IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Prepared by Michel Rossignol
Political and Social Affairs Division
Revised January 1996
BACKGROUND UP TO 1990
A. Early Disillusionment
B. Sanctions against Rhodesia
C. Sanctions against South Africa
The Debate within the International Community
The Lifting of Sanctions
Assessment of Effectiveness
D. Sanctions against Iraq
USE OF SANCTIONS SINCE THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A. Greater Willingness to Use Sanctions
B. Recent Mandatory Sanctions
The Former Yugoslavia
C. Continuing Sanctions Against Iraq
THE LATEST TEST
A. Strong Support for Sanctions
B. Special Economic Measures Act
SANCTIONS: THE ECONOMIC
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
When the First World War
ended, people actually believed that it had been "the war to end
all wars." Government leaders were confident that if the horrors
of war did not deter countries from starting new conflicts, the international
community's imposition of economic sanctions on delinquent states would
do so. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States was a leading advocate
of the use of economic sanctions (the "economic weapon") rather
than force to make countries desist from aggressive acts. He stated in
A nation that is boycotted
is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic,
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force.(1)
Subsequent events have shown
that President Wilson and others were too optimistic in trusting sanctions
to bring a delinquent country to its knees. Nevertheless, sanctions remain
an important feature of modern international relations, although views
differ as to their effectiveness in persuading states to cease aggressive
acts or to change policies that world public opinion finds objectionable.
This study considers the history of sanctions, their role in the new world
order, and Canada's position. The emphasis is on the collective use of
sanctions by members of the international community rather than on cases
where one country imposes sanctions on another as a result of a trade
or boundary dispute.
Sanctions usually consist
of a ban on the sale and shipment of products to a country and on the
purchase of its exports. Other elements not directly linked to trade and
commerce, such as culture and sports, are now often included. Thus we
see bans on economic, sporting and cultural contacts between countries,
as well as "person-to-person" sanctions such as withholding
visas or other diplomatic documents from citizens of another state.
Economic sanctions are usually
the most important of all sanctions imposed on a country. They imply "the
deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of
customary trade and financial relations."(2)
Sanctions are basically measures applied in response to wrongdoing by
a state, such as an act of aggression against another state or pursuit
of a racial policy that is considered to be wrong from the perspective
of international law or moral standards.
Although sanctions penalize
delinquent countries for past wrongdoing, they are above all intended
to persuade them to change actions or policies in the future. For example,
the sanctions imposed on South Africa have been described as follows:
The main purpose of
sanctions is not to punish white South Africa for the sins of apartheid,
but rather to push it to the conference table to negotiate a hand-over
of power to bring about majority rule and "one person one vote."(3)
Sanctions are used as "a
tool for coercing target governments into particular avenues of response,"(4) but there is no guarantee that they will succeed, a fact
President Wilson and others overlooked. A country can resist sanctions
for long periods, especially if their effectiveness is undermined by sanctions-busting
and disagreements within the international community on how extensive
they should be. Since sanctions cannot always produce the desired results,
enthusiasm for using them as a coercive tool has ebbed and flowed in the
decades since the First World War.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UP TO 1990
A. Early Disillusionment
After the First World War,
the first real test of sanctions showed their shortcomings. The League
of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy after the latter's invasion of Ethiopia
in 1935, but was unable to persuade the Mussolini regime to stop the aggression.
The sanctions were doomed to failure because they were too limited in
scope, did not ban vital oil exports to Italy, and were ignored by non-League
members. It is debatable whether comprehensive sanctions would have produced
different results, but this experience with Italy made public opinion
conclude that sanctions were of little use.(5)
Sanctions were nevertheless
considered useful as a diplomatic tool when the United Nations was established
in 1945; however, the Cold War soon dashed hopes that the world body would
work effectively and take such collective measures as imposing mandatory
sanctions. U.N. members often had difficulty in reaching a consensus on
whether the actions or policies of a country threatened international
peace; even when they agreed on this, they did not necessarily agree that
imposing sanctions was the best course of action. Many other factors were
involved, including the "reality of international relations where
perceptions of delinquency can vary significantly and foreign--and domestic--policy
considerations often rule out hostile action toward another state."(6)
As a result, while since 1945 representatives of various countries in
the General Assembly have often called for the imposition of sanctions,
until quite recently action was seldom taken either because of a lack
of consensus or because of a veto by the permanent members of the Security
B. Sanctions Against Rhodesia
Until Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990, the only time the United Nations reached a consensus on
the use of mandatory economic sanctions had been during the Rhodesian
crisis between 1965 and 1979. In 1965, the Rhodesian government issued
a unilateral Declaration of Independence; the U.N. Security Council immediately
called on all U.N. members to impose voluntary sanctions on Rhodesia.
A year later, these sanctions became mandatory for all countries that
had signed the United Nations Charter, Article 25 of which states that
all U.N. members have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council.
In the early stages, the
sanctions had a significant impact on the Rhodesian economy, but by 1969
Rhodesia was actually enjoying an economic boom because of import substitution,
increased South African investment and sanctions-busting by many countries.
Rhodesia's ability to withstand sanctions caused considerable disillusionment
within the international community during the 1970s. However, a successful
guerrilla warfare campaign by black groups and a reduction in sanctions-busting
reversed the economic situation. The white Rhodesian regime at last realized
that it could not continue to resist when its greatest ally, South Africa,
decided in the late 1970s that its own interests would be better served
by a black majority-rule regime as a neighbour rather than the embattled
It is difficult to assess
the extent to which sanctions contributed to the change in the white regime's
policies. That Rhodesia was able to resist sanctions for almost 15 years,
however, puts into question their effectiveness in reversing policy. It
could be argued that the guerrilla war, which intensified in the 1970s,
was as great or even greater, a factor, and certainly Rhodesia would not
have been able to resist sanctions for so long without the flow of supplies
and investments from South Africa. Even without this flow, it would probably
have taken a number of years for sanctions to have the desired effect.
C. Sanctions Against South Africa
1. The Debate within the International
When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe,
South Africa lost an ally in its resistance to the growing international
pressure to abandon apartheid. In terms of sanctions-busting, few states
could do for South Africa what it had done for Rhodesia. However, until
the mid-1980s, South Africa was not significantly affected by sanctions
because the United Nations was unable to reach a consensus on this issue.
In 1973, in response to
growing public demand for action, the oil-exporting countries agreed to
ban oil exports to South Africa; however, this was done outside the United
Nations. Inside that forum, Security Council Resolution 418 in 1977 imposed
a mandatory ban on the sale of arms and related materials to South Africa.
Still, as late as February 1985, the Canadian government, like many Western
governments, was claiming that sanctions would be ineffective and harmful
to the socioeconomic situation of the black majority they were supposed
to help. Only in the mid-1980s was the international community able to
agree on the need to impose a wide variety of economic sanctions on South
Africa. Even then, Security Council Resolution 569 of 1985 only urged
U.N. members to impose sanctions voluntarily. The resolution recommended
a ban on investments, a ban on the sale of Kruggerrand gold coins, a restriction
on cultural and sports contacts, the prohibition of contracts in the nuclear
field and a ban on the sale of computers, which might be used by the South
African security forces.
The U.N.'s inability to
impose mandatory sanctions was due to Cold War tensions as well as to
the opposition, for strategic and economic reasons, of some permanent
members of the Security Council, notably the United States and the United
Kingdom. The industrialized countries finally imposed sanctions in 1985,
when interest groups, politicians and large segments of public opinion
demanded action in response to the South African government's harsh repression
of demonstrations against constitutional proposals that ignored the demands
of the Blacks. Indeed, television reports of confrontations between South
African police and Blacks galvanized the international community.
There is evidence that governments
acted at this time not only out of concern for the situation, but also
because they anticipated that public demands for action would increase
if nothing was done. In Canada's case, however, public opinion polls taken
after the government had imposed sanctions suggest "that public opinion
was in fact following the government's lead and not the other way around."(8)
In short, in the mid-1980s, the international community reached a consensus
on the need to impose sanctions on South Africa without the United Nations
leading the way.
2. The Lifting of Sanctions
The international community
also had difficulty in deciding when to lift sanctions, once the South
African government had made its commitment to remove apartheid and implement
constitutional reforms. This was demonstrated by the haphazard way in
which individual countries and multinational groups lifted their sanctions
in the wake of Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 and the repeal
of apartheid laws in 1991. For example, in July 1991 the United States
lifted many of its sanctions, including some imposed under the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, while the United Kingdom had started removing
many of its sanctions in February as soon as Mandela was freed.
The relative haste with
which the European Community, the United Kingdom, and the United States
lifted some of their major sanctions demonstrated that they were more
preoccupied with the removal of apartheid policies than with the complete
transformation of South Africa's political system. For its part, the International
Olympic Committee also welcomed the progress made in South Africa in abolishing
apartheid; in July 1991 it recognized South Africa's National Olympic
Committee, thus paving the way for the country's participation in the
1992 Olympics. This more or less ended the sports boycott of South Africa,
something that even the ANC welcomed.
Most of the Commonwealth
countries, however, including Canada, viewed sanctions more as a tool
to help the Blacks obtain majority rule than simply a protest against
apartheid. As a result, in recognition of the progress made, the Commonwealth
Heads of Government decided at their 1991 summit meeting to lift only
a few sanctions, notably those banning cultural and scientific contacts
and restricting tourism promotion. They accepted the recommendations of
the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, supported
by the African National Congress (ANC) and other groups, to maintain most
of the trade and financial sanctions and keep pressure on the South African
government during constitutional negotiations with the Black majority.
In September 1993, following the establishment in South Africa of a Transitional
Executive Council to allow Blacks to participate in government decisions
pending the April 1994 democratic elections, Commonwealth and other states
announced that most of the remaining sanctions against South Africa would
be lifted. The European Community lifted its remaining sanctions in early
The U.N., however, did not
formally lift all sanctions against South Africa until a few weeks after
the elections and the inauguration of the new government. On 25 May 1994,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 919 which terminated the mandatory
arms embargo and all other measures against South Africa.
3. Assessment of Effectiveness
It is difficult to assess
the effectiveness of sanctions against South Africa, given the divergent
reasons within the international community for imposing them. Is success
to be defined as the elimination of apartheid laws or the establishment
of a black majority government? If the former, since the apartheid laws
were repealed in 1991, sanctions could be judged to be a great success;
if the latter, sanctions did not produce results for a much longer period
of time. It is generally recognized, however, that sanctions influenced
the South African government's decision to undertake constitutional negotiations.
A study sponsored by the International Labour Office (ILO) on the impact
of financial sanctions on South Africa stated that "the hope that
normal international financial links will be restored once thoroughgoing
political reforms have been put in place is an important factor continuing
to drive the South African Government in a reformist direction."(9) However, the report also pointed out that the government's
actions were "motivated by a matrix of factors."(10)
These factors included the
threat of an explosion of violence or even civil war stemming from the
undiminished anger of the Blacks, the removal of external threats to South
African security with the peaceful resolution of conflicts in neighbouring
countries such as Namibia and Angola, and the drop in the price of gold,
an important South African export, over the years. It would be more accurate
to conclude that sanctions, though important, were not the determining
factor in pushing South Africa away from apartheid and towards real democracy.
Thus it is not possible
to gauge from the experience with South Africa how long sanctions take
to produce results. About six years passed between the imposition of major
economic sanctions and June 1991, when the apartheid laws were repealed.
If the effects of the oil and arms embargoes established in the 1970s
are considered as well, the performance of sanctions is even less impressive.
The sanctions against South
Africa worked to the extent that they helped to persuade a delinquent
state to change policies unacceptable to the international community;
they were not effective in provoking immediate compliance. This does not
imply that sanctions can never have immediate success; obviously they
could cripple the economies of poor, small states much faster than those
of resource-rich countries like South Africa. Even here there is no guarantee
of success, however, as demonstrated by the ability of the military regime
in Haiti to refuse for many months to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
the democratically elected President, to power, despite wide-ranging sanctions
imposed by the Organization of American States.
Indeed, sanctions, just
like the bombing of cities in wartime, can often make government leaders
or the population as a whole even more defiant, especially if rallied
to the cause through effective propaganda. The apparent willingness of
most Blacks, especially supporters of the ANC, to endure the unemployment
and other effects of sanctions, facilitated the decisions of the foreign
governments to impose them, as did the support of South Africa's neighbours,
given in spite of the inevitable harm to their own economies. In other
situations, however, the effects of sanctions on the health and economic
well-being of the citizens of the targeted country and its neighbours
must be of concern to the international community.
When a state commits a delinquent
act or maintains an unacceptable policy, sanctions may seem the only course
of action because "world leaders often find the most obvious alternatives
to economic sanctions unsatisfactory - military action would be too massive,
and diplomatic protest too meagre. Sanctions can provide a satisfying
theatrical display, yet avoid the high costs of war."(11)
Military intervention by the U.N. or members of the international community
might quickly bring a deplorable situation to an end; however, the potential
costs in human lives and material damage, or the possibility of a long
drawn-out conflict, usually discourage governments from agreeing to this
option. There is no guarantee that a military intervention in South Africa
would have ended apartheid any sooner and, given the military strength
of the white regime, the costs in human and monetary terms would have
been overwhelming. The fact that constitutional negotiations aimed at
giving power to the black majority were eventually undertaken, demonstrates
that sanctions, though to some extent theatrical, can bring about significant
change without resort to military intervention.
D. Sanctions against Iraq
The U.N. imposed sanctions
on Iraq following that country's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in
early August 1990; however, despite the scale of these sanctions and the
measures taken to enforce them, they did not prevent the Persian Gulf
War. Only a few states did not respect the sanctions, the consensus within
the international community being fairly strong, and, except for humanitarian
supplies, few goods were able to reach Iraq for many months; even so,
Iraq was not persuaded to withdraw. Unwilling to let the situation linger
on indefinitely, the U.N. Security Council set 15 January 1991 as the
deadline for Iraq to pull out its troops. When this did not happen, military
It had waited many years
to see sanctions have an effect on South Africa, but the international
community showed much less patience in the case of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. There, sanctions were imposed in August 1990 and military action
was taken in January 1991; however, the two cases were quite different
in that the South African situation was internal, while the Iraq case
concerned the sovereignty of a neighbouring country. Intervention in the
internal political situation of a country is always a delicate issue because
all countries jealously guard their ability to administer internal affairs
without outside interference.
Ever since the signing of
the United Nations Charter in 1945, the deprivation of human rights has
generally been considered the legitimate concern of the international
community. However, the Charter was basically designed to deal with conflicts
between countries, especially invasion, which is a serious breach of international
law. There are many precedents for international responses to such incidents
in the form of sanctions or military intervention. On the other hand the
relevance of the Charter to internal situations is less clear; it is more
difficult to reach international consensus on the need for military intervention
in such cases, as was seen in South Africa and the former Yugoslavia.
The invasion of Kuwait was
a clear breach of international peace, in diplomatic and legal terms.
If the U.N. and the major powers had not responded strongly, tensions
around the world might well have increased as small countries began to
fear similar invasions by larger neighbours. This would not have augured
well for the new international context then developing as a result of
the end of the Cold War. In fact, the reduced tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union made it easier for the U.N. Security Council
to decide on measures to ensure a more peaceful and stable international
context by checking acts of aggression.
The Security Council acted
quickly; on 2 August 1990 it passed Resolution 660, which demanded the
withdrawal of Iraqi troops, and on 6 August it passed Resolution 661,
which imposed mandatory sanctions on Iraq while stating that medical supplies
and humanitarian food aid could still enter that country. Resolution 665
of 25 August called on U.N. members deploying naval forces to the region
"to use such measures as may be necessary" to stop and inspect
ships to ensure that banned goods would not reach Iraq, and Resolution
670 of 25 September extended the embargo to air traffic. Subsequently,
the Security Council on 29 November passed Resolution 678 authorizing
U.N. member states to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement"
Resolution 660 if Iraq did not comply by 15 January 1991. The stage was
thus set for military action.
Whether or not sanctions
alone would have eventually persuaded Iraq to withdraw its troops from
Kuwait can only be the subject of conjecture. The fact remains that, in
spite of comprehensive sanctions and the threat of military action, Iraq
did not withdraw its troops. Allowing more time for sanctions to take
effect might only have delayed the inevitable.
This does not mean that
sanctions did not have any effect on Iraq; sanctions almost always make
life difficult for ordinary citizens, even if they do not persuade government
leaders to change their policies. The U.N. and its members in fact faced
unattractive alternatives: they could let the Iraqi population suffer
the effects of comprehensive sanctions for months and even years while
allowing a breach of international peace to fester, or they could undertake
military action. The latter course inevitably caused human suffering and
material damage, but put an end more quickly to the occupation of a sovereign
country and reinforced international peace and security. The debate on
whether or not the U.N. should have shown more patience in using diplomatic
rather than military means will likely continue for some time; however,
there is no guarantee that sanctions would eventually have worked.
USE OF SANCTIONS SINCE THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A. Greater Willingness to Use Sanctions
The limitations of sanctions,
as well as their usefulness, have been demonstrated in events since the
end of the Persian Gulf War. The United Nations has imposed sanctions
on the former Yugoslavia, Libya, and Haiti, as well as maintaining those
on Iraq. These sanctions did not bring about immediate compliance with
the wishes of the international community, but they were successful in
demonstrating the international community's disapproval of objectionable
situations and, over time, in persuading the regimes of target countries
to modify their policies or to come to the negotiating table.
The willingness of the United
Nations Security Council in the early 1990s to impose mandatory sanctions
is due to the new international context in place since the end of the
Cold War. Developments in South Africa no doubt improved the perception
of the value of sanctions as a diplomatic tool, but above all the improvement
was due to the new spirit of cooperation among the permanent members of
the Security Council. Some of these, notably China, may still have reservations
about the Security Council's imposition of sanctions, but they have not
vetoed decisions to use them.
B. Recent Mandatory Sanctions
Security Council Resolution
748 of 31 March 1992 called for mandatory sanctions against Libya in response
to the latter's refusal to extradite to the U.S. or Germany two Lybian
intelligence agents suspected of being involved in the terrorist bombing
of an airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. While calling on the Libyan government
to cease all forms of terrorist action, the resolution banned air links
and arms sales to Libya. It also stipulated that all countries should
reduce diplomatic ties with that country. On 11 November 1993, the Security
Council voted to tighten the sanctions by freezing Libya's foreign bank
accounts and banning shipments of some oil equipment.
Despite the sanctions, Lybia
refused to extradite the two Lybian agents. This prompted the U.S. President
in late 1995 to call for even tighter sanctions, possibly including an
oil embargo. Most of the international community does not appear ready
to impose such a comprehensive embargo and, as many countries rely heavily
on imports of oil from Lybia, additional sanctions are unlikely for the
time being. Existing sanctions, however, are still in place, the U.N.
Security Council having extended them for another 120 days in late November
2. The Former Yugoslavia
The worsening situation
in the former Yugoslavia also prompted the Security Council to call for
sanctions. Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 imposed an embargo on deliveries
of weapons and military equipment. Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 imposed
a trade and air embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, two former Yugoslavian
republics, which at the time were continuing to use the name Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The trade embargo included a ban on financial transactions
and oil deliveries and was intented to protest against and bring an end
to Serbian aggression against other former Yugoslavian republics, Bosnia
and Hercegovina. In the fall of 1992, another resolution authorized naval
forces from various countries, including Canada, to reinforce a sea blockade
in which ships suspected of carrying banned supplies to and from the former
Yugoslavia could be boarded and inspected. On 17 April 1993, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 820, which, among other things, called for
the expansion of the existing trade embargo, the freezing of the assets
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the impounding of all its ships,
aircrafts and vehicles, and more restrictions on the movement of good
and services across its borders.
The limitations of sanctions
are evident in their failure to bring a quick end to the fighting in the
former Yugoslav republics. More than a year after the imposition of mandatory
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the region was still marked by
fighting and human rights abuses. Where the opposing sides are hellbent
on defending their cause, sanctions alone, even where the effects are
considerable, really have little chance of persuading enemies to seek
peace, at least in the short term. As a result of sanctions, ordinary
citizens in Serbia faced many hardships; inflation in Belgrade was more
than 200% by May 1993 and most service stations in the city had no gasoline
to sell. Even so, many goods were still in plentiful supply, because of
reduced consumer demand, the fact that Serbia is not dependent on foreign
trade, large government stockpiles of goods,(12)
and some sanctions-busting by other countries.
For example, Romania allowed
refuelling Yugoslav Airlines to have more fuel than required to reach
their destinations. The surplus fuel is likely to have been used in the
equipment of the fighting forces. U.N. officials could only note the process
and distribute reprimands, but could do little else to stop the flagrant
violation of sanctions.(13) Thus, despite
the efforts of multinational naval forces in the Adriatic Sea and of U.N.
observers in neighbouring states, it proved impossible to cut off a country
completely from essential supplies and thereby apply maximum pressure.
By late 1995, however, President
Milosevic of Serbia was reported as being determined to help bring the
conflict to an end, partly to pave the way for the lifting of sanctions
and thus give hope to a public weary of nationalist oratory and bloodshed.(14)
Sanctions were no doubt a factor in the process that led up to the signing
of the Peace Agreement in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, though, given
the nature of the conflict and all the issues involved, by no means the
The day after the Peace
Agreement was signed, the Security Council reacted quickly to adopt Resolution
1021. The embargo was to remain in place for the first 90 days following
the signing of the Peace Agreement; thereafter, most restrictions on the
flow of weapons into the country would be lifted, as long as commitments
made in the agreement were honoured. Some 180 days after the signing,
the remaining restrictions on heavy weapons were slated to be removed.
The Security Council also
took a cautious approach to economic sanctions. Resolution 1022, of 22
November 1995, suspended indefinitely the various economic measures taken
since 1992, instead of officially terminating them. The resolution warned
that all economic sanctions would come back into force if the Security
Council received reports that the parties to the Peace Agreement were
not meeting their obligations. By merely suspending sanctions, the U.N.
could still exert some pressure on the warring parties.
On 19 November 1992, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 788 imposing a mandatory oil and arms
embargo on Liberia, where a civil war was raging. Diplomatic efforts by
the U.N. and neighbouring countries led to a cease-fire agreement, but
tensions remained high in the country. In its Resolution 1001 of 30 June
1995, the Security Council noted the progress made by the peace process,
but reminded all states that they must still comply strictly with the
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia.
The situation in Angola,
worsening despite U.N.-sponsored elections aimed at ending a decade-old
civil war, prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 864 on 15
September 1993. This imposed a mandatory embargo on oil and arms shipments
to the UNITA rebels fighting against Angolan government forces. In 1995,
the peace process in Angola made significant progress, but in its Resolution
976 of 8 February 1995 the Security Council reminded all states that they
must continue to comply with the embargo.
The Security Council also
reacted to the military takeover of power in Haiti after the 30 September
1991 coup d'état in Haiti, which forced the democratically elected President,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, out of power; however, the Council did not impose
sanctions immediately. Instead, this was left to a regional organization,
the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS made it clear that
the sanctions were aimed only at persuading the military government to
end its illegal regime and encouraged its members, including Canada, to
provide food and medical supplies to the population, already in economic
The recognition that the
poor in Haiti would thereby face even more deprivations explains to some
extent the U.N.'s hesitation to impose mandatory sanctions. Since most
of Haiti's trade was with countries in the OAS, the regional body's sanctions
had already had a significant impact, which world-wide sanctions would
just reinforce. When the military regime remained defiant, however, the
international community grew more impatient and on 17 June 1993 the Security
Council passed a resolution threatening mandatory sanctions unless progress
was made by 23 June in restoring the legitimate government of Haiti.
The threat produced the
desired results; the military regime agreed to negotiations before the
deadline and an agreement was reached on 3 July, paving the way for a
new government of national reconciliation and President Aristide's return
to Haiti on 30 October. The threat of U.N. sanctions was given credit
for this development.(15) Any evaluation
of the impact of these sanctions must, however, bear in mind the small
size of Haiti and the weakness of its economy. The very fact that the
regime of such a small country had been able to defy the international
community for almost two years illustrates the limitations of sanctions
and serves as a reminder that other factors also come into play in ending
conflicts or periods of tension.
The turmoil in Haiti following
the lifting of the OAS sanctions in August demonstrates how quickly the
threat of sanctions can lose its impact when factions cannot reconcile
their differences. In October 1993, when Canadian and U.S. peacekeepers
were not allowed to come ashore to begin their mission, it became clear
that the regime in Haiti was unwilling to comply with the agreement reached
in July. On 13 October, the Security Council, in an attempt to persuade
the regime to honour its commitments, adopted Resolution 873 re-imposing
mandatory sanctions, effective on 18 October. The sanctions banned shipments
of oil, weapons and other military equipment and froze Haiti's overseas
assets: The U.S., Canada, and many other countries deployed ships off
the coast of Haiti to enforce the sanctions.
Despite the impact of sanctions
on the countrys economy, it was the threat of an invasion by U.S.
and other forces, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, that finally
persuaded the military government to end its illegal regime. On 18 September
1994, just before the invasion was slated to start, an agreement was reached
between a delegation led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the
military government allowing U.S. troops to land in Haiti without opposition
from Haitian military and police forces.
As well as paving the way
for President Aristides return to power and avoiding the likely
bloodshed of a full-scale invasion, the Carter agreement also made the
commitment to lift international sanctions as quickly as possible so as
to limit damage to the Haitian economy. On 29 September, three days after
President Clinton announced the termination of most U.S. unilateral sanctions
against Haiti, the Security Council adopted Resolution 944 indicating
that all U.N. sanctions would be lifted on the day President Aristide
returned to Haiti.
C. Continuing Sanctions against Iraq
As part of the cease-fire
arrangement, Iraq agreed to comply with Security Council Resolutions 707
and 715 and dismantle its arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons as well as their production facilities. Except for humanitarian
supplies, Iraq's ability to import goods was restricted, as it was by
Resolution 661 of August 1990, pending its compliance with a number of
conditions, including acceptance of a re-drawn border with Kuwait and
the end of human-rights abuses. While restricting most imports in 1991,
Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 allowed Iraq to export U.S. $1.6-billion
worth of oil to pay for humanitarian aid.
By 1996, the sanctions were
still in place because Iraq had been slow to comply with the conditions,
frequently delaying the inspection of weapons facilities by U.N. officials.
On a number of occasions, tensions increased significantly because Iraq
refused to let U.N. inspectors carry out their duties, which included
the destruction of chemical weapons. Iraq has also refused to take advantage
of Resolutions 706 and 712, which allowed for the sale of Iraqi oil to
pay for humanitarian supplies. As a result, the flow of food and medicine
into Iraq has been slowed. The Iraqi government has spent billions of
dollars a year from its own funds to purchase and distribute food to the
population; however, ordinary citizens, becoming more and more impoverished
because of the weak economy, often find it difficult to pay high prices
for other food. The effects of the war and of sanctions on medical services
and sanitation systems, plus delays in the delivery of medical supplies,
have increased child mortality and the general population's susceptibility
Despite the suffering of
the Iraqi population, Saddam Hussein's regime has been able to stay in
power and continues to defy the U.N., giving in to some of its demands
very reluctantly at the last minute. These events provide a classic example
of how economic measures can have a devastating effect on the ordinary
citizens of a targeted state, while not directly hurting the political
élite responsible for abhorrent policies. Moreover, a regime like Saddam
Hussein's, which has a significant record of human rights abuses and a
history of aggression against neighbouring states, has no qualms about
using the harsh effects of sanctions to deflect the anger of the population
towards the international community.
This does not mean that
the sanctions against Iraq did not affect government policies. Without
sanctions the regime might have continued its aggression or expanded its
weapons arsenal without any restrictions. The measures against Iraq have
in effect become "a convenient, long-term instrument of control in
Gulf policy,"(17) prevented the
outbreak of new conflicts. The positive contribution of sanctions may
outweigh their negative effects.
These can include jobs lost
in the initiating countries because products can no longer be exported
to an important client or because materials vital for the production process
can no longer be imported. Sanctions that cause more harm to the initiators
than to the target state, run the risk of forfeiting public support. The
effects of sanctions on ordinary citizens in a targeted state can also
erode support in the international community, especially if the situation
worsens over a long period while the delinquent regime refuses to change
On the other hand, sanctions
would be of little use if they were removed as soon as they began to affect
ordinary people. Thus a certain ruthlessness is necessary on the part
of the international community; the will to keep sanctions in place must
also be strong if they are to be effective.
Nevertheless, the international
community is concerned about the nutritional and health situation of the
Iraqi population. As a result, the Security Council has again offered
Iraq the opportunity to sell oil to generate revenues needed to purchase
humanitarian aid supplies. In its Resolution 986 of 14 April 1995, the
Security Council authorized Iraq to sell up to U.S. $1 billion of petroleum
products every 90 days and called for a review of the process after the
first two 90-day periods. The resolution stipulated a number of conditions
for the sale of petroleum products and specified that the revenues must
be used only to purchase medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and other
materials for civilian needs.
The Iraqi government had
resisted previous similar proposals but in January 1996 it agreed to discussions
with U.N. officials on the issue, while insisting that the resolution
was vicious and unfair. These discussions were expected to be difficult
and to have no guarantee of success, given Iraqs demands for the
removal of conditions on the sale of oil and the distribution of the humanitarian
supplies and the Security Councils apparent determination that these
would remain in place.
There was speculation that
in the event of such an agreement between Iraq and the U.N., the return,
albeit a limited one, of Iraqi petroleum products on the world oil market
would have an impact on that market. For example, states belonging to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Iraq
is a member, might have to cut their oil production. Such states would
hardly welcome reduced oil sales at a time when they are still grappling
with the economic effects of low oil price, and the Gulf war.(18)
Given the potential impact of even a partial return of Iraqi oil, significant
economic effects can be expected if and when the remaining sanctions against
Iraq are lifted. This shows how sanctions can distort trading patterns
and how decisions to maintain or lift them can easily be influenced by
numerous economic factors.
Other sanctions against
Iraq are likely to remain in place for some time, as long as the international
community continues to resent that countrys failure to comply with
provisions for dismantling chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon arsenals
and research programs. In August 1995, in a bid to convince the international
community that sanctions should be lifted or eased, Iraq admitted that
it had tipped missiles and bombs with germ warfare agents and had undertaken
nuclear weapon research. However, this admission did little to change
the international communitys attitude towards the Iraqui government,
in view of the fact that Iraq had denied these acts for so long. The Security
Council reviews the situation every 60 days and, though there are some
disagreements between the main champion of sanctions against Iraq, the
United States, and some other Council members, it will probably keep the
sanctions for some time, barring a significant change in Iraqui policies.
UNITED NATIONS REFORMS
The Iraqi situation, together
with problems with peacekeeping operations during the early 1990s, prompted
the U.N. to re-examine its role in the maintenance of world peace. In
his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali called for more emphasis on conflict prevention and improvements
in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The only mention of sanctions
concerned the collateral damage suffered by the neighbours or major economic
partners of a targeted state as a result of disruptions in their normal
trade patterns and extra costs. It was proposed that such states should
be entitled to consultations with the Security Council and have at least
some chance of restitution, possibly with economic aid. This would not
only ensure that all U.N. members had an equitable share of the costs
involved in the application of U.N. sanctions, but would also encourage
neighbouring states to comply fully with them.(19)
In the Supplement to
An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 1995, the Secretary-General
reported on discussions on the proposals in An Agenda for Peace,
including those concerning collateral damage due to sanctions. It was
noted that, while they recognized the fact of collateral damage, the heads
of international financial institutions proposed that this should be dealt
with under existing mandates for providing aid to affected states, rather
than through creation of new provisions. The Secretary-General nevertheless
proposed the establishment of a new mechanism within the U.N. Secretariat
that would carry out five functions: assess the potential impact of sanctions
before they are imposed, monitor their application, measure their effects,
ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and explore ways of assisting
states suffering collateral damage.(20)
The Supplement to An
Agenda for Peace also noted that the objectives of sanctions have
not always been clearly defined; moreover, because they are a blunt instrument
that causes indiscriminate suffering in the targeted state, they raise
ethical questions. By interfering with the work of humanitarian agencies
and the economies of neighbouring countries, U.N. sanctions often appear
to contradict the organizations objectives of improving humanitarian
conditions and promoting economic development. The Supplement called
on U.N. members to consider ways to ensure that the work of humanitarian
agencies is facilitated whenever sanctions are imposed. It was suggested
that bans on imports required by local health industries be avoided and
that applications for exemptions for humanitarian supplies be quickly
reports dealt mainly with the U.N.s role in maintaining world peace,
but other reforms proposed for the U.N. could affect the application of
sanctions. The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 added
impetus to the long-standing demand for reforms in the political and administrative
structures of the organization. One proposed reform that has gained much
favour over the years is the expansion of the permanent membership of
the Security Council to include significant economic powers like Germany
and Japan, and a number of developing countries. In this way, the Council
would become more representative of all the regions of the world. Such
changes in the U.N.s decision-making structure would affect, among
other things, the use and the effectiveness of sanctions.
A larger permanent membership
might make it even more difficult for the Security Council to reach a
consensus on when sanctions should be imposed. On the other hand, a more
representative Security Council might find it easier to convince all U.N.
members of the need to impose sanctions and to make them effective. Indeed,
a recent study of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United
Nations stated that the Security Council must become more representative
of the diverse perspectives around the world if it wants its decisions
accorded full international respect.(21)
Unfortunately, as with other proposed reforms of the U.N., it may take
several years for the organization to proceed with the proposed expansion.
Moreover, mainly because of problems with peacekeeping operations in Somalia
and the former Yugoslavia, world public opinion is becoming increasingly
disenchanted with the U.N.; this could make consensus on sanctions even
more difficult to achieve.
THE LATEST TEST
Nigeria is the latest test
of the international communitys resolve to impose sanctions. In
late 1995 and early 1996, there were growing global demands for sanctions
against Nigeria to protest the policies of its military regime, especially
in the wake of the execution of the author Ken Saro-Wiwa and other political
activists in November 1995. Because of the importance of oil production
for the countrys economy and the personal wealth of the military
leaders, most demands for sanctions have proposed a full embargo on Nigerias
The international community,
however, still hesitates, preferring to impose other types of sanction.
In November 1995, for example, the members of the European Union banned
arms sales to Nigeria, imposed tighter restrictions on visas for Nigerian
leaders and their families, and placed a freeze on all bilateral and multilateral
aid except for humanitarian projects. However, two EU members, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, vetoed proposals to impose a complete oil
embargo, mainly because of its potential impact on the Royal Dutch Shell
company, which is deeply involved in Nigerias oil production.
Meanwhile, President Nelson
Mandela of South Africa took the lead in demanding a full oil embargo,
angered like many others by the Nigerian regimes defiant execution
of Saro-Wiwa, carried out just as the Commonwealth Heads of Government
were meeting. The Commonwealth leaders instead threatened Nigeria with
expulsion from the Commonwealth in two years if its policies do not change.
An Action Group composed of foreign ministers of certain countries, including
Canada, met in December 1995 in London to review the policies of countries,
like Nigeria, that deny or delay democracy. While welcoming the EU measures,
the Action Group requested the Commonwealth Secretary-General to commission
a study on possible additional measures, to be applied on an incremental
basis, including a ban on new investments, a ban on equipment for the
oil industry, and partial trade embargoes such as oil sanctions.(22) The Action Group is slated to re-examine the issue in
decision to keep certain sanctions in reserve and to continue reviewing
the situation in Nigeria suggests that a complete embargo on Nigerias
oil exports might be used only as a last resort, if ever. Indeed, such
an embargo would disrupt the world oil market, something which, as discussed
above in connection with Iraq, key members of the Security Council, among
others, do not want to see, especially at this time. The U.N. imposes
sanctions mainly in response to major breaches of international peace
and security; unless there is a consensus within the Security Council
that the Nigerian situation is such a case, a full U.N. oil embargo is
unlikely. The United States has already indicated that, while it deplores
the policies of the Nigerian regime, it does not consider the situation
a threat to international peace and security and would not agree with
the imposition of a full oil embargo.(23)
Ironically, the United States
has imposed unilateral sanctions against Iran, claiming that a threat
to international peace arises from that countrys support for terrorism;
however, the Security Council has not joined in these. This again illustrates
how difficult it is for individual countries and the Security Council
to reach a consensus on the issue of sanctions. When the situation involves
a countrys internal policies, however deplorable, international
consensus on the need for major sanctions is even more difficult to achieve,
especially when some of the deciding states have policies almost as questionable
as those of the targeted state.
The situation in Nigeria
may prompt individual countries and international organizations to impose
bans on new investments and on the export of oil production equipment;
such measures could have an important impact on Nigerias economy
without seriously disrupting international trade. However, the international
community does not appear to be ready to accept the costs of imposing
and policing a complete oil embargo, despite some claims that this is
the only effective way to influence the military regime. In this case,
as in others, sanctions may be nothing more than a demonstration of the
international communitys concern about a situation, rather than
a decisive tool for effecting political change.
A. Strong Support for Sanctions
In recent years, Canada
has followed the general international trend toward the collective use
of sanctions against countries that have disturbed world peace or pursued
unacceptable policies.(24) Like other
countries that have signed the United Nations Charter, in addition to
maintaining measures against Iraq, Canada has recently imposed sanctions
on Libya, Serbia, Montenegro, Haiti, Liberia and Angola.
To comply with Security
Council Resolutions on mandatory sanctions, the Canadian government can
invoke the United Nations Act to issue all orders and regulations
necessary to limit or curtail trade, financial transactions, air links
or any other ties between Canada and a targeted country. As a strong supporter
of the U.N., this country has participated actively in the enforcement
of some measures; for example, Canadian naval ships and aircraft were
deployed to help police the sanctions on Iraq and Serbia and Montenegro.
If the Security Council
does not impose mandatory sanctions, Canada can still do so in partnership
with other states. Indeed, Canada championed the need for sanctions against
South Africa once international consensus had developed on their use,
despite the Security Council's inability to agree. Prior to 1985, Canada
had been reluctant to impose trade sanctions on South Africa, due in part
to a desire to avoid major disruption in the international trade of non-military
goods which is so vital to Canada's economy.(25)
It was also recognized that sanctions would have little impact on the
South African situation if major economic powers with significant trade
with South Africa, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany,
refused to impose them. When these countries and others finally agreed
to do so in 1985, in response to the worsening situation in South Africa,
Canada joined them and encouraged other countries, especially those in
the Commonwealth, to keep their own measures in place. Canada chaired
the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers, which reviewed the effectiveness
of sanctions and decided when Commonwealth members would lift them. On
24 September 1993, when the Transitional Executive Council was established
in South Africa in preparation for the first truly democratic elections
on 27 April 1994, Canada, like other Commonwealth states, lifted its remaining
sanctions on trade, investment, and financial transactions, but retained
restrictions on arms sales.
When the Haitian military
forced President Aristide out of power in 1991, Canada joined the other
countries of the OAS in imposing sanctions on Haiti. In 1993, when the
military regime in Haiti continued to resist the restoration of democracy,
despite the impact of OAS sanctions on its economy, Canada supported the
Security Council's imposition of mandatory sanctions, which at first seemed
successful. In October 1993, when the regime did not keep its promise
to restore democracy and the Security Council re-imposed mandatory sanctions,
Canada deployed ships to help enforce the ban on oil and arms shipments.
B. Special Economic Measures Act
The willingness of organizations
to use sanctions, and the realization that post-Cold War instability would
create new situations requiring urgent action, prompted the Canadian government
to expand its legislative authority to impose wide-ranging sanctions whenever
the United Nations Act cannot be enacted. In June 1992, Parliament
adopted the Special Economic Measures Act which the Government
can enact to impose sanctions whenever there is a serious threat to international
peace and security or whenever an international organization of which
Canada is a member determines that such measures are necessary to put
pressure on a delinquent state.(26)
The international organization could be the U.N. or regional or transnational
organizations such as the OAS and the Commonwealth.
Previously, the Canadian
government had limited legislative authority to ban air and sea links;
it could not prohibit Canadian companies from providing financial and
other services to the targeted state except by enacting special legislation,
such as the Iranian Economic Sanctions Act of 1980, which imposed
sanctions on Iran while U.S. embassy personnel were held hostage. However,
delays in passing such special legislation, especially if Parliament was
not sitting, could weaken the impact of Canadian sanctions and even prevent
them from being used. The new Act provides the government with all the
powers to limit trade and other contacts with a country, and allows it
to respond quickly to an international crisis, whether or not Parliament
is in session. There is provision, however, for the tabling in both Houses
of Parliament, within five sitting days, of all orders and regulations
issued and for debate on the measures taken.
Almost as soon as it was
adopted, the new Act was used to pass regulations to freeze the Haitian
government's assets in Canada for as long as the military regime refused
a return to democracy. Additional measures were taken against Haiti in
July 1992, when regulations were adopted pursuant to the new Act to prohibit
Haitian and other ships violating the embargo from entering Canadian ports.
If the Special Economic Measures Act had been available in the
mid-1980s, it would have been much easier for Canada to impose sanctions
on South Africa.
Sanctions have not proved
to be the surefire alternative to military action hoped for by President
Woodrow Wilson and others after the First World War. In most cases, it
has taken sanctions months, if not years, to produce the desired results;
in other cases, sanctions have failed to prevent the use of military force.
Indeed, even where there were positive results, for instance in Rhodesia
and South Africa, it is difficult to determine to what extent sanctions
were responsible, since so many other factors were involved.
While the "economic
weapon" never quite lived up to its proponents' high expectations,
it cannot be dismissed as outdated diplomacy. Sanctions can still play
a role in persuading delinquent states to change undesirable policies,
or at least indicate world disapproval of them. Avoiding the use of sanctions
because they are not likely to produce immediate results would only encourage
delinquent states to continue to flout world opinion. Since sanctions
were at least partly responsible for the changes in South Africa and elsewhere,
they are certainly worthwhile, especially if their use can help avoid
As it grapples with the
post-Cold War world, the international community appears to recognize
the value of sanctions more than ever. The improved relationship between
the permanent members of the Security Council following the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Cold War led to an increased use of mandatory
sanctions in the early 1990s. Even where tensions between the Security
Council members make the imposition of such sanctions difficult, regional
organizations or any groups of states can impose sanctions collectively.
The Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa demonstrate that results
are possible even if only part of the international community is involved.
On the other hand, sanctions
inevitably affect the lives of ordinary citizens in the targeted states;
indeed, they are basically the twentieth century's equivalent of the long
and cruel sieges of cities during the Middle Ages. Their use is justifiable
only as long as their positive effects on international peace and security
and respect for human rights outweigh their negative effects on ordinary
citizens. Any decision to impose sanctions should not be taken lightly;
their effectiveness as an alternative to the use of force can be weakened
if they are used irresponsibly.
Anglin, D.G. "Ripe,
Ripening, Or Overripe? Sanctions As an Inducement to Negotiations: the
South African Case." International Journal, Vol. 155, No.
2, Spring 1990, p. 360-385.
Bergeijk, Peter A.G. Van.
Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy: Positive and
Negative Sanctions in A New World Order. E. Elgar, Brookfield, Vt.,
Blumenfeld, Jesmond. "Une
étude de l'impact économique des sanctions contre l'Afrique du Sud,"
Problèmes économiques, No. 2057, 13 January 1988, p. 15-23.
Canada, Department of External
Affairs. "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary
of State for External Affairs, on the Second Reading of Bill C-53, an
Act to provide for the imposition of special economic measures, in the
House Of Commons." Statement, No. 92\6, 20 February 1992.
Canada, Department of External
Affairs. "McDougall Announces Economic Sanctions Legislation."
News Release, No. 282, 12 December 1991.
Commonwealth Committee of
Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. South Africa: The Sanctions Report.
Penguin Books, London, 1989, 273 p.
Conlon, Paul. "The
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No. 3, 1995, p. 327-338.
Cortright, D., G.A. Lopez,
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World? Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1995, 231p.
Davis, Jennifer. "Sanctions:
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Vol. 49, No. 9, November 1993, p. 16-19.
Doxey, Margaret. "International
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Power, Interdependence and Dependence. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Toronto, 1990, p. 243-261.
Dowty, Alan. "Sanctioning
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Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1994, p. 179-198.
Elliott, Kimberly Ann. "Sanctions:
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Vol. 49, No. 9, November 1993, p. 33-35.
Doxey, Margaret. "Do
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Group of Independent Experts.
Financial Sanctions Against South Africa. International Labour
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Hanlon, J., and R. Omond.
The Sanctions Handbook. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1987, 399
Harpur, Tom. "Harsh
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21 January 1996, p. C4.
Henderson, R.D. "South
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Holtschi, R. "Belgrade
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1993, p. 28-29.
Hufbauer, G.C., J.J. Schott,
K.A. Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current
Policy. Second Edition. Institute for International Economics, Washington,
Kocher, Victor. "The
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1993, p. 14.
Labbé, Marie-Hélène. Larme
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Nossal, K.R. Rain Dancing:
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Nossal, K.R. "Canadian
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In Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1990-1991.
Prévost, Jean. Pour des
sanctions efficaces et appropriés. Policy Planning Staff Paper, No. 93/4.
Department of External Affairs and International Trade, March 1993, 67
Rosen, Allen. "Canada's
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University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review. Vol. 51, Winter
1993, p. 2-53.
The Economist, 4 September 1993, p. 41.
Schlegel, John. "Twenty
Years of Policy Evolution. Canada, the USA and South Africa." The
Round Table, January 1987, p. 40-45.
Sparks, Allister. "Did
Sanctions Work?" The Gazette (Montreal), 7 October 1993,
Tracy, Nicholas. Pro-active
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Villemagne, Geneviève de.
"Les embargos incomplets, gages de nouveaux conflits." Défense
nationale, August-September 1995, p. 162-167.
Woodward, Susan. "Sanctions:
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Vol. 49, No. 9, November 1993, p. 24-27.
Wulf, Herbert. "United
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Anthony, ed. Arms Export Regulations. Oxford University Press,
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(1) Quoted in G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, K.A. Elliott,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Second Edition,
Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1990, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 2.
J. Hanlon and R. Omond, The Sanctions Handbook, Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, 1987, p. 12.
Hufbauer (1990), p. 10.
Margaret Doxey, "International Sanctions" in D. Gahlunds and
M. Hawes, eds., World Politics, Power Interdependence and Dependence,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Toronto, 1990, p. 246.
Hanlon (1987), p. 209.
K.R. Nossal, "Canadian Sanctions against South Africa: Explaining
the Mulroney Initiatives, 1985-1986," in Journal of Canadian Studies,
Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1990-1991, p. 25.
Group of Independent Experts, Financial Sanctions Against South Africa,
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1991, p. 50.
Hufbauer (1990), p. 13.
René Holtschi, "Belgrave Under the Blockade," Swiss Review of
World Affairs, August 1993, p. 28-29.
Jane Perlez, "U.N. Watches Romania Violate Sanctions," New
York Times, 30 July 1995, p. 8.
Chris Hedges, "In Belgrade, View is Still Hands Off,"
New York Times, 21 September 1995, p. 14.
"Sanctions Work," The Economist, 4 September 1993, p.
Victor Kocher, "The Sanctions Against Iraq," Swiss Review
of World Affairs, August 1993, p. 14. See also Louise Crosby, "Sanctions
Hurting Civilians, Canadian Doctor Says," Ottawa Citizen,
2 December 1991, p. A8 and Tom Harpur, "Harsh Sanctions Against Iraq
Hit the Wrong Target," Toronto Star, 21 January 1996, p. C4.
Ibid., p. 13.
"Hussein Big Winner Under UN Oil Plan," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), 25 January 1996, p. A11.
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace,
17 June 1992, paragraph 41.
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Supplement to An Agenda
for Peace, 3 January 1995, paragraphs 74-75.
Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, The
United Nations in Its Second Half-Century, 1995, p 15.
First Meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare
Declaration Concluding Statement, London, 19-20 December 1995,
Bob Drogin, "Mandela Calls on the World to Slap Embargo on Nigeria,"
The Gazette (Montreal), 16 November 1995, p. D8.
See Jean Prévost, Pour des sanctions efficaces et appropriées,
Policy Planning Staff Paper, No. 93/4, Department of External Affairs
and International Trade, March 1993.
See for example Margaret Doxey, "Do Sanctions Work?" International
Perspectives, July/August 1982, p. 13; John Schlegel, "Twenty
Years of Policy Evolution. Canada, the USA and South Africa," The
Round Table, January 1987, p. 40-45.
See Department of External Affairs, "McDougall Announces Economic
Sanctions Legislation," News Release, No. 282, 12 December
1991; "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of
State for External Affairs, on the Second Reading of Bill C-53, an Act
to provide for the imposition of special economic measures, in the House
of Commons," Statement, No. 92/6, 20 February 1992. See also
Prévost (1993), p. 7.