BOUNDARY PERMEABILITY IN PERSPECTIVE

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These papers were presented at *Permeable Borders And Boundaries In A Globalising World: New Opportunities Or Old Problems?* Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, August 25 – 27, 1999, organised by the International Boundaries Research Unit, University Of Durham, UK with the Department of National Defence, (Maritime Forces Pacific), Okanagan University College, Simon Fraser University, University of British Columbia and University College of the Cariboo.

Introduction

A number of speakers explored the concept of boundary permeability, and raised concerns about its validity. *Gerald Blake* (University of Durham, UK) drew attention to the scarcity of data about boundary permeability worldwide. He cautioned against assumptions about the desirability of permeability in all circumstances, and the effect of permeability on state of sovereignty. *Martin Pratt* (University of Durham, UK) asked what factors affect permeability, and whether there are objective measures which would permit comparative studies of different boundaries. Emphasising the range of factors affecting permeability, both positive (when the state opens up the border) and negative (when the state fails to control the border), he concluded that a meaningful *"index of permeability"* remains beyond our reach. Not all speakers however were content with a literal-geographical approach to boundary permeability. *Glen Hearns* (University of British Columbia, Canada) discussed the effects of intellectual property rights in restricting the flow of genetic resources for food and agriculture. Such intellectual boundaries are in need of urgent reassessment, and run contrary to globalisation trends. *Stanley Brunn* (University of Kentucky, USA) also highlighted numerous ways in which international boundaries still matter, many of which can be measured, such as lifestyles, welfare of children, and the *"politics of plants and animals."*

In spite of all the excitement about a globalising world and the new opportunities it presents, there was inevitably considerable attention given to some old problems and possible solutions. *Joseph Schwartzberg* University of Minnesota) presented four possible options for a new regime along the Line of Control in Kashmir, developed by the Kashmir Study Group, and superbly presented in maps designed for dialogue. *Ian Townsend-Gault* (University of British Columbia, Canada) described the remarkable informal diplomacy which he and his colleagues have conducted in southeast Asia over several years, with particular reference to the South China Sea. This paper, together with that of *Alan Henrikson* (Tufts University, USA) left participants

wanting to hear more about diplomacy, which is often overlooked in academic gatherings. Given certain conditions, Professor Henrikson argued that transfrontier diplomacy can ameliorate relations between border communities and between central governments.

Several speakers drew attention to the difficulties of managing permeable boundaries, using real-world examples. *Eberhard Bort* (Edinburgh University, UK) contrasted the internal and external frontiers of the European Union. Free movement between signatory states of the Schengen Agreement is a reality, but their external frontiers have become more *"fiercely controlled"* than ever. In the long run, effective control may be impossible to achieve along the margins of the European Union. North American contributors presented some equally striking results of research along the Canada-US and Mexico-US borders. *Theodore Cohn* (Simon Fraser University) has researched the San Diego-Tijuana (Mexico-US) and Cascadian (Vancouver-Seattle) border regions to examine the major obstacles to promoting a *"seamless"* border, such as regulations and disputes over the movement of trucks and people. Much has been achieved, but cross-border transport systems remain critical to the competitiveness of border regions. With greatly increased cross-border flows in Cascadia, *Donald Alper* (Western Washington University, USA) asked whether there is any evidence of the beginning of regional integration, and concluded that there is little interest in Cascadia as a concept deep down, and no signs of coherent cross-border community emerging. This may change however as *Alan Artibise* (University of British Columbia, Canada) suggested in his paper on the Cascadia Corridor Task Force, established by the Premier of British Columbia and the Governor of Washington in 1999. This will develop a border business plan, improve transport, agree joint policies on growth management, and encourage bi-national tourism.

Daniel Turbeville (Eastern Washington University, USA) and *Susan Bradbury* (Florida Atlantic University, USA) similarly underlined the need for improvement to NAFTA transportation corridors in Western North America. *Rosalba Linares* (Nottingham University, UK) presented a sobering case study of the Columbia-Venezuela border, where the Cartagena Agreement (1997) should facilitate free flow of goods. In 1999 a Venezuelan truck drivers' strike, allegedly because of unfair competition from Colombian drivers, resulted in suspension of the agreement.

Three speakers offered fresh perspectives on the debate about permeable boundaries and the globalisation process. *Matthew Coleman* (Carleton University, Canada) argued that our preoccupation with international boundaries as fences is strongly underpinned in the west by the fear of being overwhelmed by *"the wretched of the earth."* He challenged us to look beyond the fence, and to recognise that much of what goes on there, such as environmental degradation, is connected with what goes on inside the fence. Until they find ways of coping with scarcities globally, wealthy states will feel the necessity to reinforce their borders. *Steven Jackson* (Carleton University, Canada) reported on his research into *"technopoles"*, major concentration of high technology. A notable example is Malaysia's multi-media super corridor, (15 x 50 km), including two *"cyber cities."* The whole project is symbolic of the borderless world, but it is creating new kinds of barriers exemplified by the building workers from Bangladesh and Indonesia (for whom the borderless world is unreal) and the high technology technocrats (for whom the borderless world is virtual reality). *Valerie Assetto* (Colorado State University, USA)

also reported surprising findings concerning problems of the Danube and Tisza rivers in central Europe, where Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine have proved reluctant to continue their erstwhile cooperation. These states are in effect reasserting their sovereignty in the face of globalisation.

Joe Painter (Durham University, UK) raised questions about the nature of citizenship in tomorrow's Europe where regions are gaining more political autonomy, and the European Union is playing an ever stronger role. The model of citizenship based on national identity and the traditional nation state no longer seems appropriate; it may one day give way to *"multi-level"* citizenship in Europe whose implications may be clearer when the speaker completes an Economic and Social Research Council project on this theme. *James Scott* (Institute for Regional Development, Berlin) spoke about transnational regionalism in Europe which is surprisingly far advanced, with over 60 regional projects. On the other hand most such regions are top-down subsidised schemes which have not grown from local grass roots, and are not as yet seriously challenging the nation state in Europe. *Anthony Asiwaju* (University of Lagos, Nigeria) and his African colleagues are following events in Europe with interest. Professor Asiwaju believes that the experience of Europe in transboundary cooperation could be applied to West Africa – for example to Borgo, partitioned between Benin and Nigeria.

Tom Edwards (Microsoft, USA) contrasted academic and corporate views of the borderless world, in an arresting paper on *"Information geopolitics."* While corporations are among the leading promoters of *"connectedness"* between peoples worldwide, they continue to encounter the realities of nationalism and territoriality in their operations. His specific example of having to publish particular versions of territorial disputes to please potential clients generated considerable discussion. *Robert Adamson* (UBC, Canada) argued that the role of borders is determined in part by the way in which law makers define their significance. Increasingly, policy makers are having to redefine their concepts of state sovereignty to deliver the social *"goods"* that laws are supposed to provide. International cooperation, and the extra-territorial application of domestic laws are striking examples. States will be forced to redefine sovereignty still further in the future, although borders will continue to have an important role.

Roy Bradshaw (Nottingham University, UK) sounded a note of caution about globalisation, based on research in Latin America which does not appear well placed to benefit. There are winners and losers in the globalisation process, and Latin America is among the losers on most counts. *Heather Nicol* (Okanagan University College, Canada) saw Caribbean integration as regional evidence of the globalisation process. After decades of political fragmentation, the Association of Caribbean States was established with objectives which go far beyond free trade and espouse multinationalism, and the creation of a Caribbean Sea is recognised as *"common heritage"*, and the putative maritime boundary system is being downgraded in favour of cooperation. *Martin Whittles* (University College of the Cariboo, Canada) brought further evidence of permeable boundaries from the circumpolar north where the new Inuit Circumpolar Conference is now effectively promoting Inuit interests in five countries. This development is in stark contrast to the 1960s onwards when the Inuit were unable to permeate international boundaries.

A number of papers reported attempts to find new solutions to old problems. *Clive Schofield* (Durham University, UK) reviewed maritime transboundary cooperative ventures in Southeast Asia. *Austen Morgan* (UK) described the implications of the Belfast Agreement for the Anglo-Irish border. *William Wood* (US Department of State) illustrated how GIS has been an effective tool in cross-border crisis management, especially in preparation for humanitarian intervention; *"when it comes to humanisation intervention it is not a borderless world." John Roberts* (Financial Times, UK) examined attempts to find safe alignments for oil pipelines from the Caspian region where regional conflicts, not international boundaries, are the main deterrent to investors.

Characteristically, *David Newman* (Ben Gurion University, Israel) tried to make sense of the wealth of ideas and information presented in this conference. Like most contributors, he does not believe that *"deterritorialisation"* is happening. Territory and its physical delimiters – boundaries – clearly remains important in the formation of ethnic and national identities. While some boundaries are opening up, elsewhere new boundaries are being created as ethno-territorial conflicts are fought out and resolved. Our approach to boundaries needs to be multidimensional, as so many papers in the conference demonstrated. There are, however, many questions about boundaries in the new world order yet to be answered. Not surprisingly, therefore, *Victor Konrad* (US-Canada Fulbright Program, Ottawa) was eagerly listened to when he spoke about *"cross-border research and funding issues."*

Over the Borders of the Borderless World

List of Papers

I.   New Opportunities/Old Problems

The World Political Map: Are the Colours Fading or is our Vision Impaired?
Professor Gerald Blake
Director, International Boundaries Research Unit
University of Durham, Durham, UK

Information Geopolitics: Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty
Mr. Tom Edwards
Geographer, Microsoft Corporation
Seattle, Washington, USA

Law, Sovereignty and Trans-nationalism: Competing Trends in Global and Domestic Justice*
Mr. Robert Adamson

II: Redefining the Functions of Boundaries in the Americas

*Caribbean Integration and the Global Context***
Professor Heather Nicol
Department of Geography, Okanagan University College
Kelowna, B.C., Canada

*Making the Circle Complete Once Again: Original Peoples, Permeable Boundaries and Globalisation in the Circumpolar North***
Dr. Martin Whittles
Department of Social and Environmental Studies
University College of the Cariboo, Kamloops, B.C., Canada

Re-Defining the Functions of Boundaries in the Americas: A Latin American Perspective
Dr. Roy Bradshaw
Department of Geography,
University of Nottingham, UK

III: Regionalism and Sub-Regionalism in Europe

European Borders in Transition: The Internal and External Frontiers of the European Union
Mr. Eberhard Bort
Associate Director, International Social Sciences Institute
University of Edinburgh, UK

Citizenship, Identity and the Nation State : Regional Identity and European Citizenship
Dr. Joe Painter
Department of Geography
University of Durham, UK

Transnational Regionalism and European Integration*
Dr. James Scott
Research Associate and Project-Co-ordinator,
Institute for Regional Development and Structural Policy, Berlin, Germany

Session IV: Emerging Perspectives

Trans-Frontier Regionalism: The European Union
Perspective on Post-Colonial Africa With Special

Reference to Partitioned Borgu*
Professor Anthony Asiwaju
Department of History
University of Lagos, Nigeria

Transboundary Co-operative Endeavours in
*Southeast Asia**
Dr. Clive Schofield
Deputy Director, International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, UK

Permeating Boundaries: Ecosystem /Intellectual Property Protection*
Mr. Glen Hearns
Centre for Asian Legal Studies, University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Session V: A Borderless North America?

Transportation and Competitiveness in North America: The Cascadian and San Diego-Tijuana Border Regions
Professor Ted Cohn
Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University

Conflicts, Transboundary Visions and Agendas: Economic and Environmental "Cascadians"
Professor Donald Alper
Director of Canadian and Canadian-American Studies, Western Washington University

Trans-border Issues in Cascadia: The B.C. - Washington Corridor Task Force*
Professor Alan Artibise
University of British Columbia

NAFTA and Transportation Corridor Improvement in Western North America: Restructuring for the 21st Century*
Dr. Daniel E. Turbeville
Department of Geography, Eastern Washington University
Cheney, Washington

and Dr. Susan Bradbury
Department of Urban & Regional Planning
Florida Atlantic University, Davie, Florida, USA

Cross Border Research and Funding Issues*
Dr. Victor Konrad
US-Canadian Fulbright Program, Ottawa

VI: Fresh Perspectives on Old Boundary Issues

Managing International Capital Flows*
Mr. William Stormont
Graduate Student, Faculty of Commerce
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Ecological Degradation and the Scarcity-Conflict Methodology
Mr. Mathew Coleman
Institute for Political Economy, Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

Case Study of Columbia-Venezuelan Boundary Issues*
Ms. Rosabla Linares
Graduate Student, University of Nottingham, UK

Technopoles and Development in a Borderless World:
Boundaries Erased, Boundaries Constructed
Mr. Steven Jackson
Institute for Political Economy, Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

VII: Intractable Disputes

Permeable Border/Impermeable Sovereignties: International Rivers in Central Europe*
Dr. Valerie J. Assetto
Department of Political Science, Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado, USA

Permeating the Irish Border: Practical North-South Co-operation Under the Belfast Agreement
Dr. Austen Morgan
Barrister, UK

Kosovo/Yugoslavia/Iraq*
Mr. John Roberts
Financial Times, London, UK

VIII: Conceptual Issues

Can the Permeability of Borders Be Measured?*
Mr. Martin Pratt
Research Officer, International Boundaries Research Unit
Durham, UK

De-territorialisation or Re-territorialisation: The Changing Role of Boundaries in a Globalised World*
Professor David Newman
Head of Department of Politics and Government
Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

The Geopolitics of Life and Living: Where Boundaries Still Matter*
Dr. Stanley D. Brunn and Dr. John F. Watkins
Department of Geography, University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky.

IX: Problems and Process

Refugees and Kosovo
Dr. William Wood
Director, Office of the Geographer
United States Department of State, Washington D.C., USA

***Facing Across Borders: The Diplomacy of* Bon Voisinage**
Professor Alan Henrikson
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

When Boundaries are off the Agenda: Informal Diplomacy in the South China Sea
Professor Ian Townsend-Gault
Director, Centre for Asian Legal Studies
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

BOUNDARY PERMEABILITY IN PERSPECTIVE

Gerald Blake
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International Boundaries Research Unit
University of Durham

World political maps can be dangerous

The world political map has a powerful hold over most of us. World maps tend to be printed in bright colours, and the deep blue of the oceans provides an attractive setting for the mosaic of states which occupy the land. They also appeal to us because they are familiar, from our recollections of the map on the schoolroom wall to the tiny version of the same we can look at in our diaries when we are bored on the train or the bus. World maps are commonly part of the decor in offices and railway and airport waiting rooms all over the globe. Some of the finest world maps are triumphs of cartography and printing, and within the limits of scale and cost they convey an impression of reality which has genuine value.

Such maps are also misleading sources of information, quite apart from the distortions of various projections. They give an impression of stability, of somehow being the finished product, a tidier version of older maps which were evolving towards the ideal. Every part of the land is occupied by states usually outlined with thick red, green or black lines, each state named, and with its capital city shown. Few world maps show boundary disputes. Even fewer show maritime boundaries, although there are now some 160 maritime boundaries (or about one third of the potential) formally agreed between states. No distinction is made between boundaries marked out on the ground, and those which are delimited but not demarcated. Many maps carry dated or inaccurate information which should have been known at the time of printing. Part of the problem of course is not with the map itself, but with the viewer. Most maps are clearly dated, and it is our fault if we forget that the map is merely a snapshot of political arrangements at a point in time. In reality the pattern evolves constantly, sometimes dramatically as in the past decade and sometimes imperceptibly as during the period of the Cold War. The world map of 100 years ago was very different to our map today, and ours may be equally unrecognisable 100 years from now.

Another problem, (for which we can hardly blame the cartographers), is that international boundaries are three-dimensional whereas our one-dimensional maps have conditioned us to overlook this vital fact. States control the airspace above their land territories and above their territorial seas (to 12 nautical miles (nm) offshore), vertically to an undefined height. Coastal states have rights to resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves. In the case of the EEZ this means exclusive rights to the resources of the water column and the seabed to a distance of 200 nm offshore. In the case of the continental shelf it means exclusive rights to seabed resources to more than 200 nm offshore, where the physical continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm. States jealously guard their rights in airspace, in their offshore waters, and in their land territories. To evaluate the permeability of the boundary system of a particular

state all these dimensions deserve consideration. There is much evidence to suggest that state control of offshore areas is being avidly asserted and reinforced all over the world, as witnessed by the growing volume of national legislation, the proliferation of island and maritime disputes, and state spending on patrol vessels and surveillance systems. Similarly, airspace intrusions are taken very seriously, as shown by the shooting down of a Pakistani aircraft in Indian airspace in August 1999. In an item on BBC TV news on 13 August 1999 about air traffic control chaos over central Europe, a reporter speaking from an aircraft said that while we may not see boundaries on the ground nowadays, "they are very much in evidence up here."

Perhaps the feature of our world political maps which is most misleading, is the depiction of international boundaries as though they all have the same status, age, and function. Of course there is a limit to what can be shown at world scale, but it is surprising that in this respect cartography has hardly moved on since the beginning of the century. In the days when state boundaries were containers and barriers, and were fixed with military and geopolitical objectives in mind, thick lines indistinguishable from each other may have been appropriate. Now that the functions of state boundaries are changing, it is time for cartographers to take up the challenge. Indeed Brad Thomas called for us to consider new ways of showing international boundaries at the 1998 IBRU conference. [1] A good starting point may be to indicate broadly the permeability of international boundaries all of which lie somewhere on a spectrum from totally closed to totally open. At least some distinction could be made between "hard" and "soft" boundaries, with an indication of those which remain in dispute. Greater cartographic sophistication may prove possible, and of course the opportunity to produce C D-Rom versions with impressive detail is now available.

Mapping permeability : desirable but daunting

"Permeability" is a term borrowed from the physical sciences where it has precise meaning and the process is measurable. The permeability of a geological stratum is the result of the physical characteristics of the rock as a barrier and the frequency and volume of rainfall. Boundary permeability is the product of the barrier characteristics of the boundary (the outcome of legal, geographical, historical and social factors) and the pressures on the boundary from people, goods, capital, ideas, and so on. Permeability is however most often used as convenient shorthand for trans-boundary collaboration, borderland initiatives, and open-ness.

The task of mapping boundary permeability at global scale is probably beyond the capacity of any research team or publishing group anywhere in the world today. A proper analysis would involve data collection across 308 or more land boundaries separating 190 independent states and some 70 dependencies, not to mention maritime and airspace boundaries. National statistics about the circulation of people and goods are often unavailable, or cannot be related to particular points of entry. The communications revolution and the growing volume of information and ideas crossing international boundaries is the inspiration for much of the debate about the fading of the state and the collapse of boundaries. Martin Pratt discusses the internet and its staggering implications elsewhere in this volume. Here it may be enough to say firstly, that in 1999 in spite of breathtaking growth, access to the internet remains uneven, and is still massively concentrated

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among relatively few of the world's 5,900 million people and in relatively few well-off states, dominated by the Anglophone world. Secondly, even if detailed statistics about the internet were available as an indicator of permeability, much thought would need to be given to weighting this phenomenon in relation to flows of people and goods.

Nevertheless, mapping permeability at world scale should be attempted. Membership of the world's most active political and economic blocks could be highlighted, distinguishing between internal boundaries (with a growing level of permeability) and the external boundaries which tend to become less permeable. The greatest concentration of open borders in the world is in the European Union (EU) whose 15 member states in 1999 share 20 internal EU boundaries. Although representing only 6.5 per cent of the world's land boundaries they ought to show up on a world map. When the six intending members of the EU are added, internal EU boundaries would become almost 10 per cent of the world total. The outer margins of the EU, where borders are "hardening" also need to be depicted differently. The outer perimeter of the EU clearly has to be properly controlled if internal borders are to remain open. [2] NAFTA, ASEAN, and other major associations of states could be similarly distinguished. The majority of states today belong to an economic or political grouping of some kind.

At the other end of the spectrum, it is not too difficult to identify a number of closed (or effectively closed) boundaries, most of which are heavily militarised, and in dispute. Turkey-Syria, North-South Korea, India-Pakistan, Iraq-Kuwait are examples. Such boundaries are clearly quite unlike those for example in the EU which are peaceful, and highly permeable. A large proportion of the world's land boundaries no doubt fall somewhere between these two extremes – perhaps 200 of them. It would be highly instructive to break these down into levels of permeability, but Martin Pratt highlights the difficulties involved in such a task. One day it may be possible. In the meantime, there are arguments for doing what we can to create a more realistic political map of the world even if our categories are rather crude and incomplete. More detailed maps would have the great advantage of providing visual evidence to supplement the discourse about vanishing borders and the borderless world. Vanishing borders may (or may not) be a desirable outcome, but their advent may be more remote than is sometimes assumed.

The good news is that for a few individual boundaries, some illuminating data is being collected by a new generation of geography researchers. Much of this research throws light on boundary permeability, although that is not always the prime objective. The need for such empirical studies has been noted by Newman and Paasi. [3] If boundaries are becoming increasingly permeable, as is clearly the case in many parts of the world, boundary and borderland management will become increasingly important. Boundaries need to be open for legitimate crossings, while acting as an effective filter to unwanted people (bandits, criminals, smugglers, illegal migrants) and goods (drugs, weapons, pornography). It is a difficult balancing trick. Detailed knowledge of the rhythms, procedures and processes at border crossings, profiles of the people who cross, their origins and destinations, purposes of travel etc. provide the basis for controlled and humane management.

A Durham University postgraduate Abdullatif Al Shaikh conducted survey questionnaires in 1998-99 at a number of Saudi Arabia's border crossings with Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. About one third of all arrivals and departures were for the purpose of visiting relatives. A large proportion of arriving travellers passed through the check-points in less than 20 minutes, whereas truck drivers with local destinations typically spent two or more hours passing through. All these states are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council whose eventual aim is open borders. But how should we interpret Al Shaikh's findings? On this evidence, are these borders open or not? What more could be reasonably expected? Maybe open borders are not as easily recognised as we would like to think.

Permeability is not always good

In general, the most accessible borders are also the most stress-free borders. They are characterised by a fair measure of political goodwill on either side. The boundary itself is likely to have been formally agreed and demarcated, and will be routinely maintained and managed by both parties. In all probability there will be collaborative arrangements in place for transboundary resource exploitation, and control of pollution. There may be a standing boundary commission to oversee boundary and borderland affairs. The classic models for boundary commission activities are the Canada-United States and the Mexico-United States international boundary commissions. Stress-free borders are usually easy to reach without encountering military controls, using good road or rail links. Open and stress-free borders are heavily used by tourists, and local people engaged in commuting, shopping, or visiting friends and relations. In the Middle East, and elsewhere no doubt, the most common reasons given for border crossings are social rather than economic. In this kind of environment, permeability is clearly desirable and beneficial to the borderland communities.

There are regrettably many parts of the world where permeable borders bring negative results. In these areas governments may be well advised to impose strict border controls, or to effectively close their borders. The point hardly needs to be laboured. All the indications seem to point to more and more international boundaries coming under stress from a variety of potentially costly and threatening phenomena. Equally, citizens of the states affected expect their governments to prevent such threats, which most of them perceive to be a function of the state boundary, although in practice this may not be the case. Four examples are:

1. **Illegal migrants/bogus asylum seekers etc.** Caused by political upheavals and economic deprivation, the international movement of illegal migrants is on a colossal scale, and growing. For obvious reasons nobody knows the precise figure, but worldwide illegal migrants already number millions. Most rich states are vulnerable. In 1999 the United Kingdom seemed to be particularly popular with asylum seekers. [4]
2. **Refugees.** Civil wars and famine are major causes of large-scale refugee movements. Some large refugee groups are semi-permanent while others as in Central Africa disperse after a short time. Refugees create enormous strains and stresses on the host country politically, economically, and environmentally. One of the most abnormal international boundaries is Burma-Thailand, where large numbers of Karen refugees settled in

Thailand retain cross-border contacts.[5] There are some 16 million refugees in the world today, a significant proportion of whom remain permanently close to the borders of their homelands.

3.   **Smuggling.** The greatest concern is with drug smuggling, with North America and Europe the most favoured target areas. Much of the drug trade is overland, and a considerable number of states are involved in attempting to intercept supplies. In practice many drug seizures are made away from international boundaries.

4.   **War lords and bandits.** Several borderlands in Africa and elsewhere are beyond the effective control of central governments,. They have become the power domains of rebels whose objectives may be either political or criminal or both. The state boundaries bordering these regions may be extremely permeable, but hardly to the advantage of the local population, or to the state. [6]

Permeable boundaries do not negate sovereignty

The modern state system can be said to have had its formal beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which ended 30 years of war in Europe. The treaty established the right of the state to exercise its functions within its own territory to the exclusion of all other states, thus confirming the link between sovereignty and territory. Only states (and not the church) were able to exercise political control, and no state could interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. Within state territory sovereignty was absolute, extending to limits defined by boundary lines of no thickness. The drawing of state boundaries had the effect of creating national consciousness through exclusion. With European imperial expansion, the Westphalian nation state concept was exported to all the corners of the globe, and became the cornerstone of international order. In the context of thousands of years of political history the state is a relatively new idea, and international boundaries are almost a novelty. Few expect the state system as we know it today to survive for ever, and the character and purpose of international boundaries will evolve with new forms of political organisation. It is however difficult to envisage a world without boundaries.

The processes which we all agree are creating more permeable boundaries are undoubtedly powerful. Similarly it is undeniable that the modern state has a considerably reduced capacity to control its own economic affairs, deliver security to all its citizens, and ensure a clean and healthy environment. These facts have led to the assumption by some observers that borders are losing their meaning, and in time they will wither away. While it is true boundaries have lost a number of their former functions as military and economic barriers, they retain the fundamentally important role of defining the limits of the territorial sovereignty of the state. Dittgen[7] regards this legal function as the most important of all, and this view seems to be held by many international lawyers, including Marcel Kohen :

> "The exercise of power, whether "national" or "supra-national", remains essentially a territorial one. Laws continue to be adopted in order to be applied over a given territory, the Executive continues to take decisions applicable within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, judges are competent to deal with cases only if they have territorial jurisdiction. Even "supranational" decisions taken by organs of the European

Union are applicable only to the extent of the territorial limits designated by its member States. Hence, territory continues to mark the sphere of jurisdiction of States and international institutions. [8]

Although states increasingly transfer power to international institutions for certain purposes they have usually not abandoned these powers, and therefore remain sovereign. [9] In the majority of cases they have transferred, but not relinquished, these powers. There are also a number of other kinds of territorial status, including neutral zones, condominiums, joint development zones, dependencies etc in which the state is not sovereign. These should not detain us here. The essential point is that high levels of permeability along state boundaries do not diminish the constitutional necessity for boundaries, nor do they remove the important function of defining different legal systems.

There is not much evidence to suggest that governments anywhere in the world recognise the phenomenon of withering boundaries and loss of territorial sovereignty. On the contrary, states are as eager as ever to define and protect their territories and offshore areas. Land boundary agreements continue to be made, while existing land boundaries are being more accurately mapped using modern techniques such as G.P.S. Considerable sums are being spent on the demarcation and redemarcation of land boundaries. Offshore, there is great interest in delimiting the remaining 270 or so maritime boundaries which have not yet been agreed. The process is lengthy and often costly. Far from being a borderless world, about one third of ocean space is currently being partitioned between coastal states. The territorial instinct is still very strong among states and few matters can ignite nationalist fervour more readily than threats to territory.

Further evidence of the vitality of state sovereignty is the plethora of land and maritime boundary disputes, probably more than at any time since World War Two. Recent estimates identified 60 unresolved land boundary disputes, 26 unresolved maritime boundary disputes, and 32 ongoing disputes over island sovereignty.[10] In pursuit of their claims states are increasingly resorting to arbitration, or the International Court of Justice. Substantial costs are involved, and senior government officials may be preoccupied with cases for months (or even years). Although maritime disputes in recent decades have resulted in the temporary creation of some 16 joint development zones, the preferred option is invariably the negotiation of a line delimiting sovereignty.

More states, more boundaries?

David Newman and Anssi Paasi undertook a comprehensive and timely review of the literature on boundary narratives in political geography. [11] Their work revealed a wide range of opinions among top scholars across a range of disciplines concerning the future of the state and state boundaries. In all this uncertainty, one feature of the future world political map seems highly probable: there will be more states and thus more borders. They will emerge in response to several processes including:

A.   **Secession.** As a growing number of the "suppressed" nationalities of the fourth world assert themselves, some will undoubtedly achieve statehood. Ekkehard Borntrager has

argued that the time has come to open up the right of self-determination unequivocally as the only possible way to relieve rising tensions in the world political map. He detects an increasing tendency for international law to consider the claims of territorial self determination. [12] While there may be some 4,000 "fourth world" peoples in the world, not all would wish for statehood, or be able to make a credible case. A more realistic indicator may be the 50 plus members of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation representing 100 million people. [13] In mid August 1999 there were press reports in the same week of bids for secession in Russia's Daghestan and Namibia's Caprivi Strip, in addition to the long-running struggles in Chechnya and elsewhere.

B.   **Independence.** Some of the 70 dependencies are likely to opt for independence from their possessors, which include notably the United Kingdom and France.

C.   **Break-up of federal states.** There are 18 federal states in the world, with a total of something like 280 federal units. A number are undergoing serious strains and stresses, and seem destined to lose constituent members, if not disintegrate altogether. Saul Cohen predicted the emergence of 40 new states in the 21st century, by a variety of processes. [14] Most of these would be "gateway states" at favourable geopolitical and economic locations thriving on manufacturing, trade, tourism and financial services. British Columbia was among his examples. A number of his case seem improbable today, but 40 is a useful figure for speculation. There is by no means universal agreement that greater economic co-operation will lead to more superstates, and fewer small states. A 1997 study, quoted in the <u>Financial Times</u> showed that economic openness is likely to create more states, not less. Politics will become more local as markets become more global, because political separatism is less costly in a global economy. [15]

Conclusion: back to the future?

"If people are familiar with any map of the world at all, it is likely to be the map of so-called sovereign states". [16] That map, as we have seen, massively influences our conceptualisation of global political space, and has fostered the perception that all states share the same essential characteristics. This is just as absurd as the assumption that all the world's 308 or so land boundaries have the same origins, physical characteristics, fulfil the same roles, and will evolve in the same way. In reality, the sovereign states which comprise today's political map were carved out of a rich diversity of geopolitical, cultural and historic environments. Pre-state political space was organised in a considerable variety of ways, many of which did not recognise absolute sovereignty, or conceive of precise boundary lines. The state system widely superimposed on these traditions largely by Europeans, was alien and unpopular, and rarely coincided with the underlying human geographies.

Against this background it seems inevitable that as a new world order emerges there will be marked regional contrasts in the types of political entity and the boundaries which enclose them. Instead of looking for global trends, political geographers in the coming decade should take up the challenge of tracking regional differences. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that boundary and state futures in Europe are likely to diverge from those of the former Soviet Union.

Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East may develop quite differently. Pre-state territorial traditions in Islam provide a classic example:

> "In short, sovereignty in Islamic constitutional theory is concerned only with community and not with territory. It was only with the explicit introduction of the nation state that concepts of territorial sovereignty began to emerge." [17]

Precise boundaries and territorial sovereignty were therefore unimportant in Islam, and there have been calls for a return to this tradition. Besides the major groupings of states based on common cultures, history, and political experience, the world's 30 island states must not be forgotten. They are invariably overlooked in the debate about the future of the state, but they are a fundamental part of the picture.

Several cultural and ideological blocks might be identified in which the past could reassert itself. Much data needs to be assembled, and regional experts would need to be consulted to make any worthwhile predictions. In devising such a global breakdown of geopolitical/territorial traditions as a tool to examine the boundary futures, there might be some hints of Huntington's "clash of civilisations". In his view the separating fault lines between civilisations will mark the most important future conflicts. [18] This may be far-fetched, but as the contemporary world order disintegrates there could be a rush to retrieve old political styles and identities, many of which lie dormant under today's political map.

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Information Geopolitics:
Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty

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Introduction

The ideas and opinions expressed by the author in this text do not represent any official ideas and opinions of the Microsoft Corporation.

This discussion addresses the meaning and function of international boundaries in the coming century in relation to a concept I call "information geopolitics." It does not strive to make definitive statements about the nature of "nationhood" or the future of sovereignty, but it does attempt to point to some possible geopolitical trends on the horizon as related to the global infusion of information technology.

The geographic landscape of the past several decades has seen an upheaval and redirection that is unprecedented in relation to the decades that came before. This landscape consists of not only the basic territorial boundaries with which we are familiar, but also the cultures, economies, and controlling philosophies that contribute to geographic differentiation. For many decades, the discipline of *geopolitics* has guided the discussion on how these aspects of the geographic landscape interact on a political level, i.e., how real world geography is influenced by the presence of boundaries and their sovereign creators. Indeed, much of the recent past's geographic transitions have been focused on changes within and between sovereign national entities.

However, there is an emerging trend that reveals a strong movement of the power base away from a focus on territorial sovereignty and more towards one centred on economic control. Stated simply, this trend is "the receding power of the state relative to the global economy in mastering space." (Tuathail, p. 251). Much attention in this area has been given to the transnational corporations (TNCs) that have been growing exponentially in response to robust international markets demanding their goods. While this has worked well for the TNCs, it leaves open many questions as to how such corporate entities are affecting, altering, and shaping the territorial entities in which they thrive. By operating on such a global scale, within and between sovereign entities, the TNCs have in turn begun to operate on a similar plane as sovereign nations when it comes to protecting their interests abroad.

When coupled with the very rapid advances in information technology, global interpersonal connectivity, and a shifting paradigm of information usage - all developed and distributed by Tics - these new interactions challenge the notion of territoriality and the presence of "real" and meaningful boundaries. The resultant effect of this interaction between a global information

force and local traditional sovereignties is a "global versus local" clash of information contexts. **Information geopolitics** is an attempt to describe this clash and discern how it will affect real world social, political, and economic developments. The following brief discussion explores the nature of this evolving relationship between what we call sovereign nations and what we believe could be emerging forms of sovereignty for new geopolitical entities founded more in virtual than real space.

Redefining Geopolitics

Geopolitics has been a guiding discipline for defining global political interactions, yet we need to be clear about the definition of the term as it is used in the context of this discussion. The term itself is often associated today with concepts or perceptions that do not always agree with Rudolf Keller's original intentions in 1899, but they do not have to conform – new times require new definitions.

The classical definitions of geopolitics deal primarily with the notion of political spheres of influence, e.g., the Eastern Bloc, The West, and other supranational aggregations. Machinery's theories were revolutionary for their time, but today it is clearer that the "command of a particular part of the earth's surface does not apparently give a special advantage in spite of arguments developed earlier in the century that control of East Europe and the interior of Asia would give control of the 'world island'." (Cole, p. 241) At its best, geopolitics can serve as a proactive mechanism for discerning potential problems within various geographies - by studying the socio-political factors influencing local geography. At its worst, it can be contorted and manipulated to act as a propaganda device for purely nationalistic aims (e.g., the well-studied example of Nazi Germany).

Other forms of geopolitics have evolved more recently – such as "critical geopolitics." This newer variety seeks to use geopolitics as a critical filter for discerning the nature of the global power structure and its various influences on political and social systems. In this way, it acts as a voice of conscience in the field – taking a step back to examine how perceptions of politics have been formed and moulded over time. There is much that can be said about this recent concept. For now, let it suffice to say that critical geopolitics is a useful aspect of broader geopolitics as it helps to draw out the *deus ex machine* behind real world events, and as it also "deliberately attempts to avoid appearances of supporting or justifying the policies and arguments of any individual state." (O'Loughlin, p. 175)

Another recent iteration in geopolitical thought is Dijkink's concept of "geopolitical visions." Essentially, a geopolitical vision is "any idea concerning the relation between one's own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy." (Dijkink, p. 11) In line with more postmodernist thought, this definition of geopolitics incorporates a cognitive/perceptive dimension but it still "requires at least a Them-and-Us distinction and emotional attachment to a place." (Dijkink, p. 11) It deviates even more from the classic definitions in that it devolves itself of the strict inclusion of political structures and allows room for a more individualistic perception of geography and place.

We are no longer in the era where "geopolitics rested on the realist theory of international relations, and on the geography of states," (Black, p.110) so modern geopolitics should not be viewed as a static study of social and political environments. It has become a *dynamic* tool - a mechanism for portraying the temporal snapshot of a particular state or region or people, as well as a mechanism for predicting large-scale processes and changes in the short and long-term futures. It still focuses on the political mechanisms that exist between states but does so while realizing that the world today is a much more complex system. In response to dynamic social, economic, and political forces of our time, the scope of geopolitics continues to change to accommodate a changing world.

All of the preceding "flavours" of geopolitics do not necessarily serve the purpose of this discussion nor address the nature of a more recent political-economic system that is quickly developing, that is, an information-based economy. Information technology is rapidly altering the way in which nation-states interact with one another. However, we are still far away from reaching the ultimate goal implementing what Microsoft calls a *Digital Nervous System* (DNS). A DNS, put simply, is the way in which information is managed within a homogeneous organization on the small and large scale – whether in one's home, in a corporation, or even within a country (Gates, 1997). Its purpose is to realize and establish the notion that *information* is the backbone of a modern organization, whether it's a corporation or a nation-state. Most governments today are still wallowing in decades (or even centuries) of political dogma and administrative procedure that is quite difficult to overcome, i.e., they are far from realizing the benefits of a DNS-like structure. It is inevitable that most organizations will adopt some form of DNS, at various levels of maturity, as we move further into the Information Age. However, it's important to bear in mind that all DNS's are not alike – we are not discussing a single approach or solution to the problem. As the notion of the DNS propagates (in whatever form), it's important to be aware that the DNS - like any other by-product of a particular organization, political regime, or culture - is the DNS for a specific *cultural* and *political* context. This is due to the fact that most information is highly context-dependent - both in its source and in its destination.

If one imagines the future existence of many DNS's distributed globally - the DNS's not only of large transnational corporations but also of nation-states, and supranational aggregates (i.e., the UN, NATO, etc.) – then the interaction of information between context-dependent DNS's can produce many problems. While the networks may be physically connected in the correct manner, and while information formats may be compatible, there exist no effective means of resolving context differences in the <u>content</u> of the information moving through and between the DNS's. When opposing viewpoints on the same information are not compatible, we have a potential geopolitical crisis.

The definition of geopolitics changes significantly when viewed in the context of a world interacting more and more frequently via information exchange, the DNS, and other means to come. Instead of focusing chiefly on territoriality and power bases, it must consider the new, basic global interaction taking place in this new environment - arriving at a definition that is better suited for an Information Age, a definition for *information geopolitics*: **The political**

effects of two or more interacting Digital Nervous Systems of differing geographic contexts. However, the world is *not* currently populated with digital nervous systems. The existence of true DNS's are mostly in the realm of the transnational corporations who create them (and even then in incomplete stages of development); the vision of a broad 'paperless' society is far from having arrived. It is appropriate then to revise the above definition to incorporate a more generic perspective that works for the interim. When viewed on a broader, less technology-dependent scale, *information geopolitics* can be defined as: **The political effects of global information interacting with local information.**

The terms 'global' and 'local' are used here to define the context of scale – information used and/or accepted transnationally as compared to information that remains locally significant – to a country, an organization, or any particular group of people. The *global information standard* involves a level of understanding and availability of knowledge that is beyond the grasp of local government and/or cultural control. It is the information considered generally acceptable on a global basis, it is the "international" viewpoint or the shared opinion among nation-states and citizens. Global information is a pluralizing force. The *local information standard* contains strong references to local "reality" that may conflict with the global viewpoint, which could include: geographic facts, historical facts, the naming of people or features, the appearance of a map, et al. For example, declaring Canada as the country that contains the hydrologic feature Hudson Bay is an accepted, international fact that could pass from geographic context to geographic context without challenge. However, declaring a single country as the sole sovereign power over all of Jammu and Kashmir will undoubtedly face opposition from the local information contexts involved with the dispute. Local information then is a more divisive force.

The process of globalization is one to be taken seriously. The long-term effects remain to be seen, but indications are already clear that when a globalizing force intrudes upon a particular local context, there is a greater chance for conflict. Hall (1997, p.33) points out that "the return to the local is often a response to globalization." This response has been observed frequently in the software industry – where local markets respond to incoming, "Western" software with a particular vehemence that parallels the staging of real troops along its border. Microsoft has often experienced the reality during the globalization process that "you just have to wait for the local to erupt and disrupt the global." (Hall, p.39).

Notice that this new definition is purposefully less specific about boundaries or nationality. The boundaries are constructs of the political systems and histories in which they were designed and established – so we look past the boundaries themselves and towards the underlying culture that created them. The global and local context distinction emphasizes that "the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." (Huntington, p.159) It is this 'real world' cultural interaction on the basis of information exchange that defines the geographic ramifications of information geopolitics. Information, while contained and transmitted virtually, has real-world geopolitical effects that must be considered on the global and local scale.

What's in a Nation?

United Nations Charter - Article 4, Section 1:

"Membership in the United Nations is open to all other *peace-loving states* which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

As evident above, admission into the United Nations is permissible on the condition that a political entity is a "peace-loving state." Regardless of the peace-loving portion – what does it mean to be a "state" or a "nation" – or a "nation-state"? What forces define the aggregation of people into a homogeneous political body that can then declare itself "sovereign", and perhaps even peace-loving? In the previous section, we redefined geopolitics in order to proceed with a more relevant meaning. Likewise, the concept of the nation-state needs to be considered here in light of evidence telling us that "the clarity of the state frontier is now fading because the exercise of sovereign authority in certain domains is becoming either very difficult or impossible." (Anderson, p. 178)

There is no one, clear and acceptable definition for what defines a "nation". In fact, the terms "nation-state", "nation", "state" and "country" are often used interchangeably in various discussions. Defining what is meant by these terms is important here, in that by doing so we draw out the most basic factors that contribute to the identity of a nation-like group. If one were to examine the various available definitions of "nation" and aggregated them into a generic definition, then the classic notion of "nation" becomes a geopolitical entity that satisfies the existence of three major factors:

1. **People**: a homogeneous group.
2. **Territory**: a geographically defined area.
3. **Government**: an organizing, nationalistic body.

Within various sources there appears to be a distinction made between the terms "nation" and "nation-state." The key issue separating the two concepts is *territorial control*. If we adhere only to the "nation" definition above, we are left open to accepting the presence of many possible nations in today's geopolitical landscape, in fact "estimates of the number of stateless nations in the world run as high as 9,000." (Minahan, p. xvi). So the distinction we make between a "nation" and a "nation-state" is that in the former – the conditions of nationhood have been met but in the latter, the conditions of "statehood" have been met, i.e., the nation actually *controls* the territory they have defined as being theirs. The notion becomes clear that "the nation is the basis of political legitimacy…all assume that *the nation is bounded, that it has frontiers*." (Anderson, p. 42). As an example, the Kurdish people generally meet the conditions of nationhood but they have not satisfied the condition of *statehood* – they don't control the territory they view as being their exclusive realm. The idea of territorial control incorporates some degree of political, economic, and militaristic influence over the geography – it's actual control over space. One question to ponder here would be, is territory an absolute necessity to establish the legitimacy of a "nation" as a geopolitical force?

From the previous discussion we conclude that a "nation-state" is a nation that wholly controls its geographic space and by so doing has obtained its *sovereign* status. Under this typical model, it is the obtainment of sovereign status (i.e., statehood) that solidifies political control and it is this sovereignty that secures nation-states the right to self-determination. In short, "the exercise of a state's authority over its territory implies that sovereignty is complete and exclusive." (Knight, p. 75) So the generic "nation" definition above can be revised to reflect the "nation-state", as follows:

1. **People**: a homogeneous group *that demonstrates national consciousness.*
2. **Territory**: a geographically defined area *exclusively controlled by the governing body.*
3. **Government**: an organizing, nationalistic body *that solely represents the national interests abroad.*

Why is the definition of the "nation-state" so relevant to our focus on the notion of information geopolitics? It's important when we consider that "in the broad sweep of history, nation-states have been a transnational form of organization for managing economic affairs." (Ohmae, p.141) The nation-state serves as the fundamental geographic unit through which international political and economic systems interact, evolve, and conflict. By understanding the current perception of the nation-state we can move forward with examining how this perception is being altered by technological change.

The Position of Modern Sovereignty

How relevant are the conditions of sovereignty in today's evolving information-based economies and cultures? When considering the basis of present and future geopolitics being the flow and interaction of information of various contexts – do these conditions hold much meaning anymore? These are not easy questions to answer and certainly cannot be fully explored here - but an attempt should be made to make a surface evaluation of their relative importance.

People
The geopolitical process of individuals becoming a people, a people becoming a nation, and a nation becoming a nation-state starts, obviously, with human beings. The process exists by and for people and as such, people are its most critical element. Many studies and texts have been produced on the subject of nationalism and identity and the factors involved with their evolution - we need not delve into these here. It is sufficient to note that the phenomenon of people organizing themselves into nations and nation-states is a global phenomenon - it is not regionally or temporally unique, it is human nature.

In the face of rapidly changing technology, and more significantly, the increased presence of global information amongst local societies (through mere exposure - not necessarily through extensive technological implementation), it is not human nature that is changing but rather the end result of that applied nature. Many of the present ethnic conflicts and struggles for nationalism can be argued as being remnants of failed colonialism and imperialism. Small

nations such as Chechnya, East Timor, Tibet, and others are taking advantage of an opportunity they have long-awaited and are continuing the process towards statehood that has been interrupted for decades. Cultural identities continue to remain strong in many regions, yet without a doubt, "the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity." (Huntington, p.161)

Kenichi Ohmae's commentaries on the state of nations and the emerging global economy reveal a keen understanding of this change in the people; how the information market forces are reshaping social identities so rapidly and so profoundly. Consider the following passage:

> "This late-20th-century wave of immigration [from the old economy to the new borderless economy] is being driven, on the surface, by the development of global brands and popular culture and, at a much deeper level, by the infectious spread of new information-related technologies. It is a new kind of social process, something we have never seen before, and it is leading to a new kind of social reality: a genuinely cross-border civilization, nurtured by exposure to common technologies and sources of information, in which horizontal linkages within the same generation in different parts of the world are stronger than traditional, vertical linkages between generations in particular parts of it." (Ohmae, p. 38)

This powerful trend that Ohmae mentions could be a temporary one, a transitional process as technology is further introduced into many aspects of life on the small and large scale. But even if this represents a limited process – there are enormous implications to the existing concept of nation-state. A person will give allegiance to the primary force in their life that provides them with identity. When younger generations are influenced more by Tics and their products - they will take up their identity less with the nation-state in which they were born but more so with the powers that establish for them the information and cultural context they rely upon. Ohmae concludes this point by mentioning that "as more and more individuals pass through the *brutal filter* separating old-fashioned geographies from the global economy, power over economic activity will inevitably migrate from the central governments of nation states to the borderless network of countless individual, market-based decisions." (Ohmae, p.39)

The new social phenomenon involves the rise of the individual and the small interests as potential "players" in the global political and economic system. Commonality is still a drawing factor between individuals and their nature to aggregate will not be suppressed. But the nation-state, depending on its own will and goals, will strive to maintain some level of control over the globalization of its people by trying to restrict information flow or technological implementation. The power of the individual however is nothing trivial to overlook as the masses become empowered by technology. It is helpful to observe that "our lives have been transformed by the struggle of the margins to come into representation. Not just to be placed by the regime of some other, or imperializing eye but to reclaim some form of representation for themselves." (Hall, p. 34).

As long as multimedia and computing technology are produced with a global emphasis, i.e., working from a global information context, or even if supposed global information is produced

with a clear cultural bias, the information standards of local regions will continue to be threatened. When propagated for a long enough duration, perhaps over a few generations - or less - the end result is a people whose nationalistic connections are wholly diluted, if not completely severed.

Territory
The implications of a people losing interest in the goals and *raison d'être* of their nation-state are serious ones. Could this extend to the "real" territory upon which their nation's sovereignty and in fact their own personal freedoms have been based? For most of human history, the importance of land and territorial control has been absolute - in fact it could be argued that the great majority of conflicts were contests over geographic control (spurred on by religious/ethnic prodding). If individuals are conditioned to disregard the importance of geographic space by exposure to global information, then the perceived need for territorial control may diminish, and thus sovereignty as we know it today will be endangered. Regardless of the future outcome, at this moment the "perceptions of frontiers are changing, from one frontier to several, from line to zone, from physical to cultural, from spatial to functional, from impermeable to permeable." (Anderson, p. 190). Territorial importance may have less and less significance as people an travel faster and farther away from home, both literally and virtually.

Since people are the architects of the geopolitical system in which they thrive, it is true that "as with all regions that pertain to human social organization, a state's territory is a social construct." (Knight, p. 76) The territory does exist in the real world but clearly without the human imposition of value onto the land, the concept would be empty. Even school children ponder the lack of big, fat lines painted on the landscape to delineate state from state, wondering where those states really are if the big, obvious lines they see on maps are not there in the real world. We cannot overlook the role that cartography plays in reinforcing the concept of geographic control. In fact, "claims to an identity between people and territory can be asserted through maps and extended back through time." (Black, p. 143) Maps have served for centuries as spatial surrogates for the abstract spatial concept that we cannot see in the real world - the nation-state. We can cognitively perceive evidence of the existence of a nation-state - the homogeneity of the people, the flag flying overhead, the national anthem, the different language, etc. - all *symptoms* of statehood. We can measure the area of the nation-state and prove its existence geographically. However, in the end the "territory is more than just a physical and measurable entity. It is also something of the mind because people impute meaning to and gain meaning from territory." (Knight, p. 77) Information technology has revolutionized visual communication and the individual expression of self - and "as a consequence of the explosion of those new forms of cultural communication and cultural representation there has opened up a new field of visual representation itself." (Hall, p. 28).

The proliferation of global information across local contexts weakens nationalistic tendencies and a connection to territorial value, while increasing the various information conflicts. The problem for the nation-states is that "the Internet brings forth a personal mode of communication that national authorities cannot regulate easily." (Nielsen, 1999). Nationalistic groups now seeking statehood realize the importance of territorial control and thus continue their struggles

for independence from the colonial powers that be. Yet for those nations that have attained sovereignty, and whose populace is becoming "wired" to the global networks and influenced by TNC marketing, territorial control is not a serious issue in their daily lives. In this way, one might imagine a form of technological transition taking place as nations become states and as states become technologically enhanced. This relates directly to the Ohmae's "brutal filter" concept that was mentioned above. For the common citizen, finding a connection with the land/territory is not as important nor as cognitively significant as finding connection to the global scene - to other people with similar ages, interests, etc.

In the end, the overall value of territory begins to decrease in the face of globalized information, when identity is established with more than just the state. When local information contexts are slowly dissolved, often by the economic intrusion by TNCs, then *some* information context must take its place. Consider carefully that "even if a few states can still defend their territory against an invading army…none can control the flow of images and ideas that shape human tastes and values. The globalized "presence" of Madonna, McDonald's, and Mickey Mouse make a mockery of sovereignty as exclusive territorial control." (Krieger, p. 853) Some pundits praise the kind of liberation that a global information context can bring to the people of an oppressed nation-state and yet others condemn it as the worst form of cultural destruction. Whatever the case may be, this process is currently underway and as a result, the "real," geographic space is being forfeited in favor of virtual space - the space where information resides and ideas are created and disseminated, where perception is much more relevant than reality. When one realizes that "the political boundaries of nation-states are too narrow and constricted to define the scope and activities of modern business," (Korten, p.123) we begin to see the kind of powerful forces the nation-states face.

Government
The government aspect of sovereignty is essentially the aggregation of the people and territorial aspects; the control of territory by a homogeneous people requires an organizing body to administer the state's affairs. It is not difficult to imagine how state governments might react in the face of the broad technological changes that have been aforementioned. If a nation's people begin to lose their national identity and in turn the importance of territorial control, then the last bastion for maintaining the state's sovereignty will lie in the government originally created to protect the state's interests.

Many national governments have had to change their administrative practices and even their whole perspective on what they govern in the face of rapid economic and technological advances. Regional military and economic alliances in the past few decades have led governments to yield some degree of their sovereignty to a supranational group for the purpose of solidarity in economic and military control. However, "sovereign states have only reluctantly surrendered parts of their sovereignty to supranational groups since the 1950s." (Cole, p. 233) Reluctantly yes, but the trend is ever-increasing at the close of the 20th Century, with the advent of the European Union, and other economic alliances such as GATT, NAFTA, ASEAN, OECD, ECO, and so forth. One can hardly blame the governments for taking such action - the isolationism of the pre-World War II era is long gone and in the face of regional economic

powers, the need for aggregation in order to remain viable in a global market is paramount. It is this strong emphasis on economy, on the flow of goods, services, and information, that is significant here. Sovereign governments are beginning to work towards a level of economic cooperation and competition that is unprecedented, yet they are discovering that the transnational corporations have already 'arrived', i.e., the TNCs are already operating at a level of sophistication and market penetration that is far beyond the scope and capabilities of most nation-states. The TNCs were developed and have thrived on the principles of economic gain and market savvy that nation-states are only now beginning to realize, but more importantly the TNCs appeal to basic needs and desires of individuals that nation-states simply cannot address.

The TNCs appreciate the advantages they possess in this emerging arena and as the development of a global information infrastructure continues, they have been politically active to protect their interests within the nation-states. This has led some analysts to conclude that "all over the world, national, provincial, and local governments have become pawns of global corporations and the Corporate Agenda." (Brecher & Costello, p. 301) This might be a more extreme viewpoint - but it does point to the reality that TNCs operate on a geopolitical plane that is unique from the nation-states. Some may argue, as an example, that even the Microsoft and U. S. Department of Justice confrontation is not about monopolistic practices - it is about the United States trying to preserve its sovereign economic control in the face of a formidable new economic force – the information economy that was essentially birthed in the U.S. TNCs enjoy an almost untouchable status in some regions as the perceived carriers of economic advancement and prosperity for more impoverished regions. Does this mean that the role of a national government is diminishing to the point where it only serves as an unwitting tool for TNCs? Some staunchly disagree and believe that "the role of the nation-state in creating an innovation society is absolutely critical to the well-being of its citizens in the information age." (Carnoy, p. 91) At the moment, the need for partnership is apparent – we are in a transitional mode and any type of overly rapid upheaval to the sovereignty system would undoubtedly cause widespread social and political confusion. Besides, TNCs care less for the daily welfare of the consumers, which is the function of the state to provide the basics. In the eyes of TNCs, the individual exists to consume – what they do beyond that is less relevant. The severity of TNC infiltration into the processes of statehood has yet to be objectively evaluated, however we can see some rudimentary signs. When governments begin to legislate or take other formal actions against TNCs at an increasing rate, the perception is that the nation-states are beginning to understand the nature of the global information economy and are taking action to secure their role within it – if not as technological innovators then as technological regulators. Indeed, "the political result of this development will likely be a reordering of international relations in a manner that suggests that undemocratic or authoritarian nations may find the regulation necessary to their survival impossible." (Nielsen, 1999).

The initial focus of information geopolitics will be on the relationship between national governments and TNCs - this is where the 'battle lines' will be drawn. Whether or not a peaceful settlement is attained will remain to be seen. At this point in time, we can discern the early signs of a contention between the remnants of the nation-state paradigm - the governments - and the new entities of an evolving information-state paradigm - the TNCs. Keep in mind that this is directly related to the more fundamental aspect of information geopolitics – a conflict between

the global (TNCs) and the local (national governments). What is clear at the present is that "the greater the political power of corporations and those aligned with them, the less the political power of the people, and the less meaningful democracy becomes." (Korten, p. 140) This is so because the global information economy is much less reliant upon nation-states as the primary unit of interaction. Due to advanced, progressive and relatively inexpensive information technology, the primary unit of interaction is becoming the region, the small group, and even the single individual acting by their own accord, by a "personal sovereignty." The nation-state begins to seem much less effective in representing constituent interests. If and when national societies reach this most intrinsic, personal level, people will begin to connect, interact, aggregate, and socialize according to common factors that transcend nationalism and sovereignty – at which point the significance of the nation-state as a geopolitical entity will diminish even further.

On Being Transnational

At the global scale, we realize the fierce competition of many powerful TNCs to position themselves to as not only the primary conduits of information but as the primary originators of information. The notion that "multinational corporations and nation-states are key actors in shaping the direction of the information economy" (Carnoy, p. 8) is generally true, but the roles they play and for what duration will remain to be seen in this transitional model. Having briefly examined the nation-state and its changing applicability, it would be prudent at this point to do the same for the transnational corporation and such entities that are disseminating the information revolution.

The author contends that how one views a TNC and information technology depends primarily upon where one stands in terms of gaining or losing from the imposition of the technology. The real "threat" exists in the fact that much of the advancement of local and global societies rests on the achievements of the various TNCs and their relatively unhindered dissemination of these advances. In short, the TNCs are creating the global information infrastructure while nation-states act as the top-level political system with which TNCs must negotiate – but this is typically a minor filter. What advantage does a TNC really have over a nation-state and why will this make a difference? Information technology – including mainframe and personal computers, software, peripherals, multimedia, and most importantly, networks – is a fundamental means through which TNCs operate. The more proficient any individual, TNC, or nation-state becomes at realizing the potential of the technology, the more successful they are likely to be in managing their information flows. There are three main advantages that can be gained from implementing information technology: "(1) to compress time, (2) to overcome geography, and (3) to alter the structure of relationships, such as bypassing intermediaries." (Malecki, p. 208) This is an underlying power of the technology – the removal of information boundaries between states and more importantly, between individual citizens. Information – for better or worse - acts as a binding medium when shared across diverse geographic contexts. It has the potential to create a familiarity between cultures that hundreds of years of international relations fail to yield. Stated even more appropriately, information is "the raw material of the economic process, itself quite indifferent to space, because the technologies of information transmission are now supposedly

approaching the point where the friction of distance is nil." (Storper, p. 237) The elimination of distance and the diminution of geographic space are key factors that characterize the global information system. It is in this realm of "virtual space" that information geopolitics can be found – along with its constituent parts: TNCs and a growing host of individuals and emergent "nations" that are finding a home on the global networks.

Although somewhat laughable, we already have seen emerging attempts at "nations" stake a claim in cyberspace, from the Dominion of Melchizedek (Knecht, 1999) to the Hutt River Province (Leonard, 1999). Realizing that they're real world territorial claims are moot points, these and others like them establish virtual kingdoms via websites and other means. In and of itself, this is not wholly remarkable – but the overwhelming response such efforts have received from ordinary citizens worldwide is something to note.

The *modus operandi* of a TNC working to build the global infrastructure is not entirely noble. The focus is on the global information economy – therefore the goal is producing revenues wherever possible. Globalization allows TNCs "to look for ways to sell their product in as many different places as possible." (Economist, 4/98) While some corporations may operate on a more philanthropic basis, the fact is that most exist for the goal of expanding markets and increasing their global revenue. If they happen to raise the standard of living in some regions, or create a new infrastructure, or bring international citizenry towards a more common understanding – that is a by-product. Conversely, if they disrupt local customs and practices, it is most likely not by intention but simply by the virtue of their global presence interacting on a local level. Consider, for example, how McDonald's restaurants have altered some basic practices in Asia: "children's birthdays (previously uncelebrated in many places), queuing in Hong Kong (previously a scrum; now more likely to be in a line), the way that Japanese eat their food (previously always sitting down; now more likely to be standing up), and even smiling at strangers (previously close to an insult in China)." (Economist, 5/98)

The responsibility of the TNCs is to examine their markets very carefully and discern how to ease into a market to cause the least amount of disruption. Disruption of culture, language, mores, and even sovereignty will occur – it's an issue of minimizing the effects as much as possible. Thus some form of "recontexting" must take place, wherein the intruding entity must establish how its imported information context must be changed or "interfaced" to the local context – unless the TNC wants to openly invite a conflict. Many TNCs try to consider the locale when preparing information content, or preparing to physically move in and establish a foothold to provide services. But because TNCs primarily operate on a global information standard, they may reach a point at which the conflict between the global and local information contexts will become obvious and must be resolved. Typically, the TNC ends up prevailing in the contest – either because the nation-state does not have strong enough legislation or the citizens value the benefits of the TNCs presence enough to the point where they are willing to relinquish some former aspects of their cultural identity in favor of new, imported aspects.

Information Geopolitics and Microsoft

At Microsoft (and in the software world), the term **localization** is used to describe the process through which products are prepared for local markets. Localization is a complex exercise wherein the language is translated from U.S. English, but more than that – the content is altered as necessary to fit the local information contexts of the market. The software's global context has to be tailored to fit a local expectation. This in itself is a difficult and careful task, and usually the arena at which problems arise for the company. Microsoft strives to carefully consider its market geography and analyze the best approach to entering, but problems inevitably arise. Usually they relate to the breakdown of the appropriate 'interface' between the global information contained in the products and the local information expected in the market. This breakdown can be caused by a number of things, not the least of which is the lack of local understanding derived from the information creator being in the wrong geographic context. That is, an American in Redmond, Washington, USA is much less likely to understand the local information expectations of a Turk in Ankara, Turkey. So the aim of localization embodies "achieving a balance between being global, with the scale advantages associated with size and global scope, and being local within each regional or national market and network of resources." (Malecki, p. 202)

The history of geopolitical errors at Microsoft is a gallery of localization events where the crucial global-local information interface was not diligently considered beforehand. Some mistakes can be traced to individual ignorance of world geography. Other mistakes are caused by a critical lack of local knowledge that probably could not have been foreseen. The majority of problems Microsoft has encountered have involved the cartography in its various products, from Windows to Office to Encarta World Atlas. This makes sense, because "maps can serve as tools of debate, highlighting these spatial implications and thus apparently providing graphic evidence of the nature of the practice of power and of what can be seen as a need to challenge it." (Black, p. 120) However, Microsoft has had many significant problems with art images, flags, national anthems, religious symbols, and a plethora of other content; maps are only a primary part of the total picture.

One of the first things customs agents in some countries will examine are the maps in the products – they load it onto their computer and take a look to see if Microsoft's global information is acceptable to the local information market. In some specific cases, such as Turkey, India, and China, the answer may be a resounding negative. We just recently added Tunisia to the list, because the government there disliked the content about their country in Encarta Encyclopedia. In some countries, it is true that "unofficial maps, such as those made by or for one of the parties to a legal dispute, are sometimes admitted in court." (McEwen, p. 19) In Latin American countries, this legal complication can include *any* cartography sold in the country, regardless of the source, which then makes Microsoft a contributor of evidence in a potential, real-world boundary arbitration (for or against their host market!). In these situations, Microsoft is forced to make a market decision: comply with the local information needs and change the product, or, bypass the local information market completely and proceed to sell in those countries where the global context is palatable. This is somewhat of a simplification of the actual circumstances, but nevertheless focuses on the core decision being made.

The challenge for Microsoft, as with some TNCs, is that a mistake found in one product might affect the sales potential of other products. As an illustration, the problem in India with Windows 95 did not threaten only the Windows 95 software – it threatened the sale of <u>all</u> Microsoft products in that market. Like any other TNC, Microsoft would prefer to expand into new markets but if the potential risks outweigh the benefits, then Microsoft may forsake the market in favor of another one of less risk. Some nation-states are more adamant about enforcing their sovereignty, and they do so by reinforcing their local information standard. In the end, it may make a small difference to the TNC – there are many more potential markets to enter – and thus the country ends up losing services. The reasons for choosing not to enter a market are complex, but when viewed simply, it is a decision based on the give and take of information geopolitics. Microsoft, as a primary producer of information management tools as well as content, is unwilling to become embroiled in a dispute over competing local information contexts. If anything, it would prefer to work around such a dispute and still enter the market.

In many of the geopolitical issues at Microsoft, the nation-state is struggling to reassert its sovereignty via the information medium. Indeed, they exemplify the truth that "our very concept of 'world,' an ideological construct that is usually more philosophical than geographical in content, can be framed and articulated by cartography." (Henrikson, p. 50). Many governments are fully aware of the power of cartography and also the power of the global information venue provided by TNCs and their related information technology. Therefore, the local governments strive to utilize the TNC as a means to escalate their local information context into the global context. Why? Because if a country is successful in promoting its local viewpoint, and convinces a TNC to incorporate their local context into the broader, global information stream – then that country's local context is globally legitimized, and possibly at the expense of other neighboring contexts that might disagree. This is pure information geopolitics at play.

Thus a TNC or any information provider/producer may be used as an ignorant participant in misinformation on the global scale. However, the provider is not always unaware of what it's getting into; this is where another dimension to the problem occurs. In order to secure a foothold in a local market, a TNC may *consciously* favor one local information context on the basis of market revenues. For example, if Argentina yields significantly more revenue than Chile for a certain company's product in Latin America, the company may decide to favor the Argentinian viewpoint – at the exclusion of the Chilean (if the two viewpoints are incompatible). The product may not sell in Chile and may actually yield some negative public reactions there, but in the TNCs broader perspective within the global economy, the loss in Chile is a trifle. The TNC gets what it is really after – the larger revenues - and appeases at least one local information market in the process, one that may then remain loyal and show greater long-term promise. In fact, clearly biasing itself towards one local context may improve the TNCs ability to thrive in that single market - more than if it had compromised between the country viewpoints. Some opponents believe that this strategy is precisely the case with Microsoft, stating that "by putting it [the technology] in the (operating system), they anoint. You give it credibility. You give it distribution." (Greene, 1999). While this comment was made in reference to a specific technology's deployment in Windows software, it is true in reference to content that is incorporated into software products.

Microsoft strives to avoid situations where the content in its products is employed as a tool for local geopolitical agendas. It also attempts in every way to reach a compromise between differing local information contexts – Microsoft is not interested in starting or participating in a *geopolitical information war*. The company has not always been successful in avoiding these problems, mainly due to a lack of a local geographic understanding. However, Microsoft is taking steps company-wide to be more attentive to these issues, such as the creation of the Geopolitical Product Strategy (GPS) group. The GPS mission is to help protect Microsoft's global markets against closure and in turn preserve local market trust in Microsoft's product integrity. But even with the existence of the GPS group, Microsoft will continue to face difficult decisions on a market-by-market basis. The real challenge, as dictated by information geopolitics, is to proactively discern the proper 'interfaces' between the global and local information contexts long <u>before</u> the products are released. This is the challenge Microsoft and many other TNCs face during the process of localization (or glocalization as some have come to call it).

The nation-state – with its unique local information context - is then in the position of having to compete with other nation-states to access the global information context, and to place themselves within it. Because TNCs are not only the creators of this global information venue but primarily the administrators of it, nation-states struggle to reaffirm their sovereignty in a world where real boundaries, territorial control, and the notion of sovereignty are challenged by virtual markets, globalized information, and technologically-empowered citizens.

Information Geopolitics and New Sovereignties

Consider the major trends outlined so far in this discussion and how they relate to the role of nation-states and TNCs in information geopolitics:

1.   The profusion of information technology on a global scale and a subsequent, unprecedented level of individual access to knowledge.
2.   People becoming more connected with individuals in other countries than with their own nationalistic tendencies.
3.   Geographic territory becoming less important as compared to information access and the control of the *image* of territory (e.g., cartographic information).
4.   National governments yielding control to intranational bodies to form economic alliances to control information flows and to protect local/regional information contexts.
5.   Transnational corporations acting as conveyors of global information, choosing to accept/reject local contexts as part of the global information system based on market viability.
6.   Nation-states jockeying for access to the global information stream, each trying to assert its own local context as being globally significant - or else forfeiting the local context in favor of the global one.

When these trends are examined *en masse*, it becomes clear that nation-states, TNCs, and individuals all have a unique role to play. These trends solidify the supposition that "the past two

decades have seen the most rapid and sweeping institutional transformation in human history. It is a conscious and intentional transformation in search of a new world economic order in which business has no nationality and knows no borders." (Korten, p. 121) The turnabout has been so rapid in fact that it is clear that all the players (individuals, groups, nation-states, and TNCs) are not fully aware of the extent of this revolution. If there is any truth-value to this suggestion, and growing evidence indicates that there is, then the world may be poised for another geopolitical shift – one that remains grounded in a real world but diverges significantly into a virtual world of information representation and manipulation. If the geopolitical landscape changes in response to information technology, creating a new interaction called "information geopolitics", then who might the players be on this stage, and what will their actions dictate?

At the present time, both nation-states and corporations are acting out somewhat uncoordinated – but similar - roles in the global information economy. Up to the present time, nation-states have been carrying out their individual "manifest destinies" and exercising their right to self-determination as gained through their sovereign status. Likewise, TNCs have been operating mostly as big businesses – not only because that's what they are but also due to their unrealized, hegemonic nature on the world scene. When positioned together in the present global system, the nation-states and TNCs carry out mainly a contentious interaction that is based on one entity trying to circumvent the other's regulations or practices, i.e., it is not necessarily always a constructive relationship. This is a broad generalization of course – certainly not all of the interactions between these two entities are negative. When nation-states take notice of the advantages of borderless TNCs, they come to realize that "technological capacity gives many states the possibility of operating beyond boundaries, including space." (Krieger, p. 853) Both nation-states and TNCs maneuver for strategic economic control over markets, both adopting similar tactics and both relying more heavily on information technology as the means to this end. TNCs are realizing however that technological infrastructure must have a real world, geographic basis, i.e., they have to install services in a territory (unless keen advantages of emerging satellite technologies are realized) and thus must be subject to national regulations. Meanwhile, nation-states – while controlling the territory – understand that "unlike other advances in communication, the Internet brings forth a personal mode of communication that national authorities cannot regulate easily." (Nielsen, 1999).

On the information geopolitics field of play, we have one side where the nation-states are trying to maintain their sovereign control over the perception of national homogeneity and another side where the TNCs are trying to globalize geographic information and homogenize national citizens into being good transnational consumers. While TNCs have the option of catering to specific local contexts – and some do – it is more cost effective and beneficial to future revenues to create a more homogenous consumer base. The goal of the two forces is the same: maintain the national citizens as consumers of your information. The realization here is the role of the individual and the small interest groups in dictating how the large, global players may interact. We are talking about a level of personal empowerment that has never existed before - and at this personal level, boundaries and territory are much less significant. The only boundaries that matter are those of perceived personal space and the amount of freedom one has to access information.

Possible Geopolitical Entities

As the global information economy grows and develops further into the future, we will see unique roles ascribed to the primary players of the former geopolitics model. We may see nation-states become more "corporation"-like, and TNCs become more "state"-like (forming perhaps a Corporate Nation), but realistically the information economy of the future will allow for many new kinds of geopolitical interaction.

New players will undoubtedly enter the information geopolitics scene and new roles in the system will be made possible because of the new forms of power available. We will see many roles being performed by many diverse geopolitical entities, widely ranging in scale and power, and also varying in the amount of technological adaptation that has taken place. While the primary fuel of the system – information – will be more clearly defined as a commodity, the acting players and their interactions will actually become *very* complex. The spectrum proposed here is based on the notion of *scale* – starting with the single individual citizen and propagating the concept to the highest aggregation possible – the global state. The table below provides a brief summary:

	People	*Territory*	*Government*
Individual	A citizen empowered by information technology; an information user with a distinct identity.	The virtual networks; a virtual 'home', local geography.	Adheres to the local information context while accessing the global.
Clan	A group of citizens united with a common identity; information users and distributors.	Shared virtual spaces, neighborhoods, small regions.	Builds its own local context while accessing the global.
Nation	A homogeneous aggregation of individuals and clans, united by a common identity or purpose, connected via information technology; creates, distributes, and uses information.	Large, distributed virtual spaces, possible geographic space.	Self-determining with its own local context, with its own global access.
Info-nation or Virtual nation	A virtual nation-state, comprised of a people, virtual territory, and a governing system; maintains a unique information domain.	A nation without geographic territory; possesses a well-established, influential virtual presence. Sovereignty is based on control of information.	Self-governed nation, answering to itself on a virtual basis. New local context is created, or, a new interface to the global context within a local one.

	People	*Territory*	*Government*
TNC	A transnational business operation established for the purpose of creating, disseminating and controlling information technology.	Exists virtually, distributed across many geographic contexts. May be based in one nation-state.	Follows national government regulations as much as necessary to penetrate local markets. Thinks globally, acts locally.
Nation-state	Classic definition: a defined people, geographic territory, and government body.	Exists geographically – sovereignty is based on control of territory.	Governments exists to regulate and legislate, to protect national citizenry (i.e., reinforce the local context).
Corporate nation	A unified corporate body of individuals, together for the purpose of succeeding in the global economy.	Exists virtually or geographically or both; geographic territory is secondary to control of information assets.	Self-governing, tolerates nation-state governments (local contexts) as a hindrance, interfaces better with other Corporate Nations (other global contexts) .
Intranation	An aggregation of nations, info-nations, nation-states, and/or corporate nations, based on common goals and regional information contexts.	Virtual or geographic, the space is an aggregation of individual national entities	Control is relinquished to a higher body for decision making, local contexts are aggregated into regional contexts for better interface to the global context.
Global-state	A fully aggregated political-economic system wherein the global information context has absorbed all local information contexts.	Exists virtually and geographically, de facto control over most territory – despite possible rogue nations.	Disaggregated sovereignty is gone, self-determination exists only at the highest level by a governing body.

The implications of such a system are prodigious but this is only one possible model. This is not a strict hierarchy with a simple transition from one state of existence to the next. Many of the new entities of information geopolitics may exist with no need to evolve, while others may aggregate and expand. Obviously, the global state is the pinnacle of the hierarchy – a point at which information geopolitics is irrelevant on a global scale because all local contexts have been absorbed and aggregated. This global-state is not proposed here as a positive, logical end to the process, but merely as a possibility. When viewing this system, "we need to ask again about the ways in which electronic information and mapping technologies are reconfiguring the contemporary world…the techniques of data exchange and representation legitimize new social practices and institutions in ways we have only begun to recognize and regulate." (Pickles, p. 231) At this point in time, we can only begin to surmise what kinds of geopolitical entities may arise in response to the information paradigm shift that is underway.

In addition, and possible of more important, we need to closely observe and examine the role of the individual in this future scheme. The geopolitics of the past involved primarily a diplomatic plane between nation-states – but the information geopolitics that may arise in addition to or in replacement of traditional statecraft must account for the empowerment of individual citizens. Barlow states in his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, speaking on behalf of cyberspace users everywhere to the nation-states that "we must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our bodies…we will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before." (Barlow, 1996). Whether taken seriously or not, such statements begin to indicate the presence and possible rise of a mentality that all national governments will need to address sooner or later.

Conclusions

In the course of this discussion, not a great deal of emphasis has been directly placed on boundaries and territoriality when discussing information geopolitics. These being the by-products of a broader geopolitical sphere of action however, the implications on these are clear. Undoubtedly, many questions can be raised throughout this discourse, there are many "What if's" and "maybe's" to be addressed – any one of which can change the course of the direction of the current geopolitical trends. There are *many* barriers still in existence that can prevent the global information economy from ever reaching fruition. Some of these barriers are sadly blatant, such as the fact that "more than 1.3 billion people live on less than a dollar a day, about 60 percent of them in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Infant mortality rates remove over 90 per thousand live births in Sub-Saharan Africa and 70 in South Asia, compared with 40 in East Asia." (World Bank, p. 4) Or just as much a barrier is the reality that "the majority of the people in the world have never even seen a computer, much less thought about accessing the internet and broadcasting local difficulties." (Nielsen, 1999). The serious economic and political disparity that exists between nation-states today certainly cannot be overlooked. While one may find Coca-Cola in the middle of a Third World country, this is by no means an indication that the country is reaping the benefits of information technology.

At the present, we are in a time of transition and it would prudent for individuals, nations, nation-states, and corporations to realize that "economic globalization is neither in the human interest nor inevitable. It is axiomatic that political power aligns with economic power. The larger the economic unit, the larger its dominant players, and the more political power becomes concentrated in the largest corporations." (Korten, p.140) If this trend remains strong into the next century, then the field of information geopolitics will be ripe for development and the evolution of new forms of sovereignty will not be unlikely. The author makes no illusions that the current global system is still distant from the world of information geopolitics as outlined here, but all the potentials exist and the necessary mentality is emerging.

The realization is being made across distances more and more frequently that "the production of information is shaping politics and, by default, establishing new rules for postindustrial society." (Barnet & Cavanagh, p. 334) As we focus our attention on the state of geopolitics and the future viability of nation-states and boundaries, let us consider then what the new information geopolitical rules might be, and who will be writing them.

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Re-defining the nature and functions of boundaries: a South American perspective

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Introduction

The boundaries of South America are highly distinctive. Whether in origin, historical development or present-day role and function the boundaries of South America are seen to be quite unlike those found anywhere else in the rest of the world. In Europe national identity and the related concept of territoriality have helped determine the location and function of national boundaries. Asia is similar in that for most Asians questions of identity and territorial location are reasonably clearly defined. In Africa the system of nation states and national boundaries is largely nonsensical, defying all logic except that of the former colonial powers, and yet it has been accepted as a fully working system which few have yet challenged or successfully been able to alter.

South America is different. Unlike Europe where strong linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural differences have all combined to form the elements which we know as national identity, in South America most of these elements are missing. Over most of the region the people have the same ethnic origins, they speak the same language, have the same religion, the same colonial history, the same basis for their legal and administrative systems, and so on. In other words national identity and, with it national territory and national boundaries, are based on factors quite distinct from those found elsewhere on the globe. South American boundaries are different, and the reasons for this difference are to be found in the circumstances surrounding their origin and formation, and above all in the historical development of the modern South American state.

The origins of boundaries in South America

Simon Bolivar's declaration, shortly before his death in 1830, that:

> "(South) America is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea."

did not mean that it was impossible to govern **in** South America but rather that it was impossible to govern **as** South America. Bolivar's great dream of a pan-American union had come to nothing. His more limited plan for an Andean confederation consisting of Gran Colombia, Peru and Bolivia was never given any serious consideration and even his own state of Gran Colombia was shortly to split into the constituent elements of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. However, the Spanish Empire had successfully governed much of South America as a single unit or

collection of units for over three hundred years. The Spanish crown together with the church had provided very effective unifying forces within the region throughout this time. Colonial America had not been ungovernable, it was post-colonial unity which had proved so impossible to achieve.

The formation of the boundaries, national territories and national states in South America all have their origins in the earliest days of colonial rule. The tensions, sentiments and social groupings which were vital to the origin and maintenance of the various independence movements can all be traced back to the earliest days of colonisation and colonial administration or even before. For the 700 hundred years prior to 1492 any Spaniard wishing for personal advancement had been able to join in the *Reconquista*, the struggle against the Moors, in the search for gain fame and fortune. The fall of Granada and the discovery of the Americas in 1492 had closed off one set of possibilities and at the same time opened up another. Many tough, self-reliant and adventurous Spaniards had been able to switch from participating in the re-conquest of the Iberian peninsula to participating in the creation of an empire. As a result the typical early Spanish settlers in America have been described as:

> "rough, uneducated peasants from Extremadura and Western Andalucia who were quick to mutiny or to disregard authority, for they had come out to the Caribbean islands to make a quick fortune and then to go back home again" (Williamson, 1992, p13)

The seeds of dissension and rebellion were present right from the start. The problems of administration and government in South America began with Columbus' governorship of the earliest Spanish settlements. As early as 1494 a faction of Catalans rebelled against the rule of Columbus' brother Diego, who had been left in charge during Christopher's absence. Not only was there rivalry amongst the new settlers but also tension between the settlers and the Spanish authorities, particularly over the treatment of the native peoples. Although Queen Isabella and all subsequent Spanish monarchs expressly forbad any slavery or maltreatment of the native peoples a system of indented labour, *encomienda,* was introduced in which the employer was forced to pay reasonable wages but the labourer was still forced to work. It was little more than slavery and open to a great deal of abuse.

It was a constant concern of the Spanish authorities throughout the 1500s to ensure that the Americas were governed in an ethical and Christian manner. Some of the early governors were enlightened but others were unashamedly exploitative and used their positions to seek personal gain and to mistreat the indigenous peoples. There was a constant tension between the local administration and the colonial authority back in Spain determined to carry out efficient but fair government. This tension soon resolved itself into one between the local born people of Spanish origin, the *criollos*, who were denied access to the highest posts in the administration, and the officials sent out from Spain, the *peninsulares*, who were charged with carrying out the policy of the Spanish crown.

What was true of Columbus' reign was repeated in Pizarro's takeover of the Inca empire in Peru. Constant squabbles between the Pizarro brothers led to conflicts and eventually to civil war amongst the Spaniards. At the same time the behaviour of the Spanish settlers towards the native peoples ensured their deep censure by the Spanish authorities. As early as 1546 the surviving Pizarro brothers sought to make themselves independent from Spain with Gonzalo Pizarro declared King of Peru. In 1547 a royal army entered Peru and in the following year defeated the Pizarristas. Gonzalo Pizarro was executed and royal authority asserted once again over the Spanish settlers.

Thus, the potential problems of governance in South America can be identified from the very earliest days of colonial rule. The tensions which gave rise to these problems can be summarised as follows:

        i) the desire to get rich and to exercise political power by the earliest Spanish settlers, soon to be succeeded to by the their equally ambitious offspring, the american born *criollos*;

        ii) resentment at control by the Spanish colonial (ie non-local) authority;

        iii) resentment at restrictions over the production and trade of agricultural and manufactured goods which were all strictly controlled by metropolitan Spain;

        iv) the desire by the *criollo* elites to replace metropolitan Spain as rulers in south America;

        v) the resentment of the native indian peoples against their *criollo* masters and the desire to be treated as free individuals and not to be subject to semi-slave conditions.

The native indians were largely unsuccessful in this latter aim and even today have rarely gained equality within the state. During the various wars of independence they were often used as cannon fodder fighting for one or other groups formed by members of the *criollo* elite. Of the present day South American peoples many of those who are of indian origin remain largely on the edge of society whilst those of european origin still hold most of the highest offices.

What the Spanish Empire, and in particular the Catholic monarchy, was able to offer its American colonies was legitimacy and stability. The monarchy ruled under a system of benign paternalism which accepted the ethnic and cultural pluralism of its subject peoples. The only requirements were loyalty to the crown and adherence to the catholic faith.

> "The culture of the Catholic monarchy possessed enduring strengths: it pervaded all strata of society, linking high culture and low; it could accommodate *mestizaje* (cross-breeding) in all spheres, from sexual relations to architecture; and finally it was capable of reconciling great ethnic and regional diversity with a sense of underlying unity" (Williamson, 1992 p164).

The resentments harboured amongst the *criollos* was directed against the arrogance of in-coming peninsular immigrants and officials and not against the Catholic monarchy which the *criollos* fully understood was vital to the survival of their society. By the seventeenth century the *criollos* represented a frustrated ruling class who often held seething resentments against Spain but not against the authority of the monarchy. In part this was because the Crown provided legitimacy to

the rather privileged lifestyle of the *criollos* and in part it was out enlightened self-interest. The *criollos* knew that in the event of an uprising by the indigenous peoples that the Spanish Empire would send in forces to re-establish authority.

Although this belief in the monarchy was somewhat shaken by rule of the Bourbon monarchs, especially Carlos III who tried to implement reforms according to the best principles of the Enlightenment (Lynch, 1985 p15), nevertheless the authority of the Crown was never seriously challenged. It was the intervention of Napoleon in Spain in 1808 which led to the collapse of the system. Napoleon forced Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to renounce the throne and delivered the crown to his own brother Joseph. This act broke the compact between the absolute ruler, the Spanish monarch, and the subject peoples. Within Spanish America this act produced a constitutional crisis. The abrupt removal of the constitutional monarch now posed the question as to where legitimate authority lay, with the new monarch, with the former monarch or with the *criollos* themselves? This situation provided a number of radicals, most of them from the *criollo* elite, with the opportunity to seize power. After 1810 South America broke up into a series of fracticidal struggles and occasionally full-blown civil wars as the various *criollo* groups lurched towards gaining full-blown independence for their region.

The reason for the former empire splintering into many smaller nation states is explained quite simply by the fact that these latter represented the major groupings of colonial society. the Spanish empire was very far from occupying all the lands of South America., most of the settlements were clustered around the major administrative centres and in the coastal regions. It was these largely isolated groups around which the new nation states were formed.

With independence from Spain came the practical problem of delimiting the extent of national territory. In 1810 the doctrine of *uti possidetis de jure* was formed as a guideline towards the establishment of the boundaries of the newly independent states. the doctrine of *uti possidetis de jure* was generally understood to mean that each new state was entitled to the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the former colonial authority which it replaced. This doctrine was of questionable legal validity and of even greater practical difficulty in implementation. There had been frequent administrative changes within the Spanish Empire, particularly in the preceding century, so that it was not always clear what was the legitimate former colonial authority to which the doctrine should be applied. For example, Caracas and Venezuela had sometimes been administered from Santo Domingo, sometimes from Bogota and sometimes from Caracas itself. Added to this confusion was the fact there were often few if any accurate maps of the boundary areas. Many of the borders were located in uninhabited areas and in some cases had never been properly explored at all. Indeed, this situation is still true for many border areas today and it is only to be expected that South American governments would view such areas as frontiers of opportunity waiting to be exploited.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that for most countries of South America the post-colonial period is dominated by border disputes and the struggle to gain territory and resources. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of clear distinction between the peoples of the region. The very factor which attracted Bolivar to believe in the possibility of creating a united South

America, the uniformity in the origins and nature of society, was the very factor which facilitated territorial claims and boundary disputes throughout the region. Whereas in other parts of the world any attempt to take over neighbouring territory soon has to take account of the fact that the local people are of a different ethnic type, speak a different language, have a different culture, etc in much of South America this has not been a problem. For example, to the people of northern Atacama it mattered very little whether they were ruled from Santiago, Lima or La Paz. Such uniformity has made it very easy to pursue irredentist policies, the lack of a clearly defined "other" has made it much easier to lay claim to vast tracts of territory.

As a result of these particular circumstances it is not surprising that for many of the newly independent states much of the nineteenth century and large parts of the twentieth century have been spent in territorial disputes. Details of these disputes have been chronicled elsewhere (e.g. Ireland, 1938; Child, 1985; Bruce St John 1994a and 1994b) and little more need be said here about them except that in most cases they have been intricate in their detail and that few of them have been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. In some cases they have led to quite bloody conflicts, the most notable being the War of the Triple Alliance (1870) when over a million Paraguayans died in the conflict with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay leaving less than 300,000 survivors (Niedergang, 1971 p207). In the twentieth century such disputes have, fortunately, become rarer and generally much less bloody. Nevertheless disputes still occur and the recent flare-up in the Ecuador-Peru conflict over the boundary area in the Cordillera del Condor shows that such disputes have not lost their capacity for vicious unpleasantness. However, to place these events in context it is salutary to compare a map of South America in 1900 with a map of Europe of the same date. Within the twentieth century far greater territorial changes and much greater associated loss of life have occurred in the Old World than in the New. Although in South America many boundary disputes remain (see below) and the rhetoric is frequently bellicose, in reality it is quite rare for these disputes to lead to major conflicts.

Geopolitics in South America

There is a surprisingly large literature on geopolitics in most countries of South America, little of which finds its way into the outside world. It forms a major subject of study in many academic institutions and most military academies, particularly those within Chile, Argentina and Brazil. At a time when geopolitics has been almost entirely discredited in Europe and North America, in South America geopolitics has been a topic of rapidly growing interest, particularly within the last twenty years. The strength of this interest has meant that geopolitical thinking underlies much of current policy towards boundaries throughout South America.

For South American authorities, especially governments and military planners, geopolitical issues are an obvious subject of concern. In a region where most issues are still in a very fluid state and where there remain considerable potential resources still to be tapped, each national government is concerned to be in the most advantageous position possible to take full advantage from any future resources which may be uncovered. At the same time governments watch their neighbours very closely to make sure that they do not gain some advantage at their own expense.

In South American politics it is normal to regard every potential situation as a zero sum game where one country's advantage is thought to be gained entirely at another country's expense.

There are plenty of precedents to support such views. Chile's territorial advance north up the Pacific coast during the nineteenth century was largely based on the desire to gain control over the valuable guano (phosphate) and nitrate deposits in the disputed areas. It was Chilean policy to use these resources to pay for the costs of the war (Bruce St John, 1994b p13). The current dispute (which may or may not have been satisfactorily resolved this year) between Ecuador and Peru in the Cordillera del Condor area is based partly on the possible presence of oil in the area, which is of vital importance to Peru which is a net importer of oil whereas Ecuador is not, and on the old Ecuadorian dream of gaining a navigable outlet on the river Amazon, or at least its subsidiary the river MaraZon. The dispute between Chile and Argentina over the islands in the Beagle Channel was re-intensified by the discovery that the waters of the South Atlantic may contain rich deposits of hydrocarbons.

In a major study of geopolitics in South America Child (1985) lists at least 20 actual or potential major conflicts in all Latin America and the Caribbean, of which at least 14 involve South American states (see Map and Table). Furthermore, many of these conflicts are inter-linked. Movement on one of these issues is likely to have a knock-on effect elsewhere. Thus the defeat of the Argentinean armed forces in the Falklands/Malvinas war together with destruction of Argentinean war materiel eased the pressure on Chile in terms of the dispute over the Beagle channel and other issues.

To these many actual and potential conflicts should be added a rich vein of geopolitical writings which provide, or at least purport to provide, a coherent account of national development, national destiny, territorial claims and international relations with neighbouring states. These writings usually portray a harsh and cruel Darwinian world full of competitive states which are engaged in a rather vicious game of survival of the fittest. In this vision it is the most aggressive nations which not only survive but also manage to increase their power and influence and finally gain control over territory and resources.

Geopolitical thinking in South America has been developed out of a close study of the early pioneers including Ratzel, Kjellen, Mahan, Mackinder and Haushofer. However, whereas in Europe and North America these ideas were discredited by their association with Nazism, in South America the study of geopolitics was to continue unabated throughout the post-war period, and to flourish in the period since the 1960s.

Many of the earliest writings were based on an organic theory of the state, an idea first developed by Ratzel and his followers in the nineteenth century. This metaphor was based on the idea that the idea that a state was like a living organism that had to be healthy and strong in order to prosper and grow. This concept was expanded to include many aspects of national life and by 1968 Franco's Spain had adopted a new constitution based on an "Organic Law" which was intended to provide the framework for the political development of Spain in the post-Franco era. (Medhurst 1973, p26). Following Franco's death and the establishment of western-style

democracy the concept of the organic state was discredited and abandoned in Spain. However, in South America the concept was to continue in use as a guide both to the internal and to the external policies of nation states. For example, in July 1983 the government of Venezuela passed the *Ley Organica para la Ordenación del Territorio* (Organic Law for Territorial Management) which was designed to co-ordinate and integrate the "internal geopolitics of the nation" (del Pilar Lliso, p370). The aim of this law was to guide and promote the occupation and full use of national territory, including the promotion of new settlements and the location of new economic and social activities, with the objective of ensuring the constant and sustained growth of Venezuela's economy in order to promote Venezuela into becoming a great nation.

More typically the organic theory of the state has been used as a basis more for guiding a nation's external policy. Thus, organic concepts have often been used to promote highly nationalistic policies based on a creating a strong domestic economy but with the ultimate aim of using this domestic economy to help promote the expansion of the state out to its "natural frontiers". Such policies, adapted from the ideas of Karl Haushofer, have been summarised by the leading Chilean geopolitician, General Augusto Pinochet as follows:

i) that every state needs *lebensraum*, the vital space which a state needs in order to grow and expand;
ii) that a state's boundaries should be based on natural features which should mark out the limits to this *lebensraum;*
iii) that a state should develop a strong domestic economy and not be dependent on any other state, the policy of *autarchy*;
iv) that states should expand out into their spheres of influence in order to exercise their optimum maximum power in the world.

Such a policy takes no account of neighbouring states which are either ignored, or are assumed will lose out to the "fittest" states in the constant struggle for survival,. A state becomes "fit" by pursuing the correct geopolitical policies. It is easy to see how this form of thinking can lead on to bellicose policies and military confrontation, and why it is so attractive to military leaders as a means of justifying their position in society.

In South America geopolitics has, in extreme cases, been used to promote and justify a crude and often very confused form of *realpolitik*. The American analyst Jack Child, who was born and lived his early life in Buenos Aires, quotes (1985) the case of a senior Argentinean general who had been in charge of his country's border commission and who had been advocating a doctrine based on the "law of the orange". The idea behind this "law" was that an orange thrown anywhere into the River Plate basin would eventually float past Buenos Aires and therefore come under Argentinean influence. By implication this would be true of all human activities as well.

At its worst this mode of thinking has given rise to a rhetoric which appears to be full of bombast and self-delusion. The following is a section from the writings of one of Argentina's leading geopolitical writers, Jorge T. Briano (1966):

> "The exceptional historico-political formation of the Argentine nation has been made possible thanks to the marvellous conjunction of the most favourable geographic environment and the optimum ethnic conditions of the Argentine People, which probably cannot be found in any other country on earth. The spiritual currents of the human masses which make up the country - essentially and principally greco-latin - have produced a philosophical and political conception that distinguishes it with unique characteristics, which are humanitarian, with a universal transcendence, which have made of Argentina the recipient the friendship and consideration of all the people of the Earth" (quoted in Child, 1985 p46)

As Child goes on to say the sense of Argentinean geopolitical greatness can:

> "become wrapped up in the excessive pride and even arrogance and racism that is the occasional dark side of the Argentine character" (Child, 1985).

However, to put this into perspective the first country to propound and execute geopolitical policies within the hemisphere was the USA with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the long-held view that the Caribbean was an "American lake" and the rest of Latin America "Uncle Sam's backyard". Indeed the USA has been far more active in promoting its national policy overseas than any of its southern neighbours and has directly interfered in the internal affairs of practically every state south of the Rio Grande.

In his study of South American geopolitical discourse and military thinking Hepple (1992) discusses the extraordinary power of the underlying organic metaphor for fuelling much of this geopolitical thinking. As Hepple points out, the organic metaphor is one of the "big" metaphors in social and political theory. It provides a powerful and intuitively very accessible explanation of the role and function of states. However a metaphor is merely a way of making sense of some aspect of the world. It is not necessarily the "correct" way nor even less the only way of viewing the world, but hopefully it is a useful way.

> "No metaphor can provide total, unmediated vision. Rather metaphors are enforcing devices that make the world knowable while always already precluding still other ways of ordering the world" (Demeritt, 1994 p81)

It should also be remembered that a metaphor is the application of a name or description to an object to which it is not literally connected (Hesse, 1963, 1980). Thus the organic concept is a metaphor taken from the plant kingdom and applied to political and military situations. Demerritt goes on to warn of the dangers of "appropriative holism", of claiming unwarranted exclusivity for a metaphor. No matter how useful a metaphor has been at one stage in its existence it can easily become inappropriate and out of date.

Hepple (1992 pp152-154) has discussed the possible death of the organic metaphor in geopolitical thinking and practice in South America, suggesting that with the demise of many of

the former right wing military regimes their policies would disappear as well. This judgement would seem to be somewhat premature. The tradition of the *cuadillo*, the populist nationalist leader, is still very strongly embedded in the South American psyche and is probably far too strong to have disappeared for good. Indeed, the election of the ex-paratroop commander Hugo Chaves to power in Venezuela last year suggests that the strong appeal of a charismatic military leader is as powerful as ever in South America.

Hepple goes on to suggest that what is required is the discovery of new metaphors which will replace the role of the state as organism metaphor, which he regards as an unacceptable view of the state. He makes a plea for a number of smaller more focused metaphors which are needed to clarify the legitimate needs and objectives of the state but without attempting to link them together within one overarching framework as the state organism metaphor has attempted to do and which, Hepple asserts, has done a "disservice to political debate" (Hepple, 1992 p154). This item is addressed again below.

The Globalization Thesis and the "End of the Nation State"?

Throughout much of the 1990s it has been argued that with the rise of Trans-National Corporations and the extraordinary increase in the size and influence of the international financial system that there has been a concomitant reduction in the economic autonomy of the state. That we now live in a new world order in which the globalization of trade and capital has undermined the economic sovereignty of nation states (Dittgen, 1998). Various authors have taken this further and argued that a loss of economic sovereignty will lead inevitably to the destruction of the basis for the nation state as the focal point of political activity and authority, that with globalization we are seeing the end of the nation state. (Ohmae 1995; Strange 1996).

There has been much debate as to what constitutes globalization but all of the following have been suggested for inclusion as key factors in the globalization process:

> i) the rise of the international financial system. The coming of modern electronic communication systems has made it possible to develop twenty-four hours a day banking systems which now account for enormous quantities of financial transactions far greater than the volumes of money that a single nation state can deploy, even one as powerful as the USA;
> ii) the rise in importance of trans-national corporations (TNCs). The argument that global companies are able to deploy their resources around the globe so that they can maximise their economic power and minimise any control which might be exerted by a national government;
> iii) the rise of the global market. That the post-war years have seen the rise of the global products such as Coca Cola, Persil washing powder, etc and that increasingly companies are thinking in terms of products for global markets and not national markets;

iv) the rise of global cultures. Increasingly when companies such as Coca Cola sell a
product they do not sell a drink so much as a way of life, a feel-good factor, a part of
the "American dream";

v) the retreat of the state and the rise of the market in determining the prosperity of
citizens. That as a result of the previous items the prosperity of citizens depends
increasingly on factors such as interest rates and stock market performance, factors
which are largely global and not national in behaviour.

Although there has been a considerable debate as to whether globalization is a new phenomena
or, as some authors suggest, merely the recent and rapid extension of existing trends (Hirst
&Thompson, 1996), the main issue has been to try and identify the impact that globalization is
likely to have around the world. Ohmae (1995) presents a convincing case to say that the
countries of the "Triad", Japan, North America and Europe, are all well positioned to take full
advantage of globalization. What is far less clear is how this will affect the economies located in
the less favourable parts of the world. For example, South America hardly figures at all in
Ohmae's analysis. In fact there are a number of factors which indicate that South America is not
well placed to take advantage of the new opportunities of the global economy.

i) **History**. As we have seen the historical precedent in South America is not in favour of
the types of cooperation between states that globalization requires. Historical
experience and geopolitical thinking has left behind a legacy of mutual suspicion. The
dismantling of border controls and the opening up economies to outside influences
goes against almost every instinct of current geopolitical and nationalistic thinking.
Modern successful economies, as Fukiyama has noted, depend on high levels of trust
but, as noted above, in South American geopolitics the typical response tends to be
one of paranoia rather than trust.

ii) **Geography.** It has already been noted that most of the states of South America are
based around core areas and that the border zones are frequently in inhospitable
territory with very few inhabitants. In such circumstances it is not possible to think in
terms of the same level of cross-border activities that are being promoted with notable
success in parts of Europe. In fact in many parts of South America there is no shortage
of plans and projects to promote increased cross-border activity and cooperation. See,
for example, any issue of the Venezuelan journal *Aldea Mundo,* which maintains a
very full record of such activities along the Venezuelan-Colombian border.
Notwithstanding the very laudable intentions contained in these projects, the total
level of activity remains very low compared with the national economy as a whole.
For most South American states the border areas are very much on the periphery of
national territory and scope for co-operative ventures continues to remain very low.

iii) **Transport.** Again, because of physical factors much of South America is quite
difficult of access. Most communication networks are centred on the core areas of the
state and cross-border crossings are often quite rare. For example along the
1,000 miles of border between Venezuela and Colombia there are really only two or
three worthwhile crossing points and only one presently suitable for carrying a large
amount of international trade.

iv) The Economy. The Venezuelan writer, Kaldone Nweihed (1999), has attempted to catalogue the winners and losers in the globalization process using as his starting point the analysis by Paul Streeten. This classification is shown in table form and Nweihed goes on to argue that, for every category, South America appears on the 'losers' rather than the 'winners' side of the ledger. Nweihed goes on to quote Owen Lippert of the Fraser Foundation where he states that the process of globalization is bound to increase the gap between rich and the poor societies (Nweihed, 1999 p104). The states of South America with poor communications, low levels of computer ownership, underdeveloped financial and service sectors, etc are at a distinct disadvantage in the new globalization society. As far as globalization is concerned much of South America falls into the 'poor' category.

v) Trade. In terms of trading activity few South American states enter into trade with the dominant "Triad". The one major international trading partner is the USA. Trade with Europe and Asia is, with very few exceptions, at quite low levels. Even for the three largest economies in the region, Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil, most trade is destined to remain in the hemisphere. For example, Venezuela sends 56.7% of her exports and receives 45.% of her imports from the USA whilst a further 38.4% of imports and 21.5% of exports remain within Latin America (all figures refer to 1997). Very little of Venezuela's trade is with the rest of the world. The figures are rather better for Argentina and Brazil where no more than about 50% of trade remains within the Americas, indicating a more diverse trading pattern. The situation worsens again for many of the smaller countries such as Ecuador and Uruguay, where 60% or more of the trade is conducted within the hemisphere. The pattern of trade by commodities can also indicate a very heavy reliance on the export of raw materials. Outstanding is the case of Venezuela where 46.3% by value of exports are made up of extractive industries, mainly oil. Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia are also very heavily reliant on the export of extractive products (oil).

From the above it can be seen that South America is extremely poorly placed to gain full advantage from the new globalizing world economy. The impact of globalization on levels of cross-border activity within South America is likely to remain relatively small until a number of fundamental changes are brought about in terms of improvements to the infrastructure, etc.

Conclusions

As noted above Hepple has argued for a new set of metaphors to explain the workings and function of the modern nation state, that the old metaphor of the state as organism is both misleading and dangerous and needs to be replaced by less ambitious but more focused metaphors which explain smaller but more clearly defined areas of social and political activity. In line with this recommendation a number of observations are offered concerning the metaphors and theoretical concepts currently being used to explain borderland activities and in the light of current developments in South American boundaries.

The dominant metaphor of boundaries at the present time is Gidden's concept of the boundary as 'container', that boundaries represents the edge of the vessel which 'contains' all the power relations of a modern state. However, this view is very centrist and views the boundaries from within the container and sees it as a line where authority ends. It says nothing about cross-border activity.

A more recent modification of this dominant metaphor has been the 'leaky container' which emphasises that the container is not entirely watertight and that some activities manage to seep through the gaps in the container. This metaphor is an improvement in that it does permit cross-border activity but suffers the disadvantage that it is tolerant of all activities seeping through whereas in the real world restrictions are often placed on certain cross-border relations.

A further refinement might be to consider boundaries as chemical membranes, which permit certain chemicals in solution to pass through but restrain others. This would have the advantage of including both the restraining and the permissive aspects of a boundary to be included in the explanation.

However, even these modifications do not throw light on the rich pattern of activities that can often be discerned in borderland areas. In South America borderlands are important for a whole range of activities apart from the more traditional ones of trade and transport. Borderlands may be attractive to guerrilla movements with the possibility of seeking refuge across the border. They are frequently used by smugglers including drug traffickers, kidnappers and for other criminal activities.

1)   *All boundaries are leaky no matter how well they are fenced and patrolled by police or military forces.* Thus the boundary between North and South Korea or the Berlin Wall was never a complete seal. Goods and people were always being passed across the Berlin Wall during the period of its existence. Similarly migrants and refugees as well as spies and armed groups still manage tom cross the Korean border despite all the precautions which have been taken by both sides. In general it is possible to restrict the flows that cross a boundary but it is never possible to stop them.

2)   *All boundaries generate interaction across both sides of the border.* The existence of two or more different states with different regimes and resources either side of a boundary will mean that there will always be some advantage in trading goods and labour across that boundary. Thus the existence of a boundary will generate activity such as trade and the movement of goods and people across that boundary.

3)   *Some boundaries will generate more interaction than others depending on the gradient and the wealth of the two bordering states.* The level of the overall wealth of the two neighbouring states will determine the amount of interaction that takes place between them. Thus two wealthy states will have much more interaction between them than two poor states or one rich and one poor state. Similarly the gradient , the gap between the levels of wealth and social activity between the two neighbouring states, will determine

the direction of that interaction. The larger the gradient the greater the flow of people (i.e. migrants, whether legal or illegal) in one direction from the poorer to the richer state. If there is high wealth but no gradient between the two states then the flows will be large but in both directions. The situation with goods is more complex but in principle the larger the gradient then the more the pattern of trade is differentiated, with morte raw materials etc flowing in one direction and high value goods and services flowing in the other. (I am not quite sure about this latter point and want to think some more about it).

Boundaries are the places (the *locii* ?) where the differences between states (and nations?) becomes most apparent. It is only when a state is held to comparison with another similar entity, another state, that the significant differences become apparent.

The greater the differences the more that potential for unusual activity is created. Thus if there is no boundary then there may be more activity in terms of volume but it is a repetition of the activity found in the rest of the state. However, if a boundary is put into place then activity will be created which will be unusual (i.e. not the norm). The new activity will not be that which is found in the core (i.e. non-boundary) areas of either of the neighbouring states. In part it may be an activity which is undergoing transformation or transition or it may be an amalgam of activities found on both sides of the border or yet again it might be some form of fusion which has created a completely new activity, an activity which is not found in the core areas of either of the adjacent states.

However, this activity must be considered potential because restraints may be placed which restrict both the size and the scope of cross-border activity. Thus in an extreme case such as in the former Berlin Wall or present-day N and S Korea the border line is designed to stop all cross-border activity. However, even in such extreme cases a certain amount of cross-border still takes place - spying, military incursions, fraternisation around the edges such as between fishermen, radio and other media broadcasts - no boundary is absolute in being able to stop all cross-border activity.

Thus a boundary is a zone where not only is activity created but also restrained. Thus it is the case with all boundaries that they form a paradox. By fulfilling their prime activity of forming a boundary they, at the same time both create and retrain other activities. However, like all good paradoxes (see Gilbert Ryle ??) it is the nature of these creations/restraints which is of interest. Thus a boundary, by carrying out its prime function, stimulates new unusual activities whilst at the same time it restrains the more usual activities.

Thus the main paradox of a boundary is that it is both a restrictor and an encourager, it is at the same time both a constrainer and an initiator. The boundary is a constrainer to activities such as social interactions, economic exchange and generally the day-to-day busyness of life (going to school, policing, shopping, etc) but at the same time the boundary encourages and initiates activities that would not otherwise occur. These new activities include the legal or otherwise

permitted by the state (customs posts, legal trade, official cross-border cooperation activities, etc) as well as the illegal (e.g. smuggling, kidnapping, etc) and others to which the state is not in favour but allows to happen or is forced to allow to happen (cross-border gambling, prostitution, etc).

Part of the attraction of having exchange across a boundary is to do with the cultural other . Across boundaries the other can be both feared and disliked, the enemy (actual or potential), the non-member of the community, etc but at the same time the other can be the attractive, the exotic, the different, that which is refreshing, the attraction of the new, the attraction of opposites (or at least the attraction of the different), which is often linked to the mysterious and the non-familiar. This another of the paradoxes of the boundary.

The notion of the other is linked to concepts of community, the other being, by definition, a non-member of the community (see Cohen 1985, to develop these points). The concept of boundary is also linked to the question of land (territory). Here, if we take a more anthropological view we see that the idea of boundaries representing the end of one's rights and responsibilities (in medieval England the importance of beating the bounds of the parish, of the annual meeting of the village in the open field system to decide the next year's limits for the cultivation and use of each plot of land - i.e. not the ownership of the land but the responsibility and right to cultivate it as a member of the community, communal ownership and operation of the land doing much to foster the sense of community).

The sense of land and boundary is one which appears to be deeply imbued in most human societies and may go back as far as the neolithic revolution (i.e. cultivation depends on having some notion of land occupancy for at least the period of the growing season). Thus boundary in its widest sense is a concept which is much older than Westphalia. The significance of Westphalia should be seen in a different and perhaps more restricted context.

Where there is a rich/poor refraction at a boundary then there is always (?) an accumulation of socially deprived (?) activities on the poorer side of the boundary, e.g. Mexico has prostitution, gambling, drugs, the manufacture of cheap and often illegal products, etc all because a) it is cheaper to supply these activities on the poorer side of the boundary and, b) socially it is more acceptable to engage in such activities in someone else's country (one does not shit on one's own doorstep). Like vandalism, drunkenness, litter, etc it is all more acceptable to do socially deprived activities somewhere else, beyond the responsibilities of one's own land or the community's land.

Although it is cheaper and just as acceptable to carry out these activities anywhere on the other territory it is more convenient to do this in the nearest part of the other country, i.e. the border lands.

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Winners and Losers in the Globalization Process

Identity of sector affected	Winners	Losers
Level of the individual (biological)	Men	Women
Economic level	Those who can afford to pay for private services .	Those who depend on public services.
	Savers.	Borrowers.
Labour	Qualified workers.	Unqualified workers.
	Flexible workforce.	Inflexible workforce.
	Techno-specialists.	Basic producers.
Level of the individual (social)	People with interests.	People without interests.
Cultural	The global.	The local.
Socio-economic functions	Production, utility	Employment, salary
Company level	International market.	Local communities.
	Large enterprises.	Small enterprises.
	Flexible firms.	Inflexible firms.
Geographical or macro-cultural region.	East and south-east Asia	Africa and South America.

After Streeten and Nweihed (1999)

European Borders in Transition: The Internal and External Frontiers of the European Union

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Introduction

The Final Act of Helsinki, in 1975, guaranteed the existing borders of Europe; academic discourse on European frontiers seemed, subsequently, restricted to specialist academic circles. Two major developments have since changed that situation. Within the European Union, the "Euro-sclerotic' phase was overcome through the Single European Act (1986) and the drive to abolish frontier controls at the EU's internal borders, expressed in the Schengen agreements of 1985 and 1990. Outside the European Union, the pivotal events of 1989-1992 – the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of the Eastern communist regimes, and the crumbling of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Sovjet Union itself opened the opportunity to heal the rift that had divided the Continent during the Cold War. Since then, *c*. 20,000 km of new international frontiers have been created in Europe, and the discourse on the functioning and the perception of frontiers has gained new salience in political discourse.[1]

The Single European Market ("Europe 1992") abolished border controls for the movement of goods, services and capital. Regionalisation has enhanced the political, administrative and identity-marking function of sub-state boundaries. Since March 1995, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Convention of 1990 have progressively been implemented, guaranteeing the free movement of people within 'Schengenland'.

Both at its internal and its external frontiers, the opening of borders has not solely been seen as a positive development – anxieties and even fears have accompanied the process. Would open borders be an invitation for criminals and illegal immigrants to cross freely and move easily between one European country and another? Schengen entails that the abolishment of border controls at the internal frontiers be matched by a standardised strengthening of controls at the

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[1]   See, for example, M Foucher, *Fronts et Frontières, un tour du monde géopolitique*, Paris: Fayard, 1990; H Donnan and T Wilson (eds), *Border Approaches*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994; S Raich, *Grenzüberschreitende und interregionale Zusammenarbeit in einem "Europa der Regionen"*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995; M Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996; L O'Dowd and M Wilson (eds), *Borders, Nations, States*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996; G Éger and J Langer (eds), *Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe*, Klagenfurt: Norea, 1996; P Ganster, A Sweedler, J Scott and W-D Eberwein (eds), *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America*, San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1997; R Krämer, *Grenzen der Europäischen Union*, Potsdam: Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1997; G Brunn and P Schmitt-Egner (eds), *Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa —Theorie — Empirie — Praxis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998; Beate Neuss, Peter Jurczek and Wolfram Hilz (eds), *Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, Tübingen: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung, 1998; M Anderson and E Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998.

external frontiers of 'Schengenland'. Does that mean that the eastern frontier of the European Union, opened in 1989/90 from the East, is subsequently experiencing a degree of closure from the West? How does that match with attempts at developing institutionalised cross-border co-operation along that frontier?

Part of the accession process of Central and Eastern European states is the demand by EU member states and by the EU itself that the applicant states police their eastern frontiers efficiently. Schengen standards are being exported eastward in order to secure the future eastern frontier of the European Union. Schengen casts its shadow far into Central and Eastern Europe.

The result of this intricate, sometimes unclear or even contradictory picture of conflicting functions of frontiers, torn between enhanced co-operation and integration (requiring open frontiers) and the perceived need for strict controls (requiring limits to this openness), is a political discourse highlighting the issue of migration as part of the 'security threat' and the need for harmonised and strict identity controls, at the borders and beyond, in what has been called a return to spatial approaches to security and control, including border zones and police co-operation far beyond national frontiers.

Chernobyl in 1986 made abundantly clear that international frontiers are no barriers to environmental pollution. Other global developments also challenge the role of frontiers as barriers and protective or regulatory instruments.

The internal and external frontiers of the European Union are in transition, presenting a less unilinear and more complex picture than slogans like 'a Europe without frontiers' may suggest. This will be the case for the foreseeable future, for at least six reasons:

- The further political, economic and social integration of the EU (tax and legal harmonisation as well as the possible strengthening of the regional tier of European governance) may further blur the boundaries between member states and sub-state units of the European Union.
- EU enlargement will transform external into internal EU frontiers and create new external EU frontiers.
- On the margins of the EU, in the Balkans, and further east, in the former Sovjet Union, existing borders are being challenged and far from stable.
- Wealth disparities in Europe, but also in a global context, will keep a focus on the topic of legal and illegal migration and the control of it.
- Aspects of globalisation – new communications technologies, e-commerce, etc – will further challenge the role of frontiers as efficient regulatory instruments.
- Organised transfrontier crime seems to have replaced the military threat, and the fight against it is increasingly based on the linking of the internal and external in a new security discourse.
- EU applicant status for Turkey puts a new spin on the questions of the frontiers of Europe: where are the geographical limits of the Continent? Is there a defined *finalité politique* of the European Union?

Internal EU Boundaries

Border conflicts

There are no longer any significant border-related conflicts between EU member states, with the following exceptions:

- The most serious conflict, hindering implementation of European Union Justice and Home Affairs legislation, is between Spain and the UK over the territory of Gibraltar. Spain has used Schengen (and the fact that the UK has not singed up to it) as a lever to impose rigid and time-consuming controls at its border with Gibraltar.
- ETA in the Basque Country campaigns for an independemt Euzkadi, which would encompass Basques on both sides of the international frontier between Spain and France. Yet, there is little support from the Basques on the French side, and none from the French and Spanish governments, for any change of the international frontier.
- A plethora of more or less militant Corsican independence groups strive to break away from France.
- With the Belfast Agrement of Good Friday 1998 and the subsequent change of the Irish Constitution, the conflict over the Northern Irish border has been defused – although the nationalist parties in the North (Sinn Féin and the SDLP), as well as the parties of the South, still aspire to a united Ireland, to be achieved by peaceful and democratic means.
- A minority movement in the north of Italy, led by Umberto Bossi and his Northern League, demands its separate state – Padania – from Italy.
- The Scottish National Party (SNP) campaigns for Scotland's 'independence in Europe' and would hold a referendum on parting from the UK in case of an election victory in Scotland.

Most of these cases do not have any influence on EU legislation and are seen as internal matters for the member states to deal with.

Schengen

As the European Economic Community transformed itself into the enlarged European Union, the goal formulated in the Treaty of Rome of an 'ever closer union of peoples', encompassing the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and people, progressed in leaps and bounds, particularly since the mid-1980s.

Customs formalities at internal frontiers had all but vanished by the late 1980s – a process widely welcomed even if it was not without difficulties.[2] More controversial have been the negotiations and the implementation of the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Schengen

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[2]   Abolishion of Customs affected border communities which had depended on checkpoints and their personnel as well as on trade generated by Customs differences.

Convention of 1990 which, together with hundreds of pages of rules and regulations make up the Schenbgen *aquis*. With the exception of Ireland and the UK, all present EU member states have signed up to Schengen. Germany, France, the Benelux states, and Spain implemented Schengen in March 1995; Austria and Italy followed on 1 April 1997. The Scandinavian EU countries had, from 1996, 'observer status', in view of the difficulty that they – Denmark, Sweden and Finland – shared a passport union and common travel zone with non-EU member state Norway. It is envisaged that the entire Scandinavian 'Nordic Union' will become party to the Schengen *acquis*, despite Norway's determination to remain outside the EU. Greece, whose airport controls at Athens have come under the Schengen regime, is still not deemed efficient enough in its external border controls – with its difficult external sea and islands frontier, Greece is the only EU country without a common land frontier with another EU member state – to pass the entry tests of the Schengen Control Group for full membership. Through the Amsterdam Treaty, ratified in 1999, Schengen has come under the institutionalised umbrella of the EU, managed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of Ministers.

Schengen created a common external frontier for those EU states which have implemented it ('Schengenland'). This frontier is policed and controlled according to rules and regulations laid down in the confidential Schengen manual and through a common visa policy. A central computer system, the Schengen Information System (SIS) based at Strasbourg and linked to national data bases, has been installed to facilitate quick exchange of data on wanted persons, illegal immigrants and stolen vehicles. Data protection is provided by an independent control board, yet its efficiency is being questioned by civil rights groups and from within the European Parliament. So-called SIRENE offices (*Supplément d'Information Requis à l'Entrée Nationale*) have been established in all Schengen states as support structures. Schengen also emphasises closer police and law enforcement co-operation between the participating states, and particularly in the border regions; it also calls for a common visa, asylum and immigration policy.

In practice, Schengen has created border zones along the internal frontiers of Schengenland – usually of 20 km in depth, where the police has now the right of 'hot pursuit' across the frontier. In some cases, larger areas have been made into border zones, where random controls are legally allowed.[3] The Austrian Ministry of the Interior, for example, announced 30 km-wide 'security veil' along the German border, with a significantly increased police presence, and that German police could pursue criminals unlimited by space and time in Austria.[4] Dr Horst Eisel, Assistant Director for Frontiers at the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, put it thus, covering internal as well as external frontiers:

> The spatial approach clearly ought to take precedence over the purely linear approach to geographic boundaries. The latter is no longer a match for today's challenges, because individual and collective security begins beyond our borders and continues well on this side of them.[5]

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[3] The constitutional legality of this is challenged in some German *Länder* (like Baden-Württemberg), following a controversial decision of the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern High Court in November 1999.

[4] See Claus Pándi, 'Bayerische Polizei bekommt in Österreich mehr Kompetenzen', in *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, 17 April 1997.

[5] Quoted in Patrice Molle, *External Borders Pilot Project: Placement Report*, Strasbourg: Centre des Etudes Européennes, 1996, p.6.

While border posts have vanished at the internal frontiers, this must not be confused with a 'border-free Europe', as if borders no longer existed. Schengen has only been incompletely implemented and occasionally suspended. France, for example, decided to retain border checks on its Benelux frontier, because the French government perceived liberal Dutch drugs policies as potentially dangerous.[6] Likewise, France suspended Schengen during 'Vigipirate', after terrorist bombs had exploded in the Paris Metro in 1995.[7]

Perception of frontiers

Some of the internal frontiers of the EU have long since acquired the status of 'natural' frontiers. France, for example, came to regard the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, the Channel and the Atlantic as its 'natural' limits, centuries after Caesar had described Gaul in the same terms, and despite the diverse history which followed. As Fernand Braudel observed, a relic boundary like the Roman *limes* between the Rhine and the Danube reemerged as a new dividing line: "When the Reformation occurred, it was along virtually the same frontier that the split in Christianity became established: Protestants on one side and Catholics on the other."[8] Of course, there is no such thing as a 'natural' frontier. "Frontiers tend to entrench frontiers and make them seem natural phenomena."[9] All frontiers are human constructs – yet it helps if natural and geographical features can be employed to support frontier claims. Borders thus engraved in collective memory and public consciousness will not vanish with the abolition of border controls. They mark different cultures and life styles, different languages, different legal and political systems.[10]

In fact, the more the physical trappings of the frontier are erased, the more the frontier demands to be permanently imagined, created as a frontier of the mind, in defence of culture and life style, but also in order to experience and cherish difference. The border, no longer viewed as an obstacle or a hindrance, becomes an attractive line to be criss-crossed in pursuit of difference, enhancing the quality of life in the 'borders', and thus sometimes reverting the historical experience of having been sealed off, having been a backwater, peripheral and under-developed.

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[6]   The doping scandal subsequently overshadowing the 1998 *Tour de France* was detected at the Belgian-French border.

[7]   Reinforced during the football World Cup '98, this time targeted against cross-border football hooliganism.

[8]   F Braudel, *Civilisation and Capitalism*, iii: *The Perspective of the World*, London: Collins, 1985, p.66.

[9]   *Ibid.*, p.218.

[10]   Even at the local level, ancient divides can still exercise their influence on present-day culture and politics. The northern-English neighbouring cities of Gateshead and Newcastle are jointly bidding to become European city of culture. But there still are difficulties to be overcome in bridging the Tyne which separates the 'sister ciries'. Gateshead's director of arts, Bill Macnaught, was quoted in the *Guardian* (24 August 1999): "It's a narrow river, but it has been a big divide."

Internal frontiers within the European Union vary widely in terms of geography and demography – from low-intensity frontiers, with very few crossings (or crossings concentrated at very few passages), in mountainous regions (Pyrenees, Alps) or in sparsely populated areas like Scandinavia, to high-intensity frontiers like, for example, those in the upper and lower Rhine valley.

These historical, geographical and demographic features have an impact on the function of these frontiers and on the need and possibility of co-operation across them.

Police co-operation

Police co-operation at the EU's internal frontiers preceded Schengen, often in an informal way, based on personal contacts – sometimes operating, legally, in a 'grey zone'. Schengen has generated a wealth of accords, agreements and co-operative arrangements between law enforcement agencies, not all of them co-ordinated. Bilateral and multilateral arrangements often overlap. A good example is the Channel tunnel, covered by the Anglo-French Protocol of 1991.[11] In addition to the bilateral agreement, there are letters of understanding between Kent Constabulary and police authorities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. This, in turn, needs to be seen in the wider framework of the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference. Of course, this particular frontier comes also under the remit of Europol and, at least partly, of Schengen. Overarching is the global network of Interpol.[12]

On the one hand, this is a confusing complexity and is widely criticised for its lack of transparency and accountability. On the other hand, in practical terms of police activity, this siutuation offers alternative channels of communication, should one network not function properly. Apart from all that, co-operation, based on personal acquaintance and trust has increasingly supplemented the institutional arrangements. Since 1996, the EU Commission has sponsored seminars and placements for border police to enhance the exchange of notes, with a view towards harmonising border management.[13]

Sub-state frontiers

'Europe of the Regions' and the discourse on the imminent death of the nation state, which flourished in the 1980s, seem to have taken a back seat again, since the establishment of the Committee of the Regions provided by Maastricht. The big topics – engineering the introduction of the European single currency and tentatively opening the European Union towards the South and, particularly, the East – have put the member states and their (heads of) governments firmly at the helm of European politics.

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[11]   This Protocol provides for a French police presence at Folkestone and a British police presence at Fréthun.

[12]   See Jim Sheptycki, 'Police Co-operation in the English Channel Region, 1968-1996', *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, Vol.6, No.3, pp.216-35.

[13]   See Patrice Molle, *op.cit.*

The importance of the nation state in future European governance has become a new emphasis,[14] echoing the turn taken by former Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac in their letter to the 1997 Cardiff Summit, where they seemed to reduce the principle of subsidiarity to a two-polar exercise between Brussels and the member states – rather than "the devolution of powers from Brussels and Strasbourg not to a national but to a sub-national or regional level."[15] This is clearly seen as a worrying turn of rhetoric in cross-border regions, particularly on the German side, where the emphasis had been on balancing national with European and regional identities.

Yet, the twists of rhetoric on the one hand, and the actual development of cross-border regionalism on the other, may diverge. The European Union clearly shows signs of multi-level governance. The Tübingen political scientist and integration theorist Rudolf Hrbek has defined four levels within the European Union: the national level (formed by the member states), the supranational level (i.e. the EU institutions), the transnational level (transnational communication and co-operation of non-governmental actors), and the subnational level, encompassing the territorial units existent below the member states. Hrbek points out that these levels are not hierarchically related to each other, but have their own impact.[16]

Identification with the region has undergone a dramatic change. Were region and 'Heimat' twenty or thirty years ago seen as parochial, backward, stifling and narrow if not outright reactionary, the emergence or re-emergence of local history, vernacular writing, grassroots movements and citizens' initiatives has led to a nearly complete revaluation of regions as models of democracy, where one finds not only the parameters for one's identity but where, in Louis MacNeice's words minted for Ireland, one can see the end of one's actions.

This is important when the discourse on the role of the regions in governance shall not be restricted to constitutional questions, without reference to issues closer to the minds of the people. Accountability, transparency of political decision-making, control over the affairs in one's environment are of import as well as 'bread and butter' questions. How does regional government relate to economic performance? Can it "raise the innovative capacity of the indiginous regional economy'?[17] Is a strong local culture conducive to inward investment and structural development. What are the synergy effects in regional co-operation? Constitutional questions have always to be seen in conjunction with questions of political culture and economic policies, if a convincing case is to be construed.

Undoubtedly, there has been a European process of regionalisation – transforming such centralist states as Italy, France, Spain or Belgium, adding a touch of decentralisation if not turning them into federal or at least semi-federal units. Italy created, in 1970, twenty administrative regions, from the pre-industrial areas of the far south to the ancient city states of the North and the special status regions of Val d'Aosta or South Tyrol. France, under Mitterand in the early 1980s,

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14   See Peter Schenk, "'Die Nation ist noch nicht überholt'", *Badische Zeitung*, 6 July 1998.
15   Christopher Harvie, *The Rise of Regional Europe*, London: Routledge, 1994, p.1.
16   quoted in *ibid.*, pp.17-18.
17   Kevin Morgan, 'Let's get regionalism right this time', *New Statesman*, 26 June 1998.

decentralised – in what has been called 'a silent revolution' – administrative and planning power to twenty-two regions. Belgium's answer to its ethnic/linguistic divisions has been the federalisation of the country, creating the three regions of Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels.[18] Spain embarked on a programme of regionalisation after Franco, with Euzkadi (the Basque Country) and Catalonia paving the way for other regions like Galicia or Andalusia. German unification meant the restitution of five federal states on the territory of the former centralist German Democratic Republic. And, endorsed by the overwhelming referendum result in Scotland on 11 September 1997, and the cliffhanger in Wales a week later, as well as with the 'Yes' vote in the Irish referenda of 1998, the UK and Ireland have belatedly joined the European regionalisation train, creating assemblies in Belfast and Cardiff and a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh. Furthermore, London got, in 2000, its elected mayor, with other cities set to follow that example, and English regions can be expected to demand their own devolved structures, particularly if -– as in the Spanish case of rolling devolution — the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies will be seen as coming up with the goods.[19]

Additional pressure comes from the need to restructure regional and cohesion funds in view of EU enlargement. Cornwall has been recognised as a target region of its own – its indicators showing 69 per cent of the EU average, when detached from the more affluent counties of Devon and Somerset – as has been Western Wales, South Yorkshire and Merseyside, all looking for priority status for regional funding, as do the Highlands and Islands of Scotland.[20] Similar moves can be seen in Ireland and other European countries.

Regionalism is, clearly, a process complementing and balancing centralising tendencies and needs within the European Union. This is most obvious in the realm of environmental policies. It was regional protest against nuclear power stations, against polluted rivers, and poisonous industrial emissions which informed regionalism in the 1970s as a grassroots movement. At the same time, this environmental consciousness helped to grasp the fact that standards and frameworks of environmental protection must not stop at national borders. Acid rain, ozone depletion, threats to wildlife – all require international and cross-border co-operation. Many of these grassroots regional movements themselves in fact transcended and transcend national frontiers – as, for example, the anti-nuclear movement in the Upper Rhine region.[21]

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[18]   See Benedikt Jonas, 'A Disintegrating Belgium at the Heart of an Integrating Europe?', in Eberhard Bort (ed), *Borders and Borderlands in Europe*, Edinburgh: ISSI 1998, pp.53-71.

[19]   In *London's Mayor and the Prospects for English Regional Government* (*Renewal*, 1998), Mike Craven predicts that London's mayor will pave the way for regionalism in England, bringing in its wake directly elected assemblies for the North, the North-West, Yorkshire and the South-West within the next decade. See also the 'Regions' supplement in the *New Statesman*, 26 June 1998. At the time of writing (April 2000), the Northern Irish institutions are suspended, due to the impasse over the issue of decommissioning paramilitary weapons.

[20]   European Parliament (ed.), *EP News*, July 1998.

[21]   See Thomas Lehner, 'Einige Sätze über das Elsaß', in Lars Gustafsson (ed.), *Thema: Regionalismus* (*Tintenfisch 10*), Berlin: Wagenbach, 1976, pp.121-123.

Transport policies, macro-economic planning, redistribution through regional and cohesion funds have been other areas where power has been increasingly concentrated on the European level. In the light of this, the preservation of cultural, linguistic and historical identities – 'unity in diversity' – requires strong regional structures. As a tier within the governmental structures of the EU, the regions can safeguard democratic participation of the citizens in the decision-making processes concerning their own affairs, applying in practice the principle of subsidiarity. Regionalism, in other words, brings government closer to the people. Regions seem, potentially, more competent in handlig economic affairs. They seem better suited to the modern demands of 'flexible specialisation' in manufacturing.[22] States seem, on the one hand, too large, their political centres often too far away from the regions, to arrive at economic decisions which are properly informed about interconnections on the ground; on the other hand, they seem too small to provide the markets for industries and services.

Bernd Groß and Peter Schmitt-Egner distinguish between three phases of regionalism in Western Europe:

- 'old' regionalism, which was conservative, tied-up with ethnic nationalistic ideals.
- 'new' regionalism as a rebellion of the province against centralist policies of modernisation, following autonomous, separatist and autarkist goals – of decreasing impact, but still to be observed in the Basque Country or in Corsica.
- 'postmodern' regionalism, encompassing regional elites (rather than marginal groups), integrated into the different levels of governance, aiming at co-operation in structural and industrial policies; neither making front against modernisation, nor passively suffering it.[23]

This last category – which I would call 'new regionalism' – strives at actively supporting regional culture by developing both internal instruments of governance and external co-operation. It plays an important role in the balance between integration and autonomy, unity and diversity. Groß and Schmitt-Egner analyse what they call its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Why, Groß and Schmitt-Egner ask, is decentralisation a necessity in Europe. Following Jens-Joachim Heese, they come to the conclusion that regions offer specific development potentials, because they are close to the problems which have to be solved, can muster reserves, resources and active participation.[24] The nation state, Kenichi Ohmae has argued, has become "an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world."[25] This might be slightly exaggerated. But the role of the nation state is

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[22]   See Eberhard Bort and Neil Evans, 'Networking Europe: Understanding the European Union from Below', in E Bort and N Evans (eds), *Networking Europe: Essays on Regionalism and Social Democracy*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000, pp.5-24; p.17.

[23]   Bernd Groß and Peter Schmitt-Egner, *Europas kooperierende Regionen: Rahmenbedingungen und Praxis transnationaler Zusammenarbeit deutscher Grenzregionen in Europa*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994, p.16.

[24]   *Ibid*., pp19-20.

[25]   Kenichi Ohmae, 'The Rise of the Region State', in *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 2 (1993), pp.78-87; p.78.

certainly changing. Nation states are, in the phrase of Michael Mann, "diversifying, developing, not dying."[26] Regions have, as Scott, Sweedler, Ganster and Eberwein highlight, grown in importance because of "their greater flexibility and capacity to react rapidly to new economic circumstances."[27]

Groß and Schmitt-Egner summarise the regionalist agenda as follows:

- historically developed identities and cultural diversity can be preserved and developed;
- political action becomes more comprehensible, transparent, and democratic;
- acceptance of the overarching European level of governance is made easier; a stronger regional consciousness supports the identification with Europe;
- regional economic fine-engineering as a regulative to economic centres can contribute to a more equal economic development in Europe;
- the so-called 'third level', i.e. the regions besides the member states and the EU institutions, guarantees a vertical division of power, thus contributing to a harmonisation of the distribution of power in Europe.[28]

Four major trends may be discerned in regional developments. First, there is the trend towards regionalisation within European states, as already alluded to in the cases of France, Italy, Spain or, latterly, the UK. "The tide is still running strongly towards regional governance structures across Europe."[29] Regionalism is a process. Rolling devolution – or uneven federalism – continues to develop in Spain, where Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia have demanded the recognition as nations, rather than, as at present, 'nationalities'. In their 'Declaration of Barcelona', they have appealed to the EU to accept the transformation of Spain into a confederation of states.[30] Italy is encountering problems with its federalisation programme. And in Germany the debate about a reorganisation of the Länder structure gathers pace, particularly on the centre-right, as the discrepancies in viability and affluence are accentuated by the new Länder, highlighting at the same time the structural weaknesses of small units like Bremen or the Saarland.[31]

Then, secondly, there are inter-regional partnerships, like the Welsh tie-in with the Four Motors (Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, Rhone-Alpes, Catalonia), which have partly been made possible by this regionalisation process, and have progressed regardless of their fashion-value in

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[26]   Michael Mann, 'Nation-States in Europe and other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, not Dying', in *Daedalus*, 122, 3 (1993), pp.115-40.
[27]   James Scott, Alan Sweedler, Paul Ganster and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, 'Dynamics of Transboundary Interaction in Comparative Perspective', in James Scott et al (eds), *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America*, San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1997, pp.3-23; p.5.
[28]   *Ibid.*, p.27.
[29]   Patrick Dunleavy and Stuart Weir, 'Home rule for Yorkshire?', *New Statesman*, 26 June 1998.
[30]   See Friedrich Kassebeer, "Wie Spanien in Stücke zerfällt', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 August 1998.
[31]   See Bernt Conrad, 'Die Kraft des Föderalen', *Die Welt*, 23 December 1997; Ralf Neubauer, 'Föderaler Reformbedarf', *Die Welt*, 22 January 1998; and Philip Kunig, 'Vielfalt ist gut, weniger Vielfalt wäre besser', *Die Welt*, 22 August 1998.

the media.[32] Other examples would be Scotland, which is informally linked with Bavaria, or the West-German Länder twinning with the New Länder of East Germany after 1990.

A relatively new phenomenon, particularly evident in Germany, is the emergence of sub-regions. A good example is the Greater Stuttgart Region, an area covering *c.*2.5 million people, which got its own, directly elected parliament in 1994, creating a new tier of governance between the Land level and local government, with its remit concentrated on spatial and infrastructure planning. This regional assembly still has its teething problems, as intense debates over competences have shown,[33] but has already been copied in other sub-regions with similar problems of congestion, like Frankfurt or the Ruhrgebiet. A fourth phenomenon is cross-border regionalism (which will be discussed below).

Some of these regional developments seemed to find their entry into the system of European governance through the Maastricht process. The Committee of the Regions, created through Art. 198 of the Maastricht Treaty, and meeting for its inaugural on 1 March 1994, was

> a significant step in institutionalising the presence of regions in the Community but ... a long way short of the ideals of the more ardent regionalists who looked to a regionally based second chamber of the European Parliament.[34]

Despite its mere consultative role, and despite the wide and uneven diversity of its constituent members (from Northrhine Westphalia's 18 million to British or Greek local councils), it must not be underestimated that in negotiating the creation of this body the regions were integrated into the Maastricht process; and the Committee of the Regions is an integral part of the decision-making structures of the European Union. Many in the Committee of the Regions see it only as a beginning. "Rather than complaining what we have not (yet) achieved, we should make full use of the opportunities open to us", seems to have been the motto since its creation.[35]

Regionalism is not a *panacea*. It has to be seen as part of the process of European integration, fully tied in into the way European affairs are being governed, from international relations to local matters. It would be fatal if people had to find out that regionalism has left them with a meaningless playground where they can build their little castles in the sand, while the big decisions on the big issues are being made elsewhere, out of the reach of their control and influence. Regionalism must also not serve as an excuse for nation-states to abandon policies of solidarity by devolving standards of social security to an uneven system of regions, most of them

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[32]   See Phil Cooke and Kevin Morgan, 'The Wales–Baden-Württemberg Accord', in Eberhard Bort and Neil Evans (eds), *Networking Europe*, 2000, pp.45-55
[33]   See Helmut Doka, 'A Region is a Region is a Region – is it? Planning in the Stuttgart Region', in Eberhard Bort and Neil Evans (eds), *Networking Europe*, 2000, pp.463-71.
[34]   B Jones and M Keating, *The European Union and the Regions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.15.
[35]   Dietrich Pause, the former Secretary General of the Committee, quoted in N Schöbel, *The Committee of the Regions: A Preliminary Review of the Committee's Work during its first two Years in Operation*, Tübingen: European Centre for Research on Federalism, 1997, p.6.

incapable of sustaining levels a redistributive state could manage. "The new European regional agenda presupposes devolution," Kevin Morgan has argued,

> not least because regions need to be able to design and deliver policies attuned to their own circumstances, to act on their own knowledge and, yes, to make their own mistakes. But this should not be seen as an opportunity for central governments to relinquish responsibility for the fate of their poorer regions.[36]

It would further be detrimental if regionalism were to develop into regio-centrism. Competition between regions can be a motor for development, but if it deteriorated into a Darwinistic wooing of investors, snatching them from other regions which are unable to offer large-scale tax-incentives and other subsidies, the distortion of European integration to the disadvantage of the taxpayer would be the flipside of a free-for-all for multi- and transnational concerns, playing cat and mouse with the regions. Kevin Morgan speaks of

> a regulatory regime that safeguards against their [the regions'] precipitating a race to the bottom by outbidding each other in debilitating subsidy wars to attract inward investment.[37]

For all these reasons, competence and tie-in are the keys for a regional European polity. Real competences in the governance of their own affairs (i.e. effective subsidiarity) empowers the regions – within a European framework in the construction of which, in turn, the regions must have their constitutionally guaranteed part to play.

Is regionalism prone to be more open to sleaze and corruption than larger units of governance? Parochial politics certainly could be fostering nepotism and clientilism. Yet it also offers the chance of greater accountability and transparency, which will have to be emphasised in the institutions of local and regional democracy. The danger cannot be completely ruled out, but why it should be greater than in larger, more anonymous units of governance, is difficult to conceive. Again, a system of checks and balances in an integrated system of interlinking levels of governance, from the local to the European, seems to be the best guarantee of the best possible democratic control of decision-making processes at all levels.

If there is any truth in the contrast between European *culture* and American *civilisation*, it rests to a great degree with the regions. Strong regional cultures have long been accepted as an important 'soft factor' for industrial and economic development. Sustainable, 'cultural' tourism is one of the most obvious areas where regional initiatives may both support local culture, traditions and identities, and create infrastructure and jobs. Thus, the debate about regionalism is not only an abstract constitutional game, perhaps enriched by some discourse on identity and belonging. These must not be underestimated, but what counts in the end is that real issues – poverty, unemployment, environmental hazards, alienation – are being addressed. To do this efficiently, regions need to be empowered with competences, both in their own area of responsibility, and on a European level.

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[36]   Kevin Morgan, *art. cit.*
[37]   *Ibid.*

If, say, the UK government wants to safeguard the (UK) Union, it might be best advised to push for a strong regional tier in European governance. This would alleviate the pressure on stateless nations (not only in the UK) to press for full independence. If stateless nations were to find that nation-state rhetoric and practice does deny them the input and access to governance on the European level which small nations like Denmark or Finland enjoy, let alone potential newcomers like Estonia, Slovenia or Malta, then that would be grist on the mills of separatist 'big N' Nationalism – not necessarily atavistic or ethnic in itself, but separatist along the lines of the Scottish Nationalists' 'Independence in Europe' programme. If, on the other hand, there was sufficient provision for participation in the governance of the EU for stateless regions/nations, then these might yet settle for 'small n' nationalism in form of autonomous, devolved regimes, perhaps aspiring towards federal solutions at home and at the European level, avoiding the disruption of existing EU member states and the setting up of new international frontiers. Yet, for that to be achieved,

> a new regional vision of Europe is demanding attention, one that challenges the current Europe of the nation states and is likely to do so more strongly in the coming century. If it is to be democratic, this new Europe must have strong local and regional governments.[38]

The mosaic of regions as it presents itself in Europe at the moment is untidy, fuzzy, best illustrated by the unevenness of composition and inadequacy in power of the Committee of the Regions. It is a process, not least a learning process. "The Europe of the Regions," to quote John Osmond,

> remains a fluid and unfocused notion, a direction of the will rather than a blueprint. No one map can capture its sense. Yet it is on the map in the 1990s in a concrete economic way that was only dimly perceived in the 1970s, certainly so far as England is concerned. And at least one aspect of the direction now seems unmistakable: a transcendence of the rigidities of big, upper-case Nation-State nationalism by the flexibilities of small, lower-case regionalism.[39]

Cross-border co-operation – Euroregions

Cross-border regionalism has flourished over the past two decades, beginning from the heartlands along the western border of Germany, and taking a new step in the 1990s, when – in response to the opening of the Iron Curtain – Euroregions were set up from the Finno-Russian border down to Austria, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.[40] This, of course, has the potential to question the basis of a "Europe of the Regions" as understood by Brussels (where regions are defined as the sub-state level of governance within member states). Not only does cross-border

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[38]   John Osmond, 'The Welsh Assembly 1979 and 1997', in Eberhard Bort and Neil Evans (eds), *Networking Europe*, 2000, pp.325-36; p.331.
[39]   John Osmond, 'Unitary Britain and Regional Europe', in Eberhard Bort and Neil Evans (eds), *Networking Europe*, 2000, pp.69-84; pp.82-83.
[40]   See Eberhard Bort, '*Mitteleuropa*: The Difficult Frontier', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter 1998, pp.91-108; Eberhard Bort, 'Crossing the EU Frontier: Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Cross-Border Regionalism and State Sovereignty', *Interregiones* 6, 1997, pp.20-31.

regionalism challenge traditional views of state sovereignty,[41] it also transcends the external frontiers of the Union – not only in the East, where nearly all the neighbouring states are to become members of the EU in the not-too-distant future, but also in the case of Switzerland, particularly on the Upper Rhine and in the Lake Constance region. In April 1998, the Upper Rhine Council was established – not quite a parliament (yet), but a political body made up of elected members (MPs, mayors, prefects) from Baden-Württemberg, Alsace and the Swiss cantons of Basle-City and Basle-Land.[42]

Peripheral borderlands are one of the legacies of the nation-state. It is because of the memory of that fact that the returning rhetoric of the lasting importance of the nation state is viewed with scepticism in the borderlands of Europe. Regionalism, and in particular cross-border regionalism, has been a tool to place formerly peripheral regions at the heart of developments.[43]

Wherever possible, cross-border Euroregions have been based on common cultural and historical experience, but primarily they are a pragmatic enterprise for economic development, funded by the European Union's INTERREG and, at the external frontier, PHARE programmes. The EU's introduction of the INTERREG programmes[44] at the beginning of the 1990s gave transboundary planning of infrastructural investment a solid basis. Their objectives are to support border regions in their adaptation to the single market, to alleviate their economic and social peripherality, and to support cross-border co-operation.[45] The Euregio Meuse-Rhin, formally established in 1976, may serve as an example. With almost 3.7 million inhabitants, at the meeting point between Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, and three working languages, it is "a true laboratory for the European experiment",[46] based on "a common artistic and cultural heritage".[47] Its 'euroregional council', established in 1995 and made up of representatives from elected political bodies (60 per cent) and from societal organisations (40 per cent) – trade unions, chambers of

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[41]   The German *Grundgesetz* in Art.24,1 (introduced in 1992) already allows the transfer of sovereignty rights across frontiers. See Ulrich Beyerlin, 'Neue rechtliche Entwicklungen der regionalen und lokalen grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit', in Gerhard Brunn and Peter Schmitt-Egner (eds), *Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie–Empirie–Praxis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp.118-34; particularly pp.129-33.

[42]   It cannot really be called a parliament, as only half the Baden-Württemberg members are MPs, the other half are mayors and elected *Landräte*, with no specific mandate to represent the region; the Swiss representatives come closest to the paliamentary tag, as they are delegates from the canton parliaments.

[43]   See the late Hans Briner, 'Das Europa der Regionen – die Perspektive des 21. Jahrhunderts', in M Anderson and E Bort (eds), *Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern frontier of the European Union*, Edinburgh: ISSI, 1996, pp.39-46.

[44]   INTERREG I (1990-94), INTERREG II (1995-1999), INTERREG III (2000-2004).

[45]   See James Scott, 'Dutsch-German Euroregions: A Model for Transboundary Cooperation?', in James Scott *et al*. (eds), *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America*, San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1997, pp.107-40; especially 118-19 and 136-39.

[46]   Interreg (ed.), *Euregio Meuse-Rhin*, n.d.

[47]   *Ibid*, p.6

commerce, universities, employers' organisations) – keeps it at the cutting edge of cross-border regionalism.[48]

Another example, straddling internal as well as external frontiers of the EU, is the International Lake Constance Conference (ILCC) – again, a body born out of environmental concern, particularly focusing on the water quality of this important freshwater and fish reservoir. The ILCC was established in 1972 between the German *Länder* Baden-Württemberg and Bayern, the three Swiss cantons of St Gallen, Schaffhausen and Thurgau, and the Austrian *Land* Vorarlberg, "to solve cross-border problems through common policies, to work on co-operative projects and to contribute regionally to the transcending of borders."[49] Since 1990, the Regio Bodensee has been formed, including the cantons of Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Appenzell-Innerrhoden, as well as Liechtenstein, which has observer status.

Schengen has created the possibility of cross-border regionalism without borders as barriers, something felt particularly where international frontiers separated regions with common roots, as between Italy and Austria, in the case of North and South Tyrol.[50] Cross-border regionalism has helped to overcome deeply-ingrained enmities and sources of conflict, as demonstrated in the German borderlands, West and East. Maybe the Belfast Agreement of Good Friday 1998 will play its part in finding a regional solution for the bitter conflict which has left its mark on Northern Ireland over the past decades. In its provision of safeguards for both majorities and minorities, and its complex three-stranded structure it may yet be seen as a model for a post-nationalist Europe.

External EU Boundaries

There are two broad categories of EU external frontiers: first, those with the rich non-EU countries like Norway and Switzerland or with microstates like Andorra or Monaco, and those with relatively poor Central and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. External borderlands of the EU 'range from the most advanced regions in the core (EU borders with Switzerland) and northern periphery (outer borders with Norway) to the most poorly developed regions in the east.'[51] A more refined typology distinguishes four different categories of external frontiers:

- with highly-developed EFTA/EEA[52] countries and rich microstates;

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[48]   Bas Denters, Rob Schobben, Anne van der Veen, 'Governance of European border regions: a legal, economic and political science approach with an application to the Dutch-German and the Dutch-Belgian border', in Gerhard Brunn and Peter Schmidt-Egner (eds), *Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie – Empirie– Praxis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp.135-61; p.144.

[49]   Regio Bodensee (ed.), *Bodenseeleitbild*, Constance: Regio-Büro Bodensee, 1995, p.9.

[50]   See Michael Frank, 'Vereinigung nach Art der Tiroler', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 April 1998.

[51]   AEBR – Association of European Border Regions/European Commission (eds) *Practical Guide to Cross-border Cooperation*, Gronau: AEBR, 1997, 2nd ed., A2/10.

[52]   European Free Trade Area; European Economic Area.

- with Central and Eastern European countries on the threshold of becoming members of the EU, including the Baltic states, Cyprus and Malta;
- with other Central and Eastern European countries like Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Yugoslavia,[53] Turkey,[54] Moldova and Russia, which have no immediate perspective of membership;
- with African and Middle Eastern countries around the Mediterranean.

The first category of frontiers can be considered 'as if' frontiers. The countries themselves and the EU tend to treat these common borders 'as if' they were internal frontiers. Bilateral agreements attempt to bring co-operation and control mechanisms in line with standards of the Schengen countries.[55] The Nordic Union, for example, based on conventions agreed in 1954 and 1957[56] and straddling the EU external land frontier since the accession of Sweden and Finland in 1995, agreed with the EU on the granting of observer status of Schengen to Norway and Iceland in May 1996. Similar practical arrangements are in place at the Swiss frontiers. EU INTERREG funding for frontier region co-operation on the EU side of the frontier is matched by national funding on the other side because INTERREG funds can only be used on EU territory. Financing of joint programmes at the external frontier is done in co-operation with other EU programmes such as TACIS, PHARE and ECOS/OUVERTURE.[57]

Micro-states and overseas territories

These entities illustrate the raggèd and fragmented character of the external frontier, having varied and anomalous relationships with member states, the European Union and, in the case of overseas territories, with their close neighbours. The status of Europe's microstates, overseas territories and autonomous regions, and their relation to the framework of the European Treaties, is, to say the least, complex.

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[53]   Following the Kosovo war, the European Union announced its Balkans initiative, creating an inclusive perspective for all Balkan countries to eventually become members of the EU.

[54]   Turkey was accepted in 1999 as a candidate country; negotiations for accession started on 28 March 2000.

[55]   Bilateral police co-operation is often easier between Switzerland and Germany, than between France and Germany, because both have decentralised police organisations.

[56]   There are three main differences between its *modus operandi* and the Schengen system: random controls at the internal Scandinavian frontiers are allowed; external frontier checks are regulated by a five-paragraph guideline, rather than the 250 pages of the Schengen manual; and exchange of information between frontier police is decentralised, contrasting with the centralised Schengen Information System in Strasbourg.

[57]   TACIS: Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. the countries of the former USSR. PHARE: Poland and Hungary Assistance for Economic Recovery (subsequently extended to the Czech Republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia). ECOS/OUVERTURE is a European Commission Programme for external interregional co-operation, promoting co-operation between regions and cities in the EU and their counterparts in central and eastern Europe, the New Independent States and the Mediterranean non-member countries.

Special relationships fall into four categories:

- independent countries (microstates) within the European Community's boundaries;
- French overseas *départements*;
- European or nearby regions of Member States which enjoy autonomous or semi-autonomous status;
- overseas countries and territories referred to in Part Four of the Treaty of Rome and listed in Annex I to the Council Decision of 25 July 1991, which retain ties of varying intensity with a Member State.

Notions of political sovereignty are scarcely relevant for micro-states. Their very existence, throughout history, has depended on the goodwill of, and negotiated arrangements with, their larger neighbours.[58]

The blue frontier

All EU member states, except land-locked Luxembourg and Austria, have sea frontiers. Sea frontiers are very diverse but, except for fisheries where there is a common regime for the territorial waters of the EU states, both seas and sea ports form part of the external frontier. Some areas of the sea have pollution and coastal protection problems which can only be solved by cross-border co-operation, and regimes for this have been put in place. Other areas for co-operation include improvements of sea infrastructure (transport, tourism and safety/emergency measures). Still perceived as natural barriers, 'maritime borders are often characterised by common historic and cultural links and trading traditions'.[59] Under the INTERREG programmes, maritime borders were included as 'exceptional', and programmes for external maritime frontiers supported initiatives for the Baltic, the North Sea, Greece and Cyprus, and Spain and Morocco.

The Baltic

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 created a new security situation in the Baltic. While the immediate military threat of the USSR disappeared, social and economic conditions in Russia were potentially destabilising for the region. The environmental threat of the decaying Russian nuclear northern fleet was serious. New and vulnerable Baltic states re-emerged. The different forms of neutrality of Sweden and Finland seemed to lose some relevance. Poland unequivocally 'joined' the west and aspired to membership of both NATO and the EC.

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[58] See Tom Nairn, 'After Brobdingnag: Micro-states and their Future', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter 1998, pp.135-47.

[59] AEBR (ed.), *op.cit.*, A2/12.

During the Finnish presidency of the EU in the second part of 1999, Finland tried to promote its concept of a "Northern Dimension',[60] focusing on trade with Russia and forging a regional co-operative for the Baltic Sea, both complementary and as a counterpoint to the Euro-Med Partnership. Russia's north harbours one-third of the world's gas resources, is oil-rich and the location of one-fifth of the world's forests. The Finns use these arguments to promote what they call the 'Baltic chance' – a field of gigantic opportunity for investment and trade, with Finland as 'Europe's gateway to the East'.

The Mediterranean frontier

The Mediterranean 'blue frontier' is the most problematic of the external maritime frontiers of the EU. Intractable political conflicts,[61] resulting in both wars and terrorist action, complicate political relationships between the EU and its neighbours. Trafficking and landing illegal goods and persons occurs on all sea frontiers of the EU, but the Mediterranean presents the most difficult problems.[62] Greece, Italy and Spain have long coastal and island frontiers, in close proximity to unstable and relatively poor neighbouring countries. Migratory pressure and cross-border crime present serious policing problems. The gulf between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, often dubbed 'Europe's Rio Grande',[63] is wide and getting wider.[64] The disparities are sometimes referred to as the three Ds – demography, development and democracy - which present formidable barriers to close co-operation between the EU and the southern shore countries.

The eastern frontier

As all the eastern neighbours of the European Union have applied for membership, and negotiations for accession have commenced in 1998 with five of these applicant states (Poland,

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[60]   While the Finno-Russian border zone is very thinly populated, the population of the St Petersburg area is larger than that of the whole of Finland, 'one of the reasons why this frontier is the European Union's window on Russia.' R Veijalainen, Security Arrangements at the External Borders of Schengen: A View from Finland', in Monica den Boer (ed.), *Schengen's Final Days? The Incorporation of Schengen into the New TEU, External Borders and Information Systems,* Maastricht: EIPA, 1998, pp.101-11, p.102.
[61]   Greeks and Turks dispute the Aegean frontier, which led to the brink of armed conflict (between two NATO states) in 1996; both countries are also in conflict over divided Cyprus. In order to qualify for EU membership, proximity talks started in December 1999 at the UN trying to solve the Cypriot question. There are also signs that the Spanish and the British governments will attempt to find an agreement over the status of Gibraltar (See Cornelia Bolesch, 'Das felsige Hindernis soll aus dem Weg', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 March 2000). Other disputes, from the Western Sahara to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, are beyond the immediate remit of the European Union.
[62]   Crossing the 14 km Strait of Gibraltar illegally costs over, according to inoffoicial estimates, over on a thousand lives every year. See Beat Leuthardt, *An den Rändern Europas*, Zürich: Rotpunktverlag, 1999.
[63]   See Russell King, 'The Mediterranean: Europe's Rio Grande', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998, pp.109-34.
[64]   See E Bort, 'Frontiers or Intermediaries: *Mittel*europa, the *Medi*terranean and the *Middle* east', in Biserka Cvjeticanin (ed.), *The Mediterranean: Cultural Identity and Intercultural Dialogue*, Zagreb: Institute for International relations, 1999, pp.233-46.

the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia), and in 2000 with the 'second wave' (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus), the erstwhile Iron Curtain is destined to become an internal EU boundary in the first decade of the new millennium.

When Austria and Italy implemented Schengen (between 1 October 1997 and 1 April 1998) the former Iron Curtain, opened from the East in 1989, became the external Schengen frontier of the EU. This was feared as a threat to cross-border relations in the neighbouring states to the east. And When there was a trial run of Schengen external frontier controls at the Italian-Sloven border in October 1997, this caused considerable disruption.[65] Yet by April 1998, the expected barrier did not materialise — at least not to the extent expected.[66] The Slovenian border authorities had taken the Schengen threat seriously, and persuaded their own government to adopt the Schengen criteria (of identity and customs checks) at their Croatian frontier, and convinced the Italian, Austrian and EU authorities that Slovenia has — practically — implemented Schengen (without being part of it) at its external non-EU frontiers. This, obviously, made it possible for border controls with Italy and Austria to remain relatively flexible, even after Schengen had become fully operational on 1 April 1998.

Yet this does not obscure the unease which is being felt beyond the external frontier of the EU about the Schengen process. From Poland to Slovenia, there is concern at being obliged to implement Schengen norms – in the negotiations of which these countries had no right to participate.[67]

Slovenia may have been successful in saving its partially-open frontiers with Italy and Austria. Slovakia, as can be experienced when crossing from Bratislava to Vienna, was not as successful – or did not try as hard to implement Schengen-type frontier controls at its eastern frontier. Co-operation between the border authorities in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic seemed better developed – regular meetings, comparing notes, frequent communications, common training and exchanges – than further south, as could be seen, for example at the Austrian-Slovak crossing of Berg/Bratislava, where communication between both sides was rare, and often had to be conducted indirectly via Vienna and Bratislava. Improvements have been achieved since the end of the Meciar regime. From the Austro-Hungarian border (historically, certainly one of the most symbolic frontiers of Europe) long queues have been reported since Schengen was fully implemented by Austria on 1 April 1998, caused by Austrian border police, a new special police force with a 'martial outlook'.[68]

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[65]   Melita Richter-Malabotta, 'Some Aspects of Regional and Transfrontier Co-operation in a Changing Europe', in M Anderson and E Bort (eds), *Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union*, Edinburgh: ISSI,1998, pp.41-72; especially pp.65-67.
[66]   See Marko Gasperlin, 'Schengen needs Modification: A Slovenian Perspective', in M Anderson and E Bort (eds) *Schengen and EU Enlargement: Security and Co-operation at the Eastern Frontier of the European Union*, Edinburgh: ISSI, 1997, pp.102-103.)
[67]   A point emphasised by Jazek Sayusz-Wolski in a lecture for the Europa Institute in Edinburgh on 30 April 1998.
[68]   Michael Frank, 'Da gerät Europa an seine Grenzen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 Januar 1999.

The future frontier

Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as Estonia – those states with whom negotiations for EU accession have started in March 1998 – are under increasing pressure to police their Eastern frontiers efficiently. This seems to have resulted in far-reaching changes of border controls, particularly in Poland, but also in the Czech Republic and Hungary. A closure of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, for example, has implications for the large Hungarian minority in Romania.

The Schengen Agreements thus cast a shadow beyond the present European Union. The EU Commissioner in charge of the Single Market, Mario Monti, told the Polish government that Poland's chances of joining the EU depended to a great deal on how well it could police its borders. The strengthening of Poland's eastern frontier is seen – particularly in Germany – as the attempt to erect a first serious obstacle to illegal migration and illegal trade from east to west.

Marek Bienkowski, in charge of the Polish border guards, announced the building of fifteen new border crossings on the eastern frontier by 2001, along with an increase of the number of border guards and the installation, aided by EU PHARE money, of electronic passport-reading equipment at border check-points. Poland also introduced a new aliens law at the beginning of 1998, which led to protests from Russia; several border crossings were blocked by Russians. Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Warsaw. But there was also protest from Polish traders who depend on cross-border traffic. Ukrainians and Lithuanians must now prove that they have suffiecient means to sustain themselves in Poland. Russians and Belarussians must have Polish invitations or pre-paid hotel-vouchers if they want to cross into Poland.[69]

The economic price for these measures is heavy. In east Poland, more than 1,000 local traders rallied against the 'economic catastrophe' caused by tighter border controls. Incomes in eastern border towns dropped dramatically, unemployment rose. There was a sharp fall in trading, not only in the border areas, but also at Warsaw's economically important 'Russian bazaar'. Here, trading fell by about 30 per cent after the introduction of the new aliens' law and the new visa regime. In 1997, the turnover of the Warsaw bazaar had been, according to Poland's Market Economy Research Institute, in the region of £350 million.

But there are also problems of policing, because Poland's eastern neighbours cannot, or will not co-operate. 'Chaos and corruption'[70] was the verdict of the respectable *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, summing up the situation at the frontiers between Poland und Kaliningrad in the north, as well as Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine – the extensive 'green border': 407 km with Belarus, 526 km with the Ukraine. While in Belarus, as at the time of the Soviet Union, the army still exercises a measure of control from the east, the Ukrainian side is totally deficient in its policing of the border. When Ukrainian frontier guards ceased to receive their salaries in 1997, they were wont to recoup the money by assisting illegal migrants to cross the frontier. But corruption is supposed

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[69]   Ian Traynor, 'Fortress Europe Shuts Window to the East', *The Guardian*, 9 February 1998.
[70]   'Deutsch-polnische Hausaufgaben', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 August 1998.

to be widespread on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border.[71] As frontiers are only controllable if there is co-operation with the other side, Poland attempts a delicate balancing act – stabilising and effectively controlling the borders but avoiding total closure towards the East: "Poland, too, does not want barriers at its eastern frontiers," Poland's Foreign Secretary, Bronislaw Geremek stressed on a visit to Bonn in November 1997.[72] And the Minister for Europe, Ryszard Carnecki spoke of a tightly controlled border which could, at the same time, function as a bridge to the large markets of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. Stabilising the states which have emerged from the rubble of the Soviet Union, he stated, must be in both Poland's and the West's interest.[73]

Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime, although often exaggerated, must also not be underestimated. Leslie Holmes has argued that, "at their most extreme, substantial rises in the proportion of illegality in international economic activity can destabilize national economies."[74] The rise in internal and cross-border crime in Eastern Europe, and particularly in the countries of the former Soviet Union, can be pinned down to the difficult transitional situation in these countries: post-communist states attempting, in Claus Offe's term, a 'triple transition': the rapid and simultaneous transformation of their political systems, their economic systems, and their boundaries and identities.[75]

This 'triple transition' is grafted upon a pre-1989 experience under communism, where corruption and dodging the state were part of the political culture, "creating an environment of institutionalised illegality."[76] Economic decline had long laid the foundations of a flourishing shadow economy, before the fraught transformation into market economies provided new opportunities for criminals to exploit deficiencies in inadequately-regulated markets which could not match demand and supply. Yet this is not just an internal problem of the post-communist countries. There seems to be wide-spread interaction between organised criminals in post-communist states and established criminal structures in the West, as "all sorts of crime can cross borders"[77] or operate in the border zones, from street prostitution to money laundering and drug-trafficking, arms smuggling to human trafficking.

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[71] See Thomas Urban, 'Nach Westen isoliert', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 September 1998.
[72] Quoted in 'Kohl sagt Polen Unterstützung zu', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 November 1997.
[73] 'Deutsche profitieren von Polens Beitritt', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 April 1998.
[74] Leslie Holmes, 'Crime, Corruption and Politics: International and Transnational Factors', Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors*, forthcoming.
[75] Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in Eastern Europe', *Social Research*, Vol.58, No.2, 1996, pp.3-13.
[76] Mark Galeotti, *Cross-Border Crime and the Former Soviet Union* (*Boundary & Territory Briefing*), Vol.1, No.5, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 1995, p.1.
[77] *Ibid*., p.6.

It is estimated that human trafficking earns well-organised, internationally operating criminal cartells up to $5 bn a year.[78] The most 'popular' routes for human trafficking are, according to the *Bundesgrenzschutz*, the 'eastern channel' (Almaty, Moscow, St Petersburg, Minsk, Vilnius) and the 'Balkan channel' (Romania, Hungary, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Poland).[79] The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* noted the connection between the drastic tightening of the German asylum laws in 1993 and the increase of illegal migration. As the door was closed in the face of asylum, refugees were driven into the arms of unscrupulous human smuggling organisations, paying up to £5,000 per head for their services.[80]

A particularly sad chapter are the casualties at the border, particularly refugees drowning in the Oder and Neisse rivers, led by their smugglers to remote river banks and dangerous currents because these are the least policed spots of the border. Nearly a hundred corpses have been fished out of the rivers in the past few years, a watery grave putting an end to journeys which often had covered thousands of miles.[81]

The discourse of migration control has become intricately linked with the discourses on crime and security in what Jef Huysmans and Didier Bigo have both called a process of 'securisation'.[82] Security has become a much broader concept, compared with the focus on military concerns which dominated the discourse until the the changes of 1989/90, encompassing new risks and threats to society, the economy and the polity itself.[83] This constitution of a security continuum, including the control of frontiers and immigration among police activities in the fight against crime is, Bigo argues, "not a natural response to the changes in criminality", but rather a proactive mixing of crime and immigration issues.[84] Barry Buzan has coined the term 'societal security', describing the shift of security concerns from protection of the state to protection against threats, ort perceived threats, against society and identity, or the identity and security of groups within a society.[85]

Refining border controls as a means of exclusion can be seen as a response to the threat to societal security. Yet reinforced borders, a fortress mentality, although being often invoked when

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[78]   Peter Scherer, 'Zustrom von Illegalen wächst', *Die Welt*, 16 June 1998.
[79]   Peter Scherer, 'Schleuser gehen jetzt Weg über Tschechien', *Die Welt*, 13 October 1998.
[80]   Christoph Schwennicke, 'Abwehrmauer an den Ostgrenzen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 January 1997. For reports on human trafficking, see also Jens Schneider, 'Spezialisten für Grenzfälle', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 September 1998; and Hans-Werner Loose, 'Schmuggelware Mensch', *Die Welt*, 8 September 1998.
[81]   See Olaf Kaltenborn, 'Die neue Todesgrenze an der Neiße', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12. June 1997; and Markus Lesch, 'Die Eltern ließen ihr totes Kind zurück', *Die Welt*, 14 January 1998.
[82]   Didier Bigo, 'The Landscape of Police Co-operation', in E Bort and Russell Keat (eds), *The Boundaries of Understanding*, Edinburgh: ISSI, 1999, pp.59-74; p.69. See also Jef Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of "Securitizing" Societal Issues', in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (eds), *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, London: Pinter.
[83]   See Jan Zielonka, 'Europe's Security: A Great Confusion', *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.1, 1991, pp.127-37.
[84]   D Bigo, 'The Landscape of Police Co-operation', pp.67-68.
[85]   Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Inernational security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp.18-19.

Schengen is criticised, are no longer really conceivable as practical solutions for internal security needs. It is undeniable that the security of individuals has become deterritorialised.[86] Internal security now implies collaboration with foreign countries and is thus linked to foreign policy, and the 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of a public debate on policing, coinciding with the emergence of a discourses on urban insecurity and the city on the one hand, and discourses on stopping immigration of unskilled workers on the other.[87]

There have been two predominant modes of reaction to the challenges of cross-border crime: increased security protection at borders, (yet not necessarily restricted to the actual borderline), and increased international cross-border co-operation.

Cross-border co-operation

In an attempt to combat the rise in cross-border criminality, police forces are intensifying their co-operation across frontiers. Co-operation between border police at the German-Polish and the German-Czech borders is already highly developed, with a permanent exchange of notes, common training, and daily communication.[88] At the Austro-Slovak and Austro-Hungarian frontiers, this is still much less the case. In 1996, the European Commission started to sponsor seminars and a placement scheme for EU border police, with the intension to create an institutionalised network of exchange and co-operation.[89] Seminars on detection of fraudulent documents are being held, and the collaboration between, for instance, car rental firms and police organisations in the East and Central European states are being intensified, which has already led to arrests and disruption of smuggling routes.[90] This is not only happening in an internal European context. The US State Department has invested more than $8 mill into police training in Hungary. In 1995, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was founded in Budapest, offering eight-week courses for law enforcement agents from Hungary and other East Central European states, concentrating on combatting terrorism, drug-related crime and economic criminality. This seems to go hand in hand with a much-needed improvement the Hungarian government provides for its underpaid – and allegedly corrupt – police force, and efforts to establish closer co-operation between the secret services in the East and in the West.[91]

Following the example of cross-border Euroregions (particularly on Germany's western frontier), informal contacts developed into formalised cross-border institutions along the Eastern Frontier.

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[86]   Didier Bigo, 'The Landscape of Police Co-operation', p.73
[87]   See, for example, Malcolm Anderson, Monica den Boer , Peter Cullen, William Gilmore, Charles Raab, Neil Walker, *Policing the European Union: Theory, Law and Practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; see also Jim Sheptycki, 'Transnational Policing and the Makings of a Postmodern State', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol.35, No.4 (Autumn) 1995, pp.613-35; and J Sheptycki, 'Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the Transnational Arena: Reflections on the War on Drugs', *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 24, 1996, pp.61-75.
[88]   *Ibid*.
[89]   See Patrice Molle, *op. cit.*
[90]   Stefan Simon, 'Wenn der Mietwagen nie mehr auftaucht', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 November 1998.
[91]   Thomas Becker, 'Wo Polizisten pauken müssen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 January 1999.

In the north, we find the regional co-operation model of Kuhmo-Kostamuksha (1992) on the Finnish-Russian border; in the German-Polish border regions, the Euregios of Neisse-Nysa (1992), Spree-Neisse-Bober (1993), Pro Europa Viadrina (1993) and Pomerania (1995) were created. Further south, there are the Euregios on the German-Czech border – Elbe-Labe; Erzgebirge, Egrensis, the Euregio Bayerischer Wald/Böhmerwald (including the Austrian *Mühlviertel*), and the Region Triagonale between Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Further east, there are cross-border Euroregions like the Carpathian Region (1993) and the quadrilateral Niemen co-operation (1996), involving Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia (Kaliningrad).

The establishment of institutionalised cross-border co-operation seems to show that a translation of practical concerns from West to East is well underway. The frequently expressed need for cross-border co-operation (environment, infrastructure, tourism, security) matches certain regional reform concepts, devolving planning authority and decision-making processes to the regions. The regional context may also be more conducive to solving problems of national minorities and even provide regional solutions for international problems. Regionalisation and 'integrated borderlands',[92] rather than a nineteenth-century model of the nation state could offer a more tranquil future for non-homogenous states with large ethnic minorities within their borders.

The implementation of Schengen and the accession process of Central European states to the European Union, highlighted by the establishment of these Euroregions which, in order to function effectively, require a high permeability of borders – the border as bridge, as communicative channel rather than barrier – add up to a confusing, sometimes even contradictory and ambiguous picture of a frontier with elements of both openness and closure.[93]

Conclusion

The internal and external frontiers of the European Union are in transition. How border management will develop at the internal frontiers will depend to a great extent on the enlargement process and its impact on the integration project. Will the boundaries between strong regions and small member states be further blurred? If not, then established regions – or nations in multi-national states – like the German *Länder* or the Spanish regions, or Scotland and Wales, might have to gain greater European competence within their states, if not strive for independence, in order to fully participate in a European system of governance which then would be predominantly intergovernmental, rather than multi-level and integrated.

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[92]   O J Martinez, 'The Dynamics of Border Integration: New Approaches to Border Analysis', in C H Schofield (ed.), *Global Boundaries*, London: Routledge, 1994, pp.1-15.
[93]   M Anderson, 'Transfrontier Co-operation – History and Theory', in Gerhard Brunn and Peter Schmitt-Egner (eds), *Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie – Empirie –Praxis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp.78-97.

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn for future policies concerning the external frontier:

- Security at and beyond borders can best be guaranteed through co-operation. Closed borders are not an option.
- Getting used to open frontiers is a learning process in a time of transition, where new identities and roles are being shaped.
- The mixing of perception and realities can lead to symbolic politics which, though appearing to be remedies against perceived threats, may prove, in the long run, counter-productive to stability and prosperity in the macro-region.
- Organised crime and issues of migration must be clearly separated, with the exception of illegal trafficking (where the smuggler, not the smuggled, is the criminal).
- Human trafficking is a consequence of frontier restrictions, rather than of open borders.
- Financial and organisational support for the economies and the institution-building processes of civil society, both in the post-communist countries and for the mediterranean neighbours, should have priority, as their present deficiencies, in combination with the gap in prosperity between East/South and West, are the main sources of organised crime and migratory pressures.

The British *Economist* referred to the different time zones *and* the different economic zones at the Estonian-Russian border.[94] Not only do people on both sides of that particular border live in different actual time zones, they – and they share this experience with many other border regions in East-Central Europe – also live, figuratively speaking, in different time zones, in different phases of development. And what is true for Central Europe, might well have implications for the Mediterranean, if at least the moderate goals formulated at the Barcelona Conference of November 1995 are to be translated into reality.

Michel Foucher noted that borders are 'time inscribed into space or, more appropriately, time written in territories',[95] i.e. temporary, functional arrangements. He contends that in a Central Europe, which embarked on fundamental changes in 1989/90, 'a "fuzzy logic", less rational, less rigid, but allowing historical transition to take place',[96] may be a necessary condition we have to live with for the foreseeable future.

A free society,' Didier Bigo sums up the state of play in the transition of European frontiers, inside and outside the European Union,

> is one with open frontiers and plural identities. This implies both that behaviour is adaptable and that there must be acceptance of illegality at the margins. Whether European politicians accept it or not, a free society now implies tolerance of international phenomena decoupled from territory, characterised by transnational networks and the penetration of national territories.[97]

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[94]   'Good fences', *The Economist*, 19 December 1998.
[95]   Michel Foucher, 'The Geopolitics of European Frontiers', in M Anderson and E Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter 1998, pp.235-50; p.249.
[96]   M Foucher, 'Europe and its Long-lasting Variable Geography', in E Bort and R Keat (eds), *The Boundaries of Understanding,* Edinburgh: ISSI, 1999, pp.163-69; p.169.
[97]   Didier Bigo, 'Frontiers and Security in the European Union'; p.161.

Multi-level Citizenship and Regional Identities in Contemporary Europe

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Citizenship and Cultural Identity

In recent years that has been a remarkable growth in academic interest in citizenship, reflecting some urgent practical political problems. This growth has been marked by the establishment of a new journal, *Citizenship Studies* in 1997 and by numerous books, articles and collections of essays (for example: Beiner, 1995; Brown, 1997; Dauenhauer, 1996; Holston & Appadurai, 1999; Kymlicka, 1995). Ethnic tensions, globalization, the development of supra-national polities, demands for group recognition and group rights and the restructuring or retrenchment of the welfare state have all contributed to pressure for a rethinking of the concept of citizenship, and in some cases to a questioning of its continuing relevance. As Michael Ignatieff notes, there is a 'tension between the republican discourse on citizenship and the liberal political theory of market man [*sic*]' (Ignatieff, 1995). This tension has been particularly acute in the current context of the apparent hegemony of neo-liberal market economics.

Since the abandonment in 1954 of the proposed European Political Community, the development of the European Community (now the European Union) has placed more weight on economic integration and the development of the Common Market, and subsequently the Single European Market, than on building a political community based on the principle of citizenship. It is thus somewhat ironic that the EU should explicitly create a formal concept of European Citizenship (in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty) just at the time when the very idea of citizenship is increasingly seen as problematic.

Citizenship is commonly defined as 'membership of a political community', but the basis of that membership is a matter of considerable debate (Beiner, 1995; Dauenhauer, 1996; Kymlicka, 1995). The difficulties begin with the very constitution of the community: where do its boundaries lie? who may belong and who is excluded? Most conceptions of citizenship work with territorial definitions of community. While these may have the merit of simplicity and can provide the basis for efficient practical administration and institution building they do not necessarily reflect the complex geographies of the actual social and political relations that are in other circumstances thought of as constitutive of community. Moreover, as the spatial structures of politics and governance become increasingly elaborate, the merits of simplicity and practicality no longer always apply, as we shall see.

Demarcating the political community in question is by no means the only problem facing the analyst of citizenship. There is also much debate over the nature of the relationship between the

citizen and society; over the *terms* of membership, in other words. In the literature at least two major themes can be identified. First is the idea of citizenship as a formal relationship between an individual and a polity. Here the emphasis is on citizenship rights and duties and the procedures for defining these. Second is the idea of citizenship as a cultural identity involving a feeling of belonging to an 'imagined community' (Painter & Philo, 1995). Liberal political theory typically emphasises the former theme, while communitarian writers emphasise the latter.

For many years work on citizenship was framed by the work of Marshall (Marshall, 1950), who argued that the development of citizenship since the eighteenth century had involved the successive acquisition of civil rights, political rights and social rights. Civil rights include such innovations as the right to a fair trial, freedom from arbitrary detention and violence, freedom of speech the right to hold property, and rights of contract. The emergence of these rights was particularly associated with the development of the institutions of the judicial system and a free press. Political rights include the right to vote and to stand for election. These are associated with the development of institutions such as an elected parliament and payment for Parliamentary representatives. Social rights include rights to health care, education and a subsistence income, and arise with the development of the institutions of the welfare state. Marshall regarded social rights as of vital importance (indeed his work was partly aimed at promoting the development of the welfare state). He insisted that citizenship that was limited to civil and political rights would exclude many from full membership of society, because people who were struggling with poverty or disease, or who were poorly educated, would not have the time, resources or capacity to exercise their citizenship rights in practice.

The Marshallian model has been widely criticized on a variety of accounts (Turner, 1989), but it still remains an important reference point for rights-based approaches to citizenship.

The concept of the 'imagined community' is usually associated with work on national identity and nationalism and particularly the writings of Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1983). However, it has important implications for theories of citizenship too. As Kofman (1995) points out, the ability to exercise one's *de jure* citizenship rights depends in part on being recognized as a citizen in daily life by other members of society. Those whose faces do not fit with the majority collective perception of the 'imagined community' may find that they are excluded *de facto* from full participation in social life. Institutionalized racism in the welfare state, for example, might mean that members of minority cultural and ethnic groups have worse access to health care, education and welfare benefits than others despite equal citizenship status in law. Citizenship laws can also be framed explicitly or implicitly along cultural or ethnic lines, such that those who do not belong to the imagined (ethnic) community are excluded from citizenship altogether. Even where citizenship laws are framed along civic, rather than ethnic lines (as in the United States, for example), it is still possible for them to be applied in discriminatory ways.

The affective, or identity aspect of citizenship is both about feeling part of society and about being accepted as a member of society, though this does not necessarily require ethnic homogeneity. Individuals who lack one or both of these elements are likely to find it difficult to gain the full benefits of formal citizenship rights. Legal rights, in other words, while essential,

are not sufficient. Identification with an imagined community also underwrites a further aspect of citizenship, namely citizenship as active participation in society. Citizens will be more likely to contribute to society in a variety of ways and to participate in its political processes if they have an emotional identification with the wider community. Finally, theories of citizenship commonly refer to the obligations of membership as well as its rights. Again, those with an affective attachment are more likely willingly to undertake these obligations.

Some seek to divorce the formal rights of citizenship from issues of identity for the good reason that one's legal rights should not be made dependent on adopting a particular cultural identity. If that path were followed, it is argued, citizenship could be denied to all kinds of groups on highly discriminatory or even fascist lines. Such concerns are understandable and justified, but the argument here is not that formal rights should be dependent on acceptance of a particular ethnic, national or other identity. Rather I am suggesting that in practice the capacity to take advantage of formal rights already allocated is influenced positively or negatively by cultural factors. The relationships that underpin citizenship are not only legal but also inevitably social and cultural.

Until recently it was taken for granted by most writers that the political community of which citizens are members is the nation-state. The nineteenth century saw the consolidation of the sovereign territorially-bounded nation-state as the pre-eminent political institution (Giddens, 1985). This seemed to offer the prospect of territorial congruence between the imagined community of the nation and the institutions of the state so that citizenship in the sense of formal rights would coincide with citizenship as a cultural identity and feeling of belonging. In practice this neat fit was always limited. Formal rights were distributed unequally (for example women often acquired the right to vote much later than men), state borders have always split some national groups into two and there are many multi-national states. Nevertheless, the model provided by the nineteenth century idea of the nation-state had enormous power, both because it defined the terms of debate and because the states involved were what, in another context, Rogers Brubaker has labelled 'nationalizing states' (Brubaker, 1996). Nationalising states are states engaged in the propagation of nationalism in order to generate a sense of belonging and collective identity; in short they are nation-building states.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the idea that there is or should be a congruence between national identity, territoriality, statehood and citizenship is being challenged and undermined in three related ways. First, nation-states are no longer the pre-eminent institutions of governance (Camilleri & Falk, 1992), although they remain important. According to Jessop (1994) the nation-state has been 'hollowed out' with power moving 'up' to the European Union, 'down' to the local and regional level and 'out' to inter-regional networks. Governance in Europe is increasingly polycentric and multi-layered. For Anderson (1996) this involves the emergence of overlapping spheres of political authority at several spatial scales (local, regional, national and European). Anderson's argument develops that of Hedley Bull (1977). Bull's prescience was striking, as Held et al. observe:

> The existence in medieval times of an array of authority structures from the local to the transnational and supranational, coexisting with an evolving system of territorially defined political units, has similarities to

the contemporary period. This is not to argue that nothing has fundamentally changed. Rather, it is to suggest that a 'new medievalism' may be a useful metaphor for thinking about the present era. As Bull describes it, the 'new medievalism' represents 'a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above' (Bull, 1977, p. 254). (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, p. 85)

This restructuring of governance, with its multiple, overlapping and sometimes conflicting and competing extra-territorial and intra-territorial flows of political authority, has considerable implications for citizenship. It challenges the assumption that the 'political community' of which citizens are members is the nation-state, and raises the intriguing possibility of multi-layered citizenship. To add to this complexity, in post-communist central Europe several newly independent nationalising states appear to aspire to precisely the form of statehood that is declining elsewhere (Brubaker, 1996). In some cases this involves forms of citizenship that link territory, state and identity tightly together again.

Second, in many parts of Europe state-based national identities are challenged by regionalist or minority nationalist identities. These challenges undermine the fit between identity and nation-state. In addition successful mobilisation behind regionalist goals can lead to increased political autonomy or secession, intensifying the restructuring of governance and potentially reconfiguring both the rights-based and the identity-based aspects of citizenship. Prominent examples include demands for Catalan, Basque and Galician autonomy or independence in Spain, while in the United Kingdom, Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities have provided the basis for nationalist challenges to the unitary United Kingdom state. In both Spain and the United Kingdom a degree of devolution and decentralisation has been effected in response.

Third, migration has increased cultural diversity. In some cases members of diasporas form distinct regional populations, such as the Russians in north-east Estonia (Smith & Wilson, 1997). In other cases they may be dispersed more evenly. Both situations undermine the link between citizenship and national identity. In Estonia, Russians are denied even formal citizenship, on grounds of ethnicity. In other cases the attribution of citizenship to ethnic minorities weakens the link between identity and *de jure* citizenship, though minority groups may still be subject to *de facto* discrimination.

These processes are producing a geography of citizenship that marks a break with the nineteenth century ideal of territorial congruence. The twenty-first century seems to be ushering in a phase of territorial dislocation.

European Citizenship

Nowhere is the complexity of twenty-first century citizenship revealed more clearly than in Europe. Europe was the cradle of modern ideas of citizenship, and it is in Europe that we can see the simultaneous effects of polycentric governance, regionalism, national separatism, migration and cultural diversity. In the face of this complexity, the European Union has inaugurated the concept of European citizenship.

European citizenship can be related to both the aspects of citizenship outlined above – formal rights and cultural identities (Delanty, 1997). The European Union's publicity material describes formal EU citizenship as 'the most important innovation of the [Maastricht] Treaty' (Fontaine, 1993).

Formal EU citizenship consists of a package of rights. The *Treaty on European Union* was agreed at a meeting of the European Council in Maastricht in 1991. It was signed in Maastricht in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. While the proposals for Economic and Monetary Union form its centrepiece, the Maastricht Treaty is wide-ranging, and one of its innovations was the formal introduction of European citizenship, by an amendment to the Treaty of Rome. Article 8 of the amended Treaty states that 'every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union' and goes on to set out the rights of citizenship. These are the rights to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; to vote and stand for election in municipal and European elections in the member state in which the citizen is resident; to receive protection from the diplomatic and consular authorities of any member state in any country where the citizen's own state is not represented; and to petition the European Parliament and refer matters to the Ombudsman. Article 8e allows these rights to be strengthened by unanimous agreement among the members state of the EU. Indeed the Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997 did add the further right of citizens to bring cases in the European Court of Justice against EU institutions.

As Shaw points out in her comprehensive discussion of EU citizenship:

> It will quickly be seen that this catalogue of citizenship rights is exceedingly limited and rather specific, and hardly comparable with domestic (generic) conceptions of citizenship. In fact, one of the key concessions made to Danish sensibilities after the first referendum, which narrowly rejected the Treaty of Maastricht, was a declaratory confirmation by the European Council that nothing in the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht in any way displaces national citizenship. Furthermore, it is not an 'independent' status of membership: EU citizenship attaches to those with the nationality of the Member States, and it is *prima facie* the Member States who determine – as sovereign states under international law – who are their nationals. (Shaw, 1998, p. 246)

Thus formal EU citizenship is *supplementary* to citizenship of a member state; to be a citizen of the EU one must first be a citizen of a member state. Notwithstanding this proviso, or the rather 'thin' conception of citizenship involved, EU citizenship is an important development, because of the open-ended nature of EU constitutional policy-making. The EU is a work in progress and the concept of EU citizenship is likely to evolve further.

Citizenship and European Identity

The treaties say almost nothing about the affective aspect of citizenship; that is citizenship as membership of an imagined political community and as a subjective political identity. This dimension of citizenship is often regarded as a *sine qua non* of durable legitimacy for political institutions and of meaningful democratic participation. Furthermore, despite the neglect of the issue in the treaties, the development of a common European identity has long been a goal of those steering the processes of European integration, dating back to the vision and idealism of Monnet and Schuman, who saw that a sense of shared values and cultural norms (rather than a stress on national differences) might contribute to the aim of bringing peace to a war-torn continent. Moreover, it has been argued that the future sustainability and development of the European project will depend in part on the legitimacy provided to EU institutions by a popular sense of European identity (Garcia, 1993; Leonard, 1998a; Leonard, 1998b).

Today, the importance of this affective dimension is recognized in principle by the EU. According to EU publicity, 'common citizenship is forged over time, through shared experience and the *affectio societatis* which unites individuals and gives them a sense of belonging to a collectivity. Until people have a clearer idea of the real issues in the political debate at the European level, there is bound to be a lack of information and civic commitment which has to be overcome' (Fontaine, 1993). In a recent speech, Marcelino Oreja, then European Commissioner with responsibility for culture, declared that 'our aim is to bring to the fore the cultural features shared by Europeans, which are to be found in the fundamental values adhered to by the vast majority ... [and] to show Europeans what unites them, and to show them the strength of their common cultural roots, despite the wide variety of cultures that Europe has produced' (Oreja, 1997). To date, however, practical steps to develop European identity have been limited. The 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity referred to shared values of representative democracy, civil rights and the rule of law. In the mid-1980s the Adonino Committee proposed a range of initiatives to give a European identity concrete form, including a common television area, European sports teams, greater cooperation and interchange in education, and a flag and anthem. However, 'the implementation of these measures has been patchy' (Leonard, 1998b, p. 36).

For Delanty (1997) and Leonard (1998a) these attempts to develop both the rights and identity aspects of European citizenship are deeply flawed. The formal citizenship provided by the treaties is both limited and subordinate to national citizenship: 'a second-order citizenship' (Delanty, 1997, p. 296). In addition, it has been introduced at a time when the rights model has itself been criticized for its concern with procedures rather than outcomes, for its individualism and for its exclusionary character: 'European citizenship is in danger of becoming an even more formalized kind of citizenship than national citizenship currently is and, moreover, is pointing in the direction of becoming an exclusionary supranationality defining Europe by reference to the non-Europeans' (Delanty, 1997, pp. 296-7). At the same time, the idea of European identity fostered by the EU is based on the essentialist model provided by the nineteenth century nation-state. The development of the modern nation-state, especially in the 'long 19th Century' (1789-

1914) saw the mutual constitution of sovereign, territorially-centralised states (Mann, 1984) and national political identities through mechanisms such as the education system, the suppression of minority cultures and languages and preparation for and prosecution of warfare. Although the end of the 20th Century this close tie between state formation and the development of national identities has broken down, the framework it provides seems to continue to set the agenda for the EU.

Moves to promote European identity have tended to focus on high culture (classical music, fine art, theatre, philosophy) and on Renaissance and Enlightenment thought and values:

> Europeans are defined [...] by reference to a cultural discourse whose reference points are: the geopolitical framework of the European continent, the cultural heritage of Europe, and a strong sense of the uniqueness of Europe. [...] Europeanness is constructed in opposition with the non-European, in particular Islam' (Delanty, 1997, pp. 297-8; see also Morley & Robins, 1995, pp. 43-69; Tassin, 1992).

There are several difficulties with this approach. First, by combining an 'abstract and heavily political conception of European identity' (Leonard, 1998b, p. 35) with the cultural forms of the European social elite, this model of identity is likely to alienate the majority of Europeans rather than uniting them. By contrast, current work in cultural studies emphasises the significance of everyday and popular culture in constructing identity. Second, it excludes (by definition) non-western (and to some extent non-Judaeo-Christian) cultural and political traditions which are now firmly part of a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-faith Europe. Third, despite a heightened emphasis on respecting cultural diversity (Oreja, 1997), this approach still tends to imply the construction of a shared, universal, and unitary identity. The nineteenth century nation state depended on an essentialist conception of political communities (nations) coterminous with and grounded in homogeneous and spatially contiguous cultural communities. By contrast, much contemporary work in political theory and cultural studies emphasises the theoretical and political problems with this perspective. In its place recent approaches stress pluralism, multiculturalism, ethnic and cultural hybridity, multiple and fragmented identities and spatial complexity and transnationalism (Benhabib, 1996; Kymlicka, 1995; Morley & Robins, 1995; Mouffe, 1993). The cultural diversity within Europe is such that it is highly unlikely that a single, homogeneous European identity could be a lived reality for more than a small minority of European citizens, unless it was so thinly developed as to be an ineffective basis for the development of citizenship. As Leonard puts it:

> Too often European leaders seem to be trying to construct a European identity on the nation state model. ... In fact, any European identity that does emerge will have to be radically different. ... It must take its place in the multiple identities and social roles ... that most Europeans recognise as central to their lives. (Leonard, 1998a, pp. 23-4)

The power of the nation-state model may also explain why the EU also seems to see *national* identity (defined as identification with one of the 15 member states) as offering the only other possible claim on citizens' loyalties in addition to 'feeling European'. For example, the regular Eurobarometer opinion polls ask respondents to measure their sense of European identity only

against their sense of national identity. Yet, in many parts of Europe minority national, regional and local affiliations are as, or more, important than state-national ones.

Multi-level Citizenship

In the light of these difficulties with the idea of a unitary European identity, its use as the foundation for European citizenship has been greeted sceptically by many academics. For Tassin there can be no common supranational European identity. He proposes instead the development of a 'European fellow-citizenship' that 'requires citizenship to be broken away from nationality' in contrast with the 'nation-state principle of citizenship [...] based on an amalgamation of nationality and citizenship' (Tassin, 1992, p. 189). Kofman (1995) suggests that rights could in future be accorded on the basis of 'denizenship' (residence), rather than (identity-based) citizenship. Delanty (1997, p. 299) argues that 'something like a multileveled framework of citizenship will emerge, incorporating the subnational, the national and the supranational'. For Leonard, 'if there is to be a true Euro-identity, it will be a supplement to national identity, and other regional, local and associational affiliations, not a replacement for them' (Leonard, 1998b, p. 38). Morley and Robins (1995) identify three scales of identity and claim that 'to be European now is to be implicated in all three - continental, national and regional - and being European is about managing some amalgam of these' (1995, p. 20). Finally Meehan (1993) and Gamberale (1997) suggest the idea of multiple citizenship. As Meehan argues, 'a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and obligations associated [...] with citizenship, are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions' (1993, p. 1).

In different ways all these proposals represent attempts to break with the assumption that citizenship, national identity, nation-state and territory are, or should be congruent, and to fashion and theory of citizenship that is more complex, less exclusionary and better suited to an era of polycentric, multi-level governance and increasing cultural pluralism.

Regional Identities and Multi-Level Citizenship

There is thus an emerging consensus that multi-layered governance and multiple and overlapping political communities in Europe will both enable and require the development of multi-layered identities and forms of citizenship. However, to date there has been little research on whether such complex, multi-layered identities are emerging, what form they take, what processes generate or undermine them, how they relate to the restructuring of governance and institutions and how they vary from region to region. A consideration of regional and minority national identities is of particular importance because the meso-scale is particularly important multi-layered governance, and because the links between regional identity and European citizenship are routinely ignored in official policy-making (as shown, for example, in the absence of questions on regional identity in the *Eurobarometer* polls).

Regional and minority national identities are not pre-given cultural phenomena, but are constituted through, in and against, cultural and political institutions, social movements and processes of governance, and evolve in relation to patterns of socio-economic development. Hechter (1975), Lijphart (1977) and Nairn (Nairn, 1981) emphasise in different ways the relationship between regionalism and uneven development. However, for Smith (1981), these 'uneven development' arguments neglect the cultural basis of regional identities. Similarly, according to Keating (1988, p. 17) 'a sense of history does appear as an important element in many cases of regional mobilisation, with the sense of identity rooted in an independent past - but it does not have to be accurate history'. This view emphasises the discursive construction of identities. However, discourses are not free-floating, but embedded in institutions, and Keating stresses the role of institutions such as the distinctive Scottish legal and educational systems, in the formation and shaping of regional identities.

This kind of institutionalist approach usefully highlights the mutually constituting links between governance restructuring and the development of identities. *Governance* is a wider category than *government* (Goodwin & Painter, 1996; Rhodes, 1997), and can includes institutions in civil society (urban social movements, trade unions, cultural, religious and voluntary organisations etc.) as well as the state. The precise ways in which identities are constituted by and manifested in institutions vary from region to region. In addition, regional identities are not monolithic, they may be contested, and they intersect with other social cleavages.

The idea of multi-tiered structures of governance captures something of the emerging patterns of institution formation and political authority in contemporary Europe. By contrast, the concept of multi-level citizenship is more strongly normative. While it is likely that some elements of multi-level citizenship will emerge in tandem with multi-tiered governance, this is not inevitable, and nor is it likely that 'complete' citizenship in the sense of a package of both rights and cultural identities, will grow automatically as governance restructures. Rather, if it does develop it will be constructed politically and in the face of conflicting visions of the European future.

Ideas about multi-level citizenship are increasingly well developed as abstract concepts in the political philosophy and political theory literatures. In addition it has obvious attractions as a normative ideal in conditions of post-modernity. However, there are a number of major difficulties to be addressed before multi-level citizenship can be adopted as a description of an emerging political reality, or developed further as practical political project. A number of these related directly to the issue of regional identity, of which five are highlighted here.

First, regional identities vary widely in intensity around Europe. This suggests that the complexity of multi-levelled citizenship (crudely, the number of levels) will vary widely too, which is likely to lead to marked uneven development in the package of rights and affiliations across Europe.

Second, regional identities are expressed in many forms, from rationalist civic nationalism to the barbarism of ethnic cleansing. Not all types are equally compatible with the vision of multi-level citizenship. Indeed both reactionary ethnic essentialism and rationalist civic nationalisms sit

uneasily with the multi-level model. Arguably, the first is too particularist, denying the rights associated with other 'levels' of identity, or even the very existence of such other levels. Conversely the second may be too universalist, being predicated on the idea of a single public sphere, rather than the complex overlapping and interlocking forums of debate and contestation implied by the multi-level idea.

Third, regional identities are themselves often complex, contested and internally heterogeneous, though the degree of such complexity varies greatly. Among other things this means that there will be conflicting understandings within regions of the potential for articulating regional and other identities, and competing visions of what such articulation might involve. An important element of the complexity of regional identities is their intersection with a range of other social cleavages and their associated identity, such as social class, gender, ethnicity, religion and so on. This raises the possibility that specific interest groups, such as elite class fractions with hegemonic aspirations, will seek to undermine, or in other cases to promulgate, multi-level citizenship.

Fourth, there is a close relationship between the emerging pattern of multi-tiered governance and the proposals for multi-level citizenship. However, the patterns of institution formation that constitute the developing map of European governance also vary widely from region to region. Some regions have strong and strongly autonomous regional government, others are mere statistical units. Some regions are within the umbrella 'top level' of the European Union, others are located outside the EU with presently much looser supranational or international governance structures. Some nation-states are authoritarian in character, and unwilling to countenance the develop of regional government, or even the expression of regional cultural identities, conversely others are already federal, or consociational in form. This diversity adds to the likely unevenness in any future development of multi-level citizenship as an expression of both rights and identities.

Finally, very little is known at present about the views of citizens themselves. What is the appetite for multi-level citizenship? Does the idea of multiplex identities linked to more variegated and fluid governance structures have any popular appeal? How does its appeal vary from region to region, particularly along the various axes differentiation between regions mentioned above? Are strong regional identities mainly associated with ethnic regionalism of an essentialist or primordial type, largely incompatible with the multi-level model? Empirical research to answer these questions is urgently required if the development of multi-level citizenship in Europe is to progress as a political project.

Conclusion

The European Union is the foremost and best developed example of a transnational structure of political authority. If it is to become a vehicle for transnational democracy, it will need to develop greater legitimacy, accountability and transparency. It will also need to promote a sense of affinity among its citizens both with each other and with the EU itself. European citizenship appears to offer the prospect of this in theory. However, full citizenship involves a sense of identity as well as legal and political rights. The challenge for policy makers and Europeans is to develop both the rights and the identity aspects of citizenship in ways that are sensitive to the emerging complexities of governance in Europe and to the multiple identities that are now evident in Europe's regions and nations.

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TRANSPORTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS IN NORTH AMERICA:
THE CASCADIA AND SAN DIEGO-TIJUANA BORDER REGIONS

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The United States' trade and foreign investment linkages with Canada and Mexico were already extremely close before the North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect in January 1994, and the NAFTA has further solidified these ties. The growing volume of trade between the three North American states has posed major new challenges for their cross-border transportation systems, because trucks carry almost 70 percent of the goods traded between the United States and Canada, over 80 percent of U.S.-Mexico trade, and about 60 percent of Canada-Mexico trade.[98] The importance of rapid transport to trade liberalization objectives was in fact evident to the negotiators of the NAFTA, who included detailed provisions on liberalizing land transportation services in the agreement.[99] Rapid transportation throughout North America depends on upgrading transport infrastructure, and on modernizing and easing the regulations regarding cross-border transit. However, it is difficult to generalize about the effects of transportation on trade efficiency and competitiveness along the entire length of the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders, because of the different requirements and priorities of the various regional ports-of-entry.[100]

This paper focuses on the efforts to facilitate rapid transport as a means of promoting competitiveness in two NAFTA cross-border regions: Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana. Although regional and national competitiveness are complementary, the various regions (including cross-border regions) in large, diverse states such as the United States, Canada, and Mexico often compete with each other for trade and foreign investment. Thus, any given region must face "the possibility of being underbid or outbid by a competitor region."[101] After discussing the role of transportation in promoting regional competitiveness in general, the paper places particular emphasis on two aspects of cross-border transport: the development of transport

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[98] Statement of the American Trucking Associations, Inc. on "NAFTA, Border Infrastructure, and Motor Carrier Safety," in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure*, U.S. House of Representatives, "Reauthorization of ISTEA: North American Free Trade Agreement, Border Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Safety, Laredo and Pharr, Texas," 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 8-9 August 1996, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 74.

[99] The NAFTA provisions on land transportation services are contained in an annex to Chapter 12 on Services (Annex 1212) and in NAFTA Annex I. See *NAFTA Text – Including Supplemental Agreements*, final version (Chicago, ILL: CCH, 1994).

[100] See Statement of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Deborah Waller Meyers before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, April 14, 1999.

[101] Michael Storper and Allen J. Scott, "The Wealth of Regions: Market Forces and Policy Imperatives in Local and Global Context," *Futures* 27-5 (1995), p. 518.

infrastructure for border areas, and the development of innovative regulations and procedures to facilitate cross-border travel. The paper also examines the major obstacles to promoting a more "seamless" border, ranging from funding shortages to disputes regarding the cross-border movement of trucks and people.

The two regions of special concern in this paper are Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana. This paper uses the most common definition of "Cascadia", which includes the Canadian province of British Columbia (B.C.) and the U.S. states of Washington and Oregon. While many of the Cascadia cross-border institutions discussed below have been formed by governmental and nongovernmental actors at the provincial/state level, muncipal governments have also established some cross-border institutions such as the *Cascadia Metropolitan Forum* and the *Cascadia Mayors Council*.[102] Thus, the Cascadia region is defined in rather diffuse terms with regard to the key actors. The San Diego-Tijuana region, by contrast, is defined primarily in terms of the two main cities in the area. A major reason for this difference relates to the location of the largest cities in relation to the two border areas. San Diego is only about 20 miles from the border with Mexico, while Tijuana extends up to and along the international border. Transborder regional concerns therefore tend to focus on these two cities, and a *Who's Who Directory* of institutions and individuals involved in crossborder activities states that "the important and growing ties between San Diego and Tijuana represent the emergence of a binational region with shared interests and challenges."[103] In the Cascadia case, by contrast, Vancouver, B.C. is about 33 miles north of the Canada-U.S. border, while Seattle and Portland are 111 and 283 miles south of the border. These cities are simply too far apart to establish a highly interdependent relationship. Vancouver in fact has a far greater impact on Bellingham and Blaine, Washington, which are much closer to the border than Seattle. However, Bellingham and Blaine are too small to be significant focal points of the Cascadia region. (Some institutions in Bellingham such as the Whatcom County Council of Governments do play an important role in promoting transborder regionalism.)

Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana were selected for this study because of their importance as NAFTA transborder regions, and because of the possibilities of drawing comparisons between them. Tijuana has become a major site for foreign-based *maquiladora* plants, largely because of its proximity to San Diego; and the service industries of San Diego often utilize Mexican labour. There has also been an exponential growth of travel across the common border, and today the San Ysidro border crossing between the two cities is the busiest international land crossing in the world with over 90 million persons crossing in 1998.[104] The San Diego metropolitan area is also the largest urban area in the entire U.S.-Mexico border region, encompassing almost one-half of

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[102] A total of 26 cities in Washington, Oregon, and B.C. were initially invited to participate in the Cascadia Mayors Council. The members of the Cascadia Metropolitan Forum are the Greater Vancouver Regional District, Portland Metro, and the Puget Sound Regional Council - which includes Seattle. ("Cascadia Metropolitan Forum – Conference Proceedings", various years; "Cascadia Mayors Council – 14 July 1998 Meeting Agenda".)

[103] *Who's Who in San Diego-Tijuana Cross-Border Affairs* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, n.d.).

[104] Caltrans District 11, "U.S./Mexico Border Activities," March 1999, p. 7.

the population on the southern U.S. border.[105] In Cascadia, the cross-border ties have resulted from a strong feeling "that the natural and built environments, the economy of the region, and the socio-cultural characteristics of the residents ... [have] more in common than any part of the region ... [has] with other areas in either Canada or the United States."[106] Cross-border trade and tourism are important contributors to prosperity in the Cascadia region, and the Peace Arch Crossing between B.C. and Washington State is the third busiest along the Canada-U.S. border with nearly 4 million crossings in 1995-96. The B.C.-Washington State border ports as a group registered about 17 million crossings in 1995-96.[107]

Mexico-U.S. and Canada-U.S. border relationships have some starkly different characteristics, largely because of Mexico's lower level of economic development. Despite these major differences, there are some important similarities between the Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana experiences. Both regions have a Pacific coast orientation and place considerable emphasis on economic linkages along the Western coast of North America and the Asia Pacific. These two regions are also located a long distance from their national capitals in Ottawa, Mexico City, and Washington, D.C. In Cascadia, this distance has contributed to feelings of "western alienation". B.C. governments, whether led by the Social Credit or New Democratic Party, have often pitted themselves against the Federal government; and in Washington State, Seattle often seems to have "more in common with Vancouver, B.C., than Washington, D.C."[108] In the Tijuana-San Diego region, Governor Ernest Ruffo Appel (1989-1995) from the opposition PAN party in Baja California, strongly pressured the Mexican government (led by the dominant PRI party) to transfer more fiscal capacity to the state and local levels. Thus, the geographic location of Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana has contributed to an activist and unique brand of politics in both regions.[109]

Before focusing on Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana, it is necessary to examine what insights we can gain from the general literature on regionalism, competitiveness, and transportation.

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[105] Robert W. Duemling, *San Diego and Tijuana: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Border Communities*, Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 23rd Session, 1980-81, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, p. 1; John R. Weeks, "The Changing Demographic Structure of the San Diego Region," in Norris C. Clement and Eduardo Zepeda Miramontes, eds., *San Diego-Tijuana in Transition: A Regional Analysis* (San Diego: Institute for Regional Studies of the California, San Diego State University, 1993), pp. 17-21.

[106] Alan F.J. Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures: Shared Visions, Strategic Alliances, and Ingrained Barriers in A Transborder Region," April 1997, p. 6.

[107] Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures," pp. 14-15.

[108] Elaine Porterfield, "Emerging `Cascadia': Geography, Economy Bring Northwest Cities Ever-closer," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 July 1999, p. 3.

[109] David A. Shirk, "New Federalism in Mexico: Implications for Baja California and the Cross-Border Region," Briefing Paper for *San Diego Dialogue*, July 1999, p. 23; Joachim Blatter, "Explaining Crossborder Cooperation: A Border-Focused and Border External Approach," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 12-1&2 (Spring and Fall 1997), p. 163.

Studies of Regionalism and Competitiveness

A striking characteristic of the literature on competitiveness is its almost exclusive focus on the competitiveness of nation-states and international firms, even though "regions are one of the essential bases of industrial organization in the emerging global economy."[110] Part of the reason for this oversight stems from the fact that regionalism has not been a mainstream concept in the study of international relations. Traditionally, regionalism has aroused "connotations of something small in scale, something provincial, practical, innocent, and weak. It has been depicted as one of the principles organizing political space within states, but as void of relevance in a broader context."[111] The tendency to overlook regional competitiveness also stems from the preoccupations of economists. For example, David Ricardo's influential theory of comparative advantage explains the benefits of trade on the basis of the relative advantages of *nation-states*. Concentration on the national level has limited the number of relevant actors and made theories such as comparative advantage more manageable.[112]

In this age of globalization, the view of regionalism as a low-profile issue of little political significance – or as a negative influence - must be reconsidered. During the Cold War years, state borders were quite rigid, and there was little room for cross-border regionalism. With the decline of the Cold War, however, the "high politics" of state security issues has had to share the stage with "low political" preoccupations such as economic growth, integration, and interdependence. Along with this shift toward socio-economic issues, has been a heightened interest in regional relationships, including cross-border regionalism. Some writers have become more attuned to the importance of regional competitiveness. In her ground-breaking study entitled *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, Jane Jacobs has focused on the limitations of examining competitiveness only at the national level. According to Jacobs, most states in fact "are composed of collections or grab bags of very different economies, rich regions and poor ones within the same nation."[113] Explicitly adopting a regional view of competitiveness, Jacobs asserts that "a nation in which city economies have been enfeebled is necessarily a nation in process of becoming poor and backward."[114]

In *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, Michael Porter argues that competitive advantage develops from geographic concentration, or from "clusters" of related industries within a nation-state. These "internationally successful ... industry clusters frequently concentrate in a city or region, and the bases for advantage are often intensely local.... While the national government has a role in upgrading industry, the role of state and local governments is potentially as great or

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[110] Storper and Scott, "The Wealth of Regions," p. 509.

[111] Pertti Joenniemi and Ole Waever, "By Way of Introduction: Why Regionalization?," in Pertti Joenniemi, ed., *Cooperation in the Baltic Region* (Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis, 1993), p. 1.

[112] Peter Karl Kresl, *The Urban Economy and Regional Trade Liberalization* (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 14-15. This section of the paper draws upon some of the ideas discussed in the Kresl book.

[113] Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 32.

[114] Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, p. 211.

greater."[115] In *The Work of Nations*, Robert Reich similarly refers to the development of competitive "symbolic-analytic zones" within nation-states, which have each developed a unique combination of institutions and skills over time. For example, the Los Angeles area is known for film and music; greater Boston and the San Francisco Bay area for science and engineering; and New York for law, advertising, publishing, and global finance.[116]

Kenichi Ohmae argues that "region states" are the important boundaries to consider in terms of global economic relationships today. The United States is in fact a collection of region states, some of which cross the border with Canada and Mexico; for example, Ohmae identifies Cascadia and the San Diego-Tijuana corridor as region states that overlap existing national boundaries. While a region state must be small enough for its citizens to share certain common interests, it must also be large enough to support the infrastructure needed to participate effectively in the global economy. Thus, a region state must have at least one international airport, and one good harbor with international class freight-handling facilities.[117] Paul Krugman discusses the important historical role of the U.S. manufacturing belt, a cross-border region that extended from the U.S. Northeast and Midwest into Ontario, Canada. The manufacturing belt retained its dominance for so long because of the advantage to individual firms in clustering together, even after the U.S. production of most raw materials had moved to other regions.[118] Since the manufacturing belt industries benefited from economies of scale, this region "had a better transport network than any other part of the country."[119] It is to the role of transportation in promoting competitiveness that we now turn.

Studies of Transportation and Competitiveness

Historically, advances in transportation have contributed to major breakthroughs in economic development. The world's first great commercial centres developed around seaports, and a second wave of economic development took place in river- and canal-based cities that were central to the industrial revolution. Railroads were critical to a third wave of industrial development, and a fourth wave resulted from the shift to trucks and cars for moving goods and people. A fifth wave of development is associated with a greater emphasis on high-speed jet airplanes and advanced telecommunications technologies.[120] Rapid transport has become even

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[115] Michael E. Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 622.

[116] Robert B. Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), pp. 177 and 234-40.

[117] Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs* 72-2 (Spring 1993), pp. 79-85; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 88-89.

[118] Paul Krugman, *Geography and Trade* (Leuven, Belg and Cambridge, MA: Leuven University Press and MIT Press, 1991), pp. 11-14. For an earlier study that devotes considerable space to the importance of the U.S. manufacturing belt, see Harvey S. Perloff, Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., Eric E. Lampard, and Richard F. Muth, *Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).

[119] Krugman, *Geography and Trade*, p. 25.

[120] John D. Kasarda, "Transportation Infrastructure for Competitive Success," *Transportation Quarterly* 50-1 (Winter, 1996), p. 37.

more important in promoting development and competitiveness in recent years with the shift to global sourcing and exporting. The emphasis on speedy production processes became particularly evident in the early 1980s when auto manufacturers began implementing just-in-time (JIT) production techniques to reduce their stockpiles of raw materials and parts.[121] The JIT concept is straightforward – to deliver material to production points at the precise time and in the exact amount required. By synchronizing all stages of the value chain from raw material acquisition to finished products, JIT production shortens sourcing, production, and delivery times, and gives firms a competitive advantage in pricing. Closely associated with the JIT concept in production are the concepts of Quick Response (QR) in the retailing and apparel industries, and Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) in the food and grocery industries. Increasingly, competitiveness will be determined by rapid response time, which in turn will depend on the timely movement of goods through railways, highways, seaports, and airports.[122] Rapid transport has been essential to the economic vitality of cities and regions. While regions with high degrees of traffic congestion and pollution can lose important industries, regions in the forefront of transport infrastructure and technology reap significant economic benefits.[123] For example, a 1990 report listed London and Paris as being among the most desired locations for European business because of their good transportation facilities. Fifty-seven percent of the firms surveyed considered transportation to be an "absolutely essential" factor in their decision to locate in a particular city.[124] The sections that follow examine the special challenges in developing multimodal transport systems for cross-border regions such as Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana. In comparing these two cases, it is useful to focus on two types of cross-border transport issues: the development of transport infrastructure, and the development of innovative regulations and procedures to facilitate border crossings.

Cascadia

In the 1990s a number of government agencies, private business groups, and informal transborder institutions became committed to facilitating cross-border transport in Cascadia. The establishment of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988 and the NAFTA in 1994 increased these groups' awareness that an efficient and seamless transportation system was essential for Cascadia to attain its competitive potential. Vancouver, Seattle, and Portland have a natural advantage as sea and air transport points because of their greater proximity to Japan and other areas in the Asia Pacific. Nevertheless, Cascadia faces serious competition from the ports

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[121] James Aaron Cooke, "Beyond Quality ... Speed," *Traffic Management* 33-6 (June 1994), p. 32. The emphasis on frequent and timely deliveries by suppliers is now widely referred to as *kanban* after its Japanese innovators. See Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, p. 43.

[122] Douglas Gantenbein, "The Competitive Edge: The Role of Transportation in a Regional Economy," prepared for the Regional Transit Project and Trade Development Alliance of Greater Seattle, July 30, 1993, p. 4; Cooke, "Beyond Quality ... Speed," p. 33; Kasarda, "Transportation Infrastructure for Competitive Success," p. 38.

[123] On problems of traffic congestion and alternate modes of regional development see Gantenbein, "The Competitive Edge," pp. 2-4; and Timothy Egan, "The Freeway, Its Cost, and 2 Cities' Destinies," *New York Times*, July 14, 1999, pp. A1 and A18.

[124] Gantenbein, "The Competitive Edge," p. 3; Kasarda, "Transportation Infrastructure for Competitive Success," pp. 43-47.

and railroads in the Los Angeles-Long Beach area of California, which put aside their differences in developing the Alameda Corridor. Without similar cooperation in linking ports, airports and cities with high-speed rail and roadways in Cascadia, its natural advantage in terms of distance to Asia will be eroded.[125] Progress in developing a rapid and seamless transportation system in Cascadia has been slow because of political, bureaucratic, and economic obstacles. However, some initiatives which have shown considerable promise are discussed below: the PACE/CANPASS dedicated commuter lanes, the Cascadia Project, and the International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC).

PACE/CANPASS

A number of transborder groupings in Cascadia such as the *Discovery Institute*, the *Cascadia Institute*, the *Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER)*, and the *Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council (PACE)*, have sought to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods, services, and people.[126] One result of these groups' efforts was the introduction of a *Peace Arch Crossing Entry* (*PACE*) dedicated commuter lane at the main border crossing between B.C. and Washington State in 1991, which permits frequent and low-risk travelers who have undergone a police background check to bypass regular inspection lanes. The actual decision to introduce the PACE lane resulted from a 1990 regional agreement signed by two Canadian and two U.S. officials, which required final approval by the U.S. Department of State, Canada's Department of External Affairs, and customs and immigration in both countries.[127] One potential obstacle to gaining approval was the concern about cross-border shopping. Cross-border shopping by B.C. residents in Washington State was at its height in 1990-91, and some B.C. business groups feared that a PACE lane would facilitate this shopping and detract from their own sales revenue. These business groups were assured, however, that the PACE lane was in fact designed for others such as commuting workers and vacationers with summer cottages. In 1991, the PACE lane was finally approved at the Peace Arch crossing as a pilot project. PACE automobiles, marked by a window decal, travel through the lane without regular inspections. This was the first dedicated commuter lane in North America, and it proved to be so successful that the concept was extended to other regions on the Canada-U.S. and also the Mexico-U.S. borders. Although the term "PACE" was originally used on both sides of the Peace Arch border crossing, when the concept became more national in scope the name was officially changed in Canada to "CANPASS". Currently, Canadian and American residents must apply separately for the U.S. PACE and Canadian CANPASS programs, and undergo separate security checks to qualify for each country's program. A goal of many groups in Cascadia is to have joint U.S.-Canadian administration of PACE and CANPASS so that the application processing and data management can be shared rather than duplicated. However, the differing policies of the two countries make

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[125] Ross Anderson, "A Seamless Network Urged for Northwest," *Seattle Times*, December 19, 1997, p. B2.
[126] For a discussion of these groupings see Theodore H. Cohn and Patrick J. Smith, "Subnational Governments as International Actors: Constituent Diplomacy in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest," *BC Studies*, no. 110 (Summer 1996), pp. 25-59; Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures."
[127] The four officials were Blake Delgaty, John Watson, Richard Smith, and Thomas Eberhart. Interviews with Blake Delgaty, Director for Canada Customs Border Services, Pacific Region, in Vancouver, B.C., 1 May 1998 and 9 August, 1999.

such coordination difficult. Although Canada has already expanded CANPASS service to other border crossing points for northbound traffic into B.C., the U.S. has not yet extended PACE service beyond the Peace Arch crossing into Washington State (U.S. federal funds have been allocated for expanding the PACE program, but these funds have not yet been utilized). In May 1999, Canada's Minister of National Revenue announced that users of the CANPASS program in B.C. would no longer be required to pay the $25 annual administrative fee; but the PACE program in Washington State still requires a $25 fee, and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has no plans to emulate Canada in eliminating the fee. The procedures for the CANPASS and PACE programs in terms of number of lanes available, cost to commuters, and so forth will have to become standardized before U.S.-Canada joint administration of the commuter lane program can be contemplated. The experience gained by current efforts to develop joint U.S.-Canadian facilities at several smaller border crossings will help to determine whether a joint program can be developed for the commuter lanes. For example, the two countries are building a new joint customs building which will be partly on the Canadian side of the border (in Coutts, Alberta) and partly on the U.S. side (in Sweetwater, Montana). Similar joint operations are also planned in the border areas adjoining Osoyoos, B.C.; Emerson, Manitoba; and Little Gold Creek, Yukon. Certain adjustments will have to be made in these joint facilities; for example, U.S. customs officials will have to disarm when they enter the Canadian side of the building, because U.S. officials carry guns and Canadian officials do not.[128] The results of this cross-border experiment should be useful in assessing the possibilities for developing binational procedures for commuter lanes.

The Cascadia Project

Created in 1993, the *Cascadia Project* supports binational cooperative planning to achieve common objectives in areas such as trade, tourism, and technology; but it identifies a rapid, seamless transportation system as being the most important objective. The Seattle-based Discovery Institute, a public policy think tank, manages the Cascadia Project in cooperation with the Vancouver-based Cascadia Institute. The Project seeks to involve not only business groups and transportation providers and users, but also provincial/state and local governments. In May 1997, the Cascadia Project launched a "Connecting the Gateways and Trade Corridors Initiative," which is designed to develop a twenty-year multi-modal transportation plan for the Interstate 5 corridor connecting B.C., Washington, and Oregon. Boeing Company and the Port of Seattle provided the initial funding for this initiative. Boeing is a prime example of a company that depends on subassemblies getting to its factories on time, and it is therefore "committed to the development of an intermodal transportation system for the enhanced movement of people and goods" in Cascadia.[129] By stimulating dialogue and providing a forum for cooperative work, the Connecting the Gateways and Trade Corridors Initiative is designed to achieve this objective.

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[128] Mike Trickey, "Guns Create Toilet Trouble at Border Post," *Vancouver Sun*, 11 August 1999, p. 3.

[129] Letter from P.M. Condit, Boeing, to Paige Miller, Chair of Seattle Port Commission, 25 March 1997; International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project, "Status Report on the IMTC Scope of Work," prepared by Whatcom County Council of Governments for the Port of Bellingham, 12 January, 1998; Whatcom Country Council of Governments, "The Cascade Gateway and the International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project," n.d.; Pacific Northwest Economic Region and Discovery Institute, "Connecting the Gateways and Trade Corridors," n.d.; Arthur C. Gorlick, "Joint Port Authority with B.C. on Agenda," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, November 20, 1997, p. D4.

The International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project

While the Connecting the Gateways and Trade Corridors Initiative is concerned with developing longer-term plans for transportation from B.C. to Oregon, the *International Mobility and Trade Corridor* project (*IMTC*) focuses on shorter-term transportation objectives only in Western Washington and B.C. along the I-5/Highway 99 corridor.   The original idea for the IMTC resulted from a "brainstorming meeting" of three individuals: James Miller of the Whatcom Council Council of Governments (WCCOG) in Bellingham, Washington; Bruce Agnew of the Discovery Institute; and David Sherwood of the Pacific Northwest Economic Region. The IMTC was formally launched in April 1997, and the WCCOG was selected as the lead agency in the project.   To improve cross-border mobility, participants in the IMTC process have pressured for the expansion of PACE/CANPASS; enhancement of infrastructure and approach roads to border areas; the development of intelligent transportation systems, shared border facilities, and bilateral financing; and the conclusion of international border-zone agreements.

Among the concrete achievements of the IMTC has been its ability to develop proposals (under the leadership of the WCCOG) for funding from U.S. federal sources to improve corridor and border infrastructure. In response to IMTC information and pressure, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service earmarked $1.6 million in appropriations in October 1998 for expanding the PACE program in Cascadia. The WCCOG and the Washington State Department of Transport have also jointly submitted proposals for funding under the U.S. Transportation Equity Act for the 21ˢᵗ Century (TEA-21), which authorizes U.S. federal funds for highway safety and transit programs. Of particular relevance are Section 1119 of TEA-21 which deals with funding for border infrastructure, and (to a lesser extent) Section 1118 which deals with national corridor planning and development.[130] Under TEA-21, the U.S. Department of Transportation has the authority to allocate up to $140 million each year over four fiscal years (1999-2003), for a total of $700 million. In the first year of TEA-21, three border projects submitted by the WCCOG and the Washington State Department of Transport received federal funding, and the State of Washington provided some matching grants.   The first project grant will enable the IMTC to continue coordinating binational border planning; the second will be used to gather origin-destination and commodity flow data with the aim of adding new border facilities, upgrading existing facilities, and implementing new technologies; and the third will be used to expand and improve the PACE program.[131]

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[130] U.S. Public Law 105-178, 105ᵗʰ Congress, 9 June 1998.

[131] Interview with James Miller, Executive Director, Whatcom County Council of Governments in Bellingham, Washington, 3 August, 1999; International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC), "Summary of Awarded FY 99 Project Applications to the Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program," n.d.; "DOT Secretary Slater Announces $124 Million in Fiscal 1999 Grants for Borders and Corridors Program," U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., http://www.dot.gov/affairs/fhwa3699.htm, 27 May 1999.

Continuing Obstacles in Cascadia

Despite the efforts to facilitate cross-border transportation in Cascadia, major problems remain and there are continuing obstacles to progress. A 1989 study by the Texas Transportation Institute referred to greater Seattle as the fifth most congested area in the United States, and a more recent article by Seattle's Discovery Institute describes the inadequacy of the present transportation system on the I-5 corridor and in the U.S.-Canadian border area.[132] Obstacles to cross-border cooperation in improving rapid transport result from differences in political systems; differences in priorities at the federal, provincial/state, and local levels; and competition and conflict among governments.

The ability of Cascadian state and provincial governments to establish formal relationships are of course limited by the control that the U.S. and Canadian federal governments exert over international relations. Even in areas where provincial and state governments are able to establish their own linkages, the differences in political systems pose some serious obstacles. For example, in 1977 the Washington State Legislature established a Joint Legislative Committee on Washington/British Columbia Cooperation in hopes that a formalized relationship could be established between the Washington and B.C. legislatures. However, B.C. did not establish a comparable legislative committee, largely because of the difference in political systems. While the joint committee in Washington State could speak alone on behalf of the legislative branch, this would be impossible in B.C. because of the fusion of the executive and legislative branches in a parliamentary system. Thus, a formal relationship between the B.C. and Washington State legislatures has never been established. For similar reasons, B.C. Premiers have been more reluctant than Washington State Governors to establish formal ties at the executive level. Unlike U.S. states where governors can develop structured relationships with each other, the government in Victoria "is in and of the legislative assembly, and must stand and answer to it."[133] Thus, the differences in political systems can impede efforts to develop provincial-state institutions in Cascadia on transportation and other issues.

Another factor interfering with cooperation on cross-border transport in Cascadia is the differences in priorities at the federal, state/provincial, and local levels. In this paper, it is only possible to give a few examples of this problem. At the federal level, recent U.S. actions to deal with illegal immigration – primarily from Mexico – threaten to interfere with cross-border transport throughout North America. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed Section 110 of the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (the implementation of Section 110 has been delayed until March 30, 2001). If implemented, Section 110 would require

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[132] Gantenbein, "The Competitive Edge," p. 2; Bruce Chapman, Glenn Pascall and Bruce Agnew, "Looking Ahead 50 Years to Solve Washington's Transit Problems," Special to the *Seattle Times*, 25 July, 1999.

[133] Gerard F. Rutan, "British Columbia-Washington State Governmental Interrelations: Some Findings upon the Failure of Structure," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 15-1 (Spring, 1985), p. 105; Gerard F. Rutan, "Legislative Interaction of a Canadian Province and an American State: Thoughts upon Sub-National Cross-Border Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 11-2 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 67-79. Blatter points out that such political differences need not be absolute barriers to cross-border cooperation. See Blatter, "Explaining Cross-Border Cooperation," pp. 166-67.

all non-U.S. citizens to be inspected by an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer when leaving as well as entering the United States. Although Section 110 is aimed at illegal immigration in the United States, it would result in massive delays and backups at the borders with Canada and Mexico for commuters, shoppers, tourists, and truckers who carry goods traded among the three NAFTA countries.[134]

At the provincial/state level, the political leanings of recent B.C. governments have not been conducive to cooperative agreements with Washington and Oregon on transportation. B.C. has traditionally been less concerned about American domination than some other provinces such as Ontario. However, the current governing party in B.C. – the New Democratic Party (NDP) – has been associated with economic and cultural nationalism, and opposition to the NAFTA. The NDP-led government has therefore been slow to push for cooperation in promoting cross-border transport. At the local level, priorities regarding community life style also sometimes conflict with plans to upgrade the transport system. For example, a major goal of the Cascadia Project has been to develop a high-speed rail corridor extending from Vancouver, B.C. to Eugene, Oregon. Plans are now underway to increase the one round trip per day Amtrak service between these cities to three, but a range of obstacles may interfere with these plans. The current Amtrak service travels through White Rock, B.C., and there is considerable local pressure to have trains travel through that area at slower speeds. Local pressures may also interfere with U.S. plans to expand its border facilities at the Peace Arch crossing. A number of local groups strongly oppose the expansion plans, which may encroach on the Peace Arch Park, the Peace Portal Golf Club, and residential areas.[135]

Finally, competition and conflict *within* Cascadia interfere with the region's efforts to form a unified front in competition with other regions. B.C., for example, is concerned that competitive pressures from Washington and Oregon may detract from Vancouver's importance as a gateway city for transportation. In 1998, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council composed of senior executives from industry and government identified some of these concerns:

1. Competing U.S. gateways have public subsidies, and lower taxes and capital costs, which put Vancouver at a cost disadvantage. Canadian shippers are therefore using more U.S. routes for their goods, and one major Canadian potash shipper has built a terminal in Portland, Oregon.
2. Although the weak Canadian dollar temporarily masks the cost disadvantages of Vancouver as a gateway, the lower valued Canadian dollar threatens Canadian ownership of transportation companies because of aggressive acquisition efforts of U.S. firms.

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[134] For a detailed discussion of Section 110, see Theodore H. Cohn, "Cross-Border Travel in North America: The Case of U.S. Section 110 Immigration Legislation," *Canadian-American Public Policy*, University of Maine, forthcoming, 1999.
[135] Discovery Institute, "Cascadia Transportation/Trade Task Force," n.d.; Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures," pp. 19-21; Gerry Bellett and Chad Skelton, "Border Project Draws Ire," *Vancouver Sun*, 7 September 1999, pp. A1 and A2.

3. While the U.S. TEA-21 program will provide benefits for cross-border transport in Cascadia, competitors in Washington State will be major beneficiaries of these funds. The Canadian government has no federal highways program for borders and corridors that even compares with the U.S. government's TEA-21.[136]

Efforts to develop cross-border transportation linkages are sometimes adversely affected not only by competition among governments within Cascadia, but also by open conflict. B.C., Washington, and Oregon all have important resource sectors that are competitive with each other, and there have been serious clashes in recent years over softwood lumber, salmon, and apples. At the height of conflict in the region over salmon fishing regulations, the B.C. government stopped participating with its two Cascadia partners in talks on a range of unrelated issues. Since the urban economies in Cascadia have more service and technology-oriented industries, these disputes tend to centre on the rural areas of B.C., Washington, and Oregon. Thus, much of the support for cross-border linkages is found in the large urban areas.[137] Within these cities, private business has often taken the lead in promoting cross-border transport, and the provincial and state governments have generally been followers. However, if Cascadia transportation initiatives are to achieve their objectives, it will be necessary to have political leaders emerge who "effectively champion the Cascadian cause."[138] One encouraging sign was the decision of the B.C. Premier and Washington State Governor in June 1999 to form a new joint corridor task force to improve cross-border transportation.[139]

San Diego-Tijuana

The San Diego-Tijuana region's estimated spending on port, rail, and airport development to expand Pacific Rim trade for the years 1996 to 2000 amounts to less than $400 million; this figure is far below those for other city regions such as Los Angeles ($4.3 billion), the San Francisco Bay area ($3.2 billion), and Seattle-Tacoma ($1.5 billion). As a result, San Diego-Tijuana is highly dependent on Los Angeles-Long Beach for its port, rail, and airport transportation. San Diego International Airport is unable to meet about one-quarter of the region's air passenger demand, and from one-half to two-thirds of its air cargo needs; most of this demand is met by airports in the Los Angeles area. About 90 percent of the vessel cargo shipped to and from San Diego-Tijuana goes through the Ports of San Pedro Bay in Los Angeles-Long Beach. Thus, component parts for the maquiladora industry are shipped from East Asia

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[136] "Vision for the Future...of the Greater Vancouver Gateway," Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, Summer 1999, p. 8.
[137] On the differences between the urban economies and the hinterland in B.C. see H. Craig Davis and Thomas A. Hutton, "The Two Economies of British Columbia," *BC Studies* no. 82 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-15.
[138] Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures," p. 25.
[139] "Task Force to Improve Cross-border Transportation," *British Columbia News Release*, Employment and Investment 061, 18 June, 1999.

through the San Pedro Bay ports, and then transported by truck to border plants. The cross-border region also lacks a direct rail connection to the East with the rest of North America, and its rail shipments are routed through Los Angeles.[140]

Some argue that San Diego-Tijuana's dependence on Los Angeles is efficient, because Los Angeles has world-class facilities that the border area could not match, and using these facilities has decreased the need for large local transport investments. However, others argue that the drawbacks of over-dependence outweigh the advantages. Although the border region will continue to depend on Los Angeles facilities, the extremely high degree of reliance interferes with San Diego/Tijuana's control over economic development in the border region. Reliance on Los Angeles area airports is also problematic because delays and controversies over environmental issues pose a threat to their expansion plans. Furthermore, traffic congestion will continue to increase travel times between the cross-border region and Los Angeles area airports.[141]

In the cross-border region itself, the most immediate transport problem is the need to improve the highway system. Efficient highways and land ports of entry are essential because the San Diego/Tijuana trade flow is mainly north-south. San Diego's exports are largely NAFTA-oriented, with 44 percent going to Mexico, 9 percent to Canada and only 23 percent to East Asia. For Tijuana, the main export market is the United States, with a majority of exports being shipped to the Western U.S. states. San Diego serves as a major transshipment point for these goods, and also for goods shipped from East Asia for Tijuana's maquiladora industries. Component parts from Asia for the maquiladoras are trucked from Los Angeles-Long Beach to Mexico, and finished products are then trucked back across the border. The NAFTA has resulted in a marked increase in the amount of goods being shipped, and congestion has become a major problem on local streets because of the lack of direct connections between border crossings and the interstate highway system. On a recent trip to Mexico, a California Senator therefore indicated that a common problem on both sides of the border was the need for funds to construct and improve highway networks.[142]

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[140] Steven P. Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," *San Diego Dialogue Briefing Paper*, February 1999, p. 13; Steven P. Erie, "Trade Laggard: While Other West Coast Centers Prosper, the San Diego Region is Missing Out," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 21 February, 1999, pp. G-1 and G-6.

[141] Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," p. 14; Anthony Millican, "Port Director Prepares to Launch Strategy to Solve Air-travel Woes," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 25 July, 1999, pp. B-1 & B-3; "Filling the Void: Airport Capacity is Vital to San Diego's Economy," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 25 July, 1999, p. G-2.

[142] Karla Gómez, "Deben Mejorar Infrastructura Carretera," *La Crónica de Baja California*, 11 July 1999, p. 1.; Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," pp. 9-12; Diane Lindquist and Valerie Alvord, "Trucking through Tecate," *San Diego Union Tribune*, 29 July 1999, p. C-1.

Efforts to Improve the Cross-Border Transport System

In the early 1990s, the U.S. and Mexican governments created a *Binational Liaison Mechanism* (*BLM*) program, under which communities along the U.S.-Mexico border would establish BLMs to deal more formally with border-related matters of local concern. The San Diego-Tijuana/Tecate BLM has been actively involved in transport issues, and has formed a working group - the *Port of Entry Council for Tijuana-San Diego-Tecate* – to advise it on developments related to the region's ports of entry. The Council provides a forum for regional and federal agencies as well as community stakeholders to examine ways of improving the management of border crossings. It also considers the long-term expansion needs of the ports of entry, and their integration with the highway systems on both sides of the border.[143] Another local institution involved in cross-border transport issues is the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG). As early as 1975, the SANDAG designated a representative of the Tijuana and Baja California governments as an honorary member on its Board of Directors. In 1996, the SANDAG signed an agreement with Baja California to establish the Bi-State Transportation Technical Advisory Committee (BTTAC). The BTTAC, which brings together the agencies for transportation planning along the border of the two states, has supported a number of border-related transportation programs. At the state level, the California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) has agreements with state and federal transportation agencies in Mexico to cooperate in transportation planning.[144] As is the case in Cascadia, the SANDAG (along with CALTRANS) has successfully applied for U.S. federal funding under the TEA-21 program for border improvement projects and planning.

Cross-border arrangements are of course not limited to governments; and business, civic, and academic groups have been cooperating to promote their transportation and development interests. The *Border Trade Alliance* (*BTA*), which deals with issues along the entire U.S.-Mexico border, has had a significant effect on cross-border transport in the San Diego-Tijuana region. Formed in 1986, the BTA includes economic development corporations, chambers of commerce, banks, industrial parks, service providers, trade associations, manufacturers, and state and local government agencies from every state along the U.S.-Mexico border. The BTA has been working with U.S. Customs to deal with such issues as the high turnover of U.S. customs personnel at southern border ports; the need to expedite the shipment of high-volume, low-risk goods; the possibility of using high-technology equipment as an alternative to manual inspection at the border; and the possibilities for increasing communication between U.S. and Mexican Customs.[145]

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[143] SANDAG, "Recent Border Related Projects," http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/projects/binational/recent_projects.html, pp. 1-2.
[144] SANDAG, "Border Area Transportation: The Local, State, National, and International Connection," November 1996, pp. 16-17; SANDAG, "Recent Border Related Projects," pp. 1-3.
[145] Theresa M. Sires, "The Border Trade Alliance: Improving U.S.-Mexico Trade Through Action and Education," *Twin Plant News* 6-1 (August 1990), pp. 74-80.

Another important group is the *San Diego Dialogue*, which was established in 1991 and is a partnership between the greater San Diego/Tijuana community and the University of California, San Diego. The membership includes university scholars and leaders from both sides of the border in business, the media, the arts, education, and government. In April 1994, the San Diego Dialogue published a study pointing to the high volume of border crossings by commuters, shoppers, and tourists in the San Diego-Tijuana region.[146] This report led the U.S. Congress to authorize a dedicated commuter lane pilot project in 1995 – called the SENTRI (Secure Electronic Network for Traveler Rapid Inspection) lane – for business people at the Otay Mesa port of entry. Patterned after the PACE/CANPASS lane in Cascadia, the Otay Mesa lane has been quite successful. Thus, two SENTRI lanes are ready to begin operating at the San Ysidro crossing (also between San Diego and Tijuana), and there are plans to develop other commuter lanes along the entire length of the Mexico-U.S. border.[147]

Although the SENTRI lane was patterned after PACE/CANPASS, there are some significant differences which result partly from concerns about illegal immigration on the Mexico-U.S. border. While the cost to commuters travelling to the U.S. at the Tijuana/San Diego crossing is $129, the cost to commuters going to the U.S. at the Cascadia crossing is only $25. The Mexico-U.S. SENTRI system is also more automated than the PACE/CANPASS system, and those applying for SENTRI permits in Tijuana-Cascadia must provide fingerprint samples. Those using the new SENTRI lane at San Ysidro will have a crossing card which they must "swipe" when crossing the border, and a radio transmitter placed in the owner's vehicle will aid in identification. When SENTRI lane users slide their cards through the optic reader, their fingerprints will be read by a computer. The SENTRI lane at the U.S.-Mexico crossing is only on the U.S. side of the border and is administered solely by the United States. In Cascadia, by contrast, Canada has a CANPASS lane comparable to the U.S. PACE lane, and there is discussion about developing joint administration of the commuter lanes.[148]

Continuing Obstacles in San Diego-Tijuana

As is the case with Cascadia, the political systems on the two sides of the border between San Diego and Tijuana limit progress in facilitating cross-border transport. For example, a highly fragmented governance system in San Diego interferes with binational cooperation in infrastructure planning and management. In some California cities such as Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Francisco, and Oakland, city agencies have more comprehensive authority over port, rail and airport decision-making. In San Diego, by contrast, the agencies responsible for

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[146] "Who Crosses the Border: A View of the San Diego/Tijuana Metropolitan Region," *A Report of San Diego Dialogue*, (La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, April 1994).

[147] Daniel Salinas, "Retrasa Cruce Rápido - México," *Frontera*, Tijuana, 5 September 1999, pp. 4-5; Interview with Nancy Le Roy, Public Affairs Officer, and Adriana Mendiolea, Cultural Programs Coordinator, U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, Mexico, 29 April 1998; Franciso J. Ortiz Franco, "Ingreso Rápido a San Ysidro con Revisión Electrónica," *Zeta*, Tijuana, 23-29 April, 1999, p. A 37.

[148] Salinas, "Retrasa Cruce Rápido - México," pp. 4-5.

infrastructure decision-making such as the Port District and the Metropolitan Transportation Development Board are limited-purpose special authorities. This fragmented governance system compounds San Diego's difficulties in promoting bilateral cooperation with Tijuana on infrastructure issues.[149]

Tijuana has its own set of governance problems. The Mexican political system has had many of the characteristics of an authoritarian, unitary government. Although Mexico has been evolving in the direction of democratization and some regional devolution of authority, uncertainties and constraints regarding the decentralization process make it difficult for Tijuana to engage in binational cooperation. Mexican President Zedillo's willingness to accept increased democratization resulted in the election of the first opposition-dominated Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and the legislature has supported changes to the Mexican constitution that would give municipalities greater control and responsibilities. "Baja California has been at the forefront of Mexican decentralization," and it has assumed greater responsibility from the federal government in transportation as well as education, health care, and sewage and water facilities.[150] Nevertheless, in the view of many U.S. officials, this decentalization is proceeding at too slow a pace. Cross-border transportation planning is also difficult because Baja California does not have a metropolitan council of governments similar to SANDAG in the San Diego area. Furthermore, Mexico's rail, port, and airport services are being privatized, and the privatization process is creating considerable uncertainty with regard to planning and cross-border cooperation. For example, Mexico's attempts to privatize the 44-mile Baja California spur of the San Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway has been an "on-again, off-again" affair, with a series of setbacks.[151]

As has been the case with B.C.'s NDP government, another obstacle to cross-border cooperation on transportation issues in Tijuana-San Diego has been Mexico's concerns about sovereignty vis-à-vis it much larger neighbor to the North. Concerns about sovereignty are based on Mexico's lower level of economic development and its high degree of dependence on the United States. Indeed, the most important constraint to cross-border transportation planning stems from the socio-economic disparities between San Diego and Tijuana.[152] Tijuana's dependence on San Diego is most evident in the maquiladora operations. If Mexican labour costs become too high, U.S. investors can simply relocate their assembly operations to countries with lower wages. Another result of the economic disparities across the border is the problem with illegal immigration. The U.S. Border Patrol has referred to the San Diego-Tijuana region as the "war

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[149] Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," p. 23.

[150] Shirk, "New Federalism in Mexico, p. 1.

[151] See Dean Calbreath, "Plans to Privatize Tijuana-Tecate Rail Are Rolling Again," *San Diego Union Tribune*, 18 June 1999, p. C-7; "Propuestas Para la Vía Corta Tijuana-Tecate: Concluirá Privatización del Sistema Ferroviario," *El Mexicano*, 3 July 1999, p. C-1; Diane Lindquist, "Mexico Spurns Bidder for Segment of Rail Line," *San Diego Union Tribune*, 14 July 1999, p. C-1.

[152] For comparisons of Mexican and Canadian relations with the United States, see Theodore Cohn, "Canadian and Mexican Trade Policies towards the United States: A Perspective from Canada," in John Curtis and David Haglund, eds., *Canada and International Trade, Vol. I* (Montreal: The Institute of Research on Public Policy, 1985, pp. 7-61.

zone" because so many people attempt to cross every night illegally,[153] and tensions resulting from the pressures for illegal immigration have impeded efforts to facilitate cross-border transport.

The economic disparity between Tijuana and San Diego is especially evident in regard to cross-border transport issues. While San Diego is concerned about its congested freeways, Tijuana is more preoccupied with the lack of paved roads in some of its newest neighbourhoods. Only about 40 percent of the Tijuana area's public roadway system is paved, and 60 percent of that system is in disrepair. The disparate abilities of San Diego and Tijuana to share costs pose a serious problem for joint infrastructure development. CALTRANS is actively involved in building new roads on the U.S. side of the border to cope with expected increases in traffic; but these improvements will not produce the desired results if SAHOPE, the Baja California transportation agency, does not improve the highways on the Mexican side of the border. The disparities are also evident in light rapid transit. In the early 1980s San Diego built a light rail mass transit system that connected its downtown business district with the border at San Ysidro. Lack of finance, however, has interfered with Tijuana's ability to build a similar system connecting its downtown with the U.S. system at San Ysidro.[154] Socio-economic disparities also interfere with the development of the SENTRI lanes, one of the success stories in cross-border transport. The United States is the creator, promoter, and administrator of the SENTRI program, and Mexican authorities are not involved in the selection or inspection of SENTRI lane users. The Mexican government has argued against the $129 U.S. fee for use of the SENTRI system, but the U.S. has been the sole decision-maker on this issue.[155]

Socio-economic disparities sometimes contribute to outright conflict. A primary example today is the U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute. Canada and the U.S. agreed to expanded trucking operations with each other in the early 1980s, but significant barriers to cross-border trucking on both the Mexican and U.S. sides of the southern U.S. border remained.[156] NAFTA contains a timetable for the phased removal of barriers for transporting cargo between the U.S. and Mexico. On 18 December 1995, the U.S.-Mexico border was to be opened for increased commercial truck traffic within the four U.S. border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas), and the six Mexican border states; and on 1 January 2000, all limits on access for international traffic are

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[153] Milton H. Jamail and Margo Gutiérrez, *The Border Guide: Institutions and Organizations of the United States-Mexico Borderlands* (Austin, TX: CMAS Books, University of Texas at Austin, revised edition, 1992), pp. 24-25.

[154] "Planning for Prosperity in the San Diego/Baja California Region," Report of the Binational Task Force on Economic Development and Transportation Infrastructure, Sponsored by the Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce and managed by San Diego Dialogue, 30 September 1993, p. 42; James Gerber, ed., *Economic Profile of the San Diego-Tijuana Region: Characteristics for Investment and Governance Decisions* (San Diego, CA: Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State University, 1995), ch. 5; Lawrence A. Herzog, "International Boundary Cities: The Debate on Transfrontier Planning in Two Border Regions," *Natural Resources Journal* 31-3 (Summer 1991), p. 604.

[155] Salinas, "Retrasa Cruce Rápido - México," pp. 4-5.

[156] For a discussion of remaining restrictions on Canada-U.S. trucking see Darren Prokop, "In 1988 We Freed Trade. Now Let's Free Transport," *Policy Options* 20-5 (June 1999), pp. 37-40.

to be phased out.[157] In December 1995, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation indicated that it would not remove the transport barriers until the safety of Mexican trucks improved. A U.S. Department of Transportation official has stated that "what we would like to see is a comprehensive safety regime established in Mexico that would meet many of the kinds of safety demands that we require of our motor carriers here in the United States."[158] The U.S. refusal to implement the NAFTA provisions on transborder truck travel is highly contentious among some groups in both the U.S. and Mexico, and a detailed examination of the competing views on this issue are beyond the scope of this paper.[159] At the point of this writing, the U.S. has still not agreed to implement the NAFTA provision on trucking, and Mexico (although it has mixed feelings about increased competition that cross-border trucking would bring) has launched a dispute settlement case on this issue under NAFTA Chapter 20.

Conclusion

David Ricardo viewed comparative advantage in national terms, but competitive advantage today is in fact a regional as well as a national phenomenon. This paper has pointed to the importance of a rapid, efficient transportation system for promoting competitiveness in two cross-border regions: Cascadia and Tijuana-San Diego.[160] In both of these regions, nongovernmental and governmental institutions have identified transport problems and proposed solutions, and some significant breakthroughs have occurred. For example, Cascadia pioneered in developing the PACE dedicated commuter lane, and San Diego-Tijuana followed with a similar SENTRI lane; both regions have received funding for corridor and border transport from the U.S. TEA-21 legislation; and both regions have highly innovative groups and projects which are looking to future as well as present transport requirements. Nevertheless both regions continue to have transportation problems that seriously interfere with their competitiveness. San Diego-Tijuana continues to be too dependent on the Los Angeles-Long Beach area for its transport needs; congestion in both regions interferes with the smooth flow of traffic in the corridor and border areas; border crossing procedures have not been updated sufficiently to take account of just-in-time production and other competitive requirements: and neither region has developed an adequate multimodal transportation system that coordinates the need for rapid air, sea, and land travel. Cross-border cooperation on transport is hindered by political governance and sovereignty issues; by competition and conflict among actors within both regions; and by major socio-economic disparities between Tijuana and San Diego.

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[157] *NAFTA Text*, Annex I for the United States on "land transportation". See also Michael P. Rhoades, "NAFTA's Implications for the Transportation Industry," *Transportation Quarterly* 48-2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 135-48.

[158] Testimony of Slater at *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure*, pp. 15 and 21. In the U.S. view, its refusal to implement the agreement for safety reasons is permitted under NAFTA Article 904, which deals with the "right to establish protection".

[159] Competing views on this issue in the U.S. Congress are evident from U.S. House of Representative letters to President Clinton on the NAFTA trucking issue dated 4 April 1997 and 2 July 1999.

[160] See Thomas J. Courchene with Colin R. Telmer, *From Heartland to North American Region State: The Social, Fiscal and Federal Evolution of Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Faculty of Management, Monograph Series on Public Policy, 1998), pp. 268-74.

Steven Erie has referred to three necessary conditions for binational cooperation on transportation issues which are highly relevant for both Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana: belief in a common destiny, leadership, and patience.[161] In some respects the destinies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada may seem to be anything but common. Both Mexico and Canada have concerns about maintaining a degree of sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States, and Mexico's status as a developing country clearly differentiates it from industrial states such as the U.S. and Canada. In an age of NAFTA and competing trade blocs, however, the three North American states have much to gain by cooperation. At the regional level, there are additional reasons for cooperation. Seattle, Vancouver, San Diego, and Tijuana are all middle-range cities which individually cannot compete with larger North American cities such as Los Angeles and New York in developing transport infrastructure, a large consumer market, and economies of scale in production. The subnational governments in the Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana regions can only achieve the size critical for becoming more competitive by joining forces and cooperating. For example, Seattle and Vancouver have a natural advantage in sea and air transport over Los Angeles because they are closer to Japan and other parts of the Asia Pacific. Without cooperating in developing a multimodal transport system where trains and trucks can move rapidly between seaports and airports, this advantage will be of little benefit to the region. Effective leadership is a second requirement for improving cross-border transport. In Cascadia, "no Governor or Premier has stepped forward to provide the political leadership involved ... in developing the institutional mechanisms necessary to further the concept"; and "the heart of the problem" in San Diego-Tijuana also "is that *somebody* has to lead."[162] Existing governmental agencies tend to have clearly delimited authority, and are reluctant to engage in decision-making in areas such as cross-border planning which are outside their mandates. On the other hand, they are often resistant to the establishment of new transborder agencies that might infringe on their territory. As for elected officials, voters generally are not aware of the potential benefits of cross-border cooperation, and there is little political reward for politicians to pursue a cross-border agenda. Although nongovernmental group in both regions have developed innovative proposals for improving transport policies and infrastructure, effective leadership by major governmental actors in each region is essential if such proposals are to be implemented. Despite the problems with effective leadership, there are indications that political leaders are emerging who are willing to take effective action and propose innovative ideas. In Cascadia, for example, B.C. and Washington State (which have often lagged behind private actors) recently agreed to set up a new joint task to improve cross-border transportation; and in San Diego-Tijuana, a California State Senator has proposed that a multimodal transit center be established which would preserve "the sense of neighborhood" in San Diego, and at the same time contribute to economic competitiveness in the region.[163]

Finally, patience is required because cross-border relationships and institutions develop only gradually. State/provincial and municipal governments also have only limited financial resources for cross-border ventures,

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[161] Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," pp. 29-30.
[162] Artibise, "Cascadian Adventures," p. 25; Erie, "Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region," p. 25.
[163] Interview with California State Senator Steve Peace in *San Diego Dialogue Report* 2-10 (September, 1999), p. 9.

and sometimes are involved in disputes (such as the fisheries dispute in Cascadia) that seriously interfere with progress on cross-border transport issues. Patience in developing a rapid, efficient transportation system is, however, a "virtue", because the rewards in terms of competitiveness and development of cross-border regions such as Cascadia and San Diego-Tijuana can be great.

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CONFLICTING TRANSBORDER VISIONS AND AGENDAS: ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASCADIANS

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In North America, considerable attention is being paid to north-south border regions as they serve as sites for new forms of transnational economic, environmental, social and political interaction. These regional processes are heavily influenced by business groups, environmental non-governmental organization (NGOs), and a wide array of civic officials. One area of North America where regional processes are well advanced is the Pacific Northwest/western Canada transborder region that has come to be know as "Cascadia." Rapid population growth and economic expansion, fueled by the high tech economies of the west coast and driven by Pacific Rim and other international trade, has stimulated new thinking about partnerships that transcend the border. While always an area with considerable cross-border interaction, increased interdependencies within Cascadia have focused considerable attention on this north-south transboundary region. Particular attention has been given to regional economic development, environmental protection, transportation, border crossings and other issues related to the notion of sustainability. A number of cross-border alliances and partnerships have been formed and notions of a "Cascadia economy" and a "Cascadia bioregion" have increasingly caught the attention of journalists and policy makers across North America and in Europe.

This paper examines various notions of Cascadia and the ways in which transboundary cooperation and activity in this region is manifesting itself. The paper discusses many of the transboundary linkages that have formed and how they relate to one another. Of note in the case of Cascadia is the relative lack of development of operational models for the organization and management of transboundary cooperation. Although there are many governmental and private cross-border linkages, the scope and depth of institutionalization is minimal. In part this is due to the relatively late (compared to Europe and the Great Lakes and Atlantic regions of North America) onset of cross-border activity by subnational entities in the Pacific west. Until recently, the BC government rejected formalized ties with its American neighbors for ideological as well as economic self-interest reasons (Johannson 1978; Groen 1994). Further, region-building in Cascadia, unlike in European cross-border regions, has not been defined and nurtured in a broader national or continental context. Research findings indicate that transboundary environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to be effective when national and regional authorities work collaboratively (Hodge and West 1998). For mostly political reasons, neither Ottawa nor Washington, D.C. have expressed support for, or even a great deal of interest in, Cascadia initiatives. In turn, Cascadians have approached cross-border relations with a "go-it-

alone" attitude. Indeed, officials and activists in the region tend to be suspicious of federal authority and generally regard federal institutions as distant, meddlesome and unhelpful (Alper 1997).

Research has shown there are at least three sets of factors that are influential in transboundary "region building." First, cross-border regions are viewed as vehicles for promoting socio-economic cohesion in areas plagued by historical conflicts or disparities in incomes and living standards (Cappellin 1994; Scott 1998). Second, transboundary economic regions are part of the logic of the new global economy where business and trade interests are not coincident with historical borders (Ohmae 1993; Agnew and Pascall 1997). Third, increasing awareness of ecological interdependencies have given rise to ecosystem, as opposed to traditional juirisdictional, approaches to managing resource and environmental issues (Drost and Brooks 1998; Young 1998; Blatter 1996). The Cascadia regional movement, which involves two nations with a history of harmonious relations and relative equality in standard of living, is best understood in the context of economic and environmental factors. In Cascadia the main drivers of regionalization are economic and environmental interests. These interests are functional in nature and generally not in alignment in terms of vision and goals. Although the normative goal of sustainability has the potential for integrating these visions and agendas, business and environmental Cascadians have found little common ground and, for the most part, have operated within their own domains. As Blatter (1996) points out, most cross-border institutional connections in Cascadia thus far have been sectoral. Cross-border integration within sectors (environmmental or economic) is much easier to achieve than cross-sectoral integration. Further, the Cascadia movement, centered in these functional areas, has not connected with other important groups such as labor, cultural entities and tribes/First Nations, nor has it penetrated the general public. In short, a Cascadia transboundary mindset has not developed.

THE IDEA OF CASCADIA

The idea of a Cascadia region derives from both geography and history. Geographically, Cascadia is made coherent by rainforests and mountain ranges which follow a north-south grid and a system of major rivers which flow east to west into the Pacific Ocean. Prior to European settlement, a common Native American culture pervaded the area. In the 19th century the area known today as BC, Washington and Oregon was controlled by the Hudson's Bay Company and later the Oregon Country extended across today's national boundaries. The isolation of BC in the western corner of North America, and its links with the Pacific states, helped shape an identity remote from central Canada. Permeability of the Canada-U.S. border, whether reflected by American miners going north in the 19th century or Canadians today travelling south to Washington state and Oregon in search of recreation land and more favorably priced goods, has reinforced perceptions of region. More recently, the upsurge of environmentalism and free trade have highlighted a new raison d' etre for permeability. Finally, the idea of Cascadia has been advanced by the centrifugal tendencies in both federal systems where both federal capitals in Washington. D.C. and Ottawa are seen as remote from, and uninterested in the affairs of the Pacific west.

The name Cascadia comes from waterfalls and rivers that flow from the Cascade mountain range to the sea. It implies a major element in the region's identity—spectacular natural beauty, strong environmental consciousness and distinctive northwest landscape and lifestyle. Geographically, the core of the region is the binational coastal corridor that extends north-south from Vancouver Island, to Portland, Oregon, and west-east from the Pacific to the Cascade and Coast Range mountains. This growing areas of approximately 7 million, anchored by three major cities—Vancouver, BC, Seattle and Portland—is the economic and culture center of the region. Within the corridor lie the shared transboundary marine waters of Georgia Basin and Puget Sound, as well as rivers, freshwater aquifers and wilderness areas that bisect the border.

As an economic region, Cascadia's vitality and global potential is linked to the new information economy and the region's cultural and trade ties to the Pacific Rim.

From an ecology perspective, the Cascadia identity is rooted in the unifying nature of the natural environment in which boundaries are defined in bioregional as opposed to political terms. The Cascadia bioregion is an ecological unit which encompasses the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound inland sea (Salish Sea), the rain forests of Vancouver Island and the Olympic Peninsula and the wilderness perimeter that includes the Coast Range mountains to the east and north of Vancouver and the Cascade range to the south in Washington and Oregon. Integral to the bioregion are the major watersheds that drain into the Pacific Ocean.

A more profound view of Cascadia rejects the traditional notion of spatial jurisdiction, and instead emphasizes patterns of functional interactions, connections and networks that are said to be reconstituting cultural and political life in the Pacific Northwest of North America and elsewhere. (Walker 1999). According to this view, connections and networks are more important in creating commonalities than traditional political jurisdictions. In effect, this view defines Cascadia not as territory but as a web of socio-cultural interdependencies which guide and structure community life.

Definitions of Cascadia vary according to academic and media perspectives and the interests of different groups pursuing regional goals. For the most part, these groups can be divided into business-oriented alliances and environmental activists. Although both have transborder agendas, their interests and goals are quite different.

BUSINESS ORIENTED CASCADIANS: A BRIEF SUMMARY

Although the idea of Cascadia implies commonalities related to culture, geography, environment and economy, business and economic imperatives have been the main drivers of transnational regionalism. The idea of economically integrated cross border regions as necessary elements in the new global economy is well established in Europe. In North America, scholars and policy makers are studying and promoting cross border relationships as inevitable components of a new trilateral continentalism as well as globalism (Earle and Wirth 1996). As free trade agreements have increased transnational interactions and interdependencies, greater attention has been focused on the advantages to be realized from economic cooperation by regional actors on both

sides of the border. Research indicates that economic development interests are the principal stimuli to transborder cooperation (Hansen 1983; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). Economic development actors in Cascadia include business councils, firms, public-private alliances and government officials.

THE CASCADIA PROJECT

Of all the business-oriented Cascadia initiatives, the Cascadia Project is the most visible and active. The Cascadia Project was begun in the early 1990s as a "strategic plan for environmentally sound economic development and urban management in the Cascadia transborder corridor" (Agnew 1992). The goal was to demonstrate the possibilities for sustainable development in a still unspoiled urban area experiencing rapid growth. A Cascadia Task Force, led by a former U.S. congressman from Washington State, was formed as the instrument to bring together a coalition of regional leaders to promote cooperative economic, transportation and growth management initiatives. The original plan was to create a binational "Cascadia Corridor Commision" to manage binational issues and serve as a kind of early warning system for regional conflicts. The commission idea went nowhere largely because of fears in the BC government that the scheme was "politically dangerous" and "too American" (Artibise 1996, 32).

Despite its somewhat rocky start, the Cascadia Project has taken the lead on numerous cross border initiatives, and especially ones related to transportation and border infrastructure. Numerous public-private alliances among business groups and state, provincial federal and municipal governments agencies have been created. These include a Cascadian Mayor's Council involving 19 mayors from Oregon, Washington and BC; the Cascadia Metropolitan Forum linking Portland, Seattle and Vancouver; the Cascadia Border Working Group, an alliance of officials from counties adjacent to the border; and the International Mobility and Trade Corridor project (ITMC), a coalition of county, state and federal agencies focused on upgrading transportation infrastructure that co-joins Canada and the U.S. The Cascadia Project operates under the auspices of the Discovery Institute, a conservative think tank in Seattle. Its Canadian partner, the Cascadia Institute, is located in Vancouver, B.C.

Today, the top priority of the Cascadia Project is improved transportation throughout the corridor. The Project's leading initiative, called "Connecting the Gateways and Trade Corridors" is an attempt to mobilize support for an ambitious regional transportation system—to link ports, freeways and railways—from Portland to Vancouver, BC (Chapman, et al. 1999). Part of this is a proposed fast train that would speed freight and passengers up and down the I-5 Corridor. To fund this ambitious regional project, Discovery Institute officials have proposed a Cascadia Corridor Development Bank that would oversee a $100 billion, 20 year rebuild of the roads and bridges in the Interstate 5 corridor—Cascadia's 465-mile "Main Street" (Goldsmith 1999). The binational corporation would be a cooperative alliance of the numerous levels of government throughout the corridor. To date, regional heavyweights such as Boeing, Weyerhauser, McCaw and area ports have endorsed the project and some federal transportation funding has been

secured. However, the specifics of a regional transportation plan are mired in state and provincial politics and as a result liitle progress has been made.

Another priority of the Cascadia Project is finding ways to speed up border crossings—especially for commercial traffic. The north-south I-5/Hwy 99 corridor is the second busiest Canada-U.S. crossing. Growth in commercial crossings is about 10 percent per year. Pilot projects involving pre-clearance and the utilization of technology to speed truck inspections at the land border and freight handling at ports are examples of changes instituted due to effective political work by the Cascadia Project. In addition, the Cascadia Project, working through the Cascadia Border Working Group, has engaged in an active lobbying effort opposing U.S. congressional attempts to impose a border fee and led the effort to make permanent dedicated commuter lanes (Artibise 1996).

Promotion of regional tourism is also a major goal of the Cascadia Project. Glossy maps, brochures and web sites promote Cascadia as the "Gateway to the Pacific Northwest" and the "Two Nation Vacation". Recently, the Cascadia Project was a strong backer of the effort to bring the Olympic Games to Seattle, with events to be sited from B.C. to Oregon. Tourism is a rapidly growing industry in the region and also a very competitive one. Close cooperation between BC and Washington state tourist officials is problematic because of this competition.

PACIFIC NORTHWEST ECONOMIC REGION (PNWER)

Another version of Cascadia extends the territorially boundaries to encompass much of the Pacific Northwest and western Canada. Known as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), this regional entity is an organization of legislators and businesspersons from five states, (Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Alaska) two provinces (British Columbia and Alberta) and one territory (Yukon). The organization is unique in that it has institutionalized representation and dues-based funding from provincial and state governments. PNWER grew out of a 1989 conference of BC, Alberta and Pacific Northwest legislators following the signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988. Its goal was to promote economic development and trade abroad and within the cross-border region (Blatter 1996). The main work of the organization, in addition to trade promotion, has been fostering cooperation within industry sectors through nine working groups: agriculture, environment, export, forest products, government procurement, recycling, telecommunications, tourism and transportation.

In concept and organization, PNWER resembles what Kenichi Ohmae (1993), calls a "natural global economic zone." According to Ohmae, such zones are characterized by the presence of a geographically coherent internal market, usually involving parts of more than one country, where there exists common economic and environmental interests, and large ports which provide links with the global economy. The idea underlying the Pacific Northwest Economic Region is that by rationalizing linkages among the region's economies, the regional entity as a whole could be situated to compete as a major world economic force in the 21st century. There is a strong feeling within PNWER that the respective federal governments have not done enough for regional exports and thus the region needs to take action on its own behalf (Artibise 1996). As one

PNWER booster said, "we want to sell the Northwest as the best place to get environmental technology; through working together, we can more effectively market our products to Asia, the EC and the rest of the world."

Although well funded and successful in such areas as helping exporters develop new markets, PNWER's effectiveness as a regional institution has been hampered by its unwieldy size and internal conflict about its focus and mission. Some question whether it makes any sense to think of PNWER as a region at all given its size and internal heterogeneity.

In 1999, PNWER commissioned a group of regionalist thinkers from outside the organization to set out a vision for PNWER in the 21st century (Periwal 1999). A key recommendations of the report was that PNWER could be most effective as an inclusive arena—a "neural network"—for fostering dialogue on concerns common to Pacific Northwest states and western Canada. The report suggested that PNWER should model itself as more than an economic development group. The report highlighted the need for a regional organization equipped to bring together diverse constituencies and to consider environmental, economic and social issues as mutually reinforcing, rather than as categories in opposition.

PNWER's self evaluation is significant for the debate about the future of the region. Clearly, with a funding base and representation from 8 governments, PNWER can and often does have a strong voice on regional issues. So too, it has been an effective lobbying voice on issues of common interests to the businesses in the extended region. Whether an organization made-up primarily of businesspersons and politicians can be seen as a legitimate forum for developing alternative initiatives in areas such as environment, education, immigration and labor remains to be seen.

PACIFIC CORRIDOR ENTERPRISE COUNCIL (PACE)

Another example of regional economic cooperation is the Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council (PACE), a private sector business group involving more than 200 managers, owners and entrepreneurs in the two-nation region. PACE was inspired by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA. Its goal is to foster free trade throughout the region, including California and Mexico. PACE works closely with boards of trade and chambers of commerce throughout Cascadia.

The business Cascadians have been successful in creating alliances of local, state and federal officials who, with support from business groups, have focused attention on the logic of enhanced cross-border linkages and cooperation, especially in the transportation area. Yet political boundaries remain entrenched and funding for joint projects has been all but non-existent. From the Canadian side, with an historical sensitivity to the binational power imbalance, expanded linkages almost always heighten fears of "American influence." In recent years, regional and national politics has intruded to confound cross-border relationships in the Cascadia region. Disagreements over salmon have prompted nasty incidents such as Canada's imposition of a "licensing fee" on Alaska-bound U.S. fishers in 1995, and a provincial.

government-supported blockade by B.C. fishers of an Alaskan ferry in Prince Rupert in 1997. On the U.S. side, cross border harmony has not been helped by congress' passage of immigration legislation that, if implemented, would severely tighten border controls. The weight of binational political relations in Cascadia serves as a drag on the forces of integration. Functional linkages have proliferated but the border continues to serve as a barrier to closer regional cooperation. A Vancouver Sun columnist noted that despite nearly a decade of effort by the Cascadia Project and affiliated groups, the border inhibits interaction as least as much now as it did prior to enactment of North American free trade agreements (Nagle 1999).

A FRAMEWORK FOR STATE-PROVINCE COORDINATION: THE BC/WASHINGTON CORRIDOR TASK FORCE

The efforts to improve cross-border mobility and develop an efficient north-south transportation corridor have provided a unifying theme to the Cascadia movement. North-south integration, accelerated by NAFTA, has focused increasing attention on the movement of freight between the corridor states of Oregon and Washington and British Columbia, and even Alberta, Idaho and further south to Mexico. While the Cascadia Project has focused on the Interstate-5 coastal corridor, the idea of an inland north-south freight corridor has become popular with politicians who represent interior constituencies, and those concerned about greater congestion in the Cascadia main street area. The inland corridor idea was the catalyst that led to the formation of the B.C.-Washington Corridor Task Force in 1998 (Burke 1999). The task force, co-chaired by high ranking provincial and state political officials, established terms of reference focused on improving border infrastructure, developing transportation corridors, coordinating state-provincial tourism, and promising binational cooperation to foster sustainability in the marine environment of the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound and the built environment surrounding it.

Although it is too early to assess the impact of the task force, it represents an effort to provide some level of institutional framework, involving provincial and state policy leaders, for dealing with regional issues. In this regard, the task force, backed by the top political leadership in the province and state, has the potential to raise the profile of "region building" projects, and establish sustained leadership on binational issues.

ENVIRONMENTAL CASCADIANS

In recent years, a great deal of attention has focused on environmental protection and restoration in the rapidly growing Cascadia corridor. Growth rates in the Seattle-Tacoma and Vancouver urban areas have been among the highest of metropolitan areas in Canada and the U.S. The resulting ecological impacts such as habitat loss, declining air and water quality, traffic congestion and loss of farmland have prompted calls for new forms of cooperation, management and planning processes.

Within the Cascadia region, environmental management agreements and institutions have evolved since the 1980s. The current transboundary governance framework includes the geographically focused BC-Washington Environmental Cooperation Council, regional

institutions focused on specific issues such as the Pacific Salmon Commission and the State/BC Oil Spill Task Force, non-governmental alliances, and bilateral partnerships linking provincial, state and federal eco-system initiatives on either side of the border.

In terms of fostering cross-border environmental cooperation, the most important agreement to date is the B.C./Washington Environmental Cooperation Agreement, signed between B.C. and Washington State in 1992. The agreement formed a unique binational coordinating body, the BC/WA Environmental Cooperation Council.

B.C./WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION COUNCIL

A major oil spill off the Washington coast in 1991, which polluted beaches in both Washington and B.C., focused attention on the need for further and deeper cross-border collaboration on environmental issues. In 1992, Washington governor Booth Gardner and B.C. premier Mike Harcourt signed an Environmental Cooperation Agreement pledging both governments to cooperate to preserve the shared environment.

The Agreement created a B.C./WA Environmental Cooperation Council (ECC) chaired by high level provincial and state officials. The Council is composed of the Director of the Washington Department of Ecology and the Deputy Minister of the BC Ministry of Environment, Land and Parks, as well as observers from federal agencies in both countries. The Council reports to the governor and premier. Meetings are held twice each year. The Council's mandate includes marine and freshwater issues, air shed management and Columbia River water quality. To carry out its mandate, the Council has created five task forces to coordinate work in five priority areas: air quality, aquifer contamination, river flooding which spills over the border, contamination of the Columbia River and protection and restoration of the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound (Salish Sea).

The council's purposes are twofold: to coordinate action on common environmental issues and to provide an institutionalized forum for communication among the parties (Alley 1998). Task forces and their work groups deal with specific issues and scientific research has been fostered through commissioned research and conferences.

In 1997, ECC activities were disrupted by the U.S.-Canada salmon dispute. When BC fishers blockaded a U.S. ferry boat in July, 1997, Premier Glen Clark suspended B.C. participation in ECC meetings. Resumption of council meetings did not occur until October, 1998.

The ECC has worked well to improve cross-border communication among environmental actors, including government officials, NGOs and academics. It has sponsored the most comprehensive scientific study of the quality of the shared waters. It has provided a framework for the signing of specific agreements and MOUs covering air quality issues, marine spill prevention in the shared marine waters, pollution issues involving the Columbia River, and contamination of an aquifer than spans the border. Another ECC success is a joint monitoring project to assess fish contamination in the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound waters.

The ECC was designed to be a "coordinating" and "information sharing" body. In this regard, it has provided a badly needed framework for highlighting problems and developing common strategies for dealing with environmental issues.

However, as a regional organization, the ECC has lacked the authority to engage in planning or management of the transboundary environment. It is essentially a coordinating body without legally or policy based instruments for implementing environmental management. The question that has been raised by the critics of the ECC is whether the ECC process is the equivalent of "talk and log." NGO groups have become especially impatient with the lack of real progress in building a process where truly binational environmental problem solving can occur.

The ECC is limited by a lack of authority to make and enforce rules. Neither Washington State nor B.C. has given up decision making power to this regional organization. Even if there existed the political will to do so, it would be difficult, if not impossible, given the mix of federal, provincial and state jurisdictional authorities involved. The council has also been hampered by the unwillingness of political officials, especially in Canada, to commit designated funding to support the council (Alley 1998).

TRANSBOUNDARY NGOS

Environmental non-governmental organizations increasingly have become major players in cross-border regions. In Cascadia, the major groups are the People for Puget Sound, Georgia Strait Alliance and the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance. In 1995, the People for Puget Sound and the Georgia Strait Alliance joined together to form the Sounds and Straits Coalition. The coalition links numerous groups from around the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound bioregion. The work of the coalition and other environmental NGOs emphasize research, education, information sharing, advocacy, and issue analysis. There are also numerous unaffiliated, locally based organization scattered throughout the region.

Despite a strong and active network of NGOs throughout the Cascadia region, NGO transboundary activity is not well developed. Most environmental interest groups are focused on their own province, state or country. Trade agreements like the NAFTA have encouraged a good deal of cross border NGO mobilization, but the arena in which this activity occurs is more often national and continental than regional (Schwartz 1998). Transnational cooperation among environmental NGOs, tends to be protective and defensive. NGO groups are most effective when responding to highly focused issues and crises. In short, most environmental activists are not regionalists; instead they coalesce to exert pressure on governments, businesses and public opinion in the pursuit of objectives tied to national governments and multilateral trade organizations.

The different political and legal institutions in the two countries also serve as a constraint on cross-border NGO cooperation. The cross-border region is an abstraction as far as conventional politics is concerned. There is little incentive for NGOs to expend energy and resources where

they cannot affect votes or legislative decisions. For NGOs, perhaps more than economic organizations, the border is a formidable obstacle to building coherent regional organizations.

Further, environmental NGOs in Cascadia have lacked the citizen base and financial resources needed to focus and enhance public interest in the region as a whole. Hodge and West (1998) point out that the Cascadia bioregion lacks an organization equivalent to Great lakes United (GLU), a formal binational citizens' coalition that includes member groups of environmentalists, sports persons, labor and civic organizations from the Great Lakes states, Ontario and Quebec.

BIOREGIONAL INITIATIVES

Basin wide approaches to environmental management and sustainability have been a mainstay in Canada since the 1980s. A series of initiatives directed at the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound bioregion have been launched by provincial and federal governments to facilitate cooperation among levels of government and stakeholders. These include the Georgia Basin Initiative, Fraser River Management Program, Fraser River Action Plan, Fraser River Estuary Management Plan, the Burrard Inlet Environmental Action Plan , the Georgia Basin Ecosystem Initiative and the Fraser Basin Council. Although none of these initiatives have been explicitly transboundary in design, recognition that ecosystems do not respect borders has invited transboundary participation and perspectives. This was the central theme of a 1999 conference in Vancouver, BC, "Basin Forum: A Workshop Focusing on the Georgia Basin and Puget Sound," that urged closer transboundary collaboration to achieve a more livable Georgia Basin/Puget Sound bioregion. While governments, burdened by constituency and funding pressures, will continue to find it difficult to make transboundary work a priority, they are increasingly finding it difficult to ignore.

GEORGIA BASIN ECOSYSTEM INITIATIVE

This initiative, prompted by the Canadian federal government, explicitly recognizes the transboundary nature of the Lower Fraser/Georgia Basin area. The area has been designated as a top priority within the whole of western Canada because of its projected growth, current levels of habitat loss and worsening air quality in the Lower Mainland region (Hildebrand, et al. 1997). Still in the planning stage, once implemented this initiative is intended to coordinate the work of federal agencies with the B.C. government in promoting sustainability in the shared Fraser Basin-Georgia Basin-Puget Sound ecosystem.

PUGET SOUND ACTION TEAMCFRASER BASIN COUNCIL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

In 1999 the Puget Sound Action Team, which has responsibility for overseeing the protection of Puget Sound water quality in Washington state, signed an MOU with the Fraser Basin Council, charged with responsibility for promoting sustainability in the Fraser Basin. The agreement explicitly made reference to the similar goals of the two organizations with respect to water quality and biological well-being of the Fraser Basin and the Puget Sound. Most importantly,

the agreement committed the two organizations to cooperate to develop strategies to improve the quality of the shared ecosystem. The agreement also provided for annual binational meetings of the two organizations.

TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE PROTECTED AREAS

A coalition of Canadian and U.S. environmental groups, including the People for Puget Sound and the Georgia Strait Alliance, have proposed a series of transboundary marine protected areas in the U.S. San Juan and Canadian Gulf Islands. Ecologically stressed marine areas and islands, on both sides of the border, would be designated protected areas. The strategy has been to develop the scientific grounding and then work with constituent groups (island residents, fishers, aboriginal groups) to build a consensus, before engaging the respective governments. As a grass-roots, bottom-up process, the Marine Protected Area campaign has the advantage of being well-focused and less entangled in the complex jurisdictional politics at the state, provincial and federal levels. This initiative, if successful, could serve as a model to inform the public and help legitimate cross-border cooperation. Efforts to organize collaboration focused on the whole of the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound bioregion have proven to be extremely difficult given that no single problem is the focus of attention and end-results are not clear cut and most often long-term in their realization. Although gaining protected area status for a group of islands is quite a different political challenge than saving an ecosystem, the transboundary marine protected areas initiative could be an interesting model for environmental regionalism.

ASSESSMENT

This paper has surveyed transboundary interactions and the factors shaping the dynamics of cross-border cooperation in Cascadia. Of interest is the extent to which Cascadia regional processes are structuring and organizing transboundary cooperation on behalf of a coherent regional agenda. The normative goal of sustainability is a central point of reference in the debates about direction and objectives in Cascadia. Although numerous "sustainability projects" have emerged—many with cross-border implications—there is little evidence these initiatives have become the basis for a "region-wide" agenda or for cooperative actions. Different political and legal systems, historical sensitivities and competing domestic political considerations related to resource and other cross-border issues have hampered efforts to articulate a common regional vision and develop the structure and processes needed for cooperation. Interestingly, the Cascadia experience suggests that political jurisdictions are highly resistant to the "border-eroding" effects of global and regional exchanges. In fact, it appears that increased cross-border interactions often serve to strengthen, not weaken, the binary qualities of the border. Intensification of the flow of cross-border interactions, especially those perceived to be undesireable (economic competition, drugs, certain immigrants) increases the pressure on political jurisdictions to reinforce barriers rather than tear them down. In short, despite the increased interdependencies generated by the activities of Cascadia groups, the barrier effect of provincial and state jurisdictions remains relatively intact.

Perhaps most important, Cascadia represents a struggle between visions which are incompatible, if not contradictory. The economic visions advanced by the Cascadia project and PNWER are pro-growth, although moderated by the espousal of sustainable development, and are in favor of freer trade. The bioregional visions are generally anti-growth and either neutral or opposed to strategies aimed at enhancing the region's trade potential. Business actors are hoping to achieve the critical mass for competing in continental and global markets. This requires building and streamlining infrastructure (especially transportation and border crossings) and lobbying on behalf of private sector interests. For them, a major goal is to promote the region in the global economy, and especially across the Pacific and in Europe. Environmental actors have different agendas, most of which are aimed at managing growth, preserving biodiversity and protecting and restoring the region's natural environment.

What the Cascadia visions have in common are transboundary perspectives that emphasize interdependencies and favor cooperative regional actions. These perspectives, however, contain values that are in opposition. On the one hand, economic Cascadians wish to shape the region in accordance with the borderless global economy. In contrast, the bioregional Cascadians call for a primary focus on conserving place and community. As the bioregionalist Patrick Mazza (1997) put it, "The issue comes down to focus and values. How do we envision our region, as a marketing district or a watershed; a marketplace or life place."

These conflicting visions have ensured, at least so far, that most cross-border connections (both informal and institutional) are sectoral. In a very real sense, the economic and environmental groups that work across the border operate in separate ideological arenas, having little if any contact with their Cascadian counterparts. This lack of convergence across sectoral boundaries discourages broader cross-border cooperation and constrains the regional conversation.

Essentially, Cascadia involves a wide variety of activities and frameworks for gathering and sharing information. Although Cascadia has spawned new patterns of functional interaction, new forms of cross-border governance and policy coordination are noticeably lacking. Nor have fora or processes evolved for democratic conversations about the future of the region. Cross-border activity tends to be sectorally-based, bottom-up, problem-oriented and for the most part exclusive (the voices of labor, native groups and human rights organizations are conspicuously absent in the Cascadia dialogue). Whether this web of interactions can be translated into a coherent approach for fostering a more sustainable border region remains to be seen.

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PERMEABLE BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: FEELING AT HOME AMIDST GLOBAL POVERTY? [164]

Mathew Coleman

> Space is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced...
> Though a product to be used, to be consumed, [space] is also a means of production;
> networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are
> determined by it (Lefebvre 1991: 85).

The cover illustration on the December 1994 issue of the Atlantic Monthly may be read as a map, replete with borders, fears of (in)security, and what has been understood as a "pervasive . . . search for a lasting and stable order, for a resilient architecture that might withstand the assaults and erosions of temporal change, unexpected dangers and volatile fortunes" (Walker 1993a: 3). The journal's provocative artwork depicts a white male – sporting an apron embroidered with the phrase 'Home Sweet Home' – barbecuing hot dogs in a well-kept, uncluttered backyard. The man is glancing disconcertedly over his right shoulder, beyond the limits of his bordered real-estate. Outside and pressed against the fenced-in backyard is an ambiguous and seemingly chaotic crowd of onlookers, contrasted *en masse* – as dark and disorganized – against the orderly white picket fence lining the borders of the affluent property (Dalby 1996b: 487).

Any ambiguity presented in the Atlantic Monthly cover art is quickly clarified in the opening paragraphs of Matthew Connolly and Paul Kennedy's related piece, entitled 'Must It Be The Rest Against The West?' A quote from Jean Raspail's The Camp of the Saints, detailing a fictitious oceanic pilgrimage of thousands of Calcutta's most desperate and impoverished to Europe's shores, reproduces the cover's imagined theme and introduces the article:

> [I]t was like trying to count all the trees in the forest, those arms raised high in the air, waving and shaking
> together, all outstretched toward the nearby shore. Scraggy branches, brown and black, *quickened by a breath of*

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hope. All bare, those fleshless Ghandi-arms . . . thirty thousand creatures on a single ship (quoted in Connolly and Kennedy 1994: 61; emphasis added).

The cover art – in conjunction with this controversial excerpt – initiates an interesting account of politics under conditions of global environmental change. The homogenous and nameless crowd both at the picket fence and on the decks of ships of Indian origin are, to borrow from Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, "environmental refugees" displaced by ecological degradations and change driven by the consumptive lifestyles of "omnivores" located largely in the North (Guha and Gadgil 1995, Dalby 1998a). The complexity of Guha and Gadgil's formulation – key to a critical rereading of the Atlantic Monthly's cover art – is, however, not the concern of this particular article: the difficulties of interrogating ecological degradation and migration are subsumed by the neat white picket fence polarity. In this sense, despite Guha and Gadgil's assertion that environmental refugees are not unrelated to Western suburban affluence, the artwork makes difficult an understanding of the flows present between the nomadic mob and the fenced-in homeowner. Indeed, in drawing from Raspail's novel and asking 'must it be the Rest against the West?', Connolly and Kennedy, rather than detail exchanges across the picket fence, frame politics in distinctly bordered terms: politics is captured as a spatialized fear of those 'inside' and aspiration of those 'outside' (Dalby 1996b: 487). This facilitates an understanding of the artwork as a conventional realist inter-national map itemizing supposedly distinct peoples, environments, and politics.

The textual script/legend accompanying the artwork/map makes clear this sense of disconnectedness: "Whether it's racist fantasy or realist concern, it's a question that won't go away: As population and misery increase, *will the wretched of the earth overwhelm the Western paradise*?" Accordingly, the artwork/map presents migration as a socio-political problem and consumption as a socio-political norm, and fails to highlight the specifically political-ecological flows linking migration and consumption – flows which clearly render suspect a claim that idealized consumptive (Western) lifestyles are not the pressing political issue at stake when considering both the movement of people and ecological degradation. Of note is how this account of affluence, migration, and ecology speaks in the familiar language of borders and sovereignty: it is notably the candidly presented fear generated by a challenge to sovereign subjectivities, socialities, and securities which demonstrates the currency and supposedly intuitive bordered character of both natural environments and socio-political community (Dalby 1997b, Dalby and Mackenzie 1997).

A similar mapping is discernible in recent reports concerning boats of migrating Chinese nationals reaching Canadian shores. A quick look at the August 14th 1999 edition of Canada's national The Globe and Mail demonstrates the currency of the white picket fence script. The front page story announces that a boat "overflowing with Chinese criminals" en route from Lithuania is expected shortly on Canada's east coast (Mitrovica and Armstrong: A1). In the piece, Canadian immigration officials suggest that the "recent flood" of Chinese migrants – note the easy translation from criminals to migrants – should help bolster Canadian immigration procedures and bring Canadian refugee laws in line with the "expedited removal" laws currently practiced south of the border (A3). In the same edition, another piece suggests that Canada is the "soft underbelly" of the United States, alternatively referred to as a "mythical land of plenty . . . known to millions of Chinese as Gold Mountain, the place where you get rich" (Cheney: A3). Finally, in the letters-to-the-editor section – tellingly entitled

'Anger Over the Illegals' – three self-affirmed Canadians lament the recent arrival of the Chinese migrants/refugees/criminals. One letter suggests that Canada should be concerned with illegal immigration because resources for "deserving Canadians" are being unfairly redirected towards unexpected illegal migrants (D11). Another letter suggests that the Canadian government "had better start redirecting a lot of money to immigration because the whole world will be getting into boats" (D11). The last letter berates Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan's refusal to turn back the boatloads of Chinese nationals. The letter's author suggests that the current "abandonment of traditional immigration standards" – identified as Briton and European – is leading Canada towards "insoluble social and economic problems and ultimately the disintegration of the country as we know it" (D11).

The question asked by Connolly and Kennedy in the 1994 Atlantic Monthly article –will the wretched of the earth overwhelm the Western paradise? – is clearly the issue at stake in these articles and letters. Much as dark brown faces are pitted against the soon-to-be-marred suburban ideal in Connolly and Kennedy's Raspailian essay, The Globe and Mail's recent coverage of Chinese migration – as well as popular responses to this coverage – evidently turns on the encounter of Chinese "criminals" with Canada, the "soft underbelly" of "Gold Mountain". And as with the Atlantic Monthly's interrogation of migration in an era of globalization, migration is presented as a socio-political problem and Canadian affluence as a socio-political norm, and little is said of the specifically consumptive transborder flows which confound the easy contrast drawn between criminal Chinese and vulnerable Canadians – an apparent attempt to read complex geographical realities in terms of reified entities and (threatened) stable spatial metaphors (Dalby 1996b).

Arguably then, such sketches of the ecological degradation-migration dilemma may be perceived as an interesting foray into the politics of space, ecological degradation, and "geo-graphy" – the writing of human spaces according to physical places, what Ó Tuathail refers to as "not a noun but a verb . . . an [ambitious] earth-writing . . . [organized] to fit [particular] cultural visions and material interests" (1996a: 2). The focus on writing – on scripting – human lives and experiences in spatialized terms is of central importance. The question here, in fact, asks how it is that spatial form (the backyard, for example) organizes people and various (particularly consumptive) activities of the everyday. Following this, a really quite simple query takes shape: how might particular spatialities "act to encourage some thoughts and discourage others . . . [telling] us *what and who belong where*"? (Cresswell 1996: 334) This path of inquiry encourages the student of issues of ecological origin to give thought to how spatial imaginings might author, order, and authorize the *quotidien* (Sibley 1998), and consequently, to how the "geographical interpretation of [spatial] metaphors as they are thought and acted out in the realms of politics and ideology do much to delineate the praxis of everyday life" (Cresswell 1996: 343).

It is in this sense that a Lefebvrian reconstitution of spatial metaphor as corporeal (bodily) practice is compelling, for if white picket fences, for example, can be re-presented not as unquestionable elements of physical space, but rather as the diacritics of a socially produced and reproduced arena, rendered unsettled are the specific representations of ecological degradation empowered by the white picket fence script. In turn, a tradition of security writings which, arguably, provide the basis for Connolly and Kennedy's understanding of ecological degradation in demographic terms may be usefully engaged. Accordingly, in following a path borne by studies not normally juxtaposed with one

another (studies of society and space and scarcity-conflict literatures), it should be possible to, first, contest demographically-concerned scarcity-conflict interpretations of ecological degradation, and second, explore a loosely defined Lefebvrian political economy approach (Keith and Pile 1993) to the study of matters of ecological origin.

Lefebvre and borders

Lefebvre's inquiries in the opening pages of <u>The Production of Space</u> (1991) are critical of mathematical conceptualizations of space which disengage *res cogitans* from *res extensa*: for Lefebvre, this sovereign demarcation of spaces either mental or material – spaces governed by the Cartesian logic of subject and object – refuse a treatment of space in corporeal terms. In other words, argues Lefebvre, Cartesian thought tends to fetishize space – it renders inaccessible the social, political, economic, cultural, gendered, and/or ecological processes that constitute the space (1991: 5). This binarism – implying a possible categorization of problems in mechanistic, atomistic, and empiricist terms (Merrifield 1993: 518) – precludes both physical and social space, thus making practical political action – premised on a recognition of 'the outside world' as corporeal – difficult (Lefebvre 1991:7).

Lefebvre's work, in contrast, treats 'outside' space as a product of the human body: space is conceived, perceived, and practiced, and not simply existent. For Lefebvre, this lesson is well taught by the Cartesian methodology itself, for a binary physical-mental spatial logic – most obviously its vocabularies and embodied codes – is really only made possible by "intervening in social space and . . . taking on body" (Peet 1998: 104) or, in other words, by dictating how bodies are to relate to physical space in the first place. Accordingly, Lefebvre's "anatomy of space generated by living bodies" – unlike the Cartesian approach – serves notice that it is impossible to speak of an indifference of the 'container' and the 'content' (Stewart 1995: 612): space is understood as something socially rooted/routed, something that "*permits* fresh actions to occur, while *suggesting* others and *prohibiting* yet others" (Lefebvre 1991: 73; emphasis added). This opens for discussion the materiality of space and the notion that there are both users and producers of space (Peet 1998: 104).

An interrogation of space as social morphology emphasizes a need to de-fetishize space, to combat the abeyance of users of space and to recognize that "any determinate and hence demarcated space necessarily *embraces some things and excludes others*" (Lefebvre 1991: 99; emphasis added). Such a project involves problematizing those who are given the capacity to represent and evaluate space (architects, urban planners, state governments) and suggests that it is those who live out their daily lives in these spaces who are the real experts (Lefebvre 1991: 95). This study may be understood as a toolbox for an explicitly political and temporal analysis of space, as a set of destabilizing meditations which disprove decorporealized knowledges and spaces (Stewart 1995: 610).

Lefebvre's contemplation of space is, in part, facilitated by introducing representations of space (spaces of representations/lived spaces and spatial practices/perceived space comprise the remainder of Lefebvre's spatial triad). Representations of space are "conceived spaces, born of savoir and logic: maps, mathematics, the instrumental space of social engineers and urban planners" (Stewart 1995: 610). At question in representations of space is authorship. Who is mapping the spaces in which

people live? What does this mapping imply for people charted by such representations? The specifically corporeal element in representations of space – that such spaces exercise control over bodies – is highlighted:

> Representations of space have a *practical impact*, that they *intervene in and modify spatial textures* which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology. . . . Their intervention occurs by way of construction B in other words, by way of architecture, conceived not as the building of a particular structure, palace or monument, but rather as a project embedded in a spatial context and a texture which call for 'representations' that will not vanish into the symbolic and imaginary realms (Lefebvre 1991: 42; emphasis added).

From this Lefebvre proposes a study of space as architexture. The architextural inquiry refuses to treat spaces as mere architectures or unproblematic physical externalities. Rather, space is addressed in terms of flow and movement (productions and consumptions) or in terms of textures, surroundings, context, and "associated networks . . . set down, as a part of a particular production of space" (Lefebvre 1991: 118). The architextural inquiry looks to borders, not as simple, pre-existent, closed physicalities, but as problematic social representations which enforce a spatial code of proxemics or respectful distances. Most important for our purposes here, Lefebvre notes that a logic of property in space neither assumes space as something textured nor as a network "*open* on all sides to the strange and the foreign, to the threatening and the propitious, to friend and foe" (1991: 118; emphasis added). Rather, a logic of property in space quite simply presumes that "places and things belonging to you do not belong to me" (Lefebvre, 1991: 57).

One outcome of this bordered logic of property in space is a refutation of people as producers and reproducers of space: borders are understood as sacrosanct and inviolable remnants of former times, and little thought is given to borders in terms of human innovation, renovation, and renewal. As such, space is decorporealized; ignored and refuted is the presence of the body in the constitution of space and the effects it has on space. Another outcome of this bordered logic is a refutation of flows between supposedly hermetic spaces. Accordingly, Lefebvre warns of the spatial trap which occasions sovereignty (1991: 105-106).

Lefebvre's discussion encourages a general understanding that the social is at once spatial, and that, conversely, spatial delineations – whether physical or metaphysical – are socially grounded. Thinking about space, in other words, is not simply thinking about abstract metaphorical puzzles, but is, rather, central to an examination of materiality, politics, and justice. Lefebvre's key point is, in fact, that spatiality is not a purely philosophical or mathematical enterprise: space is bodily; it both constrains and enables certain activities and imaginations, and is thus necessarily political and ideological (Stewart 1995: 609). This sociological and geographical mapping suggests that space – as those flows or relations between and including peoples, objects and organizations – and place – as the product of such flows and relations, imbued with meaning and capable of imparting design on flows – "take on meaning through, and are permeated by, historically defined social relations (and vice versa)" (Merrifield 1993: 525). Consequently, representations of space, in designating flows between places (as well as the creation of these very places) and in bestowing definition to social relationships,

provide the contours of place – perhaps a sense of familiarity and interconnectedness, or, as is witnessed by the white picket fence, a sense of isolation, containment, and difference. In turn, it is reasonable to suspect that these 'senses of place' are capable of authoring and ordering (notably peopled) flows between places.

Rereading Connolly and Kennedy via Lefebvre: the politics of space

To return briefly to the Connolly and Kennedy piece, it is clear that the order imposed by the white picket fence is, in Lefebvrian terms, a representation of space with distinct corporeal implications. In this sense, perhaps, the backyard may be captured as an instatement of spatial fixity or as a spatial code of proxemics which details respectful distances based on a logic of property in space. The central lesson to be drawn from Lefebvre in this context is that sovereign mappings of space – presented in terms of naturally occurring pre-cast socio-political containers, for instance – refute people as producers of space and disallow a recognition of the (social and ecological) situatedness (texture) of human activity.

An appreciation of space as social and the social as contestable allows us to critically revisit the <u>Atlantic Monthly</u> cover art. In this sense, although the "suburban ideal . . . marred . . . by the many dark-skinned faces, some clad in various 'ethnic' headgear, who are looking over the white picket fence surrounding (the aproned man's) yard" (Dalby 1996b: 487) is made manifest in physical space – the contours of which serve to reinforce the legitimacy and authority of this very ideal – the fence may be reread as a social arrangement, as a contestable bordered space. Accordingly, while the backyard may be this 'man's' 'Western paradise' to be overwhelmed by the 'wretched of the earth', for those on the other side of the enclosure the fenced-off area enjoys only a tenuous claim to borderedness. Indeed, if one returns to Guha and Gadgil's discussion of environmental refugees, it is not only clear that the land is not the sovereign piece of property assumed by the suburban homeowner but that the land (in that it is constitutive of and constituted by a largely unbound Western culture of consumption) is an active determinant in the fate of numerous (unrecognized) Others assumed to be geographically removed from 'paradise.' In other words, the backyard may be understood as a social morphology – a space of social and ecological exchanges, and not simply a bordered real-estate. It serves to note that this appreciation of the porosity of human existence contrasts markedly with Connolly and Kennedy's voiced concern over bodily transgressions of the sovereign yard, refused as anything except an ontological given.

This seemingly vast leap from the backyard of "postmodern bliss" (Dalby 1998a) to theories of space is made by focusing on politics: a central argument here is that mapping – as a set of practices by which citizens, non-citizens, academics, activists, journalists, intellectuals of statecraft, and others ascribe characteristics and meanings to various landscapes – is an inherently political activity. This movement from the map as neutral to the map as an imposition of order (Ó Tuathail 1996, Shapiro 1997) is particularly relevant in the context of the Raspailian artwork examined above. It is interesting to note, for example, that it is only when supposedly immutable sovereign borders are challenged that politics is explicitly invoked; otherwise, sovereign space is understood as a physical given and not a site of political contention. In this sense, most telling is what is deemed contestable: it is the 'mob' at the picket fence – and not the fence itself – which is the subject of political dispute. This focus renders

the notion of bordered and sovereign spaces uncontestable and obscures the politics constituted by and constitutive of such demarcations of space. In this context, it is imperative that space – and its import for politicking – be fully interrogated.

There is no doubt, for instance, that Connolly and Kennedy's article raises for debate the politics of ecological degradation. Specifically, reading ecological degradation *via* the metaphor of the distinct and disconnected backyard underpins a facilely demographic politics (Arizpe *et al*. 1994; Sen 1994) and facilitates what Betsy Hartmann calls the vision of an "overpopulated, environmentally degraded and violent Third World" in which both poor women – as racialized and othered agents – and the social movements representing poor women are positioned in terms of a population growth-induced socio-ecological security problem (1997: 14, 16).

This demographic focus – where threats are referenced according to a familiar Cold War identity trope of global disorder wrought by environmental damage, population growth, poverty, and refugee flows (Ó Tuathail and Luke 1997) – has fast become conventional political counsel in national security spheres. Kaplan's Raspailian The Coming Anarchy (1994) – which, as with Connolly and Kennedy's piece, suggests that the "political and social impact of surging populations . . . will be the core foreign-policy challenge" of the West in the post-Cold War environment (1994: 58) – has, for instance, been uncritically referenced in public speeches by U.S. President Bill Clinton and by Cabinet members appearing before Congress (Hartmann 1997).[165] In a corroborative manner, top U.S. State Department officials have blamed recent violent conflict in Chiapas, Rwanda, and Haiti on population-induced ecological degradation and scarcity (Hartmann 1997: 8).[166] In seeking an election platform, the Republican party has focused on these concerns: chief party members have recently addressed the viability of an isolationist Fortress America, capable of defending its own fenced backyards against unruly financial, ecological, and demographic flows (Mitchell 1998).

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[165] For example, Clinton suggested: "I was so gripped by many things that were in that [Kaplan's] article and by the more academic treatment of the same subject by Professor Homer-Dixon . . . . You have to say, if you look at the numbers, you must reduce the rate of population growth" (quoted in Hartmann 1997: 12).

[166] Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott before the Environmental Issues in American Foreign Policy Seminar at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Arlington, Virginia, September 10, 1996:
[S]truggles over land, water, and other natural resources affect our national interests overseas as well, since they can lead to instability in regions of critical importance to the United States . . . closer to the U.S., where I've spent a lot of time, including in recent weeks, is Haiti.
When President Clinton went to Haiti in March of 1995, he looked out the window of Air Force One as it passed over the Dominican-Haitian border. What most struck him was that you could tell which country was which from high in the air. The Dominican side was canopied with forests, while on the Haitian side, there were mostly bare mountains. The President had been to Haiti in the '70s, with Mrs. Clinton, and he remembered it as a lush, green land. Haiti is an agricultural country which has lost 98% of its forests, as much as 50% of its topsoil, much of it in the last thirty years. No wonder rural incomes are stuck at $50 per year. In the next 30 years, Haiti's population will nearly double, and 13 million Haitians will have to survive on an island with even less arable land than it has now. Democracy, like Haiti's crops of rice, corn and sugarcane, needs arable land in order to grow and survive. (http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/960910.html)

It is also important to point out that this image of environmental-demographic global disorder is prevalent in bodies that are not readily associated with the realist world of foreign policy prescription. The recent 1998 U.S. Sierra Club debate concerning immigration is a case in point. A large portion of the club's voting membership (approximately 40%) supported Alternative A, a "resolution that would have declared all immigration [to the U.S.], legal and otherwise, to be an environmental ill" (Goldin 1998: 7). Backed by 31 134 members, including: Dan Stein (head of the anti-immigrant Federation for American Immigration Reform), Gaylord Nelson (founder of Earth Day), Dave Foreman (founder of Earth First!), Paul Watson (founder of Greenpeace), Lester R. Brown (president of the Worldwatch Institute), and members of Californians for Population Stabilization (Goldin 1998; Cushman Jr. 1998), the defeated proposal suggested that steps need to be taken to, first, stabilize the U.S. population and, second, reduce net immigration to the United States (Branigin 1998). Although the debate and subsequent vote produced Alternative B or a neutral stance on immigration, it nonetheless consolidated support in the Sierra Club for international birth control programs. Carl Pope, the Sierra Club's executive director, despite having championed Alternative B, digressed little in his post-vote speech from the spatialized fear of those 'inside' and aspiration of those 'outside' dilemma explored above: "The Sierra Club cannot protect our environment by building a wall around our borders. The common sense solution to reducing our population is birth control, not border patrols" (Cushman 1998). Interesting in this sense is Pope's specifically demographic segue to matters of ecology, for wall or no wall, the Raspailian imagery of masses of waving arms remains prevalent. Hence, despite his pre-vote talks about U.S. energy consumption and global ecological damage (Goldin 1998; Motavalli 1998), Pope's attempt to rally the opposing groups in the club focused on controlling bodies rather than exploring the different ways bodies are positioned – specifically as regards consumption – with respect to one other.

The pressing importance of understanding the white picket fence imagery in social and political contexts is evident. The normalized white picket fence imagery arguably provides an important political and socio-spatial backdrop for "foreign and security policy prescriptions [dependent] in large part on how the questions of appropriate policy prescriptions are practically understood within the larger geopolitical discourse and their interpretations of geopolitical order" (Dalby 1996b: 474). As Nalini Visvanathan (1994) suggests, by far the most important aspect of such scripts is how they articulate with a popular belief that population growth in the developing world is a major security and environmental issue. In this sense, the Atlantic Monthly's popularized adventures are of notable consequence because of their affirmation – through an ontologizing of borders – of homogenous selves and Others, the segmented human geography requisite for Foreign Policy (Campbell 1996a). In drawing attention to issues of security, the white picket fence script allows for concerns with consumption to be supplanted by a definition of corporeal well-being in terms of a spatial distinction between 'here' and 'there' (Dalby 1996b). And the result, as Hartmann notes, is a masking of "the deeper political and economic forces generating poverty, environmental degradation, violence and migration" (1997: 14).

The politics of security

It serves to underline Hartmann's claim that the above accounts of ecological degradation and the migration of peoples cannot be sustained – particularly in the capitalist Western societies where the

Atlantic Monthly audience is largely resident – without reference to the notion of scarcity or natural resource shortage. However, the white picket fence imagery is focused not on scarcity *per se*, suggests Hartmann, but rather on competitive and individualist (bordered) apologies for ecological scarcity (Hartmann 1997: 9). The result is a focus of attention on localized problematics of scarcity – how to manage supposedly finite and sparse resources – without addressing the complex linkages between those supposedly living and not living within the constraints of ecological scarcity. In other words, attention is rarely turned to the production of scarcity, and instead focuses on methods of coping. This approach strengthens an ontologizing of borders, inasmuch as borders are an obvious means, at least for Connolly *et al.*, to protect natural resources under threat from population growth-induced migration. It is in this sense that a translation is made from scarcity to security: ecological scarcity is dealt with by fortifying white picket fences.

The centrality of scarcity to this issue betrays the Lockean foundation of the 'white picket fence anxiety'. Lockean governance requires a population committed to a supposedly productive and fruitful sovereign demarcation, extraction, and consumption of natural resources (Kuehls 1996; Dalby 1998a, 1996e; Rich 1994; Shiva 1992). Nomadic peoples and forms of indigenous (read casual and unproductive) labour are specifically written out of this Lockean model (Kuehls 1996: xii). Nomadic peoples – according to the Lockean criteria deemed suitable for order and prosperity – do not make proper use of land because land is neither possessed nor settled permanently. The nomadic orientation to territory is, thus, understood as a move away from the supposedly stable (and desirable) political, social, economic, and ecological order generated by permanent, fixed, regularized, and propertied Lockean environments (Kuehls 1996).

In the Lockean mindset, then, an unsettled and itinerant refusal to occupy and undertake productive activity from a specified locale is scripted as a direct security threat to the maintenance of (Lockean) political communities committed to fixed populations and the bordered use of natural resources. It is specifically this reluctance to relate to natural resources in a 'settled' fashion which pens nomads (Them) as a potential source of violation or trespass to 'Lockeans' (Us) who, it is presupposed, relate to nature in a particularly arboreal (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) fashion. And it is precisely because the unsettled nature of nomadism translates into an irreverence for bordered properties that nomadism can be constructed as a threat to politics, for, in Lockean terms, politics is an activity essential to a designated locale. As such, people who refuse a propertied logic are also seen to refuse a civilized politics (Agnew 1998). This may go some way to explaining the fear and consternation of the white picket fence artwork.

It is here that a useful return can be made to Lefebvre's production of space. Borrowing from Lefebvre, Agnew suggests that Lockean spaces are representations of space whose reproduction necessitates both citizenship and security (1994: 60). First, only with citizenship or residence in a specific territorialized space is it assumed that the "self-conscious subject of modern history [can] emerge" (Agnew 1994: 61). The absence of a sovereign jurisdiction and/or a (Lockean) governance capable of enabling and enforcing insides and outsides precludes citizenship and hence the formation of political identity, thus making politics consonant with the geography of boundaries. Second, security is offered as the defense of the territorialized state spaces required for political citizenship. In this sense, security is explicitly the Lockean governance – the ordering of peoples and territories –

whose absence precludes politics. Simply put, citizenship defines and legitimates the requirements of a (national) security just as security (territorial integrity) provides for meaningful politicking, or citizenship. Citizenship and security are, thus, inextricable.

Most important here is that citizenship (permanent residence) is only made meaningful when residents are successfully distinguished from non-residents (nomads or residents of other places) or when a binary geography is established which differentiates 'here' from 'there,' 'modern' from 'backwards,' or 'civilized' from 'barbaric' (Agnew 1998: 20-31). As such, the spatial code of proxemics established by citizenship and security – which details respectful distances based on a logic of property in space – reinforces a particular citizenship/security dynamic which maintains that "places and things belonging to you do not belong to me" (Lefebvre 1991: 57). With this in mind, it is particularly telling that Connolly and Kennedy speak of scarcity in terms of "rich versus poor," "race versus race," "developed versus developing countries," and "the Rest against the West" – in categories of familiarity and foreignness.

With this in mind, it is useful to examine briefly the 1994 <u>Atlantic Monthly</u> article in which Kaplan talks of the peopled ecological chaos of Sierra Leone and the orderly comportment of business life at New York's Kennedy Airport, but is unable to provide (or even ask about) the flows which might connect the ordered hustle and bustle of Western cosmopolitanism with Western Africa's supposed demographic plight (Dalby 1996b). It is quite clear that Kaplan's formulation of security in unabashed self/Other terms enables a certain (sovereign) disconnectedness. For what does Kaplan endure upon arrival in New York but an arduous security check – indeed the "toughest security procedures I have ever encountered when returning from overseas" – which suggests that the borders "separating West Africa from the outside world are in various ways becoming more impenetrable" (Kaplan 1994: 76). The security provided by Kennedy Airport renders, for Kaplan, one place distinct from the other, particularly since the drugs and disease (peopled flows) brought from West Africa ('there') are intercepted at U.S. customs ('here'). Accordingly, made unlikely is a problematization of those flows specifically not subjected to the scrutiny of U.S. border guards: the self/Other security dynamic refuses to ask questions about the unconfined socio-ecological practices that security renders secure.

As such, the self/Other constitution of security does not invite thinking 'from the inside,' as it were, about the constitution of security and instead is concerned with 'external' peopled threats to established sovereign states/backyards. Indeed, to think 'from the inside' is to confound the security cartography's linear internal/external dichotomy. By interrogating the "multiple interconnected causalities and feedback loops" of extractive, productive and consumptive institutions and practices being rendered secure in the North, for instance, thinking 'from the inside' about the constitution of security demonstrates that security 'does things' (Dalby 1995, 1998b; Dillon 1993). Specifically, security renders secure not only boundaries but key consumptive practices and pollutive institutions housed in those boundaries. Indeed, if security is to be understood as the maintenance of such practices and institutions, then, a "dilemma appears here because these . . . are the very things that are causing many of the contemporary global environmental difficulties" (Dalby 1995: 176). This problem is indicative of a need to rethink bordered ontologies and challenge assumptions about what constitutes socio-ecological and political community.

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Thinking otherwise

A return to Lefebvre's writings may be an interesting way to reimagine Connolly *et al*.'s demographic portrayal of ecological degradation. Borrowing from Lefebvre, Smith suggests that scale provides a useful geography in which to speak of social and ecological phenomena. Scale "is a kind of framework regulating the dimensions of spatial differences that are produced; all space is scaled through and within social processes" (Smith 1998b: 66). For Connolly *et al*., for instance, scale inscribes boundaries which facilitate the working out of a multitude of social and ecological issues, and marks boundaries which contain struggle. Scale may be understood as the

> active progenitor of specific social processes. In a literal as much as metaphorical way, scale contains social activity and at the same time provides an already partitioned geography within which social activity takes place. Scale demarcates the sites of social contest, the object as well as the resolution of the contest (Smith 1993: 101).

Using Lefebvre, and thinking of Connolly *et al*.'s picket fence, scales may be understood as produced spaces which attempt a division between the mental and the material – between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, between social dynamics and material outcome – and which misrepresent the complex and dialectical character of human sociality (Lefebvre 1991: 1-14). Scale, in other words, represents the fetishization of space – a negation of the processes that constitute space and a treatment of space as something in and of itself.

A concern for spatial scale is particularly important when considering issues of ecological origin: the resolution of social and ecological issues, argues Smith, in terms of bordered spatial scale often depends on a geographical translation of ecologically destructive practices and wastes to other supposedly scaled sites. In this sense, Smith wonders how a scaled Western backyard can be described in terms of a bordered "environmental cleanliness" when this very condition is dependent on a capacity to move consumptive and extractive wastes across borders, specifically making other places sites of ecological degradation (1998a:66).

From this insight Smith articulates an interesting (eco)politics. Recounting Alix Kates Shulman's 1995 memoir Drinking the Rain, Smith suggests that much can be learned from Shulman's retreat from New York life to an island in Maine. Faced with the daily difficulties on the island, and armed with a country cookbook, Shulman pragmatically "takes to eating whatever is scavengable in the environment" (Smith 1998a: 282). Important for Smith is that Shulman's engagement with nature is a "consumptive production of nature" – an eating and transformation of nature "in an array of starkly pragmatic practices" (Smith 1998a: 283). In this sense, Shulman – through consuming wild salads and fish – is consciously involved in a production of nature which eventually becomes a source of self-knowledge and understanding. Most importantly, Shulman becomes aware of the environments which sustain her lifestyle of "busyness." In traversing the scale back to her New York life Shulman "grasps her predicament more clearly" by understanding the ecological politics of foods and of a consumption which she previously had not considered. In other words, Shulman's experiences 'elsewhere' find a place in Shulman's New York life and prompt her to consider 'elsewheres' in terms of the immediacies of her cosmopolitan lifestyle.

Looking, as Smith does through Shulman's <u>Drinking the Rain</u>, at the ways in which humans are interrelated is to interrogate "the bounded spaces of the human world, from fenced fields to political states protected by radar screens," and more specifically, is to question the "material characteristics" of that which is often understood in terms of both fences and states – what is often called 'home' (Tuan 1991: 101). In this sense, the seeming self-evidence of 'home' is usefully resituated in terms of 'home' as a "unit of space organized mentally and materially," a familiarizing rite of survey, a "minipoem" which evokes the familiar (and the unfamiliar), and at times an imposition of boundaries – or white picket fences – which both constrain and enable social activity and imagination (1991:101-104). And what happens when 'home' is rendered unsettled? What happens "if the entire planet is taken as the human home, and we realize that there are no strangers, human or nonhuman" (1991: 105)?

This unsettling potential politics of scale – which confounds categories of 'here,' 'there,' 'Us,' and 'Them' and instead encourages one to think of the many potential linkages and exchanges which make such terms difficult – accentuates the "intellectual necessity of distancing oneself from one's fondest fears to look again at one's identity in the light of its being rendered strange" (Dalby 1998b: 309). Such a politics challenges the popularized association of ecological degradation with the physical movement of people beyond the white picket fence and instead asks how the lifestyles maintained within might be understood or experienced from an alternate viewpoint. Moreover, such a politics entails looking at the social and discursive constitution of scripted arenas.

Most relevant in this sense is Smith's inversion of the assumptions presented in the scarcity-conflict arguments forwarded by Kaplan, and Connolly and Kennedy. It will be recalled that these authors speak of the bodily transgression of spaces as a principal source of ecological degradation. For Smith, the traversibility of spatial scale – an indisputable expression of nomadism – provides not for socio-political and ecological chaos but rather the basis of a reconstructed political project. Specifically, Smith professes that the bodily transgression of demarcated sites – or a "politics of jumping scale" – usefully challenges the notion of property claims over nature (Smith 1998a: 66). In this sense, fundamental to the distinction between Smith and the scarcity-conflict position is the concept of ownership. The artwork/map presented in Connolly and Kennedy's <u>Atlantic Monthly</u> article, for instance, neatly demonstrates the centrality of ownership to a scarcity-conflict politics, and as such, is clearly informed by a sense of property-based socio-political order and governance. For Smith, the translation present in this propertied reasoning between "reality and the [fenced] description of nature is fully erased; the discourse and the reality are rendered interchangeable" (Smith 1998b: 274). Lost is a sense of "who is doing the production [of space] and under what circumstances" (Smith 1998b: 273).

This "creative translation" becomes prominent when bodies traverse spatial scale. This is precisely the political project that Lefebvre understands to be the result of the dismissal of everyday experiences by representations of space – a political project defined by the confrontation of (migrating) spatial practices with (fixed) representations of space (Lefebvre 1991: 52). In this sense, Smith's (postsovereign) bodily politics of scale usefully entails challenging territorialized diacritics which encode space as a "field, an infinite, universal, and unchanging box within which material events occur . . . as a set of philosophical lenses [through which] the symptoms of spatial restructuring

appear as just so many separate processes at separate scales with very separate causes and explanations" (1984: ix). In so doing, the ontological, epistemological, and methodological reductionism of human sociality to scaled parameters – which suspends complex ecologically-based interactions and ignores the possibility that socio-ecological activity need not be confined to fenced-in backyards – is rendered usefully unstable.

To conclude, it might be noted that to engage the white picket fence imagery at this level is to study studies which centre borderedness and is, most importantly, to become involved in a politics which asks about the horizons embedded in such approaches. The task at hand is informed by production: rather than focus on space as given, one focuses on space as something socially constituted, as something socially produced and reproduced; one also focuses on studies which employ specific designations of space and asks questions about how space, defined as such, is itself constitutive of both the everyday and social study – how, in other words, spatiality produces and reproduces particular focal points in lived experiences and in social study. To pursue such a course is to ask demanding questions of how study about spaces and places is both a study of the social constitution of spaces and places and a study of the social constitution of study about these spaces and places.

Arguably then, to take both everyday practices and social inquiry seriously is to take experienced arenas and spatialized categories of analysis as social categories themselves, and is to refuse to treat such orders as uncontestable. As Kuehls suggests: "It is important to pay attention to the lines within . . . text[s], to become intimate with these boundaries. *Where have they been drawn? How have they been used?*" (1996: 30; emphasis added). This suggests that a more comprehensive account of global ecological flows and politics might focus on the social constitution of space – on the ordering of peoples, locales and exchanges between peoples and locales – in order to understand people and places as relational, rather than as absolutely bordered, demonstrating that spaces and people are dynamic, in movement, "always *en route* rather than *rooted*" (Scholte 1996: 597).

Technopoles and Development in a 'Borderless World': Boundaries Erased, Boundaries Constructed

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This is an essay about metaphors. It begins from the premise that how we talk about things matters, that the way in which we think and act upon the world is shaped by the stories we tell about it. This paper takes up the case of a particularly powerful metaphor by which changes associated with recent information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been represented: the story of the movement towards a 'borderless world'. This has risen to particular prominence in recent years, permeating social and policy debates of many types and levels. The nature of globalization, the prospects for development, the proper scale and meaning of governance – in these and other debates the metaphor of the borderless world has profoundly influenced the way we talk, think and act about new communication technologies, as well as the broader sociopolitical processes of informational change.

The vehicle for this discussion will be a technological development project of considerably scope and significance: the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) currently being promoted and developed by the Malaysian government in collaboration with a handful of domestic and multinational technology firms. At once technology park, free trade zone, and social experiment, the MSC has been described by its founder and chief promoter, Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as

> Y a giant test-bed for experimenting with not only multimedia technology, but also, and more importantly, the evolution of a new way of life in the unfolding age of information and knowledge.[167]

It forms the heart of an 'information-led' development strategy celebrated as the springboard by which Malaysia may 'leapfrog' into the ranks of the 'information' or 'knowledge' societies of the advanced capitalist world. It is also hailed as a visionary model of political economic cooperation, combining public and private, global and local interests, in productive and mutually beneficial partnerships. These in turn are shaped to reflect the realities of a new global economy – the borderless world – brought about by the spread of new information and communication technologies.

At the same time, the MSC reveals some of the deep ambiguities that characterize a wide range of similar information-led and borderless world development strategies. To begin with, in contrast to its

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[167] Mahathir Mohamad. <u>Excerpts from the Speeches of Mahathir Mohamad on the Multimedia Super Corridor</u> (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1998).

futuristic rhetoric, the MSC is a deeply historical phenomenon, profoundly influenced by past patterns of social and political economic conflict and the policy outcomes that these have produced. Furthermore, despite its connotations of liberty and claims to informational free-flow, the drive to create and promote the MSC has contributed significantly to a discursive closure which has undermined broader social discussion of the means and ends of technological development in Malaysia.[168] Finally, in contrast to its legitimating narrative of the borderless world, the MSC has functioned in part by systematically *putting boundaries up*.

The MSC is a particularly interesting reference point for the present discussion of informational change and the metaphors by which it is represented for at least two reasons. First, in its design, execution and promotion (both domestic and international) the MSC has been explicitly shaped and driven by the idea of the borderless world. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that one of the chief architects of the project, as an influential advisor to the Malaysian government and member of the MSC's International Advisory Panel, is Kenichi Ohmae, who has been a leading international advocate of the borderless world concept – indeed, whose 1990 book of the same title first popularized the term.[169] Beyond this, the MSC lies at the intersection of some of the key social and policy debates of our time. For instance: What is the appropriate role for the state in economic and technological development within a (selectively) liberalizing world economic order? How is the understanding of what was once called 'Third World development' being recast in the 'information age', and should this move be greeted with celebration or apprehension? What forces will shape the character of post-colonial technopoles[170] like the MSC, both within the global political economy and a wide variety of more immediate social, cultural, and political economic contexts? How might the social and cultural characteristics of post-colonial societies challenge present ethnocentric assumptions concerning the nature of 'information societies'?

It is not the purpose of this paper to answer all of these questions, any one of which would extend well beyond the space available here. Nor does it profess to offer anything remotely resembling a 'final word' on Malaysian information-led development strategies, which remain highly dynamic and subject to processes of daily experimentation and revision, as well as the ongoing possibility of broader social negotiations leading to more fundamental reorientations.[171] Instead, what I wish to argue is precisely the need for a new way of talking and thinking about these processes, one that better captures the full range and tone of the social negotiations surrounding informational change. I

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[168] A more detailed presentation of some of these arguments can be found in Zaharom Nain and Mustafa Anuar, "IT strategies in Malaysia: The Multimedia Super Corridor," a paper presented at the UNRISD International Conference on Information Technologies and Social Development, Geneva, June 1998; and Steven Jackson and Vincent Mosco, "The Political Economy of New Technological Spaces: Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor," Journal of International Communication 6:1 (June, 1999).

[169] Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (Harper Business, 1990).

[170] I adopt the terminology of Castells and Hall here, who describe technopoles as "various deliberate attempts to plan and promote, within one concentrated area, technologically innovative, industrial-related production: technology parks, science cities, technopolises and the like." Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes (Routledge: New York, 1994), p 8.

[171] Interested readers are referred once again to Zaharom and Mustafa, op. cit., Jackson and Mosco, op. cit., and the official website of the Multimedia Development Corporation at http://www.mdc.com.my.

also want to demonstrate the deeply *political* character of our ways of representing informational change, by showing how the borderless world discourse that frames the MSC has enabled certain analyses while disabling others, brought certain social practices into sharp relief while obscuring others, and supported a particular politics of socio-technical change while removing others from the field of social possibility. In short, I argue that the metaphor of the borderless world that has shaped the development of the MSC and other technopoles is deeply inadequate to the task of understanding current social and spatial reorganizations associated with the expansion of new ICTs, and that we need to find new ways to conceptualize these processes. I suggest that clear thinking about technopoles and the global(izing) effects of new information technologies might begin by replacing the simple notion of boundary erasure central to the borderless world narrative with a more complex understanding of simultaneous boundary erasures *and constructions*.

The final section of the paper considers two possible sources from which we might begin to rethink the complex and power-laden relationships connecting space, communication and technological change. The first comes from British geographer Doreen Massey, who has written perceptively on what she terms the 'power geometry of place' to argue the need for placing present discussions of an undifferentiated globalisation within the context of a variable 'politics of mobility' stratified along lines of class, race and gender. The paper concludes by suggesting the usefulness of Henri Lefebvre's theory of the 'production of space' as a starting point for reconceptualizing the relationship between contemporary informational development and spatial reorganization.

A BORDERLESS WORLD?

Much contemporary usage of the 'borderless world' metaphor is owed to Japanese management consultant Kenichi Ohmae, whose influential 1990 book – The Borderless World – first popularized the term. For Ohmae, the rich countries of the world (especially the 'triad' of the US, Europe and Japan) increasingly constitute an Interlinked Economy (ILE), whose primary policy objective lay in "ensuring the free flow of information, money, goods and services as well as the free migration of people and corporations"[172]. For the people/consumers of these nations (Ohmae uses the terms interchangeably), as well as those of the enlightened NICs who aspired to join the club, this would necessarily produce a substantial increase in well-being and personal liberty. The new center of power was the individual consumer, now freed from both the repressive apparatus of government and unresponsive corporations who failed to realize that in the new order, "multinational companies are truly the servants of demanding consumers around the world."[173] All that stood in the way of this happy outcome was the short-sighted and self-interested resistance of government bureaucrats,

> slow to grasp the fact that their role has changed from protecting their people and their natural resource base from outside economic threats to ensuring that their people have the widest range of choice among the best and the cheapest goods and services from around the world.[174]

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[172] Ohmae, op. cit. pp *xii-xiii*.
[173] Ibid, p *x*.
[174] Ibid, p *x*.

The nature of this borderless world, argued Ohmae, definitively settled the development debate. The only reasonable option for the governments and peoples of less-developed countries was to abandon all nationalist sentiments and protectionist programs and seek the fullest possible integration into the Interlinked Economy. The unprecedented track records of interventionist governments in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in fostering economic development, while acknowledged, were claimed to belong to an earlier and definitively finished era, in which a different set of economic rules applied. In the present conjuncture, argued Ohmae, nationalist policies could reflect only two things: first, a profound misunderstanding of economic process (either an outmoded mercantilism or what Ohmae castigates as the 'resource illusion'); second, the cynical maneuverings of political and bureaucratic elites willing to put their personal hold on power ahead of the welfare of their people. Indeed, in the present era the very idea of 'nation' or 'national interest' had become irrelevant. In his concluding "Declaration of Interdependence", Ohmae asserts that

> Inevitably, the emergence of the interlinked economy brings with it an erosion of national sovereignty as the *power of information* directly touches local communities; academic, professional, and social institutions; corporations; and individuals. It is this borderless world that will give participating economies the capacity for boundless prosperity.[175]

Underlying all of this is an assumption implicit throughout much of the argument, but evident in the final quotation above: namely, that *it is the fundamental nature of information, and information technologies, to break down boundaries*. This is a prominent and long-standing theme in most accounts of communication technologies (old and 'new') that if anything has become even more prevalent now than at the time Ohmae was writing. Indeed, the borderless world metaphor presents itself as unobjectionable, makes sense to so many, in large part because it follows upon a set of technological assumptions deeply embedded in the popular (but also academic) imagination. Numerous scholars and popular commentators have pointed out the strong libertarian bent of discussions surrounding the new technologies, in which information and information technologies emerge, by argument but more commonly by assumption, as a powerful symbol of freedom. In this representation, the essence of information is the power to subvert, to undermine existing structures of restraint, to route around control. Thus liberal communication scholar Ithiel de Sola Pool can describe the new communication tools (indeed, entitle whole volumes) as Technologies of Freedom and Technologies without Boundaries.[176] Global software firms can build international advertising campaigns around the provocative question: Where do you want to go today?

This is closely aligned to a second prominent way of imagining the spatial effects of the new communication technologies: namely, their tendency to eliminate distance, or 'annihilate space.' It has become commonplace, even banal, to observe that new communication and transportation technologies have played an important part in 'making the world a smaller place'. Three decades of historical evidence to the contrary, McLuhanite visions of a benign 'global village' display an enduring hold on the popular imagination. A prominent contemporary variant of this argument can

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[175] Ibid, 216 (my emphases).
[176] Ithiel de Sola Pool. Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in a Global Age, ed. Eli Noam (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990); Ithiel de Sola Pool. Technologies of Freedom (Belknap Press: Cambridge, MA, 1983).

be found in Francis Cairncross' <u>The Death of Distance,</u> which identifies the elimination of spatial barriers brought about by advances in communication technologies as "the single most important force shaping society in the first half of the next century."[177] The implications of this change are regarded as truly revolutionary, producing, among other things, "near-frictionless markets", "the proliferation of ideas", a "shift from government policing to self-policing", the "rebirth of cities", "increased mobility", a new "market for citizens" (with competition conducted on the basis of lower tax rates), the "rebalancing of political power" (away from governments, towards people) and even "global peace" (on the basis of economic interdependence).[178]

Certain costs associated with the transition are grudgingly acknowledged; Cairncross dwells in particular on the loss of privacy through surveillance (though this will also produce a sharp decline in crime) and the growth of income differences within countries (though this is more than compensated for by reduced income differentials *between* countries). Overall, however, the death of distance is hailed as an inevitable and overwhelmingly positive advance. Critics of the process are treated, rather patronizingly, as understandably confused by the accelerating whirl of historical progress. This, as well as the general spirit and principal argument of the book, is accurately captured in the following (somewhat lengthy) quote from Cairncross:

> For many people, this prospective new world is frightening. Change is always unsettling, and we are now seeing the fastest technological change the world has ever known. But at the heart of the communications revolution lies something that will, in the main, benefit humanity: global diffusion of knowledge. Information once available only to the few will be available to the many, instantly and (in terms of distribution costs) inexpensively.
>
> As a result, new ideas will spread faster, leaping borders. Poor countries will have immediate access to information that was once restricted to the industrial world and traveled only slowly, if at all, beyond it. Entire electorates will learn things that once only a few bureaucrats knew. Small companies will offer services that previously only giants could provide. In all these ways, the communications revolution is profoundly democratic and liberating, leveling the imbalance between large and small, rich and poor. The death of distance, overall, should be welcomed and enjoyed.[179]

'In the main', 'the many', 'overall' – the prevalence of these terms and others like them identifies what is perhaps the chief failing of the 'borderless world' and 'death of distance' narratives: namely, an almost complete lack of social differentiation. Complex social histories are in this way averaged out into general (and generally favorable) historical trajectories; the divergent, often conflictual, interests of specific groups and individuals are overwritten with a general human interest, sometimes elevated to the level of 'humanity' or 'mankind'. This is closely tied to a second difficulty with such narratives: their failure to give an adequate account of the power relations that have shaped and continue to shape the very changes they are describing. Rather than beginning with the new communication technologies (which then inevitably emerge as the chief protagonists of the story – the heart of the critique of technological determinism), the proponents of such accounts would be well advised to take a step further back, to consider what forces and social relations might have contributed

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[177] Frances Cairncross, <u>The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives</u> (Harvard Business School Press: Boston, 1997), p 1.
[178] Ibid, pp *xi-xvi*.
[179] Ibid, p 4.

to the development of present technological and spatial forms in the first place. This denaturalizing critique would also form a necessary part of the effort to account for social differentiation in the relationship between information technologies and space that is absent in accounts of the borderless world.

It is considerations such as these which separate the borderless world and death of distance arguments from a wide variety of critical accounts which nevertheless employ a similar imagery in portraying the relationship between technological and spatial change. A leading contemporary version of this sort of critical 'annihilation theory' is offered by David Harvey, who draws on Marx's famous phrase, "the annihilation of space by time"[180] to develop his own theory of 'time-space compression' – a phenomenon shaped by

> processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves.[181]

Continuing, Harvey writes:

> As space appears to shrink to a 'global village' of telecommunications and a 'spaceship earth' of economic and ecological interdependencies – to use just two familiar and everyday images – and as time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is (the world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of *compression* of our spatial and temporal worlds.[182]

Rather than appearing as a disembodied and free-floating phenomenon, as it does in Ohmae and Cairncross, for Harvey the current experience of spatial and temporal shrinkage represents only the latest round in a historical series of time-space compressions – a series in turn rooted in periodic spatial and economic restructurings within capitalism. The immediate roots of the current round of time-space compression can be traced to the emergence of regimes of 'flexible accumulation' in response to crisis conditions prevailing in the advanced industrialized economies in the early 1970s. Far from information technology *determining* the general course of social development, as Ohmae and Cairncross would have it, the character of the technologies themselves are in large part *determined by* processes of social reorganization contemporaneous with their development – and *both* are in turn rooted in the more general process of political economic restructuring.

This provides a starting point for the type of social differentiation lacking in more optimistic variants of the shrinking world hypothesis. Crucially, it allows us to begin to think about power in relation to the constitution and spatial effects of new communication technologies. For Harvey, the annihilation of space through time expresses the broader dynamic of intensifying capitalist competition on the basis of information control and geographic expansion; accordingly, the empowering aspects of the borderless world are skewed to privilege the interests of capital.

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[180] Karl Marx, Grundrisse. Foundations of the critique of political economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus. (Random House, New York, 1973).

[181] David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Blackwell: Cambridge, MA, 1989), p 240.

[182] Ibid, p 240.

But this doesn't tell the whole story. As Scott Kirsch asks,

> What happens to space after its collapse, how do these spatiotemporal transformations impact our everyday lives, and how does this notion of a shrinking world help us to understand the social relations which that world embodies?[183]

An exclusive focus on the annihilating tendencies of time-space compression – the point at which Harvey touches popular accounts of spatial change such as the borderless world – captures only part of the larger spatial process that Harvey is describing. I want to suggest that some of the political and analytical points that this critique seeks to raise might be better made by bringing to the fore a second formulation present but sometimes neglected in Harvey's account, one that discards the notion of erasure (of space, of boundaries) and begins instead by considering the part played by technology in their active *production*. This brings us to a field of social theory most famously pioneered by Henri Lefebvre. Before that, however, I want to provide a concrete frame of reference for these rather abstract discussions. The next section takes up the case of the MSC.

THE MULTIMEDIA SUPER CORRIDOR

As noted above, choosing the MSC as an exemplar of the borderless world metaphor in action is far from an arbitrary decision. Each stage of the project, from design to implementation to domestic and international promotion, owes a clear and explicit debt to the particular vision of a borderless world shaped by new information technologies found in Ohmae's writings. The MSC is also a project of deep social significance, central to the restructuring of Malaysian development strategies and priorities, and widely regarded as a potential model for other countries considering similar informational development paths. Each of these points is emphasized by Prime Minister Mahathir, who has declared that

> Malaysia is taking a single-minded approach to developing the country using the new tools offered by the Information Age. The MSC will be the R&D centre for the information-based industries, to develop new codes of ethics in a shrunken world where everyone is a neighbour to everyone else, where we have to live with each other without unnecessary tension and conflicts. Indeed, the MSC is a pilot project for harmonising our entire country with the global forces shaping the Information Age.[184]

At the level of physical detail, the Multimedia Super Corridor consists of a 15 x 50 km zone lying immediately south of the capital, Kuala Lumpur. It stretches from KL's central business district, including the Kuala Lumpur City Centre and the world's tallest buildings, the Petronas Towers, to the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport, completed to the south of the capital in 1998. Falling within this zone are a number of residential zones, past commercial and industrial developments, the national sports complex, and the pre-existing National Technology Park, along with large stretches of plantation land, held by the Federal Land Development Agency, the Selangor State Government and a variety of smallholders and private developers.

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[183] Scott Kirsch, "The incredible shrinking world? Technology and the production of space," <u>Environment and Planning D: Society and Space</u>, vol. 13 (1995), p 529.
[184] op. cit., 30.

The true heart of the MSC, however, lies in two new 'intelligent' or 'garden' cities: Putrajaya, the new administrative capital, and Cyberjaya, its private sector counterpart. Announced in 1994 at a projected cost of RM 20 billion (at the time, US $7.1 billion) Putrajaya will eventually house the Prime Minister's Department, the Ministry of Finance and 15 other ministries, plus a range of other State and Federal agencies. When complete, it is expected to be home to some 79,000 government and 59,000 private sector workers, with a total population exceeding 240,000. It will be governed by Putrajaya Corporation, a quasi-private body with "the regulatory authority of City Hall and the development powers of a State Economic Development Corporation."[185] After a delay of several months, the Prime Minister's Department officially relocated operations to Putrajaya in June 1999.

Immediately to the west of Putrajaya and 45 minutes from downtown KL lies Cyberjaya, projected as the commercial heart of the MSC and home to a group of corporations and 'knowledge workers' engaged in a range of advanced technological and commercial activities. Infrastructural provisions are scheduled to include a fibre-optic network capable of handling advanced telephony, data exchange and interactive multimedia services, high-speed road and rail links to Kuala Lumpur, Port Klang, and the airport, and customized office space suitable to corporate research and commercial activities. Also planned is a Multimedia University which will train workers and encourage joint academic-industry research. Cyberjaya is being promoted as an experiment in eco-friendly living, based on "symbiotic harmony between man, the environment and technology".[186] Initial planning documents describe a range of mid to high-level accommodation options, including "hillside mansions, lakefront houses, and condominiums".[187] For the foreign and Malaysian knowledge workers envisioned as its future residents, Cyberjaya is touted as an idyllic 'garden city', which will "ensure that a suitable environment is created for promoting spiritual, mental and physical health and the enjoyment of nature and cultural pursuits."[188]

Beyond these infrastructural and environmental factors, potential investors in Cyberjaya are wooed by a range of financial and institutional incentives, laid out in the government's 'Bill of Guarantees' to MSC investors. Participating firms are offered the option of complete income tax forgiveness for up to ten years or (if their MSC operations represent a cost center) a 100% investment tax allowance. Duties on imported multimedia equipment are being waived. Local firms may participate in the R&D Grant Scheme, covering up to 50% of allowable research costs. Foreign firms are granted complete freedom of ownership, capital sourcing and remission of profits, including exemption from foreign exchange controls. MSC firms also enjoy unlimited freedom to import foreign knowledge workers. Furthermore, as part of the MSCs 'soft infrastructure', a number of changes to the Malaysian legal system are being introduced. These include a Digital Signatures Act designed to facilitate electronic commerce, a Copyright Amendment Act which strengthens intellectual property protection, a Multimedia & Communication Act establishing a legal framework for media convergence, a Data

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[185] Mahathir, op. cit., p 35.
[186] Ibid, p 32.
[187] MDC, op. cit.
[188] Mahathir, op. cit., p 32

Protection Act governing the gathering and exchange of personal information, and more specific measures designed to facilitate applications like telemedicine and electronic governance.[189]

The promotion and long-term management of Cyberjaya, as well as the MSC more generally, is governed by the Multimedia Development Corporation. It has received strong public support in this from the Prime Minister, who has led a number of promotional missions to corporations and potential investors in the United States, Europe and Japan. The MDC is officially incorporated under the Companies Act of 1965, but is 100% publicly owned; in Mahathir's words, "It combines the efficiency and effectiveness of a private company having entrepreneurial flair, with the decision-making and authority of a high-powered government agency."[190]

Responsibility for the design and strategic direction of the MSC is shared between a number of bodies. First among these is the National Information Technology Council (NITC), a group representing Malaysian corporate interests along with officials drawn from relevant government ministries and headed by the Prime Minister. The NITC is responsible for setting the general framework and strategies for incorporating information technologies into national development goals. A second influential group is the International Advisory Panel on the MSC, comprised primarily of the heads of many of the world's largest IT companies (including Sun, Microsoft, IBM, Netscape, NTT, etc.). This group, also chaired by the Prime Minister, solicits the advice of leading international technology firms and other 'expert' advisers. Telekom Malaysia, which took over the activities of the Telecoms Department in 1987, and the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics (MIMOS), a public corporation housing the NITC secretariat, have also played important steering roles.

The research activities of the MSC, and its most immediate point of articulation with the broader social and economic life of the country, are organized around a series of seven 'flagship applications'. The 'Smart Schools' flagship aims to develop tools and strategies for expanding the use of information technologies within the national public education system. The 'Multi-purpose Card' encourages the development of a single chip-based card capable of performing national ID, driver's licence, immigration, health and electronic cash functions, as well as data-processing and file management (later versions may also include credit card, pension fund, student card, bill payment and voter registration features). 'Telemedicine' is aimed at promoting general health information and education, as well as allowing remote diagnoses and consultations. 'Electronic government' promises to "reinvent the concept of government through connectivity"[191], i.e. by improving internal government efficiency and delivery of government services through internet and public kiosk technologies. 'Worldwide Manufacturing Web' promotes the MSC as a site for regional manufacturing support and coordination activities, while 'Borderless Marketing' encourages firms to

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[189] MDC, op. cit.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Mahathir, op. cit., p 68.

center their regional and global marketing activities in the MSC, including telemarketing, online information services, electronic commerce and digital broadcasting. Finally, the 'R&D Cluster' flagship is designed to promote collaborative research and information sharing among private and public sector researchers.[192]

These initial plans, ambitious as they are, constitute only the first step in what is envisioned as a dramatic and longer-term process of economic, social and cultural restructuring, whose end goal the Prime Minister has identified as "the evolution of a new way of life in the unfolding age of information and knowledge".[193] In its third and final stage (scheduled to coincide with the achievement of the country's earlier 'Vision 2020' development goals) the MSC is projected to catalyze the transformation of Malaysia as a whole into a 'super corridor'. In this it will join other 'islands of excellence' throughout the world and become an integral element in the Global Information Infrastructure governing the open and 'informational' world of the future.

The changes expected are clearly fundamental and far-reaching, going well beyond purely 'technical' questions of economic development policy. The project is deeply indebted, in both its design and rhetoric, to the vision of a borderless world. The reshaping of national development policy around new information technologies is predicted to produce precisely those benefits connoted by the broader discourses of informationalism outlined above – the elimination of borders and distance – leading to a vast increase in personal freedom, mobility and general well-being. These are the themes that have dominated domestic promotional efforts and much of the general social discourse surrounding informational change in Malaysia to date. The prime carriers of these messages have been public 'education' initiatives (most famously, the national 'Love IT' campaign, featuring billboards, nightly prime-time television ads, and an 'IT song' instantly recognizable to all KL residents), the advertising efforts of high-tech firms (e.g. in the rapidly growing computer, software and mobile phone industries) and the domestic media, including newspapers, radio and television.

The very saturation of these images, however, and the resulting dominance of the borderless world imagery within public and popular discourse, has limited the range of debate over the nature and social meaning of informational change in Malaysia. I argue that this raises serious and disturbing questions about a sort of 'informational authoritarianism' within the politics of technological change in Malaysia (though clear parallels, I believe, can be drawn here between Malaysia and other contexts, not all of them to be found in the 'developing' world). All of this stands in stark and ironic contrast to the more upbeat visions of freedom and liberty which characterize the narrative of the borderless world. Given the depth of change that the MSC and the Malaysian information-led development strategy is intended to produce (and here for once – in its ambitions at least – the much-abused term 'information revolution' might not be overblown) such limits on the range of public discourse and imagination should be taken very seriously indeed.

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[192] Ibid.
[193] op. cit., p 7.

OUT-OF-BOUNDS IN THE BORDERLESS WORLD

Interviews with a range of social actors – government officials, representatives of international and domestic IT firms, NGOs, citizen groups and political opposition figures – revealed a number of concerns generally neglected in the prevailing discourse on the MSC and informational change, at least that part of it represented in official announcements and mainstream media coverage.[194] Some of these came in the form of a 'technical' critique, which accepted the terms in which the debate had been framed (ie. upheld the notion of the borderless world and the general soundness of Malaysia's information-led development model) but questioned the feasibility of the MSC's ambitious development targets.[195] While far from common, such questions have periodically made it into the realm of 'legitimate' public discussion.

Others, however, raised concerns whose marginalization was far more pronounced. This marginalization was the product of at least two factors. First and most obvious was the long-standing power relationship connecting the interests and policies of the state to most of the mainstream media outlets.[196] This ensured that news about the MSC and information-led development received prominent and sustained coverage within the domestic media, nearly all of which enthusiastically endorsed the government's efforts and indeed played a crucial role in the attempt to mobilize popular nationalist sentiment around the MSC. However, alternative critiques were just as seriously undermined by the largely successful effort to position the question of the MSC, and questions of technological development more generally, within the borderless world narrative of technical and social change. Beginning from this starting point brought certain issues immediately to light while rendering others obscure, offered a ready vocabulary for describing some social processes while

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[194] These interviews were conducted in July and August of 1998. It should be noted that this was a time of considerable political and economic uncertainty. Politically, barely-concealed tensions were mounting between the Prime Minister and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, within UMNO and the Barisan Nasional (the leading party and ruling coalition, respectively). Economically, great uncertainty existed as to appropriate policy responses, as well as the probable length and severity, of the recession brought on by the Asian financial crisis of late 1997. A discussion of these political dynamics can be found in Meredith Weiss, "What Will Become of Reformasi? Ethnicity and Changing Political Norms in Malaysia," <u>Contemporary Southeast Asia</u> 21:3 (Dec. 1999), pp 424-450. For more on the economic impact of the financial crisis in Malaysia, see Jomo K.S., ed. <u>Tigers in Trouble: financial governance, liberalisation and crises in East Asia</u> (Zed Books: New York, 1998).

[195] Concerns of this nature included the availability of suitable 'knowledge workers', the scarcity of venture capital willing to support new technology start-ups, fierce regional investment competition (particularly from Singapore), short-term inadequacies in communication and transportation infrastructures, and above all in the summer of 1998, the uncertain effects of the Asian financial crisis on long-term regional development and investor confidence. A fuller account of these concerns can be found in Jackson and Mosco, op. cit., as well as in "MSC: Confronting the Realities", <u>PC Magazine Malaysia</u>, July 1998, and "Mahathir's High-Tech Folly", <u>Businessweek</u> (Int'l. Edition), March 22, 1999.

[196] See, for example, Zaharom Nain, "Rhetoric and realities: Malaysian television policy in an era of globalization," <u>Asian Journal of Communication</u> 6:1 (1996); Zaharom Nain, "Commercialization and control in a 'Caring Society': Malaysian media towards 2020," <u>Sojourn</u> 9:2 (1994); Loh Kok Wah, F. and Mustafa Anuar, "The Press in Malaysia in the early 1990s: Corporatisation, technological innovations and the middle class," in Mohd. Sarim Hj. Mustajab, et. al, eds., <u>Critical Perspectives: Essays in Honour of Syed Husin Ali</u>. Petaling Jaya: Malaysian Social Science Association, 1996.

leaving others nameless. In short, the installation of this particular structure of representation had a real and limiting effect on the types of social questions that could be effectively communicated.

What were some of these concerns? One set of questions had to do with the changing distribution of power between public and private actors embedded in the long-term vision of the MSC and the information society it is projected to produce. It was questioned whether the 'technological imperative' wasn't being mobilized to support a shift towards a corporatized mode of governance that was not (despite attempts to link the two) automatically embedded in the logic of informational development itself. This critique may seem counter-intuitive, given the crucial role of the state, and the dynamic leadership of the Prime Minister himself, in the early stages of the project; certainly the model of the MSC challenges any easy understandings of a simple state-market dichotomy. Nevertheless, concerns were raised over the vastly disproportionate weight accorded to corporate, as compared to civil society, representatives in the key design and steering decisions of the project. As noted above, the majority of seats on the National Information Technology Council – the body responsible for setting the means and ends of national informational development – are held by the heads of domestic communication and high technology firms, while groups such as non-governmental organizations, citizens movements, unions, etc. are entirely unrepresented. At the most immediate level, this has raised serious conflict-of-interest questions, as many NITC members represented firms who stood to reap substantial benefits from MSC infrastructure and flagship projects.[197] Respondents also questioned the role of the International Advisory Panel in the strategic direction of the MSC. The fear was raised that this move would locate substantial decision-making power beyond the reach of local and national accountability.[198] This concern was particularly pronounced when it came to such sensitive areas of social provision as health and education.

The longer-term vision for the MSC and Malaysia's information society expressed by the Prime Minister clearly extends this model of social decision-making. Responsibility for leadership in important social sectors is described as shifting increasingly from the state to the realm of corporate social responsibility. As Mahathir argues:

> People – especially corporate managers – must lead business and society with a social responsibility that displays not only a balanced set of values and ethics, but one that will inculcate the spirit of corporate integrity.[199]

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[197] This fear was heightened by a series of questionable corporate-political connections stemming from past rounds of privatization. For more on this, see Jomo K.S. and E.T. Gomez, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jomo K.S., ed. Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); and E.T. Gomez, Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional (Kuala Lumpur: Forum Publications, 1991).

[198] The extent of this body's decision-making power remains unclear. On one hand, as an advisory panel it would appear to have little formal authority. On the other hand, because it includes representation from several key present and prospective investors, its *informal* influence would seem to be, at least potentially, substantial. The question is clouded by a disjuncture between the MSC's international and domestic promotional efforts; the first of these asserts the important steering role of the IAP, while the second tends to emphasize local project control.

[199] Mahathir, op. cit., p 87.

This move in the direction of private governance does not begin with the MSC nor with the idea of information-led development in Malaysia; rather, it continues long-standing trends first evinced by the Mahathir government's aggressive privatization and liberalization campaigns from the mid-1980s onwards.[200]

A number of NGO representatives noted with apprehension the deep tensions running between a recent history of informational closure in Malaysia and the vision of openness and democratic potential sometimes ascribed the MSC. Although the government has promised freedom of the internet within its 'Bill of Guarantees' to investors, and proponents speak of IT's power to produce a democratized and empowered civil society, past experience should suggest some caution in this regard. As revealed by events surrounding the dismissal and prosecution of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 – including the ousting of perceived Anwar supporters from the editorial board of media outlets such as the New Straits Times, and the dismissal of leading academic Chandra Muzaffar from his post at the University of Malaya – controls over the channels of public communication remain strong in Malaysia.[201] Older pieces of legislation which have been used in the past to control media freedom and political dissent, including the Printing Presses and Publications Act, Official Secrets Act, and the Internal Security Act, remain in place[202].

Thus, while the new information technologies promoted by the MSC may indeed pose new challenges to regulators and new openings to domestic NGOs and social movements[203], they have not escaped past patterns of informational control. Evidence of this was provided in the so-called 'internet rumor mongering' case of August 1998, when reports of ethnic rioting in a downtown KL market spread quickly via email, sparking runs on stores throughout the capital region as people stocked up in preparation for a prolonged period of civil unrest. After several days of official silence (during which established media outlets made no reference to the story) the government came out strongly against the report, branding it a malicious fabrication, the work of 'traitors' and 'cowards'. The country's chief internet service provider was enlisted to access private email files in an attempt to determine the source of the rumor. Three people were eventually detained under the terms of the Internal Security Act for their part in the incident.[204] Partly in response to this, in December 1998 a bill was introduced requiring the country's numerous 'cybercafes' to identify and register all users and make this information available to the police.

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[200] For more discussion of these historical connections, see Jackson and Mosco, op. cit. Excellent accounts of the changing orientation of Malaysian economic policy can be found in Jomo, op. cit.

[201] For a description of the continuing (and in some ways deepening) restrictions upon the Malaysian press and media system, see Zaharom Nain, op. cit.; and Loh and Mustafa, op. cit.

[202] Zaharom, op. cit.; Zaharom and Mustafa, op. cit.

[203] Email and Internet strategies have indeed been adopted by many NGO activists to network and exchange information with domestic and international supporters. There are also, however, limits to the reach and effectiveness of such 'net-activism'. For a discussion of these, see Anna Har and John Hutnyk, "Languid, tropical, monsoonal time?: net-activism and hype in the context of South East Asian politics," Saksi #6 (July 1999) at http://www.saksi.com/jul99.

[204] See New Straits Times, The Star, Aug. 8-13, 1998.

Finally, a large number of the MSC's domestic critics expressed concern over the polarizing effects that the current information-led development strategy could be expected to produce. It was feared that the promised benefits of information would merely become the latest field for the iteration of long-standing socio-economic divisions. Thus, where once the categories of rich and poor were defined primarily according to access to material resources, the move to informationalism would shift the terms of the debate (for example, to notions of the 'information-rich' versus 'information-poor') while doing little to address the questions of inequality and unequal distribution of resources as such.[205] To the extent that background and training prepared elite and upper middle classes to be the most immediate beneficiaries of the MSC, and as Malaysia moved to restructure its economy around informational production, it was feared that information-led development would only widen the already large gaps in levels of prosperity throughout society as a whole.[206]

I wish to emphasize that these concerns about social distribution were at one and the same time questions of spatial organization. Several respondents pointed out that the MSC's central location, while perfectly logical given the need for advanced transport and communication infrastructure, as well as access to the business community and skilled labor market of Kuala Lumpur, was likely to only widen the already considerable gap separating the capital region from other, more remote, parts of the country. The vision of a futuristic zone of advanced technology and 'informational' living (as suggested by the MSC's promotional literature) with stronger links to a global economic system than to its immediate local and national surroundings was seen as a potential challenge to social cohesion. The challenge was described in different ways by different respondents. Some spoke of growing divisions along the lines of socio-economic class, as described above. Others suggested a growing cultural split separating the MSC and its associated forms of development from other regions of the country. This reflected in part a concern over the 'foreign' nature of the MSC, both in the composition of its workforce and the cultural values attributed to it.[207] But it also revealed an interest, while avoiding the question of 'Malaysian' versus 'foreign', in the cultural forms that might be produced by the day-to-day experience of living and working in the MSC. In short, what sort of 'cultural space' might the MSC come to represent? What factors would determine the character of this space? And what relationship might it have to other cultural spaces within the country?

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[205] For one version of this argument, see Lim Kit Siang, IT For All (Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1997).

[206] One respondent thus characterized the public monies spent on the MSC as 'a regressive net transfer of resources from poor to rich.' These issues were viewed with special concern in the context of domestic economic 'turmoil', where money directed toward the advanced technology sectors was money not spent on a system of basic social services under severe stress.

[207] In this, the MSC was inevitably caught up in the larger and highly sensitive debate (given the history and politics of Malaysian inter-ethnic relations) over what might properly constitute a 'Malaysian' culture or identity. One of the most immediate public expressions of this came in questions surrounding the range of allowable internet communications, including the issue of internet pornography. Efforts were also underway to define the relationship of Islam to informational development – a particular version of the 'cultural negotiation' of technology which would appear to be a universal of informational change. One example of the politics of this process can be found in the Prime Minister's suggestion that Malaysian religious groups should embrace information technologies to play a leading role in developing 'Islamic content' for the World Wide Web.

These concerns were made particularly acute by the powerfully contradictory element of exclusion embedded in the design and promotion of the MSC. Consider once again, for example, the design of the 'cybercities' projected as the nucleus of the project. The stated goal of Cyberjaya planners – to create a city combining "a world-class urban development", "a human-friendly urban environment" and "an eco-friendly sustainable environment" – is shaped by the desire to

> give MSC companies a first-of-its-kind working and living environment where the full potential of multimedia technologies can be explored without any physical limits.[208]

Specific features of the new city will include

> A wide choice of hillside mansions, lakefront houses, and condominiums to suit varying family needs, as well as a commercial precinct comprising [sic] of shopping facilities, first-class, resort-style hotels, convention centres, food outlets, and service apartments to accommodate business professionals and activities.[209]

These, along with numerous references to the "top management and knowledge workers" envisioned as the future residents of Cyberjaya, raise serious questions about who may be expected to access the social space of the MSC, and who may be held out 'at the borders.' This immediately suggests a different way of posing the question of information technology, space and borders, one which brings to light an entire 'micro-politics' of space organized around boundary practices more localized, often more subtle, but ultimately no less significant or compelling than borders prevailing at the level of the nation-state.

It should be noted that this exclusive nature is not incidental, an unintended by-product of the project's design. The need for a bounded zone with an explicitly 'global' character is clearly central to the government's appeal to international investors and foreign (arguably also Malaysian) professionals. It is also key to the MSC's position as the new symbolic center of national development aspirations. As several respondents (including many enthusiastic supporters of the project) argued, it was important that the MSC be something of a space apart, if indeed it was to provide an example to which the rest of the country could aspire in time. Paradoxically, its separate status in this way (and in the present discursive frame) contributed to its ability to act as the masthead of an increasingly technologically-oriented nationalism. For all these reasons, the MSC (and many other technopole developments existing or under construction elsewhere in the world) depends upon and is constituted by practices of social and spatial exclusion. Or, to push the point somewhat: *exclusion may in fact be the socio-spatial logic of information-led development*, at least as presently conceived and practiced.

But here we are moving into a set of questions for which the borderless world narrative offers little guidance. Indeed, the insistence upon erasure as the dominant motif within its particular vision of spatialization makes such practices of exclusion hard to even see. We clearly need a new way of talking about the relationship between contemporary processes of technical and spatial reorganization. The final section of the paper suggests two sources from which such a rethinking might begin.

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[208] Cyberjaya: The Model Intelligent City in the Making, Multimedia Development Corporation, 1998, p 7.
[209] Ibid, p 7.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, THE POLITICS OF MOBILITY, AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

We can now return to the more general discussions broached in the first section of the paper. There I argued that one of the principal failures of the borderless world narrative was its lack of social differentiation, its tendency to convey the impression that borders everywhere are disappearing or becoming porous, that communication and mobility (recall, "the free flow of information, money, goods and services, as well as the free migration of peoples and corporations")[210] are undergoing an unchecked and universal expansion.

Against this, drawing on the evidence of the MSC, I wish to set a formulation advanced by British geographer Doreen Massey. Massey argues that what such global analyses inevitably forget or obscure is the simple point that spatial transformations (the rise of the borderless world, the death of distance) are experienced in radically different ways by different people.

For different social groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn't, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation *to* the flows and the movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway-differentiated mobility: some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.[211]

We are reminded here that questions of communication and mobility (now as always) are deeply and inescapably *political*; that is, that the experience of these phenomena is accorded to different groups in different ways, with different effects.

To illustrate, consider two groups of workers central to the success of the MSC. The first are the 'knowledge workers', the hi-tech and business professionals (both Malaysian and foreign) that MSC planners have been eager to attract. Some will have recently been transferred, by choice or assignment, from offices abroad – Japan, Australia, California, Boston, Ottawa. Many will use the MSC as a base, spending much of their time travelling to clients and branch offices elsewhere in the region. Some will have recently returned from jobs or education in Australia, the U.S., Europe, Japan. Many will leave the country on weekends, vacationing and shopping in Bali, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong. Most will live in one of the new designer suburbs (and eventually, Cyberjaya) with an easier commute to the new international airport than downtown KL. For the foreigners among them, immigration procedures will be quick and painless, with a guaranteed 48-hour turnaround on all permit applications.

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[210] Ohmae, op. cit., pp *xii-xiii*.

[211] Doreen Massey, "Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place", in <u>Mapping the Futures: local cultures, global change</u>, eds. J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson and L Tickner (Routledge: New York, 1993).

Compare this to the experience of a second group, the construction workers who are, quite literally, building the MSC. Many of these will also be foreigners, although they are far more likely to come from Indonesia or Bangladesh than the U.S., Australia or Japan. Immigration procedures do not flow so smoothly for these workers; in recent months the price of a work permit has soared beyond reach, when permits are available at all. In better times these were 'guest workers'; now, with the economy in crisis, they are more commonly simply 'illegals', subject to periodic (and well-publicized) round-ups and deportation. It should be emphasized that these workers are also mobile, also part of the expanding global flows, though the circumstances surrounding their movement are vastly different.

Two groups of workers, both deeply implicated in the process of informational development, and two radically different experiences of boundaries. My point is simply this: that *both* of these experiences, and not merely the first one, must be taken into account before we can begin to meaningfully discuss the processes of technological and spatial reordering currently underway. Assertions of the borderless world (or, for that matter, any of the other global narratives currently in vogue) must therefore be met with certain questions: *Whose* borderless world? And for what purpose?

A second way of reconsidering the relationship between space, boundaries and informational change might begin from the theoretical frame supplied by French philosopher and social theorist Henri Lefebvre. For Lefebvre, far from being given, the empty Cartesian grid upon which sociality, as historical process, is written, space is actively and socially produced; put simply, "(Social) space is a (social) product."[212] Space is not only a neutral *medium* to be overcome or annihilated, but also the *outcome*, of social practice. It represents at once the 'sedimentation' or 'inscription' of history, i.e. the physical embodiment of historical social struggles, and the site and object of ongoing social negotiation and struggle.

Lefebvre has suggested a three-part schema or 'trialectic'[213] by which the production of space may be understood to occur. The first component he identifies as 'spatial practice' or *perceived* space. This consists of the material embodiments of place and location (e.g. buildings, road construction, park areas, urban zoning patterns, etc.) and the practices by which they are produced and reproduced. This corresponds to our everyday and commonsensical understandings of the social function and meaning of space; or, as Lefebvre biographer Rob Shields puts it, the myriad practices by which "'space' is dialectically produced as 'human space.'"[214] The second component consists of 'representations of space', made up of the knowledges, signs and codes by which the immediate experience of space is abstracted and restructured into systems of knowledge and logic. This is a *conceived* space precisely because of its power to overwrite the distinctly corporeal and material nature of space with a set of mental abstractions – philosophies, theories, the science of planning – which portray space as uniformly divisible and quantifiable, capable of being mapped onto a consistent and universal grid. This is the space of scientists and planners, and the primary site of a technocratic power intimately connected to prevailing relations of production. The final element of Lefebvre's triad is made up of

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[212] Henri Lefebvre, <u>The Production of Space</u> trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Blackwell: Oxford, 1991), p 26.
[213] See also Edward Soja's <u>Thirdspace: journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and-imagined places</u> (Blackwell: Cambridge, MA, 1996) for a treatment of these themes heavily influenced by Lefebvre.
[214] Rob Shields, <u>Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics</u> (Routledge: New York, 1999), p 162.

'spaces of representation' or *lived* space. For Lefebvre this represents the 'clandestine' or 'underground' side of social life (including art), in which symbolisms and practices rooted in the lived experience of community may evolve which differ from both the dominant 'common-sense' understandings of perceived space, and the technocratic impositions of conceived space. Spaces of representation are thus identified as potential sites of resistance and sources for new forms of spatial practice through acts of appropriation – Lefebvre gives as examples the activities of slum, favella and barrio-dwellers – which put space to uses other than those mandated by the practice and conception of prevailing social orders.

It is precisely the relationship, frequently antagonistic, between perception, conception, and lived experience that accounts for the production of space; for Lefebvre, the radically different spatial outcomes evident today and historically have been determined by complex interactions among the three 'poles' of this triad. The role of technology in this process is best understood not through its ability to erase space, but rather its effect in shifting the balance of influence among these three constitutive elements of spatial production. Technology's general tendency, for Lefebvre, is to privilege the *conceived* over the *lived*, the abstract spaces of technocratic planners and capital over the daily experience of living in community. In his urban writings, this corresponds to the rise of the city as product (characterized by homogeneity, calculation, the dominance of exchange value) over the city as work, or 'oeuvre' (marked by creativity, difference, use value).[215]

While this particular reading of technology (which is not, it should be added, a prominent feature of Lefebvre's writings on space) has come under considerable criticism, the general framework established in the Production of Space can act as an important corrective to many of the failings of the borderless world narrative outlined above. It will be apparent that beginning with an analytical frame built around active spatial production immediately renders such ideas as the erasure of space or the death of distance, strictly speaking, nonsensical. In doing so it forces us to engage with the multiple and complex relations prevailing (and persisting) in the concrete conditions of particular times and places. This grants technopole projects such as the MSC a specificity denied by borderless world arguments, which would cast the technopole in the most simple terms as a generic creature of policy, whose social character merely reflects an emergent global economic logic as a whole.

Lefebvre's insistence upon the importance of lived experience in the production of spaces may also offer a useful entry point for the sorts of cultural questions identified in early responses to the MSC project. While the precise forms that this might take remain unknown at this early stage of the project, the evolving character of everyday life in the new cybercities of the MSC will clearly bear heavily on the broader and longer term social outcomes likely to proceed from it. The uncertainty here stems from more than the new and unfinished character of the MSC, however; taking a Lefebvrian trialectics of spatiality seriously also means remaining sensitive to the potentially

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[215] Lefebvre, Henri. Writings on Cities, trans. and eds. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Blackwell: Oxford, 1996).

transformative character of everyday experience, introducing a necessary degree of openness and flexibility in the analysis of spatial phenomena.

Finally, starting with the framework laid out by Lefebvre might give us a way of approaching the sort of 'micro-politics of space' neglected within discussions of the MSC to date. It would allow us to ask more interesting, if more complex, questions about *all* of the boundary practices by which the MSC and other technopoles are constituted. For example: Who/what has access to this space, and on what terms? Who/what is held out at the border? Within the technopole, who moves where, and under what conditions? Or, as Massey reminds us to ask, for whom is freedom and mobility enhanced, and for whom is it constrained?

These are questions for which no clear answers presently exist. The MSC, at the time of writing and certainly in mid-1998 when the primary research for this study was conducted, remains a plan on the way to reality (though there is no guarantee that these two will bear a close resemblance). Quite apart from the longer-term considerations raised by respondents and conveyed here, the MSC faces some real and immediate challenges of a more strictly economic nature, including the need to attract higher levels of domestic and foreign investment, the availability of public and private funds to finance the costs of infrastructure development, and intensifying competition from other regional technopoles, old and new. But it should be emphasized that acknowledging contingency is also required in any serious engagement with the conceptual contributions of Massey and Lefebvre. Speaking of the production of space means taking seriously the interaction of the perceived, the conceived and the lived, the outcome of which is never determined in advance. Arguing for a politics of mobility means taking seriously the potential for that politics to produce unanticipated results. The story of information technology and spatialization conveyed by the borderless world metaphor has the advantage of a clear and happy ending; the alternative view suggested here is unavoidably committed to an ambiguous future.

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PERMEATING THE IRISH BORDER: PRACTICAL NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION0[216] UNDER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT AUSTEN MORGAN

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Introduction

This is a report on government work in progress in Northern Ireland. It deals in particular with the six so-called implementation bodies, agreed by the transitional Assembly on 18 January 1999. These are north-south institutions to be shared by the Republic of Ireland ('ROI'), and one of the devolved regions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ('UK'). I'm interested in precedents for such state to state relations elsewhere in the world. In this paper, I will explain the constitutional/legal nature of these north-south bodies – one set of institutions in the Belfast Agreement - in the context of the political history of the Northern Ireland problem.

While permeability presupposes an international boundary, the problem in Ireland was to have it mutually recognized so practical cooperation could be constructed. My theme is: the Irish government[217] cannot distinguish adequately the rhetoric of reunification, and practical – mainly socio-economic - cooperation (which Ulster unionists are prepared to accept).

An intractable dispute?

An intractable dispute is probably how Northern Ireland is perceived globally. But I want to make two points. One, London and Dublin worked for about ten years to produce the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998. And two, this is seen by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair as prototypical of solutions to local disputes in the post-communist global world. They want it to work; they have bigger fish to fry.

The Belfast Agreement: a health check

A health report, however, is probably necessary. David Trimble and Seamus Mallon were elected first minister and deputy first minister on 1 July 1998, as effectively a transitional administration. By 18 December 1998, most of the major decisions had been made.

Decommissioning of paramilitary – mainly IRA – arms has been the principal cause of the failure to transfer power. David Trimble's party has affirmed a no guns, no government policy. Sinn Féin says it is doing all it can; and that is all that is necessary. The Hillsborough declaration of 1 April 1999 was allowed to unravel. And *The Way Forward* plan of 2 July 1999 collapsed (leading to the

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[216] This term was used in article 10(c) of the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement, Cmnd. 9657, November 1985. It was used by John Major in his foreward to the 1995 *Framework Documents*, Cmnd. 2964, December 1995.
[217] Thus, the foreign minister, David Andrews, characterized Strand Two as creating the embyro government of Ireland.

resignation of the deputy first minister). Senator Mitchell has been sent for, and there is to be a review of the Belfast Agreement this September (scheduled probably to the end of October 1999).

Last year at Durham, I argued – on the basis of the referendums of 22 May 1998 - that the two governments had got the balance wrong. That in Northern Ireland produced a 71.12 per cent 'yes' vote for the Belfast Agreement (on an 81.1 per cent turnout): however, it split the majority unionist community. The referendum to change the constitution in the ROI produced a staggering 94.4 per cent 'yes' vote on a 56.3 per cent turnout. Since then, Irish nationalism has culturally appropriated what it calls the Good Friday Agreement (not entirely a bad thing), leaving the unionist population feeling the historical losers. To have a party with a private army in an involuntary coalition of four (including Dr Paisley's party) is no longer - if it ever were - politically possible.

Prospects?

The Belfast Agreement is not dead. It may be described loosely as fundamental international law; the United Kingdom and Irish governments have no alternative. There is an analogy with the Olso accords in the middle east. Statecraft may produce a solution in the Mitchell review (with the 22 May 2000 deadline for decommissioning approaching). If it does not, there will still be the 108 elected members of the transitional assembly. After 30 years of violence (to misquote the prime minister), 30 months is a reasonable time in which to manage a transition to democracy.

I have just spent the last four months writing *The Belfast Agreement: a practical legal analysis*, to be published in London by Sweet & Maxwell later this year.

The six implementation bodies

By way of an appetiser, I will start with the institutions agreed on 18 December 1998, and approved by the assembly on 18 January 1999[218]:

Waterways Ireland;
The Food Safety Promotion Board;
The Trade and Business Development Body;
The Special EU Programmes Body;
The North/South Language Body;
The Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission.

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[218] The 18 December 1998 agreement is Annex 1b of New Northern Ireland Assembly, *Report from the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate)*, NNIA 7, 15 February 1999. It was approved in New Northern Ireland Assembly, *Official Report*, 18 January 1999, pp. 416-75, but only on the basis of New Northern Ireland Assembly, *Report of the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate)*, NNIA 6, 18 January 1999. However, the assembly took note again, in New Northern Ireland Assembly, *Official Report*, 16 February 1999, pp. 68-109.

One estimate (designed to impress) is an annual expenditure, after three years, of IR£56m and a total staff of about 880[219]; these are not realistic figures. Given that the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission – which exists in separate entities – employs some 300 people, the achievement is commensurately less.

Un peu d'histoire
Towards an international frontier

Ireland was once united as an administrative unit, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This constitutional unity (under the Irish Office in London), however, masked a significant nineteenth-century socio-economic divide between north and south.

The consequence, given a majority Irish desire for self-government, and a minority (Ulster) attachment to the constitutional status quo, was partition under the Government of Ireland Act ('GOIA') 1920. The Irish border developed as follows:

1920-22:
an internal UK administrative frontier, between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, based on parliamentary areas;

1922-25:
an international land boundary, with some uncertainty about the status of the Irish Free State, a dominion within the British Empire;

1924-25:
a three-person boundary commission, to reconcile the wishes of the inhabitants with economic and geographic conditions, which led to a London-Dublin-Belfast agreement to accept the 1920 border[220];

1937 to present (the Irish view):
the Irish territorial claim to Northern Ireland in Eamon de Valera Bunreacht na hÉireann (constitution of Ireland);

1949 to present (the United Kingdom view):
the independent ROI not a foreign country[221];

the (putative) constitutional balance in the Belfast Agreement of 10 April 1998:
the end of the Irish territorial claim (in return for alleged UK recognition of the Irish people's right to self-determination[222]).

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[219] David Andrews, Dáil Éireann, *Official Report*, 9 March 1999.
[220] Ireland (Confirmation of Agreement) Act 1925; Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Act 1925.
[221] Ireland Act 1949 s 2(1).
[222] Constitutional Issues section of Belfast Agreement.

The boundary between Northern Ireland and the ROI has been one of the most stable in Europe. It is also now among the older land frontiers. The only threatened international incident was in 1969-70, when an Irish cabinet minority attempted a policy of limited military invasion. The concept of consent in Northern Ireland (after nearly 30 years) is foregrounded in the constitutional part of the Belfast Agreement (awaiting entry into force as an international agreement).

North-south relations after partition

The GOIA 1920 – it is little remembered – provided for so-called Irish union (within the United Kingdom), by identical acts of the Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland parliaments. This was 'with a view to the eventual establishment of a Parliament for the whole of Ireland, and to bringing about harmonious action between the parliaments and governments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland, and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of Ireland, and to providing for the administration of services which the two parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of Ireland…'.[223]

The Council of Ireland was given immediately powers in the areas of:
railways;
fisheries; and
the Diseases of Animals Acts.

This, however, was not at the expense of domestic jurisdiction in the two parts of Ireland.[224]

None of this came to pass. The 1925 agreement, whereby the Irish Free State recognized Northern Ireland, also saw the end of any possibility of a Council of Ireland. It was another 40 years – 1965 – before the heads of government in Belfast and Dublin met again. Paradoxically, it was during the Irish cold war of the 1950s, that some practical cooperation took place:

(1) drainage of the river Erne. A draft agreement was drawn up by the ministry of finance for Northern Ireland and the electricity supply board in the ROI for works on both sides of the border. This looks like a contract in private international law. While provision was made for a United Kingdom or Irish arbitrator[225], the law of the contract is not specified. Under the Erne Drainage and Development Act 1950, the board was authorized to enter into the agreement. There does not appear to have been related Northern Ireland legislation;

(2) the Foyle Fisheries Commission. Under the Foyle Fisheries Act (Northern Ireland) 1952, and an apparently identical act of the ROI (seemingly drafted in Belfast), the ministry of commerce for Northern Ireland and the minister for agriculture in the ROI, were permitted to purchase jointly fisheries and land. Conservation boards in both jurisdictions were dissolved. And the above

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[223] GOIA 1920, s 2(1).
[224] GOIA 1920 s 10(2).
[225] The terms United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were used in the second schedule to the draft agreement.

commission established, to preside over a lough and other areas without the territorial sea being determined. The commission purports to be a body corporate. And the administrations in Belfast and Dublin appoint the members. It is required to have an office in Northern Ireland and in the ROI[226];

(3) the Great Northern Railway. Under the Great Northern Railway Act 1953, and a similar act in Northern Ireland, the minister for industry and commerce in the ROI and the ministry of commerce for Northern Ireland, were permitted to purchase jointly the Great Northern Railway Company (Ireland), which ran a number of cross-border routes. There was to be an office in Dublin and another in Belfast. The two ministers jointly appointed the board, and could jointly direct its members. The board again purported to be a body corporate. The 1953 agreement was terminated in 1958. Under the Transport Act (Northern Ireland) 1958, and a similar measure in the ROI, the undertaking was divided between the Ulster transport authority and Córas Iompair Éireann.

The 1973 (unsuccessful) Sunningdale Agreement

The term, Irish dimension, emerged in the Northern Ireland Office document, *The future of Northern Ireland: a paper for discussion*, October 1972. It was juxtaposed to 'the United Kingdom interest': 'The United Kingdom Government has three major concerns in Northern Ireland. First, that it should be internally at peace.... Second, that it should prosper.... Third, that Northern Ireland should not offer a base for any external threat to the security of the United Kingdom.'[227] The following reasons were given for an Irish dimension: one, Northern Ireland is part of the geographical entity of Ireland; two, 'an element of the minority in Northern Ireland has hitherto seen itself as simply a part of the wider Irish community.'; three, 'the problem of political terrorism...has always had manifestations throughout the island'.[228]

Sunningdale included provision for (again) a Council of Ireland. There would be a council of ministers – seven each from Belfast and Dublin – 'with executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role'. There would also be a 60-member consultative assembly 'with advisory and review functions'. These institutions would have a secretariat headed by a secretary-general, with permanent headquarters and its own staff.

What were these institutions to do? There were to be 'studies' (seemingly to be completed by the time of the formal conference early in 1974) being directed to identifying 'suitable aspects of activities in the following broad fields':

- exploitation, conservation and development of natural resources and the environment;

- agricultural matters (including agricultural research, animal health and operational aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy), foresty and fisheries;

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[226] Paragraph 10 of the third schedule of the Irish act. It is in fact administered from Derry/Londonderry.
[227] Paragraph 74.
[228] Paragraph 76.

- co-operative ventures in the fields of trade and industry;

- electricity generation;

- tourism;

- roads and transport;

- advisory services in the field of public health;

- sport, culture and the arts.[229]

None of this came to pass. The power-sharing executive had fallen by May 1974, due mainly (but not entirely) to the Irish dimension.

The problem of legal forms
How does a state create a body shared with a neighbour? Two models – neither adequate – are extant:

identical acts of the Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland parliaments: this idea (as noted) was contained in the GOIA 1920. But it was redundant from the point at which nationalist Ireland refused to accept the 1920 act. It would never have worked in the Irish Free State, or its successor, Éire/Ireland. Yet, it was nationalist Ireland's chosen method of creating the implementation bodies (paragraph 10 of the Strand Two section of the Belfast Agreement);

(unspecified) agreements or arrangements between Belfast and Dublin: this appeared first in section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Ireland Act 1949 (which recognized the ROI as a separate state). It was not used seemingly. Agreements or arrangements were reenacted in section 12 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act ('NICA') 1973. This power was not used either. It has been reenacted again, in section 53 of the Northern Ireland Act ('NIA') 1998 (which has yet to come into force).

The correct model – the international organization – was found eventually in 1998-99 (as we will see).

The 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement
This was a consultation plus agreement between London and Dublin to do with Northern Ireland. It established an intergovernmental conference, to discuss: political matters; security and related matters; legal matters, including the administration of justice; and the promotion of cross-border cooperation.

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[229] Agreed communiqué if Sunningdale conference, 6-9 December 1973, reproduced in: *Boland v An Taoiseach* [1974] IR 338, 343-50.

While the UK government was principally interested in security cooperation, the Irish government succeeded, after the 1988 review, in having north-south economic, social and cultural cooperation treated as a regular agenda item. The origin of Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement lies in article 10(c) of the Anglo-Irish agreement (which was opposed fundamentally by Ulster unionists from 1985). However, it is being replaced by the British-Irish Agreement, a new start in state to state relations.

But there is a problem about Dublin's role in the transition. The Anglo-Irish agreement envisaged the Irish government acting as guarantors for northern nationalists in the search for devolution, or if there was no solution.[230] The Belfast Agreement is a devolution settlement in escrow. There is no role specified for the Irish government under the Anglo-Irish agreement, while, under the British-Irish Agreement, it will be shifted away from Northern Ireland to a genuine bilateral basis.

The negotiation of the Belfast Agreement
The 1993 *Downing Street Declaration*, Cmnd. 2442, and the 1995 *Framework Documents*, Cmnd. 2964, preceded the multi-party negotiations in 1996-98. The Sunningdale proposals were revived by Dublin, and accepted seemingly by London.

This was evident at least quantitatively, in the Mitchell Draft Paper (the penultimate version of the final agreement); 49 instances of north-south cooperation were specified.[231] Between 6 and 10 April 1998, this was whittled down to the Strand Two text, including the work programme to select six implementation bodies and six areas for cooperation by 31 October 1998 from an annex.[232]

Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement
This relates to north-south relations. The text of this 19-paragraph section of the Belfast Agreement (along with its annex) is appended. It provides for mainly a North/South Ministerial Council ('NSMC') – a treaty body - (a more practical and modest version of the 1920 and 1973 plans).[233] Strand Two is covered by Strand Three, the east-west dimension, comprising a British-Irish Council (and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference), the former treaty body comprising two states, three devolved administrations and the lesser islands[234].

The six implementation bodies
These, as noted, were agreed by the first minister and deputy first minister, with the ROI and UK governments involved, on 18 December 1998. They were approved by the assembly on 18 January 1999. They are listed here again for convenience:

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[230] Articles 4(c) and 5(c) respectively.
[231] Available at: http://www.nuzhound.com.
[232] The story is recounted by Senator Mitchell in *Making Peace*, London 1999, pp. 151-76.
[233] This is to be established under article 2(i) of the BIA. However, there was also a supplementary agreement of 8 March 1999, Cm 4294, Ireland No. 3 (1999), March 1999: *Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland establishing a North/South Ministerial Council.*
[234] The Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.

Waterways Ireland;
 The Food Safety Promotion Board;
 The Trade and Business Development Body;
 The Special EU Programmes Body;
 The North/South Language Body;
 The Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission.

The provenance of the six is interesting. The first and fourth were anticipated by the annex to Strand Two. The third and fourth were the deputy first minister's preferred choices; tourism – long a favourite – was downgraded. The remainder came from the first minister's camp[235]: the second raised the question of differential agricultural standards; the fifth activated parity of esteem between Ulster Scots and the national language of the Irish state (Irish); and the sixth raises indirectly the question of the territorial seas in Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough; further, Irish Lights – an anomalous UK-law body located in Dublin – may well be run through the British-Irish Council[236].

Legal creation
Article 2(ii) of the British-Irish Agreement ('BIA') – the legal form of the Belfast Agreement – signed by Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern on 10 April 1998, purports to create the Strand Two, paragraph 9(ii) bodies. However, this cannot be the case; they are not specified sufficiently.

Thus, on 8 March 1999 in Dublin, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, and the Irish foreign minister signed an *Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland establishing Implementation Bodies*, Cm 4293, Ireland No. 2 (1999). This was one of four agreements supplementing the BIA.[237]

Article 1 creates the six bodies in international law. Article 6 states they shall have legal personality (in Irish and Northern Ireland law). And article 3 puts them under the NSMC (as required by paragraph 11 of Strand Two). Whereas the 1973 legislation envisaged partial transfers of sovereignty, as functions were moved out of Northern Ireland into the ROI, and the 1998 act still allows for this, the international organization model is completely mutual. Each administration (one a state) is affected in the same way. The two administrations (Northern Ireland through the United Kingdom) agree to the temporary transfer of functions out of their jurisdiction into an international organization. The organization (a single body) is then given legal form in Northern Ireland, and Irish, law. There is no transfer of sovereignty – though there is pooling - , and the functions can be brought back by agreement or even unilaterally.

However, there are three problems with the 8 March 1999 international agreement. First, Article 2(1) refers to the 'functions' in Annex 1, while article 2(2) specifies consequential 'arrangements' in Annex 2. The 18 December 1998 agreement, approved by the assembly under section 1(1) of the

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[235] Two of these – trade and language – had not been endorsed by the UK government in the Mitchell Draft Paper.
[236] See article 4 of the international agreement cited in the section below.
[237] Articles 8 and 9.

Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998 on 18 January 1999, is contained in Annex 1. The legality of Annex 2 – pages 13 to 50 of the agreement – remains to be ascertained. It was not approved by the assembly. And it is more than technical details. The intention of ROI and Northern Ireland officials appears to have been to make the six bodies more meaningful. Thus, Waterways Ireland was to have functions added 'progressively thereafter' (Annex 1). In Annex 2, this becomes by 1 April 2000. Most likely, Annex 2 will be construed restrictively by the courts in terms of Annex 1.

Second, under article 5, the NSMC has to resort to the two governments for amendments of the international agreement by exchange of notes. Indeed, there was one such on 18 June 1999 (even before the agreement had entered into force), seeking to clarify an aspect of the Special EU Programmes Body.[238] (The secretary of state had little difficulty putting this through Westminster by a – direct rule – order in council.[239] In Dublin, the Oireachtas had to resort to primary legislation[240].)

Third, article 7(1) reads: 'Each Body shall act in accordance with any directions of the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs or the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs necessary to ensure compliance, within their respective jurisdictions, with any international obligations of the British Government or the Irish Government other than the international obligations arising under this Agreement or the British-Irish Agreement.'

Matters have been transferred from London to Belfast. The Northern Ireland administration is responsible under devolution. But, when it comes to cooperating with the Irish government, the UK foreign secretary can step in paternalistically. (There is no issue for Dublin: the foreign minister is a member of the Irish government which sits on the NSMC.) Under article 6, the United Kingdom government legislated on 10 March 1999: the North/South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 SI 859/1999. The international agreement was scheduled to the order. The Irish government also did this with the British-Irish Agreement Act 1999, promulgated on 22 March 1999.

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[238] The exchange of notes is scheduled to each of the pieces of legislation in the two notes immediately below. This was not made under article 5. The Irish government was concerned to amend the original agreement in accord with article 31(3)(a) of the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties.
[239] North/South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 1999, SI 2062/1999, made on 19 July 1999.
[240] British-Irish Agreement (Amendment) Act 1999.

APPENDIX
EXTRACT FROM THE BELFAST AGREEMENT OF 10 APRIL 1998

STRAND TWO

NORTH/SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a North/South Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.

All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to make alternative arrangements.

The Council to meet in different formats:

- in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach;

- in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each side represented by the appropriate Minister;

- in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement.

- Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for consideration or action.

The Council:

- to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Administrations, North and South;

- to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all-island benefit, and which are within the competence of both Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any disagreements;

- to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both Administrations, North and South;

- to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side to remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in place on either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of those attending.

As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus operandi.

During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government operating in the North/South Ministerial Council will undertake a work programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at least 12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October 1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will take place. Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the Annex.

As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the following categories:

- Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for co-operation in each separate jurisdiction;

- Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed implementation bodies on a cross-border or all-island level.

The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work programme, function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish Agreement and the transfer of

powers, with legislative authority for these bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the transfer of powers to the Assembly.

The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council.

Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences and responsibility of the two Administrations.

It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other.

Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format described at paragraph 3(iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement between the two sides, experts could be appointed to consider a particular matter and report.

Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public function.

The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service.

The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings.

The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual interest and concern.

Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues.

ANNEX

Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the following:

- Agriculture - animal and plant health.
- Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges.
- Transport - strategic transport planning.
- Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management.
- Waterways - inland waterways.
- Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers and fraud control.
- Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development.
- Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their successors.
- Inland Fisheries.
- Aquaculture and marine matters
- Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues.
- Urban and rural development.
- Others to be considered by the shadow North/ South Council.

Complex Emergency Response Planning and Coordination: Potential GIS Applications

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The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Government.

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Bradford L. Thomas, master cartographer and boundary scholar.

Complex emergency responses are invariably difficult, multi-faceted, and highly charged undertakings, with international relations implications and urgent lifesaving requirements. Accurate, relevant, and timely data can play a critical role in humanitarian missions and yet a cohesive information plan has been largely absent from recent multilateral emergency responses. This paper explores the potential use of geographic information system (GIS)-linked data collection, organization, and dissemination prior to and during multilateral humanitarian operations. The multiple functions of international boundaries in such operations are raised, as are the challenges of meeting crisis-response objectives. The use of GIS tools in Kosovo provides a model for projecting informational requirements onto future complex emergency responses that will involve both peacekeepers and civilian agencies.

Complex Emergency Operations

A growing body of literature on humanitarian relief and intervention describes the significant institutional, moral, and operational challenges such activities pose. While humanitarian relief operations are those that bring food, shelter, medicine, and other basic needs to vulnerable groups, a complex emergency operation entails something more. Traditional relief operations usually unfold with the consent of the government in which the crisis, usually a natural disaster, takes place. Such efforts will include a number of organizations, urgent life-saving measures, and difficult working conditions, but the common purpose is taken for granted: to assist with the recovery process. Depending on the extent and intensity of the disaster – an earthquake, flood, hurricane, drought, or even a toxic chemical spill – survivors can expect that life-threatening conditions will eventually recede, allowing them to return to the mundane challenges of daily survival, at least until the next disaster strikes (Burton, Kates, and Gilbert 1993). Reviews of "natural disasters" underscore underlying conditions of poverty, income inequity, and poor resource management, which are often not adequately addressed by international relief efforts. While these studies also acknowledge that such disasters can spill across borders, international boundaries per se usually do not play a critical role, other than as a logistical and bureaucratic hurdle to relief deliveries (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and Wisner 1994).

Complex emergency operations, in contrast to a "traditional" humanitarian relief operation, almost always involves a multilateral military and civilian response to a life-threatening crisis that is

deliberately imposed and manipulated rather than one stemming from a "natural" or accidental disaster. That key difference accounts for the much greater political, socio-economic, security, and even logistical difficulties faced by the international community in dealing with the victims of civil war, human rights abuses, ethnic violence, and compelled impoverishment (Cuny 1999). The international effort to help a war-ravaged community to recover can thus become highly contentious, requiring outside responders to understand the context in which the problem – and possible solutions – exist. A "crisis assessment" requires not just an understanding of the immediate humanitarian needs of victims, but also the social, political, economic, and military factors that will influence the international community's ability to assist in their recovery.

Complex emergency responses are frequently implemented over the objections of the government that has internationally recognized sovereign power over the crisis zone. The spatial dimensions of a humanitarian crisis are influenced but not necessarily confined within the delimited boundaries of the State, which attempts to legitimize its national authority by exerting control over its territory (Knight 1999). Under normal conditions, national territorial controls, such as at border checkpoints, are taken for granted as part of the recognized rights of a government. They become problematic when the State in effect loses control over the conflict zone or is deemed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to bear responsibility for the crisis. The UN Secretary General argues that sovereignty should not be used as an excuse to abuse human rights: "We [the UN] will not, and we cannot accept a situation where people are brutalized behind national boundaries" (Annan 1999 p. 32). Complex emergencies, though, generally result from widespread and systematically brutal treatment of minority groups, which the national government may actively participate in or implicitly condone.

Multilateral Response

Multilateral operations are often undertaken amidst ongoing hostilities between armed belligerents who have all too often targeted civilians as part of their military campaigns. These multilateral responses can involve peacekeeping forces, human rights monitors, refugee officers, civil affairs experts, negotiators, and special envoys of the UN Secretary General. They can force the UN and its member states to make difficult choices between the safety of UN peacekeepers and civilian staff and the protection of civilian war victims, especially those unable to cross an international boundary to the relative safety of another country (Moore 1998). International responses to complex emergencies, particularly those in which a lack of public security weakens relief capabilities, invariably require involvement by a variety of civilian agencies and peacekeepers from several governments, international and regional organizations (such as the UN, OSCE, and NATO) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Volatile and fluid military and political conditions that surround a complex emergency operation make the functions of international boundaries of critical importance. Initially, the UNSC must review the threats facing a vulnerable group and the implications for regional stability. If a mission is launched, international organizations may establish multilateral operations that must often negotiate their way through government and militia forces that may attempt to deny access, obstruct their work, steal their supplies, and even kidnap or kill their personnel. Additionally, relief agencies and peacekeepers must deal with the other products of war: landmines, atrocity sites, ongoing clashes

between ethnic groups, de facto divisions of communities along cease-fire lines, and even the creation of new subnational (Bosnia) and international boundaries (Ethiopia/Eritrea).

Complex emergency responses involve two sets of actors B victims of various types and groups of responders - and a set of operational goals, or pillars (Wood 1996). Multilateral intervention in a complex emergency entails coordination among a variety of agencies collecting many different types of data coming from a variety of agencies. Geospatial data are critical to the success of complex emergency responses because of the multitude and complexity of factors that can affect these missions. Geospatial in this sense refers to any data, including maps and imagery, "georeferenced" to a point or area on the earth's surface. These data can relate to physical features of the affected area, as well as infrastructure, population locations, and other factors relevant to both peacekeeping and civilian operations.

GIS software is uniquely capable of sorting through such "data layers" and displaying not-so-subtle relationships that underlie the context of the crisis and implications for multilateral response operations, from immediate relief through long term development. This paper looks at how GIS tools were used to assist international agencies responding to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and goes on to discuss how such tools might be applied to other complex cross-border emergencies.

Boundaries

Perhaps the most important geospatial data for multilateral operations are those only indirectly linked to physical geography. Current international land boundaries, for example, have often been imposed with little appreciation for local ecological conditions (watersheds), economic ties, land uses, or the distribution of ethnic groups. The variable functions of these boundaries can have profound influence on cross-border socioeconomic interactions (Thomas 1999). They can also either facilitate or impinge on cross-border relief operations depending on the degree and consistency of their openness. Kosovo's border crossings into Macedonia and Albania, for example, were alternatively open or closed depending on the numbers of refugees attempting to cross, security conditions, and bilateral relations.

Both the belligerents responsible for a humanitarian crisis and those attempting to resolve it work across permeable borders where porosity can vary greatly by place and time. The same border crossing can be open or closed to refugee flows or relief efforts depending on the policies of governments on both sides of the boundary line. Similarly, weapons can be smuggled quietly across one border while food shipments are hung up for days on another. Thus, border porosity is a critical – yet often ignored – function in multilateral response operations. Measures of cross-border relief flows, as well as operational impediments (such as multi-day delays at customs checkpoints), would be a useful addition to a GIS-linked set of data for emergency operations.

In addition to international boundaries, subnational administrative lines can also influence the spatial parameters of the conflict. They can divide a zone of safety from one of danger, determine the future of ethnic groups demanding self-determination, and even dictate the political and economic fate of specific communities located on one side or the other of the new line (or, in some unfortunate cases,

straddling it). The responding agencies themselves can introduce new de facto boundaries, such as those that allocate peacekeeping operational responsibilities for specific "sectors" to particular countries. In Bosnia, the Dayton-created inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) between the Bosniak-Croat "Federation" and the "Serb Republic" has taken on many of the functions of an international boundary, with divergent political structures and migration impediments. In Kosovo, the ethnically and administratively divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica has been a continuing source of violence well after the arrival of KFOR peacekeepers.

Civil-Military Coordination

Complex contingency operations are invariably costly, complicated, and lengthy missions led by the UN and some member states (Sohn 1997). Multilateral responses across international boundaries are often divided into those aspects managed by either military (peacekeeping) or civilian agencies (relief). Military rolls call for peacekeeping or observer forces under UN or regional organization (NATO) leadership. Military missions usually bring with them impressive logistical capabilities, a relatively disciplined work force, and clear command and control structures. More often than not, however, they do not bring much expertise in handling large humanitarian crises, and often these forces believe they are much better suited to dealing with military security concerns rather than relief delivery. Military operations are also expensive to launch and maintain (Brown and Rosecrance 1999).

Civilian agencies vary greatly, but in comparison with military forces, are generally much smaller and less well-structured (Lute 1998). These agencies can range from widely experienced UN administrators to NGO entrepreneurs. Together they are supposed to help transform an atrocity-ravaged society from chaos toward a durable peace. Such multilateral humanitarian efforts are optimistically mandated in UNSC resolutions, but can be quickly bogged down in operational, political, and security dilemmas. While civilian agencies might agree in principle to a division of labor, in the "field" (the crisis area) tensions among relief personnel can arise over poor mission coordination, funding problems, staff shortages, miscommunication, and insufficient protection for staff members.

Mission success requires effective integration of various aspects of military activities with many civilian entities across a broad range of functions. While implementation problems will invariably recur with each new crisis, they could be lessened with appropriate information management tools that improve inter-agency communication. Such information management tools and shared data need to be part of a broader process of collaborative planning between civilian and peacekeeping programs. Absent such cooperation, disjointed missions at a minimum result in costly duplication of effort. Without corrective measures to improve information sharing, civilian and military operations can become disjointed and thereby negatively affect the well being and safety of crisis victims.

GIS as a Planning and Coordination Tool

Both civilian agencies and peacekeepers are beginning to harness new information technologies that can assist their efforts to improve preparedness and responsiveness to natural disasters and complex

emergencies (Global Disaster Information Network 1997). While each responding agency usually brings specialized skills to as set of complementary mission goals, these are not enough – different agencies need to work together. New computer-based information management tools can help with the always-difficult tasks of planning, implementing, and successfully completing a multilateral mission.   GIS-based applications offer one set of information management tools to assist contingency planning for complex emergencies. GIS software, for example, has been used to describe the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, as well as assist with operational planning for the safe return of Kosovars and the reconstruction of their homes (Dziedzic and Wood forthcoming).

GIS is a means to spatially organize a variety of data for any given place or area. The premise is simply that natural features (a mountain or stream) and events (an earthquake or flood), as well as human activities, tend to occur on the earth's surface and can thus be linked by their relative location. Observations of such activities - a birth, a death, a crop yield, a road, a town, or the GDP of a whole country - can thus be "georeferenced" to a defined place or area. Once they are thus organized, these disparate data can be "layered" to study patterns of human activities and their societal and environmental consequences (Martin 1996; Wood 1999a). These data layers can also be linked to earth observation images of the earth surface and precisely tied to specific points on that surface through the use of global positioning system (GPS) receivers.   GIS software and GIS-linked data sets, if properly applied, can track a broad range of local, national, and international problems (PTI 1997).

In the Kosovo context, GIS was used to document a systematic pattern of forcible expulsions of ethnic Albanians from their communities. In that process tens of thousands of dwellings were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of Kosovars were forced into Albania, Macedonia, and beyond (US Department of State May 1999). Since October 1998, with the advent of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the troubled province has served as a testing ground for new information management tools. One such innovation, GIS, involves both a methodology for collecting, organizing, and using place-based information, as well as the software that allows such information to be shared among a diverse set of civilian and military agencies. This paper reviews how GIS was used as a multilateral information sharing and mission coordination tool, beginning with KVM and ending with the establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in July 1999.

GIS for Kosovo

Since the early 1990s, genocidal actions in the former Yugoslavia led to frustrating diplomatic impasses over how to respond to the latest threats by Serb nationalists against other ethnic groups (Woodward 1995; Zimmermann 1996; Holbrooke 1998).   By 1998, three years after the Dayton Peace Accords helped stabilize Bosnia, widespread violence erupted in the province of Kosovo. By the fall of 1998, GIS software was used to enable two of the lead international agencies involved in Kosovo - the OSCE-supported KVM and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - work together. KVM was responsible for monitoring human rights violations and maintaining public security, with an emphasis on limiting hostilities between Yugoslav military and policy units (VJ and MUP forces) and ethnic Albanian guerrilla forces (KLA). UNHCR had responsibility for

coordinating the relief activities of over 40 UN and NGO agencies, who collectively delivered food, built shelters, surveyed damage and water availability, and performed many tasks to meet the urgent needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs). A GIS package was developed as a means of data sharing between KVM and UNHCR. While this project got off to a good start, escalating violence in the spring of 1999 postponed creation of GIS-enhanced databases related to security and relief activities.

The foundation for the use of GIS in Kosovo was an "electronic base map" of the province assembled by the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), which is the lead federal agency for collecting worldwide cartographic and imagery-based geospatial data. An initial product was a "humanitarian planning map" that was used in its paper copy form by many relief agencies. More important, though, was the underlying GIS product that contained several data "layers" (topography, roads, places, administrative units, etc.). A complementary NIMA project was a Kosovo gazetteer of over 1,500 place names and geocoordinates. This NIMA map and gazetteer in effect created an objective spatial framework for collecting data about the unfolding ethnic cleansing tragedy. KVM, for example, used the GIS-generated map to begin a database of reported landmines and boobytraps that was later adopted by the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). UNHCR used the same map to support its survey of dwelling damage; this effort was continued following renewed hostilities against ethnic Albanians.

Following the NATO air campaign, KFOR and UNMIK quickly deployed into Kosovo, facing the difficult task of ensuring stability in the province, as well as providing assistance to over a million Kosovars who had been displaced and were now returning en masse. GIS tools were used to map refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, where over a half million Kosovars had sought refuge under very difficult conditions. The need for GIS tools in late spring and summer of 1999 was even greater than during the previous fall and winter. Returnees to Kosovo faced many obstacles: landmines and unexploded ordnance; destroyed infrastructure; tens of thousands of damaged dwellings; abandoned farms; lingering mistrust between returning ethnic Albanians and those ethnic Serbs who had decided to stay; and, finally, a devastated economy.

The US Government-led Kosovo Repatriation Information Support (KRIS) project identified data of relevance to safe cross-border repatriation and included them within GIS-linked databases. The rapid pace of spontaneous returns precluded a well-ordered and prioritized repatriation from Albania and Macedonia, but added even more urgency for shareable data between KFOR and UNHCR. A priority was data on landmines and unexploded ordnance that could be used by KFOR and UNMIK-coordinated agencies to identify and disarm these pervasive threats to returnees. Another valuable data set was a NIMA imagery-derived assessment of damage to dwellings. The KRIS team brought in laptops loaded with GIS software and NIMA-supplied foundation data and worked with UNHCR GIS experts. A particularly important UNHCR field staff contribution was the creation of standardized "place codes" to facilitate data collection. As the lead humanitarian agency under the UNMIK aegis, the UNHCR launched a Rapid Village Assessment survey that used these "place codes" to georeference field data. Another operational innovation was the use of an agreed-upon assessment form and template that could be directly linked to a relational database, which, in turn, could interact with and be displayed through a GIS. These standardized assessments were used to

produce an initial report on destruction, population returns, and other critical variables (see some of these data at http://reliefweb.int/hcic/). In addition GIS-linked data sets were used to support the work of the newly established Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center, which provides relevant data to the UN and NGO relief agencies working in the province.

Planning for Future Multilateral Responses

Traditionally, the international community has responded to humanitarian emergencies with relief efforts directed primarily at refugees. More recently, however, relief agencies are attempting to reach victims who remain within a country racked by war (Dowty and Loescher 1996). The UN has had some success in providing urgent relief supplies to stave off starvation and epidemics, but has been less able to cope with causal factors and protecting internally displaced persons (Wood 1996; Moore 1998). A report by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies criticized the UNHCR-led multilateral effort to assist Kosovar refugees for weak coordination among UN agencies, donor governments, and NGOs (ICVA 2000). The UNHCR's "independent evaluation" also noted unsatisfactory coordination during the crisis because of the UNHCR's weak surge capability, tardy staff deployment, and inconsistent implementation (UNHCR 2000). The likelihood of more destabilizing spillovers suggests the need for improved contingency planning and coordination prior to future missions, but such efforts have been easier to propose than to implement (Lute 1998).

Multilateral responses are now called upon to confront deep-rooted hostilities, curtail arms flows, strengthen democratic institutions, and address educational biases. Such ambitious objectives are now considered essential for the creation of a "culture of prevention" (Annan 1999; Government of Sweden 1999). In areas of mass atrocities, though, NGOs argue that political and militia leaders hinder their access to victims because relief agencies are viewed as obstacles to the elimination of targeted communities (Medecins Sans Frontieres 1997). Refugee advocacy groups also claim that they can assist victims only if the international community acts firmly to support cross-border relief, initiate human rights monitoring, and, most importantly, protect those forcibly displaced, whether they stay in their country or leave. A more vigorous UN and/or regional response capability requires a longer-term investment in conflict prevention measures and a consistent "firm but fair" challenge to those committing atrocities (International Peace Academy 1995; Jentleson 1996). Preventive diplomacy measures, though, need a well-structured information base about the geopolitical and situational context of each crisis.

GIS for Coordinated Responses

GIS capabilities, especially when enhanced with high-resolution imagery, have been well tested under a variety of civilian and military applications, but their use by agencies responding together to a complex emergency is relatively new. Kosovo was a promising test case, despite the unpredictable and complicated problems that arose because of the rapid returns, extensive damage, lack of winterization supplies, and continuing political problems (del Mundo and Wilkinson 1999). Both peacekeepers and civilian agencies involved in Kosovo now have improving computer-based

information management capabilities. But these took many months to develop. The international community's challenge is to incorporate these new decision-making tools into a multilateral contingency planning process before the next crisis erupts.

NIMA's "humanitarian planning map" established a critical geospatial foundation for other disparate types of crisis- and relief-related data. Such a GIS-based map must be developed quickly and accurately prior to the intervention, so that emergency response agencies can focus on integrating just those data layers that are relevant to their mission and help with overall mission coordination. Unfortunately, such maps are often taken for granted and/or assumed to already exist, when more often they do not exist at the scale required for multilateral response operations in remote areas – especially border regions where crises often erupt. For base maps to be truly useful, they need to be clearly organized, standardized, and fully GIS-compatible. Dynamic base maps must form the core of an information package that interveners bring with them because once they cross into a war-ravaged country, they will have their hands full with the crisis.

Regardless of its computing power, a GIS is only as good as the data it displays. While GIS technology is more affordable, powerful, and user-friendly, it is still heavily dependent upon the accuracy and currency of the databases that support it and the skills of the people who use it. In most war-devastated countries, basic socio-economic and population data are poor to begin with and, since they are usually collected under pre-war conditions, they are literally overtaken by events and are usually out of date for repatriation requirements. Similarly, remote sensing imagery and other data are becoming more accessible, in large measure to the Internet, but the volume of data on-line is not a good measure of success for complex emergency responses. Rather, any GIS program should be judged by how well it manipulates relevant data layers to help answer tough cross-border mission problems.

GIS for Basic Needs

GIS tools can help organize the logistical requirements for effective and timely relief deliveries. A humanitarian crisis is largely defined by the immediacy of the threat to the lives of those affected. The scale of basic needs response – the provision of food, water, medicine, clothes, and shelter – is dependent upon the spatial extension of the emergency (Wolde-Mariam 1981). For example, famines can be the result of both a lack of food supply (from crop failures) or, often more importantly, the inability of victims – usually rural poor – to buy available food. Indicators of such a crisis can be seen in changing agrarian conditions – the rising price of grain and the declining price of livestock (as farmers sell off herds that they can no longer afford to maintain). A local famine can best be ameliorated with food imported from the regional and national levels; a national famine usually entails an international response. When the famine has been fueled by warfare and/or corrupt regimes, efforts to import donated food across an international boundary can become a highly charged and internationalized political problem. GIS tools can help in demonstrating the spatial extent and severity of a drought and resulting crop failures, changes in the price of food staples, and locations of acutely malnourished communities (such as done by the Famine Early Warning System

for Africa). Such combinations of war and natural disasters, such as has been the case almost annually in the Horn of Africa, can hit both subnational and transnational areas and can shift from year to year, thus requiring an international response strategy.

In complex emergencies, many victims are left with next to nothing to help them survive under dangerous conditions, other than their determination. Over a million forcibly displaced Kosovars demonstrated this resolve during the dangerous months prior to their return following the NATO air campaign. While those that escape across a border are often provided better care and protection by the international community than those remaining within their country, both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) require basic provisions for survival (US Committee for Refugees 1997). At the peak of such a crisis, delays of hours and, more likely, days can take a high toll in lost lives. Clean water is often the most urgent supply problem. Closely following clean water come other basic needs requiring deliveries to often isolated and distant sites: food, sanitation facilities, rudimentary shelters, and vaccinations. Data about supplies and demands are often lacking and fluctuating. A well-prepared GIS package can be used to assess campsites, populations in need, health threats, border checkpoint bottlenecks, delivery supply routes, water sources, food stockpiles, and other critical data for multilateral operations.

GIS for Public Security

Unlike a natural disaster, where the biggest public security threat may be pillaging, man-made emergencies are made more problematic and dangerous by well-armed belligerents who all too often place a higher priority on diverting or stopping relief deliveries than helping the people they claim to represent. Food becomes a weapon of war and a means of controlling people (Cuny 1999). Loosely controlled militias can and do hijack relief trucks, kidnap relief workers, and steal food directly from relief victims. In many conflict zones, there is a lack of civilian police capable of providing protection to IDPs and residents. Despite a sizeable KFOR presence in Kosovo, violence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs continued into 2000, with many Serbs fleeing. Another major public security threat in many civil wars is landmines and unexploded ordnance. While a GIS can itself do nothing to curb ongoing violence, it can be used by peacekeepers to plan safe routes, locate illegal militia checkpoints, determine cease-fire lines, and, perhaps most importantly, delineate suspected landmine fields along military lines of control and porous international borders.

GIS for Political Dialogue

Since political confrontations underlie all complex emergencies, international responders must also include a process for negotiating a stable outcome. The more violent and deep-rooted the internecine conflict, the more difficult the challenge of reconciliation and more arduous the negotiations for an acceptable power sharing regime among armed antagonists. The hatred and distrust that flourishes in civil wars does not end with a cease-fire. In Kosovo, even within the ethnic Albanian community there is tension over efforts by one political group associated with the KLA to dominate local institutions and exclude those with different political objectives. Elections are an important element in the introduction of democratic institutions that can help overcome such alienation, but they are only a means and, unless carefully nurtured, can reinforce nationalistic tensions. GIS can be used to assist

organizations that aim to encourage democratic practices by helping to organize data related to voter registration, electoral districting, and election results at the local and national levels. A GIS-based approach can be used to clarify territorial aspects of the underlying conflict, and can be an important aide in looking at political solutions based on the creation of new and/or reconfigured subnational and/or international political jurisdictions, such as the Dayton peace talks (Corson and Minghi 1996). Relevant data layers for such territorial redistricting might include population distribution, ethnic composition, economic ties, and transportation linkages. The downside for partition schemes, such as in Bosnia, is that they can be used by nationalist groups to reinforce ethnic segregation and discourage returns of IDPs and refugees to areas where they would be the minority group.

GIS for Human Rights/Justice

Systematic human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and even genocide have been closely identified with recent civil wars (Stremlau 1998). The vast majority of deaths in such wars are no longer soldiers on the battlefields, but civilians who are often deliberately targeted. Ethnic cleansing is the process of forcibly expelling an ethnic group from its community; it can involve torture, massacres, methodical destruction of homes and places of worship, and, of course, generation of large numbers of IDPs and refugees. GIS tools were used to analyze ethnic cleansing patterns in Bosnia based on data collected by several agencies, including the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Wood and Smith 1997).

In civil war-prone countries, the rule of law and human rights principles are frequently ignored and criminal gangs, often associated with militias, can wield life and death power. In Kosovo, as many as 10,000 people may have been killed since 1998, most of whom were non-combatants. A GIS-based project for Kosovo included showing patterns of ethnic cleansing, identifying the locations and conditions of massacre sites, and estimating levels of destruction in war-ravaged communities (US Department of State 1999). It can help war crime prosecutors, truth commissions, and human rights investigators determine the physical dimensions of atrocities against civilians and the impact of those crimes on the landscape. It can also be used to help plan for the safe deployment of peacekeepers and human rights monitors, under the UNSC's Chapter 6 and 7 provisions, to violence-prone areas within the sovereign space of UN members.

GIS for Sustained Economic Development

The ultimate goal for multilateral emergency operations is to transform the conflict zone into a politically and economically stable country, with decreasing ethnic tensions and improving living conditions. All are long term prospects and are difficult to achieve under the best of conditions. Political and economic conditions are interrelated, with positive and negative trends feeding back to affect the likelihood of democracy on one hand or economic growth on the other. Economic development is difficult to catalyze and sustain in post conflict societies; foreign investment can be skittish and legitimate business can be scared away by the institutionalized corruption that war encourages. Once basic needs are established, a country struggling to recover from the devastation of war needs considerable investment in reconstruction of destroyed homes, damaged energy,

transportation, and telecommunication infrastructure, and public health. Kosovo, despite a large international presence, will likely continue to face problems with power outages, lack of building supplies, and weak economic prospects. A current relief-to-development project for Kosovo is using GIS tools to assess reconstruction requirements and priorities – from estimating the extent of housing damage to road and utility repairs. GIS can also be used to look at agricultural and resource extraction prospects – what lands can be returned to productivity most quickly and which natural resources might be tapped to generate revenues. It can also be used to look beyond the crisis country to regional markets and trading networks, which are vital to long term development goals.

GIS for Multilateral Synergy

GIS is most effective as an "enterprise-wide" tool to improve planning and coordination among the five mission areas outlined above. While the interrelations among these goals are obvious, the international community's crisis response is often based on institutions with stove-piped information flows. Each institution is given a mandate to address a particular goal – such as supplying building materials or organizing elections - but is constrained in how it interacts with other institutions. From the perspective of the war victim, though, they need all of the above in varying levels. Victims need effective management and leadership that will produce an integrated approach that minimizes duplication of effort and maximizes efficient services. A GIS can be used to institute "mission-wide" strategic planning and complementary relief, security, human rights, and development services. The first step is to establish a GIS-enhanced data sharing regime among all the key actors responding to the crisis. The second is for such an information strategy to be used by the senior-most members of the multilateral operation. In Kosovo, such responsibility lies with the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, who administers UNMIK. The daily challenge of implementing a strategic information plan then takes up the many intervening steps of collecting, organizing, analyzing, and sharing data related to operational objectives. The last step is arguably the most important: leaving the GIS-structured information system to the local and host nation institutions that will take over from the responders once they leave.

Conclusion

International responses to complex emergencies, which can be regionally destabilizing, are often weakened by poor planning and insufficient data sharing. As diplomats, peacekeepers, human rights monitors, and relief agencies continue to wrestle with the challenge of implementing peace operations, relief deliveries, and even civil administrations in war-ravaged areas, they will need to rely more on new geographic information technologies and methodologies (Wood 1999b). For inevitable future complex emergencies, the issue will not be what GIS is capable of, but rather how it can be best applied to support effective collaborations before, during, and after responders deploy into the crisis zone.

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Facing Across Borders: The Diplomacy of *Bon Voisinage*

Alan K. Henrikson

Introduction

The nature of border relationships is crucial to determining the quality of the overall relationship between member states in the international system. Without mutually acceptable relations across borderlands, satisfactory relationships between adjoining nations, including diplomatic relationships between central governments in national capitals, may be almost impossible to achieve. Transboundary stability and border-area comity may thus be *necessary* conditions of wider, even international-regional, stability and comity. Is peace along international borders, however, also a *sufficient* condition of world peace? Can the amelioration of conditions along borders produce--actually, by itself, generate--global reconciliation, cooperation, "good neighborhood"? In what circumstances might diplomatic strategies that are aimed at, across, and about borders begin to have such a transformative effect?

The validity of the above-suggested stronger thesis--namely, that a diplomacy of *bon voisinage* might significantly contribute to peace between nations and in the world--would depend on the fulfillment of a number of major conditions. I shall seek in this article to identify what these are, and to explain their causal importance. Let me briefly state them at the outset. The first is that the nations in question must "face," or consciously confront and also formally address, one another--the crucial issue here being whether the countries and their leaders are sufficiently oriented toward, and therefore attentive to, one another. Whether or not they can thus emphasize and highlight their mutual relations may depend on the historically conditioned geopolitical orientations of the countries involved, that is, where the general population of each of the countries conceives the "front" and the "back" of that country to be. A "front"-to-"front" relationship is more likely to have significance than a "back"-to-"back" one, or even a "front"-to-"back" one or "back"-to-"front" one.

The second requirement is that the two facing countries must be internally organized--constitutionally ordered and socially connected--in such a way as to allow the effects of positive transborder relations to flow throughout their respective national "bodies." The issue here is not just whether the border itself is transparent and permeable, but also whether the remainder of each of the national societies involved can efficiently process, and beneficially absorb, what is transmitted at the border, not merely the goods and services that may pass through but also the ideas and the images that can be conveyed. The very "picture," or visual landscape, of a border zone, natural features as well as border installations, helps to give content to a nation's view of its transborder and other relationships with a neighboring country. The more positive (i.e., physically and socially attractive) the borderscape, on both sides, the better. "Positive"-"positive" imagery here is obviously to be preferred to "negative"-"negative," or even "positive"-"negative" or "negative"-"positive." But the border-area picture, whatever its character, must be communicated.

The third condition of successful bordering diplomacy, particularly to be emphasized, is that the "skins" of countries--reflecting the geographer Friedrich Ratzel's notion of the boundary as the

"peripheral organ" of a state and thus inseparable from it (Ratzel, 1969: 23)--should somehow be bonded, legally and even institutionally, to the political epidermises, i.e., borders, of the country or countries adjacent. The key issue here is whether the mutual chafing that can occur at borders, given the discrepancies that can exist between countries, can be avoided by joint management. The effectiveness of most bilateral transborder relationships around the world can usually be reinforced by bilateral, or even multilateral, systems of transfrontier cooperation. Such "internationalization" of border-area cooperation can create larger common-border systems, as is developing today most notably within the geographic area of the expanding European Union (EU). In most parts of the globe, however, a high degree of amalgamation, with supranational controls, is hardly possible. Therefore the international *diplomacy*, as opposed to the supranational administration, of border arrangements must be emphasized. Even in Europe, especially its eastern and southern regions, continued diplomatic attention to borders is warranted.

In most countries, and also regional groupings of countries, there is an interplay between capital communities and border areas: between "centers" and "peripheries" (Gottmann, 1980a). In those cases, as in Europe, where there is wider international involvement, particularly big-power interest and also supranational-organizational involvement in the making of local boundary arrangements, there may be different levels of center vs. periphery forces at play. For convenience of future reference, those forces operating at the national level, within nations or directly between them, will be noted as national-"central" (with a little c) or national-"peripheral" (with a little p), and those of a wider scope as international-"Central" (with a big C) and international-"Peripheral" (with a big P). Typically today, in negotiations concerning borderlands and cross-border issues, there is a complex involvement of national-level centers and peripheries, in the immediately juxtaposed or neighboring countries, and Centers and Peripheries, representing factors in the larger international community as well. An examination of what is here called "the diplomacy of *bon voisinage*" must take account of these multi-level dynamics.

In general, border-focused diplomacy, to be successful, must coordinate the interests of centers and peripheries within and across national lines, harmonizing them so to speak. That is, both of the central governments and also the peripheral communities that are involved must be able to find that an adjustment of a border-related dispute is in the common interest. There are, as indicated, two pairs of centers and peripheries implicated, and these can interact, directly and indirectly, regardless of national lines. As shown in the "Frontier Transactions Model" (Fig. 1) of the political geographer John W. House, there can be "inter-State" transactions between the neighboring countries, i.e., between central-government officials situated in their respective national capitals or perhaps meeting one another elsewhere. There can be "core-periphery" transactions between the central areas and border regions within each of the two countries. There can, furthermore, be "frontier zone," or immediate cross-border, transactions. Finally, there can be, more remarkably, "core-periphery *adjacent* State" transactions, involving some, though probably limited, contact between the center of one country and the periphery of the other (House, 1980: 466).

Whether the four actors actually do interact (i.e., engage in active exchanges) or not, they may co-vary in their responses, and their attitudes. In order for successful border-based diplomacy to occur, all four of the actors, the c's and p's of each country, will need to recognize that such

interchange, possibly resulting in an international agreement concerning a border matter, is advantageous to them, individually as well as collectively. So, too, if the larger international community is involved, should the dominant powers or leading organizations therein, the C's, and also the weaker but nonetheless perhaps influential P's, appreciate the advantage that a border agreement may bring. All parties must concur, at least in a general way, for an international border accord to be perceived as fair and just, to be implemented effectively, and, as a consequence, to have a chance to endure. This outcome can be achieved more readily if there is a guiding concept to inspire and to direct the diplomacy of international bordermaking.

The Concept of "Good Neighborhood"/*Bon Voisinage*

"In the field of world policy," Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his first inaugural address as U.S. President on 4 March 1933, "I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors" (quoted in Guerrant, 1950: 1).

In the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, it is loftily stated: "We the Peoples of the United Nations" express determination "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours" (United Nations, 1990: 1). The equally authentic French-language text, always a little different, replaces "good neighbor" with "esprit de bon voisinage" (spirit of good neighborliness) (Nations Unis, 1997: 3). Article 74 of Chapter XI, concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories, commits UN members holding such territories to respect there, on the colonial periphery no less than in their metropolitan areas, "the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters" (United Nations, 1990: 39). The French text, almost identical, affirms "le principe général du bon voisinage dans le domaine social, économique et commercial, compte tenu des intérêts et de la prospérité du reste du monde" (Nations Unies, 1997: 48).

It is obvious from these historically celebrated and internationally primary expressions of the idea of good neighborhood that the "policy" or "principle" of good-neighborliness/*bon voisinage* is not a strictly defined legal concept. The words with which it is formulated do not completely capture it. In the French-language Charter text the "esprit" of good-neighborly relations is noted, and perhaps emphasized. The *Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international* (1960: 94) recognizes that "bon voisinage" is not "un concept juridique précis" (a precise juridical concept) but, rather, the expression of "un esprit de mutuelle considération, de réciprocité et d'entente confiant" (a spirit of mutual consideration, of reciprocity and of confident understanding).

Nonetheless, certain distinct elements in the spirit-idea are clear, perhaps the most basic being the notion of mutuality or reciprocity--that is, equivalency of station and interchange. Neighbors are to be accepted as being equal and thus as deserving of considerate regard when an action that might adversely affect them is being contemplated, just as if the shoe were on the other foot. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"--the Golden Rule--obtains. Moreover, there is an

implied acceptance of difference or, at least, a commitment to *tolerance* of difference. Force must not be used to change things. There is a further, more specific implication of noninterference in the internal affairs of others.

These were the meanings that the notion was given in the policy context of the Roosevelt administration's "Good Neighbor Policy," narrowed as it was later in 1933 to U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries, within the Western Hemisphere. At the Seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December of that year, the American republics approved a Convention on the Rights and Duties of States which prohibited intervention by any state "in the internal or external affairs of another." This express and absolute commitment to nonintervention did have antecedents in the dialectic of U.S.-Latin American relations during the preceding Republican administrations (Welles, 1944: 185-241; Wood, 1961). As far back as February 1848, with the signature of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on "Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement" that ended the war between the United States and Mexico, the "good neighborhood" (and probably also *buen vecindad*) phrase was used. Suggested by the Mexican delegation (Wood, 1961: 124), this mention is considered the *locus classicus* of the current concept (*Dictionnaire*, 1960: 94).

In the preamble to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo it is stated that the United States and Mexico, as between themselves, would "establish upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship, which shall confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both, and assure the concord, harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the two Peoples should live, as Good Neighbors." Article 21 of the treaty provides specifically for what should be done (and not done) if "disagreements" arose. There must be no resort, by either country, to reprisals, aggression, or hostility of any kind "until the Government of that which deems itself aggrieved, shall have maturely considered, in the spirit of peace and good neighborship, whether it would not be better that such difference should be settled by arbitration of Commissioners appointed on each side, or by that of a friendly nation" (Bevans, 1972: 792, 803). The possibility, even then, of third-party--to that extent, international--involvement in the maintenance of bilateral U.S.-Mexican relations is noteworthy.

The broader meaning of Roosevelt's 1933 use of the Good Neighbor expression, in its conceptual scope (beyond merely the "nonintervention" commitment) and also in its span of geographical application (into the realm of "world" policy), "has been lost," as his closest collaborator in handling inter-American matters, Sumner Welles, later commented (Welles, 1944: 192-193). The present reexamination of the concept is an effort to recover some of that lost content and spread.

In truth, *bon voisinage* is not a practice unknown to other parts of the world. The historical geography of Europe, which happens to have more kilometers of political boundary per unit of land than any other continent, is replete with examples of boundary cooperation. Most of these have been very localized. House (1980: 459) describes the designation in Europe of parallel frontier zones, of varying widths, on either side of a border which grant local residents special customs and other privileges. Such zones for small-scale frontier exchanges (*Kleiner Grenzverker*) usually have been negotiated bilaterally, in the limited interest of the border residents. Their larger political purpose has been minimal.

An illustrative historical case is the boundary arrangement contained in a 1926 commercial treaty between Hungary and Yugoslavia (League of Nations, 1929-30: 117-29; Boggs, 1940: 237-245). Its stated purpose was "to afford reciprocal traffic between the frontier zones the facilities required for daily needs." Accordingly, the text defined two 10-to-15 kilometer border zones on either side of the line. It even enumerated the foodstuffs (e.g., fresh vegetables and milk) and other necessary items (e.g., firewood and building materials) that could be transported across the border without payment of duties. For the benefit of local-area farmers, the treaty provided that fields could be tilled and livestock pastured on the other side of the boundary line. "Frontier permits" would be issued to other persons who also needed regularly to cross the border. Specific crossing places and times ("between sunrise and sunset") were designated. In urgent situations, "frontier passes" could be given out by a summary procedure. During emergencies such as floods, forest fires, or other widespread calamities, frontier residents were authorized "to cross the frontier by all routes by day or by night."

For the general betterment of Hungarian-Yugoslav border-area relations, some bilateral cooperation of an institutional kind was provided for by the 1926 treaty. With a view to "ensuring mutual assistance" and to "creating between the frontier authorities on both sides the atmosphere of good neighborliness," the chief officers of the two nations' frontier authorities were to meet regularly. Those officers were to "endeavour to remove any difficulties arising from incidents of slight importance and redress any grievances of the inhabitants of the frontier zones." This suggests different levels at which border-related diplomacy can be conducted.

Three Levels of Border Diplomacy

A diplomacy of *bon voisinage*--as distinct from traditional capital-to-capital diplomacy carried out at national centers, with little or no reference to national peripheries--can occur at any or all of three levels. The first, and highest, is the level of "summit" meetings, or direct encounters between national political leaders. Not uncommonly, these take place at border locations. Such sites at or near the political boundaries between countries may be, symbolically if not geometrically, midway between the two centers, making it possible for the leaders "to meet each other halfway," for reasons of convenience as well as regard for dignity. These meetings remain, however, essentially center-to-center encounters.

The "halfway" sites chosen may not be at formal boundary lines at all but, rather, at the common edges of their respective spheres of control--that is, geopolitical equilibrium points. Sometimes they may be at military fronts, where armies meet. One thinks, for example, of the meeting in 1807 of Napoleon and Alexander I on a raft in the Neman River near Tilsit (now Sovetsk, on Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast border with Lithuania), where they famously divided power in Europe between themselves. When leaders' meetings take place at settled borders of already recognized state domains, they gain additional resonance therefrom. The border location enhances their presence, just as the boundary, as a line between equal sovereignties, is reconfirmed by their being there.

An example of a more or less regular series of border-situated leaders' meetings, occurring in the North American context, are the encounters that, traditionally, have taken place at the border between the United States and Mexico when a new U.S. President is elected. The *encuentro* that occurred in

January 1981 between the American President-elect, Ronald Reagan, shortly before he was inaugurated, and the President of Mexico of the time, José López Portillo, illustrates the pattern. That border actually defines the U.S.-Mexican relationship. "Our friends south of the border" was the way Reagan referred to leaders of Mexico (and even of other, more distant Latin American nations). It is worth noting, too, that President Reagan's "first trip out of the country" following his inauguration was "a get-acquainted meeting," as he termed it, with the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Reagan, 1990: 240). This took place in the capital of Canada, Ottawa--a political center, but also a location very close to the northern border of the United States and thus perhaps, from a Washington-centric perspective, somewhat on the periphery.

Reagan's first instinct, as a new President, evidently was to keep the fences of the United States mended with the nation's "friends" to the south and to the north. There happened to be a larger, longer-term policy purpose as well: to lay a basis of neighborly understanding, at the leadership level, for the negotiation of what he had termed, in announcing his candidacy for the presidency in November 1979, a "North American accord"--the germ of what became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As Reagan later recalled, it had long been his belief that "the largest countries" of North America--Canada, the United States, and Mexico--should "forge a closer alliance and become more of a power in the world." The grouping would be "to our mutual economic benefit" and the example and effects of the three North American countries working together "might be able to help the Latin American countries help themselves" (Reagan, 1990: 240). Reagan's notion of tripartite North American cooperation was rooted in the concept of neighborhood. His very term, "accord," suggests direct, heart-to-heart contact. Revealingly, he had said when he proposed the North American accord idea in 1979: "It is time we stopped thinking of our nearest neighbors as foreigners" (quoted in Henrikson, 1993: 77).

The second, or middle level, of a direct diplomacy of *bon voisinage* is that which occurs through ministerial or subministerial contacts. These, too, are often regularized, and sometimes even institutionalized. The ministries typically involved, besides ministries of foreign affairs such as the U.S. State Department, are those other departments or agencies of national government having an interest in border-related policy matters, particularly commerce and immigration but also issues related to the environment, public health, and crime. In order to coordinate the handling of U.S.-Mexican relations in these many areas, President Jimmy Carter and President López Portillo established in 1976 a Consultative Mechanism for that purpose. The following year a Border subgroup was set up to study and cooperate in the management of common economic and social problems under the general oversight of the Consultative Mechanism (House, 1982: 256).

At this subsummit level or, generally, intermediate level there should also be included the continuing transactions of such treaty-based binational or international commissions as have been established, more permanently, for the management of physical problems that may develop on borders, including possible adjustment of the borderline itself. In the context of U.S.-Mexican border relations, there is the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), dating from the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and a water boundary treaty of 1889. In the U.S.-Canadian context, there is the International Joint Commission (IJC), created by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which has a somewhat broader purview.

The third, and lowest, level is the subnational level. "Diplomacy" at this level may be conceived to include consultations that take place across national lines between state (or provincial) and also municipal authorities as well as discussions that occur between nongovernmental or private-sector groups desirous of good-neighborly relations. In 1977, for example, there was set up a U.S. SW Border Regional Commission and, on the Mexican side, a Co-ordinating Commission of the National Programme for the Borders and Free Zones (House, 1982: 256). To the extent that such entities are created not only for the purpose of advancing the interests of the resident communities in the border areas but also to engender a wider comity, between neighboring countries as wholes, they can be understood to have a "political" purpose. The broader political, even consciously inter*national* purpose may justify the non-strict use of the term, "diplomatic," to describe the relevant portion of such inter-local representation and discourse.[241] "Citizen diplomacy" can exist, if it is structured and if it is strategic.

The diagram of House's "Frontier Transactions Model" (Fig. 1) captures many of these relationships, with a distinct emphasis on such "frontier zones" as might be defined along nations' peripheries. A modification of his model by J. R. V. Prescott (1987: 160) makes a further distinction between "capitals" and "provincial centres," both of which can deal with "border settlements," as they do also with each other (Fig. 2). It is the capital cities of nations, of course, from which foreign policy proper emanates, but other, non-capital urban centers, especially those located in major regions nearer the border, also can play important roles in the overall diplomacy of *bon voisinage*, as can border-settlement communities and their leaders themselves.

Local and National "Mending Walls": Consociative Peacemaking

Ideally, a political boundary between communities should be a "Mending Wall," to use the title of Robert Frost's widely known but commonly misunderstood poem about boundary-keeping in New England (Frost, 1946: 35-36). Frost essentially posited that, in "walking the line" between fields, physical neighbors could become, by virtue of their common effort of jointly maintaining a boundary line and its markers, neighbors in further senses too--together making a neighborhood. Boundaries are, as a chief cartographer in the U.S. State Department, Bradford Thomas, has written, the "mortar" that holds together, as well as simply delineates the pieces of, "the giant mosaic" that is the global map (Thomas, 1999: 69). To a degree, they are the "mortar" of the political world itself.

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[241]   **Notes**

The political scientist Ivo Duchacek has a more complex nomenclature for subnational transborder diplomacy. He distinguishes between "*global microdiplomacy* (or *paradiplomacy*)" and "*transborder regionalism*." The former refers to "processes and networks through which subnational governments search for and establish cooperative contacts and compacts on a *global* scale, usually with foreign central governments and private enterprises." The latter refers to "the sum of the various informal and formal networks of communications and problem-solving mechanisms which bring *contiguous* subnational territorial communities into decisional dyads or triads--that is, bicommunal or tricommunal transfrontier regimes" (Duchacek, 1986: 14, 17).

On whatever geographical scale, there conventionally have been thought to be two basic strategies for making peace between communities: those of an *associative* kind and those of a *dissociative* kind. The former strategies are based on the premise that removing barriers between hostile or suspicious parties will help to reconcile them. The latter are founded on the opposite assumption that keeping antagonistic parties apart will reduce their antagonism and maybe even, in time, placate them. Here a third strategy, which may be termed the *consociative*, is proposed.[242] More than just a combination of the first two strategies, it is based on the idea that the interaction, and even linking, of societies at and across boundaries in space, with the semi-permeable boundary zone working to form as well as to define a relationship, is a key to peacemaking.[243]

There are "schools" of belief concerning this subject. Those of an idealistic turn of mind have tended to favor the associative approach, preferring boundaries that are "meeting places." A few writers, such as the British geographer Lionel William Lyde in his book *Some Frontiers of To-morrow: An Aspiration for Europe* (1915), have argued that boundary lines should be drawn where they might have an "assimilative" effect. He went so far as to propose (remarkably, during the First World War) that boundaries should be "anti-defensive." He meant more than that boundaries should not be highly fortified. They should be "identified with geographical features which are associated naturally with the meeting of peoples and persons in the ordinary routine of *peaceful* intercourse" (Lyde, 1915: 2).

The dominant perspective on political boundaries, however, surely has been the more realistically minded one that they are, almost by definition, dissociative--or "dissimilative," in Lyde's lexicon. "Functions of boundaries are in general negative rather than positive," as a former geographer of the U.S. Department of State, Samuel Whittemore Boggs, pointed out in *International Boundaries* (1940). "To at least some degree they restrict the movements of peoples and the exchange of goods, of money, even of ideas" (Boggs, 1940: 11). Much the same basic outlook upon boundaries is adopted by Stephen B. Jones in his handbook, *Boundary-Making* (1945). Directly taking issue with Lyde's assimilationist argument, Jones declared: "Almost inevitably an international boundary offers

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[242]   There is, perhaps, no such thing as a completely novel word. Upon checking in *Webster's*, I find "consociation," a voluntary council or union of neighboring Congregational churches (*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 1961: 484). Interestingly, there is thus an in-built geographical component in this historical meaning. Spatiality is implicit, too, in Arend Lijphart's notion of "consociational democracy," which deals with the structuring of relations between proximate or even intermingled ethnic or religious groups within the same, plural society. Only if secession or partition occurs would "the model of international diplomacy," which is emphasized in this article, apply (Lijphart, 1977: 45).

[243]   Elements of all three theories--associative, dissociative, and consociative--may be found in Frost's poem, "Mending Wall." The associative view is implied by the line: "Something there is that doesn't love a wall." The forces of nature itself, during the upheavals of winter, have caused boundary stones to tumble down, thus seeming not to want the wall to exist. The dissociative view (surely not Frost's own) is expressed by the Yankee farmer who, moving along the stone barrier as in a dark age, keeps repeating his father's saying, "Good fences make good neighbours." The consociative view is captured in the poem's metaphorical description of the collaborative process, not a spontaneous occurrence but an anticipated and requisite event, of annually repairing the stone fence between farm plots by joint action: "And on a day we meet to walk the line/And set the wall between us once again" (Frost, 1946: 35-36). The reciprocating process of boundary maintenance pulls the divided parties together--like a zipper. A boundary, cooperatively restored, binds as it bounds. In being jointly mended, the wall itself mends.

some impedance to the circulation of people and goods. Therefore there may be some advantage--other things being equal--in locating a boundary in a zone where circulation is relatively weak" (Jones, 1945: 8). Earlier, Lyde's "academic idealism" had been criticized also by the British boundary-maker, Colonel Sir Thomas H. Holdich, who asserted that "the first and greatest object of a national frontier is to ensure peace and goodwill between contiguous peoples by putting a definite edge to the national political horizon, so as to limit unauthorized expansion and trespass" (Holdich, 1916: x).

The trouble with both of these contending "schools" is that they do not clearly enough recognize the essential *relation* between the associative aspects and the dissociative aspects of boundaries. A consociative border strategy integrally connects these. Its essence is structured cooperation, spatial and functional. Consociatively connected countries are confederated in contiguity, so to speak, through formal and informal transborder links. The human use of these joint structures, in day-to-day dealings, can, figuratively, stitch foreign and alienated countries together. "Consociative diplomacy," this style of politically conscious border-based exchange and communication between countries may be called.

The Relevance of Boundary-making Today

Generally, boundaries have been thought of as *problems*. As Gottmann has observed, "The record of history demonstrates that political limits in geographic space have been and remain a major source of tension and conflict" (Gottmann, 1980b: 433). The emphasis of the present article is, instead, placed on the potential role of political boundaries, including administrative regimes to control them, as *solutions*--as ameliorative factors in situations that might, otherwise, erupt in local or general recrimination and violence. "Border incidents," in other words, can lead to peace as well as to war. What is required is a new way of looking at boundaries, to accommodate the actively pacific roles that boundary lines and boundary systems can play.

In advancing this argument, asserting the present-day efficacy of boundarymaking, one must acknowledge that there is a growing belief in some regions of the world, most especially in Western Europe, that the very idea of boundary divisions is losing significance. Economic interdependence, social mobility, technological exchange, and communications flows--in a single word, "globalization"--have made the very notion of achieving such aims as security, prosperity, or liberty through better territorial partitioning seem quite unrealistic and unreasonable. Nonetheless, there has not been a complete revolution.

A British diplomat, Robert Cooper, has argued that there simultaneously exist in today's world three different mentalities: the *pre-modern*, which is essentially a tribal outlook, focused on ethnic identity and survival; the *modern*, which is fixated on the notions of nation-state and sovereignty and emphasizes territorial integrity; and the *post-modern*, which transcends political-territorial foundations and walls, and allows, even requires, openness to the outside--and from the outside. Two-way transparency is seen as advantageous. For certain purposes, such as human rights advancement, even external intervention in a country's internal affairs may be welcomed (Cooper, 1996).

The European Union has carried the notion of post-modernity the furthest. Within the EU, national sovereignties to some extent have been pooled. Among the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), too, there has been a certain joining of vital national interests in a way that reduces boundaries' importance. Article 5 of NATO allies' Washington Treaty (1949) affirms, remarkably, that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995: 232). The countries in the European and Euro-Atlantic sphere, and to some degree their nearby neighbors as well, as the *Economist* observed in a comment on Cooper's scheme, now operate "in a system that encourages mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs and invites constraints and surveillance in military affairs," and increasingly in other areas of policy as well (*The Economist*, 1997: 41-43).

Post-modernism does not mean, however, that boundaries are obliterated. They are, rather, becoming more differentiated. Their functions are now more various. Some borders themselves are becoming extended. Countries located along or amidst oceans now in most cases have much wider national maritime boundaries.[244] The sea frontiers of the world are today much more inclusive and complex than they once were. For small island states, especially, the vast spatial aggrandizement that is implied is an enormous complication, for it entails increased national administrative responsibility and diplomatic involvement, with neighbors and others.

So numerous, layered, and diversified have boundary arrangements become that, as Bradford Thomas suggests, they cannot even be graphically delineated, on the map, as before. "'Full international boundaries'--those boundaries agreed by the two states being separated--came to have relatively uniform functions and be represented by a single symbol on the world political map," as he reflects. "Departures from that symbol represented not a change in function but such differences in legal status as disputed boundaries, cease-fire lines, and provisional administrative lines." Today, however, "changing concepts of territorial sovereignty and even of the state are bringing more variation in the

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[244]   This is a result of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and, particularly, the articulation therein of a "contiguous zone" of up to 12 nautical miles (beyond a 12-mile-maximum "territorial sea") within which infringements of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations pertaining to the territorial sea can be prevented or punished and also of a novel "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) of up to 200 nautical miles. The EEZ concept gives to a state claiming such an economic zone the right to control resources both on or under the seabed and in the water column above it. This prerogative encompasses the management of all resources, protection of the marine environment, conduct of scientific research, and erection and use of artificial structures. Moreover, for some countries with the right geographies, a "continental shelf" of up to 350 nautical miles also can be claimed if the submarine physical topography so justifies this (Thomas, 1999: 82-87; Sohn and Gustafson, 1984: 94-95, 113-171).

functions of international boundaries and a tendency for decline in the number or level of functions a boundary may perform. A single 'international boundary' symbol no longer will suffice for the world political map" (Thomas, 1993: 1-2).[245]

Boundaries of "post-modern" economic and political communities--such as the European Union arguably is becoming--or even the common outer limits of merely "modern" bilateral or multilateral international free trade areas--such as Canada, the United States, and Mexico have together formed with their NAFTA--should perhaps be drawn on the political map. They are certainly now parts of most Europeans' and North Americans' "mental maps" (Henrikson, 1980, 1991, 1993, 1995). The EU members and the NAFTA countries thus would be presented as collectivities or groupings, as well as individual nations.

Within some countries, certain lines of division, including "pre-modern" ones, also might need to be drawn in order better to indicate current and changing realities. The continuing disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an example of an ethno-national dialectic that has taken clearer and clearer linear form. To be sure, the administrative borders within Yugoslavia that have emerged as interstate boundaries have not, except in the case of the Croatia-Slovenia interrepublican line, conformed well with the actual ethnographic map. As conveniences, however, they have been used as the basis of what have become in some cases major international frontiers (Ratner, 1996).

There must be "a better way" to make boundaries between countries, so as to help resolve international tensions and engender peaceful and productive relations. As earlier indicated, there are three basic conditions that an effective peace-through-bordering, or "good neighbor," diplomacy may need to fulfill. These will be discussed more fully, in order.

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[245] In particular, as Thomas predicts, the "mounting pressure for marine resource development can be expected to lead to representation of offshore boundaries on political maps." Political maps might, for example, "extend the color applied to a state's land area into the seas over which it exercises economic jurisdiction in a screen of reduced values of the same color. Whatever the method of symbolization chosen, it seems clear that in order realistically to reflect human responses to political changes around the world, future political maps will need to display a number of different kinds of 'international' boundaries--on land and in the sea" (Thomas, 1993: 1-2).

Geographical Confrontation and Diplomatic Attention

The first premise of effective transborder[246] diplomacy, as suggested at the outset of this article, is that, in order for border relations to bring larger intercommunal or, if between sovereign parties, international peace, is that the two (or possibly more) actors, seated in their respective territories, must think of themselves as "facing," or geopolitically confronting and also directly addressing, one another. The very word "frontier," it may be noted, derives from the Latin word, *frons*, for "forehead." Thus an anthropomorphic factor is built into the very idea of international relations at and across frontiers.

The orientation of a country is a very complex matter, involving not only geography itself but also history and culture--as well as, more specifically, a country's foreign policy traditions and habits of diplomacy. Nontheless, certain fundamental things can be said. Any geographic space is altered by the conscious outlook of the human intelligence, individual and collective, residing in the corporeal entity, or "body," of the people occupying it. As was written long ago by Immanuel Kant, "our geographical knowledge, and even our commonest knowledge of the position of places, would be of no aid to us if we could not, by reference to the sides of our bodies, assign to regions the things so ordered and the whole system of mutually relative positions" (Kant, 1929 [1768]: 22-23, quoted in Tuan, 1997: 36). The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan epitomizes this Kantian psycho-geographical perception this way: "The human being, by his mere presence, imposes a schema on space" (Tuan, 1977: 36). That is to say (generalizing from a single person to a part or the whole of a society), the way a community "faces" *makes* an area, whether a linear border zone or a broader territory ahead, a "front."

The basic point, in the present context, is a deceptively simple one: in order to negotiate effectively with another country, a country must *face* that country. It is only thus that vistas of opportunity can be opened up, which an entire society as well as its leadership can "see." And, of course, the other country must face it. That is, the diplomatic confrontation should be mutual. As earlier suggested, "front"-"front" negotiations, though not the only ones possible, are the most likely to result in breakthroughs for peace.

Some contiguous or nearly contiguous countries "face" each other, and others do not. Some peripheral zones in Europe, particularly those marginal territories between the great state-building

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[246]   The term, trans*border* diplomacy, may be used more or less interchangeably with trans*frontier* diplomacy, ignoring for present purposes subtle differences between these, in different languages and geographical contexts. *Frontière*, in French, and *Grenze*, in German, are relatively inclusive, single terms. "Frontier" and "boundary" are contradistinguished by Ladis Kristof (1969), who sees a frontier as *outer-oriented*, directed toward outlying areas that are both a source of danger and a prize, and a boundary as *inner-oriented*, created and maintained by the will of a central government. The former is a manifestation of *centrifugal* forces, and the latter is drawn by *centripetal* forces. A frontier, because it is a "zone of transition" from the sphere (ecumene) of one way of life to another, is an *integrating* factor; and a boundary, because it impedes transitional flows between such spheres, is a *separating* factor. Kristof accepts the assertion of the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer (1927) that boundaries are "zones of frictions."

cores, have been what the political scientist Stein Rokkan termed "*interface* peripheries" (Rokkan, 1980: 175). The historical relationship between France and Germany, fraught with fear as well as familiarity, is an example of a genuine face-to-face dialectic, and it may be used to illustrate the above-mentioned point. Following the Second World War, hundreds of border-located and other communities within France and Germany joined in bilateral cooperative relationships, notably *jumelage*, or twinning, pacts. At the highest level of national leadership too, direct transborder politics were emphasized, for symbolic as well as for substantive reasons.

One can cite, at the personal level, the roles of the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and the German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, both Rhinelanders, in constructing the postwar French-German relationship, including the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in part on the basis of their commonly experienced neighborhood. Indeed, their approach to reconciliation was more than neighborly: it was consociatively binational, aimed at joining their countries geo-functionally. When Schuman visited Bonn for the first time as foreign minister in January 1950, he said at a luncheon given for him by Adenauer that "when one day the history of our time and its problems is written, it will be recognized that we attempted an important piece of work here on the Rhine, our Rhine, the German and French Rhine, this river that is one entity despite all national frontiers" (quoted in Adenauer, 1965: 235).

Countries that are larger and geopolitically more detached, such as the United States on its transcontinental base in North America, have somewhat more freedom of orientation. The United States can "face" Europe, toward which it was originally and traditionally oriented (Meinig, 1986); or, alternatively, it can swing toward the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on challenges there--in so doing, "turning its back," it seems, on the Old Country. To be sure, it is probably still the northeastern seaboard of the United States, for most of its history the main gateway for imports and immigration, that is considered by most Americans the nation's "front" (Tuan, 1997: 42; Gottmann, 1961). Nonetheless, the geopolitical constraints on Uncle Sam are not so great as to prevent a shifting of the national "geobody" toward other horizons.

The smaller countries of North America, Mexico and Canada, are weaker and more vulnerable, and cannot so easily turn away from their immediate neighborhood--and neighbor. In President Porfirio Díaz's famous lament, "Pobre México, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos" (Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States). For Mexicans, the Colossus of the North simply cannot be ignored, given the pressure of power in vicinity. Whether or not to "face" the United States is thus not really a choice. The northern frontier is the place where most of the exchanges with the United States occur. It is thus not surprising that Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green, in her first ministerial address, accepted responsibility for coordinating "los diversos aspectos de la relación compleja e intensa con los Estados Unidos de América, vecino geográfico, socio comercial y con quien compartimos la mayor de nuestras fronteras" (the diverse aspects of the complex and intense relationship with the United States of America, geographic neighbor, commercial partner and with whom we share the largest of our frontiers) (Green Macías, 1998). Her Canadian counterpart, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, also has described preserving the positive "world's longest border" relationship with the United States as a primary responsibility. "The Canada-U.S. border is a potent symbol of the enduring partnership between our two countries," he

writes. "It is symbolic of the many ties that link our citizens and our destinies. Much more than a simple dividing line, our common border is a model of trust, mutual respect and cooperation between our two nations" (Axworthy, 1999).

It is unlikely that any U.S. Secretary of State at any time in American history would have felt so obliged to place such an emphasis on managing relations with neighboring Mexico or Canada. Geopsychologically, those two next-door countries lie somewhat to the "left" or "right" of the main course of American concerns, depending on which way the United States then is facing. "In our experience as mobile animals," as Yi-Fu Tuan emphasizes, "front and back are primary, right and left are secondary" (Tuan, 1977: 42). To the extent that American society is similar to individual persons in psychology of spatial orientation, it requires a "turn" for U.S. authorities, at the national headquarters in Washington, to address relations with either Mexico or Canada head-on, "frontally," with full attention. Except on rare occasions, as during the Reagan administration which was exceptional in its initial North American continental-policy interest, those countries tend to be dealt with "sideways," as a consequence of U.S. officials' major foreign policy attention being directed across the Atlantic, toward Western Europe and Russia, or the Pacific, toward Asian nations.

America's main adversary, Russia, has scarcely been in direct contact with the United States at all. Historically, the two countries have seemed to be on opposite sides of the globe. This changed somewhat during the Cold War, when the geostrategic attention of Soviet and U.S. planners came to be focused on the Arctic zone. When Uncle Joe (Stalin) and Uncle Sam as personifications of the two countries faced each other at the top of the globe, as in a 1947 cartoon by the *Washington Post*'s Herbert Block ("Herblock"), the geographical context ("One World") of their political confrontation was not at all well defined or delimited (Bailey, 1950: 321; Henrikson, 1975: 46) (Fig. 3). The high north strategic frontier, though vitally important in defense, had very little transformative potential for the Russian and American nations in general, for it was "watched" mainly by the military, a specialized sub-culture. Only large-scale economic development, including extension of shipping and air transport routes, of the whole resource-rich circumpolar zone--an "Arctic Mediterranean," as some fancied it--might have caused widespread Russian and American ties to form into a transarctic international "neighborhood" (Henrikson, 1990; Young, 1996). As it was, the only Russian-U.S. boundary "interface" was between Big Diomede Island (Ostrov Ratmanova) and Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait.

National Organization and Internal Transmission

Besides the requirement that countries must be thought of as "facing" each other in order for an improvement of transborder relations to have a pervasive effect throughout their societies, there is a second condition that, as has been suggested, needs to be met: that the physically juxtaposed societies be organized internally in such a way as to communicate relevant information and imagery from the border areas to the center, and around the country. The country must work cybernetically (Deutsch, 1966). Put in anatomical terms, the national "body" must be well articulated. It must have a solid bone structure, i.e., a strong constitutional-political framework. It must have an efficient digestive, or economic, system, so that internal flows of goods and services occur smoothly. It must have a responsive nervous system as well, so that impulses from the periphery are transmitted

throughout. The effectiveness of transfrontier diplomacy requires that border zones and their populations must be adequately represented at the center, or at least have sufficient communication with it. The capital or, more broadly, the national government must have some presence, or at least representation, in the border areas as well. The importance of the internal "structure" of a country in shaping its external geographical relationships, as Jean Gottmann noted (Gottmann, 1973: 143-154), has not been adequately recognized.

An example of how things can go wrong, even in a democratic country where center and periphery may be presumed to be mutually responsive, is the furor that resulted from an exchange of notes, done "in secrecy" as it seemed to some suspicious critics of the action (Olson, Seidenberg, and Selle, 1998: 75), by the central governments of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977 with regard to the American-Russian maritime boundary. Dating from the 1867 U.S. purchase of Russian Alaska, this sea frontier remained vague in places. The two governments' understanding in 1977 was that, in establishing the 200-nautical-mile fisheries conservation zones which they both were setting up at that time, they would mutually respect, and be limited by, the 1867 Convention Line. There was considerable uncertainty regarding the exact location of that Line, however, owing to a technical difference in the way the two governments depicted it cartographically. The Soviet government showed it as a series of rhumb (compass) lines and the U.S. government showed it as a series of great circle arcs. This produced a vast area of overlap in the Bering Sea of almost 21,000 square nautical miles. Already there were fisheries enforcement problems, which now became more difficult.

A formal U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement regarding the disputed matter, which essentially split the difference between the competing claims, was signed on 1 June 1990, at a Washington summit meeting (Charney and Alexander, 1993: 447-460). The treaty still has not gone into effect, however, because the Russian side, with the Duma refusing to give its consent, has not been able to ratify it. There is continued pressure for the cross-boundary sharing of resources--and also for the better conservation of them, for U.S.-based fishermen suspect Russian (and Russian-licensed) fishermen of taking too many juvenile pollock, thus depleting the stock of that species.

The controversy has helped to draw attention not merely to the 1990 treaty text but also to an executive agreement that soon afterward accompanied it. The latter understanding was effected by an exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. It committed the two sides to abide by the terms of the 1990 treaty until it came into force. Although State Department and other federal officials dutifully conferred with the Governor of Alaska and his colleagues in Juneau, it seemed to some Alaskans that the whole arrangement had been negotiated, at a distance, without sufficient input from them. Partly in response to this local feeling, Representative Don Young (R., Alaska), as well as some other members of the U.S. Congress, protested against the executive-agreement "giveaway"--of oil and gas resources as well as fish. They requested more information from the administration and insisted that any boundary-and-resources agreement with the Russians be validated in treaty form only (Olson, Seidenberg, and Selle, 1998: 84-85). Alaskans were not alone. Fishing and other interests in the Pacific Northwest state of Washington also were concerned. The legislature of California, apparently

fearing that if the federal government could ignore one state in negotiating international maritime boundary agreements it could ignore California as well, passed a resolution in support of Alaska's right to be represented in U.S.-Russian boundary talks (Olson, Seidenberg, and Selle, 1998: 85, 86-87).

The U.S.-Canada maritime frontier has also been the scene of controversy, most recently over salmon fishing. In both the United States and Canada, peripheral interests--including native Indian groups, with "pre-modern" rights--have been at odds not just with each other, as fishing competitors, but with their respective national centers, the federal governments in Washington and Ottawa, as well. At issue has been the setting of quotas for the two countries under the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty between the countries. Pacific salmon hatch in rivers in the United States and Canada, then go to sea, and eventually return to their native rivers to reproduce, migrating down the coast from Alaska to Oregon. In 1997 a flotilla of Canadian fishermen at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, forcibly blockaded an Alaska ferry in protest against Alaskan fishermen for intercepting too many of "their" fish. British Columbia's populistic premier, Glen Clark, threatened to deny the U.S. Navy continued use of a torpedo test range in Nanoose Bay off the B.C. coast over the issue. His provocative expressions prompted the Canadian federal government to assert national jurisdiction. Accordingly, Canadian Fisheries Minister David Anderson negotiated with the U.S. government a new quota regime, if not perfect "salmon peace." This U.S.-Canadian salmon agreement, concluded in June 1999, will set future quotas on the scientific basis of abundance, rather than equity. The U.S. side, whose share of the total Pacific salmon harvest is expected to drop from 20.5 percent to 16.5 percent, has promised to contribute funds for salmon population restoration work. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy commented in a joint statement, implicitly acknowledging continued center-periphery and periphery-periphery tensions, that the new arrangement "represents a victory for all those on both sides of the border interested in salmon conservation and the long-term viability of our salmon industries" (Kenworthy and Pearlstein, 1999).

With regard to the southwestern border of the United States, too, there have been serious disjunctions between federal diplomacy and local politics. At the center in Washington, there often are considerations of policy, regarding overall relations with the government of Mexico in an international relations context, that do not have much bearing on the lives of those, American citizens and Mexican citizens as well, who live at the border. The impact of these federal level initiatives toward the other, notably the conclusion of the massive NAFTA arrangement, is stressful for the local communities along the border. As John House, who closely studied the problem of inadequate coordination between center and periphery in managing border relations between the United States and Mexico, remarked, "It will be entirely within the verdict of history if all decision-making continues to be centralized in Washington DC and México DF, whether or not this may be to the detriment of the dwellers on both banks of the Rio Grande" (House, 1982: 256).

In the southeastern corner of the United States as well, tensions arise from the different perspectives of federal capital and local community interests. Florida is but 90 miles from Cuba, from which many present-day Floridians have fled. An example of center-periphery misunderstanding in this setting is the strong opposition of many anti-Castro "Miami Cubans" to President Clinton's decision, expressed in a joint communiqué with the government of Cuba on 9 September 1994, to revise the

status of fleeing Cubans under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. Accordingly, all Cubans subsequently coming into the United States no longer are to be treated presumptively as political refugees but are, rather, considered to ordinary immigrants, without assurance of automatic admission of the United States.

A general "key," if one such salient factor exists, to solving problems of internal coordination between center and periphery in dealing with neighboring countries may be found in consociative diplomacy. Ways need to be found somehow to bridge--actually to structure--the wide gap that usually exists between central government and peripheral areas on *both sides* of a dividing line. Local communities and even individual states, or provinces, usually lack the power, in themselves, to command attention as anything like "equal" partners in national decision-making regarding relationships with neighbors. At home, within their own country, they are just one periphery among many. They may need to concert their efforts, and join their weights, *transnationally*, with the border community opposite with which they have a direct interface and proximate interests. This can be done with interstate (interprovincial) and even somewhat broader interregional "alliances," including public-private partnerships, that extend across national lines.

International Agreements and Transfrontier Cooperation

The third condition for a successful "peace through neighborhood" strategy, as indicated, is the international one. There can be agreements across borders, including not only bilateral pacts but also, where relevant, multilateral ones affecting international regions, which advance and support transfrontier relationships. These agreements, because they join pairs or groups of countries formally, can enhance international stability and serve as a basis of confidence for transactions of economic and other kinds. They are legal commitments and are to be taken seriously. In particular, treaties which include good neighborhood, or *bon voisinage*, provisions which bind countries together via cooperative border arrangements are needed, not only to symbolize but also actually to secure "close" relations between contiguous nations.

In the part of the world of the original Good Neighbor Policy, there have been many occasions for the practice of transfrontier diplomacy, resulting in some cases in formal accords. The New World, born in intercolonial rivalry with a plurality of "pre-modern" heritages as well, is notorious for its territorial and boundary disputes.[247] Some notable ones have been those between Bolivia and Paraguay, Peru and Colombia, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and British Honduras, and Peru and Ecuador, a recurrent conflict that in 1995 again broke out in open warfare. In every one of these cases, the peace machinery of the Inter-American System, a moral-legal framework, was used to help contain and resolve the controversy.

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[247] Victor Prescott distinguishes between *territorial* boundary disputes, arising from the attractiveness of a neighboring territory to the initiator of a border conflict, and *positional* boundary disputes, concerning the actual location of a boundary and often, as well, the terms by which that line is to be defined (Prescott, 1987: 98). In the Latin American context, the two types are often difficult to tell apart.

The Peru-Ecuador case is unusual in that a number of the hemisphere's great powers were directly involved, as guarantors of a settlement--functioning as a kind of Western Hemispheric "Center." The effective instrument was the Peruvian-Ecuadorian Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1942 both by the disputants and by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Brazil has been leader of the guarantors group. The controversy was not completely settled in 1942, however, in part because of specific alignment disagreements (termed *impases*) concerning several sectors of the Rio Protocol boundary line (Thomas, 1999: 79, 80) (Fig. 4). After further fighting in 1981, 1984, and 1995, the matter was finally resolved in an agreement--the Brasilia Presidential Act--signed by Peru's and Ecuador's presidents under Brazil's auspices on 26 October 1998. This new treaty was "sealed" and put into effect not in Brazil but on the frontier itself on 13 May 1999, at the border town of Puesto Cahuide. Peru's President Alberto K. Fujimori and Ecuador's President Jamil Mahuad met there, shook hands, and ceremoniously together dedicated an orange-painted boundary stone. This was the last of the settings marking the border and it completed the boundary gestalt, so to speak, spatially and temporally. "Here is the final frontier [boundary] between two neighboring peoples that managed to come together and reach agreement," declared President Fujimori. "We are putting an end to disputes," said President Mahuad, "closing wounds to start a new, healthy life" (*The New York Times*, 1999). Photographs and other recordings publicized the event throughout Peru and Ecuador, Latin America, and the world.

In its substance, the Peru-Ecuador border agreement might not have been possible but for the two countries' acceptance of an arbitration decision rendered by the Brazil-chaired guarantors--the Center. The agreement was a "package deal." It collectively settled all of the issues assigned to binational commissions dealing with commerce and navigation, with border integration, with confidence-building measures, and with on-site border demarcation. A principal element of the package was Ecuador's final acceptance in principle of the 1942 Rio Protocol's line of division, which had precluded it from being an "Amazon" (and Atlantic) country as well as a Pacific coastal country. This favored Peru, though Ecuador did actually gain a square kilometer of private--not formally sovereign--territory on the Peruvian side of the border. This symbolic piece of real estate, at Tiwinza on top of the Cordillera del Condor, was the site of Ecuador's last military holdout against Peru in the 1995 war. The place was to be consecrated by a monument to the country's war dead. The other major element was Ecuador's gaining navigation rights--again, without sovereign access--to the Amazon River and its tributaries in Peru, along with two trading centers thereupon. The treaty plan further provided for establishment, by both countries, of a transborder ecological park across which transit would be guaranteed and within which no military forces (only police) would be allowed (Simmons, 1999: 15, 20). In separate understandings, the two countries planned also to link up their electrical grids; and Peru agreed that Ecuador, an oil producer, could have access to one of its underutilized pipelines (*The New York Times*, 1998).

The "incentives" for this border accord were both national and international. Each country would save in terms of defense expenses and the cost of human lives. It was clearer to both Peru and Ecuador than ever before that mending fences between themselves was a de facto precondition of their being accepted, by other countries, in a broader neighborhood of international cooperation such as MERCOSUR--not to mention the $1.5 billion in international loans for future development of the two countries' poorer regions that was on offer (*The New York Times*, 1999), from the Center. The

internal and external attractions of the agreement were such that it could be observed that "South America may, for the foreseeable future, in 1995 have seen its last last war over territorial claims" (*The Economist*, 1998b).

The Old World, too, is progressing toward peace on and via boundaries. A major factor is the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1 August 1975. While not a "peace treaty" between the Second World War adversaries or a formal legitimization of the Cold War geographic division of Europe, the Helsinki Final Act, with 35 initial signers, was a fundamental commitment to the principle of the "territorial integrity" of states--a precondition, though not itself the essence, of "good neighborhood." Recognizing that frontiers can be modified in accordance with international law, by peaceful agreement, the Act also solemnly declares: "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers." There was a positive, or constructive, aspect to their commitment as well. Under the rubric of "Co-operation among States," the participants in Helsinki stated that they would "endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice" (U.S. Department of State, 1975: 324-326).[248]

There subsequently was concluded, originally with a focus on Western Europe, a "European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities." It was negotiated under the auspices of the Council of Europe at a meeting in Madrid on 21 May 1980 (Council of Europe, 1982). This master framework text authorizes agreements for cooperation between neighboring *noncentral* authorities in such fields as urban and rural development, protection of the environment, improvement of public facilities and services, and mutual assistance in case of emergencies. It is aimed especially at improving conditions in the "frontier regions," with those of Eastern Europe--Europe's "Periphery"--now being politically accessible as well. In so doing, it can contribute to "the spirit of fellowship which unites the peoples of Europe."

Even more recently in Europe, just following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the reunification of Germany, there seemed a need to intervene to "stabilize" relations among, especially, the smaller European states in the East which, formerly, had been held firmly together by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The government of France proposed a treaty that would not be an assistance pact but

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[248]   Even before this Europe-wide commitment to general principles of coexistence, cooperation, and comity was made, the Federal Republic of Germany, following its policy of *Ostpolitik*, signed treaties with some of its eastern neighbors--notably, the German Democratic Republic (1969), the Soviet Union (1970), and the People's Republic of Poland (1970)--that prepared the way for the later CSCE border-related undertakings. For example, the Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Equal Relations Between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, 17 December 1969, in its preamble acknowledges a common "endeavour to make an effective contribution to *détente* and securing of peace in Europe, to remove tension between the two German states step-by-step, to bring about good neighbourly relations as equal sovereign states, and to advance the creation of a European security system" (Whetten, 1971: 218).

would, rather, offer a kind of code of conduct for countries wishing to join the Western institutions, centrally the European Union. In April 1993 the French Premier, Edouard Balladur, proposed an international conference, on the model of Europe's great international conferences of history, to realize the French aim. This--the Balladur Initiative--resulted in the Pact on Stability in Europe of March 1995. Taken up by the European Union, the Stability Pact idea, though watered down somewhat both in its organizational and in its funding implications, was an initial Joint Action of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successor to the CSCE, was to administer the Pact.

A major emphasis of the Stability Pact, an international-Centrally (big C) driven project, was consolidation of frontiers. Balladur's original idea of suggesting possible minor frontier rectifications was dropped--as likely to open Pandora's box. It was, perhaps, considered too merely "modern" a European approach to territorial problems. Nonetheless, international-Peripheral (big P) states wishing benefits, including possible future organizational membership, were to reaffirm their commitment to the inviolability of frontiers and to make agreements between themselves pledging "good neighborliness." In addition, they were asked, in appropriate cases, explicitly to acknowledge the rights of national minorities in their midst--a controversial international recognition of the concept of collective rights.

A notable example is the sizeable Hungarian minority inside Romania, along the border area and in Transylvania within the interior. In consequence of the Balladur Initiative, there was negotiated a "Treaty on Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourly Relations between Romania and the Republic of Hungary." It included minority protections as well as mutual boundary recognition. National minorities were recognized as "integral parts" of the societies in which they lived and "territorial claims" were forever disavowed. Signed on 16 September 1996, in Romania (near the Hungarian border) at Timisoara, which was considered the "cradle" of the 1989 Romanian democratic revolution (in which many ethnic Hungarians participated), this was a politically complicated but psychologically needed accord (Székely, 1999). Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn went there himself to sign it. This was his first trip to Romania since he had taken office more than two years before. The Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty is one of the most important of the more than a hundred such bilateral agreements facilitated--in a sense, required--by the Balladur Initiative and the ensuing Stability Pact.

In most of the cases, the existence of an international political-juridical framework worked together with the enticement of eventual membership in the EU and also NATO to encourage countries in Eastern Europe, with historical grievances against their neighbors, to set these aside. Formal bilateral agreements, promising good neighborliness, by themselves would not have been sufficient to initiate processes of real reconciliation, if only because the countries of that region had historical recollections of the failure of such agreements in the interwar period and the "fraternal" Soviet era (Székely, 1999). In this context, the CSCE and EU initiatives especially, along with the more specifically frontier-oriented programs of the Council of Europe, have helped to give shape if not the emotional content to a new general movement of European fence-mending.

Conclusion

How significant are these peace-via-borders international arrangements? Are they likely to prove to be effective in engendering the bilateral processes of reconciliation, where they are needed, and, more generally, the spirit of regional good neighborhood? Are they, in truth, relevant today, given that they emphasize action at the level of the nation-state, or "modernity," and may not take adequate account either of "pre-modern" ethnicity questions or the prospect of "post-modern," post-international integration? Maybe the very idea is anachronistic.

The upshot of the matter seems to be that borders, though their technical functions and policy contours are changing, are as important as they ever have been. To be sure, the processes of "globalization" seem to be indifferent to borders. "But it is almost as though international politics obeyed some strange principle of the conservation of finitude," the *Economist* observes: as some borders fall, so others rise" (*The Economist*, 1998a). In Europe, in particular, one sees that, as internal restrictions on the flow of goods, capital, and persons, within the EU itself, are being removed, pressures increase for greater controls at the outer margins of the Union as it expands. Some new EU members, such as Austria, that in the past had quiet border towns on their own frontiers now find themselves on the administrative front lines, for Europe. This has increased the need for the European Union "to arrive at more coherent frontier region policies" (Anderson, 1996: 126).

In this context, formal diplomacy of the kind that produced the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Co-operation, and Good Neighbourly Relations can assume a new importance, not just as fulfillment of a *conditio sine qua non* for membership in the EU but also as a practical basis for closer community, based on reciprocity, in the region of cohabitation itself, regardless of when or whether EU membership comes. The Timisoara treaty and others like it must actually be used. Even though these treaty arrangements may be endowed, in institutional terms, with little more than joint intergovernmental committees and thus may lack methods or means of implementation, they do constitute important international guarantees of stability. If national minorities across borders, such as the Magyars in Transylvania, do remain in place owing in part to these basic treaties, these groups will be in a position, especially as borders become more open, to realize "their most progressive endeavor," which is to be "a bridge between two neighboring nations" rather than a cause of division and conflict (Székely, 1999).

Transboundary diplomacy, whether based on treaties or not, may not produce enormous "spillover" effects (McCormick, 1996: 15-20). This is true even though some boundary-focused international agreements, e.g., the Hungarian-Romanian treaty, reach well into the interiors of the countries involved, illustrating the "core-periphery *adjacent* State" type of transaction that is described in House's model (Figure 1). Some of these contacts and exchanges may seem legal and technical. And "functional integration" across borders does not automatically lead to "political and social integration," as Michael Keating concludes from an extensive analysis of European regional cooperation policies (Keating, 1998: 182). Nevertheless, international contacts across borders, which

may be facilitated by programs such as those sponsored by the Council of Europe, or the European Commission's INTERREG program, do form networks that can have a cohesive force (Anderson, 1996: 121; Keating, 1998: 180-181).

Increasingly, there is developing, not only in Europe, what Keating describes as "an interpenetration of territorial policy spaces" (Keating, 1998: 183). This interpenetration can blur the distinctions between places and it can confuse identities, in what might otherwise be a beneficial "post-modern" fashion. "Pre-modern" patterns--that is, the relationships of ethnicity or nationality groups to their homelands--may fade badly. Even "modern," or nation-state, belonging--the psychological level at which diplomacy is traditionally conducted--may become lost to sight, obscured by a welter of competing juridisdictions, on different geographical scales and with different spatial and functional dividing lines between them, varying with the different policy purposes being advanced. "Traditional diplomacy," as Keating rightly recognizes but does not positively stress, "covers the whole range of state interests and seeks to present a united front to the world" (Keating, 1998: 178).

There is something to be said for keeping conventional political boundaries of nations at the fore. They are the "interface" between countries. The entities they define remain, still, the locus of loyalty, of patriotic feeling, for people in most parts of the world. The international system is yet, basically, an interstate system. Diplomacy, being the method by which states address each other, retains a fundamental importance. This may even be increasing. It is the only way countries can deal with each other as wholes. For diplomacy to work, nations must continue to have personalities. *Persona*, by definition, is unitary (Strawson, 1959: 87-116).

In this situation, the personification of international relations through meetings between nations' political leaders at borders can have a pivotal, even transformative role, for they interconnect the "bodies politic" of countries in ways that other kinds of communication, even summit meetings held elsewhere, may not. The national body "gestures" made at border locations have a directness, spontaneity, and force that those made in capital cities rarely do have. They actually touch another country; and its people, and those of the country doing the touching, can feel it.

Consider, as a final example of the diplomacy of *bon voisinage*, the trip, by bus, that India's Prime Minister Atal Beharji Vajpayee made across "Line Zero" at Wagha on the Punjabi border between India and Pakistan on 20 February 1999, to meet his Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. These two countries, suffering "cartographic anxiety" (Khrishna, 1997: 83) owing to their origin in partition, were acutely sensitive to one another. What occurred at that normally closed border post was felt throughout the subcontinent. Nominally a journey to inaugurate scheduled bus service between New Delhi and Lahore, Prime Minister Vajpayee's novel exercise in "bus diplomacy" was much more. "I bring the good will and hopes of my fellow Indians, who seek abiding peace and harmony with Pakistan," he said when he met, and embraced, Prime Minister Sharif at the border. "I am conscious that this is a defining moment in South Asian history, and I hope we will be able to rise to the challenge" (Bearak, 1999).

This "challenge" included the difficult issues of sovereign control over and fighting in Kashmir and also lesser boundary matters including the western sea border between India and Pakistan. The basic

survival issue posed by the two countries' strategic nuclear rivalry was also of existential concern. The fact that the Vajpayee-Sharif humble summit occurred, and occurred where it did at the very center of the fronts of both countries, provided an optimal geodiplomatic setting for beginning to resolve, or at least for restricting, these conflicts.

Boundaries do make friends as well as foes. They function, at any level, to stabilize social relationships. As John Brinckerhoff Jackson, philosopher of landscape, has written, "They make residents out of the homeless, neighbors out of strangers, strangers of enemies" (Jackson, 1972: 15). They can be transformative.

It has been the fundamental purpose of this article to challenge the notion that international political boundaries are chiefly, as the *Geopolitiker* Karl Haushofer considered them, "fighting places." They are not, however, simply "meeting places," either. Borders and border control systems are more complex phenomena: they both divide and unify. When synthesized across national lines they can be, in addition, "joining places," capable of connecting wholly different countries, consociatively, in certain kinds of organized ooperation while maintaining their distinctiveness and independence, in good neighborhood.

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