CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Law and Government Division
THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
When discussing constitutional options with respect to
both culture and communications, the first difficulty is to define the
area of legislative or regulatory power involved. The original Constitution
Act, 1867, refers to neither culture nor communications (with the
exception of "telegraphs") as areas of legislative jurisdiction,
and the existing constitutional situation has evolved from how courts
have inferred jurisdiction from other, specifically mentioned, classes
of subjects, such as "property and civil rights within the province"
(provincial jurisdiction) or "inter-provincial works or undertakings"
(federal jurisdiction). Conversely, any constitutional amendment that
makes specific reference to either "culture" or "communications"
will impinge upon the existing interpretation of other areas of jurisdiction.
It is always difficult to anticipate how any new head
of power, or class of subject, might affect the overall jurisdictional
structure because modern economic and cultural structures are both complex
and inter-related; the problem is magnified when the potential new head
of power is itself unclear.
The concept of "culture," in particular, is
not easily defined. In 1979, the Task Force on Canadian Unity described
it as follows:
In day-to-day usage, culture is often considered
to be the intellectual and artistic aspect of life in a community
Culture has a broader meaning, however, when related
to the character of a whole community. In this context, culture may
be defined as the sum of the characteristics of a community acquired
through education, training and social experience. It includes knowledge
in all fields, language, traditions and values. It adds up to a collective
way of thinking, feeling, and doing, a collective way of being.
Culture draws individuals together, supports thought,
judgment and action, gives a community its character and personality,
differentiates it from other communities and encourages its members
to seek common objectives.(1)
If we look only at the first, or day-to-day, usage, culture
would seem to come within provincial powers over education and civil rights.
If we look at the broader meaning, "culture" is so all-pervasive
that it becomes difficult to anticipate the extent to which a legislative
power over "culture" might impinge on other heads of power.
The issue of the "environment" is perhaps an
instructive example of the problems involved in defining "culture"
for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction. The main federal powers over
the environment are similar to those over culture: inter-provincial or
international issues; the concept of "national interest"; and
the criminal law power with respect to public health, safety and welfare.
The provincial power, which is very extensive, comes from the fact that
most environmental issues involve property and civil rights within the
In 1988, the Australian Constitutional Commission reported
back after several years of deliberation on all aspects of the Australian
constitution. It rejected the idea of creating a new provision dealing
with the environment, primarily because of the difficulty in restricting
the scope of any such power:
"environment" includes all aspects of the
surroundings of man, whether affecting him as an individual or in
his social groupings, and "environmental" has a corresponding
meaning; . . .
If environmental law is to be defined more helpfully
than simply as the law relating to the environment, it needs a considerable
refinement and careful circumscription, for prima facie the
expression "environment" may include literally almost anything
Attempts to formalize the role of culture within our
constitutional structure would most likely lead to similar definitional
"Communications" involves a somewhat different
issue, but one that has created even more controversy within constitutional
circles. Communications can refer to either the content of a message,
the means of transmission of the message, or both. The content of a message
is often a matter of property and civil rights within a province (provincial
jurisdiction) but the means of transmission is increasingly likely to
involve an inter-provincial or even international undertaking (federal
Traditionally, public communications transmission has
involved either broadcast technology (through the airwaves from a single
transmitter to many receivers) or telecommunications (point-to-point communications).
In the early days of communications regulation, radio exemplified broadcast
technology and telephones exemplified telecommunications. Radio seemed
to fall most naturally under federal jurisdiction, as the transmission
waves could not necessarily be confined within provincial boundaries,
while telephone regulation seemed most amenable to provincial regulation
because telephone "networks" were geographically controllable.
The technological revolution of the past decade or two,
however, makes it increasingly difficult to separate means of transmission.
Telecommunications companies have taken advantage of the airwaves by using
microwave and satellite systems to improve point-to-point communications,
while broadcasting companies have enlarged their audiences through local
cable television networks.
As a result of these trends, the difference between "broadcasting"
and "telecommunications" has become less related to technology
and more related to purpose. Broadcasting tends to remain a public function,
with important cultural and educational implications. Telecommunications,
however, involves economic and technological issues, and a modern, efficient
telecommunications infrastructure is generally considered an essential
component of a successful business environment.
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Throughout most of Canadian history, constitutional law
has been concerned with a very few sections of the Constitution Act,
1867. Prior to 1982, nearly every constitutional case dealt only with
the issue of whether the federal or provincial government had legislative
jurisdiction in a particular situation. Unlike the case in the United
States, where the issue is often whether any level of government
has the power to interfere with individual rights, in Canada the question
was always which level of government had the power in question.
All emerging jurisdictional areas, therefore, had to be assigned by the
courts to one or the other level of government. Working with a document
written in a pre-technological era, the courts constructed an elaborate
structure of judicial precedents that have had as much, if not more, effect
on federal-provincial jurisdiction than the Constitution Act, 1867
For example, the fathers of Confederation felt that they
had ensured a strongly centralized economic union, while allowing the
provinces continuing control over non-economic matters. Donald Creighton,
in a study done for the 1939 Royal Commission on Federal-Provincial Relations,
suggested that they:
... attempted to separate the affairs and interests
associated with commerce from certain rights and customs dependent
upon land. The former, which covered the great bulk of economic activities
of British North America as they knew it, they gave to the control
of the Dominion; the latter, which included matters of minor economic,
or of largely cultural, importance, they entrusted to the provinces.(3)
The Constitution of 1867 was based on the realization
that a strong economic union was necessary if the British North American
colonies were to survive as a separate entity from the much larger, newly
unified, and occasionally aggressive nation to the south. Local issues
of property and civil rights, however, were to rest with the provinces
and, in a general way, these issues included culture. On the other hand,
long-distance communications were both slow and uncertain in the mid-nineteenth
century, and tended to be associated with methods of general transportation
that were largely inter-provincial undertakings. In addition, the relatively
new discovery of the telegraph was placed firmly under federal regulation.
In order to ensure the primacy of the economic union,
the federal government was given the regulation of trade and commerce,
a phrase which by 1867 had "come to acquire the greatest importance
and the widest amplitude";(4)
the peace, order and good government power; the power to disallow provincial
acts; and the power to implement imperial treaties. However, early judicial
decisions in Britain by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, then
Canadas highest court of appeal, severely limited these federal
powers, in large part by expanding the meaning of section 92(13) of the
Constitution, "property and civil rights within the province."
The Lords of the Privy Council, used to the British unitary system, expanded
this provincial power beyond anything conceived of by the original framers
of the Constitution.(5)
In Canada the provincial heads of power include one
of great extent and importance. This is s. 92(13), "property
and civil rights in the province," a phrase which is apt to include
most of the private law of property, contracts and torts and their
many derivatives. Indeed, at the hands of the Privy Council, s. 92(13)
became a kind of residuary power itself, and one which was much more
important than the federal peace, order and good government power.(6)
In short, national economic standards were considered
a necessity but, given the fact that the nation was constructed from three
distinct communities (as represented by the three divisions in the original
Senate), the provinces were to retain control over all local matters.
Neither "culture" nor "communications" was referred
to in the original Constitution, but there was a fundamental understanding
that the national government would not interfere with local or cultural
interests. Even in 1867, however, it was difficult to draw an exact line
between national economic issues and poverty and civil rights within the
province. It is far more so today.
In the case of telecommunications, a strong national
infrastructure is essential to any economic growth. At the provincial
or local level, however, there are major decisions to be made, such as
the degree of cross-subsidization in basic personal services such as telephones.
Urban subscribers subsidize rural users. Business users tend to subsidize
non-business users. Traditionally, inter-provincial and international
traffic has tended to subsidize intra-provincial traffic. However, what
is appropriate for Toronto may not work in Prince Edward Island. At one
level, therefore, telecommunications is a vital national economic issue
requiring federal regulation; on the other, it is an essential local service
that is critical to provincial cultural policy.
The Supreme Court of Canada has often referred to the
Constitution as "a living tree" that continues to grow, albeit
sometimes in a disorganized fashion, but is constantly tended and pruned
by the courts. The common law approach to the Constitution has been organic
and inductive, dealing with specific fact situations, from which general
principles gradually evolve. What may now be at issue is whether we replace
this with an inclusive, deductive approach: a comprehensive set of principles
that defines the contractual relationship. The difficulty, from a legal
point of view, is that major jurisdictional changes upset the evolving
base of judicial interpretation, and there would be a time of considerable
uncertainty before we knew how the courts would interpret the amendments
approved by the legislatures.
Culture is not specifically referred to in our present
Constitution, with one exception. Section 40 of the Constitution Act,
1982, states that if an amendment transferring provincial legislative
powers over education or other cultural matters is passed from the provincial
legislatures to Parliament, any province to whom the amendment does not
apply, because it has not approved it, is entitled to reasonable financial
compensation. If, for example, seven provinces with 50% of the population
were to approve an amendment transferring jurisdiction over universities
from the provinces to the federal government, the three provinces that
did not agree would be entitled to reasonable compensation from the federal
government so that they could continue running their own universities.
It seems clear, however, that the provincial legislatures
were originally intended to have legislative jurisdiction over most cultural
issues as matter of a merely local or private nature within the province.
The exceptions to this rule were areas where national standards were desirable
or necessary, such as copyright, patents, naturalization, and marriage
In fact, the provincial legislatures do have exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over most cultural matters.
On the whole, the federal governments role involves only the spending
power ? the ability to fund cultural institutions and programs such as
the Canada Council, the National Film Board and the national museums.
It is possible that the federal government could also justify some
legislative control over national cultural institutions through the use
of the "national concern" branch of the POGG power ("peace,
order and good government"), as was done with the National Capital
Commission, or by declaring various works, such as museums, to be for
the general advantage of Canada. They have not done so to date, however,
and the spending power seems to be the more relevant issue.
The concept of a federal "spending power" is
a relatively recent constitutional development. It arises from federal
government initiatives immediately following the Second World War, and
is closely linked with efforts to centralize the taxing power. By providing
program funds, either unilaterally or in co-operation with the provinces,
for a variety of health, social assistance, education and cultural programs,
the federal government dramatically altered the national approach to issues
which were essentially within provincial control.(7)
The spending power thus became the main lever of federal
influence in fields within provincial legislative jurisdiction, such as
health care, education, welfare, regional development, and culture. By
making financial contributions to specified programs, the federal government
can exercise considerable influence over provincial policies, priorities
and program standards.(8)
The spending power is thus a fiscal mechanism, but it
has been increasingly discussed in terms of a constitutional concept.
It seems probable that the use of the term "spending power"
first emerged as a constitutional term at the Federal-Provincial Constitutional
Conference of 1969, when the federal government submitted a working paper
entitled "Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending Power of Parliament."
As recently as 1977, however, such a noted constitutional commentator
as E. A. Dreidger was "unable to find the expression spending
power in Canadian judicial decision or statute."(9)
Peter Hogg agrees that the spending power is nowhere
explicit in the Constitution Act, 1867, but says it must be inferred
from the powers to levy taxes in section 91(3); to legislate in relation
to "public property" in section 91(1A); and to appropriate federal
funds, as in section 106.(10) Arguably, the "spending
power" is simply the expansion of the taxing power to the point that
the federal government has sufficient revenues to underwrite national
social or cultural programs, in addition to fulfilling its more specific
One of the provisions of the 1987 Meech Lake Accord would
have added a new section 106A to the Constitution immediately after section
106. Depending upon ones point of view, this would have either strengthened
national programs and standards by formally recognizing the spending power,
or weakened national programs and standards by allowing the provinces
to opt out with compensation.
Regardless of how the constitutional status of the spending
power is perceived, however, there are definitely limitations on how it
can be used. The first involves the manner in which the money is raised,
the second the way in which it is spend. Despite the wide general taxing
powers of the federal government, taxing legislation could be questioned
if it were explicitly combined with a spending program outside federal
jurisdiction. For example, environmental concerns are largely within provincial
jurisdiction, but the federal government can nonetheless spend money on
environmental programs that affect local concerns within the provinces.
If, however, the federal government implemented a tax for the express
purpose of enforcing or funding a local environmental objective, the legislation
might well be struck down.
Even when money is raised through a proper exercise of
the federal taxing powers, there are limits on how it can be used. The
federal government can spend or grant its money as it chooses,(11) but it may not directly regulate activities
within the provincial sphere of jurisdiction.
Parliament . . . is entitled to spend the money that
it raises through proper exercise of its taxing power in the manner
that it chooses to authorize. It can impose conditions on such disposition
so long as the conditions do not amount in fact to a regulation or
control of a matter outside federal authority.(12)
Some commentators have argued that the spending power
should be formally restricted since otherwise the federal government can
directly fund programs within provincial jurisdiction and thereby disrupt
provincial priorities. If the spending power is simply a fiscal incentive
to adopt certain conduct or policies, then financing can be withdrawn
or curtailed under certain circumstances without difficulty. Theoretically,
at least, the elimination of the spending power should involve simply
the elimination of the programs involved.
However, if the spending power involves a federal intrusion
into provincial jurisdiction, as some provinces argue, then perhaps the
disruptive potential of eliminating these grants could be assuaged only
if the federal government were required to turn over to the provinces
the funds or tax room necessary to continue the programs.(13)
The 1991 Allaire Report (Report of the Constitutional Committee of the
Quebec Liberal Party, "A Quebec Free to Choose"), for example,
suggested that the federal spending power would be "eliminated in
[Quebecs] areas of exclusive authority" together with "a
complete reassessment of the distribution of taxing powers." "Culture"
and "communications" would be within exclusive Quebec authority,
and the federal government would be unable to spend money directly in
In the absence of a restricted definition of "culture,"
therefore, the only real alternative to the existing constitutional situation
is for restraints to be placed on the ability of the federal government
to fund cultural programs, whether with or without compensation to the
provinces. This could be done by (1) federal-provincial agreement, or
(2) a constitutional amendment prohibiting or regulating federal government
spending in areas outside its express legislative authority. The first
option would be far simpler and more flexible, but would not be constitutionally
binding or enforceable. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in
its 1989 decision on federal-provincial transfer payments:
[S]upervision of the spending power is not a separate
head of judicial review. If a statute is neither ultra vires
nor contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
the courts have no jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of legislative
A constitutional amendment would be more definitive,
but would also have broad consequences, restricting federal-provincial
relations in a range of activities extending far beyond the cultural field.
In addition, unless the flow of funds to the provinces was increased,
by inter-provincial transfer or by restricting the federal taxing powers,
at least some provinces would have difficulty in picking up the slack
and existing programs would suffer.
The constitutional background to the evolution of Canadian
communications regulation is complex and even somewhat chaotic. One commentator
has gone so far as to suggest that:
[T]hose sources of law which might normally be expected
to guide the decision-making processes of telecommunications service
providers and users alike as regards required, permitted, and/or illegal
market conduct and the enforcement thereof, are so fragmented and
lacking in consistency and overall perspective as to be all but incoherent.(16)
The possible transfer of greater constitutional powers
over broadcasting and telecommunications to the provinces is a complicated
issue. This paper therefore merely summarizes the salient points.
From 1867, legislative jurisdiction over communications
has generally followed the same principles as jurisdiction over transportation,
and important aspects of communications regulation are still to be found
in the Railway Act and the National Transportation Act.
By far the most important reference in the Constitution Act, 1867,
is section 92(10), which gives the provincial governments control over
"local works and undertakings" with several exceptions that
are placed expressly under federal jurisdiction:
(a) lines of steam or other ships, railways, canals,
telegraphs, and other works or undertakings, connecting the province
with any other or others of the provinces, or extending beyond the
limits of the province;
(b) lines of steam ships between the province and
British or foreign country;
(c) such works as although wholly situate within
the province, are before or after their execution declared by the
Parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada or
for the advantage of two or more of the provinces.
This last exception is generally referred to as the federal
"declaratory power," and has been used in the Acts incorporating
the two largest telephone companies in Canada: Bell Canada (serving Ontario
and Quebec) and the British Columbia Telephone Company. The declaration
power has, however, fallen somewhat into disuse and federal jurisdiction
over these companies is also based on other aspects of the telephone network.
The word "undertakings" involves both physical
and organizational elements. In one of the last Canadian cases decided
by the British Privy Council, the concept was defined as follows:
Such communications can be provided by organizations
or undertakings, but not by inanimate things alone. For this object,
the phrase "line of ships" is appropriate: that phrase is
commonly used to connote not only the ships concerned but also the
organization which makes them regularly available between certain
As communications networks have become more inter-connected,
the courts have used the test of "functional integrality" to
find that a particular service is part of a inter-provincial undertaking,
organization or system rather than a work within the province.
In 1927, Canada signed the International Radiotelegraph
Convention. In the face of a jurisdictional challenge by Quebec, the
matter was referred to the courts. The Privy Council ultimately decided
that the power to legislate with respect to broadcasting fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal level of government, both because
of the international aspects of broadcast regulation and because the transmitter
and receiver formed an integral system involving an inter-provincial undertaking
analogous to telegraphy.(18)
As cable television networks developed during the 1960s
and 1970s, the argument was made that cable companies, which distributed
their programming within the local community by coaxial cable, were local
works or undertakings. In the late 1970s, however, the Supreme Court of
Canada extended exclusive federal jurisdiction to the regulation of cable
television on the grounds that the local companies received their signals
"off air," or by broadcast receivers, and thus became an integral
part of an inter-provincial system.(19)
Although the federal government has exclusive authority
over the national broadcasting system, provincial governments retain some
control over content. In Attorney-General of Quebec v. Kelloggs
Company of Canada,(20) and again
more recently in Irving Toy Ltd. v. A.G. Quebec,(21) the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld provincial legislation restricting specific types
of advertising on the grounds that the legislation dealt with consumer
protection rather than broadcasting, and aimed at advertisers rather than
a broadcast undertaking.
With respect to legislative authority over telecommunications,
there was a surprising lack of judicial involvement for some time. This
is partially because neither level of government had an interest in upsetting
the status quo, which, although inconsistent in theory, worked well in
By far the largest telephone company in Canada has always
been Bell Canada, which services the Ontario and Quebec market and is
federally regulated as an inter-provincial undertaking. With the exception
of that in British Columbia, provincial phone systems were provincially
regulated and Crown corporations operated the telephone systems of the
three prairie provinces.
Because telephone services were a public service utility
or monopoly, cross-subsidization was a major component of rate policy
and the public policy varied from province to province. All of the major
phone companies, including Bell Canada, however, ran a joint venture known
as Telecom Canada (formerly the Trans-Canada Telephone System or TCTS).
Although Telecom Canada was not itself regulated, the federal regulatory
body (the CRTC) played a crucial role in cross-subsidization policy through
its regulation of the major partner, Bell Canada.
For example, long distance rates tend to subsidize local
rates and Telecom Canada agreements took this into account in rate-splitting
agreements. If the CRTC, however, refused to approve the long-distance
rates of Bell Canada as too high relative to local rates, the expected
long-distance revenues were no longer available to the other provincial
partners in the national network for the subsidization of local rates.(22)
However frustrating the other provinces found the arrangement,
there was little desire to have the matter adjudicated because of the
probability that all provincial networks would be found to be a part of
an integral national telephone network under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
In the early 1980s, the rapid expansion of telecommunications
services and the consequent pressure for a more competitive approach forced
the jurisdictional issue. CNCP Telecommunications (now known as Unitel)
applied to the CRTC for interconnection with the various phone systems,
including Alberta Government Telephone (AGT). AGT went to court, claiming
that the CRTC lacked jurisdiction, both because the provincial phone system
was a local undertaking and because AGT was an agent of the provincial
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the national
telecommunications network was an integral network under exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The federal government introduced Bill C-41 to implement
this decision, but the bill died on the order paper when Parliament was
dissolved in the spring of 1991.(23)
There have been numerous federal-provincial negotiations
and proposals on legislative jurisdiction with respect to communications
over the past 20 years. On occasion, there has even been something close
The Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity addressed
the problem of communications policy concisely in its 1979 report A
In communications, the clash arises between the central
governments view of communications as an integrated Canada-wide
system serving as a powerful instrument for nation-building and the
insistence of the provinces, particularly Quebec, that the impact
of communications on local and provincial responsibilities is so pervasive
that provincial control is necessary for them to meet the demands
place upon them and for the provinces to safeguard regional and local
In general, therefore, it seems clear that any resolution
of the communications issue that might be satisfactory to a majority of
Canadian governments would have to involve some degree of (1) concurrent
jurisdiction, (2) legislative interdelegation or (3) intergovernmental
The second, interdelegation of legislative authority
between the two levels of government, is not permissible under the existing
Constitution, but both the Pepin-Robarts Report and, more recently, the
Report of the Special Joint Committee on the Process for Amending the
Constitution of Canada have suggested a constitutional amendment to allow
for such legislative delegation. This could allow the federal government
to delegate to the provinces, or to specific provinces, various legislative
authority over communications. The delegation could presumably be revoked
or expanded as technological change altered the situation.
The third possibility, intergovernmental mechanisms,
is generally discussed in terms of jointly appointed regulatory boards.
While this might be palatable to the provincial governments, it is difficult
to see how it could provide a coherent national policy.
Fundamentally, the problem lies with the increasing convergence
between broadcasting, especially cable distribution, and telecommunications.
It is generally accepted that an efficient and effective telecommunications
network is essential to national competitiveness:
Telecommunications is seen as increasingly important
in the competitiveness of the country and the well-being of business,
so cost has to be as low as possible and quality as high as possible.
Telecommunications is as important as the railways were, or more so.
It is recognized as the underpinning for entering the future.(25)
Some communications issues, such as provincial educational
networks, can be treated separately from the general telecommunications
network, which is essential to a national economy and so regulated. However,
ongoing technological developments make it increasingly difficult to discern
aspects of the national communications system that are not functionally
integral to the overall telecommunications network.
(1) The Task Force on Canadian Unity,
Coming to Terms: The Words of the Debate, Ottawa, 1979, p. 4.
Final Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1988, Vol. 2, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988, p. 765.
Donald G. Creighton, British North America at Confederation:
A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations,
Ottawa, 1939, p. 50.
See Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation
of the British North American Provinces, 3rd session, 8th
Provincial Parliament of Canada, Hunter, Rose & Co., Quebec, 1865.
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (2nd
ed.), Carswell, Toronto, 1985, p. 370.
"In addition to its general policy of reconstruction and a
more activist approach, particularly in welfare, the government considered
it essential to centralize taxation power to promote the Keynesian economic
policies which it proposed to embark upon..." G.V. La Forest, "The
Allocation of Taxing Power under the Canadian Constitution," 2nd
ed., Canadian Tax Paper No. 65, Toronto, May 1981, p. 28.
Technically, there is no reason why the spending power should be
an exclusively federal mechanism. Fisheries, for example, is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction and yet is of considerable economic concern to many
provinces. Theoretically, the provinces could present a joint fisheries
program, and offer to fund it if the federal government were prepared
to implement the program as federal legislation. The reason no one speaks
of a "provincial spending power" is financial and pragmatic
rather than constitutional.
A.E. Dreidger, "The Spending Power," Queens
Law Journal (1979), 124, at p. 124.
Hogg (1985), p. 124.
A number of cases confirm that the federal government can spend
its revenue on matters outside its legislative competence: Angers
v. M.N.R.,  Ex. C.R. 83 sustains the validity of federal
family allowances; and CMHC v. Co-op College Residences
(1975), 13 O.R. (2d) 394 (OCA) sustains the validity of federal loans
for student housing.
Winterhaven Stables Ltd. v. Canada (1988), 53 D.L.R.
(4th), (Alta. C.A.) at p. 434.
"Tax room" or "tax points" are difficult concepts
and have limited practical application. To oversimplify, the total capacity
of Canadians to bear tax is seen as a large pie divided between the two
levels of government. Thus, if the federal government reduces its portion
of the total pie, the provinces have "tax room" available to
fund additional programs.
"A Quebec Free to Choose: Report of the Constitutional Committee
of the Quebec Liberal Party," Quebec, 1991, p. 37-8.
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), 15 August 1989
S.C.C., unreported, p. 48.
Bohdan Romaniuk and Hudson Janisch, "Competition in Telecommunications:
Who Polices the Transition?", 18 Ottawa Law Review 561 (1986),
p.564. Romaiuk and Janisch go on to note:
As will be seen, there exists at the federal level
alone well over a dozen statutes (dating from 1880 to 1986) bearing
directly upon one or another aspect of market conduct in various telecommunications
markets. Yet, no single federal statute concerns itself exclusively
with the telecommunications industry as a whole. Rather there
exists a hodge-podge of legislation dealing with individual companies,
individual market-segments and different departmental and regulatory
bodies. . . There are statutes focussing specifically on broadcasting,
radio-communication and telegraphy, but not with their interrelation,
either among themselves or with telephony. Other statutes concern
themselves with different industries altogether, particularly railroads,
touching upon telecommunications only incidentally, although with
C.P.R. v. Attorney-General for British Columbia,
 A.C. 122, at p. 141.
In Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada,
 A.C. 304.
Capital Cities Communications v. C.R.T.C., 
2. S.C.R. 141; Public Service Board v. Dionne,  2
 2 S.C.R. 211.
 1 S.C.R. 929.
"One measure of the extent of cross-subsidization involved
is suggested by Bell Canada figures which, in 1982, indicated that $1.2
billion in non-competitive long distance revenues were used to pay for
local services." Nis Moller, "Communications: Selected Constitutional
Issues," Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 12 March 1991, p.
See James R. Robertson, Legislative Summary, "Bill C-41, An
Act to amend the Railway Act (Telecommunications)," Research Branch,
Library of Parliament, 3 October 1989.
Canada, Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together,
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1979, p. 91.
Edward Trapunski, "Federal Regulator Casts a Wide Net,"
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 10 September 1991, p. C2, quoting
Guido Henter, Executive Director of Telecommunications, CRTC.