Religious Diversity in Canada
A Decade of Knowledge

Early in the existence of PRI there was recognition of the need to have a vehicle for consolidating and disseminating policy-relevant research findings. Out of this need was born the publication known as Horizons. In those early days it was a bulletin containing short pieces that directed analysts to research along a thematic that could prove of interest to the policy and policy research communities.

Over the last ten years, Horizons has become one of Canada’s respected policy research publications.

While there is a significant change in distribution – from what was effectively an internal federal government print publication with a small circulation (of a couple of hundred copies), to a universally accessible, electronic, on-demand e-zine with over 10,000 downloads for an average issue – our goals have remained the same.

We endeavour to provide high-quality research material available on issues of growing policy salience. The choice of topic is often – but not always – guided by PRI’s own mandated research, but issues of Horizons are always designed to frame policy challenges, to direct policy makers to high-quality research, to signal opportunities for researchers both within and outside the federal government to contribute to the creation of knowledge in support of policy development and to identify gaps in both theoretical and empirical analysis and in data that need to be addressed in the interests of sound, evidence-based policy making.

Many past issues of Horizons have remained policy-relevant over time and are referenced frequently. As an example, the issue on Population Health (volume 2, number 3) was downloaded over 1500 times last year – 9 years after its first printing.

This issue marks ten completed years of Horizons with 42 issues covering a broad range of public policy interest.
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The popularity of the Canadian sitcom *Little Mosque on the Prairie* shows that dealing with religious diversity is one of the realities to which many ordinary Canadians can relate. A 2008 study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project finds that religion remains an essential part in the lives of individuals in most countries it surveyed. Though Canada was not one of the countries included in the Pew study, its findings nevertheless resonate here.

Even though attendance at religious services is on the decline, a majority of Canadians still identify themselves with a faith tradition. Changes in patterns of immigration are, however, changing how Canadians express their faith. The evidence presented in this issue of *Horizons* speaks to the growing religious diversity in Canada. In particular, while mainline denominations, such as Catholic and Protestant, show a decline in the past decade, the number of adherents of other faith traditions doubled in the same period. Moreover, in recent years, issues of religious diversity have sprung up in a number of public policy areas, both in Canada and abroad.

So what does all this mean? and does it challenge the way we treat issues related to religion in developing and implementing policy?

The questions posed by religious diversity appear likely to become more salient over time. Recent changes to how governments relate to citizens – for example, the increasing use of ombudsman services – provide new ways for individuals to raise grievances with the way public policy affects them in the practice of their faith. Federal employees also have a new avenue of expression: recent changes to the *Public Service Labour Relations Act* established an informal conflict management system to address workplace tensions, including those linked to faith. Policy makers will be prompted to think about whether and how to adapt policies to meet the particular needs of Canadians from differing religious backgrounds.
This area of public policy is also inherently horizontal. A better understanding of religious differences and the role that religious identities play in the social life of the country is likely to reveal policy needs and opportunities that will prompt a broad range of departments and agencies at all orders of government to reconsider the programs and policies for which they are responsible and to identify implications for how they are staffed and managed. In addition, the development, design and implementation of particular domestic and foreign policies may suggest new approaches to responding to increasing religious diversity in other policy areas.

Mechanisms for mutual learning and horizontal policy development are still weak – partly because public servants find the subject sensitive, and because there are few fora for developing a common knowledge base or sharing effective practices.

How are the structures we have in place coping with the new pressures?

Discussions on religious diversity have often been subsumed under the broader rubrics of cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Yet in a series of roundtable consultations jointly conducted in 2007 by the Policy Research Initiative and the Multiculturalism Program (then housed in the Department of Canadian Heritage), many participants observed that religion is increasingly emerging as a topic on its own. Among the gaps identified were:

- the absence of a clear societal discourse that – at the level of principle – describes and guides how Canadians deal with religious diversity in their daily lives; and
- a lack of understanding of how governments and other institutions relate to religious individuals and communities in practice – especially in policy development and design and in service delivery.

On the whole, Canada’s institutions have been able to deal quite well with issues arising from diversity. Nevertheless, it is possible that tensions may increase between the religious traditions of newcomers and traditions inherited from Europe, in which religion has been embedded in civic practice. These debates could also spill over into the discourse around First and founding nations. Yet research also shows that we have been able to change institutional practice to include the participation of people of differing faiths. While those changes can sometimes take too long, it is not clear what mechanisms are available to accelerate institutional adaptation. Our strongest asset here may be managers’ openness to dialogue and willingness to invest in finding new ways of working. Formal links to faith communities can help policy makers understand the context they are working in and provide valuable counsel on options under consideration.

Drawing from research in Canada and abroad, the articles in this issue address questions such as these: What is the extent of religious diversity in Canada and internationally? How do societies and public institutions deal with this diversity? How should public policies (and the broader societal discourse) adapt to increasing religious diversity?

A few articles in a single issue of Horizons can at best scratch the surface of this large and complex topic. With this in mind, the issue identifies avenues for further research. The goal is to increase interest among policy practitioners (and among researchers in both government and the external research community) in the production and dissemination of high-quality research that can inform government policies on religious diversity, including their connections to the country’s multiculturalism policy framework.

**References**


Responding to Religious Diversity: A Third Element of Multiculturalism Policy

In the last two decades, Canada has experienced a growth of diversity in culture, language, and religion. However, dealing with such diversity remains a work in progress subject to the evolving social context as governments and citizens respond to issues of the day. Since the inception of Canada’s multiculturalism policy over 30 years ago, discussions on cultural diversity have evolved from cultural retention in the 1970s and racial equality in the 1980s, to social inclusion in the 1990s (Fleras and Kunz, 2001). While religion is often discussed in the context of culture, accommodating religious diversity has increasingly become a topic of its own in recent years.

A series of regional roundtables conducted by the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) in partnership with the Department of Canadian Heritage in the first half of 2007 provided a snap shot of the opinions of randomly selected groups of Canadians on multiculturalism. One key finding was the significant uncertainty among participants as to whether and how to incorporate faith and religion into the public sphere more generally and into the multicultural discourse more specifically (Kunz and Sykes, 2007).

In a recent presentation, Kymlicka (2008) observed that multiculturalism is under pressure to add religion as a “third track” along with ethnicity and race, noting in particular that “there remains much uncertainty about the role of religion within the multiculturalism policy, and about the sorts of religious organizations and faith-based claims that should be supported by the policy.”

Drawing from all the contributors to this issue of Horizons and other sources, this article sketches a preliminary analytic framework for exploring the policy implications of religious diversity in Canada. It is premised on the notion that religious diversity is here to stay and policy responses to the issues arising out of that diversity need to succeed simultaneously at multiple levels:

- at a “micro” level, by facilitating and promoting mutual private accommodation among religiously diverse individuals and communities;
- at a “meso” level, by tailoring government programs and policies to meet the needs of a religiously diverse citizenry;
- at a “macro” level, by adopting a broad societal discourse that reflects and shapes ongoing public debate over the role of religion and religious diversity in public life.
Finally, the article also attempts to sketch out a preliminary list of policy research gaps that may warrant further study.

**Religious Diversity: A Fact of Contemporary Societies**

As Thomas notes in the article on p. 14 of this issue, there are significant global shifts underway in the intensity and geographic pattern of religious faith, reflecting a resurgence in religiosity, notably among Islamic and evangelical Christian communities in many countries as well as significant population migrations between countries with different religious traditions.

In Canada, as in other Western countries, this is reflected in a growing religious diversity. Notwithstanding an overall decline in church attendance in Canada, the overwhelming majority of Canadians still identify themselves as Christian – mostly Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants, with smaller numbers of Orthodox Christians and small (though rapidly growing) numbers of “other” Christians, including evangelicals. However, in recent decades, immigration has steadily contributed to a diversification of religious faith (figure on the right), a trend that is expected to continue.

As noted in this issue, religion has sprung up in a number of areas of Canadian public policy in recent years, a trend that predates – but has acquired a significantly heightened profile since – the events of 9/11. Canada’s Muslim community in particular has frequently become the focus of public and media attention, although incidents involving Sikh, Jewish, and other faith communities have also attracted attention. That attention has by no means all been cast in a negative or sensationalist tone (i.e. focusing on “threats” to and “conflicts” within the Canadian social fabric): “Little Mosque on the Prairie,” a Canadian sitcom broadcast on CBC, deals with the misunderstandings between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in a fictional Prairie town. Now in its third season, the show has garnered accolades in Canada and has been syndicated internationally.

Canada is not alone in facing the challenges associated with increased religious diversity. There is growing policy interest in this area in other Western countries with similar demographic realities, as witnessed by the 2003 report by the Stasi Commission in France (Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la république, see p. 49) which led to the subsequent law banning religious symbols in public schools in France, the 2004 report in the United Kingdom, *Working Together: Cooperation between Government and Faith Communities*, and the 2004 Australian report (see p. 33), *Religion, Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia* (see p. 39). Key recurring themes in these debates look at how both governments and citizens need to respond, and how government policies in particular should be adapted to deal with this evolving reality.

**Dealing with Religious Diversity: Three Levels of Policy Analysis**

Policy responses to increasing religious diversity arguably need to succeed simultaneously at three distinct levels.

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**Immigration Contributes to Growing Religious Diversity: Canada**

![Graph showing immigration contributions to religious diversity in Canada](image-url)
At what could be considered the “micro” level, private individuals and organizations generally try (and mostly succeed) in working out their differences through various strategies of mutual accommodation, with the help of public policy interventions that, in a cohesive society, are modest in scale or arise only occasionally.

At a “meso” level, governments of all orders need to develop and deliver public policies, programs, and services to citizens, both religious and non-religious, generally adapting them to their different needs, subject only to the need to respect certain core values set out in the country’s constitution and other foundational documents.

Finally, at a “macro” level, diverse societies generally need to be able to tell a coherent and compelling story about how they treat all citizens justly and with respect, but also to acknowledge and explain the trade-offs that may sometimes be necessary between respect for diversity, on the one hand, and other core values of the broader society.

Getting Along: The “Micro” Level

In cohesive societies, differences and the tensions they sometimes generate are, for the most part, worked out privately between individuals or sometimes through spokespersons for individual communities intervening with private organizations. Differences may also be resolved through voluntary actions by different communities to accommodate the particular needs of others and, more generally, to engage in ecumenical outreach to other faith communities. Occasionally, tensions may
be avoided through forms of (typically limited) self-segregation on the part of religious communities themselves.

Given the significant place religious faith often occupies in the identities of Canadians, private accommodation of religious differences may make a particularly important contribution to social cohesion. On the whole, Canadians appear to be well intentioned in this regard, viewing cultural and, by implication, religious diversity as a source of strength of their society.

For example, as revealed in an Environics survey of Muslim and non-Muslim Canadians (summarized in the article by Adams in this issue), a general level of good will between the two groups undoubtedly goes a long way in enabling individuals and communities to resolve their differences privately through mutual accommodation in real life, just as in fictional episodes of “Little Mosque on the Prairie.”

As Adams also points out, some areas of concern and misunderstanding remain between Muslim Canadians and non-Muslim Canadians, notably concerns that Muslim Canadians (most of them immigrants) are not committed to integration with broader society – notwithstanding the strong interest and commitment among Muslim Canadians to do just that.

This misapprehension testifies to a broader challenge: the evident unease felt by many Canadians in relation to whether and how to accommodate the needs of their fellow citizens from minority religious backgrounds. This may often be a reflection of lack of familiarity and information, the absence of which, in turn, reflects the natural tendency for adherents of different religious faiths to congregate with others of that faith. Efforts at public education or at facilitating dialogue across different faiths (as suggested in the article by Seljak in this issue) may thus have some value as policy prescriptions for reducing the scope for misunderstandings.

More challenging to policy makers are the infrequent episodes involving situations where usually effective private efforts at accommodations fail to prevent the emergence of public controversies. Public mediation and facilitation efforts may sometimes be effective, especially when conflicts remain low-key. Such efforts may also fail, giving rise to demands for various forms of adjudication, whether through government (e.g. ranging from municipal decisions on zoning to changes to human rights legislation) or through the courts (see figure below).

Serving Canadians: The “Meso” Level

The highly competitive nature of political dynamics in democratic societies generally translates into governments (and political parties in general) seeking to address the particular needs of a wide variety of citizens by bringing them or spokespersons for the communities to which they belong into the decision-making process and through resulting adaptations of their policies and programs.

In most cases, both the decision-making process and the resulting policies and programs seem to raise few, if any, controversies. Several articles in this issue describe recent initiatives and
present case studies of (largely) successful – though ongoing – efforts to adapt government policies to increasing religious diversity. Milot and Tremblay’s article describes adaptations to Quebec’s school system and Benham Rennick’s article describes adaptations to growing religious diversity in the Canadian military. Based on interviews with a number of federal departments, the article by Gaye and Kunz also describes a range of other cases where federal policies were adapted in the face of growing religious diversity. In a somewhat different vein, the second article by Thomas sketches out some of the key challenges posed by increasing religious diversity on a global scale for the conduct of foreign policy by Canada and other countries (see Thomas on p. 50).

While numerous examples of successful policy adaptations can be found, many seem to be more the product of a ‘muddling through’ approach, that is, dealing with each situation on a more or less ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Many of the policy practitioners they interviewed felt the country’s broad constitutional and legislative framework (including multiculturalism policies of more general application already in place) set the tone for flexible policy adaptations that would be more difficult to make if made subject to rigid, high-level directives.

Even though the goal of an overarching, principle-based approach to adapting policies to religious diversity may be beyond reach, policy makers may still be able to draw useful lessons from recent patterns of both successful and unsuccessful attempts to adapt policies geared to the interests of faith communities. For example:

• As a general rule, policy adaptations in areas not involving the exercise of state authority over Canadians appear likely to raise the fewest objections: e.g., consultations with religious community stakeholders, most services offered to all Canadians on a more or less equivalent basis (or at least on a basis that is seen as equally flexible for all) and even foreign policies.

• Policy adaptations that may appear to involve “exemptions” from legislative, regulatory, or other obligations imposed on Canadians generally can be expected to be significantly more controversial, particularly if they are seen to involve changes to statutory obligations. The debate on proposals in Ontario to allow recourse to Sharia law and other alternative legal codes under family law arbitrations is one recent example.

• Especially controversial (though sometimes hard to identify in advance) are adaptations that in some way are seen by significant numbers as running counter to their core values or undermining historically significant national symbols. A recent example is the Quebec National Assembly’s decision not to remove the crucifix from its chamber, thereby rejecting one recommendation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Another example was the resistance in Ontario to proposals to facilitate access to public funding for faith-based schools, notwithstanding existing confessional education rights in the Constitution.

Setting the Tone: The “Macro” Level

Notwithstanding the likelihood that it will be difficult (if not impossible) to set out a single analytical framework for assessing the need for and designing policy adaptations relating to Canada’s diverse religious communities, the country is still likely to want (and need) to present a coherent overall discourse, grounded in principles, to describe and guide its overall approach.

In his article in this issue, Cladis notes that the acknowledgment accorded to faith-based discourse in the public space can and does vary from one society to another – and even across
those that view themselves as impeccably liberal democracies. The key question addressed in his article is that of “how to accommodate and respect – but not privilege – religious diversity in public space and in political deliberation.”

Drawing on Cladis’ four archetypal models of the role of religious discourse in the public space, one can think in terms of a historical typology of societies, ranging from faith-based societies consisting of a single dominant faith, to those that (even though they may be religiously diverse) are faith-guided (in the sense that religious discourse is a common and recurring theme in public debate), to those that are actively faith-averse and to those that are faith-neutral.

While no living society is ever likely to fall neatly into one or the other of these archetypes, Canada throughout its history appears especially hard to classify in these terms. The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1982 acknowledges that “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.” The Constitution Act, 1867 also entrenches confessional school rights. References to God exist in both English and French-language versions of the national anthem. At the same time, freedom of conscience and religion is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In form, and increasingly in everyday practice, Canada appears to most closely approximate a faith-neutral society that is generally welcoming of its religious diversity but seeks to be neutral as between the different faiths (or absence of faith) of its citizens – a vision described (in Therrien’s article, describing the particular context in Quebec) as one of “laicity” (“laïcité”) to distinguish it explicitly from the more forceful doctrine of secularism (“laïcisme”) adopted in France and some other countries. Another model of faith-neutral society could be found in India, as described by Bhargava in this issue. However, even a largely faith-neutral society may find itself having to decide on and enforce some kind of reasonable limits on religious practices (or, more typically, traditional customs that may be hard to disentangle from religious beliefs), notably where such practices may conflict with other core values of the broader society and require appropriate trade-offs. As such, no societal discourse on living with religious diversity can ever be properly viewed as absolute. This is particularly true given that such a discourse is continually evolving in the face of changing mores and the patterns of successes and failures in adapting to the changing patterns of that diversity.

Policy Research Gaps

As suggested by other articles in this issue, religious diversity appears to be here to stay and will inevitably have implications for the development and design of public policies. Yet in many ways, this area is unexplored terrain for many (if not most) policy makers. Federal policy makers have only begun to explore these issues: the article by research staff at the Multiculturalism branch now based within the department of Citizenship and Immigration, in this issue, summarizes recent research commissioned by the federal government, notably on religious radicalization, the interaction of religious Canadians with an increasingly secular society, the role of social capital within religious communities, and the particular challenges facing Muslim integration into Canadian society. Nevertheless, sizeable gaps in knowledge and understanding of key issues (and even in basic data) remain.
Nature and Fluidity of Religious Identities

Religious belief (or lack thereof) is often a key aspect of many individual identities. As demonstrated by Bowlby (2001), religious identity often overlaps with other identity markers such as gender, race, or language and with other individual attributes that may affect their social and economic outcomes in ways that are still poorly understood.

Further, unlike gender and race, religious identity is relatively fluid: the nature and intensity of religious beliefs and affiliations of individuals can and do change over the course of their lives and from one generation to the next. It is not clear to what extent this holds for immigrants from countries with very different religious traditions, for whom immersion in the traditions of Canadian society may pose particular challenges. Nor is it well understood how religious identities evolve between the first, second, and subsequent generations of immigrants.

Religious Affiliation as Social Capital

It is common enough for immigrant populations (including those from minority faith traditions) to congregate in regionally concentrated areas – at least for a time – to profit from ready-made social networks ("bonding" social capital). While such self-segregation occasionally raises concerns, it remains unclear when and how to distinguish the generally positive phenomenon just described from situations where systemic and other barriers may impede the full participation of religious minorities in the Canadian mainstream. For example, some studies (e.g. Beyer, 2005) have suggested that individuals of certain religious convictions may be more vulnerable to low income in spite of their higher education levels. That said, it remains unclear to what extent this phenomenon is related to religious affiliation or to some other factor (e.g. immigrant status/period of time spent in Canada, language skills, etc.).

In a somewhat different vein, it is not always clear what may constitute indicators of potential conflict with broader societal values in cases where particular religious communities explicitly choose to live apart from the broader society and to avoid a (broader or narrower) range of relationships with it.

Policy Instruments and Governance

Governments are increasingly asked (and/or ask themselves) whether and how to deal with the challenges of a more religiously diverse society. Knowledge gaps exist in relation to the diagnosis of precisely what those challenges are, but also in relation to the effectiveness of available policy instruments in addressing them.

For example, to the extent that improved public information efforts (e.g. to foster acceptance of diversity of religious practice and public displays of religious symbols) are viewed as a potentially important part of future policy responses in this area, it remains unclear how broadly responsive Canadians are to such efforts, what systematic differences there may be in this regard across different regions, age or socio-demographic groups, and how robust these differences may be.

The often delicate issue of what kinds of public policy or program adaptations can and should be made could also benefit from a more thorough identification and examination of best practices both domestically and in other countries.

Similar questions arise in relation to governance questions of how best to reach out to religious communities while remaining cognizant of the reality that they typically consist of individuals and sub-groups with widely divergent views.

Data Gaps

Though interest in research on potential impacts and policy responses to religious diversity has increased over the last decade, basic information on religious identity and its relationship to many areas of interest to public policy remains scarce.
The question on religion on the census ("What is this person’s religion?") is asked only once a decade and was last asked in 2001 – before the events of 9/11 – and will not be asked again until 2011. Moreover, census results are often reported only in broad categories, such as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and so on. While this may be relevant for many purposes, describing adherents of any one faith as forming part of a single homogenous community limits researchers’ ability to take into account the rich ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background of each religion’s adherents when exploring such issues as self-identity and success in immigrant integration. For example, analysis based on a “Muslim” community in Canada that includes South Asians, Africans, Middle Easterners, and East Asians among others, would be no more helpful than an analysis based on a Canadian “Catholic” population of French Canadians, Filipinos, Eastern Europeans, Africans, and Latin Americans among others.

At present, the most up-to-date source of detailed information on religious identities is public opinion research. Statistics Canada posed certain other religious identity questions on more recent surveys, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted in 1998, but from a researcher’s perspective, sample sizes are too small to permit effective research on minority faiths in Canada (much less on specific ethnic or linguistic subgroups among their adherents). The Ethnic Diversity Survey, a post-censal survey by Statistics Canada, which has better minority counts, is also considered dated in that the survey was in the field just a year after 2001, and attitudes about religion may have changed as we have moved further away from 9/11.

**Conclusion**

Religious diversity is a demographic fact in Canada. While often subsumed under the domain of culture in the past, dealing with religious diversity has emerged in recent years as a topic of its own as governments and the courts are increasingly asked to respond to or arbitrate tensions arising from religious differences. This article has proposed an analytic framework to approach religious diversity at the levels of individuals and communities, and governments, as well as society as a whole. It also highlights the need for better understanding of the factors associated with the integration of religious communities into Canadian society.

**References**


Introduction

This article sets the stage for an examination of the changing role and impact of religious identities on international relations (see Thomas, p. 50), focusing on the religious revivals and demographic shifts underway within the two largest world religions – Islam and Christianity – and their impact on certain regions of the world.

The Politics and Demographics of the Global Resurgence of Religion

A number of central features characterize the global resurgence of religion now underway both in public perceptions and as a reality that will, by necessity, affect the public policies of countries around the world, especially their foreign policies.

First, the religious resurgence is global in a geographic sense; it is not confined to any particular region of the world. The global resurgence of religion is widely recognized as a key phenomenon in the global South. The religious resurgence follows a massive, general demographic shift from the developed countries in the North – Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Union – to the developing countries. The North accounted for 32 percent of the world’s population in 1900, 29 percent in 1950, 25 percent in 1970, about 18 percent in 2000, and it is estimated that the North will account for only 10 to 12 percent of the world’s population in 2050 (Jenkins, 2007). In the 21st century, the West or North is becoming in many ways more post-Christian, and Christianity in the global South is becoming more and more post-Western (Sanneh, 2003).

These shifts are crucial for understanding how the cultural and religious landscape of world politics is changing, and what this cultural and ideological shift will mean for international relations. We can no longer assume, rather parochially, that Christianity in Europe or even Anglo-Saxon evangelicalism will determine the global future of Christianity (Freston, 2001). Scholars and commentators of international relations often juxtapose terms, such as “the West” and “the Islamic world,” with the idea that the West, at least in a cultural sense, still represents Christianity. The reality is that Christianity apart possibly from Latin America (which really includes a variety of cultures, indigenous as well as European), and the small, and now dwindling, minorities of Christians in the Middle East, is increasingly a post-Western religion, dominated by peoples and countries of the global South. Despite what some of their leaders may claim, the evangelicals, Pentecostals, and others who constitute the Christian Right in the United States are not the same as global evangelicalism or Pentecostalism, nor are they the same as the Christianity of

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...
the global South. If US policy makers now feel that Islam is the most urgent challenge for foreign policy, it may be the case that the politics of global Christianity over the long haul will be as important.

Second, the global resurgence of religion is also taking place throughout the world in countries with different cultural and religious traditions, including the main non-Christian world religions: Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The rise in Orthodox Judaism, for example, in Israel and the United States has an impact on politics in both countries (demographically displacing more liberal Jewish secularism since conservative Jews have more children than secular Jews, although it may be a bit too much to claim that Jewish liberals are literally dying out). Norwithstanding their Marxist pasts, genuine religious revivals are also going on in China and Russia. Of even greater potential importance is the dynamic nature and geographic range (and overlap) of Islamic and Christian revivals in some of the world’s most populous countries.

Growth of Christianity in China and East/South-East Asia

Christianity is exploding in China, which comprises a fifth of the world’s population, and the state now encourages religion, even if it is for its own ends – social order amidst a rapid economic development (Lai, 2003; Kindopp and Hamrin, 2004). China has one of the largest Pentecostal and evangelical Christian populations in the world. Pentecostalism is also at the cutting edge of Christian growth in South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam, all of which have vibrant and significant Christian minorities.

The issue is not whether China is going to become through national conversion a predominantly Christian country: this is unlikely. Rather, it is whether Christianity will in the coming decades achieve the same degree of cultural permeation of national life in China that it has already achieved in South Korea. What this possible religious change may mean for democracy, human rights, and foreign policy will need to be part of any evaluation of China’s role in international relations (Aikman, 2006; Lampman, 2007; Pew, 2007) in the 21st century.

Revival of Orthodox Christianity in Russia

A genuine religious revival of Orthodox Christianity is also taking place in Russia after 70 years of suppression, and this suggests how durable some religious identities can be even in a global era. The Russia Orthodox Church’s recent unification of its domestic and overseas hierarchies, a legacy of the Soviet era, and closer church-state relations, facilitated by “petro-populism” or “oil nationalism,” has established the religious and political foundations for a type of Orthodox identity politics – a greater role of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church on the world stage. The Moscow Patriarchate sees reunification as an important step in spreading its global influence, and the Russian state sees the restoring of the unity of the entire Russian world – the ties between Russia proper and the Russian diaspora (in which Orthodoxy is its spiritual foundation), as part of its quest to regain global influence (Daniel, 2006; Eggert, 2007; Garrard and Garrard, 2008; Holley, 2007; Marsh, 2004; Miller Llana, 2007; Trumbull, 2007).

Evangelicals subscribe to a set of core beliefs: the authority and sufficiency of the Bible – Scriptures over tradition, particularly the Catholic Church’s tradition; the uniqueness of redemption through the death of Christ upon the cross, such that salvation comes through faith and grace, rather than good works; a need for an inner, personal, conversion; and the necessity, propriety, and urgency of evangelism.

Pentecostals adhere to the same set of core beliefs as evangelicals but their Christian practice tends to be more emotive, arguing that modern Christians can be infused with the power of the Holy Spirit in ways similar to the disciples in the New Testament, and so they tend to believe in healing, miracles, and “speaking in tongues” or unknown languages.

Global Expansion and Overlap of Islam and Evangelical/Pentecostal Christianity

The world religions where we can most see explosions of religious fervour are the global Islamic resurgence and the global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity.

The global Islamic resurgence is a genuine Islamic revival, and is more wide ranging than Islamic fundamentalism (BBC, 2003; Kepel, 1994; Mahmood, 2005; White, 2002). A visible return to Islam can be observed in dress (the veil for women, a beard for men), prayers, and rituals in countries that make up the Islamic world. A key part of this revival is that people want Islam to be the organizing principle in their lives and also in their society, generating significant debate, discussion and, in some cases, more violent confrontations (e.g. the riots and politics over the contested meanings of Islam and secularism in Turkey in 2007) (Berger, 2006; Shahan Hurd, 2008).

The Islamic world is far larger than the Arab world, stretching across non-Arab Central and South Asia through to Southeast Asia, up to and including Indonesia, which is the Muslim country with the largest population (Table 1). In fact, the four largest Muslim countries (and seven of the top 8) are non-Arab, and are mostly outside the Middle East, which qualifies any quick generalizations about Islam regarding women, democracy, or terrorism. Three of the four countries with the largest Muslim populations are in South Asia (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh), and the fourth (Indonesia) is in Southeast Asia. Turkey (in Europe) is also in the top 10, so if Turkey joins the EU, the EU will have as a member one of the largest Muslim countries in the world. By current projections, Nigeria (a country whose population is almost evenly split between Muslims and Christians) will have a larger population than Pakistan or Bangladesh in 2050 and may be expected to climb further up the list of countries with the largest Muslim populations. Nigeria’s Muslim-Christian demographics and (in the Islamic, northern part of the country) the confluence of criminal syndicates and radical Islamist groups have created concerns regarding international terrorism. Osama bin Laden has called on his followers to focus on Nigeria since 2003 (IISS, 2006).

The global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity is the most dramatic religious explosion in the world today (Martin, 2008). It has now replaced the Eastern Orthodox churches as the largest single group of Christian denominations after Catholicism. It used to be thought that evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity was mainly private and personal (i.e. its growth would not conflict with perceived trends toward greater secularization), and that its followers were largely apolitical in their outlook. The 2006 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life argued that this view needs considerable rethinking: “Pentecostalism’s growing numbers will almost certainly guarantee that the movement will be a major force in shaping the political as well as the religious landscape of the 21st century.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
<th>% Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>204,498,135</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>164,160,045</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>153,831,451</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>127,443,924</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>735,421,168</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>73,127,656</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>71,749,022</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>64,557,719</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>33,896,758</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>33,431,971</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>32,410,992</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>28,152,919</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>28,146,656</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>27,374,544</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>27,074,707</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

century.” Pentecostalism is rapidly spreading across the world, and is remaking the face of global Christianity. According to the World Christian Database, there may be as many as 250 million Pentecostals: one-eighth of the world’s two billion Christians and about one in twenty-five of the global population (Martin, 2002).

As can be seen in tables 1 and 2, three of the countries with the largest Muslim populations (India, Indonesia, and Nigeria) are also countries with large numbers of Pentecostal Christians and have sizable Christian minorities overall.

The majority of Indians are Hindu (80.5%), but this dominance masks the considerable religious variation across India’s states. Muslims make up the majority of the population in Lakshadweep (95%) and in Jammu and Kashmir (67%). Christians predominate in its small eastern states of Nagaland (90%), Mizoram (87%), and Meghalaya (70%), and are significant minorities in two southern states, Kerala (19%) and Tamil Nadu (6%). Sikhs are the majority in Punjab (59.9%) (Pew, nd). Long-standing tensions within India – notably in relation to caste – also have a significant inter-religious dimension. In particular, the movement for Dalit rights (i.e. for the country’s 150 million to 250 million Dalits or “untouchables”) has long featured an undercurrent of Dalit religious conversions, notably to Islam, to Buddhism and, increasingly in recent decades, to Christianity. These conversions have angered Hindu nationalists and been an ongoing source of Hindu-Christian tensions (Jenkins, 2007: 214-217).

In Indonesia and Nigeria, ethnic divisions can intensify religious conflicts. Indonesia, although it is the largest Muslim country in the world, also has a sizeable minority Christian community of 23 million or about 10 percent of the population. What has led to inter-religious tension is that they are concentrated in particular ethnic groups and in particular regions. In the cities, Christianity is associated with the ethnic Chinese, who are also often merchants – a source of tension in the wake of the economic downturn in the late 1990s. Christian regions are scattered across some Indonesian islands, including Timor, Sulawesi, Lombok, and Maluku (the Moluccas or Spice Islands). East Timor, which is predominantly Catholic, achieved independence from Indonesia after a bitter liberation struggle (which Osama bin Laden opposed).

**Conclusions**

A variety of factors put strains on older traditions of Muslim-Christian, Hindu-Christian, and Muslim-Hindu tolerance in a number of major countries around the world. These include the spread of Islamic and Christian revivalism, their doctrines and demographics, and the way ethnicity and poverty (or economic success) often coincide with religious affiliation. Without greater inter-religious dialogue and more thoughtful approaches to political theology and to religion and development, it is possible the future may see more political instability and outbreaks of inter-religious violence.

These developments may also have significant geopolitical implications. In particular, as noted by Jenkins (2006: 9; 2007: 121), China and other countries in East Asia are frequently thought of as the Asian anchors of the Pacific Rim, but how much would it change perceptions of world politics and the prospects for conflict in East and Southeast Asia if, in the wake of increasing Christian influences on the culture and society of these countries, the Pacific Rim came to be seen as a “Christian arc” surrounding Muslim Indonesia? The media often cast Islam as the defining religion of the developing world, but to talk about

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**Table 2**

**Pentecostals by Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Country’s Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>72.0 million</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>20.2 million</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>15.0 million</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>13.0 million</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9.0 million</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>7.0 million</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.2 million</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

global resurgence of Islam without also talking about the global spread of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity is to miss a key part of the story (Jenkins, 2007).

The global spread of Christianity is shifting its centre of gravity from the industrialized countries to the developing world. The majority of Christians in the world by 2050 will be non-white, non-Western, from the ex-colonized world, rather than the former colonizers, and will espouse forms of Christianity that are more emotive and charismatic than those found in the West (which the Pew Forum’s recent study of Pentecostals indicates is not the same as saying they are political conservatives). What is more, many of these Christians will be living as minorities under non-Christian and often hostile regimes. The demographic shift in Christianity to the global South, the changing theologies of revivalist forms of Islam and Christianity, and the demographics of Islam and Christianity will make living with religious diversity and inter-religious dialogue, especially the relations between Muslims and Christians and the politics of religious freedom, increasingly important issues in international politics in the early 21st century.

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Holley, David. 2007. “Russian Orthodox Church Mends Global Schism - Overseas Church that Refused Soviet Control Formally Reunites with Homeland Hierarchy in Moscow.” Los Angeles Times (May 17).


Operation World, 2000


———. nd. India Religious Demographic Profile. <pewforum.org>. (Accessed October 26, 2008.)


E ven in countries with long histories of mass immigration, specific migrant groups sometimes garner particular concern or attention. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, immigrants to Canada arrived almost exclusively from Christian Europe. But religious divisions among Christians were vastly more charged at the time, and as Catholic immigrants from Ireland, Poland, and Southern Europe added to the ranks of the French-speaking Catholics already living in Canada, the Anglo-Protestant elites wrung their hands and worried that these people would never integrate. With attachments to the Vatican that were sometimes seen as undercutting nationalist loyalties, and with a desire for a separate school system that would continue to inculcate Catholicism into new generations, Catholics were seen as a social subgroup that might never successfully fit into Canadian society.

Similar doubts were raised in relation to the large numbers of Orthodox Christians emigrating from Eastern Europe.

Today, with Catholics and Orthodox Christians long installed at the heart of mainstream Canadian life, Canadian Muslims are now under special scrutiny. Against a global backdrop of concern over terrorism carried out under the banner of militant Islam, as well as a handful of spats about Muslim headcoverings (mostly hijabs and niqabs), some Canadian commentators have expressed concern about whether Muslims who immigrate to this country are willing to adapt to Canada’s secular, liberal norms.

In late 2006 and early 2007, Environics Research Group surveyed Canadian Muslims to gain insight into this minority religious community’s attitudes toward Canada and its desire to participate fully in Canadian life. This study was inspired, to a great extent, by a parallel study conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes project in France, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain. Like the Pew project, the Environics study included a survey of an oversample of Muslims (in Canada’s case, the sample included 500 Muslims) as well as a survey of the population at large designed to measure the general public’s attitudes toward the Muslim minority.

The findings in this article are drawn from telephone interviews conducted with 500 Canadian Muslims and

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1 Other minority religious groups, most notably Sikhs, have also been scrutinized at various moments in the last few decades. International events, including the September 11th attacks, the London transit bombings, and various cultural clashes in Europe (such as international Muslim anger over a Danish cartoonist’s depictions of the Prophet Mohammed) have conspired to make scrutiny of, and anxiety about, Canada’s Muslim minority especially intense.
2,000 members of the Canadian general public. The Muslim survey took place from November 30, 2006 to January 5, 2007. Interviews were conducted in English, French, Arabic, and Urdu. Comparisons with census data indicate the survey sample mirrors the total Canadian Muslim population in demographic characteristics as well as regional distribution. The general population survey occurred between December 8 and December 30, 2006. Interviews were conducted in English and French.

The survey results offer cause for optimism about the successful integration of Muslim immigrants (about nine in ten Canadian Muslims are foreign-born) into Canadian life. Canadian Muslims expressed simultaneous pride in Canada and pride in Islam, a willingness to participate in and adapt to Canadian norms, and a condemnation of the extremism that is sometimes cast as commonplace in other countries with significant Muslim populations. Although seriously concerned about discrimination and underemployment, Canadian Muslims expressed feelings of goodwill toward Canada and were the least likely Muslim minority in any Western country surveyed to express a sense that the bulk of their compatriots are hostile to Islam.

Canadians at large expressed moderately positive views of Islam, but were less likely than Muslims to feel that most Muslims wish to integrate fully into the Canadian mainstream. Likely as a result of this underlying uncertainty about Muslims’ willingness to integrate, the general population was more
inclined than the Muslim minority to favour certain measures geared toward forced adaptation, such as a ban on Muslim headscarves in public buildings (although the proportion of Canadians favouring this measure remains a minority).

**General Impressions of Islam and Muslims**

Muslims were divided on whether other Canadians’ impression of Islam was generally positive or negative. Half of Canadian Muslims (50%) believed Canadians’ impression of Islam to be positive, while four in ten (39%) believed Canadians have a negative impression of Islam overall. Seven percent thought Canadians’ impression of the Islamic faith was neither positive nor negative.

Notably, when Canadians stated their own impressions of Islam, their answers corresponded closely to Muslims’ expectations. Half of all Canadians (49%) said their impression of Islam was generally positive, while about four in ten (38%) said their impression of the religion was negative. Eight percent said they were neither positive nor negative about Islam.

These results are almost the same as in the Focus Canada omnibus survey in the first quarter of 2004. It is also worth noting that as Canadians’ personal contact with Muslims increases, their impressions of Islam become more positive: among those who said they often encountered Muslims in their daily lives, 70 percent expressed a positive impression of Islam. Among those who rarely or never have personal contact with Muslims, by contrast, just 36 percent had a positive impression of Islam.

Most Muslims in Canada did not see other Canadians as hostile to their coreligionists. When asked to estimate how many Canadians are hostile to Muslims, 16 percent of Canadian Muslims said most (5%) or many (11%) Canadians were hostile. The majority of Muslim Canadians believed just some Canadians (39%) or very few (36%) were hostile to adherents of Islam.

When the general public was asked to make a similar estimate about Canadian hostility toward Muslims, the proportion perceiving hostility was somewhat higher. About three in ten Canadians believed most (7%) or many (21%) Canadians were hostile to Muslims. Forty-four percent believed some Canadians were hostile, while a quarter (24%) saw very few Canadians as being hostile to adherents of Islam.

Canadian Muslims were less likely than Muslims in Great Britain, France, Spain, and Germany to feel hostility from the society in which they live.

**Integration and Identity**

Muslims and the general public both perceived a growing sense of Islamic identity among Canadian Muslims, but differed on whether this was a good thing for Canada. Most Canadian Muslims believed that, overall, Canadian Muslims have a very strong (30%) or fairly strong (42%) sense of Islamic identity. The general population had a very similar perception; most Canadians believed Canadian Muslims have a very strong (27%) or fairly strong (44%) sense of Islamic identity.

Muslim Canadians and the general public also shared the impression that the sense of Islamic identity in Canada was on the rise: 69 percent of Canadian Muslims and 62 percent of all Canadians believed there was a growing sense of Muslim identity in this country. Muslim Canadians differed from the general population, however, in their perception that this growing sense of Islamic identity was a good thing for Canada. Of those Canadian Muslims who saw a growing sense of Islamic identity among their coreligionists, 85 percent believed this was a good thing for Canada and nine percent believed it was bad. By contrast, among members of the general population who perceived a growing sense of Islamic identity in Canada, more than half (56%) saw this as a good thing for Canada, while just a third (33%) saw it as a good thing.
Canadian Muslims tended to say they were positive about the growing sense of Muslim identity in Canada, because the values of Islam are positive and they believe Canada will benefit from the expression of these values. The population at large, however, expressed reservations about a strengthened Muslim identity in Canada, citing the fear of extremism as the main reason.

Most Canadian Muslims identify first as Muslim, and second as Canadian, but their pride in being Canadian matches the national average. When asked whether they identify first as Muslim or first as Canadian, 56 percent of Canadian Muslims chose Muslim first, while 23 percent chose Canadian first. Notably, 17 percent of Canadian Muslims volunteered the answer that both identities are of equal importance to them. (“Both” was not an option presented by the interviewers to preserve comparability with the Pew surveys in Europe, but in view of participants’ eagerness to employ this answer, the questionnaire will be adjusted in the next wave of Canadian research.)

There is a notable generational difference on this question, with Muslims aged 18 to 29 markedly more likely than average (77%) to describe themselves as Muslim first. Among those in the youngest cohort, 14 percent called themselves Canadian first and eight percent volunteered that they were equally Canadian and Muslim. The question of youth identity is an important one, and not heavily emphasized in this research. Whether young Canadian Muslims’ relatively strong embrace of their minority religious identity is a sign of pride in Islam (which John Berry of Queen’s University would likely count as a positive) or a sign of alienation from the wider Canadian society resulting from discrimination and exclusion (as Jeffrey Reitz and Rupa Banerjee of the University of Toronto might argue) is beyond the scope of this study but obviously bears examination.

While the majority of Canadian Muslims identified themselves first as Muslim, almost all (94%) said they were proud to be Canadian. This proportion is the same as the proportion of all Canadians (93%) who expressed pride in being Canadian. Similar proportions of Muslim Canadians (73%) and the general public (74%) said they were very proud to be Canadian.

Muslims believed their coreligionists want to integrate into Canadian society, while the general public perceived Muslims as wanting to remain separate from the wider society.

When asked whether they thought most Muslims wanted to “adopt Canadian customs and way of life” or “be distinct from the larger Canadian society,” a modest majority (55%) of Muslims said they believed most Muslims wanted to adopt Canadian customs. An additional 13 percent believed their coreligionists wanted both to adopt Canadian customs and remain distinct as a community. Just a quarter of Canadian Muslims (23%) believed that most of their coreligionists in Canada wanted to remain distinct from the wider society.

Among the general population, the proportions were roughly reversed, with just a quarter of all Canadians (25%) believing that most Muslims are interested in adopting Canadian customs, and a majority (57%) believing that Muslims wish to remain distinct. Seven percent of the general public believed Muslim Canadians are interested in both integrating and remaining distinct.

In Canada, the disparity between the opinions of the Muslim community and the general population was the second largest of any country surveyed (after Spain) on this issue. In other words, Canadians were more likely than citizens of France, Germany, or Britain to underestimate the desire of Muslims in their country to integrate into the wider society.

Muslims and the general public diverged notably on support for the recognition of Sharia law and the banning of Muslim headscarves in public institutions. About half of Canadian Muslims (53%) believed Sharia law should be recognized by Canadian governments as a legal basis for Muslims to settle family disputes. A third (34%) believed Sharia law should not be recognized. Among the Canadian public, by contrast, eight in ten (79%) believed that Sharia law should not be recog-
nized by Canadian governments, while just one in ten (11%) supported such recognition.

A divergence of opinion – albeit a less marked one – also emerged on the banning of Muslim headscarves in public places, a measure adopted most notably in public schools in France. Canadian Muslims overwhelmingly (86%) believed that such a ban was a bad idea, while just one in ten (9%) called it a good idea.

Among the Canadian general public, a majority (55%) agreed with Canadian Muslims that the headscarf ban was a bad idea, but over a third (36%) called the ban a good idea. The Canadian public was similar to the British and American publics in expressing majority opposition to the headscarf ban; 57 percent of Americans and 62 percent of Britons believed the ban was a bad idea. By contrast, majorities in Germany (54%) and France (78%) favoured the headscarf ban, while Spain was more divided (48 percent opposed to the ban and 43 percent in favour).

This divergence of opinion between the Canadian Muslim population and the Canadian population at large is, probably, rooted in the two groups’ divergent perceptions of the general willingness of Muslims to integrate into Canadian society. While Muslims were relatively confident that their coreligionists wished to participate in Canadian life – and saw no benefit (or possible harm) in, for example, a ban on headscarves – Canadians at large, particularly Quebecers, were less certain about Muslims’ underlying willingness to integrate and placed great stock in symbolic adaptations, such as the abandonment of religious clothing. Hijabs and niqabs were seen by many secular Canadians, particularly Quebecers from Catholic backgrounds, as symbols of patriarchy and a form of religiosity that Quebec as a society largely abandoned only a few decades ago.

**Life in Canada**

Canadian Muslims expressed satisfaction with life in Canada, reporting that Muslims were better off in Canada than in other Western countries, and that Muslim women enjoyed a higher quality of life in Canada than they would in most Muslim countries. Nevertheless, nearly a third of Canadian Muslims said they had had a negative experience related to their race, ethnicity, or religion in the last two years. In addition, majorities expressed concern about unemployment and discrimination.

In Canada, Muslim satisfaction with the direction of the country was higher than the national average. Eight in ten Muslim Canadians (81%), compared to six in ten members of the general public (61%), expressed overall satisfaction at the way things were going in Canada. Canadian Muslims expressed greater satisfaction with the direction in which their country was headed than did Muslims in France, Germany, Spain, or Great Britain.

Three quarters of Canadian Muslims believed Muslims were treated better in Canada than in other Western countries. Another 17 percent saw Muslims
as experiencing similar treatment in Canada to what Muslims encounter in other Western countries. Just three percent believed they were worse off in Canada than their coreligionists in other countries in the West.

Seven in ten Canadian Muslims (70%) believed the quality of life for Muslim women was better in Canada than in most Muslim countries. Twenty-three percent believed Muslim women’s quality of life in Canada was about the same as it would be in most Muslim countries. Just three percent saw Muslim women as worse off in Canada. Canadian Muslims (70%) were markedly more likely than those in France (62%), Britain (58%), Germany (50%), or Spain (46%) to see Muslim women as better off than they would be in most Muslim countries.

Three in ten Canadian Muslims reported experiences of discrimination in the previous two years. Thirty percent of Canadian Muslims said they had “had a bad experience” due to their race, ethnicity, or religion in the last two years. Canadian Muslims were roughly average in this regard. They were more likely than German (19%), Spanish (25%), or British (28%) Muslims to report negative experiences related to ethnicity or religion, but less likely than French Muslims (37%) to report the same. Notably, the youngest cohort of Canadian Muslims was the most likely to report an experience of discrimination: 42 percent of those aged 18 to 29 reported such an experience, 11 points above the Muslim average. Women were also more likely than men to say they had been discriminated against, a disparity that may be linked to headscarves, which identify women as Muslim.

When Canadian Muslims were asked to rate their level of concern about a slate of issues relating to Muslim life in Canada, the proportions saying they were very or somewhat worried was highest on the issues of discrimination (67%) and unemployment (64%). Smaller, but still significant, proportions of Muslims declared themselves to be very or somewhat concerned about extremism among Canadian Muslims (53%), the influence of music, movies, and television on Muslim youth in Canada (49%), and the declining importance of religion among Canadian Muslims (48%). Muslim Canadians expressed markedly less concern about women taking on modern roles in society (26%).

Extremism and Terror

Canadian Muslims expressed minimal support for extremists who claim to act in the name of Islam, and estimated very low levels of support among their fellow Muslims in Canada for extremist activities. Muslims living in Canada felt a terrorist attack perpetrated by Canadians of Muslim background was very unlikely. In addition, a large majority of Canadian Muslims felt a strong responsibility to report on potentially violent extremists in their communities.

Four in ten Canadian Muslims (40%) believed there was a struggle in this country between moderate and extremist Muslims. Of those who believed such a struggle was afoot, 80 percent personally identified with the moderate
side, while 14 percent identified with the extremist side, though it is by no means clear that most (or even any) among this subgroup were prone to act on those views, especially with regard to violence. The general public (56%) was more likely than Muslims themselves to perceive a struggle between moderates and extremists in the Muslim community.

When asked to rate the likelihood that Canada would experience terrorist attacks in the near future carried out by Canadians of Muslim background, eight in ten Muslims described such an event as not very (21%) or not at all (60%) likely. About one in ten Muslim Canadians thought a domestic terror attack was either very (3%) or somewhat (8%) likely. The general public was considerably more likely than the Muslim population to believe a terrorist attack perpetrated by Canadians with a Muslim background was likely. Most Canadians saw such an attack as either very (19%) or somewhat (40%) likely. A minority said it was not very (26%) or not at all (11%) likely.

Canadian Muslims felt a strong responsibility to be vigilant about extremists in their communities. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Canada believed ordinary, law-abiding Muslims have a responsibility to “report on potentially violent extremists they might encounter in their mosques and communities.” Seven in ten Muslim Canadians (72%) said that ordinary Muslims have a great deal of responsibility to report on potentially violent extremists they may encounter. An additional 15 percent said law-abiding Muslims have at least some responsibility in this regard. Just six percent of Muslim Canadians felt no responsibility at all to report on extremists they suspect might perpetrate violence in the name of Islam.

Three quarters (75%) of Canadian Muslims were aware of the arrests of 18 men and boys in the Greater Toronto Area on terrorism charges in 2006. Of those Muslims who reported an awareness of these arrests, three quarters (73%) said the attacks, if carried out, would have been not at all justified. Thirteen percent (of the 75 percent subsample who had heard of the arrests) said the attacks would have been either completely (5%) or somewhat (8%) justified. The combined total of those in the subsample saying the attacks would have been at least somewhat justified (13%) amounted to a little under 10 percent of the overall sample.

The findings of the Environics survey of Canadian Muslims, as well as the survey of the Canadian general public on Muslim participation in Canadian society, reveal areas of concern and misunderstanding, but also a strong foundation of goodwill between Muslim and non-Muslim Canadians.

Asked whether they had any sympathy with the feelings and motives of those who allegedly wanted to carry out the attacks, eight in ten Canadian Muslims (82%) said they had no sympathy with the young men’s feelings and motives. Nine percent expressed some sympathy with the young men, while two percent expressed mixed feelings.

When asked to estimate how many Muslims in Canada supported extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, just three percent of Muslims believed that most (2%) or many (1%) of their coreligionists in Canada supported such groups. Eight in ten Canadian Muslims said that just some (11%), very few (61%), or no (11%) Muslims in Canada supported extremist groups. Fifteen percent of Canadian Muslims said they did not know how many Muslims in this country supported such organizations.

Muslims were notably less likely than the population at large to imagine support among the Canadian Muslim population for extremist groups. Still, among Canadians at large, just 13 percent estimated that most (5%) or many (8%) Muslims in Canada supported al Qaeda and other such organizations. Most Canadians believed that just some (26%) or very few (51%) Muslims in Canada supported such groups.

Conclusion

The findings of the Environics survey of Canadian Muslims, as well as the survey of the Canadian general public on Muslim participation in Canadian society, reveal areas of concern and misunderstanding, but also a strong foundation of goodwill between Muslim
and non-Muslim Canadians. Environics research shows that in their optimism, aspirations, and feelings of both Canadian and minority-group pride, Muslims in Canada have much in common with other immigrant groups in this country both past and present.

When the status, treatment, and behaviour of a minority group becomes politically charged – as in the case of Muslims today – sustained quantitative research into both attitudes and outcomes (such as employment outcomes, efforts toward social and political participation, and experiences of discrimination) can be an invaluable corrective to the sometimes inflammatory soundbites on the nightly news.

Environics Research Group intends to update this important survey in 2009 or 2010.
Hans Küng, the internationally renowned theologian, has famously said, “There will be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions. There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions” (Küng, 2005).

While Küng was speaking about international conflicts, his adage could just as fruitfully be applied to the various ethno-religious communities that make up Canadian society.

Even though it already happens both in formal and informal ways in Canadian institutions, dialogue among the religions has never been a priority in government policy in Canada, and certainly not in its official policies and practices around multiculturalism. Given that interfaith dialogue seeks to promote respect for difference, encourage co-operation, and overcome conflict, it is surprising that it has been ignored by those who hope to make Canada a more multicultural society.

This situation reflects the fact that religion as a whole has been largely ignored by official policies and practices regarding multiculturalism, which have focused on ethnicity and race in recent decades. The lack of focus on religious differences in these policies and practices is surprising given that the guarantee of freedom of religion and the promotion of religious diversity are written into every major piece of policy and legislation that defines the Canadian model of multiculturalism.

Those interested in promoting multiculturalism — that is, in making Canada a more diverse, participatory, and just society — should take religion seriously, because Canadians take it seriously. An emerging scholarship is demonstrating the intimate connection between ethnic and religious identity in many cases. This connection is so close that members of these communities themselves cannot say with certainty where ethnicity ends and religion begins. One cannot claim to have recognized and honoured the particular identity of an ethnic community when one has refused to acknowledge those religious elements that members of that community see as central to their identity.

Such an attitude has the potential to alienate members of ethno-religious communities from mainstream society. Consequently, policy makers are beginning to see that a failure to acknowledge how important religious

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1 Initial research for this article was done under a research contract for Strategic Policy, Research and Planning Branch, Multiculturalism and Human Rights Program, Department of Canadian Heritage. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

2 On the intimate connection between religion and ethnicity in Canadian society, see Paul Bramadat and David Seljak (eds.), 2005 and 2008.
identities are to many Canadians may lead to misunderstandings and injustices that translate into the polarization, ghettoization, and radicalization of certain religious communities – a situation with which many European countries are currently grappling.

Other Western countries with significant religious minorities (e.g. the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, as well as Canada) appear to be more accepting of religious differences. But even within these countries, there are significant differences in approach. For example, Canada lags far behind Britain and Australia, where governments sponsor councils to promote interfaith co-operation and education, as well as to advise governments, along with their agencies and institutions, on religious questions.

Yet these approaches may be well-adapted to the Canadian context, given the country's commitment to cultural diversity in general and given that Canada is not subject to a formal American-style separation of church and state or to France's system of public secularism or laïcisme (Seljak, 2008).

Accordingly, Canadian policy makers may want to consider bringing stakeholders together to examine seriously the prospect of sponsoring a Canadian interfaith council along the lines of those that have been created in countries such as Australia (described in the text box on page 31). The council's functions could include:

- facilitating communication and cooperation between government departments, public institutions, and faith communities on an ongoing basis;
- promoting understanding and cooperation among various religious groups;
- negotiating conflicts between adherents of religious faiths and within religious communities;
- helping members of immigrant communities with strong religious identities to integrate into Canadian society by promoting religious structures and practices that facilitate social integration;
- providing information to governments, public institutions, and the media on questions related to religious diversity;
- sponsoring public education – in schools and other forums – on religious diversity, tolerance, and freedom; and
- combating religious extremism in its various forms (Seljak, 2008: 69-72).³

Such a council would fit in well with Canada's multiculturalism model, because it would build on existing practices and structures while remaining flexible enough to adapt to Canada's evolving religious demographics. This article examines the need for religious identity to be taken seriously in the promotion of multiculturalism in Canada, the role of interfaith dialogue in that effort, and the opportunities for promoting such a dialogue in Canada.

Religion and Multiculturalism
Less than a decade ago, it was virtually impossible to initiate a public discussion about the role of religion in Canadian society and the goals of multiculturalism policies and practices. The federal government sponsored little research on the topic, and suggestions that it be put on the agenda were often silenced with reference to Canada's policy of separation of church and state. Religion was rarely discussed at conferences on immigration and multiculturalism. At a National Metropolis Conference some years ago, a senior administrator in Canadian Heritage indicated that she would like to address the issue, but policy makers were afraid that raising the topic of religion would be divisive, controversial, and potentially dangerous. Besides, she observed, no one in government appeared to know anything about it.

³ See a fuller discussion in David Seljak et al., 2007: 93-95.
Fear and ignorance are not good starting points for creating policy. And in any case, such attitudes have been overtaken by events – as the recent report of Quebec’s Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (the Bouchard-Taylor Commission) makes plain. Increasingly, policy makers, media analysts, and academics are realizing that religion remains an important element in the identities of many Canadians, both immigrants and those born in Canada. Religion has become a regular presence on the agenda at conferences on immigrant integration, multiculturalism, and diversity in Canada. Special issues of Canadian Diversity, Canadian-American Research Series, and the Journal of International Migration and Integration have addressed the topic. This issue of Horizons is another indication that religion has become a respectable topic of inquiry in policy and academic circles – as was the recent (November 2008) workshop on religion, secularism, and multiculturalism sponsored by the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance Project.

These changes have taken place because developments have begun to convince policy makers to take religious identity seriously. These include:

• recent events in which members of minority religious communities have sought recognition and accommodation of their specific needs from both public and private institutions;

• the persistence of religious intolerance and discrimination in Canadian society (for example, the second-most-common motivation for hate crimes, after race, is religion); and

• conflict between religious groups in Canada that have their roots in conflicts abroad.

Those interested in promoting multiculturalism are realizing that ignorance and fear regarding religious communities, especially minority religious communities in Canada, can undermine co-operation and compromise between these groups and other elements of society, as well as among these groups themselves. Awareness is growing that the goals of multiculturalism policy are best achieved through promotion of interfaith dialogue and education.

The Role of Interfaith Dialogue

Interfaith dialogue – as it is currently understood – is unique to modernity and essential to modern multicultural democracies. In such a dialogue, the partners are not interested in converting one another or in arguing the superiority of their own tradition. Instead, partners come to the dialogue in an open-ended encounter to learn about each other, explore a common religious issue (e.g. what is the meaning of suffering?), or address a pressing concern (e.g. how can we work together to promote human rights?). Dialogue can be at the grassroots or at the level of religious community leaders; it can be spontaneous or institutionalized; it may be goal-oriented or simply pursued as an end in itself.

Behind these myriad efforts is a negotiation of religious pluralism – that is, the effort to co-operate and ease conflicts between religious groups. It may well be that the effects of dialogue in promoting recognition of diversity, tolerance of others, and respect for human rights may not depend on the type of group or its purpose. Participants in dialogue often report that it is the personal friendships and connections – the face-to-face encounter with fellow human beings – that results in an acceptance of the “other” that often transcends doctrinal, ethical, or practical differences.

In Canada, the earliest efforts at interfaith dialogue emerged after the horror of the Holocaust; Jews and Christians came together to fight anti-Semitism. The reform of Canada’s immigration laws in the 1960s inspired a second wave of interfaith dialogue, as groups sprung up to include representatives of many of the world’s religious traditions that were increasingly part of the immigrant population. More recently, in the post-9/11 world, interfaith dialogue has taken on a new urgency as Canadians seek ways to address religious conflicts and counter religious intolerance and discrimination (Lamoureux Scholes, 2007: 6-7). The Canadian experience illustrates in practical terms the manner in which interfaith dialogue serves the goals of multiculturalism.
The Canadian Experience

In Canada, we see many kinds of interfaith groups. For example, a number of centres and groups focus on ecumenism – that is, improving relations between Christian denominations. Other groups, such as Interfaith Grand River in Kitchener-Waterloo in Southwestern Ontario, bring together representatives of many faiths. Some interfaith groups, such as the Christian-Jewish Dialogue of Toronto, focus on relations between just two communities. Many of these groups sponsor education programs to inform people about the richness of the various religious traditions in Canada. Others provide education on specific issues, such as intolerance and discrimination. For example, the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews has a program to eliminate intolerance and discrimination aimed at people because of their race, ethnicity, and religion. These groups help their members to address misconceptions that are rooted in fear and ignorance, as well as in historical grievances and transnational conflicts.

In addition, other multifaith groups work on specific issues, such as the public funding of education or the ecological crisis. The ability of a common cause to overcome exclusivist religious beliefs and attitudes is demonstrated by the experience of Christian evangelicals, Jews, Sikhs, Muslims, Armenians Orthodox, and Seventh-day Adventists who formed the Coalition for Justice in Education Funding to pressure the Ontario government to fund other religiously based independent schools as it does Roman Catholic separate schools. This coalition gathers together people of various faith communities who might be sure that they will not meet one another in heaven, but have managed to meet – and work together – in Ontario.

Because Canada does not have a formal American-style separation of church and state, and because several government institutions (such as the Canadian Forces and Correctional Service of Canada) have chaplaincies, there are more practical and immediate reasons for those interested in promoting diversity in Canada to pay attention to dialogue between the religions. The efforts of Correctional Service of Canada and the Canadian Forces chaplaincies to recognize and accommodate religious differences have been exemplary (as noted in the article by Benham Rennick in this issue). Beyond pragmatic issues, such as recognition of sacred days, provision of prayer space, and accommodation of religious diets, these agencies have begun to promote dialogue among religious groups in order to better serve their stakeholders. Officials in the health care and education systems have also addressed religious diversity and dialogue in creative and sensitive ways (Lamoureux Scholes, 2007: 7-9).

Canadian governments at the federal, provincial-territorial and municipal levels could encourage faith-based non-governmental organizations in their varied efforts at interfaith dialogue and education. The federal government, for example, could consider giving groups official recognition and financial support – as has been done in other countries. In the United Kingdom, since the spring of 2001, the government has awarded an annual Strategy Grant to the Inter Faith Network for the UK, an independent voluntary organization, funded in large part by private donations, charitable trusts, and the faith

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6 For example, the Canadian Forum on Religion and Ecology brings together people of many faiths to explore spiritual responses to the environmental crisis.

7 The Ontario Multifaith Council is an example of a provincial government’s sponsoring of a not-for-profit, non-governmental interfaith network that provides government agencies, businesses, interfaith organizations, religious groups, and the general public with information and training regarding religious diversity. However, recent reductions to the Council’s funding have greatly impaired its effectiveness.
communities that belong to it. Since 2001, the Network has increasingly worked with the British government, advising various departments and ministries on issues relating to religious diversity in the United Kingdom (Pearce, 2007). The Network's publications indicate the type of educational work it does; they include *Building Good Relations with People of Different Faiths and Beliefs*, *Women's Inter Faith Initiatives in the UK: A Survey*, *Looking After One Another: The Safety and Security of Our Faith Communities*, *Partnership for the Common Good: Inter Faith Structures and Local Government*, and *Community Cohesion: A New Agenda for Inter Faith Relations*.

The 2004 Australian report *Religion, Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia* suggested the creation of a similar multi-faith body that would advise the Council for Multicultural Australia and other government and non-government bodies (Cahill et al., 2004: 119-20). In the wake of that report, the Australian government has sponsored the Australian Partnership of Ethnic and Religious Organisations, as well as a number of Living in Harmony projects, which include the promotion of interfaith dialogue (Rutland, 2006). In co-operation with the Australian Multicultural Foundation and the World Conference of Religions for Peace, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous

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**Interfaith Councils: An Australian Example**

The authors of *Religion, Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia* suggested responsibilities that an interfaith advisory body might have. They wrote:

It is suggested that the Council for Multicultural Australia would incorporate the following terms of reference into its ambit of responsibility:

1. to advise the Australian Government on all matters pertaining to faith communities and interfaith harmony and co-operation for the social and economic well-being of Australia and to safeguarding it from extremism of all kinds;

2. to provide informed advice, based on consultation with faith community leaders and their communities, on policies and programs relevant to interfaith harmony and co-operation and to monitor and evaluate them;

3. to design, in association with heads of faith communities, ceremonies, services and pageants at times of national and international celebration, remembrances and tragedies that reflect the unity of Australia's multi-faith society;

4. to provide informed advice to government on policy and practice related to the entry into Australia of religious personnel on a permanent and temporary basis;

5. to oversee and monitor appropriate orientation and inservice programs for religious personnel newly arrived in Australia, for religious marriage celebrants and for religious personnel generally;

6. to disseminate to faith communities and their leaders material on government policies and programs, including through the electronic network of faith leaders and their communities;

7. to support and work with local government authorities in establishing and maintaining local multi-faith networks;

8. to work with the community, including the media, in educating the public about the role and function of faith traditions in local, national and international affairs;

9. to promote, in liaison with DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), nationally and internationally Australia's image and reputation as a model of interfaith harmony;

10. to monitor the websites of Australia’s ethnic and faith communities for material or links damaging to Australia's social cohesion;

11. to work for, in liaison with State and Australian educational authorities, interaction and co-operation between Australia's government and religious schools and for the design of appropriate curricula; and

12. to develop a resource centre for appropriate government and community use (Cahill et al., 2004).

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8 The Inter Faith Network for the UK provides considerable resources: <http://www.interfaith.org.uk>. (Accessed November 2nd 2008).

Affairs also produced a kit on the creation of local interfaith networks (Cahill and Leahy, 2004).

There are already a number of agencies dedicated to interfaith dialogue in Canada. The Canadian Council of Churches, as well as many church agencies, have already engaged in interfaith initiatives. Moreover, a variety of local, regional, and national groups are engaged in interfaith dialogue. What is missing in Canada is government recognition of, and support for, interfaith groups that one finds in Britain and Australia at the national and local levels (though there is as yet no scholarship on the success or failure of the UK and Australian councils).

**The Limits of Interfaith Dialogue and Education**

Dialogue among the world’s religions is as important for harmony within a society as it is for peaceful coexistence between societies, but it is no magic wand to solve problems of conflict, mistrust, and ignorance. It is an important first step that must be part of a coordinated effort to address religious intolerance and discrimination.

Once taken, this step will lead to a number of difficult challenges. Questions remain about how federal, provincial, or municipal governments can target their support to particular groups and agencies. For example, it might seem clear enough that Canadian Roman Catholics can be represented by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (although some Catholics might object), but it is not so clear who could represent Canadian Muslims or Hindus. These communities are dispersed, divided, and decentralized. Imams and Hindu priests do not have the same status or play the same role in Islam and Hinduism that Roman Catholic priests and Protestant ministers do in Christianity.

The question of whom to invite to the dialogue leads to a more controversial issue: whether and how to engage with communities (or, more typically, segments within them) less disposed to dialogue and posing more fundamental challenges to Canadian values. Frequently, the members of religious communities who choose to participate in interfaith groups are those who are predisposed to respecting others, avoiding proselytism, and working out differences through dialogue and compromise. It is more difficult (though perhaps also more necessary) to engage with intransigents and radicals within those communities. A key question is how to bring them to the table without seeming to legitimize their challenges to the values of the broader society. These questions are both serious and difficult.

However difficult these questions, they should not deter us from addressing the challenges of promoting religious freedom and diversity through the sponsorship of interfaith dialogue and education. Canadians have faced many difficult challenges in the past, and should not be afraid to tackle the question of religious diversity now. It is widely assumed that people cannot discuss religion in a civil fashion, nor compromise around religious teachings and practices. Religion is thought to make people conservative, rigid, and uncompromising.

But religious studies scholars know this to be a caricature of religion. No doubt some religious communities and thinkers are exclusivist and intransigent. However, there are many more instances when religion has inspired people to include others; when religious communities have evolved – and even reversed themselves on important issues.

Not long ago, people assumed that ethnic identity was fixed and that certain ethnic groups could not live and work together. The Canadian experience of multiculturalism has proved these assumptions to be false. Religion is not so different from other aspects of human culture. Canadians have learned to overcome differences rooted in ethnicity and to celebrate diversity. Our challenge in the 21st century is to work together despite differences over religion, and ultimately to celebrate our various religious identities.

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Engaging Faith Communities: A UK Example


This government-commissioned report presents recommendations for co-operation between government departments and faith communities in England. The conclusions are based on local, regional, and national consultations with individuals in the government, various faith communities, and the broader community.

The report is premised on the understanding that faith is not simply a personal issue. Rather, faith communities and organizations have enriched and strengthened British society over the centuries, contributing to a wide range of areas such as community development, education, and social inclusion. Therefore, it is important for government departments to work effectively with faith communities in policy development and service delivery. At the national level, the report offers guidelines for government departments to engage citizens from faith communities in policy consultations. The recommendations include, among others, 1) building capacity among faith communities to fully participate in policy consultations, 2) engaging all stakeholders in the process, 3) recognizing the diversities within these communities, 4) ensuring representation of women, youth, and seniors, and 5) developing “faith literacy” through faith awareness training among government officials.
In Quebec, the relationship between the school system and religion underwent major transformation between 1997 and 2008. Over a decade or so, the confessional school system was completely secularized, from its machinery of government to religious education. In the past, Quebec’s school system was based on a division between Catholics and Protestants. At the time of Confederation in 1867, education came under provincial jurisdiction according to the principles by which jurisdictions were divided among the federal and provincial parliaments. Protestants, who were a minority in the province of Quebec, demanded full administrative jurisdiction over their schools. Catholics, who were a minority in the other three confederated provinces, made the same request (Lamonde, 2000: 351). The addition of Section 93 to the British North America Act (BNAA) was specifically designed to protect the Catholic and Protestant school administrations of these provinces in regions where these groups were in the minority.

Constitutional protection also covered elementary schools in Montréal and Quebec City. Catholic French-Canadian students attended Catholic public schools (only a few schools were English Catholic) and all “non-Catholic” students went to Protestant schools, which were primarily English-speaking schools. Thus, for more than a century, public education in Quebec played a key role in the reproduction of both religious and linguistic markers.

When the Quebec government officially took over the education system in 1964 by adopting Bill 60, An Act to Establish the Ministry of Education and the Superior Council of Education, a Catholic committee and a Protestant committee were maintained within the Superior Council of Education. These committees played a key normative and decision-making role in guiding the educational projects of Catholic and Protestant schools, in religious education programs and teacher qualification. The confessional nature of the school system was secured.

1997 marked the beginning of major changes in this secular system. The process began when the Government of Quebec requested that Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 be amended so as to provide Quebec with full authority to redefine school boards along linguistic rather than confessional lines. The removal of constitutional obstacles opened the door to a series of recommendations from many of the government’s advisory councils to make schools and religious education better tailored to the changes in Quebec society. Behind the government decision to secularize education was the desire to

Religion in the Quebec Public School System
A Change for Equality and Diversity

Micheline Milot, Ph.D.
Professor
Sociology Department
Université du Québec à Montréal

Stéphanie Tremblay
Masters in Sociology
Université du Québec à Montréal
make the school a place that welcomes diversity and respects the principle that all citizens are equal.

The Need to Rethink the Secular School System

The confessional school system’s lack of legitimacy can be explained by a number of changes that marked Quebec society, which were evoked in the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education as early as 1963. The report, which recommended the creation of the Ministry of Education (1964), stated the need to take into account “Québec’s now pluralistic nature, from a religious standpoint, [...] parents who do not or no longer share the Catholic or Protestant faith or who do not belong to any religion” [free translation] (Vol. 4, section 100). The system granted specific rights only to two denominations: Catholics and Protestants. The report recommended opening a non-confessional sector where numbers warranted. This recommendation was never put into practice and was unworkable, since it would have assumed that people belonging to a given minority denomination were concentrated in a common geographic area.

Disputed since the 1960s, this scheme appeared to be even more problematic with the proclamation of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (1975). A striking illustration of this clash between confessionalism in education and the respect of fundamental rights lay in the government’s need to resort to the override provisions in the Canadian and Quebec human rights charters. These derogations were necessary to maintain the legality of confessional education and keep it safe from possible legal challenges based on the system’s discriminatory aspect.

In addition to running aground on the principle of equality with respect to other religious denominations and non-believers, the confessional public school model was lagging behind the socioreligious changes occurring in Quebec society. The increase in migration from Asia, the Caribbean, Africa and Latin America since the 1970s was helping transform Quebec’s cultural and religious environment, and thus the educational needs of students regarding religion. The secularization of society was also gaining more and more ground … even in schools. In fact, to adapt to the evolving student population, teachers were increasingly reducing the content focused on faith, thereby secularizing the confessional aspect of education from within. The school system was increasingly clashing with Quebec’s educational and integration policies, such as the Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration (Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration, 1991) and the Policy on Educational Integration and Intercultural Education (Ministère de l’Éducation du Québec, 1998), two important texts clearly aimed at respecting equality and pluralism. As time went on, these sociological and legal mutations made maintaining a secular school system less and less credible.

Legislative Changes and Their Normative Arguments

After thirty some years of heated debate on the place of religion in schools, the system was officially called into question by government inquiry commissions. In 1996, the Commission for the Estates General on Education recommended “unlocking” educational confessionalism, which had been locked in by Section 93 of the Canadian Constitution. Following extensive public consultation in which supporters of secularism and confessionalism confronted one another, the explicit recommendation in favour of secularization was based on the need to ensure “that all students can be taught the shared values that we as a society wish to embrace,” and thus “continue the separation of Church and State” (Commission for the Estates General on Education, 1996, p. 55). In December 1997, the Parti Québécois government, supported by the other parties in the National Assembly, took steps with the Canadian government to have Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 amended. At the same time, a Task Force on the Place of Religion in Schools was set up by the Minister of
Education with a view to examining all aspects of the place of religion in schools, defining the relevant orientations and proposing means to implement them.

In its final report, *Religion in Secular Schools: A New Perspective for Quebec*, published in 1999, the Task Force formulated many recommendations, including that of secularizing the school system and replacing religious education with a religious culture program. These recommendations were based on a full recognition of fundamental rights (equality and freedom of conscience and religion) and the social landscape, marked by moral and religious secularization and pluralism (Task Force on the Place of Religion in Schools, 1999: 115-128). The report recommended the adoption of “open secularism”, that is, one that did not rule out recognition of religious realities in relation to respect for the freedom of conscience and religion of both those attending schools and those who teach in them.

The proposal to replace confessional teaching with a course on religious culture was compatible with the requirement for neutrality on the part of the state and with the schools’ socialization mission. In this regard, the justifications given revealed a notion of religious reality that considers it a fact of personal and social experience that must be taken into account in education. The excerpt below illustrates the normative direction of this important recommendation:

“The study of religion meets the four goals set for schools by the state with respect to adequate preparation for citizenship: it exposes students to cultural heritage as it relates to religion; it exposes students to a diversity of opinions likely to help them develop critical and independent moral judgment; it promotes the development of tolerance toward, or even better, appreciation for various world views, both religious and secular; finally, it introduces students to life in a society richer for the integration and appreciation of the heritage of different religions, namely the Christian traditions passed on by the first settlers and the various religious traditions of those who came to Quebec after them.” (Task Force, 1999: 203).

Openness to pluralism has therefore been formulated based on a logic of inclusion that is both geographical and educational.

Openness to pluralism has therefore been formulated based on a logic of inclusion that is both geographical and educational.

2 Ibid, p. 3.
to overcome the polarization of competing demands: a demand to keep the option of confessional education in schools (Lefebvre, 2000), on the one hand, and on the other, the position that there is no place whatsoever for religious discourse in schools (MLQ, 1999). Faced with these tensions, the government decided to act on a step-by-step basis.

In 2000, the government made an initial transition phase possible by adopting the Act to Amend Various Legislative Provisions Respecting Education as regards Confessional Matters (Bill 118). All confessional school systems, from the Ministère de l’Éducation to the schools, were secularized. This bill put an end to the historical sharing of responsibility for education between church and state. Under Bill 118, only Catholic and Protestant religious education were kept. Given its hybrid nature, both confessional and secular, designed to reconcile competing expectations, the ambiguity of this compromise testified to its interim nature.

Bill 118 created an advisory committee, the Comité sur les affaires religieuses (Religious Affairs Committee). The committee’s mandate was to track the evolution of Quebec society and to make recommendations to the government. After study and reflection, in 2004, the Comité sur les affaires religieuses published a brief entitled Establishment of an Ethics and Religious Culture Program. Providing Future Direction for All Québec Youth. It recommended drawing the necessary conclusions from schools’ secular reality and argued that “new orientations are needed [for these programs] in today’s common and open secular schools.” The committee recommended replacing confessional religious education with a common, mandatory ethics and religious culture program. The government decided to adopt this recommendation and to give schools the mandate to educate citizens who are open to society’s moral and religious pluralism. This civic perspective of education enabled the Government of Quebec to stop resorting to the override clauses in the human rights charters to keep religious confessional education in public schools. Opposition proved to be less intense and some joined the trend toward accepting this new program. Three objectives represent the compromise that helped implement a compulsory course on religion, a task that so many societies have failed to accomplish.

The Act to Amend Various Legislative Provisions Respecting Education as regards Confessional Matters (Bill 95), adopted on June 15, 2005, replaced confessional religion classes (Catholic and Protestant) by a mandatory ethics and religious culture program in the fall of 2008. The orientations of this new program are clearly aimed at educating citizens and fostering a sense of community. The orientations of this new program are clearly aimed at educating citizens and fostering a sense of community.

This educational outlook adopted by the government did not give rise to much debate in 2005, unlike what happened in 1999 with respect to the secularization of schools, presumably because mindsets had adapted to the school’s new secular orientation. Even so, a “coalition for freedom of choice in education” was established to enable parents who wanted a choice the option of choosing between traditional confessional education and the new ethics and religious culture program. The latter was perceived as a threat to children’s religious identity (parents said they feared their children would be “mixed up” by being exposed to religious differences and “relativism” was seen as the outcome of this type of education on religious cultures). These parents, few in numbers but highly militant, wanted their children exempted from the mandatory ethics and religious culture program in the name of freedom of conscience and religion and, in fact, they formed a protest movement (the Coalition for Freedom in Education). At the start of the 2008 school year, a few hundred parents demanded that their children be exempted from this program, but school administrations did not follow through on their
requests. The Minister of Education remained firm about the fact that the ethics and religious culture program would be mandatory for all students. The program involves knowledge and understanding of religions, so the freedom of conscience and religion argument does not, at first glance, appear relevant. It has not been shown that a program which simply aims for a better understanding of the Christian heritage and the heritage of other religions, without any confessional purpose that would impede freedom of conscience, can justify an exemption from this mandatory program. Another movement, the Quebec Secular Movement (MLQ), has also continued to criticize the new course, for other reasons. For the MLQ, religion must strictly be confined to private life, it does not have a place in a secularized environment and that any discourse on religion requires some recognition of the obscurantism religion represents.

School and Religion: Democratically Compatible

The normative direction adopted by the Government of Quebec in this new program is undoubtedly part of a new civic paradigm. The accelerated transformation of Quebec’s educational landscape between 1996 and 2008 reflects not only how educational priorities have evolved, but also appears to be a sociological indicator of Quebec society’s relationship with fundamental rights and moral and religious pluralism. This normative change in favour of secularism therefore introduces a more inclusive notion of schooling, in which recognition of cultural and religious diversity and respect for equality of individuals are the driving forces behind an education that prepares students for democratic life. Citizen participation in a democratic context assumes that citizens can orient and debate their ethical choices, drawing from their most profound moral and religious convictions, which can diverge from or even contradict each other. Education therefore has a role to play in developing “virtues” or attitudes among youth which foster peaceful deliberation and tolerance: recognition of the diversity of world views, respect for differences, and the ability to think in terms of reciprocity, among others. There is also somewhat of a social consensus in Canada and Quebec (approximately 75%) in support of this type of religious education in schools (CRIC, 2004; Ouellet, 2005).

Conclusion: Secularism and Religious Symbols at School

Although the vast majority of Quebeckers are in favour of this new relationship between schools and religions as regards education and the educational system, they seem more divided when it comes to expressing religious affiliation at school through specific symbols. The issue of reasonable religious accommodation has given rise to much debate within part of the population. Among others, the accommodation extended to a young Sikh to allow him to wear his kirpan at a public school (Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6) had many saying that the majority had taken religion out of schools and that minority groups were bringing it back in. The problem of religious accommodation initiated such a media storm that Jean Charest’s government deemed it appropriate to create a “Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences” in March 2007. The media attention focused on reasonable accommodation or situations mistakenly associated with such accommodation was completely disproportionate to the situation on the ground. Although religious accommodations, under the principles of equality stated in the human rights charters, are not all related to school environments, accommodations granted in schools seems more of an irritant than other forms of accommodation. The wearing of religious symbols, particularly Islamic headscarves, is at the core of the debate. Must a secular school really accommodate the religious expression of those who attend it or work there?

An inaccurate yet persistent interpretation of secularism underlies this public dissatisfaction. For many citizens, secularism in schools should, according to the model adopted in France, apply not only to school regulations and educational programs, but also to people attending the institution, teachers and students alike. Yet, in Quebec and Canada, freedom of conscience and religion is directly linked to freedom of expression. It is especially difficult to understand how one could justify an ethics and religious culture program at schools, whose purpose is openness to diversity, while simultaneously prohibiting any expression of that diversity. 📜
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Responding to Religious Diversity in a Multicultural Society: An Australian Example

Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Australian Multicultural Foundation in association with the World Conference of Religions for Peace, RMIT University and Monash University (2004), Religion, Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia: A Partnership under the Australian Government’s Living In Harmony Initiative.

Commissioned by Australia’s federal government and published by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, this report examines the role of faith traditions and religious communities in a religiously and ethnically diverse country. The report notes that religion has always played an important role in the development of core social and moral Australian values.

However, a conscious effort is needed to maintain harmony between different religious and ethnic communities. This report is based on the notion that social capital, both bonding and bridging, is essential to mutual acceptance among population groups and to the well-being of individuals and society in general. The report provides a historical perspective on the evolution of religious diversity in Australia, analyzes interfaith relationships, and discusses challenges arising from religious and ethnic diversity. It also recommends how an increasingly diverse Australia might continue to live in religious and ethnic harmony. Recommendations include, among others, 1) convening an annual multi-faith advisory forum to advise the government on interfaith and associated intercommunal affairs, 2) establishing an electronic directory of religious communities, 3) providing newly arrived religious leaders with English language training and in-depth orientation on Australia, 4) opening Parliament each day with a prayer from a different faith community, and 5) conducting further research to examine the place of religion in education.
Historically, Christianity has held a privileged position in the Canadian military given its prominent place in Canadian society and the continual involvement of Christian clergy serving as military chaplains. Today however, while the majority of Canadian Forces’ members continue to come primarily from Christian traditions, increasing immigration from countries with predominantly non-Christian religious traditions poses new challenges to some of the assumptions embedded in Canadian military culture and for the predominantly Christian chaplaincy. This new pluralism means there is an ever-increasing need for religious accommodation as well as ongoing struggles to overcome traditional structures and customs that exclude members from non-Christian traditions.

This article examines some challenges posed to the military by the growing religious diversity of Canadian society based on the findings from a qualitative research project examining the role of religion in the Canadian Forces. The broader research was founded on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 32 Canadian Forces members (16 chaplains and 16 non-chaplains) from September 2004 to September 2007. This analysis provides insights into the challenges of working in a multi-faith environment and points to religious accommodation and integration in Canadian institutions as an area for further policy research, because of the potential for religious differences to be a source of conflict, misunderstanding, and discrimination.

A Christian Chaplaincy in a Multifaith Environment

As noted elsewhere in this issue, although the ethno-religious pluralism of Canadian society is still somewhat limited, it is increasing rapidly both in the general population and within the Canadian Forces. Although the Canadian Forces does not compile statistics on the religious identity of its members, interviews with unit commanders and personnel from these areas suggest this is most true of reserve units based in large urban centres, such as Vancouver, Montréal, and Toronto where immigrant populations tend to be most concentrated (Jedwab, 2004). For example, one reservist from the Toronto area indicated his unit included Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, Pagans, and practitioners of Aboriginal religions. A chaplain from Montréal said her unit included Asian, African, South American, and Eastern European members including Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sikhs, and “no religion” (Benham Rennick, 2006).
The reserves currently involve about 25,000 personnel and make up about 36 percent of the total forces (i.e. all ranks and services); according to the Department of National Defence (DND, 2007a) “in the past, up to 40 per cent of all peacekeepers have been reservists.” The participation of reserve units, particularly those from large urban centres, on Canadian military operations is very likely to increase the religious diversity within a unit during a deployment.

Consequently, whether on base or on deployment, Christian chaplains are more likely to encounter personnel who have been raised in a non-Christian faith tradition. The military has attempted to adapt to the situation in a number of ways. For example, it has adopted an official policy that chaplains are to minister to members of all religions to the best of their ability and in as open-minded a fashion as possible (DND, 2003). Further, public rituals, such as Remembrance Day services, are to be as inclusive as possible and, in recent events, such as the dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the ceremony of the Consecration of the Colours at the Royal Military College in Kingston, the Chaplain General invited members of the Buddhist, Hindu, First Nations, Jewish, and Muslim communities to participate as guests (DND, 2001a, 2007b; Gorniak, 2001).

Despite policies to ensure religious accommodation and inclusivity, Christian chaplains face real difficulties serving believers from other faith traditions. Padre Kevin Dingwell exemplified this struggle in his description of trying to meet the spiritual needs of civilians and personnel while posted in Bosnia at the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001. He said:

\[T]he first person to seek out spiritual support [regarding the terrorist attack]... [was a devoted] Wiccan.... How could a Christian chaplain help another from a vastly different faith community struggle with the emotional and spiritual challenges of that moment?... [I] led a memorial service so that all within the camp, military and civilian, might have an opportunity to reflect and pray. Attending that service were about three hundred people of many religious backgrounds, including a large number of the locally engaged employees. Most, if not all, of these civilian employees were Muslim (Dingwell, 2004).

Today, all but two of the Canadian Forces’ 320 regular and reserve force chaplains belong to Christian denominations. The Chaplain Branch bases its staffing needs on Canadian statistics on religion and attempts to recruit religious leaders who belong to the largest groups (Statistics Canada, 2003). In 2003, the first Muslim chaplain, Captain Suleyman Demiray, was inaugurated into the regular forces. In 2007, a reservist Orthodox Jewish rabbi joined (DND, 2007c; Galloway, 2007). No additional non-Christian chaplains have been inaugurated into the branch since 2007 although the branch continues to seek willing minority religious leaders to join.

Decisions about who may join the branch rest with the Interfaith Committee on Canadian Military Chaplaincy (ICCMC), a sub-committee of the Canadian Council of Churches, in collaboration with the Chaplain General (DND, 2001b). Although non-Christian religious leaders are invited to join the chaplain branch, the chaplaincy remains subject to the Canadian Council of Churches. Further, potential candidates from groups not recognized by the Canadian Council of Churches (e.g. pagans, Wiccans, and other such loosely affiliated religious groups and associations) are not eligible to serve as military chaplains (DND, 2001b: IX-2). The rationale for this exclusivity is to ensure adequate pastoral training and standard entry requirements for all chaplains. The inherent problem with this model is that it innately favours Christian clergy trained according to a Western pedagogical model and is likely to exclude Hindus, Aboriginal elders, pagans, and other religious traditions whose religious leaders typically are not trained in this way.

Religious Challenges to Institutional Policies and Military Culture

National Defence policies now mandate the accommodation of religious needs by allowing modifications to some of the hallmarks of conformity in the Canadian Forces: namely the uniform and regulations governing facial hair and length of hair for men (CFPSA, 2005). Aboriginal members are permitted to wear their hair longer than standard regulations permit, typically in one or two braids. Sikhs may wear turbans or other head coverings as long as they comply with safety regulations for helmet use. Orthodox Christians (or Jews, Muslims, and Sikhs) can wear beards as long as they
Comply with safety regulations for operational or occupational equipment such as gas masks. Muslim women can wear a specially-designed, loose-fitting uniform that conforms to Islamic requirements for modesty. Further, military personnel are now able to get meals that accommodate religious dietary restrictions, they can take time for prayers, and slowly but surely, they are being provided with places to worship (CFPSA, 2005: A3).

A number of interfaith worship spaces have been created on bases across Canada either by modifying Christian chapels or building a separate worship space. In 2006, the Christian chapel at Canadian Forces Base Halifax was expanded to include a multifaith worship space called “the gathering place” that includes religious imagery, prayer space, and resources for worshippers from a variety of faith traditions. Leaders from Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Unitarian, Aboriginal, and Bahá’í traditions participated in its dedication service (Gilmour, 2006). At the Royal Military College in Kingston, chaplains have responded to growing numbers of Muslim personnel by installing a curtain in the Christian chapel to create a Muslim prayer room. Further, the base chaplain arranged for the installation of footbaths in the washrooms to facilitate ablutions (Benham Rennick, 2006). In 2007, Canadian Forces Base Shilo in Manitoba erected the “The Faith Centre” beside their Christian chapel to accommodate the spiritual needs of non-Christians on the base (Power, 2007). An Aboriginal “Circle of Unity Lodge” housed within The Faith Centre offers “sacred sweat-lodge ceremonies and workshops to CF members and their families” (Thiessen, 2006).

While the Canadian Forces are required by law to make religious accommodation for personnel and commanding officers are obligated to uphold those laws, personnel from minority religious traditions continue to face some difficulties in the conformist environment of the military, because their religious beliefs present them with “special needs” and because they are often visibly different from the white majority. For example, despite current policies, vegetarian Sikhs note that a vegetarian meal is not always available. Pagans wishing to celebrate solstice while on deployment cannot do so “sky clad” (i.e. naked) ostensibly for safety reasons (Canadian Press, 2007). And in some cases, those who request religious accommodation are subject to scrutiny to determine if their needs are genuine, as in the case of a Muslim convert who requested time off from duties for prayer and was interrogated by his senior officer to discover if he “really” needed to do so (Benham Rennick, 2006).

Long-standing traditions that are part of military culture present real challenges to minority personnel. Sikhs, for example, have a long cultural tradition of participation in the military that might make them more likely to pursue a Canadian Forces career. However, many Sikhs abstain from alcohol, a central component of fellowship and camaraderie in every Canadian regimental group. In a civilian setting, a Sikh’s decision not to drink alcohol might have little effect on fellowship between peers, but in the Canadian Forces (as in the militaries of most Western countries) drinking is a significant component of military tradition. Similarly, an Aboriginal writing on the differences between military and Aboriginal culture notes that cultural differences can become frustrating barriers for career advancement and can be the source of misunderstanding between unit members. She gives the example that, “in Inuit culture, a woman must not look an older man in the eye, as this is being disrespectful. In the military, if you don’t look your supervisor in the eye, they think you have something to hide” (Bergeron, 2006). In these examples, religious restrictions coupled with visible differences of skin colour or dress code quickly identify minority personnel as outsiders in an environment where conformity and inclusion are paramount for success. Further, they invite opportunities for exclusion, discrimination, and harassment.

Conclusion
Some military analysts argue that establishing a distinct military culture is foundational for generating cohesion within a homogeneous group to produce an effective fighting force (English, 2004; Snider, 1999; Ulmer et al., 2000). Donna Winslow, an advisor to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia argued that group cohesion can actually reinforce behaviours that conflict with official military policy, because personnel learn to “cover up” for one another to protect the group (Winslow, 1998: 345-367). As a result, one unfortunate effect of the homogenizing nature of military culture in Canada is that it can be both abusive
toward, and exclusive of, the very people the Canadian Forces seeks to incorporate, including women, Aboriginal people, and visible minorities. Policy makers must recognize and take steps to overcome the reality that religious identity has the potential to interfere with group cohesion and become a source of discrimination against minority members.

Canadian Forces policies and practices governing religious accommodation attest to the institutional willingness to prepare for a new era of diversity within the ranks. Nonetheless, Canadian Forces members who belong to religious traditions other than mainstream Christianity frequently must adapt their religious practices to fit in with military culture and duties, because their religious freedoms cannot always be guaranteed. The need for accommodation and policies that protect the rights of minority religious personnel will become increasingly important as diversity in the Forces increases due to efforts to attract and retain greater numbers of personnel from immigrant populations. Tensions will arise as military traditions continue to be challenged by those outside the historical Christian norm. The experiences of religious minorities in the Canadian Forces provide important insights into the potential struggles other Canadian institutions and broader society will face as religious diversity increases across Canada and points to a continuing need for policy research on the role and influence of religion in Canadian society.

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Introduction

In 2007, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) conducted Canada-wide roundtable discussions on the country’s approach to multicultural diversity. One issue identified for further research in the Canadian context was the implication of religious diversity for the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policies. Participants noted that while much of the debate on managing diversity centres on accommodating religious practices, decision makers and the public are often ill at ease in responding to these challenges.

Following the roundtables, the PRI, in collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), interviewed federal public servants from a number of different departments and agencies in the National Capital Region over a five-month period (see text box on p. 45). The objective was to gather information from experienced federal public servants on the extent to which religion and religious diversity are addressed in federal policymaking – and how. The interviewees came from departments and agencies responsible for a range of policy areas, including social, foreign affairs, and security policy, and included officials involved in policy development, and program delivery and evaluation. Participants were asked to draw on personal experience from working within the federal government as managers, researchers, and policy or program practitioners in responding to a series of questions. Interviews were not intended to be exhaustive or to be construed as a full-scale survey. Nonetheless, three common themes emerged.

- A broad consensus prevailed among policy and program practitioners that there is no need to adopt a distinct policy “lens” for dealing with religious diversity in Canada.

- Consideration of religious diversity in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policies tends to be subsumed under the more general rubric of “culture.”

- Especially at the operational level, the extent to which federal departments take religious diversity into account in their policies and programs varies widely.

Adoption of a Distinct Religious Diversity “Lens”?

Participants agreed that Canada does not require a distinct religious diversity lens for designing, implementing, and evaluating policy. They argued that policy practitioners are already called upon to consider many distinct policy lenses (e.g. ethnicity, language, gender, regional, and economic differences).
Participants felt that adding a further religious diversity lens could be inappropriate for two reasons.

- Religious diversity already received adequate attention as a component of broader “cultural” lenses (e.g. ethno-linguistic lenses).
- A religious diversity lens would be more time consuming and complicated to apply than other lenses, because one would not only have to look at diversity between religions but also at the extensive diversity within religious communities, greatly compounding the complexity of the task.

While most participants were wary of adopting and applying a high-level discourse on religious diversity, the interviews nevertheless revealed that, in practice, such a lens was implicitly being applied to program development and delivery in a number of cases. This lens was applied on a case-by-case basis when departments and agencies determined that the diversity of religious identities was likely to be a determining factor in achieving department goals and ensuring program success.

Overall, Canada’s legislation, judiciary, and democratic institutions were already seen to provide federal departments, managers, and employees with...
the necessary guidance to provide appropriate services to Canadians, including those with diverse religious identities. This broad guidance allows departments to consider religious diversity in policy-making processes where it is determined to be material to the accomplishment of departmental mandates and policy objectives, and to adapt programs based on the religious and other needs of the clientele.

This approach has, however, translated into large variations among federal departments and agencies in the extent to which religious diversity is taken into account and acted upon. In particular, there was a clear difference between interviewees involved in policy development and those responsible for policy implementation. Those in policy development generally acknowledged their lack of understanding of religious differences. In contrast, many of those involved in operations (i.e. policy implementation) appeared more informed and saw themselves as being relatively well equipped to identify how particular religious beliefs and practices could impact program success and service delivery, and the means of addressing them through judicious adaptations.

In both cases, interviewees generally approved of what they saw as the flexibility of Canada’s current approach to dealing with religious diversity through a combination of case-by-case policy adaptations and the resolution of certain issues by the courts. While most interviewees did not focus on the role of the courts in the course of the interviews, some felt it was advisable to leave decisions on religious diversity to the courts.

Notwithstanding their awareness of growing religious diversity in Canada, policy practitioners’ knowledge of different faiths and religious practices appeared quite limited.

Subsuming Religious Diversity Under “Culture”?

All individuals interviewed acknowledged that Canada is a religiously diverse country. There was also a broad understanding among public servants that religious diversity within Canada’s population had increased over time due, in large part, to immigration, and Canada will continue to see changes in the religious composition of its citizens in years to come.

Notwithstanding their awareness of growing religious diversity in Canada, policy practitioners’ knowledge of different faiths and religious practices appeared quite limited. Participants were easily able to name major religions such as Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, but were often unable to identify differences in specific spiritual beliefs, rituals, and practices among them. This extended to participants being unable to identify religious holidays, the significance of religious symbols, institutions, and self-governance practices within religious communities.

In contrast, participants could more readily identify and describe culture in terms of practices, rituals, food, language, and ethnicity. Religion was seen in most cases to be a component of one’s broad cultural or ethnic rituals and traditions. Practitioners had difficulty identifying which customs and practices were specifically religious and which were more broadly cultural and determining what particular policy challenges may be posed by the former.

A Variety of Approaches to Religious Diversity at the Policy Design and Operational Levels

As noted above, religious diversity was acknowledged by all participants as a fact of the Canadian landscape, though the extent to which they were able to identify it as an important consideration in the design and implementation of Canadian public policy varied greatly.

Few Examples of Integrated Policy Design and Implementation

In particular, the interviews revealed few examples of structured institutional approaches to enable departments and agencies to deal with religious diversity “on the ground” and to reflect these practices in broader departmental or agency policies. The clearest example of a structured institutional approach to adapting policy to religious diversity was found in the multifaith chaplaincy at Corrections Canada. The chaplaincy provides a clear organizational structure for responding to the religious needs of inmates and their families across Canada.
The first response to requests for help from inmates or prison staff in ministering to their specific religious needs is at the level of the individual, that is, by the chaplain at an institution. If chaplains are unable to meet those needs by drawing on their own expertise and other information provided by the chaplaincy service, they are expected to consult the relevant local faith community, that is, going out into the faith community of the inmate in the vicinity of the prison to seek advice from its leaders.

When solutions cannot be found at the individual or local level, chaplains seek out advice from appropriate authorities at the regional/provincial level. If required, requests for guidance may be addressed to a national consultation board. Guidance given by the national board reflects consensus among its members, and is transmitted back down the chain of command, ensuring services are sensitive to the needs of religious inmates. In particular, the institutional structure established by the chaplaincy for responding to the religious needs of its clientele remains flexible enough to respond to different individual needs including among different adherents to the same faith.

While the chaplaincy has a strong institutional structure for ministering to the religious needs of inmates, similar institutional structures and consistency in responding to religious diversity were not found in other departments or agencies. At the organizational level, issues of religious diversity receive little or no emphasis in the organizational structure of most departments and agencies. Religious issues at the organizational level most often arise in regards to managing staff and ensuring that non-discrimination policies are respected during staffing processes.

Variability in Adaptations at the Operational Level

At the operational level, religious diversity tends to be taken into account to ensure program success. In this case, participants explained that if religious diversity were not considered in program development and delivery, the goals of a program might not be achieved.

To ensure the success and effectiveness of programs, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), DFAIT, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) all give significant consideration to the religious views of stakeholders and counterparts in their respective domains. Individuals from these departments appeared to have a greater understanding of the central role that religion and faith can play for certain individuals and communities; for their programs to be effective, they saw a need to acknowledge and respect the beliefs of individuals and the communities with which program personnel interact.

Interviews revealed few examples of structured institutional approaches to enable departments and agencies to deal with religious diversity ‘on the ground’ and to reflect these practices in broader departmental or agency policies.

Training

Religious orientation training for employees is most often provided directly by their department or agency; INAC, DFAIT, CIDA, and the Department of National Defence all provide religious sensitivity training to
assist employees in performing their functions both in Canada and internationally. In addition to the standard orientation training provided to employees, individuals are also able to request additional religious training if they so desire.

In general, religious orientation training for federal employees involves three elements.

- **Sensitize employees to the religious beliefs and practices of communities and people.** This includes teaching employees about religious beliefs, the significance of religious symbols, and the religious customs of various communities. For example, INAC provides new employees with a two-day sensitization training session that takes place within a First Nations community. This training allows new employees to learn about First Nations or Inuit culture, tradition, and beliefs.

- **Provide employees with the appropriate understanding of respect accorded to religious leaders and elders in a community.** This includes learning about the influence elders and religious leaders have on their communities in the decision-making process.

- **Provide employees with effective tools for working in different faith and religious settings.** This includes making employees aware of different religious holidays and effective communication strategies for conducting discussion forums and actively participating in communities.

In addition to general department-specific training on religious diversity for federal employees, the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS) provides training for managers to help them deal with religious differences in the workplace, based on giving general guidance and exploring specific adaptations through the use of case studies. For example, religious diversity issues are explicitly addressed as part of the CSPS’s management course, *Diversity, Vision and Action*. Course participants are given two case studies that a manager may confront. One provides an example of a team member whose personal religiosity is invasive and the second provides an example of a team member whose religiosity is not invasive. Managers are then asked to develop appropriate responses to each case.

While religious orientation training is provided within specific departments and agencies and through the CSPS, a number of interviewees expressed doubts as to the relevance of the religious orientation training available to them. Interviewees noted there was limited opportunity for feedback to their departments and agencies on the relevance of the training they received. In addition, managerial responses to the religious needs of employees vary greatly depending on their individual knowledge of religion and comfort level in dealing with potential religious conflicts in their teams.

**Conclusion**

Over the course of the interviews, policy and program practitioners all acknowledged that religious diversity is present in Canadian society and that this diversity will continue to grow. However, the extent to which practitioners felt that religious diversity was an important or necessary lens to apply to federal policy development and implementation varied. While participants were generally wary of formally adopting a distinct religious diversity lens, it was clear that certain departments and agencies already implicitly apply such a lens on a case-by-case basis where they feel religious diversity considerations enhance the effectiveness of programs and policies.

Policy and program practitioners varied significantly in the extent to which they systematically took religious diversity into account in developing and implementing policy. Participants involved in policy development often noted these considerations were largely absent from their functions. In contrast, those involved with policy implementation at the operational level demonstrated a more developed understanding of the religious diversity among their stakeholders and of when and how this needed to be reflected in adaptations to better achieve policy objectives through effective programs. However, participants at the operational level also expressed concern over the likely loss of...
institutional memory surrounding program adaptations made as the result of applying an informal religious diversity lens.

Based on these initial interviews, it may be useful to explore a number of questions in more detail.

1) Is the manner in which policy and program practitioners currently address religious diversity (i.e. on an informal ad hoc basis) likely to be appropriate in the wake of increasing religious diversity?

2) Is there a need to develop a more consistent approach to dealing with religious diversity (i.e. as an element potentially distinct from culture) in the development of policy as well as in its implementation?

3) What are the best practices in this regard, both within and outside the federal government?

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The Principle of Secularism (Laïcité): France


This report presents the findings of the Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République, chaired by Bernard Stasi. President Jacques Chirac established the commission in July 2003 to investigate how the principle of secularism should apply in practice within a country that has become more religiously diverse through immigration. While the report focuses on the wearing of religious attire in the public school system, it also comments on how secularism should apply in the public sphere, at work, and in the delivery of public services. To understand how it should apply in practice, the commission interviewed representatives from various groups, including religious and community leaders, teachers, equal rights promoters, and politicians.

Following this research, the commission reiterated that the French republic is a secular society and that conspicuous religious symbols should not be worn in the public school system. This led to the French law on applying the principle of secularism and on religious symbols in schools, which bans the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in the country’s public primary and secondary schools. While this principle was the most publicized element of the report, the commission made other recommendations, including declaring Yom Kippur and Eid as vacation days, banning conspicuous symbols of political affiliation, and finding ways to eliminate discriminatory practices.
Introduction

This article describes the changing role and impact of religious identities on international relations. It shows how globalization is increasing the integrating and fragmenting effects of religious identities, changing how they play out on the world stage – notably through changes in the main religious actors (states, non-state actors, and diaspora communities) – and discusses their contributions to international conflict or co-operation. It also examines potential implications of these changing global demographic trends, as well as trends in religious identity (mainly in Islam and Christianity) for conflict, security, and development.

The “Levels of Analysis” and the Future International Politics of Religious Identity

“Levels of Analysis”
Some of the potential implications of demographic trends and trends in religious identity (described in “Global Trends in Religious Identity” on p. 14) for conflict, security, and development can be more clearly seen through the “levels of analysis” framework, commonly used in the theory of international relations:

- First, the overarching global level picks up on the effects of economics, technology, and globalization on the religious resurgence.
- Second, the inter-state level (the level of analysis of the states in the international system, as international relations is conventionally understood) examines what these demographic trends might mean for diplomacy, statecraft, and the relations between states more generally.
- Finally, the ways in which these demographic trends may affect domestic religion, politics, and political stability are examined at the state-and-society level.

The Global Level of Analysis
The global level of analysis seeks to explain outcomes in international relations in terms of global natural, social, or technological forces that transcend the relations between states at the level of analysis of the international system. This level is becoming increasingly important because of the integrating and fragmenting effects of globalization on international relations.

Globalization is rapidly dissolving social and economic barriers in time and space, and thus the distance between states, transforming the world’s diverse populations into a more integrated or homogeneous world: global markets, global travel, a global youth culture, and an age of global information (e.g. mobile phone pictures of police brutality in Egypt or vote-rigging...
in Zimbabwe) (Osterhammel and Peterson, 2005). Globalization is also creating a more fragmented and heterogeneous world, facilitating more particular identities. On the one hand, globalization is making it easier for people of a similar identity to be aware of each other across time, space, and distance and to come together across the globe. On the other hand, it contributes to the ethnic, religious, and racial divisions that are fragmenting the political landscape into smaller and smaller units.

However, what is happening is more complicated than this. The global and the local are becoming more closely linked together in a kind of “global particularity.” One example is “globalized Islam,” in which types of radical Islam around the world blur the connection between Islam, a specific society, and a specific territory. Another example is the transnational links between churches and denominations that make up global evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity. The global resurgence of religion is not about – or not only about – old, primordial fears and divisions, but also new ones, caused by the paradoxical interdependence of these social forces that are unifying and fragmenting the world at the same time.

The global resurgence of religion is not about – or not only about – old, primordial fears and divisions, but also new ones, caused by the paradoxical interdependence of these social forces that are unifying and fragmenting the world at the same time.

The cause of conflict, or the potential for conflict, should be seen not as a result of the existence of religious diversity. Rather, it should be seen as arising from the collapse, or the threat of the collapse, of diversity, resulting from the forces of globalization.

How does the global level of analysis help us understand the impact of the religious resurgence on security and conflict? First, globalization is rapidly changing what religion is, and so globalization is changing what constitutes religious actors or religious non-state actors in international relations. In other words, how globalization is changing religion (and how religion is also changing globalization) are key aspects of the way social change influences international relations.

Ever since Samuel Huntington popularized the notion of the “clash of civilizations,” most accounts of religion in international relations have followed an analysis of the static and rather well-delineated blocs that ostensibly make up the main world religions and civilizations: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. However, this assumes stability in the global religious landscape, as well as a rather static approach to religious non-state actors that is at odds with the reality of religion and religious change in the 21st century.

Second, the role of religion in international relations is constantly evolving. Rapid religious and social changes are taking place in the Islamic world, producing the various Islamic non-state actors mentioned in the newspapers every day (al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc.). But there are a variety of other Islamic non-state actors that are not terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (political movements that are particularly active in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Sudan). The missionary organization Tablighi Jamaat (a society for the propagation of the Muslim faith) is probably the largest Islamic non-state actor in the world, and probably the most important single element in the Islamic global resurgence (Kepel, 1994). In other words, the more well-publicized Islamic terrorist groups are not the only (or necessarily even the most important) Islamic non-state actors in world politics.

Third, globalization is helping to create or expand ethnic and religious diaspora communities around the world. These are some of the most significant non-state actors in world politics in the 21st century. Religious diaspora communities contribute to the changing nature of conflict and co-operation, and they can complicate the problems of security and global terrorism. This is why in security and intelligence circles, the concept of a global “war on terrorism” is giving way to the wider notion of a struggle against “global Islamic insurgency” (Kilcullen, 2006).
Diaspora communities are not new. Long-existing examples include the Chinese, Jewish, and Armenian diasporas, as well as the Arab diaspora – mainly Syrian and Lebanese emigrants – who form communities in West Africa. These global-local links or networks do not just happen; they are not free-floating. They are social networks, embedded in religious diaspora communities that are also a key aspect of religious transnationalism. Thus, rather than be carried away by the idea that such social networking is one of the hallmarks of globalization and a significant new feature of international politics, one should remember that such social and information networks have been part of much of human history, and they predate the modern state system.¹

Rather than be carried away by the idea that such social networking is one of the hallmarks of globalization and a significant new feature of international politics, one should remember that such social and information networks have been part of much of human history, and they predate the modern state system.

It is these kinds of global-local religious links or social networks that allow al-Qaeda and Hezbollah in Lebanon to do illicit fundraising and money laundering in East, Central, and West Africa (IISS, 2003/4: 289, 293). Similarly, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia have become a concern because of their ability, until recent political changes, to contravene United Nations sanctions on conflict diamonds (IISS, 2002/2003: 323). In Nigeria’s northern states, for example, criminal syndicates and radical Islamist groups have been able to come together (IISS, 2006: 251). Al-Qaeda can flourish through local, almost subcontracted, religious extremists, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia. Radical clerics, trained in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere, have sought asylum in Europe or North America, where they can now spread their more radical, extremist forms of Islam in the West.

Unfortunately, globalization has blurred the lines between religious organizations involved in social welfare and those involved in terrorism. If Islamic social welfare organizations in the West or throughout the Islamic world collect money for Palestine, then Hamas or Hezbollah may use the funds for terrorism.

However, we have been here before, or at least the French have. The way these social networks work is not new, for this is how the Sufi brotherhoods in North Africa supported the Islamic resistance fighters against the French occupation in the late 19th century. The social and charitable networks, which may fund or recruit suicide bombers, also promote and maintain communities. One of the reasons Islam and Christianity are growing in urban Africa, for example, is because of the social welfare services that such faith-based organizations provide. Given those countries’ weak states, corruption, and crumbling social infrastructure, secular and faith-based development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a main source of education, social welfare, and health care in developing countries.

Globalization also enables (or even empowers) people in diaspora communities to create or participate in a variety of new types of global or transnational identities, offering new types of community and political action. There is nothing unusual about this. A variety of advocacy and pressure groups – Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and most development NGOs – rely on this kind of identification to get financial support.

However, globalization can enable people in diaspora communities to create or participate in new, radical forms of identity and political action. A key current example, already mentioned in this article, is what Olivier Roy calls “globalized Islam.” Among diaspora Muslim communities in the West, the revival of Islam may not be a backlash against modernization or Westernization, but a consequence of it. Young, rootless Muslims, living as a minority in Western societies, can become part of a “global Ummah” – a global Islamic majority, the global Muslim community – through videos, the Internet, and cheap air tickets (to places such as Pakistan). This can lead to new forms

of radicalism, ranging from support for al-Qaeda to rejection of social integration into Western societies (Roy, 2002).

Diaspora communities in which ethnicity and religion can facilitate new forms of identity exist in other religions as well. The (Hindu) Tamil diaspora funds and supports the civil war against Sri Lanka’s (Buddhist-nationalist) Sinhalese-dominated government. The middle-class Indian diaspora in California’s Silicon Valley has funded Hindu nationalist parties in India – the RSS and the BJP. In other words, religious diaspora communities – including those that constitute prominent religious minorities in Western countries – can play important roles in the international politics of ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism.

The Inter-State Level of Analysis

This level of analysis focuses on implications of global religious trends for the conduct of international relations. The concern here is on how religious identity may influence interstate relations in terms of likely allies, alliances, the ability of countries to influence others, and the impact religion may have on the likelihood and eventual intensity of conflicts. First, consider which 25 countries are likely to be the most populous by the mid-21st century (Table 1).

Second, consider again the 25 countries likely to be the most populous by the mid-21st century, but this time compare which ones will be predominately Christian and which predominately Muslim (Table 2). According to Jenkins, nine will be wholly or mainly Muslim and eight wholly or mainly Christian, with three deeply divided between the two religions (Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania). With the important exceptions of India and China, the future centres of global population are mainly in countries that are already divided between two of the great world religions: Christianity and Islam. He thus argues that state divisions and religious divisions may increasingly reinforce each other.

Does this matter? If it does, under what conditions does it matter? Jenkins says that these divisions are likely to intensify in the future: “In present-day battles in Africa and Asia, we may today be seeing the political outlines of the new century, and probably, the roots of future great power alliances” (Jenkins, 2002: 164).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
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<td>338</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4. Indonesia</td>
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<td>5. Nigeria</td>
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<td>10. Congo</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Philippines</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mexico</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Vietnam</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Russia</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>146</td>
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<td>15. Egypt</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>16. Japan</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
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<td>17. Iran</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Tanzania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Turkey</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Sudan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Uganda</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Germany</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Yemen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Thailand</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jenkins (2002), p. 84.
However, before we can accept Jenkins's proposition regarding religion and alliance formation, we must understand far more about how culture and religion influence the construction of the collective identities of states and communities in a global era. It is widely agreed in the social sciences that any conception of the “self” can be worked out only in relation to an “other.” Huntington offers a robust version of this general proposition: “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against” (Huntington, 1996: 21; emphasis added). Others would accept the general self-other proposition regarding the construction of identity, but argue (in a more neutral vein) that such diversity is what societies and communities make of it: enemies, rivals, or friends (Wendt, 1999). What religious leaders and communities make of it given the global pressures on their local communities depends on a set of factors—certainly their general interpretations of piety and religious ethics, and their political theology, but also the way globalization may be helping to shift the social, cultural, political, and economic influence of their respective communities in the states and societies to which they belong.

Jenkins collapses the more revivalist versions of these religious traditions with the existence of religious diversity. He seems to assume that the Crusades, an ugly phase in Christian-Muslim relations that took place in the Middle East, offers the only key to interpreting the collective identities of states or societies based on Islam and Christianity. In Mali, for example, young, reformist Muslim intellectuals, often trained in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, have taken on leadership roles in new Islamic, community-based organizations. They are intent on spreading what they considered to be a purer, less Malian form of Islam, disrupting the long history of these religious communities living together. Unfortunately, the intervention of the US Defence Department’s Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorist Initiative has only encouraged the radical Islamists and exacerbated religious tensions (Gutelius, 2006: 38-39).

Culture or religion is often not very useful in prediction of allies or alliance formation. It is as easy to think of exceptions (most recently, the West’s support—against Orthodox Serbia—for Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo) as it is of examples that correspond to a faith-based alignment of interests (e.g. Orthodox states did oppose the bombing of Serbia, and Germany was pressured by domestic Catholics to recognize diplomatically Catholic Croatia’s break away from Yugoslavia). Historically, Venice traded with the Ottomans, but it finally joined the princes of Christendom to defeat the Ottomans in the Battle of Lepanto (in 1517).

Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to conclude that the religious demographics of states constitute potential flashpoints for interstate conflict, and (crucially) that a country’s own debates over culture, religion, and politics (that is, what determines a state’s collective identity) do tend to lead a country to frame its national interests in a way that influences its foreign policy orientation.

Third, another aspect of how religion may influence foreign policy and interstate relations relates to the spread of

## Table 2
The Religious Balance of Power among the Most-populous Countries in the 21st Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Overwhelmingly Muslim</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mainly Muslim, with significant Christian minorities</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overwhelmingly Christian</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mainly Christian, with significant Muslim minorities</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Congo (the former Zaire)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Christian and Muslim, neither with a strong majority</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other nations, dominated by neither Christianity nor Islam</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pentecostalism. Some of the countries with the largest number of Pentecostals—Brazil, India, and China (see Thomas on p. 14)—feature prominently in the thesis that Brazil, Russia, India, and China ("BRIC") will be the great powers of the future, since their economies are rapidly developing, and by 2050 they could eclipse most of the currently richest countries of the world. Another article in this issue points out that Pentecostalism is at the cutting edge of Christian growth in East Asia, in what Jenkins sees as a potential future "Christian arc" above Indonesia (see Thomas on p. 14). Each of these BRIC countries is likely to become a leading regional power. Thus, for example, in East and Southeast Asia there may be more significant religious dimensions to the politics of regionalism and regional integration in the future—developments that could also affect their relations with other great powers and Western countries generally.

Fourth, what has been stressed so far at this level of analysis are the ways religious minorities, religious diversity, and religious transnationalism can become sources of religious conflict and pose challenges to international security. However, they also offer new, untapped resources for diplomacy and international co-operation. The section on the global level of analysis examined how globalization has helped link the global and the local, facilitating new identities and reinforcing old ones, connecting people to a variety of types of ethnic and religious diaspora communities. Multi-track and faith-based diplomacy make use of the changing global, social, and religious context of world politics to promote dialogue, conflict resolution, and peace-building.

Multi-track diplomacy refers to the informal, civil society, or non-governmental contacts between states and societies that involve private citizens, religious groups, the business community, and a wide range of non-state actors. Faith-based diplomacy recognizes that if religion is a part of the problem of international conflict, it also needs to be a part of the solution. It is with this wider conception of diplomacy that a country’s ethnic or religious minorities, through their global social and commercial links to their wider diaspora communities, could become an effective resource for the foreign policy of Western countries. This is not only good for social cohesion at home in the West, in which members of these communities are now more clearly seen as an asset in a variety of ways, but it also means they can help their adopted country achieve its goals in foreign policy: supporting trade, investment, human rights, gender equality, religious freedom, etc.

The State-and-Society Level of Analysis

At the state-and-society level, identity politics (structured around an increasing diversity of religious identities) is posing new threats to security, and it is playing an increasing role in influencing both domestic and foreign policies.

First, globalization has complicated multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-faith relations in the West on a host of social policy issues, because these domestic communities are increasingly part of global religious diaspora communities. Because of globalization, multi-faith relations can no longer be conceived as single-country problems within the domestic policy discourses of “race relations,” “minority rights,” or “multiculturalism.” Social groups that are sometimes identified in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion often have overlapping identities. Members of religious minority groups (such as Canada’s Sikh community, Muslim Algerians or Moroccans in France, and the mainly Christian Chinese minorities in Malaysia or Indonesia) often have broader social identities facilitated by globalization and may be said to form part of transnational religious diaspora communities.

Therefore, globalization has made multi-faith relations one of the new types of “intermestic issues” in international relations (that is, issues that symbolize the merger of international and domestic politics) (Manning, 1979: 308-324). The domestic Danish cartoon incident of 2005, for example, was transmitted and amplified throughout a global Islamic subculture, stoking violent clashes in places far from Denmark, including between Muslims and Christians across the northern states of Nigeria where Sharia law is practised (IISS, 2006: 251). Politically, local Islamic extremists in many countries were able to use the global knowledge about the cartoons to bolster their Islamic credentials.

Faith-based diplomacy recognizes that if religion is a part of the problem of international conflict, it also needs to be a part of the solution.
Second, as a result of the global resurgence of religion (examined in Thomas p. 14), a number of societies are being embroiled in a kind of Kulturkampf, a cultural as well as theo-political struggle taking place over the boundaries of the sacred, the secular, and the political in their common life. This makes identity politics a part of their domestic politics (in addition to colouring their international relations). The first way this may occur is when adherents of one religious tradition seek to declare that nation X should be a Muslim or a Christian nation (such as Nigeria and Zambia) or a Buddhist nation (such as Sri Lanka and Thailand). Zambia’s evangelical former president, Frederick Chiluba, for example, sought to gain favour with this growing constituency by declaring the country to be a Christian nation (in opposition to the mainline churches and the significant Muslim minority). Christian-Muslim tensions were exacerbated in Nigeria’s decision to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Pressure exerted by monks in Thailand to have Buddhism recognized as the national religion has fuelled the Islamic insurgency in the predominately Muslim southern part of the country.

The second way religious identity may contribute to conflict is when countries have religiously divided populations, in which there is a narrow gap in power and numbers between two religions. It is in these “torn countries” (Table 3), as Jenkins calls them, that there have

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Christianity</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Hinduism</th>
<th>Judaism</th>
<th>Indigenous/Other</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15-22</td>
<td>10-15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>50-75</td>
<td>24-49*</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes both Muslim and Hindu.

already been intermittent or prolonged Muslim-Christian violence such as: Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The narrow gap in religious power and numbers has also surprisingly erupted in more recent outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence in Kenya, where such tensions have been intermittent, and in Côte d’Ivoire, where they were almost non-existent until recently.

According to Jenkins, the main potential flashpoints appear to be states with minorities representing 10 or 20 percent of the population, which is sufficient to resist policies to promote religious homogenization and enough to sustain military struggles against repressive governments. Alternatively, as Thomas (p. 14) pointed out in relation to India and Indonesia, the narrow religious gap may be located in particular regions of a country, even if one religion is predominant. Jenkins estimates that no less than 10 of the world’s 25 largest states in 2050 could be divided by Islam and Christianity (i.e., the gap between these religious minorities could be between 10 and 20 percent). Given current trends, each one could be the scene of Christian-Muslim conflict.

Table 3 indicates how many potentially torn countries there are in the world (those in which there is a minority religious group that reaches Jenkins’ flashpoint of 10 to 20 percent of the population). However, what is remarkable is that there isn’t already greater Christian-Muslim conflict. Clearly, other factors have to be present before demography contributes to religious conflict. These include economic inequality and religious persecution or discrimination. Connected to globalization, in addition, is the way the integrating, homogenizing aspects of globalization can threaten authentic development (that is, the development and modernization of these communities rooted in their own cultural and religious traditions rather than Western forms of modernization) (Fox, 2004). Thus, it is the way globalization can threaten the collapse of religious identity and provoke politically motivated religious discrimination, and not the existence of religious diversity, that contributes to conflict. Indonesia provides a counter-example: this Islamic democracy with a free press, a vibrant civil society, and an active Islamic feminist movement provides a model for a new type of Islamic modernization and development (Hefner, 2000: 20).

It must also be acknowledged that the potential for inter-confessional violence may be due not only to the relative size (in static terms) of each of the religious groups (beyond threshold levels of a gap of 10 to 20 percent between minorities). It may also be because of differential birth rates between religious minorities or (more sensitively) mass conversions associated with proselytization. So it may be reasonable for Jenkins to say that religious and political stability can be potentially threatened by differential birth rates and rates of population growth between communities – say, the minority Shi’ites in Lebanon, who made up the traditional underclass, but whose birth rate is higher than the better-off Christian community. However, Lebanon’s messy politics, the cross-confessional military alliances, etc., certainly pose a challenge to any attempt to link politics, religion, and demography (Jenkins, 2002: 192-196).

Finally, future social conflicts within countries are likely to be influenced by social trends that can reinforce the particular kind of fragmentary cultural or religious identities facilitated by globalization. It is often argued that countries in the global South face a lot of social pressures arising from what are called “youth bulges,” a large cohort of young adult males (between 16 and 30 years of age) that is supposed to contribute to social unrest, civil war, and terrorism. High youth bulges have been blamed for many of the Hindu-Muslim riots in India, the attraction to radical Islamic groups throughout the Islamic world, and the civil conflicts in West Africa, with their pervasive use of child soldiers. However, apart from male or gender stereotypes that youth-bulge theory builds on, whether or not youth bulges cause political instability or instead empower young people for social change and political action depends on a variety of other factors. Some of them are domestic, such as state repression, economic recession,

Thus, it is the way globalization can threaten the collapse of religious identity and provoke politically motivated religious discrimination, and not the existence of religious diversity, that contributes to conflict.
and simply bad, stifling, economic policy. Some are international, such as foreign aid policy, support for human rights, international law, international organizations, and the government’s relations with foreign governments.

Conclusion

Religion is both dividing and connecting the world in new ways that pose new challenges for both global and domestic peace, security, and prosperity. Globalization has helped to link the global and the local in countries around the world, facilitating new identities and reinforcing old ones, including identities that span and connect different religious diaspora communities across the world. These global-local linkages and diaspora communities are transforming domestic policy debates over the nature of race relations, minority rights, and multi-faith relations. At the same time they provide new types of challenges to international security, since religious diaspora communities and ethnic or religious non-state actors – in a variety of religious traditions – have been able to pursue some of their political objectives through terrorism.

The challenge for governments in a global era is how to use religious diversity as a resource for their foreign policies. Faith-based and multi-track diplomacy, since they make use of civil society rather than merely links between governments, show how a country’s ethnic and religious minorities can more actively contribute to their country’s foreign policy.

References


The Role and Place of Religious Discourse in Democratic Society

This article explores the role and place of religion in contemporary democratic societies, particularly in North American public and political life. We live in an age when many inside and outside of the academy are thinking and talking about religion — specifically about what role, if any, religious discourse should play in the public space. This article addresses this topic by proposing four models: 1) Religion Over the Public Landscape (in which religion is necessary for the health of public and political life); 2) Religion Banned from the Public Landscape (in which religion is kept out of public and political discourse); 3) Public Landscape as Religious Space (in which the health of society depends on a shared civil religion); and 4) Public Landscape as Varied Topography (in which religious views are not initially treated as a special case, but rather are treated like any other more or less comprehensive view that may offer a voice in public and political debate).

The article argues that model four is best suited to democratic countries and that the risks associated with attempts to discourage public expressions of religious faith are significantly greater than those associated with welcoming them.

The article then applies this model to two practical issues: state-sponsored school prayer and government funding for faith-based services. Although these models are fashioned in the context of the author’s political and cultural home (the United States), these models may be broadly applicable in other contexts.

Surveying Religious Discourse in Democracies: Four Landscapes

1) Religion Over the Public Landscape

According to this model, public professions of religious faith are necessary for the health of the public and political life in the United States and other modern democracies. They are necessary, because they inculcate virtues that sustain a vital citizenry. Such virtues might include justice, moral reasoning, and courage, or humility, hope, and love. According to this model, if religious faith and its concomitant virtues were excluded from public life, the moral health of the country would deteriorate.

This model is commonly associated with traditional conservative religious faiths, but forms of politically progressive faiths also belong to this model. Some argue that a robust democracy in the United States relies on the beliefs and practices of progressive forms of Christianity, Judaism, and now Islam. If a society fails to tap the religious impulse that nourishes and inspires the human spirit, then human rights, the
protection of the marginalized, the protection of the environment, and the eradication of racism will not be expressed even as national aspirations, much less as future achievements.

This model usefully acknowledges the moral significance of religiosity in America’s past and present, and it does not attempt to relegate religion to the private realm – rather, it invites it into the public and political landscape. Yet the placement of religion over the public is problematic, if what is meant by this is that the United States can reach its most profound moral and political goals only if religious beliefs and practices “watch over it” – i.e., if they guide and protect it, providing it vast and indispensable moral resources.

Moreover, there are compelling moral and social considerations that may persuade even religious believers to reject this model. It is one thing for an individual or community to bring a religious perspective to bear on a current, public topic such as the war in Iraq; it is another thing to make the global claim that the nation requires religion and, by implication, if fellow citizens are not religious, they do not have access to the most important moral resource. Though religious traditions offer rich and often distinctive moral resources that can enrich a nation’s public discourse, they do not have a monopoly on such moral resources.

2) Religion Banned from the Public Landscape

According to this model, religion should be kept out of the political life – and even much of the public life – of the United States. This model usually assumes that professions of religious faith are contentious and divisive unless they are rendered safe by being consigned to the private sphere: the sphere of the voluntary association, the family, or the individual. They must not be brought into the larger public or political sphere, because their partisan nature has great potential to introduce division and therefore conflict into the public life of the state.

Sequestering religious belief to the private sphere is the ideal held by most Rawlsian social contract liberals, including the late Richard Rorty. The idea is to keep religious discourse out of public, political debate on the grounds that: 1) religious beliefs are not subject to public reasoning, and 2) religion is therefore divisive.

Rorty championed what he called a “happy, Jeffersonian compromise” (Rorty, 1999: 169). The compromise is between the heirs of the Enlightenment and those professing religious views, and it consists of this: the religious may keep their religious beliefs, but only on the condition that they are willing to privatize them. Ponder this compromise for a while, and it soon becomes clear that it offers the following: You may hold all the religious beliefs you want, so long as they remain irrelevant, or at least silent, to many things that matter most – for example, to public discussion and policy on the environment, energy, war, and social services.

Rorty offers various justifications for this restrictive position on the place of religious views in public and political debate. For example, he claims that “the main reason religion needs to be privatized is that, in political discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-stopper” (Rorty, 1999: 171). By conversation-stopper, Rorty has in mind a person making a statement to which others have no response, presumably because they do not share the worldview that the statement entails.

Now, a democracy may for good reason want public interlocutors to exhibit a wide range of virtues, including attentiveness, discretion, and sensitivity to audience, as well as courage, honesty, and judgment. But these virtues and their corresponding vices do not run along religious versus non-religious lines. Moreover, a democracy cannot enforce such virtues, especially by stating in advance that all reference to religion be excluded. Rorty could arguably have better advanced his aims by describing in detail the kind and quality of conversation he would like to see on public issues, rather than by attempting to rally “we atheists” to “enforce Jefferson’s compromise” (Rorty, 1999: 169).

When Rorty argued that religion should be kept private, he meant, among other things, that churches, synagogues, and mosques should not speak to their members about public or political issues (Rorty, 2003: 148). Rather, religion should restrict itself to helping “individuals find meaning in their lives” and to serving “as a help to individuals in their times of trouble” (Rorty, 2003: 142). It is not clear, however, how religious communities can assist individuals with issues of

1 See Stout, pp. 85-86, for a discussion on democratic virtues in public speech.
meaning or in times of trouble and, at the same time, systematically avoid addressing public and political issues. Are religious communities to be mute on such issues as war, social security, and environmental policies? May not such issues connect profoundly with issues of meaning – especially during times of trouble?

Scholars of religion usually have little patience with Friedrich Schleiermacher’s attempt to make a pact of non-aggression between religion and modernity by placing ethics, science, and religion each into its own discrete and protected sphere. Why should they be any more patient with Rorty’s similar act of segregation for the sake of keeping religion out of public and political life?

Early in his career, Rawls seemed to share Rorty’s wish that religion stay out of public life. But later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls opposed the public exchange of religious arguments only when addressing “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.” Nonetheless, in either the more or less restrictive case, citizens whose outlooks are informed by religion would, under this view, still be required to refrain from making reference to this profound aspect of their identity when engaging in significant political deliberation and debate.

This Rawlsian restriction on religious arguments is problematic for the following reasons:

- **Psychologically,** it is not clear that people can so neatly uncouple aspects of their identity.

- **Politically,** it is not clear that the public interest is well served when some citizens are expected to repress the real reasons behind their public stance and to invoke only the kinds of reasons that this Rawlsian view would permit.\(^2\)

- **Juridically,** it is not clear that a pragmatically useful and meaningful line can be drawn between “questions of basic justice” and all the other (lesser yet related) issues that pertain to questions of justice and the nature and arrangement of our public institutions.

- **Epistemologically,** it is not clear that what Rawls calls “public reason” can in fact be defended as “the reason of citizens”; that is, as an inclusive style of deliberation that can be said to be acceptable to all reasonable persons.

This epistemological doubt is intensified, not weakened, when Rawls, in the “Introduction to the Paperback Edition” of Political Liberalism, permits comprehensive religious doctrines to enter into public reason, provided that “in due course public reasons … are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support” (Rawls, 1996: li-lii ).\(^3\) This new concession is essentially offering this: An argument wearing the cloth of religion may be permitted, provided that at some point the religious vestments are removed, thus allowing public reason to appear naked. The only religious argument that can be permitted and trusted, then, is one that could initially have been stated in other terms – namely, in the terms of public reason. And yet this very idea of perfect translation between “non-public, religious reason” and “public reason” is precisely what gives pause.

The noble Enlightenment hope for public reason should perhaps be reformulated, not as Rawls’s view that public reason should trump non-public reason, but as hope for a lively, rough-and-tumble, democratic political process of free and open exchange. This process of exchange – this alternative view of “public reasoning”: the public (citizens) reasoning with each other – is not limited in advance by what all “might reasonably be expected to reasonably endorse” (Rawls, 1996: l).\(^4\) Rather, this process acknowledges that what is reasonable to endorse is itself debatable, and that some voices in the debate will not always be deemed reasonable by others in the debate. This unkempt process arguably goes to the

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2 See Stout, p. 64, where he states, “I would encourage religiously committed citizens to make use of their basic freedoms by expressing their premises in as much depth and detail as they see fit when trading reasons with the rest of us on issues of concern to the body politic. If they are discouraged from speaking up this way, we will remain ignorant of the real reasons that many of our fellow citizens have for reaching some of the ethical and political conclusions they do.”


4 This is not to suggest that Rawls would want to legally prohibit religious reasons from public debate; he, like Rorty, is offering an argument that he hopes will lead people to voluntarily adopt his approach. And while I disagree with Rawls’s notion of public reason as it applies to most citizens, I do think that elected officials and judges should adopt something akin to it.
heart of a democracy that honours diversity, equality, and liberty of conscience. The test of the democratic process is not, ultimately, that it produce “the reasonable” – as Rawls understands it – but rather that it foster an inclusive and open exchange on matters of public significance.

3) Public Landscape as Religious Space

According to this model, the health of a society depends on a pervasive, shared civil religion: a set of morally charged, shared beliefs and practices pertaining to a nation’s history, founding documents, monuments, ideals, and so on. While a full-blown account of civil religion is beyond the scope of this article, this model directly pertains to our reflection on the place of religion in public. If the model has any plausibility at all, then it suggests that religion – now understood in a Durkheimian fashion; that is, religion as any set of shared beliefs and practices that morally unite a group – will always have a place in the public and political landscape.

This model brings a specific and useful complexity to the topic of religion and the public life. Those for and those against the profession of religious faith in public life often speak of religion as a clearly defined set of beliefs and practices. Boundaries between the “secular” and the “religious” seem plain and unambiguous. A merit of this third model is its refusal to accept this all-too-tidy border line. “Secular religion,” while an awkward expression, is not an oxymoron in this model.

Moreover, the model can easily acknowledge the various and often alloyed religious expressions made in public. It can, for example, account for how Martin Luther King Jr. can seamlessly – and within the same sentence – evoke the sacredness of human rights (conjuring civil religion) and the dignity of all humans as made in the image of God (conjuring traditional theology). This model, then, would not only lead us to question facile, hard-and-fast distinctions between “secular” and “religious” and between “public reasoning” and “private reasoning,” but it would also bring attention to different types of religious expression in public.

The model is not without problems. Conceptually, it relies on broad definition of religion, so broad that almost any significant public symbol, ritual, or principle could be considered religious. Politically, some fear that civil religion contributes to a form of national idolatry or that it sanctions, by sanctifying, nationalistic ideologies and aspirations. For the limited purposes of this article, however, this model adds some useful complexity to an otherwise simplistic discussion of the place of religion in the modern world and, specifically, of religion in the public life of democratic societies.

4) Public Landscape as Varied Topography

The name given to this model intentionally avoids a reference to the word “religion,” because this model does not initially treat religion as a special case. In this model, one does not decide in advance who may speak, or what kind of arguments one may offer, in public and political debate. A working assumption is that public voices will usually be varied in form and content. Some voices may be explicitly religious; others may be explicitly non-religious or even anti-religious. But these distinctions do not matter, according to this model, because no voice is treated as a special case. Liberty of conscience and freedom of speech deem that each voice is a special case worthy of a hearing.

This model makes no predictions about whether acknowledging and accommodating a varied public topography is likely to produce more conflict or more harmony. In some instances it may lead to divisiveness, in others to accord. But, harmony, often a worthy aim, is not usually the most salient issue. More important is attention to open and inclusive conversation, debate, and participation in democratic institutions.

Now, after having noted in what ways religion should not be treated as a special case, this model goes on to acknowledge that, in some sense, religion may be a special subject in some societies (in light of their particular socio-historical circumstances). Given the history of religion in the United States, which includes both religious persecutions and religious revivals, Americans as a people tend to be both religious and wary of religious authority. There are highly charged issues that pertain to religion in the United States that would not merit consideration in other societies. Different societies have different histories and different concerns. In US society, the association of a belief or practice with religion may be enough for it to become controversial if it enters the public space of government or education. This is in part because Americans have learned some lessons of caution from their history of religion.
Adherents to each of the models sketched out above wrestle in one way or another with the issue of religion and conflict. And while each model has its merits, each also tends to make contestable assumptions about how to defuse possible conflict associated with religion: model three (in some versions) assumes the existence of a pervasive and comprehensive national civil religion; model two assumes the viability of stripping away citizens’ religious identities in public and political debate; and model one assumes that traditional religion in the United States, if given free rein, will assure the moral flourishing of the nation.

While model four, Public Landscape as Varied Topography, does not seek to introduce unnecessary conflict and wishes to contribute to accord where needful, it does nonetheless focus more on honouring the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”) than on reducing social discord.

How, in practice, does this model support both clauses? Consider two examples of how model four translates into practical applications.

The model allows religious voices in public and political debate, while disallowing state funding and actions that promote any particular religion. The model, then, would largely support US Supreme Court decisions since the 1960s that have, on the one hand, prohibited state-sponsored school prayer and, on the other hand, allowed public schools to teach about religion – that is, to study religion as an academic subject. This distinction is crucial and reflects the spirit of model four: it prevents the state from promoting a particular religion, while permitting the state to host the study of, and thereby provide a forum on, religious diversity. Indeed, both acts – forbidding school-sponsored prayer and educating students about diverse religious traditions – work in concert as a powerful educational lesson, teaching students about living, working, playing, and debating in a pluralistic society. Studying diversity in this fashion is one of our best avenues to greater social understanding and tolerance on matters pertaining to religion.

Turning now to a different application of the model, consider the recent entry of evangelical Christians into public and political debate about climate change and other environmental policies. Christian evangelical organizations grew increasingly critical of the former Bush administration’s record on the environment. Increasing numbers of these conservative Christians are bringing to public debates about environmental policy distinctive theological arguments that refer to the goodness of the natural world and to the biblical obligation to protect all of creation – an obligation that for them entails political action. The Evangelical Environmental Network, for example, which is concerned about the relation between hurricanes, climate change, and the poor, can be expected to continue lobbying Congress to enact laws to stem global warming.

Model four would welcome expressions of these evangelical voices and their religious arguments addressing environmental policy in the public realm. It would not, however, permit government funding for evangelical groups to administer environmental programs, if these groups promote a distinctively theological point of view in the delivery of services. If recycling programs, mercury removal projects, or reduction of carbon emission programs were justified by appealing, for example, to the biblical obligation to care for the environment, they would be deemed an unconstitutional form of state sponsorship of religion. Model four would not prohibit all government funding for faith-based programs (some of such funding has much precedent that precedes the former Bush administration). But it would be vigilant in prohibiting funding to programs in which services delivered are entangled with a religious message or justification.
Although there is no detailed blueprint for how to apply the prohibition found in the First Amendment, its spirit is clear: Government is to refrain from explicit religious endorsement and from supporting religious proselytism. Historically, this prohibition has not automatically disallowed government from funding religious charitable organizations, providing that the delivery of services was free of proselytism and government endorsement.

Model four would not, however, support the former Bush administration’s “Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,” a multi-billion-dollar set of initiatives to aggressively woo and fund religious organizations to administer public social services in a way that makes many religious and nonreligious citizens alike nervous about religion in government and government in religion. The Bush White House’s publication “Partnering with the Federal Government,” promised that if religious organizations receive government funding, they may invite their social service clients to their religious services and events. They may even conduct religious activities such as prayer in the presence of those whom they are serving: for example, offering prayers before a meal at a soup kitchen. Moreover, those offering the prayers, who are paid with taxpayers’ dollars, may even be deemed qualified for their employment on the basis of their religious beliefs. The clients in these social service programs are often subjected to proselytizing, and the few prohibitions against proselytism that do exist are not enforced by the government.

Model four, then, would support faith-based, federally supported programs that vigorously prohibit all forms of proselytism and discrimination in hiring. Such support is consistent with the model’s basic principle: to welcome religious voices in public and political life, while disallowing state funding and actions that promote religion.

Again, although reduction of conflict is not the chief goal of model four, it does seem reasonable to expect that acknowledging and honouring our differences in public and political arenas will lead to a more co-operative society. Welcoming the many and varied voices is not only the right thing to do – legally and morally – but it may also be the most strategic way to draw on a powerful yet still latent source of strength in pluralistic democratic societies: the vitality of their diversity.

Religion, Democracy, and Modernity: A Way Forward

While model four may be appropriate for the United States, as well as for other democratic societies, it will need to be adapted to each society’s social and historical circumstances: its particular histories, institutions, struggles, ideals, and hopes. The province of Quebec, for example, which in the 1960s decisively moved away from a long-established model of society – a version of model one – that accorded significant political power to a particular faith (Roman Catholicism), may want to establish safeguards that prevent any particular religion from monopolizing political power, while at the same time developing venues and informal institutions that enable religious voices, including those of Roman Catholics, to express perspectives that pertain to the shared life of the greater society.

Whatever the nature of these adaptations, the presence of religion in modern societies makes clear the importance of wrestling with the ongoing, central democratic challenge of how to accommodate and respect – but not privilege – religious diversity in public space and in political deliberation. This article has argued that societies should not attempt to shield themselves from division and conflict by attempting (and probably failing) to keep religion out of public and political debate. While many will remain wary of hearing a significant (and possibly even rising) volume of religious discourse in the public space, the risks associated with attempts to suppress public expressions of religious faith are significantly greater than those associated with welcoming them. This goes to the heart of the promise of a dynamic democracy, in which diversity of perspective is brought to bear on common projects.

References

Introduction

The advisory report entitled *Laïcité et diversité religieuse : l’approche québécoise* [Laicity and Religious Diversity: The Quebec Approach] originated in the specific context following the attacks of September 11, 2001. At that time, situations involving religious diversity produced strong reactions within Quebec society. Examples include a young Sikh’s request to carry his kirpan at school and the expulsion of a student from a private school for wearing an Islamic veil. In addition, the government was going to have to decide whether or not to extend the override clause making it possible to provide Catholic and Protestant religious education in public schools, which was set to expire in June 2005.2

This article goes back to the structure of that advisory report, summarizes its content and core recommendations, and positions it in relation to the events that have occurred since it was published.

Religions and States

Depending on the period, region, type of political regime, and forces present, the relationship between religions and States has taken different forms and features. During some periods, the two notions were in fact practically merged. For example, some sovereigns, such as the Pharaoh in Antiquity or the Inca in pre-Columbian America, were considered to be gods. In Europe, during the first centuries of Christianity, State and Church were intimately related, the king holding his authority by divine power. However, over history, the two forces began to distance themselves, through processes specific to each country.

Thus, today in the West, some countries affirm the separation of Church and State in their constitutions. This is particularly the case in France, but also in the United States, Mexico,

1 In 2004, as a research officer employed by the Conseil des relations interculturelles (CRI) [Intercultural Relations Council], Ms. Therrien wrote the advisory report *Laïcité et diversité religieuse : l’approche québécoise* [Laicity and Religious Diversity: The Quebec Approach]. She is now performing similar duties at the Quebec Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (MICC). This article, written in a personal capacity, does not reflect the views of the CRI or MICC.

The mission of the CRI, a research and consultation agency, is to advise the Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities on all issues relating to integration of immigrants and intercultural relations.

*Submitted to the Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities on March 26, 2004, the report is accessible on the CRI web site at <www.conseilinterculturel.gouv.qc.ca>. The original report is in French, but there is also a 43-page English summary on the web site.

2 Bill 118 (An Act to amend various legislative provisions respecting education as regards confessional matters), adopted in 2000, repealed the confessional status of primary and secondary public schools but also allowed only Catholic and Protestant education to be maintained in Quebec public schools. Under the Charter, no religion should benefit from privileges inaccessible to other religions. Therefore, the government had to use an override clause to withdraw its law from the authority of the Charters. Since the federal Charter limits the duration of an override clause to 5 years, the government was to render another decision on the issue of religious education in schools in June 2005.
Portugal and Turkey. Others have a State religion (England, Denmark and Finland), while granting some recognition to other faiths. Some States (Belgium and the Netherlands) have adopted the so-called “pillar” system, in which some faiths are officially recognized and receive direct financial support from the State. Spain, after a period in which Catholicism was the State religion, recently recognized the Muslim religion.

Canada is a separate case, with the Constitution being practically silent on the relationship between State and religion even though for two centuries, two major religions have cohabited here with no significant confrontations. It should also be noted that, when the Constitution was repatriated in 1982, one reference to the supremacy of God did appear in its preamble, but that the Supreme Court has never made any reference to that in its judgments.

But what is the situation in Quebec?

Quebec and the Religious Dimension: A Changing Reality

The Place of Religion in Quebec: A Bit of History

Rooted in the North American continent and benefiting from both French heritage and a British influence, Quebec finds itself at the junction of several traditions which are very different with respect to Church-State relations.

New France. Following the Conquest in 1760, the British quickly recognized freedom of religion for Catholics, to prevent them from allying themselves with the Americans who were at war with England at that time. Thus, Catholics in the “Province of Quebec” were recognized to have rights which Catholics in Ireland did not enjoy at that time.

However, the Lower Canada Rebellion (known by French Canadians as the “Patriots’ Rebellion” - 1837), which was harshly repressed, and the signing of the Union Act between Upper and Lower Canada (1840) transformed relations between the colonial power and French Canadian society, and also between the clergy and the political elites which, starting at that time and for strategic reasons, would become strategic allies. From that time, French Canadians’ interests would become intimately tied to the interests of the Catholic clergy, for practically the whole following century.

The situation did not change when the British North America Act was signed in 1867. After World War II, however, the Church’s domination started to crumble. In the early 1960s, the Quiet Revolution took place, with the development of Quebec’s welfare state and the nationalization of electricity. Cultural and social transformations occurred at the same time. There was an accelerated movement to laicize Church-run structures, with a redefinition of identity. Ethno-religious anchors to identity lost their relevance. “French Canadians” disappeared, and were replaced by the “Québécois”, a name which gradually came to include men and women who, though not born in Quebec, have chosen to live there. Language and culture have become the paramount unifying elements and the poles of reference for identity.

Other major changes accompanied that transformation, particularly the National Assembly’s adoption in 1975 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the adoption in 1977 of the Charter of the French Language, making French the official language in Quebec and compelling immigrant children to go to French schools. The following years were thus marked, among other trends, by the promotion and expression of a culture of individual rights, the adjustment of Quebec institutions to ethnocultural diversity and the ongoing laicization of Quebec society.

3 Quebec society in this period is often presented as being entirely dominated by an omnipotent Catholic Church able to impose its views on the political powers. The work of Milot instead tends to demonstrate that, although the Church did have unquestionable ideological weight, the State was able to preserve its rights, even against the will of religious authorities, particularly on the issue of women’s right to vote or civil marriage.
Laicity in Quebec

In Quebec, laicity appears with different characteristics than in France. There, laicity began with the Revolution in 1789, and was opposed to a clergy allied with the Ancien Régime, and aimed to start a new social order, whereas Quebec laicity was based on a well-established democratic tradition. In France, laicity is a value to be defended, whereas in Quebec, it is a practice which has not always been named. Therefore, an effort is necessary to specify the meanings given to certain concepts which are often used as synonyms, but which correspond to different realities.

Based on the work of Micheline Milot and Jean Baubérot (2002), the following definitions have been used:

- **Secularization** applies to a society’s internal process whereby religion gradually loses its all-encompassing dimension under the influence of the other social phenomena (culture, the economy, etc.). Religion may remain relevant for individuals, but can no longer impose itself upon society as a whole.

- **Laicization** refers to the deliberate steps taken by the State to maintain neutral relations with religions and to prevent any direct interventions by religions in the management of the State. These elements are either formulated by means of constitutional provisions, by judicial decisions, or through common law.

- **Laicity** describes the result of the process of laicization. It can be defined as “a progressive development of social and political institutions with respect to the diversity of the moral, religious and philosophical preferences of citizens. With this development, freedom of conscience and religion are guaranteed by a neutral State with respect to the different conceptions of the good life, on the basis of commonly shared values that make encounter and dialogue possible. [translation]” (Comité des affaires religieuses [Religious Affairs Committee], 2003: 21).

Thus, laicity can be viewed as:

- The independence of the State from religions, as well as the autonomy of religion from politics. In other words, religions do not directly exercise any political power and the State exercises no religious power, leaving the churches to freely organize themselves in the public domain.

- A principle which rests upon individual rights. Laicity is in fact a corollary of rights and freedoms. Individuals, as holders of beliefs and convictions, have the right, recognized by charters, to exercise their freedom of conscience and religion and to express them in the public domain. Laicity therefore imposes itself upon institutions so that individuals may be able to fully enjoy their rights and freedoms.

Laicity defined in this way is quite different from laicism, a doctrine which aims to remove religion, in all its manifestations, from the entire public sphere.

Religions in the Civic Sphere

The Legal Framework

In Quebec, freedom of religion is a right guaranteed by section 2a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 3 of Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Freedom of religion is an individual right which is applied collectively through the right for members of the same religion to gather together and manifest their faith. Based on this stated and protected right, courts have given various judgments that have contributed to building the case law on which cases are henceforth evaluated.

The obligation of reasonable accommodation can be defined as “the obligation to adapt the rule designed for a majority, for the purpose of meeting the specific needs of certain persons or of a group so that they will not be victims of discrimination because of characteristics which differentiate them from the majority. This requires making exceptions to some general rules or modifying them in such a manner as to accommodate special needs of certain groups or persons, in order to respect their right to equality.” (Drapeau, 2001: 306).

Expressing freedom of religion, including through negotiation of a reasonable accommodation, cannot involve denying another a right protected by the Charter. In other words, one person may not assert a right if he/she thereby affects the right of another person.
The School Environment

Compared with other settings where religious diversity can exist, schools have certain specific features: it is not like a business confronted with a request from an employee or a client exercising his or her rights with full understanding of the case, but rather there are two third parties, namely, parents and educators, who, on both sides, wish to defend the child’s rights.

In this context, parents are of course justified in exercising, on behalf of their child, the right to religious freedom. Seen from the educator’s perspective, a request can also be seen as a religious constraint imposed on the child, whereas the school, by forbidding religious practices, provides room for the child’s freedom (McAndrew, nd).

In fact, schools play a role as a pivot point between the private and public spheres and, in that capacity, they must be open to accommodations. Nowadays, the question to be asked is not so much “when” or “on what” to make an accommodation, as to decide “how far” and “how” to do it. Whatever may be said in the school sector, guidelines do exist and they are fairly clear. Thus, in school as elsewhere, an accommodation should not directly interfere with any of the student’s other rights or the rights of any other students nor, of course, should it impose any undue hardship upon the school with respect to its operation or budget. Solutions found must also comply with the Public Education Act and its regulations, which formulate rigorously stringent requirements intended for school managers and teachers.

The Health Care Sector

This is a sector in which interventions can be sensitive because they involve those particularly significant times in human lives: birth, suffering and death. However, the very nature of the interventions, which are personalized and focused on the person’s needs, creates a context favourable to negotiation and often allows conflict resolution on a case-by-case basis. In this sector, the issue of religious diversity does not seem to arise in a specific way: it is more perceived as a component of cultural diversity. However, the level of sensitivity of health care professionals is very variable. Thus, although some multi-ethnic settings have developed very broad expertise, others seem to only just be discovering this reality. Moreover, in places where a sensitive approach had previously been developed in order to respond to the reality of a numerically larger group (for instance, Italians in Saint-Léonard), the institutions are sometimes experiencing difficulties in transferring their expertise to people from the more recent waves of immigration.

In several hospitals, for example, chaplaincy services have adapted to the diversification of beliefs and Catholic priests are no longer the only ones bringing comfort to people who express a need for it. Similarly, efforts have been made so that places reserved for meditation are not directly associated with one particular faith and may be used by the believers of different religions.

Municipalities

The diversification of religious practices (Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism, Buddhism) and the emergence of new Christian denominations (Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostalists) is creating an increasing demand for building places of worship, converting old churches or enlarging religious buildings. It is estimated that in 2002, of the 800 places of worship on the Island of Montréal, 35 percent belonged to ethnoreligious communities or groups.

The context of an increasing proliferation in places of worship is leading municipalities to fear a concentration of places of worship in residential neighbourhoods. The real estate market raises the issue of space sharing in a limited space where the proximity of a place of worship affects the market value of homes located in residential neighbourhoods.

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4 Text from the research of M. Jézéquel, Cadre d’analyse juridique en matière d’aménagement ou de reconversion des lieux de culte par les municipalités du Québec [legal analytical framework for developing or converting places of worship by Quebec municipalities], conducted for the CRI.
Authorization to build a place of worship depends essentially upon the zoning bylaw authorizing certain uses in certain zones. In the absence of available sites for building a place of worship, petitioners may request a modification of the zoning bylaw from the municipal Council, who refer it to the consultative Zoning Committee for an opinion. In the 1990s, several municipalities “froze” their zoning bylaws in a wholly legal fashion in order to restrict the sites where places of worship may be set up. Other municipalities adopted a moratorium on places of worship. “This change, which indeed protected the established churches, amounted in fact to a serious freeze put on the establishment of new places of worship, unless the petitioners made use of former Catholic churches (generally oversized when compared with the size of the new congregations).” (Germain et al., 2003: 27).

Recommendations

Based on the elements developed in the previous sections, the CRI formulated 27 recommendations, several addressed to the government overall, others to the Minister of Immigration and Cultural Communities and some, more specifically, to the Minister of Education, Leisure and Sport, to the Minister of Health and Social Services and to municipal authorities.

The following points summarize its recommendations of general application.

- Support reflection on a Quebec definition of laicity by initiating a dialogue with different religious groups, by supporting research and considering, as an outcome of these discussions and studies, a government declaration on laicity in the Quebec context;
- Create and maintain contacts with the various religious groups present in Quebec;
- Replace denominational Catholic and Protestant education in the public schools with ethical and cultural education about religions;
- Ensure that difficulties experienced by recent immigrants trying to enter the job market, especially people originating from the Maghreb, be monitored and given special attention, in order to counter any form of discrimination based on religious affiliation;
- Ensure that practices for integrating new immigrants take better account of religious diversity, especially with respect to sensitizing and training those that assist in their integration;
- Update the part of the 1991 Policy Statement which deals with intercommunity relations, to take into account changes in Quebec society and increase in religious diversity and to promote the exercise of citizenship based on living together;
- Examine the various practices followed in zoning places of worship to ensure that they not only take into account the urban development dimension, but also guarantee that religious diversity is taken into account at the local and regional levels;
- Introduce greater flexibility for facilitating the installation of places of worship in mixed-zone spaces (i.e. sectors zoned concurrently as residential and commercial), rather than in areas specifically designated as residential zones;
- Sensitize employers to the competitive advantages that can accrue from hiring individuals who are ethnoculturally and religiously diverse;
- Encourage, in each ministry and agency, development of expertise necessary to support the adaptation and negotiation efforts of various service units in matters involving cultural and religious diversity; and
- Pursue sensitivity training of personnel at all levels and ensure that it take into account the religious diversity dimension.

Since the publication of the advisory report Laïcité et diversité religieuse : l’approche québécoise, some situations have experienced major changes. This is true in schools where, in accordance with the recommendations of several consultative bodies (Comité des affaires religieuses [Religious Affairs Committee], 2004), including the CRI, the...
government decided to replace denominational Catholic and Protestant education in public schools with a religious culture and ethics course offered to students starting in the fall of 2008.

In October 2006, an Advisory Committee on Integration and Reasonable Accommodation in the Schools was established, with the mandate of proposing a strategy and relevant tools to the Minister of Education, Leisure and Sport. After the Committee’s report was submitted in December 2007, the Minister announced “that she would act upon its recommendations and that a ministerial team would be put in place to support schools and school boards in the process, if needed. In addition, the Minister made a commitment to distribute a reference guide setting out the legal framework for reasonable accommodation and suggesting an appropriate decision-making process for handling requests.”

However, the debate around the reasonable accommodation issue, far from losing interest, intensified, and resulted in the creation of the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles [Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences] in February 2007, chaired by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor.

Hearings held throughout Quebec as part of the Commission’s work showed to what extent issues of developing religious diversity can arouse passions and emotions, primarily because they touch on the concept of identity. In its report submitted to the government on May 22, 20086, the Commission raised several concerns: integration of immigrants, Quebec identity, interculturalism, French language, role of the media, etc. However, if one focuses on the place of religion in the public domain, as is the central intention of this article, it is noteworthy that several of the Commission’s reflections were consistent with those of the CRI. For example, this is the case when it discusses the definition of open secularism (laïcité ouverte), guidelines for managing adjustment requests in public institutions, training for those delivering public programs, the fight against religious discrimination, and promoting efforts in the workplace.

Since Bouchard and Taylor published their conclusions, Quebec intellectuals have been confronting each other on the deeper significance of their report – what it says and what it does not say. What will the report’s results be? The answer is still to come, but whatever its future, just like the CRI report, the Proulx report (1999) on schools and laicity or the work of the Comité des affaires religieuses [Religious Affairs Committee], it is already one more stone in the construction of a lay, open and inclusive society.

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6 To obtain a copy of the report (in French only): <www.accommodements.qc.ca>.

WWW.POLICYRESEARCH.GC.CA
Religious Diversity in Secular Societies: A Rising Challenge

Secular states and their underlying ideology of political secularism appear to have come under siege everywhere since the 1970s. They were severely jolted with the establishment of the first modern theocracy in 1979 in Iran. By the late 1980s, Islamic movements emerged in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Chad, Senegal, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Movements challenging secular states are hardly restricted to Muslim societies, however. Protestant movements decrying secularism have emerged in countries as widespread as Kenya, Guatemala, and the Philippines. Protestant fundamentalism has also become a force in American politics. Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka, Hindu nationalists in India, ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel, and Sikh nationalists in the state of Punjab in India and among diasporic communities in Canada and Britain have also questioned the separation of state and religion.

Even the largely secular-humanist ethos of Western Europe has not remained untouched by this public challenge. This is evident in Germany and Britain but was dramatically highlighted by the headscarf issue in France and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands.

With rising levels of immigration from non-Western countries, globalization has thrown pre-Christian faiths, Christianity, and Islam together in Western public spaces. The cumulative result is an increasingly deep religious diversity that is historically unprecedented in the West, a weakening of the public monopoly of single religions, a rising tide of mutual suspicion and distrust, and (on occasion) outright hostility and conflict.

Mainstream Western Secularism: Part of the Problem?

Can Western secularism reinvigorate itself and deal with the new reality of multiple vibrant religions in public life or with the social tensions this can engender?

The dominant self-understanding of Western secularism is that it is a universal doctrine requiring the strict separation (i.e. the mutual exclusion) of church/religion and state, for the sake...
of individual liberty and equality (including religious liberty and equality).

The social context that gave this self-understanding urgency and significance was the fundamental problem faced by modernizing Western societies: the threat to liberty posed by a church (or competing churches) bent on hegemony – a threat to religious liberty conceived individualistically (the liberty of an individual to seek her or his own personal way to God, an individual’s freedom of conscience) and to liberty more generally as, ultimately, the foundation of common citizenship.

To overcome this problem, modernizing Western societies created or strengthened alternative centres of public power completely separate from their historically dominant churches. In some cases, the state forcefully extricated itself from a hegemonizing religion in the name of both religious liberty and liberty more generally. (Hence the anti-religious flavour of some secular states). Moreover, the break was typically a sharp one – a mutual exclusion (a wall, as Thomas Jefferson famously put it) between the two relevant institutions, one intrinsically and solely public, and the other expected to retreat into the private domain and remain there. The individualist underpinnings of this view are also fully evident.

Western secularism was not designed for societies with deep religious diversity and...has persistent difficulties coping with community-oriented religions.

This classic Western conception of secularism was designed to solve the internal problem of a single religion (Christianity) with different fiercely competing sects. It also appeared to rest on an active hostility to the public role of religion and an obligatory, sometimes respectful indifference to whatever religion does within its own internal, private domain. As long as it remains private, the state is not meant to interfere.

It is now increasingly clear that this form of Western secularism was not designed for societies with deep religious diversity and that it has persistent difficulties coping with community-oriented religions, such as Roman Catholicism, Islam, and some forms of Hinduism and Sikhism that demand a public presence for themselves, particularly when they begin to cohabit the same society. This individualistic secularism is, in many ways, too parochial to have widespread acceptability and is increasingly being challenged outside Western societies as well as within them. In other words, Western secularism has become part of the problem.

Religion-Centred Alternatives to Secularism Offer No Solution

Is nothing redeemable in Western secularism? Should societies revert to a more religion-centred state that fuses with rather than separates from religion? Not if they value freedom and equality. Historically such states, for example, the state that established the Anglican Church in England or the Catholic Church in Italy properly valued neither freedom nor equality. Such states recognized a particular version of the religion enunciated by that church as the official religion, compelled individuals to congregate in only that church, punished them for failing to profess its particular set of religious beliefs, levied taxes its support of the one particular church, and made instruction of its favoured interpretation of religion mandatory in educational institutions. In such cases, not only was there inequality between religions (notably between Christians and Jews) but also among churches of the same religion. As a result, such societies were frequently wracked by inter-religious or inter-denominational wars and actively persecuted their religious minorities.

The situation of states with such “established” religions has not changed much with time. In contemporary Pakistan, for instance, the virtual establishment of the dominant Sunni sect has led to the persecution of even Muslim minorities. For example, Ahmedis have been deemed non-Muslim and have been convicted for calling themselves Muslims or using the word “mosque” to designate their place of worship.

Israel suffers from the same problems. As a self-declared Jewish state, it cannot but exclude its own Arab citizens (let alone other Palestinians) from at least some of its scheme of rights and benefits. The privileged status of Orthodox Judaism also leads to effective discrimination against adherents of Judaism’s reform and conservative offshoots.
Does this mean that all secular states are better than religion-centred states? No. Many such states (e.g. the British Raj in India and other colonial states) have historically separated themselves from religion to pursue power, wealth, or both more effectively and with few moral qualms. In opportunistically distancing themselves from all religions, these Machiavellian states fare equally poorly on an index of freedom and equality.

Standing in contrast to these “amoral” secular states are those that uphold freedom and equality, that is, value-based states in the mould of mainstream Western secularism. The problem, however, is that these are the very states that are said to be in crisis.

An Alternative Conception of Secularism: The Indian Model

Are there only two options to choose from: religion-centred, theocratic/pro-establishment states or purely individualistic, strict-separationist, Western secular states? Many non-Western societies have rejected secular states altogether and taken the first option. As Western societies become diverse, which way will they go? Will they become even more dogmatic in their assertions about their strict-separation secularism or, in view of changed circumstances, will they abandon it in favour of an unashamed embrace of some form of official establishment?

Or is there something that can get them out of this bind? Perhaps the problem lies with the implicit assumption that there is only one model of secularism: the one that emerged in the West. But have other models of secularism evolved elsewhere that may be better able to address the new demands facing Western societies without giving up the values for which the original model was devised?

The Indian model of secularism may well be of interest in this regard. It is a model that cannot be understood as a doctrine or a theory, but is one that has been worked out jointly by Hindus, Muslims, and adherents of other religions in the subcontinent, and that can be glimpsed in the best moments of inter-communal practice in India, as well as in the country’s constitution, properly interpreted.

The model did not just grow out of the influence of colonial modernity in the first half of the 20th century, but had its own deeper historical antecedents tracing back to a well-documented religious heterodoxy as far back as Vedic times (in the second millennium BCE), through to the reshaping of Vedic Brahmanism under Buddhist and Jain influence from the middle of the first millennium BCE through to early medieval times (in the bhakti movements in sixth and seventh centuries CE), as well as the later arrival of Islam, and the emergence of Sikhism, all of which emphasized social equality (see text box on p. 76).

Seven features of the Indian model potentially lend themselves to broader application.

- Multiple religions are not extras, added on as an afterthought, but present at its starting point, as part of the societal foundation.
- It is not entirely averse to the public character of religions. Although the state is not identified with a particular religion or with religion more generally (there is no establishment of religion), there is official and therefore public recognition granted to its multiple religious communities.
- It has a commitment to multiple values of liberty and equality, not conceived narrowly as pertaining only to individuals but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities, as well as other more basic values such as peace and toleration between communities. (As such, the model is acutely sensitive to the potential within religions to sanction violence.)
- It does not erect a wall of separation between state and religion. There are boundaries, of course, but they are porous.

This allows the state to intervene in religious affairs in various ways: granting aid to educational institutions of religious communities on a non-preferential basis; or prohibiting socio-religious practices that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion or to those of others (e.g. the ban on untouchability and the obligation to allow...
everyone, irrespective of caste, to enter Hindu temples, and actions to correct gender inequalities). In short, it interprets separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality but rather what could be called principled distance.

• There is no need to choose between active hostility or passive indifference, or between disrespectful hostility or respectful indifference. Societies can combine the two: the state may intervene to inhibit some practices, so long as it shows respect for other practices of the religious community by publicly lending support to them.

• By not fixing its commitment from the start exclusively to individual or community values or marking rigid boundaries between the public and private, India’s constitutional secularism allows decisions on these matters to be taken within the open dynamics of democratic politics, albeit with basic constraints, such as the renunciation of violence and protection of basic human rights, including the right not to be disenfranchised.

A formulaic articulation of Indian secularism could go something like this: The state must keep a principled distance from all public or private, individual-oriented or community-oriented religious institutions for the sake of the equally significant (and sometimes conflicting) values of peace, worldly prosperity, dignity, liberty and equality.

• Its commitment to multiple values and principled distance means the state tries to balance different, ambiguous but equally important values. This makes its secular ideal more like a contextual, ethically sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement (which is what it really is), rather than a scientific doctrine conjured by ideologues and merely implemented by political agents.

In the interests of succinctness, a somewhat forced, formulaic articulation of Indian secularism could go something like this: The state must keep a principled distance from all public or private, individual-oriented or community-oriented religious institutions for the sake of the equally significant (and sometimes conflicting) values of peace, worldly prosperity, dignity, liberty, and equality (in all their complicated individualistic and communitarian versions).

Discerning students of Western secularism may now begin to find something familiar in this ideal. But then, Indian secularism has not dropped fully formed from the sky. Over recent decades and centuries, it has shared a history with the West and, in part, has learned from and built on it. Indian secularism may be seen to be a route to retrieving the rich history of Western secularism – one that has largely been forgotten, underemphasized, or frequently obscured by the formula of strict separation. If so, Western societies can find reflected in it a condensed version of their own history and a vision of their future.

But one can still object: Look at the state of the subcontinent! Look at India! How deeply divided it remains! How can success be claimed for the Indian version of secularism? The force of this objection should not be underestimated. The secular ideal in India is in periodic crisis and is deeply contested. Besides, at the best of times, it generates as many problems as it solves.

But it should not be forgotten that the modern, constitutionally secular state of India was set up despite the massacre and displacement of millions of people on ethno-religious grounds. It has survived in a context in which ethnic nationalism remains dominant throughout the world. As different religious cultures claim their place in societies across the world, India’s development of secularism may offer the most peaceful, freedom-sensitive, and democratic way forward.

In particular, looking at the Indian experience it is important to keep in mind the following points.

• The state cannot avoid having or endorsing a policy toward religion or religious organizations. Religion plays an important part in the lives of many people and religious institutions inevitably interact with other (secular) institutions. So separation cannot mean the exclusion of religion from the public domain.
Separation of church and state should also not be interpreted as strict neutrality. No state can possibly achieve the goal of absolute neutrality. It can neither help nor hinder all religions in the same manner and to the same degree.

The state may interfere with religion – or refrain from such interference – depending entirely on which of these promotes the values of freedom and equality.

Values of freedom and equality must be interpreted both as rights of individuals and, wherever required, as rights of communities. Community rights are particularly important if religious groups are vulnerable or, because of their small number, have relatively little power to influence the process of decision making.

Secularism must be neither servile nor hostile to religion. It must manifest an attitude of neither blind deference nor indifference but of critical respect toward all religions.

Secularism that professes principled distance and is sensitive to multiple values cannot avoid making contextual judgements. Contextual judgements allow for ethically sensitive balancing and compromise.

Sensitivity to multiple values, the adoption of principled distance, and a commitment to contextual reasoning permit each society to work out its own conception of secularism and its own model of a secular state. Societies must recognize the need for multiple secularisms.

Finally, those who think they are liberated from religion or believe their own system of belief is liberating – but not the beliefs of others – should accept, with humility, that none of their achievements are irreversible. They should also not fail to remember the history of oppressions within their own respective religious (and non-religious) traditions.

As more and more societies become multi-religious, a sense of vulnerability of one’s own religion, indeed of one’s own world view will be crucial for a peaceful and just world order.

Secularism that professes principled distance and is sensitive to multiple values cannot avoid making contextual judgements. Contextual judgements allow for ethically sensitive balancing and compromise.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

India, by itself, is only one alternative model. This type of alternative version is likely embedded in the best practices of many states, including those Western states that are deeply enamoured by the ideology of mainstream Western secularism. And yet, the Indian model may help to demonstrate several points.

Western states need to improve understanding of their own secular practices just as Western secularism needs a better theoretical self-understanding.

Canada should carefully examine the normative potential in its own well-honed practices of social and political accommodation as well as looking to the Indian variant of a model based on “muddling through” to workable solutions rather than getting stuck on an idealized model developed at a particular time in the history of its parent (or neighbouring) societies.

Canada, like other Western societies, must devise a secularism that is less rooted in Christianity, less exclusively reliant on classical liberalism, and more openly sensitive to public- and community-oriented religions.

There must be willingness to recognize the religious rights of communities.
India has what Amartya Sen has called a long tradition of heterodoxy, citing numerous passages even in India’s oldest classical texts – the Vedas (which date back to the middle of the second millennium BCE) and other Sanskrit texts – that testify to extensive questioning by sceptics and even outright agnostics and atheists of religious orthodoxy and of the role and privileged position of the Brahmin caste.

The conceptual space for the idea of principled distance between rulers and the adherents of different religious traditions can be traced back to the reshaping of Vedic Brahmanism under Buddhist and Jain influence from the middle of the first millennium BCE onward.

Especially important was the development in India of Buddhism. For the Buddha, belief in a deity was far less important than human relations and right conduct toward one’s family and wider community. Further, since the function of the state is to prevent the disintegration of the society – and since caste structures constituted a force for disintegration – early Buddhists saw it as the duty of the ruler to oppose them, making Indian Buddhism one of the earliest originators of a version of the idea of social equality, an equality that in principle (if not always in practice) extended to both men and women.

The Buddhist emperor Ashoka (third century BCE) codified rules for public discussion of religious views, emphasizing restraint and the need to honour sects other than one’s own. Buddhism was also particularly important for the later influence it exercised in early medieval India (sixth and seventh centuries CE) on popular religious movements, creating background conditions for the development of Indian secularism.

The bhakti movements arose in the sixth and seventh centuries, particularly in southern India. For exponents of bhakti, what mattered ultimately was liberation from rebirth and from the miseries of this worldly existence. But unlike earlier forms of Hinduism and Buddhism, the bhaktas believed that only the individual’s devotion and faith in God could enable them to do so. Adherents decried all forms of rituals, undermining the position of Brahmins (whose self-understanding was that they alone could carry out necessary rituals) and eventually challenging the caste system. One particular bhakti movement, the Vir Shaivite movement founded by a Karnataka saint (Basava) in the 12th century went furthest, rejecting Vedic authority, the role of priests, all caste distinctions, and even the rite of cremation, favouring burial instead. More significantly, it attempted a radical restructuring in the role of women in south Indian society. It insisted on the equality of men and women, promoted the remarriage of widows, condemned child marriage as well as arranged marriages, and no longer classed women as polluted during menstruation.

The arrival of Islam in India (starting in the eighth century) broadened the choice before individuals of teachers and deities. The confluence of bhakti and (Islamic) Sufi traditions also led to further innovations. These syncretic inventions deviated sharply from both orthodox Hinduism and Islam, just as they bypassed the conflict between the orthodoxies of the two faiths. Like bhakti, Sufism frequently asserted the freedom of the individual to experiment with Islamic religious truth, even if such experimentation entailed a deep questioning of the sharia. Nirguna bhakti was as sceptical of idolatry as were all forms of Islam.

The rejection of the caste system by radical bhakti movements paralleled the propagation of social and religious equality professed by Islam. Both popular Islam and popular Hinduism veered toward individual religious idiosyncrasy and the rejection of social institutions and their power, as exemplified in the 16th century teachings of Ramananda, who taught egalitarianism and accepted disciples regardless of caste. Kabir, one of his pupils, took his teacher’s views in an even more radical direction, arguing that each devotee should seek God directly and

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envisioning a radically egalitarian social order. His views were endorsed by broad sections of society including peasants, artisans, and untouchables.

As the bhakti movement emphasized individual choice and a devotional path to God through the choice of an individual guru or sant, so the Sufis gave prominence to pir and fakirs. Over time the very distinction between guru and pir, between sant and fakir began to break down and those who were initially brought up as Hindus and Muslims forsook formal boundaries to follow the more fluid teachings of the Shaktas, the bhakti saints, and the Sufis. Those who did not belong to the upper levels of society followed and fulfilled their religious needs through what Romila Thapar calls the guru-pir tradition. This tradition, which emphasized individual choice, dissent, social equality, the mundane welfare of the people and, by sustaining the fluidity of boundaries between clearly demarcated elite religions, taught toleration and a form of limited but sincere universal social ethic, was followed by a majority of the people of India. The extensive (though not always uniform) practice of different forms of toleration and respect for religious heterodoxy in subsequent centuries (including the era of modern Indian secularism) is believed to draw its conceptual resources from this tradition.

The 16th century Mughal (i.e. Muslim) emperor Akbar epitomized the tradition, abolishing the jizya (pilgrim tax on Hindus), forbidding forcible conversions to Islam, removing restrictions on building temples, and appointing Hindus to high office. Echoing the religious councils organized by his Buddhist predecessor (Ashoka) two millennia earlier, he also organized religious discourses which were initially restricted to Muslims but after 1572 were opened to Hindus, Jains, Parsis, Christians, and even atheists – in sharp contrast to other parts of the world where religious bigotry and intolerance were rampant. (For example, 1572 also marked the St. Bartholomew's massacre in France.)

Akbar also developed and implemented the largely Sufi doctrine of sulhikul, under which all religions were equal, such that the festivals of all religious communities were to be publicly observed. This tradition of equal respect and impartiality by the state toward people of all religions was continued in the early period of British rule.

The coexistence over long periods of this great multiplicity of religious and non-religious world views and the impossibility or futility of one totally dominating or annihilating the other gave rise to a conceptual space which enabled the development of traditions of religious freedom. Not only were different faiths permitted to promote their teachings but also to build their own places of worship. As Max Weber put it, “religious and philosophical thinkers in India were able to enjoy nearly absolute freedom for long periods. Freedom of thought in ancient India has no parallel in the West before the recent age.”

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Introduction

In the wake of rising interest in issues of religious identity in Canada and other countries, this article summarizes research that prominent academics conducted between April 2007 and March 2008 with funding from the Multiculturalism Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.¹

Religious identity is central to the lives of many individuals, and the intensity and public manifestation of those identities is increasing in many countries. Even predominantly secular societies must address challenges associated with growing religious diversity.

Significant public discourse on the place of religion in Canadian society has been going on for several decades. Uncertainty over whether and how to adapt private and public practice to this new reality has been evident in the significant attention that the media and the general public have paid to visible religious markers in clothing (e.g. head covers for Muslim women, turbans for Sikh men), faith-based arbitration, and incidents that have been perceived as signs of increased anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Though Canada’s religious minorities remain small, their continuing growth, coupled with increasing religious diversity, suggest that these issues will have a higher profile in the future.

Recent Research Efforts and Remaining Gaps

Despite the scarcity of basic information on religious identity and its relevance to public policy, interest in research on religious diversity – its potential effects and the policy responses to it – has increased over the last decade. The question “What is this person’s religion?” was last asked in the 2001 Census of Canada, and will next be asked in 2011. Statistics Canada asked some religious identity questions on more recent surveys (such as the General Social Survey), but the sample sizes of those adhering to minority faiths are too small to use in research. The 2002 post-census Ethnic Diversity Survey (Statistics Canada, 2002) has adequate minority counts but is dated: attitudes about religion may have been changing as we move away from the events of September 11, 2001. Thus, there is a gap in data on religious diversity and the intensity of religious identities.

What is new in recent years is that our long-standing approach to accommodating religious differences must adapt to the increasing religious diversity in Canada. Uncertainty over whether and how to adapt private and public

¹ The Multiculturalism Program was transferred from the Department of Canadian Heritage to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in October 2008.
Nevertheless, a number of efforts have been made in recent years to understand the realities and implications of the increasing range of religious identities in Canada. In light of a growing number of controversies over both private and public accommodation of religious minorities across Canada (e.g. Islamic arbitration and public funding for religion-based schools in Ontario, and the incidents in Quebec that led to the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission), roundtable discussions suggest that a lack of religious literacy among decision makers and the public at large may be hampering identification of and effective response to situations that could compromise social cohesion.

Although the preamble to the Canadian Multiculturalism Act lists religion as one of the fundamental characteristics of Canadian diversity, some have argued that the public discourse around multiculturalism and immigration, and perhaps citizenship more broadly, has overlooked the importance for many Canadians of religious identities (as distinct from other cultural identity markers, such as ethnicity and language) and the needs of religious communities (Biles and Ibrahim, 2005).

In February 2008, the Department of Canadian Heritage hosted a forum on religious diversity, attended by over a hundred experts and policy makers, at which several researchers presented their findings. This forum was the culmination of the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch’s efforts from 2006 to 2008 to take stock of the demographic, social, and cultural challenges facing Canada. To generate discussion on the possible policy implications of the findings, the event showcased the Department’s commissioned research on religious diversity. Drawing on this research, a special edition of Canadian Diversity magazine was devoted to religious diversity in Canada (Jedwab, 2008a and 2008b; Seljak 2008; Bramadat and Wortley 2008a; Dib, 2008; Delic, 2008).

This article summarizes the commissioned researchers’ findings and the resulting policy implications. The following themes recur: religious radicalization, interactions of religious Canadians with an increasingly secular Canadian society, social capital within religious communities, and the challenges involved in integrating Muslim Canadians.

Religious Radicalization and Youth: Importation and Strain
Paul Bramadat and Scott Wortley researched youth radicalization in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism.

Although the 1985 Air India bombing gave Canadians an early indication of the potential security threats associated with radicalism grounded (at least in part) in religious identity, it was not until the events of September 11, 2001, that such threats and the need to understand their causes acquired an acute urgency throughout North America and around the world. The new post-9/11 environment has focused attention on the intersection of race, ethnicity, and religious identity. Bramadat and Wortley point to the need to fill in the gaps in our understanding of this intersection and its implications for public policy – particularly regarding public security and multiculturalism.

They point out that although radicalization may be due to a variety of causes, in the current environment there may be a need to address the causes of exclusion and marginalization, since they may be contributing to anti-social behaviour and radicalization. Perhaps more than any other recent event, the 2005 terrorist bombings in London sharpened the focus on minority youth, since the perpetrators were young men who had been brought up in British culture. As well, during the summer of 2006, police arrested and charged 17 men in the Greater Toronto Area under Canada’s anti-terrorism laws on suspicion of planning a series of major attacks in Ontario as part of an Islamic terrorist cell. A majority of the suspects were young: some in their teens and early 20s.

Such events have made the intersection of radicalism, youth, and religion a controversial matter of public discussion in Canada. Bramadat and Wortley argue there is a clear need to better understand the scope and nature of this as-yet under-researched intersec-

Despite the scarcity of basic information on religious identity and its relevance to public policy, interest in research on religious diversity – its potential effects and the policy responses to it – has increased over the last decade.
tion. A balanced exploration would require that religious youth radicalization be examined broadly, rather than focusing narrowly on Muslim youth. In addition, a preoccupation with national security can lead to perceptions of racial and religious profiling, which may undermine civil liberties and equality provisions for some minority ethnic or religious communities. Other research suggests that an effective multicultural approach could satisfy security needs by viewing factors contributing to anti-social behaviour and radicalization more widely as “social” security concerns. This would require working with communities and keeping in mind the social aspects, while factoring in respect for public liberties and human rights.

Bramadat and Wortley assert that of the five religions surveyed, none has proven historically to be more prone to violence than any other (Bramadat and Wortley, 2008a). Furthermore, by analyzing the content of 181 Canada-based religious web sites that target youth, they determined that only a small percentage (3.8%) of sites promote religious radicalization or violence (Bramadat and Wortley, 2008b).

Bramadat and Wortley also examine competing models in the analysis of religious youth radicalization: the importation model and the strain model. According to the importation model, religious extremism or radicalization is “imported” into Western countries such as Canada, having been developed elsewhere. The strain model, on the other hand, evaluates religious radicalization according to the conditions immigrants and minorities face within host societies (Bramadat and Wortley, 2008a).

Although both models may apply to Canada, and given that one of the objectives of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act is to address the integration challenges that “individuals and communities of all origins” face, Bramadat and Wortley view the strain model as most relevant to multiculturalism policy and programming. If the assumptions of this model are correct, Bramadat and Wortley argue for an approach to combating radicalization based on adding a focus on religious discrimination to policies and programs designed to combat hatred and discrimination. A more holistic approach would incorporate goals in addition to dealing with discrimination: goals such as removing barriers to full social, economic, and political participation, and working with communities on the entrenchment of democratic values and the sense of belonging.

Interaction of Religious Canadians with an Increasingly Secular Canadian Society

David Seljak explored the theme of how religious Canadians interact with what is widely perceived as being an increasingly secular society. He explains that in recent years, our understanding of the relationship between the state and religious institutions and communities in Canada has been tested by events and public controversy pertaining to issues such as faith-based arbitration and school funding in Ontario, as well as reasonable accommodation in Quebec. During summer 2005, a public debate that was going in many directions over a proposal to let Ontario residents use Islamic law to settle family disputes according to the province’s existing arbitration legislation ended abruptly when the Ontario government announced plans to ban all faith-based arbitration in the province on the grounds that such a ban would clarify the boundaries between church and state. Subsequently, during the 2007 electoral campaign, the province’s
political parties crossed swords over proposals to extend public funding to Ontario’s faith-based schools.

In 2008, the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences in Quebec suggested (in what is known as the Bouchard-Taylor report) that the province should define its approach to dealing with the needs of its religious communities, and particularly the distinction between secular institutions associated with “the state” and the rights of individuals to religious expression.

Seljak suggests a common factor linking these debates is confusion about the nature and parameters of secularism in a modern society, particularly the question of the appropriate relationship between religious beliefs and their expression in the public sphere. His recent work in this area, featured elsewhere in this issue, suggests this confusion may be due to poor understanding of the limits of secularism. This lack of understanding may be compounded by the influence of American secularism and a “myth of progress” that manifests itself in part as the popular belief that to become modern and advanced, a society must increasingly free itself of religious belief.

Seljak contends that the notion of the separation of church and state, a clear and precise “wall of separation” between these two institutions, is inaccurate as a description of the Canadian situation. Although Canada has become more secular its separation of political, economic, and social institutions from religious institutions, a majority of Canadians still describe themselves as “Christian”. As well, the number of non-Christian religious communities has increased since the 1970s.

Seljak concludes that any attribution of a clear separation between church and state to the evolution of Canadian government and society would be abstract, ahistorical, and therefore false (Seljak, 2008). He suggests that perpetuation of what he terms the myths of secularism and progress may inhibit the promotion of diversity and inclusion, which are among the goals of Canadian democratic participation and multiculturalism. In other words, ignoring the limits of secularism on the one hand and the increase in religious pluralism on the other may:

- mask the prevalence of typically ascribed Christian values in Canadian public culture and in institutional practices and structures;
- alienate large sectors of the Canadian population by refusing to acknowledge or respect the public elements of their religious traditions;
- ignore other claims made in the name of religion (for example, claims by Aboriginal peoples for access to certain lands in order to fulfill requirements of Aboriginal spirituality);
- discourage contributions to Canadian society by faith-based institutions and organizations, such as schools, hospitals, and social service agencies, as well as cultural, sports, and charitable organizations;
- foster resistance to reasonable accommodation of religious differences, a human right that guarantees that a practice or policy that serves the majority does not discriminate against members of religious minority groups;
- encourage the creation of religious “ghettoes”: closed ethno-religious communities that have relatively little connection to the rest of Canadian society; and
- prevent integration of ethno-religious newcomers (immigrants and refugees) by giving the Canadian state and society a public face that they see as foreign or hostile.2

Social Capital Within Religious Communities

Jedwab (2008a) argues that religious associations play an important, but overlooked, role in Canadian civil society – as important drivers of the social capital that is generated within society. He argues that nearly half of North America’s stock of social capital is religious or religiously affi-

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2 This list of challenges is taken from Seljak, pp. 6-24.
ated (as measured by indicators such as association memberships and philanthropy).

For example, between 1960 and 1990, Jedwab notes that spending by all levels of government on health, education, and social services grew rapidly, though direct delivery of many services remained in the hands of non-profit organizations. Religious congregations (local churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, and other places of worship) have responded to social needs arising in their communities, including those that may in part reflect reductions in government support. Of religious organizations that serve people directly, 73 percent primarily serve the general public (i.e. not just their own members). From the perspective of what is sometimes described as “good” social capital, he notes that only 27 percent of religious organizations say their members benefit most from their activities, while nearly 70 percent report that both members and non-members benefit from their services. This compares to the 46 percent of all organizations (i.e. both religious and non-religious) where non-members report benefiting from the services provided.3

Canada has the second-largest non-profit sector in the world, according to the Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective, which reports on the sector in 37 countries on the basis of size, scope, and donations. Among the registered religious charities, more than 40 percent (32,000) are faith-based, which include places of worship, clubs, and other forms of association (Hall et al., 2005).

Although religion is a very important source of social capital, mobilizing members in laudable causes and purposes, such mobilization may sometimes raise concerns. On more than one occasion, public attention has been directed to the link between religious activism and the security of Canadians.

Jedwab nevertheless argues that religious world views promote beneficial social capital overall, countering concerns that religious activism may undermine security. He notes that major world religions – Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam – like Christianity, all espouse some equivalent of a “golden rule” or ethic of reciprocity (“Treat others as you would like to be treated”) and that most religiously engaged people believe that the relief of poverty or suffering (i.e. doing good deeds) is a practical application of their faith. In particular, he cites a 35-country inquiry into views of citizenship among five religious groups that reveals few differences in opinion regarding certain tenets of good citizenship4 (Table 1).

This evidence suggests that religious engagement fosters greater belonging and discourages threats (real or perceived) to security. However, a macro-level view shows that diverse views do exist within each religious group in Canada, including more radical views than the mainstream (among Christian and Jewish groups as well as among Muslims, Sikhs, etc.).

### Challenges of Integrating Muslim Canadians

As a case study of a Canadian religious group that has been the focus of a disproportionately large amount of public and media debate in recent years, Zijad Delic was commissioned to conduct a comparative study on Muslim integration in Canada, France and Bosnia.

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3 Figures quoted in the paragraph are from Jedwab, 2008a.

4 Ibid.
For Canadian Muslims, Delic suggests that Canada’s multiculturalism model opens up opportunities to renew and reform their communal outlook within mainstream society while maintaining their religious beliefs. He argues that “this approach is unlike the one experienced by Muslims in France who live in a model of systemic assimilation or Muslims of Bosnia who were politically and socially under pressure to abandon their religious beliefs and become ‘others’” (Delic, 2008). He argues the major difference is that Canada consciously and officially defines itself as a multicultural state in that it not only tolerates but also welcomes people with a variety of ethnic origins, respects minority religions and cultures, and has made constitutional commitments to this end. Canadian integration policies can help visible or religious minorities engage in their surroundings, reconcile societal differences, and create realistic opportunities for both minorities and majorities to contribute to society as a whole.

A recent survey suggests these policies may be effective: a majority of Canadian Muslims feel at ease and comfortable in Canada, recognize Canada as their homeland, and are proud to be Canadians (CBC News; Environics Research Group, 2007). Yet obstacles to integration, inclusion, and participation remain. At odds with that survey – which found that 45 percent of Canadian Muslims have at least one university degree – is the fact that Muslims have the second-highest unemployment rate in Canada: 14.4 percent of Muslims are jobless, almost twice the national rate (Statistics Canada, 2001; Mujahid and Egab, 2004). In short, Canadian society does not yet appear to embrace Muslims as full citizens. As Husaini has noted, “If people are constantly reminded that they do not belong, whether on the crude level of the rhetoric of far-right discourse or media or the day-to-day discrimination, subtle or otherwise, that they may face, or when the government fails to listen to their concerns and request for needs, it is only a matter of time before they will feel alienated and lose the desire to belong” (Husaini, 1990).

According to Delic, overcoming the obstacles of integration and inclusion and expanding the opportunities to engage Canadian Muslims in Canada’s civic, economic, social, and political life would be a major national undertaking. To facilitate this process, he argues that representatives of Canadian Muslim associations and government policy makers must make a priority of increasing Muslims’ engagement in Canada. Delic calls on leaders, scholars and institutions (Muslim as well as non-Muslim) to find ways to help Canadian Muslims to participate fully in Canada.

References


International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity

Co-edited by: Paul Bramadat, Director, Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria, Canada
Matthias Koenig, Department of Sociology, University of Göttingen, Germany

This volume is the first in a new series, “Migration and Diversity: Comparative Issues and International Comparisons,” that is a partnership of the Metropolis Project and Queen’s University’s School of Policy Studies. Volumes are developed at the annual International Metropolis Conferences and are published as part of the Queen’s Policy Studies Series through McGill-Queen’s University Press. The series editors, James Frideres (University of Calgary) and Paul Spoonley (Massey University) work with the editors of each volume to ensure that the volumes speak to both research and policy.

This volume explores the wide range of social and political responses to religious diversity that one finds in Western states. Authors focus on changes in the political, legal and social responses to religious diversity resulting from increased international migration and the public visibility of new religious minorities in the West.

The first part of the volume examines contemporary theoretical debates about the governance of religious diversity in immigrant receiving countries. The second part presents original in-depth analyses of specific national contexts in which readers can scrutinize the social forces at work in the governance of religious diversity. The third part puts these national case studies into comparative perspective through an examination of both international normative frameworks for policy-formulation and the impact of contemporary world events on international public discourse about the relationship between religious diversity and migration.