



The Canadian Army Journal

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ARTICLES

Coins in the Dust: Battlespace Commanding and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: From the Bonn Agreement to the Afghanistan Compact

The Glaucus Factor: Red Teaming as a Means to Nurture Foresight

The Tactics School and Army Transformation

*The Canadian Forces and Military Transformation
An Elusive Quest for Efficiency*

*UN Sanctions and the Military Missions:
Implications for the Canadian Forces*

*The Canadian Forces in Somalia:
An Operational Assessment*



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The Canadian Army Journal

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The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of the Army. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. *The Canadian Army Journal* is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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EDITORIAL: A TIME FOR REFLECTION



Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp
Editor-in-Chief

"We learn from history that in every age and every clime the majority of people have resented what seems in retrospect to have been purely matter-of-fact comment on their institutions. We learn too that nothing has aided the persistence of falsehood, and the evils resulting from it, more than the unwillingness of good people to admit the truth when it was disturbing to their comfortable assurance."

—B.H. Liddell Hart

Why Don't We Learn From History? (1944)

Lessons learned on campaign must make their way into institutional thinking where they can be further considered, debated, and adopted or discarded. As combat operations begin to draw down in Afghanistan, the time is arriving when the army must start conducting contemporary operational studies and analyses on its performance there. Whether the subject is tactics or transformation, there is much to be gained from the study of campaigns, operations, battles, and engagements. At the same time, there is a need to begin the synthesis of this material into publication for wider dissemination and consideration.

Over the past couple of years, a growing body of literature on the Canadian Army in Afghanistan has appeared in the commercial press, but all of these books focus on personal or individual accounts. More complete operational overviews covering the Canadian campaign as a whole have yet to be written, despite the fact that many of our coalition partners have already started publishing such works. Amongst our allies, worth noting are the U.S. Army's Long War Operational History Series that already includes a two-volume history of the War in Iraq and the first volume of a contemporary history of the army's Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute recently published a very detailed operational analysis entitled "Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008." This 274-page examination of the defence of Combat Outpost Kahler on 13 July 2008 is a remarkable study of modern warfare and will surely remain a seminal work in all future analyses of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. It is also, in my opinion, a fantastic example upon which to base similar unclassified operational narratives and studies of our own.

1. Available online at
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdf>.

Still, perhaps it is understandable that it may be some time before such complete studies will become available to us. Therefore, in the meantime, the Canadian Army Journal provides an excellent venue for taking an iterative approach to developing operational narratives and providing contemporary accounts on any aspect of the recent campaign. We strongly encourage the army's veterans of Afghanistan to write about their experiences, lessons learned, ideas, concepts, assessments of doctrine, etc. No subject should be left out. All are important to encouraging army innovation and evolution. This latest issue of the journal includes a variety of operational analyses of the type that we encourage everyone to submit.

Beginning with two critical examinations of Afghanistan, the first piece by Major Mark Popov highlights the challenges of modern insurgency, while the second piece by Captain Tyler D. Wentzell offers some insight on the efforts made to address those challenges. The next articles speak to innovation. "The Glaucus Factor" introduces the concept of red teaming. "The Tactics School and Army Transformation," meanwhile, introduces a key organization in the army assigned the task of transforming ideas and concepts into practice. Rounding out these articles are three case studies, each examining how events have shaped lessons, which in turn have shaped the very future of the army itself.

The critical analysis of past performance, as Liddell Hart noted in his essay above, is not always welcomed by institutions under the microscope. It is, however, absolutely necessary in order to provide the base from which future force development can occur. Real innovation—vice change simply for the sake of change—requires a commitment to the objective study and constructive criticism of past events. The Canadian Army Journal looks forward to being part of that ongoing process.

ON THE EDITOR'S DESK...

Aside from mandatory readings for JCSP, over the past several weeks I have had the opportunity to read a few new books, including two Canadian Cold War-era operational histories from the University of British Columbia Press. Both *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64*, written by Kevin Spooner, and *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956–67*, written by Michael Carroll, are refreshing and insightful re-examinations of these well-known Canadian missions and are highly recommended. I have included their reviews in this issue. At present, I am reading C.J. Chivers' Pulitzer Prize-winning book on the history of the AK-47 simply titled *The Gun*. This survey of the iconic nemesis of Western armies is a must read, and I will be sure to include a review of it in the next issue. In the meantime, please enjoy this issue of the journal and, as always, we encourage you to let us know what you think.



Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp
Editor-in-Chief

PLEASE NOTE: Due to circumstances beyond our control, Vol. 14 of The Canadian Army Journal will cover 2012 calendar year. There will be no journals published for the year 2011. We apologize for any inconvenience.



Honours and Awards

STAR OF COURAGE

Private Adam J.P. Fraser, S.C.

Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Courcellette, Québec

Corporal Déri J.G. Langevin, S.C.

Chicoutimi and Québec, Québec

Corporal Marc-André Poirier, S.C.

Amos and Québec, Québec

On July 19, 2009, Corporals Marc-André Poirier and Déri Langevin and Private Adam Fraser demonstrated exceptional courage while helping people who had been injured following the crash of a civilian helicopter at the Kandahar Air Field, in Afghanistan. Alerted to the incident, the three rescuers rushed to the scene outside the security wall of their camp. They crossed a dangerous area engulfed in flames and dodged frequent explosions to reach two victims who were lying in a ditch near the wreckage of their burning helicopter. They moved the wounded to a safe place and provided first aid until medical personnel arrived. The rescuers had to abandon their search for other victims when they realized they were in a minefield. Thanks to the rescuers' efforts, five of the 21 passengers and crew survived.

MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS

Medal of Military Valour

Lieutenant Guillaume Frédéric Caron, M.M.V., C.D.

Rimouski, Quebec

As part of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team in Afghanistan from April to October 2009, Lieutenant Caron contributed to the battle group's operational success. While supervising an Afghan National Army company, he distinguished himself during combat operations through his courage on the battlefield, notably when he led the difficult recovery of an Afghan helicopter that had been shot down. Through his leadership, combat skills and tactical acumen, Lieutenant Caron has brought great credit to the Canadian Forces.

Medal of Military Valour

Corporal Bradley D. Casey, M.M.V.

Pugwash, Nova Scotia

On February 18, 2010, Corporal Casey risked his life to provide treatment to a wounded Afghan National Army soldier. With bullets striking around him, he provided critical treatment and transported the casualty to the medical evacuation helicopter. Despite being under constant fire, Corporal Casey never wavered from his task, ensuring the provision of exceptional medical care to a fellow soldier.

Medal of Military Valour**Private Tony Rodney Vance Harris, M.M.V.**

Penfield, New Brunswick

On November 23, 2009, Private Harris was at Forward Operating Base Wilson, in Afghanistan, when insurgents unleashed a mortar attack. Without regard for his own safety, he ran to the scene of the impact and provided first aid to American soldiers. Noticing another soldier trapped inside a burning sea container, Private Harris went to his aid, single-handedly pulled him to safety and rendered life-saving first-aid as rounds continued to fall. Private Harris' courageous and decisive actions under fire that day saved several lives and brought great credit to Canada.

Medal of Military Valour**Captain Michael A. MacKillop, M.M.V., C.D.**

Calgary, Alberta

As commander of a reconnaissance platoon from October 2009 to May 2010, Captain MacKillop disrupted insurgent activities in a volatile sector of Afghanistan through his courageous and relentless engagement of the enemy. Often facing fierce resistance and fire from multiple directions, he remained composed during intense battles, calmly providing direction and constantly looking to gain the advantage. Captain MacKillop's exceptional leadership under fire and his ability to get the most from his soldiers were critical to consistently defeating insurgents in Afghanistan.

Medal of Military Valour**Master Corporal Gilles-Remi Mikkelsen, M.M.V.**

Bella Coola, British Columbia

On November 1, 2009, a member of Master Corporal Mikkelsen's joint Canadian-Afghan foot patrol was severely wounded by an improvised explosive device. During the ensuing ambush, Master Corporal Mikkelsen selflessly crossed through intense enemy fire to provide life-saving first aid to the critically wounded Afghan soldier. Despite the danger, his outstanding courage saved a comrade's life and brought great credit to Canada and the Canadian Forces.

Medal of Military Valour**Master Corporal Marc-André J. M. Rousseau, M.M.V.**

La Sarre, Quebec

On August 3, 2010, while Master Corporal Rousseau was conducting an exercise with a group of civilians at the Kandahar Airfield, insurgents blew a hole in the fence in an attempt to force their way inside. Despite being under heavy fire, Master Corporal Rousseau led two comrades over exposed ground, occupied a nearby vehicle and aggressively engaged the enemy. Without regard for his own safety, Master Corporal Rousseau demonstrated outstanding leadership and courage, which proved vital to winning the battle and saving countless lives on the airfield.

MEDAL OF BRAVERY

Joseph Henry Roland Bouliane, M.B.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

Major William Robertson Green, M.B., C.D.

Caronport, Saskatchewan

Blair William Allan Hockin, M.B.

Portage la Prairie, Manitoba

RCMP Constable Alfred Douglas Lavallee, M.B., C.D.

St. Ambroise, Manitoba

Sergeant Joseph Kenneth Penman, M.B.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

Master Warrant Officer Hamish Jackson Seggie, M.B., C.D.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

Warrant Officer Shaun Spence, M.B., C.D.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

Abebe Yohannes, M.B.

Brandon, Manitoba

Hermann Zarbl, M.B.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

On October 12, 2007, Major William Green, Warrant Officer Shaun Spence, Sergeant Joseph Penman, Roland Bouliane and Abebe Yohannes rescued two people who were trapped inside burning vehicles, in Headingly, Manitoba. The men tried frantically to put out the fire inside one vehicle, but the flames spread quickly and the dark smoke made it difficult to see inside. Major Green broke the rear window, pulled a little girl from the back seat and brought her to safety. Constable Alfred Lavallee and the other rescuers again tried desperately to reach the two other victims inside, but were driven back by the heat and flames. Meanwhile, Blair Hockin, Hermann Zarbl and Master Warrant Officer Hamish Seggie ripped out parts of the dash on the second vehicle to pull out the driver, who was trapped beneath the debris. They removed the victim, moments before the vehicle became engulfed.

Master Corporal Julien Gauthier, M.B.

Alouette, Quebec

Sergeant Joseph André Hotton, M.B., C.D.

Kingston, Nova Scotia

On November 19, 2008, military search and rescue technicians Sergeant André Hotton and Master Corporal Julien Gauthier rescued three people from a sinking barge, off the coast of Nova Scotia. Responding to a distress call stating that the barge was in trouble in heavy seas, a military helicopter was sent to the site to evacuate the people on board. After several failed rescue attempts, Sergeant Hotton was lowered a distance away from the vessel where he signalled for one victim to swim out to him so that he could be hoisted up to the aircraft. Although advised by the air base that the rescue operation should cease because of low fuel and approaching darkness, the pilot and crew opted to continue with the rescue. Sergeant Hotton was

again lowered and was hoisted up with one more victim. Master Corporal Gauthier was then lowered down and completed the rescue of the last victim. The entire rescue operation took approximately one hour to complete, and the barge capsized shortly afterwards.

Leading Seaman Robert T. Binder, M.B. (deceased)

Toronto, Ontario

Master Corporal David Frederick Taylor King, M.B., C.D.


Victoria, British Columbia

Able Seaman Jaret A. McQueen, M.B.

Hamilton, Ontario

On August 14, 2008, Leading Seaman Robert Binder, Master Corporal David King and Able Seaman Jaret McQueen rescued a man from a submerged vehicle, in Esquimalt, British Columbia. Upon hearing the crash of the vehicle—which was then propelled into the waters of Lang Cove, at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt—Leading Seaman Binder and Master Corporal King entered the murky waters to reach the vehicle. After repeated efforts, they extracted the unconscious man from the vehicle, brought him back to shore and began CPR. Master Corporal King and Able Seaman McQueen dived numerous times to the vehicle to search for other possible victims. Only once the vehicle was pulled out of the water did they find a deceased woman inside.

The decorations awarded to Leading Seaman Binder and Master Corporal King were presented at a previous ceremony.



MEDALS OF HONOUR

For every medal that Canadian soldiers receive, there are two stories. One is about the soldier's bravery or service and the other is about the medal itself. Beginning with the Canadian Victoria Cross, *Medals of Honour* explores the history, design, manufacture and meaning of medals. This award-winning documentary provides viewers with a richer understanding of medals, from the gold buttons that Alexander the Great bestowed upon his soldiers to the campaign stars that the Governor General awards today.

Sergeant Marco Comisso's documentary was honoured at the 19th International Military Film Festival in Italy. To learn why Sergeant Comisso decided to make this documentary, watch episode 381 of Army News.

For more information on the Canadian Forces Honour System, please visit the Directorate of Honours and Recognition's website:

<http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhr-ddhr/nhs-sdh/index-eng.asp>



Source: Staff Sergeant Christine Jones, United States Air Force

COINS IN THE DUST

Battlespace Commanding and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

Major Mark Popov, CD, MBA

Contemporary organized military forces, acting on behalf of recognized states, that seek to generate and then apply combat power to destroy their opponents through fires, manoeuvre and massed, synchronized high-tempo effects¹ are easy to find but hard to kill. While modern combat formations lack stealth, advertising their presence by virtue of their size and mass, they compensate through protection, firepower, manoeuvrability, tempo and battlespace fire effects provided by a breadth of sophisticated, lethal combat systems. Non-state actors who simultaneously hide amongst² and intimidate a country's population, attacking through night letters,³ information campaigns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are, conversely, easier to kill⁴ but much, much harder to find. As the nature of the Afghan conflict has shifted from sustained instances of hard, kinetic combat to its present, more insidious nature, the tactics, techniques and procedures used by Canada's soldiers to combat insurgents in Kandahar Province have also evolved.

B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron located on the southern flank of the Task Force 3-09 Battle Group area, was tasked to secure the population of Kandahar Province's Dand District from September 2009 to May 2010. Augmented with attachments and enablers from across Task Force Kandahar (TFK), to include whole of government partners from Canadian civilian police departments and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), it captured a number of key counter-insurgency lessons during its mission. This article is a distillation, compilation and explanation of eleven critical lessons—coins of knowledge and experience gathered from Kandahar's dusty plains by soldiers' sweat, blood and effort. These lessons held true throughout the deployment.

BACKGROUND

It is a given in counter-insurgency theory that insurgencies are political power struggles⁵ in which insurgent movements seek to overthrow an existing government.⁶ In this struggle, the population's attitudes, perceptions and support are often the centre of gravity⁷ for both insurgents and government forces. In order to engage the population and influence it to support the legitimate government and not the insurgents, kinetic military action alone cannot succeed. Although sometimes killing is necessary, recent history continues to prove that counter-insurgency "cannot kill or capture [its] way to victory."⁸ Government forces, locked in "a competition with the insurgent"⁹ for influence, must convince the population to deny insurgents the succour and support, both tacit and overt, that they need to live, operate, hide, manoeuvre and attack.¹⁰ This task is far more difficult than it appears. When planning operations, key terrain and vital ground are no longer defined solely by physical areas on the ground, but rather must also include attitudes and actions taken by residents of an area to render the insurgent ineffective. In order to defeat the insurgent, the counter-insurgent force, whether indigenous or foreign, cannot disregard the population, act in isolation and expect to prevail. One must take a page from the insurgent's playbook and influence the population by acting on multiple concurrent axes, not just the purely military plane, to win. When planning counter-insurgency operations, **the people are the terrain.**

KANDAHAR SITUATION, FALL 2009

Although the "what"—influencing the population—is clear, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has proven that *how* to accomplish this task is more difficult. Successive Task Force Kandahar¹¹ rotations have made significant steps in positively influencing the population and denying insurgents freedom of action in southern Kandahar Province.¹² However, experience has shown that the spectrum of battlespace effects in Afghanistan can often be fragmented and cause friction at the tactical level as different elements with different mandates, different capabilities and different commanders operate in the same piece of terrain and seek to influence the same population. Much as fires and manoeuvre must be closely synchronized to achieve concentration of force, maximize economy of effort, husband scarce combat power and prevent fratricide, non-kinetic effects must also be similarly synchronized. The majority of Kandaharis care far less

about command structures and the division of responsibilities between different units than they do about effects. To them, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers, no matter the unit or nationality, are a homogeneous group of foreigners. The concept that within ISAF there are different groups responsible for different things and effects is inconceivable. In order to best focus on Kandahar's population and influence it to reject the insurgency, TFK must synchronize reconstruction, development, governance, security operations, raids, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)¹³ development and stability, which are all intertwined in the population's perception. In theory, this synchronization is easy to achieve. In practice, the frictions of war, differences in organizational culture, national mandates, time, space, resources and the ever-present threat can all serve to make synchronization immensely difficult.

ENABLING SYNCHRONIZATION

In order to better synchronize the disparate and dispersed elements of its deployed units, Task Force Kandahar began implementing the Battlespace Commander (BSC) concept in southern Kandahar Province late in 2009, first in Panjwayi District, followed by Dand District. Much as the concept of one commander responsible for tactical effects in a single area of operations is part and parcel of kinetic operations and a given in our military culture, the BSC concept extended this unity of command into a broader spectrum. It saw one sub-unit commander, appointed as the BSC, made responsible for synchronizing and guiding all battlespace effects and activities in a specific district, including non-military stabilization, governance, reconstruction and development efforts. That same BSC was also responsible for all interactions between ISAF elements and government-appointed district leaders, Afghan government officials and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in his district.

Government of Afghanistan Order 3501,¹⁴ issued on 16 September 2007, mandated the creation of Afghan National Army-led¹⁵ Operational Coordination Centres (OCCs) across Afghanistan to coordinate the activities of disparate ANSF elements (as identified in Figure 1) with each other and with ISAF. These centres, working at the provincial and district levels, coordinate security efforts and act as a central source for information about incidents, events and upcoming plans. They are frequently co-located and partnered¹⁶ with ISAF elements. Establishment of Operational Coordination Centres in Kandahar province was predicated on the security situation, ANSF capacity and local Afghan government officials' political will. Prior to late 2009, the conditions were not right for establishing district-level Operational Coordination Centres (OCC-Ds); as soon as conditions evolved sufficiently, the BSCs in Panjwayi and Dand established OCC-Ds to satisfy this Government of Afghanistan requirement. Each OCC-D was a partnered Afghan-Canadian synchronization and information node which supported each BSC, its partnered ANSF elements and each district's appointed District Leader.

EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION

Becoming a BSC sub-unit and establishing the Dand District Operational Coordination Centre OCC-D(D) was a significant challenge for B Squadron. Figure 2 depicts the squadron's general composition on its initial deployment, while Figure 3 shows its



AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Primary Organizations

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Afghan National Police (ANP)

- Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)
- Afghan Border Police (ABP)
- Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
- Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
- Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
- Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

National Directorate of Security

Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)

Figure 1: Afghan National Security Forces – Primary Organizations. C.J. Radin, "Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)," Public Multimedia Incorporated, p. 3, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/afghanistan/index.php> (accessed 28 August 2010)

configuration as the Dand District Combat Team, an evolution which brought an approximately threefold increase in personnel and a great deal more responsibility to the existing squadron command structure. However, this responsibility and command challenge was balanced by the significant capabilities that the Combat Team's attachments and enablers provided, coupled with the OCC-D's ability to interact and coordinate with local government officials and ANSF.




Figure 2: B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, after deployment as the Task Force 3-09 Battle Group Reconnaissance Squadron as of September 2009

The Construction Management Organization (CMO) team focused on village-level or multiple-village projects such as building irrigation canals. It had excellent contacts with local labour organizers and the ability to monitor local attitudes and impressions during its interactions with local work teams. The Civil–Military Co-operation (CIMIC) team was the Combat Team's overt, public and friendly face, staffing a reception centre oriented to mitigate dissatisfaction over manoeuvre damage, land claims and other issues. It also had the ability to assess village needs, then initiate precisely targeted, quick, low-level projects to resolve minor grievances and provide limited employment. The Police Operational Mentor Liaison Team (P-OMLT) focused on training, mentoring and developing the individual and collective skills of the district's ANP detachment, from basic weapons handling, to scene management, to first aid, to search techniques, to conducting basic investigations and interacting with the public as the professional face and primary constabulary apparatus of the Afghan government. The P-OMLT, which included a civilian police officer from a Canadian municipal police force, also acted as the BSC's primary link to and liaison with the ANP command structure. P-OMLT facilitated partnered planning and operations and ensured a consistent approach and style of interaction between the ANP and the Combat Team. The Combat Team's civilian Stabilization Officer and the OCC-D(D) worked closely with the District Leader and his staff. They worked together to professionalize legitimate local government officials in order to contribute to ongoing stability, governance, reconstruction and development efforts, synchronizing those efforts with both ANP and ISAF security activities. This organization ensured that every facet of counter-insurgency efforts in the district, from kinetic operations to construction projects, from village meetings to ANSF activities, was synchronized. Every Combat Team element knew what every other element was doing, which enabled the BSC to set priorities, resolve conflicting demands quickly, maintain flexibility and keep pressure on the insurgents through a full spectrum of synchronized effects.

LESSONS CAPTURED AND APPLIED

During the American counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam, Bernard Fall observed, "If it works, it is obsolete."¹⁷ Adaptability is a necessity. In order to maintain the tactical initiative, confuse enemy observation, and avoid both pattern-setting and complacency in planning and operations, the Combat Team captured




Figure 3: B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, after augmentation and establishment as the Dand District Combat Team, January 2010. While the District Leader, Afghan National Police (ANP) and CIDA Stabilization Officer were not subordinate to the BSC, they are included with dotted lines reflecting their partnered status

lessons through after-action reviews, both Canadian-only and partnered with ANSF, throughout its tenure. In the course of its deployment, the Combat Team noted the following eleven consistent and critical principles which proved their worth through every operation, every evolution, every interaction and every change in situation. All of the events described below occurred in Kandahar Province's Dand District.

1. **Partnering is critical.** Partnering with the ANSF is the most effective way to operate because of the results it achieves, not just because it is ordered from higher.¹⁸ Partnering may sound like a theoretical construct that is impossible to execute in real life, but it actually is workable. Some ANSF elements may not perform the same way their ISAF counterparts do; sometimes they do not meet timings, they may have different hygiene standards, they may not plan operations in as much detail, and they have more limited combat service support capability than their ISAF counterparts. Despite these differences, the positive effects of partnered operations outweigh the challenges they present. Partnered operations had a much more significant effect on the population and achieved far better results than unpartnered operations. ANSF personnel generally know and understand the population and its dynamics far better than their ISAF counterparts ever could, can often tell when they're being lied to, can use force when and where required, can avoid being browbeaten by village elders and can often tell if there are foreigners in a village. They are Muslims, are not as restricted as ISAF in searching compounds,¹⁹ do not offend the locals by their presence in villages and compounds and are, for the most part, extremely brave.



B Squadron Commander Major Mark Popov and Dand District Chief of Police Colonel Sher Shah meet with a tribal militia commander during a security survey in southern Kandahar Province, March 2010

A reasonably planned partnered operation actually leads to better effects on the ground than a perfectly planned and executed unpartnered one and keeps more combat power intact to fight another day. In the fall of 2009, an ANSF element partnered with B Squadron conducted patrols in and around a contentious village. Partnered patrolling caused local insurgents significant consternation and positively influenced the population so well that the insurgent leadership panicked. An information source indicated that a local insurgent commander had harangued his fighters to immediately emplace IEDs in the road and on the tracks where the ANSF element had been patrolling. Despite protests from insurgents on the receiving end of the order, the local commander ordered his fighters to “do something immediately.” That evening, IED emplacements brazenly attempted to set a number of devices on tracks under overwatch and were subsequently destroyed. The partnered nature of the operation overwhelmed the insurgents’ command and control, which caused a local insurgent commander to panic and needlessly sacrifice his fighters.

Fully partnering and living with ANSF eases the transition to living amongst the population and may allow soldiers to live in close proximity to culturally significant locations. A close presence will often prevent insurgents from using mosques, shrines, schools or other emotive locations as meeting places or recruiting or messaging locations. Locals in villages where ANSF and ISAF live together are less afraid to approach positions and more willing to offer information and discuss security concerns than they are in locations without a partnered presence. In one small village,

a combined ISAF/ANSF position located next to a prominent local shrine is part and parcel of the village's makeup. Residents are extremely comfortable with both soldiers and police and remark favourably on partnered patrolling, vehicle checkpoints and the presence of a security force close to their shrine.



Source: Staff Sergeant Christine Jones, United States Air Force

Afghan police and Canadian soldiers link up prior to searching a village, 26 January 2010


2. **The whole of government approach: A winning combination.** Whole of government partners, such as civilian police (CIVPOL) officers and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) stabilization officers, offer capabilities that both counterbalance and complement those inherent in the military force:
 - a. Non-military thinking and problem-solving styles that can frequently help the BSC resolve challenges in dealing with Afghan government officials.
 - b. Expertise and credibility that soldiers often lack in the governance, reconstruction and development spectrums when dealing with local governments, non-governmental organizations, relief and aid organizations.
 - c. Understanding of and access to operational and strategic-level government-sponsored programs and larger governmental development initiatives.
 - d. The ability to mentor, shape, teach and develop the capacity of the ANSF and government bodies in ways that uniformed personnel cannot.
 - e. A civilian face of leadership and guidance to represent the BSC at governance- and development-oriented fora such as District Development Assemblies, Administrative Shuras, Education Shuras and in mentoring sessions with District and other Afghan officials.
 - f. A less threatening option than uniformed personnel in conducting meetings, liaison and interaction with locals, leaving the BSC room to broaden the approach to resolving challenges by introducing uniformed personnel into a situation as required.

In Dand, the CIDA Stabilization Officer worked, on a daily basis, very closely with Afghan district government staff to improve governance and accountability. This cooperative civilian-led approach tangibly demonstrated that, despite a significant military presence, security, governance, reconstruction and development activities were and must continue to be conducted in accordance with directives from the legitimate Afghan government, not foreign military officers.

- g. Many civilian experts do not deploy on a six-month rotation cycle as Canadian military personnel deployed in forward locations do. In many cases, they represent long-term commitment and organizational stability to locals and district staff. They often offer the BSC a vault of institutional memory that can be called upon to outline the history of current relationships and ongoing programs that a new BSC may be unaware of after taking responsibility for an area.

3. **Value of the Battlespace Commander concept: Unity of command is essential.** Prior to initiation of the BSC concept, there were, in some areas, multiple sub-units operating in the same villages and interacting with the same villagers, but pursuing different mandates. At times, certain villages would be patrolled by multiple disparate Task Force Kandahar elements on the same day, while other villages were missed completely, lessening the effect of deterrent patrolling.²⁰ Information gathering was fragmented as different elements reported information through separate reporting chains, limiting lateral commander awareness. Patrols were unable to effectively respond to queries from locals about needs or grievances addressed in project proposals by other Task Force Kandahar units, and that caused local leaders to question TFK's capability and credibility. This gap in understanding created difficulties in the aftermath of kinetic operations and during the course of normal patrolling, often confusing and infuriating village leaders when they attempted to ask questions or make complaints. Once the BSC concept was implemented, kinetic operations, patrolling, projects, messaging, meetings and ANSF interactions were all tightly synchronized and more effectively targeted. Soldiers and civilians on patrols, attending meetings and interacting with the population gathered information. The Combat Team headquarters analyzed it, then acted upon it quickly, using the full spectrum of battle and war-winning effects. One commander remained responsible and accountable for effects on the population across the spectrum from kinetic events to influence operations. The BSC concept makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts.
4. **The combat team is the building block.** The breadth of skills and the dedicated command and control element that the doctrinal combat team²¹ brings is essential in conducting operations across a broad spectrum of situations. While influencing the population and supporting the government is critical, the provision of assistance, conducting meetings, targeting humanitarian assistance, establishing development projects and conducting negotiations with local leaders can only accomplish so much; in some instances, the only way to protect the population and maintain force protection is to kill or capture insurgents. As it is based upon an existing combat arms sub-unit, a combat team maintains its core skill of defeating the enemy through kinetic action, whether by closing with and destroying the enemy, or defeating it through firepower and the aggressive use of battlefield mobility. Combat teams also contain a headquarters that is well established and practised in regrouping with attachments and enablers without requiring significant reorganization. The counter-insurgency combat team must have additional skills and enablers over and above those found in the traditional combat team grouping in order to best achieve a mix of effects, as shown in Figure 2. Throughout deployment, the author grouped the Dand District Combat Team's elements under two general classifications based on the effects they achieved:

- a. **Battle winners.** This category comprises most of the traditional combat team grouping of Armour, Infantry, Engineers, Artillery and, in the case of the Dand District Combat Team, Armoured Reconnaissance forces. The battle winners are exceptionally capable of destroying the enemy and achieving kinetic effects on the ground through fire and manoeuvre. A flexible, agile and responsive grouping, it has proven effective in combat,



offering a robust spectrum of effects within the span of control of a sub-unit headquarters. The battle winning side of the combat team is essential to providing the necessary security, conducting kinetic operations such as clearing villages, seizing key terrain or destroying insurgent elements, while remaining capable of supporting non-kinetic operations such as village surveys or humanitarian aid distribution. The battle winners ensure that the combat team is a hard target, are resistant to enemy action and are capable of rapidly applying force, up to and including lethal force, anywhere in the battlespace.

- b. **War winners.** This category comprises those elements which provide “softer” effects in the battlespace and are focused on achieving longer-term changes by connecting with and influencing the population more than the traditional battle winners can. In the Afghan context, they are the enablers that develop ANSF capabilities, build stability and governance, support reconstruction and development, all of which further serve to separate insurgents from the people through actions and positive effects that the insurgents cannot achieve. The Dand District Combat Team’s war winners included its CMO team, CIMIC elements, P-OMLT, the CIDA Stabilization Officer and the OCC-D.

5. **Always know, understand and use the full team.** Every plan must include and synchronize the actions of both the battle winners and the war winners and the effects they have on the population prior to, during and following any operation. For example, in preparation for a partnered ANP/ISAF cordon and search operation, battle procedure and preliminary moves saw the P-OMLT conduct a ten-day training program to bolster ANP capacity and prepare patrolmen to conduct building searches. Had this training not been synchronized with the operation, ANP soldiers would not have been properly prepared to conduct their mission. Their training was a success and the ANP successfully executed thorough, professional and effective searches throughout the initial operation and successive iterations in different villages. During the cordon and search, CIMIC operators followed immediately behind the partnered lead search teams to complete village surveys, gather critical local information from the population, carry out information operations messaging, locate key leaders to set the conditions for future meetings known as key leader engagements, and identify potential quick-impact projects to further influence and support the population.

After deliberate operations, follow-up ANP/ISAF partnered patrols comprising both battle winners and war winners maintained presence in and attention towards villages affected by the operation. In so doing, they were able to confirm information, gauge changing local attitudes, target non-kinetic effects or aid and continue to positively influence the population. This technique was used successfully in several cordon and search operations; over the course of several months, it paid dividends in every instance. Relations between ISAF/ANSF patrols, gauged by patrol interactions with village residents, improved. Several key villages that had previously been overtly hostile and suspected of supporting insurgents took a neutral stance, opening the door for future ISAF/ANSF influence. Without the potential for kinetic operations and the overt physical security provided by the Battle Winners, the War Winners would be unable to act, while insurgents would have a free hand to intimidate the population and win undecided residents to their cause. However, the long-term tangible daily benefits that the war winners provide make the insurgency unattractive and counter the insurgency’s claims that the government cannot care for the population. To be most effective, BSCs must know and understand how all attachments and enablers operate and what they can achieve, and must plan for and ensure their employment in each and every operation.

6. **Living amongst the population must be tailored—there is no blanket solution.** The concept of living amongst the population, close to villages in small forward positions²² rather than in massive fortified encampments in larger cities, is viable and has demonstrated excellent results. During a village security survey conducted in March 2010, one village leader, known as a Malik,²³ noted that “for 2 years, ISAF sat in the Kandahar Airfield and only came here sometimes to fight and never talked to anyone. Now, we see you living here with us and it is better for everyone.”²⁴

Living amongst the population increases both the population's physical security and, more importantly, its perception of its own security, while denying insurgents a free hand to threaten or otherwise negatively influence the population. However, living amongst the population is a concept that must be applied differently in every different village, enclave and community. It cannot be applied "top down," forced upon locals or implemented in a blanket or cookie-cutter fashion. Much as the enemy has a vote in any tactical plan, the population has a vote when a military force attempts to live amongst it. The following examples outline some challenges, successes and ways forward found in living amongst the population.

- a. **Finding real power-brokers takes time and patience.** Different elders, families or family clusters within a single village will have widely varying opinions of the counter-insurgents' efforts and may hold their opinions very closely, exposing them only over time. Showing early support or favour to the most outspoken or overtly welcoming of the villagers may isolate those who actually wield power and influence or represent the majority of the population. Quite often after a force enters a new village, a number of locals will quickly offer themselves up as village representatives, seeking to curry favour and ingratiate themselves as a means to discrediting or achieving vengeance against those who are their historic, family or tribal opponents, those who owe them money or those with whom they are in contention in land-claim or water-access disputes. Moving too quickly to take up residence in or near a village on the assurances of only one representative can, in the long term, work counter to the desired effects and actually isolate counter-insurgent forces from the villagers they seek to influence.
- b. **What is the best way to live amongst the population? The answer is different every time.** The definition of "living amongst the population" will vary from village to village. Some villages will feel comfortable and secure with soldiers occupying a compound, school or other facility in the village proper or a short distance away. Others consider a close presence an affront and will ask the military force to leave or will become silent, sullen, fearful and uncooperative. At worst, too close a military presence may make the villagers uncomfortable or fearful enough to flee. Obviously villagers fleeing a location once a force arrives telegraphs friendly-force movements to enemy observers, is counter to the strategy of connecting with the population and gives the insurgents a ready grievance to exploit. In 2009, ISAF elements occupied a school on the outskirts of a village that was less than 200 metres from the nearest inhabited compound. The village's residents had little complaint. A similar position was established in the vicinity of two villages in a different area of the same district, using a series of abandoned compounds more than 800 metres from the nearest inhabited residence. When surveying villagers in an attempt to find a new location closer to either village, the residents of both villages indicated that they would be frightened of soldiers living closer to them and asked that the soldiers remain in their current location. Villagers insisted that they felt very safe with soldiers patrolling in and around the villages during the day and at night and living within sight of, but not too close to, their villages.
- c. **Finding balance: Too many tasks, not enough people.** There will always be more villages to secure than forces available to secure them. While it may not be possible to permanently place soldiers in every village, non-standard patrolling techniques can mitigate this factor for forces working to secure a large area with scarce personnel and resources. Leaguering vehicles in proximity to isolated villages for two or three days and conducting extended dismounted patrols into the villages from leaguers has proven effective in improving the perception of security without intimidating residents or damaging property by driving armoured vehicles through their villages. As patrols revisited remote village clusters during successive operations, residents grew more at ease with continued soldier presence; in some cases, residents approached patrols and offered compounds or fields closer to the villages for patrols to use temporarily. By working with



Source: Photographer Unknown

During a dismounted patrol, soldiers from the Dand District Combat Team support Afghan National Police in searching a suspicious compound and questioning persons suspected of insurgent activity, April 2010

the existing village leadership, whether by seeking local advice or listening to the Malik's or the village elders' recommendations, patrols can select locations that provide a security presence but avoid offending or threatening the village's residents. This technique gives local residents some ownership of their own security and creates the perception that security is a cooperative effort between the people and the government, not something forced on the village by outsiders. More importantly, it respects traditional tribal and village governance structures, empowering village elders²⁵ and demonstrating that ISAF does not wish to destroy or change the traditional way of life, an allegation often made by insurgent groups seeking to discredit ISAF/ANSF efforts.

7. **Battle procedure, war games and rehearsals are critical.** Kinetic operations are never conducted without proper battle procedure, wargaming, and rehearsals whenever possible, and they are followed up with after-action reviews.²⁶ Jirgas, Shuras, tribal meetings and interactions with local officials must be planned and executed with the same rigour. Jirgas are the Afghan traditional ruling body, a council of adult males that reaches decisions by consensus. Jirgas are only ever called by Afghan leaders; foreigners may be invited to observe or speak but are never part of a Jirga in any decision-making capacity.²⁷ Shuras are a traditional Islamic means of community participation in decision-making, similar to a Jirga but less formalized and used for different functions.²⁸

Afghan tribal leaders, village elders and local officials,²⁹ accustomed to gaining power and influence through negotiation and building consensus through the Shura and Jirga system, are practiced manoeuvrists who will seek to exploit any and every opportunity to gain concessions, promise or favour in any interaction. Some of them believe that interactions with ISAF are



Source: MCpl Jason Dunnett

Soldiers from B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, meet up with Afghan National Police before a partnered patrol, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, March 2010

a zero-sum game; for them to look powerful and competent, they must make others, usually ISAF, look bad. In order to counteract this tactic, those participating in shuras, meetings or other gatherings must rely on proven battle procedure and planning techniques. Principal interactors must conduct a thorough estimate of the situation, including the history of the participants, their grievances and their relationships and history with other participants. Once the dynamic and the history of the attendees is understood, the event must be wargamed with all participants, identifying lines of discussion, delegating discussion issues, reviewing critical messaging points, exploring discussion tactics that participants may use or issues towards which they may attempt to manoeuvre the discussion. Exit strategies, conversational diversion and “do not discuss” issues must be covered in a group, focused on “if ... then ...” action/reaction/counteraction comparisons. Without planning, rehearsing and wargaming, non-Afghan participants run the danger of losing credibility or committing to unsustainable courses of action. The following are examples of kinetic-type planning for non-kinetic operations achieving success.

- a. **Meetings are tactical events: Preparation is key.** In February 2010, heavy rains caused extensive flood damage to a number of fields and compounds. The Government of Afghanistan formally asked ISAF to support ANSF flood-relief efforts, but requested that ISAF allow ANSF to plan and execute those efforts without providing assistance unless asked. The morning after the rainstorm, the District Leader (DL) demanded an immediate meeting with the BSC³⁰ and the district Chief of Police. Despite the urgency of the situation, the BSC and his key staff paused and conducted a quick planning session. Based on historical interactions and knowledge, their assessment was that the DL would attempt to castigate ISAF in front of the district staff and a collection of notable village elders for not supporting the population with flood relief or supplies. During the subsequent meeting, after the formalities and pleasantries of greeting, the BSC opened the discussion with a generous statement of support for ANSF efforts and a selection of facts and figures concerning ANSF aid efforts to date, coupled with a description of efforts taken by ISAF soldiers in the district to support the Afghan government in a second-tier fashion. The DL was forced to publicly acknowledge that, like the BSC, his own plans and personal feelings on assistance were subordinate to the Provincial Governor’s orders and higher-level plans, and that it was indeed excellent to see Afghan forces leading the efforts to provide for Afghan needs. The DL also acknowledged the assistance that the BSC’s soldiers had provided to the ANP in the aftermath of the flooding.³¹

The BSC further leveraged the discussion to demonstrate the effectiveness of the newly created OCC-D, which included providing him and the DL with up-to-date and accurate information about district happenings and security. At the close of the nearly two-hour meeting, the DL had been unable to blame ISAF for the flood or inadequate assistance to the population in front of the elders or district staff. The DL was also forced to acknowledge that working in partnership benefited the district's people and to pledge further co-operation. Had the interaction not been carefully wargamed, the outcome could have been markedly different and the elders negatively influenced, which would have harmed future ISAF credibility in the district. In this instance, rigorous preparation, awareness of potential grievances, identification and manoeuvre to avoid inflammatory topics and sticking points allowed for a messaging victory.

- b. Consider, then wargame mixed courses of action.** A private security company owned and operated by the DL's brother had been known throughout the district for its questionable business practices. The company was not properly registered with Afghan authorities and its members were frequently found to be in violation of Afghan law for not wearing uniforms or carrying proper identification cards while carrying arms. Locals and ISAF contractors frequently complained that this company's agents extorted money from road travellers at illegal vehicle checkpoints. As the DL was resistant to any suggestion of malfeasance by his brother, he was unwilling to permit the ANP to investigate the matter or take any actions to prevent questionable practices.

The experience of other Task Force Kandahar units in similar situations showed that attempting to resolve the situation by taking a hard line with the owner and threatening his business with closure or the loss of ISAF-sponsored project security contracts produced little success. The DL refused to support ISAF with any action other than platitudes such as "all companies should obey the law" and "my brother is the only one I can trust," and eventually the situation became a friction point hampering DL/ISAF co-operation. In order to resolve the situation, the BSC and his staff surveyed the collective knowledge, skills and experience of the Combat Team's leaders, particularly the CIDA Stabilization Officer's invaluable historical knowledge of the situation throughout the previous year. The BSC and staff collectively wargamed several courses of action and determined that an indirect influence operation could achieve success where direct pressure, threats and a hard line had failed.

In the course of meetings and discussions both with the DL and the company's owner, the BSC and his staff conducted messaging emphasizing the fact that the owner was a respected businessman in the community, who set the example for others to follow and who was relied upon by his brother, a fair and just DL, so would obviously seek to become properly registered. ISAF/ANP patrols quickly investigated allegations of extortion and reported their results in writing to the company's owner for resolution, with the message that "we are sure your company would never do this to the DL's people, because ISAF knows that the people respect you and you too are working to build security." Any illegal weapons carriage by company agents resulted in immediate confiscation, with written receipts and a letter provided both to the DL and the owner identifying the circumstances of the confiscation. The campaign was successful: after a month of consistent messaging and measured, documented action, weapons confiscation events dropped to marginal levels. Extortion complaints dropped to zero and the company's owner sought proper accreditation after being influenced by his brother, the DL, to do so. Tactical actions to verify local grievances caused by the company's actions through patrolling and interaction, synchronized with influence actions using meetings as manoeuvre and messaging as fire, executed consistently over time, achieved success where other, more direct but single-spectrum short-term plans had failed.

8. **Tactical patience: The “48-hour rule.”** In conventional warfare, when conducting high-tempo, synchronized kinetic operations, pausing instead of taking quick and decisive action may be fatal. When dealing with Afghan village elders, tribal leaders and government officials, resisting the impulse to act quickly and pausing to let situations develop may in fact be the best course of action.³² In many cases, Afghans expect and count on military leaders to try and take quick, decisive action to resolve frictions, conflicts or unpleasant situations as quickly as possible, whether on their own initiative or after being pushed by their superiors. They are well aware that problem solving and speed of response is part and parcel of western military culture. Pausing may often turn the initiative in a negotiation or conflict between ISAF elements and Afghan official back to ISAF’s advantage, as the following examples demonstrate:

- a. On one occasion, in an attempt to manoeuvre the BSC into a hasty reaction and force him into a position of relational weakness, the DL one day refused to occupy his office at the District Centre. With great public show, stating that he was displeased with access control and security measures at the District Centre, the DL and his staff took up temporary residence in a nearby unoccupied medical office. He quickly passed word to provincial-level officials that the BSC was preventing him from consulting with the district’s residents and keeping him from occupying his own District Centre. Rather than moving quickly to appease the DL, offer entreaties to him to return to his office, or accommodate the DL by reducing the facility’s partnered security posture, thus endangering his own and the facility’s ANP soldiers, the BSC ordered that business proceed as usual and no special attention be paid. When questioned, the BSC assured his own staff and his higher headquarters, which was understandably anxious and being queried from its own higher, that the situation would be resolved within 48 hours. Within 24 hours, the DL’s staff, ANP representatives and the local NDS agent met and, with the assistance of the BSC’s staff, spent several hours devising and reviewing an Afghan-led, collaborative security plan for the facility that was amenable to all participants, the District Chief of Police (DCoP) and the DL. Within 48 hours, the DL had approved the new security plan, returned quietly to his office and made no mention of his previous exodus. The tactical pause had achieved significant effect and tangibly demonstrated BSC resolve in the face of DL threats. The BSC’s actions allowed the DL to save face by successfully negotiating a resolution to his grievances and demonstrated the BSC’s support, respect and consideration for the DL and his wishes. It was a tangible and public demonstration of the collective will for ISAF and Afghan government officials to cooperate, despite the often-conflicting demands for both security and access to the population³³ that partnered facilities create.
- b. In front of a collection of tribal elders, the DL remonstrated that “Canadians did nothing for the people,” then he refused to grant certain villages any projects and loudly lambasted a member of the BSC’s staff. Rather than rushing back to the DL with facts and figures to prove him wrong, or taking umbrage at the allegations, the staff officer executed a tactical pause, politely concluded the meeting and ensured that he had no further interaction with the DL for the remainder of the day. The next day, the DL cordially invited the same officer to sit with him, treated him to chai,³⁴ assured him that he was pleased with the number and type of ongoing projects and apologized profusely for his poor manners. Pausing and refusing to rise to provocation demonstrated that the BSC staff was not subordinate to the DL and paved the way for a more cooperative working relationship for the remainder of the rotation.
- c. During a shura with a group of village elders, the DL became agitated and indicated that Canadians had insulted him by searching his private security detail, which had attempted to gain entry to the District Centre in an improperly marked vehicle earlier that day. He then went on to tell the elders that Canadians “never paid damage claims,” did not conduct operations with the ANP, never provided projects or employment to the district’s villagers and that working under such conditions was “offensive to his religion.”



Source: Staff Sergeant Christine Jones, United States Air Force

Two members of a B Squadron Coyote crew prepare to link up with their ANP counterparts and search a village, 26 January 2010

He then stated that he was going to resign his position as DL and left his office. During the next several days, during which even the DL's own staff were unable to reach him, the BSC and his staff continued operations as normal, neither making reference to the DL nor inquiring about him to his staff. The DL returned to his office with the excuse that the provincial governor had refused his resignation and returned quietly to work, subdued and cooperative. The BSC and his staff's actions demonstrated that while the DL was an important man, governance and improving the lot of the people could and would continue without him. In this and several other interactions, tactical patience and a measured approach to provocation maintained BSC freedom of action and prevented him from becoming subordinated to DL whims in a reactionary posture.

9. **Listen, don't tell.** When interacting with Afghans, particularly when attempting to institute change, listening often pays better dividends than talking. When conducting an influence operation to set the conditions for police recruiting and the establishment of new police stations in the district, the BSC met with a series of village leaders, elders and tribal leaders. During each and every interaction, listening to what the Afghan people had to say, asking their opinion of security activities and soliciting their opinions on police checkpoints and patrols paid dividends. Counter-insurgency experts state that "re-empowering the village councils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way"³⁵ to counter religious leaders and others who have been "radicalized by the Taliban." The local leaders were, in every instance, flattered to be asked their advice rather than being "told by foreigners what was going to happen."³⁶ Listening instead of telling made measurable gains in maintaining an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between local leaders and ISAF/ANSF elements and further served to support and legitimize traditional village governance and leadership.
10. **Every soldier is a mentor: Learning is a two-way street.** When occupying joint ISAF/ANSF tactical positions, conducting partnered patrolling or deliberate operations, every soldier acts as a mentor, whether intentionally or not. In partnered facilities, the Dand Combat Team's soldiers conducted daily garbage sweeps and made collective efforts to maintain cleanliness. After a time, the young, untrained ANP patrolmen who also occupied the facility were seen picking up garbage, disposing of it properly and keeping their own positions in better repair. During partnered vehicle checkpoints, ANP vehicle search teams working in conjunction with ISAF soldiers demonstrated a high level of consistency and attention to detail when searching vehicles. On security patrols, ANP patrolmen often took their lead on interactions with locals from their Canadian counterparts. Patrols which interacted frequently with locals while on patrol were emulated. In many cases, the actions taken, the attitudes adopted and the activities undertaken by Canadian soldiers were emulated by their partnered ANSF, demonstrating that in a partnering-focused atmosphere, every soldier, whether overtly or inadvertently, is a mentor and can significantly influence the attitude and performance of indigenous forces.

While ISAF soldiers frequently mentor their ANSF counterparts, influence and mentoring can often work both ways. During his tenure as the Dand District Combat Team commander, the author was fortunate enough to work closely with the District Chief of Police, a 25-year veteran of Afghan policing and a survivor of multiple assassination attempts. In planning partnered operations, interacting with local leaders or conducting joint training, his local knowledge and advice was invaluable. During a partnered cordon and search operation in February 2010, villagers received word that a woman from the village being searched had died in Kandahar City, and the village began preparing for a funeral. Based on the Chief's advice, the search was stopped³⁷ and the partnered force withdrew to a respectful distance to continue less-obtrusive surveillance. The author had been unaware of the impact of the woman's death; continuing the search would have demonstrated disrespect, validating insurgent claims that ISAF and ANSF are disrespectful of traditional ways and Islam.

11. **Personal interaction is critical.** While digital communications make the transfer of large amounts of data simple, electronic means cannot transmit the intangibles of relationship, attitude, intent and feeling. Moreover, flanking military units, particularly those from other nations, may not be able to connect digitally due to equipment constraints. Personal liaison and relationship building between allies is critical to ensuring comprehension, synchronizing actions and passing on information. Whether interacting with ANSF, governmental officials or flanking units, personal liaison always proved more effective and often faster than attempting to convey critical information, plan or synchronize operations by any electronic means.

CONCLUSION: CONSIDER “A” WAR, NOT JUST “THIS” WAR

Debate continues in offices, at mess tables, on hangar floors and in schools throughout Canada’s army on the relative merits of orienting training and efforts to focus on preparing for the present counter-insurgency war at the expense of mechanized, high-intensity unit and formation-level war-fighting skills. Counter-insurgency, particularly as practised in the limited scope of one of many Afghan districts, may not define future Army operations, but failing to recognize, understand and apply lessons hard-won through recent experience would be short-sighted. While the 1990s have been described popularly as a “decade of darkness,” characterized by military deployments to support United Nations efforts in a number of failed states, 1990s-era Balkan experience taught valuable practical lessons concerning convoy escorts,³⁸ VIP security, military negotiation techniques, house clearing,³⁹ gathering human information and working with non-military partners that have been and continue to be successfully applied in Afghanistan. Similarly, lessons from Afghanistan should be identified, used, refined and then, when and where possible, applied, no matter the shape or nature of future conflicts. The blanket application of Afghan experience will not solve every new problem. However, understanding and applying lessons from the current conflict may help save soldiers’ lives and resolve future challenges.

Many of counterinsurgency’s lessons involving interacting with and respecting local leaders, influencing and providing security to the population can be directly applied during domestic operations, where soldiers will have to influence and support their fellow Canadians. In future wars, even high-intensity mechanized conflicts, there may be times when firepower and manoeuvre will not solve every problem, such as in the aftermath of a successful kinetic operation in an area where the local population has been unable to flee. A force that occupies terrain for any length of time will likely cause grievances amongst the local population, which will have to be resolved lest they provide subversive elements the opportunity to negatively motivate and influence the population. In a contiguous, linear battlespace with defined forward and rear areas, soldiers will likely have to secure their lines of communication, establish remote positions, influence a local population, contend with displaced persons or refugees and work with allied forces of varying capabilities. Units will have to maintain force protection through awareness, synchronized fire, manoeuvre, influence, information operations and myriad other effects across a broad spectrum. In future stability operations or counter-insurgency operations in countries other than Afghanistan, soldiers may need to accomplish tasks working in and through ad hoc organizations not found in any doctrine manual, in uncertain and potentially lethal situations. All of these challenges have been met in Afghanistan.

Despite the constant flux and evolution of operations in southern Kandahar Province in 2009–2010, the eleven lessons identified above ran through B Squadron’s Afghan deployment as a constant thread. While operations in other theatres and in future conflicts will present a host of tactical, enemy, environmental and human challenges that differ from those found in Afghanistan, these “COINs in the dust” form a framework of principles, proven in operations, that future generations of soldiers may well find useful in whatever conflict they may face. 🌸

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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ENDNOTES

1. Many Canadian doctrinal references, valid at the time of the experiences outlined in this article, support this assessment of the conventional threat and seek to guide actions in response that will defeat them: Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, Vol. 2, 1997), p. 100.; Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations— Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army (English)*, 1998, p. 153; Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-007/FP-001 *Firepower*, 1999, p. 132.
2. David Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," *Surviva*, vol 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006–2007), p. 120, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=23107642&site=ehost-live>.
3. Thomas Johnson, professor, Naval Postgraduate School, quoted in Olivia Ward, "Model District no Safe Haven," *The Toronto Star*, January 1, 2010, <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/744846—model-district-no-safe-haven> (accessed September 5, 2010), offers analysis of night letters, a Taliban intimidation tactic being used in Dand District. Night letters are written texts, often interspersed with Koranic verse, that exhort locals not to support the Afghan government or ISAF and may threaten reprisals. They are normally posted on significant buildings such as mosques, shrines or village leaders' residences and serve to demonstrate the Taliban's reach and ability to watch villages and maintain freedom of manoeuvre and action.
4. David Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May 2006), p. 104, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=21388378&site=ehost-live>
5. Dan Green, "The Taliban's Political Program," *Armed Forces Journal* (2009), <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/11/4294842/> (accessed 5 September 2010).
6. Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszely, *Military Review* (March–April 2007), p. 5.
7. As outlined in detail in Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May–June 2005), p. 9, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf> (accessed 25 July 2010).
8. General David H. Petraeus, *COMISAF COIN Guidance* 01 August 2010, Vol. 2010 (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 2010), p. 2.
9. Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," p. 103.
10. *Analyzing the Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha, Understanding Afghan Culture* (Monterey, California: Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 6 August 2009), p. 10, offers the text and an analysis of the 2009 *Layeha*, or Taliban code of conduct. Guideline 59 states, "The Mujahedeen must have a good relationship with all the tribal community and with the local people, so they are always welcome and are able to get help from the local people. A note from Mullah Omar written on the back page directs fighters: "Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide/separate you."
11. Task Force Kandahar 3-09 comprised a Provincial Reconstruction Team, a Battle Group, a National Support Element, a Task Force Headquarters and a host of smaller elements, many of which operated in the same terrain, but with different mandates.
12. The Army's collective experience, captured in Army Lessons Learned documents, demonstrated through changes to pre-deployment training at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre, a reduction in violence in Task Force Kandahar—controlled areas and increases in freedom of movement/freedom of action in these same areas all support this statement.
13. C. J. Radin, "Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)," Public Multimedia Incorporated, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/afghanistan/index.php> (accessed 28 August 2010) contains a comprehensive description of ANSF organization, manning, training, budgets and development, current as of 15 April 2010. In common terms, ANSF generally refers to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), while smaller police elements such the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) also interact with ISAF elements. Not mentioned in the reference is the National Directorate of Security (NDS), an internal security and intelligence-gathering body reporting to the Ministry of the Interior with wide powers of arrest and detention. NDS methods have been called into question as indicated in Gil Shochat, "Tories Alerted to Afghan Secret Police Legal 'Risk'" Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, <http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/04/06/afghan-detainee-transfers.html> (accessed 7 September 2010). In Dand District, one CID officer and one NDS detachment were co-located with the ANP in the District Centre compound.
14. As indicated during a series of briefings from the Commanding Officer and key staff of the Kandahar Operational Coordination Centre—Provincial (OCC-P(K)) to Operational Coordination Centre—District (OCC-D) commanders, January 2010. At time of writing, the reference was not available from any open-source or online repositories; this information was taken from the author's personal notes.
15. Petty Officer Paul Dillard, "Afghans Coordinate for Safe & Free Election," *The Enduring Ledger* (August 2009), <http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2009/08/afg-occs-take-shape-in-time-for-elections.html> (accessed 25 July 2010); "Afghan Command Center in the Service of the People," <http://www.sada-e-azadi.net/joomla/index.php/en/afghanistan/north/907-afghan-command-center-in-the-service-of-the-people> (accessed 28 August 2010).
16. Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, "Building Goodwill in Gereshk--Part Two," Official Blog for UK Military Operations in Afghanistan, <http://www.blogs.mod.uk/afghanistan/2008/07/page/2/> (accessed 28 August 2010).
17. Bernard Fall, quoted in Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," p. 124.

18. General Stanley McChrystal, *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 2009* (Kabul: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 2009), pp. 5, 7—ISAF's counterinsurgency guidance during Task Force 3-09's deployment.
19. Except inless an emergency or a situation of extreme tactical necessity, ISAF forces are generally prohibited from searching compounds without being partnered with ANSF elements. Local ANSF commanders, however, may conduct compound searches as they see fit.
20. Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," p. 106, notes that deterrent patrolling seeks to "flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target." The Dand District Combat Team used this tactic throughout its deployment to keep enemy observers off-balance and overwhelm enemy command and control by deploying multiple concurrent patrols, varying in tempo and avoiding patterns.
21. Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-321-006/FP-001 *Combat Team Operations (Interim)* (Kingston: Directorate of Army Doctrine 4, 12 February 2004), p. 1.
22. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "All Counterinsurgency Is Local," *The Atlantic*, October 2008, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/all-counterinsurgency-is-local/6965/> (accessed 5 September 2010).
23. In Kandahar Province, village leaders are known as Maliks. They are often elected by the village population, or appointed by a council of elders and are normally trusted to speak on behalf of their villages in matters of security, development, agriculture, employment, education and most other facets of village life. Normally, formalized interactions between ISAF/ANSF and villages are conducted either through the village Malik or a selection of elders, one of whom may be the Malik or a relative or representative of the Malik. In several villages in southern Kandahar province, the actual Maliks reside in Kandahar City and trust the day-to-day supervision of village affairs to an assistant or proxy. In the instance noted here, the Malik was supportive of ISAF/ANSF efforts; despite frequent death threats from Taliban agents, he continued to reside in his village.
24. Results of a series of security shuras conducted in villages throughout Dand District with a view to bolstering ANP recruiting and gauging local support for ANP expansion and further police-station construction. The village leader's name and village are not provided for OPSEC reasons, to protect not only soldiers currently serving overseas, but also the village leader and his family.
25. *Operational Pashtunwali: Understanding Afghan Culture* (Monterey, California: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS), Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 15 June 2009), p. 8.
26. This practice is reinforced at every level of Army leadership training and is part and parcel of Canada's current military culture.
27. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Afghanistan: Cultural Awareness* (Ottawa: Centre for Intercultural Learning, 3 July 2008), pp. 64–65, 71, 122.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
29. Often these are collectively known as "key leaders," while interactions with them are known as "key leader engagements" (KLEs).
30. For OPSEC reasons, names have been omitted. However, all accounts are factual, experienced personally by the author, and the information provided is taken from the author's notes.
31. Rising flood waters had washed away a police checkpoint securing a bridge, and the District Chief of Police (DCoP) had requested assistance. Dand District Combat Team soldiers secured the bridge and concurrently established a new police checkpoint to replace the one that had been destroyed.
32. Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," p. 105 supports this principle through a distillation of lessons learned from other counter-insurgencies. Operations during Task Force 3-09's deployment validated it.
33. Ward, "'Model' District no Safe Haven." The Dand District Centre was attacked by two suicide bombers in March 2009, which severely damaged the main building that is the seat of Afghan governance in the Dand District. On 30 December 2010, an IED destroyed a Canadian vehicle less than 2,000 metres from the District Centre, killing five people. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Dand District government and police officials were frequently threatened and were targeted by attacks on several occasions.
34. *Operational Pashtunwali: Understanding Afghan Culture*, p. 4, notes that drinking chai (tea) is an important element of Afghan Pashto culture and a mark of honour and respect.
35. Johnson and Mason, "All Counterinsurgency Is Local."
36. This complaint was repeated frequently during a series of security shuras throughout the district by many different elders and leaders.
37. Eric Talmadge, "As US Starts Afghan Surge, Dug-in Canadians Plan Exit," *San Francisco Examiner*, 6 February 2010, <http://www.sfoxaminer.com/world/83714922.html> (accessed 5 September 2010), written by a reporter embedded with the Combat Team, describes the operation in greater detail.
38. Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches*, Vol. 1, is titled "Convoy Operations" and indexed at http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/dispatches_e.asp.
39. Major J. H. Vance, "Zero Template House Clearing Range," *The Army Lessons Learned Centre Bulletin* 2, no. 2 (February 1996) <http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/bulletin/TheBulletinVol2No2eng.pdf> (accessed 8 September 2010) describes creation of a zero-template range for building clearing based on a United Nations scenario.




SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN: From the Bonn Agreement to the Afghanistan Compact

Captain Tyler D. Wentzell

Buzzwords abound in describing the convoluted environment faced by soldiers and statesmen alike in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Suffice it to say that the war has proven to be more complicated than initially anticipated. Destroying al Qaeda's base areas proved easy, but denying them those same areas has required an arduous process of armed nation building. The earlier idea that "superpowers don't do windows" has been abandoned. At the cost of vast amounts of blood and treasure, NATO and its allies have learned significant lessons regarding the process generally described as Security Sector or Security System Reform (SSR). The stage that can be termed the "light-footprint" period, between the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, merits particular attention. This period laid the groundwork for all future developments in SSR. Although the international community and Afghan elite accomplished a great deal, there were significant errors that damaged the credibility of the Afghan state in the eyes of its people. Pessimists may claim that the war was "lost" in these early years, that these mistakes were so grave that they cannot be fixed. Optimists concede that mistakes were made, but none so significant that they cannot now be rectified. Can we get "there," a secure Afghanistan, from "here"? Only time will tell. In the interim, we can only seek to learn from these missteps in a meaningful way that will help us avoid them in future operating environments.

This article seeks to examine the major lessons learned during the SSR process between the Bonn Agreement and the Afghanistan Compact. It will begin with a simple introduction of the concept of SSR and explain how the international community pursued the process from 2001 until 2006. Although SSR covers a wide assortment of security actors, for purposes of this essay the SSR process will be examined as it relates to the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process, the military, the police, and the judiciary. This process will then be discussed in terms of some of the key lessons learned, providing some general guidelines that can be applied on future missions, regardless of the assets available. This period was marked by a general scarcity of resources for SSR, and, although that is the most obvious criticism, it is not a particularly useful one. Proponents of *any* position consistently claim that their cause is under-resourced, and SSR is no different. This article seeks to avoid that pitfall and will instead focus on what could be done differently under similar constraints.



SSR is a relatively recent concept that continues to gain wide acceptance. The term was first introduced in 1998 by the British Secretary of State for International Development and was subsequently adopted by several international organizations.¹ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Canada is a member, has adopted the term and produced the primary document on the subject: the *OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook on Security System Reform*,² officially launched in Canada in February 2008.³ Although not binding, it provides a necessary common framework for SSR activities, which are often characterized by a wide variety of actors. OECD states that "the overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy."⁴ SSR is tightly linked with the idea of human security, a mainstream concept in Canadian foreign policy since 1993. The security system is then defined by the OECD as consisting of core security actors including the military, police, border guards and intelligence services; security management and oversight bodies like the ministries of defence and the interior, ombudsman, and financial management bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions including the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, and traditional justice systems; and non-statutory security forces like private security companies and private militia.⁵ The process of reform is necessarily comprehensive; even a well-trained police officer is of little use without effective legislation to enforce the law, a judiciary to try and sentence an offender, and a penal system with which to detain and, ideally, reform the offender.

THE BONN AGREEMENT

The international community's decision to create the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), a provisional government run by Afghans instead of an international organization, framed the SSR process. Succeeded by the Transitional Authority (TA), the AIA produced the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which articulated the parameters of the "new" Afghan state. The process would be Afghan-led—governed by the re-adopted Constitution of 1964—but would also occur with the assistance of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for security in the capital region and, later, by the capacity-building efforts of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This process was largely a reflection of the light-footprint approach, a decision that was influenced by concerns about creating another Bosnia-type quagmire, but that failed to account for Afghanistan's limited human capital.⁶ ISAF was a scant 5,000 people responsible only for the security of the capital and its immediate environs. Afghan forces and institutions—supported in some provinces by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and ISAF in the capital region—would have to be created rapidly in order to provide security elsewhere.

SSR was not directly addressed within the Bonn Agreement. The document primarily dealt with traditional government. It outlined government structures and general timelines for elections and the drafting of the constitution. Regarding SSR, the Bonn Agreement only offered that the 1964 Constitution would be re-adopted, providing the backbone for judicial reform. It stated that, as of December 22, "all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces."⁷

The Tokyo Donors Conference the following January 2002 further articulated the details. The "lead nation" system was proposed and adopted. The United States developed the Afghan National Army (ANA); Italy became the lead nation for judicial reform; Japan took the lead on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); the United Kingdom tackled counter-narcotics;⁸ and Germany took responsibility for the Afghan National Police (ANP). The lead-nation system, designed to ensure that the countries involved took ownership of their respective sectors, ultimately achieved disunity of purpose and an uneven distribution of resources.

The lead-nation system proved to be problematic in other aspects as well. Reform efforts between sectors, such as those between the police and the judiciary, were not coordinated and the actual responsibilities incurred by the lead nation were not clearly understood. In the DDR process, for example, Japan was the lead country, but the UN Development Program (UNDP) implemented the program while several other countries provided significant financial contributions. The United States, as lead nation for the ANA, still benefited from the provision of British trainers for the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), French trainers for officer development at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), and Polish and Czech trainers for the use of old Soviet-pattern equipment. Germany received no such assistance in its efforts for police reform; other nations viewed that appointment as placing police reform under the exclusive purview of Germany.⁹ These issues became increasingly apparent in the following years.



DDR AND THE CREATION OF THE ANSF

The initial DDR process was tightly interwoven with the creation and development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The invasion heavily leaned on the forces of various warlords, collectively dubbed the Afghan Military or Militia Forces (AMF). However, these forces lacked loyalty to the central government or respect for human rights and were therefore not a viable long-term solution. Nonetheless, the warlords remained influential and, if handled poorly, could easily change sides, as Abdul Rashid Dostum, a warlord from the area of Mazar-e-Sharif, had demonstrated on previous occasions. Most warlords were therefore granted delegate status for the June 2002 Loya Jirga, a national forum to develop consensus among Afghanistan's power brokers, and given politically significant appointments within the new government. Dostum became the chief of staff to the commander of the new ANA. Mohammad Fahim of the Northern Alliance became the Minister of Defence. Ishmael Khan, the major power broker in Herat, became the governor of the province. The same process gave lesser warlords a senior officer rank within the ANA or the ANP, a practice that led to the appointment of thousands of generals and colonels, regardless of qualification or skill. In 2003, one study estimated that the ratio of officers to soldiers within the ANA was 1:2, whereas in most armies the ratio stands at 1:12 or 1:13.¹⁰ The ANA especially drew upon the demobilized soldiers to fill their ranks.

The DDR process began in October 2003. The Afghan New Beginning Program's (ANBP) mandate was to reintegrate 60,000 militia soldiers of AMF groups falling under the MoD. Their weapons were to be collected and the soldiers provided with jobs, training, or education through one of 30 implementing partners. The program disarmed 63,380 ex-combatants¹¹ and demobilized 134 AMF units¹² before it transitioned to the Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process in December 2005. The program was particularly successful in terms of heavy weapons cantonment, collecting the bulk of the armoured vehicles and artillery pieces littering the country. The program did meet its specific mandate, but the warlords of Afghanistan were far from disarmed. ANBP occurred in only eight provinces, and even prominent government officials, such as Khan, Dostum, Fahim, and Gul Agha, governor of Kandahar Province, maintained their own private armies numbering in the thousands. Although these groups were somewhat de-legitimized and rendered illegal, they still existed. Additionally, there remained considerable warlord armies that continued to exist with an official government mandate.

The distinction between AMF units falling under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) inadvertently left the security of the countryside in the hands of the warlord armies. In September 2003, the United States, as lead nation for the ANA, had decided to build the army "from the ground up."¹³ No such decision had been made regarding the ANP, partly because the police were required to provide security for the 2004 presidential elections.¹⁴ Consequently, AMF groups that had previously been under the MoD demobilized, while groups that came under the MoI, which was responsible for the police, remained unaffected. Therefore, in spite of the DDR process, warlords continued to provide the bulk of the security forces in Afghanistan's peripheries.

THE ANA

Amongst the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the ANA received the greatest attention. Coordinated by the American Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan (OMC-A), US Army Special Forces trained the first ANA battalion in May 2002, with the second battalion beginning training that June. That summer, OMC-A established KMTC, the national training centre for the ANA. The future structure of the ANA was only articulated in December 2002, at a donor conference in Petersburg, Germany. The volunteer, infantry-heavy force, to include an air corps, was projected to number 70,000 personnel by the end of 2007. Although ISAF forces in the capital region contributed equipment and trainers, the American effort was largely insular. For example, if a non-American unit wanted to conduct a joint operation with the ANA, they had to coordinate with OMC-A, not the ANA itself.¹⁵

Despite these efforts, the ANA suffered from qualitative deficiencies. In 2003, the ANA began conducting offensive operations against the Taliban alongside American forces in Paktika, Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. However, the Americans observed poor performance by the ANA. OMC-A began the process of



Source: Combat Camera
AR2011-0018-015

MCpl Dion Sylvain, Kandak Mentor Team (KMT) 4 Recce Coy mentors Afghan National Police members (ANP) at Camp Hero on a live fire exercise. Afghan National Police members (ANP) training and mentoring takes place at Camp Hero with a live fire exercise

embedding trainers within the ANA units on operations. These trainers came to be known as Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). Their role was to fill the gap in the development of the unit between training at KMTC and their progression to proficiency as an operational unit. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), provided by other countries and fulfilling the same functions as ETTs, were created in the spring of 2006. There were some signs of progress. By 2006, more than 2,500 ANA soldiers participated in Operations MOUNTAIN LION and MOUNTAIN THRUST with an improved degree of tactical proficiency.¹⁶ Although the ANA remains a developing organization, it is often quite rightly lauded as one of the success stories of the SSR process in Afghanistan. The ANP were more problematic.

THE ANP

The Germans seemed to make considerable progress towards developing the ANP in the early years. The ANP included a general-purpose police force, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); a gendarmerie, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); a border patrol force, the Afghan Border Police (ABP); and a counter-narcotics organization, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). Officers and non-commissioned officers received training at the new Kabul Police Academy (KPA). Patrolmen attended the new Central Training Centre (CTC) and seven Regional Training Centres (RTCs). By March 2002, more than 3,200 police were in training.¹⁷ The organization of the force and the quick establishment of training centres suggested a force that was well suited to provide security for the Afghan people and extend the reach of the central government to the peripheries of Afghanistan. The reality was very different. It appeared that the ANP were not only failing to enforce the rule of law in the peripheries, but were, in fact, contributing to the instability.

Afghanistan had no recent tradition of a professional police force, and the quality of recruits was low. Illiteracy remains common and, although the training programs offered at the KPA and the RTCs at first



Source: Combat Camera
AR2011-0018-012

Afghan National Police members (ANP) train at Camp Hero on a live fire exercise. Afghan National Police members (ANP) training and mentoring takes place at Camp Hero with a live fire exercise

seemed impressive, the fact remains that the instructors were normally ANP officers who had received only three weeks of training themselves.¹⁸ While officers spent years training at the KPA, untrained warlord policemen provided security in the countryside. Also, while the ANA deployed in relatively large groups, regularly operated with ISAF and OEF forces, and went through regular training cycles, the ANP received only their initial training, were normally situated in isolated locations, and had little to no oversight of their activities. No equivalent to the ETT program existed until after the Afghanistan Compact. The process by which the ANP were fielded virtually ensured rampant corruption. The overall effect was a force of henchmen in police uniforms representing the government of Afghanistan to its people.¹⁹

JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM

The core security forces of Afghanistan were not the only institutions within the security sector that were in dire need of reform. The formal Afghan judiciary had all but vanished under Taliban rule. Without one, Afghanistan could only be “secure” under the loosest of definitions. Establishing rule of law—through a complex mixture of Sharia, Islamic law; statutory law; and customary law—would be critical to bringing about and maintaining a lasting peace. The lack of human capital presented the greatest problem. The Afghan judiciary was missing an entire generation of qualified and experienced judges and lawyers. Those who remained did not necessarily conduct themselves in a professional manner: significant personality clashes among the members of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) crippled efforts towards coordination.²⁰ In January 2004, a Judicial Reform Commission was established to develop a plan for judicial reform. It did not succeed. After four months, the Commission was dissolved because it could not seem to develop a plan.²¹ Its successor lasted a full two years, but failed for similar reasons. The legal professionals involved held widely different qualifications. One study showed that 44% of Afghan judges were graduates of the Sharia faculty at a university while 11.6% were graduates of a law faculty; a full third of judges had no more than a high-school education.²² New judges and lawyers are now joining the system as they graduate from Kabul University’s four-year program that covers both Sharia and judicial law.

The interim adoption of the 1964 Constitution provided the initial framework for justice sector reform. Simply creating a judiciary in the first place proved to be quite a challenge; harder still is extending its reach and building its legitimacy. Personality clashes were significant, and the required qualifications were simply not available. Additionally, the nature of the lead-nation system inhibited coordination between the AGO and the MoI; a commission to resolve the issue was not created until 2007.²³ The presence of a parallel legal system—the National Directorate of Security (NDS), which investigates, prosecutes and detains enemies of the state in a completely separate court system—further complicated matters. Finally, allegations of corruption within the MoJ did much to destroy the credibility of the state in general and the ministry in particular. Transparency International has cited the Ministry of Justice as the most corrupt organization within the Afghan administration.²⁴

The predominance of customary and Sharia law in the Afghan judicial system has also proven to be a conceptual hurdle for western donors. The central government has traditionally been unable to extend its reach into the countryside, where systems of customary law, the least familiar legal system to the western donors, remain the norm. Although these systems are unique from region to region, they generally focus on restorative justice and consensus building. Afghan law in its most relatable form, as defined in the constitution and criminal code, has only prevailed in the cities. In 2007, an estimated 80% of cases were dealt with through the informal justice system.²⁵ Some experts therefore advocate a provision for customary law within the Afghan legal framework, while still adhering to internationally accepted norms of human rights. This effort has met with little success, however.²⁶ Sharia law often eludes foreign advisors whose education has only exposed them to secular jurisprudence. This was demonstrated in 2003 when an Italian legal expert created a new criminal code and did not consult Afghan authorities. The document, strongly influenced by its Italian equivalent but with little reflection of Sharia law, was resisted and only approved after Italy threatened to pull funding from other legal programs.²⁷ Such a document, if resented by the government elite, seems unlikely to be effective in governing the actions of the rural masses.

THE PRISONS

The prison system was also problematic. The bulk of Afghan prisons fall under the Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) of the MoJ, but military jails and the high-security wing of Pul-I Charki prison belong to the MoD. Police lock-ups belong to the MoI, while the NDS, in addition to detaining and trying its prisoners, also independently detains them. Thus, under the lead-nation system, the prisons belonged to everyone and no one. In March 2003, the Italian government took responsibility for prison reform as an adjunct to its judicial reform responsibilities. But, despite this effort to unify prison reform, there remained no national program. Although improvements have been made, allegations of poor living conditions and abuse within the prisons continue, suggesting that there has been a certain inadequacy in prison reform to date.

THE ROLE OF THE PRTs

In the countryside, the PRTs implemented SSR programs. PRTs, an intriguing tactical fusion of military elements and other government departments (OGDs), have drawn praise and criticism in equal measure. The first PRT was set up in Gardez, Paktia Province, in January 2003 with the intent of extending the influence of the central government into the provinces. NGOs in particular have criticized the program for using aid as a weapon in the counterinsurgency effort, thereby decreasing their neutrality, or humanitarian space; focusing instead on the construction of infrastructure and ignoring the human aspects of development. NGOs also criticized the program for usurping, not enhancing, the Afghan government. These criticisms are not without merit, but even more detrimental to the process of SSR was the ability of the PRTs to pursue programs as they saw fit, and not as part of a wider strategy. A report by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations found that a lack of strategic direction was a major concern within the PRTs.²⁸ The PRTs were, essentially, expected to develop their own strategy independent of a greater plan. Although this freedom allowed PRT commanders to pursue local solutions to local problems, it also meant that programs could simply be ignored, regardless of their strategic



Source: Combat Camera
IS2011-2001-12

Captain Abdul Khalil, Commander of the 2nd Company, 6th KANDAK (Battalion) of the Afghan National Army's 1st Brigade of the 205th (Hero) Corps, confirms cleared areas on a map with his mentor, Warrant Officer Marc Gagnon of the Operational Mentor Liaison Team during Operation HAMAGHE SHAY

impact, if they were inconvenient. SSR was one of the stated functions of the PRTs, but it was the one that received the least attention. For example, the PRT in Khost, the so-called “crown jewel” of the American counterinsurgency effort, did not assist in the training or development of the ANSF even as late as 2008.²⁹ The PRTs’ contribution to the SSR effort was helpful, but uneven.

THE AFGHANISTAN COMPACT

The SSR effort received its greatest definition at the London Conference in January 2006. While the Bonn Agreement had only discussed governance, the London conference and the Afghanistan Compact that came out of it approached the Afghanistan problem in light of three “pillars”: economics and development; governance, rule of law and human rights; and security. Although judicial reform had been somewhat divorced from the security sector, the Afghanistan Compact placed SSR at the forefront and clear goals were established. By the end of 2007, all illegally armed groups were to be disarmed. By the end of 2010 the army was to be 70,000 soldiers strong, while the police forces would total 62,000. All unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition was to be destroyed.³⁰ The term “key partners” replaced “lead nation.” The same lead-nation tasks from 2002 were maintained, although police reform was now the responsibility of the European Union, and judicial reform, still led by Italy, was now organizationally a component of the governance, not the security, pillar. The Afghanistan Compact also signified a departure from the light-footprint approach. While the Bonn Agreement was “a pact among Afghans to be monitored and assisted by the United Nations,” the Afghanistan Compact focused on the partnership between the Afghan government and the international community.³¹ Instead of a limited commitment, a resurgent Taliban and a floundering reform effort required that ISAF take on a greater role in creating a secure Afghanistan.

SIGNIFICANT LESSONS LEARNED

Although it is fashionable to criticize the reform efforts made between the Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, a great deal had been accomplished in the face of difficult circumstances. SSR efforts are, in general, afflicted by certain contradictions. Decision makers need to balance the requirement for *some security now* with *better security later*. Adequate security forces may be enough to stabilize a situation, while inadequate forces—whether by virtue of skills, professionalism, or equipment—may prove to be significant de-stabilizers. The decision makers of the donor countries must balance their own constituents' desire for a short-term engagement with a light-footprint approach and the actual requirements of the situation. Simultaneously, they must work to prevent the recipient government from becoming dependent. This is no small task, and there are no easy answers. In spite of this, the donor countries created a national army, police forces, a judiciary and their supporting ministries from almost nothing. They also succeeded in integrating what remained of the Mujahideen into the national army and, although some warlord armies remained, they did not significantly destabilize the government. These were not minor accomplishments.

These statements are made not to convince the reader that mistakes were not made, but rather to lead to an analysis of the situation that accepts that SSR has been conducted in complex environments. The individuals involved in the early years of the SSR could not have foreseen the level of violence that the insurgency engendered in later years. Similarly, they had no control over the degree of public support that would allow them to mobilize the resources they needed. It would be unfair to criticize the decision makers, or the decision implementers, for what they could not predict and for what they could not do. Nonetheless, there are a series of guidelines that stand up to these realities, lessons that can be applied “the next time.” Put succinctly, SSR must be comprehensive and coherent. It must make adequate concession for customary practice, while identifying the problems within the preceding organizations and changing them. The SSR strategy must additionally be based on an honest assessment of existing human capital.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The “comprehensive approach” is a popular term when discussing the war in Afghanistan. Evolving out of the “3D” approach (defence, diplomacy and development), and then the “whole of government” approach, the comprehensive approach attempts to combine all tools available to the government. The fact that *everything* falls under the comprehensive approach seems to be an obvious flaw. After all, in a world of finite resources, a concept is useless if it does not allow decision makers and implementers to develop priorities. However, the concept does not imply that everything has equal priority, just because they are all parts of the same system. Each component will require varying degrees of attention, ranging from determining that no reform is necessary to asserting that a complete overhaul of a particular component must be undertaken. The early years of the SSR effort in Afghanistan ignored this concept. The lead-nation system is the most obvious example of this failure. Judicial reform and police reform, components that are directly dependent on one another, were developed independently. The required coordination did not occur, and the net result was a marked failure to establish rule of law in Afghanistan. Additionally, with each component developed independently from the others, significant components were ignored. Prison reform is one such example: even once the Italians took on the project, prison reform remained predominantly the product of independent PRTs and it received widely differing degrees of attention. Only by pursuing a comprehensive approach can an effective security apparatus be constructed or reformed.

COHERENCE

The SSR strategy must be coherent in its application. As in most endeavours, a lack of coordination between the involved parties leads to redundant efforts and holes in coverage. The task of coordinating the overall effort, in effect, fell to no one. OEF and ISAF strictly held security tasks, while UNAMA was understaffed and had no authority over the forces involved. The only relevant command to speak of was the American OMC-A, and its purview went no further than the development of the ANA. Unfortunately, PRTs were also part of this problem. The PRTs fell under the Commander of OEF and then of ISAF, and as such they had considerable independence. One study found that domestic interests played a considerable role in

determining PRT operational priorities, as did the agency within the PRT that controlled the most funding.³² Consequently, a civilian-led PRT provided by Germany may have had significantly different priorities than a military-led PRT provided by the United States. The Canadian PRT, for instance, has put considerable effort into improving the Sarposa Prison. As such, the PRTs may not pursue priorities in accordance with a greater strategy. In military parlance, the term to describe the required approach is unity of command—what Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope calls the “forsaken principle of war” in Afghanistan.³³

CUSTOMARY PRACTICES

Customary practices must be examined in depth to ensure that the new or modified institutions are similar enough to their precedents to ensure sustainability. After all, any SSR development is irrelevant if it is discarded as quickly as it is implemented. An obvious example of this is the Afghan penal code, essentially a “cut and paste” initiative undertaken by the Italians. Although a western-style penal code is no doubt appealing to any western donor, it seems inconceivable that such a system could endure when it ignores the people whose behaviour it is supposed to govern. A legal system that ignores the principles of Sharia law, a system that is near and dear to the 99% Muslim population of Afghanistan,³⁴ or even customary legal practices, the *only* law currently practised in the country’s most contested areas, looks alarmingly similar to an imperialist imposition and seems unlikely to last. Sharia law should not be feared by western donors. Indeed, it has been effectively integrated into the relatively liberal legal systems of many predominantly Muslim countries, from secular Turkey to moderate Jordan. Customary law is slightly more problematic. Customary law as it exists in Afghanistan is not necessarily in line with internationally held concepts of human rights. The practice of using forced marriages to reconcile past grievances—an estimated 60%–80% of marriages are forced for a variety of reasons³⁵—would not be in line with human rights as defined by either the donor countries or the government of Afghanistan itself. Such a practice could not be tolerated. Other practices that do not violate human rights, however, could conceivably be government-sanctioned and -regulated, thereby creating a system that could endure and effectively integrate the central government into existing and accepted structures.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Although customary practice must be duly respected, the requirement for SSR demonstrates that these institutions are, in some ways, inadequate. Change of some kind is clearly required. For example, the Afghan army has traditionally suffered from an uneven ethnic balance within their ranks, an arrangement hardly conducive to forming a true national army. During the Soviet invasion, the majority of officers were Pashtun. Even into the early 1990s, the majority of the infantry commanders were still Pashtun.³⁶ Today, the opposite appears true. Of the approximately 100 generals named by Defence Minister Fahim, commander of the predominantly Tajik Northern Alliance from the Panjshir Valley, 90 were Panjshiri Tajiks even though Tajiks only make up 27% of the Afghan population.³⁷ Additionally, 50% of the recruits in the first ANA battalion were Tajiks. True ethnic balance, and the perception of it, seems key to the ANA’s effectiveness as a security institution. Such a balance seems unlikely to be achieved without donor intervention.

The determination of which customary practices to maintain and which to change is difficult to ascertain. In general, the conventional wisdom of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” seems to apply. If an element is functional, customary and generally acceptable, it clearly needs little reform. Take, for example, the case of Afghanistan’s tribal militias and warlord armies, collectively known as irregular forces. Even in 1938, when the Afghan Army adopted a divisional structure, irregular forces played a significant role in plans for war. In the event of war, tribal militias were expected to provide 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers.³⁸ Similar systems arose following the Soviet invasion, the civil war, and even the period of Taliban rule. Such systems are cheap—and therefore sustainable—and they constitute a customary practice that would have been acceptable to most of the powerful individuals within Afghanistan. Additionally, the use of irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations is strongly advocated among many theorists as a mechanism for providing security to the population; their use has shown particular utility in Iraq. Similar programs, such as the Afghan National Auxiliary Police and the Community Outreach Program in Wardak Province, have also been pursued in Afghanistan, but on a much smaller scale. In the Afghanistan



Source: Combat Camera
AR2011-0025-072

Brigadier-General Ahmed Habibi, Commander of the 1st Brigade of the 205th (Hero) Corps of the Afghan National Army greets two local Afghans while on foot patrol

context, however, these irregular forces may be counterproductive: the strength of irregular forces during the Soviet intervention is often cited as contributing to the collapse of the state.³⁹ This was a factor in the decision to disband, instead of integrate, the AMF into the ANA. What is the correct mix between customary practice and practices requiring change? There certainly seems to be no simple answer.

HUMAN CAPITAL

Lastly, an SSR program can only be effective if it is based on an honest assessment of human capital. Although it was impossible to predict the strength of the insurgency as of December 2001, it was certainly possible to assess the human capital available among the Afghan people for the nation-building effort. With 42.9% of the population under the age of 14 and a war raging since 1979, few living Afghans had experience living under the rule of law.⁴⁰ Political leaders, bureaucrats, judges, lawyers and police officers

were few and far between. Even military commanders and soldiers with practical experience in fighting had little to offer in terms of the skills required of a professional army tasked predominantly with internal security. Light footprint meant little advice and even less oversight. The government ministries dealing with security, in particular, were neglected. The Strategic Advisory Team–Afghanistan (SAT-A), a small Canadian team sent to Kabul to provide advice on policy and governance, was instrumental in developing, among other things, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). However, it did not begin providing assistance to ministries concerned with SSR, the MoJ and the MoI until the summer of 2006.⁴¹ Similarly, UNAMA did not become active in rule-of-law programs until 2005. The result was unsurprising. The sudden influx of money from international organizations and NGOs, combined with untrained bureaucrats and inadequate oversight, contributed to rampant corruption. Even as recently as 2009, Transparency International cited Afghanistan as the fourth most corrupt nation out of 180 surveyed.⁴² Corruption and incompetence, from the highest political leaders to the lowest police patrolman, has caused considerable harm to the legitimacy of the government in a place whose people are traditionally wary of any central authority. The issue of corruption has significantly complicated the SSR process.



Source: Combat Camera
IS2011-2001-18

Major Saidmon Ashamee, acting Commanding Officer for the Afghan National Army's 6th Kandak, 1st Brigade of the 205th (Hero) Corps updates Major André Girard, Officer Commanding Bulldog (Bravo) Company of the 1st Battalion, Royal 22^e Régiment Battle Group following a day of clearing patrols during Operation HAMAGHE SHAY

CONCLUSION

The Afghanistan Compact has since been superseded by the so-called Obama strategy and the decisions that were part of the 2010 Kabul Agreement. The term “exit strategy” has left the political lexicon; “transition” has taken its place. The overall strategy places the emphasis overwhelmingly on the reform of the Afghan security sector and, ultimately, the transition of Afghan security from the hands of ISAF to the ANSF. Increased training and funding for the ANSF paint an optimistic picture, but two obvious questions remain. Is it enough and is it too late? Can we get “there”—effective security for the Afghans by the Afghans—from “here,” or have the mistakes of the past irreversibly damaged the credibility of the Afghan government in the eyes of its people? It remains to be seen whether the SSR effort in Afghanistan will ultimately be successful.

The experience in Afghanistan has taught invaluable lessons. Although an SSR effort with the incredible scope of the Afghan campaign in the near future seems unlikely, future interventions must be characterized

by an SSR contribution by donor states. The requirement for a comprehensive approach has been highlighted by past errors. OGDs can reasonably anticipate greater involvement earlier and a significant requirement for coordination among groups that have little to do with one another in their home countries. Commanders, whether civilian or military, will need greater spans of control. Who is in charge is irrelevant. What matters is that *someone* is in charge of integrating the efforts of all involved. These same commanders can anticipate difficult decisions in balancing the requirement for maintaining customary practices that will endure, and selecting those elements that need to be changed. In Afghanistan, the donor countries hold considerable leverage over the government of Afghanistan and can affect the status quo fairly easily. This may not be the case on future operations. Finally, an honest assessment of the human capital within the afflicted nation is critical to success. This assessment will drive almost all other decisions in terms of the extent and type of reform required. Organizational architecture, for example, is important, but having the right people with the right skills is immeasurably more so. Whether future SSR efforts are light or heavy, the lessons learned in Afghanistan provide guidance for our analysis of future endeavours. 🌸

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Tyler D. Wentzell graduated from the Royal Military College in 2006. He joined the Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, as a Platoon Commander and deployed with the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team as a Company Mentor. Since 2009, he has worked at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre as an Observer Controller Trainer and the second in command of the Security Force Capacity Building Center of Excellence. He has been active in the training of Canadian, Australian and Romanian OMLTs. Captain Wentzell completed his Master of Arts in War Studies in May 2011 and subsequently began law school at the University of Toronto that fall.

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THE GLAUCUS' FACTOR

Red Teaming as a Means to Nurture Foresight

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INTRODUCTION

At first glance, one could simply conclude “what is old is new again.” Red teaming, although receiving much attention in the defence and security community over the past decade, is not a new or recent innovation.³ In fact, the history of red teaming, when considered broadly as a challenge function or activity meant to “teach” and “mentor,” is well documented with the first recorded example dating back to at least 2200 BC.⁴ However, what qualifies as new in this ancient activity is the critical thought that has gone into, and now underpins, the art and science, or the discipline, of red teaming. In essence, the discipline of red teaming (from validating the various methods and techniques used to challenge blue force⁵ through to team selection, force generation, development and employment) is new—or, at the very least, our understanding and application of the facets of red teaming has significantly matured over the last decade. It is only since the late-1990s that the defence and security community has invested significant resources and effort towards the critical examination and validation of red teaming as an effective method to mitigate, or prevent, biased-thinking and mental stagnation in blue. In other words, while the activity of red teaming is old, the discipline of red teaming is a recent innovation.

The goal of this article is to outline and discuss research on red teaming conducted by the Adversarial Intent Section (AIS), Defence Research and Development Canada—Toronto (DRDC Toronto), between 2008 and 2010.⁶ Specifically, this article will discuss the results of red teaming conducted in four contexts: (a) in support of unit training; (b) in support of Joint Task Force Games; (c) in support of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command; and (d) in support of Combined Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan.

RED TEAMING—FRAMING THE PROBLEM-SPACE

Although some thought had been given to red teaming at DRDC Toronto, research on the topic did not start in earnest until 2008.⁷ One of the first

activities of the research program was to survey the broad range of red teaming literature for the purpose of developing a red teaming definition. To accomplish this task, a broad understanding of red teaming was used, which allowed for an examination of a number of historical and contemporary challenge functions, including, but not limited to: opposition force, military simulations and strategic gaming, and war gaming.⁸ After examining the extant literature and identifying and comparing examples of red teaming from across public and private sectors, a preliminary conceptual framework and working definition were developed in the fall of 2008. The conceptual framework determined that red teaming can, and should, be applied across organizational activities and that red teaming was an activity that challenged blue force through the “eyes of adversaries.”⁹

Since that time, and based on more in-depth research in the application of red teaming in planning and training environments, the concept of red teaming has significantly matured. Based on research conducted over the last two years, three main points are proposed. First, rather than a specific technique, red teaming is a broad conceptual category that includes several different forms or types of techniques, each of which is suited for a particular audience, environment and organizational activity. However, it should be noted that the audience, level of application and the environment in which it is employed will dictate the type of red teaming technique that will be used as well as the type of red teamer to be employed. In other words, red teaming is not a one-size-fits-all endeavour.

Second, rather than a single or discrete activity (i.e., a one-off activity), red teaming is a discipline incorporating programs of activity (United States Army colleagues refer to red teaming as an enterprise). That is, red teaming is a deliberate, intentional and thought-out process that is performed over a period of time, using a number of activities and, possibly, different techniques. Red teaming is the aggregation of challenge activities, culminating in a greater appreciation of the problem-space by blue force.

Third, the broad conceptual category of red teaming, as a program of activity, can be divided into two elementary forms: that of (a) mimetic and (b) diegetic. Mimetic red teaming (also called threat emulation red teaming) is a constructive and theatrical or performance-based activity, and it is a conscious, thought-out and deliberate representation and acting-out (i.e., role playing) of the adversary or other agents occupying the battlespace. It should be noted that mimesis does not imply a naïve or superficial representation, but rather (and ideally) a highly accurate, robust and believable representation; it is a dramatic (i.e., emotionally invested) and physically active representation of the real world from another’s perspective. It is beyond mere imitation; it strives to be as real and accurate as possible.

In contrast, diegetic red teaming (also called decision-support red teaming) is a fundamentally narrative and descriptive endeavour. Diegetic forms of red teaming are a recounting, or a nuanced report, of the real world. Whereas mimetic red teaming embodies and represents through live action, diegetic red teaming represents the world through a detailed and accurate description of the world.¹⁰ The difference is that mimetic red teaming involves detailed and accurate role playing, whereas diegetic red teaming involves a nuanced, descriptive product, such as an analytical report; that is, where mimetic red teaming “shows,” diegetic red teaming “tells.” The two elementary forms of red teaming are presented in Table 1.

ELEMENTARY FORM	DESCRIPTION	APPLICATION
Mimetic Red Teaming (Threat Emulation Red Teaming) ¹¹	A highly accurate and detailed acting-out or role playing of the real world	Usually applied in a highly structured environment, such as a field training exercise. In some cases, these methods may be used to test “live systems.”
Diegetic Red Teaming (Decision-support Red Teaming)	Narrative based and descriptive account of the real world, usually involves an analytical product	Can be applied in structured or unstructured environments, such as collaborations, round-table discussions or one-on-one conversations. These techniques normally support planning or decision-support in operational environments.

Table 1: Red Teaming Conceptual Framework

Various red teaming techniques are listed in Table 2.

TECHNIQUE	DEFINITION
Futures Analysis	A structured technique to identify alternative futures.
Alternative Analysis	The presentation of ideas outside of the status quo.
Alternative Perspectives	A range of alternative perspectives on a problem or issue; this technique may incorporate red, green, white and blue perspectives into an analytical product.
Red Team Analysis	A holistic analysis of the problem or issue using all information available, including open and closed sources.
Competitive Intelligence	A structured approach in which two separate teams analyse the same problem or issue.
Team A/Team B	Another form of competitive intelligence in which the two teams have access to different information.
Peer (Critical) Review	A critical review of products by peers, often used in the academic community (i.e., peer-reviewed publications).
Devil's Advocacy	The intentional challenge of a position from a contrarian's perspective.
Attack the White Board	An anything-goes brainstorming session designed to critique underlying assumptions.
Red Team Table Top Exercise (TTX)	A table top exercise designed, executed and controlled by the red team. Often, the red team leader will serve an omnipresent narrative role and will guide blue through the exercise scenario.
Advisory Role	A form of "soft red teaming," the red team provides expert advice on a problem or issue. In essence, this is a second look at a problem.
Emulative Analysis	Similar to alternative perspectives, this technique requires an advanced understanding of the adversary's culture, religion, history, geography, social structure, etc.
Red Cell	A team that emulates the adversary in field training exercise environments. The red cell is specially trained and has an advanced understanding of the adversary.
White and Black Hat Hacking	Penetration tests of synthetic systems. White hat hacking is conducted in such a way that it does no harm, whereas black hat hacking is conducted on live systems and could result in system shutdown. White hat hacking is also called ethical hacking.
Opposition Force	A general opposition force to blue in an exercise environment, usually without any special training to replicate the adversary.
Tiger Teams	Specially trained teams to conduct challenge assessment of blue systems or processes.
Penetration Tests	Assessments of blue physical security systems and protocol.
Covert Testing	Similar to penetration tests, but done in a covert fashion.

Table 2: Red Teaming Techniques¹²

Although mimetic and diegetic are different forms of, or approaches to, red teaming, both serve the same purpose, that is to create a learning environment for blue force. An examination of the different forms of red teaming reveals that the following interrelated attributes, in order of priority, are critical to the success of the endeavour:

1. **Positional Authority.** The red team must be sanctioned at the highest level possible in the organization or activity. This is particularly true in hierarchical organizations. Otherwise, the red teaming effort lacks sufficient “top-cover” and will not be able to directly challenge blue force’s perspective; thereby relegating itself to a “self-licking ice cream cone.” Positional authority may not be required if there is a complete buy-in of the red teaming effort by the blue force.
2. **Trust and Respect.** The red team must be able to establish rapport, and build a relationship marked by trust and respect, with the blue force. This type of learning is very much a two-way street and reciprocal, requiring mutual trust and respect.
3. **Expertise.** The red team must be seen by the blue force to be an authoritative (i.e., expert) source of information or, at the very least, capable of pulling in expert resources to inform the red team’s position. If not, the blue force will dismiss, out-of-hand, the insights or actions of the red team as being ill-informed, fantastical, improbable or naïve.
4. **Relative Independence.** The red teaming effort is designed to serve the needs of the blue force. As such, there should be continuous dialogue and negotiation between the blue force and the red team in order to identify needs and to respond to vulnerabilities and emerging issues. Autonomy from the blue force is necessary only in special circumstances, such as penetration tests.
5. **Adaptable and Flexible.** Red teaming is not a static or prescribed endeavour. The needs of the blue force, and the context in which red teaming is applied, will differ for each blue audience.¹³ The red team must be flexible and adapt to the needs of different blue forces as well as the changing operating environment.

Combined, the aforementioned attributes create and maintain red team *credibility*, without which the endeavour would fail.¹⁴

Based on the conceptual framework and key attributes, the following definition is proposed for use by the Department of Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF):

*Red teaming is a dynamic, organizational support activity undertaken by a credible team that aims to nurture foresight by creating a collaborative and reflexive learning environment in which the team, through the application of critical methods and techniques, challenges the beliefs, assumptions and concepts that underpin the planning, structure and operations of the organization.*¹⁵

To qualify as a red teaming activity, three components are necessary:

1. The endeavour is undertaken by a credible team¹⁶ specifically tasked for the challenge role (i.e., it is not a second glance at the problem-space conducted by blue force or an internal audit).
2. The endeavour is specifically designed to educate, and not to evaluate, assess or validate, through the application of critical methods and techniques.
3. While methods and techniques may vary, the learning endeavour involves a critical, and objective, examination of self, and others, that occupy the problem-space (i.e., it is holistic).

The goal of red teaming is to help the blue force overcome inherent bias in thinking and, in doing so, to develop a holistic understanding of the problem-space, expand the potential decision space and nurture foresight.¹⁷

The actual end state of red teaming is not to guard against groupthink or mitigate mental stagnation (although, they are important and critical products, or intermediate outcomes, of the red teaming enterprise), but rather to develop foresight (also called *leitvisionen* or lead-vision)¹⁸ on the part of the blue force, the purpose of which is to help the blue force understand and shape the future. Foresight is the synthesis of forecasting with insight. Whereas insight is a deep understanding and appreciation of a particular subject (e.g., an adversary, a battlespace, a technology, etc.), forecasting is the holistic and systems-based understanding of the problem-space in which alternative and plural futures are identified (i.e., what are probable, possible and wildcard scenarios).

There are two kinds of foresight: (a) pragmatic foresight and (b) strategic foresight. Whereas pragmatic foresight involves looking outward from the near future to five years in the future, strategic foresight is the looking outward to more than five years in the future. Both forms of foresight are about enhancing blue force performance by identifying, appreciating and positioning the organization to shape, or respond, to emerging threats or opportunities.¹⁹

EXAMINING RED TEAMS IN TRAINING AND PLANNING ENVIRONMENTS

Initiated in 2008, the goal of this multifaceted study was to examine the role, application and value of red teams, and red teaming, in planning and training environments.²⁰ The study involved data collection in four different contexts:

- a. red teaming in support of unit-level training;
- b. red teaming in support of Joint Task Force Games (JTFG);
- c. red teaming in support Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM); and
- d. red teaming in support of Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF 82).

Context 1: Unit-level Training

The reserve unit used in the study has actively employed mimetic red teaming (commonly called red cells) to enhance unit-level training since 2004.²¹ During the study, the red cell designed and conducted a series of exercises, role played during the exercises and served as exercise controllers. Exercises were designed and executed in close coordination with the blue force commander. This was to ensure that exercises matched the skill level and capabilities of the primary training audience (i.e., the blue force) and targeted the identified learning objectives. It should be noted that the red cell was not a passive or uninvolved entity; rather, the red cell drove and underpinned the training process.

Data were collected during three exercises; two unit-level exercises and one brigade-level exercise.²² All three exercises required the blue force to operate out of a forward operating base and involved a combination of section- and platoon-level patrolling as well as a platoon- and company-sized deliberate raids on a static and well-defended objective (e.g., a house, a compound, etc.). For the unit-level exercises, the red cell designed, coordinated and conducted the exercise, including executing injects and major events. The unit-level exercises were grounded by a scenario that involved antigovernment militias engaged in a campaign of low-level violence and intimidation against a relatively passive civilian population. The brigade-level exercise was set within an expeditionary context (e.g., Afghanistan) and involved both low- and high-intensity violence. Both exercise types were designed to enhance the skills necessary for soldiers to be more successful in counter-insurgency operations.

A number of differences between the unit-level and brigade-level exercises existed and should be noted. First, the red cell was responsible for the actual design and execution of unit-level exercises. Rather than limiting involvement in the exercise to showing up and role playing, the red cell was responsible for working with the blue force to identify the learning objectives as well as setting the context that would allow the blue force to achieve its learning objectives. Second, the red cell members received explicit training or guidance about the exercise scenario, the agents they would represent (including boundaries of appropriate behaviour and what is culturally correct and incorrect), the purpose of the exercise and their role as a training aid for blue (i.e., they saw themselves as teachers or mentors).

In the brigade-level exercise, the red cell was less involved in the exercise design process and was largely relegated to role playing. Outside of the leadership, many members of the red cell were tasked at the last minute to role play. Moreover, the leadership provided little or no guidance to red cell members on the blue force learning objectives, the agents they would represent (i.e., role play) or the overall purpose and goals of the exercise. In other words, the red cell at the brigade exercise was largely uninvolved, uninformed and unaware of its role and purpose.

A common complaint from blue was that there was an overall lack of realism in the brigade-level exercise. The blue force identified this as a result of lack of appropriate training for the role players, especially training on how to represent the adversary and other agents that would normally occupy the battlespace. For example, role players wore a mix of CF uniforms with civilian or foreign-military clothing and used whatever they could find (standard CF issue green towels) to wrap around their heads in an attempt to “look the part.” It was noted by blue participants that red cells require supervision and training, and that they must see themselves as teachers or mentors. In other words, the red cell must know the agents they are role playing, and they must understand their role in the exercise environment, for the benefit of blue rather than for themselves. Red cells should not only be used to reinforce proper actions (by the blue force), but they should also be used to reinforce proper and accurate perceptions about the complex cultural spaces in which troops are required to navigate.

Blue force participants reported that red cells worked when they received clear direction and guidance from both the blue force and the red cell leadership about the role, mandate and activities of the red cell. There needs to be mutual understanding and buy-in by both the blue force and the red cell. Moreover, blue force participants indicated that one of the key qualities for red cell members is maturity; that is, the red cell needs to recognize that they are a training aid and, as a result, that blue force’s training needs (learning and performance objectives) must come first. Responses from red cell and blue force participants also indicate that the value in red teaming lies in scenarios that force intensive or deep social interaction. Although environmental conditions were not identified as a key issue, blue force participants reported that “getting the behaviour right” was a condition for believability. It should be noted that participants (red cell and blue force) did not report that they felt they were “truly in another place.” However, participants did report that believability (i.e., the suspension of disbelief) was dependent upon the role players looking and acting (behaving) the part.

While there are clear benefits in having the red cell mimic the adversary in realistic fashion (in particular, adversary techniques, tactics and procedures), the value of red cells is realized when there is a requirement for the blue force and the red cell to interact in a non-kinetic fashion, such as with presence patrols in a town or when conducting a key leader engagement. It is in these situations that the red cell has the opportunity to break (or when done poorly, reinforce) cultural stereotypes and bias; in other words, these situations require the blue force to examine, appreciate and navigate complex cultural environments.

It was clear from the immersive research that the red cell requires team members with a strong knowledge of the agents they are role playing as well as a high level of maturity. In essence, the red cell must recognize that these agents are training aides, and that the exercise is not for its benefit. A typical challenge presented to red cell coordinators was the continual reeling in of younger, and less experienced, team members who continually sought to operate outside of identified behavioural boundaries.

Context 2: Joint Task Force Games

JTFG was the purpose-built operational headquarters responsible for the command of the CF contribution to the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia (V2010). The JTFG effort was primarily directed towards supporting the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which was the lead agency for security operations. In 2008, JTFG stood-up the Games Red Team (GRT) to conduct a range of red teaming activities on JTFG preparations and plans.²³ The objective of the GRT was to maintain the “mental agility and competency” of JTFG staff, and the commander, by critically examining and challenging blue in the lead-up to, and during, V2010.



Source: Combat Camera
VI 2008-0177-26

Troops proceed cautiously as they enter the village, and inspect the contents of each building

AIS support to the GRT started in the summer of 2008. The primary purpose of the support was to provide in-house subject matter expertise on adversaries, leverage the expertise resident in the broader academic community and to conduct research in an applied environment to validate decision-support red teaming methods, approaches and techniques. Specifically, AIS was tasked to support the GRT by providing scientific expertise as well as the theoretical and conceptual frameworks to:

1. Identify and understand the mindset, intent, capabilities and behavioural characteristics (including techniques, tactics and procedures) of the broad range of adversaries that may target V2010.
2. Develop, deliver and validate decision-support red teaming activities, methods and approaches.
3. Critically examine GRT decision-support red team activities and identify best practices and lessons learned for future CF decision-support red teaming activities.

To ground the red teaming enterprise, AIS and GRT performed three preliminary, but critical, activities. The first activity bounded the problem-space by defining the adversary as:

Any domestic or foreign-based entity, faction, group or movement seeking, either directly or indirectly, to disrupt, damage, harm or threaten the 2010 Winter Olympics, including (but not limited to) the safety, security and welfare of participants, officials, staff, volunteers, spectators, sponsors, buildings or physical assets through criminal activity or terrorism.

The second activity was to seek the assistance and advice, by way of a survey and consultations, of a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) from academia and government. Using the adversary definition, the surveys helped the GRT to gain a better understanding and appreciation of potential adversaries. The survey responses provided by the SMEs, plus additional analysis provided by AIS scientific personnel, were also used to inform and design exercise scenarios used by the GRT and to build a generic adversary, which was named the Chinyavada Cell.²⁴ The adversary survey was based on the Sleipner Threat Management (Sleipner) technique, which was developed by the RCMP for conducting strategic threat analysis on organized criminal entities and networks. The Sleipner technique facilitates a comparative analysis of various threat-agents in a systematic and objective manner and is used to measure the relative threat-risk level represented by each threat-agent using a set of rank-ordered and valued attributes (e.g., organizational characteristics).

Survey Results

Eighteen surveys were submitted by 12 SMEs from academia and government. Three SMEs submitted multiple surveys. The surveys included groups or movements representing a broad spectrum of potential adversaries. Since SMEs were not assigned specific adversaries, a number of surveys covering the same adversary were submitted. In total, the SMEs submitted surveys detailing 10 different groups falling into the following four, broad thematic categories: (a) left-wing extremism, (b) right-wing extremism, (c) ethnic and religious extremism and (d) apolitical extremism.

The lowest score possible on the survey was 0 and the highest was 840. The actual scores of the surveys ranged from 303 to 776. From the surveys and supplemental analysis, it became apparent that potential adversaries were capable of using a broad range of tactics and that each adversary had the potential to disrupt the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, although the severity of the disruption differed significantly when the entire threat spectrum was considered. The supplemental analysis also revealed that the most challenging situation faced by security forces was not from a single, highly determined adversary, but rather from the coincidental, simultaneous convergence of multiple adversaries.

Adversarial Intent Workshop

The third activity was the Adversarial Intent Workshop. Hosted by the GRT and co-sponsored by AIS, the workshop included representatives from JTFCG, academic and government SMEs, research personnel and invited guests from the military and partnered security agencies. The workshop was divided into four sections: (a) GRT overview and discussion of the GRT decision-support red team strategy; (b) an overview of the current thinking on, and approaches to, decision-support red teaming in the CF and the US Army; (c) an analysis and discussion of the threat-agents that may target the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (based on the adversary survey); and (d) a brainstorming session on, and an opportunity to challenge, the GRT decision-support red team strategy for JTFCG and the generated adversary (Chinyavada Cell).²⁵

The GRT decision-support red teaming strategy can be described as diegetic red teaming in which the scenario is narrated, typically within a table top exercise environment (these exercises became known as Red Team TTXs).²⁶ The goal of the GRT decision-support red team strategy was to make Red Team TTXs as realistic as possible, but also challenging by pushing the blue force to consider a range of alternatives from the mundane to the extreme, but all within the realm of plausibility. To help maintain realism, Red Team TTXs followed a natural and realistic timeline rather than a series of events isolated or disconnected in time. As designed by the GRT, the generic adversary adhered to a campaign plan; the goal of which was to destroy Canadian will to continue with the 2010 Games. To accommodate for a range of blue forces, the GRT generated a series of scenarios that covered a range of events, from limited-scale, one-dimensional engagements through large-scale, multidimensional and multipronged attacks (complex scenarios). Underpinning the adversary campaign plan was the assumption that potential adversaries do not work in isolation, and a particular incident may be complicated by the simultaneous and coincidental occurrence of other incidents, either human-caused or naturally-occurring, in the operating environment. The GRT noted that the objective of complex scenarios was two-fold: (a) to allow blue to discover that it could not protect against all threats (i.e., bad and unexpected things do happen); and (b) to provide the intellectual space for blue to “stretch its mind” and to “think about the unthinkable,” that is, to stimulate creative and dynamic thinking.

Exercise LAUREL WREATH 1001

Exercise LAUREL WREATH (EX LW 1001) was a GRT overlay exercise on normal operations, meaning the staff were involved in the exercise and, at the same time, in normal operations. The GRT designed the exercise, executed injects and served as exercise controller. This was to ensure that the exercise did not interfere with normal operations, but also to ensure that learning objectives were met and red teaming lessons learned were recorded and incorporated into the organization. The exercise injects, which ranged from no- or low-threat to high-threat events, were executed at the direction of the GRT and each inject targeted a specific point of the JTFCG formation. The injects, as well as the response, were then monitored by the GRT through the communications, command and control process to higher and lateral formation release points. Based on the Top Offset (TOPOFF)²⁷ exercise series conducted by the US Department of Homeland

Security, the GRT overlay exercise utilized existing communications and space infrastructure and was primarily conducted as a command post exercise and TTX; however, it had a limited field training exercise portion that consisted of troop movement and employment. The overall aim of the exercise was to confirm the ability of JTFG to focus resources for Operation PODIUM prior to the Command JTFG declaration of operational readiness.

Although called a red teaming exercise, the question begs to be asked: what made EX LW 1001 a red team exercise? That is, what qualified this exercise as a red teaming activity?

First, the GRT designed and executed the exercise. As such, they were able to create the conditions to challenge key assumptions made by the blue force. Through close and detailed examination of blue force's plans and procedures, the GRT was able to identify several vulnerabilities and gaps, as well as biases that dominated and drove blue force thinking. By designing and controlling the exercise, the GRT was able to target and challenge specific issues. The point of red teaming is to get blue force to think critically about the problem-space. Simply pointing out errors in blue force's plan (commonly called seagulling) does little to encourage critical and dynamic thinking about the problem-space. In essence, this was the purpose of EX LW 1001; that is, to set the conditions whereby the blue force, through self-discovery, identified and examined the issues. The end results are increased knowledge about the problem-space enhanced foresight on the part of the blue force and a more robust and flexible plan.

Secondly, there was constant negotiation between the blue force and the red team in the build-up towards, and during the course of, the exercise. The point of the negotiation was not only to target specific pre-identified vulnerabilities, but also to resolve emerging issues (newly identified vulnerabilities). Red teaming exercises by nature are dynamic and reflexive learning endeavours; they are not simply meant to validate a plan.

It is also important to note that red teaming is not a single event or activity; rather, it is a series of activities specifically designed to improve the ability of the blue force to think about, and respond to, unexpected events and outcomes. Although not a decision-support red teaming activity by itself, the GRT overlay exercise should be recognized as one tool or activity (amongst many) utilized by the GRT over the course of two years to red team JTFG.

Context 3: Canadian Expeditionary Force Command

Decision-support red teaming was used twice by CEFCON at two course of action (COA) development war-gaming exercises in 2009. Unlike the red team support of JTFG in which the GRT drove the exercise process, the CEFCON decision-support red team was more of a participant in the COA war-gaming exercises and was not involved in the design or execution of the exercise. Moreover, the CEFCON decision-support red team was not used in a structured or formal manner during normal activities at CEFCON in a planning or operational support capacity. In other words, decision-support red teaming was limited (isolated) to the COA war-gaming exercises. It should be noted that CEFCON utilized war gaming to critically examine specific COAs for future mission rotations. Although war gaming is common across the CF, the war-gaming exercises (i.e., to war game specific COAs) were the first of its kind for CEFCON. This application of a decision-support red team in support of a COA war-game exercise was also a first for the CF.

The CEFCON decision-support red team, which consisted of a number of military and civilian SMEs, served a devil's advocate role, using a number of methods and approaches to challenge assumptions and to stimulate thinking about the problem-space. However, it should be noted that the decision-support red team was not involved in the planning process prior to, or after, the war-gaming exercise, and that the exercises included an oppositional (adversary) force, which was played by J2.²⁸ Decision-support red teaming, in this environment, was highly structured and formal. The war-gaming exercise involved a brief introduction to the COAs (and the key assumptions underpinning the COAs) by the commander and then a round-table discussion, which was used to clarify information and for the staff to provide their insight. Rather than challenge staff directly or immediately, the decision-support red team was required to add its thoughts, perspectives or critical insights at the end of each round. Often, the decision-support red team

would question the underlying assumptions (i.e., why do you assume X or Y?), but also provided additional information or alternate perspectives on the adversary as well as sociocultural, political and economic insights.

The purpose of decision-support red team involvement in the exercise was to help shape the thinking of the blue force, to introduce new information or alternative perspectives for consideration and to encourage the blue force to consider the cascading effects of kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Consistent with the GRT approach, the CEFCOM decision-support red team did not impose upon blue solutions to the problem, but rather presented, and encouraged blue to consider, a range of alternatives. In other words, the goal of this decision-support red teaming was not to prove the blue force wrong; rather, it was to ensure that blue examined the problem-space in a holistic manner.

The CEFCOM Operations Research and Analysis Team (ORAT) provided analytical support to the exercise. Although the primary purpose of the exercise was to assess the viability of each COA, a secondary objective included assessing and evaluating structured decision-support red teaming as a means to encourage or support an enhanced appreciation of the problem-space. In terms of assessing the value of decision-support red teams, participants were asked in a survey to answer a number of open-ended questions, including: (a) Did the red team provide insights? If so, did the insights challenge your (the participant's) views or assumptions? (b) State if (and how) insights provided by the red team strengthened or weakened your position for favouring a particular course of action?

Analysis of the survey data indicated that respondents generally felt the decision-support red team concept had merit, and it provided cultural insights that augmented and enhanced the round-table discussions. Many respondents reported that the timing of blue force and red team interaction was poor (too structured at the end of each round) and that the red team did not engage them in critical thinking or challenge their assumptions or beliefs (i.e., there was little or no critique of the blue force and little, if any, interaction between the blue force and the red team). Respondents indicated that the decision-support red team interaction must occur throughout the course of the exercise, rather than at specific intervals. It was reported that the highly structured format of the exercise provided little opportunity for the decision-support red team to challenge blue force's assumptions and thinking, which required continuous dialogue and negotiation.²⁹

In its analysis, the CEFCOM ORAT noted that the selection of decision-support red team members was largely random, and that only two (of four) members had previous red team training or experience. The ORAT also observed that the format and structure of the exercise prevented the red team from elaborating on certain points, red team and blue force interaction and the red team from directly challenging a specific blue force assumption. In essence, input at the end of each interval prevented the application of critical methods to challenge blue (e.g., the Socratic Method), which was the intention of the war-gaming exercise.

The ORAT team also noted that, while considerable literature on decision-support red teaming methods and team composition exists, there was little information on the assessment of decision-support red teaming, in particular measures of effect and effectiveness. A key outcome of the war-gaming exercise, and the assessment of the decision-support red teaming component, was that there is a need to develop assessment tools to evaluate the value-added nature of decision-support red teaming.³⁰ As a result of the exercise, five recommendations were made by ORAT regarding the employment of red teams in future war-gaming exercises:

1. Decision-support red teams should be involved in COA development (red team involvement should not be limited to the COA assessment stage of planning).
2. Careful consideration needs to be given to decision-support red team composition to ensure credibility (i.e., red team members must be authoritative and members must have excellent interpersonal skills).

3. Decision-support red team members should have appropriate training (e.g., red team methods and approaches, the operational planning process, etc.).
4. Allow the entire decision-support red team to interact with the blue force (do not use a spokesperson for the entire red team).
5. Providing additional insight and information is good, but the red team must ask specific and direct questions, and challenge the blue force's assumptions, about the problem-space.

Context 4: Combined Joint Task Force 82

In the winter and spring of 2010, Matthew Lauder³¹ was attached to the CJTF 82's Decision-support Red Team (DSRT).³² The overarching objective of the assignment was to participate in DSRT activities and to identify key issues and challenges regarding red team concept integration into Canadian tactics, techniques and procedures as well as doctrine. The assignment had two pragmatic purposes: (a) to provide a Canadian defence member with deeper situational awareness of the process and operationalization of red teams in support of expeditionary operations and (b) to help DSRT gain a "coalitional force perspective" and provide assistance in examining the problem-space from a holistic, systems-based perspective. In essence, the DSRT was seeking to red team the red team, in order to prevent potential mental stagnation and guard against complacency in critical thinking, while DND/CF was seeking to better appreciate the role and value of red teaming as a decision-support tool at the operational and tactical levels in support of expeditionary operations.

The attachment to the US 82nd Airborne Division in Regional Command East involved complete integration into the DSRT as well as full interaction with the staff, including inclusion in planning meetings, briefings, committees and working groups (e.g., Intelligence Sharing Conference, Negative Influencers Working Group, Future Operations, Information Operations Working Group, Targeting, Stability Operations Working Group, and Counter-improvised Explosives Device Working Group, etc.).³³ Unlike the emerging Canadian approach to decision-support red teaming, which was formalized by the GRT and includes both interaction with planning staff but also the design and execution of red team TTXs and strategic threat emulation, the US Army approach is exclusively decision-support based; in other words, DSRTs do not do threat emulation in exercise environments (that is usually the purview of the J2). In essence, the DSRT interacts with, and provides insight to, the staff and the commanding general (CG) on key issues and focuses much activity on analytical product generation. These products are typically aimed at the commander, but other products may be written specifically for the staff or another entity within the formation, such as a subordinate unit or other government agency.

It is important to note that DSRTs, being outside of the formal command structure (i.e., as a commander's special asset), influence decision making (a) by seeing the situation outside the internal lens of the staff structure, (b) by bringing forward properly framed questions to drive more productive alternatives and (c) because the red team methods and analysis generally differs from the staff planning process used to develop plans and operations. Moreover, additional vulnerabilities, insights and opportunities may be identified and shared by the participants. Independent review of plans and operational products may result in significant insights that have direct and tangible influences on mission strategy and execution. This is why a good red teamer "thinks outside of the box, but does not exist outside of the staffing process."

Overall, the DSRT functions at a high pace, producing (on average) one analytical product per week. Depending on the topic, the generation of a report may take several days. This time frame may be extended, depending on the requirement to collect data from partners or to conduct field research and site visits. The DSRT also briefs the CG on key issues on a regular basis, usually once every two weeks. The DSRT is not limited in terms of the issues it can examine; in essence, it has *carte blanche* to examine any issue the DSRT deems relevant to the success of CJTF 82.

The relationship between the DSRT and the CG can be best described as "push and pull"; in other words, the DSRT will identify, examine and advise on issues they believe the CG needs to be made aware of (i.e., push), and the CG will specifically task the DSRT to examine, analyse and advise on issues (i.e., pull).




Figure 1: US Army Decision-support Red Teaming Operational Model

See Figure 1 for the US Army decision-support red teaming operational model. Over the course of Matthew Lauder's attachment to the US 82nd Airborne Division, the DSRT examined and/or produced analytical reports on a range of issues, including effects assessment, force protection, regional influencers, economic stimuli, security development, effectiveness of combined action, and insurgent networks.

The DSRT used a number of structured and unstructured methods and tools to identify and examine key issues. One notable technique was that of "red team collaborations." In essence, these collaborations were informal (although structured) opportunities for invited staff and partners, both military and civilian personnel, to meet with the DSRT in what was referred to as a "non-attribution zone." The unshakable golden rule was simple: "what is said in the DSRT office stays in the DSRT office ... no exceptions!" The purpose of the collaborations is to allow staff and partners to provide insights into, and alternative perspectives on, critical issues and to help shape the outcome of the DSRT analytical product. In addition, collaborations help to develop rapport with staff, subordinate units and partners (e.g., other government agencies). It should be noted that the non-attribution zone was essential to the DSRT endeavour, as it provided a space for staff and partners to freely and openly discuss issues in a non-judgemental, non-partisan environment.³⁴ This interaction allowed the DSRT to keep their "ear to the ground" and "feel the pulse of the staff" and went a long way to help nurture what the DSRT commanding officer called "the red team insurgency."

Summary

Red teaming is not new; in fact, it is an ancient activity. In various forms, red teaming (as an approach to, or method of, teaching) has been around for more than four millennia. However, what is new is the discipline of red teaming (e.g., the method and theory of red teaming). It is the development of the art and science of red teaming that can be considered novel. Based on the research conducted over the last two years, three main points are advanced.

First, red teaming is not a specific challenge technique; rather, it is a broad conceptual category that includes a number of techniques, each suited for application to a specific problem or environment. In other words, red teaming is a family of techniques. Second, rather than a single, isolated activity, red teaming is a program or curriculum of activity. US red teaming colleagues often refer to red teaming as an enterprise. No matter what it is called (e.g., enterprise, endeavour, franchise, etc.), red teaming is not a single activity—it is an intentional and structured activity that culminates in the blue force gaining a better appreciation of the problem-space and (through that enhanced appreciation) a greater capacity to shape the future. One does not arrive at 0900 hrs and red team for an hour and be done; it is not that simple. Red teaming is a learning process that requires significant investment of time, effort and resources. Third, the broad conceptual category of red teaming can be divided into two elementary forms: that of (a) mimetic, or threat emulation, red teaming and (b) diegetic, or decision-support, red teaming. Although the two forms are qualitatively different, the goal and purpose remains the same—to increase the blue force's appreciation of the operational environment by challenging the assumptions and thinking that underpin the blue force's decisions and actions. At the end of the day, red teaming is about making the blue force better by encouraging greater foresight. 🌸

ABOUT THE AUTHORS...

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Dr. Phil Eles is a defence scientist with DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (DRDC CORA). He leads a team embedded within the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Since 2006, his work has focused on opinion polling, violence metrics analysis and the evolution of the improvised explosive device threat in Kandahar. In 2010, he was seconded to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at United States Central Command. Dr Eles received a PhD in physics from the University of British Columbia in 2005.

Dr. Katherine Banko is a social scientist and SME in quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research. She has been an operational research (OR) defence scientist with DRDC CORA since 2005 and is currently embedded with an OR team at CEFCOM. She is responsible for research, analysis and performance measurement in operational and organizational domains. Katherine is the chair and national lead for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Human Factors and Medicine 185 task group: "Processes for Assessing Multinational Missions." She has earned a BA in Psychology, an MEd in Educational Psychology (Human Learning and Performance) and a PhD in Psychology (Social Psychology).

ENDNOTES

1. In Greek mythology, Glaucus (which literally means "glaring eyes") is the owl associated with Athena. The Glaucus owl is a symbol of wisdom and vigilance.
2. Matthew Lauder's appreciation goes to Col (retired) Greg Fontenot and John Roach of CEFCOM for their advice and insight on red teaming, especially in the early days of DRDC's red teaming research program.

3. H. Coombs, et al., "Theories and Tools for Strategic Simulation," KMG Associates for Defence Research and Development Canada—Toronto, June 30, 2008.
4. M. Lauder, "Red Dawn: The Emergence of a Red Teaming Capability in the Canadian Forces," Defence Research and Development Canada, SL 2009-077, April 2009.
5. In military parlance, blue force is considered friendly forces. In a training environment, blue force may also be considered the primary training audience. In contrast, red forces are normally considered to be the adversary or enemy. However, in the context of red teaming, red teams are not necessarily the enemy, but rather the team that challenges the blue force.
6. This paper is limited in scope to the red teaming research conducted by DRDC from 2008 through 2010. At present, DRDC is conducting a short study on decision-support red teaming, and a more detailed study on decision-support red teaming is planned. The red teaming research conducted between 2008 and 2010 should be recognized as exploratory and preliminary; that is, it serves as a springboard for a more detailed examination.
7. Dr. Robert Walker, CEO of Defence Research and Development Canada and Assistant Deputy Minister, Science and Technology, Department of National Defence, identified interest in red teaming as early as May 2007. See: R. S. Barrett, "Borrowing from Security Strategy: Can Red Teams Help Astronauts Prepare for Crew Conflict in Space," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 4 (2009): p. 60–9. Motivated by Brad Gladman's report (B. Gladman, "The Best Practices of Red Teaming," DRDC CORA, TM 2007-29, July 2007.) Rear-Admiral Pile, Commander Joint Task Force Games, indicated his intention to stand-up a red team as a part of the CF preparations for V2010. Rear-Admiral Pile identified red teaming as an effective way to challenge the assumptions and preconceptions held by the blue force and to help guard against groupthink, maintain flexibility of mind to deal with unforeseen situations and assist in knowing the range of potential adversaries. In a memo dated 15 May 2008, Rear-Admiral Pile set the context and the mandate for the Games Red Team, which was critical to its functioning within the headquarters (HQ) (File JTFG: 3350-RTP [COS]).
8. Mark Mateski identifies the application of red teaming in a number of different forums, including the military, physical security, computer security, and business corporations. See: M. Mateski, "Toward a Red Teaming Taxonomy 2.0," *Red Team Journal* (2004).
9. The first "working" definition, dated November 2008, was developed for the military community, although it provided enough latitude for application by the civilian community. In addition, the definition was designed to be applicable at all levels of the organization (i.e., tactical, operational and strategic) and across organizational processes (i.e., it was not designed for application in a single setting, such as planning environments). At that time, red teaming was defined as an organizational process support activity undertaken by a flexible, adaptable, independent and expert team that aims to create a collaborative learning relationship by challenging concepts, plans, operations, organizations and capabilities through the eyes of adversaries within the context of a complex security environment.
10. J. A. Cheyne, "Mimesis and Semiotics of Bullying: A Group and Self-Defining Ritual," (University of Waterloo, 1998). Available at <http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~acheyne/misc/mimeticbullying.html>.
11. The US has a robust threat emulation program. Threat emulation teams consist of specialists who replicate the contemporary operating environment to strategy, tactics, technology and equipment. See: G. Fontenot and D. L. Combs, "Fighting Blue: Why First Class Threat Emulation is Critical to Joint Experimentation and Combat Development," *American Intelligence Journal* (Summer, 2008): p. 24–30.
12. A description of many of the techniques can be found in: "A Guide to Red Teaming," Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, February 2010.
13. Red teaming is used in many contexts. See: "A Guide to Red Teaming," Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence (UK), February 2010.
14. For additional information on the criteria of effective red teams, see: J. F. Sandoz, "Red Teaming: Shaping the Transformation Process," Institute for Defence Analysis, D-2590, June 2001.
15. It should be noted that this is the third iteration of the red teaming definition since November 2008. Like the activity itself, the red teaming definition should be seen as a working definition, something that will evolve and mature as greater experience is gained with red teaming.
16. Credibility is a function of the key attributes: (a) positional authority, (b) trust and respect, (c) expertise, (d) relative independence, and (e) adaptable and flexible.
17. In her article on confronting assumptions and biases, Jane Sheldon notes critical thinking involves engaging in self-reflection, considering alternate perspectives and recognizing the influence of assumptions and biases on decision making. See: J. P. Sheldon, "A Secondary Agenda in Classroom Activities: Having Students Confront Their Biases and Assumptions," *Teaching of Psychology* 26, no. 3 (1999): p. 209–11. As noted by Stephen Yanghar and Brent Slife, assumptions are important because they serve as the foundation of thought and actions. S. C. Yanghar and B. D. Slife, "Teaching Critical Thinking by Examining Assumptions," *Teaching of Psychology* 31, no. 2 (2004): p. 85–90.
18. R. Rohrbeck and H. G. Gemunden, "Strategic Foresight in Multinational Enterprises: Building a Best-Practice Framework from Case Studies," (paper, R&D Management Conference, Emerging Methods in R&D Management, Ottawa, Canada, 2008).
19. Foresight is grounded by three rules (the Three Laws of Futures): (1) The future is not predetermined—no single predetermined or monolithic future exists (i.e., there are multiple, possible futures); (2) The future is not predictable; and (3) Future outcomes

can be influence by our choices in the present; we can influence and shape the future, and it is through advanced insight that we can identify possible consequences and cascading effects. The three rules are based upon work by Joseph Voros. See J. Voros, "A Primer on Future Studies, Foresight, and the Use of Scenarios," *Prospect* no. 6 (December 2001): p. 1–2.

20. The study was reviewed and approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at DRDC Toronto.
21. A number of things should be noted about the immersive and observational research. First, Matthew Lauder is an infantry officer in the unit that participated in the study. Even before the study, he was involved in the design and execution of the red cell coordinated exercises. This advanced knowledge of the unit and the red teaming capability provided excellent access to the training environment. However, it is difficult to assess how his rank and role in the exercises influenced data collection. It needs to be recognized that participants may have felt obligated to participate in the study and, during discussions, put a positive spin on red teaming. We tried to mitigate this by ensuring all troops that participation was both voluntary and anonymous. ; It should be noted that other red cells exists in the CF. For example, there is a trained red cell at CFB Wainwright (Alberta) that supports pre-deployment training for Afghanistan. In addition, the Land Forces developed the Common Army Training Scenario, which is a guide for designing and executing stability and support operations exercises. This guide provides detailed information on adversaries that was used to unit-level train red team members.
22. Matthew Lauder role played an adversary in the two unit-level exercises and role played an embedded journalist in the brigade-level exercise. This provided an opportunity to experience red teaming from both the red cell and the blue force's perspective.
23. For an account of the GRT, see: A. S. Wilner, "Terrorism in Canada: Victims and Perpetrators," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 12, no. 3 (Spring, 2010).
24. The Chinyavada Cell was a fictitious, generated adversary used in red teaming exercises to represent the high-end threat. The Chinyavada Cell was, in essence, a generic adversary as it was based on the findings (i.e., the integrated results) of all the adversary surveys rather than representing a single known adversary, such as Al Qaeda. The justification put forward by the GRT for this approach (generic versus specific) was that it allowed blue force to more easily buy-into the exercise scenario and to focus on the effects of a particular incident rather than on the adversary itself.
25. The most important outcome of the workshop was that it served as a peer review and critical assessment of the GRT and its red teaming strategy for JTTFG. Red teaming is a learning endeavour, and the GRT must allow itself to "go under the microscope" to ensure that it remains credible and relevant.
26. GRT TTXs were diegetic in nature because the red team (exercise) leader narrated the scenario. In essence, the red team leader describes, in detail, the mindset and emotions of the adversary. ; It should be noted that the US Army recently incorporated a full-spectrum decision-support red teaming capacity into its exercises. This approach goes beyond more conventional red cell or threat emulation approaches to support an exercise. However, it should be pointed out that the red team does not design, execute or control the exercises; rather, it serves as a participant. See: C. F. Ham, G. Fontenot, D. Pendall and L. Cluster, "Red Team Reign: Red Team Support to Joint Task Force Decision Processes," *Red Team Journal* (September 2010).
27. P. J. Liroy, et al. "TOPOFF 3: Comments and Recommendations From Members of the New Jersey Universities Consortium for Homeland Security Research," *Journal of Emergency Management* 4, no. 6 (November/December, 2006): p. 41–51.
28. In the continental (or general) staff system, J2 is responsible for intelligence and security.
29. In his article on red teaming and law enforcement, Michael Meehan recognizes the two key impediments to red teaming as: (a) situational and (b) organizational. Situational impediments may be caused by poor exercise scenarios or conditions, whereas organizational impediments include poor red team and blue force interaction and organizationally imposed constraints. See: M. K. Meehan, "Red Teaming for Law Enforcement," *The Police Chief* (n.d.). For a discussion of effective red teams, see: Defence Science Board Task Force, "The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September, 2003. Red teams rules of engagement are briefly discussed in: T. G. Malone and R. E. Schaupp, "The 'Red Team': Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency Plan," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Summer, 2002): p. 22–33.
30. It is recognized in the red teaming community that measuring the effectiveness of red teaming is extremely difficult. One issue is that, in order to measure the effectiveness of red teaming, standardized approaches may be required. However, no standards for red teaming methods or techniques exist. In fact, red teams would likely argue that standards methods or techniques run counter to the philosophical underpinnings of the capability—flexibility and adaptability.
31. Matthew A. Lauder is Project Manager and Scientific Authority for Applied Research Project 15AG: Canadian Forces Enhanced Influence Operations. Research on red teaming is conducted under the auspices of 15AG.
32. Matthew Lauder would like to extend a special thanks to Col Jeannie Arnold, LCol Richard Jordon, LCol Dede Figueira, Maj Eric Johnson and MSG John Nombrano of the CJTF 82 DSRT for their hospitality, insights and guidance.
33. The purpose of attending staff meetings and working groups is three-fold: (a) to identify key issues for examination, (b) to shape the way the staff thinks about the problem-space and (c) to show the staff that the DSRT is fully involved in planning and operations (rather than existing on the margins).
34. Red teams are outside the normal staff planning process. As such, it is argued that they look at the problem-space in a more objective manner and do not participate in groupthink. See: J. E. Barnes "Military Planners in Iraq May Soon Be Seeing Red," *Los Angeles Times*, January, 2007.



THE TACTICS SCHOOL AND ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Lieutenant-Colonel M. A. Lipcsey, MSM, CD; Major T. Batty, MSM (US), CD;
Major J. Hunter, CD; and Major S. Paul, CD

INTRODUCTION

During the past several years, the Tactics School has undergone a significant transformation. (The school's new coin is shown in Figure 1.) Previously, the Tactics School was only responsible for training the Army's future leaders in the art of the combined arms team. However, training has significantly expanded to include state of the art cells that maintain relevancy on the modern day battlefield as well as on the individual training and education fronts.

Training future Army leaders in the art of the combined arms team is still our primary focus, as it continues to evolve with the doctrine as well as the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) being shaped by the many lessons learned from the contemporary operating environment. The Tactics School's mandate has recently increased to include the Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Counter-improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), the Army Learning Support Centre (ALSC) and the Area Simulation Centre (ASC). When used to mutually support each other, these unique cells have a tremendous impact on the development of the Army's future leaders. This article will provide insight into each cell's function and capability in an effort to increase general awareness so that they may be better employed to support Army initiatives.



Figure 1: New Tactics School Coin

The delivery of tactical knowledge to junior and senior officers for both the Regular and Reserve Force at the captain/major level has continued to evolve. By achieving a fine balance between doctrinal principles and recent experiences in modern day combat operations, students receive a world-class education on fighting a combat team in all phases of war. The hasty attack is used as the training vehicle of choice. However, this only addresses one component of being a successful warrior on today's battlefield.

The Tactics School is currently undergoing a transformation to better prepare Army leaders to match the recent demands of the contemporary operating environment. The school has adopted the Warrior's Ethos, shown in Figure 2, as a training philosophy. With its strong foundation, the ethos focuses its efforts on three pillars: the *intellectual*, the *physical* and the *resilience* attributes required of warriors in order for them to be successful on operations.

Today's modern warrior must have a strong *intellectual* capacity based on experience, knowledge and training. Leaders that participate in the various courses offered at the Tactics School must not only arrive and participate on these courses but they must also be fully engaged and immersed in both the education provided at the school and the Army as an institution.

This institution is mandated to prepare future leaders for tactical operations as well as provide the forum and mental bearing to allow them to pursue their own professional development and increase their leadership skills and knowledge. The Tactics School's intent is to instil in all of its students this sense of development and the never-ending pursuit of knowledge, the hallmark of every true warrior.

Today's warriors must be in peak *physical* condition to endure the rigours of combat. It goes without saying that the ability to sustain the physical demands of combat and challenging operations is essential to survival and success. It is the aim of the Tactics School to instil a sense of fighting spirit that requires a warrior's strength and physical stamina, which is achieved through proper physical conditioning.




Figure 2: Tactics School's Warrior's Ethos Training Philosophy

Understanding one's body, both physiologically and psychologically, during periods of intense stress will better prepare our leaders and soldiers for demanding operations and could significantly increase the Canadian Forces' operational effectiveness.

As directed by the Armed Forces Council in January 2009, resilience training is in the process of being institutionalized across the Army for both non-commissioned members (NCM) and officer DP systems. Working in partnership with Health Services, the Tactics School has taken the lead in bringing resilience training to the Army Officer Corps. The Tactics School's goal is to ensure that the Army's future leaders possess a high level of resilience that will enable them to cope with the complexities and stressors of modern military operations. The school's building-block approach to resilience training is illustrated in Figure 4.

Resilience training will be introduced to the Army with a progressive building-block approach beginning at basic military qualification (BMQ) / basic military officer qualification (BMOQ). In this initial stage, Canadian Forces members will learn how to shield and protect themselves during periods of increased and significant stress. As an individual passes through the DP system, they will learn more about the importance of resilience for themselves, but of equal importance, for their subordinates. This building-block approach will allow members to delve into the leadership aspects of such training. In doing so, they will learn not only how to better prepare themselves but how best to train the soldiers under their command. This is but one of many projects currently underway at the Tactics School.


The area that will receive additional focus and resources in its development are the mental attributes required of a warrior, or what we have called *resilience*. The resilience logo is shown in Figure 3. Significant effort has been placed on professional development as it pertains to knowledge and physical fitness in the Army. Less effort has been directed towards the mental agility and, more specifically, the resilience required of a warrior.

In a recent article for the *Canadian Army Journal*, 13.1 Spring 2010,¹ Lieutenant-Colonel R. Cossar stressed the importance of training resilient soldiers as a potential solution to operational stress injuries. LCol Cossar elaborated on the importance of resilience training before soldiers are deployed overseas in order to ensure they are fully prepared for combat and to help minimize the likelihood of their developing operational stress injuries afterward.

When Canada first deployed to Afghanistan, our soldiers were suffering a disproportionate number of casualties due to the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IED). In response, in order to save the lives and limbs of our soldiers, government partners and local nationals, the Army initially focused on defeating the devices through force protection measures and the use of explosive ordnance disposal teams. Due to our operational successes in this regard, a shift has occurred at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to rebalance and transition to target the IED network.

Prediction is an integrated intelligence-based activity that provides an understanding of the resources, TTPs and supply chain that facilitate the placement of IEDs by opposing forces. Through the integration of all senses, including situation reports, exploitation reports and intelligence capabilities, we are achieving better situational awareness and have advanced in our ability to predict areas of interest.

Figure: 3 Resilience Logo



At the tactical level, AtN can be viewed from either a human perspective (local leadership, technical experts, emplacements or igniters) or a resource perspective (origin of material and equipment). The Tactics School is focused on the human component either through interacting with the local population or by conducting a tactical assessment of the ground.

Training is primarily focused on Army personnel who are preparing for the road to high readiness (R2HR) cycle and is in collaboration with the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering, which is the Defeat

the Device CoE. The Tactics School, through the Tactical Exploitation (TE) course, teaches students the process whereby evidence is collected, preserved and recorded for both judicial and further exploitation purposes by specialized labs.




Figure 5: IED Incident Time Frame

The course focuses on two key areas of a mission. First, it focuses on providing subject matter expertise to the chain of command during pre-mission planning. Then during the exploitation of an incident, it focuses on tactical questioning, evidence handling and collection. There are two main types of exploitation: hasty (unit based) and deliberate (exploitation teams). These are distinguished by the security and tactical situation at the time of an incident. The TE teams are able to pick up the pieces, find evidence and put their findings into a detailed analytical report. This is not a task that is conducted in isolation, as a cordon needs to be established and maintained by conventional forces to preserve the material recovery process and to protect the specialized teams during the evidence collection process.

The goal of TE is to learn who may have built and placed the device, with a view to prevent the circumstances that allowed it to be set up in the first place. However, if an IED is emplaced and a detonation occurs, the exploitation of the incident and the intelligence gained will assist in providing a picture of the adversary's capabilities. This will greatly assist in predicting future IED activity, enable the targeting process and, ultimately, protect our soldiers through the refinement of our unit TTPs.

IEDs will remain a persistent threat to Army deployments conducted across all spectrums of war. Only by applying an unrelenting pressure on the opposing force network will we be successful in the C-IED fight. There is no doubt that we are facing an adaptive opposing force who has the agility; command, control and communications; and the post incident analysis cycle (lessons learned) to adapt quickly to our countermeasures. Through training, our soldiers on the R2HR have become more agile and adaptive in responding to the IED environment.

The TE course conducted at the Tactics School remains an essential element in preparing and creating these specialized teams that will lead to intelligence-based operations. The course should be institutionalized across the Army in order to provide a residual capability across all combat arms units. This is especially true because the IED threat will remain a factor in counter-insurgency operations throughout the world in the foreseeable future.

ARMY LEARNING SUPPORT CENTRE

The Army Learning Support Centre is an important subunit of the Tactics School. Unique within the Canadian Forces, the ALSC was established in 2008. It was established to help offset some of the strains on the individual training system resulting from the increased operational tempo, the throughput demands

resulting from force expansion and shifting demographics, which have ultimately resulted in higher attrition rates. ALSC's mission statement details the specific requirements and is provided in Figure 6.

To support the modernization of the Army individual training curriculum with a view to:

- reduce course residency requirements;
- increase individual training throughput;
- improve the overall quality of individual training; and
- reduce individual training costs.

Figure 6: ALSC Mission Statement

To help achieve this challenging mission, the ALSC has developed a vision for the employment of various advanced learning technologies that can be incorporated into the overall Army individual training modernization construct. These initiatives include: distributed learning, distance learning and advanced training aids (3D models, animations, Virtual Battle Space 2 vignettes [VBS 2], to name a few). Graphically represented in Figure 7, this concept has already proven to be successful.

PERSONNEL

From concept development to end product, it takes a large and diverse workforce to meet the growing demand for ALSC products. To this end, military personnel, Department of National Defence civilians, New Brunswick Community College Interns and a number of contractors are employed at the ALSC. Unique skill sets such as training development officers, instructional designers, multimedia developers, 3D graphic artists and imaging technicians as well as numerous others all work together. The 133 people at ALSC ensure that state of the art advanced learning technologies are produced in support of individual training.

SUCCESSSES


Although still in its relative infancy, the ALSC has met with many successes to date. Some examples include:

- **The Primary Leaders Qualification (PLQ) and the Army Tactical Operations Course (ATOC).** In both cases, ALSC products resulted in a reduction in residency requirements, leading to an increased throughput and a reduction to course costs while providing an enhanced learning opportunity for the soldier.
- **Detailed 3D modelling of the M777 Howitzer and the Leopard 2 turret interior** have enabled high quality training to be conducted when the actual equipment has been unavailable.
- **More than 50 VBS 2, or animated, training vignettes** have been produced on a variety of topics which have raised the quality of training and reduced the time to competency.

THE FUTURE

Requests for ALSC products continue to increase as Army Individual Training Authority schools and centres of excellence gain further experience with employing advanced learning technologies. It is envisioned that the ALSC will need to continue its growth to meet future demand as well as to reach out to assist with other training initiatives. Army Reserve individual training modernization is one of many areas where ALSC products may prove to be useful. Today's young adult learner demands more than a chalkboard, a sandtable or PowerPoint presentations. The ALSC is uniquely tasked to assist in Army individual training modernization, ultimately helping to meet the needs of the soldier, the individual training system and the Army.

ALSC Vision



Vision Statement

To dramatically increase the amount (and quality) of advanced learning technologies, so that modern, learner centric training can be delivered to the soldier, rather than requiring the soldier to go to the institution. This will provide an enhanced training opportunity and a better Quality of Life for the soldier. The ability to overlap courses will ultimately result in greater throughput while reducing training costs.

Figure 7: ALSC Vision

LFAA / CTC SIMULATION CENTRE

The Land Force Atlantic Area / Combat Training Centre Simulation Centre (LFAA / CTC SC) is located in building J-7 at CFB Gagetown. The simulation centre is responsible for coordinating and delivering a myriad of simulation opportunities for the units in LFAA, the five local CTC schools which include: Tactics, Engineer, Armour, Infantry and Artillery schools as well as other non-Army units such as 403 Tactical Helicopter Squadron. The LFAA / CTC SC operates and coordinates the use of simulation assets for both the Directorate of Land Synthetic Environments (DLSE) and CTC. The LFAA / CTC SC is a diverse organization in both personnel and capabilities (see Figure 4). The LFAA / CTC SC consists of 4 military members and approximately 90 full-time and part-time civilian contractors.

The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) and the Virtual Battle Space 2 provide a virtual environment for both individual and collective training exercises. VBS 2 is classified as a “first-person shooter” and is primarily intended to support the training of individuals and small tactical groupings up to the platoon level. JCATS is best suited for exercising tactical plans from platoon to battle group. When JCATS and VBS 2 are linked together or “federated,” the two systems provide a challenging and diversified simulation environment.

The Land Command Support System (LCSS) section provides training to commanders and their principal staffs on automated decision support and staff tools such as Battlview and Falconview. LCSS training allows commanders to leverage technology to make faster and more accurate decisions.

The Crew Gunnery Trainer provides soldiers with an opportunity to gain self-confidence and hone their gunnery skills on the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) and Leopard tank, while the Indirect Fire Trainer allows them to practice calling for indirect fire. The Small Arms Trainer (SAT) is an eight-lane indoor range that provides personnel the opportunity to refine their skills on all in-service small arms weapons. All three systems ensure that students are properly prepared before conducting live field training.

Finally, the Canadian Weapons Effect Simulator (CWES) uses a combination of real and virtual simulation technologies to enable the achievement of high-readiness and operational training objectives. The CWES system replicates the effects of indirect and direct fire weapons on personnel and vehicles and injects a greater degree of realism in field training exercises.

SUCCESSSES

The LFAA / CTC SC has enjoyed a number of successes over the last year which include:

- **Establishing the Armour School VBS 2 Lab.** The LFAA / CTC SC in conjunction with the Armour School established a 40-station VBS 2 lab in the Armour School lines. The introduction of this simulation training into Armour School courses has helped to both reduce the student failure rate and to better prepare students for the challenges of field training.
- **Combined JCATS / VBS 2 Exercises.** The use of both JCATS and VBS 2 simulation provides a more enhanced training opportunity.
- **Supporting the Conceptual Doctrine Experiment 10 (CDX10).** The Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs (DLCD) is sponsoring a series of activities to support the doctrinal and structural evolution of the Army. CDX10 is the main effort. CDX10 is the largest simulation exercise ever supported by the LFAA / CTC SC and will require all the simulation centre's personnel and resources.

FUTURE INITIATIVES


Two initiatives that will greatly enhance the training opportunities for soldiers are as follows:

- **Land Vehicle Crew Training System (LVCTS).** The LVCTS is a Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR) initiative supported by the Directorate of Army Training (DAT) and DLSE. The LVCTS will provide simulation training for individuals and crews up to combat team level federating new crew gunnery trainers for the Leopard 2, LAV III, Close Combat Vehicle and the Tactical Patrol Vehicle. The LVCTS will introduce high fidelity simulators that accurately portray the crew stations, enabling the crew to perform all functions associated with fighting the vehicle.
- **Virtual Combined Arms Training Trainer (VCATT).** VCATT is a project that involves DAT, DLR and DLSE. The intent of VCATT is to create a versatile simulation and networking capability that will allow federated simulation training between the areas. Although in its infancy, the VCATT concept is a very exciting idea that would greatly enhance the training opportunities for all soldiers.

Another initiative that the Simulation Centre is examining is improving the SAT. With the latest available technology, staff at the Simulation Centre are exploring the "immersive environment," where a soldier will experience a virtual scenario that is getting closer and closer to resembling reality. This is a long-term project, but will truly enhance soldiers' training experience as all of their senses (sight, hearing, tactile feel and smell) will be targeted in this new immersive environment.

Over the past year, well over 2000 soldiers took advantage of the training opportunities at the LFAA / CTC SC and the 2010/2011 calendar is nearly booked to capacity. With the simulation capabilities we possess today, each student can run through multiple iterations of an operation at minimal cost in time and money. On courses where simulation is used prior to field training, failure rates have been noted to drop significantly, student confidence levels are higher and training is more effective. The virtual training world of 2010 provides instructors with powerful tools for preparing soldiers for challenges they will face on operations.

A FINAL WORD

The Tactics School remains ready to develop the Army's future leaders. Our centre of gravity lies in the quality of the level of instruction provided to the Army. Our end state is to become and be recognized as the centre of excellence for combined arms training (below battle group level) that harmonizes training, learning support and C-IED attack the network. By integrating all of its component cells, the Tactics School will continue to provide cutting edge learning technologies and instruction that are in keeping with the contemporary operating environment TTPs. Intellectus, Vires, Durus! Intellect, Strength, Resilience! 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS...

LCol Martin A. Lipcsey, MSM, CD is a RCR officer who has served over 25 years with Reserve and Regular Force units. He has had five operational deployments since 1994 and in recognition of his tactical acumen and combat leadership during the planning and execution of complex brigade and battle group operations on his last tour in Afghanistan; he was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal. LCol Lipcsey holds a Bachelor in Military Arts and Science (BMASc) through the Royal Military College and a Masters in Defence Studies. He currently serves as the Commandant of the Tactics School at Canadian Forces Base / Area Support Unit Gagetown.

Major Thomas A. Batty, MSM (US), CD joined the Royal Canadian Armour Corps in 1979 where he completed recruit, reconnaissance and tank training while attending Ryerson Polytechnical Institute. He was selected for commissioning from the ranks in 1983. Maj Batty received the Land Force Command Achievement Award from the Armour School in 1999 for his exceptional service as subject matter expert for the Leopard Thermal Sight Project. He is currently serving as the Officer Commanding of the Army Learning Support Centre at the Tactics School.

Major James R. Hunter, CD enrolled in the Canadian Forces in January 1987. He has had two deployments: first, to Cyprus as a platoon commander in Rural Squadron and second, to Bosnia as the Reconnaissance Squadron second in command. In 2005 he received the Chief of Land Staff Commendation for his efforts as Commander of the Land Force Atlantic Area Training Centre Detachment Aldershot in Kentville, NS. Maj Hunter is currently serving as the Managing Authority of the Land Force Atlantic Area / Combat Training Centre Simulation Centre.

Major Sasha Paul, CD has had several operational deployments including platoon commander in Haiti (Operation HALO), Training Centre second in command in Sengal (Operation AUGURAL) and, most recently, as the military assistant to the divisional Chief of Staff of Regional Command Southern Afghanistan. He has a double major in Political Science and History from Dalhousie University located in Halifax, NS and is a graduate of the Land Force and Staff College. Maj Paul is working toward his master's degree in History at the University of New Brunswick. He is currently serving as C-IED Lead at the Tactics School.

ENDNOTES

1. See, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Cossar, "Training Resilient Soldiers—Looking for Solutions to Operational Stress," *Canadian Army Journal* 13, no. 1 (2010). Available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/CAJ/default_e.asp?view=more&issueID=52 (accessed August 31, 2011).





THE CANADIAN FORCES AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AN ELUSIVE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY

Major Devin Conley and Dr. Eric Ouellet

The Canadian Forces (CF) has implemented a number of change strategies during its history. The most recent example, the former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier's policy of CF Transformation of the mid-2000s, left a considerable legacy whose ultimate accomplishments are now in doubt.¹ Changing a military institution can be a daunting task, and to be successful it requires, among other things, a good understanding of the deep institutional forces that may hinder change.

This article looks at three historic key change exercises in the CF to show that the same deep institutional forces were never overcome, and essentially ignored. These are Paul Hellyer's unification policy of the 1960s, the Defence Policy of the 1970s that stemmed from the findings of the Management Review Group and resulted in the creation of National Defence Headquarters, and Hillier's CF transformation. Although these change initiatives appear to have followed rational strategies and decision-making, they overlooked that any armed forces is not just an organization, but it is also a social institution. To provide a better understanding of the institutional dynamics that are at the core of any armed forces organizational life, this article proposes a formal institutional analysis of those three key change exercises to show that such policies deeply destabilized the CF as a whole, and essentially failed because they were undermining CF internal institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, this study aims to highlight that when it comes to understanding military institutions, the dominant model of rational decision-making, so cherished by members of the military and civilian defence bureaucracy, is actually a very poor guide for implementing institutional change.

METHODOLOGY

Institutional analysis is a sociological approach that seeks to uncover the bases of how social order is created and maintained within an institution. As well, it emphasizes the notion of legitimacy, as any social order must be perceived as legitimate enough to maintain itself without too much conflict. Hence, according to institutional theory, an institution will be expending a lot of energy to protect its legitimacy, oftentimes at the cost of achieving its functional goals.

There are several schools of thought in institutional analysis, but Richard Scott's² framework provides a unique and holistic model integrating a vast array of perspectives on institutions. Scott's approach, given that it provides a more encompassing view, will therefore guide this analysis. Institutions, although extremely varied and complex, may be defined as a

...relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances.³

Furthermore, by creating social order, institutions also create inequity that has to be justified and perceived as legitimate. In a modern state, the armed forces (with police) retain the monopoly over the use of legitimate violence. This monopoly over such extraordinary powers has to be seen as legitimate, one way or another. In a democratic environment, given that there is more room for dissension, maintaining legitimacy is usually a more difficult task. Thus, institutions, despite their resiliency, always face challenges from their environment about the inequity they create. In other words, for a group of people to have the monopoly over legitimate means of violence (i.e. the armed forces), it must be seen as "deserving" such "privilege" if it wants to keep such a monopoly without facing major challenges from its parent society. The impact of the Somalia affair on the CF, and all the policies that had to be implemented afterward throughout the 1990s, illustrate quite well how institutional legitimacy should never be taken for granted.

As well, the military, as an institution, has to ensure that its own internal integrity is maintained, as institutions also create inequities internally (such as the rank structure and access to decision-making). Military leaders have to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of their troops too. Oftentimes; however, an institution faces pressure from its external environment requiring it to take measures that will upset the internal balance of the institution. The issues surrounding the acceptance of gays and lesbians in the United States military is but one classical example of such institutional tensions between external and internal legitimacy.

Scott's framework identifies three sources, or pillars, of legitimacy for an institution, which are described as the *Regulative*, *Cognitive* and *Normative*. The Regulative pillar is tied directly to the regulative element of institutions, namely the written and unwritten rules and regulations within an institution that can be invoked for justifying and legitimizing decisions. In a Western democracy, the use of force has to formally respect national and international legal regimes. In other words, rules within an institution work to limit, enable and define legitimate social behaviour. Directly tied to rules and regulations are sanctions, equally formal and informal, that reinforce the boundaries separating the legitimate from the illegitimate.⁴

The Cognitive pillar addresses common thought patterns and world views within an institution that serve to maintain social cohesion and legitimacy. It emphasizes meaning, created within organizations through shared ideas, that define for them social reality. It can be considered as the common lens through which an institution views the world. Once again, these ideas and notions are used for justifying and legitimizing decisions. For instance, up to the end of the Cold War—while in fact there were already many non-conventional conflicts occurring around the world—Western armed forces, by invoking the Soviet threat, emphasized almost solely the kinetic means of warfare. These ideas and notions, also found in one's internalized role and institutional routines and which are “taken for granted”, act very much like an unwritten “script.”⁵ These “scripts”, as they are underwritten by beliefs in what is construed as “effective”, “efficient” and “proven”, serve also to justify the way people do things.

The Normative pillar is based on the norms and values found within an institution that prescribe behaviour in order to maintain social cohesion and order.⁶ Values define the desirable ideal against which behaviours can be measured. Norms, on the other hand, represent the actual actions of individuals and activity patterns that are enacted because of the social pressures linked to abiding to institutional values. Both values and norms; however, are deeply embedded in the ethical notions “good” and “evil”; as abiding to a particular set of values and norms is ultimately justified because it is a “good” thing to do. This provides a powerful way to justify and legitimize decisions. As a secondary, but crucial order of effect, norms and values also underwrite the members' deep sense of identity. In Western armed forces, there is a central yet implicit tenet that the military is not a “bunch of armed thugs”, but that there is something fundamentally noble in the soldiers' identity. Such tenet is also central to ensure that armed forces are perceived as a legitimate institution within their parent society.

Transgressions of these normative values can evoke a strong emotional response. The reaction to the failure to adhere to these unwritten norms can result in a more visceral reaction than a violation of the regulative guideline to social behaviour. In this regard, adherence to norms and values in an organization can be considered as more important to the social cohesion than adherence to rules.

HELLYER'S UNIFICATION OF THE 1960S

In March 1964, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Paul Hellyer, released his government's new white paper on national defence. It outlined in detail his intent to reorganize the entire Canadian military and defence organization in order to achieve two main goals: increasing operational effectiveness and reducing administrative inefficiency.⁷ The whole initiative in fact aimed at creating financial efficiencies within a smaller CF, which for decades, ultimately became an elusive government objective.

Minister Hellyer's assessment that the integration of Canada's three armed services into a single unified force would produce greater operational effectiveness was built on a logical line of reasoning. He assessed

that the gains of integrating the three services would be analogous to the gains in operational effectiveness the army had realized upon amalgamating separately administered field artillery, infantry and cavalry into one army.⁸ He cited that although forcing the services to work together in an ad hoc manner had worked during the Second World War, the fact that they were not proficient at working together within a common communications system and a common lexicon had ultimately cost lives.⁹

The second line of reasoning in Minister Hellyer's initiative to unify the three services in the CF into a single armed force was based upon the perceived administrative inefficiencies at the time. Prior to unification, administrative services such as dental, pay and postal were provided independently by each of the three services, which Hellyer deemed to be inefficient. He also wanted to increase the efficiency and prioritization of military procurement by increasing the Deputy Minister's authority.¹⁰

The results of Minister Hellyer's efforts were codified in several ways. The *1964 White Paper on Defence* explained the philosophy of unification and was, at the time, widely regarded as a significant step forward in strategic thinking.¹¹ Minister Hellyer then expanded upon his concept to reorganize the Canadian Forces in his *1966 Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*. In this address he re-iterated his justification for the reorganization of the Canadian Forces, but put much more emphasis on the fiscal implications: "If we were to maintain useful forces to meet out national and international commitments we had two choices. We must greatly increase defence spending or reorganize our forces. The decision was to reorganize."¹²

Bill C-234 and Bill C-90 were the legislative result of the Minister Hellyer's policy described above. Bill C-90 abolished the positions of the service chiefs of staff and established a single Chief of Defence Staff with a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) designed along more functional lines. Bill C-234 put the reorganization of the Canadian Forces into law. It legally combined the former three services of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into one single service, henceforth called the "Canadian Armed Forces."¹³ The ultimate success of Hellyer's initiative has been regarded by scholars as debatable and not having achieved his desired effects.¹⁴

REGULATIVE DIMENSION

The fact that Hellyer exercised his regulative power as the Minister of Defence to impose his unification agenda on the forces offers little room for dispute. As mentioned above, Bill C-90 and C-243 formalized unification into national level legislation. Hellyer also took regulative actions within the department in order to bring about the reorganization of the CF.

In 1966, as the civilian authority over the DND, Hellyer exercised his legal authority to reorganize the CF. He did so in a number of ways. One of his first acts as minister was to cancel the delivery of new navy frigates that had been ordered by his predecessor Gordon Churchill. He also scrutinized and adjusted the air force proposal to purchase additional CF-104 fighters.¹⁵ Having established his willingness to exercise his ministerial authority over the military, Hellyer moved on to addressing the operational and fiscal inefficiencies he saw within the CF.

The legislative changes also abolished the three services "chiefs" (the Naval Board, General Staff and Air Staff) and replaced them with a single joint staff under the CDS. In addition, the power of the Deputy Minister was increased, particularly in the area of procurement. Finally, Hellyer's creation of the CFHQ reduced the size of the military staff by thirty percent and decreased the number of committees within the military staff. Combined with the maintenance of the civilian staff at the same level, the intended second order effect of this was to increase the civilian power base in the department.¹⁶ These regulative measures decreased the traditional power base of the independent services and elevated the civilian power within the Department of National Defence. Not surprisingly, the internal military bases for legitimacy were seriously challenged, and took away some prerogatives that were construed as purely "military."

In the face of resistance by senior officers, Hellyer had to resort to further regulative measures in order to enforce his unification policy. Hellyer was more than willing to sanction officers who stood in the way of the



Source: Combat Camera
IS2006-2356a

Deputy Commanding Officer, Major Doug Palmer, a reservist with the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa stands at attention during a ceremonial Freedom of the City parade in downtown Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

reorganization of the Canadian Forces. For example, he was quoted as saying “I suggested officers should get enthusiastic about integration...or else turn in their badges and take the special benefits available to them.”¹⁷ Hellyer’s dismissal of the outspoken Admiral Landymore for disloyalty to the policies of the government was another clear example that the legitimacy of the unification process was relying heavily on formal and legal sanctions.¹⁸

COGNITIVE DIMENSION

The fact that there was acceptance of the unification policy by the civilian policy makers and initial acceptance by many retired and serving generals is interesting to note. There was much intellectual debate in the 1950s and 1960s over whether or not the Canadian Forces should remain as separate services or be a unified single force.¹⁹ The culmination of this debate, prior to Paul Hellyer becoming Minister of Defence, manifested itself in the Glassco Commission of 1963, which produced a series of reports examining federal government reorganization. The commissioners of the defence subjects report examined the concept of unification but stopped short of recommending it for the Canadian Forces. Instead they recommended greater efficiency through the integration of services but did not recommend a complete unification of the services with a single Chief of Defence Staff.²⁰ Regardless, Paul Hellyer did not find the report's conclusions innovative enough and went forward with his own aggressive policy of integration leading to unification.

Initially, there were a number of senior military leaders and officials who also accepted Hellyer's unification policy for the CF. The Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence held in June 1963 was provided evidence from both serving and retired senior officers who supported the idea of unification.²¹ There was also initial wide spread intellectual support for the White Paper of 1964. This was made evident by editorial comments made in *Canadian Aviation* magazine at the time where "Defence Minister Hellyer's White Paper has been widely heralded as the most forward thinking defence document produced by any government for the past decade, and probably since World War II."²² The strongest support; however, came from the policy-makers' level.

If creating efficiencies was an undisputable administrative principle for many in the military, unification was instead construed as degrading military competencies. In this cognitive context, many general officers became vehemently opposed to unification. Those who did make arguments based on tactical and strategic themes. One such argument was that unifying the forces would degrade the service specific capabilities of the land, sea and air forces.²³ Specifically, the views of the notably vocal commander of the navy, Admiral Landymore, clearly illustrate this key point of preserving the unique skills of each of the services. When asked if his opposition to CF unification was based on tradition or tactics and strategy, Admiral Landymore replied:

I do not think it enters into the operational field. I think generally navies are very close to one another and their way of doing things and their manner of presenting themselves and in their identity. If there is a reluctance, and there is, it is due to that factor more than any other (Hellyer 1990, 156).

The above example clearly demonstrates how, at the time, the cognitive frame at the senior level in the Canadian Forces was divergent to that of Minister Hellyer.

NORMATIVE DIMENSION

The unification policy was counter to many of the established values and norms in the military of the day. Hellyer discounted many of these symbols and traditions as excessive and antiquated. He was particularly surprised by the navy traditions. He clearly illustrated this view when visiting a Canadian Naval vessel in 1964. Hellyer remarked on what he saw as excessive pampered treatment, which was traditional according to navy standards, by stating "such practices seemed an abuse of indentured labour reminiscent of the dark ages."²⁴

In spite of his seemingly set views on the matter, Minister Hellyer did allow debate on the policies of unification; but noted that in the face of vigorous resistance from senior officers that he never encountered a valid military problem with unification and that opposition was "purely emotional."²⁵ One of the main counter arguments to unification from a normative perspective was the impact on morale. Hellyer discounted any such emotional arguments and labelled traditionalists as "anachronisms."

The imposition of a common uniform for all services was a direct attack on a long standing institutional carrier of the three separate services. All three services were opposed, but the navy was particularly affronted

by the change in uniform. A senior representative at the time poignantly summed up the sediment in the navy on the loss of their distinct uniform in stating that it would result in the “loss of their identity” and make the Canadian navy “a laughing stock and virtual pariahs in naval circles.”²⁶ The proof that this regulative measure never achieved normative status is the fact that the three environmental services of the Canadian Forces had their distinct uniforms reinstated in the 1980s.²⁷ It should be noted that the 2011 re-instatement of the older service titles (“Royal Canadian Navy,” “Royal Canadian Air Force,” and “Canadian Army”), which appears to have been sponsored by a discreet group of CF naval officers, is further evidence that this deep institutional normative dynamics is still at play, even if no one in today’s CF served during Hellyer’s tenure.

Hellyer encountered a similar emotional reaction when he executed a reduction in the reserve units. Hellyer’s policy called for a cut in the militia from 51,000 to 30,000 in all ranks; a cost cutting measure that was part of the overall goal of achieving greater fiscal efficiency within the department. In order to accomplish this, entire units were decommissioned and placed on the supplementary order of battle. This eroded the normative base of the Canadian Army which had its origins in its militia regiments, many of which had a long and proud history. The result was a considerable backlash that spilled over into the political arena. Decisions to disband regiments such as the Victoria Rifles and the Irish Fusiliers of Vancouver brought forward serious delegations of representatives who made a pitch for their reinstatement. Of particular note was the resistance of the Irish Regiment of Canada. In protest to the disbandment, the President of the Irish Regiment Veteran’s association sent a telegram to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II asking that the regiment be reinstated.²⁸ Despite the high profile of some of these actions, Hellyer was able to contain them and press on with his policy, but he had certainly underestimated the impact of his policies and how little legitimacy they held within the military institution.

MACDONALD’S MANAGEMENT REVIEW GROUP OF THE 1970S

Not long after his election to power in 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau commenced an inevitable review of defence policy. Not surprisingly, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had his own particular views on defence and the military in general. One of his beliefs was that the military was an expensive bargaining chip to be leveraged in relationships with the provinces and other allies.²⁹ He also questioned Canada’s existing commitment to NATO and believed that the key to Canada’s defence was the reliance on American nuclear deterrence. Trudeau’s views naturally led him to conduct a review of defence. To this end, he appointed Donald MacDonald as the Minister of Defence and gave him the task of developing a new defence policy.³⁰

In 1971, under MacDonald’s leadership the *Defence in the 70’s* White Paper was produced. In addition to producing this document, MacDonald appointed a civilian consultant board called the Management Review Group (MRG) in order to evaluate the organization and management of the Canadian Forces. The main task of the MRG was to examine all aspects of the management and operation of the Department of National Defence. The key findings of the MRG indicated that there was a problem with basic management and organization within the Canadian Forces as it related to unification, and that this had led to an inefficient management of defence resources. In addition, one of the major conclusions of the MRG was that although the Canadian Forces was effective at conducting operations, it was in need of a headquarters and command structure that would better enable the management of resources.

Based on these findings, the Management Review Group made a number of recommendations. Chief among these was the reorganization of the separate legal entities of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence into one entity. The concept was to subordinate the CDS and by extension the CF to the Deputy Minister. These substantive changes and others would have meant opening and modifying the National Defence Act.

In the end, most of the recommendations of the MRG report did not receive widespread support and were buried until the document was declassified in 1984.³¹ The one recommendation that was instituted was the amalgamation of the CFHQ, that had been created by Hellyer, with the Department of National Defence into the unified National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). This new headquarters fused the two in practice and

structure, but not in law. Despite the intent of greater management efficiency and by extension operational efficiency, this policy has widely been regarded as one that actually reduced the operational effectiveness of the CF by creating a greater degree of confusion as to who is in charge of what.³²

REGULATIVE DIMENSION

The changes made upon on the recommendations of the MRG, similar to Hellyer's unification, were primarily instituted through the use of formal authority. General Jacques Dextraze, the CDS during the implementation of this policy, initially accepted the concept that military and civilians staffs could be combined under the new structure, with either civilians or military members occupying positions. What he initially discounted as "boxes and lines on a chart" became a thorn in his side as he realized that his ability to administer and control the CF was greatly diminished. General Dextraze would admit years later that his agreement to form joint civilian-military staffs in NDHQ was "the worst decision of my period as CDS."³³

The MRG proposed that the restructure and institution of a more managerial style would alleviate the perceived inefficiencies. But such perception was not shared within the military institution. The least aggressive of the senior service representatives during the review was the commander of maritime command who simply requested that the environmental staffs in Ottawa be improved and that environmental commanders have a place in the Defence Council and Defence Management Council.³⁴ The commander of Air Command, General Mackenzie was more emphatic in his assertions. He stated that the main problem was a lack of influence of the environmental commanders within NDHQ and that this was caused by "the absence of an adequate formal interface between the functional commands and NDHQ."³⁵

The most aggressive in his assertions to re-establishment of the strong environmental service power base within the Canadian Forces was the Force Mobile Commander General Paradis. He went so far as to say that an "Army Commander" be established who would be solely responsible for this service.³⁶ Also, he proposed that NDHQ be reorganized completely on services lines instead of functional lines and that only a small unified staff be maintained to manage common issues. This demonstrates, once more, that by attacking the power of the environmental services through policies such as amalgamated civilian-military staff, the defence policy of the 1970s was attacking the traditional structure of the forces just as unification had in the 1960s. This once again elicited resistance to these policies in the Canadian Forces and contributed to their lack of legitimacy within the institution.

COGNITIVE DIMENSION

When he began to review defence policy in 1971, MacDonald deliberately chose not to consult senior military officials.³⁷ He deemed any questions on defence policy from defence officials as "obstinate rebellion."³⁸ Instead, he assigned civilian business leaders to the MRG who considered the correction of "management inefficiencies" to be the main feature of new defence policy.

The prevailing belief amongst the members of MRG was that by correcting the management shortcomings of the department, it would improve the departmental "bottom-line", which was considered to be the efficiency and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces. Unfortunately, this managerial approach failed to bear fruit in the way it was intended. This likely resulted in an increase of the influence of the civil servants and a corresponding decrease in focus on operational issues. Command authority and responsibility were reduced and the end result was a Canadian Forces that was significantly less operationally effective.³⁹

These conflicting views of managerial-efficiency focused versus command-operationally focused are further illustrated upon examination of the Task Force Review on Unification. During the review it was noted by senior commanders that NDHQ did not address the commands' operational requirements, specifically in the areas of force development and tactical doctrine. The report of the Review Group, produced in August 1980, further reinforced the contradiction to the managerial approach, that had been established in the 1970s, by recommending that "operational effectiveness be identified as the governing criterion in monitoring progress and in identifying improvement in all areas of CF endeavour."⁴⁰ Also, the report raised major

concerns with respect to the civilian managerial techniques that had been employed for the past eight years. The report openly questioned the managerial-efficiency focused philosophy of the 1970s by asking if such policy: “will it work in conflict?”⁴¹ Once more, if seeking efficiency was acceptable cognitively, what was perceived as dabbling in “military affairs” was not justifiable, as civilians were seen as militarily incompetent.

NORMATIVE DIMENSION

During his interactions with MRG, General Jacques Dextraze discovered that he could not control the staff as he had previously done in his military career. Despite the fact that senior civilian and military members of the staff were structurally obliged to serve the chain of command whether or not they were a civilian or military officer, their loyalty always defaulted to their original sub-culture.⁴² In the face of structural changes that impacted the social cohesion of their respective traditional sub-cultures, the military and civilian staff defaulted to their normative behaviour based on past behavioural patterns. These actions of loyalty to the unwritten normative hierarchy directly contradicted the new regulated structure.

Similar to Hellyer’s policy of unification, the MRG targeted the Canadian Forces’ strong service identity. The MRG was highly critical of norms and values that, in their view, had a negative impact on the management of Canadian defence. In this assertion, the MRG was often referring to the military way of doing things. Specifically it noted that:

...operational (i.e.) land, sea, air and functional loyalties are often maintained at the expense of loyalty to the organization as a whole; a widespread acceptance of organizational accountability in lieu of individual accountability makes for ineffective and irresponsible performance...⁴³

Although the normative resistance remained relatively informal in nature, later, it was made explicit through the work of the 1980 Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces. This task force made explicit representations with respect to CF identity, specifically regarding institutional symbols and carriers. One example was the recommendation that the three environmental services re-adopt distinct uniforms. The task force also recommended that the navy rank nomenclature be recognized throughout the forces.⁴⁴ Other examples include the recommendation made that “further identification be provided in the Canadian Forces for environment, ship, squadron or unit (and) trade badges be authorized.”⁴⁵ Not all these recommendations were accepted, of course, but their existence in a written report generated by senior CF officers clearly indicated the importance of these symbols in the values and norms of this era. This emphasis on institutional carriers such as distinct uniforms in 1980 illustrated that the policies of unification and the defence policy of the 1970s that espoused a “joint” culture, were not accepted as legitimate.

GENERAL HILLIER’S CF TRANSFORMATION OF THE MID-2000S

The story of CF Transformation begins with Lieutenant General Rick Hillier’s selection for, and acceptance of, the position of Chief of Defence Staff in 2005. Unlike many of his predecessors, even before being appointed as CDS, General Hillier enjoyed an excellent relationship with the Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham.⁴⁶ By gaining his support, Hillier established CF Transformation as a military-led initiative, unlike the previous change initiatives.

After consulting a number of key military players in Canada, on 18 October 2005 Hillier issued his CDS Planning Guidance for CF Transformation. In this document he issued his intent to create a Canadian Forces that was “...more effective, relevant and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased...”⁴⁷ Hillier also emphasized the integration of the three traditional services and special operations forces and the establishment of “...new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system.”⁴⁸ Finally, Hillier identified six principles to lead the CF Transformation:

- a. loyalty first to Canada and the Canadian Forces;

- b. command and control structures to be designed for optimal decision making;
- c. clear assignment of authorities and accountabilities for commanders;
- d. operation-focus;
- e. leadership emphasizing mission command philosophy; and
- f. optimization of regular, reserve and civilian personnel's skills and competency through integration.⁴⁹ As one can appreciate, issues surrounding efficacy and efficiency are, once again, at heart of this change initiative.

REGULATIVE DIMENSION

Similar to Hellyer and MacDonald, General Hillier intended on restructuring the CF command structure as part of CF Transformation. He also used the power of his position to advance CF Transformation in the face of resistance. The establishment of new operational command structure was designed to optimize operational decision-making and support in accordance with Hillier's intent and principles described above. This was, however, only made possible by reducing the power of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS), the heads of the three "services", by circumscribing the ECS primary function to Force Generation,⁵⁰ i.e. training at the formation level.

Whilst not as aggressive as Hellyer's "Golden Handshake" policy, Hillier used his authorities and structural changes to adjust the senior officer cadre. For instance, Hillier believed the merit process of the CF was overly



Source: Combat Camera
AR2011-0238-013

Brigadier General Dean Milner, the Commander of Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (JTF-Afg), speaks during the lowering of the Canadian Flag Ceremony at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City, signifying the end of Canada's contribution (both military and civilian) to the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team

driven by formula and not subjective enough.⁵¹ Accordingly, he set about changing the merit system at the executive level and shaping the General and Flag Officer Corps to suit his vision of CF Transformation. As a result a number of senior officers retired, many of whom took an early retirement. Hillier certainly used succession planning as a regulative measure to further his policy of CF Transformation, thereby putting stress on the traditional power base within the Canadian Forces, specifically at the executive officer level. Once more, someone was directly attacking the powerbase of the heads of “service” and used his authority to remove those who resisted.

COGNITIVE DIMENSION

Having gained the support of the politicians, Hillier communicated CF Transformation to his subordinate general and flag officers at his initial seminar in February 2005. The initial reception was very positive and enthusiastic.⁵² His subordinate officers were excited by the prospect of change; the creation of a CF that was more modern and relevant was accepted, i.e. to become more effective and efficient.

This common view did not last, however. As early as the second general and flag officer seminar in June 2005, senior officers began to voice concerns over Hillier’s proposed vision.⁵³ The navy and air force were particularly apprehensive about the vision as it focused on failed states, and primarily involved land operations. The belief that Hillier’s vision was “army-centric” was present from the onset.⁵⁴ As a result, Hillier ended up adjusting his vision subsequent to his May 2007 general and flag officer seminar in order to make it more inclusive of the other “services,” but momentum amongst his senior officers had clearly been lost as mistrust was by then deeply entrenched. Once more, if efficiency was generally accepted as a driving principle, efficacy was defined very differently in each of the three armed “services.”

NORMATIVE DIMENSION

Like the previous change initiatives, Hillier also attacked identities found in the CF. Although Hillier is often considered as having instilled renewed pride in the CF and having restored its warrior ethos, he also created a number of institutional tensions. He wanted to rebuild traditional ties between the army, navy and air force as well as build new ties with the Canadian public. Hillier used a strategy called “Recruit the Nation” to accomplish this connection between the Canadian public and the CF.⁵⁵ He also wanted to re-establish the fact that the Canadian Forces was different from other departments in public service because the job of the CF was to kill people if necessary. In other words, he wanted to put back “real soldiering” in front and centre of the institution.

Hillier went on to conduct an aggressive campaign of activities such as CF appearances at sporting events and “support the troops” rallies. As a result, the Canadian Forces were raised from relative obscurity to become the focus of attention at the national level.⁵⁶ Hillier’s campaign was a success. Christie Blatchford noted that many of the soldiers had the opinion that General Hillier “made it respectable to be a soldier again.”⁵⁷ Yet, his greater goal of re-engineering CF culture to one loyal to Canada and the CF above the “services” and units would prove more difficult. In the Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Structure, it was noted that “...while the organizational dimension of Transformation is progressing reasonably well, a key element of the Transformation Process—specifically culture change is not.”⁵⁸ The report noted that the Canadian Forces culture still contained “a considerable degree of parochialism and, in some cases, an even more serious lack of trust confidence and respect.”⁵⁹

There were further indicators of the resistance of the independent “services” to CF Transformation. The ECS were concerned about the reduction in their own status in the new operational command structure that was created.⁶⁰ The air force and navy were particularly concerned with Hillier’s vision that many perceived as too “army-centric.”⁶¹ There have also been other more recent indications of an enduring environmental service oriented culture within the Canadian Forces. In an interview with Television Ontario (TVO) on 2 November 2009, the Chief of Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral McFadden, stated that the Canadian Forces has necessarily grown the capacity to conduct land operations and supporting air mobility capabilities at the expense of developing maritime capabilities in order to support the effort in Afghanistan.⁶² The Vice-Admiral went on

to state that the navy has not been successful enough at “selling” its capabilities. Also the term “maritime blindness” has recently been used by senior Canadian navy officers to describe what they perceive as a lack of understanding and appreciation of the Canadian navy’s capabilities, both by the CF and the public.⁶³ There has also been a recent successful motion in the Parliament to resurrect the navy curl for naval officer ranks.⁶⁴ Interestingly, the naval uniform is also getting very close to appearing as it did before the 1960s unification.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

It is a common idea in Canadian strategic studies that the country is in a relatively benign geostrategic environment and that it can count on the security guarantees of the last superpower, the United States of America. This perception appears also to be well-entrenched within Canadian society. What is often forgotten; however, is that it has significant implications for the CF in maintaining its institutional legitimacy within Canadian society. To put it crudely, the CF is implicitly perceived as an expensive optional tool for the state. This issue comes up time and again, and was well illustrated by the Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff’s vow to cancel the purchase of F-35 jet fighters, as he stated that “they [the Conservative government] were sent out to buy a Chevrolet and they brought back a Ferrari.”⁶⁵

It is no surprise, therefore, that change initiatives in the CF have all focused on finding efficiencies and increasing efficacy. Yet, this institutional analysis showed that if increasing efficiency was a principle also shared within the military institution, the notion of efficacy was a much more complex one. On a cognitive level, from Hellyer to MacDonald to Hillier, the institutional view was that each “service” has a unique expertise and competency, and therefore it cannot simply be reduced in lieu of another. In other words, economies of scale cannot be made among qualitatively different capabilities. This argument is certainly defensible, and given the relatively small size of the CF, this issue is certainly more acute.

But it appears; however, that it is at the normative level where the greatest source of resistance to “reformulating” efficacy is found. The deep sense of identity found in the CF, based on the notion that military institutional legitimacy is also based on the unique competency that the profession of arms bring to the Canadian society, is shattered when someone else tells the military what “real soldiering” means. If in the cases of Hellyer and MacDonald it was coming from civilians, in the case of Hillier it was perceived as coming from one particular corner of the institution, i.e. the army. In the end, the effect was the same; the sense of belonging to a “service” is a component of CF military identity that runs very deep, even forty years after the official unification of the forces.

This context validates once more a key hypothesis of institutional theory; that an institution will only change if it has no other option. In all three change initiatives, the only way to introduce change was to rely on regulative legitimacy by using “forcefully” legal authority. Given that the CF is very loyal to the Canadian state, it was the only legitimate avenue available to change the institution. Yet, given that these change initiatives are not perceived as legitimate within the institution at the cognitive and normative level, the transformations were only partially effected.

Although a well-planned military change initiative, as the rational decision-making model predicts, may appear the central condition for success, when it comes to the military institution, factors outside the rational realm are significantly more important for success that one may realize. This institutional view should give sobering thoughts to those who are planning the next change exercise for the CF at some point in the near future. 🌹

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UN SANCTIONS AND THE MILITARY MISSIONS: Implications for the Canadian Forces

Mrs. Andrea Charron, PhD

Many conflicts in the world are addressed with sanctions and a mission, yet little thought is given to the interaction of these tools to address instability in the world. Do they conflict with or do they complement each other, or is there simply a permanent state of disconnect between the two? This article focuses narrowly on the application of United Nations (UN) mandatory sanctions and missions (peacekeeping and enforcement) and asks: what are the implications for the Canadian Forces (CF)?

This article is organized in three parts. First, it will investigate the application of sanctions—especially the changes to sanctions as a tool of coercion for the Security Council (or Council). Next, sanctions shall be related to military missions—a connection that is rarely made in the literature, at the UN or within armed forces organizations. Finally, but most importantly, this article shall discuss why any of this may matter for the CF.

PART 1: UN SANCTIONS AND ARTICLE 41

Article 41 of the *Charter of the United Nations* states:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

When faced with a conflict, the Security Council has five options. The first is to do nothing. The second is for the Council to recommend peaceful methods of dispute settlement as outlined in Chapter VI of the *Charter*. The final three options, however, are special because they all fall within Chapter VII of the *Charter* that encompasses actions only the Security Council can decide be taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Further, states are obligated to take the necessary action to give these measures effect. Once the Security Council has decided that a crisis is of such a nature that it damages or endangers international peace and security under Article 39, the Council may:

1. invoke Article 40 and call upon the parties concerned to comply with provisional measures the Council deems necessary; and/or
2. invoke Article 41 and adopt measures “short of force”; and/or
3. invoke Article 42 and apply measures that include the application of armed force.

This article focuses on Article 41—or measures short of force. While there is no reference to the term “sanctions” in the *Charter*, Articles 41 and 42 measures adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII can be and are referred to as “sanctions.” However, academics and practitioners now apply the term “sanctions” exclusively to those measures adopted under Article 41. Even within this narrower classification, only those measures that involve an “interruption” of economic or diplomatic relations by states vis-à-vis another state or actor are considered “sanctions.” According to the International Law Commission, sanctions are:

reactive measures applied by virtue of a decision taken by an international organization following a breach of an international obligation having serious consequences for the international community as a whole, and in particular ... certain measures which the United Nations is empowered to adopt, under the system established by the Charter, with a view to the maintenance of international peace and security.¹

VOLUNTARY VERSUS MANDATORY SANCTIONS

There are two types of sanctions regimes that the Council may authorize. One is voluntary or “hortatory” meaning that states have the option to apply the measures or not. Therefore, they have the look and feel of a sanctions regime, but are not obligatory. The other, and more common, is mandatory in which, by international law, states must apply the necessary legislation and measures to give effect to the Council measures short of force; sanctions have no legs until states put in place the necessary rules and legislation. Applying the sanctions is not the job of the Security Council—a common misperception.

Voluntary sanctions have been (mostly) ignored by the literature for a variety of reasons. The first is that the term sanction has been reserved, almost exclusively, for mandatory measures called for by the Security Council. The second reason has to do with the difficulty in categorizing voluntary regimes as they require a much closer reading into the circumstances under which the Security Council resolution was adopted—they are not as standardized as their mandatory cousins. Third, there are far fewer voluntary regimes than mandatory regimes, and so, there is not a significant sampling to analyse independently of mandatory sanctions. Finally, as voluntary regimes are often ignored by sender states and because the literature is focused on “effectiveness,” there has been less impetus to analyse them. Therefore, voluntary sanctions regimes have been left out of the discussions on sanctions in the literature. They remain an option for the Council nevertheless. For example, there was a voluntary arms embargo placed against Yemen in 1994 and Afghanistan in 1996 to address the internal instability within these states.² Voluntary sanctions can also become mandatory—as was the case for sanctions against South Africa,³ Southern Rhodesia,⁴ Ethiopia and Eritrea,⁵ and, some would argue, against North Korea.⁶



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The most commonly applied sanctions (voluntary or mandatory) are the arms embargo that includes a ban on ammunition and its related delivery mechanisms. Indeed, only one mandatory UN sanctions regime did not have an arms embargo—diplomatic and travel sanctions imposed against Sudan for its support to the assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.⁷ Ironically, Egypt was a nonpermanent member of the Council at the time and influenced greatly the scope of sanctions placed against Sudan.

Of late there has been a shift in targeting. Rather than blanketing an entire state with an arms embargo, they are applied, increasingly, to target either a specific group or certain individuals. This makes it, paradoxically, much harder to monitor and verify the effectiveness of sanctions because of their selectivity. If they target the right actor—for example a “Viktor Bout”⁸ aka “the sanctions buster” (a well-known arms dealer)—the Council may have an impact by targeting particular individuals. However, as the UN has no intelligence service and depends on the input of member states, pinpointing the right individuals to target can be problematic—especially if the permanent five members (P5) are not engaged or interested. In the absence of targeting the “right” people, enforcement of the sanctions (ensuring weapons, parts and precursor agents are not delivered to the sanctioned state) becomes very important.

The second most applied sanctions are travel bans and financial asset freezes against individuals. But again there has been a change. Rather than applying them against the elite as was once done, for example against the “government of Iraq”⁹ or “senior officials of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and adult members of their immediate families,”¹⁰ they are now placed against individuals who



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may have no leadership role. Note that the Council avoids naming sitting heads of state for sanctions¹¹—even in the case of the financial and travel bans against Saddam Hussein (former President of Iraq) and former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, they had already “stepped down” from their offices before the sanctions were put in place naming them specifically rather than lumping them into the wider category of “senior members of the government” of Iraq or Liberia.

PART 2: MISSIONS AND SANCTIONS

There is no equivalent *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello* rules of sanctions application as apply to the use of force. In the 1990s, of course, this was the cause of much concern prompting articles in *Foreign Affairs* entitled “Sanctions of Mass Destruction”¹² because of the devastating impact of comprehensive sanctions applied against Iraq. And while the Council made a commitment to minimize the unintended adverse side effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries,¹³ the only rules governing the application of sanctions are that the requisite number of Security Council votes be achieved (9 yes votes out of a possible 15 and no vetoes cast by the P5) and that the sanctions measures be in line with the purpose and principles of the

UN. The permissive nature of the text—note that article 41 says “may include” and “may decide” coupled with a suggested but not prescriptive list of measures—allows the Council to be as creative as it wishes in deciding what actions may be taken. For example, in addition to sanctions, the Council has created international tribunals,¹⁴ working committees,¹⁵ investigative commissions¹⁶ and a compensation fund,¹⁷ all pursuant to Article 41. On the one hand, the permissive nature of the text is an advantage for the Council—it is neither bound nor constrained by a preset list nor is it required to undergo judicial oversight or seek external authority. The Council is the executive, legislature and judiciary of the UN. On the other hand, many have criticized the Council for taking on a law-making role that is beyond the confines of the *Charter*.

This article focuses on the mandatory sanctions only. In the requisite Security Council resolution, it usually states that the Council is acting under Chapter VII and that it “decides that” certain sanctions are adopted. The Council has applied sanctions to address four types of conflicts—interstate, intrastate, “rogue” states or international norm-breakers and terrorism. The number of mandatory sanctions regime since 1990 per conflict category is provided in Table 1.

CATEGORY OF CONFLICT	NUMBER OF MANDATORY UN SANCTIONS REGIMES SINCE 1990	STATES TARGETED
Interstate	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Iraq I and III for invasion of Kuwait · Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) I vs Bosnia-Herzegovina · Ethiopia vs Eritrea
Intrastate	13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Former Yugoslavia—before dissolution · Somalia (and now Eritrea—support to rebel groups in Somalia and Djibouti) · Liberia I · FRY II—Bosnian Serb party · Haiti · Angola—UNITA · Rwanda · Sierra Leone · Kosovo · Liberia II · Democratic Republic of the Congo · Liberia III · Côte d'Ivoire
Rogue or International Norm-Breaking States	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Iraq II—weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) · Sudan II—human rights' abuses (intrastate too) · Iraq III—WMDs continued · North Korea—WMDs · Iran—WMDs · Libya II—human rights' abuses
Terrorism	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Libya I—terrorism · Sudan I—terrorism · 1267 and 1988 Sanctions Committees—Al Qaeda and Taliban (note, while there have always been two separate sanctions lists, there are now two separate sanctions regimes) · Hariri assassination

Table 1: Mandatory Sanctions Regimes since 1990

Intrastate conflicts represent half of the sanctions regimes. This is in line with the Council's preoccupation with intrastate conflicts generally and Africa specifically. Of the 13 sanctions regimes, 9 address a civil war in Africa. Terrorism represents the newest category of sanctions regimes in line with the latest preoccupation of the Council. It is not inconceivable that a new category of "conflicts" shall be addressed in the future with sanctions—for example, to address over fishing, pollution or a phenomenon like piracy.

The Security Council is much maligned as anachronistic and ineffective, but sanctions are one area where it shows not only commitment but also a growing understanding of conflicts generally. Today all sanctions are targeted, and they have been applied to tackle additional objectives above-and-beyond ending hostilities. Sanctions are applied to coerce parties to return to the bargaining table,¹⁸ to end hateful radio broadcasts,¹⁹ to end the recruitment of child soldiers²⁰ and to induce governments to manage natural resources better;²¹ indeed, the Council understands intuitively that lootable natural resources are an incendiary catalyst to the flame of armed conflict. The Council has therefore reaffirmed its:

determination to take action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict.²²

In the future, it is likely that the Council will need to consider sanctioning other natural resources. For example, warring militias in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are stealing and selling livestock to finance the war and to buy munitions.²³ Côte d'Ivoire's most lucrative industries include cocoa and cotton as well as diamonds.²⁴ And in Somalia, sanctions experts noted that charcoal and fish were exploited by rebels to finance their activities.²⁵ Endangered animals are fast becoming the new "blood diamonds"—ivory being particularly valuable.²⁶

Targeted sanctions have as their goal the limitation of humanitarian consequences to the civilian population. While laudable in theory, this may have tied the Council's hands to some degree. For example, although the US had been calling for more coercive measures to be applied against Iran in the form of a petroleum ban—Iran is so dependent on refined oil imports, it has been deemed too costly for the general population and not likely to be endorsed by the Security Council (read China), but rather applied unilaterally, which may lessen the impact and bite.

The Security Council is applying sanctions differently in different conflict contexts. For example, in the case of interstate conflicts, the sanctions are applied before troops are on the ground; in fact, the sanctions often signal that force is imminent and represent a ratcheting-up of coercion. The sanctions are applied to stop the hostilities and induce the parties to the bargaining table. In contrast, sanctions applied in an intrastate context come after a regional group (such as Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] or the Organization of American States [OAS]) has negotiated a peace agreement and troops are on the ground. A peace-breaking event (e.g., another coup attempt, for example), then draws in the Security Council to apply sanctions to ensure parties return to the terms of the original peace agreement. The sanctions also remain in place for many years after even into the post-conflict phase. For example, an arms embargo, travel ban and financial asset freeze against individuals in Liberia are still active. Similar forms of sanctions have been in place since 1992 and remain even though the country is no longer at war and democratic elections have taken place. As well, the Council increasingly is mandating the UN or UN-blessed peacekeeping mission on the ground to monitor and enforce the sanctions.

In a rogue context, sanctions are often the only coercive measures applied. Therefore, the sanctions are a stick to prompt talks, which then becomes a carrot to (perhaps) lift sanctions, which then becomes a stick again when talks breakdown. While it seems an endless (some would say pointless) cycle, it meets the immediate objective of preventing the deployment or retaliation of WMD. Force is not usually an option for the Security Council for a variety of reasons—not the least of which is political. The recent application of sanctions and the mandate to apply force against Qadhafi's regime in Libya is the glaring exception. The hope is that other abusive leaders around the world (especially Assad in Syria) are taking note.



In a terrorism context there is no consistency of application of force and/or sanctions; in half of the cases force is applied while in the other half only sanctions are mandated. However, there is little connection between the application of force and sanctions—it is as if the tools are deployed in parallel with little reference or thought to the other.

This apparent pattern or sequencing of sanctions and the application of force in different conflict contexts raises two fundamental questions: 1) Does this sequencing matter to the reestablishment of peace? (i.e., is the sequencing optimizing chances for peace or are the sanctions and force randomly applied vis-à-vis the other) and 2) What are the consequences for the troops on the ground generally and the CF specifically?



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The answer to the first question is a tentative “maybe.” Every UN sanctions regime in force today to address an armed conflict (inter or intrastate) has a mission twin. The range in scope and depth of the connection between these twins is variable. In the case of interstate conflicts, the pattern of sanctions first followed by force or UN mission is a logical response to the kinetics of the conflict—often unexpected attacks by one army against another. For example, the comprehensive sanctions applied against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reinforced by the authorization “of all necessary means” to ensure the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina was protected.²⁷ This authorization was later provided to prevent the trans-shipment of arms and other banned goods via the roads and rivers. In the case of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, there was a total disconnect between the sanctions regime and the UN mission. On the one hand, applying

sanctions first prior to the use of deadly force, as in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, seems to make sense; the sanctions afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply with the resolutions and avoid a fight against coalition forces. On the other hand, if states know that force is imminent, there is little incentive to comply with the demands tied to the sanctions.

In the case of intrastate conflicts and despite the fact that there are many different kinds of intrastate conflicts (civil wars, coups, ethnic rivalries etc.), more often than not a UN-blessed mission is on the ground prior to the application of sanctions. At least in the case of African conflicts, the fact that regional troops are on the ground prior to the Council's involvement via sanctions reflects the relative speed and engagement of African regional groups. UN sanctions are a stick applied against the parties who stray from the regional peace agreements / ceasefires in place. However, as the Council was not involved in negotiating the terms and conditions of the peace agreement / ceasefire, the sanctions may be reinforcing a poorly conceived deal. Applying an arms embargo, and the trend is to apply them against individuals and not the state, after a civil war has been raging is a bit like closing the proverbial barn door after the animals have escaped. The most tragic case, of course, was the application of an arms embargo against Rwanda *after* the genocide had taken place despite pleas from the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) for the Security Council to authorize more coercive measures. That being said, there have been some successes. Liberia is the outstanding example of how sanctions and missions can work to achieve relative calm. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was authorized to enforce the sanctions (arms, travel, diamond and timber sanctions) and establish conditions to hold elections.

In the case of rogues and terrorism, there is often very little connection between the missions and the sanctions other than in limited ways. For example, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was instrumental in identifying WMD in Iraq. However, coalition forces in the first (1991) and second (beginning in 2003) Gulf wars had very little connection to or concern for the sanctions. In the case of Afghanistan, the Security Council initially authorized states to ban the export of the chemical acetic anhydride (used to convert opium into heroin) to Taliban-controlled areas.²⁸ This sanction may have proved potentially helpful for the International Security Assistance Force in later years—at the very least to track who was shipping and receiving the chemical—but priorities and attention shifted, and this sanction was all but forgotten.

PART 3: CONSEQUENCES FOR SOLDIERS GENERALLY AND THE CANADIAN FORCES SPECIFICALLY

But now to the second question: what are the consequences for the troops on the ground and the CF specifically?

A common problem with sanctions and the soldiers who occupy the same “space” is that verifying, monitoring and enforcing sanctions are a police matter, not a military one. However, the majority of UN missions are either led by regional groups, like the African Union (AU), or are made up of troops from Africa or Asia that do not often deploy police officers (and they are deployed to countries lacking the concomitant judiciary to process the lawbreakers). Complicating all of this is that various conflicts are subject to different sanctions regimes simultaneously—the Security Council's, AU's, European Union's (EU), even unilateral regimes—making it extremely confusing on the ground. Moreover, the sanctions regimes rarely match in objectives and measures—often the regional sanctions are more biting than the UN's, but the UN is blamed/credited for these sanctions.²⁹ Finally, the very fact that sanctions are applied impacts aid and development work—aid can be viewed as a positive or negative form of sanction itself and/or aid is driven away because of the difficulty of complying with or being exempt from the various sanctions in place.

All of these complications are manifested in the mission on the ground. Not only are the mandates and rules of engagement (ROE) of missions expanding (from actively ending hostilities, to aiding with elections, to delivering aid, to enforcing sanctions), but the mission itself may be impaired by the sanctions (from difficulties getting access to the necessary equipment because the sanctions came after the troops were on the ground [and so the Security Council has to adopt another resolution specifically exempting the troops

from the sanctions],³⁰ to being overburdened with too many expectations with too few resources and lacking, in some cases, the necessary skill sets to complete the tasks assigned—especially regional military organizations).

Most problematic is the optics on the ground for peacekeepers (with a mandate to use force only in self-defence) but responsible for enforcing a Chapter VII tool—sanctions. The impartiality that is the security blanket for the UN mission is then severely compromised when they must enforce sanctions that are applied in nearly all cases against only one party or particular individuals to the conflict. Add to this the confluence of black markets to “facilitate” banned goods with the poor allowances of the majority of soldiers deployed on UN missions from Asia and Africa and the sanctions become rather meaningless. The dynamics on the ground become more complicated with these new “entrepreneurs” and/or the conflict can spread into neighbouring states as new shipping routes for banned items are sought. Salaries of soldiers, porous borders and complicit neighbouring states are constant challenges to the effectiveness of sanctions.

Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor and enforce the UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were heralded as the model for future enforcement missions. In the case of the 757 sanctions regime, all states were authorized to halt inward and outward-bound maritime shipping for inspection of banned items.³¹ Rather than mandating the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the International Conference and its Contact Group were to determine whether or not the border between the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina was “secure.”³² SAMs were instrumental in preventing illicit items from crossing the borders. Customs experts from various EU countries were sent to bordering states in an advisory capacity. SAMs were operating in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Romania by the end of 1992 and in Albania, Croatia and Ukraine by February, 1993. In addition, the European Commission formed a Sanctions Assistance Communications Centre in Brussels and created the position of a sanctions coordinator. Through a direct connection to the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee, customs officers in neighbouring countries were able to verify what commodities had and had not been approved by the Committee. Further, the Western European Union established a Danube Patrol Mission to enforce the sanctions, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would later assist. According to the Copenhagen Roundtable on United Nations Sanctions, in the case of the Former Yugoslavia:

This unprecedented formula of coordinated, inter-institutions, international cooperative effort to assist states in their observance of mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council may have been a decisive fact in making these measures a valuable and effective policy instrument in the graduated response to international peace and security in this case.³³

Despite the success of SAM, such measures have not been adopted for other UN sanctions regime. Instead, the Council has authorized member states to stop and search cargo and vessels en route to a target state.³⁴ This may ratchet up the level of tension: it is one thing to insist that the shipping companies, insurance agents and customs officials verify, track and inspect cargo at border points; it is quite another to seize a ship at sea.

At the global level, the other issue of concern is the number of human rights challenges being launched (30 in all across the world) as a result of the application of UN sanctions—mostly associated with the 1267 Al Qaeda and 1988 Taliban sanctions regime.³⁵ Improper listing or delisting of individuals and entities complicates the ability of peacekeepers, police and border guards to enforce the sanctions. The Swiss for example, actively debated the legality of the 1267 financial sanctions regime in parliament because of the lack of habeas corpus, right of appeal, right of property and judicial review. As they are a major banking power, a decision not to enforce the sanctions would be problematic.

Nowhere, however, is the clash of sanctions and missions starker than in the recent cases involving Libya and Afghanistan. The application of sanctions and force against Libya is like no other case to date, and yet, it may be repeated in the future. Supporters of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine believe this to be “the”

case to operationalize (finally, in their estimation) R2P. However, despite the fact that the application of force and the application of sanctions were approved within days of each other and by the Security Council, there is very little connection between the two; in fact, they may be working at cross-purposes complicating the mission for NATO forces.

On 26 February 2011, the Security Council unanimously authorized the following sanctions pursuant to resolution 1970 in response to the violence (“the gross and systematic violation of human rights”) committed by Libyan authorities against the Libyan people:

1. an arms embargo and other arms restrictions
 - a. All states are prohibited to provide any kind of arms to Libya.
 - b. All states are prohibited from allowing the transit to Libya of mercenaries.
 - c. Libya is prohibited from exporting any arms to any other state.
 - d. States are called upon to inspect suspicious cargo that may contain arms. When such arms are found, states are required to seize and dispose of them.
 - e. All states are called on to strongly discourage their nationals from travelling to Libya to contribute to human rights violations.
2. targeted sanctions against key figures
 - a. Seventeen Qadhafi loyalists are subject to an international travel ban.
 - b. Six of these individuals, including Qadhafi himself and his immediate family members, are also subject to a freeze of their assets.
 - c. The Security Council commits to ensure that any frozen assets will be made available to benefit the people of Libya.
 - d. A Sanctions Committee is established to impose targeted sanctions on additional individuals and entities who commit serious human rights abuses, including ordering attacks and aerial bombardments on civilian populations or facilities.



A few weeks later, on 17 March 2011, the Council adopted resolution 1973 (with five notable abstentions from China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil) due to the failure of Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970. Resolution 1973 authorized member states: “to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (para 4), “to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians” (para 6) and “to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited” (para 13).



Source: Combat Camera
HS2011-E001-009

Leading Seaman (LS) Mikael Tardif hoists the NATO Flag as HMCS Charlottetown joins Standing NATO Maritime Group 1

Very soon, however, the disconnect between resolution 1970 and 1973 came into stark relief as the NATO coalition began to make plans to give effect to the demands of the Council. Could Libyan rebels be exempted from the blanket arms embargo against the state of Libya? How could the sanctions be enforced on the ground if a “foreign occupation force” was excluded? What about banning Qadhafi’s access to the oil fields and petroleum products? Why were plane parts and technical assistance not banned from Libya if a “no-fly zone” was in place? Clearly, the ability of NATO soldiers to apply resolution 1970 and 1973 was confounded (at the very least, complicated) by the fact that the resolutions (unwittingly) were working at cross-purposes.

The other case to consider is Afghanistan where the 1267/1988 regimes (Al Qaeda, Taliban and associates)—once a geographically limited UN sanctions regime, now with a global reach, it is raising much controversy. First, in keeping with the trend toward applying only targeted sanctions, the current arms, travel and financial sanctions apply against individuals and entities only—not the state. A voluntary arms embargo was in place in 1996 pursuant to resolution 1076 against the “parties” involved in a then-intrastate war, but never a blanket ban against the entire country. Perhaps anticipating the future, the Council also reiterated its concern in 1996 that the conflict in Afghanistan at that time: “Provide[d] a fertile ground for terrorism and drug trafficking which destabilize the region and beyond, and *calls upon* the leaders of the Afghan parties to halt such activities.”³⁶ (Emphasis in original).

Second, the Security Council is under pressure to delist more individuals from the Taliban list. This pressure has been growing steadily in the lead up to elections held in Afghanistan and as NATO troops end combat missions. The balance that must be struck for the Council is to delist moderate Taliban that are likely to be members of future Afghan governments but not to delist radical Taliban or Taliban

with very limited connections or leadership potential. If Taliban with little leadership potential are delisted, it may be the right thing to do morally speaking, but that goodwill is not likely to be extended into the wider-Taliban community. Contrariwise, if radicals are delisted, then they have renewed access to funds to relaunch offensives. Indeed, so great has been the pressure to target the right people, that the Council has finally separated the sanctions applied against the Taliban versus Al Qaeda. First, one group was never representative of the other. Second, different considerations and information are needed in listing individuals and entities from either group. Finally, it demonstrates that after 10 years, the Council has learned something about the targeting of individuals; mega lists are rarely useful. Beyond the Afghanistan context, the pressure on the Security Council to improve its delisting procedures has been so intense that an office of the ombudsperson, which replaced a focal point, has been created to receive communication from individuals who feel they have been wrongly listed, but not to adjudicate their case.

The Canadian government has met its international obligations vis-à-vis the 1970 and 1267/1988 regimes. As well, Canada has passed additional regulations against Libya under its *Special Economics Measures Act*.³⁷ Further, there is nothing to stop NATO member states from adopting additional sanctions beyond those applied by the Security Council (for example, to stop or limit the trade in fertilizers and semtex [improvised explosive device incendiary materials] by member states to Afghanistan and Libya). All states, including Canada, can work to implement regulations to give effect to UN sanctions quicker. For example, sanctions against Eritrea were required by the Security Council on December 23, 2009 pursuant to resolution 1907—the corresponding Canadian regulations came into effect at the end of April 2010.³⁸ If Canada continues to average about four months to prepare the necessary legislation despite having one of the most professional bureaucracies in the world,³⁹ what chance is there that fragile states be able to apply the necessary legislation faster, if at all? Four months is ample lead-time to squirrel away assets to unreachable safe havens—indeed, it may even serve to focus and prompt such activity.

The clash of force versus sanctions objectives may be particularly problematic when one considers the population-centric, counter-insurgency strategy NATO forces have adopted. While it may not be a direct clash, but an indirect one, the unintended side effects need to be considered. The approach of the CF and NATO forces is to interact with the locals—mainly via the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the counter-insurgency doctrine—to gain their trust and work with them to oust the Taliban. With sanctions still in place—especially targeting the Taliban—there may be built-in mistrust for NATO, which is often confused as one-and-the-same with the UN and assumed to be far more integrated with Security Council decision making than is the case. For example, the US is the lead of both the P5 and NATO. This may add to the mistrust of Afghans toward NATO forces generally. Perhaps minor in many cases, but if you are a Taliban or al Qaeda member who cannot travel internationally and cannot access funds because of the UN sanctions (which can also impact family members living in other states), your only target may be the coalition forces (and civilian counterparts) and/or to set up shop in a country that does not implement UN sanctions thus transferring the problem to other fragile states. The Taliban is not adverse to promoting propaganda that links the UN sanctions to NATO and exaggerating their impact on the general Afghan population.

The other problem is that just as aid is often confused with the sanctions regimes, the PRTs can be viewed as a form of negative or positive sanction—promised PRT projects not funded or completed for a variety of reasons may be viewed by Afghans as a form of sanction, which has a much more nefarious connotation than simply logistical/funding problems. To what extent this is the case is not known. Further, how many cases have there been of forces (around the world and in any peacekeeping/enforcement context) ignoring violations of UN sanctions regimes because it furthers (or rather does not complicate) military strategic ends? Are the unintended consequences of such actions considered?

So what are the consequences of the continued application of UN sanctions regimes for the CF? First, sanctions remain the Security Council's tool of choice to deal with international instability. It will continue to employ them, especially in an intrastate capacity. Of the 12 sanctions regimes in place today, 6 apply against Africa and have an intrastate conflict element.

Canada has traditionally been a supporter of sanctions applied by international organizations. Canadians Robert Fowler, David Malone, Margaret Doxey, Paul Heinbecker and David Angell have been instrumental in studying, promoting and improving the application of sanctions in multilateral contexts. As well, the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN is helping to finance a project to facilitate communication between UN panels of sanctions experts. Sanctions are likely to remain on the UN agenda and, therefore, be part of Canada's foreign policy calculus.

So how likely is it that sanctions will impact Canada Forces' missions in the future? The answer is very likely. Sanctions and missions (enforcement and peacekeeping missions) seem to go hand-in-hand, even though little thought is given to how they interact. The Security Council and regional organizations continue to apply sanctions and missions. Every UN sanctions regime today (save Iran and North Korea) has a corresponding mission. And even though Canada has sent more troops in support of NATO-led enforcement missions than in support of UN peacekeeping missions since approximately 1990, sanctions have applied in parallel to all of these missions. Therefore, no matter in what type of mission the CF participates (be it "peacekeeping missions" [robust and/or the classic form] or peace-enforcement missions) sanctions will be a feature of the mission—explicitly or implicitly. Further, the CF will have very little



Source: Combat Camera
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say in the types of sanctions applied by the UN.⁴⁰ It may, however, have more say in what additional sanctions Canada, NATO or other organizations apply. For example, US General Petraeus' focus on fighting corruption in Afghanistan is a form of sanctions. However, because sanctions are so widely linked to arms embargoes and travel bans and generally misunderstood, initiatives like it are not considered in a "sanctions" light.

Finally, the CF works with other states that have either enacted separate sanctions (e.g., the US often applies additional measures) and/or have different protocols vis-à-vis the monitoring of sanctions and/or different priorities with respect to the sanctions—all of these difference could be at odds with Canadian ROEs and/or Canadian regulations.

But, the question must be asked if sanctions are even on the CF's radar screen? Especially as Canada continues to promote a whole of government approach to international security situations, sanctions could be an extra tool for the CF / Royal Canadian Mounted Police / Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade—to seize arms, prevent graft, stop the sale in raw material for improvised explosive devices, prevent war criminals from travelling etc. Sanctions could also be a nuisance—just another task on a long list of things to do or another report to fill out. Or worst of all, sanctions could prove detrimental to the mission—undermining the goodwill between local civilians and the CF or working at cross-purposes, as is the case of Libya. Are sanctions fully considered in operational plans? 🚩

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Prior to completing her PhD studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (Department of War Studies), she obtained a Masters' of Arts in International Relations from Webster University, Leiden, The Netherlands, a Master's of Public Administration from Dalhousie University and a Bachelor of Science (Honours) from Queen's University. Dr. Charron was a participant of Canada's Management Trainee Programme and worked for various federal departments including Canada's Revenue Agency, Canada's Customs Agency and the Privy Council Office (Security and Intelligence Secretariat) as a policy analyst. Andrea's book, *UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats*, explores the application of the UN Security Council's mandatory sanctions since 1946, and, in particular, the regimes adopted for specific types of conflict.

ENDNOTES

1. A definition given by the International Law Commission. See *Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 31st session* (1979), Doc. A/34/10, 115–122 at 121, para. 22.
2. S/RES/924 (1994) and S/RES/1076 (1996) respectively. Security Council resolutions are identified by their UN symbol, S/RES/, followed by the number of the resolution. Letters and reports to the Security Council are identified by S/the year/ and a number, and verbatim records of minutes of the Security Council are identified by S/PV and the meeting number. All UN documentation can be found on the UN's bibliographic site found at <http://unbisnet.un.org/>.
3. S/RES/181 (1963); S/RES/191 (1964); S/RES/282 (1970); S/RES/418 (1977)—made mandatory. Many more voluntary sanctions were applied until sanctions were lifted in 1994.
4. S/RES/216 (1965); S/RES/217 (1965); S/RES/221 (1966); S/RES/232 (1966)—made mandatory. Sanctions were lifted in 1979.
5. S/RES/1227 (1999); S/RES/1298 (2000)—made mandatory. Lifted in 2001.
6. Because the Council did not invoke Chapter VII specifically but stated that it was “acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” S/RES/1695 (2006) is interpreted as voluntary by some states, mandatory by most. S/RES/1718 (2006) removed all doubt specifically invoking Chapter VII and Article 41.
7. S/RES/1054 (1996).
8. Viktor Bout is named to the Liberia III sanctions regime for a travel and financial ban (S/RES/1521 [2003]) and was listed for the Liberia II sanctions regime (S/RES/1343 [2001]). While he was also accused of interfering in the civil war in Sierra Leone, he was not listed on the Sierra Leone travel ban list. He is now held in US custody facing trial on charges that stem from his alleged agreement to arm a terrorist group.
9. S/RES/661 (1990), para 4.
10. S/RES/1127 (1997) and S/RES/1173 (1998). Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's rebel leader was #140 on the list of 157 names for sanctions. All sanctions against UNITA were lifted in 2002.
11. Qadhafi is a glaring exception. However, many states now no longer recognize him as the legitimate leader of Libya.
12. Mueller, John and Karl Mueller. “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (May/June, 1999): p. 43–53.
13. “While recognizing the need to maintain the effectiveness of sanctions imposed in accordance with the Charter, further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.” UN Security Council letter from the P5 dated April 13, 1995 to the president of the Security Council. S/1995/300.
14. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
15. S/RES/1373 and S/RES/1540.
16. The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Darfur Commission).
17. The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) and the corresponding compensation fund.
18. 1) Former Yugoslavia (713 regime)—European Commission and Conference on Security and Cooperation conference on Yugoslavia (S/RES/713); 2) Liberia I (788 sanctions regime)—Yamoussoukro IV Accord (S/24815 and S/RES/788); 3) Haiti—Governor's Island Agreement (S/RES/861); 4) UNITA (Angola or 864 sanctions regime)—Accordos de Paz (S/RES/864); 5) Rwanda (918 sanctions regime)—Arusha Peace Agreement (S/RES/918); 6) Sierra Leone (or 1132 sanctions regime)—Abidjan Agreement (S/1996/1034 and S/RES/1132); 7) Liberia II (1343 sanctions regime)—fulfillment of the Yamoussoukro IV and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Five (S/RES/1343); 8) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1493 sanctions regime)—Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (S/RES/1493); 9) Liberia III (1521 sanctions regime)—Comprehensive Peace Agreement (S/RES/1521); and 10) Côte d'Ivoire (1572 sanctions regime)—Linass Marcoussis Agreement and Accra III Agreements (S/2003/99 and S/RES/1572).

19. Côte d'Ivoire – S/RES/1782 (2007). Unfortunately, the radio broadcasts in Rwanda that incited the genocide were not banned. This is evidence, however, that the Council is learning from past errors and omissions.
20. DRC–S/RES/1698 (2006).
21. UNITA (864)—diamonds; Sierra Leone (1132)—diamonds; Liberia II (1343)—diamonds and timber; Liberia III (1521)—diamonds and timber; Côte d'Ivoire (1572)—diamonds.
22. S/RES/1625 (2005): para 6 adopted after the Security Council's Heads of State-level meeting during the 2005 World Summit.
23. Halperin, Alex and Jina Moore. "In Congo, A New Twist on 'Blood Diamonds,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 27, 2008.
24. S/2005/699.
25. See S/2005/625, para 119 and S/2006/229, para 159.
26. Begley, Sharon. "Extinction Trade," *Newsweek*, March 1, 2008. Trafficked contraband like ivory fetches \$400 a pound, tiger parts—\$7,000 for a set of bones, rhino horns—up to \$25,000 per pound. Shark fins, exotic birds, reptile skin, etc. have reached \$10 billion a year and possibly twice that according to US State Department estimates.
27. S/RES/816, paras 1, 4.
28. S/RES/1333, para 10. This was authorized in 2000.
29. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) placed quite comprehensive sanctions (including a ban on agricultural products) against Burundi in 1996 after a coup. The Security Council did not mandate any sanctions but did endorse those of the OAU. Meanwhile, the regional mission in Burundi (MIOB) was left to deal with the growing anger of the people of Burundi who were running out of food supplies thus increasing tensions on the ground. When a UN mission for Burundi (ONUB) was authorized in 2004, the peacekeepers had a difficult time convincing the people they were there to "assist."
30. The timing of these resolutions is improved, and it is now widely accepted that the UN arms embargo do not apply to the UN or UN-blessed mission on the ground.
31. S/RES/787 (1992), paras 11 and 12.
32. S/PV.3612 (1995), p. 2–4.
33. *Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia*, held at Copenhagen on 24 and 25 June 1996. (Para. 5) S/1996/776. (September 24, 1996).
34. For example, the Security Council authorized Member States to halt inward maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations because of UN sanctions ordered against Southern Rhodesia, Haiti, the FRY and Iraq I and II.
35. Individuals and entities associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda were listed separately. The lists were administered by the 1267 Sanctions Committee. On 17 June 2011, the Security Council created a separate Committee—the 1988 Committee—to administer the Taliban list. (The 1267 Committee remains and is still responsible for the Al Qaeda list).
36. *Ibid.*, para. 5.
37. *The Special Economics Measures Act* authorizes the Governor in Council to make orders or regulations to impose sanctions measures in relation to a foreign state absent a UN resolution but in compliance with another international organization (e.g., If the Organization of American States (OAS) of which Canada is a member calls for sanctions) or "where the Governor in Council is of the opinion that a grave breach of international peace and security has occurred that has resulted or is likely to result in a serious international crisis." The *Area Control List (ACL)* is another regulation Canada can use to sanction states. Currently Myanmar (which is not subject to UN sanctions) is subject to the *Area Control List*. The ACL controls the export of any goods to the state in question.
38. See SOR/2010-84 (SOR is short form for official regulations). Entered into force April 22, 2010. The prorogation of Parliament did not and does not (legally) impact the Governor in Council's ability to adopt regulations. Therefore, the four-month average time frame remains the norm.
39. See a review of Canada's implementation of UN sanctions in Andrea Charron, "Canada's Domestic Implementation of UN Sanctions: Keeping Pace?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 14, no. 2 (2008): p.1–20 esp. 14.
40. A reason why membership on the Security Council is important. One cannot underestimate the role Canada has played, especially thanks to the work of Ambassador Robert Fowler, in how UN sanctions are monitored and enforced.



THE CANADIAN FORCES IN SOMALIA: An Operational Assessment

Ms. Katie Domansky

In the early 1990s, Canada contributed to the international intervention in Somalia, an African country devastated by internal conflict and famine. The intervention, sanctioned by the United Nations (UN), attempted to deal with a devastating food and resource shortage, to foster reconciliation among warring factions, and to promote national reconstruction. Although Canada achieved several significant operational successes while operating in Somalia, the experience was ultimately marred by controversy when Canadian troops were implicated in the widely publicized deaths of several Somali civilians. Those incidents led to accusations of racism within Canadian society and of systemic problems within the Canadian government and military, and they became a scandal which created a serious crisis of confidence in the Canadian Forces (CF).¹


Since the cessation of Canadian activities in Somalia, the specific achievements and failures of the Canadian contingent while operating there have become the focus of many analyses. While some scholars have used Canada's contribution to explore the changing nature of international peacekeeping and Canada's role within it, others focus specifically on the Somalia intervention, drawing conclusions regarding Canada's specific conduct.² The majority of the latter assessments have been extremely critical, focusing on the scandal and blaming Canadian commanders, troops in the field, and senior military leaders at home for Canadian failings.³ While many more positive reviews of Canadian actions have also been published, there is still no single piece of literature that evaluates the success of the Canadian mission in Somalia based simply on operational objectives achieved. This paper attempts to address this under-developed historiographical aspect of Canadian operations. Defining "success" as the fulfilment of the majority of tasks assigned, where any failures that did occur did not undermine the achievement of the stated objectives of each mission, it assesses Canada's overall success in Somalia by analyzing each operation that Canada participated in, comparing original goals and objectives with actual events and outcomes.

Ultimately, this paper argues that Canada's mission in Somalia was successful overall. While several serious incidents, including the abuse and murder of Somali civilians, certainly occurred and had an impact on the mission, they did not prevent Canadian forces from meeting their objectives as assigned at the outset of each operation. Specific and systemic Canadian failures in Somalia, especially those of a racist and violent nature, have been acknowledged and studied in Canada in an effort to identify underlying causes and to prevent their reoccurrence.⁴ This paper certainly recognizes these failures and shortcomings but considers them only in reference to their impact on the success of the overall mission. As the majority of Canadian objectives were achieved and often exceeded despite such failures, it must be concluded that the Canadian mission in Somalia was an *operational* success.

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA: A DISCUSSION

The literature devoted to the international intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is quite substantial, particularly studies on the role of the UN and the United States (US).⁵ Works specifically focused on the Canadian contribution, however, are significantly fewer in number. This trend is the result of several factors. First, the actual Canadian contributions to operations in Somalia were considerably fewer than those of the US or the combined contributions of UN member states. While Canadian involvement was substantial in terms of the capital and armed forces available to the country, it was quite limited relative to the role of the US and the UN as a whole. Second, the violent incidents involving Somali civilians and Canadian soldiers have certainly affected interest in Canadian activities. There were four incidents in particular in which civilians were injured or killed by Canadian forces; in one, a teenage boy named Shidane Arone was beaten and tortured to death.⁶ These incidents resulted in the government-appointed Somalia Commission of Inquiry and have had a negative impact on the way many Canadians view their country's role in the Somalia intervention. Evidence of this fact can be seen in the overwhelming focus within the Canadian literature on the episodes of violence. Most works discussing Canada and Somalia use the significant incidents as the foundation for their assessments.

The first of these works was published in 1996. Historian David Bercuson, in *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, discusses what he perceives as systemic problems inside the Canadian Armed Forces. Using the murder of the teenage Somali civilian as his focus, Bercuson analyzes the Canadian Army's regimental system, the changes it has endured in the post-World War II era, and the creation and development of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), which was sent to Somalia in 1992. He suggests that the murder in Somalia was the direct and inevitable result of the failure of "Canada's people, government, military, and specifically its army ... to keep real soldiers, combat effectiveness, and traditional military leadership at the centre of the Canadian army."⁷ As a result, Bercuson argues, the Canadian military command structure had become ineffective, its soldiers demoralized, and its equipment outmoded and often inadequate. While Bercuson is eager to support the Canadian soldiers and praise their efforts in humanitarian relief, the specific achievements of Canadians in Somalia are not his focus. His work is less useful as a tool for evaluating the Canadian mission than as a discussion of the development of the Canadian Armed Forces in general.



Note: No ISBN, this is an internal report

The publication of Bercuson's book was followed by that of the Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. Established by the Canadian government in 1993, the Commission investigated the leadership, discipline, actions, and decisions of the Canadian Forces, as well as the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence (DND) concerning Canada's participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia.⁸ Although its investigation was cut short by the government in 1997, the report it released contains significant information and conclusions regarding Canada's conduct in Somalia. It also provides recommendations for future operations.

The principal conclusion of the Inquiry is that the Canadian mission went badly wrong: command systems fell apart, leading to significant organizational failure and violence. Ultimately, it concludes that the failure was one of leadership. Although the Report identifies several individual failings, especially pertaining to the pre-deployment phase of the mission, the most serious problems were those that concerned organizational or group responsibility for institutional shortcomings.⁹ These conclusions were reached after thousands of government documents were analyzed and the testimony of hundreds of pertinent witnesses, including military and government officials, was heard in public hearings organized by the Commission.¹⁰

The Report's negative judgment of Canadian operations in Somalia is largely focused on decision-making mistakes, mandate confusion, and the violence perpetrated by Canadians in the field. The verdict is negative despite the Report's recognition and documentation of the fact that the Canadian contingent reached and in many cases exceeded its assigned objectives.¹¹ As a result, the Report's overall assessment of the Canadian mission in Somalia as a failure must be understood as arising from a focus on the perceived confusion and hurriedness with which operations were organized and on Canadian culpability for multiple violent incidents. For the Commission, the Somali civilian deaths had a greater impact in the evaluation of the mission's success than did the achievement of operational objectives.

Sherene Razack's *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (2004) also contributes to an overwhelmingly negative view of the Canadian Forces in Somalia. Razack focuses on the violent incidents perpetrated by Canadians and argues that peacekeeping is an inherently racist endeavour. She suggests that the violent incidents in Somalia were not isolated events, that they were not the product of a few "bad apples" or a failure in leadership, and that, rather, they were indicative of the underlying themes of racism and imperialism that shape the foundation of modern peacekeeping.¹²

Razack, who is a professor of sociology and equity studies, largely develops her argument theoretically, creating a detailed discussion of the connections between gender, race, colonialism, and identity as they pertain to peacekeeping. While she bases her discussion within the context of the incidents in Somalia and the Canadian reaction to them, her overarching generalizations regarding peacekeeping lack sufficient evidence. Conclusions regarding peacekeeping, which has evolved over time and manifested itself in a multitude of different ways, should not be generalized through the case study of one particular mission. While her arguments regarding race dynamics present in Canadian society raise several interesting and pertinent issues, her overall argument regarding peacekeeping requires further examination of historical evidence. Regardless, her focus on the nature of peacekeeping and on the incidents in Somalia means that her work, like Bercuson's, is less useful as a tool in analyzing the overall achievement of objectives by the Canadian contingent in Somalia.

Even works that are largely positive and do not focus narrowly on the violent incidents as a foundation for their analyses lack a detailed examination of operational objectives achieved or not achieved. Grant Dawson's 2007 book *"Here is Hell": Canada's Engagement in Somalia* is an extremely well-researched study of the political decision-making processes that led to Canada's deployment to Somalia. Although he does recognize in scattered sentences that Canadian troops achieved their humanitarian objectives and were largely successful in fulfilling their mandate, he does not delve into their specific achievements in detail.¹³

This aspect of the overall Canadian mission in Somalia—specifically an evaluation of success based on operational objectives achieved—requires further development and assessment. This paper represents an attempt to provide that analysis. Political perceptions of the mission, expectations for Canadian soldiers, and international evaluations of Canadian achievements all form the basis of this discussion.


BACKGROUND: CRISIS IN SOMALIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa, the easternmost projection of the African continent. In the late 1980s, civil conflict in the country escalated dramatically as insurrections were launched against the repressive dictatorship of General Siad Barre, the president of Somalia from 1969 to 1991. Despite enjoying initial popularity and support, Barre's regime quickly experienced significant criticism. Although his tenure had begun with great and positive ambitions, Barre eventually maintained power by suppressing critics, capturing and arresting opponents, using clan interests and rivalries to his advantage, and occasionally buying out opposition groups with cash. Continued economic stagnation and decline also negatively affected the Somalis' already deteriorating belief in a central government. By the end of its tenure, Barre's regime had lost all credibility with the Somali people and was ultimately toppled on 27 January 1991.¹⁴

Despite the removal of the oppressive central government, the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate rapidly; without a common enemy, rebel factions reverted to traditional clan hostilities and turned against one another. Although an interim president was established immediately following Barre's departure, overwhelming political and economic problems ensured that he did not control Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, for more than a few months. While he retained his position, his government had little to no influence or real power.¹⁵ In the chaos that followed, government offices, foreign embassies, schools, and even hospitals were looted and destroyed. Agriculture and food distribution were disrupted and competition for resources escalated the violence, pushing Somalia further into a state of anarchy. The resulting famine affected hundreds of thousands of Somalis, who suffered from starvation as much as from the sporadic outbreaks of violent gunfights.¹⁶ Andrew Natsios, head of the American Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, testified before Congress in late January 1992, that Somalia was "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world."¹⁷ By mid-March, 300,000 Somalis had died, 3,000 were dying daily, 500,000 had fled to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and 70 percent of the livestock had been killed.¹⁸

The situation in Somalia eventually resulted in the official intervention of the international community in January 1992 when the UN Security Council (SC) invoked Chapter VII of the *UN Charter* and imposed an

SOMALI POLITICAL FACTIONS



arms embargo. This was followed in March by the signing of a ceasefire by Somali factional leaders.¹⁹ It was not until six weeks after the ceasefire agreement that the SC finally decided to establish a UN peacekeeping operation for humanitarian intervention.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM, later labelled UNOSOM I) was the result of SC Resolution 751, passed in April 1992. It sent fifty unarmed monitors to Mogadishu and agreed to deploy a 500-member security force to escort humanitarian deliveries.²⁰ This intervention focused on the ceasefire as a means of facilitating humanitarian operations. It failed, however, to utilize the ceasefire as the first step in a broader strategy to promote political reconciliation; tensions escalated and worsened, conflicts flared up, and relief materials being supplied by the mission were not being delivered to famine victims.²¹

In response to the progressively worsening situation, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's 22 July proposal for an expansion of UNOSOM and the mounting of an immediate airlift to southern Somalia.²² Plans were immediately drafted to implement this expansion, while the World Food Programme (WFP) began flying food to inland populations.²³ While many Somalis did receive significant aid as a result of these actions, neither the airlift nor an attempt to auction food relief to merchants in Mogadishu at reduced prices managed to overcome the fundamental problem of insecurity and looting.²⁴ October and

November 1992 did see some improvement in conditions as prices for certain foods fell, supplies increased, and death rates began to decline, but the famine was not yet over and the situation continued to be exceedingly fragile. A major obstacle remained: the looting and diversion of food by gangs and rival factions.²⁵

In December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a UN-sanctioned multinational force led by the United States, was charged with carrying out SC Resolution 794: to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in Somalia.²⁶ This operation had authorization to use “all necessary means” to achieve the objective of restoring order; in other words, the use of force was permitted.²⁷ UNITAF was a unique operation in that it was the first time in history that the UN authorized a group of member states, operating outside of UN command, to use military force for humanitarian ends in an internal conflict.²⁸

UNITAF lasted until May 1993, when a third operation, UNOSOM II, was established to replace the first two. Always conceived of as a temporary exercise in peace enforcement, UNITAF was only ever meant to establish “a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.”²⁹ Because even UNITAF had found it difficult to consistently enforce any kind of peace, the peacekeeping mission meant to follow it clearly also required the inclusion of a mandate to use force; there was simply no continuous peace to keep. As a result, UNOSOM II was sent to Somalia with a large peacekeeping component operating under a peace enforcement mandate.³⁰ Replacing both UNOSOM I and UNITAF, this new mission emphasized the importance of disarmament and arms control while continuing to secure transport and communication routes for the distribution of humanitarian aid.³¹

UNOSOM II operated until March 1995, attempting to disarm the various Somali factions, to restore law and order, to help the people set up a representative government, and to re-establish infrastructure in the country. This mission ended in failure. It was characterized by the violent hunt for one particular Somali warlord, General Aideed, as well as a significant number of UN troop deaths.³² Eventually, the Somali people, disappointed by the failure of the UN to disarm the warlords, actually began to support the factional leaders in an “us versus them” mentality.³³ On 4 November 1994, after peacemaking efforts by UN troops had clearly failed, the SC voted to withdraw all forces. UNOSOM II’s mandate ended in March 1995, when American ships off the coast of Somalia assisted in the safe departure of UNOSOM troops.³⁴

While several nations participated in each of these operations, Canada specifically made three operational commitments: to the UN humanitarian airlift in August 1992, to the UN peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM I, and to the US peace enforcement coalition, UNITAF. Deciding against continued participation in UNOSOM II, Canada eventually pulled its contingent out of Somalia in May and June 1993.³⁵

CANADA AND THE HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT: OPERATION RELIEF

Following the recommendations of a DND planning team that had travelled to the area in advance, three C-130 Hercules aircraft were deployed to Nairobi, Kenya, in September 1992 as part of Canada’s contribution to the humanitarian airlift (Operation RELIEF). These aircraft began to transport relief supplies into southern Somalia on 11 September. One plane was dedicated to aiding International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operations and a second to those of the UN/WFP, while the third served as a backup to help maintain a consistent delivery schedule.³⁶ As other contributing countries had provided their aircraft free of charge for a period of 90 days, Canada initially decided to do the same, although multiple extensions eventually lengthened the commitment.³⁷

Operation RELIEF was given the task of flying food, medicine, and occasionally construction materials and fuel to remote airstrips in Somalia. To accomplish this, Canada created the Airlift Control Element (ALCE), comprising approximately 65 personnel who accompanied the three Canadian aircraft sent to Somalia; ALCE moved through four separate rotations while Canada was operating in the country.³⁸ Through DND, Canada managed to provide enough funding and resources to ensure that the daily flying schedule of its

mission could boast two aircraft flying two missions each a day.³⁹ As C-130s had an approximate maximum return flight time of five hours, and two aircraft could hold approximately 15,000 pounds, Canada had the potential to deliver over 30,000 pounds of supplies a day.⁴⁰ While Operation RELIEF was not expected to reach a specific weight in delivered cargo, Canadian authorities did require the operation to maintain the goal of flying two aircraft, twice a day, carrying as much as possible.⁴¹

The Canadian airlift began with its first flight transferring over 6,000 tonnes of maize to the town of Bardere, where survivors desperately needed relief from the famine that had already killed thousands in the community.⁴² As the mission progressed and flights continued, Canada managed to maintain the four-flights-a-day objective. In the first six weeks of operation, the Canadians achieved 169 return flights, 688.5 flying hours, 5,253,633 pounds of cargo and 156 civilians transferred, and 16 airdrops for a total of 448,000 pounds. During this period only one mission was aborted due to aircraft unserviceability.⁴³ According to ALCE commander Lieutenant-Colonel Jensen, what he will remember about the first few months of Operation RELIEF is how well everything went, that “with only one exception, we completed every flight ... there is a sense of accomplishment.”⁴⁴ He boasted that Canada was ready and willing to “fly to any destination requested.”⁴⁵

In terms of the mandate assigned to and carried out by DND—that two aircraft would fly twice a day, carrying as much cargo as possible, to any destination in southern Somalia that could be reached—the first ALCE rotation (12 September–25 October 1992) of Operation RELIEF was very successful. The above statistics are consistent with the objective of four flights a day with maximum cargo; with only one exception, every planned flight took off and made a successful delivery. The fact that supplies once again became targets of looting once they had been delivered⁴⁶ does not diminish the fact that ALCE I successfully achieved all its objectives. The mandate did not include protecting supplies after planes began their return flights.

ALCE II (26 October–20 December 1992), made up of 75 personnel, left Canada in mid-October to take over responsibilities in Nairobi and officially assumed control on 26 October 1992. The task of this group continued to be the provision of two flights a day to both the ICRC and WFP into Somalia. Although three aircraft still remained to achieve this objective, it was often the case that the ALCE only had two aircraft to work with due to wear and mechanical difficulties. As a result, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Cromwell, ALCE II commander, recognized that it was not possible to fly four flights a day every day of the operation. Still, he stated that there were only “a few days” when it was not possible to meet the goal of supporting both the ICRC and WFP with two flights each.⁴⁷

By the end of the ALCE II rotation, operations were complicated by the arrival of the Canadian contribution to UNITAF. The Canadian Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters staff arrived in Somalia in early December and immediately had a number of requirements for air support that needed to be satisfied in addition to those of Operation RELIEF. When the CAR began to deploy, ALCE became exceptionally busy. To ensure that both airlift and UNITAF troops received adequate support, more aircraft were dispatched from Canada. Operations were developed so that either two or three aircraft always arrived and departed Nairobi each day.⁴⁸

The roles of ALCE III and ALCE IV were similarly complicated by the need to transport Canadian Forces material and personnel in addition to humanitarian aid. ALCE was transformed into a major support organization for the combined continuance of Operation RELIEF, airlift support for the sustainment of Canadian Joint Forces Somalia (CJFS) Headquarters staff in Mogadishu, and the relocation of Canadian Forces in Somalia as needed.⁴⁹ Problems did occur. Fear of a fuel shortage in Nairobi led to a frantic search for an alternate source out of Tanzania, landing weight and ground manoeuvre restrictions prompted renovations of certain Somalia airfields such as the one at Belet Uen, and a hunt for suitable offloading vehicles was launched because not every airstrip had the capability to unload supplies from the aircraft. Despite all of this confusion, and aside from three days at the end of December when operations were temporarily suspended, “Operation RELIEF and CJFS support flights continued as per normal.”⁵⁰ Between 15 December 1992 and 1 February 1993 (comprising the end of ALCE II, all of ALCE III, and the beginning of ALCE IV), the Canadian Forces flew 458 flights carrying 3,045,804 pounds of grain,

cooking oil, rice, building materials and water, as well as 189 passengers in support of the humanitarian airlift. In support of UNITAF, 234 flights occurred in which 3,366,145 pounds of military equipment, materials, and supplies, and 3,137 soldiers were transported.⁵¹

Operation RELIEF ended on 28 February 1993, after over 540 flights had carried more than 16 million tonnes of food to various locations throughout Somalia.⁵² Despite the significant increase in tasks and responsibilities given to the ALCE throughout its many rotations, every operation was approached with full effort and dedication and was conducted admirably. The Canadian Forces satisfied the objective of four daily flights supporting the ICRC and WFP humanitarian relief effort beyond the initial 90 days mandated. Although there were a few exceptions when all flights on a given day were not achieved, these incidents were minimal and did not impact the overall success of the mission.

CANADA AND UNOSOM I: OPERATION CORDON

As Canadian forces were organized in support of the humanitarian airlift in Somalia, Canada also chose to contribute to the expanded UN peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM I. On 25 August 1992, Canada was approached informally by the UN Secretariat regarding the provision of a security battalion; Canada was asked to provide 750 personnel to conduct relief operations in northeastern Somalia.⁵³ After determining that Canada was capable of responding to this request favourably, the PM granted the UN's official request for support on 15 September. The resulting Canadian operation became known as Operation CORDON.⁵⁴

When Canada accepted a role in UNOSOM I, it was with the knowledge that the Canadian battalion would be deployed to the northeast corner of Somalia, that Canadian headquarters would be in the town of Boosaaso, and that their mission would extend from the coast southward as far as the towns of Garoe and Galacio.⁵⁵ The Canadian Airborne Regiment was chosen in September 1992 to fulfil the Canadian



Source: CFJIC
HSC92-0849-31

Canadian Navy deploys to the region

commitment. Having already undergone intensive training in all aspects of peacekeeping and peacemaking for a possible deployment to the Western Sahara, the CAR appeared especially prepared for an alternative deployment to Somalia.⁵⁶ Colonel Houghton testified to the Commission that he viewed the CAR in 1992 as ideally suited for Somalia because it was trained to work in areas with absolutely no infrastructure.⁵⁷ Although disciplinary problems during training gave some individuals pause over the choice of the regiment, the CAR was regarded by authorities as suitable and was ultimately selected for the mission.⁵⁸

On 5 September 1992, the CAR was officially given notice to begin preparing for deployment to Boosaaso. Training specific to a Chapter VI UN operation (peacekeeping) commenced immediately.⁵⁹ In addition, HMCS PRESERVER was deployed from Halifax on 16 November to provide logistic support to the battalion once it arrived in Boosaaso.⁶⁰ That arrival never occurred, however. The UN's decision to increase armed security personnel in Somalia was met with serious resistance from many factional leaders. As a result, the deployment of the CAR to Somalia was delayed. An advance reconnaissance team began waiting on 24-hour alert as early as mid-September for UN permission to leave, but by November only the PRESERVER had made the trip.⁶¹

As Canada waited for permission to deploy, the security situation in Somalia continued to worsen. Civil disorder was widespread as factions continued to fight one another and resist international interference. Up to 1.5 million people remained in danger of starvation while the UN was prevented from deploying the security battalions necessary for the success of the UNOSOM relief mission.⁶² As a result, the UN adopted SC Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992 authorizing the use of force in Somalia regardless of whether security forces were acting in self-defence or had the permission of factional leaders to be there. On 5 December, Operation CORDON was suspended and subsequently cancelled in favour of participation in the new UN-sanctioned peace enforcement coalition, UNITAF.⁶³ The CAR, although trained and ready for deployment, never reached Somalia as part of the UNOSOM operation. They never got the chance to succeed or fail at fulfilling their mandate.

While this lack of deployment makes it impossible to make an assessment regarding Canada's achievement of UNOSOM objectives, it should be noted that Canadian pre-deployment actions were taken quickly and satisfied the requirements of promises made to the UN. A 750-member battalion that included two mechanized companies and that received proper training for a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation was made available within weeks of acceptance of the mission. The fact that the CAR did not deploy to Somalia as part of UNOSOM I was not a result of Canadian errors or a slow response time.

CANADA AND UNITAF: OPERATION DELIVERANCE


Planning for the Canadian contribution to UNITAF, known as Operation DELIVERANCE, began in early December 1992. Fully supporting UN resolution 794 concerning multinational military operations in Somalia, Canada chose to participate in UNITAF for its duration (at that time, an estimated nine months).

A properly supported battalion-sized force of up to 900 troops was supplied by Canada with the understanding that Canadian soldiers would not be participating in any subsequent peacekeeping operations in Somalia.⁶⁴

When Canada made the decision to participate in the American-led enforcement mission, the CAR was already in the process of mounting Operation CORDON. Quickly redirected to participate in the new enforcement coalition, the CAR was expanded to include 900 personnel with the addition of infantry, armour, engineer and other support groups; together they formed the CAR Battle Group (CARBG).⁶⁵ When combined with the newly created national joint headquarters, HMCS PRESERVER already en route to Somalia, and the air transport detachment already in theatre, some 1,250 personnel formed the CJFS, the entire Canadian contingent deployed for Operation DELIVERANCE.⁶⁶

Canada understood the US-led mission to Somalia as having the overall objective of conducting enforcement operations "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief to the starving population."⁶⁷ It also had four specific objectives: to secure seaports, airports, ground routes and major relief centres; to protect and assist NGO operations; to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid; and to

Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Organization



disarm, as necessary, forces interfering with humanitarian relief distribution.⁶⁸ These objectives would be achieved through operations conducted in four phases. The seaport and airport of Mogadishu would be the focus of phase I, the area west of Mogadishu (near Baidoa) the focus of phase II, and the area near Kismayu (just south of Mogadishu) the focus of phase III. A transfer of authority back to UNOSOM would be accomplished in phase IV. This transfer was set to occur within 240 days from the date that UNITAF troops first landed on the beach at Mogadishu.⁶⁹

Within this overall plan of operations, Canadian forces were assigned the Belet Uen Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS)—one of eight sectors in Somalia created by UNITAF—and were assigned a number of important tasks to complete: to provide security by conducting military operations to secure airport and seaport facilities, key installations, and major relief distribution sites; to provide humanitarian assistance such as convoy escort and food distribution under UN auspices; and to assist in re-establishing a social structure in the area.⁷⁰ To fulfill these tasks, Canada defined four operational objectives: to dominate the populated areas and provide a feeling of complete security; to dislocate the influence of factional leaders and warlords; to eradicate both criminal and factional banditry; and to reinstate traditional tribal leadership as a prelude to district or regional councils.⁷¹

In order to assess its progress in the achievement of these objectives, Canada also developed several specific “measures of effectiveness.” First, there could be no severe malnourishment. In other words, Canada recognized malnourishment as a common fact of life in Africa, so instead of attempting to eliminate

it altogether, simply sought to reach the levels present before the outbreak of the civil war. The same can be said for banditry. Somali clans had traditionally stolen from one another in competitive coexistence. Thus, Canada sought to reach pre-war banditry levels. Third, Canada had to complete the cantonment (collection) of all heavy weapons in its region, while implementing a reasonable disarmament program for light weapons. Again, recognizing the importance that personal weapons had gained for the Somali people within their society, Canada sought to disarm only those groups that were being blatantly aggressive. A program of weapon registration and training in the proper, non-threatening use of weapons characterized Canadian disarmament efforts.⁷² The fourth measure of effectiveness was the demobilization of all militias in the area, including the elimination of all technicals (improvised civilian fighting vehicles), while the fifth measure was the creation of a neutral local police force. The final measures concerned social and political reconstruction. Canada required the presence of effective political, security, reconstruction, and relief committees involving all local clans, embryonic and sustainable local initiatives, as well as other visible indicators of economic and social development, such as children attending a new school.⁷³ Altogether, each of these practical indicators of change formed the guidelines used by Canada to determine the effectiveness of its actions.



Source: CFJIC
ISC93-33

The actual deployment of the CARBG for Operation DELIVERANCE began on 11 December 1992, when an advance party was deployed to maintain the security of the Baledogle airfield, 85 kilometres northwest of Mogadishu.⁷⁴ Under the operational command of the 10th (US) Mountain Division, this advance party would aid in the security of the airfield until the main body of the CARBG arrived in Somalia between 26 and 30 December 1992.⁷⁵ On 28 December, the 10th Mountain, other US Special Forces personnel, and the advance party of the CARBG moved overland and secured the airfield at Belet Uen.⁷⁶

As Canadian operations began, commanders quickly conceived of a dual-track approach to achieving their objectives. Short-term security would be focused on the support and protection of NGOs in order to get food and medicine to the population. Concurrently, long-term peace and security would be achieved through a “hearts and minds” campaign of nation-building with Somalis.⁷⁷ This campaign focused on marginalizing troublemakers while earning the respect of the local people, winning their hearts and minds in other words, in an effort to convince them to align with security forces.⁷⁸ The Canadians recognized that the Somali people, traditionally not receptive to outsiders, needed to make the decision to accept the presence of international help to ensure long-term stability; the Somali population did not have to like the Canadian soldiers, but if they respected them and understood their security and reconstruction goals, they might work with the Canadians to guarantee better chances for long-term peace. The Canadian commander in Somalia, Colonel Serge Labbé, gave an example of the effectiveness of this approach in a presentation delivered in March 1996 at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC). Labbé explained that if a bridge or building for the use of the Somali people was built without Somali involvement, it was simply destroyed and looted immediately. As a result, if bridges or schools were needed in the Canadian sector, the Somali people built them. For example, a school built in Belet Uen was planned and designed

by a Somali engineer and built by Somali labourers. Canadian soldiers provided support when asked, but largely only guarded the building until the school officially opened. At the official opening, all sixteen of the region's tribal kings chose to be present, sending a clear signal that this particular building was accepted by the population. When the guards were taken away from the building that night, no looting or destruction occurred; the school remained intact. Labbé asserted that this example was one among many that indicated a need amongst the Somali people to perceive of civil organizations or pieces of infrastructure as having been suggested, designed, and built by the Somali people themselves.⁷⁹

Before any significant social gains could be achieved, however, a safe environment needed to be secured. Thus, when the CARBG first arrived in the Belet Uen HRS, short-term security goals pertaining to disarmament and the protection of humanitarian supplies were Canada's immediate priority. Aggressive patrolling in the Canadian sector began immediately after the Belet Uen airfield was secured. Although most of the vehicles and material needed to support the CARBG did not arrive in Belet Uen until 15 January 1993, original patrols were conducted on foot; despite their lack of motorized supplies, the Canadians perceived an urgent need to establish a strong armed presence in the area and to begin to implement clear policies with respect to weapons and overall conduct.⁸⁰ Once the Canadian vehicles arrived, the regiment expanded its operations to cover the entire relief sector, using aggressive long-range patrols, observation posts, and helicopter reconnaissance to provide security.⁸¹



Canadian soldier on patrol

Source: CFJIC
ISC93-37

A major aspect of Canada's security program was the disarmament of aggressive Somali gunmen. As has previously been discussed, CJFS was not concerned with wholesale disarmament in Somalia, but rather focused on the selective confiscation of weapons when the success of the Canadian mission (security for humanitarian distribution) was directly threatened. To this end, Canada established several sites for the cantonment of heavy weapons. Three widely dispersed sites were created to collect and catalogue weapons from various factions; one was located in Belet Uen, one in Balem Balle, and one in Guri Ceel.⁸² Canada worked actively to disarm Somali factions by patrolling, seeking, and destroying unauthorized weapon storage sites and establishing roadblocks.⁸³

Canada also sought to establish an authorization system for certain light weapons and to train Somali gunmen in proper handling techniques. Negotiating with local clan leaders and village elders, Canada implemented a registration system of serial numbers and owner cards. Guns owned by Somalis were registered and then left in their possession if certain protocols were followed: weapons were required to be handled in a non-threatening manner when a person was in a populated area (always pointing down when the person was walking or left on the floor of a vehicle if he was driving).⁸⁴ Robert B. Oakley, the American special envoy during the Somali Crisis, recognized that Canada had an extremely "high degree of success in getting the local militia commanders to place heavy weapons in compounds and taking them out of circulation, in keeping light weapons out of sight and identifying and tagging most light weapons for the entire HRS." He suggested that only the French, working in a sector adjacent to Canada's, approached such a high level of success on disarmament.⁸⁵

As security patrols and disarmament continued, the arrival of motorized vehicles also enabled escort for humanitarian relief convoys still struggling to get food and medicine to the thousands of Somalis dying of starvation every day. The CARBG's task was to provide armed escorts for the convoys so that they were not faced with extortion or looted en route. This task proved more complicated than the simple provision of armed support, however. Somalia was in such disarray that serious repairs to much of the infrastructure in the country was required before convoys could even begin to move into many areas.⁸⁶ Working closely with the NGOs operating in their sector, the Canadians determined which roads and runways required immediate repair to facilitate the movement of goods and then quickly began improvements. Much of the work was accomplished by Somali labourers, who were paid using money from humanitarian relief organizations; a CJFS proposal for infrastructure repair funds was approved by the WFP and resulted in the disbursement of almost \$75,000 (US) dollars for the hiring of local labour in the Belet Uen area.⁸⁷

By the end of February 1993, the main supply roads in the Canadian sector had been improved and runways made ready for the rainy season. In addition, a Bailey bridge entirely paid for with Canadian funds and designed by Canadian engineers was built along the China Road to facilitate travel between Belet Uen and Matabaan; the previous concrete bridge had been destroyed and the bypass ran through a minefield.⁸⁸ With these improvements to the transport network through its area of operations, the CARBG began effectively escorting supplies carried by truck convoys. By 1 May 1993, Canada had escorted over 20 supply convoys in and through the Belet Uen HRS.⁸⁹ In addition, Canadian forces took the initiative to provide security for a number of convoys en route to Dhusa Mareb, several hundred kilometres outside of the Canadian HRS.⁹⁰ This action was largely in keeping with Canada's cooperative approach to security activities, the Canadian contingent having worked hard to establish close relations with other UNITAF troops, specifically the French and Italian units, operating in adjacent sectors.⁹¹

Through the careful cultivation of relationships, use of foot patrols, roadblocks, weapons sweeps/searches, frequent long-range vehicle patrols, helicopter patrols, convoy escorts, and humanitarian assistance missions, the CARBG was able to quickly create an atmosphere of security in its HRS that "according to the local population, had not been experienced in recent memory."⁹² On 27 March 1993, the entire Belet Uen HRS was declared fully secure. It became and remained one of the few humanitarian relief sectors to be "declared secure and kept secure."⁹³

This accomplishment, enabling the delivery of humanitarian supplies, is indicative of Canadian success in achieving its overall UNITAF objective: establishing a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the starving population. Within the Belet Uen HRS, "relief supplies [were] being distributed without hindrance,"⁹⁴ and "the devastating effect of the famine was quickly reversed."⁹⁵ Canada achieved the cantonnement of all heavy weapons, the eradication of all technicals and the demobilization of militias, and it effectively disarmed all the factions within its area of operations.⁹⁶ These accomplishments allowed the CARBG to provide "daily support to the 22 aid agencies present in the area, including more than 20 convoy escorts bringing supplies into the relief sector."⁹⁷ It is clear that Canada fulfilled its short-term security goals.

Having secured the Belet Uen HRS, the CARBG had the opportunity to focus its resources on social reconstruction and other humanitarian relief support activities. As Colonel Labbé suggested, in order for long-term peace and stability to be a reality in Belet Uen, the Canadians needed to show the Somali people that they were "trying to achieve peace and security with them and not establishing white western standards and policies for a country which is clearly not."⁹⁸ To this end, Canada involved Somali citizens to the greatest extent possible in all reconstruction and rehabilitation projects attempted.

First, a mine-awareness program was initiated to educate local civilians in identifying and avoiding mines. Tribal kings and their immediate subordinates were trained with the understanding that they would then train their own people; the project would be better received and become self-sustaining.⁹⁹ The resuscitation of the local police force in Belet Uen also became a serious focus of the Canadian contingent. A proposed force of 150 was quickly approved for the area. By late January, Somali police officers had begun escorting Canadian soldiers on patrols of the Belet Uen area and assisting with the control of traffic at a local bridge and other checkpoints.¹⁰⁰ The CARBG contributed to the legitimacy of the force by aiding in the repair of



Source: CFJIC
ISC93-5

the roof and doors of the local jail and in training the Somalis in first aid and riot control.¹⁰¹ As no compensation was initially available for the police, the Canadians also procured daily food rations to serve as a short-term payment solution; eventually, the Somali officers were paid through US AID, a US State Department organization.¹⁰² With the arrival of uniforms flown in from Kenya, the Somali police force slowly developed a strong foundation for legitimate and effective participation within the community. This success prompted Canadian efforts to support a similar program in Matabaan.¹⁰³

The results that Canada achieved in infrastructure reconstruction in the Belet Uen HRS also received significant praise. As has been mentioned, multiple roads and runways were repaired and a bridge along the China Road was built in support of humanitarian deliveries. These improvements had long-term benefits for the movement of the local population. In addition, Canada sponsored the construction of a footbridge alongside the existing Bailey bridge in central Belet Uen. The bridge was barely sufficient to support military vehicles and increasing pedestrian traffic when the Canadians implemented their solution for making it safe for all users.¹⁰⁴ Medical facilities also received significant attention from the CARBG. Construction work by military engineers and hired Somali workers resulted in the restoration of several damaged medical facilities—as well as the creation of new ones—and Canadian medical personnel donated their time. Members of the Board of Inquiry into Somalia travelled to the African country in April 1993 to observe Canadian operations and interview personnel. While there, “the Board witnessed Canadian medical personnel in the hospital giving of their time, knowledge and compassion to ease the suffering of those who, by Canadian standards, were in appalling circumstances.”¹⁰⁵ The Canadians provided much-needed medical skills and technical knowledge to the health organizations operating in the region.



Source: CFJIC
ISC93-10400

A small portion of the weapons collected by the Airborne Regiment

The most ambitious social reconstruction project undertaken by the CARBG was the rebuilding of schools. Robert Oakley asserted that “the Airborne Regiment took on the most ambitious program of any of the HRS’s with respect to school reconstruction.”¹⁰⁶ Schools in Somalia had been closed for over two years when the Canadian contingent arrived in the country. Reacting to the possibility that an entire generation of Somali children might grow up without any education, the Canadians led the drive to re-establish schooling in the Belet Uen HRS; this sector became the first in all of southern Somalia to re-open schools.¹⁰⁷ Through Canadian initiatives, and using excess material from the Battle Group camp, a school in Matabaan was reconstructed and became functional in February 1993. Several schools followed quickly in Belet Uen and re-opened in April and May of the same year.¹⁰⁸ Canada encouraged the use of Somali labourers to clean and construct all buildings; these workers were paid through the WFP. Teacher training and testing and the procurement of school supplies were also sponsored by the Canadians in coordination with the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).¹⁰⁹ Eight schools were constructed in total, allowing almost 300 teachers and over 7,000 students to attend school for the first time in two years.¹¹⁰

While in Somalia, the CARBG performed well, achieved its operational objectives, and even surpassed its mandate. It helped reduce the rampant starvation and disease plaguing the Belet Uen relief sector by providing a secure environment for the transport of humanitarian supplies. Canadian forces disarmed aggressive factional leaders and warlords, but respected the importance of personal guns to Somali culture by creating a registration system for light weapons. Armed patrolling and disarmament curbed the activities of bandits, even as work programs engaged the Somali people in rebuilding their own communities. The provision of medical assistance, in addition to the reconstruction of schools, roads, and bridges, effectively laid the foundation for the renewal of a Somali social infrastructure.

In spite of these worthwhile achievements and the outstanding performance of Canadian troops, it must be noted that the CARBG was also involved in four incidents of violence against Somali civilians. Those incidents, all of which were promptly and thoroughly investigated, have attracted extensive attention from the media and the Canadian public; three of them resulted in serious charges against members of the CARBG. Those events must be acknowledged and discussed in an effort to recognize and accept responsibility for serious mistakes that occurred during the Canadian mission and to help prevent their repetition in the future.

The first incident occurred on 17 February 1993, when members of the CARBG defended the Bailey bridge outside Belet Uen against a crowd of approximately 300 angry Somalis. The hostile group began throwing rocks at the Canadian soldiers, and neither the seizure of one of the instigators nor several warning shots fired by Canadians had any effect on the mob. Eventually, two of the instigators of the riot were shot at by the soldiers in an effort to disperse the crowd. The shots achieved the desired effect but also wounded both Somalis, who were immediately evacuated to the local hospital for medical attention. One was pronounced dead on arrival.¹¹¹ A unit investigation was commenced immediately to determine whether the Canadian response had been appropriate. That investigation concluded that the soldiers and leaders involved in the event acted in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement. No charges were laid against any participants.¹¹²

The second incident, on 4 March 1993, involved two Somali civilians who approached the Canadian compound after dark. Canadian sentries noticed the Somalis trying to find a way through the barbed wire surrounding the compound. The Canadians tried to arrest the intruders, who fled on foot. Warning shouts and shots did not halt their flight. Eventually, aimed fire was applied and both Somalis were hit; one was wounded and the other was killed.¹¹³ In this case, the investigation into the actions of the CARBG soldiers resulted in the laying of charges. A charge of negligent performance of a military duty was laid against the commanding officer of the CARBG, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, in relation to orders allegedly given by him while in Somalia that did not comply with Canadian rules of engagement. Captain Rainville, the officer leading the CARBG Reconnaissance Platoon in Somalia, was charged with unlawfully causing bodily harm and negligent performance of duty. Both men were subsequently acquitted of those charges.¹¹⁴

The third incident occurred relatively soon after the second and concerns the death of a Somali while in Canadian custody in Belet Uen. On 16 March 1993, Shidane Arone, a 16-year-old Somali national, was arrested by members of the CARBG inside the Canadian compound. Arone was placed in a holding facility pending transfer to local Somali authorities. Later that night, he was found unconscious after being violently tortured and beaten. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the unit medical section.¹¹⁵ Master Corporal Clayton Matchee was charged with second-degree murder and torture in relation to this death, but he was found mentally unfit to stand trial in April 1994 following a suicide attempt while in custody. Private Kyle Brown was also charged with second-degree murder and torture and was found guilty of manslaughter and torture. Brown was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty's service.¹¹⁶ Other individuals charged in relation to this death include Sergeant P. Gresty, Sergeant M. Boland, Major A. Seward, Private D. Brocklebank, and Captain M. Sox. The charges against these men ranged from negligent performance of duty to torture and unlawfully causing bodily harm. Only Sergeant Gresty and Private Brocklebank were acquitted of all charges against them.¹¹⁷

The fourth incident occurred only a day after the death of Arone, on 17 March 1993. Members of the CARBG were escorting a convoy of ICRC vehicles transporting supplies from the Belet Uen airfield to the ICRC compound. When they arrived at the compound, a scuffle broke out and the Canadian soldiers were shot at by a Somali gunman. Returning fire, the Canadians hit one Somali in the stomach; the man was pronounced dead on arrival at the medical centre.¹¹⁸ As with the first incident, the investigation into this death concluded that the soldiers involved acted in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement. Consequently, no charges were laid.¹¹⁹

Each of the incidents described here raised significant questions about the conduct and professionalism of the Canadian troops who operated in Somalia, and about Canadian military practices in general. The Canadian approach to training, equipping, organizing, and deploying its armed forces all came under fire from the media, the government, and the Canadian public. Serious issues, oversights, and weaknesses within Canadian military practices were identified and became the focus of much discussion and research

relating to Canadian involvement in Somalia and Canadian peacekeeping in general. These systemic problems and the violent incidents that resulted caused many observers to deem the mission in Somalia a serious failure; they regarded the neglect of duty, lack of discipline, and confusion that ultimately led to the civilian deaths as unacceptable and Canadian actions against Somalis as unforgivable.



Source: CFJIC
ISC93-10180

All the deaths that occurred as a result of Canadian actions were unfortunate and regrettable. The two deaths for which no charges were laid, however, clearly were an unfortunate consequence of the implementation of Canada's rules of engagement. Civilian deaths should be avoided at all costs, but in these particular situations the fulfillment of the mission was threatened and the actions of Canadian soldiers were deemed legal and appropriate. Still, discussion and analysis of these incidents is certainly needed in order to minimize the need to resort to the use of force in the future. In the other two cases, the actions of Canadian soldiers have correctly received more critical attention, as the deaths are entirely unjustifiable. Even though those charged in the 4 March incident were found not guilty, many maintain that that outcome was a result of uncertainty and confusion over evidence rather than innocence.¹²⁰ The murder of Shidane Arone is particularly disturbing, and must be considered a serious failure of the Canadian mission in Somalia. That death should never have occurred, and many issues related to command and discipline within the CAR, in addition to failures in oversight by other military commanders, are to blame.

Although these incidents were serious failures, they did not undermine the overall achievement of Canadian objectives. The CARBG did fulfill all of the tasks and objectives assigned to UNITAF commanders. The Canadian contribution to UNITAF was a success in terms of operational objectives achieved, despite the unfortunate deaths of Somali civilians at the hands of Canadian soldiers.

CONCLUSION

Canadian forces began their withdrawal from Somalia on 15 May 1993, completing it by 26 June. As originally planned, Canada chose to end its contribution to the intervention in Somalia with UNITAF; participation in UNOSOM II was never an anticipated part of Canadian involvement.¹²¹

The international effort to end human suffering in Somalia became one of the most arduous and challenging undertakings ever addressed by the United Nations. Mounted in conditions of exceptional complexity, in a country where the government had completely collapsed, operations in Somalia attempted to deal with a devastating famine, to foster reconciliation among warring factions, and to promote national reconstruction. Although operations in Somalia began as a simple effort to help maintain a ceasefire and to deliver humanitarian supplies, they were soon obliged, in response to looting and violence perpetrated by rival factions, to incorporate the use of armed force. In a country where violence and conflict continued even after the arrival of international troops, peacemaking and peace enforcement soon became a part of the international mandate.

Canada, a country with no political or economic interest in the Horn of Africa, chose to become one of many nations to contribute to the international intervention in Somalia. This contribution reflected Canada's post-Cold War optimism concerning the UN's role in international peacekeeping. Canada hoped that once the UN freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry, it would reclaim and increase its role in the protection of international peace, security, and the promotion of human rights. Given Canada's historical relationship with the UN and UN-sanctioned peace operations, many believed Canada might find a leading role to play in that new future. The intrastate violence and humanitarian crisis in Somalia represented a perfect opportunity for Canada to promote humanitarian values considered important to its own foreign policy.

Many assessments of the actual contributions made by Canada in Somalia have been extremely critical, focusing on the deaths of Somali civilians at the hands of Canadian soldiers and blaming Canadian commanders, troops in the field, and senior military leaders at home for Canadian failings. Most analyses have assessed the Canadian mission as a complete failure because of the significant incidents of violence and the organizational and leadership failings they revealed. Yet, if the mission is evaluated based on the degree to which it carried out assigned tasks and achieved objectives, that conclusion appears to be unfair. While unnecessary civilian deaths did occur and certainly overshadowed the mission, the Canadian Forces achieved remarkable successes in meeting operational objectives. Canada must acknowledge and discuss its failures, especially those of a racist and violent nature, in an effort to avoid repeating them. However, as the majority of Canadian objectives were achieved and often exceeded, despite those failures, it must be concluded that the Canadian mission in Somalia was an operational success. 🌸

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Katie Domansky is currently pursuing her PhD at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. In 2009, she earned her Master of Arts degree in military history at the Tri-University Graduate Program in Ontario, where she was fortunate to have an opportunity to work with scholars from the University of Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University, and the University of Guelph. She graduated from the University of Calgary with a bachelor's degree in military history and pure mathematics in 2007. Katie's research interests include military, diplomatic, and intelligence history, strategic studies, Canadian military reform, and Canadian foreign defence policy.

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soldiers were killed and the American public was broadcast a distressing video of a captured American helicopter pilot and footage of a dead American being dragged through the streets of south Mogadishu by a jeering mob.

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56. *Ibid.*, document DND000811, "Background Paper: Chronological Background to the Tasking in Somalia of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group."
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58. *Ibid.*, document DND011769, "Memorandum Captain Blair to distribution, Canadian Airborne Regiment — Past Incidents," 10 May 1993. Several incidents occurred that were indicative of serious disciplinary problems within the Airborne. For example, flares, smoke grenades and other pyrotechnics were set off outside of a club on base on 2 October 1992, and on 3 October 1992, the vehicle of Sergeant Wyszynski was set on fire and a bushfire incident occurred.
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89. *Ibid.*, document DND032206, "Information Package, Op DELIVERANCE CJFS Info Package," 1 May 1993.
90. *Ibid.*, document DND010161, "Letter from LGen Johnston to Adm Anderson, Performance of Canadian Joint Forces Somalia," 1 May 1993. Dhusa Mareb is located in the Galguduud region of Somalia.
91. *Ibid.*, document DND010158, "Letter Robert Oakley to the Hon. Kim Campbell," 11 May 1993. The Canadians were able to increase and expand two broad corridors for the effective protection of humanitarian operations leading from Mogadishu to Ethiopia. Canada also worked out an informal means of communication and identification with the Ethiopians along the border of their HRS to ensure that there was no possibility of unplanned engagement between coalition forces and Ethiopian forces as a result of mistaken identity. For more information see: *Information Legacy*, document DND010161, "Letter from LGen Johnston to Adm Anderson, Performance of Canadian Joint Forces Somalia," 1 May 1993.

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114. Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy*, vol. 1 "The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial."
115. Canada, *Information Legacy*, document DND288515, "Briefing Note Prepared by MGen Boyle for the Minister of National Defence," 29 October 1993.
116. Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy*, vol. 1, "The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial."
117. *Ibid.*, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol. 1, "The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial." Sergeant Gresty was acquitted on two counts of negligent performance of duty. Sergeant Boland was convicted of negligent performance of duty but the torture charge against him was stayed. Major Seward was acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm but was found guilty of negligent performance of duty for giving instructions to abuse detainees. Private Brocklebank was acquitted of both torture and negligent performance of duty. Captain Sox was acquitted of causing bodily harm but found guilty of negligent performance of duty.
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Major Robert Wilson Wight
Source: Author's Collection

THE OBITUARY OF MAJOR ROBERT WILSON WIGHT

Mr. David F. Ritchie and Sergeant Kurt Grant

Major Bob Wight was born on November 22, 1919 in Galt, Ontario and died June 6, 2011 in Toronto, at the age of age 91. Bob was a man of many sides. During World War II, he was a soldier with the common touch. He was a teammate and leader who served with distinction. After the war, he studied and practiced pharmacology, becoming Director of Sales for Dow Chemical Company. But mostly, he was an adoring family man, and my friend.

Bob Wight's infantry experiences in the bloody battlefields of enemy occupied Europe—where politics, ideology and soldering collided—were tested, strengthened and fulfilled in World War II. At the age of 21, Bob joined the Royal Canadian Air Force and became an instructor in gun armament. He told me, “if you love your country, you have to do it.” But he wasn't satisfied in the Air Force and transferred to the Canadian Army's Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) as a private for a “little more action.” His drive and skills were noticed, and he was promoted to sergeant and then was commissioned as a second lieutenant, then was promoted to lieutenant and commanding officer (CO) of the demolition platoon. As a captain, he became CO of A Company, RHLI—known as the Rileys. After the war, he took the staff and command course and was honourably discharged in 1953 with the rank of major.

I was invited by Bob's son, Tony Wight, to recount his father's Army wartime service. As a good friend, I felt deeply honoured and accepted the difficult task. Difficult because I was in the Royal Canadian Air Force in World War II, flying high in the sky over Europe and sheltered from the life-changing hand-to-hand combat of soldiers on the ground. My observations were seen from that distance. Though Bob told me about his combat experience at Woensdrecht, Holland, his comments were always understated. I knew only that they had faced artillery, self-propelled guns and mortars and had experienced German paratroopers.

Tony helped me with the battle details by recounting his father's stories for me, but I learned more about Bob's role during the war from a book written by playwright and pioneer Canadian filmmaker Arthur J. Kelly, a former corporal under Bob's command. The book, entitled *There's a Goddamn Bullet for Everyone*, is an off-the-record recounting of the Riley's experience during World War II. The author's instincts for accurately recounting battles are invaluable to the uninitiated. The narrative is written in an earthy, man's language: terse at times, and pithy, with forceful candour and graphic descriptions of horrific battles. Often times shocking in its detail, the reader is taken into the heart of each battle. Kelly uses both fictional and real characters to tell the Riley's story, and he wrote the narrative with amazing naturalness, so the book is a useful source for the historian.

I found reading this book to be a particularly rewarding source as it covers the lives of the lower ranks—privates, corporals and sergeants—usually neglected by authors and officer heroes. As a result, the book is full of gritty humour, stories and heart wrenching descriptions of the experiences of the people who encountered the enemy face to face. In one passage, Kelly writes that he had been cited for promotion, but word reached his CO that he'd written a letter to Prime Minister Mackenzie King. (It had been intercepted by the censor.) Kelly was not charged, but received a stern lecture from his superior, Major Bostwick. Clearly exasperated with Kelly, the major, as Kelly recounts, came down hard saying “Jesus, Jesus, what did I do to deserve you? You're like that old saying about women: ‘You can't live with them and you can't live without them.’” Despite his indiscretion, Kelly was later recommended for the Military Medal and the French Croix de Guerre, both of which he received.

Lieutenant Wight was often included in the narrative of the book. Chapter 4, for instance, deals with the takeover of Woensdrecht, Holland, which Kelly concludes was a key to the Allied victory in northwest Europe.

The battle of Woensdrecht started on October 16, 1944, in the black of night at 03:15 a.m. when the road to Woensdrecht was cleared of mines by the demolition platoon under Wight. At 03:30 a.m. the Canadian



artillery opened up and methodically pounded down many of the buildings of the little Dutch town. The destructive barrage drove out the German soldiers and Dutch civilians leaving it a ghost town. The Rileys moved in. LCol Whitaker, the Riley's CO, took over a partially roofed building as his headquarters. The demolition platoon moved into a house commanding a view of the main road. They considered it a good position to defend the left flank. It was now daylight, and they worked to convert the shaken-up and battered houses into fortresses. It wasn't long before the Rileys found themselves being counter-attacked by the German shell and mortar fire. Their position was tapped by the Germans. For an hour the shells poured in and killed and wounded many of them. When the barrage lifted, the German paratroopers approached from the church firing their automatic weapons:

Whitaker absorbed the battering of the pounding German shells that landed on the piles of rubble and smouldering ruins, once the happy homes and flourishing stores of Woensdrecht. The official word that emerged from his gradually crumbling brick headquarters: "Nobody leaves. We stay to the last man—and win!"²

"O'Reilly³ stared out of the opening in the window. He was sure the Germans would come soon. Wight hollered up and told him to come down. When he reached the bottom of the stairs he told Wight he thought the enemy would make its final attack within twenty minutes. Wight called all of the men around him. "Please, everyone sit down. I want everyone to hear what I'm going to say. We won't give the heinies an inch. We have lived this far, though a barrage of hell-sized proportions and we haven't cracked, nor will we. I must be honest with you. Shortly, we will be called upon to repel an enemy who is coming to try to kill us and recapture Woensdrecht. Maybe we will all die: I don't know. I hope not. I ordered this place to be fortified so we could withstand the vicious thrust of the Germans. I also rehearsed all of you to go to designated spots in the building to make your last stand. This is our last stand. You men are brave. You're wonderful. I'm proud to be your officer and if we all die, then we go out together as human beings who did not flinch. We served God and our country right up to the last bitter moment. That is indeed an honour and heroic privilege." Wight paused, "If we succeed in turning back the Germans, who are brave and excellent soldiers, then the booze is on me!" the room was silent. The men erupted into spontaneous and heartfelt cheers for Bob Wight. They moved toward the stairs; before any of them reached the second floor, the house was hit three times, simultaneously, by three different shells. One of them blew the entire cellar in, directly behind Wight and O'Reilly. The second shell, which came from a heavy gun somewhere back on the South Beveland peninsula, ripped the roof off and ploughed like a falling meteor down onto the ground floor, ploughing out all of the partitioning walls. The third shell, fired point blank from one of the self-propelled guns, came through the back wall and knocked its every brick into spinning weapons that soared with the other bricks, rafters, flooring, windows and fixtures, high into the sky above Woensdrecht, only to cascade down with crushing impact on the men below. The shell that hit the cellar entered the midst of the demolition platoon like a passenger train engine on the rampage. The force of it blew bodies about like corks on a rough sea. It sent the shelves stacked with jars of fruit, in messy collision, showering the room with glass fragments as lethal as any German machine gun. Men were killed. Men were wounded. Men were blinded, men were battered and dazed. And men cried out for help from under the weight of the broken rubble, over which swirled a thick cloud of brick dust.⁴





Figure 1: RHLI position at Woensdrecht, October 16, 1944⁵

Wight raced down to Whitaker's headquarters for reinforcements and stretchers. Neither was available. Wight told Whitaker that the left flank was now fully exposed. Whitaker ordered the Rileys' mortar platoon to hit the road on the left flank approaching Woensdrecht, with everything they had, until they received orders to cease fire. Wight rushed back to his men. He led them in a search for the wounded and the buried. The Germans came back down the road as expected and were blown into retreat by the terrible mortar fire directed against them by the mortar platoon. Gil set up a Bren gun and opened fire on the enemy who was racing down the road for cover.⁶

The demolition platoon fought the Germans hand-to-hand. Those still standing in nearby A Company fought with bayonet, knife and rifle-butt swinging, slashing and stabbing in a close-up killing brawl. As Kelly recounts, "It was an appalling scene of men who blasphemed, murdered, maimed and gutted Woensdrecht."⁷

By the next morning, they continued to fight the Germans to a standstill. The obsessed Germans attempted to dislodge the RHLI but could not, and in the end, were themselves defeated. The Rileys had endured for five days and were relieved on October 23. It was a personal victory for LCol Whitaker and the demolition platoon headed by Lt Wight. But there was a terrible price to pay. In this battle alone, the Rileys suffered 161 casualties. The Third Canadian Division had suffered more casualties than any other division in the army group. The Canadian Second Division was second in the horrific competition, a testament to the hard-fighting will of the Canadian soldier.

The next stage for the RHLI and Lt Wight was capturing and holding the Goch-Calcar Road in Germany, February 19–26, 1945.



RILEYS GOCH-CALCAR ROAD AS OF FEBRUARY 19, 1945 (NOT TO SCALE)

Figure 2: The RHLI layout at Goch-Calcar Road ⁸

The Rileys moved up. They were positioned outside Cleve, where they watched that city, like Caen, fall under the devastating impact of 500 bombers. When the burgeoning masses of grey smoke had faded, there was nothing of the city left to see. The following day, the demolition platoon groped through the lousy weather into a rank-smelling ruined cellar inside Cleve ...

... Wright jumped down into the cellar. He looked upset as he gathered the men around him. He tried not to betray his own anxiety when he told them, "We're moving through the Winnipeg Rifles and putting in an attack to capture the high ground close to the Goch-Calcar Road which is going to be one son-of-a-bitch of a job to do. Major Pigott has asked that we be attached to his 'C' Company during the attack to give him extra fire power and some battle wise troops. After 'C' Company gets into its objective, we are to clear up the road and capture a farmhouse and dairy located between 'D' and 'C' Companies, for a Headquarters for Colonel Whitaker. We're also to hold both of these buildings so the heinies can't force a wedge in between the two companies. We are also to supply jeeps to pick up casualties and install trip flares in front of the company positions...."

"Christ!" exclaimed Coty, "the only thing we're not being asked to do is fire the artillery pieces behind us."⁹

Lt Wight had been given his objective, the crossroads at Goch-Calcar Road. In an interview given after the war to LCol Whitaker for his book *Rhineland*, Wight describes in vivid detail the hand-to-hand combat of his demolition platoon with guns and bayonets and hand grenades. On one occasion, they took the farm next to the road and some 20 German prisoners. As he tells it:

Our objective was the crossroads, but there was still one more farm to reach before we could get there. A manned 88 stood near one of the farm buildings. Suddenly, a single Canadian tank appeared. I had no radio or any means of communication, but somehow, by running in front of and alongside the tank, I was able to direct cannon and machinegun fire directly at the farm and the 88 gun, and at the same time indicate that we would rush the farm....

The tanker apparently understood. It was now my difficult task to rally the men for an all-out assault on the farmhouse and the 88 gun. It occurred to me that with fixed bayonets, everyone might gain the courage needed for this sort of head-on attack. The presence of some of my own platoon, whom I had known and respected for months, helped me greatly. I started to sing the Demolition Platoon [sic] theme song, "L'Amour, L'Amour, L'Amour." The men took up the song. Getting close to the building, we charged and threw our grenades. Finally we took the farm and some 20 German prisoners....

We reached our objective, a farmhouse on the road, and every man started frantically to dig in. The fire rained down on us, so no one had to tell the men to dig.¹⁰

He went on to describe his experience as 'hell on earth.' During this encounter, there were 125 casualties in the RHLL, and many were killed. As a leader, Wight had always been deeply committed to the men who fought beside him, often facing death and showing great courage as they moved in the battlefield.

The Canadian artillery pulled the plugs on their guns. A cold assault of steel roared out of the barrels of their thundering cannons.... [T]he carriers on the flanks were the first to go. J.J. Martin, who was driving for Lieutenant Gordie Holder, was on fire, burning like a torch. Holder was dead. Their carrier exploded like a gasoline fed bonfire. Dorky Kew went down, screaming to his death. Both of his legs were blown off. Farrington shot up into the air, his head severed from his neck by a huge piece of shrapnel. Blood spurted from the stub as if it was water from a fire hydrant. Espano, reinforcement from Peterborough, died, cut in half by the machine gun bullets that streamed endlessly from the windows of the farmhouse up ahead. Holtham fell down, bleeding badly. Coty spun around and dropped, wounded. One of the Johnsons suffered a serious shrapnel wound and bled massively. The Germans were dropping rounds of their artillery in behind the Canadians barrage and killing and wounding the Canadians as easily as fish caught in a net. Carriers were burning, crippled by 88s. Men were down in the mud, ripped apart by shells, mortars, and machine gun fire. The screams of the wounded, the pleas of the dying, the shocking state of the shredded bodies and the terrified faces of the men, were stark ingredients in what seemed to be a monumental act of revenge. It was a cameo of war. Posterity's engraving. There was no time, no space, no refuge, no reins to cling to....¹¹

Wight barged into the small building and killed two German paratroopers. O'Reilly reached down and grabbed Moffat's sten gun. He attempted to organize all the available men. Like a crazy man, he led the screaming Rileys at the German paratroops located in another strong point across the field directly in front of them. They were oblivious to the hail of bullets and shell fire that whizzed around them. Hounam was beside O'Reilly. Wight rallied the others and plunged across the field in pursuit of another enemy formation who poured a river of fire at them as they advanced directly toward them. ... Wight ran across the back of a Canadian soldier who lay dead, flat out, face down, on top of the wire which sagged down to the ground from his weight. O'Reilly and Hounam followed. The other men flopped down across the wire and acted as bridges for their comrades. The Germans inside the house were all crack paratroopers from the First Parachute Army. They refused to stop fighting. Men fell like saplings before a bulldozer as they followed Wight and O'Reilly into the farmhouse. The fighting inside was coarse, brutal and soul-murdering. The floors of the house were slippery with blood as a vicious hand-to-hand fight seesawed upstairs and down, into the cellar which was full of hysterical, screaming, crying, praying, German civilians. The place looked and smelled like a slaughterhouse. Some of the paratroopers threw up their hand and cried, "comrade!"

O'Reilly sent the prisoners back with Gil and Forrest. Wight ordered O'Reilly to take a section and attack the dairy and farmhouse and cut the Goch-Calcar Road, while he proceeded with his combination of men from the demolition platoon, the carrier platoon, who were on foot after having their carrier shot out from under them, and the few men of 'C' Company who were still left¹²

Wight was under siege, but he stood his ground. Clancy had reported to him with more men from the handful O'Reilly had brought up from 'A' echelon. Wight had no communication with Whitaker, but he knew the Fort Gary tanks had gone back to refuel and to get more ammunition. He found himself without food and nearly out of ammunition; somehow, Quartermaster Robinson got some through to him. Wight found two slave workers in the farm opposite the crossroads. One was a frail-looking girl, the other a young boy. The girl gave Wight some milk and disappeared. Wight authorized a necklace of tin cans and 75's grenades to be laid across the main road, in an attempt to slow down the attacking German troops. He was the only live and fighting officer in 'C' Company. Lieutenant Thompson had been killed. The fate of Lieutenant Sams was unknown. Wight ordered two men to take up positions with Piat mortars on each side of the main road. He ordered everyone else to dig in. They got hit with tanks and one hundred marching German soldiers who screamed and shouted obscenities. The German tanks broke in on 'C' Company; they ran right over the 75's grenades on the road. The Piat mortars missed them. The fighting was savage; stabbings, strangling, clubbing and a small arms conflict so intense that it was nearly impossible not to get hit. Wight sent a runner back to Whitaker requesting that artillery saturate 'C' company's position. He never saw the runner again, but the artillery fire increased. The Germans drove 'C' company off the crossroads. The dead were heaped and the wounded uncountable.

Wight reported to Whitaker in person, who ordered him not counter attack with men from the Rileys, and Essex Scottish. Wight attacked. A wild bloody encounter ensued and the Rileys, with the help of the Essex Scottish, recaptured the crossroads. The Germans launched another assault, but Wight and his men held. Hank Johnson, from the demolition platoon, mad and beyond caring, jumped up on the road and using his Bren gun like a hose, sprayed a group of Germans who were coming down the road. He returned to the trench where Wight and a German Sergeant were locked in a hand-to-hand fight. Johnson broke the German's head open and killed him with the butt of his Bren gun. Whitaker dispatched more reinforcements to 'C' Company, including a Captain Bolt who was to relieve Wight. Bolt was twice wounded with the North Shore Regiment before he came to the Rileys.

Wight had saved the left flank and averted defeat. The German dead lay twisted, piled, and dishevelled across the entire area. Lee's mortars got on target and began mowing down Germans still left standing in the new Riley stronghold. The Fort Garry tanks who had rushed back up to the front, moved in on the German Panther tanks, but the poor six pounder guns of the Rileys' anti-tank platoon were blasted to hell by marauding Panthers.

The Goch-Calcar road became a raging inferno. Men died and were left to die. Tanks exploded and burned. Barns, houses and other buildings blazed with flames and crumbled into rubble from shells and mortars. Stretcher bearers were shot and killed as they looked after the wounded. Men fought on, so exhausted that they screamed from nerves that were festering and raw. The Goch-Calcar road was a place where men fought for a half-assed highway and fields of cow shit, a place where men fought to stay alive¹³

The demolition platoon heard through the battalion grapevine that the Rileys had sustained a total of 125 casualties in cutting and holding the Goch-Calcar Road. The Rileys had demolished eleven tanks and six self-propelled guns. The top flight German soldiers in the Panzer Lehr division had been so badly disseminated that they withdrew and were transferred to fight against the American Ninth Army. Scuttlebutt was, a number of the men in the Rileys were going to be decorated. They

were all convinced that Wight should win the Victoria Cross for his performance during and after the attack on the Goch-Calcar Road. “If they don’t award the son-of-a-bitch the Victoria Cross, then nobody should ever get one again,” declared O’Reilly.¹⁴

In his book, Kelly called Wight the hero of Goch-Calcar Road, who for some unknown reason never received the Victoria Cross that his men recommended. He was their number one officer. Kelly called Wight “the best officer in the outfit¹⁵.” Kelly goes on to criticize the brass, who in his opinion pushed aside and left out many of the deeds of greatness of the infantrymen and favoured the senior officers. What went wrong with the commanding officer’s commendation system? We’ll never know.

Bob Wight was an infanteer who knew fear but overcame it. He had superior military skills in gunnery and personal combat and was unwaveringly courageous. His split-second timing and action at Goch-Calcar Road in Germany succeeded against great odds in neutralizing the threatening German army. After the war he advanced to the regiment’s top position, lieutenant-colonel. He was an outstanding soldier. He became a civilian at war’s end; and with his wife, Gertrude, he raised a wonderful family in Toronto.

It was my honour to call him my friend. 🌹



ENDNOTES

1. Arthur J. Kelly, *There's a Goddamn Bullet for Everyone* (Paris ON: Tyoworonh Arts and Publishing Co., 1980), p.167
2. *Ibid* p. 186.
3. The character O'Reilly appears throughout the various narratives in this piece. As Kelly points out in the forward to his book "There's a Goddamn Bullet for Everyone" "The books protagonist, Canada O'Reilly, is a composite figure fashioned from the whirling spiralling undercurrents, frustrations, horrors and tensions of war. O'Reilly is not typical. He is the conscience of a generation, hurtled into a moral abyss forced to confront the unconscionable, forced to make decisions that the rest of us only intellectualize about." In short, O'Reilly is a character created to express the general feelings of the men.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
7. *Ibid*, p. 182
8. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 302–3.
10. The above three paragraphs were taken from W. Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Rhineland: The Battle to End the War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989) p. 161–2.
11. Kelly, p. 305–6.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 307–8.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 317–9.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
15. Kelly, p. 190



THE TFK ENGINEER REGIMENT AND SUPPORT TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN

Captain Anthony Robb, MSM

The operating environment in which we find ourselves in southern Afghanistan is comprised of a diverse multitude of agencies, organizations and nations, each potentially possessing unique aims and goals. Canadian doctrine defines this type of milieu as a joint interagency multinational and public (JIMP) environment.¹ This unique and complex JIMP environment truly characterizes southern Afghanistan, and it presented both challenges and opportunities to the Task Force Kandahar (TFK) Engineer Regiment as it planned and executed, in concert with other TFK units, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. In order to be successful in a JIMP environment, engineer commanders and staff must collaborate with these other actors in order to synchronize their efforts, thereby leveraging the benefits of all available resources. In essence, they must embrace the true nature of the collaborative approach. Furthermore, the TFK Engineer Regiment's experience in southern Afghanistan has shown that a robust and task-tailored military engineer organization, complete with its own unique enablers, is an essential component of a task force conducting COIN in a JIMP environment.

Joint is defined as an adjective that denotes activities, operations and organizations in which more than one service of the same nation participates.² While combat engineer regiments (CERs) within the Land Force acted as the primary force generator for the TFK Engineer Regiment, it was also augmented by non-commissioned members and officers from the Air Force and Navy, regular force soldiers, reserve personnel and civilians. In some instances, there exist some interoperability concerns. However, the joint nature of the TFK Engineer Regiment is, in fact, one of its greatest strengths. The unique training and experience possessed by its varied members provide fresh perspectives and new ideas to the engineer team. The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise of naval clearance divers, the trade specific ingenuity and project management experience offered by Air Force construction engineers, the horizontal construction knowledge and close support provided by combat engineers and the contracting power of Defence Construction Canada civilian personnel are only a few of the examples of how TFK Engineer Regiment was strengthened by the diversity of its members. Future deployed engineer organizations must continue to be task-tailored, and every effort must be made to continue to draw the right people with the right capabilities and expertise from across the Canadian Forces (CF).

Interagency is a broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the CF working in conjunction with other agencies, both governmental and non-governmental.³ In the TFK area of operations (AO) there were several such agencies, often working in isolation, attempting to achieve individual and uncoordinated aims.

While this can pose a significant challenge, there are often opportunities, hidden amongst the disarray, which can be exploited, thereby contributing to tactical and operational success. Establishing working relationships early on, combined with aggressive collaborative planning, was the key to unlocking the benefits and resources of these non-military organizations. This is largely due to the fact that the military enjoys one advantage that most other agencies do not: its capacity to plan and synchronize disparate efforts into a unified aim—an action that can often remain transparent to these other organizations. As such, the TFK Engineer Regiment actively strived to understand all of the reconstruction activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other government departments (OGDs) and international organizations (IOs) within the TFK battlespace. Once understood, the TFK Engineer Regiment, using the planning power of its robust headquarters and its responsive engineer construction squadron (formerly known as the construction management organization), planned and executed projects that further enhanced and exploited the work done by NGOs, OGDs and IOs. In one instance, an NGO developed a comprehensive plan for upgrades to key governance infrastructure within the TFK AO. The TFK Engineer Regiment, working hand-in-hand with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), quickly planned and executed additional projects in support of governance such as constructing the Panjwai Line Ministry Building, thereby building on the work programmed by the NGO. The TFK Engineer Regiment also executed a robust road paving and road improvement program that served to connect countless villages, some of which had been severely isolated and disenfranchised, to these newly upgraded and operational district government centres. Despite the disparate sources, all of these projects had the combined effect of increasing GIROA's ability to effectively exercise governance within the TFK AO. In another instance, the TFK Engineer Regiment was able to steer a multimillion dollar US Department of State demining effort so that it aligned with the geographical main effort of the TFK commander, thereby reinforcing the clear to hold transition in a key area within the TFK AO.

Other organizations, over and above NGOs, OGDs and IOs, were essential enablers for the TFK Engineer Regiment as they provided critical services and capabilities not integral to TFK. These organizations (be they private security organizations, explosive detection dogs or engineer heavy equipment companies) often bridged critical capability gaps inherent to the CF. As an example, private security organizations provided force protection for civilian contractors, thereby ensuring that key reconstruction projects could be executed in non-permissive environments without having to commit additional CF soldiers. This ensured that the highly trained CF soldiers were free to conduct kinetic operations in non-permissive areas, vice providing on-site security for reconstruction projects. In short, JIMP environments often contain a plethora of organizations that can assist engineer commanders achieve desired effects. Gaining a solid understanding of their agendas and timelines as well as, where possible, conducting collaborative planning are absolutely essential steps in order to leverage their many benefits.

Multinational refers to military activities, organizations or operations in which the CF participates with one or more allies or coalition partners.⁴ TFK, which was under the command of a multinational divisional headquarters and whose manoeuvre forces included both a Canadian battle group and an American battalion, while, at the same time, partnered with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), can certainly be classified as a multinational brigade operating in a multinational environment. In order to maximize engineer effects, the TFK Engineer Regiment quickly gained a solid understanding of flanking non-Canadian military engineer organizations and consistently strived to leverage their unique capabilities. In many instances, these organizations possessed expertise, equipment and resources that were not inherent the TFK Engineer Regiment, such as deep well drilling and horizontal construction. In other instances, these organizations augmented capabilities that were not abundant within the TFK Engineer Regiment, such as additional route clearance packages, EOD teams and general engineer support (GES) engineers. Given that many TFK Engineer Regiment contractors would not operate in non-permissive environments, it was essential to leverage all of these military engineering capabilities. In the fall of 2010, a construction company from the 864th Engineer Battalion (US) was attached to TFK for the sole purpose of constructing a 15-kilometre line of communication and the requisite tactical infrastructure needed to secure this road into western Panjwai. This essential task was the key to TFK's expansion into an extremely volatile and violent area.

Despite the many benefits to having multinational teams, there are also a diverse multitude of challenges. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has clearly defined command relationships, they are often misunderstood or trumped by national caveats. To continue with the example above, the 864th Engineer Battalion would not formally attach the construction company to TFK as it violated a certain US national policy regarding command and control. With no formal command relationship established, there were, at times, both technical and tactical friction points during the execution of engineer tasks within the TFK battlespace. These friction points, however, were mitigated by ensuring that a solid working relationship existed between the headquarters of the TFK Engineer Regiment, the 864th Engineer Battalion and all subordinate levels.

Interoperability is also an inherent problem when working with other nations' armed forces. Working alongside and developing our Afghan brothers in arms was a top priority for the TFK Engineer Regiment, as that is a well-known key to overall strategic success. Unfortunately, severe logistical shortfalls limited the ability of the ANA to fully deploy into the operating environment. Although tremendous strides have been taken, the ANA still have a limited ability to self-sustain. As such, they often relied on coalition partners to address sustainment issues. From an engineer perspective, this often meant providing continuous GES for the ANA. With CF engineer resources already stretched to the breaking point, this proved to be an extremely difficult endeavour. To further compound the issue, ANA equipment typically required resources that TFK Engineer Regiment GES engineers did not have readily available. As an example, Afghan power generation and distribution adheres to the European 50 Hz standard. The TFK Engineer Regiment only carries North American 60 Hz standard components and their technicians are typically trained with a focus on 60 Hz power and parts. Contingency planning and ingenious problem solving displayed by the TFK Engineer Regiment's Engineer Support Squadron were the keys to overcoming such challenges.



Source: Combat Camera
182005-2021a

Darko Salamic from Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, a dog handler with Task Force Kabul (TFK), uses Tex, an explosive-sniffing 5 year old Belgian Sheppard, to check a vehicle entering Camp Julien in Kabul, Afghanistan



A Canadian Combat Engineer from Task Force Kabul (TFK), runs detonation cord around 122mm rockets prior to an ordnance disposal near Nazer Kala, Afghanistan

Another significant challenge stems from the fact that other nations often operate with a completely different concept of employment. While mission command and initiative are standard practice in the CF, the same was not so for the ANA. Engineer operations typically require forward planning, often well before formal orders are given, in order to ensure that resources are available for task execution. The ANA, with its rigid top-down command structure, whether inadvertently or not, did not promote forward planning at the staff level prior to formal direction and orders issued by commanders. As a result, ANA engineers were very reactive in nature and often ill-equipped and ill-prepared to properly execute engineer tasks, thus making partnering extremely difficult. The TFK Engineer Regiment somewhat mitigated this challenge through partnership at the staff and soldier levels, continuous training and provision of CF resources for ANA engineers. Attempting to change the reactive nature of ANA engineer concept of employment proved to be a difficult endeavour. Instead, developing a sound understanding of the ANA system and facilitating its functioning proved to be the best method to conquer these Afghan-Canadian interoperability issues.

David Kilcullen states that COIN is “a competition with the insurgent for the right and ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.”⁵ The public aspect of the JIMP framework reflects the fact that all campaigns will occur in the public eye and forum: locally, regionally, internationally and domestically (the latter referring to the home nations of contributing nations).⁶ Within the TFK AO, successful COIN has often been realized by applying the define, shape, clear, hold, build and enable model on a selected village. The define, shape and clear phases require concentrated battle-winning units to focus efforts on key areas within a particular village or area. The aim is to quickly and decisively rid the area of insurgents, thereby creating a temporary secure void that can then be exploited through the quick identification and

implementation of reconstruction projects. These projects, often executed by the TFK Engineer Regiment, are key in transitioning from the clear to the hold phase within the COIN model. In short, reconstruction projects serve to reinforce tactical success, thereby further enabling both security and stability in a particular village or area, which is a critical step in convincing the population.


Reconstruction can be viewed as the execution of projects and initiatives that quickly achieve influential gains, thereby reinforcing tactical effects and the perception of security. Reconstruction is a military responsibility, as it is the only organization with the resources, planning capacity and capability to do so. Organizations such as the TFK Engineer Regiment were essential in the rapid implementation of reconstruction projects across the AO, thereby progressively winning population in key areas and immediately reinforcing tactical successes in villages such as Salavat, Zalakhan, Degh-e-Bagh and Talukan. Success was palpably felt within weeks of implementation, as demonstrated in Western Panjwai during the construction of a 15-kilometre road project. In fact, the District Governor of Panjwai, Haji Fazaluddin Agha, made the following comments regarding TFK reconstruction efforts: “In the past 300 years there has never been this much progress seen in Panjwai. People say Panjwai is no longer a district; it is a province. This is called good governance.”

In his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, David Galula remarks, “the counter-insurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way to participate in the fight against the insurgent by such work as building roads.”⁷ As the legitimate authorities of Afghanistan, reinforced by TFK, continuously delivered on promises (such as the construction of roads), the trust of the population was slowly gained, resulting in an increased number of local police initiatives and an unprecedented number of improvised explosive device turn-ins by local nationals. Between September 2010 and July 2011, the TFK Engineer Regiment completed 40 kilometres of route paving, 63 kilometres of route improvement, 60 kilometres of drainage canal construction and averaged a monthly employment of about 735 local Afghans; this sheer volume of reconstruction could not be ignored by the public and was an essential component in TFK’s COIN-winning strategy.

The success of the TFK Engineer Regiment was due, in large part, to the ruthless execution of engineer operations, despite the unique challenges associated with conducting COIN in a JIMP environment. Flexibility, foresight, patience, ingenuity and teamwork proved to be the key characteristics required to overcome these challenges. In a war where various services from over 40 nations comprise the coalition, where countless NGOs, OGDs and IOs operate and where success or failure is dictated by public support, agile and responsive engineer organizations such as the TFK Engineer Regiment are absolutely essential and must be part of future task forces charged with the task of conducting COIN in a JIMP environment. While there are certainly plenty of engineer-specific challenges inherent to a JIMP environment, there are an equal or greater number of opportunities, often hidden amongst the layers, competing agendas and complexities; an astute engineer simply needs to search for them. 🌸

ENDNOTES

1. In May 2007, the Army Terminology Panel defined JIMP as follows: “JIMP refers to a framework of joint, inter-agency and multi-national partners, in a public environment, who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives.”
2. B-GL-300-001/FP-01 *Land Operations* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), p. 2–14.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2–16.
5. David Kilcullen, “28 Articles” (Edition 1, dated March 2006), p. 1.
6. B-GL-300-001/FP-01 *Land Operations* (2008), p. 2–16.
7. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Wesport: Praeger Security International, 1964), p. 82.



Allan Harding MacKay
Portrait of a Canadian Airborne Regiment Soldier
CWM 19960062-127
Beaverbrook Collection of War Art
Canadian War Museum

This painting, entitled 'Portrait of a Canadian Airborne Regiment Soldier,' was completed by Mr. Allan Harding MacKay in early 1993. For reproductions of Canadian War Museum images, or for more information, contact Image Reproduction Services, 1 Vimy Place, Ottawa ON, K1A 0M8, Fax 1-819-776-8623; email Imageservices@warmuseum.ca

SOMALIA, OPERATION DELIVERANCE

Allan Harding Mackay

For many in the Army the word Somalia is inextricably linked to bitter memories of a period in the 1990s when the Canadian Forces (CF) was held to account for the actions of a few. Despite its many mission successes, the Somalia Enquiry resulted in a report damning the leadership of the Canadian Army and ended with the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, a decision for which the effects are still being felt today.

But the early 1990s were troubling times throughout the world. The Cold War had just ended, and there was a perceptible shift from inter-state wars to intra-state conflicts. The resultant explosion of conflicts saw the United Nations launching humanitarian operations at an unprecedented rate. In Africa, the overthrow of Somalia President Siad Barré by a grouping of clan-based factions resulted in nearly one million Somali becoming refugees and over five million facing starvation.

Efforts by the United Nations and non-governmental agencies to provide humanitarian aid were met by bold thievery and looting by Somali *technicals*. As a result, in April 1992 the United Nations authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); however, armed with only a Chapter VI mandate and inadequate manpower, the UNOSOM forces could not counter or control the bandits.

In an effort to regain control of the situation, the United States offered to lead an operation to restore order and ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies. The Security Council accepted the offer and approved the creation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF forces began arriving in Somalia on 9 December and order was quickly restored.


Canadian participation in UNITAF was Operation DELIVERANCE. HMCS Preserver, initially deployed under UNOSOM I (Operation CORDON), was transferred to UNITAF on 6 December. The deployment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), originally slated to participate in Op CORDON in the town of Bosasso in northern Somalia, was reassigned to Belet Huen in West-central Somalia, a hot-bed of “technical” activity. The CARBG began their deployment to Belet Huen in late December 1992.


But UNITAF was only intended as a temporary solution. In its place, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized to use force to preserve the peace, disarm the Somali factions, and assist the flow of humanitarian aid.

While UNITAF was being launched, a national reconciliation conference was being held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. An agreement was reached on 27 March, but from the start, it was clear that the faction led by “General” Muḥamad Faarah Aideed had no intention of honouring the agreement. On 5 June, when Pakistani forces attempted to remove weapons from an Aideed compound, Aideed forces attacked killing or injuring 90 UN personnel. The UN responded by allowing its forces to use ‘all necessary force’ to punish those responsible for the attacks. Consequently, on 12 June the UN began air and ground operations to attack Aideed compounds, storage sites, and clandestine facilities.

But the UNOSOM II offensive was not the deterrent hoped for. UN forces continued to be attacked by any number of the Somali factions in Mogadishu and although none of these attacks were individually costly, the cumulative casualty total became a matter of concern.

The Canadians, who operated out of Belet Huen in West-central Somalia, included the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), the Airlift Control Element (ALCE) and its Hercules aircraft, and 93 Rotary Wing Aviation Flight (93 RWAF). In total, the contingent consisted of roughly 900 personnel and despite the unrest in the capital region, continued its task of delivering humanitarian aid and disarming local militias. They fixed generators, rebuilt schools and hospitals, opened medical clinics and helped organize local relief committees.

In spite of the successes realized by the Canadians (the only contingent to achieve its UN objectives), in late May the decision was made to terminate Canada’s participation in UNISOM II and by early July the last of Op DELIVERANCE personnel had left Africa. 



WITNESS TO WAR: Reporting on Afghanistan 2004–2009

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

DAY, Adam. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010, 292 pages, ISBN: 978-1-894673-38-9

Reviewed by Sergeant Kurt Grant, CD

Over the past four years we have witnessed an increasing number of books being published on the subject of Afghanistan. Unlike the former Yugoslavia, for which there are a scant handful of books covering the 10 years we were deployed there, Afghanistan appears to have captured the imagination of the nation, and commercial publishers are eager to capitalize on the trend.

Christine Blanchford's *Fifteen Days* was among the first to take advantage of this new found interest with her intimate look at the lives of soldiers in the field. Chris Wattie followed with *Contact Charlie*, a battle narrative of Charlie Company, 1 PPCLI in August of 2006. Both books became best sellers. Since then, books such as *Kandahar Tour*, *No Lack of Courage*, *Fob Doc*, *Outside the Wire* and *Afghanistan, the War So Far* have all shed new light on the Canadian experience, each telling their own story from a different perspective.

Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) Press has taken the lead in this trend to publish topical books on current operations by publishing a number of books including Col Ian Hope's *Dancing With the Dushman*, Andy Tamas' *Warriors and Nation Builders* and LCol Conrad's *What the Thunder Said*. To this group we can now add Adam Day's book *Witness to War*.

Day has made three trips to Afghanistan, and unlike the bulk of reporters who never seem to leave Kandahar airfield, he was embedded in the field with the troops when the bullets were flying. In putting the book together, Day has taken the opportunity to expand upon articles he originally wrote for the *Legion* and other publications over a five-year period, to create a series of snapshots of his time in Afghanistan. Like Blanchford and Wattie before him, Day "gets it." Having lived with soldiers in the field, he understands their perspective and their sense of humour. The approach works, and the reader is left with a broad view of Canadian operations over a protracted period of time and a real sense of how the soldiers feel about their mission.

The book is broken into three parts, each representing Day's trips in 2004, 2006 and 2008. As such, the articles clearly demonstrate just how difficult, and complex, the work being done by our troops really is. There are two chapters that tell the story of two of our soldiers, Jamie Murphy and Erin Doyle, a (limited) chapter on the counter-improvised device taskforce, a discussion about the role of civil-military cooperation and an interesting chapter on the ethics of war reporting, a topic not often discussed in public.

Day tells a really good story, but I feel the core of the book centres on chapters four through seven which focus on Operation MADUSA and an interview with BGen David Fraser. Much debate has emerged over the decision to move the start time to capture Objective Rugby (the schoolhouse) ahead by 48 hours, and this is a debate that Day does not shy away from. Indeed, he calls it like he saw it stating "with little if any battle procedure, no reconnaissance and intelligence that was either insufficient or wildly wrong, Sprague (the company commander) led his force down the bank and into the river," to begin the first company-sized mechanized combined arms attack since Korea. But Day is not wedded to his version of the story. He later

notes that after the story was initially published he received an email from a high placed source during the battle that defended the quality of the intelligence and insisted instead that “the intelligence was ignored,” thus adding more fuel to the fire.

For those unfamiliar with Operation MADUSA and the attack on the schoolhouse, it should be noted that this was not the first attempt to take Objective Rugby, but rather the *third*. The Russians were the first, and only one month before Major Sprague launched Charles Company 1 RCR across the river, the PPCLI attempted the same ground during Operation ORION.

The official report of the operation refers to what happened as an ambush. But Day isn't convinced, and points out that:

In some sense that's true; but largely, it is not. On Aug 3, the PPCLI were ambushed at the schoolhouse. Calling September 3 an ambush is sort of like calling what happened at Dieppe an ambush. A small Canadian force was sent on an attack against a numerically superior enemy in a well-established defensive position.

Day is quick to point out that his is only one perspective and notes “in any war story, in whatever form, it's difficult for a writer to include the full perspective of everyone involved in the action.” For this reason, I was pleased to read the interview with BGen Fraser immediately following the MEDUSA entries. Fraser defends his decision to advance the schedule by saying:

You fight the enemy guided by a plan. You don't fight a plan. If you fight a plan and ignore the enemy, you will fail. You will incur lots of casualties and you will fail. A plan only gets you thinking and gets you to meet the enemy and the enemy has a vote. So probably on the 1st or the 2nd I had decided the situation was changing so that we could attack.


The remainder of the interview is well worth the read as one gets a real sense of the commander and his relationship with the officers on the ground.

The book is liberally peppered with high quality black and white photographs to help the reader get a sense of the ground, but if this book has any weaknesses it's that it lacks maps. The narrative on Operation MEDUSA would have been better served if the reader were able to relate to the ground. From a historical perspective, the Canadian Forces would do well to capture as much information and intelligence on this battle as possible and create a sand model so that it can teach the lessons learned to up-and-coming commanders. This is an important battle, and it deserves to be studied.

As the history of our time in Afghanistan continues to emerge, it's essential to understand where this book fits. Clearly, it is not an official history for that will not be written for many years to come. Neither too is it a personal account, though it does contain personal recollections. Rather, *Witness to War* can best be described as a battle narrative, based on personal experience, interviews with the participants and additional research. The narrative that emerges is engaging and sufficiently detailed to give the reader an intimate account of the subject matter being discussed. Each story is well rounded and, as such, will serve as an important touchstone for future historians because it contains a wealth of information and observations compiled by a trained observer and storyteller. One such observation was made during an early visit. At the end of one of his articles he notes that “according to no less an authority than history itself, the trick to winning in Afghanistan may not be the invasion or the occupation, but clear parameters for a well-timed withdrawal.”

Indeed.

Witness to War and other books from CDA Press are not available in stores, but can be ordered by members of the CF and defence professionals free of charge directly from the CDA website at <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/TheCanadianDefenceAcademyPress-eng.asp>. 🌸



MILITIA MYTHS:

Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896–1921

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

WOOD, James. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010, 350 pages, ISBN 9780774817660

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp

The debate over what form the Canadian Army should take—professional standing army or citizen volunteer militia—is as old as Confederation itself. Born in the latter decades of the Victorian era and still in vogue today, this argument has fostered sharp emotional criticism from every quarter both internal and external to the military.

Yet as with many venerable arguments, those who still debate the “militia myth” today have largely forgotten the original context from which the fight evolved. In the superb analysis of *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier*, however, Canadian historian James Wood recaptures the ideological origins and evolution of the conceptual foundations that shaped Canada’s Army during its most formative years. Beginning in the Laurier era and following the debate through to the end of the First World War, the author draws the reader easily through a series of critical national events that shaped the country’s land force development from the 1895 Venezuela Crisis to the demobilization of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

In essence, this study is about the nature and characteristics of the archetypal Canadian soldier and his transformation between 1896 and 1921 from long-serving militiaman to untrained citizen volunteer. As Wood rightly points out at the beginning of his study, it is a transformation that has often been sorely misunderstood and misinterpreted by previous historians, who preferred to simplify the Army’s evolution during this period as a polarized confrontation between progressive British-minded mentoring “professionals” and backward colonial patronage appointed “amateurs.”

Using comprehensive and readily available primary source evidence, Wood identifies a third group involved in this evolution—a community of professionally minded militia officers whose efforts Canadian historians have mostly overlooked. Tracing their debates through a number of professional journals (such as *The Canadian Military Gazette*, *Canadian Defence*, *Canadian Field*, *Canadian United Services Magazine* and others), these soldiers proposed a third option for Canada—a citizen army focused mainly on self-defence. It was an option that was more successfully received by government than we have been previously led to believe. Along similar lines, Wood’s analysis also reveals the richness of the Army’s strategic culture and thinking during this period, something that too many historians have wrongly claimed was lacking or non-existent. Not only does his work draw from the original writings of a number of Canadian soldiers, doing so reminds us of the tremendous number of professional military publications that existed during this period as well as the depth of analysis they offered.


Beyond the ideas surrounding the development of a citizen army in Canada, Wood also presents perhaps the first in-depth analysis of the history of the debate surrounding the adoption of universal military training in Canada prior to the First World War. Contrasting Canada’s own experiences with those of other dominions in the Empire, the author adds yet another layer of detail to his complex yet engaging subject. Finally, Wood investigates the impact of the First World War on the ideology of the citizen soldier, revealing how the experience of total war forever reshaped the concept and effectively ended the pre-war militia

volunteer ideal. What is perhaps most poignant about this part of Wood's analysis are the parallels that may be drawn with the aftermath of the First World War and the way the Army's primary reserve is being perceived today following the end of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan.

Historian James Wood has in a single effort replaced many outdated and erroneous myths about Canada's Army with solid evidence-based research and analysis, effectively delivering what will undoubtedly become a must-have book in every Canadian military library. *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier* is one of the best books in Canadian military history I've read this year, and it is highly recommended to all. 🍁



Source: PA-002451



BOMBHELL:

The many faces of women terrorists

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BLOOM, Mia. Toronto: Penguin, 2011, hardcover, 308 pages, \$32.00, ISBN: 978-067006982-8

Reviewed by Captain Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald

Suicide bombers are the epitome of asymmetric warfare. They are clearly the weapon of choice for international terrorism. They are the ultimate smart bomb and weapon of mass destruction combined; in that, suicide bombers can change or abort their mission at will; only the most strengthened defence can (possibly) deter them; they are cost effective

in the sense of planning (no need to plan an extrication operation) and in the cost of material versus casualties caused; they attract greater media attention than conventional weaponry and; finally, they leave little in the way of residual intelligence for their targets to exploit. It is therefore not surprising that an estimated seventeen terrorist organizations in fourteen separate countries espouse the use of suicide bombers as a means of achieving their ends.¹ From Bali to Chechnya, Moscow to Kandahar City, suicide terrorism has come of age.

Equally disturbing, as analyzed by noted Canadian author² and academic, Mia Bloom, in her new book, *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, is the trend to increased use of females as suicide bombers in what was, traditionally, a male-dominated form of combat. Building on her earlier work, interviews with various female bombers and other terrorists and with a firm grasp on the secondary literature in the area, Professor Bloom persuasively argues that the engenderment of suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon but has gained increased public awareness due to recent events.

Bombshell is a very important study in this emerging area for many reasons. It first examines the history of suicide terrorism. Bloom traces the genesis of suicide terrorism to the *Nizari*, an Ismaili Islamic sect, more commonly known in the West as the "Assassins."³ The primary goal of this group was to purify Islam by returning all Islamic communities of believers (*umma*) into a single collective. Suicide bombers have a more recent incarnation in the *kamikaze* (Divine Wind) of the Japanese Imperial Navy. Japanese naval pilots were trained to ram their fully fuelled and armed aircraft into American naval vessels, principally aircraft carriers and battleships in the hopes of either sinking or disabling them.⁴ The broader use of suicide as a weapon of political dissent was found in the hunger strikes of various male and female IRA prisoners⁵ and in the self immolation of Buddhist priests in the 1960s in Viet Nam. Suicide terrorism, as a strategic weapon, enjoyed a resurgence in 1981 during the occupation of Lebanon.⁶ *Hezbollah* recruited both male and female bombers among Lebanon's Shia Muslim, Maronite Christian, communist and socialist communities. This strategy culminated in the 1983 bombing of the United States marine barracks in Beirut that resulted in the deaths of 241 military personnel. The point Bloom makes is that throughout history, irrespective of religion and for a number of discrete reasons, there are people who are prepared to die for their beliefs; even if the reasons their deaths are not understood and even reviled by many.

The strategic logic of the female suicide bomber is also examined. Notwithstanding that the use of women as suicide bombers conflicts with some fundamentalists' perspectives, women bombers serve the tactical need

for a stealthier weapon. They enjoy many advantages denied their male counterparts. They exploit the female stereotype of the “fairer, gentler” sex. They can blend in with their target by resorting to less traditional more western dress, even portraying themselves as being in the latter stages of pregnancy. Their gender results in a reluctance by government security forces to search them. This reluctance is particularly manifested in more conservative societies, the venue of the majority of the bombings. Moreover, use of females as suicide bombers has significantly increased the number of potential combatants, the pool of potential bombers has increased by 50%. Women, Bloom argues, are more successful in penetrating their targets more deeply than men, resulting in a greater number of casualties per mission. Female bombers, according to Bloom, attract eight times the global media attention than men. Finally, the use of female bombers has an enhanced psychological impact, both in the domestic and in the international sphere, in that female suicide bombers erase the traditional distinction between combatant and non combatant. If women are prepared to give up their traditional roles, so the argument goes, the goals of their sponsoring organizations must be just; equally so, an occupying force which compels women to abandon their homes and family to make the ultimate sacrifice, must be evil.



Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) speak to an Afghan woman with the help of an Afghan interpreter (left) during a foot patrol in Panjwayi district, Afghanistan

Bloom agrees with a number of other authors in this area who have studied the demographics of the suicide bomber. Bloom's contribution in this area is the analysis of bomber demographics placed within a female paradigm. Contrary to public perception, suicide bombers are not wild eyed, drug crazed, under educated, under employed religious fanatics. Quite the reverse, most female bombers are primarily secularists who are motivated along nationalistic lines. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which fought for an independent Tamil country, have the highest proportion of female bombers in the world.⁷ Similarly, the Black Widows of Chechnya fight for their country's independence.⁸ Bloom writes that most female suicide bombers are older than their male counterparts. While the present evidence is far from conclusive, female bombers appear to come from all economic and social classes, from the unemployed to the professional, from the poor to the middle class. Most have lost a close family member to the war or are married to a committed *jihadi*. There is no credible evidence that, unlike their *hashishiyyin* ancestors, female suicide bombers are incapacitated by drugs either during their training or during the mission itself.

What, then, motivates women to become suicide bombers? In the most interesting part of her analysis, Bloom posits that the “four Rs plus one” – *revenge*, *redemption*, *relationship*, *respect* and *rape* motivate women to become suicide bombers. *Revenge* for the death of a loved one or for the occupation of one’s country; *redemption* from the disgrace of being raped or abused by the soldiers of the occupying forces; a *relationship*, marriage or otherwise, with a known insurgent or *jihadi*; the *respect* of the community for their actions, a respect not easily gained in a male dominated, conservative society and, finally, *rape* or the coercive use of sexual violence to force women into this form of warfare.⁹ The rate at which women are kidnapped by, sold to, given over to the *jihadi* by family members is growing at an alarming rate, particularly in Iraq and Chechnya. Bloom asserts that feminism is not a driver influencing women to become bombers. Oppression along nationalistic, not gender, lines is the basis for female participation in a terrorist organization.


Bloom completes her story with; arguably, the weakest portion of her analysis by attempting to answer the question: What can be done to counter this growing threat? She provides a number of strategies. The increased use of female security operatives would deny the use of gender as camouflage. She suggests the following options: delegitimizing the use of violence as a means of political discourse, deglamourizing of the female bomber in the global media and demobilizing of the female bomber by providing a non violent political voice for this marginalized group. These strategies, either singularly or collectively, are not gender specific. They apply equally as well to male bombers. The spectre and horror of the suicide bomber will only be eradicated when the fallacious doctrinal, religious and ideological constructs creating them are exposed for what they truly are and are repudiated from within or when the communities whose interests these human WMD supposedly protect, rise up and renounce them. 🌸

ENDNOTES

1. The prevalence of this type of weaponry is reflected by those political organizations which use the suicide bomber. From the left to the right, secularists to fundamentalists, the suicide bomber is the weapon of the weak and, arguably, the weapon of last resort. The Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNA), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Fatah Tanzim, Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Jemah Islamiya (JI), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Chechen rebels are example of political groups that count the suicide bomber as part of their arsenal.
2. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press (2005); Mia Bloom, “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism” in Ami Pedahzur (ed) *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, New York: Routledge (2007)
3. Bloom fails to mention the Zealots, a Jewish sect who, in the First Century A.D. used suicide attacks to kill Roman citizens and Jewish collaborators: Robert Pape, *Dying to Win*, New York: Random House (2006).
4. In the battle of Okinawa (April–June, 1945) the *kamikaze* operation accounted for 1400 sorties, five thousand deaths and the sinking of 35 ships: Pape, *ibid.*, 21.
5. The most famous of these Irish patriots was Bobby Sands who died in Maze prison on May 5, 1981 after a 66 day hunger strike. He was elected to Parliament during his incarceration. Eight other prisoners followed his example.
6. The first known attack by a female suicide bomber was either Dalel Al Maghribi, a Fatah commander, who hijacked then blew up an Israeli bus killing herself and thirty six passengers in 1978 or Khyadali Gana who, in 1985, drove a truck into a IDF convoy killing two Israeli soldiers: Debra D. Zedalis, *Female Suicide Bombers*, Washington: Strategic Studies Institute (2004)
7. On May 21, 1991, Thenmuli Rajaratnam (aka Dhanu) assassinated the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur. She wore a suicide vest containing a quantity of C-4 explosives and large number three millimetres steel balls for added effect. The blast killed her, Ghandi and sixteen others.
8. The Black Widows of Chechnya were instrumental in the failed 2002 bombing of the Moscow House of Culture (*Dubrovka*), the successful bombing of the Moscow subway on March 29, 2010 (28 dead, 60 wounded) and the equally successful January 24, 2011 Moscow airport bombing (35 dead, 100 wounded)
9. Media reports indicate that Samira Ahmed Jassim (51), a Pakistani women, facilitated the rape of at least eighty women (28 of whom later became suicide bombers) and then converted them into bombers by preying on their religious and cultural attitudes towards honour and virginity: <http://www.hudson-ny.org/1099/the-female-jihad-1>
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article5653088.ece>;



Source: Combat Camera
AR2005-A01-237a



THE INFORMATION FRONT:

The Canadian Army and news management during the Second World War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BALZER, Timothy, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, 257 pages, hardcover, \$85.00, ISBN: 978-0774818995, paperback, \$32.95, ISBN: 978-0774819008

Reviewed by Mr. John MacFarlane

During the Second World War the country's military developed public relations units to censor, supervise and assist war correspondents. In 1939, as there existed no ready-to-apply template for this important function, policies and procedures—shaped by a variety of groups with often conflicting objectives—emerged to get “appropriate” information to Canadians. The government, the press, the public, and Canadian and allied military groups disagreed on the optimal balance between the truth, an independent press and military considerations. Timothy Balzer looks at how the Canadian Army met the challenge.

With the exception of one chapter, not included in the book, *The Information Front* began as a doctoral thesis. A version of this interesting chapter, on casualty notification and publication, has fortunately been published in *Canadian Military History*, Winter 2011. The topic of the book is well chosen and the decision to focus on Army public relations (PR) appropriate. Some sections seem repetitive, partly due to a long conclusion and combined chronological approach in part I with the case studies in part II; of course other structures would have led to different criticism from grumpy historians. More important, the book is based on impressive primary research, good use of related secondary sources and provides fascinating reading.

The first and fourth chapters deal with the early years and initial attempts, by several groups, to define PR objectives and activities; including, the Wartime Information Bureau (WIB). There were few “good news” stories available at the time, when information was heavily sanitized. Balzer argues that the “deceptive” coverage was a “low point.” The case study of Dieppe, August 1942, highlights the progress that had been made as well as problems still to be ironed out. One minor quibble in this section: the affirmation that historian C.P. Stacey was “forced” by the British coordinator of the raid, Lord Mountbatten, to modify his account of Dieppe requires greater support to convince. One theme of these early years that the author handles particularly well, is the failure to develop adequate French-speaking PR structures. Too many Anglophone historians have quickly concluded that translating appeals to defend the British Empire was sufficient; it was not (often harming more than helping) and there was a connection between support for the war effort and effective PR.

Balzer deals with the next phase of the war in chapters two and five, with a focus on the Sicilian campaign in July–August 1943. In general, the news was better by this time but he argues that coverage, while not as deceptive as with Dieppe, remained too vague. Problems related to coordinating policies with Allies and providing access to correspondents in the field, continued.

Finally, with the campaign in Northwest Europe, the good news arrives. However, the three case studies are anything but good news: the killing of Canadian prisoners by the 12th SS Panzer division; the massacre of the Black Watch during Operation SPRING; and the accidental bombings of Canadian troops during

Operation TOTALIZE and Operation TRACTABLE. Acceptable procedures had emerged and relations were generally good between all affected groups, but Balzer uses these cases to illustrate that the news remained sanitized, focussed on heroism and avoided subjects such as battle exhaustion.



Source: Library and Public Archives Canada

Weekly newspaper editors observe male machinist at the Otis Fenson Plant. May 1941 / Toronto, ON

The Information Front contributes to our understanding of an important subject, throwing light on many issues still very relevant today. Journalists very close to the military were considered to be too close to be objective by other journalists very far away. Uniformed men could not be objective, uninformed men could not know; as it is today, the debate over 'embedded journalists' took many forms. When considering the issue of objectivity during the Second World War, Balzer correctly emphasizes the unique relationship between the military and the media: "It would be a mistake to think that war correspondents wished to provide 'objective' reporting on the war and that the censors prevented them. The war correspondents were also eager to promote Canada's war effort." (p. 79). The same relationship did not exist in Vietnam, or any war since, affecting both military efficiency and media access. Other issues apply less today. Technological advances since 1945 provide new possibilities for sharing information through television, the internet and something my daughter calls "twitter." Groups discussing how best to manage the news in future wars, to the degree it will be possible; will have to deal with many new fronts.

John MacFarlane is a historian at the Directorate of History and Heritage, DND. He is the author of *Triquet's Cross: A Study in Military Heroism*, and is currently working on the official history of Canadian observers in Indochina, 1954–1973. 🍁



KISS THE KIDS FOR DAD:

The wartime letters of George Timmins, 1916-18

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

Edited by BENNETT, Y.A. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009, softcover, 208 pages, \$32.95, ISBN: 978-0774816090

Reviewed by Colonel Peter J. Williams, CD

With the passing of Canada's last veteran of the First World War, we are now almost completely reliant on accounts such as these to give us a sense of what it was truly like to be a soldier in the trenches during what was originally called, "The Great War."

The good news for historians or those with an interest in such accounts is that increasingly the

relatives of those departed veterans are finding long forgotten (or hidden?) boxes filled with letters and diaries of their departed loved ones who served overseas with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) from 1914–1918.

Such is the case with this book on the letters of Private George Timmins, which had long lain, lovingly tied with a ribbon, in his wife's dresser, and which were discovered decades later by his grandson, when he retrieved a sweater for his grandmother from the same drawer.

George Timmins was a native of England who married May and thereafter moved to Canada to escape poverty and the class system he found repelling in his native land, eventually settling in Oshawa and working in the steel industry. By the time of his enlistment in the 116th Battalion of the CEF in 1916 he had three young children. He was later transferred to the 18th Battalion, with whom he saw service in the now iconic battles of Vimy, Passchendaele, among others. He was wounded in 1918 and invalided home.

I have read many such accounts based on personal diaries and letters and have found this to be one of the most heavily researched I've come across: the end of the book is supplemented with a very detailed Notes section which runs to some 59 pages. The extensive bibliography is equally impressive, and includes a work with the interesting title. Sadly, the letters which May and the children wrote back to George did not survive, though throughout his writings he makes reference to having received them. George's letters are published as they were written, with only very occasional deletions due to the censor's hand. What I find continually amazing is the relatively short time it took (by 1900s standards) for letters from Canada to reach recipients: on average George would receive letters, or "care packages" from Oshawa in about 3–4 weeks, including the time it took to cross the Atlantic by boat. I compare this with the close to a month it would often take mail to reach me from Canada while serving on a UN mission in Africa some years ago.

The letters begin with descriptions of George's basis training in Niagara camp, after which he was quickly shipped overseas, arriving in Liverpool in early August 1916. By October he is writing from "Somewhere in France." Despite his military duties, George was able to write May and the children on average once a week.

If there is a constant theme which came across for me it is that George Timmins was a good man. Throughout the war he exhibited a constant concern for his wife and children, seeking to assure them that he was well, and that in the post war era, there would still be jobs available for such as he. He was also a rather humble man, and whether due to a heightened awareness of operational security, largely skips over the battle

of Vimy Ridge, merely stating in a letter of 24 April, that, “That was when the Canadian made their advance. We seem to be able to win now at any point.”¹ The controversial battle of Passchendaele some months later, elicits a different response from George, as he writes May, that, “That stuff I’m telling you about Belgium I don’t think I’d give it to the papers yet. Wait till you get it all.”²


While seeking to shelter his family from the horrors of the war, George also gives his views on Canadian military administration (the “rottenest affair in the world”³), the honours and awards system (“In the army the man with a little influence gets decorated...the man that does the work is ignored.”⁴) and even politics (“I’m inclined to socialism”⁵).

I greatly enjoyed this book, and would most strongly recommend this to soldiers about to deploy, as it addresses many of the issues and challenges they’ll most likely face. In an era with access to Skype and all the technology of the modern age, if we can heed George’s call to “Don’t forget to write”, and put pen to paper once in a while, we’ll leave a lasting legacy for those who follow us, both scholars and general readers alike.

Colonel Williams is Director Current Operations on the Strategic Joint Staff. He also serves as Regimental Colonel, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. 🍁


ENDNOTES

1. Bennett, Y.A., ed., *Kiss the Kids for Dad: The Wartime Letters of George Timmins* (Vancouver, UBC press, 2009), p. 53
2. *Ibid.*, p. 77
3. *Ibid.*, p. 88
4. *Ibid.*, p. 88
5. *Ibid.*, p. 103



BUSH WARFARE

In the Victorian Era, many young talented Canadians graduating from the Royal Military college of Canada went on to serve in the British Army. William Charles Gifford Heneker, from Sherbrooke, Quebec, was one of them. Between 1896 and 1906 Heneker served in more than a dozen African campaigns ranging from peacetime military engagements to major combat operations. As a tactical commander, Henniker demonstrated considerable talent and skill, and in 1907, he preserved his strategic and tactical ideas on fighting small wars and counterinsurgency (Bush Wars) in this book for future commanders to consider.



OUT OF NOWHERE:

A history of the military sniper, from the sharpshooter to Afghanistan

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

PEGLER, Martin. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2011, softcover, 302 pages, \$16.95, ISBN: 978-1-84908-645-5

Reviewed by Sergeant Kurt Grant, CD

Mention the word “sniper” to an average person and the image that often springs to mind will be one of an individual with a scoped rifle about to take a shot at someone. While pulling the trigger is one aspect of sniping, little is ever mentioned about the other 90% of their job.

As a result, the myths surrounding what snipers actually do are more often replete with false information than real, accurate fact. With few books that delve deeply into the reality of the job, it is no small wonder that so much false information abounds. In part this is because snipers, by necessity, work away from the battalion. Also, as a battalion-level resource, snipers rarely ‘mix and mingle’ and a mystique quickly develops around them as stories of their exploits slowly emerge.

For Instance, we all know of the 2430 m shot taken by Corporal Rob Furlong of the PPCLI, but what else was he doing in the mountains of Afghanistan? Despite proven effectiveness on every battlefield since South Africa, the trade (and I use this word ‘trade’ quite deliberately here) and the skill of marksmanship have been met with indifference; as emphasis has been focused on “more important” aspects of soldiering. Interestingly, it has only been since the post-Vietnam era that the sniper has been recognized as a legitimate “weapons system” and thus found a permanent place within the battalion structure.

Into this field of confusion, Osprey Publishing has launched Martin Pegler’s book: *Out of Nowhere: a History of the Military Sniper, From the Sharpshooter to Afghanistan*. Written in an easy to read style, this book takes the reader through sniper concept development from its earliest days to the present. This is the second iteration of this text. Like the first, by delving into the human side of sniping, this latest edition works hard to dispel the many myths and negative connotations presently associated with the sniping profession. Interviews and examples aptly illustrate how snipers were generally treated; by enemies and allies alike, with misunderstanding, awe, and fear. Along the way, the reader begins to realize that sniping is far more than just pulling the trigger, and is not a profession for everyone, as illustrated by a 30% washout rate before the course even starts.

Pegler takes a broad approach by examining the historical approaches of numerous countries to the sniper profession. Beginning with evolution of the rifleman in the 1500s, he covers the development of sharpshooters in medieval Europe and the riflemen of the US Civil war, then continues the discussion up to the modern era and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Along the way, the reader learns about the development of various weapons and their use on the battlefield.

Despite his attempt to describe the evolution of sniping in a broad context, in the end, he seems drawn back to the American experience and body of evidence. This is not necessarily a bad thing for the American sniping experience is a rich and varied one; however, it does remind the reader that this book is written primarily for an American audience. In the end Pegler’s book can be described as a 5000 ft fly over on the subject. And rightly so, since the only way to effectively cover nearly 500 years of history is to remain focused on only one aspect of it; the *evolution* of the trade.

While the history of sniping could very easily be turned into several volumes, Pegler has managed to condense his research to a script a little over three hundred pages in length. Even so, the work is packed with plenty of interviews, photographs and anecdotal evidence to illustrate the various points of discussion. This is one of the most comprehensive yet entertaining books about sniping that I've read, and I highly recommend it to anyone with more than a passing interest in the subject. 🍷



Source: Combat Camera
APD02 5344



BATTLE GROUND:

The greatest tank duels in history

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

ZALOGA, Steven J. (Editor). Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011, hardcover, 368 pages, \$30.00, ISBN: 978-1-84908-551-9

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp

Since their entry onto the battlefield during the First World War, the tank has rightfully earned a place of great respect in the annals of military history. In this latest offering from Osprey Publishing, editor Steven J. Zaloga collects together what he considers to be the five greatest tank duels in history.

They are in order:


- a. T-34 vs Panther in the Ukraine, 1943;
- b. Tiger vs Sherman Firefly in Normandy, 1944;
- c. M26 Pershing vs T34/85 in Korea, 1950;
- d. Centurion vs T-55 in the Golan Heights, 1973;
- e. M1 Abrams vs T-72 in Operation DESERT STORM, 1991.

Though Osprey had previously published each of these “duels” separately, Zaloga brings together these five engagements into a single attractive hardcover volume and includes additional illustrations, commentary and analysis. The end result is effective enough, and for those who have not previously sought out this title from Osprey, this volume may offer a good opportunity to do so.

If one ignores debating what the title of the book infers for the moment, this edited volume offers a decent survey of the history of armoured warfare in the 20th century by examining five relevant and detailed case studies. Each chapter follows a similar formula, beginning with the introduction of the historical context for the encounter and then followed by a detailed examination of the design and construction of the two opposing weapon systems. As is typical with all Osprey publications, these sections are lavishly illustrated with profile artwork, turret cutaway diagrams, and details on types and qualities of tank ammunition. Subsequent sections in each chapter examine the crew, their training, and then finally the action itself and how it was fought. For the novice, each of these sections provides a good introduction to understanding how exactly a tank is tactically applied in battle.

Given the aim and scope of the book, the omission of a study of the very first tank duel at Villers-Bretonneux on 24 April 1918 seems something of an oversight, as does the lack of serious mention of armoured engagements during the interwar period. One also gets the feeling, at times, that the real aim of this book is to highlight only those engagements relevant to American readers rather than a more balanced examination of the subject, but such is often the case with general survey books. Perhaps nowhere does this become more obvious than in the chapter examining Tiger vs Sherman Firefly. Though Canadian armour in Normandy is mentioned in passing here, for example, the focus is clearly upon the continued lionization of *SS-Hauptsturmführer* Michael Wittmann and the British claim of having killed him on the battlefield. As Osprey continues to develop its tank DUEL series in the future, perhaps future volumes might collect together other important engagements beyond the purely Anglo-American experience.

As an introduction to the subject, this book is recommended. It makes useful reading on the history of armoured warfare and presents the topic in an attractive volume. Osprey, Zaloga and each of the chapter authors are to be commended for their work on this book. 🍷



ZULU RISING:

The epic story of iSandlwana and Rorke's drift

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

KNIGHT, Ian. London: MacMillan, 2010, hardcover, 697 pages, \$36.99, ISBN: 978-1405091855

Reviewed by Captain Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald

As a young boy, I can remember sitting with my father and watching the movie *Zulu*,¹ the classic depiction of the battle of Rorke's Drift on January 22–23, 1879. I can still remember my father, who was *not* an infanteer, remarking that *Zulu* was the epitome of disciplined small unit tactics. Many years later, I watched the movie,

Zulu Dawn,² which depicted events at the battle of iSandlwana and, where twenty four hours earlier, the British No. 3 Column was almost annihilated to the last man. I remember thinking to myself, “What a bloody shambles. How could these two events, so dissimilar in their results, be connected?” In his recent book, internationally recognized author and expert on the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), Ian Knight,³ examines the connection between the two battles. In doing so, using archival materials, the personal papers of many of the participants, the oral histories of the Zulu nation and archaeological evidence unearthed many years after the battle; he faithfully reconstructs an almost hour by hour reconstruction of events.

The ostensible cause of the war was the kidnapping and; eventually, the murder of two Zulu women (one of the royal Zulu household) who had fled to Natal following allegations of their infidelity. The real cause was not so exotic. The British Empire was expanding in southern Africa and needed a buffer between its colonies and the lands of the Zulu nation, itself an imperial and expansionist nation. And; of course, there was the recent discovery of diamonds. Unlike most modern wars, the Anglo-Zulu War was not initiated by the government of the day but by two English officials, Theophilus Shepstone⁴ and Sir Bartle Frere, militarily aided and abetted by Lord Chelmsford. This war was to be a quick and decisive campaign. No native population; so it was thought, could stand up to the might of the British Empire whose armies, officered by men who had been victorious in the Crimean War and in a number of smaller conflicts, were equipped with the latest military technology; the fast and accurate, breech loading, Martini-Henry rifle, cannon, cavalry and rockets. The enemy would be defeated, his lands taken and London would be presented with a *fait d'accompli*, which they would have to acknowledge and reward those responsible. The Zulu was dismissed as the *kaffir* whose short stabbing spear (*assegai* or *illwa*), knobkerrie (*iwisa*) and cow hide shield (*ihawu*) could not stand up against the massed firepower of a British regiment. The arrogance of these men did not consider that the Zulu was defending themselves on their ancestral land against an imperialist invader. The Zulus could only respond in the only way open them with predictable results—iSandlwana.

On Wednesday, January 22, 1879, the Zulu launched a highly disciplined double envelopment attack (“the horns of the buffalo” or *impondo zankhoman*) on the British camp. In a two hour battle the British Centre Column was decimated, losing 1,329 (both British and native) of its approximately 1,700 members. Only 55 British soldiers escaped to make their return along Fugitive's Drift to Natal. It is estimated that the

Zulus regiments (*ibutho*) suffered 1,500 casualties. Knight attributes this *debacle* to a number of causes including: Chelmsford dividing his forces that day without first fixing the location of the Zulu army; inadequate reconnaissance the day of the battle; LCol Pulleine (the commander of the camp) placing the six companies of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 24th Foot so far ahead of the camp as to make resupplying them difficult and, at the same time, increasing the frontage of each company thereby decreasing the effectiveness of their fire; the retirement of Col Durnford's cavalry on the right flank opening up the camp to direct attack; failing to strike the camp at the onset of the attack impeding the subsequent withdrawal through the camp; failure to entrench (*laager*) the camp the night before; and finally, the diminished battle worthiness of the various native contingents attached to the British column. With almost forensic precision, Knight dismisses a number of myths that have been created; perhaps, in the hope of salvaging imperial pride: the "ammunition box" theory for the defeat;⁵ the notion that the end came all at once without any evidence of a final "last stand"; and the stringing up, torture and eventual murder of the two young drummer boys. Towards the end of the battle, it was hand to hand fighting, bayonet against spear, killing at close quarter. There is no way to soften this type of combat and Knight does not try. Flesh was skewered and torn about, heads were caved in, blood and brains scattered apart with disembowelment (*hlomula*) to follow. Notwithstanding questions about the leadership of the senior officers that day, the author provides many examples of the discipline and bravery of the British soldier that day.⁶



Depiction of the battle from the *Illustrated London News*

The attack on Rorke's Drift, the following day, was not planned. Neither was it coordinated when executed. The right wing of the Zulu army was responsible for the flanking of the British camp at Isandlwana and the interdiction of any British escapees. The king's brother, who led these regiments, was not satisfied with this secondary role. He wanted to share in the fame and in the spoils that had befallen the warriors at iSandlwana; and so, contrary to Cetshwayo's express order not to invade British Natal, he moved on the Drift. The almost accidental start of the battle does not detract from its heroics. The defenders were indeed "pinned like rats in a hole." The defenders are well known to history but Knight corrects some liberties taken with them through the ages: B Coy of the 2nd/ 24th Foot was an English regiment, garrisoned at Brecon, Wales, composed of

a sprinkling of Welshman;⁷ there was no singing or dancing during the battle by either combatant and certainly no singing of “Men of Harlech”; there was no final pitched assault on the last day, the fighting having petered out the previous midnight; Pte Hook was not the gin soaked malingerer depicted in the movie but a teetotaler; the near deaf Lt Gonville (“Gunny”) Bromhead, the scion of a military family, was, according to a fellow officer, “a capital fellow at everything except soldiering”; Lt John Chard RE described as “somewhat lazy” was not so shaken by the battle as to not enjoy the fame it brought him, including dinner with Queen Victoria; Colour Sergeant Bourne was young (25) and extremely junior (youngest Col Sgt in the British Army) in his rank, called “the kid” by his men and did not play a central role in the battle. The real hero of the battle, according to Knight, was Acting Assistant Commissary James Dalton who persuaded Chard, as the senior officer present, to stand and fight. The victory at Rorke’s Drift was seized on by the military to deflect criticism of the ill-advised invasion (not the first or last time such a tactic was used). Notwithstanding the ultimate success of the campaign, the sacking of the Zulu royal household at ONdini (Ulandi) in July, the individual reputations of Chelmsford and Frere never recovered and both returned to England in varying degrees of disgrace.

Zulu Rising can only be described as magisterial. It provides a highly readable, gripping *tour de force* of the end of one empire and the beginning of another. It examines not only every aspect of the early days of the conflict but provides a comprehensive background to the conflict. The author describes in detail the training, tactics and practices of the combatants. The reviewer has a few observations which do not detract from the overall excellence of the book. Notwithstanding the title, the author focuses on Isandlwana while the defence of Rorke’s Drift appears to be an afterthought. More could have been said about this latter battle. Maps, properly located in the text, are critically important in the accounting of any battle. For ease of reference, it is the reviewer’s opinion, maps should be placed within the relevant chapters rather than, as they are here, at the beginning of the book. Closer editing of the text might have corrected the few spelling and formatting mistakes spotted by the reader. Finally, the immediate translation of feet into meters when describing distances is not necessary and interrupts the flow of the narrative. These minor comments cannot, however, detract from what can only be considered the definitive work on the subject, one which will not be eclipsed for years to come, if ever. 🍷

ENDNOTES

1. *Zulu*, Cy Raker Endfield (dir), Stanley Baker, Michael Caine, Jack Hawkins, Ulla Jacobsen (per) (1964).
2. *Zulu Dawn*, Douglas Hickok (dir), Burt Lancaster, Peter O’Toole, Sir John Mills, Simon Ward, Bob Hoskins (1979).
3. Knight has published over thirty books about the Anglo-Zulu War including: *The National Museum Book of the Zulu War* (2003), *Zulu War* (2006), *Brave Men’s Blood* (1995), *March to the Drums* (1998), *Go to Your God Like a Soldier* (1996), *The Boer War* (1999), *Great Zulu Generals* (1999).
4. Shepstone’s idea was to create a confederation of colonies which would provide a strong and united defence against the more heavily populated, geographically larger and more war like Zulu nation. This idea had worked twelve years earlier with the confederation of the four Canadian provinces.
5. Knight asserts that the “ammunition box” theory of the defeat came from a misunderstood letter penned by then-Lieutenant Horace Dorrien-Smith, transport officer of the column (later LGen Smith GOC II Corps BEF) and seized upon by author Donald Morris in his *Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation* (1965) to the effect that because the column’s ammunition boxes were bolted down and assigned to specific companies, wider supply of the ammunition was restricted leading to the defenders running out of ammunition during the battle.
6. Only one Victoria Cross (VC) was awarded that day and that to Pte Samuel Wassall who survived the battle. Lt. Dorrien-Smith was nominated for another but as the request did not proceed through “proper channels”, it was not awarded. Until 1906, VC could only be awarded to living recipients whose exploits were vouched by senior officers. As only five officers survived the battle and none from the line companies, awarding a VC for action at Isandlwana preserved an official reluctance to award the highest medal for bravery for arising from the greatest defeat British arms at the hands of a non European army. In 1906, when VCs were awarded posthumously, two additional VCs were awarded to the families of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill who attempted to spirit away the colours of the 1st Battalion and were killed in the process.
7. The 24th Regiment (the 2nd Warwickshire) of Foot was raised in Kent in 1689. It saw action in Flanders, America, in India, Egypt, South Africa and Canada. It had fought at Waterloo and during the Sikh Mutiny. The regiment was augmented by a second battalion in 1858. Its officers were experienced in the many “little wars” of the Victorian Empire while its men were drawn from the slums of London and from many farms in Ireland. In 1881, it was reorganized as the South Wales Borderers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Wales_Borderers



VICTORIA TO VLADIVOSTOK: Canada's Siberian expedition, 1917–1919

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

ISITT, Benjamin. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010, softcover, 299 pages, \$29.95, ISBN: 978-0774818025

Reviewed by Colonel Peter J. Williams, CD

As an instructive tale of a highly-flawed military campaign, based on unclear national and coalition objectives, fought in conditions which can be described as grim and gloomy, this newly published work on the Canadian Expeditionary Force Siberia (CEFS), which in fact never reached Siberia, is hard to beat. Part of the Canadian War Museum's Studies in Canadian Military History series, it is based on

extensive primary source research, by an author whose specialty is labour history. Indeed, it was while researching the history of labor movements in British Columbia (BC), from where the CEFS conducted their not uneventful embarkation, that the author learned some of the details of this little known episode in Canadian military history.

With the Russian Revolution in 1917 and Russia's subsequent withdrawal from the war, there was great consternation among the allies, and a sense of betrayal. Some leaders felt particularly displeased that they had lent Czarist Russia much money in war loans, funds they were now very unlikely to recover from the new Bolshevik government. The complex interplay of motives, not only ideological, but also military, diplomatic and economic, led Canada, in concert with the allies, to intervene in Russia.

Canada was formally asked on 9 July 1918 to send forces to Siberia, "to restore order and a stable government..." The Borden government approved the request and the CEFS was, as we say today, "force generated". The troops, eventually numbering some 4,000, were largely made up of conscripts; many of whom were none too pleased to be embarking for Vladivostok only four days before Christmas 1918. If contemporary accounts are to be believed, some troops mutinied in Victoria while marching to their troopships, and had to be forced to continue at the point of the bayonet. Perhaps, as a first foray into the whole of government realm, the Canadian expedition also included the Canadian Siberian Economic Commission, which had the task of helping re-establish Siberia's productive industries so as to benefit Canadian trade. The CEFS also included a detachment of the Royal North-West Mounted Police, forerunners of the Mounties, who even found time to perform the Musical Ride while in Russia.

Conditions in Vladivostok were grim, the first Canadian contingent arriving in the midst of a typhus epidemic; and ostensibly, as part of the allied effort, helping prop up a White (i.e. not "Red") regime who often conducted brutal reprisals against the local population. The Canadian troops spent most of their time performing local defence tasks in the Vladivostok area, without undertaking actual "force employment" or operations, as such. In the face of continuing unrest in Canada, unclear coalition objectives, and an increasingly powerful Red opposition, Allied resolve began to waver, to the point where consideration was given to negotiations with the Communists. By February 1919, the Canadian government had decided to end its part in this misadventure, and in late April the CEFS embarked for home. In the official history of Canada in World War 1, the Siberian expedition merits a mere six pages. From the author's point of view,

and his case is not unconvincing, one of the indirect impacts of the Russian Revolution on Canada was that it provided an example to others to challenge the authority of the state, an example most visibly manifested in the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919. One might argue that the war itself, which saw the fall of several monarchies (German and Austro-Hungarian, as well as Russian) gave impetus to a new fond sense of popular socialism.




Source: Library and Public Archives Canada

Canadian supply officer and soldiers aboard a motor lorry, Gornostai barracks, 1919

The book is well illustrated with photos from the period, several maps, and annexes which include: inter alia, letters of protest from Canadian labour unions against the deployment of the CEFS, and a list of the 21 CEFS casualties (there were no deaths as a result of enemy action, and the roll lists cause of death ranging from suicide to small pox, to pneumonia; the most common cause of death). As a testimony to the depth of research that went into this work, the Notes run to some 73 pages, while the Bibliography runs to some 16 more, including both Canadian and Russian primary source material.

At a time where our mission in Afghanistan is evolving, and leaders come to grips with the “Afghanization” of the military effort there; and, where the future of Canada’s and the international community’s involvement in Libya is being widely discussed (at the time of writing of this review), this book highlights many lessons concerning strategic objectives, one being military intervention, and the necessity for public support for same. Highly recommended.

Colonel Williams is Director Current Operations on the Strategic Joint Staff. He also serves as Regimental Colonel, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. 🍁



NORMANDY CRUCIBLE:

The decisive battle that shaped World War II in Europe

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

PRADOS, John. New York: Caliber, 2011, hardcover, 320 pages, \$30.00, ISBN: 978-0451233837

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald

For decades D-Day, the Battle for Normandy, the closing of the Falaise Gap and the race to the Seine have been the stuff of legend, movies¹ and a veritable library of books². One is left to wonder what is so new that could occupy the thoughts and time of a noted author and military intelligence expert; and in turn, produce a well written, fast paced and

provocative account of this campaign. John Prados, senior research fellow at the American National Security Archives, looks at the Normandy campaign, principally the American Third Army's breakout (Operation COBRA), from the operational perspective of the opposing senior commanders; Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery and Field Marshals von Rundstedt, Rommel and von Kluge.

The real value of *Normandy Crucible: The Decisive Battle that Shaped World War II in Europe*; however, is how the author analyses the Allies' use of military intelligence, principally *Enigma* intercepts, in framing and fighting the battles of that awful summer.

On 6 June 1944, fighting against the elements and a determined entrenched, enemy, Canadian, British and American soldiers dropped from the skies and crashed ashore on Juno, Sword, Gold, Utah and Omaha to secure a lodgment in Hitler's *Festung Europa*. And then nothing! Through June and July, with little result and at great cost in men and materiel, the Allies battled yard by yard through the *bocage* and hedgerow country. The battles were reminiscent of the bloody trench warfare of World War I. General Montgomery, notwithstanding his grandiloquent comments to Churchill, General Alan Brooke and Eisenhower, was stalled before Caen.³ The Americans had captured the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg but had not advanced much further. All the while the enemy was getting stronger. Something had to be done to break the stalemate.

This was the genesis of *Cobra*, a concept Prados describes as the brainchild of General Omar Bradley, commander of the American First Army. The plan, admittedly with its emphasis on heavy aerial bombardment to soften up the defenders followed by a massive breakthrough and exploitation by armoured divisions, borrowed elements of Montgomery's *Charnwood* approach to Caen. Once through German defenses, *Cobra* envisioned the advancing troops sealing off and, investing the Brittany Peninsula, then pivoting left (East) and moving towards the Seine. The initial breakthrough through the German defensive crust would be performed by elements of the First Army, but the exploitation was the task of Gen Patton's newly activated Third Army. It was only later, during the ill advised German *Operation LIEGE* (thanks to intercepts of *Luftwaffe* notices of bombing operations, the allies were warned), which sought to seal off Patton's advance by a multi corps armoured advance towards Avranches and Mortain, did the opportunity for the envelopment of the German Seventh Army and element of Panzer Group West occur.

This is the military back drop of *Normandy Crucible*. However, Prados does not restrict himself to a dry recitation of the facts. He discusses the personalities involved, the intrigues on both sides of the line⁴ and the change in Allied strategy following the Mortain-Avranches offensive. Relying on primary archival sources, interviews and secondary sources, *Normandy Crucible*, is an almost hour by hour accounting of this important campaign.

But how “decisive” was it? If one were to simply consider the losses of men, material and territory, the Allies were clearly the winner. On June 5, 1944, Germany controlled France, Belgium and Holland. By September, the Germans had been expelled from most of France and the British and Canadians were nearing the Belgium border. The Americans were approaching the Rhine. On the eve of D-Day, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, as OP West, could muster thirty eight infantry divisions and nine armour divisions. By September, he could only scrape together 21 infantry divisions and eight Panzer divisions, some with few, if any tanks. The *Heer* had suffered 450,000 casualties with more than half dead or wounded. The Allies, with 210,000 dead, wounded or missing (including 17,000 aircrew and 4100 aircraft and 4000 tanks), had not fared well either; but then again, they could make up their material losses more readily than the Germans.

Yet



Source: Combat Camera
DCS 003

A lone tribute to the fallen soldiers rests in the sand of Juno Beach 59 years after D-Day

Normandy was not as decisive as Prados contends. A mere six months later, Hitler launched his ill fated *Watch On the Rhine* offensive, commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge, and the war did not end for an additional five months thereafter.

Some of the author's other conclusions are also suspect or, if not suspect, then open to serious debate. The notion that the June 17 conference, at Margival between Hitler, von Rundstedt and Rommel, marked the inception of a German strategy for a multi-corps counteroffensive to be directed solely against American forces, is a novel thought; as is, his argument that more careful attention to Intelligence intercepts might have alerted the Allies to Germany's strategic intentions.

This reviewer has some stylistic comments which might be dismissed as mere quibbles. Some of the book's passages would be better as footnotes rather than as text. Misidentification of people (Lord Alanbrooke, for example³) and over familiarity with some of the main protagonist (referring to General Omar Bradley as "Brad") is distracting, as is the reference to "Commonwealth" forces when referring to combined British and Canadian operations.

Canadian readers will appreciate the depiction of the Second Canadian Corps and its commander (identified as General Sir Guy Simonds) as brave, intelligent and resolute fighters. Operations GOODWOOD, SPRING, TOTALIZE, and TRACTABLE are appropriately placed in context and given due regard in the overall picture.


A crucible is an instrument wherein metals are heated, at great temperatures, until the dross seeps out and a harder, tougher alloy is produced. D-Day and the battle for Normandy was, indeed, a crucible for both the Allied and the German armies. It changed the way both sides thought about strategy, tactics, technology and techniques, logistics and supply, unit organization and command leadership. *Normandy Crucible* demonstrates that war is a learning experience and victory goes to the one who can more swiftly adapt to the constantly changing battle field. Normandy made tougher fighters on both sides. 🍁

ENDNOTES

1. *Band of Brothers*, (2001), Tom Hanks (dir), starring Lewis Damien, Ron Livingston, Donnie Wahlberg; *Saving Private Ryan*, (1998), Steven Spielberg (dir), starring Tom Hanks, Tom Sizemore, Matt Damon, Barry Pepper; *The Longest Day*, (1962) Ken Anaakin (dir) starring John Wayne, Richard Burton Paul Anka, Robert Mitchum; *D-Day, The Sixth of June*, Henry Kaster (dir), starring Robert Taylor, Richard Todd, Dana Wynter.
2. As an example see; Zuehlke, Mark. *D-Day: Juno Beach Canada's 24 Hour of Destiny*, Vancouver: Douglas & MacIntyre (2004), Zuehlke, Mark. *Holding Juno*, Vancouver: Douglas & MacIntyre (2005); Whitaker, BGen Denis & Sheila Whitaker, *Victory Falaise: The Soldier's Story*, Toronto: HarperCollins (2000); Ryan, Cornelius. *The Longest Day*, New York: Simon & Schuster (1959); John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris*, New York: Random House, (1982); Beevor, Anthony. *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*, London: Viking Press (2009); Hastings, Max. *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*, London: Pan Books (1984); d'Este, Carlo. *Decision in Normandy*, New York: Dulton (1983).
3. There exists a long standing debate whether General Montgomery's strategy was to break out from the British i.e. eastern sector or simply tie down German armour and allow the break out to occur from the American, i.e. western sector. Ian Hamilton, Carlo d'Este in his *Decision in Normandy* (1983) argues persuasively that the former strategy was actually Montgomery's intent and it was only later when the advance to Caen stalled that he adopted the latter plan. Ian Hamilton, Montgomery's biographer, in *Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942-1944*, London: Hamish, Hamilton (1983) argues that Montgomery's plan throughout was to attract the weight of the Panzers onto the British, Canadian and Polish formations and thereby permit the breakout to occur in the American sector.
4. Montgomery's less than prudent public statements, his slow approach to Caen and his slight to Churchill immediately before Goodwood (July 18) created an enormous amount of ill will among the Allied senior command such that both Churchill and Eisenhower contemplated removing him from command. It was only through the efforts of Field Marshal Allan Brooke CIDC that Montgomery held onto his job. Prados also details the July plot to kill Hitler and its subsequent impact on the operational command structure of the *Wehrmacht*.
5. Field Marshall Alan Brooke was not elevated to the peerage, Baron Alanbrooke of Brookeborough, until 19 September, 1945. On January 1, 1946, he received the title of Viscount Alanbrooke.



Source: PA-132474



CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE:

Conscientious objection in Canada during the First World War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

SHAW, Amy J. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009, hardcover, 255 pages, \$85.00, ISBN: 978-0774815932

Reviewed by Mr. Brian Bertosa

Most scholarship on the subject of resistance to conscription in Canada during the First World War has tended to focus on the widespread opposition to participation in that conflict on the part of French Canada. In *Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada during the First World War*, Amy J. Shaw of the University of Lethbridge has

chosen instead to take quite a different tack. The Borden government's *Military Service Act, 1917*, which introduced conscription, allowed for exemptions on the basis of occupation, ill health, financial obligations that would result in hardship to dependents if the man were conscripted, and refusal to take up arms for reasons of conscience (hence the term "conscientious"). It is this latter category of exemption, the men who sought to be recognized under it, and the attitudes of the Canadian society at large towards these men that constitute the subject of this fascinating study.

In the pages of this book we are introduced, as if almost to a different world, to an Anglo-Celtic Canada where men of military age could scarcely walk the streets in civilian clothes without being badgered to enlist, and where the mainline Protestant denominations, far from cleaving to the pacifist elements of Christian thought, openly vied with each other in the number of their parishioners heeding the call to the colours. Against such a bellicose backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that the conscientious objection clause in the *Military Service Act* applied initially only to members of what are known as the "historic peace churches"—the Quakers, Mennonites, Doukhobors, Hutterites and Brethren in Christ (Tunkers)—whose members were forbidden, as a point of doctrine, from taking up arms. Many of these groups had been admitted to Canada under specific promises of exemption from military service, affirmed in various militia acts and orders-in-council; lest these pledges be rendered meaningless, the government had little choice in the matter as far as these churches were concerned. As time went on, other pacifist denominations sought inclusion under the *Act*; some succeeded, but many did not.


Unlike the case in Great Britain, exemption on the basis of an individual's freedom of conscience, understood as distinct from any consideration of his formal religious affiliation, was not permitted. Nevertheless, numerous individuals tried their luck with the appeal tribunals anyway, and were invariably ordered to don the khaki. Of those that refused to submit, most were imprisoned in Canada, but some were sent overseas. At Seaford Camp in England, in an effort to make them submit to military discipline or, more insidiously, lash out against their tormenters, thereby invalidating their pacifist principles; they were subjected to beatings, torture, and threats of extra judicial killings. None; however, were to be among those Canadians to die by firing squad during the First World War.



Source: Library and Public Archives Canada

Anti-conscription demonstration staged by Université de Montréal students, Champ de Mars

This work is very well written. Although some may consider the author's style a little dry, it is nevertheless a model of scholarly objectivity, a virtue when dealing with a subject that gave rise to heated passions on all sides, and especially, with the religious element front and centre. The text is virtually flawless, for which the proof-reader and UBC Press should be commended. My only real criticism, and it is a minor one, is that the text of the *Military Service Act*, in the public domain in any case, ought to have been printed as an appendix. Being able to consult the wording of the Act directly would have made discussion of it, particularly the confusing issue of *exemptions from the Act* and *exceptions to it*, much clearer. Nevertheless, this book remains an exemplary specimen of the scholarly monograph, marking an important step forward in the fields of Canadian military history, religious history, and peace history. 🍁



NO GREATER ALLY:

**The untold story of Poland's forces
in World War II**

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

KOSKODAN, Kenneth K. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2009, hardcover, 272 pages, \$34.95, ISBN: 978-1846033650

Reviewed by Mr. Richard Palimaka

Poland's experience of the Second World War is a complex tale of tragedy and unimaginable suffering underscored by the remarkable heroism, loyalty and tenacity of its armed forces and civilians both at home and in exile. The story also reveals strategic missteps and unrealistic expectations in the face of changing hard geopolitical realities. Polish veterans

and survivors feel a palpable sense of betrayal, that they fought and died in the millions for a victory and peace they were not to enjoy. In fact, apart from a handful of fighter pilots (who declined the offer) Polish forces were excluded from the Victory Parade in London in 1946.

The historiography is full of works skewed by emotion or biased by Cold War agendas. Myths built on half-truths and propaganda have been repeated and perpetuated, in some cases by respected historians. Fortunately, with new primary source material becoming available, over the past two decades there has been a reassessment and some excellent histories have been written in Polish and English. Most of these deal with unit histories or specific campaigns or battles. There has long been a need for an accessible and objective English-language overview of the Polish contribution. Unfortunately this is not that book.

Koskodan studied communications at the University of Michigan and is of Polish descent. He is not a trained historian and this becomes evident very quickly. A glance at the sources reveals a selective and dated bibliography of secondary sources, which includes some works which have been discredited and random newspaper articles from various Midwestern U.S. cities from the 1940s that add nothing to the argument. The text contains many factual errors that should have been detected by the editors or by deeper research with more recent sources. These errors are too numerous to list here, but include: Battle of Britain and D-Day claims by the Air Force, many "Americanisms" when referring to unit names and establishments, confusing of the V-1 with the V-2 and the inaccuracies in the background leading to the Warsaw Uprising. The cumulative effect of these mistakes detracts from the credibility of the work. It also suffers from a number of omissions. Among them, the Navy is hardly mentioned, and there is no examination of the decisions and rationale for the evacuation of armed forces and the government to Romania and eventually to France in 1939.

The author also indulges in some rather cryptic statistical analysis to prove some tenuous and dubious theories, among them that the Battle of Britain may have been lost without Polish pilots. He also treads on some dangerous ground when trying to quantify the suffering of Polish Christians versus Polish Jews, and by making a very strange and convoluted comparison of Polish and Russian (as opposed to Soviet) loss if life. The book falls within that category of history that presents Poland as a victim and martyr, and avoids any critical examination of the mistakes and errors of judgment made militarily or strategically.

To be fair, the book does expose the reader to less well-known aspects of the Polish experience. First-hand accounts of the resistance by the Home Army (AK) and the wholesale deportations by the Soviets of Polish families to Siberia are particularly shocking. The book also examines and discredits many of the myths that were deliberately created regarding the performance of Polish troops, particularly the truth about Polish “cavalry charges” against German armour, and the destruction of the Polish Air Force on the ground in September 1939. Polish ground forces receive better treatment than the other services in the book, and their exploits are generally well presented.

It is difficult to recommend this book. I wanted very much to like it, and hoped I could present it to my own children to help them understand their own heritage. It will frustrate those who have some background in the area, and has too many errors and omissions to recommend it to the non-specialist. Its strength is in the first-hand accounts, but even here the selection of people interviewed is narrow. Throughout the war, the Polish armed forces and the civilian government worked closely with Canadians at all levels: the Battle of Britain, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), the Battle of the Atlantic, the English Channel, the 1st Polish Armoured Division in NW Europe. An understanding of the history of this contribution would benefit Canadians trying to understand their own experience, and those of the many thousands who chose Canada as their new home when they could not safely return to a communist Poland. 🍁



**Canada, the Congo Crisis,
and UN Peacekeeping,
1960-64**

KEVIN A. SPOONER



CANADA, THE CONGO CRISIS AND UN PEACEKEEPING 1960-64

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

SPOONER, Kevin A. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009, 280 pages, ISBN: 9780774816373

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrccsp

The history of Canada's involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has often dominated various aspects of the field given the tremendous resilience and perhaps popular appeal of the idea, however misguided, that Canada's international security role has traditionally always been a peacekeeping role.

Still, this popular and scholarly interest in the subject has yet to produce very many detailed accounts of Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. In his recent study, *Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, Wilfrid Laurier University historian Kevin A. Spooner has offered one of the first scholarly detailed accounts of this mission.

World War II's immediate post-war period witnessed a great amount of international decolonization, the immediate results of which were often turbulent and uncertain. More often than not, stability and security evaporated in these new countries often requiring the international community to respond in some manner. The departure of Belgian colonial rule and authority over its former colonies in the Congo created a particularly complicated political mess at a time when East-West cold war confrontations were reaching their pinnacle. In this complex web of international relations Canada at first balked at, and later continued to have reservations about, participating in a peacekeeping mission in this region.

Writing any history of the Congo crisis presents numerous challenges, but Spooner has more than risen to the occasion in this articulate and well-researched account. Though the author offers the caveat up front that his work was not intended to be strictly a military history of Canadian peacekeeping in the Congo, it is uncertain how he or anyone could have successfully covered the subject if it had been only so. By its very nature and characteristics, peacekeeping is a complex political-military-social-economic activity requiring those who research and write about it to look beyond the narrow confines of any one discipline. Spooner has done so here remarkably, so much so in fact that this book was awarded the C. P. Stacey Prize in 2009 for its significant contribution to the fields of military and international history.


Composed of seven chapters, the book opens with situating the reader to the immediate post-war security environment in equatorial Africa and then sets the stage for the crisis that is at the heart of this study. The author has taken great care to provide a detailed and balanced assessment of both Soviet and Western influences in the region as well as the impact they had. There has been much recent research and debate regarding cold war Africa, and as archives open and new sources become available, historians such as Spooner have been able to investigate this aspect of the subject in much greater depth to everyone's benefit. Subsequent chapters in the book examine the decisions of the Diefenbaker government as well as the initial deployment of peacekeepers to the Congo. What is interesting here is that readers witness a much more savvy and reflective decision-making process than this government has historically typically been given credit for. Finally the mission itself is examined over several chapters, offering readers interested in this period and subject considerable substance to consider.

Spooner has delivered an important work on Canadian political-military history and has been appropriately recognized by his peers for doing so. Well researched and very readable, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64* will make a welcome addition to military bookshelves as well as courses examining Canada's international security role in the first half of the cold war era. 🍁



Source: Combat Camera
IS2011-1009-04

The production of briquettes is a new initiative on behalf of the Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN) in an effort to promote environmental sustainability and at the same time provide a source of heat for families to cook their meals. Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo



CUTTING THE FUSE:

The explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

PAPE, Robert & FELDMAN, James K. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010, hardcover, 349 pages, \$30.00, ISBN: 978-0226645605

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald

Suicide as a political act has a long history.¹ Suicide as an accepted operational strategy dates to antiquity.² The suicide bomber is, however, a recent phenomenon.³ The suicide bomber is the epitome of the smart bomb; he or she can avoid most defenses, penetrate to the heart of the enemy, abort when required, switch targets with little thought and when

exploded, leaves little for investigators afterwards. Suicide bombers are a very efficient mode of killing.⁴ It is a very cost effective form of technology.⁵

Suicide bombers are described as the “ultimate asymmetric weapon”. They have quickly become the weapon of choice for many terrorists groups. Suicide bombings have a high symbolic value because the willingness of the bomber to die signals his high determination and dedication to the cause. They serve as symbols of the justness of the bomber’s struggle, galvanize popular support, generate financial support for the organization and become a source of new recruits for future suicide missions. From an organizational perspective, suicide bombing is the epitome of political realism. Suicide bombers force their adversary to make concessions. Bombers, by their demonstration of merciless resolve, also crowd out other less ruthless organizations, the so-called “market share theory” of suicide bombing.⁶

The incidence of suicide bombing is spiraling ever upwards.⁷ What confounds many in the West is the motivation of these suicide bombers. What would cause a rational human being to strap on a suicide vest or drive a vehicle laden with high explosives to their ultimate destination and blow themselves up?

Early characterizations of suicide bombers described them as: “crazed,” “poor,” “uneducated,” “under the influence of drugs or the sway of some Svengali-like personality,” “lunatics” and “young”. Studies have shown that these initial impressions did not accord with the truth. Suicide bombers are predominantly male. Their average age is 25. They are, in the main, mentally stable. They are rarely impoverished (though some have refugee camp experience). Most are employed. Few are uneducated. In fact, some possess post secondary education, even professional degrees. More surprising, perhaps, from a western perspective, the overwhelming majority are not radical Islamic fundamentalists. Few, if any, had prior connections to political groups.⁸ Demographics, however, do not explain motivation. This is why Robert Pape’s and James K. Feldman’s *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it*, is an important contribution to the study of this phenomenon.

At the heart of *Cutting the Fuse*, is Pape’s and Feldman’s “occupation theory”, which holds that suicide terrorism is not caused by Islamic fundamentalism but by foreign occupation. As the authors observe, “*What every campaign of suicide terrorism has in common is that they are occurring as the central feature in violent resistance to foreign occupation of territory that the terrorists view as their homeland or prize greatly.*” The target of the bomber, the authors argue, is almost exclusively the military forces of democracies. Democracies are more susceptible to public opinion. The aim of the suicide bomber is to undermine public support, among the citizens of the occupying countries, for the occupation, and thereby hasten the end of the occupation.

To support their thesis, the authors present detailed case studies on the causes of suicide terrorism in: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, Chechnya and Sri Lanka. Each country is examined by means of several variables: the number of terrorist groups; the nature, goals, weapons and targets of terrorist groups; the specific trajectory of suicide campaigns, and the local recruitment and community support of terrorist groups. By way of example and to prove their hypothesis; prior to 9/11, the only suicide bombing in Afghanistan was the assassination of the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Masoud on September 9, 2001.⁹ In the aftermath of the invasion, between 2001 and 2005, Afghanistan experienced only fourteen suicide attacks. In 2006, there were 93. By 2007, the number had increased to 137, a year later to 138 and in 2009 to 98. The authors argue that: the incremental expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) throughout Afghanistan (particularly in the southern traditionally Pashtun territory of the country); the consequential increase in force support and number of coalition bases; and the accompanying use of problematic American tactics (air strikes with high collateral damage and night raids) have led many Afghans to believe that their country is, in fact, occupied.¹⁰ This view is compounded, according to the authors, when one considers the corruption and wide spread alienation of the Karzai government.



A 'suicide bomber' starts to detonate a simulated explosive on a patrol consisting of Medical Technicians during exercise Striking Serpent held at CFB Petawawa from from 20 to 31 Aug 2007

Cutting the Fuse builds on Pape's earlier book, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Bombing*,¹¹ but offers a number of important additions. First, the data that Pape and Feldman use to formulate their "occupation theory" has been updated from 2005 to 2010. This new data includes information from countries not previously considered in the earlier work. Second, the authors introduce the notion of the "transnational terrorist", individuals who respond to the foreign occupation of countries not of their birth. To explain the surge in foreign fighters, Pape and Feldman argue that colliding communal loyalties between the fighter's home community and kindred community come into play, the authors' concept of "divided loyalties". The community considered most threatened is the one the transnational terrorist protects. As the authors write "[H]ence the foreign military occupation of the kindred community can result in an

individual's hierarchy of loyalties elevating the kindred community over the home one."¹² Finally the authors offer a more assertive statement of their argument, that a change in American military strategy in the Middle East will result in a decrease in suicide terrorism—using a combination of “in country balancing” that is, creating and establishing local political, economic and social initiatives separate from the national government, and “off-shore balancing” or a careful drawdown of occupation forces, coupled with strategic regional alliances and quick reaction forces; Pape and Feldman foresee a decrease in the incidence of suicide terrorism .

Pape and Feldman argue that foreign military occupation, not Islamic fundamentalism; the so-called “Islamic Narrative” is the root cause of suicide terrorism.¹³ There may be other, equally compelling explanations. The phenomenon and its causes are far too complex, it is submitted, to lend themselves to one single explanation.¹⁴ What cannot be denied is that the specter of the suicide terrorist will continue to haunt the citizens of the world until a solution is designed which addresses the root causes of the problem. *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it* is an important contribution to the growing literature on this subject and should be read by all those who have a role in formulating counter bombing strategies. 🌸

ENDNOTES


1. The Buddhist monks who self immolated during the Viet Nam War, the Irish hunger strikers in Long Kesh prison, the Dev-Sol militants in Turkey and, more recently, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit seller, are examples of suicide as a means of political protest.
2. Religious and political groups of all backgrounds have used suicide attacks. The earliest such attacks can be attributed to the Jewish Zealots (Sicarii), a Jewish sect in 100 A.D., who used suicide attacks to kill Roman forces occupying the Holy Lands and their Jewish collaborators. Similarly, the Hashashins, a Shi'a sect located in the mountains of Syria, Iraq and Iran between the 11th and 13th centuries, employed suicide attacks to assassinate rival Sunni leaders. The Hashashins drew their name from the fact that they were usually under the influence of hashish when completing their mission. The Hashashins were so successful that the word *assassin* became the English derivative. The *kamikaze* (divine wind) of the Imperial Japanese Navy was very successful targeting US and Allied military ships in the latter part of World War II. North Vietnamese or Viet Minh sappers and Iranian mine clearers fall into this category.
3. The first generally accepted contemporary suicide bombing was the attack by Iranian agents on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December, 1981 that left 27 dead and more than 100 injured. The most costly, until September 11, was the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks and the deaths of 241 American military personnel and the 58 French military deaths on the same day: Scott Atran, *Mishandling Suicide Terrorism*, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Washington Quarterly*, Volume 27, (2004), pages 67–90 ; Brian Kelly, *Martyrs in Mesopotamia: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (unpublished thesis) University of Pennsylvania (2008).
4. Suicide bombers obtain the highest kill ratio of any other form of terroristic endeavour. The average number of victims in a shooting attack is 3.32; in a remote control explosive attack, 6.92; in a suicide attack with an explosive vest, 81.48 and with a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), 97.81: Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perlinger, *Introduction: Characteristics of Suicide Attacks* in Ami Pedahzur (ed), *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: the Globalization of Martyrdom*, New York: Routledge (2006), pp. 1–12.
5. In a September, 2004 interview, Hamas leader Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi stated, “[o]ur people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs.” In a 2003 interview with *World Today*, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld bemoaned, “[t]he cost-benefit ratio is against us. Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost of millions.”
6. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press (2005), p. 3, 16–17. This “outbidding” theory is described thusly: “When competition is especially intense, multiple organizations have occasionally vied with one another to claim responsibility for a particular attack and identify the bomber as their operative”: Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism* in Ami Pedahzur (ed) (2006), p. 28.
7. In the six years between 2004 and 2009, there were a total of 1,833 suicide attacks compared with a total of 350 attacks in the period of 1980 through 2003, page 34.
8. Riaz Hassan, *Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism: An Overview*, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 36 (2008), pages. 271–291; Debra D Zedalis, *Female Suicide Bombers*, Carisle: U.S. Army War College (2004); Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Random House (2005).
9. On September 9, 2011, Al Qaeda operatives posing as Arab journalists, under the guise of interviewing Massoud detonated explosives hidden in their equipment. He died enroute to hospital. One of the assassins died in the explosion, the other was shot while escaping from jail: Steven Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, New York: Pan, (2004), pages 582–583.

10. Throughout the summer of 2011, President Karzai repeatedly condemned the civilian deaths caused by Coalition bombs. On May 31, 2011, he stated that if the bombing did not stop, he would consider Afghanistan an "occupied" country: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/world/asia/01afghanistan.html>
11. PAPE, Robert. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Bombing*, New York: Random House, (2005).
12. Pages 43–44.
13. As examples of the secularization of suicide bombing, Pape and Feldman point to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PPK) and Hezbollah, none of which are Islamic and all are working for nationalistic i.e. political ends.
14. The literature on suicide terrorism offers a veritable cocktail of causes for the individual's participation including self humiliation from pervasive domestic violence in middle eastern households: Nancy Hartvelt Kobrin, *The Banality of Suicide Terrorism: The Naked Truth About the Psychology of Islamic Suicide Bombing*: Dulles: Potomac Books Inc. (2010); personal revenge for abuse, humiliation including sexual assault at the hands of the occupying force or the death of family member: Mia Bloom: *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*, Toronto: Viking, (2011); the financial reward, status and recognition accorded to the families of suicide bombers: some are driven by altruistic purposes, namely to highlight and to relieve the plight of so-called oppressed peoples or the fact that martyrdom guarantees seventy relatives a place in Paradise: Bloom (2005) at page 88; some bombers are not as selfless as sacrifice for a cause is both personally redemptive and a mark of honour, a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted elite: Martha Crenshaw, *Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay*, *Security Studies* vol. 16 (2007), pages 133–162, 153. Sageman argues that pre-existing friendship and kinship move individuals to join terrorist groups: Marc Sageman, *Islam and al Qaeda*, in Pedahzur, ed. *Root Causes*, 121–132. In short, the existing data has not established a stable set of psychological variables that can be causally linked to a "typical" suicide bomber's personality.



Source: Combat Camera
AR2006-M012-00XX

At the scene of the aftermath of a suicide bomber the Provincial Reconstruction Team Quick Response Force (PRT QRF) responded to to secure the site along Highway 4



PEARSON'S PEACEKEEPERS:

Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956–67

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

CARROLL, Michael K. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010, 230 pages, ISBN: 978-0-7748-1582-6

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp

In 1957 Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF); a military “peacekeeping” formation deployed to the Middle East as part of an international effort to control tensions in the Suez Crisis. The award and its subsequent mythologizing has since fuelled strong and emotional debates over the true nature of

Canada’s peacekeeping reputation, with most average Canadians still firmly believing that their country is primarily a peacekeeping nation.

Despite many general surveys of Canada’s peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1995, there are in fact very few detailed studies of these operations. With his latest work, *Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1957–67*, Author Michael K. Carroll has made a good effort to address portions of the gap in Canadian military UN history. Exploring in detail the realities of the mission behind all the rhetoric, upon which its legacy has since been constructed, Carroll reveals to the reader a starkly different record of this decade-long operation than what most readers might have expected.

Though often referred to as a “classic” peacekeeping operation, the insertion of blue berets into the Middle East did not automatically guarantee peace. As well, as Carroll demonstrates, no one in 1956 expected peacekeepers to become stuck in the desert for over a decade. Nor did Canadians expect, after all the hoopla over being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, that their peacekeepers would later be ungraciously evicted from Egypt without any thanks for all their efforts. Still, the experience in UNEF eventually led to other missions and Canada’s soldiers would subsequently find themselves deployed all across the world either leading or supporting other UN operations. Many of the initial lessons learned with UNEF proved beneficial to diplomats and soldiers, making the study of the history of Canada’s role in defusing the Suez Crisis worth pursuing.

Interestingly, despite the impression created by the choice of photos for the book —mainly pictures of Canadian soldiers serving in UNEF—Carroll’s analysis focuses primarily on the political-financial aspects of the mission. As well, much of the book is devoted only to the initial period of the crisis from 1956–1957. Readers looking for a purely military or operational narrative of Canada’s role in UNEF, or details of the Canadian mission in the desert from 1958–1967, may be left wanting. Though the author does include a chapter titled ‘The Forgotten Army’, his examination of the operational narrative is decidedly brief by comparison to other topics and the narrative as a whole places the politicians and diplomats at the center of the story, not the soldiers who carried out the operations. This may also explain the inclusion of only a single map of the entire region at the very beginning of the publication.

Nevertheless, compared to other studies of the period, Carroll’s refreshing and far more detailed approach offers readers a much different lens through which to examine an otherwise well-known subject. As such, his book makes an important contribution to the field of Canadian UN history and it is a welcome addition to bookshelves and libraries. The author is to be commended for his efforts. 🍁



Source: Combat Camera
ISD01-3125

Members of the 4 Engineer Support Regiment (4ESR), hand out "Izzy" dolls to the local children outside Senafe, Eritrea

ALSO RECEIVED BY THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL

NO GREATER ALLY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF POLAND'S FORCES IN WORLD WAR II

KOSKODAN, Kenneth. K. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 272 pages, \$16.95

ISBN: 978-1-84908-479-6

This is the story of the Polish forces during the Second World War; the story of millions of young men and women who gave everything for freedom and in the final victory lost all. In a cruel twist of history, the monumental struggles of an entire nation have been largely forgotten, and even intentionally obscured. With previously unpublished first-hand accounts (information never before seen in English) and rare photographs, this title provides a detailed analysis of the devastation the war brought to Poland and the final betrayal when, having fought for freedom for six long years, Poland was handed to the Soviet Union.

THE INFORMATION FRONT: THE CANADIAN ARMY AND NEWS MANAGEMENT DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

BALZER, Timothy. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, 255 pages, \$35.95

ISBN: 798-0-7748-1900-8

In wartime, it is not only success on the battlefield that determines victory. Winning hearts and minds is a vital part of military strategy and relies in large part on the effective management of how and what information is reported from the front. Brought to life with public relations case studies from Dieppe, the Sicilian campaign and Normandy, this book reveals clashes among individual commanders and politicians, the press, the military, the government and the Canadian public. *The Information Front* offers a balanced and intelligent discussion of how the military used censorship and propaganda to rally support for the war effort.

HEINZ GUDERIAN

BATTISTELLI, Pier Paolo. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 64 pages, \$22.00

ISBN: 978-1-84908-366-9

Heinz Guderian was one of the most highly respected tank commanders of World War II. The son of a general, there was little doubt that he would follow in his father's footsteps. He became deeply involved in the development of armoured warfare in the German army in the years between the wars. On the outbreak of World War II, he commanded the Panzer forces of XIX Armeekorps in both Poland and the battle for France, leading his troops to the edge of the Dunkirk Pocket in a whirlwind campaign. This book gives a focused, military biography of Heinz Guderian and is number 13 in the COMMAND, STRATEGY, AND CONFLICT series from Osprey Publishing.

WALTHER MODEL

FORCZYK, Robert. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2011, 64 pages, \$22.00

ISBN: 978-1-84908-357-7

Walther Model was the youngest Generalfeldmarschall in the Wehrmacht in World War II and Hitler's favourite commander. He was a tough and tenacious leader, particularly when on the defensive, and enjoyed considerable acclaim throughout his stellar career. Model really made his mark late in the war, when time was already running out for the Third Reich. Time and again, he rushed from one crumbling front to the next and succeeded in temporarily restoring the situation. Model earned himself the nickname "Hitler's fireman" and deserves recognition as one of the great defensive commanders of modern military history.

OPERATION ARCHERY: THE COMMANDOS AND THE VAAGSO RAID 1941

FORD, Ken. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 80 pages, \$22.00

ISBN: 978-1-84908-372-0


Operation ARCHERY, the raid on Vaagso and Maaloy in Norway, was the first true combined operation carried out by British forces. The targets were selected because they offered a perfect opportunity to damage German installations and morale. Mountbatten, the new head of Combined Operations, hoped to eliminate the local garrison, destroy the fish oil factories and sink enemy shipping. Although the raiders had the element of surprise, German resistance was stiff and a fierce firefight ensued. This is another in the Osprey Publishing's RAID series.

WALCHEREN 1944: STORMING HITLER'S ISLAND FORTRESS

BROOKS, Richard. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 96 pages, \$22.95

ISBN: 978-1-84908-237-2

In September 1944, the Allies captured the port city of Antwerp intact, heralding an end to the logistical weaknesses that had plagued the campaign in north-west Europe. In order to start the flow of supplies into the city, they first had to clear the river Schelde of German outposts, including the island of Walcheren at the mouth of the Schelde Estuary—the most fortified stretch of coastline in the world. Following one of the last major amphibious operations of the war, the Army and Royal Marines cleared the positions of their German defenders over eight days of bitter street fighting. The Schelde was opened and the supplies flowed in, just in time to help the Allies withstand the German Ardennes offensive. This is number 235 in Osprey Publishing's CAMPAIGN series.



THE CANADIAN ARMY READING LIST

In September 2001, the Canadian Army produced its first Canadian Army Reading List. In the time since its publication many new books and articles of interest to the Canadian Army have appeared, prompting the need to revisit the list, and review and expand it. This new and revised Canadian Army Reading List retains most of the original publication, while adding a considerable amount of new material for soldiers to consider. The aim of the Canadian Army Reading List is to provide an instructive guide to soldiers to explore suitable literature on a wide range of subjects.

BELIEVERS IN THE BATTLESPACE, RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND WAR

DENTON, Peter H. (Editor), Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011, 230 pages, ISBN: 978-1-100-16168-6

Blaming religion for creating conflict has become a popular activity in recent years. Such a conclusion, however, does not survive contact with the evidence. The closer the examination of specific situations, the less explanatory value there is in blanket statements about the culpability of religion for violence in the world. Yet, in the 21st century, the role played by religious belief in any particular conflict has become more significant. Religious factors are at least equal to social, cultural and psychological ones in understanding the sources of conflict and the motivations of the combatants. Even in a supposedly secular society like our own, values linked to religion are embodied in many of the decisions we make. Beginning with the idea that the battlefield has irrevocably become the battlespace, the authors of this collection of articles and essays explore the relation between religion and modern warfare in a variety of historical and contemporary contexts.

CANADIANS AT WAR: A GUIDE TO THE BATTLEFIELDS OF WORLD WAR I

SHAW, Susan Evans. Fredericton: Goose Lane Publishing, 2011, 350 pages, \$24.95
ISBN: 978-08604-926548

Since the Armistice in 1918, the battlefields of World War I have been a tourist destination. Rushing to see where fathers, brothers, husbands and lovers had fought, and in some cases died, Canadians travelled the roads of Europe soon after the war. Later generations have continued to visit the battlefields and memorials to the Canadian soldiers who fought in the war to end all wars. *Canadians at War* follows the route of the Canadian Expeditionary Force—from its first encounter with the Germans to its final battles. In this informative guide, the author provides an overview of each battlefield as well as maps, modern photographs and information on memorials and cemeteries.

BATTLEFIELD ANGLES: SAVING LIVES UNDER ENEMY FIRE FROM VALLEY FORGE TO AFGHANISTAN

McGAUGH, Scott. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 272 pages, \$24.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-515-1

Battlefield Angels provides a series of personal profiles that illustrate the personal heroism of some of America's most celebrated medics and corpsmen. Opening with the story of Casper Wistar, a pacifist Quaker, who served as a nurse in General Washington's army and ends with the story of Pfc Monica Brown, the army medic who was awarded the Silver Star for rescuing fellow soldiers from a disabled Humvee during an ambush in eastern Afghanistan in 2007. In between, the author traces the valour of medics and corpsmen who served during the Civil War, the First World War, both major theatres of World War II, Korea and Vietnam. The author also traces the evolution of battlefield medicine that led to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan having the lowest battlefield fatality rate—ever.

BILL SLIM

LYMAN, Robert. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 64 pages, \$19.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-528-1

Bill Slim was one of the greatest British generals of World War II. In a career that stretched from 1914 until 1958, Bill Slim's most impressive triumphs came in India and Burma in the long war against the Japanese. He employed in his military strategy the principles of flexibility and surprise that foreshadowed modern British military doctrine. Thrust into a desperate situation, he orchestrated the longest retreat in British Army history in the withdrawal from Burma. He then turned on the Japanese when they invaded India, shattered their army and pursued them to destruction in Burma. Apart from his great military victories, Slim left a legacy of training and morale building that endures in the British Army to this day. This is another in the COMMAND series from Osprey Publishing.

THEY SHALL NOT PASS! THE BRITISH BATTALION AT JARAMA—THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

HUGHES, Ben. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 271 pages, \$30.00

ISBN: 978-1-84908-549-6

In February 1937 a group of British volunteers stood shoulder to shoulder with their Spanish Republican allies in a valiant attempt to halt the encroaching flood of fascism. *They Shall Not Pass!* is the breathtaking story of the battle of Jarama, where these amateur soldiers inflicted the first ever defeat on the fascists, a victory which would give Europe hope during the darkest days of the Second World War.

EISENHOWER

ZALOGA, Steven J., Oxford, Osprey Publishing Inc., 2011, 64 pages, \$19.95

ISBN: 978-1-84908-359-1

In his long career as an infantry officer, Eisenhower seldom held a rifle and never fought in a single battle, but he rose to command the most modern and powerful armed force the world had ever seen. He represented a fundamentally new type of military commander, one suited to the demands of the industrialized warfare of the 20th century, who outfought his enemy through superior management rather than personal feats of arms. Eisenhower's greatest strength was perhaps his skill as a statesman, keeping a fractious coalition together despite difficult relations between the American and British commanders and then leading his nation as President during the height of the cold war. This is another in the COMMAND series from Osprey Publishing.

KING TIGER VS IS-2: OPERATION SOLSTICE 1945

HIGGINS, David R., Oxford, Osprey Publishing Inc, 2011, 80 pages, \$19.95

ISBN: 978-1-84908-404-8

The savage Eastern Front battles of World War II prompted a frantic arms race, as the Soviets strove to develop heavy tanks that could match the German's Tiger and King Tiger designs. Both sides sought to better integrate heavy armour into a combined-arms system. Formidably armed and armoured but with limited mobility, the King Tiger excelled in long-range defensive fighting, while its Soviet counterpart, the IS-2, was lighter, more manoeuvrable and far more numerous. The German counterattack against the Soviet forces in Eastern Prussia in February 1945, codenamed Operation SOLSTICE, pitted small numbers of King Tigers against the Soviet heavy tank battalions equipped with the IS-2s. The ensuing battle represented the culminating clash between the military hardware and doctrines of Germany and the Soviet Union. Number 37 in Osprey Publishing's DUEL series. 🌸

**TOWARD LAND OPERATIONS 2021**

To mitigate the unpredictability of future conflict and prepare itself for the challenges it will face in the years ahead, the Army has recently published Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow, to serve as a guide for land force development through the year 2021. Toward Land Operations 2021 is the foundation document, developed from a series of operating, functional and enabling concepts that collectively describe an approach to future land operations characterized by the deliberate dispersion and aggregation of adaptive forces in order to create and sustain tactical advantage over adept, adaptive adversaries.



THE EIGHTH QUESTION: A BETTER ESTIMATE PROCESS?

Lieutenant-Colonel David J. Banks, PPCLI

Every one of us has some particular thing that we hate, fear or loath. For any officer who has ever attended Army Staff College (and for a goodly number of us who have taught there) that despised thing would be the formal estimate. Obtuse, non-intuitive and very “user-unfriendly”, this tortuous piece of mental gymnastics has dogged us for decades. It has none of the elegance, adaptability nor the logical simplicity of the Operational Planning Process (OPP). Nobody enjoys writing estimates, and I can guarantee that even fewer people enjoy reading, deciphering and marking them. The observation that Army Staff College students of today struggle in the same way with the same frustratingly arcane parts of the same estimate process (and make the same mistakes) as their directing staff did many years before in their own student days, suggests very strongly to me that the problem isn't with the students: it's a systemic problem. In other words, our estimate isn't really the best tool in the shed. Of course, as with so many things in our Army, we've made a virtue out of necessity (or out of inertia, perhaps...) and in fine Canadian tradition we've “made it work.” Doubtlessly, those who have struggled with the beast and survived all share that subconscious, nagging feeling that there's probably a much better way to do it, but...it's “good enough.” And anyway, that's how we've always done it, right?

There might be a better way. To find it, we need look no further than to one of our closest allies, and arguably our most important military progenitor: the British Army. Some years ago, the British Army developed a greatly improved version of the estimate process, known as “The Combat Estimate.” Commonly referred to as “The Seven Questions”, in the British Army this process is taught and used from platoon commander to battle group CO.

I was first exposed to “The Seven Questions” during a visit to the UK Land Warfare Centre at Warminster in 2008, and I have since discussed it at length, both with UK officers who have been brought up with it, as well as with some Canadian

officers who have been exposed to it on a trial basis at CTC. “The Seven Questions” estimate has been tested in battle and in stability operations, most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has evolved as a result.²


Inherently flexible, “The Seven Questions” can be used equally well at Brigade Group level for more straightforward tactical problems. It is similar to our own combat estimate process, but in some ways has more of the feel of the OPP about it. “The Seven Questions” draws its nickname from the fact that it is based on seven logical, clear analytical questions that lead the planner from the initial analysis of the situation through to the development of a useable plan. These questions are:

1. What is the enemy doing and why?;
2. What have I been told to do and why?;
3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop my plan?;
4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?;
5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?;
6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?; and
7. What control measures do I need to propose?

As in any military situation, a clear, well-framed question tends to focus the mental efforts immediately. We can get to what really matters much more quickly from a precise question than from a generic statement or ambiguous title such as “assessment of tasks”. Further, the answer to each of these seven questions builds progressively on the next, with the result that the plan is framed with the answering of the final question. Perhaps an even greater strength of the British process is that it is heavily map-based, as opposed to the current Canadian estimate which produces pages of text (sometimes many pages of text). Our present system makes plenty of cross references to maps for a whole range of factors and considerations, but the end product is very much a text document. “The Seven Questions” can be completed to a great extent directly on the map surface, whether as talc sketches or as digital overlays. A piece of tactical information, or a concept of operations, is usually much more effectively depicted in a clear graphical way than in text form. With good graphical presentation there is much less requirement for a reviewer (or a student trying to write a plan) to constantly refer back and forth between text and map. It is because of this very close relationship with the map that “The Seven Questions” is so much more intuitive for the user, and is equally well-suited to both the commander in the hatch and to the planners in a tactical headquarters.

Of course, the UK process is quite capable of producing a written operation order if that is required, just as our current estimate process ultimately does. The clarity, logic and apparent brevity of the UK process should in no way be taken to suggest a lack of depth or detail: underlying the answer to each question we still find the degree and scope of analysis demanded by the situation, using tools and techniques we are already familiar with. There is no great leap of knowledge required to effectively apply “The Seven Questions”: it is almost a natural progression from our current estimate process.

To close, “The Seven Questions” combat estimate process offers the Canadian Army a battle-proven, flexible, intuitive and far more user-friendly tactical decision making process than we currently find in our well-worn (but equally well despised) Canadian Army estimate process.

Why do we persist in using an awkward, non-intuitive, text-based system for tactical decision making: one that few people are really comfortable with? Is it because “that’s what we’ve always done?” If that is the reason, maybe we should ask ourselves another question. So, here is the “Eighth Question”: why not adopt “The Seven Questions”? 

ENDNOTES

1. *The Combat Estimate* (Warminster, Ministry of Defence, 2007)
2. *The Combat Estimate—A User's Guide* (Warminster, Ministry of Defence, 2011)



Source: Combat Camera
ISD02-3014

MILITARY SYMBOLS FOR LAND OPERATIONS



Light
Machine Gun



Medium
Machine Gun



Heavy
Machine Gun




Mortar




Grenade
Launcher



Light Field Artillery
Direct Fire Gun



Armoured Tank




Armoured Personnel
Carrier




PSYOPS




Friendly Ground
Axis of Supporting Attack




Fortified Area



Occupied Company
Position




Line of Departure




Known Enemy Position




Known Friendly Position




Section




Platoon



Company



Battalion




Battle Group




Refugees




Infantry




**Mechanized
Infantry**




Armour



Recce




**Armour
Recce**




**Anti
Armour**



**Field
Artillery**




Mortar



Engineer



**Engineer
Bridge**



Signals



HQ




**Electronic
Warfare**



NBC



**Combat Service
Support**



Medical



Airborne



**Special Operations
Force**



**Aviation Rotary
Wing**



**Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle**



Air Defence



**Air Defence
35 mm Skyguard**

13.657338
25.356445
13.496473
23.554688
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-85.735246

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