JADEX Papers 4

Campaign Authority As a Framework in Operational Design

Lieutenant-Colonel D.J. Lambert

National Defence Défense nationale

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AS A FRAMEWORK IN OPERATIONAL DESIGN

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"JADEX"

General Jacques Alfred Dextraze

These occasional papers are named in honour of the legendary Canadian Army General Jacques Alfred Dextraze, CC, CMM, CBE, DSO, CD, LL.D., affectionately known to his soldiers first as 'Mad Jimmy' and then later simply, 'JADEX'. Born 15 August 1919, he joined the Canadian Army in 1940 as a private soldier. He would end his military career 37 years later as a full general and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

Jacques Dextraze received his early education at St. Joseph's College in Berthierville before joining the Dominion Rubber Company as a salesman. During the Second World War, he left his civilian employment and enlisted as a private soldier with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) in July 1940, shortly after the fall of France. Showing leadership potential during training, he was promoted to acting sergeant, but his first attempt to gain a commission in early 1941 was refused by the regiment. Nevertheless, he continued to display good-natured leadership and great skill, especially in instructing other soldiers. He was eventually commissioned in early 1942, and applied for active service overseas as soon as his officer training was complete.

Lieutenant Dextraze arrived in England just after the Dieppe Raid in August. With his unit decimated in that attack, it fell on him and other new junior officers to rebuild the unit and make it combat ready once more. The resourceful and dedicated young Dextraze applied himself completely to the task, showing great leadership at all times. By June 1944, Dextraze and the FMR were ready for combat.

The FMR landed in France in the first week of July as part of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. It immediately went into action as the 1st Canadian Army was ordered to attack and destroy the remaining German resistance in Normandy and secure positions for the breakout battle that would follow.

On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze commanded D Company in an attack to capture the church of St. Martin de Fontenay. The church, which was used as an observation post by the enemy, commanded the whole area and threatened the success of further operations of 6th Brigade, as it dominated a feature that had to be captured to secure the front. D Company took heavy losses in the assault from enemy machine gun and mortar fire

which swept the open streets. Realizing that it was vital to keep up the momentum of the attack, Major Dextraze rushed forward and with no regard for his own safety personally led the assault into the church yard through enemy grenades, rifle and machine gun fire. In the sharp hand-to-hand fight that ensued, Major Dextraze, "setting the example", overwhelmed the enemy and captured the position. Almost immediately the enemy counter-attacked, but Major Dextraze quickly organized the remainder of his men and defeated all efforts against his position. For his tremendous personal leadership and bravery in combat, the Army awarded Major Dextraze the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).[1] His men awarded him the title, "Mad Jimmy".

In December 1944 Major Dextraze was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and command of his regiment. He led the FMR through the remainder of the war, earning a second DSO for his leadership in the liberation of the city of Groningen, the Netherlands, on 15 April 1945. The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade was given the task of clearing the enemy from the centre of Groningen, and the FMR were ordered to clear the eastern half of the city. This involved house-to-house fighting, as the enemy was determined to hold the position at all costs.

During the early stage of the battle the leading troops were held up by heavy machine gun fire coming from well-sited posts. Lieutenant-Colonel Dextraze quickly appreciated that if this condition was allowed to continue the whole plan might well collapse. He went forward immediately to the leading company, formulated a plan to clear the machine gun posts, and personally directed their final destruction. When the right flank company commander was killed, Dextraze raced through enemy fire to personally reorganize its attack and lead it forward to its objective. Despite intense enemy fire, he forced the Germans from their defences and forced the surrender of the garrison. Throughout the entire action, Lieutenant-Colonel Dextraze led his battalion forward, and when they were held up, assisted and encouraged them onto their objective. His resourcefulness, superb courage and devotion to duty was not only a great inspiration to his men, but the contributing factor to the final surrender of the enemy garrison of Groningen and the completion of the divisional plan.[2]

Lieutenant-Colonel Dextraze commanded his unit until the final surrender of Germany, after which he volunteered to lead a battalion in the Canadian infantry division then formed for active service in the Pacific. Japan surrendered in August before Canadians units were deployed, and Dextraze 'retired' to the general reserve officer's list and re-entered civilian life. His tenure out of uniform was short, however, and in 1950 he returned to active duty as the officer commanding 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment on overseas service during the Korean War. Dextraze again displayed his tenacious character and leadership at the defence of Hill 355, when his unit was surrounded by the enemy, but held off all attacks and refused to surrender the position. In 1952, Lieutenant-Colonel Dextraze was made an officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his service in Korea.

After returning from Korea, Dextraze was briefly appointed to the Army Staff College and then to the Land Forces Eastern Area Headquarters. In 1954 he was promoted full colonel and appointed Chief of Staff of Quebec Command in Montreal. He subsequently served at the Infantry Schools in both Borden and Valcartier, until he returned to command the Quebec Region as a brigadier in 1962. His tenure there was short, however, as the following year he deployed as the commander of the Canadian contingent as well as the Chief of Staff for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. In early 1964 he organized, coordinated and led a series

of missions under the operational codename 'JADEX' to rescue non-combatants from zones of conflict in theatre, actions which earned him a promotion within the Order of the British Empire to the rank of Commander as well as the award of an oak leaf for gallant conduct.[3]

Upon returning to Canada Dextraze was appointed Commander 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, where his traditional signature of 'Jadex'on all official correspondence stuck with him as a nickname. In 1966, he was again promoted to major-general and the position of Deputy Commander of Mobile Command. In 1970, Dextraze was promoted to lieutenant-general and made Chief of Personnel at National Defence Headquarters. In 1972, Lieutenant-General Jacques Alfred Dextraze was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff with the rank of full general and awarded the rank of Commander of the Order of Military Merit. He served as Canada's top soldier until his retirement in 1977, nearly four decades after he joined as a private in the infantry. For his tremendous service to the armed forces and the country he was admitted to the Order of Canada in 1978. When Jacques Alfred Dextraze passed away peacefully on 9 May 1993, the nation said a sad goodbye to one of the most legendary and outstanding soldiers in its history.

ENDNOTES

1.   Recommended for immediate DSO, 5 September 1944, endorsed by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, Acting General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, First Canadian Army on 4 November 1944.

2.   Recommended for immediate Bar to DSO on 17 April 1945; supported by Headquarters, 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade on 2 May 1945 and passed forward on 30 May 1945.

3.   Awarded Commander, Order of the British Empire (CBE) with gallantry oak leaf as per Canada Gazette of 3 October 1964 "For Services with the UN Forces in the Congo" as Commander of the Canadian contingent with the United Nations in the Congo (UNUC).

DIRECTORATE OF LAND CONCEPTS AND DESIGNS

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the concept of Campaign Authority as a framework to assist in operational design in the creation of legitimacy within a campaign. Developed over the past 30 years, operational design seeks to develop campaign plans that achieve desired end states. In doing so, they use a number of concepts and tools, a key one being the maneouvrist approach which seeks to gain a psychological advantage over the adversary. With the decline of the Cold War there has been a re-discovery that campaigns occur in complex environments and require a multi-agency approach to achieve enduring end states. The role of individuals and groups are highly influential in conducting a successful campaign, even one of conventional war fighting. The perceptions of those audiences in terms of the overall legitimacy of a campaign is thus vital in achieving the desired end state, particularly with regard to those audiences that act as centres of gravity within the campaign. Campaigns have failed for want of legitimacy in the eyes of various audiences. Yet no tool exists within operational design to formally consider, create and assess the level of perceived legitimacy. The concept of Campaign Authority, initially developed in UK peacekeeping doctrine, provides such a framework and complements the manouevrist approach and other elements of the operational art. The concept allows legitimacy to be built and assessed across four dimensions: mandate; the manner in which the campaign is conducted; the delivery of expectations; and, the consent given by affected audiences, be they domestic, regional or indigenous. The paper recommends that Campaign Authority be adopted as a framework for the creation of legitimacy in the operational design process.

INTRODUCTION

Military campaigning is a difficult intellectual process that entails the application of a nation's or coalition's fighting power to achieve a desired end state. Ideally, the pathway of a campaign is conceived to its desired conclusion before forces are committed and blood is shed. This campaign design process has been disciplined and refined over the past thirty years, to include an array of concepts and planning considerations. Because the design of a campaign links the tactical level of conflict to strategic outcomes, it has been termed operational design in that it stems from the operational level of war.[1]

With the decline of the Cold War standoff between the conventional forces of peer competitors, many nations and indeed the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have become involved in an array of campaigns of differing natures and amongst different cultures. Coalition forces have deployed in peace support campaigns, counterinsurgency campaigns and anti-piracy interventions.[2] Normally these campaigns occur in very complex social situations and environments and this should be considered a normal state of affairs for operational design.[3] Rarely does a campaign plan have to merely consider the adversary's military capability and seek to defeat it; instead, the campaign plan may have to achieve conditions and objectives across a wide array of social elements and systems, whilst countering an array of adversaries and competitors, none of which may resemble a conventional foe. In such cases, the military will be working with an array of other agencies and government departments. Furthermore, the importance of understanding the perceptions and gaining the support of various actors, populations and audiences in the environment has been realised.

As campaign design methods and concepts have been expanded to encompass the complexities of these campaigns, their constituent operations and the environments in which they occur, the supporting campaign concepts and taxonomy have expanded and been adjusted conceptually. A focus has developed on the concepts of perceptions and legitimacy in terms of reaching a successful conclusion to a campaign. These developments have been reflected in coalition, allied and national joint and service doctrines.[4]

In line with such developments, the concept of Campaign Authority has recently been introduced. The concept refers to the perceived legitimacy of a military force to conduct a campaign and is assessed across four dimensions: mandate; consent of those affected; the manner in which the campaign is conducted; and the delivery of expectations.[5] Although recently introduced by the UK and Canada into their doctrines, it has yet to be completely articulated and widely accepted. Nor has its proper role in operational design been fully considered and discussed despite a recent focus on legitimacy in military campaign doctrine development.[6] However, an examination of the concept and the role it can play in the planning and conduct of all campaigns will indicate its central importance. Specifically, a careful study of the operational art, the importance of populations and their perceptions of legitimacy, and this concept in particular, will show that Campaign Authority provides a suitable framework for the creation of legitimacy and thus an operational and strategic advantage to commanders, is necessary

for campaign success due to its relationship to populations as centres of gravity, and should thus be instituted as an element of operational design.

To this end the paper will review the post-Vietnam War development and refinement of operational design and the realisation that operating environments are much more complex outside of the Cold War paradigm. This will include a discussion of the recently improved delineation of the Continuum of Operations and its predominate campaign themes, the introduction of the comprehensive, multi-agency approach to campaigns, and the advent of an effects-based approach to campaign design.[7] The recent identification of legitimacy as a planning principle or consideration will be examined particularly in terms of (populations as) centres of gravity within complex operating environments. In short, the paper will illustrate the complexity of campaign design in the post Cold War era and the central role played by perceived legitimacy as viewed by populations as centres of gravity. This will set the context for specific discussion of the concept.

The actual construct of Campaign Authority will then be described as it exists in British and Canadian doctrine. The concept's relevance as a conceptual tool in campaign planning in complex environments as a means framework for the creation of legitimacy will be established. In order to understand and maximise the potential of Campaign Authority, the constituent elements of Campaign Authority will be examined through various means and concepts, particularly in view of its relevance to operational objectives, populations as centres of gravity and achievement of campaign end states. In summary, it will be shown that the concept of Campaign Authority will serve as a framework for the development and assessment of legitimacy and as such will address vital aspects of operational design, will provide operational and strategic advantage to commanders and will be seen as necessary for the successful conclusion of a campaign due to its impact on populations, particularly those that act centres of gravity.

THE BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

The (Western) Development of Operational Art and Manoeuvre Warfare[8]

In order to understand the correct place that the concept of Campaign Authority has in the planning process, one must review the development of operational design. The operational level of war is defined as, "the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations."[9] Operational level planning links the strategic and tactical levels of war, specifically to ensure that tactical actions serve the higher strategic purposes. As such it is part of the overall operational art.[10]

Although operational level concepts and planning began to develop in the 19th century and were well articulated and practised by Soviet and German forces prior to and during the Second World War, the western development of the operational level of war was generally slow.[11] Despite the obvious success of operational level planning and the focus on manoeuvre at that level by both the Allies and Axis during the Second World War and indeed in Korea, few writers articulated the concept of operational level planning in Western doctrine.[12]

In terms of recent Western development, the concept of the operational level of war grew out of the post-Vietnam era when military theorists attempted to remedy the doctrinal disconnect that saw US forces win the tactical battle but loose the strategic level of conflict.[13] The term did not appear in Western collective doctrine until 1973.[14] In effect, the post Vietnam conceptual investigation sought to ensure the tactical activities were connected to and supported the strategic level objectives and end states. This impetus for doctrinal development was accompanied by the Western realisation that Warsaw Pact forces greatly outnumbered NATO forces and thus victory through attrition-based battles was not an option.[15] These frustrations and realisations spurred doctrinal development both inside and outside the military.[16]

In attempting to articulate and develop the operational level of war, analysts combined the ancient writings of Sun Tzu and his concepts of using "extraordinary" forces to manoeuvre against weak points to gain both physical and psychological advantage against the enemy with the practical examples of German and Soviet doctrine and practices in the Second World War. This resulted in the concept of manoeuvre warfare, also termed the manoeuvrist approach.[17] This concept envisioned the enablement of the operational level of war through manoeuvre that would avoid enemy strengths and seek to dislocate and disrupt the enemy. Successful manoeuvre allows the commander to gain both positional and psychological advantage over the enemy and effectively enable to force to defeat a numerically superior force.[18]

In order to assist in operational level planning and the manoeuvrist approach, analysts such as William Lind identified key tools and concepts that included: the avoidance of "surfaces" or strengths and the exploitation of enemy weaknesses or "gaps"; the concept of a main effort that would ensure a force's limited power was focused on the critical point in a unifying purpose; and, mission type orders that allowed subordinates to use decentralised initiative to meet the overall superior intent.[19] Firepower was no longer seen as simply destroying enemy capabilities, but was seen as the means to support the movement so that forces might manoeuvre to advantageous positions and threaten those enemy weak points. It is from here that the concept of combined arms operations was developed, reinforced with historical reference to previous wars.[20]

Timely decision making in operational planning has always been key and as part of this operational development, a notion of competitive time in planning was added and termed, the observe-orientate-decide-act (OODA) loop, often known as the decision-action cycle. The superior adversary observes, assesses and acts before his opponent thus rendering the opponents reactions increasingly inappropriate. The opponent then withdrawals, surrenders or as a last resort, is defeated.[21] Hence, the competitive time factor adds to the superiority of psychological advantage in operations.

As the 1980s unfolded, these concepts were introduced into Western doctrine, specifically that of the US Army.[22] The doctrine began to articulate that the true "artistry" of war takes place above the level of winning single battles, through the cunning use of manoeuvre to use a combination of capabilities to

defeat the enemy's will to fight, as much as his capability.[23] It introduced the description of "operational art" as the employment of forces and capabilities to achieve strategic goals through the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations.[24]

Ironically, the development of operational art was completed just as the Cold War ended. For reasons that will become evident later in this paper, it is important to note that the Soviet Union and the threat it posed was not defeated by superior military forces or their threatened use. Instead, the system expired along the lines forecasted by the diplomat George Kennan in his famous anonymous 1947 article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In his recommendations for American reaction to Soviet expansion, Kennan recommended a policy of containment, for the Soviet Union contained sufficient deficiencies, untruths and contradictions that it would eventually decay from its own internal rot.[25] In the eyes of its own people and of external audiences, including admirers of socialism, the Soviet state and its actions lacked justification of its actions, policies and attitudes. In other words, the state and its actions lacked legitimacy in the eyes of those affected and in the eyes of external observers. In order to contain and even counter Soviet influences, the United States need only use a "modest measure of informational activity" to advertise its own success and the correctness of its own actions and policy.[26] In other words, the United States could contain Soviet expansionism by demonstrating its own legitimacy and countering the Soviet claims. This was effectively an advantage through manoeuvre on a psychological plane by means of perceived legitimacy.

The Current Construct of Operational Design and the Manoeuvrist Approach Cornerstone[27]

The practice of the operational level of war has come to be termed operational art. Operational design and the resulting campaign plan are realised through the practice of operational art; indeed, operational design and the resulting campaign plan is the expression of operational art.[28] This concept of operational art is defined as, "the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles."[29] At its core, it brings together in a joint framework the service elements, be they land, air, maritime components, in a cohesive and orchestrated manner in order to achieve operational level objectives.[30]

The manoeuvrist approach or manoeuvre warfare has become the centrepiece doctrinal concept within operational design, and is defined as: "a war-fighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, co-ordinated whole—rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition."[31] It is an indirect approach that seeks to avoid adversary strengths and attack weaknesses in order to shape the adversary's understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion, both physical and moral.[32] Hence, the manoeuvrist approach focuses on the psychological effects of its activities, ideally gaining the capitulation or withdrawal of the adversary before an attrition-based battle is needed.

In its attempt to undermine the will and shatter the cohesion of the adversary, the manoeuvrist approach seeks to use three primary means: pre-emption of the enemy's plans; dislocation of his strengths; and disruption of the cohesion of his capabilities.[33] Manoeuvrist approach is supported by a superior decision-action cycle. [34]

In order for the manoeuvrist approach to support the execution of a campaign, it is supported with another philosophy, that of mission command, which allows a decentralised use of subordinates' initiative, guided by the superior's intent, his focal point of effort (main effort) and a desired end-state.[35]

As stated, the manoeuvrist approach seeks to avoid an enemy's strengths and exploit his vulnerabilities and weaknesses. To support this concept military writers borrowed the concept of centres of gravity from Carl von Clausewitz. A centre of gravity may be defined as, sources of strength that are obvious, "dynamic, positive, active agents" that create effects. They are based on people in groups or individuals.[36] They may be physical in nature such as an armoured division in reserve, or they may be moral, such as a key political or religious leader. Centres of gravity will usually have characteristics and capabilities such as, 'an armoured reserve and its ability to counter-attack across the river', or 'a political leader and his support for an insurgency.'[37] Centres of gravity will exist at all three levels of war and there may be more than one at each level.[38]

The key tenet of the manoeuvre warfare concepts is that adversary strengths are to be avoided and weaknesses attacked so as to maximise psychological impact. In order to fulfil this dictate, centres of gravity may be analysed so that their critical vulnerabilities and weaknesses may be identified and exploited. In this way the centre of gravity, that is the source of strength, may be dislocated, neutralised or destroyed.[39] In the example of an armoured reserve and its ability to attack across a river, an opponent using manoeuvre warfare might destroy its fuel re-supply prior to battle, destroy the single bridge allowing the crossing of the river, shell the tank crews as they gather for feeding or, as a last resort, for it attacks a strength, directly target the armoured reserve itself.

Moral centres of gravity can be more difficult to attack in terms of identifying their critical vulnerabilities and weaknesses. A political or social leader that is influential in an insurgency may be killed in order to remove him as a centre of gravity with moral influence and psychological effects. However, if this is not possible or desirable, he may be neutralised in other ways. For example, an insurgent leader claiming to be a moral leader for a grieved minority group and encouraging violence may have his influence dislocated or disrupted by the opposing forces in that they resolve the group's grievances directly or undermine the legitimacy of the leader, by revealing, for example, his criminal links. In the case of either the physical or moral centre of gravity, the issue was the same: a manoeuvrist approach was used to avoid enemy strengths and to disrupt, dislocate or if required, destroy the source of strength through exploitation of a vulnerability or weakness.

Just as the enemy's centre of gravity is to be assessed and attacked through any weaknesses, one's own centres of gravity should be assessed and actions taken to defend it, particularly any vulnerable aspects. In short, this conceptual

tool of centres of gravity and their analysis for their systemic vulnerabilities supports the manoeuvrist approach and overall campaign design.[40]

Around these doctrinal concepts of manoeuvrist approach and supporting philosophies, a campaign may be designed with a number of tools entitled "elements of operational design."[41] These guide the operational level planning and articulate the detailed campaign design and eventually, result in the assignment of actions and activities at the tactical level.[42]

The various tools or lexicon differ only slightly across different national doctrines, but in general may be summarised as follows.[43] The campaign plan will articulate an end state that will be reached through a series of operational objectives, each of which are achieved through a number of decisive points. The objectives and their decisive points are plotted or grouped along lines of operation leading and building towards the end state. In order to achieve these decisive points detailed plans assign activities and tasks to service components —land, air and maritime. Identified centres of gravity are assessed and included in the plan to help develop objectives and their decisive points so that adversary strengths are avoided and the vulnerabilities are exploited.[44]

Figure 1 below illustrates the basic structure.

Figure 1: Campaign Design with Three Lines of Operation

Sources: Adapted from Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

Thus one sees the concepts or elements of end state, lines of operation, decisive points and centres of gravity to name a few brought together as a means to describe and illustrate the sequential conduct of the campaign.

Initially, lines of operation and their decisive points and objectives were very much tied to terrain. Since the end of the Cold War these elements of operational design have adopted more conceptual and less tangible meanings to reflect the realisation that campaigns will involve more than simply a conventional foe and the premise of clear, easily defined objectives.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING BEYOND THE COLD WAR

The Return to Complex Operating Environments

The sudden end of the Cold War did not stop doctrinal development. Not only did operational design find both success and justification in the ashes of the Iraqi Army but the victory led to further developments in other doctrinal areas, such as Information Operations, albeit with a continuing focus on conventional battles and foes.[45]

As far as recent military campaigns are concerned however, the Gulf War was a rather straightforward affair requiring the defeat of a recognisable enemy to be replaced by a government-in-waiting, supported by its populace.[46] Since this time, the majority of western military commitments have involved deployments in highly complex situations, involving diverse ethnic groups, competing political agendas, failed states absent of authority to secure their populations and social strife. Success became defined in terms of the creation of an enduring stable environment, social development and responsible government, thus requiring more than the application of military means.[47]

It was realised, or remembered, that populations and ethnically based groups have a say in the outcome of any conflict and a stable peace requires their support. Thus their perceptions of the campaign and its justification are central to the environment. The military works in conjunction with other agencies and organisations in order to achieve the end states that involve competing demands by social groups and systems rather than simply a military foe. This was reflected in the variety of peace keeping, peace enforcement and counter-insurgency operations.[48]

This development should not have come as a surprise. Operating environments involving a complexity of interests, influences and actors has generally been the normal state of affairs throughout history and should be realised as such.[49] As stated in recently developed Canadian doctrine:

> Campaigns will likely occur in complex environments in which there are numerous interdependent systems, entities, and actors all affecting the situation at hand. Their roles, power structures, objectives, and the part they play in the current crisis or situation must all be assessed in order to understand the environment and its constituent elements.[50]

Commanders must attempt to comprehend the various influences and systems that operate the environment, to understand the role they play in the outcome and how to work through them to achieve the campaign end state. These systems and influences—political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure—combine in the environment and have at their core the unique history and culture of the environment or sub-group within that environment. Figure 2 provides an illustration of both the complexity and uniqueness of every environment.


Figure 2: An Illustration of the Complexity of Operating Environments

Sources: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007); and, United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence,*Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4-05 The Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2006).

The enduring outcome of a campaign, often described as a stable environment, will demand that these systems be assessed and engaged using the military, along with all the other necessary elements of power and agencies, to address the root causes of the conflict that the campaign seeks to solve.[51] Furthermore, in these complex environments, the perceptions of people, as individuals and groups, become a vital factor in the achievement of campaign end states. This is illustrated in current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. There, campaigns have sought to defeat a mix of irregular threats including insurgencies, quell civil war and end general strife, rid the regions of organised crime and, in short, re-build nations and governments as stable authorities able to govern.[52] Such environments reveal the role that populations will play in achieving enduring outcomes for a campaign. In order to better understand and work within these environments a number of doctrinal developments have occurred that have focused on the social and psychological aspect of campaigning.[53]

The (Recent) Conceptualisation of the Elements of Operational Design and Doctrinal Concepts—Amplifying the Manoeuvrist Approach

The Continuum of Operations—A Better Description for Campaigns

With the realisation that campaigns consisted of more than war and operations other than war, military doctrines began to better describe the nature of military deployments. The resulting Continuum of Operations describes four major "predominate campaign themes" that occur at various locations along the spectrum of conflict: major combat; counter-insurgency; peace support; and peacetime military engagement. Note that these are operational level descriptors.[54] Figure 3 illustrates the relative position of these campaigns along the spectrum of conflict.


Figure 3: The Spectrum of Conflict and Predominate Campaign Themes

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

All campaigns are conducted and realised through a mix of four types of tactical level operations: offensive; defence; stability; and enabling.[55] These are tactical level activities and the balance between them changes with the nature of the campaign theme. Thus a major combat campaign will include a majority of offensive and defensive operations whilst a peace support campaign will have a majority of stability operations and tasks. Stability operation has been defined as

a "tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order." They include activities that lead to an enduring stable environment and include security and control measures so that other agencies may work, assistance to non-military agencies, reconstruction of infrastructure, and the training and development of indigenous security forces and capabilities.[56] They often address the causes of the crisis and local grievances and do much to win the support of individuals and groups in the environment. This overall description of operating environments has been termed the Continuum of Operations and is illustrated in Figure 4.


Figure 4: The Continuum of Operations with Major Campaign Themes

Source: Adapted from Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

By their vary nature, stability operations increase as campaigns move towards the more peaceable end of the spectrum. Given their nature, many of them are best conducted by non-military agencies and this will increase as the security situation improves.[57] This is illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Transition across the Campaign Themes Showing Changing in Balance of Tactical Operations

Source: Adapted from Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

The Development of the Comprehensive Approach and the Conceptual Nature of the Elements of Operational Design

In response to the realisation that most campaigns and the tactical level stability operations associated with the campaigns require agencies other than the military, albeit working in harmony with military forces, the concept of a Comprehensive Approach was developed and defined as:

> the application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a campaign.[58]

The Comprehensive Approach or the similar US concept of Unified Action seeks to harmonise within the same overall campaign the application of all elements of power to address root causes of grievances and to create enduring stability and end states across all the systems in an environment. Such a concept will seek to harmonise through a shared intent and end state government agencies, international organisations, local and international security forces and non-governmental organisations, all as appropriate to the situation.[59]

As stated in the Canadian counter-insurgency manual, "only this Comprehensive Approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgents will obtain an enduring solution."[60]

The general concept sees the military forces creating a framework of security within which other elements of power may be free to operate to address root causes of social grievances and insecurity and to build the conditions for enduring stability, such as the provision of essential infrastructure services or the creation of a responsible and effective civil service and police. In the early stages of a campaign, the military may have to assume some duties outside of its normal sphere, such as the re-establishment of essential services, but ideally such activities will be assumed by more appropriate agencies once an appropriate threshold of security is established.[61]

This development will alter campaign plans so that the elements of operational design become more conceptual or thematic.[62] For example, lines of operation have assumed a more thematic nature such as that of "governance" with objectives of "interim governance established" and "self-governance established". Supporting decisive points may be labelled along the lines of "military leadership reformed" and "civil service school established."[63] Figures 6 and 7 below provide an example as to how thematic lines of operation, objectives and their supporting decisive points may be illustrated.


Figure 6: Example of a Campaign Plan with Thematic Lines of Operation.

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

Figure 7: Examples of Lines of Operation with Example Decisive Points Building to the Achievement of Operational Objectives. (Decisive points are shown as ovals.)

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000*
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007 (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

As illustrated above, the meaning and application of operational design elements have expanded to be more conceptual rather than merely physical constructs. Objectives and their decisive points may refer to an enemy capability or condition, a key geographical feature or to a set of conditions created through assigned activities and multiple agencies.[64]

This need to use a wide array of agencies and elements of power in addition to the military to address the myriad of systems and causes of strife in an environment to reach a stable situation is nothing particularly new.[65] Nor does it change our concept of operational design and its focus on a manoeuvrist approach, which is by definition more a psychological construct than a physical one. The Comprehensive Approach simply provides the campaign designer with a wider array of elements of power with which to campaign. Just as military forces may manoeuvre to seize a key terrain objective and force an enemy to capitulate, forces within the Comprehensive Approach may manoeuvre to create conditions that will undermine the claims or authority of adversaries such as insurgents and thus their cohesion and will.[66] What this does do, is, within a campaign plan, place societies, individuals and groups, and the systems within which they work as the focal point of attention. It therefore puts emphasis on the perceptions, understanding and will

of individuals and groups to support and consent to a campaign. For this to occur the objectives must meet their expectations and solve their grievances; in other words, the campaign must be perceived as legitimate.

Effects-Based Approach to Operations—Ensuring Better Manoeuvre within the Comprehensive Approach

A key element to the overarching Comprehensive Approach to campaigning has been the introduction of an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), which is defined as:

> a planning philosophy combined with specific processes that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of operational objectives. It ensures that tactical level activities directly support operational objectives.[67]

EBAO simply ensures that tactical level activities are planned so that the effects, that is the results that they create, logically and directly support the operational objectives and end state and are done so to address all the environmental systems that influence the outcome. Therefore, decisive points that build to operational objectives may also be termed 'supporting effects' as results of activities taken to reach the objectives. In short, "decisive points are supporting effects to be created by the conduct of activities on the path to an operational objective."[68] EBAO is nested within the Comprehensive Approach in that it seeks to incorporate all elements of power, military and non-military, to reach objectives that span all necessary elements or systems within an environment, in pursuit of the strategic end states.[69] The concept is nothing new and is something that sound commanders and planners have always strived to achieve.[70] It is simply a particularly articulated means of exercising the operational art and the manoeuvrist approach in particular for its effects should focus more on the psychological rather than the physical.[71] Many of these effects will be created through a Comprehensive Approach in terms of addressing social issues, structures and grievances. Thus there will be an emphasis here on creating perceptions of legitimacy in the establishing of enduring objectives and stable end states to the campaign. In the final analysis, EBAO simply allows for better manoeuvre at the tactical and operational levels of command in support of operational design.[72]

Tools to Assist in Manoeuvre through Influence—Information Operations and Their Influence Activities

Information Operations (Info Ops) is a doctrinal construct that began development in the late 1970s but grew with the spread of information technology.[73] Within NATO, Info Ops are defined as:

> Coordinated and synchronized actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other [NATO] approved parties in support of the Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own.[74]

Although Info Ops include counter-command activities and information protection activities, the real focus most recently has been influence activities, defined as activities that affect the perceptions, understanding and ultimately the will of the adversary or other approved target audiences.[75]

Influence activities have a first order effect on the understanding, perceptions and will of the target audience, this is, a first order psychological effect normally accomplished through a set of key activities: psychological operations; deception; presence, posture and profile of military forces; public affairs; and civil-military cooperation.[76] Information Operations cover a wide range of activities and may be applied in a wide variety of circumstances. For example, psychological operations may be used to convince enemy conscripts to surrender before an attack is started whilst other psychological operations or public affairs may be used to inform local populations of reforms to government institutions or the opening of new schools.[77] Likewise, the development of infrastructure through CIMIC will influence the perceptions of local audiences regarding the legitimacy of a campaign and will ideally gain support for the campaign from previously alienated factions.

The purpose of influence activities is to alter the behaviour of a target audience.[78] In many cases this will aim to gain support for a campaign amongst various audiences who play a role in reaching the desired end state of a campaign.[79] In order to illustrate this, the various audiences in an environment may be plotted along a spectrum of relative interest depending upon the level of support they have for a campaign. The aim of influence activities within Information Operations should be to gain maximum support for the campaign by moving audiences along the spectrum to support the campaign.[80] This is illustrated in Figure 8.

The willingness of populations to support the campaign will be determined by their perceptions of legitimacy in the campaign, its objectives and the security to retain those objectives once achieved.

SPECTRUM OF RELATIVE INTEREST

Information Ops/Influence Activities

NEUTRALS

ALLIES

INACTIVE

HOSTILE

ENEMY

SUPPORTIVE

UNSUPPORTIVE

FRIENDLY

SUPPORT FOR THE CAMPAIGN

MORE   LESS

Figure 8: Influence Activities to Increase Support for a Campaign.

Source: Adapted from Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-61.

The Development of Comprehensive Operations (Fires and Influence)

The aim of all activities within an operational design is to affect the behaviour of the target. In a manoeuvrist approach, a weakness in a key capability is threatened or otherwise affected so as to have a *second order* psychological effect, ideally one that shatters cohesion and will. As described above, influence activities are conducted in order to achieve first order effects on the understanding and perceptions of a target audience, that is on the psychological plane, in order to influence will and behaviour. These two concepts may be brought together in an expanded manoeuvrist approach termed Comprehensive Operations with their activities and effects occurring on two planes, the physical and the psychological.[81] Figure 9 illustrates the concept.

Figure 9: Operations on the Physical and Psychological Planes as Comprehensive Operations in an Expanded Manoeuvrist Approach.

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000*
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007 (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

Therefore, influence activities and their direct affects on understanding and will become part of the manoeuvrist approach. For example, the issue of a psychological operations message to enemy conscripts may encourage a significant portion to surrender, again the desired behaviour. This in turn would affect the combat power of the adversary and his will and would reflect a truly "indirect" approach espoused by Sun Tzu and other authors of manoeuvre warfare. The coordinated manoeuvre on the psychological plane has been illustrated in current doctrine:

> Thus, just as a commander may wish to manoeuvre his forces to reach a piece of key terrain and threaten the adversary's position before the adversary reaches it, that same commander may wish to issue a media statement, launch a PSYOPS message, or build emergency infrastructure in a village before the adversary issues a propaganda statement, issues a false media message, or intimidates the local population into giving support. Thus, a commander creates desired effects through simultaneous manoeuvre on both planes.[82]

Thus, this expanded concept of manoeuvre continues to seek to gain an advantage on the adversary.

The synchronised conduct of influence activities and physical activities, termed "fires" has been termed Comprehensive Operations and is coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management (temporal and spatial organisation of activities).[83] It is illustrated in Figure 10. It is directly related to the Comprehensive Approach and the Effects-Based Approach to Operations in that it seeks to understand the environmental systems affecting the successful outcome of a campaign, undertake actions to create desired physical and psychological effects in support of objectives, using all the elements of power, not just the military.[84]

Figure 10: The Synchronisation of Fires and Influence Activities as Comprehensive Operations.

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

The Importance of People—Individuals and Groups—in Operational Design and Campaign Success

The important role that individuals and groups will play in supporting or countering the successful outcome in a campaign is of course nothing new and they will often be considered target audiences.[85] It certainly holds true for those who subscribe to the theory of the advent of "war amongst the people" and the end of conventional wars.[86] It also holds true for those who believe that despite recent trends, conventional warfare will continue to exist.[87] Individuals and groups, motivated by their perceptions have always played a role in campaigns regardless of the nature of the campaign, at all levels of command at various times. This will continue to be the case. In describing the enduring nature of war, the analyst Colin Gray writes that a constant "theme is the overwhelming significance of the human element: people matter most."[88] Even those who view the Vietnam War as a mainly conventional military campaign acknowledge that it was the lack of will amongst the US populace based on their perceptions of the war that led in large

part to the eventual failure.[89] Furthermore, any campaign that seeks as an end state a stable peace will require the support, and thus the perception of legitimacy, by the indigenous population.

Thus, the prudent commander identifies the individuals and groups whose understanding and perceptions will affect the outcome of the campaign; in fact, various groups and their support may be considered centres of gravity, and those sources of strength to whichever side has their support.[90] The commander will work through them as necessary, and as part of the operational art, to ensure campaign success. This entails a broader concept of the manoeuvrist approach described as Comprehensive Operations.

The Rise of the Concept of Legitimacy Amongst the Populations

This overall realisation of the vital importance of audiences and their perceptions in support of a campaign seems to have led to the inclusion of "legitimacy" within doctrine.[91] Thus a campaign or its constituent actions and demands may be considered legitimate in that they can be seen as justified in the eyes of specific audiences. Perceived legitimacy implies then that a campaign will be supported, or at least not opposed, and that individuals and groups (the audiences) will consent to its demands. If properly planned, these perceptions will be created through the manoeuvrist approach of combined fires and influence activities. Obviously, if individuals and groups are to support a campaign and its forces, then they must perceive the campaign to be justified, that is, be legitimate and thus to have legitimacy.[92] After all, it is only through such support that conflict and violence will cease and stability be reached.

American and NATO doctrine have therefore recently introduced legitimacy as an additional principle of operations, added to those normally considered Principles of War. The US Joint operations publication summarises legitimacy as follows: the purpose of legitimacy is to create the will amongst groups and individuals necessary to achieve the strategic end state and is thus a decisive element of the campaign; it is based on legal, moral issues and the "rightness" of actions undertaken; affected audiences will include local populations, foreign nations, and participation forces; concerted plans and efforts must be made to sustain legitimacy of the campaign and of the host government and this may lead to friction with tactical level demands; and, the vital legitimacy of local governments and institutions may be enhanced, in the perceptions of their own populations, through humanitarian and civil-military cooperation, however, caution must be taken to ensure a perception of legitimacy is not given to local officials and institutions that are ineffective and corrupt and thus not deserving of legitimate recognition.[93]

In short, the perceptions of the legitimacy of the campaign and its aims by affected populations will affect the outcome; indeed, even commentators at the time of the Vietnam War noted that this is, in terms of campaign success, more important than the body counts of enemy dead, despite the accepted wisdom of the time.[94]

Although not mentioned as a specific principle, legitimacy is a constant and consistent theme in the Canadian counter-insurgency (COIN) manual. References repeatedly refer to actions that reinforce the legitimacy of the campaign

and its forces, or to planned actions that seek to undermine the claims to legitimacy of the insurgents. Hence, it clearly articulates the counter-insurgency competition as a struggle over claims to legitimacy.[95] Indeed, this is such a central issue to a COIN campaign that it is stated in the overarching philosophy of COIN:

> A successful COIN campaign requires the support of the populace. Thus all military activities must be conducted with a view to gaining and maintaining the support of the local populace and to this end, creating and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign. This must be understood at all levels of command, including the lowest tactical levels.[96]

As a result of this philosophical basis, COIN doctrine stresses that populations are in fact strategic centres of gravity within the campaign. This reflects the early definition of centres of gravity as sources of strength and given the nature of insurgencies, populations indeed provide both moral and physical strengths to either side in the battle.

The support of populations is therefore contested within an insurgency. Initially, this will be limited to the indigenous population but with the intervention of supporting governments or coalitions, their domestic populations also become a focus of struggle. Insurgents seek to defeat the will of those populations to support the COIN whilst seeking to defeat the will to resist of their own populations.[97] This is illustrated in Figure 11.


Figure 11: Illustration of Populations as Centres of Gravity Contested by Adversaries and Campaigning Nations

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

The concept of populations as influencing outcomes need not rest solely at the strategic level. In Afghanistan for example, the population of a particular tribe and its potential support for an insurgency may be considered an operational centre of gravity. Likewise, a religious or tribal leader within a small village whose population looks to him for guidance may be considered a tactical moral centre of gravity and campaigning forces should seek to gain his support for the campaign. In line with the concepts established, this would be done by convincing him that the COIN campaign is justified and thus legitimate.

Populations are important in all campaigns, but naturally to varying degrees. Any campaign including major combat that seeks to achieve a stable peace and environment will require support amongst the indigenous population. This will require, to degrees varying with each situation, that commanders and their campaign plans focus on the creation of a perception of legitimacy that will draw the support of individuals and groups. When there exists competition for such support, the commander must manoeuvre on the psychological plane to gain a position of advantage.[98]

Perhaps the best summary of the concept of legitimacy was recently presented in a single sentence in the revised Canadian Forces operational planning publication. It states:

> The essence of operational design is to apply [sic] joint effects in a manner in which friendly strengths are brought to bear on enemy weaknesses, friendly weaknesses are shielded and the enemy is outmanoeuvred in time, space and legitimacy, forcing him into a position from which the only option is capitulation.[99]

This statement clearly reflects the contention that manoeuvre occurs on both the physical and the psychological planes in a time-competitive fashion to win a position of advantage in the minds of affected audiences. In many cases creation of legitimacy and thus support for the campaign will assist in the achievement of objectives.[100] In short then, the attainment and maintenance of legitimacy in the perceptions of individuals and audiences affecting the outcome of a campaign will provide an operational and strategic advantage to the campaigning forces.

The Missing Framework for Creating Legitimacy

To this point, the paper have surveyed the development of operational art and its supporting elements. The centrepiece is the manoeuvrist approach and its aim of achieving decisive psychological affects, be against an adversary or amongst individuals and groups whose support for the campaign is vital to success. Gaining support for a campaign and its objectives results from the overall justification, that is, the perceived legitimacy of the campaign and its execution. Manoeuvre of this sort to gain a position of advantage will demand that the commander successfully portrays his campaign and its execution as more justified and more legitimate than that of his opponent and legitimate enough to endure the cost a campaign imposes upon a nation. Creation of legitimacy gives a commander operational and strategic advantage over his adversary.

Although a commander has a variety of tools with which to shape perceptions, such as psychological operations and public affairs, there exists no framework within which he may conceive, build and measure the perceptions of legitimacy. The recent introduction of Campaign Authority as a doctrinal concept may provide a basis for such a framework. The following section of this paper will work to review this concept in detail as it currently exists in doctrine with a view to developing it as the needed framework. Since legitimacy provides a commander with strategic and operational advantage over his opponent, then surely there should be a framework for its creation, maintenance and assessment.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY IN CURRENT DOCTRINE AND WRITING

General

The concept of Campaign Authority appeared in doctrine in 2004 but focused primarily on peace support campaigns. It has been expanded within UK doctrinal development, but it remains focused on campaigns dealing with peace support or irregular threats. It has with rare occasion appeared in other documents, but inserted only by those familiar with campaign planning and its supporting doctrine. Most recently, it has been raised in Canadian land force doctrine, but without proper placement within operational planning and design.

Campaign Authority in UK Doctrine: Expanding from Legitimacy to Campaign Authority

The 1998 edition of UK peace keeping doctrine replaced previously issued single-service Army doctrine and reflected the new emphasis on joint operations and campaigns.[101] The publication discussed to a limited extent the concept of legitimacy in terms of gaining and maintaining consent for the mission at hand. It listed legitimacy as a "consent promoting principle" and described it in terms of the campaign mandate, often sanctioned by the UN or other international body, the legality of the campaigning force and the importance of promoting the legitimacy of the campaign through the legal conduct of the military forces.[102] In doing so, it clearly linked the idea of legitimacy to the perceptions of populations and audiences and their willingness to consent to the campaign.

Building upon this concept of legitimacy as a planning consideration, the formal concept of Campaign Authority first appeared in June, 2004, in the UK's *JWP 3-50, 2nd Edition, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (PSO)*. Since this time, it has appeared in several interim publications, but does not appear to have become formalised in the operational design process.[103]

The UK's PSO publication articulates Campaign Authority in detail and throughout refers to its consideration and promotion. It details the complex nature of operating environments, particularly in campaigns that seek to establish an enduring peace in a nation that has failed to provide it for itself. It notes that crisis requiring intervention stem from the inability of a nation to govern its own societal elements or to do so in a manner that aggravates a society or a substantial portion of it.[104] Furthermore, it notes that based on campaign experiences,

crisis situations can only be resolved through the integrated efforts of international and indigenous elements working together to resolve the root causes of a crisis across all the constituent facets of an environment: rule of law; economic; governance; military; informational; education; and commercial. This results in the involvement of a "complex of actors," both indigenous and foreign, working to solve the crisis and create an enduring condition of stability.[105] The region's unique history and culture must be considered when attempting to address a crisis situation.[106]

It follows then that any PSO must have the support of this variety of groups and individuals, that is, the complex of actors, and the indigenous population at large if there is to be an enduring, self-sustaining peace.[107] The authority for a campaign begins at the strategic level with a formal mandate, often issued by the UN or some regional organisation, that reflects international will and support.[108]

The UK doctrine expands this initial source of legitimacy to all levels of command in the construct of Campaign Authority, which it describes as, "the term used to describe the amalgam of four related and inter-dependent factors." These factors are: the legitimacy of the international mandate for the operation as perceived by the complex of actors; the perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit and implicit in the mandate, placed on those conducting the operation; the degree to which involved factions, local populations and other actors or audiences subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the operation (ranging from unwilling compliance to complete consent); and the degree to which the activities of those executing the operation meet the expectations of the various affected audiences.[109]

An examination of the text and concept clearly indicates that it is embedded in the presumptions of a PSO, be it of a peace keeping or a more difficult peace enforcement nature. The mention of an "international mandate" and limits ("freedoms and constraints") that may be imposed upon the actual conduct of the campaign again places the concept well within the bounds of a peace support mission. It places the mandate in terms of purely legal authority for the campaign. In doing so, it excludes the possibility of legitimacy in any international intervention mandate under the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine that had been developed three years prior to this publication.[110]

The concept articulated here focuses on the perceptions of those within the operating environment and it makes no mention of the role that may be played by domestic audiences of any contributing nation during the campaign. Any campaign requires the support of the populations that are contributing forces and resources and thus the effort must be seen as legitimate by those domestic populations.[111] The will of a population to support a campaign must thus be attacked or defended as necessary.[112] The manual recognises the key role played by populations but it neglects to identify them as potential centres of gravity.

Notwithstanding the peace keeping and in-theatre focus of this initial description of Campaign Authority, the publication does note that successful campaign outcomes require the compliance and consent of affected populaces and this will be reflected in the level of cooperation given the forces in questions.

Thus, the greater the level of Campaign Authority, the more freedom of action and capacity to act will exist for the peace support forces. The concept applies to all levels of command and may be assessed across different audiences and regions.[113] In essence, the greater the Campaign Authority in the overall theatre, the greater will be the chances of success.

Levels of Campaign Authority at any given time will indicate the type of stance a peacekeeping force will adopt: enforcement; stabilisation; or transitional. Enforcement will occur during the implementation of a ceasefire or settlement mandate and Campaign Authority will be generally low or uncertain at best. Coercive force may be necessary to carry out the mandate. Stabilisation will be required once a peace plan has been implemented and Campaign Authority will generally be of a high level and force should only be required in self-defence or to dissuade those who would violate the agreement. Finally, a transition stance will see the military force as part of a multi-agency effort establishing the conditions that will sustain a peaceable situation. Campaign Authority will generally be high and military force should rarely be required. As indigenous forces and agencies develop their own capabilities, responsibilities for governance and sustainable security should be passed to them. This will serve to increase the Campaign Authority of the mission.[114]

This description and practical consideration of Campaign Authority in the conduct and development of a campaign towards the desired end state is fairly revealing. Firstly, it clearly indicates that as a campaign becomes more peaceable Campaign Authority will increase, for the campaign will be seen as succeeding and players are consenting to its authority. It is perhaps better explained in the reverse: as more actors in the environment consent to the authority of the campaign and its mandate, the less violence will occur and the greater will be the Campaign Authority. Secondly, the description notes that Campaign Authority will be increased through the military working in a multi-agency cooperative effort, that is, in a Comprehensive Approach. Finally, the concept notes that Campaign Authority will increase as indigenous capabilities are developed and assume responsibility for the enduring peace. It therefore links Campaign Authority to the fulfilment of the natural expectations of an indigenous populace. The description of Campaign Authority in these stages of a peace support campaign implementation clearly focuses on the roles played by the complex of actors, their given consent and the satisfaction of their expectations.

In discussing the fundamentals that are deemed specifically relevant to a successful peace support operation, the publication lists, "Creating, Sustaining and Enhancing Campaign Authority" as the first fundamental.[115] As such Campaign must be continually assessed and developed at all levels of conflict (tactical, operational and strategic), across all four facets: mandate recognition; prosecution; delivery of expectations; and consent given by various affected groups. It notes that Campaign Authority will vary across different regions and groups that differ along ethnic, social, religious and cultural lines. Furthermore it advises that both military commanders and civilian leaders and administrators in a mission must be aware of and address differing levels in an effort to maximise the perceptions and acceptance of Campaign Authority across local, regional and global audiences.[116]

One may note here that the concept of Campaign Authority differing across various groups echoes the early idea that any perception of legitimacy will differ along cultural, religious and ethnic lines. Thus, commanders must appreciate such differences and work to enhance the perceptions of Campaign Authority as interpreted by differing groups and their expectations particularly in terms of resolving their unique grievances.

The need to build Campaign Authority is pervasive and personnel at all levels must understand their role in this. Campaign Authority will be enhanced through adherence at all levels of command and across all agencies to the campaign aims, professional standards, compassion, respect for local customs and social/religious practices.[117] This directly the reflects the prescriptions offered by Julian Paget, based on his observations from a number of peace support and counter-insurgency campaigns, that security forces can contribute to gaining support, and thus consent, from a populace by demonstrating good discipline, understanding and restraint and in helping to address grievances. At the same time he notes that such measures will remove the ability to insurgents to exploit grievances and injustices.[118] It other words, such conduct will thwart the adversary's attempt to undermine the Campaign Authority and create his own legitimacy.

In sum, UK peace support doctrine has raised the creation, maintenance and enhancement of Campaign Authority as a fundamental of a peace support mission and has tied it to campaign success. Additional advice places a focus on using credible, but proportional and discriminatory force to deal with threat in a measured and controlled manner that avoids damaging Campaign Authority, but enhances it whenever possible.[119]

In discussing guidelines for the campaign conduct, the publication goes on to note that Campaign Authority will be enhanced when: the military works in harmony with other agencies to achieve a comprehensive solution to the environment; cultural and social sensitivities and requirements are understood and considered; and when other agencies, particularly those outside of the government's control, understand the need to build legitimacy.[120] In short, the publication indicates that the Comprehensive Approach to the campaign will build Campaign Authority in that it will meet expectations and thus build legitimacy.

The PSO doctrine ties Campaign Authority to overall operational design and hypothesises that the campaign fulcrum—the point in a campaign in which initiative switches irreversibly to one side or the other—in a PSO is reached when Campaign Authority is increased and becomes self-perpetuating. On the other hand, failure to build Campaign Authority within an acceptable amount of time, a misfortunate event of immense proportion or a failure to accurately comprehend the environment and its demands may so undermine the campaign that its legitimacy and authority are irrevocably destroyed, and thus preclude long term success.[121] To this end, Campaign Authority will serve as a measure of campaign effectiveness: the greater the Campaign Authority, the greater likelihood of a successful outcome.[122]

Campaign Authority may be enhanced by a "hearts and minds" programme that uses military resources to provide specific support to a local populace

and by the general fostering of good will between the force and the populace. At the same time, Campaign Authority is built on not only meeting expectations but on a sufficient ability to deter hostile actions through force if necessary.[123] J3 staff must be prepared to advise commanders of actions that will negatively affect perceptions of the force such as collateral damage. Gains to be had by parties that comply with the mandate and requirements of any agreements must be advertised and fulfilled. Additionally, a sense of justice must be created and exploited in the terms of agreements and negotiations if Campaign Authority as reflection of legitimacy is to be created.[124] Although force must be used judiciously in meeting the mandate, a failure of the peace support force to prevent violations of any agreements and the overall mandate will undermine Campaign Authority and the effectiveness of the mission. It will obviously frustrate the expectations of the complex of actors, but will bring into question the effectiveness and the mandate.[125] One need only reflect upon the desperate situation of the UN's failure to protect their own designated safe havens during the Bosnian civil war to understand the effect that an ineffective mandate or impotent force will have on a campaign and the affected populations.

Commanders must keep in mind that Campaign Authority must be created and assessed across all echelons within a society. Although the leadership of a particular group or region may support a campaign and give its consent, if the lower echelons and majority of any group do not reflect an acceptable level of Campaign Authority than no lasting peace will be likely.[126]

The UK publication dedicates an entire sub-section on the role of Information Operations in a PSO, and focuses in good measure on its ability to enhance Campaign Authority. Information operations will influence parties to support the campaign objectives and thus build Campaign Authority as follows: legitimate authority of the mandate is to be stressed and enhanced in messages; compliance should be encouraged in target audiences; messages should manage expectations; and, nothing should be communicated that will prejudice perceptions of the mandate.[127] Additionally, media operations are vital to building and maintaining domestic and international will for the campaign.[128] This reflects the recently broadened concept of the manoeuvrist approach (manoeuvre on the psychological plane through influence activities to achieve first order effects such as that of influencing target audiences) and that information operations will be integral to campaign design.

In short then the UK PSO doctrine indicates that Campaign Authority has a central role in reaching a successful conclusion to a campaign. The greater the campaign authority built during the campaign, the greater the likelihood of enduring success. Having said that, the text fails to clearly enunciate the reason why, based on first principles, Campaign Authority is so vital to campaign success. Plainly stated, and in view of the other operational design tools previously discussed, Campaign Authority reflects the legitimacy of a campaign as perceived by key centres of gravity, that is, individuals and groups whose consent is vital for campaign success. One may also reverse this as an equation: at all levels of command, individuals and groups are centres of gravity; their support and consent for a campaign is vital for enduring success;

their support and consent for a campaign will reflect their perceptions of legitimacy of the campaign and the forces conducting it; and, legitimacy is built through the development of Campaign Authority.

Beyond Peace Support Doctrine—The *Ad Hoc* Inclusion of Campaign Authority in British Doctrine and Writing

Campaign Authority receives mention in detail in only one other UK doctrine publication, that of Joint Discussion Note 2-07, Countering Irregular Activity.[129] The publication deals with irregular threats that the military may face.[130] It is this publication that the concept is expanded beyond Pease Support campaigns.

The publication returns to first principles, noting that authority stems from the state's ability to govern effectively in the provision of human security.[131] A failed state is one that has lost its authority in that it fails to meet the needs of its population. When this develops to a point of crisis, irregular threats exploit it and external intervention is required. This intervention must build its own Campaign Authority, in place of the indigenous authority until state functions are self-sustaining and the crisis is reduced to a manageable level.[132] The key to countering irregular threats is to build authority.

Building Campaign Authority will thus be accomplished through "the provision of adequate human security and the resolution of underlying grievances" in order to solve the crisis at hand. This will in turn marginalise irregular threats to a level that can be managed in a routine, internal manner.[133] The model of Campaign Authority and its four constituent elements will provide "a means to understand" the threats to security by irregular adversaries and a means, based on the four dimensions of the model, to determine the types of forces, agencies, and skills needed to counter the threat the stability and authority.[134] It will help determine the types of forces, agencies, skills and even objectives needed in the campaign. It will demand a Comprehensive Approach and will be refined in reference to a society's unique culture and social expectations. The military will focus on providing physical security that counters irregular threats whilst other agencies tackle the root causes of crisis in areas such as governance and justice. In doing so, the military will provide "breathing space" for the political process to take hold, to re-establish a rule of law and begin to address grievances through legitimate authority.[135] Simply put, Campaign Authority is a framework for commanders to understand challenges to authority and in which to build legitimacy that will counter those challenges, and shaped to the environment at hand.

Given the political nature of campaigns countering irregular threats, the military will generally play a supporting role and the campaign plan will include thematic lines of operation that reflect a multi-agency and pan-government approach. The Campaign Authority concept will guide military forces in establishing temporary authority until other agencies and indigenous capacity assume the responsibility. Furthermore, the concept can be used at all levels of command to measure the effectiveness in facilitating a return to normalcy.[136] If necessary, the military might make a short-term contribution to capacity building within the failed state, particularly in the field of building security forces and other essential services. The provision of a security framework will be key

to marginalising and neutralising threats and drawing a population to support an authority, that is, it will build Campaign Authority.[137] This text is very similar to the direction given in Canadian doctrine, particularly COIN doctrine and capstone Land Operations doctrine, in dealing with stabilisation of the security situation until other agencies are able to deploy and undertake tasks.[138]

Much of the military's role in building Campaign Authority will include the building of capabilities within indigenous armed forces, constabularies, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces and intelligence and security services as required by the situation. Ideally with the assistance of other agencies better suited to other disciplines, it will also include the development of border and customs services, judiciary and penal systems.[139]

As soon as possible, indigenous security forces should be incorporated into the security framework in order to: interface with the local populace (assuming they are trusted and thus have their own legitimacy); provide first-hand intelligence; provide the numbers required to protect the populace; and assist with development tasks.[140] One may add to this that the presence of indigenous security forces working with an intervening force will provide an indigenous profile and influence on operations and, as long as the indigenous forces are respected and held to a high standard, will in turn, increase legitimacy Campaign Authority.

Depending upon the security situation and presence of other agencies, the military may have to assume other stability operations such as provision of essential services in order to meet the immediate expectations of the populace. These stability operations will build Campaign Authority, undermine irregular threats and prevent a return to crisis situation. Once civilian authority is established or re-established, military forces will likely be called upon to protect it and vital economic interests, at least until indigenous forces are developed and assume the responsibility.[141] Such work will preclude the deterioration of the initial Campaign Authority and will serve to further develop the sense of legitimacy for the campaign and its forces in that it meets the expectations of local populaces.

In the immediate term and to some extent throughout a campaign, a commander must deal with those adversaries threatening a peaceful restoration of indigenous capabilities. In doing so, he must use a mixture of fires and influence activities with "some discrimination and an understanding of the longer-term consequences to strengthen Campaign Authority and counter irregular activity." In other words the commander must blend manoeuvre in both the physical and psychological plans to gain positions of advantage over the adversaries, particularly in relation to support from the populace.[142]

Finally, this Joint Discussion Note states that "the most corrosive effect of irregular activity is its erosion of [domestic] public support and enthusiasm in response to an intervention" for those nations contributing forces to a campaign. In other words, irregular threats will seek to undermine the will of troop contributing nations through time, casualties and attacks against targets in those nations.[143] Whilst this is not clearly stated in the publication, it certainly implies that Campaign Authority must be viewed from the perspective

of domestic audiences, and thus built and maintained to ensure public support of those domestic audiences throughout the campaign. A domestic population of course will only support what it believes to be legitimate, particularly when they are paying for it. This reflects Canadian COIN doctrine previously mentioned that identifies domestic audiences and their support as a centre of gravity for campaigns.[144]

Thus, this British developing doctrine clearly allows Campaign Authority a significant amount of attention in a campaign, but has focused on its role in those campaigns dealing with irregular threats. It has matured the concept to the point that it offers Campaign Authority as a model or framework in which the challenges and approach may be envisioned and planned. It clearly links the establishment of Campaign Authority to enduring success as it eventually translates to become authority and legitimacy of an indigenous government and structure by developing indigenous capabilities. However, it does not indicate the role that Campaign Authority would play in any conventional war or major combat campaign theme.

Outside of peace support doctrine and the JDN dealing with irregular threats and activities, the concept of Campaign Authority receives little if any attention, and certainly not from a holistic, harmonised approach. The capstone Land Operations publication produced in 2005 reflects doctrine developments underway at the time within NATO and the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program. Despite the currency of the publication it only mentions Campaign Authority in relation to Peace Support Operations, noting its requirement for success, the need to work in the Comprehensive Approach and its usefulness as a means of measuring progress.[145]

The British military issued in 2006 a new version of their publication dealing with Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) reflecting recent developments and concepts in NATO and the ABCA program.[146] It notes that CIMIC will increase Campaign Authority by influencing the attitudes and conduct of other agencies (international and indigenous) and populations.[147] The publication notes that CIMIC, due presumably to its ability to facilitate civil development, is an influence activity that will win "'hearts and minds'" in the campaign. Such activities are aimed at specific target audiences in order to gain support for the campaign. Such activities must not be considered humanitarian aid but specific activities undertaken to create "real and demonstrable improvement in the lives of the target population." As such they are neither neutral nor impartial and if properly planned and targeted will add to Campaign Authority.[148] In short, the text is specific in that it prescribes the use of CIMIC as an influence activity (part of or related to Information Operations) to build perceptions of legitimacy and general consent for the campaign amongst targeted audiences.

Other formal UK doctrine publications, even those written at the same time as PSO doctrine or since then, have failed to discuss the concept of Campaign Authority. Joint Operations Planning has not included it as a consideration in planning but does note the importance at one point of building a sense of legitimacy for the campaign across various audiences.[149]

Despite the stated role that media operations will play in creating, maintaining and advertising Campaign Authority, the recently released UK Media Operations publication makes no reference to the concept and the key role that it could play in influencing a theatre's complex of actors and other audiences.[150] Furthermore, a 2006 review of UK Counterinsurgency doctrine and proposed plan for a re-write have failed to mention the concept of building Campaign Authority whatsoever.[151] This absence is quite remarkable given the acknowledged role that the perceptions of populations will play in resolving an insurgency.[152]

Between 2005 and 2007 the UK produced two Joint Discussion Notes (JDNs) attempting to articulate the UK's approach to the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). Only the earlier edition mentions the concept, but it clearly indicates that it is a concept for consideration in a wide range of campaigns, not just peace support. It notes that the resolution of a crisis (presumably one requiring an intervention force) relies heavily upon the attitude and commitment of the indigenous populace and that to achieve this, the military must work holistically with other agencies in order to address the root causes of crisis, much of which will require non-military approaches, and thus "build and sustain an effective, legitimate campaign and Campaign Authority." As the publication notes, "Campaign Authority is the fundamental basis from which legitimacy is derived in the eyes of the indigenous population and the wider international community."[153]

This concept of Campaign Authority certainly sits well within the EBAO philosophy, in that it ensures tactical level activities create effects (results) that support the operational level objectives and strategic end states. For example, well planned training activities to develop local security forces will develop an indigenous capability responsive to the needs of the local populace and will work towards a stable, enduring peace. Reconstruction of essential services will address grievances that aggravated the crisis and win the support of indigenous populations; indeed, they can be targeted towards specific regions and groups, as part of operational objectives.

The JDN dealing with the Comprehensive Approach mentions Campaign Authority in brief but summarises it nicely. It notes that the campaigning force must seek to build "tangible legitimacy," that is, Campaign Authority. This is done through the careful management of expectations and the attainment of support from individuals and groups who shape collective opinions and lead in consent. Despite a lack of detailed discussion in building Campaign Authority the Comprehensive Approach, by definition of the concept itself, indicates that Campaign Authority will be built through the application of those elements of power that address the root causes of grievances to reach enduring solutions across elements of power beyond just military objectives. This of course will achieve the expectations of affected audiences, be they international, domestic and indigenous, and likely reflect the terms of any campaign mandate. Without providing extensive details, it emphasises the current doctrinal trends regarding the military working in conjunction with other agencies to achieve enduring, complementary end states.

In summarising the place of the concept of Campaign Authority throughout formal and developing UK doctrine one will note that it has been fairly uneven. It has been formally introduced within the boundaries of Peace Support doctrine, stemming from the traditional concept of requiring broad consent for a peacekeeping mission to succeed. However, the development of the concept within formal doctrine in key areas such as media operations—areas that would have major affects in developing Campaign Authority—has failed to materialise. |The concept has percolated to developing doctrine, mainly in the form of JDNs, but has not been discussed in an extensive manner. However, it has been expanded from an application to peace support campaigns to at least the majority of campaigns.

UK doctrine sees Campaign Authority from two perspectives. Firstly, it is something to be created, this broad sense of legitimacy in the campaign and the force. This in turn will generate consent for the campaign across affected audiences, allow more freedom of manoeuvre on both the physical and psychological planes for campaigning forces, and support the achievement of desired end states. Secondly, Campaign Authority has been viewed as a measure of effectiveness itself, in that the greater the perception of legitimacy and granted consent by affected audiences, the greater will be the likelihood of a successful end state. The doctrine for countering irregular threats has given the most extensive discussion of Campaign Authority in the majority of campaigns to be encountered. It specifically mentions the importance of building legitimacy across popular perceptions and the use of Campaign Authority as essentially a method to guide plans to counter threats to authority.[154]

Outside of UK doctrine, the concept has rarely appeared except in reference to it by those intimately familiar with it or related concepts. In April of 2003, the post-Iraq War Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) developed a partial draft plan re-building Iraq, entitled, "A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq." In the introduction, the American general, General Jay Garner, the Interim Civil Administrator, notes that: "History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post hostilities activities."[155] Although the ORHA was an American invention, this draft mission plan was clearly written by UK staff, given its Anglo-oriented wording.[156] Despite being written the year prior to UK PSO doctrine, the plan uses the term Campaign Authority and some of its concepts. Under the heading of Campaign Legitimacy, it asks the question, "what will provide post hostilities campaign authority?"[157] In response, it notes that the mission must be internationalised (the use of a coalition with broad support) so as to prevent a "backlash/intafada" and that this should be done by reducing the levels of US-led coalition forces and thus the image of occupation by invaders. It notes that nations not in the original coalition will be unwilling to join the post-war effort without a "recognised form of legitimacy such as a UN or UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) mandate.[158]Reflecting UK PSO doctrine, this draft mission plan emphasises the need for the perception of legitimacy in two key audiences: the local populace who will resent the idea of occupation by conquering invaders; and, the possible members of a coalition who will perceive increased legitimacy in an international mandate. Thus, it reflects two facets of the campaign authority model, that of recognised mandate and the manner in which a campaign is conducted.

In analysing past campaigns, Stuart Gordon bemoans the fact that the simplification of COIN doctrine has lead to the idea that the support of a populace—their 'hearts and minds'—can be "bought and force protection achieved, by gifts and so called kindnesses in the face of enormous individual physical as well as political, social and economic threats."[159] Gordon suggests that instead, the concept of Campaign Authority better describes the requirements of such an environment. He states that Campaign Authority is built through the complementary combination of: a political framework for the campaign, what he called a "grand political bargain," or effectively a mandate; a unity of effort across integrated military and civilian efforts to simultaneously provide security and meet the needs of the population; and, the carefully regulated use of force to avoid alienation of the population and to build legitimacy of the campaign.[160] Thus Gordon's prescriptions reflect the UK doctrinal concept of Campaign Authority and its constituent dimensions.[161]

In keeping with these themes, a recent Royal Air Force journal article dealing with combat air power in irregular warfare discusses Campaign Authority as if it is a broadly accepted concept in UK doctrine in general. It articulates the concept from a new perspective of building legitimacy to combat the narrative, or story, used to justify the actions of the irregular adversary and to advertise his legitimacy. It notes that in UK doctrine, "achieving and maintaining perceptions of legitimacy and popular consent are considered part of establishing Campaign Authority." Most importantly, it links consent to trust of the campaign and its practitioners by affected audiences. Through actions and honest words, a campaigning force builds trust and consent, which translates as Campaign Authority. Conversely, where a force's actions are perceived to lack legitimacy, are detrimental to a population, fail to provide personal security or fail to meet other expectations, the target audience will lack trust and therefore, Campaign Authority will decline.[162] In its conclusion this article describes the concept of Campaign Authority as a central objective in modern warfare. In light of this, the influences produced on target audiences through actions and words must be both precise and compelling, in order to build Campaign Authority in the manner desired. Thus, precision is more than simply an element of destructive targeting. The ability to be compelling stems from a true understanding of the target audience concerned.[163] In summary, this RAF journal article correctly shows Campaign Authority as stemming from the trust and consent of affected populations build upon the words and actions of the campaigning force. Thus, it echoes most of the facets of the concept displayed in developing joint doctrine. As with all previous UK doctrine though, it discusses the concept in the context of irregular threats and campaigns vice campaigns in general.

These three sources exemplify the rare appearance of Campaign Authority outside of formal UK doctrinal work, albeit they all stem from British sources. Although they are independent references and take a slightly different approach or view, the use of the concept is certainly in line with that proposed in UK Peace Support doctrine and extended in Joint Discussion Notes to other campaigns, but generally limited to those dealing with irregular threats.

Campaign Authority in Canadian Doctrine

Outside of UK doctrine and conceptual discussions, Campaign Authority as a formal doctrinal concept has appeared only in the newest Canadian Army doctrine. Drafted in 2007, Land Operations combines both operational and tactical aspects of the land component in the full-spectrum of operations. In dealing with the operational level of war, the publication introduces the concept of Campaign Authority but unlike UK doctrine, formally defines the term as:

> the total perceived public legitimacy and authority of a force to conduct a campaign. Note: It is measured through four criteria: perceived mandate; the manner in which it is prosecuted; the consent of affected parties; and, the management and satisfaction of the expectations of the affected parties and other audiences. It may be measured at international, national, regional and local levels.[164]

As given below in Figure 12, the Canadian doctrine illustrates the construct of Campaign Authority through the relative measurement of the four criteria and notes that changes in the levels of Campaign Authority may be illustrated over time and across different audiences or regions.

Represented by this illustration or model of Campaign Authority is an overall increase in the measurement or assessment of the total Campaign Authority over time and/or audience. Over the theoretical time period given,


Figure 12: Illustration of Campaign Authority Indicating Changes over Time

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000*
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007 (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

the campaigning force has increased the recognition of its mandate, has improved in the manner in which the campaign is prosecuted, has better managed and delivered expectations and has increased the number of those supportive of the campaign, that is, those who are willing to consent to the campaign. It indicates that Campaign Authority may be measured and compared across different audiences. For example, the support of Canada's military participation in the NATO campaign has amongst the Canadian domestic audience will likely differ from the perceptions of the indigenous Afghani population although likely related to it.

The Canadian doctrine, more so than most other references, directly states that Campaign Authority is built, and indeed, commanders must strive to build it, to directly gain legitimacy in the eyes of the affected populations, for their support is needed for a campaign's successful conclusion.[165] It clearly links ultimate success of a campaign to Campaign Authority through the perceptions and attitudes of those affected by it. It concludes that any campaign that is not perceived to be legitimate will likely fail as a result of a loss of popular support.[166]

Apart from the creation of Campaign Authority through words and deeds, it may be enhanced and maintained through influence activities such as psychological operations (PsyOps), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs. This mirrors UK doctrine and concepts. Such tools and methods must be used "to provide both information and evidence of campaign progress and the resolution of sources of conflict," that is the resolution of grievances and disputes.[167] In other words, such tools must promote Campaign Authority across the various dimensions of the model, by indicating the advances in each area such as the existence of a formal mandate, the satisfaction of a populace's expectations and the legitimate or just manner in which the campaigning forces are conducting themselves. Specifically it notes that Information Operations must be used to actively counter adversarial propaganda.[168]

A unique aspect of the Canadian interpretation of Campaign Authority, one that deviates substantially from the original concepts in the UK peace support doctrine, is that the mandate may not be internationally sanctioned or formalised in any particular manner. As it states, "if a humanitarian crisis for example demands intervention, an intervening military force that immediately relieves suffering and prevents a further deterioration of the situation will likely be viewed as having legitimacy and thus Campaign Authority, even though no international mandate may have been issued."[169] Such instances may include non-combatant evacuation operations in which military forces are used to remove Canadian citizens and those of our allies from a conflict situation in a failing state.[170]

The Canadian doctrine, more so than British doctrine, places Campaign Authority and legitimacy in a much more direct, synonymic relationship. It effectively equates the two: when the legitimacy of a campaign is perceived by audiences, say through the equitable and fair manner in which is it prosecuted, the campaign gains authority to act; likewise, when campaign authority is built, for example, in the granting of an internationally recognised mandate, the legitimacy of the campaign increases, at least in the eyes of some audiences. Thus, legitimacy builds Campaign Authority and Campaign Authority enhances

overall legitimacy, for Campaign Authority is legitimacy. In fact, it is simply an illustration of legitimacy. Although this may seem confusing to the reader, it is clarified in the first order by the definition, with its statement that Campaign Authority is the total perceived legitimacy, or justification, of the campaign. Thus, the Campaign Authority model provides a framework through which legitimacy may be conceived and built.

Furthermore, by noting that it may be viewed differently across different audiences, the model reflects the idea stated earlier that like legitimacy itself it is relevant to the minds of a particular audience. This relationship is best illustrated in the dimension of consent of affected parties: a perception of legitimacy, stemming from one of the other dimensions, say recognised mandate, will naturally cause more individuals and groups to consent to a campaign; the more members of a populace that consent to a campaign, the greater will be the legitimacy of that campaign. Indeed, this may have symbiotic influences across different audiences. For example, Canadians are more likely to acknowledge the legitimacy of the NATO campaign in Afghanistan and thus support it, if they see that the majority of the Afghan population is freely consenting to the presence and actions of the campaigning force.

It must be remembered that the creation of Campaign Authority in one dimension, does not translate into greater consent automatically. Despite how well and equitably a campaigning force prosecutes its mandate and delivers expectations, its mere presence and mandate in a nation will be so repugnant to certain sectors of a populace that consent will be virtually impossible. But such is the nature of the will of individuals and groups in dealing with the political outcomes of a campaign and the civil order that result. There is no doubt, for example, that some former members of the *Front de liberation du Quebec* still deny the legitimacy and authority of the Canadian federal government over the province of Quebec, but they have been made so small in number and their own legitimacy has been so marginalised that they pose no real threat to stability.[171]

Despite this clear linkage of legitimacy to Campaign Authority and the development of an illustrative model, Canadian doctrine unfortunately fails to actually do anything with the concept of Campaign Authority, other than to discuss it. Within the Land Operations publication, it is placed at the start of the chapter dealing with operational level planning, but fails to indicate any specific place for the concept within that planning. Canadian doctrine treats the concept as an interesting consideration, but does not imply that it is a tool in any way, nor does it really note where and when it should be specifically considered, other than stating that commanders must continually strive to build it. Typically, commanders have endless considerations to make in any campaign, particularly given the recent increases in the speed and flow of information and unless it is formally incorporated it will be missed.

Conclusion: What is the Next Step in Developing the Concept?

In concluding the review of the current concept of Campaign Authority, one can summarise that although it has appeared in both UK and Canadian

doctrine, it still requires considerable development. Originating from the idea that consent is a necessary ingredient in peace support operations it first developed within UK peace support doctrine, but has been introduced as a key consideration in planning, particularly in campaigns involving irregular threats. This stems from the key role that populations and their support for a campaign will play in that campaign's ultimate success. Canadian doctrine develops the concept slightly more in that it formally defines it as total perceived legitimacy. However, despite a conceptual model, this doctrine fails to articulate in detail how Campaign Authority might be developed across the four dimensions. Nor, like UK doctrine, does it assign the concept a formal place in operational design other than to mention that is should be a consideration for the commander. The concern is valid. If Campaign Authority reflects the consent of populations and if populations are key to the success of a campaign, especially where they are centres of gravity, then surely Campaign Authority has a formal role to play in the operational design process. Certainly the authors of the initial draft plan for post-war Iraq felt that Campaign Authority is so central it required its own section in the campaign design.[172]

The consideration for the next sections of this paper is the formal place that Campaign Authority should have in operational design of all types of campaigns and the methods that should be used to maximise Campaign Authority and thus the likelihood of a success campaign outcome.

THE PLACE OF CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY IN OPERATIONAL DESIGN

A Framework Within Operational Design—Providing Strategic and Operational Advantage

The initial portions of this paper reviewed the historical development of operational art and its keystone philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach, which seeks to gain a psychological advantage over the adversary. In recent years, operational design has been broadened with manoeuvre now including all necessary elements of power working with the military in a Comprehensive Approach in order to achieve desired end states in relation to a myriad of systems influencing the operational environment. In addressing problems in complex environments there has been a re-discovery of the fact that individuals and groups are vital to the successful conclusion of a campaign. This is certainly the focus of campaigns dealing with peace support and counterinsurgency, but it applies to all campaigns, even conventional military campaigns. In any campaign, forces must deal with populations, including their own domestic populations and their perception of the war. In the end, peace and stability will be impossible without the support of the audiences affected. Their support will reflect their perceptions of the justice and legitimacy of the campaign and its end state. This point was clearly made in the Vietnam War and certainly well understood by America's adversary.[173]

Although legitimacy has been introduced as a major consideration, indeed even as a principle in some doctrines, it has yet to be formally incorporated in operational design. As shown in earlier discussions, there is a need for a framework in which legitimacy can be conceived, created and measured. Although Campaign Authority has been introduced in some detail in UK doctrine

in dealing with peace support and other campaigns involving irregular threats, it has been formally defined and modelled in Canadian doctrine, albeit not extensively developed. However, it provides all the facets needed to fulfil this vacancy of a framework in which legitimacy may be conceived and build as part of an operational design.

Campaign Authority provides the focal points through which legitimacy may be created in the first order: the creation and advertisement of a justifiable mandate to campaign; the manner in which the campaign is prosecuted so that legitimacy is created and enhanced at all levels of command; and, the management and delivery of expectations so that legitimacy is not lost in the failure to fulfil demands of the individuals and groups. Legitimacy created in these three fields will logically encourage the audiences concerned to consent to the campaign, to follow its dictates and meet its demands or in other words, to support it. In turn, the greater the number of affected audiences to support the campaign, the more legitimacy it will have. Thus, as a framework, Campaign Authority allows for legitimacy to be measured. This last point is particularly important when viewed from the viewpoint of a Western, democratic-orientated audience. The support of a campaign amongst the indigenous populations will, by virtue of its popularity as a reflection of democratic practice, lead to greater support for the campaign in Western nations. Furthermore, since Campaign Authority will reflect overall support for a campaign it can be used as a measure of success.

In the end, Campaign Authority as a framework for the creation and measurement of legitimacy of a campaign will provide the commander with an operational and strategic advantage over his adversary and those who would oppose his campaign. It will allow the commander to outmanoeuvre his adversary on the psychological plane. It will support a concept that appears to be developing as a new principle of war, that is, legitimacy itself.[174]

Parallels in the Business Community – Legitimacy through Social Licence

Before the paper examines how Campaign Authority may be employed as an operational design tool, it will be useful to examine how a similar concept exists in the business community.[175] INMET mining is an international mineral mining company based in Toronto. They take an immense amount of pride in the ethical conduct of their business and strive to educate their employees and governing bodies regarding expectations and standards.[176]

Leading executives with the company readily identify with the need to create perceptions of legitimacy in the nations and amongst the populations within which they operate.[177] In the first place, they recognise that a formal license from the host government is important, but not the only requirement. They noted the difficulties in dealing with dysfunctional governments and the fact that true stability in (mining) operations will come from the local populace. Thus, they require the support and consent of local populations who have specific expectations, regarding exploitation of their resources, and potentially harmful effects and some sort of benefit from the profits. Local consent is a necessary factor in successful mining operations regardless of formal blessing of any government,

which itself may lack public legitimacy. Whilst attempting to reach their objectives, the company must also be able to counter the campaigns, and in some cases, the propaganda and falsehoods, of environmental and social groups opposed to their work. In countering such threats to their success, the company must maintain a high ethical standard of conduct in order to not undermine its own reputation and thus legitimacy. They must gain consent from the local populace by "sharing the wealth." This is not merely a form of welfare or philanthropy, but a sound principle of investing wealth for future development; in fact, the company must be seen to be building the society rather than simply exploiting its resources and paying taxes to a central authority. In order to understand the link to the community, the company works with local power structures down to the sub-clan and village level in order to better understand and deliver expectations and to meet the requirements of the indigenous population. They work with local agencies, various levels of government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in sustainability and environmental areas in order to build their legitimacy and be acceptable to all audiences concerned. The company's own share holders must also be convinced that the company is operating in a legitimate fashion. In terms of an overall plan (equivalent of an operational design) they adopt a Comprehensive Approach to work with local and international organisations in seeking the maximum benefits for all concerned, that is, the attainment of success in their business campaign. The conceptual framework used by INMET Mining in this cooperative process is termed, "social licence" and represents the broadly accepted legitimacy and authority to operate granted by the interested society at hand. Thus the company gains social licence by operating in a justified and acceptable manner and the acquisition of social licence further increases their legitimacy in terms of increased consent. Where corporations have failed to obtain social licence, strife and civil war have at times resulted.

Hence one can see parallels here to military campaigning and the creation of a sense of legitimacy at all levels, local, regional and national. It is akin to Campaign Authority and thus can be developed and assessed over time and across different audiences. Although there are few parallels between military campaigning and industrial mining, the examination of the social licence framework provides similar concepts: the success of an operation through the attainment of legitimacy in the perceptions of affected audiences.

CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY ACROSS THE LEVELS OF COMMAND:

Before describing the creation and assessment of Campaign Authority in general, it will be best to illustrate its existence at the various levels of command.[178] Whilst the text of British doctrine emphasises the importance of analysing and fostering Campaign Authority at all three levels of conflict, the tactical, operational and strategic, it fails to further articulate or illustrate this notion. Since Campaign Authority is about perceptions of legitimacy amongst populations, that is, groups of people, the entire concept must rest on populations at all levels of command.

One may surmise that based on the focus on mission mandate, establishing Campaign Authority must begin at the strategic level. This view of mandate must be examined from at least three perspectives: the international perspective

from which many mandates will come, for example, from the UN Security Council; the domestic perspective based on the perceptions of the populations of troop contributing nations; and the indigenous perspective of nation in which the campaign will occur.

This concept of needing a public perception of a legitimate mandate or cause is nothing new. In the 1758 campaign against French forts in the Lake Champlain region as part of the French-Indian War, General James Abercromby became frustrated by the lack of support from American provincial governments, in that their reluctance to supply muskets and troops delayed the start of the campaign by six weeks and precluded sufficient training for the provincial regiments.[179] In light of the fact that the Provinces had been promised in writing by the Prime Minister that their costs in recruiting provincial soldiers would be supplied or reimbursed, their reluctance likely stemmed from something other than fear of the financial cost such as a lack of perceived legitimacy in the campaign's objectives or a lack of belief in success. Either way, it demonstrated a lack of consent to support the campaign and thus a lack of Campaign Authority at the strategic level.[180]

Since concepts or perceptions of legitimacy will be considered through cultural, religious and ethnic filters, the strategic consideration of Campaign Authority may include a regional perspective. For example, if the nation in which the campaign is to occur includes a population whose ethnic identity spans an entire region, the comprehension and promotion of Campaign Authority may require a regional focus as well. This ethnic or regional base view must be expanded to include ex-patriot communities in other nations, particularly those involved in an intervention campaign. Campaign Authority will have to be considered on a dispersed cultural or ethnic basis, addressing the perception of legitimacy as required. For example, perceptions of legitimacy for Canada's participation in the Afghanistan NATO campaign must be considered amongst the indigenous Afghani population, the expatriate Afghanis living in Canada, and amongst the larger Muslim community of Canada. Relationships between sub-group perceptions will also be important. Expatriate Afghanis living in Canada and supporting the campaign as being legitimate will likely influence the general Canadian domestic perception of the campaign and its legitimacy.[181]

At the operational level Campaign Authority will have to be created and sustained to achieve operational objectives in terms of perceptions of legitimacy and ensure tactical level activities achieve those objectives and support the strategic end state. Within the Comprehensive Approach to campaigning, the military will work in a harmonised, complementary fashion with other agencies and elements of power in order to reach shared, enduring end states.[182] Beyond local audiences, Campaign Authority and its perception of legitimacy may be required to be built and maintained amongst the various agencies that do not normally work with the military or are distrustful of it. These may include indigenous government agencies, international organisations and even one's own non-military agencies directed to support the campaign. Indications exist that non-military departments within the Canadian government's effort in Afghanistan have doubted the legitimacy of the military's role and approach in certain areas

such as the advisory teams in the national government.[183] This has resulted in acrimony and a disjointed approach to achieving operational objectives such as government reform and development of governance capacity.[184]

Within a theatre, there may be specific groups or individual leaders that act as centres of gravity, physical in the former, moral centres of gravity in the later.[185] Thus, creating and maintaining Campaign Authority at the operational level in this regard may include convincing a particular sect, tribal or religious leader of the legitimacy of a campaign and its worthiness of support. Such was the case with the Pathans (Pashtuns) of the North-West Frontier, who in the mid-19th century accepted the legitimacy of British authority in the region and formed the Indian Army's Corps of Guides, thus supporting strategic end states in that region.[186] Given that many Pashtun tribes are supporters of the Taliban forces, major campaign objectives could be achieved in Afghanistan if specific Pashtun tribes could be convinced of the legitimacy of the current Afghan coalition campaign. Similar successes with operational level Campaign Authority may be seen to have occurred during the French-Indian Wars in North America. In support of the British campaign to capture Fort Duquesne in 1758, the British commander General Forbes sent forward a key emissary to convince the Shawnee and Delaware tribes to withdraw their support for the French. They did this by convincing the native leaders that settlement with British authorities would be more just for the long term Indian interests, and thus legitimate, than any settlement with the French.[187] It is interesting that the British were able to remove what may effectively be seen as an operational centre of gravity for the French by creating this perceived legitimacy and thus Campaign Authority, despite their previous reputation for duplicity in dealing with natives. Thus one can see the use of Campaign Authority to give the British an operational advantage over the French.

Many perceptions amongst populations are formed at the local, tactical level for it is at the immediate, personal level where individual's opinions are often formed.[188] Hence, creating Campaign Authority at the tactical level will be vital and should be viewed as building towards the strategic end state. This will include actions and postures taken at the tactical level to instil a sense of legitimacy amongst local populations. The perception of legitimacy should focus on the force, the manner in which it conducts itself and manages and delivers local expectations, and the justification of the overall mandate. This will be established very much at the local level, in villages, hamlets or local neighbourhoods, that is, the areas of responsibility for platoons, sub-units and units. Examples of this can be found in programmes such as that of Combined Action Platoons and rural reconstruction in Vietnam, during which USMC platoons, combined with local forces, would protect villages, provide humanitarian aid and assist in local development.[189] Through protection and addressing immediate needs the Combined Action Platoon and related rural reconstruction programme sought gain the support of the local populations and prevent the exploitation of their grievances by the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) insurgents. In other words, they were building legitimacy for the counter-insurgency campaign and gaining the consent of the populace, and denying the consent to the enemy. They were manoeuvring to a position of advantage in relation to their enemy.

Under the classification of influence activities within Information Operations, local audiences may be influenced by the Posture, Profile and Presence (PPP) of campaigning forces. The related measures taken by forces, such as the choice to wear berets on patrol vice helmets and the conduct of soldiers at vehicle check points can be used to reduce negative impressions such as that of an occupying force, and thus to build confidence and trust with local populations.[190] This perception development through the use of planned PPP will translate into a perceived legitimacy for the force and its campaign. As mentioned earlier, legitimacy is perceived through specific cultural, social or ethnic filters. This will also apply to the creation of Campaign Authority, particularly at the tactical level and its interface with populations. Thus, in this case, the legitimacy of a force may have to be established in a variety of means. Based on the cultural perceptions at hand, an initial deployment of a force may have to establish a rather robust presence initially, before a softer, more approachable PPP level is established. Such was the case for the Australian Forces in their deployment to Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The initial deployment demonstrated a very robust joint military capability and serious, but non-threatening profile whilst the simultaneous arrival of police and civilian agents demonstrated a commitment to help, rather than simply quell. They demonstrated competence and commitment vice pure aggression.[191] In short, they quickly established their legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace in a manner befitting their cultural expectations. In recent conflicts some members of coalitions have criticised the PPP of other contingents in that they poorly portray the campaign and provide negative images the undermine cooperation by local populaces.[192]

Tactical level activities, in relation to the perceptions of populaces, should be undertaken to create credibility for the force and thus build legitimacy. Credibility will come with fulfilment of expectations and the fair and just manner in which the campaign is conducted. Hence, the sense of Campaign Authority is supported through the creation of credibility at the tactical level.[193]

Just as tactical level activities will build Campaign Authority, the undesired effects of tactical level activities can undermine it. Brash, arrogant behaviour in relation to populations, particularly actions that offend local and cultural sensibilities, will do much to undermine Campaign Authority, for it will alienate those populations whose consent and support is vital.[194] Other actions at the tactical level can do much to harm Campaign Authority. A historic example can be seen in the failure of the rural reconstruction programme during the Vietnam War. With the focus on a doctrine of attrition offensive operations often destroyed the tactical level village reconstruction projects that were aimed at long term consent building amongst the populations.[195] In the end, the failure to build consent amongst local populations, including the Vietnamese populations, led in good measure to the eventual failure of the war effort.[196]

Recent improvements in the Iraq campaign can be used to illustrate the increase in legitimacy and Campaign Authority across the three levels of conflict. At the tactical level, the surge on troop numbers and a change in tactics and methods reflecting new US COIN doctrine have improved security of the urban populations and thus their credibility and legitimacy. At the operational

level, two initiatives have improved the environment: the creation of pro-government, local militias has brought employment to tens of thousands of previously unemployed young men and created responsive security elements; and, better planned and focused development aid has achieved superior results in development. At the strategic level, the conflict and Iran's demonstrated "adventurism" and duplicity have brought other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain into a closer alliance with the west and US in particular.[197] All of these undertakings and improvements have increased the Campaign Authority for the coalition: the US is employing new doctrine and therefore their conduct is seen as more acceptable and more attuned to the nature of the conflict; they have met local expectations that Iraqis should be responsible for their own security based on local requirements; attacks against coalition forces have decreased, civil unrest and violence is down to levels below any seen since the liberation and oil exports have increased over the last year; and, nations in the region have accepted at least tacitly benefits of remove of the Iraqi threat and the role begin played in the region to counter Iranian subterfuge.[198] In other words, through improvements at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, Campaign Authority has increased across all four of its components: manner conducted; expectations delivered; consent given; and mandate accepted.

CREATION AND ASSESSMENT OF CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY ACROSS ITS CONSTITUENT DIMENSIONS

General

If Campaign Authority is to be used as a framework through which legitimacy in a campaign may be created then it should be examined in some detail. The section dealing with the applicability of Campaign Authority across the levels of command has provided some indications as to how this is done. It must be remembered that Campaign Authority is a guiding framework, not a rigid template or formula. It simply provides one of the many canvases for the exercise of the operational art.

Legitimacy through the Perceived Mandate

Any campaign begins with the perception of a mandate to undertake operations to achieve a desired end state. This falls within the rubric of Just War theory, specifically *jus ad bellum* and its constituent conditions that must be fulfilled: just cause; proportionality; reasonable chance of success; public declaration; legitimate authority (to declare the war); right intention; and last resort.[199] The most obvious just cause for a mandate is the occasion of national self-defence to deter an aggressor. The case becomes less clear when one nation seeks to defend another, but the post-Second World War era has given rise to international mandates issued by recognised bodies such as the United Nations in the form of resolutions.

Such was the case in 1990/1991 and the issue of UN Resolution 678 which authorised coalition actions to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This resolution provided a specific mandate seeking to correct the unjust invasion and allowed a broad coalition of 33 nations from the West and Middle-East to be formed.[200] It obviously provided legitimacy to the campaign and the resulting authority

vested in the coalition and its actions presented the Iraqi leadership with coalition it could not defeat or dissuade. Furthermore, and just as importantly, the mandate's limited focus on opposing the wrongs perpetrated by Iraq created legitimacy within the region and in the eyes of Arab populations. This UN Resolution did not allow for extensive military operations against the nation of Iraq outside of the aim to expel its forces from Kuwait. Actions outside of the mandate, such as the toppling of the Iraq government or national occupation, would have undermined the legitimacy of the campaign in two ways: firstly, it would have likely violated the condition of proportionality; secondly, it would have not been supported by the Arab nations of the region and would have broken the coalition, meaning fewer nations would have consented to it.[201] Years later, the lack of UN resolution to authorise a war against Iraq in 2003 for being in violation of its agreed obligations to disarm and adhere to previous resolutions undermined the overall legitimacy of the planned campaign and created a great deal of resentment against it, even from long-standing allies.[202]

Beyond reasons of self-defence and international resolutions, the mandate for a campaign may be more difficult to establish. In recent years, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect has developed, based on the founding principle that a nation exercising the right of sovereignty also has the responsibility to meet the basic needs of its population; however, if it fails to do so through either lack of capability or will, "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."[203] Hence, where a state fails to meet its obligations to care for its own populace, the international community has, in severe cases, a responsibility to intervene to provide immediate protection of those at risk and to establish the conditions for stability and security.[204] Although this has not been adopted as pervasive doctrine its principles and elements are used to justify current campaigns. The initial actions in Afghanistan to eliminate a terrorist threat, in self-defence, that the Afghan government was unwilling or unable to eliminate were based in international law.[205] However as cited in the January 2008 federal commission's report on Afghanistan (Manley Report), the reasons for continued campaigning in Afghanistan echoes many of the fundamental underpinnings of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, such as the protection of threatened populations and the obligation and authority to assist failed states and regions in need.[206]

Thus, reflecting R2P doctrine, the actual formal mandate may actually be of less concern than a mandate given by a local populace based on their desperate needs. As was shown in the examination of a business model, the government's formal license often matters little to affected audiences. The form of "social licence" based on the needs and expectations of affected populaces and their eventual fulfilment is what generated true legitimacy in terms of mandate.

This is illustrated by the recent increase in Canadian support for the mission in Afghanistan. The UN mandate for the coalition campaign (UN Security Council Resolution 1510, passed 13 October 2003) has publicly endorsed the campaign in accordance with international law.[207] Although this did not change during preparation of the Manley Report, the public attention and awareness generated by the report resulted in a doubling of public support for the extension of the mission and 70% of Canadians agreeing with the report's recommendations.[208]

Nor did the report specifically highlight the formal mandate, which is not mentioned in detail until Appendix 4.[209] Hence, it can be seen quite clearly here that a perceived mandate in terms of creating a sense of legitimacy stems in large part from public education regarding the key conditions of Just War theory: just cause; and right intentions. Regardless of the formal mandate, the perceived mandate will be based on the perceptions developed in the minds of various audiences. Thus governments must make use of media relations to convey the sense of justified mandate.

Thus the "story" of the mandate is important to promote. Narratives are routinely used by insurgencies to give legitimacy to their cause and exploit grievances.[210] However, narratives exist in most campaigns even major conflicts with conventional forces.[211] Likewise, any mandate within the context of Campaign Authority should rest upon a "compelling narrative" that indicates the course of the campaign and the desired outcomes.[212] This narrative must fully explain the "right intention" of the campaign to all audiences concerned. This would include domestic audiences as well as those in the region and the indigenous population. A formal mandate may only carry sway with certain audiences, such as Western-European populations who put great stock in international organisations and cooperative ventures. A mandate based on "just cause" and "right intention" is key to providing legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous populations who affect the outcome of the mission. Without a legitimate mandate, the campaign will most surely be opposed.

The mandate must of course be seen in the cultural context of the audiences concerned. The mandate of creating a western version of "liberty" and "freedom" based on western style democracy has effectively failed to produce a sense of legitimacy amongst cultures that do not place the same value in those qualities. The idea of a stable, responsible governance model is, through cultural bias, represented as liberal democracy, which may be incompatible with the culture, traditions and social structures preferred by the local populace. Such poor assumptions undermine the mandate of a campaign and create resentment to it. The end result is frustration and failure.[213] All populaces generally expect their grievances to be resolved, but this must be done within their own cultural context. Indeed, what has been termed "cultural absolutism" produces a hubristic assumption that cultural or social qualities are completely transferable.[214] Because they are seen to have legitimacy for that culture, they are not accepted. This then undermines the legitimacy of the entire campaign.

Finally, as an element of "just cause" the campaign must be seen to be supporting a legitimate end state and institution. It was the American support of the corrupt South Vietnamese government and their failure to reform that undermined the legitimacy of the campaign in the minds of both local and American audiences and led in good measure to the failure of the campaign.[215]

Legitimacy in the Conduct of the Campaign

One of the surest means to create or destroy legitimacy is through the detailed conduct of the campaign, at all levels of command. Indeed the narrative that underpins the mandate must be supported by actions in the conduct of the campaign.

Producing legitimacy must be considered in the overall conduct of the campaign. In order to maintain cohesion and thus a sense of legitimacy in the first Gulf War, the command relationships and responsibilities were carefully delineated with Arab forces solely under command of a Muslim, Arab general.[216] Likewise the tactical conduct of the war was orchestrated so that Arab forces liberated Kuwait and did not enter Iraqi territory for the sake of perceptions of not invading another Arab nation.[217] These issues of conduct were carefully planned in order to maintain cohesion and build Western legitimacy.

Conduct even at the lowest tactical level is recognised as important to fostering legitimacy. As illustrated previously, Information Operation include Posture, Profile and Presence (PPP) as a formal influence activity to send a message to specific audiences. The message will depend upon the audience and context: to a would-be attacker, it may provide a hard target whereas to local civilians seeking reassurance of stability, the profile, through dress and deportment and interaction, would be adjusted accordingly.[218]

Conduct must be in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) otherwise legitimacy is undermined. This meets the minimum standard of *jus in bello*.[219] Tactical actions during the Vietnam War illustrated for American television viewers a lack of justice and legitimacy in the war itself by virtue of its conduct. The My Lai massacre and its illustration of the attitudes of American policy towards the citizens whom campaign was supposedly supporting destroyed American support for the war.[220]

Even when the LOAC may allow a particular activity, the creation of collateral damages, even those permitted as generally reasonable, may indeed undermine the legitimacy of the campaign and rob it of popular support, particular in those campaigns that require broad indigenous support (COIN and peace support). Hence it is not unusual for tactical engagements in Afghanistan to be denied indirect fire or air support if there is any danger of killing civilians, even if the losses could be justified as proportional and unintended.[221] Likewise, the brutal conduct and lack of discrimination of insurgents in either purposefully targeting civilians or wilfully ignoring their safety, along with their involvement in organised crime have undermined their own credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous populations.[222] Manoeuvre through Information Operations should seek to exploit this weakness.

If the conduct of a campaign is going to be legitimate, than the activities must support the strategic objectives and end state, that is, fulfil the operational art. If the activities fail in this regard, then they and the campaign begin to lack legitimacy in the eyes of affected audiences. Such was the case in Vietnam with the emphasis on battles of attrition.[223] This has been clearly indicated in the recent recommendations for the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan in that military activities must be better orchestrated with expanded activities that satisfy the long term needs of the nation, such as development in the areas of public institutions governance and security.[224] Indeed, this is reflected in current doctrine in that a campaign is realised through a combination of offensive, defensive and stability activities, the latter focused on creating the conditions for enduring stability.[225]

Legitimacy in the Fulfilment of Expectations

Regardless of the formal mandate and the justice of the activities undertaken in its name, legitimacy will fail to exist, particularly in the perceptions of indigenous populations, if the campaign fails to properly manage and fulfil expectations. Indeed, it is here where some of the commander's measures of effectiveness are applied in order to gauge the creation of legitimacy and progress towards success.[226]

The expectations of domestic audiences are generally straightforward. They desire the strategic aims of their nation to be achieved and any threats to it eliminated, ideally in a relatively quick manner and at minimum cost. Failure to do so quickly undermines the legitimacy of and support for the campaign.[227]

By their very nature, crises that require a military intervention reflect complex environments and often stem from social grievances.[228] Enduring solutions to the campaign are more likely to occur when those grievances and their causes are resolved. Therefore any campaign must strive to identify, through a systems analysis across the constituent social elements, the root causes of grievances and the expectations of the local populations. Many causes of conflict will be beyond the ability of the military to achieve, at least on larger, national scales. Thus, the Comprehensive Approach will be needed.[229] Only in this way can the expectations of those populations be met and popular support, as a condition of success, be achieved. Within the delivery of expectations for long term stability, the military should move to a supporting role of security framework, thus providing manoeuvre space within which other agencies specialising in long term development can operate and the civilian populace may freely function.[230]

Notwithstanding the involvement of specialist agencies, the military may still play a key role in addressing the grievances. The abuse of power by officials, particularly those in the security sector and crime in general should be checked by military activities. The civilian populace will naturally expect such action if a security force is truly legitimate. It has been noted that it easy for military forces to dismiss unacceptable practices by indigenous authorities as part of the local culture. This of course is simply a practice of moral relativism in that clearly immoral practices unacceptable in any stable society are considered a natural part of the local environment and should not be changed. This is a falsehood and a failure to act in such cases will only aggravate the rational expectations of a local populace that an intervening military force protect them from abuse.[231]

Additionally, expectation may be initially satisfied and legitimacy increased for the campaign by the military assuming quick impact development projects that address immediate needs and essential services, particular when the security environment has yet to allow the entry of other agencies. These will unlikely be long term solutions but they will reflect good will and "just intent" on the part of the military forces.[232]

Management of expectations on all fronts is vital. Domestic audiences must be made to realise that the deployment of their forces may not bring immediate results and that the resolution of a complex environment often involving a failed state will require a significant amount of time. Local audiences must be encouraged to be patient, but where campaigning forces can meet a need that should do so quickly.

In terms of indigenous populations, their expectations must be met in a culturally relevant manner. The imposition of standards or solutions that are inappropriate to the local culture will be rejected or simply unworkable; hence, solutions to grievances must be tailored to the environment at hand and ideally are guided by those most affected by the outcome and most familiar with the causes.[233] A recent example is the Canadian International Development Agency's insistence that only secular schools are funded in Afghanistan and the local demand for moderate madrassas (religious schools) be ignored.[234] Not only does this fail to meet the desires and expectations of the indigenous populace that wishes a religiously based education, but it is hypocritical, coming from a nation whose own population, at least in some provinces, has state-funded access to Roman Catholic schools. Again, legitimacy is damaged and thus support for the campaign.

This leads to a related point. Long term solutions to the campaign will only be achieved when the indigenous forces, leadership and people have the ability through empowerment to defend and effectively govern themselves.[235] Such empowerment is a reasonable expectation of an indigenous populace and steps taken to enact it will be readily supported, thus increasing the overall legitimacy of the campaign and reflecting "right intent" and a justifiable end state. Developing capability is a shared responsibility across the Comprehensive Approach and will involve such stability activities as Security Sector Reform and development in governance and the civil service.[236]

Legitimacy through Popular Consent to the Campaign

The outcome to success in the other three domains of Campaign Authority will inevitably lead to more individuals and groups, many of them centres of gravity at various levels, consenting to the campaign. The greater the number of persons and leaders giving their public consent to a campaign because they see it as being justified and legitimate the greater will be the overall legitimacy.

This reinforcing influence can cross geographical boundaries. The fact that many Afghan-Canadians support the NATO mission in Afghanistan, will likely engender support from Canada at large by virtue of the esoteric knowledge and vested interest of the former group.[237] Likewise, it stands to reason that the more Afghans who consent to and support the campaign, the more Canadians in general will support the campaign.[238] Thus, in terms of indigenous and domestic populations functioning as influencing bodies, and indeed, centres of gravity for the campaign, the consent of the indigenous populace, influences consent in the domestic populace, through general perceptions of increased legitimacy.

Consent of those individuals and groups affected by the campaign is in the end the cornerstone of Campaign Authority and the overall legitimacy. It is the area to which measures of effectiveness should be readily applied so that changes in the overall consent may be measured and accurately attributed to a specific cause, be it a cause for an increase or a decrease in consent. This will in turn guide the nature of subsequent actions and plans.

Campaign Authority and its Relationship to Other Operational Design Concepts

Campaign Authority as part of the lexicon on of operational design will exploit the other complementary elements that support operational design and exist in a complementary relationship. Firstly, and most importantly, it reflects a manoeuvrist approach in that Campaign Authority, by building perceptions of legitimacy, attempts to gain a psychological advantage over the adversary. This advantage will exist on the psychological plane in the perceptions of individuals and groups that the commander will, as part of his operational design, have identified as centres of gravity influencing his campaign. The commander will plan to attack the vulnerabilities in the legitimacy of the adversary In recent campaigns this will include such characteristics and practices as the disregard the insurgents have for civilian casualties.[239] At the same time, the commander will protect his own centres of gravity, that is, key populations and their perception of his legitimacy. This may include ensuring that he presents clear explanations of mandates, for example.

The resolution of grievances that led to a campaign will build legitimacy through the delivery of expectations, but will require multi-agencies working with the military. Hence the creation of legitimacy will be enhanced, and in many cases only possible with, the Comprehensive Approach to operations.[240] Furthermore, the use of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations will ensure that all tactical level activities are legitimate by creating results in support of operational objectives.

Finally, as detailed previously, Information Operations will play a major role for legitimacy is based on the perceptions of key individuals and groups. Within the framework of Campaign Authority, Information Operations will use a wide variety of tools and activities to influence the understanding, perceptions and will of various actors and audiences in order to demonstrate the just cause, just intent and therefore legitimacy of the campaign.[241] Much of the Information Operational effort will be spent to counter the propaganda of adversaries that will seek to undermine the campaign and its legitimate cause and efforts.[242] In the end though, Information Operations does not give legitimacy, but only advertises it, and gives voice to it, in the hopes of creating more through increased consent by affected populations.

CONCLUSION

Review

Campaign authority has been defined as the total perceived legitimacy of a force to conduct a campaign, in terms of a mandate, the manner prosecuted, the delivery of expectations and the consent granted by affected audiences. It has been shown that perceptions of legitimacy are a vital consideration in all campaigns, regardless of the nature of the campaign. It supports operational design's centrepiece concept of the manoeuvrist approach for actions to create a sense of legitimacy provide a point of advantage on the psychological plane in support for the campaign and its end state. Legitimacy has even been introduced as a principle for joint operations.[243] Yet there exists no formal framework for the creation and assessment of legitimacy. In reviewing the constituent elements of Campaign Authority and the existing doctrine for its application, it is evident that the concept will provide a sound framework, with its four constituent dimensions, for the development and assessment of legitimacy and thus enhance operational design.

Campaign Authority as a Framework for Legitimacy Within the Maneouvrist Approach

Just as the principle of offensive action may be realised through a framework of attack with supporting elements of fire support, movement and synchronisation to name a few, legitimacy requires a framework within which it may be realised and implemented into operational design.[244] Campaign Authority with its four dimensions provides that framework for the creation and assessment of legitimacy. Realisation of legitimacy across the constituent dimensions will create combined, operational and strategic level legitimacy. This framework will allow the commander through his operational design to outmanoeuvre his adversary in the minds of individuals and groups, many of whom may be centres of gravity influencing the outcome of the campaign. The use of Campaign Authority to build legitimacy will give the commander an operational and even strategic advantage over his adversary.

All the elements of manoeuvre warfare continue to apply. Those individuals and groups that may be defined as sources of strength for a campaign, that is, centres of gravity, will be identified along with their vulnerabilities to be either protected or attacked through perceptions of legitimacy. Subordinates guided by the commander's intent will use mission command philosophy to build perceptions of legitimacy at their own levels, consistent with the operational objectives. Timely decision making and speed of action will ensure the decisions to create legitimacy and their supporting messages will undercut those of the adversary and make them irrelevant.

In light of the central role of legitimacy within a campaign, it is recommended that Campaign Authority be adopted as a framework for realisation of legitimacy throughout a campaign. Time and experience will eventually define how best to conceptualise its application within the operational planning process, but as a starting point, it should be considered in parallel to each proposed line of operation to ensure that the decisive points and their activities create or protect legitimacy and build consent, en route to the objectives and end state.

Summary

This paper has demonstrated that perceived legitimacy is important in all campaigns. Military writers attempting to describe either conventional operations or modern insurgencies have cited the biblical story of David and Goliath. David is portrayed as a conventional manoeuvrist for he dislocated Goliath's strengths by avoiding his spear and sword.[245] The story is also used to illustrate modern insurgencies and the ability of the weak to defeat the seemingly stronger.[246] In light of this, it is therefore appropriate to return to this story to properly appreciate the role of legitimacy. "You come against me with sword and spear and javelin;" said David to Goliath, "but I come against you in the name of the Lord."[247] Thus, before engaging Goliath, David first established his legitimacy and thus his advantage over his adversary. He did so within hearing of all the other Philistines and within the hearing of his own population.[248] It was only after establishing his legitimacy, in the eyes of all, did David then act to demonstrate his legitimacy and defeat this moral and physical centre of gravity. David's subsequent actions continued to reinforce his legitimacy.[249] So it should be with the concept of Campaign Authority.

Legitimacy is a cornerstone of a campaign. It exists in the minds (perceptions) and hearts (emotions) of the audiences affected by the campaign. Through the framework of Campaign Authority, commanders must establish their legitimacy to the adversaries, neutrals and to their own populations and continue to do so throughout the campaign thus gaining operational and strategic advantage. Only in this way, will a campaign be likely to achieve enduring success.

Endnotes

1.   The operational level of war is defined as, "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations." See NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2007*, (Ottawa: 2007), 2-O-3. The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels of war. For further details see: Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007); 3-3.

2.   NATO deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are well documented as are Canadian deployments to Haiti. In late 2007, NATO also deployed naval forces in anti-piracy and presence patrols around Africa. See German-Foreign-Policy.com. "Around Africa", http://german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56085?PHPSESSID=meqvitn6sqj4cm4mbuuqak2me5; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008.

3.   Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-1 to 2-6. See also, Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century—Future Warfare*, (London, UK: Orion Books Ltd, 2005), 19–25.

4.   For example, see United States. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), A-4. Here, legitimacy is introduced as a principle on par with the traditional principles of war.

5.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007); 6-1.

6.   The idea of legitimacy appears repeatedly in both US and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine and has been introduced as a principle in US joint doctrine. See the following: United States, Department of Defense, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006); United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), A-4.

7.   The elements of a nation's power may be described in terms of diplomatic, military and economic. (Some nations consider informational as an element of national power.) In such instances, the military will work along side other government agencies and departments in order to reach a common objective or end state. See United Kingdom, Ministry of National Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach*, (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-4. An effects-based approach to operations is a planning philosophy that ensures tactical level activities directly support operational objectives through the effects or results that they create. It is part of the comprehensive approach.

8.   Although this section refers in the main to American doctrine, it is recognised that doctrine across the lead Western nations occurred in concert with US doctrine particularly through the collective development and national ratification of NATO doctrine which is influenced by national doctrinal developments.

9.   NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2007* (Ottawa: 2007), 2-O-3.

10.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-3. Operational art is defined as, "the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations." See Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command.* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 1996), 159.

11.   Clayton R. Newell, *The Framework of Operational Warfare*, (New York: Routledge, 1991), 15 and 175. See also John English, "The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War," Chapter 1 in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 7. See also, John English, "The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War," Chapter 1 in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 7–13, and B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1954), 319–326. Additionally, see See also, William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 6, 7, 13.

12.   Allied planning and conduct of the Normandy campaign, the closing of the Falise Gap and the swift manoeuvre to the Seine River in 1994 indicated a knowledge of, and skill with, the operational level of war, with a particular emphasis of manoeuvre against enemy forces. See John English, "The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War," Chapter 1 in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 15.

13.   Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 148.

14.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2007* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 2-O-3. The NATO glossary indicates that the term "operational level of war" was accepted 01 July 1973. AAP 6 is an exclusive manual and thus each NATO nation must concur with the term and its definition in order for it to be accepted.

15.   John English, "The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War," Chapter 1 in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 16. See also, Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5, no 3 (Winter, 1980–1981): 61–79; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 08 April 2008.

16.   Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 148, 153 and 162.

17.   Sun Tzu was a 5th Century BC Chinese general whose tract Art of War has become a primary source for the origins of manoeuvre warfare. Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 28–30. See also, Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 91–92 and 100–102. See as well, Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5, no 3 (Winter, 1980-1981): 61–79; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 08 April 2008. Additionally, see William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 4 and 13. See also, John English, "The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War," Chapter 1 in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 13–14.

18.   Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 154. Modern manoeuvre warfare theorists in the early 1980s included Edward Luttwak and William Lind. See William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 2–5, and Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5, no 3 (Winter, 1980–1981): 61–79; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 08 April 2008. For a more matured discussion of the development of operational concepts and manoeuvre warfare based on slightly earlier writers see, Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 18–19.

19.   William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 13–18.

20.   William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 18–20. This idea of combined arms operations sees the integration of armour, infantry and artillery, along with air assets and other fires to achieve objectives. The inclusion of air and maritime power to achieve a common objective would be viewed as "joint" in current taxonomy. Furthermore, this combination of firepower supporting movement in the pursuit of advantage has obviously lead to the current definition of manoeuvre: Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2007*, (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 2-J-1 and 2-M-2.

21.   William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 5–7. The OODA Loop concept was developed by Lt Col John Boyd, USAF. Although widely accepted the concept was never articulated by Boyd in a paper, but simply remained as a five hour long visual presentation using over 190 view-foils.

22.   United States. Department of Defense, *Field Manual 100-5 Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1982), [edition on-line]; available from http://www.cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008. See pages 7-1 to 7-13 and 8-4. See also, Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 160–162. See also John L. Romjue, "The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept," *Air University Review*. (May–June 1984) Journal on-line; available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.il/airchronicles/aurreview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

23.   Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 162.

24.   Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." Chapter 8 in *The Operational Art* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 165. Although it has been raised to the joint level, refined and broadly accepted across NATO doctrine since this initial development, the key concept remains extant. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine*, (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007).

25.   X [Kennan, George F.], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

26.   X [Kennan, George F.], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html; Internet; accessed 09 April 2008.

27.   In discussing operational art as it currently exists in doctrine, a variety of Canadian, US, UK and NATO references will be used, reflecting that their respective definitions and concepts generally mirror one another and are harmonised in ratified NATO doctrine.

28.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-3.

29.   Department of National Defence. *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operational Planning Process*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), 2-1. Operational art may also be defined as: "the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations." See: Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 1996), 159. US joint doctrine describes operational art in similar terms: "the application of creative imagination by commanders and staff—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces." See United States. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), xx.

30.   A campaign is defined as, "a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces." See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2007*, (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 2-C-1.

31.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 39 NATO Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions, Study Draft 1.* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007). See also, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-71. NATO Joint doctrine describes the manoeuvrist approach as: "shattering the adversary's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel. It is an indirect approach, which emphasizes targeting the enemy's moral component of his fighting power rather than the physical." See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 5-2.

32.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007.* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-72.

33.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-75 and 5-76. See also, Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 2–The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities" [article on-line]; available from Air University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008

34.   Conducted together in an orchestrated fashion based on a manoeuvrist approach, these elements will have a devastating effect on the adversary. A well documented example of such manoeuvre was the Allied landing at the start of the Normandy campaign: deception measures in England convinced the Germans that a major attack would come in the more northern regions of France and thus the German operational reserves where held to the north of Normandy for weeks following the invasion and were thus dislocated; airborne drops beyond the beachhead pre-empted the German counter-attacks; and, coordinated air bombing and sabotage of rail lines and roadways disrupted the deployment of German tactical reserves.See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-77.

35.   Mission command is defined as: "The philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders." See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-82 and 5-83.

36.   Dr. Joe Strange, and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity," [article on-line]; available from Air University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008. The definition for centres of gravity posed by these authors differs from that given in standard NATO references in that it focuses on elements—people in groups or individuals—that can cause effects and may benefit from certain characteristics and locations. Other definitions include characteristics and localities as centres of gravity themselves. According to the authors, this confusion stems from improper translations from the original German text in various editions of von Clausewitz's work. This paper's author has also discussed this point with Colonel Richard Iron himself, in Nov 2006 and May 2007. See also Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* ed. And trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

37.   Dr. Joe Strange, and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity," [article on-line]; available from Air University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

38.   Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 2–The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities" [article on-line]; available from Air University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

39.   Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 2–The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities" [article on-line]; available from Air University http;//www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

40.   The tool can be used to illustrate its intuitive application in past campaigns. For example, in the May to June 1940 German conquest of France, the German campaign planners recognised the French Army and their defensive line as a centre of gravity. Identifying vulnerabilities in the physical defences and by dislocating much of the Army through a feint, the Germans struck rapidly along an indirect approach (the unexpected route through the Ardennes) into the depth of Allied dispositions, thus pre-empting and dislocating the Allied forces, and exploiting their weakly defended rear areas and withdrawal routes. The psychological impact of this rapid advance and neutralisation of the French and Allied forces had such a psychological impact that France realised their position and offered an immediate surrender. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1954. Second edition 1967.), 217–220.

41.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-7.

42.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine* (Ottawa: 2007), 4-20 and 4-21. Many of these stem from the general concepts that were developed to support the doctrinal creation of the operational level of war and its practice. The planned tempo of operations within a campaign, for example, stems from the time competitive nature of the operational art as articulated in decision-action cycle. Tempo is defined as "the rate of military action relative to the enemy." See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 39 NATO Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions, Study Draft 1.* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007).

43.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-7 to 6-25. The remainder of this description is taken from this reference. See also United States. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), IV-6. Note that these elements of operational design discussed here apply to campaigns and to major operations, such as the conduct of a non-combatant evacuation operation, that is, the evacuation of non-combatant from a foreign nation in crisis, an operation that would only last a number of days.

44.   A selection of other campaign design tools help determine the tempo of operations, the simultaneous or sequential nature of securing decisive points and objectives, the operational reach (distance and time) between decisive points and objectives, and the avoidance of over-extension or culmination. Together, these concepts will describe and illustrate, in words and visually on a map, the campaign plan. The campaign plan is then realised through the issue of supporting plans and orders.

45.   American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program, *ABCA Report Number 018, Capability Group Act 003, Information Operations Project Team* (Washington, USA: ABCA Program Office, 2006); Report on-line; available from http://www.abca-armies.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008. See Annex A of the report. Information Operations are defined as: coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of overall objectives by affecting their information, information based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own." See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-46.

46.   Conventional adversaries are defined as those with recognisable orders of battle, identifiable chains of command, established doctrines and manoeuvre-based forces. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-3 and 2-11.

47.   The various military deployments to the Former Yugoslavia provide a solid illustration of the convoluted nature of many recent campaigns. What began as a European Union sponsored monitoring mission grew into a UN mandated force to ensure humanitarian aid delivery, which was eventually assumed by a NATO force imposing and enforcing a peace solution developed with US State Department leadership. The ongoing solution involves a variety of agencies including Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) working in close cooperation with the military and police authorities. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), "The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia," in Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operational Role in Peacekeeping in *NATO Handbook* [handbook on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0501.htm; Internet; accessed 13 April 2008.

48.   SFOR Informer. "Ink and Radio Waves Contribute Toward the Peace," http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/106/s106p15a/ t01020715a.htm; Internet; accessed 13 April 2008. See also, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), "The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia," in Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operational Role in Peacekeeping in *NATO Handbook* [handbook on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0501.htm; Internet; accessed 13 April 2008.

49.   Colon S. Gray, *Fighting Talk—Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Stability*,(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International; 2007), 3, 24–26. See also, Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Perseus Books, L.L.C.; 1977), 96.

50.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007.* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-5. This reference defines a complex environment as: "a battlespace with a mix of geographical, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations."

51.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-6 and 5-1 and 5-14. See also, United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4-05 The Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2006), 1–4. By its own nature, the military cannot solve many of the root causes that led to the crisis and requirement for military intervention in the first place. Therefore, the creation of an enduring end state demands that a comprehensive approach be taken that uses all necessary elements of power along with the military.

52.   Irregular forces are forces or elements in the environment that posses martial capabilities but lack the hallmarks of conventional forces: recognisable orders of battle and doctrine; distinguishable identifiers; and clear military aims. They may include criminal gangs, insurgent groups and radical sectarian groups and private militias. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-3 and 2-4.

53.   All doctrine developed within NATO is ratified by most member nations, a limited number of nations take the lead in doctrine development. These are namely the US, UK, The Netherlands and Canada. This is portrayed in the numerous publication custodial responsibilities of these nations. See publication listings at http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm.

54.   American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand Armies' (ABCA) Program. *ABCA Report 009 Report on the Continuum of* Operations. Roslynn, VA: 2005. Report on-line ; available from http://www.abca-armies.org/Private/Products.aspx?productid=150; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008. See also Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-11. Peacetime military engagement refers to those campaigns that seek long term development of other nations through a range of agencies. Peace support includes the full range of peace support campaigns often described along lines of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace making. This has been introduced to NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, Study Draft 1 (2008) [publication on-line]; available from; http://www.nsa.nato.int; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008. In addition to the four campaign themes is Limited Interventions which describe a major military deployment that is limited in scope and time, such as a disaster relief mission or the evacuation of nationals from a failing nation.

55.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-20 to 3-28. While offensive and defensive activities refer to combat activities, enabling activities are those that transition from one operation to another (withdrawal, relief-in-place, etc) and stability activities are defined as "tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order."

56.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-21 and 3-25.

57.   Stability operations include: security and control; assistance to governance; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; governance and reconstruction; and assistance to other agencies. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-28.

58.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations - Final Draft July 2007*
(Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-15. The UK uses the same terminology and a similar definition. See United Kingdom.
Ministry of Defence. *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4-05 The Comprehensive Approach.* Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint
Doctrine and Concepts, 2006.

59.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 5-15. See also, United States. Department of Defense, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Final Approved Draft),*
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1–10.

60.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003. Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007*
(Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 1-4.

61.   United States. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations—With Change I (February 2008)*,
(Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2008), II-3. For complete details on the comprehensive approach, the rationale for its
creation and its supporting principles, see Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-1, 5-14 to 5-20.

62.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 6-17. See also, United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 7-06 Incorporating and Extending
the UK Military Effects-Based Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006) 2-7 and 3-6.
Note that UK doctrine is considering the change of "decisive points" to the term "supporting effects" in order to reflect an effects-based
approach to planning and operations.

63.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 7-06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-
Based Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006), 3-6.

64.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine* (Ottawa: 2007), 4-21. See also,
Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 6-19 to 6-21 and 6-35. Logical lines of operation are discussed at length in: United States, Department of Defense,
Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 5-3.

65.   Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Stackpole Books, 1971), 49–54.
See also, Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 157.

66.   This expanded interpretation is discussed in detail in Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000
Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-74 to 5-80.

67.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 5-21. See also, United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 1-05 The UK Military Effects-Based
Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2005), 1-1. UK doctrine defines EBAO in similar terms:
'the way of thinking and specific processes that, together, enable both the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within
a CA [Comprehensive Approach] and the realisation of strategic outcomes. See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence.
Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 7-06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach (Shrivenham, UK: Director
General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006), 1-3.

68.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 5-21 to 5-24, and 6-17.

69.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine*
(NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 1-11.

70.   Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk—Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Stability*
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), 64.

71.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 5-31. Also taken from discussions in November 2006 with Colonel Richard Iron, UK Army, UK Liaison Officer to NATO
Allied Command Transformation.

72.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing
Office, 2007), 5-32. Because EBAO is a philosophy, it may be applied to all levels of command. See as well, United Kingdom. Ministry
of Defence. *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 7-06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach* (Shrivenham, UK:
Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006) 1-7 and 1-8.

73.   American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program. *ABCA Report Number 018, Capability Group Act 003,
Information Operations Project Team.* Washington, USA: Roslynn, VA: 2006. Publication on-line; available from
http://www.abca-armies.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008. See Annex A.

74.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine*
(NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), Lexicon–9. This generally reflects the various definitions that vary slightly across NATO nations.

75.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP) – 3.10 NATO Military Doctrine
for Information Operations—Ratification Draft* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 1–7. See also Department of National Defence,
B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007 (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-47 to 5-49. See also
American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program. *ABCA Report Number 018, Capability Group Act 003,
Information Operations Project Team.* Washington, USA: Roslynn, VA: 2006. Publication on-line; available from
http://www.abca-armies.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008.

76.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-54. Some nations do not consider CIMIC or public affairs (media operations) under the construct of Information Operations and influence activities, but do consider them to be closely related and considered together with influence activities. See American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program. *ABCA Report Number 018, Capability Group Act 003, Information Operations Project Team*. Washington, USA: Roslynn, VA: 2006. Publication on-line; available from http://www.abca-armies.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008. See also United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence,*Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-80 Information Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2002), 2-4 to 2-5.

77.   In this example of psychological operations and public affairs, psychological operations would have the military crafting and issuing the message regarding the opening of new schools and direct it towards specific audiences. Public affairs would simply facilitate local and international media coverage of the event.

78.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-47.

79.   An excellent example may be taken from the Kenyan Mau Mau campaign. In this case, security measures taken to deny insurgents the ability to steal food from farms caused some farms to loose as much as 25% of their production. Although initially resisted, a sound communications plan properly that explained the reason for the measures ensured that farmers "co-operated loyally." In other words, they were convinced of the legitimacy of both the campaign and the restrictive measures. See Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 100.

80.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-61.

81.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007*. (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-2 to 5-10.

82.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007*. (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-11.

83.   Comprehensive Operations are defined as, "the deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects." See, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-11. This concept is very similar to the UK developmental doctrine of Joint Action, comprising influence activities and fires. See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 1-07 Joint Action* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007).

84.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 1-07 Joint Action* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2. See also, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-17.

85.   No negative connotation should be assumed in the use of the term "target audiences." Private businesses use the term as well. Within a military context, the use of influence activities on friendly audiences simply seek to ensure that perceptions are developed through clear understandings based on truthful information. Such activities are used in a defensive manner to counter such things as enemy misinformation. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-7.

86.   Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London, UK: Penguin, 2006), 404.

87.   Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century—Future Warfare* (London, UK: Orion Books Ltd, 2005), 24. This is also based on discussions on 11 April 2008 with Mr. Neil Chuka, strategic analyst for Defence Research and Development Canada, who has studied the recent build-up of conventional arms and doctrines amongst South American nations.

88.   Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century—Future Warfare* (London, UK: Orion Books Ltd, 2005), 376. See also Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk—Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Stability* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), 93.

89.   George R. Vickers, "U.S. Military Strategy and the Vietnam War." Chapter 6 in *The Vietnam War—Vietnamese and American Perspectives*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), 115.

90.   Canada. Department of National Defence. *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-2.

91.   As stated in US joint doctrine, this inclusion has resulted from recent "extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations." See United States. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations—With Change I (February 2008)*, (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2008), II-1. Legitimacy, as a noun derivative of legitimate, is defined as, "conforming to the law or to rules" and, the ability "to be defended with logic or justification." See Concise Oxford Dictionary, ed 10. This second definition will be used throughout this paper unless otherwise stated.

92.   The term "legitimate" is defined in terms of being able to be defended through logic and justification. Thus if one can justify an action or set of actions (as in a campaign) in the perceptions of an observer, then the action or set of actions will be viewed as being legitimate. See Concise Oxford Dictionary 11th ed.

93.   United States. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations—With Change I (February 2008)*, (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2008), A-4 to A-5. This precaution against bestowing a sense of legitimacy on undeserving indigenous administrations reflects one of the failures of Vietnam that is, commitment to a government that was highly corrupt and lacking of any sense of legitimacy. See James S. Olson, ed., *Dictionary of the Vietnam War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 449.

94.   Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), 146–149. See also, Robert D. Kaplan, "Unconventional Wisdom." *The Wall Street Journal*. 10 April 2008. Journal on-line; available from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120778343299903223.html; Intenet; accessed 14 April 2008.

95.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 1-22.

96.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-2.

97.   Recent examples of insurgents seeking to undermine the will of populations supporting another nation's government include the March 2004 terrorist bombs on trains in Spain that likely affected the outcome of national elections and the sudden withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, and the killing by an Afghan suicide bomber on 18 September 2006, the same day that Parliament re-opened for a new session. Both these actions likely sought to convince the targeted audiences, domestic populations in these cases, to the campaigns were not legitimate in terms of the costs being paid. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-4 and 5-18.

98.   For example, timely issue of media releases and the quick reparation of collateral damages will undermine the propaganda of the insurgent seeking to attack the credibility and legitimacy of the campaign.

99.   Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operational Planning Process—Change 2*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 2-8. It is unfortunate that the text has used the word "apply." Effects are in fact results of activities and therefore are created, not applied. This does not however significantly detract from the meaning of the text.

100.   If, for example, a campaign objective is to build a responsible police force, a perception that this is indeed a legitimate objective and is being achieved in a legitimate fashion will lead to broad support amongst the populace.

101.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50 Peace Support Operations* (Northwood, UK: Permanent Joint Headquarters, 1998), i. Note that this publication was written and published by the then-newly established Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ) vice a doctrine writing centre. This likely reflected the immediate need of the users and the new prominence of a joint HQ as a force employer.

102.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50 Peace Support Operations*. (Northwood, UK: Permanent Joint Headquarters, 1998), 4-3 to 4-4.

103.   The term Peace Support Operation (PSO) is synonymous with the concept of a peace support campaign. It uses the term "operation" in a colloquial sense.

104.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-10.

105.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-11. Note that the constituent elements of a society may also be described as a set of environmental systems: political; military; economic; social (including culture and religion); infrastructure; and informational (PMESII systems). This belief eventually led to the development of the Comprehensive Approach.

106.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-10.

107.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-11.

108.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-13.

109.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-14.

110.   Responsibility to Protect doctrine is based on the concept that sovereignty is a right and a responsibility and that when nations are unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the welfare of their populations, the international community has a responsibility to intervene. It has yet to be formally implemented. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.

111.   As illustrated in the previous section in the discussion of COIN doctrine, the perceptions and thus support of populations as centres of gravity are vital to campaign success.

112.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-00 Counter-Insurgency Operations–Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-3. As cited in this manual, terrorist bombings in Spain in 2005 were timed to alter the outcome of national elections and encourage the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.

113.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-14, 2-17 and 2-19.

114.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 2-17 and 2-18.

115.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 3-2.

116.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 3-2.

117.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 3-3.

118.   Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 177.

119.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 3-4. This detail does miss the point however, that the rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict are not the only sources of legitimacy in the use of force. Even in circumstances where the use of force may be permitted, it may not be seen as justified and thus legitimate by various audiences of concern. Despite this advice, experienced commanders will know that legitimacy can be actually undermined if mandated limits on force is applied when situations clearly demand, on moral grounds, the use of protective force, even if not formally sanctioned by the mandate. Clearly, the inhabitants of Bosnia and much of the world did not see much legitimacy and Campaign Authority in the failure of military forces to protect UN declared safe havens and civilians in general during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.

120.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 3-8 to 3-10 and 4-20.

121.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 4-7.

122.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 4-28.

123.   There are a number of claims as to the origins of the phrase "hearts and minds" however, it is generally understood to refer to affecting perceptions and understanding (minds) in order to affect will (hearts) and gain support for a campaign. See Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-00 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

124.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 5-3 to 5-4.

125.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 5-27.

126.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 5-5.

127.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 5-29.

128.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50, 2nd Edition The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), 5-27 and 5-28. It should be noted that some nations like the UK consider media operations (public affairs) to be closely related to, but separate from Information Operations, although they are considered, planned and discussed together.

129.   The British military uses Joint Discussion Notes to introduce doctrinal concepts before they are formally incorporated into doctrine.

130.   It classifies irregular threats and activity as:: insurgent groups; endemic criminality; sectarian or private militias, warring ethnic groups; and terrorism. See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), v, 1-1, 1-7.

131.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-1. Human security involves the economic, food, environmental personal, community and political security of a populace. The UK reference to it stems from the UN Human Development Report 1994, *New Dimensions of Human Security*.

132.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-4. Note that this concept draws authority from recently developed Responsibility to Protect doctrine. See International Research Council, *Responsibility to Protect—The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, Canada: 2001).

133.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-6.

134. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-7.

135. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-7, 3-3.

136. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-4.

137. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-1, 3-2, 3-4. Routine security tasks in many campaigns, particularly peace support and COIN are often termed "framework activities."

138. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-00 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007) and Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations–Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

139. This is termed Security Sector Reform (SSR). See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-6 to 3-9. Within UK doctrine, Security Secure Reform includes the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 3-07 The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 1-2.

140. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-7.

141. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-9, 3-10.

142. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-8.

143. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 3-17 to 3-18.

144. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 2-3.

145. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development and Doctrine, 2005), 20-22. As a reflection of the currency of this publication, see similarities with, American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand Armies' (ABCA) Program. *ABCA Report 009 Report on the Continuum of* Operations, (Roslynn, VA: 2005); Report on-line ; available from http://www.abca-armies.org/Private/Products.aspx?productid=150; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008.

146. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-90 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006), iii. CIMIC in a UK context is defined in NATO terms: The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the [NATO] Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. UK doctrine adds that provides for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange between military forces and in-theatre civil actors. It thereby assists the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with the achievement of the military mission and maximises the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission.

147. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-90 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006), 1-3.

148. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-90 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2006), 4-9.

149. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 5-00 Joint Operations Planning* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Concepts and Doctrine, 2004), 2-2.

150. Given that this was produced at the same time as the CIMIC publication, this omission may have been intended. At clearly indicated earlier, Campaign Authority can be build through the use of influence activities, a constituent part of Information Operations. They reluctance of public affairs personnel to be associated with Information Operations in general, and other capabilities such as psychological operations in particular, may have caused the authors to avoid the topic. Western nations differ in what is classified as Information Operations, but all agree that if not part of the construct, public affairs or media operations are closely related and considered in the same planning process. See American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program. *ABCA Report Number 018, Capability Group Act 003, Information Operations Project Team*. Washington, USA: Roslynn, VA: 2006. Publication on-line; available from http://www.abca-armies.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008.

151. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Review of AFM Vol 1, Pt 10 Counterinsurgency Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, May 2006). Internal document obtained from SO1 Land Operations DCDC.

152. See United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Army Field Manual, Vol 1, Part 10, Counterinsurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development and Doctrine, 2001), A-2-2.

153.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 1-05 The UK Military Effects-Based Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2005), 1-2. This publication does not claim any authority itself in the discussion of Campaign Authority, but in a footnote refers the reader to UK Peace Support doctrine.

154.   United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 2-07 Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach*, (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine, 2007), 2-7.

155.   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. *A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq*. Unpublished draft. Article on-line; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/orha.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008. The ORHA was redesigned as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) late April 2003 and Gen(ret'd) Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer in May of that year. This document was never formally produced.

156.   Phrases and wording such as "Her Majesty's Government" in reference to the UK government reveal the British role and influence in developing this draft document.

157.   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. *A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq*. Unpublished draft. Article on-line; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/orha.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008.

158.   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. *A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq*. Unpublished draft. Article on-line; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/orha.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008.

159.   Stuart Gordon, "Myth Creation, Dysfunctional Organisation and that 'Nauseating Phrase': Hearts and Minds." Presentation to the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, 07 November 2005. Presentation on-line; available from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/conferences/presentations/Gordon%20Staurt.ppt; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008. The author of this presentation is a lecturer at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

160.   Stuart Gordon, "COIN in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the U.S. Government Workshop, November 7-8, 2005." Presentation delivered at Harvard University to the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy and US Army War College, Presentation on-line; available from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/COIN_Report_Nov2005.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 March 2008.

161.   Although Gordon's presentation occurred at a workshop was sponsored in part by the US Army War College and attended by major personalities in US doctrine development, such as Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl and Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Commander of the US. Army Combined Arms Centre, the concept of Campaign Authority has yet to appear in U.S. doctrine.

162.   Wing Commander Harry Kemsley, "Combat Air Power in Irregular Warfare: Operational Utility, the Lack of Narrative and Risk of Strategic Failure," *Royal Air Force Air Power Review* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 21.

163.   Wing Commander Harry Kemsley, "Combat Air Power in Irregular Warfare: Operational Utility, the Lack of Narrative and Risk of Strategic Failure," *Royal Air Force Air Power Review* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 41.

164.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-1.

165.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-2.

166.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-3.

167.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations - Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-2.

168.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations - Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-2.

169.   Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations - Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-2.

170.   Other circumstances may include situations of extreme human suffering and thus intervention under a claim to the previously mentioned Responsibility to Protect doctrine. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

171.   The *Front de liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) was an insurgent organisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s that sought to gain independence for Quebec through the use of violence. It resulted in the FLQ Crisis of October 1970 during which most members were arrested. After conviction and expulsion from the country, they were eventually repatriated.

172.   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, *A Unified Mission Plan for Post Hostilities Iraq*. Unpublished draft. Article on-line; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/orha.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2008.

173.   Colonel T.X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St Paul, USA: Zenith Press, 2004), 65. The author gives a number of examples in his publication including the actions of the North Vietnamese leadership.

174.   United States. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), A-4. This publication places legitimacy on par with the principles of war in terms of joint operations.

175.   Mining companies are a useful comparison to military operations. They routinely operate in foreign cultures, they bring with them a significant footprint, have the potential to create lasting effects and are not necessarily perceived, at least initially, in a positive light. Whilst the author of this paper would never equate military campaigning with private enterprise, a brief examination as to how businesses deal with the perceptions of populations in difficult circumstances and foreign lands may provide some insight.

176.   INMET Mining, *Code of Business Conduct and Ethics*, (October 2007), [booklet on-line]; available from http://www.inmetmining.com/Theme/Inmet/files/pdf/2007_English_Code%20of%20Business%20Conduct%20and%20Ethics.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008.

177.   This section is based upon discussions with Mr. Jochen Tilk, President and Chief Operating Officer INMET Mining Corporation, and Dr. R. Craig Ford, Vice President, Safety, Environmental and Community Affairs, INMET Mining Corporation, Toronto, Canada, 27 January 2008.

178.   The levels of command are synonymous with levels of war: the tactical; the operational; and, the strategic.

179.   John A. Schutz, "The Disaster of Fort Ticonderoga: The Shortage of Muskets During the Mobilization of 1758," *The Huntington Library Quarterly,* 14, no. 3 (May 1951): 307-315; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 19 Mar 2008.

180.   The campaign's aim and the chances of success reflect the aspects of "right intent" and likelihood of success, both elements of the Just Cause portion of Just War theory. See Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace—An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 90–95.

181.   This concept of assessing and creating strategic Campaign Authority across disparate and displaced groups reflects recently adjusted concepts of an operational commander's area of interest being expanded through cultural and social linkages beyond traditional geographic, spatial and temporal limits. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 4-12 to 4-13. Area of Interest is defined as: "the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto." See NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2007).

182.   See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4-05 The Comprehensive Approach* (Shrivenham, UK: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, 2006), 1-5; and Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-14. The Comprehensive Approach may to all levels of command but is particularly applicable at the operational level.

183.   For example, see Eric Lerhe, "Is the 3D Construct at Work in Kandahar or are We Kidding Ourselves," *The Dispatch—Newsletter of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2006) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newsletterfall2006.html; Internet; accessed 03 April 2008. See also, Major Michel-Henri St-Louis, "The Strategic Advisory Team: A new capability in nation building for the Government of Canada—A new role for the Canadian Armed Forces," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme Masters of Defence Studies Research Project, 2007), 44.

184.   Christie Blatchford, "'Bureaucratic Jealousy' Threatens Military Team," *Globe and Mail*, 14 January 208, A-7.

185.   Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity," [Article on-line]; available from Air University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2008.

186.   Karl E. Meyer, "The Peacemaker of the Pashtun Past," *The New York Times*, 7 December 2001 [article on-line]; available from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2008.

187.   Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War—The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754 to 1766* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 200), 270, 274–279.

188.   Perceptions of government legitimacy amongst the peasantry of Vietnam for example were most concerned with the local conditions of their village and land reform along traditional, ancestral lands. See James S. Olson, ed., *Dictionary of the Vietnam War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 430.

189.   James S. Olson, ed., *Dictionary of the Vietnam War*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 92 and 397.

190.   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)—3.10 NATO Military Doctrine for Information Operations—Ratification Draft* (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 1-7. See also Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-50.

191.   Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*, RAND Corporation—National Defence Research Institute. Prepared for United States Joint Forces Command (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 23. See also, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003. Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 8-21.

192.   Thomas Harding, "British Brigadier Attacks America's John Wayne Generals," *Daily Telegraph*, April, 19, 2006. This British commentary cited American Hollywood-like, shoulder-holster wearing personas with loud voices, wrap-around sunglasses, talking bravado that together actually undermined good relations with local populations.

193.   Major R.C. Rankin, LdSH, Directorate of Army Doctrine 4, in conversation with the author, 19 March 2008. The failure to create credibility at the tactical level, mainly through a failure to meet expectations of groups and individuals will as well undermine Campaign Authority. Operational level plans to develop infrastructure and governance will loose their legitimacy if, at the tactical levels, the plans are not completely implemented to meet the created expectations. Even if promised schools are built, they will only deliver expectations, and thus create credibility and in turn legitimacy, if they are provided with supplies, teachers and the security to operate.

194.   The importance of the profile and posture of tactical level forces has been emphasised in even some of the earliest doctrine dealing with campaigns focusing on the role of populations. See Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967.), 177.

195.   James S. Olson, ed., *Dictionary of the Vietnam War*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 398.

196.   George R. Vickers, "U.S. Military Strategy and the Vietnam War," Chapter 6 in *The Vietnam War—Vietnamese and American Perspectives* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 124. See also .James S. Olson, ed., *Dictionary of the Vietnam War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 300 and 449.

197.   David Frum, "5-Year Anniversary of the Iraq War: Success Finally Seems Possible," *The National Post*. 20 March 2008. Article on-line; available from http://network.nationalpost.com/np; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

198.   David Frum, "5-Year Anniversary of the Iraq War: Success Finally Seems Possible," *The National Post*. 20 March 2008. Article on-line; available from http://network.nationalpost.com/np; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

199.   Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace—An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 87–97. Some doctrines omit the condition of "right intention" as it is subjective and is thus distinct from cause and justification in the first instance. However, since a perception of legitimacy is subjective itself, a mandate based on a "right intention" or just end state will support claims to legitimacy and thus increase Campaign Authority.

200.   General Sir Peter de la Billiere, *Storm Command,* (Glasgow, UK : HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 304. See also Damian J. McCarthy and Susan A. Medlin, "Two Hats for the Joint Force Commander," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 25 (Summer 2000): 91–98; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

201.   Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace—An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 90. See also, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, *Storm Command* (Glasgow, UK : HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 304–305. This proportionality would have been in relation to the aim of the mandate, that was, to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

202.   BBC News World Edition, "EU Allies United Against Iraq War," dated 22 January 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2683409.stm; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008. See also BBC News World Edition, "'Million' March Against Iraq War," dated 16 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2765041.stm; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008. See also, Human and Constitutional Rights, "The War on Iraq: Legal Issues," http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/Iraq.html; Internet; accessed 21 April 2008.

203.   International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.

204.   International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.

205.   Canada. Office of the Judge Advocate General, "Charter of the United Nations—1945, Article 51," in *Collection of Documents on the Law of Armed Conflict, 2005 ed.* Edited by Directorate of Law Training, 66. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005. See also Department of National Defence, Office of the Judge Advocate General, B-G-005-027/AF-021 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), 13-1. Based on interpretations of Hague Convention V, Articles 5 and 10, Hague Convention XIII, Article 25, and the San Remo Manual on Internatinal Law applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1954).

206.   Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan *Final Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 32.

207.   Canada. Office of the Judge Advocate General, "Charter of the United Nations—1945." In *Collection of Documents on the Law of Armed Conflict, 2005 ed.* Edited by Directorate of Law Training, 62–72 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), Chapter VII, Article 42.

208.   Angus Reid Global Monitor, "Canadians Reject Extending Afghan Mission," http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/canadians_reject_extending_afghan_mission1/; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008. The Afghanistan report was released in Jan 2008. From Jul 2007 to February 2008, support for extending the mission moved from 16% of Canadian polled to 36%. Overall, the poll showed that 70% of Canadian agreed with the recommendations of the report but the majority also felt that the government had failed to properly explain the mission. On 13 Mar 08, the Canadian Parliament voted 198–77 to extend Canada's mission until 2011. See Angus Reid Global Monitor, "Canadians Reject Extending Afghan Mission," http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/30271/canadians oppose_extension_to_afghan_mission; Internet; accessed 22 April 2008.

209.   Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan *Final Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 76.

210.   Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 1-3.

211. Iraq for example used a narrative to justify its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 based on historical land claims and charges of Kuwait stealing oil and driving down the price of oil, all of which threatened Iraq's security. Tom Cooper, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: 1991," [article on-line]; available from Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Data Base, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_213.shtml; Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

212. Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland, *Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrist Approach to the 'War on Terror' for the Australian Army*, (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2006), 37.

213. Jonathon Kay, "The Freedom Doctrine, RIP," *National Post*, 22 January 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://www.nationalpost.com; Internet; accessed 22 January 2008. See also, Daniel J. Mahoney, "Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy," *The Intercollegiate Review* Fall 2006: 3-13; http://www.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 23 January 2008.

214. Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-22.

215. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Perseus Books, L.L.C.; 1977), 97–101. See also, Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), 146–147.

216. Damian J. McCarthy and Susan A. Medlin, "Two Hats for the Joint Force Commander," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 25 (Summer 2000): 91–98; http://www.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

217. de la Billiere, General Sir Peter, *Storm Command*, (Glasgow, UK : HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 304.

218. Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007).

219. Jus in bello refers to the just conduct in war and in the main details who can be attacked and by what means. It has been codified in the Laws of Armed Conflict. See Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace—An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 100, 228.

220. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Perseus Books, L.L.C.; 1977), 322. See also, James S. Olson, editor, *Dictionary of the Vietnam War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 293–294.

221. Taken from discussions between the author and Major R. King, The RCR, second-in command, 2 RCR Battle Group, Task Force Afghanistan, January to August 2007.

222. David Frum, "5-Year Anniversary of the Iraq War: Success Finally Seems Possible," *The National Post*, 20 March 2008 [article on-line]; available from http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/achrive/2008/02/20/; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008. See also, David Frum, "Big News Out of Basra," *The National Post*, 05 April 2008.

223. Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), 144.

224. Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 33–36.

225. Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-20, 3-28 and 7-90.

226. Measures of performance ask the question, "Are things being done right?" Measures of effectiveness ask the question, "Are the right things being done in order to achieve the desired effect?" Measures of effectiveness measure progress towards the desired end state. See Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-38.

227. In 2003 falling the fall of the Iraq regime, 76% of Americans supported the war effort in Iraq. In April 2008, after much frustration in reaching the expected end state, American opinion had reversed itself and 64% felt that the war had not been worth fighting. USA Today.com, "Support for Iraq War at Lowest Level," http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-03-iraq-poll_x.htm; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008. See also, Angus-Reid Global Monitor, "Most Americans Disappointed Over Iraq War," http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/most_americans_disappointed_over_iraq-war/; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008.

228. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 1-3. Indeed, the grievances may be the motivating factor behind populations as centres of gravity. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 6-12. In the opinion of some analysts, the failure of coalition efforts to address the needs and grievances of the Afghan populace has decreased campaign support and increased support for the insurgency. See, The Senlis Council, Security and Development Policy Group, "Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a New Course to Complete the Mission," http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/charting_new_mission; Internet; accessed October 2007.

229. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-15. The Comprehensive Approaches utilises all necessary elements of power working together to reach shared end states across all elements of an environment.

230. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 7-96.

231. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-20 to 3-21. The point is made here that in attempting to address issues such as corruption commanders must have sympathy for the situation at hand. For example, there is a distinct difference between an underpaid school teacher charging parents a fee for free, state education and an armed policeman extorting payments at a checkpoint.

232. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-26.

233. Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 16.

234. Murray Brewster, "Canada Reluctant to Support Afghan Islamic Schools," *The Canadian Press*, 20 March 2008, [article on-line]; available from http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/War_Terror/2008/03/20/506331-cp.html; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008.

235. John A. Nagl, "A Battalion's Worth of Good Ideas," *The New York Times*, 2 April 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/opinion/02nagl.html; Internet; accessed 02 April 2008.

236. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 7-92.

237. Davis, Jeff. "Watching from Afar: Afghan-Canadians Perspectives on the War in Afghanistan." *Capital news Online*, 20 October 2006. http://www.carleton.ca/jmc/cnews/20102006/n2.shtml; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008. This article does not draw a direct correlation between Afghan-Canadian support and general Canadian support, but does highlight the general support for a combination of both military and development operations in the wake of the major offensive of Op MEDUSA, late 2006.

238. An October 2007 poll in Afghanistan showed that 79% (81% in Kandahar) of respondents felt that the campaign was "going in the right direction" and the majority felt their situation had improved under the coalition effort. In the eight weeks following the release of this poll, support in Canada for extending the mission increased by 12% as did the opinion that the mission had been better explained. See CBC News. "Poll: What Afghans Think—Environics Poll in Partnership with the CBC" October 2007. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/afghan-survey2007.html; Internet; accessed 23 April 2008. See also, Angus-Reid Global Monitor. "Canadians Reject Extending Afghan Mission." http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/canadians_reject_extending_afghan_mission1/; Internet; accessed 20 April 2008.

239. David Frum, "5-Year Anniversary of the Iraq War: Success Finally Seems Possible," *The National Post*. 20 March 2008. Article on-line; available from http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/achrive/2008/02/20/; Internet; accessed 20 March 2008.

240. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 5-14. As discussed above, the Comprehensive Approach brings all the necessary elements of power and agencies together to address all the applicable systems within an environment in order to achieve an enduring end-state.

241. The use of public affairs must be viewed as distinct from psychological operations. Public affairs should not be considered as a purposeful influence of opinions for one's own gain, but only as a means to ensure members of the public and one's own forces are well informed and knowledgeable regarding the campaign.

242. Department of National Defence, *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 8-5 and 8-7.

243. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO Standardisation Agency, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)–01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine*, (NATO Standardization Agency: 2007), 2-26. See also, United States. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 2006), A-4.

244. "Offensive Action" is considered to be a principle of war. See Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Operations—Final Draft July 2007* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2007), 3-7.

245. Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 66–67.

246. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St Paul, USA: Zenith Press, 2004), Introduction.

247. First Samuel 17:45.

248. Although many artists' renditions of the battle scene show Goliath well ahead of the Philistine troops, Scripture notes that Goliath was with the other Philistines in their battle line. First Samuel 17:48.

249. The Philistine Army immediately capitulated and fled once Goliath had been killed. First Samuel 17:51.

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