**A SYMPOSIUM ON PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES**

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Peacebuilding has emerged as one of the critical features of international involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations. It has also become a prominent focus of Canadian foreign policy and the human security agenda that has been promoted by the current Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Peacebuilding has been attempted in a number of different settings with varying degrees of success. It also involves a number of very diverse instruments and, much like an orchestra, these diverse instruments must be finely tuned and working in concert in order to produce anything resembling a coherent approach to post-conflict reconciliation and long-term peace. In an effort to critically examine these diverse instruments and to assess the potential and pitfalls of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconciliation, a one-day symposium was held at the University of Alberta on March 10, 2000. The symposium coincided with the visit of the Honourable Madam Justice Louise Arbour who delivered the University of Alberta's Visiting Lectureship in Human Rights in Edmonton on Thursday March 9, 2000. Madam Arbour's visit and her participation in the symposium provided a focal point for examining the different instruments that have been used in the peacebuilding process – ranging from the work of international criminal tribunals through to truth commissions to the work of nongovernmental organizations at the level of civil society. The symposium brought together academics, policy advisors, practitioners and an audience of more than 100 drawn from the Edmonton community to examine and discuss various dimensions of peacebuilding and the post-conflict reconciliation process. The symposium was sponsored by the generous support and assistance of the Human Rights Education Foundation, the University of Alberta, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence.

Opening Remarks

The symposium was chaired by the Honourable Senator Douglas **Roche** who began the day's proceedings by reminding the audience of the importance of moving beyond a culture of war to a culture of peace. There is a need for people at all levels of society to work to establish and entrench a culture of peace and especially to advance it through supporting more participatory and people-centred processes. He called attention to the significant progress that has been made in a number of areas, citing the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines; the Treaty of Rome establishing the International Criminal Court that finally ends impunity and establishes accountability for the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the conclusion of a convention banning the use of child soldiers. Senator Roche made note of Canada's considerable efforts in each of these areas. He also spoke of the need to continue this work by strengthening the capacity of the United Nations (UN) through reforms of the UN

Security Council and through the development of a UN Rapid Reaction Force. He closed by noting the critical importance of preventive diplomacy as a crucial element of peacebuilding.

Madam Justice **Arbour** spoke of the need to think about peacebuilding and reconciliation in concrete terms. She noted the fact that internal wars have tended to be the most devastating for individuals and that such wars are often marked by an extensive array of crimes against vulnerable populations. Such situations often demand an element of retributive justice as part of the process of reconciliation. Despite the local demands for justice, at the international level there continues to be significant resistance to the idea that justice can contribute to the peacebuilding process. This resistance has been combined with a great deal of controversy with respect to the implementation of formal justice.

The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have served as important laboratories for the application of justice in post-conflict (or ongoing conflict) situations. The Tribunals should, however, be recognized as part of a myriad of international instruments that could and have been used to address post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. They have, however, operated in very different circumstances and under different mandates. The ICTY operated in the middle of ongoing conflict, amidst a wide array of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including the NATO peace support operations – the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) – and dozens of NGOs. In contrast, the ICTR operated after the conflict had ended and in a virtual political vacuum, as only a handful of IGOs and NGOs continued to operate in the region. The ICTR itself, worked from a small office for the prosecutor in Kigali and the Tribunal conducted its hearings in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR worked under a very restricted mandate that was bound in terms of time and territory. The ICTY's mandate, in contrast, was more open ended. This allowed the ICTY to continue its work in Kosovo, whereas the ICTR could not investigate any activities which took place before or after 1994 or outside of Rwanda.

One of the difficulties that the Tribunals have encountered in their work has been a strong resistance on the part of the military to support the enforcement of proper conduct by combatants. One would have thought, Arbour said, that the military would have an interest in supporting the prosecution of those who violated the 'warrior's honour', but in her experience this was not always the case. The ICTY had been given a chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council, but there seemed a general reluctance on the part of military units to work with it in the field. The ICTY, for its part, relied on the military rather extensively for logistical support in conducting its on site investigations of war crimes. This was necessitated by the need to operate in high-risk areas, at times when the conflict was ongoing, and the need to keep the 'scene of the crime' secure while the prosecutors completed their investigation.

The military eventually became more cooperative and IFOR was subsequently tasked to aid in the apprehension of indicted war criminals.

A second difficulty encountered by the Tribunals and the more general effort to pursue justice at the international level has been the strong commitment on the part of the UN, other IGOs, and most NGOs to a culture of neutrality. A culture of neutrality does not support the production of evidence to support the prosecution of war criminals. While adopted in good faith, a culture of neutrality limits the willingness of these actors to support the work of the Tribunals for fear that the actors will be tainted with being on one side or the other during the conflict. The Tribunals and prosecutor's office took great pains to explain that they were pursuing criminals – not Serbs or Croats or Hutus – but criminals, and further, that the only side they took was the side of justice and truth. They refused to participate in the discourse of ethnic communities and instead stood firm on the discourse of justice and criminals. The culture of neutrality is, however, pervasive throughout most international institutions and will be one of the most significant challenges confronting future efforts in this area such as the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Also on the matter of the ICC, Arbour noted the significant challenges facing the ICC and cautioned against harbouring unrealistic expectations. National courts will retain their primacy. The ICC will also need to establish its credibility, by impartially pursuing truth and justice, rather than being influenced by political considerations. The Court has obvious strengths over the adhoc Tribunals, but is by no means a panacea for human rights abuses.

In the long term, Kosovo might prove to be one of the most useful case studies for the work of international criminal tribunals in demonstrating both the potency and the limits of such instruments. One of the most noteworthy limits was the fact that the Tribunal no longer had jurisdiction once the war was over, yet while the war was on the Tribunal actually had a much clearer mandate than it did during the undeclared war in Bosnia. As an experiment in the application of international justice, the war crimes tribunals provide a valuable lesson for the international community in responding to crimes against humanity.

Panel One: Instruments of reconciliation/retribution/peacebuilding

Kenneth Bush, Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University
Ronald Slye, Professor, Seattle University School of Law

The first panel continued from Madam Justice **Arbour's** comments and explored the different instruments used in peacebuilding activities as well as the selected application of truth and reconciliation commissions, drawing primarily from the South African experience.

Dr. Kenneth **Bush** provided an overview of the different instruments used by the international community in his presentation. Bush argued that there has been too much emphasis on the various instruments of peacebuilding which have been employed, and too little attention on other instruments not commonly associated with peacebuilding. These other instruments may actually contribute more to the establishment of a sustainable peaceful society. He raised the importance of asking the question: how do we determine if peacebuilding instruments worked. Part of the problem in addressing this question, in Bush's view, has been that the military instruments have

tended to drown out the development agencies in determining the response to civil conflicts. Partly this is because these instruments are readily available, but the readily available instruments are not necessarily the most appropriate instruments. At times the instruments of peacebuilding may undermine the peace.

He noted the need to combine our instruments more effectively than we have done in the past.

Bush spent some time reviewing the concept of peacebuilding, defining it as an attempt "to foster and support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, recurrence, or continuation of violent conflict." Peacebuilding involves both the deconstruction of violence and the reconstruction of a culture of peace. He continuously stressed the need to focus on impacts and outcomes instead of process. He also noted that we need to conceptualize reconciliation as much more than the absence of violence and to look at it as strengthening and developing a shared, common, or mutual commitment to work together.

Bush argued that it was important not to ghettoize peacebuilding but to integrate it closely with other, especially development, activities and to look at how development work could contribute to peacebuilding and vice versa. He also called attention to the tensions between the instruments of peacebuilding, particularly those that involve the military or security forces, and the desired outcomes, and cautioned against the militarization of peacebuilding. Indeed efforts should be made in many societies to delegitimize gun-based structures. He further stated that civil society needs to be directly and regularly involved in peacebuilding as the whole objective of good governance and rule of law involves much more than the state.

Prof. Ronald **Slye,** in delivering the second presentation of the session, focused on the role of truth commissions in post-conflict societies. Specifically, his comments addressed the question: how did the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) contribute to the process of reconciliation in that society. He noted that reconciliation involves both the past and the future. In addressing the past, reconciliation requires that the stories be told and that the truth be uncovered. It also provides an opportunity for rehabilitation and reparation, though the latter was largely symbolic in the South African case. Finally, it involves assigning accountability for the crimes of the past. In looking to the future, reconciliation mechanisms establish principles and practices that will carry over and guide governance processes in that society. It thus serves a norm-setting function and acts as a model of democratic processes. It also creates a culture of human rights and the rule of law. The SATRC attempted to address these concerns and achieved considerable success in doing so.

One of the features of the SATRC was the provision of amnesty, an issue that Slye addressed at length, and which had implications for the SATRC's ability to provide for accountability. He suggested that there were some difficulties with this despite some real strengths in the way amnesty was addressed in South Africa. Among the strengths of the South African amnesty

program, he noted particularly the mandatory process (required self-identification, public acknowledgement of crimes, public testimony for more serious crimes, cross-examination during public testimony) and the substantive decisions which acknowledge the accountability of the wrongdoer regardless of whether they are granted amnesty.

Among the concerns noted by Slye was the requirement that amnesty be granted for acts 'associated with a political objective'. His concern was the message this requirement sent to the South African people concerning justice, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. The requirement seemed to accord special privileges to political authorities in that their acts or acts in their name have more legitimacy (are eligible for amnesty) and that political acts are of less concern than those committed for personal gain. Slye acknowledged that there may be political reasons for this apparent preference and that it might be all one can hope for in the politically charged environment of a post-conflict society, but there remains good reason for concern.

Panel Two: Role of international governmental institutions

Adekeye Adebajo, Associate, International Peace Academy
Jean Daudelin, Senior Researcher, Conflict and Human Security, The North-South Institute
Kassu Gebremariam, Lecturer, Wayne State University

The second panel of the day addressed the role of international governmental institutions. The presentations looked at how outsiders responded to civil conflicts with particular attention on regional conflicts in Africa and the response of states, regional and international institutions.

The first speaker, Dr. Adekeye **Adebajo,** reviewed the role of outside governments and institutions in West Africa's 'tragic twins' – Sierra Leone and Liberia. Civil conflicts in these two West African countries in the 1990s have left over 200,000 dead and 1 million refugees. The conflicts pose security threats to the region, as the conflicts themselves have had external implications. For example, in March 1991, the war in Liberia spilled over into Sierra Leone. There are many linkages between the rebel movements in the two countries. This becomes an important consideration in peacebuilding as it forces one to look at the regional context and consequences of civil wars. The response of the regional peacekeeping operation ECOMOG (Economic Organization of West African States [ECOWAS] Ceasefire Monitoring Group) was primarily drawn from one country as 80% of the force was made up of Nigerian troops and 90% of funds came from Nigeria. The Nigerian regime not only had a genuine interest in stopping the conflict, but it also used the operation to funnel money to the Nigerian government through corrupt practices. This sort of financial and material support may be more difficult to sustain under a civilian, elected government as Nigerian troops also experienced about 400 deaths. Nigeria's concern was not merely to assert hegemonic power in the region, nor was Nigeria the only state interested in peacebuilding in the region. Other states, such as Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, also had an interest, as among other problems they received many refugees on their borders and their regimes worried about their own stability. As far as outside powers were concerned, only the United States in Liberia and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone had any significant interest, with the latter being the more significant interest.

In discussing the peacebuilding tools that were used, Adebajo noted that interventions must be provided with timely resources if they are to achieve their goals. He also said that the role of regional hegemons is important, and that international efforts to contribute to peacebuilding could be built around pillars of regional hegemons. The role of the UN then would be to come in to share the burdens and costs of such operations. As can be seen in the West African experience, peacebuilding must adopt a sub-regional approach to the conflict. One cannot deal with these conflicts in isolation. It is also necessary to coordinate the response of outsiders. The matter of resources is critical. The UN and other agencies have to provide assistance. Funding is especially required to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. Donor conferences, such as have been held for the Balkans, must be replicated for other regions. International support is also needed for the important public security or civilian policing sector. Adebajo also noted the importance of putting a stop to illicit activities. In addressing all of these concerns it will be essential for the international community to dig deeper to provide resources.

He noted the real contribution that Nigeria, through ECOWAS, made to these conflicts when many others in the international community had turned away. He argued that despite Nigeria's political interests in intervening (for domestic, regional and international reasons) it was effective in securing a settlement in Liberia. Sierra Leone on the other hand has been much more problematic.

Adopting a more critical view, Dr. Jean **Daudelin** addressed what he viewed as some of the fundamental dilemmas surrounding 'humanitarian occupation'. He started by noting that prevention is always better than getting there too late, but there are circumstances where the international community must intervene. As a result it was, in his view, both unavoidable and necessary to have a full and frank discussion of intervention. Greater clarity on this matter was essential to avoid paralysis. Daudelin identified four issue areas or problems that needed to be addressed.

First, was the scope of peacebuilding operations. Peacebuilding was not a short-term matter. Indeed peacebuilding with its attendant intervention is inevitably long and protracted because it only occurs where there are massive human rights violations. Intervenors therefore must be in for the long haul. Yet our expectations are still for the short term. The international crisis group has argued that you should think in terms of tasks, not time.

A second issue was funding. Peacebuilding is very costly. And while there is a commendable willingness to invest in the process, the resources are not up to the task. Daudelin called attention to the problems being encountered in Kosovo where the peacebuilding mission operates on a very small budget and is constantly on the brink of insolvency. It is, in Daudelin's view, ridiculous for missions to constantly work for and worry about additional funding. Peacebuilding operations are totally dependent on the will and the whims of the United States and the European Union. Inadequate funding threatens the credibility and the consistency of interventions. Why invest resources, however inadequate, in Bosnia and not in Sierra Leone? This, he argues, has less to do with the seriousness of the threat than with the interests and whims of great powers.

Daudelin suggested that an effort be made to delink funding for intervention from the great powers. Peacebuilding missions must be self-sustaining and peacebuilders should try to 'live off the land'. While noting the controversial nature of such a recommendation, for Daudelin there were two principal aspects he thought needed to be considered. One was for outsiders to avoid creating a dual economy, by living within local means rather than what they might be used to in New York or Geneva. A second was to look at ways of generating local capital to support peacebuilding operations, for example the use of oil revenues from Sudan or diamond profits from Sierra Leone.

A third issue involved in peacebuilding involves the North-South dimension of these operations. What is the place of the South in peacebuilding? Interventions have been mostly a Northern affair; whereby Northern states have determined where, when and how such interventions will occur. The big Southern countries are not even at the table. More pragmatic measures like the involvement of key Southern countries – Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, for example – should be taken. If they are involved, the colonial aspects of intervention will be reduced and the legitimacy of these operations will be strengthened.

A fourth and final issue is that of national interests and the extent to which these guide interventions. On the one hand, interventions challenge the national interest – the whole concept of national interest – in strengthening the norms of human or individual rights and security. In practice, however, national interests are crucial to the whole process. Undertaking war without risks demonstrates the lack of interests or commitment on the part of intervenors. Yet interests are necessary to mobilize resources. One cannot swim against the current of national interests. Therefore, one must harness national interests to serve these peacebuilding objectives. The failure to do so is no longer good enough. If we cannot link peacebuilding to the national interest (with all the support, commitment, and resources that this would imply), it is better to stay home and shut up.

In the third presentation, Dr. Kassu **Gebremariam** questioned whether or not human security had indeed been advanced since the end of the cold war. In a review of the peacebuilding process in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, and Egypt) and the role of outside agents, especially the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development (IADD), he argued that the existing approach to peacebuilding cannot alleviate the crisis in the region. The current approach is, in his view, overly deterministic and inadequate. It fails to address critical values namely the influence of the international factor, especially in an historical context. He questions the commitment to human rights in the region. He also challenged conventional thinking by suggesting that the cold war system was more compassionate to the problems of these countries. He maintained that the cold war system provided greater safety and that safety is an essential prerequisite for productivity. The cold war powers were the guarantors of order in that part of the world. With the emergence of the neoliberal world order there has been a disintegration of the state and a decline in individual security. The OAU arose out of the Pan-Africanist movement and was based on the principles of respect for colonial boundaries and non-interference. The conflict in Somalia challenged these two principles, but the OAU could do little to enforce them. Only the two

superpowers could and did reinforce such principles. Thus an international order that sought to protect national borders might provide a more effective structure of security than one which adopted a more permissive view of intervention in the name of human security. Gebremariam also argued that the critical factor in most peacebuilding operations was the international factor and the role of outsiders. During the cold war, governments took a greater interest in developing countries. This in turn tended to support state structures, structures that are critical for the security of individuals.

Gebremarian also said there was a need to raise the relationship between state and society. Specifically, it was necessary to tap into society and indigenous knowledge, such as the wisdom of the elders that exists within societies. The pattern of intervention that has marked the post-cold war international system has tended to undermine the state and thus overlook the indigenous capacity of local actors who in turn must assume greater responsibility for many things including security.

Panel Three: Role of non-governmental organizations and the media

Cyril Ritchie, Chair, Steering Committee, World Civil Society Conference 1999
Mark Hoffman, Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics
Shauna Sylvester, Executive Director of the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society

The third panel examined the role of nongovernmental organizations and the media.

The first presentation was from Cyril **Ritchie** who began by taking issue with the use of the term 'nongovernmental' organization and proposed instead the notion of civil society. He noted the ongoing development of civil society organizations – both local and transnational – and their increased relevance to the peacebuilding process. These organizations exist because ordinary citizens decide to get together, to consult, to mobilize concern or resources, to address an issue, to advocate for government action, to exchange experiences, and/or to build capacity. They are derived from inherently positive motivations. That is why the concept of civil society and civil society organizations is the more favoured term.

A partnership with civil society is not an option, in Ritchie's view, it is a necessity. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have given new life and new meaning to the international community. There is much that we can do as partners in the field of peacebuilding. There are many reasons for the presence and actions of CSOs in post-conflict societies.

Democracy is the potential bulwark against civil conflict. Fostering and instructing other societies in the democratic process is a prime role for CSOs and free media.

A second area of activity has been elections. Elections are a necessary, though not sufficient, part of peacebuilding. Here too CSOs provide expertise and monitoring functions as evident by a number of CSOs such as the Carter Centre.

CSOs also have an educational role. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross actively promotes the Geneva Conventions. Established and evolving norms surrounding a culture of peace are in constant need of annunciation and enforcement and an informed civil society becomes a potent monitor of human rights standards and practices.

The importance of the active presence of CSOs in peacebuilding situations can be supported by examples from the point of view of operations on the ground. In relief and recovery operations, for example, CSOs have a wealth of experience. They know who can be rapidly and economically deployed and are aware of the need to ensure that relief is linked to longer-term sustainability and to longer-term capacity building.

Most peacebuilding concepts are more understandable to CSOs. Issues such as people-centred development, the significance of women and gender issues (such as the education of girls), and more generally, the importance of educational structures in not replicating past injustices, are all familiar terrain for CSOs.

CSOs can also work to reintegrate combatants and others into post-conflict society.

CSOs have the same charlatans, fools, and incompetents as are found among other groups. We all need codes of conduct that are publicly annunciated and enforced. We all need greater discipline in our headlong rush to be universal good doers. Are the 400 CSOs competing in Kosovo all necessary? Were ten evaluation teams in Uganda all needed? We need to look impartially at these questions to help us do our work better.

CSOs are a bit of angels and a bit of fools and a bit of both. Peacebuilding needs a lot of the in-between types.

Prof. Mark **Hoffman's** presentation examined a case study of peacebuilding that involved a group from Northern Ireland working with a group in Moldova to promote a sustainable peace in the latter country.

Before discussing the case study, Hoffman spent a few moments on the genealogy of peacebuilding. He called attention to the radical origins of the concept of peacebuilding which had initially been identified in the peace research writings of Johan Galtung and the Bouldings. From their perspective peacebuilding meant addressing the deep underlying structural causes of conflict. It emphasized bottom up approaches and had the radical intent of decentring social and economic structures. In short, it called for a radical transformation of society away from structures of violence to an embedded culture of peace. Peacebuilding has now become part of the official discourse and as used by Boutros Ghali it has become linked specifically with post-conflict societies. The emphasis on reconstituting order limits the nature of peacebuilding, tames it and deradicalizes it. Hoffman stressed the need to identify what kind of peace we are trying to build. Peacebuilding has to be seen as a kind of politics. It has to be concerned not only with post-conflict situations, but also the broad spectrum of conflict. It must be concerned with generating and sustaining conditions of peace, with managing differences without recourse to violence.

In examining the role of NGOs and the so-called second track peacebuilding activities as they involved Moldova, Hoffman noted the distinct nature of the conflict there. The issues were social, political, and economic, not ethnic. Nor were there major refugee concerns. It was not a secessionist movement and the level of violence was small. It was far off everyone's radar and had a grand total of 14 external actors (compared with hundreds in Kosovo or Bosnia). The nature of the conflict suggested that it could easily be solved and provide a model for others. The principal objectives of the NGOs were to develop both horizontal (across communities) and vertical (between civilians and elites) linkages through grassroots activities. The idea was to maintain a number of these groups or workshops so that if one got sidetracked others could keep going. This would also help to maintain the process. Another objective was to establish the credibility of NGOs and to keep in contact with political authorities. One of the benefits of involving NGOs is that they can say things that officials cannot. This encourages the transfer of ideas.

The experience leads to many conclusions, but one of the more important ones is that it is difficult to identify generic categories. Actions must be contextualized. Peacebuilding must be interconnected. It is worthwhile to have many processes at work at many different levels. It must also be proactive, dynamic and sustainable. Peacebuilding must be about local resources and social capital. This is easier said than done as many times locals are looking for answers. In building local capacity, outsiders must recognize that they are not neutral actors and their involvement will have political consequences. They also need to worry about co-optation and becoming part of the official process. There is a danger of false expectations and agendas that may create cynicism.

Why has peacebuilding been so very difficult in this uncomplicated conflict? Hoffman identified two critically important reasons: first, was lack of political will and political leadership; second, was the political economy of civil conflicts. Many people have a vested interest in maintaining conflict. In response it becomes necessary to develop an alternative economy.

In the third presentation, Shauna **Sylvester** examined the role of the media in peacebuilding. She began by noting the significant role the media plays in contemporary society and how this role is not always constructive in nature. At times, the media has played a more disruptive role, instigating stereotypes, hatred, and violence. Yet its very significance and its potential to do either harm or good, makes it worthwhile to examine the relationship between the media and peacebuilding.

While concentrating on journalism in her remarks, Sylvester called attention to the diverse nature of media – media as entertainment/education; television; video; movies; and the new media, internet – many of which are becoming increasingly important and worthy of attention. Among the many roles that the media can play in peacebuilding are acting as an early warning instrument; acting as an emergency response team in getting to the conflict early; creating alternative media; supporting local partners, infrastructure, democratic development; and training media. One illustration of this has been the use of radio to promote reconciliation by using soap operas to address issues of conflict.

To illustrate the peacebuilding potential of the media, Sylvester talked at length on an important project underway in South Asia. The Katmandu project brought power brokers together – the editors and owners of leading press in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The participants had an interest in attending because they were concerned with recognition and market profile. This group met on two occasions, once after the coup in Pakistan. The process was very short. The initial objective was to try to build confidence among the group. They started by sightseeing as a way to get to know one another. They then met and compared notes about what is going on in the region from their own personal perspectives. There was no attempt here to try to cover up hostilities and anger. There was, however, an attempt to challenge stereotypes. In addition, a number of practical measures were encouraged to build relationships, e.g., the South Asian editors forum, exchanges, a glossary of hate terms, syndicated articles, and eventually bringing in politicians.

The experience illustrates the contribution that outsiders can make. In this instance, the locals had all the resources, but the role of the third party was critical. If one of the locals had assumed responsibility, the interaction among these different communities would likely never have begun and would be more difficult to sustain. Outsiders were essential to the process.

Panel Four: Role of states and the military

Colonel Walter Semianiw, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, Department of National Defence
Michael Small, Director of Peacebuilding and Human Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The final panel focused on the role of the state and the military. The arguments, while drawn specifically from the perspective and experience of the Canadian state and the Canadian Armed Forces, **have wider application**.

Colonel **Semianiw** spoke to the significant changes that have taken place in the military's role in what are now commonly described as peace support operations. His talk dealt with four main areas: the nature of peacebuilding, trends in peacebuilding, the ongoing problem of resourcing peace support operations, and future directions in these operations. All of this was in the context of determining the proper role for the military in peace support operations.

The United Nations, principally in Boutros Ghali's agenda for peace, has defined peacebuilding. Part of the difficulty with peacebuilding is in generating a clear definition of conflict and, more specifically, determining when a conflict begins and ends. Moreover, the nature of conflict has changed as it no longer takes the form of official declarations and final treaties of peace. This makes it necessary to get back to first principles about the nature of conflict within societies and the requirements for an enduring peace. Peacebuilding looks at ensuring a lasting peace and this involves much more than a cessation of hostilities. It includes such essentials as economic development, human rights, rule of law, democracy, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Many of these tasks require the capacity of other actors and it, therefore, becomes

essential for the military to work with others in support of peacebuilding. An enduring peace requires more than the military alone can provide. The military does not have all the necessary tools in its toolbox so it must engage with civilian groups and actors. What the military does provide is force and the application of force to create a secure environment in which others can work.

It is clear that conflict is rooted in deeper issues and that civilian perspectives are often best suited to meet peacebuilding needs. The military has a role but it is a more limited one than is frequently assumed. For these reasons there has been a notable increase in civilian involvement in peacebuilding.

In the past militaries would go in first and deal with the crisis and others would follow once the environment had been secured. Now everyone moves in at the same time and the Canadian Forces are providing services along the continuum from securing the environment to post-conflict reconstruction of infrastructure and civilian policing (civpol) functions. Many of these activities are not the most appropriate for the military. East Timor is now looked on as the centrepiece for United Nations peace support operations in the future. Thus there has been a paradigm shift.

Much of the change has taken place in a totally unsupported environment. These missions are extremely costly, yet the answer is not always one of more money. Indeed Semianiw argued that one should not throw more money at the problem as the experts are not always there to do anything. If we hope to build democracy in Kosovo we must employ the necessary resources to do the job – most important are police and an effective judicial system. Indeed civilian policing or civpol is becoming one of the more critical elements in peace support operations. The need is to establish independent policing services where no local forces exist. There has been an exponential increase in demand for civilian police in post-conflict societies. In Kosovo, for example, there was a request for 6600 civpol, but only 3000 were sent. The problem of capacity is increased as you turn to civilian forces and nongovernmental organizations as these do not have a contingency force as does the military. You cannot go to local police forces or the courts and ask them to send an additional 500 or 1000 personnel into a post-conflict situation. You must rely instead on volunteers. In some areas logistical support is required and the military can provide this. The military can also carry out a variety of other tasks, but it is not a police force and it must be able to hand off responsibilities to others. And while the military is particularly important during the crisis phase, and helps to ensure that the other elements have a stable environment in which to work, as you move from crisis to longer term development, there is a need to hand off responsibilities to others. In the interim there is a need to reconcile the two different cultures.

Michael **Small** started by noting the policy coherence problematic, having not met Department of National Defence's officer in this area. This reflected a wider policy coherence issue that he returned to later in his talk. Small began by calling attention to the government's/department's peacebuilding initiative launched in 1996 and the establishment of the Global Issues Bureau in 1995. He then went on to discuss a number of trends in the area of peacebuilding, indicating the extent to which the practice has evolved.

First, is a broadened scope of peacebuilding activities. The Department has been attempting to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Initially there was a tendency to focus on post-conflict reconstruction and a reactive response to crises. There is now a different approach. For one, a different view and a broadened time perspective for peacebuilding have begun to take root. There is an attempt to move back and focus first of all on conflict prevention, at least at the verbal level. For the first time the G-8 had a dedicated meeting on conflict prevention in December 1999. There has also been a study conducted under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on the effectiveness of aid for the prevention of conflict. The United Nations Secretary General is also spending a lot of time on conflict prevention.

Despite appearances to the contrary, and with exception of a few high profile cases, intra-state conflicts have been steadily declining since 1992. Those conflicts that remain, however, are persisting over a longer period and appear more intractable.

A second trend is a broadened vision of the scale over which peacebuilding should take place. The common approach to date has been to approach peacebuilding as if one were dealing with small island states and to treat them in an isolated fashion. There needs to be a change, to think of peacebuilding as being more than these concentrated interventions: larger in scale, operating with no functioning states, and working with neighbouring states. We have to scale up to deal with these more complex issues. South Asia as discussed by Shauna Sylvester is a particularly good example, as is Indonesia. Another dimension to this trend is that neighbours and regional organizations must be brought in. It is necessary to examine civil conflict as a part of a regional conflict and to find appropriate roles to broker in neighbouring states.

A third trend is a much greater emphasis on the international architecture to support peacebuilding. Successful peacebuilding does not take place in a vacuum. As Madam Justice Arbour noted, new human rights instruments have created roles such as special rapporteur or representatives for children or displaced persons. More often the people who play these roles come from countries in the South. They have a capacity to do early warning. They are also important sources of information and can suggest appropriate peacebuilding strategies. Disarmament is another part of this international architecture – disarmament at all levels: nuclear, small arms, landmines, etc.

A fourth trend is to take a fresh look at peacekeeping. This involves different issues such as how to engage development aid. We also need to look at how peacekeeping has changed. There is now a much more explicit mandate for the protection of civilians – e.g., Sierra Leone. This is not easily done and requires new training and doctrine. There is also the ongoing problem of limited resources.

A fifth trend is the need for a more profound understanding of what is needed for personal security and how conflict disrupts this for people who lack protection under international law. Security guarantees must be built into any international peace mission. There are also different security needs for men, women and children. Ending the fighting and restoring calm does not

necessarily increase security. For example, there is more violent crime in El Salvador now than during the war. Crime can be as pervasive a source of insecurity as civil conflict. This is one of the primary reasons for the emphasis on security sector reform.

Small concluded by arguing that there has been and needs to be a shift from looking at peacebuilding as a discrete activity to a broader conception of human security, a need to put individuals, and not sovereign states, at the heart of international relations. This is the future direction that peacebuilding must take.

Recommendations

1.   Peacebuilding is a long-term process and requires a substantial commitment over a long period of time. It must be approached with this in mind. Short-term solutions are not possible and short-term programs are ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.

1a.   Peacebuilding cannot be undertaken on short-term mandates. It is essential to seek longer-term mandates from international and regional institutions, state governments, and nongovernmental organizations.

1b.   Peacebuilding operations should be developed in terms of tasks and the successful completion of tasks, rather than in terms of time.

2.   Peacebuilding requires a substantial commitment of resources – time, personnel, and money. Peacebuilding is threatened by donor fatigue yet has seldom been fully supported.

2a.   Peacebuilding needs to rely on larger and more secure sources of funding if it is to meet its long-term objectives. It is essential to look for alternative, secure sources of financial support.

2b.   Peacebuilding personnel should live like locals and monitor the extent to which they distort the local economy with a view to limiting such distortions.

2c.   Personnel, particularly in the area of civilian policing, are critically important, and recruitment of highly qualified personnel in this area should be a matter of high priority.

3.   Peacebuilding is first and foremost about transforming societies and creating a culture of peace. Peacebuilding operations should be approached with this in view.

3a.   A proper balance must be found between the role of the military and civilian agents in the peacebuilding process. While there is an important role for the military in the immediate post-conflict settlement, the military should not be tasked to perform peacebuilding activities. The military role in peacebuilding should be limited.

3b.   The civilian policing function is critically important and must be removed from the military. Early and extensive efforts need to be taken to demilitarize the society. Civilian policing and public sector security reform are critically important areas for peacebuilding, especially in post-conflict situations where criminal activity quickly establishes a strong presence in these societies.

3c.   Responsibility for peacebuilding should be handed off to competent and well-resourced civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity.

4.   Those states and institutions (governmental and nongovernmental) that are involved in peacebuilding operations should strive for better cooperation through donor conferences or consortia.

4a.   Peacebuilding operations should be closely coordinated with the programs of other agencies, including UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), etc., and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

4b.   Peacebuilding cannot be separated from the larger economic, social, and political context in which states must function and cannot work in isolation. It must be supported by concerted

action to address related issues such as criminal activity and the political economy that develops around civil conflicts.

4c.   Outside governments should also ensure the coordination of their own peacebuilding operations/efforts. This should include coordinating the work of NGOs operating from their country and the financial support of the government.

5.   Peacebuilding must be approached in consideration of the regional causes and consequences of civil conflicts. This necessarily involves regional states and institutions in the peacebuilding process.

5a.   Peacebuilding operations should work with and can benefit from the support of regional hegemons.

5b.   Peacebuilding operations must work closely with regional organizations, for example, in Africa and Southeast Asia.

5c.   Peacebuilding efforts by the UN and regional institutions must work to integrate more Southern states into the peacebuilding process both at the stage of policy formulation and in the implementation process.

6.   Peacebuilding operations must take great care to respect and involve local actors/communities, even at the risk of abandoning original plans and objectives.

SPEAKERS

The Honourable Madam Justice Louise Arbour, B.A., LL.L., was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada effective September 15, 1999. For over two-and-a-half years prior to this appointment the Security Council of the United Nations appointed her as Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. She served in this position from 1996 through to June 1999. Madam Justice Arbour has served on the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Ontario. Prior to this, Madam Justice Arbour taught at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo joined the International Peace Academy (IPA) in 1999 as an Associate. He is involved primarily in work on the Africa Program which includes research on regional security issues with special reference to West Africa and is currently writing an occasional paper focusing on case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone and the development of a security mechanism in West Africa. Dr. Adebajo obtained his doctorate in International Relations from Oxford University. He served on United Nations missions in South Africa, Western Sahara, and Iraq and worked at the Ford Foundation.

Dr. Kenneth Bush is a Geneva-based Research Fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, and Special Advisor on Humanitarian Issues and the United Nations Security Council for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University and has published on issues of peacebuilding, identity-based conflict, and bad governance. Current projects include an evaluation framework to assess the peace and conflict impacts of development projects in conflict zones; a UNICEF study on children, education and "ethnic" conflict; and a World Bank/ Government of Sri Lanka project on relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation.

Dr. Jean Daudelin is Senior Researcher, Conflict and Human Security, the North-South Institute. He is an analyst of international affairs, Canadian foreign and trade policy, inter-American political, security and trade dynamics, as well as religious, ethnic, political, social and military problems in Latin America, with a special interest in Brazil and Nicaragua. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Université Laval, Québec, and has completed post-doctoral research at the Instituto de Estudos da Religião (Rio de Janeiro) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Carleton University, Ottawa).

Dr. Kassu Gebremariam is an instructor at Wayne State University in Detroit. He has taught courses such as Understanding Contemporary Africa, the Africans, and Black Social and Political Thought. Previously he served as a principal researcher at a non-governmental organization known as the Daily Bread and has been affiliated with the Center for International Relations and Security Studies at York University in Toronto for several years. He has also lectured at Addis Ababa University. He completed his Ph.D. at York University in the Department of Political Science. His Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the protracted conflicts of the Horn of Africa region.

Professor Mark Hoffman is a Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is also Director of the Conflict Analysis and Development Unit within the Department. His main areas of research are critical international theory, and conflict and peace studies, in particular interconnected third parties in peace processes. His practitioner work in this area has been in Moldova, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. He has also been involved in developing training programmes on conflict prevention for staff at the UK Department for International Development and the UN.

Cyril Ritchie is Chair of the Steering Committee for the World Civil Society Conference 1999: "Building Global Governance Partnerships." He has in his career held leadership roles in the Conference of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) NGOs, the Environment Liaison Centre International, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, the International Schools Association, the International Year of the Child NGO Committee, the (then) League of Red Cross Societies, the UNICEF NGO Committee, and the NGO Committees for several UN Conferences.

Colonel Walter Semianiw is Director Peacekeeping Policy at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. He is responsible for defence policies relating to peace support and humanitarian operations as well as defence relations and policies for Canadian Forces operations in the Middle East and Africa. He completed one UN peacekeeping tour in Cyprus in 1991. In 1997 Colonel Semianiw was promoted to his present rank and was posted to the Royal Military College of Canada where he completed a Masters Degree in Military Strategic Studies.

Professor Ronald C. Slye teaches at the Seattle University School of Law. He was a visiting professor at the Community Law Center at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa during the 1996-97 academic year. While in South Africa he served as legal consultant to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, worked with a coalition of advocacy groups on issues concerning socio-economic rights under the new South African constitution and undertook research on international human rights and transitional justice. From 1993-1996 he was associate director of the Orville H. Schnell Jr., Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School.

Michael Small is the Director of Peacebuilding and Human Security in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This policy unit is located within the Global and Human Issues Bureau of the Department, with responsibilities for the new global issues of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, democratic development, and human security. During his diplomatic career, Mr. Small has served in Canadian missions in Malaysia, Brazil, Costa Rica and most recently Mexico, where he was Minister-Counsellor, responsible for political and public affairs.

Shauna Sylvester is a founder and Executive Director of the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS). Since 1996, she has worked on a range of media and peacebuilding initiatives including coordinating an annual policy roundtable on media and peacebuilding, setting up and supervising a journalists training project in Cambodia, supporting a confidence building initiative for senior editors of the indigenous press in South Asia, facilitating workshops on the issue, and coordinating the first research project on media and peacebuilding in Canada.

Symposium Chair – **Senator Douglas Roche**, O.C.**,** author, parliamentarian and diplomat was appointed to the Senate of Canada in 1998. Senator Roche was Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament from 1984 to 1989 and was elected Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Committee in 1988. Senator Roche was elected to the Canadian Parliament four times, serving from 1972 to 1984 and specializing in the subjects of development and disarmament. In 1989, he was appointed Visiting Professor at the University of Alberta, where he teaches "War or Peace in the 21st Century?"

SPONSORS

The Human Rights Education Foundation was founded in Edmonton in April 1999. It is the initiative of the organizers of the successful International Human Rights Conference held November 1998 in Edmonton. The purpose of the Foundation is the promotion of an understanding, through education, of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Though the Foundation has no borders, the immediate focus is the schools of Alberta. The distinguished patrons of the Foundation are the Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, John Hume, Dr. Margaret Kunstler-Humphrey and the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer. Foundation representatives on the Symposium steering committee are Patrick Bendin, Gurcharan S. Bhatia, C.M., Prof. Gerald Gall, J.S. (Jack) O'Neill and Madhvi Russell.

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