

THE ARMY DOCTRINE & TRAINING BULLETIN

Canada's Professional Journal on Army Issues

**Intelligence Operations:
What's in it for the Commander?**

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Guest Editorial

CWO P.J. Wonderham, MMM,CD

RSM, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

I will begin by thanking the Editorial Board of the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin for giving me the opportunity of addressing such an important audience.

Unfortunately, as is often the case, I have procrastinated and now I find myself sitting at the corner of Khaki Trail and Blue Route frantically scribbling some of my thoughts in a field message book. Having said that, I can think of no better place to get an undistorted view of good basic leadership at the junior and senior non-commissioned officer level. From this vantage point I am also humbly reminded of our main goal (for all of us), and that is: to train, support and motivate these young soldiers with cold, wet feet and two day old cam-stick on their faces to get to the objective; and at the same time mentor them into model members of Canada's society. That's a tall order !

I am a firm believer that basic leadership principles and the responsibilities of leaders has not changed over the years. (See the extract from the Canadian Army, 1957 *Manual of Administration and Discipline* at the end of my message). I recall that my first tank commander, over 30 years ago, was an excellent leader. He was extremely competent, dedicated and very professional. I am also aware that over the years our army, like our society, has become much more complicated; therefore, we must constantly update the tools in our leadership tool bag, or we just ain't going to "cut it" as effective leaders in today's army.

I just returned from an exchange tour at the largest non-commissioned officer training academy in the world, not as big as the corner of Khaki and Blue Route, but big enough. The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) in Fort Bliss Texas trains and graduates thousands of NCOs from the United States and other countries annually. The senior course is nine months long and places NCOs in an environment where they can discuss current leadership and doctrine issues.

"...over the years our army, like our society, has become much more complicated; therefore we must constantly update the tools in our leadership tool bag, or we just ain't going to `cut it' as effective leaders in today's army."

As you can imagine this academy is very costly, both in terms of dollars and manpower. Having had a good hard look at it, I think that our army offers the same opportunities only in a less formal setting. Our formal leadership courses do a fine job of teaching us the art and the principles of leadership, but we cannot expect to graduate from these courses and stop our development there. We have the doctrine and opportunities to enhance our formal education.

The newly released manual entitled *Canada's Army*, the Army Lessons Learned Centre publications, and this journal, *The Army Training and Doctrine Bulletin*, are all examples of material available to enhance our formal education. Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) and our training seminars for leadership in a diversified army are designed to make good leaders better. If you are not getting NCO professional development training at your unit...you should. We must read all the available material, discuss it, and get our officers and soldiers involved in open dialogue on these subjects.

The other day I was delighted to see a copy of the Army Lessons Learned Centre *Dispatches* in the field. At the time it was being used to hold a camp stove naphtha tank in place. Although this was not its primary purpose, at least it was in the field and I am sure that it had already been read and discussed.

We should all be proud of ourselves for the strides and progress we have made over the past years. However, keeping in step is not something we can only do some of the time and that ol' parade square isn't as level as it once was.

The next time you are at your favourite corner, be it "Khaki and Blue", "5 fingers" or perhaps "McKinney Defile", or in your unit lines or armoury, put some of your thoughts or discussion points on paper and use this Bulletin as another tool to open dialogue. As Lieutenant-General Leach, the Chief of the Land Staff wrote in the first edition of this publication, "Use this journal to expand your knowledge...The army will gain from your effort".



Duties and Responsibilities of Warrant Officers and Non-commissioned Officers

Extracted from the Manual of Administration and Discipline (Canadian Army-1957)

1. Discipline and welfare of men in units and establishments are dependent to a great extent on the manner in which warrant officers and non-commissioned officers carry out their duties and maintain their positions. Owing to the influence that they exercise on the discipline, efficiency and moral of the Canadian Forces as a whole. It is essential that the importance of their status be recognized by all officers and men.
2. As the non-commissioned officer is the link connecting men with their officers, the most exemplary conduct at all times and in every situation is demanded of him. He must be active, diligent and attentive to his dress and appearance, careful of the honour of his unit, and perfectly acquainted with his duty.
3. The maintenance of discipline is essential to the fighting efficiency of the unit, and the foundation of every system must be the non-commissioned officers. They will, therefore, be selected from the ranks not only on account of their leadership abilities, good conduct and military appearance, but also in the expectation that they will be capable of maintaining discipline by their ability, character and vigilance.
4. Non-commissioned officers are at all times to show a proper sense of their rank and station in their unit. They must remember that their authority will be increased or lessened in proportion to the respect that they create in the men by the conscientious manner in which they perform all duties. Their respectful bearing towards their superiors, and the considerations they show to those over whom they exercise authority.
5. The prevention of crime should be the aim of everyone in authority, while the shielding of it and the overlooking of irregularities is one of the greatest offences non-commissioned officers can commit. They must avoid undue familiarity with their subordinates and, as far as possible associate with those of their own rank.
6. Non-commissioned officers will, on no account, use improper language towards the men: they should always be firm and prompt though considerate in manner.
7. When giving an order, non-commissioned officers will do so briefly and distinctly in the most positive terms, and not in the form of a request. They must insist upon prompt and strict compliance with their orders, but at the same time use their authority with discretion and never allow themselves to be influenced by prejudice towards any individual.
8. All non-commissioned officers are, or should be, potential instructors. They must be in possession of up-to-date training manuals and must endeavor constantly to increase their military knowledge.

9. It is the duty of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers to preserve order and regularity among the other men wherever they are. This responsibility rests upon them whether they are on duty or not.

10. In summary, all officers look to them for loyal support in maintaining the efficiency and traditions of the Forces and junior men look to them for direct assistance. They should:

- a. set an example of loyalty and discipline;
- b. accept the responsibility of their positions;
- c. work at all times for the well-being and efficiency of the Forces as a whole;
- d. exercise tact; and
- e. obey the orders of their superiors with the same cheerfulness and alacrity with which they expect to be obeyed by their juniors.

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From the Managing Editor

Captain John Grodzinski, CD

Any doctrine, custom, or tradition advanced as a reason for doing a thing in war _ or not doing it _ indicates the presence of the Dead Hand (of the past). Suspicion should immediately arise and the matter should be examined in the cold light of logic, going back not to old quotations, old axioms, old opinions, or old doctrines, but straight to scientific fundamentals. For war is not won by tradition, but by the utilization of solid facts logically applied.

Canadian Army Training Memorandum, No. 13, April 1942

When this quotation was published, the Canadian Army Overseas was transitioning from the various divisions, independent brigades and independent units raised or sent to England between 1939 and 1941, to a structured field army with an army headquarters, two corps headquarters, corps and army troops, five divisions and two independent brigades. In the three year period, the Army underwent revolutionary change. In 1942, the Army looked nothing like it had in 1939. New organizations appeared, new tactics were developed, and the experimentation of new weapons and equipment was underway. These changes brought a host of new demands upon the army leadership. Staff training, a rarity in the pre-war army, expanded severalfold as dozens of officers attended Canadian and British staff schools. Similarly, training of non-commissioned leaders grew to meet the demands of the Army. Leaders for formations and units had to be found and trained. Surprisingly, many of the so-called 'qualified' leaders extant in 1939 were found lacking in professional knowledge, skill and physical robustness. A group of new leaders emerged from the junior officer ranks, a group that was more receptive to the changes and one that was less burdened by past practices.

Aside from not being at war, the army today is undergoing somewhat similar changes. The oft mentioned 'dwindling' resources are partly responsible; more significant is the fundamental shift in command style and doctrine and structure, brought on by a number of individuals. Technology too, is having an influence. Although my crystal ball cannot leach out the secrets of how the army will look in the next few years, our published doctrine has much to say. Gone is directive command. The focus is to properly convey intent and the desirable endstate, not to get bogged in the detail to get there. Doctrinally, we have shifted our sights to the other side of the warfighting coin and focussed on manoeuvre rather than attritional warfare.

This leaves us where our army was in 1942. Those who could not cope in the new environment were removed, cashiered or placed out of harm's way. I am not suggesting that we sack half the officer corps, rather, like the junior officers of the Second World War who emerged as battalion and formation commanders, or even the innovative thinkers of the pre-war army, we should be receptive to new ideas. As the quote above says, we should not rely on "old quotations, old axioms, old opinions, or old doctrines" (okay, if you pause here and say, well, he is using an old quote, you're missing the point). In order to do so, we must develop ourselves. I do not believe the army is yet capable of doing this properly. I do not believe that completing a few DIs in Kingston or Toronto on doctrine, history or international politics makes you knowledgeable in these subjects. Are these insitutions academic? How much time is given to prepare? How seriously are the subjects approached and how demanding is the standard? The answer is that we must *teach* ourselves and develop *disciplined* thought processes. Emotional opinions ("I am speaking from the heart...") or those based upon casual reading must be avoided. Let us become a thinking army.

Articles In this Issue:

"Information Operations: Whither Mission Command"

The Canadian army has adopted information operations as one of the six combat functions with its principal objective being the achievement of information dominance over an adversary, and manoeuvre warfare with its particular emphasis on the mission command. Digitization will greatly enhance situational awareness and operational tempo, improve synchronization and serve to unify operations. However, where information is scant, false, or contradictory, operational success depends on the ability of commanders to make appropriate and timely decisions. Increased tempo, coordination and synchronization are also dependent upon the subordinate commanders' initiative when making decisions and actions in support of the higher commander's intent. This paper contends that the eventual digitization of the battlefield with its commensurate ability to create an all-informed, seamless, real-time picture of the battlefield could create the illusion of information infallibility. Moreover, as more information is available to commanders at higher levels, the more those commanders will desire to make decisions and control actions several levels down. In other words, the increasing ability to digitize the battlefield endangers the foundations of manoeuvre warfare and, in particular, the philosophy of mission command.

"The Psychology of the Bayonet"

Soldiers have traditionally had an aversion to using the bayonet in combat; they invariably kill better from a distance. As a soldier closes with an adversary, the psychological impact of killing increases. It would be naive to assume that bayonet fighting and its training did not serve an important function in the psychological preparation of soldiers for combat, but soldiers will rarely involve themselves in direct personal battle with the bayonet, if it can be avoided. The question of the bayonet's relevance on the modern battlefield is examined in this article. It is not a definitive history on the bayonet and bayonet fighting; but will hopefully serve as a forum for the reader to examine their own personal beliefs on the validity and conduct of bayonet training.

"Surviving in a Whistleblowing Environment"

For years now, the media have been deluged by documents and 'tips' from individuals within the Department of National Defence. The resulting exposure has helped fuel a five-year firestorm of negative publicity, contributed to a serious decline in public confidence in the Canadian Forces, and resulted in poor morale among its members; by the same token, this has unquestionably been a catalyst for significant and much needed reform. It is an emotive issue, rarely written about in the Canadian context and less often discussed in open forum. The dilemma of 'to blow or not to blow the whistle' is a profound ethical decision that tests the bonds of loyalty to the organization like no other. The frequency of whistleblowing in the Department of National Defence, the motivations for doing so, the type of information being leaked and to whom it is given, all offer valuable insights into the ethical condition of the department. This article explores this phenomenon. First, it distinguishes between whistleblowing and leaking. Secondly, it describes the effects of this behaviour, and proposes that reasons for the high number of leaks in the Department of National Defence. Finally, it suggests conditions whereby whistleblowing may be morally justified, and applies those conditions to a number of cases.

"An Army for the 21st Century"

The Canadian Forces has failed to develop a basic vision of the strategic, operational and tactical environments within which it will conduct operations 25 years hence. Lacking a coherent vision of the future battlefield, the army is incapable of developing relevant doctrine and structures for future operations or even acquiring effective equipment. The army remains a prisoner of its past. Despite the general adoption of the

U.S. battlefield framework of close, deep, and rear operations, the Canadian army has resolutely refused to prepare itself for any form of combat beyond the conventional close battle. Our formations lack the structure, doctrine and equipment to conduct operations across the whole of their battlespace. Simply put, activities not directly associated with the conduct of the close battle are dismissed as supporting acts to the central drama. Although a fundamental element of our doctrine, the constituent components of the battlefield framework are simply ignored or, even worse, given the most elementary analysis. Neither our brigade nor our divisional headquarters possess the structure or doctrinal understanding to effect any mission beyond the close battle. The intent of this paper is to stimulate discussion on the type of army our nation needs now and for the foreseeable future.

"Reconsidering Amphibiosity"

'Amphibiosity' is a slang term first coined by the British to embrace all thinking and undertakings related to amphibious warfare. It is a term familiar to Americans and our NATO allies, but in Canada it remains an oddity. This is now changing as the Canadian Forces rediscovers the role amphibiosity must play in Canadian foreign and defence affairs. When the proposition that Canada should reconsider amphibiosity first emerged during Exercise MARCOT 96 preparation in late 1995, there was shocked surprise followed by howls of derision in many quarters: "Canada does not *do* amphibious warfare!" Now, three years later, the Minor Amphibious Operations Study (MAOS) is nearing completion. Linked to it are a number of other closely-related initiatives which have joined the MAOS to develop a Canadian joint amphibious warfare capability. The near-simultaneous and independent emergence of these projects testifies to a widespread appreciation in all three environments that the Canadian Forces must grow beyond its traditional enemy-specific, theatre-specific, and 'continental and deep-water' posture, and embrace some form of amphibiosity. This article moves beyond the question of requirement - the 'why' we should consider amphibiosity - and focuses on 'how' the Canadian navy is reconsidering amphibiosity, in the hope that the constructs and models presented herein will facilitate discussion amongst army personnel. The article concludes by describing a 'way ahead' for the amphibious initiative.

"The Army and Public Affairs"

This decade has witnessed dramatic swings in public opinion regarding the Canadian Forces. From a high in the early 1990's, the public's confidence has been eroded through a series of tragedies that has too often left the public aghast. Despite several well-executed operations, this confidence has not been restored. The importance of public affairs and communications has not been lost on senior commanders and staff officers within the army. They have discovered the importance of getting the message out and in doing so have sought to improve the situation by producing communication strategies and plans to ensure that army issues are effectively communicated to the public. However, as this paper argues, the message given has been more often been left to vagarious acts rather than considered, developed strategies. This article examines this issue during this decade and offers many enlightening insights.



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The Canadian Forces Journal

The Professional Forum of the Armed Forces

Call for Submissions

A Message to our Readers
from the Editor of
"The Canadian Forces
Journal" ...

The Canadian Forces Journal is the in-house professional peer review forum for articles by both military and civilian personnel on Canadian security and defence issues.

The Canadian Forces Journal is issued under the authority of the Minister of National Defence and produced quarterly by the Royal Military College of Canada.

As the professional journal of the Canadian Forces, *The Journal* will publish peer reviewed academic/professional papers, and shorter, editor reviewed, commentary. *The CF Journal* is the forum for open discussion and the free exchange of critical ideas about Canadian defence issues broadly conceived to include, but not restricted to, security policy, force structures, training, professionalism, equipment, procurement, doctrine and future developments. Articles and comments are invited from all ranks of the Canadian Forces and from the academic community concerned with defence matters—past, present, and future.

The CF Journal will be published quarterly, with the first issue slated from the fall or winter of 1999, depending on the number and quality of submissions. Submissions to *The CF Journal* will be reviewed by an Editorial Board consisting of officers (serving or retired) and qualified academics. Prospective authors should review the guidelines for submission.

Normally submissions will be required at least eight weeks prior to the publication month but we are now accepting articles for the first several issues and will require a broad selection before commencing serial production.

Guidelines for Article Submission

Articles of reasonable length will be considered for publication, the ideal being 2000-6000 words. Articles can be submitted in either official language. **Official Articles** presenting service or element specific news or information of general interest to the defence community will also be considered. **Opinion Pieces/Points of Debate** should be no longer than 1500 words. **Letters to the Editor** are to be a maximum of 500 words.

Usage and spelling are to be in accordance with *The Canadian Style: A Guide to Writing and Editing* (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) or, *Le guide du redacteur, Translation Bureau* (PWGSC, 1996) and *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* or the *Petit Robert*. Articles can be submitted electronically to the editor or by conventional mail with a disc copy (preferably in MSWord 7). Supporting tables, charts and photographs should be included and printed separately. Endnotes and a bibliography are required.

Contributors should include personal details such as their current appointment.

Considered, reasoned debate is central to the intellectual health of the CF. Articles designed to promote thought or further discussion are therefore welcomed within the confines of current security regulations. All ranks and members of the defence community are encouraged to submit material for consideration.

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From the Directorate of Army Doctrine

The Banning of the Anti-Personnel Mine

Background and the Ottawa Convention

On 3 and 4 December 1997, 123 countries signed the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction*. This event was the culmination of one year's work by like-minded nations to completely ban anti-personnel mines after failing to achieve substantial improvements through the 1996 review of the *1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices*. The 1980 protocol regulated the use of these devices but did not ban or impose restrictions on the production, stockpiling and export of anti-personnel mines.

The banning of the anti-personnel mine was driven by humanitarian and political concerns. In the wake of the Ottawa Agreement, military forces around the world are assessing its impact on combat capability, the legal implications of the convention on operations, and replacement technologies.

The motivation to ban anti-personnel mines was the global humanitarian crisis resulting from their indiscriminate use. An anti-personnel mine costs between US\$3 to US\$10¹ to produce, making it one of the weapons of choice in many developing nations. According to the United Nations, at least 110 million anti-personnel mines have been laid worldwide, killing or maiming about 26,000 people per year. Misuse has resulted in serious barriers to reconstruction in many developing countries long after the conflict that brought their use has ended. Canadian soldiers have witnessed the wanton effect of these devices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique. While acknowledging that anti-personnel mines have some military utility, the international community considered the humanitarian cost so unproportionately high that it demanded a ban on the use of the anti-personnel mine.

Demonstrating Canada's strong support for the underlying principles of banning anti-personnel mines and in keeping with our leading role in the campaign, on 2 December 1997 Canada was the first nation to ratify the Convention. Concurrently, the federal government passed legislation (Bill C-22 - The Anti-Personnel Mines Implementation Act) making it illegal for any Canadian to:

- Place an anti-personnel mine under, on or near the ground or other surface area with the intent to cause the explosion of the anti-personnel mine by the presence, proximity or contact of a person; or
- Develop, produce or otherwise acquire, possess or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, an anti-personnel mine, or stockpile anti-personnel mines.

The maximum penalty for a violation of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act is a \$500,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment. The Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act is applicable to anyone in Canada, including foreign citizens. The Act is also applicable to Canadian Forces personnel serving anywhere in the world. Any Canadian Forces member serving with the Canadian Forces, on international staff, exchange postings or liaison postings who violate the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act is liable to prosecution under section 130 of the National Defence Act.

Impact on the Canadian Forces

An anti-personnel mine is defined as a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. The Canadian interpretation of this definition cues on the concept of "an innocent act", meaning that any explosive device set off by an innocent act, such as walking through an area, is considered to be an anti-personnel mine. Anti-tank mines (a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle and that will damage or destroy

the vehicle) are not included in the Ottawa Convention.

The impact of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention is that no mine or device that can be exploded by an innocent act can be employed by the Canadian army. Therefore, all anti-personnel mines and tilt rod fuzes in our inventory were destroyed, and the employment of explosive booby traps as a substitute for anti-personnel mines is prohibited. However, anti-handling devices that are part of, linked to, attached to, or placed under an anti-tank mine that detonates the mine when it is tampered with or intentionally disturbed are permitted. An example of an anti-handling device is a switch connected to explosives such that when the anti-tank mine is disturbed, the explosives detonate. Command detonated mines or explosive devices, such as the Claymore, are not banned.

At the tactical and operational level the impact of the Ottawa Convention is much broader such that the Canadian army cannot assist, encourage or induce activities prohibited by the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention. The legal implications of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention on operations has been analyzed and the following controls apply²:

- **Combined Operations.** Canada may participate in combined operations with a state that is not party to the Convention, however, Canadian troops will not use, request, even indirectly, or encourage the use of anti-personnel mines by others.
- **Rules of Engagement.** When participating in combined operations, Canada will not agree to the Combined Rules of Engagement section that would authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. This would not, however, prevent states that are not signatories to the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention from using anti-personnel mines for the defence of their contingents.
- **Right to Self-Defence.** The right of states which are not signatories or party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention to use anti-personnel mines is not prevented by the convention.
- **Operational Plans.** When engaged in combined operations Canada will not agree to operational plans, which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. Canadians may participate in operational planning as members of a multi-national staff, however, they may not participate in planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. This would not prevent a state that is not a signatory or party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention from participating in a multi-national force or planning the use of anti-personnel mines by its own forces for strictly national purposes. Canadian Forces personnel will not be involved in such planning.
- **Command and Control.** The use of anti-personnel mines will not be authorized in cases where Canada is in command of a combined force. Likewise, if Canadian Forces personnel are being commanded by other nationalities, they are prohibited from participating in the use of, or planning for the use of anti-personnel mines.
- **Operations on Previously Mined Terrain.** Canadian troops may take over operational responsibility for an area in which anti-personnel mines have previously been laid. If self-neutralizing or self-destructing anti-personnel mines have been used, Canada will not seek their replacement once they expire. If the anti-personnel mines are not self-neutralizing or self destructing, Canada will only monitor the minefield and maintain the marking, but will not conduct the maintenance thereof. Under no circumstances shall a Canadian request or encourage the use of anti-personnel mines in an area planned for occupation by Canadian troops.
- **Clearing Minefields.** Responsibility for clearing minefields will depend upon the circumstances. There is no legal obligation to clear mines simply because Canada is conducting operations in an area of responsibility during peace support or other operations. An obligation may arise at the cessation of hostilities depending upon circumstances such as the degree of control exercised over the territory, the terms of any peace accord or other bilateral or multilateral agreement.
- **Training.** Countermine training is permitted. The Anti-Personnel Mine Convention specifically

permits signatories to retain a small number of anti-personnel mines for research and development and training in mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction techniques.

- ***Transit of Anti-Personnel Mines.*** The Anti-Personnel Mine Convention does not prohibit the transit of anti-personnel mines, which is defined as the movement of anti-personnel mines within a state, or from a state, to its forces abroad. Canada, however, discourages the use of Canadian territory, airspace or territorial waters for the purpose of transit of anti-personnel mines.

In the spirit of the Anti-Personnel Convention, and to further its ideals and goals, there are a number of activities that are permitted by Canadian Forces personnel. They include:

- The placement, acquisition, possession or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines, as authorized by the Government of Canada, for the development of, and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques.
- The acquisition, possession or transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of their destruction.
- The acquisition, possession or transfer of an anti-personnel mine that has been deactivated as prescribed by Government of Canada regulations or that has been deactivated by:
- Removing all explosive substances, including the priming charge, booster charge and main charge, from the anti-personnel mine, including from any fuse, percussion cap or detonator; and
- Removing or destroying the anti-personnel mine's priming or detonating mechanism or rendering the mechanism inoperable in such a way that its function cannot readily be restored.
- Participation in operations, exercises or other military activities with the armed forces of a state that is not a party to the convention that engage in activity prohibited by the convention if that participation does not amount to active assistance in the prohibited activity.

The Way Ahead

Militaries are understandably reluctant to suddenly give up a weapon system that has been part of their doctrine and procedures for decades. The speed with which the Convention was implemented surprised many and little time or resources were dedicated to developing alternatives when the Convention was signed in December 1997. The Canadian Forces was not an exception. The challenge now facing the Canadian Forces and other militaries around the world is to quantify the loss of the anti-personnel mine and determine if a capability gap has resulted. Most of our allies have embarked upon various means of studying the problem and providing solutions. The proffered solutions vary by the technological sophistication and industrial base of the nation involved.

Aside from interpreting the legal ramifications of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention, the Canadian Forces, initial response for determining the impact on operations is the initiation of an operational research study. The aim of the study is to determine the impact of removing the anti-personnel mine on land force operations and to determine if replacement technologies are necessary, and if so, define the requirements. Participants in the study include the Director Army Doctrine, Director Land Strategic Concepts, Director Military Engineering and the Director Science and Technology Land all under the auspices of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies. The operational research study will address the following aspects:

- Identify the capability that the anti-personnel mine provided and identify those capabilities that should be replicated to compensate for their loss;
- Examine the impact of removing the anti-personnel mine from land force operations at the tactical level;
- Determine if a system to replace the capabilities lost by the removal of the anti-personnel mine is necessary;
- If a replacement system is required, identify the requirements, alternative concepts and associated research efforts; and
- Analyze concepts and provide recommendations for further analysis.

Based on very preliminary analysis a number of functions performed by the anti-personnel mine on the battlefield have been identified. These functions are subsets of two main capabilities: surveillance and lethality. Under surveillance, anti-personnel mines provide early warning in all types of terrain, particularly in ground hidden from view (dead ground). Its lethal nature enables them to protect anti-tank mines, reinforce existing obstacles and adversely effect the enemy's morale. The challenge is to examine these functions, quantify them, and determine if other weapon systems or processes compensate for the loss of the anti-personnel mine, and propose alternatives for any identified capability gap.

Conclusion

It is essential that all Canadian Forces personnel fully understand the ramifications of this unique piece of arms control legislation, particularly the legal implications. The utility of the anti-personnel mine varied from nation to nation, depending on how they were employed and integrated with other weapons systems into the overall plan. Once the analysis by the Canadian Forces and our allies is complete, the capability of the anti-personnel mine will be more clearly understood and the effect of its loss made more clear. Efforts can then be directed to replacing this lost capability with either new devices, modified processes or enhanced effectiveness elsewhere.



Endnotes

1 UNICEF _ *The State of the World's Children* 1996. [\[Return\]](#)

² Canadian Force Manual _ *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level*. [\[Return\]](#)

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE CAPABILITIES	
Surveillance	Provides early warning
	Economy of force measure in close terrain and dead ground
Lethality	Inhibits early or rapid hand breaching of anti-vehicle obstacles
	Inflicts personnel casualties
	Reinforces existing obstacles
	Adversely affects enemy morale, instills caution
	Provides close protection to defending units
	Delays or canalizes the enemy
	Hinders the enemy's use of drop/landing zones

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From The Directorate Of Army Training

Army Leadership Development

Leadership, and our practice of it, is perhaps the most emotive subject one could broach in this, or any other army journal. We would rather admit to being bad drivers than confess to an instant of poor leadership. Our exploits as tried and fearless leaders of soldiers are the stuff of legend, unassailable by any that have not undergone the same trials as us. The purpose here however, is not to philosophize, but rather to communicate the progress achieved to date in the area of leadership development and, more importantly, to outline where work will be focussed in the future.

In the past, the army has regarded the development of its key leaders somewhat as a process of osmosis. It was supposed that over time, and given a variety of exposures in both command and staff appointments, both officers, warrant officer and non-commissioned officers would naturally emerge equipped with the requisite skills, knowledge and traits to assume increased levels of responsibility, and higher rank. In the post-Second World War army when most officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers had experienced combat, it might have been reasonable to assume that as they rose through the hierarchy, they developed the desired characteristics to lead the army into the future. For the most part this proved to be true. The type of threat posed by the Warsaw Pact in the early phases of the Cold War did not differ drastically from that in the Second World War and the Korean Conflict. Both the enemy and the terrain were familiar and technological advances were limited, so there was no reason to suppose that the tried and true leadership paradigms of the recent past would not win the day.


As we entered the mid-nineteen seventies however, several of the comfortable constants changed. First, the generation of experienced combat leaders, on which the 'leadership development through osmosis' hypothesis was predicated, retired from service, leaving a new, untried generation at the helm. Secondly, the much touted revolution in military affairs (RMA) began, bringing with it drastic and accelerating changes in both the nature of conflict and the technology available to fight it. Finally, both the enemy and the battlefield terrain completely changed at the beginning of this decade, eradicating completely any vestige of the 'comfortable constants'.

The 1990's have been painful. Significant budget and personnel cuts, Office of the Auditor General reports indicting our efficiency, gender integration, departmental business planning and performance measurement, Somalia, Bakovici and the Minister's Report to the Prime Minister have forced the realization that 'osmosis' can no longer be the fundamental tenet of leader development. Coping with an accelerating pace of change requires a re-think of how to prepare the sergeants and captains of today to be the army senior leadership of 2015.

The Army Senior Officer's Retreat

Having recognised these influences, the need to 'Renew Leadership' was acknowledged at the Army Senior Officer's Retreat (ASOR) in the fall of 1997. The goal was stated as:

The development of leaders who have earned the trust and confidence of their troops through proven, professional competence,



genuine caring for the welfare of subordinates, and ethical and accountable behaviour.

The Strategic Framework

'Renew Leadership' was developed into one of the six Strategies which form the basis of the Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance (LFSDG). Figure 1 shows the goals and objectives of the strategy mapped against a framework that guides the co-ordinated development of all six of the Army Renewal Strategies. There are four priorities common to all, and they are represented in the boxes to the left in the diagram. Each priority generates an objective, depicted as an octagon, and a series of supporting sub-objectives shown as ellipses.



Figure 1 _ Renew Leadership Strategic Framework

Priority One: Unity

The centre of gravity in this renewal process is the establishment of unity; that is to say unity of thought, unity of action, and unity of purpose in Army Leadership Development.

- **Professionalism and Ethos.** The establishment of army professionalism and ethos is the first step. The professional and ethical foundation of army leadership is articulated in *Canada's Army*. It sets out the guiding principles by which army leaders are to be developed, and the traits, knowledge and skills they are expected to possess. It describes the moral component of combat power as the army ethos and provides guidance on how to foster it in the force. It is published now, and is compulsory reading for all army leaders.
- **Leadership Guidance.** Command guidance to elucidate the leadership tenets articulated in *Canada's Army* is being promulgated in such publications as the previously mentioned LFSDG and this journal. Separate guidance for leadership and conduct in training is planned. These documents will set out the commander's expectations for the practice of leadership by all his subordinates and explain how *Canada's Army* is to be interpreted. It is just as important that a professional and constructive dialogue with widespread participation of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers be fostered. Captain Trollope's Stand Up Table commentary in Volume 1, Number 2 of this publication is an excellent start.
- **Quality Trainers.** Leadership example is the most powerful tool in the development of army leaders. Consequently, it is imperative that we ensure the correct instructional environment. Instructors at all levels must be carefully selected and prepared to operate within an environment that encourages professional development, allows sufficient preparation time and recognizes their contribution.
- **The Leader Development Model.** The process by which an individual is selected to be a leader, learns leadership principles, practises leading and is evaluated, is depicted in the leader development model (Figure 2). The aim of this process is to identify those who possess the desired traits, knowledge and skills to perform well at the next level of command, and provide them with the requisite training, education and experience to do so.



Figure 2 is the army Leader Development Model as it is currently envisaged. It is a process that depends upon leader example and clear standards and requirements. It depicts the steps required at each stage in a leader's professional development. After initial selection, whether a sergeant or colonel, one learns, practices, and is observed/evaluated, and then, if necessary,




Figure 2 _ The Leader Development Model

counselled, corrected and re-motivated. At this point, one returns to the learn and practice steps to hone skills, and over time becomes an effective leader at that rank. Having achieved this standard one becomes eligible for selection to the next rank. Of course, validation of the requirements and standards is an ongoing process that ensures the

model continues to produce the required output: effective army leaders. The cycle is repeated at each successive professional development period with particular emphasis on selection for the next stage being based on potential.

Priority Two: Short Term Sustainability

Today more than ever, the profession of arms requires that leaders, both officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, continue to improve their skills to meet the demands of the ever-changing operational environment. This implies the requirement for enhanced professional development models, and a more effective leadership assessment framework. The aim of the initiatives in priority two is to 'Build the Army Leader Development System'.

- **Sustainable Professional Development Models.** These models are built upon a framework of necessary tasks and skills at the Canadian Forces, army and Military Occupation Code (MOC) levels with separate models for both officers and non-commissioned members. They will align the training and employment in a leader's career profile to ensure the needs of the army are met, while the potential of the individual is developed to the fullest. This is a significant undertaking that has seen the Canadian Forces and Army Officer Specifications completed in draft, and MOC Writing Boards scheduled for spring of 1999. The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) General Specifications will be completely reviewed beginning in January and complete by June 1999. Army and MOC NCM Specifications will then follow. Once the requirement is established, training standard and training plan writing boards will determine how all army individual training is to be conducted. It is anticipated that changes from this first principles approach will be delivered in 2001 for officers and 2002 for NCMs.
- **Leadership Effectiveness Assessment.** Selection of future leaders is the key component of 'The Leader Development Model' at Figure 2. The new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) is the mechanism for selection, but further study is required to determine if CFPAS is entirely sufficient for Army purposes. What should be the role of course reports (for example, the Combat Team Commanders' Course)? Do we have the correct board methodology for the specific selection of commanding officers or regimental sergeants-major? Do good commanding officers necessarily make good strategic level commanders? Are there further appraisal measures necessary? Much work remains to be done.

Priority Three: Maximized And Sustainable Combat Capability

The aim of this priority is to ensure that the Army Leadership Development system continues to deliver leaders who can lead the army into the future.

- **Training and Education.** As with any skill, leadership requires honing through structured practical experience and continuous training and education. Having mapped the requirements for training and education for both officers and NCM's in the Professional Development Model, we must deliver programmes that answer this need. Initiatives as the university degree program at the Royal Military

College of Canada and the University of Ottawa are good examples. Technical training available to NCMs also requires updating and fresh approaches to delivery are being examined.

- **Practical Leader Experience.** Education and training do not stand-alone; they must be forged into ability through practise and evaluation. As field-training opportunities dwindle, an alarming percentage of leaders complete a tour of command without having led their soldiers in even the primary operations of war. A policy that states the minimum number and type of field evaluations required for a command tour to be 'complete' will have to be considered. Adventurous and arduous training exercises are particularly well suited to junior leader development, and although this type of training is an attractive target in cost cutting drives, evidence suggests that they are high value activities which should be pursued whenever possible.

Priority Four: Prepare For The Future

Finally, we must not allow our perception of effective leadership to calcify. Situational awareness and Command, Control and Information Systems (C2IS) developments are having real impact on how operational commanders will lead forces in the future, and that future is remarkably close. The key to understanding these impacts lies in the realization that, to date the army has focussed on fielding 'equipment' vice 'capability'. Consequently we potentially face the situation of deploying new command support tools within an environment where commanders have not been properly prepared to function.

Conclusion

Much of the leadership renewal strategy should be controversial. After all, it is the very basis of this changing profession. Many key questions must be answered—what is the correct (and affordable) balance between education, training and experience? Indeed, what is the future role of the officer? The NCM? How do we prepare and select leaders to function at the operational and strategic levels when the bulk of the army is focussed at the tactical level? What level of technical awareness do officers and NCMs require to function in the 21st Century? What does the army require of its militia leaders? How should the mission command philosophy be incorporated into training?

Answers to these and the hundreds of other questions must be sought, as part of the recovery process for army leadership development. The following initiatives are the beginning of what will be a long and detailed process:

- a joint Queen's University and Army Training Authority session scheduled for June 1999 to tackle 'The future role of the Army NCO';
- a full review of officer and NCM specifications—tasks, skills and knowledge requirements, underway now and complete in 2000; and
- a full occupational analysis to begin the summer 1999 to determine current and future career job and training profiles of combat arms officers and NCMs.

Inputs and discussion from the officer and NCO community at large will be a vital component that will factor directly and indirectly in the results achieved. Constructive debate therefore is encouraged and necessary to ensure that the army is prepared for the future.



Information Operations:

Whither Mission Command?

Recent developments in Canadian army operational level doctrine can be characterized by two key tenets. First, the adoption of information operations as one of six combat functions with its principal objective being the achievement of information dominance over an adversary. Second, the adoption of the manoeuvre warfare approach to warfighting with its particular emphasis on the mission command philosophy of command. Facilitating both tenets are contemporary developments in the application of information technology to the battlefield. It seems obvious that the `digitization¹ of the battlefield will greatly enhance the army's ability to achieve optimum situational awareness on the battlefield thereby directly and monumentally increasing the army's ability, at higher levels of command, to enhance operational tempo, and improve synchronization and unification of operations to a level far superior to that of the past. However, in combat situations where information is scant, false, or contradictory, operational success depends on the ability of all commanders to act on their own initiative, and make appropriate and timely decisions. Increased tempo, coordination and synchronization are also dependent upon the ability of commanders at all levels to act autonomously and with appropriate initiative when making decisions and carrying out independent actions in line with the higher commander's intent. This is mission command. However, it is the contention of this paper that the eventual digitization of the battlefield with its commensurate ability to create what will seem to be an all-informed, seamless, real-time picture of the battlefield could create the illusion of information infallibility. Moreover, as more information is available to commanders at higher levels, the more those commanders will desire to make decisions and control actions several levels down. In other words, the increasing ability to digitize the battlefield, endangers the foundations of manoeuvre warfare and, in particular, the philosophy of mission command.

Aim

The aim of this paper will be to demonstrate that the evolution of information operations doctrine, and the digitization of the battlefield with which it is associated, poses dangers to the manoeuvre warfare approach to warfighting and the affiliated philosophy of mission command.

Scope

The paper will first describe current Canadian doctrine related to manoeuvre warfare, mission command, and information operations. Second, the paper will discuss the future of land warfare and, in particular, how developments in information technology such as the digitization of the battlefield, are profoundly changing the nature of conflict across the spectrum. Finally, the paper will describe how these trends and technological developments could create an operational environment that is non-conducive to the conduct of operations within a manoeuvrist mindset, and how this could be avoided.

Manoeuvre Warfare

According to B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, combat power is defined as the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.² Furthermore, combat power is generated by the integration of a number of elements called combat functions. In particular, the Canadian army defines six combat functions as follows: command, information operations, manoeuvre, firepower,

"The most unfortunate commander of all is the one with a telegraph wire attached to his back"

- General von Moltke

protection, and sustainment.³ In order to achieve mission success commanders will seek to integrate and combine these combat functions in such a way as to produce overwhelming combat power when and where required.

Canadian army doctrine also acknowledges the nature of conflict, and the existence and significance of both moral and physical factors on the battlefield. One of those factors, cohesion is described as the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders and allows military forces to endure hardship and retain the physical and moral strength to continue fighting and accomplish the mission. It follows then that the Canadian army seeks to defeat an enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion. This approach strikes a balance between the use of physical destruction and moral coercion in order to create for the enemy a rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. Key to creating this type of situation is in avoiding enemy strength and in targeting combat power through his weaknesses in order to strike at his vital assets. Examples of vital assets may include lines of communications, C2 facilities, and rear areas. The successful commander, therefore, will integrate the six combat functions in time and space through the designation of the main effort, and the use of synchronization and tempo.⁴ The main effort is the activity that the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at the time. By focusing his combat power to strike hard at one of the enemy's weak points, his forces can overthrow a more powerful enemy.⁵ Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at a decisive place and time. Synchronization is used to overload an enemy commander.⁶ Finally, tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity on operations, relative to the enemy. Tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution, and the speed of transition from one activity to another. Tempo seeks to keep the enemy off balance by posing new and different threats faster than he can react to them. Key to tempo is the decentralization of decision-making consistent with the commander's intent.⁷

The ultimate aim is to break the enemy's cohesion and, ultimately, his will to resist. This, in essence, is the manoeuvre warfare approach to operations.⁸

Mission Command

The manoeuvre warfare approach to operations requires a distinctive philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the responsibility to act, speed of action, and initiative within an environment that is fraught with danger, fear, confusion, death, destruction, and all the other perils of modern armed conflict.⁹ This philosophy of command is described as mission command and has five enduring fundamentals: unity of effort, decentralizing authority, trust, mutual understanding, and timely and effective decision-making¹⁰

Mission command requires that subordinate commanders focus their efforts and actions on realizing the higher commander's intent, yet retain the freedom of action and flexibility in achieving it. In this way unity of effort is maintained in an environment that has decentralized decision-making authority at the appropriate levels in order to minimize the uncertainty and confusion of battle. Therefore, a climate of mutual trust between superior commander and subordinate commanders must exist. The basis of this trust must be mutual understanding. Finally, mission command requires timely and effective decision-making at all levels.

For the Canadian army, therefore, to conduct operations according to manoeuvre warfare precepts, the mission command philosophy is indispensable. As Richard Simpkin points out, "Manoeuvre theory, with its emphasis on tempo and dynamic effects and thus on responsiveness, is not really compatible with control by detailed orders."¹¹ In other words, in order to break an enemy's cohesion and, consequently, his will to resist, combat power is harnessed and focussed in time and space through the designation of the main effort, and the use of synchronization and tempo. However, designation of the main effort is redundant if, in the confusion

and stress of battle when direction from higher is lacking, a subordinate commander does not have the autonomy to act decisively within the parameters of the higher commander's intent. There must be unity of effort at all times. Similarly, actions will not be as effectively synchronized nor will optimum tempo be achieved if the environment of command is lacking in trust and mutual understanding, and decision-making authority has not been decentralized. Consequently, the decision-action cycles for the force, at all levels, would stultify, rendering defeat a likely consequence.

Information Operations and Digitization

The combat function of information operations integrates all aspects of information on the battlefield and facilitates the integration of the other five combat functions in order to achieve optimum combat power. The principle objective in information operations is to achieve information dominance - a relative advantage between the friendly commander's decision-action cycle and that of the enemy, and to use that advantage to enhance and enable the commander's ability to apply combat power. Information operations involve three interrelated components: Command and Control Warfare (C2W), Intelligence and Information (I2), and Information Systems. This paper focuses on the information systems component of information operations. In particular, information systems refer to the integration of all information activities on the battlefield and the provision of the digitized picture of the battlefield.¹²

Information operations are not new and have always been embedded in all military operations. What is unprecedented, however, is the global trend toward digitization and the application of advanced information technology in the conduct of military operations in order to enhance situational awareness.¹³ In line with the stated aim of the information systems component of information operations, digitization has the potential to provide a degree of shared situational awareness, a shared understanding of the battlespace, at all tactical levels, as never before. In essence, the shared battlefield information framework will operate (as has been described by Brian Nichiporuk and Carl Builder) as a combat network or combat internet from which users, from the most senior commander to the individual soldier, will be able to 'pull down' up to date information from any tactical level as required¹⁴.

As Nichiporuk and Builder state, "Network architecture could enable a theater commander to create a 'living encyclopedia' of current location and status information for all friendly (and conceivably for many enemy) units in the theater."¹⁵

Conventional wisdom holds that digitization will greatly enhance a force's level of shared situational awareness and, hence, its commensurate ability to achieve information dominance over the enemy. Moreover, a commander will possess an unprecedented ability to communicate his designation of the main effort and achieve unity of effort across the breadth of his force, will be able to synchronize and coordinate the activities of his force quickly and decisively, and, finally, will be able to establish and maintain a degree of tempo significantly superior to that of an enemy. It is a commonly held belief, that information operations, in particular, digitization will significantly amplify a commander's ability to apply the manoeuvre warfare approach to operations by providing a powerful means by which he can establish and maintain a degree of tempo significantly superior to that of the enemy.¹⁶

The Danger

An article in a recent issue of *Airpower Journal* has made the point that throughout history "every improvement in communications has always carried with it the dangers of micromanagement."¹⁷ In our rush to digitize the battlefield and thereby increase our ability to achieve information dominance, increase our tempo, and increase our ability to coordinate and synchronize operations, we may, paradoxically, be creating a command environment that is not conducive to the exercise of mission command.

As has been pointed out, the nature of conflict is such that a commander will seldom have all the information necessary to make a command decision in the heat of battle. Uncertainty, confusion, fear, and misinformation have been the constants of battle throughout history. Command decisions, therefore, "are based partly on established fact and sound information, partly on information of questionable reliability, and partly on 'reasonable' assumptions."¹⁸ Given a certain situation, then, the commander most appropriate to make a decision is the one with the greatest feel for what is sound and reliable information. In many situations it is a lower level commander. He, therefore, must have the autonomy to do so. This is why mission command is so vitally important.

In examining the history of the development of 'integrative' technologies such as the railroad, the telegraph, and recent developments in the field of digitization, a U.S. Army War College study has determined that each new advance in technology has been accompanied by a belief that a commander would finally be able to acquire "perfect, real-time information upon which to base his decisions and direct his subordinates" and that "greater centralization of decision-making would yield greater combat effectiveness at the point of battle."¹⁹ The point here is the very human reaction to information. The more information one is given, and the more that information is believed to be complete and reliable, the more one is compelled to make a decision and control a situation. This point is also brought out by Robert Leonhard who makes the observation that "*information breeds decisions* [his italics]. That is, when reports are fed to people in authority, it is human nature for those people to render an opinion on it all. And when a boss renders an opinion, it becomes a decision to be implemented. The commander often becomes proud of his decision and zealous to ensure its execution."²⁰ Corollary, "*decisions generate a requirement for more information* [his italics]."²¹

With the advent of digitization, is the Canadian army in danger of creating the command environment described by Leonhard? By creating all-informed, real-time battlefield data networks is the army creating a system whereby, for example, a division commander could believe that the information he is able to pull-down pertaining to the situation of a particular company or platoon size element in his formation is as accurate and as complete as the information available to the applicable company or platoon commander? And if this is so, will that same division commander not be compelled to render a decision? This type of command environment is obviously contrary to the philosophy of mission command. This is a danger. To be fair, it is less probable that in operations other than war and war combat operations when disparate elements of a command could be simultaneously engaged in fighting various aspects of a battle that the danger would be as prevalent. The commander several levels up in this type of scenario would probably feel more compelled to step back and retain an overall view, and thus overall control, of the battle. However, in non-combat operations during peace and conflict, as peace support operations or in operations in aid of the civil power, the danger becomes more pronounced. Often, tactical situations arise singularly and become the focus of the force for the duration of the incident only because little else is happening. The commander several levels up in this type of scenario, coupled with the information being fed to him from the digitized network, will naturally feel compelled to render a decision. Mission command is thus compromised, and with it goes the force's capability of conducting operations according to the precepts of manoeuvre warfare.

So what is to be done? As information operations in general, and digitization in particular, are technical in nature, the obvious solution would be to design some technical solutions such as creating information barriers or 'firewalls' between various levels of command in order to prevent the danger of micro-management and over control. But a technical solution presupposes that human beings do not have the self-discipline and will power to resist their desire to over-control and micro-manage. It also limits a commander's ability to exercise leadership for there will be times, as Richard Simpkin points out, when a commander will need to influence vital operations several levels down or when he needs to 'sense' the battle at a particular time and place.²² Besides, if a firewall is built, a commander can simply order his G6 to tear it down.

But what of the emphasis the Canadian army has now placed doctrinally on mission command? Three years

after publishing his now famous *The Art of Maneuver*, Robert Leonhard published a separate article in which he forwarded the idea that the US Army has possibly gone too far in cementing the mission command philosophy of command (he prefers to call it *Directive Control*) into its doctrine, and that a certain "doctrinal myopia"²³ has been created in which the US Army institutionally refuses to recognize any situation in which *detailed control* methods of command (the opposite to directive control) might be preferred. Perhaps the same can be said of the Canadian army. As Leonhard states, "The near future of American warfighting technology suggests that commanders will have an unprecedented degree of battlefield information. To exploit these new capabilities, we must have the mental toughness to re-examine our doctrine and biases toward command philosophy."²⁴ Leonhard, then, calls for doctrinal flexibility as it pertains to command philosophy. As Leonhard states, "An army that can employ detailed control over dispersed, fast-moving elements in order to concentrate and synchronize rapidly and then make a transition into directive control to maintain the initiative during a pursuit will be one that truly fulfills the doctrinal tenet of agility."²⁵ Therefore, just as digitization poses a danger to mission command, perhaps the army's doctrinally ensconced enthusiasm for mission command has too quickly discounted the possibility that digitization will lend toward operational situations in which detailed control is the preferred command method.

The danger, then, that information operations doctrine and the digitization of the battlefield poses to the manoeuvre warfare approach to warfighting and its affiliated principle of mission command is only one danger. The Canadian army's enthronement of the mission command philosophy of command while denying the operational advantages which digitization will bring to the conduct of operations along more centralized, detailed control methods of command poses another danger. These dangers, then, can really only be averted if commanders continue to recognize that solutions to command problems must remain essentially human and flexible. As DiNardo and Hughes point out, "higher commanders [need to] show the discipline required to avoid micromanagement."²⁶ Conversely, commanders must recognize when detailed orders and detailed control are necessary to increase tempo, to synchronize operations, and to unify effort. Command, despite all the technological support now available, is still essentially a human process involving the interaction of personalities with events as they unfold.²⁷ Therefore, the discipline required to avoid the micro-management and over control of subordinates must be applied with a view to retaining the trust and mutual understanding between commander and commanded so essential to manoeuvre warfare and mission command. Similarly, higher level commanders, especially commanders at the operational level, must be able to recognize when, because of information available at higher levels (JSTARS, Satellites, etc.), they need to apply a more detailed control method of command. The situation will dictate which method of command is most appropriate.

Conclusion

This paper has set out to demonstrate that the evolution of information operations doctrine, and the digital technology with which it is associated, poses a danger to the manoeuvre warfare approach to operations and its affiliated principle of mission command. There is no doubt that digitization will greatly enhance a commander's ability to apply the manoeuvre warfare approach by providing a powerful tool by which to increase tempo, to synchronize operations, and to unify effort. However, paradoxically, digitization could also be creating an illusion of information infallibility and completeness, consequently compelling commanders to centralize decision-making and to remove the ability of lower level commanders to make timely decisions, to take initiative, and to act with authority. This is contrary to the mission command philosophy of command; an essential component of the manoeuvre warfare approach to operations. As digitization gradually becomes a reality in the Canadian army, and as the army's ability to achieve information dominance over future adversaries also becomes a reality, commanders, at all levels, will need to remain cognizant of this danger and will need to exercise the self-discipline and constraint in order to avoid over-control and micro-management. Similarly, commanders at all levels will also need to recognize when, because of the greater availability of information and intelligence at higher levels, a more detailed control

method of command might be preferred in certain situations. Command is essentially a human function that must remain flexible in its application and is dependent on the quantity and reliability of information and intelligence available at different levels of command. The discipline required to avoid the micro-management and over control of subordinates must be applied with a view to retaining the trust and mutual understanding between commander and commanded so essential to manoeuvre warfare and mission command. Similarly, higher level commanders, especially commanders at the operational level, must be able to recognize when, because of information available at higher levels they need to apply a more detailed control method of command. Mission success in future operations may well depend on this flexibility of mind.



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Endnotes

¹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine For The Canadian Army*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996) defines digitization as the near-real-time transfer of battlefield information between diverse fighting elements to permit a shared awareness of the battlefield situation. Digitization describes the group of technologies used to support acquisition, processing and distribution of information, p 7-5.

² Ibid., p 2-6.

³ Ibid., p. 2-7. For a more detailed explanation of each combat function see pp. 2-7 to 2-9.

⁴ Ibid., p 2-9.

⁵ Ibid., p 2-9.

⁶ Ibid., p 2-9.

⁷ Ibid., p 2-10.

⁸ Ibid., p 2-3.

⁹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-000, *Command*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), p 28.

¹⁰ Ibid., p 32.

¹¹ Richard Simpkin, *Race To The Swift*, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), p 230.

¹² Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine For The Canadian Army*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), pp. 7-2 to 7-5.

¹³ Situational awareness is described as that condition in which a common understanding of information on the commander's assessment of a situation, his intent, and his concept of operations is combined with a clear picture of friendly and enemy force dispositions and capabilities FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1996), pp. 1-11.

¹⁴ Brian Nichiporuk and Carl Builder, *Information Technologies and the Future of Land Warfare*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995), pp. 68-70.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p 69.

¹⁶ Lest one should think that digitization is still off in the distant future for the Canadian Army, a recent edition of *Armour Bulletin* (Vol. 29, No. 2, 1996) dedicated to the subject of digitization contained a number of articles describing in general detail the major digitization programmes about to enter service with the Canadian army between 1997 and 2001. All using the TCCCS/IRIS project as the collective data transfer backbone, the Canadian army will soon see the fielding of the Land Force Command System (LFCS), the Tactical Battlefield Command System (TBCS), the Position Determination and Navigation for the Land Force system (PDALF), and the Battlefield Combat Identification (BCID) system. In addition, Director Land Requirements (DLR) 4 are also developing follow-on projects to deal with the common sharing of real-time information related to enemy force disposition and capabilities such as the Advanced Tactical Intelligence System (ATIS).

¹⁷ R.L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, "Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare", *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1995, pp. 74-75.

¹⁸ Simpkin, p 199.

¹⁹ General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant-Colonel James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, February 1993), 16-17.

²⁰ Robert Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver*, (Novato: Presidio Press, 1991), p 119.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p 120.

²² Simpkin, pp. 234-235.

²³ Robert Leonhard, "The Death of Mission Tactics", *ARMY*, July 1994

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ DiNardo and Hughes, p 75.

²⁷ Bellamy, Chris, *The Future of Land Warfare*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p 243.



[Français]

The Psychology of the Bayonet

Major William Beaudoin, CD

Recently, I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to read Lieutenant-Colonel David Grossman's book entitled *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*.¹ In doing so, it reminded me of another exceptional book that had long sat dormant on my bookshelf and therefore, was in need of re-reading. It was Lord Moran's penetrating piece, *The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic Study of the Soldier's Struggle Against Fear*.² Both books examine some fundamental questions concerning the psychological impact and costs associated with courage, fear, and the act of killing. They challenge and question our beliefs on the very basest nature of our profession.

In *On Killing*, Grossman contends that soldiers have traditionally had an aversion to using the bayonet in combat. This finding supported one of his major premises that soldiers invariably kill better from a distance and, therefore, the psychological costs to the soldier were greater the closer the nature of the killing. While seemingly logical in itself, his chapter specifically dedicated to killing with the bayonet and knife was both illuminating and surprising. If one believes Grossman's assertion that soldiers do not like, and historically have attempted to avoid using the bayonet, then question of the bayonet's relevance on the modern battlefield is worth examining as Remarque in his work, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, prompts us to do:

But the bayonet has practically lost its importance. It is usually the fashion now to charge with bombs and spades only. The sharpened spade is a more handy and many-sided weapon; not only can it be used for jabbing a man under the chin, but due to its greater weight if one hits between the neck and shoulder it easily cleaves as far down as the chest. The bayonet frequently jams on the thrust and then a man has to kick hard on the other fellow's belly to pull it out again; and in the interval he may easily get one himself. And what's more the blade often gets broken off.³

"War has always interested me; not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great generals...but the reality of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in what way and under what influences of what feelings one soldier kills another than to know how, the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino."

- Leo Tolstoy

Aim

For the purposes of the reader, and perhaps my own clarity, it will be easier to explain first what this paper will not be, or do. This essay will not attempt to be a definitive history on the bayonet and bayonet fighting; nor will it propose radical new doctrine or bayonet training methods. It will, however, hopefully serve as a forum or launching pad for the reader to examine their own personal beliefs on the validity and conduct of bayonet training. In a peripheral manner, I also hope that this paper will serve as a positive recommendation of Grossman's book.

Obviously, there is also a responsibility on my part to inform the reader as to what my feelings and beliefs are on the subject of bayonet training and fighting. Given some of the factors and trends I will outline and the direction that our military and other military forces are taking, I believe the art of bayonet fighting is dying. Unfortunately, there will always be a need to 'close with and destroy the enemy'; often at intimate distances with gruesome devastation and lethality. We have forsaken one method to do so, for the reasons to be outlined shortly.

A Brief Historical Context

By 1700, and concurrent to the mass production of reliable flintlock muskets, the socket bayonet was

developed. Replacing the earlier plug and ring bayonets, which blocked the musket's muzzle, this initiative provided each man the ability to fire and defend himself in hand-to-hand fighting. This allowed for a more flexible and aggressive use of the infantry arm and enabled the first, rudimentary step in the development towards 'fire and movement':⁴

A quick review of illustrated historical references will demonstrate through paintings, and still photography that rarely was a soldier to be seen without his bayonet fixed. From Napoleon and Wellington at Waterloo, through the battle of Gettysburg and on into the First World War, all armies maintained this fundamental requirement whether the soldier was in contact or not. The greater preponderance of automatic weapons; the move away from the parade square mentality and set-piece battle of earlier wars; and the abhorrence of what the stagnation of trench warfare had brought, were some of the factors contributing to the rarer instances of soldiers having fixed and fought with bayonets from the Second World War on.

There was a fundamental transition between the World Wars in how soldiers engaged and killed the enemy. During the First World War, the soldier charged mindlessly across no man's land with the primary aim being to enter the enemy's trench systems so that the 'real fight' could begin. A round or two may have been fired on entering the trench system but then the battle took on the savagery that Remarque writes about. Soldiers killed with bayonets, clubs, knives, spades and their hands. During the Second World War, soldiers primarily killed or wounded the enemy by fire and then finished off the enemy with their bayonets.

It would be naïve to assume that bayonet fighting and its training did not serve an important function in the psychological preparation, and perhaps inculcation, of soldiers for combat. This will be examined later. What is relevant however, is that Grossman contends that soldiers will rarely involve themselves in direct personal battle with the bayonet, if it can be avoided:

In mêlées both Yank and Reb preferred to use the butt of the weapon, or to swing their muskets by the barrel like a club, rather than gut the enemy with their bayonets.⁵

Combat at Its Most Personal

With the exception of hand-to-hand combat and knife fighting, the most direct and personal way to inflict death, or be killed is by the point of the bayonet. As indicated previously, Grossman contends that soldiers will strive to find ways to avoid both. His chapter entitled *Killing at Edged-Weapons Range: An Intimate Brutality* explains his belief in three psychological factors inherent in bayonet fighting, supported through historical reference and personal interviews with combatants. Firstly, Grossman contends that most soldiers, when within bayonet range of the enemy, will use any other means to injure or kill the enemy, rather than penetrate him with the bayonet. Secondly, he believes that given the closeness and immediate visible effects of bayonet wounds, there is enormous potential for psychological trauma. Lastly, that given the soldier's natural abhorrence to killing and/or being killed by the bayonet, actual bayonet engagements are rare as one invariably flees first.⁶

What is interesting to note is that Grossman's last point often results in a slaughter as the chase or hunter instinct overwhelms this stated aversion to killing with a bayonet. "Combat at close quarters does not exist. At close quarters occurs the ancient carnage when one force strikes the other in the back".⁷ One can only assume the psychological persecution that one endures after participating in such an event.

Fix Bayonets

"I shall never forget the sight that morning, of A Company advancing through a thick mist with bayonets fixed. Many of the last Argentine defenders were killed with the bayonet."⁸

**- Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike
CO, 3rd Battalion**

B-GL-309-003/FT-001, makes little reference to the use of the bayonet in completing the destruction of the enemy. In the fifth section on battle drill (The Approach), the order to fix bayonets is indicated as the section commander's responsibility prior to commencing the critical assault. Thereafter, detailed instruction, less the use of the bayonet, is provided in the conduct of the assault and clearance of the enemy trench system. Perhaps, the statement "clean up the trench using fire and movement" should suffice. It also helps to keep this portion of battle, at least in print, morally and ethically 'clean'.

Long before soldiers face this reality, they should be adequately prepared for the moment. I will be the first to admit that the preparation and training of soldiers has two different facets. Despite all the well-worn clichés concerning 'train hard, fight easy' and more sweat in training, less blood in war', the times in which we live influence our views towards training and combat, our training methods, and where our defence priorities lie. That however, is another paper.

At school nobody ever taught us how to light a cigarette in a storm of rain, nor how a fire could be made with wet wood - nor that it is best to stick a bayonet in the belly, because it doesn't get jammed, as it does in the ribs.⁹

Infantry soldiers are exposed to bayonet fighting during their primary qualification training (QL3). They receive instruction during the conduct of Performance Objective 412 - *Fight at Close Quarters*. Inherent in this is the employment of pugil stick training to practise bayonet skills and to develop aggressiveness in soldiers. Invariably, unless conducted and supervised properly, these drills denigrate to the point of who can beat who into the ground. Given the clumsiness of pugil sticks and the desire to instil aggressive behaviour, I am not sure that this tendency is all that wrong. This is particularly relevant, since the primary reference for the conduct of bayonet fighting, the C7/C8 Manual, calls for "instilling a spirit of vigour and determination" and "quick and instinctive skills." As an aside, lesson emphasis is placed on killing an enemy on the ground. Examine the psychological implications and ramifications behind this.

Once a soldier has completed his primary infantry training, his exposure to bayonet fighting will vary from unit to unit and priority to priority. Rightly or wrongly, I have the perception that bayonet training is disappearing from our training schedules, and perhaps from our military psyche. I recall about 14 years ago, a sergeant was conducting a 40 minute period on bayonet fighting during an Airborne Indoctrination Course. After this 40 minutes, I seem to remember being both physically and mentally spent. The training was good, hard and relevant. I have seen little in the way of similar training being conducted since. I offer my apologies and ask that those individuals who have conducted or participated in such training not take exception. Remember, this is my perception.

But I believe this perception is supported by some realities. Most of us remember the FNC1A1 and its bayonet. It was a heavy, robust and effective weapon pairing. Rationally, the move to the C7 was a necessary step in the evolution of small arms for the army. A lighter weapon, capable of automatic fire, and allowing for a greater amount of ammunition to be carried cannot be argued against. In making these gains however, we have a shorter weapon with a more fragile construction of both the weapon and bayonet. Both have direct correlations when applied to bayonet fighting.

Bayonet training has been curtailed because the bayonet would snap or break when used. The C7 cannot take the physical beating that the FN could, nor does the C7 optical sight handle this rough treatment well. This evolution is not unique to the Canadian Forces. It is a reflection of the trend in small arms the world over. Would the bayonet have been as effectively employed at Tumbledown Mountain and Mount Longdon had the Parachute Regiment been equipped with the SA 80?

The Relevance of the Bayonet in the 21st Century

The development of new weapon systems enable the soldier, even on the battlefield, to fire more lethal weapons more accurately to longer ranges: his enemy is, more and more, an anonymous figure encircled by a gunsight, glowing on a thermal imager, or shrouded in armour plate.¹⁰

Increasingly, our military is becoming more technologically sophisticated and greater demands are being placed on our soldiers to learn, understand, and maintain larger and costlier items of equipment, vehicles, and weapons. I am confident that we can, and have, easily met the challenge. What does concern me however, is that in this environment some of the more rudimentary skills of our profession are being shunted aside, or lost. When was the last time you completed the shoot-to-live programme? Perhaps, given the increased lethality of weapons today, and our desires for a clean, stand-off, media-friendly kill, these skills are becoming irrelevant and only detract from the mission at hand.

There have always been three reasons for conducting bayonet training. They, in my estimation, remain unchanged. First and foremost, the ability to kill and maim, must remain the central reason for bayonet training. In combat, a soldier must be prepared to use every weapon to both achieve the mission and survive. Although I do not fully support Grossman's contention that soldiers will attempt to avoid using the bayonet if possible; not to providing him with the necessary tools is wrong.

Secondly, bayonet training has been one of the more fundamental methods of psychologically inculcating a soldier into his profession. Historically, the racial characteristics or traits of an enemy were either placed on the bayonet dummy, or certain epithets were employed by the soldier when skewering the dummy. These were common practices when nations were locked in national or global conflicts of survival. Today's geographically limited wars, although just as deadly, do not incur the same base instincts that were prevalent during the Second World War, nor I suspect will society allow them. We no longer 'Shoot-to-Kill'.

Bayonet training does serve to generate controlled, aggressive behaviour. It also serves on the other hand as a release valve for the aggression and frustration of its trainees. Although society is placing great demands for a quieter and gentler military, bayonet training and its associated psychological implications concerning an in-your-face method of killing, directly conflicts with these demands. The push for more civilized training methods directly contradicts the savagery of combat. Bayonet training, I believe, should always have a place in both identifying and developing mental toughness in our soldiers.

Finally, the physical fitness benefits of conducting aggressive bayonet training cannot be understated. A properly conducted bayonet period (with or without bayonet dummies) is an excellent upper-body workout and provides a cardiovascular challenge. It can be conducted at any time and in just about any location (parade square, drill hall, a field) with a minimum of preparation. All that is required is the soldier's standard fighting order, time, and an aggressive and enthusiastic instructor.

The Challenge

Whenever an individual writes a paper and describes a problem, real or perceived, he has a responsibility to recommend a solution. In this case, I am not sure I have one. Bayonet fighting remains an integral, albeit quickly fading, part of our profession. The skill has also largely rested on the shoulders of the non-commissioned officer to maintain (none of my platoon commanders have done any bayonet training). There are increasingly greater demands being placed on them to be both technically proficient on a number of sophisticated weapons and equipments but this must also be done in a climate of conflicting socio-military priorities. As we enter the 21st century, the psychology of soldiering, could probably be the subject of an essay in itself.

When I indicate that I have no solutions, it is because with the exception of time and practice, the cornerstones remain intact. Infantry soldiers receive the basic training necessary and the supporting documents exist to conduct effective bayonet training. They just need to be dusted off from time to time. The

question is, will we? But then again, we have only been discussing one man's perception.



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Endnotes

1 Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p ix.

2 Lord Charles Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic Study of the Soldier's Struggle Against Fear* (London: Constable, 1966)

3 Erich Maria Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929), p 103.

4 David Chandler, *The Art of Warfare on Land* (Toronto: The Hamlyn Publishing Group Limited, 1974), p 130.

5 Dave Grossman, *On Killing...*, p 123.

6 *Ibid*, p 122.

7 *Ibid*, p 127.

8 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1983), p 298.

9 Erich Maria Remarque, *All Quiet...*, p 85.

10 Dave Grossman, *On Killing...*, p 169.



[Français]

Surviving in a Whistle Factory - That Leaks

Major Brett Boudreau, CD

The exposure of illegal, harmful, and unethical acts or omissions of those who wield administrative or financial authority is hardly a new phenomenon in western political culture. Cut into marble tablets and set waist high in the walls of several public buildings in Venice, for example, are ferocious and grimacing stone faces with an opening in the mouth. As early as the 14th century, secret denunciations against Venetian public officials would be deposited into these *bocca di leone* - 'lion's mouth' or 'mouths of truth' - in which a secure container was housed. A powerful state security organization called The Council of Ten would deliberate on the defamatory offerings: anonymous writings were not considered, and only two witnesses were needed to corroborate the allegations. Those who proffered unfounded charges were punished, but those judged to have committed crimes against the state had no right of appeal and were not told the identity of their betrayers. The accused awaited their fate in an antechamber next to The Council of Ten, and for the unfortunate guilty, it was a quick shuffle in chains over the *Bridge of Sighs* to the torture chamber and dank prison.

Today, the court is public opinion, and the worst fate awaiting those exposed and found guilty would seem to be pillory by the press, though the more cynical would assert the 'sentence' for military miscreants is a posting, promotion or personal services contract. And more often than not it is the whistleblower - who figuratively slips the allegation into the lion's mouth in the first place - whose hand is bitten off by the very institution that was fed.

American Admiral Hyman Rickover perhaps best summed this up in remarking, "If you must sin, sin against God, not the bureaucracy. God will forgive you, but the bureaucracy never will." Another widely quoted observation about the obstacles faced by whistleblowers is that, "if you have God, the Law, the Press, and the Facts on your side, then you have a 50-50 chance of winning."¹

If that is the sad fate which awaits the whistleblower, then how is it that we are at the point where the casual observer of Canadian military affairs is likely to conclude leaks to the media are the primary means of communication from the Department of National Defence (DND) to the public? For years now, the media have been deluged by documents and 'tips' from individuals within the department. The resulting exposure has helped fuel a five-year firestorm of negative publicity, contributed to a serious decline in public confidence in the management of national defence, and to poor morale among its members. By the same token, this has unquestionably been a catalyst for significant and much needed reform.

Supporters refer to whistleblowers as 'public heroes', opponents call them 'vile wretches', and there is little common ground to be found between the two extremes. It is an emotive issue, rarely written about in the Canadian context and less often discussed in open fora, a remarkable situation considering the significant effect on the formulation and implementation of public policy. The dilemma of 'to blow or not to blow the whistle' is a profound ethical decision that tests the bonds of loyalty to the organization like no other. The frequency of whistleblowing in DND, the motivations for doing so, the type of information being leaked and to whom it is given, all offer valuable insights into the ethical condition of the Department and suggests some ways and means to improve the situation.²

At some point in the course of their duties, the majority of employees in the public sector and private industry will become aware of acts or omissions which are at odds with their values and morals. What guidelines, ethical or otherwise, exist to give the public servant some means of assessing if knowledge of an act or omission is important enough to bring to the attention of persons outside one's own work section? And if the

decision is to whistleblow, to whom should the information be given?

This paper is constituted in three parts, and explores answers to those questions as well as offering observations on the phenomenon in general. First, it distinguishes between whistleblowing and leaking, and explains why the former is a more ethical choice than the latter. Second, it describes the effects of this form of behaviour, and proposes that reasons for the high number of leaks in DND include contempt for the institution, and by the junior leadership of senior ranks; a misunderstanding of the role of leadership and the concepts of accountability, responsibility and loyalty; and in certain cases, out of malicious intent. Finally, it suggests and outlines five conditions that must be met for whistleblowing to be morally justified, and applies those criteria to a number of cases.

Defining Whistleblowing and Leaking

Leaving aside for a moment the discussion of whether blowing the whistle and leaking are the 'right' or 'wrong' things to do, strictly speaking the two terms are not one and the same. Gerald Vinten provides perhaps the most comprehensive definition of whistleblowing by referring to it as the "*unauthorized* disclosure of information that an employee reasonably believes is evidence of the contravention of any law, rule or regulation, code of practice, or professional statement, or that involves mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority, or danger to public or worker health and safety."³ [emphasis added].

Whistleblowing is not limited to disclosure externally. There is wide agreement among academics that it includes disclosure to other authorities within the department but outside the normal reporting chain.⁴

In the United States, where this issue figures more prominently in public administration theory and practise, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, a federal statute, protects persons who disclose information reasonably believed to evidence "a violation of any law, rule or regulation" or "gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety."⁵ In its broadest sense, then, whistleblowing "include(s) employees who oppose, either internally or externally, their employer's conduct."⁶

Ethicist Sissela Bok notes whistleblowing is usually an overt activity, the source of the information meaning to make him/herself known internally or externally to the organization. By definition, one resorts to whistleblowing in response to a matter of serious danger, fraud, safety or abuse, with the intent of drawing attention to the failings of an identifiable individual or a specific group. The assignation of blame is meant to single out "those who knew or should have known what was wrong and what the dangers were, and who had the capacity to make different choices."⁷

In contrast, leaks are principally covert acts, the sources of information resorting to clandestine means to assure confidentiality or outright secrecy primarily out of concern for their continued employment. Leaks can continue until the source is identified and stopped, and generally involve issues of small-scale morality and administrative discretion rather than imminent danger or serious breaches of ethics, which characterize whistleblowing. The evidence also suggests that whistleblowing is practiced almost exclusively by lower-ranking officials in the public or private sectors.⁸ Leaks, on the other hand, are a recognized *bona fide* tool of governing, most frequently used as trial balloons or to divert attention, and thus defy easy attribution to any one group or level within government or business. It would appear from media reports, however, that financial improprieties are the principal motivations for leaks by lower level officials, whereas those involving policy decisions are the leak of choice by senior bureaucrats or political staff.

John Dean, who testified so spectacularly to United States Congressional committees on the excesses of the Nixon Administration, is a classic example of a whistleblower, whereas 'Deep Throat', who relayed insider

information on Watergate to journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, is the classic leaker. In the Canadian context, the decision of Major Barry Armstrong to bring crimes committed during the Somalia mission to public attention, still hotly debated in military circles, constitutes whistleblowing.⁹ There is no shortage of examples of leaks in the department; the admiral in charge of the department's finances was living on 'imposed restriction' for six years in one of the most expensive hotels in Ottawa; the forced retirement of a lieutenant-general for maintaining accommodation at public expense while owning a residence within a reasonable distance of work; and the release of correspondence written by a junior officer to a superior alleging sexual harassment by another senior officer are just three recent high-profile examples.

Whistleblowing and leaking involve a similar activity and are generally thought to be interchangeable, so distinguishing between them may seem to be little more than an exercise in semantics. However, the discussion to this point intimates otherwise, and a number of authors write convincingly of the reasons why whistleblowing is more morally acceptable than leaking information.¹⁰ The salient point is that by identifying themselves as the source of the information, the whistleblowers' bias, motivations and merit of the allegations can be subject to greater scrutiny and cross-examination than the cases of those who choose to leak anonymously. That being said, the convention is that the act, whatever it happens to be called, is taken to mean disclosing information (anonymously or not) to agents outside DND, including to media; it is a description which is assumed in subsequent discussions in this paper.

Why is it Happening and What Does it Mean?

The delineation which once characterized authorized from unauthorized disclosures becomes blurred in an information society. Canada inherited the British Parliamentary system, with its strong tradition for - and reward of - administrative secrecy. This has long meant the *modus operandi* of Canadian public servants reflected the advice of Sir Arthur Robinson (a character from the British television series *Yes, Minister*), who posited that "if no one knows what you're doing, then no one knows what you're doing wrong." One does not need to delve into the provisions of the Official Secrets Act or other similarly restrictive regulations to discover how pervasive has been the bureaucratic imperative to share as little information as possible with the public. After all, it is not so long ago that copies of Canadian Forces (CF) personnel evaluation reports were considered to be 'too sensitive' for retention by the subject of the assessment. And, the Public Service Employment Act still requires all public servants to take an oath of secrecy, swearing that he "will not, without due authority ... disclose or make known any matter that comes to his knowledge by reason of such employment."¹¹

This culture of secrecy, however, is now very much at odds with federal legislation and departmental orders and regulations. It is government communications policy, for example, that all departments "provide information to the public about its policies, programs and services that is accurate, complete, objective, timely, relevant and understandable." The recently promulgated DND public affairs policy obliges CF members and DND employees to maximize public and media accessibility to departmental policies and procedures, including operations and initiatives, in a timely manner.¹² One practical application of the new policy is to allow members to speak to media about their jobs without seeking approval beforehand, and in that sense it is likely the most progressive communications policy among federal departments. In addition, the Access to Information Act (AIA) compels the disclosure of records, subject to specific and limited exemptions, under threat of administrative sanction. The drafters of this legislation very much intended that the onus be shifted from the citizen to justify why information should be released, to the government to justify why information should be denied.

How, then, is the public servant to reconcile the competing values of legitimately providing access to information, with that of loyalty to the organization by not whistleblowing or leaking? That is, if an employee on his or her own accord provides records (e-mail, memoranda or other documentation) to an

outside agency, do we applaud the employee for initiative or chastise the individual for whistleblowing? Fundamentally, what constitutes the unauthorized disclosure of information any more? After all, the Access to Information Act essentially renders security classifications obsolete, since the decision to release records is based on the effect of the information becoming public, not on its classification. The circumstances in which the public servant can be held accountable for making embarrassing or 'secret' records public on his/her own (assuming they are severed in accordance with Access and Privacy legislation) is now rather unclear, since the act of informing the public is in keeping with stated government policy and direction. What actually constitutes the act of whistleblowing in today's public sector is changing dramatically, and is an issue yet to be litigated and resolved.

Once a decision to disclose information unofficially has been made, there are several means of doing so, depending on the nature of the act or omission. Internally, whistleblowers or leakers can look to divulge information to a succession of senior officers or senior civilian personnel within or outside their chain of command right up to the commanders of the land, air or naval staff; the Chief of the Defence Staff; the Deputy Minister; the Minister; the military police; the National Investigation Service; the Chief of Review Services (the military's in-house 'auditors'); to the Command Inspector in the case of the army; and soon, likely to the CF Ombudsman, though his terms of reference have yet to be defined. As well, employees who face harassment have the additional option of discussing the case with trained counselors outside the individual's direct chain of command.¹³

There are an even wider number of external options, ranging from the legislative branch (be it a Senator or a Member of Parliament, who may or not belong to the governing party); the judiciary; the civilian police; the Auditor-General; a variety of commissioners with investigative authority and powers of an ombudsman, including those for Official Languages, Privacy, and Access; federal tribunals or commissions; citizen's groups; or, the media.

The act of disclosing information unofficially is the result of a conscious decision to notify someone outside the individual's work section of some act or omission, and therefore is not a naturally occurring phenomenon nor is it inevitable. Those within DND who complain the present crisis of confidence in leadership in the institution is 'mainly the media's fault' would do well to consider why media outlets, and Scott Taylor's *Esprit de Corps* magazine in particular, are provided a steady diet of embarrassing revelations from departmental insiders in the first place.¹⁴

A number of aspects of the present situation deserve analysis. First and foremost, that so many individuals choose to leak information outside the department would appear to be evidence of the contempt with which DND leadership is presently held by its employees. Members of an institution who have faith in their superiors to act ethically, fairly and without undue favour to rank, who understand that grievances are resolved as quickly as practically possible, and who believe in the institution and its values, choose internal resolution mechanisms. Those who 'go outside' do so because they have lost faith in the organization and believe there are no more viable options.

Selecting media as the agent to receive information is further evidence of a lack of trust and confidence in the military's senior leaders so profound that members think outside agencies will be co-opted by the forces at play from within the department. Therefore, an independent media likely is viewed by individuals as the most logical choice to bring issues of concern. Clearly, the spectre of the truncated Somalia Inquiry haunts us still.¹⁵

The Pavlovian-dog-like reaction of the institution to the media stimulus following a leak simply exacerbates the situation. All are familiar with the scene by now _ an immediate Ministerial statement condemning the activity or practice along with a commitment to change; the cessation of the activity or practice; an inquiry, an annual report, an advisory group or oversight committee; perhaps a 'thorough review of the case'; or the

latest fad, the launch of the National Investigation Service. At a minimum, suddenly it is the 'issue of the moment.'

The effect is three-fold. First and foremost, it diminishes the capacity of those in leadership positions to exercise command and be held to account for that honour. Second, those who voiced concerns internally become more frustrated as cases take progressively longer to adjudicate, bumped down the priority list as staff deal with a matter of lesser importance, but of Ministerial interest. Third, leaks make things happen and achieve results, which encourages others to follow suit.

The type of information being leaked to media also leads to some interesting insights into the motivations and ethics of whistleblowers at DND. From media reports, the topics of choice consist mainly of allegations (or confirmation) of improper behaviour, minor fraud, investigations and disciplinary actions. While not to diminish the seriousness of some of the issues, these are petty revelations in the context of the challenge facing leaders

in a department grappling with a revolution in military affairs. What does it say about those persons intent on 'helping' the institution reform itself, who sweat the small stuff, rather than stimulating public debate on real issues of import to the profession of arms? For example, the significant commitment-capability gap and increasingly irrelevant description of a 'general purpose combat capable' military; the effect of budget cuts and alternative service delivery on DND's capacity to conduct and support operations; and the lack of an effective pay system for Reservists surely are more vital elements for public discourse than the issues the department has been forced to deal with over the past few years. Why, then, leak the little things?

It is too simplistic an answer to say that Canadians 'do not care' about the larger concerns. Members of DND find fault with the media for continuous coverage of the peccadilloes; to a certain extent it is simply the nature of the latter to do so,¹⁶ but there are more telling reasons for the situation. In the first place, reporters are being fed solid leads requiring virtually no research and little analysis, which makes copy quick, easy, titillating, and cheap to produce.

Second, senior leadership in DND confuses information with advocacy (which is not permitted, and justifiably so), and as a general rule rather than the exception, either erects obstacles or goes so far as shackling serving personnel from informing the media or public of what is really happening in and to the Canadian Forces.¹⁷ Third, the department is not willing to invest in an effective and apolitical internal information program, which, it argued, substantially contributes to the problem of whistleblowing and leaking at DND.

The scope and pace of reform is mind-boggling, and though members suffer from 'publication fatigue', never have they been more bereft of information. This is not as ironic as it may first seem, since what is being provided _ best of intentions notwithstanding _ is not as relevant, timely, or informative as what is required.¹⁸ Members leak to media in part because they believe action is not being taken to address a situation, or think it is being ignored or even 'covered up'. More often than not, it is the case that something is being done or has already been done to address the concern. Without the capacity to adequately communicate where and how far certain yardsticks have moved _ and a willingness to admit where they have not and why they have not _ the impression, rightly or wrongly, is that nothing is happening. In the context of massive and fundamental change and the concomitant disruption to the *status quo*, whistleblowing and leaks are probably inevitable, though their frequency and effect would be significantly limited with an effective internal information program.¹⁹ As an added bonus, since Canadians learn about the military primarily through direct contact with military personnel, a more informed workforce would constitute a better 'natural outreach' program than is now the case.

Conditions Under Which Whistleblowing is Morally Justified

Several authors have written of conditions under which whistleblowing is morally justified;²⁰ four considerations seem common to all, to which I would add a fifth. As a general rule, all five conditions should be satisfied, but clearly, there is no one formula or template which can be applied in every case as a guide for the would-be whistleblower. The literature on this subject often does not distinguish between whistleblowing and leaking, and while the latter is considered less ethical than the former for reasons already discussed, the criteria suggested here seem equally valid for both.

First, the act or omission in question must be seriously and demonstrably harmful to the public interest. Morally, a decision to whistleblow must derive from the requirement to prevent unnecessary harm to others, that is, to militate against a serious danger to public health, safety or welfare. A rational, objective assessment of the effect of the act or omission is required to determine if the issue is really and truly *a matter of public interest* or whether it is *merely interesting to the public*. The distinction is critical. Because of the potentially serious and pernicious effects of whistleblowing, it "is not an absolute, unqualified right which may be exercised at any time, in any place, and in any manner," writes Daniel Westman. "The notion of whistleblowing implies calling attention to an imminent danger that can only be stopped by the act of whistleblowing."²¹

"The judgement expressed by whistleblowing concerns a problem that should matter to the public," adds Bok. "Certain outrages are so blatant, and certain dangers so great, that all who are in a position to warn of them have a *prima facie* obligation to do so."²² The discharge of toxic effluent into a source of drinking water or a conscious decision to sacrifice basic safety practices in a mine for the sake of profit are examples. From a military perspective, the purchase of seriously defective equipment or the unsafe storage of chemical weapons near populated areas, would satisfy this condition. Even in these extreme cases, however, whistleblowing outside the organization should not be the automatic reaction, since internal authorities may not be aware there is an issue at hand; rather, the seriousness of the danger to the public interest would influence the urgency with which efforts are made to satisfy the other conditions.

In less critical or obvious situations, one must first determine if the issue affects the safety or welfare of the public, and then come to terms with whether the effect is insignificant or substantial enough to warrant disclosure.

The most common failing by DND whistleblowers appears to be mistaking 'public interest' for disagreement with a policy or a course of action by an official charged to make the decision. Government is, after all, an exercise in compromise. Simply disagreeing with decisions made by those elected or appointed to do so is not, *inter alia*, a moral cause for whistleblowing. Neither are those cases in which a whistleblower compares his personal ethical standards and judges others to be lacking. The individual weighing a decision to whistleblow must ask himself questions such as what public interest or public value, exactly, is being harmed; how substantial and irreversible are the effects; how imminent is the danger; and will a decision *not* to whistleblow be a violation of an ethical duty to the public? If the answers are unclear, or the act or omission 'just doesn't seem right' when weighed merely against one's personal ethical standard, then whistleblowing is likely not the best option.

Second, the determination of serious and demonstrable harm must be supported by sufficient evidence.

The potential whistleblower is morally obliged to have substantial and sufficient knowledge or information about a case which would convince the disinterested and reasonable observer. Since it will often be the case that only partial information is available or one merely harbours a deep suspicion of unbecoming conduct, the standard of proof is not a dossier complete enough for conviction by a court of law. However, it is precisely because evidence of wrongdoing is often incomplete that it is incumbent to either seek to validate the concern beyond a reasonable doubt, or to draw attention to the situation using the chain of command or other internal channels.

Accusations unsupported by credible and convincing evidence can do irreparable harm to an individual, a unit, or the institution. It must be remembered that possession of, or access to, documents including electronic mail or correspondence is very likely an incomplete record of the actions contemplated or taken by management on an issue.

Third, all means at one's disposal must be exhausted to allow internal channels sufficient opportunity to correct the perceived harm.

This presents the greatest conundrum for those contemplating whistleblowing. How much time is enough and how far up the chain of command is one expected to go? There are no easy answers, since the practical result of marching into the office of an environmental commander, the deputy minister or the chief of the defence staff with a collection of damning e-mails is not likely to endear one to immediate superiors; neither are the high marks for 'courage' on the personal evaluation report by one's boss likely to offset those for 'loyalty' and 'teamwork'. There are a number of factors which, taken together, compel potential whistleblowers to sober second thought.

First, the department is presently attempting to navigate waters as turbulent as any in its modern-day history. Deep budget cuts led to significant downsizing even as the operational tempo increased; this is overlain by changing social expectations and a veritable revolution in military affairs. There are a finite number of matters which managers and leaders can attend to in a day. Wrongdoing, perceived or otherwise, may be less likely a result of intent than of omission resulting from oversight, choosing to spend time on issues of greater relative importance, having incomplete information when arriving at a decision, or, simply having made a mistake.

As well, commanders generally prefer to correct notable deficiencies when informed of them, either because it is simply 'the right thing to do', or the result of doing nothing could affect public safety, and/or public confidence in the institution. Further, employees are obliged by moral principles and civil law "not to act for persons whose interests conflict with the employer's interests," and the considerations of loyalty and ethics oblige whistleblowers to "minimize the disruption caused by their disclosures."²³

The benefit of turning to insiders to raise concerns satisfies loyalties both to the organization and to the public. As Bok suggests, "It is disloyal to colleagues and employers, as well as a waste of time for the public, to sound the loudest alarm first. Whistleblowing has to remain a last alternative because of its destructive side effects."²⁴

Finally, even those party to knowledge of a questionable act or omission are not necessarily aware of the complete range of actions taken by others to rectify the situation or to deal with it. After all, a superior is under no obligation to inform subordinates of actions taken subsequent to being made aware of an issue. As such, the situation may have been resolved unbeknownst to the potential whistleblower. Can it be confirmed that action has not been taken, or is this simply surmised? More fundamentally, does the would-be whistleblower know with absolute certainty the matter has been brought to the direct attention of someone in a position to effect change? The combined effect of these considerations is that the employee owes the institution a reasonable opportunity to rectify the act or omission.

For those concerned that the highest echelons of the power structure are implicated to the degree that they all would fail to act, there remain the options of the independent National Investigation Service and perhaps the new Ombudsman. Externally, of course, there are many choices to raise an alarm without going to the media first.

The discussion to this point would suggest an ethical course of action for the individual contemplating whistleblowing. In general, it would be through one's entire chain of command first; then to internal agencies

outside one's chain of command; then to outside organizations which are unlikely to make public the situation before it is resolved (the institution may well want to publicize the action and the remedy to dissuade others once the issue has been attended to); then to outside organizations with a direct interest in the issue at hand (who may or may not make the issue public); and as a last resort, to the media.

Fourth, there must be good reason to believe the disclosure will bring appropriate change and result in an overall net benefit for the institution.

Implicit in this statement is the notion of it being more moral to blow the whistle (at least internally) before the harmful consequences have had a chance to take effect. To do so after the fact, while in possession of the relevant information beforehand, reduces the whistleblower to accomplice status, since bringing attention to the act or omission earlier would or could have mitigated the effects.

It follows that the whistleblower should refer the matter to the individual or agency that can do the most to correct the problem. While recent experience has clearly demonstrated this is the media rather than senior leadership, the long-term effect of consorting with the former is to further erode the capacity and authority of the chain of command. Each case which unnecessarily becomes a news item, and thus a matter for the minister in the House of Commons, is automatically accorded priority for resolution and relegates to secondary status those cases which were brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities through legitimate means. Thus, delay prompts frustration in those who have been mindful of the rules and regulations, leading to the belief the only way to resolve a situation is to send it to the media or the government's opposition members, who will make an immediate case of it, thereby exacerbating the situation.

In addition to ending or modifying the harmful activity, the effect of moral whistleblowing must be to do more collective good than harm. Viewing cases in isolation or ascribing higher moral import to them than circumstances merit results in pyrrhic victories. The effect of winning all of the battles on relatively minor issues at the expense of the organization losing the war is hardly conducive to building a stronger institution.²⁵

Fifth, the motivation must serve the general public interest, not private interests or agendas.

Bok suggests that would-be whistleblowers have a power to dramatize moral conflict, and thus a "special responsibility to ask themselves about biases in deciding whether or not to speak out."²⁶ It is said that the easiest thing in the world is to convince someone s/he is overworked; it is probably as difficult to convince whistleblowers their actions are for the good of the institution and not merely to satisfy private interests or agendas. In short, 'blowing the whistle' must never be cause for 'tooting one's horn'.

The limited research on this form of protest informs us that whistleblowers generally believe they are defending the true interests of the organization, and are more likely to have contemplated the ethics, merits and consequences of their actions than those who with similar information, choose not to make the issue a matter of public attention. One survey of whistleblowers in the United States found that they "shared a belief in absolute moral standards, a strong sense of individual responsibility, and a fierce commitment to upholding moral principles."²⁷ As James Bowman writes, the majority do not appear to be "malcontents, misfits, neurotics, nor radicals."²⁸ Certainly, those who expose themselves and their families to criticism in order to draw public attention to an issue possess a certain amount of moral courage, though that does not necessarily mean doing so was the 'right' or 'moral' thing to do under the circumstances.

Of course, not all who blow the whistle do so out of concern for the public interest, as Bok so succinctly points out: "It is a fact that the disappointed, the incompetent, the malicious, and the paranoid all too often make groundless accusations."²⁹ Certainly, those same sorts of people also make allegations which *are* substantiated by facts, but to bring the issue to public attention out of vindictiveness, or for the sheer

self-aggrandizement of reading about oneself or one's actions in the media, is morally akin to the arsonist or vandal. It is safe to say that there are many motivations and no such thing as a 'typical' whistleblower.

Often, satisfying this criterion is merely implied as a 'given' in discussions on the ethics of whistleblowing. It is worth exploring further, however, in light of a malevolent form of behaviour _ not anticipated by academics _ which seems to be manifesting itself in DND.

The information society has empowered employees at the expense of employers to the point where the capacity of the individual to influence public policy and negatively affect careers of senior public servants is unprecedented in our history. This is particularly true in DND, where the insidious effects of a bureaucratic culture have so infiltrated the institution that time and again it has proven itself unable or unwilling to defend individuals, units, the officer corps or the collective institution against unsubstantiated criticism by media, politicians, or internal dissidents. The ease with which media can be drawn to a negative story regardless of merit, the preparation of records with the express purpose of having them subject to an Access to Information request,³⁰ and comprehensive daily diary entries (which by nature are biased), are all tools for the morally unscrupulous bent on revenge for past slights, perceived or otherwise.

The result is that aggrieved public servants, if driven by vindictiveness, bitter at being passed over for promotion or for other spiteful reasons, can plan and execute a military-style 'information campaign' to set up individuals, units and regiments for investigation and public disgrace. Obviously, whistleblowing for these motivations or for the sake of improving one's personal standing relative to others in the organization is immoral behaviour.

Practically Speaking

The practical side of coming to terms with whether a particular case meets the criteria for morally justified whistleblowing is rarely a routine, objective exercise.

Recently, Canadians were shocked to learn from the media of army Warrant Officer Tom Martineau's unsuccessful efforts to obtain adequate post-operative medical support after being shot by a sniper in Bosnia while on peacekeeping duty. While the case was a sad indictment of the capacity of the department to tend to its injured, does it in fact satisfy the five criteria for morally justified whistleblowing?

It is argued the soldier's situation meets the 'seriously and demonstrably harmful to the public interest' criterion, particularly if the effect of inadequate post-operative medical support is or may be the standard for past, present and future injured soldiers. One might further argue that in exchange for unlimited liability, unique in society to the profession of arms, the public interest is served by holding the military to its moral obligation of providing adequate care to members injured on duty.

The second criterion of 'evidence of serious and demonstrable harm' is adequately met by the directly observed physical condition of the soldier and examples of other documented cases where post-tour medical support has been found lacking. Numerous internal surveys, media reports and feedback from soldiers substantiate the situation, and statements by the top echelon of officers in the CF attesting that the medical and administrative support network needs emergency surgery confirms the harmful effect of the status quo.

The process the soldier followed in trying to resolve his case is not entirely clear. If his account of months of battling bureaucracy at various levels in the chain of command as described in the media is accepted at face value, then he satisfied the condition 'to allow internal channels sufficient opportunity to correct the perceived harm'. Even if all of the available avenues were not exhausted, however, it is a fact that since 1992, the tempo of Canadian Forces international operations has been high, resulting in a significant number of physical and psychological casualties. Given the nature of the profession and the years elapsed, there is a

reasonable expectation that by now the Department would have resolved systemic shortcomings identified long ago, so that processes and programs would be in place to adequately assist those who have paid a high price for their service.

The disclosure of the circumstances of this case resulted in a renewed effort to provide quality post-operative care and support for the individual, and it would appear for others in similar circumstances as well. This satisfies the fourth condition. Finally, while the individual obviously has the most to directly gain from blowing the whistle, the act of doing so would not appear to satisfy merely a petty personal interest or private agenda. Thus, by the established criteria, one would be morally justified to whistleblow in this case, including to the media.³¹

Other examples are more ethically problematic, particularly those less emotive than the case just described. By media accounts, the most frequent test of loyalty to the organization on a regular basis appears to be for those individuals with knowledge or suspicion of financial improprieties. Consider the hypothetical case of a finance clerk concerned about processing the claims of a general taking an inordinate amount of national and international trips in the months leading up to his retirement: does the case meet the criteria for the clerk to whistleblow in good conscience?

Arguably, knowledge of the wasteful expenditure of any public money is in the public interest. This is particularly true if allowing the practice to continue unabated may lead to a further abuse, or if the practice is guided by the rationale that it must be 'OK' because a superior approved it, and therefore is evidence of a wider, systemic problem of culture. However, even if the travel to investigate job prospects is of questionable morality, the issue is hardly 'seriously and demonstrably harmful' to the public interest *per se*. On this point alone, the case does not meet the requirements of the first condition and is therefore sufficient to determine that whistleblowing to external agencies would be morally wrong. Depending on the degree and scope of the questionable activity though, it may well be cause to bring to the attention of internal agencies to determine if applicable rules and regulations governing travel and benefits have been transgressed. Only after an appropriate and reasonable period of time, and with clear and unequivocal evidence of serious misconduct, would it be ethical to consider resorting to an outside agency like the Auditor General's office for review.

Conclusion

The leak of information concerning acts or omissions of CF members and DND employees to outside agencies and to media in particular has landed the department in hot water on many occasions in the recent past. There continue to be revelations on a regular basis, but more often than not the broth is old, or involve issues which, relatively speaking, are of minor import.

In view of the significant challenges now facing the Department, those contemplating the unofficial disclosure of information must more rigorously assess the morality of their actions. Immoral whistleblowing and leaking is ultimately profoundly destructive. It focuses public attention on relatively trivial matters and away from public deliberation or debate of serious issues affecting national defence; causes staff to fritter away time inquiring, investigating and responding to priorities which are not necessarily determined by operational merit; and hurts morale, since the nature of news and institutional lethargy means the department cannot recover from critical media reports, even if they are out-and-out wrong. In short, immoral whistleblowers and leakers serve to doom DND, since the plaudits of domestic operations and peacekeeping missions gone fabulously well can never recover lost public goodwill.

It may well be that those who choose this form of protest have the best of intentions for the institution and its people in mind when they decide to make an act or omission public. Those trying to help should seriously consider their situation in light of the criteria suggested here. Those who whistleblow or leak without even the pretense of helping the institution should stop professing their moral standards are higher than the institution, and become part of the solution by resigning rather than continue to be part of the problem by

remaining. In lieu of any more relevant or practical advice, then, perhaps as good a guide as any is "whistleblowing if necessary, but not necessarily whistleblowing."

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Endnotes

¹ Quoted in Kenneth Kernaghan, "Whistle-blowing in Canadian governments: ethical, political and managerial considerations" *Optimum*, Vol. 22-1, 1991.

² The stigma attached to whistleblowing is such that the motivation behind writing this article needs to be explained. Before tongues wag, the author to this point happily has not had occasion to blow the whistle. Interest in the issue stems from working in military public affairs, a branch of national defence that is regularly accused by its detractors (rightly or wrongly) of whistleblowing or being the source of leaks to media. The material presented here, then, is a composite of thoughts drawn from academic sources, discussion among peers and by reflecting on the rationale which informs those who choose this particular route of protest.

³ Gerald Vinten, (Ed.), *Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 5.

⁴ Daniel Westman, *Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge*. Washington: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1991, p. 19.

⁵ Whistleblower Protection Act 1989, 103 Stat. 17 section 1213 (a)(1).

⁶ Westman, p. 19. Whistleblowing is concerned with aspects and degrees of unbecoming conduct, and thus as a general rule of thumb is distinct from publicly disagreeing with government or departmental policy. For example, concluding that groundfish stocks are at a certain level and publishing the findings in a respected journal does not constitute whistleblowing, even if the tally arrived at by scientists differs from that of bureaucratic superiors. However, it is whistleblowing for the former to publicly accuse the latter of contriving to pressure or even order the scientists to fix the data set to satisfy political considerations.

Writing letters to the editor or articles for newspapers or publications critical of departmental policy may be dissent and grounds for sanctions, but generally is not whistleblowing unless there are serious negative effects from the policy choice in question which are evidence of gross mismanagement or serious abuses of power. Publishing or discussing opinions in internal publications, departmental symposiums or other fora is the preferred route (even though the information may well become public), since these are accepted means of promoting healthy discussion and debate, and it is understood the views expressed do not necessarily represent official policy. By the definition and conventions of a profession, Canadian Forces members are expected to actively participate in the study and debate of military issues. The absence of internal vehicles to promote professional exchange is a minefield DND sows for itself, since it forces members to seek media

external to the department to do so. This is wrongly viewed as whistleblowing, and should not necessarily even be considered dissent, since viable internal options do not exist to give voice to observations or constructive debate over policy choices

⁷ Sissela Bok, *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1983, p. 215.

⁸ The most notable examples of this in the United States include New York City police officer, Frank Serpico, and nuclear safety protestor Karen Silkwood. While empirical research cannot conclusively determine whether information has become public through 'unofficial', a careful review of print and electronic media provides reasonably certain evidence as to whether the material was leaked, and generally by what level of government official. In Canada, media reports and publications about the military often refer to "the troops" rather than senior officers or executives surreptitiously bringing incidents to public light. See Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass*, Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996, especially p. 66.

⁹ This raises an interesting topic for debate: "Given: That Maj. Armstrong deserves a Medal of Bravery or Meritorious Service Cross for his actions during and after the Somalia mission."

¹⁰ See especially Bok, Vinten, and Westman.

¹¹ Public Service Employment Act, 1967, schedule C.

¹² Department of National Defence, *Defence Administrative Order and Directive, numbers 2008-0 and 2008-2*.

¹³ This example points to the difficulty inherent in categorizing behaviour as moral or immoral. By definition, the dispute resolution mechanism of harassment counselors constitutes whistleblowing, albeit in a form which is institutionally sanctioned (various grievance processes and 1-800 lines are other examples). As such, regardless of the merit of the complaint, the moral decision is to have brought the issue to the attention of appropriate internal authorities first rather to external agencies. More problematic are those cases that are advanced for frivolous or vexatious reasons; though the means used to raise the issue are correct and appropriate, the motivations for doing so may well be evidence of immorality on the part of the complainant.

¹⁴ The mechanics of leaking are quite easy, ranging from the ubiquitous 'brown envelope', a fax or e-mail of an actual document, or by phone for a 'tip'. The actual documentation need not be provided, since for the most part it is obtainable under the Access to Information Act. Some who leak take their tips to media seriously: there are several cases in Defence where media have requested records citing the exact date, file number and title of a document, and its exact location in a specific individual's filing cabinet.

¹⁵ It is not lost on observers inside or outside the military that the most senior officer to be charged and convicted for activities relating to the Somalia debacle was a commander in the public affairs branch. This officer headed the section where prepared responses for media were tampered with. He was court-martialled, pled guilty to a charge of negligent performance of duty, and fined \$2,000 in addition to a reprimand.

¹⁶ The nature of media is that they are principally concerned with satisfying a private commercial interest rather than serving the public interest and are event, not issue-driven. The effect is to ignore or trivialize issues by reducing them to mere entertainment. In Walter Lippmann's classic phrase, media are driven more by the "curiously trivial as against the dull important."

¹⁷ There are regulatory constraints against the free expression of opinion, (generally taken to mean criticizing government policy) for legitimate reasons, those being the requirement to preserve ministerial accountability and to maintain a politically neutral military force. However, that the testimony of CF members to the recent SCONDVA hearings appeared to the Canadian public (and Parliamentarians!) to be so revelatory, is clear evidence of the constraints under which CF members operate. As one recent study chaired by John Fraser points out, "the quality of defence thinking in this country must improve, and one way to effect change is to promote full and open debate on military concepts and practices ... it is crucial ... that serving military personnel be allowed a forum for the free expression of views on CF doctrine, tactics, procurement, strategic concerns and social questions. These issues are extremely important to the intellectual well-being of the CF and Canada's defence community." (from *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces Interim Report*, 1998, p. 8).

¹⁸ Defence has failed to learn and apply lessons from its own studies on internal information. Data indicate DND personnel are most informed about issues that least interest or concern them. They are also least informed about issues that most interest or concern them. Statistics indicate that the most important source of information about the military for its members is provided by the mass media, not through the chain of command, even though the chain of command is the most trusted conduit of information for internal audiences. Personnel are therefore forced to turn to the media or word-of-mouth to learn of issues of concern to them, yet these are the information sources in which they have the least confidence. CROP Inc., *Reading Behaviour and Impressions of Internal Communication Vehicles Addressed to Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence Personnel*, June, 1993).

Experience to date would seem to indicate that only an agency independent of the bureaucratic influence of DND could produce and disseminate relevant and apolitical information about military matters for military personnel. For example, a weekly newspaper similar in editorial tone and content to the respected American publication *Stars and Stripes*, and a daily one-hour radio show beamed direct to major and minor unit locations, would provide relatively inexpensive vehicles to communicate required (and desired) information from and by the military chain of command. It would also provide a much-needed forum to discuss and debate issues of concern and interest to those in the profession of arms.

¹⁹ The Minister's committee monitoring change in the department has also noted this deficiency. It is so pronounced, in fact, that the draft strategic communications plan for the department does not even include informing internal audiences: "A comprehensive plan must address internal communications issues as well," writes the committee (*Interim Report*, 1998, p. 6).

²⁰ See especially Bowie, *Business Ethics*; Kernaghan and Langford, *The Responsible Public Servant*; and Westman, *The Law of Retaliatory Discharge*.

²¹ Westman, p. 169 and 29.

²² Bok, *Secrets*, p. 219.

²³ Westman, p. 23 and 42.

²⁴ Bok, *Secrets*, p. 221.

²⁵ A recent high-profile incident of whistleblowing is a case in point. Sometime before June 17, 1998, correspondence written two years earlier by an army captain to then-deputy commander of the army Major-General Bill Leach was leaked to media. Among the documents made public in the press was one alleging harassment of a female civilian worker by Colonel Serge Labbé, and later, rather amazingly, the

annual personal assessments of the documents' author (the army captain). The release prompted a military police investigation into the actions taken by the general subsequent to being made aware of the case, which eventually found insufficient evidence of wrongdoing on Leach's part, and no evidence of wrongdoing on Labbé's part. Before acting impulsively, the whistleblower was morally obliged to consider the net effect of his actions; that is, would going to the media result in an overall gain or loss for the army and the Canadian Forces? It is unclear what 'appropriate change' could be effected and what benefits could accrue as a result of the leak, in contrast to the very negative effects of being either 'right' or 'wrong'. This incident also does not satisfy any of the other conditions discussed to this point for whistleblowing to be morally justified. As such, the individual who released the documents to media, and/or put them in the hands of someone so disposed to do so, committed an immoral act.

²⁶ Bok, *Secrets*, p. 224.

²⁷ Philip Jos, Mark Tompkins and Steven Hays, "In Praise of Difficult People: A Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 49 (November/December 1989), p. 558. See also Frederick Elliston, John Keegan, Paula Lockhart and Jane van Schaick, *Whistleblowing Research: Methodological and Moral Issues*, New York: Praeger, 1985.

²⁸ James Bowman, "Whistleblowing in the Public Service: An Overview of the Issues," *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 1 (Fall 1980), p. 17.

²⁹ Bok, *Secrets*, p. 213.

³⁰ The Access to Information Act (AIA) is frequently used by media to substantiate verbal or written tips. The AIA allows whistleblowers to bring attention to events, incidents or expenses in relative privacy and with a reduced requirement to personally substantiate the allegations, since much of this work can now be done by a reporter interested enough in the story.

This situation is exacerbating an interesting and little-studied harmful effect for the formulation and implementation of public policy in Canada. Access to information is hailed as an important vehicle for more informed decision making, leading to 'better' public policies and the restoration of public confidence in public institutions through open and accountable government. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that on balance, the direct consequence of the AIA to date is more secrecy in DND (and by extension the federal government), not less, and a decline in public confidence in our institutions. In an effort to 'level the playing field', the public servants' silent protest against the AIA takes the form of giving direction or briefings orally rather than in writing, or simply not committing to paper minutes of meetings, ideas, analyses, recommendations or advice on potentially controversial topics.

If secrecy is defined as 'deliberately withholding information' (Bok, *Secrets*, p. 10), then the result has been greater secrecy. Ironically, Canada is in danger of exchanging the pre-AIA situation of limited public access to a broad storehouse of information, for a situation with relatively broad access to a diminishing storehouse of information. The act of whistleblowing which is not morally justified, then, is directly contributing to greater secrecy in the department. If the motivation of whistleblowers is to force the department to be more open and accountable, it would appear to be having the opposite effect. From Brett Boudreau, *Force for Change or Agent of Malevolence? The Effect of the Access to Information Act on Public Policy: A Case Study of National Defence*, unpublished directed study paper, Carleton University, May 1998.

³¹ The assessment that a particular case satisfies the five conditions merely indicates whistleblowing is morally justified if that is the option selected; it neither *obliges* one to whistleblow, nor is the individual immoral for not doing so (unless, as discussed earlier, the gravity of the act or omission warrants disclosure).

Of course, for a significant number of DND personnel, even discussing the subject at hand is anathema, particularly for those who live by the moral code of "the institution, right or wrong". For these individuals, all whistleblowing is immoral, and believe that resigning from the military before speaking out is the *only* ethical choice. Though admirable on the face of it, this view does not seem consistent with the obligation to ultimately act in the interest of the country rather than the institution in the event of conflicting loyalties. It also does not seem helpful that the individual or agency responsible for the questionable act or omission should remain in the military, potentially unpunished, while the moral element is required to leave.



[Français]

Some Thoughts on an Army for the 21st Century

Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Cessford, CD

The intent of this paper is to stimulate discussion (notably sparse to date) on the type of army our nation needs now and for the foreseeable future. As the necessary first step to this process, it might be worthwhile for me to declare my biases first - in essence to articulate those first principles which I believe must shape this debate.

First Principles

New Jerusalem is not upon us. For the foreseeable future, war in all its various forms will remain with humankind - an instrument to be used by nations and non-nations, by citizens and by criminals. While the nature and conduct of war may change, the essence will remain: *war* is an act of force to compel our enemy to our will.¹ We can debate differing strategies and tactics (symmetric or asymmetric; limited war or total war; hot war or cold war *etc.*) but the fact remains that organized violence retains its efficacy as an instrument of state and non-state entities alike.

The second fundamental principle is that land power remains the ultimate arbitrator of national destinies. Only armies can take and hold ground - the ultimate expression of a nation's warfighting power.² This is not to deny the growing power of air and naval forces, especially in conflicts with limited objectives or those non/near conflicts grouped under the loose heading of operations other than war (OOTW). Nor does this premise ignore the extraordinary value and utility of joint forces. However, the frank point to be made is that land power, with or without air and sea power, can win serious (or unlimited) conflicts. Air or sea power can not yet achieve the same.

The third consideration is the fact that the use of military force (from peace support operations to full-blown war) is either discretionary (i.e. Canada has the choice as to whether it will participate and to what extent) or non-discretionary (i.e. the consequences of non-participation threaten the well-being or even existence of Canada itself). Examples of discretionary conflicts are the Gulf War and Korea; the Second World War is an example of a non-discretionary conflict. As a general rule, non-discretionary operations will demand a major military effort, with the army fulfilling the primary role. Discretionary operations may allow Canada the luxury to limit or tailor its force allocation although (as discussed below) there are limits to what our allies will allow.

"For the foreseeable future, war in all its various forms will remain with humankind - an instrument to be used by nations and non-nations, by citizens and by criminals."

A fourth factor is the probability that Canada will find itself acting as part of a coalition during any future military endeavours. The extent of Canada's participation will depend on the type of engagement (discretionary or non-discretionary) and the seriousness of the threat. And the degree to which Canada's interests are at risk is a good indicator of the government's willingness to commit ground combat forces to operations. A key point to grasp here is that Canada's interests include its relationship with its allies -

particularly the United States. Whereas there may be no direct threat to Canadian interests, active participation by combat forces may be deemed necessary as the price for close diplomatic and economic relationships with our major allies.³ And again, the commitment of ground combat forces, especially in an era of unchallenged US air and maritime supremacy, is the currency of choice in international relations. The point to be made is that 'burden-sharing' entails much more than simply lining up another flag on the podium. In a serious conflict Canada will be expected to expend both treasure and blood.

The fifth and final principle is that "low-tech" does not mean low-risk or low-casualty. It is naive to suggest that any coalition involved in serious operations will accept limited (i.e. non-combat) participation by Canadian forces.⁴ And any coalition will use Canada's ground combat forces, regardless of the strengths or weaknesses of their training and equipment. Good basic infantry, be they lightly or even poorly armed, are always in short supply and are extremely useful - be it clearing streets in Mogadishu or breaching the Saddam Line in southern Kuwait. The point to be recognized is that lightly armed ground forces will not be held out of the fight and, once committed, are much more vulnerable than adequately equipped and balanced formations.⁵

Where We Are Now

The Canadian army has failed to develop even a basic vision of the environment (strategic, operational and tactical) within which it will conduct operations 25 years hence. The failure to even attempt to define this environment compromises the army's ability to develop relevant doctrine and structures for future operations or acquire effective equipment. As a consequence, the army remains a prisoner of its past.

Despite the general adoption of the American battlefield framework (close, deep, and rear operations), the Canadian army has resolutely refused to prepare itself for any form of combat beyond the conventional close battle.⁶ Our formations lack the structure, doctrine and equipment to conduct operations across the whole of their battlespace. Rear battle is generally ignored while the conduct of deep operations remains an enigma.

Simply put, activities not directly associated with the conduct of the close battle are dismissed as supporting acts to the central drama. Although a fundamental element of our doctrine, the constituent components of the battlefield framework are simply ignored or, even worse, given the most elementary analysis. Neither our brigade nor our divisional headquarters possess the structure or doctrinal understanding to effect any mission beyond the close battle and it is patently ludicrous to suggest otherwise.⁷

The reason for the Canadian army's intellectual stagnation is simple; for almost four decades our entire institution dedicated itself to the execution of a single tactical engagement on NATO's central front. All energies were focused on the commitment of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG) to defensive operations as an element of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG). This mission curtailed serious professional study of operations beyond that of the tactical close battle in Central Europe. Generations of staff college students marched battle groups and brigades across southern Germany. Regimental officers and formation staffs walked the ground assigned to 4 CMBG, siting individual fighting vehicles and sections to the positions from which they would engage Warsaw Pact forces. The Brigade General Deployment Plan (GDP) became sacred writ, inviolate and unassailable.

In fairness, this tactical pre-occupation was endemic throughout NATO, reflecting an historical bias towards battle as the central element of warfare.⁸ Strategy provided simple context for tactical execution and the operational level of war was unknown.⁹ In short, the individual tactical engagement was seen as the end itself, rather than the means to the end. Within NATO, this simplistic view of the battlefield held sway until 1982, when the US Army fundamentally revised its key doctrinal manual: Field Manual (FM) 100-5 *Operations*. A substantially improved FM 100-5 was re-issued in 1986, further polishing the US Army's understanding of the operational level of war. This manual served as the doctrinal foundation for the development and execution of the 1991 Gulf War ground campaign.¹⁰ Other NATO nations have built upon US doctrine to craft their own visions of future conflict. Unfortunately, the Canadian army has been left behind by this debate. Despite the much heralded adoption of manoeuvre warfare and mission command concepts, there has been precious little change at the coalface. As a profession, we continue to view the battlefield as only that area which can be influenced by our integral direct fire weapons systems or, at most,

by our direct support artillery.¹¹ In short, our understanding of war is framed (and constrained) by the two-dimensional battlefield, not the three-dimensional concept of battlespace. And this vision of the battlefield is an absolutely tactical construct whereas an understanding of battlespace is a precondition to analysis at the operational level.

This focus on the close battle corrupts the army's efforts to gain an understanding of manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare concentrates all activities towards the attainment of strategically relevant objectives. The close battle is the epitome of the tactics, the least important element of the military hierarchy of strategy, operations and tactics. In emphasizing the tactical level, the essence of this hierarchy is inverted and corrupted. Battles conducted independently of strategic and operational considerations dissipate blood and treasure without real return.¹²

A further cause of this operational myopia, has been the structural imbalance within the Canadian Forces itself. Aviation is a fundamental element of the land battle and yet the current system militates against the real integration of helicopters into the tactical fight.¹³ Helicopters are an Air Force asset, allocated to the army but never really a part of the ground combat force. The Air Force retains absolute control over the operational employment of its helicopters. In addition, the Air Force is responsible for aviation doctrine, dictating the principles that guide their employment.¹⁴ In reality, this translates to a cautious reluctance to accept any but the most routine and mundane of tactical tasks. Utility transport and command and liaison missions are of value to the ground commander but, if this is the best our aviation can do, we should place our money elsewhere. Aviation should provide the land (and joint) commander the ability to strike deep and manoeuvre deep in support of ground and joint operations.

This is an issue that goes far beyond the simple mechanics of command and control. Given competing priorities within the Air Force, it is extremely unlikely that we will see the acquisition of a modern fleet of attack or assault helicopters.¹⁵ Allied armies, recognizing this truth, have generated their own aviation forces.¹⁶ If the army wishes an equivalent capability, we will have no option but to follow their lead.

In fairness, it should also be stressed that the army itself is equally to blame for its lack of deep battle resources. In essence, our fixation with close battle has compromised efforts to develop or acquire ground based sensor and strike systems capable of executing deep battle. Simply put, our leaders have failed to lift their eyes beyond the level of the trench parapet.

Critical deficiencies include the utter lack of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or target acquisition (TA) radar. The latter shortfall is particularly egregious given the vulnerability of our soldiers to indirect fire while on operations in the former Yugoslavia or Somalia. Modern TA radars, such as the Q36/Q37, provide reliable and accurate locations of threat mortars and artillery. Next generation radars, such as the Q47, will cover far larger areas and can provide locations of multiple launch missile systems as well.

UAVs are another battle-proven force multiplier, having won their spurs in Lebanon, the Gulf, and Chechnya. Over 70 armies possess UAVs and this number continues to grow almost daily. In fact, there are now categories of UAVs, from GLOBAL HAWK, which provides a theatre or operational surveillance capability, to the common and simpler tactical UAVs found in brigades, divisions and corps around the world. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of the army UAV project over a period of more than twenty years, we have failed to introduce UAVs into service. We have, however, introduced (or retired) any number of orders of dress and badges - a fairly striking indication of our sense of priorities.¹⁷

Sensor systems are ultimately useless, unless tied to an appropriate strike system. And whereas some progress has been made with land based sensor systems (for example the introduction of COYOTE, AERIES and TRILS), the army has refused to even consider the acquisition of modern deep battle strike systems.

Particularly noteworthy is our lack of a modern multiple launch rocket system.¹⁸ These systems possess extraordinary range, precision and firepower and have been in general service since the Second World War.¹⁹ They are remarkably versatile; modern rocket sub-munitions can destroy personnel, light fortifications, artillery systems or armoured vehicles at close or extended ranges. Yet, astonishingly, our most recent purchase of an indirect fire system was the towed GIAT 105mm gun. Although a leader in its class, the GIAT offers, at best, modest range, limited firepower and indifferent tactical mobility (the claims of the GRIFFON community notwithstanding) while remaining extremely vulnerable to any type of counter-battery threat.

In the final analysis, our commanders and staffs are incapable of executing the deep battle. This is the consequence of both a lack of equipment (sensors and shooters) and a lack of training and experience. The planning, coordination and execution of the deep battle is an extremely demanding task for both commanders and staffs, requiring extended training coupled with a comprehensive understanding of sensor-shooter capabilities and linkages.²⁰ The problems are daunting (but not insurmountable) and, as a result, we routinely wish the problem away.

In our training, *deus ex machina*, in the form of American attack aviation assets or MLRS brigades, magically appear on formation orders of battle, instantly solving the tiresome and difficult problem of deep operation planning and executing. With the distractions of deep battle (and to a lesser degree rear battle) safely put to one side, our formation headquarters can focus on what they understand and do best; the close battle.

Force development has been reduced to the haphazard and incremental improvement of current doctrine, structure and equipment. Lacking a vision (or visions) of the future military environment, the army has looked to past wars to inform its force development decisions. The result has been a perpetuation of the Cold War Canadian army; a Land Force focused on the mid/high-intensity close battle coupled with the retention of a very limited peace support/enforcement capability. Neither of these capability objectives is likely to retain significant relevance into the next century.

So What Must Be Done?

As a first step, the Canadian army must objectively and honestly consider the likely future security environment (FSE). The FSE encompasses much more than a simple threat analysis; it is a multi-faceted examination of strategic interests and challenges, militarily relevant technologies and national (as opposed to purely military) capabilities and vulnerabilities. In essence, the FSE posits the future strategic environment within which the Canadian Forces will execute its missions. Even if imperfectly crafted, an accepted understanding of the FSE will allow the army to determine and allocate roles, missions and tasks, identifying those capabilities required for this future environment. These capability requirements then serve to drive the development of an operational concept or even concepts: the integration of doctrine, structure and technology to produce relevant maritime, land and air forces capable of integration within joint and combined structures.²¹ The importance on the proper development of this concept (or concepts), as the essential guide to the army's future, simply cannot be overstated.

The army has recognized this imperative and has taken the first steps in the development of this process, however, we are far from any definitive result.²² In the interim, I would offer the following thoughts on the future army.

We should allocate our limited resources to those functions providing the best 'return on investment'. By this I mean those assets possessing real and balanced operational utility throughout the depth of the battlespace, unconstrained potential and which enhance our ability to operate as a joint and combined force.²³ Having

satisfied these very general criteria, we should then look to exploit (where possible) those areas in which we already enjoy some level of capability.

In specific terms, as a first step, we must accept risk in close battle. Modern armies possess the assets to effectively see and strike in depth potentially determining success or failure well before the close battle is joined. In short, more and more fighting is taking place deep beyond the FLOT.²⁴ Recognizing this trend, the army's efforts must shift to the doctrines, structures and equipment necessary for the prosecution of deep, dispersed and non-linear operations. Our fixation on the close battle blinds us to the utility of forces that can strike throughout the battlespace, shattering the enemy's will and ability to fight. To my mind, the army must make a concerted effort to integrate, physically and doctrinally, relevant components of the Air Force into the Land Force battlespace. The army must recognize the potential inherent within our aviation and initiate the process to begin its transformation to a manoeuvre arm. In the short term, this means the provision of unstinting army support to the development of ISTAR and, eventually, armed GRIFFON variants.²⁵ It also argues for the development of relevant army aviation doctrine and the inculcation of a comprehensive understanding of attack doctrine in our leaders and staffs. We must be trained to think in terms of battlespace rather than the present two-dimensional construct of the battlefield. In the long-term, the Canadian army must make every effort to acquire attack aviation, not necessarily AH-64 APACHE but certainly at least an AH-1Z COBRA equivalent.²⁶

An equivalent effort must be directed towards the acquisition of long-range strike systems. Conventional tube artillery, with its limitations in range, precision, firepower and flexibility, cannot fulfil this role. In the near-term, the army should consider the acquisition of a multiple launch rocket system - if necessary, mortgaging its tube artillery assets to do so. There is a case to be made for the transfer of some or all of our tube artillery to the Militia, less its associated fire support and target acquisition cadre, if monies saved could be directed towards the acquisition of long-range strike systems.²⁷ In placing some or all of our tube artillery at a lower state of readiness, the army would be accepting risk in its ability to prosecute the close battle but would gain a dramatic increase in its ability to influence the depth of the battlespace. Another factor to be considered is the potential loss of high readiness forces suitable for general employment in non-artillery roles. This is an important, but not critical, consideration.

Attack aviation and long-range strike systems are ultimately useless without an equivalent integrated, sensor system. Some progress has been made with the acquisition of specific sensors (particularly in Electronic Warfare and close/medium ground reconnaissance) but we lack a plan to develop a single integrated system of systems. This sensor system should be linked to appropriate strike assets and command nodes, allowing for the rapid acquisition and defeat of targets across the battlespace. The point to be stressed is that data is in and of itself of generally minor importance. Timely and operationally relevant intelligence is critical - but only if we possess the ability to exploit this knowledge through the application of force be it manoeuvre or lethal and non-lethal firepower.

Clearly the most important of all combat functions is that of command. Command is at the essence of everything we do. Ideally it links all other combat functions and shapes all activities within the battlespace, gaining a synergy that the simple sum of the parts can never impart. Within the army much work has been done and the impending introduction of the Tactical Command, Control and Communications System (TCCCS), the Land force Command System (LFCS) and the Situational Awareness System (SAS) offer extraordinary potential. However, the issue of command is far more than the simple acquisition of technology. The effective integration of command (an art) and control (a science) within a physical environment characterised by uncertainty, danger and friction is an incredibly difficult task. And in our rush to adopt technology, we run the risk of ignoring the human dimension of command. We must provide potential commanders both education and experience and then demand from them a very high professional standard. In particular, resources must be devoted to the development of a command training and evaluation

program culminating in an objective assessment of the commander and their staff.²⁸ This is an essential first step if we are to develop commanders and staffs of the first rank.

Conclusion

It is my belief that a conceptual shift from the battlefield to the battlespace will best prepare the Canadian army for its future missions, roles and tasks. In the final analysis, this article simply articulates the need for the doctrine, structures and technologies necessary for the effective execution of the 'manoeuvrist approach to operations' (and how I hate that phrase - let me count the ways) and mission command. It holds out the promise of achieving what the Russians call 'udar' or operational shock, in effect the paralysis of the enemy's command structure and the dislocation of his operational concept through the application of precision deep strikes and manoeuvre. This is a goal to which we should aspire.



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Endnotes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75.

² I exclude the employment of nuclear weapons when making this statement. A strategic nuclear exchange will fundamentally shape (or end) those nations that suffer their effects.

³ Douglas Lovelace of the US Army War College has suggested that the increased economic linkages inherent to globalization may provide the US increased clout when developing coalition support for its own objectives. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., *The Evolution in Military Affairs: Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Paper, June 16, 1997), pp.17-18.

⁴ The Gulf War may be cited as an example of a coalition where Canada did in fact provide very limited support to the Allied war effort. I would respond with two questions: Were Canada's interests, in fact, served by our decision not to provide serious (i.e. a ground component) combat forces to the coalition? And does anyone believe that had the Allies bogged down, with heavy casualties, in front of the Saddam Line, that Canada would not have faced very strong pressure to commit ground combat forces? The point here, clearly, is not to disparage the efforts of our Navy and Air Force during the Gulf. They served Canada honourably and well and deserve every credit. However, with US air and maritime supremacy a given, Canada's commitment of a reinforced fighter squadron and a small naval task group earned us scant credit.

⁵ Another important point that often needs additional explanation is the fact that light forces are not necessarily cheaper than your standard garden variety mechanized force. For example, the XM-8 light tank would have cost the same as an M1A1. Cost drivers are now not so much the size of the vehicle but rather its sophisticated fire control and avionics packages.

⁶ See B-GL-300-002/FP-000, *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, pp.1-12 to 1-16.

⁷ Only now is the Canadian army beginning to seriously consider the conduct of deep operations. The Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) has recently prepared a briefing paper on the requirement for the establishment of formation Deep Operations Coordination Cells. There is no comparable impetus for the establishment of equivalent mechanisms for the rear battle. The US concept of Rear Area Operations Cells (RAOC), normally a reserve element dedicated to the execution of tactical operations in the formation rear area, might present a useful model.

⁸ Historically the West has suffered from a preoccupation with tactics, neglecting the operational level of war. Conversely, the Soviet Union developed a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between strategy, operations and tactics.

⁹ The term itself has no basis in English and was, in fact, "lifted" from the Soviet military lexicon. Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, (Cambridge, 1987), p. 91.

¹⁰ One of the best comparisons of Soviet and western military thought is Shimon Naveh's *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997). This work also provides an excellent account of the US Army's doctrinal maturation in the 1980s.

¹¹ And contrary to current wisdom, direct support artillery (with a range of all of 18 km) is NOT a deep operations weapons system.

¹² Numerous examples abound, among them: the German spring offensives of 1918; US operations in Vietnam, 1965-1972; and Israel's 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon.

¹³ The author was one of several personnel, newly arrived in Kingston, who were briefed by the 1st Canadian Division on its organization and roles. Every staff section and every Arm and Service advisor spoke to the part they played within the headquarters and the division itself. The one glaring exception was 1 Canadian Air Wing. No briefer spoke to the role aviation played within the Division and there was no representation from 1 Canadian Air Wing.

¹⁴ For example, there is simply no Canadian army doctrine on the employment of attack aviation in the deep or even close battle. This is a serious deficiency in our doctrine given the extraordinary utility of this weapon system and the proliferation of attack helicopters forces among our allies. Any Canadian formation working within a coalition must be prepared to work with armed/attack helicopters. It must be noted however that the use of attack aviation is a key part of the CLFCSC Command and Staff course - based on Canadian Air Force doctrine.

¹⁵ Over the next 10-15 years, the Air Force will need to fund CF-18 upgrade, AURORA MPA upgrade, C-130 replacement, and SEA KING replacement. The costs associated with these projects will dwarf current army initiatives - and raise real concerns as to whether they are even affordable given current and projected funding levels.

¹⁶ The British Army's 24th Airmobile Brigade will comprise three AH-64D regiments and two airmobile light infantry battalions plus an Army aviation general support regiment. The RAF will continue to fly CHINOOK and PUMA, providing medium lift support to the Army. The Australian Army, plainly dissatisfied with the support provided by RAAF aviation, purchased the UH-60 for its tactical assault aviation. The Australian Army is, as well, considering the acquisition of an armed or attack helicopter in the near future. Within the US Army, aviation is an integral component of every division and corps. The point to be grasped here is that many of our Allies have each, in turn, attempted to integrate Air Force aviation into the land battle and, in failing to do so, have then chosen to develop their own aviation force. Indeed, the US Marines have gone even further, developing their own fixed-wing capability as well (including KC-130, F-18 and AV-8B fleets).

¹⁷ In fairness, the comparison may appear specious however our army does seem to spend an inordinate amount of time telling its soldiers what to wear (the most recent being a missive on the proper wear of civilian backpacks). Army orders of dress introduced and/or retired include: garrison dress, work dress, summer DEU, winter DEU and the infamous Mk II combat uniform. And in April 1998, the army received a new badge, motto and flag; the Navy received four UPHOLDER class submarines.

¹⁸ Examples include the US Army's HIMARS or MLRS or the Russian 9A52 or BM-27 systems.

¹⁹ Ironically, the Canadians were among the first to use this potent weapon, employing a rocket battery armed with the 'Land Mattress' to good effect in the latter stages of the European campaign.

²⁰ During the period 1995-1997, a typical US mechanized division headquarters completed 12 major CPXs (in which all division and formation HQs deployed to the field). It also completed a *Warfighter* test CPX (evaluated by the Battle Command Training Program team from Ft Leavenworth), two overseas exercises involving deployed division CPs and two CPXs requiring deployment within the continental US.

²¹ This is the methodology articulated in the Future Army Process Handbook.

²² The creation of the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) and the articulation of the army's need to gain a future orientation (the result of the Army Senior Officer Retreat) indicate a changing Land Force focus.

²³ By balance, I mean the equilibrium required between our command, sensor systems and shooter systems. It would appear that currently all the army's efforts are directed towards the first two systems while ignoring our ability to effectively strike (either with fires or manoeuvre) on the battlefield. We should be cognizant of the fact that data doesn't kill people, bullets kill people.

²⁴ In the words of an observer at the US Army's Divisional Advanced Warfighting Experiment: "There was a great deal of killing taking place beyond the direct fire fight."

²⁵ The Air Force should shortly be obtaining surveillance suites for a number of CH-146, the GRIFFON. These suites will also allow, for comparatively minor cost, the mounting of an effective weapons package (particularly the HELLFIRE missile) on the GRIFFON.

²⁶ There is no shortage of suitable airframes, including among others: the TIGRE, the MONGOOSE, the KA-50, the MI-28, etc, etc.

²⁷ The technical skill sets required for the employment of tube or rocket artillery are certainly attainable

within a reserve structure. The 142d Field Artillery Brigade (Arkansas National Guard), with the least time in theatre of any US combat formation, performed very well in combat during the Gulf War.

²⁸ And these evaluations must shape decisions on the future employment of the assessed commander otherwise they are irrelevant.



[Français]

The Army and Public Affairs from 1990 to 1998

Captain Claude Beauregard

The 1990s have been very interesting — some would say disappointing — for army public relations. Early in the decade, in 1990 and 1991, the Canadian public held its military in high regard. A few years later, total disaster struck. In 1990, two major events thrust the army into the limelight: the Oka crisis, and the Gulf War. These two occurrences were extremely significant. They made Canadians aware of the importance of the armed forces — something that has been less evident since the Cold War ended in 1989. Moreover, it must be emphasized that, during the Oka crisis, public relations activities were conducted in a professional, exemplary manner.¹ The newspapers had nothing but praise for the military. For example, Lise Bissonnette of *Le Devoir* wrote, [Translation] "What the Canadian army is proving in masterly fashion, with its professional meetings with the press and the crucial information it is providing to journalists, is that it is possible to act intelligently in times of crisis."² Unfortunately, as we shall see further on, the Department of National Defence was to forget that lesson during the Somalia crisis.

The figures speak for themselves: "On average throughout the 1980s, 56% of Canadians held favourable impressions of the CF [Canadian Forces]. This rose to highs of 65% and 75% during the Mohawk and Gulf crises respectively."³ In 1990, 78% of Quebecers viewed the military favourably, and this represented the highest approval rating in Canada.⁴

A public opinion survey on defence and the Canadian Forces contended that:

Canadians' overall attitude toward the CF [Canadian Forces] is strongly positive and climbing in the wake of the Cold War. As of 1992, three out of four Canadians described their impression of the CF as, in sum, favourable. The proportion of people holding an unfavourable impression fell from 25% in 1986 to just 6% in 1992. Canadians have responded very positively as the visibility of the CF has increased. Of those Canadians who do hold unfavourable views, about half indicate that they have this impression because they consider the CF under-equipped (22% of those having an unfavourable impression in 1991) or too small to be properly effective (30%).⁵

Canadian military personnel took part in peacekeeping missions in Somalia in 1992 - 93. During the night of 16-17 March 1993, a 16-year-old Somali youth named Shidane Arone was beaten to death by members of the Airborne Regiment. Photographs of the incident would later be published in Canadian newspapers. On 20 March 1995, the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of

"Does an institution that refuses to face the media to defend its position, refuses to explain its actions (good or bad) to the public and refuses to allow its members to speak out deserve the respect of the citizens of this country?"

Canadian Forces to Somalia was formed.⁶ Also in early 1995, two highly controversial videotapes on the initiation of members of the Airborne Regiment were televised. A survey indicated that "two thirds of respondents (66%) expressed varying degrees of distaste, disappointment and shock at the behaviour of the members of the Regiment shown in the videos."⁷ In the summer of 1996, the Commander of the army, General Maurice Baril, announced that an inquiry would be conducted into the behaviour of Canadian soldiers in the former Yugoslavia.

A Louis Harris / Thompson Lightstone Poll shows that public confidence in the Canadian Forces had declined dramatically. In February 1994, 41% of Canadians expressed a great deal of confidence in the Canadian Forces. In August 1996, only 26% held that view.⁸ Also in August 1996, a Southam News / Angus

Reid Poll contended that a slim majority of Canadians had faith in the leadership of the Canadian Forces:

It was reported that 51 per cent of Canadians believe that the management of the military is basically sound, and that the scandals surrounding DND (Department of National Defence) should be viewed as "isolated incidents"; 45 per cent (a majority of 52 per cent of Quebecers) believe that such incidents were indicative of more "widespread, fundamental" problems within the entire structure of the Canadian Forces; 4 per cent were unsure.⁹

In the fall of 1996, 53% of Canadians thought that General Boyle should resign¹⁰ and 69% felt that "the Canadian Armed Forces has covered up the truth in the Somalia Affair."¹¹ It is not surprising, then, that 58% of Canadians approved of the \$600 million cut to the defence budget in 1996.¹² In February 1997, only 24% of Canadians indicated a great deal of confidence in the Canadian Forces. This constituted a decrease of 2% since August 1996.¹³

It would take two natural disasters for Canadians' confidence in the army to finally increase, namely the Manitoba floods of 1997 and the ice storm crisis in Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick in 1998.¹⁴ The army had become popular in spite of itself. Quite literally in spite of itself, because no communications plan had been systematically prepared in the army since the spring of 1994. Moreover, the plans that had been drawn up in the early 1990s primarily reflected the concerns of the military and did not take into account those of the public.

On 26 June 1991, the Deputy Commander of the army, Lieutenant-General J.C. Gervais, unveiled the army's new public affairs plan. It states that "the Commander wishes to foster among our personnel a pride of service and a sense of belonging by keeping them informed of changes. Similarly, the Commander considers that it is vital for the future of Mobile Command [the army] to obtain the understanding and support of the Canadian public."¹⁵ The theme that the army intended to be its hallmark was "Advertise by Performance".¹⁶ It could not have been phrased better. The army would indeed advertise by its performance, particularly its performance in Somalia! As for keeping military personnel informed, that was an intention soon forgotten. Military personnel would never be as ill-informed as they were during the 1990s. Several publications were sacrificed for budgetary reasons, thereby keeping the members of the Armed Forces in the dark. There was to be no improvement in internal communications until the newspaper *The Maple Leaf* made its debut in 1998.

In 1993, it was decided to produce a guide to assist commanders and public affairs officers in presenting the army's point of view. The themes to be developed were defence priorities, relations with allies, army activities (conditions of service, equipment, recruiting, training, etc) and personnel policies (bilingualism, employment of women, homosexuality, harassment, drugs, etc).¹⁷ However, communications priorities were soon to change. A strategic analysis of Canada's security revealed the need to maintain well-equipped forces capable of rapid response.¹⁸ The senior commanders were worried about budget cuts and seeking public support:

The end of the Cold War and the precipitous collapse of the Soviet threat, combined with the wide-spread economic recession in the West, have led to deep and rapid reductions in military force levels and defence expenditures. However, a safer world has not materialized and the break-up of the old order has created new tensions and increased instability. Public debate and concern about Canada's role in the new world order are growing. Combined with real fear of a national financial crisis, the issue of defence expenditures is receiving particularly close scrutiny. Unfortunately, much of the debate is supported by incomplete, incorrect, or a complete lack of factual information.

In the shadow of these evolving and unstable global realities, the army is carrying out significant reductions

within the overall context of a complex and difficult reorganization. It has become increasingly evident that there is an urgent need to inform and educate our publics about what the army is doing; how the army is doing its job and what the limitations of the army are. The practical difficulties being encountered are not clearly understood by our publics. We must stress that the army is doing a lot with scarce resources, but that it cannot continue to carry out its responsibilities to the nation without the support and understanding of Canadians.¹⁹

The army therefore dwelt on defining its mission, vision, key messages and strategies. These were to be "implemented through a proactive campaign to inform its publics [...]."²⁰ However, this communications plan would never be used. A few months later, in April 1994, the army drew up a new plan: priorities had changed. The military authorities considered that it was now necessary to inform the public about the army's activities because the federal government had decided to review its defence policy. In the army's judgment, "With the defence review in progress and a Defence White Paper expected by December, heightened interest in defence issues is anticipated for the remainder of the year".²¹ It was incumbent upon army staffs to ensure that "information [...] is made available to those most likely to require it, and to those requesting it."²² The army proposed to produce a number of pamphlets containing specific messages for specific groups. This was a far cry from the proactive approach described above.

It is important to stress that the main thing wrong with all of these communications plans was that they contained no analysis of Canadian society. The army was attempting to spread its messages without taking into account the budgetary, social or political situation. It was therefore a purely theoretical exercise of no practical consequence.²³ No provision was made for any reliable feedback mechanism. Implementation of the communications plans depended on the cooperation of military personnel. The 1993 directive states: "All commanders and their staffs must be convinced of the importance and priority of public affairs."²⁴ In point of fact, army commanders are not at all convinced of the importance of public affairs.

Army commanders loathe the media. Being answerable to the public is not one of the traditions of the military. Indeed, the army was unable to grasp the changes that took place in the world of communications in the 1990s. In January 1997, reporter David Pugliese of the *Ottawa Citizen* described the view of public relations held by senior officers in these terms:

I do not see a will among senior ranks to be more open on good or bad stories. To them the media is simply an obstacle in doing their job instead of a resource to be used to build support among the public who for the most part doesn't really have a clue what the Armed Forces does today. A General I interviewed several months ago told me that the way out of the current problem faced by the military is through quiet professionalism, that Canadians will be impressed and give their support to the military if the military just went about their job in a usual professional way. To me this is an example of the dinosaur way of thinking in the upper ranks of DND and a lack of understanding of modern communication. Quiet professionalism while commendable will get you little in today's world.²⁵

Let us now see what form this took in actual fact. The subject of our analysis is the Directorate of Land Communications, which was established in 1996. When General Maurice Baril assumed command of the army, he soon realized that he had to have a team of public affairs officers at his disposal to assist him. These officers were to play an important role in the Zaire crisis in the fall of 1996. The team was formed in the summer, shortly after the army headquarters had moved from Saint-Hubert, Quebec, to Ottawa.

The Directorate of Land Communications experienced organizational problems from the very outset. It had been identified as a manpower pool to serve other purposes than communications. The Director, a colonel, was assigned to an investigation for six months. A major and a chief warrant officer were sent to assist the Inspector General. The staff thus consisted of one lieutenant-colonel (public affairs), one major (public

affairs) and two captains who did not come from the public affairs environment. The Colonel returned to the Directorate in January 1997.

The staff was to encounter a variety of problems, chief among which were the army leadership's lack of a strategic vision vis-à-vis the media, and disagreements between the public affairs officers and the other officers of the Directorate who had a different conception of public relations. Although the Directorate of Land Communications supported General Maurice Baril in his move to make the army more open and transparent, its efforts, unfortunately, were confined to this aspect of communications. All work involving external relations was deemed unnecessary, yet the primary mission of a public relations officer is to build up a fund of understanding and trust among the members of the public.

The following are a few examples. The army refused to become extensively involved in the launching of three books on its history (*The Italian Campaign, A War Without Battle* and *Une guerre sans combats*). An officer was forbidden to brief foreign diplomats in Montreal on the role of satellites, on the pretext that there were urgent tasks to be performed in Ottawa. The journalists present were quite simply stunned. The manager of Radio Canada International (Canadian Forces Network) offered to work with the Directorate of Land Communications to improve the transmission of information between Canada and troops deployed throughout the world.²⁶ The Directorate of Land Communications refused to take part in the project. The Associate Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies offered to publish a series of articles on military matters. The purpose of the project was to provide the Canadian public with information about its army,²⁷ but it soon sank into oblivion. The strategy dealing with the development of the army Internet site has been more or less abandoned — the site is inaccessible most of the time. An informal arrangement between the Friends of the Canadian War Museum and the army to raise the profile of both organizations has, for all practical purposes, been abandoned. A pamphlet meant to provide the public with information about the army was amended 27 times and the photos were changed 7 times; it never went to press. Other similar examples could be offered, but it is more appropriate within the scope of this article to understand the reasons underlying such actions.

It is a widely known that the operations of the Directorate of Land Communications are characterized by crisis management, which takes up most of the time devoted to public affairs. In an environment such as this, no time is devoted to developing a realistic communications strategy, reading newspapers or submitting the most recent information about the army to higher authority. All that is required is to read press clippings, which give a distorted view of the reality. Too often, newspapers are thrown in the wastebasket unread. As to the work atmosphere, let us simply say that interpersonal relations are characterized by mistrust.

While the public relations officers of the Department of National Defence complain regularly about being ignored by the chain of command, it must be said that the reverse is equally true. Public affairs officers are very reluctant to work with people from outside their specialty. "Outsiders" are regarded as not having the skills required to work in the field of communications.

For its part, the army has always treated public relations, and academic training for that matter, with a certain amount of contempt. The recently published document entitled *The Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance Document* states that "the army must deal with the public in an open and truthful manner at all times [...]. A proactive public affairs policy is of course entirely consistent with the military ethos [...]."²⁸ If these aims are to be attained, the necessary resources must, of course, be allocated. The post of Director of Land Communications has been vacant for several months. A fine way to be proactive! This compromises the whole credibility of the army's strategic direction document. It is all very well to want to change the army; one must still have the courage of one's convictions and implement the principles that must henceforth guide the reform of our institution. Doing the opposite only demonstrates the army's inability to adapt to new developments.

Communications and public relations are leadership functions. In recent years, the army has preferred to rely on the "specialists" in the field and has refused to become involved in this crucial area. Why? No doubt because of the lack of academic training in the army officer corps. Does an institution that refuses to face the media to defend its position, refuses to explain its actions (good or bad) to the public and refuses to allow its members to speak out deserve the respect of the citizens of this country?



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Endnotes

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⁴ Steve Flemming, *Public Opinion Toward Defence and the Canadian Forces 1978-1994: An Overview of Post-Cold War Trends*, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, 14 September 1994, p. 21.

⁵ "Canadians Hold CF [Canadian Forces] in High Regard. Public Opinion Toward Defence and the Canadian Forces 1978-1992", 7 November 1994, *Canadians on Defence: 1994-1995 Yearbook*, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Director General Public Affairs.

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⁸ Barbara Waruszynski, "Decline in Public Confidence in the Canadian Forces", *Canadians on Defence*, Director General Public Affairs, 17 October 1996.

⁹ Barbara Waruszynski, "A Slim Majority of Canadians Have Faith in the Leadership of the Canadian Forces", *Canadians on Defence*, Director General Public Affairs, 7 August 1996.

¹⁰ Kevin Chappell, "Narrow Majority of Canadians Believe General Boyle Should Resign", *Canadians on Defence*, Director General Public Affairs, 4 October 1996.

¹¹ The Louis Harris / Thompson Lightstone Poll, September 1996, Vol. 3, No. 9.

¹² Kevin Chappell, "Over Half of Canadians Approve Cuts to Defence Budget", *Canadians on Defence*, Director General Public Affairs, 5 June 1996.

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¹⁴ During the ice storm, several polls measured public satisfaction with those who were endeavouring to restore the situation. The Canadian Army topped every poll. A Léger et Léger poll (conducted for *Le Journal de Montréal* and *The Globe and Mail*, published on 24 January 1998) gave the Army a satisfaction rating of 96%. An SOM poll (conducted for *La Presse* and the TVA network, published on 26 January 1998) showed 95.9% and a SONDAGEM poll (conducted for *Le Devoir* and *Le Soleil*, published on 30 January 1998) gave the Army a satisfaction rating of 93.5%. See *Le Fleur de Lys*, the Land Force Quebec Area Newsletter, February 1998. In February 1998, 34% of Canadians said that they had great confidence in the Canadian Forces. See The Louis Harris / Thompson Lightstone Poll, February 1998, Vol. 5, No. 3, Confidence in Institutions.

¹⁵ Mobile Command Public Affairs Plan, Office of the Deputy Commander, Saint-Hubert, Quebec, FMC 1350-5 (CmdtA), 26 June 1991.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Development of a Land Force Key Issues Guide, Brigadier-General N.B. Jeffries, Land Force Development for Chief of the Defence Staff, 1350-1 (DGLFD), 6 July 1993.

¹⁸ Land Force Communications and Public Affairs Directive 1/93. Strategic Assessment Summary, July 1993.

¹⁹ Land Force Communications and Public Affairs Directive 1/93. Lieutenant-General G.M. Reay, Commander, 1350-1 (Cmdt), 17 August 1993.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Land Force Communications and Public Affairs Directive 1/94, Brigadier-General C.J. Addy, Chief of Staff, for the Commander, 1350-1 (CEM), 11 April 1994.

²² Ibid.

²³ The inadequacy of the Army's communications plans becomes evident when they are compared with the methods used in the civilian world. A communications plan in private industry consists of ten parts: [Translation] "1. Introduction; 2. Research and analysis of the situation; 3. Identification of the problem and the target publics; 4. Definition of the aims to be attained; 5. Proposal of an overall strategy; 6. Media; 7. Schedule; 8. Resources; 9. Budget; and 10. Evaluation and feedback". Danielle Maisonneuve, Jean-François Lamarche and Yves Saint-Amand, *Les relations publiques dans une société en mouvance*, Presses de l'Université du Québec, Québec, 1998, pp. 88-89.

²⁴ Land Force Communications and Public Affairs Directive 1/93, Lieutenant-General G.M. Reay, Commander, 1350-1 (Cmdt), 17 August 1993.

²⁵ Media Q in, TRANSCRIPT, Location: RCAF [Royal Canadian Air Force] Officers Mess, David Pugliese, *Ottawa Citizen*, SUBJECT: Somalia media coverage, January 14, 1997.

²⁶ Letter from Mr Keith Randall (Manager, CF Programming), 5 March 1997.

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[Français]

Reconsidering Amphibiosity

A Canadian Construct

Major Robert Bradford, CD

Amphibiosity is a slang term, first coined by the British to embrace all thinking and undertakings related to that ancient naval activity known as amphibious warfare (AW). It is now a familiar term to Americans and other NATO allies, but in Canada it remains an oddity. This is not surprising given the country's 50-year absence from the joint-littoral arena, at the centre of which amphibious warfare naturally resides. That half-century hiatus is now ending as the Canadian Forces (CF), with the navy in the lead, rediscovers the role amphibiosity must henceforth play in Canadian foreign and defence affairs. When the proposition that Canada should reconsider amphibiosity first emerged during Exercise MARCOT 96 planning in late 1995, there was shocked surprise followed by howls of derision in many quarters. "Canada does not *do* amphibious warfare!" was repeatedly and emphatically asserted by many in whose minds visions of Dieppe and Iwo Jima flashed. Now, three years later, the Minor Amphibious Operations Study (MAOS), which grew out of the MARCOT initiatives in 1996, is nearing completion at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre. Linked to it are a number of other closely-related initiatives which began independently during the ensuing three years, and which have gladly joined the MAOS to form a general initiative to develop a Canadian joint amphibious warfare capability in the global-littoral context. These include the navy's Advanced Logistics and Sealift Capability (ALSC, better known as the AOR replacement), 12 Wing's exploration of the across-the-beach utility role for the maritime helicopter community, and the 'boat company' project underway by the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment, one of the army's new light infantry battalions. The near-simultaneous and independent emergence of these projects testifies to a widespread appreciation in all three services that the Canadian Forces must grow beyond its traditional post-Second World War posture, which was enemy-specific, theatre-specific, and 'continental and deep-water' in character, and embrace some form of amphibiosity.

Undoubtedly underlying this appreciation is the experience of the Canadian Forces in the past ten years, during which there have been two major contingency non-combatant evacuation operations (or NEOs: BANDIT in 1988 and DIALOGUE in 1994), one contingency sea-based evacuation of military forces (COBRA in 1994-95), one actual logistics-over-the-shore operation (in Somalia, 1992), and one actual sea-based humanitarian assistance operation (for Hurricane Andrew in 1994). The littoral focus of major NATO exercises, which typically have an amphibious operation as their focus, and the development of a joint force-capable STANAVFORLANT concept which stresses that formation's ability to cooperate with land and amphibious forces, also argue in favour of Canada revisiting the amphibious warfare sphere which is at the heart of joint warfare in the global-littoral context. This requirement has been discussed in another recent paper.¹ This article will go beyond the question of requirement - the 'why' we should consider amphibiosity - and focus on 'how' the Canadian navy is reconsidering amphibiosity, in the hope that the constructs and models presented herein will facilitate discussion amongst Canadian officers. Accordingly, it will examine four specific elements: first, the definition of amphibious warfare and its Canadian legacy; second, the anticipated character of Canadian amphibiosity; third, the "different aspects" of Canadian amphibious activity; and, fourth, the working models developed by the MAOS to illustrate and check various aspects of the emerging Canadian concept. The article will conclude by describing the proverbial way ahead for the amphibious initiative.

"...[Amphibiosity] is increasingly an aspect of general operations and therefore the business of conventional, as well as dedicated forces."

Definition

The first and most critical challenge for the revival of Canadian amphibiosity is the very meaning of the term amphibious warfare. NATO defines an amphibious operation as follows:

An amphibious operation is an operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore.²

For many Canadian middle and senior officers, both navy and army, this definition has unsettling implications for various reasons. The first is a cultural one. Understandably, as Cold War members of the services, they have had virtually no direct experience with amphibious operations. Canadian experience in the field essentially ended in 1945, and though there is a proud legacy of Canadian amphibiosity from the Second World War, no tradition ensued. Thus, it is understandable that many would cast their minds back that far, so that the term amphibious conjures up visions of brutal assaults such as those at Dieppe, Normandy and Iwo Jima. In another vein, Canadian officers have associated amphibious operations since 1945 primarily with dedicated British and American forces, particularly the latter. The complicated and sophisticated US Navy amphibious groups _ the 'Gators' _ and the highly developed Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), are often viewed as the archetype of modern amphibiosity. Correctly, such a capability is viewed as well beyond Canada's grasp, and any attempt to emulate it is doomed to failure while diverting scarce resources from more reasonable and attainable goals. However, as will be illustrated, amphibiosity is not confined to such sophisticated, complex, and large-scale forces.

Rather, it is increasingly an aspect of general operations and therefore the business of conventional, as well as dedicated forces.

There is another reason for the reticence shown by many officers, this is the challenge implied in the NATO definition itself, particularly the terms "hostile shore" and "potentially hostile shore". A review of various doctrinal manuals dating from the seminal American *Tentative Landing Manual* of 1934 to today's NATO ATP-8(A) reveals that the basic premise of Western amphibious doctrine is that landing forces will be delivered ashore in such a place and manner as to avoid resistance to the greatest extent possible. Thus, although the full-blooded 'storm landing' as evidenced by Tarawa and Iwo Jima during the Second World War is the archetypal image of the amphibious 'assault', it is, in fact, the exception. "Hostility" suggests the potential for opposition, even where no resistance is expected. The Americans have always insisted that this suggestion form part of the definition in order to ensure that amphibious operations are indeed operations, with naval, ground and air forces organized and employed tactically, notwithstanding the premise that minimum resistance is a prerequisite factor. It is true this emphasis has been questioned in the past, and the Amphibious Warfare Working Group of the NATO Naval Board in Brussels will soon study the idea of re-writing the definition in order to obviate the implication that amphibious operations do not include landings in low-threat environments or humanitarian undertakings such as non-combatant evacuation operations. Yet such re-definition is not necessary to permit a Canadian reconsideration of amphibiosity, for it is already agreed that amphibious operations may be conducted at any point on the scale of conflict, from humanitarian undertakings and peace support operations to war. Furthermore, they may be undertaken as independent operations or in conjunction with other naval, land and/or air operations within a campaign. Finally, it must be remembered that the essence of amphibious warfare is not a particular type of landing or the degree of opposition expected. The essence is that it is a joint operation launched from the sea by a joint force.

The present reconsideration of amphibiosity is concerned primarily, but not exclusively, with the amphibious operation. Two other operations are closely associated with amphibious warfare, but technically excluded from the NATO definition though they share the same doctrinal, procedural and material basis as amphibious warfare. These are logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations and what MAOS has termed sea tactical transport (STT). LOTS is concerned with the delivery from shipping of a force and/or materiel over the shore through the use of expedient terminals (such as beaches, undeveloped harbours, disabled ports) or their

withdrawal through such terminals. STT involves the embarkation, transportation and discharge of a ground element using naval vessels and/or ships under direct naval control (for example, integrated into a naval formation), usually for the purpose of delivering that element into, or extracting it from an immediate tactical situation. This is distinct from sealift in the conventional sense, which is involved with the movement of forces between theatres, but which, apart from perhaps convoy and passive air defence measures, does not involve tactical operations. In reconsidering Canadian amphibiousness, MAOS includes these two associated areas.

Character of Canadian Amphibiousness

The value of definition lies in establishing the breadth of amphibiousness. Taken in conjunction with the claim that, in the new global-littoral strategic context, amphibiousness is more and more an aspect of general operations than it is a speciality, this begs the question of who does, or indeed, can do, amphibiousness.

Amphibious forces are maintained world-wide by states of every political, economic and social condition. These range from the large and sophisticated amphibious forces of certain NATO members (primarily the US) to the navies of small, underdeveloped states which maintain a few landing craft that double as general-purpose utility vehicles. A useful construct for characterizing the amphibious capability of a state involves the following:

- **Dedication** - The degree to which forces are organized and maintained primarily for amphibious operations.
- **Specialization** - The degree to which a force is specially equipped in material terms to conduct amphibious operations; and
- **Adaptation** - The degree to which non-dedicated and/or non-specialized forces or elements of forces are adapted to conduct amphibious operations.

Amphibious forces represent different combinations of these characteristics. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Royal Marines are examples of dedicated, specialized amphibious ground forces. The United States Navy's (USN) amphibious groups and the Royal Navy's amphibious squadron are examples of dedicated, specialized naval forces. In contrast, Australia relies on the adaptation of otherwise conventional naval and ground forces operating with land-based air forces, but possesses a small number of amphibious shipping and landing craft. Therefore, the Australian amphibious force is not dedicated, but is specialized to some degree in terms of equipment.

Theoretically, adaptation does not apply to forces which are both dedicated and specialized, but it must apply to forces which are either dedicated or specialized, and to forces which are neither dedicated nor specialized. A useful illustration is the Australian amphibious capability. As mentioned above, the Australian Defence Force employs otherwise conventional naval and ground forces to constitute an amphibious force (which is therefore not dedicated) but does operate a small number of amphibious ships and landing craft (which represents a degree of specialization in material terms). Thus, Australia requires a greater degree of adaptation in its amphibious force than the USN-USMC force, and this is provided for in the form of deliberately prepared doctrine and procedures (amongst other measures). To move further along the spectrum, a state with neither dedicated nor specialized forces could, nonetheless, constitute an amphibious force through adaptation alone, if provision was made for the preparation of otherwise conventional forces through such measures as approved doctrine and procedures, amphibious warfare staff officers, occasional exercises, and so on. However, without such adaptive measures, it is misleading to characterize an ad hoc combination of conventional forces as an amphibious force with any credibility. Such an improvised formation might act as an amphibious force, in fact, and carry out an operation launched from the sea, but it does not merit the description amphibious force in a doctrinal sense. Thus, a distinction should be made between adaptive forces and improvised or ad hoc forces. The latter are inevitably inefficient compared to the former, and may be ineffective and embarrassing relative to the former in all but the most favourable

situations.

Canada's anticipated status is suggested in the MAOS mission statement, which describes the study as a preliminary consideration of the latent amphibious capabilities of the Canadian Forces and their relationship to possible and probable future operations, with a view to developing such capability commensurate with current and anticipated resource constraints. It is clear from this that an adaptive capability is being considered for the Canadian Forces. This adaptability will rely on certain deliberate measures, particularly the development of doctrine, procedures and techniques. Furthermore, though no thought is being given to the acquisition of major specialized amphibious materiel, this approach does not preclude consideration of amphibious operations when assessing the merits of equipment being considered for other roles, for example the AOR replacement.

It is not the purpose of this article to deal with the requirement for Canadian amphibiosity, which is argued in other papers, but here the reader can fairly ask, Why an adaptive capability, why not an improvised approach? A review of recent amphibious and related littoral operations by allied forces, coupled with an examination of Canadian preparations for such contingency operations (COP) as DIALOGUE (the NEO in Haiti) and COBRA (the withdrawal under pressure of UN forces in Yugoslavia), clearly reveals the gross limitations of the improvised approach. Since the organization and despatch of the first UN Emergency Force to the Sinai in 1956, the Canadian Forces has demonstrated its talent in switching from well-established, long-practised roles and functions to new ones on short notice. However, there are limits to such versatility, particularly in this new era of budget restraints and the consequent reduction of resources. Amphibious operations in the new global-littoral strategic context, typified by NEO's, are short-notice situations requiring a near immediate response. Such a response can only be made by forces in a state of relatively high readiness. It is not sufficient to say that Canada can simply decline to get involved in such situations. The annual *Defence Planning Guidance* (DPG) is replete with references to short-notice tasks which only high-readiness forces can handle, while the undertaking of COP's BANDIT, DIALOGUE, COBRA and the Hurricane Andrew response indicate the willingness of the government to assign such tasks. COP's DIALOGUE and COBRA in the mid-1990's were effectively organized _ in so far as we can judge a contingency operation not executed - only because time and staff-power (notably that of Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters and 1st Canadian Division Headquarters) were available. The former cannot be guaranteed in most cases, and staff-power throughout the Canadian Forces has been reduced due to cuts and burdened more than ever with traditional and new responsibilities. At the tactical level, the amphibious experiments conducted during MARCOT 96 off Nova Scotia clearly demonstrated that Canadian navy, army and air force elements can be fused into a force capable of conducting 'micro-joint' operations at the lowest level in an amphibious context. However, the success of the two landings derived from some eight months of superb and particularly close planning and cooperation on the part of the expedient amphibious transport, HMCS Preserver, and the embarked ground combat element, 'J' Company Group of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. A similar experiment conducted during MARCOT/UNIFIED SPIRIT 98, in which some of the main participants did not enjoy the same amount of time and close cooperation, showed uneven success at best, clearly demonstrating the shortcomings of the improvised approach in a less than ideal planning situation.³ Improvisation involves on-the-job-training and much learning from scratch; it requires time and a degree of single-minded dedication and close cooperation which no commander should rely on as a norm. Some littoral operations of an amphibious nature will be such that only dedicated, specialized forces of the highest readiness (such as an Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit) can accomplish the mission. However, many fall within the scope of the adaptive force, and as BANDIT, COBRA, DIALOGUE and the others show, Canada will often deem it necessary for her own forces to conduct such missions. Those same contingency experiences and MARCOT experiments clearly indicate that the improvised, ad hoc approach is unequal to the task. We must be adaptive in our approach to amphibiosity.

Aspects of Canadian Amphibiosity

How would such an adaptive Canadian amphibiousness be employed? To date, the study has framed such employment in the context of two principal situations, cooperation and independent operations, each of which has a number of specific aspects.

Cooperation, as the term suggests, is concerned with the ability of Canadian forces to cooperate with amphibious forces, ranging from allied dedicated, specialized forces (for example the US Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit) to Canadian adaptive amphibious forces, in the conduct of littoral operations. This situation has two specific aspects:

- **General Cooperation** such as the employment of conventional forces in their normal roles, but supporting, assisting or otherwise cooperating with amphibious forces. Such conventional forces could include a Canadian Joint Force or Joint Task Force Commander having an amphibious force under command to a Canadian naval element cooperating with an amphibious task force (e.g., surface task group as a screen or escort force); and
- **Integral Cooperation** such as the incorporation of Canadian elements directly into an allied amphibious force. An example is the inclusion of a Canadian MCDV element in the mine countermeasures (MCM) group of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF). It can also apply to Canadian forces incorporated into the Landing Force (LF) with a view to their immediate introduction into operations, probably as a follow-on echelon after the initial assault.⁴ This primarily concerns ground and perhaps aviation elements, but could include naval shore-based organizations such as the Harbour Defence Unit, or naval military police, to name just two.

Independent operations refer to the conduct of minor amphibious operations by Canadian forces alone, either within a larger overall operation or in stand-alone episodes. This situation has two specific aspects. The first is the water gap crossing which includes those operations concerned with projecting a force ashore, across a water gap, from naval vessels or navy-controlled shipping, for the purpose of accomplishing a mission on land. There are two iterations of this aspect. The first iteration is the establishment of an amphibious tactical lodgment, which is defined as "The landing of forces from the sea in tactical order to secure an area or reinforce forces already ashore. The landing forces are prepared to meet, but do not anticipate opposition.

Such operations require a favourable sea, air and land situation."⁵ This is entirely consistent with the amphibious assault as defined in ATP-8(A), but emphasizes the low end of the scale, and the requirement for a near-benign, low-threat environment for a minor Canadian operation. MAOS is studying this as an enabling operation based on an infantry company group. The second iteration is the delivery over the beach, which is essentially LOTS, even in the case of delivering a combatant unit ashore in a non-tactical manner through the use of ship-to-shore and expedient terminal activities. On occasions when a force or supporting elements must be delivered ashore but conventional means are unavailable to permit administrative delivery until the threat is removed or the facilities rehabilitated, delivery over the beach by surface and aviation means from ships is necessary. Such activities would always be conducted in a genuinely benign environment. MAOS is studying this using the numbers and variety of personnel/vehicles/equipment and amount of cargo associated with an infantry battalion group as a model, but a beach-delivered element could be anything from a field hospital to an engineer support regiment.

The second aspect of independent operations is sea tactical transport, which concerns the movement of forces embarked within a task force, as distinct from strategic, non-tactical movement of vehicles, equipment and cargo from Canada to a seaport of disembarkation. STT is concerned with the cycle of embarkation-transit-disembarkation, including the planning process for embarked forces and ships, marrying-up procedures, organization and drills/routines for transit, and disembarkation procedures. The resulting guidance will be of value to all-Canadian forces (i.e., Canadian ship-Canadian embarked force), Canadian ships embarking allied forces, and Canadian land forces embarking in allied ships.

These situations and aspects, though expressed as relatively exact and discrete episodes, in fact represent

several points along a spectrum. It is possible an operation could involve more than one aspect, or that two or more could be combined. However, if a Canadian amphibious capability is organized to deal with each of these, any unique combination can be addressed much more effectively.

Conclusion

This construct is consistent with both the anticipated missions and the assessed latent amphibious capability of Canadian sea, land and air forces. All the foregoing aspects have been investigated to a modest yet meaningful degree during MARCOT 96 and MARCOT/UNIFIED SPIRIT 98. Certainly more experience is required, but the concept of a distinctive Canadian amphibiousness, though still disputed, is no longer dismissed at a whim. However, the construct is just a beginning, the foundation on which a more specific and detailed programme will be proposed and realized. In the short term perhaps its greatest contribution will be as a reference point, the proverbial 'strawman', and thus as a facilitator for the professional discussion, any new initiative needs to mature and gain acceptance in the Canadian Forces.



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Endnotes

¹ See Major R.D. Bradford, CD, "The Canadian Requirement for an Amphibious Capability", *Maritime Security Working Papers* (Number 9, Summer 1998).

² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *ATP-8(A) Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Military Agency for Standardization) Article 101.

³ The most successful portion _ the landing and physical extraction of evacuees - was that conducted by Compagnie "C", 3ieme Bataillon, Royale 22ieme Regiment. The company group had not only researched NEO procedures, but conducted extensive training and was assisted by a US Marine Corps staff sergeant provided by MARLANT HQ from the USMC Reconnaissance School at Fort Story, Virginia. In contrast, the expedient amphibious transport, HMCS Provider, was heavily engaged in other portions of the exercise and, both during pre-exercise planning and on the exercise, was not afforded anywhere near the time and supporting expertise required for her to prepare for the mission. The same was true of the MARLANT HQ, derived Joint Force Headquarters and Maritime Component Headquarters, and in the event it was decided to downscale the NEO episode to the level of a landing force exercise by the Royale 22ieme Regiment. Though disappointing at the time, in hindsight the contrast between the adaptive element (the company group) and the improvised elements (the AOR, MCC HQ and JFHQ) has validated the MAOS position on the necessity of adaptation. Thus, in concert with MARCOT 96's experiments, the MARCOT/UNIFIED SPIRIT 98

experiment has proved to be extremely valuable.

⁴ In fact, it is more politic than realistic to state that such an element would be used only in a follow-on capacity. It is most unlikely such elements would participate in specialized marine functions like the amphibious surface assault. However, it is entirely conceivable that they could participate in the assault if employed in such a manner as would be merely an adaptation of their normal doctrinal role. The efficacy of this was demonstrated by the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, during MARCOT/UNIFIED SPIRIT 98, when the unit conducted an airmobile assault from the LHA USS Nassau. The mode of delivery to the theatre (i.e., by an amphibious transport) and the platform for the helicopter assault (the deck of an LHA) were, indeed, unconventional. However, this in no way affected the ability of the Canadian troops to conduct an airmobile assault landward, an operation in which the Canadian army is very well experienced. It should be noted that this operation followed several months of planning and close cooperation with 2nd Marine Division. This experiment was conducted in a combat situation, but the significance of this for NEO's and other humanitarian operations is particularly noteworthy.

⁵ This definition is borrowed from the Australian Defence Force's joint manual, *ADFP 12 _ Amphibious Operations*. Presumably, the Australians encountered the same difficulty with the high-end violence implied by ATP-8(A)'s amphibious assault.



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Articles, Books and Websites of Interest

In the Journals: Articles of Interest

The following list provides readers with an overview of articles in other professional and general interest journals.

Army Quarterly & Defence Journal

Volume 128, No. 3 July 1998

"Land Systems Reference Centre" by T.B. Bridge

"The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer at Warminster" by John Pegg

"New Subs for Old: UK Upholders Replace Canada's Ageing Oberons" by Vice Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch

Armée d'aujourd'hui

No. 232, juillet/août 1998

Armée de terre et technologie

Australian Defence Force Journal

No. 131, July/August 1998

"Restructuring the Australian Army: The Seeds of Future Crisis?" by Major C.J. Shine

"Laser Protection: The Need for a Coordinated Approach" by Dr T. McKay and Dr J. Craig, DTSO

"Ceiling Rank for Part-Time Army Officers: Need for Review?" by Captain A. Plunkett, RA Inf

"Australia Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations" by Lieutenant F. Rogers, RAN

Canadian Defence Quarterly

Volume 27, No. 3, Spring 1998

"Coyote: Canadian Army Reconnaissance into the Next Century" by Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Carruthers

"Reforming the Department of National Defence: A View from the Audit Office" by Peter Kasurak and Nicholas Swales

"The Canadian Military and Higher Education" by David A. Charters and Noel Iverson

The Canadian Forces Journal

This new professional journal will commence publication in 1999.

Canadian Military History

Volume 7, No. 2, Spring 1998

"Reflections on Caen, Bocage and the Gap: A Naval Historian's Critique of the Normandy Campaign" by Dr Marc Milner

"Canadian Armour in Normandy: Operation "Totalize" and the Quest for Operational Manoeuvre" by Roman Johann Jarymowycz

"Within Ourselves...The Development of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years War" by Ian McCulloch

International Journal

Volume LIII, No. 2, Spring 1998

"A Ban for all Seasons: The Landmines Convention and its Implications for Canadian Diplomacy" by Lloyd Axworthy and Sarah Taylor

"Black Past, Grey Future? A Post-Dayton view of Bosnia and Herzegovina" by John Graham

International Peacekeeping

Volume 5, Number 2, Summer 1998

"Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion" by Astri Suhrke

"The Diplomacy of Peacekeeping: France and the Multinational Forces to Lebanon, 1982 _ 84" by Pia Christina Wood

"Rebuild '97: A Simulated Exercise for Peace Support Operations" by Anthony Verrier

The Journal of Conflict Studies

Spring 1998

"The Grey Zone: The United States and the Illusory Zone Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement" by Willie Curtis

"The Real Threat from Oklahoma City: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Terrorism" James M. Smith and William C. Thomas

Marine Corps Gazette

Volume 82, Number 7, July 1998

"Focus on Expeditionary Fire Support" by Lieutenant Colonel Forrest R. Lindsay, USMC

"Marine Field Artillery: Doctrine to Procurement Mismatch" by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Strahan, USMC

"Supporting Fires on the Move" by Lieutenant Colonel Forrest B. Lindsay, USMC (Ret)

"Defending Convoys" by Major Joseph M. Curatola

"Convoys in Operations Other Than War _ The Fast Experience" by 1st Lieutenant Jon A. Custis

Military Technology

Volume XXII, Issue 7, 1998

"Indian and Pakistan Towards Nuclear Power Status" by M.A. Hhan and Ezio Bonsignore

"Armies in the Era of Change: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Norway and Portugal" various authors

"Combat Battlefield Identification: Guidelines for Success" by Pascal Maugin

Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly

Volume XXVIII, No 3, Autumn 1998

"The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement" by John Hillen and Michael P. Noonan

"Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance" by John W. Brinsfeld

"Tomorrow's Army: The Challenge of Non-Linear Change" by Antulio J. Echevarria II

"Military Theory and Information Warfare" by Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree

US Naval Institute Proceedings

August 1993

"No Democracy Can Feel Secure" by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond S. Shelton, USMC (article deals with the threat posed by biological agents)

Books of Interest: A Listing of Recent Publications

Canadian Topics

Graves, Donald E. *South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1998.

Law, Clive M. *Canadian Military Handguns, 1855 - 1985*. Alexandria Bay, N.Y. and Bloomfield, ON: Museum Restoration Service, 1994.

Margolian, Howard. *Conduct Unbecoming: The Story of the Murder of Canadian Prisoners of War in Normandy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.

Neary, Peter and Granatstein, J.L., Eds. *The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998.

The Canadian Oxford Dictionary. Toronto/Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Political and Strategic Issues

Coolong, Benjamin Franklin, Ed. *War, Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes*. Port

Washington, N.Y./London: Kennigak Press Corp, 1981.

Feemand, Linda. *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

Powanski, Ronald E. *The Cold War: the United States and the Soviet Union, 1917 - 1991*. New York/Oxford University Press, 1998.

Sarty, Roger. *The Maritime Defence of Canada*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996.

Doctrine and Theory

Antal, John F. *Combat Team: The Captain's War: An Interactive Exercise in Company-Level Command in Battle*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.

Burke, Alan W. and Critchlow, Robert D., Eds. *Foundations of the Military Profession*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1994.

Henry, Ryan and Peartree, C. Edward. *The Information Revolution and International Security*. Washington: The CSIS Press, 1998.

Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997.

Young, Thomas Durrell. *Multi-National Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997.

Ethics

Fleck, Deiter, Ed. *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Ancient to Early Modern Periods

Hooper, Nicholas and Matthew Bennett. *The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: The Middle Ages, 768 - 1487*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Ketchum, Richard M. *Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War*. New York: Henry Holt, 1997.

Prevas, John. *Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Enigma Re-examined*. Rockville Center, N.Y.: Sarpedon, 1998.

Santosuisso, Antonio. *Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500 - 167 B.C.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Yadin, Yidgael. *Masada: Herod's Fortress and the Zealot's Last Stand*. London: Phoenix Illustrated, 1997.

Nineteenth Century Conflict

Coldfelter, Michael. *The Dakota War: The United States Army Versus the Sioux, 1862 - 1865*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1997.

Muir, Rory. *Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.

Quimby, Robert S. *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997.

Weider, Ben and Forschufvud, Sten. *Assassination at St Helena Revisted*. New York, Wiley, 1995.

White, Charles Edward. *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst adn the Militarishce Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801 - 1805*. Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1989.

Twentieth Century Conflict

Cockfield, Jamie H. *With Snow on their Boots: The Tragic Odyssey of the Russian Expeditionary Force in France during World War I*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1998.

Cooke, James, J. *Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997.

Herwig, Holger H. *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914 - 1918*. London: Arnold, 1997.

Mitcham, Samuel W. *Rommel's Greatest Victory: the Desert Fox and the Fall of Tobruk, Spring 1942*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1998.

Prefer, Nathan N. *Patton's Ghost Corps: Cracking the Siegfried Line*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1998.

Weapons and Equipment

Gudgin, Peter. *Armoured Firepower: The Development of Tank Armament, 1939 - 1945*. Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing, 1997.

Jentz, T.L., Ed. *Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force: Formations, Organizations, Tactics, Combat Reports, Units Strengths, Statistics*. Atlglen, PA: Schoffer, 1996.

Peacekeeping

McFate, Patricia Bliss. *Verification in a Global Context: The Establishment and Operation of a United Nations Centre for Information, Training and Analysis (CITA)*. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996.

General

Gray, Chris Hables. *Postmodern War*. New York: The Guilford Press, 1997.

Lavisse, Emile Charles. *Field Equipment of the Equipment of the European Foot Soldier, 1900 - 1914*. Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1994.

Newark, Tim. *Brassey's Book of Uniforms*. London: Brassey's, 1998.

On the Internet

This feature appears in every second issue of the *Bulletin* and offers listing of "cool sites" that our readers may wish to explore. The URLs are current as of publication.

Offered below are a variety of sites on historical and popular military literature.

The Australian War Memorial

A wealth of information on the Australian forces, including links to other sites.

<http://www.awm.gov.au/>

Arnhem Memorial

A site dealing with the epic struggle by the British 1st Airborne Division around Arnhem in September 1944.

<http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/4854/eindex.html>

Camps Hughes Military Site

A site maintained by The Military History Society of Manitoba covering the history and preservation of the former Manitoba training area.

<http://www.gatewest.net/~gcros/>

Canadian Army Regiment Index

This site offers links to all official and unofficial web sites dealing with Canadian Army corps, regiments and museums.

<http://www.du.edu/~tomills/military/america/cargxref.htm>

The Canadian Military Heritage Project

An outstanding site covering domestic and international campaigns Canadian military history.

<http://www.rootsweb.com/~canmil/>

Castles on the Web

A great site with lots of information on mediaeval fortification.

<http://www.castlesontheweb.com/>

The Royal Flashman Society of Upper Canada

A literary site dedicated to the great nineteenth and early twentieth century cavalryman created by George Macdonald Fraser.

<http://www.pangloss.ca/flashman/>

Fortress Study Group

Another fortification site dealing with all aspects of permanent fortification.

<http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/3337/index.html>

The National Library of Canada

This site provides researchers information on the massive holdings of this national treasure.

<http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/>

Sharpe's Rifles

A literary site dedicated to the Sharpe series written by Bernard Cornwell. His Peninsular War hero is also the subject of a popular television series.

[http://sharpe.stayfree.co.uk/over the hills-small.htm](http://sharpe.stayfree.co.uk/over%20the%20hills-small.htm)

World War Two on the Web

A list of sites dealing with the Second World War.

www.bunt.com/~mconrad/etolink.htm

Somme Home Page

The official web site commemorating the Battle of the Somme.

<http://www.somme.com/>



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