

**CANADA'S ELECTORAL PROCESS:  
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS**

Law and Government Division  
Political and Social Affairs Division

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## CANADA'S ELECTORAL PROCESS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

### PART I – REFORMING THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM

#### A. Participation in the Electoral Process

##### 1. How has voter turnout changed in federal elections in recent years?

Until the most recent general election, voter turnout at the federal level in Canada had been declining since 1988. Although the modest upsurge in turnout for the January 2006 general election was a welcome departure from an 18-year trend, the progressive decline witnessed during the four previous general elections remains a matter of concern for policy-makers.<sup>(1)</sup> Indeed, the 2004 figure was the lowest voter turnout ever recorded at the federal level. The following figures show participation rates in federal elections since 1993:

|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| 2006: | 64.9% |
| 2004: | 60.9% |
| 2000: | 61.2% |
| 1997: | 67.0% |
| 1993: | 69.6% |

In a 2003 poll commissioned by Elections Canada, reasons offered for neglecting to vote included negative attitudes toward politicians and political institutions, a belief that participation would make no difference, and general lack of interest. It is not clear whether the permanent register of electors (which has replaced door-to-door enumeration) and other changes have contributed to the decline.

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(1) Please see Part II (“Changing the Electoral System”), section 5, for more information on current and recent electoral reform initiatives at the federal and provincial levels.

## **2. How does the low federal turnout compare with turnout in provincial elections? Internationally?**

Voter participation has also dropped in provincial elections, but not as dramatically or as consistently as in federal elections.<sup>(2)</sup> Among the world's other affluent, industrialized democracies, the situation is not much better: in most of them, a steady decrease has been witnessed since the 1960s. In the United States, which has experienced the most significant decrease, turnout for recent federal elections has been at approximately 50%. Significant drops in voter participation have also been seen in Europe, Japan, and Latin America, although they have been marginally less dramatic than those in the United States.

## **3. What can be done to improve voter turnout?**

Numerous measures to improve voter participation in Canada have been suggested by a variety of organizations and individuals and by governmental bodies such as the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and the Law Commission of Canada. Among the suggestions are:

- the implementation of a proportional representation system
- mandatory/compulsory voting
- lowering the minimum voting age
- a return to the practice of door-to-door enumeration
- Sunday voting days.

These suggestions are described below, except for proportional representation, which is discussed in Part II, section A.

## **4. What is mandatory or compulsory voting? Where is it used?**

Mandatory voting, sometimes called compulsory voting, requires citizens to register as voters and to present themselves at their polling station on election day. Those who refuse to do so are usually subject to a fine (unless they have an acceptable explanation, such as illness). Although it is known as “mandatory voting,” this practice does not actually require citizens to *vote*. They must register and present themselves at their polling station; however,

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(2) Centre for Research and Information in Canada, *Voter Participation in Canada: Is Canadian Democracy in Crisis?*, Montréal, October 2001. The document is no longer available online due to the elimination of the parent agency, the Canadian Unity Council, when funding for the Council was discontinued by Heritage Canada in 2006.

those who do not wish to vote may still exercise the option of spoiling their ballot or registering an abstention. In fact, several countries provide a box on the ballot for those who wish to mark their vote for “None of the candidates.”

Mandatory voting legislation exists in a number of countries, including more than 30 democracies, such as Australia, Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Brazil. In 1892 Belgium became the first country to introduce mandatory voting legislation. Australia has arguably the best-known mandatory voting system (first introduced in 1915 by the State of Queensland and adopted nationally in 1924). Australian citizens over the age of 18 must be registered to vote and are required to present themselves at their respective polling stations on election day. Those who do not do so are subject to a fine (unless, as mentioned above, they have an acceptable reason). Since Australia’s mandatory voting law came into force, voter turnout has nearly doubled to about 95%.

## **5. Has mandatory voting been proposed in Canada?**

On 9 December 2004, Senator Mac Harb introduced Bill S-22, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (mandatory voting), in the Senate. The bill would have required all registered voters to vote in all federal elections or be faced with a fine. Voters would still have the option of refusing the ballot, voting for “none of the candidates,” or providing Elections Canada with an acceptable reason for not voting.

Bill S-22 faced strong opposition in the Senate. Critics argued that it was undemocratic to force Canadian citizens to vote. Senator Noel Kinsella and Senator Donald H. Oliver were particularly concerned that forcing an individual to vote interfered with that individual’s Charter right under section 3, which includes the right *not* to vote.<sup>(3)</sup> Bill S-22 did not proceed beyond second reading in the Senate, and died on the *Order Paper* when the 38<sup>th</sup> Parliament was dissolved in November 2005.

Mandatory voting also seems to be unpopular with the Canadian electorate. As part of a 2003 survey investigating Canadians’ attitudes toward electoral reform, Elections Canada

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(3) See Library of Parliament, LEGISinfo, Bill S-22, Debates at 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading, 9 February 2005 and 8 June 2005, <http://lp-bp/apps/LEGISINFO/LEGISINFO.asp?Lang=E&Chamber=S&StartList=2&EndList=1000&Session=13&Type=0&Scope=I&query=4386&List=stat>.

asked Canadians whether they supported compulsory voting. The survey found that the majority of Canadian respondents were opposed – often strongly – to mandatory voting legislation.<sup>(4)</sup>

## **6. What are some of the arguments for and against mandatory voting legislation?**

Several arguments are consistently put forth by proponents of mandatory voting, including the following:

- There is increased voter turnout;
- The views of the electorate are better represented in Parliament;
- Voting is considered a civic duty similar to jury duty, payment of taxes, etc.;
- Election campaigns can focus more on issues, instead of focusing on getting citizens out to vote on election;
- Voters are not forced to vote; rather, they are obliged to turn out to vote; and
- If they are required to participate, voters may become more involved in the political process.

Arguments against mandatory voting include the following:

- Forcing a person to vote is undemocratic and interferes with an individual's Charter rights;
- Mandatory voting does not address the issue of educating the electorate to ensure that citizens are making informed choices on political issues;
- Although mandatory voting may increase voter turnout, it may not necessarily increase the representation of the views of the electorate or lead to more informed voting;
- Mandatory voting does not address the question of why citizens are not voting; and
- Enforcing the penalties against those who fail to vote can be expensive.

## **7. What are the implications of lowering the minimum voting age?**

Of all groups of eligible voters, young Canadians have the lowest voter participation levels. According to studies commissioned by Elections Canada, not only are young people participating less in the electoral process than older generations, but their willingness to participate is also in decline. One idea put forth to counter this trend is the

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(4) Elections Canada, *Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A New Survey of Non-voters*, March 2003, Section 8,  
<http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=loi&document=elect&dir=tur/tud&lang=e&textonly=false>.

lowering of the voting age from 18 to 16. Proponents of this initiative argue that instilling democratic values in young people while they are still in school will encourage the development of life-long voting habits. Opponents believe that 16-year-olds lack the maturity to make an informed political decision and that the novelty of being eligible to vote would eventually wear off.

When the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, chaired by Pierre Lortie, published its final report in 1991, it recommended that the voting age be set at 18 years of age. It also said that Parliament should revisit the issue periodically.

Parliament revisited the issue of lowering the voting age in June 1998, when the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs presented a report on the *Canada Elections Act*. Most members of the Committee agreed that the minimum age of voting should remain at 18.

In Quebec in March 2003, the *Comité directeur sur la réforme des institutions démocratiques*, chaired by Claude Béland, presented its report on citizen participation in Quebec's democratic institutions. On the question of lowering the voting age, the Béland Commission said the positions on the issue were not clear enough and that the impact of lowering the voting age should be studied further. In the meantime, it recommended that the voting age be kept at 18 years.

When the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Jean-Pierre Kingsley, appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on 25 March 2004, he commented that the idea of lowering the voting age to 16 merited consideration.

The movement to lower the voting age has suffered two substantial blows in recent years. On 13 May 2004, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled against two Edmonton teenagers who argued that their rights under the Charter had been violated by Alberta's *Elections Act*. The Court agreed with the trial judge that a voting age limit was, in principle, a violation, but that it was justified in order to maintain the integrity of the electoral system. On 4 November 2004, a private member's bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Liberal MP Mark Holland to lower the voting age to 16; it was defeated on 8 June 2005 after second reading debate.

## **8. Is a permanent voter list an improvement over door-to-door registration?**

In April 1997, door-to-door enumeration – the traditional method of compiling voter lists – was replaced by the National Register of Electors (a permanent voters list). Although the new system is more cost-efficient, some critics suggest that it contributes to the disengagement of citizens from the electoral process. First, difficulties have been encountered with respect to accuracy; given people's increased mobility in modern society, many voters are absent from voter lists at election time as a result of relocation. In such situations, the onus to register is placed on the voter, who may not have time to track down the local Elections Canada office. Second, many observers believe that because the door-to-door enumeration process is more personal, it heightens a voter's sense of awareness and civic duty in a way that receiving a notice in the mail cannot. Against these arguments, door-to-door enumeration is costly and time-consuming, and the minimum length of an election campaign would have to be extended to accommodate the additional time needed for enumeration. It is also increasingly difficult to find enumerators, and many people may not be home when enumerators call or may be reluctant to answer the door to strangers.

On 24 October 2006, the Conservative government introduced Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Public Service Employment Act, in the House of Commons. Responding to recommendations made through consultations with the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), the bill included measures to enable the sharing of lists of electors between the CEO and his or her provincial counterparts; to allow electors to register in person on polling day; and to increase the security and clarity of the election process. Bill C-31 was given Royal Assent on 22 June 2007.

## **9. How effective would Sunday voting be?**

Changing the traditional Monday election day to Sunday is an idea that has garnered little attention in Canada. In Europe, however, it has been explored more thoroughly in recent years, in both an academic and a practical context. In recent elections to the European Parliament, several member states have experimented with Sunday voting in an effort to bolster routinely low voter participation. Many people who abstained from voting cited work-related obligations as the primary reason; the implementation of a weekend voting day sought to remedy this problem. Although studies found that Sunday voting facilitated the process for some electors, it effectively created a new class of non-voters who simply did not want to give up their free time on the weekend.

Whether Sunday voting would help increase voter participation in Canada is debatable. In the wake of a barrage of calls for electoral reform from many sides, Sunday voting has been, until recently, conspicuously absent from the Canadian agenda. There are two possible reasons for this:

- Section 133 of the *Canada Elections Act* provides that employees are entitled to three hours of paid leave on election day in order to cast their votes. In addition, Section 128 of the *Canada Elections Act* requires that polls be open for a 12-hour period, which, for most people, allows time to vote before or after a regular work day. These provisions negate, at least in part, the argument that work plays a major role in determining voting patterns.
- In a 2003 survey commissioned by Elections Canada, only 5.8% of non-voters said that the reason they did not vote was that their attention was turned elsewhere. (Work was not specifically singled out.) The main reasons non-voters provided had to do with attitudes toward politicians and the government. Discontent, perceived meaninglessness of participation and lack of interest were the factors most often mentioned.

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, the government introduced Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (expanded voting opportunities and to make a consequential amendment to the Referendum Act).<sup>(5)</sup> The bill aims to increase the number of advance polling days from three to five and to increase the number of polling stations that are open on the last day of advance polling. Significantly, it seeks to do this by designating the last two Sundays before polling day as advance polling days, and by designating regular polling stations as advance polls. The effect of the bill would be to introduce Sunday voting indirectly. The bill has already come under criticism from religious organizations on the ground that Sunday advance polls would intrude on a day of religious observance. There is also a concern that some places of worship that normally host polling stations might not be available for this purpose on Sundays. Elections Canada notes that 12.3% of polling day polls and 18.8% of advance polls were located in church facilities in the 2006 federal election.<sup>(6)</sup>

Finally, there is some question as to whether voter turnout is in fact influenced by Sunday voting and an increase in the number of advance polling days. It has been noted that Quebec has had Sunday voting since 1979. In 1976, before Sunday voting was instituted, voter

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(5) See Michel Bédard, Bill C-16: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (expanded voting opportunities) and to make a consequential amendment to the Referendum Act, LS-578E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 14 November 2007, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=5309&Session=15&List=ls>.

(6) Elections Canada, *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 39th General Election of January 23, 2006*, p. 61, [http://www.elections.ca/gen/rep/re2/statreport2006\\_e.pdf](http://www.elections.ca/gen/rep/re2/statreport2006_e.pdf).

turnout was 85.27%. In 1981, voter turnout was 82.49%. Voter turnout in the most recent Quebec election was 71.23%.<sup>(7)</sup>

The authors of a report recently commissioned by Elections Canada found that it was difficult to discern, on the basis of their review of a number of important studies conducted over the past 10 years, any significant effect of extended advanced voting on voter turnout.<sup>(8)</sup>

## **10. How well are women, Aboriginal peoples and minority groups represented in Parliament?**

Women, minority groups, and Aboriginal peoples continue to be under-represented in Parliament, a fact that raises concern about the current electoral system in Canada and, as some argue, indicates the need for electoral reform. Although women represent half the Canadian population, they occupy only 20% of the seats in the House of Commons.<sup>(9)</sup> Similarly, while Aboriginal and other minority groups constitute 11% and 3.5% of the population, respectively, they are also under-represented in the House of Commons.<sup>(10)</sup>

Although increasing the representation of women, minority groups and Aboriginal voters in Parliament is considered a priority by some, their representation has shown little improvement in recent federal elections.<sup>(11)</sup> It has been pointed out that, despite efforts to nominate candidates from these groups, increased representation in the House of Commons can result only if these candidates are nominated in winnable constituencies.

In the 23 January 2006 federal election, only 25% of the 999 candidates nominated by the Liberals, Conservatives, New Democrats and Bloc Québécois were women.<sup>(12)</sup> For visible minorities, the numbers were even lower: of the 308 NDP and 75 Bloc Québécois candidates, only 21 and 9 candidates, respectively, were visible minorities (the Liberals and Conservatives have not made data available on the number of their minority candidates).<sup>(13)</sup> These figures are lower than in the previous election. Table 1 shows the number of women elected to the House of Commons in Canada's 2004 and 2006 general elections.

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(7) R. Pennings, *Feds' Sunday voting plan could backfire*, *Calgary Herald*, 16 December 2007, p. A11.

(8) A. Blais, A. Dobrzynska, and P. Loewen, *Potential Impacts of Extended Advance Voting on Voter Turnout*, Elections Canada, Ottawa, September 2007.

(9) See: Julie Cool, *Women in Parliament*, PRB 05-62E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 20 February 2006.

(10) Law Commission of Canada, *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada*, Ottawa, 2004, p. 62.

(11) John Gray, "Once more, few women, fewer minorities," *CBC.ca Reality Check*, 3 January 2006, [http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/realitycheck/women\\_minorities.html](http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/realitycheck/women_minorities.html).

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid.

**Table 1: Representation of Women in the House of Commons<sup>(14)</sup>**

| Party                        | 2004 Election           |                                     |                                   | 2006 Election           |                                     |                                   | Change between 2004 and 2006 |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
|                              | Number of women elected | Total number of seats held by party | Percentage of seats held by women | Number of women elected | Total number of seats held by party | Percentage of seats held by women |                              |
| Bloc Québécois               | 14                      | 54                                  | 26%                               | 17                      | 51                                  | 33%                               | +7%                          |
| Conservative Party of Canada | 12                      | 99                                  | 12%                               | 14                      | 124                                 | 11%                               | -2%                          |
| Liberal Party of Canada      | 34                      | 135                                 | 25%                               | 21                      | 103                                 | 20%                               | -5%                          |
| New Democratic Party         | 5                       | 19                                  | 26%                               | 12                      | 29                                  | 41%                               | +15%                         |
| Total                        | 65                      | 308                                 | 21.1%                             | 64                      | 308                                 | 20.8%                             | -0.3%                        |

With respect to Aboriginal groups, access to and participation in the electoral process is of significant concern. Although voter participation in the 2004 federal election by the Canadian population as a whole was 60.9%, Aboriginal voter participation was considerably lower, at approximately 40%.<sup>(15)</sup> It has been suggested that Aboriginal groups often consider non-Aboriginal elections as a threat to their rights, autonomy and self-government goals, and that this contributes to their lower level of participation.<sup>(16)</sup> Many Aboriginal Canadians feel alienated from the political process. Others have argued that in order to reduce their sense of exclusion from the federal electoral system, efforts must be made to integrate the Aboriginal

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- (14) Parliament of Canada, “Women in the House of Commons,” <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/people/house/WomenHofCidx.asp?Language=E&Hist=N>; Parliament of Canada, “Women – Party Standings in the House of Commons,” <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/lists/PartyStandings.aspx?Language=E&Section=03d93c58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb&Gender=F>; Vicky Smallman, “Equal Voice 2006 Election Analysis: Women Elected to Parliament,” Equal Voice, Ottawa, <http://www.equalvoice.ca/womenelected.pdf>.
- (15) Based on an Elections Canada public opinion survey conducted following the 2004 federal election, *The Hill Times*, 19 December 2005, p. 5.
- (16) Daniel Guérin, “Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Federal Elections: Trends and Implications,” *Electoral Insight*, Elections Canada, November 2003, [http://www.elections.ca/eca/eim/article\\_search/article.asp?id=22&lang=e&frmPageSize=&textonly=false](http://www.elections.ca/eca/eim/article_search/article.asp?id=22&lang=e&frmPageSize=&textonly=false).

world view into the Canadian political process,<sup>(17)</sup> or other special efforts must be made to involve them and address their issues.

## **B. Political Financing and Campaign Regulation**

In recent years, a number of significant changes to the *Canada Elections Act* have affected the financing and regulation of election campaigns, nomination contests and leadership campaigns. Some of these changes took effect with the major overhaul of the *Canada Elections Act* brought about by Bill C-2, which received Royal Assent in May 2000.<sup>(18)</sup> The most significant changes, however, came about with Bill C-24, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (political financing), which took effect on 1 January 2004.<sup>(19)</sup> Bill C-2, An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability (the Federal Accountability Act), introduced in the 1<sup>st</sup> Session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, has introduced further refinements to the political financing regime under the *Canada Elections Act*.<sup>(20)</sup>

### **1. Who can make a political contribution?**

Only individuals (Canadian citizens and permanent residents) may make financial contributions to registered parties, candidates, constituency associations, and leadership and nomination contestants.

Effective 1 June 2007, unions and corporations are no longer permitted to make political contributions. Before passage of the *Federal Accountability Act* (FAA), unions could make modest contributions of \$1,000 collectively to candidates endorsed by a party, nomination contestants and electoral district associations, and \$1,000 to independent candidates.

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(17) Anna Hunter, "Exploring the Issues of Aboriginal Representation in Federal Elections," *Electoral Insight*, Elections Canada, November 2003, [http://www.elections.ca/eca/eim/article\\_search/article.asp?id=25&lang=e&frmPageSize=&textonly=false](http://www.elections.ca/eca/eim/article_search/article.asp?id=25&lang=e&frmPageSize=&textonly=false).

(18) J. R. Robertson, *Bill C-2: The Canada Elections Act*, LS-343E, Parliamentary Research and Information Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 9 March 2000.

(19) J. R. Robertson, *Bill C-24: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (Political Financing)*, LS-448E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 11 June 2003.

(20) The amendments to the political financing provisions of the *Canada Elections Act* brought about by the bill took effect on 1 June 2007.

## **2. What are the limits on financial contributions?**

The FAA reduced the maximum amounts that individuals may contribute to the various entities that make up a political organization, and it modified the way in which those amounts may be allocated among those entities.<sup>(21)</sup> The result is that individuals may make the following contributions:

- \$1,000 in total in any calendar year to a registered party;
- \$1,000 in total in any calendar year to the electoral district associations, nomination contestants and candidates of a registered party;
- \$1,000 to leadership contestants; and
- \$1,000 to an independent candidate in an election.

The FAA reduced to \$1,000 the amount that candidates, nomination contestants and leadership contestants may contribute from their own funds to their own election campaigns or nomination or leadership contests. That amount is deemed not to be a contribution. Previously these individuals could contribute \$5,000 of their own funds.

For the sake of clarity, the FAA amended the Act to the effect that fees paid by participants at conventions held by political parties are contributions to the political party and, therefore, subject to the contribution limits.

The contribution limits prescribed above in the *Canada Elections Act* are adjusted annually to take account of inflation. As a result, the maximums noted above have risen to \$1,100.

## **3. What constitutes a contribution?**

Contributions include most donations of money, goods and services. Party membership fees are not considered contributions. A candidate's or nomination contestant's own funds used in an election or nomination contest are considered to be contributions if their amount exceeds \$1,000.

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(21) Previously, individuals could contribute the following amounts: \$5,000 collectively to a party, candidate, riding association and nomination contestant within the same political family in a calendar year; \$5,000 to an independent candidate in an election; and \$5,000 to leadership contestants within a particular leadership contest.

#### **4. What are the spending limits imposed on participants in the political process?**

Limits on spending by *political parties* during an election are determined by multiplying \$0.70 by the number of names on the registered list of electors for constituencies in which the party has endorsed a candidate.

Limits on spending by a *candidate* in an election are: \$2.07 for each of the first 15,000 electors in the constituency; \$1.04 for each of the next 10,000 electors; and \$0.52 for each of the remaining electors. This amount is increased if the number of electors per square kilometre of a constituency is less than 10.

Limits on spending by *nomination contestants* are 20% of the spending limit established for electoral candidates, not including some personal expenses such as travel and living expenses.

No limits are imposed on spending by *leadership candidates*. Candidates are required, however, to disclose the amounts and sources of contributions to Elections Canada. Candidates are also required to register with Elections Canada in order to accept contributions or incur expenses.

Parliament has been called upon periodically to impose limits on leadership campaign spending. In his 2001 report to Parliament, *Modernizing the Electoral Process*, the Chief Electoral Officer maintained that leadership contests are not private matters of a political party.<sup>(22)</sup> Because they are an integral part of the democratic process, he argued, Parliament has an interest in regulating such contests and imposing campaign spending limits.

The Chief Electoral Officer renewed his recommendation to impose spending limits on leadership contests in his recent mini-report to Parliament on political financing.<sup>(23)</sup> The report argues that limits would help to ensure a level playing field for leadership candidates.

#### **5. To what extent are political parties and candidates financed publicly?**

Bill C-24, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (political financing), which came into force on 1 January 2004, increased and extended the level of public financing of political parties and candidates.

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(22) Elections Canada, *Modernizing the Electoral Process – Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada Following the 37th General Election* (November 2001), Recommendation 8.1.4, p. 131.

(23) Elections Canada, *Recommendations of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs Respecting Specific Issues of Political Financing* (26 January 2007), p. 33.

**a. Annual allowance to political parties**

*Political parties* are entitled to an annual allowance of \$1.75 per vote received by the party in the previous election, provided that candidates endorsed by the party received, collectively, at least 2% of valid votes cast nationally in that election or 5% of valid votes cast in the constituencies in which the party endorsed a candidate. The \$1.75 allowance per vote is adjusted annually for inflation.

The threshold provisions of the *Canada Elections Act*, which govern the granting of annual allowances to political parties (section 435.01), were recently the subject of a court challenge by a number of smaller parties, including the Green Party of Canada, the Canadian Action Party, the Marijuana Party, and others.<sup>(24)</sup> The challenge, brought in the Superior Court of Justice for Ontario, was based largely on section 3 of the Charter (the voting rights provision), section 15 of the Charter (the equality rights provision) and the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in *Figueroa*.<sup>(25)</sup> In *Figueroa*, the Court struck down the provisions of the *Act* that denied party registration status to parties with fewer than 50 candidates running in an election. Party registration confers important benefits on political parties; these include the reimbursement of election expenses, the ability to issue tax receipts, and the listing of the party name beside the candidate's name on the ballot. The Court held that the exclusion of parties that did not meet the 50-candidate threshold undermined the right to meaningful participation of individuals in the electoral process, resulting in a breach of section 3. The legislation was further held to deprive individuals of the right to information to assist in exercising the right to vote.

In the *Longley* case, the Superior Court of Justice granted the relief sought by the applicants, including: (1) a declaration, made retroactive from 31 December 2003, that paragraphs 435.01(a) and (b) are of no force and effect because they contravene sections 3 and 15 of the Charter; and (2) an order entitling the parties to the annual allowance from 1 January 2004.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that, although the thresholds violate section 3 of the Charter, they are reasonable and justifiable limits in accordance with section 1 of the Charter.<sup>(26)</sup>

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(24) *Longley v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2006 CanLII 36358 (ON S.C.).

(25) *Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912.

(26) *Longley v. Canada (Attorney General)* 2007 ONCA 852 (CanLII).

### **b. Reimbursement of electoral expenses**

Parties are also entitled to reimbursement of 50% of their electoral expenses, provided that candidates endorsed by the party received, collectively, at least 2% of valid votes cast nationally or 5% of valid votes cast in constituencies in which the party endorsed candidates.

*Individual candidates* are entitled to partial reimbursement of electoral expenses. The candidate is issued a payment as a first instalment immediately after the return of the election writ if he or she received 10% or more of the valid votes cast. A final payment is issued to the candidate after his or her official agent files the candidate's electoral campaign return and the required supporting documents. The amount of the final instalment will be 60% of the candidate's paid election and personal expenses, less the first instalment already paid, or 60% of the maximum election expenses allowed under the *Canada Elections Act*, less the initial instalment.

### **c. Tax credits for individual contributions**

Tax credits under the *Income Tax Act* provide incentives for individuals to make monetary contributions to registered political parties, registered electoral district associations, and candidates. Tax credits are not available for contributions to leadership candidates and nomination contestants or to unregistered parties and unregistered EDAs. The amount of the tax credit is scaled to the contribution amount as follows: 75% of the first \$400; 50% of the next \$350; and 33.3% of an amount over \$750.

## **6. What are the limits on third-party election advertising?**

A third party is defined as an individual, or a group, that is neither a candidate nor a political party. Third parties play an increasingly significant role in election campaigns by supporting or opposing, through advertising or other expenditures, individual candidates or parties.

Third parties may not incur more than \$150,000 in total election advertising expenses. Of that amount, no more than \$3,000 may be spent on supporting or opposing the election of one or more candidates in an individual constituency. With respect to a party leader, the \$3,000 spending limit applies only to his or her candidacy in a particular constituency. These amounts are adjusted for inflation.

The regulation of third-party election advertising has attracted considerable debate. Proponents of regulation argue that since spending by political parties and candidates, and now nomination contestants and leadership candidates, is carefully regulated, other groups and individuals should be subject to some regulation in order to ensure a level playing field.

Opponents of regulation and spending limits argue that restrictions on third-party spending constitute an infringement on basic Charter rights such as freedom of expression. This debate featured prominently in litigation that reached the Supreme Court of Canada in *Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)*.<sup>(27)</sup> In *Harper*, a majority of the court, in upholding the third-party spending limits in the *Canada Elections Act*, adopted an “egalitarian” model of electoral fairness, which recognizes that those with greater financial resources can effectively control the electoral process and shut out those lacking economic power. The egalitarian model was upheld in contrast to the libertarian model, which favours having as few restrictions as possible.

Attempts to regulate the activities of third parties during election periods have continued. One such effort, Bill C-79, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (third party advertising), introduced in the House on 23 November 2005, died on the *Order Paper* with the dissolution of Parliament on 29 November 2005. This bill sought, generally, to limit a third party’s ability to use, for election advertising purposes, contributions received during a period commencing six months before the issuing of an election writ and ending on polling day (“the designated period”). The bill essentially attempted to link the maximum amount a third party could spend for election advertising to the contributions received by the third party from individuals and entities. Another important feature of the bill was its attempt to place limits on contributions to third parties for the purpose of election advertising, although not for other purposes, and only if the contributions were received during the designated period.

The bill proposed that a maximum of \$5,000 from the contributions of an individual could be spent by the third party on election advertising if the contribution was received from the individual within the above-mentioned designated period. A \$1,000 spending limit would have been imposed in respect of contributions received from persons other than an individual during the same period.

The bill would also have imposed a limit of \$150,000 on the amount an individual or an organization could contribute to a third party during the designated period for the purpose of election advertising in a general election. A contribution limit of \$3,000 was proposed if the individual or entity intended his or her contribution, made in the corresponding period, to be used for election advertising to oppose or support the election of candidates in a given electoral district in a general election. The \$3,000 contribution limit was also proposed for election advertising in a by-election.

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(27) [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827.

Finally, the bill would have required third parties to disclose the names and addresses of individuals who contributed more than \$5,000 during the designated period described above, and the amount that the third party paid out of, or incurred as expenses from, that contribution for election advertising. Similar disclosure requirements were proposed for contributions of \$1,000 or more from other persons or entities.

### **7. What are the rules concerning donor disclosure?**

Under section 424.1(1) of the *Canada Elections Act*, parties entitled to an allowance under section 435.01(1) must provide a quarterly financial transactions return to the Chief Electoral Officer setting out the total amount of contributions received, and the names of contributors contributing more than \$200 to the party. Candidates must provide a similar financial return within four months after polling day (section 451(2), (4)). Candidates for leadership contests are required to file regular reports on the amounts and sources of donations (section 435.31) in the period leading up to the contest. Six months after the leadership contest, candidates must submit further information on additional contributions received and expenses incurred (section 435.3(6)). Despite these requirements there continue to be concerns that the rules are inadequate.

Critics maintain that disclosing the identity of a candidate's donors four months after an election defeats one of the underlying purposes of the rules: to provide the public with timely disclosure and to be fully informed of who is supporting a political party or candidate so that the voter can make informed voting decisions. The Government of Ontario recently passed the *Election Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005*, which among other things requires more timely disclosure of donor information. Candidates must report any contribution over \$100 within 10 days of receipt to the Chief Electoral Officer. The Chief Electoral Officer then must ensure that the report is provided to the public on a website within 10 days of the report being received.

### **8. How are the political financing rules enforced?**

The *Canada Elections Act* prescribes a long list of offences relating to breaches of political financing rules. These offences include circumventing, or conspiring to circumvent, the restrictions on political donations; failing to report a contribution or an expense; and spending in excess of the prescribed limits.

For many years, the limitation period on the time within which a prosecution for an offence may be initiated was 18 months from the date on which the offence came to light, with an absolute limit of seven years from the occurrence of the offence.

The FAA has extended these limitation periods. Section 514 of the *Canada Elections Act* now provides that a prosecution under the Act must be initiated within five years from the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections becomes aware of the facts giving rise to the prosecution, with an absolute limit of 10 years from the date the offence was committed.

The FAA has also resulted in the division of responsibility for investigation and prosecution of offences between the Commissioner of Canada Elections and the newly created Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP is now responsible for initiating and conducting prosecutions of offences under the Act on behalf of the Crown. The Commissioner of Canada Elections continues to investigate possible offences under the Act, on the recommendation of the Chief Electoral Officer, and can refer the matter to the DPP, who will decide whether to initiate a prosecution.

## **9. How are leadership campaigns regulated?**

New rules for the conduct of leadership campaigns have been in force since 1 January 2004 (see Part 18, Division 3.1, of the *Canada Elections Act*). Prior to this date, campaigns were unregulated.

Once a leadership campaign is called by a registered party, the party must notify Elections Canada. Candidates are deemed to be candidates once they accept a contribution or incur a campaign expense, and they must register with Elections Canada. In the weeks leading up to the leadership convention, candidates are required to file periodic reports on the amounts and sources of contributions. Six months following the leadership convention, candidates must submit further information on additional contributions received and expenses incurred to the Chief Electoral Officer.

Candidates must appoint an auditor at the time of registration. They must also submit an audited report if they spend or receive more than \$5,000. Each candidate must also appoint a campaign agent and a financial agent. The financial returns of all candidates are published.

## **10. How are nomination campaigns regulated?**

Before the passage of Bill C-24, nomination contests were unregulated. As of 1 January 2004, nomination contests became subject to special rules provided for in the *Canada Elections Act* (Part 18, Division 5). Within 30 days of the date on which the nomination contest is to be held, a constituency association must report the holding of the contest to Elections Canada. A nomination contestant is deemed to be a contestant upon acceptance of a contribution or the incurring of an expense. Nomination contestants must appoint a financial agent to accept contributions and incur expenses. Contestants must report contributions and expenses to Elections Canada if those contributions and expenses exceed \$1,000. An auditor must be appointed if the contestant spends or receives contributions in excess of \$10,000.

The reporting obligations arise after the completion of the nomination contest (unlike leadership campaigns, in which the candidates must provide reports during the campaign). Nomination contestants must file a financial return, if applicable, within four months after the completion of the nomination contest. If the nomination contest occurs during an election period, the return may be filed within four months after election day.

## **11. How are loans treated?**

Loans are seen as an increasingly important source of campaign financing, particularly in light of the reduced contribution limits and the ban on corporate and union contributions resulting from the FAA. Loans to parties, candidates, riding associations, nomination contestants and leadership contestants are permitted under the Act.

Loans are referred to in the Act as “unpaid claims.” The reference is found in various provisions of the Act. Unpaid claims must be repaid within four months after polling day in the case of candidates and nomination contestants, six months after the due date of the claim in the case of registered associations and political parties, and within 18 months of a leadership contest in the case of leadership contestants. These periods may effectively be extended by the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) if, upon the filing of a financial return, a repayment schedule for the loan is provided. Alternatively, a political entity or the agent may apply to a judge who is competent to conduct a recount for a similar authorization.

The Act requires that claims against a political entity that remain unpaid are deemed to be campaign contributions 18 months after polling day in the case of candidates and

nomination contestants, 18 months after the end of the fiscal period in the case of political parties and registered associations, and 18 months after the selection date (or after polling day in some circumstances) in the case of leadership contestants. The Act, however, exempts unpaid claims from the deeming provision if the claim:

- is the subject of a binding agreement to pay;
- is the subject of a legal proceeding to secure payment;
- is subject to a dispute as the amount to be repaid; or
- has been written off by the creditor as uncollectible in accordance with the creditor's usual accounting practices.

The financial reporting provisions of the Act are also relevant in the treatment of loans. In the case of a candidate and a nomination contestant, a financial agent must provide a financial statement to the CFO within 4 months after an election. In the case of a leadership contestant, the financial return must be provided within six months after a leadership contest. Political parties and constituency associations must provide their returns within six months and five months, respectively, after the end of the fiscal period for those entities. These periods may be extended by the CEO. A further report is required where there are unpaid claims and an authorization has been granted by the CEO approving a repayment schedule for unpaid claims. The Act contains similar provisions for the other political entities.

Bill C-54, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (accountability with respect to loans), 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, was introduced in the House of Commons on 8 May 2007. The bill was reported back to the House of Commons with amendments on 19 June 2007. The bill was reinstated as Bill C-29 after the prorogation of Parliament in the fall of 2007. The bill proposes a number of changes to the *Canada Elections Act* that would affect loans and loan guarantees, including:

- a ban on loans and loan guarantees by unions and corporations, except banks as defined in the *Bank Act*;
- the amount that an individual may loan or guarantee, combined with any contribution, may not to exceed \$1,100;
- more stringent rules for the treatment of unpaid loans; and

- limits on the amount that financial institutions and political entities may loan; and
- a requirement that financial institutions provide loans at market rates.

**12. To what extent can money, goods and services be transferred among political entities that make up a political organization?**

The Act permits the various entities that make up a political organization to transfer funds among one another with few restrictions. With a few exceptions, these transfers are not considered contributions and are thus not subject to the contribution limits set out in the Act. Subject to several restrictions noted below, the following transfers are permitted:

- A party may transfer funds to an electoral district association (EDA), to a candidate (unless the funds come from a trust) and to a leadership contestant.
- A registered EDA may transfer funds to the party, another registered EDA or to a candidate (unless the funds come from a trust).
- A candidate may transfer funds to the party, to a registered EDA, or to him or herself in his or her capacity as a nomination contestant.
- A leadership contestant may transfer funds to a party or to a registered EDA.
- A nomination contestant may transfer funds to the party, to the registered EDA that held the nomination contest or to the candidate endorsed by the party in that nomination contest.

Some important restrictions, however, are imposed by the Act. Funds from a trust may not be transferred by a party or a registered EDA to a candidate endorsed by that party. If a party or an EDA provides funds, goods or services to nomination contestants or leadership contestants, these must be provided equally to all contestants, unless the funds come from a directed contribution in which the contributor has expressed a wish that the money go to a particular leadership contestant. The amount of the directed funds is deemed a contribution on the part of that contributor.

In the case of goods and services, transfers are permitted and are not treated as contributions in the following situations:

- from a party to an EDA, a candidate, a nomination contestant or a leadership contestant (subject to restrictions noted below);
- from a registered EDA to another registered EDA, a candidate, a nomination contestant or a leadership contestant (subject to restrictions noted below);

- from a candidate to a party, a registered EDA or him or herself in the capacity of nomination contestant.

As with transfers of funds, goods and services may not be transferred by a party or an EDA to nomination contestants and leadership contestants unless the goods and services are made equally available to all contestants.

### **13. How are other gifts or advantages treated?**

The FAA introduced new rules for the receipt of gifts or advantages by a candidate. These are now expressly prohibited under the Act in such cases where they would appear to a reasonable person to have been given for the purpose of influencing the candidate in his duties as a member of Parliament should the candidate be elected. Candidates must provide a statement to the Chief Electoral Officer of all gifts or advantages whose value to the candidate exceeds \$500 and that were received during a prescribed period beginning from the time the candidate becomes a candidate and ending on the day he or she becomes a member of Parliament, or on polling day if he or she is not elected. It is an offence for a candidate to accept a prohibited gift or advantage or to fail to provide the required statement within the required period of time (four months after polling day). If the offence is committed knowingly, the Act prescribes more severe punishment than if the failure or omission is inadvertent.

## **C. The Functioning and Administration of Elections**

### **1. How are returning officers selected?**

Returning officers are responsible for the administration of an election in the electoral districts to which they are assigned. They are required to be entirely impartial in performing their duties: the *Canada Elections Act* (section 24(6)) prohibits returning officers from participating in any partisan political activities while in office. As a result of the FAA, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) is now responsible for the appointment and removal of all returning officers. He is also charged with the responsibility to establish a merit-based process for their appointment and to set qualifications for their appointment. Before passage of the bill, returning officers were appointed or removed by Order in Council. The appointment process that the CEO establishes must be an external process as defined in section 2(1) of the *Public Service Employment Act*. The appointment is for a 10-year term that can end sooner in cases of

death, resignation, ceasing to reside in the electoral district to which the returning officer is assigned, or removal from office for reasons prescribed in the Act. These reasons include:

- mental or physical incapacity to satisfactorily perform his or her duties;
- failure to competently discharge a duty under the Act or failure to follow an instruction of the CEO;
- failure to complete the revisions to the boundaries of polling divisions; and
- engaging in partisan conduct, including making a financial contribution under the Act and holding a position in a political party or a constituency association.

A returning officer may be reappointed for a further 10-year term after the CEO consults with the leader of every recognized political party in the House of Commons.

## **2. How are electoral boundaries determined?**

The *Constitution Act, 1867* and the *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act* require that representation in the House of Commons be readjusted after each decennial (10-year) census to reflect population changes and movements within Canada. These readjustments to electoral boundaries are carried out by independent commissions in each province. Each of the 10 commissions is chaired by a judge appointed by the Chief Justice of that province, or by a person resident in that province and appointed by the Chief Justice of Canada. In addition, the Speaker of the House of Commons appoints two members who are residents of that province.

Each commission prepares proposals, which are published in the *Canada Gazette* and local media. Public hearings are then held to obtain public input. Following the hearings, the commission determines what changes, if any, should be made to electoral boundaries, and prepares a report. The report is submitted to the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), who presents it to the Speaker of the House of Commons for tabling. Members of Parliament have 30 days to review the reports and file objections with the designated committee of the House of Commons. That committee has 30 sitting days to review any objections for each commission. The objections as well as the minutes of the committee's discussions and any evidence heard by the committee are sent to the CEO, who in turn forwards them to the appropriate commission.

The commissions may consider any objections received from the House of Commons, but ultimately they make the final decision on electoral boundary readjustments

independent of the CEO or Parliament, after conducting further public hearings. Final reports of the commissions are sent by the CEO to the Speaker of the House of Commons, after which a draft representation order is prepared. The representation order specifies the number of members of the House of Commons to be elected for each province; divides each province into electoral districts (i.e., constituencies); describes the boundaries of each district; and specifies the name of each district and its population.

The 2003 representation order resulted in the allocation of 7 seats to Newfoundland and Labrador, 4 to Prince Edward Island, 11 to Nova Scotia, 10 to New Brunswick, 75 to Quebec, 106 to Ontario, 14 to Manitoba, 14 to Saskatchewan, 28 to Alberta, 36 to British Columbia, and 1 seat to each of Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The total number of seats in the House of Commons increased to 308 from 301 as a result of the readjustment. The new boundaries took effect with the dissolution of the 37<sup>th</sup> Parliament on 23 May 2004.

### **3. How well has Canada's system of representation by population kept up with population shifts?**

Concerns have been raised that Canada's system of representation by population has not kept pace with shifts in population. Three provinces in particular – Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario – have fewer seats in the House of Commons than their percentage of the total population would supposedly warrant. Over the past four decades, these gaps have grown.<sup>(28)</sup> This is clearly demonstrated in Table 2. In 2004, Alberta had a difference of 0.9 percentage points between population and number of seats, compared with 0.1 in 1966. British Columbia had a difference of 1.4 percentage points, compared with 0.7 in 1966. Ontario had a difference of 4.4 percentage points, compared with 1.5 in 1966.

Bill C-56, An Act to Amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Democratic representation), was introduced in the House of Commons on 11 May 2007. The bill was reintroduced as Bill C-22 in the 2<sup>nd</sup> session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament. The bill seeks to address the distortion in the reflection of population growth and growth in the number of elected

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(28) It should be noted that some of these gaps are an inevitable product of the so-called “senatorial clause” in section 51A of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, which requires that a province may not have fewer seats in the House of Commons than its allotment of Senate seats. This would account for the disproportionate share of seats, in relation to population, for provinces such as Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, as well as the growing gap between population and representation for those provinces.

representatives assigned to each province by readjusting the number of members of the House of Commons and the representation of the provinces therein.

As with the formula presently employed to readjust the number of members seated in the House of Commons, the bill prescribes a formula that readjusts seats after each decennial census, while also apportioning any newly created seats to the province or provinces that experienced population growth from one decennial census to the next. The Bill C-22 raises the number by which the total population of the provinces is divided; this divisor is at present fixed at 279. A readjustment conducted under this new formula would see the total number of seats in the House increase from 308 to 330.

**Table 2: Percentages of Population and House of Commons Seats, by Province and Territory, 1966-2004**

| Year<br>Province or<br>Territory | 1966               |               | 1976               |               | 1996               |               | 2004               |               |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
|                                  | % of<br>Population | % of<br>Seats | % of<br>Population | % of<br>Seats | % of<br>Population | % of<br>Seats | % of<br>Population | % of<br>Seats |
| Alberta                          | 7.3%               | 7.2%          | 8.0%               | 7.4%          | 9.3%               | 8.6%          | 10.0%              | 9.1%          |
| British Columbia                 | 9.4%               | 8.7%          | 10.7%              | 9.9%          | 12.9%              | 11.3%         | 13.1%              | 11.7%         |
| Manitoba                         | 4.8%               | 4.9%          | 4.4%               | 5.0%          | 3.9%               | 4.7%          | 3.7%               | 4.5%          |
| New Brunswick                    | 3.1%               | 3.8%          | 2.9%               | 3.5%          | 2.6%               | 3.3%          | 2.4%               | 3.2%          |
| Newfoundland<br>and Labrador     | 2.5%               | 2.7%          | 2.4%               | 2.5%          | 1.9%               | 2.3%          | 1.6%               | 2.3%          |
| Northwest Territories            | 0.1%               | 0.4%          | 0.2%               | 0.7%          | 0.2%               | 0.7%          | 0.1%               | 0.3%          |
| Nova Scotia                      | 3.8%               | 4.2%          | 3.6%               | 3.9%          | 3.2%               | 3.7%          | 2.9%               | 3.6%          |
| Nunavut                          |                    |               |                    |               |                    |               | 0.1%               | 0.3%          |
| Ontario                          | 34.8%              | 33.3%         | 35.9%              | 33.7%         | 37.3%              | 34.2%         | 38.8%              | 34.4%         |
| Prince Edward Island             | 0.5%               | 1.5%          | 0.5%               | 1.4%          | 0.5%               | 1.3%          | 0.4%               | 1.3%          |
| Quebec                           | 28.9%              | 28.0%         | 27.1%              | 26.6%         | 24.7%              | 24.9%         | 23.6%              | 24.4%         |
| Saskatchewan                     | 4.8%               | 4.9%          | 4.0%               | 5.0%          | 3.4%               | 4.7%          | 3.1%               | 4.5%          |
| Yukon                            | 0.1%               | 0.4%          | 0.1%               | 0.4%          | 0.1%               | 0.3%          | 0.1%               | 0.3%          |

Sources: Statistics Canada, *Historical Statistics of Canada*, 1983, and *Canadian Statistics*; and Library of Parliament, PARLINFO database.

#### **4. What identification is required to register and vote in a Canadian general election?**

Bill C-31 An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Public Service Employment Act (as enacted by S.C. 2007, c. 21) introduced amendments to the Act that will require prospective voters to provide one piece of identification, issued by any level of government, containing a photograph and the name and address of the elector. Alternatively, the

voter may present two pieces of identification, each of which establishes his or her name, and one of which establishes his or her address, if those pieces of identification have been authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer, who is required to publish, each year and within three days of the issue of an election writ, a list of the types of identification that are adequate alternatives to government-issued photo identification.

A further alternative is provided to voters who lack any suitable identification. A voter may take a prescribed oath provided that he or she is vouched for by another person whose name is on the list of electors in the same polling division as the elector and who has the required identification prescribed by the Act. The individual who vouches for the elector must do so by taking an oath.

Bill C-31 also introduced special procedures for voting day registration that mirror the requirements for identification at the polls. The identification requirements resulting from Bill C-31 took effect on 22 August 2007.

To address the potential disenfranchisement of some rural voters whose identification documents do not contain a civic address, the government introduced Bill C-18, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (verification of residence). It has been estimated that over one million voters could be disenfranchised by the identification requirements of Bill C-31. A voter will be permitted to vote if the address that appears on the identification document(s) being presented at a voting station is consistent with the information related to the elector that appears on the list of electors. The residence of the voter is by this means deemed to have been proven.<sup>(29)</sup>

The new requirements for identification at the polls are a direct response to concerns expressed by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs during its study of proposed reforms to the Canada Elections Act.<sup>(30)</sup> In the course of its deliberations the Committee was struck by the absence of any requirement for an elector to confirm his or her identity when voting. As long as the person's name was on the list of electors,

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(29) See Sebastian Spano, Bill C-18, An act to amend the Canada Elections Act (verification of residence), Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, 6 November 2007, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=5311&Session=15&List=ls#arequirements>. The bill came into force with Royal Assent on 14 December 2007.

(30) House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, 13<sup>th</sup> Report, June 2006, *Improving the Integrity of the Electoral Process: Recommendations for Legislative Change*, <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=10465&Lang=1&SourceId=150092>.

he or she was entitled to vote. Identification was required only when an election official, or the candidate, or his or her representative at a polling station, had reason to doubt the identity or right of an individual to vote. If challenged, a voter could present “satisfactory proof of identity and residence.” The Act, however, did not prescribe what constituted satisfactory “proof.” Further, if the prospective voter lacked satisfactory proof when challenged, he or she would still be permitted to vote upon taking a prescribed oath. The Committee considered this lack of proper identification to be a significant deficiency in the voting process and one that could encourage fraudulent voting practices.<sup>(31)</sup>

In the fall of 2007, Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (visual identification of voters) was introduced in the House of Commons. The bill will require that, in addition to providing the identification documents prescribed by Bill C-31, a voter must uncover his or her face when voting or when registering to vote at a polling station, unless it would be harmful to the voter’s health.<sup>(32)</sup> The voter, alternatively, may be vouched for by another voter on oath, who must present his or her identification with an uncovered face.

##### **5. To what extent is the reporting of election results restricted or regulated?**

Section 329 of the *Canada Elections Act* makes it an offence to release election results to the public before polls have closed. During the 2000 federal election, BC resident Paul Bryan transmitted election results from Atlantic Canada on the Internet before the polls closed in British Columbia. As a result he was charged with violating section 329 of the *Canada Elections Act*, which makes it an offence to release election results from one electoral district to the public in another electoral district before the polls have closed in the latter district.

The intention behind the impugned provision was to ensure that electors would not be influenced by results from other parts of Canada and that all electors would have access to the same information when they voted. Mr. Bryan appealed his conviction, bringing a challenge to section 329 on the basis that it violated section 2(b) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of expression.

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(31) The Committee heard anecdotal evidence from the 39<sup>th</sup> general election that, in some polling stations, magazine subscription labels were accepted as satisfactory proof of identity and address. See *Improving the Integrity of the Electoral Process*, p. 27.

(32) See Sebastian Spano, Bill C-6: An Act to amend the Canada Elections (visual identification of voters), LS-572E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 5 November 2007, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=5290&Session=15&List=ls>. The bill is currently at the committee stage.

The Supreme Court of Canada recently rendered its decision on the appeal.<sup>(33)</sup> It held that although section 329 of the *Canada Elections Act* infringed section 2(b) of the Charter it was a reasonable limitation justifiable in a free and democratic society. The Court, basing itself on *Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, established that the maintenance of public confidence in the electoral system was a pressing and substantial objective.

The Court held that logic and reason, combined with some social science evidence, established a rational connection between section 329 and the objective of maintaining public confidence in the electoral system.<sup>(34)</sup> The Court determined that there was sufficient evidence that the policy choice of Parliament is a rational and justifiable solution to the problem of information imbalance and, thus, that the legislation met the minimal impairment test.<sup>(35)</sup> Finally, the Court stated that the salutary effects of section 329 of the *Canada Election Act* outweigh the deleterious effects.<sup>(36)</sup>

## **6. What reforms have been recommended by the Chief Electoral Officer?**

In his report on the 38<sup>th</sup> General Election, tabled in the House of Commons on 29 September 2005, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) made a series of recommendations to amend the *Canada Elections Act*.<sup>(37)</sup> The House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs conducted a study of those recommendations. In its 13<sup>th</sup> Report, tabled in June 2006 and entitled *Improving the Integrity of the Electoral Process: Recommendations for Legislative Change*, the Committee responded to those recommendations and made recommendations of its own.<sup>(38)</sup> Some of the Committee's recommendations were incorporated

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(33) *R. v. Bryan*, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, par. 37.

(34) *Ibid.*, par. 41.

(35) *Ibid.*, par. 47.

(36) *Ibid.*, par. 52.

(37) Elections Canada, *Completing the Cycle of Electoral Reforms: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer on the 38<sup>th</sup> General Election*, Ottawa, 29 September 2005.

(38) The Government responded to the Committee's report in a document entitled, *Government Response to the Thirteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs: "Improving the Integrity of the Electoral Process,"* 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 20 October 2006. The Government's response was followed by legislation to give effect to some of the recommendations that flowed from the Committee's report. See Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Public Service Employment Act.

in Bill C-31. Below is a summary of some of the reforms recommended by the CEO that did not form part of Bill C-31, together with the Committee's responses.

**a. Confirmation procedures**

Currently, the *Canada Elections Act* requires that candidates be confirmed by a returning officer, but this can be done only during an election. Persons wishing to be candidates must also take all the required steps in the nomination process by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> day preceding the polling day. These steps include: obtaining the required signatures of electors; filing the nomination papers with the returning officer; and securing the confirmation of the papers by the returning officer. Furthermore, a potential candidate's nomination papers cannot be filed with the returning officer until after the issuance of a Notice of Election, which can take place up to four days after the issuance of the election writ.

The current procedures can have some drawbacks. There may be delays in confirming candidates' status. In addition, retroactive liability may be imposed on candidates who may have inadvertently failed to follow the rules set out in the Act, such as appointing an official agent and an official auditor, opening a bank account, and issuing receipts for contributions. These requirements are generally triggered upon the receipt of a contribution or the incurring of an election expense.

The report also notes that if the registration process were simplified and streamlined, it could be done through the Office of the CEO rather than through returning officers in individual constituencies.

The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs was generally supportive of the CEO's recommendations to simplify the process, particularly with regard to nomination contestants confirming their nomination before to the issuance of an election writ. However, the Committee rejected the CEO's recommendation that this process be run centrally through Elections Canada rather than the local returning officers. The Committee's concern was that a centralized process would remove the connection between nomination candidates and their constituency and undermine the role of returning officers.

## **b. Broadcasting**

Chapter 3 of the CEO's report contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring some measure of fairness in the apportionment of paid and free-time political broadcasting. These include the following:

- All registered political parties should be entitled to purchase a maximum of 100 minutes of time from each broadcaster at the lowest unit rate;
- Each broadcaster should place a cap of 300 minutes on all political advertising. Where requests from all parties exceed 300 minutes for one station, the broadcaster should pro-rate the requested time;
- All registered parties should have the right to purchase additional time, if available, at the lowest unit rate;
- A party's ability to purchase time would be subject to its election expense limits; and
- Each broadcaster (as opposed to network) that accepts advertising would be required to apportion 60 minutes of free time in prime time equally among registered parties.

The Committee supported the CEO's recommendations in achieving greater equity among the political parties in the availability of paid and free political broadcasting. The government's response endorses these recommendations and suggests that the issue be studied in detail. In addition, the government proposes that political parties as well as broadcasters be consulted extensively in order to develop and implement the best regime.

## **c. Enhanced examination and inquiry powers for the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO)**

The *Canada Elections Act* grants the CEO only limited verification powers over candidate and nomination contestant returns, and no effective review powers over the returns of registered parties, registered constituency associations, leadership contestants or third parties. The CEO seeks statutory authority to conduct audits and reviews of the returns of all political entities that are subject to the Act. The powers sought are extensive and include:

- power to examine any document that relates, or should relate, to information that is, or should be, in the records of the political entity or its election return;
- power to compel a political entity to provide any document or additional information;
- power to enter premises and compel the occupant to provide required information or answer questions. Entry into a dwelling should be done only on consent or by *ex parte* warrant issued by a judge; and

- power to compel any person who is not a political entity subject to the Act to provide any information or document, with prior judicial authorization.

The Committee rejected this recommendation to grant the CEO these additional powers.

#### **d. Reports of volunteer labour**

Allegations were made at the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities that a registered party benefited from the work of full-time volunteers who were on the payroll of an outside organization while the volunteer work was being provided to the party. This work constitutes a contribution to the party made by the organization employing the individuals. The CEO recommends amending the Act to require any registered political party that receives an annual allowance under section 435.01 of the *Canada Elections Act* to submit a statement of volunteer labour provided to the party as part of its annual financial report to Elections Canada. Parties receiving an annual allowance are those parties that received at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in the constituencies in which they ran candidates in the most recent general election.

In its report, the Committee explains that although the CEO's recommendation is well-intentioned, it would not be feasible. The Committee contends that the reporting requirement would impose a burden on parties and individuals that could ultimately dissuade them from engaging in the electoral process.

## **PART II – CHANGING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM**

### **A. House of Commons Electoral Reform**

#### **1. What is proportional representation?**

Proportional representation is a voting system intended to ensure that all political parties are allocated a share of the seats in a legislature that approximates, or is proportional to, each party's share of the popular vote. As Fair Vote Canada emphasizes, "The principle behind these voting systems is to get as close as possible to making every citizen's vote count. The goal

is to maximize the number of citizens who can help elect the representatives they desire.”<sup>(39)</sup> To that end, for example, under proportional representation, if Party A receives 25% of the popular vote, that fact would be reflected in the legislature by the party receiving 25% of the available seats. Under Canada’s current “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) system, on the other hand, a party’s share of the national vote is not necessarily reflected in its share of parliamentary seats. Table 3 shows the discrepancy between the percentage of the popular vote and the percentage of parliamentary seats in Canada’s 2006 general election.

**Table 3**  
**Percentage of Popular Vote, Number and Percentage of Seats,**  
**2006 General Election**

| <b>Political Party</b>       | <b>Percentage of Popular Vote</b> | <b>Number of Seats</b> | <b>Percentage of Seats</b> |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Conservative Party of Canada | 36.3%                             | 124                    | 40.3%                      |
| Liberal Party of Canada      | 30.2%                             | 103                    | 33.4%                      |
| Bloc Québécois               | 10.5%                             | 51                     | 16.6%                      |
| New Democratic Party         | 17.2%                             | 29                     | 9.4%                       |
| Green Party                  | 4.5%                              | 0                      | 0%                         |
| Other                        | 1.0%                              | 1                      | 0.3%                       |
| <b>Total</b>                 |                                   | <b>308</b>             |                            |

Source: Library of Parliament, ParlInfo and Elections Canada.

As indicated above, Canada currently has an FPTP system, as do the United Kingdom, India and the United States of America. On election day, a voter is simply required to select one candidate on the ballot and place an “X” next to that candidate’s name. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes in each constituency is elected, regardless of whether he or she receives a majority of the vote. In Canada and the United Kingdom, the party with the most candidates elected forms the government; the other parties form the opposition. Supporters of the FPTP system argue that it allows citizens more access to their member of Parliament and helps to balance urban and rural needs. However, detractors argue that the system is outdated and contributes to the marginalization of visible minority interests at the parliamentary level.

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(39) Fair Vote Canada, “Dubious Democracy: Report on Federal Elections in Canada From 1980-2004,” January 2006, p. 12, <http://www.fairvotecanada.org/files/DubiousDemocracyReport-January2006.pdf>.

## 2. What types of proportional representation systems exist?

Various PR systems are in use around the world: single non-transferable vote, single transferable vote, List-PR, mixed member majoritarian, and mixed member proportional. The major features of each type are reviewed below.<sup>(40)</sup> For more information on the systems that have been proposed for Canada, see Michael Dewing and Megan Furi, *Proportional Representation*.<sup>(41)</sup>

*Single Non-Transferable Vote:* The single non-transferable vote system was formerly used in Japan, and is still used in Jordan, Taiwan and Vanuatu. On election day, voters are given only one vote and the candidates with the highest number of votes will be awarded a seat in the legislature. Therefore, in a constituency where there are 5 seats available and 15 possible candidates, the top 5 candidates will all be elected.

*Single Transferable Vote:* The most complicated of all electoral systems, the single transferable vote system is used in Australia to elect its Senate, as well as in Ireland and Malta. On election day, voters rank the candidates on the ballot. They may rank as many or as few candidates as they wish. Once all the votes are counted, a vote quota is established; candidates must meet the quota in order to be elected. In the first count, candidates who receive the necessary number of first-preference votes to satisfy the quota are elected. Any remaining votes for these candidates (that is, first-preference votes in excess of the quota) will be redistributed to the second choices on those ballots. Once these votes are redistributed, if there are still seats available after the second count, the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes is dropped and the second preferences on those ballots will be redistributed. This process continues until enough candidates achieve the quota to fill all available seats.

*List-PR:* The List-PR (proportional representation) electoral system is used widely in many European democracies. Prior to election day, each party draws up a list of candidates to run in each constituency. The parties place their preferred candidates at the top of the list and their

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(40) Sources include: Ace Project, Electoral Systems Index, [http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/topic\\_index](http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/topic_index) (accessed 15 November 2005); Heather MacIvor, *Proportional and Semi-Proportional Electoral Systems: Their Potential Effects on Canadian Politics*, paper presented to the Advisory Committee of Registered Political Parties, Ottawa, 23 April 1999, [http://www.elections.ca/loi/sys/macivor\\_e.pdf](http://www.elections.ca/loi/sys/macivor_e.pdf); John C. Courtney, *Plurality-Majority Electoral Systems: A Review*, paper presented to the Advisory Committee of Registered Political Parties, Ottawa, 23 April 1999, [http://www.elections.ca/loi/sys/courtney\\_e.pdf](http://www.elections.ca/loi/sys/courtney_e.pdf); Law Commission of Canada (2004).

(41) Michael Dewing and Megan Furi, *Proportional Representation*, TIPS-120E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, July 2004, <http://lpintrabp.parl.gc.ca/apps/tips/tips-cont-e.asp?Heading=16&TIP=106>.

least preferred candidates at the bottom. On election day, voters vote for a party, not a specific candidate. Once all the votes are counted, each party is awarded seats in proportion to its share of the national vote. The winning candidates are chosen according to their placement on the party list. Thus, if a party is awarded two seats, then the first two candidates on the party list obtain seats. This electoral system is very flexible and has been uniquely adapted to every country where it is used.

*Mixed Member Majoritarian:* The mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, also known as parallel voting, is used in Japan, South Korea, Russia, and many other countries. In this system, voters have two votes on election day. One vote is for a constituency candidate who will be elected through a plurality majority system (usually FPTP). The second vote is for a party, which presents a pre-set list of candidates, similar to what is used in the List-PR system. An important feature of the MMM system is that the two votes are fully independent of each other. The party seats will not compensate for any disproportionate result in the constituency elections, which the mixed member proportional system, discussed below, seeks to do.

*Mixed Member Proportional:* The mixed member proportional (MMP) system is used in Germany, New Zealand, Italy and Mexico, and for elections to the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. As in the MMM system, voters select a constituency candidate who will be elected through an FPTP process; they also place a second vote for a party list, where candidates will be elected through a List-PR process. However, this system differs from the MMM system in that the List-PR seats attempt to compensate for any disproportional results in the FPTP constituency seats. Additional seats are awarded through the List mechanism where the number of constituency seats won by a party fails to reflect overall voter support. There are variations among the various MMP systems in how this allocation is made.

Several non-PR electoral systems exist in addition to FPTP, but none are currently being considered for possible use in Canadian federal elections. These other non-PR systems include the alternative vote system, the two-round system, and the block vote system.

*Alternative Vote:* The alternative vote system, also referred to as preferential voting, is used to elect members of the Australian House of Representatives. On election day, voters are presented with a list of candidates which they must rank in their order of preference. To be elected, a candidate must receive a clear majority of the votes (50% plus one vote). If no candidate receives that majority on the first count, then the candidate with the fewest votes will be dropped and the second preferences on those ballots will be redistributed. This process will continue until one candidate receives the necessary majority and is awarded a seat in the House.

*Two-Round:* The two-round system, also referred to as the run-off system, is used to elect the legislatures of many countries, including France. This system has not one, but two, election days, generally held within two weeks of each other. Elections are conducted in the same manner as in the FPTP system, where voters select one candidate on a ballot. If a candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round, he or she is declared the winner and will be awarded a seat in the legislature. Where there is no majority winner in the first round, a second election will be held with only the top two candidates from the first election results. The candidate with the highest number of votes in the second round will be elected.

*Block Vote:* The block vote system is used in several countries, including Bermuda, Thailand, and the Palestinian Authority. On election day, voters are able to cast as many votes as there are candidates on the ballot. The counting of the votes is simple: if 10 seats are available in the constituency, then the 10 candidates with the most votes will each be awarded a seat in the legislature. In essence, it is the FPTP system applied across multi-member constituencies.

Table 4, below, compares important features of the various PR and non-PR systems and lists some of the countries where they are in use.

**Table 4: Comparison of Electoral Systems**

| Electoral System                           | Examples   | Advantages   | Disadvantages   | Canadian Context   |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| <i>Proportional Representation Systems</i> |  |  |   |  |
| <b>Single Non-Transferable Vote</b>        | Jordan, Vanuatu  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Easy to use and understand</li> <li>• Fairly proportional</li> <li>• Greater potential of minority representation in Parliament</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot guarantee a proportional result</li> <li>• Parties tend to have a narrow focus</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple</li> <li>• Possible proportional</li> <li>• Possible diverse representation</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Single Transferable Vote</b>            | Ireland, Malta   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional results</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> <li>• Voters can influence coalitions</li> <li>• Vote for a candidate not a party</li> <li>• Possible for independent candidates to be elected</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complicated and sophisticated</li> <li>• Counting results is time-consuming (can take up to two weeks)</li> <li>• Members of the same party will compete against each other</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Effective government</li> </ul>   |
| <b>List-PR</b>                             | Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional results</li> <li>• Very few wasted votes</li> <li>• May permit greater representation of smaller parties, women and minorities</li> <li>• Limits regionalism</li> <li>• Creates effective governments</li> <li>• Encourages power-sharing within Parliament</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difficult to use and understand</li> <li>• No geographic link to MP</li> <li>• Little choice over the candidate who will represent you</li> <li>• Tends to create coalition governments</li> <li>• Fragments the party system</li> <li>• Provides representation to extremist parties</li> <li>• Difficult to remove a party from power</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional</li> <li>• No wasted votes</li> <li>• Possible diverse representation</li> <li>• Accountable</li> <li>• Broad-based parties</li> </ul> |
| <b>Mixed Member Majoritarian</b>           | Japan, South Korea, Russia, Cameroon   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fairly proportional</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> <li>• Voter has greater choice – one district and one national</li> <li>• Smaller parties may gain representation in the national vote</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difficult to use and understand</li> <li>• Creates two classes of MPs (district versus national)</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Possible diverse representation</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Mixed Member Proportional</b>           | Germany, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Scotland, Wales                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional results</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> <li>• Greater representation of smaller parties, women and minorities in Parliament</li> <li>• Limits regionalism</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difficult to use and understand</li> <li>• Creates two classes of MPs</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportional</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Diverse representation</li> </ul>   |

| Electoral System                               | Examples  | Advantages   | Disadvantages  | Canadian Context   |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| <i>Non-Proportional Representation Systems</i> |   |  |  |  |
| <b>First-Past-the-Post</b>                     | Canada, United Kingdom, United States of America, India     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Easy to use and understand</li> <li>• Constituencies are a reasonable size</li> <li>• Produces stable majority governments</li> <li>• Geographic link between constituents and MPs</li> <li>• Strong opposition in Parliament</li> <li>• Encourages broad-based parties</li> <li>• Vote for a candidate not a party</li> <li>• Possible for independent candidates to be elected</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disproportionate results from popular vote</li> <li>• Exaggerates regionalism</li> <li>• Under-representation of smaller parties, women and minorities in Parliament</li> <li>• Promotes adversarial politics</li> <li>• Wasted votes</li> <li>• Possible to manipulate electoral boundaries</li> <li>• Difficult to remove a party from power</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Stable government</li> <li>• Inexpensive</li> <li>• Familiar</li> </ul> |
| <b>Alternative Vote</b>                        | Australia   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Easy to use and understand</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> <li>• Encourages broad-based parties</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disproportionate results</li> <li>• Wasted votes</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Possible diverse representation</li> </ul>                              |
| <b>Two-Round</b>                               | France, Egypt, Togo, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voters have a chance to change their mind</li> <li>• Actual winner will have 50%</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> <li>• All votes are meaningful</li> <li>• Encourages broad-based parties</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disproportionate results</li> <li>• Unpredictable results</li> <li>• The most expensive electoral system</li> <li>• Places a larger burden on voters</li> <li>• Voter turnout may decrease between first and second round</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• No wasted votes</li> <li>• Possible diverse representation</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Block Vote</b>                              | Bermuda, Fiji, Thailand, Palestinian Authority, Philippines | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Easy to use and understand</li> <li>• Constituencies are a reasonable size</li> <li>• Vote for a candidate not a party</li> <li>• Geographic link to MP</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disproportionate results</li> <li>• Exaggerates regionalism</li> <li>• Under-representation of smaller parties, women and minorities in Parliament</li> <li>• Wasted votes</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple</li> <li>• Link to MP</li> <li>• Inexpensive</li> </ul>  |

**3. How would the results of the June 2004 election have differed if Canada had had proportional representation?**

Following the 2004 general election, the Law Commission of Canada calculated the number of seats that would have been allocated to each party under its proposal for a mixed member proportional system. Table 5 compares those numbers to the actual number of seats that were awarded under the present first-past-the-post system.

**Table 5**  
**Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Seats Awarded per Party Under Canada's Actual Electoral System and a Possible Proportional Representation System, for the 2006 General Election**

| Political Party              | Actual Seats | Percentage of Seats | Possible Seats Under Proportional Representation | Percentage of Seats Under Proportional Representation |
|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|--|---|
| Conservative Party of Canada | 124          | 40.3%               | 113  | 36.7%   |
| Liberal Party of Canada      | 103          | 33.4%               | 93   | 30.2%   |
| Bloc Québécois               | 51           | 16.6%               | 31   | 10.1%   |
| New Democratic Party         | 29           | 9.4%                | 59   | 19.2%   |
| Green Party                  | 0            | 0%                  | 12   | 3.9%  |
| Other                        | 1            | 0.3%                |  | 0%  |
| Total                        | 308          |                     | 308  |   |

Source: Library of Parliament, ParlInfo and "A 'Fair' Way to Share the Seats: How a New Parliament Could Have Looked," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 29 January 2006, p. A8.

**4. Could electoral reform improve the representation of women, Aboriginal voters and minority groups in Parliament?**

In its 2004 report on electoral reform, the Law Commission noted that Canada's first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system was established when the country's population was more homogeneous and much less mobile than it is today.<sup>(42)</sup> As discussed above, the FPTP system results in the under-representation of women, Aboriginal voters and minority groups. Consequently, "[d]iverse representation represents one of the most important aspects of the electoral reform debate in Canada."<sup>(43)</sup>

(42) Law Commission of Canada (2004), p. 33.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Some argue that electoral reform will improve the representation of groups currently under-represented in Parliament. Women's groups in particular have argued that a proportional representation (PR) system would be preferable to the current system in terms of attaining more representative results.<sup>(44)</sup>

An example of a PR system that could be emulated in Canada in order to increase the representation of women and Aboriginal people in Parliament is New Zealand's mixed member proportional (MMP) system. Designed to use compensatory seats lists, New Zealand's MMP system has resulted in an increase in female and Maori legislators.<sup>(45)</sup>

The Scottish Parliament also uses an MMP system. Although some improvement in the number of women represented in Parliament was noted following the 1999 election, no minorities were represented in the 1999 Scottish Parliament. One possible reason put forth for the lack of minority representation was that none of the parties placed minority candidates in winnable constituencies.

It is important to note, however, that while a PR system may improve the representation of women, Aboriginal people and minority groups in Parliament, the adoption of such a system would not, in itself, be enough. Policies, strategies and political party commitment are also needed to ensure the effective representation of under-represented groups in Parliament and in Cabinet.<sup>(46)</sup>

## **5. What are some current and recent electoral reform initiatives at the federal and provincial levels?**

At both the federal and the provincial levels of government, a broad range of electoral reform measures have been considered and, in some cases, implemented. Federally, fundamental reforms have been recommended by the Law Commission of Canada; in addition, a House of Commons committee has prepared a report recommending a process for examining options for electoral reform. Several provinces are currently studying the issue, including reform of the voting system and fixed election dates.

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(44) For additional information on women and Parliament, see Cool (2006).

(45) It should be noted that pursuant to New Zealand's *Electoral Act, 1993*, a formula is set out in order to determine the number and boundaries of Maori seats in Parliament. There is also a constitutional requirement for a minimum number of Maori seats. New Zealand, nonetheless, has seen an increase in Maori representation over and above the legislated and constitutionally mandated minimum.

(46) For examples of recommendations on this matter, see Law Commission of Canada (2004), Recommendations 6-12, p. 176.

**a. Reform proposals at the federal level**

On 31 March 2004, the Justice Minister tabled the Law Commission of Canada report *Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada*, which recommends the adoption of a mixed member proportional system. The report also makes recommendations on how to increase diversity in the House of Commons by ensuring better representation of women, minorities and Aboriginal peoples.

One significant reform that has already taken place at the federal level affects the registration of political parties. Largely as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in *Figuroa v. Canada*,<sup>(47)</sup> in 2004 the government introduced Bill C-3, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act. Among other major reforms, this bill included, for the first time, a definition of a political party (an organization one of whose fundamental purposes is to participate in public affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as candidates and supporting their election). It also lowered the candidate threshold that enables an organization to qualify as a political party and benefit from public funding and favourable tax treatment of political contributions; previously set at 50, that threshold was reduced to 1. This development is significant because it opens up the electoral system to small parties that had previously been excluded from the benefits of registration. The bill received Royal Assent on 14 May 2004 (S.C. 2004, c. 24) and came into force on 15 May 2004.

In the 5 October 2004 Speech from the Throne, the government pledged “to examine the need and options for reform of our democratic institutions including electoral reform.” On 25 November, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs was given an Order of Reference “to recommend a process that engages citizens and parliamentarians in an examination of our electoral system with a review of all options.”

The Committee tabled its report on Electoral Reform (Report 43)<sup>(48)</sup> on 16 June 2005. It recommended that the government launch a “two-track” approach involving a special committee of the House of Commons and a citizens’ consultation group. It further recommended that the process begin in October 2005 and be completed by the end of February 2006.

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(47) [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912. The Supreme Court ruled in June 2003 that the 50-candidate threshold for party registration violated section 3 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

(48) Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Report 43, 7 June 2005, [http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteeList.aspx?Lang=1&PARLSES=381&JNT=0&SELID=e22\\_4&COM=8988&STAC=1091702](http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteeList.aspx?Lang=1&PARLSES=381&JNT=0&SELID=e22_4&COM=8988&STAC=1091702).

In its response, tabled on 7 October 2005, the government agreed with the Committee's substantive recommendations but not with the timetable, saying that more time would be required to set up and run a national citizen consultation process and to conduct committee hearings.<sup>(49)</sup> Ultimately, Parliament was dissolved before the consultation process could begin or a special committee could be set up.

In March 2007, the government began a three-month-long process of public consultations on democratic reform, holding a series of 12 citizens' forums: one forum was held in each province, one was held in the territories, and one national youth forum was held. Participants were asked to provide their views on such issues as the role of the House of Commons, the role of the Senate, the role of political parties, electoral reform, and the role of the citizen in democracy.

On 10 September 2007, the government released a report entitled *Public Consultations on Canada's Democratic Institutions and Practices*.<sup>(50)</sup> The report indicated that, among other things, Canadians appear to be more favourable to the current first-past-the-post system than to one that includes proportional representation. However, the consultations also found that respondents were "open" to considering change, including a voting system in which every vote for a party counts.<sup>(51)</sup>

#### **b. British Columbia referendum on proportional representation**

In April 2003, British Columbia created a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, an independent, non-partisan assembly of citizens with the mandate of examining the provincial electoral system and making recommendations on reform. The Assembly included 160 eligible voters: 80 women and 80 men, chosen from each of British Columbia's 79 constituencies, and two Aboriginal representatives. In December 2004, the Citizens' Assembly recommended the single transferable vote (STV) system as the best choice for the province, and on 17 May 2005 the STV proposal was put to the voters of British Columbia as a referendum question in the provincial election. In order for the referendum to pass, it needed to be approved by 60% of all voters, and by a simple majority of voters in 60% of the 79 constituencies.

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(49) Government of Canada, "Government Response to the Forty-Third Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs," 7 October 2005, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=8988&Lang=1&SourceId=130349>.

(50) The full report is available online at: <http://www.democraticreform.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1382>.

(51) Jack Aubry, "Poll shows voters favour winner-take-all system," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 September 2007.

In the referendum, the STV proposal received 57% support – short of the required 60% majority – and was therefore not approved. However, as a result of the considerable support across the province for the proposed STV system, the Government of British Columbia has indicated that another referendum on STV will be scheduled at the same time as the municipal elections in November 2008.

### **c. Reform proposals in Prince Edward Island**

In December 2003, the Prince Edward Island Electoral Reform Commissioner recommended that the province adopt a mixed member proportional (MMP) system. However, the Commissioner also recommended further study of the issue, including more public consultation and public education, and he directed that any changes to the province's electoral system must be made by referendum. In December 2004 the Legislative Assembly established the Commission on Prince Edward Island's Electoral Future, with the task of developing a clear plebiscite question and recommending a date for holding the plebiscite. In May 2005, the Commission released its proposal for an MMP system for the province. The plebiscite was held on 28 November 2005, with a threshold for voter approval set at 60%. The proposal for electoral reform was rejected by 64% of the voters.

### **d. Reform proposals in Ontario**

The Democratic Renewal Secretariat of Ontario was created in October 2003 to review the provincial electoral system. The *Election Amendment Act, 2005* received Royal Assent on 13 June 2005, allowing for the selection of a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform to examine the current electoral system and recommend possible changes.

On 27 March 2006, Ontario's Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal announced the formation of an Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform.<sup>(52)</sup> The Assembly was made up of 103 members (52 women, 51 men) representing each of Ontario's constituencies, randomly selected by Elections Ontario from the Permanent Register of Electors for Ontario. Operating independently of government, the Assembly's mandate was to

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(52) Democratic Renewal Secretariat, Government of Ontario, "McGuinty Government Moves Forward on Historic Electoral Reform Initiative," News release, 27 March 2006, [http://www.democraticrenewal.gov.on.ca/english/news/20060327\\_nr.asp](http://www.democraticrenewal.gov.on.ca/english/news/20060327_nr.asp).

“assess Ontario’s current electoral system and others, and recommend whether Ontario should keep the current system or adopt a new one. If the Assembly recommends a change, the government will hold a referendum on that alternative within its current mandate.”<sup>(53)</sup>

George Thomson, former provincial court judge and deputy minister in the Ontario and federal governments, was appointed Chair of the Assembly.<sup>(54)</sup> Members of the Assembly convened in September 2006 with a schedule to meet twice a month for eight months. On 15 May 2007, the Assembly released a report entitled *One Ballot – Two Votes: A New Way to Vote in Ontario*, which recommended a mixed member proportional system. A province-wide referendum to decide whether to implement this new system was held in conjunction with the provincial election on 10 October 2007. The proposal did not receive the requisite voter support – at least 60% of the total referendum ballots cast *and* more than 50% of the referendum ballots cast in at least 64 electoral districts – as prescribed in section 4 of the *Electoral System Referendum Act, 2007*, S.O. 2007, c. 1.

#### **e. Reform proposals in Quebec**

In December 2004, the Quebec government introduced a draft bill in the National Assembly that, among other reforms, proposed a new mixed electoral system that would combine elements of the existing first-part-the-post-system and a new proportional representation approach. In June 2005, the National Assembly passed a motion to appoint a parliamentary committee to study and make recommendations on the draft bill, as well as undertake extensive public consultations on the changes recommended in the draft bill. Public consultations were held across Quebec beginning in January 2006.

The Citizen’s Committee reported its findings to the National Assembly on 21 April 2006. Its report rejected the government’s draft bill and proposed a system of mixed proportional representation similar to that of Germany. The Committee’s main criticism of the government’s draft bill was that the proposed one-ballot system did not accurately reflect the wishes of the voters and would encourage strategic voting.

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(53) Ibid. See also the website of the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, <http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/index.html>.

(54) Ibid.

#### **f. Reform proposals in New Brunswick**

In December 2003, the Commission on Legislative Democracy was established and, among other things, was instructed to propose an appropriate proportional representation model for New Brunswick. To accomplish this task, the Commission held public hearings and community roundtables, received online submissions and questionnaires, and conducted independent research and analysis. In January 2005, the Commission's final report recommended a regional mixed member proportional system and advised that a binding referendum be held no later than the 2007 provincial election.

The provincial government responded to the final report and recommendations of the Commission by issuing *Improving the Way Government Works* on 20 June 2006. With a change of government in the fall of 2006, a new report was released on 28 June 2007 in response to the Commission's recommendations. Entitled *An Accountable and Responsible Government*, the report included 20 initiatives the province will undertake to improve and enhance legislative democracy in New Brunswick between 2007 and 2012.

#### **g. Fixed election dates**

Currently, only British Columbia and Ontario have legislated fixed election dates. In British Columbia, the *Constitution (Fixed Election Dates) Amendment Act, 2001* amended the *Constitution Act* to require a general election on the second Tuesday of May in the fourth calendar year following the most recent general election.<sup>(55)</sup> The next election was held on 17 May 2005, and subsequent elections will be held on the second Tuesday of May every four years. It should be noted that the Lieutenant Governor still has the power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly before that date, should the need arise.

On 13 December 2005, Ontario became the second province to pass legislation fixing provincial election dates. Under the *Election Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005*, the next provincial election is set for 4 October 2007, with subsequent elections to be held on the first Thursday of October every four years. The Lieutenant Governor retains the power to dissolve the legislature at any point, should the government lose confidence in the Legislative Assembly.<sup>(56)</sup>

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(55) Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Legislative Library, *Electoral History of British Columbia: Supplement 1987-2001*, 2002, [http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/electoral\\_history/electhistvol2.pdf](http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/electoral_history/electhistvol2.pdf).

(56) See James R. Robertson and Megan Furi, *Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces*, PRB 04-17E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, revised 16 October 2007..

A number of other provinces, including Quebec and New Brunswick, are considering the idea of fixed election dates. The Commission on Legislative Democracy in New Brunswick recommended in January 2005 that the province adopt fixed election dates, beginning on 15 October 2007 and continuing on the third Monday in October every four years after that. The powers of the Lieutenant Governor, including the power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly, would be unaffected.

On 30 May 2006, during the 1<sup>st</sup> Session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, the Conservative government introduced Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, in the House of Commons. The bill provided that, subject to an earlier dissolution of Parliament, a general election must be held on the third Monday in October in the fourth calendar year after polling day for the last general election, with the first general election to be held on Monday 19 October 2009. The powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion, remained unaffected by the bill. Bill C-16 was given Royal Assent on 3 May 2007.

## **B. Senate Reform<sup>(57)</sup>**

### **1. What steps would need to be taken if a decision is made to reform the Senate?**

Major changes to the Senate would require an amendment to the Canadian Constitution.<sup>(58)</sup> Any reform affecting the powers of the Senate, the method of selecting senators, the number of senators to which a province is entitled, or the residency requirement of senators can be made only under the general amending formula contained in section 38. This formula calls for the consent of the Senate and House of Commons and the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces (7 provinces) with at least 50% of population of all the provinces (the "7/50" formula).

### **2. What proposals have been made for electoral reform of the Senate?**

#### **Table 6: Proposals for an Elected Senate**

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(57) Information in this section is based on Brian O'Neal and Sonia Ménard, *Senate Reform*, TIPS-79E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, October 2004.

(58) Mollie Dunsmuir, *Constitutional Amending Formula*, TIPS-19E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, November 2000.

|   | <b>Electoral System</b>  | <b>Constituencies</b>  | <b>Timing of Election</b>  | <b>Term</b>   |
|---|--|--|--|---|
| <b>Canada West Foundation (1981)</b>  | Single transferable vote   | Province-wide constituencies   | Coincide with House of Commons elections                             | Not specified   |
| <b>Special Joint Committee (Molgat-Cosgrove) (1984)</b>                     | First-past-the-post  | Within province  | Fixed dates every three years  | Nine years (non-renewable): one-third elected every three years                 |
| <b>Macdonald Royal Commission (1985)</b>                                    | Proportional representation  | Not specified  | Not specified  | Not specified   |
| <b>Alberta Special Committee (1985)</b>                                     | First-past-the-post  | Province-wide constituencies   | Coincide with provincial elections                                   | Equal to the life of two legislatures, half renewed at each provincial election |
| <b>Government of Canada Proposals (1991)</b>                                | Not specified  | Not specified  | Coincide with House of Commons elections                             | Not specified   |
| <b>Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie) (1992)</b> | Proportional representation  | Constituencies no larger than needed by proportional representation. Multi-member constituencies electing at least four senators | Fixed, not to coincide with House of Commons or provincial elections | Six years, non-staggered  |
| <b>Charlottetown Accord Proposals (1992)</b>                                | Not specified. By people or by provincial and territorial legislatures | Not specified  | Coincide with House of Commons elections                             | Not specified   |

Sources: F. Leslie Seidle, "Senate Reform and the Constitutional Agenda: Conundrum or Solution?" in Janet Aizenstat, ed., *Canadian Constitutionalism: 1791-1991*, Canadian Study of Parliament Group, Ottawa, 1992, p. 116; Jack Stilborn, *Senate Reform Proposals in Comparative Perspective*, BP-316E, Parliamentary and Information Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, November 1992.

3. How would seats be distributed under these proposals?

**Table 7**  
**Proposed Seat Distribution for a Reformed Senate**

|                                    | Canada West Foundation (1981)* | Special Joint Committee (Molgat-Cosgrove) (1984) | Macdonald Royal Commission (1985) | Alberta Special Committee (1985) | Government of Canada Proposals (1991) | Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie) (1992)** | Charlottetown Accord Proposals (1992) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Ontario</b>                     | 6-10                           | 24   | 24                                | 6                                | Not specified                         | 30 / 20  | 6                                     |
| <b>Quebec</b>                      | 6-10                           | 24   | 24                                | 6                                |                                       | 30 / 20  | 6                                     |
| <b>British Columbia</b>            | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 18 / 12  | 6                                     |
| <b>Alberta</b>                     | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 18 / 12  | 6                                     |
| <b>Saskatchewan</b>                | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 12 / 8   | 6                                     |
| <b>Manitoba</b>                    | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 12 / 8   | 6                                     |
| <b>Nova Scotia</b>                 | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 10 / 8   | 6                                     |
| <b>New Brunswick</b>               | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 10 / 8   | 6                                     |
| <b>Newfoundland &amp; Labrador</b> | 6-10                           | 12   | 12                                | 6                                |                                       | 7 / 6  | 6                                     |
| <b>Prince Edward Island</b>        | 6-10                           | 6  | 6                                 | 6                                |                                       | 4 / 4  | 6                                     |
| <b>Northwest Territories</b>       | 1-2                            | 4  | 4                                 | 2                                |                                       | 2 / 2  | 1                                     |
| <b>Yukon</b>                       | 1-2                            | 2  | 2                                 | 2                                |                                       | 1 / 1  | 1                                     |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                       | 62-104                         | 144  | 144                               | 64                               |                                       | 154 / 109  | 62                                    |

\* Proposal sets out ranges.

\*\* Proposal sets out two possible distributions.

Source: Stilborn (1992).

#### 4. What powers would the Senate have under these proposals?

**Table 8: Proposed Powers for an Elected Senate**

|                                     | <b>Canada West Foundation (1981)</b>  | <b>Special Joint Committee (Molgat-Cosgrove) (1984)</b>               | <b>Macdonald Royal Commission (1985)</b>                         | <b>Alberta Special Committee (1985)</b>  | <b>Government of Canada Proposals (1991)</b>   | <b>Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie) (1992)</b>   | <b>Charlottetown Accord Proposals (1992)</b>   |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Money bills</b>                  | Reject or reduce (subject to House of Commons override), but not increase or initiate         | Supply bills subject to no delay                                      | Not specified  | House of Commons could override Senate on money or taxation bills by simple majority | No role in relation to appropriation bills and measures to raise funds, including borrowing authorities            | 30 days to deal with supply bills, House of Commons simple majority override on bills defeated or amended by Senate | Could force House of Commons to repass supply bills within 30 calendar days. Veto on bills that result in fundamental tax policy changes directly related to natural resources |
| <b>Ordinary legislation</b>         | Powers similar to those of the House of Commons, but House could override by special majority | Suspensive veto of 120 sitting days                                   | Six-month suspensive veto  | House of Commons could override Senate by "vote greater in percentage terms"         | Senate approval required   | Senate approval required, House of Commons override. Nature of override not specified                               | Defeat or amendment of ordinary legislation would lead to joint sitting with House of Commons. Simple majority would decide outcome  |
| <b>Linguistic/cultural matters</b>  |   | Double majority for "legislation of linguistic significance"          | Double majority for "matters of special linguistic significance" | Double majority for "all changes affecting the French and English languages"         | "Double majority special voting rule" for "matters of language and culture"  | Double majority on "measures affecting the language or culture of French-speaking communities"                      | Double majority (all senators and all francophone senators) for bills "materially affecting the French language and culture"   |
| <b>Ratification of appointments</b> | Ratify or reject appointments to national boards, tribunals or agencies                       | Appointments to federal agencies with important regional implications | None specified   | None specified   | Governor of Bank of Canada; heads of national cultural institutions, regulatory boards and agencies                | Governor of Bank of Canada; heads of national cultural institutions, regulatory boards and agencies                 | Able to block all key appointments, including heads of key regulatory agencies and cultural institutions   |
| <b>Other</b>                        | Power to ratify or veto constitutional amendments   | None specified  | None specified   | Ratify non-military treaties   | Six-month suspensive veto over "matters of national importance, such as national defence and international issues" |   |  |

Sources: Seidle (1992), p. 116; Stilborn (1992).

## 5. What about abolishing the Senate?

Some have argued that the Senate should be abolished rather than reformed. This, however, could be accomplished only through major amendments to the Constitution. Although there is some discussion regarding whether the general amending formula (7/50) or the formula requiring unanimous consent would be required, it is most probable that unanimity would be necessary in order to effect such a major change.

## 6. What positions have federal political parties taken regarding Senate reform?

Some political parties have adopted formal positions on democratic reform and have put forward proposals to change the structure of the Senate.

*Bloc Québécois:* During the 2005-2006 election campaign, leader Gilles Duceppe said Senate reform would not be possible because the necessary constitutional changes would require the unanimous consent of the provinces.<sup>(59)</sup>

*Conservative Party of Canada:* In a policy statement released on 8 September 2004, the Conservative Party indicated that it would “support the election of senators” were it to form the government, and that it “believes in an equal Senate to address the uneven distribution of Canada’s population and provide a balance to safeguard regional interests.”

In its campaign platform for the 23 January 2006 election, the Party announced two reform proposals. It would:

- begin reform of the Senate by creating a national process for choosing elected senators from each province and territory; and
- propose further reforms to make the Senate an effective, independent, and democratically elected body that equitably represents all regions.<sup>(60)</sup>

The first proposal would involve a limited reform in the method of selection. The second would require more extensive reforms requiring a constitutional amendment.

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(59) Mark Kennedy, “Martin supports elected Senate, but changes won’t come soon, PM says,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 December 2005, p. A3.

(60) Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006*, 13 January 2006, p. 44.

It is unclear how an interim selection process would function. It is also unclear whether the process would be conducted federally or provincially. Prime Minister Harper, in some public statements made during the recent electoral campaign, spoke of a federally conducted process.<sup>(61)</sup> He is also reported to have said that he would let the provinces hold elections and that he would appoint the choices made by voters.<sup>(62)</sup>

If a federal process is chosen, new legislation would be required to govern the conduct of the elections for senators; the *Canada Elections Act* deals only with elections to the House of Commons at present. Elections could also be conducted by the provinces and territories. Alberta has been holding such elections in conjunction with municipal elections since the late 1980s, although only in one case (Stan Waters) was the winning candidate appointed to the Senate. British Columbia had similar legislation in the early 1990s, but it lapsed. Not all provinces are as interested in the election of senators, and some provinces might adopt systems other than first-past-the-post for such elections. Quebec has traditionally maintained that its senatorial candidates should be selected by the National Assembly.<sup>(63)</sup> The overall result could be a system in which senatorial nominees are selected in differing ways, which might accommodate the diversity of the country but could have a profound impact on the operation of the Senate and raise questions about the equality of regions and provinces.

There has been limited discussion on whether the particular kind of reform being contemplated by the new government, in the initial phase, can be achieved by Parliament acting alone and without a constitutional amendment. Some argue that any permanent change to the selection of senators would require a constitutional amendment.<sup>(64)</sup> Others have suggested that the Prime Minister could agree to accept a different method of selecting senators for recommendation to the Governor General, effectively waiving any right conferred upon him by constitutional convention.<sup>(65)</sup>

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(61) Conservative Party of Canada, “Harper to initiate reforms to elect senators and set fixed election dates,” News release, 14 December 2005.

(62) CBC Television, Interview with Susan Bonner, *The National*, 14 December 2005.

(63) It has been reported that Quebec is opposed to the Conservative Party’s proposal. See S. Larocque, “Quebec not interested in elected Senate, prefers to make recommendations,” Canadian Press, 30 January 2006.

(64) Senator the Honourable Serge Joyal, P.C., O.C., *Legal, Constitutional and Political Imperatives to Senate Reform*, Unpublished paper, February 2000, p. 14.

(65) G. Gibson, *Challenges in Senate Reform: Conflicts of Interest, Unintended Consequences, New Possibilities*, Fraser Institute, Vancouver, 2004, p. 14.

In the 1980 *Senate Reference* case, however, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the fundamental character of the Senate – *including* the method of appointment – cannot be altered by a unilateral action of Parliament.<sup>(66)</sup> Whether the approach proposed by the Conservative Party of Canada constitutes altering the “fundamental character” of the Senate is uncertain.

*Liberal Party of Canada:* The Liberal Party of Canada has focused its parliamentary reform efforts on the House of Commons and has no specific proposal for Senate reform. During the 2005-2006 election campaign, Prime Minister Paul Martin said he agreed with the concept of an elected Senate, but that it could not be done until the provinces were prepared to deal with broader Senate reform.<sup>(67)</sup>

*New Democratic Party:* The NDP has traditionally favoured abolition of the Senate.

## **7. What methods do other major Western democracies use for selecting senators?**

This section reviews the methods of selecting senators in the 15 major Western democracies with bicameral legislatures (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America).

### **a. Election and appointment**

As shown in Table 9, direct election (at least in part) is used to select senators in a majority of the 15 countries (9, or 60%). In four countries (Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), senators are elected indirectly, while in two (Canada and the United Kingdom), senators are appointed. Two countries (Belgium and Ireland) have a mix of directly elected and appointed senators, while one (Spain) has a mix of directly and indirectly elected senators.

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(66) *Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54.

(67) Kennedy (2005).

**Table 9**  
**Method of Selection in Senates of the Major Western Democracies**

| Country        | Method of Selection             | Voting Method                          |
|----------------|---------------------------------|--|
| Australia      | Directly elected                | Proportional                           |
| Austria        | Indirectly elected              | Proportional                           |
| Belgium        | Directly elected and appointed  | Proportional                           |
| Canada         | Appointed                       |  |
| France         | Indirectly elected              | Proportional and majority              |
| Germany        | Indirectly elected              | Members of Länder (state) governments  |
| Ireland        | Directly elected and appointed  | Proportional                           |
| Italy          | Directly elected                | Proportional and simple majority       |
| Japan          | Directly elected                | Proportional and simple majority       |
| Mexico         | Directly elected                | Proportional and majority list         |
| Netherlands    | Indirectly elected              | Proportional                           |
| Spain          | Directly and indirectly elected | Simple majority                        |
| Switzerland    | Directly elected                | Simple majority                        |
| United Kingdom | Appointed                       |  |
| USA            | Directly elected                | Simple majority and absolute majority* |

\* Two states – Georgia and Louisiana – require absolute majorities to be elected.

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, PARLINE Database.

### **b. Voting methods**

Of the nine major Western democracies in which at least some senators are directly elected, six countries (38%) use proportional voting methods, either entirely or in part. Only three major Western democracies (Spain, Switzerland, and the United States) use simple majority systems for the most part.

Of the major Western democracies in which senators are indirectly elected (Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), three use proportional methods to choose senators, while in Germany, members of the Bundesrat are chosen from members of the Länder (state) governments.

## **8. Senate reform initiatives**

In the 4 April 2006 Speech from the Throne, the Harper government said it would “explore means to ensure that the Senate better reflects both the democratic values of Canadians and the needs of Canada’s regions.”<sup>(68)</sup> To that end, the government pursued what it called a

(68) Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne,” 4 April 2006, p. 8, [http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt\\_e.pdf](http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/sft-ddt_e.pdf).

“step-wise approach” by introducing a bill to limit Senate terms to eight years and another to provide for advisory, or consultative, elections.

In May 2006, the government introduced Bill S-4 (reintroduced in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament as Bill C-19), which would amend section 29 of the *Constitution Act, 1867* to establish eight-year terms for new senators. Existing senators would continue to serve until age 75. Bill S-4 was silent on the reappointment of senators, which meant that a senator’s term could be renewed after eight years. Bill C-19, however, expressly limits Senate appointments to one eight-year term. Appointing senators for eight-year terms would gradually increase the turnover rate in the Senate, and future prime ministers might be able to use this to their advantage by maximizing the number of governing-party senators.

On 28 June 2006, the subject matter of Bill S-4 was referred to the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform. The Special Committee tabled its report on 26 October 2006. The Committee agreed with the principle of defining term limits and noted “there appears to be no need for additional clarity on the constitutionality of Bill S-4.”<sup>(69)</sup> Bill S-4 received second reading in the Senate on 20 February 2007 and was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.

At the same time as it examined Bill S-4, the Special Senate Committee also considered the question of Western regional representation in the Senate when it examined a motion of Senator Lowell Murray that the *Constitution Act, 1867* be amended to recognize British Columbia and the Prairie provinces as regions to be separately represented in the Senate. The Committee tabled its report in October 2006, and most of Committee members supported the motion.<sup>(70)</sup>

On 13 December 2006 the government introduced Bill C-43, the Senate Appointment Consultations Act (reintroduced in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Session of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament as

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(69) Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, *Report on the Subject-Matter of Bill S-4, An Act to Amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate Tenure)*, October 2006, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/refo-e/rep-e/rep01oct06-e.htm>.

(70) Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, *Report on the Motion to Amend the Constitution of Canada (Western Regional Representation in the Senate)*, October 2006, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/refo-e/rep-e/rep02oct06-e.htm>.

Bill C-20). It would establish a mechanism for consulting electors in a province with respect to their preferences for the appointment of senators to represent the province.<sup>(71)</sup>

On 18 April 2007, Prime Minister Harper announced that Bert Brown, the winner of Alberta's 2004 Senate election, would be appointed to the Senate.<sup>(72)</sup> Alberta had held Senate elections in conjunction with municipal elections since the late 1980s, although in only one case (that of Stan Waters) was the winning candidate appointed to the Senate. Other winners were referred to as senators-in-waiting.

On 12 June 2007, the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs tabled its report on Bill S-4. The Committee re-examined the constitutional issues surrounding the term limits in the light of the reforms proposed by Bill C-43. It recommended extending the length of terms from 8 to 15 years, making the term appointments non-renewable, and maintaining the retirement age of 75 years. In addition, the Committee concluded there were "significant constitutional concerns" about the bill. It therefore asked the government to refer Bill S-4 as amended to the Supreme Court of Canada and recommended that the bill "not be proceeded with at third reading until such time as the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled with respect to its constitutionality."<sup>(73)</sup> On 19 June 2007, the Senate adopted the Committee report, putting further debate on S-4 on hold until the Supreme Court has ruled on its constitutionality.

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(71) Michel Bédard, "Bill C-43: Senate Appointment Consultations Act," LS-553E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, 23 April 2007, [http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Bills\\_ls.asp?lang=e&source=library\\_prb&Parl=39&Ses=1&ls=C43](http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Bills_ls.asp?lang=e&source=library_prb&Parl=39&Ses=1&ls=C43).

(72) Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister Harper announces intention to appoint Alberta Senator-in-waiting Bert Brown," News release, 18 April 2007, <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1628>.

(73) Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Thirteenth Report, 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 12 June 2007, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/lega-e/rep-e/rep13jun07-e.htm>.