Democracy, a Universal Value?

Selected Texts

COLLECTIF
DÉMOCRATIE
ET MODERNITÉ

Rights & Democracy
20 years

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Acknowledgements

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Ce rapport est aussi disponible en français.

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Acronyms

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - Justice and Development Party - JDP
APF	Asia Pacific Forum
CCDH	Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme
CDM	Collectif Démocratie et Modernité
EU	European Union
IER	Instance Équité et Réconciliation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDH	National Human Development Initiative
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MSP	National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHRCK	National Human Rights Commission of South Korea
PJD	Justice and Development Party
ROK	Republic of Korea
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

In memory of Driss Benzekri (1950-2007)

After spending 17 years in prison for his Marxist affiliations, this Berber teacher turned his activism to human rights. Starting in 2000, Driss Benzekri chaired the Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER) responsible for shedding light on the political repression and human rights violations committed during the period between independence and the end of King Hassan II's reign (1956-1999). Beginning in 2005, he chaired the Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme (CCDH).

Preface

In 2004, Rights & Democracy published the study *Democratic Development and Civil Society Movements in Morocco: Analysis and Strategic Actions*, the fruit of a participatory process carried out in partnership with Espace Associatif and in close collaboration with Moroccan civil society. This analysis of various aspects of democratic development in Morocco sought to promote a better understanding of the role of civil society in an ever-changing political climate. In 2005-2006, four regional forums were held across the country. The objectives of these meetings were to increase and enrich national collaboration and coordination among the various stakeholders in Moroccan civil society, with the goal of formulating better strategies for civil society at the local, regional and national levels. These forums brought together hundreds of civil society stakeholders to discuss the problems they were confronting in their respective regions and communities.

Rights & Democracy then developed a partnership with the Association régionale de développement du Gharb, a community association located in Sidi Yahia du Gharb, close to Rabat. One of the association's missions is to promote the involvement of the region's youth in a democratic participation process, and to provide them with advocacy training.

Throughout 2007, several initiatives were launched that fell within the framework of the previous programme cycle, with the goal of building the capacity of the various stakeholders in Moroccan society. Specifically, within the framework of a project sponsored by Elections Canada and Rights & Democracy, Moroccan media representatives visited Montréal and Ottawa to learn more about Canada's rules and procedures for ensuring fair election coverage. Rights & Democracy and the Institut national démocratique pour les affaires internationales du Maroc (IND) organized a visit by the campaign strategists of four major Moroccan political parties to observe the election campaign in Québec.

The Board of Directors of Rights & Democracy decided to hold its annual conference in Morocco on the basis of several factors, namely, the strength of Moroccan civil society, the reforms promoting democracy and rule of law, and the elections scheduled for September 2007. In organizing this event for the first time outside Canada, Rights & Democracy worked in partnership with the Casablanca-based Collectif Démocratie et Modernité (CDM). Founded in February 2003, this Moroccan coalition is composed of non-governmental associations and leading figures from civil society. Its mission is to organize debates, conferences and seminars and to promote activities in all milieus with the goal of promoting or defending democracy and progress.

The following is a collection of some of the talks given by speakers who submitted their texts following the conference and our call for submissions.

Razmik Panossian
Director of Policy, Programmes and Planning
Rights & Democracy

Opening Addresses

On the Universality of Democracy
By Jean-Louis Roy

"Democracy coexists with a broad range of spiritual, cultural and social traditions. Full recognition of the idea of a common quest, the singularity of the democratic ideal, the plurality of democratic systems and the inclusion of the "social substance" should inform our debates and our efforts to advance democracy around the world in the 21st century."

Allow me to begin by telling you about the wonderful welcome I received from Driss Moussaoui, former President of the Collectif Démocratie et Modernité, when I came knocking at his door to propose the undertaking that brings us together: it was warm, immediate and he offered many ideas. Our sense of fellowship deepened as we worked out a joint project between our two organizations.

I am also cognizant of the contributions of Nacer Chraibi, current President of the Collectif Démocratie et Modernité, and his colleagues in the steering committee, and I warmly thank them. As well, I wish to thank the Chair of Rights & Democracy's Board of Directors, Janice Stein, and the other Board members who are here with us. From the outset, they gave their support to the idea and realization of our conference.

Morocco's recent march toward democracy is unquestionably the most committed since the beginning of the new century. It is firmly rooted in history, from your struggle against the protectorate, the involvement of many in the national movement after 1955, and the part played by your historic political parties, which have been joined by many newer ones since.

The 1962 Constitution made any move towards a single party system illegal. That of 1996, the fifth, initiated the principale of changeover of political power. In the opinion of many analysts, this decision constituted a transition towards democracy. Between these two historic dates, there has been a long process, including the creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission.

The first six years of this century have been, in your history, a period of great democratic debate, expanding politically the fundamental principles of your constitution. I refer, in particular, to the first article that affirms the democratic character of your country, reinforced by the concept of the equality of all Moroccans (Article 5), and the affirmation of equal civil and political rights for all adult citizens of both genders (Article 8).

The implementation of these principles, while of course debated, is unprecedented. Examples include the reform of family law *(the Moudawana)*, the new law on citizenship, a

formula in your 2002 electoral law to guarantee the presence of women in the Parliament, which resulted in your country going from the last place to first in the Arab world with respect to female parliamentary representation, and finally, the 2002 election, which led to advances for new political forces, including the Justice and Development Party (PJD).

Finally, the recognition of the Amazigh (Berber) culture and the launching of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture are also a part of this period of major debates and great democratic achievements. I know that all this is still being discussed through impassioned and passionate debates on issues such as voting procedures and the revision of the constitution.

Please allow me to tell you that, viewed from outside, these choices are clearly converging toward a democratic culture. So much so, that they mobilize your civil society, which is organized, vibrant and capable of making suggestions. We are also aware of the scale of the issues and challenges posed here, as in many countries, by the full realization of social and economic rights. In his speech from the throne on July 30, 2002, the King drew up a stirring enumeration of these issues and challenges.

Incomplete, yes, but indisputable, Morocco's long march toward a democratic culture is part of a global movement which, in this last quarter of a century, has changed geopolitical reality worldwide, with the number of countries calling themselves democratic doubling in this period.

We will be discussing all these points. Is the wave of democratization still strong and productive in the world? Is democracy a universal aspiration?

Democracy is not the monopoly of anyone, or of any particular era of civilization.

Democracy cohabits with a wide variety of spiritual, cultural and social heritages. It is a shared quest with the goal of putting into practice the universality of democratic values and their implementation, while integrating the diversity of all countries of the world.

We must understand, accept and appreciate that the singularity of the democratic ideal can be embodied in a wide variety of democratic systems. Secularization is conceived in a radically different manner, for example, in Western societies and in India. Democracy can be poured into these two moulds: the West's rejection of all religious references and the equal respect for all religions in India.

We must be careful not to propose abstract projects, but to ensure that local realities and needs, and the distinctive character of spiritual, cultural and social heritages be completely taken into account. Democratization does not mean westernization. This myth must be debunked. Intercultural differences and similarities are equally real.

Even a quick glance at the current state of the human family and what it is becoming should convince us that it is not enough to consider democracy solely from the angle of political rights. It also includes socioeconomic rights.

Every system of democratic governance evolves in a changing world. Such a system takes its energy from the complexity of the spiritual, cultural and social needs of its components, i.e. every individual human being and collective entities is an attempt to reach an equilibrium that must deal with the paradox of "legal equality" and "social inequality."

The time has come to conciliate and harmonize political, economic or social and cultural rights. These categories of rights are indissociable and should be applied with the same rigour.

Democratic and Social Revolution in Contemporary Morocco
By Nacer Chraibi

Over the past several years, Morocco has undergone remarkable advances in such areas as political, social and women's rights. The beginning of the process of change could be attributed to the constitutional reform of 1996, which brought about, for the first time in the country's history, a government in which political power changes hands.

There was also the creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, which examined the country's past and enabled many Moroccans to make peace with their history. There was also the creation of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, with the legal and factual recognition of the Amazigh language as a national language, taught to all Moroccan children at school and of the Amazigh culture as part of the national heritage that every Moroccan is proud of.

Women benefited from particular attention, because the family law reform gave women the same rights as men, in most areas. The practice of polygamy has been strictly reined in by conditions that precede the authorization of a second marriage. Divorce has become a shared right and ruled by the court with regulations regarding the management of goods acquired during the marriage. Legal tutelage of children is now ensured jointly by the father and the mother. The rights of children are recognized.

The educational reform, initiated under the reign of King Hassan II, continued and there were new developments in schooling, with the recent introduction of human rights being taught at the primary level, and revision of school manuals to introduce into teaching practices an opening onto the world and tolerance.

New laws respecting freedom of the press lifted some restrictions on the work of journalists and the media. The new political party law has the objective of rehabilitating the political arena and obliging more internal democracy and transparency within the political parties.

Obligatory health insurance now covers 30% of the population, up from only 15% previously. The other 70% of the population, made up of the most deprived social groups, will benefit from free medical assistance within public health structures.

On the economic front, Morocco is a huge worksite, from north to south, with the creation of the Tanger-Med port and a free-trade zone; with the creation of a road that will link the Mediterranean towns of the north; with the construction of highways between Casablanca and Tangiers, Rabat and Fez, Casablanca and Marrakesh, and soon, between Marrakesh and Agadir.

Special effort has been made in the mountainous areas to open them up and to give the people living there access to running water, electricity, medical care and education.

The National Human Development Initiative (INDH) was launched to battle poverty and marginalization throughout the entire country, targeting especially the poorest areas and populations. Of course, nothing is perfect, and many problems remain, including high levels of unemployment and illiteracy, as well as many areas of substandard housing.

The Moroccan economy remains very dependent on rainfall and social measures have been slow in coming because the State's resources are limited by bad harvests. But current investment and open worksites lead us to hope that there will be notable improvement in the economic and social situation of Moroccans in the coming years.

Finally, to the country's credit, a civil society has been developed that is massively involved at every level and that remains vigilant with respect to gains, both old and new, and in particular, those concerning human rights.

Democracy: A Universal Value?

From Political Democracy to Social Democracy
By Guido Riveros Franck

Latin America began a cycle of democracy in the 1980s, at a time when a political, economic and cultural "globalization," concurrent with the hegemony of the so-called *"Pax Americana,"* was being formed.

With the Washington Consensus, a model of political governance and a market-based economy rooted in economic efficiency and competitiveness became widespread, together with a redefining of the state and its role in the diverse aspects of social, regional and economic life.

Democracy met electoral expectations of institutional formality, consolidating political citizenship, but accumulating a worrisome deficit in social matters. Poverty and inequality thus never ceased to be the main problems.

In 1990, the percentage of the population living in poverty was between "45 and 47%, while in 2006, over 40% of Latin Americans [were] poor."[1] Democracy was unable to effectively improve the living conditions of the disadvantaged, who had fervently hoped that it would be able to satisfy their most urgent needs.

Today, thanks to the spread of information, the surge in means of mass communication, freedom of the press, and the work of international and local organizations to make economic information more accessible, it is not only possible for citizens to be more informed and up to date, but also to be more critical, as they compare different realities and living conditions with an astounding ease only made possible by modern digital technology. "Civil society" thus has more expectations and a firm resolve to improve its standard of living. To that end, it has developed a growing ability to pressure those in power and does not hesitate to mobilize in large numbers when it deems necessary.

With respect to inequality, we find societies in which the disparity between the richest and the poorest has grown. "The income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990, and 30 to 1 in 1960."[2] This demonstrates that the policies implemented in the last decade of the past century have aggravated an economic inequality which, in many countries, has prevented the creation of a social citizenship that makes possible full societal participation in political and state life.

With so much poverty and social inequality, is political stability possible in the region? Or, if we are to continue in this fashion, should we expect a period of weakening of the state and delegitimization of politics and of its institutional actors, with greater social fragmentation, antagonistic polarization among divergent national sectors?

Why is democracy unable to handle our economies more efficiently and why does it not have the capacity to ensure fairer distribution of income among the various classes of the population?

We have reached a point at which the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the population, the indigenous peoples, or "aboriginals," and peasant labourers do not identify with "neo-liberal democracy" or with the current party system. This has increased distrust of those in power, of representational mechanisms such as the national parliament, local deliberative bodies and the political class, all of which are instruments that have proven to be incapable of meeting the demands of employment, productive investment and social inclusion.

The perception of the citizenry is that democracy has not solved its problems. The political parties that were able to articulate a utopia of freedom during the dictatorships to garner approval from a large part of the population thus gaining significant support and political legitimacy, have not turned out to be very creative. They were too limited by the demands of international organizations, and lacked the courage or conviction to create an alternative discourse with greater social content and national vision. It would seem that through globalization, "the power to make decisions regarding the direction of economic political development has been effectively transferred from countries to detached, distant, and undemocratic multilateral bodies such as the IMF, WB and WTO."[3]

Both the pro-government parties and the opposition parties have been trapped in the labyrinth of power and the absence of creative intellectual debate. They have been bereft of new ideologies and values to make the political attractive, which would serve to restore, at the least, a mobilizing centrality to political matters—a centrality which would make it possible to organize the various emergent public spaces and social actors.

Even more, the opportunity has been lost to lay the foundations for a national plan which would focus on politics, and coherently define diversity and the capacity to affect, profoundly and sustainably, the future of matters economic, social, historical and cultural.

People began to identify the political players and those in power with large economic corporations and "transnational companies" which pillage our natural resources, circumvent tax laws, and do not generate stable or well-paid employment. In addition to the demands of "structural [economic] reforms" came the establishment of a market economy which dismantled the weak State apparatuses, taking away from their ability to deal with issues of education, health, production, housing, climate vulnerability (drought, floods, natural disasters), and lack of protection for the national market, particularly "sensitive [agricultural] products."

This neglect of social and national problems and the exclusion of productive social organizations from the development of public policy—which resulted in reducing the legitimacy of government programmes and weakening the ability to control the economic, commercial and financial conditioning of international organizations—helped to increase discontent with democracy.

Thus it was that in 2004, according to the report on democracy in Latin America prepared by the United Nations Development Programme, 47% supported democracy in Mexico and Central America, 44% in the MERCOSUR region of South America, and 37% in the Andean region.

These percentages showed the interrelationship between the development of democracy and the economy according to geographical region. Greater acceptance or rejection of democracy depended on its economic effect. It is no coincidence that in the Andean region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) there has been greater mistrust of the democratic system. In this region, in addition to the economic issues and State weakness previously mentioned, there were and still are major problems regarding the inclusion of indigenous sectors in political and economic life, rural poverty and urban marginalization, and drug-trafficking and illegal crops, all of which are fuelled by inadequate government management and growing corruption in public administration.

However, it should be acknowledged that, since 2004, this political and social framework has undergone some notable changes in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, where the overwhelming victory of candidates connected to the popular and indigenous sectors has awakened new hope among the citizenry for the economic and political future. These, as Felipe Gonzáles has termed them, "energetic nationalisms" or "recurrent nationalisms" that have emerged, and that appear throughout the pendulum of Latin America's history, have in common an upsurge in the price of hydrocarbons and raw materials, the institutional precariousness of national states, and the collapse of "systemic parties." There are, nevertheless, significant differences among them, such as the "21st-century socialism" of Hugo Chávez, and the populist-indigenous championing, with all its programmatic and administrative management limitations, of Evo Morales in Bolivia.

Party-free Politics

The main components in the economic and social framework described are the profound crisis of the party system, and the ongoing questioning of the political and of representative democracy. Within this framework, an imbalance began to arise between the expectations and needs of the public, and the programmatic proposal of the political parties. The party apparatuses held fast to a bureaucratic-legal logic, in which "democratic formality" was more important than the citizens' demand for greater openness in the political system and equality of opportunity in the exercise of political representation.

Political parties entered a crisis and lost popular support because they were no longer "social aggregators" representing collective and majority interests; they lost their connection to society and no longer spoke of a national plan. They were more interested in the market than the state, they encouraged private interests to the detriment of public interests, and they became more elitist and removed from the people. "From the moment that politics seems less relevant in relation to how people perceive their individual and collective destinies, the very activity expressed through the parties necessarily begins to revolve around itself in somewhat of a vacuum."[4]

Political parties began to isolate and close themselves off, and no longer genuinely represented the citizens. They became mediators for other interests and not for those that really matter to society. This programmatic mistake was made worse by democratic stagnation, loss of values, and loss of behavioural standards within the parties. In this absence of political paradigms, in this ideological vacuum there was an emergence of *caciquismos* [despotism], *prebendalismos* [type of electoral gift-giving, or bribery], elitist and nepotistic practices, and vertical leadership. Orders supplanted debate to exact submissive obedience instead of eliciting intelligent discipline and loyalty, thereby replacing the voter with the militant, and suppressing reflection so as to unconditionally accept the economic and institutional policies of the Washington Consensus.

This is when substitutes for political organizations began to emerge, in a quest to establish party-free politics. Save for rare exceptions, we can state that democracies in Latin America are weak because they are based on unstable political organizations that are not consolidated as parties and that do not manage to build a real political system. The causes of this structural problem affecting "the political" can be found in predominant cultural habits, elites that are not constitutionally established and lack a profound national/State vision, a lack of territorial/geographical integration with internal regional imbalances, clusters of poor/indigenous/rural populations left out of the marketplace, and, in the national economy, monoproduction based on an important natural resource which favours service and transport infrastructure development in certain geographic areas.

To the above must be added scarce or overdue development of farming—on land which historically has been concentrated in the hands of the few, and which has indigenous/peasant labourer populations subjected to over-exploitation as cheap and abundant labour—and a lack of industrial development without employment policies and training of labour.

To summarize, we could say that for a long time, the "ruling elites" preferred living a "comfortable and easy life" in their countries to building nations, cultivating citizenship and developing solid institutions. A State apparatus based on legal standards and public institutions was created to constitute an instrument of power which would guarantee the permanence of a political core in government. In the best of cases, this made

possible electoral alternation and shared power which had no objective other than the financial gain of a small privileged "oligarchic" group.

This narrow concept of nation did not require full citizenship and solid political organizations. In dispensing with creative intellectuals, a nation state was unnecessary. Instead arose a government apparatus which, by distributing its largesse (*prebendismo*) in the administrative spheres, was able to maintain the public's political support for routine elections, dignifying by the vote the national and local representatives chosen by the elite to fulfill their functions within this instrumental political model.

For these reasons, there was never an interest in an authentic development of politics, and parties were structures without a democratic internal life, with leaders in positions for life and with programmes that reflected their economic and business interests. This explains why, for a large part of our history, political parties have obeyed a given sector of society, and have not transversally represented it.

Despite this, based on diverse global ideological currents, parties with liberal, conservative, socialist, communist, Christian-democratic and other characteristics arose. Others decided to represent social classes or groups such as workers, peasant labourers, indigenous peoples and the middle class. In the 1930s, as a result of the "economic crisis of capitalism" and of the vision of "development within," which promoted policies of "import substitution" and the implementation of a process of industrialization, populist movements began to appear. These movements advocated "class alliances," managing to attract diverse sectors of society so as to broaden politics and implement economic land and labour reforms. They extended political citizenship by means of universal suffrage in order to incorporate national majorities into political life, establishing the notion of the "national/popular" and instituting the welfare state.

Beyond Social Class

The reconversion of the world economy has had an important and not necessarily homogenous impact on our nations.

A phenomenon of "social decomposition and [...] de-socialization" has begun to occur, due to the absence of a State seeking social cohesion.[5] As the market grows and the State shrinks, the result is a fragmented society of innumerable nuclei and scattered groups. Rapidly, gaps appear between urban and rural areas; between powerful industrial cities and cities stagnating in their economic past; and between the capital cities of the republic and other cities lobbying for a decentralization of administrative bureaucracy.

In the social sphere, few sectors of the population benefit from the new economic model, which has resulted in a process of concentration of wealth and "social narrowing," increasing the number of those excluded and marginalized by globalization.

Urban conglomerations grow in a disorderly manner, the result of a phenomenon of rural-urban migration which, particularly in countries with a significant "aboriginal" population, gives rise to what some called "urban ruralization." There is also, however, a component of territorial mobility in this migration: from the mountains to the coast, from the highlands to the plains and valleys, from one region to another, and from the provinces to the capital. This process leads to internal territorial differences and autonomous movements of a regional nature.

Latin American societies have thus become more complex and the poverty linked to ethno-cultural groups is exploding, vastly overwhelming the political parties, which are no longer organic channels for the electoral representation of these new social movements. As Alain Tourain very aptly points out, before, "we spoke of social actors and of social movements; in the world which we have already entered, we will more frequently have to speak of personal subjects and cultural movements." The result is an inevitable logic of political self-representation, disorganization, and dissipation of the political.

To the above are added the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to have the needs of the different sectors of our "sliced-up societies" met and addressed by the weak mechanisms of the State, the public allocations bereft of institutional structure and sufficient financial resources, and the stagnant apparatuses of the political parties. A large number of the NGOs inculcate an anti-State attitude and contribute to the development of movements of indigenous groups, neighbourhood

groups, groups of peasant labourers who produce "organic food," environmental groups, and gender- and generation-based groups. These movements reject the existing political organizations and have an unlimited tendency to dissolve partisan structures.

Thus it is that in several countries throughout our continent, "citizens' organizations" proliferate. These organizations seek to send their representatives directly to the national parliament or to regional and municipal deliberative bodies. "Community thinking goes beyond the old debate between left-wing thought and right-wing thought, and suggests a third social philosophy [...] The central idea is now the relationship between the individual and the community, as well as between freedom and order," giving rise to multiple "civil libertarians" and "sensitive community members."[6]

With the weakening of "civil society," NGOs play the role of backing excluded sectors, supporting their organization, developing proposals and a sense of group membership. Often, however, instead of creating "social inclusion," they develop extreme approaches which lead to large confrontational social mobilizations. Instead of making gradual progress by claiming space within government administration and being included in the establishment of public policies, they ultimately marginalize themselves vis-à-vis the political system.

The absence of a uniting factor in society, whether arising from the State or the political—because the former neglects social matters and distances itself from national groups, and the latter is uncapable of finding the means to adapt to "new realities"—generates a worrisome "political institutional vacuum" to be filled by multiple social actors with "anti-political politics."

In this way societal stratification is destroyed and social classes have no "centralizing factors." These have been replaced by new assemblages of people grouped according to different specific activities, with partisan interests and their own problems. Band-aid and short-term solutions take precedence over a planned future and a "*Weltanschauung*." Focus is on the group and the community in isolation, using, varying intensities of mobilization as a pressure tactic to obtain only partial results, with no concern for possible harm to the rest of society, the national economy and

institutional order. A "tribalization" has arisen in which the individual is more important than the community, in which the group is more important than the "sense of community."

The New Organization of the Political and the Social

Political representation has become increasingly fragile and peremptory, and those elected by the citizens are quickly delegitimized if they do not act exactly in keeping with the opinions of the sector they represent. It is a time of growing societal disintegration, and also of great weakness for the emerging social sectors. The proliferation of new groups creates organic shortages, an absence of standards of coexistence and a lack of behavioural standards, and the creators of these groups quickly rise and fall.

Each social group has its own particular interests, and seeks to construct its own identity in the battle for access to a space of power in which to carry out its activities and consolidate a referential presence as a pressure group. "The dynamism of social differentiation has been so intense and accelerated that the very idea of society has begun to be lost."[7]

The new political challenge lies in properly linking the world of political parties with citizens' organizations. To avoid the ongoing and draining rupture between society and politics, it is necessary to perfect, through the political inclusion of the social movements which speak for "direct democracy," the mechanisms of "representative democracy" which are losing legitimacy. To stop "the bureaucratization of democracy and [to avoid] the bureaucratization of social representation," it is necessary to develop a legal body which will enable the political regeneration of the parties, but which, at the same time, will include organized social movements in democratic institutions.[8]

As the political cannot be reduced to partisan structures, and civil society demands participation and the opportunity to direct its representatives, a new way of organizing "the political" must be created, and this new way must seek to integrate the new social actors in the mechanisms of participation in, deliberation on and decision-making with regard to public policies.

How do we transform a political democracy with a rigid party system that has no possibility of containing or representing society into a social democracy that seeks to organize representation and political work in a new systemic vision?

The path toward this seems to begin with a better institutionalization of parties, and an acknowledgement of the forms of organization taken by a society in its different sectors, indigenous identities, and regions. Only a national consensus, in which all participate and present hegemonies are shunted to the side, can restore meaning to politics and make it attractive and credible once again in the eyes of the citizenry. Taking the path of imposition of a circumstantial majority that ignores civil society, or one that seeks absolute societal control and quashes all forms of political organization, is to continue the vicious cycle of antagonistic confrontation that paralyzes and drains the energy necessary to design new public spaces and build a Nation State that guarantees social cohesion.

As Huntington points out, "two groups which only consider each other enemies cannot constitute the foundation of a community": they do not build a sense of national belonging, they do not create a vision of a country, and they do not guarantee peaceful, equitable and efficient democratic sustainability.

N.B. All quotes are free translations of the original texts.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Francisco Rojas, "El nuevo mapa político latinoamericano," Revista Nueva Sociedad, 2006.

[2] UNDP, Informe sobre el desarrollo humano, 1999.

[3] Cándido Grzybowski, "Democracia, sociedad civil y política en América Latina: notas para un debate," UNDP, 2004.

[4] Manuel Antonio Garretón, "La indispensable y problemática relación entre partidos y democracia," 2004.

[5] Alain Touraine, Un nuevo paradigma. Editorial Paidos, 2006.

[6] Amitai Etzioni, La nueva regla de oro, Editorial Paidos, 1999.

[7] Fernando Calderón, "Notas sobre la crisis de legitimidad del estado y la democracia," UNDP, 2004.

[8] Jardin Celi Pinto, "Ciudadanía y democracia: los aportes de una perspectiva de género," UNDP, 2004.

Democracy and Secularization

Turkey's Search for Identity: A Eurasian and Islamic Country
By Ayla Göl

The revival of Islam since 9/11 has often been identified in Western media and political discourses as a failure of modernization and the inexorable emergence of fundamentalism and terrorism. The role of Islam in Turkish politics cannot be directly related to the rise of Islamism in regional and global contexts after 9/11 and the US-led occupation of Iraq. Turkey is usually described as a bridge—the so-called bridge theory—between Europe and Asia, the West and the (Middle) East or the Western and the Islamic civilizations.[1] This identification seems logical given the fact that Turkey is geographically located between Europe and the Middle East. Historically, Turkey was the first example of the transferring of an Islamic empire to a secular nation-state outside Europe in the 1920s. It is also the first Muslim country to achieve candidature for European Union (EU) membership in the 21st century. However, the ongoing debates about Turkey's membership in the EU have brought it to question not only its role as a bridge, but also the Turkish identity, its history and culture in the context of European collective history and identity.

While the so-called "bridge theory" suggests that Turkey acts as a mediator between the West and the East, the counter-argument emphasizes Turkey's role as a geographical barrier between Europe and the conflict zones in the Middle East and the Caucasus. According to Huntington, rather than a bridge, Turkey has become a "torn" country that "has a single predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization."[2] Huntington argues that "a bridge … is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey's leaders term their country a bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn."[3] He also identified Australia, Mexico and Russia as other torn countries, which are identified by two phenomena. "Their leaders refer to them as a 'bridge' between two cultures, and observers describe them as Janus-faced. 'Russia looks West—and East'; 'Turkey: East, West, which is best?'; 'Australian nationalism: Divided loyalties'; are typical headlines highlighting torn country identity problems."[4] In Huntington's opinion, among these states, Turkey is "the classic torn country which since the 1920s has been trying to modernize, to Westernize, and to become part of the West."[5] However, the Muslim character of Turkish society and the Islamic legacy of the country are not compatible with Westernization and modernization. Despite the secular character of the Turkish state, Huntington places it in the Islamic civilizational realm when categorizing civilizations of the world.[6]

This paper challenges Huntington's "torn" country and "clash of civilizations" thesis by arguing that the Turkish historical experience is based on a synthesis rather than a clash of competing Islamic and Western civilizations. Turkey is neither a torn country nor a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, but a "Eurasian" country that historically combines the fundamental characteristics of both the East and the West, geographically connecting Europe to Asia. There is no doubt that Turkey's engagements with the Western model—characterized by modernization, democratization and secularization—pose a matrix of political, religious, cultural and social questions, but this should not be interpreted as Islam's incompatibility with Western civilization.

There is a general tendency—mainly influenced by Gellner and Huntington's arguments—to claim that wherever Islam is a powerful societal force, as it is in the case of Turkey, there is little success in building a modern democratic and secular state based on the Western model. This paper disagrees with the essentialist understanding of Islam in the context of Turkey. It argues that Western modernity does not clash with the Islamic character of Turkish society. However, the universal character of modernity does not imply that Turkey's unique historical and societal factors are unimportant. On the contrary, these socio-historical dimensions are important to explain the complexity of a Muslim society's engagement with the West in the context of democratization and secularization, which are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the Turkish experience in secularism with its "authoritarian" character essentially differs from any other Western society. On the other, Turkey is not a fully-fledged democracy due to the interference of the military in politics and the lack of minority rights. These obstacles cannot be attributed to the strength of religion but to the existence of a strong state and a weak civil society in Turkey. Thus, this paper aims to explain how Turkey has produced its own *synthesis* by combining its Islamic and European characteristics.

The first part of the paper will put the alleged clash of civilization thesis into question in relation to Turkey's torn country status and related identity problems. In the second section, I explore what secularism means in Turkey. The main assumption is that the claim about a binary opposition between the secularism of the Turkish state and the Muslim identity of Turkish society is misleading in understanding the current political developments and protest meetings of 2007. The third part of the paper will explain the possibility of a Muslim democracy in Turkey by refuting Huntington's claims. Turkey's experience in democratization will be analysed in relation to its specific social and historical conditions as well as international and regional dynamics. The paper concludes by suggesting that Turkey is neither a bridge nor a torn country between the two civilizations but a unique country, which produced its own endogenous "Eurasianism" between two geo-cultural and socio-political systems. Such an analysis recognizes the possibility of interacting civilizational dynamics and "multiple modernities" in the world.[7]

Turkey as a Torn Country?

Based on his essentialist understanding of Islam and unitary conception of civilizational identity, Huntington claims that "[a]t some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pledging for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West."[8] According to his thesis, Turkey is more likely to turn back to its Islamic identity after "having experienced the bad and good of the West in secularism and democracy."[9] As Casanova suggests, "Huntington would apparently welcome such a transformation of Turkey from a secular to a Muslim state, if only to fulfil his own prophecy of the inevitable clash of civilisations."[10] However, Huntington's claims in the context of Turkey's relations with the West are historically and geopolitically inaccurate. It seems that Huntington is referring to the golden age of the Ottoman Empire as the antagonist of the West. He fails to acknowledge that the Sublime Porte—*Bab-i Ali*—was geopolitically part of the Concert of Europe and had developed close relations with the West through war, trade and diplomacy since the fifteenth century.

Unlike other post-colonial countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, there is no evidence of strong anti-Western feelings in Turkish politics. On the contrary, Turkey has always had a pro-Western orientation, not only with the establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, but also with the Ottoman modernization policies of the nineteenth century. The modern Turkish state became the 13th member state of the Council of Europe in 1949 and then a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.[11] Thus, Turkey has already secured its membership in two key military and cultural organizations of the West. Huntington's claim about Turkey's "humiliating role as a beggar pledging for membership in the West" is incorrect unless he refers to Turkey's problematic candidacy for the economic organization of European states, the EU.[12] Turkey's unsettled membership within the EU reflects the political divisions among European states in reference to what the European project and identity means. More importantly, the European states have to reach an agreement on whether they recognize Turkey's place in Europe or not.

According to Huntington's thesis, there are at least three requirements to redefine a torn country's civilizational identity: "First, the political and economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. Third, the dominant elements in the host civilization, in most cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the convert."[13] If we apply these conditions to current identity politics in Turkey, there are contradictory aspects, which refute Huntington's claims, as manifested in the current protest meetings in the name of republicanism and secularism, in April and May 2007.

In relation to his first requirement, the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*—Justice and Development Party—JDP) government, despite its Islamic roots, has not challenged Turkey's pro-Western direction and policies since it took power in November 2002. If Huntington were right, the AKP would give up the previous Turkish governments' aim for Turkey to become a member of the EU and redefine its identity as an Islamic state, thus acclaiming its Islamic civilization. In Huntington's thesis, it is not very clear how Turkey under the AKP government must redefine its civilizational identity: is it regarded as part of European or Islamic civilization? Huntington argues that only the Kemalist-oriented elite wants to be a part of the West, while the society itself has a different orientation. But a democratically elected government clearly represents the political will of a society and the AKP's victory is not an exception.

When the AKP came to power, many claimed that Islam was on the rise in Turkey. The AKP's victory demonstrated that political Islam was a reaction to Turkey's failed modernization based on Kemalist secularism.[14] The AKP's domestic and foreign policies, after almost five years in government, have not yet shown anti-modernization and anti-Western orientations, and, more than any previous government, the AKP is determined to achieve Turkey's EU membership. It is usually an overlooked fact that the AKP used a populist and nationalist discourse in order to win the elections in 2002.[15] Moreover, the AKP is not the first party to play the "Islamic card" in Turkish politics. Since 1950, both right wing and religious parties have used the religious factor to their own ends. The AKP learned from the mistakes of its

predecessors: the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* MSP) under the leadership of Necmeddin Erbakan in the 1970s; the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), again under Erbakan's leadership in the 1980s and 1990s; the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) and the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*), which were established after the 1997 post-modern coup. The Virtue Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for anti-secular activities.[16] All these parties clearly played the "Islamic card" during the election campaigns, but they knew that voters cared more about economic issues than religious issues.[17]

The former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, led the reformist group of the Welfare/Felicity Party to leave the traditionalists and establish a new party—the AKP.[18] Its leaders emphasized the idea of a new and clean ("ak" literally means both white and clean in Turkish) leadership that was determined to eradicate corruption from the state system. Many voters wanted to get rid of the old leadership and two thirds of them had never voted for Islamist parties before. The crucial factor was the economic crisis of 2001, which led the voters to try out a new party and its promising leadership. While the AKP introduced new blood into politics, the majority of its voters were enticed by economic and social problems rather than the party's views on religion. For instance, the most controversial headscarf issue was in eighth place—way below more significant concerns about the economy, corruption and joining the EU. The AKP leaders not only used a very clever mix of modernity and tradition, but also aimed to attract different sections of the society. The AKP continues to operate within the structure of the existing political system and to use an even stronger nationalist discourse for the early election campaigns in the summer of 2007.

According to the second requirement of Huntington's torn country claim, the redefinition of a civilizational identity takes place reluctantly without protests. The political tension between Kemalist secularists and the AK Party government has been highlighted by the presidential candidacy of the current foreign minister Abdullah Gül, who is accused of having a hidden Islamist agenda. The protest meetings of secularists—described as the Republic Protests (*Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*)—which took place in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir most recently between 14 April and 20 May, 2007, were the first example of their kind in Turkish history and they challenge Huntington's claims. He ar-

gued that "Turkey may be equally qualified to lead Islam. But to do so it would have to reject Ataturk's legacy more thoroughly than Russia has rejected Lenin's."[19] Recent protest meetings prove him wrong: Many demonstrators carried pictures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Turkish flags while chanting slogans to express their determination to protect secularism and republicanism as the main principles of Kemalism.[20] These peaceful mass rallies clearly demonstrated the determination of the people to protect Ataturk's legacy and support the country's secular system against any Islamic agenda.

These events had been the strongest manifestation of the acceptance of secular identity by a broad spectrum of Turkish society. Although there are controversial debates about which groups—in particular the army or retired members of the Turkish military forces— were involved in organizing these meetings, there is no doubt that millions of people were mobilized and they were strongly supported by NGOs, in particular, women's civil society organizations.[21]

It is also important to note that the secularist demonstrators criticized the role of the army in Turkish politics as well as the hidden Islamic agenda of the AKP government. For these people, neither a military coup nor an Islamic state— *Shari'a*—is desirable for Turkish democracy.[22] The problem is not Islam itself, but the use of religion and religious identity, demonstrated by the presidential candidacy in state affairs. It is not easy to decide to what extent these claims are valid. If we accept that modernity is inherently creative, than it is, consequently, never a completed process. As such, the AKP's tenure in power is clearly not aimed at Islamizing state institutions but at creating a sense of identity to move attention away from state and high politics, which disguise the agency of the public sphere. The fears of Islam and the alleged hidden agenda of the AKP seem to be exaggerated.

Consequently, the AKP's use of state power for its own ends, with the support of Muslim bourgeoisie, media and the discourse of nationalism, created a new cycle within which the secularists are politically *constructed as the new reactionaries*. This group perceive that their secular identity and daily life style, such as the freedom to drink alcohol, wear non-religious clothing—from mini skirts to bikinis and not wearing head scarves, as well as women being able to hold a driving

licence—is threatened by the AKP's envisaged Islamic identity. In this case, one can argue that secularism in Turkey has moved beyond a state project and become a social phenomenon. This challenges not only Huntington's claims but also the classic textbook explanations about Turkish secularism: there is a tension between the secular character of the state and the Islamic identity of the society. On the contrary, recent developments prove that there is a tension between the Islamic agenda of the AKP government and the secular character of the Turkish society.

Huntington's third requirement of the redefinition of a civilizational identity is probably the most acceptable and relevant claim. Turkey, with its secularized state institutions and society, represents a convergence, not a clash, between Eastern and Western civilizations. Nevertheless, the acid test is whether the host civilization—the West—will recognize such a convergence. As Huntington puts it "[…] the West, have to be willing to embrace the convert."[23] Although Huntington is right to identify the West—i.e, member states of the EU—as representative of the host civilization, his description of Turkey as a "convert" is misleading. Moreover, "the view from inside Turkey attests that Huntingon's picture is a mere caricature of Turkey's political realities. Certainly, there is—as in all EU member-states—a broad coalition of EU sceptics."[24] Even if Turkey does not become a member of the EU in the near future, the possibility of turning itself to an Islamic state seems to be a preposterous suggestion. Huntington does not recognize that the historical processes of secularization and democratization have also begun in Turkey, as evidenced by the pro-Western choices of its leaders.

The Turkish experience proves that democratic institutions can take hold in a Muslim society where religion and politics are separated. Whether European states will acknowledge the diversity of Turkey with its five-times-a-day calls to prayer and Eurasian identity, depends on how they define "Western civilization." Most probably, Turkey is not European enough to be accepted as part of the West. Similarly, due to its secular character, Turkey is not Islamic enough to be regarded as part of the Muslim world. Therefore, the next section explores what secularism means in Turkish politics.

Secularism as a Social Phenomenon

It is a historical fact that Turkey is the first secular state in the Muslim world. Gellner and Huntington's claims can be identified as the most influential theses of secularization and modernization. According to Gellner, Muslim societies cannot be secularized since Islam as a religion displays unique characteristics which are resistant to modernity and secularization.[25] Furthermore, "secularisation and democratisation have been often considered mutually reinforcing processes" in modernization theories.[26] If we focus on the secularization thesis first, the separation between religion and politics takes place in societies through the development of modernization, industrialization and rationalization.

Many views on the incompatibility of Islam, secularism and democracy are generally based on an essentialist as well as an Orientalist view of Islam.[27] In this view, Islam is portrayed as a unified homogenous phenomenon, which is incompatible with European modernity and its essential characteristics of secularism and democracy. This view does not acknowledge that there are different interpretations and political trajectories of Islam, ranging widely from Algeria, Morocco via Turkey to Indonesia and Malaysia. More importantly, the lack of democracy in many developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia cannot be attributed to the strength of Islam, as there are different belief systems in these countries.

In reference to secularization and Islam, it is important to make a differentiation between a separation of religion and state (*din wa dawla*) and that of religion and politics (*din wa siyasa*). Turkey's experience in secularization is described as *laïcité (laiklik)*,[28] "based on the principles of positivist secularism that was modelled after French republican laïcité, Jacobin statism, and vanguard elitism."[29] In its classic definition, "secularization refers to the divorce of public affairs, including law and education, from religion."[30] Therefore, there is a clear separation between religion and state institutions, but not necessarily between religion and politics.

It is usually claimed that the founders of the Turkish republic achieved the separation between religion and state in an "authoritarian"

way.[31] However, religion was placed under the control of the state, rather than a distinct separation being made between the two. The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 instigated the institutionalization of cutting ties with Islam, which represented tradition, irrationality and the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. In the same year, the closure of Holy Places, banning of Dervish orders and the establishment of the Directorate for Religious Affairs were carried out as part of this revolutionary transition. Islamic authority, practice and knowledge were tightly *included* rather than *excluded* under the strict control of the secular state, which controlled the public visibility of Islam. The banning of the veil and the fez (the latter was banned in the Hat Law of 1925) was an attempt to project an image of civilization during the founding years of the Republic. Indeed, a raft of other measures such as the imposition of the Gregorian calendar, the introduction of a Western Penal Code as well as the replacement of Arabic script with a Latin alphabet in 1928 and a Turkish translation of the Koran from Arabic (with the call to prayer—*ezan*—sung in Turkish) were all implemented to reinforce the visibility and symbolic omnipotence of a secular way of life.[32] These reforms, to a certain extent, reflected the competing representations of tradition and modernity, Islam and secularism.

Consequently, Turkey's particularly unique experience of secularism was criticized for putting religious affairs under the direct control of state institutions, rather than the common pattern in the West, where all religious affairs are separated from formal political affairs. This process has two important repercussions: first, Turkish secularism produced "a ruling administrative military-civilian bureaucratic elite with a distinct identity as 'laik Turks,' separate from ordinary backward Muslim subjects"; second, Islam is perceived as a threat to the secular character of the state, which produced "the ideology of a national security state with an exclusionary code of violence."[33]

However, the main problem with this analysis is that it assumes a strong tension between the implemented secularism of the state and the repressed Islam of Turkish society. For this understanding, it is the very nature of the secularization project as an imposition from above that contributed towards the politicization of Islam. The control of religion by the state led to the repression of Islam, which has been regarded

as "reactionary" because of its subversive potential by the Republicans. Not only are the binary oppositions of state and society, public and private, inherently problematic, but the assumption that secularism remains as a state *project* is also deeply problematic. Such an understanding does not acknowledge the possibility of turning a secular project into a social phenomenon and historical process that penetrates into the different layers of the Turkish society.

In particular, the sheer support of the public to the recent Republican mass rallies can be interpreted as a sign of the Turkish people's acceptance of secularism. To be more specific, a counter-model of the Turkish secular state would be an Islamic state where the legal system is based on Islamic law (*Shari'a*). According to the Gallup's World Poll Special Report on the Muslim World in 2006, Turkey is the only country, "where 57% say Shari'a should not be a source of legislation, not surprising for a country whose constitution explicitly limits the role of religion in the governmental sphere."[34] Interestingly, Lebanon comes in second at 33% and Indonesia is third at 18 %. Iran is fourth with 14%, although 66% support the idea that "*Shari'a* must be a source of legislation but not the only source." This percentage is 23% in Turkey (Gallup, p. 2) Only 12% of Turkish people support the idea of an Islamic state by accepting Shari'a as the only source of legislation.[35]

Two polar opposite trends—the militant secularist vs. the radical Islamist—do not represent the majority of Turkish society's views on secularism. One can argue that *laïcité (laiklik)* has established itself in important areas of both the state and society, "largely due to the power resources available to the secular state apparatus"—in particular legal and educational systems—as well as its international connections.[36] The AKP's electoral victory has been wrongly interpreted as the rise of Islamism in Turkish public affairs. Many observers interpreted it as meaning that the previous bastion of secularism in the Muslim world was endangered.[37] The secularist demonstrations of 2007 proved that these observers were wrong. Similarly, the secularist demonstrators criticized the army's interference in state affairs, which is also an important indication of current political developments.

The Turkish experience demonstrates that secularism and democratization are two sides of the same coin. They mutually constitute and reinforce each other. However, the recent developments in Turkey reveal the contested nature of a paradoxical relationship between secularization and democratization. On the one hand, secularization is seen as an essential prerequisite of democratization, and on the other, Turkey's relative progress in democratization is also associated with its authoritarian state secularism. There is a *paradoxical partnership* between secularism and democratization in Turkey due to the role of the army in this relationship, which raises the question: can there be a Muslim democracy?

Turkey as a Muslim Democracy

Despite the fact that Turkey has sustained democracy since 1946, and that it is the only democratic Muslim country, not only in the Middle East but also the Muslim world, it is not recognized as a democratic state by Freedom House.[38] According to this US-based international think tank, Israel stands out as the only democracy in the Middle East, despite also being classified as the least democratic region in the world. Based on these assumptions, the essentialist view of Islam concludes that the "democracy deficit" in the Middle East is a consequence of religious or cultural obstacles.[39] It is either Islam or Arab culture or both that obstructs democratization in the region.

According to research by Alfred Stephan, in the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, 11 (23%) countries have democratically elected governments.[40] This situation deserves very careful consideration of the underlying historical, socio-economic and international factors—such as colonialism, underdevelopment, illiteracy and poverty—rather than explaining it as "Arab exceptionalism."

The Turkish engagement in the establishment and consolidation of democracy in spite of its own "fault lines" has differed from those of both developing Western states, most developing countries, as well as Arab states of the Middle East.[41] Many scholars argue that democracy took root in Turkey only after Islam was excluded from the public realm in the early years of the Republic.[42] However, the recent history of Turkey demonstrates that democracy has been consolidated by the gradual inclusion of Islam into politics "while constitution-

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al and legal secularism have been kept intact."[43] This is the key to understanding the causes of the recent public demonstrations: to protect constitutional and legal secularism via democratic mechanisms in Turkey.

There had been a strong state tradition in Ottoman/Turkish history, and this tradition remains as the main obstacle of the Turkish transition to democracy. The rigid control of the public sphere by the state was the dominant character of Turkish politics between 1923 and 1946 under single-party rule (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – Ataturk's Republican Peoples Party). A multi-party system began after the first victory of an opposition party (Democrat Party) in 1950. State power softened gradually throughout the 1950s and the 1960s while the global liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s introduced new conditions for democratization. Meanwhile, Turkish democracy was interrupted by three direct and two indirect military interventions in politics[44]: three direct military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and then a post-modern/soft coup in 1997, followed by indirect interference in the recent presidential candidacy in April 2007. The Turkish Armed Forces act as the self-appointed guardians of the secular state system. "In its self-appointed role as the 'guardian of the unitary, secular state, the military occupies the paradoxical position of 'safeguarding' democracy while at the same time posing a major challenge to further democratisation."[45] Well-trained Turkish generals must be well aware of the fact that there is no place for a strong army in a fully democratic Turkey.

One can argue that there is almost a tradition of military intervention in every decade since Turkey's advance to a multi-party system. However, direct military rule has been the exception rather than a constant rule in Turkish politics since 1960. There is a paradox here: the army interferes as the guardian of secularism and each military intervention seriously harms democratization processes by pushing the country's democratic advance back at least 10 years. It sounds like the famous Turkish march—two steps forward and one step backwards. Furthermore, military interference also produced a unique military-state elite and mentality which utilized religion, when necessary, according to its own understanding and needs.

As Feroz Ahmad argues, the paradoxical role of the military particularly contributed to the politicization of Islam after the 1980 coup and religion has become an instrument of social control.[46] Within the cold war mentality, the atheist communist threat from the Soviet block was framed as the main threat to Turkish security. The generals of the 1980 coup blamed this communist threat for the ideological and violent street struggles between left and the right wing youngsters. The solution was found in the so-called "Turkish-Islamic synthesis," which was originally theorized by intellectuals (*Aydinlar Ocagi*—Intellectuals' House) of the right. It "became the quasi-official ideology of the military regime. Based on the typical fascist troïka of "barracks, mosque and family," the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was geared to bring the rebellious youth back into the fold of the establishment through emphasizing obedience to authority and fear of God."[47] Although this semi-religious, semi-military nationalism did not function as the generals expected, this mentality led the state elite and the establishment to turn a blind eye to growing religious organizations and sentiments during the 1980s and 1990s. The increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere in the 2000s only makes sense within these socio-historical conditions.

The AKP won the election in 2002 because it had embraced the rules of the only game in town—democracy—and recognized the legitimacy of the army as the guardian of secularism. Although the relationship between secularism and democratization appears to be paradoxical in the Turkish context it still proves that "Muslim democracy is as possible and viable today in Turkey as Christian democracy was half a century ago in Western Europe."[48] While Turkey is less advanced than Europe, it is relatively more advanced in democratization than other Middle Eastern countries. The following historical, socio-economic and international explanations will help us to understand Turkey's exceptionalism:

i. Historical explanation: Turkey, of all the Muslim countries has had the longest engagement with democracy. In accordance with the modernization policies of the Ottoman Empire, Turks were introduced to the idea of a constitutional parliamentary regime first between December 1876 and February 1878 and second, between July 1908 and January 1913. Therefore, the Turkish experiment in parliamentary democracy did not commence with the establishment of the

Republic in the 1920s, but has been going on for more than a century, the longest experience in the Muslim world. "In Turkey, democratic institutions were neither imposed by the victors, as happened in the defeated Axis countries, nor bequeathed by departing imperialists, as happened in the former British and French dependencies, but were introduced by the free choice of the Turks themselves. This surely gave these institutions a much better chance of survival."[49] Turks under the Ottoman Empire were part the ruling elite and had never been directly colonized. It was an *endogenous* movement, not an *exogenous* one, as experienced in many post-colonial contexts. Nevertheless, this cannot be the only explanation, given the fact that Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, like Turkey, never experienced direct colonial rule except for some interruptions of foreign rule in their histories. Moreover, in comparison to these countries, Turkey is also more advanced in nation-state building, which leads us to other socio-economic factors.

ii. Socio-economic explanation: The Ottoman Empire's close relations with the European states triggered a specific form of socio-economic and political change since the mid-nineteenth century. Its progress in democratization in the 20th and 21st centuries undoubtedly rests on this socio-historical experience. The empire's modernization policies also contributed to economic changes, which produced a professional, technical, managerial and entrepreneurial middle class. The establishment of the Turkish Republic not only established a secular nation-state but also consolidated a national market economy. Many observers have attached great importance to Turkey's economic development, which was not related to its natural revenues, unlike other oil-rich Muslim countries.[50] Turkey is not a *rentier* state. Turkey's economic growth was a consequence of its participation in the capitalist market economy. As described by Lipset, the proverb "No taxation, no representation" makes clear sense in understanding the relationship between economic development and democratization in Muslim societies.[51] In oil-rich countries of the Middle East, citizens of a state usually do not have a voice in decision-making as long as the state provides the ba-

sic services and satisfies public needs, such as jobs, health care and housing. In return, the oil-rich states do not need taxes to finance these services. In the Turkish context, the state cannot depend on its oil revenues and therefore, taxation and representation mutually reinforce each other on the path to democratization.

iii. International dimension: Turkey has had the longest geopolitical and closest diplomatic relations with the West, dating back almost to the fifteenth century. The Ottoman Empire's problematic existence within the Concert of Europe was resolved with modern Turkey's firm commitment to pro-Western alignment through its NATO and European Council membership as well as its EU candidacy. Thus, as stated earlier, there is not a strong sense of "anti-Westernism" in Turkish politics. Turkey has become one of the closest allies of the USA and Israel in the Middle East, which reflects the secular character of its foreign policies. Neither the American nor the Israeli governments have criticized the role of a strong army in Turkish politics while establishing close security and defence relations. It is through Turkey's EU membership that the role of the army has been criticized. As Ilter Turan identifies, "the EU has been critical of Turkey in three broad areas: the restricted nature of civil liberties, the insufficient protection of minorities and the unusual political influence of the Turkish military."[52] Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether the army usually returns to barracks because of their dedication to democracy or whether the "international factor" indirectly forces them to hand power to civilians. Clearly, the key obstacle to Turkey's consolidation of democracy is not the strength of Islam but the existence of a *strong state* tradition and the paradoxical role of the army as the guardian of secularism. The answer lies in the rise of civil society to balance state power and resolve its poor record of human rights.

All these historical, socio-economic and international factors created a specific political culture, within which democratic values and institutions have gradually been *synthesized* in the social context of Turkey. The current AKP government, despite its Islamic roots, is identified as the most democratic government and an

example of Muslim democracy. Ironically, the AKP leaders have never described themselves as "Muslim democrats" but as "conservative democrats."[53] The rise of the AKP as the continuity of its predecessors can only make sense within the specific historical and socio-economic conditions of Turkish domestic and international policies. The rise of Islam in the Turkish public sphere cannot be interpreted "as a deviation from the country's modernization process" but as a product of modernity.[54] The AKP leaders have not changed Turkey's pro-Western policies but have achieved the greatest political reforms in order to gain Turkey's EU membership.

Turkish leaders must cease reducing its European credentials to membership and identity issues. The political discourses of the current AKP government as well as the previous governments give the impression that EU membership is regarded as "the ultimate mark of being European."[55] In the 21st century, it is time to change this mentality and it is not Turkey that is suffering from an identity crisis, but Europe.

The public debates in Europe over Turkey's admission have shown that Europe is actually the torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question of whether European identity, and, thus its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy, and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism. Publicly, of course, European liberal secular elites cannot share the Pope's definition of European civilization as essentially Christian. But they also cannot verbalize the unspoken "cultural" requirements that make the integration of Turkey into Europe such a difficult issue.[56]

It would be easier for both sides if Turkey's Eurasian identity were recognized geo-culturally. As a former foreign minister (1997-2002), Ismail Cem argued, successive Turkish governments have failed to define Turkey's identity in reference to "Avrasya" (Eurasia) by presenting Turkey as sharing the European collective identity.[57] Turkey's insistence on its European-ness has been counter-productive on two accounts: it creates a false consciousness about its identity as "non-European"—"Islamic" and leads to a futile resistance of its "Asian-ness." Turkey culturally shares more characteristics with Central Asia than the Arab Middle East and it also has historical relations with European countries.

For European states, it will be relatively easier to accommodate Turks in a multi-cultural EU when Turkey's Eurasian identity is promoted. Economically, the EU can also benefit from Turkey's energy corridors via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline. Turkey's EU membership will open Central Asian markets to Europe, which has a vested interest in expanding its commercial relations and influencing their socio-political developments towards plural democracy. Within the Cold War mentality, Turkish policy makers refrained from formulating policies that would reflect Turkey's "Eurasian-ness." In the post-Cold War era, Turkey is perhaps the best candidate to realize the need for "Euro-Asian" dialogue. Such a dialogue challenges not only Huntington's thesis but also the existing American hegemony in regional and global contexts.

Concluding Remarks

Turkey is the first historical example of a "secular" 'Muslim democracy' in the Islamic World. Turkey's unique experience shows that it is neither a bridge nor a torn country. Twenty-first century Turkey must geopolitically redefine its endogenous Eurasian identity. Its spatial existence in Europe and Asia is enhanced by the combination of its temporal experience of Western and Islamic civilizations. As Casanova suggests, "the contemporary transformation of Muslim politics in Turkey offers perhaps the best illustration of Muslim democratization and the most compelling refutation of Huntington's thesis."[58] The recent demonstration movements exhibit that Ataturk's legacy and secularism remain as part of Turkish political culture. It is a historical fact that Turkey has *created* its own modernity by synthesizing Islam with contemporary Western secularism and liberal democracy. The Turkish experience also proves the possibility of turning secularism from a state project imposed from above into an evolving *social phenomenon*. However, it is now the West's turn to recognize Turkey's western credentials and Eurasian identity with its unique historical experience. Eurocrats in Brussels must realize that Turkey's EU membership will promote the idea of "unity in diversity" rather than clash of civilizations.

FOOTNOTES

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Democracy, Citizenship and Civil Society

Civil Society and the National Human Rights Commission in the Republic of Korea
By Byunghoon Oh

The countries of the East Asian region have shared the political culture of authoritarianism for most of their histories. Since the 1980s, many efforts to overcome the authoritarian system have been made in several countries, but it is said that the Republic of Korea (ROK) is recognized as the only country in the region to have followed the best practice of economic growth and democracy. This paper will discuss the following questions regarding democratization in the ROK:

- How was authoritarianism overcome and has a democratic political order been established?
- What are the characteristics and roles of the civil society movement in the process of democratization since 1987?
- What is the role of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in fulfilling its mandate to eliminate the authoritarian political system?

For this discussion, I will focus on the institutional aspects of democratization, drawing on South Korea's practical debates and experiences. That is, how can we establish democracy as an institution in our lives at the grassroots level? What matters is that it will take time for the institutionalization of democracy to take root through trial and error. In the Korean case, the kind of resistance faced by the despotic power of the authoritarian political system, and the kind of negotiation that brought about the establishment of an independent national human rights body are key to understanding the democratization process.

The Origin and Characteristics of Authoritarian Political Culture

Korean society is rooted in Confucianism, which was a philosophical mechanism contributing to the mind-set of elites during the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910). Many other East Asian countries had this philosophical background in common in their histories.

Even though many scholars blame this historical background for the rise of authoritarianism in Korean society, the critical point for the development of a vicious authoritarian mindset came from Japanese imperialism or militarism, which eradicated the civilian ruling system that was beginning to sprout. After liberation from Japanese imperialism, military despotism and anti-communist ideology were prevalent until the middle of the 1980s in Korea. The rulers produced and manipulated this ideology in order to impede the progress of democracy.

Advent and Characteristics of Civil Society

1. Advent of Civil Society in Korea

As in other countries, civil society in Korea has played an important role as a protagonist of democratization. Civil society fought against authoritarian, coercive and monopolistic military despotism in the process of democratization, then secured itself an autonomous space separate from state authority. The democratization movement in 1987 was an important event for developing democracy in Korea. At this time, the civil movement was at the centre of very militant, radical anti-governmental drive. Since then, the civil society campaign has been legalized and popularized. Now that various actors lead the movement, the influence of civil society is prevailing nationwide.

The civil society of Korea has attained growth in both quantity and quality. Currently, civil society is seeking to change its strategy to adapt to an autonomous and pluralistic society that contrasts with its roots in the violent and coercive epoch of the despotic regime. It also seeks to build a cooperative relationship with the state. In the relationship between civil society and the state, civil society needs to develop a cooperative network for mutual negotiation in order to contribute to the development of democracy, while at the same time remaining separate from the power structure.

2. The Change in the Nature of Civil Society

The civil society movement in 1987 provided a critical push for democratization in Korean society by combining the explosive power of the labour and student movements. Since that time, it has changed its strategy from mass mobilization to lawsuits, policy presentation, handling of civil complaints, etc.

The civil rights movement was enriched by the participation of NGOs equipped with human rights expertise. They focused on human rights violations caused by political power, capital, governmental bodies, bureaucracy, private bodies and even personal relations. Strategic changes have occurred, especially with respect to the relationship between the civil society and the government. Even though civil society recognizes the legitimacy of the ruling government, it is always alert to irregularities in policy implementation, such as arbitrariness, illegality, and irrationality, stressing instead comprehensiveness, public interests, and morality.

Civil society utilized a number of strategies in the democratization campaign, such as monitoring public policy, anti-candidate campaigns, protection of civil rights and freedom, checks on government activities and politics, and the presentation of policy alternatives based on expertise.

Nevertheless, it is said that there are some shortcomings in the civil society movement. As the democratic behaviours of people and establishment of democratic political culture are still in a formative state, the voluntary and active participation and organization of human resources is limited. Moreover, civil society movements often struggle to develop feasible alternatives to the policies they criticize.

These new features of the civil society movement need to be recognized in the perspective of institutionalizing conflicts to reach a new level of democratization in Korean society.

Establishment and Function of NHRCK

1. National Human Rights Commission: background

There are some provisions respecting human rights in the Constitution of Korea, but these civil rights are too vulnerable to political powers to depend on only governmental bodies. In the 1990s, civil society focused its desire for democratization on the establishment of the National Human Rights Institution (NI). NI was then a relatively recent development in the promotion and protection of human rights. According to the Paris Principles, NIs are usually entrusted with the three-fold task of promoting awareness and education about human rights, advising and assisting government, and investigating alleged human rights violations.

As the basic task of political democratization was attained in Korean society, establishing an institutionalized mechanism for monitoring state power in the process of perfecting the democratic system was unavoidable. Many representatives from NGOs participated in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, when nobody knew how long it would take to establish the NI. But the participation and their later initiative to establish NI in Korea created the cornerstone for the organization of the independent NHRCK in November 2001.

At that time, a political struggle between the Ministry of Justice and human rights organizations in civil society dominated the whole process. The Ministry's bill to set up NI under its jurisdiction was eventually abandoned due to the opposition of civil society, which pushed for an independent governmental institution.

2. Mandates of NHRCK

NI's functions are distinct in the sense that no other state institutions are expected or required to fulfill the solemn responsibility to respect human rights in the process of exercising state power.

NHRCK has the following mandates:
- Investigation and research of statutes, legal system, policies and practices related to human rights
- Investigation and remedy of HR violations and discriminatory acts
- Survey on human rights conditions
- Education on human rights
- Recommendation of guidelines on human rights violations
- Cooperation with NGOs and international organizations related to human rights

These mandates are the basic minimum core required to meet international human rights standards in Korean society. In the process to promote and protect human rights, NGOs working with particular vulnerable groups are a vital access point to the NI for vulnerable communities: indigenous or ethnic minority groups and organizations of women, people with disabilities, prisoners, children and so on. Some of these groups have been represented on the membership of commissioners' meeting since the beginning of the NHRCK.

3. Challenges Facing the NHRCK in the Democratization of Korea

Of all state institutions, NI is distinctive because it is intended to serve, not to rule, the vulnerable and powerless. NI is also distinctive, in that support from international society and civil society is essential for its effective functioning. In this sense, NI can be understood as keeping the windows of the state wide open towards both international and civil society. The NHRCK faces the following challenges in the democratization of Korea as well as at the international level:
- reinforcement of institutionalized mechanisms to protect civil rights
- strengthening links of solidarity with international organizations and NGOs for domestic implementation of international human rights standards.
- preparation for the international demand to protect human rights in the Asia-Pacific region and four other continents: Europe, Africa, North and South America.
- contribution to the formation of international human rights mechanisms

Recently, NI has received a broad mandate to police international standards because it may provide a more effective remedy than the various domestic and international mechanisms. As NIs have the reputation of being the most realistic means to implement international human rights standards, their role is expected to be more noticeable in the newly established UN Human Rights Council and treaty bodies.

Prospects for the Relationship between Civil Society and NI

As discussed above, the civil society movement led democratization, and the establishment of NHRCK was an outcome of the democratization movement. Our experience of operating NHRCK gave us many lessons in setting up the appropriate relationship between civil society and the NI. Even though NHRCK was indebted to the human rights organizations' consistent efforts over more than 10 years, it is not supposed to directly reflect the opinion and intention of the civil society in decision-making, as each sector acts according to their respective mandates. This is also true of the NIs' relationship with governmental bodies, given the reality that a large number of human rights

violations are still committed by governmental institutions.

Thus, the appropriate relation among NIs, NGOs and GOs needs to be set up with consideration of interdependence and independence in their mandates and human resources. Now that the NI has attained rapid development for decades depending on civil society, it can give a great deal of assistance to the fledgling human rights NGOs in civil society. Especially in the international human rights community like UN Human Rights Council, the interdependence with the civil society and government is one of the challenges that NI should meet in order to play a role as a bridge or a conduit of communication among social powers in the process of reviewing the human rights situation of a particular country. Actually NGO activists have a closer and more trusting relationship with grassroots communities. NGOs, by their very nature, have a freedom of expression, a flexibility of action and a liberty of movement that enables them to perform tasks which governments and NIs are unable or even unwilling to perform.

Finally, I would like to make sure that the discussion above is relevant to the Korean situation because it is very difficult to find a generalized logic to explain the Asia-Pacific situation, as it is an enormously diverse region in which human rights matters differ greatly from country to country. Even given these circumstances, the Asia-Pacific region has created a framework for cooperation on human rights, the Asia Pacific Forum of NHRIs (APF). Over the past ten years, all 16 member NIs have benefited from the APF in various areas, from establishment to operation to technical assistance, to promote and protect human rights at home and abroad.

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Programme

DAY 1
Friday, June 8, 2007

8:00 AM - 9:00 AM	**RECEPTION AND REGISTRATION**
9:00 AM - 10:00 AM	WELCOMING ADDRESS AND OPENING REMARKS Mahjoub El Haïba, General Secretary of the Consultative Committee for Human Rights, Morocco • Nacer Chraibi, President, Collectif Démocratie et Modernité, Morocco • Driss Moussaoui, Past President, Collectif Démocratie et Modernité • Jean-Louis Roy, President, Rights & Democracy, Canada
10:00 AM - 10:30 AM	**BREAK**
10:30 AM - 1:00 PM	**ROUNDTABLE 1 AND DISCUSSION: DEMOCRACY, A UNIVERSAL VALUE?** Facilitator: Janice Stein, Chair of the Board of Directors, Rights & Democracy, Canada, and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto
Bolivia	Guido Riveros Franck, President and founder of the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy, Bolivia
Central and eastern Europe	Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT), Hungary
The Arab world	Saad Eddine Ibrahim, Political Sociology Professor of the American University of Cairo and General Secretary of the Egyptian Independent Commission for Electoral Review (ICER), Egypt
Asia	Byunghoon Oh, Director of International Human Rights Team, National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, National Human Rights Commission of South Korea (NHRCK)
Sub-Saharan Africa	Hannah Foster, Executive Director of the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS), Gambia
United States	Jean-François Lisée, Executive Director of the new International Studies Center (CERIUM)
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM	**LUNCH BREAK**

2:30 PM - 5:00 PM	**ROUNDTABLE 2 AND DISCUSSION :DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PLURALITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS**
	Facilitator: Hind Taarji, Journalist and Writer, Morocco
Democracy and elections	Noureddine Ayouch, President of the 2007 Daba Association Marc Mayrand, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
Democracy and political parties	Gérard Latulippe, Director of the National Democratic Institute in Rabat and Senior Representative for the Maghreb region
Democracy and equality	Sima Samar, Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan (Darfur)
Democracy and information	Dominique Payette, Sociologist, Journalist and Professor of Communications, Université Laval, Canada
5:00 PM - 5:30 PM	**BREAK**
5:30 PM - 6:30 PM	Special Activity: Abdelaziz Bennani, First President of the Moroccan Human Rights Organization

DAY 2
Friday, June 9, 2007

9:00 AM - 12:00 PM	**ROUNDTABLE 3 AND DISCUSSION : DEMOCRACY AND SECULARIZATION**
	Facilitator: Mohamed Sghir Janjar, Director of the periodical Prologue, Morocco
The Indian model	Rajeev Bhargava, professor of political theory at the University of Delhi, India
The European model	John Parisella, Concordia University, Canada
Islam and secularization	Mohamed El Ayadi, Sociologist and Historian, Professor of Social Sciences and History of the Present at Université Hassan II Aïn Chock-Casablanca
	R'Kia Laoui, Professor of Educational Sciences, Université du Québec à Rimouski, Canada
	Ayla Göl, Lecturer of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM	**BREAK**

12:00 PM - 2:00 PM	**LUNCH BREAK**
2:00 PM - 4:30 PM	**ROUNDTABLE 4: DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

Facilitator:
Sabah Chraibi, Doctor of Law and National President of *Espace de la Femme pour la Solidarité et le Développement Maroc* (ESPOD) (Women's Space for Solidarity and Development, Morocco)

The case of Morocco	Driss El Yazami, General Secretary of the International Federation for Human Rights, Morocco
The case of Canada	Nancy Riche, Past Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Labour Congress and past Vice-president of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Canada
Latin America	Guido Riveros Franck, President and founder of the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy, Bolivia
Asia	Byunghoon Oh, Director of International Human Rights Team, National Human Rights Commission of South Korea National Human Rights Commission of South Korea (NHRCK)
Sub-Saharan Africa	Fatimata M'Baye, Chairperson of Association mauritanienne des droits de l'Homme (Mauritanian Human Rights Association) and Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights
4:30 PM - 5:00 PM	**BREAK**
5:00 PM - 6:00 PM	**CLOSING ADDRESSES**

Facilitator:
Jean-Louis Roy, President, Rights & Democracy, Canada

- Nacer Chraibi, President, Collectif Démocratie et Modernité, Morocco
- Janice Stein, Chair of Board of Directors, Rights & Democracy, Canada and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto
- Driss Moussaoui, Past President, Collectif Démocratie et Modernité

Authors' Biographies

Nacer Chraibi

Nacer Chraibi was professor of cardiology from 1976 to 2004 at the Faculty of Medicine in Casablanca. He is particularly interested in strategies to prevent cardiovascular disease in developing countries. Dr. Chraibi is one of the founding members of the *Collectif Démocratie et Modernité* and has been its President since 2007. He is also Vice-president of the "Alternatives" Association since 1998 and Secretary-General of the Moroccan foundation for youth, initiatives and development since 2000. He has written over 165 articles, which have been published in national and international journals.

Ayla Göl

Ayla Göl is a graduate of the University of Ankara in Turkey and holds a PhD from the London School of Economics (LSE). Before joining the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, she lectured at the Department of International Relations, LSE between 2003 and 2005. Her research interests include political Islam, the politics of developing countries, nationalism and Turkey.

Byunghoon Oh

Byunghoon Oh is the Director of the international division of South Korea's National Human Rights Commission (NHRCK). Created in 2001 as an entity independent of the government, its role is to promote respect of human rights in South Korea. The Commission is responsible for carrying out investigations when complaints concerning violations of human rights are filed. Its mandate also includes significant research and public education components.

Guido Riveros Franck

Guido Riveros Franck is a founder and current President of the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (FBDM), an organization that works primarily to consolidate democracy in Bolivia by supporting a stronger party system and promoting dialogue and the participation of all sectors of society in democratic development. He has also been a member of the National Congress, the Deputy Minister of coordination between the Parliament and executive power, and a diplomat in Colombia, where he successfully worked for the release of victims of abductions.

His actions have always been informed by his advocacy for democracy, human rights and justice. This struggle forced him into exile in Switzerland during the dictatorship of General García Meza.

Jean-Louis Roy

Jean-Louis Roy was President of Rights & Democracy between 2002 and 2007. A former Director of the Montreal daily *Le Devoir*, Mr. Roy was Secretary General of the *Agence de la Francophonie in Paris* from 1990 to 1998. Mr. Roy holds a Ph.D. in history from McGill University, where he was Director of the Centre for French Canadian Studies at McGill University from 1971 to 1981. He was Director of *Le Devoir* from 1981 to 1986 until he was named Québec Delegate General in Paris and Delegate to Francophone Multilateral Affairs, a post he held until 1990. President of the *Ligue des droits et libertés du Québec* (Quebec's Civil Liberties' Union) from 1976 to 1978, he was also a member of the *Commission des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec* (Québec's Human Rights Commission).

To contact us:

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