Professional Ideology and The Profession of Arms In Canada



Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley

Canadian International Council

PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY

and

The Profession of Arms in Canada

Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley
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Kingston, Ontario

Canadian International Council

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Foreword

The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created in 2002 to champion, govern and manage professional development reform initiatives in the Canadian Forces. In 2003, in keeping with this mandate, the CDA published *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* establishing the benchmark for military professionals in the Canadian Forces. It was always intended that *Duty With Honour* would encourage ongoing research and discussion to continually strengthen the concept of military professionalism, thus assisting members of the Canadian Forces to overcome the diverse security challenges of the 21st century.

Professional Ideology and The Profession of Arms in Canada is such a work. The definition and explanation of professional ideology contained here, broadens our understanding of the construct of military professionalism and proposes a promising description of the core of professional military knowledge and its relationship with the military ethos. The broad outlines for the implications of a full understanding of professional ideology for professional development are clearly identified.

We trust that *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* will prove informative and stimulating, and garner a wide readership, extending beyond the confines of the Canadian Forces, engaging all those responsible for the health of this essential national security institution or interested in furthering the debate.

P. R. Hussey
Major-General
Commander
Canadian Defence Academy

Preface

In the summer of 2004, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute initiated the Strategic Leadership Writing Project that is designed to compile a body of knowledge relating to military professionalism and Canadian military leadership (past, present and future) which can be used by Canadian Forces educational and training institutions and organizations, as well as by other governmental departments and the public at large. This project clearly has great potential to be a valuable learning tool and professional development mechanism, as well as a vehicle to create a body of Canadian operational leadership knowledge, which is currently lacking. As such, Lieutenant-Colonel, Dr. Bill Bentley's volume - *Professional Ideology and The Profession of Arms in Canada* – represents the first product of this ambitious endeavour.

Within this framework, Lieutenant-Colonel Bentley has done yeoman's service in providing a thought-provoking study that demonstrates that the military profession, while similar in many respects to other professions such as law and medicine, is a unique social construct in Western society. He clearly distinguishes between knowledge, values and norms inherent in the profession of arms and these same elements as they are manifested in the free market and bureaucracy. In essence, he explains the essential nature and structure of professional military expertise and how the Canadian military ethos shapes our Canadian military professionals as they pursue their duty internationally with integrity, loyalty and courage, or more succinctly, with honour.

In the end, *Professional Ideology and The Profession of Arms in Canada* is a definitive work that substantially adds to the study of professionalism, specifically the profession of arms in Canada. Readers, both military and civilian, will undoubtedly find this book extremely informative and stimulating. It serves well as the inaugural volume of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's seminal Strategic Leadership Writing Project.

Bernd Horn
Colonel
Director
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute

***PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY* And The Profession of Arms in Canada**

Introduction

The Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Gulf War, Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq. These are all names and events seared into the memories of members of the Canadian Forces. They are also familiar to all citizens interested in Canada's welfare, national security and place in the world today. They represent a long, but not exhaustive, account of the service rendered by Canada's military in pursuit of peace in a troubled era. Behind the story that sustained those who prosecuted Canadian policy across the globe since the Second World War and the Korean conflict lies motivations that range from love of country and dedication to duty, to a uniquely Canadian sense of opportunity and even adventure. It is, in fact, hard to account for the intimate history of the Canadian military and its successes in any single, simple explanation. Certainly, however, one common theme has been professionalism. Canadians who donned the uniform all entered the profession of arms. To be sure they did not all serve the profession honourably, but by far, the vast majority did. Nor has the collective legacy of this venerable institution been without blemish. In the end, however, it has been, at least in terms of the efforts of individual sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen, an almost stellar performance.

But what is the profession of arms? What are the elements of military professionalism that help account for Canada's military performance over the decades? How does the profession of arms relate to other professions such as law and medicine, engineering and the scholarly disciplines? Perhaps more importantly, what distinguishes it from all those other occupations spread throughout society in the business world, government and the bureaucracies characteristic of most large organizations? The beginning of the answer can be found in *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* published by the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces in 2003. *Duty With Honour* is at least a partial answer to these questions and describes the essential characteristics of the military profession in Canada. It provides an effective framework for the ongoing transformation of the Canadian Forces, an

indispensable guide for the professional development system and the stimulus for ongoing research and discussion. The present study responds to this latter opportunity.

There is no question that the work of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz in the US, and General Sir John Hackett in the UK, established in the early 1960s, the basic parameters for any analysis of the military as a profession in the early 1960s. Their work is accorded appropriate recognition in this study. But much has changed both in the scholarly literature concerning professionalism, civilian as well as military, and most certainly in the social and geo-political context in which the profession of arms is practiced in the West. Professions, in general, have lost much of the prestige they were once accorded and the military profession in Canada experienced some of this diminution in respect by Canadian society in the 1990s as a result of a litany of inappropriate behaviours. In the end, the major theme advanced in this book is that the continuing threat to the Canadian profession of arms comes from a lack of understanding of the idea of professional ideology and the role it plays in sustaining the concept of professionalism itself. Professional ideology is a complex, somewhat abstract construct that relates to both the nature of professional expertise and the ethical standards that adjudicates how this expertise is applied and how those applying it should conduct themselves. Professional status cannot be claimed or maintained unless the appropriate professional ideology permeates the institution and infuses the performance of its members.

What follows first establishes the nature of professions in Western society as they have evolved over the past 200 years, or so. In Chapter Two this concept is then related to the military and the similarities and important differences between civilian and military professions are described. Next, Chapter Three defines military professional ideology and focuses on distinguishing it from the ideologies of the marketplace and bureaucracy. Central to this definition is an account of the core military knowledge at the heart of military professionalism, represented by the general system of war and conflict. The relationship between this theoretical structure of military knowledge and the military ethos; that is, the center of gravity of the professional construct, is explored in some depth.

Chapter Four applies this theoretical model to Canada and describes its

components in Canadian terms. Factors which historically have shaped military thought and influenced which strategic paradigms have dominated are examined. The case made is perhaps provocative, and is indeed intended to proselytize to a certain extent, but in any event is offered in the spirit of open and constructive dialogue. The main point made is that only through the creation and understanding of a sovereign professional ideology, will the Canadian profession of arms fully protect the public it is sworn to serve. Based on the argument advanced in Chapter Four it becomes clear that the major ongoing threats to professionalism in the Canadian Forces as identified in the concluding Chapter, are the erosive influence of business and management concepts and practices, the need to create and maintain a truly Canadian body of military knowledge and the requirement for a professional development system that accords professional ideology appropriate emphasis. As such, a methodology is then introduced as the most appropriate response to these challenges. That methodology envisages five elements - expertise, cognitive, social and change capacities and professional ideology; one might call them meta-competencies, which are developed progressively through Initial, Intermediate, Advanced and Senior levels. Military professionals acquire knowledge, skills and capabilities in all these areas through education, training, experience and self-development. Professional ideology is *primus inter pares* among these meta-competencies and must pervade all the others. The profession of arms in Canada cannot meet and overcome the military and other security challenges of the 21st century without understanding, espousing and living the Canadian military professional ideology.

Chapter One

Defining Professions and Professionalism

The study of professions and professionalization has been, with few exceptions, the purview of sociology. Max Weber, who began his work as a legal scholar and economist before he turned to sociology, and Emile Durkheim, often referred to as the father of modern sociology, established the framework for such study early in the 20th century, Neither, however, explicitly discussed professionalism at length. Nonetheless, their work, and especially the structural-functional theories originally developed by Durkheim, dominated not only sociology generally, but the study of the professions particularly, for much of the 20th century. Weber's analysis of the division of labour in modern industrial societies and the associated forces of bureaucratization and monopolization went on to clearly identify the theoretical basis for the emergence of the socio-economic phenomena of professions.[1]

Weber posited three grounds of legitimacy for society: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. In the latter case, legitimacy derives from belief in the validity of legal statutes and functional competencies based on rationally accepted rule. Weber suggested that the legal-rational model animated modern society and rationality and efficiency grew relentlessly and irreversibly from early seeds of Western civilization. His foremost interest was in rationalization, meaning the tendency of things to get organized and subjected to rules and orderly processes. Division of labour, bureaucracy, professionalization, discipline and efficiency were, in Weber's view, the essential features of industrial society.[2]

These same phenomenon, especially the division of labour in modern society, posed the problem of social conflict and anomie for Emile Durkheim and he sought a theoretical basis for order and stability. Consequently, much of Durkheim's work can be read as an attempt to reconcile the structural inequality of modern society with the requirements of social solidarity. The "mechanical solidarity" of pre-industrial socie-

ties, according to Durkheim, had been replaced by a complex, non-traditional division of labour, wherein stability could only be achieved through what he called "organic solidarity." Organic solidarity is present when there is extensive social differentiation, including specialist hierarchical organizations run by individuals whose responsibilities reflect their relevant personal skills, the development and valorization of autonomous personalities and an exchange of goods and services leading individuals to recognize that they are also mutually interdependent and have shared interests. To maximize this solidarity he advocated the formation of public, elective occupational guilds based on the existing class structure. Their function would be to lay down general moral and legal principles according to which relations among the various occupations and classes would be regulated.[3]

Although his prescription for the overall organization of modern capitalist society may have been influenced by the emergence of more specialized professional groups Durkheim did not focus on their particular function or evolving characteristics. His *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* was actually intended to inform the creation of society-wide "occupational guilds" and it was not until 1922 that the political scientist, Robert MacIver identified professional associations *per se* as social entities deserving of closer attention.[4] No detailed or complete study of professions occurred thereafter until the seminal work of A.M. Carr-Saunders and P.A. Wilson in their 1933 book, *The Professions*. Carr-Saunders and Wilson began by noting that as of that date, information about the professions was almost wholly lacking and no adequate history of the professions existed. Interestingly, they did not provide any formal definition of what they meant by "the professions".

We shall not offer, either now or later, a definition of professionalism. Nevertheless, when we have completed our survey, it will emerge that the typical profession exhibits a complex of characteristics and that other vocations approach this condition more or less closely, owing to the possession of some of these characteristics fully or partially developed.[5]

Perhaps because of their lack of definitional rigor, they were able to go on and describe no less than 23 occupations ranging from doctors and lawyers to journalists and brokers, whose "characteristics" suggested to them that they should be grouped into this special professional cate-

gory. Central to the Carr-Saunders' thesis was the proposition that occupations taking on the characteristics of professions were both integral to, and valuable for, liberal, industrial society. In this regard they seemed much influenced by an earlier work by the historian R. H. Tawney who, without going into detail, proposed that professions could serve as the basis of an ideal socialist society. Tawney stressed the potential contributions of professions to orderly social progress, as a bridge between knowledge and power.[6] The important role that professions played in modern society suggested by these scholars was later endorsed by the influential sociologist Talcott Parsons who declared that:

It is my view that the professional complex has already become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies. The massive emergence of the professional complex, not the special status of capitalistic or socialistic modes of organization is the crucial structural development in the 20th century.[7]

Many scholars even today continue to agree, to one degree or another with this assessment, despite the tarnishing of the reputations of many professional groups over the intervening years. As late as 1996, for example, Harold Parkin of Northwestern University, opined that the evolution of the social/occupational construct of professionalism constituted the third revolution in the social history of humankind:

...the first was the Neolithic when settled agriculture allowed craftsmen, priests, warriors and rulers to found cities and civilizations. The second was the Industrial Revolution which released a majority for work in mass services. The third has, through phenomenal productivity in agriculture and industry, created a professional society.[8]

More recently, professor Eliot Freidson, whose study of professions spans over 30 years, makes a similar, less extravagant, but still compelling case for the continuing importance of the concept of professionalism in *Professionalism: The Third Logic*. Freidson warns however, that threats to professionalism, both from within and from the competing social constructs of the market and bureaucracy can erode and even destroy the social value inherent in what he calls the professional project that has spanned the last two hundred years or so.[9]

The time frame that Freidson identifies to situate the evolution of professions is important. Although Parsons had observed that in the Judeo-Christian world, the clergy is clearly the primary historical matrix from which the modern professions have differentiated, the true history of this concept dates more accurately from the early to mid-19th century. Professions emerged around this time, in their recognizable modern form, as one manifestation of the dual revolutions; industrial and bourgeois-democratic, that transformed western European societies and their offshoots in the 19th century. Professionalization was the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market for their particular expertise. The continuity of professions with their pre-industrial past, specifically with the guild systems of the Middle Ages, is, therefore, more apparent than real. The British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead explained the difference by observing that "a craft is an avocation based upon customary activities and modified by trial and error of individual practice. A profession, in contrast, is an avocation whose activities are subject to theoretical analysis and are modified by theoretical conclusions derived from that analysis."[10] Modern professional organizations, therefore, have only a superficial resemblance to the guilds of agrarian society and the difference lies in the social structures of knowledge.[11]

Only when knowledge emerged as a socio-cultural entity in its own right, independent of established social institutions, and when society came to be based on knowledge in a way quite different from earlier periods, could the professional construct take hold. In modern society, the cognitive referent - ie., the yardstick for assessing the truth or validity of knowledge - is the objective world of nature; in all earlier forms of society that reference point was one of a number of social institutions.[12] The beginning of this transformation in the basis for knowledge dates from the "scientific revolution" of the 16th and 17th centuries. It was a process that continued throughout the 18th century, the so-called Age of Reason. During this time the intellectual climate was decidedly unsympathetic to claims that revelation, tradition and received authority could serve as the basis of valid knowledge. The two main philosophical currents of the 17th century - rationalism and empiricism - were synthesized rather successfully by the leading intellectuals of the Enlightenment period of the 18th century, who expressed great confidence in reason and observation as a means of solving humanity's problems. Thereafter, the division of knowledge into rigidly defined fields and a

professionalization of the scientific and social disciplines greatly accelerated. Knowledge became professionalized during the 19th century and categorized systematically, with well-defined programs of study to assure the careful training of new workers in both the social and natural sciences.[13]

Simultaneously, the forces of the free market had reached sufficient salience as a feature of society for the private provision of knowledge-based services to become viable. Professor M.S. Larson, therefore, argues that the evolution of professionalization, "pertains to general dimensions of modernization, the advance of science and cognitive rationality and the progressive differentiation and rationalization of the division of labour in industrial societies over the past two centuries."[14] In *The Rise of Professions*, Larson constructs a narrative around the process by which a limited group of occupations undertook to raise their social status and gain a monopoly in the marketplace. She describes the historic process of professionalization, emphasizing how occupations obtained economic advantage by restricting the supply of practitioners and striving for a special position of public respect and influence. For this, she draws on Max Weber's analysis of how groups with interests in common can act in such a way as to circumscribe their membership so that they may either pursue their collective interest or respond defensively to the attempts of others to secure an advantage at their expense.[15] Thus, social stratification, for all that it has a basis in the structure of capitalist market society, is nonetheless, something that in important ways is the outcome of the purposeful actions of members of society, especially their collective actions. However a specialized group may originate, if it has an interest to pursue, it will almost inevitably endeavor to become a legally privileged group. It will aim for a closed monopoly and its purpose is likely to be the closure of social and economic opportunities to outsiders.

Andrew Abbott has argued that the history of professions is to be understood as a continual clash over such monopolies in certain areas of work. That is, a clash over what he calls jurisdictions. Professions tried to claim jurisdiction over this or that form of work by associating themselves with some abstract knowledge to accomplish the work and then presenting that claim in front of various audiences; in the marketplace, in public opinion and before the organs of state.[16] According to Abbott, it is the history of jurisdictional disputes that is the real, the determin-

ing, history of professions.[17] The crucial point to recognize here is that "closure" as it applies to professions is predicated in large part by the exclusion of those who have not mastered the body of abstract knowledge upon which service to clients is based. The origins of any profession lie in the existence of an area of knowledge that those who possess it are able to isolate from social knowledge generally and establish a special claim to. As important as retaining control of it, is its development and presentation to society as the special province of the member, who alone can be trusted to use it in an ethical manner.[18] Such trust is solicited based on the articulation, codification and institutionalization of a code of conduct that regulates how practitioners will employ their skills and relate to consumers or clients.

The model of a profession sanctioned by the state, trusted, more or less, by society and based on an identity rooted in the mastery of a body of abstract, theory-based knowledge developed its most distinctive characteristics, and the most clear-cut emphasis on autonomy and self-regulation, in the two paramount examples of laissez-faire, capitalist industrialization in the 19th and early 20th centuries - England and the US. The professions developed less spontaneously in other European societies with long-standing bureaucracies and strong, centralized governments. The model of professions in these cases, particularly France and Germany, is closer to that of the civil service than it is to professions in the US and England. Thus, for example, in England, of the top 13 professions, 10 acquired a private association of national scope between 1825 and 1880. In the US, eleven of the top professions acquired similar status in the 47 years from 1840-1887.

In summary, the form that modern professions takes in the course of the industrial revolution, and beyond, is that of corporate groups attempting, first of all, to organize production for a special type of market and to gain in it, quasi-monopolistic control. Given the singular nature of the "commodity" to be exchanged, the organization of production is concerned not with an inanimate product but with the selection of producers or providers of services based on specialized knowledge. The end point of this primary aspect of professional organization is therefore, the monopoly of relatively standardized education.[19] Thus, as Freidson concludes, two of the most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that certain work is so specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required training and experience, and the

belief that it cannot be standardized, rationalized or commodified. At the core of professionalism is its claim, therefore, to discretionary specialization.[20]

Drawing upon these themes, Talcott Parsons enumerated three "core" criteria by which to assess an occupation's claim to professionalism.

- The requirement of formal technical training accompanied by some institutionalized mode of validating both the adequacy of training and the competence of trained individuals. Among other things the training must lead to some order of mastery of a generalized cultural tradition, and do so in a manner giving prominence to an intellectual component - that is, it must give primacy to the validation of cognitive rationality as applied to a particular field.

- Not only must the cultural tradition be mastered, in the sense of being understood, but skills in some form of its use must also be developed.

- A full-fledged profession must have some institutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially responsible uses.[21]

With this historical and conceptual background in place the development of professions and the professionalization process can be depicted in both its political-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, as illustrated in Figure I.



FIGURE I

Occupations seeking professional identity aspire to elevated status that can only be bestowed by the culture in which they are embedded, based on reflecting highly valued norms. They also require protection in the economic order, a claim they base on specialized knowledge, useful, if not essential, to society's well being. This protection is provided by the state. To maintain a privileged position in the community, professions must master and enlarge the cognitive basis of their authoritative knowledge and act in ways that reinforce the trust and confidence placed in their services by society at large. This requirement is reflected in an occupational ethic that demands adherence to the highest standards along both these dimensions.

The end result of the process, illustrated in Figure I, is an idealized conception of a profession described by the sociologist Bernard Barber in terms of four attributes:

A high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge; a primary orientation to the community interest rather than to individual self-interest; a high degree of self control of behaviour through codes of ethics internalized in the process of work socialization and through voluntary associations organized and operated by the work specialists themselves; and a system of rewards that is primarily a set of symbols of work achievement and thus ends in themselves, not means to some end of individual self-interest.[22]

A more recent, and for present purposes, more useful definition is that provided by Eliot Freidson, who describes the five interdependent elements of ideal-type professionalism as follows:[23]

- Specialized work in the officially recognized economy that is believed to be grounded in a body of theoretically based, discretionary knowledge and skills and that is accordingly given special high status in the work force.

- Exclusive jurisdiction in a particular division of labour created and controlled by occupational negotiation.

- A sheltered position in both external and internal labour markets, based on qualifying credentials created by the occupation.

- A formal training programme lying outside the labour market that produces the qualifying credentials, which is controlled by the occupation and associated with higher education.

- An ethic that asserts greater commitment to doing good work than to economic gain and to the quality rather than the economic efficiency of work.

Freidson summarizes these elements by stressing that professions claim both specialized knowledge that is authoritative in a functional and cognitive sense, and commitment to a transcendental value that guides and adjudicates the way that knowledge is employed. In this conceptualization the central role of knowledge and trust is readily identified and, in combination with the professional claim, forms the content of professional ideology.

Even a cursory review of the relevant literature on professions since Weber and Durkheim suggests that the inclusion of the military in this sociological concept was not, until recently at least, obvious. Before the meaning of professional ideology for the so-called profession of arms can be fully explored the nature of military professionalism and its relationship with the generic concept of a modern Western profession requires clarification. This will be dealt with in Chapter Two before going on to a more complete analysis of military professional ideology

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[21]Parsons, "The Professions," 545.

[22]Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions," *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* Fall, 1963, 672.

[23]Freidson, *Professionalism,* 127.

Chapter Two

The Military Profession

Samuel Huntington, the author of the seminal work on the military as a profession, noted in 1957, that prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional officer. However, in 1900, such bodies existed in virtually all major western countries.[1] Arguing along the same lines, the military sociologist Morris Janowitz observed in 1960, that "the officer corps can also be analyzed as a professional group by means of sociological concepts." The emergence of a professional military - specifically a professional officer corps, had, according to these two students of military professionalism, been a slow and gradual process with many interruptions and reversals. Mercenary officers were ubiquitous in the 16th century but the outline forms of professionalism were not clearly discernible until the beginning of the 18th century. It took another 100 years, or so, before one could speak of the emergence of an integrated military profession.[2]

The parallels with the evolution of professions, in general, in the 19th century are inescapable, with many of the same factors that account for the professionalization of select occupations in the latter half of that century at play in Western militaries. It is generally the case that the military profession, as we know it, emerged out of the European state system, the development of modern society and the European wars of the last 200 years.[3] In support of this contention a British authority on the subject, General Sir John Hackett, writing at about the same time as Huntington and Janowitz, observed that:

Service under arms has evolved into a profession, not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an education pattern adapted to its own specific needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in society which has

brought it forth. In all these respects it has strong points of resemblance to medicine and the law, as well as to holy orders. Though service under arms has strongly marked vocational elements and some appearances of an occupation it is probably as a profession that it can be most profitably studied.[4]

Other than the efforts of these three scholars however, the military as a profession had not, by the early 1960s, or indeed in large measure throughout the Cold War period, been addressed to any great extent in the scholarly literature, civilian or military. Carr-Saunders in his pioneering work, *The Professions* excludes consideration of the military, explaining that "the Army is omitted because the service which soldiers are trained to render is one which it is hoped they will never be called upon to perform."[5] Parsons does not examine the military, nor does Larson in *The Rise of Professionalism* (1977), Abbott in *The System of Professions* (1988), or Freidson in *Professionalism: the Third Logic* (2001) deal with this subject. Examining the factors that account for these omissions help illuminate the precise dimensions of the military as a social institution, sharing many of the conventional characteristics of civilian professions, but nonetheless remaining a unique entity within this overall intellectual construct. The study of the military profession can, indeed, be dealt with in an ideal-type framework drawing out the characteristics that situate it in the mainstream of the professional construct. But, just as the law differs from medicine and again from engineering, the factors that led scholars to differentiate the profession of arms from its conceptual cousins should be recognized.

In general, a significant reason for the lack of attention paid to the military, and one that serves as sub-text for three more particular explanatory analytical issues, is the somewhat antagonistic relationship of Anglo-American values as a matter of principle to military norms, that shaped scholarly inquiry into the military, or lack thereof. Adopting the meliorist and liberal amilitary tradition that frequently characterized much of academe, most social scientists, at least until after the Second World War, expressed no interest in military affairs and tended to ignore the position of the military in social life. Even then, as the German sociologist, Hans Joas has recently observed in *War and Modernity*, "The traditional strengths of the social scientists have never included a preoccupation with violence between states and we are now paying the price for this. Social scientists have always paid far greater attention to

economic, social and political inequality than to the manifestations of violence." He goes on to add that little had changed in the post-Cold War era, "The legitimate institutions of the state monopoly of the means of violence, during this period, have attracted only marginal interest from the social sciences-an astonishing fact, given their size and importance."[6]

In this context, as already noted, the study of professions tended, in the Anglo-American world, at least, to follow the structural-functional theory of Weber, Durkheim, Parsons and Robert Merton. And recent modifications in this framework first through the development of neo-functionalism and by the more recent so-called "actor network theory" in sociology does not alter the focus of analysis being on the place of particular occupations in the division of labour in the <u>capitalist market economy</u>. Those occupations that sought professional status specifically sought autonomy in the free market of services, together with freedom in determining the conditions of work. The constitution of these professional markets leads to comparing different professions in terms of the marketability of their specific cognitive resources. Autonomy in the market was either never sought or conceded by some occupations that might otherwise be regarded as professions, that is, the established clergy and the military, necessary though they are to the maintenance of a healthy and secure society and state.[7] This militated against the study of the military as a profession in the eyes of many scholars since military forces did not transact their services in the market. As Professor T. C. Halliday observed, "The military is the most highly organized association in the state, but it is not distinct from the organization that employs it."[8]

The military is not necessarily excluded by this factor alone, however. The search for autonomy and social closure in the market by occupations seeking professional status in Western liberal democracies necessitated a particular relationship to the state. The state legitimized the monopoly of the provision of services of a particular kind and greatly facilitated the linkage between individual professions and the higher educational systems upon which their claim to systematic expertise was based. Exclusion from the market was a distinguishing feature of the military, to be sure, but scholars could not help note a parallel between the state and professions and the state and the highly organized, distinct social entity of the military when other attributes of professionalism

were considered. Nonetheless, although the state acted as a kind of intermediary between conventional professions and their clients, it had a distinctly different relationship with the military, whose sole client was the state itself.

Added to exclusion from the market, therefore, was the fact that the military reflected several of the characteristics of bureaucracy that many scholars considered antithetical to the nature of professions. Talcott Parsons, a disciple of Weber, was acutely aware of the essentially bureaucratic nature of large organizations and pointedly advised that professionals were neither capitalists nor were they typically governmental bureaucrats or administrators.[9] The classic model of professions analyzed was, of course, of individuals of more or less equal status, albeit formed into loose associations, offering their services to a variety of clients on a one to one basis. The consensus among those studying the phenomenon of professionalization was that professional workers require a kind of autonomy contrary to Weber's model of rational-legal bureaucracy. The proper way for such men to work was as a self-regulating company of equals.[10]

This apparent dichotomy between professions and bureaucracies, it seemed, stood in stark contrast to the military, which as Samuel Huntington himself later noted, was not only a professional body but also a bureaucratic, hierarchic organization.[11] In addition, as already observed on, the military had only one client, the state, to which it was totally subordinate. This distinction between professions and bureaucracies, perhaps artificial almost from the beginning of professionalization in the 19th century, certainly lost much of its theoretical basis over time as increasingly, professions and professionals were integrated into large organizational structures. The study of one construct required the consideration of the other. Recently, therefore, the whole issue of the relationship between professions and bureaucracy has received considerable attention and this has made the inclusion of an examination of the military profession more palatable to an increasing number of scholars.

A final factor that tended to militate against the study of the military as a true profession, at least until the Second World War, was the conception of the body of knowledge that underpinned certain occupations' claim to professional status. As already mentioned, abstract knowledge is usually accepted as the foundation of an effective definition of a pro-

fession. Such a cognitive base is necessary, according to Larson, to every professional project.[12] But in each project it had a different content, therefore it occupied in each, a different place among various strategic resources. Essentially though, the knowledge base in question was assumed to be anchored in some type of science, as was clear for medicine, engineering, biology and various other organized disciplines. In some cases, like law, economics and sociology the cognitive base was acknowledged to be somewhat broader but remained, nonetheless, complex and requiring extensive study. In the case of the military it was not generally held that knowledge in this field constituted the same theory-based expertise associated with the rise of conventional professions.

Carl von Clausewitz himself, perhaps the most influential military theorist in modern times, had maintained, early in the 19th century, that "knowledge in war is very simple, being concerned with so few subjects and only with their final results at that. But this does not make its application easy."[13] Another influential military theorist and practitioner of the 19th century, and one carefully listened to after the Wars of German Unification (1864-1870), Helmut von Moltke, seemed to reinforce this view when he stated that the doctrines of strategy hardly go beyond the first propositions of common sense, "one can hardly call them a science, their value lies almost entirely in their concrete application."[14] Von Moltke's famous statement that strategy was merely a system of expedients was quoted endlessly in Western military thought. This however, represented a serious misreading of his intention, which was not to denigrate the intellectual content or theoretical value of military knowledge, but rather, to warn practitioners not to be seduced by the apparent law-like character of military theory and strategy propounded by the disciples of the Swiss military theorist Antoine Jomini, who dominated military thought in the Anglo-American world throughout much of the 19th century.[15]

Consequently, until after the First World War, it remained true that many, especially in the military itself, believed that attributes such as character mattered more to an officer than intellect. Colmar von der Coltz's conclusion in *A Nation in Arms* to the effect that heart and character should be decisive in selecting officers, not intellect and scientific attainment, was accepted at face value.[16] There was little difference in the UK, where a recent review of officership and education in the British forces concluded that at no time in history, until the recent past, had

British army officers ever considered themselves to be members of a "learned profession."[17] The military literature of the period confirms this state of affairs in all Western armies, including Russia, notwithstanding the efforts of a handful of reformers in virtually every country in question.

The application of both science and technology to strategy, operational art and tactics, the intensification of the integration of disciplines such as history, sociology, psychology, economics and political science into the systematic body of military knowledge and the importation of German and Russian theory into evolving Anglo-American military thought after the First World War, all contributed to the growing awareness that knowledge in the military was, in fact, grounded in a theoretical, cognitive base that qualified it as a true profession. Notwithstanding an increased appreciation for the complexity of purely military affairs however, exclusion from the market and bureaucratic structure continued until after 1945 to restrict the study of the military to the more conventional areas of history, political sociology and political science. Most scholars did not consider it to be an appropriate subject for specialized study as a profession. This also, of course, inhibited a completely satisfactory exploration of the subject of civil-military relations.

This situation changed after the Second World War. In the post-war period there was a virtual paradigm shift in how Western societies viewed military force, its utility and how this increasingly destructive instrument could be controlled. Technology had burst its Newtonian bonds and the nuclear age now posed hitherto unimaginable problems regarding the integration of force into diplomacy and statecraft. Within two short years after 1945, the Cold War threatened a bipolar confrontation, buttressed by huge standing forces whose potential for destruction, even without the "atomic" bomb, had been amply demonstrated on a global scale between 1939 and 1945. Equally unprecedented was the degree and scope of the influence of senior military officers now seemingly deeply embedded in the policy-making apparatus of all the world's major powers. While statesmen, policy-makers and senior military officers grappled with these new challenges in terms of national policy, the construction of international organizations and arms control regimes, scholars in a variety of disciplines sought to identify the theoretical implications of evolving power structures inherent in this new world and suggest ways of coping with them. International relations scholars such as

Hans Morgenthau, Bernard Brodie, Raymond Aron and Hedley Bull, to mention only the most prominent of many investigators, turned their attention to questions posed by “total war”, “limited war” and the new nature of the international system at mid-century.

At the same time, a number of other political scientists and sociologists addressed squarely the apparent dangers of the concentration of organized military force, in the hands of a small number of decision-makers, in light of the recent past and what looked like a very uncertain, as well as dangerously unstable, future. In 1948, the noted British social scientist, Harold Lasswell coined the phrase “the garrison state” in a study whose purpose was “to consider the possibility that we are moving to a world of garrison states; a world in which the specialists in violence are the most powerful group in society. The picture of the garrison state offered is no dogmatic forecast. Rather it is a picture of the probable.”[18] These “specialists in violence”, Lasswell argued, included in their number, civilians whose role focused on the development and allocation of war making means as well as the organization of society to support such policies. His primary concern, however, were military officers whose specialty was, in his words, “the management of violence.” Following on the heels of Lasswell’s work, John U. Nef published his *War and Human Progress,* arguing that war had always hindered human progress and that industrialization, in particular, had helped to destroy the restraints on war. He warned that “the causes for the movement of war to beget war have never been so accessible to the human mind as they are in our time.”[19]

The combination of these two concerns - the dangers of catastrophic war, controlled by “specialists” or “managers” of violence, found compelling expression in Stanislav Andreski’s *Military Organization and Society* published in 1954. Andreski believed that the problem of the influence of military organization on society had, on the whole, failed to attract sufficient attention from social scientists. In a wide-ranging study of the relationship of military organization to societies from ancient Egypt to the present, Andreski extended the dangers of militarism as an ideology propagating military ideals, beyond the feudal-aristocratic construct found in Alfred Vagts’ 1937 classic study,[20] into contemporary times. Andreski proposed a model of types of military organizations based on three variables: a military participation ratio (MPR); degree of subordination to civilian control and degree of cohe-

sion (or identity) of the military organization itself. Of the seven types identified both across history and extant in the world of the 1950s, two were of particular relevance to the West. The first, Andreski called High Military Participation/High Subordination/High Cohesion (MSC), and the second was, low MPR, high subordination and high cohesion (mSC). The appearance of subordination was less significant than the dominance of the military in the governance structure according to Andreski.[21] His conclusion troubled those concerned about the use and abuse of military force in the modern world. Andreski believed for instance that the armed forces of the US were steadily moving towards a position of political dominance, based on a high military participation ratio. Thus, consequently, "the problems of the relations between military organizations and society has lost none of its relevance to the great issues of our time."[22]

Shortly after Andreski's work appeared, another well-known American military sociologist, Walter Millis, published *Arms and Man: A Study in American Military History*. Millis said nothing to assuage the concerns raised by Andreski and in fact warned that control of the colossal US military machine, in which soldiers, industrialists and bureaucrats are combined in a military interest with a powerful influence over foreign, budgetary and manpower policies, was of increasing concern.[23] Furthermore, "There appeared to be almost no way," argued Mills, "in which the deployment of military force for the destruction of other men could be brought rationally to bear upon the decision of any of the political, economic, emotional or philosophical issues by which man still remained divided." He added, "This is the great and unresolved dilemma of our age."[24]

Neither Andreski, nor Millis, raised the issue of professionalism directly, but their work suggested the advisability of examining the nature of militaries in terms of how they related to the society they protected, as well as, the politicians and bureaucrats who purportedly worked with them in this endeavour. One scholar in particular made the connection between the sociological studies that had usually treated the military as a bureaucratic structure and the need to reconceptualize this model if concerns of social responsibility and civil-military relations were to be appropriately identified and analyzed. Samuel Huntington acknowledged that bureaucracy was, indeed, a characteristic of the military but argued that it was a secondary, not essential characteristic. He noted

further that the nature and history of professions in general had received considerable scholarly attention, but that the public, as well as the scholar, hardly conceived of the military in the same way that they did law or medicine; withholding from the military the deference they accorded to civilian professionals. According to Huntington, when the term professional was used in connection with the military it normally had the sense of "professional" as contrasted with "amateur" rather than in the sense of "professional" as contrasted with "trade" or "craft."[25] Huntington, however, rejected this exclusion of the military from the professional construct both in theory and in practice. He stated explicitly that the overriding theme of his path-breaking book, *The Soldier and the State* was, "that the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man. Professionalism was what distinguished the military officer of today from warriors of previous ages."[26]

Drawing especially on Carr-Saunders and Talcott Parsons, Huntington identified expertise, responsibility and corporateness as the distinguishing attributes of that special type of vocation commonly known as a profession. He maintained that, according to these criteria, the military qualified fully as a profession. Military expertise was acquired only by prolonged education and experience. This professional knowledge is intellectual in nature and has a history that is central to professional competence. In terms of responsibility, the military professional performs a service, which is essential to society, and therefore, the particular client of the military profession is society itself. According to Huntington, financial remuneration was not, and cannot be the primary aim of the professional *qua* professional, and this was certainly the case for military officers. Finally, members of the military profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen - Huntington's definition of corporateness. Such was precisely the case with all other professions.

Huntington was adamant that the profession of arms possessed the necessary systematic, theory-based body of knowledge that underpinned ideal-type professionalism throughout modern history as demonstrated in the scholarly literature concerning this subject. The military professional's special skill, accordingly, is best summed up in Lasswell's phrase "the management of violence."[27] This characterization should not be a cause for alarm but rather prompt the construction of an ana-

lytic framework to better understand its implications for, and benefits to, society. Huntington conceded that before the management of violence became the extremely complex task that it is in modern civilization, it was possible for someone without specialized training to practice officership. Now, however, only the person who completely devotes his working hours to this task can hope to develop a reasonable level of personal competence. The skill of the officer is an extraordinarily complex intellectual one requiring comprehensive study and training. The duties of these "managers of violence" include the direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence. This is the particular skill of the military professional.

In accordance with the theory of professions as it had developed since Parsons and Carr-Saunders, Huntington invoked "closure" to distinguish those who were legitimately members of the profession of arms and those who were not. Huntington's model excluded support and specialist officers and all enlisted ranks. In the case of the latter, they were part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy. Enlisted personnel had neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the operational officer. They were specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. The differentiation of military personnel between military operators and all the rest would continue to be the subject of analysis and debate up to the present. Until recently this differentiation constituted the basis for a decidedly exclusionary model of the profession of arms common throughout the West. The implications for a more inclusionary model are only now being fully analyzed and debated.

Huntington had addressed concerns about the destructive potential of modern military force and how it could, in part at least, be controlled by formally applying a rigorous professional construct to the military. Military professionals had a special responsibility for the well being of society exercised through an institutional framework embedded in the overall governance structure of the state. Huntington advocated what Andreski had called a low level of military participation on the part of a highly cohesive professional body (operational military officers) firmly subordinate to civilian authority. This was achieved by allowing the professional, corporate organization to focus on its function of the management of violence but prohibited by its professional ethic to engage in

debate over when this function would be executed. The psycho-social distance between the profession of arms and its surrounding society should be maximized and technical expertise insulated from political interference. This would preclude the politicization of the professional officer corps, protecting the state through what Huntington called the "objective civilian control of the military."[28]

Morris Janowitz was motivated by concerns similar to those of Huntington, and he also addressed them within the construct of professionalism in *The Professional Soldier: A Political and Social Portrait,* published in 1960. He accepted Huntington's characterization of professions as consisting of expertise, responsibility and corporateness and recast these attributes into his own definition:

Professionals are social trustees, acting in a fiduciary capacity to ensure the public good. They possess systematic knowledge acquired through a long period of training and, as required by their occupational ethic, they apply it competently, objectively and impartially to meet the needs of the client and improve public welfare.[29]

Janowitz emphasized the element of occupational ethic more so than did Huntington and rather profoundly differed on the question of the nature of civil-military relations. Where Huntington stressed separation, Janowitz argued that the military profession must be as integrated with society and its norms and values as was possible without, of course, jeopardizing the military's operational or functional imperative. The advent of the nuclear age, in Janowitz's opinion, represented a profound shift in the nature of warfare requiring a closer interface and greater collaboration between the military and civil communities. He agreed with one of the preeminent civilian strategists of the period, Bernard Brodie, that whereas in the past the military professional's role was to prosecute wars, in the future their job would be to prevent them.[30] Consequently, the understanding of "managing violence" must shift in the professional mind from seeking decisive victory, which was now unthinkable in any socio/political/cultural sense, to a more nuanced role. That is, the role of the military should no longer be geared primarily toward periodic warfighting but instead toward the ongoing tasks of crisis management. For this, the professional military needed to embrace the constabulary concept. Janowitz's intention was a force, not in the sense of a paramilitary or gendarmerie, but one in which an understanding of professional-

ism included greater consideration of political-social dimensions and employment of force in non-battle configurations. He defined such a force as follows:

The military becomes a constabulary force when it is continually prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine.[31]

Janowitz's conception of the military professional's jurisdiction was consequently far more expansive than Huntington's. He argued that the military profession, which had hitherto centered on the self-conception of the warrior type or the "heroic" leader, would now require the incorporation of new identities, namely the "military manager" and the "military technologist". There was now a more equal balance required between these three types.[32] The debate over the implications for the profession of arms of this viewpoint, particularly with the end of the Cold War and the introduction of additional "types" of military professional orientations such as the soldier-diplomat and soldier-scholar continues to the present. Reconciliation of all these professional self-conceptions is a major function of professional ideology as this concept applies to the military.

General Sir John Hackett did not endorse the constabulary concept in his popular book, *The Profession of Arms*, published in 1963, but his definition of the function of the profession suggested a subtlety more attuned to Janowitz than Huntington. The General defined military professionals as those responsible for "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem."[33] "Ordered," because part of the professional's specialized skill lay in their capacity to apply measured force in accordance with a finely developed judgment. Resolving social problems, albeit with force, reinforced the profession's responsibility to society and theoretically expanded the jurisdiction of the military profession well beyond simply "fighting and winning their nation's wars." Huntington, Janowitz and Hackett remained the standard references for the study of the profession of arms, essentially throughout the remainder of the 20th century.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, debates and discussions

concerning the profession of arms took place largely within the theoretical framework established by this triad of scholars. In Canada, beyond the publication of a considerable quantity of conventional military history, occasional efforts to address certain dimensions of military professionalism from within the Huntington/Janowitzian paradigm emerged in the disciplines of sociology and political science. In the case of history, one notable work by Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass*, analyzed the professionalization of the Canadian Army in the inter-war years within an explicitly Huntingtonian framework. Such an effort to cover the Canadian Forces in the post World War Two era is long overdue.[34] Over the period 1964-1983 James Eayrs published his 5-volume *In Defence of Canada,* discussing issues of civil-military relations, relationships with allies, particularly Britain and the US, inter-service rivalry and the evolution of new roles from 1918 to the early 1970s. However, neither Eayrs, nor those who sought either to further his themes or contest them, cast their work in ways specifically meant to advance an understanding of Canadian military professionalism *per se*.

Eayrs' scholarship covered the whole period of integration and unification through the amalgamation of National Defence Headquarters in 1972. These organizational developments represented an institutional transformation that, of course, had profound implications for Canadian military professionalism.[35] Some of these are well treated in Doug Bland's *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, written much later in 1995, which focused on civil-military relations. A complete analysis of this period from the perspective of the study of professionalism in all its aspects, however, remains to be attempted. Not entirely coincidently, the same period witnessed the growth of "peacekeeping", mainly through the United Nations, as a significant role for the newly established Canadian Armed Forces. Although considerable attention was paid to the politico-military nature of peacekeeping and its function in Canadian foreign and defence policy, the tension between this "constabulary" role and the "warfighting" premise for the Canadian military mission in Europe, was not explored in any depth for its implications for military professionalism.

This is not to neglect the work of political scientists Rod Byers and Colin S. Gray who published "Canadian Military Professionalism: The Search for Identity" in 1973,[36] or that of the Canadian military sociolo-

gist Charles Cotton including his short, but very pertinent, essay entitled "Canada's Professional Military: The Limits of Civilianization."[37] As the sub-titles of these works indicate Canadian scholars were tentatively exploring two perennial issues for the Canadian military - identity and ethos. During this period Colonel Frank Pinch also conducted a considerable amount of research within the CF on issues relating to Canadian military professionalism,[38] and helped establish the Canadian chapter of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS), originally founded in Chicago by Morris Janowitz. The journal of the IUS, *Armed Forces and Society* has provided a platform for many Canadian scholars to discuss military professionalism, broadly defined. Colonel Pinch, now retired, was awarded the Order of Military Merit for his contribution in this area in 1998. Issues of identity and ethos, compounded by related ones of jurisdiction, expertise and responsibility, would rise to virtual crisis proportions in the wake of the Somalia affair and other unfortunate incidents after the end of the Cold War.

The study of Canadian military professionalism as a whole did not, therefore, receive a great deal of attention during the Cold War. Scholars and practitioners alike seemed content to accept the models advanced by Huntington, Janowitz and Hackett with the significant caveat that uniformed officers strenuously rejected the constabulary concept of Janowitz. This was unfortunate on its own merits but it also predisposed Canadian officers to neglect fruitful avenues for discussion and debate, touched on in Janowitz's work related to issues of jurisdiction, ethos and ultimately military expertise, from which Canadian military thought would have profited. Rather, during this period, the Canadian military virtually drifted from the British sphere of influence to that of the US. Canadian tactical excellence, amply demonstrated in the Second World War and Korea, was generally maintained, to be sure. In fact, Canadian contributions to 4 Brigade and 4 Allied Tactical Air Force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and service in North American Air Defence (NORAD) was consistently praised by allies. Canada's excellent reputation as peacekeepers rested firmly on mastery of the tactical level of combat capability. However, Canada's tactical contribution had been, and was, embedded in strategic and operational theories and concepts imported from abroad. The lack of a distinctly Canadian body of military knowledge in these vital areas of military theory consistently undermined a thoroughly national sense of autonomous military professionalism.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the Charter of Paris (1990) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union constituted something of a professional conundrum for all Western militaries. These fundamental geo-political changes challenged traditional jurisdictional boundaries in the profession of arms and in some cases these changes were politically imposed on reluctant militaries. In fact though, the necessary reassessment of professional orientation was driven by a combination of developments beyond the geo-political realignment of the 1990s and in some areas predating it. The three most important were probably the putative revolution in military affairs (RMA), socio-demographic changes in Western society over the previous quarter century or more and the ubiquitous phenomenon of post-modernism. This latter movement purported to reject meta-narratives in general, while actually constituting a new meta-narrative all its own throughout the social sciences and the discipline of history. All of these developments necessitated reassessments of all professional attributes - core expertise, identity and ethos as well as conceptions of responsibility.

The application of advanced technology to the military sphere, historically commonplace, had over the period from the early 1980s seemed to take on the character of a qualitative change rather than merely quantitative. The cutting edge of this phenomenon was clearly information technology with its implications for communications, intelligence, sensors and precision guided munitions. Net-work enabled operations greatly enhanced joint operations and overall battle tempo. Many, verging on technophilia, began to talk about "information warriors" as the mid-wives of victory by providing dominant battlespace knowledge. This in turn, it is often argued, will bring about "revolutionary" changes in force structure, strategy and doctrine. All of this has, of course, major implications for military professionalism. At the same time the RMA, while it is undoubtedly affecting the character of war and other forms of armed conflict, does not change the nature of war itself.[40] Each of the attributes of expertise, identity and even ethos will be affected but for the foreseeable future the function of the profession of arms will remain the ordered application of military force pursuant to government direction. No amount of technology will make war an autonomous phenomenon. All forms of organized armed conflict will remain inextricably bound up in their political, social and cultural contexts.

Socio-demographic changes as they relate to the military profession in-

clude increasing educational levels, the rise of individualism, cosmopolitanism, decline in deference to authority and multi-culturalism. Each of these phenomena influences the attributes of professionalism, affecting how expertise is acquired and distributed and especially how the ethos structures the military community and its professional identity. Lastly, post-modernism, whose bewildering, multi-dimensional aspects defy comprehensive treatment here, has nonetheless, serious consequences for professionalism in general and the profession of arms in particular.[41]

Postmodernism is characterized by dislocation and fragmentation, a concern with images, the superficial and the ephemeral, and a rejection of the traditional philosophical search for an underlying unity, reality, order and coherence to all phenomena. It is closely associated with that other powerful late 20th century movement – post-structuralism, which itself is characterized by being anti-traditional, anti-metaphysical and anti-ideological. Knowledge, from a postmodern perspective, is legitimized not by its appeal to its truth, or its ability to represent accurately what is objectively the case. Instead there is an appeal to its efficiency; minimization of input or maximization of output or both are the goals to be achieved. The influence of post-modernism is inextricably bound up with technology as well as a variety of intellectual and demographic factors and cannot be avoided. It needs to be better understood and accommodated, however. Clearly the status of professional knowledge itself must be firmly established in the face of such challenges. The threat to the ethical core of professionalism is even more profound. The case will need to be made that all values are not in fact relative, although they may well be relational or dependent on perspective.[42]

One assessment of the effects of post-modernism on the military suggests a summary of its impact as follows:

The post-modern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the increasing penetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminuation of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank and combat versus non-combat roles. The third is the change of the military purpose for fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The fourth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimized) by entities beyond the nation-state. The final

change is the internationalization of military forces themselves.[43]

How this post-modernist impact, as well as changes generated by geo-political, technological and socio-demographic changes effect military professionalism is the subject of ongoing, even intense debate and discussion. In addition to the work of Charles Moskos referred to here, in the late 1990s and early 21st century, the military sociologist Sam Sarkesian and his colleagues undertook a major analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War on military professionalism in the US. The results of this study were published as *The US Military Profession into the 21st Century*. At about the same time the West Point Professionalization Project got underway focusing on the US Army. In Canada, work began in the Canadian Forces (CF), with extensive consultation with interested scholars and senior governmental officials, on the profession of arms manual. These three events, in particular, served to illuminate the theoretical and institutional status of military professionalism in the US and Canada at the end of the 20th century and, not incidentally, at the end of the era of "total war." Background research for all these efforts drew extensively on British and other European sources as well. They represent a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, treatment of the subject and therefore point the direction for much needed additional research and analysis.

Sarkesian's work reflects two significant developments in the theory of military professionalism. First, the resultant modifications proposed to the conventional model result in a more inclusive structure, reflecting the ongoing changes both domestically and internationally in the Western world. In this new context, support and specialist officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were, in the Sarkesian model, all considered members of the profession of arms. Second, there is an acute awareness of the changing roles and tasks of military forces and the potential impact of these changes on all of the attributes of the profession. Sarkesian addresses this issue in terms very similar to those employed by Andrew Abbott in *The System of Professions*, highlighting the concept of contested jurisdictions and the resultant pressure to enlarge the concept of expertise and reassess civil-military relations theory. This latter point is a theme taken up by Eliot Cohen in *Supreme Command*. A protégé of Samuel Huntington, Cohen argues that the new security environment and the changing nature of military professionalism, in that context, necessitates a modification or evolution in the Huntington

position concerning civil control of the military:

But the "normal" theory still requires emendation in its understanding of the military profession and hence in its understanding of civilian control. If officership is a unique profession, military expertise is variable and uncertain and if the boundaries between political ends and military means are more uncertain than Huntington suggests, civilian control must take a form different from that of "objective control", at least, in its original understanding.[44]

Huntington's "objective control" was deemed achievable and even desirable largely because the military's jurisdiction was conveniently narrow, that being to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Professor James Burk from the University of Texas, agreeing with Cohen's point about the ambiguity of civil-military boundaries, argues, in addition, that jurisdictions are almost always contested and goes so far as to suggest that professions, including the military, can be defined in terms of three attributes, that differ from the Huntington model-expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy. This represents a shift from the older functional theory, utilized throughout most of the 20th century by sociologists to discuss professionalism, to the newer action theory. Action theory shifts the emphasis of analysis from what professions are, usually discussed in terms of traits, with significant normative overtones, to what professions actually do.

Burk argues the case that since contested jurisdictions, in the case of the military profession, are "negotiated" with the government that is its sole client, civil-military relations acquire a novel salience. The profession's legitimacy is potentially at stake since failure to adapt to new jurisdictional boundaries could render the military less relevant. The opposite danger is to so diffuse the function of the military as to erode its very professional status. According to Burk, when possible, "the military should wrap its expertise in the language of the market to enhance its professional legitimacy."[45] This recommendation is not necessarily directly pertinent to the Canadian situation but nonetheless serves to highlight the issue of appropriate roles and missions for the CF and how they might influence the attributes of professionalism. It also suggests, however, that Burk has not sufficiently appreciated the corrosive effect on military ethos of business values and norms which may be imported into this ethos inadvertently through the use of inappropriate symbols

and language.

The results of Sarkesian's analysis is a proposal for a somewhat revised definition of military professionalism that basically re-affirms the fundamental attributes of professionalism as described by Janowitz incorporating the views of several scholars since the early 1960s. Not surprisingly, it is articulated along lines parallel to the definition of ideal-typical professionalism offered by Freidson, described in Chapter One.

- The profession has a defined area of competence based on expert knowledge.
- There is a system of continuing education designed to maintain professional competence.
- The profession has an obligation to society and must serve it without regard for remuneration.
- It has a system of values that perpetuate professional character and establish and maintain legitimate relationships with society.
- The profession has control over the system of rewards and punishments and is in a position to determine the quality of those entering the profession.[46]
- There is an institutional framework within which the profession functions.

The second initiative responding to the impact of geo-political, technological, demographic and postmodern factors on professionalism was an institutional one undertaken by the US Army. This began in the mid-1990s with an extensive examination of the subject conducted at the US Military Academy at West Point. Led by two Academy professors, Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, the study has explored several important themes, including civil-military relations, professional expertise, professional leadership and ethics. To date, the project has reached a number of conclusions pertaining to the US Army, that resonate strongly in a theoretical sense in the Canadian context. The four with particular relevance to the present study are:

- Military character and the professional ethic are the foundation for the trust the American [Canadian] people place in their military and the foundation for the trust Army [CF] officers place in their profession.

- The Army's [CF's] bureaucratic nature outweighs and compromises its professional nature. It is regarded as true in the minds of the officer corps. Officers do not share a common understanding of the military profession and many of them accept the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms and behaviour as natural and appropriate.

- The Army [CF] faces increasing jurisdictional competitions with new competitors. Thus its jurisdictional boundaries must be constantly negotiated and clarified by officers comfortable at the bargaining table and skilled in dealing with professional colleagues on matters touching the profession's civil-military and political-military boundaries.

- The Army [CF] needs to redraw the map of its expert knowledge and then inform and reform its educational and developmental systems accordingly, resolving any debates over the appropriate expertise of America's Army.[47]

These four conclusions, relating to ethos, bureaucracy, jurisdiction and expert knowledge, amongst others, were certainly germaine to the third effort already referred to, the development and publication in Canada of the profession of arms manual. This was a Canadian project also intended to accommodate the impact of the same four issues of geopolitics, technology, demography and postmodernism on the concept of military professionalism.

The profession of arms manual project, begun in 2001, has antecedents that go back, at least, until the early 1990s. At that time concern over the professional development of officers in the wake of the end of the Cold War led the then Assistant Deputy Minister for Personnel, Lieutenant-General Paul Addy to commission an extensive study on the subject under the direction of a retired Air Force three-star, Lieutenant-General Bob Morton. A team of 14 officers and civilian equivalents

spent a year preparing recommendations embedded in the resulting "Officer Professional Development Review Board", also known as the Morton Report, submitted in 1994. Morton's Report made seven major recommendations, one of which was the re-conceptualization of officer professional development to include the four pillars of education, training, experience and self-development, structured in four developmental periods. This was accomplished over the subsequent two years. The remaining six recommendations spoke to enhancing the educational component of professional development and some reorganization of existing professional development institutions within the CF.[48] These recommendations did not go far enough, lacking the boldness of vision necessary to generate decisive action. The Report itself concluded that the scope of the study was excessively ambitious to be accomplished in the time available. One consequence of this perceived lack of time was the failure to develop an implementation plan to give effect to even the limited reforms proposed. Furthermore, the task of preparing this plan was left to the Assistant Deputy Minister Personnel who was replaced within two months of receipt of the Report and the new Assistant Deputy Minister only remained in that appointment for six months.[49]

In any event, the ongoing struggle at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) to deal with the debilitating budget cuts of the early to mid-1990s and the emerging Somalia crisis so preoccupied the senior leadership of the CF that the Morton Report was effectively consigned to history. The Somalia affair was a pivotal event in the history of the Canadian profession of arms at the end of the 20th century. In early 1993 members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, on a United Nations (UN) peace support mission to the African country of Somalia, tortured and killed a young Somali man. The event itself was horrific but it was the effort to substantiate allegations of high-level cover-up, professional incompetence and criminal wrongdoing that precipitated one of the most difficult periods of civil-military relations in Canadian history.[50]

In response to the growing and strident demands to discover the truth, both from within government and from the media and public at large, the Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia incident was created through the Federal Inquiries Act in March 1995. The military had tried to deal with the issue internally and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral John Anderson had established the Board of Inquiry – Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group on 28 April 1993. It was in-

formally named the deFaye Commission after its chairman Major-General Tom deFaye. The Mandate of the deFaye Commission was to "Investigate the leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures of the Airborne Battle Group in Somalia." The scope of the Commission's task was soon seen to be, perhaps deliberately, far too narrow and it was disbanded after only two months. According to the author of the definitive study of Canada's Airborne Forces "The message was unmistakable. The Government felt it had no choice but to appoint a separate, independent Commission to investigate the truth." Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn concluded that "Politicians and many in the public domain no longer trusted the military to investigate themselves."[51] The highly publicized hearings of the Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia Incident drew attention to systemic issues throughout the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces that extended well beyond the mission to North-East Africa. In its findings, *Dishonoured Legacy. The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia [*henceforth *Somalia Commission Report]* directly questioned the health of the profession of arms in Canada and was a major factor in convincing the new Chief of the Defence staff, General Maurice Baril, to appoint Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire as his Special Advisor for Professional Development in February, 1999.

Over the next year Dallaire and his small team, led by then Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, developed the long-term strategy for the professional renewal and future development of the officer corps. Dallaire began by articulating a vision of the officer corps that would guide the team's work over the subsequent years:

The vision is an officer corps that is fully professional, aware of its responsibilities to the nation and which manifests those qualities and ideals inherent in the military ethos upon which military effectiveness depends. It calls for men and women who are outstanding leaders who demonstrate superior intellectual capacity based on a broad liberal education. They will be dynamic and flexible in thought and action, capable of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity, innovative and proactive. They will operate effortlessly in a technological and information rich environment and be committed to life-long learning.[52]

The phrase "fully professional" was meant to evoke an acute under-

standing of the nature and purpose of a powerful military ethos whose internalization throughout the corps would guard against the erosion of standards and performance that seemed to have plagued the force in the decades prior to the Somalia incident. It also referred to a body of unique, systematic, theory-based knowledge that was to be imparted to officers throughout their careers in the form of a "core" curriculum that would form the framework for the whole professional development system. The nature of this corpus of knowledge was not, and is not yet, fully understood, reflecting the difficulty in completely grasping the meaning and significance of the concept of professional ideology in the Canadian context.

The Special Advisor proposed eight strategic objectives for the reform of the CF's officer corps designed to prepare leaders, and especially senior leaders, for the challenges of the 21st century. His final report, entitled *Officership 2020*, recommended a sustained and focused effort on enhancing the liberal education of the officer corps, including the requirement for senior officers to acquire appropriate post-graduate qualifications at the Master's Degree level. In order to achieve the enhancement of education throughout the system, a Canadian Forces University or Academy was proposed, and subsequently established as the Canadian Defence Academy in April 2001. Finally, *Officership 2020* recognized the need to comprehensively reassess the concept of military professionalism, as it was understood in the CF, and to take whatever measures necessary to realign this concept with the highest standards of professionalism yet to be articulated.

The Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff for Professional Development turned to the question of Non-Commissioned Members (NCM) of the CF on completion of *Officership 2020*. Again a number of strategic objectives were established to ensure the appropriate development of NCOs into the future. Significantly, the exclusionary nature of a military professional paradigm, based on the Huntington model, that restricted membership in the profession of arms to officers was rejected. The final report on NCM development called for a fully professional NCM Corps. A key result of the two strategies, *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020*, both endorsed by the Minister of National Defence (MND) in 2001, was approval of the project to develop a doctrinal manual on the profession of arms in Canada.

Production of a profession of arms manual was thus, one component of the overall reform movement in the CF that dates from the time of the *Minister's Report to the Prime Minister Jean Chretien on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces,* accepted by the Prime Minister in 1997. The Manual was one of three Capstone Manuals proposed, the other two being CF Leadership and CF Strategic Doctrine. The profession of arms manual, entitled *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada [*henceforth *Duty With Honour]* intended to benchmark professional concepts and standards, was completed in early 2003 and promulgated by the Chief of the Defence Staff in October 2003, with the endorsement of the Minister of National Defence and the Governor General.[53]

Duty With Honour reflects the evolution of the theory and practice of military professionalism since Huntington, incorporating developments analyzed in the civilian scholarly literature as well. In addition to situating the profession in the context of geo-political change, the impact of technology and the influence of demography and post- modernism, the four issues of ethos, bureaucracy, jurisdiction, and expert knowledge identified during the research phase of the Special Advisor's work are addressed. The Manual provides a detailed description of the Canadian military ethos and its rationale as the foundation for the trust the Canadian people place in their military. The Manual's use of the "collaborative" model of civil-military relations provides the basis for effectively addressing jurisdictional issues but by definition requires mutual awareness and deep understanding on the part, not only of military professionals, but of senior officials and politicians alike. Civil-military relations in Canada are complex and dynamic and the manual does not preempt the requirement for ongoing research and dialogue to ensure that Canadians are protected by a national security policy fully informed by all military and non-military factors relevant to the defence equation.

The tensions created by the bureaucratic nature of military organizations and the "map" of the expert knowledge of the profession, however, are two issues that do not receive sufficient attention in *Duty With Honour*. Both of these issues go to the heart of the concept of professional ideology and therefore further development of the Manual could be informed by the analysis presented here, as well as much needed further research and analysis. The nature of professional ideology is also

directly relevant to another theme where the Manual is perhaps on the cutting edge of the theory of professionalism and that is with regard to its inclusiveness. The Manual makes the declaratory statement that all NCOs are full members of the profession of arms in Canada. This remains a problematic proposition, especially as it pertains to expertise. To what extent are NCOs expected to possess the systematic, theory-based body of knowledge underpinning the profession and how and when is this knowledge to be imparted? Clearly this issue has both theoretical and professional developmental aspects. Confirmation of the validity of the former would then require a major reform of the latter.

The Canadian professionalism construct, as defined in *Duty With Honour*, remains closely linked to functionalist and neo-functionalist theory as employed in the social sciences. The profession is consequently viewed as responding to particular societal requirements. Specifically, the profession of arms responds to a societal imperative to reflect Canadian core values and remain subordinate to civil authority. This relates directly to the professional attribute of responsibility. A functional imperative requires that the Canadian military maintain its professional effectiveness for applying military force in the defence of the nation and thus speaks directly to the attribute of expertise. The profession is recognized as being embedded in the institution of the Canadian Forces and closely linked with the Department of National Defence. These are two distinct entities that constitute two vital components of the overall national security structure of the country as provided for in the *National Defence Act*. The imperatives, societal and functional, operating through this institutional framework, result in two sets of responsibilities-organizational and professional, in the latter case to include the requirement to articulate the nature of the general system of war and conflict at the core of military expertise. The overall theoretical structure is depicted in Figure II.

The profession of arms itself consists of four attributes: expertise, responsibility, identity and ethos. Professional expertise draws upon many disciplines but, at its core, it consists of a body of systematic, discretionary, theory-based knowledge concerning the structure of war and conflict in the modern world. The profession not only has a special responsibility for the defence of Canada but also has an internal responsibility to maintain, adapt and enhance professional effectiveness. Professional identity relates to both the professional's distinction from the rest



FIGURE II

of society and the complex internal differentiation into Branches, Environments and the CF. In the former case, concerning its differentiation from society, the profession of arms, like all professions are dependent upon a class solidarity, upon its members constituting in some measure a group apart with an ethos of its own.[54] As Walter Millis put it: "Military service stands by itself. It has some of the qualities of a priesthood, of a professional civil servant, of a great-bureaucratized business organization and of an academic order. It has something of each of these but it corresponds exactly to none. It is set apart therefore from those who have followed other walks of life."[55] General Sir John Hackett, speaking to the same point, observed that for as long as members are in uniform they will never be a civilian, but they always remain a citizen. In the latter case, internally a certain, potentially healthy tension is created in the Canadian case as military professionals identify with both their Service - Navy, Army and Air Force, and the larger institutional construct of the Canadian Forces. The profession of arms manual reconciles this tension by positing a "hierarchy of loyalties" operating in ascending order from Classification and Branch through the Environments (i.e. Army, Navy, Air Force) to the CF.

The fourth attribute, the Canadian military ethos, plays a special role in the Canadian professional construct, influencing all the other attributes.

Specifically, the ethos informs members about how they are to fulfill their function and does so in a manner that engenders trust and confidence in the government and society they serve. Finally, the profession practices within a given jurisdiction, essentially comprising authorized roles and missions. The government of the day establishes the boundaries of this jurisdiction. The overall professional construct is depicted at Figure III.



FIGURE III[56]

Based on this construct, the profession of arms in Canada is described in the Manual as being:

... composed of military members dedicated to the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government of Canada. The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability. Its members possess a systematic and specialized body of military knowledge and skills acquired through education, training and experience, and they apply this expertise compe-



FIGURE IV

tently and objectively in the accomplishment of their missions. Members of the Canadian profession of arms share a set of core values and beliefs found in the military ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty and allows a special relationship of trust to be maintained with Canadian society.[57]

The ethos, described in Chapter 2 of *Duty With Honour* as the Statement of Canadian Military Ethos (SCME)[58], consists of three components: core military values, beliefs and expectations about military service and fundamental Canadian values. As depicted in Figure IV the military ethos shapes the understanding, application and status of the other three attributes of military professionalism and therefore, governs the conduct of CF members. Military members perform those duties assigned by governmental direction with honour. As suggested by Figure IV there is an inherent feedback mechanism in place whereby failure to do one's duty with honour requires a reassessment or validation of the appropriateness of the ethos in given circumstances.

Duty With Honour, the profession of arms manual, is sound doctrine as it currently stands. However, like all good doctrine it is a living document whose themes and concepts must be reviewed on an ongoing basis. In the short term it must be assessed with regard to how well it reflects and integrates the concept of professional ideology. The Canadian military ethos is a powerful and essential attribute of professionalism and is indispensable in establishing the bonds of trust between the profession of arms the Canadian Government and society. This, it will be recalled from Figure I, is one component of professional ideology. The other component involves the relationship of specialized professional knowledge, that is, the attribute of expertise, to this ideology. The next chapter discusses this issue in generic terms and chapters four and five will conclude by describing the concept of professional ideology in terms of the Canadian military professional construct as previously portrayed at Figure III.

Endnotes

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[3] S. Sarkesian and R. Connor, *The US. Military Profession into the 21st Century* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 19.

[4] General Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times Publishing, 1963).

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[6] Hans Joas, *War and Modernity* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 29.

[7] Larson, 219.

[8] T. C. Halliday, *Beyond Monopoly* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 36.

[9] Parsons, "The Professions," 536.

[10] E. Freidson and B. Rhea, "Processes of Control in a Company of Equals," *Medicine Men and Their Work*, ed. Eliot Freidson (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 186.

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[19] John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Boston: Harvard University. Press, 1950), 413.

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[22] Ibid., xvi.

[23] Walter Millis, *Arms and Man: A Study in American Military History* (NY: Putnam, 1956), 346.

[24] Ibid., 364.

[25] *The Soldier and the State*, 8.

[26] Ibid., 7.

[27] Quoted in ibid., 14.

[28] Ibid., esp. 189-192 and 260-263.

[29] *The Professional Soldier*, 13.

[30] Bernard Brodie, "The Weapon: War in the Atomic Age and Implications for Military Policy," *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie (NY: Harcourt-Brace, 1947), 76. See also the discussion of this issue in both Chris Brown*, International Relations Theory* (NY: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992), 146, and James Dougherty and R. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (NY: Longman, 2001), 344-397.

[31] *The Professional Soldier,* 418. See also the discussion in Morris Janowitz, *Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of Peace and War*

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[45] James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction and Legitimacy in the Military Profession," *The Future of the Army Profession* (ed.) Lloyd Mathews (NY: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 35. See also James Burk, *The Adaptive Military* (NJ: Transaction, 1998).

[46] S. Sarkesian and Robert Connor Jr., *The US Military Profession Into The 21st Century* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 21.

[47] Lloyd Mathews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession* (McGraw-Hill, 2002), Chapt. 25.

[48] Officer Development Review Board: Morton Report 1 July 1994-30 June 1995.

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[50] For perspectives on the events themselves as well as the findings of the Somalia Commission Report see Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons* (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), Chapters 8 and 9; David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1996) and Peter Desberats, *Somalia Cover-Up: A Commissioner's Journal* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997).

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Chapter Three

Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms

The Ideologies of the Market, Bureaucracy and Professions

The argument so far has been that professions evolved, primarily in the 19th and 20th centuries, as a unique socio-economic element in society's division of labour. The military profession, although different in some important respects, developed along lines very similar to these other professions. In particular, professions accessed a special type of knowledge and developed a socio-economic structure that differed from other occupations and ways of organizing work. In addition, professions incorporated an ethic that demanded a responsiveness to community requirements and a special relationship with clients upon which trust in their services and their monopolistic claims were based. At a certain level of abstraction and in an ideal-typical way, this approach can be contrasted with how individuals and economic groups operate in the market and in bureaucracies.

Although this point is made intermittently in the literature, both civilian and military, Eliot Freidson has written the first systematic account of professionalism basing his analysis on the method of conceptualizing and organizing work in professions in contradistinction to the market and bureaucracy. In this account, specialized workers control their own work, while in the free market, consumers are in command and in bureaucracy, managers dominate. According to Freidson, therefore, professionalism has its own logic, requiring different kinds of knowledge, organization and education.[1] This logic is expressed in a professional ideology fundamentally different than the ideologies animating the market or bureaucracy.

The concept of ideology, properly understood is, indeed, a powerful tool for analyzing how professionals view their role in society. The

broader concept of culture could be used for this task but lacks specificity insofar as culture is too inclusive and does not readily lend itself to the kind of analytical granularity required to fully explore the nature of professions and their relationship to the surrounding society. By contrast, ideology can be used more precisely to designate certain elements of culture, which are thought to provide authoritative explanation and justification for a particular set of institutions like professions. In this regard, Freidson follows Parson's view that in the modern world, concern with the expression of moral commitments and with their application to practical problems, social and otherwise, has to a considerable degree become differentiated in the function of ideology.[2] Thus, for example, the ideology of professionalism asserts above all else devotion to the use of disciplined knowledge for the public good.

Ideology reflects a specific system of ideas, or a conception of the world, that is implicitly manifest in law, in economic activity and in many other manifestations of individual and collective life. But it is more than a conception of the world as a system of ideas; it also represents a capacity to inspire concrete attitudes and motivate action. To be recognized as such, an ideology must be capable of organizing humans, must be able to translate itself into specific orientations for action. To this extent ideology is socially pervasive, in other words "the source of determined social actions."[3] The American sociologist Daniel Bell uses the concept of ideology in this way in his book *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* explaining that it is in the character of an ideology not only to reflect or justify an underlying reality but, once launched, to take on a life of its own. "A truly powerful ideology opens up a new vision of life to the imagination, but once formulated, it remains part of the moral repertoire to be drawn upon."[4] The concept of ideology, therefore, is *systematic* - beliefs about one topic are related to beliefs about another, different, topic; *normative* - to a large degree it contains beliefs about how the world ought to be; and, *programmatic* - it guides or incites concrete action.[5]

It is in this sense, for example, that Philip Bobbitt in *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* describes the parliamentary nation-state as one whose "ideology" accepted the legitimate promise of the nation-state that it was based on the will of the people and was constituted for their material well-being. Parliamentary ideology went on, however, to specify free, fair, regular and open elections

as a means of determining the popular will. The parliamentary nation-state made voting publics the judge of whether their governments were in fact maintaining and enhancing the welfare of the nation. Moreover, this type of institutional ideology required governments to comply with their own laws and to administer law impartially.[6]

Systematic, normative and pragmatic, professional ideology claims both specialized knowledge that is authoritative in a functional and cognitive sense and commitment to transcendental values that guide and adjudicate the way that knowledge is employed. The commitment at issue is represented in the ideology by the professional's occupational ethic or in the case of the military, by the ethos. The ideology of professionalism, furthermore, argues that expertise properly warrants special influence in certain affairs because it is based on sustained systematic thought, investigation and experience, and in the case of individuals, accumulated experience performing specialized work for which they had long and appropriate training and education.

According to Freidson, the ideal-typical ideology of professionalism is concerned with justifying the privileged position of the institutions of a profession as well as the authority and status of its members. To do so it must neutralize, or at least effectively counter, the opposing ideologies that provide the rationale for the control of work by the market, on the one hand, and by bureaucracy, on the other. Freidson refers to the ideology of the market as consumerism; that of bureaucracy, managerialism.[7] Contrary to the professional's claim that only the specialists who can do the work are able to evaluate and control it, both consumerism and managerialism claim a general kind of knowledge superior to specialized expertise, that can direct and evaluate it. These three ideologies, depicted in Figure V, compete over the nature, control and normative application of knowledge.

Consumerism, or market ideology, claims that ordinary human qualities informed by everyday knowledge and skills and fuelled by self-interest, enable the individual, properly motivated, to learn whatever is necessary to make all economic or political decisions. Denying professional expertise any unique status, consumerism falls back on its own special kind of preparation for positions of leadership-an advanced but general form of education that equips them to direct or lead specialists as well as ordinary citizens in the pursuit of profit. Max Weber had identified



FIGURE V

the power of market ideology early in his study of the free market economy and was concerned with its impact, not of course on professions in particular, but rather on the moral and ethical tissue underpinning Western civilization in the early 20th century. He warned that " no religious-ethical conviction is capable of barring the way to the entry of capitalism, when it stands in full armour before the gates."[8] The imagery conveyed by Weber here serves to illuminate the challenge posed by consumerism to the normative dimension of professionalism. Recent developments in power theory, influential in both political science and sociology, also suggest difficulties in this area for the status of professions in the 21st century. Power theorists analyze an increasingly educated, reflexive, knowledge-consuming and organized set of consumers and third party payees who seek to reorganize professional services to streamline service delivery and lower its cost. Almost all of these reorganization attempts seek to limit professional discretion and autonomy.[9]

In a related vein, George Ritzer talks about the "McDonaldization" of Western society, a phenomenon that insists upon efficiency, calculability, predictability and control. Ritzer's theory integrates Weber's theory of rationalization and Marx's theory of capitalism to describe the emerging consumer culture as a social force that is centrally conceived and controlled while being relatively devoid of substantive content.[10] To

the extent that Ritzer has accurately captured this phenomenon the implications for professional ethics are serious in terms of eroding one of the key foundations of professionalism. Such a culture, of course, also drains the concept of specialized knowledge of meaningful content.

Against the ideology of the market, professional ideology presents knowledge and skill based on cultural, scientific and intellectual concepts that it claims are, at best, only touched on in general public education and that are too esoteric and complex to be understood spontaneously or to be learned quickly by the average person. The professional is expected to think objectively and inquiringly about matters that may be for the layman subject to orthodoxy and sentiment which limit intellectual exploration.[11] Furthermore, professional knowledge is applied in accordance with an ethical imperative to privilege good work over "the bottom line".

The ideology of managerialism presents a rather different basis for resistance to specialized knowledge and skill. A challenge that is particularly acute for the profession of arms since military professionals are, naturally, embedded in a large, hierarchic and hence largely bureaucratic, institution. And the challenge does not come only from civilian members of the organization. It is more insidious as it arises from the inherent nature of bureaucratic ideology that by definition resides within the military institution itself. The ideology of managerialism claims the authority to command, organize, guide and supervise the activities of the professional. It denies authority to professional expertise by claiming a form of general knowledge that is superior to specialization because it can organize it rationally and efficiently. Those who espouse this view of knowledge from within the ranks of bureaucracy or management could also be called "elite generalists."

C. W. Mills warned of the dangers to professionalism posed by bureaucracy as early as 1956, arguing that bureaucracy was becoming such a dominant force in modern society that professions were increasingly " being sucked into administrative machines"[12] where knowledge is standardized and routinized into the administrative apparatus and professionals become mere managers. There are many circumstances in this situation in which organizational rules drive out professional criteria, diminishing professional power and prestige. Moreover, managerialism is not merely a system of rules, it is also a means of handling

knowledge. The threat that this ideology poses to the professional is in the systemization of professional knowledge in a manner that will remove professional judgment, indeterminacy and ultimately professional standards, by rationalizing the corpus of knowledge into bureaucratic procedures and division of labour.[13]

Against the concept of "elite generalism," professional ideology counters that its knowledge and skills are too complex and esoteric to be managed by those who have only knowledge and skills based on the science of management, however advanced. But equal in importance to the complexity of its specialized knowledge is the claim that professional knowledge goes beyond specialization. Unlike purely technical education, ideal-type professional education provides, or requires, prior exposure to high culture in the form of advanced higher education. The ideology of professionalism is based on knowledge that is not merely the narrow depth of the technician or the shallow breadth of the generalist, but rather a wedding of the two in a unique marriage. The wedding of a liberal education to specialized development and training, honed by experience, qualifies professionals to establish policy directly related to the profession as well as organize and control their own work and the work of their colleagues independently of managers. Professional ideology, therefore, differs markedly from market ideology, which celebrates competition and cost, and from bureaucracy, which invokes the virtue of efficiency through standardization.

Professional Ideology in the Profession of Arms

The concept of professional ideology is as much a feature of the profession of arms as it is in any profession. Like other professions there is an espoused ethic, or more properly an ethos, a part of its ideology, which contains norms and values antithetical to those manifested in the market or bureaucracy. These include service before self and responsibilities that extend beyond the profession itself. The military ethos component of professional ideology is, however, distinguished from other professional ethical frameworks by the inclusion of quite different concepts such as a very expansive idea of duty, unlimited liability, warrior spirit and an emphasis on a particularly personal concept of discipline. The ideology inherent in the profession of arms also claims a unique body of military knowledge that is developed, organized, imparted and applied

differently than that which occurs in the market or bureaucracy. Such knowledge shares certain characteristics with other bodies of professional knowledge primarily pertaining to a significant level of abstraction resulting from its basis in theory and consequently a requirement for extensive education and study. From this theoretical structure, applied expertise and skills are derived.

However, military theory is not merely a composite of theories drawn from other disciplines, although it can, and does, incorporate aspects of these disciplines in its overall knowledge structure. Military theory has its own ontological basis, in the sense that the ontology of a theory is the set of things to which that theory ascribes existence by referring to them in a way that cannot be eliminated or analyzed out.[14] What the content of such an ontological structure is, and how it is accessed is a matter of epistemology, understood as the philosophic study of the definition, foundations and validity of knowledge.[15] Professional ideology is not, of course, directly about the set of things contained in theory, but rather, reflects the commitment to their validity, development, value and proper application. To fully understand the nature of military professional ideology, therefore, it is necessary to articulate the substance of military knowledge within an appropriate theoretical framework.

This understanding begins, as Andrew Abbott insists, with the realization that abstract knowledge is the foundation of an effective definition of any profession.[16] As already noted, Freidson also argues that the specialized work of a profession must be grounded in such abstract knowledge which he describes as a body of theoretically based, discretionary knowledge, associated with higher education.[17] Discretion is central to the professional ideology, demanding as it does the development and application of keen judgment regarding the use to which abstract knowledge is applied in the ever-present context of uncertainty. Max Weber contrasted this with bureaucratic knowledge, with a bit of hyperbole, when he observed: "confront the bureaucratic mentality with a new situation and it is helpless."[18] Freedom of judgment, or discretion, in performing work is, therefore, intrinsic to professionalism, directly contradicting the managerial notion that efficiency is gained by minimizing such discretion. The exercise of professional judgment is a point that is also picked up by both Abbott and Larson, who observe that the leaders of what they call "the professional project" will define the areas that are not amenable to standardization. They will define the place of

unique individual creativity and the criteria of talent that cannot be rigidly bounded by mere pragmatism.[19]

Support for this approach to the relationship of knowledge and professionalism is provided by Henri Jamous and Bertrand Peloille, two sociologists who propose that any given body of knowledge can be described in terms of its "indetermination" (I)[20] versus its "technicality" (T), that is, its abstractness and concreteness. All occupations can, therefore, be rated according to their I/T ratio. Any occupation claiming to be a profession needs to be high on indetermination (I) since abstraction is the one quality that above all, sets professional knowledge apart from knowledge in other occupations. Only a knowledge system governed by abstraction can redefine its problems and tasks and seize new problems. This is a very significant characteristic of professional knowledge and of great relevance to military theory. It is in these terms that the I/T model helps contrast the two systems of military theory originally proposed by Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss military theorist Antoine Jomini in the 19th century. These two systems are still contested, to some degree, in the field of military thought today.

Jomini's system, summarized in his *Art of War* was thoroughly grounded in Positivism, a philosophy of knowledge that influenced many 19th century intellectuals and was enormously important in the development of all the social sciences throughout the 1900s. Positivism claimed that all cognitive knowledge should be based on the principles of physics as then understood. The aim was to reveal the causal laws that explained observable phenomena, the only kind of phenomenon that could constitute valid knowledge. Its rejection of metaphysics extended to dismissing all speculation and knowledge based on normative criteria. In short, positivism was antipathetic to abstraction and any form of *a priori* reasoning. As Jacques Barzun caustically observed, "being a Positivist required little effort of thought and offered no occasion for elaborate argument."[21] Today, positivism is often referred to as scientism. It remains a form of radical empiricism that seeks through a reductionist methodology to explain all phenomena in terms of the putative laws of natural science. Positivism in the guise of scientism is an epistemological orientation that continues to constrain military thinking and inhibit creative strategic responses to complex challenges.

Clausewitz's thought, on the other hand, derived in large measure from

German Romanticism, which in turn was critically shaped by idealism. Notoriously hard to define, Romanticism is best understood as an intellectual and aesthetic movement sometimes referred to, perhaps a little too narrowly, as the Counter-Enlightenment. It reached its apogee in Western Europe during the period 1770 – 1840. Romantic thought rejected the duality of subject and object inherent in the Cartesian model and sought a synthesis of the particular and the general. This latter point helps account for Clausewitz's understanding that while war in each age had its own unique characteristics, it was nonetheless always fundamentally a reflection of a general idea or archetype that he captured in the concept of Absolute War. Above all, Romanticism insisted that a full accounting of reality must include room for the unexpected, novelty, imagination and virtually infinite individuality.[22] Clausewitz found this mode of thinking ideal for his theorizing as he sought to take into account all of the intangible dimensions of war alongside the observable scientific data. The Romantic world-view enabled him to accommodate friction, chance and uncertainty in an inclusive, holistic theory of war and conflict.

In the contemporary world one could say that Jomini's system is thoroughly Newtonian while Clausewitz's fits comfortably into the organic, non-mechanical paradigm of modern biology. Being thoroughly non-positivistic, the Clausewitzian paradigm is also not at all incompatible with abstract concepts in physics and mathematics such as Einstein's theory of relativity, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, Chaos Theory and Godel's Theorem.[23] For this reason the Clausewitzian system best represents the core of the systematic, theory-based knowledge underpinning the profession of arms. The I/T model proposed by Jamous and Peloille also helpfully informs the perennial debate, based on comparing Jominian theory with Clausewitzian, about whether the conduct of war is an art or a science. It is both because an epistemologically sound theory of war, with its supporting concepts, ideas and techniques represents a particular I/T ratio, the components of which may vary somewhat from one historical era to another, while always retaining a high degree of indetermination. Carl von Clausewitz understood this perfectly and warned in his masterpiece *On War*:

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the

mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realm of action.[24]

Abstraction (indetermination) introduces a normative dimension into the professional body of knowledge and consequently questions of value and the concomitant requirement for judgment is again introduced. Therefore, beyond grounding, in a broad sense, in science, professions like the law straddle the scientific/normative divide in a more obvious way than others. T. C. Halliday argues that the military is such a profession and thus displays what he calls a syncretic epistemological foundation.[25] This foundation constitutes a synthesis of what the German philosopher Wilhelm Windleband called nomothetic and ideographic knowledge. The former represents the law-based, generalizing concepts of the natural sciences, whereas the latter reflects the individualizing concepts of the human sciences. Ideographic knowledge relies heavily on a type of understanding best expressed by the German word *Verstehen*, resting as much on empathy as inductive and deductive logic. A natural scientist is primarily searching for explanations based upon causes or regularities, and is not seeking to understand meanings. That is, the goal of natural science methodology is not to interpret meanings that natural objects have for themselves, or for other objects. Such a test is, however, unavoidable for social scientists. The nature of the synthesis in question between science and the humanities, and the methodological path to its realization, has been debated up to the present and modern versions of the discussion can be found in C.P. Snow's *Two Cultures* (1959), Steven Jay Gould's *The Hedgehog, the Fox and the Magister's Pox* (2003) and E. O. Wilson's *Consilience* (1998). In the context of the present discussion of professional expertise, mastery of the complete body of military knowledge requires a coupling of the best ideas from advancing science, technology, the social sciences, the humanities and a doctrine for their tactical, operational and strategic application. Such a coupling is achieved in a body of professional military knowledge thoroughly grounded in the theory of war propounded by Carl von Clausewitz.

The Prussian theorist's work, especially *On War*, has, accordingly, had a profound influence on the evolution of the theory and practice of war and armed conflict since it was first published in 1831. Bernard Brodie maintained that *On War*, is not simply the greatest, but the only, truly great book on war.[26] Colin S. Gray enthusiastically echoes this assess-

ment, maintaining that there is no worthy contest over the merit in Clausewitz's theory of war and strategy.[27] His work has provided the theoretical framework for the ongoing development of military thought for almost 200 years, including in the areas of naval strategy, operational art, air warfare, revolutionary warfare, nuclear deterrence theory and civil-military relations. Julien Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* is explicitly Clausewitzian as is von Moltke's, von Schlichting's, Svechin's, Tukechevsky's, Luttwak's and Warden's contributions to strategy and operational art. Lenin and Mao Tse Tung studied Clausewitz closely and the best theorists of strategy in the nuclear age, Brodie and Schelling, generously acknowledge their debt to Clausewitz.[28] The theories of Henry Kissinger, Michael Howard, Andre Beaufre, Raymond Aron and Colin Gray draw both inspiration and much of their power from Clausewitz.

Clausewitz's theory begins with the justly famous declaration that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a combination of political intercourse carried on with other means."[30] He goes on to advise that:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given cause. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.[32]

Clausewitz equates the quality of primordial violence to the people, society or nation; chance is the arena in which the army operates, (today we would say the armed forces) and; finally, the element of rationality or reason is assigned to policy and therefore, government. These three elements are variable in their relationship to one another and Clausewitz's theory attempts to maintain a balance between them, like an object suspended between three magnets. Clausewitz was writing on the very cusp of the era in which technology was to have such a profound effect on war and he therefore spent little time considering its impact. An impact it should be noted, that facilitated the rise of the ubiquitous media and all that that has come to mean for the conduct of operations. This failure to adequately reflect the influence of technology was

later amply rectified by practitioners and theorists such as Moltke, the Frenchman Colin, Trevor Dupuy, Martin van Creveld and many others.

War, of course, takes place in a given historical and geo-political/social context. For Clausewitz this was an international system consisting of nation-states considered by important contemporaries of Clausewitz in Prussia - Georg Hegel, Leopold von Ranke and Willhelm von Humboldt, for example, to be the final stage in the historical evolution of humankind. To these early modernists and pioneers of historicism, the state represented the highest ethico-political development possible in the evolution of humanity.[33] In the *Philosophy of Right,* published in 1821, Clausewitz's friend and philosophic mentor, Georg Hegel, outlined the centrality of the state and argued that war was the inevitable consequence of relations between states. This was not, however, perpetual war, and Hegel advised that statesmen must always consider the peace that would follow these instances of conflict. Clausewitz adhered strictly to Hegel's view of the international system and drew the conclusion that war must be made subject to reason and in this way conducted with the anticipated peace in mind. Policy was the instrument through which the tendency of war to escalate to extremes of violence would be controlled. The genesis of the most influential school of international theory in the 20th century, that of Realism, can be found in these propositions.[34]

Later schools of theory including the neo-realist, neo-functional, critical and constructivist would treat the characteristics of the international system, and the component elements of the Clausewitzian trinity, differently but none has convincingly challenged his theory as one of the most compelling descriptions and explanation of the true nature of war.[35] The resulting intellectual construct, modified from the original to reflect the influence of technology, can be depicted as shown in Figure VI.

On War goes on to create a more detailed model of international conflict that encompasses policy, strategy, operational art and tactics. These elements are nested, one within the other, starting with policy. Each nested concept is derived from its superior "parent" concept and the influence of each is transmitted throughout the paradigm, as shown in Figure VII.



FIGURE VI



FIGURE VII

Thus, the policy in question determines not only what strategy is pursued but also influences, to one degree or another, activities down to the tactical level. Equally important, events taking place at lower levels in the structure have an impact upwards even to the extent of tactical activities influencing strategy and policy. The relationship between these nested concepts can be described in terms of civil-military relations at the policy/strategy interface and in terms of command, control and leadership in a hierarchical manner throughout the paradigm.

In fact, the structure of conflict described here is better understood as a general system along the lines explained by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in his *General Systems Theory*. Bertalanffy defines a system as a complex of interacting elements and compares open systems, with their exchange of matter and information, with their environment, to closed systems, considered isolated from the environment. Two characteristics of general systems theory that make it a useful framework for both understanding and analysis are the synergistic nature of systems and their organizing principle. In the case of the former, Bertalanffy explains the expression "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" as simply that constitutive characteristics cannot be deduced solely from the characteristics of the isolated parts. The characteristics of the whole complex, therefore, compared to those of its elements appear as new or emergent. In the context of the open, general system of war and conflict, therefore, tactics cannot be understood separate from the whole complex, nor can operational art or strategy. They are constantly interactive and results from this synergy are always emergent. Significantly, although he does not explicitly draw from Bertalanffy, the military theorist Michael Handel supports this conception of a general system of war and conflict in his discussion of a non-hierarchical, complex model of interaction among strategy, operations and tactics.[36] Colin Gray's masterful treatment of modern strategy also implicitly supports a system-like relationship among these elements of war and armed conflict.

With regard to a system's organizing principle, Bertalanffy asserts the absolute dominance of the system's aim and uses the analogy of the brain, arguing that the initial assertion of the aim by the system's brain, or directing authority, predetermines the comprehensive whole. The definition of the aim is the cognitive force that generates the system and determines the direction and patterns of its actions. Moving the system from a state of abstract, cognitive commonality to a practical course of

positive progress, "can only be achieved by translating the overall aim into the concrete objectives and missions for the system's individual components."[37] In the case of the general system of war and conflict, the organizing principle, the system's "brain", is policy. Clausewitz made this clear when he explained that "war has its own grammar but not its own logic."[38] However, the system cannot achieve successful results until missions, objectives and tasks are clearly assigned to all interactive elements - strategic, operational and tactical.

In the Clausewitzian system there are two fundamental policy choices regarding war-unlimited and limited. Each of these policy objectives gives rise to two profoundly different strategies-the strategy of annihilation and the bi-polar strategy. Subsequently, the German military historian Hans Delbruck and the Russian military theorist Alexandr Svechin explored in detail the implications of the two types of strategy at the end of the 19th century. At the end of the 20th century the distinguished British military historian, Brian Bond, analyzed this model and convincingly verified it by applying it to war and conflict from Napoleon to the first Gulf War.[39] Clausewitz did not deal explicitly with the subject of operational art but did relate the Prussian concepts of *operatien* and *operativ* to strategy and tactics. *Operatien* and *operative* were systematic military preparations and actions necessary to move and sustain large forces in preparation for battle. They represent the embryonic beginnings of the full blown subordinate theory of operational art to be developed later, successively by von Moltke, von Schlichting, Svechin, Tuchachevsky, Simpkin, Luttwak, Holden and Shimon Naveh. Tactics were defined as the use of armed forces in battle. This was close order combat where the actual destruction of the enemy took place in detail. The complete system, in outline, is depicted at Figure VIII.

The military theory incorporated in this paradigm merges at its borders with history, political science, economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology as well as other social science disciplines. Equally, it has frontiers on the natural sciences. The professional ideology of the profession of arms, however, insists that knowledge derived from these disparate fields of study is integrated into the core body of expertise organized and applied in accordance with the overall theory of war and conflict, represented by Figure VIII. This is the framework for the systematic, theory-based body of discretionary knowledge underpinning the profession of arms.



FIGURE VIII

The theory of war and conflict at the center of the profession of arms accords policy uncontested primacy, following Clausewitz:

That the political view should cease to count on the outbreak of war is hardly conceivable. In fact, as we have said war is nothing but an expression of policy itself. Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument. No other possibility exists then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.[40]

The point is so important that it bears a second reference to Clausewitz's view of the matter: " The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted," he asserted, "are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace."[41] Thus, in terms of the paradigm at Figure VIII, policy supplies the "logic" for conflict while its "grammar" is expressed through strategy, operational art and tactics.

Clausewitz linked policy to strategy by defining the latter as the use of

engagements to achieve the political objective of the war. Colin Gray urges us in *Modern Strategy,* to interpret the word "engagement" in as broad a manner as possible to include campaigns, major operations and the tactical battles nested within them. In this sense, the policymaker wages war, while the commander(s) conducts campaigns or fights battles; between these realms, though drawing from them both, is the zone of strategy. Strategy is the bridge that should cement military power to all kinds of political purpose.[42] Gray himself offers his own definition of strategy, reflecting this function, as "the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy."[43] For analytical purposes this distinction between policy and strategy is important, indeed indispensable, if we are to understand their different natures clearly. However, the interface between policy and strategy is a complex one and includes other constructs such as "grand strategy" and "national security strategy" where military considerations merge with other sources of national power including economic strength, population and good governance. Both policymakers and strategists are wise, therefore, to heed Henry Kissinger's warning that "a complete separation of military strategy and policy at the highest levels can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over concern with finesse. Since the most difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely" military advice."[44]

Gray goes on to argue that there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes. In the Clausewitzian paradigm this "essential unity" is expressed as the choice between the enduring alternatives of two kinds of strategy, decided by the political objective-the original motive for the war-which will determine both the military objectives to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The strategy of annihilation or overthrow is appropriate when the political objective is expansive and unyielding, usually expressed as the unconditional surrender of the opponent after he has been rendered prostrate. All efforts and resources are focused on this goal and campaigns and battles that do not contribute to this end directly are avoided or misguided. This was the strategy associated with the Napoleonic art of war and is the strategy that dominated military thought in the West until the mid-

dle of the 20th century. In terms of professional ideology, it gave rise to the understanding of the utility of military force as being 'to fight and win the nation's wars.' The jurisdiction of the profession of arms was felt to be legitimately restricted to that of warfighting.

The arrival on the geo-political scene of nuclear weapons rendered this conception of strategy problematic in the extreme. The debate between proponents of massive retaliation and those advocating flexible response in the 1950s caused policymakers and strategic analysts to turn to the alternative conception of the bi-polar strategy. Bernard Brodie, Charles Osgoode, Henry Kissinger and Generals Gallois in France, and Taylor in the US, among others, argued that in the prevailing circumstances war must be limited, at least to the extent that it precluded recourse to nuclear attack and counter-attack. The strategy of annihilation was not a "reasonable" means to rational ends and policy must, therefore, be pursued in accordance with the theory of bi-polar strategy. In this strategy policymakers, diplomats and generals/flag officers alternated between the battle pole and the non-battle pole both successively and concurrently. Clausewitz had contrasted such a strategy with that of annihilation favoured by Napoleon. The Russian military theorist Alexandre Svechin concurred with Clausewitz's analysis, concluding that in the bi-polar strategy all operations are primarily characterized by the fact that they have limited strategic goals; a war conducted in accordance with such a strategy does not proceed as a decisive assault but is a struggle for positions on the armed, political and economic fronts.[45] In the strategy of annihilation many campaigns and battles may be fought but only the final one counts, when the opponent has fully surrendered. In the bi-polar strategy every campaign and battle counts since it is necessary for every operation in and of itself to lead to certain tangible achievements.[46] Incremental gains either limit the opponent's progress or move the conflict towards the limited aims originally sought.

Whatever approach is adopted, it is an extraordinarily difficult enterprise since strategy performs a bridging function between unlike elements - politics/policy and armed conflict. After all, as a rule the criteria of military effectiveness are generally limited, concrete and relatively objective; the criteria of political effectiveness tend to be indefinite, ambiguous and highly subjective. Linking the two sets of criteria is no easy task. Colin Gray accounts for the difficulty, which is in part based on the problem policymakers and strategists alike have in overcoming

this dichotomy:

Politicians may know too little, if nothing of war per se, at least of the probable character of war today to know what to demand or expect of their generals. Similarly, professional soldiers may know, perhaps choose to know, so little about the world of politics that they genuinely do not comprehend the policymaker's worldview. In modern times, there are few politicians who understand what Clausewitz called the "grammar" of war, how war works as war, or even how war works at the preparatory stage of defence preparations. Also there are few generals who understand what Clausewitz called the policy "logic" of war.[47]

The problem of reconciling policy with strategy is therefore one of the most difficult of all those encountered in the general system of war and conflict. It requires that policymakers learn a lot more about the grammar of war than seems natural to them on the surface of things and be able to truly collaborate with their strategists. Even more, strategists must be able to adapt their business to more effectively reflect political goals. A salutary example of this dilemma would be the relationship between Bismark and von Moltke in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Bismark's policy envisaged a limited war that would end in a negotiated peace with France. Von Moltke did not dispute the goal but reflecting a dogmatic adherence to a singular interpretation of Clausewitz's analysis of war, could not adjust military means to limited ends. He prosecuted a strategy of annihilation determined to render France prostrate before turning the issue back over to Bismark. Prosecuting the war in this manner did not accord with the actual policy that had always been predicated on a bi-polar strategy. In the end Bismark prevailed but unfortunately the centrality of the strategy of annihilation was not displaced from its privileged position in subsequent German military theory. Indeed, the myth of German strategic superiority grew inappropriately strong as the result of propagation of an historically inaccurate story.

The war in Iraq presents another modern case study of the dilemma. The first campaign in 1990-1991 was pursued strictly in accordance with a bi-polar strategy intended to achieve the limited aim of liberating Kuwait and further containing Saddam Hussein and his Ba-athist government.[48] The balance of means to ends, including plans for the subse-

quent invocation of the non-battle pole, resulted in impressive international support for decisive action. Military action at the operational level, involving hundreds of thousands of troops was the perfect instrument to achieve the bi-polar aims through maneuver. After over ten years of actions on both the battle and non-battle pole of the bipolar strategy, and in an atmosphere poisoned by the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), namely the terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the campaign to remove Saddam Hussein was launched. Policymakers were unable to articulate a clear, long-term objective that essentially envisaged the surgical excision of the Baathist regime while leaving the Iraqi people capable of rapidly re-creating a viable governance structure. That is, they could not formulate a policy that established an unequivocal context for the prosecution of a bi-polar strategy. Politicians lacked both the will and the knowledge of the "grammar" of war to effectively influence the overall strategy employed. Senior military leadership defaulted to a strategy of annihilation that unsurprisingly quickly defeated Iraq's organized military forces and led to the operational level commander's demand to declare "the end of major combat operations." Michael O'Hanlon of the Brooking Institution blames both policymakers, especially Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, for mistaking opportunity at the operational level with sound strategy; and, military officers, except General Shinseki, for not fully engaging in the politico-strategic dialogue that shaped the overall enterprise.[49]

Accusations that the US Administration had won the war but lost the peace masked the reality that a strategy targeting the overthrow of the Iraqi military infrastructure could not substitute for a bi-polar strategy that incorporated strategic elements on both poles, including a more robust international coalition of political supporters and the commitment of, and integrated plan for, adequate long-term military forces for stability operations.

Beyond the challenge of reconciling political ends and military means, strategy is difficult also because it comprises many broad, pervasive and inter-penetrating dimensions. This compounds the problem of executing sound strategy even when it is aligned with policy. According to Clausewitz, the strategic context that affects the use of engagements may be classified into various types; moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical.[50] Michael Howard offers a modern rendi-

tion of this typology by organizing strategy into four broad dimensions: social, logistical, operational and technological.[51] Colin Gray analyses seventeen dimensions clustered into three categories: People and Politics (people, society, culture, politics, ethics); Preparation for War (economics and logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology) and War Proper (military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary, time).[52]

However many categories or dimensions are used to encompass the field of strategy they cannot be viewed in a linear fashion or understood in a Jominian way. Strategy is interactive at all levels and in all aspects. Therefore, it is easy to imagine how various combinations and permutations of whatever set of categories enumerated above are used can complicate the issue. Clausewitz understood this clearly and his theory reversed Jomini's characterization of tactics as barely controlled chaos whereas strategy was conceived as the realm where principles and scientific-like laws could be discovered, articulated and used as sure guideposts for military commanders. Until late in the 19th century this meant that Jomini's influencial book *The Art of War,* extremely popular in most European militaries (as well as the American), was regarded as an effective manual on generalship. His cursory treatment of the relationship between policy and strategy seduced policy makers and generals alike into believing that the two spheres could be neatly and legitimately isolated one from the other. For those not inclined to deep reflection it continues to have this baneful attractiveness.

Clausewitz, on the other hand, argued that it was only the tactical level that could be structured by certain rules and mechanical techniques but the strategic level, immersed in uncertainty and ambiguity, required judgment, intellectual flexibility and the application of reason to intractable, even contradictory events and problems. Svechin, whose work was self consciously intended to counter the influence of Antoine Jomini and his Russian disciples Generals Leer and Dragomirov, repeatedly demonstrated, in Clausewitzian fashion, that "there is no doubt that strategic practice is not exclusively a branch of scientific activity but also a field of application of an art."[53]

The true nature of strategy is perhaps best captured by the French strategist General Andre Beaufre who defined it as "the art of the dialectic of

force or more precisely the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.[54] Edward Luttwak expands upon the dialectic nature of strategy arguing that this makes it inherently paradoxical, for example when an offensive strategy reaches its culminating point and is transformed into a defence. The problem for strategy, as Luttwak outlines persuasively, is that every cunning plan has to succeed against, not blind nature, but rather an adversary with whom you conduct a permanent tactical, operational, strategic, and political-moral dialogue.[55] All of these observations serve to emphasize both the discretionary, and specialized, nature of strategic knowledge.

Nested in strategy is the concept of operational art. If strategy is the bridge between policy and military power, operational art is the link between strategy and tactics. Politics shapes strategy in all its dimensions, strategy sets the parameters of operational art and operational art shapes tactics to the theatre campaign. It is the realm of campaigns, offense and defence, centers of gravity, culminating points and large-scale movement. Modern operational art emerged from political, military and technological factors dating back to the French Revolution. Conscription introduced the mass age of military history at this time and the intersection of advancing technology and Napoleonic concepts of tactics and grand tactics throughout the 19th century irrevocably altered the shape of the battlefield. Over the next century operational theory and practice responded to both strategic change and tactical advances. It has become inherently joint, that is involving two or more of the traditional Services of Navy, Army or Air Force. Diverse assets, both military and non-military, available to the strategist in the bi-polar strategy, for example, are echeloned and coordinated in this domain. Operational art, according to Svechin, is the totality of maneuvers and battles in a given part of a theatre of military action directed towards the achievement of the common goal, set as final in the given period of the campaign.[56] In a modern theatre of operations these "maneuvers" must be understood to include all activities associated with the political and strategic goals established, to include diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and socio-cultural.

Operational art definitely did not emerge out of Anglo-American military theory. In fact, Edward Luttwak has made the point that "it is a peculiarity of English language military terminology that it has no word of its own for what stands between the tactical and the strategic to describe

that middle level of thought and action wherein generic methods contend and battles unfold in their entirety."[57] As a component of the growing body of distinctly military knowledge, operational art appears as a product of the thought and practice of Prussian, later German, theorists and practitioners in the mid to late 19th century. It is picked up as a theme in France after the German Wars of Unification from 1864-1870 and in Russia as part of a general critique of Russian military theory resulting from the poor performance of Russian troops in both the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.[58] Decades of ongoing military research and application culminated in the clash of these three "systems" of operational art, French, German and Russian, in the Second World War.

Little concentrated effort on this dimension of the theory of war occurred over this period in Anglo-American military thought. A full explanation of why this is so would take an extended paper on its own. In essence, however, Britain's maritime orientation and land expeditionary force history and America's isolationism, late entry into European conflicts and above all US reliance on industrial might, diverted serious attention from this area of theory until after the Second World War. To be sure, as Edward Luttwak demonstrates in his seminal article on operational art, "there were isolated examples of generalship at the operational level, but they, and all that they implied, never became organic to the Anglo-American tradition of warfare. Instead, such operational approaches remained the trade secrets and personal attributes of men such as Douglas MacArthur, Patton and the British General O'Connor."[59] Luttwak's influential 1981 article publicized an intense period of reformulation of American political and military thinking about strategy and the "nesting" of operational art within the US perspective on war and strategy, largely in response to perceived failures in Vietnam and the need to refocus on the European theatre of confrontation with the Soviet Union. By 1986, however, the operational level of war was firmly integrated into US military doctrine. The UK was not far behind and British doctrine reflected this theoretical construct fully by the early 1990s.

Operational art is certainly the link between strategy and tactics but it is not merely the sum of tactical parts. It is qualitatively different than either and transcends the technological means that facilitates it. The Israeli military theorist Simon Naveh captures both its complexity and theoretical power when he observes that although tactical missions must

correspond to the general aim established at the strategic level, tactical results are only intangibly defined by strategy. On the other hand, tactics are the domain of concrete, mechanical performance. Tactics, focusing entirely on the mechanical dimension of warfare, totally lacked the cognitive tools needed to merge and direct the numerous engagements towards obtaining the strategic aims. Conversely, strategy, leaning primarily on abstract definitions of aims and policies, lacked the ability to translate its intentions into mechanical terms. In this situation the importance of the operational level becomes clear. Only on this level, explains Naveh, "can the abstract and mechanical extremes be fused into a functional formula through the maintenance of cognitive tension."[60] The operational commander must, therefore, be fully cognizant of the strategic plan. In fact, whenever he is faced with a choice between two (or more) operational choices he will be unable to justify a particular operational method if he stays solely within the realm of operational art. He will have to rise to a strategic level of thinking. Equally, the tendency to rely excessively on tactical excellence in the absence of a comprehensive operational cognition can be a destructive combination. Arguably both of these errors are identifiable in the prosecution of the Vietnam War.

At the heart of operational art is the concept of operational maneuver, which incorporates its own unique appreciation of time, space and terrain, while achieving the strategic goal by preparing the battlespace for tactical success. The clear outlines of operational maneuver emerged clearly towards the end of the 19th century out of the growing conviction that the strategy of annihilation could no longer necessarily be prosecuted by seeking a single decisive battle.[61] The nation-state's ability and willingness to devote its entire resources to war with the concomitant increase in the size of armies, that would be relentlessly reinforced, and the dramatic increase in lethality at the tactical level, bestowed by advanced technology, demanded an alternative. "The transformation of the idea that sought to destroy the opposing force in a single, integrated battle into an idea aimed at neutralizing the rival system's capability to attain its goals," insists Naveh, "provided the operational school with an abstract, yet logical, framework for the construction of the operational maneuver."[62]

Richard Simpkin has shown that this "idea" translates into a coherent plan of successive and/or concurrent campaigns comprising discrete

major operations and battles, with appropriate operational pauses.[63] Operational maneuver itself is qualitatively different than maneuver at the tactical level. In the latter, maneuver consists of fire and movement. That is, the movement of discrete weapons platforms to positions from which they can bring to bear effective fire. Physical destruction is the immediate aim. Operational maneuver is, however, a function of mass and mobility. Operational commanders mass forces and achieve mobility, superior to their opponent, through deception, fixing actions and above all, through technological superiority. The greater the operational mobility differential, the smaller the fixing force required. Firepower can also be used as a fixing force. The optimum combination of mass and mobility achieves superior operational maneuver capability and hence effectiveness. Thus, Soviet doctrine, by the 1980s, rated an airmobile brigade the equivalent of a mechanized division, in operational terms, because of the mobility of the rotary wing. Tactics are nested within the operational construct. In the fixing force they act as the "glue" that holds the opposing force. In the operational maneuver force they inflict the physical destruction necessary to victory. This relationship is depicted in Figure IX.



FIGURE IX

Both Simpkin and Luttwak demonstrate that the difference between "attrition warfare" and what Luttwak calls "relational-maneuver warfare" occurs at the operational level and is determined by the relationship between mass and mobility. Large mass and relatively low mobility will result in an attrition style of combat at the operational level. This is the explanation for the situation on the Western Front in the First World War after the Battle of the Marne. Relatively high mobility in comparison to mass results in maneuver warfare as demonstrated by both the Allied Forces after Normandy and the Soviets after the breakout from Stalingrad in 1943. Coalition Forces in both Gulf war campaigns-1991 and 2003 - achieved extremely high levels of operational maneuver. In comparing operational art as practiced by the Germans, the Soviets and the US since 1939, Naveh argues that in the German case tactical prowess could not make up for the fact that "in the final analysis the operational mobility displayed by the Wehrmacht barely equaled that of the Grande Armee of 1812." He agrees with Simpkin who makes a slightly different argument concerning this point to the effect that the Germans never got the equation between mass and mobility right, always underestimating the necessary mass.[64] Soviet doctrine, especially as it related to the disruptive effect of deep operations theory, was much more effective. In the US case, Naveh contends that synchronization and simultaneity are operational-level concepts that give American doctrine unprecedented superiority.

In General Tommy Franks' account of the second major campaign of the Gulf War (1990-ongoing) he describes how the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force struck north towards Baghdad in a highly mobile action while six Iraqi divisions, echeloned above Basra, were held immobile by elements of a Marine Regimental Combat Team controlling massive air and naval "operational fires."[65] As depicted in Figure VIII, operational maneuver is a concept applicable not only to the strategy of annihilation but also in the battle pole in the bi-polar strategy as illustrated in the Gulf in both 1991 and 2003. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the concepts of mass and mobility must be applied, in a somewhat different sense, when the operational commander is operating on the non-battle pole, developing and executing campaign plans that must integrate, co-ordinate and echelon military and non-military means in pursuit of assigned strategic objectives.

Although the parameters and modalities of sea and air combat are dif-

ferent, the basic concepts of operational maneuver are similar to that of land operations. Alfred Mahan's theory of massing maritime power against the decisive point, while decidedly Jominian, was based on achieving this kind of operational maneuver. Command of the sea remains dependent on maritime operational maneuver. Similarly the ability to mass airpower and move it quickly (mobility), not plane by plane, but as a complete "air package" formed the basis of NATO's plan to destroy second echelon Soviet forces on the Central Front. John Warden's *The Air Campaign* fully explains the concepts of operational art and operational maneuver in the aerospace context in the Post-Cold War era. In the 21st century debating the particular relationship of sea, land and air forces to operational art is in any event anachronistic and even pedantic. These forces, while not yet interchangeable, are nonetheless all components of the single operational idea that organizes tactical forces and achieves strategic objectives.

Tactics are the final nested element in the general system of war and conflict. They are obviously important because only they deliver success within the context set by strategy and operational art. "Any military activity," Colin Gray argues, "is inherently tactical, organized by operational art, but the consequences of all military activity is the realm of strategy." The factors of fear, danger, fatigue and extreme physical and mental exertion are either unique to the tactical realm or their effects are greatly magnified there. Tactical maneuver, as already discussed, is a function of fire and movement and is strongly influenced by technology. Tactics have, in fact, been altered by technology as much, if not more, as strategy and operational art. This is a point made dramatically by General Franks when he pointed out that a single sergeant in a Bradley fighting vehicle in 2003, controlled more firepower than a 1991 Desert Storm armoured battalion.

Crucial to a full understanding of the tactical level is that it is always shaped by strategy and operational art. For example, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example, Egyptian tactics in the Sinai were predicated on a particular preemptive holding strategy and its associated operational plan. Likewise, US nuclear strategy in the 1950s translated into an operational conception that tactically reorganized the US Army into pentagonal divisions and ended with a Canadian brigade equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, in a discussion with the author, one of the foremost Soviet military analysts then writing in the West,

Christopher Donnelly reflecting on the relationship of tactics to operational art in particular, forcefully made the point that in Soviet doctrine, "if a machine is to run smoothly, a cog must remain a cog." The machine in question was the Soviet theory of operational art and the cog was made up of Soviet tactical formations at the battalion and divisional levels.[66] This interaction among strategy, operations and tactics is important to the future of the Canadian military profession because the CF can no longer accept performing as a "cog" in another strategic/ operational conception, whether that be the US, the UN or any other candidate. The general system of war and conflict that subsumes the interaction of the strategic, operational and tactical spheres must be populated with Canadian concepts and other intellectual structures.

The general system of war and conflict represented in Figure VIII, and described above, constitutes the knowledge component of an ideology that is fuelled by the military ethos, referred to at the beginning of this chapter as a set of transcendental values inherent in the professional construct. Therefore, taken together they represent a professional ideology unique to the profession of arms. This ideology, as with all professions, counters the claims of both market and bureaucratic ideologies. It does so first by claiming a group of norms and beliefs that are fundamentally different than either consumerism or managerialism. Secondly, professional military expertise has its own ontological basis that discriminates it from other fields of knowledge and requires different organization and education as compared to the market or bureaucracy. Finally, this systematic, theory-based knowledge is represented by the general system of war and conflict upon which specific and functional skills and abilities are based, ranging from the more mechanistic at the tactical level to the more abstract, organic and even aesthetic, at the level of strategy. This construct is depicted graphically in Figure X.

Each element is present in Canada's military professional ideology but they; taken together as a synergistic whole, are not sufficiently understood by all military professionals. Equally troublesome is the lack of understanding and appreciation for what all this means on the part of many politicians and civilian national security officials. The nature of Canadian military professional ideology and its proper application has, consequently, been under threat throughout much of this country's history.



FIGURE X

Endnotes

[1] Freidson, *Professionalism*. 3.

[2] Parsons, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 545.

[3] J.Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1979), 80.

[4] Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (London: Heineman, 1976), 60.

[5] Larry Johnston, *Ideologies: An Analytical and Contextual Approach* (Peterborough, ON, Broadview Press, 1996), 14.

[6] Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (NY: Alfred Knopf, 2002), 571-609. Haydon White also uses the concept of ideology in his analysis of 19th century historiography. He argues that history was always written in accordance with one of four ideologies-anarchism, conservatism, radicalism or liberalism. See his *Metahistory:the Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[7] Freidson, *Professionalism,* 106.

[8] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 3 vols (NY: Bedminster Press, 1968), 973.

[9] Kevin T. Leicht, "Professions," *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, vol II.George Ritzer, ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 606.

[10] George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society: Revised New Century Edition* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2004), 22-27.

[11] Everett Hughes, "Professions," *Daedalus,* 656.

[12] C. W. Mills, *White Collar* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1956), 112.

[13] See R. H. Hall, "Professionalization and Bureaucratization," *American Sociological Review*, 38(1), 1968. also Irving Zeitlin*, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 159.

[14] Ontology: the theory of existence or, more narrowly, of what really exists, as opposed to that which appears to exist, but does not, or to that which can prop-

erly be said to exist but only if conceived as some complex whose constituent are the things that really exist. Alan Bullock and Stephen Trembley (ed.), *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* (London: Harper Collins, 1999).

[15] Epistemologists propose criteria such as accuracy, coherence or consistency, for what counts as good or bad, true or false, rational or irrational, forms of knowledge. An empiricist epistemology, for example, requires good knowledge to be based primarily on experience, that is evidence derived from observation or other senses. By comparison a rationalist would argue for the importance of a priori reason, formal logic or theory, in advancing knowledge. A rationalist epistemology would rely on the use of logically consistent or coherent knowledge founded primarily upon philosophical reason or, in the case of science, the theoretical ordering of experience. Most epistemologies incorporate varying degrees of commitment to both empiricism and rationalism. Epistemology may also prescribe ideal forms of explanation or the types of relations to be sought after between theory and evidence.

[16] Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 102.

[17] Freidson, *Professionalism*, 128.

[18] Quoted in Roland Stromberg, *European Intellectual History Since 1789* (NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 179.

[19] Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 102; and Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism*, 41.

[20] Jamous, H. and B. Peloille, "Changes in the French Hospital System" in J.A. Jackson (ed.) *Professions and Professionalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), 113.

[21] Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present* (NY: Harper-Collins, 2000), 509.

[22] Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 14-22. Also Morse Peckham, *Romanticism and Ideology* (London: Wesleyn University Press, 1995) 4-21.

[23] The relationship between Romantic philosophy and science is explored in Robert J. Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002). See also, Peter Watson, *A Terrible Beauty: The People and Ideas That Shaped the Modern Mind*. (London: Phoenix Press, 2000).

[24] *On War,* 578.

[25] *Beyond Monopoly,* 36.

[26] Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War," Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* Peter Paret and Michael Howard, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976), 53.

[27] Colin S.Gray*, Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 85.

[28] Julien Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1911).

[29] For an excellent account of Clausewitz's influence in the Anglo-American world see Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also T. L. Knutson, *A History of International Relations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 144-147.

[30] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

[31] Ibid., 89.

[32] See J. Colin, *The Transformation of War* (Paris: Flammarion, 1911); T.N. Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (Indianapolis, 1980); Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York, 1989).

[33] See Georg Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity To The Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover: Wesleyan University. Press, 1997), Chapter. 1; and M. Bentley, *Modern Historiography* (London: Routledge, 1999), Chapter. 4.

[34] For the connection between Romantic thought and Realism see Torbjorn Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 223-225.

[35] For a review of these theories see James Dougherty, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (NY: Longman, 2001).

[36] Michael Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: 1996), 57.

[37] Ludwig von Bertalanffy*, General Systems Theory*. (NY: Harpers, 1975), 70.

[38] Clausewitz, *On War*, 604.

[39] Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War: The Dawn of Modern Warfare, vol iv* (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press,1985), 439-444; A. Svechin, *Strategy* (Minneapolis: Eastview Publications, 1992), 186. See also Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[40] Clausewitz, *On War,*607.

[41] Ibid., 605.

[42] Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 60.

[43] Ibid., 17. Basil Liddell-Hart's definition is equally good: "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy." in *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Praeger, 1967). 335. The reference to the "art" of strategy, in fact, reinforces the discretionary nature of strategic knowledge calling for specialized judgment.

[44] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (NY: Harper Collins 1994), 120.

[45] Alexandr Svechin, *Strategy* (Minn.: East View Publications, 1992), 246.

[46] Ibid., 249.

[47] Gray, *Modern Strategy,* 60.

[48] For details on Gulf War One, or more accurately, the first major campaign on the battle pole in the Gulf War 1990-present see Jeffrey McCausland, "The Gulf Conflict:A Military Analysis," *Adelphi Paper 282* (London, Nov.1993) and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston, 1995) and L. Freedman and E. Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: 1993).

[49] Comments made at the "Changing Nature of War Conference" sponsored by the *Center for Strategic Studies*, Alexandria, Virginia, 25-26 May 2004. Transcript available at Can Document Control and Distribution Section-Document N00014-00-D-0700.

[50] Clausewitz, *On War*, 183.

[51] Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs,*

57, 1979, 976.

[52] Gray, *Modern Strategy.* 24.

[53] Svechin, 71.

[54] Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, trans. R. H. Barry (London, 1963), 22.

[55] Edward Luttwak, *Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Belnap, 1987), 16.

[56] *Svechin,* 38.

[57] Luttwak, *Strategy,* 91.

[58] Bruce W. Menning, *Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), Chapt. 6 "Theory and Structure: Young Turks and Old Realities," 200-237.

[59] Edward Luttwak, "The Operational Level Of War," *International Security*, vol. 5, no. 3, Winter, 1980-1981, 61-79.

[60] Simon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 30.

[61] The case has been made that the genesis of this evolution actually began in 1807 during the Napoleonic wars. See Robert Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1994).

[62] Naveh, 38.

[63] Richard Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare.* (London: Brassey's, 1985), 103.

[64] Simpkin, 33-34; Naveh, 55; and Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," 64-67. For additional details of this whole discussion.

[65] General Tommy Franks. *American Soldier* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2004), 472.

[66] Conversation with the author at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 May 1988.

Chapter Four

Professional Ideology and The Canadian Forces

Historically, professional ideology in the Canadian Forces has been under pressure from two main sources. One threatens the ethos component; the other undermines the knowledge component of the multifaceted construct described in the previous chapter. First, the competing values found in both market and bureaucratic ideologies have threatened and in some cases eclipsed those of the military ethos. These values have in many instances been imported from society at large, through entrants thoroughly socialized in contemporary civilian values before encountering the demands imposed by professional military life. In other, more egregious cases, necessary adaptation to the external world of politics, economic reality and government oversight has caused members of the profession of arms to lose contact with the core beliefs, expectations and values central to military professionalism and required to counter-balance civilian mind-sets and business practices.

The second threat to Canadian professional military ideology involves the knowledge component of that ideology. In this case the general system of war and conflict has not been clearly articulated or understood from a Canadian perspective. This is partly a function of civil-military relations and the reconciliation of policy demands with strategic thought and available resources. But more damaging has been the over reliance, through the years, on theories and concepts adopted without appropriate re-conceptualization from foreign models, especially British and American. Some scholars and political analysts have said that Canada as a nation-state has gone from colony to satellite without an intervening phase. This is an oversimplification of Canadian history but is nonetheless instructive with regard to the status of professional military knowledge. In this chapter these threats to professional ideology will be explored. A somewhat extended look at the relationship between Canadian policy and strategy over the years is necessary to identify the pressure points in terms of civil versus military perspectives. Canadian mili-

tary professional ideology is a product of history as much as current civil – military relations or the state of strategic theory today. Equally, this ideology can only be understood if competing conceptions of the utility of military force are clearly identified. Appropriate responses that strengthen the military professional construct in Canada and guide professional development are proposed in the concluding chapter.

As discussed in Chapter Three, market ideology (consumerism) inherently favours self-interest and is one that exerts enormous influence throughout Western society. It is an ideology that can also readily co-exist with the bureaucratic ideology, or managerialism, which according to its Weberian definition is essentially value neutral beyond seeking efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This easy relationship accounts, in part, for the power of the "McDonaldization" phenomenon identified by George Ritzer. However, consumerism is incompatible with professional ideology, usually establishing an inherently hostile relationship that resists productive reconciliation with it. The tension between these two ideologies has been one focus of the work of Charles Moskos for over 30 years. His analysis of the relationship between institutions and occupations highlights one important dimension of the professional/consumerism/managerialism dynamic in terms that resonate strongly with the themes of this study:

An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms; that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling. An occupation, on the other hand, is legitimized in terms of the market place; that is, prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest rather than the employing institution.[1]

The CF is such an institution and the conflict in priorities identified is often reflected in the phenomenon of careerism. One of the most serious cases illustrative of this phenomenon was probably that of a senior officer, one of those assigned the role of stewards of the profession in *Duty With Honour*, released for claiming exorbitant expenses for which he was not entitled. This specific example is unfortunately one of many others, usually related to the broader objective of "getting ahead" at the expense of both subordinates and especially the professional institution itself.[2] The seductive appeal of identifying with one's occupation rather

than membership in the profession of arms, given the relatively less onerous demands of the former, is even more commonplace, often manifested in subtle, but nonetheless, debilitating ways, for the system. Adopting the persona of military managers and military technologists was, according to Morris Janowitz, a necessary corrective, in the modern era, to the wholly "heroic" model that tended to inhibit the ability to adapt to change in a timely manner. Such an adjustment is a double-edged sword, however; tempting service personnel to identify with their differentiated roles and classifications, to the virtual exclusion of their primary place in the profession of arms.

There is considerable evidence that many CF members have an occupational orientation, privileging their technical knowledge over professional knowledge as understood by professional ideology. Illustrative of this potential dilemma was a running debate the author had with a Master Warrant Officer Dental Technician during the development of *Duty With Honour*. This NCM insisted that although she came to work in "combats", she did not see herself as a member of the profession of arms. This, it seemed, was a claim reserved in some way for "operators." In an increasingly 'technical' force structure this false dilemma needs to be acknowledged and resolved. A wide variety of technicians, information specialists, human resources specialists and many others along with so-called operators must understand that broadly speaking there are no 'front-lines.' Indeed, the differentiation of the military structure into numerous occupations is a necessary means to achieve operational effectiveness. However, if this process is not subsumed by the integrating function of professional ideology it becomes seriously dysfunctional.

In the struggle between consumerism and professionalism the military ethos plays a key role throughout a members career, socializing them in the core Canadian military values of Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage. The acceptance of unlimited liability, the belief in fighting spirit and teamwork transcends unrestrained individualism. Self-interest, the core of market ideology, is ultimately subordinated in the understanding that military professionals must adhere to the ideal of, mission - own troops - self, in that order of priority.

As a profession that is inherently bureaucratic, to a degree, the tension between the hierarchic, compartmented pole and the professional pole

in a military organization can be acute. The ideology of bureaucracy or managerialism, therefore, poses, perhaps, the greater threat to professionalism in the Canadian Forces than that of consumerism. Again, these two ideologies often form an alliance born of both compatibility and convenience and their corrosive influence is mutually reinforcing. It is true furthermore, that the skill sets and techniques that constitute the core of managerialism do not in themselves threaten professionalism. In fact, in the modern era they are virtually indispensable. However, an ideology that purports to organize, control and direct professional knowledge, inhibiting its discretionary nature, blunting professional judgment and forcing it into impenetrable "stovepipes" must be consciously shaped to serve and support professional norms and objectives. For this reason the focus in a military professional's education and development must focus not only on the countervailing values and norms of professionalism but also on the professional body of knowledge defining the profession itself.

Striking the proper balance between the ideology of bureaucracy and that of professionalism is particularly difficult for senior leadership in Canada at the policy-strategy interface, organized into an integrated civil-military headquarters at National Defence Headquarters. Managerialism is often imported in an insidious way, in this unique organizational structure, in company with techniques that on the face of it seem only designed to enhance accountability, cost-effectiveness and transparency. The ends are laudable but the means can seem deceptively innocuous. An example might be the trendy management techniques advocated by then Secretary of Defence Robert MacNamara and his associates during the Vietnam War in the US Department of Defence (DoD). Similar management theories were influential in the Canadian case and often embraced largely without qualification by Canadian military planners in headquarters and training establishments in the 1960s and 1970s. Jack English, whose work admittedly is always provocative, makes a valid point when he observes that NDHQ, after the reorganizations resulting from the report of the Management Review Group in 1972, became even more immersed as a whole in financial management, personnel administration and capital procurement, to the point where bureaucrats, in and out of uniform, prevailed over operators.[3] English's view is by no means an isolated one and reference to this phenomenon can be found, for example, in Jack Granastein's, *Who Killed the Canadian Military, Dishonoured Legacy. The Lessons of the*

Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia and even the *Defence Minister's Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces(1997).*

If these pressures on professional ideology were problematic during the Cold War, they were amplified to quite extraordinary levels beginning in 1989. The requirement to respond to the major budget cuts of 1994, and Program Reviews 1 and 2 that followed them, was complicated by the need to relocate all three Command headquarters – Maritime, Land and Air – to Ottawa. All of this in an environment where the senior leadership of the CF perceived the demand of the Canadian public, Parliament and Treasury Board, monitored by the Office of the Auditor-General, to run the affairs of government, and especially Defence, more like a business.[4] A member of Foreign Affairs in the early post-Cold War period remembers confronting this dilemma in another Department and has recently reflected:

In addition to fuelling a massive rise in living standards in the Western world, the private sector served as a model for how to structure organizations and societies. Workers from both the non-public and public sectors sat through endless seminars on how to infuse their departments with efficiency and entrepreneurialism. Efficiency experts drafted elaborate plans for how to bring the market economy – the magic solution to all social and political ills – to non-market organizations and institutions.[5]

This was clearly a familiar phenomenon in the CF as well and a number of measures were adopted in accordance with the logic of the market and bureaucracy. Under an initiative entitled Defence 2000, decision-making and spending authorities were devolved to the lowest possible levels in the Department of National Defence. Fiscal devolution was naturally accompanied by the adoption throughout the Canadian Forces of formal business planning. Shortly after the publication of the *1994 Defence White Paper* the Department also launched a complete review of the many other management processes extant in Defence in response to the huge reductions in military and civilian employees, the need to downsize the top-level Headquarters by at least one third and to absorb the three Command Headquarters into National Defence Headquarters. The Management, Command and Control Re-Engineering Team

(MCCRT) was stood up in January 1995 with a mandate to re-engineer the DND/CF command, control and resource management structure. The scope of the MCCRT initiative involved a reduction of approximately 7,000 personnel in 18 headquarters. The MCCRT completed its work and handed off its responsibilities to the Director-General Management Renewal Services in June 1997. As far as it went the MCCRT exercise was both necessary and successful. In retrospect, however, as the Somalia debacle unfolded and problems in Bosnia, most notably the Bakevechi incident, emerged there was a sense that management processes were being applied in lieu of leadership solutions or a full grasp of command responsibilities beyond planning, supervising and directing.

Fundamentally, none of these measures can be faulted on their own merits but it is questionable whether second and third-order effects of processes rooted in market and bureaucratic ideologies were really appreciated. Testimony in front of the Somalia Commission certainly suggested that some witnesses felt that recent trends toward more civilian and business oriented practices, although of assistance in the management of DND, were having a negative impact on the membership of the CF. The Commission reported that as military members attempt to accommodate not only the practices but also the characteristics and values underlying those practices, essential military values are put at risk.[6]

Allan English, commenting on the results of the Somalia Commission, has also noted the potential for undermining military professionalism by such a shift towards civilianization. This would be the inevitable result of the infusion of occupational values in the CF, versus the traditional vocational values.[7] These are all valid concerns but they must be balanced against the imperatives of civilian control as this has been understood to evolve in Canada's historical experience, as well as the need for maximum cooperation among all actors in the national security equation. If military professionals lost their footing, or indeed, found little purchase in anachronistic, even militaristic doctrines and values, civilian officials and politicians certainly underestimated their responsibility to actively support measures promoting a healthy national security institution. In times of relative calm, militaries are often ignored. It is precisely during such times that civilians must carefully audit the doctrines of their military organizations, reconcile political ends with military means and change with political circumstances and technological developments.[8]

To balance the legitimate demands of societal oversight and prudent expenditures of resources with professional prerogatives, senior leaders and defence officials need to distinguish between what are known as heteronymous professional organizations and conjoint organizations. In the former work settings, considerable control is exercised over professional work; such as house attorneys practicing law in large corporations. Conjoint professional organizations involve professionals, managers and administrators operating in separate domains of expertise and sharing the benefits that derive from collaboration.[9] An example would be the relationship between administrators and researchers in research institutions and think tanks. In keeping with the underlying rationale of this latter organizational concept each domain in NDHQ has its legitimate and essential role to play in delivering security, and collaboration must be intense. For this reason, therefore, the creation of a "CF Headquarters," separate from the Department of National Defence, sometimes recommended as a possible remedy to relieve the tension between professionalism and managerialism, is not only inadvisable, but also counterproductive. What is required is a much greater understanding of, and mutual respect for, the ideologies that fuel the separate, but interdependent functions.

The senior leadership of the profession, both officers and NCOs, has a further responsibility to develop in more junior military professionals an acute awareness of their roles in the overall national security matrix, roles that distinguish the military professional from the bureaucrat regardless of the organizational context. Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, as Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff for Professional Development and he often ruminated on the putative dilemma of how to respond to junior officers asking whether they should "go to Staff College or get an MBA."[10] The answer, of course, is not a zero-sum game, in that there is a requirement for both processes and skill sets. Symbolically, however, the question illuminates the ongoing struggle in the minds of many aspiring military professionals between professionalism and managerialism. A thorough understanding of what constitutes professional knowledge greatly ameliorates the dilemma. The appropriate military ethos can only function when it is directly related to the existential knowledge component of an holistic professional ideology.

The problem, however, for the Canadian military, historically, has been

that much of what constitutes this professional military knowledge has first passed through the prism of British, and subsequently, US lenses. In terms of the paradigm illustrated in Figure VIII strategy was initially defined in terms of British imperial strategy. It assigned the Dominion a growing degree of home defence responsibilities, a limited role in imperial frontier policing and, later, a small, but politically important place in the British strategy of annihilation, the preferred strategic pole of the paradigm when confronting major opponents like Germany, Japan, and after The Second World War, the Soviet Union. To the extent that anyone in Canada was exposed to military thought and theory, prior to World War One and even after, it was exclusively through British soldier-theoreticians.[11] William Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula* established a position for its author as the pre-eminent military thinker both in Britain and the Dominions. Patrick MacDougall published *The Theory of War* in 1856, and it remained one of two required texts at the British Staff College until 1914. The second text, even more influential, was E.B. Hamley's *The Operations of War*. MacDougall and Hamley's books were thoroughly Jominian and dismissive of Clausewitz except in their endorsement of the Clausewitzian concepts of decisive victory and the strategy of annihilation.[12] The nexus between military practice in Canada, under the watchful eyes of the British Officers Commanding, and theory imported from Britain, was seamless.

Notwithstanding a growing nationalist sentiment across the country, Canada's involvement in the First World War was virtually automatic. Ties with the "mother country" remained strong and it must be remembered that 70 percent of those volunteering for service in the first six months of the war were in fact British born. Canadian participation did, however, take the form of discrete, national contributions such as the Canadian Corps. A Canadian "forward headquarters" under Sir George Pearly was established in London to look after Canadian political interests and 1st Canadian Corps, under General Sir Arthur Currie distinguished itself on the battlefield. Vimy Ridge became the symbol of Canadian nationhood and the quest for greater autonomy in the Empire.[13] Nonetheless, Canada's military involvement remained strictly at the tactical level and no military strategists or uniquely Canadian strategic perspectives emerged. In the immediate inter-war years the Canadian Army and Navy retained their "political" and organizational separation from British Forces, as did the new Royal Canadian Air Force, established in 1924. However, during this period the major challenge was

mere survival nationally and there was certainly no pretense among military officers of developing a separate strategic perspective, different from that emanating from London.

Lacking a staff college of their own in the years following the First World War, Canadian officers, in small numbers, attended both the British college at Camberly, and in even smaller numbers, the Imperial War College during the 1920s and 1930s. Any thought Canada might profit from a Staff College of its own was strongly resisted. In fact, the future General and Commander of the Canadian Army in The Second World War, H. D. G. Crerar made it clear that he could imagine no worse blow to the desirable practical assimilation of the military forces of the Empire then that each Dominion should have its own Staff College. "If the Dominions were to march in step," he warned, "they must absorb the same doctrine and the same learning."[14] After World War One, therefore, Canadian military officials continued to plan for a large expeditionary force to fight alongside Britain, albeit, at the tactical level, should the need arise. By 1939, as Jack English has pointed out, though no formal alliance existed between Britain and Canada, the forces of both nations were more closely integrated than those of the NATO allies in the Cold War.[15] Professional ideology in Canada, admittedly in its embryonic stage, reflected the British conception of the general system of war and conflict and an ethos stressing a strong sense of loyalty and duty to Imperial aims.

Since Canadian policy did not envisage such a close alignment with British imperial or European continental concerns, the preoccupation of Canadian officers with British military thinking complicated civil-military relations in Ottawa and made the development of a uniquely Canadian military strategic perspective extremely problematic. Canadian policy makers tended to view Canadian security in terms of three threats-absorption, disintegration and military. Absorption would be the consequence of an Imperial structure that was excessively centralized or increasingly, the failure to resist the pressures-economic, cultural and political, from south of the border. Disintegration loomed if Government policy did not accommodate Quebec's concerns both domestically and in terms of international entanglements. The military threat paled in significance with the former two, as Canada sought autonomy and flexibility in the Imperial structure in ways that reduced the nationalist pressures emanating from Quebec.[16] In the post-World War I period, and in

the context of this assessment of the national security problem in Canada, the two senior officials at Foreign Affairs, O. D. Skelton and Loring Christie, developed a deep and abiding distrust of men in uniform. Skleton's opinions reflected a long-standing anti-imperial and national bias, which saw the Canadian military's intimate association with the British Army and Navy as one of the more powerful ties binding the Dominion unnecessarily to the mother country. Furthermore, "Skleton was convinced that the Canadian General Staff's dedication to helping Great Britain in time of peril would ultimately strengthen the imperial cause and thereby make it impossible for Ottawa to formulate a foreign policy of its own."[17] Canada's leading politicians were undoubtedly sympathetic to the views held at Foreign Affairs but these were usually far ahead of a largely pro-British public opinion. In this situation civil-military issues at the policy - strategy interface were tendentious but muted, prickly but unresolved.

Skleton's preference was that Government policy, domestically, should restrict military forces to contributing to nation-building, broadly enough defined to include strike-breaking and controlling Depression-struck citizens as required. Internationally, Canadian military forces should play no role that would hinder the growing autonomy that Canada sought on the world stage. When Loring Christie discovered that the General Staff was drafting mobilization plans for an Expeditionary Force, he said that it was pure folly for the Canadian Army to use the pretext of a major war as the ordinary and permanent design and strength for its organization. He declared that Canadian Government policy would determine when and where such commitments would be made. In the meantime more localized crises around the world were the norm in international politics and should form the basis for planning. Here we see the emerging conflict in terms of a military ethos, between the contention that military forces are intended to focus on their war-fighting tasks versus the requirement to serve as an instrument of crisis management, broadly defined. This debate shaping the Canadian military professional ideology during the inter-war years at the policy/strategy interface, was, of course, resolved in favour of the Imperial connection and adherence to the strategy of annihilation by the rise of Hitler, Hirohito and the failure of the League of Nations. Canada made an impressive contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers under the steady and non-negotiable strategic and operational direction of first the British and then the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

In the Cold War period, the triad of threats to Canadian sovereignty and security remained absorption, disintegration and military, with the first now a cause of concern due to the hegemon to the south and the third looming much larger than hitherto, in the face of Communist fervour and intransigence and a nuclear armed Soviet Union. Multilateralism as the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy became entrenched as a response to all three threats. This was operationalized largely through Canadian membership in NATO and an activist orientation at the United Nations. As before, policy in the post-Second World War period tended towards a focus on limiting conflict with a mix of deterrence, diplomacy and peacekeeping, resorting to force as a last resort. The ever-present threat of the Soviet Union and the American response to it, however, entangled Canadian strategic thinking in the opposite pillar of the strategy of annihilation. American strategies of massive retaliation, graduated response, flexible response and nuclear deterrence, in all its guises, dominated virtually all strategic discourse. All these theories were predicated on the ultimate threat of unlimited war with the Soviets. Even counter-insurgency theory, which as practiced by the British and the French was understood to involve a bi-polar strategy supporting a limited war policy, was forced into the annihilation pole by an American insistence on decisive military victory. How Canadian military strategy might accommodate this discourse was never seriously debated beyond endeavouring to maintain tactically competent forces interoperable with major allies and increasingly this meant with the US. The knowledge component of professional ideology was thus restricted to the more mechanistic domain of tactics.

The history and ultimate demise of Canada's National Defence College (NDC) is perhaps symbolic of the Canadian attitude towards national security and the level of commitment and effort necessary to reconcile the relationship of strategy to policy. Opened in December 1947, it was the first attempt to organize in Canada an institution for the advanced study of war and security problems. By the end of the 1950s however, NDC had already acquired a reputation for being a center of leisure rather than a center of learning. In 1967, the eminent Canadian military historian, Adrian Preston described it as "an educational disaster, lacking curriculum and competence and exposing its students to a few defence problems with an intensity appropriate to a gentleman's club."[18] Recognition of the need for, and effort required to sustain, the 'syncretic epistemological foundation' at the heart of professional ideol-

ogy was certainly missing here. Throughout the 1970s the course consisted of four terms; Canadian Studies, the World Environment, Strategy and Canadian Defence and Wither Canada. Astonishingly, in 1981 the entire strategic term was eliminated. Ironically, after the end of the Cold War, when the need and opportunity for the creation of a distinctly Canadian professional ideology that encompassed strategy, operational art and tactics was imperative, NDC, unable to reform itself and reflecting the defence establishments long standing inability to engage in a conceptually clear and coherent manner with issues above the tactical, was closed in the early 1990s.

The Cold War did not turn 'Hot' and in the virtual political/strategic space provided, Canada, in reality, practiced an inchoate strategy that was nowhere clearly articulated or debated. The military continued to envisage a tactical contribution to a coalition strategy seeking decisive victory against the backdrop of nuclear destruction. This was reflected in Canadian contributions of land, sea and air forces to NATO and integration in NORAD. Peacekeeping was accorded a minor role in this strategic paradigm. This is not to argue that these contributions were not valuable as far as they went. They did in fact support Canada's policy of multi-lateralism, as well as commitment to the defence of liberal democracy. At the same time though they were viewed from radically different perspectives in the case of policymakers and military strategists. The optimum political/military dialogue was consistently thwarted and a unifying military identity, conducive to a more joint military ethos was damaged. The "logic" of policy and the "grammar" of war were never reconciled in the Canadian context. As late as 1987 military planners and civilian officials in the Department of National Defence still envisaged the need for a large conventional force of traditional structure and ethos to prosecute a strategy of annihilation against the Soviet Union.

In terms of professional ideology in the context of the Cold War, the Canadian military ethos component was not far from Huntington's depiction of the classic military ethic; being pessimistic, historically inclined, power oriented, nationalistic, militaristic and instrumental in its view of the military profession. It was, in brief, "realistic and conservative."[19] Professional knowledge clustered around theories, concepts and roles derived from the study of the strategy of annihilation. In the Canadian context the code for this orientation was the rationale for, and

maintenance of, “a general purpose combat capability.” This was, in fact, a misappropriation of an American concept intended to bridge part of the conceptual gap between massive retaliation and flexible response. In the former strategy, conventional forces were designed to set the framework for nuclear war and “mop-up” the battlefield as required. Flexible Response, on the other hand, required the ability to respond conventionally at every stage of escalation up to and including nuclear response in order to raise the threshold for such extreme operations as high as possible. For this, US doctrine called for the maintenance of a “general purpose combat capability” to cover the spectrum of conflict throughout the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Canadian usage lacked doctrinal clarity and was motivated, in part, by military politics. It confused civil-military relations, and given both policy considerations and resource limitations, stretched the limits of credibility and logic.

The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on Canadian military professionalism, as was the case throughout the Western world and beyond. Notwithstanding the promise of a re-invigorated UN, the triumph of democracy and a much anticipated “peace dividend”, the world rapidly revealed itself to be a very unstable, dangerous place. Lacking a readily identifiable opponent to “overthrow” the required reorientation of strategic perspective was, nevertheless, difficult to articulate and slow in coming. Unfortunately, it seemed in the early 1990s, and to some extent beyond, relinquishing the time worn policy and associated grand strategy of containment, prosecuted largely on American terms, meant retreating to a confused, if not fearful, reliance on “chaos” as the guiding principle for the post-Cold War world. The new Liberal Government, grappling with a crushing deficit problem, was also intent on an expanded role for the UN and tended to dismiss the efforts, directed by capitals throughout the Alliance and pursued vigorously in Brussels, to reorganize and reorient NATO. The Liberals had campaigned against the incumbent Conservatives on the basis of a platform enunciated in a document entitled *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada*, referred to as the “Red Book,” chapter eight of which addressed their foreign and defence policy platform.[20] Reference to this election document is indispensable for an understanding of the unfolding of Canadian security policy over the subsequent years.

According to the “Red Book,” a Liberal government would strengthen Canada’s leading role in international peacekeeping, in part through a

reorientation of Canadian defence policy and procurement practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping. A new Liberal government, it promised, would accordingly give priority to Canadian efforts to improve the United Nation's policies on peacekeeping. Significantly, there was no mention of NATO whatsoever in this campaign document.[21] The Conservatives had already begun the draw-down of stationed forces in Europe and it was a foregone conclusion that if anything this would accelerate under any new Liberal government. As for the Gulf War, it seemed that the major lesson drawn was not the utility of armed force in the "New World Order" but rather the promise of unanimity on the Security Council in matters of peace and security. Under the umbrella of a robust UN Resolution an impressive international coalition of like-minded states had assembled to counter blatant aggression. This was precisely the United Nations that the new Liberal government had in mind for the 21st century. Canada's military involvement in this effort was minimal, although respectable. There is very little indication, however, that anyone in Ottawa, military or civilian, thought about the Gulf War in terms of the general system of war and conflict and therefore, its implications for either Canadian political-military cooperation or strategic thought.

Upon election, the Government set out immediately to reorient foreign and defence policy in response to their conception of the new security environment. Defence planners were, however, very concerned that the Government appeared far too sympathetic to the work of the Canada 21 Council, a group of notable Canadians determined to shape the inevitable Defence White Paper that would replace the defunct and discredited policy contained in the Defence White Paper of 1987.[22] The *Canada 21 Report*, published in early 1994, started from the premise that in the new strategic context there was no obvious need to maintain the wide range of air, ground and anti-submarine conventional forces needed to repel a military attack, because it was difficult to conceive of any military power with the desire and ability to attack Canada. The Council's Report advocated a strengthening of Canada's capacity to contribute to peacekeeping and peace-building, while eschewing involvement in combat operations involving heavy armour or modern airpower. Consequently, current military capabilities should be progressively eliminated where they depended upon the use of heavy armoured formations, heavy artillery, air-to-ground fighter support and anti-submarine warfare techniques. The Government should reduce the fighter fleet by

two-thirds, phase out the frigates, forego the purchase of submarines and buy three replenishment ships. The Report went on to recommend that beyond merely lending political support to the creation of a UN "Stand-by Force," Canada should contribute two light, mechanized battalions to such a force immediately. This commitment would add to, not replace, the need for traditional peacekeeping personnel and called for a much lighter force structure, designed primarily to participate in peace support operations.[23]

The senior leadership of the CF was extremely skeptical of the Report's recommendations, fearing that the misguided perception of a more benign geo-political/strategic environment might tempt the Government to slash defence in ways that could not be easily recouped in the years ahead. The philosophy behind the *Canada 21 Report* was felt to strike at the heart of what was understood as the Canadian military professional ideology. By implying the renunciation of major combat roles it threatened a military ethos fixated on warfighting. Oriented almost exclusively on the UN, the Report undermined the concept of decisive victory at the center of the military's conception of strategy. In fact, as respected military analyst Doug Bland has pointed out:

It is hard to say whether the military capability choices or the limited war scenario put forward by the Canada 21 Council raised more ire in military or foreign affairs traditionalists. But whichever idea struck deepest into the body of the military institution, it is difficult to find any other post-Second World War set of defence policy recommendations that so enraged the defence establishment.[24]

Ironically, however, the Canada Council's recommended force structure was larger than either the Department of Defence's projections or those offered by the Conference of Defence Associations. Despite this, opponents had tagged the Report as advocating a "Constabulary Force," although these words, or mention of this concept, did not appear in the Report. Without a common framework from which to view policy, international security or strategy, what transpired was a "dialogue of the deaf." The Canada 21 Group perceived the military as being committed to preparing to fight wars of overthrow and decisive victory although this scenario existed at best in an almost unimaginable future. Conversely, the military, certainly not cognizant of any viable alternative strategy such as existed, at least theoretically, in the general system of

war and conflict model, nonetheless, rightly felt that the Canada 21 Council was advocating a position that occupied only what would be the non-battle pole. Ironically, as discussed in Chapter 2, a proper understanding of the Janowitzian concept of constabulary force would have situated both camps firmly on the bi-polar pillar of the general system of war and conflict model. Differing conceptions of strategy, the utility of force and beliefs, expectations and attitudes about war and conflict lay at the heart of the disagreement. The existing professional ideology made constructive dialogue virtually impossible.

There were of course, countervailing forces at play beyond Canada 21 and committed Liberal party ideologues, in the formulation of the 1994 White Paper, not the least of which were the uncertainty surrounding the political evolution of the member states of the former Warsaw Pact and the experiences of Canadian Forces personnel on the ground around the world. In the latter case the evidence was mixed, with marked success in operations in Afghanistan/Pakistan (UNMOGOMAP-1988-90), Iran/Iraq (UNIIMOG, 1988-91), Namibia (UNTAG-1989-90), Central America (1989-92) and Cambodia (UNTAC-1991). These, however, were counterbalanced by intractable problems in the Balkans and the salutary example of recent inter-state war in the Middle East. The new 1994 Defence White Paper explicitly countered the extreme optimism of proponents of the "New World Order" with the observation that "Canada's defence policy must reflect the world as it is rather than the world we would like it to be."[25] In a clear reference to the *Canada 21 Report*, the White Paper stated that by "opting for a constabulary force – that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat – we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future. Indeed, it is the Government's view that from the perspective of promoting our values, protecting our interests, insuring against uncertainty or even providing value for money, investment in forces capable of only constabulary operations would be very difficult to justify." Notwithstanding the fact that the *Canada 21 Report* had never referred to a constabulary force, the military responded that the retention of combat capabilities was important as they formed the basis for the generation of larger forces should they ever be needed. This reference to mobilization underscored an understanding of military forces, not as required for use on the battle pole of a bi-polar strategy, but as the inevitable requirement for some future strategy of annihilation.

The Liberal government's new policy, however, did signal an intended shift of the centre of gravity of defence planning from all previous models. Significantly, the traditional Canadian military doctrine, extant from the 1960s onwards, that called for the maintenance of general purpose combat forces, was formally dropped in favour of multi-purpose combat capable forces. This included the reduction of the CF 18 fleet from 72 aircraft to between 48 and 60 and the implicit rejection of tanks from the force structure. The "Red Book's" emphasis on peacekeeping was strongly reflected in the White Paper's declaration that as a matter of general principle the CF would be prepared to deploy on UN operations, contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel. Specifically and significantly, the White Paper called for a "stand-by force" to be constituted from its 10,000 man contingency force made up of two ships, one battle group, an infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element and a headquarters element.

Within a few months of the publication of the 1994 *Defence White Paper* a new foreign policy document was promulgated that, unsurprisingly, extended the intent of evolving policy even beyond the previous year's defence statement. It identified three key objectives for Canadian international actions in the years to come; the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of Canadian security, within a stable global framework; and, the projection of Canadian values and culture abroad. According to *Canada and the World*, "the United Nations continues to be the key vehicle for pursuing Canada's global security objectives. Canada can best move forward its global security priorities by working with other member states. The success of the UN is fundamental, therefore, to Canada's future security."[26] During this time Canada provided the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and it must be noted that Canada's Ambassador to the UN during this period, Louise Frechette, was then appointed Deputy Minister of National Defence and subsequently took up the job of Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations. Concurrent with the formulation of the Liberal government's Foreign and Defence policies, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence also undertook a major study on how to improve the UN's rapid reaction capability. Over a period of 18

months two large international conferences involving over 25 member states, including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, were held to solicit views and gain consensus. The concept was briefed in Washington, London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Canberra and Tokyo and the final report, *The UN Rapid Reaction Study,* was presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the General Assembly meeting in September 1995.

Notwithstanding the near euphoric and almost "Panglossian" tenor of this evolving policy framework, events on the ground were rapidly undermining many of the premises and assumptions upon which it was based. By the time the 1994 *Defence White Paper* and *Canada and the World* were published Rear-Admiral Ken Summers had already commanded a Joint Task Force in the Gulf, an action during which the Canadian Air Force had fired its first shots in anger since Korea. Canadian troops had participated in the first ground combat operations since the Korean War in Croatia, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Calvin[27] and; in the persons of General Romeo Dallaire and Major Brent Beardsley, had stood witness to genocide in Rwanda. Colonel Serge Labbe had commanded the ill-fated mission in Somalia and Major-General Lewis McKenzie had commanded in the operation to open the airport in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The UN proved incapable of dealing with the situation in the Balkans and NATO took over at the end of 1995. Direct NATO involvement in the Balkans would lead inexorably to the "air war" in Kosovo in which the Air Force played a significant role.[28] In 1996 Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril, at the time the Chief of the Land Staff, led a large, albeit short-lived intervention to Zaire. Some have argued that this mission to Central Africa, this so-called "bungle in the jungle" demonstrated that Canada's predilection for trying to punch over its weight had finally come to a logical and inevitably sad, conclusion. Canada, it seemed could not operate in such demanding operational and strategic domains. Certainly the complexity of such initiatives across the full range of the general system of war and conflict was brought home dramatically. Gordon Smith, a former ambassador to NATO, was Deputy Minister at Foreign Affairs at the time and recalls:

Even within Foreign Affairs with all the diplomatic issues and getting people lined up, we were right at the breaking point. I simply dropped everything else I was doing as DM and handled this file. It was all we could do to cope. I'm not sure there was adequate appreciation of just

what was involved, for both the Defence department militarily and the Foreign Affairs department diplomatically.[29]

These experiences, including others in Haiti and East Timor, drove home the point that in this "New World Order," policy would have to be far more sophisticated, nuanced and resourced than simply relying on the United Nations. As Doug Bland and Sean Maloney argued in their *Campaigns for International Security*, the 1994 *White Paper* became increasingly irrelevant in this new context at the same time that it became clear that the UN was incapable at the strategic and operational levels to respond adequately to the challenges posed by globalization, nationalist fervor and ethnic conflict. Concepts such as "common security," "human security" and "the responsibility to protect" continued to inform Canadian policy but they were difficult policy goals to translate into strategic objectives when the entire paradigm had shifted from the old basis in annihilation. Supporting these policy orientations required several adjustments to Canadian military professional ideology. They implied the need to acquire expertise in areas not traditionally held to be part of the knowledge component of that ideology. They also implied a degree of close co-operation and collaboration with non-military actors, hitherto not encompassed by the concept of team spirit in the military ethos. And last, but not least, they explicitly altered the meaning of decisive victory.

Commenting on the complex dynamics of the evolution of military strategy, a US officer and military theorist, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Leonard, summarized the period up to the end of the Cold War while pointing to the future of strategy in the 21st century:

From 1805 through 1990 the Western World contemplated the phenomenon of total war. Both in hot war and cold war, Western military strategists had to contend with the idea that two blocs of nation-states were about to enter a life and death clash which would end only when one side utterly defeated the other side's military capability. The logic was simple - there will be no political resolution short of the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. However, total war, both in theory and in practice is a relative anomaly in history. Most armed conflicts come to a political decision long before the actual destruction of enemy armed forces. To instruct future generations of officers that they must destroy the enemy through relentless attack as a prelude to victory is simply in

error. Real military operations in the 21st century will not comply with such an easy formulation.[30]

Within a few years this theoretical formulation was reflected in the experience of the American four-star General Wesley Clark, commenting on his tenure as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and especially the lessons of the conflict in Kosovo:

The big battle philosophy that dominated much of Western military thought during the twentieth century must be modified. While nations have always aimed in conflict to gain their objectives with the least cost, in modern war achieving decisive political aims may not require achieving decisive military results at the strategic level. Conflicts can be resolved through battles never fought, as much as through battles of annihilation taught in the military textbooks.[31]

Both Leonard and Clark had come to the realization through study and experience that it was the bi-polar pillar of the general system of war and conflict that had come to dominate in the geo-political, geo-strategic environment of the 21st century. An environment characterized more and more by a shift away from retaliatory, threat-based strategies to defensive, vulnerability based strategies.[32] The necessary reorientation required in Canada was difficult for all concerned in the foreign and defence communities at the end of the Cold War. For foreign affairs officials, "set-piece" diplomacy against the backdrop of a tried and true pseudo-strategy of reliance on American deterrence doctrine was difficult to give up. Gordon Smith's recollections speak volumes about the kind of effort, and resources that would be required, in collaboration with Defence officials to regain Canada's previous status on the world stage.

In the case of the CF the required shift was, if anything, more difficult than for other government officials and foreign and defence analysts. The professional ideology that had animated their careers throughout the Cold War did not prepare them either in terms of knowledge, mind-set or conduct values for what lay ahead. From 1988 until 1998, the most difficult of the transition years, all of the top 3 and 4-Star positions were held by "Cold War Warriors". General John de Chastelain, Admiral John Anderson and General John Boyle served as CDS from 1989 to 1997. Army, Navy and Air Force senior officers who had "cut their op-

erational teeth" in Germany and SACLANT. Eight senior officers, none with contemporary operational experience post-1989, served as Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) during this time. Nine senior officers served as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff before Lieutenant-General Ray Crabbe took over in September 1997, with Balkan experience. One of these officers was Vice-Admiral Nigel Brodeur who served as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) from 1985 to 1987. Brodeur was a fine man, outstanding sailor and effective combatant in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. In 1997, he communicated to the author that a major problem in the CF since 1988 was that senior executives, military and civilian, in Ottawa had no sense for, or understanding of, what soldiers, sailors and airmen were experiencing in the novel operations in the new strategic context of the Post-Cold War era.[33] Finally, seven senior officers occupied the post of Assistant-Deputy Minister Personnel, officially the ones directly responsible for education and training, before Romeo Dallaire assumed this appointment in April 1998. It should be remembered that throughout all of this period Bob Fowler dominated the Department of Defence as one of the most powerful and certainly the most intrusive Deputy Ministers in the Post-Second World War era. Fowler was an extremely intelligent, ambitious and even ruthless mandarin, unfortunately locked in the liberal, UN-oriented, anti-NATO mind-set of many of his civilian colleagues and peers of the 1970s and 1980s. He was comfortable as both policy advisor and one responsible for policy implementation but had no conception of the complexities of the strategic and operational spheres. Unfortunately, during this critical time he went virtually unchallenged by those who should have known better.

Dallaire's experience as Force Commander in Rwanda converted him completely. He was, thereafter committed to the necessary re-orientation suggested by Leonard and Clark and determined, to affect the required paradigm shift in professional ideology. Dallaire sought to promote a better understanding of bi-polar strategy within the context of a sovereign Canadian military ideology. He was supported in this program by the new Chief of the Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril. Baril of course, had experienced the early 1990s as the Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General and was acutely aware not only of the limitations of the United Nations but also of the need, especially in the Canadian case, for a balanced and nuanced strategic orientation.

The 1990s could have been handled better by most concerned. However, the intent behind this account is not to engage in revisionist history. Some of the personalities involved lacked professionalism but by and large most were simply products of their experience and a developmental system incapable of preparing military professionals for the transformed geo-political environment. What was lacking mostly was the ability to acknowledge that virtually everyone was "constantly being thrown into the unknown."[34] This, of course, relates to the imperative that professional knowledge, based on the quality of abstraction, the key element of professional ideology, to be able to respond creatively to new situations and construct new knowledge and attitudes (ethos) as required. That rare personality trait that encouraged introspection, openness and self-analysis was sadly lacking. Being locked into one's past experience and developmental path, of course is no longer a valid excuse, if it ever was. The problem for Canadian policy-makers and strategists alike, now, is to escape from their own preconceived notions of the relationship between policy and strategy. Policy-makers must understand that all policy goals pursued in the international arena require strategic means for their achievement. These means involve the recourse to force as one component of a broad front strategy bringing all appropriate aspects of national power to bear on a given situation. They must demand clear and measured input from military strategists regarding the quantity and quality of such force and how it is best coordinated with non-force measures. Policy not only sets the framework for the recourse to force, but commensurate with strategic advice authorizes its use, in accordance with informed judgment. This can only be achieved if policy makers have successfully made the effort to understand the essentials of the "grammar" inherent in the general system of war and conflict. This is the key point made in Eliot Cohen's *Supreme Command: Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*. It is a book that should be required reading for all responsible for national security policy and planning.

Canadian military strategists, on the other hand, must understand that strategy is always and continuously shaped by policy. Canadian strategy must be crafted to pursue the "logic" of the general system of war and conflict both through force and through the use of military means to support diplomatic and political objectives short of conflict. This is a more complex endeavour intellectually and physically than simple preparation for decisive battle. In the general system of war and conflict

depicted in Figure VIII, capability planning, force structuring, training and all other dimensions of professional development are significantly more complicated for the strategist operating according to the bi-polar pillar than that of annihilation. Both policymakers and strategists must, however, clearly understand that recourse to the battle pole may well involve operational level campaigns as large, intense and dangerous as any conducted in accordance with the strategy of annihilation.

Notwithstanding the drama, emotion and tragedy of the events of 9/11, the war on terrorism fits naturally into the bi-polar pillar of the general system of war and conflict. Diplomatic, legal, economic, financial and perhaps other instruments will be as necessary and effective against this enemy as military force. That is to say that the war on terrorism will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the bi-polar strategy. In fact, as Thomas Barnett argues in his popular book *The Pentagon's New Map* the war on terrorism is only a sub-set of the challenge posed by the preeminent security threat arising from the phenomenon of globalization. The political, economic and cultural differential between states succeeding in a globalizing world and those falling farther behind, fuel the desperation, hatred and extreme ethnocentrism that contribute to terrorism. According to Barnett, the overriding policy objective and its associated "grand strategy" is to increase the connectivity between the Core (successful states) and the Non-Integrating Gap (all the others). This approach must be pursued on a very broad front, sustained over time, and must access both poles of the bi-polar strategy, as necessary. Significantly, Barnett believes that unlike the strategy of annihilation where a putative decisive victory results in strategic withdrawal, or the end of major combat operations, in this new paradigm, "there is no exit strategy."[35]

These reflections can only reinforce the Canadian experience in the 1990s. They strongly suggest the need to study carefully and intensely the nature and characteristics of bi-polar strategy and its relationship to a professional ideology appropriate to this new conflict environment. Canada has already participated on both poles of this strategy in Afghanistan and the role of the Canadian Forces will continue to involve missions on both the battle pole and the non-battle pole. This is, in fact, the only strategic construct that can "nest" comfortably in its guiding Canadian policy framework. It is of great importance however, that an appropriate dialogue takes place between military strategists, security

officials and policy-makers to enhance mutual confidence and trust. All must come to fully appreciate the validity of both poles of such a strategy-battle as well as non-battle.

If Canadian military strategy suffered first from over-dependence on British and American constructs and then from the intellectual strategic vacuum following the end of the Cold War, the concept of operational art was almost terminally neglected. The idea of operational art formally entered Canadian military doctrine in the early 1990s, imported directly from US thinking. The study of this crucially important component of the structure of conflict paradigm was seriously impeded, until recently, because, unlike the American School for Advanced Military Studies and the UK's Higher Command and Staff Course, there was no dedicated institution for its consideration. Although rudimentary efforts were made at the CF Staff College, it was not until the inauguration of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) in the mid-1990s that this new element of Canadian military doctrine received the attention and scholarly treatment that it deserved.

These courses did not appear serendipitously in the Canadian context but were the result of a growing awareness among a select few, including a number of senior officers who recognized the growing gap in Canadian military thought. General Scott Clements originally drew General Dallaire's attention to the need for reform in this area and Romeo Dallaire was, in fact, the first Canadian officer to attend the British Higher Command and Staff Course. The need for progressive education and training in operational art was also raised in the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Board of Governor's Report to the Minister of National Defence and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett championed the imperative to improve joint doctrine in the CF, an inherent feature of the operational level of war.[36]

Although the conceptual framework had been established first by the German-Russian school of military thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries and then particularly by the efforts of Simpkin, Holder, Winton and Naveh, in the modern era, the practical utility of the concept of operational art was difficult for Canadian military professionals to conceive. In part this reflected the long- standing suppression of creative military thinking by a mechanistic mentality restricted to the tactical level of conflict. Additionally, the relatively small size of the CF, ele-

ments of which were constantly "penny-packed" out to foreign formations at the operational level, seemed to preclude the need for an autonomous Canadian theory of operational art. In the Cold War this resulted in the assignment of operational control of ships' squadrons, brigades and air squadrons to NATO commanders throughout the Alliance and usually even smaller elements to the UN, operating in relatively small missions around the globe. Organizationally those functions, that in other countries were normally assigned to operational level headquarters such as Northwood in the UK, Commander, North Norway (COMNON), or the Regional Commanders-in-Chief in the US, (now Combatant Commanders), were retained at NDHQ under control of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. There was, therefore, no organizational counterpart or entity to execute the activities required in a discrete operational level campaign. Experience throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century belied this approach. An increase in theoretical and doctrinal knowledge together with the dramatic increase in the size, tempo and danger of new operations strongly suggested the need for change. After a somewhat slow start, operational authority, at least for planning purposes, was devolved to a new Joint Operating Group (JOG) located in Kingston, Ontario.

By 2001 a few senior leaders went even further in their speculations about the way ahead. A recent book at that time by a US Admiral, and past Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled *Lifting the Fog of War* attracted considerable attention in NDHQ, particularly with the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. The US officer, Bill Owens, stressed the importance of joint operations and severely criticized the US armed forces for their slow progress doctrinally and organizationally in achieving a fully coherent operational level construct. Admiral Garnett insisted that all of his staff read Owen's book and began talking of the need for greater progress here in Canada in this area. One idea was the creation of two operational level headquarters, one for domestic operations and the other for contingency operations.[37] This idea remains solely in the conceptual realm with little indication that it has even progressed to a preliminary planning or experimental/simulation stage. What is clear, however, is that Canadian military professional ideology must reflect the imperatives of joint operations both in terms of new expertise and an ethos that subsumes, to some degree, Service rivalries of all types.

Experience in Afghanistan and the second Gulf Campaign both in theatre and at NDHQ and Central Command Headquarters (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, has reinforced the need for further progress but countervailing factors such as fiscal restraint and stubborn Service-centric cultures continue to inhibit decisive action. At the same time care must be taken not to mistake progress in technical or subordinate areas such as "effects-based operations," "network-centric warfare" or "Joint Interagency, Multinational (Public) Operations (JIM(P)) Doctrine," as a substitute for a complete understanding of operational art and its inescapable relationship to strategy and tactics. Current initiatives are important but will only enhance capability and act as force multipliers to the extent that they fit appropriately into the general system of war and conflict and are seated in a doctrinally sound organizational context. Certainly it is now clear that size is only one component of operational art and certainly not the most important. Furthermore, leading in campaigns in Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti or providing senior staff support in Southwest Asia requires both a theoretical and practical mastery of conflict at this level. If Canada is to pursue an explicitly bi-polar strategy, operational commanders must be educated and trained to prosecute campaigns that co-ordinate and integrate both poles of that strategy as well as execute "maneuver warfare" on the battle pole when called upon to do so.

The theoretical model of professional ideology developed in Chapter 2 can now be seen from a Canadian perspective. The model comprises a systematic body of knowledge understood to be directed by Canadian policy and executed through a bi-polar strategy. It is authoritative, cognitively because it is based on sound theory and Canadian experience; and functionally, because it serves uniquely Canadian national and security interests and values. Finally, this ideology has an ethos component that infuses professionalism with values and norms supportive of Canadian society and in keeping with the fighting traditions of soldiers, sailors and airmen/women throughout Canadian history. At the same time the shift, referred to earlier, from retaliatory strategies tied to state on state confrontations over territory to vulnerability strategies often against asymmetrical opponents, requires a reformulation of the military ethos at the core of professional ideology. This 21st century ethos should dramatically modify the original Huntington model. It must be realistic, not pessimistic; future oriented, not historically inclined; nuanced in its understanding of power; cosmopolitan, not excessively na-

tionalistic; collaborative, not militaristic; but nonetheless remain instrumental in its view of the military profession. The claim to theory-based knowledge, authoritative in a cognitive and functional sense must be understood to be associated with a bi-polar strategy, attuned to Canadian policy, yet capable of vigorous execution through operational maneuver on the battle pole and decisive tactical action throughout the modern battlespace.

Professionalism in the CF in the 21st century will be enhanced and sustained to the extent that practitioners clearly identify, understand and counter the threats to Canadian military professional ideology posed by the competing demands of market and bureaucratic ideologies and create a body of knowledge coherent with the general system of war and conflict comprising autonomous, Canadian concepts of strategy and operational art. This sovereign professional ideology must be internally pervasive and communicated externally to policymakers and other national security officials. It must be clearly articulated in the philosophy and doctrine for both leadership training and professional development. A developmental model and methodology that has potential to help achieve these goals is offered in the concluding chapter of this study.

Endnotes

[1] Charles Moskos. "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, 1 (Fall, 1997), 41-50.

[2] See"Court Martial Held Without Public Notice," *Globe and Mail*, 9 Jul1997; *Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Command, Control and Leadership of CANBAT 2*, dated 15 Nov 1996; Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1996) and *Tested Mettle* Ottawa: (esprit de corps books, 1998); "Shamed in Bosnia," *Macleans*, 29 July 1996, 10-12; Peter Worthington, *Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1997, 314-315; Peter Desberats, *Somalia Cover-Up: A Commissioners Journal* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997), 4-5; and Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment. A Socio-Cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997) 72-74. *Esprit de Corps* also ran a running critique of any and all foibles present in the CF in virtually every issue of its publication from 1993 to the present. See also DND News Release NR-96.111, 27 Dec 1996; "The Rise and Fall of an Officer," Ottawa Citizen, (10 April 1998, A4); Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*? (Toronto: HarperFlaming-Canada, 2004), 155; John A. English, *Lament for an Army* (Concord, ON: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 7, 64-65; Major Robert Near, "Devining the Message: An Analysis of the MND and Somalia Commission Reports," in Bernd Horn, ed., *Contempory Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: CISS, 2000), 65-91; and Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons* (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2001), 232-234.

[3] John A. English, *Lament for an Army: The Decline of Military Professionalism* (Toronto: Irwin, 1998), 56.

[4] Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Gary Garnett, 7 October, 2003.

[5] Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (Toronto:Harper-Collins, 2004), 137.

[6] Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy,* "Executive Summary," 50.

[7] Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 33.

[8] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (NY: Praeger, 1984), 9.

[9] Kevin T. Leicht, "Professions," 608.

[10] Conversations with the author over the period February - October 1999.

[11] After 1918 MacDougall and Hamley were replaced by other British military and strategic thinkers like Sir Basil Liddell-Hart and J.F.C. Fuller among others.

[12] See Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (London: Allen and Irwin, 1983), 167-170.

[13] For more details on the battle for Vimy Ridge and its wider significance see Pierre Berton, *Vimy* (Toronto, 1986) and John Swettenham, *McNaughton, vol. 1: 1887-1939* (Toronto: 1968), Chapter 4.

[14] John A. English, *Failure in High Command: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign* (Ottawa: The Golden Dog Press, 1995), 139.

[15] Ibid.. 159.

[16] I am grateful to Lieutenant-Colonel David Last for helping me clarify this point.

[17] Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 160.

[18] Adrian Preston. “The Organization of Defence Studies in Canada: A Comparative Analysis.” *Brassey’s Annua.*(London: William Clowes, 1967), 236.

[19] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. 79.

[20] One of the primary authors of chapter eight was Michael Pearson the grandson of Lester B. Pearson. Michael went on to serve as Senior Policy Advisor to the first Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Ouellet and then for Lloyd Axworthy.

[21] *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada*. Ottawa, (Liberal Party of Canada, September, 1993).

[22]The Council was chaired by Ivan Head, former Chief of Staff to Pierre Trudeau and its membership included Tom Axworthy, former defence minister Donald Macdonald, Sylvia Ostry, Nobel Laureate John Polanyi, Maurice Strong and the Rt. Hon. Robert Stanfield. The Project Writing Team was chaired by Janice Stein.

[23] *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century.*

University of Toronto: The Centre for International Studies, 1994.

[24] Douglas Bland, and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 27.

[25] Canada. *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: DND, 1994).

[26]Canada. *Canada and the World: The Foreign Policy White Paper* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1995). 5.

[27]An account of this action can be found in Carol Off, *The Ghosts of Medak* (Toronto: Random House, 2004).

[28] For perspectives on Canada's role in the Balkans see J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajavo (Vancouver: 1993) Chapters 4 and 5, and Carol Off, *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle* (Toronto, 2000).

[29] Quoted in John Wood (ed.), *Talking Heads, Talking Arms: Whistling Past the Graveyard* (Toronto: Dundern Press, 2003), 156.

[30] Robert R. Leonard. *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA.; Presidio, 1998), 83.

[31] Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 418.

[32] Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: Peace, War and the Course of History* (NY: Alfred Knopf, 2002), 806.

[33] The author was VAdm Brodeur's Executive Assistant when he was DCDS.

[34] This was a phrase used by General Maurice Baril in a discussion with the author in late 1999.

[35] Thomas P. M. Barnett. *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G. F. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 173.

[36] Interview with Lieutenant-General Dallaire, 19 December 2003. The author was a member of the Study Group that wrote the *Royal Military College of Canada's Board of Governor's Report to the Minister: Balanced Excellence* also known as the *Wither's Report*.

[37] Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Gary Garnett 07 October 2003.

Chapter Five

Professional Ideology: Challenge and Response

Professionalism in the Canadian Forces has weathered some tough times over the past 15 years. The direct challenges of the 1990s threatened a professional ideology with historical roots predating Confederation but formed mainly in the only period of large, standing, voluntary service in Canadian history between 1939 and 1989. After the Cold War, however, radically different missions than the defence of the free world from Communism demanded not only new skills and different training but also a complete reorientation of civil-military relations and strategic perspective. A re-orientation that had to be accomplished in an atmosphere of extreme fiscal duress and an unprecedented operational tempo. Many in uniform yearned for, and sought the comfort of the *status quo ante* and retreated into an ethos that was now both insular and even confrontational. There were, however, others, many others, who struggled for a way forward in the face of an otherwise preoccupied public and successive governments, as incapable of understanding the general system of war and conflict from a civilian standpoint, as the Cold War senior military leadership was from theirs.

In the midst of this turmoil it was difficult for those involved on both the civilian and military sides to distance themselves sufficiently to view the challenge from both a broader societal perspective and in terms of a methodologically sound action plan. Only by situating the crisis within the broader situation of professions and professionalism in general could leaders isolate and clearly identify specific major issues beyond immediate and parochial ones. If the profession of arms in Canada was at risk, the explanation lay in part, in the failure to reinvigorate the professional ideology – a failure increasingly noted by informed observers occurring in the professional construct throughout the West. The noted cultural historian, Jacques Barzun made this point emphatically, including professions in his assessment of the decline of Western culture into “decadence”:

Professions have lost enough of their self-respect to be deprived of the prestige they once enjoyed. Doctors, once idolized, were accused of indifference to their patients and of money-grubbing as well as malpractice. Professors were no longer regarded as indispensable experts they had been from the time of the brain trusts through the Second World War. They had injected "political correctness" into the academy and made themselves ridiculous by the antics it entailed. Scholarship was the pretentious garbed in the unintelligible. Lawyers ceased to be divided into two kinds, the worthy and the contemptible. This animus was due to the large increase in litigation under the many protective rules of the welfare ethos, lawyers thrived on suits against corporations for product liability, the jury verdicts often being exorbitant. Journalism, which not everybody called a profession, did not escape the common revulsion.[1]

Andrew Abbott anticipated this same theme earlier, expressing concern that professions were threatened by both the commodification of their expert knowledge and more important by the way the professions were drawn into organizations where they became well-paid workers of high status who exercise a relatively large degree of independence, but only within the boundaries, channels and goals carefully established by their employers.[2] Abbott's concerns were clearly prompted by the success of both market and bureaucratic ideologies in subverting a healthy professional ideology. The military in Canada of course, certainly understands that their employer, the Government of Canada, legitimately assigns jurisdictional boundaries and discrete missions to the Canadian Forces. The danger, reflected in Abbott's analysis, is that responsible policy-makers, civilian officials and senior military leaders confuse this societal imperative with misguided direction that inappropriately, and indeed illegitimately, attempts to create channels and establish goals that undermine professional military knowledge, inhibit, or lock out, professional judgment and erode the military ethos.

The worst and not completely unlikely result is that military professionals will be slowly transformed into especially privileged technical workers. This is what is implied by Professor Sam Brint's analysis of the changes that have been taking place in the status of professions generally in North America. He tentatively, but persuasively, shows that professionals, once considered trustees of socially important knowledge designed to contribute to the public good, and servants of values tran-

scending the immediate and practical, are on a course of changing into neutral technical experts.[3] This society-wide phenomenon resonates to an uncomfortable extent in the profession of arms. It is an underlying factor in the West Point Professionalization Project and should be a continuing subject of study in the follow-on work in the CF, generated by the publication of *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. The "socially important knowledge" in question is the general system of war and conflict, especially a deep understanding of bi-polar strategy and its relationship upwards to policy and downwards to Canadian operational art and tactics. The "values transcending the immediate and practical" are embedded in a military ethos attuned to modern Canadian society but anchored in a warrior spirit capable of successfully executing the military profession's function. Even in, in fact especially in, an era of information warfare and networked enabled operations, all military professionals must be imbued with this spirit. Knowledge and ethos - these constitute the professional ideology.

None of the above expresses a merely academic exercise or random theorizing. Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, both a casualty and hero of the Somalia Affair and its fallout, admitted that he was deeply concerned that the CF may not have been able to recover from the damage inflicted by the events of the mid-1990s.[4] Concerned and dedicated senior leaders, exemplified by General Maurice Baril, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett[5] and Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire grappled with these issues beginning in 1997-98 when they assumed their appointments as CDS, VCDS and ADM(HR-Mil), respectively. They were the spearhead of a phalanx of more junior officers and indeed some concerned civilians such as Doctor John Scott Cowan, convinced that the only way ahead was to confront the challenges directly; reform and transform the Force, and re-establish a vibrant professional ideology at the center of the profession of arms in Canada.

One consequence of the damage to the credibility of the CF in the eyes of the Canadian public referred to by Murray, struck at the very heart of professionalism; that is, the privilege of self-regulation. Again, the issue has a wider application as the economist Jane Jacobs argued in *Dark Age Ahead*.[6] According to her, five central pillars of Western society show signs of decay: community and family, higher education, science and technology, governmental representation and self-regulation of the professions. The last pillar is of course, particularly germane to the pro-

fession of arms in Canada and was seriously threatened by the fall-out from the fissures in professional ideology revealed in the 1990s. After several years of internal discussions and inconclusive debate it proved impossible, for example, to establish a true Inspector-General for the Canadian Forces. An appointment intended to enhance self-regulation in a manner fully credible to government and society. In the final analysis, this issue was resolved by establishing the position of a civilian Ombudsman. Taken by itself this result is neither unwise nor even unwelcome and certainly no serious indictment of the profession overall. However, concurrent with this policy decision, the Government decided that the implementation of the recommendations of the *Minister's Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces* would not be left completely in the hands of the profession itself. DND promulgated its Change Implementation Plan in October 1997 and the Minister of National Defence established The Minister's Monitoring Committee (MMC) to monitor the process of implementation for these changes and to evaluate their effectiveness, shortly thereafter. The Committee submitted a total of six reports, increasingly focusing attention on leadership and professional development.

The imposition of an external monitoring mechanism was not welcomed by the senior leadership of DND or the CF and progress towards a mutually satisfactory end-state was somewhat slow. After two years the MMC reported that at least part of the reason for what they observed was the sometimes tenuous link between decision and activity was the combination of uncertainty about the status of Ministerial direction, the lack of centralized, strategic guidance for the program and the tendency to re-interpret the meaning and intent of accepted recommendations so as to fit within the pattern of current activities or accommodate some assumed constraints on achieving change. Put simply, the MMC reported that the defence team had applied tactical solutions to what it considered to be tactical problems. What the Committee had stressed over its tenure was that the reform program was a strategic challenge that required a strategic solution.[7]

External oversight was an uncomfortable aspect of civil-military relations during this period of reform in the CF. However, professional integrity was further impugned in the case of the investigation into the effects of prolonged exposure to toxic elements during the deployment of Canadian Forces personnel to Croatia. The Army's sincere but insu-

lar response was a public relations disaster and led to demands for an independent, civilian led inquiry. This was fortunately strenuously resisted by the senior leadership and Brigadier-General Joe Sharp, an Air Force officer, was assigned the task. The point though, is that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, in giving General Sharp his mandate, stressed that failure to execute the Croatia Board of Inquiry in an objective, comprehensive manner that elicited the full confidence of the Canadian public would likely result in the right (and privilege) to internal self-regulation being seriously jeopardized. The Croatian Board of Inquiry's team, led by Joe Sharp, exceeded all expectations and helped signal the emergence of the profession from under the cloud of suspicion and uncertainty that had attended it throughout much of the 1990s.

The root of the distress felt in the Canadian profession of arms was clearly related directly to leadership and professional development. And these were in fact two of the main features of the CF's response to the various criticisms leveled at the institution and the profession. When he was Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Romeo Dallaire had championed the idea of a CF center of excellence for both pure and applied research on the subject of leadership. As a result the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute was stood up in 2000 with Captain (Navy) Alan Okros as its first Director. Concurrently, in a rather dramatic move, under the watchful eye of the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, the existing Recruiting and Education and Training Systems Command was dismantled. The CF Recruiting Group was established to continue this function and the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created with Rear-Admiral David Morse as its first Commander. The CDA brought a much needed focus to education, broadly defined, and the Commander, while subordinate to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Human Resources (Military), was accorded direct access to the Chief of the Defence Staff for specific issues. The evolution of professional development policy was, however, also monitored externally until recently, by a Senior Advisor to the Minister of National Defence. Fortunately, the first, and only, occupant of this position was Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Lynn Mason, a man with extensive operational experience and a keen sense of the full meaning of military professionalism. All of these initiatives involving policy, program and institutional reform created significant change in direction within the CF. Their genesis can be found in Officership 2020 and NCM Corps 2020, strategies welcomed by the Minister's Monitoring

Committee. In fact, by 2003 the Minister of National Defence concluded that this aspect of extraordinary outside regulation was no longer required. In the Committee's final report in November 2003 they concluded that a culture change in respect to the promotion of professional development within the CF had taken place, "for which the leadership should be commended."[8]

Over the period 1997 until 2004 the Canadian Forces have therefore, executed a program of reform and transformation to considerable effect. External oversight, beyond that, constitutionally and legislatively mandated for Parliament, the Office of the Auditor General and specifically authorized agencies, for example, Treasury Board, has been removed. The Canadian Defence Academy, with its subordinate units, the Royal Military College, The Canadian Forces College and the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre, is moving ahead decisively with a renewed and effective professional development system for both officers and NCOs throughout the Canadian Forces. *Duty With Honour* has been followed with the publication of *CF Leadership: Conceptual Foundations*, the first thorough review and restatement of leadership theory and doctrine since the early 1970s.[9]

The new Leadership manual maps professional attributes directly to key leadership concepts; responsibility is linked to mission focus, expertise with leader competence, identity to the leadership functions of cohesion and teamwork and military ethos shaping leader conduct values. The military ethos serves a similar, binding function among the primary and three enabling leadership outcomes in new CF doctrine as it does with the attributes of the professional construct. Thus, the ethos informs mission success, the processes of internal integration and external adaptability, and especially, leader responsibility for member well being.

CF leadership doctrine now explicitly discriminates between leading troops directly and leading the institution of the CF itself. In the former case, leaders exercise direct, face-to-face influence on individuals, teams, units and formations in the execution of operations and implementation of policy. In the latter case, at senior rank levels, the responsibility and authority to oversee system performance, develop system capabilities and make major policy, system and organizational changes, is assumed. In these terms the leadership function can be linked directly with the general system of war and conflict at the core of professional

ideology. Leading people occurs primarily at the tactical level while leading the institution is associated with the operational and strategic levels. Institutional leadership has functional and geographic nodes and NDHQ is certainly important in both these senses but does not monopolize either. The sea, land and air Environments lead institutions, not only from Ottawa but Halifax, Winnipeg and Kingston as well. Similarly, the Canadian Defence Academy plays a major institutional role in the area of professional development. Also, the DCDS leads a system that extends throughout the operational sphere shaping the institution for modern, global operations. One of the most important functions of institutional leaders, including senior Chief Warrant Officers, is the stewardship of the profession of arms that, of course, is inextricably embedded in the institutional structure of the Canadian Forces. The overall relationship between leadership and the general system of war and conflict is depicted at Figure XI.



FIGURE XI

The promulgation of these capstone doctrine manuals represents an important milestone in the broader, ongoing program to transform the CF. Nonetheless, the threats to professionalism, both from within and without, remain potent. Countering these threats requires not only vigilance and effort but also a thorough understanding of professional ideology, within the context of a professional development construct capable of not only sustaining but also constantly renewing the profession of arms. This construct begins with an understanding of institutional effectiveness defined as a combination of organizational effectiveness, that is, the outcome values representing what needs to be accomplished; with professional effectiveness, or the conduct values representing how it gets done. This comprehensive approach of incorporating outcome and conduct values related to both primary and secondary objectives provides a much broader perspective than is contained in other military, public service or private sector competency frameworks.[10] In particular this framework contains two distinctive differences from other approaches. The first is the incorporation of elements of professional effectiveness derived to a large extent from the concept of professional ideology, while the second is an integration of the two dominant job-analytic approaches of task-based and worker based job analyses. The resulting construct comprises four elements, anchored in a fifth – professional ideology itself. The other four elements are military expertise, cognitive capacity, social capacity and change capacity. Members of the profession need to be developed in all of these areas, progressively, from induction and initial development through intermediate and advances stages, culminating in the most senior stage. When these two dimensions, temporal and intellectual/psychological, are combined, the matrix at Figure XII results.[11]

Professional development occurs through experience, education, training and self- development, processes combined across all five elements. Military expertise is acquired first in terms of those skills and techniques required at the tactical level and then progressively in terms of more complex knowledge necessary in the areas of operational art and strategy. Military expertise, incorporating as required, input from natural science, the humanities and the social sciences, is governed by the general system of war and conflict. Senior leadership at the operational and strategic levels require broad, general knowledge dealing with systems and institutional functioning. At the most senior level this development must produce national security professionals capable of main-

Professional Development Matrix

	Military Expertise	Cognitive Capacity	Social Capacity	Change Capacity	Professional Ideology
Senior	Strategic	Creative Abstract	Inter-Institutional	Paradigm Shifting	Stewardship
Advanced	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Intermediate	|	|	|	|	|
Initial	Tactical	Analytic	Inter-Personal	Open	Internalize

FIGURE XII

taining the appropriate civil-military relationship with those operating in the sphere of overall national policy making.

Military professionals must have the cognitive capacity to acquire and apply the systematic, theory-based body of knowledge underpinning the profession. The complexity and discretionary nature of this knowledge, especially in the higher functions of the system of war and conflict requires the development of abstract thinking and creative cognitive abilities. Professionals first develop the ability to deal with ever more complex concepts, mental models and theories. The ultimate goal, however, at the most senior levels, is knowledge creation itself. This capacity, like social and change capacities, is a somewhat slow-growth area, conditioned by education and enhanced by experience. Professional judgment is dependent on this faculty.

In the modern profession of arms the ability to operate as a member of a large number of diverse teams is crucial. Joint, interagency and multinational operations require these skills at both the tactical and operational levels. Therefore, social capacity, that is, the complex of inter-

personal skills and abilities enabling cooperative effort is very important in the professional construct. At advanced and senior levels this capacity must be expanded to include maintaining relations with other national and international institutions, large organizations and social movements. Strategic roles and functioning require additional social-influence skills to manage multi-dimensional relationships. Superior communications skills help secure commitment to change and the understanding of external actors. The function at advanced stages of professionalization is understood to be strategic relations building.

Change is ubiquitous in the environment in which the profession of arms is embedded. Failure to anticipate change, political, social and technological, and adapt to it where appropriate, was arguably the most serious deficiency in military professionals for at least the last 30 years. Even new professionals must be open to change and this capacity must be encouraged and developed assiduously. The ability and importance of making appropriate judgments concerning the balance between change and continuity becomes increasingly important as military professionals acquire rank and responsibility. Stability is very important in the profession of arms with its unique, critical and extremely complex responsibilities and maintaining a stable environment is an integral aspect of managing change. Nonetheless, the defining moment for a profession may come when a paradigm shift in one or more attributes of professionalism is required. Leaders of the profession must have the capacity to effect such change. This is arguably the case in the Canadian profession of arms where the paradigm shift from the strategy of annihilation to the bi-polar strategy must be made.

Professional ideology itself occupies a privileged position in the proposed professional development construct. Initially, practitioners need to internalize the appropriate ideology and conduct themselves in accordance with its dictates and claims. Progression in the profession then involves the responsibility for developing professional ideology in subordinates. The gravest responsibilities are those associated with the overall stewardship of the profession. Ensuring that members recognize and understand the nature of military professional knowledge and shaping and nurturing the ethos that governs both its application and the conduct of each military professional is at the apex of professional responsibilities. Stewardship includes infusing all of the other elements of the developmental construct with the content and meaning of profe-

sional military ideology, in ways that are systematic, normative and programmatic.

In the final analysis the discussion returns to the issue of what is the military profession and how it functions in modern Canadian society. The three attributes of responsibility, identity and expertise remain conceptually as defined and described in *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. The fourth, military ethos, however, should be construed as the center of gravity of the broader, more powerful attribute of professional ideology. This attribute, that claims both specialized knowledge, authoritative in a cognitive and functional sense and commitment to a transcendental value that guides and adjudicates the way that knowledge is employed, more accurately fulfils the binding function in the professional construct as illustrated at Figure XIII.

FIGURE XIII

Endnotes

[1] Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn To Decadence: 1500 to the Present* (NY: Harper-Collins, 2000), 794.

[2] Andrew Abbott, "The Order of Professionalization: An Empirical Analysis," *Work and Organization*, 18, 1991, 355-384.

[3] S. Brint, *In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103.

[4] Interview with Gary Garnett, 7 October 2003.

[5] General Maurice Baril was appointed as the Chief of the Defence Staff in 1997. Garnett was appointed as the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and Dallaire as Assistant Deputy Minister Human Resources (Military) in 1997 as well. John Cowan, then the Vice-Principal of Queen's University, was a member of the RMC Board of Governor's Study group chaired by General (ret'd) Ramsey Withers that produced The Balanced Excellence Report (The Withers Report). Cowan is now the Principal of The Royal Military College and the Senior Academic Advisor to the Commander of The Canadian Defence Academy. The author has discussed many issues associated with professional reform with all of these individuals on several separate occasions.

[6] Jane Jacobs, *Dark Age Ahead* (Toronto: Random House, 2004), 5.

[7] Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee-1999 Final Report. http://www.frasercom.ca/other_monitoring_committee_reports-e.htm. 8-9.

[8] Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee-Final Report 2003. http://www.frasercom.ca/reports-e.htm. 8.

[9] The leadership manual was written by Karl Wenek, assisted by an Advisory Group composed of Allan Okros, Colonel Mike Capstick, Colonel Chris Little, Colonel Mike Jackson, Commander Keith Keyes, Bob Walker, Ross Pigeau, Carol McCann, Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley and Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Craig Calvert .

[10] A.C. Okros, "Applying the CFLI Leader Framework." Unpublished Paper, October 2004.

[11] Captain (Navy) Allan Okros and Doctor Bob Walker, both at the CF Leadership Institute, were instrumental in the creation of this construct.

Glossary

ADM (HR-Mil) – Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military)
AMSC - Advanced Military Studies Course
ATAF – Allied Tactical Air Force
CDA – Canadian Defence Academy
CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff
CENTCOM – Central Command
CF – Canadian Forces
DCDS – Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DND – Department of National Defence
I/T Ratio – Indetermination/Technicality
IUS – Inter-University Seminar
JIM(P) – Joint, Interagency, Multi-National (Public)
JOG – Joint Operations Group
MCCRT – management, command and control re-engineering team
MMC – Minister's Monitoring Committee
MPR – Military Participation Ratio
MSC – high military participation/ high subordination/ high cohesion
mSC - low military participation/ high subordination/ high cohesion
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCM – non-commissioned member
NCO – non-commissioned officer
NDC – National Defence College
NDHQ – National Defence Headquarters
NEOps – Networked Enabled Operations
NORAD – North American Aerospace Defence
RMA – revolution in military affairs
RMC – Royal Military College of Canada
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT – Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SCME – Statement of the Canadian Military Ethos
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
US – United States
US DoD – United States Department of Defense
VCDS -Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff

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Professional Ideology and The Profession of Arms In Canada

The concept of professionalism has been increasingly maligned in the so-called post-modern Western World. Whether in medicine, law, academia or business, the classic attributes of unique specialized knowledge, applied in accordance with an inviolate value system have been undermined. The profession of arms in Canada has been subjected to similar social, cultural and economic pressures that erode the status of professions in an era of profound politico-strategic change: a time that, paradoxically, demands the highest standards of military professionalism to defend Canadian security and interests.

Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada examines the place of the Canadian military in the professional construct. Professional military ideology is then compared to the competing ideologies of the market and bureaucracy, so prevalent in our society. The argument is compellingly made that only strict adherence to the tenets of a distinct professional ideology enables healthy, collaborative and therefore, effective civil-military relations in our particular constitutional democracy. Lieutenant-Colonel Bentley describes in detail the general system of war and conflict that comprises the discretionary, theory-based body of knowledge at the heart of military professionalism and shows how a powerful military ethos; the second component of professional military ideology, animates the profession of arms and infuses its members with a commitment to life-long duty.

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