In 2003, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada was published and distributed across the Canadian Forces (CF). In 2005, I promulgated Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations. Together, these publications represent the theoretical and doctrinal foundations upon which to build competence for effective military leadership. I am greatly encouraged by the overwhelmingly positive response that these doctrinal publications have garnered from military practitioners and scholars both nationally and internationally. The next logical step is to supplement these foundation documents with two applied manuals, one with a focus on leading people and one that addresses the practical side of institutional leadership. This manual, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution, provides guidance to all senior officers and non-commissioned officers who serve in key appointments, their staffs, and others with the abilities and commitment to contribute to CF strategy. Leading the Institution is designed to provide assistance to those operating, or aspiring to work, at that level. It offers direction for one to attain the knowledge, leader capacities, skills and professionalism required for becoming an effective institutional leader.

Arguably, this has never been more important than it is today. The dynamic and ever-changing security environment, with its complexity, chaos and lethality, necessitates a transformation of the CF into a force that is more relevant, responsive and effective. This transformation will ensure that our personnel deployed on operations at home and abroad can succeed in their assigned missions. It requires outstanding leaders at all ranks and all levels — tactical, operational and strategic. However, nowhere is leadership more important than at the institutional level, the focal domain for the nexus of organizational effectiveness and professional effectiveness. As such, CF members have discovered, sometimes through painful experiences, that leading at this institutional level demands a highly refined set of capabilities, knowledge and perspectives.

As with all sound doctrine, Leading the Institution is not merely a set of checklists and general principles. This doctrinal manual provides in-depth guidance upon which institutional leaders can build and shape their requisite skills and techniques. Furthermore, it offers guidance on how best to direct, enable and motivate others while steering the CF in the successful achievement of its very wide range of tasks and maintaining its professional ethos and relevance in this ever-changing world.

This manual should be used extensively by all members of the CF. Importantly, I expect all senior leaders, whether engaged in formal courses or in independent self-development, to study, incorporate and apply the concepts, approaches and techniques contained in Leading the Institution. In the end, the success of the CF depends on it.

General Rick Hillier
Chief of the Defence Staff
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The Canadian Forces has a particular responsibility for the ordered application of force on behalf of the Government of Canada. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is accountable exclusively to the Government for this function. In this regard, the CF and the Department of National Defence (DND) contribute collectively to the implementation of national defence policy in Canada and are responsible separately and collectively, through the CDS and the Deputy Minister (DM), respectively, to the minister of national defence (MND). This shared responsibility creates unique challenges and opportunities for leaders at the institutional level.

Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution addresses these challenges and opportunities through its focus on the role of leading at an institutional level within the CF. It is an applied manual that is directed toward those officers and senior non-commissioned officers who, by virtue of their rank, situation, position and/or formal responsibilities, have significant influence on the CF as an institution and on its members, the development or implementation of CF policy, the integration of DND/CF policy, and the representation of the CF within the domestic and international security environments.

Leadership at the tactical level is primarily about accomplishing missions and tasks through direct influence on others — that is, leading people. Institutional leadership, on the other hand, takes place predominantly in higher headquarters at the operational, or theatre, level and at the strategic level of the CF. There is a predominant focus on indirect influence on organizational and campaign performance. An institutional leader is not necessarily synonymous with a senior leader. Although senior leaders do have unique responsibilities for leading the institution, members in staff positions who assist and influence senior officers, or liaise with external agencies on behalf of a senior appointment, also play a significant role in leading the institution.

The challenge in leading the institution is that you have to take all of your operational skills and you have to utilize them, but in a very different way than you would on the bridge of a warship, or in the command vehicle in the field, or in the fighter aircraft.

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck

As CF members progress in their careers, it is more and more likely that they will have some responsibility for leading at the institutional level. At senior levels, within the officer and non-commissioned member corps, leading at the institutional level will increasingly become a predominant focus of responsibility and accountability. As institutional leaders and stewards of the profession of arms in Canada, senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers ensure that the CF fulfils its organizational and professional responsibilities to Canada. They use their

Introduction
power and influence to ensure the continued development of the institution, its culture and subcultures, and its future leaders. This manual provides guidance to all institutional leaders and provides particular assistance to senior CF leaders in attaining the necessary skills, knowledge and orientations to become effective institutional leaders.

*Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* is one in the collection of CF doctrinal publications that include:

- *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*;
- *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*;
- *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*; and
- *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People*.

These publications form part of a closely linked series. *Duty with Honour*, published in 2003, serves as a defining and guiding document for the profession of arms; it provides the foundation for the development and implementation of values-based leadership in the CF. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, published in 2005, builds on this foundation; as a companion publication to *Duty with Honour*, it incorporates the key ideas on Canadian military professionalism into CF leadership doctrine. Similarly, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, also published in 2005, provides the theories and intellectual foundation underpinning the doctrinal leadership manual.

Stemming from these conceptual manuals are two applied manuals, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* and this volume, both of which will provide practical guidance for CF leaders. Specifically, this manual is aimed at institutional leaders in both operational and staff appointments.

Although the definition of effective CF leadership — “directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success” — remains the same for all CF leaders, the responsibility for leading the institution is different from that for leading people at the tactical level. Those who lead at the institutional level continue to lead people, but predominantly are involved in activities, and contribute to outcomes that have an impact on all members of the CF at the strategic level or on the effective performance of operational levels of command such as Canada Command. Leaders of the institution, whether employed in staff positions or in operational settings, are responsible for creating the overall conditions for the success of the CF through development and implementation of internal strategies and policies; stewardship of the profession of arms itself, including member well-being; as well as establishment of effective external relationships.

As a point of departure, the term *institution* in this manual refers to a formally established organization with a specific professional function to perform consistently over time. It has legal or quasi-legal standing as well as permanence and, therefore, a history. These parameters generate a culture particular to the institution in question. Institutions exist across the spectrum of social activity and private and public organizations. Most institutions are not monolithic blocs but often contain major sub-components “nested” within the overall institution. This is certainly the case with the CF, which incorporates navy, army and air force sub-institutions as well as operational-level or theatre-level organizations.

Effective institutional leadership is critical to the well-being and success of the organization and the profession. It is at this level that leaders exert influence in ensuring a synergy of organizational and professional effectiveness, resulting in overall
institutional effectiveness. In ensuring organizational effectiveness, institutional leaders are charged with overseeing system or theatre capabilities and performance and making major policy, system and organizational changes designed to ensure the institution’s continued strength, relevancy and viability. In ensuring professional effectiveness, institutional leaders exert direct influence on professional standards, norms and values. They are responsible for creating and articulating vision as well as establishing the necessary strategies and sourcing the requisite resources to ensure its achievement. Whether in a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) type of environment, or in operations, such as establishing a formation within the context of a national theatre operation or deployment or within a coalition setting, the demands remain the same. This often translates into changing institutional subcultures and initiating, shaping and influencing enduring change. In addition, it always entails creating the conditions and the conducive environment necessary for tactical success and overall CF effectiveness — or, simply put, leading the institution.

Although institutional leaders are tasked with the higher responsibilities of leading the institution at large, the importance of their personal influence, example and direct communication is undeniable. The greater the institutional change or transformation desired, the greater the need for senior leaders to put a personal face on the modifications required. Senior leaders use leadership, management and command to achieve this. However, institutional leadership per se should not be seen as merely a command function. For example, the CDS, Chief of the Maritime Staff, Chief of the Land Staff, and Chief of the Air Staff are commanders who have authority; these commanders also manage and lead. In addition, this applies to the operational level commanders in the CF. The Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) is not a commander; however, the incumbent does have position authority. The Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) manages and also leads. Senior staff officers and some senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), as a result of appointments they hold and positions they occupy, also fill an institutional leader role. The CF Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) and the various command CWOs and chief petty officers, for example, have significant responsibilities as institutional leaders.

The requirement for strong institutional leadership has never been greater. The security environment is complex, uncertain, volatile and ambiguous, demanding a strong and vibrant profession of arms and a robust defence institution. As a result, the CF has embarked upon dramatic and continuing transformation to ensure that the organization and the profession of arms are capable of carrying out national defence policy. This transformation has necessitated moving the CF from a Cold War military model to one that has a fully integrated and unified approach to operations. It also entails transforming the command structure, changing how the CF organizes itself, and enhancing its ability to deploy on domestic or international missions. Inherent in this transformation is the continued ability to invest in the professional development of its members to ensure they have the skill sets, knowledge, professional attributes and military values required to operate in the constantly changing security environment, as well as the ability to co-ordinate, communicate and work with other government departments and coalition partners.

This is a tall order. To meet these challenges it will require CF institutional leaders who are capable of transforming the vision and CDS intent into concrete actions and policies that achieve the governmental and institutional objective. As with any radical change, the role of the institutional leader in developing and communicating the vision, creating a plan of action and executing that plan, with full
“buy into” by all members, is a Herculean task. This is more so the case in light of the numerous subgroups within the institution. In addition, the challenge to institutional leaders in navigating transformation through the stormy waters of change is not confined solely to NDHQ or garrison activity throughout Canada. Operations, particularly in the complex and dynamic security environment of today and tomorrow, will also tax institutional leaders. Whether creating or operating formations within a domestic context or a coalition setting internationally, CF senior leaders will be expected, and required, to demonstrate sound institutional leadership.

Undeniably, institutional leadership will be key to CF success. One of the greatest challenges will be balancing the inherent and systemic struggle between the competing priorities illustrated in Figure I.1. As role models of values-based leadership, institutional leaders always strive to achieve optimum balance and integration — CF effectiveness — across CF essential outcomes, specifically between the outcomes of Mission Success (the primary outcome), External Adaptability, Internal Integration, and Member Well-Being and Commitment (the three enabling outcomes).¹

The potential conflict is legion. For instance, the primacy of operations is beyond question; yet, mission completion will be set against maximizing force protection and keeping casualties to a minimum when Canada undertakes missions in dangerous regions. This, compounded by problems of operational tempo and quality of life for service personnel, will create continual tensions and trade-offs between outcomes. This is only one example. Similar conflict is inherent internally to each of the enabling outcomes. There will always be strain and competition externally and internally for resources, as well as tensions arising from policies and decisions that pit internal loyalties and subcultures (that is, uniform and civilian, regular and reserve, or respective environments) against one another. These dynamics — balancing and resolving competing outcomes — as well as simply maintaining an awareness of competing outcomes, will be

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¹ See Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 18–23.
essential for institutional success and the maintenance of internal, as well as external, trust and credibility.

Critical to meeting these challenges and helping to alleviate the tensions inherent in institutional leadership is the concept of military professional ideology. This ideology claims a specialized, discretionary and theory-based body of knowledge and a transcendental value that guides conduct and adjudicates how that knowledge is applied. The unique body of knowledge at the core of the profession of arms relates directly to conflict and war across the tactical, operational and strategic levels. For institutional leaders a key component is an understanding of policy making and civil-military relations. The transcendental value in question, in fact, the military ethos. Professional ideology, therefore, unifies members of the profession across branches and environments; it helps create a common culture, the CF culture, within which various subcultures are nested. Although military professional ideology applies to the military, it is worthy of study by our civilian colleagues in order for them to have a clear understanding of the nature and role of the military professional. In fact, it is the basis upon which trust, credibility and respect are built. Finally, professional ideology facilitates the resolution of conflicts among the outcomes described above. It demands the primacy of mission success, but it provides explicitly for the professional judgment necessary to make reasoned decisions in order to move forward amid conflicting demands.

Leading the Institution is designed to assist institutional leaders in meeting these significant challenges. In doing so, the manual is organized by chapters around three key themes: institutional effectiveness; the practical aspects of leading at the institutional level; and building institutional leadership. These themes are not discrete or linear. The manual presents, in practical terms, a series of interrelated and cyclical activities. It is the combined application of these imperatives by institutional leaders that ensures the effectiveness of the CF.

Section 1 establishes institutional effectiveness, the sum capacity of professional effectiveness and organizational effectiveness, as the framework for leading the institution. Chapter 1, “Stewarding the Profession,” addresses the profound responsibility that institutional leaders have for the professional effectiveness of the CF. As stewards of the profession, institutional leaders set and maintain a high standard of professional attributes, norms and values among all members of the CF — a level of professionalism that is essential to the effectiveness of the CF. Chapter 2 addresses organizational effectiveness. Through the lens of “Systems Thinking,” this chapter discusses the critical analyses and numerous processes that institutional leaders facilitate to ensure mutually enhancing, balanced and complementary outcomes within and across various systems and domains of the organization. Institutional effectiveness, through the role of the institutional leader as a military strategist, is discussed in Chapter 3, “Being a Military Strategist.” An effective military strategist integrates a deep understanding of the relationship between professional effectiveness and organizational effectiveness with an equally significant understanding of external strategic cultures and the role of a military professional.

In addressing the practical aspects of leading the institution, Section 2 opens with a discussion of the context within which institutional leaders lead. Chapter 4, “Working the Town,” provides practical guidance for negotiating the interdependence of the system of war and conflict represented by the CF and the structure and dimensions of the federal government represented in Ottawa. Annex A, “How Canada’s National Government Works,” provides important supplementary information to the
Leading the Institution is intended to be practical in the extent to which theory and concepts are combined with practical how-to guidance for leading the institution. As such, it is likely that readers will find themselves seeking more extensive explanations and additional information related to the material presented herein. Each chapter in the manual ends with a selected bibliography of scholarly literature that informed the development of the chapter and, therefore, is likely to provide useful additional reading. In addition, each chapter is substantively linked to previous CF doctrinal publications that will provide amplifying information on some of the themes and concepts discussed.

In the end, the challenges discussed in Leading the Institution can only be met by competent and dedicated institutional leaders, whether in command or staff appointments, in garrison or operational settings. Only through a sound understanding and continuous development of their professional and technical expertise, and cognitive, social and change capacities, as well as a solid comprehension and adherence to CF professional ideology, will current and future leaders be able to succeed. This applied manual is one specific tool designed to assist senior leaders in meeting the challenges that await them.

Chapter 5, “Creating a Vision and Leading Change,” describes the role of a vision in guiding change and discusses the processes involved in developing a vision that provides the CF with a sense of purpose and direction, thus generating motivation and commitment toward the goals represented within the vision. This chapter also offers a step-by-step guide to leading change, with particular attention to maintaining momentum and following through to ensure enduring change. While Chapter 5 is based upon the premise that enduring change happens through people (the members of the CF), Chapter 6, “Ensuring Member Well-Being and Commitment,” reinforces the paramount importance of people to the effectiveness of the CF. This chapter highlights the numerous responsibilities of institutional leaders in optimizing the complex relationship between the members of the profession, the CF and the people of Canada.

Section 3, the final section of the manual, provides a way ahead for meeting the challenges discussed thus far. Chapter 7, “Ensuring Effective Succession of Institutional Leadership,” deals directly with leadership development and the requirement to build institutional leadership capacity in the CF. Focusing on the relationship between the institutional leader and CF effectiveness, this chapter presents a professional development framework to act as a guide for institutional leader development in five core elements or capacity domains: expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities and professional ideology. Annex B, “Professional Development Framework,” adds detail to each of these core elements across leader development levels.

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Section 1
Institutional Effectiveness
Chapter 1
Stewarding the Profession

Understanding the Attributes of Professionalism ............................................. 5
Articulating and Promulgating Professional Ideology ........................................ 7
Aligning Culture with Professional Ideology: Connecting with the Internal Audience .................. 10
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The function of the profession of arms is the lawful, ordered application of military force at the direction of the government. This profound responsibility gives rise to the concept of the primacy of operations. It demands the highest standards of professionalism from all members. Ensuring that such standards are established and strengthened is a matter of stewardship and is certainly one of the most important roles for institutional leaders in the Canadian Forces. Given the inclusive nature of the profession of arms in Canada, stewardship is the responsibility of both officers and senior NCOs, serving in the regular and reserve forces. In addition, the profession is embedded in the CF and linked directly to the DND. Therefore, stewardship involves an inward orientation in order to strengthen and protect professional ideology, that set of beliefs and values that claims a specialized body of military knowledge and is anchored in the Canadian military ethos. This is a key factor in achieving internal integration and ensuring member well-being and commitment. Stewardship also involves an outward orientation in order to maintain the external adaptability necessary to anticipate and react to changes at the CF-DND interface, Canadian societal norms and values, and the ever-changing security environment and battlespace.

Stewardship, therefore, involves a high degree of intellectual agility. Institutions such as the CF itself, or those with which it interacts, do not remain static. As they evolve and change, institutional leaders guide the profession in a way that ensures that it remains agile, adapting rapidly to changing requirements. The profession must be relevant, vibrant and effective.

Governance of the CF and its many organizational entities is the responsibility of institutional leaders. Good governance involves both organizational functions and professional functions, the two elements of institutional effectiveness. Stewardship is a subset of governance whose province is maintaining professional effectiveness. In fact, institutional leaders, in their role of steward, need to be constantly vigilant that military professional
The military services are simultaneously professions and government bureaucracies. This dual nature — profession and bureaucracy — creates a challenging but healthy tension within all military institutions. However, measures of efficiency rank behind effectiveness as measures of success for professions.
Canadian military professionals understand that branch and environmental identities, while important and discrete, are moulded into a single identity symbolized by the CF. The promotion of a strong CF culture is necessary to support the development of strong, joint doctrine embedded in truly joint organizations. This serves to enhance CF identity. Above all, stewardship involves the dissemination of military professional ideology. Institutional leaders need to understand profoundly what it is, how to shape the environment so that it can flourish, and most importantly, how it can be threatened or eroded. In this area, stewards of the profession are true proselytizers.

**CASE STUDY — Production of Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada**

Stewards react quickly and decisively to institutional crisis. They are also responsible for articulating formal statements of philosophy, values and creed. In the aftermath of the Somalia Commission in the late 1990s, both of these roles came into play. As a result, **Officership 2020 and NCM Corps 2020** established strategic objectives relating directly to professionalism in the CF. In **Officership 2020**, the objective called for “the highest standards of professionalism”; in **NCM Corps 2020**, “a fully professional NCM Corps.” The Special Advisor to the CDS for Professional Development (SA PD) proposed that a major contribution to the achievement of these objectives would be to codify what the military profession in Canada was and how it was to be understood. Specifically, a manual defining, describing and explaining military professionalism should be written. The CDS strongly supported this idea.

A small team was created in the SA PD’s office to develop the initial draft, and it consulted widely both within and outside the CF. In addition, the team leader assembled a small advisory group consisting of representatives from the three environments and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff group at the rank of colonel. The advisory group also included a member from Defence Research and Development Canada, a former chair of the Military Psychology and Leadership Department at the Royal Military College, and the director of the CF Leadership Institute. The advisory group met regularly and frequently to refine successive drafts.

Most important of all, however, was the fact that at key junctures in the development of the draft manual, Armed Forces Council (AFC) met to provide necessary guidance. The manual was considered in detail at the Council on five separate occasions. Armed Forces Council members, fulfilling their role as stewards of the profession, were determined to fully explain the concept of the Canadian profession of arms. In some cases this involved AFC members themselves actually engaging in the drafting in order to provide the power, in some cases, or the nuance necessary to achieve clarity and meaningful messaging.

Upon approval by AFC, the CDS directed that a summary of the manual be produced and provided to every member of the CF. The manual itself was distributed widely to bases and units, as well as professional development centres. It was also sent to key stakeholders throughout and external to DND.

The CDS personally communicated the importance of the manual for the CF to the Minister of National Defence and the Governor General. The manual, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, was signed by the CDS as head of the profession. The summary was signed by the CDS, the MND, and the Governor General as Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces.
ARTICULATING AND PROMULGATING PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY

Military professional ideology claims a systematic, discretionary and theory-based body of knowledge that is authoritative in a functional and cognitive sense, and a commitment to a transcendental value system that guides and adjudicates the way that knowledge is used. Stewards require that all members of the profession acquire and understand the nature of this ideology. Stewards, therefore, ensure that all understand that the knowledge in question is functionally authoritative because it is the knowledge, the only knowledge, that can get the job done. It has cognitive authority because it is not derivative or based on opinion but is grounded in theory; it is rational and largely empirically verifiable. Broadly speaking, it is scientific. This overall body of knowledge is derived from theories of war and conflict developed and tested throughout modern times and reflecting Canadian history and experience in peace and war, as well as the relevant experience of others.

Stewards ensure that this specialized and unique body of expertise is the framework upon which all professional development is conducted. This involves careful monitoring of, and input into, curricula in all CF schools and colleges. Those directly involved in the command and running of these organizations are assisted by those indirectly involved, because the latter as institutional leaders are responsible for mission success. This is especially true for very senior stewards, up to the head of the profession of arms in Canada, the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Stewards of the profession also realize that the quintessential characteristic of a profession is the requirement for the development of judgment. They insist that Canadian military professional ideology requires honing one's judgment concerning what to do, how to do it, what force to apply and when to apply it. This is central to sustaining the Canadian doctrine of mission command, another key principle for the 2005 CF transformation initiative promulgated in the CDS's vision statement From Risk Adverse to Mission Command. Stewards of the profession eliminate the risk aversion syndrome by insisting that all members of the profession of arms acquire the right knowledge and apply it with discretion in accordance with the commander's intent and the general guidelines, and even in the absence of immediate direction. They ensure that in the Canadian profession of arms, failure to act at all is more serious than trying and making an honest mistake. Stewards therefore encourage initiative and bold, thoughtful, decisive action. They accept that mistakes will be made but that failure to act in critical situations will likely have far more negative consequences.

Summary Analysis

The crisis of the 1990s underlined the importance of foundational doctrine. It is imperative that institutional leaders as senior stewards of the profession participate fully and provide resources as well as a conducive environment. In addition, they personally engage in the creation of the subject doctrine. Their active involvement highlights the priority they place on this issue. In addition, broad consultation enhances the quality of the doctrine as well as its acceptance. As an example, Duty with Honour continues to have a powerful, pervasive influence throughout the CF. It also forms the philosophical basis for the new values-based CF leadership doctrine.
The second component of professional ideology, the transcendental value system, is represented by the military ethos. Stewards of the profession articulate and maintain this ethos and constantly strive to align the culture of the CF with it. This activity is at the heart of the function of stewardship. Over the past five years, institutional leaders, acting as stewards, performed this function when they directed, guided and approved the Statement of Canadian Military Ethos (SCME), as cited within *Duty with Honour*. As discussed conceptually in Chapter 5, “Creating a Vision and Leading Change,” they conducted wide-spread consultation with hundreds of CF members (officer and non-commissioned member) and many external stakeholders, officials, scholars and other Canadians. The SCME was carefully reviewed by the CDS and the AFC and ultimately signed into effect by the Governor General as Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of National Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Staff.

In the future, stewards of the profession will need to maintain a watchful eye on the Statement of Canadian Military Ethos, adapting it as necessary to meet the demands of the evolving security environment and Canadian society. As discussed in greater detail below, aligning the CF culture with the ethos will help create an atmosphere of caring, before, during and after operations. Stewards of the profession embed this culture by providing the right training to prevail in combat, the right leadership and resources to conduct successful operations, and the right facilities and opportunities for rest, rewards, recuperation, and health care after operations. This approach has a long-standing history in the Canadian profession of arms.

Stewards also seek out and connect with external audiences. In this way they act as champions for the profession, describing its unique character and function in defending Canada, promoting Canadian values abroad and protecting Canadian interests. At the same time they send the strong message that the profession of arms reflects Canadian attitudes of hard, honest work, human rights, individual worth and the strength to be derived from diversity. This is achieved when stewards of the profession interact effectively with elected officials and professional civilian colleagues, and above all, when they establish close networks with communities across the country. As noted by Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, a former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), “This is a lot of work. It means that in every meeting you are in, every operation that you are involved in, and every public pronouncement that you make, you need to ensure that you are consistently delivering the messages that are important.”

**CASE STUDY — The Integration of Women in the Canadian Forces**

Stewards of the profession are responsible for ensuring that the CF does not become isolated from Canadian society. This became a particular challenge in regard to gender equality in the 1970s. In spite of growing evidence that women were capable of performing a full range of military roles, CF institutional leaders either continued to resist government direction or complied with a policy change to meet the minimal legal requirements.
In 1970 the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women provided six recommendations specific to the CF: the elimination of restrictions on recruiting married women; equal initial engagement periods for women and men; the retention of pregnant service women; equal pension benefits for women and men; opening all occupations to women; and opening military colleges to women. By 1975 the first four points had been resolved, but only two-thirds of all occupations were open to women. Ten years later, in 1980, admission was opened for women to enter undergraduate programs at the Royal Military College of Canada as officer cadets.

In 1978, the proclamation of the Canadian Human Rights Act increased the pressure on the CF to provide full equality for women. The CF reacted by establishing the Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles (SWINTER) trials, which were conducted from 1979 to 1985. They were designed to determine the overall suitability of women serving in non-traditional roles. The SWINTER trials produced evidence to show that factors other than the performance of servicewomen influenced male attitudes toward women in the trial units. For the most part, the leaders of these units did not fully appreciate the substantial gap between Canadian values and the resistance in supporting the integration of women. This resistance, in fact, created a negative public perception of leadership effectiveness in the CF.

In 1982 the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was instituted. In response, a parliamentary subcommittee produced a report in 1985 entitled Equality for All. This document once again advised that all CF occupations should be open to women. Subsequently, the CDS formed a charter task force to inform CF decision-making. The task force concluded that the major basis for the exclusion of women from combat units was resistance from male military personnel. Once again, the leaders of the units employing women did not fully appreciate the substantial link between Canadian values and the expectations of Canadians in regard to the application of those values in the CF. In fact, resistance to the integration of women and the failure of CF leadership to make a sincere commitment to eliminating this resistance continued to contribute to negative public perception of leadership effectiveness in the CF for the next fifteen years.

As a result of the task force’s findings, 75 percent of all occupations were open to women by 1986. Furthermore, the Combat-Related Employment of Women (CREW) trials were initiated in 1989 to evaluate the impact of mixed gender units. However, before the CREW trials were completed, a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision in February 1989 mandated the CF to implement several specific actions, including external monitoring, to ensure full gender integration during the following ten-year period.

Subsequent to considerable legal consultation, CF institutional leadership acknowledged reluctantly that the tribunal direction was the law, and opened all occupations to women in July 1989. In 1990 the Minister’s Advisory Board on Women in the CF was stood up to conduct external monitoring. Over the next five years, numerous bureaucratic barriers to the full participation of women were reduced through initiatives such as the implementation of harassment policy and personal equipment adaptations. In addition, training programs were conducted to address the cultural shifts necessary to achieve gender integration. In 1994, CF senior leadership declared that gender integration was complete. In contrast, numerous research and media reports released between 1994 and 1999 confirmed that various issues such as harassment continued to impede the integration of women.
In 1999 the Canadian Human Rights Commission concluded that the CF had not achieved gender integration as directed in 1989. However, the Commission did not impose further external monitoring as it was convinced, through the review of CF gender-integration plans, that CF senior leadership was fully committed to moving forward with gender integration.

**Summary Analysis**

The increased representation and broader involvement of women in the CF since 1970 is largely the result of legal processes that reflect Canadian values and have forced the CF to address the increasing inclusion of women. By 1989 institutional leaders in the CF had lost the confidence of government in this regard and were directed to change CF policy toward the employment of women, and the CF became subject to external monitoring of gender integration. This represents a failure of stewards to appropriately align CF policy and practices with Canadian societal values. The participation of women in the CF has increased marginally since 1989; however, by 1999 institutional leadership had not yet gained the full confidence of Canadians in its ability to effectively lead and implement change. Stewards of the profession have a fundamental responsibility to remain attuned to major social and cultural shifts in Canada.

Institutional leaders as stewards of the profession need to be sensitive to powerful social and cultural changes and trends in Canadian society and respond positively, with alacrity, when appropriate. They do not allow the institution to become isolated from society. In the past, institutional leadership did not always respond effectively; it did not act decisively to steward these changes into the profession. This was arguably the case with the inclusion of women throughout the CF, the issue of sexuality, and again the full and open integration of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* into the policies and directives that provide the governance framework in the CF and hence the profession of arms in Canada. In these cases it was largely external pressure that ultimately caused the institution to align more appropriately with Canadian society. In the future, stewards of the profession will need to be more attentive and to act more quickly. Some areas that continue to require attention include multiculturalism, the impact of information technology and mass media on Canadian youth, and Canadian attitudes to global integration and humanitarian intervention.

**ALIGNING CULTURE WITH PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY: CONNECTING WITH THE INTERNAL AUDIENCE**

Stewards of the profession ensure that new members are appropriately and effectively socialized into the value systems of Canadian military professional ideology if they are to shape the culture in such a way that preserves the legitimacy of the CF and the trust in the military as a national institution. They have to confirm that legal and ethical regulatory systems operate as intended, and more generally, they have to align administrative policies and practices with the values of the military ethos. Actions required here include exposure to the doctrine contained in *Duty with Honour*. Importantly, this extends beyond a one-time exposure at recruit school to reinforcing and developing understanding throughout a professional career. For example, such doctrine is essential to professional training at the Royal Military College, at the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre through the Primary Leader Qualification, and throughout Development Phase 1 training (three to four phases) for all officer cadets. Similar exposure to the suite of
CF leadership manuals reinforces understanding of the relationship between the professional construct presented in *Duty with Honour* and the values-based CF leadership model.

Subsequently, the subject of military professionalism needs to be prominently included in more senior professional-development courses and activities. Here teachers, coaches and mentors can draw on a wide variety of scholarly works on the subject. They can also draw on the experience and articulated reflections of other military professionals.

Stewards are acutely aware that self-regulation is a primary defining feature of any profession. This point is of critical significance since the Government, on behalf of the Canadian people, grants considerable powers of self-regulation to the profession of arms. There is an associated and very high expectation that the stewardship of the profession carried out by senior leaders will guarantee the highest standards of performance and conduct. Stewards are responsible, therefore, for ensuring the transparent operation of regulatory mechanisms such as the military justice system, boards of inquiry, and promotion systems. Stewardship involves, as well, the co-ordination of Canadian military professional ideology with the Defence Ethics Program in ways that guarantee the understanding and practice of ethical behaviour and the alignment of military imperatives with societal expectations. Failure to internalize and uphold civic, legal and military values places the authority of the CF as a self-regulating institution in jeopardy.

**CASE STUDY — The Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change**

Stewards of the profession are responsible to maintain the profession’s capability to self-regulate. As such, the establishment of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change (MMC) jeopardized the important tenet of self-regulation. In the aftermath of the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, institutional leaders in the CF and DND had assembled a series of recommendations to address its concerns. Actions proposed, however, went further and were intended to begin a reform movement to shape the CF and DND to better meet the challenges of the security environment in the twenty-first century. The Minister’s *Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces*, containing these recommendations, was forwarded in April 1997. The prime minister approved it within a month and directed that all of its recommendations be implemented.

In the politically charged atmosphere surrounding the early termination of the Somalia Commission’s work and the release of its report, the Government decided that a very public display of determination was required. Therefore, in October 1997 the Minister of National Defence established the MMC to oversee the implementation of the Minister’s Report to the Prime Minister. The MMC was to receive reports from the CF and DND on the Report to the Prime Minister, the *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice*, and the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia.*

The MMC comprised seven prominent Canadians and was chaired by the Honourable John Fraser. It was later reduced to three members: John Fraser, David Bercuson and D. Bevis Dewar. At this time the MMC focused its attention on the question of the revitalization of the reserves. Direct contact with the DND/CF was established through the office of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, who set up a small secretariat to deal with the MMC.
Relations between the MMC and the DND/CF were proper, formal and, in the initial days, strained. In an early report the MMC stated that progress in implementation of the various recommendations was slow due to the sometimes tenuous link between decision and activity, the lack of centralized strategic guidance for the program, and the tendency to re-interpret the meaning and intent of accepted recommendations. As time went on, relations did improve as communication improved and mutual understanding increased. In their final report in 2003 the MMC reported general satisfaction with the progress made but warned that the momentum had to be maintained. When the MMC was disbanded, it was replaced by the Education Advisory Board reporting directly to the minister.

Summary Analysis

Professional self-regulation is not a right; it is a privilege and responsibility. When taken for granted, this can be revoked. Therefore, it is incumbent upon stewards of the profession to safeguard and protect the integrity of the profession. The MMC was an example of an external intervention to compensate for the lack of effective self-regulation. In the end, the MMC was effective in keeping progress in the reform of the CF open and transparent. Despite a difficult start, it did help repair and strengthen civil-military relations in three principal domains: societal, political and civilian officials.

The importance of this aspect of stewardship is best illustrated by recalling an example where self-regulation of the profession fell short of the expectations held by the Government and indeed the Canadian people. The Minister’s Monitoring Committee was established in the fall of 1997 to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, the Minister’s Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces, and the Dickson Report on the military justice system. This action represented a perception on the part of the Government that in many areas, hitherto believed to be a purely internal responsibility, an increased degree of external regulation was required. The Minister’s Report itself, reflecting the sense, if not necessarily the language, of the Somalia Commission Report, starkly acknowledged that there had been a failure of leadership and that the honour of the CF had been impugned. Fortunately, the senior leadership of the CF launched a reform movement of considerable magnitude and dimensions, addressing issues of strategic institutional guidance (Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 [Defence Strategy 2020]), the re-articulation of a powerful Statement of the Canadian Military Ethos, and a wide range of organizational and conceptual modifications to the CF’s professional development system. Within five years the Minister’s Monitoring Committee was persuaded that the CF had achieved an appropriate orientation and momentum. It was disbanded in 2003 and replaced by the Education Advisory Board.

At the same time, stewards of the profession explain the legitimate oversight responsibilities of Parliament, ministerial control and some central agencies. They act consistently to ensure compliance of all members with such requirements. These external regulatory mechanisms include the requirement for the Chief of the Defence Staff to report to Parliament on an annual basis. The CDS and select senior officers also provide testimony before House of Commons and Senate committees as required. In addition, the Minister can exercise considerable
latitude in establishing oversight of both DND and the CF. Central agencies such as the Treasury Board and the Office of the Auditor General also frequently exercise oversight and regulatory activities in accordance with their legislative responsibilities to the Prime Minister and Parliament.

**Embedding Culture**

Stewards of the profession constantly act to align cultural assumptions, values and behaviours with professional ideology. Primary and secondary mechanisms are used in supporting this goal. Secondary mechanisms can serve to reinforce the existing culture, but only if they are consistent with primary practices. If they are inconsistent, they will be irrelevant and ignored or a recurring source of dissonance and frustration. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* identifies six primary embedding mechanisms and six corresponding secondary reinforcement mechanisms, which are expanded upon below, using select examples to illustrate each mechanism.

**Primary Embedding Mechanisms**

- **Stewards engage in deliberate role modelling, teaching, mentoring and coaching.** Stewards of the profession lead by example and are able to fully account for their actions. Except when the operational situation precludes it, they are willing to explain their decisions. Coaching and mentoring, however, are not “cronyism,” where members try to attach themselves to “rising stars” in the interest of self-promotion.

- **Stewards react quickly, decisively and transparently to critical incidents and organizational crises.** Stewards of the profession are actively scanning the profession to identify critical incidents and major organizational problems. An example of this not being done well was the initial reactions to the Somalia incident in 1993. The establishment of the DeFaye Board of Inquiry fell far short of government, societal and professional standards. The commission was criticized and ultimately terminated because its findings and recommendations seemingly failed to reflect known facts or testimony emanating from ongoing courts-martial. Critics both within and outside DND and the CF felt that the commission placed too much emphasis on protecting the image of the Army, instead of providing a meaningful analysis of the problems encountered and their root causes. This was a major contributing factor in the Government’s decision to establish the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. Conversely and much more positively, CF senior leadership established and conducted the Croatia Board of Inquiry in such a manner as to exemplify the core military values of duty to the Canadian people, loyalty to members of the profession involved, integrity with regard to all the facts of the case, and moral courage to admit mistakes and rectify the situation.

- **Stewards of the profession ensure that resources are allocated in accordance with observed criteria.** Based on the criteria established in *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020*, a professional development system centred on the Canadian Defence Academy and including the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre is being resourced to champion lifelong learning in both corps. This contrasts with a situation in the past where members were being encouraged to seek self-development opportunities, in part because the criteria for advancement were increasingly based on formal vocational and educational achievement. This process, however, was not adequately or equitably funded.

- **Stewards of the profession pay attention to what is important to them and measure and control it on a regular basis.** The hearings of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs in the late 1990s resulted from insufficient attention being paid to quality of life
issues in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, thus highlighting inadequate assessment and monitoring of related issues. Senior leadership in collaboration with civilian officials in DND and the Treasury Board finally brought the issues and facts to the Government’s attention at the end of the decade. They took decisive action and demonstrated that member well-being and commitment would henceforth be a matter of concern on a regular basis. Another good example is the Army’s experience in culture measurement and change over the past forty years.

- Stewards of the profession allocate rewards and status based on observed criteria. In the future, stewardship of the profession will involve allocating status (and rank) to those capable of recognizing, among other things, the need for change and possessing the capacities to bring about its implementation. In the past, there was a tendency to reward those who would loyally maintain the system at steady state, for example, by adhering to a model of a general-purpose combat capability designed to deal with the Cold War threat. Canadian Forces transformation requires leaders with the knowledge, cognitive, change and social capacities, as well as a fully internalized professional identity, to create a CF that is more relevant, responsive and effective.

- Stewards of the profession recruit, select and promote members in accordance with observed criteria. NCM Corps 2020 established the criteria for a fully professional NCM corps and initiated a restructuring of NCM courses for the most junior, through intermediate and advanced courses, culminating in a Chief Warrant Officer / Chief Petty Officer 1st Class qualification. These actions ensure that those selected to the highest NCM ranks are prepared for the responsibilities associated with their role as “custodians” of the NCM corps and “co-stewards” of the profession of arms. An example of an ongoing requirement associated with this mechanism is providing officers and NCMs with the potential to become strong institutional leaders. This potential is enhanced by early and meaningful opportunities to serve as institutional leaders, particularly with regard to getting experience at National Defence Headquarters.

**Secondary Reinforcement Mechanisms**

- Stewards of the profession provide formal statements of institutional philosophy, values and creed. Duty with Honour is such a statement, as is the current suite of CF leadership manuals. It is critical that they not be neglected in the future. An important requirement now is the formulation of a defence framework linking the CF and DND in a manner that enables continued CF transformation in accordance with two key principles: moving from an institutional focus to operational goals; and towards viewing the regular and reserve components, including the public service, as part of a single solution. The challenge for stewards of the profession of arms will be to develop a defence construct that does not homogenize but protects the unique nature of the military element while incorporating civilian defence professionals into one synergistic team.

- Stewards of the profession initiate and maintain institutional rites and rituals. A good example of aligning culture to professional ideology is the support given to the Year of the Veteran in 2005, thus celebrating a key aspect of history, heritage and tradition by recognizing the sacrifices of those members of the profession of arms who went before. Other examples include Trooping the Colour and the exercise of “Freedom of the City” ceremonies.

- Stewards of the profession collect and publish stories, legends and myths about people and events. Stewards of the profession pay attention to the actions of all members of the profession as they make history. Currently, a major effort to gather, codify and disseminate
historical and contemporary stories is being made at the CF Leadership Institute through the In Harm’s Way series. Navy, Army and Air Force histories, including regimental, squadron and ship’s histories, all contribute. In the past, institutional leaders have been less than assiduous in recording their memoirs and leader or command experience. Stewards of the profession now begin to see this as a particular responsibility in their role as leaders and mentors. Support for this kind of stewardship is now in place with the establishment of the Canadian Defence Academy Press. Institutionally, it is also time to begin writing the history of the Canadian Forces.

- **Stewards of the profession match philosophy and doctrine with organizational design and structure.** Aligning culture with professional ideology means setting in motion a unifying process that contributes directly to enhancing joint operational perspectives. In the past, this caused both dissonance and frustration because such perspectives were only marginally reflected in CF structure. The CF transformation process has begun to rectify this situation through the creation of significant operational-level (theatre) organizations. The process will only be effective if institutional leaders view the effort through the prism of stewardship and not just strategic leadership and change management.

- **Stewards of the profession align organizational systems and procedures with the desired cultural outcome.** An example of stewardship playing a critical role in aligning culture with professional ideology in this secondary mechanism is stewards’ influence on the evolving HR Strategy for 2020. Personnel systems must be both efficient and effective. Efficiency calls for modern psychological, sociological and managerial approaches. Effectiveness calls for acute awareness of the purpose of the organization in question; this is contained in military professional ideology. The alignment in question results in a major contribution to all four desired outcomes: it helps internal integration; it highlights member well-being and commitment; it increases the CF’s reputation with external audiences; and as repeated so often in this manual, those three outcomes are essential to achieve the fourth, mission success, at the institutional level.

- **Stewards of the profession maintain a coherent body of knowledge and doctrine.** As explained in *Duty with Honour*, military expertise is organized into three components: core, support and specialized. Stewardship involves ensuring that a coherent system is built around the core, with support and specialized knowledge linked appropriately. The core body of knowledge is built around the general system of war and conflict, encompassing policy, strategy, operational art and tactics, as described in Chapter 3 herein. Core knowledge is developed by intense study and work throughout the CF but especially in doctrine cells at both CF and environmental levels and at the Canadian Defence Academy through all its units, and at the Royal Military College, Canadian Forces College, the CF Leadership Institute and increasingly the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre. Knowledge and doctrine can also be both created and debated through contributions to the *Canadian Military Journal*.

### CONNECTING WITH EXTERNAL AUDIENCES
Stewardship of the profession of arms in Canada involves engagement with government in all its dimensions, Canadian society at large, allies and a wide variety of international and non-governmental organizations. Stewards carefully study the international security environment and consider the impact of advancing technology. Both these factors impact directly on military professionalism, sometimes adversely. For example, the CF was slow after the...
Cold War to adapt an ethos that was essentially pessimistic, historically inclined, nationalistic and somewhat militaristic to one that was more attuned to the twenty-first century — realistic, future oriented, nuanced in its understanding of power, cosmopolitan and collaborative. It took a decade to evolve the Statement of Canadian Military Ethos; stewards of the profession have a particular responsibility to ensure that it remains relevant.

Stewardship means staying attuned to major cultural and social shifts in Canada. They may not always be particularly supportive of, or beneficial to, a healthy military profession. Nonetheless, they should not be allowed to isolate the profession from its parent society. In most cases the best approach is to communicate clearly and persuasively the unique nature of the profession of arms and how it serves to advance the values and interests of importance to Canadians. Certainly, stewards remain apolitical, but within this professional norm there is plenty of latitude to conduct a dialogue with the Canadian people through community activities, the mass media, and academia. Institutional leaders conduct this dialogue, but they also encourage all military professionals to participate. As long as members understand that each time they engage with external audiences they are acting as exemplars for the whole of the profession of arms, the result will always be stronger bonds of trust, confidence and credibility with Canadians.

Stewards of the profession are almost constantly in contact with elected officials and/or civil officials at all levels from municipal to national. Therefore, they work to maintain bonds of collegiality and mutual respect through conveying not only their contribution to the community and nation but also an understanding of the important roles their civilian colleagues play in the peace, order and good government at the heart of the Canadian way of life. This is especially important in the context of the DND/CF defence framework. Stewards of the profession encourage the development of solid, mutually supporting teams that execute defence policy and directly support operations worldwide.

An important process in this context is the development of a strong common understanding that different approaches to managing and applying knowledge do exist. Thus, market ideology (entrepreneurialism) and bureaucratic ideology (managerialism) both make important contributions to the DND/CF role in Canadian security policy, and each contains a particular occupational ethic of its own. The goal for stewards of the profession is to explain to both internal and external audiences how these ideologies can erode military professional ideology, especially its military ethos component. Constructive dialogue, including encouraging civilian colleagues to maximize their participation in common professional-development approaches and activities, will result in stronger, more effective and dedicated DND and CF teams.

**STEWARDSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS**

To respond effectively to the evolving external environment, the profession will need to continually develop a higher order of understanding and knowledge concerning Canadian political and social developments and new forms of conflict. These in turn will have direct consequences on the attributes of responsibility and, especially, expertise. The nature of the environment will require that the highest standards of professionalism be exhibited by all ranks.
To maintain the health of the profession and its culture, *Duty with Honour* suggests four principles to guide development and change:

- **Relevance**, which simply means that, whatever changes are contemplated or introduced, the CF must continue to meet its responsibility to society and satisfy the expectations of Canadians;

- **Openness**, which refers to the idea that individual and collective learning, and the consequential enhancement of professional expertise, can only occur in an environment that prompts the open exchange of ideas, mediated by reason and core values;

- **Consistency**, which requires the integration and alignment of the professional attributes of responsibility, expertise, identity and ethos; and

- **Reciprocity**, which refers to the balance of mutual obligations between the CF and its professional members.

Stewards of the profession weigh carefully against these principles any change that has the potential to affect the culture of the profession and hence the institution.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

Stewards of the profession exercise constant oversight of all the attributes of professionalism, thus ensuring that as true professionals they fulfil their moral contract to society, engendering trust and confidence in the institution. They are provided the necessary and relevant expertise, have the cohesion and morale that come with a unifying identity, and above all, share a military ethos that guides their conduct at all times. This contributes to the achievement of the enabling outcomes of member well-being and commitment, internal integration and external adaptability, which in turn are necessary enablers to achieve the primary outcome of mission success. Stewardship links directly to the primary outcome by imbuing military professionals with a professional ideology that gives them the knowledge, sense and spirit to prevail in a wide range of missions and under difficult, challenging conditions.

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Professionalism in the CF in the 21st century will be enhanced and sustained to the extent that institutional leaders clearly identify, understand and counter the threats to Canadian military professional ideology posed by the competing demands of market and bureaucratic ideologies and create a body of knowledge coherent with the general system of war and conflict comprising autonomous Canadian concepts of strategy and operational art.

*Professional Ideology, 111*
Summary – Stewarding the Profession

Ensure Understanding of the Attributes of Professionalism
• Maintain a holistic view of the profession in order to guide how members and external audiences understand the attributes of responsibility, expertise, identity and professional ideology.

Articulate and Promulgate the Professional Ideology
• Promulgate the systematic, theory-based body of knowledge as the Canadian general system of war and conflict, encompassing policy, strategy, operational art and tactics, and maintain and sustain the value system contained in the military ethos.

Align Culture with Professional Ideology
• Employ primary and secondary culture-embedding mechanisms to align CF culture with professional ideology:
  - Primary: deliberate role modelling; reaction to critical incidents; observed criteria for allocating resources; paying attention to important issues on a regular basis; observed criteria for allocating rewards; and observed criteria for recruiting, selecting and promoting.
  - Secondary: formal statements of institutional philosophy; institutional rites and rituals; stories about people and events; organizational design and structure; organizational systems and procedures; and a coherent body of knowledge.

Connect with External Audiences
• Remain attuned to major social and cultural shifts in Canada.
• Communicate clearly and persuasively the unique nature of the profession of arms and how it serves to advance values and interests of importance to Canadians.
• Maintain bonds of collegiality and mutual respect with politicians and civilian colleagues, conveying not only this group’s contribution to the community and nation, but also an understanding of the important roles these individuals play in the peace, order and good government at the heart of the Canadian way of life.

Steward the Profession Into the Future
• Maintain the health of the profession and its culture through adherence to four principles to guide development and change: relevance, openness, consistency and reciprocity.

Link to Mission Success
• Ensure all members understand their responsibilities and duty to Canada in such a way that the concept of the primacy of operations remains sacrosanct.
Stewardship embeds the construct: Mission — Own Troops — Self.
Recommended Reading


Bentley, L. W. Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005.


Chapter 2
Systems Thinking

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It should be noted that, in implementing change at the institutional or systems level of leadership, there is a markedly increased requirement for a systems perspective and systems thinking. Generally speaking, systems thinking is grounded in a recognition of the profound interconnectedness of things and the need to consider how the discrete parts of a system both interact with and affect the whole.

_Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 105_

The CF is comprised of numerous systems and subsystems operating within an environment (a supra-system) comprised of the federal government, Canadian society and the broader security environment. The objective of strategic leadership is to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the CF, through the internal integration and management of organizational systems and by positioning the CF favourably in relation to its environment. Systems thinking is based upon the premise that the relationship among systems and characteristics at the institutional, group/unit and individual levels can be understood as interrelated patterns of cause and effect. It distinguishes itself from more traditional approaches of analysis by emphasizing the interactions and connectedness of the different components of a system. Change among any individual or combination of characteristics can alter the input, flow and/or output of any individual or combination of systems and subsystems. The strategic alignment and internal integration of Defence systems is critical to ensuring mission success and in satisfying external requirements.

Stewardship, therefore, involves a high degree of intellectual agility. Institutions such as the CF itself, or those with which it interacts, do not remain static. As they evolve and change, institutional leaders guide the profession in a way that ensures that it remains agile, adapting rapidly to changing requirements. The profession must be relevant, vibrant and effective.

**THE CF — A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS**

Management of the CF system, including its numerous subsystems, is essentially the management of the resources input by the external environment — the defence budget, people, capital and equipment, infrastructure and knowledge — in order to ensure effective output. The output — defence capability — is continuously evaluated and measured, thus creating feedback loops to inform the external environment inputs as well as the internal systems and processes. In this sense, the DND/CF system and its subsystems operate as double-loop open systems, providing a continuous flow of input, throughput and output. An open system has the capacity for self-maintenance based upon input and feedback from the external environment as well as the internal environment and its various systems and subsystems. In the absence of the external feedback loop, the CF would be considered a closed system that strives to maintain itself based only upon internal feedback and inputs. Figure 2.1 illustrates these relationships.
System and subsystem self-maintenance, similar to the notion of self-synchronization in a networked operational environment, is based upon clear and consistent understanding of national and institutional strategies and goals, high quality information and shared awareness, competence at all levels of systems management, and trust in the information provided by internal and external feedback loops. Institutional leaders develop and sustain the framework and culture to ensure that continuous adjustments, in both degree and kind, are made to the processes, structures, and resources that comprise the defence system and its subsystems, in order to sustain (self-maintain) defence capability.

In doing so, it is important that institutional leaders understand the relationships between the component parts of the CF (people, processes and structures) and view them as interrelated pieces of a larger system. The DND/CF system is varied and complex and embedded within DND — both operate in the broader context of federal government policy and direction, Canadian societal interests, and global security concerns. This results in one “system of systems” approach within the CF, DND and Government. For example, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services) (ADM [Fin CS]), as the chief financial officer for the Department, provides essential support to both the CF and DND. ADM (Fin CS) is accountable to the DM and the Minister for ensuring the integrity of the financial management and control framework. The DM and the Minister are, in turn, accountable to the Treasury Board (TB) and the Government of Canada for the prudent management of resources, including public funds. The Director General, Financial Management (DG Fin Mgt), as the CF comptroller, provides military financial advice to the chief financial officer as an integral member of the ADM (Fin CS) group.

1 Adapted from David S. Albert and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge, the assumptions underlying self-synchronization are clear and consistent understanding of command intent; high quality information and shared situational awareness; competence at all levels of the force; and trust in the information, subordinates, superiors, peers and equipment.

2 For example, TB policy on management, resources, and results structure identifies a requirement for clearly defined and measurable outcomes that are linked to government priorities and provide the basis for horizontal links between departments with similar or natural groupings of strategic concerns.
Figure 2.2: CF Procurement Project: System and Governance Relationships
In fulfilling their responsibilities, it is also essential that institutional leaders understand the governance and structure of the CF and DND. The VCDS acts as the chief of staff for NDHQ and, as such, is responsible for the co-ordination of integrated DND/CF response in key areas of defence planning and management. In turn, systems management is enhanced by an integrated system of governance overseeing defence planning and management. The Defence Management Committee (DMC) is an advisory and decision-making body informing the authority of the DM and CDS. The Armed Forces Council is an advisory body informing the decision-making authority of the CDS. Both are ultimately responsible for ensuring that DND and the CF are in compliance with Canadian expectations, including the guidelines set out by the Treasury Board. The accountability, responsibility and reporting relationships that influence the management of a CF procurement project, illustrated in Figure 2.2, provide a relevant example of the complexity of integrated system relationships as discussed above. In this example, the various system relationships reach across the federal government, including Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), the governance mechanisms of the DND and CF, and various entities within the CF.

Institutional leaders in the CF manage many of these systems or subsystems within defined boundaries of authority and responsibility. But they understand that they work as part of that broader integrated system and strive for the co-ordinated planning and utilization of resources, leading to an integrated outcome. Institutional leaders facilitate not only the integration of regular, reserve and civilian components of defence but also increasingly systems external to defence (police, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), etc.) that contribute to the defence and security of Canada. In this environment, the CF must be capable of operating at high levels of complexity and able to make organizational self-adjustment as a result of external inputs. While every system must have manageable boundaries, institutional leaders ensure that those boundaries remain permeable, flexible and open to continuous redefinition.

CASE STUDY — Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel

The Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) project is an excellent example of the outcome of effective systems thinking. In the 1987 White Paper, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, the Government indicated the need for Canadian Maritime Forces to have the capability to detect, monitor and control activities in our sea approaches and maritime areas of jurisdiction. The White Paper also outlined the Total Force concept in which the reserve force would be developed not only to augment the regular force but also to take on specific operational tasks. To that end the naval reserve was tasked to conduct maritime coastal defence, including coastal patrol and surveillance and mine countermeasures. In just over a decade of this pronouncement, a fully worked-up concept of operations and capability was developed to meet the needs of coastal defence in Canada. While even shorter developments in the future are feasible, the implementation of this project from requirement to actual capability at sea stands as one of the best executed in Canadian project management of a large Crown acquisition.
As a result of the 1987 White Paper, the Naval Reserve Modernization project directive was issued in the same year. Naval authorities moved ahead quickly to secure funding and approval for this project. They recognized the unique alignment of government, industry and maritime requirements, which led to a relatively fast final contract award in 1992. The requirement for this important project was fully supported and sustained by well-coordinated briefs during subsequent government reviews and the formulation of the 1994 Defence White Paper. The MCDV project broke new ground in manning, through the use of naval reserves in the Total Force concept; in costs, through the utilization of commercial standards and specification for design and construction; and in the use of commercial contracting to provide the vast majority of in-service support.

In the area of manning the MCDVs, the Navy not only used the naval reserves in the primary role, but it developed a highly flexible system that matched manning to specific missions, thus achieving significant economies in the manpower of sailors. The size of the crew would vary between 28 personnel and a complement of 36 depending on the complexity of the mission. Moreover, different modularized payload packages were made available to complete assigned missions, including a minesweeping payload, a route survey payload, and a remotely operated vehicle payload, in addition to the inherent coastal surveillance capability. The procurement of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems and the use of military specifications only where essential, allowed for rapid construction. A second major initiative, the MCDV In-Service Support Contract, was put into effect immediately following the delivery of the lead ship HMCS Kingston, in December 1995. The intent of this maintenance concept was to provide maximum operational availability for the vessels in the most cost-effective manner without adding a large, permanent, dockyard infrastructure to support MCDVs.

**Summary Analysis**

Effective systems thinking by institutional leaders resulted in an efficient sequence of processes for the successful integration of the MCDVs and their capability into the fleet. The net result was a significant increase in operational flexibility, economy and capability in Canada’s navy. The MCDVs have bridged the gap between harbour defence forces and the remainder of the “blue water” assets. They have the potential to extend the current capability of inshore mine countermeasures and ensure a regular presence and surveillance in Canada’s coastal approaches. The COTS systems and commercially based construction enabled rapid and economic production. The flexible manning concepts and in service support also achieved significant overall efficiencies. Many lessons learned and some technical concerns were identified in the project completion report, but the project became a reference point for future Crown projects. It was finished in advance of the timeline for all twelve vessels and under budget. The project provided a new maritime defence capability, which was fully integrated and has enhanced the overall effectiveness of Canada’s navy. Strategic leaders successfully employed systems thinking to align government priorities and industry and maritime requirements to deliver a new capability economically and effectively for the defence of Canada.
Institutional leaders who manage and govern CF systems also consider the impact of their decisions on relationships within and across systems over time. Defence planning and management, for example, requires making decisions now even though the effects will not be evident for some time. In recognition of the time required to implement such decisions, the focus is on maintaining or enhancing capabilities in the short term (Horizon 1, 1–4 years), replacing or enhancing current capabilities for the medium term (Horizon 2, 5–19 years), and acquiring and developing new capabilities for the longer term (Horizon 3, 10–30 years).³

There is no doubt that effective systems management demands the development and application of knowledge that extends analysis and decision-making well beyond specific areas of expertise. Thinking in terms of systems and systems relationships facilitates such analysis and decision-making.

The reality is that in order to achieve what you set out in terms of your objective for leading the institution, I think one of the most fundamental requirements is to have a really good understanding of how this headquarters works in a horizontal fashion or how it should work in an integrated way.

Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis

³ Defence planning and management incorporates numerous components including strategic planning, capability-based planning, resource prioritization, business planning, performance management, and annual reports to government.

CASE STUDY — Amalgamation of Military Occupation Series 500

The Military Occupation (MOC) Series 500 amalgamation provides an illustration of the complexity of systems relationships within an institution. Throughout the CF in the mid-1990s, change was rampant. There were downsizing activities within all the environments as the CF responded to government priorities to become smaller and more efficient. Within the Air Force, the mantra became “the best little air force” (in the world). This was typified by outsourcing non-essential (non-core) activities, reducing fleets and reducing the number of support personnel at the wings and squadrons.

In the new generation of war fighting, aircraft design and organizational efficiency, the ways in which the Air Force conducted maintenance were outmoded. War fighting was no longer the threat from a formidable foe; instead, light, manoeuvrable and lethal became the key characteristics. Aircraft design shifted from damage tolerant to fracture-critical and/or black-box replaceable technology. Finally, top-heavy organizations were de-layered so that the technician on the flight line could communicate directly to the commanding officer of the squadron. These features made the case for completely revamping the conduct of aircraft maintenance in the Air Force.

With increases in aircraft performance, there was a resultant decrease in the durability and therefore longevity of aircraft. Equally, the advances in electronics and computers increased the complexity of avionic systems, whereby a computer was required in order to diagnose the problems with the aircraft computers. The advances quickly outstripped the ability of individual technicians to learn and keep up with the evolution of aircraft technology. As a consequence, the industry evolved from specialized trades into generic trades, and the work shifted from the user doing the fixing to the part being shipped back to the original manufacturer. The Air Force was obviously affected as new aircraft and new systems replaced the old obsolete designs. With the disposal of the Voodoo, Star Fighter and Freedom Fighter and the introduction of the CF-18 Hornet and CP-140 Aurora, the Air Force had to transform in order to catch up to the current reality.

Prior to amalgamation in 1995, the aircraft technician trades (MOC 500) comprised eleven different occupations aligned to the specific functional areas of an aircraft. The euphoria of change across the CF as a whole helped to facilitate the much-needed change to the conduct of aircraft maintenance. Accordingly, technicians in ten of the eleven maintenance trades were regrouped into three: Aviation Systems (AVN), Avionics Systems (AVS) and Aircraft Structures (ACS). Occupational specifications were redefined, and training standards and plans were created. By 1997, every technician in the Air Force had been put through conversion to take them from their parent trade and convert them to the new trade structure, and they were “grandfathered” into the new trade structure. At the same time, all new recruits were exposed to the new structure.

Under the old system, training had been delivered at the CF School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering in Borden. Upon amalgamation, the combined training days were significantly reduced and the delta of training between the old and the new was absorbed at the operational units, where formalized and standardized education and training was replaced by on-the-job training. As a result, technicians entering ab initio the military spent minimum time in the school in order to maximize their exposure on the aircraft.
Organizationally the changes were simple. All positions were renamed to coincide with the new nomenclature. In addition, 15 percent of the positions in each unit were removed deliberately in anticipation of the resultant savings, by having one technician perform the work of what used to be done by four technicians. It was recognized that it would take at least fifteen years to produce a truly AVN-qualified technician who would be capable of replacing the combined skill and knowledge of three or four former trades. Nevertheless, the expected savings were taken from the organization well in advance, especially in light of the downsizing environment the CF was facing at the time.

Under the old system, given the “stovepipe” nature of the occupations, it was very easy for career managers to post a technician from one type of aircraft to another (e.g. Auroras to Hercules), because the skill sets mirrored one another. Under the new system, a technician would comprise the skills and knowledge of three or four former trades. However, the acquisition of the necessary skills would only be attained by the rank of master corporal or sergeant. Career managers therefore could not assume that an AVS technician was equally qualified across the spectrum and therefore capable of fulfilling the position in a CF-18 squadron that had been vacated by a technician who had acquired a different range and depth of skills. This meant that career development, posting and selection would have to be devolved from the career-manager level down to the tactical level where the insight into skills and knowledge was available. Instead of the career managers moving technicians from place to place, this would have to be left to the units on a wing and between wings to identify the career paths for the technicians and orchestrate the moves inter-wing with the assistance of the career managers.

This process was essential, especially given that under the new system it would take at least three times longer than under the old to produce a fully functional technician. Therefore, the old posting cycle of every six to seven years from one fleet of aircraft to another would have to be changed to fifteen to twenty-one years in order to maximize the return on training investment and fully qualify a technician on any given fleet. This was consistent with modern aircraft technology, which was advancing exponentially and becoming more and more complex. To develop the necessary knowledge and understanding of modern aircraft would require more time on the same fleet.

This concept was also directly in line with the direction of the Department. Cost moves were drastically reduced; therefore, members would not be posted as often. Likewise, from a quality of life perspective, families no longer wanted multiple moves in a career and preferred to establish roots in support of spousal professions and school continuity for children. However, amalgamation was an Air Force initiative. Personnel policy resided within the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources — Military). The link to the realignment of the trades and the shift to a different employment philosophy and career development approach were never made. This and several other challenges addressed below were not evident at the time of amalgamation.

From an operational perspective, amalgamation was met with trepidation. At a time when war fighting was changing at equal pace to the changes in aircraft maintenance, the concept of operations was changing in concert with the concept of support. Given operational primacy, the changes to support, and therefore the changes being undertaken by the maintenance community, took lower priority. As a result, although the technicians were converted under the 45-day conversion plan, upon their return to the units they reverted to the employment patterns of their old occupations.
With the shift in focus from formal training and education in a school environment to an on-the-job training and experience program, the operational units shouldered the burden of training. The shift occurred at a time when the operational units were decreased by 15 percent and the operational tempo was increased. Within five years of amalgamation, trained effective strength at impacted units was reduced from well over 80 percent to less than 60 percent. Ten years after amalgamation had been initiated, the greatest limiting factor to the Air Force was the lack of qualified technicians, and the outlook was bleak. In 2005, over 50 percent of aircraft technicians were within three years of or beyond the pensionable point. Given the time it takes to qualify technicians under the current training regime, attrition of experience was poised to outstrip the CF’s ability to replace it.

Summary Analysis

The amalgamation of the air technician trades was consistent with modern aircraft technology and broader resource changes taking place within the CF at the time. However, it failed to align a specific system within the context of the CF as a system of systems. In spite of significant planning, amalgamation met with numerous unanticipated barriers to full and successful implementation. Hindsight, being what it is, has identified several potential considerations that would have informed planning for amalgamation. How could planners have ensured that the changes in training, employment philosophy and career development were synchronized with the rest of the Department? Given the timelines for conversion and full development of technicians, would conversion be more effectively achieved through attrition? In essence, a fully inclusive and disciplined systems thinking approach that seeks a full understanding of cause-and-effect relationships at the individual, group/unit, and institutional levels mitigates such challenges.

In 2005, systems thinking was applied to a multi-year transformation project to re-establish the capability of the aircraft technician trades. Some of the measures that have been taken to re-establish the former capability of the air technician trades include a new occupational analysis, re-alignment of the trades within the AVN, AVS and ACS constructs, re-establishment of training at the school in Borden to offload the operational units, and the implementation of a new career management process under the auspices of an aircraft technician career development plan.
The following principles and ideas, while counterintuitive in some ways, are important aspects of systems thinking:\footnote{Adapted from Peter M. Senge, \textit{The Fifth Discipline}, and Peter M. Senge et al., \textit{The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook}.}

- Dynamic relationships within and among systems are more important than linear cause-and-effect chains;
- Processes of change, rather than snapshots in time, provide the most valuable input;
- Understanding the complexity of \textit{dynamics} is more important than understanding the complexity of \textit{detail};
- A global, holistic and peripheral vision is imperative;
- The time of greatest growth is the time to plan for harder times;
- It is important to look beyond the symptom to find the root causes of a problem;
- Doing the obvious thing will not always produce the obvious outcome; and
- Systems thinking cannot be practised on an individual level, because good results in complex systems depend upon multiple perspectives and integrated feedback loops.

These principles and ideas are meaningful, not so much in themselves but because they represent effective ways of thinking and acting to enhance overall systems thinking.

An integrated and balanced systems approach is facilitated by critical analysis from a multidirectional, networked perspective across systems both internal and external to the CF. Institutional leaders employ systems analysis to identify and analyze relationships and impacts among relatively stable and predictable processes, as well as to enhance the potential to identify unanticipated and developing relationships and outcomes. In optimizing systems thinking, institutional leaders think critically, develop innovative and self-motivated teams, and apply consultative approaches to leadership and management. In addition, senior leaders ensure well-developed doctrine and policy, supported by continuous, multi-directional feedback and efficient resource utilization – all key enablers of effective systems management.

Inputs to systems require continuous adjustments, of varying degrees and substance, to ensure desired outputs. Individual system managers strive for maximum output from their system. Institutional leaders play a key role in ensuring that an optimum balance of resource inputs, structure, process and performance output among systems and subsystems contributes to overall system output — the goals of the CF. As noted by Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, a former VCDS, institutional leaders continuously ask questions related to such things as the appropriate balance between equipment, personnel, and strategic investment: Is it worth having more people with obsolete equipment, or fewer people with the best equipment? How do institutional leaders invest in the future when nearly every penny is being consumed by present requirements? These considerations are always effectively balanced with the

\textbf{Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer and to help us see how to change them effectively.}

\textit{The Fifth Discipline, 7}
CASE STUDY — The Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team

The Management, Command and Control Re-Engineering Team (MCCRT) is an example of an attempt at a very logical systems approach. However, in the end, the criterion of efficiency was allowed to subordinate military effectiveness. Efficiency is not the end but the means by which systems strive to achieve effective defence capability. Shortly after the publication of the 1994 White Paper the Department of Defence launched the D2000 initiative, which was originated to improve the way in which DND and the CF managed its business. The MCCRT evolved from this initiative. It was stood up in January 1995 with a mandate to re-engineer the DND/CF command, control and resource management structure. The objective of the MCCRT was defined by its team leader: “to focus resources on operational capability by reducing resources assigned to headquarters and achieving dramatic performance improvements by re-engineering processes.” The MCCRT assumed that the future management of DND/CF would be guided by business planning and other accoutrements of “modern management.”

The MCCRT went through four phases: development of command and control options; development of a master implementation strategy; development of implementation plans; and co-ordination of cross-functional issues. It conducted a complete review of the many management processes extant in the Department in response to the huge reductions in military personnel and civilian employees, the need to downsize the top-level headquarters by at least one third, and the need to absorb the three Command headquarters into National Defence Headquarters. Thus, Maritime Command moved from Halifax, Mobile Command from St. Hubert, and Air Command from Winnipeg. The scope of the MCCRT initiative involved a reduction of 7,000 personnel in 18 headquarters. It completed its work and handed off its responsibilities to the Director General, Management Renewal Services, in June 1997. A number of change initiatives were still ongoing when the MCCRT stood down.

Summary Analysis
As far as it went, the MCCRT exercise was both necessary and relatively successful. In retrospect, however, as the Somalia debacle unfolded and problems in Bosnia, most notably the Bakovici incident, emerged, there was a sense that management processes were being applied in lieu of leadership solutions or a full grasp of command responsibilities beyond planning, supervising and directing. There was definitely a sense in which the criterion of efficiency was privileged over effectiveness. The long-term impact of certain cuts was not appreciated. For example, elimination of the force development organization adversely affected the ability of the CF to conceptualize the force structure requirements posed by the rapidly changing security environment. Similarly, the reduction of the Directorate of Military Manpower Distribution, caused considerable confusion in the personnel manning system. These were some of the issues raised by the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change as well as by the Special Advisor to the CDS for Professional Development in 1999. In fact, a major objective for the publication of both Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada and Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations was to provide a counterweight to the concept of “modern management” (for example, controlling, accounting, supervising) in the CF. Such practices are often inimical to operational goals if they are not placed firmly in the context of military professionalism, CF leadership doctrine and the military ethos. Thus, bureaucratic ideology and the ideology of the market (business planning et al) were countered by the articulation of a military professional ideology based on concepts of service before self, duty, and core military values.
expectations and requirements of the profession of arms and the CF mission. Most often, this balance must be achieved within significantly restricted resource envelopes. Such an environment demands that institutional leaders understand and practise efficient, innovative and technically sound resource management (or work to improve the resource management practices), while at the same time working to evolve the institution.

Efficiency must also be viewed critically against effectiveness. Relevant and effective defence capability is the overall goal of efficient practices, processes and systems management. Efficiency is not the end but the means by which systems strive to achieve effective defence capability. In spite of some success, the overall failure of the Management, Command and Control Re-Engineering Team, 1995–1997, illustrates this point. Efficiency that does not result in relevant and effective output is not success.

**DEVELOPING A LEARNING ENVIRONMENT**

A learning environment is essential to the effective integration and application of relevant and accurate knowledge among the systems that comprise the CF. Institutional leaders are responsible for the development of knowledge capacity across the CF. Leading and managing from a systems perspective is dependent upon the provision of continuous feedback and knowledge into the planning and implementation of activities — frequently referred to as feedback loops. The optimum form of organizational feedback is found in the learning organization, an organization that is able to examine critically its performance, assimilate information from its broader environment and transform itself to exploit opportunities and develop new capabilities in meeting new challenges. A systems approach is dependent upon individuals, teams and groups who have the capacity to learn and to develop, share and apply knowledge. Systems thinking can be understood as the sum capacity of an organization to understand the interrelationships that shape and influence systems. Consequently, there is an inextricable link between a learning environment and the capacity for systems thinking. Institutional leaders place high priority on ensuring that effective mechanisms and practices are in place to facilitate feedback loops, thus ensuring that lessons learned do inform ongoing practices and organizational learning.

Institutional leaders influence the development of a learning environment in numerous ways. A learning environment is built upon trust among and across institutional leaders and their teams and upon shared understanding of the overall goals and strategies of the organization. The visible commitment of institutional leaders to personal learning and development, as well as participation in developing, sharing and applying knowledge, is a critical basis upon which to build a learning organization. Active recognition of the contributions of individuals and teams by ensuring opportunity for training, experiential learning, and professional development is an essential first step. In addition, leaders in a learning organization:

- accept risk associated with experiential learning;
- support lessons-learned processes through formal mechanisms such as the publication and distribution of lessons learned;
- mitigate risk by promoting knowledge sharing, knowledge development, and innovative applications of knowledge;
- promote the *need to share*, thereby reducing reliance on the *need to know*;
- model and promote open, transparent and innovative practices; and
- reinforce strategic context of team contributions.

Canadian society and the CF are increasingly networked socially and technologically. As a result, organizational learning and systems thinking are influenced by informal groups and networks as well
as formally identified groups and systems. Participation in professional forums, volunteer organizations, electronic chat rooms, communities of practice, and interdepartmental working groups, for example, contributes significantly to knowledge development in the defence and security environment. A significant challenge for institutional leaders in managing systems in the CF is ensuring that all potential impacts and opportunities are identified and integrated in a way that optimizes the potential across the CF to contribute to its overall mission success. Overwhelming amounts of information and data are available. The challenge is to establish and sustain structures and processes that provide the most accurate and relevant feedback when and where it is most valuable. In the learning organization, subordinate leaders and teams are developed and empowered to actively engage in analysis and decision-making. As a result, institutional leaders can strike an appropriate balance between providing strategic-level guidance and full engagement in decision-making.

Actually, that is probably one of the toughest management things to learn — when to leave people alone and let them do their job. In addition, people will do a better job if they know that they are not going to be executed at dawn the next day for making a mistake as long as it’s an honest one.

Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) Ken Calder

One of the greatest barriers to managing from a system perspective is the culture of the CF. Institutional leaders play a critical role in facilitating and conducting critical analyses to determine how the “taken for granted” cultural beliefs, assumptions and associated practices influence CF systems, system relationships and the nature of system outputs. It is important to be mindful of the shared cultural beliefs; regardless of content, shared beliefs dominate systems. People frequently do not have accurate, timely, trusted information about what they are doing and why things go wrong. If the culture is indifferent to feedback, institutional leaders can take advantage of available feedback to demonstrate how action based on feedback can improve output. That is, institutional leaders are ultimately responsible for intervening when taken-for-granted beliefs and assumptions influence culture in ways that prevent open processing and integration of feedback. When feedback loops are blocked, systems and subsystems are at risk of losing the capability to self-maintain/sustain themselves. In these instances, institutional leaders consider, above all else, the best interests of the CF and integrated defence capability. Cultural change strategies will rely upon transformational leadership skills such as education, communication, dialogue and consultation, and perhaps most importantly, alternative role modelling.

Institutional leaders have a direct impact on the way that data, information and knowledge are managed within the CF and between the CF and external stakeholders. Information flow within the CF has traditionally been top down through the chain of command and the institutional hierarchy. Typically, the sharing of information horizontally has been limited to distribution through formally appointed institutional leaders, such as unit commanding

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An organization that does not promote the widespread sharing of information will not have well informed individuals and organizational entities. An organization that takes full advantage of the information available will be at a competitive advantage.

*Power to the Edge, 63*

Transforming the CF from a traditional “stove piped” organization to a highly networked, integrated and holistic institution demands that institutional leaders ensure alignment of the commitments and loyalties to the defence of Canada and the effectiveness of the CF. The capability of the senior leadership cadre to optimize a capacity for systems thinking is linked to broader culture-changing goals. Institutional leaders play an important role in continuously clarifying and confirming strategy, vision and commander’s intent. Through such communication they contribute to cultural alignment and ensure that all individuals and groups understand how they can and do contribute to the success of the CF. Institutional leaders across the CF, from senior NCOs to general and flag officers, are key contributors to the CF-wide commitment and trust that are necessary to facilitate open and transparent systems approaches.

**MONITORING AND MEASURING IMPACTS, RELATIONSHIPS AND OUTCOMES**

Systems management is dependent upon reliable knowledge and data to inform decision-making. Monitoring and measurement of system dynamics and outputs to inform feedback loops can range from informal and spontaneous to scientific and systematic. While the possibilities for measurement are endless, the following general principles apply to strategic measures:

- Measures are part of and come from the planning process;
- Measures are implemented over time;
- Measures are owned by an accountable group; and
- Measures are comparable year to year and linked to ongoing plans.

As discussed below, both informal feedback and formal qualitative and quantitative measures can provide valuable sources of feedback.

Institutional leaders frequently have a sense of the significant impacts and relationships within a system, based upon their individual experience or the input of team members and colleagues. Importantly, a systematic measurement accesses inputs from a much broader range of perspectives. Systematic measurement serves to confirm or deny this intuitive understanding of how things are going. When significant resources are at stake, institutional leaders are

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faced with difficult decisions. Within this context it becomes very important that action be based upon what they know to be true from a representative sampling of responses, rather than what they think to be true based on a small number of inputs.

You have to have a huge situational awareness about the organizations and the individuals within that you are dealing with because you have to understand their perspectives.

_Vice-Admiral Ron Buck_

Institutional leaders minimize risk and optimize opportunity through timely access to informal feedback and scientifically developed information. Ready access to information through informal networks enhances the agility and adaptability of institutional leaders. In addition, the continuous development and sharing of knowledge from various perspectives significantly enhances the value of informal networks and increases ready access to a broader range of reliable knowledge. The creation of knowledge-enhancing processes such as communities of practice and informal networks of experts can result from information-sharing environments and contribute to knowledge-rich processes. Many measures provided on an ongoing basis by internal and external organizations, such as reports of the Office of the Auditor General, public opinion polls, the annual report of the CF ombudsman, and routine reports on CF mechanisms of voice (for example, grievance and harassment complaints), are also useful sources of system information.

Monitoring and measurement provide feedback on the pulse of the organization at individual, group/unit, and institutional levels, confirm achievement of intended outcomes, or identify unintended effects and outcomes to inform activities across systems. Longitudinal measures, such as during an initiative and pre- and post-initiative, are useful in identifying trends and changing relationships over time. Institutional leaders enhance the effectiveness of feedback by implementing integrated monitoring and measurement methods and approaches, including multi-system measures that incorporate multi-method measurement tools and facilitate comparison and validation. Quantitative and qualitative data collected from various disciplinary perspectives provide different levels and detail of data that can be used in complementary ways to compare and isolate relationships and outcomes. For example, a survey administered to a sample of the CF population can provide a snapshot of attitudes across the CF and within major subgroups (for example, junior and senior NCM, junior and senior officer). However, a targeted qualitative approach may be necessary to determine what underlies any significant differences across the major subgroups. The monitoring of system dynamics will require particular attention to data-collection methods that measure outputs both within and among systems at individual, group/unit and institutional levels.

The defence performance management framework provides an example of an integrated, multi-method, and strategic approach to performance measurement. Based upon a balanced scorecard approach, the defence planning and management strategy map provides a framework for measuring and communicating how the CF and DND generate

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8 Developed by Kaplan and Norton in the 1990s to translate strategies into measures while reflecting balanced and integrated measurement of the financial and non-financial outcomes of an organization. See Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, _The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action._
value in contributing to the defence objectives. The DND/CF Balanced Scorecard includes numerous measures from across the CF and DND to inform various strategic and transformational objectives (for example, foster leadership and inclusiveness; and relevant, responsive and effective combat-capable, integrated forces). Such measurement processes require the establishment and maintenance of a stream of data and analysis to inform senior leaders and stakeholders on how the CF and DND are progressing on the implementation of strategy in support of defence objectives.

Regardless of the approach chosen, subject matter expertise in selecting appropriate measurement approaches, developing measurement tools, and interpreting and analysing data is important. Culture, for example, comprises a range of very complex phenomena and is quite difficult to measure in a meaningful way. A variety of quantitative and qualitative research methods, such as survey measurement and ethnographic studies, are available and should be considered when investigating and measuring institutional processes and outcomes. Survey measurement, in particular, is very useful to organizations as it provides broad-based results with relative economy; however, there are numerous methodologies and approaches to measurement including focus groups, exit interviews, and demographic analysis, that can be considered for any given measurement challenge. In any case, the resulting data will be only as accurate as the knowledge informing the development of the research tool. Sophisticated techniques and technology will frequently be useful; however, it is most important that they do not drive measurement design. Data accuracy takes precedence over data precision, and measurement design must be driven by the goals of the CF.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

As managers of systems, institutional leaders are responsible for fostering organizational integration, which enhances the overall effectiveness of the CF. This systems approach requires the engagement of a range of processes and activities, including effective governance, innovative partnerships, ongoing consultation across systems, commitment to individual and team development, communication of institutional strategy and commander’s intent, and employment of subject matter experts. The capacity of the CF to implement a systems approach to decision-making is significantly enhanced through knowledge development and processes that enhance shared knowledge across the CF. The capacity of institutional leaders to think critically and to think in terms of systems and relationships is dependent upon the integrated capacity of the institution to generate knowledge and knowledge-building relationships. People are at the heart of these and other processes and systems. The relationship between people and systems is a central consideration of all policies, programs and activities that institutional leaders undertake to contribute to mission success.
Summary – Systems Thinking

Understand the CF as a System of Systems
• Conceptualize the CF as an open system of systems with internal and external input, output and double feedback loop.
• Understand the concept of self-maintenance.
• Understand the relationship between the CF as a system and the larger external environment of systems (also see Chapter 4).
• Understand the relationship between systems and governance in the CF.

Practise Systems Thinking
• Employ systems analysis tools to seek understanding of cause-and-effect relationships, input and output, across stable and predictable processes (e.g., system modelling).
• Anticipate and model illogical, unexpected outcomes.
• Focus on awareness and understanding of the complexity of system dynamics.
• Adopt a global, peripheral vision of systems and relationships.
• Seek understanding of cause and effect; go beyond symptoms.
• Understand the relationship and influences of individual, group/unit and institutional characteristics on CF systems.
• Develop understanding of decision-making processes of related systems.
• Develop and sustain effective feedback processes; seek multiple perspectives.
• Seek balance and efficiency across systems in achieving effective outcome.

Develop a Learning Environment
• Develop individuals, teams and groups with the capacity to learn, develop, share and apply knowledge.
• Establish commitment and trust through shared understanding of strategies and goals.
• Develop and empower subordinate leaders and teams to actively engage in analysis and decision-making.
• Accept risk associated with experiential learning.
• Model, facilitate and support open, transparent and innovative practices.
• Reinforce the strategic context of team contributions.
• Conduct critical analyses of shared beliefs and cultural practices; challenge assumptions.

Monitor and Measure Impacts, Relationships and Outcomes
• Integrate measurement and feedback with strategic planning processes.
• Implement measures over time; monitor output measures on a recurring basis (e.g., year-to-year output).
• Seek optimum combination of informal, scientific, qualitative, quantitative and multi-perspective measures and feedback.
• Integrate available external measures, and conduct comparative analysis with internal measures.
• Make decisions based upon relevant and accurate information and data.

Link to Mission Success
• Monitor relationships between people and all systems and their subcomponents to inform policies, programs, and activities.
Recommended Reading


Chapter 3
Being a Military Strategist

Understanding the Relationship between Strategic Culture and Strategy ........................................ 44
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Link to Mission Success .................................................................................................................. 58
Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 59
At the strategic level, leadership requires a broader perspective and is uniquely about developing and maintaining the capabilities that will enable success at the operational and tactical levels of command both today and tomorrow.

*Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 98*

This chapter presents a discussion of the ways in which institutional leaders engage in the function of making strategy in the Canadian context. Strategy is broadly defined to include both institutional strategies, such as *Defence Strategy 2020*, and applied strategy as a means of distributing and directing military force in conjunction with other sources of national power and influence (national security strategy) to achieve objectives pursuant to a policy goal. In what follows, strategy will be considered as the process by which means are related to ends, intentions to capabilities, and objectives to resources. Formally, the chapter will consider the subject in accordance with this CF definition of strategy: “the art of distributing and applying military means, or the threat of such action, to fulfill the ends of policy.” It is helpful to consider another definition, although not doctrinally authoritative, offered by the strategic theorist Colin S. Gray: “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” Note that both definitions insist that policy guides and even controls strategy. Clearly, strategy must be viewed as both art and science. There are scientific elements and fully rational aspects in the nature of strategy and its application. However, strategy is non-linear and interactive in all its dimensions; it is a subject primarily of the mind, intellect and will. Even in an applied sense the subject of strategy should be approached less in terms of how to *do* strategy in any mechanical sense than in terms of how to *understand* strategy.

**CASE STUDY — Defence Strategy 2020**

*Defence Strategy 2020* is an excellent example of institutional strategy. As discussed in the chapter, the dimensions of military capabilities do not evolve quickly and can take upward of two decades to do so. Military strategy should, therefore, provide for these capabilities in realistic, forward-looking institutional strategies. Furthermore, most people readily agree that the world will not be the same in twenty years as it is today. It was with these thoughts in mind that senior CF institutional leaders, just prior to the turn of the century, developed what has come to be known as *Defence Strategy 2020*. This institutional strategy sought to shape thinking in an environment very different than the one that was extant when the 1994 *Defence White Paper* was published. It also created the foundation for the emerging reform movement in the CF that was designed
to escape the legacy of the Somalia affair. These forward-looking and innovative leaders understood that military effectiveness required more than just a willingness to succeed; it required the right people with the right organizational structure, the right equipment and the right operational doctrine to respond to emerging threats with the rapidity and flexibility required to ensure success. In short, it was recognized that the only way to effectively defend Canada’s interests and values tomorrow would be through changes put in place today.

The Defence Leadership Team developed Defence Strategy 2020 by first examining the current defence mandate and mission. They then reviewed ongoing changes throughout the world and engaged the assistance of military and defence experts. Although it was accepted that there was no sure way of predicting the future, it was also understood that there was much that could be reasonably forecast based upon current and emerging trends. Some of the trends assessed were geopolitical (for example, the United States would likely remain the dominant global power, and religious extremism and ethnic unrest would be the main sources of conflict); military (for example, the future battlespace would be global in scope, cyberspace would add another dimension, operations would be conducted at an accelerated pace); socio-economical (for example, Canadians would continue to value the environment, economic growth, education, health, and social justice); and organizational (for example, the most effective organizations would be adaptable and innovative, and leadership would become more important than administration or management).

Armed with the knowledge that the future is not totally predictable, the developers of Defence Strategy 2020 did not simply rely upon an extrapolation of trends; they evaluated the strategic options through a matrix of future scenarios. Three possible futures were considered: first, a strategically stable and benign world; second, a world where regional instabilities and conflicts would reflect the current state; and third, a malignant world typified by even greater instability and rivalry. The team then assessed CF strengths and weaknesses to establish current capabilities and the mechanisms that might be put in place to meet the future challenges. The resulting document, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (Defence Strategy 2020), provides a road map on how Canada can best implement its defence policy to ensure future success.

**Summary Analysis**

The 1994 Defence White Paper set the government policy on defence. As a result, institutional leaders were required to craft a strategy for its implementation. The five-year gap between policy articulation and strategy creation in this case was arguably too long. Nonetheless, the necessity to become more innovative, strategically focused, and proactive did impact the strategic orientation of the institution, as did the five strategic imperatives: to set and maintain a coherent strategy for the future; to nurture pride in the institution; to maximize its strategic partnerships; to maintain a relevant force structure; and to improve resource stewardship. As such, these lessons were learned also from the Defence Strategy 2020 experience, and the 2005 defence policy statement was followed immediately by the articulation of an institutional transformation process.
UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND STRATEGY

Institutional leaders in their role as Canadian military strategists should acquire a deep understanding of Canadian strategic culture through study and experience. Strategic culture has been described as a nation’s way of war and conflict. Therefore, Canadian strategists need to develop a viable working hypothesis concerning the Canadian “way of war and conflict.” This can only be achieved through intense study of Canadian history and politics, which includes, of course, its international dimension. Canadian military strategists consider how governments, senior civilian officials, and institutional leaders in the CF have, over time, established a Canadian strategic culture in response to the external (and occasionally internal) threat environment. Strategists seek to identify and understand Canada’s strategic culture through intellectual effort and extended discourse with key actors in the policy-making and security communities.

Military strategists understand strategic culture to be an integrated system of symbols (that is, argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, et cetera) that acts to establish pervasive and long-term grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in political affairs. The strategic culture thus established reflects national preconceptions and historical experience as much as it does purely objective responses to any given threat environment.

The “grand strategic preferences” referred to above provide the link between strategy and the broader construct of national security strategy, that is, where military force is integrated with all other sources of national power. Strategic culture is thus the context in which discrete strategies are formulated. Strategic culture endures for at least generations and is very slow to change. Individual strategies, while long-term by nature, may change frequently in response to the threat environment. Strategic culture is thus shaped decisively by both national historical behaviour and national character and identity. Both of these parameters, although real, are amorphous and subject to much debate and interpretation.

Broadly speaking, Canada’s strategic culture derives from our historical ties with the United Kingdom, France and the United States and from Canadian experience with these countries in peace and war throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and into the twenty-first century. Our unique experience of the nuclear age and the Cold War has also powerfully moulded Canada’s approach to the role and uses of military force. Domestically, geography and politics are key influences. In particular, politicians and policy-makers have always had to face three threats to national sovereignty and even national survival: absorption, disintegration and, more remotely, direct threats to Canada and its interests. Generally, over the years, Canadians have tended to define who or what is to be made secure in terms broader than the Canadian nation, always conscious that, for Canada, serious threats were not necessarily military in nature.

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realm of action.

On War, 82
UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF STRATEGY
Carl von Clausewitz, the great military theoretician, said, “War has its own grammar but not its own logic.” Policy supplies the logic; and strategy, operational art, and tactics supply the grammar. Strategists understand that there are logically associated strategic orientations best suited to achieve any selected political objective. If the objective requires the unconditional surrender of the adversary, for example, as in the Second World War, then the strategy employed seeks the overthrow of the opponent through the destruction of all means of resistance. The strategic goal is decisive victory. Individual actions and victories are important only insofar as they contribute to final overall military victory. If, on the other hand, the objective sought is a limited one, as was the case in the Korean War, the strategy employed is a more complicated one, combining battle with non-military means such as diplomacy and economic sanctions. In the strategy of annihilation, diplomacy, economics and other forms of national power may be used, but they are integrated into and subsidiary to the continuous flow of military operations. With more limited objectives, the juxtaposition of military and non-military means constitutes a “bipolar” strategy.

Battles combined into large campaign plans at the operational level in the bipolar strategy can be as intense as those fought with the strategy of annihilation, as for example, was the case in the Gulf War of 1990–1991. However, mindful of the limited nature of the conflict, the strategist co-ordinates resorting to the battle pole with other means of achieving success. Such interplay is what makes this strategy bipolar. Here the strategist should possess the skill and determination to be a successful war fighter while mastering the knowledge and acquiring the temperament of a soldier-diplomat and soldier-scholar. The bipolar strategy is the appropriate one in the Canadian context given the requirement to seek national security and viable international relations through defence, diplomacy and development (the three-D model). This model of strategy within the framework of the general system of war and conflict is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The new forms of confrontation and conflict are always a complex combination of political and military circumstances. The military strategist focuses on how they constantly influence each other as events unfold.

Figure 3.1: The General System of War and Conflict
According to this system, in the bipolar strategy the strategist uses force to ameliorate and contain the situation, to deter and coerce in order to alter the confrontation, or to destroy elements of the opponent. In the latter case, recourse to the battle pole is required to resolve the conflict. This, if successfully done, will contribute to the resolution of the confrontation, but such resolution will always require action on both poles of the strategy.

[There is credence to the claim] that there is a unity to all strategic experience: nothing essential changes in the nature and function (or purpose) — in sharp contrast to the character — of strategy and war.

*Modern Strategy*, ix

Canada’s involvement in the operation in Kosovo is an instructive example of the application of the bipolar strategy. Canada agreed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that force might be required to achieve their goal of halting Serbian aggression in Kosovo. Canadian policy-makers always viewed this goal within the context of its humanitarian basis, and therefore Canadian strategists, in co-operation with NATO, developed a bipolar strategy that initially used diplomacy, information operations, the media and an unarmed verification mission to achieve the policy objective. Eventually NATO moved to concurrent military operations on the battle pole, with Canada providing air, sea and land elements. The Serbs fully complied, and the land element rapidly found itself in a peace-enforcement and later peacekeeping role. This unique ability to seamlessly transition from war fighting to stability operations, that is, to move from the battle to the non-battle pole of a bipolar strategy, has become a trademark of the Canadian Forces.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the leadership function as it moves from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level. At the tactical level, leadership is predominately about leading people. However, tactical leaders affect the institution through their behaviour and sometimes through their actions (the “strategic corporal”). Therefore, there is always an element of institutional leadership possible here. It is incumbent on leaders at the tactical level, who have first-hand experience of both the “threat” and the existing capability, to identify and advocate changes at the institutional level to training, doctrine, equipment and personnel skills that are made necessary by evolution in the battlespace. Further, such leaders take whatever action is within their authority to initiate changes in order to generate the required operational capability.

The operational or theatre level represents the transition from the tactical to the strategic level. Leadership at the theatre level is primarily institutional leadership. After all, operational headquarters, such as Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, do not even have large numbers of troops assigned until actively deployed. During preparations, and even after deployment, leadership is about developing campaign plans, allocating resources and co-ordinating integrated operations — in short, shaping the battlespace to enable tactical success. The strategic level is concerned very largely with institutional leadership. Nonetheless, strategic-level leaders are still involved to some degree with leading people.
CASE STUDY — Operation Apollo: Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism

Operation Apollo provides an example of applied military strategy to achieve policy ends. Canada’s contribution to the war on terrorism during the period 2001–2002 illustrates the significantly improved state of CF institutional effectiveness since the Cold War. Prior to 1990, the CF had not had effective, permanent institutional means to respond with military force during a rapidly developing crisis situation. The ad hoc J-Staff established in 1990 to deal with Oka and the Persian Gulf was the first step, but the force generation and deployment pattern that developed from 1991 to 1995 was uneven. In many cases the combination of a cap in mission personnel established by the government and unrealistic demands by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations produced deployments that were limited in capability and difficult to support. In the case of Somalia, the changing and unfamiliar nature of the mission, a specialist-armed humanitarian intervention, taxed planners who had no doctrine or experience from which to work.

By 2001, however, the experience gained by the CF in the Balkans and elsewhere, particularly during the crisis in Kosovo, had paid off. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York, the CF was able to generate rapidly a force structure for operations in and around Afghanistan that was salient, effective and capable. Canadian ships conducted leadership interdiction operations as part of a multinational task force. For almost two years, the Navy mobilized for the largest operation since the Korean War. Practically the entire fleet — fifteen out of seventeen major combat-capable surface vessels — deployed to the southwest Asian theatre during that time frame. Canadian special operations forces worked seamlessly with their American and other allied counterparts. The Canadian battle-group force package deployed to Kandahar, which included an infantry battalion and was supported by a recce squadron equipped with the latest technology and satellite communications, was stood up and deployed in less time than any Canadian overseas deployment in the 1990s.

Summary Analysis

In the case of Operation Apollo, Canadian military strategists developed an effective applied strategy that linked national policy goals to coalition operational campaign planning as well as to deployed tactical forces. In assisting American and coalition efforts ashore and leading the multinational co-operation in interception operations at sea, the CF increased security at home and abroad. The rapidity of the Canadian response, particularly with the special operations forces, secured Canada significant influence within the coalition and at the same time was an effective component of the hunt for Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Clearly the CF was institutionally more effective in delivering an expeditionary capability immediately after 9/11 than it had been in the 1991–1995 period. In essence, Canadian military strategists correctly interpreted political intent and assigned effective tactical forces appropriate to the campaign plan.
EMPLOYING THE DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

Military strategists should not be misled by the deceptively simple definition of strategy. Strategy quickly becomes enmeshed in great complexity when the many broad, pervasive and interpenetrating dimensions of strategy are considered. Military strategists can profitably use a model that groups the dimensions of strategy into three categories as indicated in Table 3.1.
Strategy makers assess all of these dimensions, assigning appropriate weight to each, as they develop strategic plans and directives. All dimensions apply to both the annihilation strategy and the bipolar strategy. In the former the non-military dimensions are distinctly subordinate to the military goal of decisive victory at the strategic level. In the bipolar strategy these dimensions are accorded greater status and indeed may predominate during certain phases of the confrontation. The primary dimensions will be briefly covered below within the context of the Strategic Planning Cycle.

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<th>People and Politics</th>
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<th>War and Conflict Proper</th>
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<td>Society</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>Organization¹</td>
<td>Geography</td>
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<td>Politics</td>
<td>Military Administration²</td>
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¹ including defence and force planning
² including the personnel functions, professional development, and most aspects of armament
³ including chance and uncertainty

CASE STUDY — Canadian Command Styles in Maritime Operations

As discussed in the chapter, military strategists should master the eighteen dimensions of strategy housed within the three categories: people and politics; preparations for war and conflict; and war and conflict proper. From 1990 onwards, Navy leadership prosecuted a successful strategy exploiting uniquely Canadian factors of environment, technology and culture to effectively prepare national maritime forces for combat operations overseas. From December 2001 until the end of October 2003, senior naval officers exercised the responsibility of commanding a multinational coalition fleet gathered on the Arabian Sea for the initial stages of what has become an ongoing war against terrorism. As Operation Enduring Freedom continued, the Canadian phase, Operation Apollo, represented a unique Canadian style of leadership in coalition operations. Canadian naval commanders led an efficient co-ordination of the at-sea employment of an array of surface, air and sub-surface forces from a disparate collection of navies — some of them not typical “allies,” and a great many from different cultural backgrounds. The apex was the designation of a Canadian commodore as commander of Task Force 151 from February through June 2003.
One recent study points to Operation Apollo as "the realization of what can be termed a Canadian (naval) command style." As a medium-power navy with limited resources, the Canadian Navy has sought "command parity" with its larger allies, but as an essentially small-ship navy with limited power-projection capabilities, it has had to compensate through technical and tactical innovation, much of that resulting from a unique level of interoperability with the United States Navy (USN). At the same time, an open-minded and culturally inclusive approach, reflective of Canadian values, has been internalized by senior Canadian commanders, making them uniquely sensitive to the fostering of coalition operations.

As noted above, the three most important factors contributing to this Canadian command style in the Navy have been the environment, technology and culture. Due to the rigorous physical environments of Canada’s three oceans, the Navy has had to design ships that can deploy long distances in a wide variety of sea conditions. The end result is a fleet that can be sustained over oceanic ranges and possesses a relevant general-purpose war fighting capability with strong command and control (C2) for interoperability with USN operations. Further developments in interoperability were achieved once Canadian warships began integrating with USN battle groups. This higher level of interoperability meant that Canadian warships had full communication connectivity with satellite communications and more complex and sophisticated network-enabled classified systems. Nevertheless, Canadian warships still possessed the more pedestrian communications suites generally available off the shelf and common to other smaller navies. The interoperability enabled the Canadian Navy to act as a gateway to other navies, many of whom were and still are unable to link into USN C2 systems. Finally, Canada’s multinational perspective enabled Canadian commanders to be perceived as effective leaders in a coalition environment. All of these assets are underpinned by technical competence in maritime operations. Canadian commanders have paid special attention to the technical capabilities and limitations of coalition members, to ensure the best operational employment, while also taking into account the political direction and aspirations of their respective governments.

**Summary Analysis**

Canadian maritime strategists brought the various elements of environment, technology and culture to great effect for the Canadian Navy in Operation Apollo in 2001. The ability to deploy a significant, competent force capable of working with the USN immediately upon arrival demonstrated an inherent flexibility that would be useful in coalition operations. Along with the gateway command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technical capabilities resident in the task force flagship, the obvious professional competence of Canadian sailors and their commanders in a variety of warfare skills, and a cultural predisposition to act in concert with others, a succession of Canadian commanders very quickly earned and maintained a command role over coalition forces.

**APPLYING THE STRATEGIC PLANNING CYCLE**

Strategists can use a relatively simple strategic planning cycle model to help bring order to the complexity inherent in the interaction of all the dimensions of strategy. It is composed of four parts: External and Internal Analysis; Strategic Visioning and Plan; Implementation; and Controlling, Evaluating and Re-assessing. This cycle is both continuous and iterative. External and internal analysis relates primarily to people and politics, but overlaps...
with preparation for war and conflict. Strategic visioning and plan relates to preparations for war and conflict, and implementation relates to war and conflict proper.

This particular heuristic model is not the only available approach to strategic planning. Strategists explore a range of models using each as appropriate. In fact, part of the job of institutional leaders is to constantly seek to develop better, more effective models.

Within the external and internal analysis part of the cycle — the strategic estimate — strategists scan and diagnose the environment and assess the challenges and opportunities it presents. A picture of the security risk is created. In the past the strategic estimate used a “threat-based” approach designed to deal with a clearly identifiable opponent (for example, the Soviet Union). In the current security environment a “scenario-based” approach is employed, although it is not devoid of threat definition. Concurrently an equally comprehensive, realistic and reliable internal assessment of the present state of the forces in being is conducted, that is, of the strengths and weaknesses. The assistance of various subject matter experts is usually indispensable in this phase.

In the next part of the cycle — strategic visioning and plan — strategists formulate the strategic vision, that is, the desired end state, or the commander’s intent, and the plan for getting there. The strategist identifies the number of strategic objectives required to realize the vision. Again, the vision must lead to the achievement of a policy end state. These objectives may be pursued simultaneously or sequentially depending on the situation. Inherent in the objectives will be the force generation, professional development, and equipment requirements necessary to achieve them.

In the implementation phase the objectives are assigned to appropriate operational-level organizations, or such organizations are created. Resources of all types are allocated to these organizations in order to begin operations. Although simple to state, this process is easier said than done.

Finally, during the controlling, evaluating and re-assessing phase, operations are controlled through the issuance of broad strategic directives that define theatres of operations and co-ordinate campaigns. For example, during the Gulf War in 1991, Canadian strategy was closely co-ordinated with Washington as well as with the commander of Central Command. The Pentagon co-ordinated the activities of the two commanders-in-chief involved: Supreme Allied Command Europe, who was responsible for Israel; and Commander-in-Chief Central (CINCCENT), who was responsible for operations in the Kuwait theatre of operations. Canadian Forces were employed in accordance with CINCCENT’s campaign plan.

Strategists constantly evaluate progress, keep policymakers apprised of the overall situation, and gather data upon which to base decisions. As required, either because of policy changes or the situation in the field, they readjust resources, alter strategic objectives, or direct changes in campaign plans.

External and Internal Analysis

People and Politics: Canadian military strategists address people and politics in a Canadian context and develop a deep appreciation for country’s society and culture. In the case of the Canadian political system, they certainly need to understand partisan politics, but they act in an apolitical manner in their strategy-making role. Key to this dimension is the requirement to be thoroughly familiar with the way policy is made in Ottawa. They “know the town” and are able to “work the town” (see Chapter 4). Institutional leaders participate as advisors and collaborators in the creation of security policy. They know the process, and in each particular case they
seek to be familiar with all the broad factors that result in any given policy program or goal. Strategists should be intimately knowledgeable about existing policy as it is articulated in formal statements such as White Papers, or less formally, in prime ministerial and ministerial directives and declarations. Canada’s security, foreign and defence policies are contained in three related documents: *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (April 2004); *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview* (2005), Canada’s international policy statement; and *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (2005), Canada’s defence policy statement.

These documents respond to the very different security situation since, especially, the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on New York, but more important, they seek to shape the future environment through all levers of national power, including military power. They benefited from an extensive consultation process in which military advice played a significant role. Taken together, they provide the basis for the development of a national security strategy that combines CF military capability with a wide variety of other resources of national power including diplomacy, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and financial support. Strategists analyse such policies carefully to derive militarily relevant objectives that can then be executed at the operational and tactical levels.

Within the context of government policy the institutional focus for strategy-making is National Defence Headquarters, with its broad network of relationships throughout the federal government. In particular, strategic leaders need to understand the role of Parliament, the Prime Minister and relevant Ministers in the policy-making process and indeed their periodic direct involvement in strategy. Equally important is the requirement to develop direct contacts with key actors in central agencies such as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Privy Council Office (PCO) and Treasury Board (TB). Finally, strategic leaders will deal directly and frequently with relevant officials in pivotal departments such as Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Emergency Preparedness.

Internationally, CF strategists co-ordinate and even integrate Canadian strategy with allies and partners bilaterally and through coalitions and alliances. They acquire a very wide knowledge of international affairs, country and regional expertise, and a cultural awareness. In practice there is (or certainly should be) a constant dialogue between military effort and political goals.

Canadian Forces strategists realize that, in the Canadian strategic culture, politicians and many civil authorities often engage directly in strategy. Therefore, strategic leaders need to work hard at informing and explaining the nature and role of military power and collaborate closely with civilian authorities whose own responsibilities overlap the area where politics and strategy meet. This is the nexus for the integration of CF strategy into the broader national security strategy. The strategist is responsible to deal with the tension and friction often inherent at the policy-strategy interface. Politicians and civilian officials can be unaware or lack knowledge of things military and are usually uncertain when it comes to the efficacy of military force. At the same time, military strategists must be wary of resenting what might be viewed as unnecessary intrusion into the formulation of military strategy. Henry Kissinger’s advice is a good antidote for both realities:

> A complete separation of military strategy and policy at the highest levels can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It caused [causes] military power to become identified with the most absolute application of
power and it tempts diplomacy into overconcern with finesse. Since the most difficult problems of national policy are the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as “purely military advice”.¹

Military strategists should ensure that CF strategies have been fully co-ordinated with DND and with relevant external stakeholders. It is not unusual in Ottawa for ADM (Policy) or the DM to express an interest in military strategy, even its details. Certainly, ADM (Fin CS), ADM (Materiel) and other Level 1s (L1s) have a direct role in supporting CF strategy and therefore should be involved in its formulation to one degree or another. The Minister, beyond merely being kept informed, may become involved directly. For example, during the difficult days in Bosnia before the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation assumed control from the United Nations, the MND personally participated in a map exercise to help devise an exit strategy for CF personnel in the UN Protection Force. Outside officials from Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, and PCO are also likely to express deep interest in CF strategy. This is not to say that civilian officials should have significant influence in determining how military strategic objectives should be achieved; however, they clearly have significant influence in establishing what those objectives are.

**Ethics:** Canadian military strategists ensure that all strategy-making, from formulation to execution, is informed by the military ethos. Institutional leaders in their roles as strategists use the military ethos as a key criterion when judging the efficacy of the chosen strategy. Canadian strategies, whether institutional or applied, reflect loyalty, integrity and moral courage. Keeping in mind that war and conflict are as much about will as about physical clashes, success comes from strategies that reflect the fighting spirit and teamwork that form a part of the Canadian military ethos.

Equally as important, strategy needs to reflect fundamental Canadian values if it is to be understood and supported by Canadian society. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s the political and military debate in Canada over the acquisition and use of tactical nuclear weapons involved military and technical issues that precluded an unambiguous decision to move forward in this area. The Government’s final decision to reject these weapons, however, was greatly facilitated politically due to Canadian society’s antipathy to Canada remaining in the “nuclear club.”

In contemporary times, Canadian military strategists responding to the Canadian position in such matters need to be intimately knowledgeable about the various laws of armed conflict and other related conventions. This is particularly important in an era of non-conventional and asymmetrical armed conflict.

**Strategic Visioning and Plan - Preparing for War and Conflict**

Military strategists start with a vision that is firmly grounded in a policy context (see Chapter 5). The vision is the strategic analogue to commander’s intent at the operational and tactical levels. The strategist then describes and explains how the vision will be realized. This involves the establishment of militarily viable strategic objectives, their sequencing and their resourcing. Strategy, however, is a dynamic phenomenon, and therefore, effective strategists have to be capable of thinking critically and exercising great flexibility of mind.

Economics, Logistics and Organization: Strategymakers develop long-term institutional strategies based on the nature of current and future threats (intelligence). These guide the evolution of the CF and DND to meet a range of contingencies. Such institutional strategies provide a focus for defence decision-making, guide planning, force structure, and procurement decisions, as well as investments in personnel, education and training. Applied strategies designed to deal with particular policy goals are enabled by institutional strategies. For this reason institutional leaders collaborating with colleagues in DND and other agencies and departments in the creation of these broad, enabling strategies need to shape them in such a manner that they directly support operational goals.

Within a purely CF context, CF-wide institutional strategies are guided and developed from the top, beginning with the Defence Management Committee. This involves the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister, in the roles of co-chairs, as well as all L1s, military and civilian. The Armed Forces Council provides the venue for the CDS to obtain military advice from its members and achieve unity of purpose and understanding. The VCDS co-ordinates the efforts of all participants, civilian as well as military.

The Navy, the Army and the Air Force each have institutional strategies that are used to organize and generate operationally ready forces. Each has strategic concepts that guide its maritime, land or air operations. For example, the Air Force published Strategic Vectors, a planning document that provides for the transformation of the Air Force from its Cold War–oriented organization to a new force prepared to conduct operations in the future security environment of the twenty-first century. Such strategies are incorporated into higher-level CF strategy. This is a major function of the strategic staff estimate as part of the ongoing CF transformation process.

The dimension of organization within which strategic leaders work is the CF-DND defence framework, and they collaborate with their civilian colleagues to allow DND to support and enable operational goals.

Strategic Theory and Doctrine: In terms of strategic theory and doctrine, CF strategists have replaced, as working theories, deterrence, conventional war fighting, and peacekeeping with conflict resolution; the integration of the Defence, Diplomacy and Development framework (the stated Government policy regarding Canada’s response to armed conflict); and the “Three-Block War” concept. The three-block war concept is merely the manifestation at the tactical level of a bipolar strategy that requires the use of military force on both poles of that strategy — humanitarian aid and peacekeeping on the non-battle pole, and combat on the battle pole. The constant creation and refinement of such strategic concepts is a prime responsibility of Canadian military strategists. Strategists then take these concepts and develop doctrine to prosecute fully integrated, inter-agency operations, with the clear recognition that combat capability must be sustained.

Technology: Strategists keep abreast of technology on a broad front and incorporate appropriate technologies into all applied strategies. Sources and conduits to relevant knowledge and assistance in its application in this domain include the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC),2 Defence Research and Development Canada, and Canadian Forces College. Strategists would be well advised to pay particular attention to this dimension of strategy given the rapid, dramatic pace of technological change. However, despite some extreme views, what has been called a revolution in military affairs has not changed the nature of war and conflict. Canadian Forces strategists, therefore, should not be slaves to technophilia. Strategy will continue to be primarily about people, concepts, willpower and moral strength.

2 The Department of Applied Military Science at RMC (Faculty of Engineering) is focused on technology as it relates to military applications.
Implementing Strategy — War and Conflict Proper

Military Operations and Command: War and conflict proper is the sharp end of applied strategy. Here the strategist translates policy goals into strategic objectives and allocates resources to achieve them. These strategic objectives take policy and convert them into successful missions. Military strategists view strategy as a bridge between unlike elements — politics (policy) and armed conflict. They are aware that the former tends to be indefinite, ambiguous and highly subjective, the latter limited, concrete and relatively objective.

A major challenge in this part of the cycle is the establishment of an effective command structure down through the tactical level. In today’s multi-dimensional, inter-agency operations this will involve the integration of, or co-ordination with, non-military assets. Of course, manoeuvre of allocated resources is the responsibility of commanders at the operational and tactical levels. Institutional leaders, in their role as strategists, need to resist the temptation to intervene unnecessarily at these levels. Certainly, strategic leaders should be fully aware of conditions on the ground both to keep policy informed and to help shape the battlespace for lower-level commanders. When strategy changes, so will campaign plans, but sound strategy is best executed by well-trained leaders at the operational and tactical levels who are accorded maximum autonomy.

Strategic- and theatre-level leaders, nonetheless, in the modern era appreciate that there are factors at play that impose a kind of exogenous oversight of operations. Questions that conventionally were considered purely operational are now exposed to a type of oversight that influences the conduct of operations throughout a campaign. This is, in fact, in the nature of the bipolar strategy. The media is ubiquitous and even embedded in operations. Technology allows access to a wide variety of interested actors, and tempts micromanagement throughout the chain of command from the political level down. The complex legal considerations in most operations today also mean that lawyers are involved at every level, advising on how to reconcile force with law. For all these reasons the phenomenon of civilian involvement in operations is virtually unavoidable. Strategists deal with this reality, constantly mitigating its more deleterious impact where necessary. They cannot, however, completely eliminate the kinds of ethical challenges posed as they reconcile their loyalty upward to elected civil authority and downward to subordinates focused on the environment on the ground and unfamiliar with all of the resultant pressures at the policy-strategy interface. There is no template to respond to this issue. Strategists and theatre-level leaders rely on their professional judgment and the core military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage.

In past years CF doctrine has evolved and now formally incorporates the operational level of war and conflict between tactics and strategy, reflecting the model for a general system of war and conflict. Strategists must completely understand the Operational Planning Process and Systemic Operational Design used to develop campaign plans and control tactical activities. Campaigns are planned and executed at the operational level, using the operational planning process, to achieve objectives set by strategy. Operational manoeuvre, a function of mass and mobility, is used to disrupt and disorient the adversary, generally shape the battlefield and synchronize tactical manoeuvre, a function of fire and movement. Tactical manoeuvre brings about the direct destruction of the adversary. All operations at the operational level are inherently joint and increasingly integrated with non-military assets.

Strategists use the general system of war and conflict to devise organizational structures and procedures so that the CF delivers military force effectively at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the policy-strategy interface (in the realm
of civil-military relations), national security policy and strategy are formulated through the close collaboration of all relevant actors. Military strategists participate at all levels of the policy-strategy interface. The CDS attends Cabinet as required, and lower-level leaders attend co-ordinating meetings at PCO as well as frequent bilateral working sessions with a number of other departments and agencies.

Internally, military strategists structure the force appropriately at each level. Thus, for example, in 2005, as part of the CF transformation process, a number of new and discrete headquarters were created at the operational level: Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Special Operations Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command. Canadian Forces doctrine specifies that the CDS serves as the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada and commands at the strategic level. The overall structure, with the CDS at its head, is command-centric with a clear and unambiguous chain of command from the strategic to the tactical level, with commanders at all levels clearly understanding their assigned authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities. The CDS’s command and advisory roles give rise to a Strategic Joint Staff structure that serves these two functions. The first staff function is to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS in his or her role of principal military advisor to the Government. The second is to enable the CDS to effect strategic command, allowing him or her to plan, initiate, direct, synchronize and control operations at the strategic level.

The Adversaries and Friction: Finally, in the category of war and conflict proper the strategist must consider the adversary and the concept of friction. The French military strategist André Beaufre captures this dimension elegantly when he defines strategy as “the art of the dialectic of force, or more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.” The problem for strategy, therefore, is that every cunning plan has to succeed against not blind nature but rather an adversary with whom the strategist conducts a long-term tactical, operational, strategic, political and moral dialogue.

Unlike the Cold War, where the adversary was fairly clear, the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century is much more ambiguous for military strategists. There is no readily definable enemy but, rather, generalized instability, ethnic nationalism, failed and failing states, and ultimately, global terrorism. Reflecting this situation, Canada’s Defence Policy Statement states: “The fluid nature of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict the precise threats we might face even five years from now.” The Statement goes on to list four broad threats, in order of priority: failed and failing states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and regional flashpoints. The military strategists devise appropriate, effective applied strategies to deal with all contingencies in each of these threat areas, or any other that may emerge.

Strategists should understand the nature of friction in conflict. They guard against being lulled into complacency when a large number of dimensions of strategy are, or seem to be, unchanging. This state of affairs is almost always deceptive. Strategists prudently assume that strategy always involves a contest with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. The institutional leader as strategist understands that it is important to constantly scan the strategic horizon, across all its dimensions, detecting and interpreting changes in all of them — and then adjust.

However, the many categories or dimensions used to encompass the field of strategy cannot be viewed in a linear fashion. Strategy is interactive in all of its dimensions and in all aspects. It is easy to imagine how the issue can be complicated by various combinations and permutations of categories. This reality
has two major implications for CF institutional leaders. First, all institutional leaders have important roles to play in making strategy. Each occupies a position or appointment along one or more of the dimensions of strategy discussed above. As a result, all institutional leaders have a responsibility to be expert in the field of their contribution to the making of strategy. In addition, however, they must master the full subject of strategy in all its other dimensions. This is as true for the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) as it is for the Chief Force Development (CFD).

Second, strategy is difficult. It can only be done collaboratively, and it bridges two domains — the political domain and the physical domain of armed conflict at the operational and tactical levels. Institutional leaders have a responsibility to their political masters and Canadian society, as well as subordinates, to maintain a system of professional development that can produce military strategists of the first order. The Professional Development Framework discussed in Chapter 7 is designed to achieve this goal. Expertise, professional ideology, and cognitive, social and change capacities combine to generate institutional leaders capable of contributing fully to the formulation of overall national security strategy.

INTEGRATING STRATEGY INTO NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

So far the subject of strategy and being a strategist has been discussed in a simplified way, isolating it in large measure from its real context in national security policy and national security strategy. This allowed a detailed analysis of the concept before linking it to the broader construct of national security strategy. Military strategy does not and cannot stand alone; it is integrated into national security strategy as only one, albeit important, component. It is the responsibility of institutional leaders in the CF, acting as strategy makers, to bring about this integration in collaboration with the politicians and civil authorities who are also responsible in their own capacities for the defence of Canada. National security strategy can be defined by paraphrasing the generic definition of strategy: the art of co-ordinating, integrating and applying all sources of national power and influence to ensure the security and well-being of Canada and its citizens. In the post-modern world of the twenty-first century the difficulty and complexity of this task can hardly be overstated. Engaging in the process of making national security policy imposes enormous demands on institutional leaders in terms not only of expertise but of interpersonal skills, networking and communicating.

In the real world of making national security policy and strategy in Ottawa, political objectives are not always well defined and sometimes change with changing circumstances. Often there is not enough longer-term strategic thinking in Government, and planning is not always well thought out, long term, or necessarily well co-ordinated. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult for institutional leaders to know what they may be asked to do with military force, which, in turn, makes it hard to predict what might be required and how to prepare for it. The point is, do not expect clarity at all times nor simplicity. Strategists work in an environment characterized by “the fog of war” and “the friction of war” every bit as much as do theatre commanders and tactical leaders, albeit of a somewhat different nature.

Strategists need to be acutely aware of the different capacities required at the strategic and operational levels versus the tactical level. Research shows convincingly how strengths that served well at the tactical level can become dysfunctional when individuals move to higher levels. Certain characteristics that are invaluable in a strong leader in any organization, and especially prized in the military — such as self-confidence, willingness to accept responsibility, a thirst for facts and hard data, and respect for the status quo — all have possible
downsides. The function of strategy-making and conducting campaigns requires contemplation before action, tolerance for ambiguity, and appreciation for broad participation in the decision-making process. At the strategic level there are tenuous links between cause and effect; results — even when discernible — are difficult to quantify. Often there are incomplete or conflicting data from multiple sources. At the theatre level the challenge, in addition, is to be able to bridge the gap between somewhat abstract strategic objectives and the mechanical application of force at the tactical level. Furthermore, institutional leaders at the theatre level are able to combine mass and mobility over extended space and time to achieve effective operational manoeuvre. This is a capability much different than directing fire and movement at the tactical level.

The national security apparatus in Canada, reflecting Canadian strategic culture, is not as structured as in many Western countries such as the United States, France or the United Kingdom, although since 9/11, this has been changing. Thus, for example, the 2004 National Security Policy was the first of its kind in Canadian history. Also, an official with the rank of Deputy Minister was appointed as the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor. A Cabinet committee has been established to consider national security policy, and the new Department of Public Safety and Emergency has taken on considerable new responsibilities for national security matters.

The Privy Council Office is responsible to Cabinet for the co-ordination of national security matters under the general oversight of the Clerk of the Privy Council. Meetings are conducted on a regular, though not scheduled, basis, bringing together officials from all relevant departments and agencies, including Canada’s whole intelligence apparatus. These meetings take place at several levels involving officials of various ranks. Most frequently a core group of representatives from DND, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Justice Canada and the intelligence community are involved. Representatives from other departments and agencies attend as required. As the chief military advisor to the Government, the CDS meets, as required, with the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence to discuss the highest levels of strategy and national security strategy. The Deputy Minister of National Defence also has important responsibilities in this area and discharges them in conjunction with the CDS. Institutional leaders as strategy-makers often represent the CDS throughout the national security network in the country, and they therefore rely upon a multitude of contacts in Ottawa and elsewhere. National security inevitably has an international and multinational dimension, and strategy-makers spend a lot of time consulting and collaborating with allies — bilaterally and in alliance contexts.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

Making strategy, either institutional or applied, is critical to mission success. Institutional strategy is essential for the development of requisite capabilities to execute defence and national security policy. Applied strategy bridges policy and enables the operations in the field to prevail. Mission success is about institutional effectiveness, which is the sum of organizational effectiveness and professional effectiveness. Effective strategy melds these two together in ways that bring coherence to operations and represent the ordered application of military capabilities to achieve policy ends, including the use of force when necessary, in the most efficient manner and at the least cost to the Canadian Forces and the nation.
Understand the Relationship Between Strategic Culture and Strategy
• Develop a keen working hypothesis concerning strategic culture — the Canadian way in war and conflict.
• Understand how governments, senior civilian officials, and CF institutional leaders have, over time, established a Canadian strategic culture in response to the threat environment.
• Appreciate how strategic culture is shaped decisively by national historical behaviour and national character and identity.

Employ all the Dimensions Of Strategy
• Assess all 18 dimensions of strategy when developing strategic plans.
• Apply the Strategic Planning Cycle.
• Understand that the dimensions of strategy are pervasive, interactive and non-linear.

Apply the Strategic Planning Cycle
• Use the Strategic Planning Cycle to bring order to the complexity inherent in the interaction of all the dimensions of strategy.

Integrate Strategy into National Security Strategy
• The art and science of co-ordinating, integrating and applying all sources of national power and influence to ensure the security and well-being of Canada and its citizens.
• Strategists represent the CDS throughout the security network in the country as well as internationally in a multilateral context.

Link to Mission Success
• Strategy represents the ordered application of military force to achieve policy ends in the most efficient manner at the least cost to the CF and the nation.

Summary – Being a Military Strategist
Recommended Reading


Bentley, L. W. *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005.


Section 2
Practical Aspects of Leading The Institution
Only extensive knowledge and acceptance of the democratic political processes that sustain the Canadian state and its relationship to the international system will allow military professionals to collaborate effectively in the civil-military equation.

*Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada, 42*

Civil-military relations can be defined as the interrelationship, even interdependence, of the general system of war and conflict and the government structure that is made up of constitutional, political and public service dimensions. Largely, that interrelationship is also the policy-strategy interface. Institutional leadership at National Defence Headquarters, therefore, involves important and indispensable relationships with government as a whole, including other government departments, central agencies, Parliament and a number of disparate external stakeholders. Policy-makers and strategic planners face a complex environment, including multiple categories and levels of governance, diverse social and economic groups and regions, unity challenges, difficult issues with the United States, and international, multilateral and multinational pressures. Canadian Forces leadership at the national level is, nonetheless, committed to the formulation and implementation of the optimum defence and security outputs possible.

The military can describe in some detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can decide whether to feel threatened and, if so, how or even whether to respond. The military assesses the threat, the civilian judges it.

*Armed Servants, 6*

It is frequently difficult and even frustrating to understand that despite its ultimately fundamental importance, national security rarely ranks near the top of the Government’s overall set of priorities at any given time. While the Governor General is the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces, the CF really operates under the direction of Cabinet. This means that the CF is insulated neither from budgetary constraints nor from the impact of regional, cultural, socio-linguistic, socio-economic, industrial and other government priorities. To operate in this environment, institutional leaders need to understand in detail how government works in Ottawa (and to some extent in the provincial capitals), and to generate strategies and military capabilities, at the same time as mastering the intricacies of NDHQ itself.

**WORKING THE POLICY-STRATEGY INTERFACE**

Institutional leaders work in the federal policy “marketplace,” much of which is in the nation’s capital. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and described in greater detail in Annex A. They require a comprehensive knowledge of the components of this policy arena and the complex interaction among all of its elements. Donald Savoie, in his book *Governing from the Centre*, provides a salutary warning concerning the difficulty of working in this environment, observing that elected politicians themselves sometimes do not fully understand how the machinery of government actually works, even after several years in office.
Institutional leaders understand that this is the case not only because of the inherent complexity of the structures, formal processes and organizations involved. In the first place, irrespective of the framework of government that stays relatively constant, people, at all levels, move through the system fairly rapidly. Personalities change and governments change. In both cases this can significantly change the dynamics of relationships. Institutional leaders also come to appreciate that things that look normal, stable and permanent often are not. Governments come and go, and when they do, it is apparent that many things are not cast in stone. Policies obviously change, as do the ways of doing things and the relative distribution of power among all of the actors in the governance framework. The challenge for institutional leaders in the CF is to stay abreast of change and be prepared to adapt, in an ethical manner, to the shifting political landscape. They develop a relatively high degree of tolerance for ambiguity and the intellectual and emotional capacity to deal flexibly with the fluctuating mosaic of power, bureaucracy and politics in the nation's capital.

**Figure 4.1: The Federal Policy Marketplace**
The rule of law means that everyone is subject to the law; that no one, no matter how important or powerful, is above the law — not the government; not the Prime Minister, or any other Minister; not the Queen or the Governor General or any Lieutenant-Governor; not the most powerful bureaucrat; not the armed forces; not Parliament itself, or any provincial legislature.

*How Canadians Govern Themselves*, 32

Responsible government, federalism, and the rule of law are the three cornerstones of Canada’s system of government. This means that Ministers of Cabinet are responsible to Parliament, and Parliament to the people; there is a specific separation of powers between the federal and provincial levels; and everyone is subject equally to the law.

Institutional leaders are well advised to familiarize themselves with the Canadian Constitution, consisting of both written and unwritten portions. In the former case, the *Constitution Act, 1982*, outlines twenty-six primary documents that make up Canada’s written constitution: fourteen acts of the British Parliament, seven acts of the Canadian Parliament, four British orders-in-council, and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. The core of the written constitution is the *Constitution Act, 1867* (originally called the *British North America Act, 1867*). This act provides for the raising of defence forces exclusively by the federal government and designates the Governor General, the head of state, as the Commander-in-Chief of the CF. The unwritten portion of the 1982 constitution has been further developed and interpreted by custom, by judgments of the courts and by agreements between the Government of Canada and provincial governments. Additional legislation has also shaped the constitution.

Institutional leaders work in an environment shaped not only by the *National Defence Act* but by a number of other pieces of legislation. Therefore, depending on what appointment they hold, they will be required to be familiar with, as a minimum, the following legislative acts: *Canadian Human Rights Act, Employment Equity Act, Access to Information Act, Privacy Act, Security of Information Act, Criminal Code, Emergency Preparedness Act, Emergencies Act, Aeronautics Act, Fisheries Act, Financial Administration Act, Department of Public Works and Government Services Act, Federal Real Property Act, Canadian Environmental Protection Act, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, Auditor General Act, Public Service Employment Act, Public Service Labour Relations Act*, and *Official Languages Act*, as well as a large number of international treaties and formal obligations.

Institutional leaders further relate to the legislative branch of government by contributing to the development of various acts of Parliament through the provision of military advice. They also keep Parliament informed of defence and military matters through various reports and direct testimony.

Institutional leaders deal more directly and regularly with the executive branch of government, usually through a wide network of civilian officials. The primary organizations of interest to institutional leaders are Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s Office, Privy Council Office, the Office of the Minister of National Defence, and a number of other government departments and central agencies such as the Finance Department, the Treasury Board and the Office of the Auditor General. These leaders also deal directly with certain committees of Parliament. Beyond such official bodies, institutional leaders will often deal with a wide range of interest groups, lobbyists and institutes.
Since the Prime Minister, once known as “first among equals” in the Cabinet, is today incomparably more powerful than any colleague, institutional leaders need to be aware of the role of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Officials in the PMO are not public servants but political appointees. Institutional leaders, while certainly non-partisan, still require a thorough understanding of the political context in which policy and strategy are formulated. While it is important to develop ties with all civilian colleagues involved in national security matters, knowledge of the personnel in the PMO and their individual and specific roles is critically important to institutional leaders.

Institutional leaders are primarily concerned with the influence of three of the current six committees of Cabinet:

- Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee;
- Priorities and Planning Committee, which sets overall strategic direction and priorities for the Government; and
- Treasury Board Committee.

The Treasury Board (TB) is unique in that it is constituted by an act of Parliament; it approves and manages the allocation of funds for policy proposals approved by Cabinet. It is specifically supported by the Treasury Board Secretariat, which is responsible for financial oversight and comptrollership throughout the Government. The comptroller general of Canada is in the Treasury Board Secretariat, and all departmental comptrollers have a second line of reporting, aside from their Deputy Minister, to this individual. The other three committees are Operations, Social Affairs, and Economic Affairs. The functioning of the Cabinet is flexible and issue specific. Its objective is to enable informed, timely decision-making. Within the Department of National Defence there is a Director of Cabinet Liaison who is the point of contact for all Cabinet business. The Director also drafts all Defence Cabinet documents and tracks items of interest to DND/CF that are scheduled for Cabinet consideration.

Much more relevant than the Cabinet itself to institutional leaders on a day-to-day basis is knowledge of, and contact with, the Privy Council Office (PCO), which is headed by the Clerk of the Privy Council and consists of over 600 staff, mainly public servants. It is hardly possible to overstate the importance of this office to the policy- and decision-making process of the Government. Consequently, the CF personnel attached to the PCO are pivotal in their roles as gatekeepers and liaison officers to the CF. Sometimes referred to as the “PM’s department,” the PCO is the final bureaucratic arbiter in matters involving the deciphering and interpreting of the Government’s vision. The clerk performs three roles: Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Cabinet, and Head of the Public Service Commission of Canada. The PCO includes a set of secretariats that map directly on to all Cabinet committees and ensure that relevant departments and other parties are consulted before an issue is presented to Cabinet and that all papers are suitable for the Minister’s consideration. Importantly, when necessary, the PCO can suggest policy initiatives necessitated by new issues and to achieve the Government’s agenda. Clearly, institutional leaders, particularly at more senior levels, need to nurture close relationships with relevant officials in the PCO. This is where the battle for attention and resources begins. Competition among departments, played out in part in Cabinet, is often adjudicated at the PCO. Very, very few proposals get before ministers unless the PCO agrees to put them on the Cabinet agenda.

As mentioned above, a critically important department for institutional leaders in the CF is that of Finance. This department holds the pen for drafting the federal budget. Finance always needs to be reminded of the reasons the Minister of National
Defence really needs all that money allocated to defence. And when money is tight, Finance is also in charge of looking for savings. The Treasury Board plays a complementary role; it always wants to be reassured that what DND and the CF want to spend:

- reflects Government priorities;
- fits within the Defence spending envelope;
- makes sense from the point of view of the defence budget, defence policy and the overall defence program; and
- will be spent according to the rules.

When the Department of Finance is looking for savings from defence, the TB will insist that cuts follow in short order and that the monies to be spent really do have to be spent now. At National Defence Headquarters, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services) and staff are in virtually continuous contact with officials in both the Department of Finance and the TB. Ultimately, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister for the management of departmental resources and the co-ordinated development of the defence budget and defence program.

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You need to work the town, you need to work the town collegially around the table to listen to people, understand their points of view... both for and against, and determine how much of that change is achievable, and what pieces you may have to break into stages to get there over a longer period of time.

*Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management) Dan Ross*

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**CASE STUDY — Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs**

Understanding and working the structures of the political and bureaucratic fabric of the capital is clearly important when CF leaders wish to secure governmental attention to defence issues within the context of other competing demands on the Government. In the case of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), DND/CF leaders were able to understand the depth of the problem that faced the CF and crafted an effective strategy to bring attention to it. Equally important, they were able to devise a process to address the issues in cooperation with the government.

In 1996 numerous media reports highlighted the socio-economic plight and related aspects of the quality of life of CF members. Several scenarios were raised, including military members delivering pizza to supplement inadequate military salaries and living in substandard military housing, and military families frequenting food banks. Senior leadership was aware that numerous factors in the previous years had taken their toll — severe budget cuts, rapid force reduction and an increasingly unsustainable operational tempo — and that action to address related impacts on CF members and their families was long overdue.
In response, the Deputy Minister, the Honourable Jim Judd, and the acting Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Larry Murray, sought government support to address these matters. As a result, the Minister of Defence, the Honourable Doug Young, approached SCONDVA, requesting full investigation of issues impacting CF members and their families. At the same time, a SCONDVA liaison team (SLT) led by a colonel was stood up under the auspices of the then Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Lieutenant-General David Kinsmen. Shortly after this initial request, an election was called, putting the matter on hold. In early 1997, immediately subsequent to the election, the Minister once again requested that SCONDVA look into matters impacting the quality of life of CF members and their families. The liaison team was re-formed along with a Level 1 steering group to develop a strategy for effective liaison with SCONDVA. As a result, senior leadership ensured that SCONDVA had full and transparent access to DND/CF research, senior leadership, CF members, and military families across the CF in order to become informed on the quality of life of CF members. Through the collaborative efforts of institutional leaders in the CF and DND, SCONDVA took on a life of its own as a highly visible project.

After a detailed investigation by the Committee, which included testimony by hundreds of witnesses from across the CF, the Committee tabled its report in 1998, making eighty-nine recommendations. The recommendations covered specific issues relating to economic hardship; poor housing; out-of-date equipment; a sense of spousal abandonment; frequent and extended deployments; and a profound lack of appreciation among the leadership, the government and the general society for the dedication, commitment and work of the CF. This latter finding spoke to the existence of a broken trust that CF members articulated, which they based on the absence of reciprocity to their commitment to achieve mission success — absence of the commitment of government to honour its social contract with members, in return. Concurrently, an opinion survey administered to CF members confirmed an overwhelming lack of trust by serving CF members in their leaders. The Committee concluded that although member well-being in the CF was in crisis, members remained committed to the mission as their first priority.

The recommendations that the Committee made to improve CF member well-being included closing wage discrepancies within CF groups, and in some cases between some CF ranks and their public service equivalents; implementing a cost-of-living allowance; providing military housing comparable to societal standards; establishing a centre for the support of the injured, retirees, veterans, and their families; providing appropriate equipment to conduct the missions that CF members were asked to undertake; commencing rehabilitation training of their choosing for injured CF members six or more months prior to their military release; and reaffirming programs, through funding, to assist members dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder.

Recommendation No. 88 of SCONDVA stipulated a one-year time frame for the Chief of the Defence Staff to table an interim report to the Standing Committee, and a two-year period for tabling a comprehensive progress report on quality of life issues in the CF. Upon receipt of the report, a robust project management office was immediately established within ADM (Personnel) and was directly accountable, through the chief of staff for ADM (Personnel), Major-General Romeo Dallaire, to the DM and the CDS. The project management office was given aggressive timelines and provided with the resource power to ensure that those timelines would be met. Senior leadership exerted significant influence in ensuring that people were made available to address the office’s taskings and that projects were funded, even if at the expense of other CF capabilities. Senior leadership fully understood that capital, equipment and other capabilities were important, but that without the
Institutional leaders realize that although they have been granted considerable latitude for self-regulation, the CF is not fully autonomous. Agencies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Treasury Board Secretariat, not to mention the PMO and the PCO, have either a legislative or a political responsibility to delve into the affairs of defence as specifically laid out in the statutes. Institutional leaders must be very knowledgeable concerning what roles they play, in part because CF leaders have an obligation to the CDS and the Minister to see that the activities of these agencies do not exceed their legal mandate or impede the professional or operational effectiveness of the CF. Usually, however, leading the institution involves a very collaborative approach, leveraging these relationships for the benefit of the defence mission. Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, a former VCDS, has emphasized that these relationships must be developed. He noted:

The challenge is figuring out what the opportunities are and how to make it work for you. Invariably, whatever you want to achieve will take more than one player so you have to be able to read the environment and adapt to it. You need to have trap lines, you need to know on a day-to-day basis what is actually happening in this city, across the country and in deployed theatres of operations. That means you need to know folks and you need to be able to talk to them.

Ministers, as direct participants in Cabinet and leaders of their departments, are at the apex of both the political and the bureaucratic systems. Although the vast majority of federal government decisions are made at a bureaucratic level, these decisions take place within a hierarchical framework of policies decided by Cabinet and individual Ministers. In fact, all ministers receive formal mandate letters from the Prime Minister, drafted by the PCO, when they

**Summary Analysis**

Understanding and working the town is critical to institutional success — quite simply, open communication and cooperation between institutional leaders, elected politicians, and bureaucrats to achieve important goals. SCONDVA is a case in point. In 1996 and early 1997, senior leaders were proactive in ensuring that issues impacting the CF community directly, and by extension the effectiveness of the CF, were brought to the attention of the Canadian government through SCONDVA. A strategy was developed, action was taken, resources were committed and issues were addressed. A key reason for the success of the DND/CF response to conditions of service and the recommendations of SCONDVA was the high visibility accorded the project through direct accountability to the DM and the CDS. Through effective stewardship of the profession, institutional leaders directly addressed the essential nature of reciprocity and the social contract, that is, the responsibility that senior leaders have on behalf of both Canadian society and CF members to ensure optimum effectiveness of the CF through the well-being and commitment of its members.
assume their portfolio. Thus, while individual Ministers have some latitude to develop their own direction and initiatives, they are obligated to implement the priorities set by the Priorities and Planning Committee and the Operations Committee of Cabinet.

**INTERACTING WITH THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Under the *National Defence Act* the Minister’s mandate is defined as “the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence.” In short, the *National Defence Act* and other legislation make him or her accountable for everything that involves the department and the CF and, in particular, matters concerning:

- the state of the armed forces;
- their readiness and ability to carry out the duties and missions that the Government sets for them;
- financial management;
- personnel issues;
- the procurement program;
- international defence relations; and
- setting and implementing defence policy.

The Minister is assisted in these tasks not only by officials in DND and institutional leaders in the CF but also by his personal office. Institutional leaders are well advised to understand completely the role of the Office of the Minister. The MND’s staff members are political appointees, not public servants. They directly support the Minister in discharging his or her mandate. The Minister’s Office is headed by a Chief of Staff with the equivalent rank of Deputy Minister.

Institutional leaders need to be aware that there is a strong informal network among political staffs across all Ministers’ offices at the hub of which is the Prime Minister’s Office. The PMO provides policy advice, keeps intelligence flowing, advises on all Memoranda to Cabinet (MCs) from the departments, and maintains relationships with parliamentarians, interest groups and departmental officials. The Minister’s Office acts as a filter to the Minister on almost all matters and occasions. Good relations with the staff are indispensable to the advancement of major CF programs of all types. Institutional leaders know that it is frequently necessary to convince one or more layers of staff of the merits of particular proposals. Often the staff in question will be perceived as young and inexperienced on defence issues; however, ministerial staff are influential in the political context of the Minister’s Office. An example of the effectiveness of working the Minister’s Office occurred when *Duty with Honour* was presented to the Minister for signature. The manual was first explained to the Minister’s Senior Policy Advisor and his Director of Communications. After two meetings at this level, *they* advised the Minister to support this initiative. According to Vice-Admiral Greg Jarvis, a former Chief of Military Personnel and Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military):

> One of the fundamental things that a lot of people fail to appreciate is that the key to getting something approved by the Minister is not convincing the Minister but convincing the Minister’s staff. If there is a significant issue burbling that you know will ultimately require ministerial consideration, get the Minister’s staff engaged early. Start briefing them so that they can start asking questions. By the time it gets to the ministerial level, the staff can brief the Minister and provide all the important answers. As a result the comfort level automatically jumps up.

The Minister’s Office is also responsible for responding to any conceivable stakeholder who communicates a concern, question or suggestion about defence to the Minister. This may include any resident of Canada (including the Minister’s constituents), a business or non-profit organization, another level of government or even (on a shared basis with the Minister of Foreign Affairs)
non-Canadian entities or governments. The appropriate response is routinely accomplished by referring the issue to subject matter experts within DND/CF. These ministerial inquiries are voluminous and can be distracting to busy CF leaders; however, they are rarely spurious. Stakeholders want serious answers, and institutional leaders should appreciate both the constituency from which the question arises and the genuine responsibility of the Minister’s Office to support the Minister.

**INTERACTING WITH EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS**

In addition to working with official government organizations, institutional leaders frequently interact with a range of non-governmental organizations such as the corporate sector, business associations, lobbyists, interest groups, and institutes. The majority of these will be pro-defence. Such is the case, for example, with the Conference of Defence Associations and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

Sometimes institutional leaders need to contest the approach taken by external stakeholders when they feel that those positions are inimical to the defence of Canada. Regardless of the nature of the stakeholder, however, institutional leaders remain objective, promoting the interests of not only the CF and DND but Canada as a whole. Individual issues are addressed based on what is the right thing to do. When required, institutional leaders provide the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, the Minister and even Cabinet with relevant information and arguments to counter the negative proposals of the interest group in question. An example of this occurred during the preparation of the 1994 Defence White Paper. A group of prominent Canadians, drawn mainly from academia and the business community, constituted themselves as the Canada 21 Council and lobbied strenuously with the Government to radically alter Canada’s future defence policy. Their major report was perceived by institutional leaders in the CF and many DND officials as a call for a significant diminution of Canada’s military capacity. It was also perceived to represent a serious threat to Canadian alliance partners and other allies. Canadian Forces institutional leaders, through their contacts with the Minister’s Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Privy Council Office, effectively countered this lobbying effort. The White Paper retained a multi-purpose combat capability and strong ties to NATO and the United States.

**UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF AND THE DEPUTY MINISTER**

Institutional leaders in the CF work together with their colleagues in the Department of National Defence as a unified team to fulfil the defence mandate. This approach is necessary because under the law the CF is an entity separate and distinct from DND. The Department of National Defence is established pursuant to Section 3 of the National Defence Act, and a Deputy Minister is provided for in Section 7. In accordance with Section 14, “the Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.” The institution of the CF and the organization of DND, thus, have complementary roles to play in providing advice and support to the Minister and in implementing the decisions of the Government in the defence of Canada.

The National Defence Act provides for the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff under Section 18 as follows:

1. The Governor in Council may appoint an officer to be Chief of the Defence Staff, who shall hold such rank as the Governor in Council may prescribe and who shall, subject to the regulations and under the direction of the Minister, be charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.

2. Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are
required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Although not specifically provided for in the National Defence Act, it is accepted by custom that the CDS commands all operations at the strategic level. This, of course, is the direct implication of Section 18(2) of the act. Furthermore, in accordance with the Organization and Accountability document issued under the signatures of the CDS and the Minister, the CDS has primary responsibility for the command, control and administration of the CF, and military strategy, plans and requirements. Whenever required, the CDS advises the prime minister and Cabinet directly on major military developments.

The CDS has a special relationship with the Governor General who, as the Queen’s representative in Canada, exercises virtually all powers under the Constitution and, therefore, serves as Commander-in-Chief of the CF. Thus, there is in formal terms, though not in practice, a direct “line of command” from the head of state through the CDS to all officers who hold the Queen’s Commission and through them to all members of the CF.

Institutional leaders in the CF work for the CDS. They take orders directly from the CDS, through the military chain of command. They should, however, understand completely the role of the Deputy Minister. This official, like all DMs, is the Public Service head of the department. Deputy Ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister and are very influential individually and collectively. They head the structure of the public servants in any given department whose very purpose is to assist Ministers in discharging their mandates. Deputy Ministers are, in a sense, part of the structure by which the Prime Minister controls the operation of the Federal Government. The job includes developing policy “up,” driving policy “down,” running a competent department and exercising operational sensitivity to the political interests of the minister and the Prime Minister. The DM is also responsible for compliance with the Financial Administration Act, which establishes the framework within which all departments must manage their affairs.

The Deputy Minister for the Department of National Defence is provided for in the National Defence Act. This act makes no mention of any duties specific to the DM — because it does not have to. The DM’s responsibilities flow from any number of legislative acts, and his or her authority derives from that of the Minister. The Interpretation Act, 1985, in its Section 24(2) specifically states: “words directing or empowering a Minister of the Crown to do an act or thing, regardless of whether the act or thing is administrative, legislative or judicial, or otherwise applying to that Minister as the holder of the office, include…his deputy.” Simply put, this makes the DM the Minister’s alter ego. The DM serves on regular DM committees that mirror Cabinet committees enabling collective co-ordination, direction and scrutiny of major decisions and policy across Government. The DM network is also supported, for example, by a weekly DM breakfast hosted by the Clerk of the Privy Council.

It is of the utmost importance that institutional leaders in the CF appreciate that neither the defence mission nor mission success in DND and the CF can be achieved without a strong and collegial DM-CDS team. The role of the DM alongside the CDS must not be underplayed.

In developing and articulating defence policy and making decisions on most defence issues, the Minister draws on policy advice and other support from the DM. At the same time, the CDS is a unique appointment in the governance structure in Canada. The CDS is solely responsible to the Canadian people to provide Cabinet and the Prime Minister, through the Minister, a professional military force that is loyal, responsive and effective. As such, the CDS is
the Minister’s senior military advisor, playing a key role by providing advice on military requirements, capabilities, options and consequences. In fact, the rules for writing memoranda for Cabinet specifically call for his advice to be noted in a clearly identified section, as appropriate.

One specific and unique role assigned to the CDS by Section 278 of the National Defence Act is that of service “in aid of the civil power.” When such requests are made by provincial governments, the CDS is obliged to act without direct reference to the Prime Minister or the Minister. In practice the CDS arrives at his or her decision concerning how to respond, not whether, after consideration of all the political and financial circumstances of each case. The issue of aid to the civil power reinforces the requirement for institutional leaders to maintain appropriate contact with provincial authorities.

In addition, the CDS plays a central role in the development of all institutional strategies and is a key collaborator, along with the DM, in the development of defence and national security policy and strategy. Institutional leaders readily appreciate that these issues are decided jointly — both within the context of DND/CF and outside in the wider governmental security community. Although familiar with the concepts of unity of command and unity of effort, they must adjust to the reality that at the strategic level these are not always synonymous.

Unity of effort is achieved through mutual respect, understanding and concerted effort to co-ordinate roles and functions within necessarily distinct but complementary agencies and subcultures. This is not only inevitable but, in fact, desirable in a system dedicated to the preservation of the principles of democracy, responsible government and the rule of law. Unity of effort at National Defence Headquarters is achieved formally through the co-ordination of a military chain of command running down through the CF from the CDS and a “line of departmental authority and accountability” that extends from the DM to each member of the department and the Forces who exercises modern comptrollership, financial management, human resources management, contracting management and other authorities delegated from the DM. Broad government priorities and objectives can only be achieved when these policies are inputted on a continuous basis by knowledgeable participants in the overall governance enterprise and monitored by agencies mandated to ensure system-wide compliance and consistency.

This is not to say that the process is always streamlined, overly coherent or without friction. For example, in the case of the Zaire Task Force in 1995/1996, both the DM and the CDS were virtually inventing processes, procedures and ad hoc solutions on an almost hour-by-hour basis. Political guidance was less than precise, and doctrine and organization were not fully appropriate to the task. In fact, the DM of Foreign Affairs at the time has stated publicly that at the height of the operation he and his defence and security staff were completely preoccupied with this one file alone. The co-ordination of the efforts of a number of additional departments was accomplished through the PCO but not without some confusion and unhelpful tension. The point to be taken is that institutional leaders must balance the desire for stability, full mutual understanding, and certainty with the need to work in conditions of considerable uncertainty and levels of frustration not covered in textbooks on civics or decision-making theory.
CASE STUDY — Operation Assurance: Zaire 1996

Within the context of working the town, institutional leaders balance the desire for stability, full mutual understanding and certainty with the need to work in conditions of considerable uncertainty and levels of frustration. External actors, circumstances and conditions will affect the institution’s ability to achieve mission success. Internal constraints and restraints only exacerbate this friction. Operation Assurance is an excellent example of these prevailing challenges.

When the Rwandan genocide ended with the victory of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front in July 1994, the extremist perpetrators kidnapped almost two million civilians and took them into exile in Zaire. The extremists easily took total control of the refugee camps and began to pillage humanitarian relief supplies. For two years, the government of Rwanda warned the international community that if they did not secure the camps and permit the refugees to return home, Rwanda would act. In the fall of 1996, Congolese rebels, trained by Rwanda, launched a military offensive at the Rwandan extremists. Hundreds of thousands of refugees began moving, and international aid agencies warned of an impending humanitarian disaster of catastrophic proportions. The UN could not act effectively or decisively, lacking the necessary consensus in the Security Council.

The Prime Minister announced that Canada would lead an international humanitarian intervention to Zaire to protect and assist the refugees. Canada appointed Ambassador Raymond Chrétien as a special representative of the Secretary-General for the crisis. General Maurice Baril of Canada was appointed military head of the mission. With no notice, the CF, which simply had never developed a strategy to lead a major coalition international operation, found itself tasked with just such an order and the requirement to deploy within days, not months or years.

The CF proved incapable of mounting, deploying, operating or sustaining such an operation. It did not have a strategic staff capable of integrating military strategy into the larger Canadian or international strategy to achieve policy objectives. The CF had few links to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency and other critical government agencies, and the procedures for the 3D (defence, diplomacy, development) approach were not then in place. The CF lacked strategic lift and could not self-deploy into the heart of Africa even with assistance from contractors or allies. Units were rapidly assembled in an ad hoc manner, as standing joint organizations did not exist, except on paper. Canada lacked the necessary intelligence-gathering capabilities, and there were no mechanisms in place to effectively share available information located in several government departments and agencies in Ottawa. Events on the ground outpaced the conduct of planning, and within days most of the refugees had walked home by their own volition. The operation was terminated before Christmas 1996. However, without the national capability, the agreement of Rwanda or the support of our major allies, the operation was facing difficult barriers.
Within the Department of National Defence, senior officers and officials are responsible primarily to the CDS or to the DM, or responsible equally to both. In any event, all of their activities are co-ordinated by the VCDS, who acts as the Chief of Staff to both the CDS and the DM. In this regard, the VCDS has a particularly close relationship with the DM. The VCDS also acts as the CDS in his absence (Section 18.2 of the National Defence Act) and is the senior resource manager at National Defence Headquarters. The Chiefs of the Maritime Staff, Land Staff, Air Staff, and Military Personnel, for example, are primarily responsible to the CDS. Conversely, Assistant Deputy Ministers such as Assistant Deputy Ministers of Policy, Finance and Corporate Services, Materiel, Infrastructure and Environment, and Human Resources – Civilian, are primarily responsible to the DM. The Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management), the CF Legal Advisor, the Chief of Review Services, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Science and Technology), and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) are equally responsible to the CDS and the DM.

The Judge Advocate General is appointed by the Governor in Council and is responsible to the Minister for the superintendence of the administration of military justice. The DND/CF ombudsman is designated under the National Defence Act to act on the Minister's behalf, independent of the chain of command, as a neutral and objective sounding board and mediator and to report on matters related to DND and the CF as described by ministerial directives.

These relationships, when not prescribed by law, are very stable but not immutable. They have evolved over the years, and will continue to do so, as a result of changes in the security environment and a number of major reorganizations such as unification and integration in the 1960s, the amalgamation of Canadian Forces Headquarters and the Department of National Defence in 1972, and CF transformation in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century. Institutional leaders in the CF are responsible for working collegially within the structure while remaining vigilant to ensure that a departmental/bureaucratic culture that diminishes the focus on operational goals and military effectiveness does not emerge. As noted by Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, “it has to be an integrated team. If the military is marching off in one direction and civilian officials are marching off in another, the operational output will not be effective.”

Summary Analysis
The significance of this operation was not in what it did not achieve but in the lessons the senior leadership of the CF learned. In 1996, the CF began a development process to ensure that if the Government ever again called upon it to lead a major international military effort, the CF would possess the capability of fully complying with such direction. Concepts, doctrine, equipment, organizations, training and support were developed specifically at the operational and strategic levels. A Joint Operations Group operational-level headquarters was established, and projects were initiated to acquire adequate strategic air- and sea-lift capacity. These efforts are ongoing, but in 2004 when the CF was called upon to provide the command and control capability of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, it was able to successfully conduct that mission for a period of one year, winning international acclaim, recognition and respect.
OPERATING WITHIN THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
The civilian-military duality of the operating structure has resulted in a governance model structured around committees, as opposed to a board of directors that one would normally find in a corporate or non-public organization. At the top is the Defence Council (DC), chaired by the MND. It includes the CDS and the DM as members. The most senior committee is the Defence Management Committee, which is co-chaired by the DM and the CDS and is used to consider all management matters affecting the strategic direction of defence. This committee ensures co-ordinated decisions in the operation of DND as a whole and unified advice to the minister. The Armed Forces Council is the senior “uniformed” committee that is charged with the stewardship of the CF. It meets regularly to advise the CDS on broad military matters related to command, control and administration of the CF. Importantly, the CF’s Chief Warrant Officer sits on this committee as the senior non-commissioned member responsible to the CDS for the well-being of the whole NCM corps and as the senior NCM steward of the profession of arms. The decisions of the Defence Management Committee and the Armed Forces Council are predominantly policy decisions.

PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM ABOVE BUREAUCRACY
The CF, and therefore the profession of arms, comprises both bureaucratic and professional attributes and characteristics. Similarly, the organization of DND is structured bureaucratically while reflecting the professional attributes of the Public Service of Canada. The two concepts — bureaucracy and professionalism — can be antithetical, the former with its focus on efficiency and work breakdown, and the latter with its focus on conduct and comprehensive knowledge. Both ways of organizing work and knowledge contribute to the overall effectiveness of defence. It is the responsibility of senior leaders to exercise institutional leadership and stewardship to ensure that the concepts of bureaucracy and professionalism are melded together organizationally and in terms of the military ethos to best achieve the defence mission. The nature of the process and its ramifications is a major theme developed throughout this manual.

LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS
Institutional leaders are responsible for both institutional and operational success. In the former case this involves ensuring the confidence and trust in, and respect for, the CF throughout the Government and with important non-government actors. They often provide advice and input to a number of governmental processes, especially as these relate to national security. The input must be seen to be reliable, relevant and important. To ensure operational success, institutional leaders compete in the policy-making marketplace for the resources necessary to generate, develop, equip and employ the CF. In both instances, only by knowing the governance structure and effectively working the town will they be successful.
Summary – Working the Town

Work the Policy-Strategy Interface
• Acquire comprehensive knowledge of the federal policy-making marketplace.
• Establish good working relationships with PMO, PCO, Office of the Minister and relevant central agencies.
• Interact with important external stakeholders.

Interact with the Office of the Minister of National Defence
• Maintain good relations with the staff to advance major CF programs.

Interact with External Stakeholders
• Facilitate pro-defence activities of organizations such as the Conference of Defence Associations.
• Counter the activities of organizations with goals inimical to defence.

Understand the Role of the CDS and the DM
• Work together with colleagues in DND as a unified team to fulfil the defence mandate.
• Understand the role of the DM and work closely with the DM’s staff.
• Work in accordance with the military chain of command and the line of departmental authority and accountability.

Operate Within the Committee Structure
• Understand and work with the DC, DMC and AFC and all subordinate committees.

Promote Professionalism above Bureaucracy
• Ensure the concepts of professionalism and bureaucracy are melded together organizationally.

Link to Mission Success
• Successfully working the town is necessary to ensure mission success both institutionally and operationally.
Recommended Reading


Chapter 5
Creating a Vision and Leading Change

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Implementing large-scale change in any organization is typically a difficult undertaking. Besides managing the mechanics of technological process or structural change, leaders must also get the people who have to implement the change on side. Change can only be achieved through people. … A well-constructed vision has motivational properties which encourage and support attitudinal and behavioural change as well as the alignment of organizational culture with the direction set by senior leadership.

_Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations_, 103–104.
a shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values, and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment, and that are transmitted to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think, and act in relation to these issues.

The CF has a unique character. People build their lives around it, depend upon it, and identify with it. The CF has a life of its own as the embodiment of a values-based profession. It is comprised of many systems and subsystems and exists within larger systems and subsystems, all with a life of their own, continuously influencing one another. Change is often unsuccessful in institutions like the CF because it is hard to drive people out of their comfort zones, people become defensive, and even those leading change will often underestimate how their own actions continue to reinforce the status quo even as they work to achieve change. Finally, integrated change relies upon change to what is often not readily visible — the assumptions, practices, processes, expectations and beliefs that guide the action of the CF and the response of others to the CF, thus reinforcing the status quo. It is important to understand how culture will have to change and how culture can be used to effect change (see Chapter 1).

Vision without systems thinking ends up painting lovely pictures of the future with no deep understanding of the forces that must be mastered to move from here to there.

The Fifth Discipline, 12.

**Conditions for Change.** Change must be guided by the persistent and unrelenting efforts of institutional leaders, as well as by conditions that bind the institution and the profession as one. Institutional leaders set the conditions for change, if they are not already in place, by ensuring that shared values, vision, doctrine, and strategy are relevant to change, clarified, communicated and embraced. This helps people understand what will and what will not change.

**Strategic Coherence.** The alignment of strategy, vision, values, strategic objectives, and action plans is critical to successfully implementing change. Coherence among these parts of the strategic whole provides the basis for decentralized execution and empowerment, because it provides the foundation for people to be self-directing. A comprehensive and aligned strategy is an essential foundation for change. However, even with this foundation in place, the pace and acceptance of change will vary among individuals and groups.

**Stages of Change.** Individuals and subgroups in the CF proceed through basic stages of change. This process takes on various and unique characteristics across the CF; however, the stages can generally be understood as follows:

- **Stage 1: Avoid Change** — represents intense resistance to change;
- **Stage 2: Endure Change** — occurs when change is considered a “thing” to be managed with as little disruption as possible;
- **Stage 3: Accept Change** — occurs when people become focused on change as a process; and
- **Stage 4: Embrace Change** — occurs when people start to see change as a tool that can be used to become something different. Movement into this stage in some cases will be achieved almost immediately, while in other cases it can take several years to occur.
**Inertia.** Inertia can often result within the first three stages discussed above, as a direct result of complacency. Complacency can be based upon many things including past successes overshadowing the need for change, low performance standards, high performance standards based upon efficiency rather than effectiveness, and insufficient feedback from the external environment. Institutional leadership overcomes inertia — change is led, not managed.

**Expectations.** Every team member needs to know what is required so that they can effectively contribute to change. Frequently, and in the case of change in particular, leaders will not be able to clearly convey the expected outcome. If expectations are not clear, expectations are established through dialogue. It is not sufficient to send away, with only vague ideas of the expected outcome, those upon whom you are depending to effect change.

Institutional leaders should be aware that failure to respond to processes such as those discussed above could foil even the most dynamic leader with the most comprehensive change agenda. Change is essentially about people. Change begins with the vision of dynamic and creative institutional leaders, who in turn lead change by empowering people to embrace and contribute to change in their own dynamic and creative ways.

**CREATING A COMPELLING VISION**

Vision provides the ultimate sense of purpose, direction and motivation for everyone within an organization, particularly during periods of ambiguity, change and uncertainty. It is a mental representation of what the organization can and should become. In short, vision is a verbal or written expression of where an organization needs to be in the future. A clear vision that is understood and accepted by all creates commitment, energy, inspiration and a sense of identity within the organization. It acts as a means of focusing effort and progressing towards the desired future. It also functions as a means to distinguish an organization and set it apart as a unique entity. Crafted correctly, an inspirational vision will never be forgotten.

The initial conception of the vision is truly a creative process relying on the intuitive and cognitive capacities of exceptional institutional leaders. As such, it requires creative capacities (that is, imagination and innovation) as well as analytical skill and expertise. Rank and/or appointment is not a qualifying attribute; rather, ideas are the capital used by individual leaders to craft the vision. Sustained, lasting change only occurs if subordinates/followers/team members buy in to the vision. To achieve this they should believe in the vision and see it as their own. Therefore, the vision must touch the heart as well as the mind. Not surprisingly, a compelling vision normally attracts commitment and generates energy and excitement.

A realistic appraisal of strengths and weaknesses is critical if a credible, attainable vision is to be achieved. It is important to see the organization as it is, and as it should be in the future. It is very useful to present a picture of what the organization can be and what it should look like in five, ten or fifteen years. In creation of the vision, both the internal and external environments must be understood and analyzed. Quite simply, the need for change must be recognized.

It is also important to identify that which does not have to change. Identify the capabilities and characteristics of the CF upon which change will build or rely to ensure successful change — these capabilities and characteristics form a critical foundation that must remain resistant to change. A careful analysis of the organizational environment, its history, mission and values, as well as future trends in the external environment within the societal, political (domestic and international), technological and economical contexts, should be carefully undertaken. A systems approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, provides essential input to this process. A pragmatic and realistic
forecast of the future facilitates the conception of an image of what the organization should be so that it can function effectively and successfully in the future environment.

Once determined, the need for change and the change strategy should be linked to the conditions that make the change not only necessary but of urgent priority. A sense of urgency is developed by generating understanding among institutional leaders, and ultimately the entire CF, of the potential negative outcomes associated with a “business as usual” response to current and future challenges. An informed sense of urgency and priority enhances the capacity of institutional leaders in contributing to the change, as well as reduces resistance to change.

DEVELOPING THE CHANGE TEAM
The subsequent challenge is to develop and shape the vision, along with a plan for implementation of the vision through a collaborative approach. This is the only way to ensure that the plan is relevant and realistic as well as widely supported. In leading and implementing change, institutional leaders require effective strategies and resources to educate, persuade and motivate other institutional leaders and members of the profession of arms to commit to change. Ideally, such strategies and resources come from all corners and pockets of the CF; however, the responsibility for establishing an inclusive and collaborative change environment exists within an institutional leadership team.

Leadership is being able to energize the team to produce results that are far greater than the sum of the individuals.

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck

Once the vision and strategy have been established, a “change team” provides the initial endorsement and action to put the vision and plan into action across multiple levels and domains. It is essential that this initial change team have the power and credibility to lead change. An effective team comprises institutional leaders with proven transformational skills who are representative of all stakeholders and who have the potential to influence change. These include members who, as a minimum:

- represent subject matter expertise in all knowledge areas that will be relevant to the change initiative, including the process of change itself;
- represent informal and formal groups and networks with the interest, power or legitimacy to impact the successful implementation of the change initiative;
- are open minded, tolerant and highly motivated;
- are committed to vision and change;
- are aware of their own strengths and weaknesses;
- are open and transparent; and
- are capable of building and maintaining trust among colleagues and superior and subordinate institutional leaders.

Development of the change team means more than selecting individuals and assigning responsibilities. It also means educating, persuading and motivating to ensure that members are fully committed to the vision and change. A former VCDS reinforced the role of the institutional leader in this regard, noting, “You must have a good understanding and ability to foster the team, and if you do not, you will become marginalized and ineffective in achieving change.” Institutional leaders also ensure that members of the change team are prepared to educate, persuade and motivate others in support of the change initiative.
Institutional leaders on the initial change team are responsible for the short-term success of initial change efforts; however, more important, it is this change team that will inform effective change strategy and build momentum and commitment to change across the institutional leadership cadre and the profession of arms. In other words, the initial change team is selected and developed to become a powerful and credible force to propel and reinforce change efforts. That is not to say that only those on the first-round change team are change agents — institutional leaders negotiate the “we-they” atmosphere to ensure that everyone buys in and considers themselves an integrated part of the change process. As effective change agents, institutional leaders provide the basis for trust and ongoing support among the team members, as well as the basis for developing understanding, commitment and trust across the CF as change plans are developed and implemented at various levels. The perceived trustworthiness, effectiveness, representativeness and credibility of this team will influence the perceived credibility of the overall change initiative and subsequent efforts to implement and sustain change.

**CONDUCTING STAKEHOLDER AND IMPACT ANALYSIS**

Stakeholder and impact analyses are important early processes for senior leaders in identifying potential barriers to change and in ensuring that the approaches to address such barriers become part of the implementation plan. In addition, early consultation is essential to ensure that as much potentially relevant information as possible becomes integrated into the change process. In the case of *Defence Strategy 2020*, released by the DM and the CDS in 1999, military and civilian defence experts were consulted through a series of symposia and conferences that examined emerging defence issues, challenges and opportunities. The expectations of Canadians, the Government of Canada, and Canada’s defence allies were also integrated into the planning and implementation of *Defence Strategy 2020*. Consultation requires significant time and resources in the short term. However, in the longer term, early information gathering and knowledge sharing play an important role for institutional leaders in identifying and mitigating risk related to planning and change at all levels of the CF. It is difficult to lead, manage or change what is not fully understood.

The timely and appropriate involvement of stakeholders — individuals and formal or informal groups and organizations that will be impacted, directly or indirectly, by the change initiative — is an important strategy that institutional leaders can employ to eliminate potential obstacles to change. As stakeholders, these individuals, groups and organizations will frequently have the power, legitimacy or interest to impact the outcome of related activities and processes. The degree to which various stakeholders will be influenced, or perceive that they will be influenced, will in turn influence the potential impact of these same stakeholders on leadership efforts to implement change. Consequently, the stakeholder and impact analyses are very closely related and interdependent.

A consultation strategy is designed to engage all stakeholders. For example, institutional leaders determine the stakeholders who should be provided with timely and objective information, the stakeholders who should be directly involved in change-planning workshops and discussions, and the stakeholders who should be given authority for decision-making related to change planning and initiatives. The quality and inclusiveness of consultation will be essential to the development of change plans and the implementation of change activities.

It is important to understand how critical individuals, institutional leaders, groups, organizations, and cultural influences can contribute to success or failure, and how influential they can be before, during and after implementation of change. These
influences determine how they should become involved or informed at various stages of plan development and implementation, including the communication strategy. Identification of allies and key change agents, as well as the barriers to achieving the vision, is integral to the ultimate success of the vision and the plan of action. The allies and change agents will be critical in assisting with the action and communication plans, that is, getting the message out, rewarding success and the desired behaviour, as well as providing the necessary guidance, direction and action where required. Influential change agents, who will prove to be important in assisting with overcoming obstacles and barriers, can be found across CF and government domains. Potential impediments and opportunities should always be identified as early as possible so that the necessary pre-emptive measures can be taken.

On a more pragmatic note, people are further committed when they have had a hand in the creation of the vision, or at least a voice in the process. Initial contribution and buy-in will also be enhanced if the resource implications have been considered and it is, therefore, realistic to expect that adequate resources will be available to support the vision. Overall, the process provides institutional leaders with a basis of trust and credibility. As such, eliciting feedback is always important. The stakeholder and impact analyses represent an important step in plan development and are an ongoing process that should continue throughout plan development and implementation.

**CREATING A PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE VISION**

Once a vision has been carefully postulated, senior leaders develop a strategy or plan of action to reach the desired end state or goal. It is the combination of the vision and the plan of action for its implementation that provides a clear road map for the future. As such, considering objectives, courses of action, and resources required to achieve the aim is key. Ideally, the implementation plan provides distinct definable objectives that are easily recognizable as the organization advances on its path to transformation. These will act as indicators and milestones of progress. They will provide clear benchmarks as to whether or not the organization is succeeding.

The first barrier to strategic implementation occurs when the organization cannot translate its vision and strategy into terms that can be understood and acted upon.

*The Balanced Scorecard, 193.*

The Officer Professional Development 2020 (OPD 2020) project, initiated in 1999 and aligned with *Defence Strategy 2020*, is a case in point. A number of challenges and difficulties in the 1990s led to a need to re-examine the professional development system for officers. Initially, there was great reluctance by a large number of officers to acknowledge that problems existed, or even that circumstances had changed to render the Cold War model obsolete. The CDS, however, established a special team in 1999 to examine where officer professional development should be in 2020. The team undertook in-depth research, examined institutional strengths and weaknesses, explored future trends and developed a new set of assumptions and perspectives. Most important, it opened a broad-based set of consultations and discussion with all CF stakeholders, as well as external experts, in an effort to craft the requisite vision that would resonate with CF members and bridge the gap between where the officer corps was at the time and where it had to be. In the end, the
Officer Corps 2020 vision had a multitude of authors from across the CF, but importantly, the Armed Forces Council, representing the most senior leaders in the CF, directly influenced the final version:

Leading by example, fully accountable, they [officers] are dedicated to their subordinates and inspire loyalty and mutual trust. They possess the spirit and expertise to succeed in a wide range of operations. These officers of high intellectual ability operate effectively in a technological and information-rich environment. With an understanding of national policies, military doctrine and their application to diverse national and international circumstances, they will boldly accept the risk and ambiguity inherent in the demands of their profession. They embrace the military ethos, understand and apply the appropriate levels of force, and draw strength from the values and aspirations of the pluralistic nation they serve. They welcome challenge and serve with courage and integrity.

As this example indicates, while the vision is an image of a future state, it also imparts the overarching concept that serves to initiate and focus more specific organizational goals, plans and programs. It should portray the desired end state of the organization and act as a bridge from the present to the future. If it is clear and compelling, it will not only provide a road map for future direction, but also generate excitement and enthusiasm.

To assist with the attainment of the vision, in the case of OPD 2020, eight end-states and eight key initiatives were developed through a series of senior leader (director-level) workshops and subsequent Armed Forces Council recommendations. The ends represented critical objectives that were required to meet the vision. The means were activities that when completed would ensure successful achievement of the ends. The resulting matrix presented in Figure 5.1 that was developed and utilized provided a clear road map of how to achieve the vision through ends and means. For example, the ends-and-means framework provided the structure under which numerous specific detailed activities, requirements, and benchmarks were established to move the means to meet the objectives (ends). Once a solid plan is in place, communication is essential to ensuring that the vision becomes embedded across the CF.

**COMMUNICATING THE VISION**

Communicating the vision effectively is one of the most important steps for success. An understandable and compelling vision delivered with conviction and sincerity will normally generate excitement and actually touch all members of the organization. The emotion demonstrated by a senior leader, particularly the delivery of the vision with fire and passion that can be seen in his or her eyes and actions, is key. Inherently this means face-to-face communication.

Undeniably, the communication of the vision is the personal responsibility of the institutional leader(s). Unless the leader is involved, it is impossible to overcome the normal resistance that inherently accompanies change. Mr. Dan Ross, a former Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management), emphasized that leaders have to walk the talk in front of their people every day. Similarly, a former VCDS emphasized the importance of face-to-face communication. “Talking to people, taking their questions and providing answers, including ‘I don’t have the answer,’ he asserted, is crucial to success. There must be enough momentum to

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1 See *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officers Corps and the Officer Professional Development System* (National Defence: Ottawa), February 2001, for further details.
### Figure 5.1: Officer Professional Development 2020 Implementation Matrix

|------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|

Note: The cells of the matrix were filled with specific and illustrative examples of activities required to achieve the objective.
ensure that the vision is sustained and requisite initiatives are undertaken. This is the only way to gain widespread support and commitment.

The ongoing CF transformation effort initiated in 2005 provides a powerful example. Upon his appointment, Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier initiated significant changes to CF organization and

CASE STUDY — Canadian Forces Transformation in the Twenty-First Century

Vision is key to any change initiative. As such, the 2005 transformation provides an appropriate example of how vision was used to initiate and lead change as well as generate support and sustain momentum. On appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff in February 2005, General Rick Hillier immediately revealed a new and compelling vision for the CF. After initial discussion with, and buy-in by, all general and flag officers in Cornwall, General Hillier refined his presentation, created an electronic version and took the message to the men and women of the CF and DND from coast to coast. The vision presentation discussed the security environment in which the world then found itself, compared how the CF was configured as a default setting to a security environment more suitable to the Cold War than to the one represented post–September 11, 2001, then set out a vision for transformation of the CF to meet the new security challenges as a fully integrated force that is relevant, responsive and effective.

General Hillier’s vision for the CF received widespread support from most quarters. Presentation of the CF vision across the country enabled him to further refine and adjust the vision. Moreover, he was able to obtain full government support by providing a highly effective yet uniquely Canadian approach to military transformation. The new vision called for a transformation of the CF to meet the asymmetric threat post–September 11, 2001, by changing the way the CF was structured, equipped, trained and educated to execute military missions. At the heart of this vision was a new focus on the country, which looked at Canada as an operational theatre like any other operational theatre, organized and commanded by one joint force commander, as opposed to a number of complex and convoluted command arrangements as a result of historical developments. It also enabled all regular and reserve components to focus on operations and readiness — in other words, operational primacy versus a staff-centric focus. From an international perspective, the new CF vision responded to the Government’s need to shape Canadian contributions to international missions for a more unified and larger integrated national security apparatus, which would enable Canada to have a bigger footprint on international operations and consequently be more influential in international affairs.

In order to execute the vision, General Hillier immediately established a new organization, the Chief of Transformation; he also created a strategic steering group for transformation, under a major-general, to directly oversee and implement a plan of action. The implementation plan considered the required objectives, courses of action, and resources required to achieve the aim. Within three months of espousing the new vision for the CF, General Hillier had also established Canada Command with its commander, Vice-Admiral Forcier, and the first cadre of staff. Shortly thereafter, the first integrated joint regional command in Atlantic Canada was stood up.
Summary Analysis

A clear and widely communicated vision, in combination with the effective institutional leadership of General Hillier, inspired a sense of urgency among CF personnel, which created the momentum required to work through difficult and complicated changes within the institution. Further progress in developing a shared culture and attitude, as opposed to an environmental focus, was encouraged and achieved amongst key enablers. The vision also included a focus on a simplified command structure aligned with the requirements of operational missions, vice a focus on a staff-centric structure for mission command. Finally, there was full acknowledgment that future successful missions in the CF would inevitably include regular, reserve and civilian components, perhaps from a number of government departments. In short, a “Canada first” approach, utilizing all aspects of the CF, together with other Canadian participants, to generate a greater effect for all Canadians in the years to come. In the end, the CDS’s dynamic and visible leadership reinforced the need for change and ensured continued momentum.

culture. To ensure success, he undertook an aggressive communication strategy by which he personally addressed both internal and external audiences and shared his vision of the transformed CF. In his message he continually provided not only an image of what it would be but also the reasons the CF had to undertake this journey. The CDS’s message was promulgated in many forms — in person and by all available multimedia venues — to reach the broadest possible audience. Regardless of the vehicle, the message was always forceful, clear and consistent.

Reaching the broadest possible audience is key to attaining widespread support. To achieve success, all members of the institution should be knowledgeable of the vision and the reasons behind the change process. An aggressive communication plan enables this level of awareness and understanding. It empowers the organization with a shared vision, which in turn:

• acts as a bridge from the present to the future;
• provides a sense of enduring purpose; and
• empowers leaders and followers to act.

However, as mentioned earlier, an aggressive communication strategy is most effective when it is consistent and clear and infuses a sense of senior leader commitment. In addition, the more the vision and message resonates with followers (that is, uses language, examples, nuances and symbols that are recognizable and meaningful to the targeted audience) the greater is its power. Institutional leaders always know who their audience is, what it needs to know, how to deliver the message in the clearest and most effective manner to gain buy-in, and when and where to deliver the message. Moreover, the strength of the vision increases when senior leaders connect with the audience on every possible level — through personal contact, change agents, and multimedia. Importantly, the vision and accompanying message should be repeated as often as possible, using all available forms of communication.
Human beings are creatures of habit, obviously, and routine, and when you disrupt their routine, they resist that. And they’re slow to accept the necessity of that change, so you really have to communicate to people a why, when and how — put the rationalization to it and do it repeatedly and consistently.

*Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management) Dan Ross*

Clearly, institutional leaders have a pivotal role to play in communicating the vision. But this role as a spokesperson is not confined exclusively to the internal makeup of the organization. Leaders are also required to share the vision and pass the message externally. This is critical to ensure that the society and the environment in which it exists understand the organization, as well as to make certain that it is aligned correctly with government direction and Canadian societal expectations and values. In this vein, the transformation effort that started in 2005 was an active campaign in championing the CF agenda in public and reaped a windfall of endorsement, notably high societal and government support for CF personnel and a high level of resource commitment.

**IMPLEMENTING CHANGE**

Inherently, individuals resist change, as it takes them from their comfort zone into uncharted waters. It normally entails more effort and work and always involves a degree of uncertainty. For this reason, institutional leaders lead change from the front. They provide the example by living the vision. Moreover, they develop a sense of urgency and convince followers that change is the only option for the organization — that status quo is simply unacceptable. It is important that institutional leaders are reliable in encouraging the belief that the vision represents a credible image of the future state of the CF, and in using the action plan as a method to guide future development.

You have to infuse your entire organization with the mind-set that change is an opportunity and not a threat. That takes hard work.

*Peter F. Drucker and Peter M. Senge,*


Once again, the 2005 CF transformation agenda provides an excellent example. The CDS generated compelling rationale for change, which underlined the need for rapidly deployable, integrated, operational forces worldwide. General Hillier created clear imagery of a threat environment that had changed from focusing on the *bear* (the Soviet Cold War threat paradigm) to that of *snakes* (a more asymmetrical threat model that includes terrorists, failed states, international criminal organizations, and cartels). This imagery symbolized the need for a wholesale shift from actual practice and current structure. Furthermore, ongoing CF operations and continuing global instability reinforced the CDS’s sense of urgency for transformation.
It is essential that the message be communicated with conviction — through both words and action. This may be difficult for senior leaders who do not accept the vision and direction of the change. As noted by Lieutenant-General George MacDonald, a former VCDS,

… change threatens the source of their professional validity. They may not intellectually resist the change, but they do not know where it is leading them. They many not understand or embrace the vision.

Still others will quietly carry on with little or no resistance or contribution to change. The skeptics should be embraced. Take the time to hear dissenting points of view. Clarify the ways in which alternative perspectives reflect the values and vision that inform the change plan and the broader vision for the CF. Be a systems thinker. How will these leaders influence change? Do they have the capacity to leverage change in a way that provides added momentum and strength to change efforts, as a result of their unique knowledge, network or ability? Are they willing to contribute to the vision in a productive or meaningful way? Can they be entrusted with authority or influence in the change process? In these cases, leaders of change are faced with several options, including ignore, exhaust, or provide options for leaving the CF to resisters who have the capacity to negatively impact outcomes.

Inclusive, persuasive and motivational communication techniques, ranging from face-to-face meetings with individuals and small groups to interactive large group “town hall” sessions, comprise the most important contribution of institutional leaders in implementing change.

All leaders need to recognize the reality and the paradox of continuous change and learn to live with them. The requirement to deal with uncertainty, increasing complexity and a diversity of new demands must become commonplace in the skills-set of the future leader. Leaders need to pay careful attention to the effect of change on the people in the organization, focussing on how to help individuals and groups deal with it, and how to exploit the opportunities that conflict and change present. After all, the organization is the people.


Throughout development and implementation, institutional leaders gain trust and support through continuous consultation with identified and emerging stakeholders. Open, transparent, flexible, and adaptable consultation and communication creates a safe environment for candid feedback and exchange. Stakeholders, including CF institutional leaders and CF members, have a reciprocal responsibility to contribute to consultation, including full disclosure of anticipated barriers to change, challenging what they do not understand, and speaking up when they have concerns about a change initiative. Full transparency in acknowledging the anticipated impacts of the change is essential to building trust in the short term and maintaining trust and commitment in the
longer term. It is important to adapt plans according to circumstances during the change process, and stakeholders are a significant source of feedback to the adjustment process.

Creating a conducive environment for change, by empowering followers, encouraging initiative and tolerating mistakes, is critical. It is also important to reinforce desired behaviour with recognition and reward strategies. On the other hand, institutional leaders need to adopt a determined approach in addressing persistent resistance to change, once efforts to consult and build understanding have been exhausted. In establishing a positive change environment, institutional leaders have to identify and directly engage resisters and skeptics who have power and influence over others. Unchallenged, skeptics and resisters can wield significant influence over individuals and groups, thus impairing the potential for full implementation. Institutional leaders find it necessary to directly address resistance coming from those with the substantive power, legitimacy, credibility or interest to impair immediate change efforts or longer-term acceptance and integration of strategic objectives.

All institutional leaders are well advised to engage appropriately in change activities, demonstrate knowledge of the change plan, and express confidence in the plan and the vision. Major-General Andrew Leslie, a former Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, observed, “No one likes to be micromanaged, but there is a fine balance between mission command and allowing chaos to occur all around you. Tell people what you want accomplished and let them get on with it. However, occasionally step in and offer advice or get feedback.” It is important, in leading change, to balance carefully the direct and indirect involvements of senior institutional leaders. In some cases, direct and visible involvement of key institutional leadership is critical. In others, the overall impact is enhanced if other members of the leadership team are trusted to lead change activities and are provided with appropriate responsibilities and decision-making authority. As a case in point, in response to Defence Strategy 2020, various institutional leaders set to work in developing strategies and action plans that reflected the vision and intent of that defence strategy (for example, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 was promulgated by the Chief of the Maritime Staff in 2000, and Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future was promulgated by the Assistant Deputy Minister [Human Resources — Military] in 2002).

**MAINTAINING MOMENTUM**

The continuous development and implementation of the change plan results in incremental expansion of the change team in order to establish greater inclusive involvement of all stakeholder organizations, groups and individuals. As awareness, understanding and acceptance of change increases, the visions and underlying values become embedded within the assumptions and behaviours that characterize the institution. Change is ongoing and continuously experiences new beginnings as the requirements for change shift, new members join the profession of arms, institutional leaders come into new positions, new stakeholders emerge, unanticipated barriers emerge, new direction flows from government, and new opportunities present themselves. Institutional leaders are responsible for ensuring that organizational design and structure reflect the philosophy and doctrine of the CF, as well as ensuring that systems and processes remain aligned and integrated, as discussed in Chapter 2, thus providing a reliable foundation and framework for change efforts. Continual communication between senior institutional leadership and the change team, and with institutional leaders across the CF, provides important support and facilitation of change. In addition, visible institutional leadership support, such as active modelling of change, is effective. Acknowledging and rewarding the initiatives of
people that reflect the goals of change provides another powerful tool for institutional leaders in actively supporting change efforts. The annual DM/CDS Innovation Award, for example, recognizes individuals and teams who have demonstrated leadership and renewal in championing change, proactively initiating change, or demonstrating vision.

Communication and activity related to the change initiative should consider the unique circumstances of various groups, organizations and networks. The propensity and capacity to accept and implement change may vary across groups for many reasons. For example, those CF members who experienced the impact of the Management, Command, Control and Re-engineering Team and the Government’s “downsizing” initiatives of the 1990s may be quite skeptical of any change plan that claims to increase efficiency and effectiveness through the reduction of resources. In cases such as this, unique approaches may be required to rebuild the trust and the change capacity of institutional leaders who experienced the change of the 1990s. At the same time, emerging institutional leaders will share a different “legacy” and understanding of today’s challenges. As one size does not fit all, what is evident and relevant to one group may not make any immediate sense to another.

The achievement of strategic objectives may take time; however, in the absence of substantive and visible progress, efforts will wane and priorities may change. Institutional leaders are able to adapt to changing demands, but strategic goals must also be kept alive. In the case of NCM Corps 2020, a “fully professional NCM corps” was one of eight strategic objectives identified in 2002. Two related milestones, the development of the Advanced Leader Qualification course and the Chief Warrant Officer qualification, would take time. The immediate response of institutional leaders was the inclusion of chief warrant officers and chief petty officers, 1st class on the executive leadership symposium for newly promoted brigadier-generals and commodores. This action functioned as a bridging strategy and also demonstrated immediate commitment to the vision of a fully professional NCM corps.

CASE STUDY — The Executive Bridging Program for Chief Warrant Officers and Chief Petty Officers, 1st Class

The process of visioning and leading change was severely tested when the Canadian Forces undertook to profoundly reform the non-commissioned members corps in the early part of the millennium. Increased emphasis on educational requirements, and initiatives to change traditional employment patterns, stressed the professionalization of the NCM corps. Significant elements of both the officer corps and the senior NCM corps were unable to grasp the necessity for change. Although the vision and long term seemed clear, it was not fully accepted despite a very proactive communication strategy. In short, neither corps appeared to fully understand the implications of a completely inclusive profession of arms in the Canadian context.

The strategy was promulgated in 2002 and took into account the changed security environment, the complex nature of the modern battlespace, and the altered demographic profile of the NCM corps. It set eight strategic objectives designed to shape the NCM corps of 2020. *The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21st Century (NCM Corps 2020)* also advocated the adoption, where appropriate, of common officer and NCM professional development.

*NCM Corps 2020* called for “a fully professional NCM corps.” Subsequently, with the publication of *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, the nature of such a corps was fully articulated. *Duty with Honour* also recognized that the most senior NCMs — chief warrant officers and chief petty officers, 1st class (CWOs and CPO 1s) — would act as the “custodians” of a fully professional NCM corps and as co-stewards, along with senior officers, of the profession of arms in Canada as a whole.

One major implication of these developments was that CWOs and CPO 1s needed a professional development program that included exposure to strategic-level issues such as those addressed in the executive leadership symposium for newly promoted brigadier-generals and commodores. The CF institutional leadership realized that until the new suite of NCM leadership courses such as the Advanced Leadership Qualification and the Chief Warrant Officer Qualification was in place, specific preparations to enable the CWOs and CPO 1s to benefit from attendance at the symposium were necessary. Consequently, a four-day “bridging program” was created that familiarized specially appointed CWOs and CPO 1s with the subject matter contained in the executive leadership symposium. This program was run annually in advance of the symposium, and those CWOs and CPO 1s attending proceeded to the symposium.

The first bridging program was run in 2003 under the direction of the commander of the Canadian Defence Academy. Responsibility for the program was transferred to the Canadian Forces College in 2004. In spite of some successes, resistance was still present.

**Summary Analysis**

The *NCM Corps 2020* program underlines the importance of full buy-in by stakeholders, as well as the need to develop the requisite strategies to achieve it. The creation and conduct of the bridging program for CWOs and CPO 1s provided a timely foundation for the continued professional development of the NCM corps; however, it proved insufficient on its own to maintain momentum. *NCM Corps 2020* demonstrates that a provocative and forward-looking vision by itself does not necessarily mean success.

Establishing a credible and achievable vision and plan across the defence team is critical to ensuring the trust and commitment of all stakeholders throughout the CF. This active involvement and support, including continuous monitoring of implementation, is the responsibility of the institutional leader.

**SUSTAINING CHANGE**

In previous sections, focus has been placed on the development and implementation of a change plan, including creating the vision, developing the change team, conducting a stakeholder and impact analysis, identifying potential barriers to successful implementation, establishing trust and commitment
across the institutional leadership team, and maintaining momentum as change efforts evolve. Such efforts are critical to enhancing change outcome. It is equally important for leaders, in providing the fuel to sustain change, to ensure effective follow-up and monitoring of change. Institutional leaders use numerous follow-up and implementation methods to reinforce and continuously regenerate the initial implementation efforts. For example, monitoring can result in valuable feedback, thus allowing subordinate organizations and groups to reinforce best practices and amend implementation strategies where required. Substantial change takes time, so continuous efforts to keep change on everyone’s agenda become essential to sustaining motivation, irreversible momentum, and effort directed toward change.

The monitoring process includes a variety of methods designed to measure change, identify problems and provide support to ongoing change efforts. For example, performance indicators and measures such as those discussed in Chapter 2 determine whether change is moving in the desired direction. Such performance measures might include active monitoring of progress through analysis of changes in data that are already collected within the organization (for example, the number/proportion of officers with university degrees), or measures that are developed specifically to assess a particular change initiative (for example, a survey to measure attitudes toward, and acceptance of, increasing diversity in the CF).

In addition to structured feedback data, the implementation of various feedback mechanisms ensures that all CF members have the opportunity, both individually and collectively, to provide open and transparent feedback. This includes openness on the part of institutional leaders to dissenting points of view. Timely and unfiltered communication allows institutional leaders to identify and address gaps, barriers and failures. An open and transparent learning environment, as discussed in Chapter 2, significantly enhances such feedback and consultation processes. In addition, feedback from various sources is used to share successes along the way with other institutional leaders. Particular effort is required to ensure that measurement and feedback mechanisms are integrated across the CF, while maintaining a capacity to isolate particular problems and successes. In response to internal measurement data and feedback, or changes in the external environment influencing the change initiative, performance indicators are continually confirmed, amended and re-established to reflect outcome goals related to vision, strategy and change.

Importantly, keeping teams together is a key enabler of change. Teams that have developed a vision and plan, established interactive work patterns, and developed an understanding of the strengths and potential contributions of individual team members are also likely to have a synergy and commitment to achieving change goals. Premature displacement of effective team members will impede change as new members integrate into the team and become familiar with information and processes related to the team mission. In addition to the positive dynamics and productivity of a mature team, keeping a team together ensures ownership, accountability and follow-through by the team on its own initiatives.

Change implementation plans must be persistently supplemented with effective follow-up and monitoring to ensure that change efforts do not die after short-term bursts of directed activity. Effective follow-up and implementation are critical to ensuring that change efforts are sustained. Significant change efforts create an enduring impact on the institutional effectiveness of the CF. Enduring impact results when the values and principles underlying change are embedded within the cultures that influence day-to-day activities across the CF. The ongoing support of institutional leadership is critical to ensuring that key changes become part of the “taken for granted” way
that the CF operates. Initially, it will be important to recognize, acknowledge and communicate the small steps along the way that are leading the CF toward its goals. Visible acknowledgment of short-term wins provides evidence that the plan is moving forward and that efforts to date have been worth it. As a result, those actively involved in the change receive positive feedback, those who are not committed to change will be encouraged to be so, and the skeptics and resisters find it more difficult to influence change in a negative way.

The social, economic and political forces influencing defence strategy are in continuous flux. As a result, change implementation plans should be responsive over time. The Chief of the Maritime Staff has identified and responded to such evolution and change with the 2005 publication of Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Securing the Course from Leadmark, which moves forward from the Navy’s strategy for 2020 published in 2000. Similarly, the Chief of the Land Staff has continually updated Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance, which was

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**CASE STUDY — Army Transformation: Advancing With Purpose**

Vision was an integral ingredient in the Army's successful transformation in the early part of the millennium. In 2002, after years of careful study, discussion and debate and an enormous intellectual effort, the incumbent Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, released the Army strategy titled Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy, One Army, One Team, One Future, which was intended to transform the Canadian army from its Cold War–oriented organization to a new Army that would be prepared and ready to conduct operations in the future security environment. While the process of transformation is still underway, the strategy laid out a clear, concise and articulate vision and identified the key functional and relational objectives that needed to be achieved in order to successfully implement the strategy through a transformation plan.

The relational component of the strategy clearly identified the centre of gravity of the strategy as institutional credibility, which could only be achieved by increasing the Army's contact and legitimacy with the Canadian people. It could only do so by being relevant to the national leadership, by enhancing trust within the CF and DND, by recruiting and retaining the best and brightest in Canada and by ensuring that what the Army lacked in quantity it could deliver in quality through the highest standards of expertise. It was determined that the Army, in order to be credible, had to deliver combat-capable forces, sustainability, and internal unity.

The functional component of the strategy clearly articulated four objectives, with five- to ten-year targets: connecting with Canadians, shaping Army culture, delivering a combat-capable sustainable force structure, and managing readiness.

For the implementation of this strategy, key factors were identified including enhancing the resources flexibility of the Army by focusing on core and new capability areas and accepting risk in other areas. The other factors included maximizing army influence in the wider public-policy environment, and better management of Army internal structure and culture.
originally promulgated in 1998, and subsequently has developed the Army strategy, *Advancing with Purpose*, in 2002.

Adaptability in ensuring continuous movement in the right direction is an important attribute of institutional leaders and their teams. This might mean, for example, modifying stakeholder and institutional leadership involvement and adapting the overall implementation strategy as required. External stakeholders and legislated oversight bodies (for example, the Canadian Human Rights Commission) should be kept informed of progress, and they may provide valuable input to overcoming unanticipated or persistent barriers. At every change and step along the way, it is the responsibility of institutional leaders to ensure that the vision and “commander’s intent” are clarified and reconfirmed. Continuous monitoring and measurement are also essential to ensure that the beliefs, assumptions and practices embedded within the profession of arms are evolving in alignment with the change vision and strategy.

**Summary Analysis**

Through sincere and committed institutional leadership, especially in personal, written and public communication, Lieutenant-General Jeffrey was able to inspire the chain of command and the land staff with his vision. After study, discussion, debate, and ultimately decision, the result was an Army strategy that fully complied with *Defence Strategy 2020* and provided clear direction to the land force on the way ahead. Armed with this strategy, the senior leadership of the Army began a series of initiatives, changes and reforms, which are still in progress, to achieve the objectives of the strategy. Lieutenant-General Jeffrey and army transformation is a clear example of the development and importance of vision to the institutional leader being a core attribute of the successful senior leader.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

A realistic, compelling vision provides direction, purpose and identity for an organization. It creates energy and commitment within the members of an organization and acts as a bridge from the present to the future. A properly executed process of creating
and communicating a vision is an important tool that shapes organizational culture by creating, adjusting or confirming organizational purpose, identity and values. It also creates change and moves an organization to a more effective model to meet future challenges. Ultimately, it is key to the success of an organization. Undeniably, it is a key skill and critical activity that institutional leaders conduct to achieve mission success for the CF.

In the end, ultimate achievement of the vision demands consistency, compassion and the tenacity to use every opportunity to hammer home the message and reinforce the link between change and continued mission success. As such, senior leaders are always conscious of, and utilize, symbolic behaviour. The active and visible commitment of institutional leaders is pivotal in establishing the commitment and trust essential to enduring change.
Summary – Creating a Vision and Leading Change

Understand the Complexity of Change
- Understand culture and potential impact of culture on change.
- Set the conditions for change: establish strategic coherence and clarify expectations.

Create a Compelling Vision
- Assess organization — what it is and what it should be in future.
- Critically examine and analyze internal and external environments.
- Identify strengths, weaknesses, what must change and what must stay the same.

Develop the Change Team
- Establish change team with power and credibility to effectively lead change.
- Elicit feedback to further develop visions and strategy.
- Foster motivation and commitment of change team.

Conduct Stakeholder and Impact Analysis
- Identify individuals and groups that will be impacted directly or indirectly by change.
- Identify barriers to change.
- Identify and develop understanding of internal and external influences on change.
- Identify key allies and change agents to assist with development, communication and execution.

Create a Plan to Achieve the Vision
- Develop a road map for the future, leading to desired end state.
- Identify objectives, potential barriers to change, courses of action, and resources.
- Develop milestones — distinct, definable objectives to measure progress and success.

Communicate the Vision
- Utilize every vehicle (multimedia) and opportunity possible to communicate vision.
- Emphasize face-to-face communications; deliver the vision with emotion and sincerity.
- Use language, examples, nuances and symbols that are recognizable and meaningful.

Implement Change
- Develop sense of urgency; clearly link change to mission success.
- Communicate with confidence and enthusiasm and in open, transparent and flexible manner.
- Create a conducive environment for change.
- Anchor change in the culture (see Chapter 1).
- Reinforce desired behaviour and deal decisively with barriers to change.

Maintain Momentum
- Provide visible leadership support through continuous communication and behaviour.
- Acknowledge successes and reward initiatives aligned with vision and change.
- Continuously develop and expand the change team.

Sustain Change
- Monitor and measure change; inform ongoing communication and change strategy.
- Continuously adapt and evolve strategy and practice to achieve vision.
- Monitor beliefs, assumptions and practices; ensure evolution aligns with vision and strategy.

Link to Mission Success
- Reinforce vision to shape organizational culture: create, adjust, confirm and reinforce organizational purpose, identity and values, and reinforce link to mission success.
Recommended Reading


Chapter 6
Ensuring Member Well-Being and Commitment

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Ensuring Member Well-Being and Commitment

At the institutional level of leadership, effectiveness in assuring *member well-being and commitment* calls for senior leaders to assume the role of personnel champion. In this capacity, senior leaders must thoroughly understand *social contract* principles, must be proactive in providing satisfactory conditions of service, and they must ensure that fair mechanisms exist to respond to members’ concerns about their treatment.


Institutional effectiveness cannot be achieved without assuring members’ well-being and commitment to the profession, CF and country. All leaders, including officers and NCMs, are responsible for taking care of people and the quality of their conditions of service. Institutional leaders have a particular responsibility for safeguarding Canada’s moral commitment to CF members in recognition of the unique service that they provide to Canadian society. This responsibility includes the maintenance of several principles identified in 1998 by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs:

- fair compensation;
- access to suitable and affordable accommodation;
- access to a full range of support services for members and their families;
- suitable recognition, care and compensation for veterans and those injured in the service of Canada; and
- dignity and respect through reasonable career progression and provision of appropriate equipment and kit commensurate with tasking.

Facilitating member well-being is also important to institutional leaders for practical and legal reasons, as described below.

In the practical sense, member well-being contributes to mission success by providing commanders with the skilled, fit and motivated personnel they need. This is a result of the CF’s functional imperative to carry out its assigned tasks and the professional obligations of stewardship. Well cared for people are also more motivated, committed to the mission, productive, and inclined to remain in service — all serious concerns, given the CF’s high operational tempo and limited resources. However, to achieve the degree of commitment necessary in a military context, institutional leaders also make certain that members internalize critical aspects of the military ethos. This helps to ensure their allegiance to critical national and professional values.

1 For further detail in reference to these principles, see Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvement in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa, Ont.: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, 1998), and Canada, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, Ont.: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003).
The CF, as an element of the Canadian government, has a legal obligation to comply with a broad range of legislation and regulation through direct application and/or by ensuring that the spirit and intent of the legislation is represented in CF policy. Despite the CF’s distinctiveness and the profession’s latitude in self-regulation, the CF is always subordinate to civil authority, and failure to respond may jeopardize the ability of the profession to remain distinct and self-regulatory.

Conditions of service, military values, ethics and ethos limit CF members’ rights (for example, unlimited liability, voice, association, legal, medical and behavioural rights) and create expectations of members’ leaders. The principles of reciprocity and equity oblige leaders to honour this unwritten social contract between the members and the Government and society by taking care of the people entrusted to them. It is incumbent upon institutional leaders, in doing so, to find effective ways to reach an optimum balance between the expectations of members and the demands of the mission, the CF, and Canadian society. An effective social contract can be maintained only if CF members are included as essential participants in continuous negotiation of expectations, priorities, and resource demands.

Generally, member well-being contributes to both the effectiveness of the CF and the health of the profession of arms by generating trust and commitment among members, society and government. Institutional leaders who successfully champion member well-being are aware of, and interested in, subordinates’ needs and expectations. Importantly, they are also willing and capable of responding to those needs and expectations. However, given institutional leaders’ positions, seniority, geographical locations and organizational complexity, they face numerous challenges in this responsibility.

**GAINING AWARENESS**

All institutional leaders responsible for member well-being — officers and NCMs alike — have to have an awareness of members’ quality of life, including their circumstances, needs and expectations, and of the ongoing efforts to provide appropriate services. Institutional leaders constantly assess the situation through face-to-face interactions and monitor the pulse of the institution. While this is critical in gaining a general impression, voice mechanisms (for example, feedback and grievance procedures) and diagnostic studies (for example, survey and qualitative research) also help by providing a broader and
more representative — rather than anecdotal — picture of member well-being. The CF possess a number of proven ways to assess morale, physical and mental health, fitness, quality of life, family satisfaction, equity and harassment, among others, that should be fully exploited. Some examples include the unit climate surveys, “Your Say” surveys, and conditions-of-service studies. Failing to use these tools to identify and resolve such problems early may permit conditions to worsen to the point that they require drastic action and pose extreme consequences for the institution.

For example, as illustrated by the SCRDVA case study detailed in Chapter 4, throughout the significant downsizing and pay freezes of the 1990s, institutional leaders were unable to secure necessary resources to care properly for members. They hoped that if they drew the Committee’s attention to these problems, the root causes would finally be publicly recognized and corrected. SCRDVA’s 1998 Quality of Life Report made numerous recommendations on how the military should improve member well-being, and in fact it eventually led to increased support from the Government. However, it also resulted in an external monitoring committee that required the CF to submit regular progress reports, thus impacting the ability of the institution to self-regulate.

To avoid similar difficulties in the future, institutional leaders should carefully consider the results of diagnostic studies such as those mentioned earlier. However, familiarity with these results alone is insufficient. Leaders are also responsible for ensuring that the necessary studies are routinely administered in order to provide the most accurate and current picture of particular aspects of members’ conditions of service. Similarly, senior leaders ensure that results of individual studies are linked to provide a comprehensive view of well-being. Finally, institutional leaders ensure that these surveys are updated periodically so that they remain consistent with internal changes to the CF, broad societal expectations, and evolving government requirements.

If we expect our subordinates to furnish us with unvarnished information, unbiased advice, and unswerving support at the times when it really counts, we need to have cultivated a culture that encourages and rewards them for doing so.


Institutional leaders complement this process by fostering policy in support of open and transparent communication with CF members through suggestion, complaint and grievance procedures. It is important to ensure not only that such feedback mechanisms exist, but also that there is a conducive environment where members feel comfortable to express their concerns without censoring themselves or minimizing problems. Members must be confident that they will be heard without retribution — disagreement is not disloyalty. For example, the Chief of the Defence Staff publicly encouraged members to speak freely at the SCRDVA hearings and publicly guaranteed them no recrimination. Such candour is necessary to ensure that institutional leaders are well informed about members’ expectations. However, not all expectations are reasonable (needs versus desires) or achievable (realistic versus unrealistic). Therefore, institutional leaders consistently communicate their analysis and intent back to members in order to harmonize members’ expectations with leaders’ intent and sincerity.
This collaborative and systematic approach yields far better results than does reacting to complaints and crises in an ad hoc fashion or after the fact, as described in the Croatia Board of Inquiry case study. Recommendation No. 50 of the 1998 SCONDVA Quality of Life Report supported this view, noting that if injured members cannot reveal their problems without fear of reprisals, operational effectiveness may be degraded. A systematic and open approach contributes to mutual trust and

CASE STUDY — Croatia Board of Inquiry

The Croatia Board of Inquiry is a profound example of institutional commitment to member well-being. In the end, it was the process of the inquiry itself, specifically its honest and transparent conduct, and not the outcome, that earned the trust and appreciation of service personnel. As such, it serves as an excellent example to emulate.

While Canadian soldiers were deployed to the Balkans in the early 1990s as part of Operation Harmony, they witnessed unspeakable atrocities and were subjected to an intensity of operations unknown since the Korean War. They lived in a state of constant danger and in an environment that seemed contaminated. Over time, large numbers of soldiers exhibited physical and psychological symptoms that defied medical explanation.

The soldiers sought assistance, but the chain of command failed to adequately address their concerns. This increased the level of frustration and, in some cases, contributed to deterioration of their health. Some soldiers relied on the media to publicize their disappointment at the way they were treated, while others approached the ombudsman to find solutions to their problems. In the face of mounting pressure from the media, the public and government officials, the CF established the Croatia Board of Inquiry in the summer of 1999 to determine whether the illnesses exhibited by the veterans of Operation Harmony were linked to environmental hazards in theatre.

The Board quickly realized that the complaints resulted from the stress to which CF members had been subjected and the failure of the military’s medical system to treat these stress-related illnesses. The majority of individuals who had subsequently left the military had also been denied access to appropriate care and compensation because no physical cause of their ailments was found. This led to distrust and resentment of the leadership that was responsible for ensuring their well-being.

Once the Board became aware of the way in which these soldiers had been treated, they extended their focus to also address a broad range of issues that affected the health and well-being of CF members in general. Members of the Board felt that the soldiers deserved to understand the true causes of their symptoms. As a result of this transparent and honest conduct, the Board eventually came to be seen as reliable, credible and committed to helping those injured as a result of their service in Croatia. Its final report made extensive recommendations to redress the systemic problems within the CF, DND and Veterans Affairs Canada that had caused the denial of treatment to injured members.
maximizes the benefits for all parties. It also affords the CF more flexibility in designing and implementing changes, while ensuring they are consistent with its culture and realities. The collaborative efforts of institutional leaders in the CF and DND can also be critical to the CF and its members. In the late 1990s, for example, the CDS and the Armed Forces Council struggled, unsuccessfully, to identify an appropriate model and implement an inspector general to oversee issues related to the well-being of the CF and its members. In 1998, and as a direct result of a request from the DM and the CDS to the minister, the first CF ombudsman was appointed to fulfil this oversight role.

MEETING NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS

Institutional leaders also use face-to-face interactions, diagnostic tools and voice mechanisms to identify gaps, conflicts, tensions and shortcomings in their efforts to promote member well-being. At the institutional level this is achieved largely through the management, integration and synchronization of systems. Member well-being is not simply a human resources concern; institutional leaders consider systems as diverse as procurement, doctrine, technology, education and training, and communications, among others, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual. Institutional leaders are responsible for the coherent and effective policies that guide these systems, as well as the robust programs that provide full coverage for all members at all times and in all places. However, the circumstances of members vary widely. The challenge for institutional leaders is to ensure that rewards are equitable, accurately reflect needs and are applied systematically. The 1998 SCONDVA Quality of Life Report emphasized:

While the principle of equality insists that we treat everyone the same, with regard to the application of rules and entitlements, equity focuses on the importance of outcome. Equity teaches that it is acceptable, indeed at times necessary, to treat people differently in order that they may enjoy equality of condition. If we are to do away with the myriad of frustrations faced by serving members, then we need to assure equality of outcome.

Building equity also requires impact analyses to identify potentially adverse effects as a result of initiatives intended to provide equity for those who have been disadvantaged in terms of overall well-being and opportunity. The case of perceived ‘zero tolerance’ for human rights violations in the CF in the 1990s clearly illustrates the potential impact of institutional response intended, in this particular case, to reduce harassment and racism, satisfy external pressure, and increase the overall effectiveness of the CF. As the case study indicates, the CF was successful in addressing one goal; however, there was unintended negative impact on the overall integration and effectiveness of the CF. Leading from a systems-thinking perspective, as discussed in Chapter 2, will minimize, if not eliminate, such

Summary Analysis

Ultimately, the Croatia Board of Inquiry placed a greater emphasis on member well-being and had a greater recognition of the role of stress in physical illness. The Board held the Government responsible to soldiers injured as a result of military service, thus reinforcing the shared responsibility that institutional CF leaders and the Government of Canada have for the well-being of Canadian citizens who volunteer to serve in Canada’s military.
conflict, and enhance integration across the organization. This represents a shift from addressing well-being from the perspective of an independent system toward understanding well-being from the perspective of one system that is integrated across multiple systems and interests.

Such a shift in approach, using various diagnostic tools to inform the analysis of outputs, assists institutional leaders in changing existing systems and creating policies and programs to address shortcomings or gaps. Continuous monitoring and assessment are required to determine whether efforts are effective.

CASE STUDY — Zero-Tolerance and Human Rights in the Canadian Forces

The climate of ‘zero tolerance’ that permeated the CF in the 1990s was clearly the result of the commitment of institutional leadership to member well-being. Leadership actions demonstrated a belief in the necessity to uphold national values and expectations in the context of the treatment of Canadian citizens, as well as to enforce the legal and moral tenets of the social contract.

In 1983 the Chief of the Defence Staff issued a policy statement recognizing that there was increasing evidence to suggest that sexual harassment of servicewomen by servicemen was becoming a serious problem within the CF. In 1988 an overarching harassment policy (Canadian Forces Administrative Order 19-39) was promulgated.

Research conducted by the CF Personnel Applied Research Unit in the early 1990s (Personal Harassment in the Canadian Forces: 1992 Survey) confirmed that harassment of all kinds — including personal harassment (based on race, ethnicity, colour, religion, sex, and the other prohibited grounds of discrimination under Canadian human rights legislation), sexual harassment, and abuse of authority — was experienced frequently by CF members. This study, numerous court challenges, and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision on the employment of women in the CF informed revision of the harassment policy in the early 1990s and led to the promulgation of a policy on racist conduct (CF Administrative Order 19-43) in 1993.

In 1996, to reinforce the policy that harassment will not be tolerated, the DND/CF introduced the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) program. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General J. E. J. Boyle, directed that SHARP training was mandatory for all CF members and required routine reports on participation through Level 1s. In 1998, and in response to media reports of sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape in the CF, the serving CDS, General J. M. G. Baril, sent an open letter, distributed through the Maple Leaf newspaper, clearly and forcefully denouncing such action and indicating that all CF commanders would be held accountable for the conduct of their military personnel. By some accounts, the policy and strong messaging were successful. Canadian Forces survey research conducted in 1998 revealed a significant decline in all forms of harassment, with women in particular reporting incidents of harassment down to 14 percent from a previous 26 percent in 1992.
However, by 1997 and 1998, senior leaders were also aware that many operational- and tactical-level leaders, in operational environments in particular, increasingly perceived that it was becoming risky to exercise their leadership as their actions could easily be interpreted as harassment. Others believed that they did not have adequate skills and training to effectively lead within the context of the changing demographics and the expectations of leaders. While the earlier policies and communications promulgated by institutional leaders demonstrated an unambiguous commitment to human rights, many interpreted the message as one of zero tolerance that weighed heavily in favour of a complainant and came without an adequate “toolbox” for leaders.

In 2000, a new harassment policy (Defence Administrative Order and Directive 5012-1) and a set of reference guidelines, responsibilities and terms of reference were introduced through a robust communications strategy. The policy intent had changed significantly from “report, investigate and punish” to “prevention and early resolution.” A 2003 policy review revealed that the new philosophy and structure had been welcomed and instituted and that culture change had taken place at a much faster pace than anticipated. The goal was to create an environment where all members of the defence team could work in an atmosphere free from harassment and abuse, and where a climate of trust encouraged reporting of complaints in breach of the policy.

Summary Analysis
Institutional leadership is responsible for creating the conditions and environment that ensure member well-being. This includes communicating appropriate messages, creating necessary policy and providing appropriate professional development, as well as enforcing rules and regulations that reflect societal norms and values. Beginning at least as early as 1983, the Chief of the Defence Staff acknowledged and communicated to the CF that harassment and discrimination would not be tolerated. However, numerous indicators in the 1990s convinced the institutional leadership of the CF that human rights were not being taken seriously enough by CF members. Various leadership directions, such as the mandatory SHARP training program, made it clear that harassment and discrimination would not be tolerated. However, leadership actions were reactive responses to media accounts and reported rates of harassment, rather than integrated strategies that were informed and inclusive, allowing CF members to make a broader-based commitment to a climate of trust. The policy shift to “prevention and early resolution” is such a strategy.
understanding — from a rules-based to a principles-based framework — within their areas of responsibility. Such change strengthens the institution by engaging all members in continuous transformation efforts and ensuring their own well-being. This, in turn, facilitates the sort of long-term approach required to provide for future operational effectiveness and the sustained health of the profession. Innovation also becomes an important factor. Effective institutional leaders recognize that one size does not fit all. Solutions often require creativity; however, not every solution needs to be tailor-made.

To make the shift to a culture of understanding, leaders emphasize proactive influence behaviours such as facilitation, support, participation and delegation. Building trust is a key component of transformation and is vital to the outcome of the mission. Through a reciprocal process, leaders build confidence in their subordinates and vice versa. By creating such an environment, institutional leaders generate greater buy-in from subordinates and reduce potential for resistance. The best institutional leaders work to develop visions that are flexible enough to integrate members’ input throughout the process. By engaging members in the design and implementation of the vision, the institutional leader provides a concrete example of institutional openness, adaptation and learning that could enable the vision to function more effectively. Open communication in a culture of understanding contributes to the credibility of the institutional leader in demonstrating to members that their well-being is an integrated priority within the competing demands of internal integration, external adaptability, and mission success and thus demonstrating the human and systems dimensions of the institution.

If the well-being of people is overlooked or is unduly subordinated to other competing demands, commitment will diminish and mission success will be compromised. Leaders’ direct interaction and collaboration with members is therefore a necessity; leading the institution and leading people are never completely distinct efforts. Engaging people also allows them to become part of the decision-making process so that changes are made with them, not just for them. This builds a higher level of morale, esprit de corps, and pride and ultimately leads to a profounder sense of belonging and an effective commitment. Institutional leaders distribute the power among those most affected by policies and systems, facilitating self-directed member well-being and responsibility.

In the decision-making process, experienced senior leaders value the upward communication established in feedback mechanisms that empower subordinates. They ask members questions, listen carefully to the answers and incorporate members’ input. Likewise, senior leaders also improve downward communication to provide members not only with instructions but also a clearer understanding of the institutional vision, intent and values. In this respect, senior non-commissioned officers can serve as an important link between the vision and the concerns of members. By incorporating members’ ideas, leaders ensure their vision reflects people, principles and systems. This sort of comprehensive vision generates a sense of purpose and direction that is more easily understood and internalized by all members of the institution. A clear vision that is shared and accepted further reinforces member commitment, motivation and shared identity.

Institutional leaders are responsible for ensuring that the chain of command recognizes, responds to and is accountable for member needs and well-being at every level. As the 1998 SCONDVA Quality of Life Report noted, operational success alone is not enough. “Leadership also needs to be effective with regard to day-to-day activities of administration, personnel support, career management, etc.,” throughout the chain of command. Otherwise, efforts to ensure member well-being and commitment at
senior levels are doomed. Therefore, it is important to provide subordinate leaders with the necessary authority and resources (for example, information, and financial and material resources) to implement the vision.

There is a major difference between the consequences of breaking a promise and violating a contract. Breaking a promise can produce disappointment. That disappointment may be substantial, if either the expectations were high or what was promised was very desirable, but disappointment is still the likely outcome. By violation of a psychological contract, in contrast, is likely to produce more emotional and intense reactions. Outrage and anger replace disappointment, and the accompanying behavioural consequences are likely to be consistent with the more intense emotional reaction.

A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal Partnership Between the Department of Defense, Service Members and Families, B-8.

By following through and following up, institutional leaders honour the social contract and take corrective measures when the institution falls short. Whether perception or reality, broken promises and unfulfilled expectations can result in disappointment, even anger amongst members, and therefore have a negative impact on mission success. Senior non-commissioned members in particular are responsible to convey members’ needs and concerns up the chain of command and follow up with examples of lost trust when these concerns are not acted upon. Phrases such as “people are our most valuable resource” or “the most important weapon system in the CF is professional people” can become cliché or even counterproductive if leaders do not ensure that their people are actually well looked after. In addition, the social contract is open to continuous interpretation. Therefore, institutional leaders play a pivotal role in negotiating agreement and understanding among CF members, society in general, and specific communities, regarding expectations, obligations and the reciprocal relationship between well-being and commitment to the defence mission. In this role, the credibility of institutional leaders is critical in terms of conveying their commitment to the relationship between people and the overall capabilities of the CF.

**BALANCING VALUES AND RESOURCES**

Even when institutional leaders gain full awareness of needs and expectations and adopt a transformative leadership style, they are still constrained by competing values and limited resources. Institutional leaders reconcile the pressure to accomplish the mission and the pressure to achieve the vision, through the CF’s values-based approach to leadership. For example, taking care of people sometimes conflicts with operational mission accomplishment because the mission requires leaders to expose their troops to dangerous circumstances. However, excessive concern with force protection could also compromise the mission and endanger members by placing them in a static defensive posture. Thus, institutional leaders often put their troops in harm’s way, though mission accomplishment at any cost can only be justified under certain limited circumstances. These are dictated not only by military strategy but also by the national socio-political context.
The challenge for institutional leaders, then, is to balance mission accomplishment with member well-being in challenging operational contexts and in situations where there is incomplete information, rapidly changing circumstances, and no “right answer.” Senior leaders confront this inherent uncertainty in operational settings by adopting the same transformational leadership approach used in institutional settings. The efforts of leaders to take care of people in non-operational settings — particularly in addressing human resources issues such as compensation, awards, housing, and health care — also have long-term impacts on mission accomplishment. The case of Operation Phoenix and Rx 2000 provides an excellent example of the challenge that institutional leaders faced in developing a strategy for CF-wide medical care within the context of limited resources and competing demands in the 1990s.

CASE STUDY — Operation Phoenix to Project Rx2000: a Decade of Change

The provision of health care to service personnel is fundamental to member well-being and commitment and therefore is a critical component of mission success. After all, it builds member trust and confidence in the institution. Members must know that the CF is committed to looking after their well-being when they require medical care. The transition from Operation Phoenix to Rx2000 provides an appropriate example of how the institution has evolved to ensure member well-being and commitment.

Since its formation in 1959 (when the medical services of the Army, Navy and Air Force were amalgamated), the Canadian Forces Medical Services (CFMS) have gone through numerous organizational constructs designed to respond to peacetime domestic, peacekeeping, peace support, and wartime situations. The 1962 Royal Commission on Government Organizations (Glassco Commission) questioned the efficiency of the CFMS and recommended that hospital care of CF personnel in Canada be transferred to civilian hospitals; the recommendation was subsequently overturned by an interdepartmental committee.

The status quo was maintained for ten years until the Treasury Board identified the need for a review of military medical services. This lead to the S42 Study that confirmed the need for a medical service for operational reasons and concluded that this could best be accomplished by a military medical service. Based on the mandate and rationale for the CFMS confirmed by the S42 Study, in 1977 the Treasury Board approved a departmental policy for the provision of health care and the maintenance of the CFMS as a uniform service.

In 1989, the review of operational support, by the director general, military requirements, indicated that CF medical organizations, then under the command and leadership of the environments, were incapable of providing the required care to deployed Canadian formations. The 1990 Auditor General’s report pointed to an urgent need to transform medical services delivery into a more viable, operations-oriented and cost-effective system. In 1992, an internal evaluation by the chief of review services concluded that excellent in-garrison
care was being provided but at the expense of operations support capability. Within a context of increasing operational tempo, the CF leadership realized that it was essential to assess and rationalize health-care services provided to CF members to ensure a viable operations-focused and cost-effective system.

In 1993, the Canadian government’s efforts to address national deficits through reduced government spending and personnel downsizing placed considerable pressure on DND and the CF. As a result, internal scrutiny of CF capabilities intensified. Combat service support and headquarters organizations, National Defence Headquarters in particular, were targeted in efforts to fix the “tooth-to-tail” ratio by reducing the resources committed to areas other than combat and combat-support organizations. Due to the limited role that the medical services were playing in operations of the day, they had become viewed as an in-Canada, stay at home, in-garrison only, health-care delivery system (and perhaps had even adopted a civilian-health-care-system-like mentality). Within this climate, Operation Phoenix was initiated to produce a strategic plan and recommendations to refocus the Canadian Forces Medical Services by creating a health-care system capable of supporting assigned CF missions and tasks. This re-orientation represented a significant reversal of role priorities and mindset for the CFMS — from the provision of day-to-day health care to operational support.

While there is no question that the work done under the auspices of Operation Phoenix was invaluable and served to underpin the success of the most recent reform efforts under Project Rx2000, the Operation as a major reform and re-engineering activity was doomed to failure for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, it was based upon the premise, now known as flawed, that medical operational primacy related only to the provision of medical support on operations, with in-garrison medical support being a secondary objective. This proved to be a major failing as the provision of medical support to operations is a continuum and a key force-protection requirement — everything the medical service does is related, directly or indirectly, to maintaining the operational readiness of CF personnel. The reinforcement of in-garrison medical support in Canada as “secondary” and “non-operational” in nature had a negative and lasting impact on medical services funding and force levels, and would eventually render Operation Phoenix unviable.

At the time, senior leaders of the CF did not appreciate the complexities and interdependencies of medical service provision and the operational effectiveness of the CF, including the statutory responsibilities regarding the provision of health care, within which the CF and the health services must operate. As a result, arbitrary and unrealistic decisions were made that placed the CF and its health services in a position of unacceptable risk regarding their capability to meet operational requirements. In addition, the prevailing “business case” approach to retaining “non-operational, essential” health-care providers undermined the ability of the health services to support essential care delivery in under-serviced areas of the country. At the same time that the CF was downsizing its health-care capability, the civilian health-care sector was also undergoing significant resource challenges, which further undermined the CF health system. The culmination of these initiatives resulted in a mass exodus of the CF’s most experienced medical personnel through the Force Reduction Program, a situation from which medical services have not recovered, a full decade later.

By the late 1990s, the CF health services were managing in the environment of a fragmented in-garrison capability, a dispirited organization and unhappy stakeholders at a time when the operations tempo of the CF had increased to unprecedented levels, and with it the spectre that CF personnel were no longer
Leadership in the Canadian Forces

receiving the care to which they once had access. Indeed, capabilities related to CF health-care provision were declining as a result of numerous changes, including CF hospital closures and the declining availability of military health-care personnel. In 1999, after a barrage of complaints from serving members, the Chief of the Defence Staff directed the Chief of Review Services (CRS) to undertake a review of the provision of in-garrison medical services in the CF. The CRS was specifically tasked to examine the issues of continuity of care and administration of temporary medical categories, as well as other issues relating to the provision of care to CF members.

Upon receiving the report, the CDS concluded that an action plan and a commitment from DND/CF leadership were required to restore in-garrison health care while maintaining operational effectiveness. The task force assembled by the CDS went beyond the initial CRS recommendations to address the areas that had been identified as requiring further study. The task force action plan comprised in excess of one hundred recommendations that challenged virtually all aspects of the medical services. Addressing the recommendations was a complex undertaking and would impact on the entire CF population.

The CDS action team reaffirmed that both the physical fitness and the mental health fitness of CF members were inextricably linked to the readiness, effectiveness and efficiency of the military as a fighting force. In-garrison medical care was recognized as having a direct impact on the ability of the CF leadership to ensure that troops were both physically and mentally prepared for deployment. In addition, the CRS report confirmed that the statutory responsibility vested with the Crown to provide medical services to its members. Canadian Forces members are also excluded from coverage under provincial health-care plans by virtue of the enactment of the Canada Health Act (1984) that does not include CF members as insured persons.

In response to the perception of a growing gap between CF and Canadian health-care standards, the Standing Committee on Operational Medicine Review was stood up to conduct an in-depth clinical-perspective review of deployed health-care services, from point of injury/illness to arrival in a destination hospital in Canada, in order to further identify deficiencies and recommend solutions.

It was determined that to provide continuity of care, especially in the many under-serviced areas where the CF operates, the CF needed to provide a health-care structure that offered consistent care delivery, comparable to that available to other Canadian citizens, and that was managed with clearly articulated direction and guidance. Canadian Forces institutional leadership, through the Rx2000 Senior Review Board chaired by the CDS and DM and consisting of Level 1 representation, determined that the exercise of their health-care provision responsibilities could best be exercised through the centralization of command, control and management of CF medical services under the commander of the CF Health Services Group, with associated staff responsibilities as the Director General, Health Services. This recognized the complexity of command and control relationships relevant to the CF medical services and the associated impacts on existing departmental vertical and horizontal accountability structures. Finally, Project Rx2000 was approved to put into operation the work of the CDS action team.
In providing for members’ well-being, senior leaders are required to weigh the benefits of specific policies and programs against the associated expenses in order to ensure efficient and responsible expenditure of limited financial resources. Effective institutional leaders make difficult choices regarding these constraints and then communicate broadly and clearly both their decision and their justification. This generates a better understanding and increased co-operation by members. At the institutional level, the leader not only specifies what to do but also why — the guiding principles. This helps to ensure...
that the means of achieving the results are consistent with legal, ethical and professional standards, and permits institutional leaders to build linkages among organizational, professional and members’ needs.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

Taking care of people and their quality of life is critical to achieving commitment and optimal performance while helping to eliminate any resistance that could impede or pose a threat to effectiveness. All of these factors contribute significantly to overall mission success. Ensuring member well-being requires a significant amount of time, effort and money; however, institutional leaders should see these as investments in the future of the institution rather than as just short-term expenses. Successful transformation requires all members to adopt this long-term perspective and integrate it into both their day-to-day activities and their strategic planning.

Well cared for people must have appropriate training, equipment, leadership and support as well as equitable rewards, recognition and services to meet their individual and family needs while on operations, when preparing to deploy or when returning home. This will enhance subordinates’ trust and confidence in their leaders as representatives of the institution, thereby making member well-being a force multiplier. Well cared for members also have higher morale, and aid the profession in attracting, developing and retaining the best and brightest men and women. Finally, honouring the social contract is essential to maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Legitimacy is crucial to increasing Government’s and Canadians’ trust and confidence in, and support for, their military.
Summary – Ensuring Member Well-Being and Commitment

Understand the Importance of Member Well-Being
- Recognize the practical, legal and moral motivations to care for people.
- Understand the national context, government requirements and societal expectations.
- Acknowledge the need for improved situational awareness of members’ well-being.

Gain Awareness
- Become familiar with the results of internal diagnostic studies.
- Ensure these studies are regularly administered and updated, linked horizontally, and accurately reflect societal expectations and government requirements.
- Establish appropriate feedback mechanisms, including suggestions, complaints and grievances.
- Guarantee there will be no recriminations for members who exercise these options.
- Assess members’ expectations, then communicate which ones will be met, and how.

Meet Needs and Expectations
- Identify gaps, conflicts, tensions and shortcomings in systems that affect well-being.
- Make certain that rewards are equitable, reflect needs and are applied systematically.
- Conduct impact analyses to identify how systems should be integrated and de-conflicted.
- Modify systems or create new elements as necessary.
- Monitor and assess effects; adjust as necessary.

Transform the Institution
- Adopt transformational influence behaviours.
- Express confidence in subordinates.
- Communicate and engage members at all stages, from visioning through assessment.

- Articulate institutional visions, intent and values as well as directives.
- Empower subordinate leaders to implement plans, and hold them accountable.
- Address broken promises and unfulfilled expectations swiftly and openly.

Balance Values and Resources
- Balance force protection and mission accomplishment requirements.
- Weigh proposals’ benefits to members against associated expenses.
- Treat related time, effort and monetary requirements as long-term investments.

Link to Mission Success
- Member well-being enhances subordinates’ trust and confidence in their leaders as representatives of the institution, acting as a force multiplier.
- Well cared for members have higher morale and are more inclined to continue serving, increasing commanders’ ability to accomplish the mission in the short term.
- Honouring the social contract also helps ensure that society sees the military institution as legitimate.
- Perceived legitimacy, in turn, is crucial to future recruiting efforts and to increasing the Government’s and Canadian’s trust and confidence in and support of the military.
Recommended Reading


Section 3
Building Institutional Leadership
Ensuring Effective Succession of Institutional Leadership

Effective institutional leadership is not simply a linear extrapolation of operation leadership and command. While some senior Generals and Flag Officers periodically will be assigned to force commander roles, most of their time will be devoted to providing advice on national security matters, planning and leading change, managing large complex systems, and stewarding the profession. For this reason, professional [development] and formal education… [and] a series of staff appointments… should provide them with the competencies needed to anticipate the future, lead change within a strategic context, and ensure continuing and effective operational capabilities.

_Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 101_

The Canadian Forces, as a hierarchic and bureaucratic organization with a profession of arms embedded within it, is a unique institution that requires effective institutional leaders with very special capabilities. Current institutional leaders, in whose hands rest the lifeblood of the institution, the CF vision, the CF future, and long-term member well-being, are responsible for ensuring the continuity of these aspects through the leader capacities of their successors. Senior leaders have to be teachers, guides and mentors in the professional development of the CF’s future institutional leaders.

This chapter is significantly different from previous chapters in that it utilizes the collective content of those chapters as the justification and foundation for the extensive professional development of those engaged in institutional leadership. The responsibility rests with institutional leaders to define what their successors need to know, do and be, and to professionally develop those successors. This responsibility includes the provision of broad strategic direction and oversight of institutional leader development, as well as focused, personal and professional guidance of their individual successors. Effective leadership of the institution is essential to the future effectiveness of the CF; for only through effective successors can current institutional leaders ensure their vision is fulfilled.

From the challenges laid out in the previous chapters, it is clear that institutional leaders require both a broad foundation and a deep understanding of leader theories and concepts, institutional and/or CF effectiveness, and CF leader effectiveness. As well, institutional leaders must possess, and endorse for all leaders, the requisite capacities to deal with the increasing complexity of leadership. They require well-honed cognitive, social and change capacities, extensive strategic and institutional expertise, and a professional ideology appropriate to the CF.

**CANADIAN FORCES EFFECTIVENESS**

The CF is influenced and shaped by four interrelated factors: government direction, societal expectations, professional norms, and strategic integrated operating concepts. These factors determine the context of
the CF mission and roles. Institutional leaders ensure that their successors understand that effectiveness results from the appropriate integration of these complex factors.

However, the complexity does not end there. Institutional leaders need to meet both organizational and professional objectives in order to achieve institutional effectiveness. These are objectives with diverse values and conflicting challenges. Institutional leaders balance the levels of attention paid to the domain of leading people, particularly at the more junior rank levels, and the domain of leading the institution at the more senior levels.

Strategic leaders find themselves enmeshed in intricate networks of competing constituencies and cooperative endeavours that extend beyond their own organization. Strategic leaders must have a “future focus,” spending much of their time looking toward the future and positioning the organization for long-term success.

*Strategic Leadership Primer, 111.*

To guarantee organizational effectiveness, institutional leaders are responsible for ensuring four essential CF outcomes: mission success, internal integration, external adaptability, and member well-being and commitment (see Figure 7.1). The conduct value of military ethos infuses the four essential outcomes with professional standards and values. This represents the requisite consequence of professional effectiveness. Military ethos is the fundamental requirement that transforms the CF from an effective organization into a professional institution.

Inherent in the four outcomes are significant conflicts and competing values to be addressed by current institutional leaders and their successors. Such conflicts substantiate the call for the capacities, attributes and competencies demanded in senior leadership, and reflect upon the responsibility of current institutional leaders to ensure such capacities are developed in their successors. Conflicts facing institutional leaders include:

- task or mission success versus people well-being and commitment;
- intra-organizational and interdepartmental synchrony versus external influence, accommodation and change;

**Figure 7.1: Canadian Forces Effectiveness**
• bureaucratic and organizational stability versus professional ideological growth, cultural evolution and perpetual “learning organization” flux; and

• Canadian civic, legal, ethical or military values versus international political diversity, foreign cultural expectations, various military norms, and global heterogeneity.

CF LEADER EFFECTIVENESS
From the foregoing it is evident that the major imperatives implicit in leader effectiveness are that future institutional leaders must have learned, before becoming such leaders, to see the world in terms of its paradoxes and contradictions and to balance the competing demands represented by each essential outcome. However, the ability to understand organizational dynamics this way does not come naturally. It demands that institutional leaders acquire a systemic perspective of global activities and a dramatic change in outlook. It requires the cognitive complexity that goes beyond the linear, analytic logic appropriate for solving well-defined problems toward a creative, abstract and flexible logic. Effective institutional leaders possess the capacities to influence others to take action on a daily basis, to enhance the institution’s long-term viability while maintaining its short-term effectiveness. Therefore, institutional leaders have:

• a keener sense of a leader’s particular moral and ethical commitment as a practising professional;

• an awareness and mastery of the cultural, national and international contexts in which military leaders function, along with abilities to deal with the complexity in cognitive, social and behavioural terms and to sort out the competing values of pluralistic and diverse cultures;

• a more differentiated leadership approach to include the concept of distributed leadership in operational issues and personnel administration consistent with the mainstream values of Canadian society; and

• a commitment to a model of institutional effectiveness beyond the Cold War and the 1990s experiences, that is, a twenty-first century model that links conflicting dimensions of organizational effectiveness with unique dimensions of professional military effectiveness.

LEADER CAPACITIES: A LEADER FRAMEWORK
Institutional leaders recognize and exemplify the requisite leader capacities necessary for themselves, and their successors, to be successful at generating institutional effectiveness. Institutional leaders also ensure the development of these capacities in leaders at junior, intermediate and advanced levels. A new, CF-specific, framework of five leader elements has been developed. This Leader Framework incorporates the elements of expertise, cognitive capacities and social capacities. For decades, these elements were referred to as technical skills, thinking skills and interpersonal skills, but they have now been expanded, labelled and described in line with their higher complexity required for effective leadership. As one example, technical skills has been expanded to expertise, which clusters technical and specialist expertise, military and organizational expertise, and strategic and institutional expertise — essentially a continuum of three levels of expertise that are layered and that are accepted by leaders as they progress through the leader levels.

Strategic leadership is about becoming. It’s about a process of never-ending individual, team, and organizational learning.

Becoming a Strategic Leader, xiii.
CASE STUDY — The Stand-Up of the Canadian Defence Academy

Succession of leaders with the capacities necessary to generate successful outcomes is critical to the well-being of any institution, including the CF. One major area of interest in the reform movement in the CF which developed in the wake of the Minister’s Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the CF (1997) was professional development. There was a growing awareness and acceptance of the need to examine the traditional balance among the four pillars of professional development as understood doctrinally in the CF. These pillars are training, education, experience and self-development.

This was a key focus for analysis in the office of the Special Advisor to the CDS for Professional Development (SA PD) established in 1999. The SA PD made the argument that in the emerging security environment of the post–Cold War era, an increased emphasis on education and lifelong learning was required. Training and experience would remain central to operational effectiveness, but they had to be buttressed with new knowledge and, especially, the development of much higher order cognitive capacities.

Organizationally, the problem was that education was embedded in the CF Recruiting, Education and Training System (CFRETS) and did not receive the necessary attention. As stated in the SA PD’s Statement of Operational Requirement, “today’s organization and structures will be unlikely to achieve the degree of co-ordination required. CFRETS is, in fact, stretched today to handle current issues and problems. CFRETS institutions such as RMC, Canadian Forces College (CFC) and the two War College courses (Advanced Military Studies Course and National Security Studies Course) operate with a degree of independence and state of relative isolation that is inimical to the required level of coherence necessary in the future.” The statement went on to recommend the creation of a CF university to focus attention on professional development, especially the education component.

Concurrently, the VCDS engaged the consulting firm Consulting and Audit Canada (CAC) to examine the question and propose options. The CAC team consulted widely, and discussed the problem at considerable length with the SA PD and his staff. They supported the special advisor’s contention that the Royal Military College had to be the pivotal institution upon which a higher formation would be built. The CAC report recommended that CFRETS be disbanded and the Canadian Defence Academy be created, commanded by a major-general or a rear-admiral, and containing the Royal Military College, the Canadian Forces College, a CF Leadership Institute and the Non-commissioned Member Professional Development Centre.

Summary Analysis

The Canadian Defence Academy was stood up in April 2002. As such, it represents an important component in the effective succession of CF institutional leaders through relevant professional development. With its mission to “champion lifelong learning and CF professional development in support of the defence mission,” the Academy is positioned to provide an integrated focus for professional and leader development in order to ensure institutional effectiveness within the Canadian Forces.
The Leader Framework also reflects the “shaping and leading change” capacities required of institutional leaders and their teams functioning in a “learning organization” and in current, rapidly changing, ambiguous circumstances. Finally, the framework incorporates a professional ideology, in support of the institution’s military ethos and as a requisite component for institutional leaders to generate CF effectiveness. This framework of requisite leader elements is applicable to all levels of leaders, including leaders engaged in institutional leadership with the additional and important responsibility to develop and shape their successors.

Accordingly, the Leader Framework consists of five leader elements: expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology (see Table 7.1). The Leader Framework reflects the identification, in Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (page 60), of the important leader characteristics in five domains: knowledge and skills; cognitive ability; social influence and flexibility; adaptability and purposeful change; and motivation and values and/or professionalism.

Institutional leaders benefit from understanding the utility of this framework for developing their successors. The complete leader framework incorporates a hierarchy of elements, attributes and competencies for the development of leaders. Nested within the five elements are a total of sixteen attributes, all of which are applicable to and required of CF leaders. The specificity for certain leader activities not shared by all leaders would fall to numerous competencies embedded within each attribute, competencies that would be so detailed as to be in line with designated positions, jobs, tasks, leader levels, or groups of positions or tasks.

CASE STUDY — Senior Leaders Project

The Senior Leaders Project (SLP), under the auspices of the Canadian Defence Academy and its Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, addressed the professional development needs of general officers and flag officers (GOFOs) and of chief warrant officers and chief petty officers, 1st class who were selected for senior appointments (CWOs/SA). The Canadian Defence Academy, through its Canadian Forces College, already provides a number of formal courses for senior leaders. The Senior Leaders Project focused only on the professional development requirements of post–Canadian Forces College GOFOs and CWOs/SA.

The Canadian Forces Leadership Institute’s research to identify GOFO and CWO/SA learning requirements included a thorough analysis of the Canadian Forces’ 2020 documents (Defence Strategy 2020, Officership 2020, NCM Corps 2020, Human Resources 2020, et cetera) plus other military sources and the generic leadership literature. The Institute also conducted interviews, focusing on senior leaders’ professional development needs, with numerous serving GOFOs and CWOs/SA and with DND civilian executives. Two major findings resulted:

- The substantial need to enhance senior-leader capacities beyond formal military courses continues to exist. The CF, post–Cold War, in its perpetual transformation, makes highly enhanced senior-leader capacities essential for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Institutional leaders require exceptional cognitive, social and change capacities, and strategic and institutional wisdom, all integrated with a professional ideology.
• A fundamental requirement exists for a combination of high-impact, low-duration learning circumstances and effective learning strategies. To accommodate the lack of time and availability of senior leaders, the professional development must include the most beneficial subject matter, the most economic use of time, the most appropriate and effective learning strategies, and the most convenient circumstances for congregating.

The broad research, fortified by GOFO and CWO/SA interview outcomes, demonstrated the two best strategies for the professional development of senior CF leaders:

• Institutionally supported self-development among senior leaders on a self-starting, self-regulating basis, with opportunities internal and external to the CF. Examples include professional development plan guidance with academic mentors, other senior leaders and subject matter experts; several-day or one-week exchanges and/or placements with other government departments; brief executive seminars at universities; focused reading lists on specified subject matter; short-term battlefield tours; multi-rater (360 degree) assessment feedback.

• Targeted, Canadian Defence Academy–sponsored seminars that are short, sharp, exclusive (privileged platform), focused, convenient (on site where enough senior leaders work or congregate), half-day, responsive to needs identified by senior leaders, and facilitated for open exchanges and general discussion. Subjects include “Understanding Ottawa” and “Working the Town”; Visioning; Leading and Implementing Change; Strategic Planning; Strategic Leadership; Creative/Critical Thinking; Systems Thinking; Stewarding the Profession; Organizational Culture; Integrating the Major Internal Systems; Advancing Member Well-Being and Commitment; and Creating the Institutional Leader.

A significant outcome of the Senior Leaders Project was the identification of the need for a post-Canadian Forces College transition in learning and learning methodologies toward short, focused, high-impact opportunities using adult-learning strategies and away from the pedagogical, classroom-lecturer, developmental strategies. This shift in learning circumstances and professional development strategies would go beyond the granularity of individual level competencies, single leader attributes, and dollops of new knowledge. This outcome, this shift, represents key design components for institutional leadership in support of the CF’s competitive strategy, its organizational learning, its commitment to evolve and transform, and its professionalism.

Summary Analysis
Canadian Forces effectiveness is dependent upon CF leader effectiveness, which in turn is dependent upon the effective application of requisite leader capacities, particularly by senior leaders. The four requisite capacities, when shaped by professional ideology, together coalesce into a leader framework. Successful development of these capacities, through best choices for subject matter and learning strategies, ensures that CF leaders can address the substantial challenges facing the CF in the twenty-first century.
### Table 7.1: A Leader Framework: Five Elements and Sixteen Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Framework of Five Leader Elements</th>
<th>Sixteen Attributes <em>(in bold)</em> Within Five Elements Across the Leader Continuum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>The focus, scope and magnitude of competencies for responsibilities related to the leader attributes will vary with rank, leader level, position, etc., and usually increase with time in the CF, rank, seniority and credibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Capacities</td>
<td>Expertise consists of technical (clusters, e.g., combat arms, sea trades, aircrew) and specialist (Military Occupation Classification) proficiencies, an understanding and development of the military and organizational environments, and the practice and eventual stewardship of the profession of arms, with the capacities to represent and transform the system through applications at the strategic and institutional levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capacities</td>
<td>Cognitive capacities consist of a problem-solving, critical, analytic, “left-brain” competence to think and rationalize with mental discipline in order to draw strong conclusions and make good decisions; plus an innovative, strategic, conceptually creative, “right-brain” capacity to find novel means, “outside the box” ends, and previously undiscovered solutions to issues and problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Capacities</td>
<td>Social capacities consist of a sincere and meaningful behavioural flexibility to be all things to all people, with authenticity, combined with communications skills that clarify understanding, resolve conflicts and bridge differences. These capacities are blended with an interpersonal proficiency of clarity and persuasiveness, team relationships that generate co-ordination, cohesion, trust and commitment, and partnering capabilities for strategic relations building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Ideology</td>
<td>Change capacities involve self-development, with risk and achievement, to ensure self-efficacy; group-directed capacities to ensure unit improvement and group transformation; and all with an understanding of the qualities of a CF-wide learning organization, the applications of a learning organization philosophy, and the capacity of strategic knowledge management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional ideology consists of an acute awareness of the unique, theory-based, discretionary body of knowledge at the core of the profession, with an internalized ethos whose values and beliefs guide the application of that knowledge. The discretionary nature of military knowledge requires keen judgment in its use and involves moral reasoning in thinking and acting, shaped by the military ethos. Professional Ideology underpins a leader exemplar with credibility/impact who displays character, openness, assertiveness and extroversion that ensures the necessary effect by and from the leader.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As an example, within the leader element of Cognitive Capacities, two attributes, analytic and creative (see Table 7.1), are clustered. Competencies that, in turn, would cluster within each of these attributes and would be job, position or level specific would be reflected in their detailed descriptions. For example, for institutional leaders, the competencies might be well defined versions of the following: visioning, strategic problem-solving, corporate decision-making, conflict resolution in partnerships, and institutional judgment. Importantly, the leader elements in the Leader Framework are interrelated, interconnected and interdependent and, like jigsaw puzzle pieces, need to be assembled and interlocked to create a complete picture, a whole. Only collectively do the leader elements make effective leadership possible.

INSTITUTIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT: A SUPPORTING FRAMEWORK

To develop successors at the senior-leader level, incumbent institutional leaders need only array the Leader Framework of requisite elements against a progressive development process, essentially a professional development framework, applicable across the continuum of leader responsibilities at the junior through the intermediate, advanced and senior levels. (This four-level format — junior, intermediate, advanced, senior — is arbitrary but useful for explaining leader development across the continuum.) In this manner, institutional leaders create a framework, the Professional Development Framework, which has great utility for guiding leader development throughout the CF.

Institutional leaders are responsible to oversee the development of their successors. They are responsible for the specific learning content, the emphases in the professional development, and the strategies and methodologies most effective for each compartment of the Professional Development Framework. These compartments, created by the five elements cross-tabulated with the four leader levels, together are the keys to success for effective professional leader development. Institutional leaders understand the significance of all levels — junior, intermediate, advanced and senior — for each element, because each level represents a necessary foundational layer for each successive and higher level of leadership. Hence, institutional leaders master all compartments of the Professional Development Framework.

Being a strong strategic leader means you have to focus on others as much as — if not more than — on yourself.... Create a climate that fosters strategic leadership in others. Develop strategic leadership abilities in those around you.

Becoming a Strategic Leader, 39–40.

While Table 7.2 provides only the senior leader level of the Professional Development Framework and contains detail on each of the five elements at that senior level, Annex B addresses the full professional development framework. Annex B, Table B.1, provides important professional development information as it highlights the sequential and increasingly challenging capacities across the five leader elements arrayed against the four leader levels, from junior to senior.
Table 7.2: Professional Development Framework: Senior Leader Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERTISE Strategic</th>
<th>COGNITIVE CAPACITIES Creative/Abstract</th>
<th>SOCIAL CAPACITIES Inter-Institutional</th>
<th>CHANGE CAPACITIES Paradigm Shifting</th>
<th>PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY Stewardship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Expertise</td>
<td>Knowledge Creation</td>
<td>Strategic-Relations Building</td>
<td>Multi-Institutional Partnering</td>
<td>Stewardship of the Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scope and content moves from knowledge to expertise with accompanying expansion to a strategic understanding of the domain of security.</td>
<td>• Able to generate, organize and manage the theory-based body of knowledge applied across the profession.</td>
<td>• Relates to the concept of leading the institution, relies on secondary and tertiary influence processes for the senior leader to communicate institutional priorities and strategic intent across organizational systems.</td>
<td>• Focus is external, on changing others’ understanding of the military as a strategic political capacity, and internal, on implementing internal change initiatives.</td>
<td>• Core capacities are related to managing collective professional identity — the key issues of articulating what the profession is, what it stands for and what it believes in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shift from knowledge to expertise requires ability to apply the philosophy and principles that govern the generation and employment of military capacities (knowledge + philosophy = expertise) and strategic, institutional co-existence among peer ministries, foreign defence agencies.</td>
<td>• This goes beyond the analytic, creative and judgment capacities needed to adapt the profession to the external environment, and expands to include the obligation to update and extend the profession’s unique body of knowledge so as to ensure that the profession is discharging all of its responsibilities to society in the most effective manner.</td>
<td>• Builds open teams such that immediate subordinates can contribute novel ideas and can critique taken-for-granted assumptions.</td>
<td>• In this latter regard, there is an emphasis on the initial stages of anticipating change, effectively contributing to the change, and monitoring and adjusting initiatives over the change period.</td>
<td>• Able to engage in very abstract reasoning, exemplified at the highest stages of moral/identity development — in particular, the capacity for independent judgment of the profession’s core philosophy, ideology and principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expertise at this stage clearly is dependent upon the complementary development in Professional Ideology, a full understanding of the profession of arms.</td>
<td>• Cognitive capacities at this stage have a strong parallel to those at advanced academic postgraduate levels; masters the particular academic discipline but also generates new knowledge.</td>
<td>• Externally focused capacities pertain to building and maintaining strategic relations with others engaged in the broad security arena and related national/government initiatives.</td>
<td>• Senior leader initiatives exist to transform and improve a team or multiple units, or to attempt learning-organization applications at organizational and institutional levels.</td>
<td>• This capacity is integrated with acquisition of related capacities in Cognitive and Change Capacities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
For institutional leaders overseeing the development of their successors, the choices of effective learning processes or strategies are as important as the learning content or skills enhancement in each compartment of the Professional Development Framework. With respect to professional development, the CF approach, traditionally, has been the conventional professional-development pillars of experience, training, education and self-development. There is great potential, particularly at advanced and senior leader levels, for the development of today’s requisite leader capacities beyond the training and experience pillars and more through additional and enhanced education, self-development, and the specific experience of professional socialization.

CASE STUDY — The Executive Leadership Symposium
An important component of any succession program is the provision of the requisite professional development for senior leaders as they advance in rank and responsibility within the institution. As part of the overall reform movement generated by the Minister’s Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces, the CDS established the Office of the Special Advisor to the CDS for Professional Development (SA PD) in February 1999. The first incumbent was Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire. The Office was to provide the centralized strategic guidance for the professional development reported as lacking by the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change.

The SA PD conducted a wide-ranging, intensive analysis of professional development in the CF, initially focussed on the officer corps. In due course, attention shifted to the non-commissioned member corps. The special advisor’s initial report, Officership 2020: Statement of Operational Requirement, noted that since the closure of the National Defence College in 1994, there had not been an adequate program of professional development for senior officers, especially newly promoted general officers and flag officers. The creation of the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course was underway, to be sure, but it would take time for these courses to fill the gap. In any case, it was argued, even when they were fully operational, there would still be a requirement to extend and deepen the development of these very senior officers, especially in the areas of the study of military professionalism, institutional leadership, civil-military relations, the theory of war and conflict, and policy-making and decision-making at the national level.

The CDS supported the special advisor’s position on this issue, and the Executive Leadership Symposium was created by the SA PD’s staff. The Symposium consisted of five days of lectures and discussions on the above-mentioned subjects. Subject matter experts in all these fields were brought in to support the program. The first two symposia, run annually, were conducted by the SA PD at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. The responsibility for the Symposium was subsequently transferred to the College in 2003.

With the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course in full operation today, the responsibility of institutional leaders now requires that the Executive Leadership Symposium be adjusted to benefit from the quality of the military professionals who are attending after having completed these extended courses.
Only a portion of each of these leader elements can be developed using structured, directed learning processes in which the CF establishes the learning objectives and evaluates the learning acquired. In contrast, a significant component of the Cognitive Capacities, Social Capacities and Change Capacities and virtually all of the acquisition of Professional Ideology require that members determine for themselves how they will relate to the institution and the expectations of the military profession. Institutional leaders oversee development in the domains that utilize processes complementary to the current emphasis on learning through CF-directed training, education and experience, and emphasize alternative processes that facilitate personal growth, self-study, self-development, and professional socialization.

Breaking the Paradigm. When institutional leaders attempt to influence the large and complex system of professional military institutions for training and education, they avoid the powerful tendency to seek only solutions that are definitive, prescriptive and complete. The emerging realities of the strategic environment dictate that a different, adult learning, developmental approach is more appropriate for future institutional leaders. The emphasis is shifting somewhat from a focus on logical reasoning, science, and empirical methodologies towards a balanced process that includes greater flexibility and individual initiative, with a greater concentration on complex problem solving, innovation, and flexible social skills. For institutional leaders overseeing their own succession, this new paradigm requires a fundamental shift in how future leaders are developed, with both the institution and the leader having shared investment and responsibility in the process.

Senior-level development by its very nature is designed to prepare the best performers of an institution for positions of higher responsibility. Operating effectively at the institutional level consists of thinking and doing business in qualitatively different ways. The key action is not the acquisition of knowledge but the skill of knowing how to interpret the knowledge and then knowing what to do with it. The developmental approach for future institutional leaders addresses expanding frames of reference, perspective taking, building mental maps, and developing conceptual capacities, all of this to build upon the acquisition of skills and knowledge. Being open and flexible allows institutional leaders to see problems from more than one perspective, allows complex problems to be reframed so that solutions become clearer, and allows the accommodation of seemingly ambiguous solutions. Openness and flexibility by senior leaders allows the questioning of underlying assumptions about a problem and facilitates the generation of an array of possible solutions and an understanding of the resulting system-wide

Summary Analysis
While formal courses are required to address part of the professional development needs of institutional leaders, there also is a need to provide flexible means to address emergent issues or shortcomings. In this case, the Executive Leadership Symposium provided a stop-gap until the senior leadership cadre could be bolstered by graduates of the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course, and it will offer an opportunity to address other concerns as these two courses mature. Additionally, post-Canadian Forces College developmental offerings, as per the Senior Leader Project case study, above, were identified by institutional leaders as crucial to the succession of effective leadership.
outcomes. Currently serving institutional leaders know that the impetus for continued development comes from the recognition that existing frames of reference are insufficient to deal with the performance demands placed on today’s institutional leader.

In an organization that promotes learning, learning permeates all aspects of the organization’s culture. The organization values knowledge and new ideas. It enables and encourages its employees at all levels to learn and share learning. It builds on the capacity of people to acquire and develop knowledge and to add value to existing knowledge. It provides opportunities and incentives for people to learn. It fosters participation and openness.

**Canadian Centre for Management Development, A Public Service Learning Organization from Coast to Coast: Directions for the Future,13**

*Adult Learning.* Adult learning emphasizes that adults differ from young people in terms of psychological, physical and social characteristics. These differences are relevant to creating the most effective learning environments for adults. Institutional leaders ensure a conducive adult-learning environment by putting in place the following factors:

- An environment where leaders, even when functioning as students, feel supported, where individual needs and uniqueness are honoured, and where abilities and life achievements are acknowledged and respected;
- An environment that fosters intellectual freedom and encourages experimentation and creativity;
- Self-directed learning, where leaders take responsibility for their own learning. They work with teachers, mentors and senior leaders to design individual learning programs that address what each person needs and wants to learn in order to function optimally in his or her profession;
- Pacing, or intellectual challenge. Optimal pacing is challenging people just beyond their present levels of ability. Challenged too far, people can give up; challenged too little, they will become bored and learn little. Those adults who report experiencing high levels of intellectual stimulation — to the point of feeling discomfort — grow more;
- Active involvement in learning, as opposed to passively listening to lectures from subject matter experts or specialist institutional leaders. Where students and instructors interact and “dialogue,” where students try out new ideas in the workplace, and where exercises and experiences are used to bolster facts and theory, adults grow more; and
- Regular feedback mechanisms for students to tell mentors, teachers and senior leaders what works best for them and what they want and need to learn — and mentors, senior leaders who hear and make changes based on student input.

In adult learning, institutional leaders act as teachers, facilitators and mentors and become the mechanisms for leveraging the myriad of case histories stored within each leader’s, each student’s, respective career. The act of leveraging this reservoir of experience is the key component for current institutional leaders to use when overseeing effective adult-learning programs for incoming institutional leaders, particularly at the advanced- and senior-leader levels. The curriculum
delivery strategy for all advanced and senior courses needs to be driven by several guiding principles:

• Individuals should be exposed to multiple perspectives — military and non-military, and those of doctrine, academics and practitioners — whenever possible to allow individuals to form their own opinions;

• Curriculum activities should be delivered by the best available authorities and facilitators in each subject area, be they military personnel, civilians, academics, corporate leaders, public servants, et cetera, who are schooled in the dynamic processes and techniques of adult learning;

• Members must be provided with comprehensive and active support by a cadre of professional mentors and educators to help foster new frames of reference, critical thinking and creative thinking; and

• Time is a critical factor for aspiring institutional leaders; therefore, short courses and seminars concentrating on specific subject areas are necessary.

However, importantly, significant uncertainty remains as to what works best and what does not in pedagogical and adult-learning methodologies of professional development. Institutional leaders ask themselves, continually, how best to generate strong and effective successors as institutional leaders. The Professional Development Framework provides institutional leaders with a system for addressing the challenges of effective professional development for institutional leaders.

*Mentoring.* One of the most underutilized components in the arsenal for institutional leaders to address effective executive development, outside the structured group-learning format, is an institutional mentoring process. Through mentoring, the wisdom and experience of institutional leaders is passed to others, facilitating personal and professional growth for those being mentored.

Institutional leaders have a particular responsibility in this area. Mentoring, however, represents a crucial role in knowledge management and distribution; hence it needs to be viewed not only as a responsibility but as an obligation. Often mentoring does not attain the level of implementation that it should. Frequently leaders are insufficiently familiar with the process and its value. Mentoring provides benefits for the institution, the protégé or participant, and the mentor. The participants, for example, are provided with a better understanding of the organization and the means to succeed and advance within it. Mentoring builds greater confidence in their abilities and skills. The organization typically receives from the participant an increased commitment, improved work performance and better future leadership. Mentors benefit through information exchanges with participants, self-preparation for mentoring sessions, and active cognitive reviews of past experiences and previous lessons learned.

Canadian Forces executive wherewithal rests with the leaders who have lived the institutional experiences, studied the concepts and theories behind those experiences, developed themselves professionally, and applied all of that to CF strategy-making activities. These institutional leaders represent a considerable learning resource to be leveraged in shaping future institutional leaders of the CF. A mentor can be a crucial sounding board for a military member or any colleague working through complex institutional or career challenges. Mentoring by those who have the knowledge and wisdom and who have gained the experience is invaluable to the development of institutional leaders. Leaders must professionally develop their successors at least partly through mentoring and, hence, will shape the long-term future of the CF.
APPLYING THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK TO HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEMS

Leaders of the institution possess a sophisticated awareness of human capacities and human resources (HR) systems. Examples of well-functioning systems are performance appraisal and promotion, HR management and career management, and succession planning, which are founded on the identification of institutional leaders according to their different capacities and expertise. Institutional leaders are policy overseers, strategic decision-makers, and executive communicators, but they are not interchangeable in these roles. The Professional Development Framework as the instrument for categorizing the requisite human/leader capacities, some of which require enhancement through professional development, can contribute to HR systems and in turn to institutional/CF effectiveness. Importantly, the Framework can act as a conceptual foundation for reviewing and restructuring future HR policies. Effort is required to apply the Professional Development Framework to identify the very function-specific leader capabilities and capacities, but HR programs and procedures are improved accordingly. Consider some of the broader HR policy implications, particularly at institutional leader levels:

Performance Appraisal and Promotion. Performance appraisal, when used for assignment/promotion decisions, is simply another selection process applied to the eligible internal population of contenders. Accurate assessments of potential for higher rank usually are highly confounded with performance in current rank (in the absence of clearly differentiating capacities and attributes between those ranks), performance within ranks but for vastly different roles and responsibilities, and performance over time as CF commitments change. Therefore, such entities as aptitudes, attitudes and unique expertise as part of the leader capacities that are not equal among equals (institutional leaders) need to be assessed. In some organizations, valid self-report “personality” tests, combined with multi-rater, 360-degree, feedback assessments, are utilized to differentiate among institutional leader candidates. Additionally, while ethical foundations of leadership within individuals are presumed to change little over professional careers, in the late-1990s reviews and initiatives among those institutional leaders who were engaged in defence ethics reform determined that challenging military ethical circumstances. For example, speaking truth to power, balancing loyalty up and loyalty down, handling transparency and “political correctness,” practising consistency between words and actions and/or setting an example, standing up to pressure and/or having moral courage, on being encountered by presumably ethically well-founded institutional leaders, constituted significant ethical challenges that were interpreted and addressed in various and diverse ways, almost beyond solution for some.

In response to the ambiguity, complexity and challenge, institutional leaders recommended ethics “training” for senior colleagues, utilizing adult-learning strategies like self-study, case studies, simulations and role plays, and syndicate discussions. Such findings underscore the importance of ethics and values in leadership and of assessors having the ability to differentiate among institutional leaders when conducting performance appraisals and determining promotion eligibility.

The Professional Development Framework provides a broader conceptual basis for identifying significant differences in aptitudes, attitudes, experience and well-founded individual ethics and for focusing on meaningful discontinuities from one rank to the next, or one leader level to the next; for example, the shift in focus from self-regulation and personal insight at junior- and intermediate-leader levels to developing the capacities to instil professional values in others, align unit culture successfully, implement change initiatives, and engage in institutional stewardship and knowledge creation at advanced and senior levels. With respect to Professional Ideology, the
Professional Development Framework supports a potentially more comprehensive model for appraisal and/or promotion through assessment of moral reasoning, professional identity development, the balance of autonomous thinking with conformity, and the propensity to inculcate a professional ideology — all measurable entities. Granted, this is a continuum of professional ideology acquired through time and experience, but that evolution is measurable and varies among military leaders.

Career Management. Effective career management has far greater probability with strong performance appraisal and promotion practices. The Professional Development Framework, applicable in circumstances that demand significantly different leader attributes and capacities, supports the focus on individual strengths, therefore addressing the realities that not every leader is suitable for every institutional leader position. Such differences required in various positions or roles evolve from, among other sources, those previously identified, competing, CF effectiveness outcomes, for example, mission success versus member well-being, and internal organizational stability versus shaping change to achieve external adaptability. Career management systems, in hand with performance appraisal and promotion systems, require that institutional leaders and administrators be capable of discriminating among the crucial qualities and capacities of institutional leaders. (Think cool Colin Powell versus Stormin’ Norman Schwartzkopf, in the 1990s.)

Today, for example, for the Canadian Forces, the major shift is toward institutional strategies for transformation and toward military operations involving failed states, terrorist/guerrilla operations, multinational partnerships, and 3D (defence, diplomacy, development) government policy. This shift demands significantly different leader capabilities in leading and shaping change for the ongoing transformation, engaging in complex multi-partnered strategic planning for multi-national resourcing of foreign operations, and utilizing maximum leader flexibility in diverse and new civilian/community circumstances. Effective career management can be assured only through the capabilities of an HR system to differentiate among the various levels of the required leader capacities, in line with the leader requirements identified for the specific roles.

Succession Planning. Just as career management is supported by effective performance appraisal and promotion, so also is succession planning. The effective co-ordination of any organization’s planning requires an integrated “leading the institution” philosophy, meaning that the overriding and futuristic focus is not on maintaining the status quo and responding to predetermined tasks; rather, it is on the institution’s capacities to adapt to demands and, therefore, to develop and shape the successors to institutional leaders. These new leaders will be responsible for increasing the probabilities of success in their responses to challenges in a range of future, ambiguous and unpredictable responsibilities. Only with complete development of these leader capacities can an HR succession-planning system ensure that the very best institutional leaders will inherit the responsibilities to effectively lead and to continue to transform the CF. The institutional capacities to differentiate among the distinct strengths of individuals and to thereby plan for the succession of those individuals into appropriately differentiated positions (and hence maximize effectiveness of and congruence with the institution) are fundamental to the CF’s succession planning and long-term success.
Western society’s transition from the industrial era to the information era included a transformation on the work site from an orientation that was job defined, served by task, occupation and job analyses, to a focus on the worker with a backpack of capacities and leadership. This entails far more than that which can be stipulated in job descriptions. Certain aspects of human resources cannot be served adequately only by the detailed information from current occupational analyses. For example, leadership, as captured in the Professional Development Framework and as present in effective institutions, is akin to that multicoloured Rubik’s cube of interconnected requisite capacities and interdependent leader attributes, which are best enhanced through a variety of leadership learning strategies. Professionalism is far more than a sense of right-mindedness and a list of positive attributes. The central HR system of professional development — training, education, focused experiences, self-development, mentor-based knowledge transfer, and slow-growth experiential enhancement — benefits from implementation of the Professional Development Framework.

**LINK TO MISSION SUCCESS**

As has been stated elsewhere, while leadership in the CF is at the heart of military professionalism, military professionalism is at the heart of leadership. And leadership is complex; it is not straightforward or easy to understand. As stewards of the profession of arms in Canada, senior CF leaders, both officers and non-commissioned officers, have a particular commitment to ensure that the CF fulfils its organizational, professional and institutional responsibilities to Canada currently and into the future. With a more complex world come more complex perspectives, each with an exponential growth in expectations for those leaders in charge — expectations for solutions through leading change, leading the institution, influencing the surrounding environment, and stewarding the profession.

Current leaders of the institution are responsible for ensuring that ongoing CF transformation is successful. They are responsible for ensuring that future institutional leaders have been professionally and thoroughly developed in order to generate excellence, to accomplish future tasks, and to be capable, personally and individually, of transforming from the art of the familiar to the art of the possible.

This is the responsibility of institutional leaders.
Summary – Ensuring Effective Succession of Institutional Leadership

Ensure Canadian Forces Effectiveness
• Develop successors to understand the relationship between institutional effectiveness and institutional outcomes.
• Develop successors to be conversant fully with the four CF outcomes — mission success, internal integration, external adaptability, and member well-being and commitment — and the integration of military ethos with those outcomes.

Promote Canadian Forces Leader Effectiveness
• Identify to successors the paradoxes/contradictions among roles.
• Generate in successors a commitment to a leader-effectiveness model beyond the Cold War and the 1990s roles and responsibilities — a twenty-first century model that integrates organizational effectiveness with professional effectiveness to create institutional effectiveness.

Build Leader Capacities
• Oblige successors to identify and exemplify the leader capacities necessary for generating successful CF outcomes.
• Further oblige successors to comprehend the evolution of these requisite leader capacities through the leader levels of junior, intermediate, advanced and senior.

Create a Professional Development Framework
• Ensure successors comprehend the relevance of the Professional Development Framework of leader elements cross-tabulated with leader levels.
• Educate successors to understand that the four generic elements, when shaped by professional ideology, together coalesce into a collective, interdependent set of effective leader capacities.

Champion Institutional Leader Development
• Influence successors to break the paradigm of pedagogy as the predominant means for generating institutional leaders of the future, by using broad CF-wide experience, training, education and self-development.
• Develop among successors a full comprehension of “andragogy” — adult learning — and its methodologies as effective means to develop effective leaders.

Create a Professional Development Framework with HR Systems
• Identify to successors the applicability of the Professional Development Framework to human resources policies as a means for initiating HR review, revision and renewal.
• Focus on differentiating among leader capacities for positions that demand such variations, and structure accordingly the appraisal, promotion, career and succession-planning systems.

Link to Mission Success
• Ensure that successors comprehend that leadership in the CF is at the heart of military professionalism, and that leadership is the bridge to the future.
• Ensure that successors understand the profound complexity of leadership and leader capacities.
• Know that institutional leaders are 100 percent responsible for the development of their successors; hence, they are responsible for the future of the CF and its perpetual chameleonic transformation.
Recommended Reading


Conclusion
The concept of institutional effectiveness — the integration of organizational effectiveness with professional effectiveness — provides the focus for the application of institutional leadership excellence. Leaders in the Canadian Forces continue to hone their expertise and professional leadership capacities throughout their careers. Most will lead at an institutional level at some point; however, relatively few will achieve the senior leadership status that demands a continuous focus on leading the institution.

The demands placed on those who do lead the institution are great. Too often it is assumed that a great leader of people will be a great leader of the institution. However, leading at the institutional level demands a whole new set of capabilities, knowledge and orientations that can only be developed through great personal commitment and effort. Leaders do not become entitled to lead the institution as a result of the experience that they have gained or the time that they have committed to leading people. Leaders seek and accept the privilege of leading the institution as an opportunity to contribute to the defence of Canada and serve the members of the Canadian Forces.

Becoming a senior leader is challenging; however, being an institutional leader presents the greater challenge. Institutional leaders commit many hours to work, study and personal development, spend frequent and extended periods away from home and family, and face numerous dilemmas and challenges. They make tough ethical and moral decisions that can launch and harm careers, or conflict with expected loyalty to a particular branch or environment in the Canadian Forces. Institutional leaders act at all times in the best interests of the CF and Canadians. Their legitimacy and credibility is always vulnerable to the perceptions of the many that the institutional leaders have acted in the best interests of the few.

Institutional leaders function within a constant state of risk. They accept that there will never be a 100 percent solution and that the CF must achieve institutional excellence in spite of limited resources and an ambiguous, chaotic security environment. Institutional leaders accept the direction provided by their political masters on behalf of the people of Canada. However, this does not mean that they do not exhaust every avenue and opportunity to advise and inform when they believe that decisions are being made that are not in the best interests of the CF and the defence of Canada and the society they serve. Regardless of their level of agreement, institutional leaders accept the final direction; under no circumstances do they disobey, ignore or passively resist legitimate government direction. Institutional leaders demonstrate the moral courage to challenge when there is a need. More importantly, they possess the intellect, professionalism and discipline to accept governmental decisions that result from due democratic process. The government and the society it serves represent the legitimate power that the profession of arms, and as such the institutional leadership responsible for its stewardship, serves.

In the end, this manual offers practical advice and guidance covering a range of institutional leader roles and responsibilities. It also offers a professional development framework to assist leaders in their own development and in the development of their successors. The future of the Canadian Forces is the responsibility of every leader who seeks and accepts the privilege of leading the institution of the Canadian Forces.
Annex A: How Canada’s National Government Works

THE CONSTITUTION

The Dominion of Canada was brought into existence by a British act of Parliament, The British North America Act. This established a federal form of government. There was no provision made for its own amendment. All amendments had to be made by a fresh act of the British Parliament.

Attempts to “repatriate” the constitution began in 1927. Until 1981 they repeatedly failed because the federal and provincial governments could not agree on a generally acceptable method of amendment. In 1981 the Senate and the House of Commons with the approval of nine provincial governments passed the necessary joint address asking for the final British act. This placed the whole process of amendment in Canada and removed the last vestige of the British parliament’s power over Canada. The British North America Act, 1867, became the Constitution Act, 1867.

The written constitution of Canada is, however, not a single document. It is a collection of twenty-five primary documents, outlined in the Constitution Act, 1982, the act that repatriated the constitution. The Constitution consists of fourteen acts of the British parliament, seven acts of the Canadian parliament and four British orders-in-council.

The Constitution Act, 1982, made four big changes in Canada’s constitution. First, it established four legal formulas for amending the Constitution. Second, three of the amending formulas “entrench” certain parts of the written constitution, that is, place them beyond the powers of Parliament or any provincial legislature to touch. Third, the new Constitution Act, 1982, sets out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which neither Parliament nor any provincial legislature, acting alone, can change. Finally, the fourth change gave the provinces wide powers over their natural resources.

The Constitution Act, 1867, remains the basic element of Canada’s written constitution. But the written constitution, even with the latest addition, the Constitution Act, 1982, is only part of the whole working constitution, the set of arrangements by which Canada is governed. Responsible government, the national cabinet, the bureaucracy, political parties — all of these are basic features of Canada’s system of government. But the written constitution does not contain one word about any of them. The flesh, the muscles, the sinews, the nerves of the constitution have been added by legislation (for example, the public services acts), by custom (the Prime Minister), by judgments of the courts and by agreements between the national and provincial governments.

THE RULE OF LAW AND THE COURTS

The rule of law means that everyone is subject to the law and that no one, no matter how powerful or important, is above the law. The courts keep the various authorities from getting above the law, doing things the law forbids, or exercising powers the law has not given them. The great principle of the independence of the judiciary dates, in British history, to the English Act of Settlement of 1701, and it is also part of Canada’s constitutional history.
The Constitution provides that almost all Canada's courts shall be provincial, that is, created by provincial legislatures. It also provides that the judges of all these courts, from county courts up (except courts of probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), shall be appointed by the federal government. It provides that judges of the provincial supreme courts and all provincial courts of appeal shall be removable only on address to the governor general by both houses of Parliament. The acts setting up the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court have the same provisions. No judge of any Canadian superior court has ever been so removed.

With the inclusion of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the role of the courts has become even more important, since they have the tasks of enforcing the rights and making the freedoms effective.

The Supreme Court of Canada, established by an act of the national parliament in 1875, consists of nine judges, three of whom must come from the Quebec bar. The judges are appointed by the governor general on the advice of the national cabinet and hold office until they reach age seventy-five. The Supreme Court has the final decision, not only on constitutional questions but also on defined classes of important cases of civil and criminal law. It also deals with appeals of decisions made by the provincial courts of appeal.

PARLIAMENT: THE QUEEN, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

The Queen

The Queen is the formal head of the Canadian state. She is represented federally by the Governor General and provincially by the Lieutenant-Governors. Parliament meets only at the Royal Summons, and no federal or provincial bill becomes law without Royal Assent. The Governor General has the right to be consulted by Ministers and the right to encourage or warn them. But the Governor General and Lieutenant-Governors almost invariably must act on Minister's advice, though there may be very rare occasions where they must, or may, act without advice or even against the advice of the Ministers in office.

The Senate

The Senate usually has 105 members: 24 from the Maritime provinces (10 from Nova Scotia, 10 from New Brunswick, 4 from Prince Edward Island); 24 from Quebec; 24 from Ontario; 24 from the Western provinces (6 each from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia); 6 from Newfoundland and Labrador; and 1 each from the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. There is provision for 4 to 8 extra Senators: 1 (or 2) from the Maritime region, Quebec, Ontario and the West, but this provision has been used only once, in 1990.

Senators are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. They hold office until age seventy-five unless they miss two consecutive sessions of Parliament. They must reside in the province or territory for which they are appointed. The Senate can initiate any bills except bills providing for the expenditure of public money or imposing taxes. It can amend or reject any bill whatsoever, and it can reject any bill as often as it sees fit. No bill can become law unless it has been passed by the Senate. The Senate's main work is done in its committees, where it goes over bills clause by clause and hears evidence, often voluminous, from groups and individuals who would be affected by the particular bill under review.

The House of Commons

The House of Commons is the major law-making body. It considers bills submitted by the Government as well as by private members. The House of Commons is also the place where the Government must account for itself, especially during question period. Parliament, however, only has limited powers of appointment when compared with the
Prime Minister. The House appoints the Auditor General, the commissioner of the Privacy Act and the Commissioners of the Public Service Commission. In recent years the Prime Minister has agreed that House Committees will have expanded powers to review some of the senior appointments made by his office. In each of the country’s 308 ridings the candidate who gets the largest number of votes is elected to the House of Commons, even if his or her vote is less than half the total.

**The Prime Minister**

The Prime Minister is normally a member of the House of Commons (there have been two from the Senate, from 1891 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1896). A non-member can hold the office but by custom must seek election to a seat very soon. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Governor General.

The Prime Minister used to be described as “the first among equals.” This is no longer so. He or she is now incomparably more powerful than any colleague. The Prime Minister chooses the ministers in the first place and can also ask any of them to resign; if the Minister refuses, the Prime Minister can advise the Governor General to remove the minister, and the advice would invariably be followed. Another indication of this pre-eminence is that Cabinet decisions do not necessarily go by majority vote. A strong Prime Minister, having listened to everyone’s opinion, may simply announce that his or her view is the policy of the Government, even if most, or all, the other ministers are opposed.

**The Cabinet**

The Prime Minister chooses the Cabinet. All of the Cabinet members must be or become members of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. Privy councillors are appointed for life by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. All Cabinet Ministers and former Cabinet Ministers are always members, as are the Chief Justice of Canada and former Chief Justices and usually ex-Speakers of the House of Commons. Various other prominent citizens can be made members simply as a mark of honour. The whole Privy Council as such has never met. The Cabinet, “the Committee of the Privy Council,” is the Council’s operative body.

By custom, almost all members of the Cabinet must be members of the House of Commons or, if not already members, must win seats. Senators can be members of Cabinet, but, since 1911, usually there has been only one Cabinet Minister in the Senate, and without portfolio — the leader of the Government in the Senate. Also by custom, every province must, if possible, have at least one Cabinet minister. If a province does not elect any government supporters, this becomes difficult, and the Prime Minister may put a Senator from that province into the Cabinet, or have some member from another province resign his or her seat so that someone else from the “missing” province may be elected there.

By custom, Ontario and Quebec each have ten or twelve ministers, provided each province has elected enough supporters to warrant such a number. In recent years women have won increased recognition, and Canada’s multicultural nature has been reflected in Cabinet representation from Jewish, non-English, and non-French ethno-cultural minorities.

**The Speakers**

The Speaker of the Senate is appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Speaker of the Senate has the rank of Cabinet Minister and is a Member of the Privy Council.

The Speaker of the House of Commons is elected by secret ballot by the House itself after each general election. He or she must be a member of the House. The Speaker is its presiding officer, decides all questions of procedure and order, controls the House of Commons staff and is expected to be impartial, non-partisan and as firm in enforcing the rules against the Prime Minister as against the humblest opposition backbencher.
**Political Parties**

Major and minor federal parties were not created by any law, though they are now recognized by the law. They are voluntary associations of people who hold broadly similar opinions on public questions. The party that wins the largest number of seats in a general election ordinarily forms the Government. Its leader is asked by the Governor General to become Prime Minister.

The second largest party (or the largest party in the instance when the government in office does not win the largest number of seats but is able to form a government with the support of minor parties) becomes the official opposition.

**The Public Service Commission**

The Public Service Commission is a central agency, but it is fundamentally different from the other bodies. As a parliamentary agency it enjoys a degree of independence from the Government that the others do not. The Commission is accountable to Parliament and “then only for its overall performance, not for specific actions.” The Public Service Commission is headed by a chair and two other commissioners, all appointed for a ten-year term and removable prematurely only by joint resolution of the House of Commons and the Senate.

The *Public Service Employment Act* gives the Commission “exclusive” responsibilities to make appointments to or from within the public service, to develop processes and standards for the selection of candidates, to operate an appeal system for appointment, to audit staffing activities, to investigate allegations of irregularities or inequities in staffing, to oversee or protect the political rights of public servants, and to recommend to the governor-in-council exclusions from the *Public Service Employment Act*. The Public Service Commission also has responsibilities which are not exclusive or which are shared or delegated from the Treasury Board.

**Figure A.1: Organization of the Public Service Commission**

*In matters dealing with the *Public Service Employment Act* the Minister of Canadian Heritage is the designated spokesperson for the Commission in Parliament and is also the appropriate Minister within the context of the *Financial Administration Act*.\*
When the five leader elements are arrayed against a progressive professional development process stretching from junior- to senior-leader levels, the Professional Development Framework, first introduced in Chapter 7, is created. As per the expanded detail at Figure B.1 below, the Professional Development Framework’s vertical arrows indicate macro-level objectives across all five elements. Professional ideology is seen to occupy a privileged place in the Framework. The first four elements across the top of the Framework can be expected to be generically present in most effective organizations. Only when these elements are shaped by a military professional ideology (depicted in Figure B.1 as concentric rings, like an old-fashioned sonar burst) do all five elements coalesce into a collective, interdependent “Rubik’s cube” of effective leader elements capable of achieving complete institutional effectiveness. This Professional Development Framework has great utility for guiding leader development throughout the Canadian Forces.
A fully mature Professional Development Framework (see Table B.1 below) populates the cells or compartments created by the five elements cross-tabulated with the four leader levels, to represent a seamless, balanced, professional leadership development spectrum. Particularly at the advanced- and senior-leader levels, the development process is balanced through the less concrete and more abstract capacities — cognitive, social and change — and professional ideology being accorded greater emphasis. At junior- and intermediate-leader levels, currently, expertise/knowledge is inordinately emphasized, partly due to its congruence with pedagogical, group-taught, lecture approaches that are ideal for information dissemination for technical skill development. However, for senior leaders, the emphasis is not on what is known but on how one thinks and conceptualizes and who one is professionally. Development of complex and expanding cognitive, social and change capacities (increasingly important at senior leader levels), as well as inculcation of a professional ideology, requires adult-learning strategies and individualistic “andragogical” methodologies for those experienced, inquisitive, self-starting and intellectually oriented leaders.

The structure of Table B.1 emphasizes that the most expansive leader level — senior — is founded on the development at the less expansive leader levels — junior, intermediate and advanced. Senior leaders understand, apply and live the significance of these early leader levels, as each level represents a necessary foundational layer for each successive and higher level of leadership. Hence, senior leaders master all components of the Professional Development Framework as they gain seniority and rank and as they progress through their careers.

**CONCLUSION**

The Professional Development Framework, partnered with the most effective learning strategies, is a comprehensive model for expanding the depth and breadth of learning. The Framework supports a shift from a pedagogical sufficiency (“pass”) model of professional development to a mastery (“excel”) model of performance and leadership, one that can lead to the identification of the best professionally developed performers with the potential for promotion, appointments, special projects, and complex roles and responsibilities, rather than identifying simply those performers basically suited for their next assignments. This Framework goes beyond the granularity of individual level competencies, single attributes, and dollops of new knowledge. In fact, it represents a key design component for the CF’s competitive strategy, its organizational learning, its commitment to evolve and transform, and its professionalism.

The overriding current and ongoing theme for the CF is transformation, a transformation possible through a focus on people — members professionally enhanced in the leader capacities essential for mastering the challenges of the twenty-first century. With the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces currently tackling this challenge of ongoing transformation, the Professional Development Framework is the professional development linchpin for the overall effort.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEADER LEVEL</th>
<th>EXPERTISE</th>
<th>COGNITIVE CAPACITIES</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SENIOR</strong></td>
<td>Security Expertise</td>
<td>Knowledge Creation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Scope and content moves from knowledge to expertise with accompanying expansion to a strategic understanding of the domain of security.</td>
<td>• Able to generate, organize and manage the theory-based body of knowledge applied across the profession.</td>
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<td>• Shift from knowledge to expertise requires ability to apply the philosophy and principles that govern the generation and employment of military capacities (knowledge + philosophy = expertise) and strategic, institutional co-existence among peer ministries, foreign defence agencies.</td>
<td>• This goes beyond the analytic, creative and judgment capacities needed to adapt the profession to the external environment, and expands to include the obligation to update and extend the profession’s unique body of knowledge so as to ensure that the profession is discharging all of its responsibilities to society in the most effective manner.</td>
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<td>• Expertise at this stage clearly is dependent upon the complementary development in Professional Ideology, a full understanding of the profession of arms.</td>
<td>• Strong parallel to cognitive capacities at advanced academic post-graduate levels; masters the particular academic discipline but also generates new knowledge.</td>
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<td>Defence Knowledge</td>
<td>Mental Models</td>
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<td>• Shift from information to knowledge, incorporating a broad understanding of the CF and defence as key components of security and government functions.</td>
<td>• Uses inductive and deductive reasoning skills to create, adapt and generalize knowledge both from one’s own previous learning and experiences, and from other domains such as professional literatures.</td>
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<td>• The shift from information to knowledge requires the additional perspective of understanding the rationale and purpose of intended actions; and the generalized outcomes that are to be achieved (information + purpose = knowledge).</td>
<td>• Conducts abstract reasoning and draws on appropriate professional orientation to be able to understand desired outcomes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military Information</td>
<td>Theories and Concepts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• How MOC contributes to larger formation capabilities.</td>
<td>• Able to reason, moving from the concrete to the abstract, from procedures and rules to principles.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Understanding not only what to do but the context in which this occurs (data + context = information).</td>
<td>Theorems, Practical Rules</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Examples: Effects-based operations, impact of instability and conflicts on multinational relations, international law, civil control of military.</td>
<td>• Reasoning at this level is intended to identify the appropriate task procedures, using simple theorems, practical rules or established scientific principles/laws.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Technical and Tactical Procedures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Learning standard Military Occupational Classification (MOC) and sea/land/air procedures.</td>
<td>• When cognitive capacities interact with expertise at the junior level, the two elements function in a ‘cookbook’ approach to problem solving and task accomplishment. There is limited capacity for innovation.</td>
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<td>• For initial leader roles, acquiring an overview of such standards and procedures, and small group tactics.</td>
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<td><strong>ADVANCED</strong></td>
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<td><strong>INTERMEDIATE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>JUNIOR</strong></td>
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<td>SOCIAL CAPACITIES</td>
<td>CHANGE CAPACITIES</td>
<td>PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY</td>
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<td>Interpersonal to Inter-Institutional</td>
<td>Openess to Paradigm Shifting</td>
<td>Internalizing to Stewardship</td>
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<td><strong>Strategic-Relations Building</strong></td>
<td>• Relates to the concept of Leading the Institution, relies on secondary and tertiary influence processes for the senior leader to communicate institutional priorities and strategic intent across organizational systems. • Builds open teams such that immediate subordinates can contribute novel ideas and can critique taken-for-granted assumptions. • Externally focused capacities pertain to building and maintaining strategic relations with others engaged in the broad security arena and related national/government initiatives.</td>
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<td><strong>Group Cohesiveness</strong></td>
<td>• At this level of larger or multiple units/teams/groups, is involved in aspects of leading the institution, and applies broad influence processes to ensure internal cohesiveness, fostering commitment and supporting subordinate leaders while also engaging in effective boundary-spanning activities, especially in joint or multi-national operations.</td>
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<td><strong>Individual Persuasion</strong></td>
<td>• Social skills for leading people, particularly the abilities to effectively influence others “one-on-one” or small-group, using some range of influence behaviours appropriate to the characteristics of the situation, the followers and the individual leader.</td>
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<td><strong>Team-Oriented Followship</strong></td>
<td>• Aware of group norms, minimum leader-style flexibility. • Moderate communication capabilities applied through baseline interpersonal skills, reflecting an awareness of basic influence factors, group diversity issues and non-prejudicial self-behaviour.</td>
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<td><strong>Multi-Institutional Partnering</strong></td>
<td>• Focus is external, on changing others’ understanding of the military as a strategic political capacity, and internal on implementing internal change initiatives. • In this latter regard, there is an emphasis on the initial stages of anticipating change, effectively contributing to the change, and monitoring and adjusting initiatives over the change period. • Senior leader initiatives exist to transform and improve a team or multiple units, or to attempt learning-organization applications at organizational and institutional levels.</td>
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<td><strong>Group Transformation</strong></td>
<td>• Able to adapt and align groups or sub-systems to the broadest requirements of the institution while ensuring the tactical proficiency and effective integration of individuals and small teams/sections within the larger formation.</td>
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<td><strong>Self-Efficacy</strong></td>
<td>• Capacities at this stage are focused on the individual’s abilities to monitor self-efficacy, engage in self-reflection, make early commitments to self-development, and adapt one’s behaviours to the social environment/context in which one is functioning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Awareness</strong></td>
<td>• Minimal expectation in change capacities would be a generalized orientation and awareness of changes occurring external to the CF, and the CF transformational efforts, as means of signalling the importance of practising openness to externally driven change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative Compliance</strong></td>
<td>• Understands the concepts and practices of the profession of arms at an introductory level. At a minimum, practices military group norms, and adheres to discipline demands. • As an ab initio professional (apprentice), looks externally (to supervisors or codes of conduct) for guidance as to the appropriate behaviours in specific circumstances. Internalizes values minimally.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stewardship of the Profession**
- Core capacities are related to managing collective professional identity – the key issues of articulating what the profession is, what it stands for and what it believes in.
- Able to engage in very abstract reasoning, exemplified at the highest stages of moral/identity development – in particular, the capacity for independent judgment of the profession’s core philosophy, ideology and principles.
- This capacity is integrated with acquisition of related capabilities in Cognitive and Change Capacities.

**Cultural Alignment**
- Guides framing of problems, and interactions with others, to apply leader influence to shape or align the extant culture to be consistent with the ethos.
- Contains some of the most complex challenges in achieving competing institutional effectiveness objectives – mission success versus member well-being; internal synchrony and stability versus external adaptability and experimentation.

**Self-Regulation**
- Conducts basic self-regulation, avoiding obvious ethical violations and not displaying behaviours that erode the reputation, image or credibility of the profession; essentially a journeyman stage of professionalization.
- Abides by the principles of the Defence Ethics Program.
- Capable of serving as an example.

**Internalizes values minimally.**
accountability  The requirement to be accountable for one’s conduct through professional, moral and legal appraisal or adjudication.

authority  The legal right to make decisions, to direct the activities of subordinates with the expectation of being obeyed, and to hold subordinates accountable for their actions and performance.

balanced scorecard  A framework used to translate vision, mission and strategy into integrated financial and non-financial objectives and performance measures around four different perspectives: financial, customer, internal business process, and learning and growth. The DND/CF scorecard integrates program resources, defence outputs, internal processes, and professional, effective and sustainable defence team objectives.

command  The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces. Also, the authority-based process of planning, organizing, leading and controlling the efforts of subordinates and the use of other military resources to achieve military goals. See also management.

commander’s intent  The commander’s personal expression of why one is conducting an operation and what one hopes to achieve. It is a clear and concise statement of the desired end-state and acceptable risk. Its strength is the fact that it allows subordinates to exercise initiative in the absence of orders, when unexpected opportunities arise, or when the original concept of operations no longer applies.

community of practice  Distributed groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, a mandate or a sense of purpose. Often informal groups of experts, communities of practice serve to reconnect individuals with each other in self-organizing, boundary-spanning communities.

culture  A shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment, and that are transmitted to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think and act in relation to these issues.

emergent leadership  The voluntary assumption of a leadership role by someone who lacks formal responsibility and authority; most apparent when a formal authority structure is lacking or inactive in a group; encourages participation, a diversity of ideas, or a sharing of responsibilities.

ethics  A sub-field of philosophy that aims at clarifying and evaluating the nature of right and wrong. It involves the recognition and promotion of certain values, the development of ethical principles and obligations (which can be used to help guide behaviours and deal with ethical issues), and the development of moral reasoning in all ranks of military professionalism so that military members can understand and reflect on their own actions.

ethos  The essential and distinctive character or spirit of a race, people, system, culture or institution as defined by customs, usages, habits and morals.

executive leadership  The overseeing of responsibilities and the co-ordinating of capacities for operational success. Executive leaders require a broader knowledge and understanding of the context of the organization. They execute and interpret the leader’s vision by articulating a plan of action that includes directing the work of others, negotiating strategies, allocating resources, planning and monitoring activities, promoting ethical climate, and setting goals and practices needed to sustain and improve the CF as an institution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>term</strong></th>
<th><strong>definition</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>functional</td>
<td>With respect to the defence function of the CF, the obligation to be operationally proficient and effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imperative</td>
<td>See also societal imperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance</td>
<td>The processes and relationships by which an organization is directed, controlled and held accountable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
<td>Sense of self, of personhood, constructed in relation to sameness to and difference from others; derived from individual characteristics (such as gender or ethnicity) that can be relatively durable; and developed through a process of “construction” influenced by cultural characteristics (such as norms, beliefs, values, traditions, organization, sub-groups) that may be relatively fluid over a lifetime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institution</td>
<td>A formally established organization with a specific professional function to perform consistently over time. An institution has legal or quasi-legal standing and permanence. Institutions dependent upon bureaucracy and hierarchy are generally slow to adapt and change, while networked institutions organized around professional ideals are more adaptable to changing circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutional leaders</td>
<td>Officers, non-commissioned officers, and members of the Department of National Defence who, by virtue of their rank, position and/or responsibilities, have significant influence on CF members and on the development or implementation of CF policy, and/or represent the CF within the domestic and international security environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutional leadership</td>
<td>The process of directly or indirectly shaping the reputation and effectiveness of the CF by means of formal authority or personal influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge management</td>
<td>An integrated systematic approach which, when applied to an organization, enables the optimal use of timely, accurate and relevant information; it also facilitates knowledge discovery and innovation, fosters the development of a learning organization, and enhances understanding by integrating all sources of information, as well as individual and collective knowledge and experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leadership</td>
<td>The process of directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning organization</td>
<td>An organization that is able, on an ongoing basis, to critically examine its performance, assimilate information from the environment, and transform itself, with a view to adapting to challenges and positioning itself to exploit opportunities or to establish a dominant capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Military and civilian incumbents of positions with authority to act on behalf of the Canadian Forces in accordance with the delegation of authorities for financial administration for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (for example, the vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and assistant deputy ministers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management</td>
<td>The authority-based process of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling the efforts of organizational members and the use of other organizational resources to achieve organizational goals. See also command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentoring</td>
<td>A supportive learning relationship, based upon mutual commitment, trust and respect, between an individual “mentor” who shares his or her knowledge, experience and insights with a less-experienced person, a “mentee,” who is willing and ready to benefit from this exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military ethos</td>
<td>The living spirit that creates and shapes military culture, finds full expression through the conduct of members of the profession of arms, and comprises three fundamental components: beliefs and expectations about military service, Canadian values, and Canadian military values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military strategy</td>
<td>The bridge that cements military power to political purposes and comprises numerous dimensions related to people and politics, preparation for conflict, and war and conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mission command  A command philosophy that promotes decentralized decision-making, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. It entails three enduring tenets: the importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent, a clear responsibility to fulfill that intent, and timely decision-making. To exercise mission command, a commander must give orders in a manner that ensures subordinates understand his or her intent, their own tasks and the context of those tasks; tell subordinates what effect they are to achieve and the reasons why it needs achieving; allocate appropriate resources to carry out missions and tasks; and allow subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions and tasks.

operational level  The level of activity acting as a bridge between strategy and tactics. Operational art includes co-ordination of diverse assets, both military and non-military, and the fusion of the abstract and general strategic objectives and the somewhat mechanical, technical activities at the tactical level into a functional formula referred to as the campaign plan.

organization  A specific grouping of entities connected by function or interest and with an identifiable end state or purpose. Conventionally, organizations, public or private, take on specific structures with hierarchical or networked characteristics focused on the production of a given product — material, service or intellectual. Organization may be short-term or long-term; permanent organizations develop history and culture and may be very similar to, or become, an institution.

organizational responsibility  Collective accountability of military professionals to the Government and the people of Canada for the successful execution of the duty assigned by the Government of Canada.

personal power  The capacity or potential to influence others on the basis of personal characteristics and attributes. These include expert power, referent power and connection power.

position power  The capacity or potential to influence others on the basis of authority conferred by organizational position or rank. Position power includes legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, information power and ecological power.

professional ideology  A framework guiding the profession of arms that claims specialist, theory-based knowledge and a commitment to the ethical values that guide the application of that knowledge.

professional responsibilities  Within the context of collective accountability of military professionals to the Government and the people of Canada for the successful execution of the duty assigned by the Government of Canada, an individual member of the profession is accountable for his or her performance and for acting in compliance with the law and maintaining high standards with respect to self-discipline and to the professional attributes of the Canadian Forces.

professionalism  In general, the display of the qualities or features of a profession. With respect to the Canadian Forces, professionalism means that CF members apply their unique body of military expertise in accordance with the civic, legal, ethical and military values of the military ethos, pursuant to the profession’s responsibility to society, and to a strong personal identification with military activities and the military way of life.

responsibility  Professional, ethical and legal liability for optimum contribution to mission success, at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

risk management  A systematic approach for determining the best course of action and mitigating risk when risks are present. Risk management involves identifying, understanding, assessing, and acting on risk according to its likelihood and potential impact.

senior leader  This concept is not tied to doctrinal definitions of senior officer and senior non-commissioned member; rather, it describes leaders who have developed the proficiency and the leader attributes that allow them to operate at the institutional and/or strategic level and influence the effectiveness of the CF and the culture of the institution.
societal imperative
With respect to the Canadian Forces’ legal and professional responsibilities to society, the general obligation to serve Canada’s interests and satisfy Canadians’ expectations of the armed forces, including specific obligations to remain subordinate to civil authority and to reflect core Canadian values. See also functional imperative.

stakeholder
A individual, a formal or informal group or network, or an organization, that is directly or indirectly affected by particular decisions and that has the power, legitimacy or interest to affect the outcome of related activities and processes.

stewardship
The special obligation of officers and non-commissioned members who by virtue of their rank or appointment are directly concerned with ensuring that the profession of arms in Canada fulfils its organizational and professional responsibilities to the Canadian Forces and Canada, including the use of their power and influence to ensure the continued development of the institution, its cultures and its future leaders to meet the expectations of Canadians.

strategy, strategic
See military strategy.

strategic corporal
An information-age, post-modern phenomenon by which the individual soldier, sailor or air person can be responsible for making a decision and taking an action that can have positive or negative consequences on the outcome of an operation at tactical, operational and strategic levels and within national and international contexts.

systems thinking
A discipline with various frameworks, spanning the physical and social sciences, engineering and management, for seeing wholes, interrelationships and patterns of change.

tactical level
The level at which tangible activity is delivered to satisfy the context set by strategy and operational art. Either the factors of fear, danger, fatigue and extreme physical and mental exertion are unique to the tactical realm or their effects are greatly magnified there.

three-block war
An operational contingency in which military personnel may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the same area of operation, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and/or to combat, all in the same day and all within three city blocks.

transactional leadership
A general pattern of influence based on the provision of various rewards or benefits in exchange for extra effort or improved performance; sometimes discussed with reference to principles of economic exchange.

transformational leadership
A pattern of leader influence intended to alter the characteristics of individuals, organizations, or societies in a fairly dramatic or substantial way so that they are somehow more accomplished, or better equipped to deal with the challenges they face, or are likely to face.

unity of command
The concept that a single, clearly identified commander be appointed for any given operation and that he or she be accountable to only one superior. This ensures clarity and unity of effort, promotes timely and effective decision-making, and avoids conflict in orders and instructions. It is characterized by a clear chain of command, where command at each level is focused on one commander.

unity of purpose
The co-ordinated and co-operative effort by all individuals to successfully achieve a specified aim or set of objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent.

visioning
The art and practice of developing an imagined possibility for the future that moves beyond today’s capability and provides an intellectual bridge from today to tomorrow in a manner that establishes a basis for positive action, growth, and transformation.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Aircraft Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM (Fin CS)</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM (HR-Mil)</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM (Mat)</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVN</td>
<td>Aviation Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVS</td>
<td>Avionic Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Consulting and Audit Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Canadian Forces College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFMS</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Medical Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFRETS</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Recruiting, Education and Training System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHRC</td>
<td>Canadian Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCCENT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Central</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Chief of Military Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>commercial off the shelf</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPO 1</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer, 1st Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREW</td>
<td>Combat-Related Employment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Chief of Review Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWO</td>
<td>Chief Warrant Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Defence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deputy Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Defence Management Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAB</td>
<td>Education Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOFO</td>
<td>general officer and flag officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCS</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Canadian Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>memorandum to Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCRT</td>
<td>Management, Command and Control Re-Engineering Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCDV</td>
<td>maritime coastal defence vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMC</td>
<td>Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>military occupation (code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>non-commissioned member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Officer Professional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Professional Development Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWGSC</td>
<td>Public Works and Government Services Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>Royal Military College of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Special Advisor or Special Appointment (context will determine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA PD</td>
<td>Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff for Professional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCME</td>
<td>Statement of Canadian Military Ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCONDVA</td>
<td>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHARP</td>
<td>Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>Senior Leaders Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLT</td>
<td>SCONDVA liaison team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWINTER</td>
<td>Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Treasury Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBS</td>
<td>Treasury Board Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>defence, diplomacy and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>