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84-3E
PORNOGRAPHY
Prepared by:
James R. Robertson, Principal
Law and Government Division
Revised 30 September 2002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE DEFINITION
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
A. “Pornography”
and Harm
B. The Current Law
C. The Obscenity
Standard
D. Pornography
as a Human Rights Issue and as Hate Literature
E. Child Pornography
F. Pornography
on the Internet
G. Judicial Developments
PARLIAMENTARY ACTION
A. Justice Committee Report,
22 March 1978
B. Bill C-51, First Reading
1 May 1978
C. Bill C-19, First Reading
7 February 1984
D. Bill C-38, First Reading
1 April 1985
E. Bill C-114, First
Reading 10 June 1986
F. Bill C-54, First Reading
4 May 1987
G. Bill C-128, Royal
Assent 23 June 1993
H. Justice Committee Report,
16 November 1994
CHRONOLOGY
REFERENCES
PORNOGRAPHY*
ISSUE DEFINITION
Sexually explicit material, or “pornography,” is not a
new phenomenon. It has existed in some form in virtually every society
throughout history. It is clear, however, that in Canada today more of
such material is available than ever before; it is also more explicit and
more violent than in the past. New technologies, such as the Internet,
have created unique challenges and problems.
Traditionally, society’s response to sexually explicit
material has been to prohibit or restrict what is beyond the community’s
level of tolerance. The implicit rationale of this approach is that pornography
may be forbidden because it offends a common standard of taste. Not only
is pornography considered immoral insofar as it expresses an ideology and
view of the sexes and their relationship that is repugnant, but it is also
argued that pornography causes actual harm. Thus, many consider it an appropriate
matter for use of the regulatory and coercive powers of the state.
On the other hand, there are those who contend that there
is no convincing evidence of any causal relationship between pornography
and actual physical harm, and that any other effects are too attenuated
or insignificant to justify the infringement of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. There is also the issue of how or who is to determine
what is offensive, and what standard is to be used. This review will attempt
to give a survey of this debate.
BACKGROUND
AND ANALYSIS
A.
“Pornography” and Harm
A great deal of the difficulty in discussing pornography
results from confusion or lack of agreement over what is meant by the term.
Except for a 1993 amendment regarding “child pornography,” the criminal
law does not use the word “pornography” but rather “obscenity.” Pornography
can be an extremely emotive word, whose scope can vary with the outlook
of the person using it.
Some people consider any depiction of nudity or sexual
activity to be pornographic. What is objectionable to others, however,
is not sexual content per se, or “erotica,” which depicts normal
consensual sexual activity, but material in which one or more participants
are demeaned, degraded or abused in some manner. Pornography, according
to this view, is material that condones or encourages sexual debasement.
Such a distinction cuts across conventional definitions because it means
that very explicit sexual depictions can be called “erotica,” while sexual
material with relatively unexplicit but demeaning content can be called
“pornography.” At the same time, much conventional pornography depicts
naked women, and it is argued that such material perpetrates images of women
as sexual objects and, thus, can victimize women directly and indirectly.
The elasticity of the word also contributes to society’s
difficulty in determining the prevalence of pornography. It is clear, however,
that it is more available, and certainly more explicit, than in the past.
It has also been suggested that community standards have changed to the
point where 30% of all Canadian newsstand sales now consist of periodicals
that would have been illegal 20 years ago. Furthermore, in recent years
a whole new videocassette market has developed, and the Internet has emerged
as a major communications system.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties of definition, many believe
that material which depicts violence towards – or demeans – women is demonstrably
harmful and should be controlled. There is, however, considerable divergence
on the appropriate strategy. Harm is said to flow from pornography in two
ways. First, it is theorized that there is a direct causal link between
violent pornography and violence against women, so that such material can
act as a “trigger” to aggression. Second, it is said that pornography contributes
in a general way to myths about sexuality and about women that ultimately
make violence and degradation more acceptable to society as a whole. According
to this view, distinctions among types of pornography are invidious. Such
material constitutes a continuum: consumers are desensitized or “numbed”
by “soft” pornography, the wide distribution of which makes the allegedly
more directly harmful “hard” pornography easier to accept and, indeed, encourages
its production.
It can be, however, difficult to find objective proof of
the harmful effects of pornography. Three potential sources of such proof
are available:
-
anecdotal evidence – police or press reports
may say that a sex offender was a habitual consumer of explicit material,
or victims may claim that their assailant had been influenced by pornography;
-
statistical evidence – attempts to show a
correlation between the prevalence of pornography and the incidence
of violent crime; and
-
experimental evidence – accounts of experiments
which attempt to measure the reactions of individuals to the stimulus
of pornography, in particular, aggressive or violent material.
Anecdotal and statistical evidence suffers from the defect
of being unable to establish a causal link between pornography and violence.
The presence of such material may be merely symptomatic of anti-social behaviour,
rather than its cause. Indeed, some research has purported to show that
many rapists report having had little exposure to pornographic material.
As for statistical evidence, rates of sexual assault have increased, but
not significantly more than those of other forms of crime. In any event,
establishing a statistical link of this sort is extremely problematic.
Experimental studies can lay claim to being the likeliest
source of a proven link between violence and pornography, and, indeed, some
work has shown that, under laboratory conditions, there may be a measurable
relationship between aggressive behaviour and exposure to aggressive pornography.
Critics point out, however, that such experiments are inherently artificial,
and that the results are not particularly significant. Even those conducting
the experiments concede that their results are not readily transferable
from the laboratory to the real world, where a wealth of other stimuli and
inhibitions also affect social behaviour.
Not all studies of the effects of pornography
inquire into its negative consequences. Some subscribe to the so-called
“catharsis” theory – that pornography can act as a safety valve of sorts,
allowing its consumers to satisfy aggressive impulses in a non-violent way.
The catharsis theory is as unprovable as the theory that pornography induces
aggression, and some of the attempts to find substantive proof in the experience
of countries that have liberalized obscenity laws have been discredited.
Some contend that the absence of conclusive scientific
proof of a direct causal link between pornography and violence should not
deter action to suppress such material; because of the nature of the phenomenon
and its social context, such “proof” is next to impossible to obtain. According
to this view, the self-evident fact that pornography contributes negatively
to societal perceptions of women and sexuality is sufficient justification
for its suppression. Opponents of this view contend that society should
impose limitations on expression only where there is demonstrable proof
of actual harm, and that, in any event, current legal sanctions, possibly
slightly modified, deal adequately with the problem.
The 1985 report of the Special Committee on Pornography
and Prostitution (the Fraser Committee) made several significant findings
on pornography in Canada. The Committee declined to give an explicit definition
of what it considered “pornography,” principally because there is no accepted
definition in the community at large. It acknowledged the validity of the
idea that pornography should be distinguished from erotica, and agreed that,
although it is violent pornography that is of most concern, to some extent
there is a continuum from apparently mild sexually offensive material to
violent material.
Pornographic material was found to be almost exclusively
imported into the country, and to be more widely available in 1985 than
15 years earlier, although this conclusion seemed to depend “not on concise
and comprehensive statistics, but on the piecing together of some statistics
with indications, trends and general observations.” Moreover, the Committee
could not determine with any precision whether more people were actually
using pornographic materials than before. It concluded:
The research which has been conducted on magazines
and videos does not confirm the overwhelmingly awful picture presented
by some groups and individuals in their briefs to the Committee. ...
[T]he view that large amounts of violent pornography or child pornography
are being consumed is not substantiated by the research.
The Committee strongly suggested that pornography represents
and nourishes attitudes and activities inimical to the equality of men and
women and that it presents demeaning images as normal and commendable, so
that it perpetrates “lies about aspects of women’s humanity and denies the
validity of their aspirations to be treated as full and equal citizens.”
B. The Current
Law
The principal existing sanctions against pornography are found in the criminal
law. Section 163 of the Criminal Code creates a number of offences
in relation to the fabrication and distribution of “obscene” publications,
or to possessing them for the purpose of distribution. It is also an offence
to mail obscene matter, or to give an “immoral, indecent or obscene” theatrical
performance. These offences may be punished on summary conviction or by
indictment, with up to two years’ imprisonment where the latter course is
chosen. There is also provision for the seizure and forfeiture of obscene
materials.
Central to these prohibitions is the elaboration of what is obscene in
section 163(8):
For the purposes of this Act, any publication a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex,
or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.
Whether there is “undue” exploitation is almost invariably determined by
reference to community standards, i.e., if a dominant characteristic is
the exploitation of sex or of sex and any other enumerated quality, the
trier of fact must determine the community standard of tolerance. Would
the community tolerate the presentation, publication or distribution of
the material as presented or published? If not, the material is deemed obscene.
As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in the Butler case, the
community standards test is concerned not with what Canadians would not
tolerate being exposed to themselves, but with what they would not tolerate
other Canadians being exposed to.
It should be noted that crime, horror, cruelty and violence by themselves
are not obscene; it is only when they are portrayed in conjunction with
sex that obscenity exists for legal purposes.
The obscenity standard is flexible – it responds to shifts
in public acceptance of explicit material. Notwithstanding the theory
that it is also national in application, there is potential for considerable
variation, because the criminal law is administered by the provinces,
which may set different prosecution standards. Finally, the obscenity
standard is today quite “liberal.” In media such as magazines or films,
where there is little likelihood that those unwilling to view the material
will be exposed to it, there is considerable leeway; in other, less discretionary
forms of expression, such as television, tolerance is lower.
Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code was enacted
in 1993. It prohibits the production, distribution and sale of “child
pornography,” and also makes it an offence to possess such material.
Maximum sentences of ten years for its production and distribution, and
five years for simple possession, are prescribed. The section contains
a definition of child pornography that includes:
-
visual representations of explicit sexual activity
involving anyone under the age of 18 or depicted as being so;
-
other visual representations of a sexual nature of
persons under the age of 18; and
-
written material or visual depictions that advocate
or counsel illegal sexual activity involving persons under that age.
Other than the criminal sanctions, there is little else
in federal law that purports to control sexually explicit or violent material.
Under the Customs Tariff, customs officials were, until 1985, empowered
to forbid entry into Canada of material of an “immoral or indecent” character,
as determined by reference to community standards; the scope of those
words was wider than that of “obscenity.” Thus, a broader range of materials
could be kept out of the country by administrative action than by criminal
prosecution. On 14 March 1985, however, the Federal Court of Appeal
found that that this provision was too vague to be compatible with the
guarantee of freedom of expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and, therefore, was of no force or effect. The Customs
Tariff was subsequently amended to change the reference in the Schedule
to materials “deemed to be obscene” under subsection 163(8) of the
Code, or found to be hate propaganda under section 320(8). Since
1993, it has also referred to material that constitutes “child pornography”
within the meaning of that term in the Criminal Code.
The provinces have a relatively narrow role in the control
of pornography. Because the enactment of criminal legislation is beyond
provincial jurisdiction, direct prohibition by regulation is not possible,
although regulation may incidentally deal with, or complement, obscenity
laws. Such is the case with the censorship and classification of films
by provincial boards, the constitutionality of which was vindicated by
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1978. The power of such boards to order
deletions from motion pictures, or to prohibit exhibition entirely, has
been put in doubt by a 1984 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Court held that the absence of specific guidelines concerning censorship
rendered the power of the Ontario Censor Board (now the Ontario Film Review
Board) an unreasonable limitation on freedom of expression under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
Beyond regulation of film, provincial involvement in
this area is limited. Municipalities, using powers derived from the provinces,
can regulate the pornography industry by prescribing how such material
is to be displayed, or through licensing and zoning restrictions, but
this control must not infringe on criminal jurisdiction. This limitation
on provincial jurisdiction was emphasized in October 1984 by a decision
of the Ontario Divisional Court dealing with a provision of that province’s
Municipal Act (and particularly a by-law of the municipality of
Toronto) that would have allowed the regulation of the sale of erotic
magazines. The provision was struck down on the ground that the by-law
affected public morality – something that can be dealt with only by the
federal criminal power.
New technologies have created new problems: computer pornography is an
increasing concern, especially because dissemination of such material cannot
generally be controlled. There are also issues regarding the potential
liability of the owners or managers of computer networks, such as universities.
Although criminal charges have been laid regarding the distribution or possession
of pornography on the Internet, to date there has been little judicial guidance
on the issues involved.
C. The Obscenity
Standard
The criminal prohibitions of obscenity, with their emphasis
on sexual explicitness, are viewed by many as inadequate. Furthermore,
many do not find the community standards test to be particularly useful
– if pornography is in fact harmful in some way, an objective standard
is required, rather than a mere subjective assessment of what the community
will not tolerate.
In 1984, as part of Bill C-19, the Liberal government
proposed a new definition of obscenity that would have taken into account
some of these criticisms. It would have read as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, any matter or thing
is obscene where a dominant characteristic of the matter or thing
is the undue exploitation of any one or more of the following subjects,
namely, sex, violence, crime, horror or cruelty, through degrading
representations of a male or female person or in any other manner.
This proposal would have effected two major changes.
First, it would have made it quite clear that the definition would apply
to all “matters or things” and not merely publications, thus removing
a persistent ambiguity. Second, it would have severed the link between
sex and cruelty, horror or violence now necessary for material to be deemed
obscene.
The proposal would have retained the requirement of “undue
exploitation,” however, and thus the community standards test would still
have applied. The suggested addition of a reference to degradation would
have added little to the existing sanction; it is within the current power
of the courts to find undue exploitation arising from circumstances of
degradation.
A different approach to redefinition has been proposed
by some feminist groups. This would not rely on an assessment of the
community standard of toleration at all, but rather on a purportedly objective
determination of whether material can be taken to express approval of
the behaviour that it depicts. One version, which has been proposed by
the National Association of Women and the Law, would replace the word
“obscenity” with “pornography,” which would be defined as:
A presentation or representation whether live,
simulated, verbal, pictorial, filmed, video-taped or otherwise represented,
of sexual behaviour in which one or more participants are coerced
overtly, or implicitly, into participation; or are injured or abused
physically or psychologically; or in which an imbalance of power is
obvious, or implied by virtue of the immature age of any participant
or by contextual aspects of the presentation, and in which such behaviour
can be taken to be advocated or endorsed.
The clear basis of the proposal is that any depiction
of sexual activity beyond an ideal of mutual consent is harmful and should
be suppressed. Nevertheless, the potential difficulties with such a definition,
in the context of enforcement of the criminal law, would be significant.
Many of the terms used are extremely vague, and would require the courts
to analyze the intentions of those who made the representations.
The Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution
(the Fraser Committee) proposed a thorough revision of the criminal law
in relation to obscenity. The suggested changes would have gone considerably
farther than the 1984 government proposals, but would have avoided the
subjectivity inherent in some feminist proposals. Suggested revisions
were based on the view that two “harms” flow from pornography: harm to
those involuntarily subjected to it, and the broader social harm resulting
from the undermining of the right to equality.
The most notable aspect of these proposals was the jettisoning
of the “community standards” test. It was intended that pornography would
be subject to an assessment based not on “taste,” but on more objective
grounds, although the defences of scientific or educational purpose, or
of artistic merit with respect to sexually violent or degrading pornography,
would continue to require a large element of subjective analysis. Furthermore,
sexual explicitness alone would not be a sufficient ground for application
of the criminal sanction. Some may still question, however, whether it
would in fact be appropriate to permit in this way any sexual depiction,
however explicit, so long as it was not violent, did not involve children,
and was not indiscriminately open to the public.
The Fraser Committee was of the opinion that its proposals
were constitutional; although they might infringe upon freedom of expression,
the Charter allows freedom to be subject to reasonable limits. In the
Committee’s view, such limits could be justified on the grounds that pornography
may encourage inequality for certain elements of society.
D. Pornography
as a Human Rights Issue and as Hate Literature
The Fraser Committee took the position that new ways
of seeking redress for the social harm caused by pornography should be
explored. One of these was the inclusion in human rights legislation
of measures intended to reduce exposure to pornography in the workplace,
stores and other facilities. It was also suggested that consideration
be given to the provision of a civil right of action in respect of the
promotion of hatred through pornography.
Anti-pornography activists are attempting to move their
fight into the realm of human rights law, and seek to build on previous
cases in which depictions of naked women in the workplace have been found
to be harassment of female employees. The Ontario Human Rights Commission
argued in 1993 before a board of inquiry that the presence of men’s sex
magazines in corner stores is a form of discrimination against women.
The case targets “soft-core” materials, such as Penthouse and Playboy,
which are generally considered to meet the community standard of tolerance
outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Butler. In a 2-1 decision,
the case was dismissed on a preliminary motion on the basis that the Commission
had not complied with its statutory obligation to endeavour to effect
a settlement before proceeding to a board of inquiry (Findlay and McKay
v. Four Star Variety, 22 October 1993). In May 1996, the
Commission finally quashed the complaint on the basis that “evidence”
against the store owner, and the “current state of the law,” made further
inquiry into it “inappropriate.”
Finally, the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal
Code could be amended to include sex, age, and mental or physical
disability as attributes of “identifiable groups” protected by those sections.
The inclusion of “sex” would presumably allow for the prosecution of a
distributor or maker of material that promotes hatred of either sex.
Whether amendments such as these would have anything other than symbolic
significance is open to question. The intention to promote hatred, according
to the current provisions of the Criminal Code, has proved very
difficult to establish; this would probably also be the case if the provisions
were extended to include pornographic material.
E. Child Pornography
Child pornography is generally acknowledged to raise
some issues that do not apply to pornography dealing exclusively with
adults. Those issues have to do with the participation of children in
the production of such material and their exposure to it. It is assumed
that adults may choose to be involved in pornographic productions or to
view them, while children are deemed incapable of giving informed consent
to such activity. Accordingly, it is argued by some that the use of children
should be outlawed, and that any sexually explicit display involving children
should be deemed obscene.
The Committee on Sexual Offences against Children and
Youths (the Badgley Committee) – a special committee appointed by the
Ministers of Health and Justice – issued its report in August 1984. Part
of its mandate had to do with the use of children in the production of
pornography, and their access to such material. The Committee found that
there was no evidence to support claims that child pornography had reached
“epidemic” proportions in Canada, as some had claimed. What child pornography
there is, is imported and constitutes a small proportion of all pornography
entering Canada. There is a good deal of “pseudo-child pornography” –
pornography that uses adults who appear to be children – entering the
country, however, and this may appeal to the same tastes and evoke the
same responses as material actually using children. The Committee urged
a concerted effort to strengthen the processes whereby the importation
of such material could be prevented.
As for domestically produced child pornography, the Badgley
Committee found that it existed in an “informal and fragmented” system
of private production, primarily undertaken to serve the sexual gratification
of those involved. It also found that such production almost invariably
involves the sexual abuse of the children used, and that new communications
technology holds the potential for much more production. Accordingly,
the Committee recommended that it be made an offence to use children in
the production, manufacture, sale or distribution of, and to possess,
visual representations of “explicit sexual conduct” of persons under age
18. All except the possession offence would be indictable, punishable
by up to 10 years’ imprisonment; the possession offence would be punishable
on summary conviction.
The Badgley Committee also found that the existing laws governing restrictions
on children’s access to pornography were inadequate. The criminal obscenity
law does not specifically deal with restricting access, and provincial and
municipal laws are unevenly applied, or non-existent. The Committee suggested
a summary conviction offence of knowingly selling, displaying or offering
to sell “visual pornographic materials” to persons under the age of 16.
The Fraser Committee’s 1985 report set out its recommendations
with respect to children and pornography separately, to emphasize the
special treatment children should receive. Perpetrators of child pornography
would be subject to the severest punishment. It would also be an offence
to “induce, incite, or coerce” a person under age 18 to participate in
any representation of explicit sexual conduct. Significantly, the Committee
also recommended an offence, punishable on summary conviction, of being
in possession of child pornography. Possession of adult pornography would
be an offence only where that possession was for the purposes of sale
or distribution. The Committee acknowledged that this was a severe recommendation,
but justified it on the ground that it was necessary in order to deter
the production of child pornography.
On 13 May 1993, the federal government tabled in the
House of Commons Bill C-128, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and
the Customs Tariff (child pornography and corrupting morals). The bill
was dealt with expeditiously by both the House of Commons and the Senate,
receiving all-party support. Various arts and cultural groups and civil
libertarians, while endorsing the need for measures to combat child pornography,
expressed serious reservations and concerns about the wording of the bill,
which nevertheless received Royal Assent on 23 June 1993, and was
proclaimed in force on 1 August 1993. For a more detailed discussion
of the bill, see Library of Parliament Legislative Summary LS-178E, Bill
C-128: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and Customs Tariff (child pornography).
A controversial case that arose in December 1993 involved child pornography
charges against a Toronto artist, Eli Langer, and the art gallery that displayed
his work. Mr. Langer’s paintings and drawings show children performing
a variety of sexual acts. Subsequently, in February 1994, the Crown dropped
charges against Mr. Langer and an art gallery official, but applied for
forfeiture of the artwork in order to destroy the paintings and drawings
seized in the case. The case raises questions about the scope of the new
legislation and its exemption for works of artistic merit. Arts groups
have expressed concerns that serious and legitimate artists run the risk
of violating the new law, and that the prospect of criminal charges will
have a “chilling” effect on artistic activity because of the loss of time
and money and the notoriety they involve. At the same time, advocates of
tougher child pornography measures are concerned about the definition of
art and the ambiguity of the artistic defence, as well as the prospect that
it could be used to justify or cloak pornography involving children.
In April 1995, Mr. Justice David McCombs ruled that Langer’s
art was not illegal. Although he called the pictures “shocking and disturbing,”
the judge said that they had “artistic merit,” and that he was not convinced
that they “pose a realistic risk of harm to children.” At the same time,
the judge rejected the constitutional challenge by Langer and groups representing
artists, writers and civil libertarians. He said that the child pornography
law was a reasonable restriction on artists’ freedom of expression and
was designed to protect children from the harmful impact of child pornography.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis that
the law contravened the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and also
with respect to the issuance of warrants authorizing the seizure of allegedly
pornographic materials. Although the application was supported by the
Ontario government, leave to appeal and cross-appeal was refused by the
Court on 11 October 1995. (Ontario (Attorney General) v. Langer
(1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 290, 123 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 40 C.R. (4th) 204,
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 100 C.C.C. (3d) vi, 126 D.L.R. (4th)
vii, 42 C.R. (4th) 410n.)
In January 1999, in R. v. Sharpe [169 D.L.R.
(4th) 536, 22 C.R. (5th) 129, 58 C.R.R. (2d) 261, 40 W.C.B. (2d)
507], a justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled that the
prohibition against possession of child pornography in the Criminal
Code was unconstitutional, although he upheld the prohibitions on
the possession of child pornography for purposes of publication, distribution
and sale. The case was appealed, on an expedited basis, to the Court
of Appeal for British Columbia, where a majority decided, in June 1999
[136 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 1], that section 163.1(4) – the
offence of possession of child pornography – contravened the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada, where it was heard on 18-19 January 2000, and
a decision was rendered on 26 January 2001. The Court found that the
law on child pornography strikes a constitutional balance between freedom
of expression and the prevention of harm to children. Nevertheless, the
Court read into the law two exceptions relating to expressive material
privately created and kept by the accused. It found that possession of
such material poses no reasonable risk of harm to children if it is:
-
self-created expressive material, i.e., any
written material or visual representation created by the accused alone,
exclusively for his or her own personal use; and
-
private recordings of lawful sexual activity,
i.e., any visual recording, created by or depicting the accused, provided
it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused
exclusively for private use.
The Court ruled that the possession of these
materials should be excepted from section 163.1(4). It should be noted
that in the second instance all parties involved must have consented to
both the activity and the creation of the record, and the possessor of
such material must have personally recorded or participated in the sexual
activity it portrays.
The Supreme Court also ruled on the wording of section
163.1(1)(b), which prohibits “any written material or visual representation
that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age
of eighteen years.” In order to meet the requirement of “advocates” or
“counsels,” the Court ruled that the material must be viewed objectively
and seen as “actively inducing” or encouraging the described offences
with children. Thus, the mere description of the act is not enough to
contravene the law.
Section 163.1(6) provides that material that constitutes
child pornography can be defended if it has “artistic merit.” The Supreme
Court defined “artistic merit” as “possessing the quality of art” or having
“artistic character.” This defence must also be established objectively.
The Court then set to define what is meant by “art.” It found that the
decision must, for each case, be left to trial judges to make the determination
on the basis of a variety of factors. These can include the subjective
intention of the creator, the form and content, and its connections with
artistic conventions, traditions or styles. Judges may even rely partly
on the opinion of experts. The Court did find that the defence of artistic
merit does not incorporate a community tolerance standard because it was
not included in the legislation. The Court decided that reading such
a standard in would run counter to the logic of the defence that artistic
merit outweighs any harm that might result from the work. The Court also
held that the defences of medical, educational, and scientific purpose
should also be taken into consideration regarding what can be deemed as
child pornography.
Finally, the Supreme Court ordered that the charges
against Mr. Sharpe be sent back to the British Columbia Supreme Court
for trial. There, the trial judge, Mr. Justice Shaw, rejected Mr.
Sharpe’s defence that the photographs of children he had had in his possession
were lawful as they were intended exclusively for his own private use.
Mr. Sharpe also argued that the boys depicted were likely over 14 years
old and since the age of consent for sexual activity in Canada is 14,
the children had legally consented to be depicted in the materials.
Mr. Justice Shaw ruled that Mr. Sharpe could not prove
that the pictures were for his own personal use, nor could he prove that
the boys depicted had any further involvement in the use of the photographs
after they were taken. Thus, on account of these photographs, Mr. Sharpe
was convicted of possessing child pornography. As for the written materials
in Mr. Sharpe’s possession, the judge found that, while they were morally
repugnant, they did not counsel or advocate the commission of sexual crimes
against children. Mr. Sharpe, therefore, was acquitted of the offence
of possessing child pornography for the purpose of distribution or sale.
As for the issue of artistic merit, Mr. Justice Shaw
went on to address Mr. Sharpe’s “artistic merit” defence although
it was no longer necessary for his decision. Three English professors
and one psychiatrist testified as expert witnesses on the matter. The
majority found some artistic merit in the writings. One of the professors
denied artistic merit but was found to have applied a community standard
of tolerance test in his assessment, thereby mistakenly letting considerations
of morality play a role in assessing the work. The trial judge concurred
with the majority of the expert witnesses and found evidence of artistic
merit in Mr. Sharpe’s writings. Such factors included the portrayal of
people, events and scenes that were reasonably well written, parody and
allegory, characterization, imagination, and at times reasonably complex
plots.
This case has been extremely controversial, and the issue
has become very political: outrage was expressed over the implications
of striking down the prohibition against possession of child pornography,
and there have been demands that Parliament should invoke the notwithstanding
clause of the Charter to ensure that the law remains in force.
F. Pornography
on the Internet
A major concern in recent years has been the proliferation
of pornography – particularly child pornography – on the Internet, which,
according to one expert, offers about 250,000 “adult-oriented” web-sites.
This raises serious issues of access and liability, as well as the question
of how such material is to be regulated, particularly where it transcends
national boundaries. The focus of much police work is now on the Internet;
although there have been convictions, the very nature of computer technology
often impedes investigations.
In 1995, an accused was convicted of distributing child
pornography via a computer bulletin board, although he was acquitted of
other charges (R. v. Pecciarich (1995), 22 O.R. (3d)
748). In April 1998, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the principle
that jail sentences are necessary in the fight against child pornography
on the Internet: R. v. Lisk, [1998] O.J. 1456.
Other approaches have also been used. In July 1996,
iStar – a provider of Internet access – blocked customers’ access to material
deemed offensive, such as child pornography or bestiality. This action
came quietly after months of complaints from customers who were upset
with the content of Internet newsgroups or “alt.binaries” where pictures
can be easily transmitted.
iStar made this decision after discussions with the
RCMP. The company claimed that since child pornography was illegal, it
had to do something to prevent its spread in order to “comply with the
law of the land” because “if we don’t do something about illegal activity,
the police or government have a right to shut down or take our computer
equipment.” At the time, however, Canada had yet to lay out any laws
regulating the Internet. Despite this situation, the then federal Justice
Minister Allan Rock publicly supported iStar’s move.
While iStar feared being shut down if offensive materials
were spread through its services, David Jones, President of Electronic
Frontier Canada, claimed that the Internet should be treated the same
way as Canada Post or the telephone system. In these cases, people such
as postal carriers are not responsible under the law for the content of
the message they carry through their system. As long as they don’t do
so consciously, they cannot be held responsible for distributing material
such as child pornography.
In the case of iStar, although few people supported
the material that was being spread through the newsgroups, many expressed
concerns about the blocking process and the precedent it might set, as
well as about issues of censorship. Alan Borovoy of the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association worried that legitimate material would be blocked
as well.
Some of the other Internet providers indicated that
they would not be following iStar’s example. For the future, iStar indicated
that while it cannot possibly monitor the roughly 20,000 newsgroups it
carries, it will investigate complaints received from customers or authorities.
The company will then block access to these areas if they are spreading
“illegal” material (but not solely because someone finds them offensive).
In February 1996, the United States Congress passed
the Communications Decency Act. One of its goals was to punish
those who disseminate “indecent” material over the Internet. In June
of that year, however, a three-judge panel from a District Court in Philadelphia
found that the word “indecent” was too vague and the Act was ruled unconstitutional.
In 1998 the U.S. Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act,
which imposes prison sentences and fines of up to $100,000 for placing
material that is “harmful to minors” on a web-site available to those
under the age of 17; the statute has never taken effect as there has been
a Federal District Court order blocking its enforcement since February
1999, and this was continued in effect by a decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in May 2002. These issues remain unresolved.
The nature and extent of pornography on the Internet
remain matters of some dispute. Although Internet pornography appears
to be increasing, at the same time it defies traditional government regulation.
The issues involved are complex and different from those of access to,
and distribution of, ordinary pornography. Various governments have grappled
with the problem, which is likely to increase over the next few years.
G. Judicial Developments
A number of court decisions have involved the obscenity
provisions of the Criminal Code. In Ontario, in what is believed
to have set a Canadian precedent, a seller of pornography was jailed in
August 1990 after being convicted of 12 charges relating to his magazine
distribution business. In Ottawa, a record company and record distributor
were charged with distribution of obscene material and possession of such
material, in relation to two records by a British Columbia punk band,
Dayglo Abortions. The defendants were acquitted after a trial that lasted
several days. In July 1991, a bookstore owner in London (Ontario) was
found guilty of selling obscene material after police seized copies of
an album by the controversial U.S. rap group 2 Live Crew.
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
decision in the case of R. v. Butler ((1992), 70 C.C.C.
(3d) 129, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 11 C.R. (4th) 137, [1992] 2 W.W.R. 577).
The Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the obscenity provisions
of the Criminal Code, holding that, although the prohibition against
pornography contravened the freedom of expression guarantee in section
2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it could be justified
under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law.
Mr. Justice Sopinka, writing on behalf of the Court, said that, although
a direct link between obscenity and harm to society may be difficult,
if not impossible, to establish, there was nevertheless sufficient evidence
that depictions of degrading and dehumanizing sex do harm society, and,
in particular, adversely affect attitudes towards women. He held that
the overriding objective of the law was not moral disapprobation but the
avoidance of harm to society, and that the threat to equality resulting
from exposure to certain types of violent and degrading material cannot
be ignored.
In the course of his reasons, Mr. Justice Sopinka provided
some guidance in applying the various tests to determine what constitutes
undue exploitation: the community standards test, the degradation or
dehumanization test, and the internal necessities test or artistic defence.
He also divided pornography into three categories: (1) explicit sex with
violence; (2) explicit sex without violence but that is degrading
or dehumanizing; and (3) explicit sex without violence that is neither
degrading nor dehumanizing. He believed that the first two categories
would almost always constitute undue exploitation of sex, but the third
category would generally be tolerated. However, two of the other judges
disagreed, arguing that not only the content but also the representation
can be objectionable. A more detailed discussion of the case appears
in Library of Parliament BP-289, Obscenity: The Decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Butler.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Butler helped
to clarify the provisions of the Criminal Code, but there continues
to be confusion about what constitutes obscenity. As expressed in an
article in The Globe and Mail on 26 March 1993: “A year after
Canada became the first country to define pornography as materials that
harm women by degrading them, enforcement is infrequent, inconsistent
and based on ill-defined terms.” Police authorities complain that they
cannot act without more guidance as to what constitutes “degradation.”
Some women’s groups, while admitting that few charges have been laid,
believe that the law and the Supreme Court decision have nevertheless
had a self-policing effect on distributors.
In September 1991, Toronto police seized sexually explicit
videotapes as being obscene. Two people were charged with various criminal
counts of owning and distributing obscene material, notwithstanding the
fact that the tapes had been viewed and cleared by Ontario’s Film Review
Board. In October 1993, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the definition
of obscenity is limited in order to capture only material that creates
a substantial risk of harm. Moreover, the fact that films or videos have
been approved by a provincial agency such as the Ontario Film Review Board,
while relevant in terms of community standards, does not amount to a lawful
justification or excuse for their content, or a bar to prosecution: “The
[film] board’s approval is not binding on a court or determinative of
whether the films are criminally obscene” (R. v. Hawkins
(1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 549). This incident highlights the differences between
federal and provincial laws. It also illustrates the problems of enforcement
of the obscenity provisions when some provinces adopt a more lenient attitude
than others, as well as the difficulties and unpredictability inherent
in the “community standards” test.
In November 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
retailers cannot assume that a film is not obscene simply because it received
prior approval from a film review board. At the same time, the Court
held that retailers of pornographic material must have at least a “general
idea” that their products are obscene if they are to be found guilty of
knowingly selling obscene materials. The Court warned, however,
that retailers cannot avoid liability by simply turning a blind eye to
whether or not the material could be obscene under the law, or viewing
the material themselves and deciding whether or not it is obscene (R.
v. Jorgensen, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55).
In the autumn of 1994, the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association, the Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium in Vancouver and
its owners challenged provisions of the Customs Tariff and its
Schedule VII that authorize the seizure of obscene materials at the border,
or “prior restraint,” arguing that the system violated the Charter’s section
2(b) freedom of expression guarantee. It was also contended that the
law’s application discriminated against the authors and consumers of the
prohibited material on the basis of their sexual orientation, contrary
to section 15. Government defendants conceded the section 2(b) infringement,
but argued that it was justified under section 1 of the Charter; they
denied any section 15 violation.
The January 1996 ruling of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia considered the constitutionality of both the legislation and
its application. Turning first to the law, the Court acknowledged a disproportionate
impact on lesbian and gay individuals; however, it found this “inevitable”
unequal effect not to be discriminatory under section 15, because “homosexual
obscenity is proscribed because it is obscene, not because it is homosexual.”
The Court also found the legislation to be a justifiable limit on freedom
of expression under section 1. In its view, criteria previously articulated
by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to section 2(b) and obscenity
were equally applicable to homosexual material. Having found the law
per se in compliance with the Charter, however, the Court concluded
that systemic deficiencies in the law’s application and patterns of arbitrary
and improper practices by Customs officials had resulted in the wrongful
prohibition of admissible materials. These shortcomings infringed the
section 2(b) rights of the plaintiffs as well as of authors, artists and
other consumers in Canada. In the result, the Court issued a declaration
that the legislative provisions at issue had been construed and applied
in violation of section 2(b) and section 15 (Little Sisters Book and
Art Emporium et al. v. Canada (Minister of Justice of Canada) (1996),
131 D.L.R. (4th) 486).
In June 1998, the British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled
that harm could arise from the proliferation of obscenity – whether homosexual
or heterosexual – and that the Customs Act is reasonable
legislation in a free and democratic society. The majority of the Court
felt that the law allowing agents to seize gay material is not unconstitutional.
There was, however, a lengthy dissenting opinion from the third judge.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which heard arguments
on 16 March 2000; on 15 December 2000, the Supreme Court rendered
its decision, with three judges dissenting in part. While the Court ruled
that the Customs Act and Customs Tariff were constitutional,
it found that Customs officials’ adverse treatment in applying the legislation,
targeting the appellants at the administrative level, was prejudicial
and demeaning to their dignity. The resulting section 15 violation was
not capable of section 1 justification as it was not “prescribed by law”
(Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of
Justice)).
Several cases involved indecent or immoral theatrical
performances, such as so-called “lap dancing.” In R. v. Ludacka
(1996), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 565, 28 O.R. (2d) 19, the Ontario Court of Appeal
ruled that performances involving physical sexual contact between the
performers and patrons constituted an immoral performance contrary to
section 167(1) of the Criminal Code. The activity was not protected
under section 2 of the Charter, as it could not be characterized as a
form of expression. In March 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed
that “sexual touching” in such circumstances was illegal: writing for
a unanimous court, Mr. Justice John Sopinka said that the practice is
degrading to women and “objectifies [them] in a socially unacceptable
manner.” In the Court’s view, lap dancing exceeds community standards
of tolerance, although it is not clear whether other forms of touching
between dancers and patrons would be permissible (R. v. Mara,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 630).
PARLIAMENTARY
ACTION
A. Justice Committee
Report, 22 March 1978
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
Legal Affairs issued a report after conducting a study of the subject
matter of several Private Members’ bills dealing with pornography. The
report made a number of recommendations, among them a new definition of
obscenity that would have included “degradation,” and that would also
have included reference to materials involving children.
B. Bill C-51, First
Reading 1 May 1978 (3rd Session, 30th Parliament)
This omnibus Criminal Code amendment bill included
a redefinition of obscenity similar to the Justice Committee’s recommendation.
It died on the Order Paper, as did identical Bill C-21, introduced
in November 1978.
C. Bill C-19, First
Reading 7 February 1984 (2nd Session, 32nd Parliament)
This omnibus Criminal Code amendment bill included
a new definition of obscenity which no longer required that obscene material
have a sexual element; the bill also specified degrading representations
as a means of “undue exploitation” and substituted “matter or thing” for
“publication” in the definition. It provided for forfeiture of obscene
material, and would have placed limitations on prosecutions of materials
passed by provincial classification boards. The bill died on the Order
Paper in July 1984.
D. Bill C-38, First
Reading 1 April 1985 (1st Session, 33rd Parliament)
This bill, which received Royal Assent on 3 April 1985,
amended the Customs Tariff to incorporate the obscenity standard
in the Criminal Code by reference. It was necessitated by a court
decision striking down the previous prohibition on the importation of
“immoral or indecent” material as contrary to the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Originally slated to expire on 30 June 1987, the tariff
item was extended on an annual basis until 1989, when it was made permanent.
It is now Tariff Item 9956 of Schedule VII to the Customs Tariff.
E. Bill C-114, First
Reading 10 June 1986 (1st Session, 33rd Parliament)
This bill would have repealed the obscenity provisions
in the Code (and in the Customs Tariff), replacing them with strict
and more objective provisions dealing with various types of pornography.
It died on the Order Paper in August 1986.
F. Bill C-54, First
Reading 4 May 1987 (2nd Session, 33rd Parliament)
Bill C-54 constituted a revision of Bill C-114, with
some relatively minor changes and a few important additions.
The bill proposed amendments to the Criminal Code
and the Customs Tariff that were similar in structure to the recommendations
of the Fraser Committee, with some significant differences. There would
have been a series of “tiered” offences, the severity of punishment depending
on the nature of the material in issue. The offences would have applied
to visual matter, i.e., child pornography, pornography showing physical
harm in a sexual context, sexually violent pornography, “degrading” pornography,
and what might be termed “simple” pornography. Each type of pornography
would have had a specific statutory definition, and “dealing” in any would
be an offence. All, except child pornography and pornography showing
physical harm, would have been subject to a defence based on artistic
merit or scientific, medical or educational purpose. Perhaps the most
significant difference between the bill and the recommendations of the
Fraser Report was with respect to “simple pornography,” i.e., the depiction
of non-violent, non-degrading sex acts involving consenting people. The
Fraser Committee would have placed restrictions only on the display of
such material; the bill (subject to the defences just noted) would presumptively
have prohibited manufacture, distribution, sale and any other dealing
in such material.
Child pornography would have been treated harshly, with
the use of persons under the age of 18 in the production of sexually explicit
material severely punished. Simple possession (i.e., not for commercial
or distribution purposes) would also have been made a summary conviction
offence. In a new departure, dealing in matter or “commercial communication”
that “incites, promotes, advocates or encourages” any of the conduct covered
by the definition of the various types of pornography (except the conduct
involved in simple pornography) would also have been made a severely punished
offence.
The bill would have incorporated the new pornography
standards into offences dealing with theatrical performances, with the
corresponding defences, and into that provision of the Customs Tariff
dealing with prohibited imports. Finally, following a recommendation
of the Fraser Report, “sex” would have been included in the definition
of “identifiable group” in the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal
Code.
Bill C-54 was very controversial. Although some efforts
were made to limit the scope of its proposed restrictions on pornography,
some contend that the changes were merely cosmetic. It was argued that,
in limiting defences as it did, and in proposing to apply the full force
of the law only to material which was sexually explicit and not to that
which was violent or degrading, the bill was an overreaction, and a threat
to civil liberties. There remains, however, a significant constituency
that wishes to see even greater controls on explicit materials. It may
not be possible to reconcile these views in legislation.
Bill C-54 died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved
on 1 October 1988.
G. Bill C-128, Royal
Assent 23 June 1993 (3rd Session, 34th Parliament)
Bill C-128 received widespread support and speedy passage
through Parliament. Dealing solely with “child pornography,” which is
given its own definition, the bill creates separate offences for the production,
distribution and possession of such material, and prohibits the importation
of child pornography.
H. Justice Committee
Report, 16 November 1994 (1st Session, 35th Parliament)
In April 1994, the Minister of Justice tabled in the
House of Commons draft legislation that would prohibit the importation,
sale and distribution of crime cards and board games to those under the
age of 18. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs undertook a broad study of this issue, and tabled its Fourth Report
in November 1994. The Committee rejected the draft legislation as too
narrow, and recommended that the Minister of Justice table amendments
to the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with the
undue glorification or exploitation of horror, cruelty and violence.
CHRONOLOGY
1959 - The Criminal Code was amended to include
a statutory definition of obscenity based on “undue exploitation,” instead
of the common law concept which involved assessment of whether material
had a tendency to “deprave” or “corrupt.”
19 January 1978 - The Supreme Court of Canada, in the
McNeil case, upheld the constitutionality of provincial film censorship
and classification boards.
22 March 1978 - The House of Commons Justice Committee issued its report
on pornography.
1 May 1978 - Bill C-51, which would have redefined obscenity,
was introduced in the House of Commons.
12 January 1981 - Bill C-53, which contained amendments
to the Criminal Code on child pornography, was introduced in the
House of Commons.
16 February 1981 - The Committee on Sexual Offences Against
Children and Youth (the Badgley Committee) was formed, part of its mandate
being to inquire into child pornography.
17 April 1982 - The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
contains a guarantee of freedom of expression, was proclaimed in force.
31 March 1983 - The Ontario Divisional Court ruled, based
on the Charter, that the powers of the Ontario Censor Board to order deletions
from films, or to ban films, must be supported by explicitly enunciated
guidelines, which do not abridge freedom of expression. The Court of
Appeal later upheld this decision.
23 June 1983 - The Minister of Justice announced the
formation of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (the
Fraser Committee).
7 February 1984 - Bill C-19, which contained several
amendments to the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code, was
given first reading in the House of Commons.
22 August 1984 - The Badgley Committee issued its report,
recommending the establishment of new offences having to do with the production
of child pornography and the sale of pornography to children.
31 October 1984 - The Ontario Divisional Court struck
down a Toronto by-law and a provision of the Ontario Municipal Act
which purported to regulate the sale of erotic magazines.
14 March 1985 - The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that
that part of the Customs Tariff which forbade the importation of
“immoral or indecent” material was constitutionally invalid. In response,
the Act was amended by R.S.C. 1985 (1st Supp.), chap. 21, to incorporate
the obscenity standard, by reference. Subsequently, the tariff item was
extended annually until 1989, when it became permanent.
3 April 1985 - Bill C-38, which amended the Customs
Tariff to incorporate the obscenity standard in the Criminal Code
by reference, received Royal Assent.
23 April 1985 - The Fraser Committee’s report on pornography
and prostitution was released, recommending extensive revision of the
law.
10 June 1986 - The government introduced Bill C-114 embodying
proposals for new laws on pornography. This bill died on the Order
Paper when Parliament was prorogued in August 1986.
4 May 1987 - The government introduced Bill C-54, a revision
of the proposals on pornography in Bill C-114. This bill died on the
Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved in October 1988.
27 February 1992 - The Supreme Court of Canada upheld
the constitutionality of the obscenity provisions in the Criminal Code,
in R. v. Butler.
13 May 1993 - The government introduced Bill C-128,
dealing with child pornography. The bill was passed quickly by the House
of Commons and Senate, and received Royal Assent on 23 June 1993.
It was proclaimed in force on 1 August 1993.
16 November 1994 - The House of Commons Standing Committee
on Justice and Legal Affairs, in its Fourth Report, recommended that the
Minister of Justice table amendments to the obscenity provisions of the
Criminal Code dealing with the undue glorification or exploitation
of horror, cruelty and violence. In its response of 19 April 1995, the
government agreed, and undertook further study of possible amendments
to the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code.
REFERENCES
Library of Parliament. Bibliography Nos. 241 and 241
(Supp.) Pornography and Prostitution in Canada.
* The original version of this Current Issue Review
was published in February 1984; the paper has been regularly updated
since that time.
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