

# IN HARM'S WAY

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## SERVING THE GREATER GOOD: Perspectives of Operational Duty



Edited by  
Colonel Bernd Horn

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## FOREWORD

I am delighted to introduce yet another Canadian Defence Academy Press publication, *Serving the Greater Good*, which represents the second volume of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's *In Harm's Way* series. In sum, this book is a valuable addition to our Strategic Leadership Writing Project, which is designed to (a) create a distinct and unique body of Canadian leadership literature and knowledge that will assist leaders at all levels of the Canadian Forces to prepare themselves for operations in a complex security environment, and (b) inform the public with respect to the contribution of Canadian Forces service personnel to Canadian society and international affairs.

This volume, as well as the one that preceded it and those that will follow it in the *In Harm's Way* series, represents the experiences and insights of an array of individuals who have taken the time and effort to capture their thoughts so that others may profit from them. Invariably, this has meant utilizing personal leave, weekends and nights to complete their stories. Their commitment and dedication are greatly appreciated. I wish to thank all those who have risen to the challenge of preparing our successors for the complexities that lie ahead.

*Serving the Greater Good* contains a collection of "war stories" from all three environments and from a myriad of military occupations. They are based on personal experiences and the respective interpretations, reflections and lessons learned that result. Although these experiences do not represent the doctrine and policy of the Department of National Defence or of the Canadian Forces, they are no less valid. They express a richness of information that can assist others in preparing for operations and for leadership in general. In essence, they can act as virtual experience for those who have not had the opportunity to deploy. Everyone can profit from a wider, broader and greater repertoire of knowledge.

In closing, I wish to reiterate the importance of this book, as well as of all others in the *In Harm's Way* series. At the Canadian Defence Academy, we hope that they will provide valuable insight for those who serve in, and for those who interact with, the profession of arms in Canada.

Major-General P.R. Hussey  
Commander, Canadian Defence Academy



## INTRODUCTION

*Serving the Greater Good* is the second volume of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's *In Harm's Way* series. As with the first volume, its strength lies in the experience of the contributors. Much of the first introduction is repeated here because the sentiments are as accurate and true for this book as they were for its predecessor.

Once again, I must reiterate that the dedication, initiative and professionalism of the men and women in the Canadian Forces never fail to amaze me. They have consistently done their country proud, persevering under austere, harsh and remote conditions, as well as in dangerous and volatile environments. They have faced ambiguity, change and uncertainty with courage and conviction. And, despite constraints in manpower and equipment, they have never failed the people or the government of Canada. Moreover, they have always been humble, if not embarrassingly discreet, about their achievements.

Although this culture of understatement and humility is exceptionally commendable, it does have a significant weakness. First, such culture fails to educate Canadian society in regard to the contribution and sacrifice of its military personnel. As such, Canadians, including politicians, are not always fully aware of the difficult nature or the significance of CF personnel's achievements.

More important, the reluctance to share experiences deprives the institution of valuable learning opportunities. Although the security environment is constantly changing and each deployment or theatre of operation offers its own unique challenges, at the very least knowledge, if not vicarious experience, can still be derived from the actual experience of others. Leadership challenges in particular offer a bonanza of professional development opportunities. There are many situations, problems and dilemmas that are timeless and that transcend missions or geographic area. The sharing of these challenges and different approaches and/or solutions by individuals provides guidance to others, especially young, inexperienced leaders. Similarly, lessons derived from specific missions, operations or geographic areas also provide the insight and knowledge to those deploying that will allow them to be better prepared to meet the challenges and to lead their personnel more effectively.

The chapters also provide a window on the different cultures of the various services (Navy, Army and Air) as well as on the myriad of problems that confront individuals in the various classifications and trades of the military occupation. This window will assist all military personnel, as well as the public at large, in developing a clearer understanding of the peculiar and distinct challenges that individuals face. Such comprehension is critical as we move forward towards a more integrated approach in operations.

Overall, this sharing of knowledge and experience throughout the institution is key to enabling mission success. It is also the cornerstone of a learning organization. For this reason, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute established the Strategic Leadership Writing Project, a seminal program intended to create a distinct and unique body of Canadian leadership literature and knowledge that will assist leaders at all CF rank levels to prepare themselves for operations in a complex security environment. The project will also educate the public in regard to the contribution of CF service personnel to Canadian society and international affairs.

The *In Harm's Way* series encapsulates “war stories” (for lack of a better term) that capture the challenges faced by leaders at all rank levels and from all three services, in operations ranging in the post-Cold War period from the early 1990s to the present. These stories are intended to act as a professional development tool for military members, as well as an educational vehicle for the Canadian public.

The chapters contained in *Serving the Greater Good*, as in future volumes, are the experiences and viewpoints of the authors and should be taken as such. Personal attitudes, biases, beliefs and interpretation are at play. Readers may not agree with all the views, opinions or statements made. This is to be expected. What is contained in this book, or in any volume of the series, is not meant to represent CF doctrine or official policy. Rather, it is the personal experiences and reflections of individuals who have been in harm's way in the service of their country. Their narratives are offered in the spirit of critical thought and shared experiences, in an effort to assist others to be better prepared when they are called out on operations. In addition, the lessons that leap from the pages should serve to generate discussion and debate in order to determine better practices and policies that will serve to make the CF more effective, efficient and operationally ready. Furthermore, the contributions should act as a means of sharing with the Canadian people glimpses of the challenges and hardships that their military endure, as well as the accomplishments they achieve.

# CHAPTER 1

## OPERATION SCIMITAR: LEADERSHIP DURING THE CANADIAN FIGHTER DEPLOYMENT TO THE ARABIAN GULF, OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1990

*Lieutenant-Colonel Bernie DeGagné*

On 1 August 1990, on Saddam Hussein's orders, under the pretext that Kuwait was an ancestral Iraqi province that had to be reunited with its home country, the Iraqi Army invaded and occupied Kuwait. The international community immediately denounced this overt act of aggression, and a coalition of nations, led by the United States, mobilized a considerable military force intended to first stabilize the situation by protecting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states from further aggression, and subsequently liberate Kuwait; the latter of which was achieved on the night of 27/28 February 1991.

Canada was vigorous in denouncing Iraq's actions and very quickly joined the military effort, initially dispatching three naval warships to the Arabian Gulf within weeks of the invasion, and then deploying eighteen CF-18 "Hornet" fighter aircraft in late September to participate in the air defence of the region. After the commencement of hostilities in January 1991, the fighter contingent was increased to 26 aircraft and, once the ground campaign began, a field hospital was dispatched to Saudi Arabia. The air campaign, which lasted approximately six weeks, systematically destroyed Iraq's early warning, command and control capabilities, as well as much of its transportation and military infrastructure. The land campaign lasted one hundred hours during the course of which Kuwait was liberated and a large part of southern Iraq was briefly held as part of a flanking movement that was conducted to destroy Iraqi forces.

This is a personal account of my experience as Squadron Operations Officer (SOpsO) of 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron, The Nighthawks, while part of 4 Wing, based at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Baden Sollingen, West Germany as we prepared for and deployed to the Arabian Gulf in October 1990 as part of Canada's response to Saddam Hussein's invasion and conquest of Kuwait that summer. This was the first operational

deployment of Canadian fighter aircraft since the Second World War, and marked the beginning of Canada's participation in a series of post-Cold War peace support and enforcement operations by naval, army, and air force units that continues to this day. While these Canadian expeditionary operations were always within a coalition, they did not always take place within traditional areas of Canadian concern. I will attempt to relate the leadership challenges associated with our deployment to Doha, Qatar from early October 1990 until our rotation home in December of that same year. Any omissions or errors in recollection are due to the passage of time and are mine alone.

Sound, effective leadership is an essential element of any successful military operation whether executed by naval, army or air force units. While the very nature of leadership remains constant and involves convincing military personnel to carry out tasks which they might not normally be readily willing to undertake, its application varies over a broad spectrum of behaviours and actions, from hard and autocratic direction to a more relaxed *laissez faire* approach. While Air Force units are traditionally associated with the *laissez faire* end of the spectrum, this reputation is unwarranted and does not always hold true. I maintain that the type of leadership demonstrated by the leaders of 409 Squadron was based heavily on three principles: a clear vision, leadership by example and the use of common sense. For example, the Commanding Officer (CO) set a clear vision of achieving the highest level of operational effectiveness through discipline and training. Secondly, the squadron's leaders were excellent examples for their subordinates to follow, both on the ground and in the air. They were all competent and respected fliers who led their share of missions while deployed. In addition, the CO was particularly decisive, an individual who would never ask one of his pilots to do something he himself was not prepared to do. Lastly, the leaders all used sound common sense in carrying out their tasks.

The first great challenge we faced was to train and prepare a static, Germany-based, multi-role fighter squadron around the nucleus of 409 Tactical Fighter Squadron, which was augmented with non squadron personnel, to deploy from NATO's Central Region to the Arabian Gulf as part of an ad hoc coalition to be based in Qatar. It was essential that the squadron function effectively as part of the coalition air defence forces in the Gulf. In addition, maintaining the morale and unit cohesion within the context of uncertainty, which existed from the moment the

Government of Canada contemplated sending a fighter force to assist in the containment of Saddam Hussein until our return to Germany in December 1990, was also a major endeavour.

## PLANNING AND PREPARATION

At 409 Squadron, planning and preparation for the deployment to Qatar began shortly after the Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, not long after the Government of Canada decided to send a naval force of two destroyers and one re-supply ship to the Gulf as part of a multi-national force to counter and contain the Iraqis. One morning in mid-August at the daily meteorology and operations briefing, the Nighthawks' CO announced to the assembled pilots and officers that if the government of Canada decided to send a fighter force to the Gulf, it would be formed around 409 Squadron and that he would be the commanding officer. Subsequently, he announced that all Nighthawk pilots who were combat ready would be part of the deployment, and that he would have the final say on who would augment our numbers from the two other 4 Wing "Hornet" squadrons. One of the first steps taken was to organize the pilots in combat pairs.

Fighter pilots on squadron service live and operate in a hierarchical system based on their experience, flying skills and proven leadership ability in the air. The basic building block of fighter flying is the two aircraft (ac) formation, called an element (2 ac), with one pilot as lead, and the other as wingman. The largest independent fighter formation is created by joining two elements into a section (4 ac), with one of the Element Leads qualified as a Section Lead. It is possible to form larger formations of fighters by joining sections (4 ac) together under the leadership of a Mass Attack Lead, whose primary leadership task is to acquire and maintain the necessary air picture, and to coordinate and direct the actions of each section (4 ac) to maximize tactical effectiveness. The Mass Attack Lead is also responsible to establish the necessary procedures to ensure the physical deconfliction between sections (4 ac) and as well as to effectively lead his own section (4 ac) in combat. All of these professional fighter pilot qualifications are earned following the successful completion of established academic and flying programmes to develop the required knowledge and leadership. These programmes are conducted within the individual squadrons and the qualifications are awarded by the respective squadron commanders. We flew the vast majority of our Combat Air



Patrols (CAP) in the Gulf as elements (2 ac), but managed to fly some of our training missions as sections (4 ac) to maintain the application of the greater firepower of four aircraft.

In the high-speed arena of air-to-air combat, reactions must be instinctive and always complementary to the other members of the element (2 ac) or section (4 ac). One way of fostering and developing such cohesiveness is to have the squadron pilots paired up to train together as often as possible, more commonly known as flying in combat pairs. The CO directed that the new pilots who arrived to augment the squadron be organized into elements (2 ac) and sections (4 ac) which flew together as exclusively as possible in preparation for flying together in combat. While it was not always possible to keep the pairings completely exclusive for reasons of minor illness or non-availability, most of the training and operational flights undertaken in the Gulf did occur as such.

The preparation phase was very chaotic, primarily due to the fact that the squadron was not intended to deploy from Germany as part of an expeditionary force. Strong leadership and direction were required to maintain the squadron's focus on preparing for an operational deployment to the Arabian Gulf. The Germany-based squadrons were intended to fight from Baden Sollingen or Lahr. Our role being to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO's Central Region, and so no contingency plans existed for a deployment to the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter. Therefore, prior to our departure in early October 1990, which itself was not announced until very late in September, all aspects of our deployment to Qatar were planned and decided over a roughly six-week period during the second half of August and September 1990.

Input from the squadron was considerable, and covered all aspects of the training and deployment. The leadership approach was to focus on the air defence mission, and to ensure that the training was as effective and as straightforward as possible, with a strong emphasis on the basics.

While preparing the squadron for an air defence mission was relatively straightforward, most other aspects of the deployment were shrouded in uncertainty. This applied to nearly all aspects of the potential deployment, including if and when the squadron was going to deploy, where we would be based, or how long our deployment would be. All

levels of leadership considered operational security to be a special concern and, until the government announced our participation, we were strictly forbidden from discussing what we were preparing for. This caused numerous rumours to develop all over the wing, and caused added stress on the home front with our families, who were aware of the events in the Middle East and of the Canadian government's decision to send warships. They noticed the increased training tempo, and managed to deduce that we were preparing to deploy to the Arabian Gulf. The leadership position of maintaining operational security was upheld, and only caused frustration amongst the spouses with regard to the lack of information from their husbands. Information meetings for the families were only conducted after the deployment was announced by the government, and left little time for them to adjust. In addition, this caused the rear party organization to be established in an ad hoc fashion, as its planning was undertaken very late in the process. Only the strength of character and intelligence of some of the service spouses saw this very important aspect of the deployment succeed.

During this preparation and training phase, the days were very full and they began to seem remarkably similar as they blended together. Activities mandated by the squadron leadership that were carried out included: maintaining perishable flying skills, updating all annual check rides to obviate doing them in theatre, conducting all required maintenance on the pool of aircraft that had been selected to deploy, completing Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) mandated training in a variety of non-NATO related subjects, and arranging numerous intelligence briefings on our possible theatre of operations and our new enemy's equipment and tactics. The CO held many meetings with the squadron leadership over this initial period to consider which training activities we should undertake, how large the squadron should be, and which other pilots from the wing should take part in the deployment. The CO considered all of our input and ideas before deciding on a course of action. While discussion was encouraged, once a decision was made, the CO's expectation was that there would be no public dissent and that the decision would be actioned as expeditiously as possible.

The roster of augmentation pilots from the other squadrons was dealt with early in the process. Two philosophies were proposed. The first was to bring only the most experienced and most qualified pilots, while the second would see a mix of experienced and qualified pilots form the

squadron. The second option was selected in order to include all the combat ready “Nighthawks” and expose the broadest spectrum of pilots to an operational deployment. It was also acknowledged that a squadron of section (4 ac) leads was sometimes difficult to manage. As such, an important condition of the selection of augmentation pilots was their compatibility and their ability to work in a team environment.

Some non personnel related decisions concerning equipment were also addressed. Initially, the pilots’ personal weapon was to be the Walther PPK semi-automatic pistol in .32 auto calibre, which many of us felt was insufficient for the task of self-protection in the event of an ejection. By some fortuitous coincidence, the Canadian Forces (CF) was in the process of acquiring the SIG SAUER P-225, and we requested and obtained that the process be expedited. As a result, however, we had to dedicate a day at the range qualifying on the very new handguns. This example had not so much been about improving the pilots’ ability to resist capture if forced to eject into Iraq, but was seen as a question of faith and confidence by the CF in ensuring the safety of its pilots. The new pistols had a greater effect on increasing our morale than in increasing our lethality if we ever found ourselves behind enemy lines.

Initially, the position of the Allies in the Gulf was a defensive one intended to prevent any further expansion of the Iraqi occupation. This matched up well with the Government of Canada’s mandate that any force deployed should be only defensive in nature. Even though the squadron was equipped, trained and manned as a multi role unit that could undertake both offensive and defensive missions, our initial role was strictly air defence.

At the time, the CF-18s were state of the art fighter aircraft with a true “look-down shoot-down beyond visual range air-to-air” capability provided by the APG-65 pulse Doppler radar and the AIM-7M semi active radar missile. For closer engagements, the AIM-9L and the M-61 20mm Gatling gun were available.

The two advantages of being a single role air defence squadron were that only air-to-air weapons would have to be transported into theatre and that air defence skills and procedures are less complicated than the air-to-ground ones, making it easier for the pilots to concentrate and maintain their air defence skills, procedures and tactics in the run up to the deployment.

Another issue that was settled fairly quickly was the size of the squadron. This was determined by the nature of the air defence role and a limited daily period of liability of eighteen hours. Such a posture was considered both significant to the coalition defensive effort and readily sustainable from Germany and Canada. The training programme was developed very quickly. It was a balancing act between the continuation training required by the pilots and the completion of DCDS instructions for deployment that included many topics from personnel weapons training to cultural awareness. By far the greatest challenge involved the management of the aircraft required so as to keep the pilots current in their air defence tactics and flying qualifications prior to the deployment, as well as to allow the maintenance crews enough time to prepare the agreed upon number of fighters. As planning for the deployment phase became more refined, it was decided that the aircraft would be ferried to Qatar using the Canadian Boeing 707 air-to-air refuellers. We did not practice the art of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) regularly, and most of us had never been trained to do so. In order to effectively carry out the deployment to Qatar and to operate in the Area of Operations (AO), it was determined that the pilots would have to acquire this new skill.

In NATO's Central Region, the distances over which we were called upon to operate did not require us to be proficient in AAR. Therefore, very few of the Germany-based pilots had ever done AAR, with the exception of those few who had flown tours on the CF-5 Freedom Fighter or on Canadian-based CF-18 Hornet squadrons where AAR was more common. A tanker was requested, and all pilots underwent an intensive AAR programme prior to our departure. Given the short time available, this training involved a certain amount of risk, and was complicated by the relatively large number of sorties that were required in order to qualify each pilot to refuel both in the daytime and at night, as well as the number of times each pilot had to repeat the manoeuvre. Luckily, no serious damage was caused by the very hard metal AAR basket found on the Boeing 707 tanker when it occasionally bounced off the probe and fuselage of a number of duelling CF-18s.

Another training goal was easier to achieve. The Iraqi Air Force were using the French Mirage F-1 as its primary air defence fighter. Therefore, we organized a series of dissimilar air combat training sorties with neighbouring French Air Force squadrons who flew the F-1. These proved very instrumental both in confirming our tactics against the potential

adversary and in increasing our confidence in our aircraft and its air-to-air weapons and defensive suite. The only difference proved to be the high quality of the French aircrew compared to that of the Iraqi.

While we very busy preparing to deploy, it seemed that the final governmental decision for us to do so, as well as the location we would be deploying to, were a long time in coming. Since none of the squadron leadership could affect these decisions, we ensured that the squadron's focus remained squarely on what we could do, which was to continue to prepare for a possible operational deployment to the Middle East. By the time decision was finally announced, we had somehow managed to meet all the necessary training requirements that the squadron CO, the Air Force, and the CF had set for our deployment. The advance party flew to Doha, Qatar, and was quickly followed by the main body. Once there, preparations for the arrival of the eighteen CF-18 Hornets allocated to the mission began.

Our objective was to quickly deploy enough resources and personnel to begin flying air defence CAP as quickly as possible. There was a sense of urgency for the aircraft to arrive in theatre and to begin flying operations as soon as possible. This was due to the fact that Iraqi intentions were unknown. There was also a coalition assumption that they could move against Saudi Arabia quickly. Nonetheless, our driving concern was that we did not wish to miss the upcoming show.

## DEPLOYMENT

The process of ferrying the aircraft was to proceed in waves directly from Baden Sollingen with Boeing 707 tanker support. I was on the first wave of eight aircraft, which was led by the CO. The aircraft configuration for the trip was a heavy one as all the aircraft were fitted with three external fuel tanks, four AIM 7M, two AIM 9P and a full load of 20 mm in the gun. On the first day, we were to fly over France, then over Sicily, and to land at the Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Akrotiri, on the island of Cyprus. The second day, we were to fly south into Egyptian airspace, and top up over the Red Sea before continuing to Doha unaccompanied by the tanker. While the plan had been developed with the best information available, it did not quite unfold as predicted. As we approached Sicily, it was apparent that the fighters had consumed more fuel than planned and the tanker could not give any more away. It was decided that the last four

fighters and the tanker would land in Sicily, but not before giving the first four fighters enough fuel to get to Cyprus. Lasting four hours and twenty minutes, this was my longest trip in the Hornet. Luckily no one went unserviceable after landing in Sicily, and all arrived in Cyprus later in the day. The following day went as planned, and all eight aircraft reached Doha on 7 October 1990 without experiencing any problems. The remaining ten aircraft reached Doha over the next two days without incident.

While most of the squadron personnel arrived in Doha early during the deployment phase, most of our equipment was still to come as it took slightly more than eighty C-130 Hercules transport aircraft sorties to transport everything to Doha. Despite the lack of supplies, there were enough resources and personnel in theatre to begin flying operational sorties very shortly after the fighters arrived in theatre. Some of the lessons learned during the deployment were: a) in our armed ferry configuration, the fuel consumption was higher than planned and; b) with limited accommodation and operational infrastructure in Doha, the work load associated with establishing ourselves at another base was initially unevenly distributed amongst the personnel.

While operational flights were conducted during this phase, our living, maintenance, and command and control arrangements were ad hoc and a high priority was accorded to the establishment of the required support and security enablers. As a result, the support and security personnel had to work overtime to complete their assigned tasks associated with supporting ongoing operations, in addition to creating the essential infrastructures for the detachment. Meanwhile, some of the pilots in non-supervisory positions flew their assigned sorties and were relatively underemployed. Therefore, in order to alleviate some of the pressures on the support personnel, pilots were tasked to carry out some of the less complex duties associated with our establishment in theatre. The perfect example of this is that we all took our turns filling the sandbags for which there was a high demand. Over the next few weeks, as more equipment and infrastructure arrived or were created, the problem was resolved. The important lesson here was that the aircraft and the aircrew should be the last part of an Air Force expeditionary force to deploy into theatre, as it is usually difficult to sustain a reasonable operational tempo until all security and force protection measures are in place, all detachment personnel can be housed and fed properly, and all command and control infrastructures are in place.

Initially, we were housed in Doha at the Gulf Hotel, which was not far from the airport. However, the ultimate solution was to house the contingent at two locations outside the city. Our stay at the Gulf Hotel lasted approximately three weeks, until both sites were prepared. The dual site plan was developed due to the fact that there was not enough available space on the military side of the airfield to accommodate the whole Canadian contingent. As a United States Air Force (USAF) F-16 squadron was already established in air-conditioned tents on the airfield, our choices for accommodations were reduced. A dilapidated and empty housing facility for oil workers situated outside Doha was leased and made suitable to house most of the support personnel, and was eventually named "Canada Dry One" (CD 1). The pilots and the remainder of the squadron operations and intelligence staff were housed in a series of ATCO type trailers which were placed in an unoccupied part of the Qatari base and was named "Canada Dry Two" (CD 2). While it would have been better to house all of the detachment personnel in one location, our arrangement did not cause any extraordinary leadership problems. Administratively, the personnel from CD 1 were convoyed to the base for their shifts protected by members of our security force. Mike Company of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR) was responsible for security. These soldiers worked long and hard, creating or improving existing security measures and infrastructure, providing escort for the convoys from CD 1, and manning the sentry posts at both sites.

The relationship between the Air Force and Army components of the detachment was not problematic. We very quickly recognized the members of Mike Company as dedicated professionals who took their job of force protection very seriously and demonstrated an incomparable work ethic. Some mutual respect already existed between the two groups since we generally knew their officers because 3 RCR was also stationed at Baden Sollingen and, while we had not worked together, we had interacted and socialized with many of them in Germany prior to deploying. As for the senior Non-Commissioned Officers, we recognized many of them from home base and in short order, concluded that they were mature leaders who got the job done quickly and efficiently.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Given the ad hoc and expeditionary nature of our deployment to Doha, the two critical aspects of the contingent's command and control and

logistical support were decided prior to our departure. The command and control structure of the deployment that had been settled upon was that the Air Force detachment in Doha would be commanded by a colonel with a small operations and intelligence staff to assist him in his command duties and to buffer the squadron CO from both national and coalition command and control. A small liaison and coordination cell was established at Lieutenant-General Charles Horner's coalition air component headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This group represented Canadian interests within the Coalition Air Component Commander's headquarters and ensured that all of our sorties were properly inserted in the daily Air Tasking Order.

Eventually, Canadian national command for both the Canadian Air Force and Naval deployments to the Arabian Gulf was established under a Canadian Commodore who established a joint task force headquarters in Bahrain. This arrangement proved to be problematic and frustrating. The Commodore barely hid his distaste and contempt for Air Force personnel, and pilots in particular, and did not understand fighter operations. He demonstrated his lack of knowledge of fighter operations in two ways. First, he attempted to insert his headquarters in the coalition air defence chain of command, not understanding that such an arrangement would unnecessarily increase the response times of the Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptors) (QRA(I)). Discussions between the Detachment Commander, the Squadron CO and the Commodore did cause him to withdraw this command and control arrangement. Secondly, he steadfastly refused to allow any maintenance and rest days for the fighter detachment during the conflict itself while still permitting access to port visits for the three Canadian naval vessels during the same period. This last situation did not change, and the fighter detachment simply got on with the task at hand and continued to generate aircraft sorties without respite.

As no expeditionary support unit existed in the Air Force, it was decided that 3 Canadian Support Group (3 CSG) would directly support our operation. This also proved unsatisfactory, as 3 CSG was a static third line support unit that did not understand the intricacies of supporting a fighter operation in the field. They demonstrated this by their slow responses to requests for aircraft parts and materiel and their slowness in establishing the necessary operational and accommodation infrastructure in theatre. Their solution was to make all of our supply demands or short-



falls Immediate Operational Requirements (IOR) without using a valid priority system. For instance, the most glaring example was pillows and garbage cans having the same priority as the aircraft parts required to repair unserviceable Hornets. We were unable solve this problem in Qatar, and eventually assistance was provided by 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters (1 Cdn Air Div) in Lahr. I happened to be in the Squadron Operations Centre when Commander 1 Cdn Air Div, Brigadier-General Jean Boyle, called and asked who was prioritizing our supply requests. He had just come from the hangar in Lahr where our supply demands were being prepared for trans-shipment to us. He remarked that there did not seem to be much logic in how items were being forwarded to us and had seen garbage cans and aircraft parts with the same priority. I explained that we were not requesting non-operational items to be sent with the same priority as parts and at his request, passed him over to the CO for further discussion of the issue. The situation did improve, but the learning curve was very steep for 3 CSG.

## **LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES**

Prior to deployment, the Squadron CO had also raised the question of conducting training sorties in theatre. It was eventually acknowledged by higher headquarters that, in order to maintain the necessary fighter pilot skills in the event of a conflict, such a requirement was valid. This was due to there being virtually no training benefit for a fighter pilot on a CAP sortie if there were no contacts to prosecute and it was otherwise uneventful. For most of our time in theatre, the routine was to conduct twenty-eight sorties per day, six days per week. Eight sorties would be training and twenty would man a CAP in the northern third of the Arabian Gulf for a ten-hour liability period with a two-ship element, providing coverage for the many Allied vessels sailing there. The allocation of flying hours for the CF-18s during the pre-war period was generous but not unlimited, and I was required to manage the monthly flying rates so as not to exceed our allotment. The allocation was sufficient to meet all of our training and operational needs, and the morale of the pilots was not adversely affected as the training opportunities, while not numerous, were varied and challenging. Limiting the flying allocation also meant that the aircraft would not reach their maintenance milestones prematurely and require replacement or inspections, which could only be done in theatre with great difficulty.

Another problem was that we began flying operations with inadequate command and control communications to our Squadron Operations Centre from the coalition's air component commander's headquarters. This situation was brought to light by the liaison staff in Riyadh. The system used by the coalition was an American encrypted telephone that could not initially be placed in our ops centre because it was not continuously manned, and because the former was initially for American use only. The matter was never fully resolved, but a work-around of placing the secure phone in the adjacent Squadron Intelligence Centre, which was continuously manned, was implemented. Airborne command and control was done by radio from ship-based air control centres manned by U.S. Navy air weapons controllers. Since the majority of our CAP missions were over the Arabian Gulf, we were rarely controlled by Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which were used primarily over land.

In the best traditions of fighter operations, the contingent as a whole worked very hard to establish itself in Doha and to overcome the impediments and restrictions to operations that came from a number of quarters. On the flip-side of the coin, it was necessary to alleviate the pressures that had built up during the preparations to being operationally effective. Recreational and exercise facilities were available on the Qatari base or were established within the camps, and we had unfettered access to the shopping and tourist areas in Doha, which we frequented often when off duty. Like in Saudi Arabia and any of the other Gulf states, alcohol was not readily available and could only be purchased by those in possession of a license issued by Qatari authorities. This made any squadron-sized social event that included alcohol impossible to organize.

The detachment commander, in the interest of minimizing any alcohol related incidents in a Muslim country, decided not to seek any licences for the Canadian camps, hence the ironic names of Canada Dry One and Two. He did not permit the establishment of any organized system that would permit the airmen and women under his command to consume alcohol in a controlled environment. In the end, the only way Canadian personnel could legally consume alcohol in theatre was to befriend an expatriate with a license, or to participate in an expatriate sponsored activity where alcohol would be served, for example a house party. Another "escape" was to play an exhibition rugby game at the licensed Doha Rugby Club and gain access to the clubhouse after the game for the "third half".

When 409 Squadron deployed on Operation Scimitar, the official tour length for any member of the contingent was unknown. We were told we were deploying for the duration of the operation, which of course was not known at the time. Shortly after we became completely established in theatre and were flying operational sorties as a matter of routine, it became possible to turn our attention to the matter of deployment length. There was a desire from many senior officers within the fighter force to have as many fighter pilots and support personnel as possible rotate through Doha so as to experience an operational deployment. Using this rationale and acknowledging that a period of non-readiness for the fighter contingent would be unacceptable, a rotation was planned to occur over approximately a two-month period to be completed prior to Christmas 1990. This plan was put into effect and personnel started rotating back to their home bases early in November 1990. The only drawback was that those personnel who worked so hard to establish the mission were not in place when hostilities finally broke out in January 1991. Although the number of pilots and aircraft was increased for the war, not all members of the first rotation were called back to Doha.

Discipline was generally good throughout the deployment, with no infractions of the National Defence Act. No summary trials and no courts martial were necessary. As the CAP missions became routine and uneventful, a certain complacency set in amongst the pilots and there were a few incidents demonstrating a degradation of flying discipline. The incidents involved unauthorized low flying and the taking of unauthorized aircraft-to-aircraft photos.

With regards to low flying, the first incident involved the over flight of the maintenance crews at the Quick Reaction Alert facility, causing the collapse of a section of modular tent and slightly injuring some of the technicians. When the offending pilot was asked to explain his actions, he gave his primary reason as the improvement of the technicians' morale. The CO then assigned him the duties of squadron morale officer responsible for maintaining and uplifting the morale of the ground crew by organizing activities in the local area for their benefit and ensuring their messing and living quarters were satisfactory. The pilot had to report his progress to the CO on a regular basis until he was repatriated home.

In another incident, the Qatari Air Force was also able to determine with their air defence radar that one element (2 ac) returned from their CAP

missions by over flying the Qatari peninsula at extremely low level causing consternation amongst their citizens in the small desert villages. Once confronted and reminded by the CO that they could be sent home if this activity persisted, the pair ceased this activity immediately.

Another occurrence involved aircraft-to-aircraft photos of pilots wearing their Tilley hats, which had been provided to us as part of our environmental clothing because of the extremely dry and hot climate. While transiting to their CAP station, one element (2 ac) removed their helmets in succession and took photographs of each other with their Tilley hats on. Their stated goal was to eventually send the photos to Mr. Tilley in support of his excellent product. Forcefully reminded by the CO of their lack of professionalism and his intolerance of any further such incidents, there were no further infractions and Mr. Tilley did not receive the photographs.

The question of why aircrew were not charged over these breaches in flying discipline is often asked and the answer is relatively straightforward. Points to consider are that pilots are highly trained and generally in short supply, and that it is impossible to conduct fighter operations without them. Generally, they are a group of well-intentioned, goal-oriented, highly intelligent, proud type "A" personalities who have to be disciplined with care. Since no one suffered serious injury, the incidents were not serious and were generally considered pranks. Any sanction awarded would have had to fit the transgression. Overly punishing the offending pilots could quickly cause resentment and degrade the remaining pilots' morale and effectiveness. What matters most to a pilot is flying time. As a result, more corrective action to a pilot's "deviant" behaviour can be achieved by limiting his flying time, or assigning him extra duties where he can correct or reflect on his transgression, than through classic military punishments.

As the deployment neared the end of 1990, the subject of maintaining our exclusive air defence posture was reviewed, and the decision was made to prepare to conduct air-to-surface operations in the event the policy might be changed. While I remained on the periphery of these discussions, it became apparent that a strictly defensive posture would see Canada's fighter contribution lose its importance, especially given the multi-role capabilities of the pilots and the CF-18 aircraft. All arrangements for training and equipment were eventually made and, shortly after hostilities broke out in 1991, the Canadian Hornets carried out air-to-surface sorties.

Gradually, the 409 Squadron portion of the detachment was rotated home and the flavour of the deployment shifted towards the growing numbers of “Desert Cats” formed by 439 and 416 squadron personnel. I was on the last flight of 409 Squadron personnel, arriving home on 22 December 1990 - in time for Christmas as promised by Brigadier General Boyle.

## **CONCLUSION**

The challenges faced by the leadership of 409 Squadron in training and deploying to Qatar were associated with deploying a static multi-role fighter squadron from NATO's Central region to the Arabian Gulf as part of an ad hoc coalition. Common sense, along with the required decisive and timely decisions regarding the training, equipment, and personnel essential to complete the task of providing an air defence squadron within the ad hoc coalition were evident throughout, and made the deployment a success.

## CHAPTER 2

### OPERATION MARQUIS: NAVAL LEADERSHIP LESSONS LEARNED DURING SERVICE IN CAMBODIA

*Lieutenant-Commander (Retired) Douglas S. Thomas*

In 1990, I attended the Royal Navy Staff College in Greenwich, England. During that period, Canada sent forces to assist in the recapture of Kuwait, principally a Naval Task Group, and I felt “left out of the action” by being out of the country. I returned to Halifax as Commander of Fleet School Halifax’s Seamanship Division, where I was involved in the training of ships’ teams for Operation (OP) Friction, but I decided to volunteer for some role in this or some other Maritime Peace Support Operation. Initially I volunteered as a Monitor for the Peace Mission that followed the liberation of Kuwait. Later, while a pre-cleared member of the International Stand-by List, I thought I might participate in the maritime patrols conducted on the Pacific Coast off El Salvador. This was not to be, however, and I found myself chosen at short notice to lead a team of 30 naval personnel to a new mission in Cambodia, as part of the Maritime Component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Canada’s participation in UNTAC was known as Op Marquis. This chapter will review some of my personal experiences and observations as a maritime area commander (for the Gulf of Thailand), Operations and Intelligence Planner in Phnom Penh, and Canadian team leader during the UNTAC mission. I was in Cambodia from 04 May to 02 December 1992, but was involved in a training role until the mission was completed in November 1993, six months after UN-sponsored elections. Although my experience was 13 years ago, I have written, lectured and thought of it frequently since then, and it is still very fresh in my mind.

#### BACKGROUND

Initially, it is necessary to provide some context and background to the mission. Cambodia had been a very unstable country for centuries, a situation exacerbated in the 1960s and 1970s by the war in Vietnam that frequently spilled over its borders. Khmer Rouges (KR) guerrilla forces over-ran Cambodia, taking control of the capital of Phnom Penh in April

1975. Many are probably familiar with the Hollywood film, "The Killing Fields," which depicts those times and the drastic internal changes that took place. The Khmer Rouges soon proved to be such difficult neighbours that they were in turn attacked and defeated by the Vietnamese Army. As result, the KR fled to the Western and North-Western Borders near the Thai border, while a Communist Vietnamese-backed "puppet" government was established in Cambodia in early 1979.

By the late 1980s, Vietnam had withdrawn much of its army from an unstable Cambodia whose puppet government was still opposed by the Khmer Rouge and two other warring factions. Several neighbouring countries provided weapons and funds to continue the conflict, in exchange for exotic lumber and precious gems. A series of peace conferences took place, culminating in the Paris Conference of October 1991, at which time the factions agreed on a "Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict." A detailed implementation plan was drawn up by the Secretary General of the UN, and subsequently approved by the Security Council.

## THE UN MANDATE

The powers given to UNTAC were unprecedented: supreme authority over all those aspects of the political settlement dealing with civil administration, military functions, elections and civil rights. The mandate included:

- supervising, monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and their weapons and equipment;
- all matters related to maintaining a cease-fire;
- supervising the cantonment, demobilisation and arms control of the opposing forces;
- monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance;
- liaison with neighbouring countries;
- locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies;
- conducting mine clearance and awareness programmes;
- assisting in the release of prisoners-of-war and civilian internees;
- and
- completing the mission by running a "free and fair" election in May 1993.

## PLANNING

Initial planning for the mission was carried out in UN Headquarters in New York, and then by the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC): several hundred people that began arriving in Cambodia shortly after the Paris Conference. The planners recognised the importance of waterways to that country, and recommended the addition of a naval component.

The UNAMIC naval planning team was composed of two Uruguayan officers, including the eventual first maritime component commander (MCC). These officers surveyed the available Cambodian naval vessels, and pronounced them – with necessary repairs – fit for use as UN patrol vessels. This option also provided a nation-building opportunity: to re-furbish and re-train the navy, and turn it over to the newly-elected democratic government of Cambodia as a functioning coast guard at the end of the UN mandate. The initial plan was that 215 UN-seconded naval personnel would operate these vessels in support of UN operations.

Canada had agreed to provide a composite Logistics Company and some headquarters personnel to Cambodia. The Canadian Military Representative in UN Headquarters also suggested a naval contingent of up to 30 officers and men, whose personnel would be rotated back to Canada every six months. The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff agreed with this proposal and staffing commenced.

## THE MISSION

During the period of April- to June 1992, the UNTAC mission swelled from 300 to 23,000 military and civilians, including some four hundred naval and marine personnel. A maritime component was needed due to the country's many natural inland waterways, the impact of the annual rainy season on the road and rail system, and the poor state of existing transportation infrastructure due to war damage and land mines. The two major warring factions continued to conduct naval operations against each other, so a UN force was required to be interposed between them and to report cease-fire violations.

The maritime component was composed of 215 officers and men with UNMO status from seven countries: Canada, Chile, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, UK and Uruguay. There were also 168 marines from



Chile, the Philippines and Uruguay for security duties at the two naval cantonment sites, and a number of local people with language skills were hired as translators. There were 15 “observer bases” or naval stations throughout the country, with a headquarters in Phnom Penh. Command of the bases was allocated to contributing nations, based on their proportion of total manning.

The maritime mission was complex, and evolved throughout the 18-month duration of UNTAC. Initially the Maritime Component conducted patrols to verify the cease-fire agreement, transported UN forces and equipment along the coast and internal waterways, and informed the local people of the UN mission objectives. An essential part of this activity was repairing and maintaining naval vessels so that they would be capable of conducting this work, and training their crews to safely operate them.

A major task was to canton troops of the four factions in regional centres throughout the country, commencing in June 1992. The intention was to destroy weapons and re-train the servicemen for jobs in the civilian workforce. A great deal of our early effort was to organise the naval portion of this activity. Some 56,000 soldiers, airmen, sailors and marines reported to cantonment sites throughout the country and turned-in their weapons; however, none of them were from the Khmer Rouge. There were at least 200,000 other personnel who did not disarm, as they feared that the KR would take advantage of their weakness.

When the cantonment plan failed, the maritime contingent continued to ready vessels for patrols. As the organization and conduct of an election was one of UNTAC's major tasks, we also selected and made-safe additional locally-procured boats for the UN electoral teams, and transported electoral officials throughout the country as they educated and registered potential voters and issued identification cards which would entitle individuals to vote.

One of the country's difficulties was the perceived corruption of the public service and a shortage of government revenue. Pay for public servants was very low or non-existent, and it appeared that some of them used their positions to extort money from citizens for licences to conduct business, or by levying fines. For example, a small restaurant near the city of Ream, where many UN Military Observers (UNMOs) lived, was run by

people who occasionally hosted lavish lunches for the local police in order to retain their licence to operate. There was also a great deal of smuggling of goods into the country, and rarely, if ever, was any import duty paid. As part of the UN mission, a customs department was established and the maritime contingent co-operated fully with this initiative in the conduct of patrols - particularly in the Gulf of Thailand.

The interception of some of this smuggling trade, from automobiles to toilet bowls, as well as maintaining a watch for arms and drugs, helped to discourage such activity. As the mission progressed, the smugglers became increasingly well organised and threatening. The third Canadian naval team-leader found it necessary to fly a platoon of Philippine Marines from Ream to Sre Amble some fifty kilometres away, in order to protect unarmed observers and hold the contraband until the following morning.

### **MARITIME COMPONENT: NATIONAL CONTINGENTS**

The different approaches taken by varying nations in regard to the make-up of their national contingent made a very clear statement about their military ethos. Most countries sent available personnel rather than volunteers. In one case, some of these people had been informed, or were told while deployed, that they were being made redundant and would be released soon after being repatriated. Some, from that same country, had requested to leave the service, and were sent to Cambodia because they were available pending release. I know that there were morale problems in that particular national contingent when people on release, or notified of redundancy while deployed, were sent to an arduous and potentially dangerous mission. The officer commanding that group worked hard to resolve the personnel problems that inevitably resulted.

A technical advisory team of seven Russian naval officers, including Captains and Commanders, was sent out to investigate the status of spare parts for the Russian-built vessels of the Cambodian Navy. They packed lightly for a two-week visit, and ended-up staying for a year! Their morale was surprisingly good - a major factor was their UNMO pay, which far exceeded their normal salary. Nevertheless there were problems, not least of which was the fact that they had not brought their uniforms with them and so were unable to join the other national groups at military ceremonies. However, there was a large Russian diplomatic presence that

had remained in the country, so at least the Russian naval officers had national support available.

One of the initial morale problems was the uncertain status of the members of the naval contingent. The MCC had been working for months to achieve UNMO status for naval personnel, and assured us that this would be granted. A decision was long over-due from the UN in New York. There was much doubt about the outcome. This was not only bad for morale, but no planning could take place to deploy observers because the necessary support infrastructure was not in place. Pending resolution of status and support requirements, the Canadians were able to start the process of deploying from Phnom Penh, because we each had drawn a large advance of funds from our own country to bridge this uncertain period.

### **SELECTION AND TRAINING OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT**

All of the Canadian naval observers had responded to a request for volunteers. I volunteered because I had been out of the country during our involvement in the Persian Gulf War, and I was seeking an adventure in my final years in the navy. An advance party of six officers, led by myself, commenced several days of briefings and immunizations at CFB Valcartier, where our likely employment was not well understood. Indeed, we were not sure either. I remember being told that officers should not worry about getting driving instruction on Four-Wheel Drive vehicles, because an army driver would be provided whenever we needed to go somewhere. Needless to say, things did not turn out that way and I learned to drive a truck in Cambodia. Luckily, there was time to do it. In retrospect, the better-trained one is for the unknown, the better.

Prior to deployment, we flew to Ottawa for three days of briefings on UNMO duties, were given more immunisations, and issued additional clothing and equipment specific to the mission. After 40 hours of travel, we arrived in Phnom Penh in early May 1992. We were met by the Canadian Contingent Commander, temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius and 100 percent humidity. Over the next several weeks we:

- attended additional mission training and cultural briefings;
- visited a number of the proposed UN naval stations;
- helped establish a Maritime Component HQ (MCHQ) in Phnom Penh, in a former small hotel on the Tonle Sap River;

conducted further investigation into the materiel state of Cambodian vessels;  
helped establish preliminary refit and maintenance teams;  
drafted maritime rules of engagement and patrol plans;  
submitted to many additional shots at the Logistics Company (Camp Canada); and  
began deploying to operational bases.

One of the principal tasks of the advance party was to assess the situation and to determine the composition of the remaining members of the Canadian team. Prior to arrival in the mission area, it was understood that our naval personnel would man and operate the primarily Russian-built patrol vessels of the Cambodian Navy. Initial concerns included learning their systems and translating damage control markings from Cyrillic into English. After a further assessment of the situation, it was decided that the Cambodians would operate their own vessels, but that they would need assistance with maintenance and repair. As such, it was decided that naval observers would man regional headquarters, and be embarked on the vessels to direct and conduct patrols.

We found that the Cambodian vessels were in appallingly poor condition, and a great deal of technical assistance was required to make them fit to carry out patrols. This requirement was passed to national personnel staffs, and was reflected in the composition of the remainder of the Canadian and British contingents, which included a good mix of senior, skilled enlisted personnel and officers who could help repair, maintain and operate these vessels.

In the case of Canada, a range of qualifications was requested from our naval HQ after consultation with the other national advance parties. The “shopping list” included Hull, Maritime Engineering and Communications Technicians; seamen knowledgeable in operating small boats and outboard motors, and, in order to interact with the UN Logistic and Financial authorities: a Logistics Officer with UN experience and a Supply petty officer to assist him. The additional personnel arrived five weeks after the advance party.

The first group of Canadians was formed at rather short notice, from personnel who responded to a navy-wide call. There were as many reasons for volunteering, as there were people. The initial group did not expect

much additional remuneration, so money was not a great incentive. I think the prospect of adventure was probably the biggest motivator. My 30-man team included a group of fairly senior chief petty officers (CPO) from our West Coast Fleet who had come as a group, and had certain pre-conceived ideas as to their role and importance. The fact that we had to improvise to conduct patrols, and continually make some accommodation with UN officials and the Cambodian Navy, did not sit well with some of these rather inflexible people. Another problem was that the CPOs were all at the same rank level, and did not respond well to taking direction. In order to avoid this problem in the second rotation, I ensured that a CPO of a grade clearly senior to the others was brought out to take effective charge of all non-commissioned personnel.

The training of the first rotation included several days of briefings on health and safety concerns, the land-mine threat and Cambodian culture. Once in the mission area, there were further administrative and operational briefings. After my return to Canada, I organised and ran a 2-week pre-deployment training package for the third (and final) rotation. This was conducted at the Seamanship School I commanded, with UNTAC experienced instructors and using similar equipment and procedures to those employed in the mission area. This proved to be very successful, and the course was documented so that it could be used, with necessary amendments, as a better starting point for preparing personnel for future missions.

Several months after arrival, status as military observers and a rather impressive mission support allowance was conferred on the naval members of the maritime component. In addition, the recruitment of the second and third Canadian rotations was accomplished in a more orderly manner. By that time, the requirement for certain skill-sets and appropriate rank-levels was better understood and the expected mission termination date was known. The additional knowledge gained of the mission, and the conferring of UNMO status, made it easier to recruit the follow-on teams.

## THE DYNAMICS OF FORMING MULTI-NATIONAL TEAMS

Although the maritime component was formed from seven different navies, we were all sailors and understood the problems posed by the mission. Nevertheless, I believe the primary problem in team building was

language. For example, the Uruguayans were limited in their language skills and the Russians spoke only a little English or French in addition to their native tongue. To help address this problem, the Spanish-speaking Chileans and Uruguayans co-manned two of the naval stations. There were also other hindrances to accomplishing the mission caused by mixing national representation, such as consultation between officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the training standards at each rank level among the variety of different navies.

One of the nations had sent eleven officers, of which four were of Commander (i.e. lieutenant-colonel) rank. This caused a great deal of difficulty within the maritime component, as well as within that national contingent. It was necessary to allocate senior positions to other nations; therefore there were insufficient responsible positions for these senior officers. They were unhappy, and the other national groups were annoyed at what appeared to be an attempt to get all the good jobs. This was not seen as a problem by the offending nation, as they later sent a naval Captain (full Colonel equivalent) to relieve one of their commanders! The other contingents believed that this was done to ensure the nationality of the Maritime Component Commander would not be changed.

It was also very interesting working with the Russians. In early 1992, the "Cold War" was not a distant memory. Nevertheless, the Canadians got on well with them and soon established a very good working rapport. In order to help integrate them into our team on the coast, I requested a Russian army UNMO who I knew spoke fluent English, French and Vietnamese. Prior to his arrival I discussed this move with our Russian technical officers. They became very upset, telling me that they would not work with him because he was actually KGB (Security and Intelligence) and he would be watching and reporting their every move! I quickly cancelled the posting.

## **DISCIPLINE AND MORALE**

In discussion with the other team leaders, I was made aware that there were disciplinary and morale problems among most of the contingents. In the case of the Canadians, I believe a principal factor was that the officers and men were trained and deployed separately. Although this was necessary at the time, as an advance team was required to survey the situation, it led to a lack of team cohesiveness. To avoid a repetition of this situation, I

recommended to my national authority that future teams should be trained and deployed as a unit. This did become the policy and I believe it improved the situation.

Another difficulty, in my view, was the splitting-up of national groups so that each "base" was composed of a mixture of nationalities. The decision to mix people up had been made by the MCC, who had been part of the advance planning team. The only alteration to this plan was the setting up of two Spanish-speaking bases, to cater to a lack of language skills. Although there were advantages to this policy because it made the most of the strengths of each national contingent, it introduced additional impediments to maintaining discipline and team-cohesiveness in a country with very poor communication links. Although the leadership of each small base did its best to organise assigned personnel and accomplish their mission, different standards of training and discipline as well as national attitudes made the task more difficult.

I believe it would have been preferable to man each "base" with personnel from a single country. This would have greatly improved understanding of each other's professional qualifications, there would have been far less confusion due to language difficulties, and it would have been easier to resolve career and personal problems that required resolution by the individual's home nation. Although the usual policy with UNMOs is to provide a mixture of national backgrounds in each small observer team of two or three officers, the situation of the maritime component in Cambodia was quite different. It was necessary to work directly with the Cambodian navy to repair their vessels, train their crews and conduct operations. The teams were also larger than most normal observer teams: generally 10 or 12, with about 30 at the Ream coastal base and headquarters, on the Gulf of Thailand.

Perhaps if we had known more about the conduct of the mission in the beginning, nationality-based teams would have been the method used. I certainly recommend it for future missions of this type. Adequate central supervision would have been required to ensure that a common standard of conduct and performance was maintained throughout the mission area. Effective representation of all national groups in the central headquarters would have ensured such a common standard. I believe this is essential no matter how personnel are organised.

## **BECOMING OPERATIONAL**

During the early months of the mission, there were many problems to be solved in establishing bases, conducting training and deploying sailors from seven different nations to conduct riverine and coastal operations. For example, I chaired coastal planning meetings at the Ream base that were typically conducted in five different languages: English, French, Russian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese. Another challenge was the employment of elements of the Cambodian Navy for UN cease-fire patrol, escort and transportation of UN personnel. These vessels were in near-derelict condition and their crews had not been paid in many months. This situation demanded some unique leadership and interpersonal approaches in order to achieve success.

One of the problems was motivating the Cambodian patrol-boat crews to go to sea. They had not been paid for many months, and the sailors would lie about most of the day, expending what little energy they had by fishing to supplement their rice ration. To remedy this situation, the MCC requested that the UN pay them. There seemed to be many bureaucratic reasons why this could not be achieved, and the best that could be organised was the issuing of food - rice, cooking oil, canned sardines - for the crews and their families. Luckily this seemed to be enough, although we naval observers were embarrassed by this lack of generosity.

### **CO-OPERATING WITH PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS**

Dealing with different cultural backgrounds, and attempting to work with the Cambodian Navy in repairing and operating their vessels, presented many challenges. Although there was some attempt to familiarise personnel with the social culture of Cambodia and some of the background to the conflict in that country, it was far from adequate. Several of my non-commissioned officers found being part of a visible minority, albeit a privileged one, disturbing. This added to the stress these individuals exhibited as their time in the mission area accumulated. It was an interesting object lesson in what it must be like for visible minorities in our own country! Some of this stress was alleviated when those individuals took leave outside Cambodia, even if they remained in South East Asia.

Another challenge was the Cambodian Navy coastal commander. He saw his appointment as an opportunity to gain wealth, and was only



interested in co-operating with the UN if he saw some personal advantage. This was obvious from his rather lavish standard of living and his various business activities that employed sailors and other naval resources. We ensured he did not use any UN fuel, or vessels that were repaired by us, for his personal purposes. However, many junior Cambodian naval officers were very co-operative and saw the UN presence as a chance to revive their moribund service. Earlier, I alluded to impartial observers. It was not really possible for us to be impartial as we depended upon “our” Cambodians to maintain and operate their vessels, with UN technical leadership, direction, and financial assistance, which we then used to patrol Cambodian internal and coastal waterways.

There were many dynamics at work, not the least being the widespread hatred with which Cambodians regarded Vietnamese people. This attitude dates back many centuries, although the recent Vietnamese conquest of the country from the ruling Khmer Rouge regime in early 1979 certainly has done much to renew that feeling. The KR elements were particularly xenophobic on this topic; they believed that a secret Vietnamese army remained in Cambodia, with weapons and uniforms readily available to re-conquer the country. The KR made threats against the lives of several of our Vietnamese interpreters, which led to them being transferred to a less-dangerous area. One of the Canadian officers was of Vietnamese extraction, and doing a tremendous job in supporting the mission. I was concerned for his safety, and reported the situation to our national headquarters. It was decided to keep him in country, as he wished, and to avoid placing him in situations where the Khmer Rouge could capture him. He returned home unscathed at the end of an extended, year-long attachment to the mission.

## DOMESTIC ARRANGEMENTS

While the UN provided national contingents, such as army battalions and the Logistics Company, with food and accommodations UNMOs were expected to be mobile, and were paid an allowance so that they could re-locate at short notice. Their accommodation was not lavish by Canadian standards, and in some cases was an adventure in itself. Personnel at the naval “stations” made various domestic arrangements, such as having a teak house built next to the jetty where their patrol boats were berthed; living on a “floating house/HQ” on Tonle Sap Lake; keeping a python to cope with the rat problem; or renting accommodation

for groups of observers in the local economy, and hiring cooking, cleaning and security staff.

Safe water and food were a constant concern. Water was procured from a number of sources: brought from Camp Canada's Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit in 5 gallon Billy Cans, bottled water purchased in the markets, and local water boiled and/or treated with purification pills. Most of the UNMOs became intimately familiar with digestive problems and medications. Some of the bottled water, for instance, had been refilled and resealed by local entrepreneurs to make it look safe, thus, producing what one might call "counterfeit water." The other observers and I lost weight on a diet of white rice and boiled fish, supplemented by fresh fruit. Dining could also be an adventure. For instance, an enterprising and innovative Filipino marine provided a daily lunch for the observers at Ream base. On at least one occasion, a tasty stew was made from a three metre-long python, discovered while clearing tall grass and bushes around the marine barracks. He was also raising dogs as a food source!

## UNIQUE CONDITIONS

The conditions caused by the rainy and dry seasons, and the effect this has on major inland waterways, were factors totally new to Canadian naval personnel. The Mekong River has a range of some 45-50 feet (14-16 metres) in water level between these seasons. Villages appear and disappear, parts of the river are not navigable in the dry season, and in the rainy season the current becomes so strong that slow vessels make little progress against it. Another effect is the reversal of flow on the Tonle Sap River as the Mekong causes it to back-up into central Cambodia's Tonle Sap Lake, swelling the lake six-fold in area and flooding many roadways. During the rainy season, most of Cambodia's roads and railways were impassable due to flooding. Even during the dry season, many roads and bridges were impassable due to mining, war damage or poor maintenance.

## PATROL PLATFORMS

The Cambodian coastal vessels required extensive repairs to propulsion systems, auxiliary machinery, radar, and radios. Damage control and fire fighting were particular concerns, and kept the technical staff busy readying vessels for patrols. Existing first-aid and fire extinguishers were suspect, and, when a few were tested they proved inoperable. Additional

extinguishers were purchased and brought in from Singapore. Life rafts were also a concern, and were moved from vessel to vessel until new ones could be purchased.

When we first stepped aboard the vessels, we were surprised to find a wide range of explosive ordinance in plain sight. Land mines used for perimeter security, machine-gun shells and even surface-to-air missiles were exposed to the elements and presented a considerable hazard. This situation was reported to UN ammunition experts, who provided advice on stowage and specialised personnel to dispose of ordinance considered hazardous.

Extensive repairs were required to ready vessels for operations. In order to accomplish this, permission was sought to make use of existing infrastructure. For example: cables were procured through the UN for a marine railway in Sihanoukville so that landing craft and smaller patrol boats could be hauled from the water and repaired; a barely-floating dry-dock had to be repaired by UN naval technical personnel in order to commence hull work on the STENKA Class Fast Patrol Boats (FPB)s; additional vessels were acquired through negotiation with Cambodian authorities and then refitted; and white marine paint, with which to paint UN patrol boats, was unavailable in the country, so that house paint had to be purchased in local markets as a stopgap until supplies could be obtained from Singapore or Bangkok. Needless to say, house paint did not like salt water!

## **MARITIME OPERATIONS**

The initial role of the maritime component was to monitor adherence to the terms of the peace agreement. We met local dignitaries and faction heads, carried out area patrols, and generally ensured that the local population was made aware of the mandate of the UN mission. The presence of UN observers tended to put local officials on their best behaviour. During the last half of the mandate, the major objective became the support of the electoral process and the UN-run elections to be held in May 1993.

Operations were conducted on internal waterways, as well as along the coast in the Gulf of Thailand. A typical riverine patrol from the Phnom Penh River Base would involve the use of a parent vessel, a modified

Landing Craft (LC) with accommodation for 12 people, and several outboard-powered inflatable boats. A distant town or village would be selected as the base for a three-day patrol. The first and last day would include a transit to/from that operating base.

Whenever possible, a medical assistant would be embarked from the Logistics Company or German Field Hospital, primarily to treat minor ailments in the town as part of the “hearts and minds” aspect of the mission. There were very few qualified medical personnel in the country, and any medications available were often shelf life expired and very expensive.

The inflatable boats would operate in pairs for mutual support, frequently on tributaries not navigable by larger vessels. Patrols were conducted in daylight only, as factions might fire at vessels that they could not identify as UN. During these patrols, contact would be made with the local fishermen, “floating villagers”, headmen and military faction leaders. They would be briefed on such UN programmes as cantonment, education, medical and clean water initiatives, radio stations and the electoral process. Inquiries would be made as to recent activities, threats, and cease-fire violations in the area. This information would be fed back to Naval HQ where it became part of a database, and anything significant would be passed to the Force Commander’s staff.

The smaller bases along the rivers and Tonle Sap Lake were equipped with a combination of KANO-Class water-jet powered wooden patrol boats and inflatable boats, and several had a landing craft as well. Initially civilian-pattern inflatable boats were used, but they were not sufficiently robust and required a great deal of maintenance. During the second and third rotations in 1993, larger and more durable Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) were procured and proved suitable for local conditions.

Throughout the internal waterways of Cambodia hundreds of ferries carried people, a wide range of goods, and live animals to markets in major centres. A common problem faced by these passengers was extortion. Bandits, who were sometimes disguised as soldiers or police, would board a ferry, shoot an animal in full view of the passengers, and then demand money and valuables from the traumatised bystanders. The thinly veiled threat was obvious: pay up or the next bullet will be aimed at you! The UN presence on the rivers, and reports that went speedily to the Supreme

National Council governing the country, acted as a firm deterrent to this activity. On at least one occasion, a Canadian naval observer caught a “river policeman” in the act, and was able to cause his arrest. These ferries were often the only way for people and their goods to travel around the country, but they were far from safe: one of them capsized near Phnom Penh in the fall of 1992, with the loss of over thirty lives.

## LESSONS LEARNED

The operational tour provided many lessons learned. First, Serious consideration should be given to employing vessels from one of the contributing UN countries, rather than vessels of one of the warring parties. This occurred in the mission to El Salvador, when Argentine patrol boats, complete with trained crews and maintenance teams, were employed by UN observers to deter the smuggling of arms. I understand that Singapore had offered to provide patrol vessels and trained crews. The planning team decided that the Cambodian vessels would be used instead so that a Coast Guard could be created after the conclusion of the UN mission. This was a laudable, nation-building initiative, however, it also caused problems.

Second, the use of vessels and crews of one of the factions meant that UNTAC had to work closely with the Cambodian Navy, and there was the potential for a perception of UN favouritism to one faction from the other three. Furthermore, the Cambodian naval vessels were in appalling condition. Entire classes required re-building (the KANO-class PBs), or were totally unsafe for operations (four salt-water based SCHMEL-class river gunboats with rusty bottoms). The largest and most modern vessels at the Ream coastal base were the Russian-built STENKA-Class Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs). They were only 4-8 years old, but had up to 18 inches of marine growth on their hulls, no functioning fire extinguishers or fire hoses, suspect life rafts, non-functioning radar and gyro compasses. Upper-deck fittings had suffered advanced rust damage due to neglect and posed a threat of laceration and tetanus to exposed flesh on the upper decks. Ammunition, missiles, and mines lay in plain sight or were in unlocked stowage, often exposed to the heat and weather. None of the four STENKA FPBs had been underway in the previous year due to fuel shortages.

A third lesson learned was the fact that the UN bureaucracy was painfully slow in releasing funding to procure such necessities as fire fighting

equipment, life rafts, inflatable boats and outboard motors. Given the short life span of most UN missions, in future the bureaucracy must be more flexible in co-operating with maritime components in achieving mission objectives. These issues must be resolved prior to the arrival of personnel who need this equipment to perform their roles.

Fourth, the magnitude of the effort required to ready the Cambodian vessels for operations adversely affected the effectiveness and frequency of patrols, especially in the early months of the mission. If the vessels and infrastructure of another navy had been used to provide platforms for UN Observers, the maritime patrol effort would have been greatly enhanced.

Finally, as already mentioned, a revised two-week package for the third rotation included a modified boarding course, several days of small arms familiarisation, the experience gained by previous teams; and intelligence, land mine threat, flora and fauna, health, hygiene, customs and traditions briefings by an NDHQ team. This proved to be a cost-effective alternative to sending everyone to CFB Borden and Ottawa in central Canada.

## CRITICAL ISSUES

There are a number of critical issues in a successful maritime mission of the type I have described. Many have been alluded to in the text, however, they are highlighted here for clarity and emphasis:

Selection of Personnel: It is essential that the right people be selected for these significant tasks. Although I was pleased with the over-all performance of the maritime component, careful selection of those best suited for such a difficult task would have greatly alleviated some of the discipline problems. In the case of Canada, it was recommended that a team of people be pre-selected in case of a requirement to deploy. Team members would remain with their own units, but would periodically assemble for briefings, general training, and immunisation. This recommendation has not been taken up, due to manning shortages.

Adequate Pre-Deployment training: There were problems with the training of my team. A special 2-week package for the third rotation, employing lessons-learned and mission-experienced personnel as trainers, was a big improvement. Such a package should be "kept on the books", and refined as necessary as a starting point for future such missions.

Mission Turnover: In order to ensure that some of the lessons-learned were passed on to the next rotation, I requested that my relief and the new senior non-commissioned officer come over two weeks early for a turnover. This was done, and gave them a much better idea of the mission. Without this, we might have met briefly in the airport before they boarded the plane from Thailand to Cambodia, as was the case with the remainder of the incoming naval observers. Other recommended methods include keeping a diary or record of activities and contacts, frequent messages back to a central co-ordination cell in your own country, and input into pre-deployment training.

Leave: Most of the personnel I knew found the mission highly rewarding but stressful. Everyone should take leave to get out of the mission area at least once during a six-month tour. Those who did were better performers after their return.

## CONCLUSIONS

From a personal perspective, I found the experience very rewarding. I met some very interesting and generally well-meaning people who sincerely wanted to contribute to a successful outcome for the mission. We had found Cambodia in an almost totally chaotic condition, and improvements to the country's infrastructure could be seen to be happening all around us. It must be acknowledged, however, that the presence of the UN caused problems too, such as galloping inflation and spread of infectious diseases. Nevertheless, I believe that, for the vast majority of the population, the country is a much better place to live now than it was prior to the intercession of the international community.

I also met some people who I think should not have been deployed to Cambodia, both in my team and in others. Some because they could not get-on well with members of their own team or other nationalities, and some that should have been weeded-out prior to training because they had personal issues that adversely affected their performance. A proper selection process is required in order to limit the number of misfits deployed on such missions. It seemed that I spent a disproportionate part of my time trying to resolve the problems of a few people. This was an unneeded distraction as there were plenty of challenges to occupy me. After all, in a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute in September 1994, Australian Lieutenant-General Sanderson, the UNTAC Force Commander,

described our environment. He stated: "...the naval observers had one of the greatest adventures of modern times. Smugglers, pirates, rustlers, (and) massacres were almost daily fare for the naval component."

Certainly, UNTAC's Maritime Component had much to offer to a mission where transportation on inland and coastal waterways was often the only way to get around the country. It is interesting to note that of the UN's 180 member-states, only 35 do not have a coastline. Many of those 35 have significant inland waterways, which should be considered when planning future peacekeeping operations. In recent years, Canada's Navy, whether represented by a task group or a few observers, has proven its ability to contribute to our peacekeeping effort. It should always be remembered that, where appropriate, a maritime contingent is an excellent alternative to deploying an infantry unit to fulfil our international responsibilities.





## CHAPTER 3

### A PROFILE OF EFFECTIVE OFFICERSHIP IN MULTI-NATIONAL COMMAND

*Major Brent Beardsley*

From July 1993 until May 1994, I had the opportunity and the privilege of serving as the personal staff officer to then Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), before and during the genocide that swept that nation in 1994 and which resulted in the murder of 800,000, largely innocent men, women and children.<sup>1</sup> While the mission failed to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda, that failure was overwhelmingly due to the lack of will and means provided to the mission from the international community. It was not due to a failure in command in the mission. In fact, the mission was blessed with a group of outstanding senior international officers, who with their individual and collective values, skills, knowledge and attitudes, as well as their sense of duty and their phenomenal moral and physical courage, directly contributed to saving the lives of over 40,000 Rwandans. They achieved this success with a force of only 444 soldiers, from 21 different nations, and with totally inadequate means, and provided the only positive effort by the world in responding to the genocide in Rwanda.

How was it that this diverse group of senior officers could come together in such a short time and achieve so much in a mission that was abandoned by the United Nations and the International Community? The answer to this question is the central idea of this chapter - that is to provide some personal observations of the individual and collective qualities this group of senior officers displayed as they undertook their responsibilities in various command roles in UNAMIR, before and during the genocide of 1994.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this chapter, the Force Commander will be referred to as Major-General Dallaire, although for the first months of the mission (July-December 1993) he was a Brigadier-General and after the mission he was promoted to and retired as a Lieutenant-General. Major-General was the rank he held for the major part of the mission, especially the war and genocide of 1994.

While “trait” or “great captain” theories of leadership/officership have largely been subordinated to more scientific and advanced theories, the observation of great commanders at work can still provide insights and role models for junior officers, as well as lessons, which can be judiciously applied under similar circumstances. This chapter will focus on those qualities, based on personal observation of a group of six officers of different nationalities and diverse backgrounds, who came together in a relatively short time span to lead and command under the worst and most adverse combat conditions. As Canadian senior officers continue to be posted to similar challenging missions, within multi-national commands, this chapter will attempt to provide those officers with some lessons in officership from the Rwanda mission experience.

The six senior commanders of UNAMIR were Major-General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, Brigadier-General Henry Anyidoho of Ghana, Colonel Uddin Moen of Bangladesh, Colonel Herbert Figoli of Uruguay, Colonel Isoa Tikoka of Fiji and Colonel Luc Marchal of Belgium. These commanders came from six different countries, six very different national militaries with different cultures and traditions and very diverse professional military training, education and development systems. Every one of them spoke English, the mission language, as their second, third or fourth language. They came from religiously and culturally different societies. They all had unique experiential development, both within their parent societies and within their respective militaries. They came together in November 1993, formed an effective command team within a month or so of arrival in-theatre and were performing magnificently under adverse conditions until April 1994, and then under the most horrendous operational conditions until the genocide ended in July 1994. Who were these senior officers?

Major-General Dallaire is well known to Canadians and Canadian soldiers. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada (at both St. Jean and Kingston campuses), he served as an artillery officer in a variety of appointments at the troop, battery, regimental and brigade level, including command at those respective echelons. He also had diverse experience in staff appointments at schools, the Military College, Army and National Defence headquarters. His professional education included US Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the UK Higher Command and Staff Course. He had extensive NATO experience and had been developed throughout his career as a Cold War warrior.

In 1993, he was appointed by the Canadian Forces (CF) and the United Nations (UN) to command the UNAMIR mission to Rwanda, on what was supposed to be a relatively straightforward traditional, Chapter VI or peacekeeping (vice a Chapter VII or peace enforcement) mission. In the end, it was anything but a simple mission and is one of the best examples of the failure of traditional peacekeeping as a panacea in conflict resolution in the post-Cold War world. Despite a total lack of political will and material support, before and during the civil war and genocide, Major-General Dallaire remained focused on his mission, led with honour, and effectively commanded a totally inadequate force, which tried against all odds to succeed in its mission.

After Rwanda, he held appointments as Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army, Commander 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, Commander of Land Force Quebec Area, Chief of Staff of Assistant Deputy-Minister (ADM) Personnel, ADM Human Resources-Military and Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff on Officer Professional Development. He retired from the Forces in 1999 and currently holds the appointment of Special Advisor to the Canadian Government on War-Affected Children, has written and spoken extensively in Canada and around the world, and is completing a fellowship at the prestigious Carr Centre of Human Rights at Harvard University. In 2005, he was appointed to the Canadian Senate.

The Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff (DFC/COS) of UNAMIR was Brigadier-General Henry Anyidoho. A graduate of both Sandhurst and his nation's military academy, he was a signals officer in the post-independence national army of Ghana. He had command experience at the troop, squadron and unit levels and he had held a wide variety of staff appointments, mostly in the operations branches within his army. He had also completed professional education at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He had operational tours in Congo and Lebanon, and had planned and successfully deployed his nation's contingents to Cambodian and Liberian missions.

As Ghana provided a major contingent to UNAMIR, it was invited to provide an officer to the DFC/COS position and he was appointed to that position. He became a close personal friend and the closest and most trusted advisor of Major-General Dallaire before and during the genocide. He was also, on a moment's notice, more than ready to step up should the commander become a casualty. UNAMIR would have been as well served

by Anyidoho as it was by Dallaire. After the UNAMIR mission, Brigadier Anyidoho commanded a brigade in Ghana until his retirement.

Colonel Uddin Moen of Bangladesh served as the Chief Operations Officer (COO) and occasionally as the Bangladesh (the largest contingent in pre-war UNAMIR) Contingent Commander. He had joined his army and fought in combat during the vicious and brutal civil war, which had liberated Bangladesh from Pakistan. In the post-war army, he had been one of the officers called upon to build a new national army for his country, literally from scratch and with very limited resources. He also had extensive counter-insurgency combat experience in the Hill Tracts war of his nation. He had commanded at the platoon, company and unit level. He had held a wide variety of staff appointments in field and national headquarters. His professional education included completion of the US Army Command and Staff College.

Moen joined UNAMIR as the COO during the deployment stage in January 1994, and served before and during the war and genocide in this position. He was responsible for running the tactical portion of the Force headquarters on a day to day basis, leaving Major-General Dallaire and Brigadier Anyidoho, with their planning staff, to run the operational level of the headquarters, including campaign planning and coordination with the strategic headquarters in New York. Major-General Dallaire was well served by Colonel Moen. After his tour in UNAMIR, Moen was selected to attend War College in China and has since been promoted and continues to serve in senior command and staff appointments in his national army.

Colonel Herbert Figoli arrived in Rwanda with the advance party from the UN mission in Cambodia to assist in building the force, particularly the force and sector headquarters. He had just completed a year of service in Cambodia in command and staff positions. He was a graduate of his nation's Military Academy and Command and Staff College. He was an infantry officer and he had held command positions at the platoon through unit level and a wide variety of staff appointments. In Rwanda, he became a key advisor to General Dallaire and, with only a handful of staff officers, 50 military observers and a 60 man Tunisian company, secured the 100 kilometer (km) long demilitarized zone in the north of the country between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF). He earned the respect of both parties, and

there were no major clashes in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) throughout his tenure of command as the DMZ Sector Commander.

Unfortunately, he was recalled to his national army in January 1994, and UNAMIR was denied the services of this most excellent commander during the subsequent genocide and war. Nevertheless, in a very short period of time, his legacy in UNAMIR was his establishment of an effective sector headquarters and control of the DMZ. He greatly assisted in the successful deployment of follow on forces, all the while conducting active operations in and around the DMZ. He has, since his tour in Rwanda, been promoted in his Army and continues to serve in senior appointments.

Colonel Figoli's replacement was Colonel Clayton Yachee of Ghana. Colonel Yachee was a graduate of his nation's Military Academy and Command and Staff College. He was an infantry officer, who had held command appointments from the platoon to the unit level in his army. He had operational experience from a tour in Lebanon at the height of the its civil war in that nation. He had held a wide variety of staff appointments in his army. He was appointed Commander DMZ Sector and his command included the Ghanaian Battalion, a multi-national group of military observers and a Bangladesh Engineer Company.

After hostilities started, he was redeployed to Kigali to serve as Senior Staff Officer of the Humanitarian Branch. This was an enormous undertaking, which from absolutely nothing built the humanitarian assistance branch, in the near total absence of international, governmental and non-governmental aid organizations (with the notable exception of International Committee of the Red Cross and *Medcins sans Frontier* (Doctors without Borders)) and provided the only humanitarian assistance available to the tens of thousands of displaced persons that came under UNAMIR's protection. The phenomenal efforts and achievements of this branch saved the lives of tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of people during the genocide. He also coordinated the post-war humanitarian efforts, which contributed to saving the lives of over two million Rwandans, inside and outside Rwanda. Achieving this distinction, without any background in humanitarian assistance matters, in itself describes the common sense, good judgment, initiative, flexibility and superior competence of this commander. Since his tour in UNAMIR, Colonel Yachee has moved rapidly through the ranks of his army and is now the Chief of Staff of the Ghanaian Armed Forces.

Colonel Isoa Tikoka was the Commander of the Military Observer Group, which at its peak in April 1994, had approximately 350 military observers in three subordinate sectors (RPF Sector, RGF Sector and Southern Sector) and seconded observers in the other three sectors (United Nations Observer Mission Uganda and Rwanda or UNOMUR in Uganda, DMZ and Kigali Sectors). Colonel Tikoka was an infantry officer, who had been professionally educated in Australia at their Military Academy and Command and Staff College. He had held command appointments at the platoon, company and unit level, including an extended period of command of a battalion on two operational tours. He had extensive UN operational experience in Sinai, Lebanon, India-Pakistan and Somalia in command, staff and military observer appointments. He had more operational time out of his nation, than time at home in his country. Colonel Tikoka was absolutely fearless and had a reputation throughout the United Nations for his personal bravery, which was only enhanced by numerous acts of personal courage during the genocide in Rwanda.

Colonel Tikoka led from the front and was always at the location of maximum danger. Through his personal example, he earned and held the respect and loyalty of his diverse group of military observers from 22 different countries. He had also been the military observer at the Arusha Peace Talks and was a close personal advisor to Major-General Dallaire. After his tour in Rwanda, he continued to serve in his army until he retired to accept a senior government appointment.

The final key senior officer in UNAMIR was Colonel Luc Marchal. He was a graduate of his nation's Military Academy and Command and Staff College. Marchal was an infantry officer, with extensive command experience at the platoon, company and unit levels largely within a NATO/Cold War context. He had held a wide variety of general staff appointments, including Executive Assistant to the Belgian Minister of Defence. Colonel Marchal had considerable operational experience in Africa; in the Congo and Rwanda. He was appointed to command the Kigali Sector of UNAMIR, which contained the airport, the mission's designated vital ground. His command was diverse, including a Belgian Para-Commando Battalion, a small Bangladesh Battalion, a Tunisian Light Infantry Company and a number of multi-national military observer teams. He held the dual responsibility of also being the Belgian Contingent Commander for the mission. Before and during the initial stages of the war, he was a close and trusted advisor to Major-General Dallaire.

When the war started, he directly commanded the expatriate evacuation, which rescued and saved 5,000 foreign nationals, including over 150 Canadians, from Rwanda. Despite enormous political pressure from Brussels, he never wavered in his loyalty to Dallaire or his support of UNAMIR, even when he was technically removed from UNAMIR command by his nation. When ordered to withdraw the Belgian Contingent, he deliberately delayed the withdrawal for several days so that Major-General Dallaire could evacuate the Bangladesh units (which had been ordered withdrawn by their nation). He also bought the time so that, with very limited transport and fuel, Dallaire could redeploy the Ghanaian Battalion to defensive positions at the airport (the mission's vital ground) and secure the only hope for logistical and humanitarian support and as a possible route of evacuation should that be required. Colonel Marchal was the epitome of the gentleman officer: well mannered and articulate in four languages, brave and principled. His personal moral and physical courage saved the UNAMIR mission in the dark days of mid-April 1994 and the lives of tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.

In return for this extraordinary leadership and courage, he was made the scapegoat for the failures and the cowardice of the Belgian Government and its policies in Rwanda. He was court-martialed for failure to prevent the murder of 10 Belgian soldiers on the first day of the war. The charges were dismissed and despite enormous political pressure, he was completely exonerated by the Judge who eloquently and publicly directed all criticism of events in Rwanda onto the Belgian Government. He retired from the army and has continued to be persecuted by some, while praised by many for his decisions and actions in Rwanda. To those who served "in harm's way" in Rwanda, he will forever be a hero of that tragic mission.

Six very different men; each with his own personality, strengths, weaknesses, religious faith, language and cultural background. They were trained, educated, developed, and experienced in very different armies in different institutions, with varying operational experience and in different career positions. Yet somehow, these soldiers all came together to form a cohesive and effective senior command team of a diverse, multi-national force based, largely on some observed common qualities. Those common qualities were that each of these senior officers was a leader, a warrior, a commander, a manager, a teacher, a student and a gentleman.



The first observed quality held by each of these officers was that they were well-trained, educated, developed and experienced leaders. They all had been taught, had learned and practiced solid leadership skills, and no doubt had risen in rank in their respective armies because of their proven leadership abilities. All based their leadership on the common military values of duty, honour, professionalism and courage. They set the personal and professional example for their subordinates and led by example. They were quickly imitated by most of their subordinates, regardless of national background. Each of them was firm, fair and mostly friendly, and they established high standards and demanded that those standards be achieved and maintained.

Four of the six, in their early careers, had participated in military coups that had overthrown their respective governments and established military rule in their countries. However, in common from that experience, each had concluded that democracy, human rights and the rule of law were the preferred civic values of the future. They respected the dignity of all persons, whether subordinates from their own nation or another, or Rwandans in general. None of them had a single racist or ethnocentric cell in their bodies and would not tolerate any form of discrimination in their subordinates. This quality alone permitted them to bring together an extremely diverse group of individual soldiers into a cohesive and effective team.

Every one of these officers could be relied upon to give clear and objective advice and opinion, but when a decision was made and orders were issued from the chain of command, whether they liked or disliked the orders or agreed or disagreed with them, they obeyed lawful authority. In turn, they demanded obedience from each of their subordinates. The only litmus test of an order, in any military culture, is and should be the legality of that order.

Each of these officers led by personal example. Whether in speech, dress, fitness, exposure to danger, or living conditions they set the example in all they said and did. They served the mission before they served themselves. These ethical principles so evident in the words and actions of these senior officers are the same ethical principles that we have established for the Canadian Forces and we will be well served in the future by adhering to them.

As leaders, they focused all of their energy and attention towards successfully accomplishing any assigned mission from the chain of command. Mission success, despite danger, always inadequate resources, within a complex and ever-changing situational context, was their first priority and this priority was effectively relayed to subordinates as the standard for their efforts. They understood that the mission and the tasks they were called upon to perform were right (morally, ethically and legally), and were important (operationally and within the context of humanity). They instilled this motivation for the success of the mission in each subordinate. Soldiers will accomplish or give every effort to try to accomplish any assigned mission, if they believe the mission is right as well as important. They will not squander their lives or risk injury, wounds or sickness for the trivial or for the morally, ethically or operationally questionable.

As leaders, these officers were experienced and skilled at rapidly forming effective teams. They could appreciate the tasks needed to accomplish the mission, assess the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates, assign resources and bring all of these elements together into an effective team focused on mission success. Building cohesive and effective multi-national teams brought together the strengths of each national soldier and compensated for their individual weaknesses.

Effective multi-national team-building is an essential quality of a leader in a multi-national force. While the preference will always be to assign all critical work and leadership roles to officers of one's own army or similar armies, this tendency must be resisted and individuals from every nation in the force must be given their share of responsibilities, if the loyalty and respect of all subordinates are to be obtained. While it may involve a degree of risk in over-challenging some individuals, the benefits in loyalty and operational effectiveness far outweigh the risk in building an effective team.

Each of these officers was especially skilled at being personally flexible and ensuring operational flexibility in plans and their execution. The situation in Rwanda was not as it seemed. The mission was not a simple, straightforward, traditional peacekeeping mission. It rapidly became a war and genocide where traditional peacekeeping and even traditional war-fighting doctrine no longer applied. This was a new situation, where a weakly mandated, restricted and poorly supported force had to blaze a new

trail in a dangerous, complex situation. Each of these men rose to the challenge of command under combat and adverse conditions, because they could always adapt to the situation as it changed on the ground.

The final quality consistently demonstrated and sincerely held by each of these officers, was their love of soldiers and soldiering. Although, they each had their own way of expressing this love, at the heart of every decision and effort they made was a genuine and observable care for their troops and their welfare. They always did, and were seen to do, the best they could with what they had for the care and comfort of their men, even when they were leading them, with inadequate resources and against all odds, into harm's way. They shared the same living conditions and resource shortages as the lowliest private soldier. They led by example. An effective officer must love his soldiers, even when he orders them, as these men had to, to their deaths to achieve the mission.

Based on extensive, albeit diverse, leadership training, education, development and experience, each of these officers, in his own way, was an effective leader. Do you have to be an effective leader to be an effective commander? The answer is yes, because soldiers will follow a commander because of his legal authority, but they will follow a leader, even to their deaths, because they want to follow him as a human being whom they respect. This is an important point and will be repeated: *Soldiers will follow a commander because they have to, but they follow a leader because they want to.* In Rwanda, each of us was deserted and written off by his parent nation, his army and the international community. We were provided with a level of support that can only accurately be termed "disgraceful." We were told by New York that "there was no cavalry over the hill and no one was coming to get us out." We knew that, if one or both of the parties attacked us, we would all be massacred without any hope of rescue. Major-General Dallaire could not even guarantee us a bottle of water, a meal or medical evacuation should any one of us be wounded, injured or stricken by sickness. When the world quit Rwanda and clearly demonstrated that it did not care, why did we stay and continue to perform our military professional duties when it was evident no one was going to support our mission? We stayed for one reason only, and that was that we had full loyalty and confidence in our commanders because we trusted them as leaders. As long as they stayed, we would stay. As long as they did their job, we would do ours regardless of the cost.

And the cost was high. Of 444 soldiers in UNAMIR, 15 were killed, about two dozen were wounded, half came down with malaria during their tour, and it is suspected that the overwhelming majority suffered some degree of severe psychological reaction to the experience. The only way out of UNAMIR for each of those 444 soldiers was in a body bag or on a stretcher, if the Hercules transport aircraft was flying.

Soldiers may follow a commander who is not a leader in peacetime. They will never serve under a commander who is not a leader in conditions like those we were expected to serve under in Rwanda. As long as a commander can deliver victories or wins, his subordinates will continue to follow him. However, when he loses, they will cease to follow him, as happened in Rwanda with more junior commanders when their soldiers did not have confidence in their leadership. A leader, however, who has earned the respect and loyalty of his subordinates, can, through no fault of his own, deliver losses and defeats and still lead because his subordinates will maintain their respect and loyalty to him, and forgive his mistakes, when they know he is doing the best with what he has been given and has the success of the mission balanced with their welfare as his primary concerns. Once again, an effective commander must be an effective leader.

The second quality shared by all of these officers was that each was a warrior. They each had joined the profession of arms of their respective nations to serve as soldiers in the service of their country. They had all been trained to fight and win at every level of command. Some had extensive combat or near-combat experience, and they all had life-long study and experience in training in pursuing the ultimate skill of the warrior, which is to fight and win.

Although the pre-war peacekeeping mission to Rwanda did not appear to demand this skill, after 7 April, it was clear in every soldier's mind that the force, as a last resort, had to be prepared to fight, to kill and, if necessary, to die in the pursuit of the mission. No one was going to surrender after we had heard of, or seen the mutilated bodies of our Belgian comrades. Neither were we under any misconception that traditional peacekeeping methods of negotiation would solve every confrontation that we had with the blood soaked butchers of the Interhamwe militia. An officer must be capable of fighting and winning in battle.

Each of these men had the respect and the confidence of their subordinates that they knew, when and how to fight if necessary. This shared quality ensured that all subordinates knew their senior officers would fight them effectively if necessary, but not engage their troops in a fight needlessly. A soldier knows when and how to fight and win, a peace-keeper hopes he will never have to learn that lesson. These complex and dangerous missions, upon which we have been deployed over the last decade, of which Rwanda was only one of several recent examples, demand that warriors know how to fight if necessary. In this case, these six warriors brought incredible skill sets that ensured all means short of the use of force could be exercised, but if necessary the use of force was still an option, which they were prepared and competent to exercise if the situation demanded it. Being a warrior is a true quality of the modern senior officer, and God help us if we ever forget this critical requirement as we transform into a post-modern military.

The third observed quality of these officers was that each was an experienced commander. Each of them had extensive experience, at all levels in command, from their most junior days in the army as platoon or equivalent commanders to recent command experiences at unit and even formation level. Some had even had multi-national command experience. There is no substitute for command experience. You can spend a lifetime of study of the theory of command, but nothing replaces the comfort, confidence and ease with which an experienced commander exercises command.

Why each of these men was an experienced and effective commander was also developed by the time they had spent in staff employment, learning how various organizations worked and observing both good and bad examples of commanders. This experience, in command and staff employment at every level in the chain of command ensured that, whether employed in command or in staff functions, they were equally effective. Some argue that command and staff career tracks should be initiated to best develop the specific skills of officers. Such a system has been proven wrong throughout our military history, and was proven wrong in Rwanda. The unwelcome result of such a system would be senior commanders who do not understand how to use their staffs and senior staff officers who do not know how to command. The best system, still in use with every major army in the world, regardless of its size, is to train, educate, professionally develop and experience officers in command and staff appointments, up

the chain of command, until they can advance no further or until the competition takes them out of this stream. Unfortunately, in some cases and in some armies, this career progression is nothing more than a series of check marks in career boxes, which will ultimately not provide the best quality of commanders or staff officers. The rotating experience between command and staff must be a full experience, and must demonstrate mastery of command and staff skills at each level of employment. This system and its retention will continue to ensure that armies produce senior commanders who are as comfortable, confident, interchangeable and experienced in appropriate command appointments as they are in appropriate staff appointments.

What does command experience provide to the individual officer? First, it provides the opportunity to gain competence at the applicable rank level. The skills that each of these officers had obtained in command experience were the foundation of the next higher level of command.

Second, command experience demands the development of character. The commander is unique and alone. His words and more importantly his actions are watched and studied by all of his subordinates. He cannot slack off or cover-up a lack of character. He must walk the walk and not just talk the talk. Soldiers are smart and getting smarter, and they will identify those senior officers and commanders who lack character and ultimately they will refuse to follow them into harm's way.

Finally, command experience and preparing for command experience provides an excellent opportunity to develop ones intellect. No one wants to be commanded by a "dummy." Virtually anyone, through training, can develop the predicted response to a known situation, which is the goal of training. However, professional and intellectual education provides the ability to reason one's way through unpredictable situations. Given the current and future security environment, we will continue to need (as this group of senior officers demonstrated) commanders, with strong intellect, who can successfully reason their way through the unpredictable situations we will continue to face in the complex, ever-changing and dangerous operations of the future.

The next common quality of each of the senior officers in UNAMIR was their skill as managers. Management has become the forbidden "F" word to the intellectually challenged officer who lacks confidence in the

necessary skill sets of the future leader. An officer leads people, commands organizations and manages resources. There should be no discomfort with conducting a life long study of management with a view to acquiring the skills necessary to effectively manage resources at higher levels of command.

Each of these officers came from armies that were always short of what they considered to be the minimum necessary amount of resources. The only constant in UNAMIR, before and during the war and genocide, was its totally inadequate resource allocation to even achieve minimum operational effectiveness. An officer, as some have suggested, can throw up his hands, blame the politicians and quit the mission in disgust. A professional soldier takes what he is given and does the best that he can with it in order to achieve, or try to achieve his assigned mission. While he has a mandatory obligation to advise his superiors of the risks due to inadequate resources, and he has to spare no effort in obtaining more resources, at the end of the day, you have what you have been given and you still have the professional obligation to succeed in your mission. UNAMIR failed in Rwanda, but it was not a failure from not trying to use what little we had been given to accomplish our assigned mission.

Management skills, such as these senior officers had acquired in their respective careers, in inadequately resourced armies, are essential skills of the senior officer. These officers could and did do five things. They always knew how much of each critical resource they had in the force. They always prioritized the allocation of the minimum essential amount of resources to the “must do” tasks. They effectively supervised the use of resources to eliminate any waste. They never became complacent and always fought for more resources. Finally, they were always receptive to any idea to improvise or to improve their resource situation. Resource Management skills are essential to an officer in multi-national command and cannot be delegated to the staff.

Micro-management must be avoided, but the commander must know the state of his available resources, he must prioritize their allocation to the most important tasks and he must expend every effort to get more resources. This lesson from the performance of the senior officers of UNAMIR highlights an essential quality for senior officers. After all, those employed in multi-national commands should anticipate operating with inadequate resources for the missions they will be asked to perform.

The senior officers of UNAMIR individually and collectively had more training, education and experience than most of their subordinates. Moreover, they were not given the choice of subordinates. They had to accept the individuals that were assigned to them regardless of work ethic or customs, and regardless of language, command or staff skills and experience. Some subordinates were phenomenally well-trained and capable. Others were next to useless, some through no fault of their own, and others due to an unprofessional work ethic. Regardless of the quality of each subordinate, they all had to be pulled together into an effective team to achieve the mission.

These officers were all extremely skilled and experienced at measuring the quality of each subordinate's skill level regardless of his nationality, race, experience, or training. Critical jobs were assigned without national preference to those who demonstrated skill and the appropriate work ethic. However, if your best people alone are given all of the demanding and dangerous work, they will one day become burned out or killed and you will not have any "best" people left. Each subordinate has to be given the opportunity to develop to the "best" level to which he is capable of achieving. For example, someone who is illiterate in English through no fault of his own, is not going to be taught how to write in a war zone and therefore should not be placed in a staff position. He could be moved to a field position more in line with his skill sets. Potential for skill improvement is a subjective judgment and is an essential quality in a senior officer.

Each of these officers dedicated an extensive amount of their time to training or delegating training by the "best" to others to raise the skill sets of all of their subordinates. The idea that training ends in the mission area or when the first bullets begin to fly is dead wrong. In UNAMIR, rules of engagement, staff, communication and other skills training were conducted throughout the war. Training never ends. There is always something that can be learned by a subordinate that can save lives, whether his own or those of others. Furthermore, continued training adds to the overall operational effectiveness of the force. These senior officers were all excellent trainers who took the time and made the effort to invest themselves in the training and development of their subordinates.

As for those subordinates with an unprofessional work ethic who would not enable themselves to be trained, they were relieved of critical jobs,



given mundane but nevertheless dangerous jobs or repatriated out of theatre. However, these actions should not be taken lightly. No national government likes to be told one of its officers is unprofessional and incompetent and that officer will always claim discrimination. The best way of conducting this action is for the senior officer to inform the national contingent commander of the subordinate's shortcomings, the efforts made to correct them, the embarrassment that the officer in question is causing his national army, and request that the contingent commander conduct an attitude adjustment or relieve the officer. This process was used effectively in UNAMIR but sparingly, and only in cases of cowardice, total incompetence or when the actions of the individual adversely affected the larger team in the achievement of its mission. In most cases some form of employment appropriate to the skill level of the officer could be found, permitting that officer to make a meaningful, albeit limited, contribution to mission success.

Any officer of any rank level who thinks he knows everything is a fool who is too stupid to realize that he is a fool. Everyone has something to learn and anyone, regardless of his race, culture, training, education or experience can teach you something. The skill demonstrated by our senior officers was that they were each smart enough to "know what they knew and know what they did not know." Armed with this knowledge, our senior officers were always prepared to make the effort to learn from someone that which they knew they did not know. There is no shame in asking a subordinate or a civilian to teach you a skill you know you are missing.

Every one of our senior officers had a thirst for new knowledge and skills, and was prepared to change their attitudes to improve themselves as officers and to improve their subordinates. The lesson taken from UNAMIR is that you never stop learning and that everyone in the mission area can teach you something. It is not necessarily what you know, but in fact what you do not know that will get you or your soldiers killed in a new, complex, dangerous and ever-changing mission environment. Take the time throughout your career to learn and be a life long student.

The term an "officer and a gentleman or lady" is a term which has gone out of use for somehow being politically incorrect in our post-modern army. In UNAMIR, we had the privilege of serving under six senior officers who were also gentlemen. So what exactly is a gentleman or a lady?

Each of these officers knew how to speak, dress and act in any situation. They were as comfortable attending an international meeting at the Presidential Palace as they were at a cocktail party at an embassy or sharing a bowl of rice under fire with a private soldier. They could adapt to any situation in language, personal hygiene, the smartness of their dress, and their manners and actions. I was always proud of each and every one of them and of the comfort with which each could seamlessly float between any every occasion. They set a standard and an example for all to follow.

This was also an operational requirement for two reasons. Before and even during the war, there was more to be learnt about the operational environment at the table of the warring parties than sitting in our offices lamenting our lack of knowledge of the situation on the ground. These occasions were used to gather intelligence, change attitudes and actions, and ultimately to influence the situation for mission success. These senior officers disarmed their adversaries with their charm and were able to enter the psyche of their opponents. Secondly, soldiers of any nation respect an officer who is a gentleman or a lady because they are not just another one of the “boys” or “girls” but are officers who can be respected. Much of the respect the non-commissioned members and NCOs once had for the Canadian Officer Corps has been lost, and started eroding when officers no longer felt it was necessary for them to speak, dress and act like ladies or gentleman. This remains an essential quality of the senior officer, especially in multi-national missions where it will be demanded as a “must have” by subordinates from other armies and cultures.

Six very different senior officers, from six very different nations and cultures, from six very different armies, with no common training, education, professional development or experiential base came together in short order and led UNAMIR beyond any expectation in the performance of its mission in Rwanda during and after the genocide. Those who served in UNAMIR were well served by their leaders in doing their best with what little they had in trying to achieve their mission. They achieved more in Rwanda than the rest of the entire world during the civil war and genocide. They were only able to do this because of the qualities of their senior officers and the inspiration each received from them to perform any assigned task to the best of their professional ability.

Senior Officers in the current and future security environment and junior officers who aspire to become senior officers must be effective leaders,

warriors, commanders, managers, teachers, students, as well as ladies or gentlemen. Without these qualities, we will seldom enjoy victory in multi-national missions. With these qualities, Canadian officers will continue to add to the long line of victories in their nation's proud military history and tradition as we prepare for the inevitable operations that our country will call upon us to perform in the complex future security environment.

## CHAPTER 4

### OPERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD - SOME WORDS OF ADVICE

*Major R.J. Martin*

I do not wish to appear presumptuous, however, I do believe that my experience has provided me with some insight that is worth sharing. As an infantry officer with The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), I have served in all three of its battalions, as well as The RCR Battle School and 3 Airborne Commando of the former Canadian Airborne Regiment, as well as in various staff positions. Equally important, I have deployed on eight operational deployments, which include: Cyprus 1984 and 1991, Oka 1990, Cambodia 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 and 1998, and Sierra Leone 2000.<sup>1</sup> These experiences have allowed me to make many observations, which I have divided into broad categories (i.e. Propensity to use Force, Negligent Discharges and how to prevent them, Truth to Power, and Advice for United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs)). I will address each in turn.

#### PROPENSITY TO USE FORCE

In my experience, the first use of force by soldiers will only occur after far more provocation than is required by whatever Rules of Engagement (ROEs) are in effect has transpired. That is to say that initially the threshold of tolerance and risk acceptance is generally very high. Inevitably, there will have been several occasions where force could have, and probably should have been used before the first case occurs where force is actually used. Normally, with each subsequent incident, the threshold will be lowered and, as a result, the willingness to resort to the use of force will be greatly increased. This pendulum creates a significant leadership issue. In essence, a leader must go from trying to ensure that the appropriate use of force is used in accordance with the ROE

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<sup>1</sup> Editor's note – Major Martin was deployed in Afghanistan at the time this volume was assembled (fall-winter 2005-2006).

(i.e. just enough to get over the threshold) but must also make certain that the threshold does not sink below what good judgment requires and the ROE permit. In short, leaders must ensure the credibility of the force, as well as maintain consistency so that the other parties understand “the rules.”

For example, the first shots fired by the battalion in which I served at Kanawake during the Oka Crisis in 1990, were only fired after our antagonists had initiated significant violence. The shots were completely appropriate and in accordance with the ROE (with the exception that the shots were fired by a C-9 light machine gun – meaning it was a short burst rather than a single shot and they were not fired in a particularly safe direction). Nonetheless, I believe that the soldier’s actions were reasonable in the circumstances. He took the initiative of firing warning shots when the violence (a mob was in the process of beating a soldier) was of such severity that it threatened the life of the soldier being attacked. Evidently, this was also the view of the senior leadership who ruled the soldier had acted correctly and no further disciplinary or administrative action was taken.

However, I believe more attention should have been paid to the errors that were made. It is necessary to clarify that scrutiny was not required from the point of view of second guessing the soldier (who, again, I believe did the right thing) or with a view to assigning any blame, but rather from the point of view demonstrating that, while it is necessary on occasion to use force, how it is done is also important as questions will be asked. I believe that, in this particular case, up to that point leadership had observed a general reluctance to use force regardless of the provocation or threat level. Therefore, to overcome this dangerous mentality, the leadership felt that it was important not to dwell on the errors, as any questioning of the incident may have exacerbated the problem and made soldiers fear taking appropriate action despite the danger it may have posed to them and others. Based on the circumstances of the time, this line of thinking and the subsequent conclusion were totally reasonable.

Significantly, however, the next incident saw warning shots being fired much more quickly. Although the actions were still within the ROE (albeit with less certain judgment) shots were fired at almost the first hint of danger where a week prior, no similar action would have come of such an incident. There are two problems with this. The first is that the use of

force may quickly become inappropriate and perhaps unlawful. The second is that the effect of warning shots declines rapidly with each subsequent use. The first time a population experiences them there is a rapid dispersal. By about the third incident, warning shots have little to no effect.

It is a fine balancing act. I believe the right approach to take is for the company/platoon to debrief all such incidents as a group (including those incidents where force was not, but perhaps should have, been used). This is not “second-guessing” the actions of the individual who pulled the trigger or failed to do so (and this must be emphasized). Rather, it is an after action review that should deal honestly with what could have, or should have, been done in the circumstances. Inherently, there will always be a reluctance to question the actions of others. However, this must be overcome if the exercise is to have any value. It should be stressed that with the benefit of hindsight (we all know that 20/20 hindsight is far more enlightening) and additional time to think through decisions, better solutions may become apparent and should be discussed for the education and vicarious experience of others who may face similar situations in the future. But, this analysis and debriefing should not be seen or interpreted as criticism of the individual who made the best possible decision and took action with limited information and time in a crisis situation. Additionally, the minutes or notes of these discussions should potentially be the basis of a lessons learned submission so that others outside the group or unit can also share in the knowledge and lessons learned.

### **NEGLIGENT DISCHARGES (ND) AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM**

Strictly anecdotally speaking, it seems to me that the rate of NDs over the duration of a tour follows a predictable curve. The height of the curve will vary with training and experience, but generally at the start of a tour the rate is at its highest point (due to the inexperience in carrying and handling live ammunition) and declines rapidly. This is followed by a small surge that is most likely due to complacency brought about by routine. The rate again falls off as the “surge” (and subsequent summary trials) serves to remind all personnel of the results of carelessness and its consequences. At times, it picks up at the end of the tour as complacency once again sets in.

I believe we should slightly modify our approach to training. Rather than just carrying weapons for the pre-deployment exercises they should be carried, with blanks, for a month or so in advance of deployment every day as part of garrison routine. They can be issued after daily physical training (PT) periods and turned in at last parade. But, they should be carried all day – practising clearing the weapons going into buildings in the course of the day and loading them upon leaving. The idea is to get past the initial peak of NDs in Canada with blanks during training prior to deployment. Essentially, this would move the curve to the left and make our mistakes in training rather than on operations.

One must be careful when dealing with NDs. They are almost always the result of inattention. However, if the reaction to them is too harsh, soldiers become more afraid of carrying their weapon in the appropriate state (i.e. with loaded magazine) and risking an ND than they do facing their antagonists or prevailing threat that dictated the necessity to carry a weapon in the first place. Do not kid yourself, some soldiers will remove a firing pin with a view to never having an ND. So what to do? (Besides inspect, inspect, inspect). The punishment must fit the crime, but the aim is to demand vigilance (a ND is almost by definition unintentional). I do not agree with the normal recourse to large fines (equating to percentages of “UN pay” or the like.) Fines should be the minimum required to demonstrate that such inattention is serious and unacceptable. Fostering a culture that recognizes a ND as a serious professional lapse is of more value. In such cultures, the embarrassment over an ND is a more useful deterrent than any fine. Where circumstances permit, removal of the soldier’s weapon and suspension from duties that require him to have it until he can be re-trained and re-qualified on it, will sting as much as a fine, demonstrate the gravity of the error, foster a professional culture, re-enforce, and refresh training, and will not affect his family or quality of life one iota.

## TRUTH TO POWER

Leaders issue orders. They do not wish to issue poor orders. However, orders given without a good grasp of the situation on the ground will more often than not appear deficient. Some are poor and some reflect information that may not be universally available to those receiving the orders. To function as an armed force, those receiving the orders, regardless of quality, must accept them. However, it is the responsibility

of leaders at all levels (circumstances permitting – and I want to stress that there is judgment involved – there are times to do this and time not to) to bring forward any serious deficiency in any orders received. Such deficiencies need to be resolved at some level. Such resolution may consist of nothing more than a response that the “Commander is aware of that and it was considered.” This is critically important because he may not have been aware of certain circumstances and therefore, not all ramifications of the orders may have been considered. It is not easy to speak “truth to power” (i.e. the chain of command) and valid questions often do not make it back up the chain of command. All it takes is for one link in the chain of command to be afraid to bring a matter to the attention of his superior the chain is broken. Commanders must guard against this.

I will cite two examples that are variations on this theme. The first involves ROE as issued at Oka. Essentially, no fire was to be returned unless the incoming fire was effective. What that meant to me (and I think to most combat arms officers) was that unless I was actually suffering casualties I could not use lethal force. To this day I do not know if that is what was actually meant. It is my understanding (and was at the time) that before Corporal Lemay (the Quebec provincial policeman) was killed, the natives fired warning shots, the police returned fire and then the natives began to attempt effective fire. The orders as issued may have been designed to prevent this. It may also have been that the commander who issued the order did not understand that he was partially removing the soldier's right of self-defence. Clearly, no one spoke truth to power, as the order did not change. In any event, it was a very difficult order to issue. It did not come with the possible rational outlined above and in my experience was universally questioned. Circumstances did permit a more full explanation or a change if the intent was different. Without this, I am far from certain that, had push come to shove, the restriction would have been respected.

The second example is one where I know the intent of the order and know that the order issued was not what was intended. As the officer of the court for virtually all of the Somalia Courts Martial, I listened over and over again, trial after trial, to the order that was actually issued that eventually contributed to Shidane Arone, the teenage Somalian thief being beaten to death and again and again to the officer who issued it trying to explain it. It is perfectly clear to me what he intended. What he intended was an



order along the lines of – use as much force as is necessary to effect capture up to but not including lethal force. This would have been lawful and within the ROE. Unfortunately that is not what he said. What he said, with regard to effecting capture was, “abuse him if you have to just don’t shoot him.” By “abuse” all he meant was that it was okay to use force to effect capture. Again what he intended and what he said were not the same things.

The poor direction and inadequate articulation of orders was exacerbated by the circumstances of the camp at the time. They were looking for a solution to the daily problem of camp infiltrations and theft by locals. Where there is no functioning civilian authority and where anything you provide to a detainee, including water, is more that he would have otherwise, how do you deter break-ins? This situation, combined with the words he used, made a clearly unlawful order (as spoken) seem plausible to some. Most, possibly all, who received it directly recognized it as unlawful and did not pass it on, but no one made the person who issued it aware of what it meant. It was questioned, but not in such a way as to make their obvious concerns clear. I have no doubt that had the commander understood how what he had said would be interpreted he would have immediately made his actual intent more clear. Arone would be alive, several careers un-ruined, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment active and well. SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER.

## WORDS FOR UNMOS

This is not leadership stuff but I am on a roll:

- If you think you might need it bring it with you – rely on the UN for nothing.
- Your pay will be screwed up – be ready.
- Never be without cash.
- Travel in uniform in the third world. This will reduce your risk as compared to a civilian, and authorities at airports or other public locations will treat you much better.
- If possible, travel on a red passport. If you cannot get one, try NOT to travel on a green passport. A green passport provides no diplomatic protection but identifies you as a government official – risk without benefit (by the way, you do have some diplomatic protection when travelling to and from your mission, you just cannot prove it without a red passport).

- When dealing with the UN, work backward from the guy who has what you want. Go and see him. Ask him what he needs to see/have in order for him to give you what you want. Go and see the guy who can provide that. Ask him what he needs to see/have in order for him to provide you what the first guy needs and so on down the food chain until you reach yourself and what you need to do. Do that, then walk it back up through each of the levels you just visited and you will get what you want. You should be able to get one thing in a day. Do not try and do this by mail, phone, or any means other than in person or you will never get anything.

I do not presume to pretend that the insight and observations that I have shared in this chapter are profound or ground-breaking. However, they are important to mission success and may help those without the same level of experience avoid problems or provide them with possible solutions. In the end, it's all about sharing knowledge and helping others avoid making mistakes that may put others at risk. Pro Patria.



## CHAPTER 5

### MILITARY POLICE IN OPERATIONS. EXPERIENCES IN LEADERSHIP - PROVEN PRINCIPLES

*Major Doug Henderson*

*He who is only a soldier is a bad soldier, he who is only a professor is a bad professor, he who is only an industrialist is a bad industrialist. The complete man, he who wants to fulfill his entire destiny and to be worthy of leading men--in short to be a chief--this man must have an open mind on everything that honours mankind.<sup>1</sup>*

French Marshal Lyautey, 19 February 1916

For millennia, military men and scholars have examined leadership in operations in search of the silver bullet. What makes one man stand out as a great commander over a multitude of others? The codification has been exhaustive. Unfortunately for all those learned men, only experience in operations can actually demonstrate if a man can be great or not. Canada has had many such opportunities to test her leaders in military operations and, in every case, the nation's military leaders, at every level, have gained valuable experience on how to motivate their subordinates to carry out and complete their missions in hazardous circumstances.

Military Police (MP) have deployed on almost every operation Canada has undertaken in support of line units. Their tasks are different from other troops, but in today's operations, danger visits everyone. Military Police tasks in operations occupy a unique niche like those of the combat engineer and the signaller. MP are specialists who work in small groups, often isolated, on tasks that are vital to the success of an operation. MP units and their training are often unique in their formations and unique to the operation. Unlike formed battalions that deploy, MP units often consist of a small core augmented by large numbers of personnel from across the Canadian Forces (CF). In some cases, even the chain of command of the MP unit has never worked together and only knows each other by reputation.

In deployed operations where task forces are formed from separate units across Canada and the Canadian military, the commander may meet his

Military Police commander at the evening Orders Group in theatre. This is a very awkward time as the MP commander learns the character of the operation, the staff and the personality of the overall commander.

During this phase, the MP commander is also in the process of moulding his unit into both a team and a coherent fighting unit. In many of the CF operations, the first rotations are deployed as formed units. However, as further rotations progress, units often become ad hoc with formation commanders and MP members rotating in as augmentees, knowing each other by reputation only, if at all. These extreme and trying periods in the opening phases of an operation are very stressful and difficult for not only the MP commander but also for the troops placed under his care and command.

The aim of this chapter is to examine leadership lessons learned from an analysis of four operations between 1998 and 2003. Canadian service personnel have been exposed to a wide spectrum of operations. These include humanitarian missions (e.g. Joint Task Force Central America in Honduras and the ice storm in Montreal), peace enforcement operations (e.g. Op Palladium in Bosnia) and low to medium intensity conflict (e.g. Op Apollo). On an individual level, these operations contributed to my own personal growth. I hope that my experiences and analysis will offer you a different thought process and consideration to improvements in leadership.

The operation in Central America, Operation (Op) Central, involved the Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a Helicopter Squadron from CFB Petawawa, and a composite MP unit of 48 MP personnel drawn from Air Force wings across Canada. Canada had pledged support to the Honduran people after the devastating hurricane in late 1998. My involvement in the operation lasted from 08 November to 15 December 1998. It consisted of receiving orders to report to Trenton, Ontario, join with the other members of the unit and deploy to La Cieba, Honduras. Once there, we were to provide aircraft security for the Canadian helicopters. We had minimal collective training in Trenton and, with the exception of the Deputy Commanding Officer, I did not have the opportunity to meet the senior staff until I arrived in Honduras. I was the MP Flight Commander, and later appointed the Force Provost Marshal.

Op Recuperation was the deployment of the CF to support the relief effort in Ontario and Quebec after a huge ice storm in February 1998. I received

a warning order at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta. We were told there was no requirement for us and we stood down from preparations for the deployment. But within the week we had received orders to be prepared to deploy to Montreal and form a composite MP company of Air Force MP from across Canada. Once we arrived in Montreal, we were tasked to support 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) and 1 CMBG operations in the Montreal – Drummondville – Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu triangle. We were also tasked with visibility and confidence operations to show the people of the region that the central government still had control of the situation. I was the Company Operations Officer and reserve MP Platoon Commander.

In Op Palladium, a peace enforcement operation in the former Yugoslavia, I was appointed the Multi-National Division South West (MND SW) Provost Marshal from July 2001 to end September 2001. In the division, we had a Canadian commander and a staff made up of British, Dutch, Czechoslovakian, and Canadian officers. The division was comprised of forces from those respective countries. We were tasked with the maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia through peace enforcement operations such as patrolling, weapons confiscation and community building. The MP units of the division were supporting their national contingent's operations. My job was to provide the division commander with MP and security advice, provide direction to the Division's commanders on the employment of military police, and to implement policies to ensure the safety of division troops on the roads of Bosnia.

The final operation I will be citing as an example is my role as the Canadian Provost Marshal in Tampa Bay, Florida as part of the Canadian Headquarters supporting operations in South West Asia. The operation was in support of Canada's role in the war on terrorism and the ongoing attack on the terrorists' bases in Afghanistan. We supported MP in Camp Mirage, an Air Force base and the Canadian naval presence in the Straits of Hormuz, as well as MP in Afghanistan. The MP were providing security and policing to the Canadian formations and in Afghanistan the MP also provided field policing, such as traffic control, prisoner handling and investigations.

## COMMISSIONING SCROLL

The first place I wish to start my examination of the leadership practiced by the Canadian officer begins with our Commissioning Scroll, which

directs officers “to exercise and well discipline both the inferior officers and men serving under you and use your best endeavour to keep them in good order and discipline.”<sup>2</sup> Any officer honoured with this responsibility must understand that command and leadership are bestowed on a few. It is not to be taken lightly, but leading the best young men and women Canada has to offer should rather be seen as a great privilege and an awesome responsibility.

The role of a commander and a leader is a privilege to be cherished and exercised with humility and wisdom as one could be called upon to lead others into harm's way. When leading an ad hoc unit, such as were those created in the four operations that will be examined, respect must be earned as you proceed. As such, the most important resource that an MP officer in command of ad hoc unit will have at their disposal is the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO). My experience with these professionals has been that they have vast police experience and even more operational experience. They are a great calming influence on the young officer who wants to do right for his commander and personnel. They also ensure that the quality of work of the soldiers under command remains high as tempo increases or stress levels start to take a toll on the unit members. In short, the senior NCOs of a unit are key to the sustainment of the unit in operations. They are the key to an officer's ability to fulfill the mandate given to them as part of their commissioning.

## PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership has been a much discussed and philosophized topic from Alexander the Great, to Napoleon, to Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein. Canada has had some great leaders who have shown the acumen of inciting their troops to undertake actions in extremely challenging circumstances (e.g. the Marquis de Salaberry, Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister, and more recently General J.V. Allard and Brigadier-General L. Mackenzie). Canadian leadership courses have consistently taught the importance of a number of leadership principles, which have provided guidance for junior leaders and those without operational experience. They remain timeless and extremely relevant:

- Lead by example;
- Achieve professional competence;
- Know your soldiers and promote their welfare;

- Make sound and timely decisions;
- Keep your followers informed of the mission, the changing situation and the overall picture.
- Train your soldiers as a team and employ them up to their capabilities;
- Seek and accept responsibility;
- Make sure your subordinates know your meaning and intent, then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission;
- Develop the leadership potential of your followers; and
- Appreciate your own strengths and weaknesses and pursue self-improvement.\*

The foregoing was listed on a card that I kept in my field message pad so that it was with me at all times. I took it out and read it several times to remind me of the importance of the principles. It is essential for a leader to assess the way he thinks. Constant attention to leadership principles, the principles of war, and lessons learned by Canadian commanders in operations ranging from the Boer War, World War One, World War Two to Korea and peace operations since, will ensure that MP leaders build on the rich heritage of our past commanders. Lessons were derived from mistakes made, some costly in lives, but all resulting in a knowledge base that provides future leaders with the ability to carry out operations with confidence and success. Following the principles and inserting humanity and compassion into the mix will help any leader once the tempo increases and the stress level becomes increasingly high. Commanders and leaders must be highly educated and trained in their profession, as well as their occupation classification. As stress levels increase, an officer has to rely on instinct, reaction and critical thinking. Only very good training, a solid educational base, and long time personal practice of the above principles will allow the leader to continue to function effectively.

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\* Editor's Note: The 10 "traditional" Principles of Leadership have actually evolved. They have been slightly reworked and increased to twelve. They are: Achieve professional competence and pursue self-improvement; Clarify objectives and intent; Solve problems and make timely decisions; Direct, motivate by persuasion and example and by sharing risks and hardships (i.e. lead by example); Train under demanding and realistic conditions; Build teamwork and cohesion; Keep subordinates informed; Mentor, educate and develop subordinates; Treat subordinates fairly; Maintain situational awareness, seek information and keep current; Learn from experience and those who have experience; and Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos, maintain order and discipline and uphold professional norms. This new list is approved Canadian leadership doctrine. See Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: DND, 2005).



Commanders and leaders must always remember that it does not take long for troops to recognize a careerist who is only concerned about personal gain. The axiom "the military is not a career but a way of life," is very true and this should be felt strongly by each member of the armed forces. Therefore, it is incumbent on leaders to set the example. I will share my observations and experience on leadership by addressing each of the leadership principles in turn and providing examples from my operational experience.

### **LEADING BY EXAMPLE**

Leading by example is a fundamental principle, which by its importance will affect your reputation amongst the troops and your peers. It has often been said by many sage people that you must not expect anything of your subordinates that you would not undertake yourself. This was the approach I took while deployed on Op Central in Honduras. We had to stay on the airfield to protect the aircraft. As a result, the MP were housed in Honduran Air Force quarters that had been used by refugees prior to our arrival. There were no windows, no hardware for the doors, two out of eight toilets worked and all of the white porcelain had turned black through use. Only two of the six showerheads worked and the water ran continuously. We were eventually able to bring the quarters up to a livable standard, but not before someone had raised the alarm at higher headquarters in Canada. As a result, two Master-Warrant Officers (MWO) from higher command arrived unexpectedly asking why the MP were receiving different treatment from the rest of the force. When it was explained that our duty was to be close to the aircraft and that the MP stayed at the hotel four nights out of 12 their concerns were eased. In fact, their apprehensions were completely alleviated when they learned that the Company Sergeant Major (CSM) and myself stayed at the hotel only one night out of every fortnight.

Another example dealt with the Honduran Federal Police's request for assistance in locating the bodies of three policemen missing since the hurricane. We set up a search grid and sent the MP to look for the missing men. The search area had been severely damaged by the storm, with mudflows and standing water that bubbled. The senior NCOs and I took part in the search and walked the same areas as the MP. Conversely, the Honduran Police captain sat at a local bar and waited with his senior staff for the search to end. The Canadian leadership shared the heat, the

dust and whatever was in the water. In addition, the members of my unit and I were very involved in the reconstruction of a school that had been damaged, and I participated in my unit MP's visits to a hostel for orphaned boys, to help them in any way possible.

Another form of leadership through example that the Canadian MP practised was directed towards the local police. The civilian police were transferring from the military to become a national police force. Their reputation was poor and the local populace feared them more than anything else. When we arrived, I started to travel with the local police captain to see what was going on in the local area. We stopped and tried to talk to people about what was needed to get the towns back on their feet after the hurricane. I was struck by the timidity of the people and their fear of the police, who were menacing and strutting about with rifles.

As a result, I made a conscious decision to get the police involved in our reconstruction project of the local school. I was very aware that the MP and others working at the site were always friendly and courteous to the local people, and I know the local police captain was affected by the way we interacted with the locals. At first the children were hesitant to approach us but, over time, they became quite comfortable, and would pick their favourite individual to try and communicate with, although we had little idea of what they were saying. They even became quite friendly with the civilian police who also returned the friendship. The parents became less afraid of the police who regularly worked on the school. It seemed that the police were now being seen less as a tool of oppression and instead were becoming an arm of the government that was there to serve and protect.

### **ACHIEVE PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE**

There is nothing worse for soldiers than to be saddled with an incompetent commander. It is vital for the unit's morale, and its overall well-being, that the its senior members are professionally competent. The troops and senior NCOs can normally compensate for weak or incompetent individuals and still complete the mission; however, it is dangerous for the unit and the reputation of the branch if the leadership is weak. While deployed with the DART in Honduras, I was impressed with the level of professional competence of the MP who deployed with me. All of the senior MP NCOs had past operational deployments and were

able to assist me in the steep learning curve that resulted from my meeting them and the rest of the unit only in the week prior to the deployment. The unit members had all been trained in the Airfield Security role through the Contingency Component Command, in addition to the experience many of them had gained on United Nations (UN) deployments. MP are remarkable in their ability to bond and carry out operations together despite being pulled from many separate units. Often, through the process of training to become competent MP officers, you will get to know the troops entrusted to you and learn not only their limitations but your own.

### **KNOW YOUR SOLDIERS AND TRAIN YOUR SOLDIERS AS A TEAM AND EMPLOY THEM UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.**

The importance of taking the time and care to get to know your subordinates cannot be overstated. This means genuine care and not the superficial knowledge of names and platitudes with which some replace that knowledge. During operations, it is important for individuals to know you are thinking of how things affect them, but it is more important for the unit to know that the individual is an important element of the team. This knowledge directly translates to the well-being of the whole unit. The value of training with those with whom you deploy is highlighted by the following incident involving the commander of the task force in Central America and his perception of the training level of the MP under his command. He had not trained with us, and as with other operators, he had only a vague idea of what MP were capable of undertaking.

The MP unit was deployed to provide security to the helicopters in support of the operations in the hurricane-ravaged country. But, for some reason, the commander gave the task of aircraft security to the DART unit instead. As this was our reason for being in the Task Force, I approached the Task Force commander and asked why the MP were not being employed to do the security. He had given a combat arms unit the task for which the MP were trained. His response was that he did not have confidence in the training of the MP, while the artillery unit from which the troops were deployed had been very effective in suppressing recent riots in Bosnia just six months before.

Within days, one of the artillery members demonstrated that he lacked the proper training with the weapons used for the aircraft security detail when he pointed a shotgun at an aircraft as he unloaded the weapon. The pilot told the aircraft security officer (ASO), an MP, to warn the soldier of the dangers to the aircraft. This is an example of the commander making misguided assumptions about training levels.

As stated above, there was a tension between the DART operational jurisdiction and that of the MP unit. Although the command element was trying to set the boundaries, the two units did have conflicts. One incident between the DART and the MP unit demonstrated poor leadership and affected the confidence of the MP in the DART's capabilities. As the ASO returned to the aircraft, an officer and Warrant Officer who had been watching the poor weapon handling by the soldier did nothing. However, they did approach the MP onboard the aircraft and challenged his authority to be there. The DART officer then grabbed the headphones the MP was wearing and queried what the MP was doing onboard the aircraft. When told that that the commanding officer (CO) of the helicopter squadron had tasked the MP, the DART officer stated it would not happen again and talked to the helicopter commander to confirm that the MP was onboard in accordance with the CO's direction. The mission was allowed to continue as planned.

However, word about the incident eventually spread and, despite it being reported up the chain of command, the MP senior NCOs became distrustful of the DART chain of command and doubted whether they would look after the MP when push came to shove. In the end, it resulted in a wariness of the "others" by the MP and confirmed in my mind that there would be no help in jurisdictional issues between the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, the DART commander, and myself, who were all officers of the same branch. While this incident did affect the unit morale, members of the MP unit did not allow it to affect operations. Had we all trained together, confidence would have been built up between all players, particularly between the MP commander, the DART commander and the JTF commander, and this type of problem would not have occurred.

In another example, we had to downsize during the operation in Central America, as we realized the threat level was not as high as originally thought and it was getting close to the end of the DART deployment. I was told to quickly pick five personnel to return to Canada. The section

sergeants were tasked off base and unavailable so the CSM and I decided whom to send home. In this case, I had to rely on my knowledge of the MP from my home Wing. One of the MP was known to be unmotivated and did not perform well on domestic police patrols at his home base so I assumed that he was the same in theatre. Actually, he had risen to the occasion and was one of the stronger junior leaders in the unit. However, he went home early and another MP, who was an effective worker in domestic operations, but not so in theatre, stayed. It was a mistake. If I had had more knowledge of their individual strengths and weaknesses, I would have kept the better leader and profited from his presence.

To continue the theme of knowing your soldiers and employing them up to their full capabilities, I will use another example from Op Central. While in Honduras, we ran an eight-day shift, four-day rest rotation. During the eight days, the MP provided two days and two nights of aircraft security and four days as a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The RRF were available on call to provide emergency assistance to the shift. This proved to be extremely boring for them. They occupied their downtime watching many movies. We visited a boys' orphanage on Mondays, but the rest of the week was very long and between that and with the issues of jurisdiction with the DART, the MP were getting very discouraged and started to complain. I directed one of the sergeants to find a project that the RRF could work on to give meaning to the operation and occupy their time in close proximity to the aircraft.

He found a school that had been destroyed in the hurricane in a small, poor village outside the gates of the camp. We arranged to repair it, and spent the rest of the tour, with the help of the US Marines, the tactical helicopter squadron technicians and others, making the school like new. The morale of the MP improved, and the rest of the deployment went relatively well.

The assistance that we gave to the boys' orphanage and the school was personally gratifying in that it provided me with a distraction and allowed me to refocus for the next day. It helped alleviate the worry about my family and a rapport was built between me and those around me that made the long days pass easier. In addition, taking part in the work, with the senior NCOs allowed us all to get to know the troops better and

showed that we were willing to share their burdens. By recognizing that the MP were not being employed up to their capabilities, we were able to find a project that gave meaning to the sacrifices that they were willing to make during the operation. Had the chain of command not acted quickly to curb the morale issues, the unit and mission could have been detrimentally affected.

## MAKING SOUND AND TIMELY DECISIONS

One of the most important leadership aspects that always seemed to be in short supply was making sound and timely decisions. The first example is a result of poor intelligence and a lack of planning. We arrived in Central America and within three days, the sergeant and the sections had carried out their reconnaissance (Recce). I considered this a good thing since we had only one two-wheel drive truck for the whole unit. The only other choice would have been to borrow the commander's personal vehicle as our dedicated MP vehicles were detained in Trenton waiting for space on the transport aircraft.

One day, we were tasked to provide security for a water bagger that had broken down in a ford. The water bagger had dropped its wheels but was able to move out of the ford to dry land. The two members in the vehicle were now stuck overnight without weapons and a radio, counter to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the operation. As a result, we were directed to provide two personnel to assist the DART. Unfortunately, we discovered that no one knew where the vehicle actually was, so I asked the DART MP sergeant to escort our personnel to the general area where the water bagger was believed to be.

We received our orders at 1730 hours and by 1800 hours it was dark. Based on the intelligence briefs we had received of a country nation in chaos with no central government control, banditry rampant throughout the country and a high threat level, I felt it was now too dangerous to send only two MP out without an escort. But then it was ascertained that a lieutenant knew where the vehicle actually was, and it was decided that he would act as the guide. However, the lieutenant had failed to report to us by 2100 hours so I felt that it would be too difficult and dangerous to send MP from the base to find the vehicle in the dark in a potentially hostile environment. Feeling this way, I went to the hotel to talk to the JTF commander and voice my concerns.

I asked the commander about the wisdom of sending more people who had no idea of where to go out into the dark, to cross a fast flowing river ford and look for a broken vehicle. I was told to continue with the task, despite my concerns. As I prepared to return to the airbase to put the plan into action, word was received that the water bagger had arrived at the DART camp. We had given the MP a warning order at 1800 hours and they were waiting and ready long before 2130 hours, at which time they were told to stand down. Despite the fact that the water bagger would have been extremely difficult to find, I should have sent MP as soon as possible to provide assistance to the disabled vehicle.

I learned a number of things that night. Since I had not been included in the initial Recce for the operation, I should have personally undertaken a detailed Recce of the area as soon as I could after landing at the airhead. In addition, I should have sought up-to-date intelligence information in order to have a realistic picture of the situation in the country. If I had known these things, I would not have been so cautious about dispatching the MP to do the job. If I had acted as early as possible, the MP would have been moving in daylight/dusk instead of the pitch black, which caused me to hesitate and waste time.

Another example of making timely and sound decisions involves an incident in Bosnia. Bosnian authorities reported that a young boy had been beaten by some British soldiers approximately two kilometres from their camp. Apparently the soldiers had picked up the boy and meted out “discipline” because of his behavioural problems. The Bosnian Interior Minister had complained to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) Commander who wrote a letter to me with instructions to investigate the matter.

I asked the British unit to brief me on the incident. They explained to me that the youngster and some others had entered the British wire to throw stones at the working dogs. They were spotted and a chase ensued. The other boys escaped but one got caught on the wire and sustained minor cuts and bruises. The British forces were now waiting for the local police to make a complaint about the incident to the International Police Task Force, who would then report it to the military. At this point, British forces could then officially open the investigation. This had not happened, and the boy's parents had complained to the local mayor. The SFOR Commander demanded the British personnel be investigated and charged.

However, without the civilian complaint, the British system would not start the investigation, as it would jeopardize the court case.

I called the Deputy Provost Marshal in SFOR headquarters (HQ) asking him to caution the General on the improper command interest in this case. However, he was not inclined to help. I went to the British Special Investigations Branch and asked them to look into the situation pending the proper reporting of the incident to make the process flow faster for the Commander. As a result, we were able to provide the official information to the SFOR Commander in a timely manner and protect the integrity of the system without the commander being implicated in trying to politically influence the investigation.

Finally, the Force Commander sent a letter to the Interior Minister with the information we had received from the Special Investigations Branch, and the entire matter was resolved with no disruption to the British justice system or the reporting system set up in the former Yugoslavia. By recognizing the changing situation of the political environment in Bosnia, and engaging the necessary authorities in a timely manner, we were able to prevent a rift within our own chain of command and safeguard the policies in place in Bosnia.

In another example, on 11 September 2001, the mature peace enforcement operation in Bosnia took a serious turn. As we watched the twin towers crash down in New York, the American SFOR Commander ordered us to keep our webbing, flack vests and helmets nearby. The security levels went up and down four times in the hours after the attacks. Finally, we were ordered to a state of high security. However, the British Deputy Commander of the MND SW was upset by what he perceived to be an overreaction on the American's part, and he would not follow the Commander's direction on security measures. I advised him of the orders from Sarajevo, but he would not follow them as he felt that the British had experience in Northern Ireland and believed that they knew how to handle this better than the inexperienced Americans.

The Multi-National Division had reacted to the SFOR Commander's direction and then had to step back as we got "clarification" from the Deputy Commander. The Situation Report (SITREP) submitted to SFOR HQ revealed that our Division had not attained the proper level of protection. The Deputy Commander was aware of this but nevertheless



ordered that the SITREP be sent. Within five minutes, the Deputy Commander received a personal call from the SFOR Commander, and we immediately complied with the order.

The problem with the fluctuation of the security levels was that the Deputy Commander did not initially follow orders. The Division personnel were aware of the Command direction and by changing the orders the Deputy Commander confused matters. By the next day, we were confident of a stable security level and the British officers in the HQ failed to bring their webbing or helmets to the office in accordance with direction. In fact, one of the British officers did not even bring a personal weapon into theatre! This did little for their credibility or reputations as professionals. It was an example of an officer not being responsible enough to take his own personal safety and that of those around him seriously.

### **KEEP YOUR FOLLOWERS INFORMED OF THE MISSION, THE CHANGING SITUATION AND THE OVERALL PICTURE**

As I have already, discussed, I was not included in the Recce to Honduras. As we de-planed in theatre, we were very surprised to see everyone in T-shirts when we had been told back in Canada to wear our combat shirts at all times to avoid insect bites. In addition, there did not seem to be any threat from bandits. I did not realize this until three days later, when I was finally able to conduct a Recce of my own. This was accomplished, unfortunately for me, after the water bagger incident. Once again, if I had been on the initial Recce I would not have felt the need to use such extreme caution and there would have been less upheaval.

### **SEEK AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY**

Commanders must seek and accept responsibility for their troops, as well as the execution of their missions. This includes ensuring that MP work to the highest standards regardless of the situations faced by them in operations.

During the operation in Afghanistan, Canadian MP conducted an investigation into the loss/theft of munitions. The investigation was conducted and the explosives were ultimately accounted for. However, when the reports were submitted, they were incomplete and of poor quality. I called the senior MP in theatre and directed him to ensure that

the reports were completed properly. The senior NCO in theatre complained to me that they were at war and that the investigators had done a brilliant job in concluding the investigation, which was true. I agreed that the investigation was well done and that the MP should be congratulated. Nonetheless, I stressed that the report was incomplete and the quality control was poor, and therefore, the report had to be rewritten. The investigation was reopened and completed in the correct fashion.

You must always have confidence in your soldiers' abilities, but you must also recognize that sometimes they need guidance and direction to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their tasks. Commanders at all levels must accept responsibility for all aspects of the work involved and must not allow the quality of work to deteriorate. If this is allowed, discipline breaks down and the unit suffers from a commander who loses confidence in the MP leadership, and the MP lose confidence that their senior leadership will ensure they are well-led in all types of operations.

### **MAKE SURE YOUR SUBORDINATES KNOW YOUR MEANING AND INTENT, THEN LEAD THEM TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION**

After 11 September 2001, the peace enforcement operation in Bosnia moved into a new phase of "offensive protection". Our Multi-National Division conducted operations to ensure terrorists would not initiate any disruptive actions in Bosnia. When we as the senior HQ were writing the orders for the battle group operations, I was very conscious of the fact that I was providing operational guidance and not giving orders to the MP units under command of the brigades. It was difficult to find the balance between preaching and simply informing and reminding commanders of the capabilities they had at their disposal. I rewrote the Military Police annex to the operations orders a number of times before feeling I had done enough to ensure that MP were going to be properly employed by their Brigades. My concern was to be very clear as to how far MP could be employed in operations, in accordance with doctrine and their training. Also, I was somewhat concerned that the MP would be under-utilized due to commanders or staffs not realizing the potential of the MP units. In the end, as the operations unfolded, I was happy to see that the MP were employed in their doctrinal roles, allowing them to complete the mission successfully.

## **DEVELOP THE LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL OF YOUR FOLLOWERS**

The nature of the Canadian Forces leadership is versatile and each member is expected to act on his or her own initiative<sup>3</sup>. A great deal is expected of our subordinates when carrying out orders and acting on their own initiative. During the operations described, MP were asked to carry out orders and to act on their own in some difficult circumstances. Each one was able to meet the standard expected, and in most cases surpassed the expectations. The young men and women who form part of the MP branch will rise to any occasion given the opportunity. They must be given their full range of options and be allowed to exercise their judgment. Consistently, they impressed me with their versatility and capabilities.

From Central America, where MP deployed on their own in helicopters and dealt with frantic crowds of people looking for food and water, to the MP assisting in peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, to a port in South West Asia where they dealt with senior naval personnel, MP have shown that they are very capable and can perform to a level expected of members senior to their rank level in other branches of the military. They simply need to be allowed to do their jobs and receive support for their actions from their chain of command. It is true, as I have mentioned above, that sometimes direction is needed, but incidence of poor workmanship is not common. The recruiting process does its best to ensure that the chosen men and women have inherent leadership qualities that can flourish when given proper training and the opportunity to demonstrate their potential. Relying on your strengths and encouraging your subordinates to express opinions develops a culture of leadership.

## **KNOW YOUR STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS AND CONTINUE SELF-IMPROVEMENT**

The last principle of leadership is to know your strengths and limitations and continue self-improvement. The quote at the beginning of this chapter is from the foremost commander of French colonial troops at the turn of the twentieth century. Marshal Lyautey was able to conquer and pacify Morocco. His success was such that the colonial troops came to the aid of their conquerors in two world wars instead of rising up in rebellion.<sup>4</sup> The respect he earned as an innovator and combat leader lends great credence to the importance the CF puts on the continual education

and all-round development of its officer corps.<sup>5</sup> In this vein, MP officers must continue to expand their professional knowledge. Studying professional journals and taking military and academic courses will allow military personnel to keep a hard edge on their training. Literature of a professional nature gives a good background to help one to adapt. Time in operations will cement those things learned. In addition, by learning from each other, military personnel can continue their self-development in any environment.

Personally, you must recognize that everyone, including the leader, needs sleep, rest, and balanced meals, whenever possible. This is especially important for leaders to remember. If you allow yourself to become run down, it makes you useless to yourself, your commander and most importantly to those you are leading.

Furthermore, when dealing with anyone, always tell the truth and ensure that you advise commanders with brutal honesty - even when they do not want to hear it. This will inspire confidence in all of those you deal with. It will also ensure that the commander is never surprised by any incident.

## MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS

In the following paragraphs are leadership lessons I have learned that did not fit perfectly into the subject headings of the principles of leadership. These were either observed behaviours that demonstrated a lack of leadership, or actions taken that helped the troops function and affected their morale.

Morale is a huge factor in the well-being of the troops and leaders in a theatre of operations. It seems to be a driving factor on how well a unit completes the mission. If a unit has high morale, it gets the job done well and in a timely fashion. If morale is low, the mission is often accomplished in a manner that does not meet high standards and in a less than satisfactory timeframe. For example, a young MP from Halifax was to deploy to Op Apollo but due to errors at all levels of command, he was turned on and off a couple of times. This was very hard on the individual and was also a problem for the members of his unit who had to watch this go on and wonder if they would go through the same thing. The uncertainty of departure and return dates is always a huge morale factor.

A further example demonstrates that morale is very important even for those deployments that are relatively benign such as the humanitarian missions in Montreal and Honduras. In Montreal, the father of one of the Military Police was extremely ill and died suddenly. The Padre informed me and I in turn informed the section sergeant and had the young fellow in to see me. It was difficult to impart this information, but when he returned from the compassionate leave period, he came to see me and thanked me for personally talking to him about his father's death. It taught me an important lesson. Always take the time to talk with your personnel, no matter how difficult it might be, as it has a huge effect on the individual and you will grow as a leader with the experience.

In Op Central, the DART deployed to Central America with only three MP, which was not enough for the tasks required. Conversely, the Air Force sent a proper number of MP into theatre as part of the security detail for the helicopter squadron. It was always a problem as the DART looked at the Air Force MP as a manpower pool should they run low. I was deployed as the MP flight commander responsible to the helicopter squadron CO. A couple of days into the operation, I was made the force Provost Marshal and the manning remained a point of contention for both my CSM and myself. However, we did lend personnel to the DART to complete the mission.

It was difficult to ensure that MP were represented on the Recce teams, and the Intelligence officers were often tasked with our Recce requirements. Commanders for the most part know what MP can do for them but in an operation, however, they are concerned with so many things that they forget to include MP issues in Recces, or they often think they know better. An example of this was evident in the planning for the relief operations in the Congo, Op Caravan, which was an operation we supported from JTFSWA HQ. We recommended, and the force HQ agreed, that a section of MP be included in the flight crew going into the operational area. But someone in Paris decided that the French contingent would be able to provide protection for the Canadian aircraft and so there would be no need for MP support.

In the end, MP did not deploy. Fortunately, in this case there were no repercussions. However, it has been my experience that relying on other countries for help with security is a mistake. They are concerned first and foremost with the security of their own personnel and equipment, and another nation's equipment and personnel will receive second-hand

attention. Only once the host nation assets are secured will attention be focused on others, and by then it could be too late. One must not take the MP or their functions for granted. As MP, we must remain flexible and, when excluded, we must make the best of a bad situation and try to influence change.

Another lesson was the fact that the type of function some personnel perform, can impose restrictions on how they can interact with those around them. This was particularly evident for Padres and MP. In Bosnia, during Op Paladium, I was the Division Provost Marshal for the MND SW, and I was told that there was one place I was not to go even though all the other officers and senior NCOs did so. It was the junior ranks club known as "The Foundry". The bar was a lawless place where the British soldiers fought amongst themselves more than with any enemies. It was a place to relieve the boredom each of us felt as the peace enforcement operation matured, even though the potential for violence in this region was just below the surface.

It was very important for the Provost Marshal to remain aloof from the potential areas of conflict and the disregard of rules and regulations as it was his duty to make recommendations to the commander as to what action to take should something go very wrong in the highly charged atmosphere of the clubs in the Banja Luka Metal Factory. It was also much easier to talk to the members of the HQ when you did not have any knowledge of how they had acted the previous night.

To remain aloof, however, does not mean to isolate one's self. When the rest of the officers are taking risks in the clubs, you should stick to the letter of the law, but still enjoy the available movies, other activities and the prescribed beer ration. Just stay away from potential trouble so you are of use to the commander in the event that something should take place, and not be the one in front of him without your beret (i.e. on charge) the next morning. To become embroiled in an incident would mean losing your credibility as a Military Police advisor and your usefulness to the commander. Remember, remain professional at all times, maintain a sense of humour and an easy-going attitude until you are required to be firm. This will go a long way to earning the respect others.

*Canada's Army* states that the professional military ethos is based on the five precepts of courage, integrity, discipline, and selflessness, and loyalty.<sup>6</sup> These precepts are anchored on duty, integrity, discipline and honour.

These are weighty responsibilities that can, and often do, come into conflict with personal feelings. An example of this is loyalty to the chain of command and loyalty to your subordinates, which at times, is a fine line that must be balanced. This is not easy, especially if you become close to your troops and really get to know them. However, the mission must be carried out and completed. A leader always owes loyalty to the higher chain of command without question.

In Montreal during the ice storm recovery, the MP Company was employed in different sectors. We received orders to conduct operations on a twelve-hour on and a twelve-hour off cycle. It became evident that one platoon had decided to go on a three days, three nights, three off shift. The other platoon commanders discovered this and open hostility ensued. The bickering continued until the Company Commander directed the platoon to follow the original orders. We as leaders must be above reproach and ensure that the letter and spirit of the orders given are followed. If they are not, discipline breaks down, the unit suffers from a senior commander who loses confidence in the MP leadership, and the MP lose confidence in their own senior leadership as well.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Canadians will continue to play a vital role in the world as peacekeepers and peacemakers and possibly, along with our allies, we will be involved in full-fledged combat. As such, our leaders must be well-versed in the concepts of leadership. Learning curves due to lack of experience and the creation of ad hoc units will be steep, but they will be manageable with the assistance of the senior NCOs assigned to lead the unit. MP leaders will have to remain versatile and diplomatic, but most of all, committed to the men and women they are charged to lead. The principles of leadership are a tried and true list of the basics of effective leadership. Leaders at all levels must never accept mediocrity. To do so puts Canadian lives at risk, and our national reputation will suffer for it. Most of all, it will affect the men and women we are charged to lead in adverse ways, and they deserve only the best from their leadership.

Finally, truly enjoy the job – leading people is satisfying and fulfilling. The role of command lasts a short time. Seek professional development throughout your career and you will excel. If you focus only on career advancement, you will not enjoy the opportunities given to you in command. and you will become stressed and unhappy, and it will be reflected in your unit.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lautey: the development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, Edward Mead Earle, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, reprint 1973), 258-259.
- 2 Canadian Forces Commissioning scroll.
- 3 Canada, *Canada's Army*. CFP 300, B-GL-300-000/FP-001 (Ottawa: Land Force Command, 1998), 42.
- 4 Gottman, 257.
- 5 For the current CF doctrine on leadership see: Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundation* (Kingston: CDA, 2005). For a Cold War dissertation on leadership and continued education and its importance to the leader see "The Art of Leadership" by General Jacques Dextraze, CC, CBE, CMM, DSO, CD, LLD found in *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol.1#2 Nov 98, [http://armyyapp.dnd.ca/acl/ADTB/Vol\\_1/Nov\\_98/English/default.htm](http://armyyapp.dnd.ca/acl/ADTB/Vol_1/Nov_98/English/default.htm)
- 6 *Canada's Army*, 130.





## CHAPTER 6

### OPERATION CENTRAL: AIRLIFT LEADERSHIP IN LA CEIBA, HONDURAS, 6 NOVEMBER – 23 DECEMBER 1998<sup>1</sup>

*Major Deanna L. Manson*

On 26 October 1998, Hurricane Mitch, the fourth-strongest Atlantic hurricane on record, turned westward and hit the Central American countries of Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador. The Category-Five<sup>2</sup> hurricane killed an estimated 10,500 people and left over three million homeless. By the middle of November, an additional 11,000 people were reported missing. Honduras was the hardest hit of the affected nations, with approximately \$4 billion in structural and agricultural damage. With flooding and outbreaks of water-borne diseases among the primary concerns for the countries devastated by Hurricane Mitch, Canada responded to the humanitarian disaster by deploying the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to La Ceiba, Honduras. The deployment was dubbed Operation Central.

Given the relatively short distances involved in the planned airlift and the potentially austere airport conditions in theatre, it was decided that the DART and its accompanying units would be deployed using integral Canadian Forces (CF) air transport resources. The C-130 Hercules transport aircraft was the workhorse for this particular airlift. Mobile Air Movements Section (MAMS) teams at 1 Air Movements Squadron in Winnipeg were placed on standby on Wednesday, 4 November 1998. Personnel at 2 Air Movements Squadron at 8 Wing Trenton, the designated airport of embarkation, began the arduous task of receiving the DART equipment and preparing it for air transport. With the addition of a three-aircraft package of tactical helicopters from 427 Squadron in Petawawa (also the source location of the DART personnel and equipment), there would be an estimated forty-five C-130 chalks<sup>3</sup> to be transported from the staging base at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa Bay, Florida into theatre. MAMS teams and material handling equipment would be required in theatre to receive and unload the aircraft. This chapter provides a personal account of Operation Central and the leadership challenges that accompanied it, from the perspective of the airlift support personnel that were deployed in the initial phases of the operation and subsequently remained in theatre for its duration.

During the planning stage of the operation, A3 Movements and A4 Operations staff at the Air Force operational-level headquarters 1 Canadian Air Division (1 Cdn Air Div HQ) in Winnipeg initiated the orders for the deployment of the MAMS teams. On 4 November, a strategic reconnaissance team departed 8 Wing Trenton via Hercules aircraft.<sup>4</sup> In addition, aircraft at 435 Squadron, located at 17 Wing Winnipeg, were placed on standby to participate in the airlift. Two of these aircraft were immediately designated to transport the MAMS teams and equipment, a K-35 loader and a 10,000lb forklift, into theatre. These chinks would form part of the advance team and would be among the first to arrive at the airport of disembarkation. Two full MAMS teams prepared for deployment (a total of twenty personnel), commanded by then Major Randy Boucher, the Commanding Officer of 1 Air Movements Squadron. On Friday, 6 November, the two 435 Squadron aircraft loaded with the MAMS teams and their equipment departed Winnipeg to pre-position at the staging base at MacDill.

A friendly rivalry between the two Air Movements Squadrons has persisted over their 54-year history. Each Squadron is home to deployable MAMS teams (three in Winnipeg and four in Trenton) whose *raison d'être* is to be on the road. The teams also cover the aircraft handling, or "line crew" functions at their home airfields. MAMS personnel typically deploy in excess of 150 days per year, sometimes as many as 250 days or more if training, exercises and courses are included in the tally. Despite this very high operational tempo, the personnel assigned to these teams are constantly chomping at the bit to be selected for the many missions that are assigned to their respective Squadrons.

MAMS teams are tasked by 1 Cdn Air Div HQ A4 Movements staff, and these missions are apportioned equally between the two squadrons. Other factors that are considered when giving an assignment to a MAMS team include the geographic location of the deployment and the operational tempo that is expected at the airport of embarkation if either Winnipeg or Trenton is designated to perform this function. In the case of Operation Central, the deployment of the MAMS personnel from 1 Air Movements Squadron was a logical one for two reasons: the Winnipeg Squadron was next-in-line for a major overseas mission, and the airport at 8 Wing was going to be a busy place as the bulk of the Task Force prepared to deploy out of Trenton. The friendly rivalry transformed into something other than completely professional, however, as the planning for Operation Central progressed.

A key component of the airlift planning process is the delegation of airlift command authority from the Commander of 1 Cdn Air Div HQ to the Commander of the designated airport of embarkation. This transfer of authority occurred just as the MAMS teams were departing Winnipeg. Unbeknownst to the teams, the designated Airlift Commander (ALCC) at 8 Wing Trenton did not concur with the deployment of the MAMS teams from 1 Air Movements Squadron, based on advice that he was receiving from the Commanding Officer (CO) and Deputy Commanding Officer (DCO) of 2 Air Movements Squadron. Sparked by professional jealousy rather than common sense, the latter were fighting for their personnel in the hopes of also deploying into theatre. The 1 Air Movements Squadron MAMS teams arrived in Tampa Bay amidst this controversy. The subsequent discussions between the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) MAMS, and the ALCC distracted the MAMS personnel from the mission at hand and their preparations to deploy into theatre. The bickering was senseless and clearly to the detriment of the air movements community. Despite the advice of the OIC MAMS to deploy the two teams into theatre given the relatively unknown tempo of operations (in the early stages of the process it was thought that as many as 10 chucks per day would be handled) and the potentially austere working environment, the ALCC directed that only one team would travel into Honduras.<sup>5</sup>

In the interim, an ad hoc Airlift Control Element (ALCE) had been quickly established in Tampa Bay. An 8 Wing aircraft, redirected from an airdrop exercise in Little Rock, Arkansas had arrived with a small ALCE staff that included an intelligence cell. On Saturday, 7 November, a C-150 Polaris aircraft arrived from 8 Wing with aircrew and maintenance personnel that would participate in the airlift. The MAMS team assisted with the off-load (trying to ignore the many sets of golf clubs among the baggage) and then returned to the hotel to rest before their planned departure in the early morning hours of Sunday, 8 November.

While the OIC MAMS attended the many planning meetings associated with the airlift, I was tasked to prepare my team for our arrival in theatre and received several intelligence briefings as part of this duty. Hence, we come to a key lesson in leadership. I have always believed very strongly that the troops should be as well informed as I am on the status and nature of our mission. Keeping the troops advised is a key part of my job. There is, however, a balance that should sometimes be struck between passing on any-and-all received information and filtering out items that might

needlessly cause apprehension among the troops. In this case, I should have realized the over exuberance of the intelligence operators would unduly scare my team before our departure. The intelligence briefing that I was given detailed a very grim and dangerous situation in theatre.<sup>6</sup> This was just not the case.

As we discovered, the airport to the west of La Ceiba was relatively unscathed. We arrived at Goloson International Airport to leafy green surroundings in the early morning hours. In the distance, we could see mudslides shifting down the surrounding mountains, but otherwise there was no evidence of the devastation Hurricane Mitch had caused to the countryside. We were assigned a portion of the ramp occupied by the Honduran Air Force and hangar space from which we could work. The office space and other amenities required a heavy-duty cleaning (details of which I will not describe), but otherwise the working conditions were more than acceptable.

The MAMS team worked throughout the day receiving the reconnaissance team and the first few chinks of the advance party, and then retired to a local hotel for the night. Our drive into the small city of La Ceiba was also uneventful, although the effects of the flooding of the Cangrejal River, running through the eastern portion of the city, were apparent. There was only sporadic power operating in La Ceiba at this point, but the hotel did have running water, a blessing after working in the hot sun all day.

It was determined that the flow of the aircraft would be limited to five chinks per day at two-hour intervals, daylight operations only. Navigational aids were not available at Goloson, and the runway approach was tricky with the surrounding mountain range. With only one MAMS team in theatre the workload was manageable, although we had hit the ground running with little time to acclimatize to the tropical environment. It was vital that we consume large amounts of water and take breaks to avoid becoming dehydrated and sick. We were self-sufficient with our supply of bottled water and Individual Meal Packets (IMPs) and were cautious about sampling the local fare for the first few days of the mission. We were also on a high dosage of Doxycycline, an antibiotic used as an anti-malaria treatment. The side effects of this medication include an increased photosensitivity, and for some, gastrointestinal problems. We were, of course, careful to use copious amounts of sunblock and, for those who suffered an intolerance to the Doxycycline,

Chloroquine was later prescribed as an alternative drug. We were lucky in that a flight surgeon soon arrived, accompanying the tactical helicopter squadron, and she was able to assist our personnel with both the anti-malarial treatments, as well as remedies for the inevitable Montezuma's Revenge.<sup>7</sup>

There was no slowing down, however, as our workload was increasing. The word had gotten out that the Honduran Air Force Base Aérea Coronel Héctor Caracciola Moncada at Goloson International Airport was now home to a Canadian MAMS team and aircraft loading equipment. Other nations that were providing humanitarian assistance to the region began using Goloson with greater frequency because they could get off-loaded more quickly and thus, accomplish many more deliveries than if the aid was off-loaded by hand.

It must also be noted that a MAMS team never says no to an aircraft in need of attention. Not only did the number of aircraft handled per day increase, but the number of different aircraft types and loading methods also increased dramatically. The ten members of the team were divided between the CF deployment chinks, USAF C-130 engines-running on/off-loading operations, various commercial-pattern aircraft and much-needed rest in the hot climate. After a few days of this routine, the 427 Squadron CH-146 Griffon helicopters arrived; raising the prospect that helicopter slinging operations would also become part of our repertoire. Usually a rambunctious lot in their time off, the MAMS team members would return to the hotel, eat dinner and crash for the night. It was a tiring routine, but luckily, would only last for a maximum of ten days.

Although I had been on several airlift operations during my year or so as a MAMSO, this was my first deployment with our squadron CO. Having the CO present in this particular operation was invaluable to me for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the wrangling between the ALCC at 8 Wing and our small MAMS component continued after our arrival in theatre. As OIC MAMS, the CO took on the brunt of these discussions and his rank carried more weight than mine obviously would have. I could concentrate on the management of the team and our immediate mission: to safely offload aircraft in a timely manner.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, I had a great example to follow in our day-to-day operations. I was like a sponge – I watched how he handled things and learned things that I could later apply to my own techniques and leadership style. I also had a personal coach, or mentor, as

he supervised me in action and made observations and recommendations. We each brought ideas to the table that helped us reach the optimum course of action. It was a great working relationship and a great experience for me as an air mover and a leader. It has been my personal experience that this type of mentorship is infrequent among officers, particularly within the Air Force Logistics trade. This is also relevant because it is the type of a team-building relationship that I should have had with my right-hand man, the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCO i/c) MAMS, the team Sergeant.

Junior officers employed at Air Movements Squadrons have always recognized the unique nature of the job and of working with the Traffic Technicians that comprise the bulk of these organizations. While Air Force Logistics Officers have by and large coveted a tour at an Air Movements Squadron, a surprising majority of these members have subsequently left the Squadrons (and even the CF) disgruntled and frustrated. Amazingly, these cases can largely be attributed to the leadership challenges of working with Traffic Technicians.

Given the very diverse nature of the trade, Traffic Technicians are employed in a variety of different functions. They have a long history with origins dating back to the end of the Second World War when No. 9 Air Transport Group was formed in 1945.<sup>9</sup> Today, the trade is apportioned between the Army and Air uniforms, but is technically a “purple” trade where the colour of uniform does not determine where a member can be employed. Traffic Technicians are thus engaged with all three services as shippers/receivers and furniture and effects clerks at static bases, as Air Movements personnel on Air Force bases and as Loadmasters with the existing air transport fleets.

Air Movements and Loadmaster employments are both extremely technical and require years of education and training before a member is considered qualified to work in the field. Furthermore, the nature of Loadmaster employment contributes to the culture of the trade that is on the rough and burly side of the spectrum (the Loadmasters affectionately refer to themselves as “pigs”), further characterized by some relatively unprofessional habits developed while part of an aircrew.<sup>10</sup>

The Traffic Technician culture is also one that tends to lack confidence in women, as well as officers in general. Notably, women were admitted into

the Traffic Technician trade in 1976, but their employment in those early years was restricted to the clerical or administrative functions of the job until well into the 1980s.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the Traffic Technicians who are or who have been members of Air Movement squadrons often view the establishment of officers within these organizations as a temporary “stepping stone” with no real operational or practical value. This places the officers at a significant disadvantage upon their arrival at the Squadrons; with little or no experience in air movements operations, they are in a position where their subordinates at every rank level know the job one-hundred times better than they do. As a result, the squadron personnel are left with the impression that the officers are there only to learn, and not to lead. Indeed, the officers have historically passed through the squadrons too quickly, some spending as little as 18 months on a MAMS team before moving on to DCO/Operations officer employment or worse, to be posted to a staff position within the branch. All said, it is a lethal combination; Traffic Technicians are smart, confident and accustomed to an aircrew mentality that does not lend itself to ready acceptance of officers that are void of operational and technical experience. Certainly, the members that reside within the Senior NCO level of the trade were indoctrinated in a timeframe when women and officers did not have as active a role as they do today. The sergeant assigned to my team fell into this category.

When I arrived at 1 Air Movements Squadron in the summer of 1997, the animosity between the officers and the troops was readily apparent. Our CO set out to single-handedly break down these barriers and it was a tough battle. I learned very quickly on my first few deployments that I indeed had a role to play on the MAMS team, as did my sergeant, and although these roles were distinct from one another, they should have been complimentary. To be sure, the effective functioning of a MAMS team hinged upon a team effort at all rank levels. We ran into difficulties when the sergeant felt that my presence usurped his position as the leader of the team. It took us a few months to work through those issues. By the time we deployed to Honduras, our working relationship had seen marked improvement, although it was still not as smooth as it could have and should have been.

Participating in an operational mission is perhaps the best test of an individual's leadership skills. The same CO said to me once that seeing how a person performs when playing a sport, particularly a team sport, is



a great way to judge character. I am an avid athlete, so I know that to be true – and have observed that a team cannot be functional when there is internal discord or a lack of trust between team-mates. When the team leader is the focal point of this discord, effective leadership is an uphill battle. Another parallel that can be drawn in the study of team dynamics is that a winning team is usually one with a high level of morale and functionality. For a MAMS team, relative success and morale is also intrinsically linked to the level of activity and tempo of operations. A busy team is a happy team. The term “work hard and play hard” is a MAMS mantra.

Luckily, Operation Central was a high-pace operation, but our workload was bringing out a side of my NCO i/c that I had not seen before. He was spending a lot of time pushing pallets with the troops, and not enough time standing back and supervising. Members of the team were neglecting to use basic safety equipment such as earplugs (a necessity when working around aircraft), an observation that should not have been discussed between the OIC MAMS and myself. It took far too much prodding to get the NCO i/c to address the point to the troops. I also noticed that he far too often jumped in and took over when one of the female corporals was working in the back of the aircraft. She was one of the top members of the team, and was quite capable of doing her job. I could sense her frustration that the sergeant would continually step in, perhaps a well-intentioned chivalrous gesture, but she was obviously beginning to feel that he was not confident in her abilities.

I tried every tactic to get the NCO i/c to slow the pace, in the interest of safety, and to change his approach. I chatted with him informally as we walked back to the hangar. I attempted a bit of reverse psychology, and then finally got tough with him, suggesting that he had to back off and be a supervisor, not a pallet pusher. Nothing worked. Indeed, even when the CO spoke to him he changed his approach only for a few minutes and then he was back to the same routine.

We did have some technical difficulty with the loads arriving from Trenton on the C-130 aircraft. The DART equipment was configured for deployment but was nonetheless bulky and cumbersome, some of it ill-fitted for transport via the small C-130 cargo compartment. Because this was the DART's first operational deployment, Air Movements staff were largely unfamiliar with their equipment and the unique loading

techniques that might be required for an airlift using the C-130. Many of the loads were heavy ISO containers, the weight exceeding the capacity of our standard 10,000-pound forklift. This meant that we had no way of lifting the containers from the K-35 loader, unless the containers were emptied by hand to decrease their weight. There was one decrepit crane available for rent in La Ceiba (the roads were washed out in much of the surrounding area), but the owner/driver was not the most reliable sort and his arrival at the timing required was always in question. In fact, the ability of the crane to lift the containers was also in question, although the cost of the rental was dear. We had to ask the Movements Control personnel working at our location and at 8 Wing to space out the delivery of the containers so that we could allow for more time between their arrivals to clear our K-35. This disrupted the prioritization of the loads for the DART team and the Tactical Helicopter Squadron, but no other solution was readily available.

To make matters worse, some of the containers arrived accompanied by their assigned Container Load Trailer (CLT), a wheeled device that should have been attached to each end of the container, allowing it to be rolled mechanically off the aircraft. In each case, however, the two pieces of the CLT were lashed together and loaded at the front of the aircraft (behind the container), making it impossible to employ until the entire load was removed from the aircraft in the traditional method. The CLTs were then used to manoeuvre the containers on the ground.<sup>12</sup> These lessons learned later resulted in better liaison between the DART and Air Movements staff at 1 Cdn Air Div HQ and the Squadrons to ensure the air transportability of DART equipment and freight.

How the aircraft is loaded at one end of the operation very much determines the ease at which it can be off-loaded at its destination. As the deployment phase of the airlift continued, it was obvious that fatigue at both ends of the operation was becoming a factor. ISO containers that exceeded 20,000 pounds in weight were loaded into the aircraft on double-pallets; this resulted in the warping and breaking of the 10,000-pound capacity aircraft pallets under the strain of the load. Some of the pallets became impossibly wedged in the aircraft loading system and could not be removed without the brute strength and innovative techniques employed by the MAMS team and loadmasters. These difficulties caused delays in the off-loading operation that would have a domino effect on the following chalks.

As previously mentioned, airlift operations are very much a team effort that is unfortunately complicated by animosities and rivalries. The squabble between the two Air Movements Squadrons that had occurred as the MAMS teams were deploying had caused bad feelings that extended into the operation. The MAMS team NCO i/c loudly cursed our associates at 2 Air Movements Squadron, accusing them of purposely sabotaging the loads. I spent an unfortunate amount of time and energy deflecting his morale-affecting and unprofessional commentary. The reality of the situation was that mistakes were made on both ends of the airlift operation that caused damage to the aircraft and had an impact on the relative success of the operation. Loudly complaining and blaming the other guy has no real value in any context.

The other issue that kept me on my toes were the concerns of the MAMS personnel regarding our status relative to the remainder of the task force. Because we were deployed into theatre on a short-term basis only, we were distinct from the other units in terms of command, as well as administrative control. We were a small in-theatre ALCE that remained responsive to the ALCC at 8 Wing, and not to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander. Besides the obvious Command and Control implications that this relationship entailed, it also meant that we could choose our accommodations and feeding arrangements and did not fall under the arrangements for rations and quarters that were being contracted for the members of the Task Force. As trivial as this might seem, it was a key issue for the NCO i/c MAMS and the other members of the team. It could have implications on how much money they would make on their Temporary Duty (TD) claims. Little did they realize that they might have been sacrificing other benefits and allowances associated with the out-of-country operation.

The focus on TD money and commercial accommodations frustrated me continually during my time at the Air Movements Squadron, but in the midst of a busy airlift operation, I would do my best to ensure that issues related to our accommodations did not distract the team. Our living conditions were more than acceptable; we ate IMPs for breakfast and lunch and enjoyed fresh rations at the hotel for dinner. Life was good. That said, it must be noted that in general, despite their partiality to living in commercial accommodations and eating on the economy, it cannot be denied that a MAMS team also thrives on getting down and dirty – the possibility of living under canvas and eating IMPs is equally appealing as long as there is rewarding work to be done.

Despite the long history of the Traffic Technician trade that does not lend itself to ready acceptance of officers within the Air Movements Squadrons, the fact remains that MAMS personnel are highly motivated and thrive on being deployed into an operational theatre. There is nothing worse than delivering the news to a MAMS team that they have to wait their turn for the next opportunity. They are disappointed no matter how recent their last deployment. Teams languishing on static line operations tend to be bored with the day-to-day activities at the Wings, so any whiff of an upcoming operation is exciting to them. One cannot ask for a higher level of motivation, regardless of the caveats that might accompany it.

When the MAMS teams were initially tasked, they were to be employed for the first phase of the operation only. The members of the team left home expecting to be gone only a week to ten days, the duration of the deployment airlift. When we deployed into theatre with only one team, any concerns that we might have had about our workload were assuaged by the fact that it would be a short-term deployment. We could safely work at a high pace in an austere climate for a defined period. The team that had remained behind in Tampa Bay had by then redeployed to Winnipeg, making it certain that our numbers could not be augmented. Between 8-15 November, the deployment phase of the operation, the in-theatre MAMS team handled 55 aircraft and off-loaded over 1.3 million pounds of freight.

In the meantime, decisions were being taken back in Canada to continue the airlift beyond the deployment phase by initiating a daily delivery of humanitarian aid via C-150 Polaris. We were subsequently asked to maintain a small MAMS team presence for an indefinite period, although our workload at that stage of the planning process was still uncertain. We decided on a team of six personnel, and those that were to remain in theatre called back to Winnipeg to deliver the news to their family and friends. We knew that the duration of the DART team deployment would be for a maximum of 60 days, but that would potentially take us through the Christmas period.

Our new status in the operation would change our command and control relationships, as well as administrative arrangements. We would be attach-posted to theatre and work for the designated Air Component Commander (ACC) within the JTF. The ACC was occupied primarily with the day-to-day operations of the Tactical Helicopter package, but we were

mostly self-sufficient as a very small-scale ALCE. At the prodding of the team NCO i/c MAMS, the ALCE personnel (including signals operators and communications technicians) immediately began a campaign to maintain our present living arrangements, in a hotel that was separate from the other units in theatre. The JTF Headquarters (JTFHQ) and Tactical Helicopter Squadron personnel were occupying two different hotels, the latter within walking distance of ours in town.<sup>13</sup>

I suspected that this arrangement would not last, but humoured the troops and agreed to discuss with the ACC. Indeed, he was receptive to the idea and understood our wishes to remain distinct from the remainder of the task force. In the meantime, however, a small contingent from the ALCE had visited the Tactical Helicopter Squadron cadre at their hotel. Since their facilities were superior to ours (they had a pool that might soon be in working order) and because the Squadron personnel seemed like “a fun bunch,” the troops changed their mind and wanted to change hotels. I should have foreseen this eventuality, but rather than get frustrated with my fickle sergeant, garnered respite in the fact that it made much more sense to be in the hotel with at least part of the Task Force and dining in facilities with an established contract, therefore members would no longer need to get their meals on the economy. The troops would eat better with such arrangements. We moved the next day.

The delivery of humanitarian aid from Canada arrived via C-150 daily at noon, the hottest part of the day. There was no way to change the timing of the arrival, however, because the flight had to depart 8 Wing Trenton early in the morning and return the same day. The Canadian Red Cross Airlift Coordination Centre, established at the onset of the Hurricane Mitch crisis, prioritized the aid and subsequently determined the composition of the daily delivery. The Centre worked closely with NDHQ J4 Movements staff and 8 Wing Trenton. The latter soon became overwhelmed with the amount of aid arriving at their warehouses. Each flight carried in approximately 60,000 pounds of freight that was offloaded by the MAMS team and handed-off to the various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that were working at the airfield in La Ceiba.

The NGO aid organizations were coordinated by one agency, the World Food Bank, giving us one point of contact at the airfield. The aid was subsequently transferred from La Ceiba to various parts of the region by

truck or sometimes by CH-146 helicopter. The MAMS personnel were also involved with helicopter slinging operations, although to a limited extent. There were adequate numbers of slinging qualified personnel among the DART team in the field to ensure the safe transfer of aid and equipment at their location.

Although we were receiving only one Canadian flight per day, we soon realized that we had left ourselves short in the number of MAMS personnel that we had retained in theatre. We had only the minimum number required for a C-150 turnaround, and the flights arrived seven days per week. We also continued to handle foreign aircraft that arrived unscheduled at our little airfield. Our limited numbers gave us no flexibility whatsoever to allow for days off, so we ran a rotating schedule where two members of the team could take a half-day after the arrival of the C-150 flight leaving a skeleton MAMS team at the airfield to handle the foreign aircraft for the remainder of the day. We also employed our vehicle technicians and signals personnel as honorary MAMS team members, and even seconded an air movements qualified and current Traffic Technician employed with the Tactical Helicopter Squadron to our ranks.

Our official requests to increase our manning levels were denied by the NDHQ J3 Operations desk officer, despite our justifications and the support of both the ACC and the JTF Commander (as well as the advice of 1 Cdn Air Div HQ A4 Movements staff). I joked in an orders group that someday the baggage of that desk officer would get lost in transit at an Air Movements terminal.

Another challenge that we faced was the limited availability of aircraft handling equipment at Goloson International. The airport was not equipped to handle an aircraft the size of our C-150 Polaris (the Airbus A310 in commercial terms), and there were no stairs available that could reach the upper deck of the cargo compartment. The cargo configuration of the A310 is a unique one, and the height of the cargo and passenger entry doorsills an unprecedented 14 feet. As a temporary measure, we could use the K-35 loader to board and deplane passengers, but the alternative was not optimum nor was it preferable for the aircrew. A set of portable stairs could have been sent to our location from Winnipeg or Trenton, but several discussions with 1 Cdn Air Div HQ A4 Movements staff determined that C-130 availability to transport the equipment was

nebulous at best. Given the potential delay and the maximum 60-day duration of the operation, we agreed that we could continue to use the K-35 loader for the limited number of passengers that would be travelling on the daily flights.

We settled into a routine that was extremely rewarding. MAMS teams like to be kept busy, and busy we were. From my perspective, I had a few additional duties, as I was double-hatted as the ALCE Commander within the ACC as well as the JTFHQ J4 Movements in the absence of a Movement Officer within that organization. The JTFHQ Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer was too busy with the DART team to attend to the NGOs at the airfield, so I remained the link between the World Food Bank coordinator and the Red Cross Airlift Operations Centre back in Canada. Overall, our MAMS team had an excellent working relationship with all of the organizations on the ground, and had earned the respect of the JTF Commander and his staff.

The type of expertise that we offered to the JTF extended beyond our mandate as mobile air movers. For example, we provided assistance to the Tactical Helicopter Squadron support staff when they were unable to get CH-146 parts arriving by commercial air and couriers to our location and subsequently released from the Honduran Customs authorities. There were two problems related to the shipment of CH-146 Griffon parts via commercial means. The CH-146 fleet was the first to outsource supply chain functions to the manufacturer. This meant that spare parts were shipped directly from Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited on demand and not stockpiled in CF warehouses and supply depots. The company had guaranteed door-to-door delivery via courier or commercial air cargo means within 24 hours of the demand.

This concept worked well for domestic locations, but for units deployed in austere theatres there were complications. In this case, the parts were shipped by Federal Express to the larger airport at San Pedro Sula, over 120 kilometres away (as the crow flies) and not accessible by road. As far as Fedex was concerned, that was the closest that they could get the parts to us in our present location given the conditions in country. Bell refused to comply with our requests and ship the parts instead to Trenton where they could be loaded on the daily C-150 flights because they would be in contravention of their contract. They changed their minds when the first three shipments of parts remained in San Pedro Sula to no avail.

The second issue was that despite the signed and sealed Standing of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allowed the shipment of CF goods into Honduras without duty or tariff, the local Customs authorities insisted on the payment of an additional “tax” before they would release the goods to us. We refused to pay and they acquiesced eventually, but only after a few days of holding out.

During the month of November, the JTFHQ and its subordinate units were subject to a Staff Inspection Visit (SIV), to be conducted by NDHQ J3 Operations and J4 Logistics staff. We received word that the team would include the Operation Central desk officer who we had been dealing with in discussing the size of the MAMS establishment. In a rare twist of irony, when the SIV team arrived in theatre, the J3 Ops desk officer was void of his baggage. He loudly complained to me that he only had the underwear that he was wearing and gave me quite the tongue-lashing. I could only gloat, I am afraid. Nonetheless, I assured him that his bags would arrive on the C-150 flight the next day, although it took two days, in fact, before the baggage made its way to Honduras.

Besides the occasional lost bag, there were but a few hiccups experienced during the course of the mission. Once the freight was off-loaded from the aircraft, it was handed-off directly to the coordinator for the NGO aid agencies working at the airport. There was limited sheltered space on the airfield, so the aid was generally left on the aircraft pallets and positioned along the ramp until it could be broken down and loaded onto the designated transport. The airfield was relatively secure and the aid was moving quickly, so it did not sit for very long. At first, the type of aid that arrived was not items that would be easily pilfered, nor was it particularly attractive to potential thieves. For example, literally tons of canned sardines arrived, followed by several shipments of soda crackers. As time progressed, however, the attractiveness of the unsecured freight and the time that it sat on the ramp increased exponentially. We noticed soldiers from among the Honduran troops at the base discarding food packaging from the aid at their barracks. On one occasion, our forklift driver was directed by one of the Honduran Air Force officers to bring a pallet of freight to an awaiting truck behind a hangar, only realizing when it was too late that he had unwittingly helped a group of soldiers steal the goods. Some of the inbound freight was addressed to locations that could not be accessed by road, and no representative for the responsible aid agency was available at La Ceiba to ensure the onward shipment of the items.



Later in the operation when the NGO agencies began to disperse, the airfield was virtually deserted at night, leaving the aid vulnerable to thieves. Near the end of the mission, one of the last aid shipments to arrive at La Ceiba was the worst possible combination: a huge delivery of eye-catching portable radios destined for an aid agency that was no longer working at Goloson International. Not surprisingly, a portion of the shipment went missing.

By the middle of December, it was announced that the DART team and other units on Operation Central would be returning home before Christmas. Just as 8 Wing Trenton had been busy preparing the deploying units prior to their departure, this time it would be our end of the airlift that would become increasingly busy. The redeployment airlift would be accomplished using chartered aircraft, and we had to quickly estimate how many equivalent C-130 chalks we would require to get the freight home. The DART equipment returning from the field had to be sanitized and prepared for air shipment – this was a particular challenge for vehicles and pieces of major equipment that had been rendered unserviceable. Among these items was a backhoe with a broken axle. Innovation again came to the fore: the team came up with a plan to use an old Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) pallet, shipped from Trenton, to secure the vehicle and used the decrepit crane to lift the load as a unit onto the K-35.

Smaller pieces of freight had to be built up on aircraft pallets to a prescribed height and width, depending on the aircraft type that would be contracted by NDHQ J4 Movements staff. We certainly would not be able to accomplish this task with our small MAMS team. A second team from 2 Air Movements Squadron in Trenton was tasked to come into theatre to assist us in preparing for the redeployment.

The fact that a team from Trenton would be coming into theatre was extremely ironic, considering the dispute that had occurred at the beginning of the operation and the subsequent bad feelings that had festered between our two squadrons. The two teams would now be playing from the same bench, and would have to find a way to work together. The hostility between the members of the two teams and the two sergeants in particular, however, was blatant upon the arrival of the team from Trenton.

2 Air Movements Squadron had not sent an officer into theatre, but the MAMSO on their team was a master warrant officer. She and I had never met or worked together before this time (although my reputation for being a high-pace and hard-nosed individual had preceded me), but it was obvious from the outset that we had to find a way to get our teams to drop the posturing and get down to business. We immediately put aside any hard feelings that might have lingered from the beginning of the operation and resolved to work together. We were committed to working as a team, and worked out our strategy for the upcoming redeployment airlift together.

Our teams were divided into separate shifts, but some of the members from each Air Movements Squadron mixed between the two groups. We also ensured that the teams socialized as a group during our off hours and attempted to curtail any further infighting. Despite our best efforts, however, the animosity between the two sergeants prevailed and the two separate shifts were highly critical of each other's techniques. Each team spent an inordinate amount of time breaking down the other team's work and re-building it to their satisfaction. This was ridiculous on so many levels that it does not even need explanation, but most importantly it only added fuel to the fire. The other MAMSO and I pulled the two sergeants aside and instructed them to get a grip on themselves.

Airlift planning is among the busiest of times for a MAMSO. We were in constant liaison with NDHQ J4 Movements staff to ensure that the right number of commercial aircraft were contracted for our redeployment. In short order, a Movements Control team was deployed to our location to coordinate the delivery of freight to the airhead and take over the communications link between us and Ottawa. Thankfully, another ALCE commander was deployed into theatre to deal with the issues directly related to the flow of the aircraft into the airport. We assisted the administrative staff in ensuring that flight bookings for the passengers were accomplished for each chalk. The collection of airlift data was also a very important part of our job, at that point. Statistics, known as Unit Load Summary (ULS) data for the amount of freight, passengers and mail loaded and offloaded for each chalk was maintained by the MAMS teams and relayed to Movements Control and onward to Ottawa for each and every flight departure.

A portion of the ULS statistics also had to be credited to the MAMS team from each Air Movements Squadron. The data is used as a measure of the

static and deployed workload of the Squadrons and of the individual MAMS teams. In the end, this was relatively easy to achieve as the redeployment airlift was accomplished using a relatively fewer number of chucks: an estimated thirty C-130 chucks translated into the requirement for seven commercial IL76 aircraft chucks, nine C-130 chucks for vehicles that could not be loaded into the IL76 aircraft, and five C-150 transits for freight and passengers. Each team was given the opportunity to work an equal number of chucks, and the statistics divided accordingly.

Operation Central had its humorous moments from beginning to end, even in the midst of the intense and emotional discussions over the deployment of the teams at the onset of the mission. The ALCE Commander in theatre for the deployment phase of the operation, like the ALCC, had not accepted the advice of the OIC MAMS to ensure that adequate MAMS personnel were brought into theatre. As he departed La Ceiba after the week of receiving the deployment chucks, he commented to the MAMS personnel (to the frustration of the OIC) that he could not believe that we were able to accomplish all that we did with so few people.

In another instance, as we were planning the redeployment, a senior aircraft maintenance representative on the ALCE could not understand why a C-130 aircraft was required to transport the 10,000-pound forklift out of theatre. We needed the forklift and the K-35 loader until the very last day of the redeployment, for obvious reasons. As such, two of the C-130 aircraft had to be the last chucks out of theatre. There was a C-150 aircraft scheduled to take the last of the personnel back to Canada, but vehicles cannot be loaded into the C-150 given the very small size of the cargo door. The individual continued to question our strategy and asked us: "Can't you just flip the forklift onto its side and push it in?" Perhaps I would have refrained from sharing his comment with the troops if he had made it to me directly, but it was his misfortune that he made the comment to a group of the corporals on the team. The story spread like wildfire and will undoubtedly haunt the individual for many years to come given the very long memory of the typical Traffic Technician.

Thus, on 23 December, the 1 Air Movements Squadron contingent boarded a 435 Squadron Winnipeg aircraft with our K-35 loader and headed back to our home base. We were "first in and last out" – a common quip for MAMS teams that are more often than not among the first to arrive in an operational theatre and the last to depart. Over the

course of six weeks our team had handled 122 chawks of 11 different aircraft types<sup>15</sup> and over five million pounds of freight. That amount is comparable to approximately one-third the total freight handled in an entire year by both Air Movements Squadrons together, for both domestic and international operations.<sup>16</sup> The members of my team were happily on their way home before Christmas having done a very satisfying job and in a country that desperately needed our help. It was not only a successful mission, but also a great learning experience for all of us, old and new.

In its nine-year history, the DART has only been deployed three times, each for short-term 45-day missions. The deployment to Honduras in support of Operation Central was its first full-scale deployment and operational test. It was also a test for the CF in its ability to deploy the high-readiness unit with integral airlift resources. It remains the only operational deployment where this was achieved in recent history. And while the successes of the operation focussed on the achievements of the DART in the medical services and clean water that they were able to deliver to the local population, the work accomplished by the small ALCE and MAMS component should not be forgotten. We made a very significant contribution to the recovery of Honduras after the devastation of Hurricane Mitch.

International operations come with their own unique leadership challenges given the austerity of the environment and very high operational tempo, but at the end of the day, it is the personalities that make up the team that define how effective that team will be in accomplishing the mission. The most important lesson that I learned from my experience on Operation Central was the value of avoiding needless internal conflict that might distract the team from its mission. From a leadership perspective, there is also something to be said for remaining calm and not falling prey to emotional outbursts in response to something that is bothering the troops or some conflict that might be occurring at higher levels within the chain of command (even when those outbursts might lead to the lost baggage of the perpetrator).

In the case of our deployment to Honduras, once we were established in theatre we were lucky to form part of a highly functional Task Force where each unit gave the others the mutual respect that they deserved and the support that they needed to get the job done. There was an extremely high level of professionalism and maturity among all of the units at La Ceiba

and its surrounding environs. The camaraderie, combined with the very rewarding work that we were doing, contributed to our successes and the high morale of our team.

## ENDNOTES

1 I wish to extend a special thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Boucher; the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute; JS J4 Pentagon; and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) W.J. Douglas, of the Canadian Defence Academy for their assistance in the preparation of this submission.

2 National Climatic Data Centre (NCDC), U.S. Department of Commerce, "Mitch: The Deadliest Atlantic Hurricane," (<http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/mitch/mitch.html>). Hurricane Mitch was classified as a Category-Five hurricane, the most devastating class of hurricanes on the Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Intensity Categories. It remained a Category-Five hurricane for an unprecedented 33 hours.

3 Glossary, Close Quarters Battle BLOG (<http://www.fortunecity.co.uk/meltingpot/back/904/index.htm>). "Chalk" is the military term for an aircraft load, varying in size according to the type of aircraft, so called from the loadmasters chalk outline drawn on the hangar floor to show the size of the load.

4 DND/CF News Release, "Strategic Reconnaissance Team Leaves for Central America," NR-98.091, November 4, 1998 ([http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=535](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=535)). The strategic reconnaissance team was led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and included approximately ten members of the CF and one representative from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The team's mandate was to determine a potential operating location for any Canadian contribution and type of assistance that would be provided.

5 1 Cdn Air Div HQ A4 Movements tasked two MAMS teams from 1 Air Movements Squadron to deploy. When command of the airlift transferred to the ALCC, he recommended that the second MAMS team should be sourced from 2 Air Movements Squadron, to give them an opportunity to deploy into theatre. With the MAMS teams from 1 Air Movements Squadron already on their way to Tampa Bay and given the increasing workload at Trenton, this recommendation just did not make sense. The ALCC subsequently directed that only one team would proceed into theatre, and the second team from 1 Air Movements Squadron was ordered to redeploy to Winnipeg.

6 Among other things, we were told to expect to see devastation such as flood victims being consumed by stray and wild dogs.

7 Montezuma's Revenge is a colloquial American English name for traveler's diarrhea. The name refers to the conquering of the Aztecs by European invaders. Its cause is usually due to protozoa or parasites. It is estimated that 40 percent or more vacations are disrupted by the disease, ([www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)).

8 2 Air Movements Squadron DIN Web-Site, (<http://trenton.mil.ca/2AMS/home.htm>). The Air Movements Squadron mission is to provide safe and efficient processing of passengers, baggage, freight and mail for air transport and to provide Mobile Air Movements Sections (MAMS) teams of members trained and medically fit for employment any place in the world in support of Operations/Exercises as directed by 1 Cdn Air Div/CANR. Our normally temperamental K-35 loader had thus far maintained an almost perfect record, having only blown a hydraulic line behind an aircraft once that was quickly repaired by our integral Vehicle Technicians.

9 Logistics Branch Handbook, Volume 9, Chapter 2, "History of the Traffic Technician Trade," ([http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/logbranch/handbook/Volume9/chap2\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/logbranch/handbook/Volume9/chap2_e.htm)).

10 On an aircrew, the importance of rank is negligible and the crew operates in an informal environment that is based on teamwork. Regardless of their subordinate rank on the crew, the loadmasters enjoy virtually equal status with all crew members and quickly become accustomed to being treated like an officer or senior NCO. Furthermore, the Air Transport fleets rarely ever subject themselves to austere accommodations on the road and each crew member is allowed his or her own room in typically expensive and highly-rated commercial accommodations. Leaving that type of lifestyle behind is very difficult for former loadmasters when they return to static employment at a base. They also suffer a drastic cut in pay and benefits after years of earning flight pay and temporary duty allowances.

11 Logistics Movers Association Web-Site, (<http://www.lmacanada.ca/>).

12 There were several lessons learned associated with the difficulties of sea container loading and off-loading on the C-130 aircraft. First and foremost, 1 Cdn Air Div HQ A4 Movements staff realized that the CLTs in their present configuration with four large wheels would not allow for the effective maneuvering for aircraft loading, and modifications to the system were developed to replace two of the wheels with smaller "bogey" wheels to allow the container to be steered more precisely. They also contracted Boeing to develop a "slipper" container loading system that allows the containers to be secured within the aircraft without using a double-or-triple pallet configuration.

13 The Military Police Platoon was the only organization working in La Ceiba to be housed in the barracks (barely hospitable) on the Honduran Air Base.

14 The cargo hold of the IL76 is 20m in length, compared to the 12m of the C-130. The width of the cargo hold in both aircraft is roughly the same.

15 Aircraft handled included (above and beyond the CF C-130 and C-150) B727, IL18, IL 76, CD-3, DC-4, C-127, C-141, C-160 and CF-144 aircraft.

16 For calendar year 1999, the two Air Movements Squadrons handled approximately 15 million pounds of freight (on- and off-load).

## CHAPTER 7

### OPERATION REPTILE: SERVING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

*Captain Lloyd Johnson*

Operation (Op) Reptile was the Canadian commitment to the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The mission name and mandate actually changed in December 1999, to United Nations Armed Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This change was the result of the introduction of armed UN troops and the evolution of the mandate from a Chapter VI (peacekeeping) to a Chapter VII (peacemaking) mission of the Charter of the United Nations. UN Security Council resolutions 1270 (1999) and Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, provided the legal standing and mandate of UNAMSIL.

The assistance was long in coming. Conflict in Sierra Leone raged from early 1991, until the signing of the Lome Accord on 7 July 1999. Even then, local flare-ups and hostage takings still occurred. However, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) effort still continues today. Nonetheless, in November 1999, I received the opportunity to be a part of the first Canadian military commitment that returned to Africa following the Somalia and Rwanda operations of the early to mid-1990s, as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO), as part of Op Reptile.

I am a Reserve infantry captain and a member of the Princess Louise Fusiliers. Op Reptile consisted of four Regular Force members (two infantry officers, an armoured officer and a signals major) and myself in the field. Our mission team also included two very important members (a lieutenant (Navy) and a major) who actually worked out of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). Often these members in Ottawa are forgotten, but that is a mistake. Their input and work on our behalf made our lives safer and better during our deployment. The ability to work with them and understand their important role in the success of the mission is one of the first lessons that must be learnt - they are your voice, your foot on the ground in NDHQ. In all, these six officers were to become very important in my life, and to this day I consider the experience we shared something quite unique.



## PSTC KINGSTON

Prior to deployment, I had already completed my Combat Team Commanders course (Advance Infantry Classification) and the Militia Command and Staff College. The deployment required that I also conduct training at the Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). I found my previous training / background very valuable in my PSTC training, as well as during my deployment.

The opportunity to attend the first international Canadian observer PSTC course that was run in Kingston, from September to October 1999, was an excellent learning opportunity. Working with international students from African and Eastern European countries, along with my fellow Canadian officers, prepared me for the international flavour that accompanies all UN observer missions. It also set the tone. As directing staff warned, it became obvious that the other foreign nationals looked to native English speakers, particularly from professional militaries, to take the lead in certain areas of UN missions and tasks.

Armed with this knowledge, it became a great opportunity to put a “Canadian” flavour into the methodology by which the teams I was involved with would function. It provided me with a certain comfort level in expressing my opinions and implementing my ideas. In short, I tried to employ a method of ensuring that all members were clearly aware of their role in any task and the expected outcome we were to achieve, individually and collectively. The intended aim was to accomplish this end state without confrontation.

Unfortunately, there were cases of confrontation that normally caused dissent and made attaining the required outcome more difficult, if not impossible. However, most of this was due to a number of individuals who clearly did not possess the requisite professional skills and / or desire to attain the required outcome. Almost always, they were quickly marginalized. This dynamic was to be a valuable lesson for my deployment. I was also fortunate to be roomed with a Russian officer. Once and again, this experience was to better prepare me for my tour in Sierra Leone.

## NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

I actually attended PSTC expecting to deploy to Kosovo. However, when the call came in November 1999, the mission allotted to me was Sierra Leone, West Africa and it came with direction to immediately report to NDHQ for briefings. Here, I met the companions with whom I would deploy. Our desk officer was a very direct and informative individual. There was no doubt in my mind when I left NDHQ that he was our control; that he was a hands-on individual; and that the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) was taking a personal interest in our day-to-day activities while we were deployed. There was no time wasted on unnecessary pleasantries - the necessary information we required was passed, our questions answered and we were sent home to prepare to deploy the following week.

My initial feeling that our desk officer would be “hands on,” was quickly confirmed. Our movement orders and mission directives were always clear and direct, but this was tempered with a true concern for our well-being. This was demonstrated one night when I was in Kenema and checked in with NDHQ by satellite phone. Our desk officer immediately ordered me to call my wife. This concern shown for my family always meant a lot to me and always motivated me to ensure our deployment went as effectively and efficiently as possible in accordance with our orders. Loyalty is a powerful tool. Loyalty breeds loyalty – regardless of direction.

## DEPLOYMENT

We met in Toronto at the International Terminal and flew into theatre as a group. Our team leader was approachable and always used his previous experiences to assist others. We had two days in Conakry, Guinea while Canadian Embassy staff sorted out our visas. The experience of the staff and the advice and information passed on to us here was were of great value. The embassy staff provided us with both insight and an overview of life in Africa. Throughout our tour, up to and including our return journey, they were always there for us.

Upon arrival in Freetown, we established our presence at the UN headquarters and immediately struck up a close relationship with British officers who had been in theatre prior to our arrival. We quickly developed friendships with officers from many other countries as well, such as

Russia, Croatia, and New Zealand to name a few. One Canadian officer deployed as Operations Officer to Bo with his team led by a Swedish lieutenant-colonel. Another Canadian deployed to Lungi as the Operations Officer with a team led by a Russian officer. I was assigned to a team that had yet to deploy. As a result, in the interim, I worked in the lessons learned cell.

The lessons learned cell leader was a lieutenant-colonel from the Middle-East. He was a pleasant individual, but seemed distracted, and I found it necessary to gather information and process it into a report without his input or direction. I always ensured he saw all drafts and was aware of what I was doing, which seemed to more than satisfy his requirements.

The opportunity to remain in Freetown afforded me the opportunity to observe the Force Commander, a brigadier-general from India, who seemed frustrated by the civilian side of the UN mission, as well as the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and certain military unit commanders who were not taking control of their areas of responsibility at the rate he had directed and expected. The frustration he experienced with the UN bureaucrats was easy to understand. Early on, vehicles for the mission were in short supply for the mission, and observer teams were forced to deploy with far fewer vehicles than required to properly fulfill their duties. This was the result of the bureaucrats gobbling up the available vehicles - every senior and not so senior UN bureaucrat had their own UN vehicle. It was very evident that the civilian administrative tail was wagging the military dog. In essence, the UNMOs are the reason the UN civilian bureaucrats were there. Without the observers, they have little reason for being in theatre. Nonetheless, as an UNMO, it is important to remember that they represent the UN - they have the power, and you will have to work with them to succeed. The old saying, "you catch more flies with honey than vinegar" is worth noting.

As mentioned earlier, in February 2000, the UN changed the UNOMSIL mission from observer status to armed intervention – it was now United Nations Armed Mission Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). While this did not seem to have a direct impact on us as observers, the increase in UN troops enabled us to move more freely. Before my team deployed to Kenema, I spent a week in Port Loko working for a Russian lieutenant-colonel. I also roomed with a Russian officer, who became a good friend.

The Russian team leader had a reputation for being aggressive in pushing the mission. This was reinforced one evening when he sent six of us observers into the Ocra hills to meet with the rebels to discuss future Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and inform them that there would be a delay of a few days before they could come in for processing. Before departing for the rendezvous, we discussed the whole matter. For instance, why did the local commander feel it was so important to get into the program all of a sudden – in essence, what was driving his sense of urgency? We also discussed what we could do to satisfy some of his needs and expectations without over taxing our resources.

The drive to the rendezvous point was quiet. No one was sure whom we would be meeting, or what state the “soldiers” would be in. After all, these were the rebels that had taken British hostages just before our arrival in Sierra Leone (and would do so once again later in the tour as we were leaving). At the rendezvous, we sat in a circle inter-mixed with the rebels. We also kept two UNMOs with the vehicles to maintain open radio communications. Calm, direct, yet respectful dialogue led to a successful meeting. We set dates for their entrance into the DDR process, and we were able to offer immediate medical support, knowing that this was a concern for the local commander.

I met with the Russian lieutenant-colonel again towards the end of my tour in Kenema, when headquarters felt his approach was required to build on his previous success. Here, the temptation to forget who you work for came into effect. As I mentioned earlier, when I left NDHQ, my orders /directives were crystal clear, yet the desire to advance the UN mission mandate - to be “successful,” did was not always allow it to be compatible with Canadian directives. Failure to remember this could lead to repatriation, as was the case with one Canadian officer whom NDHQ felt had lost proper perspective. The Canadian in question wanted to be brash - show others that we could go anywhere and do anything anyone else could or would do. He felt that this would make us appear as a real valuable contributor to the mission and as being on side. However, this interpretation was not in consonance with Canadian directives or thinking (which preferred a more restrained involvement in the mission). For example, while in Kenema, I was involved in arranging the deployment of a fellow Canadian in accordance with the Canadian requirements. During the process, I had a senior British officer, in a rather insulting manner, ask me “if I felt safe.” He was referring to the guidelines Canada established for

its members. While the immediate temptation was to volunteer for the next mission in the “I’ll show him” mode, I had to remember Canadian policy and understand our national position.

### **KOIDOU TEAM**

When the time came for me to deploy, I was also tasked as the Operations Officer of my team. I was attached to the Koidu Team, which was commanded by a very knowledgeable lieutenant-colonel from Nepal. Although I was one of the last officers assigned to the team, I immediately felt welcome and needed. Our team of officers came from China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, Gambia, Uruguay, Bangladesh, and Tanzania. Each brought a different approach to the mission and a different reason for being there. Our team leader was an impressive leader. He never raised his voice and never swore. His style, which was extremely effective in an international environment, was to treat each member with respect, yet remain firm. He ensured each team member contributed to the best of his or her ability.

The team leader also conducted meetings every evening at the same time with the same format, which ensured everyone knew what to expect and was prepared for the meeting and for the next day. Moreover, the round table procedure allowed for questions and concerns to be addressed in an open and transparent manner. These meetings ensured participation by everyone in the team and in its objectives and financial affairs.

The team leader’s attempts at forging exclusivity were important. The motives for being in Sierra Leone varied among the team members. For some, the economic opportunity could set them and their families up for life upon returning home following one year of service. For others, it was about furthering national interests in the future of Sierra Leone and other West African countries. Yet others were there to get the experience of a UN mission. Once the motives for being there were identified, the method of motivating some of the members to contribute effectively rather than just sit and draw their mission pay became more apparent. For example, the threat of stopping UN pay motivated some individuals to return to their deployed team stations, become active contributors to their teams, conduct patrols and / or simply successfully complete assigned tasks.

It must be understood that for some, this mission was all about the money. As long everyone understood that, the money very quickly became a key “motivation” tool. Knowledge of an UNMO’s country of origin and its economic system also played a role in assigning tasks. Officers originating from a country with a strong barter system were much better at making the team’s living allowance money go farther, which benefited the team’s standard of living. As Canadians, we were not able to get as much from the local economy as compared to some of our peers who really knew how to barter. Therefore, tasks were assigned by strengths. Some officers were assigned more patrolling, and others were tasked to deal with the administrative requirements of the team.

It must also be said, however, for political reasons, or as a lack of training, some individuals were not advantageously employable. That was just the way it was. Each team had one or two of these individuals and you quickly identified them, marginalized them and really did not want anything to do with them. In the field, you wanted each member of the patrol to be as functional and professional as possible since your safety depended on that individual. You had to be able to rely on one another.

Fortunately for me, in one encounter with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) when our patrol to Koidu was held for over fourteen hours, all members of the patrol were, in my opinion, highly trained professional officers. We were led by a lieutenant-colonel from the Czech Republic who was a take charge individual and did most of the negotiating with the rebels. We also had a Gahanna Officer who spoke the native language, thus, keeping us informed on what the Rebels were saying and planning. In addition, we had a British officer who supported the team leader and who was respected by the RUF.

The initial surprise at being captured, gave way to a sense of uncertainty that increased as time went on and circumstances effecting the mental state of the RUF changed. The more intoxicated they became, the more aggressive and unpredictable they became. This required firm but not aggressive dealing between us. When they requested articles of clothing or anything else, we all denied them, firmly but not offensively. There is no doubt that if one of us had been insulted we would all surely paid a heavy price. One officer had to be placed out of contact with the RUF by being put in a vehicle for his, as well as our collective safety. A professional soldier, he was deeply offended by being held by little more than thugs, as

he saw them. However, they were armed and we were not. This was neither the time, nor place for him to make his views known or to act upon them. Looking back on the incident, it becomes clear how important it is to be able to trust your patrol members, ensure you remain unified and share the hope / trust that your headquarters is equally as engaged in the process. These factors are critical in maintaining a positive atmosphere. In any case, there was never any doubt that UNAMSIL was negotiating with the RUF leadership in Freetown. Our biggest concern was not provoking the local leadership and letting the higher-level negotiations have the time to be completed and passed down the RUF chain of command.

### **CANADA HOUSE**

When the Canadian contingent arrived in Freetown, it was agreed we would establish a residence and share the cost. Those working in Freetown would occupy the house but they would maintain rooms for the other Canadians who came to Freetown for short leave. All of us ensured we took our leave every thirty days in the city. The temptation to stay at the team site for a host of reasons all driven from the feeling if you are not there things will not get done or will get screwed up is real, however, you must not allow yourself to be sucked into that black hole - burnout will come in a hurry. Three days away makes all the difference in the world.

For this reason, and others, the residence in Freetown became important. It was a place to go for those three days; a location to store kit not needed at the team site; an opportunity to gather in one place as a group and compare experiences and support each other in numerous ways from listening to someone bitch about something to offering advice on common problems. The residence allowed us the opportunity to withdraw into a safe environment and deal with any and all problems, and seek and get advice from friends. It would also serve as our staging point for going home.

### **RETURN TO CANADA**

When it came time to go home, three of us left together. One had left a day or two earlier, and one was being left behind. Leaving one officer behind was the tough part. There was a mixture of emotions that ranged from eagerness to get home, relief at safely completing the tour and some sadness at leaving newly made friends.

Upon arrival at home, it was difficult not to continue issuing orders. I had to accept that my wife and two daughters, and even the dog, had established a routine that did not include me and that adjustments on both sides would be required. I went through the post-deployment administration and still laugh when I think about being asked by the social worker, after being home for less than week, how I felt. Well, let me see; I am home safe and sound, my family is fine, I have complete power over myself 24/7. I was not aware of any problems. I felt really good. I understand the need and importance of this process, but I still feel you must take stock of your emotions and situation regularly with maybe a session six months after to evaluate how things have gone, or are currently going, in regards to getting back into your family's life and them into yours.

## CONCLUSION

I feel honoured to have had the chance to work with the people involved in Op Reptile and having had the opportunity to represent my country. We were professional, and completed our duties as such. If allowed, I would offer only one piece of advice - know Canada's expectations and the mission parameters, as well as how you may conduct yourself, and what your duties are. Do not allow perceived mission needs or the desire to facilitate requests by others to contradict your national orders in an effort to be seen as a "mission team player".





## CHAPTER 8

### OPERATION ECHO: WITH TASK FORCE AVIANO IN ITALY

*Lieutenant-Colonel Steven L. Whiteley*

In 1999, NATO conducted Operation (Op) Allied Force that caused the capitulation of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Allied land forces then occupied Kosovo. During and following the allied occupation, air power was tasked to enforce the 'No Fly Zone' and provide 'on call' support to Land Forces in the event of an attack by Serbian forces. The Canadian Air Force's contribution to this mission was OP Echo, which consisted of a force of CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft and its supporting structure. I deployed to the American/Italian Aviano Airbase in Italy for five months as the Detachment Commander of the 101 personnel and six operational CF-18s that made up the Detachment.

The Aviano Detachment reported directly to the Canadian Task Force Commander, situated at the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre (COAC) in Vicenza, Italy, a 45-minute drive from Aviano. The Detachment's mission was to provide six aircraft sorties per day, five days per week on a normal basis, and to maintain a surge capacity. The missions included Air Defence patrols and Close Air Support (CAS), as well as pilot proficiency Air Defence and Interdiction training missions.

Aviano Airbase was an Italian Air Force base dominated by American forces. The Italian Base Commander had a small staff but no forces. The American Base Commander, for all intents and purposes, ran the airbase. The Canadian camp was situated directly on the Airbase. The camp consisted of contracted container type shelters that made up an operations complex, as well as accommodation shelters. There were also tented facilities for the field kitchen, combined mess, and rest and recreation (R&R) areas. The R&R areas were equipped with movies, television, Internet and games. The co-located American facilities provided athletic and further recreational facilities. Aviano itself is a small village, and the area was largely agricultural with many outlying small villages. However Venice and Vicenza, two attractive cities, were within easy driving distance, and the beaches of the Adriatic coast were a one-hour drive to the east.

Throughout the tour, there was a ground threat of terrorism. In the base area, two terrorist attacks had taken place prior to my arrival. A major road ran by the base perimeter that was approximately 400 meters from the Canadian camp. With aircraft taking off over this road, Man Portable, Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) were a concern. Mortar attacks were also viable given the range.

In the mission area, the threat was considered low. There was the potential of small arms fire and SAMs occasionally powered up, but this was rare. The belligerent forces had a small air capability and, though we were prepared to encounter it, we did not even once during my tour. Nevertheless, vigilance was required and only in retrospect was it known that they would not make use of their threat capabilities.

I commanded two rotations (Roto). I took over command of Roto 4 approximately one month before the end of their six-month tour. Roto 4 was primarily based on one squadron with augmentation from the Wing and other Canadian Forces (CF) bases. Roto 5 arrived for a four-month tour to finish up an extended mandate accepted to optimize the long-term rotation cycle. Roto 5 was a composite unit made up of personnel from across 4 Wing and the CF.

The Aviano rotational cycle was somewhat complicated. Detachment commanders rotated on a five-month cycle, pilots rotated on a two-month cycle, and the support troops rotated on a six-month cycle. While there were good reasons for these rotations, they hampered cohesive training and employment. My training for the operation was less than ideal. Returning to flying from a staff tour in the spring of 1999, I spent the summer of 1999 converting to the CF-18. I assumed command of my squadron in September 1999, which was to a large extent still deployed to Aviano on Roto 3. I spent that fall and early part of 2000 in the Combat Ready upgrade program while Roto 4 was deployed. I conducted my individual training with Roto 5. However, I deployed before Roto 5 collective training could be conducted.

As with each of our the branches of service, there are unique aspects in regards to their methodology for deployment - air operational employment is no different. As such, the Air Force normally operates from the rear area. This puts the expensive and flexible, thus very valuable, assets in a more defensible position without hampering their

employability. Furthermore, in the Air Force, only the aircrew go on combat missions. In the case of the CF-18, this translates to only the pilots. While the other detachment personnel may face combat, it is only in the defensive role. This fact presents a special cohesion issue to Air Force units. It is easy to allow a we/them attitude to develop because of the huge difference in what each group experiences. Therefore, it is critically important to ensure that all are aware of the experiences of others and the interdependence of their roles.

With the foregoing introduction provided as a backdrop, I will now describe the challenges that arose, and the success, or otherwise, of the manner in which I addressed them with my team.

## CHALLENGES

Before leaving Canada, I carefully considered the mission and realized that the perspective of personnel who served solely on the airfield in Aviano would be far different from those that actually flew into the mission area. Personnel in Aviano could see their deployment as an extended European vacation or as a day job with convenient beaches, ski hills, shopping and culture nearby. This would significantly detract from mission focus. At the pre-deployment briefing I was able to conduct with Roto 5, I drew people's attention to the effect of our work on the ground – how literally millions of Kosovar lives would be changed by the security we would be supporting and enforcing. Having witnessed the atrocities of the war on television, many could easily contrast this with the peaceful lifestyle in Canada.

I arrived in theatre and took control of a detachment (Roto 4) that had only one month to go before repatriation to Canada. This presented several challenges. First, was the personal challenge of getting to know the camp and the team. Second, was the necessity to compare and contrast the directives I had read, and briefings I had received, prior to deployment with what I actually encountered on the ground in Aviano. Third, was the challenge of trying to maintain mission focus in a team that had only one month to go. I spent a lot of time with the Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) during the initial period, discovering what had gone on before my arrival. I also made a significant effort to know and be known by the detachment. I actively participated in the sports day. I attended all the social functions, and I talked with as many people as I could during walkabouts and meal

times at the combined mess tent. I continually referred to the effect we were having on the people in the former Yugoslavia. Thankfully, Roto 4 was a strongly motivated team. Their efforts, supported by the message of the mission outcome, facilitated continued mission focus up to the end of the Roto.

Shortly after arriving in Aviano, I was faced with a technical challenge. It became evident that there was a potential problem with the CF-18 weapon system. The problem was indicated by a recurrent fault code on several aircraft. The technicians believed that this code would not cause a malfunction during operations, but were unable to confirm their opinion by specifically identifying the problem. I insisted that the problem be specifically identified and fully resolved. In the end, this resolution required significant support from Canada. However, the problem ultimately was solved, and it turned out that an operational failure could have occurred had it been ignored. I continually stressed the difference between home base support in Canada and Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) deployed operations support. I prohibited staff from dealing with any national authorities except the DCDS J-Staff. Two issues of improper lines of communication occurred later in the deployment, and were dealt with disciplinarily. In this way, the J-Staff supported the Detachment well and staff learned the proper procedure.

Another challenge was the camp's physical location. The Canadian camp in Aviano was approximately 200 metres from the main operational runway. The camp was abeam the runway near the take off point for most operational aircraft, the noisiest area. Consequently, noise provided a real, and almost constant, health and safety hazard. The first step was to initiate, with the Camp Medical Officer, a two-pronged attack on this problem. I initiated scientific studies to positively quantify the hazard and its potential effect on detachment personnel. The second part of the project was to implement a comprehensive hearing protection plan. We bought a plentiful supply of the best ear defenders we could, in several different styles. An aggressive information campaign on the dangers and requirement to use the protective equipment was backed up by continuous and public use of the system by all supervisory personnel and a no-tolerance policy for any non-use. This system was very effective and minimized the negative effects of a serious hazard. In addition, a letter was put on every detachment members' medical file attesting to the fact that they had operated in that specific noise hazard environment.

Another challenge was the implementation and policing of the DCDS alcohol policy, which was very difficult in an open camp in a friendly mixed rural/urban environment. The easy availability of weekend travel made the problem more significant. I discussed this issue thoroughly with my senior staff prior to the arrival of the main party. We stressed the policy in the in-brief and had all read, and signed as having read, the policy. Roto 4 had had a significant alcohol policy violation incident prior to my arrival. On my arrival, Roto 5 was confined to camp for 48 hours. I challenged them to be the first Roto without an alcohol policy issue. But on the first night out of the camp, we had a significant violation. Along with my senior staff, we continued to stress the importance and the non-tolerance of alcohol misuse. In the end, without controlling movement, I could not police everywhere. I began touring the local area and having my senior staff do the same during off time. In that way, we were visible and could prevent or address significant violations. In the end, there were no official incidents of Detachment members causing embarrassment to the Detachment or the country. However, I would have loved to have had a better tool to address enforcement of the alcohol policy in an open camp environment.

Deployment policy created another major challenge. The composite nature of Roto 5 had the effect of less than desired cohesion on the arrival of its personnel. This became clearly evident. There was no spontaneous organizing of social events and there was a high degree of intersection griping. Given that many of the support staff had never supported an air operation before, there were perceptions of serious inequities between occupations. I stressed unity and commonality of purpose in my discussions with all and sought to meet with all sections to acknowledge their issues, ensure they understood the aims and clarify the situation of other sections they may have considered advantaged.

As part of the program, the pilots were tasked to communicate unclassified mission information to the troops to ensure everyone understood the operational side. At the same time, the Canadian repatriation and commemoration of the Unknown Soldier was taking place. This provided another bonding opportunity. My CWO proposed, and I approved, a local Unknown Soldier commemoration. We solicited volunteers for the commemoration and received a 75 percent response rate. While this overwhelmed the resources we had planned, the CWO soon had everything arranged for the event. A War Cemetery that had a single

Canadian Unknown Soldier's grave was located approximately an hour away. With the co-operation of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the local constabulary, we organized a parade at the cemetery.

The parade went off very well. This seemed to be a significant event in improving the cohesion of the Detachment. We also went to great lengths to create a memorable Canada Day celebration. With the valuable assistance of the Personnel Support Program, we produced what the local American Commander dubbed the 'best party around'. This event also served to bolster unit pride and cohesion.

Another team building activity that we conducted was a charity drive for Kosovar refugees. The CWO and I offered up our hair and moustaches respectively, if the goal was reached, which it was. The last thing I did in my team building effort was to regularly, and publicly, remind people of and thank them for their accomplishments. This gave me the opportunity to let people know what other sections had done and to provide more appreciation for our accomplishments. Things that I did not do that may also have helped in creating cohesion were implementing a 'walk a mile in my shoes' program where individuals could work a half or full day with another section, and conducting additional sports days.

The Padre provided invaluable assistance to me during the entire period. The Padre was very active in visiting all sections, and I specifically requested that he give me general feedback on the state of affairs. On rare occasions, I also asked the Padre to be alert for feedback on specific issues on which I wanted more information. I believe that the Padre and the commander can also provide a ready ear for each other, something they are both short of in many circumstances.

## **COMMUNICATION**

One of my early commanding officers said that poor, or a lack of, communication causes 95 percent of the world's problems. I believe this officer was right. I recommend we all become dedicated students of communication. We can learn to use more effective words and phrases. It pays!

Communication is one of the most important skills a leader can have. My ability to craft and successfully communicate the mission message and the cohesion message were instrumental in mission success. I consider the following to be important tools in communication. Be a good listener. Ensure your aim is simply and clearly stated, and that it is well understood by all. Always speak in the positive, what you want, not what you do not want. Use metaphors to make your message memorable and understandable. Speak slowly enough to ensure your message is understood. The essence of communication is the message received. The fact that we transmit does not determine the outcome. It is what is received that determines results. It is worthwhile to confirm that the intended message has been received.

When there were difficult policy issues, such as the alcohol policy, I worked to be seen doing what I expected others to do. Be visible so you can see how things are going and provide situational guidance and demonstrations of desired behaviour. It is in doing, rather than talking, that we have the greatest influence.

It is clear that the set-up for my command was less than ideal. The lack of collective training, staggered rotation schedules, and a composite unit were all complicating factors. Nevertheless, we play with the cards we are dealt. When presented with low cohesion in the training cycle, many steps can be taken to ameliorate the situation. When presented with the situation in the operational theatre, the combination of mission focus and mandatory intersection fraternization made a positive contribution.

## GENERAL LEADERSHIP THEORY

Quite apart from the specific examples above, our personal leadership traits have a great influence on our subordinates. History is littered with examples of leaders that were effective in combat, but not in peacetime, and vice versa. That leads me to believe that a successful military leader must have two minds. In peacetime, we are in the people-building business so that our troops are better than the enemy's when they meet in combat. To build our people, the peacetime mind is communicative, collaborative, and co-operative. This makes the best use of resources, including the ideas of others, in order to develop our subordinates and ourselves to the maximum extent possible.



In combat or crisis, there is often a shortage of time to describe or discuss what all the options are. In real combat or crisis, a less than ideal, but useful action done right away, is often better than an optimal action done later. Thus, the combat mind must be decisive, directive and aggressive. There are varying degrees of both ends of the described minds, and it is probably more useful to describe these two aspects of the mind as opposite ends of a spectrum we can operate anywhere on. Nevertheless, there are very different aims and requirements for building the ability of our troops in peacetime and employing them to win in combat or succeed in crisis.

In essence, we must act ethically. No one admires those who are not ethical. We certainly cannot expect our subordinates to admire leaders who are not. Ethical behaviour is a pre-requisite to respect. Respect is the foundation of loyalty.

My general leadership theory owes much to J. Edward Deming and W.E. Glasser. I largely follow the theory laid out in Glasser's book, *The Control Theory Manager*.<sup>1</sup> This book asserts that each leader has two functions, first, to clearly communicate the organization's aim to subordinates, and second, to provide a system that supports subordinates in their efforts to produce that aim. Similarly, subordinates have two functions, the first is to produce the leader's aim to the best of their ability, and the second is to inform the leadership of changes to the system that will improve their ability to produce the aim. This simple model is the essence of continuous improvement and establishes support as the primary criterion and medium of exchange between the leader and subordinates. It is through this specific mutual support that effectiveness is maximized.

## CONCLUSION

In the end, Task Force Aviano Rotos 4 and 5 did accomplish their mission. Moreover, they left a positive impression on the local populace, and as a group, felt rewarded by their experiences. All missions present unique challenges. None will be like the one(s) before it. In dealing with these challenges, leaders will always come up with better solutions when they combine the input and thinking of many rather than the thinking of a single person. We provide increased capacity when we provide an atmosphere of mutual support. I believe that communication remains the

most critical skill, and that we can consciously study and improve our communication skills. In my experience, the application of the two minds model and Glasser's Control Theory has proven to be very effective.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 W.E. Glasser, *The Control Theory Manager* (New York, New York: Harper Collins, 1995).



## CHAPTER 9

### OPERATION APOLLO: A SENIOR CHAPLAIN'S MINISTRY

*Lieutenant-Commander John L. Domotor*

As Senior Chaplain with the Canadian Fleet Pacific (CANFLTPAC), my main duties and responsibilities were to ensure that the spiritual and pastoral needs of the members of the Fleet were met with the assistance of a team of chaplains representing various denominations. By no means was pastoral care limited just to members of the Christian Faith. Our mission is to provide assistance to any member regardless of creed, gender or race.

I have had the pleasure of participating in two Operation (Op) Apollo Deployments. The first deployment took place from March to September 2001, aboard HMCS *Winnipeg*, commanded by Commander Kelly Williams. My second deployment, again aboard the HMCS *Winnipeg*, occurred from September 2002 to April 2003. As Senior Chaplain within the Fleet, my main duties were usually to co-ordinate and supervise the junior chaplains in my team. Since our team is small in number, all the chaplains are able and ready to deploy at a moment's notice. During this period, all the chaplains were assigned to various ships that were about to deploy or were already deployed. As such, when the need for a chaplain to deploy aboard HMCS *Winnipeg* was identified, since I was the only Fleet chaplain available, the Commander of CANFLTPAC assigned me this tasking, which I readily accepted.

As had always been my practice prior to deployments, I made a point of visiting the ship on numerous occasions in order to build a rapport with the ship's Commander, the Executive Officer (XO) and the Coxswain. This was important to ensure that an opportunity existed for the key leadership personnel aboard ship to get to know the chaplain assigned to them. It also allowed the chaplain to give them an understanding of his/her role aboard the ship. At all times, I impressed upon them that I expected to be a full member of the ship's company and not a "rider" out for a pleasure cruise. I always expect to share in the duties and responsibilities like the rest of the ship's company, taking part in the preservation of the security and safety of all aboard during the mission.

As a chaplain, I also wear the uniform of my country's armed forces. Although my main duties are to provide spiritual and pastoral care, I am also an officer and am expected to behave as one, with all that is implied in one's commission, namely setting an example through leadership. My being onboard gave the ship's company a sense of security and peace of mind - even though they were heading for potential danger, the Padre was with them. This in itself, I believe, gave some confidence to the members of the ship's company and fellow officers.

I always kept in contact with the Commanding Officer (CO), XO and Coxswain on a daily basis. From the beginning, I made it very clear that I was aboard to serve the whole of the ship's company, not just one segment of the crew. I accomplished this by gaining permission to visit and spend time in all of the Messes. I tried to share meals with everyone, at all times being conscious of the fact that I was a guest who must respect their privacy and could not repeat anything that was not meant to be heard outside of their respective messes, including my own Mess, the wardroom.

Due to security consideration while in the theatre of operation, one had to be ready for any eventuality. On a couple of occasions, planned port visits had to be cancelled, which caused disappointment for all concerned. Everyone, without exception, accepted the change and went about their duties with the same confidence and professionalism. Nevertheless, after being out on patrol for several weeks, one was ready for a couple of days of port activities.

Before any deployment, the ship's company is invited to attend a number of pre-deployment gatherings, one being with the members' families, at which time valuable information is shared, specifically details that will affect those left behind namely the crew members' loved ones. The chaplain sailing with the ship is also in attendance, giving him or her the opportunity to familiarize the families with how to go about contacting the support team of chaplains in case of need. Because the chaplain onboard has access to the ship's external communication system whenever the need may arise, he or she can usually, within a short period of time, make the necessary contacts back at home base in order to help to alleviate the problem. Aboard the ship, the same chaplain can be a great source of help in assisting a member who has received distressing news from home to cope with the situation and assure the member that everything that can be done, will be.

Clearly, spiritual matters are our main mission. Thusly, when called upon, the chaplain is a source of spiritual comfort. This can take place through regular worship services conducted aboard ship, scheduled prayer meetings and bible study, as well as the "Ministry of Presence". Ministry of Presence refers to the fact that the Chaplain is seen as a person of God and that he / she is available to assist in any matter at all times, meaning at all hours, regardless of the "Watch." This is one reason why the chaplain must exhibit a sense of calmness, compassion, understanding and confidentiality.

Whether the ship's company or just a few members recognize the need for a Padre aboard the ship, all feel the chaplain's presence. And, whether they are willing to admit it or not, they do feel, for whatever reason, a bit safer and secure. After all, nothing bad can happen when the "Sin Boatswain" is aboard.

During our deployment, our main mission was to board ships in order to ascertain whether or not they carried "terrorists" or any other undesirables that would be in the service of international terrorism. There was always the possibility that such ships or boats would have terrorists aboard, and that lethal measures would have to be taken. This certainly caused a certain amount of anxiety aboard the ship, especially for the safety of the Boarding Party. Even though everyone was highly trained to deal with any eventuality, the fear factor was always there. Nevertheless, at no time did I ever notice that it diminished the determination and desire to fulfill the mission. I would have gladly accompanied the Boarding Party, but because of the wisdom of the Commanding Officer, that was not possible.

On numerous occasions, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Sea King crew on flights and I always looked forward to any opportunity to do so. These usually occurred on those occasions when my presence was requested aboard one of the coalition vessels, namely US naval vessels, to conduct various pastoral and spiritual ministries. I feel that, by being willing to fly aboard our Sea King helicopters, I gave our pilots and flight crew a sense of security as well.

As the Padre aboard the ship, I also had a close working relationship with the "SickBay" personnel. Whenever a member was admitted, for any reason, I, as the Padre, was available to assist as required, but only if he or she had no objections of course. Most of the cases in which I was involved

were cases that dealt with home issues rather than deployment-related ones. In my second deployment to the Persian Gulf, the stress levels were mainly caused by the inability to go into port when scheduled due to security requirements and the postponement of “Chop out” from the “Box,” but in spite of these disappointments, the ship’s company remained alert and carried out their responsibilities with confidence and professionalism.

Fatigue and boredom are always elements aboard ship life that, if not dealt with, can cause difficulties and even have serious safety ramifications. We were very fortunate, as were all the Canadian ships on these deployments, to have exercise equipment onboard for those wishing to avail themselves. Whenever possible, one of the Messes would host a BBQ (Banyan) on the flight deck. This always proved to be a popular and effective stress reliever. Some would jog on the flight deck or participate in the aerobic sessions that were also held there. We would have special dining evenings where specialty dishes would be prepared by the galley staff, accompanied by ethnic cuisine prepared by members of various backgrounds.

As for me, in order to deal with boredom, I would assist in the galley everyday with various tasks such as preparing foods (i.e. vegetables, lunch meats, etc). On my last deployment, I was given the opportunity to run the sandwich bar by preparing sandwiches upon request. At other times, I would serve the steam-line at various meal hours, as well as prepare some of the main dishes. This especially helped the galley team since one or more would be assigned to boarding parties, causing a personnel shortage. This helped me immensely in scheduling my time. What better way to get to know the whole ship’s company then to serve them in the steam-line? On some occasions, I would also assist in the Chief Petty Officers’ Mess.

Technology was a great assist in the quality of life for our ship’s company, mainly in the form of “e-mail” access for all. This alleviated the anxiety of waiting to get to port to place a phone call home. Having said this, there were some drawbacks, albeit not of a serious nature. These I normally dealt with. For example, a member would receive a vague e-mail from someone back home, either from a partner or other family members, that would cause tremendous anxiety to the member, simply because, he or she did not know what to make of it. In some cases, the member’s distress would interfere with his or her ability to concentrate on their duties. As the Padre, I had access to satellite phones, therefore, I would contact one

of my chaplains at homeport and have him or her look into the situation. Most of the time, the anxiety of the member could be resolved by a clarified response from home.

Usually, a chaplain deploys aboard one of our naval vessels on all deployments of longer than three months. This chaplain can be of any denomination represented in the Canadian Forces Chaplain Branch who wears one of the environmental uniforms. Regardless of which uniform the chaplain wears, they are all adequately trained to serve aboard our ships. The designated chaplain is there to serve everyone regardless of the member's denominational affiliation, race or gender. He or she is onboard to serve the needs of all, even to those who profess no religion. The chaplain works in close relationship with all in positions of authority, whether it is the Commanding Officer or the Divisional Officer, on behalf of the member. At no time does the chaplain work in opposition to those in positions of authority in carrying out pastoral ministry. Nevertheless, the chaplain does safeguard the confidentiality of anyone who requests counselling for whatever reason. If the member needs assistance that only the CO can approve, then the chaplain informs the member that, in order to assist him or her, the chaplain needs to divulge pertinent information in order for the CO to make the necessary decision.

Since at any given time, a quarter of the personnel of most of our ships, is made up of female members, on occasion situations arise due to imprudent behaviour on the part of both genders. Though for the most part, all regulations and policies are adhered to by all, and during my two deployments to the Gulf, there were never any situations that called for disciplinary action due to unlawful fraternization. The ship's company worked in unison and harmony due to the professionalism and capability of both female and male members. Space constraints aboard ships can at times affect the privacy of both genders, but at no time was I made aware of any improper behaviour between the genders. This, however, does not mean that it did not occur in some rare cases.

Overall, the provision of chaplains on board ships during deployments is another important element in ensuring the well being of our service personnel. It is a preventative measure that assists with their morale and spiritual health. In addition, it provides the ship's leadership with another resource to assist in preventing and resolving personnel problems and situations that may arise. And of course, chaplains provide that confidential shoulder to lean in times of personal crisis.





## CHAPTER 10

### THREE MAPLE LEAVES IN A SEA OF STARS: A SMALL MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

*Major D.A. Bourque*

The great British wartime prime minister, Sir Winston S. Churchill stated, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies -- and that is fighting without them.” Truer words have never been spoken. Canada has deployed land, sea and air forces in various operational areas at home and abroad with differing mandates and contributions. These mandates have ranged from humanitarian aid and peacekeeping to combat operations. The contributions have also varied in size from lone observers to brigade groups. At times, these deployments have involved participation in multinational coalitions. Often, the United Nations (UN) or NATO is the force responsible for assembling these coalitions, but not always. There are times when our long friendship with the United States calls upon us to demonstrate our bond with more than words. This was the case with Canada’s Operation (Op) Apollo.

The discussion that follows is not a treatise on command. The NATO definition of command is “the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.”<sup>1</sup> This chapter describes a small mission in Afghanistan, working within a US-led coalition environment. A perspective on leadership will instead be explored, with a view to providing education and insight to the reader. In 1973, then current Chief of Defence Staff – General J.A. Dextraze – defined leadership as “the art of influencing others to do willingly what is required in order to achieve an aim or goal.”<sup>2</sup>

#### BACKGROUND

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, against the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Canada launched Operation (Op) Apollo, made up primarily of air and maritime forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. Canada’s immediate land force contribution to Op Apollo and the US-led war on terror – dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom by the Americans –

was the deployment of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (3 PPCLI BG) to Kandahar. Even as this Land Force mission was phasing out, the continued need to participate in the campaign prompted the forward deployment of army staff officers from Task Force Southwest Asia in Tampa Bay to Bagram, Afghanistan. Although part of Op Apollo, the three staff officers deployed, with their peers from other coalition countries, were attached to the United States (US) headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force 180 in theatre.

My predecessor in Bagram was tasked to be an Operations Watch Officer in the Tactical Operations Centre. The US security posture was such that even coalition partners were denied the access needed to properly perform such functions. Frustrated by this situation and not content to sit through an operational tour filtering second-hand information, this officer took positive action. Through some personal initiative and manipulation of circumstances, he moved from Bagram to Kabul and was attached to the US Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan (OMC-A). He began work planning the pilot of a Brigade Staff Training Programme for the newly-formed Afghan National Army (ANA). It was during this planning and preparation stage that I relieved him in place.

## THE MISSION

The opportunity to participate in Op Apollo came in October 2002, with a message seeking senior officers to deploy to Task Force Southwest Asia. At that point in time, the location of this mission remained somewhat of a mystery. Requests for information through the chain of command produced only guesses. Frustrated but not effectively deterred, I made contact with my predecessor through electronic mail and learned in no uncertain terms where I would be going and was also given a good idea of what I would be doing. Further, he asked me to gather what publications and training aids I could that might assist me in my mission.

To preface the mission further, this would be my first international operation. No pre-deployment briefings could adequately prepare me for the departure from my wife and daughters. The fear of the unknown was present. In time, this fear would be replaced with an enhanced sense of situational awareness, and in turn this sense too would leave the forefront of my thoughts to become more of a sub-conscious conditioning.

I was immediately attached to the Afghan National Army Planning and Design Team (ANAPDT) of OMC-A when I arrived in Afghanistan in January 2003. My predecessor remained for a few days to make sure he effectively handed over the task to me, and to ensure my acclimatization to the local surroundings. This orientation period included several demonstrations on how to navigate a vehicle at considerable speed through crowded streets. It also introduced me to the team, many of whom would remain throughout my period of employment. Among this team were members of the US Army, US Marine Corps, the British Army, Romanian Army and of course, two-thirds of Canada's army in Afghanistan at the time: my roommate and me.

As part of this team, I continued to prepare the Brigade Staff Training Programme and then oversaw the execution of the pilot serial. This pilot consisted of a cadre of fourteen Afghan senior officers employed as Directing Staff (DS) with whom I communicated daily through the aid of my interpreter. The daily communication required me to travel by road for twenty minutes through the city streets at the start and end of each day. Telephone calls and videoconferences were simply not possible, nor would they have been appropriate. What was appropriate in this culture was to join the DS each day for "chai" tea, where all manner of issues were discussed, ranging from the class schedule, resource requirements and doctrine to "English as a Second Language" lessons and cultural comparisons.

This daily ritual of sitting down to tea was one of the best sources of Human Intelligence I had while in the country. Not only was I assured that about ninety-five percent of the population was happy we were there, but I was also given advice as to how I might avoid the other five percent. It also developed the rapport I needed to ensure the loyal cooperation of the DS who naturally remained wary of foreigners in their midst. Through our daily discourse, I realized that the DS were dedicated professionals who wanted to see a successful outcome to this programme of instruction. They were very motivated towards creating a stable and secure country after decades of warfare.

Preparing a programme of instruction in austere conditions was quite challenging. The Americans bolstered the local economy as they invested money and labour gathering tables, chairs, boards, and the construction material for a large sand table that we built in the main classroom. There

were no data projectors or overhead projectors readily available, so much of the instruction would use whiteboards and markers. The Afghan cadre helped set up the classes and built the terrain model.

Much of the doctrine taught was new to the instructors; we completed a “train the trainer” programme before conducting the pilot serial. The necessity for this training became very clear when my interpreter and I sat in on a classroom rehearsal where part of a reconnaissance mission discussed included the policy of shooting captured enemy. We were quick to intervene and explained some nuances of the Law of Armed Conflict. The team – through this kind of demonstrated interest and dialogue – became effective.

Once the students arrived, conducting them through a bureaucracy of administration and logistics was mind numbing. After several days and many visits to the Special Forces headquarters, most the students had received access with photo identification, a basic issue of personal equipment, and a notebook and pen. I also arranged to have them paid. Part of the problem here again stemmed from me not being American, and at times I had to bring along a team member from the US to facilitate my way through the “red tape”.

The Brigade Staff Training Programme consisted of instruction on the continental staff system, force employment of combined arms teams up to battalion-group in size, staff writing procedures, and the Law of Armed Conflict, among other such subjects. For the planning of operations, we used the Combat Estimate, although in later serials the US Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) would replace it. After the initial programme was successfully completed, the team identified an ongoing need for this training. Further courses were contracted out to a US company called Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI)<sup>3</sup>. This transfer of the training programme included the Afghan instruction cadre, but not my interpreter, as MPRI hired its own. It also occurred about midway through my operational tour, giving me a tactical pause where I returned home for Easter and allowing me to re-write my job description.

The Chief ANAPDT shared my concern about contracting out the staff training, so I retained a liaison position with MPRI at the training centre. This task was limited in scope, with the provision of a support link from

OMC-A and some over-watch to ensure the currency of the subject material. In order to better use my time, I encouraged the Chief – a fellow armoured officer from the US – to let me design the training plan for the first and only tank battalion of the ANA's Central Corps. This was no small task, as it required a multinational participation seldom seen. Afghan instructors conducted basic soldier training, after they were themselves trained by the Turks and Americans then given Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) leadership training by the British. A combination of Romanian and Afghan instructors taught technical skills on the Russian built T-62 main battle tank; the Afghan expertise came from cooperative local Warlords. Tactics would be taught by the cooperative effort of the Germans and the US 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR). Finally, the British would give leadership training to the NCOs while the French would train the junior officers. More senior officers would receive training at a later date from MPRI.

Here again, team building was effective through the use of coordinating conferences, with representation from the participants in training. The outline plan would be revised to suit conditions, and the general atmosphere of close cooperation was enhanced. The Romanian technical assistance team was most interested in working with the tanks, especially since the T-62 was not current in the Romanian inventory. Fortunately, enough similarity to the T-72 existed for them to adapt.

## COOPERATION

The above example illustrates the level of cooperation enjoyed within the Coalition, as well as between the Coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Aside from employment, OMC-A provided rations and quarters, wheeled transportation in the form of rented Toyota trucks, and much of the training resources that furnished the school at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). It also placed us within a shared compound with the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) and some US special forces. Since forces dedicated to rebuilding the country surrounded us, we received few direct threats, provided that the cash continued to flow. This arrangement also provided us with relatively comfortable accommodations and with municipal utilities that worked more often than not.

Because we were part of the US-led Coalition but not actively hunting Al Qaeda or the Taliban, we tended to remain within the zone protected by ISAF. We also drew on the ISAF expertise that provided Mobile Training Teams to the local ANA brigades for the conduct of driver training, Law of Armed Conflict education, and first aid. To coordinate these training tasks, regular conferences were held at the ISAF Brigade Headquarters. In this way, we placed faces to names and improved the liaison relationships between both operations.

One particular instance where cooperation with ISAF was demonstrated was on 7 March 2003, during the ANAPDT's return trip from the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) near Gardez. The team had had an uneventful trip in the morning from Kabul to Gardez, stopping at various places to take photos and stretch. The tour of the PRT was similarly event-free, as was a stop in the town of Gardez where we gave candy and pencils to local children. When we neared Kabul on the return trip, the situation changed. Afghan militia blocked the road and reported that an explosion further along the road was making travel unsafe. We had no idea if this was the result of a mine, rocket-propelled grenade or remote-detonated explosive. Once we learned that the ISAF Quick Reaction Force was being dispatched to the scene, the Chief decided it best to carry on past the roadblock and link up with ISAF rather than wait for darkness to fall so far from the compound. We proceeded to where an ISAF checkpoint blocked us, and dismounted with weapons ready. There was no way to know whether the person or persons responsible for the explosion were still in the area, but we were prepared to engage an enemy in any case. This was neither the first nor the last time where we had rounds chambered, as doing so was the norm when away from the compound. It was, however, the closest I came to firing at a human target. For this Reservist from Moncton, on my first international deployment, the adrenaline was elevated and it would be safe to assume I was not alone among the team in this regard. No amount of range time or simulation prepared me for this event, and as I observed through my optical sight (this took place before my C7A1 was replaced with a C8) I had a mix of emotions, at once hoping the target would present itself so we could engage, destroy and get back on the road while at the same time dreading just that.

The area where we stopped was surrounded by homesteads, so another fear was that an innocent would suffer from a nervous finger when poking

out of a door. Fortunately, the situation on the road ahead was cleared and we passed through without incident, but it did give pause for thought once we were relatively safe, back in our compound. Mind you, safe did not mean fed, as we had missed supper and instead enjoyed some hard rations. Close cooperation with the US Army should not suggest a lack of support from home. The Canadian "Army of Three" in Afghanistan received periodic deliveries at the Kabul International Airport from the National Support Element (NSE) at Camp Mirage, ranging from such necessary clothing and equipment as Arid CADPAT and C8 carbines to such Quality of Life items as pizza. Any readers from the comptroller branch must note that the pizza was not a stand-alone delivery, but added to an already scheduled flight. The NSE also arranged cash advances and the all-important Home Leave Travel Assistance.

This was not unidirectional support. On a few occasions, we had the opportunity to assist small visiting CF parties as they arrived to complete other tasks. This ranged from assisting with arrangements for VIP security to helping the Theatre Activation Team for Operation Athena with some acclimatization.

No mission in Afghanistan is possible without the cooperation of the host nation. In this case, the Afghan instructor cadre was hired from outside the Afghan National Army (as the ANA was still the training audience), mostly officers from the Communist era of Afghanistan. They were very open to learning Western operational art in order to teach it. Much effort was put into translating NATO terminology and doctrine. Both my interpreter and a KMTC pool of translators were used for this. KMTC also provided the schoolrooms and access control at the front gate in cooperation with US forces, allowing a relatively safe place to conduct training.

## SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

As any estimate draws to a close, the question that must be asked is whether the situation has changed since the process started and if so, what has been the impact of that change. Over the span of several months in Kabul, the situation changed many times. As mentioned earlier, the tasks themselves evolved from staff training to tank training, but the overarching mission remained the development of a credible ANA. The climatic conditions also changed from winter to spring, but the variations



in temperatures were less severe than those found in Atlantic Canada, so it was not difficult to adjust. Because the deployment began in winter, the acclimatization was gradual. Those who deployed from Canada during the summer had a greater challenge in this regard.

The force protection measures in place varied, but the norm was to have a single vehicle with two coalition partners, armed and wearing fragmentation vests with ballistic plates. When the situation dictated, this would increase to a minimum of two vehicles for security and when danger increased, travel was delayed or cancelled altogether.

Force protection was always at the forefront. Each morning, the ANAPDT gathered for a Battle Update Briefing (BUB) where the latest intelligence was shared to the extent the US Army was prepared to share it. In other words, details of troop deployments were not given, but local security concerns and the overall security climate were shared. Following this passage of information, the activities of the team's past day were reviewed and the current day charted out. This gave the Chief some needed intelligence on what was happening in various projects while affording him the opportunity to issue guidance. It also gave my compatriot and me an opportunity to compare the intelligence given with that received through the Canadian Chain of Command.

Through the Canadian Senior Liaison Officer (LO) in Bagram, we received regular updates on security concerns by e-mail, phone and weekly visits, depending on the sensitivity of the information. These updates often confirmed the concerns noted by the American headquarters. On a few occasions, the Canadian risk assessment was greater than the American, and we acted accordingly. Certainly, when one assessment by the Canadian Contingent Commander suggested to him that we receive Canadian soldiers to assist with force protection, we gladly accepted several infantry soldiers rotated through from Camp Mirage's Defence and Security Platoon. Not only did they add depth to our Canadian presence, they also gave an excellent example of professional soldier conduct.

The BUB also served as a measure of team morale while ensuring that as a coalition, all members were still sharing the commander's intent. This became more important as the new campaign in Iraq was growing from the planning stage to its execution. Outside the BUB, we remained mindful that events elsewhere would have repercussions locally. Canada's

stance on the Iraq campaign was not welcome news to a number of our peers. This was mitigated with the announcement of increased Canadian presence in Afghanistan, albeit as part of ISAF and not the US Coalition.

Another source of valued information who cannot be forgotten is my interpreter. While I was sometimes assigned a different interpreter from the ANAPDT office pool, one in particular was most effective in improving my understanding of local customs, security concerns to be mindful of, and similar such intelligence. This is not to suggest that the other interpreters were ineffective; they too conducted themselves well. The team as a whole was well served by these Afghan nationals, and we in turn took every opportunity to demonstrate our spirit of cooperation.

As mentioned earlier, the ANAPDT operated within the protected area of ISAF. This allowed for a certain freedom of movement within Kabul, provided we remained mindful of ISAF security concerns. That said, the team kept in regular communication with ISAF headquarters and the Kabul Multi-National Brigade Group (KMNb). ISAF was invaluable, considering the state of Kabul's civil police force and the fledgling army we were creating. When ISAF saw a significant threat, we responded, with the compound taking up stand-to states of readiness. The first few stand-to adoptions were not very well done, so the Team, in cooperation with our neighbours in the compound, developed a security plan and practiced drills. This bolstered the confidence of the soldiers greatly, and seeing a more professional reaction to threats was heartening to my compatriot and me as well as we identified shortcomings in the previous security postures.

## **SOLDIER DIPLOMACY**

Canadian culture and its multi-national heritage have contributed greatly to the Canadian soldier's ability to exercise a good degree of tact. We tend to treat others with respect and courtesy, observing our surroundings closely. This increases our sensitivity to local customs. Our desire to assist around the globe rather than assimilate also comes from the Canadian multi-cultural heritage and decades of lessons learned.

The way we dealt with local people was similar to that of our allies in many ways, but not always. For example, we all tended to haggle with merchants with the same vigour, and had established price guides for certain goods.

The guides ensured a fair market value so that the merchants would still enjoy some prosperity while the soldiers were not preyed upon financially. This practice was seen as being fair overall; only merchants who agreed to the price guides were allowed to enter the military compounds to sell their goods at the weekly bazaars.

One example where the Canadian approach differed was in dealing with a sensitive matter of pay. This matter had the potential of becoming a violent incident, as my interpreter remonstrated after the fact. One of the participants on the Brigade Staff Training Programme – who happened to be a local loyal Warlord – had been absent from most of the training for culturally legitimate reasons: he was attending the religious pilgrimage to Mecca. Participants in the Programme were paid by the US Army in cash, based on their attendance. My initial thought was to seek religious accommodation and have the person paid, a practice that is quite acceptable here in Canada, but the higher authorities did not approve this, and no pay was forthcoming for him. Payday arrived, and I was faced with the option of letting him learn in the line that he was not on the list, or to take him aside and explain the situation beforehand. I chose the latter course of action; I would like to think any other Canadian officer would do likewise. This was risky, but the embarrassment he avoided by not standing in line mitigated his displeasure to the point that he smiled and thanked me for doing him the courtesy of explaining the situation privately. The Warlord later resigned, but did so peacefully. How peaceful he would have been otherwise is now a matter for speculation only. The fact that he returned to the ANA suggests that this was the right way to deal with the situation.

This was one of very few occasions where a clear threat existed towards my safety. The far greater threat was in navigating the streets at high speed with crowds of motorists and pedestrians, but the perception of risk was reduced over time as I became acclimatized to this style of driving. Note to pre-deployment trainers: greater emphasis should be placed on defensive driving skills and evasive manoeuvre.

## TOOLS OF THE TRADE

21<sup>st</sup> Century operations rely heavily on portable technology and an effective sustainment system, especially in areas of operations where decades of war have reduced significant infrastructure. In our area,

potable water did not exist, making it necessary to have bottled water delivered from outside. Electricity was sporadic, and the principal source of heat during the winter was a wood-burning fireplace. A back-up power generator was maintained in the compound.

Because we were attached to the US headquarters, no access to the Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN) existed. Instead, we received accounts on the US “unclassified but sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network” (NIPRNet). This allowed us to communicate with our peers, transfer files and presentations for review, et cetera; it did not allow us to research the Canadian Defence Information Network (DIN). This would have enhanced our ability to prepare courseware for translation, assist my compatriot as he developed ranges and training areas, and similar such tasks. If file sizes were small enough, we had reference material sent by e-mail from home, provided it was unclassified.

Another advantage to the NIPRNet was that the firewall – in many ways as protective as our own – did allow access to web-based e-mail servers, allowing us some ability to keep in touch with loved ones beyond the weekly phone call. There were times when this access was blocked, either for reasons of security or preservation of needed bandwidth. Such periods were taken in stride by most, keeping in mind the situation.

The Defence Switched Network (DSN) provided us with necessary telephone service as well, allowing us to call Camp Mirage, our senior liaison officer in Bagram, and home units as needed. During silent hours, the DSN line was also a link for the weekly call home if the lines were tied up in the Military Welfare Office. Unfortunately, it was during one such call home that my conversation with my daughter was interrupted by a rocket attack about 1800 metres away at the ISAF headquarters compound. Without indicating a problem, I cut the conversation short and donned my Kevlar. Only later would she and the rest of my family learn of “what came up” to get me off the line.

A large number of cars and trucks in the area were Toyota, so it was only natural that the vehicles rented locally for our use were a range of diesel-fuelled Toyota trucks in extended cab pick-up or Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) configurations. These vehicles were easy to maintain, with the greatest attention being placed on a weekly blowing of dust from the air filters with an air compressor. They did not have any ballistic

protection whatsoever, so off-road driving was discouraged. Our practice of moving from the compound included the provision of hard rations and drinking water in the vehicle in case we found ourselves out on the road during a meal. Given the lack of protection offered by these vehicles, dining out was uncommon.

With no local Canadian headquarters, one other concern was financing. US dollars were accepted almost everywhere, but it took weeks before we could convince the US pay office that they should honour our American Express Traveller's Cheques. Carrying large sums of cash would have been easier, albeit riskier.

As attachments to the US headquarters, we received medical support through a US infirmary within our compound. We also had access to the ISAF medical facilities if a need arose. In my case, such need did not arise, and the infirmary was able to see to my needs quite adequately.

In a compound less than one kilometre in length, it is difficult to go for an evening or morning jog. Many people did run laps back and forth the enclosed alley, but greater use was made of the small weight room with cardiovascular exercise machines. This equipment was in regular use, and lines could be long at times. Still, it allowed for a certain level of physical activity sought by body and soul alike.

We also had access to the Chaplaincy for spiritual needs. A barber visited the compound regularly. There was a laundry service in place, but after a few instances of peers losing uniforms and other clothing, we decided early on that the manual washing machine in our house was a wise choice, and we ran lots of line for drying clothes. This all became part of the routine in Kabul with an occasional evening out, when the tactical situation allowed, enjoying a meal at a restaurant. Our favourite location was an "Italian" restaurant that served an interesting variation of pizza that was quite good.

## CONCLUSION

This mission in Afghanistan was interesting in many respects. The culture was quite different from what I had grown accustomed to in Atlantic Canada. Certainly, contrasting attitudes towards societal norms were of great interest, given my university studies in sociology back in the mid-eighties.

The women's practice of wearing full body veils was most peculiar when compared to my upbringing where such things were not seen. The reason given to me by one of our interpreters gave pause for thought, stating that the women wore such veils to protect themselves from rude men, with the implication that the majority of rude men arrived from foreign lands. It was quite evident to me that there was a wide gulf between our perceptions and those of the Afghans.

To look upon the battle damage wrought by decades of war and then see the sparkling eyes and wide smiles of children and adult alike was both unsettling and inspiring. So much has happened to batter this nation. Hope remains in each of those eyes, and thanks in each of those smiles.

Not having a large contingent of Canadians with me, I found the greatest common ground in culture with the Americans and with the French liaison officer who visited the compound daily for the BUB but did not stay there. I would like to emphasize that while Canadians and Americans are very similar, I did not fully espouse their culture or political views, and when the campaign against Iraq was starting, there were a few of us coalition partners who received some icy stares due to policy decisions not to rush into that country with barrels ablaze. Those we worked closely with were either sympathetic or discrete by not voicing their displeasure of Canada's stance on Iraq with any regularity.

While it was not the operation I had expected, I believe many accomplishments were seen. The Brigade Staff Training Programme initiated by my predecessor was successfully executed as a pilot, and demonstrated to the OMC-A that a recurring requirement existed for such training. The establishment of a multi-national training programme for the tank battalion saw positive results, as all the battalions trained prior to this were of light infantry. As significant as these accomplishments were, it was more personally satisfying that through extending a professional courtesy to a loyal warlord, I saved him embarrassment that would possibly have resulted in bloodshed. By demonstrating the subtle differences in approach that are common in Canada, I believe the maple leaf remained a welcome sight in Kabul.

As my mission drew to a close, a much larger mission was being prepared for the Canadian Forces. Camp Julien was being designed and built, with Operation Athena inbound later that summer. My replacement started his

mission with the US headquarters where I had been stationed, but in time he too was transferred to Camp Julien. This effectively ended the Land Force participation in Op Apollo.

Working within a coalition will no doubt remain the Canadian way of doing business for some time. To remain relevant in such an arrangement, matters of policy must be agreed to and enforced prior to deployment. Being assigned to a command post and not given access to it forced my predecessor to write his own terms of reference. Rules of Engagement (ROE) were not uniform, and it seemed that our ROE were more robust than our employers' at OMC-A. Apart from this, the level of support in the Area of Operations from both the US and CF was very good, and I was able to succeed in my phased mission to help produce a more professional ANA.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 B-GL-300-003/FP-000, Land Force Command
- 2 Department of National Defence, "The Art of Leadership," Canadian Forces Personnel Newsletter, June 1973.
- 3 <http://www.mpri.com> describes its mission as follows: "MPRI's mission is focus the experience, expertise and values of our workforce to develop and implement comprehensive, imaginative programs that build security, justice and well-being within the United States and around the world."

## CHAPTER 11

### LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN: ONE STAFF OFFICER'S VIEW

*Major K.S. McKay*

This chapter describes personal observations gathered during my deployment with OP Apollo and Op Athena from May to November 2003. These observations relate primarily to issues of low-level leadership and the importance of effective human relationships during operations. As my conclusions are based on my own experience, I recognise that much of what follows is highly subjective. Despite this limitation, I remain hopeful that the article may be of some benefit to other officers facing similar environments in the future.

In May 2003, I was deployed to Afghanistan in support of Op Apollo. My orders directed that I was to serve as a liaison team leader co-located with the United States (US) Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters (HQ) in Bagram. Shortly before my arrival in theatre, I discovered that my team had been re-located to Kabul. The purpose of this relocation was to provide much needed staff planning support to the Afghan National Army Plans and Design Team (ANAPDT) within the US Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A).

At the time, OMC-A was an operational-level staff group responsible for the coordination of military support to the US Security Assistance Organisation (SAO). In addition to supporting development of Afghan national defence institutions, OMC-A maintained involvement with other security assistance pillars including Police, Judiciary, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and Counter-Narcotics Programs.

#### OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The OMC-A operating environment was extremely complex and included working relationships with the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), US Army Central Command (CENTCOM), US Army Training



and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Afghan National Army Defence and Training Authorities and US National Command Authorities (NCA) through the US Embassy in Kabul.

On my part, the Canadian national chain of command ran back to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) through the senior Canadian Liaison Officer in Bagram and the Canadian National Commander collocated with CENTCOM at MacDill AFB in Tampa Florida. Administrative support was provided through the National Support Element (NSE) located in the United Arab Emirates.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

There was no mission specific intelligence provided by Canadian authorities prior to deployment in theatre. On arrival in Kabul, the team was almost totally reliant on the US to provide situational awareness regarding day-to-day security threats. It became apparent early in the mission that much of the US intelligence would not be formally shared with coalition representatives within OMC-A.

Over time, these constraints on information sharing generated some friction among coalition members. From a Canadian perspective, we felt these constraints indicated a lack of trust by US authorities while increasing our level of day-to-day risk. From a US perspective, the presence of coalition members within the HQ complicated their own information security policies. In order to manage our day-to-day security stance, we came to rely on informal contacts with individual US staff officers. While US sources were always protected, critical information (license plate/vehicle watch lists, high threat areas, recent TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures] etc) could be “pulled” from these contacts and generally allowed us to operate with a minimum degree of security. More general security information could normally be accessed if necessary through Canadian military officers operating within UNAMA and the CJTF in Bagram.

On those occasions when our duties required us to travel outside of Kabul Province with ANA forces, we turned to individual contacts within the Afghan Ministry of Defence. While formal security assessments were never provided, we were able to determine “high risk” destinations by the level of coalition force protection “suggested” by the accompanying Afghans.

## CLOSE PROTECTION TEAMS

As our duties included daily independent travel in and around Kabul, the NSE assigned the Canadian liaison officers (LOs) a two-man close protection element. These soldiers were provided from the NSE Defense and Security (D&S) force and normally rotated through theatre every six weeks. My relationship with the close protection teams included both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, very close personal relationships were normally established. While these relationships were shaped by the working conditions and relative isolation from other national forces, I believe the most significant contributing factor was the security environment. It was apparent to all of us that we would be completely self-reliant when dealing with any security threat when deployed from the HQ compound. This demanded a high level of mutual trust within the team. In a more conventional situation, this trust could be established over time in garrison and during pre-deployment training and exercises. In our situation, this trust was often established through surprisingly personal questions and conversations as we attempted to assess one another over the first few days. Other useful approaches to cementing these relationships included the use of opportunity training events including weapons, defensive driving, and counter-surveillance techniques. Whenever possible, an element of competition tended to enhance the training.

One of the potential negative aspects of such a close working relationship is a tendency to become “risk adverse” with respect to employment of the teams. The coalition staff would often request close protection support when the team was not otherwise employed. Over time, I noticed an increasing reluctance on my own part to allow the teams to operate outside of my direct supervision. I believe much of this can be attributed to the level of individual trust I held in the officer requesting the support. While mission requirements should have been the deciding factor in releasing the teams, in reality it became a secondary consideration if I had any doubts about the “reliability” of the officer.

During my time in theatre, the soldiers were exposed directly and indirectly to a number of stressful events. These included suicide attacks on Canadian and coalition forces, friendly force casualties from mine strikes, random shootings, and fatal traffic accidents involving children. The traffic accidents hit home particularly hard. From a command

perspective, this aspect of the mission was very frustrating as it was unavoidable. The only effective response was to ensure that we had an opportunity to talk about the events among ourselves. Ignoring the obvious emotional impact of these tragedies would likely have been a major mistake.

## AFGHAN FORCES

Part of my duties placed me in an advisory capacity to a small group of Afghan staff officers from the Training Directorate at the Ministry of Defence. I was the third Canadian Officer to support this team and it was immediately obvious that very strong personal relationships had been established with my predecessors. The credibility established by these officers with the Afghans proved invaluable early on as I fought my way through the inevitable learning curve.

The entire Afghan defense establishment was undergoing tremendous change at this time and as a result, military job security was precarious. The situation was complicated further by the fact that the US and Afghan government had established a cost sharing agreement for military pay. If a soldier did not appear on the records of one or the other organisation, his livelihood and his family were immediately at risk. The result was a very “tribal” outlook for the staff team whereby the Afghans looked to the advisors for much more than just professional advice. In fact, they viewed the coalition representatives as the gateways to all essential life support (food, medical, office supplies, combat service support, security support, etc...) when their own systems failed. Virtually all of our official contact had to include at least some discussion regarding routine administrative support.

I observed this view of leader as “provider” throughout Afghanistan. I recall speaking with an Afghan Militia Force (AMF) officer responsible for Mehterlam province. Over lunch, he indicated that he had managed to arm no less than 70 percent of the people in the provincial capital with a personal weapon. This included men, women and children. Based on my own observations as we entered town, I had no reason to disbelieve him. It was obvious that he took great pride in the statistic. He went on to describe his periodic raids into the eastern mountains and it occurred to me that the men who accompanied him had no professional or even national obligations to put their lives at risk on these raids. Assuming that

they were not physically coerced, their economic reliance on the leadership would have been a significant motivator.

All communication had to take place through a translator. Despite the best intentions, this led to numerous problems during the tour. While some of the miscommunication was humorous (e.g. “fields of fire” became “pastures of flame”), some could lead to offence. I found it necessary to concentrate on the facial expression of the recipient when the translator was speaking. If I saw confusion or an inappropriate response, I normally asked the translator to repeat the communication after it had been re-phrased.

Another notable area of friction that had to be monitored were cultural differences between East and West, as well as between military and civilian actors. Many of the “Type A” personalities found in coalition armies found the slow Afghan operational tempo very frustrating. What many failed to really understand was the total lack of infrastructure behind the Afghan soldiers. Most of the elements that we take for granted in a professional military force simply did not exist. This extended to everything from transportation to telephones to supporting doctrine. If this frustration was expressed openly, the normal Afghan response was polite agreement and a change in subject. In this environment, patience was not only a virtue, it was a professional necessity.

There was limited opportunity to conduct team-building activities with the Afghan staff. To the extent possible, we included our Afghan counterparts on all of our reconnaissance missions and tried to eat at least one meal together during the week. Again, I found that the most effective means of establishing an effective working relationship was to establish an effective personal relationship first.

## COALITION STAFF

The ANAPDT was comprised primarily of US officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), Romania and France provided limited coalition representation. Despite the generally good working relationships, some friction arose with respect to national responsibilities. The US authorities had not really accounted for the presence of coalition staff in the HQ and did not initially recognize a parallel national chain of command. As an example, US staff initially

attempted to task and discipline members of the Canadian close protection party directly. This activity ceased only after direct intervention with the US colonel leading the staff. It should be noted that while he agreed to support my position he was not terribly happy with it. The lesson I derived from the experience was these types of issues should be discussed in advance rather than become a reflex action after they have become a problem.

As was noted previously, coalition staffs were not normally provided access to US security info. Access to other US background information was also restricted. Lack of visibility of operations orders, contingency plans and policy documents often limited our effectiveness by removing context and tactical direction from much of our daily staff work. In fact, this type of information was actually harder to access, as we really had no visibility of what was available, unlike security information where we could normally assume that a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) was being disseminated. The ultimate effect of this exclusion was to force the coalition staff into the role of outsiders during formal planning activities.

Quick staff turnover also hampered our overall effectiveness. Many of the second line staff were on three-month tours and had limited time to understand procedures, personalities and governance issues. Poor rotation plans often meant that job handovers did not occur, as incumbents departed before replacements arrived. During my six months in theatre, three different colonels and two different deputies led the plans team. The rapid changes in leadership were accompanied by equally rapid changes in standard operating procedures (SOPs), briefing requirements and focus. Some of this friction could have been minimised if the team had established written SOPs and formal terms of reference. More importantly, changes in leadership could have been part of a formal succession plan that avoided whole scale changes in command and staff elements simultaneously.

As a final observation, I noted that, regardless of their “day jobs”, all of the coalition staff were viewed as national liaison officers. Frequent requests for information were received from both US and national authorities. This meant that there was an individual requirement to maintain visibility of national capabilities, operations and intent. It was interesting to note that requests for information from national authorities were often broadcast to a wide audience in theatre rather than directed to specific individuals. As

a result, I would often get the same questions arriving from different intermediaries over a period of weeks. A more structured approach to “request for information” management should be considered in the future.

## NATIONAL COMMAND CHAIN

During the first half of my tour, there was infrequent contact with the national chain of command. The senior LO, located in Bagram, would stop by perhaps once every week or two, and there was no direct contact with the National Command Element (NCE) at all. While the LO visits provided some limited job-related support, they were normally great morale boosters. The visits provided an opportunity to compare notes, blow off steam and take the edges off some of the isolation.

The Canadian presence in Kabul increased significantly following deployment of the first rotation of Op Athena. After some initial confusion about the transition to new command and control relationships, it was decided that the LO Team would remain in place at OMC-A but would now be responsive to Commander NCE. There was no formal integration with the NCE staff and no new missions were assigned.

## CONCLUSIONS

My experience during Op Apollo served to reinforce two very simple conclusions regarding multinational operations. The first observation deals with information sharing. While restricting information sharing on the basis of “need to know” is a valid operational requirement, restrictions based solely on nationality are questionable and potentially harmful in the long run. The CF needs to further examine this issue from a human factors perspective.

The second conclusion deals with trust and confidence. Despite the enormous effort devoted to doctrinal and technological interoperability, trust and confidence in the people you fight with remains paramount. Taking the time to establish strong personal relationships within teams should be an integral part of any mission specific or pre-deployment training.

Furthermore, I now view “trust” and “confidence” as separate aspects of a single requirement. “Confidence” is more tangible and relates to things like technical and tactical competence in other individuals. Confidence can be

built over time through joint professional training. “Trust” appears to be more a matter of faith and is much more subjective. “Trust” is knowing that in critical situations, an individual will do the “right “ thing. While joint professional training should provide opportunities to develop trust among team members, it is likely that much of this can only be forged over long period s of time.

## CHAPTER 12

### APPRENTICESHIP INTO THE JOINT WORLD: A CJTFSWA NCE STAFF OFFICER PERSPECTIVE

*Major Kevin Ferdinand*

I was posted to a CP-140 Aurora Squadron at 14 Wing Greenwood, when I was nominated to deploy to Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia National Command Element (CJTFSWA NCE) at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), in Florida. Nearing the end of my third full flying tour on the CP-140, I was occupying the position of Squadron Standards and Training Flight Commander. As an Air Navigation (ANAV) officer, I had previously completed a staff-related exchange tour with the United States Navy (USN), as well as a challenging tour as an Evaluations and Requirements desk officer in the then-Maritime Air Group HQ in Halifax. I had no idea at the time how well these two positions would prepare me for CJTFSWA NCE duty. I had never before encountered acronyms such as DDIOs (DCDS Directives for International Operations), UORs (unforecasted operational requirements), the OPP (Operational Planning Process) and FLSs (Forward Logistic Site). In any case, this chapter attempts to relate my leadership-related experiences and perspectives from the viewpoint of a 'mighty small cog in a mighty big machine' leading a section of two personnel (myself included).

After 11 September 2001 (9/11), CJTFSWA NCE was established in the former parking lot of US Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters (HQ) at MacDill AFB. My Squadron had provided the officer to be the first NCE/J3 Air, as well as the replacement on Rotation (ROTO) 1. ROTO 2 (April-October 2002) was approaching and, in February 2002, my potential interest in deploying on ROTO 2 as NCE/J3 Air was solicited. With 22 years of service, I did not know much at all about what an NCE was, and had never before deployed for six months. I quickly accepted the offer with the clear realization that I was ready, but not so well prepared, to go to a HQ supporting Operation (Op) Apollo. The fact that this would mean that I would not likely deploy to Camp Mirage with the Long Range Patrol (LRP) Detachment for the foreseeable future, if at all, caused me some hesitation in accepting the HQ assignment.



Unofficial “reports” from NCE ROTO 1 assured me that the work hours would preclude, at least initially, the sampling of many of the well-known central Floridian creature comforts available to Canadians coming out of a Northern winter. The work schedule for Operations types was 0600 hours or so to approximately 1600 hours, six days per week. Pre-deployment preparations at 14 Wing were well established and efficient by the time it was my turn to deploy. With accommodations and transport well organized at the receiving end, conducting a handover with the incumbent NCE/J3 Air was the only on-site task to perform. My mission was to support Commander Canadian JTFSWA in exercising operational control (OPCON) of his forces in his area of operation (AOR). What this meant became apparent early on – be in the middle between theatre forces and higher HQ.

The NCE/J3 Air cell was composed of a major and a captain (as J3 Air 2). An aircrew category / qualification was an essential characteristic for each. Ideally, a pilot and an Air Navigator would be present. In our case, the Hercules and the Aurora aircraft were both represented by ANAVs. With three different aircraft types in theatre (CH-124 Sea King, C-130 Hercules and CP-140) it was necessary for the two-person cell to represent all aircraft types, however, our expertise only covered the latter two.

## **PACE AND RHYTHM**

My first impression of NCE was - BUSY. The NCE battle rhythm was driven by the Commander's morning briefing schedule with Coalition leadership at CENTCOM HQ. This meant that NCE/J3 would receive his air, land and sea briefs at 0730 hours in preparation for a 0800 hours Canadian JTFSWA brief for the Commander - a brigadier-general. Ensuring I would be ready by 0730 hours meant arriving for work just after 0600 hours. This accommodated checking e-mails (both classified and unclassified) containing aircraft (three types) mission and serviceability details, making phone calls to Camp Mirage LRP and Tactical Airlift (TAL) detachments (if required), and printing off the appropriate briefing slides (up to five). Attendance at the Commander's Brief was limited to those who worked directly for the Commander or by invitation. After the Commander's Brief, it was back to the office to address any 'fallout' that had to be addressed to better prepare him for his senior-level meetings later in the morning. By this time, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was at work and the phone calls began. The

staffing of NDHQ queries and answers consumed the balance of the day, and was interrupted only by Camp Mirage units calling prior to hunkering down for the night.

It is important to note here the nature of, and impact of, the time zone differences among the key players. Eight time zones separated Camp Mirage from NCE and NDHQ (both in the Atlantic Time zone). By the time I arrived at work, the majority of the TAL flying was complete for the day with LRP and Maritime Helicopter flying continuing as required. By noon at NCE, personnel at Camp Mirage had left their offices, eaten their evening meal and were preparing to retire for the evening. Thus, NCE and NDHQ (through NCE) needed to complete their daily business with Camp Mirage by noon Atlantic Time. NCE and NDHQ then continued work until the end of the workday at NDHQ. The problem was raised in Ottawa. NDHQ agencies not accustomed to delays in dealing with 'subordinate' commands often needed reminding of the distant nature of OP Apollo and its impact on completing staff work and getting the necessary answers.

The NCE/J3 (including J3 himself and his Air, Land, Sea, Coord and Operations (Ops) Duty Desk) staff were all located in a doublewide mobile home which also housed the office spaces of the Commander, his Chief of Staff (COS) and message centre, as well as J2 and staff. These close surroundings offered immense synergy opportunities among the desk officers and afforded the senior leadership immediate access to operational insights through his J3 staff. The remainder of NCE staff was housed in two other doublewide mobile homes situated nearby in the parking lot.

## DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The duty of the NCE/J3 Air desk was to be the Commander's Air 'eyes and ears' ensuring NCE awareness of command and control, mission planning/mission completion and support issues affecting the Air Force's ability to fulfill its Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) -driven mandates in theatre. Requirements from theatre, as well as solutions from NDHQ were staffed through NCE to validate appropriateness and mission impact. NCE's perspective was important to NDHQ as Ottawa supported Canada's deployed forces in the War on Terrorism. Further, any other 'Air' item relating to OP Apollo would come to the Air desk for staffing. Inputs to the Air desk came from Camp Mirage, NCE, NDHQ and Coalition

allies. These agencies were also the end-users of NCE's product. The input ran the gamut from studying the impact on CJTFSWA of a Coalition ally basing his aircraft at Camp Mirage to free T-shirts for aircrew (more on this later).

Since I possessed an Aurora background while J3 Air 2 was from the Hercules community, our responsibilities naturally divided along these lines to good effect. Conversely, we were ill prepared to have provide valuable input on the activities of the other's aircraft type (this would remain so for the duration of our six months at NCE). Also, we were poorly prepared at times to satisfactorily address Sea King concerns from either National Defence Headquarters (HDHQ) or Her Majesty's Canadian ships (HMCS) with their helicopter air detachments (HELAIRDETs). Fortunately, there were pilots on staff at NCE during my tenure so that particular classification-related deficiency at the Air desk was somewhat mitigated. I was immensely fortunate to have a completely trustworthy and seasoned J3 Air 2 who required no supervision. He and I spoke most freely together since we relied upon each other so heavily for mutual support and each other's flexibility.

With the 'six days on and one day off' shift schedule, Air 2 and I coordinated our schedules so that we alternated which weekend day we had off. This allowed for plans to be made in advance and increased cohesion.

### **SYNERGY – NOT YET**

At the beginning of the tour, I learned something about joint ops almost hourly from members of the Canadian Forces (CF) Joint Operations Group (JOG) at NCE. These folks were the nucleus around which NCE entities formed in support of CF operations worldwide. They knew how things were done 'jointly' on DCDS Operations and people like me were subject matter experts assigned to augment CFJOG ranks at the NCE as required for the Op. My dearth of understanding of things 'joint' showed itself immediately and the situation only slowly improved as the months passed. Though I could understand the Aurora-specific topics that arose, it was through the DCDS processes that this understanding had to be navigated and effectively applied. Since I had not received such orientation prior to deployment, I needed to pick it up quickly during my handover from the officer I was relieving and as I went along. The idea of

being so informed as to be able to assist another (as I was capable of doing on Auroras) had to wait while I figured out what DDIOs had to teach me and become aware of what those around me were doing. Mutual support amongst the J3 staff and others on the NCE team proved the most valuable facet of the NCE experience as we ROTO 2 members compared lessons learned in our new surroundings.

### **LEADERSHIP – LEARNING TO BE ‘IN BETWEEN’**

As a Major, I quickly became reacquainted with that lesson I learned long ago – leaders must know what they are doing in order to lead. Though I, on arrival at NCE, understood Aurora operations, and the CF requirements process centred on a document called an SOCD (Statement of Capability Deficiency . . . thanks Maritime Air Group (MAG)), this immediately proved insufficient. Though the theory was the same on DCDS Operations, many players and processes had names new to me. A weeklong visit to Camp Mirage went far to accurately situating my understanding of the deployed situation. Once I learned them (after about two months), I started to take a more leadership-oriented role. Nonetheless, the demand to ‘ramp-up’ was critical since:

- a. The members in theatre relied on you to know what to do to staff their requirements (to NDHQ/COS J3 if not resolvable at NCE);
- b. NDHQ staff expected you to be able to staff Higher HQ solutions to theatre forces; and
- c. Terminology associated with DCDS operations was unique and essential to all aspects of one’s NCE job.

Trained to be ‘part of the solution’ vice ‘part of the problem,’ I was naturally uncomfortable being the latter. After becoming somewhat informed by month two on how to do NCE business, it was not until month four that I felt comfortable enough to critically assess what was being done, lead staffing efforts and recommend improvements. It remained for me to continue to learn from the COS J3 staff in NDHQ who, with few exceptions, were responsible for the implementation of DCDS directives. These in turn, were a direct result of their of their experience and tenure in DCDS Operations. When to lead and when to follow among peers in one’s rank remained, as usual, important. That an Air Navigator

had difficulty explaining and justifying to an Armoured officer in NDHQ the importance of appropriate ground air conditioning carts for aircraft servicing crews at Camp Mirage was mitigated by professional respect among peers from disparate backgrounds. As usual, it needed to be earned and was not often offered freely.

## LEADERSHIP AND SYNERGY

Throughout my tour, I was reminded that to lead is to, if you are lucky, shape and direct synergy. In essence, a discovery or positive action by someone that benefited more than one agency was always most gratifying. One example that highlights this point dealt with operational clothing. And, in this case the “synergy” was a fluke. It’s important to remember that NCE was precluded by DDIO from procuring operational clothing.

We at the Air desk were investigating the possibility of providing the new lightweight NOMEX flight clothing to Camp Mirage aircrews for trial purposes. Their CF issue two-piece suits were uncomfortable in the hot and humid conditions of South-West Asia and the new-to-the-CF suits potentially offered relief. Sitting six feet away from us at the Air desk were the J3 Navy desk officers attempting to deal with Naval Boarding Parties (NBPs) requiring lighter weight suits for the same reasons as the CH-124, C-130 and CP-140 aircrews. We had overheard each other’s discussions. I had NATO Stock Numbers for the new flight clothing and the Navy sure could use that. At a speed that surprises me to this day, NDHQ/COS J3 staff had a box of these lighter weight flight suits in theatre and ready for distribution to NBP personnel for trial. Subsequently, it took no time at all for the Task Group Air Officer to contact me and clearly communicate his deep-rooted dismay that lighter weight flight clothing could arrive on a ship and not be for the HELAIRDET aircrew. In the weeks that followed, the Air Force staffing process was completed and the newer flight clothing arrived for the theatre aircrews. I, apparently, still had a few things to learn (or, was it that the aircrews in theatre were led by lieutenant-colonels and while the NBPs were led by a Commodore?) Chalk up one for the Navy.

Sometime later, the Air desk was investigating getting appropriate hot weather safety boots to supply technicians, aircraft servicing personnel and communications and information systems linemen. The Navy desk

was investigating the same thing for, again, their NBP personnel. The research benefited both elements again and the support personnel eventually did receive their hot weather safety boots (the NBP personnel found them too large at the toe for the boarding ladders). Synergy was due, in large part, to our proximity to each other at J3.

Leadership appeared at several levels among the majors at NCE during my tour. I was accustomed to task completion and always had my eye open to opportunities to solve problems. The Air Force in theatre, as it turned out, had plenty to solve. They included serious communication connectivity gaps with Naval and Allied command authorities and low-capacity ground air-conditioning carts which threatened to hamstring maintenance efforts and, thereby, effect mission completion. The Air desk successfully tackled (with some absolutely outstanding assistance) these challenges and others. A sense of satisfaction that comes from doing a job, and doing it well, allowed us at the Air desk to feel like 'part of the solution'.

The time we took to address the theatre UORs ended up taking away time that could have been better spent, it has been argued, mastering higher level professional development opportunities such as participating in the Operational Planning Process and serving as the Acting J3 on occasion. The CF JOG staff at the NCE was better prepared and positioned to act as J3 in the absence of the incumbent since they were more aware of the 'joint' picture than I was and I never caught up with their expertise during that six month tour. The time I spent on staff centred on using skills I had honed at Maritime Air Group HQ in the early nineties and on exchange duties in Iceland. Many referred to this effort as 'pursuing the low-hanging fruit'.

## LEADERSHIP AND LIMITS

The pursuit of the 'fruit' unquestionably cost me opportunities to develop my abilities as a joint staff officer. As it turned out for me, I could in six months either learn more or I could solve, or attempt to correct, theatre deficiencies as quickly as possible. I knew many of the folks in theatre and understood many of the observed deficiencies. I felt familiar with the deficiencies and familiar enough with the process to pursue solutions. Further, I served, or would be serving, with some of these aircrews and wanted to do my best for them where it assisted them most. This converted into little time leftover to acquire and practice joint warfare

command skills at the operational command level. I did not have the time to catch up with my CFJOG brethren and their head start in DCDS operational knowledge. In addition, I must admit, pursuit of the 'fruit' also became addictive. As successes emerged periodically, one was encouraged to continue 'fighting the good fight' and solving more problems. Being an operator at heart, I sacrificed the opportunity to learn more about joint operations at the national level to do what I could on a practical level for those in the field. Overall, I assess this as a good trade since it benefited the deployed crews. My future would see me spending more time with aircrews than with DCDS operational types.

### LEADERSHIP FROM ABOVE

The very close proximity of the J3 staff to the Commander and his COS meant that one had exposure to executive-level processes and decisions beyond that to which I was accustomed. Sitting approximately 10 metres from the Commander's office for six months meant that a measure of decorum and discretion was required at times. There were no problems. On the contrary, work could receive approval very promptly and timely task completion (what we were there for) could be served by such an arrangement. For instance, the morning that the CH-124 Sea King crashed on the helo deck of HMCS *Iroquois* in 2002, the NCE first heard of it from the NCE Public Affairs Officer. The then-Commander JTFSWA came from the Sea King community. The ship was headed out to theatre and was allocated under OPCON to him and he, naturally, had questions that Public Affairs officers and Naval officers could neither understand, nor answer completely. I, within minutes, had a current and complete situation report (SITREP) from the Current Operations officer at MAGHQ Air Ops who I knew and knew how to contact.

### LEADERSHIP AND ALLIES.

In my experience in the CF, officers at the captain/lieutenant(N) level are the subject matter experts (SME) – doers - with majors/lieutenant-commanders providing the oversight and direction as required. This meant that a captain would know when he/she could make some small commitments and when to refer an issue to higher levels for a decision. The US Armed Forces, as the centrepiece around which Coalition allies marshalled their resources and efforts at US CENTCOMHQ, have the major conducting these duties while captains retain virtually no ability to

decide, commit or support. This meant that, in order to adhere to the chain of command, Canadian captains, receiving insufficient assistance from their US counterparts, would refer an issue to a Canadian major. The Canadian major, not necessarily as familiar with the matter as the captain, would approach the American major for a decision only to find a major SME instead of a decision maker. As a result, the Canadian major often found himself dealing with an American lieutenant-colonel for decisions. This took some getting used to but, after developing a professional rapport, proved not insurmountable.

My experience on exchange duties served me well. I was reminded that, although the CF has senior ranks starting at major/lieutenant-commander, the US Armed Forces has theirs starting at lieutenant-colonel/commander. Where the decision-making starts is guided by this delineation. It is important to note that this was not the case with Commonwealth nations such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

Another issue was the topic of releasability of information. This has never been so sensitive with the US Armed Forces as it has been since 11 September 2001. Further, the scope of information management over which the US Armed Forces held responsibility is beyond the experience of almost all CF officers. While always keeping in mind security and releasability caveats, Canadian personnel often found prompt and swift information passage from American forces stymied by the need for decisions as described above. Developing a rapport with those American officers with which one worked on a daily basis smoothed things somewhat, but could not be relied upon exclusively since people are replaced. The most interesting example of this was centred on the daily message tasking the C-130s for their daily missions in theatre. Called an Air Tasking Order (ATO), it was released on a "US EYES ONLY" network by an American command in Saudi Arabia. Canadians at Camp Mirage normally received their copy after the ATO was taken from the US EYES ONLY network in Bahrain and deposited onto a sometimes-intermittent network accessible by many Coalition nations including Canada. The ATO would often arrive at Camp Mirage after dinner time (while a movie played against a wall of a barracks building). If the ATO was late for some reason, this would delay those at Camp Mirage who would work the ATO before going to bed and sometimes they would phone us (just after lunch in Florida) and ask for a copy ASAP.



We at the Air desk knew how to easily and quickly get a copy of the ATO to Camp Mirage so long as the American officers with whom we always dealt were on duty. When they were not on duty, success was still realized - only it took longer (remember Camp Mirage folks were waiting to go to bed). One day, in search of a copy of the ATO from US CENTCOMHQ, the American major on duty required approval prior to releasing the ATO to us. Our assurances that we had daily access to it, and our aircraft were tasked by it, were of no use. The major informed us that the ATO that tasked the aircraft of some Coalition nations was not releasable to some of those Coalition partners. Therefore, he had to verify that the ATO was releasable to Canada, and that he was permitted to provide Canada with a copy on a 3.5" floppy disk.

### LEADERSHIP FROM FAR AWAY

With Camp Mirage eight time zones away, NCE's ability to proactively address/head off emergent problems alongside our theatre end-users was severely limited (synergy denied). Consequently, I believe, more, and more involved, problems arose than would necessarily have been the case if NCE was had been at Camp Mirage. Apply to that the time difference again as NCE worked the problem with NDHQ while Camp Mirage staff were 'gone to ground' and questions and answers often waited until the following day. Operators accustomed to having problems resolved in the short term were often disappointed. Though it was not necessarily NCE's job to keep theatre forces from being disappointed, the task-oriented mentality of the military professional drove one to be as efficient as possible. This was, after all, a war. This 'disappointment' often manifested itself in communications with theatre forces replete with frustration and impatience. It was often difficult to defend the 'system' that created/added to the delays.

One telling example of the impact of distant leadership at a 'worker bee' level like mine occurred when the Commander Canadian JTFSWA deployed to theatre as part of a visit by several DND and CF VIPs. During a 'Town Hall' meeting at Camp Mirage, the Deputy Minister of National Defence was asked why deployed aircrew needed to buy their 100 percent cotton T-shirts for wear under their flight clothing. Of course, the Deputy Minister was not prepared to offer a reply, so the question was passed to the NCE Air desk directly from the Commander. That such an item would receive visibility at his level was unfortunate since he had much bigger

items to address. Research determined that the wearing of 100 percent cotton clothing next to the skin under flight clothing has been mandated by orders for many years. The recent arrival of NOMEX flight clothing into CF inventory had not yet been completely studied with regards to its applicability to the 100 percent cotton restriction. The drab olive drab T-shirts issued to deployed aircrew were intended for wear with combat clothing. The 100 percent cotton turtleneck shirts issued for wear were completely unsuitable for theatre use due to the heat. Past DCDS operations saw aircrews in similar situations buy Squadron T-shirts without raising the point. After much more research, NDHQ provided sufficient funding to allow the CF procurement of 100 percent cotton T-shirts of the appropriate colour for deployed aircrews. That something so relatively small would engender such a level of visibility may be seen by some to be difficult to believe. The fact that the situation existed at all should be considered as well.

The issue of leadership from a command structure so distant from those being commanded never went away and was examined during NCE ROTO 2. The extant situation was deemed acceptable and the move of a portion of NCE to Camp Mirage was assessed as not supported by the facts as they were at that time.

NDHQ appeared to be satisfied with having the NCE located in the same time zone as it was. NDHQ enjoyed ready access to the deployed Commander without time zone limitations or work schedule conflicts. Interestingly, several examples of an NDHQ focus different from that at NCE did occur. NDHQ 'peacetime' staffing processes, not necessarily oriented towards prompt task completion as sometimes dictated by deployed forces, sometimes clashed with the expectations of forces deployed to a theatre of war. NCE was relied upon by both NDHQ and deployed forces to ensure that all reasonable efforts were made to focus supporting efforts appropriately.

## LEADERSHIP AND SUBORDINATES

Working scant feet from peers and those subordinate in rank engendered a familiarity that led to lasting friendships and mission successes. With a few exceptions at the lowest rank levels, all at NCE were selected for their skills, maturity and accomplishments. This led to mutual respect as a team quickly formed out of ROTO 2. We all knew we were good and could be depended on by others to deliver. That engendered a certain pride that

boosted morale. When you function well as a team and you know it, your team is seldom defeated, particularly if it is well led. My challenge was to ensure that the Air 2 desk officer shared in that feeling of accomplishment and teamwork. I believe that I was successful.

Another aspect of this was encountered during my visit to Camp Mirage in the first weeks of my time at NCE. During this visit, I confirmed my understanding of the outstanding UORs from the previous ROTO personnel prior to their rotation home. I also took advantage of the opportunity to ask the flight line servicing personnel if they had any outstanding requirements and if I could be of assistance. As described above under the heading of 'Synergy', hot weather safety boots were a topical requirement that appeared to some to be languishing. A sergeant I knew from 14 Wing Greenwood was on the flight line at Camp Mirage that night and he informally briefed me, to the best of his recollections, on actions taken to date and results. We agreed as to the serious nature of this requirement and I agreed to investigate. As previously related, the boots were finally procured after six months. I firmly believe that, had I not encountered that sergeant that night, the situation would have continued uncorrected with unknown consequences.

In my follow up research with Ottawa, Winnipeg and 14 Wing Greenwood, nowhere did I find a plan to address this deficiency inside of two years (i.e. through the Clothe the Soldier Program). I was able to expedite the process and I am proud to have had a hand in more promptly addressing this requirement, albeit in an interim fashion.

## **SUGGESTIONS ON LEADERSHIP**

My time at NCE was very rewarding for my professional development and self-confidence as a major. Through several errors in judgement, I made mistakes that taught me valuable lessons. Aside from leadership basics with which all readers of this article are likely already familiar, I would offer some lessons that apply to working at an NCE as an SME from a unit other than the CFJOG, albeit they are unique to a small and very busy non-forward deployed unit operating in relatively confined spaces for six months.

First, know what you offer before you arrive. The more background in DDIOs you have prior to arriving, the easier it will be for you to become 'part of the solution'. Be aware of what you do not know and

seek out support from CFJOG or NDHQ/COS J3 representatives. They know their business and they know how your expertise should be applied. There is much to know.

Second, be on the lookout for synergistic opportunities. I considered events in which I was involved that benefited operations beyond that which was originally intended to be a measure of success. Some cases of synergy can be the sign of a team working very well. More is better. Remember, you have only six months to make it happen.

Third, “low-hanging fruit” can be addictive. Always be aware of whether an item you are pursuing which appears easily addressed is costing you an opportunity for development in another, more professionally rewarding, area. Know what is needed by your end-users and provide them with it. Above all, understand whether you are at the NCE for your own professionally rewarding purposes, or to serve the deployed forces. Once that is determined, discuss this with your chain of command in order to avoid misunderstandings. Nonetheless, you should pursue professional development as your ‘low-hanging fruit’ workload allows.

Fourth, leadership at the executive level - do not fear it. Your superiors will rely upon your discretion. It is a great opportunity to incorporate a measure of seasoning into your leadership style.

Fifth, leadership with allies - learn early on where your peers are in the leadership / decision making hierarchy of your allies. It is critical to know where the decision-making is done. Should they be one in the same, you are fortunate.

Sixth, leadership from far away can be difficult. Staying connected with your end-users (be they in theatre or NDHQ) ensures that you stay focused on the mission. Do not forget the non-operational support organizations as you exercise connectivity. Their needs can easily be greater than you know. NDHQ will almost always be the source of your solution – keep them involved. They can assist you only if they know what problems you are working on.

Seventh - be flexible. A NCE will not likely have one of every technical specialty you may require. Your ability to be innovative and adapt unfortunate circumstances to your favour will assist you as you work a problem.

Finally - the enlisted personnel hold the answers. When researching a solution to a requirement, their assistance can be invaluable. You overlook their potential to be part of the solution at your own peril, as well as that of your team.

## **CONCLUSION**

My time at NCE was the most challenging and rewarding six months of my career. Opportunities for development achievement abound in such a structure. Remember who your end-user is, marshal your resources and hone your abilities and success will be with you and your team, and more importantly, with those you are supporting.

## CHAPTER 13

### LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN: PERSPECTIVES OF A LIAISON OFFICER TO CFLCC & CJTF-7

*Major François Segard*

Although the Government of Canada (GoC) had made no decision to participate in a military campaign against Iraq, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) authorized the development of options for a potential contribution of Canadian Forces (CF) elements. Since there was an urgent need to develop detailed and coordinated options for the possible employment of a light infantry battle group within the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC), a liaison officer (LO) position was established at the CFLCC headquarters (HQ) at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The goal of the LO was to provide information to the Canadian decision making process and to aid in planning. The first LO, Major Richard Martin deployed to the CFLCC HQ in mid-January 2003.

In early February 2003, a liaison team (LN Tm) was deployed to Camp As-Sayliyah, Qatar, in order to begin liaison with Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward HQ (CFHQ). The members of this LN team were Lieutenant-Colonel Tymchuck (Team Leader), Lieutenant-Colonel Smith (Intelligence Officer) and Corporal Layton (Communicator). It was initially anticipated that Operation (Op) Apollo assets participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) would be transitioned to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The proposed name for the potential Canadian contribution to OIF was Op Iris.

On 17 March 2003, the GoC announced its decision not to participate in OIF, but indicated that Canada would continue to contribute naval forces to OEF under the auspices of Canadian Task Force (CTF) 151. Consequently, US CENTCOM curtailed access to information on Phase III of OIF (Decisive Offensive Operations) to all members of the LN Tm except for the Intelligence LO/J2, who had access to Iraq related intelligence. On the 18 March 2003, the Minister of National Defence (MND) announced that the CF would retain a reduced liaison presence within CFHQ.

The minister responsible for international co-operation and senior Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)<sup>1</sup> officials had stated that Canada would play its part in multilateral humanitarian efforts and post-conflict reconstruction in IRAQ (OIF Phase IV). Although there had been no announcement by the GoC concerning CF participation in the stabilization and recovery of Iraq, the intent of senior CF leadership was to position itself to be able to contribute, should this be authorized. In order to remain cognizant of developing OIF Coalition plans for post-conflict operations, and to be prepared to support the development of options for Canadian participation, the CDS authorized the LN Tm at CFHQ to conduct inter military liaison with CFHQ staff, and that of other coalition members as deemed appropriate. As a result of this continued presence, on 9 April 2003, I replaced Major Martin as LO to CFLCC, in Kuwait.

At this time, detailed planning of humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, both military and civilian, were taking place at the CFHQ and the CFLCC. The Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA) LN Tm's focus for Phase IV planning was to provide the Canadian JTFSWA Commander with situational awareness on the progress of this planning and to provide advice and support to the shaping of potential Canadian JTFSWA/CF and/or GoC non-military contribution.

Following the visit of the US Secretary of Defense to the CFHQ, on 28 April 2003, the process of stepping back (i.e. pulling headquarters resources) back to MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa began. Over the next several weeks, staff strength at CFHQ was reduced from approximately 1100 to 250 personnel. The CENTCOM HQ in Tampa was now responsible for operations and intelligence situational awareness. Concurrently, the Canadian JTFSWA national command element (NCE) in Tampa had taken the lead in liaison with CENTCOM through the Iraq Coalition Co-ordination Center (I-CCC).

DFAIT had also further developed planning for Canadian participation in Phase IV of OIF. The main effort was expected to be the use of

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1 DFAIT has been renamed Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), however, the title used at the time of the events in question has been retained in the chapter.

non-military government capabilities in the areas of humanitarian assistance, financial support, civil infrastructure and governance institution reconstruction initiatives. DFAIT augmented the Canadian embassy in Kuwait with a senior officer to act as a point of contact and to work alongside international participants, including the CENTCOM Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Baghdad.

On 29 April 2003, Canada sent a diplomatic note to the US offering police, detention facility experts, legal officers, combat engineers, and transport planes to help in reconstructing post-war Iraq. Around the same time, the MND, John McCallum, announced that approximately 150 members from the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) would be offered.

Consequently, it was decided that the Canadian JTFSWA LN Tm from Camp As-Sayliyah would move to Camp Mirage, United Arab Emirates (UAE), on 8 May 2003. However, the CFLCC was to remain the focal point for all Coalition ground-based operations in Iraq until CJTF-7 HQ was able to assume this responsibility once Iraq was stabilized. Moreover, the Canadian JTFSWA Commander required situational awareness on the progress of this planning, as well as advice and support on the shaping of a potential Canadian JTFSWA / CF contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq. As a result, the national JTFSWA LO to CFLCC was to remain in place until the issue of a potential CF ground-based contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq had been resolved.

On 28 May 2003, the GoC confirmed that Canada was committed to helping alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people and the DART and tactical airlift detachment were offered in support of the operation. Subsequent coordination with US CENTCOM negated the requirement for the capabilities offered by the DART. Therefore, Canada was to make available (depending on the needs on the ground and as operational requirements permitted) CF transport aircraft to support CENTCOM stabilization and reconstruction missions in Iraq. Op IRIS and Op APOLLO would be conducted as separate operations and command and control for both operations was to be provided by CJTFSWA. The intent for Op IRIS was to provide airlift support to CENTCOM without restriction on load content, except where excluded by Canadian law. This would preclude delivery of nuclear materials and delivery of



anti-personnel (AP) landmines. After proposing these two options through Washington, the USA retained only the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft flight that was placed under coalition Air Mobile Division (AMD) when the C-130 was flying as part of OIF.

On 15 June 2003, the OIF responsibility of the Commander CFLCC was transferred to the Commander US V<sup>th</sup> Corps. V<sup>th</sup> Corps, along with other elements of the US Third Army, Great Britain, Australia and a growing number of Coalition countries were named Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). From that date, all LOs lost all communication with what was happening within OIF as CFLCC was no longer in control. Fifteen days later, permission was granted by CJTFSWA J3 to move from Kuwait to Baghdad in order to be able to follow participation in OIF. However, we knew at that time that CJTF-7 was not able to receive the LOs due to lack of quarters, office space, and furniture.

On 28 June 2003, the CDS approved the move of the CFLCC LO Kuwait to CJTF-7 Baghdad. However, due to CDS direction and legal concerns by NDHQ staff, the CJTFSWA J3 advised the CFLCC LO not to move to Baghdad before he sent the order. By 14 July, the Prime Minister's Cabinet approved the move and four days later a Canadian C-130 was sent to Kuwait to pick up the Canadian, Czech and the Macedonian LOs who were the first leaving Kuwait for Baghdad, Iraq.

Once in Baghdad, the Coalition Coordination Center (CCC) housed all the LOs in Camp Victory at the secondary Palace in Abu Ghurayh, 15 minutes from the airport. In August, more LOs arrived from Korea, Spain, Italy and Georgia. On the 21 August 2003, until the 8 September, Major Donald McLeod came to Baghdad to replace me while I was away on leave. During that time, Major McLeon was in contact with Mr. Ben Rowswell, a representative from DFAIT who came to Baghdad for a month to assess the possibility of reopening the Canadian Embassy and investing \$200 million in Iraqi reconstruction. Mr. Ben Rowswell remained at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for the duration of his stay.

On 15 August 2003, under the Op Athena restructure (the third change of chain of command), the Baghdad LO was appended under the Commander Theatre Support Element (TSE) at Camp Mirage UAE. Op APOLLO was now part of Op Athena but did not appear on the Camp Mirage Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). On 13 September 2003, J3 TSE

advised the Baghdad LO that NDHQ would not replace him on completion of his tour of duty since the position was to be terminated. However, following the recommendation of Mr. Ben Rowsell and the ensuing pressure from DFAIT, the MND decided to renew the CJTF-7 LO position since it was their only source of confidential information in Baghdad.

Three days later, on 16 September 2003, CJTF-7 provided a CENTRIX MCFI computer to all LOs. With this equipment, the LO now had better communication and was able to obtain information on what was happening in Iraq instead of requesting it as before. The computer also provided connectivity with the Intelligence LO in Tampa. At that time, the representative of DFAIT at the CPA, Mr. Éric Mercier, did not have access to level-two information.

At the end of the month, on 30 September 2003, the Baghdad LO received the official message that his position had been renewed. Lieutenant-Colonel Bridgeman, a reservist from the international standby list (ISL), assumed the Baghdad LO responsibilities up to December 2003, until which time a regular force replacement could arrive. On 23 October 2003, after a week of handover, I redeployed to Canada. Two months later, Bridgeman was redeployed to Canada as well, and the position was permanently closed.

## DEPLOYMENT

When the Chief of Staff (COS) of Land Force Quebec Area was looking for volunteers to deploy on Op Apollo, I was not eager to apply since only staff officer (SO) positions in Florida were being offered. However, when overseas positions became available I immediately volunteered for a tour of duty as a LO since the beginning of OIF was fast approaching. In order to increase situational awareness and to study the possible Canadian participation within OIF, a LO position to CFLCC from 1 April to the 29 October 2003 was created within Op Apollo. The position was inserted into the Canadian Forces Taskings Plans and Operations (CFTPO) system in February 2003, but for some unknown reason, it was not allocated to any of the Land Force Areas (LFA), which created concern with all LFA taskers. Finally, the position was confirmed on 17 March 2003, providing just 21 days for screening and pre-deployment procedures. Because I had been in Bosnia the previous year my screening process was expedited but proper preparation time was still limited. All CFTPO positions should

have been assigned to a LFA at least two months prior to the deployment date regardless of whether the position was restricted or not.

After a rapid one-day in-clearance at Camp Mirage, UAE, I was sent to Kuwait City. Major Martin met me at the airport and we spent an entire day conducting a handover. Although this was beneficial, the handover was too rapid. I was introduced to many important contacts, but because of the massive size of the CFLCC Army level HQ, there was not enough time to fully understand and appreciate the magnitude of their roles. Consequently, after Major Martin's departure, much time was wasted knocking on the wrong doors. NDHQ should have provided enough time for a three-day handover for a position within an isolated detachment. I later learned that my predecessor had spent only four months in theatre and I never understood why the handover was conducted in such a rapid manner.

## EMPLOYMENT

Since the CFLCC LO was a subordinate to the Canadian JTFSWA NCE, the Canadian officer acting as the LO was under operational command (OPCOM) of the Canadian JTFSWA commander, to whom he reported to through the national JTFSWA Chief of Staff (COS) in Florida. For matters of discipline, he reported to the officer appointed Commanding Officer of the NCE. The LO to the CFLCC held the status of a non-accredited official of the GoC. This status afforded members no special privileges or immunities.

The role of the LO to CFLCC, as mentioned earlier, was to maintain Situational Awareness (SA) on the evolving planning for the stabilization and recovery of Iraq (Phase IV) in order to support the preparation of plans for Canadian military and non-military participation, should this be authorized. This required an ongoing dialogue and a close working relationship with Phase IV planners and CFLCC staff, as well as an appropriate knowledge of Phase IV plans. As the Baghdad LO, my role was primarily for SA since Canada had not made a commitment for any future involvement. However, compared to my previous three and a half months in Kuwait, this was a definite improvement in my position since Canada was considered the only non-troop contributing nation (TCN) deemed to be part of the Coalition by CJTF-7.

During this tour of duty, my chain of command changed three times. Initially, I was reporting to Lieutenant-Colonel Tymchuck at the LN Detachment in Qatar. Although I had never met him before, my association with him was a very positive one since he maintained continuous contact with me, provided guidance and understood the frustration I experienced being isolated and, thus, unable to access a great deal of information. On 8 May 2003, when the Canadian JTFSWA NCE in Tampa closed the detachment in Qatar, I lost that positive connection with senior leadership, and that support was never re-established during the rest of my tour.

Following that, I reported directly to Colonel Blanchette, COS CJTFSWA in Tampa. On 30 June 2003, after authorization was granted by CJTFSWA J3CJTFSWA J3 granted authorization, I was able to participate in OIF. Consequently, I was moved from Kuwait, thus changing from CFLCC area of responsibility (AOR) to the V<sup>th</sup> Corps AOR in Baghdad (V<sup>th</sup> Corps AOR that later became CJTF-7). On 15 August 2003, the third change in my chain of command occurred when the Baghdad LO position was moved under the Op Athena restructure. I was now under the command of the TSE at Camp Mirage, UAE, and reported directly to its commander. The name of the operation I worked under changed from Op Apollo to Op Athena and my establishment went from CJTFSWA NCE to TSE. In spite of this, the National Support Unit (NSU) and the TSE tried to give me the best support possible.

Some of the unresolved issues and procedures that were still pending were forgotten after the Transfer of Command Authority (TOCA) and I had to reinitiate most of the process. After my move to Baghdad, at which point I regained access to classified information, I became autonomous. Since the senior Canadian leadership was focusing on Op Athena, direction from my chain of command on what was required from me was virtually nonexistent. I focused on collecting information, SA and maintaining the relationship with DFAIT. Upon completion of my tour, I was invited to the office of the commander of the TSE to sign my Personnel Evaluation Report and to discuss my experience. Following our half-hour discussion, he realized that he should have maintained a better contact and relationship with me.

When I arrived in theatre, I received my initial terms of reference (TOR), but the roles and functions of my position had never not been updated

during the previous mission and therefore did not reflect our future commitments. Furthermore, some elements such as liaising with DFAIT and aiding in the reopening of the Canadian Embassy should have been part of the CJTF-7 LO TOR.

In the early phase at CFLCC, I was eager to do my job, but the non-disclosure of information to the “coalition of the willing” in OIF Phase III, made my task especially difficult. I faced daily frustration, feeling as though I was failing in my responsibilities. However, with time and patience my determination paid off and at the end of Phase III CFLCC started to disclose some information for Phase IV. However, once Canada decided not to participate to the Multinational Coalition Forces in Iraq (MCFI) my access was once again restricted. At this point, I was excluded from all SA briefings during Phase III, which lasted until 19 May 2003. From that date, I was authorized to receive a copy of the Battle Update Assessment (BUA) and the CFLCC daily situation reports (SITREP). These two pieces of classified information were the only ones that CFLCC was willing to give me with exception of a few Power Point presentations on Phase IV.

On 13 June, I was given access to the CENTRIX classified X-Net for ABCA [America, Britain, Canada, Australia]. I quickly discovered, however, that the information in this computer was obsolete and outdated (i.e. March-April 2003). The only information I was able to retrieve by this means was to take my daily BUA and SITREP. However, as of 15 April 2003 the information received from CFLCC was worthless since this was the date of the TOCA from CFLCC to V<sup>th</sup> Corps. It was evident that I would have to go to Baghdad if I wished to obtain more information about OIF. On 19 June, I was able to access the TS Intel Computer for ABCA, STONE GHOST. I discovered that the last daily INTSUM from CFLCC was dated from 10 June. CFLCC never updated the network. I had to go on the CENTCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) site to follow the intelligence on Iraq, which CJTFSWA J2 was already doing.

The Americans, who were responsible for all the LOs in Kuwait, were pleasant and tried to maintain a good relationship with us. I volunteered my services when they were short staffed and acted as an escort officer on trips to the airport. The American Force protection measures were very strict requiring two vehicles with two armed personnel per vehicle for all

trips. I found that this was a good way to gain their trust and I was able to gain human intelligence and above all, get out of Camp Doha from time to time.

Despite many attempts to gain access to classified information for the reconstruction phase, orders were coming from a much higher level of leadership at the Department of Defense (DoD), so it was hopeless to pursue that avenue. Since Canada was not a participating country and had no intention to contribute in the near future, the Americans, although sympathetic to me, were unwilling to respond to my requests for information, as I had nothing to offer them in return.

While I was in Kuwait, DFAIT was taking the lead for Canadian participation and I felt it would be beneficial to initiate a relationship with them. The Ambassador supported this initiative and I was able to have weekly meetings with him. In order to provide concise accurate information, I prepared a summary that offered him a picture of the current and future intentions of CENTCOM. The Ambassador found this information useful compared to the information he was able to receive from the US Ambassador. Knowing the intent to reopen the Canadian Embassy in Baghdad, I was able to keep the Ambassador informed of the security conditions and was later able to provide information on civilian provisional authority (CPA) programs. Even when I was in Baghdad, I maintained my relationship with DFAIT, which provided me with a purpose and removed the frustrations I encountered with the US Army administration.

Eventually, DFAIT sent representatives to CPA including Mr. Rowswell (who came to Baghdad for a month to assess the possibility of reopening the Canadian Embassy) and Mr. Mercier (as an embedded staff to CPA). Both DFAIT representatives had no access to level-two information and were astonished by the information I was able to provide. Rowswell, a young and very bright diplomat, was probably one of the driving forces from DFAIT who reversed the CF decision not to renew my position.

Once in Baghdad, I discovered that the CENTRIX MCFI (classified network) would not be operational before two months. When I asked how we would proceed to share MCFI information, I received a rude response from the person responsible for the Coalition Coordination Center (CCC) when he told me that he and his staff did not have the time to “sanitize”

information. I felt this displayed a true lack of professionalism. However, after couple of days of searching for good contacts, I was able to receive a copy of the Theater Update Assessment (TUA), the J2 graphic Intelligence update, the daily INTSUM and the daily CJTF-7 SITREP (all MCFI releases).

I shared the MCFI information with the other coalition LOs (who I discovered had not received any better treatment from the Americans than I had). This “generosity” on my part was probably caused by my accumulated frustration of being left unaided and in the dark during my stay in Kuwait. Sharing information with the other LOs was a very good initiative since it eliminated duplication of work, established trust and kept the LOs together.

In sharing information, the difference in the mentalities of the North American and European LOs compared to our Asian counterparts became immediately obvious. Shy and discrete, the Korean’s detachment was cautious and unsure of why I was sharing information and helping them. However, when they realized I was not asking anything in return, they began to offer me complementary information. On 16 September, we finally received the CENTRIX MCFI computer. This not only made our existence a great deal easier but it also gave me a secure connection with the Intelligence LO in Tampa. Before the arrival of CENTRIX MCFI, access to HQ information was difficult for some Coalition partners since many documents such as one version of the daily SITREP were classified “AUS/CAN/UK/US” eyes only. Classification of information was another significant challenge, as the Americans incorporated more and more nations into the HQ (especially on the command and control (C2) side). The only generic classification for all nations access was MCFI.

All the LOs were isolated from day-to-day activities, and did not interact with CJTF-7 staff on a regular basis. US staff were very hospitable, but their focus was clearly on the combat operations being conducted in the AOR and they did not interact with the LOs or try to integrate them within their staff as “shadow staff officers”. Coalition countries had experienced much difficulty getting information when they did not have embedded staff in the HQ.

The only consistently reliable means of communication was satellite communications (SATCOM), which were both secure and insecure, and

iridium phones that provided me with a means of communication when I was mobile in Iraq. In many instances, these systems were the sole means of communication.

Travelling around Kuwait was relatively secure once I received an unmarked staff vehicle. Being a Canadian exempted me from having to follow the American force protection measures outside of Camp Doha. However, attacks against Coalition members had occurred recently and to avoid any threat I followed some simple rules. First, I travelled only when necessary; I was never predictable and I used different routes at different times. As an extra precaution, I also kept a cellular phone with me in order to maintain communication with the Camp security.

In Baghdad, the situation was a little different, and attacks against the coalition generally numbered approximately thirty per day. I was in Baghdad when the Jordanian Embassy was car-bombed and also when two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED) were used to attack the UN HQ and several Coalition hotels near the "Green Zone". Despite the fact the Camp Victory was the target of several random mortar and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks, I felt secure when I was within its perimeter. This camp was located approximately five kilometres from the Baghdad airport and was in the district of Abu Ghurayh, near the notorious prison, which received the majority of the attacks. In this region, most attacks followed the same trend. An IED would be placed on the two main highways used by the Americans (the highway to the airport and the highway going to the centercentre of Baghdad "Green zone" (also the location of the CPA).

I had to use both highways each time I travelled to the CPA. Since 60 percent of the attacks occurred at night, my deductions were very simple - travel only during daylight and only when necessary; follow the American Force protection measures; always wear my protective kit; and have my personal weapon ready for use. Each time I travelled, I brought an iridium phone and if it was not possible to return to Victory Camp during daylight, I spent the night at the CPA. Since I had no vehicle in Baghdad, I had to coordinate transportation with the American Army, which was always difficult.

During my complete tour, I did not have any down time other than when I left on my home leave travel allowance (HLTA) trip to Canada. Unlike



other theatres of operation, it was not possible to take my 96 hours leave or R&R. American camps in theatre were very rudimentary and very crowded, with 16,000 persons residing at Camp Doha and 5,000 at Camp Victory. Living in close vicinity proximity with the lack of environmental stimulation had a tendency to cause much stress. It was easy to get “cabin fever” and therefore, I always looked forward to getting out of the camp regardless of the potential dangers.

## **REDEPLOYMENT**

Despite the fact that there was a strategic benefit to leaving an LO within CJTF-7, I was informed through the TSE G3 that NDHQ's intent was to not renew the position. Accepting that premise, we began planning, with the Theatre Support Base (TSB) J3, for an extraction by the tactical airlift on 4-5 October. However, since DFAIT benefited from my information, they began pressuring NDHQ to renew the LO position. On 29 September, a replacement from the ISL was chosen for a two-month period, thus, providing NDHQ with enough time to find a suitable replacement for December.

## **CONCLUSION**

The US Army is an enormous, well-equipped and well-trained organization. They are excellent in combat operations and they learned how to rebuild Iraq, albeit the hard way. Before the US Army commenced combat operations, they were already planning the reconstruction phase. From what I observed, everything was carried out according to a meticulous and carefully planned process. Despite having performed this planning, they were not expecting such a large amount of terrorist activity during Phase IV. At the beginning, the terrorists were uncoordinated and poorly organized. But as time went on, the terrorist organizations became proficient at their trade and the lethality and precision of their attacks increased. It is of paramount importance that Canadian troops train to be employed in a similar type of environment and are able to survive in theatres where the “three-block war” is being fought. I will always remember what a German Diplomat, whom I had the pleasure to meet during one of my visits to the CPA said: “Even with all their good will, the Americans will fail to rebuild Iraq and Iraqis will go to a civil war.” After hearing that harsh statement I analyzed the situation in theatre from a whole different angle and ironically, a couple of days after,

a violent incident involving two rival Shiites tribes ensued at the Karbala mosque, resulting in the deaths of several high-ranking coalition officers.

Members of the American military are intensely proud of their country and their armed forces. They accept criticism from other Coalition partners with great difficulty, even if it is offered in a constructive fashion. When interacting with Americans in sensitive situations, it is very important to act with the utmost diplomacy. The Americans forces are conducting a lesson-learned process that will never be shared with other Coalition partners. Therefore, in the capacity of a Coalition partner with the Americans, we must learn from our own experiences in order to avoid fatal mistakes.

After spending six months with the US forces under aforementioned circumstances, I have come to learn that the American forces have a difficult time working in a coalition environment and never offer anything. It is, therefore, absolutely essential to be proactive in order to obtain results. Nevertheless, this situation may have changed gradually as transfer of command between V<sup>th</sup> corps and III<sup>rd</sup> Corps occurred on 1 February 2004 and CJTF-7 transitioned to a more Coalition focused HQ. Due to the rapid success of their campaign, the American forces failed to envision the transitional state created from moving from a US-led fighting force to a coalition stabilization force. As a result of this, the American forces are still undertaking combat missions while supporting Iraqi reconstruction.

Even though there would have been minimal military value in keeping an LO in Baghdad if the GoC had no intention of sending troops to Iraq under a future UN mandate, the position would still have been useful. Having an LO in position to provide SA and exchange information with DFAIT would have been extremely useful up until such time as the situation returned to 'normal'.



## CONTRIBUTORS

Major **Brent Beardsley** has served for 27 years as an Infantry Officer in the Royal Canadian Regiment of the Canadian Army. His service includes four tours of regimental duty in Canada, Europe and the Middle East. His operational tours include duty in Cyprus, UN Headquarters in New York and in Rwanda. On extra-regimental employment he has been employed as an instructor, a doctrine author, an army doctrine and training staff officer and most recently as the Chief Instructor of the Canadian Forces Peacekeeping Training Centre. In 1993-1994, he served as General Dallaire's personal staff officer in UNAMIR, before and during the genocide in Rwanda and he is the co-author of General Dallaire's bestselling memoir *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. He is currently serving as a research officer at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at the Canadian Defence Academy. Major Beardsley holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Concordia University, a post-graduate diploma in education from McGill University and a Masters Degree in Applied Science in Management from the Royal Military College. He is currently completing his Masters of Arts degree in War Studies at RMC, where the focus of his studies is on genocide and humanitarian intervention. Major Beardsley resides in Kingston Ontario with his wife Margaret and his children Jessica, Joshua and Jackson.

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Lieutenant-Commander **John Domotor** is currently the Formation Chaplain/ MARPAC JTF(P). He has served in the CF for 21 years and has deployed on a number of operational tours overseas including Op Toucan, September 1999 to February 2000, and Op Apollo, March to September 2001 and September 2002 to April 2003.

Major **Kevin Ferdinand** received his Air Navigator wings in 1981 and has completed several flying tours on the CP140 Aurora. His staff experience

includes a tour as a Maritime Air Evaluations and Requirements desk officer as well as an exchange tour with the United States Navy in Keflavik, Iceland. Currently, he is the Commanding Officer of the Acoustic Data Analysis Centre (Atlantic) in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Major **Doug Henderson** has been a Military Police Officer since 1986 and has served in MP positions in CFB Petawawa, CFB Lahr Germany, 12 Wing Shearwater, 4 Wing Cold Lake, LFAA HQ Halifax. He is presently serving with the Bi-National Planning Group in Colorado Springs. He is a graduate of Queen's University and is currently studying for his Master's Degree from RMC and is also enrolled in the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Colonel, Dr. **Bernd Horn** has been the Director of CFLI since July 2004. He is an experienced infantry officer with command experience at the unit and sub-unit level. He was the Commanding Officer of 1 RCR (2001-2003); the Officer Commanding 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (1993-1995); and the Officer Commanding "B" Company, 1 RCR (1992-1993). He has also deployed to Cyprus (1984-1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1993). Colonel Horn holds an MA and PhD in War Studies and has authored, co-authored, edited and co-edited 14 books and numerous articles on military affairs and military history. He is an Adjunct-Associate Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Captain **Lloyd Johnson** is a Reserve Infantry Captain, a member of the Princess Louise Fusiliers, presently employed full-time at LFAAHQ as the G1 Reserve Personnel Management. Along with his Tour in Sierra Leone, he has also served as the Ops O on Op Danaca and has had two four years terms at CFRC Halifax as an MCC.

Major **Deanna Manson** of Cornwall, Ontario joined the Canadian Forces in 1989, proceeding to Royal Military College in Kingston, where she earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Honours History in 1993. An Air Force Logistics Officer by trade, she has enjoyed postings at Air Command Headquarters, Winnipeg; 14 Wing Greenwood; 1 Air Movements Squadron, and 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters, Winnipeg. In 2003, she returned to RMC to pursue a Master of Arts Degree in Defence Management and Policy. While posted to 1 Air Movements Squadron as a Mobile Air Movements Officer, she travelled extensively and participated

in two operational missions in 1998: the peacekeeping mission Op Determination (Kuwait) and the humanitarian mission Op Central (Honduras).

Major **K.S. McKay** is currently serving as a staff officer (Combat Engineer) at NATO Joint Forces Command-North in Brunssum, NL. His background includes employment with the Directorate of Army Doctrine, the US Army Manoeuvre Support Center, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division, and 4 Combat Engineer Regiment. He has served operational tours in Afghanistan (Op Athena, Op Apollo), Bosnia (UNPROFOR and IFOR) and Central Africa (Op Assurance).

Major **R.J. Martin** has served with all three battalions of The RCR, The RCR Battle School and 3 Commando. He is currently a staff officer with Canadian Forces Support Training Group in Borden. His deployments include: Cyprus 1984, Oka 1990, Cyprus 1991, Cambodia 1992, Bosnia 1992, Bosnia 1998, Sierra Leone 2000 and Afghanistan 2005

Major **François Segard** is an artillery officer who joined the Army as a NCM in 1975. After a rapid progression to the rank of MWO, he took his commission in 1988. As an officer, he served at the 5<sup>e</sup> RALC, Quebec City, the Artillery School in Gagetown, the French Artillery School in Draguignan, France, LFAA HQ, Halifax and the current posting as G3 Ops in LFQA. He had completed five tours of duty: three in Cyprus, one in Bosnia as G3 and one for Op Apollo in Kuwait/Iraq. Major Segard has a computer science degree from the University of Quebec.

Lieutenant-Commander (retired) **Doug Thomas** is a civilian consultant on the staff of Weir Marine Inc., employed at Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia; he is also a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and an adjunct faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. He has served for some 34 years in Canadian Naval staff and command positions ashore and at sea, including two tours of duty to the UK and one in Cambodia. He writes and lectures on topics of maritime and peacekeeping doctrine, and is the editor, associate editor and contributor to a number of naval publications.

Lieutenant-Colonel **Steven L. Whiteley** joined the Canadian Forces in 1979 in Moncton, New Brunswick. He graduated as a pilot in 1981 and has flown over three thousand hours in fighter aircraft. He flew the CF-5 in the NATO Rapid Reactor role and the F-16 on exchange with the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and commanded 441 Tactical Fighter Squadron on the CF-18. Other key appointments include Detachment Commander, Task Force Aviano, Italy; Chief of Tactical Evaluation for the Royal Air Force and NATO Headquarters Air Northwest; and Wing Operations Officer, 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta. Lieutenant-Colonel Whiteley holds a Bachelor of Military Arts and Sciences degree from the Royal Military College and is a keen fan of self-study.

## GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling
ABCA	America, Britain, Canada, Australia
ACC	Air Component Commander
ADM	Associate Deputy Minister
ALCC	Airlift Commander
ALCE	Airlift Control Element
AMD	Airmobile Division
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAPDT	Afghan National Army Planning and Design Team
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Anti-Personnel Mines
ASO	Aircraft Security Officer
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BG	Battle Group
BUA	Battle Update Assessment
BUB	Battle Update Briefing
CAD	Canadian Air Division
CANFLT PAC	Canadian Fleet Pacific
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Centre
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAS	Close Air Support
CCC	Coalition Coordination Center
CD 1	Canada Dry 1 (deployed base in Qatar)
CD2	Canada Dry 2 (deployed base in Qatar)
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CENTCOM	Central Command
CF	Canadian Forces
CFHQ	Canadian Forces Headquarters
CFLCC	Coalition Force Land Component Command
CFTPO	Canadian Forces Taskings Plans and Operations
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force



CLT	Container Load Trailer
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CO	Commanding Officer
COO	Chief Operations Officer
COS	Chief of Staff
CSG	Canadian Support Group
CSM	Company Sergeant Major
CTF	Canadian Task Force
CPO	Chief Petty Officers
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DCO	Deputy Commanding Officer
DDIO	DCDS Directives for International Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DIN	Defence Information Network
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DoD	Department of Defense
DS	Directing Staff
DSN	Defence Switched Network
DWAN	Defence Wide Area Network
FLS	Forward Logistic Site
FPB	Fast Patrol Boats
GoC	Government of Canada
HQ	Headquarters
HLTA	Home Leave Travel Allowance
HMCS	His Majesty's Canadian Ship
I-CCC	Iraq Coalition Co-ordination Center
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOR	Immediate Operational Requirement
IMPs	Individual Meal Packet
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISL	International Standby List
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFSWA	Joint Task Force South West Asia
KMNB	Kabul Multi-National Brigade Group
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
KR	Khmer Rouges
LAPES	Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System
LC	Landing Craft
LFA	Land Forces Area
LO	Liaison Officer
LN Tm	Liaison Team
MAMS	Mobile Air Movements Section
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MCFI	Multinational Coalition Forces in Iraq
MCHQ	Maritime Component Headquarters
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MND	Minister of National Defence
MND SW	Multi National Division South West
MP	Military Police
MPRI	Professional Resources Incorporated
MWO	Master Warrant Officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCE	National Command Element
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
NCO i/c	Non-Commissioned Officer in charge
ND	Negligent Discharge
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIPRNet	National Internet Protocol Router Network"
NSE	National Support Element
NSU	National Support Unit
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIC	Officer in Charge

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMC-A	Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan (OMC-A)
Op	Operation
OPCOM	Operational Command
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSTC	Peace Support Training Center
PT	Physical Training
QRA(I)	Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptors)
RAF	Royal Air Force
Recce	Reconnaissance
RHIB	Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats
Roto	Rotation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
ROE	Rules of Engagement
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SA	Situational Awareness
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SITREP	Situation Report
SO	Staff Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOpsO	Squadron Operations Officer
SOFA	Standing of Forces Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
SUV	Sport Utility Vehicle
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TD	Temporary Duty
TOCA	Transfer of Command Authority
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference

TSE	Theatre Support Element
TUA	Theatre Update Assessment
UAE	United Arab Emirates
ULS	Unit Load Summary
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Armed Mission to Sierra Leone
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda and Rwanda
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
VIP	Very Important Person
XO	Executive Officer



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