

**ABORIGINAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION:
A REVIEW OF SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS**

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ABORIGINAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: A REVIEW OF SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS

INTRODUCTION

It has been asserted that the political needs of aboriginal people are not being met within the current electoral system.(1) For example, Nils Lasko has said:

... the history of many indigenous peoples shows that the indigenous populations have had great problems in communicating with the nation-state and that they are frequently excluded from the general processes of decision-making. They have little influence on various questions concerning their welfare within the administration and other power bodies of the state. It is difficult for indigenous people to have their demands and wishes adhered to.(2)

Aboriginal people around the world have expressed frustration with their lack of both political representation in and influence on government operations. This lack of decision-making power is partially due to demographics. In Canada for example, aboriginal people currently represent 4% of the national population, yet they are numerical minorities in all federal electoral ridings in the 10 provinces. The aboriginal population is too evenly distributed across the country to influence the electoral outcome. Another factor contributing to the limited aboriginal political representation may be the minimal aboriginal participation in the electoral process. In Canada, only 13 self-identifying aboriginal people have been elected to the House of Commons since Confederation in 1867 out of 9,433 available seats.(3) Furthermore, aboriginal people have recently been entitled to vote in federal elections. Inuit were given the right to vote in 1950 and Indians on reserves were granted that right in 1960.

Efforts have been made in several jurisdictions to increase the political representation, and thus the decision-making power, of aboriginal people. This paper will review government activity, both outside and within Canada, aimed at providing aboriginal people with some form of special political representation.

THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Several countries have recognized the need for aboriginal people to have some guaranteed input into the political process. Steps towards achieving this goal have been taken by the governments in Fennoscandia, the New Zealand Parliament and by the State legislature of Maine, U.S.A.

A. The Sami Parliaments of Fennoscandia

The aboriginal population of Fennoscandia, the Sami, are dispersed over the territories of Finland, Norway and Sweden. The governments of these three countries have provided aboriginal representation for the Sami through the creation of separate aboriginal parliaments. These elected bodies are subordinate to the national Parliaments and typically function as advisory bodies on issues affecting the Sami.

1. Finland

The Government of Finland began moving towards the creation of a separate Sami Parliament in 1971, when the Finnish State Commission on Sami Affairs was established. One of the recommendations in the Commission's 1973 report was the establishment of a separate body to represent the interests of the Sami minority.

A Cabinet Decree (A 824/73) was signed by the President of Finland in 1973 implementing the Commission's recommendation. The decree established the Finnish Sami Parliament, officially known as the Delegation for Sami Affairs. The Cabinet decree established four Sami constituencies in northern Finland and set the number of members sitting in the Sami Parliament at 20. At least eight of these members are elected from the four Sami constituencies in Northern Finland, while the remaining 12 members are elected according to popular Sami vote and are drawn from all regions of Finland, both inside and outside the four Sami constituencies.(4)

The system for determining Sami electoral eligibility was also outlined in the 1973 Cabinet decree. Those individuals and their spouses who are eligible can self-identify as Sami voters on the census, which has been collecting data on aboriginal origin since 1962.

The Sami Parliament does not have the authority to make decisions binding on the national Parliament, the local authorities or their administrations. It has the power only to make recommendations to these authorities on matters affecting Sami interests. The Sami Parliament is also responsible for naming some representatives to public boards at the county, provincial and national levels of government.(5)

One of the criticisms of this system of Sami political representation is that the Parliament "has no direct powers of decision-making. ... It is [the Sami Parliament's] experience that the authorities of Finland are not positive towards our demands. Some have been listened to, but by far the majority have been ignored."(6)

Another criticism of the Sami Parliament is that it is subordinate, not only to the national Parliament but also to officials within the Ministry of the Interior.

2. Norway

The Norwegian Government in 1980 established the Norwegian Sami Rights Commission to inquire into the political, economic and cultural needs of the Sami. One of the recommendations in the Commission's 1984 report called for the creation of a separate Sami Parliament. Legislation was enacted in 1987, the *Sami Act*, establishing this Parliament, for which elections were first held in 1989. Sami voters elect three members to each of the 13 constituencies established by the Act.

To be included on the Sami Electoral Register a person must self-identify as a Sami and either have Sami as his or her home language or have a parent or grandparent who does.

Norway's Sami Parliament, much like its Finnish counterpart, is an advisory body with the power to make recommendations to both public authorities and private institutions on matters affecting the Sami.⁽⁷⁾

3. Sweden

Movement towards providing the Sami of Sweden with some form of political representation developed at a slower pace than in Finland and Norway. Significant gains in this area were realized by the Sami only in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Swedish Cabinet in 1983 appointed a commission of inquiry into Sami affairs, which released its main report in 1989. One of the key recommendations was to establish an elected body to represent the interests of the Sami in Sweden.

In December 1992, the Swedish Government passed legislation creating a separate Swedish Sami Parliament.⁽⁸⁾ This new Sami Parliament (the *Sameting*) is composed of 31 members elected by popular vote from Sami voters across the country. The Parliament is an advisory body with the power to make recommendations to national and local institutions. The *Sameting* is also authorized to allocate funds, such as State grants and money in the "Sami Fund," for public purposes. Another important role of the new Sami Parliament will be to direct Sami language projects and to appoint the board of the Sami school system.

Aboriginal people in Sweden can be placed on the *Sameting* voter register by self-identifying as a Sami or by having a parent who is or was on the register.⁽⁹⁾

B. New Zealand

The Maori people of New Zealand were the first settlers of the islands and

represent approximately 9.5% of the country's total population.⁽¹⁰⁾ In 1867, the Government of New Zealand moved towards providing the country's aboriginal population with political representation in government by enacting the *Maori Representation Act*. The legislation was initially enacted only as a temporary measure providing for four special aboriginal constituencies. These constituencies were superimposed on the existing 72 ridings for the House of Representatives and spanned the entire country. The electors in the Maori constituencies were thus guaranteed having a Maori Member of Parliament, with the same powers, privileges and perquisites as the other Members of the House of Representatives.

The New Zealand Parliament has expanded to 99 seats since 1867, including the four Maori seats. All registered Maori are entitled to vote in the Maori ridings. The registration process is performed along with the quinquennial census. Once the necessary forms accompanying the census material are completed, the Maori voter is placed on the Maori electoral roll. He or she may not change electoral lists until the following census.

The preamble to the original Act stated that it was designed to help protect Maori interests in the House of Representatives. Several other factors have also been identified as likely reasons for the introduction of this legislation. These other reasons include a need to pacify the Maori people, the desire to assimilate the Maori, and an attempt to safeguard settlers' interests until the Maori land was acquired and secured. It has also been suggested that the legislation was introduced to preclude any Maori attempt to establish a separate power base, and to placate the British Colonial Office over government confiscation of Maori land.⁽¹¹⁾

The system has regularly come under criticism on both social and functional grounds. Some opponents of the Maori guaranteed seats point to several surveys indicating that the New Zealand electorate does not wholly support the idea of separate representation.⁽¹²⁾ Reasons for not supporting the Maori seats have included: 1) that the seats are "racist" because they are allocated on the basis of race, not geography; and 2) that the system discriminates against other minorities who have similar claims.⁽¹³⁾

The structure of the system providing guaranteed Maori seats has also been criticized. One important weakness of the system is that the number of Maori ridings has remained fixed at four while the general electoral districts have swollen in number from 72 to 95 over the years. The Members for these four ridings represent 9.5% of the population yet account for only 4% of the seats in Parliament. The under-representation of the Maori has been a feature of the New Zealand system since it was established in 1867. A paper included in the *Report of the New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System* states that in 1867:

some 50,000 Maori were given 4 seats, whereas some 250,000 Europeans had 72. But there was no way that the European members would contemplate allowing Maori to have the 14 or 15 seats in the House that were due to them on a population basis,

since that would allow them too much power to make and break Governments.(14)

By failing to adjust the number of Maori ridings in response to population growth, as has been done for general electoral seats, the government has effectively diminished the strength of the Maori guaranteed seats. Another structural difficulty with the system is that Maori electoral riding boundaries are not adjusted every five years to reflect population shifts, an exercise that is completed regularly for general electoral riding boundaries.(15)

The complicated nature of the Maori voter registration process has been highlighted as another problem area. The registration process is carried out every five years along with the census. Failure to complete the special form that accompanies the census material can invalidate voters' access to the Maori electoral roll, which is not then permitted until the following census. When a Maori voter has registered successfully, further systemic obstacles become apparent. Polling stations are not as numerous as for general polls and Maori voters must often travel much farther distances to vote.(16)

Another failing of the New Zealand system is the size of the Maori ridings. The four Maori Members represent only 4% of the seats in Parliament, yet the ridings span the entire country. Considering the size of the Maori ridings, these Members of Parliament must find it very difficult to represent and service their constituents at the same high level as other Members of the Parliament.

Despite the criticisms of the New Zealand system, it has remained a part of the country's parliamentary structure for more than 100 years. While there are calls for reform and abolition of the Maori seats, there are also calls for their retention. The system provides the Maori with a voice in the House of Representatives that otherwise might not be there. Some Maori leaders view guaranteed Maori seats as "a vital component of their cultural heritage ... and as indispensable to Maori political aspirations." As well, the major political parties and some citizens of New Zealand are inclined to maintain the *status quo* until the Maori themselves want change.(17)

C. Maine

The State of Maine is another jurisdiction providing aboriginal people with guaranteed representation in its legislature. Extending guaranteed legislative representation to aboriginal people has been part of the Maine political system for many years. The earliest record of an Indian tribe sending a representative to the State Legislature was in 1823 when the Penobscot tribe did so. The Passamaquoddy tribe also realized the goal of being represented by aboriginal members in the State Legislature as early as 1842.(18) Records have even shown that the practice of sending Indian representatives to the legislature was not new when the new State of Maine was formed in 1820 and may have been practised prior to the Revolutionary War.(19)

Legislation formalizing the election of these Indian representatives was

enacted in relation to the Penobscot in 1866 and the Passamaquoddy in 1927. This arrangement was discontinued in 1941, but re-established in 1975. Aboriginal electors in these two tribes are also entitled to vote for candidates on the general electoral ballot. As a result of this dual representation, Indian delegates from these two tribes may not vote on or introduce legislation in the State Legislature. Rule 55 of the *Rules of the House* state that the two Indian representatives:

shall be granted seats on the floor of the House of Representatives; be granted by consent of the Speaker, the privilege of speaking on pending legislation; and be granted other rights and privileges as may from time to time be voted by the House of Representatives.

The aboriginal members of the Legislature do, however, enjoy all other privileges of a member of the State Legislature.⁽²⁰⁾

The United States federal government does not provide for special aboriginal representation in the Congress. The U.S. Congress has, however, allowed several dependent territories, such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa and the District of Columbia to have special representation in Congress. In much the same manner as is practised in the State of Maine, these special delegates are not permitted to vote on legislation on the floor of the House of Representatives.⁽²¹⁾

THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

Neither the federal government nor any of the provincial governments ensures that aboriginal people are represented in Parliament or in the legislatures. While there has been little action with respect to guaranteed aboriginal political representation in Canada, there has been a significant amount of discussion of the issue.

A. The Federal Level

Providing separate and guaranteed electoral districts for Canada's aboriginal people is not a new proposition; Louis Riel proposed a similar concept in 1870. The idea was also promoted by the Malecite Nation in 1946, George Manuel in the late 1950s, the National Indian Brotherhood in the 1970s and the Native Council of Canada in the 1980s.⁽²²⁾ The Special House of Commons Committee on Indian Self-Government, in its October 1983 report, discussed guaranteed aboriginal representation in Parliament, though it commented that "the best way to promote Indian rights is through Indian self-government and not by special representation for First Nations in Parliament."⁽²³⁾

1. The Report of the Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform

More recently, the issue has been raised by both the Committee for

Aboriginal Electoral Reform and the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. During the hearings of the Royal Commission, it became apparent that the issue of aboriginal representation required further study. To satisfy this need, the Royal Commission established a working group called the Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform, chaired by Senator Len Marchand. The Committee was asked to consult with the aboriginal community concerning aboriginal electoral districts to determine whether the Royal Commission should make a recommendation on the subject. The Committee, after consulting with aboriginal peoples, issued a report to the Royal Commission.⁽²⁴⁾

The Report of the Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform made several recommendations on aboriginal electoral districts. The most important recommendation was that such districts should be established to provide representation for aboriginal people in the House of Commons. It also recommended that the creation of aboriginal electoral districts "not abrogate or derogate from aboriginal and treaty rights and other rights or freedoms of aboriginal peoples, including the inherent right of aboriginal self-government."

The issue of who could vote in these proposed aboriginal electoral districts was addressed by the Committee. It felt that aboriginal self-identification should be the fundamental criterion. The Committee also recommended that anyone wishing to challenge the eligibility of those persons on the voters' list should be able to do so. Furthermore, it recommended that an appeal body, controlled by aboriginal people, should be established to oversee challenges to eligibility for inclusion on the aboriginal voters' list.

The process recommended by the Committee for determining the number of aboriginal electoral districts is similar to that used to calculate the number of seats in the House of Commons. The proposed system would see each province's aboriginal population divided by the provincial electoral quotient, which is determined by dividing the provincial population by the number of seats allocated to the province in the House of Commons. The resulting number would produce the number of aboriginal electoral districts. If, for example, the provincial electoral quotient was 100,000 and the number of self-identifying aboriginal voters within the province was 300,000, the number of aboriginal electoral districts would be set at three. This process would guarantee aboriginal representation in Parliament where the number of self-identifying aboriginal people within a province was high enough to warrant a seat.

The Committee also recommended that the electoral boundaries commission be allowed to deviate from the provincial electoral quotient by 25% or more. It "believes that a generous allowable deviation from the electoral quotient is the most effective way of recognizing the diversity of the aboriginal peoples."⁽²⁵⁾ It is important to note that deviations of 25% more or less from the electoral quotient are currently permitted to allow the Electoral Boundaries Commission to "respect the community interest or community identity or the historical pattern of an electoral district ... or ... to maintain a

manageable geographic size for districts in sparsely populated, rural or northern regions... ." Deviations of greater than 25% can occur, but only in extraordinary circumstances.(26)

During Committee hearings, several participants raised the issue of how the boundaries of aboriginal electoral district would be determined. The Committee recommended that treaty boundaries, regional council boundaries, the composition of the aboriginal population, and the aboriginal history and relationship to the land should be used as guidelines. It also recommended that aboriginal people have a voice on electoral boundary commissions so aboriginal concerns can be addressed when aboriginal electoral districts and general electoral boundaries are created or adjusted.(27)

The Committee also stated that aboriginal electoral districts should be created without the need for a constitutional amendment. To better ensure that these districts become a reality and to prevent the federal government from having to obtain the approval of the provinces, the Parliament of Canada would have to act under its own constitutional authority.

If Parliament is to act independently of the provinces, the Committee felt that several conditions must be met. First, aboriginal electoral districts should be established wholly within the boundaries of those provinces whose aboriginal population warrants it. Second, the districts would have to be created out of the existing number of federal ridings within each eligible province.(28) Finally, the number and size of aboriginal ridings would have to follow the formula now in place for determining the number of seats in the House of Commons.(29)

The Committee stated that Members of Parliament elected from aboriginal electoral districts would have the same rights and privileges as other MPs and would participate in the full range of issues before Parliament.(30)

2. The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing

The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, building on the work of the Aboriginal Electoral Committee, discussed the issue of aboriginal electoral districts in its *Final Report*.

It noted that several conditions would have to be met before aboriginal electoral districts could be instituted. These conditions would include: a consensus among aboriginal people in favour of the measure; ensuring that the implementation of these aboriginal electoral districts is compatible with Canadian traditions and the parliamentary system; and showing that compelling reasons exist for non-aboriginal Canadians to support the creation and implementation of aboriginal electoral districts.(31)

The Commission's discussion of the first condition concluded that it was satisfied that a consensus existed among aboriginal people favouring the creation of aboriginal electoral districts. It noted that this support was

qualified by many groups, who felt it was important to state that the creation of separate aboriginal electoral districts should not detract from, but rather complement, the objective of aboriginal self-government.

The Commission felt its second condition, that the implementation of aboriginal electoral districts be compatible with Canadian traditions and the parliamentary system, was also being met. It noted that the adjustment of electoral boundaries for the accommodation of certain minorities and the use of dual-member constituencies have both been practised in Canada. The Commission also stated that entrenching the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* had enhanced the claims of various groups, including aboriginal people, to political and constitutional recognition.

The last condition, in the opinion of the Commission, was also satisfied. It felt that Canadians had compelling reasons to support the creation and implementation of aboriginal electoral districts.[\(32\)](#)[\(33\)](#)

The Royal Commission believed the creation of Aboriginal Electoral Districts was in no way a substitute for aboriginal self-government. To make this position even clearer it recommended:

... that the *Canada Elections Act* state that the creation of Aboriginal constituencies not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to Aboriginal peoples.[\(34\)](#)

The Royal Commission addressed in its *Final Report* the issue of other ethno-cultural communities who may also wish to have special representation in the federal Parliament. In summarizing the need for aboriginal constituencies it stated:

Only the Aboriginal peoples have a historical and constitutional basis for a claim to direct representation. Only the Aboriginal peoples have a pressing political claim to such representation. Only Aboriginal peoples can make the claim that they are the First Peoples with an unbroken and continuous link to this land.

In sharp contrast, Canada's ethno-cultural communities have immigrated to Canada and, in so doing, have exercised free choice to accept the electoral system here.[\(35\)](#)

The Royal Commission's view that the system of special electoral districts should be applied only to aboriginal people, and not be extended to ethno-cultural communities, was thus made clear.[\(36\)](#)

The Royal Commission stated that aboriginal electoral districts should be created without the need for a constitutional amendment. Parliament could better ensure that such districts become a reality by proceeding under its own constitutional authority. If these new ridings were created as additional

ridings within a province, or if they encompassed more than one province, an amendment to the Constitution would be necessary.

It recommended that the number of aboriginal electoral districts be based, not on total aboriginal population figures, but on the number of aboriginals registered to vote in the aboriginal electoral district.⁽³⁷⁾ The Royal Commission's proposed system is based on the electoral quotient of the province; that is, the number of registered voters divided by the number of House of Commons seats assigned to the province. The number of registered aboriginal voters in the province would then be divided by this electoral quotient to give the number of aboriginal electoral districts. A deviation of 15% from the electoral quotient by the aboriginal electoral quotient was recommended by the Royal Commission.⁽³⁸⁾ Only those provinces with an adequate number of registered aboriginal voters would qualify for an aboriginal electoral district.

Under the system proposed by the Royal Commission, Members elected to an aboriginal electoral district would have all the rights and privileges enjoyed in the House of Commons by other Members of Parliament.⁽³⁹⁾

Up to eight aboriginal electoral districts could be created: one each in Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta; two in Ontario; and one or two in British Columbia. The small size of the aboriginal populations in the Maritimes⁽⁴⁰⁾ and in the Yukon, do not, in the Commission's view, warrant the creation of any aboriginal electoral districts there. The Commission also concurred with the Aboriginal Electoral Committee that an aboriginal electoral district was not required in the Northwest Territories. Table I provides an outline of the possible composition of the House of Commons if the Royal Commission's system of aboriginal electoral districts were adopted.

TABLE I
POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Province	House of Commons Seats: 1993	Proposed Aboriginal Electoral Districts	General Electoral Districts
Newfoundland	7	0	7
Prince Edward Island	4	0	4
Nova Scotia	11	0	11
New Brunswick	10	0	10

Quebec	75	1	74
Ontario	99	2	97
Manitoba	14	1	13
Saskatchewan	14	1	13
Alberta	26	2	24
British Columbia	32	1 or 2	30 or 31
Yukon	1	0	1
Northwest Territories	2	0	2
Canada	295	8 or 9	286 or 287

Source: This table, prepared by the author, applies the estimates of the Royal Commission to the current configuration of the House of Commons.

Many of the Royal Commission's recommendations are similar to those of the Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform, though more detailed and specific. These two groups agreed on several issues, including: the need to create aboriginal electoral districts; that aboriginal self-identification be the criterion for determining aboriginal voter eligibility; and that the creation of aboriginal electoral districts not abrogate or derogate from aboriginal self-government initiatives. One important difference in the recommendations of these two bodies was the allowable deviation from the provincial electoral quotient to be permitted when determining the number of ridings in a province. The Royal Commission held the opinion that a deviation greater than 15% more or less would:

diminish the efficacy of the vote of non-Aboriginal communities of interest, especially ethno-cultural communities in urban areas, by requiring that general constituencies in a province contain a proportionately greater number of voters. It is also the case that Aboriginal constituencies would be created whenever the number of Aboriginal voters reached the threshold of the electoral quotient minus 15 per cent; non-Aboriginal communities of interest, on the other hand cannot be assured that electoral boundaries commissions will use this minimum to enhance their efficacy of the vote.(41)

The Committee for Aboriginal Electoral Reform, on the other hand, regarded a generous deviation for aboriginal electoral districts as "necessary to achieve effective representation for aboriginal people.(42)

B. The Provincial Level

1. New Brunswick

Movement towards providing guaranteed aboriginal representation in a provincial legislature has recently been initiated in New Brunswick. On 14 March 1991, Premier Frank McKenna struck the Representation and Electoral Boundaries Commission, which had as part of its mandate to hold an inquiry and make recommendations concerning: "... (d) the best approach to ensuring that the aboriginal peoples of the Province are given representation in the Legislature in a manner similar to the approach employed in the State of Maine."⁽⁴³⁾ The Premier, when announcing the establishment of the Commission, indicated that the representation being proposed for the province's aboriginal community should be modelled on the system in place in that State. The Premier's proposal would see one or two aboriginal seats added to the Legislative Assembly, which currently has 58 members.⁽⁴⁴⁾

After completing the initial inquiry and consultations, the Representation and Electoral Boundaries Commission released its first report, "Towards a New Electoral Map for New Brunswick." The report was filed with the New Brunswick Legislature on 15 July 1992. One of the recommendations in the report was "that a joint committee of specified size and composition be struck (by the Select Committee of the Legislature) to consult with the aboriginal community to further explore the representation issue and to make recommendations concerning the implementation of such recommendations."

The Legislative Assembly referred the report of the Commission to the Select Committee on Representation and Electoral Boundaries, which reported its findings on 1 December 1992. The Select Committee report recommended that "the Representation and Electoral Boundaries Commission not initiate further consultation with the aboriginal community with reference to their representation in the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick unless the native community requests such a consultative process."⁽⁴⁵⁾ The legislature concurred in the recommendations of the Select Committee Report on 8 December 1992.⁽⁴⁶⁾ According to officials with the New Brunswick government, no request for consultation has been made by the aboriginal community and the issue has since waned.

2. Quebec

It has been reported that the Province of Quebec is investigating the possibility of creating separate provincial aboriginal ridings. Amendments to the provincial electoral Act would provide for up to two designated aboriginal seats in the National Assembly. The Native Affairs Minister for the province, Christos Sirros, believes that this initiative could help improve relations between aboriginals and other Quebecers.⁽⁴⁷⁾

3. Nova Scotia

On 24 May 1991, the Premier of Nova Scotia proposed a motion in the House of Assembly calling for the creation of a Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission and a Select Committee of the House of Assembly. The motion, in part, called on the House to support the principle of adding one Member to represent the Mi'kmaq people of Nova Scotia. The Select Committee was to formulate the terms of reference and mandate for the Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission. The motion was passed by the House immediately following its introduction.(48)

The Select Committee reported back in July 1991, charging the Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission with the task of redrawing the province's electoral boundaries with the addition of one guaranteed aboriginal seat. The Commission was also instructed to consult thoroughly with the province's Mi'kmaq community before making recommendations concerning the guaranteed aboriginal seat.(49)

The Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission reported in March 1992, with an important recommendation concerning the guaranteed aboriginal seat. The Commission suggested that:

On the basis of the consultation process with, and at the request of the Mi'kmaq community, the Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission hereby recommends that this proposed Mi'kmaq seat in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly not be implemented at this time.

However, because the Mi'kmaq people have expressed an interest in a legislative position of some kind, but are not prepared to make a final decision within the time frame under which the Commission must report to the Legislature, the Commission recommends that the House of Assembly adopt a procedure, including an appropriate budget and tentative deadline, for further consultation with the Mi'kmaq people.(50)

No further action has been taken by the Government of Nova Scotia on this matter.

CONCLUSION

Government-aboriginal relations have changed dramatically in the last century. As aboriginal minorities press for more input into decisions affecting their lives, governments will require greater creativity in changing the way they operate.

The international experience has shown that a system providing for aboriginal representation can function in a parliamentary system. Several jurisdictions providing their indigenous minorities with political representation have been examined. Finland, Norway and Sweden have found a unique way of providing their indigenous populations with guaranteed input into the

political process. Each country has established a separate Sami Parliament that acts as an advisory body to the national Parliaments and other state organs on issues affecting the Sami, though it does not have the power to make binding recommendations to these bodies.

New Zealand has four elected Maori members, who have all the powers and privileges of any other Member of its House of Representatives. This system of guaranteed aboriginal representation has been criticized on social and structural grounds. The four Maori seats do not come close to providing the Maori, who represent approximately 9.5% of the population, with electoral representation on a scale equal to that of voters on the general electoral roll. Additional hurdles inherent in the enumeration and voting systems have also formed practical barriers to providing Maori with equal political representation.

The State of Maine has also had a long history of providing aboriginal people with political representation, though the State has not expanded the system over the years to allow Indian representatives to vote on or introduce legislation.

While consideration of the idea of providing aboriginal representation in Parliament is in its infancy in Canada, some helpful study and discussion has already taken place. At the federal level and in two provinces, the idea of creating some form of aboriginal electoral districts has been put forward. While useful discussions and proposals have come out of each of the initial studies, no action has been taken towards creating aboriginal seats. Further study by governments and the aboriginal community may be required if an idea with considerable merit is to be brought to fruition.

(1) See Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, Ottawa, 1991, p. 169-171; Senator Len Marchand, *Aboriginal Electoral Reform - A Discussion Paper*, 1990, p. 7-12; and "The Provincial Electoral Process: Indian Political Representation," a Submission by the Anishinabek Nation to the Standing Committee of the Legislative Assembly, Government of Ontario, 24 April 1989, p. 1.

(2) Nils Lasko, "The Importance of Indigenous Influence on the System of Decision-Making in the Nation-state," in *Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples: Sami Rights and Northern Perspectives*, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 1987, p. 78.

(3) This figure includes 895 seats available at by-elections and 8,535 seats available at general elections since 1867. This information was provided by Elections Canada officials, 22 November 1993.

(4) Pekka Aikio, "Experiences Drawn from the Finnish Sami Parliament," in *Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples: Sami Rights and Northern*

Perspectives, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 1987, p. 94.

(5) W. Rudnicki and H. Dyck, "The Government of Aboriginal Peoples in Other Countries," in *Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization*, edited by J. Rick Ponting, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1986, p. 382.

(6) Aikio (1987), p. 97.

(7) Bradford Morse and David Hawkes, "Alternative Methods for Aboriginal Participation in Processes of Constitutional Reform," in *Options for a New Canada*, edited by Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991, p. 181; and Len Sillanpaa, *The Development of Saami Assemblies in Fennoscandia: Towards Aboriginal Self-Government*, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs, Ottawa, 1992.

(8) The first elections were held on 16 May 1993.

(9) Robert Eronn, "The Sami, Indigenous People of the North," in *Current Sweden* No. 397, March 1993 and Len Sillanpaa (1992).

(10) These population figures are current as of the 1991 census.

(11) Augie Fleras, "From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? Maori Seats and the Politics of Separate Maori Representation in New Zealand," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 18:3, 1985, p. 556.

(12) Stephen Levine and A. Robinson, *The New Zealand Voter - Survey of Public Opinion and Electoral Behaviour*, Price Milburn, Wellington, 1976; and Heylan Poll in *Auckland Star*, 7 June 1980.

(13) Fleras (1985), p. 564.

(14) M.P.K. Sorrenson, "A History of Maori Representation in Parliament," in *Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: "Towards a Better Democracy"*, New Zealand, December 1986, p. B-21.

(15) Fleras (1985), p. 565.

(16) David Pond, *Guaranteed Aboriginal Seats in the Legislatures*, Ontario Legislative Library, 1992, p. 10 and *Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: "Towards a Better Democracy"*, New Zealand, December 1986, p. 262.

(17) Fleras (1985), p. 552.

(18) Until the election of these tribal representatives was formalized in legislation, the two tribes followed tribal law and custom when choosing representatives for the State Legislature.

(19) S.G. Starbird, Jr., *A Brief History of Indian Legislative Representatives in the Maine Legislature*, State Law Library, Augusta, Maine, January 1983, p. 1.

(20) David C. Hawkes and Bradford W. Morse, "Alternative Methods for Aboriginal Participation in Processes of Constitutional Reform," in *Options for a New Canada*, edited by Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991, p. 179-180; *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 173; Pond (1992), p. 13; and Starbird (1983), p. 1-2.

(21) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, *Second Report to the House of Commons*, 20 October 1983, p. 135; and a telephone conversation between the author and officials with the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, 14 September 1993.

(22) Hawkes and Morse (1991), p. 180 fn. 22; *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 174; and in "The Provincial Electoral Process: Indian Political Representation," a Submission by the Anishinabek Nation to the Standing Committee of the Legislative Assembly, Government of Ontario, 24 April 1989, p. 14.

(23) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, *Second Report to the House of Commons*, 20 October 1983, p. 135.

(24) See *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 4, p. 231 for the full text of the Committee's report.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 257.

(26) *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, s. 15.

(27) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 4, p. 259-260.

(28) For example, if British Columbia is entitled to two aboriginal electoral districts, the number of general electoral districts would be reduced to 30 from 32. (See Table I) These constituencies could overlies existing constituencies within the province.

(29) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 4, at p. 251.

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 263.

(31) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 175.

(32) *Ibid.*, p.175-178.

(33) In a public opinion poll prepared by Angus Reid in June 1991, shortly

after the Royal Commission reported, it was found that three-quarters of Canadians polled were willing to lend their support to a constitutional proposal whereby a fixed number of federal parliamentary seats would be allocated for Canada's aboriginal peoples.

(34) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 190.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 183.

(36) The issue of whether or not denying other ethno-cultural groups special parliamentary representation would be an infringement of section 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* has been discussed in *Aboriginal Electoral Reform - A Discussion Paper*, Senator Len Marchand, 1990, p. 14-16.

(37) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 176.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 185-189.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 184.

(40) The Royal Commission supported the Aboriginal Electoral Committee's recommendation that a constitutional amendment be considered providing for an aboriginal constituency in the Atlantic region. *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 1, p. 186-187.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 188.

(42) *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Vol. 4, p. 257-259.

(43) Order in Council #91-174, dated 14 March 1991.

(44) Kevin Cox, "N.B. Seat Proposed for Natives," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 19 March 1991.

(45) "Towards a New Electoral Map for New Brunswick," *First Report of the Representation and Electoral Boundaries Commission*, July 1992; and the *First Report of the Select Committee on Representation and Electoral Boundaries*, 1st Session, 52 Legislature, Province of New Brunswick, 1 December 1992.

(46) *Journal of Debates (Hansard)*, Legislative Assembly, Province of New Brunswick, 8 December 1992, p. 4684.

(47) "Aboriginal Seats in National Assembly would Help Ease Tensions, Sirros Says," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 10 February 1994. "L'idée de comtes autochtones intéresse Sirros," *La Presse* (Montreal), 10 February 1994; p. B-1; "Sirros Prudent," *Le Devoir* (Montreal), 10 February 1994, p. A-4.

(48) Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, *Hansard: Debates and Proceedings*, 24 May 1991, p. 5844-5846.

(49) Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, *Report of the Select Committee on Establishing An Electoral Boundaries Commission*, July 1991.

(50) Nova Scotia, Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission, *Effective Political Representation in Nova Scotia: The 1992 Report of the Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission*, March 1992, p. 79.