

GLOSSARY

ARAACP	—	Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program
CIC	—	Citizenship & Immigration Canada
CI	—	Counter Intelligence
COMMITTEE	—	Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)
CSE	—	Communications Security Establishment
CSIS	—	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CT	—	Counter Terrorism
DFAIT	—	Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade
DIRECTOR	—	the Director of CSIS
GSP	—	Government Security Policy
HQ	—	Headquarters
IO	—	Intelligence Officer
MINISTER	—	the Solicitor General of Canada, unless otherwise stated
MOU	—	Memorandum of Understanding
NARU	—	National Archives Requirements Unit
NHQ	—	CSIS National Headquarters
RAP	—	Analysis and Production Branch
RDP	—	Refugee Determination Program
RTA	—	Request for Targeting Authority
SERVICE	—	Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
SIGINT	—	Signals Intelligence
SIRC	—	Security Intelligence Review Committee
SLO	—	Security Liaison Officer
TARC	—	Target Approval and Review Committee

SIRC REPORTS AND STUDIES SINCE 1984

(Section 54 reports — special reports the Committee makes to the Minister — are indicated with an *)

Eighteen Months After Separation: An Assessment of CSIS' Approach to Staffing Training and Related Issues, April 14, 1986 (139 pages/SECRET) * (86/87-01)

Report on a Review of Security Screening for Applicants and Employees of the Federal Public Service, May 1986 (SECRET) * (86/87-02)

The Security and Intelligence Network in the Government of Canada: A Description, January 1987 (61 pages/SECRET) * (86/87-03)

Ottawa Airport Security Alert, February 1987 (SECRET) * (86/87-05)

Report to the Solicitor General of Canada Concerning CSIS' Performance of its Functions, May 1987 (SECRET) * (87/88-01)

Closing the Gaps: Official Languages and Staff Relations in the CSIS, June 1987 (60 pages/UNCLASSIFIED) * (86/87-04)

Counter-Subversion: SIRC Staff Report, August 1987 (350 pages/SECRET) (87/88-02)

SIRC Report on Immigration Screening, January 1988 (32 pages/SECRET) * (87/88-03)

CSIS' Use of Its Investigative Powers with Respect to the Labour Movement, March 1988 (18 pages/PUBLIC VERSION) * (87/88-04)

The Intelligence Assessment Branch: A SIRC Review of the Production Process, September 1988 (80 pages/SECRET) * (88/89-01)

SIRC Review of the Counter-Terrorism Program in the CSIS, November 1988 (300 pages/ TOP SECRET) * (88/89-02)

Report to the Solicitor General of Canada on Protecting Scientific and Technological Assets in Canada: The Role of CSIS, April 1989 (40 pages/SECRET) * (89/90-02)

SIRC Report on CSIS Activities Regarding the Canadian Peace Movement, June 1989 (540 pages/SECRET) * (89/90-03)

A Review of CSIS Policy and Practices Relating to Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, August 1989 (SECRET) (89/90-04)

Report to the Solicitor General of Canada on Citizenship/Third Party Information, September 1989 (SECRET) * (89/90-05)

Amending the CSIS Act: Proposals for the Special Committee of the House of Commons, September 1989 (UNCLASSIFIED) (89/90-06)

SIRC Report on the Innu Interview and the Native Extremism Investigation, November 1989 (SECRET) * (89/90-07)

Supplement to the Committee's Report on Immigration Screening of January 18, 1988, 15 November 1989 (SECRET) * (89/90-01)

A Review of the Counter-Intelligence Program in the CSIS, November 1989 (700 pages/ TOP SECRET) * (89/90-08)

Domestic Exchanges of Information, September 1990 (SECRET) * (90/91-03)

Section 2(d) Targets — A SIRC Study of the Counter-Subversion Branch Residue, September 1990 (SECRET) (90/91-06)

Regional Studies (six studies relating to one region), October 1990 (TOP SECRET) (90/91-04)

Study of CSIS' Policy Branch, October 1990 (CONFIDENTIAL) (90/91-09)

Investigations, Source Tasking and Information Reporting on 2(b) Targets, November 1990 (TOP SECRET) (90/91-05)

Release of Information to Foreign Agencies, January 1991 (TOP SECRET) * (90/91-02)

- CSIS Activities Regarding Native Canadians — A SIRC Review*, January 1991 (SECRET) * (90/91-07)
- Security Investigations on University Campuses*, February 1991 (TOP SECRET) * (90/91-01)
- Report on Multiple Targeting*, February 1991 (SECRET) (90/91-08)
- Review of the Investigation of Bull, Space Research Corporation and Iraq*, May 1991 (SECRET) (91/92-01)
- Report on Al Mashat's Immigration to Canada*, May 1991 (SECRET) * (91/92-02)
- East Bloc Investigations*, August 1991 (TOP SECRET) (91/92-08)
- Review of CSIS Activities Regarding Sensitive Institutions*, August 1991 (TOP SECRET) (91/92-10)
- CSIS and the Association for New Canadians*, October 1991 (SECRET) (91/92-03)
- Exchange of Information and Intelligence between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service & Canadian Security Establishment*, October 1991 (TOP SECRET) * (91/92-04)
- Victor Ostrovsky*, October 1991 (TOP SECRET) (91/92-05)
- Report on Two Iraqis — Ministerial Certificate Case*, November 1991 (SECRET) (91/92-06)
- Threat Assessments, Section 40 Study*, January 1992 (SECRET) * (91/92-07)
- The Attack on the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa*, May 1992 (TOP SECRET) * (92/93-01)
- “STUDYNT” The Second CSIS Internal Security Case*, May 92 (TOP SECRET) (91/92-15)
- Domestic Terrorism Targets — A SIRC Review*, July 92 (TOP SECRET) * (90/91-13)
- CSIS Activities with respect to Citizenship Security Screening*, July 92 (SECRET) (91/92-12)
- The Audit of Section 16 Investigations*, September 92 (TOP SECRET) (91/92-18)
- CSIS Activities during the Gulf War: Community Interviews*, September 92 (SECRET) (90/91-12)
- Review of CSIS Investigation of a Latin American Illegal; a SIRC Review*, November 92 (TOP SECRET) * (90/91-10)
- CSIS Activities in regard to the Destruction of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985 — A SIRC Review*, November 92 (TOP SECRET) * (91/92-14)
- Prairie Region — Report on Targeting Authorizations (Chapter 1)*, November 92 (TOP SECRET) * (90/91-11)
- The Assault on Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi: A SIRC Review of CSIS Activities*, 25 May 93 (SECRET) (92/93-07)
- Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review — 1991/92)*, November 92 (SECRET) (91/92-16)
- Prairie Region Audit*, January 93 (TOP SECRET) (90/91-11)
- Sheik Rahman's Alleged Visit to Ottawa*, May 1993 (SECRET) (CT 93-06)
- Regional Audit, September 1993* (TOP SECRET)
- A SIRC Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (London & Paris)*, September 1993 (SECRET) (91/92-11)
- The Asian Homeland Conflict*, September 1993 (SECRET) (CT 93-03)
- Intelligence - Source Confidentiality*, November 1993 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-03)
- Domestic Investigations (1)*, December 1993 (SECRET)(CT 93-02)
- Domestic Investigations (2)*, December 1993 (TOP SECRET) (CT 93-04)
- Middle East Movements*, December 1993 (SECRET)(CT 93-01)
- A Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (1992-93)*, December 1993 (SECRET) (CT 93-05)
- Review of Traditional CI Threats*, December 1993 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-01)

- Protecting Science, Technology and Economic Interests*, December 1993 (SECRET)(CI 93-04)
- Domestic Exchanges of Information*, December 1993 (SECRET) (CI 93-05)
- Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada*, January 1994 (SECRET) (CI 93-06)
- The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports*, May 1994 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-11)
- Sources in Government*, June 1994 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-09)
- Regional Audit*, July 1994 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-02)
- The Proliferation Threat*, December 1994 (SECRET) (CT 93-07)
- The Heritage Front Affair. Report to the Solicitor General of Canada*, December 1994 (SECRET) (CT 94-02)*
- A Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (1993-94)*, January 1995 (SECRET) (CT 93-09)
- Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review 1993-94)*, January 1995 (SECRET)(CI 93-08)
- The Proliferation Threat - Case Examination*, January 1995 (SECRET) (CT 94-04)
- Community Interviews*, March 1995 (SECRET) (CT 93-11)
- An Ongoing Counter-Intelligence Investigation*, May 1995 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-07)*
- Potential for Political Violence in a Region*, June 1995 (SECRET) (CT 93-10)
- A SIRC Review of CSIS' SLO Posts (1994-95)*, September 1995 (SECRET) (CT 95-01)
- Regional Audit*, October 1995 (TOP SECRET) (CI 93-10)
- Terrorism and a Foreign Government*, October 1995 (TOP SECRET) (CT 94-03)
- Visit of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Canada*, November 1995 (SECRET) (CI 94-04)
- Review of Certain Foreign Intelligence Services*, January 1996 (TOP SECRET) (CI 94-02)
- The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports*, February 1996 (TOP SECRET)(CI 94-01)
- Domestic Exchanges of Information (A SIRC Review 1994-95)*, February 1996 (SECRET)(CI 94-03)
- Alleged Interference in a Trial*, 27 February 1996 (SECRET) (CT 95-04)
- CSIS and a "Walk-In"*, March 1996 (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-04)
- Investigation of a Foreign State's Intelligence Services*, 28 October 1996 (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-02)
- The Audit of Section 16 Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Reports*, 7 February 1997 (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-05)
- Regional Audit*, 16 May 1997, (TOP SECRET) (CT 95-02)
- A Review of Investigations of Emerging Threats*, 20 June 1997 (TOP SECRET) (CI 95-03)
- Domestic Exchanges of Information*, 23 July 1997 (SECRET) (CI 95-01)
- Homeland Conflict*, 13 August 1997 (TOP SECRET) (CT 96-01)

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 1: A REVIEW OF CSIS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST FOR 1996-97

CSIS Liaison Program with Foreign Agencies

We recommend, therefore, that the Procedures Manual be brought up to date, and that it cover important post issues that are not addressed elsewhere.

We recommend, however, that when an SLO decides to disclose adverse open information about Canadians to a foreign agency, the SLO be required to first consult with management at CSIS Headquarters.

We recommend that the Service revise, or at least better define, its system of evaluating the reliability of foreign agencies.

Economic Espionage

We recommend that administrative information collected from the Liaison/Awareness Program be retained in a non-section 12 data base.

B. ANNUAL AUDIT OF CSIS ACTIVITIES IN A REGION OF CANADA

We believe that CSIS should obtain the Solicitor General's approval to exchange information with or otherwise cooperate with government departments and agencies with which it does not have formal arrangements.

Consequently, the Committee recommends that unless there are specific operational considerations that preclude it, the Service should in future inform Federal departments concerned about the conclusions it has drawn about Federal employees investigated.

The Committee recommends that source recruitment assessments involving persons who are not targets not be retained as part of the Service's section 12 data base.

The Committee recommends that the definition of community interview programs be clearly set out in CSIS policy.

C. INSIDE CSIS

We recommend, therefore, that the Service review and set out policy which addresses gaps in current policy pertaining to information exchanges with police agencies in relation to advocacy, protest, and dissent.

We recommend, therefore, that the Service take the necessary measures to ensure that section 12 and section 15 investigations are clearly distinguishable, and, where they may of necessity overlap, ensure that all the applicable tests and controls are in place.

We recommend that CSIS clarify its policy in regard to the "strictly necessary" requirement when assessing whether to retain identifying information from foreign intelligence in the Service's computerized data base.

COMPLAINT CASE HISTORIES

This section describes complaint cases submitted during the past year to the Committee under Section 41 of the *CSIS Act*, and concerning which the Committee had reached decisions. Not reviewed here are complaints that were the subject of administrative reviews and the nine complaints about the length of time taken by the Service to provide advice to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).

Complaints about security screening interviews

Interviews are one of the procedures employed by CSIS to assess immigration and other applicants, and it is the view of the Committee that interviews conducted by CSIS investigators can identify security related concerns only if the interviews are conducted skillfully and all possible security issues are discussed.

Conducted appropriately, interviews can also provide applicants with the opportunity to address security issues.

Investigators who conduct the interviews do not make decisions about the status of applicants. A different section in CSIS analyses the interviews, as well as information from other sources, and the results are presented in the form of briefs to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). The ultimate decision to grant or refuse an application is made by CIC.

The Committee received two complaints about alleged impropriety in regard to interviews conducted by CSIS investigators. While the Committee was cognizant of the length of time that had lapsed before CIC requested the Service's advice, we made the complainants aware of the fact that the Committee's jurisdiction when assessing whether any undue delay has occurred is limited to the actions of CSIS alone.

We concluded that neither complaint was valid. In one case worthy of note, the complainant had alleged that an investigator demonstrated "personal bias" against him during an interview. We found that this allegation was not supported by the evidence. Instead, we observed that the investigator had adopted a professional and objective approach to the assignment.

A complaint in respect to an airport interview

As a result of our investigation, we were satisfied that the Service had not used its powers in an illegal or inappropriate fashion when it had conducted an interview. We concluded that the interviewee participated voluntarily in the interview.

A complaint about sharing information with an employer

In 1995, a person was transferred to another unit within the organization that employed him — an organization that shares information with CSIS. The complainant asserted that he was told that he was being transferred as a result of information that had come to the attention of his supervisor from the Service. CSIS personnel had attempted in previous years to interview the complainant and his refusal to be interviewed had left the Service with a negative perception of the complainant.

The Service maintained that it had never told the employer that it would cease to share information if the complainant remained in the unit, and, that in 1995, it had told the employer that it knew nothing to suggest that the complainant was a security risk or that he was anything other than a loyal Canadian. The Service noted to the Committee that in its view, the matter of the job transfer within the other organization was beyond its purview.

After examining the information provided by the Service to the employer, the Committee concluded that the complaint was justified and that CSIS personnel failed to disseminate the information in its possession in an objective, responsible, and professional manner. The Service has the obligation not only to accurately observe and record the facts that it collects, it must also be fair and objective when it reports such information to others.

Except to the extent that CSIS may have influenced the actions of the organization concerned, the Committee's jurisdiction does not encompass the activities of the body for which the complainant

worked. We have, however, recommended to the Service that it share in a clear and unreserved manner with senior management in the complainant's organization, its conclusion that the complainant did not attempt to conceal intelligence activities and does not constitute a threat to the security of Canada.

A delicate balance

The Committee reviewed a complaint about CSIS from a person whose status in Canada was undetermined.

This case drew the Committee's attention to the possibility that the Service could take unfair advantage of persons who would prefer not to provide assistance to CSIS, but who are concerned that failure to cooperate would adversely affect their chances of obtaining residence in Canada. Of equal concern is the possibility that persons approached by CSIS at an early stage in the immigration process could come to believe that their chances of securing status in Canada would be improved by cooperating.

In this particular case, the Committee found the complaint justified.

Complaints about a CSIS interview

To fulfill its duty to report to government on activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, the Service depends on the information of members of the public who may have knowledge of, or opinions on, activities relating to threats to the security of Canada, including politically motivated violence – information often obtained through personal interviews.

The Committee investigated complaints concerning an interview conducted by the Service and recorded by the interviewee. While we were satisfied that the interview fell within the legislative mandate of the Service, two statements made by the investigators during the course of the interview caused some concern.

At one point in the interview, an investigator referred to CSIS as "the political police." The investigator told the Committee that it was the first time he had ever used the phrase and assured us that he would never use it again. He explained that he was attempting to draw

an analogy with a foreign agency whose mandate resembled the Service's in that it investigated politically motivated violence.

While the Committee regards the investigator's particular choice of words as unfortunate, we also are convinced, based on a reading of the entire exchange, that he well understood the overall mandate and purpose of the Service, and furthermore, that he attempted to convey this information to the interviewee.

With respect to a statement made by the other investigator involved, the Committee believes that it is reasonable to expect more restraint and professionalism from CSIS officers than was illustrated in this instance. We acknowledge the fact that interviews are often an effective means of collecting information and intelligence, and that a sometimes useful interview technique involves the employment of leading statements.

The Committee believes, however, that such techniques should never include statements that are not placed in the proper context, or adverse allegations about groups or individuals that are not supported by the facts.