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The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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Unsolicited article manuscripts, research notes, book reviews, and points of interest are welcome. Articles should be 5000-7000 words exclusive of endnotes, research notes 1500-2500 words exclusive of endnotes, book review essays and reviews 500-1000 words, and points of interest 1000 words or less. Articles may be submitted in either official language. Authors must include a brief biography. Authors must supply any supporting tables, charts, maps, and images, and these should not be embedded in the article text. Articles may be submitted via email or regular mail. All submissions are peer reviewed and the Editor will notify contributors on the status of their submission. Further details regarding author submission guidelines are available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/.

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On the cover: The Canadian troops are led off the parade square at Camp Zouani in the Golan Heights by Lieutenant Colonel (LCol) Sylvain Mongeon, after the transfer of Command Authority ceremony. The Indian Army replaces the Canadian Forces in the Golan Heights and brings Canada’s 32-year participation in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) mission to a successful end. Photo by Warrant Officer Gerry Pilote, Canadian Forces Combat Camera.

Corporal Shawn Kaye, a dismount medic with Role 1 Health Support Services evacuation platoon, rests in the shade as Afghan and Canadian troops search a compound for clues on Taliban activities within the Zharey district, west of Kandahar. Photo by MCpl Robert Bottrill, Canadian Forces Combat Camera.
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FROM THE EDITOR

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, Ph.D.

I have little doubt that future analysts will identify 2006 as the year where the Canadian Army turned the corner. After nearly a decade of transformation and nearly two decades of high operational tempo in complex missions across the full spectrum of operations, the Army’s performance in Afghanistan this year is a reflection of the professional organizational culture that has evolved since the end of the Cold War. Faced with endless challenges in the early 1990s, the Army nevertheless critically questioned itself and, accepting those painful lessons, embarked on an innovative odyssey of transformation that is nothing short of amazing. From personal kit to tactics to operations to leadership, one can easily observe the results of this dedication to military enterprise and conceptual change over the last 10-15 years. And given the demands of operations in Afghanistan, such dedication could not have come at a better time.

Many organizations have faced similar challenges in the past. For example, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) found itself faced with the dilemma of ‘innovate or die’ at the end of the 1970s, a time when the United States military was focused on preparing for a large air-land battle in western Europe and not amphibious operations. Faced with possible extinction or at the very least a dramatic realignment of its core role and mission, the USMC leadership sought new and innovative solutions for its medium-weight medium-sized force. Of the many problems, one dealt with achieving a balance between mechanization and light forces. The analysis of this problem eventually led to development of maneuver concepts and then doctrine, a way of warfare that continues to define the USMC today.

The issue of achieving balance within a medium weight, strategically relevant, and tactically decisive force continues to challenge Army thinkers today. As part of the research and outreach program within the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine, these issues are investigated through many forums, including the publication of select articles in the Canadian Army Journal to stimulate both interest and debate on these topics. This issue contains a number of articles posing important questions and/or testing important hypotheses, all of which will influence thinking on Army development in some way. Lieutenant-Colonel Villeneuve examines the future role of Canadian Army intelligence, while Captains Mundy and Haynes offer proposals for the future employment of infantry and fire support. Major Strickland looks for insight from his adversary’s predecessor in Afghanistan, while Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, Major Godefroy (not the editor but his older brother), and Dr. Ken Reynolds provide retrospective analyses of past Canadian Army operations. Finally, the stand up table offers excellent point and counterpoint on issues from past journals as well as other items of note to the Army.

As per my editorial in last issue, I am once again putting a call out to the Army for articles dealing with OP APOLLO. I look forward to your submissions and am ready to answer any questions you may have. If you have an article, or even an idea you’d like to explore before putting pen to paper (or finger to keyboard), don’t hesitate to contact our office. Enjoy this issue, and let us know what you think.
The call came from London, for the last July drive
"To the trenches with the regiment, prepare yourselves to die"
The roll call next morning, just a handful survived.
Enlist ye Newfoundlanders and come follow me

Lyrics from Recruiting Sergeant—Great Big Sea, Album: Play

In his book about Second World War historiography, British military historian Sir John Keegan made this assertion:

The history of the Second World War has not been yet written. Perhaps in the next century it will be. Today, though fifty years have elapsed since it ended, the passions it aroused still run too high, the wounds it inflicted still cut too deep, and the unresolved problems it left still bulk too large for any one historian to strike an objective balance.¹

This is not at all surprising according to him, for it took 130 years for a one-volume history of the American Civil War to be generally accepted by all schools of thought on that conflict.² Certain indicators show that the history of the First World War may also not have yet been written. For example, a cursory review of the literature shows that, without a doubt, the First World War still fascinates and still generates controversies.

Titles such as Mud, Blood, and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War by Gordon Corrigan (published in 2003) and The Somme by Peter Hart (2005) and The Somme by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson (2004) re-visit the history of the war, and in this case a specific battle. The authors attempt to describe the battle in its proper context and debunk many of its myths. Furthermore, publishers are turning out an impressive number of titles, especially close to specific anniversary dates. A casual search of the Barnes & Noble bookstore Web site (this chain is the equivalent of the Canadian Chapters/Indigo stores) revealed that 20 books (new and re-prints of older titles) were published in 2005-06 on the Battle of the Somme alone.

Another example of controversies still generated by the conflict is the divergence between the revisionist histories now being published and a public memory that is still somewhat negative. Evidently, historians feel the need to correct or adjust what has become the agreed orthodox view of the war. Images of lines of khaki-clad troops marching unflinchingly across no man’s land to their doom are still very prevalent. Words and associated images such as “lost generation”, “needless slaughter” and the “the horrors of the trenches” still resonate today.³ Of the myriad possible examples to be taken from the First World War, one would be at great pains to find an event that better illustrates and reinforces this popular perception than the first day of the Battle of the Somme on July 1st 1916.

The Battle of the Somme (July—November 1916) was the result of a British attempt to relieve the pressure resulting from a German offensive in February 1916 at Verdun.
The French, who were suffering extreme levels of casualties, brought pressure to bear on the British for some sort of offensive to divert the Germans. The official Canadian history notes: “The Somme offensive had no great geographical objectives. Its purpose was threefold—to relieve pressure on the French armies at Verdun, to inflict as heavy losses as possible on the German armies and to aid allies on other fronts by preventing any further transfer of German troops from the west.”

Planning for operations started in the spring of 1916, and by late June the conditions were in place for a major offensive north of the Somme River. Overwhelmingly a British operation, it involved 18 divisions, themselves composed of about 234 battalions, for a total of over half a million men. There were two notable exceptions to this United Kingdom-only composition of the attacking forces; a small contingent of about 80 men from Bermuda (Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps) attached with the 1st Lincolns (21st Division), and the 1st Newfoundland Regiment with the 29th Division, a Regular Army division.

Originally called the Newfoundland Contingent when raised for wartime service, the battalion-sized unit arrived in France in March 1916 after a rather “uneventful” period of service in the Gallipoli theatre (where 87 casualties were reported). Re-christened the 1st Newfoundland Regiment (at that time a one-battalion regiment about 800-strong under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A.L. Hadow, a British officer) it took its place with the other battalions of the 29th Division on the line on June 30th. The plan for the 29th Division involved a two-brigade attack, with divisional objectives on the 2nd German line, an advance of almost 3 miles. There were two major features on the axis of advance of the division: First, the town of Beaumont Hamel, which consisted of about 162 houses at the time of the attack and had been turned into a veritable fortress by the Germans. Second, a ground feature named the Y Ravine. The Y Ravine is described as having “…steep banks in which numerous deep dugouts could safely stand the heaviest bombardments. In addition to being honeycombed with dugouts, it was crossed with numerous trenches. This meant that the garrison there could be relieved or supported from either Station Road or from the neighbouring trenches. The ravine ran about a half mile south of the village [Beaumont Hamel] and has two arms that extend outwards at the western end, giving it a Y shape.” These two features, intertwined with the trench system of the German lines, created a formidable obstacle for the units of the 29th Division. For their part, the Newfoundlanders had the Y Ravine directly in their path.
Extensive artillery support was planned and executed to create gaps in the enemy wire, destroy prepared defensive positions and generally force the enemy to keep his head down until the attackers reached their objectives. Leaving nothing to chance, British gunners used more than 1.5 million shells during the weeklong bombardment preceding the attack.\(^{10}\) The 1st Newfoundland Regiment was to be part of the second wave of the attack, the first wave departing at 7:30 a.m. As such they were positioned in the reserve trenches behind the British front line waiting for the order to advance.

At 7:20 a.m. the mine under Hawthorn Ridge (a part of the German defensive line in front of Beaumont Hamel) was detonated, destroying the redoubt on top of it and creating a crater 130 feet across and 40 feet deep.\(^ {11}\) Unfortunately, it also signalled to the enemy that an attack was imminent. Some ten minutes later, the British artillery bombardment ceased as gunners readjusted to commence firing on the German second line. This was the signal for the infantry to “go over the top” or leave positions already occupied in no man’s land and to close with their assigned objectives. The battalions of the 86th and 87th brigades of the 29th Division started their advance, quickly encountered heavy enemy fire and suffered mounting casualties. For example, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers (part of the 86th brigade on the left) suffered 561 casualties, while the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (part of the 87th brigade on the right) took 568. In all, of the eight battalions composing those two brigades, four are listed as having suffered 500 or more casualties on the morning of July 1st.\(^ {12}\) The preparatory bombardment and subsequent barrage had not dislocated the enemy as planned, and the Germans had been able to re-occupy their fighting positions as the British were mounting their attack. The attack soon ground to a stop, and wounded and dying men started to filter back to the British front line trenches. None probably reached the German wire.

Conflicting reports had started to reach brigade and divisional headquarters; there were signs of possible successes on the right (87th brigade), where the planned signal (a flare) had been spotted. In the ensuing confusion, the second-wave attack of the 88th Brigade, scheduled to launch at 8:30 a.m. was postponed and finally, at 8:45 a.m. the commanding officers of the 1st Newfoundland Regiment and the 1st Essex were ordered
to mount a two-battalion attack in support of the 87th Brigade. At this point, the communication trenches leading from the reserves trenches and the British front line were clogged with the wounded, dying and dead men of the first wave. Advance through the normal channels was almost impossible. The commanding officer of the 1st Essex chose, perhaps wisely, to move forward using the congested trenches, taking over two hours to reach the front line trenches. The Newfoundlanders on the other hand, were ready to move by 9:15 a.m. and Lt.-Col. Hadow, feeling a certain urgency, ordered the battalion to move forward to the front line in the open independently of the 1st Essex.

The regiment had about 300 yards to travel to reach the British front line. As soon as they started forming up in the open they came under heavy fire from machine guns and artillery. Men fell while the rest attempted to move forward through the various lines of wire found in the British lines, at times bunching up near gaps and providing the enemy with ideal targets. A few made it across no man’s land, perhaps a dozen or so, but by that time the combat effectiveness of the regiment had been reduced to nil. In a scant 30 minutes it was over. The 1st Newfoundland Regiment had taken 684 casualties (26 officers and 658 men, of which 310 were killed), or a 91% casualty rate. Every officer had either been wounded or killed. The British attacks around Beaumont Hamel gained no appreciable ground that day. Beaumont Hamel was finally captured in November 1916.
The scale of the casualties for the first day of the Battle of the Somme is difficult for us, with our modern sensibilities, to comprehend. The final returns for casualties on that day were 57,470 officers and men. 32 regiments are listed as having suffered 500 or more casualties, with the 1st Newfoundland Regiment at second position on that list (behind the 10th West Yorks at 710). Many regiments faced the difficult task of rebuilding on the 10% cadre of troops usually left behind during major operations. The regiment was eventually reconstituted and fought again in many major actions until the end of the war. In February 1918, in recognition for its service, the regiment was granted a unique honour and awarded by the King the title of “Royal”. During the First World War, over 6,000 Newfoundlanders served with the regiment and other British forces, of which 3,720 never returned.

Endnotes
3. Interestingly, these are all chapter titles from Gordon Corrigan’s Mud, Blood, and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War.
6. Ibid., p.79.
11. Gliddon, Gerald. When the Barrage Lifts: A Topographical History of the Battle of the Somme. London: Leo Cooper, 1990, p.41. The explosion was immortalized on film by George Malins and became one of the most recognizable pictures of the war.
13. Ibid., p.188.
14. Ibid., p.188. Lt.-Col. Hadow had been authorized by the Brigade commander to attack independently if needed.
15. Ibid., p.188.
16. Ibid., p.189.
On 15 June 2006 the Canadian Army received a new commander in a ceremony presided over by the Chief of Defence Staff. Lieutenant-General Marc Caron, who had commanded the army since February 2005, retired after 35 years of distinguished service. He transferred command to Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, previously the Director General of Strategic Planning at National Defence Headquarters. LGen Andrew Leslie joined the 30th Field Artillery Regiment in 1977, and as a student in England he was attached to the Honourable Artillery Company. In 1981, he transferred to the Regular Force and served with the 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in Germany, the regiment that—he like his father before him—he eventually commanded. He has completed the British Army Troop Commander and Tactics courses, French Army Commando, the hand-to-hand combat and the infantry company commander’s courses, as well as Army and Joint staff colleges and training in project management.

After a succession of field tours with mechanized and airborne combat units in Germany, Cyprus and Canada and command appointments up to regimental level, in early 1995 he was promoted to Colonel and saw service in the Former Yugoslavia as Chief of Staff Sector South (Brigade Level). He was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for his actions under fire during the fighting for Knin. He then became the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of UNCRO (Division level), and finally Chief of Staff of UNPF (Mission level). Following the UN hand-over to NATO forces, LGen Leslie returned to Western Canada as the Area Chief of Staff in 1996, and served in that capacity during the Manitoba floods of Spring 1997.

In 1997 he became the Commander of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG), an infantry (heavy combat formation) based in Western Canada, where the focus was on live-fire combined arms training. In early 1998, 1 CMBG deployed to the South Shore of Montreal to assist with ice-storm disaster relief operations. In 1999, he was promoted Brigadier-General while a student on the Advanced and National Securities Studies Courses in Toronto. In 2000, he was appointed the J6 of the Canadian Forces, responsible for commanding the communications field groups and regiments, electronic intelligence functions and supporting various national computer networks. In 2002, he became the Commander Land Force Central Area, responsible for one regular and three reserve Brigades as well as several bases and training establishments.

LGen Leslie was appointed Commander Task Force Kabul and Deputy Commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan as of 2003, for which he was awarded the Meritorious Service Cross. On his return in 2004, he assumed the role of Acting Assistant Chief of the Land Staff. Later that year, he was a full-time PhD student at the Royal Military College during which he was selected as the McNaughton-Vanier Scholar. In 2005, he became the Director General Strategic Planning in Ottawa, responsible for a wide variety of force development and resource issues, until his appointment as Chief of the Land Staff this year.
Introduction

This short article has been prepared by CWO L.A. Topp, the CTC Formation Sergeant-Major, and Commander CTC, Colonel M.P. Jorgensen. In this article, we intend to address very briefly the efforts being made at the CTC to modernize individual training within the Army’s Individual Training System. Our goal is to make sure all members of the Canadian Land Force develop a greater sense of situational awareness as to the efforts being made throughout the Army’s Individual Training System—despite serious challenges of time and resources—to transform and modernize individual training.

We need to state from the outset that a significant amount energy and vision was applied to this challenge by our predecessors, Brigadier-General C.J.R. Davis, and CWO D.A. Preeper. They got the ball rolling with a very comprehensive directive approximately twelve months ago—we are simply keeping the ball rolling, and adding momentum!

The Contemporary Operating Environment

There are many challenges facing the soldiers heading out the door on operations today. The operating environment or battlespace that we are operating in is different from that of even five years ago and one of the many challenges facing the Land Forces is to develop and deliver the right training to those who will be facing this threat.

Today the threat is no longer considered to be linear. Today we consider the threat to be asymmetrical. Many would say that this has always been the case, given that we used to preach that for an operation to be effective it must be fought deep, close, and in the rear—all at the same time. We believe the true difference to be that there is no readily identifiable enemy. There are no front lines, zone of separation or uniforms to identify the threat, and everyone from the children to the oldest individual can be a friend or pose a deadly threat. In places like Afghanistan, an attack can come at you from any direction at any time without warning. It also means that there is no safe or rear area where you can let down your guard. Training someone to enter this environment is no easy task, but this is the task of the Army training system and we are changing to meet those needs at the very start of a young Canadian’s entry into the Land Force.

The training system has been accused of not changing quickly or still being stuck in the cold war mentality. Some of this may have been true, but one needs to remember that it is not an easy task to turn an entire training system 90 degrees overnight. Even if this were possible, the instructors would not be prepared or experienced enough to make this change as quickly as we might have wished them to. The other issue is that before we “throw the baby out with the bath water” we need to establish what skills are still relevant and which ones are fundamental and must therefore be maintained.

In fact, many of the fundamentals we have taught in the past are still relevant today. If we were to examine the fundamentals of the defence one would readily see the how true that is—regardless of whether we are digging in on the open plain or occupying a roadblock. Information gathering is essential regardless of the means. Terrain, either to
use as a force multiplier or to understand that which needs to be denied to the enemy, is a key factor in an estimate in ground operations, regardless of the situation. As well, coordination, mutual support, depth, manoeuvre, firepower, and use of reserves are relevant points to consider. These factors apply whether facing the First Guard Army or securing a forward operating base (FOB) with a platoon or company in the backcountry of Afghanistan. What we must be able to do is to better communicate the continuing relevance of these factors. In our view, this can be accomplished by placing them in proper context and demonstrating how easily they can be adapted to today’s full-spectrum operations.

Of course, we have clearly identified the need to build on our skills in areas such as urban operations. We expect to be operating to some degree or another in an urban environment on all of our operations today and into the future. Some of the other skills, such as convoy operations, vehicle check points, vital point security, and cordon and search operations, that once may have taken a back seat to other training need to be brought forward in our training scenarios. This training needs to be conducted from FOBs or from inside built up areas to replicate how it is currently being done in theatre. Furthermore, our training must to reflect that operations are intelligence-led and that there is much profit to be gained from effective information operations.

There are also other dynamics at play in our operations today, such as the “Three D” (defence, diplomacy and development) approach involving other government agencies. We deploy with embedded media and the use of civilian contractors in support of operations has become part of standard operating procedures. Our soldiers will need to understand how these elements fit together in order ensure their success on operations.

The training of our NCO corps is being challenged more frequently today. While the Canadian Army has been blessed with an excellent NCO corps to date, it is clear to us that we need to develop NCO training in a manner consistent with both external and internal pressures for change. The most difficult aspect of changing NCO training is to define what it is that the NCO must “look like” at the end of the training. We must “put a face on our soldier”. In other words, we must define exactly what attributes we require in our NCOs and soldiers to enable us to shape the training that will produce the professionals we need.

In the rush to modify training over the past few years, the professional development of our NCOs has gone through some very significant changes. This has led some of us to conclude that there may not be even two NCOs who have undergone the exact same training! At one time, if you met a sergeant you would have known precisely how that sergeant had been trained and what experiences he or she had had, and knew therefore exactly what tasks that they would be able to complete. Today, the honest truth is that we are less than certain as to what training or experience these key leaders in our army actually have. In some cases, operational experience has taught them inappropriate lessons, or forced them to work in areas not traditionally within their sphere of responsibility.

So, we believe there is a need to stop changing the basic NCO training structure. Instead, we need to allow the value of some of our courses to take hold before we lose ourselves in a sea of change. We need to establish a reliable reference or base line, including appropriate doctrine, from which we can assess progress and validate at least some of the paradigm shifts we have undertaken.

**Evolving Approaches to Individual Training**

Each new training addition brings with it a fresh demand for training time, in turn creating a requirement to either add time to a course or create space by dropping other
training. Since the Army has little appetite for increasing individual training time, we are often trying to find space by cutting out other aspects of the course—most often administration time. We believe, however, that we can help the process by adopting different training delivery strategies.

First, we are phasing out the traditional approach—death by PowerPoint! We need to make better use of the time available and since learning by doing is the most effective way of teaching for long-term retention, we are attempting to introduce “student-centric” learning, using modeling and simulation to aid in the process and getting away from the dreaded “laundry-list” approach to instruction. In fact, in the absence of suitable simulation, some schools have returned to the cloth model to aid comprehension and retention.

Second, we are working to offer more militarily relevant scenarios to provide context to our leadership training. This indoctrinates the student into the military context from the very beginning. Even though some of the scenarios may be relatively superficial, we are confident that focusing all training on operationally relevant scenarios will strengthen our students’ skill-sets, given that some of this formative training will be absorbed by osmosis initially and refined later.

Third, we are moving with great speed to remove the seemingly endless series of checklists and moving towards a more holistic or “fundamentals-based” training approach. To embrace mission command we are shaping training to support the creation of a “thinking organization” wherein individuals can quickly assess changing situations and adapt on the fly. There will always be a need to teach the critical steps of mission planning, but this must be better balanced with mission execution and focusing on those things that one can actually influence. Indeed, we need to focus on the outcome of battle procedure, not just battle procedure as an end-state. We need to focus on the execution phase of the mission because this is where we earn our pay—and that includes some of the less glamorous, but necessary, activities such as weapons and equipment checks.

One of the more challenging changes we are working to incorporate into our training delivery is the introduction of a coaching and mentoring approach to instructing our young leaders. This move away from a “clipboard” mentality has been a challenging one for a couple of reasons. First, this was not the method by which most of the instructors in the schools were taught. They were taught under the old school system where, in many cases, stamina was the main criteria and many would have left the course with little or no idea of what it was that they were supposed to have learned. One of the most effective ways to describe the coaching and mentoring method to our instructors has been to tell them to teach as they would prefer to be instructed. Further, we are expecting the instructors to focus on having the students learn “how” to think as opposed to “what” to think. This takes a little longer, and the end result may not necessarily reflect how the instructor would personally have carried out the task; but it is our view that the student will emerge stronger and more capable—our having transferred the instructor’s experience to the student in an engaging and practical way. The second reason the introduction of mentoring and coaching is a challenge for us is that it places a greater burden on the instructors in terms of time and preparation. It forces the instructors to become embedded in the section or troop as they would be in a unit, with scope for passing on recent operational experience, which in turn requires a regular cycle of postings into and out of the schools. No longer can instructors rely on “clipboard solutions”.

In line with our adoption of coaching and mentoring, we have broadened our evaluation approach to incorporate a more holistic assessment scheme in which
students on select courses continue on the course until it is nearly completed, in order to ensure we have fully exhausted all options and have completed the most comprehensive assessment possible of the student. In other words, we basically allow the student to complete all the training offered on the course and only after having had that opportunity do we convene a Progress Review Board to determine whether or not the student has met the standards of the course. This philosophy is based on the realization that not all individuals progress at the same speed and that our course timetables and subject matter must cater to the development time of the average student for purposes of achieving the required standard. To date, our experience with this approach has been extremely successful, with students expressing significant satisfaction with the process.

The training system is making changes on many other fronts to bring training techniques into the current—as opposed to the previous—century. We are shifting from passive learning techniques (lectures) to “learning by doing” to the extent possible. We are changing to ensure that relevant military tasks form the basis of instruction, practice, and evaluation. We are moving our initial “distance learning” initiatives to a new level that permits greater opportunity for independent self-paced learning, with training materials that provide the right levels of academic rigour. We are, however, very aware of the challenges posed by distance or computer-based learning. There are still instances where students are frustrated by lack of computer access or a need for particular skills. We also realize that there are still instances where the person’s primary job does not provide the student the opportunity to devote his or her full focus to the training at hand.

During all these changes to training, we have not forgotten reservists. We recognize the challenges they face in making themselves available for training. Accordingly, we have moved beyond modularizing training to increase access, and now offer year-round training opportunities at Camp Aldershot for reservists—both students and instructors.

We have also taken steps to modify the training environment to support fresh delivery strategies and efforts to “train as we fight”. The need for this has never been greater. This has led us to increase the amount of training we do beyond the training area, and we are pressing hard to create an urban operations training site, and a set of FOBs. The next step for us is to further modify the training environment to reflect current and anticipated operations by adding a more effective “human factors” force to the mix—one that better reflects civilians on the battlefield and incorporates a more contemporary element of friction. The importance of having a realistic and flexible “human factors” force cannot be overstated with regards to its impact on training effectiveness. These changes will not come without additional cost; replication of the sights, sounds, smells, and living conditions of our operational environment will require a considerable investment of resources and personnel.

**Leadership Training**

We hope to see these changes in training delivery philosophy significantly improve leadership training at CTC, producing more confident and mentally agile leaders, capable of rapid—and perhaps even intuitive—tactical decision-making under stressful conditions. Furthermore, we hope to develop a greater willingness to accept risk in decision-making, without the fear of failure from having failed to divine the “DS solution”. In other words, in the creation new generations of leaders we will be encouraging innovation in decision-making, through focusing on leadership development rather than concentrating strictly on drills. We intend to accomplish that through less repetition of scenarios and tasks and an overall reduction in predictability in exercise and training design.
Another area we are exploring is that of officer and NCO convergence—both in terms of employment and training. While there may be a perception that most of the training conducted at CTC is officer training, this could not be further from the truth. The majority of training conducted at CTC is NCO training. However, the fact that we conduct both NCO and officer leadership training gives us some scope for bringing greater consistency to the training provided to both groups.

A related topic hovering on the horizon is that of determining where it is appropriate for NCOs to deliver training to other NCOs, and where officers should deliver this training. Traditionally, we have relied on NCOs to teach low-level tactical and technical training. If we are to assume that the vision of NCM 2020 is correct, we should see the integration of NCOs into planning and operations staff. These newly acquired skills could be used to extend the level and scope of training that the NCOs will be capable of delivering to other NCOs. Certainly, in the environment in which we operate today NCOs will require a broader vision of Land Force operations. We must find ways to get them the professional development and experience they need. This will likely take some time, and require some interim solutions—including having officers initially teach these skills to NCOs. However, the long-term solution must involve NCOs taking on the teaching role, thus relieving some of the stress on an already under-strength officer corps.

While this is not necessarily new thinking, we believe that we can move beyond simply teaching some similar skills at certain rank or responsibility levels. Key to success in this venture is to understand exactly what we expect at the end of the training period from each group and ensuring we understand the risks associated with greater convergence between NCO and officer leadership development. Clearly, given today’s operating environment where NCOs provide a significant degree of independent leadership in operations, we believe there is scope for challenging NCOs further in our leadership development courses without watering down the fundamental skills we need to instil in them.

Other Initiatives

The introduction of new capabilities that will flow from units such as the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) and the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) will no doubt come with additional training bills that will be over and above those for which we are presently are resourced. The potential increase in emphasis on skills such as mountain, jungle, urban, and amphibious operations will necessitate developing staff and training cadres with expertise in these areas in order to pass these skills on to those requiring them.

With the stand-up of the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre (in lieu of the Canadian Parachute Centre) we are further exploring not just unique operations or operations in special environments. We are now focusing on precision parachuting skills, including precision-delivery of supplies and special equipment in new ways. The Advanced Mountain Operations course is focusing on skills that can be applied in the contemporary operating environment more directly and with greater flexibility, while the Patrol Pathfinder course is evolving to meet the demands of everything from the SCTF to more traditional dismounted and challenging tasks.

New courses have also recently been introduced at CTC, including the very popular Urban Operations Instructors course and the Crowd Confrontation Operations training package developed at the Infantry School and delivered to numerous deployment-bound field force units. New initiatives abound at the Artillery School, including the stand-up of a Surveillance and Target Acquisition Troop capable of teaching the necessary skills to the field force, as UAV operations become the norm in artillery regiments. Along with
their ground-breaking efforts to exploit technology in training simulation through the use of the Indirect Fire Trainer for FAC and FOO training, the Artillery School has taken Air Space Coordination operations to a new level. All the schools place significant emphasis on “benchmarking” training. That is, they all have taken steps to profit directly from the experiences of our Allies through instructor exchanges, visits, conferences, deployed liaison officers, publications and so forth.

The Challenges

All the initiatives and engagements discussed above create not just opportunities but challenges.

We are training a new generation of young Canadians preparing to serve their country and we must adapt accordingly. Already, our existing NCO cohort is different from its predecessors, based on the less-than-scientific manning and promotion cycles of the past few decades. At the moment, we are fortunate to have a huge reservoir of career experience in the ranks of our senior NCOs, however, we are beginning to see the emergence of a group with less time in the CF, but more recent operational experience. Our challenge will be to harmonize these emerging trends within the Army’s Individual Training System.

While we are eagerly modernizing our training, we often find that we are struggling to find the necessary doctrinal basis for our initiatives. Fortunately, a new publication dealing with insurgencies and counter-insurgency tactics has been published, allowing us to take a more comprehensive approach to introducing counter-insurgency theory and practice into our courses, starting with our DP 1 students (introduction to theory and practice) and terminating with our Combined Arms Team Commander course (CATCC) students who will be expected to apply counter-insurgency tactics at the sub-unit level.

Along with the many challenges of modernization, we remain constantly under pressure to reduce the extent and scale of Individual Training. IT&E Rationalization, which occurred nearly concurrently with the implementation of the emergent DP system, represented an attempt to rein in the expansion of formal individual training to a level that the Army could manage. In some MOCs this caused a reduction of 30% of the training time and a cut of 50% of the ammunition allotted for training. As these reductions seemed to have the greatest impact on NCO training, they created significant friction and dissatisfaction throughout the Army as courses were reduced, restructured, or amalgamated with other training. Further, given that the primary motive behind this initiative appeared to be cost, it created a significant degree of suspicion. As well, because there was a general impression that the pressure on the individual training system had arisen as a result of a series of “new” courses (mainly Soldier Qualification), many felt that the otherwise excellent individual training for Army-managed MOCs was being sacrificed. At this point, of course, the jury is still out—we have yet to see the long-term impact of the changes brought about by IT&E Rationalization. However, those of us serving within the Army’s Individual Training System feel the pressure daily to reduce the time allocated to formal courses while at the same time striving to address new training requirements arising from the evolving operational environment.

In our view, we have gone as far as we can with training reductions. In fact, we feel there may be a need for an increase in training time and resources as we head further down the road of modernization, transformation and CF expansion. The quick promotions that are sure to follow as one generation moves on and another comes in, along with an anticipated lack of depth of experience of the follow-on generation, may require that more time be spent on formal individual training—if we remain to true to our historical reaction to training deficiencies.
We are also facing a variety of challenges with respect to shortages of ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and spare parts. Ammunition allocated to training today leaves much to be desired and we are beginning to see some difficulty with respect to having sufficient time on the ranges to produce the desired results on courses such as Armour Gunner. Often, the training establishments have not been accounted for when new equipment purchases have been made—this remains true even today, although the soon-to-be established DLR 9 will help out considerably in this regard. Hopefully, the Centres of Excellence will be able to exercise more effective influence on future equipment purchases. While Whole Fleet Management has been kind to the CTC and the Army’s Individual Training System as a whole, we continue to experience truly catastrophic VOR rates—hovering for the most part near 35 per cent or more, which makes it very challenging for school staff to provide the right kind of training platform for our students.

Over the past few years, we have also noted a distinct “silo approach” to training at the CTC. This trend is entirely understandable, given the reduction in time for each course and the pressures on personnel engaged in delivering the training. However, combined arms training at CTC has slipped considerably, and we are producing leaders without a sense of the strength of the combined arms team, or even a rudimentary idea of the coordination challenges of working within the combined arms family.

Funding for our many initiatives and basic requirements has proven problematic as well. We are a long way from having an urban operations training site. This fall, we will receive a small “sea-container-like” urban village, consisting of 12 structures. However, we are hoping for something bigger than that in the near future! As well, we are working to secure the very small funding envelope required to establish a set of forward operating bases and an appropriate “human factors” force. So far, it looks like funding for these critical initiatives is a long way off. We also have a number of excellent options for training simulation funding, including stand-alone crew gunnery trainers, the instructor console for the Indirect Fire Trainer and so on. This year, we expect to receive a company-sized dismounted suite of weapons effects simulators to allow us at least to introduce the concept to our DP 1 students before they actually arrive at their units.

Our biggest challenge, however, remains personnel tempo. Instructors throughout the Army’s Individual Training System are working flat out. There is no denying that the tempo is high throughout the Army, but we see daily evidence of instructor stress. Augmentation—or training support, as we now like to call it—remains a source of friction and endless staff negotiations between the Army’s Individual Training System and its clients, the field force. Further aggravating this situation is the fact that we are challenged to rotate the instructional cadre to ensure a constant batch of fresh instructors with recent operational experience to pass on to their students.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this brief article, we have tried to summarize a number of messages. The key message we have attempted to convey is that the Army Individual Training System is modernizing and transforming. We have also tried to illustrate that the Army Individual Training System is a sound investment that provides a key service to the Army’s force generation efforts and ensures the core fabric of Army capabilities remains reliable. Finally, notwithstanding the many challenges and the pace of activities, we believe that the Army’s Individual Training System is a rewarding place to serve and that it provides an invaluable professional development opportunity for all members of the Army at some point in their careers!
In the future security environment, the Army, as part of a Canadian Forces integrated team, will be required to operate within an international arena marked by uncertainty, volatility and risk in order to meet Canada’s national security needs and expectations. While the threats of the Cold War have receded, others have grown in importance and still others have risen in their place. In tomorrow’s world, the prospect of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by the realities of asymmetric and irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled adversaries; media-savvy foes intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding an adversary’s will to fight. The challenges presented by this type of irregular warfare will be further exacerbated by potential adversaries taking full advantage of the complex human, physical and informational environments that the world’s large and densely populated urban areas can provide.

It is within this uncertain context that the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine is working to develop the broader implications of the future security environment on land operations. To this end, the Directorate has undertaken a project to develop a Force Employment Concept (FEC) for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow (AoT) that is clear, relevant and forward-looking. This FEC will be the foundation upon which Canada’s Land Force capabilities and doctrine are developed and/or synchronized in order to ensure the Army remains strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically decisive throughout the future battlespace.

Building upon previous work presented in *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities, Crisis in Zefra, and The Army of Tomorrow: Assessing Concepts and Capabilities For Land Operations Evolution*, the Directorate has developed a series of operating, functional, and enabling concepts that collectively describe an approach to future land operations characterized by the deliberate use of dispersion undertaken by adaptive forces in order to create and sustain advantage over the adversary across the moral, physical, and informational planes of the future battle space.

The concepts developed for the FEC will be analyzed and further developed through the AoT Seminar War Game conducted in late August and several Army experiments planned for the coming months. The culmination of this concept development and experimentation effort will be the publication of the FEC for the AoT in January 2007. On publication of AoT FEC, the Directorate will complete a capability gap analysis to identify critical AoT capability requirements. It is fully anticipated that the capability gap analysis will be aligned with the Defence Capability Plan and Chief of Force Development Capability Based Planning. This capability gap analysis will also fully consider the use of land forces within both expeditionary and domestic contexts. Finally, the capability gap analysis will re-invigorate a Land Capability Development process that encompasses both the regular and reserve components of the AoT.
Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Villeneuve, CD, MDS

Fog of peace could be much denser than the fog of war as one attempts to select the right course of action.

Oyos—Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War¹

General Hillier, current Chief of the Defence Staff, uses the analogy of “The Bear” to describe the threat faced by Canada during the Cold War period.² General Hillier is, of course, making reference to the Warsaw Pact Alliance, a military organization of Central and Eastern European countries created in 1955 to counter the NATO Alliance;³ the Warsaw Pact remained under the tight control of the USSR until it was abolished in 1991. For NATO countries, the menace during the Cold War was the risk of a high intensity war between the East and the West, with a near certitude that nuclear weapons would be used in such a war. Confronted with such an overwhelming menace, the Canadian Forces military intelligence community during that era became focused on that one issue. The entire military intelligence organization, capabilities and training were all designed to fight the Warsaw Pact in a high intensity war, with little flexibility to adjust to any other level of conflict or menace. Despite the intensity of the threat, it can arguably be said that the tasks of an intelligence specialist during that period were relatively simple as the enemy was clearly defined and well known. In other words, how the enemy could react was predictable.⁴

Today, some fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the situation is no longer that simple for an intelligence operator. General Hillier refers now to “The Snakes” to describe the new menace facing Canada.⁵ The concepts of “Fourth Generation Warfare”⁶ and “Asymmetric Threat”⁷ are used to describe the type of adversaries that the Canadian Forces are currently facing when deployed on operations. The “Snakes” are anything but well defined, ranging from organized crime to armed groups and militia to terrorist cells. The enemy is as likely to be wearing uniforms and carrying weapons openly as to be blended with the local population. Due to the fluid nature of the threat, the task of an intelligence operator today is far more complex than before as he or she has to determine not only who are the adversaries, but also what are their capabilities and what do they want to do. The threat is now very unpredictable.

The fluid nature of the current threat is a clear indication that the operational environment within which military forces operates has changed considerably in the span of less than 20 years. The following analogy made by a recent United-States Army G-2, Lieutenant General Robert Noonan, helps illustrate the situation military forces are now facing:

We have gone from the Cold War era, where you had two heavyweight sumo wrestlers posturing and going at each other, to this era of globalization, where you have a game of soccer. Both sides switch rapidly between offense and defense; there is action away from the ball that is just as important as things happening near the ball; you have to shift and plan; there are set plays, and at other times there is no set play.⁸

As can be expected, this new environment is creating challenges for the Canadian Forces in general and military intelligence in particular. The aim of this study is to consider the impact of the post Cold War period on Canada’s military intelligence,
focusing mainly on the intelligence required to support deployed operations. In other words, what impact has the last fifteen years had on how military intelligence now supports Canadian Forces operations? This study will be divided into four parts. It will start with a short overview of military intelligence, before analyzing the evolving operating environment, the shifting nature of the threat and the effects of digitization on how military intelligence operates. This study will demonstrate that the demand for military intelligence since the end of the Cold War has increased significantly. It will also demonstrate that due to the current operating environment, with its asymmetric threat and digitization, intelligence has had to change considerably how it operates. However, despite the current high level of demand, army intelligence is struggling to adjust to the new operating realities, while the Land Staff is faltering with real transformation of its intelligence capabilities.

Military Intelligence—Why does it matter?

All of the business of war, and indeed all of the business of life, is to endeavor to find out what you don’t know by what you do: that’s what I called guessing what was on the other side of the hill.

Duke of Wellington

One may wonder at first about the need to study military intelligence. The answer to that question is simple as intelligence is the key element that “makes going to and conducting military operations a rational act.”\textsuperscript{10} The end result of any military operation is to achieve success. To do this, a military commander must be able to act in a coherent fashion in order to accomplish the intended objectives, and that can only be done by taking the threat into consideration. In a book written in 1948 titled Intelligence is for Commander, the authors summarized the need for intelligence well: “intelligence is not an academic exercise nor is it an end in itself. The prime purpose of intelligence is to help the commander make a decision, and thereby to proceed more accurately and more confidently with the accomplishment of his mission.”\textsuperscript{11} In this regard, the situation faced by a military commander today remains essentially the same as the one faced by the Duke of Wellington 200 years ago. To be successful, a commander requires information.

Making decisions is an inherent part of the nature of command in any type of military operations.\textsuperscript{12} In order to do this, a commander and staff need to have access to the best and most recent information available: at a minimum, the capabilities of own troops, the capabilities and intentions of the opposing forces and the impact of the environment under which the forces will operate (terrain and weather). Military intelligence is what provides information on those last two points,\textsuperscript{13} as commanders (in theory at least) already have access to information on the strength and weaknesses of their own forces.

There are many definitions of intelligence, all of which involve the same basic concept—collection and analysis of information, focused on a threat, to support a commander or a governmental entity. The latest Canadian Forces Field Manual on intelligence, published in 1999 and updated in 2001, defines military intelligence as:

...the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and the organizations engaged in such activity.\textsuperscript{14}

Another definition of intelligence is “the systematic, planned and objective-oriented (non random) collection, analysis and dissemination of information based on open or denied sources.”\textsuperscript{15} From these definitions, military intelligence can be summarized as an
organization, a product and a process. To get intelligence—the product—there is a need to have a systematic approach to do it, which is the process. The personnel and the structure dedicated to conduct this process constitute the organization.

Intelligence is there to support three distinct but very important dimensions for a commander. The first is situational awareness. This is required to support any planning process and the accomplishment of the mission, where intelligence provides the information required to build an accurate picture of who the adversaries are, what capabilities they have, what they are doing now and what potential actions they can take. The second dimension is to support the targeting process by identifying targets of value, targets that commanders can influence by kinetic and non-kinetic means in order to shape events in their favour. The third is force protection, which aims at providing commanders with adequate warning to allow them to adopt appropriate measures to protect their forces. Those three distinct but equally important dimensions for intelligence occur in every military operation.

The Operating Environment

When the Cold War ended, we thought the world had changed. It had—but not in the way we thought. When the Cold War ended, our real challenge began.

Barnett—Pentagon’s New Map

No one will dispute the fact that since the end of the Cold War, symbolically represented by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world dynamic has been modified considerably. The issue is not so much that there was and there are still changes occurring, but the extent of the changes. It is the intent of this part to analyze this issue and determine the impact of these wide-ranging changes on Canada's military intelligence.

The Evolution of World Dynamics

The world environment evolved under the influence of numerous trends following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, which removed the restraints imposed by the power blocks of the Cold War. Global economy and information integrations have increased the free flow of ideas, capital, goods and services. The traditional nation-state power base is being eroded with the emergence of non-state centres of power based on religious movements, multinational corporations and criminal or terrorist elements. Nationalism and tribalism are now replacing ideology as the leading causes of regional and local disputes. In many parts of the globe, the increase in world population is placing increased pressure on natural resources, the supply of potable water and the environment. Due to population overpressure, migration is on the rise and the preferred ultimate destinations for some of those migrants are the prosperous western nations. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to be a cause of concern, as well as the rise of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare is now becoming the norm rather than the exception for fighting against a physically stronger adversary.

As a result of the end of the Cold War and the influence of global trends, the patterns of violent conflicts have also changed. Developing nations, artificially supported by one of the super powers during the Cold War, found themselves abandoned. Faced by insurmountable internal problems (economic crisis is usually the trigger) and very often confronted by arbitrary frontiers established by their former colonial powers, those developing nations were unable to prevent anarchy and internal conflicts from rising. Most conflicts since 1990 have been internal conflict (intra-national) instead of international and have involved numerous non-state actors. Internal conflicts have been characterized by the emergence of a plethora of quasi-military forces (terrorists, war
lords, organized criminal elements, rogue military forces and private armies) often seeking extreme goals such as ethnic cleansing or even genocide. In the struggles that emerged, civilian populations were frequently targeted, blurring the lines between combatants and non-combatants.

Since the First Gulf War, the world community has been faced with a large number of crises and because of these; the concept of collective security has changed fundamentally. “The trend has shifted from an emphasis on collective defence to collective security and is now further shifting to collective interest.” Table 1 will briefly describe those concepts.

The 1990s were a period when collective security could be divided into two large categories. Confronted by difficult crises, the international community resorted first to peace support operations under the aegis of the United Nations. This launched what is called the second generation of UN peacekeeping missions, which can best be described as being multi-dimensional and complex. Second generation peacekeeping can be defined as “modern peacekeeping [that] covers a wide spectrum of conflict, is performed by several professions or disciplines, involves a host of organizations and is conducted under intense media scrutiny.” A partial list of such operations includes Cambodia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Angola and Haiti. By 1995, it was clear that most if not all of these missions experienced considerable difficulty and some, like Somalia and Rwanda, were clearly failures. As the UN was not able to bring a resolution to those crises, the international community became more discretionary in its approach to peace support operations. Although the UN still remains in force in some crisis areas, nations with similar interests prefer to turn to regional organizations to address the issue. This is best illustrated by the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. For some other crises with limited interest to overall global stability, Western nations are either avoiding becoming involved or considerably limiting their contribution, as is the case now with Congo and Sierra Leone.

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Table 1—Evolution of the Collective Concept

If the 1990s were distinguished by collective security attained by peace support operations, the first decade of the 21st century is marked by the War on Terrorism and the emergence of “collective interest.” Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a new chapter of the post-Cold War era has begun. In response to the terrorist attacks against American territory, combined with the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could be used by an extremist organization with catastrophic consequences, the US Government declared a global war on terrorism. This decision by President Bush was supported by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441: every nation has a right to protect itself. In response to the demand made by the United States, most Western nations, including Canada, have joined the War on Terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. One could argue that its origins can be traced back to the beginning of organized societies. But a study of terrorism is not easy as
there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a terrorist group. The United Nations for example defines terrorism as:

... any... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.27

For the United Nations, the essence of terrorism implies a clandestine organization, fighting outside the recognized laws of armed conflict, using violent means and usually targeting innocent victims to promote terror in order to achieve a desired political end state.28

Terrorist organizations can present many faces, as there are different types of terrorist groups fighting for different causes. Some groups are more regional in nature while others, like Al Qaeda, operate on a global basis.29 Since the early 1990s, Al Qaeda has gained worldwide notoriety for its determination and the ingenuity displayed in its operations. The key elements that make Al Qaeda a distinctive organization are its religious fundamentalism, its global reach and its intrinsic hatred of Western Civilization in general and of the United States in particular.30 The War on Terrorism is essentially a campaign against Al Qaeda, which has resulted in a “coalition of the willing” operating in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003. If the military intervention in Afghanistan received widespread support, the invasion of Iraq has been very controversial from the beginning. Due to the contentious nature of the invasion, numerous traditional allies of the United States, among them Canada, decided not to support the Americans in their intervention in Iraq.

As it stands today, the War on Terrorism continues with no end in sight for the near future. NATO is slowly taking control of all military operations in Afghanistan from the Americans, while the United States and those allies that supported US efforts in the Middle East are still heavily involved in Iraq.

Canada’s Role in International Venues

The 1994 White Paper on Defence stated clearly that the overarching aim of Canada’s defence policy is to ensure security for all Canadians and provide for the defence of the nation.31 The defence policy supported Canada’s desire to promote positive development in the political, economic and social well being of all Canadians. This desire, however, could only be achieved in an international environment of peace and security and it has therefore been in Canada’s interest to contribute to global stability.32 The importance of this aim for Canada was recently reinforced with the release in April 2005 of a new Canadian defence policy statement. In the introduction of the document, it is clearly mentioned that:

At the dawn of the 21st century, Canada faces a complex array of security challenges. The world remains an unpredictable and perilous place, where threats to our well-being, our interests and our values persist. . . In this dangerous environment, Canadians look to their government for reassurance and protection.33

Canada’s contribution to global security has taken many forms, from economic development to financial support, from diplomatic efforts to deployment of military forces. The important role played by military forces in international affairs has continuously been singled out as an essential element in facing threat at home and abroad. In the words of Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence in 2005: “the Government recognizes that the Canadian Forces are a vital instrument of Canada’s foreign policy, especially in today’s unstable world.”34
Canada’s support of the world community’s efforts to promote global stability “has included contributing elements of the Canadian Forces to virtually every military intervention and peace support operation the UN has sanctioned or undertaken.”

Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has deployed military forces to the First Gulf War, the Middle-East, Cyprus, Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Haiti, Central African Republic, Kosovo, East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, as well as providing military observers to a large number of other missions. The size of those contributions has varied, but on average, Canada has maintained the equivalent of a two-battalion-size task force deployed at any one time (between 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers) in support of international operations.

**Impact on Military Intelligence**

The changing operating environment over the last 15 years has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for intelligence support. It has also resulted in intelligence being required to do things differently from what it used to do during the Cold War. Some of these changes are related to a commander’s working environment and as a result, are also related indirectly to intelligence. Other changes are specific to intelligence, its organization and architecture.

**Command Environment.** The conditions under which a commander operates will definitively have an impact on intelligence. Since the end of the Cold War, the type of international operations in which Canada has participated can be described as complex operations (See figure 1) and military commanders are often placed in delicate situations when trying to fulfill their mission in this type of environment.

Complex operations are composed of military, civilian police and other civilian personnel mandated to help create political institutions and broaden their base working alongside governments, non-governmental organizations and local citizens’ groups to provide emergency relief, demobilize former fighters and reintegrate them into society, clear mines, organize and conduct elections and promote sustainable development practice.

![Figure 1—The Evolving Operating Environment](source: This is based on the author’s experience)
The concept of the Three-Block War is also useful to describe the complexity of current operations. This concept was first introduced in 1997 by General Krulak, Commandant of the United States Marines Corps, to describe the reality that within a radius of three city blocks, military forces could potentially deal at the same time with humanitarian, peace support and combat operations.38

Within this new environment, the typical operation conducted by the Canadian Forces over the last decade has generally been vague and unclear. This should come as no surprise, as United Nations Security Council Resolutions were the basis of most of those missions. As indicated by Ambassador Brahimi, Chairman of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations, in his 2000 report, “[A]s a political body, the Security Council focuses on consensus-building. . . but the compromises required to build consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field.”39

Many officers of the Canadian Forces are not comfortable with the environment created by those missions.

CF officers who were trained in the context of the Cold War and focused on tactical level operations did not readily grasp the political, strategic and operational dimensions that have transformed how, when, and to what purpose military force is used in the context of conflict resolution.40

In a war-fighting scenario, violence is used to influence the enemy and reach the desired objective. In a peace support operation, violence is employed only as the method of last resort.41 To reach the desired objectives, a commander must influence the will of the actors involved, which requires a good understanding of the situation specific to each actor. This is not easy, as an officer interviewed in the Debrief the Leaders project, commented:

You cannot gain the initiative or maintain the momentum essential for the successful pursuit of your mission if you are out of touch with the nuances, the customs, the subliminal messages being passed around you with impunity by the co-belligerents.42

For commanders, this new environment creates a challenge. To be able to make rational decisions, commanders need a large amount of information on numerous topics, most of them outside the scope of the military dimension. This will allow commanders to develop the level of understanding of a situation needed to influence the will of the players involved.

For military intelligence, the impacts are three-fold. First, as commanders will need a large amount of information and details about their environments, they will rely on intelligence staff to provide them with most of that information. Due to the complexity of operations in the new environment, commanders now demand that intelligence specialists be included within their staff, a situation that was unthinkable during the Cold War. Second, the information required covers a large spectrum of interests, from military to cultural, economic to political, historical to geographical. This puts pressure on the intelligence staff to find the required information that is not only outside the traditional realm of military intelligence, but that is also more often than not complex. The last dimension for military intelligence in complex operations is the requirement to deal with numerous actors, ranging from other military forces, to law enforcement agencies, to other government departments, to humanitarian organizations. In his study of Canadian defence intelligence transformation during the 1990s, BGen (Ret) Cox concluded that one of the key elements that has changed since the end of the Cold War was “the emergence of defence intelligence from behind a secretive ‘green door’ to become a much more active partner to operations and other non-traditional partners both domestically and internationally.”43
**Intelligence as a Single Issue.** Within this new operating environment, it is no longer possible for a deployed contingent to focus its intelligence operations exclusively at the tactical level. As a result, intelligence is now a single integrated issue from the strategic to the tactical level. Strategic political decisions, economic issues and international reactions among others can have as much impact on a battalion area of responsibility as the activities of the factions on the ground. In a similar line of thought, a tactical event can have a significant impact for the national leadership at the strategic level. For intelligence, this synergy of levels has forced military intelligence to adapt its method of operations from its Cold War mentality to one that will offer better integral support to deployed troops. It has involved deploying additional intelligence personnel in theatres of operations as well as pushing forward strategic intelligence capabilities, both directly with a unit and within a national contingent command structure. During their careers, intelligence operators will normally serve at all levels of command, from the strategic at Ottawa to the operational at area level to the tactical. Based on that experience, they will have a better understanding and appreciation of what resources are available in the intelligence community and can therefore be in a better position to exploit them.

**Increased Demand on Intelligence.** It is not surprising within this environment to see that over the last fifteen years, the requirements for intelligence in support of deployed operations have increased steadily, as illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2—Deployed Personnel from Army Intelligence (1992-2006)](https://www.canadianarmyjournal.ca/assets/images/2006/vol9/issue2/figure2.png)

Source: This is taken from statistics maintained by Chief of Land Staff Intelligence Staff

To overcome some of the gaps in tactical intelligence capabilities created by complex operations, changes in the intelligence structure started to take place during the 1990s. The biggest impact for intelligence organizations was the employment of dedicated intelligence specialists at all echelons, particularly at the tactical level.

At the tactical level, a battalion-sized force, based on an infantry battalion or armoured regiment, is the organization of choice for Canada’s contribution to peace support operations. The deploying troops are normally organized under a Task Force.
During the Cold War, battalions were designed to fight in high-intensity conflict within the context of a brigade and were organized accordingly. The unit headquarters had a small intelligence section with a staff of six to ten members, with no intelligence specialist. The intelligence staff comprised unit combat arms personnel who had attended a combat intelligence course. This worked well for high intensity warfare, where the battalion would be integrated within the hierarchical military structure. The battalion was responsible for its immediate zone of responsibility (up to 15 kilometres), while brigade, division and higher intelligence organizations were covering the expanding zone of interest and providing the battalion with the information it needed. However, this did not work so well in peace support operations. Battalions were deployed without their supporting brigade and lost their access to intelligence specialists. The zone of responsibility for a battalion in peace support operations is generally much larger than in high intensity warfare: at least twice the size, if not more. For example, the zone of responsibility for Canadian Battalion 2 (CANBAT 2) deployed in Bosnia under UNPROFOR (93-95) was 900 square kilometres, for the battalion deployed under UNMIH (96-97) it was half the Island of Haiti), and for the most recent unit deployed in Afghanistan it is over 50,000 square kilometres.

For all these reasons, intelligence specialists began to deploy with a battalion intelligence section in early 1990s and by 1995 it became the norm to have intelligence operators as part of a battalion staff. “When Intelligence Branch personnel were added to the unit’s intelligence sections, there were marked improvements in every aspect of intelligence support, from developing proper intelligence requirements and collection plans, to focused and relevant briefings to the commanders on the general threat and specific targets.” This situation was highlighted in the report produced by the Defense Intelligence Review, which was conducted in 2002/2003:

The deployment of dedicated intelligence staff to lower-command levels is most indicative of the increasing demand at tactical levels; Army Battle-Groups, even companies, Navy Frigates and Air Force wings have all recently deployed with dedicated intelligence staff, even though they are not organic to their units.

In addition to a stronger intelligence capability at the deployed unit level, intelligence personnel were also deployed within a theatre of operations to provide both deployed task forces with better access to higher echelon intelligence and to support national command element assets. The initial experiment with this concept took place during the First Gulf War when “a Joint Intelligence Centre was created for the first time to provide operational level support to a deployed formation commander.” Unfortunately the lessons of that experiment had been forgotten by the time Canadian soldiers started deploying in the Balkans in early 1992. The difficulties with the UN mission during the first few years led Canada to increase its intelligence capability with the addition of what was to become known as a Canadian national intelligence centre (or CANIC). The CANIC provided the interface between the deployed units and the national sources in Canada, as well as maintaining close liaison with the other Allies’ national intelligence centres. By the end of the 1990s, the CANIC became an integral component of a National Command Element.

The intelligence support to a deployed Canadian contingent evolved further with the deployment of troops in Afghanistan. With some ten years of experience in the Balkans, the concept of the CANIC was further developed with the inclusion of additional strategic assets in theatre such as geomatics and Signals Intelligence. With the ISAF mission in Kabul in 2003, the intelligence support to a theatre of operations became known as the All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) where strategic assets were pushed forward with intelligence fusion capabilities. The ASIC became more than just an interface between deployed troops and Canada. It had its own integral intelligence collection assets that
significantly increased the capabilities to provide intelligence support. This new intelligence architecture represents a major shift in intelligence support to a theatre of operations, and the initial feedback on this new architecture is very positive.55

At the national strategic level, the Chief of Defence Intelligence (Formerly known as Director General Intelligence or DG Int) started to establish dedicated teams to support deployed troops during the Balkans mission. An intelligence response team (IRT) is responsible for covering any region of the world where a large Canadian contingent is deployed. That practice remains today and has provided good results. The concept of national intelligence support is further being developed to start addressing potential theatres of operations before troops are deployed. As surprising as it may seem, intelligence is now becoming involved in a more proactive fashion from the first signs that a region of the world could become a potential theatre of operations.

If it is clear that there is a greater need for intelligence specialists to support operations, it is also clear that the challenge for military intelligence is now to support the demand. Army intelligence strength and organization have not changed significantly over the years to match the increase in requirements, which creates great pressure to keep up with the tempo of operations.

To meet operational requirements, army intelligence will face three significant challenges over the next few years. The first one is to increase the number of intelligence operators to reach the 4:1 ratio56 that the Chief of the Land Staff deemed to be the minimum required. The current ratio is more around a 2:1 level,57 which means that each deployment requires not only an army wide effort, but also a CF wide effort for intelligence to find suitable candidates. There are two means to increase the strength of army intelligence: either augment the number of regular personnel or reserve personnel or, even better, augment both. Initiatives are currently under way to address this manning issue both with the regular and the reserve force, but it will be at least five years before significant results are seen from any efforts made. The second challenge is to adjust army intelligence architecture to reflect the reality of operations. Intelligence consistently deploys intelligence operators with a battalion going on operations, but in garrison there are no intelligence personnel permanently attached with the unit. It is the same with the ASIC structure, which is created for operations but has no equivalent in Canada.

As the architecture in operations does not reflect current army intelligence architecture in Canada, there is an imbalance created when generating intelligence personnel for operations. The solution to this issue is simple—adjust the architecture in Canada to reflect operational requirements. Initiatives are underway to address this issue to include intelligence personnel within infantry and armoured battalions and to create permanent ASIC structures within brigade headquarters. But once again, any solution to that issue needs time to be implemented. The last challenge for army intelligence is to develop a smooth and efficient force generation and pre-deployment training methodology. The current approach to deployment can best be described as an ad hoc process and last minute scrambling. This situation is a reflection of the endemic shortage of intelligence staff and lack of resources to properly generate and prepare troops for deployment. Pending more resources provided to army intelligence, force generation and pre-deployment training will remain difficult and frustrating.

One factor that has characterized the operating environment since 1990 is not just constant change, but the fact that the pace of change is increasing. To keep abreast of the demand created by those changes, the capabilities of Canada’s military intelligence have been overstretched greatly over the last fifteen years. However, support to operations was conducted to the detriment of developing a more robust capability. In
other words, army intelligence was asked to squeeze the lemon harder and harder, without being given the opportunity to grow a bigger lemon. Unless army intelligence goes through an in-depth review of its architecture and capabilities in the near future, it will become more and more difficult for the intelligence community to cope with continuing changes.

The Threat

*Intelligence is in essence a guessing game, albeit one that is grounded in fact, logic and experience. It can be a useful tool to the decision makers, but it is not, even in its purest form, a magic art.*

Marchetti & Marks
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

It is difficult to examine the nature of the threat since the end of the Cold War in isolation without looking at the operating environment, as the shifting nature of the environment changed the face of the threat as much as the evolving threat changed the operating environment. Nevertheless, it is evident that the threat is different today than it was fifteen years ago and it is the intent of this section to examine the impact of the changes on military intelligence.

During the Cold War period, the threat provided by the Soviet forces and their Warsaw Pact allies was a well-defined and identifiable military force. Since then, this traditional concept of the threat is no longer relevant. Today, the threat is more fluid, still potentially involving military forces but also an increasing number of paramilitary, terrorist and criminal elements. Some elements of the threat can be clearly identified, with uniforms and a hierarchical structure, while most are not. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is getting very nebulous and is often difficult to establish.

Many articles and books have been written on the future security environment and the associated threat. Among this vast literature, some writers, such as Van Creveld, Huntington, Kaplan and Peters, have been highlighted for their views on the nature of the future threat.

In his book, *The Transformation of War,* Martin Van Creveld presents a radical reinterpretation of armed conflict. He argues that today’s world more closely resembles the pre-Westphalian period (Before 1648) than any other point since the end of the Thirty-year war. The pre-Westphalian period involves a resurgence of non-state actors. Van Creveld indicates that of the some 160 conflicts since World War II, three-quarters of them were of the “low intensity conflict” variety. Van Creveld is not saying that conventional war will disappear completely, but that it will become less likely. He defines the principal characteristics of low intensity conflict as usually taking place in the “less developed part of the world,” not involving regular armies; and having fighting parties who do not rely on high technology weapons to fight. He also foresees significant changes in the distinction between soldiers and civilians. In response to these conflicts, Van Creveld is not optimistic. “The cold, brutal fact is that much of present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interest over most of the globe.”

Another theorist who presents a radical view of future conflict is Samuel Huntington. In his article “The Clash of Civilizations” he wrote, “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” He sees future conflict taking place between Western and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. For Huntington, there are seven or eight major civilizations: Western,
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.\textsuperscript{64} Clashes will occur at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along fault lines will struggle against one another, as it is the case in the Former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and numerous African countries. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations will compete for relative military and economic power, control of international institutions and promote their particular political and religious values.

According to Robert Kaplan, the world faces a period of unprecedented upheaval, brought on by scarce resources, worsening overpopulation, uncontrollable disease, brutal warfare, and the widespread collapse of nation-states.\textsuperscript{65} In his article “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan depicts a very gloomy future where war and violence become widespread. “A large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down”.\textsuperscript{66}

The type of “soldiers” the West is likely to face is described in detail by Ralph Peters.\textsuperscript{67} In his “New Warrior Class”, Peters emphasizes the non-standard trends of war-fighters: “the enemy we [United States] are likely to face. . . will not be “soldiers”. . . but “warriors”—erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order”.\textsuperscript{68} He does not say the conventional fighters will disappear, but that a “new warrior class” will become predominant.

Predicting the future is a difficult task. However, based on the trends set in the 1990s\textsuperscript{69} and the views of some renowned theorists as seen above, conclusions can be drawn. It is reasonable to predict that the difference between the have and have-not states will continue to be accentuated; interstate conflict will remain a reality and the emergence of non-state actors will increase, some being associated with criminal enterprises, religious sects or terrorist organizations. Table 2 summarizes the key differences between the old and the new.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main threat overt with uniformed military</td>
<td>Covert, with no clear identifying uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly centralized and disciplined organization</td>
<td>Decentralized and relatively undisciplined. Shifting alliances and splinter groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear territorial base with slow and limited shift from one area to another</td>
<td>No clear territorial base. Capable of rapid shift from one place to another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp distinction between internal and external threat</td>
<td>Blurred distinction between internal and external threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close link between the size of an opponent and the extent of the threat posed</td>
<td>Due to technological advances, small opponent may create vast damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents tend to grow incrementally</td>
<td>Must consider “potential imaginary threat”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat deliberately created by continuation of policy by other means</td>
<td>Threat is often a by-product of other activities (Drug smuggling...)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2—The Changing Nature of the Threat


Impact on Military Intelligence. Military intelligence has had to change how it operates in order to adjust to the fluid nature of an asymmetric threat. The basic nature of military intelligence remains the same: find what information is required, collect that
information, analyse it and disseminate it to those who require it. What has changed is the type of information military intelligence needs to acquire and the techniques to collect and analyze it.

In a conventional scenario, military intelligence focuses on a larger view of the enemy with minimal impact from individuals. In this context, intelligence is interested in where the enemy forces are and what capabilities they have in terms of equipment and strength. In a peace support operation, the impact of individuals is very significant and the intelligence focus revolves around monitoring their activities. The questions now are: who are the players, what are their connections (alliances, organizations, associates) and what do they want to do? The importance of intelligence collected from human sources plays a vital role in such an asymmetric environment. In addition, military intelligence has had also to adjust its analyzing techniques, relying now on what used to be exclusively police analysis techniques such as “association matrix,” “link analysis” or “time event chart” on a regular basis.

In this context, the challenge for military intelligence has been to keep pace with change. However, the ability of the intelligence community to cope has been hampered considerably by three factors. The first factor is the limited number of intelligence specialists and the high tempo of deployment. This has created a situation where most intelligence sections are understaffed and over-tasked. Very limited improvements can be made, as the day-to-day requirements absorb most—if not all—resources. The second factor is the absence of an intelligence lessons learned cell to analyze the lessons from operations and take measures to address them before subsequent missions. Too often, after-action reports will clearly point out the deficiencies and potential methods to resolve them, but due to a lack of centralized point to take action on those deficiencies, the lessons are lost and forgotten. The last factor is that the current intelligence doctrine has not kept pace with the change in threat. The current doctrine still reflects a Cold War mentality that rests on four assumptions. The first is that the analysis of the threat needs to focus only on the terrain and the enemy. The second is that the adversary is an organized force conducting combat operations. The third is that an extensive intelligence database on that adversary already exists. The last assumption is that the final analysis, supported by the use of templates, will predict the enemy’s potential courses of action.

**Digitization**

*You are never there. You are always getting there.*

**Boyd**

In parallel to and independent of the changes that have taken place in the operating environment since the end of the Cold War, technological changes are also having a significant impact on the conduct of war. In the widest sense, the information age is replacing the industrial age. Rapidly integrating technologies, such as information management, sensor and precision technologies, are creating massive changes in our global society, and thus in how the military operates. The aim of this section is to examine how digitization will change the conduct and character of military intelligence.

**Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).** Technological revolutions have created disruptions throughout history. “From the dawn of the Industrial Age in the late 18th Century, until the mid-20th Century, technological developments were dramatic but fairly measured.” Until the arrival of the digitalized computer, changes took two or three
generations to have a real impact. However, the development in computer technology is accelerating the pace of change considerably. “While computers have been around in recognizable form for 60 years, and while the Information Age is now thought to date to around 1970, it is only in the last decade that the computer and the chip have truly revolutionized so many aspects of daily life on a personal, national and international level.” According to Moore’s Law, the power of computer processing capability doubles every 18-24 months, while at the same time computing costs drops by half.

The successes of integrated battlespace technologies during the Gulf War (i.e., electronic combat, communications, imaging, precision strike weapons and stealth technology) led many to conclude that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was indeed taking place. One of the first to advocate this revolution was U.S. Admiral William Owens. As vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the mid 1990s, he developed the idea of a "system of systems" that would enable any military user to employ numerous sensors to expeditiously find, fix and finish military targets.

A Revolution in Military Affairs is:

“marked by a fundamental transformation in military affairs that results from changes in weapon technology and equipment, operational concepts and military organizational methods. RMAs usually take place over a few decades and profoundly affect, and often replace, existing war fighting practices.”

Technology alone does not bring about a Revolution in Military Affairs. It is only when various elements of technologies are welded together with organizational restructures and new operational concepts that a RMA occurs.

In each of these elements, there have been significant advances in recent years. The emergence of information technology and information systems holds out the prospect of dramatically altering command and control of armed forces. Coupled with major advances in precision, lethality, and miniaturization—to name but three—this will significantly alter the way armed forces operate across the spectrum of conflict. Doctrinal and organizational changes currently under consideration seek to capitalize on the technological advances to effectively change the way armed forces would apply force. Although the United States are leading the development and application of this RMA, Canada as well as its allies such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Australia, is also actively pursuing RMA developments.

Impact on Intelligence. Digitization is also dramatically affecting the way military intelligence operates. Digitization is defined as “the near-real time transfer of battlefield information between diverse fighting elements to permit shared awareness of the battlefield situation.” As a result, concept of “time” in battle is being compressed. “This revolution is characterized by an unprecedented capability to collect, process, manage and disseminate vast amounts of data and information in real or near-real time, leading to comprehensive and continued awareness of events and situations.” Operating in a digitalized environment, the function of military intelligence will become more specialized. However, despite all the advantages that technology is providing, no system will be able to replace an experienced analyst.

One of the effects of digitization is that the time between observation and action is getting shorter, as illustrated by Table 3. The table depicts key periods in U.S. military history and employs Boyd’s OODA loop cycle (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) to indicate the time factor.
To operate in today’s environment, a military force must be able to collect, absorb and process large amounts of information quickly in order to use that knowledge in making and implementing rapid decisions. As expressed by the Americans in their New Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan, the new tenets for military forces are to “see first, understand first, decide first and act decisively.” As military intelligence is a key element in support of any accelerated decision-making cycle, the production and delivery of intelligence is becoming a “just in time” system rather than “just in case.” In other words, it is no longer possible to develop analysis of all potential threats as prudent contingency preparation, as the nature and identity of those threats is generally vague if not unknown.

Military intelligence has been one of the last military functions to be specialized. Throughout history, a military commander was generally his own intelligence officer, with information being reported directly to him. However, this situation began to change in the late 1800s with the creation of “staff systems” within Western armies based on the German experience of the “general staff.” The Canadian Army did not acquire a permanent peacetime intelligence organization until 1902 and did not formally recognize intelligence as a distinct professional organization until 1942, when it finally created the Intelligence Corps, the predecessor of today’s Intelligence Branch. The new realities of today’s environment require intelligence operators who are able to adjust quickly to any environment and focus on different types of threat, ranging from conventional forces to terrorist groups to criminal gangs. In addition, the amount of information becoming available is increasing almost exponentially, as well as the number of classified and open source computer networks available, while the time to process that information is becoming shorter. Only professional intelligence operators, highly trained and experienced, will be able to function efficiently within this new digitized environment.

However, technology alone will not be sufficient. “Without the right numbers of people, with the right kinds of training, working in the right kind of organizational structure the system will not succeed. Despite the best digitized systems, no machine will be able to replace the human brain when it is time to analyze information and extract the bits and pieces of data that, put together, represent the “so what?” of all the information gained.

**Conclusion—So What?**

*The Canadian Army, like its allied counter-parts throughout the world, must evolve doctrinally, organizationally and technologically if it is to remain a relevant institution.*

Horn & Reshke—Canada’s Army in 21st Century
The pace of change has increased considerably during the last fifteen years and all indications are that more changes are to be expected. New paradigms have emerged since the end of the Cold War. The operating environment can best be described as complex and the nature of the threat as fluid. In parallel, digitalization is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs that is changing how information is processed and managed. To remain relevant army intelligence, like the remainder of the CF, has had no choice but to adapt.

The face of military intelligence is quite different today that it was 15 years ago at the end of the Cold War. The most significant impact brought by the Canadian Forces’ participation in peace support operations during the 1990s has been a complete change of focus for the intelligence business. During the Cold War period, intelligence was focused on one major threat. The Canadian military intelligence organization, doctrine, techniques and systems were all designed to monitor Warsaw Pact forces to the exclusion of almost everything else. Today’s military intelligence community, however, is focusing on capabilities. Intelligence must have the ability to adapt quickly to shifting and fluid threats, to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice and to sustain a high level operational tempo.

The new operating environment requires more and more intelligence support, integrated at every level of operations, particularly with tactical units. In addition, the deployment of battalion-size forces without the support of their brigade structure has led to the development of CANIC and ASIC concepts to fill the gap between the deployed units and national assets. The complex nature of the threat also dictates that intelligence must be able to change and adjust its procedures quickly.

As a result, there has been a slow but steady increase in demands made on army intelligence over the years to support deployed military assets and units. As it stands today, the intelligence support for operations has reached a level of maturity that is quite impressive. The situation is never perfect and improvement will continue to be made, but overall there is no comparison between the support provided today and that provided in the first few years of the 1990s.

What has not kept pace with the requirements for deployed operations is the development of stronger and more capable army intelligence architecture, structure and processes in Canada. As well, there has been little effort made to grow the strength of army intelligence. Therefore, army intelligence is asked to provide more and more support, but the pool of available resources has not changed.

The challenge for army intelligence is to sustain the level of support provided to deployed forces. Unless a serious look is taken at the current army intelligence capability to adjust it to the new requirements and reality, little more progress can be expected. If there is no investment in capability, the ability to force generate army intelligence assets will remain limited. In other words, you get what you pay for.87

About the author….

Lieutenant-Colonel Villeneuve has been an intelligence officer for over 15 years, serving most of his career within all levels of army intelligence. He is currently the senior army intelligence officer within the Land Staff. He has a vast operational experience, serving in five overseas deployments to Western Sahara, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Op Apollo. He is a graduate from CMR St-Jean, CLFSC Kingston and CFC Toronto. He has a Masters in Defense Studies and is currently completing a Masters Degree in War Studies from RMC Kingston.
Endnotes

3. The Warsaw Pact was composed of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Albania (left in 1968), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and East Germany.
15. This definition is based on the definition of intelligence found in AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.
21. Ibid., p. 5.
23. First generation peacekeeping operations were primarily military, often with a small civilian police contingent focusing on a narrow wedge of the spectrum of conflict—termination. They were one-dimensional.
25. Jeffrey Record, “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,” (Monograph of the Strategic Studies Institutes, December 2003), p. 7. Available from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm/hurl/PubID=207/; Internet; accessed 24 March 2006. “In the wake of the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the President declared a ‘war against terrorism of global reach.’” Subsequently and repeatedly, he and other administration officials used the terms ‘global war on terrorism,’ ‘war on global terrorism,’ ‘war on terrorism,’ ‘war on terror,’ and ‘battle against international terrorism.’ The ‘global war on terrorism,’ complete with its acronym, GWOT, soon became the most often used term.”
28. Ibid.
31. Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994). This information is extracted from the Highlights.


34. Ibid.

35. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada's Army . . . . p. 59.


37. B-GL-357-001/FP-001 Intelligence. . . . p. 17.


42. Lemiex, “Articulating the vision . . . .”, 34. “Debrief the Leaders' project was a component of Officership 2020. The aim was to gather information and views from over 800 officers. The project touched on the full range of operations conducted in the 1990s at home and abroad.

43. Cox, The Transformation of Canadian Defence Intelligence . . . .”, p. 196.

44. For an interesting American point of view on this topic, see Colonel Richard Riccadelli, “The Information and Intelligence Revolution,” Military Review LXXV, no 5 (September-October 1995): p. 82-87.

45. This was the case for example in May 1995 in Bosnia, when Bosnian Serb soldiers chained military observers to ammunition depots close to Sarajevo in order to prevent NATO air strikes. This simple tactical event effectively stopped NATO from targeting Serb military facilities and another alternative had to be found.


47. The combat intelligence course is much shorter than the training provided to intelligence operators. Typically, the course is six weeks in length and focused on tactical intelligence. The intelligence operator on the other hand must attend a four months course with a larger scope at the operational and strategic level.

48. Author's experience. I served both in Bosnia in 1995 with UNPROFOR and in Haiti in 1997 with UNMIH. Afghanistan information obtained from the Afghan Intelligence Response Team, 10 April 2006.

49. Author's experience. As far as I know, the first instance of an intelligence officer deploying with a battalion in a peace support operation took place in 1994 with the 12ème Régiment Blindé du Canada, when Lt Vanasse from the 4ème Compagnie de Renseignement was tasked to deploy with the unit. I was serving in Montréal at the time and was privy to various discussions I had with other colleagues who also went on tour.


53. Author's experience. The concept of a CANIC was developed in Bosnia in 1992/1993. With two battalions and a logistics unit deployed in the region, a higher Canadian Command Element was also deployed in Zagreb. Within the Command Element was included an intelligence section that began playing the role of interface between the units on the ground and Canada. During my tour in Bosnia, I was able to appreciate the support of a higher operational intelligence center located in the mission area.

54. The typical composition of a deployed contingent is three major components: a National Command Element (NCE) which provides an interface between the deployed troops and national command in Ottawa; a National Support Element (NSE) that provides logistic support; and the actual deployed troops that are operating in a theatre of operations.

55. Author’s experience.

56. A 4:1 ratio means that for each soldier deployed, there are four soldiers available.

57. Author's experience as the Army G2.


59. Author’s experience. This is taken from the five tours I have done in peace support operations, as well as in the various discussions I had with other colleagues who also went on tour.


61. Ibid., p. 20.

62. Ibid., p. 27.

64. Ibid., p. 25.
66. Ibid., p. 72.
68. Ibid., p. 21.
70. Norm Sproll, OP Palladium Roto 8 After Action Report. Email sent on Canadian Forces Wide Area Network on 08 September 2001. Capt Sproll was the battalion Intelligence Officer.
71. Author’s experience.
74. Alan Campen and D. Dearth, Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality (Fairfax Virginia: AFCEA International Press, 1998), p. 35.
75. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army. . ., p. 113.
82. Ackerman, “Army Intelligence Deals With Two Transformations,” . . .
83. Ibid.
87. Major Russell Keller, “Intelligence is a team sport,” Marine Corps Gazette 76, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 17.
The Canadian Army’s Force Employment Concept (FEC) states that future conflicts will be predominantly asymmetric and will take place largely in complex and urban terrain. This means that our Army can expect to fight terrorist and guerrilla forces in cities, mountains, jungles and the like rather than massed conventional armies. This prediction is given credence by the Army’s recent experiences in Afghanistan and our allies’ experiences in Iraq. The majority of the literature dealing with the future of warfare also echoes these predictions including CF publications such as DLSC’s Future Force—Concepts for Future Army Capabilities.

If the future of warfare is to become as described in the FEC and other sources, the question must be asked: is the Canadian Army prepared for this form of warfare? The 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) did well in Afghanistan, participating in a campaign against a non-conventional foe. Also, many of the aspects of the future security environment will sound familiar to those who served in Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia, Haiti, Eritrea or East Timor. These missions each saw our forces operating in complex or urban terrain, often in the presence of an insurgent, guerrilla or criminal threat element. Also, in each of these cases the preponderance of forces Canada provided was infantry. This is a result of the fact that infantry are often the combat arm best suited to peace support and counter-insurgency operations, both of which require ‘boots on the ground’ to achieve their aim. Infantry is often the only arm with the tactical mobility required to operate in complex terrain such as mountains or jungles and is the only arm capable of both seizing and holding all types of terrain.
Therefore, a natural follow-up to the question asked in the paragraph above would be: is the Canadian infantry corps prepared for the future of warfare? In other words, are our infantry battalions trained and equipped to fight a guerrilla or insurgent force in mountains, cities, jungles and forests? To answer these questions we must examine the nature of future warfare and the threats our Army will face. Then we must scrutinize the doctrine, equipment and training of our infantry battalions to determine their ability to operate in this new environment. It is hoped that this evaluation will allow our infantry corps to effectively prepare itself for the challenges ahead and dominate on the battlefields of the future.

Most sources on the subject are unanimous in their assertion that the principal threat our Army, and those of our allies, will face comes from insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists and organized criminal elements. While none of these sources deny the possibility of a conventional war against a similarly organized and equipped opponent (i.e. a symmetric threat), almost all consider the likelihood of such wars as low for the foreseeable future. And with the recent retirement of the Leopard C2 tank and the M109 self-propelled howitzer, even in the event of a conventional war it is unlikely that the Canadian Army would have the needed platforms in time to play a decisive heavy role. General Rick Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff, has stated that the primary threat to Canada in the future will come from “failed or failing states” and that the focus of the Canadian Forces must shift to these asymmetric threats. This means that the Canadian Army must be prepared to fight asymmetric threats in urban and complex terrain. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the focus of our Army’s attention and efforts will be on fighting an asymmetric enemy in complex terrain during low-intensity conflicts.

This asymmetric enemy will likely take the form of lightly armed and generally poorly equipped (by western standards) infantry-type forces. The majority of their weapons will be small arms such as rifles, machineguns, light anti-armour weapons, mortars and shoulder-launched surface to air missiles. Supplementing these weapons will be mines, booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and some forces may be motorized (i.e. the ‘technicals’ of Somalia) or may possess armoured vehicles in limited quantities. The more radical opponents may resort to the use of suicide bomb attacks on foot or in vehicles.

However, the strength of these forces is not in their weaponry but instead is in their very nature and their tactics. These forces, for the most part, do not wear distinguishing uniforms nor do they adhere to the norms, laws or conventions of ‘traditional’ warfare. They are often indistinguishable from non-combatants from whom they often draw their support and recruits. This allows such forces to disappear into the population and greatly complicates their detection and defeat. This fact more than anything else is what makes counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations so difficult and time and resource intensive.

These forces employ tactics similar to those used by Mao Zedong or Vo N. Giap, which focus on avoiding decisive engagement with their opponent’s field forces. Instead their aim is to strike at their opponent’s weak points using the ambush or hit-and-run attack as their techniques. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that insurgent forces will also rely on rocket and mortar attacks on fixed installations as a way of hitting their opponents. Finally, extensive use is made of IEDs, booby traps and suicide bombers as a means of avoiding strength and instilling terror and uncertainty in the opposing force.

Combating an insurgency has always been a task primarily reserved for the infantry. This is especially true today where it is expected that most of the insurgencies we will face will take place in complex terrain. The infantry’s ability to manoeuvre in complex terrain and to put ‘boots on the ground’ is what makes it so well suited to such conflicts.
Infantry can manoeuvre with relative ease through jungles and cities and over mountains whereas mechanized forces tend to be restricted to more open terrain. Counter-insurgency operations rapidly consume manpower as the elusive insurgents increase the requirement for ‘presence’ within an area of operations (AO). Tasks such as checkpoints, patrols, cordons and searches, human intelligence (HUMINT), and manning observation posts tend to require infantry, not to mention fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA) or clearing forests. All of these tasks could be performed in a counter-insurgency operation, which indicates the necessity for a preponderance of infantry.

Fortunately, Canada’s Army today is principally an infantry force and future plans, as laid out in the FEC, seem to indicate that the Army of the future will continue to be a predominantly infantry army. Currently, the Regular Army consists of six mechanized battalions equipped with the LAV III armoured personnel carrier (APC), and three light infantry battalions. The latter each have one parachute capable company, and can be transported in the BV 206 all-terrain vehicle or in un-armoured wheeled vehicles such as the LUVW, LSVW or MLVW. All infantry battalions have recently been stripped of much of their combat support with the elimination of mortar, anti-armour and pioneer platoons. Furthermore, the battalions’ reconnaissance platoons have turned in their Coyote reconnaissance vehicles and are receiving the command and reconnaissance version of the LUVW instead.

In the mechanized battalions, much of the training focuses on the LAV III. Individual, crew and team training requirements for that vehicle are considerable and result in a constant and recurring demand on limited training time. Crewed-vehicle skills including armoured fighting vehicle recognition, gunnery, maintenance, team, section and platoon vehicle tactics, and ancillary equipment (i.e. TACNAV) operation require time to learn and, arguably, an entire career to master. There is a constant requirement for continuation and refresher training, as these skills are highly susceptible to skill fade.

The career progression of an infanteer in a mechanized battalion will see the average soldier alternating between the dismounted sections and the vehicle crews. The skills required to be a dismounted infantryman are considerably different from those required to be a fighting vehicle crewmember. Consequently, soldiers either require constant refresher training (bordering on complete re-training) each time they re-role from vehicle crew to dismounted section member, or, are forced to focus on one skill-set to the detriment of the other. This constant shifting between two very different skill sets puts the infantry corps at risk of being good at neither.

Compounding this problem are the requirements to train back-up crewmen for each vehicle and the general shortage of personnel in the mechanized battalions. The former problem means that a considerable portion of the battalion must be trained, and must remain current, on crewed-vehicle skills. The latter is a problem because the LAV III rightfully becomes the focus of the battalion’s training. Representing the battalion’s principal method of transportation, not to mention the greatest source of its firepower, COs would be foolish to do anything other than focus their training on the LAV III. The end result of this focus, however, is often a reduction in the strength of the dismounted sections to the point where it is not uncommon to see four soldiers dismount from a LAV III on exercises. The LAV III training bill means that mechanized battalions are often left with little time to conduct ‘pure’ infantry training such as patrolling, FIBUA or operations in complex terrain. As mentioned above, these skills are the ones that will be in greatest demand on the asymmetric, complex-terrain battlefield of the future.

Another characteristic of mechanized battalion training is that dismounted infantry training and crewed-vehicle training are often incompatible. For example, LAV III crews do not need to be present while the dismounted infantrymen are practicing section-level FIBUA drills or patrolling. Likewise there is little training benefit in having the dismounted
infantry sit in the back of the LAV IIIs while they practice gunnery, road moves or platoon movement techniques. Of course, each must be familiar with the procedures of the other but much of the dismounted and vehicle training can and should be conducted separately. This is not to say that the infantry and LAV IIIs will never train together but rather that training time will be used more efficiently.

However, the protection, mobility and firepower of the LAV III make it an indispensable tool in counter-insurgency operations. Despite the challenges posed by its training bill and the resultant impact on infantry skills, the LAV III has proven its worth in such places as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Eritrea. The requirement for mechanized forces is unlikely to go away despite the reduced likelihood of conventional warfare. The mobility of the LAV III allows mechanized battalions to control and influence large areas. Its protection allows infantry to operate where the threats from mines, IEDs, direct and indirect fire weapons would preclude the operations of an un-armoured force. Its firepower provides a considerable deterrent effect and allows a mechanized force to overmatch any potential asymmetric threat. Finally, its surveillance capabilities contribute to a greater situational awareness, day or night and in all weather. Clearly, the capabilities of mechanized forces mean they will play a significant role in any future conflict.

The light infantry battalions are better able to focus their training, as their soldiers are not required to constantly switch between two skill sets. Light infantry battalions often train for operations in complex terrain and have considerably more time to devote to training in ‘pure’ infantry skills. Battalions often assign specific roles to companies (aside from the aforementioned parachute role) such as ‘mountain warfare company’, ‘urban operations company’ or ‘airmobile company’, which further helps to define and refine the training within the battalion. The light infantry battalions appear to be better organized and trained to fight the asymmetric threat mentioned above by virtue of their ability to focus on training their infantrymen in infantry skills.
However, despite their relative suitability for asymmetric warfare compared to the mechanized battalions, the light infantry battalions still possess some shortcomings. Firstly, the Canadian Army still lacks a true light infantry doctrine focused on counter-insurgency operations in complex terrain. This is despite the fact that the Canadian Army has fielded dismounted infantry units since its creation and even had a unit tasked to conduct counter-insurgency operations. The disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment meant the loss of more than just a unit-level parachute capability for the Army. Also lost was a unit whose focus was almost exclusively on low-intensity conflict in complex terrain. The lack of light infantry doctrine is even stranger considering the experiences of 3 PPCLI in Afghanistan three years ago and the resulting emphasis put on light infantry operations.

The second problem has to do with organization and equipment. Throughout much of the 1990s, the light infantry battalions were seen more as mechanized battalions in-waiting rather than as true light infantry battalions. It was common for the light infantry battalions to re-role to mechanized battalions before an overseas deployment. This was easily done, as the M113 and Grizzly were simple vehicles with small training bills. As a result of the ‘mechanized battalion in-waiting’ approach, light battalions were organized and equipped almost identically to the mechanized battalions, with the obvious exception of armoured personnel carriers (APCs). Even the addition of parachute companies to the light infantry battalions did not represent a conscious attempt to organize these battalions for light operations, but rather was an attempt to keep the Army’s parachuting capability on life support. Naturally this resulted in the retardation or even reluctance to think about and develop true light infantry organizations, equipment and doctrine. It is difficult to focus on developing these things if one knows the light units are nothing more than mechanized battalions minus APCs. Nonetheless, COs of light infantry battalions strove to develop their battalions as true light infantry units as best they could.
The reserve infantry units of Canada’s Army have tended to be primarily dismounted infantry units. Although some units did train on Grizzly APCs in the recent past and the 1988 MILLAV project acquired 199 Bison APCs and variants to equip the reserves, in the last decade infantry training has almost exclusively been conducted dismounted. This is more a result of a lack of equipment than any explicit requirement for light infantry forces. As currently structured and equipped, the Army has insufficient LAV IIIs to equip the reserves with these vehicles. Furthermore, the considerable training requirements of the LAV III could not be met by reserve infantry units in addition to the already large dismounted training bill. The difficulties encountered in regular mechanized battalions would prove insurmountable in reserve units faced with very limited training time. Reserve infantry units could not dedicate the time to train both infantry and crewed-vehicle skills.

This necessary emphasis on dismounted infantry training means the reserves are not able to provide the types of reinforcements required by the regular mechanized battalions. With little or no familiarity with the LAV III, reservists would require considerable training prior to deployment. While reserve infanteers can provide individual replacements to the dismounted sections in the mechanized battalions, the NCOs and officers of those reserve units would be at a considerable disadvantage upon their arrival at a mechanized unit. This situation is worsened if the reserves are to be expected to provide formed sub-units, as has been the practice on recent operations. The regular light infantry units are much better able to receive augmentation from reserve units, as the differences in training are fewer.

The Canadian Army of today and the projected “army of tomorrow” appears to be poorly organized, equipped and trained to conduct the operations of the future. The mechanized battalions are slaves to the LAV III with the resulting lack of emphasis on those infantry skills needed in asymmetric, low-intensity conflict. Their considerable firepower, decent protection and excellent operational mobility make them well suited to taking on the “bear” but their training emphasis and limitations in tactical mobility in complex terrain make them less suited to taking on the “ball of snakes”. The light battalions are still feeling the effects of the ‘mechanized battalion in-waiting’ phenomenon and are lacking the organization, equipment and doctrine necessary to make them true light infantry battalions. The reserve infantry units similarly lack focus in doctrine, equipment and organization. They are insufficiently trained to augment a mechanized force with anything other than individual dismounted riflemen.

What then can the Canadian Army, and its infantry corps, do to improve its ability to fight a low-intensity conflict in complex terrain? How will the infantry address the shortcomings of its units with regards to organization, training, equipment and doctrine? I propose that the infantry divest itself of the LAV III and focus solely on the ‘pure’ infantry skills. While a controversial proposal and one that is likely to provoke considerable opposition, I believe the infantry needs to rise above the cap-badge battles that have surrounded the manning and operation of the LAV III and “get back to basics”. We, as a corps, need to realize that the conflicts and operations of the future will require infantry who are masters of FIBUA, patrolling, HUMINT, mountain, airmobile and airborne operations, and low-level infantry skills in general. These skills cannot be mastered while the training bill of the LAV III weighs down our mechanized battalions. As John English and Bruce Gudmundsson state in On Infantry: “…the “cutting edge” of infantry thinking remains with those armies that benefit from long standing traditions of infantry excellence.” This proposal seeks to place the Army’s infantry on that “cutting edge” so as to develop a Canadian tradition of infantry excellence.

The Canadian Army already has a corps that specializes in crewed-vehicle tactics, techniques and procedures and, is quite skilled in the operation of armoured fighting
vehicles: the armoured corps. The infantryman may make a good LAV III crewman but in so doing he will probably become a less capable infantryman. An armoured crewman is trained from the day they complete basic training to operate and fight from armoured vehicles. To have the infantry duplicate this training while also attempting to stay current in their own skill set seems incredibly wasteful. Transitioning from the Coyote or MGS to the LAV III would not be a large leap for an armoured crewman but transitioning from a dismounted section to a LAV III represents a very large difference in skill sets for the infantryman. This difference is likely to get worse in the future as conflicts place a greater demand on infantry skills.

In essence, what is being proposed here is that the infantry focus on infantry skills while the armoured crewmen focus on crewing our armoured vehicles. All nine regular battalions would transition to a light infantry organization. The organization and equipment of these battalions must not simply be identical to that of mechanized battalions minus the APCs. They should be designed from the ground up as light infantry battalions with the personnel, equipment, weapons and vehicles necessary to fight in complex terrain. The organization of sections, platoons and companies should reflect the roles of battalion rather than being limited by the carrying capacity of APCs. Similarly, the integral combat support platoons of the battalion should be organized and equipped to serve the needs of a light battalion combating an asymmetric opponent. This will mean less emphasis on anti Armour assets, but a greater emphasis on ISTAR, snipers and lightweight direct and indirect anti-personnel/anti-material fire support. Equipment and weapons should be, to the greatest extent possible, man portable and every effort should be made to limit the loads carried by the rifleman. Finally, vehicles should be highly mobile, light and easily transportable by helicopter or aircraft. The widespread use of all terrain vehicles (ATVs), light trucks (i.e. LUVW), BV 206s, and snowmobiles would appear to be one method of achieving this goal. It is beyond the scope of this essay to get into the details of the infantry battalions’ new organization but they should be modelled on the light infantry battalions of our allies where this makes sense.

The armoured corps would assume responsibility for the manning of the LAV III, thereby concentrating the training on crewed vehicle tactics within one corps. The LAV IIIs would be grouped into squadrons with each squadron capable of transporting the majority of a light infantry battalion. The squadrons would be comprised of three troops, each with sufficient vehicles to lift a rifle company. A total of six LAV III squadrons would be formed with two allocated for each brigade group. Brigade group commanders would have the option of permanently affiliating a LAV III squadron with a designated infantry battalion, or could choose to assign LAV III squadrons or even troops to infantry battalions as required. As with the light infantry battalion, it is not the intention of this essay to delve into the details of the organization of the LAV III squadron.

Achieving this reorganization is feasible and could be achieved in a relatively short time frame. It would not necessitate the expansion of the Army by any appreciable
degree as the persons-per-year (PYs) required to form the LAV III squadrons would be taken from the current mechanized infantry battalions. The crews for the LAV IIIs already exists, it is simply a matter of transferring those PYs from the infantry to the armoured corps. Similarly, this reorganization would not place any new demands on equipment as the LAV IIIs already exist. Current and future projects would have to be re-scoped to reflect the changes and to ensure the proper equipping of the light infantry battalions, but this is hardly an obstacle as the Army is already considering purchasing equipment for light battalions under the light forces enhancement project. Although technically and administratively simple to do, the proposed reorganization of the Army will confer significant benefits.

The advantages of focussing the infantry on infantry skills are numerous. Firstly, as mentioned throughout this paper, restructuring all nine infantry battalions as light infantry will allow greater concentration on fundamental infantry training. Instead of constantly bouncing back and forth between dismounted infantry skills and crewed vehicle skills, infantryman would now be able to focus on learning and mastering those skills needed on future battlefields. Skills such as patrolling, FIBUA, navigation, marksmanship and mountain operations will all be critical and all of those skills take considerable time to learn and master. Furthermore, all of those skills are perishable and must be constantly exercised if soldiers and leaders are to retain their knowledge. Those skills combined with a renewed emphasis on physical fitness would be the centrepiece of the light infantry battalion’s training plan.

An added bonus of concentrating all-crewed armoured fighting vehicles within the armoured corps would be an elimination of the duplication of effort that currently exists in our training system. The Infantry School and the Armoured School each teach tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the employment of armoured fighting vehicles. These TTPs are similar but are occasionally different. While this may be necessary in some cases, it does not make sense when each school is teaching different gun drills for use in the same turret. This inefficiency and duplication is difficult to understand in an Army as small as ours. With the reorganization of the Army, only one centre of
excellence would exist for the teaching and development of crewed armoured fighting vehicle TTPs—the Armoured School. Likewise, the Infantry School would be free to focus on infantry TTPs.

A second advantage of the proposed reorganization would be an increase in the flexibility of infantry battalions. Whereas current mechanized battalions are limited in their ability to conduct dismounted operations and current light battalions must undergo retraining if they are to operate APCs, the new light infantry battalions would help to solve both of those problems. By definition and design, the new light infantry battalions would be masters of dismounted operations in complex terrain. If, however, a light infantry battalion was required to operate in an area where the threat called for the use of APCs, they could be assigned all or part of a LAV III squadron to provide that capability. Of course training would still be required in such a situation but it would be more along the lines of marry-up drills rather than complete retraining and reorganization. This marrying-up would normally be done during pre-deployment training once each element had completed their corps-specific training. However, the marry-up drills should be just that—drills, and the light infantry and LAV III forces conducting the drills should be able to do so during a very short period of time in field conditions.

As with APC support, the new light infantry battalions would be able to ‘plug and play’ with any assortment of supporting arms and modes of transportation. Instead of LAV IIIIs, they could move into battle in light vehicles, transport helicopters, landing craft, transport aircraft, by parachute or on foot. Rifle companies or even entire battalions would focus their training on one or more of these methods rather than emphasizing the use of APCs, as is often the case today. The Joint Support Ship (JSS) project, the CDS’s expressed desire for an amphibious ship capability and transport helicopters seem to indicate that the aforementioned methods of transport will become more common for Canada’s infantry. The JSS and the amphibious ship capabilities could very possibly mean that Canadian infantry will be called upon to conduct amphibious operations while the purchase of transport helicopters indicates that airmobile operations will become
more common. The new light infantry battalions would be ideally suited to take advantage of these new capabilities, which cannot be said of our current mechanized infantry battalions.

A final but no less important advantage of transitioning all our infantry to light battalions would be an improvement in the ability to integrate reservists. All reserve infantry units are currently dismounted and converting them to light units would realistically mean only slight changes in their equipment, organization and training. Restoring homogeneity to the infantry corps, both regular and reserve, would mean that integrating individual augmentees would be much easier. No longer would reserve NCOs and officers be put at a disadvantage as a result of their lack of exposure to the LAV III. Instead, reserve units could more easily train their soldiers on similar tasks and skills as their regular counterparts. As with the regular light infantry forces, when required to operate with the LAV III, the reserve light infantry elements would conduct marry-up drills. These drills could be conducted during pre-deployment training although they would require more time than with regular infantry for familiarization training.

It is important to emphasize, once again, what is being proposed and opposed in this paper, as this is such a contentious and emotional topic. First, in no way is it suggesting that the Army as a whole divest itself of the LAV III. In fact, I would argue that the majority of operations in the future will require the deployment of the LAV III for use with the infantry. It for precisely this reason that I make this proposal as future Task Forces will require highly trained infantry and LAV III crews. Our current system is not ideally geared towards producing the highest possible quality infantrymen or the best LAV III crews. Secondly, I fully appreciate the outstanding characteristics of the LAV III including its protection, operational mobility, firepower, and surveillance capabilities. I fully believe the LAV III will often be the best means by which the infantry will be carried into battle, but what I do not accept is that it will be the only means. Whether by helicopter, transport aircraft, landing craft, ATVs or on foot, the infantry can and must exploit multiple mobility options, especially in light of the increased emphasis on operations in complex terrain. Removing the LAV III from the infantry corps will, in my opinion, impart a degree of flexibility of thought and action into the infantry battalions, which will better prepare them for the battlefields of the future.

As with any proposal, there are obstacles and disadvantages although I believe that they are in no way insurmountable. Many may see this proposal as detrimental to the infantry as it removes a significant capability from our battalions and transfers PYs out of our corps. If the aim of the infantry is to crew armoured fighting vehicles and to maintain as large a number of PYs as possible, then I am mistaken in making these proposals. If, however, the purpose of the infantry is to fight and win on the battlefields of today and the future, and to master the skills needed to do so in the most efficient and effective way possible, then I submit these proposals for consideration. The infantry corps cannot afford to remain mired in old notions of roles, organization, doctrine and equipment and cannot sacrifice modernization and change for the sake of a win in the cap-badge battles. Resistance to change and turf wars are easily overcome through leadership and clear direction and should not present a serious obstacle.

The Canadian Army is at an important junction where we can choose to adapt and prepare for the conflicts of the future or stick with the status quo. Future conflicts and operations will be typified by asymmetric threats fighting in complex, mostly urban terrain. These types of conflicts have always and will always require highly skilled infantry. Our current infantry battalions, while capable organizations, are not organized, equipped and trained to fight this kind of conflict. The demands that the LAV III places on the limited training time of mechanized battalions means that, by necessity, infantry skills are given less emphasis. Only by divesting itself of the LAV III and getting ‘back to
basics’ will the infantry corps be able to truly master those skills necessary. This does not mean losing the LAV III capability; it simply means rationalizing our training and organization to allow the infantry to focus on infantry skills while the armoured corps does what it is best at: crew armoured fighting vehicles. In so doing the Army would gain nine very skilled and flexible light infantry battalions and lose nothing.

About the Author ...

Captain Alex D. Haynes is an officer with the Royal Canadian Regiment currently serving as a planner with the Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul, Afghanistan. Capt Haynes joined the CF in 1994 and was posted to 1 RCR in 1998. He served as aide-de-camp to the Governor General from 2002 to 2004, and then as Adjutant of the Land Staff for one year before being assigned to Operation ARGUS.

Endnotes

3. At the time of the writing of this article the decision over the disposal of the army’s remaining Leopard tanks had not yet been reversed.
7. This project resulted from an unsolicited proposal from General Motors Diesel Division intended to prevent the closure of the armoured vehicle production facility in London, Ontario following the delivery of the last LAV-25 to the US Marine Corps. It was not an effort on the part of the Army to ‘mechanize’ the militia. For more information, see: Office of the Auditor General, 1992 Report of the Auditor General, Sections 16.45 to 16.48. Report on-line; available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ch9216e.html; Internet; accessed 29 March 2005.
8. The Training Plans for the LAV APC Driver and 25mm Gunner Basic courses state a requirement of 19 training days each for reservists and, on top of this, reserve crew commanders would have to complete the 25-day LAV Crew Commander Course—a very large training bill for a reserve unit, to say nothing of continuation training or resource requirements. See Department of National Defence, A-P9-031-INB/PH-B01 Driver—LAV III APC Training Plan (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001) 2-2/4; Department of National Defence, A-P9-004-SAG/PH-B01 25mm Gunner Basic Training Plan (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 1-2/4; and, Department of National Defence, A-P9-031-IEV/PH-B01 LAV III APC Crew Commanders Course Training Plan (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 2-4.
9. Phase IV of the Infantry Officer DP1 Program, where Regular Force officers now learn crewed vehicle tactics, is not mandatory for Reserve officers. Likewise, the Reserve DP3 Infantry Platoon 2/I/C course is conducted dismounted as opposed to the Regular Force DP3 course where LAV III tactics are covered. See Department of National Defence, Draft Qualification Standard: Infantry Officer DP1 (Ottawa, DND Canada, 2002), 2-5/7; and, Department of National Defence, A-P9-031-D3B/PC-B01 Qualification Standard: DP3—Infantry Platoon 2/I (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), B-1/2.
The Army’s light infantry battalions (LIB) have been repeatedly described as too light. Frequently derided as equipment deficient or even merely dismounted, the LIBs were headed for extinction before OPERATIONS APOLLO and ATHENA reminded us all of the tremendous utility of a true light infantry capability. Despite the successes of the Army’s third battalions on these operations, the LIB capability has been allowed to decay and needs to be reborn. As previously defined, the LIBs are “resource and manpower limited infantry battalions which with appropriate time, training and resources could be used for operations”; this clearly constitutes an untenable structure for employment in the Future Security Environment. Beginning with the Light Forces Working Group (LFWG), which first brought together key stakeholders in October 2004, the development of a light forces (LF) capability has now begun in earnest. LF have been re-defined as “a force optimized for military operations in complex environments, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform. Note: They are inherently rapidly deployable by air, sea, land, pre-positioning, or a combination of all. They are scaleable from sub-unit to task-force level, with all five operating functions resident with compatible mobility and protection, albeit with an increased reliance on reachback (e.g., fires, CSS) capabilities.” An operating concept is also being developed within the constraints imposed by the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS). Although tremendous progress has been made to date, the difficult task of determining force structure remains unfinished. Indeed, the legacy LF structure continues to pose tremendous challenges in the areas of firepower, protection, and mobility.

Although the force development process has articulated a requirement for a LF integral direct fire capability (anti-armour, anti-structure, and area suppression), the loss of anti-armour/direct fire support platoons from the LIBs has exacerbated the problem. A solution, however, is on the horizon. The company area suppression weapon (CASW) and the advanced lightweight anti-armour weapon system (ALAWS) are two projects that, coupled with the retention of the superb .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG), will ensure that extremely robust firepower assets remain at the light infantry rifle company and battalion level. The light utility vehicle wheeled (LUVW) command and reconnaissance variant (C&R) presents a tremendous opportunity to explore creative solutions to the second two areas of necessary enhancement—protection and mobility. Indeed, lacking the powerful LAV III, the LIB must seek an alternate platform to achieve tactical advantages in these areas. In the past six months, Third Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) has gained valuable experience, both in training and on operations, with the heavy weapons/LUVW(C&R) combination—a conceptual fire support vehicle (FSV). This paper will contend, that while not perfect, the LUVW(C&R) is an effective FSV, and furthermore, LUVW(C&R)-based elements armed with heavy support weapons can provide tremendous capability to the LIB.

The aim of this article is to describe an FSV capability—mobile, long-range, direct fire effects—and to demonstrate its value within the context of the LIB; furthermore, the LUVW(C&R) will be offered as an effective interim solution. This article will also propose...
tactical employment methods for the LUVW(C&R) configured as a FSV. It will do so within the context of a centralized platoon-level organization as a battalion-level resource. It will explain first how 3 PPCLI has currently organized LUVW(C&R)-equipped elements. It will then discuss tactical functions appropriate to such an organization, including the identification of key tactical limitations. Finally, this paper will discuss proposed concepts and a future organizational structure. This paper will not discuss the employment of the LUVW(C&R) as a reconnaissance platoon vehicle. Also, it will not discuss the technical aspects of the LUVW(C&R) in any detail except when inherent limitations affect tactical function.

Current Organization

3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) currently maintains a weapons platoon within combat support company. Based on the legacy anti-armour platoon structure, the weapons platoon is organized into four weapons sections of eight soldiers each and a platoon headquarters of five soldiers. Each weapons section is further subdivided into two detachments of four soldiers each. The organization of the weapons sections did not require significant modification in order to accommodate mounted operations as each LUVW(C&R) is crewed by four soldiers; however, finding an effective structure for the platoon headquarters was more challenging. Although its strength has fluctuated, the platoon headquarters (HQ) consists of five personnel. As originally stood up, the vehicles assigned to the platoon HQ consisted of one LUVW (Basic) and one LSVW. The platoon signaller doubled as the platoon commander's driver; the platoon 2IC and the two storemen manned the platoon stores and crewed the LSVW resupply vehicle. This arrangement was exercised and found unsuitable. As a result, a modified structure was employed recently on operation, and will be discussed in detail below.

Combat support platoons in infantry battalions are traditionally employed as detached elements. Groups, sections, and/or detachments are often detached to individual rifle companies to task-tailor mission-dependent company groups; they can also be used to directly support battalion-level operations. Combat support platoon sub-elements are structured to operate semi-autonomously and their leadership is trained as specialist advisors to battalion and company chains-of-command. While at first glance it may seem as though 3 PPCLI has merely grouped four individual rifle platoon weapons detachments together under a platoon headquarters, weapons platoon offers a far greater capability than the sum of its parts. While it still provides dismounted heavy direct fire effects as a bedrock infantry capability, weapons platoon can now increase its mobility and agility by employing the LUVW(C&R) both as a method of transporting dismounted heavy direct fire weapons from firing position to firing position, or as FSV in its own right.

Weapons platoon is designed to employ a toolbox approach with respect to its weapons and equipment distribution. Each weapons section is equipped with a range of weapons including HMGs, general-purpose machine guns, and short-range anti-armour weapons. All of these weapons can be stored in the section's vehicles. Space is obviously at a premium, especially when mission-essential equipment and ammunition is added, and, as a result, there is little room for personal kit. Extra weapons, ammunition, and kit can also be stowed in the converted LSVW trailer or left at the company A1 echelon.

In addition to its crew-served weapons, each four-man detachment is assigned one LUVW(C&R) as another item in their toolbox. In a dismounted role, the detachment operates designated support weapons as gun groups or tank-hunting teams. In a mounted role, the detachment can use the vehicle to transport itself from firing position
to firing position, or to fight the vehicle itself. Even in the latter case, for example while conducting convoy escort duty, selected crew members must be prepared to dismount to provide various security related functions. Individual crew responsibilities generally mirror those of any current fighting vehicle:

♦ **Vehicle Commander.** The vehicle commander is normally a master corporal or higher, and acts as the section commander or section 2IC. This member is responsible for the command and control, and overall operating condition of the vehicle and its crew. The vehicle commander fights the vehicle and controls the fire of its mounted weapon, while directing the vehicle within the context of the larger engagement. He is a tactical decision-maker and must be capable of operating semi-autonomously, while simultaneously maintaining proper reporting upwards. The vehicle commander dismounts frequently, for example, to control local security arrangements while halted or to liaise with dismounted supported elements.

♦ **Driver.** The driver is responsible for the tactical movement of the vehicle under the overall control of the vehicle commander. While understanding the limitations of his vehicle, he must be able to move the vehicle through close terrain and negotiate natural obstacles. He must have a complete knowledge of cross-country driving and how to maximize the benefits of the four-wheel drive system. He must respond to driving corrections from the gunner in order to achieve effective positions of observation and fire. He must be able to perform regular driver maintenance, and be able to change a tire rapidly. While operating in the mounted role, the driver does not dismount.

♦ **Gunner.** The gunner mans and operates the mounted weapon system. He must be qualified to fire all support weapons, and must respond to fire control orders from the vehicle commander. He must cover his assigned arcs, and maintain muzzle control of his weapon during cross-country movement. The gunner must be able to give corrections to the driver in order to achieve effective positions of observation and fire. As the crewmember with the best view of the immediate battle area, the gunner serves as a communications relay and helps maintain visual contact of other friendly vehicles in broken terrain. While operating in the mounted role, the gunner does not dismount.

♦ **Signaller.** The signaller acts as the number 2 on the mounted support weapon; managing ammunition resupply to the gunner and conducting barrel change drills. He provides additional observation and helps monitor the vehicle's communications. Importantly, the signaller becomes the vehicle commander's fire team partner while dismounted. A medic, signal operator, or weapons technician can occupy this position in platoon headquarters vehicles.

**Tactical Capabilities and Functions**

The legacy anti-armour platoon provided long-range precision direct fire effects against armour-based threats. While this capability remains critical, the threat has changed. Current vehicle-based threats to Canadian Army tactical operations no longer consist of massed heavy armour, but instead of Toyota Hilux jeeps and the sporadic use of light armour. Arguably, the heavy machine gun has re-emerged as a weapon of choice; indeed, recent after-action reports from Iraq suggest the M2HB .50 cal HMG to be one of the most reliable and sought-after weapons in that theatre. Coupled with the Mk 19 .40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL), US forces possess a truly potent weapon system. Fortunately, the CASW project is providing the Canadian Army an opportunity to pursue similar capabilities. While the need to defeat heavy armour has decreased, precision effects systems continue their development. The advent of fire-
and-forget technology and its application to mid-ranged tactical weapon systems (Javelin or Gill/Spike) will soon arrive in the Canadian Army in the form of ALAWS.

Three heavy support weapons, one old (.50 cal HMG) and two new (ALAWS and CASW), will soon exist together at the LIB level. Careful thought must now be given to their employment together as a system. Current planning has grouped this weapon system (minus the HMG) in a weapons platoon within each light infantry rifle company. While this seemingly answers the firepower aspect of LF development, the need for mobility and protection is still not addressed. 3 PPCLI has created a viable and effective solution using the LUVW(C&R) as an FSV, and by centralizing this capability in a combat support platoon as a battalion-level resource. A centralized approach achieves economies in command and control, manning, training, and resource management. Tactically, it is simpler to detach centralized elements than it is to constitute disparate elements into a whole. In this case, a platoon organization achieves a synergistic effect that is greater than the sum of its sections. The weapons platoon thus organized provides the battalion commander with a robust and extremely flexible element that creates mobile long-range direct fire effects against a majority of threats.

Weapons platoon has five major tactical functions: act as a firebase, conduct security tasks, act as a covering force, conduct convoy escort tasks, and constitute a quick reaction or countermoves force. The platoon can be grouped tactically in three different ways. First, the platoon can simultaneously provide four independent weapons sections to operate semi-autonomously. For example, a weapons section can be detached to a rifle company to reinforce a firebase, and another can be assigned to battalion headquarters to constitute an element of the quick reaction force. Secondly, the platoon can simultaneously provide two weapons groups each consisting of two weapons sections and a platoon-level command element. Dismounted, this element can constitute a rifle company firebase; mounted, it can provide a five-vehicle package to conduct a convoy escort task or to establish flank security during a company group attack. Finally, the platoon can operate as a formed sub-unit. Centralized, the platoon can form a battalion firebase or provide a countermoves force. The platoon’s five major tactical functions are described in greater detail below.

♦ Act as a firebase. Perhaps the most traditional role of a support weapons element is to provide a firebase to fix the enemy for a striking (assaulting) force. With numerous weapon systems, a toolbox approach can be used to task-tailor the supporting element to the mission. In recent training scenarios, 3 PPCLI has utilized dismounted firebases with a man-packed .50 cal HMG and C6 SF GPMG combination, and mounted firebases with .50 cal HMG. Dismounted firebases are more accurate, as there is no current method of marking and recording a machine gun while mounted in the LUVW(C&R) turret. When the vehicles are used in a transportation role, the guns are dismounted upon arrival at the intended firebase location. When employed as FSVs, they assume a manoeuvre role within a moving/rolling firebase. This last concept was used with some success on exercise during a battalion-level attack on an isolated urban area known to be harbouring significant insurgent forces. Once the rifle companies achieved break-in and began clearing, the vehicles assumed an assault or intimate support role. This case illustrates the utility of an FSV capable of inserting heavy support weapons into tight urban terrain. Understanding the vehicles’ vulnerabilities, namely in its weak armour protection, elements used aggressively can still create shock effect when used dynamically in conjunction with dismounted clearing elements and advantageous terrain. On consolidation, these elements can then be used in an exploitation role.
Conduct security tasks. Weapons platoon is absolutely ideal for flank security, cut-off, and cordon and search tasks. The tremendous cross-country mobility of the LUVW(C&R) and its ability to move through close terrain allows the rapid emplacement of long-range direct fire weapon systems. Elements can now rapidly cover large distances, even though this may not always be necessary, as a LIB’s terrain footprint is drastically smaller than that of a similarly sized mechanized force. Effective vehicle-based communications also increase the elements’ agility—their ability to rapidly reposition or transition to follow-on tasks. During a recent training scenario, a weapons group supported a rifle company raid on an isolated “insurgent safe house”. The rifle company was inserted through the battalion area of operations (AO) into the objective area by HLVW transport vehicles, which were escorted by the armed LUVW(C&R) FSVs. The weapons group then established a cordon, providing security and cut-off functions during the approach and assault phases of the raid. The weapons group then collapsed onto the objective with the Zulu transport vehicles to affect link-up with consolidating elements, conduct ground-based casualty evacuation, and escort all elements during the return to the forward operating base.

Act as a covering force. During a delaying operation, a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged. In a threat environment and terrain optimized for LF, weapons platoon is capable of contributing to a covering force battle. This is especially true in the context of a COIN operation, where heavier forces may not be available to support a task force’s transition to warfighting tasks. Its ability to produce long-range direct fire effects, to rapidly reposition those assets with enhanced tactical

Captain Alex Watson (left) and Sergeant Mike Gauley with the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group, discuss the best route to follow during a patrol. Canadian patrols used American pattern Hummer vehicles as shown in the background.

Photo by Cpl Lou Penney, 3 PPCLI BG
mobility, and to maintain effective command and control of dispersed elements through vehicle-based communications assets, produces enough combat power to conduct a successful delaying operation. Weapons platoon can use these same capabilities to block (a denial task that accepts decisive engagement), to guard (a protection task to gain time), and to disrupt (a task that breaks apart an enemy formation and slows its tempo).

♦ **Conduct convoy escort tasks.** In the contemporary operating environment, threats materialize from all directions; the linear battlefront is a thing of the past. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have certainly highlighted the increased risk to rear-area, line-of-communications, and service support elements. In short, every soldier in theatre must be prepared to fight and to do so at moments notice. As a result, convoy escort doctrine has been hastily developed in order to meet this new reality. While many US publications are now available, the Canadian Army’s armour school has published a superb document that served as a model for TTP development in 3 PPCLI. The LUVW(C&R), while still vulnerable, does provide an effective escort platform to service support elements. Recent operational experience during the Operation ARCHER Provincial Reconstruction Team Activation Team (PRT AT) in Kandahar during the summer of 2005 has since validated this doctrine. A convoy escort task is assigned, as a minimum, to a mounted weapons group with a platoon command element.

♦ **Constitute a quick reaction and/or countermoves force.** As potentially the most mobile battalion element, weapons platoon is well suited to conduct quick reaction force (QRF) tasks and to assume the role of a countermoves force. Elements tasked to battalion QRF duty can be used to provide escort and firepower to the package, which may include infantry, explosive ordinance demolition (EOD), field engineer, radio rebroadcast (RRB), and medical elements. Weapons platoon can generate sufficient combat power to conduct the three tasks of a countermoves force—reinforcing, blocking, and counter-attacking. While comparing an FSV to a tank is absurd, an armed LUVW(C&R) can move rapidly through the immediate battlespace, perhaps not to destroy, but certainly to disrupt and/or dislocate enemy forces.

**Tactical Limitations**

Despite its potential, an LUVW(C&R)-equipped Weapons platoon has several important limitations:

♦ With the loss of the TOW system, the platoon no longer possesses long-range all-weather surveillance assets. However there are certain integral systems, which can provide substantial short-and medium-range capabilities. Additionally, weapons platoon is not merely a TOW platoon re-equipped, and it is far more flexible in its employment during full spectrum operations (FSO).

♦ The LUVW(C&R) is not a purpose-built fighting vehicle and as such suffers some limitations in delivering precise effects in all conditions.

♦ Understanding the additional protection of the armour package, an LUVW(C&R) is extremely vulnerable to even the lightest anti-armour weapons. Risks to the exposed gunner have been mitigated through the production and use of an armoured turret shield. In addition, the vehicle provides no under-body blast protection.

♦ The enclosed vehicle body significantly reduces the ability of the crew, other than the gunner, to observe and fire. Significantly, it insulates the crew from their environment.
and creates challenges in effectively engaging a local population. In addition, a fully enclosed and armoured vehicle in extreme hot-weather conditions is critically dependent on a functioning climate control system—especially when side windows cannot be lowered to increase interior airflow. A more appropriate infantry vehicle, better suited to FSO, would consist of an open-top vehicle with multiple weapons attachments, modular armour plating, and under-body blast protection. It should also be able either to fit inside or be slung underneath a heavy-lift helicopter.

**Future Organization**

As described above, the current weapons section organization consists of eight soldiers who are capable of crewing two vehicles. These two vehicles, operating as a mutually supporting fire team, were initially thought to constitute the smallest tactical sub-element. However, creating effective TTPs for a two-vehicle independent tactical grouping proved challenging. Training scenarios and ranges were devised to practice immediate action, and basic vehicle-based fire and movement drills; this not only achieved a modicum of proficiency, but it also proved the vehicle could handle a heavy support weapon, such as the .50 cal HMG, during aggressive cross-country tactical driving. Although a two-vehicle element could provide mutual support, once a vehicle was designated destroyed or disabled, the other’s focus immediately shifted away from the tactical situation and instead concentrated on extraction, evacuation, and recovery. Unfortunately, security could not be maintained during this process and tactical initiative was invariably lost. Furthermore, during force-on-force training scenarios, it became obvious that two vehicles could not accomplish any tactical task on their own, save perhaps reinforcing the QRF function, but in this case only due to the number of attachments provided. For example, the convoy escort tasks required a minimum of four section vehicles, plus a command vehicle. If a two-vehicle section were tasked with convoy escort, the convoy commander would have no ability to manoeuvre against a threat while simultaneously maintaining security of the escorted vehicles. To create effective mutual support in providing local protection, observation, and covering fire as well as to permit disengagement and movement, four vehicles became the minimum tactical grouping.

The advantages of a four-vehicle tactical grouping are fairly obvious. At the most basic level, more vehicles equals more mounted weapons; it also means more soldiers able to dismount. The coordinated and simultaneous use of dismounts with Zulu vehicles offers attractive possibilities. Within the two-vehicle section, there are four soldiers that can dismount while continuing to operate the Zulu vehicles—two vehicle commanders and two signallers. This leaves a driver and a gunner in each Zulu vehicle, which is enough to operate the vehicles under maximum outside control—by the dismounted section commander by radio. A four-vehicle group could have the ability to dismount eight soldiers—or seven soldiers if the group 2IC remains mounted to control the four Zulu vehicles. These seven dismounts could now act as a light assault section, crew several support weapons, or even man a vehicle checkpoint (VCP). This flexible approach increases the element’s flexibility and their ability to transition between tactical tasks. For example, during a recent training scenario the entire platoon was attached to a composite rifle company and tasked to provide cut-offs during a sensitive site exploitation (SSE). As the situation developed and the objective became better defined, an urgent requirement for extra dismounted forces developed. In the end, the vehicle commanders and signallers from each vehicle dismounted, reconstituted the company reserve, and actively participated during the consolidation phase. The original mounted security task was maintained at the same time.
Command and Control

As previously noted, the weapons platoon HQ currently consists of five members: platoon commander, platoon 2IC, platoon signaller, and two storemen. Equipped with one LUVW(Basic) and one LSVW, this organization did not prove flexible or robust enough to control the dispersed and simultaneous operations of platoon elements. The only command vehicle was unarmed, which presented frequent tactical liabilities. The LSVW vehicle was seldom used as a resupply vehicle due to training scenarios and operational realities—a task force projecting combat power from a central forward operating base. Any long-range operations were supplied with the use of converted LSVW trailers towed by the LUVW(C&R) themselves. Instead, this element was used to reinforce the company A echelon.

It quickly became apparent that the command vehicle needed to be armed. As the platoon’s operating concept envisioned the tactical employment of multiple section groups simultaneously, the resulting solution involved adding a second command vehicle. This vehicle was commanded by the platoon 2IC who, in effect, became a tactical commander. While deployed to the Kandahar region during the summer of 2005, weapons platoon operated two LUVW(C&R) in the platoon HQ. Attached specialist personnel, such as the medic, were accommodated in the signaller's position in the command vehicle. Equipping the platoon HQ with LUVW(C&R) vehicles now means the command element no longer requires the protection of armed section vehicles and, at the very least, can defend itself. Platoon command elements also no longer presented a visually different target. In addition, the tactical commander now has the ability to dismount with a fire team partner (the signaller). The two command vehicles greatly increase command and control flexibility and provide valuable redundancy. For example, a command vehicle can be “dropped” into a weapons group to provide greater control during convoy escort tasks. A command vehicle can control a rolling firebase while the other tactical commander operates dismounted with the battalion tactical headquarters. A command element can also operate simultaneously with a fully manned platoon command post (CP). The use of two command elements, each capable of...
crewing an armed vehicle, was operationally validated and has worked extremely well in practice. Another vehicle option for the platoon HQ could be to mount the platoon 2IC in a Nyala mine-resistant vehicle. This would provide even greater flexibility, especially during convoy movement along undesignated routes.

**Personnel Attachments**

Fully manned, the current weapons platoon organization is large. The mobile, independent, and oftentimes dispersed nature of its tactical tasks present unique service support challenges—especially within a LIB context. There are several necessary personnel attachments:

♦ **Medical Technician.** The appreciation of the tactical aspects of medical care has begun to evolve positively in the last several years. Ever greater emphasis is being placed on casualty (vice patient) care and realistic scenario-based training. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) course has provided infantry members with critically valuable skills that will save lives on the battlefield. Although the standard of medical training for infantry soldiers has increased dramatically, specialist medical personnel are still necessary at the sub-unit level. Just as the rifle companies are allocated a medical technician (MOSID 00334-01), so too should weapons platoon be allocated one for training and operations.

♦ **Signal Operator.** Operating the current generation CF communications system can be challenging at the best of times. Managing up to ten dual installation vehicles, including their attendant EIS, can be even more so. Add extreme climatic conditions found on most deployments (or winter exercises in Wainwright), the requirement to load and regularly change cryptological fills, the challenges of properly integrating the situational awareness system, along with coalition interoperability issues and you have a daily nightmare. Having the majority of platoon personnel trained as basic communicators is a vital necessity; however, there are many issues that are beyond the capabilities of even the most technologically gifted infantryman. The presence of signal operators is critical to mission success. Recent operational experience has shown that preparing the communications arrangements of a twelve-vehicle convoy adds between thirty and ninety minutes of battle procedure time, with the presence of signal operators. One signal operator (MOSID 00329-01) should be permanently attached to the platoon and could be employed as the platoon commander's signaller.

♦ **Weapons Technician.** As a result of using a toolbox approach to its weapons and equipment, weapons platoon holds a tremendous number of crew-served weapons. Weapons maintenance issues need to be managed carefully, especially when using aged or worn systems. While guns tend to break quickly and often during prolonged firing, the majority of problems involve small parts that can be repaired or replaced rapidly in location. Guaranteed and direct access to expert tradesmen is critical to mission success—one weapons technician (land) (MOSID 000130-01) should be attached to the platoon during training and operations.

**Proposed Organizational Structure**

Using the weapons group concept, modifying the platoon-level A1 echelon, and employing a robust platoon HQ reinforced with specialist personnel attachments, the proposed organization of a weapons platoon as a combat support element includes the following elements (figure 1):

♦ Two or three weapons groups, each consisting of sixteen personnel (figure 2). In
effect, these elements consist of two traditional eight-man sections grouped together and
tactically commanded either by the senior section commander or by a platoon command
element. Each weapons group might contain the following weapons and equipment:

Figure 2

Proposed Structure
Weapons Group (0-2-14)

Call/Sign 71
Personnel:
1 x 00010-01 Sergeant (Vehicle Commander)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Driver)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Gunner)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Signaler)

Call/Sign 71A
Personnel:
1 x 00010-01 Master Corporal (Vehicle Commander)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Driver)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Gunner)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Signaler)

Call/Sign 71B
Personnel:
1 x 00010-01 Sergeant (Vehicle Commander)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Driver)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Gunner)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Signaler)

Call/Sign 71C
Personnel:
1 x 00010-01 Master Corporal (Vehicle Commander)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Driver)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Gunner)
1 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Signaler)

Weapons:
1-2 x .50 cal HMG
1-2 x CASW
1-2 x ALAWS
1-2 x C6 SF GPMG
1-2 x SRAAW(M)
4-8 x SRAAW(L)

４  x LUVW(C&R) with converted LSVW trailers;

1-2 x .50 cal HMG;
1-2 x ALAWS;
1-2 x CASW;
1-2 x C6 GPMG with sustained fire kits;
1-2 x SRAAW(M); and
8-12 x SRAAW(L).

A platoon HQ consisting of nine personnel capable of crewing two LUVW(C&R) command vehicles and one LSVW (figure 3). This consists of one platoon commander (Capt), one platoon 2IC (WO), four infantry crewmen/storemen (Cpl/Pte), one medical technician (Cpl), one signal operator (Cpl), and one weapons technician (Cpl). This headquarters is now capable of simultaneously operating two independent command vehicles, or one command vehicle and the platoon CP. The integral A1 echelon vehicle remains and the normal platoon-level service support functions are still conducted by and are the responsibility of the Platoon 2IC and his storemen. Furthermore, the combat support company quartermaster section, possibly one of the most under-utilized service support elements in an infantry battalion, could assist with platoon-level A1 echelon functions while strengthening their A2 echelon support.

**Figure 3**

**Proposed Structure**

**Platoon Headquarters (1-1-7)**

Call/Sign 79 Call/Sign 79A Call/Sign 79C

Personnel:
- 1 x 00180-01 Captain (Vehicle Commander)
- 1 x 00010-01 Warrant Officer (Vehicle Commander)
- 4 x 00010-01 Corporal/Private (Crewmen/storemen)
- 1 x 00334-01 Corporal (Medical Technician)
- 1 x 00329-01 Corporal (Signal Operator)
- 1 x 00130-01 Corporal (Weapons Technician)

Weapons:
- 1 x .50 cal HMG
- 1 x CASW
- 1 x ALAWS
- 1 x C6 SF GPMG
- 1 x SRAAW(M)
- 4-8 x SRAAW(L)

**Conclusion**

LF will become an increasingly important part of both the Army of Today and Tomorrow. As the CF reconfigures itself from an organization designed as a participant in inter-state conflict to one routinely deployed as an intervener in intra-state conflict, the need to achieve tactical dominance throughout the FSO will gain primacy. Whether dealing with humanitarian, peace support or warfighting tasks, CF operations will continue to shift into increasingly complex terrain. Robust LF are ideally suited for these theatres, and an FSV-equipped sub-element can provide a great deal of capability to a light task force. Unfortunately, critical deficiencies continue to be in their lack of mobility,
protection, and firepower. New weapons systems such as ALAWS and CASW, coupled with the retention of the .50 cal HMG, will provide potent firepower assets integral to the LIB. The introduction of the LUVW(C&R) has done much to address mobility issues within the LIB, and it has created an opportunity to explore the FSV concept. As an interim solution, the LUVW(C&R) serves as a useful vehicle for the continued development of LF doctrine and TTPs. In short, the LUVW(C&R)/heavy support weapons combination works, and a toolbox approach to weapons and equipment distribution creates versatility of employment and flexibility in task completion.

The proposed Light Infantry structure embeds integral direct fire assets at the company-level, which is necessary to support both the tactical commander and the Army’s desire to force generate interchangeable sub-units. Although the force employment concept (FEC) contained with the LF CDR explains that direct fire elements are designed to be brigaded at TF-level when necessary, it is certainly not ideal. Fundamental capabilities should not be treated as a zero-sum game; tactical commanders at all levels require direct fire support. Just as a section commander depends on his C9s to generate combat power, so does a battalion CO need an independent sub-element to provide the same capability—albeit on a larger scale. The weapons platoon structure outlined above, centralized in combat support company as a battalion-level resource, returns important integral capabilities to the commanding officer that have been lost during the Army’s deconstruction of its infantry battalions. Weapons platoon provides a CO with a highly mobile force that produces long-range direct fire effects. Thus organized, he now has the ability to influence an operation once begun, constitute credible reserve elements, and employ a potentially decisive countermoves force.

About the Author...

Captain Geoffrey M. Mundy graduated from the Royal Military College in 2002 with Bachelor of Arts in Honours History. He was posted to the Third Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry and was employed with the OP APOLLO Rear Party. Captain Mundy received the Commander Land Staff Commendation for his dedication and tireless efforts as the Battalion Repatriation Officer following the Tarnak Farm tragedy. While at the Third Battalion, he has been employed as a Rifle Platoon Commander in B Company (Mountain), the Assistant Adjutant, and Weapons Platoon Commander. In the spring of 2005, Weapons Platoon completed the first Heavy Machine Gun shoots with the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled, Command and Reconnaissance variant. Weapons Platoon conducted extensive collective training both live fire and dry. In July 2005, Weapons Platoon was attached to the Provincial Reconstruction Team Theatre Activation Team in Kandahar.

Endnotes

1. Quoted from Draft Capability Development Record—Light Forces.
3. CLS Capability Planning Guidance—Light Forces.
4. In an AAR from OPERATION PHANTOM FURY (Fallujah Nov 04), the United States Marine Corps described this combination of the M2’s penetrating power and the Mk 19’s suppressive effect as “ideal”. In this way, the enemy is presented with “the historic combined arms dilemma and proved to be extremely effective.” Quoted from 2Lt R. Sparks, Operation PHANTOM FURY after action report. Unpublished.
5. A Task Force based on 3 PPCLI conducted Exercise SPRING RAM/LIGHT FIGHTER 05 from 2-20 May 05 in Wainright. The LIGHT FIGHTER portion of the exercise was Level 6 Dry within a counterinsurgency scenario. The Battalion operated from a fixed Forward Operating Base (FOB) and projected combat power forward into the AO in Platoon, Company Group, and Battalion strength.
FORCE PROTECTION FOR LOGISTICS: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENT

Lieutenant-Colonel Tim D. Marcella

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy

Introduction

The asymmetric threat is not a new phenomenon of warfare although in recent years its impact on the battlefield has increased dramatically. Recent coalition operations have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of logistics units and lines of communications (LOCs) to asymmetric attack and disruption. To add to this dilemma, the continually increasing support demands of manoeuvre warfare and the non-linear battlefield have also contributed significantly to the strain on logistics resources. As a result of this dual pressure, current trends in logistics related to personnel manning, doctrine, training and equipment must adapt to address these changing battlefield realities. The Canadian Forces (CF) recognizes this need and clearly articulates its vision in the Chief of Defence Staff document Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020). This strategic vision document states, “the Canadian Forces is charged to develop new task tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetrical threats and WMD.” While the CF vision and direction with regards to the asymmetric threat are clear, the establishment and maintenance of the required capabilities to do so remains a challenge. This paper will provide an assessment of the current CF logistics force protection capabilities to operate effectively in the emerging asymmetric threat environment and provide key recommendations to address any apparent shortfalls.

This paper will first define the asymmetric environment in order to set the background for this assessment. This will include an identification of the major changes to the asymmetric threat in the modern battlespace. This in turn, will lead to an examination of the specific logistics capability requirements in this environment. Next, the specific logistics force protection capability model will then be explained. This model provides the necessary concepts, mechanisms and lexicon to conduct an assessment of logistics force protection capabilities that will be relevant to the current force development structure in the CF. This will then be followed by a detailed assessment of CF logistics force protection capabilities in an asymmetric environment. Finally, key recommendations will be provided to address critical shortfalls to logistic capabilities identified during the assessment.

The Asymmetric Environment

The term asymmetric warfare is unquestionably the current term du jour for military theorists and planners and as such there exists a wide range of opinion as to what exactly it entails. Ironically it is a concept as old as warfare itself. Throughout history
weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their adversary’s technical or numerical superiority by using tactics on the battlefield that nullify the enemy’s advantages. There are however, several definitions of asymmetric warfare that are particularly relevant in an assessment of CF logistic capabilities. P.F. Herman, author of Asymmetric Warfare: Sizing the Threat, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, defines asymmetric warfare as “a set of operational practices, aimed at negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities rather than engaging in traditional force-on-force engagements.” This is similar to the CF perspective that defines asymmetric warfare as “attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the opponents usual mode of operations.”

Despite its long and bloody history, asymmetric warfare has changed in significant ways in recent decades. The first important factor is the significant likelihood that the frequency of asymmetric conflicts will increase in the future. In the past, the asymmetric threat was normally just a component of the larger conventional conflict. Today however, there is only one superpower in the world and this ‘asymmetric’ gap between the U.S. military forces and those of her adversaries continues to grow. As a result, the only method of attack against this superpower and western coalitions will be through asymmetric means. Indeed, German political scientist Herfried Münkler argues that developments since the Second World War indicate that wars in the classical sense might disappear or at the most will play only a minor role. He states that “classical wars” between states seem to be a “discontinued line of warfare” and that future armed conflicts will mostly be asymmetric conflicts.

The second important factor of change in the asymmetric threat has been in the tactics and objectives of its practitioners. In the past, the targets of asymmetric attack have been, for the most part, military targets with military objectives as a goal. The modern asymmetric threat includes terrorism as a primary tactic instead of as the exception. Krystian Piatkowski, an analyst for the Poland in Europe Foundation, identified this reality when he stated “this war pattern neither corresponds to the perceptions of a Carl von Clausewitz nor the conditions of The Hague and Geneva Convention.” This changing asymmetric environment presents specific challenges for logistics force protection.

**Logistics Capabilities in the Asymmetric Environment**

Traditionally, asymmetric warfare is best used against targets that have little or no protection. Logistics units and resources are high payoff targets in sustained operations, but they normally possess minimal self-defence capability. It is this vulnerability that makes them especially attractive targets to nations and organizations that cannot effectively wage conventional warfare against their enemies. Ground-based units will encounter increased ambushes, making logistics movement high risk; more sabotage of logistics assets by hostile populations; and more electronic warfare directed at logistics command, control, and communication assets. Furthermore, the asymmetric threat does not decrease significantly during operations other than war (OOTW). In fact, the opposite is likely true, as the absence of heavy combat units could suggest weakness that may embolden adversaries eager to use asymmetric attacks. The reality is the asymmetric threat to logistics units and facilities has increased significantly in the modern battlespace, and they present more likely targets than well armed combat units.

On the conventional battlefield of past conflicts, CSS units certainly faced combat situations. The linear nature of the battlefield, however, enabled commanders to mitigate risk and exposure of CSS assets to attack. In the past, CSS personnel were exposed to indirect fire and aerial attack, however, in the modern asymmetric environment they now face the asymmetric tactics of hostile paramilitary forces and terrorists in civilian clothing. Recent conflicts such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have revealed an
unprecedented speed of manoeuvre forces. U.S. combat elements often bypassed Iraqi pockets of resistance in order to sustain the momentum of the attack. Maintaining this tempo required logistics units to provide support on unsecured LOCs and through fluid areas of operations. The fate of the 507th Maintenance Company convoy during OIF is one of many examples that vividly demonstrate this new reality. Unable to locate the fast moving elements of U.S. forces, this convoy became lost and was ambushed by Iraqi armour and crew-served weapons resulting in the death of nine soldiers and the capture of five others. In the modern asymmetric battlespace, CSS units must be capable of operating over extended LOCs through unsecured and hostile terrain. The key capability required by CSS units to operate in this high threat environment is that of force protection.

CSS units must have the resources to fight and survive while they execute their sustainment mission. This includes support to rapid and fluid combat operations as well as hostile post-combat environments. Past doctrinal concepts, which hold that combat units will be assigned to provide rear area security when necessary, are unrealistic and potentially catastrophic. Experience has demonstrated that combat units will frequently be forced to leave their LOCs unsecured as combat arms and support arms units will always be tasked with other priorities. CSS units must be capable of conducting convoy operations and base defence against the asymmetric threat without external assistance. While force development continues to strive to reduce the army's logistics footprint, leaders must also ensure that all CSS units become more lethal and survivable in the asymmetric battlespace. To achieve the necessary level of force protection, the three main pillars of personnel, doctrine and training, equipment and information infrastructure must be maintained.

To guard effectively against asymmetric threats, logistics security must be included in both doctrine and training. If security for logistics assets is not included in doctrine, this key area lacks the visibility and focus that is necessary for successful operations in an asymmetric environment. Security should not be an implied task for logistics commanders. Current and future army doctrine cannot assume that logistics units will maintain their security, augmented by combat units that are rarely available. Assuming that any sort of inherent unit self-defence capability will achieve the necessary level of rear area security in an environment with a high probability of asymmetric attack is extremely dangerous. The enemy will not distinguish between combat arms and CSS soldiers. In fact, the enemy may be more likely to target CSS soldiers. To be able to provide logistics support, CSS soldiers also must be trained for close combat. To be properly prepared for the future, all leaders and soldiers, regardless of service, must be trained to deal effectively with both asymmetric and conventional threats. In the asymmetric battlespace, CSS soldiers now have to deal with many of the same challenges that combat arms soldiers face and this includes overcoming the psychological hardships of killing in combat. They must be trained to fight and win in an asymmetric environment.

Given the need to provide a considerably higher level of force protection in the modern asymmetric threat environment, it is not surprising that a radical change in equipment requirements for CSS units is also required. In addition to improved individual protection, there is a need for improved collective firepower and protection. The first requirement is for hardened vehicles that provide increased blast and ballistic protection over what is currently available from the normal 'administrative' vehicles. The normal compliment of ring mounts for automatic and crew served weapons must be increased. Convoy personnel, who find themselves in an ambush are firing from moving and restricting vehicle spaces at an enemy who has chosen the battleground, are at a significant disadvantage from the outset. As such, flexible and overwhelming firepower is required to win the firefight quickly and to allow the convoy to rapidly escape the ambush site. This high level of armament will also contribute significantly to deterring
attacks.\textsuperscript{15} From a static defence perspective, improved intrusion alarm systems and other sensors will greatly improve force protection capabilities and deter enemy attacks.\textsuperscript{16} In order to maximize the capabilities of this equipment, it is necessary to have their employment tied into an effective information system.

A greatly improved information infrastructure is essential for CSS unit operations in the modern asymmetric environment. The current information gap that exists between combat and support units must be closed. During OIF, the Chief of Staff, G-4, Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, pointed out that logisticians in Iraq could not see the requirements of combat units on the move and this resulted in a lack of continuous, “24/7” connectivity to the operational requirements of manoeuvre forces.\textsuperscript{17} This lack of connectivity can result in a serious failure in force protection as was demonstrated by the ambush of the 507\textsuperscript{th} Maintenance Company convoy as previously discussed. Had a movement tracking system been in place they could have been quickly advised that they were moving in the wrong direction, thus avoiding their lethal encounter with the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{18} It is clear that CSS units need the same informational and communications capability as the warfighter in the modern asymmetric environment. Having defined the asymmetric environment and the specific logistics force protection requirements, it is now necessary to provide a mechanism for assessing this capability.

**Logistics Force Protection Assessment Model**

This logistic force protection capability assessment will be conducted in a manner similar to those assessments conducted within the Capability-Based Planning (CBP) process currently used by the CF. The focus of this assessment will be on the force protection capability area at the tactical level and the elements of the Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) which enable that capability. The capability goal for this assessment will be the ability for CF logistics elements to operate in a high-threat asymmetric environment as experienced by Coalition Forces in Iraq during OIF. In the context of logistics force protection capability, this assessment will focus on the functional components of personnel, doctrine and training, information infrastructure and equipment. With regard to the rating of capabilities, a simple traffic light system will be used to assessment tool. An assessment of RED indicates a failure to meet force protection requirement to a degree that may result in excessive casualties and failure of logistics capability on operations. An assessment of YELLOW indicates that force protection requirements are met in the majority of areas, but that some short falls exist which could result in high casualties and seriously denigrated logistics capability on operations. An assessment of GREEN indicates that force protection requirements are met to a degree that allows for the required logistic capability. The assessment will be focused on the force protection capability tactical level CJTLs that specifically address logistics activities that are outlined in Table 1.1.

Finally the CBP process itself will be assessed with regards to its suitability to provide the necessary mechanisms to ensure the logistics force protection capability is established and maintained. Having described the model, it is now possible to conduct an assessment of the logistics force protection capability.

**Logistics Force Protection Capability Assessment**

The first assessment area of the logistics forced protection capability will be the functional component of personnel. Unlike the vast majority of military occupations (MOCs), the Logistics Branch is a joint branch with its members, in theory, employable within the three environments. In particular, the non-commissioned members (NCMs) are frequently posted out of their normal land, sea or air environment. While this policy provides excellent technical flexibility and depth, it also results in a significant vulnerability in an asymmetric environment. While the asymmetric threat can exist on land, sea and in the air, it is in the ground environment that logisticians are most
vulnerable and where historically the vast majority of attacks occur. In 2004, the Chief of Land Staff (CLS) manning of logistics positions within CLS units by non-army personnel equalled 33% or one third of total strength. In terms of leadership, the situation was even worse. The manning at the rank of master corporal (MCpl) through to chief warrant officer (CWO) was 43% non-army personnel. Just under half of the NCM logistics leadership in army units was comprised of individuals who do not have the level of training and experience necessary for force protection in a ground environment. Considering the significant casualties suffered by U.S. fully army-manned logistics ground units during OIF, these figures indicate a critical personnel capability shortfall. As a result of the major force protection vulnerability that results from the current logistics tri-service NCM manning policy, the functional component of personnel in this assessment is deemed to be RED.

The next assessment area examined will be the functional component of doctrine. CF doctrine still contains the outdated concept that combat arms units will provide the necessary protection for LOCs and logistics units in an asymmetric environment. For example, B-GL-312-001/FP-001 Combat Service Support, which was last updated in 1987, states “…major rear area security tasks must be handled by combat forces.” This concept has become obsolete for a number of reasons. Firstly and most importantly, this doctrinal principle was designed for operations in a Cold War linear battlefield with a relatively secure rear area. It is not suitable for the modern non-linear asymmetric battlespace as experienced in Iraq. During OIF the most powerful military force in the world was unable to provide combat units to adequately protect its LOCs and logistics units in an asymmetric environment. The reality of the situation in Iraq was that convoys were responsible for their own force protection. Secondly, the army does not seem to have made the paradigm shift in thinking that calls for a fundamental change in how CSS units defend themselves. This requirement for robust integral force protection for logistics units and activities requires not only the mounting weapons on logistics vehicles, but actually providing CSS units with platforms dedicated solely to force protection tasks on a permanent basis. This need not entail assigning combat arms vehicles and personnel to CSS units. For example, the ‘Gun Truck’ concept entails mounting considerable firepower in up-armoured logistics vehicles that are solely dedicated to force protection. This highly effective concept was initially seen in Vietnam and was re-discovered during OIF. Given the continued rise in the frequency of asymmetric warfare to the point where it could become the most common type of conflict, CF doctrine should be moving in these directions. Due to the lag that seems to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T 5.1.3</td>
<td>Defend Line(s) of Communication (LOC) and Logistics Bases</td>
<td>Defend LOCs, Air and Sea Points of embarkation/Disembarkation (APOE and APOD) and their associated command arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| T 5.2 | Conduct Force Security | Conduct measures to protect a military unit, area, an activity or an installation against attacks designed to impair its effectiveness and retain the unit’s capability to perform its missions and tasks

Table 1.1: Key Force Protection Canadian Joint Tasks.
exist within logistics force protection doctrine the functional component of doctrine in this assessment is deemed to be YELLOW.

In terms of the functional component of training, there also exist some shortfalls within the logistics force protection capability. As a whole, the technical expertise of logisticians is not in question. What is in doubt, however, is their ability to protect themselves in a high-risk asymmetric environment. The current training system does not provide adequate war fighting skills and leadership training to all logistics personnel who are deployed on operations in high threat areas. The crux of this problem is the fact that, with regards to force protection, logisticians are trained by environment and then employed, most frequently, in a ground-based threat environment. In terms of frequency and quantity, this is particularly true for air force personnel. This disparity in training results in non-army logisticians being posted to the land environment where they are expected to lead and supervise troops without the requisite basic knowledge, let alone advance skills. The flaws in this system were made abundantly clear during Op APOLLO in 2003 when the National Support Unit (NSU) was deemed to be incapable of providing for its own force protection in what was only a low-medium asymmetric threat environment. As a result of this situation, an army defence and security platoon had to deploy into theatre to provide force protection. This failure to meet the required logistics force protection capability was due in part to a failure to provide adequate training during pre-deployment training. This was only part of the problem however, as it is impossible to train an inexperienced non-army NCM leader to the necessary force protection skill level in three months of pre-deployment. The training and experience essential for this skill set is acquired throughout the career progression of the logisticians involved and the current tri-service logistics training system cannot meet this demand.

There have been a number of recent initiatives that have attempted to address this training deficiency with regards to logistics force protection capability. A Logistics Branch strategic seminar was conducted in October 2004 to address these training and personnel issues, however, the subsequent recommendations are still being considered. The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) also conducted a review of the NCM General Specifications (NCMGS) from January to June 2004. The aim of the review was to ensure NCM common training meets the needs of the operational environment. This review recommended some minor changes to the performance requirements (PRs) proficiency level for some force protection skills and introduced new PRs related to nuclear, biological and chemical defence. The recommendations do not, however, fully meet the force protection and leadership capabilities needed in an asymmetric environment. This is understood to be a work in progress and additional review will be conducted in this regard. The final initiative intended to address the force protection training shortfall is the establishment of CSS Battle Schools. This is an army initiative, currently in the concept stage, which has the objective of ensuring all personnel who arrive in a CLS unit have the skills to operate in all potential environments. Despite these very positive initiatives and developments, however, the current training process does not provide an adequate logistics force protection capability for an asymmetric environment. As such, the functional component of training in this assessment is deemed to be YELLOW.

In terms of information technology infrastructure the situation in some areas meets the requirement, however, there are key short falls in other areas. The introduction of the tactical command and control system into the army’s fleet of vehicles has provided a solid capability with regards to communications. It remains adequate for communications within an asymmetric environment. The Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP) 2004 indicates that a combat identification system will also be established, which will greatly reduce the risk of friendly fire, but will also allow convoy commanders
to react quickly to new threats. What is lacking within the information technology infrastructure at this time is a movement tracking system (MTS). This system would provide the ability to identify the positions of MTS-equipped tactical vehicles, track their progress and communicate with the drivers. This is an essential capability in an asymmetric environment, particularly when manoeuvre warfare is being executed. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Army is already implementing this capability. As of June 2004, over 2000 logistics vehicles participating in OIF had been equipped with this type of system. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the current information technology infrastructure, this aspect of the logistics force protection capability is assessed as YELLOW.

Any assessment of equipment capabilities in relation to logistics force protection should be broken down into the categories of personal and collective force protection. In the case of the former, the army's Clothe the Soldier program has provided excellent personal equipment to enhance force protection capabilities. This includes body armour, Kevlar helmets and blankets, ballistic eye protection and load carrying vests. The C7 rifle upgrade, which included a telescopic sight, also greatly improved this weapon's performance. From a personal equipment perspective, logistics personnel are very well equipped for operations in an asymmetric environment. From a collective force perspective, there are several key projects listed on the SCIP that will enhance this capability. These include improved area surveillance radar as well as the Biological Warfare Threat Counter-Measure Project. In terms of vehicles, the army's fleet acquisition of the new Mercedes-Benz G Wagon, with its weapons ring mount, will allow improved convoy firepower. This capability augments the existing weapons ring mount capability of the Heavy Logistics Vehicle Wheeled (HLVW), which is the current workhorse of convoy operations. Both types of vehicles have an up-armour capability. While the CF still lacks any sort of 'Gun Truck' vehicle, this weakness is the result of a doctrinal shortfall that has already been addressed and will not be considered in this portion of the assessment. From the equipment functional component perspective, the current logistics force protection capability is assessed a high YELLOW.

The CBP planning is a sound concept that has already been adopted by both the U.S. and the U.K. Like any tool however, it is only effective when it is used properly. This is not quite the case within the CF. The existing Defence Management System (DMS) and CBP process have not yet been fully integrated and synchronized. This has resulted in some reluctance by some staff within NDHQ to fully 'buy in' to this process. A large number of personnel associated with the CBP process are also double-hatted with other duties that impact on their focus and productivity. Despite the fact CBP was implemented in 2000, to date only three of the eight capability areas are being addressed by the existing joint capability assessment teams (JCATs). There is no JCAT established to champion the force protection capability area. This lack of focus is perhaps evident in the 2004 SCIP that does not even list force protection as one of its 'capability thrusts'. Force protection issues continue to be addressed by the environment and this situation does not serve the logistics capability, which is joint, particularly well. There is a danger of issues being overlooked due to the lack of central coordination and control. The CBP process has the potential to address the force protection needs of the logistics capability, however, in its current form of implementation it is not meeting the requirement and is assessed as YELLOW.

Having examined and assessed the logistics force protection capability in terms of the key functional components as well as in terms of the CBP process it is now possible to determine an overall assessment rating. The table at Table 1.2 provides a summary of the assessment area ratings for this study. Any assessment rating of RED carries significant weight due to the fact that this shortfall will lead to excessive casualties and
logistics mission failure. As such, the overall logistics force protection capability is assessed as low YELLOW.

LOGISTICS FORCE PROTECTION CAPABILITY SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Area</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Doctrine Training</th>
<th>Information Infrastructure</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection Tactical CJTL</td>
<td>T 5.1.3 Defend LOCs And Logistics Bases</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 5.2 Conduct Force Security</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP Process</td>
<td>JCRB JCAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Force Protection Capability</td>
<td>Overall Assessment</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Logistics Force Protection Capability Summary

Legend

This assessment of the current logistic capability will use the recent experience of OIF as an example of a high threat asymmetric environment. It is assumed that the CF would strive for a high level of force protection capability in this type of environment. Colour code indicates the following:

Red—fails to meet force protection requirement to a degree that may result in excessive casualties and failure of logistics capability on operations;

Yellow—meets the force protection requirement in most areas but some short falls exist which could seriously denigrate logistics capability on operations; and

Green—meets the force protection requirement and enables the required logistic capability on operations.

Recommendations

Clearly, the establishment of a robust and effective logistics force protection capability is a complex and demanding problem, and this paper will not attempt to provide solutions to all of the current challenges in this regard. There are, however, several key recommendations that are fundamental for success. The issues of personnel and training are closely linked, and the weaknesses in this area represent the most significant shortfall in the logistics force protection capability. Radical transformation and change will be required within the Logistic Branch to overcome this deficiency and allow for the necessary logistics force protection in an asymmetric environment. There are essentially two options. The first choice is to employ logistics NCMS within their environments except for significant operation necessity. The second option is for the branch to truly adopt the often quoted but much ignored metaphor that all logisticians are ‘soldiers first and tradesmen second.’ This will ensure all logisticians, regardless of environment, are equipped with a soldier’s minimum level of skills necessary for operations in a ground environment. CF doctrine must adapt to the reality that CSS units must be capable of providing for their own force protection in the modern asymmetric battlespace and units and personnel must receive the necessary equipment and training to do so. This should include vehicle platforms integral to the unit that are used exclusively to provide overwhelming firepower in a force protection role. Finally, the army should acquire a movement tracking system similar to that which the U.S. is currently implementing. This information infrastructure asset would greatly enhance the
CF logistics force protection capability as well as provide a very important aspect of inter-operability with the world’s only superpower.

Conclusion

This paper examined the logistics force protection capability within a high-threat asymmetric environment. In particular, the capability area of force protection and its key functional components were used as the assessment area framework. In terms of doctrine and training, there are some critical shortfalls in the capability and a critical shift in thinking is required to meet the changing reality of the high-threat asymmetric environment. U.S. forces in Iraq have already experienced these realities and the necessary changes are currently being implemented. The CF must adapt to the modern battlespace as well. It is clear that the current tri-service manning policy results in a potentially catastrophic shortfall within the personnel functional component of the logistics force protection capability. The Logistics Branch must undertake a significant transformation in terms of the personnel functional component if it hopes to meet the CF goal laid out in *Strategy 2020* to develop new task tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetrical threats. As it currently exists and within a CBP context, the logistics force protection capability is assessed as low YELLOW. The CF is incapable, at this time, of conducting effective logistics operations in a high-threat asymmetric environment due to the lack of force protection capability.

About the Author...

Lieutenant-Colonel Tim D. Marcella joined the CF in 1988 after graduating from the University of Western Ontario. He served in 1 CMBG from 1989—1994 where he was employed in 2 Service Battalion as the Decontamination Platoon Commander and Supply Company 2IC and then subsequently with the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry as the Quartermaster. After a short tour with the Land Staff, he was posted to 2 Service Battalion as Officer Commanding Supply Company in 1997. This was followed by a tour with the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Germany. Upon his return to Canada, he was employed in J4 Logistics. His operation experience includes tours with the UNDOF, SFOR and KFOR. LCol Marcella is currently employed as LFCA HQ G4 in Toronto.

Endnotes

30. Ibid.
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of ferocious-looking, turban-wearing men who looked like they came from another century… After receiving them in the White House, Reagan spoke to the press, referring to his foreign guests as “freedom fighters.” These were the mujahideen.

-Eqbal Ahmad

Of the many facets of the Soviet-Afghan war that have been misunderstood, confused or had a mythology built up around them, few can compare with the mujahideen. On the one hand feted and honoured by world leaders and politicians like Ronald Reagan and Senator Charles Wilson of the United States, on the other, forced to fight the Soviet Union with the most rudimentary of weapons systems for much of the Soviet occupation; their exact nature remains shrouded in misperceptions and the language of the Cold War. The purpose of this brief piece is to examine the mujahideen with a view to enhancing the comprehension of them as an entity and removing some of the myths that have grown up around them since the close of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1989. This will also assist, in some ways, in increasing our understanding of the modern Taliban, as it is extremely unlikely that they would have existed without the example set by their predecessors.

To understand the numerous different bands and individuals who formed the resistance in Afghanistan is to merely scratch the surface of the ideas represented by the label mujahideen. The term implies a unity of purpose and effects that was not necessarily present in the rugged mountains and deserts during the Soviet-Afghan War. In fact, the word itself is borrowed, originally coming from a name used to describe a movement, which had fought the British in Afghanistan and India from 1826-1831. Lead by one Sayyad Ahmad Barlevi, mujahideen were simply his followers. In its present context, the term is somewhat more dynamic, meaning different things to different people. Over the course of this article I will examine their origins and background, as well as the principal groups and their leadership. I will then move onto a discussion of the main characteristics that define them and their evolution. Lastly, I will discuss the tactics and technology they employed in their resistance first to the government of Afghanistan and later to the Soviets. Once this ground has been covered, I will conclude with my own thoughts on what the mujahideen have contributed to the extant situation in Afghanistan.

The years immediately leading up to the Soviet invasion in 1979 were not good ones for Afghanistan. Following the coup by Daoud in 1973 the country became embroiled in a state of political unrest, which would eventually see Daoud himself overthrown and murdered in 1978. Communists, led first by Nur Mohammad Taraki and later by Hafizullah Amin, took power and “began to implement socialist programs” including the somewhat delicate subjects of land reform, education and the “strengthening of the state.” At this point, isolated uprisings by “local residents” were the genesis of a rebellion “formed along tribal and ethnic lines.” It was in these uprisings that the mujahideen were initially formed. Initially poorly armed, and centred on the village and its leader, the mujahideen rose up in an attempt to physically counter perceived threats that they saw in the legislation that was then being imposed by Taraki. Upon Taraki’s
murder by Amin, and the Soviet invasion which then followed, the “movement” underwent its first fundamental change.

In many ways, the Soviet Union’s actions proved to be a catalyst which altered the way that the Afghans structured the resistance; away from one that was focussed on defeating an unpopular, if home-grown, government, to one that had as its aim the removal of foreign invaders. Over time they would evolve and begin receiving international humanitarian and military aid, but at the outset they were nothing more than rebels against an unpopular government. With the provision of aid and international backing, the mujahideen then turned to counter the Soviet invasion in earnest. This was helped to no small degree by the exodus of Afghan citizens who then began to drum up international “political, military and economic” support.10 This was further enhanced when Pakistan’s President Zia ul-Haq appointed that country’s national intelligence agency, the ISI, to “arm, supply and organize the Afghan resistance.”11

Some have described the war itself as a “guerrilla war”; however, to use that phrase is to miss the point that from the moment when the Soviets invaded, this became an atypical guerrilla war. Rather than fighting to provoke change or overthrow a government, the mujahideen were instead trying to restore their “qawm”12 and their religion.13 From initially small numbers, the mujahideen rapidly grew in “membership” with author Milan Hauner giving their strength as being between 85,000 to 100,000 men.14 Their quality was relatively low, but over time this force would become both “better trained” and “better equipped,”15 ultimately outlasting the Soviets and watching them retreat back across the Oxus. How they did so is the next aspect of the mujahideen we will examine.

Organizationally, the mujahideen may be described as falling into six major and numerous minor groups that themselves can be split into those that were hard-line fundamentalists and those that were somewhat more moderate in their religious and political outlook. This generalization can be broken down even further into those groups that were Shi’a, those that were Sunni and those that were nationalistic instead of religious in their outlook.16 As a political entity, this was an exercise in futility. Indeed, Roy has described the mujahideen as an example of “the political failure of Islam,”17 at least in part because they were unable to overcome their different religious perspectives and move toward a common end-state. This aspect of the mujahideen may not have been solely the result of their different religious views. In part the division was the logical outcome of the efforts made by Pakistan’s President Zia, who out of fear of renewed calls for an independent Pashtunistan deliberately favoured the fundamentalist mujahideen at the expense of the moderates. As Hauner has written, “keeping the mujahidin divided
was] the best way to prevent the re-emergence of a larger Pashtunistan Question.”

The six principle factions enjoyed a certain privileged status, as it was through them that all monetary and military aid was funnelled by Pakistan and the West. This was because of a decision taken by the Pakistani government whereby they only recognized the six major groups, while they “closed their eyes to the activities of the minor groups.”

The six parties are as shown in the table below, with leaders being those that held the leadership position at the time of the formation of the faction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fundamentalists Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Moderates Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Party (Hizb-e-Islami)</td>
<td>Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Qazi Mohammed Amin Wiqad</td>
<td>National Liberation (Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli)</td>
<td>Sibgatullah Mojaddidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jam’iyyat</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Rabbani</td>
<td>Revolutionary Islamic Movement (Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami)</td>
<td>Mawlawli Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Six Major Mujahideen Parties

It must be noted that Pakistan’s decision to support these six groups had the effect of marginalizing the efforts of the numerous other factions who were engaged in fighting the Soviets. In doing so, Pakistan indirectly reinforced the Pashtun tribal network while negating the Shi’as Hazaras in particular. This is somewhat ironic given President Zia’s desire to avoid the Greater Pashtunistan question. Additionally, by favouring the fundamentalists over the moderates, it is even arguable that Pakistan planted the seeds of the eventual rise of the Taliban.

Characterising the mujahideen is an exercise in contrasts. Strengths and weaknesses seem to contradict one another in the same fashion that a desert can be both boiling hot and freezing cold. On the one hand they were highly motivated, on the other generally rejecting a professional military organization, religious and possessing a deep faith yet capable of incredible barbarity on the battlefield reminiscent of Kipling’s warning to the British soldier. Lastly, and perhaps most ironically given some of their tactical successes, they lacked unity at all levels in both the political and military spheres. Each of these characteristics warrants further comment.

That they were motivated is clear. In part this was a result of their culture and religious background. As scholar Milan Hauner has noted, the expectations of Afghan culture (if such a term can be used), and in particular the tribal demands for honour imposed by pashtunwali, essentially required a response from all able-bodied Afghans. In this instance, it was the source of “unusual moral strength” as well as “religious fervour.” Later in the war this was augmented by the not insignificant level of financial support given to the mujahideen. In some cases, this funding resulted in payments to individual soldiers that were as much as five times that paid to the soldiers of Afghanistan’s national army; the result was an ever increasing rate of desertions, which left the DRA essentially impotent.
The second element of the mujahideen, which in some ways was a defining element, was their general rejection of a professional military structure in the conduct of their activities. This is an aspect of their existence that has been commented on by many scholars, but perhaps none more so than Olivier Roy who counted this as a principal characteristic of the mujahideen. In an insightful piece of writing, he traces the fact that the professional soldier has held little in the way of respect in traditional Afghan culture. In some ways, “the rejection of the military is linked to the rejection of the state.” This rejection was manifested in several ways: first, the lack of a “structured chain of command”; second, a lack of appropriate tactical training and lastly, a lack of specialization in the conduct of military exercises. However, as much as this characteristic was the norm in Afghanistan, there was one exception—namely the “Lion of Panjshir,” Ahmad Shah Massoud.

A favourite of the western press, Massoud organized his forces differently from the bulk of his compatriots and was the sole leader to adopt a professional military structure with all that it entails. In what has been termed “the Massoud Model,” he developed both “a modern army” and “a modern strategy.” Essentially, Massoud saw that there was strength and power in first “militarizing his troops” and then “turning them into professional soldiers.” By focussing his efforts and dividing his forces into specialized roles (base forces, assault forces and mobile forces, for example) he achieved impressive results while empowering the local residents. There were, of course, some caveats which had to be followed in order for his model to work.

First, the traditional system of “qawm” had to be respected; if Massoud had alienated village and tribal leaders, it is doubtful that his system would have worked. Second, there were certain elements of society that were beyond his influence. Specifically, he did not attempt to affect the “hard core of civil identity”—the social and economic aspects of village or district life that were more appropriately in the realms of Afghanistan’s traditional tribal leaders. Thus by walking the fine line between the tribal codes and cultural traditions on one hand, and the military and political imperatives of effective organization on the other, Massoud demonstrated that there were other ways of fighting the Soviets than those that were being employed at the time. That his model was not followed by the vast majority of the leaders of the mujahideen raises the obvious question why. Perhaps it points to a lack of willingness on the part of other leaders to give up elements of their power. A second option is that walking the line between cultural traditions and political imperatives was exceptionally difficult. It was probably easier for many of the leaders to maintain established traditions, rather than chance losing face with their followers by taking a path that was certainly questionable at the time.

Devout Islamic faith also played a significant role in the daily lives of the mujahideen and served to inspire and motivate them as warriors. As author Victoria Schofield has observed “It [was] in Islam that their morale [was] anchored, and Soviet attacks, the prospect of death itself [seemed] scarcely to bother them.” Another noted specialist on Afghanistan, American Lester Grau, has stated, “The Afghan’s values, faith and love of freedom enabled them to hold out against a superpower, although they suffered tremendous casualties in doing so.”

Olivier Roy sees this aspect of the mujahideen as being a central element in their rebellion against the communists and the subsequent reaction to the Soviet invasion. To him the idea of jihad “was an ethical model and a religious duty” for the Afghans. It was far more than a war to oust a foreign invader; it was essentially a requirement for any good Moslem to come to the aid of the Afghan people in their quest to rid their lands of the infidels, in this case the Soviet 40th Army. Essentially the religious component of the mujahideen was split into four elements, as articulated by Professor Roy. These were
“fundamentalist Sunni clerics,” “Sunni Islamists,” “Shi’ā Islamists,” and “Wahhabis or ‘neofundamentalists.’” In some ways these divisions are an artificial construct; however, as much as they may overlap they do provide a means of categorizing the religious differences, which in some ways governed the creation of the major parties within the mujahideen.

A fourth characteristic that stands out in much of the academic writing on the topic is the fact that the mujahideen were a formidable and cunning enemy to the Soviets. The descriptions by popular media, in both Russia and the West, make numerous references to the abilities and capacities resident in the mujahideen that made them both feared and respected by the Soviets. One quote by Canadian journalist Eric Margolis speaks to their hardiness and tenacity:

The mujahedin would walk to battle barefoot, through deep snow, sometimes for two days and nights, carrying 90 pounds (40 kg) of mortar shells or rockets on their backs. Then they would trudge home, dodging inevitable counter attacks by Communist artillery, or the far more fearsome Hind helicopter gunships…

A Russian journalist, Artyom Borovik, was clearly impressed by the capabilities of the mujahideen. Commonly referred to as “dukhi” or ghosts, he recounts finding shepherds smuggling weapons tied to the underbellies of sheep. In this one instance we can immediately see that this was an enemy that was neither stupid nor unthinking. Numerous anecdotal accounts suggest that they were adaptable to the situations that they faced and that they were not intrinsically tied to dogmatic or doctrinaire solutions. Clearly, they were creative, tough and able to capitalize on weaknesses that they witnessed in their enemy, as evidenced by the total number of Soviet casualties. One only need flip through Jalali and Grau’s Afghan Guerilla Warfare to see that the Soviets faced an enemy that they were not prepared for.

The lack of tactical and strategic unity was a tragic manifestation of the manner by which the mujahideen factions were organized and is a reflection of the various religious and tribal differences that existed in the movement. As Ali Jalali has stated, the Afghans suffered from having “factions within the factions.” In some ways this could be considered a strength, as it made targeting principle leaders difficult, if not impossible for the Soviets. Yet at the same time, this disunity resulted in a “lack of coordination” at all levels, both on the battlefield and in the realm of international politics. Indeed, to return to the words of Jalali, “the reputation of certain factions was that they were more interested in fighting the Mujahideen than Soviets.” This again, to a certain extent, was the product of Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan resistance.
Moving beyond broad generalizations, it is worth examining the way that the Afghans conducted their war to evict the Soviet Union from their home. To refer to “mujahideen tactics” is somewhat of a misnomer; Borovik perhaps sums it up best when he writes:

To talk about the dukhi’s tactics, however, is to overgeneralize. Each band of rebels has its own style of fighting. And despite a common headquarters, each has its own interests and views on conducting combat operations.42

This is echoed by Jalali who wrote that “the tactics of the Mujahideen reflected [a] lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley to valley and tribe to tribe.”43 This lack of doctrinal methodology was, to be certain, both a blessing and a curse. For the Soviets who faced the mujahideen, it demanded a tactical agility that the majority of their combat forces did not possess. Concurrently, for the mujahideen and those agencies supporting them, it meant that there were significant problems with interoperability and a unified approach to tactical problems. The Afghans were themselves good light infantrymen that could be in many ways described as naturals, although they lacked the discipline of a professional fighting force.44 They were very much focussed on battle and the honour that it brought them; “easy LOC [Line of Communications] targets” did not draw their energies.45

Their principal battlefield weakness was their predictability in their use of terrain. They would use the same sites repeatedly to launch ambushes and rocket or shelling attacks.46 Additionally, they lacked a comprehensive air defence network and suffered greatly from Soviet attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft.47 Operating in Afghanistan’s rugged environment, such a non-unified organizational methodology placed a high demand on the combat leaders who led the mujahideen. In such an atmosphere, the loss of a capable or properly trained “leader could seriously jeopardise their operations.”48

Training, and much of their logistical support, took place in the porous border regions of Pakistan.49 Here both the Pakistani ISI and former members of the Afghan Army, among others, “tried to train the Mujahideen to a standard.”50 Logistically, the success or failure of the mujahideen relied upon the pipeline of arms, munitions and money that was controlled by Pakistan. Journalist Eric Margolis has stated that “logistics were the single most important element in the war…”Without the efficient ISI logistics network, the jihad would have been crushed by 1985.”51 While this bold statement may border on hyperbole and is certainly open to debate, there is little doubt that the mujahideen needed logistical support of all natures in order to fight the Soviets and evict them from Afghanistan. As the war progressed, and the mujahideen began to rely more and more on crew-served and high technology weapons systems, this logistical requirement increased significantly. It is somewhat ironic that this reliance on logistics in turn gave the Soviets a legitimate military target and a viable means of disrupting the military efforts of the mujahideen,52 although their relative lack of success in this regard would translate into an eventual defeat for the Soviet Union.

Technologically, the mujahideen evolved between the commencement of hostilities and their conclusion from a force that was essentially low-tech in nature to one that possessed several high-tech pieces of equipment. For the most part, the weapons used were the British Lee-Enfield .303 and Soviet AK families of weapons.53 Both sets of rifles were deadly in the hands of the Afghans, and served complementary roles, with the Lee-Enfield being used to provide accurate long-range fire, while the AKs were used more for close-in ambushes and what is now termed as close quarter battle. Additionally, the well-known Soviet Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) was particularly useful. The Afghan use of this weapon made the Soviet 40th Army suffer from a degree of “tactical timidity”,

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wherein they would try to stay out of the maximum effective range of the weapon (300 metres) in an effort to reduce casualties. This in turn forced the mujahideen to react and rely more on heavy or crew-served weapons with increased ranges and hitting power.

Much has been made of the Afghan effort to acquire anti-aircraft weapons, including the American Stinger missile. Although some have described it as being “as decisive . . . as the English longbow was at Crecy and Agincourt,” it would probably be closer to the truth to state that with the provision of the Stinger, the Soviets lost their complete dominance of the airspace over the Afghan countryside. The use of the weapon by the Afghans forced the Soviets to adjust their tactics, and suffer a loss of air mobility that they enjoyed during the early stages of the war.

These factors being known, it is a fair question to ask whether or not the mujahideen won the war, particularly as the Soviets withdrew at the end of an eleven-year occupation. Opinions on this subject vary. Milan Hauner has argued that:

The Soviets were not beaten militarily; their withdrawal was predicated on political judgements born of internal political dynamics more than anything that happened in Afghanistan.

Jalali and Grau have taken a slightly different tack, stating:

The Soviets realized that they were trapped in an unwinnable war . . . by an intractable enemy who had no hope of winning but fought on because it was the right thing to do.

In some ways, to decide whether or not the mujahideen won the war is moot; the facts speak for themselves. Accepting that all wars are, at the heart of the matter, political contests, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan without their political goals having been met. In that sense there can be little doubt that the mujahideen did win. To describe such a victory as military in nature is irrelevant to the final result. This then leads to the final question of how this applies to the extant situation in Afghanistan.

Currently, Afghanistan is wrestling with the problems created by the preceding twenty to thirty years of conflict. The international community is faced with Taliban elements and anti-coalition militias (ACMs) whose aims are essentially the same as their forefathers—the removal of foreign elements from Afghanistan. The first point that becomes
immediately apparent is that the decision by Pakistan to support the fundamentalist groups opposed to the Soviet invasion has adversely affected the tribal and cultural codes that previously existed in Afghanistan. This cultural breakdown on one hand, with a concurrent growth in the power of the mullah is a central element in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. If we are to succeed in bringing a modicum of peace to Afghanistan, this pillar needs to be changed and if possible reversed. We must find a way to strengthen the influence of tribal codes, like pashtunwali. However, we cannot be seen as attempting to marginalize the importance of Islam, or we will have an even more dynamic resistance to face.

A second fact that stands out in this examination is that the mujahideen were predictable in the conduct of their tactical operations. They made repeated use of the same sites as launching points for their attacks against the Soviets. If one assumes that the Taliban are in many ways the sons of the mujahideen, this may be a fact that can be exploited by coalition forces currently at work in Afghanistan. A historical and geographical analysis of the country may yield information which greatly assists in the neutralization of the Taliban’s tactical efforts.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this examination points to the importance of knowing one’s foe. Numerous authors repeatedly wrote of the Soviet Union’s failure to understand the enemy that they were facing. This is an error that the international community and the coalition forces currently engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom can ill afford to replicate.

About the Author ....

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Endnotes

2. There are many different spellings of this relatively simple term. Throughout this piece, unless in a direct quotation, I will employ that used by Eqbal Ahmad.
5. Ibid, p. 15.
6. Roy, p. 84.
11. Ibid. Admittedly, President Zia may have had other motives than supporting the mujahideen and there is a significant body of evidence which suggests that their lack of unity may have been a deliberate affect of the actions that the ISI undertook on his order. This will be discussed later in this piece.
16. Trying to fully describe all of the groups involved in fighting the Soviet occupation is well beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent discussion of the groups, their evolution and their leadership, see M. Hassan Kakar. Afghanistan:


20. Information is compiled from Kakar, p. 90-91.

21. See Rudyard Kipling’s well known poem “Gunga Din.”


23. Ibid, p. 100.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Roy, Afghanistan, p. 75


33. Ibid, p. 43. Roy (51) categorizes “Islamists” as those that are basically “urban laymen…who have seldom pursued theological studies” who in turn “attempt to break the religious monopoly of the Mullahs.”

34. Margolis, p. 5.


36. Ibid, p. 28.


38. Ibid, p. 401.


40. Hauner, p. 105.

41. Jalali and Grau, p. 401.

42. Borovik, p. 81.

43. Jalali and Grau, p. xiv. Ironically, cooperation between the disparate mujahideen groups was assisted by the “basic military education” afforded by the Afghan government’s previous policy of conscription.

44. Ibid, p. 404.

45. Ibid.


47. Ibid, p. 405.


49. Ibid, 300.


51. Margolis, p. 45.

52. Ibid, p. 400.
Dr. Sean M. Maloney

Who can predict what will happen in the Middle East? Whatever it is, it is likely to be unexpected, or undesired by the West. No means of peaceful settlement of the Palestine question is in sight, and there is always the possibility that the smoldering conflict will again burst into the open flame of war.

-E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (1962)

In an institutionally drab, fluorescent-lit underground hallway at the Royal Military College of Canada, on a dusty bottom shelf far below eye level, stands an empty Khaki army uniform jacket, covered with medals and wrapped with a Sam Browne belt. It is an eerie sight: the uniform and cross-chest belt are rigid, as if it is being worn, but there is no torso inside, no head, no visage. It is not supported by even a manikin facsimile of the owner. It is the uniform of an unknown, faceless, forgotten warrior. His name was Lieutenant General Eedson Louis Millard, but he was better known as “Tommy” Burns.

In 2006, fifty years after the Suez Crisis, Canada will celebrate the ostensible invention of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping by Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and eventual Prime Minister Lester B. “Mike” Pearson. During these celebrations, the Canadian government will provide masses of information on Mike Pearson’s role in the Suez Crisis to the Canadian people and in schools, for all ages. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize that now hangs in the Canadian War Museum will be deemed a symbol of Canada’s commitment to the UN and to peace. Books written for the young will promulgate the mythology of Pearson’s invention of peacekeeping for a new generation.

But there will be no mention whatsoever of Tommy Burns. Canadian schoolchildren will not learn who he was. The Prime Minister will not utter Burns’ name in the same breath as Pearson’s. There will be no monuments to him, nor will there be any mention of the critical role Burns played in the Middle East peace process long before Pearson became involved in the late-in-the-day diplomatic efforts to defuse the Suez Crisis of 1956. Nobody will make pilgrimages to Burns’ grave in Kingston, Ontario. Burns’ memoir, long out of print—and subjected to a spurious whisper campaign implying that he was anti-Semitic because of his criticism of Israel—has not been re-issued by a Canadian publisher since it was released in 1962.

In the 14th century, the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun was confronted with a problem: he lived in a society that had as its basis a mythology that could not be openly challenged because of its religious nature. How then, was Khaldun to, in his words, “get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of events” while confronted with “blind trust in tradition [and the] occupation with the scholarly disciplines on the part of those who have no genuine claim to them”?

Canadians are confronted with a problem similar to that described by Khaldun. Mythology and invented tradition tells Canadians that Lester B. Pearson invented UN
peacekeeping. This mythology has been deployed by the politically motivated to justify a wide variety of Canadian actions and activities that have little or no bearing on Canada’s national interest. Those who openly challenge the invented tradition have been shunted aside, marginalized and even accused of being “un-Canadian.” In a philosophically-disabled age, in which concepts like “truth” and “objectivity” have been under sustained attack from all sides—the glib and the lazy, the cynical opportunists and the idealistic propagandists—does it really matter that someone else was instrumental in developing UN peacekeeping? Why should we care?

Fundamentally, it is the matter of just due. Simply put, “Tommy” Burns led Canada’s peacekeeping effort in the Middle East from 1954 to 1959 and it was Burns, not Mike Pearson, who was the first Canadian to seriously consider how to use UN military forces to achieve peace in that region. It was Burns who created a plan for peace and tried to implement it. Stunningly, Burns’ criticisms of UN peacekeeping at the time are completely relevant in the Middle East today: he warned us of its limitations fifty years ago. Yet his warnings have been suppressed, or at the very least, deliberately ignored by the proponents of Canada’s peacekeeping mythology. Tommy Burns, Canadian hero, has been “Orwellianized” into the memory hole of Canadian history.

Why? Why do we not know more about E.L.M. Burns? First, Burns was not a charismatic “nice guy.” His demeanour was that of an intense, controlled, focused individual who did not smile a lot: pictures show a permanently down-turned mouth with a neatly trimmed moustache above it. He was not a “people person,” as pop psychology advocates thought people should be. As one journalist explained, “He chooses his words carefully and uses them sparingly. As unemotional as a questionnaire form, Burns leaves the visitor confident that he has command of all the facts of the case.” Physically, Burns was short and a little rotund. With this combination of physical and personality traits, Burns did not exude “dash” or suavity. He was a Roman Catholic, operating in
Canada and Britain’s predominantly anti-Catholic Protestant venues. Burns was also a failure, in the eyes of his Second World War peers. He had been relieved of Corps command in Italy by a British general who demanded that Burns be more aggressive than methodical, and, in those days, Canadian leaders aspired to be respected by their British counterparts. Not measuring up to perceived British “standards” was a strike against Burns when he was compared to, say, the more dynamic (and perhaps more narcissistic) “Monty” protégé, Canadian general Guy Simonds.

Canadian culture is extremely vicious when it comes to those who do not fit in with the rest of the herd. It is not surprising, then, that these attributes and factors served to over-ride anything positive that Burns contributed to the Canadian profession of arms, at least in the writings of Canadian military historians or political commentators.3

Clearly, some Canadians have a burning need for their heroes to be “nice guys”. This is rooted in the belief, again in 1960s-era pop psychology circles, that only charismatic “nice guys” can be effective leaders, that image is everything, that only successful people deserve continued success. These are adolescent, materialistic perceptions that need to be discarded before we examine Tommy Burns and the role he played in the Middle East “peace process,” long before it was actually called that.

Prior to his engagement as Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1954, Tommy Burns’ background epitomized the word “experience” and gave him valuable tools that he would need in the volatile Middle East geopolitical environment. Burns served for a year with the 17th Hussars before entering Royal Military College in 1914. Commissioned as a military engineer, Burns arrived in France just in time for the Somme, where he won the Military Cross for personal bravery. He participated in every Canadian operation from 1916 to 1918. In his self-deprecating memoir General Mud, Burns makes it clear that in retrospect, he did not view his participation (he was an engineer, but in command of a signals unit) as having given him the “hard-won knowledge” of fighting in an infantry unit gained by his contemporaries Alexander, Montgomery, and Slim. He felt that this put him at a disadvantage during the Second World War. In addition, Burns reveals in General Mud, a certain level of self-awareness: “Being a poor speaker and thus averse to talking to larger groups than could fill a medium-sized room, I never tried the Montgomery technique. Looking back, I regret that I never had any instruction in public speaking—or thought that I needed it.”4

Between the wars, Tommy Burns taught at the Royal Military College of Canada and attended the School of Military Engineering in Great Britain. He also attended Staff College in Quetta, Baluchistan (then part of India, now Pakistan) and the Imperial
Defence College. Burns was placed in charge of the Geographical Section General Staff by General A.G.L. McNaughton, in which post he practically invented aerial mapping (and was awarded an OBE for it).

In addition to listing his military duties, General Mud provides some insight into Burns’ interests. He was an enthusiastic poker player, having acquired the skill in the trenches of France. Skill at poker no doubt became useful when dealing with the leadership of various antagonistic Middle East countries and the UN. He also enjoyed motorcycling. It was his interest in writing and intellectual debate, however, that had the most significant impact upon his career. It put him in contact with American publisher H.L. Menken, the scathing and witty owner of the American Mercury magazine (typical Menkenisms include: “Democracy is the theory that holds that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard” and “Puritanism: The haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy.”) Provoked by a Menken article predicting that Canada would eventually be “absorbed” by the United States, Burns wrote back and argued vigorously against the proposition. Burns, who admired Menken “for his iconoclastic blasts against the stuffy Victorian-Edwardian mores and literature of North America,” was soon asked to contribute to American Mercury.5

One of Burns’ articles, written under a pen-name, attacked contemporary methods of military instruction: “while war is the most fascinating pursuit known to man, instruction of it is usually made so dull that at least seven soldiers out of ten in peacetime become disgusted with their life work and give themselves over to drink, bridge, golf or polo.”6 Burns wrote, under his own name, in the Canadian Defence Quarterly and engaged in intellectual debate over the direction of the Canadian Army, discussing how to avoid the problems it had encountered in the First World War. Burns championed the formation of mechanized divisions and even airborne formations.7

Of note, there are indications that Burns’ attitudes towards social mores bordered on the libertine: indeed, in The Generals, historian Jack Granatstein refers to Burns as a “sexual adventurer”.8 He also seemed to have developed a scepticism for the strictures of organized religion: “A deeply religious person, I suppose, can get comfort by resigning his fate to God’s will; nevertheless the various glands and organs in the complex human anatomy don’t often respond to reason, will or faith in a high and just ruler of all things.”9

Burns’ Second World War was controversial. He was initially sent packing back to Canada from Britain—in part because of his private criticism of senior British military leaders in letters home that were intercepted by authorities. During the course of this affair, Burns became acquainted with the number two man in the Canadian High Commission, a certain Lester B. “Mike” Pearson, who wanted Burns as a military liaison,
but was unable to convince senior military authorities to go along with the scheme.\textsuperscript{10}

In Canada, Burns played a role in building up the fledgling Armoured Corps. In the Ram tank programme, he was placed in command of a brigade, and ultimately commanded the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy. There were significant political problems relating to the command, use and abuse of Canadian troops in Italy, and plenty of scope for internal Canadian problems, as Burns noted: “Not a few officers of the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade took a dim view of being placed under the command of fellow Canadians who had come to the battlefield over half a year after the vanguard had waded ashore on Sicilian beaches.”\textsuperscript{11}

Burns was promoted to commander of I (Canadian) Corps and eventually led Canadian troops in the battles of the Liri Valley and the Hitler Line throughout 1944. During this time, he became concerned that there was a growing perception “that the Canadians were being used by the British high command as a kind of superior colonial shock troops.”\textsuperscript{12} and, given the manpower crisis in Canada, something had to give. It was Burns, himself.

The official history explains it thus:

Lieutenant-General Burns relinquished the appointment of Corps Commander. Although he was an officer of very distinguished abilities, nevertheless there did not exist between General Burns and the British senior officers that personal relationship of friendly mutual understanding which is so important. There was some suggestion that the lack of confidence expressed by the Commander of the Eighth Army…had in time become known to the Corps Commander’s subordinates…this combination of circumstances where it was impossible for him to carry on as GOC…\textsuperscript{13}

Was Burns forced out because of personality conflicts up the chain of command (and down: his men called him “Smiling Sunray” particularly because he did not smile…), or because he was, as a nationalist, concerned about the British using Canadians as cannon fodder?\textsuperscript{14} The probability that subordinate commanders took the opportunity to plunge the knife in at a vulnerable time cannot be discounted: this would be behaviour consistent with Canadian cultural values.

In any event, Burns was marginalized for the rest of the war. He noted in his memoirs, “I was very resentful of the way in which my service in the Italian Theatre had been terminated. Now I can look back at it in a more philosophical way. It had the result, after the war was over, of setting my life on another course, which permitted me to serve the country in ways in which I may have been more useful than I could have been had I gone on until the end of the war as commander of the 1st Canadian Corps.”\textsuperscript{15}

After the war, Burns joined Veterans’ Affairs, eventually becoming Deputy Minister from 1950 to 1954. His daughter noted that he even “dressed in seedy clothes to find out how his department treated veterans, and, unhappy with what he learned, raised hell.”\textsuperscript{16}

How, then, did a semi-disgraced Canadian Lieutenant-General, serving as a senior civil servant in a backwater department, come to command a UN force in the Middle East at the height of a nuclear crisis during the Cold War? Intrigued by the possibilities for the UN before the Cold War distorted its idealistic aims, Burns was president of the Ottawa branch of the UN Association in 1947-48.

It is important to understand that the UN of the 1940s and 1950s in no way resembled the corrupt, bureaucratically bloated institution that it is today. Created during the Second World War to act as a post-war forum to resolve global disputes peacefully through diplomacy and negotiation, the UN was based on ideals that were quickly
subverted by the Soviet Union when Stalin refused to permit Red Army-occupied eastern European countries true democratic elections. The UN became a diplomatic “front” in the Cold War and was increasingly seen by both sides as a tool to influence the newly decolonizing parts of the globe.

During this period, Canadian policy makers were still trying to discern the dimensions of the Soviet threat, and were formulating a Canadian approach to it. In time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would emerge as the primary vehicle for the Canadian response, but some still held out hope that the UN could be made to function under the constraints of the new conflict. In a number of magazine articles written in 1948 and 1949, Burns groped towards explaining the new state of affairs for the Canadian audience. Sub-textually, Burns accepted that the Soviet Union was implacably bent on confrontation with the “Free Market Democracies,” and was deliberately interfering with the intent of the UN. Burns was concerned that the West would rely too much on air power, particularly atomic air power, as a shield against “imperialistic Communism.” He expressed the view that although a strong defence was needed, the West had to remember that “the final victory has to be won in the field of economics and ideas, and while we cannot in the least afford to discount the probability that the political conflict might break out into open war, we should, so far as we can, avoid using means to win the war that will prevent the attainment of our true ends.”

From this writing it is clear that Burns’ (and for that matter, Mike Pearson’s) conception of the UN as one means of securing Canadian Cold War objectives is at odds with the assumption that both men were somehow UN supremacists. For Burns, Canada came first, and the UN was a tool, not the other way around. This is an important distinction that is overlooked by those seeking to cater to the Canadian peacekeeping mythology.

Canada and her allies were concerned about developments in the vital Middle East starting in the late 1940s. The Canadian media, in particular, was highly disturbed by the emergence of Communism and the possibility that the Soviets would exploit predicted
war between the Arabs and the Israelis in the region of Palestine.  

The details of the UN’s involvement in the Palestine question are beyond the purview of this article. For the purposes of this article, however, the following background is offered: Following a lengthy insurgency against Great Britain, the state of Israel was declared upon British withdrawal from the region in 1948. Israel was subsequently attacked by the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Displaying superior organization and manoeuvrability, Israeli forces held back the uncoordinated Arab armies on all fronts. Internally, the process that in the 1990s came to be called “ethnic cleansing” took place, as hundreds of thousands of Arab inhabitants in Israeli-controlled areas took flight or were driven from their homes. Evidence by the “new historians” in Israel suggests that expulsion was deliberately and systematically pursued.

A variety of peace plans were proposed in UN circles in the five years before Burns joined its Middle East operations. One plan was to form a bi-national state and internationalize the city of Jerusalem with a UN military force. Another was to create two separate states in which the Arab inhabitants and the Israeli inhabitants would have approximately equal claim to the land. There were many others; indeed, any soldier who served in Bosnia in the 1990s will see the similarities to that situation. Unfortunately the UN lead negotiator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by an Israeli terrorist group, the Lohamei 'Herut Yisrael (LHI or Freedom Fighters of Israel) also known as The Stern Gang. UN-Israeli relations have never fully recovered from this event.

The 1948 war led to a situation where there was no established, agreed-to peace: there were four separate armistices or truces. All five primary belligerent states agreed that the UN would play a role in maintaining these truces until a more permanent peace could be formulated: these were called the General Armistice Agreements or GAAs, four of which were signed in 1949. Under the GAAs, all belligerents were to refrain from “committing warlike or hostile acts against the other party,” that the areas of contact between the belligerent forces would be replaced by an Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL); and that military forces would withdraw from a zone extending 10 kilometres on each side of the ADLs.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was designed to monitor the GAAs. The United Nations Nation Truce Supervision Organization consisted of, initially, 66 and then 131 military observers led by the Chief of Staff (C/S) UNTSO (a confusing title to us today, but the C/S led the mission). UNTSO military observers (UNMOs) worked within the framework of four Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs): one for each “front.” The Chief of Staff UNTSO was responsible to the UN Security Council to report on all measures relating to the ceasefires while at the same time...
working with the MACs to stave off incidents that could lead to a re-emergence of hostilities.\(^{23}\) Of interest, UNMOs were armed with side arms for self defence purposes and sometimes travelled in armed vehicles.\(^{24}\)

By 1954, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was, however, having problems finding a replacement C/S UNTSO. Enter Mike Pearson, now Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Canadian government of the day had significant strategic interests in the Middle East. Primarily, it was the eastern edge of the NATO Area and as such, vital sea lines of communications ran through it. Soviet influence in the region could have dire consequences in the event of war and within the struggle by the West to get former colonies on side in the larger context of the Cold War. Contributing to UNTSO was part of this effort to stabilize the region.\(^{25}\)

Pearson wanted greater Canadian salience in the Middle East. It is probable that Pearson encouraged the St. Laurent government to persuade Burns to accept the position of Chief of Staff UNTSO. Burns believed he was chosen because of his involvement in the UN Association and his writings, coupled with his military background. It is likely that the two men were re-acquainted through government service in the late 1940s. In 1954, Burns was asked if he would don his uniform again. In his memoir Between Arab and Israeli, Burns explained his involvement this way:

I do not wish to give the impression that at this time [1954] or at any time since, I have regarded myself as a person ‘dedicated’ to the ideal of peace, or even the United Nations. I was taking on a job that had to be done; the Canadian Government wanted me to do it. It seemed also that it would be a worth-while and probably exciting employment….\(^{26}\)

Burns was not some idealistic peacenik: he was sceptical about the efficacy of the UN in the context of the Cold War, as was Pearson. This was not exactly the stuff that
Canadian social engineers could use in the promotion of peacekeeping mythology in subsequent decades.

What was the situation like on the ground when Burns arrived in Israel in 1954? On the whole, the MACs were engaged in games that will be familiar to any Canadian who has served on a peacekeeping operation. There was no actual peace, just an absence of formation and unit manoeuvre: the ADLs were artificial map lines that ignored geography and ground of tactical importance. There was a certain amount of jockeying by the military forces of the belligerent nations to ensure that, in the event of renewed hostilities, ground could be seized or defended. This led to low-level shooting and mortaring incidents on occasion. This situation was coupled to the larger diplomatic game played out at UN Headquarters in New York in which all sides engaged for legitimacy purposes. Each incident could be used as ammunition in diplomatic circles to “prove” the other side was in violation and aggressive. Again, this was linked to what we would now call “information operations,” but back then was called “propaganda.” The target audiences for the propaganda war included friend, foe and neutral alike.

UNTSO was also confronted with what was at the time called the “infiltration phenomenon.” “Infiltration” was a term used to describe crossings of the ADLs, which took many forms. First, there were displaced Arabs returning to tend their crops and recover goods from their homes. A sub-set of this group included shepherds of all sides conveying their flocks across the ADLs to graze. Although these appeared to be benign activities, they were warped into claims of “economic warfare” by the belligerents’ propaganda arms. Israeli kibbutzim settlers, armed to the teeth, started to shoot infiltrators on their own, leading to retaliatory action by displaced Arabs. Initially, none of these actions were under direct government control, though they were exploited in the information operations sphere. In an unanticipated development, however, Arab groups formed and started to use more organized violence.

The plethora of groups and motives that emerged would fill several books. There was the Muslim Brotherhood (an Egyptian terrorist group and the intellectual incubator for what would become Al Qaeda in the 1980s); there were fedayeen (“self-sacrificers”), who were more loosely organized. Some fedayeen groups were supported by either Egypt or Syria; some were self-organized. Some acted as proxies for other Arab nations, others started to call themselves “Palestinian” fedayeen and plan for a return to their homes. Egypt and Syria also conducted covert military recce and sabotage operations using fedayeen groups as cover.

Israel created special operations groups to track down and kill fedayeen, but at the same time conducted cross-border retaliatory operations against villages suspected of supporting fedayeen or other infiltration activities. This put them at odds with the official military forces of the target state. In addition, retaliatory operations were also conducted in response to non-lethal infiltration, which resulted in the deaths of civilians. Retaliatory operations increased in size and frequency. In time, regular Israeli units became involved.

Burns and UNTSO were confronted with the possibility that “infiltration,” writ large, could generate an escalatory series of actions that might result in a re-emergence of open hostilities between the official military forces of the belligerent nations in the region.

There were several possible flash-points in addition to infiltration. Back in 1948, UNTSO’s overworked UNMOs succeeded, on a local basis, in creating some Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) on the ADLs in the Sinai and Galilee, but lacked the numbers or resources to monitor them. As UNTSO expanded, UNMOs were tasked to visit these areas on occasion and report, but were not permanently located in them. On
one occasion, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Shertok, even demanded that UNTSO set up observation posts between Israeli and Jordanian forces in a number of critical areas.31

A further problem was the city of Jerusalem. Divided like Berlin and later Nicosia in Cyprus, Jerusalem had a number of neutral areas which became de-facto DMZs. In some places there was no buffer zone at all, with Israeli forces and Jordanian forces literally facing off across the street from each other.32 An Israeli enclave on the vital ground of Mt Scopus, designated a DMZ, was deep inside Jordanian-held territory and had to be re-supplied with UN-escorted convoys through UN-occupied checkpoints.33

Under Burns’ leadership, UNTSO explored several incremental local arrangements to decrease tensions on all four “fronts” in late 1954 and into 1955. Under normal circumstances, UNMOs would receive word of an incident and respond to investigate it, leaving policy action up to the MAC in consultation with C/S UNTSO and then the Secretary General. In Jerusalem, UNMOs were directed, by late 1954, to “patrol certain places…for the purposes of preventing further violation of the cease-fire.”34 The American commander of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan / Israel Commission (HKJ-IMAC) also sent out mounted patrols to deter violent activity, hoping that “the presence of the UNMOs in their white jeeps would reassure the inhabitants of the front line areas” of Musara, Mamillah road and Abu Tor. Burns also “decided to increase the patrolling and we thought that if observers occupied a number of fixed posts which overlooked the areas where the incidents started, perhaps the shooting could be cut down. So half a dozen observation posts were constructed on both sides of the demarcation line and we began to man them.”35 The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Moshe Dayan, strenuously objected to this even though the deployment was successful at reducing the level of violence, mostly because the IDF and UNTSO were engaged in a larger debate over freedom of movement for UNMOs and Israeli concerns over operational security.36

Burns expanded the observer and observation post concept to Gaza and Galilee, but “in each case the Israelis resisted the idea at first, usually giving a reluctant and conditioned consent in the end.”37 In the case of the ADL that ran along the Gaza Strip, Burns’ predecessor General William E. Riley USMC previously tried to institute joint patrols and observation posts (OPs) incorporating Egyptian, Israeli, and UN officers, not unlike the “four men in a jeep” idea that emerged in post-Second World War Vienna. He had met with limited success.38 By 1955, the infiltration situation was so bad on the Gaza ADL that Colonel Gemal Abdul Nasir himself “proposed that each side should withdraw its posts and patrols one kilometer from the demarcation line,” but later, Burns was “unable to obtain any further verbal commitment from him.”39 After a shockingly large Israeli retaliatory raid against Khan Yunis in Gaza during September 1955, Burns recommended to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld that “clashes between Egyptian
outposts and Israeli patrols could be avoided only if there was a physical barrier along the ADL, and outposts and patrols of both sides were kept at least 500 meters behind it.”40 On September 8 1955, a Security Council resolution accepted Burns’ recommendation about separation of forces, but did not modify UNTSO in any way.

The Gaza ADL problem was related to the El Auja DMZ problem down the road. Egypt was preventing UNTSO from entering its half of the DMZ. The El Auja DMZ was an example of critical ground: it was the primary route from the Sinai to Beersheba and the Negev Desert and thus constituted a primary invasion route in either direction. The Israelis, on the other hand, were suspicious about this lack of cooperation and were covertly infiltrating well-trained “settlers” and “police” to some kibbutzim on their half of the DMZ.41 Burns was unable to get movement because the Israelis would not allow UNMOs into the area either42 or, in institutional UN language, “Due to technical difficulties in drafting, it has not yet been possible to formulate a definitive agenda acceptable to both parties [in the Egypt/Israel area (EIMAC)] but each side has agreed to consider the position.”43

It took time, but Burns prevailed and by July 1956, UNTSO had “observers manning the observation posts along the armistice demarcation line” around Gaza.44 Twelve OPs were established. But “both sides objected to observation posts in their military positions…. [UNMOs] remain in their white jeeps flying a white flag.” UNMOs on the Egyptian side lived in Gaza, while their counterparts lived in Beersheba, with rotation between Gaza, Beersheba, and the El Auja DMZ, where UNMOs were stationed at one site on the Israeli side. All OPs reported in every thirty minutes to the C/S UNTSO’s headquarters and, if necessary, could connect to him directly.45

What does all this mean? The accepted Canadian mythology is that Lester B. Pearson invented UN peacekeeping in November 1956. However, we have, between 1954 and 1956, armed multinational UN personnel under a Canadian commander occupying observation posts between the belligerent armed forces in the Middle East region in an agreed-to scheme designed to deter and reduce tensions and, if necessary, report on outbreaks of violence so that high-level diplomacy could be employed. This is remarkably similar to what Pearson is alleged to have “invented.” Clearly, Burns was building on a hodgepodge of existing and unimplemented ideas, but he cut through the “noise” and made it work on two of UNTSO’s “fronts.”

At least for a time: El Auja remained hot in November 1955. Egyptian forces were detected by American intelligence moving into their half of the DMZ. There were concerns that this would escalate into open fighting with Israeli forces: Burns was informed of this while he was away in Ottawa. Passing through London, he met with Anthony Nutting, the British Foreign Minister. During the course of that conversation, Burns discussed the possibility of “injecting UN troops”46 “between the armed forces of the parties,” which would in fact mean a “military intervention by the Great Powers.”47

The realization that it would take massive combat power to actually affect peace between Egypt and Israel is more on par with what the NATO-led IFOR did in Bosnia in 1995 than what the subsequent United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) did in 1957. We will come back to this in due course.

No matter what UNTSO did, it was ultimately powerless to steer the belligerents away from going to war in 1956, just as UNEF would be ultimately powerless to prevent the slide into war in 1967. Simply put, the belligerents wanted to fight; international observation and diplomacy were incapable of convincing them not to fight. The evidence for this resides in a number of areas. First, Egypt under Nasir, chose to dramatically increase the capabilities of its armed forces—in excess of what was needed for
defensive purposes. This decision was taken in response partly to aggressive Israeli military retaliation, which in turn was driven by infiltration, both state-sponsored and non-state sponsored, from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip. UNTSO was in no position to restrict what Egypt chose to arm herself with, nor was UNTSO in a position to coerce the belligerents to stop infiltration on the one hand, and retaliation on the other.
Second, UNTSO lacked the power to force Egypt to cease its restrictions on Israeli transit of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Eilat, a policy which amounted to an economic boycott or outright blockade. The Israelis, and we know this from Dayan’s own Chief of Staff, planning for pre-emptive war with Egypt in 1955, knowingly engaged in escalation in order to provoke Nasir:

Limited acts of violence in reaction to Egyptian provocations could thus furnish the fuse by which wide-scale hostilities could ultimately be ignited, leaving the question of blame for aggression ambiguous. Israel could achieve its goal of an early military confrontation with Egypt without being condemned as an aggressor.48

Though Burns could not have known this, he at least suspected it and this probably was behind his discussion with Nutting.

As the situation deteriorated throughout 1956, Burns had several communications with Hammarskjöld in an attempt to improve UNTSO’s capacity in the region. In the problematic Israel/Syria (ISMAC) area, Canadian Colonel J.E.L. Castonguay asked Burns about the feasibility of establishing a larger group of observers who could “prevent major incidents or to prevent a situation from deteriorating quickly or simply act as a deterrent.” This observer group would consist of “a number of observation posts...located at strategic points on or close to the [ADL or DMZs].”49 Hammarskjöld, concerned about events, asked Burns to consider “strengthening UNTSO, use of military, and increase in observers” but warned him to keep costs low. The Secretary General (SECGEN) hinted that 100 additional UNMOs were within the realm of the possible.50 Replying, Burns hinted to Hammarskjöld that UNTSO’s mandate should be expanded to clarify the “function of the UNTSO in observing and maintaining” the ceasefire.51 These proposals were overridden when Nasir nationalized the Suez Canal.

As with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the complex details surrounding the Suez Crisis of 1956 are best described elsewhere. Essentially, the United Kingdom and France, working covertly with Israel, saw an opportunity to unseat Nasir, who was assisting anti-French forces in Algeria, and who had just conducted a successful campaign to force the British to abandon the Canal Zone. Israeli authorities believed that a campaign in the Sinai would destroy the Egyptian Army and permit them to seize territorial objectives that would break the blockade in the Gulf of Eilat. These operations were mounted in October-November 1956. The Israeli Blitzkrieg across the Sinai essentially bypassed the EIMAC mechanism and the UNTSO observers wound up blockaded in the Gaza Strip and subsequently evacuated by the US Sixth Fleet to destroyers off the coast.

Most accounts on the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force tend to focus on Mike Pearson’s discussion with the UN Secretary General on 2 November where he suggested the of an international force: this conversation was based on a previous discussion between Prime Minister Louis St Laurent and Pearson on 1 November. The force that Pearson was pushing for, however, was not what the UNEF would become, or what Burns was suggesting be deployed back in 1955. Pearson’s force, conceptually, could be either NATO or UN, it would be interposed with consent, in between the Anglo-French landing forces and Egyptian forces; the French and British would leave, and then
the international force would leave. The purpose of the exercise was to get the Soviet Union to back down from nuclear threats made against France and Britain, not to provide the basis of a long-term UN presence or peace between Israel and Egypt. Pearson’s international force concept was not peacekeeping as envisioned by Burns: it was crisis-oriented, temporary and not necessarily UN-dependent.\textsuperscript{52}

It was the Canadian ambassador to the United States, ADP Heeney who, after talking with his American counterparts on 2 November, suggested that UNTSO be expanded to handle the new mission and that Burns should be put in charge of it. This was the conceptual basis for UNEF, if one compares it with the Pearson concept. Only then did the Canadian UN delegation start thinking about something that resembled what UNEF would become.\textsuperscript{53}

Burns, meanwhile, had to deal with Israeli forces overrunning UNTSO. He carried out all the pro-forma verbiage necessary to get the Israelis to the table at the EIMAC, knowing full well it was futile, but diplomatically necessary. Initially it appeared as though it was a large operation to root out fedayeen in Gaza.\textsuperscript{54}

On 4 November, Hammarskjöld contacted Burns and told him that the UN force would be set up to “secure the safety of the Canal, [and] police the withdrawal of the troops to the demarcation lines.” What would Burns need to do that?

I thought that the force should be so strong that it would be in no danger of being thrust aside, pushed out, or ignored, as the [UNMOs] had been in Palestine….I thought such a force, in view of the strength of the armed forces of Israel and Egypt, would have to be about the size of a division, with a brigade of tanks, and attached reconnaissance and fighter aircraft units-the whole organized as an operational force capable of fighting.\textsuperscript{55}

The “initial form of the force should be [based] on [a] US independent regimental combat team.” The force’s units required the “normal regimental weapons [plus] anti-tank artillery.”\textsuperscript{56}

As Burns noted in his memoirs, “I had requested a strong force, containing armour and fighting aircraft, capable of carrying out operations of war. What UNEF turned out to be was something much less potent.”\textsuperscript{57} In a 1958 briefing, Burns explained that only a few countries were eligible to participate in the force for political reasons, and many were unwilling.\textsuperscript{58} UNEF consisted of six infantry battalion equivalents, a recce battalion and a support battalion, totalling about 6000 personnel or the equivalent of two light infantry brigades.\textsuperscript{59} UNEF had no air support, no tanks and only a handful of armoured cars.

In terms of the concept of operations, UNEF monitored the phased Israeli withdrawal across the Sinai (like the NATO-led KFOR would do in Kosovo as the Serbian forces withdrew in 1999); took over relief operations and administrative responsibility for the Gaza Strip (like the armed humanitarian interventions of the early
1990s in Kurdistan and Somalia); and established observation posts and patrols along the ADL at Gaza, and along the International Frontier in the Sinai between Israeli and Egyptian military forces. With the exception of watching the Anglo-French intervention force sail away, these complex roles and missions were neither recognized nor considered by Canadian diplomats in early November 1956: their objectives were to ratchet down a nuclear crisis with the Soviet Union, not to enhance UN peacekeeping in the Middle East. Burns would lead UNEF in all of these capacities, relinquishing command three years later. In 1967, Nasir would order the Canadian UNEF contingent to leave Egypt. Israel would pre-emptively strike Egypt again, despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. Burns said later that “peacekeeping seemed discredited, and there were many voices in Canada calling for abandonment of our efforts in this field.”

What are we to conclude about Tommy Burns’ role in the development of UN peacekeeping in the Middle East? It is evident here that UNTSO was engaged in interposition operations from at least 1954, or two years before UNEF’s deployment. Burns understood the limitations of lightly-armed UN forces and by the end of 1955 came to the conclusion that only a heavily-armed force with coercive power (like IFOR, SFOR or KFOR in the Balkans) supported by the international community could be truly effective in ensuring that hostilities did not break out. He was not pleased that UNEF essentially became a steroid-enhanced version of UNTSO’s EIMAC. Furthermore, Burns understood that he was dealing with two types of conflict: a low-intensity conflict conducted when overt conventional hostilities could not be, and open warfare. UN peacekeeping was only marginally effective at deterring the latter, and only with the
consent of the belligerents; it was fully incapable of dealing with the former, its proponents knowing full well that only the belligerents could police themselves with regards to the infiltration phenomenon. When comparing the efforts of Canadian diplomats and the efforts by Tommy Burns to come to grips with Middle Eastern peacekeeping, it is clear that a forgotten Canadian general has been denied his just due.

About the Author...

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is from Kingston, Ontario and served in Germany as the historian for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army’s contribution to NATO during the Cold War. The author of several works dealing with the modern Canadian Army and peacekeeping history, including the controversial Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, Chances for Peace: The Canadians and UNPROFOR, 1992-1995 plus Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian Visits Afghanistan. Dr. Maloney has extensive field research experience throughout the Balkans, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. He currently teaches in the RMC War Studies Programme, and is a senior research fellow at the Queen’s Centre for International Relations.

Endnotes

3. Parenthetically, a student of mine told me that Burns couldn’t have done anything positive because he wasn’t a “nice guy” and he “pissed everyone off.” This remark echoes similar comments made to me about Burns’ contemporary and boss, Canada’s Cold War supremo, General Charles Foulkes.
5. Ibid., p 88.
6. This quote from Burns’ article “Study of War,” appeared in Current Biography 1955 p. 83.
10. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
11. Ibid., p. 133.
12. Ibid. p. 173.
14. The details of this story must await the writing and publication of Major Doug Delaney’s epic study of Canadian Corps Commanders.
15. Burns, General Mud p. 220.
18. The details are in Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means 1945-1970 (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2002).
22. UN Archives (hereafter UNA) series S-0637 Box 11, file 4, (8 Dec 61) “Brief on UNTSO.”
24. Ilan, Bernadotte p. 77.
25. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping Chapters 2 and 3.
27. Infiltration is discussed in great detail in Morris, Israel’s Border Wars.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ilan, Bernadotte pp. 100-105.
31. UNA series S-0375 box 002 file 3, (6 Aug 48) letter M. Shertok to SRSG.
34. UNA S-0375 box 002 file 4, (22 Sep 54) note to file;
35. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli p. 53.
36. UNA series S-0375 box 002 file 5 (10 Dec 54) letter Dayan to Burns; (3 Jul 54) “Israel-Jordan Situation: Possible Practical Measures for Reducing Frontier Incidents.”
37. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli p. 55
38. UNA series S-0375 box 002 file 5, (9 Aug 56) Notes of Discussion Between General Burns and General Riley.
39. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli pp. 80-81.
40. Ibid., p. 91.
42. UNA series S-0375 box 002 file 5, (4 Apr 56) “Positions of Parties Regarding UNTSO Functions under the Security Council Resolution of 11 August 1949.”
43. UNA series S-0375 box 002 file 5, (29 Jun 55) note to file.
44. UNA series 275 box 6 file 1, (19 Jul 56) Burns to Cordier, “Weekly Summary of Activities of the MACs.”
45. UNA series 275, box 5, file 13, (28 Jun 56) HQ UNTSO, “UNTSO Observation Posts Along the Demarcation Line of the Gaza Strip.”
47. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli p. 98.
49. UNA series 373 box 1 file 4, (9 Feb 56) Castonguay to Burns, “Proposal for Increasing the effectiveness of the Military Observer Group in ISMAC.”
50. UNA series 373 box 1 file 4, (9 Mar 56) message Hammarskjold to Burns.
51. UNA series 373 box 1 file 4, (10 Mar 56) message Burns to Hammarskjold.
52. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping Chapter 4.
53. Ibid.
54. UNA series 164 box 2 file 1, (30 Oct 56) message Burns to Cordier.
55. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli p. 188.
56. UNA series 373, box 11, file 4, (9 Nov 56) message Burns to Hammarskjold.
57. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli p.189.
58. UNA DAG 13 file 311 004 (29 Sep 58) “Story of UNEF Given at Cultural exchange program by Lt. Gen. LM Burns.”
59. NAC RG 25 vol. 6101 file 50366-40 pt 6.2, (28 Feb 57) message DL(1) Division to Middle Eastern Division, “Information Material on UNEF for Use by the Prime Minister at the Forthcoming Bermuda Talks.”
The Battle of Vimy Ridge holds a special place in the collective imagination of Canadians and is usually viewed as an event worthy of being deemed the birth of our nation. The battle itself has been the subject of extensive coverage in historical writing. The success of the Canadian Corps in that battle, however, came partly as a result of Canadian soldiers mastering new tactics for combating the enemy in the weeks and months before April 1917. Such tactics included experience in trench raids by all of the front line infantry battalions of the Canadian Corps, including the 38th “Ottawa” Battalion.

In his memoirs, Undertones of War (1928), British soldier-poet Edmund Blunden wrote: “The word ‘raid’ may be defined as the one in the whole vocabulary of the war which most instantly caused a sinking feeling in the stomach of ordinary mortals.” In February 1915, while the regiment was serving as part of the British Expeditionary Force, members of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry carried out the first trench raid by a Canadian unit. The operational plan was quite simple: the raiders needed to “make a surprise entry into the opposing trenches, inflict as many casualties as possible and return before the enemy could take counter-measures.” As the above citation from Blunden would suggest, the reality was more complicated—and more dangerous—than the theory.

This was particularly true as time went on. By 1916, the objectives of the typical trench raid had expanded to include the seizure of prisoners, the capture of documents, the demolition of defences, as well as the psychological goal to “shake things up” by undermining the “live and let live” atmosphere which had a tendency to develop in a quiet sector of the front. Many trench raids had also expanded dramatically in size, from small groups of men to later examples of several hundred officers and men drawn from several battalions.

In the early months of 1917, in preparation for what would be the victorious Canadian assault on Vimy Ridge in April, units of the Canadian Corps conducted dozens of trench raids along the front line. The raids varied in size and increased in number from early January through the end of March. By the end of that period, raids had become fairly costly enterprises, with 1400 casualties being suffered collectively by raiding parties in the last two weeks of March alone. But, as Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson argued in the war’s official army history, the casualties were “offset to a great extent by the knowledge they gained of the enemy’s strength and weaknesses—a knowledge which enabled the Canadians to take their objectives [on Vimy Ridge] with lighter losses than would otherwise have been possible.”

One of the units of the Canadian Corps involved in the flurry of trench raids that preceded the battle for Vimy Ridge was the 38th “Ottawa” Battalion. Raised in the nation’s capital in early 1915, the 38th Battalion carried out garrison duty in Bermuda until mid-1916 when it sailed to England. There it joined the ranks of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 4th Canadian Division, arriving in France in August 1916 with the rest of the brigade.
After fighting in the closing battle of the Somme campaign (Desire Trench) in November 1916, several weeks of recuperation, training, and movement for the 38th followed. By December, the battalion had moved to the Vimy Ridge area of the front. Rotations in the front line trenches, support positions and the rear began by the end of the year. On 18 February 1917, the 38th Battalion marched forward to replace the 72nd Battalion, another of the infantry battalions of the 12th Brigade, thus returning to the front.
line on the near (western) side of Vimy Ridge. The next few days passed quietly. But that would soon change.5

The 38th Battalion was making final preparations for a large-scale trench raid on the German front line position on top of Vimy Ridge, while the neighbouring 78th Battalion prepared for a simultaneous, yet much smaller, raid on its front. The objectives for the 38th Battalion’s part of the raid were three-fold:

♦ to carry out a reconnaissance of the enemy positions opposite the battalion’s front;
♦ to “kill Bosche and secure prisoners,” and
♦ to “further lower” the enemy’s morale in the area.

A Brief History of the 38th Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force:

Authorized in Ottawa in November 1914, the 38th Battalion was immediately placed on active service and ordered to recruit to full strength and begin training. Popularly known throughout the war as the 38th “Ottawa” Battalion or the “Royal Ottawas,” the battalion drew its strength from several eastern Ontario regiments and from civilian enlistment. Recruitment and training progressed in Ottawa and Barriefield until August 1915 when the 38th left Canada. It sailed, not for Europe, but for Bermuda, where it was sent to carry out garrison duties, a task that lasted until May 1916. The battalion then sailed for England, where it joined the ranks of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division. In August 1916 the 38th deployed to France with the brigade, serving there until the end of the war. As part of the 4th Division, the battalion fought in numerous battles and was later awarded the following battle honours: Somme, 1916; Ancre Heights; Ancre, 1916; Arras, 1917 and 1918; Vimy, 1917; Ypres, 1917; Passchendaele; Amiens; Scarpe, 1918; Drocourt-Quéant; Hindenburg Line; Canal du Nord; Valenciennes; Sambre; and France and Flanders, 1916-18. Members of the 38th Battalion were awarded 299 decorations for bravery during the war, including two Victoria Crosses (to Major Thain Wendell MacDowell at Vimy Ridge and to Private Claude Joseph Patrick Nunney at Drocourt-Quéant), numerous Military Crosses, Distinguished Conduct Medals, Military Medals, Meritorious Service Medals, and Mentioned-in-Despatches, as well as several French, Belgian and Russian decorations. The remaining members of the battalion finally arrived home in June 1919 and the unit was demobilized in Ottawa. Nearly 4,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men passed through its ranks between August 1916 and November 1918. The battalion suffered more than 2,700 casualties (almost 800 were killed in action or died of wounds or disease, and nearly 2,000 were wounded) during the fighting.

The operational plan called for five raiding parties totalling approximately 100 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men to enter the German trenches at dusk, clear those portions of the trenches and remain in place for ten minutes. Canadian firepower support—Stokes trench mortars from the 12th Light Trench Mortar Battery and Vickers machine guns from the 12th Machine Gun Company—was to be used at the start of the raid. The Canadian weapons were to be fired along a line about 100 yards behind the enemy front line for one minute and at either end of the German trenches in “order to keep the enemy in his trenches and prevent him escaping.” The mortars and machine guns were to target the German front line and “a general bombardment along
the entire objective” was to be carried out until the raiding parties reached their objectives. After that, the support fire was to form a “box barrage” to protect the raiders from outside interference.

Little information has survived in archival documentation regarding the specific preparations made by the officers and men of the 38th Battalion for the February 1917 raid. Soldiers assigned to the raid were ordered to remove their identity discs and any other items that might identify them, as well as any papers from their clothing. A series of colours for flares was established as codes in order to signal such information as the start of the raid, the postponement of the raid, cease fire, the raiders have returned, etc. Private Percy Trendell would write in his memoirs many years later just one sentence: “We practised over tapes in a field near the chateau which I always felt was a mistake as the ground bore no resemblance to the terrible mudholes of the ridge.”

At 5.30 p.m. on 22 February, a total of five officers and eighty-five other ranks launched the raid, supported by fourteen Stokes mortars and several Vickers machine guns. The 38th Battalion’s raiding party was divided into five individual sub-parties under the command of Lieutenants Percy Gardner (No. 1 party), David Ketcheson (No. 2), Norman Stott (No. 3), Andrew Duncan (No. 4), and Arthur Jarvis (No. 5). According to Major Gilbert Howland, a recent transfer from the 73rd Battalion, there was no difficulty in getting soldiers for the raiding parties: “...it is remarkable how keen our men are to get

Detailed trench map sketches identifying the artillery fireplan for the operation
at ‘Fritzie’ and all our raiding parties are made up of volunteers and we never lack in the number for our requirements.”

No. 1 party consisted of Lieutenant Percy Gardner and seventeen soldiers. It was ordered to separate into two squads upon entering the main enemy trench. Half of the raiders were to block any German advance down the trench from the north and to protect the rest of Gardner’s men who were to move southward along the trench to meet the battalion’s No. 2 party. The members of No. 1 party were specially designated, tasked, and equipped. Half of the party incorporating the following individuals:

- Bayonetman (equipped with a Lee-Enfield rifle with five rounds in the magazine and bayonet, two Mills bombs—grenades—in his pocket, a flashlight on the rifle, and a bandolier);
- Bayonetman (rifle and bayonet, twenty rounds of small arms ammunition, a bomb- ing apron with nine grenades, and two grenades in his pocket);
- Bomber (haversack with ten grenades and a knobkerrie—a short wooden club with a heavy knob on the end of it);
- Carrier (rifle and bayonet, twenty rounds of small arms ammunition, and ten grenades in a haversack);
- Non-Commissioned Officer (rifle and bandolier, six grenades, and a wire cutter);
- Bomber (haversack with ten grenades and a knobkerrie);
- Carrier (a ten-pound mobile explosive charge and a haversack with ten grenades); and
- Extra (rifle, bandolier, and two grenades)

The other half of the party was formed as the first, with the exception of a second “Extra” soldier to carry “a haversack and a sharp knife on a lanyard.”

No. 1 party began to move forward with Lieutenant Gardner and Lance-Sergeant Edward Howe in the lead, followed by two of the party’s bayonetmen and some bombers. Private Trendell and another soldier followed behind, being “assigned the task of carrying and depositing canisters, about 15 lbs each, into two German dugouts which had been pinpointed from the air.” It was Trendell’s first time “over the top.” He later described the start of the raid: “The barrage opened with a terrific roar, everything seemed flame and fire. Our artillery barely cleared our heads as they had to keep the trajectory low on the German posts barely 100 yds ahead. The noise was indescribable so there was no way of communicating except by waving the arms.”

The raiders moved forward through the Canadian wire, the small group sticking close together and struggling in the mud under the weight of their weapons and ammunition. Despite what the operation order called for, Private Trendell remembered carrying a haversack on his chest containing six Mills bombs, an automatic pistol and a knife hanging from his belt, his rifle (with bayonet attached) in his left hand, and the canister—the mobile explosive charge—in his right “with my fingers gripping the string and button which would activate the ten second fuze.” The friendly artillery fire, which
was churning up the mud and launching much of it into the air ahead of them, had thankfully also cut the German barbed wire in front of the raider’s objective.13

As No.1 party approached the parapet of the German trench, Lance-Sergeant Howe waved the soldiers down. Some of them took refuge in a deep shell hole partly filled with water. Lieutenant Gardner and Howe reportedly entered the German trench at 5.36 p.m., followed by the rest of the party, and were met with “considerable resistance at this point from an enemy party numbering about ten who engaged the Raiders with bombs and rifle fire.” Canadian grenades and small arms fire from the group moving southward—Howe later reported that Gardner shot two Germans with his revolver—killed eight of the enemy and that two other Germans fled to a dugout. That dugout was immediately bombed.14

The time had come to throw the mobile charges into the two dugouts, as planned. Private Trendell, who had already lost his rifle, watched as another soldier dropped his mobile charge into one of the dugouts. Meanwhile, Trendell struggled as his canister kept getting heavier because of “clinging mud.” As the Canadians received the order to return to friendly lines Trendell dumped his canister (he doesn’t say where), it being later reported that both mobile charges had succeeded in destroying deep dugouts, while grenades had taken out a third.15

No. 1 party made its way back to Ersatz communications trench and friendly territory, being greeted by Lieutenant Colin Campbell who was killed soon after by a shell as he checked off the names of the men returning from the raid. It was later estimated that the party had killed fifteen Germans, at a cost of four men “slightly wounded.” One of the wounded was Private William Mollison who, although “hit in the side and suffering considerable pain [had] continued in the fight.” Privates John O’Gorman, William Thompson, and Sylvester Osborne were also wounded. Lieutenant Gardner was also wounded after the raid when the shell that killed Lieutenant Campbell broke Gardner’s arm and knocked him unconscious. As a result, Lance-Sergeant Howe reported on the party’s success to the officer commanding the battalion’s “D” Company.16

The raiding parties led by Lieutenants David Ketcheson and Norman Stott, Nos. 2 and 3 respectively, left the Canadian lines together through the Blue Bull communications trench, going up to the surface, and through a gap in the Canadian wire which had been cut for the raiders. Their orders were straightforward. No. 2 party was to bomb (with grenades) an enemy sap trench and join up with the No. 1 party squad coming down the trench line from the north. To do this, Lieutenant Ketcheson had a raiding party structured much like Lieutenant Gardner’s, with sixteen personnel. He also had a “Thrower”, equipped with a haversack full of grenades. Lieutenant Stott’s No. 3 party was tasked with bombing a nearby German communications trench for a length of about twenty-five yards. His raiding party was a bit different from the others, incorporating two Bayonetmen, three Throwers, six Carriers, one Non-Commissioned
Officer, two “Runners,” and two “Rifle Grenadiers.” The latter soldiers each carried a rifle and bayonet, twelve rifle grenades and a haversack on their chest containing eight hand grenades.17

While attempting to cross no man’s land the two parties “immediately encountered heavy fire” from three enemy machine guns and several rifles, well short of the jump off point at the edge of the German trench for the actual raid. The post-action report later noted: “Our Artillery barrage had apparently not been effective at this point.” To make matters worse, the raiders then encountered a party of twenty-five to thirty German troops in a strong point, in a position directly between where the two Canadian parties were supposed to enter the trench. The two lieutenants tried to lead their men forward, Ketcheson suffering as he had been “shot through the arm, but continued his work.”18

The officers, “finding it impossible to advance further by crawling decided to rush the objective,” No. 2 party on the left and No. 3 on the right. The two groups were approximately forty to forty-five yards from the enemy trench line. Ketcheson, about twenty feet to Stott’s left, called out “there’s nothing to it ‘Stottie[,]’ rush it.” Stott responded by calling back to his men, “rush it boys.”19

Ketcheson was wounded again, this time more severely, and several other casualties were also suffered amongst the two parties, including a fatal wound to Private George Avery and a “blighty” to Private Edwin Davey. Lieutenant Stott later noted that Avery, his “1st Bayonet man,” had immediately responded to Stott’s call for his men to “rush it,” only to be hit and killed by machine gun fire. Private Davey, Stott’s “2nd Bayonet man,” only got a little further before he was struck in the right shoulder by an enemy bullet. Stott later wrote: “The machine gun fire was terrible and it was almost impossible to proceed further, however we got within five yds of the enemy front trench on the right and some 35 yds from the the [sic] sap or shell-hole where I could plainly see three machine guns. The enemy bombs were landing a few feet away, the time of occupation was almost up. It was a most disconcerting time for both of us.”

The Canadians finally began to inflict casualties on the enemy but the time for the raid had indeed expired. Stott and a few of his men had managed to enter the enemy trench described as “almost waist deep in mud and water,” and the two parties had been in the midst of preparing to make another attempt to move forward when the signalling flares were launched. The two parties were forced to fall back to the 38th Battalion’s line, retrieving the wounded as they departed. In total, the two parties suffered casualties of three killed—Privates Avery, Thomas Brown, and Jesse Evenden—and eleven wounded. Like Avery, Private Brown had been the victim of German machine gun fire, and died at the enemy wire. Private Evenden also reached the enemy wire, where a machine gun bullet struck him. He was able to continue throwing grenades until fatally
struck in the head by shrapnel from a German shell. Stott would conclude in his report to Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron Edwards, the 38th’s commanding officer: “I regret very much that we did not reach our objective but unforeseen obstacles arose in our way, which owing to the short time we had, we were not able to overcome. The men acted as soldiers should and their conduct was as such upon which there is no stain.”20

Lieutenant Andrew Duncan’s No. 4 party—consisting of Duncan, two non-commissioned officers, and eighteen men, all drawn from “A” Company and similar in structure to the battalion’s other parties—left the battalion lines through Granby communications trench and crossed no man’s land, friendly 18-pounder shells bursting ahead and around and even among them (Corporal Joseph Lacoste was wounded by a friendly round). This party’s orders called for it to split in two upon entering the enemy trench—the left squad to move northward until meeting No. 3 party, the right squad to work southward until meeting No. 5 party.21

No. 4 party entered the German target trench as a complete unit “without serious opposition” six minutes after leaving the Canadian line. They soon saw five dead Germans, killed by Canadian artillery fire, an example of the opposite level of accuracy afforded nos. 2 and 3 parties in their part of the enemy trench line. The party then split into two squads of nine men each, moving up and down the enemy trench, while Duncan and two others remained in position at the entry point. The right squad quickly killed four Germans and blew up a deep dugout with a mobile explosive charge before getting into a “bombing fight” with a group of the enemy. As the time for the raid ran down, and this squad withdrew, Private Raoul Labelle “performed a splendid act by picking up an enemy bomb which had fallen amongst his party [of five men] and throwing it back at the Huns, where it exploded amongst a group of them.”22

Private Robert Barr, another member of No. 4 party, was also praised for his work during the raid. Despite being wounded at the jumping off point, Barr stayed on as the first bayonet man and “when the order was given by the officer in charge to advance, he led the squad against a greatly superior number of the enemy who were clustered near a dugout.” Private Barr reportedly bayonet the closest German and shot a second as he and the other men in his squad pushed the enemy back. A grenade wounded Barr again just before the order to retire came. Private Wilfred Bancroft helped him back to the Canadian front line. Bancroft was also later reported...
to be “worthy of notice” having, as the second bayonet man in the party, “personally shot two of the enemy at close quarters and bombed a dug out full of Huns” during the raid.23

Meanwhile, the left squad from No. 4 party soon found a German dugout, which it bombed with grenades. The squad continued moving northward, but was stopped about thirty yards further as it was found to be “impossible to proceed any further on account of both enemy and our own artillery fire on the trench.” On the way back to the start point for the raid, a thirty-pound mobile charge was “thrown down the dugout [which they had already bombed] and heard to explode.” Total casualties to Duncan’s party were two men slightly wounded (Lacoste and Barr), while enemy deaths totalled a minimum of nine soldiers.24

No. 5 party, under Lieutenant Arthur Jarvis, consisted of two squads (originally nos. 5 and 6 parties) totalling twenty personnel organized much like the first four parties. One squad was tasked with working northward upon entering the enemy trench to meet up with No. 4 party, while the second squad was ordered to work its way south for seventy-five yards and clear the trench for that distance.25

Jarvis’ raiders left the Canadian front line through International communications trench. While forming up in no man’s land, however, they were driven to ground by friendly Stokes mortar rounds that were falling short of the enemy target and twenty yards or less in front of the Canadian troops. The party then continued forward, moving to within twenty yards of the German front line before the enemy opened up on the Canadians with “heavy rifle fire accompanied by showers of grenades. The party retaliated and forced their way in, immediately killing five out of a party of seven Huns.” During that fighting Lieutenant Jarvis killed two of the enemy with his revolver, while Private Alex Lalonde killed another two when he threw back “an enemy bomb which had fallen amongst the party.” The Canadians then withdrew as the time allotted for the raid ran out, it having been about ten minutes since they left the Canadian line. Casualties to No. 5 party were one killed (Private John Kitchen, one of the party’s bayonet men), one man seriously wounded, and nine others slightly wounded, while they estimated a minimum of nine Germans killed and many others wounded. The seriously wounded soldier, Private Christopher Partridge, died the following day at No. 13 Field Ambulance from wounds received near the enemy barbed wire.26

Going into the 22 February 1917 raid, the 38th Battalion had been tasked with carrying out a reconnaissance of the German positions, killing the enemy, capturing prisoners, and lowering the morale of the Germans opposite the battalion’s front. The results of the raid are difficult to assess. Four of the five parties (all but No. 2 party which never reached the German trench) reported on the state of the enemy positions raided. This included Lieutenant Duncan’s assessment for No. 4 party which noted the bombing of two dugouts, the lack of any mine shafts or sap trenches observed, the lack of German barbed wire in the area, and the comment that the enemy trenches appeared: “Blown to pieces in spots but clean and [with] trench mats in good condition.”27

None of the parties mentioned capturing any prisoners. This is not surprising, given the failure to surprise the enemy and the very violent clashes with German parties and defenders. Results concerning the killing of “Bosche,” on the other hand, were more
positive. Those involved in the raid later reported thirty-three “dead Huns,” at least another forty Germans wounded, and the bombing of six dugout shelters (“three of these [were] known to have been occupied”). The 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s post-raid report noted that the Germans were “thoroughly prepared” for the raid and had equipped their trench with men and machine guns. In addition, the brigade reported that the conditions of no man’s land gave the raiders even more problems:

Parties of [the] 38th Battn. were delayed by the bad state of the ground and were held up, [at] most of the points of entry—consequently when they did fight their way into the enemy’s trench, the time limit was reached and they were forced to retire although in most cases they were just beginning to get the upper hand and were driving the Bosche along his trench—a few more minutes would have resulted in a complete victory for the 38th Battn. and probable capture of the [enemy’s] 3 Machine Guns.28

Incomplete victory or not, the raid led to several bravery decorations being awarded to officers and men of the 38th. Lieutenants Duncan and Ketcheson were each awarded the Military Cross—Duncan for “conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of a raiding party. He gallantly led his men into the entry trench, in spite of heavy fire, and carried out the task allotted to him with conspicuous success”29 and Ketcheson for “conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of a raiding party. Although wounded, he continued in command of his men, and led the assault on the enemy trench in a most determined manner. Later, he was again severely wounded.”30 Regimental Sergeant Major William Marsden was also awarded the Military Cross for his efforts. Even though he was not a member of any of the raiding parties, Marsden was indispensable in the recovery of the wounded men of nos. 2 and 3 parties after their disastrous portion of the raid. The medal citation noted Marsden’s “conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty” and his display of “great courage and determination in rescuing several wounded men and an officer under very heavy fire. He has at all times set a splendid example.”31 Lieutenant Gardner was also recommended for a Military Cross for his leadership of No. 1 party during the raid, but this recommendation was not approved.32
HONOURS AND AWARDS TO THE 38th BATTALION FOR 22 FEBRUARY 1917

Citation for Lieutenant Andrew Duncan’s Military Cross:

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of a raiding party. He gallantly led his men into the enemy trench, in spite of heavy fire, and carried out the task allotted to him with conspicuous success.”

Citation for Lieutenant David Ketcheson’s Military Cross:

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of a raiding party. Although wounded, he continued in command of his men, and led the assault on the enemy trench in a most determined manner. Later, he was again severely wounded.”

Citation for Regimental Sergeant Major William Marsden’s Memorial Cross:

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during a raid on the enemy’s trenches. He displayed great courage and determination in rescuing several wounded men and an officer under very heavy fire. He has at all times set a splendid example.”

Recommendation for a Military Cross for Lieutenant Percy Gardner (not awarded):

“This Officer displayed splendid courage and leadership while in command of No.2 Party during [the] raid on enemy trenches Feb 22/17.”

Citation for Private Alex Lalonde’s Distinguished Conduct Medal:

“For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during a raid on the enemy’s trenches. He picked up an enemy grenade which fell amongst his party and immediately threw it back at the enemy, where it exploded, killing two of them. Later, he carried a wounded comrade back to our lines.”

Recommendation for Military Medals for Privates Raoul Labelle, Bertram McRae, William Mollison and William Paterson:

“For conspicuous work during the raid carried out by this Battn on the enemy trenches Feb 22/17.”

Recommendation for Military Medals for Sergeant Edward Howe and Privates Wilfred Bancroft, Robert Barr, David Jodoin, John McNulty and Leonard Morris (not awarded):

“For conspicuous work during the raid carried out by this Battn. on the enemy trenches Feb 22/17.”
Private Lalonde, from No. 5 party, was also decorated for his heroism, in his case, with the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The citation reads: “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during a raid on the enemy’s trenches. He picked up an enemy grenade, which fell amongst his party and immediately threw it back at the enemy, where it exploded, killing two of them. Later, he carried a wounded comrade back to our lines.”33 Four members of the battalion—Privates Raoul Labelle, Bertram McRae, William Mollison, and William Paterson—were each awarded the Military Medal for their “conspicuous work during the raid carried out by this Battn on the enemy trenches Feb 22/17.” Another six soldiers—Sergeant Edward Howe and Privates Wilfred Bancroft, Robert Barr, David Jodoin, John McNulty, and Leonard Morris—were recommended for the same award but were not decorated.34

The cost of the raid to the 38th was, in comparison to that of the enemy, light. Six officers and men were killed (including Lieutenant Campbell back at battalion lines) and twenty-nine were wounded, all of the latter being brought back to the Canadian position.35 The same could not be said, unfortunately, for all of the dead. Lieutenant Campbell and Private Partridge were fortunate enough to be buried in cemeteries behind the Canadian front. The bodies of Privates Avery, Brown, Evenden and Kitchen, however, were not recovered as the raid ended, all four men being struck down near the German lines. Patrols were later sent out by the battalion to recover the bodies, but they could not be found and presumably had been already removed by the enemy and buried elsewhere. To this day, the names of these four “ordinary mortals,” as Blunden would have called them, victims of the necessary but tragic tactic of trench raiding, are listed on the Vimy Memorial in France, reminders that among the more than 11,000 Canadian soldiers with no known graves listed there, these four men died in preparation for the battle in April 1917.36

About the Author

Dr. Ken Reynolds is the Assistant Heritage Officer for the Canadian Forces with the Heritage Section, Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa. He received his BA in history from Trent University and MA and Ph.D. in history from McGill University. After graduating he undertook various research and writing contracts for the Department of National Defence, other government departments, and non-governmental organizations before assuming his current position. He is also the volunteer curator of the regimental museum of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa and their current regimental historian. The latter duties have led to his writing an up-to-date regimental history (hopefully published soon) as well as work on a book-length history of the 38th Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force (the 38th is perpetuated by the Camerons).

Endnotes

Operation Order No. 50.


8. WD 38th Battalion, 18-22 February 1917; “Report on Raid Carried Out by 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 22nd February 1917”.


10. Operation Order No. 50.


17. Operation Order No. 50.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


30. Riddle and Mitchell, 170.

31. Riddle and Mitchell, 207.

32. CWM, 19680229-001, Manu 58C 1.2.18, “Honours and Awards 38th Bn (Records of recommendations for honours and awards mentioned in dispatches 19161121 19190117)”.


34. CWM, 19680229-001, Manu 58C 1.2.18, “Honours and Awards 38th Bn (Records of recommendations for honours and awards mentioned in dispatches 19161121 19190117)”.

35. WD 38th Battalion, 22 February 1917; “Report on Raid Carried Out by 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 22nd February 1917”; WD 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, February 1917, Appendix, Intelligence Summary No. 56, 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 23-2-17; “Casualties List”.

36. “Casualties List”.

40. CWM, 19680229-001, Manu 58C 1.2.18, “Honours and Awards 38th Bn (Records of recommendations for honours and awards and mentioned in dispatches 19161121 19190117)
42. CWM, 19680229-001, Manu 58C 1.2.18, “Honours and Awards 38th Bn (Records of recommendations for honours and awards and mentioned in dispatches 19161121 19190117)
43. CWM, 19680229-001, Manu 58C 1.2.18, “Honours and Awards 38th Bn (Records of recommendations for honours and awards and mentioned in dispatches 19161121 19190117)
NOTE TO FILE—ON “NON-TRINITARIAN” CONFLICT

Mr. Vincent J. Curtis

Books that bear titles like *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz* are often written by authors who will make you read to the end of the book to deliver the punch line to the joke; or they really don't know what they are talking about. While the book with that title is entertaining to read, the title is not an inside joke. And it didn't take long for author Martin van Creveld to get a comeuppance.

The book was written in 1990, and even before it hit the presses, Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that the grand, old Napoleonic smash 'em up still held sway, contrary to van Creveld’s thesis. Since then, we've seen Gulf War II, and the conquest of Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, both of which looked suspiciously Napoleonic in character. As this is being written, the battle between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon also features a great deal of noise and smoke.

Nevertheless, this writer finally did read the book in preparation for a forthcoming paper on the Three Block War. Both Martin van Creveld and William S. Lind are forecasting the demise of the state, and as Three Block wars tend to occur in states that are suffering demise, this writer thought it would be prudent to read what these two famous military theoreticians had to say on the subject.

The thesis and the argument of van Creveld's book are as bad as the grandiosity of the title suggests. Much as this writer hates to hit a guy when he's down, it is useful to review the thesis and the arguments made in support of “Non- Trinitarian” war and the “transformation of war” because they illustrate the kinds of errors that some modern military theoreticians are prone to make.

The term “Trinitarian” is said to refer to a doctrine that Clausewitz held about war. It is alleged, and not by van Creveld alone, that Clausewitzian war has three vital elements: the people, the army, and the government. It is van Creveld's purpose: to overthrow the Trinitarian doctrine; to show that war does not require the Clausewitzian trinity; and because of the emergence of low-intensity conflict that wars of the future will be “non-Trinitarian.” That change from Trinitarian to non-Trinitarian is the transformation of war that van Creveld refers to.

Except that Clausewitz held no such doctrine. This is what Clausewitz actually wrote in Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 28, entitled: “The Consequences for Theory.”

*War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity....of the play of chance and probability....of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.*
The paradoxical trinity of war plainly are: primordial violence, chance, and being an instrument of policy. The reason why Clausewitz calls them paradoxical is that primordial violence is irrational; that, as an instrument of policy, the use of war is rational; and that chance is partly subject to rationality but is also irrational. The theoreticians make their mistake by getting hung up on the subsequent paragraph that Clausewitz wrote:

*The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.*

The sentence declares whom the elements of the paradoxical trinity ought mainly to concern; it does not say that those who ought to be concerned are the paradoxical trinity. This is a fatal error to the argument. The error is the substitution of three things accidentally related to the crucial three properties for the three properties themselves.

Somehow this fatal misattribution has received wide currency in military literature. It is upon this misattribution that van Creveld bases much of this book. Right about now, based upon the following logic, the mathematician would append his Q.E.D. (*quod erat demonstrandum*), having destroyed the central premise of the book briefly and with elegance, and move on to another to another problem.

Clausewitz wrote that the paradoxical trinity consisted of elements A, B, C. Van Creveld, by a mistaken impression, or by sleight of hand, wrote that the Clausewitzian trinity consisted of elements X, Y, Z. If the relationship between A, B, C and X, Y, Z were of necessity, then indeed by showing that the relationship between war and X, Y, Z did not always obtain, it would mean that the relationship between war and A, B, and C would not always obtain. War indeed could be non-Trinitarian in the sense that Clausewitz mistakenly thought that it should be.

But the relationship between A, B, C and X, Y, Z is declared by Clausewitz to be by accident, a happenstance of the structure of the modern state and the way it organized for war at the time he wrote. If the relationship between war and A, B, C is of necessity, and that between A, B, C and X, Y, Z obtains by accident, then the relationship between war and X, Y, Z obtains by accident and therefore cases can be found in which a relationship between war and X, Y, Z does not obtain. That such cases can be found is the pith of van Creveld’s argument for non-Trinitarianism.

Because he fails to secure the premise that a relationship between A, B, C and X, Y, Z occurs by necessity, his argument about war and X, Y, Z is futile. He would have better off trying to prove his point using propositions A, B, C in the first place.

The relationship between A, B, C and X, Y, Z is strong, however; and that is one reason why van Creveld has such difficulty establishing that war is non-Trinitarian in the sense of not possessing properties X, Y, Z.

Despite the fact that the central thesis of van Creveld’s book is destroyed by the mistake demonstrated above, it is useful to pursue further the errors in reasoning contained in van Creveld’s book, because they are symptomatic and representative of other prominent military writers today.

Elsewhere this writer has said that it is the job of the theoretician to establish definitions and to draw distinctions. One of the most important concepts in van Creveld's book is war. Yet this fundamental conception—war—van Creveld never bothers to define. So broad is his conception of what constitutes war that at one point he refers to the level of crime in the United States as a kind of war (p. 61). To bring order
to this intellectual chaos, consider as a working definition of war the following: “organized violence aimed at a political end.” This definition contains explicitly two of the three elements of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity: violence and subordination to policy. The third element, chance, is contained in the facts related to the acts of violence.

As defined, war is a species of the genus 'organized violence,' and it is distinguished from all other species of the genus ‘organized violence’ by the fact that war is that form of organized violence aimed at a political end. Now, a species is populated by individuals all of whom share the properties of the species, and some individuals of the species exemplify to an extraordinary degree the qualities of the species. Aristotle said, if you are going to show an example of the species horse, you are going to show a good horse. Some individual wars exemplify the qualities of the species ‘war’ better than others. Some individuals exhibit the qualities of their species poorly, yet still must be classified as members of that species.

For example, Plato was fond of defining man as a “featherless biped.” The only other kinds of bipeds on earth are birds, and so by calling man a featherless biped, Plato clearly and sharply differentiated man from all other kinds of animal on earth. Now, man by nature is a biped, but there are individuals who by accident have only one leg. Losing a leg or being born without a leg does not mean that that individual ceases to be human. It merely means that that individual does not exemplify to an extraordinary degree the qualities of the featherless biped.

Van Creveld offers up cripples in his effort to overthrow what he says is Clausewitz’s Trinitarian doctrine. He reaches into the middle ages, before the modern state came to be, offering up the mercenary armies of the 16th century, those of ancient Greece, and to pre-Columbus America to show that the trinity of “people, the army, and the state” did not obtain in the wars fought then. These primitive wars are held by van Creveld to overthrow the Clausewitzian trinity, and furthermore provide a basis for non-Trinitarian war in the future, those he calls low-intensity conflict. Low-intensity conflict is important to van Creveld because not only is it to be the way of the future, but that it will lead to the dissolution of the state.

Van Creveld is mistaken in thinking he has overthrown any kind of trinity, the true Clausewitzian or his own, because he fails to understand the difference between the existential and the analytical. Let us grant for the sake of argument that the trinity is “the people, the commander, and the government.” and let us consider the specific cases of Frederick the Great and Napoleon and the wars they fought. Both Frederick and Napoleon were simultaneously the commanders and the executive heads of government of their states and were able to make war, conduct diplomacy, and conclude treaties without reference to anyone else in the state. The commanders and the governments of Prussia and France are existentially inseparable in the cases of Frederick and Napoleon, as I am certain Clausewitz was aware. This situation is as muddled in respect of the trinity as van Creveld can hope for. There are only two legs of the trinity extant in these examples. And the wars fought by Frederick and Napoleon exemplify to an extraordinary degree the qualities of the species war.

Yet we can still think of Frederick as commander and Frederick as the executive king, and likewise Napoleon as commander and emperor. Their respective functions as the commanders of their armies and as the executive heads of governments of Prussia and France are analytically distinct even if the commander of the army and the head of government are existentially inseparable, being one and the same person. The wars of Frederick and of Napoleon were the primary material from which Clausewitz drew his
theory, and because he understood the analytical distinction between commander and government Clausewitz was able to keep separate in his mind the association of chance with commander and of policy with government. In primitive societies and primitive wars, the clear and sharp distinction that can be made nowadays among people, commander, and government may not obtain, but an intelligent application of the controlling insights of the theory will reveal the elements to which Clausewitz refers.

The title of van Creveld's book is the *Transformation of War*. His purpose is two-fold: to overthrow Clausewitz's theory which he says is founded upon the Trinitarian concept, substituting a new theory, which shows that non-Trinitarian war is the way of the future; and to say that low intensity conflict will see the disappearance of the state as a political entity. Not having defined war, and not understanding the philosophical implications of transformation, van Creveld gets lost in a forest of entertaining, pessimistic prolixity.

Let us discuss here the problem of transformation. When he presents his collection of one-legged men, van Creveld never makes it clear whether he means that this group of cripples constitutes the disproof that species ‘featherless biped’ has by nature two legs, or whether the group represents a different species entirely, a species having by nature fewer than two legs. Van Creveld appears to want it both ways, and thus he uses the word “transformation.” War is going to transform from a three-legged to a two-legged variety, he forecasts.

The problem van Creveld makes for himself is that species don't transform into something else, and neither do individual members of a species. An individual born a monkey does not grow up to be a man. And a species may come to be and go extinct, but a species is what it is. If a species goes extinct and something else rises in its place, then that something else is something else, not a member of the thing that went extinct and was replaced. Thus, a transformation of the kind van Creveld has in mind is impossible. If war is by nature Trinitarian, then the extinction of Trinitarian conflict means that war is extinct, and that new thing that rises in its place is something else, something we cannot call war.

Van Creveld writes of wars undertaken for reasons of justice and religion and even lust. But this is sloppy reasoning, even tendentious reasoning. If war is organized violence aimed at a political end, then other members of the genus parallel to war must be organized violence aimed at obtaining justice, aimed at imposing a religion, and aimed at gratifying lust, where it must be stipulated that obtaining justice, imposing a religion, and gratifying lust contain no element of politics at all. Van Creveld needs to give names other than war to these other species of the genus ‘organized violence’ that are parallel to war in the genus ‘organized violence’. His use of the word ‘war’ to cover all species of the genus ‘organized violence’ is worse than, but akin to, our use of the word ‘man’ to cover the species *homo habilis, homo erectus, homo sapiens neanderthalis*, and *homo sapiens sapiens*, which are the four known members of the genus *homo*. ‘Man’ names the genus *homo*. It is forgivably broad to use the appellation ‘man’ when referring only to the species *homo sapiens sapiens* because all the species of the genus *homo* except *homo sapiens sapiens* are presently extinct; but in a proper discussion of the different qualities of the four species mentioned, it makes no sense to use the word ‘man’ indiscriminately when one means one species of the genus *homo* and not any of the others. If Van Creveld wants to say that species war with its Trinitarian character is going extinct and another species of organized violence with a non-Trinitarian character is going to rise and replace it, he ought to give the new species a
new name, something other than war; otherwise he simply sows confusion. He means something else, and he should call it something else. (The words crusade and predation come to mind, but even these acts bear political consequences.)

Could van Creveld save the structure of his reasoning if war was deemed to be a genus in which Trinitarian and non-Trinitarian were two species? He cannot. We defined war as organized violence aimed at a political end. Any sub-species of this would have to append further differentia: the sub-species would have to have aim at a political end and have further qualifying criteria. (For example, the reference above to ‘Napoleonic war.’ The differentia ‘Napoleonic’ refers to wars that are large in scale, prolonged, and high in casualties. Clausewitz believed that Napoleonic kinds of war exemplified to an extraordinary degree the qualities of war.)

Van Creveld argues that war need not be aimed at a political end. This would preclude a non-Trinitarian species from belonging to the genus war, which is organized violence aimed at a political end. The genus to which van Creveld refers and needs to employ is ‘organized violence’, and war is one species of that genus.

Other factors which lead van Creveld away from a proper handling of Clausewitz are: his habit of thinking in terms of philosophical systems, his philosophical pessimism, and his innocence of political philosophy. Van Creveld refers to “Clausewitzian thought” and the “Clausewitzian universe” as in this passage from p. 155: “Ordinary Clausewitzian thought is incapable of coming to grips with what in some ways is the most important form of war, namely, one whose purpose is existence.”

The folly of philosophical system-building is that the schools of philosophy merely name their errors. Clausewitz himself was no system builder, and he ridiculed those in his day who were, specifically von Bulow, and also to some extent Jomini. Van Creveld tries to cast Clausewitz's thinking into a kind of system, and hence employs expression such as the Clausewitzian universe, Clausewitzian thought, and Trinitarian doctrine—expressions that are characteristic of philosophical systems. Philosophical systems begin by dogmatically laying down supposedly irrefutable premises in imitation of mathematical physics and Euclidean geometry, and are supposed to be more intellectually impressive thereby. His false belief that Clausewitz's work constitutes a system is why van Creveld tries to undermine the Trinitarian principle, for systems can only be accepted or rejected wholesale, and if one of the pillars can be knocked down then the whole edifice of thought collapses. But Clausewitz offers no system. He sifts evidence for nuggets of truth and he has so many caveats to the rules he discovered that many readers despair of finding a consistent picture within the body of his work.

The passage quoted above reveals van Creveld's innocence of political philosophy. The very existence of a society is one of the bedrock principles of its policy, just as the continuance of our own lives constitutes a bedrock principle of what we do with our lives. Van Creveld offers as proof that wars are not undertaken for political ends an example that shows that wars are undertaken for the most profound and basic of the political ends of society: its existence, its independence, and the freedom of its people. Van Creveld's philosophical pessimism leads him to believe that a political end is constituted as the seizure of a province or the creation of an empire, and are based upon a cost-benefit analysis (p. 155). Somehow, that “people will be driven to defend their ideals and way of life.” (p. 214) and “troops who do not believe their cause to be good will end up by refusing to fight.” (p. 176) are statements that fail to impress van Creveld with their overwhelming political nature, so innocent is he of political philosophy.

Other examples of a fundamental pessimism are betrayed in his reference to the weapons industry supporting itself through exporting its own uselessness (p. 210), in the
passage “as states collapse, leaders and warmaking organizations will merge into each other” (p 216), his belief that wars will be fought in the future because we like it for its thrills (p. 218)(cf. pp. 161-171), and his belief that war is an activity, not a means to an end, as he says “it is not necessary to postulate the existence of any ulterior objectives other than war itself.” (p. 220). His whole theory that states as we know them will collapse in a welter of low-intensity conflict is an expression of a pessimism worthy of Ludendorff, whose 1936 work van Creveld is not in basic disagreement with.

Van Creveld's work demonstrates his wide knowledge of the history of war. His pessimism renders his prolixity entertaining, even if it lacks the rigor necessary to establish the truth of his propositions. His basic theses are offered as expressions of pessimism and without proof. His prediction of the rise of low-intensity conflict and of religious-based conflict were not predictions at all, for when the book was written (in 1990) radical Islam was already prevalent in the Middle East, Hezbollah had been eight years established in Lebanon, and Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon was then eight years old and destined to last for a further ten years. His belief in the effectiveness of low-intensity conflict is being disproved even now as the battle between Hezbollah and Israel is taking on mid-intensity proportions in order that some decision in the conflict be reached. His description of the “Clausewitzian Trinity” is fatally wrong.

Finally, his belief that the state will dissolve will be demonstrated to be absurd in a forthcoming paper on the Three Block War.

Endnotes
It is perhaps appropriate that titles concerned with actions in the Seven Years’ War are reviewed at this time, now being the 250th anniversary of the official start of the conflict. This war is as important as it is forgotten (especially in Europe), marking as it does the advent of the original “First World War,” where conflict raged from the frozen wastes of Canada to the steaming heat of the Indian sub continent, and many places in between. As Thackeray famously remarked in his eponymous novel Barry Lyndon, it would take a theologian, rather than an historian, to discern the true causes of the war in Europe. However, one does not need ecclesiastical training to understand that the central theme of this multi continental conflict was the struggle for global dominance between Britain and France.

The war, initially, did not go well for Britain, but under the leadership of Pitt the Elder, a unified policy of destroying the French colonial possessions was persevered with, despite reverses, using whatever resources were required to achieve the aim. This approach was in sharp contrast to that of the French who, despite having invested vast sums in the construction of fortresses such as Louisbourg, did not supply enough military resources to the North American theatre of operations to thwart the British master plan. As the French minister of war allegedly remarked to Colonel de Bougainville, Montcalm’s
brilliant aide-de-camp (ADC), who had come to plead for more reinforcements: “you do
not save the stables when the house is on fire.” It was partly this attitude which led to the
situation in 1759, the “Year of Victories,” where Britain triumphed in India, The West
Indies, Germany, Canada and achieved absolute mastery of the seas. It was the final
outcome of this war, which set in train a series of events that has lead to the world being
much as we see it today.

The Osprey Campaign histories are an attractive series, well known to serious
military history buffs and casual interest readers alike. These Campaign series titles are
relatively small books, both being 96 pages. However they are well illustrated, with
supporting maps, prints, photos, and artists’ impressions, many being full colour
illustrations. Of particular use is the inclusion of “bird’s-eye” view tactical maps, which
show various unit’s actions in relation to the ground against an outlined chronology. The
end result is normally an easy read, supported by high quality illustrations. There is a
“comfort zone” effect, in that the regular reader knows what to expect and knows that
they will be broadly satisfied with the final product.

Both books were written by René Chartrand, who was born in Montreal. He was a
senior curator with Canada’s National Historic Sites for nearly three decades and is now
a freelance writer and historical consultant. He has written numerous articles and books,
including nearly 20 Osprey titles and the first two volumes of ‘Canadian Military
Heritage.’ Similarly, both titles are illustrated by Patrice Courcelle, who was born in
France and has been a professional illustrator for some 20 years. He has illustrated
many books and magazine articles for Continental publishers, and his dramatic and lucid
style has won him acclaim in the field of military illustration.

Not surprisingly, both books are structured along the same lines with sections on the
origins of the campaign, the rival plans, the commanders, and the opposing armies. The
majority of the text is devoted to the detailed descriptions of the battle/siege. The books
are concluded with sections on the “Aftermath,” the battlefield today, chronology and the
final section being a short bibliography and suggestions for further reading. As stated
earlier, these are small books, which really do not have the capacity to go into much
death in the peripheral areas, concentrating as they do on the main battle story. This
does mean that the introductory sections on the background to the campaign will appear
a little thin, and whilst detailing the strategic importance of Louisbourg and Ticonderoga
respectively, there is very little room for discussion of the wider war. Whilst each of these
books are designed to stand alone, if they are read in conjunction with other titles from
the Osprey Essential Histories, the broader perspective will be obtained.

Again the section on the opposing commanders is somewhat limited, with each
significant persona having a short description and picture where available. Whilst this
approach is understandable, given the overall size and structure of the volumes, the
effects of the leadership (or lack of it) by the commanders in these campaigns is
significant. At Ticonderoga the British commander, Abercromby, whilst being an effective
organiser seems to have devolved the tactical handling of events to his second in
command, Lord Howe, who was unfortunately killed in a skirmish prior to the main
attack. Abercromby seems to have gone to pieces at this loss and the result was a
poorly coordinated frontal attack, with no artillery support, which resulted in inevitable,
bloody failure. By contrast the British before Louisbourg had a commander, Amherst,
who was an effective communicator who understood the process of delegation and
identified the best qualities in his subordinates and used them accordingly. The result in
this case was a successful combined operation with the Royal Navy, which landed
Wolfe’s brigade to begin the siege operation, culminating in success nearly two months
later. Wolfe’s reputation was so enhanced by this operation that he was selected to
conduct the subsequent campaign against Quebec (Wolfe’s eccentricity caused King

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George II to remark: “Mad is he? Then I hope he will bite some other of my generals”). The French commanders are dealt with in the same format. Montcalm at Ticonderoga displayed the battlefield awareness and flair that his opponent lacked, however he was to be constrained overall by differing opinions with the Governor-General, de Vaudreuil. That these two did not share the same strategic vision, unlike the British high command, was to have major ramifications on the war in North America.

The section that describes the opposing armies gives a reasonable overview of the types of forces at the commander’s disposal. What becomes immediately apparent, apart from the British numerical superiority in both cases, is the differing make up of the two British forces. The army moving against Ticonderoga was approximately one-third regular British troops, with two-thirds American provincial troops, whilst the British before Louisbourg were almost exclusively regular. Whether this is a significant issue is difficult to tell, as the section does not go into great detail as to relative training standards/effectiveness between regular forces and the provincials. However the difficulties of command and control in such situations should not be underestimated, a factor which may have exacerbated Abercromby’s situation, but would not have been an issue to Amherst. The final part shows the respective Orders of Battle, which are very succinct and useful tables. Of note in the Louisbourg list is the significant contribution of the Royal Navy to the progress of the siege as it is, at times, easy to forget that Britain’s strategic position was underpinned by who controlled the sea.

As mentioned earlier, the bulk of these books describe the run up to the battle and the actions themselves (in both cases nearly half the page count). The books differ somewhat in style as the Ticonderoga narrative is broken down into discrete descriptions of phases of the battle, whereas the Louisbourg account is in the form of a “siege diary,” where the events are listed on a day by day basis. Whilst both approaches have their merits, and both volumes contain a wealth of information, I personally found the Louisbourg diary rather heavy going and not an easy, flowing read like the Ticonderoga account. A siege of an established fortress tended to be a methodical, ponderous affair with the progress of the siege following an almost set formula to its conclusion. I wonder if the author, by adopting the diary approach, was trying to convey the ruthless, almost inevitable, progress of the British siege? What is readily apparent was that the commander Amherst knew his trade and was able to convey his intentions clearly to his subordinates and get the best performance from them. Also, he had a good working relationship with the senior naval commander, Vice Admiral Boscawen, which was vital to the success of this venture, it being very much a combined operation.

The Ticonderoga narrative gives a clear, logical account of the action. What becomes obvious is the contrast between the two commanders, with Abercromby seemingly unable to influence the course of the battle, which degenerated into a series of uncoordinated frontal assaults against an entrenched French army, ably commanded by the charismatic Montcalm. These frontal attacks, with no apparent regard for a feint or flanking approach, culminated with the famous assault by The Black Watch Regiment, through the abbatis, which was as courageous as it was futile. That there was little or no coordination in the attacks begs more questions of the British command. Why the artillery, which was moved to the battle site at such great effort, was not effectively employed is a further evidence of command failure. Had some of the guns been placed on the high ground to the south (Rattlesnake mountain), then the fort would have been untenable, a situation which was indeed obvious to Montcalm.

The final parts deal with the aftermath of these actions. The British force retreated from Ticonderoga, but was not followed up by Moncalm’s army. This omission, whilst for understandable reasons, further soured the relations between Montcalm and de Vaudreuil, and Montcalm did not use the victory to bind his army together, being
somewhat scant in praise for his Canadian colonial troops. Abercromby appeared to shoulder the burden of defeat, but significant blame was placed on the advice given by the chief engineer, who was rather conveniently killed in the battle. Despite Ticonderoga being a French victory in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds, its overall effect did not derail the British strategy. The British resolved to come back the next year, with an equally large force, this time commanded by Amherst. It is interesting to note that he, in 1759, did not make the same mistake.

Whilst the outcome at Ticonderoga was a setback for the British, the same could not be said for the French after the fall of Louisbourg. By reducing the fortress, this then allowed the British army free access to New Brunswick, the Gaspé Peninsula and the Gulf of the St Lawrence was now under control of the Royal Navy. This set the scene for the following year’s campaign against Quebec and, now with no real prospect of relief, the destruction of the remaining French forces was only a matter of time.

Overall, these are two good volumes, which would be a useful addition to any collection on that period, providing the reader with a large breadth of information in a very digestible format. The colour maps and illustrations are very clear and enhance the text. If I have one minor criticism, it is in the choice of some photographs and the space that they occupy in these little books. In the Ticonderoga book there are four photographs (two in colour and two in black and white) each taking up about half a page, of the existing French entrenchments. Given that space is at such a premium, possibly one of each would have been enough to make the point. Again, in the Louisbourg book there are some photographs that are broadly similar and so the previous comment applies. I would have also liked to see a detailed plan of the Louisbourg fortifications rather than the two photographs of the model of the fortress from different angles. However, these are minor points that should not detract from the overall effect that these are useful primers into the subject, which nicely encourages the student to delve further into what is a particularly fascinating period of North American and, indeed, world history.

Endnotes
1. Frank McLynn. 1759 The year Britain became master of the world. BCA 2004. p. 422.

SNOW PLOUGH AND THE JUPITER DECEPTION. THE STORY OF THE 1st SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE AND THE 1st CANADIAN SPECIAL SERVICE BATTALION, 1942-1945

By Kenneth Joyce, St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2006. 320 pages. 300 black and white photos, maps. $49.95

Reviewed by Colonel Bernd Horn

The First Special Service Force (FSSF) is a popular subject. It has been the target of numerous books, articles, documentaries and even a Hollywood epic. But then, why shouldn’t it be? As a unit it was truly an anomaly—it was the first and only actual joint U.S./Canadian unit. Americans and Canadians served shoulder to shoulder, mixed together throughout the formation and wore the same uniform. Moreover, the FSSF’s origins began in Britain in the early stages of the war, when the Allies were reeling under a seemingly unstoppable German onslaught. Largely on the defensive, the Allies were looking for means to strike back at the Germans and the shadowy world of special operations appeared to be one of the most practical means of achieving this. In addition,
legendary figures such as Winston Churchill, Lord Mountbatten, Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, as well as an eccentric scientist, Geoffrey Pyke, all were involved in its conception. Finally, the FSSF created its own mythology due to its larger than life characters, exploits on the battlefield and unsurpassed combat record. As such, it is not surprising that yet another volume has been written on this fabled unit.

As such, the recent volume is a worthy addition. The author, Kenneth Joyce, a museum technologist and amateur historian, spent the last ten years researching and writing this opus. At first glance, the book immediately captures the reader’s attention. It is a well-designed and put-together tome with an attractive and eye-catching dust jacket. A cursory look through the book also reveals a wealth of pictures, many never-before published. The author clearly spent a considerable amount of time culling photographs from official archival repositories, but significantly, he also pulled many from private collections, which allows the reader to gain a more personal and less staged perspective of the Force. Similarly, the maps provided are large, detailed and clear. They easily allow the reader to follow events related in the text and add to the understanding of the significance of the FSSF’s achievements.

Equally impressive is the author’s research. The endnotes are almost exclusively based on primary sources from such institutions as the Library Archives Canada, the Directorate of History and Heritage, the National Archives in England, and the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. The latter is significant since it houses the papers of the FSSF commander Colonel, later Major-General, Robert Frederick and the Force’s intelligence officer, Major Robert Burhans. As such, the author’s in-depth research provides a wealth of detail throughout the book. Importantly, he fills in many gaps, particularly in regards to the Canadian participation (e.g. clarity on the training, reinforcement issues and frictions within the joint formation).

Notwithstanding the impeccable credentials of the sources, the detailed information and research is not always woven well into a seamless story. The first part of the book is jumpy and at times overly superficial. The author tries to address the myriad complex issues, themes and plans that characterize the early part of the war as the Allies struggled to strike back at the Germans and develop a strategy that all three major powers (i.e. British, Russian and American) could agree upon. The multitude of plans, operations, schemes and objectives are not addressed in sufficient detail or with adequate linkage. As a result, any reader without a working knowledge of some of the early events and issues of the war may find it difficult to follow.

In addition, Joyce has placed an enormous amount of emphasis on the FSSF and its ongoing linkage to Norway. Clearly, the dynamism of history is arguably rooted in differences of interpretation. This is what makes the discipline provocative and spirited. The study of documentary evidence is key as it provides a written record of decisions, plans and ideas. But equally important is intent, the nuance of power struggle, alliance politics and personalities, such as that of Winston Churchill—the politician, warlord, adventurer, soldier and writer. Churchill held an almost abstract fascination with the offensive and loved daring schemes. However, in the words of one of his top generals, Churchill was like a child with matches, and one had to take great care that he did not burn his fingers. As such, his generals at times obstructed, or at least tried to ignore,
those initiatives they felt were counter to the efficient prosecution of the war. All this to say that it is important to bleed all of these factors into the analysis to determine what is ground truth. Often a simple statement in the documentary record does not accurately reflect the state of affairs. Clearly, this would impact the interpretation of events. As such, most would argue that the FSSF’s cancelled role in Norway early on in its creation ended consideration of its employment in that theatre. The exiled Norwegian government’s rejection of any type of guerrilla warfare on its soil due to fear of German reprisals on the Norwegian population, ongoing Special Operations Executive (SOE) and commando operations against key installations in that country, and the growing Allied momentum in the war on numerous fronts, negated further consideration of the FSSF’s employment. Furthermore, once the initial mission was cancelled and the FSSF became rooted in the American order of battle, the British held little influence on its employment.

This criticism aside, the author really hits his stride once he begins to recount the operational history of the FSSF. His description of the struggle at La Difensa, is one of, if not the best, narration of that epic battle. Joyce weaves excerpts from the war diary, official reports and veteran interviews into a fast moving and very vibrant description of the Regiment’s most famous victory. His depiction of the tenacious and legendary defensive battle at Anzio is similarly illuminating. In both cases he provides details and frank insight not found elsewhere. The subsequent chapters follow in a similar style and in sum, provide an excellent account of the FSSF at war.

In all, the book is a very valuable addition to the body of literature on the FSSF and Canadian special operations forces. It is a definite must buy for history and military buffs, as well as those interested in the study of war. It is also strongly recommended for the military member as it provides excellent perspectives on command and leadership, particularly in battle.

NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Reviewed by Mr. Benjamin Zyla

Continuation of History?  Nation Building 101

This book is the latest of Fukuyama’s critique of the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. Yet, the focus of this book is not so much on foreign policy but rather on the objectives of American foreign policy in the Middle East and its Wilsonian element of nation building. Fukuyama’s edited volume is the product of a ‘nation-building’ conference held in 2004 at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the John Hopkins University at which Francis Fukuyama is the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy. He is also the director of SAIS’s international development program and the chairman of the editorial board of the conservative journal The National Interest. More than fifteen years ago, Fukuyama became well known in the academic community at the end of the Cold War with his thesis of “the end of history”, which was first published as a journal article and subsequently as a book titled
The End of History and the Last Man. The book made it to a bestseller and has been translated into more than twenty foreign editions.

However, to the informed reader who follows current debates about American foreign policy as well as Fukuyama’s scholarship very closely, this collection of essays will reveal limited novel ideas. Too many lessons learned that Fukuyama’s book describes have already been in the public domain for quite some time. The central argument of the book is that the United States can only be successful in building nation when it is committed to multilateralism has been made by Fukuyama somewhere else as a response to a lecture given by the neoconservative Charles Krauthammer. In the article he criticizes the George W. Bush administration for its “poorly executed nation-building strategy” in Iraq that slowly undermines domestic support on the ground for building local institutions and infrastructure. Fukuyama’s piece is a criticism of the neoconservative position of unipolarity in international affairs. He advocates that foreign interventions in domestic affairs of sovereign states should only be executed where U.S. national interests are at stake. Americans, so Fukuyama, expect their government to formulate exit strategies for nation building endeavours rather than forming empires that tie down the U.S. for decades.

Nevertheless, this book is a significant contribution to the very young literature about America’s experience in nation-building. It walks the reader through the various stages of U.S. involvements in nation-building from the time after World War II up until the war in Iraq. Especially the first part of the book, which is dedicated to the history of American nation-building, reveals in great detail that the war in Vietnam has been a watershed in terms of America’s commitment to Wilsonianism. Parts II and III of the book are committed to U.S. involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Pei, Amin, and Garz show in their historical overview of American engagement in nation building that the United States is perhaps the most active and persistent nation-builder in the world. Over the more than 200 cases since 1900 where the U.S. has used military forces abroad, seventeen of them have the character of nation-building. To be sure, most of American military operations have occurred as major wars, peacekeeping operations, covert operations, humanitarian interventions, or in defence of allies. It somewhat seems odd that there is such a big gap between the American experience in Vietnam and the mission in Afghanistan. The United States has intervened in foreign countries many times during the Cold War—Lebanon, Panama, Nicaragua and other states come to mind. Yet, this vastness of operations begs for a clear and concise definition of nation-building and state-building. Here, Fukuyama sets the stage in the first chapter and defines nation-building tasks as a limited exercise of political reconstruction or re-legitimation. The cases of Germany and Japan after World War II are most often cited as cases of nation-building in which the U.S. and other occupying forces did not create federal bureaucracies but helped to draft democratic constitutions and reviving the economy. However, what Americans refer to in the public discourse as nation-building rather is ‘state building’—that is building the political institutions of a nation state and promoting its economic development. Nation-building efforts include two important activities—reconstruction and development. Reconstruction is the effort to restore a society devastated by violent wars whereas development refers to the creation of a functioning administration and promotion of an economy. It is been done by outside powers where the political infrastructure has survived a conflict or crisis. “The problem is then the relatively simple matter of injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food, roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like.” Yet, development is a much more difficult and complex process. As the first two chapters of the book show, America’s commitment to development was quite high after WWII but fell into a deep crisis with the war in Vietnam. Americans and their administration were
enthusiastic about eliminating poverty in the world, but were hesitant after the experience in Asia to continue America’s internationalism.

In the subsequent chapters of part II and III of the book the argument of the authors seems to be consistent—they argue that the operations in Afghanistan were successful whereas the mission in Iraq was faulted. They walk the reader through the various stages of the conflict and U.S. commitment to the region as well as the set up of the NATO operation. The authors seem to agree that the concept of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), where personnel from the defence, diplomacy, and development community work closely together, is the right approach to nation-building. However, they criticize the administration in Washington for putting to much emphasis on the role of the military in leading the mission. In fact, one could argue, Canada’s commitment to PRTs can be the lubricator for the bilateral Canada-US relationship because the U.S. does not require Canadian military commitments to the mission in Afghanistan but experts in civil-military relations and development—an expertise the U.S. military does not necessarily possess.

Altogether, it can be said that the book under review offers a great overview of American endeavours in nation-building. It also offers, and here are chapters five to ten relevant, the lessons learned and lessons not learned from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reader will come across sentences like ‘one needs sustained policy oversight’ for nation building operations or the requirement for continuous commitment to the mission or ‘sustaining political support at home’ or ‘planning the reconstruction effort.’ In addition, nearly all authors of the book point to the fact that despite the long history of American nation building efforts over the last one hundred years, Washington has learned relatively little about it. This is because the government does not possess an organizational (or institutional) memory when it comes to nation-building missions. Once the nature of a nation-building mission is been decided by the political administration, force planners start from scratch trying to collect as much information as possible about what type of force is needed in the particular situation. These recommendations and general principles of nation building are a useful tool for policy makers, soldiers on the ground as well as members of the NGO community. However, here also lies the weakness of the book: it is largely written as a policy recommendation for an administration that is currently tied down in Iraq. Academics that expect a book about theoretical approaches to nation-building and models of how to achieve stability and security in a war torn society will be largely disappointed. The authors do not offer theoretical constructs of how to build nations nor do they make reference to empirical data to support their arguments. For example, Weinbaum writes, “Warlords and their subordinate commanders, operating through force and intimidation over local populations, often create deep resentments, although some also deliver services and enforce order (p. 128).” The author offers a normative statement that is not supported by either empirical evidence or other sources. First, it seems odd to generalize that all warlords use intimidation as their techniques to influence the local population. Secondly, there is no further explanation as to what these resentments are and how the author reaches such a conclusion. What services are delivered that overcome the resentments? Later (p. 143), the same author states that “Afghans overwhelmingly favour the country’s territorial integrity over joining ethnic cousins across Pakistani, Iranian, Turkoman, Uzbek, or Tajik borders.” Again, this conclusion is not supported by hard evidence such as written surveys or polls. This should not be too surprising since the situation on the ground is most likely to be too dangerous for pollsters to do their job and, secondly, it is most unlikely in light of the poor literacy of the local population that most Afghans are able to complete such surveys. There are many more examples such as these throughout the book that feed to the suspicion that this book has been written
for policy recommendation. This, however, should not be too surprising, because the author himself worked for many years as a professor for the RAND Corporation. This institution enjoys the reputation of providing analysis and solutions for federal departments, especially the Department of Defence. Furthermore, about half of the contributors to the book pursue active careers (or have worked) in the NGO community or served as Foreign Service officers 'on the ground' and thus have an intrinsic interest in policy guidance rather than academic enlightenment.

This, in the end, leaves the reader with simple policy descriptions of how to get involved in the nation-building business. However, it can be said that these policy prescriptions are rooted in the internationalist tradition of U.S. foreign policy and read like the following: the United States needs to understand that peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term economic and political development are the main components of reconstruction. Here, the United States is committed and capable of peace-enforcement operations but largely lacks commitment in all other three fields. Furthermore, security on the ground is one of the first pre-requisites for successful reconstruction of failed states as much as the reconstruction of political authority and legitimacy. Finally, the United States needs to realize that operations in failed states can only be successful if allies are involved and a close coordination inside the U.S. bureaucracy is assured. As such, the recommendations and thesis of the book can largely be read as a critical assessment of current U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and as an attack on the George W. Bush administration.

Endnote

NO PROUDER PLACE: CANADIANS AND THE BOMBER COMMAND EXPERIENCE, 1939-1945

Reviewed by Major Tod Strickland, CD

In recent years revisionist history has done the men and women of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) somewhat of a disservice. Their actions during the Second World War have been dissected and criticized using perspectives that would have been completely foreign to the participants at the time. Some books and television programs like The Valour and the Horror have tended to impose late 20th century values onto situations where such sensitivities were not present to a large extent in the population who lived through the events. In No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945, author David Bashow has given redress to the ground and flight crews of Bomber Command and put a significant amount of the Canadian contribution to the air campaigns of World War II into a realistic and fair context. His aim was not to glorify the participants
or their deeds, but rather to give his readers the facts and allow them to form their own analyses of the actions that were undertaken.

A veritable treasure trove of information, this book accomplishes what few others do; it is an extremely detailed, historical record of events and facts, while also telling stories that are compelling and poignant. The cast of characters is extensive, covering men and women from ground crew to Sir Winston Churchill. What makes this book different, however, is that in telling essentially human stories, Bashow has retained an eye to the historical record and documented his sources, as well as given full backgrounds. This approach allows readers to form their own opinions and thoughts on the events of sixty years ago. The language used is simple to understand and even in its tone. It is immediately evident that the author has a masterful grasp of his subject matter, yet he makes every effort to make it understandable to layman and expert alike.

Many of the incidents and general information that the author recounts are in realms of historical inquiry, which have not received focussed attention since the close of the war. One area that stands out in this regard is the treatment of what would now be termed psychological casualties. Cloaked in the acronym of “LMF”, airmen and pilots who had volunteered for one of the most hazardous of wartime duties could be classed as “Lacking in Moral Fibre.” They were subsequently removed in disgrace from flight duties for later dismissal from the RCAF if they refused to fly into hazardous situations or otherwise failed in their duties. Remembering that battlefield psychology and psychiatry were in their relative infancy at the time, one can easily see the dilemma that such categorizations could pose to commanders. Bashow’s treatment of this topic clearly shows the way that the RCAF brought its own interpretation of the regulations to bear on the solution of what was a very real problem at the time. Similarly, his detailed examination of Canada’s participation in the destruction of Berlin is exceptional. I have read few other books and certainly no Canadian treatment of this subject that cover it as well, or in as balanced a fashion. Numerous different aspects of the story are covered: why Berlin was targeted; life in a German air defence shelter; the technology race between Germany and the Allies and how the raids were actually accomplished, to name but a few areas.

One aspect of the book which both lends it credibility and reinforces the notion that even in aerial combat it is humans that are fighting, is the fashion by which the author makes use of the recollections of those who were there. Voices that might otherwise be forgotten contribute in recounting their personal involvement in various actions during the war. Men like Roger Coulombe, detailing a bomb raid over Berlin; Jimmy Sheridan, calmly recalling what it meant to be “coned” and having to “corkscrew” out of a spotlight’s beam; and Reg Lane, whose widow penned the introduction to the book. They all come alive in the stories that they share with the reader.

Finding an area to improve upon is indeed difficult in a book such as this. Thoroughly researched and documented, it is a first-rate piece of history that would make a worthy addition to any library or personal collection. Though it suffers from the inclusion of a relatively small number of maps, this is more than made up for by the extensive number of original photographs that add a new dimension to the accompanying text. One can at once see the relative youth of the men and women whose stories are being told, and revel in the relatively low-tech nature of their profession when compared to our own now. The colour plates of different Canadian and German air frames also adds to the narrative, clearly displaying the relative levels of technology and craftsmanship in a fashion that would be hard to do by words alone.

To be sure, this book does honour the memory of the men of Bomber Command who flew the missions over the European continent. What warrants note here, however, is that this is done through clear presentation of facts and human drama without the
Traditionally, the development of strategy involves the orderly consideration of ends, ways, and means. However, in the context of the American response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, order was cast aside as long held assumptions regarding the security of the North American continent and the role of the military on American soil were suddenly questioned. In 2002, old understandings and frameworks were seemingly recast as Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stood up. These were the largest changes to U.S. military and government structures since the 1946 unification of military command and the 1947 National Security Act respectively. Amidst all this flux, how has the U.S. military adapted to domestic roles? As well, how has the U.S. military interacted with the fledgling DHS? It is in this environment of flux that Stephen Duncan strives to answer questions such as these.

In light of his expertise as both a government official and an author, Duncan is well placed to offer his insights. During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, Duncan served as the senior Department of Defense (DoD) official responsible for the U.S. military’s counter-drug role. Due to this experience, he can identify organizational cultures and differences that are well-entrenched and difficult to change in U.S. bureaucracy. Moreover, he can speak to how the U.S. military has interacted in the past with officials at different levels of government, how the U.S. military has conducted itself in domestic activities, and how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act still holds considerable sway. These are important points in the context of homeland security. Also, as the author of Citizen Warriors, a 1997 account of the National Guard’s role in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, Duncan is knowledgeable of National Guard capabilities and the stresses and strains that National Guardsmen have encountered with the increase in operational tempo since the end of the Cold War. Now that the U.S. military is substantially engaged overseas (with considerable National Guard participation), and with homeland security duties increasingly placed on the National Guard’s task list, Duncan can provide perspective as to how, and whether, U.S. citizen warriors can cope.

With consecutive chapters entitled “Organizing at Home for a Long War,” “The Threat and the Bureaucratic Maze,” “Posse Comitatus and Military Force,” and “Mobilizing the Citizen Warriors,” the book’s middle section holds the core of Duncan’s analysis. The central message here is that while much has been done, substantially more needs to be done in order to develop the appropriate capabilities, adopt the right mindsets, and ensure proper military/civilian communication across all levels of government. For the U.S. military, Duncan suggests that the DoD, referring to both...
military and civilian officials, has often taken a backseat regarding homeland security. In part, this is because it wishes direction from DHS, an organization that is struggling with the complexities of being responsible for so many disparate programs and agencies. Indeed, Duncan notes analysis suggesting that DHS has only a 20 percent chance of achieving organizational success given the breadth of its internal challenges (let alone the nature of the terrorist threat). In part, hesitancy stems from the U.S. military’s overstretch in regions like the Middle East and Central Asia, such that DoD officials contend that homeland security should be largely a task for other actors. And in part, this hesitancy relates to the U.S. military’s proclivity to engage terrorist threats overseas, partially for the sake of enhanced domestic security, but also because the overseas role is what the U.S. military feels that it should do.

For a Canadian audience, the book presents useful parallel insights concerning the complexities of ensuring Canadian domestic security. The creation of CANADA COMMAND and the evolution of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada can easily be compared and contrasted to the development of NORTHCOM and DHS. How military transformation initiated in the late 1990s was upset by the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 has challenged both countries’ stances about the future direction to follow. Additionally, uncertainty pertaining to the domestic role of the military instrument is equally evident in the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security that generally lacked strategic direction for the U.S. military and Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy that contained only nebulous instruction for the Canadian Forces as a whole.

While generally an informative and insightful read, the book does get off message in two areas. First, Duncan commits the very mistake that he reveals DoD officials are making: they overemphasize overseas missions. The book, with substantial portions of text covering U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the world, often seems like an analysis of the U.S. military’s prosecution of the “War on Terrorism” as a whole. This presentation is reinforced by material dealing with military tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and the Bush doctrine of pre-emption. In trying to present more, Duncan, in fact, achieves less because his important assessments regarding the U.S. military’s domestic presence often become secondary.

The other area of critique pertains to the book’s sometimes partisan focus and the analytic blind spot that results. As a former high-ranking official in a Republican administration, Duncan saves his harshest criticism for President Clinton’s seeming lack of understanding regarding the growing terrorist threat and the resulting lack of presidential leadership during the 1990s. In a chapter entitled “Locust Years,” Duncan unleashes criticism of the Clinton Administration along the lines of Winston Churchill’s negative evaluation of British foreign and defence policy during the 1930s. According to Duncan, President Clinton did not fully appreciate all the warning signs, whether they were the first bombing of the World Trade Center on 26 February 1993, the 7 August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa or the general rise in the prevalence and lethality of terrorist activity.

However, while this apparent neglect suggests that the current challenges of civil-military coordination and changes in mindset regarding homeland security might have been directly faced earlier in the 1990s, it does not negate the fact that these matters would still have to have been faced. In fact, Duncan notes that even with the great sense of urgency in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government was slow to react. The National Security Strategy of the United States was not released until September 2002, one year after the terrorist attacks. The U.S. Congress put off voting for the creation of DHS until after the November 2002 elections. In this vein, Duncan’s considerations of DoD’s hesitancy regarding homeland security responsibilities only serve to make understandable the foot dragging that would have likely occurred in the 1990s.
In closing, for readers who wish to gain a greater appreciation of the challenges regarding homeland security and particularly the military’s role in it, this book, at its heart, offers an interesting case study. With potential U.S. military operations against countries such as Iran or North Korea always a possibility, one can assume the problems that Duncan recognizes in his book will only become more acute.

TRUST BUT VERIFY: IMAGERY ANALYSIS IN THE COLD WAR

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD

This highly readable book focuses on the little known work of imagery analysts during the Cold War, covering their attempts to provide the American government decision makers with an accurate assessment of the Soviet Unions’ strategic capabilities and by detailed analysis their potential vulnerabilities. Research into such a complicated and classified topic was made possible by a 1995 decision by then U.S. President Clinton to declassify satellite imagery collected between 1960 and 1972.

Although at the present time it may perhaps seem redundant and a rehash of recent events, the first few chapters deal with policy issues and the origins of the Cold War. As time goes by however, this background will be essential to the future reader unfamiliar with the era. The developments of both the U-2 and the SR-71 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft are put into historical perspective during an era when the U.S., lacking a constellation of reconnaissance satellites, sought to achieve an understanding of the Soviet Union’s threat potential, be it bomber or missile fleets. The incredible sensitivity and bureaucracy surrounding the use of the U-2 aircraft, ending with the shooting down of the mission piloted by Francis Gary Powers, provides a great deal of background information which puts the delicacy of the mission into perspective.

The next chapters deal with the early satellite programs and are written in such a highly readable fashion so as to allow any reader without a technical background to understand technological improvements in satellite image resolution and their impact on political decisions. The Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the best known example of the use of previously unseen by the public “classified satellite imagery.”

The latter chapters deal with such issues as inter-service and interagency rivalries and their impacts on competitive analysis, funding, and intelligence support to national U.S. leadership. The appearance of commercial satellite imagery providers and the lack of de-classification of newer satellite imagery allows the author in the final chapters of this book to speculate as to the future uses of satellite imagery.

A conclusion perhaps valid at the time of publication (2000) speculated about the usage of high-resolution imagery given that the Soviet Union as the previous focus was no longer valid. Events of September 11, 2001 have proven that there are still likely valid uses for the results of high-resolution satellite imagery in support of national security interests.

I would recommend this book as a good backgrounder for any reader wanting to understand the origins of the various U.S. agencies dealing with surveillance and aerial reconnaissance and all their accompanying challenges, and how useful these sources have proven in the past. Having read the book, potential applications of surveillance platforms to deal with future security questions should prove more readily understood. In a society where technological improvements are advancing at an incredibly rapid pace, it is certainly helpful and, at a minimum, interesting to know the origins of remote sensing from space.
Reviewed by Sergeant Gary I.H. Kett, CD, MA

Few military historians could honestly say that they have never heard of Osprey publishing. No other publisher produces the volume or topic range of military books, which in recent years has grown ever wider. Osprey publications provide their readers with snap shots of a topic, containing just enough information to whet the appetite for more in-depth reading. One of their latest publications covers the Hitler Youth Organization from 1933 to 1945. Although there have been a number of works, such as Alfons Heck’s *A Child of Hitler*, and Perry Biddiscombe’s *The Last Nazis* that mention the activities of Hitler Youth members, there are surprisingly few English works devoted purely to the topic of the organization and its members’ appearance.¹

Selecting the topic of the Hitler Youth for Osprey’s *Warrior* series appears to be a bit misplaced at first glance. Some would assume that the Hitler Youth was simply a youth organization, which had little in common with the soldiers featured in the majority of the *Warrior* series. With this in mind, one could ask if the next Osprey *Warrior* publication should be about the American Boy Scouts during the Second World War. However, this is exactly the myth that Alan Dearn’s book helps to dispel. The Hitler Youth was not the same as other youth movements during the same period. No other youth movement at that time pushed their wards into front line combat.² Therefore, it is not as out of place as it would seem.

This is the first work on this topic by author Alan Dearn, who obtained his Bachelor of Arts in History (majoring in medieval history) from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. Dearn then went on to complete his doctorate in late Roman religious history at Wolfson College, Oxford in 2003, and at the time of this review, he continues to teach history at the International Grammar School in Sydney. His particular fields of interest and research are said to include the history of martyrdom, the later Roman Empire, and the social history of Nazi Germany.

Dearn structured the book logically by dividing the chapters into the various stages of progression of a Hitler Youth member, from the process of joining the organization, to their typical training, and then moving on to the everyday activities of a member. He goes on to discuss the uniforms and general appearance of the different branches of the organization and then talks about the ideological pressures and beliefs with which the members were indoctrinated. Lastly, he wraps this all together with a section of vignettes detailing the experiences that Hitler Youth members would have encountered during combat in the final days of the Third Reich.

To help strengthen the linking of the chapters, Dearn has the reader follow the experiences of four main characters named Karl, Max, Ernest and Maria. It is important for the reader to understand that these characters are not real. They represent a compilation of the experiences of a number of former Hitler Youth members. Although Dearn explains this to the reader in the *Author’s Note* found on page 2, this fact can be easily overlooked and the reader misled into thinking they were actual people. Dearn
does not clearly explain why he uses fictional characters rather than actual excerpts from the sources he used to create them. For the most part, their intermittent inclusion in most of the chapters was not necessary. Although the use of fictional characters was an interesting idea, it was difficult to take them seriously since I knew they were not real people. For this reason, it would have been more appealing to use the experiences of individual Hitler Youth members, rather than a conglomeration of experiences.

Since almost all Osprey books are noted for their visual as well as narrative information, it would be natural to mention the colour plates used in the book. Although Elizabeth Sharp has done an excellent job with most of the plates, there are a few that appear distorted in scale. The print on page 35 (colour plate C), which portrays an 88 mm anti-aircraft battery, looks more like 300 mm guns (also the caption mentions the battery is of six guns yet seven can be counted in the plate). Furthermore, the Panzer IV on page 38 (colour plate F) appears too small for the soldiers in the picture. I realize that these observations are somewhat trivial, and the rest of her plates are crisp, accurate and informative. However, they do reflect the overall sensation of quality one feels from a book, especially one that is known for the use of colour plates. In contrast, her work on other Osprey publications such as the US infantryman in World War II series is very well done, reflecting proper colour tones and accuracy.

Dearn's use of photographs in the book is very well done. Each photo relates to the topic he is discussing on that particular page, and does help give the reader some visual appreciation of the topic being discussed. However, the photo on page 22 illuminates an important element of the Hitler Youth Organization that received scant attention by Dearn. It shows an officer with the Knights Cross, with oak leaves, surrounded by children around a sand table diorama. Though the caption reads, “a highly decorated Hauptman” (Army captain), the officer in the picture is actually Oberbannfuhrer (Senior Band Leader) Gerd Hein. The small Hitler Youth symbol on his officer’s peak headdress, along with his unusual epaulettes which display two oak leaves confirm that he is a member of the Hitler Youth leadership cadre. This organization was instrumental in the operation of the Hitler Youth and its role should have been mentioned in the book.

Another group that Dearn left out almost entirely was the Marine Hitler Youth. There are no photos, drawings or even a short paragraph relegated to this branch of the Hitler Youth. It could be argued that it was mainly the land and air elements of the Hitler Youth that saw combat, and were therefore the focus of the book. However, this would not explain the limited inclusion of the BDM (Hitler Youth Girls). There is little doubt that Naval Hitler youth would have been pressed into service in the end, as were their land and air brethren, and some information concerning them would have been welcome.

Although Dearn’s book suffers somewhat from the points I have mentioned above, it does provide the reader a good introduction to the Hitler Youth and a somewhat firm base to support more in-depth study if desired. This is usually all that this type of Osprey publication can really achieve, as it is impossible to include everything into 60 odd pages. Furthermore, Dearn has provided almost all the major English sources available on the topic in his bibliography section, which supplies the reader with avenues for further reading on the topic.

Today we hear more and more about child soldiers in Africa and other hotspots around the world. These are usually the product of the chaos created from the failure of various states. It could be said that the transformation of the Hitler Youth from a political institution to one of “last-ditch” defence was little different. The sight of ten-year-olds in combat is not new to the world and one must recall the courage and sacrifice that those young children endured during the dying days of the Third Reich. In this way Dearn’s book provides its greatest benefit to the reader.
Lastly, Osprey Publishing should seriously think about deleting the card stock advertisement at the back of their more recent publications. Although it is understandable that they wish to inform readers on how to acquire more Osprey publications, the use of card stock type postcard cheapens the feel of the books. The promo information on the inside rear cover is more than enough to satisfy a readers desire for acquiring more publications from the company. At over $25.00 Canadian for most of the current Osprey books, this advertising gimmick makes the books appear less professional.

Endnotes
2. During the 1930’s and 40’s, many nations, including the Soviet Union, had youth organizations that were very similar to the Hitler youth. However, even with German forces at the gates of Moscow, there apparently was no official attempt to place those children into front line combat. For an excellent book dealing with the Hitler Youth in combat, please read Hans Holztrager’s “in a Raging Inferno: Combat Units of the Hitler Youth 1944-45” (Helion & Company, Solihull: 2000).
3. Perhaps he ran into the same problem as Hans Holztrager, who found that many contributors wished to remain anonymous, since connections to Nazism continues to be a sensitive issue. Holztrager was able to get around this by simply using the initials of contributors, such as A.B. in H. (many did not even wish to reveal their place residence)
4. Elizabeth Sharp was trained in Fine Art at the Leicester College of Art and Technology, in the UK. Her works have been exhibited regularly in London, as well as in other exhibitions around the country. Elizabeth lives and works in Lincolnshire, UK.
5. After some research, I found another picture of the Hein on page 227, Volume 1 of J.R. Angolia’s H.J. According to very limited and perhaps shaky information, Gerd Hein won his Knights Cross on the 9th of March 1940 and his Oak Leaves in June 1942 while with 58th Infantry Division. He was later transferred to act as a Hitler Youth Leader. He was then sent to the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division where he won the German Cross in Gold in July 1944.
http://home.att.net/~SSPzHJ/GerdHein.html
6. While on the topic of visual aids, it would have been great if Dearn had included a chart of the Hitler Youth rank system. An excellent colour chart can be found at the Wikipedia web site located at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranks_and_insignia_of_the_Hitler_Youth#Reich_Youth_Leader.

TERRORISM, AFGHANISTAN AND AMERICA’S NEW WAY OF WAR
By Norman Friedman, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Hardcover, $36.95 US.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Peter J. Williams, CD

Fans of Norman Friedman’s studies of sea power will welcome his analysis of U.S. strategy and tactics in the war in Afghanistan. Having read many of his articles and publications and heard him speak on one occasion (where he stated that the reason he used such ostensibly simple language was in order to make his point more easily understood), this reviewer found his distinctive style a real treat in reading this book.

The book begins, as one might expect, and perhaps quite appropriately, with a description of the 9/11 attacks. In the wake of these dramatic events, the U.S. was able to form a broad coalition (including Canada) to undertake operations in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban, who had refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden.

Friedman draws a parallel with the mood in America after 9/11 to that experienced after the Pearl Harbour attacks, in which intelligence was seen to be wanting. Ironically, it was this perception of a capability gap, which ultimately led to the creation of the Counter Intelligence Agency (CIA), the very same organization that came under heavy criticism in the wake of September 11th.
Friedman devotes a chapter, tellingly entitled, “Sword of the Dispossessed,” to an analysis of how, in his view, the emergence of Osama Bin Laden’s brand of Muslim fundamentalism is a predictable outcome of Muslim history, and the result of the Muslim culture. That culture, until 1400, had surpassed the Western world in several aspects, and after that period saw its dominant global position reversed. In Friedman’s view this bred a culture of victimization on the part of many Muslims, a feeling taken to extremes by adherents of Bin Laden’s ideology.

Veterans of service in this part of the word would agree with Friedman’s assertion that, “Afghanistan has been a battleground for centuries.” He goes on to state that all the nations, which have had the misfortune to suffer defeat at the hands of the Afghan people, made the same great error in assuming that Afghanistan was in any way a homogeneous entity. This he uses to introduce a useful study of the tribal dynamics of this country in a chapter entitled, “The Afghan Base.” He describes the origins of the Taliban, whom, ironically, the U.S. initially supported at the request of then Pakistan leader Benazir Bhutto, who claimed she controlled them.

With a chapter entitled, “A New Kind of War,” Friedman starts to deal with the heart of the book. He gives a description of the climate in the 1990s that led to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a period characterized by so-called observe, orient, decide, and attack (OODA) loops, network centric warfare, sensor-shooter links and an apparent over-reliance on technology, and a belief that the more information one possessed about the enemy (information gathered more often than not by technical means), the better one’s decision making ability, and the better the chance of a positive outcome for those in possession of this technology. The role of air power in new conflicts is discussed at great length, including the Kosovo campaign.

Friedman contends, and there will no doubt be those who disagree with him, that by the end of the 20th century the American way of war had progressed far beyond those traits displayed in the First Gulf War. This was evidenced by the wider use of precision munitions and a realization (not always borne out by the status quo) that while “shooters” were important, perhaps even more so were the “sensors” that would cue them in the first place. It would be these sensors, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms, and others that would come into their own in the war in Afghanistan.

From the U.S. perspective, the war would be run by its Central Command (CENTCOM), using bases in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Canadian contribution of an infantry battle group (3 PPCLI), as well as special forces (elements of JTF 2) is described, if not in detail. The author devotes considerable time and space to some of the defining capabilities of the war in Afghanistan, such as special forces and precision air attack using UAVs. Indeed, Friedman believes that this type of war is typical of the type of conflict we will face in future, one that will be characterized by smaller units with increased firepower. In Friedman’s view, air power will gain increased relevance due to its ability to repeatedly (unlike missiles) deliver large amounts of ordnance with increasing precision.
It is difficult to discuss U.S. involvement in Afghanistan without talking of Iraq, and Friedman does not shy away from this challenge. The author argues that whereas the Taliban had the choice to flee if necessary into neighbouring Pakistan or Afghan mountain refuges, Saddam in Iraq had no such alternative. If he had fled he risked, at worst, assassination, and at best, loss of power and prestige.

In his final chapter, entitled, “Now What?” the author tries to analyze where the global war on terrorism will go after Afghanistan. He suggests three possible courses of action, stating that future U.S. policy will likely include elements of all three approaches:

♦ continue to attack Al Qaeda;
♦ deal with other terrorist or “semi-terrorist” threats (in which Iraq is included, as a member of the “Axis of Evil”);
♦ attack the root causes of terrorism.

Friedman ends his book with a question, “Can the United States win the war against terrorism?” Those hoping to have neat answers to such questions can expect to be disappointed. Friedman argues, and correctly so, that for a so-called “new kind of war,” we have to look differently at how we define victory. In the types of conflicts we are likely to face in future, success may be best defined as keeping the crisis at a manageable and acceptable level. As for terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden, victory may be won by breaking the hold they have over those who hate us, and here Friedman appears to be writing largely for a U.S. audience.

Overall this is a well-researched work, with notes running to some 50-plus pages, and a bibliography of six pages. It is a very useful starting point for those wishing to understand one of the most complex campaigns of our time, and how the U.S. and its coalition partners came to fight it as they did, and what that fight might portend for future conflicts.

THE BLITZKRIEG LEGEND—THE 1940 CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

Reviewed by Captain John K. Vintar, CD, MA

The prevailing image of the German Blitzkrieg (lightning war) campaign in France is one of a monolithic organization moving with both single-minded purpose and irresistible force. Aspects such as a clearly understood operational doctrine, overwhelming numbers of superior armour, extensive use of communications equipment, and coordinated air power best illustrate this image. It is held that these facets were brought together to bypass the French Maginot defensive line, break through the Ardennes at Sedan and, in a series of “scythe cut” manoeuvres, achieve a series of victories which resulted in the military collapse and surrender of France. The facts, however, are significantly different.

In The Blitzkrieg Legend, German military historian Colonel Karl-Heinz Frieser discusses and shatters these misconceptions in a detailed and enlightening study. Frieser sets the stage for the 1940 campaign in France in a generally chronological manner, and pursues parallel topics as diverse as the history of the word blitzkrieg, for lightning war (not coined by Hitler, as was later claimed), the relative strengths of fighter
and bomber aircraft between the Germans and Allies, and whether Hitler actually had a strategic war concept. All of these topics serve to set the French campaign in context, and underscore the fact that both the idea of blitzkrieg and the planning to attack France was the subject of much debate and disagreement among the hierarchy of the German General Staff.

While the history of the German General Staff planning has always been to avoid long and drawn-out wars due to the geographical position of Germany, the planning for the French campaign envisioned a repeat of the First World War. Frieser notes that the blitzkrieg had not been planned as a blitzkrieg, but that the “miracle of 1940” was a result of three factors. They were; the changing nature of war where the technological pendulum had swung to favour the attacker, allied mistakes (one could more aptly call them “blunders”) and unauthorized actions wherein the speed of the attack and the operational tempo increased to such a pace that at times the high command lost control. This required well-trained, independent, and strong-minded leaders at all levels who clearly understood their mission, and were willing to disregard orders to achieve their objectives.

To my mind, there are two pivotal topics that appear repeatedly in Frieser’s work, two essentials that are as valid today as in 1940. These are mission command (aufstragtaktik) and the employment of armour.

The German emphasis on aufstragtaktik ensured that soldiers at the lowest level understood the mission and used their initiative to achieve the objective in the absence of commanders. This emphasis on “what” was to be achieved, and not on “how” it was to be accomplished compensated for those times in the fog of war where direct command and control was not available.

This freedom of action and use of initiative allowed fleeting opportunities to be seized and permitted the Germans to continuously plan and execute well within the decision-action cycle of the French. This was most noticeable during the crossing of the Meuse, where several bunkers were destroyed and the way cleared for the Panzers with only a few Platoons of infantry and engineers. In one example, a sergeant commanding a dozen soldiers and engineers, isolated from their chain of command, seized several French bunkers and opened a decisive breach for the 10th Panzer Division. “…one must be astonished that a sergeant led this action...he by no means acted passively; he did not sit and wait for an officer to give him an order. Instead, he seized the initiative along the lines of Aufstragtaktik and acted independently.” (p. 172)

Conversely, and to their detriment, the French were more rigid in their planning and execution process. The planned French counterattack against the German breakthrough at Sedan met with a delay of nine hours before the counterattack order was executed by the commander of the counterattack force, General Lafontaine. Ultimately, the defeat was because:

According to the method of command tactics customary in the French Army, each individual phase was planned out in advance in detail and could be carried out
only after an express order had been issued...He (General Lafontaine) had a
mission, and he had it since 2000, but what he wanted was an order.
(p. 185-186)

The rigidity of the French command system was one issue. Ignoring fundamental
principles was another. What was most unbelievable was that in reacting to the
expected German advance through Holland, the French committed the Seventh Army—
the operational reserve—towards the Netherlands. When the German attacked with
their point of main effort from a completely different direction, there was no reserve
available as a counter-force. France possessed the most powerful army in Europe, but
at the critical point it was not in the right place at the right time. As Churchill later wrote,
“...I was dumbfounded...it had never occurred to me that any commanders having to
defend five hundred miles of engaged front would have left themselves unprovided with
a mass of manœuvre...” (p. 261) The element of surprise was complete and ensured a
German victory.

Initiative and superior planning skills moved in tandem with the unique employment
of the Panzer force. One of the popular misconceptions of the campaign was that
German armour was superior in quantity and quality to the Allied tanks. In fact, German
armour was outnumbered almost 2:1 by Allied armoured forces, and were inferior in
firepower and protection. For example, the Panzer Mk I was armed only with machine
guns and was intended as a tank trainer, while the Mk II’s 20mm gun was insufficient to
stop even French light tanks. The Panzer III and IV were more robust in armour and
firepower, but fewer in number. Frieser notes that in tank on tank encounters, German
shells would bounce off French tanks such as the Char B, or the British Matilda. As a
Panzer III commander stated in his after-action report, “We were really shook up as we
saw our tracer rounds bounce off the French tanks like so many marbles.” (p. 237)

One factor contributing to the German victory was the fact that every tank was
equipped with a radio, allowing for all crews to understand the commander’s intent, to
execute orders more quickly, and to act with cohesion. This was certainly a factor in the
destruction of the French 1st Division at Flavion, where “…the few French radios had
mostly broken down because of their weak batteries. This resulted in a rather strange
situation in which the French tanks mostly fought in a disconcerted pattern against a
Panzer regiment that had a single leader.” (p. 237-8)

Additionally, the employment of armour was significantly different between the
Germans and French. The Germans, primarily due to the influence of General Heinz
Guderien, envisioned the use of armour to punch through enemy positions and push
towards the rear, attacking command and control organizations and disrupting lines of
communications. This necessitated large, potent, operational formations to be used
decisively at the point of main effort. A common Guderien catch-phrase was “Klotzen,
nicht kleckern” which translates into “Hit them, don’t pick with your fingers.” The Panzers
moved rapidly with significant force, which optimized the value of shock action and kept
the enemy off-balance.

According to French doctrine, tanks were parcelled out to sub-units, and the speed
of movement was dictated by the speed of infantry. Since the range of employment was
limited by the infantry’s range, fuel tanks were of smaller capacity than in the German
panzers. Limited range, limited speed, and lack of concentrated force were contributing
causes of the French defeats. “The bulk of the French tanks, however, was scattered
along the entire front line, in tiny formations, “like small change.” The numerous
independent tank battalions, however, could only inflict tactical pinpricks.” (p. 262)

The campaign in France was expected to be of a long duration, mirroring the static
warfare of World War I. The speed of the German victory and the subsequent blitzkrieg-
euphoria served as a basis for the planning for Operation Barbarossa—the 1941 invasion of Russia. Here one could argue that the wrong lesson was learned, in that the Russian campaign was expected to be concluded in three months through a series of smashing blitzkrieg attacks. Yet while there were operational-level successes, “...the German Wehrmacht was operationally winning themselves to death. Looking at it strategically, it was bound to run out of steam sooner or later. Now the economic superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies began to take effect.” (p. 351). While the French campaign was an unplanned but successful blitzkrieg, the Russian campaign was a planned and unsuccessful one.

Frieser’s work is not a dry technical account, as he seamlessly transitions back and forth from national strategic issues to operational, tactical, and individual accounts, which serves to illustrate his arguments. This is apt considering the importance of mission command throughout the levels of the Wehrmacht. In light of doctrinal changes within the Canadian Army, with renewed and increased emphasis on these same tenets, many of the lessons learned from this book are as applicable today as they were over half a century ago.

WORLD WAR II AIRBORNE WARFARE TACTICS

Reviewed by Captain David Wray

This book is one of at least 11 titles published by Osprey relating to World War II airborne units, operations and tactics. The author, Gordon L. Rottman, served 26 years in the United States Army in special forces and airborne units. Following retirement from the Army he wrote special operations scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) for 12 years. While not a professional historian, he has the knowledge and expertise to objectively research and present his chosen subject clearly, concisely and accurately.

This book, in a few short pages, attempts to cover an aspect of the Second World War about which volumes have been written. The title is somewhat misleading, as this book does not limit itself to airborne warfare tactics. It examines the development of airborne forces of both Allied and Axis powers and includes development of doctrine, tactics and equipment. It also discusses the planning and conduct of airborne operations and the evolution of airborne forces during the Second World War. While operations histories are not as detailed as works such as Peter Harclerode’s Wing of War—Airborne Warfare 1918-1945, this book provides an excellent overview and summary of World War II airborne force development. It is an excellent starting point for anyone interested in the history of airborne warfare and contains a further reading guide to a variety of titles and topics for anyone interested in more detailed information.

The author’s introductory comments regarding advantages and impacts of airborne forces are as applicable to current conflicts as they are to operations of World War II. His review of force development by country is concise and objective and he clearly defines the designations airborne, airland and gliderborne troops. More information on Japanese force development would have been helpful. His discussion of early force, doctrine and tactics development does an outstanding job of identifying the limiting factors such as technology (e.g. aircraft lift capability or long range radio communications), policy (those in senior military leadership who opposed development of paratroop capability) and competing demands for limited resources (e.g. personnel, weapons, aircraft [transports versus bombers versus gliders]). He details force capability
limitations (such as a lack of heavy weapons, limited mobility, lack of integral combat service and engineer support and communications limitations) and discusses the effect these had on airborne force operations from both Allied and Axis perspectives.

The author’s review of later doctrine discusses Allied and Axis doctrine evolution due to experience as the war progressed. He contrasts the German decision to limit the number of airborne troops in an operation following the invasion of Crete in 1941 with the Allied recognition that airborne forces were best employed in significant numbers on large scale decisive operations. He discusses the employment and limitations of airborne troops when employed in a conventional infantry role relative to fully equipped conventional infantry and identifies why this was not the best use of airborne forces. His comparison of airborne forces from various Axis and Allied countries are clear and aided by force breakdowns and organizational charts. He details the development of an airborne operation from initial planning to force engagement and clearly enunciates the complexity of planning and conducting an airborne operation. His conclusion identifies criticisms and concerns raised regarding airborne operations and detail the eventual elimination of glider forces.

The book contains a number of black-and-white photos and colour plates that greatly add to the completeness of the author’s discussions of the subject. Overall, the book is a valuable contribution to literature pertaining to airborne operations of World War II and provides an outstanding and clear overview of a very complex subject. The book is a concise easy-to-read reference for anyone interested in the history of airborne warfare and recommended reading for anyone interested in this aspect of the Second World War. Despite the author’s comment that the study of World War II airborne operations has limited relevance to the forces of today, I believe that a number of points he discusses in this book (such as force sustainment) are valid points to consider during planning for airborne operations today.

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CAPITAINE-ABBÉ ROSAIRE CROCHETIÈRE: UN VICAIRE DANS LES TRANCHEES

Reviewed by Padre (Major) Jean-Yves Fortin

A man of faith, courage, compassion, service and love. That is the person described by the author of this book. In my view, Alain M. Bergeron does an excellent job in capturing the human dimension of Padre Captain Crochetière. Even more impressively, he demonstrates very clearly the dimension of faith and spirituality of this man, who gave his life for his flock.

Rosaire Crochetière, priest, enlisted as a chaplain, somewhat in spite of himself and followed his regiment to Europe during the First World War. He changed regiments three times, but always adjusted to the new people he encountered. He brought God everywhere the troops went. Whether they were at rest or in the trenches, this chaplain was always present. “His boys” were most important to him, to the point where he was the first and to date the only Canadian Catholic military chaplain to die on the battlefield. He died bringing moral and spiritual support to the wounded. He wanted to be there for them.
The author leads us to discover Padre Captain Crochêtière through the correspondence of this man of God, as well as through newspaper articles and excerpts from books. He has sifted through all the documentation and presents them in a coherent manner, with the result that the book reads very well. The length of the chapters is such that one or two chapters can be read at a time without the need to stop in mid-chapter and risk losing the thread of the narrative.

At the outset, we get to know Padre Crochêtière in his civilian environment and his life as a parish priest. His faith and his pastoral awareness are already apparent. Orphaned very young, he was adopted by an aunt, whom he regarded as his mother. In his correspondence with her, he tells her almost everything. Almost, for when he witnesses the horrors of war, he does not report them so as not to worry her. Instead, he confides in his three sisters, his cousin and a fellow priest.

The historical vignettes that the author includes throughout the work help to make the story of this chaplain even more vivid. Apparent throughout the book is Alain Bergeron's genuine desire to describe for us the life of Rosaire Crochêtière—his joys as well as his sorrows, his good moments and the not so good ones.

The preface by General Baril gives us a good summary of the content, but cannot replace a reading of the book itself. In my view, this book is eminently suitable as a professional tool for all currently serving Canadian Forces chaplains. It helps to present a clear picture of their important role in their dealings with the military and civilian personnel whom they serve every day—especially these days, when many members are deployed in more hostile environments.

This book also speaks to anyone who has a thirst for history, particularly for aspects of history about which we rarely hear.

Thanks to Alain Bergeron for his decision to present a priest who did much good and who had an impact on many lives: a priest who followed the word of his God and who gave his life for his flock.
THE SEEMINGLY IMPENETRABLE VENEERS OF TERMINOLOGY¹
(A Fascinating Tale of Lines, Levels and Roles)

Mr. Al Morrow writes...

Ah, terminology! Face facts—the hungry, tired and weary soldier doesn’t give a rat’s tail if his rations come from an integral unit or close support unit, if his fuel comes from an forward support group (FSG) or a service battalion or if his ammunition is delivered from first, second or third line. If he doesn’t care, then who does? Like it or not, the commander, on the receiving end of a confusing, conflicting or otherwise indecipherable order or instruction, needs to care. He needs to care a great deal—particularly if that aforementioned soldier goes hungry. Over the past few years, the combat service support (CSS) community has gone wild creating new terminology. If it did so to sow confusion, then well done! However, having spent a couple of years plying the trade, this author submits that the seemingly constant change in terminology was quite simply an honest attempt to keep up with the underlying changes that were taking place in structure and capabilities. Unfortunately, the rapidity with which new terminology was introduced has led to considerable misuse and abuse of what should be some rather straightforward language.

So, if you can handle the excitement, this short article will strip away the layers of terminology veneer, show you what is underneath, and dazzle you with the simplicity of it all. You can then show off your newly found skill in using CSS terminology correctly. (This new skill and a few bucks may get you a beer at the bar.) Where to start? A short foray into the world of “lines” and “levels” is the best point of departure. There is a rumour going round that the reason that the CSS community banished “line” terminology was that it was too often confused with “levels.” Odd. They neither look the same, nor sound the same. No matter. There is some good news for the older generation. Everything old is new again: “line” terminology is once again politically correct.² Simply put, there are four lines of support in the Forces:

♦ First Line belongs to the unit—as in the Adm Coy;
♦ Second Line is found at formation level—as in the service battalion or division support command;
♦ Third Line sustains second line and includes in-theatre national or coalition resources to support one or more components—as in a Task Force Support Group (TFSG)³, more commonly referred to as the National Support Element (NSE)⁴, or a coalition support command; and
♦ Fourth Line is essentially the homeland industrial base⁵.

Why four lines? Well, it allows for the allocation of resources and capabilities to conform to the need, protection and mobility requirements of various levels of command without burdening any one level with capabilities better held elsewhere. Surely, even the most sceptical would agree that even though an Adm Coy is a beautiful thing, it is no place to rebuild engines!

So, carefully stripping away the next layer of veneer reveals this thing called an FSG. If any organization in the Army suffers from an identity crisis, this is surely it.

THE STAND-UP TABLE
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
However, by all accounts this organization seems to be one capable puppy, able to operate at any line and solve any support problem. Throw in an FSG and all goes well! Not quite. Remember the brigade service battalion and its second line support mandate? Well, the FSG is nothing more than an extension of that second line capability projected well forward to support a Canadian battle group within a coalition brigade. Lines of support are tenacious creatures; you can combine them to your heart's content. The organizations might disappear, as in the “CFB Kabul” model, but the functions don’t. So, if the lines are sacrosanct, what happens when they are smashed together? If you combine an Adm Coy with an FSG, you no longer have a mere Adm Coy; what you have is an FSG that is providing both first and second line support. If you combine the FSG with the TFSG, you no longer have a simple FSG; you have a TFSG that is providing third, second, and perhaps, even first line support. If necessary, they can be “grouped” under a single command but employed distinctly. Then, obviously, both organizations answer roll call but carry out their “line” mandates separately.

Speaking of command and control (C2)—be flexible! Command does not necessarily have to roll upwards. Take, for example, an FSG (second line) deployed to support a battle group in a coalition (US led) brigade. Sound familiar? Depending on the circumstances, that FSG could be combined with third line resources in the TFSG; it could be chopped OPCOM to the battle group commander; or, it could be chopped OPCON or TACON to the commander of the US Forward Support Battalion that is providing support to the brigade. The combinations are both manifold and extremely useful so do not be trapped by an inflexible C2 arrangement.

The next question is where on earth did “Integral”, “Close” and “General” Support come from? Good question. Rather than bore everyone with a long story, accept that, in today’s context, these are types of support. Anyone who understands lines does not need to worry. But just for the record, in the Canadian interpretation: Integral Support (IS) serves the immediate needs of the unit; Close Support (CS) serves the needs of the formation; and, General Support (GS) serves the force as a whole. The type of support dictates the responsiveness, mobility and protection requirements of the organization providing that support. As well, the type of support provided normally carries with it a command relationship. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, Adm Coy has an IS mission; the service battalion or FSG provides CS and the TFSG provides GS. If the distinction between “lines” and types of support is not clear, do not worry. All that anyone really needs to understand is lines of support. As an aside, within ABCA, Canada has agreed to use the terms “Direct Support” (DS) and “General Support” (GS) to create “supporting” and “supported” relationships. DS is the support provided by a unit that is neither attached to nor under the command of the supported unit or formation, but that is required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. GS is that support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. The US Army puts it quite simply by viewing DS as “retail” and GS as “wholesale”. (A point of import to note when working in a US led coalition.) When the layers and levels of strategic, operational and tactical sustainment are added to the mix the party really begins. For those who love charts and diagrams, it is actually possible to overlay all of this support in a way that makes sense—at least the guys in DAD 9 say it does! (Why not give them a call?)

Lines of support should now be second nature, so it is time to move on to levels. Think maintenance! Even with modern technology, rebuilding engines is just not something that any battle group commander wants to be saddled with. To avoid such inconvenience, the commander is given a “first line” maintenance platoon that is resourced to provide operator maintenance, preventative maintenance and corrective maintenance tasks of a minor nature. For ease of reference, this support is called Level
One. Level Two, normally reserved for the “second line” unit, includes corrective repair or replacement. This type of repair is limited by a set time depending on the situation, but normally the time limit is set at 24 hours. Level Three is responsible for the longer jobs including reconditioning of assemblies and the rebuilding of minor components. Level Four tackles overhaul and fabrication. To the discerning reader, it should be clear that the level of maintenance reflects the measure of the maintenance and engineering requirement along with a time limit. But here’s the rub—any maintenance unit can be given the resources to provide a higher level of maintenance, if it makes sense to do so. It is all about the efficient management of resources so that troops and commanders are best supported. Remember, LEMS stands for Land Engineering Management System. Thus, the “M” is not maintenance. By extension, the LEMS, therefore, is the process by which equipment is planned for, acquired, fielded, maintained and disposed of. Consequently, for all those budding staff officers: do not embarrass yourself by referring to the LEMS platoon. There is no such beast! It’s a system! (within a system, within a system…)  

Not to be outdone, the medics also have their own terminology. Thankfully, they chose to use “Roles” as opposed to “Levels,” or the ordering of spare parts might have become somewhat problematic. Role 1 (Unit Medical Station) involves locating casualties and providing them with first aid and emergency care; Role 2 (Field Ambulance) emphasizes the efficient and rapid evacuation of stabilized patients as well as emergency resuscitation; Role 3 (Field Hospital) provides resuscitation, initial surgery and medical in-patient care; and, Role 4 (fixed installation) involves reconstructive surgery and definitive care hospitalization and rehabilitation. A similar set of roles applies to dental care ranging from emergency care in Role 1 to comprehensive rehabilitation in Role 4.9

So, to recap a fast and furious ride through CSS terminology, operations require first to fourth line support. Our theoretical in-theatre model starts with first line at the unit level, second line at the FSG or service battalion and third line with the TFSG. But life seldom reflects theory. Because of geography and the size of force involved, maintaining three lines of support within three separate organizations has, at least recently (and despite some protestations to the contrary), failed the efficiency test. Therefore, lines of support have been combined. In Kabul, for example, all three lines of support became a single entity, providing first, second and third line support. The same approach will be seen in Kandahar. Such an approach should not, however, be the default, but rather the result of a well thought-out estimate based on tried and true doctrinal underpinnings. As a recent ABCA paper stated:

[A]rmed forces operate through use or threat of collective violence. They do not always fight, but combat—the application of armed violence against a responsive enemy—is the most demanding task. Military forces must be prepared at all times for high-intensity conflict. However, the ability to fight also creates organizations capable of performing a wide variety of other activities, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, deterrence and helping to reconstruct failed states.10

To conclude, terminology is nothing more than a veneer. The veneer itself is, of course, unimportant; it’s what is underneath that counts. Understanding and applying operational concepts depends on having a good grasp of the associated terminology, whether it’s “reconnaissance” versus “surveillance”, “direct fire” versus “indirect fire” or “first line” versus “third line support”. Perhaps everyone needs to heed the words of the ABCA writers and remember why we need to get it right. Here endeth the lesson!
THE USE OF SIMULATION TO SUPPORT TRAINING IN A RESOURCE RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

Captain Fred Hayward, OPFOR Recce Troop Leader at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre writes...

New technologies have had many impacts on warfare throughout the centuries. One of the impacts has come from the statistical analysis of past battles in trying to be prepared for the next war. After studying the Vietnam War, the United States was surprised to learn that most of its fighter pilots were shot down within their first ten combat missions. They determined that if they could simulate combat, their pilots would already have the experience of hundreds of missions before their first real combat mission, effectively giving the U.S. the edge over their opponents.1 By the late 1990s many countries had adapted many forms of simulation (computers, map models, etc.) in order to reduce the costs of using actually equipment to simulate combat conditions. The first combat actions of most armies are usually fraught with confusion and failure. Although not precisely replicating war, training simulators/simulations offer a way to fight a first battle and not have soldiers pay for mistakes with their lives.2 This use of simulation will have a huge impact on how armies prepare and fight in the twenty-first century.

Training is the process that forges soldiers and material into combat ready units and formations.3 This process allows the Army to fulfill its mission of defending Canada, but the mission becomes problematic when one considers the amount of government resources allocated to the Army. This paper will show that by using simulators and simulation to their full potential and by training progressively, a unit can maximize the benefits and resources devoted to exercises and field firing events by conducting procedural and preliminary training prior to live fire training. This provides huge benefits to a regiment (for this purpose battalion and regiment can be interchanged) in a resource-restricted environment. As of now most units in the Army greatly under-use simulators and simulation. The majority of these training aids sit idle for the majority of the year except for a primary combat function (PCF) cycle or two. It is my hope that this essay will remind all of the capabilities the army possesses and to encourage the greater usage of these resources in unit training. The following factors will be used in support

Endnotes
1. Written by Al Morrow, an ex DAD 9, but approved by LCol Terry Honour, the current DAD 9.
2. Line terminology is now part of CF doctrine—see Chapter 30 of CF Operations
3. As described in Chapter 30 to CF Operations, the correct term for the national support element supporting a joint force is Canadian Forces Joint Task Force Support Group (JTFSG). When supporting a single component it would more properly be called a Task Force Support Group (TFSG). For purposes of this article the term TFSG will be used.
4. AJP-4(A) defines the National Support Element (NSE) as any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are part of the NATO force. NSEs are OPCON to the national authorities. They are not normally part of the NATO force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. NSEs are asked to co-ordinate and co-operate with the NATO commander and the Host Nation. If the operational situation allows for a reduction, greater co-operation and centralization of services among NSEs could produce significant savings. NSE is a generic term that designates a function, such as ‘infantry battalion’, rather than a name of a specific unit. See note 2 above.
5. For those with a penchant for more detail, see the draft CFP 300-4 Sustain, available on the DGLCD web site.
6. The term is also used to refer to service battalion assets that might be pushed forward in a brigade setting to support a specific battle group or a specific operation. In this case it remains as part of the service battalion.
7. America, Britain, Canada and Australia.
8. The impact of whole fleet management (WFM) on first line should not be confused with doctrine.
9. See draft 300-4 and B-GG-005-004/AF-017 Health Services for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations for a more complete description of the CF Medical and Dental Health Services Support System.
of this thesis: equipment (simulators, tanks, publications, philosophies); costs: field training costs significantly more than simulation training; training value: simulation allows the soldier to perform his job at peak efficiency by the end of the training calendar; time frame: simulation allows the soldier to train progressively throughout the year; and personnel involvement: simulation has a higher ratio of personnel being trained versus personnel required to conduct the training as compared to field training. Due to the fact that most Canadian regiments are resource-restricted, training can be conducted with better use of simulators and simulation, coupled with the Army’s already formed philosophy of progressive training from an individual to a collective level. These are not new ideas, but ones that must be brought into focus once again in order for units to effectively train in the resource restricted Canadian Army.

As early as 1992, the Army recognized the value of simulation and its ability to deliver flexible, cost effective training to the Army. As a result, steps were taken towards establishing an organization that was responsible for providing all synthetic environment training for the Army. Eventually, this organization evolved into the Army Simulation Centre (ASC). The ASC is the national technical authority for all simulation, ensuring consistency and uniformity in the simulation as well as the configuration of the systems used for simulation.4

Equipment

One form of simulation the Army is using is JCATS (Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation). JCATS is an interactive, computerized simulation system designed to exercise a specific training audience in several operational modes. JCATS provides a capability to examine combat operation methods by using high-resolution graphics, distributed processing, and real time play to examine the effects of weapons and tactics. Commanders and their planners can refine their decision making process while developing and testing realistic operations plans. JCATS is an interactive, ten sided simulation created to explore relationships of combat and tactical process using a stand alone, event sequenced, stochastic computer simulation.

JCATS functions as both an analytical tool and training simulation-supporting evaluation of tactics, countermeasures, and alternative force structure, as well as investigating advanced weapons applications technology in a dynamic, high resolution environment ranging from special operations teams to Brigade level. It provides urban and rural combat terrain and scenarios that allow commanders and their staffs to manage resources in accordance with current doctrine and which properly recognize time/space relationships during simulated combat.5

While JCATS primarily trains personnel at the battle group level and below, the Command and Staff Trainer (CAST) is a constructive simulation designed to exercise commanders and staff at the Brigade level and above, on a 24 hour “simulated” battlefield. The simulation can exercise commanders and staff in all combat functions from high intensity to operations other than war.

CAST employs “commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)” computers and windows-based, menu-driven, user interfaces that require minimal player and controller training.6 CAST realistically duplicates the stress-filled combat environment without incurring the heavy financial, environmental and human costs of full-up field training exercises. With a Virtual Command and Control Interface (VCCI), CAST can communicate directly with the Athena Tactical System (ATS). CAST displays military scale maps up to 600x800 km. Units—scaled from team to battalion—appear as map symbols. CAST models up to 1,000 individual pieces of equipment and can exercise up to 3,000 units. Each individual item (tank, gun, person) is modelled.7
A typical CAST exercise consists of a "Player Headquarters" and "Exercise Support". The player headquarters is physically isolated from CAST and operates out of an actual or virtual headquarters. The exercise support will consist of a Lower Control (LOCON) representing units or formations subordinate to the player headquarters, a Higher Control (HICON) representing the headquarters superior to the player headquarters and all flanking formations and units as well as a technical support staff.8

Instead of using cloth map models to simulate the ground units will be using on operations and in training, the CF has the use of MUSE and TCS. MUSE stands for Multiple Unified Simulation Environment and TCS for Tactical Control System. MUSE is a simulator that can provide a 3D visualization of a virtual battle space. It simulates an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and places it into a 3D world. It can build an unlimited number of synthetic environments using 3D terrain models created from military digital map products or by using satellite imagery. MUSE can then populate this 3D world from its own comprehensive library of 3D symbols and objects representing both allied and opposing forces.9

MUSE also has the ability to visualize in three dimensions the two-dimensional battle space depicted in JCATS. In training this ability provides much greater battlefield visualization for commanders, and is a new tool for after-action reviews (AARs). The TCS is operational equipment that consists of the software and hardware designed to plan and control the operation of surveillance suites on air vehicles, including UAVs. Its capabilities include mission planning for UAVs, control of different UAV platforms and the ability to receive imagery and other sensor data from multiple sources such as UAVs, satellites or aircraft. By using MUSE and TCS together we have the ability to realistically simulate many different UAV platforms in a 3D virtual world. At the same time units are able to realistically perform UAV missions with a real piece of operational equipment. Units can attach the MUSE/TCS simulation to another simulator such as JCATS and detect and interact with the entities in that world.10

Other simulators in use include: the Leopard Tank Crew Gunnery Trainer (LCGT), Light Armoured Vehicle Crew Gunnery Trainer (LAVCGT), Small Arms Trainer (SAT), Indirect Fire Trainer (IDFT), and the Coyote Observation Simulator (COS). The LCGT and LAVCGT are used primarily as gun-drill platforms. These save on the cost of ammo and provide realistic training to gunners, so once they reach the range they require minimum training to hit the target. These simulators have the potential to input tactical scenarios for crews or troops (troop can be interchanged with platoon) and can be linked with other simulations such as JCATS.

Crews can use the simulator with tactical scenarios, and then with the simulators linked a troop can practise drills and scenarios together. Whole scenarios can be played out from battle procedure, advance to contact, withdrawal and setting up observation posts.

JCATS has the capability to exercise a command post with one squadron (or company) in the field and one in simulation. JCATS can have the LCGT, LAVCGT, COS, SAT and/or IDFT connect to its system. This allows a commanding officer to have one or more squadrons in simulation and one squadron in the field, with a troop on the LCGTs, another troop on the LAVCGTs, a squad on the SAT and a observation party or crew in the IDFT all working on the same scenario.

JCATS and the simulators provide realistic force-on-force interactions and allow for situations to develop. For example, if crew commanders do not mange their ammo they can expend their ready rack at very embarrassing moments or if troops and squadrons do not stay within mutual support the enemy could quickly overwhelm them. Simulators
and simulations can capture information for instructional feedback, which is extremely handy when conducting after action reviews.\textsuperscript{11}

The SAT is used for shoot practices leading up to the Personal Weapons Test (PWT), thus saving thousands of dollars in ammunition. The IDFT is used to teach soldiers how to call for artillery support without having to put a battery of artillery in the field. This also saves thousands of dollars in manpower and ammunition. The COS allows soldiers to train in-garrison while the actual kit may be deployed overseas. This is very beneficial, as Canada does not have enough equipment to allow soldiers to train and be used overseas at the same time.

**Cost**

By using simulators and simulation to learn basic battlefield lessons, the army is freed from teaching these lessons to soldiers in an expensive field setting.\textsuperscript{12} In using simulators and simulation to their full potential and by training progressively, a unit can maximize the benefits and resources devoted to exercises and field firing events by conducting procedural and preliminary training prior to live fire training.\textsuperscript{13} The LCGT and LAVCGT are used first as individual drill trainers, then for crew drills, then troop drills, basic fire and movement, and finally for tactical scenarios (advance to contact, observation posts).

Once the unit hits the field it can go right into higher-level formations (squadron/combat team) saving days (and the associated costs) normally used for lower-level training. The field portion of training would still be expensive given ammo and maintenance costs but more could be achieved in that time due to the garrison lead-up training.

**Training Value**

Performing a training skill or a number of training skills once for the sake of having said that they were conducted is not effective training. Learning theory indicates that a training skill needs to be practised a minimum of two to three times in order to be performed proficiently and for the skill or knowledge to be retained. Further repetitions of training skills will be required to develop the ability to perform a task instinctively.\textsuperscript{14} Simulation allows skills to be practised hundreds of times.

Simulation ensures that individuals acquire certain skills before they move on to team training; likewise teams, crews, detachments or sections become competent in their collective skills before they successfully participate in troop or platoon training. Naturally troops and platoons must get their acts together before progressing on to company/squadron/battery and combined arms training. At each level there are three stages of training: demonstration, practise and confirmation. Simulation allows soldiers to complete all three stages before progressing from one level to another. Such progression is important as it alone promotes mastery of skills, common understanding of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and a shared understanding of higher intent throughout a unit. Commanders who can observe their subordinate commanders and troops undergoing progressive training will have the advantage of ensuring that their intent is understood.\textsuperscript{15}

**Time Frame**

Given budgetary pressures, exercises will continue to be short. Yet, with the use of simulators and simulation, a soldier will be able to be trained throughout the year. COs will set their exercise dates, and then sub-commanders will be able to build up from individual level to squadron level in garrison.
The whole unit will be able to extensively train, play and socialize together. Judging from history, the unit that does this is far more likely to pass the test of combat, particularly when faced with it for the first time. Due to simulation, the preparation leading up to the exercise would require little time to complete in order to meet the limited training objectives, which could be accomplished in a confined time period.

Personnel Involvement

Using simulators and simulation is very effective in getting the maximum number of personnel directly involved in training. A single individual can run one squadron/company in JCATS, so very few extra personnel are required to conduct valuable training for command post staffs. JCATS can present large enemy formations with only one person having to control them. Support services are not needed, as fuel, rations, ammo and maintenance are not required in simulation. To train any unit in the field, it takes almost a unit of the same size to provide safety staff, observer-controllers, enemy force, combat support, and the enemy force’s combat support.

Conclusion

In conclusion, training with simulation benefits a Canadian Army regiment in a resource-restricted environment. That is, the use of simulators and simulation complements and adds to field training. Soldiers, commanders and staff can be exposed to realistic battlefield conditions at a fraction of the price of field training.

With simulation and simulators, instead of learning only to manoeuvre vehicles and formations in the field, one is able to see the consequences of decisions and actions. Training with simulators and simulation allows a unit to portray these results without the vast amount of people required to run an enemy force, observer-controllers, and combat support. No fuel, ammo or maintenance is required, while wear and tear on both people and machines is next to nothing. The field portion can move into higher-level formations without practising lower level formations due to the fact that all lower level drills can be covered in the simulators.

Endnotes

5. Training Canada’s Army, p. 75.
6. Training Canada’s Army, p. 55.
7. Training Canada’s Army, p. 88.
8. Training Canada’s Army, p. 47.
10. Training Canada’s Army, p. 54.
11. Clark, etal, p. 29.
15. Training Canada’s Army, p. 54.
16. Training Canada’s Army, p. 7.
17. Lafreniere, p. 17.
In 2006, the concept of a Managed Readiness approach to planning and preparing for the Army’s operational commitments seems well established—almost old hat. Yet, Managed Readiness is a concept that has been defined, war gamed and implemented only over the past two years. This is without a doubt an incredibly short time between conception and adoption of a unique and inventive approach to doing business that provides for some predictability to operational tasks and allows for the husbanding of resources against these tasks. As with the Army Training and Operations Framework (ATOF) model that preceded it, predictability is a major cornerstone of the Managed Readiness approach. The current model provides operational tasks to specified units to 2009. Realistically, it could be projected well beyond this date.

I agree with and applaud the efforts and the intent behind the Managed Readiness approach. However, as noted in the various deliberations and war gaming efforts conducted throughout 2004 and 2005, there are some serious shortfalls to Managed Readiness that good intentions and wishful thinking cannot rectify. Many concerns about these shortfalls have been echoed at unit levels and will impact on the long-term ability of this concept to achieve what I believe is the intended end state—well trained and operationally effective units deployed overseas against a predictable and reasonable operational tempo. The intent of this article is to identify some of these shortfalls and related questions, and to provide a potential solution that hopefully, will spur further discussion. Overall, I believe that Managed Readiness is an effective approach but will only be saved, in the long term, through an immediate and effective Army restructure of policy and organizations.

The model of Managed Readiness works and can be war gamed based upon the overall premise that the Task Force (TF) structures remain relatively unchanged and therefore predictable with regard to personnel requirements per mission, and that the Army structure to force generate the sub-units and TF headquarters remain reasonably stable. Managed Readiness is based upon a three-year rotational cycle that includes preparations for operations (including a rotation through the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre [CMTC]), operational deployment or employment, and recovery or reconstitution. Overall, the personnel and organizational structures for 12 TFs are required to make the cycle truly effective and to mitigate operational tempo concerns, especially for the specialized and coincidentally distressed trades. The required precepts for the success of this model generate serious debate over the viability of the Managed Readiness concept in our current organizational structure. They are summarized below.

**Issues with Managed Readiness**

*It takes three to make two.* The overall concern raised by virtually all members involved in the debate over the Managed Readiness model is that, given current Manning levels and the number of personnel in each Area or Joint Task Force (JTF) structure who are deemed non-operationally deployable, it actually takes three infantry rifle companies to generate two deployable companies. This observation is made from an infantry perspective, yet the non-operationally deployable numbers across the Army for all trades, are relatively consistent, ranging anywhere from 10-15% of the overall strength (some estimates are higher) of the three key brigade formations as well as the four area support groups (ASG). This discrepancy is significant, as the organizational models created for the TFs, and the established training and employment cycles,
including operational waiver considerations, require the Army’s full commitment of infantry companies and other supporting trades. In theory, there are a sufficient number of infantry companies to meet the need, but in practice, we as an Army are woefully short.

**The 12 Factor.** Another consideration is what I term “the 12 factor”. The Managed Readiness structure is based on 12 TFs. The current Army organization has only nine infantry battalions and, thus it has only nine sniper and nine reconnaissance platoons to meet the operational demand. Clearly, this shortfall will create a higher operational tempo for these uniquely qualified soldiers and will also mandate a higher training tempo to maintain the personnel and capabilities of these organizations. The current model breaks down or approaches failure based upon this factor, especially when creating the TF based upon an Armoured Regiment Headquarters (three of the twelve TF Headquarters in the model). The predominately infantry requirements for these TFs will come from infantry battalions that have already been taxed to the breaking point by previous operational tasks. Requiring three companies to generate two for operational deployment within a 12-TF construct will surely break the model in short order.

Other issues that will require significant consideration and detailed thought to resolve have also been identified. One key observation is that the model creators may not have fully considered the implications of the imposed training cycle of CMTC and the corresponding full impact on Army tasks. Even a casual review of the proposed CMTC training cycle, with the supporting requirement of pre-training leading into arrival to Wainwright (Road to CMTC), will demonstrate that at least four TFs will be conducting extensive training and meeting mandated leave requirements over the primary summer tasking season. Another two task forces will also be on current deployment overseas. Depending on the times of deployment and redeployment, there may also be significant employment restrictions and waiver considerations for personnel who recently returned from overseas. Even without this last consideration, the CMTC cycle and the operational deployment cycles will see at least six of twelve potential TF organizations unavailable for the majority of the summer training/tasking cycle. With historically large summer training tasks to meet training requirements, this may have an unforeseen impact on the Army’s ability to support or achieve training goals across the Army, and may impose a significant training support tempo on personnel in the reconstitution and recovery phases of the Managed Readiness cycle.

There are other questions about the Managed Readiness model that are worth considering. Are we reinforcing old concepts that are not applicable to the current operating environment? For example, should the Armoured Regiments with their current equipment, manning and employment scheme still be considered manoeuvre headquarters under Managed Readiness, or should they be considered force providers similar to an Artillery Regiment or Engineer Regiment? Are they a combat support arm? With regard to training, have the preparation and training requirements leading into and through the CMTC cycle been truly validated? Given the more robust missions we are likely to undertake, is level 3 training as a continuation training base and level 4 training leading into the CMTC cycle truly enough? Do we have the measurable battle task standards necessary to validate or deny these premises through an analysis mechanism at CMTC? Further, is the TF organizational structure in question, with the recent deployment of three infantry companies vice two to Afghanistan? Has planned and expected reserve support under Managed Readiness been validated? Although these are all good questions for consideration, I would like to focus on one further issue—TF cohesion.

Arguably, the Marine Corps have been employing the TF model in some form for
more than 20 years. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are, in fact, 2200 personnel TFs with the required mixture of mobility and firepower assets to make them truly effective strike forces. The basic building block of an MEU however, is still an infantry battalion—not parts of it. With the strength of our infantry regimental systems intact, I believe that the current Managed Readiness model short-changes an essential element of team building—cohesion, and that cohesion would be reinforced in a more “whole” employment of our infantry battalions.

Potential Solutions

I have raised the spectre of many impending difficulties with the Managed Readiness concept. At this stage I would like to provide some potential ideas for change to mitigate some of the issues raised above. These three key ideas are tied to the planned increase in forces personnel. The achievement of these ideas will require an immediate and effective Army restructure of policy and organizations.

To alleviate the manning issues associated with generating operationally deployable units, the first consideration must be to change existing manning levels to compensate for the historical 10-15% number of personnel not available for deployment. This means adopting the TF structures and manning, for at least parts of the TF organization, at a recommended 115%. As an example, a proposal for TF light infantry company organization is (6-20-118) for a total of 144 personnel. Of this number (1-5-30) or 36 personnel would be reservists. I am proposing that the reserve numbers not be factored into the equation and that the manning of the company in Canada, rest at roughly another 23 personnel for a total of 167 personnel. This could take the form of an additional formalized small platoon organization such as a headquarters and two sections (1-4-18) or just a manpower pool with extra positions in the existing platoons and an extra Officer and Senior NCOs in the Company headquarters.

There are significant advantages to the 115% manning approach. This will allow a battalion to absorb non-effective personnel while conducting training, and maintaining companies at full strength. It will also provide the flexibility to mitigate the impact of attendance on leadership career course requirements between deployments. It will also allow for company organizations to be manned to meet operational deployment tasks regardless of the level of reserve support generated under Managed Readiness, and with reserve support, there would exist an inherent, built-in and required operational reserve for deployments. The 115% manning levels will enhance the achievement of the next recommendation.

To achieve increased cohesion in TFs, and meet the manning demands of the TF structure, I propose an organizational restructure in the Army to 12 infantry battalions, and that the TFs under Managed Readiness are based primarily on these 12 infantry battalions. Barring a LAV purchase, I recommend an increase in the Army of three light infantry battalions. This will also result in the creation of three additional sniper and reconnaissance organizations (for a total of twelve of each across the Army). In the short term this could be achieved by adopting a TF model of two infantry companies per battalion. Then, a base of three companies per battalion could be built up slowly as recruitment objectives are met. At six light and six medium or LAV battalions, there would be the opportunity for greater symmetry across the Army with spin-off benefits that I will describe below.

In the process of creating the three new infantry battalions, I would not jump at the potential manpower pool that exists within the three armoured regiments. These units can now concentrate on force generating the existing Managed Readiness requirements of a surveillance troop and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance (ISTAR) company headquarters but could also be structured to expand from a troop deployed on operations to support a full reconnaissance squadron for a TF. The three Armoured Regiments could also form the backbone TF Headquarters for domestic operations or be an undeclared asset, outside of the Managed Readiness framework, to truly provide an operational reserve for the Army beyond the two lines of tasks under Managed Readiness.

Finally and simply, the Army must invest in and reinforce the training system—in order to avoid burdening our operationally ready forces with training tasks and to set the stage for true reconstitution and recovery. Although it is the focus of another article, an expanded training system will mitigate tasks. An efficient flow of personnel through an expanded training system will have a positive impact on retention. It will also provide meaningful employment for those personnel who have valuable skills, but need a break from the operational tempo within our Army brigade formations.

Spin-Off Benefits

There are significant spin-off benefits to this restructure, some of which have already been alluded to. In this restructure, the Army would maintain a true and undeclared Army reserve through the three Armoured Regiments. It would also provide for the potential capability to augment TFs on an as required basis, with a full reconnaissance squadron. The structure alone would mitigate the operational tempo for the infantry and for the specialty organizations within the infantry by increasing the footprint of snipers and reconnaissance. But there are other potential benefits.

The creation of three more infantry battalions would potentially provide the opportunity to consolidate expertise and specialized service support. In a Western Canada example, the two LAV battalions could potentially co-locate in Shilo to take advantage of the proximity of the range facilities and potential savings and surge capability of two combined LAV maintenance facilities. Ranges could be tailored in Edmonton to meet more of a light role, while Shilo could be geared towards the LAV range requirements. This would also alleviate the range conflicts that will likely occur in Wainwright between the conduct of CMTC serials, courses and training conducted by Area schools and LAV training. Of course, another option is a LAV/Light two-battalion mix. In an Eastern Canada example, two battalions could perhaps be placed in Gagetown to mitigate the loss to that Area/JTF, of a battalion on operational deployment.

The final spin-off benefit will potentially influence our Special Forces capability within the Canadian Forces. As it stands right now, the majority of our Special Forces operators are sourced from the infantry. This is a fact and will likely not change. Clearly, expanding this base of soldiers will provide a greater population base to draw upon for recruitment into this specialized area, an area that is currently expanding with the creation of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR).

Conclusion

The demands of our current operational tempo and operational environments are significant. The Managed Readiness model is intended to provide some balance in achieving these demands. Managed Readiness is a concept with very good intentions, but with some significant deficiencies that could break the system before it truly commences. Current manning policies and our Army structure will undoubtedly undermine the viability of this model. As a potential solution to the deficiencies described here, I propose an immediate change to our Army structure from nine to twelve infantry battalions—an increase of three light infantry battalions. This will expand the infantry
footprint especially in those specialized elements of reconnaissance and snipers. The structure change could be achieved in the short term by initially adopting a structure of two-rifle companies per battalion, eventually expanding to three per battalion.

I further recommend a change to manning policies to ensure TF structures are maintained at a minimum of 115%. This will ensure a greater degree of flexibility in manning, meeting tasks, and maintaining an operationally ready reserve during deployments. It will ameliorate the historical 10-15% of non-operationally deployable personnel in the Army. Finally, I recommend an increase to our training system to alleviate the task burden that is superimposed on the field force. All of these recommendations combined, will produce significant spin-off benefits to the Army in the short and long term. Together, they will set the conditions for a more successful Managed Readiness program that incorporates more flexibility and provides the Army with a true operational reserve.

Endnotes
2. DLFR Army G3 Conferences—September 2004 (Ottawa), November 2004 (Halifax), and March 2005 (Montreal). Also Army Collective Training Conference and War Game 23-24 March 2005.
3. Ibid.
4. For a good description of distressed trades and the issues related to achieving recruitment objectives for the Canadian Forces see, Christopher Ankersen, “The Personnel Challenge in Defence Administration,” in Transforming National Defence Administration ed. Douglas L. Bland (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queens University, 2005), 31-44.
5. As discussed in detail and echoed by all Land Force Areas at the various conferences listed at note 2.