

# **For an Extra \$130 Bucks....**

## **Update On Canada's Military Financial Crisis A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP**

### **Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence**



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**Second Session  
Thirty-Seventh Parliament**

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**Update  
On Canada's  
Military Financial Crisis**

**A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP**

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Senate Standing Committee on  
National Security and Defence

**November, 2002**

# MEMBERSHIP

## 37th Parliament – 2nd Session

### STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Deputy Chair*

And

The Honourable Senators:

Atkins

Banks

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## Introduction

*In February 2002, The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence published a report citing severe deficiencies in Canada's military and security preparedness in the wake of 11 September 2002. The Committee stands by the recommendations of that report, including the need to bring the Canadian Forces up to 75,000 trained, effective personnel. This update to that report maintains that we have passed the point when Canada's armed forces can be restored to provide a reasonable level of national defence while continuing to fulfill the manifold missions assigned to it. The Committee is therefore putting forth recommendations that include at least one that might have been unthinkable in more normal times, but which we regard as compelling in the current context of potential world turmoil and Canada's vulnerable position within that context.*

## **WORKING FROM THE BOTTOM UP**

**This update is based on the  
Committee's analysis of  
developments since our first  
report, plus a wide-ranging series  
of interviews conducted at 15  
military bases and installations  
across Canada.**

**On our travels we encountered  
first-hand the agony of committed  
armed forces personnel  
endeavouring to protect their  
country and fulfill commitments  
with levels of personnel, training  
and resources that make  
this mission  
impossible.**

## Money Isn't Everything, But . . .

The Canadian armed forces represent Canadians' primary defence against instability, terrorism, foreign domination, and many of the other blights that have made life intolerable in so many other lands. Immigrants have been attracted to Canada for as long as any of us can remember because Canada has provided a haven from both turmoil and poverty.

The Canadian armed forces are certainly not this country's sole defence against turmoil and poverty. But, when push comes to shove – in an increasingly volatile and uncertain world – a healthy military is far from the frill that it has largely been treated as by Canadian governments for some time. When peace and prosperity are two of the most precious treasures that Canadians share, it is foolhardy to leave them unguarded and uninsured.

Our government must not close its eyes to the fact that these treasures were vulnerable during World War II, were vulnerable during the Cold War, and have become increasingly vulnerable as asymmetrical global threats have bubbled to the surface in recent years. A country's defensive military capacity amounts largely to an insurance policy against the loss of national sovereignty and national interests that are too precious to take for granted.

The question whether the Government of Canada is investing sufficiently in the nation's insurance policy is

essential to what has to be the main question: whether Canadians are being provided with what reasonable risk analysts would deem to be an adequate amount of collective security for their lives, their assets, and their way of life. It is the position of this Committee that *they are not*.

It is also the position of this Committee that *Canadians can move from an unacceptable level of security to a reasonable level of security at a relatively marginal cost*.

## When Frugal Isn't Smart

In spending on military equipment and personnel – as in most areas of life – there are bargains out there. But the general rule remains that buyers get what they pay for. Although Canada is not a poor country, it has gained international notoriety for trying to defend itself – and what it stands for – on the cheap. Consider these facts:

- Canada spends approximately \$395 per capita on defence.<sup>1</sup>
- The United Kingdom spends approximately \$1,425 per capita on defence.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The DND website gives the DND budget for 2001/02 with final supplements as \$12.313 billion. DND main estimates for 2002/03 reduce the DND budget to \$11.834.

<sup>2</sup> High Commission of United Kingdom, Ottawa; based on population of 60 million, using conversion rate for 23 Sept, 2002.

- The United States spends approximately \$2,000 per capita on defence.<sup>3</sup>
- Although Canada, in the current context of international terrorism, is clearly much more of a military target than most of the world's smaller countries, it ranks 153rd in defence spending out of 192 countries based on percentage of GDP.<sup>4</sup>
- Canada ranked 13th out of 18 NATO nations in per capita defence spending – ahead of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Turkey and Spain.<sup>5</sup>
- At approximately 31 million people, Canada has the world's 34th largest population. It has the 56th-largest regular military forces; the 77<sup>th</sup> largest military reserves.<sup>6</sup>
- As of August 31, 2002, Canada ranked 34th in the world in its contribution to **world peacekeeping missions**, supplying **less than 1 per cent** of international peacekeepers in action.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Embassy of the United States, Ottawa, 2003 Defence Appropriation \$US 378.6 billion; population of 288,123 000 using conversion rate for 23 Ept 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, **Strategic Profile: Canada, 2001**.

<sup>5</sup> **NATO Review, Spring 2001**, Table, "Defence Spending per Capita".

<sup>6</sup> Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, **Strategic Profile: Canada, 2001**.

<sup>7</sup> **United Nations Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping Operations**, "August 2002, Summary of Countries". <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/Contributors/Aug2002Countrysummary.pfd>

## Backwater Spending

Any way you cut it, Canada's level of military spending would be more appropriate to a nation hidden away from the fray of global finance, global politics, and global influence. But Canada is too big a country – and too important a country – to hide itself away.

**Not only is Canada a player on the world scene, it is a large and vulnerable target. Internationally, it is closely identified with its closest neighbour, the last great superpower. The United States is unquestionably at the bull's eye of the terrorists' target, the focus of a global network that is both committed and fanatical. Canada's affiliation with, and proximity to, the United States locates us on the second inner ring of the target – a hair's breadth away.**



## Turning Our Back On the World

Beyond its clear commitment to defending its own territory, Canada has a commitment to sharing in the defence of a continent, and the defence of its allies – like-minded nations also targeted by a movement that will find vulnerabilities elsewhere if it cannot find enough of them on American soil. It also has a commitment to assisting in the creation a less turbulent world, where vengeance is less likely to lead to violence.

As John Manley, currently Canada's finance minister but recently Canada's minister of foreign affairs, said on Oct. 4, 2001, Canada faces a ***"glaring inadequacy"*** in its defence, intelligence-gathering and foreign aid capabilities that is compromising the country's ability to live up to its commitments and its international reputation: ***"You can't just sit at the G8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom,"*** Mr. Manley said, referring to Canada's membership in the global club of seven rich countries plus Russia. ***"If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G8, there's a cost to doing that."***

The Government of Canada currently seems unwilling to pay that cost. When Canada was asked to place a battalion of soldiers into Afghanistan, it could only offer up 800 soldiers. It could not transport them there or back, and it could not respond to the request to replace the soldiers when their tour of duty was over. This incident constituted more than a national embarrassment. This incident was indicative of this country's inability to play a reasonable role in defending itself.

## Are WE the Isolationists?

Thoughtful citizens everywhere support the idea that responsible nations should work in harmony to improve international stability and well-being. Many citizens – including Canadians – have found cause to worry over the years that U.S. leaders might back away from this team responsibility, bending to the strong strain of isolationism that has always run through American political thought.

It would be more useful if thoughtful Canadians started directing their anxiety at the strong strain of isolationism that has been running through Canadian political practice in recent years.

Canada moved to a position of prominence on the world stage at the beginning of the Second World War. Now Canada is on the brink of walking away from its role in the main cast into a secondary role in the chorus. With levels of spending on foreign aid and military preparedness that fall short of past targets and current commitments, Canada is fading into irrelevance at the level at which international problems are solved.

## For \$130 Extra...

The Committee's February 2002 report recommended an immediate increase of \$4 billion to bring the Department of National Defence's baseline from \$11.8 billion to \$15.8 billion, with increases in future years that are realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation.

The Committee's recommendation works out to \$130 per Canadian.<sup>8</sup>

This \$ 4 billion figure is in line with the recommendations of several other institutions and committees that have studied this issue, including:

**A Nation at Risk** – Conference of Defence Associations, (October 2002)

**The People's Defence Review**, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (September, 2002)

**Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces**, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (May, 2002)

**Caught in the Middle: an Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces**, Conference of Defence Associations, (October 2001)

**Report of the Auditor General of Canada 2001**, Chapter 10, "National Defence- In Service Equipment."

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<sup>8</sup> Based on an increase of \$4 billion and a population of 31 million.

## The Committee's Rationale

Some of these reports, perhaps hoping to make their proposals more palatable to those who control the purse strings, have proposed that this kind of increase be introduced over a number of years. At the time, the Committee explained that **our experience is that a variety of government exigencies can intervene to constrain or reverse multi-year commitments.** Thus our recommendation for an immediate increase of \$4 billion to the baseline DND budget with future annual increases that are realistic, purpose-driven, and adjusted for inflation.

With Canada's progressive fiscal system, of course, the poor would pay much less than \$130 apiece. The rich would pay more. Both rich and poor – and everyone in between – would benefit out of all proportion to cost.

**Their contribution would go to a more stable, less-threatened country, in a more stable, less-threatened world.** In the Committee's mind, most thoughtful Canadians would find this an even more attractive bargain than a new dress, a night at an NHL game, or most of other extras that so many people find the money for in a free and prosperous society.

This thinking is behind the two recommendations we are putting forward in this Update. The first is a reiteration of our earlier conclusions. The second is a result of a deterioration in the capacity of Canada's armed forces that demands the government's full and immediate attention if our broken Forces are to be repaired.

# Recommendations – Part I

## Cash Injection as a Starting Point

1

**The Committee reiterates that the four billion dollar increase in defence spending recommended in our earlier report is the MINIMUM required, and that the full increase is required IMMEDIATELY.**

This would amount to an increase in spending of approximately \$130 per Canadian, bringing our per-capita defence spending to about \$525 a person. That is only one quarter of what the average American spends on defence, and just over a third of what Britons spend – and the latter, like Canadians, fund a national health care system.

But the Committee is not asking Canadians to spend what Americans or Britons spend.

Nor is it asking that Canadians move up among the top ranks of defence spenders in the world. That extra \$130 would only bump us one notch up the NATO ladder, ahead of Portugal, to 12th place out of 18 countries.

If the Committee were asking for a \$200-per capita increase in defence spending, that would move us up another notch, ahead of Italy as well as Portugal, into 11th place on the NATO list. The Committee is not asking that Canada rise to this heady level.

If the Committee were asking for a \$400-per capita increase in defence spending, that would move us up to 7<sup>th</sup> place on the list.

But the Committee is not asking for any of these things. Rather:

**The Committee is asking that the Government of Canada apportion an extra \$130 per Canadian to military spending to bring our main international insurance policy – our armed forces – to a level at which personnel would not be constantly stretched to the breaking point, often without the proper training or equipment to assure either their safety or success.**

# Recommendations – Part II

## Strategic Retreat: *Rope-a-Dope Revival*

The word “retreat” has a negative ring to it in just about any context, including the military. However, the phrase “strategic retreat” has a positive military connotation when it is applied to situations in which forces pull back tactically to obtain an advantage that eventually leads to strategic success.

Think of the famous boxer Muhammed Ali, and his historic success in the ring. He had an expression for one of his most successful techniques – “Rope-a Dope” – which involved backing deftly into the ropes in order to dodge punches and restore his energy so he could swirl back to win. It is not unlike what the Committee is recommending for the Canadian armed forces.

The Committee’s continued investigation into the manifest shortfall of personnel, training and equipment which pervades the Canadian armed forces has convinced us that time has run out on Canada in terms of solving its military problems with cash alone.

The Committee believes that it is now impossible to simply inject fresh funding and resources in a way that will quickly create a defence force capable of performing the tasks that the Canadian armed forces can be expected to be assigned over the next few years – certainly under the operational burden that has prevailed in recent years.

In a nutshell, even if the Government of Canada does the right thing and comes through immediately with \$4 billion in extra funding, the gesture will almost certainly prove inadequate to the multiple undertakings at hand. The military now needs time almost as much as it needs money to revitalize itself for its obligations early in the 21st century. It needs a respite from its manifold overseas responsibilities, giving it time to recruit, time to train, time to re-equip itself, time to rethink its optimal role in the modern theatre of warfare. *The following recommendation may sound Draconian to some, but the Committee believes that unless the Canadian Forces pull back from their current overseas assignments, the restructuring, rearming and revitalizing that is so desperately needed can not and will not take place:*

## 2

**The Committee recommends that all Canadian military forces be withdrawn from overseas duty as soon as current tours expire. This could take up to six months.**

**The Committee recommends that no forces be deployed overseas for a minimum of 24 months thereafter. This amounts to a 30 month moratorium on deployments.<sup>9</sup>**

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<sup>9</sup>The Committee recommends that recurring commitments such as the following be treated as exceptions to the pause in overseas tasking: military attaches, military staff at NATO and SACLANT Headquarters, NORAD-assigned Military Staff (including recently announced Land and Sea planning staffs) and the NATO AWACS units at Geilenkirchen, Germany.



## **A New Commitment to Our Allies; A New Commitment to the World**

Tours of duty normally last for six months, so within six months of the Government of Canada initiating this recommendation, all Canadian troops would be back on North American soil and engaged in restoring capacity to an effective level.

The Committee is fully aware that critics of such a move are bound to charge that Canada would be abrogating its obligations to its allies, but the opposite is true. We must turn Canadian gestures toward working in concert with our allies into genuine Canadian performances.

Canada's international image is already in disrepair. Our recommended pullback is unlikely to worsen that situation – in fact, it will likely gain us credence for realistically addressing a serious problem. In the end, the capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to advance Canada's interests will be enhanced, not weakened.

The pullback will affect our short term working relationships with NATO, UN and allies. However, the Committee is convinced that Canada's contribution to these relationships has become so marginal that it is time to take drastic action to replenish our capacity to play a useful role. Canada will be able to regain its rightful position as a significant contributor to world stability.

The fact that Canada's depleted forces have managed some stellar international performances over the past decade is more a tribute to their spirit and resilience than to the support they have been given. Spirit cannot fuel Canada's military on its own. Both our troops and our allies deserve renewed capacity, and the sooner Canada gets on with reinvigorating its military, the better.

Canada currently contributes one coalition mission to the fight on terrorism, two NATO missions, and eight U.N. missions. Operation Apollo, Canada's commitment to the war on terrorism has 1068 assigned personnel. Canada has 1579 troops assigned to Operation Palladin to help stabilize Bosnia Herzegovina. Canada has one officer assigned to the NATO operation to collect weapons from rebel factions in Macedonia. Of the eight U.N. missions, the largest is a commitment of 193 personnel in the Golan Heights. For a full description of Canadian overseas missions, see Appendix 5.

## Money and Time

The Committee has heard hundreds of hours of testimony from senior defence personnel in Ottawa and from enlisted personnel from all levels at 15 Canadian Forces bases and installations across the country. The testimony that we have heard, in conjunction with the analysis of the international military situation that we have done, compels the Committee to state flatly that *Canadian Forces are understrength, overworked, underfunded, and in precarious health.*

The zeal of the Canadian armed forces is not in question. Both our military leaders and their troops continue to demonstrate a “can do” attitude and continue to come up with “innovative methods” of executing their missions. But a jerry-rigged armed forces cannot keep rising to dangerous occasions. Too much is being asked of too few personnel with too few resources.

Built-in safety mechanisms – proper leave time, reasonable rotations, regular training – have fallen by the wayside. These are safeguards designed to preserve the marriages, health, sanity, and the professional performance of Canadian troops.

The erosion of these mechanisms has led to unusual losses of trained personnel in recent years. For instance, the Air Force 2001 business plan stated that:

***“The Air Force is at a crossroads in that it is quickly becoming people resource limited and no amount of equipment or funding resources will alleviate the situation in the short term. Personnel shortages critical to delivery of Air Force capabilities continue unabated. Lack of experience – notably in the tactical helicopter, tactical fighter, maritime helicopter and maritime patrol communities – is becoming acute.”***

Of the 567 pilots with “contract obligations,” based on informal polling, about 50 per cent said they expected to leave the Canadian Forces once their period of restricted release came to an end in 2003<sup>10</sup>. Other Air Force trades are also below Preferred Manning Levels, some critically so. The most threatened of the support technician trades is Military Occupation 640 – Refrigeration & Mechanical Technicians, Electrical Distribution Technicians, Electrical Generating Systems Technicians, Plumbing and Heating Technicians, Water, Fuel and Environmental Technicians, Construction Technician and Construction Engineering Superintendents – where six of the seven trades are coded RED (in critical condition) because their occupational strength was substantially below preferred manning levels. The 2001 report assessed the understrength of the Military Occupation 226 – Aerospace Telecommunications & Information Systems Technicians – at more than 25 per cent and continuing to worsen. Shortages are similar in the navy, and even more pronounced in the army.

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<sup>10</sup> Air Force Business Plan for 2001

## Our Military Leaders Have Public Responsibilities

Our military leaders, including senior DND bureaucrats, must be frank with parliamentary committees about what kind of performance Canada's armed forces can be expected to deliver on the assortment of tasks they are asked to perform with the resources available to them. The government, on its part, should encourage – *not discourage* – the offering of genuine professional opinions by Canada's military leaders when they appear before parliamentary committees.

The Committee is not suggesting that Canada's military leaders roam the country drumming up support for military spending on talk shows, editorial board meetings and through other media outlets. But parliamentary committees ask questions on behalf of the people of Canada, and play an advisory role in government decision-making. Governments can not make intelligent decisions without candid advice, nor can citizens properly weigh the merits and demerits of investing in competent military protection.

Parliamentary committees such as ours can deliver blunt messages to politicians and the public, but unless Canada's military leaders are more open about the state of the institution that is one of the primary instruments in maintaining Canadian security and prosperity, bad situations are unlikely to get better.

We were told repeatedly how depressing it is for Canada's enlisted personnel to have to listen when politicians drag out some "spin doctor in uniform" to defend the indefensible. There is a perception among the rank-and-file of Canada's armed forces that

some military leaders pull their punches with the public in deference to the wishes of politicians. Military power must clearly submit to political power in a democracy. No member of our Committee wants senior officers acting as public lobbyists for increased military spending. Having said that, timidity with the truth is not the kind of virtue our politicians should be encouraging among its senior military personnel when they are appearing before Parliamentary Committees.

The Committee was not always convinced that senior officers and bureaucrats appearing before it were being perfectly frank. Senior officers are telling the truth, for instance, when they say Canada can send a battalion somewhere if called upon, but they are not telling the whole truth if sending that battalion would continue the downward spiral in Canada's military capabilities.

The United States government is not reticent about telling its military leaders that they must obey their political leaders, yet U.S. military leaders are also expected to offer their most candid professional analysis to congressional committees. The Government of Canada should expect and encourage the same professional candor in this country. And if the government encourages senior officers to undermine the recommendations of committees such as ours simply because the government finds those recommendations unpalatable, democracy will not be served.

***Canadians need brave military leaders on the legislative front as much as they need brave soldiers on the battlefield. Canadians also need politicians with enough objectivity to welcome thoughtful public analysis on key issues from senior military personnel.***

It should be acknowledged that some senior officers have publicly voiced general concerns. Lieutenant-General Jeffrey, head of Canada's army, has complained about a lack of resources to sustain the army's wide array of tasking. Vice-Admiral Buck, head of Canada's navy, has attempted to muster support for the "urgency" of revitalizing the Canadian military. General Henault, Chief of Defence Staff, has stated that "the status quo is unsustainable." But these amount to small squeaks in the loud arena of public policy-making; what we could use from Canada's military leaders now is a thundering roar. Misguided loyalty appears to be muting the military's strongest voices.

## **Canadians Should Know What Our Troops Know**

Every soldier knows that training for enhanced future performance is suffering because too many resources are being thrown into too many "missions du jour." Every soldier knows that Canada's armed forces – because of insufficient training, insufficient maintenance of equipment, and insufficient home time to build quality performance on good health and good personal lives – are not performing the way they could. But these people are not in a position to alert the Canadian public about these shortfalls. Their bosses are – or should be.

## Let Them Do Their Jobs

The incidence of sick leave within the Canadian military has increased substantially in recent years because personnel are being overworked on tasks that are too big and too numerous to fit within the capacity of Canada's military forces. CBC News reported on Aug. 19, 2002, that the incidence of sick leave in Canada's armed forces had increased by 25 per cent between 1999 and 2001. Yet for all the complaints we heard from enlisted people about insufficient time to regroup and retrain, this was not the major frustration they voiced.

***The main complaint we heard was simply that soldiers are not being allowed to soldier, sailors are not being allowed to sail and airmen are not being allowed to fly because of constraints in personnel, and technicians are not being allowed to complete their jobs because of lack of funding for maintenance and equipment.***

Imagine training troops in rocket-launching with a rocket shortage that requires that only two of twenty trainees are given live rounds to fire, leaving the others to face the prospect of firing in combat with no hands-on experience. Virtual training is the wave of the future, but there will never be a substitute for hands-on experience.



## Rejuvenation: The Process

It is the Committee's belief that a 30 month moratorium in overseas tasks only represents a starting point in putting the Canadian armed forces on the road to recovery. It is likely to take the better part of a decade to bring the military back to the shape it was in when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Atrophied capacity cannot be restored over a few months.

A pause would allow key personnel – many of whom would otherwise be serving overseas – to play a role in refocussing and rejuvenating Canadian Forces training programs. Current training capacity is far too depleted to make training a priority without repatriating overseas regulars for a predictable period.

Two years will not be enough to rehabilitate the navy and air force. However, over two years, a significant turnaround could be achieved in the army. Though the army's current deficiencies are even more pressing than those of the navy and air force, it takes less time to train army personnel than it does navy and air force personnel. With adequate planning and funding, the Committee feels that a two-year turnaround is at least within the realm of possibility for the army.

The current recruiting drive should be sustained – the current level of trained, effective personnel in the Canadian Forces is 52,000 – 8,000 short of current authorized levels. But recruiting without adequate training is worthless. The Committee encountered recruits forced to sit twiddling their thumbs because of the military's depleted capacity for training. And training certainly isn't the only commodity in short supply.

## **Some Very Basic Needs**

- New career training courses for troops returning from overseas military operations – many of whom have been deprived of normal upgrading due to the pace of overseas assignments in recent years – must be introduced;
- Troops whose family life has been endangered because of the stressful tempo of repetitive overseas duty should be given a greater opportunity to “reintegrate” into their family;
- DND planning units must be bolstered to allow them to develop the kinds of innovative programs that are needed and to put these programs forward;
- More project managers must be hired to permit the proper purchasing and absorption of new capital equipment;
- An opportunity should finally be provided to conduct much-needed “regular scheduled maintenance” on all equipment;
- In non-emergency situations troops must be allowed to take their annual allotment of leave at times that are of use to their families and their personal lives rather than the rigid scheduling often imposed on them under current circumstances;

- Military planners must be given the opportunity to review existing commitments, operational plans, etc., and assess Canada's legitimate capacity to meet current and potential obligations;
- Senior military personnel must be taken out of their current "crisis management mode" and provided the time to assess capabilities and provide the government with candid and objective strategic advice on the future of the military.

**None of the foregoing recommendations has the slightest chance of being implemented unless the central agencies of the Government of Canada – the Prime Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office, Treasury Board and the Department of Finance – join forces to expedite the rejuvenation of Canada's armed forces, instead of dragging their heels to resist it.**

## **Navy, Air Force, Will Take Longer**

Canada's navy is stretched to its limit, largely due to its recent operations related to the invasion of Afghanistan. Increasing the number of operative naval personnel will take much longer than two years. The 2-year hiatus will merely free up current personnel to assist in training recruits and sailors who have been denied training because of their onerous operational schedules.

Naval personnel often require more training than army personnel. For instance, it can take more than six years to train a naval engineer. Canada's air force is in a similar situation. The air force needs more technicians and more pilots. It takes two and half years to train a pilot to basic qualifications on her/his aircraft. Technicians take about 18 months to train, and even then they are only qualified to work under supervision.

## The Bottom Line

Canadians are not interested in spending \$130 apiece just to restore the self-esteem of the Canadian military. But the Committee believes that they would be willing to see that kind of money spent to create an institution capable of building a more secure country in a more secure world. The following is a list of improvements that citizens can expect if we invest an additional \$4 billion in Canada's military budget and effect a two-year pause in overseas activities:

### **For an injection of \$1 billion into Operations and Maintenance, Canadians would get:**

- **PROPERLY-TRAINED TROOPS:** increased individual and collective training for troops, so recruits don't sit idly waiting to become useful soldiers, so reserves improve their capabilities to the level of regulars, and so regulars retrain often enough to retain skills and add new skills required for modern warfare;
- **IMPROVED AIR SURVEILLANCE:** increased flying hours on all aircraft fleets to improve surveillance of Canada's lands and waters, maintain flying skills and increase training opportunities;

- **SHIPS THAT CAN GO TO SEA:** increased ship streaming days, and an end to ships tied up because of lack of funding and personnel;
- **MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT FUNCTIONS:** refilling of “spare parts” bins to assure that equipment doesn’t sit idle because of lack of replacement parts to keep it operative and an end to cannibalizing some capital equipment to make other equipment function;
- **AN END TO MILITARY SLUMS:** improved and more regular maintenance of all capital equipment, offices and living quarters to reverse the amount of deterioration that has taken place during the past decade;
- **A ROLE IN PROTECTING THEIR CONTINENT:** a return to battalion-level training between Canadian forces and Canada’s allies (particularly U.S. forces) so that all command and operational facilities are capable of responding cooperatively to emergency threats, especially in the defence of North America.

**For an injection of \$675 – \$800 million into acquiring and upgrading military personnel, Canadians would get:**

- **ENOUGH TROOPS TO PLAY A PROPER INTERNATIONAL ROLE:** expansion of the number of personnel in the Canadian armed forces from the current 52,000 trained effective strength, to 75,000 trained effective strength to help put an end to the burnout and low re-

- enlistment rate that has been caused by assigning too few people to do too many things at too crushing a pace;
- **SAVINGS IN MILITARY TURNOVER:** increased enlistment, retention and specialist bonuses to encourage attraction and retention of first-rate personnel;
  - **FEWER SOLDIERS JUST SCRAPING BY:** selective pay raises for lower ranks to reduce unfairness, improve morale and upgrade family life;
  - **FEWER BROKEN MILITARY FAMILIES:** a range of improvements in accommodation to mitigate the pressures placed on marriages by one of the most stressful occupations in existence;

**For an injection of \$2-2.325 billion into capital programs, Canadians would get:**

- **HELICOPTERS THAT OFFER OUR FRIGATES ADEQUATE PROTECTION:** an immediate startup to the Maritime Helicopter Project to ensure that the ancient Sea Kings, which spend much more time in maintenance than in the air, are replaced by 2005;
- **AN END TO INTERNATIONAL HITCH-HIKING:** immediate procurement of a strategic lift capability, both in the air and on the sea, to ensure that Canadian troops can get where they need to go in emergency situations, without having to rent, borrow or beg lift capacity from non-Canadian sources;

- **AN IMPROVED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING CAPACITY:** acceleration of the Canadian Forces intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance project to improve ability to gather and analyze intelligence – perhaps the most crucial military mission to countering asymmetrical threats in modern warfare;
- **SHARED SURVEILLANCE OF WHAT THREATENS NORTH AMERICA:** acceleration of the Joint Space Project as one way of assuring that Canada makes a meaningful contribution in the defence of North America;
- **PROPER COASTAL DEFENCE:** improved coordination of Canadian and U.S. forces in defence of North America's long and vulnerable coastlines;
- **UNIFORMS THAT FIT THE BATTLEFIELD:** improvements in military clothing for all personnel so that troops are appropriately outfitted for all situations, particularly difficult combat situations, and particularly with regard to female combat clothing;
- **PROTECTION AGAINST FRIENDLY FIRE** – Effective recognition equipment to reduce the likelihood of casualties from friendly fire.



## What the Troops Told Us

The Committee systematically visited most of Canada's military bases and installations for two reasons:

- The visits educate Committee members about the issues facing the Canadian Forces; and
- The visits allow us to compare testimony from senior officers and officials in Ottawa with the views and opinions of officers, non-commissioned members and all others in the field who must actually deliver the goods.

**Outside Ottawa the Committee has listened to a wide range of regular and reserve commanders as well as other senior officers. The Committee also makes a point of conducting informal sessions with junior officers, non-commissioned members and enlisted men and women. The Committee also included both a recently retired general grade officer and a recently retired senior non-commissioned officer on its staff, going to great length to ensure that it was hearing the perspectives of both senior officers and enlisted personnel. The Committee is indebted to the units visited for their hospitality and to their personnel for their insights. We listened to some very committed people. And we listened to some very disillusioned people. We have attempted to pass on their messages in the following summaries of what took place at the bases and installations we visited.**

# Fighting a War on Three Fronts

Three common themes related to inadequate funding emerged from the fact-finding visits:

- I. The Personnel Crisis:**  
*Too Few People, Too Little Training*
  
- II. The Operational Crisis:**  
*Insufficient Funding for Operations,  
Maintenance, and Infrastructure*
  
- III. The Capital Equipment Crisis:**  
*Canada's Antique Road Show*

## **I. The Personnel Crisis:**

### ***Too Few People, Too Little Training***

Asked what his first priority would be if the Canadian armed forces were adequately funded, one young soldier gave us an extremely succinct reply:

***“More of us”.***

A decade of staff shrinkage has seen the Canadian Forces diminish from more than 80,000 personnel to approximately 52,400 effective.

**Systematic understaffing has resulted in problems such as the following:**

- Delayed repairs to essential equipment because there are not enough technicians;
- Ships tied up because they have no crews;
- Understrength infantry battalions;

- An excessively high tempo of operations leaving inadequate time between deployments, putting increased stress on individuals and their families, often leading to sick leave;
- Absence of any kind of training above the battalion level since 1993;
- Delays in getting potential recruits processed and into the Canadian Forces;
- Recruits left with very little to do while they wait for training opportunities to open up;
- Personnel waiting 7 to 12 months for basic qualification courses;
- The augmentation of training units from operational formations;
- Shortage of spare parts has reached such a situation where it affects technicians attitudes towards job satisfaction and their subsequent retention in the CF;
- The cannibalization of operational units in order to staff training units during peak training periods.

## **Lack of Training Capacity Big Part of Personnel Problem**

**The financial evisceration of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s had a disproportionate impact on our military's cadre of full-time instructors. With few recruits coming through the system, it was easy to argue that training personnel and material could be drastically reduced. So it was reduced, with predictable detrimental effects.**

**The Committee was told that reduced opportunities to practice and develop professional skills was the key to why some of the most skilled and useful members of the Canadian Forces have not been re-enlisting.**

## **What We Heard About the Personnel Crisis at the Bases**

### **Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt**

The Navy, like the rest of the Canadian Forces, has implemented the Total Force concept, ostensibly demanding the same standards of leadership and professionalism from regulars and reservists alike. Reservists at Esquimalt told members of the Committee that lack of training prevented them from approaching regular force standards.

Rear Admiral Fraser's main role as Commander Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF) is to prepare ships and crew for war. When the Committee visited the Esquimalt base, ships had been operating under extremely high security in preparation for the next deployment. That involved screening about 700 officers and other ranks to ensure that their training, mental and physical condition – as well as family circumstances – met requirements for overseas deployment.

We probed the fact that not all ships had the proper complement of personnel. In response to questions we learned that the ranks of junior officers were particularly thin, with some technical trades noticeably short-staffed. To bring some ships to full strength, crew had to be removed from other ships in the fleet. As a result, two ships – a destroyer and a coastal defence vessel – were left tied up, too understaffed to put to sea. Since the Navy is short about 1,000 officers and other ranks, its personnel must spend more time at sea – 60% at sea and 40% on land – than other NATO navies, where the usual time split is 50-50.

Because most at-sea training capacity is now allocated to training regular force officers, reservists are being forced to scramble for the at-sea training time they need to upgrade performance levels.

Captain (N) Pile briefed the Committee on the role of the Reserves in manning the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, six on the west coast and six on the east coast. With the exception of two regular force technical experts, these vessels are staffed (including the Captain) with 38 reservists from across Canada, on contracts ranging from three months to three years.

We learned that the Naval Reserve on the west coast faces the same staff shortage as the Navy, which meant that only five of six vessels could be crewed. The tempo of operations had become the major source of complaint at Esquimalt, eclipsing pay and allowances. The frantic pace, we were told, was having an impact on morale, stress (individual and family), physical health and group cohesiveness.

## **17 Wing Winnipeg**

The Committee was told by both troops and officers that the tempo of operations and a shortage of critical personnel were the major challenges facing 1 Canadian Air Division.

Operations and staff shortages had set up a vicious circle. The use of line personnel to augment training capacity had diminished operational capacity, in turn creating a need for more trained people.

The Committee learned that cutbacks in funding have reduced every kind of training – individual, group, national and international. As a result, the general level of readiness has

declined, with only a small number of pilots at the highest level of readiness.

The retention of existing specialists was deemed to be a more critical problem than recruiting. ***It is clearly cheaper to retain expertise than to train new expertise.*** Many specialists have been leaving because of poor working conditions as well as inadequate training and equipment. We were told that retention bonuses, if approved, should help to retain more technicians.

Chief Warrant Officer Dietrich briefed the Committee on initiatives to enhance the quality of life of Air Division personnel. He said that lack of training time had been pinpointed as a major source of stress within the Division. The airman had been forced to become “a jack of all trades, master of none” – an unprofessional situation that undermined pride, confidence and competence.

## **CFB Halifax**

Captain (N) Burke, Acting Commanding Officer, Maritime Forces Atlantic, briefed the Committee on the challenges facing the command:

- Budgets 26% smaller than five years ago;
- Reduced equipment and fewer personnel, leading to tension over tempo of operations and quality of life;
- Maintenance of fleet negatively impacted by shortage of technicians – at the moment a shortage of technicians is considered even more critical than the overall money shortage;



We were told that the command was only capable of staffing two of the three ships being prepared for deployment at the time of our briefing. Finding staff for the third ship, the Iroquois, to meet the rotation planned for January 2003 would require asking many crew members to deploy again just eight months after their previous deployment.

It was normal for a regular sailor to be at sea an average of 100 days a year, but the coastal patrol boat crews were staffed by reservists on contract, who were spending 120-150 days a year at sea, with inevitable effects on family life. Unlike the west coast Reservists' problem with lack of at-sea training, east coast Reservists complained of onerous tours of duty at sea.

## **Cape Scott**

Captain (N) Payne, Commanding Officer Fleet Maintenance Facility, Cape Scott, briefed the Committee on the importance of the facility, which was facing a labour shortage because the training program had been eliminated as part of the 1990s cutbacks. The work force was aging and an apprentice program was needed to train and give experience to the next generation of personnel.

Without the reintroduction of an apprentice program, the facility will soon reach the point where it will be unable to meet the needs of the Atlantic fleet.

## **12 Wing Shearwater**

The most difficult issue facing Shearwater, the Committee was told repeatedly, was the tempo of operations – especially overseas deployments, which were squeezing the time available for personal

training and family tremendously. In support of the Apollo war against terrorism, 12 Wing Shearwater had deployed 120 personnel abroad for 6 months to crew and maintain helicopter air detachments on board the deployed ships. This constituted a tempo that could only be sustained by reducing training and family time.

- The Wing is already short Sea King pilots. Of the 37 available pilots, 24 were deployed outside the country. When they returned they were supposed to get time to renew their family ties and time to renew tactical skills they had not used on deployment. But, at this base, like so many others, personnel were being subjected to stresses beyond those normally associated with their tough and dangerous profession.
- Some pilots and maintenance personnel were forced to “jetty hop” – move immediately to another assignment – upon their return.

Colonel Hincke, Commanding Officer of 12 Wing Shearwater, told us that deferred recruiting had led to a severe shortage of specialized personnel, a shortage that would persist until new recruits could be trained and had acquired experience. The venerable Sea King helicopters require high maintenance and a shortage of maintenance crew leads to fewer hours in the air for the helicopters – the serviceability rate of the Sea King has averaged about 55 per cent on any given day. Even given the fact that new helicopters require some maintenance time, it is not a huge exaggeration to say that it takes the better part of two Sea Kings to perform the duties that one helicopter should.

## **CFB Gagetown**

The enlisted personnel who we talked to at lunch were clearly demoralized by the dearth of suitable facilities for families – including substandard barracks, a lack of medical specialists, little assistance for school children with special needs, etc. The lack of French-speaking medical support in the city was so serious that many personnel refused postings to the base. Space is a real problem, with personnel doubled and tripled up in inadequate barracks during summer training periods as just one example.

Brigadier General Mitchell, Commander Land Forces Atlantic, and Colonel MacLeod, Commander 3 Area Support Group, briefed the Committee. They acknowledged that they face a number of “challenges” that sounded more like crises.

Since their training capacity has been cut, they must augment training staff with instructors taken from operational units across Canada, robbing these units of key staff and denying training staff family time plus time to pursue their own professional upgrading.

The Committee heard evidence that the Army lacks the personnel to both sustain the high tempo of operations and modernize itself. It was briefed by Colonel Ward, Commander of the Combat Training Centre, and by the Commandants of the infantry, artillery and armoured schools. The round table discussion that ensued was particularly candid. The blunt collective opinion expressed by officers and instructors is that they face an unsustainable, and therefore untenable, situation.

The schools are short at least 300 permanent instructors, forcing augmentation from operational units. The demand for courses was increasing relentlessly. While permanent staff had been reduced by 25 per cent, the number of students taking courses at the schools

had increased from 1,429 to 2,342 at the time of our visit, increasing the number of training days from 50,000 to 100,000. Dealing with this increase in demand had forced the training schools to increase their requested augmentation from operational units of the Regular and Reserve forces from 350 to 2,000.

In the opinion of our briefers, the situation can only get worse before it gets better – newly recruited officers will require immediate training, and once the other ranks recruited finish their basic training, they will need occupational and specialized training.

403 Wolf Squadron trains pilots to fly CH 146 Griffon helicopters used to support the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Black, its Commanding Officer, outlined a list of personnel “challenges” – the main one being personnel shortages forcing the unit to rely on the Reserves for staff and a shortage of computer technicians that forced aircraft technicians to do their work.

## **CFB Kingston**

What is it like to be a PAT (Personnel Awaiting Training)?

Committee members lunched with a group of students and PATs. Most of them told us that they had joined the military to begin exciting and worthwhile careers. Instead they had been forced to languish between seven and twelve months before trade qualification training courses became available, which they pointed out was not only a waste of resources but also a dampener on morale. While some training had been extemporized for them, most of their time was wasted. When the Committee visited, about 30 PATs were watching TV; others were working in the tuck shop, etc. At Kingston, as elsewhere, the numbers of PATs were increasing rapidly – from about a platoon (30) to a company (174). While some PATs had no objections to being paid to watch TV,

others were disgusted and demoralized, telling us that they saw no point in re-enlisting at the end of their current three year contract.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tarrant, Deputy Director of Army Training, briefed the Committee on the resources devoted to training, the costs of training non-commissioned ranks and officers, and some of the challenges that the training establishment faced. After the briefing he and Brigadier-General Nordick, Deputy Commander Land Forces Doctrine and Training System, answered questions.

To maintain their skills and operational experience, instructors are only posted for three years before they return to their units. Most instructors are full-time, but their numbers must be supplemented from regular units in the summer due to staff shortages.

BGen. Nordick said the shortage of training staff for both officers and enlisted personnel is the most serious problem the training units face, and that, in turn, has serious implications for the field forces. He pointed out that the additional 177 officers and non-commissioned members needed for training is the equivalent of the staff of three battalions. It would take almost five years for the success of the current recruiting drive to produce enough trained and experienced soldiers to meet the training needs of the army.

Since the Canadian forces can only pay Reserve soldiers for the equivalent of 35 days a year, their training opportunities are much more limited than those available to regulars who work a 250-day year. The shortage of training time for reservists is being exacerbated by the technological revolution. There is so much to learn that reservists are only given the most essential parts of courses. If they later join the Regulars, they have to be retrained with full courses. The planned increase in the strength of the Reserves from 15,000 to 18,000 had not been funded at the time of the Committee's visit.

## **CFB Borden**

At the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Headquarters, the Committee was told that the success of the current recruiting drive has stretched limited resources beyond their capacity to respond.

The Committee noted the irony here. The Forces need more personnel, and have been successful at recruiting more people, but the lack of training capacity has become a bottleneck. Both the capacity to train new recruits and the capacity to give introductory courses in the hundred different trades the Forces need has been truncated by years of cutbacks.

At an informal lunch with junior non-commissioned members, we were told that the maintenance of the tempo of operations at the current level would undoubtedly dissuade many of them from re-enlisting. Not only were instructors being disillusioned by this situation, they deplored the message it was sending to new recruits.

Major Orr told the Committee that the Recruiting Group Structure had 950 personnel, 31 per cent of whom are reservists. 553 work in 33 recruiting centres and detachments across the country, There are 307 involved in training about 5,000 recruits each year at St-Jean, Quebec, and about 90 are attached to headquarters, CFB Borden. The 10,000 planned recruitment intake had already been exceeded by 1,000 at the end of March. Recruiting of Reservists had reached 150% of planned intake. As a result, the paid strength of the Canadian Forces was already more than 61,000 and was expected to rise to 63,000 by 31 March 2003. The trained effective strength, however, is around 52,000.

Lt.Col. Lilienthal briefed the Committee on the work of the Canadian Forces Support Training Group that is responsible for delivering a wide range of specialized courses both at CFB Borden

and at other locations. On base there are schools of Administration and Logistics, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Dental Services, Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warfare as well as the Fire Academy and the Military Police Academy, a Training Development Centre and a Chaplain School. Schools of Military Engineering, Military Intelligence, Communications and Electronics, and Languages are located elsewhere.

## **8 Wing Trenton**

At 8 Wing, we were briefed by Major Henderson, who told the Committee that 8 Wing provides flexible airlift forces, search and rescue and deployable support for Canadian Forces. She said that the training of pilots is at high risk of being cancelled – even though they require a minimum number of hours to maintain their qualifications, and more to develop them – because of the heavy tempo of operations has created a shortage of aircraft. Because of this shortage of aircraft, only one aircraft can be allocated to training instead of the two that are required.

In a round table discussion, it was pointed out that about 54% of the aircraft technicians would become eligible for retirement within the next five years. It is essential to hold onto as many technicians as possible so shortages do not become even more acute. Even after courses are finished, it still takes about 2-3 years of on-job training to fully train a technician. There was some consensus that the amalgamation of the air force trades had been poorly planned – it was proving very difficult to master the full contents of the new trades.

We were told by technicians that a lack of spare parts and equipment required to do their jobs is a major disincentive to re-enlisting.

## **The Canadian Forces Parachute Centre**

The Canadian Forces Parachute Centre is at risk of being eliminated as a cost cutting measure. The officers and enlisted personnel we talked to, both at the school and at operational army units, emphasized that parachute capability is an essential element of any modern army, both for operational and morale purposes.

## **CFB Petawawa**

At 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, a round table discussion with a group of senior officers exposed the Brigade as woefully understaffed to meet its day-to-day operational tasks. For example, with about 575 personnel, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment is ostensibly at 80% strength; in reality, most days it could only parade 300-400, about half its established strength. The others have been lost to postings and sick leave. The sick can account for up to 10% of Battalion personnel, in part because there is a reluctance to remove them from active roster when there is any hope of a return to duty.

The manpower shortage leads to double tasking – assigning the same forces to cover more than one operation. Or – in the case of the operational plan to provide assistance in the event of a major earthquake in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia (COP AGILE) – it has wasted resources on planning that doesn't lead to deployment because of lack of personnel. Since the Brigade must prepare one Battalion of infantry for deployment, that battalion must be given priority on personnel, equipment and training funds. This has a serious impact on both Battalions because one operates short-handed, while the other operates with unfamiliar personnel.



If the officers had more money at their disposal, they told us that one of the first things they would do would be to build up the Brigade units to their full establishment, factoring in a margin of overstrength to allow for those on extended sick leave. The additional manpower would reduce the stress of the tempo of operations. Too frequently soldiers were forced from a course to a posting and then to summer training without any significant breaks.

They would also spend much more on field exercises and on ammunition for live fire training, both of which had been severely restricted as an economy measure. Base Petawawa itself is too small to allow infantry, tanks and artillery to manoeuvre together in realistic exercises.

The officers argued that re-enlistments will increase if more is done to challenge soldiers who have the most initiative. Their ideas for new training included development of a school of reconnaissance skills and creation of special units that – like the disbanded Airborne Regiment – would offer more challenge than the ordinary infantry unit while being less demanding than the JTF2. To encourage interoperability among the western allies, platoons could be exchanged with countries like the United States, and the U.K.

## **19 Wing Comox**

At Patricia Bay Detachment, we were briefed by 407 Squadron personnel who operate Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft from 19 Wing Comox, B.C. During the question period following the outline of the Squadron's duties, the Committee was told that because of budgetary restrictions, the pilots of the Auroras fly only 400 hours a year, only marginally above the minimum number of hours necessary to maintain skills. On 443 Squadron in Pat Bay,

the shortage of airworthy helicopters had limited their pilots to 300 hours flying at sea and 150 hours on shore.

## **The Black Watch**

While there was no formal briefing session with the officers and non commissioned officers of the Black Watch (Militia), members of the Committee discussed a number of issues in informal discussions.

Problems recruiting new officers and men were the most common personnel complaints raised by both officers and senior non-commissioned officers. Recruiting is organized and controlled on the Brigade level.

The Black Watch Regiment itself has a great deal of historical and military appeal, but red tape strangles its ability to recruit on its own – to place ads in local newspapers, to visit local high schools, colleges and universities and to participate in student job fairs. Its individual recruiting is pretty much limited to personal contact – recruiting the friends of current members – and to “curb appeal” – putting sandwich board advertisements on the street outside the armoury.

Potential recruits frequently lose their interest in joining the Regiment because of the long time it takes to complete the recruitment process and to start training. The delay in taking on potential officers is particularly long and irksome. Almost all officer candidates are college or university students who need a quick decision about their employment and an early pay check.

Pre-service in a militia unit should be a normal route, perhaps even the preferred route, into the Regular force. Instead, it takes so long to arrange a transfer from a militia unit to the Regular force that

some personnel either quit the militia or fail to mention their militia service when applying to join the Regular Force. This is a waste of time and of training resources.

The Black Watch and the other local militia units are increasingly short of instructors, and consequently cannot quickly increase their numbers. The capacity to offer training at the local level is also adversely affected when large numbers of the best trained and most experienced master corporals – the core of the militia training system – are deployed overseas or posted to training schools.



## II. The Operational Crisis:

### *Insufficient Funding for Operations, Maintenance and Infrastructure*

**The Operations and Maintenance budget of the Canadian Forces is manifestly inadequate. Flying hours, at sea days, inventory of spare parts, live firing exercises etc. have all been pared to the bone to save money. The impact of this lack of adequate Operations and Maintenance funds quickly became evident at nearly every base and unit visited. On a number of occasions during its fact-finding visits, the Committee was told that the infrastructure of military bases (and the bases of the Army in particular) was inadequate, either because of dilapidated facilities or non-existent facilities. Lack of funds to re-habilitate, maintain and to build infrastructure at military bases is another fallout from the lack of funds budgeted for operations and maintenance. While not restricted to Army bases, the issue of infrastructure was raised much more insistently at Army bases than at Navy or Air Force bases.**

The Committee heard testimony on lack of funds for operations and maintenance at the following bases in particular:

## **CFB Esquimalt**

At the Headquarters of Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), the Committee was given a number of examples of the impact of the reduced budgets. For example, the surveillance role of MARPAF has been reduced because its most effective tools, the Aurora aircraft overflights, have been cut back to 2-3 patrols a week. The units of other NATO countries average 125 days at sea, but Canada's navy on average only budgets enough fuel for 60 sea days a year. Inadequate budgets and lack of personnel mean that only 60% of the fleet can be kept at the highest level of readiness. 443 Squadron has only six Sea King helicopters to support Maritime Forces Pacific. Of these, one is unavailable. At Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF) officers and men complained that newcomers found family housing very expensive, both on and off base.

## **17 Wing Winnipeg**

At 1 Canadian Air Division, Canadian Region NORAD Headquarters, cutbacks in funding have reduced every kind of training – individual, group, national and international. As a result, the general level of readiness has declined, with only a small number of pilots at the highest level of readiness (i.e. combat ready in both air-to-ground and air-to-air roles).

Training for a number of types of missions has been discontinued. CF-18 pilots no longer practice low-level flying as one way of complying with the reduction in annual flying hours to 180 from

210. In the early 1990s, the norm for CF18 pilots was 240 hours per year.

Similarly, flying hours for Aurora pilots have been reduced. Use of simulators, and the elimination of anti-submarine training, are the rationales given for the reduction in flying hours of the pilots and crew of Aurora patrol aircraft.

## **CFB Halifax**

The Committee was told that the combination of reduced equipment and fewer personnel had led to tension about the tempo of operations and the quality of life at Maritime Forces Atlantic. At the time of our visit, however, a shortage of technicians was an even more visible grievance than the overall shortage of money. At an informal meeting with members of the Committee, service personnel complained about the length of time it took to get needed equipment.

The Committee also heard from both officers and enlisted personnel that the military housing in Halifax is substandard. The Permanent Married Quarters (PMQs) were built in the 1950s to the standards of the 1940s. As a result, about 70 per cent of the officers and enlisted personnel either owned or rented in Halifax. There was not much demand for the smaller military apartments because of local market conditions, and many were consequently unoccupied. In general the other ranks the Committee spoke to believed that the military units were not worth the rent charged – frequently more than the cost of buying a local house. There was agreement, however, that there was still the need to make larger 3 and 4 bedroom apartments available.

## **CFB Gagetown**

Colonel MacLeod, Commander 3 Area Support Group, told the Committee that there was a shortage of single rooms, even in the winter, and 200 staff had to live two or three to a room. In the summer the situation was much worse and both staff and students had to live in tents. The base infrastructure was deteriorating and some buildings were actually dangerous. There was no money available to carry out the \$100 million of renovations base training areas needed.

Another serious problem was the shortage of spare parts and ammunition for new equipment. In particular, it was extremely difficult to provide “sustainment” logistical support of parts and ammunition for overseas deployments. Lack of spare parts and ammunition leads to lack of adequate training, which not only leads to substandard performance on the battlefield and in other emergencies, but also leads to qualified people giving up and leaving Canada's armed forces.

## **CFB Kingston**

Major Hall, Deputy Commandant of the School of Communications and Electronics, told the Committee that the School trains CF personnel on how to set up, operate and maintain radio, telephone and computer communications in Canada and abroad.

The Committee learned that as a result of the halt in recruitment as the Forces downsized in the 1990s, the School lost one of its major buildings. Now, with the ramp up in recruiting and the requirement to increase training output, it is desperately short of space, dealt

with in the next section of the report. This lack of space has had a negative impact on the morale of staff and students alike.

Current capacity in the Performance-Oriented Electronics Training program is 180 positions. Although it is planned to increase the number of seats to 384, there is demand for 550-600 spaces.

It is difficult to overemphasize the debilitating effect of insufficient training capacity, and the Committee got an earful about what the effects have been. Reduced training meant no low-level technicians for a number of years, which means insufficient numbers of low-level technicians gaining the experience necessary to become supervisors. The average age of technicians rises, and when they become discouraged about lack of capacity to do their jobs and get out, there is no one to replace them. There is simply too much work for too few people.

Following the briefing the Committee visited classrooms and spoke with instructors and students before having lunch with some of the students. The loss of a building in the 1990s has forced the school to jam its parade square with about 20 temporary, portable structures. An additional 12 double trailers are on order and will be located at another site. A garage has been converted into classrooms, but it leaks and is referred to as the “swimming pool”. Although potable, its water supply is an unsightly brown colour. Funds are so short that old, unused buildings cannot be torn down. Students share accommodation – four to a 16 by 16 foot room.

## **2 Electronic Warfare Squadron, Kingston**

At a stand-up lunch with enlisted personnel of the Squadron, the members of the Committee learned a great deal about the ineffectiveness of forces equipment and the frustrations that ineffectiveness engenders.



The Intelligence Gathering System, for instance, has never worked to its promised capacity. The firm that originally supplied it went out of business, and never actually put the equipment into production. With no spare parts, a second unit is being cannibalized to keep three in operation. The electronics often malfunction after cross-country movement. Many of the system's coding and decoding functions have been obsolescent.

Many of the system's coding and decoding functions have become obsolete. Modern digital systems – the kind used by American troops – “frequency-hop” as an added measure of security. The soldiers pointed out, however, that even if they got modern equipment, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission restricts the military to assigned bandwidths. Without frequency-hopping, it is more difficult to develop code-breaking skills, to make Canadian communications secure, and to coordinate operations with allies.

Personnel told members of the Committee that they could make the Intelligence Gathering System work if they were allowed to bypass the procurement system and buy off-the-shelf parts, some of which were readily available at the local Radio Shack. They also told us that off-the-shelf parts would also have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive and easily replaced.

## **CFB Borden**

At Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Headquarters, members of the Committee had an informal lunch with junior non-commissioned members. While the latter would clearly appreciate higher levels of pay and /or signing bonuses on re-enlistment, their major complaints concerned the difficulty of getting on training courses, plus their lack of opportunity to do enough of the things they had joined the Forces to do – take part in live field exercises,

fire weapons, etc. This, in tandem with the unrealistic tempo of operations, was causing a good number to decide against re-enlisting when their time was up. The attitude toward bonuses was ambivalent – the feeling was that their appeal was primarily to those who intended to re-enlist anyway.

At 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group the officers told the Committee that, if the Brigade had more money, improvements to the base infrastructure would be a priority. For example, the Battalions have been ordered not to keep their Light Armored Vehicles outdoors, but there are no funds available to build indoor storage. Nor is there a proper building to house the computers needed for training.

## **8 Wing Trenton**

At 8 Wing the Committee learned that the fleet of Hercules transports is aging faster than the Senate. Most were acquired between 1964-1967. Planning must be based on the assumption that, at any given time, about one out of four will not be available because they need maintenance and repair. There are five different models with two different engines to service and repair. According to technicians, a lack of spare parts keeps planes on the ground unnecessarily. In their opinion, two days should be the maximum time it takes to get a spare part, but that is certainly not the case now.

At the informal lunch with Squadron staff, members of the Committee continued to explore the reasons why highly trained personnel were not re-enlisting. Responses: pilots cannot fly and airlift missions must be turned down because aircraft are not available. Mechanics and technicians have to wait for spare parts or do not have the equipment necessary to carry out maintenance quickly. Their frustration is compounded because they say the

parts or equipment they need frequently could be purchased locally.

## **CFB Petawawa**

2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group officers told the Committee that if the brigade had a bigger budget, their priority would be field exercises and on ammunition for live fire training, both of which have been severely restricted. In their opinion, lack of resources (the capacity to fire live ammunition, missiles, etc.) and the feeling that personnel are not being as challenged in the Army as they had expected, are major reasons why many trained soldiers fail to sign up for a second 3-year term. The other ranks with whom the members of the Committee lunched raised many of the same issues. Many soldiers believe that they are no longer allowed to practice their profession to the limits of their ability – whether as infantry (lack of exercises, live ammunition, ), armoured corps/artillery (obsolescent equipment, lack of opportunity to exercise, practice gunnery,.), or mechanics/technicians (lack of spare parts, insufficient training, .). Members of the artillery, armoured corps, and air defence expressed uncertainty about the future of their trades in the Canadian forces.

## **The Black Watch**

The Black Watch, like the other militia units, is starved for equipment as well as operational and training funds. The very success of the current recruiting drive could make the situation worse because the proposed increase in the strength of the militia has not been funded, nor have funds been allocated for the equipment and stores necessary to train the new recruits.

The Black Watch was short of just about every kind of equipment and much of what they had was obsolescent, if not obsolete. Members of the Committee heard comments about the lack of modern personal kit for male and female recruits and about the lack of training equipment and training aids to make the theoretical part of recruit training and introductory trades training interesting.

The “hands on” or practical parts of courses cannot usually be given at the armoury. The soldiers and their instructors must go to a militia training base to get experience on small arms ranges, to practice section tactics, etc. A shortage of live ammunition compromises the value of the training.



### **III. The Capital Equipment Crisis:** *Canada's Antique Road Show*

It is no secret that the big difference between the U.S. military and the military forces of the rest of the world is the stratospheric leap the Americans have made in the sophistication of their equipment. A country the size of Canada cannot expect to keep up with the technological advances of the world's one remaining superpower, nor can it afford to allow a huge gap to develop between its own capital equipment and the advanced equipment of its allies. That gap exists, and it is growing not only with many of Canada's allies, but with its potential enemies as well. Canada cannot afford a state-of-the-art military, but it can afford a sophisticated and effective military with some state-of-the-art equipment.

**Capital equipment deficiencies were brought to our attention at several bases:**

#### **CFB Esquimalt and CFB Halifax**

At CFB Esquimalt and CFB Halifax the Committee concluded that at least two capital programs must go ahead without delay if Canada wants to continue deploying the Navy on foreign missions. The first is the Maritime Helicopter Project to replace the Sea King helicopters. The second is the Afloat Logistics Sealift to replace the Protecteur class replenishment ships.

#### **SEA KINGS**

Outside the patrol range of Aurora aircraft, the Sea King helicopter acts as the eyes and ears of the fleet. The Sea King is now

obsolescent and only an exceptional but time-consuming and expensive maintenance and repair program keeps it airworthy.

The Commanding Officer of 12 Wing CFB Shearwater assured the Committee in the strongest possible terms that the Sea King was and could be kept safe to fly. Nevertheless, the helicopter has become increasingly unreliable and spends half of its time out-of-service due to breakdown, repair and maintenance.

Without reliable helicopters, the Pacific and Atlantic fleets are increasingly at risk in zones of active operations. Unquestionably, the Maritime Helicopter Project is the most urgent capital equipment project. Almost nine years after cancellation of the order for EH 101 helicopters to replace the Sea Kings, the government has still failed to let the necessary contracts.

Ground crew in Shearwater told us that the continuing “starting and stopping” of the Maritime Helicopter Project was killing motivation in the unit. One day, crew would hear that the MHP would be operational by 2005, only to hear a day later that the project would be delayed for still another two years. These people take pride in the role they play, but they are clearly succumbing to frustration over the lack of a definite schedule for the MHP.

## **STRATEGIC LIFT**

We were repeatedly reminded of the Navy's lack of “roll-on, roll-off” sealift capability to move heavy equipment and support deployed task groups.. The Navy only has two tired support ships – “oilers” – with limited capacity, making it extremely difficult to move troops and equipment in and out of emergency situations.” The Navy presented the government with a plan to develop a roll-on, roll-off capacity in 2001, but there has been no word as to whether the plan will be approved.

## **Canadian Air Division – Winnipeg**

We were told that the Canadian Forces' airlift capacity is also in need of review to determine whether it is currently adequate and likely to be adequate into the future.

Units of the Regular Army have been withdrawn from coastal provinces and concentrated in CFB Edmonton (Alberta), CFB Petawawa (Ontario), and CFB Valcartier (Quebec). There is a new premium on moving Army units by air in the event of an emergency – particularly an emergency that substantially disrupts road and rail communications between inland bases and coastal communities.

A Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is based on the Joint Operations Group, CFB Kingston. Its equipment is stored at CFB Trenton and 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group of CFB Petawawa is required to be ready within 12 hours to deploy a Company headquarters and four platoons – about 200 personnel – to a disaster site anywhere in Canada or the world.

The Committee was surprised to learn that it took about 26 flights of Hercules military cargo planes to move the DART equipment and personnel, an airlift requirement that could be met by about 4 flights of an Antonov class transport aircraft, which Canada is forced to rent when troop-moving emergencies arise. It was just as surprised to learn that only between one half and three-quarters of Canada's fleet of Hercules aircraft are serviceable on any given day. As a result, in the event of an emergency, days rather than hours would elapse before the DART could be fully operational on either coast.

## **CF18 UPGRADE**

While Canada's military has committed funds to upgrade the CF18, the timeframe to complete the project has been spread out over several years. There is only enough money to upgrade 80 of the 119 CF18s in inventory.

## **AURORA**

The Aurora upgrade program has been approved, but like the CF18 program, it will take several years to complete. Furthermore, there is not enough money to upgrade all of the Auroras.

## **8 Wing Trenton**

The troops at Trenton told us that recent upgrades to Hercules aircraft have at least produced a "common cockpit configuration" of the various models that Canada uses. However, these early-model Hercules aircraft are fast becoming tired and antiquated. There was a feeling that forcing the Canadian military to rent strategic lift for use in moving troops and equipment diminished the country's military credibility.

It was recommended that there be a complete review of all transport capabilities to fit missions with appropriate aircraft. It was noted, for example, that using Hercules aircraft for search and rescue was extremely hard on the aircraft due to the type of flying required by SAR. A number of "purpose-designed" SAR aircraft with lower operating costs are available on the market. Purchasing them would reduce the overall operations and maintenance costs of the SAR operation. While everyone enjoyed flying the Airbus purchased from Canadian Airlines, there was considerable dismay at the money wasted converting civilian aircraft costing less than



\$60 million apiece into military aircraft for something in the neighbourhood of \$200 million.

## **CFB Gagetown/CFB Petawawa**

There was a general sense that while new Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) had been purchased, the number is woefully short of fulfilling needs, forcing the army to upgrade some of its M113s. Half-measures seemed to be the order of the day: for instance, new wheeled equipment was supposed to be housed under cover, but the project purchasing this equipment did not provide funds to build garages.

## **2 Electronic Warfare Squadron, CFB Kingston**

Electronic Warfare troops told us that their equipment had never even made it past the experimental stage before the company that built it went bankrupt. So they were working with “electronic test models” that were not only difficult to get spare parts for, but that were incompatible with the equipment of Canada's allies.

## The 1994 White Paper on Defence: *Promises Not Kept*

Our report would not be complete without pointing out that the state of disrepair in which the Canadian military finds itself today would not have evolved over the past decade if the Government of Canada had followed the recommendations of the 1994 White Paper on Defence. The Canadian Forces' personnel, equipment and capabilities fall far short of what was called for in the White Paper, which set forth an intelligent plan, certainly not an extravagant plan.

The White Paper, ostensibly a blueprint for government strategy, promised that Canada's armed forces

*“ . . . will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations, contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve as many as 10,000 personnel. Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN of two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element and a headquarters element. If deployed, simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4000 personnel.”*

That represented a commitment to the Canadian people that their defence forces would be capable of deploying and sustaining approximately 4,000 personnel deployed on UN missions overseas on a continuing basis. That never happened. Canada has never maintained 4,000 personnel overseas in the intervening years, because the personnel and resources were never developed to meet that commitment. Twice – in Bosnia and Afghanistan – Canada set out on ambitious field efforts, only to be forced to withdraw because of lack of capacity to sustain those efforts.

The White Paper stated that the Canadian forces “**will be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements:**

- **a naval task group comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship with appropriate maritime air support** *[Afghanistan demonstrated that Canada cannot sustain this commitment for more than one rotation of troops]*.
- **three separate battle groups, or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armored regiment, and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support)** *[Canada has never been able to sustain this type of commitment. Bosnia and Afghanistan demonstrated clearly that Canada's military can hardly manage to support half of this commitment]*.
- **a wing of fighter aircraft with appropriate support** *[The last time Canada sent an augmented squadron of aircraft (28) was during the Gulf War in 1990/91. Capacity subsequently dwindled to the point that the Canadian military was hard pressed to sustain a small squadron of*

*aircraft (8-10 planes) during the Kosovo bombing campaign. A wing of aircraft is at least 36 aircraft, with appropriate aircrew and support].*

- **one squadron of tactical transport aircraft** *[Canada has never deployed a squadron of tactical transport since the Gulf War – our present commitment to Afghanistan is two aircraft and support].*
- **single elements or the vanguard component of this force – within three weeks – and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment and, within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force** *[until the CF possesses its own integral strategic air and sea transport, it will never be able to deploy within the required time, nor does the Canadian military possess the resources to have any hope of sustaining such a Vanguard force for more than six months].*

### ***The White Paper said Canada's military would also:***

- **earmark an infantry battalion group as either a standby force for the UN or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force** *[at least Canada's current military has sufficient resources to earmark an infantry battalion – deploying one under current conditions of over commitment and underfunding would be another matter] .*
- **have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis** *[there is a major crisis at hand, but no apparent measures to meet it].*

## Consequences: A Nation Diminished

Canada did a commendable job during the 20th century in two particular areas – helping defend the world against chaos and tyranny while defending the security and culture of its people, and establishing a national presence on the world stage. To a large extent the two went hand in hand. Canada's military performance over the century significantly increased our country's stature in the eyes of the world.

It is ironic that while Canada's population is growing and its economy is robust, the country's stature is being diminished by a refusal to pull our weight militarily in an increasingly unpredictable world. With loss of stature comes loss of influence in world affairs.

The first role of any government is to protect its people. Canadians are not being adequately protected – the refusal to properly fund a reasonable degree of military security amounts to nothing more than rolling the dice. Like homeowners who don't insure their property, the gamble is that nothing bad will happen and that skimping on insurance will pay off in other ways.

The Government of Canada is privileged to preside over a nation of many treasures, however, it is skimping on their protection. It is also skimping on its obligations to its allies.

Our friends are watching. Our friends are not impressed. Neither should the citizens of Canada be impressed. There is an old saying: *Every country has an army – its own, or someone else's.*



## **APPENDIX I**

### **ORDER OF REFERENCE**

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#### **ORDER OF REFERENCE**

Extract of the *Journals of the Senate*, Wednesday, October 30, 2002:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Losier-Cool:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to or prevent a national emergency or attack;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders.

That the papers and evidence received and taken during the First Session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament be referred to the Committee;

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than February 28, 2004, and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until March 31, 2004.

After debate,

With leave of the Senate and pursuant to Rule 30, the French version of the motion was modified in paragraph (b) to read as follows:

“b) les relations entre les divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements, comment ils recueillent, colligent, analysent et diffusent ces renseignements, et comment ces fonctions pourraient être améliorées;”.

After debate,

**APPENDIX I**  
**ORDER OF REFERENCE**

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The question being put on the motion, as modified, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle

*Clerk of the Senate*



## **APPENDIX II**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FEBRUARY 2002 REPORT**

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#### **CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**

##### **Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence**

The Committee published a report in February that contained the following principal recommendations:

- 1- The Committee recommends that to sustain the level of tasking required of them over the last eight years, the Canadian Forces need at least 75,000 trained effective personnel;
- 2- The Committee accordingly recommends an immediate increase to the Department of National Defence baseline budget of \$4 billion;
- 3- The Committee therefore recommends future annual budget increases, which are realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation; and
- 4- The Committee believes that Defence Policy should flow from Foreign Policy and that a Foreign Policy review should precede a Defence review.

Other recommendations included in the text were:

- 1- The Canadian Forces should consider the introduction of a more wide-spread “qualification pay” program;
- 2- The Canadian Forces should consider applying obligatory service to more “specialist training”;
- 3- The CF review its policy of slow to react to the requirement of specialist bonuses, and quick to end programs;
- 4- The CF Reserves should be considered for employment to deal with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) situations in Canada;
- 5- The CF consider stockpiling CBRN resources regionally throughout the country; and
- 6- While challenging, interoperability with CF allies should be pursued to the greatest extent possible.



### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Adams**, Corporal Terrance  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Technical Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Addy**, Major General (ret'd) Clive  
National Past Chairman, Federation  
of Military & United Services  
Institute of Canada  
Oct. 15/01

**Alarie**, Master Corporal Bernadette  
Canadian Forces Dental Services  
School  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Amos**, Chief Warrant Officer Bruce  
423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Baird**, Master Corporal Keith  
Bravo Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Baker**, Lieutenant-Colonel Roy  
Wing Logistics and Engineering  
Officer  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Barbagallo**, Lieutenant Jason  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Barrett**, Major Roger R.  
Operational Officer, 2 RCR  
CFB Galetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Bastien**, Major-General Richard  
Deputy Commander of Air Staff  
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Bastien**, Commander Yves  
Formation Administration Officer  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Baum**, Major Nigel  
J4  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Beattie**, Captain Dave  
Canadian Parachute Centre Adjutant  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Beattie**, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark  
Senior Staff Officer, Canadian  
Forces Support Training Group  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Blair**, Master Warrant Officer  
Gérald  
Canadian Forces School of  
Communications and Electronics  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Beers**, Master Corporal Robert  
Canadian Forces School of Electrical  
and Mechanical Engineering  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Blanchard**, Master Corporal Piette  
Canadian Forces Dental Services  
School  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Belzile**, Lieutenant-General (ret'd)  
Charles  
Chairman  
Conference of Defence Associations  
Oct. 15/01

**Blanchette**, Lieutenant-Colonel  
Michael  
Commander  
Canadian Parachute School  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Berry**, Major David  
Canadian Parachute Centre Training  
Officer Commander  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Bland**, Professor Douglas  
Chair of Defence Management  
Program  
School of Policy Studies  
Queen's University  
Oct. 29/01  
May 27/02

**Black**, Lieutenant Colonel Dean C.  
Commanding Officer  
403 Squadron  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Blight**, Master Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Boisjoli**, Lieutenant-Commander  
André  
Commanding Officer, HMCS Glace  
Bay  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Brown**, Major Chris  
424 Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Bolton**, Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce D.  
Commanding Officer  
The Black Watch, Royal Highland  
Regiment of Canada  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Buck**, Vice-Admiral Ron  
Chief of the Maritime Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01  
Aug. 14/02

**Bon**, Mr. Daniel  
Director General, Policy Planning,  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Buenacruz**, Corporal  
Wing Administration  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Boswell**, Lieutenant-Colonel Brad  
Acting Director of Army Doctrine  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Burke**, Captain (N) Greg  
Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces  
Atlantic  
Department of National Defence  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Bradley**, Lieutenant-Colonel Bert  
Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Calder**, Mr. Kenneth  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy  
Department of National Defence  
Nov. 26/01  
Aug. 14/02

**Brooks**, Captain Melissa  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Cameron**, Captain Keith  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

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**Cameron**, Colonel Scott  
Director of Medical Policy on the  
Staff of the Director General of  
Health Services (DGHS)  
Dec. 10/01

**Chartrand**, Lieutenant-Commander  
Yves  
Acting Commanding Officer, HMCS  
Huron  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Campbell**, Lieutenant-General  
Lloyd  
Commander of Air Command and  
Chief of the Air Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Chartrand**, Lieutenant-Commander  
Yves  
Acting Commanding Officer of the  
HMCS Huron  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Campbell**, Master Corporal Steve  
426 Training Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Cormier**, Master Seaman Michael  
Canadian Forces Military Police  
Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Castillo**, Corporal Marvin  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Côté**, Master Corporal Claude  
Bravo Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Cessford**, Lieutenant-Colonel  
Michael  
Acting Commader, Canadian Forces  
Joint Operations Group  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Clark**, Captain Robert  
CO BW No.2497 Cadet Corps  
Head Librarian, Law Library  
McGill University  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Chartier**, Honorary Lieutenant-  
Colonel Victor G., OMM, CD.  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Clarke**, Master Corporal James  
Gulf Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

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**Couture**, Lieutenant-General  
Christian  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Human  
Ressources – Military)  
Dec. 10/01

**Croxall**, Corporal Kevin  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Administration Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Dallaire**, Gabriel  
Gulf Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Daniels**, Private Jason  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Davis**, Chief Petty Officer First Class  
Kim  
Formation Chief Petty Officer  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Dawe**, Dick  
Manager, Personnel Support  
Programmes  
Maritimes Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**DeCastro**, Second Lieutenant. Rod  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**DeCuir**, Brigadier-General Mike  
Deputy Regional Commander  
Canadian NORAD Region  
Headquarters  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Deschamps**, Colonel André  
Director, Continental Operations  
Department of National Defence  
May 6/02

**Dietrich**, Chief Warrant Officer Dan  
Chief Warrant Officer  
One Canadian Air Division  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Dion**, Corporal Yves  
Canadian Forces Fire Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Dowler**, Chief Petty Officer First  
Class George  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Downton**, Master Corporal Doug  
426 Training Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Fisher**, Second Lieutenant. Greg  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Doyle**, Lieutenant-Colonel Bert  
Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Fisher**, Captain Kent  
J8  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Dufresne**, Corporal  
Canadian Forces Postal Unit  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Forcier**, Commodore Jean-Yves  
Chief of Staff J3, Deputy Chief of  
the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Durocher**, Captain Pascal  
Deputy Commanding Officer,  
2EW Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Fortin**, Lieutenant-Colonel Mario  
Acting Commanding Officer  
426 Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Ellis**, Captain Cameron  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Foster**, Lieutenant-Colonel Rob  
Acting Commanding Officer  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Falconer**, Captain Vic  
Formation Drug Education  
Coordinator  
Formation Health Services (Pacific)  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Francis**, Warrant Officer Charles  
Bravo Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02



### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Fraser**, Rear-Admiral Jamie D.  
Commander  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Fraser**, Sheila  
Auditor General of Canada  
Office of the Auditor General of  
Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**Frederick**, Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Frerichs**, Private Travis  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Froeschner**, Major Chris  
Acting Commanding Officer  
429 Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Gagnon**, Major Alain  
Commanding Officer  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Gilbert**, Chief Warrant Officer  
Daniel  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Gardner**, Major Craig  
Mechanized Brigade Group  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Gauthier**, Corporal  
2 Air Movement Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Gauvin**, Major Bart  
Directorate of Army Training 5  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Gauvin**, Commodore Jacques J.  
Acting Assistant Chief of the  
Maritime Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Giroux**, Master Corporal  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Glencross**, Captain, Reverend Bruce  
Regimental Padre Minister  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Goetz**, Captain J.J.  
Mechanized Brigade Group  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Gotell**, Chief Warrant Officer Peter  
Operations  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/01

**Graham**, Master Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Granatstein**, Dr. Jack  
Chair  
Council for Defence and Security in  
the 21st Century  
May 27/02

**Gregory**, Leading Seaman  
Wing Administration Human  
Resources Department  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Guevremont**, Benoît  
Gulf Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Guidon**, Captain (N) Paul  
Submarine Division  
Martime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Haeck**, Lieutenant Colonel Ken F.  
Commandant of Artillery School IFT  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Hall**, Major Steve  
Deputy Commandant  
Canadian Forces School of  
Communications and Electronics  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Hamel**, MWO Claude  
Regimental Sergeant-Major  
Designate  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Hammond**, Major Lee  
Artillery  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Hapgood**, Warrant Officer John  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Hazelton**, Lieutenant Spike C.M.  
Commandant of Armour School,  
C2 SIM  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Harrison**, Captain (N) R.P. Richard  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Hearn**, Brigadier-General T.M.  
Director General  
Military Human Resources Policy  
and Planning  
Dec. 10/01

**Hart**, Corporal  
Wing Administration Human  
Resources Department  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Hildebrandt**, Captain Gerhard  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Haslett**, Lieutenant Adam  
Logistics Officer & Course  
Commander  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Henault**, General Raymond R.  
Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Hatton**, Commander Gary  
Commanding Officer, HMCS  
Montreal  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Henderson**, Major Georgie  
Deputy A3  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Henneberry**, Lieutenant-  
Commander C.J.  
Commander, HMCS Nanaimo  
Maritime Air Force Command  
Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Hincke**, Colonel Joe  
Commanding Officer  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Hines**, Colonel Glynne  
Director, Air Information  
Management, Chief of the Air Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Horn**, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Hounsell**, Master Corporal Scott  
Canadian Forces School of  
Electronical and Mechanical  
Engineering  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Howe**, Corporal Kerry  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Technical Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Huqe**, Master Corporal Bryan  
426 Training Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Idzenga**, Major Ray  
Commanding Officer, Gulf Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Issacs**, Sergeant Tony  
Search and Rescue Technician  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Innis**, Captain Quentin  
Instructor  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Jackson**, Major David  
J3  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Jackson**, Gaynor  
Manager, Military Family Support  
Centre  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Janelle**, Private Pascal  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Kelly**, Chief Warrant Officer  
Michael  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Jeffery**, Lieutenant General M.K.  
Chief of the Land Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01  
Aug. 14/02

**Kelly**, Lieutenant Colonel W.J.  
Force Planning and Program  
Coordination  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Johnson**, Captain Wayne  
J7  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Kerr**, Captain Andrew CD  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Joncas**, Chief Petty Officer Serge  
Maritime Command Chief Petty  
Officer  
Dec. 03/01

**Knapp**, Corporal Raymond  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Technical Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Jurkowski**, Brigadier General (ret'd)  
David  
Former Chief of Staff  
Joint Operations  
Oct. 01/01

**Koch**, Major Pat  
J5  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Kasurak**, Peter  
Principal  
Office of the Auditor General of  
Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**Krause**, Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne  
Commanding Officer  
423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Krueger**, Master Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Kurzynski**, Major Perry  
Officer-in-charge  
Search and Rescue Operations  
Centre  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Kwasnicki**, Corporal Anita  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Laing**, Captain (Navy) Kevin  
Director, Maritime Strategy, Chief of  
Maritime Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Leighton**, Lieutenant-Commander  
John  
J1  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Lerhe**, Commodore E.J. (Eric)  
Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Lilienthal**, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark  
Senior Staff Officer  
Canadian Forces Support Training  
Group  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Logan**, Major Mike  
Deputy Administration Officer  
Canadian Forces Support Training  
Group  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Lucas**, Major General Steve  
Commander One Canadian Air  
Division  
Canadian NORAD Region  
Headquarters  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Lupien**, Chief Petty Officer First  
Class R.M.  
Canadian Forces Chief Warrant  
Officer  
Dec. 03/01

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Lyrette**, Private Steve  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Maher**, Lieutenant Earl  
4 ESR  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**MacDonald**, Lieutenant General  
George  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Jan. 28/02  
Aug. 14/02

**Maillet**, Acting School Chief  
Warrant Officer Joseph  
Canadian Forces School of  
Communications and Electronics  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**MacKay**, Major Tom  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Maisonneuve**, Major-General J.O.  
Michel  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Defence  
Staff  
Oct. 22/01

**MacLeod**, Colonel Barry W.  
Commander  
3 Area Support Group  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Malboeuf**, Corporal Barry  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**MacQuarrie**, Captain Don  
J6  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Manning**, Corporal Rob  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Technical Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Maddison**, Vice-Admiral Greg  
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
May 5/02

**Mason**, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave  
Commanding Officer  
12 Air Maintenance Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Matheson**, Corporal  
2 Air Movement Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**McNeil**, Commodore Daniel  
Director, Force Planning and  
Program Coordination  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Mattie**, Chief Warrant Officer Fred  
12 Air Maintenance Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Mean**, Master Corporal Jorge  
Canadian Forces School of  
Aerospace Technology and  
Engineering  
June 25-27/02

**Maude**, Master Corporal Kelly  
436 Transport Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Minto**, Shahid  
Assistant Auditor General  
Office of the Auditor General of  
Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**McDonald**, Corporal Marcus  
Canadian Forces Medical Services  
School  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Mitchell**, Brigadier General Greg  
Commander  
Land Forces Atlantic Area  
Jan. 22-24/02

**McLean**, Corporal  
Wing Operations  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Munger**, Chief Warrant Officer  
J.E.R.  
Office of Land Force Command  
Dec. 03/02

**McManus**, Lieutenant-Colonel John  
Commanding Officer  
443 (MH) Squadron  
Maritime Air Force Command  
Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Murphy**, Captain (N) R.D.  
Deputy Commander  
Canadian Fleet Pacific  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01



### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Murray**, Major James  
Commandant  
Canadian Forces Fire Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Olchowiecki**, Private Chrissian  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Neville**, Lieutenant-Colonel Shirley  
Wing Administration Officer  
Acting Wing Commander  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Orr**, Major Ken  
Senior Staff Officer  
Attraction Canadian Forces  
Recruiting Group  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Newton**, Captain John F.  
Senior Staff Officer  
Operations  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Parker**, Major Geoff  
Infantry  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Nordick**, Brigadier-General Glenn  
Deputy Commander  
Land Force Doctrine and Training  
Systems  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Parks**, Lieutenant-Commander Mike  
Directorate of Army Training 5-4  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**O'Bright**, Gary  
Director General  
The Office of Critical Infrastructure  
Protection and Emergency  
Preparedness  
Jul. 19/01

**Pataracchia**, Lieutenant (N) John  
Representing Commanding Officer  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Paulson**, Captain (N) Gary  
Commanding Officer of HMCS  
Algonquin  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Pile**, Captain (N) T.H.W. (Tyron)  
Commander  
Maritime Operations Group Four  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Payne**, Captain (N) Richard  
Commanding Officer, Fleet  
Maintenance Facility Cape Scott  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Pinsent**, Major John  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Pearson**, Lieutenant Colonel  
Michael J.  
Commandant of Infantry School  
SAT  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Plante**, Master Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Pellerin**, Colonel (ret'd) Alain  
Executive Director  
Conference of Defence Associations  
Oct. 15/01

**Polson**, Captain (N) Gary  
Commanding Officer  
HMCS Algonquin  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Peters**, Colonel William  
Director, Land Strategic Planning,  
Chief of the Land Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Potvin**, Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Pettigrew**, Master Corporal Robert  
Canadian Forces School of  
Administration and Logistics  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Poulin**, Corporal Mario  
Canadian Forces Military Police  
Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Preece, Captain (N) Christian**  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Renahan, Captain Chris**  
Armour  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Préfontaine, Colonel Marc**  
Comd 34 Brigade Group Executive  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Rivest, Master Corporal Dan**  
Canadian Forces School of  
Aerospace Technology and  
Engineering  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Purdy, Margaret**  
Associate Deputy Minister  
Department of National Defence  
Aug. 14/02

**Robinson, Second Lieutenant. Chase**  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Reid, Chief Warrant Officer Clifford**  
Canadian Forces Fire Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Ross, Major-General H. Cameron**  
Director General  
International Security Policy  
Department of National Defence  
Jan. 28/02

**Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel Gord**  
Commandant  
Canadian Forces Air Navigation  
School (CFANS)  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Rutherford, Master Corporal Denis**  
Canadian Forces Fire Academy  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Reid, Warrant Officer Jim**  
Air Defence Missile  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Samson, Brigadier-General P.M.**  
Director General  
Intelligence  
Oct. 22/01

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Saunders**, Corporal Cora  
16 Wing  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Smith**, Corporal  
Canadian Postal Unit  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Saunders**, Captain Kimberly  
Disaster Assistance Response Team  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Smith**, Master Corporal Terry  
436 Transport Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Schmick**, Major Grant  
Commanding Officer  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Snow**, Master Corporal Joanne  
Canadian Forces School of  
Administration and Logistics  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Scott**, Captain John  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Stacey**, Corporal Derrick  
Canadian Forces Base Borden  
Administration Services  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Skidd**, Officer Cadet. Alden  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Stark**, Lieutenant-Commander Gary  
Commanding Officer  
HMCS Whitehorse  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Skidmore**, Colonel Mark  
Commander  
2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade  
Group  
CFB Petawawa  
June 25-27/02

**Stevens**, Pipe-Major Cameron  
The Black Watch  
Nov. 5-6/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Stewart**, Warrant Officer Barton  
Canadian Forces School of  
Communications and Electronics  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Stewart**, James  
Civilian Human Resources  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Stone**, Master Corporal  
Canadian Parachute Centre  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Szczerbaniwicz**, Lieutenant-Colonel  
Gary  
Commanding Officer  
Commandant, 407 Squadron  
Maritime Air Force Command  
Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Tarrant**, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom  
Deputy Director of Army Training  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Tattersall**, Lieutenant-Commander  
John  
Directorate of Army Training 3  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Thibault**, Master Corporal Christian  
Gulf Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Tremblay**, Colonel Alain  
Commander, Canadian Forces  
Recruiting Group  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Trim**, Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Ur**, Corporal Melanie  
16 Wing  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Wambach**, Lieutenant-Commander  
Arthur  
Commanding Officer  
HMCS Windsor  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Ward**, Master Corporal  
Wing Operations  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Ward**, Master Corporal Danny  
Canadian Forces School of  
Aerospace Technology and  
Engineering  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

**Ward**, Officer Cadet. Declan  
Student  
McGill University  
Nov. 5-6/02

**Ward**, Colonel Mike J.  
Commander Combat Training Centre  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Wareham**, Corporal  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
8 Wing Trenton  
June 25-27/02

**Watt**, Major Jon  
Commanding Officer  
Bravo Squadron  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Watts**, Chief Warrant Officer Ernest  
3 Area Support Group  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Wells**, Corporal Corwin  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Whalen**, Private Clayton  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Whitburn**, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom  
Squadron 435  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**White**, Lieutenant (N) Troy  
J2  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02

**Williams**, Colonel Richard  
Director, Western Hemisphere Policy  
Department of National Defence  
May 6/02

**Woods**, Corporal Connor  
Canadian Forces Medical Services  
School  
CFB Borden  
June 25-27/02

### **APPENDIX III**

### **WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM**

---

**Woodburn**, Commander William  
Commander, Submarine Division  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Young**, Major Marc  
J4  
CFB Kingston  
May 7-9/02





**APPENDIX IV**  
**BASES AND UNITS VISITED BY THE COMMITTEE**

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**List of Canadian Forces Bases and Units Visited**

5-6 November 2001	<b>CFB Montreal</b> 3rd Battalion Black Watch
18-22 November 2001	<b>CFB Esquimalt</b> Maritime Forces Pacific Canadian Fleet Pacific Maritime Operations Group 4 HMCS HURON HMCS WHITEHORSE HMCS NANAIMO Coastal Operations Planning and Analysis Centre Military Family Support Centre
	<b>CFB Patricia Bay</b> Air Command Detachment Maritime Pacific 443 Maritime Helicopter Squadron 407 Maritime Patrol Squadron
	<b>CFB Winnipeg</b> 1 Canadian Air Division Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters
	<b>17 Wing Winnipeg</b> 17 Wing Canadian Forces Air Navigation School 402 City of Winnipeg Squadron 435 Transport and Rescue Squadron
20-24 January 2002	<b>CFB Halifax</b> Maritime Forces Atlantic HMCS GLACE BAY HMCS MONTREAL HMCS WINDSOR Submarine Division Maritime Operations Group 5

**APPENDIX IV**  
**BASES AND UNITS VISITED BY THE COMMITTEE**

---

**CFB Cape Scott**

Fleet Maintenance Facility

**12 Wing Shearwater**

12 Wing

12 Wing Air Maintenance Squadron

423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron

Search and Rescue Operations Centre

**CFB Gagetown**

Land Forces Atlantic Area

3 Area Support Group

2 Royal Canadian Regiment

4 Engineer Support Regiment

Combat Training Center

Infantry School SAT (Small Arms Training)

Armour School C2 Sim

Artillery School IFT

403 Helicopter and Operational Training  
Squadron

7-9 May 2002

**Dwyer Hill**

Joint Task Force 2

**Communication Security Establishment**

**APPENDIX IV**  
**BASES AND UNITS VISITED BY THE COMMITTEE**

---

**CFB Kingston**

Land Force Doctrine and Training System  
2 EW (Electronic Warfare) Squadron  
Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group  
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)  
Canadian Forces School of Communications  
and Electronics  
Bravo Squadron  
Gulf Squadron

24-27 June 2002

**CFB Borden**

Canadian Forces Recruiting Group  
Headquarters  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre Montreal  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre Calgary  
Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre Hamilton  
Canadian Forces Support Training Group  
Canadian Forces Fire Academy

**8 Wing Trenton**

8 Wing  
429 Transport Squadron  
426 Training Squadron  
8 Air Maintenance Squadron  
424 Search and Rescue Squadron  
Canadian Parachute Centre

**CFB Petawawa**

2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade  
1st Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment  
Royal Canadian Dragoons  
2nd Regiment Royal Canadian Horse  
Artillery  
1st Air Defence Regiment



## **APPENDIX V**

### **CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS**

---

#### **Canadian Forces Overseas Tasking – 4 September 2002**

Canada has more than 2,900 soldiers, sailors and air force personnel deployed. On any given day, thousands of Canadian Forces (CF) members are preparing for, engaged in or have returned from overseas missions.

Since 1947, the CF has completed 73 international operations. That figure does not include the current operations, or the many CF operations carried out in Canada.

#### **COALITION MISSION**

##### **OP APOLLO**

**1068**

Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism

#### **NATO ALLIANCE MISSIONS**

##### **NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR)**

##### **OP PALLADIUM**

**1579**

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Canada provides a battalion group (Bn Gp) and various elements composing the Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina (TFBH). TFBH's mission is to maintain a secure and stable environment for the local population within its area of responsibility (AOR.). TFBH includes helicopter support, signals, intelligence, medical and military police personnel.

## **APPENDIX V**

### **CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS**

---

#### **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)**

##### **OP FORAGE** **1**

*Operation FORAGE* is Canada's contribution to the NATO operation to collect weapons from rebel factions.

The CF contributes one person who works at the Task Force headquarters.

#### **UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS**

##### **UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

##### **OP DANACA** **193**

Golan Heights

Canadians have participated in UNDOF since 1974. CF provide second-line logistic support to the force, as well as communications detachments to UNDOF units.

##### **UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

##### **OP SNOWGOOSE** **1**

Cyprus

Canada still provides UNFICYP headquarters at Nicosia with one CF staff officer working in Operations.

## **APPENDIX V**

### **CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS**

---

#### **UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**

##### **OP JADE** **7**

Jerusalem

The CF maintains a contingent of seven United Nations Military Observers (UNMO)s in UNTSO

#### **Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)**

##### **OP CALUMET** **30**

Sinai

*Operation CALUMET* is Canada's contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the non-UN peacekeeping mission includes an air traffic control unit and administrative and support personnel located in El Gorah, Egypt.

#### **UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)**

##### **OP REPTILE** **5**

Sierra Leone

*Operation REPTILE* is Canada's contribution to the UN mission in Sierra Leone, which is designed to achieve peace in the region through disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of the belligerent forces. CF members are deployed as United Nations Military Observers.

## **APPENDIX V**

### **CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS**

---

#### **UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)**

##### **OP CROCODILE 8**

Democratic Republic of the Congo

*Operation CROCODILE* is Canada's contribution to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

CF members work as staff officers at MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa.

They also function as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) in situations involving security, logistics and medical issues.

#### **United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)**

##### **OP ADDITION 6**

Ethiopia and Eritrea

The Canadian Forces personnel work as part of an international group of 220 UN Military Observers (UNMOs) who monitor the Temporary Security Zone between the two countries.

#### **International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT)**

##### **OP SCULPTURE 11**

Sierra Leone

The Canadian contingent provide advice on training, logistics and administration, and deliver tactical training ranging from basic recruit courses to brigade-level exercises.

**Total CF Personnel on UN Missions 261**

**GRAND TOTAL 2,909**



**APPENDIX VI**  
**PEACEKEEPING STATISTICS**

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**Monthly Summary of Contributors**  
**Civilian Police, Military Observers, Troops**  
**as of 31 August 2002**

\*source United Nations Website

<b>Country</b>	<b>Civpol</b>	<b>Milob</b>	<b>Troops</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Bangladesh	129	66	5,227	5,422	<b>1</b>
Pakistan	282	74	4,384	4,740	<b>2</b>
Nigeria	72	53	3,275	3,400	<b>3</b>
India	444	36	2,377	2,857	<b>4</b>
Ghana	296	50	2,132	2,478	<b>5</b>
Kenya	57	55	1,729	1,841	<b>6</b>
Jordan	635	44	1,087	1,766	<b>7</b>
Uruguay		67	1,502	1,569	<b>8</b>
Ukraine	234	29	1,085	1,348	<b>9</b>
Australia	75	27	1,033	1,135	<b>10</b>
Nepal	102	38	961	1,101	<b>11</b>
Poland	174	24	817	1,015	<b>12</b>
Zambia	52	28	826	906	<b>13</b>
Guinea	1	13	774	788	<b>14</b>
Portugal	69	1	650	720	<b>15</b>
Fiji	49	7	642	698	<b>16</b>
United Kingdom	240	34	420	694	<b>17</b>
United States	660	31	1	692	<b>18</b>
Japan			680	680	<b>19</b>
Morocco			658	658	<b>20</b>
New Zealand		16	640	656	<b>21</b>
Argentina	179	12	463	654	<b>22</b>
Germany	518	11	26	555	<b>23</b>
Senegal	54	14	477	545	<b>24</b>
Austria	55	10	467	532	<b>25</b>
Slovak Republic		4	504	508	<b>26</b>

## APPENDIX VI

### PEACEKEEPING STATISTICS

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Republic of Korea		14	456	470	<b>27</b>
France	188	44	214	446	<b>28</b>
Thailand	32	18	380	430	<b>29</b>
Russian Federation	162	97	112	371	<b>30</b>
Ireland	48	31	263	342	<b>31</b>
Italy	93	31	191	315	<b>32</b>
Tunisia	6	21	264	291	<b>33</b>
<b>Canada</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>34</b>
Romania	200	40	1	241	<b>35</b>
Malaysia	120	60	43	223	<b>36</b>
Bolivia		13	204	217	<b>37</b>
Turkey	183	13		196	<b>38</b>
Spain	170	6	3	179	<b>39</b>
Egypt	117	57	4	178	<b>40</b>
Philippines	113	8	51	172	<b>41</b>
South Africa		6	151	157	<b>42</b>
Hungary	17	20	118	155	<b>43</b>
Bulgaria	132	6	2	140	<b>44</b>
China	84	51	1	136	<b>45</b>
Sweden	89	33	1	123	<b>46</b>
Singapore	27	4	72	103	<b>47</b>
Brazil	10	17	74	101	<b>48</b>
Denmark	48	39	4	91	<b>49</b>
Finland	35	42	5	82	<b>50</b>
Norway	45	22	6	73	<b>51</b>
Netherlands	55	13	2	70	<b>52</b>
Zimbabwe	64			64	<b>53</b>
Indonesia	18	29	4	51	<b>54</b>
Czech Republic	28	18	1	47	<b>55</b>
Sri Lanka	42	2		44	<b>56</b>
Greece	30	12		42	<b>57</b>

## APPENDIX VI

### PEACEKEEPING STATISTICS

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Malawi	21	18		39	<b>58</b>
Switzerland	17	20	1	38	<b>59</b>
Mali	2	29	3	34	<b>60</b>
Gambia	11	19	2	32	<b>61</b>
Niger	14	16	2	32	<b>62</b>
Benin	6	19	5	30	<b>63</b>
United Republic of Tanzania	2	19	3	24	<b>64</b>
Chile	12	11		23	<b>65</b>
Cameroon	20		1	21	<b>66</b>
Algeria		19	1	20	<b>67</b>
Paraguay		19	1	20	<b>68</b>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10	9		19	<b>69</b>
Slovenia	17	2		19	<b>70</b>
Croatia		17		17	<b>71</b>
Belgium	1	10	5	16	<b>72</b>
Burkina Faso	2	12		14	<b>73</b>
Honduras		12		12	<b>74</b>
Mozambique	6	4		10	<b>75</b>
Lithuania	9			9	<b>76</b>
Vanuatu	6			6	<b>77</b>
El Salvador	1	4		5	<b>78</b>
Iceland	5			5	<b>79</b>
Kyrgyzstan	3	2		5	<b>80</b>
Namibia		3	2	5	<b>81</b>
Peru		5		5	<b>82</b>
Cote d'Ivoire	4			4	<b>83</b>
Venezuela		3		3	<b>84</b>
Yugoslavia		3		3	<b>85</b>
Mongolia		2		2	<b>86</b>

## APPENDIX VI

### PEACEKEEPING STATISTICS

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Samoa	2			2	<b>87</b>
Albania		1		1	<b>88</b>
Ecuador	1			1	<b>89</b>
Estonia		1		1	<b>90</b>

**6,754**

**1,808**

**35,698**

**Total 44,260**

**Canadian %**

**0.621**

## APPENDIX VII

### CRITICAL SHORTFALLS

Military Occupation Category (MOC)		Preferred Manning Level (PML)	Trained Effective Strenght (TES) Offr: 11298 NCMs: 43532	% Below PML	Percent of Total Officer Requirement	Percent of Total NCM Requirement
	<b>CRITICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN THE CANADIAN FORCES – SEPTEMBER 2002 (Greater than 10% below requirements and not enough trainees to recover within 2 years, if requirements, retention and training patterns remain as forecast)</b>					
	<b>Officers</b>					
43	Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Officers (EME)	346	291	-15,9	3,1	
42	Communications and Electronics Engineering Officers (CELE)	784	702	-10,5	6,9	
32	Pilot Officers (PLT)	1445	1311	-9,3	12,8	
55	Medical Officers (MED)	230	187	-18,7	2,0	
54	Pharmaceutical Officers (PHARM)	47	36	-23,4	0,4	
56	Medical Associate Officers (MAO)	26	26	0,0	0,2	
62	Roman Catholic Chaplains (Chap (RC))	72	67	-6,9	0,6	
	<b>NCMs</b>					
215	Signals Operators (Sig Op)	1751	1417	-19,1		4,1
111	Intelligence Operators (Int Op)	284	248	-12,7		0,6
738	Dental Technicians (Dent Tech)	203	197	-3,0		0,5
714	Medical Laboratory Technicians (Mlab Tech)	27	27	0,0		0,1
715	X-Ray Technicians (X Tech)	27	23	-14,8		0,1
718	Bio Electronics Technicians (BE Tech)	22	19	-13,6		0,1

## APPENDIX VII

### CRITICAL SHORTFALLS

Military Occupation Category (MOC)		Preferred Manning Level (PML)	Trained Effective Strenght (TES) Offr: 11298 NCMs: 43532	% Below PML	Percent of Total Officer Requirement	Percent of Total NCM Requirement
	<b>CAUTIONARY SHORTFALLS</b> (Between 5 and 10% below requirements and not enough trainees to recover within 2 years, if requirements, retention and training patterns remain as forecast)					
	<b>Officers</b>					
46	Airfield Engineering Officers (AF Eng)	179	168	-6,1	1,6	
78	Logistics Officers (Log)	1415	1316	-7,0	12,5	
67	Legal Officers (Leg)	117	95	-18,8	1,0	
	<b>NCMs</b>					
277	Naval Communicators (Nav Comm)	716	665	-7,1		1,6
275	Naval Combat Information Operators (NCI Op)	438	414	-5,5		1,0
276	Naval Electronic Sensor Operators (NES Op)	361	329	-8,9		0,8
312	Marine Engineering Mechanic (Mar Eng Mech)	1041	1034	-0,7		2,4
313	Marine Engineering Technician (Mar Eng Tech)					
314	Marine Engineering Artificer (Mar Eng Art)					
332	Marine Electricians (Mar EI)	455	443	-2,6		1,1
331	Electricians Technician (E Tech)					
341	Clearance Divers (CI Div)	133	120	-9,8		0,3
342	Clearance Divers Technician (CI Div T)					
021	Field Artillery (Artymn-FD)	1254	1143	-8,9		2,9
081	Airborne Electronic Sensor Operators (AES Op)	200	188	-6,0		0,5

## APPENDIX VII

### CRITICAL SHORTFALLS

091	Flight Engineers (Flt Engr)	356	344	-3,4	0,8
651	Fire Fighters (Fire Ftr)	451	441	-2,2	1,0
811	Military Police (MP)	1110	1052	-5,2	2,5
836	Records Management Support Clerks (RMS Clk)	2874	2738	-4,7	6,6
911	Supply Technicians (Sup Tech)	2510	2398	-4,5	5,7
871	Musician (Muscn)	239	228	-4,6	0,5

	<b>SHORTFALLS IMPROVING</b> (Greater than 5% below requirements BUT enough potential trainees to recover, in the medium or long term, if requirements, retention and training patterns remain as forecast)				
	<b>Officers</b>				
44	Maritime Engineering Officers (MARE)	538	496	-7,8	4,8
71	Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface Officers (MARS)	880	803	-8,8	7,8
24	Field Engineering Officers (Engrs)	385	339	-11,9	3,4
22	Artillery Officers (Arty)	426	403	-5,4	3,8
23	Infantry Officers (Inf)	923	844	-8,6	8,2
82	Intelligence Officers (Int)	181	164	-9,4	1,6
39	Aerospace Control Officers (AEC)	506	434	-14,2	4,5
51	Dental Officers (Dent)	119	104	-12,6	1,1
57	Nursing Officers (Nur)	241	220	-8,7	2,1
49	Physio Therapy Officers (Phy Th)	12	10	-16,7	0,1
58	Social Worker Officers	35	25	-28,6	0,3
61	Protestant Chaplains (Chap (P))	77	68	-11,7	0,7
	<b>NCM</b>				
065	Naval Weapons Technicians (NW Tech)	437	384	-12,1	1,0

## APPENDIX VII

### CRITICAL SHORTFALLS

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278	Tactical Acoustics Sensor Operators (TAS Op)	478	405	-15,3		1,1
283	Naval Electronics Technician (Acoustic) (NET (A))	211	164	-22,3		0,5
284	Naval Electronics Technician (Communications) (NET (C))	243	177	-27,2		0,6
285	Naval Electronics Technician (Tactical) (NET(T))	349	252	-27,8		0,8
227	Land Communications and Information Systems Technician (LCIS Tech)	879	756	-14,0		2,0
052	Linemen (Lnm)	357	329	-7,8		0,8
411	Vehicle Technicians (Veh Tech)	2193	2079	-5,2		5,0
421	Weapons Tech Land (W Tech L)	349	315	-9,7		0,8
434	Fire Control Systems Technician (FCS Tech)	353	268	-24,1		0,8
526	Avionics Support Technician (AVS Tech)	1485	1348	-9,2		3,5
921	Ammunition Technicians (Ammo Tech)	177	138	-22,0		0,4
737	Medical Technicians (Med Tech)	1452	1343	-7,5		3,2

PML and TES for 1 Sep 02 as defined in Fall 2000 Personnel Status Report



## **APPENDIX VIII**

### **EXHIBITS**

- Exhibit #1: Conference of Defence Associations  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #2: Royal Canadian Military Institute  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #3: Council for Canadian Defence & Security in the 21st Century at the Centre for Military & Strategic Studies  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #4: Department of National Defence – Maritime Forces Pacific  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #5: Department of National Defence – One Canadian Air Division  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #6: Department of National Defence – 17 Wing Winnipeg  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #7: Department of National Defence – CFB Gagetown  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #8: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #9: Department of National Defence - Material submitted by Vice Admiral Maddison  
*(May 6, 2002, Issue No.14)*
- Exhibit #10: Department of National Defence - Material submitted by Lieutenant-General Macdonald  
*(May 6, 2002, Issue No.14)*
- Exhibit #11: Department of National Defence – Land Force Doctrine and Training System  
*(May 8, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #12: Department of National Defence – Army Training  
*(May 8, 2002, Issue No. 15)*

## **APPENDIX VIII**

### **EXHIBITS**

- Exhibit #13: Department of National Defence – Interoperability  
*(May 8, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #14: Department of National Defence – Joint-Operations  
Group  
*(May 8, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #15: Department of National Defence – Disaster Assistance  
Response  
*(May 8, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #16: Department of National Defence – Communications and  
Electronics  
*(May 9, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #17: Council for Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st  
Century  
*(May 27, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #18: Queen’s University, Defence Management Studies  
Program  
*(May 27, 2002, Issue No. 15)*
- Exhibit #19: Carleton University, Centre for Security and Defence  
Studies  
*(June 3, 2002, Issue No. 16)*
- Exhibit #20: Department of National Defence – Recruiting Group  
*(June 25, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #21: Department of National Defence – CFB Borden  
*(June 25, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #22: Department of National Defence – Canadian Forces  
*(June 25, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #23: Department of National Defence – Support Training  
Group  
*(June 25, 2002, Issue No. 19)*

## **APPENDIX VIII**

### **EXHIBITS**

- Exhibit #24: Department of National Defence – 8 Wing CFB Trenton  
*(June 26, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #25: Department of National Defence – Canadian Parachute  
Centre  
*(June 26, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #26: Department of National Defence – Sky Hawks  
*(June 26, 2002, Issue No. 19)*
- Exhibit #27: Department of National Defence – 2 Canadian  
Mechanized Brigade Group  
*(June 27, 2002, Issue No. 19)*



## **APPENDIX IX**

### **STATISTICS**

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Number of Persons Whom The Committee Met	244
Number of Bases Visited and Installations	15
Number of Units Visited	65
Number of Hours	166



## APPENDIX X

### MEDIA ACTIVITIES

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#### **Veronica Morris**

Veronica Morris joined the office of the Honourable Colin Kenny in November 1999, as a Special Assistant working on tobacco legislation sponsored by the Senator. In June of 2001 Ms. Morris assumed responsibility for media relations with the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence as it conducted an introductory survey on Canadian Security issues. Currently the Committee is examining the need for a national security policy for Canada.

Meetings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence are open to members of the media. Exceptions include when the Committee is drafting reports, dealing with personnel matters, or when a host specifically requests proceedings be held *in camera*.

When in Ottawa, Committee hearings are televised on the Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC); on the Senate Internet site (audio and video); the Parliamentary TV Network; and the Senate audio network, frequencies

(MHz): Floor: 94.7, English: 95.5, French: 95.1.

Those interested in the Committee's activities can subscribe to a mailing list that provides advance notice of meeting times, locations, and witnesses.

Information regarding the Committee can be obtained through its web site:

<http://sen-sec.ca>

Questions can be directed to:

Toll free: 1-800-267-7362

Or via email:

The Committee Clerk: [defence@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:defence@sen.parl.gc.ca)

The Committee Chair: [kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Media inquiries should be sent to: [ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca)





**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Atkins)**

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**The Honourable NORMAN K. ATKINS, Senator**

Senator Atkins was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. His family is from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where he has spent a great deal of time over the years. He is a graduate of the Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, and of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where he studied economics and completed a Bachelor of Arts programme in 1957. (Senator Atkins subsequently received an Honourary Doctorate in Civil Law in 2000, from Acadia University, his old “alma mater”.)

Senator Atkins has had a long and successful career in the field of communications – as an advertising executive to be precise. A former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited, as well-known Toronto-based agency, Senator Atkins has also played an active role within the industry, serving, for instance, as Director of the Institute of Canadian Advertising in the early 1980’s.

Over the years, Senator Atkins has had a long and successful career in the field of communications – as an organizer or participant in a number of important causes and events. For instance, and to name only a few of his many contributions, Senator Atkins has given of his time and energy to Diabetes Canada, the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, the Dellcrest Children Centre, the Federated Health Campaign in Ontario, the Healthpartners campaign in the Federal Public Service as well as the Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign.

Senator Atkins was also involved with the Institute for Political Involvement and the Albany Club of Toronto. (It was during his tenure as President in the early 1980’s that the Albany Club, a prestigious Toronto private club, and one of the oldest such clubs across the country, opened its membership to women.)

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Atkins)**

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Senator Atkins has a long personal history of political involvement. In particular, and throughout most of the last 50 years or so, he has been very active within the Progressive Conservative Party – at both the national and the provincial levels. Namely, Senator Atkins has held senior organizational responsibility in a number of election campaigns and he has served as an advisor to both the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney and the Rt. Hon. Robert L. Stanfield, as well as the Hon. William G. Davis.

Norman K. Atkins was appointed to the Senate of Canada on June 29, 1986. In the years since, he has proven to be an active, interested, and informed Senator. In particular, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of Canadian merchant navy veterans, seeking for them a more equitable recognition of their wartime service.

Currently, Senator Aktins is the Chair of the Progressive Conservative Senate Caucus, Deputy Chair of Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration as well as a member of both the National Security and Defence Committee and the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee. He is also the Honourary Chair of the Dalton K. Camp Endowment in Journalism at Saint-Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Banks)**

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**The Honourable TOMMY BANKS, Senator**

Tommy Banks is well-known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers, and an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture.

From 1968-83, he was the host of The Tommy Banks Show. A Gemini Award-winning variety television performer, he is today the owner of Tommy Banks Music Ltd.

A Juno Award-winning musician, Senator Banks has achieved national and international renown as Conductor or Music Director for such signature events as: The Royal Command Performance (1978); The Commonwealth Games (1978); the World University Games (1983); and the Opening Ceremonies for EXPO '86 and the XVth Olympic Winter Games (1988). He has also served as a guest conductor with symphony orchestras throughout Canada and in the United States.

As founding Chairman of the Alberta Foundation for the Performing Arts, Senator Banks has worked tirelessly to ensure that other promising musicians and performers receive the exposure they deserve right across the country.

In 1979, Senator Banks received an Honourary Diploma of Music from Grant MacEwan College. That same year, he received the Juno Award and the Grand Prix du Disque-Canada. In 1987, he received an Honourary Doctor of Laws from the University of Alberta. In 1990, he received the Sir Frederick Haultain Prize.

In 1991, Senator Banks was made an Officer of the Order of Canada. And in 1993, he was awarded the Alberta Order of Excellence.

On 9 May 2001, Senator Tommy Banks was appointed Vice-Chair of the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban issues. The Task Force will consult with citizens, experts and other orders of government to explore how these groups and individuals can work more collaboratively, within the federal jurisdiction, to strengthen quality of life in our large urban centres.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Banks)**

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Senator Banks lives in Edmonton.

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources

National Finance

National Security and Defence

The Special Committee on Illegal Drugs

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Cordy)**

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**The Honourable JANE CORDY, Senator**

An accomplished educator, Jane Cordy also has an extensive record of community involvement.

Senator Cordy earned a Teaching Certificate from the Nova Scotia Teachers's College and a Bachelor of Education from Mount Saint Vincent University.

In 1970, she began her teaching career, which has included stints with the Sydney School Board, the Halifax County School Board, the New Glasgow School Board, and the Halifax Regional School Board.

Senator Cordy has also served as Vice-Chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission and as Chair of the Board of Referees for the Halifax Region of Human Resources Development Canada.

Senator Cordy has also given generously of her time to numerous voluntary organizations. She has been a Board Member of Phoenix House, a shelter for homeless youth; a Member of the Judging Committee for the Dartmouth Book Awards (1993-95 --1999-2000); Member of the Strategic Planning Committee of Colby Village Elementary School; and, a Religious Education Program Volunteer and Lector with Dartmouth's St. Clement's Church.

Senator Cordy is a native of Sydney, Nova Scotia.

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

Library of Parliament (Joint)

National Security and Defence

Social Affairs, Science and Technology

Subcommittee on the Preservation and Promotion of a Sense of Canadian Community.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Day)**

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**The Honourable JOSEPH A. DAY, Senator**

Appointed to the Senate by the Rt. Honourable Jean Chrétien, Senator Joseph Day represents the province of New Brunswick and the Senatorial Division of Saint John-Kennebecasis. He has served in the Senate of Canada since October 4, 2001.

He is currently a Member of the following Senate Committees: Agriculture and Forestry; National Security and Defence; and, the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Areas of interest and specialization include: science and technology, defence, international trade and human rights issues, and heritage and literacy. He is a member of many Interparliamentary associations, including the Canada-China Legislative Association and the Interparliamentary Union.

A well-known New Brunswick lawyer and engineer, Senator Day has had a successful career as a private practice attorney. His legal interests include Patent and Trademark Law, and intellectual property issues. Called to the bar of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario, he is also certified as a Specialist in Intellectual Property Matters by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. Most recently (1999-2000) he served as President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association. In 1992, he joined J.D. Irving Ltd., a conglomerate with substantial interests in areas including forestry, pulp and paper, and shipbuilding, as legal counsel. Prior to 1992 he practiced with Gowling & Henderson in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ogilvy Renault in Ottawa, and Donald F. Sim in Toronto, where he began his career in 1973.

An active member of the community, Senator Day currently chairs the Foundation, and the Board of the Dr. V.A. Snow Centre Nursing Home, as well as the Board of the Associates of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. Among his many other volunteer efforts, he has held volunteer positions with the Canadian Bar Association and other professional organizations, and served as National President of both the Alumni Association (1996) and the Foundation (1998-2000) of the Royal Military College Club of Canada.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Day)**

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Senator Day holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College of Canada, an LL.B from Queen's University, and a Masters of Laws from Osgoode Hall.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Forrestall)**

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**HONOURABLE J. MICHAEL FORRESTALL**

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was born at Deep Brook, Nova Scotia on September 23, 1932. After an early career as a journalist with the Chronicle Herald and airline executive, he entered politics and was first elected to the House of Commons in the General Election of 1965.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was subsequently re-elected to the House of Commons in 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, and 1984. He first became Official Opposition Defence Critic in 1966, and challenged the government of Prime Minister Pearson on the Unification of the Canadian Forces. Senator Forrestall subsequently served as Defence Critic from 1966-1979 and served over that period of time as a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

From 1979-1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall served as a member or alternate to the North Atlantic Assembly. During that period of time he also served as General Rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee and presented the committee report entitled *Alliance Security in the 1980's*. In November of 1984, Senator Forrestall led the Canadian delegation to the 30th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly.

In 1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, and in 1986, the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion and the Minister of State for Science and Technology. He was a candidate in the 1988 General Election and defeated. In 1989, Senator Forrestall was appointed to the Board of Directors of Marine Atlantic, and then in 1990, appointed to the Veterans Appeal Board.

On September 27, 1990, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed to the Senate of Canada. From 1993-1994 he was a member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and serves to this day as Defence critic in the Senate. Senator Forrestall is currently Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy. The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall has, in the past, served as a member of the Senate



**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Forrestall)**

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Special Committee on the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs and Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications and Chair of the Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall is currently a member of the NATO Parliamentary Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Canada-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group and the Royal Canadian Legion.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Kenny)**

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**The Honourable COLIN KENNY, Senator**

***Career History***

Sworn in on June 29th, 1984 representing the Province of Ontario. His early political career began in 1968 as the Executive Director of the Liberal Party in Ontario. From 1970 until 1979 he worked in the Prime Minister's Office as Special Assistant, Director of Operations, Policy Advisor and Assistant Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau.

***Committee Involvement***

During his parliamentary career, Senator Kenny has served on numerous committees. They include the Special Committee on Terrorism and Security (1986-88) and (1989-91), the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce, the Standing Committee on National Finance, and the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and is Deputy-Chair of the Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. The Senator is also currently a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.

***Defence Matters***

Senator Kenny has been elected as Rapporteur for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to that he was Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Vice-Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future of the Armed Forces.

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Website: <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ckenny>

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Meighen)**

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**The Honourable MICHAEL A. MEIGHEN,**  
**Senator**

Appointed to the Senate in 1990, the Honourable Michael Meighen serves on various Senate Standing Committees including Banking Trade and Commerce, Fisheries, National Security and Defence, and chairs the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He has also served on the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada.

In his private career, Senator Meighen is Counsel to the law firm Ogilvy Renault, and was Legal Counsel to the Deschênes Commission on War Criminals. He is Chairman of Cundill Funds (Vancouver) and sits on the Board of Directors of Deutsche Bank Canada, Paribas Participations Limited, AMJ Campbell Inc., J.C. Clark Ltd. (Toronto).

Senator Meighen's record of community service includes the Salvation Army, Stratford Festival, Toronto and Western Hospital, Prostate Cancer Research Foundation, Atlantic Salmon Federation, T.R. Meighen Foundation, University of King's College (Chancellor), University of Waterloo Centre for Cultural Management, Université Laval, McGill University.

Senator Meighen is a graduate of McGill University and Université Laval. He lives in Toronto with his wife Kelly and their three children.

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Smith)**

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**The Honourable David P. Smith, Senator**

In addition to being a most able and respected lawyer, the Honourable David Smith has a distinguished record of public service.

Mr. Smith earned a B.A. in Political Science from Carleton University in 1964 and an LL.B from Queen's University in 1970. He was called to the Bar in Ontario in 1972. During a very distinguished career, Mr. Smith has become a foremost practitioner of municipal, administrative and regulatory law.

At the time of this appointment, Mr. Smith was Chairman and Partner of Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, one of Canada's oldest and largest law firms. In 1998, with the formation of Fraser Milner, Mr. Smith was named the firm's first Chairman. Previously, Mr. Smith was Chairman of Fraser & Beatty.

From 1980-84 Mr. Smith sat in the House of Commons as Member of Parliament for the riding of Don Valley East where he also served as Minister of State (Small Business and Tourism). In 1972, he was elected to Toronto City Council. After his re-election in 1974, he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the City of Toronto and Metro Toronto Council. He was re-elected again in 1976 and was subsequently appointed President of Toronto City Council and Deputy Mayor of Toronto.

Mr. Smith became very active in the Liberal party in the 1960's and held such positions as National President of the Young Liberals, Executive Assistant to Keith Davey who was national director, and executive assistant to the Hon. Walter Gordon and the Hon. John Turner.

Mr. Smith has lent his time to numerous voluntary and philanthropic organizations. He has sat on the Board of Governors of Exhibition Place, as well as on the boards of the Salvation Army, Toronto General Hospital, Mount Sinai Hospital and George Brown College. He has served as Chairman of the Retinitis Pigmentosa Foundation and as Vice Chairman of the O'Keefe Centre for the Performing Arts.

Mr. Smith and his wife, Heather, have raised three children: Alexander, Kathleen and Laura. He is 61 years of age.

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

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**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Smith)**

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Foreign Affairs  
Legal and Constitutional Affairs  
National Security and Defence  
Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament

**APPENDIX XI**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Wiebe)**

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**The Honourable JOHN (JACK) WIEBE, Senator**

Jack Wiebe is one of Saskatchewan's leading citizens. He has been a highly successful farmer, as well as a member of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly.

And in 1994, he became the first farmer to be appointed to the position of Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan in almost 50 years.

Senator Wiebe first became known in Saskatchewan as a leader in the farm community. He and his family built a thriving farm in the Main Center district of the province, and from 1970-86 he was owner and President of L&W Feeders Ltd.

Senator Wiebe has been very involved with the co-operative movement, and has served on the Main Center Wheat Pool Committee, the Herbert Credit Union, the Herbert Co-op, and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Advisory Board. He has also been active with the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and the Saskatchewan Stock Growers Association. He is currently the Saskatchewan Chairman of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council.

Senator Wiebe was elected in 1971 and 1975 as a Member of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly for the constituency of Morse.

Senator Wiebe and his wife, Ann, have raised three daughters and have four grandchildren.

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

Agriculture and Forestry

National Security and Defence

Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs

**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Chief Warrant Officer (Ret'd) Dessureault)**

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**Chief Warrant Officer  
J.J.L.M. Dessureault,  
OMM, CD**

**Canadian Forces  
Chief Warrant Officer**



Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault was born on 2 November 1945 in Shawinigan, Quebec. He enrolled in the Canadian Army on 26 March 1964 and completed his training at the Royal 22e Regiment depot at Valcartier, Quebec. In September of that year, he was posted to the 2nd Battalion Royal 22e Régiment, then stationed at Valcartier.

In July 1965, he accompanied the unit to Werl in Northern Germany for a period of four years. Upon his return to Canada in November 1969, he held a variety of positions within the 3rd Battalion until June 1971, date where he rejoined the 1st Battalion, which had been transferred to Lahr in Southern Germany. In April 1972 he was promoted to Master-Corporal.

In August 1974, following his return to Canada, he was promoted to the rank of Sergeant, initially acting as section commander and then as platoon Second in Command for the 3rd Battalion at Valcartier. In August 1976 he is affected to the 1st Battalion for a duration of five years. He was promoted twice during that posting.

In June 1983, he returned to Canada to assume the duties of Master Warrant Officer of the military drill training section at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Quebec. In June 1986, he was appointed to a position of company Sergeant-Major at the 2nd Battalion. He accompanied the unit to Cyprus in February 1987. During this tour of

**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Chief Warrant Officer (Ret'd) Dessureault)**

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duty, he was promoted to the rank of Chief Warrant Officer and, in June 1987, was posted to Headquarters "Secteur de l'Est" in Montreal.

In June 1990, following his three-year posting, he was assigned the position of Regimental Sergeant-Major of the 1st Battalion Royal 22e Régiment. On 8 April 1992, he accompanied this unit to the former Yugoslavia as part of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. He was therefore the first Regimental Sergeant-Major to be deployed with a battle group since Korea. When he returned to Canada in June 1993, he was assigned the duties of Chief Warrant Officer Land Force Quebec Area. On 20 June 1996, he is nominated Chief Warrant Officer of the Land Force Command. He is the Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer since 15 June 1999 until retirement the 31 July 2001.

November 1994, he was decorated Member of the Order of Military Merit and promoted to the rank of Officer of Military Merit in January 2000

Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault is married to Marianne Claassen, who is originally from the Netherlands; they have one daughter, Désirée.



**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Major-General (Ret'd) Keith McDonald)**

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**MAJOR-GENERAL(Ret) G. Keith  
MCDONALD**

MGen McDonald grew up in Edmonton, attended College Militaire Royal in St. Jean and Royal Military College in Kingston (RMC), graduating in 1966 and being awarded his pilot wings in 1967.

He instructed on T-33 aircraft at Canadian Forces Base, Moose Jaw Saskatchewan. In 1970, he was posted to RMC as a Squadron Commander and later the Assistant Director of Cadets.

1973 saw MGen McDonald return to the cockpit training on the CF-5 and CF104 aircraft. He was posted to 439 Squadron at CFB Baden-Soellingen in 1974 flying the CF104 in the ground attack role. Promoted to Major in 1977, MGen McDonald became the Group Tactical Evaluation Officer in 1978.

In 1980, MGen McDonald attended the Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell in England. Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1981, he returned to National Defence Headquarters responsible for CF-18 operational planning and CF-18 equipment purchases. In 1982, he moved to the CF-18 Project Management Office as the Operational Requirements Manager.

MGen McDonald completed CF-18 Training at CFB Cold Lake, prior to returning to CFB Baden-Soellingen in 1985 as the first CF-18 Squadron Commander of 439(Tiger) Squadron. In July 1987, he was promoted to Colonel and posted to NDHQ as Director Professional Education and Development. In July 1989, MGen McDonald assumed command of CFB and #4 Wing Baden-Soellingen. During his tenure as Base/Wing Commander he oversaw the mounting of the CF18 air task group to the Persian Gulf War and set in motion the closure of Baden. In 1992, he returned to NDHQ as Special Assistant to the ADM(Per) and in July 1993 assumed the newly created position which combined the SA/VCDS and the Director of the NDHQ Secretariat.

**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Major-General (Ret'd) Keith McDonald)**

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In June 94, General McDonald was promoted to Brigadier General and assumed the duties of Director General Aerospace Development at NDHQ. He was promoted to Major General in 1996, assuming the position of director of combat operations, Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command at Colorado Springs, USA. He held that position until his retirement from the Canadian Forces in 1998 after 37 years in the Canadian Forces.

Gen McDonald has accumulated over 4000 hours of pilot in command flying time, primarily in the CF18, CF104, CF5 and T-33. Professional education includes a Bachelors degree in Politics and Economics, staff school, the RAF Staff College, Post Graduate Courses in Business at Queens University, the National Security studies course, and numerous project management courses.

After leaving the military in 1998, Gen McDonald served a period of “conflict of interest” prior to joining BMCI Consulting as a Principal Consultant in the Aerospace and Defence Division. In 2002, he left BMCI to set up his own consulting business, KM Aerospace Consulting.

Gen McDonald is married to the former Catherine Grunder of Kincardine, Ontario, and they have two grown daughters, Jocelyn and Amy.

**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Grant Purves and Barbara Reynolds)**

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**GRANT PURVES**

A senior research officer, Mr. Purves joined the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament in 1974. Since then he has helped a number of Parliamentary committees prepare major studies. He was assigned to the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2001.

Mr. Purves has a strong academic background in military and East European history.

**BARBARA REYNOLDS**

Barbara Reynolds has worked with Canadian parliamentarians for 28 years in various capacities. Trained as a sociologist, she worked for 10 years as a research officer for the Library of Parliament, assisting committees involved in the area of social affairs. During this time she served for three years as Director of Research for the House of Commons Committee on Disabled Persons that produced the landmark report entitled *Obstacles*.

An associate of the Parliamentary Centre for 15 years, she organized fact-finding visits for legislators to and from the United States as well as study tours to Canada for legislators from African and Southeast Asian countries. She coordinated professional development programs for legislators and their staff, and wrote guidebooks on the operation of parliamentarians' offices in Ottawa and in their constituencies. In addition, she served as the director of the Parliament, Business and Labour Trust, a program under which legislators spend up to a week with major corporations and trade unions.

From 1985 to 2000 she also served as adviser to the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the worldwide organization of legislators that serves as the parliamentary wing of the United Nations.

**APPENDIX XII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Grant Purves and Barbara Reynolds)**

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In April 1998, she joined the Senate Committees Directorate as a Committee Clerk. Her committee assignments have included: Security and Intelligence; Boreal Forest, Fisheries; Transportation Safety; Veterans Affairs; and National Security and Defence. In June 2002, she received the Speaker's Award of Excellence for her work in the Senate.

**SENATE OF CANADA**

**National Security and Defence,**

**Standing Senate Committee**

**2nd Session, 37th Parliament, 2002**

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