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## The Story of Emergency Preparedness Canada 1948-1998

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Table of Contents

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# The Story of Emergency Preparedness Canada

## Table of Contents


- Preface
- Prologue: Civil Defence in the Second World War: The Air Raid Precautions Organization (ARP)
- Chapter 1: Civil Defence in Canada: 1948-1959
- Chapter 2: The Rise and Fall of the Emergency Measures Organization: 1957-1968
- Chapter 3: The Fall and Rise of Civil Emergency Measures: 1968-1981
- Chapter 4: The Reform of Civil Emergency Measures: 1981-1988
- Chapter 5: Toward the Millennium -- Emergency Preparedness Planning in the 1990s
- Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion
- Bibliography

# Preface

In 1998, Emergency Preparedness Canada celebrates its 50th anniversary. It was founded in 1948 as a civil defence organization in the Department of National Defence in response to the beginning of the Cold War. Over the next 50 years, it was transferred from department to department, until once again it has returned to National Defence. This study traces the development of the organization against the rise and fall of international tensions. It relates its history to the shifting priorities of domestic politics and to the continuing tensions of federal-provincial relations. It chronicles the slow change from strict civil defence, or wartime emergency planning, to the all-hazards approach of emergency preparedness in the 1990s. This is a record of dedicated public servants who continued on in the face of an indifferent public and hostile politicians. This is a story of fluctuating budgets and staff, of a program that stayed the course as public opinion and government policy determined its course and acknowledged its value. It is the history of a national institution.

* * * *

The following account is the product of early research on the predecessors of EPC and of new research on the organization's history since 1974. The files of EPC contained a draft history of emergency measures from Air Raid Precautions in the Second World War to 1974. Its origins are unclear. One section dealing with the Second World War was written during July and August 1949 by R. J. Rennie, a wartime major in the artillery, who had an MA in history.(1) It has been suggested that the section from 1948 to 1951 was written by J. F. Wallace, a long time employee of the organization.(2) The rest of the draft history may be the work of summer students hired to record ongoing events. The account of the period from 1951 to 1959, for example is attributed to a Susan McCoy.(3) The authorship of the remainder is unknown.

Rather than entirely redo this early history, the present author agreed to use the draft history as the basis for the history up to 1974. Its references and account were verified and then the author revised, reorganized, and elaborated the information it contained as he saw fit. Nevertheless, the contributions of Major Rennie, J. F. Wallace, Susan McCoy, and the other anonymous writers are substantial, particularly with regard to content, and are acknowledged. S. N. White, retired Director General Plans, was asked by EPC to comment on the early draft history and his comments are gratefully received. That portion of the history from 1968 to the present is almost entirely the work of the present author.

Finally, I would like to thank Margaret Carter, Heritage Research Associates Inc., for her editorial assistance and Mike Braham, Director, Emergency Programs and Exercises, for his supervision of the project and his patience in seeing it through to completion.

**Endnotes**

1. RG 29, Records of the Department of National Health and Welfare, Vol. 639, File 100-1-10.

2. Personal Correspondence, S. N. White to Dave Peters, EPC, 12 June 1997.

3. Lawrence S. Hagen, Civil Defence: The Case for Reconsideration, National Security Series No. 7 (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University,

1977), p. 82, fn. 58.

# Prologue

# Civil Defence in the Second World War: The Air Raid Precautions Organization (ARP)

## I Introduction

Civil defence, or passive defence as it was called before the Second World War, "...may be defined as comprising those measures of protection which can be taken on the ground to minimize the effect of attacks from the air, both of personnel and material."(1) Some of the measures, such as setting up warning systems, can be prepared in advance. Others, such as population evacuation, can be instituted only upon warning or expectation of attack. In all cases, the extent of planning, training, and implementation which occurs prior to the attack increases the effectiveness of the measures.

The origins of civil defence in Canada can be traced back to the creation of the Air Raid Precautions organization (ARP) by the federal government in the Department of Pensions and National Health before the Second World War. Since passive defence was an aspect of national defence, it was regarded as a federal responsibility. The protective measures required to implement it, however, were local by their very nature. While this dichotomy was recognized in theory, until the jurisdictional, financial, and practical responsibilities were precisely defined, there was constant federal-provincial tension. Political fears of national disunity associated with questions of war shrouded pre-war planning in secrecy and prevented consultation with the provincial governments. Consequently, the first two years of the war were marked by frantic activity at the local and provincial levels and *ad hoc* solutions to problems at the federal level. Not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did the three levels of governments work out acceptable policies to establish an efficient civil defence organization in Canada.

## II Pre-War Preparations

As the international situation in the Far East and in Europe worsened in the mid-1930s, the newly elected Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King began slowly and deliberately to prepare for a possible war.(2) In August 1936, the government established the Canadian Defence Committee as a committee of cabinet: its mission was to plan for the defence of Canada.(3) At its first meeting the committee discussed the danger of air attack and the provision of adequate protection for the civilian population.(4) On the recommendation of the Department of National Defence, the Prime Minister approved the creation of six interdepartmental committees in April 1937. One of them was the Interdepartmental Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Committee whose purpose was to examine the problem of air raid precautions (hence its name) and to recommend actions to be taken by federal authorities to protect the civilian population.(5) Almost a year later, in March 1938, an order-in-council formally established these committees, stipulating that they were to report to the Minister of National Defence rather than to the Defence Committee.(6)

Because measures to protect the public from the effects of air raids (especially gas attacks) were likely to be medical or health related, the Interdepartmental ARP Committee was placed under the authority of the Department of Pensions and National Health with the Deputy-Minister of that department, Dr. R. E. L. Wodehouse, as chairperson. This committee, which represented eight federal departments, began its deliberations on 29 March 1938. It was instructed "To enquire into and report upon non-military measures which should be adopted against the possibility of air attacks, including gas attacks, and the co-ordination of the action of the various authorities concerned, both public and private."(7) It studied British precedents, including the 1934 Handbook of Passive Air Defence. The Department of National Defence provided estimates of the forms and scale of air attack

on east and west coast cities in the event of an European or Asian war as a basis for planning.(8) Any consultation with provincial or municipal authorities was precluded, however, by the government's insistence on secrecy lest it be thought that Canada was preparing for war.(9)

The first (and last) report of the Interdepartmental ARP Committee was submitted on 30 June and approved by Cabinet in late July 1938. In this report, the committee raised jurisdictional and financial questions which would continue to bedevil the ARP organization throughout the Second World War. As an aspect of national defence, the committee argued, passive defence was the primary responsibility of the federal government which should prepare a handbook outlining the shape of the organization to be created and the nature of the passive defence measures required. Of necessity, implementation of these detailed schemes would devolve upon the municipalities. At this local level, the necessary administrative machinery already existed and could be augmented by volunteer workers. The federal government would bear the cost of services beyond those which a municipality had in place, such as producing the handbook, of procuring gas masks for the civilian population, of buying decontamination materials, and of training instructors. The link between the federal and municipal governments would, it was hoped, be provided by the provincial government, an arrangement which confirmed the existing political situation. The Interdepartmental ARP Committee also recommended that the Department of Pensions and National Health, which already dealt with several provinces and through them the municipal bodies on matters pertaining to the physical well-being of the population, assume responsibility for ARP. After Cabinet approval of this report, the committee effectively ceased to function.(10)

As a follow-up, Wodehouse set up a committee of six officials from the Department of Pensions and National Health to continue to develop federal aspects of the program. He enlarged this group of officials by adding two representatives from the Department of National Defence, the Director of the St. John Ambulance Association, and the Dominion Fire Commissioner.(11) Wodehouse also provided the committee with ambitious terms of reference, too ambitious as it turned out for the government. Its mission was to consider all points arising in connection with air raid precautions schemes, to act, when necessary, as the medium of consultation with outside authorities and also to provide generally for co-ordination, not only between government departments but with such other authorities as may be concerned. It is responsible for submitting to the interdepartmental committee matters on policy on which decisions are required, together with recommendations as to the course of action suggested.(12)

The major accomplishment of the Departmental ARP Committee was to produce Air Raid Precautions, General Information for the Civil Authorities, a Canadian version of the British Handbook of Passive Air Defence issued in 1934. Amended and adapted to the Canadian situation, this handbook was intended to provide instructions to Canadian provincial and municipal authorities when the time came to set up local ARP organizations.(13) Although 500 copies were printed in October 1938, they were not issued until August 1939. (In addition, 700 sets of handbooks and memoranda about particular aspects of ARP were purchased from the British government.)(14) As well, the committee prepared requisition and other forms and instructional material for local use. It also collected data on the population and resources of vulnerable areas, on the availability of fire fighting equipment in them, on the dangers of infection of crops and farm animals, and on other matters it considered relevant. It suggested an alternative plan of action if the provincial governments refused to assume their designated roles and recommended the creation and organization of an ARP headquarters in Ottawa.

Having compiled the handbook and collected a great deal of information, the Departmental ARP Committee submitted a report to the Minister of Pensions and National Health on 5 December 1938. The committee now wanted to move ahead with more concrete proposals and to involve the provincial authorities. It recommended that plans should be made for the evacuation of non-essential civilians from areas that were either under attack or likely to be attacked. It saw the need to set up first-aid stations, build up Canadian stocks of narcotics, and provide additional hospital

accommodation and equipment in vulnerable areas and receiving areas. It suggested that warning systems be installed in vulnerable areas and that air raid shelters be built. To deal with the destruction of an aerial attack, it recommended the provision of additional fire-fighting equipment, the training of auxiliary firemen, and the procuring of wrecking equipment in vulnerable centres.(15) Wodehouse recommend to his minister that a budget be prepared for cabinet approval to carry out the committee's plans.(16) The necessity to defend spending such large sums on ARP in the House of Commons created a difficulty. This, together with the publicity that would undoubtedly accompany a suggestion that the provincial authorities be consulted undoubtedly convinced the government to halt all progress in ARP measures. The Department of Pensions and National Health was forced to mark time until the Polish crisis in August 1939.

While the federal government had clearly recognized the need for passive defence planning in the pre-war period, it was only prepared to act within a restricted sphere. Financial restraint and the danger of national disunity limited activity to the provision of a secret rudimentary plan of action and a skeleton federal organization. Because the government insisted on secrecy in preparing the ARP scheme, there was no chance to consult with provincial and municipal authorities, especially on the sharing of responsibilities and financing. Such consultation could have obviated the subsequent wrangling over finances early in the war. As well, a clear-cut announcement of government policy on ARP measures might have restrained the hysteria following the fall of France in 1940 as local authorities and agencies scrambled to put passive defence measures in place. Ultimately, the officials of the Department of Pensions and National Health could do little more than copy British measures. Secrecy prevented these schemes from being tested against Canadian conditions.

## III The Development of ARP, August 1939 - December 1941

As Hitler prepared to invade Poland in August 1939 and pushed Europe to the brink of war, the federal government acted swiftly to set up a civil defence system before war was declared. In accordance with a pre-arranged plan, members of the Departmental Committee in the Department of Pensions and National Health were sent to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and British Columbia on 25 August and to Quebec a week later.(17) The Government of Ontario, however, refused to participate(18). As federal officials met with representatives of the provincial governments and explained the principles of passive defence, they suggested that steps be taken to meet emergencies and offered federal co-operation.(19) The legal basis for implementing ARP measures was established by Sections 32-36 inclusive of the Defence of Canada Regulations (DCR) promulgated on 3 September 1939.(20) Under these regulations, the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Pensions and National Health, or his delegate (usually the provincial premier), had sweeping powers to order evacuations, to put precautionary measures in place against attack, to close or destroy damaged or contaminated buildings, to limit lights and sounds, and to institute curfews.

To carry out federal ARP responsibilities, an officer of the Department of Pensions and National Health was appointed to assume control as Executive of Air Raid Precautions for Canada on 1 September. The Departmental Committee would advise him on policy matters. His duties were never specifically defined, but many evolved over the next two years. He advised provincial and municipal ARP committees, made provincial tours of inspection, maintained liaison with the Home Office in the United Kingdom and later with the Office of Civil Defence in the United States, and supervised the manufacture and distribution of ARP equipment. He also prepared and distributed ARP publications, made public addresses, and advised the Minister and Deputy Minister on policy questions.(21)

Federal civil defence intentions were outlined in the handbook, Air Raid Precautions, General Information for the Civil Authorities, which the Departmental Committee had prepared in 1938. This document provided the basis for provincial and local organization and described ARP services. Usually, an ARP Committee of the provincial government was set up to deal with general policy and to advise those municipalities declared by the Department of National Defence to be vulnerable to

attack. Municipal or local committees, made up of volunteers, were established to be responsible for the detailed organization of ARP measures. Auxiliary firemen and auxiliary public utility workers were designated to maintain vital services during an emergency. First-aid workers' duties included staffing first-aid posts, acting as stretcher bearers, driving ambulances, and generally taking care of casualties after an attack. Air raid wardens were to act as auxiliary police, with authority for maintaining order during a blackout practice or an actual air raid and responsibility for transmitting necessary information to the public. Except for Ontario, the designated provincial governments responded quickly and enthusiastically to these federal overtures. Each put its own individual stamp on provincial ARP organization.

Nova Scotia established an ARP committee on 29 August 1939, and local units were set up in Halifax and Sydney shortly thereafter. For all intents and purposes the provincial and Halifax committees operated as one, concerning themselves solely with Halifax. Cape Breton acted on its own and the ARP organization in Sydney extended to embrace local committees throughout the island. In Halifax, the main concerns were practicing blackouts and setting up first-aid posts. While the federal government undertook to provide first-aid, anti-gas, and decontamination equipment, it arrived very slowly. Halifax provided its own electronically operated air raid warning sirens.(22)

Since Saint John was the only vulnerable area in New Brunswick, federal and provincial authorities agreed that the local ARP committee would also be the provincial committee. It began by establishing first-aid posts and holding blackout practices, although it also prepared an elaborate evacuation scheme to remove non-essential people to the interior of the province. While Moncton had not been declared a vulnerable area, it lobbied to have an ARP organization. When the Department of National Defence declared that there was danger of sabotage, that city too received some federal funding.(23) By July 1940, excitement was so high that the provincial government decided to set up a province-wide skeleton ARP organization without federal aid. By this time, ARP organizations in Saint John and Moncton were well underway. Both established complete warden and first-aid organizations. Both had air raid warning systems: Saint John provided its own, while Moncton secured federal aid to install its system.

In late August 1939, British Columbia established a provincial ARP committee and by 7 September, local committees for the Victoria and Vancouver areas were set up. In each case, sub-committees were appointed to handle specific responsibilities. Initially, British Columbia's ARP organization was most concerned to detect and deal with damage resulting from sabotage. No air raid warning systems were installed or blackout exercises held until 1941. ARP measures were, however, put in place in Prince Rupert at the end of 1939. On its own initiative, the province also organized Nanaimo. Bickering among the participating municipalities resulted in the disbanding of the Vancouver area committee in May 1941 and of the Victoria area committee at the end of the year. They were replaced by separate committees in each of the area municipalities.(24)

In Quebec, the organization of ARP committees was delayed during a provincial election campaign resulting in the defeat of the Duplessis government. By December 1939, a provincial committee was established along with local units in Montréal and Québec City. The southern and eastern parts of the province were organized without federal funding. By December 1940, the whole of the St. Lawrence Valley from Gaspé to the Eastern Townships was covered by a net of organizations that included an air raid warden service, an auxiliary fire service, first-aid posts with first-aid workers, and auxiliary municipal workers. There was also an armed Mobile Force organized to combat subversive activities. Despite all this activity, neither Montréal nor Québec City had held blackout exercises.(25)

By August 1940, public opinion forced the Ontario government to reconsider its original refusal to participate in the ARP program.(26) On 12 September, a provincial ARP committee was established by order-in-council. By March 1941, it had organized 43 ARP units in the 14 vulnerable areas. In May, the first blackout exercise was held in Toronto. A Volunteer Corps previously organized to guard certain installations against sabotage was drawn into the organization to perform warden duties

and other services. The Committee also prepared manuals on the warden service, engineering services, and fire service, the last of which was adopted by federal authorities for use throughout Canada.(27)

Because of the large number of government agencies and employees in Ottawa and Hull, the federal ARP office decided to organize a separate committee for the Federal District. Established in October 1940, it reported directly to the Minister of Pensions and National Health.(28) By April 1941, it had set up some 30 first-aid posts and enrolled about 2,000 wardens. The Federal District organization held its first complete blackout on 26 October 1941.

As the war continued, initial provincial enthusiasm for ARP proposals was inevitably replaced by questions of federal-provincial jurisdiction. Although federal authorities claimed they had primary responsibility for ARP as an aspect of national defence, they envisioned its implementation at the local level by volunteers using existing organizations and services. Unfortunately there was no clear-cut definition of federal financial responsibility or of the amount of equipment that was needed. *Ad hoc* federal reactions to provincial requests increased both confusion and frustration. With no clear definition of financial authority, no precedents or firm figures for planning, relationships soon deteriorated.

As the provinces became increasingly involved in civil defence activities, it was soon evident they took a wider view of federal responsibilities. Before long they began making demands for money to pay the salaries of provincial officials, for office space, and administrative costs. These demands were met by a grant of $5,000 for each of the four provinces in January 1940 accompanied by a warning to expect no more.(29) Nova Scotia and British Columbia managed within the limit of these funds, but New Brunswick soon spent her grant and returned for more. Quebec submitted accounts for costs of non-designated items, which the federal government initially rejected but later settled in favour of Quebec after a second grant was made to the province.(30)

Immersed in financial wrangling, the federal government inconsistently stated that provision and maintenance of ARP warning systems and fire fighting equipment were local responsibilities. Both Moncton and Saint John worked out compromises for sharing the cost of their warning systems, and by the end of 1941, the federal government had funded the installation of sirens in Victoria, Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Toronto, Ottawa, Hull, Montréal, and Québec City. Also, in July 1941, the federal program ordered 200 portable pumps and over a million feet of fire hose, which were placed at the disposal of the provincial ARP committees.

Given the preliminary state of pre-war planning, unanticipated responsibilities were bound to arise. One was provision of compensation for ARP volunteers injured or killed on duty. The provincial governments flatly refused to accept it. After initially evading the issue, the federal government agreed in September 1941 to provide pensions for ARP workers injured during training or by enemy action and for dependents if the workers were killed.(31)

In addition, there was a legal question of whether the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Pensions and National Health had sufficient discretionary power to enforce compliance with ARP orders issued under the Defence of Canada Regulations. Federal officials initially preferred to secure co-operation by persuasion and good will. When, in May 1941, a Superior Court judge in Quebec dismissed a charge of failing to comply with blackout regulations on the grounds that the federal power had not been properly delegated to provincial officials, the federal government took action to clarify its position. The Regulations were amended, transferring authority solely to the Minister of Pensions and National Health and simplifying the issuing of orders and regulations, including the power of delegation.(32) Further amendments gave the Minister sweeping discretionary powers to restrict public assemblies and outdoor lighting in areas considered vulnerable to hostile attack.(33) The federal and provincial authorities now had strong legal authority for any ARP measures that might be considered necessary.

At the end of 1941, provision for Canada's civil defence was well underway. ARP groups existed in about 150 communities and almost 95,000 volunteers were registered as ARP workers. First-aid training was well advanced, special courses had begun for auxiliary firemen, and, with the limited equipment available, some anti-gas training was occurring. The federal government had spent $350,000 on equipment (most of it for first-aid), $40,000 on incidental expenses for the provinces, and $10,000 on training through the St. John Ambulance Association. Orders had been placed for fire equipment and sirens, and a nation-wide issue of gas masks was under consideration. Although local ARP organizations varied greatly in character and achievement, each one addressed needs it considered important in its area. The St. John Ambulance Association was noteworthy for the thorough instruction of first-aid workers provided by its volunteers. In truth, most other volunteers probably did not thoroughly understand their jobs. They suffered from a lack of proper equipment, inability to train under realistic conditions, and a dearth of properly qualified and experienced instructors. It is fortunate that Canada did not receive even a small-scale air attack between 1939 and 1941 when ARP was insufficiently organized and equipped. Even after 1941, there still remained conflicts between the federal and provincial governments over financing. Training, while going on, was largely incomplete. Supplies of equipment were inadequate. Although a beginning had been made during this early period, much remained to be done.

## IV The Maturing of ARP, 1942 - 1946

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 gave new emphasis to the importance of ARP, especially in British Columbia.(34) Even before that disaster, the Chiefs of Staff had extended their definition of the area exposed to definite risk of air attack to include all of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, all the lower St. Lawrence Valley, the coastline of British Columbia, and Vancouver Island. Western Quebec north to James Bay, much of north-eastern Ontario, southern Ontario, and British Columbia west of the Cascade Mountains were deemed areas of slight risk. In December 1941, all of these areas were included in the compensation order covering the injury or death of volunteers.(35) In addition, the responsibilities of both federal and provincial ARP agencies were increased to emphasize the growing importance of passive defence. Effective 1 January 1942, R. J. Manion (the former leader of the federal Conservative Party) was appointed Director of Civil Air Raid Precautions with deputy minister status, responsible only to the Minister of Pensions and National Health.(36) Until his death in July 1943, Manion approached his duties with enthusiasm and energy. According to his successor, Brigadier General Alexander Ross, much of the success of the ARP organization until the end of the war, especially in the securing of adequate supplies of equipment, was due to his efforts.(37)

Manion moved to eradicate the serious flaws in ARP organization which the first two years of the war had revealed. In particular, the federal-provincial financial policy was inconsistent. After a false start in February 1942, the ARP office developed a satisfactory system of assessing provincial claims to federal grants in June 1942.(38) It was based on the degree of risk each province faced, the areas involved, and the density of population. The provinces shared the grants with the municipalities (a 40/60 split was suggested) and the municipalities were expected to match the federal grant, although few did. Usually the amount available was greater than the claims submitted. This arrangement worked so well that it was continued until the end of the fiscal year 1944-5 when most ARP organizations were disbanded.

Another problem clarified under Manion's direction was the nature and extent of equipment the federal government was to provide to ARP units. A complex policy for issuing equipment was worked out early in 1942. This established a basis for assessing requirements using the number of ARP workers in each area and degree of defence risk associated with local activity. A list of equipment was established for particular types of jobs and activities (such as fire-fighting and first aid), then equipment was distributed according to a priority system of designated risk.(39) In 1942-3, additional orders were placed for sirens, first-aid, anti-gas, and fire fighting equipment and by the end of that fiscal year, $5 million worth of equipment had been provided to the six organized

provinces and large quantities had been stockpiled.(40)

Although gas was never actually used as a weapon in the Second World War, the possibility of gas attacks was taken very seriously. In April 1942, it was decided to equip all ARP workers with special respirators and to distribute gas masks to the whole civilian population in areas of definite risk. An order for two million civilian respirators, which included special types for children, babies, and helpless hospital patients, was placed with the Dominion Rubber Company. By December 1942, these masks were in the hands of the provinces but, despite some limited attempts to distribute them, most remained in storage unassembled. At the end of the war they were turned over to the War Assets Corporation.(41)

Throughout 1942, gas advisers or officers were appointed to plan the ARP defence program for federal and provincial organizations and committees in larger centres. Gas instructors were trained at McGill University, and in February 1943, gas training began in many centres across Canada. Local decontamination squads were instructed, and gas cleansing centres were set up. When the possibility of enemy gas attacks became remote at the end of 1943, Brigadier General Alexander Ross cancelled further orders for anti-gas equipment and clothing.(42) Ross had become Director of ARP after Manion's death on 2 July of that year.(43)

The war with Japan revived the possibility that it would be necessary to evacuate the civilian population from vulnerable areas. The Departmental Committee had considered this eventuality before the war, but only New Brunswick had prepared an evacuation plan to transport the non-essential population of Saint John to the interior of the province. In 1942, the federal government realized that areas on both the east and west coasts might have to be evacuated and an evacuation officer for each coast was appointed to the staff of the Director of ARP. Danger to Vancouver Island if the Japanese dropped incendiaries in its forests was the primary concern. British Columbia began developing evacuation plans for the island, but before reception arrangements on the mainland were complete the possibility of attack had become remote. In 1943, the federal evacuation officers were transferred to other duties.(44)

During his time as Director of Civil Air Raid Precautions, Manion had continually asserted the importance of ARP as an aspect of national defence in his dealings with the Department of National Defence. Although ARP officials reported good co-operation with the military establishment in such local matters as developing an efficient air raid warning communications system,(45) Manion felt that liaison between his office and National Defence officials in Ottawa was inadequate. He insisted that one officer from each service attend his staff conferences despite the reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff. After Manion's death, however, Brigadier General Ross cancelled the new appointment of a full-time staff officer to the ARP staff. Ross had no compunction about approaching the Chiefs of Staff directly. Just after his appointment, a second area of tension between ARP and the military flared. This was the continuing loss of key ARP personnel to the armed forces, especially to the Reserve Army in British Columbia. In 1943 the Minister of National Defence issued instructions not to recruit key ARP members without the permission of the provincial committee.

Brigadier General Ross was just as aggressive as his predecessor in asserting ARP's importance. In 1943, he recommended to the federal government that the name of his office be changed to Director of Civil Defence and that the ARP organization be known as Civil Defence. Such a change was in line with the nomenclature in the United States and Great Britain and, with provincial agreement, made for uniformity of name throughout the country. This change also suggests that, in the minds of some officials at least, Civil Defence had become an integral part of National Defence strategy. ARP had progressed from performing a peripheral role in air raid protection to claiming an important function in the defence of Canada.(46)

While Manion and Ross were overhauling the central organization, the tempo of activity in the provinces was picking up. Local ARP organizations in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick began very

actively training and recruiting in 1942 and 1943. In November 1941, Prince Edward Island was declared a vulnerable area and organized shortly thereafter, but Islanders never took ARP very seriously. Lighting restrictions were imposed in all three provinces in January 1942, although they were progressively relaxed until they were removed in 1944. Even though they were never called on to respond to an air raid, the ARP organizations demonstrated their usefulness in dealing with civil emergencies. In New Brunswick, workers contained several forest fires.(47) In Nova Scotia (where the provincial organization was deliberately renamed the Provincial Civilian Emergency Committee), it responded to explosions at the Naval Arsenal in Dartmouth in 1944 and again in 1945. Once it became clear that the war was coming to an end, these organizations were disbanded. Removal of the siren system from Halifax in October 1945 marked the end of wartime Civil Defence in the Maritimes.

Civil defence in Quebec followed a variation on the same pattern. Much of the province had been organized before parts of it were declared to be vulnerable areas. By March 1943, Quebec's organization had reached its peak with 145 ARP units staffed by 37,600 registered workers. While the number of units had decreased to 139 by March 1944, the number of workers had increased to 53,860. It is difficult to estimate the efficiency of the organization in Quebec, but the province was ready for a complete blackout by February 1942. A dimout was ordered until the end of navigation from Rivière du Loup to Gaspé because of submarine activity in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in September 1942. This was reimposed the following spring and extended to cover a greater area along the north shore from the Saguenay River to the Labrador border. The dimout was enforced through the co-operation of ARP units, the Aircraft Detection Corps, the Reserve Army, and the RCMP. It represents Quebec's major ARP accomplishment.

The Ontario Civilian Defence Committee developed the most elaborate organization in Canada by March 1943 with 71,587 registered workers in 123 ARP units in 15 areas. The chairman and vice-chairman both applied themselves with great energy to their tasks and forced the federal government to clarify the legal and financial arrangements of ARP.(48) The Fire Marshall of Ontario was also Manion's advisor on fire-fighting equipment and methods, and his Fire Services Manual was adopted Canada-wide. The Chiefs of Staff excluded Ontario from the risk of attack in November 1943, however, and most of the Ontario ARP organization was subsequently disbanded. Committees in the border communities of Sault St. Marie, Sarnia, Windsor, and Niagara Falls continued to function because their warning facilities were combined with those of the neighbouring American cities. Thus, 22 ARP units (14,180 registered workers) maintained their organization until the end of 1944, reporting directly to the federal office.(49)

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, ARP preparations intensified in British Columbia. The Premier of British Columbia reorganized the provincial ARP committee to deal with the increased demands and to control the politic-ridden ARP organizations in Vancouver and Victoria. He created a Civilian Protection Committee of four officials along with an Advisory Council whose main purpose was to eliminate the bickering between the different associations and groups involved in ARP.(50) By March 1943, 139 units had been formed with 62,845 registered workers. A warning system of sirens was installed at the end of 1942 and the province held wide-spread blackout exercises. An evacuation scheme was also developed before federal evacuation officers were removed in October 1943. With the disbanding of ARP units in Ontario at the end of 1943, more fire fighting and anti-gas equipment was sent to the west coast. Japanese balloon bombs were dropped on B.C. in February 1945, prolonging the life of the Civilian Protection Committee in British Columbia until August.

The federal government began to wind down the Civil Defence organization once the risk of air raids diminished. As the Allies began to win the war, Ontario's ARP organization was the first to be disbanded in November 1943.(51) The central ARP office was the next to be weakened when the federal government decided that a full time Director of Civil Defence was no longer needed in August 1944. Brigadier General Ross, however, agreed to stay on without pay.(52) Temporary

success of the German Ardennes offensive in December 1944 delayed further destruction for a time. In 1945, the provinces were advised to disband their organizations whenever they wished, and they were notified that all federal aid would cease with the end of the fiscal year on 31 March 1945. Because of their special circumstances, only the British Columbia and Halifax groups continued to function beyond that date.(53)

Provincial committees were instructed to liquidate their financial obligations, account for all equipment issued to them, and turn it over to the War Assets Corporation. Personal equipment could be retained by workers, all of whom received a certificate signed by the Prime Minister and the Director of Civil Defence acknowledging their service to the country. Finally on 14 September 1945, the relevant Defence of Canada Regulations (except for parts of Regulation 35) were rescinded thus removing most of the restrictive measures for civil defence purposes.(54)

During the war, about 775 communities were organized and received some equipment for ARP purposes. At its peak, about 280,000 workers were enrolled, most of whom were unpaid volunteers. In many smaller communities, the wartime ARP organizations, especially auxiliary fire services, did not disband but served on after the war. The governments of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia purchased all fire fighting equipment provided by the federal government with the result that more than 500 small communities, previously without organized fire protection, obtained organized, trained, and equipped fire brigades.

**V Conclusion**

Conceived by a government plagued by financial problems and the fear of national disunity, ARP could do little other than plan in secrecy before the Second World War. Once war came, the federal organization scrambled to bring vulnerable provinces onside, offering them organizational advice, limited financing, promises of equipment, and some training. It was not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 that ARP organizations began to coalesce. Under the energetic leadership of R. J. Manion and his successor Brigadier General Alexander Ross, financial problems with the provinces were solved and sufficient supplies and adequate training provided. By late 1943, danger had clearly passed and the ARP organizations were slowly disbanded. Even though ARP was never tested during the Second World War, it cast a long shadow over civil defence organizations in Canada in the Cold War era. The ARP philosophy that civil defence should be a voluntary local responsibility guided and supported by a central organization was to persist for years to come.(55)

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**Endnotes**

1. National Archives [henceforth NA], RG 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 2762, HQS 6615-2, Vol. 1, "Committee on Air Raid Precautions First Report", 1938, p.6.

2. For Canadian government policy and preparation under Mackenzie King see C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1955), Chapter I; C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), "Planning and Preparation in the Years before the War"; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), Chapter V. These works provide general background and there is very little specifically about ARP.

3. NA, RG 2, Records of the Privy Council Office, Vol. 1592, PC 2097, 20 Aug. 1936.

4. NA, RG 24, Vol. 2759, HQS 6615, Memo, Major General E. C. Ashton, Chief of the General Staff, 26 Aug. 1936.

5. NA, RG 24, Vol. 2759, HQS 6615, Memo, Ashton to Ian Mackenzie, Minister of National Defence, [April 1937?]; W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, to Mackenzie, 22 April 1937.

6. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1623, PC 531, 14 March 1938. Accompanying the order-in-council were two letters, one to the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence and the other to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs emphasizing the confidential nature of the work to be done by these committees.

7. Ibid.

8. NA, RG 24, Vol. 2762, HQS 6615-2, Vol. 1, enclosure in DesRosiers to Wodehouse, 13 June 1940, "Statement of the Forms and Scale of Air Attack to which it is estimated certain Canadian localities might be exposed, and on which the Department of National Defence is basing its calculations," Joint Staff Committee, 6 July 1938. The urban areas identified as exposed to a definite or a slight risk were Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver, New Westminster, Prince Rupert, Halifax, Sydney, Saint John, Canso (ferry), Québec City, Montréal, Ottawa, and Toronto. This list was subject to periodic revisions.

9. Ibid., passim., for records of the meetings of the Interdepartmental ARP Committee.

10. Ibid., pp. 137-49, "Committee on Air Raid Precautions First Report," nd; sent by Wodehouse, Chairperson of the committee, to Deputy Minister of National Defence, 29 June 1938 and by him to Minister of National Defence, 2 July 1938. On 27 July, Mackenzie noted that the report has been approved by the Privy Council, ibid., p. 179, Mackenzie to C. G. Power, Minister of Pensions and National Health.

11. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 152.

12. Air Raid Precautions: General Information for the Civil Authorities (Ottawa: Federal Air Raid Precautions Committee, 1940), p. 15.

13. Ibid. The date of printing on the copy in the National Library is 1940.

14. NA, MG 27 III B5, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol. 15, File 8-1-1, Memo, Wodehouse to Minister, 13 Sept. 1938: memo Wodehouse to Minister, 22 Sept. 1938.

15. Ibid., Wodehouse to Minister, 5 Dec. 1938.

16. Ibid., Memo, 30 Aug. 1938 attached to letter, Minister of Pensions and National Health to Prime Minister, 30 Aug. 1938.

17. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 152; NA, MG 27 III B5, Vol. 15, File 8-1-1, Memo, Wodehouse to Minister of Pensions and National Health, 24 Aug. 1939; memo, unsigned, 11 Sept. 1939. There are other documents in this file about the early provincial negotiations.

18. NA, MG 27 III B7, R. J. Manion Papers, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (3) General, Civil Defence 1941-1943, memo, Wodehouse to Mackenzie, 30 Jan. 1942.

19. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 152.

20. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1653, PC 2483, 3 Sept. 1939.

21. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 153.

22. For a description of the Nova Scotia organization in late 1941 see Provincial Civilian Emergency

Committee, Civilian Emergency Preparations in Nova Scotia (Air Raid Precautions) (Halifax, N. S., November 1941), in NA, MG 27 III B7, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (3) General, Civil Defence 1941-1943.

23. NA, RG 24, Vol. 2762, HQS 6615-2, Vol. 1, H. DesRosiers, Acting Deputy Minister (Militia Service) to Wodehouse, 24 June 1940.

24. Some information on the early organization in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and British Columbia can be found in NA, MG 27 III B5, Vol. 15, File 8-1-1, passim.

25. Department of Pensions and National Health [henceforth DP&NH], File 60-9, Vol. 1, J. Gordon Ross to E. H. Minns, 18 June 1940 describes the Quebec organization, cited in R. J. Rennie, "Civil Defence in Canada 1936-46" , p. 21, typescript history, EPC; the records of the Department of Pensions and National Health could not be located at the National Archives; see also NA, MG 27 III B5, Vol. 15, File 8-1-1, passim, for some references to the Quebec organization in the autumn of 1939.

26. NA, MG 27 III B7, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (3) General, Civil Defence 1941-1943, memo, Wodehouse to Mackenzie, "...Ontario declined a verbal approach of the Hon. Mr. Power to Premier Hepburn to organize with our Assistance [sic] A.R.P. in Ontario, in August, 1939, declined your written approach, Nov. 16th, 1939, accepted your offer made personally to Mr. Hepburn, Aug. 1940."

27. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1942 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942), p.155.

28. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941), p. 164; NA, MG 27 III B7, R. J. Manion Papers, Miscellaneous Subject Files (5) General, Civil Defence, Wodehouse to Frederic Bronson, Chairman, Federal District Commission, 7 Oct. 1940.

29. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1663, PC 31/301, 25 Jan. 1940.

30. NA, MG 27, III B5, Vol. 15, File 8-1-1, Mackenzie to Mackenzie King, 7 Jan. 1941. "The situation is that in three provinces the movement is so popular and creates such an outlet for war endeavour that they are clamouring for more government support."

31. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1731, PC 7147, 10 Sept 1941.

32. Ibid., Vol. 1718, PC 3962, 2 June 1941 and Vol. 1722, PC 4801, 2 July 1941.

33. Ibid., Vol. 1742, PC 9818, 19 Dec. 1941 and Vol. 1743, PC 9895, 26 Dec. 1941.

34. See, for example, the text of a national broadcast on air raid precautions by Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of Pensions and National Health, on 30 Dec. 1941 and the record of an ARP conference in Ottawa on 3-4 Feb. 1942 in NA, MG 27 III B7, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (4) General, Civil Defence 1941-1943.

35. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1741, PC 2/9660, 10 Dec. 1941; accompanying map shows the areas of risk. DND had made this revision by 12 November. See an undated memo summarizing development of risk areas in NA, MG 27 III B7, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (4) General, Civil Defence.

36. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1743, PC 10196, 31 Dec. 1941.

37. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), p. 70.

38. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1761, PC 4738, 3 June 1942.

39. NA, MG 27 III B7, R. J. Manion Papers, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (5) General, Civil Defence, 1941-1943, "Suggested Establishment of Personnel for Air Raid Precautions Services Approved by the Director of Civil Air Raid Precautions, Ottawa, Canada." This establishment provided the basis for the allocation of supplies to the provincial committees. See also "Press statement by the Honourable Ian Mackenzie..., 2 March 1942", announcing model scales of establishment for local air raid precautions organizations, NA, MG 27 III B5, Vol. 7, File 3-60.

40. For an account of the equipment, publications, and films see Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1943 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), p. 60-2.

41. Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1943 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), p. 61.

42. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), pp. 75.

43. NA, RG 2 Vol. 1811, PC 5676, 17 July 1943; B. M. Greene (ed.), Who's Who in Canada (Toronto: International Press Limited, 1938), p.466. A District Court Judge in Saskatchewan, Ross was granted leave of absence to accept the Director position; see NA, RG 2, Vol. 1811, PC 5675, 17 July 1943.

44. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1943 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), pp. 63.

45. DP&NH, plan on file (ARP) 257 (?), issued by RCAF headquarters 15 May 1943, cited by Rennie, op. cit., p. 34.

46. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), pp.72-3: NA, RG 2, Vol. 1824, PC 8453, 2 Nov. 1943. There seems to have been some initial resistance to the name change in Cabinet (perhaps from DND); the change was first made on 1 March 1943 and revoked on 12 March -- see NA, RG 2, Vol. 1794, PC 964, 1 March 1943 and Vol. 1795, PC 1914, 12 March 1943.

47. DP&NH, (ARP) 60-5-C29, report from New Brunswick, Oct. 1943, cited by Rennie, op. cit., p. 36.

48. DP&NH, (ARP) 60-7-A29 letter from Judge Macdonell, 11 April 1942, cited by Rennie, op. cit., p. 37.

49. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), pp. 71-2, 74; RG 2, Vol. 1832, PC 9969, 9970, 9971, 9972, 4 Jan. 1944 continued Civil Defence Organizations in Niagara Falls, Windsor, Sarnia, and Sault Ste. Marie respectively.

50. For a description of ARP organization and activities in British Columbia to the beginning of 1943, see "Civilian Protection. An Address by W. C. Mainwaring, Chairman, Advisory Council, Provincial Civilian Protection Committee, Made to Officers of the Pacific Command at Vancouver, January 15th, 1943" in NA, MG 27 III B7, R. J. Manion Papers, Vol. 72, Miscellaneous Subject Files (4) General, Civil Defence 1941-1943.

51. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Health for the year ending March 31, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), pp. 71-2.

52. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1860, PC 6167, 9 Aug. 1944.

53. Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Veterans Affairs for the year ending March 31, 1945 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), pp. 145-6.

54. NA, RG 2, Vol. 1912, PC 5972, 14 Sept. 1945.

55. Lawrence S. Hagen, Civil Defence: The Case for Reconsideration, National Security Series No. 7 (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1977), p. 43.

# Chapter I

# Civil Defence in Canada: 1948-1959

## I Introduction

Following the Second World War, the federal government wanted to have done with all things warlike, including civil defence, and get on with building a peaceful country. Its optimistic intent, however, could not be sustained in the hostile post-war international atmosphere created by the Cold War and the destructive potential of the atomic bomb. In 1948, building on the experience of ARP, the federal government decided to re-establish a civil defence organization. Once again federal officials assumed a planning and coordinating role, providing training, research, and limited financing. As before, civil defence services were to be provided through the extension of the functions of existing agencies, public and private, and by the efforts of volunteers. Civil defence was again decentralized, with the federal and provincial governments responsible for planning, training, and coordinating and the local governments responsible for implementing the program. Although civil defence was reborn within the Department of National Defence, it was shortly transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare because of the nature of the services it would supply to the civil population in the event of war. From 1951 to 1958, the Department of National Health and Welfare coordinated civil defence, until new forces, national and international, forced a re-evaluation.

## II Civil Defence in the Department of National Defence 1948-51

Brigadier General Alexander Ross, the Director of Civil Defence at the end of the Second World War, believed that civil defence was an essential element of national defence: consideration of a permanent civil defence organization should be included in any post-war defence planning. Before retiring, Ross submitted a report to the government outlining the nature of such an organization and the problems that would have to be solved in establishing it. In his view, federal and provincial governments should assume responsibility for planning and training, while the municipality served as the operational unit. Ross emphasized that local authorities would be ultimately responsible for civil defence, most of the work volunteer. Although financing the necessary skeleton organizations and the purchase of equipment would have to be met through federal assistance, the federal government should refrain, as far as possible, from exercising any direct control. The federal role would be to advise and coordinate, supplying such assistance as might be required to develop local resources. Ross envisaged the peacetime creation of a skeleton organization in every locality ready to implement an approved civil defence scheme. The extent of local resources should be inventoried and the amount of auxiliary aid needed should be estimated. Key personnel should be appointed to every branch of the organization, then trained to put the scheme into operation on the shortest notice. Such measures would permit rapid and complete mobilization in the event of surprise attack.(1)

Ross's report was ignored by a government that was intent on rapid demobilization and on building a peace-time Canada, not preparing for another war. It soon became very clear, however, that the post-war world was still very dangerous. Even before the war was over, the Igor Gouzenko spy case in Ottawa had signalled that the Soviet Union had hostile intent. By 1946, Churchill described an Iron Curtain descending on eastern Europe, and Communist threats were being defeated in Greece and Italy. In February 1948, a communist coup replaced the legitimate government in Czechoslovakia. One month later the Soviets blockaded West Berlin. Although the immediate Soviet threat was in Europe, the United States began to plan for the defence of North America. Despite doubts about the necessity of these defensive measures, the Canadian government felt compelled to reassure the Americans in order to maintain Canadian sovereignty. Canada continued to sit on the Permanent Joint Board of Defence and in February 1947, it signed a bilateral agreement committing Canada to the use of American weapons, equipment, training methods, and communications.(2)

Although the Soviet Union did not explode an atomic bomb until 1949, her scientists were known to be actively pursuing atomic research. In this darkening world, the question of civil defence was raised once again.

Early in 1948, the Minister of National Defence directed the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, Dr. O. M. Solandt, to prepare an appreciation and to make recommendations concerning civil defence planning and organization. In April of that year, Solandt sent a memorandum to the Defence Committee of Cabinet. The contents were based on the assumption that any future war would likely include an attack on the North American continent, either by air or sabotage. Solandt defined civil defence clearly as an aspect of total war:

> all those defensive measures which can be taken on behalf of the civilian population to insure that when such an attack is made the will to resist is maintained, and the economic and social organization of the community will function effectively in support of offensive operations.

He recognized that any plan for civil defence would have to take into account the difficulties arising from climatic and geographic conditions. He also acknowledged the jurisdictional division of responsibility between the federal and provincial governments. Preventive measures, such as early warning, internal security, industrial dispersion, and evacuation, would call for planning and execution on a national and regional level. Even remedial measures would require centralized planning due to the magnitude of the problems associated with an atomic explosion, although the organization and delivery of health and welfare services would still remain a local or municipal responsibility. The local and volunteer nature of civil defence was still clearly recognized.

The report recommended that an agency responsible for planning civil defence should be established within the Department of National Defence because of the need for close integration of civil and military defence plans. A Civil Defence Advisor to the Minister should be appointed to begin planning the creation of this new agency. He should "...be capable of taking full charge of Civil Defence in time of war. He must be experienced in administration and in public relations and have served in one of the Armed Services, preferably the Army." In his planning he should delegate all possible responsibilities to existing departments of government and other agencies. At the same time, he should retain responsibility for ensuring that federal government policy was clearly formulated and implemented. The Advisor and his staff should also handle major problems which could not be delegated elsewhere, such as those associated with shelter policy, decentralization of industry, timing of implementation, publicity, and decisions concerning the scale of civil defence preparedness relative to other defence needs.(3)

Effective 1 October 1948, Major General Frederick Frank Worthington, recently retired from the Army, was appointed as Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence to act as Civil Defence Co-ordinator.(4) His responsibilities were succinctly stated:

> The Civil Defence Coordinator will be responsible to keep abreast of the Civil Defence situation and plan the necessary organization with the appropriate agencies of the federal, provincial and municipal governments. At this stage he will act purely in an advisory capacity and will be assisted by a committee representing various government departments concerned. He will keep informed of Civil Defence requirements and developments in other countries and advise on measures that changing circumstances might require in this country.(5)

His immediate task was to study the requirements of civil defence and to make recommendations to the Minister of National Defence about measures that should be taken to meet a possible emergency. In formulating this plan, he was directed to take into account current thinking on the nature of possible enemy attacks against Canada. At the same time he was not to lose sight of such requirements as dispersal of industry, evacuation of population, provision of deep shelters, and other long term considerations.(6)

In November and December, Worthington visited all the provinces to explain to the provincial

governments the probable nature of the federal civil defence organization and to ascertain particular problems affecting each province.(7) (While he was in Regina, he met with Brigadier General Alexander Ross to benefit from his Second World War experience.(8)) In the meetings with provincial officials (usually the premiers), he stressed that the primary object of civil defence was to minimize the effect of disaster on the civil population, on industry, on commerce, and on public utilities in order that normal functions might be resumed with as little delay as possible. He explained that he wished to create an organization which could expand rapidly in time of a national emergency. Since the proposed plan was to work through provincial civil defence organizations, it was hoped that the provincial governments would set these up in the near future. It was suggested that the organization should include the premier of the province as head, with a full-time Director and a small staff capable of rapid expansion. In general, the provincial officials reacted positively to the federal initiative, indicating the need for more civil defence planning both at the federal and provincial levels.(9)

In January and February 1949, Worthington visited the United Kingdom and other Western European countries to make a thorough study of their civil defence organizations. He found the trip to be useful, both for isolating problems and for suggesting solutions. For example, very early in his study Worthington became convinced that most civil defence functions could be placed in federal government departments as an extension of their peacetime duties. Under this arrangement the civil defence agency would supply only the necessary co-ordination and direction in emergency planning. (10) During the trip he also found that civil defence organizations in several countries played an active role in the event of a natural disaster.(11) These and other ideas were incorporated into his thinking as he prepared a plan for civil defence in Canada.

On the 17 March 1949, Worthington presented an outline plan for a civil defence organization to the Minister of National Defence.(12) At the national level, it divided civil defence headquarters into three main branches -- plans and operations, technical services, and training. It made provision to keep the public informed and to maintain intelligence liaison with the armed services. The report proposed civil defence duties for the various federal government departments. A similar organization was proposed for the provinces, although Worthington took great pains not to appear to be dictating to the provincial governments. After discussions with the cabinet secretariat, it was decided that the whole subject of civil defence should be placed before the War Book Committee. In August 1949, Worthington's recommendations were considered by it.(13)

The recommendations which the Civil Defence Co-ordinator made to the War Book Committee were based upon certain clearly defined principles:

- to set up in peacetime the framework of a civil defence organization that could be expanded quickly and efficiently when an emergency threatens;
- to take preparatory steps in peacetime on those measures which should be carried out before an emergency exists; and
- to determine policy on those measures which would not normally be taken until an emergency threatens.

Worthington sketched out the suggested roles of the three levels of governments. He proposed that the federal government should take the initiative in planning civil defence on a national scale and that it should function as a coordinating agency. To accomplish this end, a Federal Office of Civil Defence should be established to keep civil defence plans under constant review and to advise the Minister on any changes which could become necessary because of strategic developments. The provision and coordination of training for civil defence personnel, the preparation of information for the public, and the provision of liaison officers with the armed forces were also considered to be part of the functions of the Office. In addition, it would be responsible for the coordination of the emergency plans of other government departments and agencies and it would assist the provincial

governments in preparing their civil defence plans. It would also assign to the various federal government departments responsibilities for the planning and execution of those civil defence measures which were natural extensions of their normal peacetime functions. The provincial governments would assume the role of area planners and co-ordinators within the scope of the broad national plan. They would also provide those services which were their responsibility in time of peace. The municipalities would direct local planning and, with some assistance from outside, control the execution of civil defence measures.

Civil defence planning would be premised on the assumption that any attack on Canada would be of a diversionary nature, while the main war was being fought in Europe. It was expected, however, that there would be an air attack using high explosives and other conventional weapons directed against large centres and vital industries. To meet this threat, planning for both preventive measures (such as setting up a warning system, consideration of the dispersal of industry, communication facilities, and the building of air raid shelters) and remedial measures (such as fire-fighting, the restoration of devastated areas, and caring for the injured) needed to be in place. The need for an organization planned and trained in advance on a national basis was therefore clear although it was also evident that the actual execution of civil defence measures would have to be decentralized to the greatest possible extent. Therefore close cooperation and coordination among the various levels of government and departments involved in emergency planning was necessary.(14)

The War Book Committee agreed to Worthington's proposals. Subsequently, it established a sub-committee, chaired by the Civil Defence Co-ordinator, made up of representatives of those federal departments which were to be responsible for aspects of civil defence -- initially National Defence, National Health and Welfare, Transport, Trade and Commerce, Reconstruction and Supply, Labour, Finance and the cabinet secretariat. Representatives of the RCMP and other departments were added as the need arose. The overall responsibility of this Co-ordinating Committee was to coordinate the early activities of the civil defence organization. As its immediate task was to study Canadian organizational requirements for civil defence, Worthington and a number of his staff were sent to the Civil Defence Staff College in the United Kingdom to study methods of training and organization. During the latter part of 1949 and the first few months of 1950 a number of projects were initiated. National fire-fighting capacity was evaluated and a program of standardization of equipment was begun. Advisory panels were set up to deal with various technical problems, shelter requirements, disaster relief, and transportation. Preliminary steps were taken towards the establishment of a civil defence training school and the preparation of training literature. The first steps were also taken toward the establishment of provincial civil defence organizations.(15)

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the possibility of yet another world war emphasized the need for civil defence. As a result, it was decided to hold a Dominion-Provincial Conference in August 1950 to discuss both what had been accomplished and what had yet to be done. Of particular interest to the provinces was a clear statement of the responsibilities to be assumed by the federal and provincial governments. The delegates agreed that national policy and the coordination of provincial planning must be the responsibility of the federal government. Since civil defence was a national concern, they considered that the costs would also have to be borne in some part by the federal government, largely in the form of grants. Federal officials, they acknowledged, would have the authority to decide on local requirements across the country. The delegates also agreed that the federal government would be responsible for setting up central schools for the training of instructors and leaders, preparing instructional manuals, and providing training materials. The provinces were to ensure the formation of local civil defence organizations, coordinate civil defence plans and training within the provinces, organize mutual aid and reception areas, and provide the necessary legal authority to establish these programs.

With a clear framework established by the conference, the provinces acted quickly. Within six months all ten provinces had nominated ministers to take charge of civil defence and had set up provincial civil defence organizations. Many municipalities were well advanced in their planning and organization, as well. Consequently, a second Dominion-Provincial Conference was held in February

1951 at which the main topic of discussion was the financial responsibility for civil defence training, equipment, and supplies. The federal government agreed to assume responsibility for stockpiling medical supplies, for providing equipment for protection against sabotage, for conducting research and development in civil defence matters, and for providing staff courses and special courses on Atomic/Biological/Chemical (ABC) warfare and other technical matters. The federal government also agreed to establish a warning system in cooperation with the provinces and local authorities; it would supply and install sirens and other warning devices in municipalities having a population over 20,000 and in municipalities forming part of a target area. The conference also considered in detail many technical aspects of civil defence, such as warning, shelters, treatment and hospitalization, evacuation of casualties, maintenance of law and order, restoration of public utilities, and firefighting. Upon conclusion of the conference, a continuing Dominion - Provincial Advisory Committee on Civil Defence was set up, composed of representatives of the federal and provincial governments, to keep these matters under review.(16)

Thus by early 1951, the government of Canada was once again planning to protect its citizens from the effects of war. The initial euphoria at the end of the Second World War had been replaced by the anxieties of the Cold War. This led the federal government to appoint Major General Frederick Worthington as Civil Defence Co-ordinator to advise the Minister of National Defence on civil defence matters. Aware of the experience of ARP during the Second World War and recognizing the jurisdictional and geographical problems of the country, Worthington recommended the creation of a decentralized skeleton civil defence organization. The federal government would plan, coordinate, and, to some extent, finance the effort. The provincial governments would create the provincial organizations and local volunteer agencies would be responsible for implementing the civil defence plans. In August 1950 and in February 1951, two Dominion-Provincial Conferences were held to negotiate the respective responsibilities of the provincial and federal governments. Then the Department of National Health and Welfare was assigned the responsibility of implementing the civil defence policy.

## III Civil Defence In the Department of National Health & Welfare 1951-59

### 1 *Governmental Organization*

Following the Dominion-Provincial conference of February 1951, the responsibility for civil defence was transferred from the Minister of National Defence to the Minister of National Health and Welfare.(17) At the same time, the responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments were set out more precisely. Civil defence was to be organized within the existing governmental framework, respecting the boundaries of federal-provincial jurisdiction. While civil defence was clearly an aspect of planning for war, it was agreed -- apparently at provincial insistence -- that the organization could deal with natural disasters as well. Although reluctantly accepted by the federal government, this agreement foreshadowed the shape of things to come.

Under these new circumstances, the federal government undertook to set out an organization plan as a guide for each level of government to follow. It assumed responsibility for coordinating the activity of the various levels of government and for maintaining liaison with the armed forces and the civil defence organizations in the United Kingdom and the United States. It would conduct research, provide training programs, supply equipment (such as training aids, radiation detection devices, respirators, steel helmets, etc.), and give direct financial aid to the provinces and municipalities on a dollar for dollar basis. It agreed to share with the provinces the cost of a compensation program for injury or death of civil defence workers.

For their part, the provincial governments agreed to set up civil defence organizations along the lines set out by the federal government. They undertook to ensure that the municipalities in the urban target areas put in place local organizations. Where necessary, they were to cooperate with the civil defence organizations of the adjacent states. They agreed to assist in training workers by establishing schools or assisting municipalities in their training programs. Equipment issued by the federal

government would be distributed through the provincial agencies. They agreed to keep the federal authorities informed of the progress of their programs and to suggest changes or improvements where required.

Major General Worthington, who remained as federal Civil Defence Co-ordinator, was transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare and directed to work through the Deputy Minister of Welfare. His responsibilities were essentially the same -- to advise the Minister and Deputy Minister on civil defence matters, to coordinate federal planning and action, and to maintain liaison with civil defence agencies in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries. He was also chairman of the Civil Defence Co-ordinating Committee, an interdepartmental body which had been established previously to oversee civil defence planning in designated federal departments. It had been expanded to include representatives of the departments or Agriculture, Finance, Labour, National Health and Welfare, Public Works, Resources and Development, Trade and Commerce, Transport, the RCMP, and the secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Representatives of other agencies were brought in as the need arose.

The day to day duties of the Civil Defence Co-ordinator were carried out by the staff of the Civil Defence Division within the Department of National Health and Welfare. It was divided into three sections:

> **Operations and Training** was responsible for developing strategic and tactical operational plans, conducting training at federal schools, and assisting provincial and local schools as required.
>
> **Administration and Supply** dealt with problems of administration, including relationships with other federal departments and with provincial civil defence authorities. It was responsible also for the procurement of training aids and equipment through the department's Purchasing and Supply Division.
>
> **Other Service Activities** included health planning, welfare planning, communications and transport, plant and animal diseases, police matters, research and development, and information services.

A section of the Civil Defence Division, organized in August 1951 to be responsible for developing a program of civil defence preparations for the federal civil service in the Ottawa area, should be noted as a precursor, in part, to the future continuity of government program. Its mandate was to ensure that there would be one organization in each federal building capable of being merged into an organization which the city of Ottawa might form in the event of a civil defence emergency. Over the next six years, over 5000 trained volunteers were enrolled into operational teams throughout federal buildings. In addition, all government buildings in Ottawa were surveyed with respect to shelter plans, means of evacuation, and existing alarm systems. In 1955 the Civil Defence Division was assigned the responsibility for the organization and maintenance of the Fire Warden service and conducting evacuation practice drills in premises owned or occupied by the federal government in the Ottawa area. Subsequently, annual emergency evacuation drills were held in the majority of federal buildings. Attention shifted during 1957 from mass indoctrination towards more specialized training. Rescue, radiation monitoring, first-aid, home nursing, casualty simulation courses, staff indoctrination, and control centre operations, including teletype practice, were undertaken.(18)

During 1954, in response to the growing size and complexity of the civil defence program, the Civil Defence Division was reorganized. It was made up of the following branches and services:

(a) Administration Branch

(b) Training and Operations Branch

(c) Plans Branch

(d) Transportation and Communications Branch

(e) Public Relations

(f) Secretariat

(g) Library and Statistics

(h) Health Services Branch

(i) Welfare Planning Group

(j) Canadian Civil Defence College, Arnprior(19)

Over the next few years as more information became available on the effects of thermonuclear war, the division's responsibilities expanded. In April 1955, two new sections were authorized: a Planning Section and a Liaison Section. The Planning Section was to assist in the development and rehearsal of evacuation plans for the population of areas threatened by attack. The Liaison Section was to maintain direct contact with provincial civil defence authorities on all matters, but in particular on the Federal Financial Assistance Program and on related planning.(20) In January 1956, a Special Weapons Section of the Health Services Branch was set up to study defensive measures against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.(21) Late in 1958, the engineering functions of the Plans and Operations Section were transferred to a new Engineering Section. Eventually, this section became involved in the design of a range of bomb shelters for incorporation in all types of buildings and the engineering portion of a shelter/evacuation study.(22)

While the federal government was developing its civil defence organization, the provinces and municipalities were setting up their own parallel organizations. By 1951, each province had created a civil defence organization with a minister responsible for civil defence and a provincial co-ordinator or director. At the time of the transfer of responsibility for Civil Defence, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario had already conducted civil defence training courses to train local instructors and key municipal personnel. The instructors in these schools had, for the most part, been trained at federal training centres and at federal expense.

At the municipal level, all potential target areas and communities of over 50,000 population (with the exception of Ottawa) had set up civil defence organizations by the end of March 1952. In a number of cities -- Halifax, Montreal, Windsor, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Vancouver, and Victoria -- local training schools were established. With the exception of Quebec and Prince Edward Island where activity remained at a minimal level, the provinces and most of their important municipalities had made substantial progress by 1955. A total of 554 municipalities possessed some form of a civil defence organization, while 128 had fully developed programs which included included a director, various services, and training facilities. In 1951, 50,000 civil defence workers were enrolled; by 1957 enrollment had increased to 275,319 workers. Of these 248,850 were trained. This group included full-time provincial and civil employees, such as fire, police, utilities, and civil defence personnel, and part-time civilian volunteers. The civil defence organization usually consisted of a number of services -- intelligence and information, communications, transport, police, fire, health (medical and welfare), engineer and public utility, rescue, ambulance, and warden. Most of these services already existed in the communities and needed only to be expanded by volunteers in time of a war emergency.

2 *Attack Planning*

With the advent of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and long range bombers to deliver them, North America lost the immunity from enemy attack that it had enjoyed during two world wars. From 1949 to 1954, however, the Canadian General Staff continued to believe that aerial attacks on North

America would be diversionary in character, designed to draw forces away from the main area of attack in western Europe. Under these circumstances, Canada was thought to have three advantages. First, few Canadian cities were likely to be attacked initially since the main targets would be in the United States. Secondly, few centres of dense population were near each other, thus limiting the damage that could be accomplished with a single strike. Thirdly, an excellent transportation service existed to move people or supplies to or from attacked areas. Consequently, civil defence planning was directed toward protecting the public in target areas against a nominal atomic bomb of 20kt. Thirteen cities were classified as target areas: Montréal, Toronto, Ottawa-Hull, Windsor, Niagara Falls, Halifax, Vancouver, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Québec City, Saint John, and Victoria. It was accepted that extensive damage would be inflicted on people and property if any of these cities were hit, but national survival under such an attack was never seriously considered.(23)

During the early 1950's Canada was divided into three distinct types of functional areas for civil defence organizational and planning purposes:

> **TARGET AREAS**: These were centres which were considered liable to attack because of population density and industrial importance. The target area consisted of one or a number of adjacent municipalities. In every case the organization was built within the framework of the civic government. Where more than one municipality formed a target area a joint control committee was established. The organization and planning of civil defence for the target area was designed to meet the war emergency within the limits of the area itself.
>
> **MUTUAL AID AREAS**: These consisted of all the communities surrounding the target area within a distance of 50 to 70 miles. Civil Defence in those areas was organized into a mobile column (to move in and reinforce the target area personnel) and a static group (to accommodate injured and homeless people).
>
> **MOBILE SUPPORT AND RECEPTION AREAS**: These were composed of municipalities outside the above-mentioned areas. They were organized to act as a general reserve, receiving the overflow of casualties and some priority classes of homeless, and providing certain forms of mobile support in specialist personnel and resources.(24)

It was not at that time the policy to evacuate large numbers of people. It was thought that they would have to stay and deal with the crisis in the target area and live there after the disaster in order that the war effort would not falter.

In February 1954, the United States Atomic Energy Commission released factual information on the results of a thermonuclear device, a hydrogen bomb, with megaton yield which was exploded in December 1952. Further tests in 1954 disclosed the terrible effects of radiation fallout. As a result of these disclosures the assumptions behind civil defence planning were reassessed and it became gradually apparent that Canada was faced with the problem of national survival. From the start of any Third World War North America must be prepared for attack by nuclear weapons with little warning. Strategists believed that the retaliatory power of the United States Strategic Air Command would ensure that this phase of the war would last a matter of days rather than weeks. However, they also realized that even a few days of nuclear warfare would produce widespread destruction, disrupting communications and public utilities. It was possible that local government would collapse and that public morale would be strained to the breaking point.

The introduction of the hydrogen bomb altered planning assumptions. Well constructed buildings would withstand the blast of an atomic bomb and their basements would give ample shelter except directly under ground zero. A 'take cover' policy, however, would be of little use during an attack by the more powerful hydrogen bombs. It was estimated that of a total population of 5 million in the thirteen target cities, 3,500,000 would be killed, 1,250,000 would be injured, and only 250,000

would be uninjured should there be a nuclear war. A stay-put policy was clearly no longer feasible and consideration had to be given to large scale evacuation of the civilian population of urban target areas.

On 28 July 1956, the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, announced government policy in the House of Commons:

> We now believe that our civil defence policy should be based on the development and testing of plans for the orderly evacuation of the main urban areas in our country should the possibility of attack on such areas by nuclear weapons appear to be imminent.(25)

He then went on to name the thirteen cities that had been designated target areas on the advice of the Chief of the General Staff and approved by the Federal Government Civil Defence Policy Committee (see above). This policy was not challenged by any provincial government and there was no disagreement about the chosen Urban Target Areas.

The survival plan which was developed was outlined in "A Guide to Survival Planning", issued in 1956. The plan involved four phases:

> Phase A: Pre-attack evacuation of the non-essential personnel of the Urban Target Areas, based on a strategic warning of 8 to 12 hours;
>
> Phase B: Planned withdrawal of the remaining population of the Urban Target Areas, based on tactical warning of three hours after enemy aircraft are detected on radar screens;
>
> Phase C: Immediate action after a hydrogen bomb burst directed toward the saving of life;
>
> Phase D: Aid and rehabilitation.(26)

In order to make the plan workable it was necessary to change the civil defence area organization. Instead of three defensive areas, there were now four:

> **TARGET AREAS** - These were expanded to include all the population residing within a 15 mile radius of a probable ground zero.
>
> **TARGET SUPPORT AREAS** - These included the area lying immediately beyond 25 miles of probable ground zero. The resident population of this area would not evacuate, and it would receive the components of the Target Area Civil Defence forces who would evacuate. Phase 'C' operations would be conducted by civil defence forces in the communities of the Target Support Area.
>
> **RECEPTION AREAS** - These are the areas beyond the boundaries of the Target Support Areas. The habitable parts farthest from the Target Area were reserved for Phase 'A' evacuees while those parts closer to the Target Area were reserved for those evacuated during Phase 'B'. In addition to the reception functions the Reception Area was responsible for organizing Task Groups (composite mobile defence columns) which could be directed to relief or reinforcement in damaged areas.
>
> **STANDFAST AREAS** - Areas lying within the possible fallout area, based on predicted wind information, were designated Standfast Areas. These areas would not evacuate and would not receive evacuees prior to bombs falling. If, after nuclear explosions, the area was not affected by fallout then it would possibly receive evacuees who had carried out remedial evacuation from seriously affected fallout areas. The Standfast Area would also be expected to organize Task Groups.

The responsibility for designating the various defensive areas within a province rested with the provincial civil defence authorities, although it was recommended that the boundaries of the areas conform to existing municipal boundaries. In some provinces consideration was given to grouping these areas into zones for administrative and operational reasons. Individual communities were also given the responsibility of coping with local or natural disaster situations.

Survival studies carried out prior to 1957 showed that the danger from radioactive fallout, which could occur almost anywhere in Canada, made a study of shelter requirements, as well as evacuation plans, necessary. It was thought that public shelters would only be required on the periphery of target cities for the use of a strictly limited number of police, firemen, and other essential civil defence workers who would have to remain after evacuation to protect the city. Elsewhere, refuges against radioactive fallout would be required for the general public.(27)

Early civil defence planning addressed the threat of the piloted bomber. By 1957, however, the Soviet Union had developed a force of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The speed of these missiles meant that there would be hardly any tactical warning. It was thought, however, that there would be adequate strategic warning because of the necessity for immense preparation by the enemy for an attack. Instead of two warnings upon which to base plans for evacuation, the civil defence organization would have only one, in effect combining Phases A and B.

ICBMs, unlike manned bombers, could not be intercepted in flight. In an attack on the United States there would be less likelihood of random air bursts over Canadian territory. Canada would only be hit by those missiles directed expressly at her major cities and perhaps by a very small number that might become erratic in flight and fall short of their target. The introduction of the ICBM, therefore, reduced the threat of widespread radioactive fallout which had been characteristic of piloted bomber attack.

The advent of the ICBM did not greatly affect evacuation policy. The aim of civil defence was still to evacuate major target areas if possible. Even if warning times were reduced, it would be extremely unlikely that the enemy would be able to launch an ICBM attack in which the missiles were timed to arrive simultaneously at all selected targets. Inevitably, priority targets would have to be selected and attacked first, and this would allow further warning time to those in secondary targets. In a global war, which it was assumed any nuclear war would be, the enemy was not likely to regard any targets in Canada as primary objectives for nuclear attack.(28)

3 *Civil Defence Services*

Although the extent and intensity of the threat of nuclear war increased throughout the 1950s, the essence of civil defence services remained the same. The Civil Defence Division within the Department of National Health and Welfare remained responsible for establishing a warning and communication system, for studying the transportation needs and problems associated with civil defence, for training workers and instructors, for planning and studying health services, and for planning and studying welfare services.

i Warning and Communications

The Civil Defence Division was responsible for provision of an advanced warning and communication system. It was composed of three elements. A telephone and teletype system provided communications between Air Defence Control Centres and Civil Defence Headquarters and between the three levels of civil defence within the country. The civil population would be warned of impending attack by sirens set up in the designated target areas. A civil defence radio network would then advise the public and keep them informed of developments before and after attack.

The telephone and teletype system was built in successive stages. By the end of the fiscal year 1952-3, civil defence officials had completed negotiations with telephone companies, allowing the installation of sufficient private and toll lines to create a national civil defence warning system. The

system consisted of direct telephone lines from Air Defence Control Centres in Canada to selected target cities (main key points) and from there by priority toll calls to other target cities (key points). In 1953-4, the system was completed by establishing direct lines into the American system and to the St. John's Newfoundland key point. Farther improvements were made in 1957-8 by provision of a direct telephone line from the Air Defence Command at St. Hubert to the government exchange at Ottawa and from there to the Civil Defence Control Centre recently established at Arnprior. At Ottawa, direct lines from the government exchange connected the Prime Minister, the Civil Defence Co-ordinator, and the RCMP. By May 1958, a national teletype system had been completed linking Civil Defence in Ottawa to civil defence headquarters in the provinces, providing a means of passing warnings from Federal Civil Defence to all provinces. By the end of March 1959, a new National Attack Warning System was operational on an "engineered" basis ( i.e. it was not fully active but could be activated on short notice). It provided direct telephone lines from Air Defence Command and Federal Civil Defence to all provincial civil defence headquarters and from there to target areas. It also supplied direct telephone connection between Air Defence Control Centres to provincial civil defence headquarters.(29)

A system of warning sirens was installed in designated target areas to warn the civil population of impending attack . Specifications were developed for a siren similar to that used in Great Britain during the Second World War -- a 5 horsepower undulating 2 tone siren with local and remote control facilities. From 1952 to 1955, these sirens were manufactured in Canada and progressively installed in target areas across the country. In 1956-7, 100 more powerful 10 horsepower sirens were purchased to augment coverage in the designated target areas and 100 more were acquired the next year. In 1959, Federal Civil Defence, the Department of National Defence, and the United States Civil Defence agreed on common signals: a steady note for three to five minutes meant turn on the radio for instructions; a rising and falling note meant attack was imminent and take cover. The cost of installation, line rental, and maintenance had been shared with the provinces on a 50% basis, but late in 1957 the federal government assumed all costs.(30)

Throughout the early and mid-1950s, studies were conducted to develop a civil defence radio communications system. Plans and procedures to serve as a guide to the operation of existing services were compiled, including the integration of amateur radio services and the broadcasting industry. In 1956-7, a plan for emergency broadcasting was approved and a contract was placed for 10 transportable 1-kilowatt broadcast transmitters for full scale field trials, which were completed by May 1958. Progress continued in setting up provincial and municipal civil defence radio networks, and the problems associated with federal-provincial radio communications continued to be studied and discussed with the Department of National Defence and the Department of Transport.(31)

ii Transportation

The Federal Civil Defence Transportation Committee was formed in April 1951 under the chairmanship of a member of the staff of the Board of Transport Commissioners. Composed of representatives of the major transportation agencies, its job was to undertake a "... study of the overall transportation problems which could arise in the event of a disaster, such as the transportation of supplies, material, and personnel to back up the resources of the provinces and municipalities concerned."(32) The effectiveness of this group is difficult to judge from the departmental annual reports. Since it met only once in the first nine months of fiscal 1952-3, its initial activities may have been limited.

The Committee recommended the appointment of a transportation officer and then of a Director of Transportation. These positions were filled in January 1953 and June 1954 respectively. There was also an early initiative to encourage the enrolment of motor vehicles for civil defence. By 1954 50,000 vehicle registration stickers had been issued to the provinces to be placed on vehicles registered for use in a national emergency. During subsequent years, national transportation of all types (air, water, rail, motor) remained under continuous study and the ability of the transportation system to meet anticipated emergency requirements was continually assessed. The provinces were

encouraged to incorporate all fields of transportation into their civil defence operational plans. Transportation forums met regularly with national transportation associations and close liaison was maintained with the United States Federal Civil Defence Section through the exchange of information and knowledge.(33)

iii Training

The federal civil defence training program began in 1951 for provincial and local officials as well as for certain federal government employees. From 1951 to 31 March 1959, over 17,500 men and women were trained in various civil defence subjects under federal auspices. At the same time, the provinces set up their own civil defence schools with federal encouragement and assistance. By 1 January 1959, 248,850 persons had been trained for civil defence work in provincial training schools. (34)

From 1951 until January 1954, federal courses were given at the Federal Civil Defence Staff College in Ottawa. Each province was allocated a certain number of vacancies and the provincial authorities would determine which candidates would attend. As well as staff forums and courses for instructors held in Ottawa, special courses were given in Atomic/Biological/Chemical (ABC) Warfare Defence at Camp Borden. Each year some selected personnel attended courses at the United States Civil Defence Staff College and at the United Kingdom Civil Defence College. The federal government paid for all transportation costs and living expenses of candidates attending these courses.

When the Canadian Civil Defence College opened at Arnprior, near Ottawa, in January 1954, the capacity of the federal government to train civil defence workers increased immensely.(35) This college was designed to accommodate about 2,000 students a year, but it usually took in more than that number. The College was established:

- to train key Civil Defence personnel in the development of civil defence organization, plans, and operations;
- to train instructors for local civil defence authorities; and
- to conduct research in proposed civil defence equipment and operational procedures.(36)

Standard courses were designed and set up to meet Canadian requirements and, from time to time, special courses were organized. For example, in 1958-9, the types of courses given were:

- Staff Courses (including all phases of Civil Defence Orientation, Planning and Operations);
- Indoctrination Courses in Civil Defence for Doctors, Dentists, and Nurses;
- Welfare Courses in Organization, Emergency Feeding, Emergency Lodging, Personal Services, and Registration and Enquiry;
- Indoctrination Conference of Mayors and Reeves;
- Forums in Communication and Engineering;
- Radiological Defence Courses;
- Techniques of Instruction Courses; and
- Rescue Instructors Courses.(37)

The College maintained contact with civil defence establishments in the United Kingdom, the United States, and European countries, and there was frequent and free interchange of ideas and personnel. (38)

It should also be remembered that a certain amount of training was done by outside agencies. In 1954-5, the St. John Ambulance Association recruited and trained enough civil defence workers to staff 450 First Aid Stations. It also provided first aid instruction to other volunteers such as rescue workers, firemen, police officers, and wardens. By the end of March 1955, the St. John Ambulance Association had trained 10,970 volunteers in first aid. In addition, the Department of Veterans

Affairs operated schools for training Nurses' Assistants to meet civil defence requirements in the event of a major disaster, and it was reimbursed for this service.(39)

A number of civil defence exercises (Alert II and III and Co-operation I and II) were conducted between 1955 and 1958. All of the provinces participated in these exercises to develop their own operational procedures and to train Control Centre personnel. Alert II and III were held in conjunction with the United States civil defence authorities, while Co-operation I and II were all-Canadian exercises. As well in 1956-7, the Federal Control Centre was activated for exercises Federal I and II to train federal civil defence employees and certain members of the Civil service Civil Defence organization in Control Centre duties.(40)

iv Health Services

The Civil Defence Health Planning Group was given the responsibility to initiate and co-ordinate health services planning at the federal level; to act as health advisers to the federal Civil Defence Co-ordinator and to be responsible for developing a general pattern for Civil Defence Health Services for Canada to serve as a guide for health services planning at all levels.(41)

Its major accomplishments over the next eight years included procurement and stockpiling of health and medical supplies, training, and preparing hospitals for war emergencies.

Health Services compiled lists of medical supplies and equipment to be purchased and stored strategically for operational use of first-aid stations, hospitals, laboratories, and other essential health services in time of war. As early as 1951-2, a yearly program began to acquire and stockpile the supplies and equipment identified. Great progress was made in 1954-5 when $4 million was placed in orders and $3 million delivered. Although the development of thermonuclear weapons with higher yields of radioactivity necessitated changes in the nature of the supplies to be purchased, it did not essentially change the program. With increasing international tensions, the purchase and stockpiling program was accelerated in 1957; by 1959 $11 million had been authorized and supplies valued at $6 million had been received into storage.(42)

In 1952, courses in ABC (Atomic/Biological/Chemical) warfare were held at Camp Borden and in Montréal for doctors selected by provincial health services authorities. At the same time, more than 1,300 nurse instructors were trained in the nursing aspects of ABC warfare. They in turn passed their knowledge on to 20,00 graduate nurses across the country. As well, civil defence nursing was made part of the student nursing curriculum in five provinces. In 1954-5, a Special Weapons Section was added to Health Services Branch to develop a program of research, planning, and training for defence against the effects of ABC warfare. Over the next years, studies were undertaken on the hazards of radioactive fallout and on methods of adequately reporting communicable diseases during wartime.(43)

Health Services was responsible for preparing hospitals and their staffs to deal with war emergencies. Beginning in 1954, a series of Hospital Disaster Planning Institutes were held regionally across Canada. Their purpose was to indoctrinate administrators, chiefs of surgery, and directors of nursing in civil defence planning. Techniques were developed to evacuate hospitals and plans were made to provide alternate hospital facilities, including the design of a portable 200-bed improvised hospital. By 1959, more than two-thirds of the 477 public general hospitals contacted reported that they had prepared or were preparing disaster plans.(44)

v Welfare Services

Immediately after the transfer of responsibility for Civil Defence to the Department of National Health and Welfare, a Civil Defence Welfare Section was established, an administration officer for the section was appointed, and a Welfare Advisory Committee was established. Welfare services included such functions as evacuation and reception, registration and inquiry, emergency feeding,

emergency lodging, emergency clothing, and personal services such as counselling.

From 1951 to 1954, the Welfare Planning Section energetically pursued its mandate in a number of different ways. It prepared and conducted courses on Civil Defence Welfare Services generally and on specific topics. These included subjects such as emergency feeding, emergency clothing, and emergency lodging. As well as giving these courses, it aided the provincial authorities in providing their own training courses in welfare services. It continued to produce a steady stream of pamphlets, brochures, guides, and manuals on the various aspects of Civil Defence Welfare Services as instructional aids and guides for provincial and local organizations. Taking advantage of newer technology, the Welfare Planning Section also produced filmstrips on emergency feeding and emergency clothing. In 1954 it released a civil defence welfare film, "the Homeless Ones", which received considerable favourable comment.

During 1952-3, the Welfare Planning Section held a number of conferences to involve officials at the local level. One of these was a conference for directors of municipal civil defence welfare services, held to discuss general welfare problems. Other conferences considered emergency feeding and emergency clothing. The following year, two forums were convened for key personnel of 30 national organizations and agencies, such as the Salvation Army, the I.O.D.E., the Catholic Women's League, and the Federated Women's Institutes, which it was hoped would provide volunteer services. As a result of the meetings, many of these organizations appointed provincial or municipal civil defence liaison officers.

While these activities were going on, Canadian civil defence welfare officials maintained continuing liaison with parallel organizations in the United Kingdom and the United States. Officials of the three countries also made reciprocal visits, enabling Canadian civil defence officials to keep abreast of current developments in civil defence welfare services.(45)

The emphasis in Civil Defence Welfare Group planning changed in 1955-6. In 1954, the Americans had released data on the effects of higher yield thermonuclear weapons (the H-bomb), especially the possibility of radioactive fallout being carried by the prevailing winds over extensive areas. It became evident that large scale evacuation of the 13 Canadian urban areas designated as principal targets would be necessary in the future. Consequently, the emphasis shifted to the planning of welfare services in evacuation reception areas. Three new staff members were added to the section to accommodate the demands of the new program. Staff participated in evacuation exercises in the United States, discussions were held on evacuation and reception in various centres in Canada, and planning began on reception plans in some rural areas.(46)

From 1957 to 1959, the Welfare Planning Group concentrated upon the completion of priority programs and the development of emergency operational procedures. Registration and Inquiry kits were produced and made available to the provinces in 1957, and research on a 3 day survival food kit was completed. During 1958, a public education initiative was undertaken. It sought to prepare the public to survive on their own food resources for the first seven days of an emergency. A pamphlet entitled *Your Evacuation Pack* was prepared and distributed. Policy and procedures on emergency clothing were completed and an instructional manual was produced. Surveys were carried out and reception plans were developed in Nova Scotia and Ontario.(47)

Federal officials, who were very active during these years, often complained that the provinces were slow in organizing welfare.(48) By the end of the fiscal year 1959, considerable progress had been made, however. Five provinces (Nova Scotia, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia) had directors of Welfare Services, New Brunswick had a part-time director, and the remaining four provinces were actively seeking means of organizing the service. As a result of this progress it was possible in 1959, for the first time, to hold a joint Federal/Provincial Welfare Conference to provide the basis for inaugurating closer joint planning and training -- some eight years after the beginning of work on welfare services!(49)

4 *Federal-Provincial Cooperation*

i Financial Assistance Program

The federal Civil Defence Financial Assistance Program was authorized in April 1952 to assist the provinces in developing and strengthening their civil defence plans. This assistance was directed primarily towards the provision of services, either the improvement and extension of those existing or the provision of new ones. Projects were to be related to, or provide for:

(i) organization, administration, and training expenditures, including training exercises;

(ii) equipment and clothing, including uniforms required for administration, training and operations for which there is normally no peacetime use other than for Civil Defence;

(iii) construction and alteration for civil defence purposes;

(iv) operational equipment having a peacetime use.

During 1956-7, the federal government extended the criteria to include projects having a peacetime use.

Initially, the federal government set aside $1,400,000 annually for the program; in 1954-5, this amount was increased to $2,000,000. The proportion of the total sum available to any province was calculated on a formula based upon the relative distribution of population in target and non-target areas. Provincial governments qualified for their share of the grant by sharing one half of the cost of specific projects, mutually agreed to. In 1954-5, this formula was made more flexible. The federal government agreed to contribute 25 percent of the cost of certain classifications of projects, irrespective of whether the provincial government contributed funds. If the province did contribute funds, the federal government agreed to match the provincial contribution dollar for dollar to a maximum contribution of 50 percent. In March 1959, the Prime Minister announced that henceforth the federal government would raise its contribution to approved projects from 50 to 75 percent on provincial projects and from 25 to 50 percent on municipal ones.

During 1952-3, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Newfoundland took advantage of the Financial Assistance Program. Nova Scotia joined during 1953-4 and New Brunswick the next year. The increased flexibility in the funding formula encouraged a number of Ontario municipalities to apply for funds in 1954-5. Ontario began to participate in 1955-6 and Prince Edward Island first applied in 1958-9. Quebec never did participate in the program although a number of Quebec municipalities received funds.

From 1952 to 1959 federal yearly contributions to the Financial Assistance Program almost quadrupled, from $250,000 to over $1,000,000. Annual figures were:

1952-3 $ 250,000

1953-4 $ 322,000

1954-5 $ 415,825

1955-6 $ 646,865

1956-7 $ 813,685

1957-8 $ 967,896

1958-9 $1,050,342(50)

ii Hose-Coupling Standardization

While civil defence was still the responsibility of the Department of National Defence, the federal government had initiated a program of hose-coupling standardization with the aim of increasing the interchangeability of fire-fighting equipment.(51) Initially, Ottawa agreed to pay one-third of the cost of new hose couplings only. Subsequent discussions with the provinces resulted in an extension of the offer to include one-third of the total cost of standardization of hose couplings. During 1951-2, Alberta and Ontario accepted the offer and British Columbia joined the program the following year. Ontario completed standardization during 1954-5, Alberta during 1955-6, and British Columbia in the summer of 1957. The federal government contributed $367,000 to Ontario, $60,000 to Alberta, and $92,000 to British Columbia. No other provinces took up the federal offer.(52)

iii Supplies and Equipment

When responsibility passed from the Department of National Defence to the Department of National Health and Welfare in February 1951, the federal government assumed responsibility for the provision of certain equipment and training aids free of charge. These included

- provision of radiological and technical instruments, respirators and special protective clothing for designated civil defence workers in selected areas, in connection with atomic, bacteriological and chemical warfare defence;
- provision of stirrup pumps and auxiliary pumps for training purposes; and
- provision of training aids, manuals and badges for civil defence workers.(53)

Under this program, the federal government provided a great variety of equipment between 1951 to 1959. Among the items were blankets, rubber boots and coats, coveralls, steel helmets, stretchers, reconnaissance ABC kits, pyrotechnic devices, first aid training kits, training films, and fully equipped fire fighting and rescue vehicles.(54) Federal government expenditures on supplies and equipment from 1 April 1951 to 31 March 1959 totaled $1,762,183. This was divided among the provinces as follows:

British Columbia $318,856

Alberta $173,479

Saskatchewan $ 76,141

Manitoba $117,952

Ontario $535,062

Quebec $256,666

New Brunswick $ 61,429

Nova Scotia $113,254

Prince Edward Island $ 5,291

Newfoundland $ 44,047(55)

iv Compensation Agreements

As a means of stimulating recruiting in the more hazardous aspects of civil defence work, the federal government obtained the authority to enter into special agreements with the provinces during 1952-3.

These arrangements permitted compensation for injury or death to an enrolled civil defence worker during civil defence training in peacetime to be shared on a 50-50 basis by the two levels of government.(56) Over the next six years, agreements were negotiated with all of the provinces, except Prince Edward Island and Quebec.(57) On 9 January 1959, authority was granted to extend the agreements to cover enrolled civil defence workers while engaged in operations arising out of a natural disaster.(58)

## IV Conclusion

For over ten years the federal government, with its provincial and municipal counterparts, had worked to set up a national civil defence organization in Canada designed to protect the civil population in time of war. Relying largely on the experience of ARP in the Second World War, federal officials planned the civil defence organization within the Department of National Defence from 1948 to 1951. As in the Second World War, the federal government was to assume a planning and coordinating role, with responsibilities for training, research, and some financing. Civil defence services would be provided through the extension of the function of existing agencies and would be carried out largely by volunteers.

In 1951, responsibility for implementing the civil defence program was transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare. That department carried out a great deal of planning and research, published various brochures, pamphlets, guides, and manuals, and trained many civil defence volunteers. A great deal of health and medical equipment was stockpiled at sites across the country. Communication and attack warning systems were installed in designated target areas. The federal government aided the provinces and municipalities in their civil defence work through a financial assistance program. A skeleton organization from the federal government to the provincial government to local organizations was put in place, ready to expand if a crisis occurred. By 1957, however, unsettling winds were blowing with the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the ICBM. Civil defence was no longer only about saving people; it now had to concern itself with national survival. While the Department of National Health and Welfare retained its lead role until 1959, other forces, both international and national, and new players would force a reassessment and reorganization of civil defence in Canada.

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**Endnotes**

1. National Archives [henceforth NA], RG 29, Records of the Department of National Health and Welfare, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 1, memo, by Brigadier General A. Ross, "Civil Defence in relation to National Defence in time of Peace", [Aug. 1944]; memo, "Civil Defence", enclosed in Ross to Worthington, 27 Nov. 1948.

2. Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), pp. 225-32.

3. In the original typescript, the compiler refers to the CDRB as the Civil Defence Review Board, but no record of such a body has been found. CDRB means Chairman of the Defence Research Board. A copy of the report has not been located.

4. NA, RG 2, Records of the Privy Council Office, Vol. 2024, PC 29/4855, 23 Oct. 1948.

5. NA, RG 29, Vol. 639, File 100-1-10, draft order-in-council, 7 Oct. 1948.

6. NA, RG 29, Vol. 677, File 108-4-1, Vol. 1, "Terms of Reference for the Co-Ordinator of Civil Defence," [Jan. 1949].

7. NA, RG 29, Vol. 639, File S-100-1-10A, handwritten notes of dates of visits on a draft letter to premiers, attached to memo, Minister of National Defence to Worthington, 23 March 1950.

8. NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 1, "Report on General Worthington's Discussions with Brigadier General A. Ross Regina Saskatchewan", [17 Dec. 1948].

9. A report of Worthington's meeting with the premiers in November and December has not been found.

10. NA, RG 29, Vol. 639, File S-100-1-10A, Appendix A, 21 March 1950, attached to memo, Minister of National Defence to Worthington, 23 March 1950.

11. NA, RG 29, Vol. 639, File S-100-1-10A, Appendix B, 21 March 1950, attached to memo, Minister of National Defence to Worthington, 23 March 1950.

12. NA, RG 29, Vol. 677, File 108-4-1, Vol. 1, Worthington to Minister of National Defence and attachment, 17 March 1949.

13. NA, RG 29, Vol. 677, File 108-4-1, Vol. 1, Heeney to Minister of National Defence, 8 April 1949; Worthington to Robertson, 25 April 1949; Canada, Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1950, p. 79.

14. Worthington's report to the War Book Committee has not been found, but his ideas were contained in his memo of 17 March 1949. See above, fn 11.

15. Canada, Report of the Department [National Defence] for the Fiscal Year ending March 31 1949, p. 73; Canada, Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1950, p.79.

16. NA, RG 29, Vol. 432, File 580-5-12, "Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1950-1951."

17. NA, RG 2, Vol. 2099, PC 985, 23 Feb. 1951.

18. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 100; ...ended March 31, 1956, p. 141; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 147.

19. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1955, p. 126.

20. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1956, pp. 139-40.

21. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1956, p. 141.

22. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 127.

23. These cities were selected in 1949. See NA, RG 29, Vol. 718, File 112-C8, Worthington to Minister of National Defence, 27 Oct. 1949.

24. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 99.

25. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. VII, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), p. 6616.

26. NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p.2.

27. Emergency Measures Organization (?), Policy File 1.04, a staff paper dated Dec. 1957,

"Organization of Civil Defence"; a staff paper dated Jan. 1957(? 1958), cited in Susan McCoy, "Civil Defence in Canada: 1951-1959", p. 19. Staff paper has not been found.

28. NA, RG 29 (?), File 108-4-2, Planning and Operations Circular #4/57, "Civil Defence and the ICBM", Sept. 1957., cited in McCoy, op. cit., p. 20. Circular has not been found.

29. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 105; ...ended March 31, 1953, p. 93; ...ended March 31, 1954, p. 120;...ended March 31, 1958, p. 126; ...ended March 31, 1959, p.125; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, pp. 8-9.

30. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 105; ...ended March 31, 1953, p. 93; ...ended March 31, 1954, p. 120;...ended March 31, 1955, p. 130; ...ended March 31, 1957, p.144; ...ended March 31, 1958, p. 126; ...ended March 31, 1959, pp. 123, 126; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 9.

31. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 105; ...ended March 31, 1953, p.94; ...ended March 31, 1954, p.120; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 144; ...ended March 31, 1958, p. 126; ...ended March 31, 1959, pp. 125-6; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 9.

32. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p.105.

33. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 105; ...ended March 31, 1953, p.94; ...ended March 31, 1954, p.121; ...ended March 31, 1956, p. 139; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 144; ...ended March 31, 1958, p. 126; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 13.

34. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 128.

35. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1954, p. 117.

36. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1957, p. 149

37. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 128.

38. NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, pp. 13-14.

39. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1955, p. 129.

40. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1956, p. 142; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 148; ...ended March 31,1958, p. 128; ...ended March 31, 1959, p. 129; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 11.

41. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year

ended March 31, 1952, p. 104.

42. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 104; ...ended March 31, 1955, p. 132; ...ended March 31, 1957, p.147;...ended March 31, 1959, p. 127.

43. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1953, p. 92; ...ended March 31, 1954, p. 119; ...ended March 31, 1955, p.127;...ended March 31, 1956, p. 140; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 145.

44. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1955, p. 127; ...ended March 31, 1956, p. 141; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 145; ...ended March 31, 1958, p. 127; ...ended March 31, 1959, pp. 126-7; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 7.

45. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, pp. 104-5; ...ended March 31, 1953, pp. 92-3; ...ended March 31, 1954, pp. 119-20;...ended March 31, 1955, p. 128.

46. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1956, p. 140; ...ended March 31, 1957, pp. 144-5.

47. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1958, pp. 126-7; ...ended March 31, 1959, pp. 126.

48. NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 8.

49. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 126.

50. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1953, p.90; ...ended March 31, 1954, p. 117; ...ended March 31,1955, p. 131; ...ended March 31, 1956, pp. 137-8; ...ended March 31, 1957, pp. 140-142; ...ended March 31, 1958, pp. 123-4; ...ended March 31, 1959, pp. 121-2.

51. Canada, Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1950, p. 79.

52. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 101; ...ended March 31, 1953, p. 90; ...ended March 31,1955, p. 131; ...ended March 31, 1956, p. 138; ...ended March 31, 1957, p. 142; ...ended March 31, 1958, p. 124.

53. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, p. 98.

54. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1952, pp. 103-4; ...ended March 31, 1953, p. 91 ...ended March 31,1954, p. 118; ...ended March 31, 1955, p. 130.

55. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 123.

56. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1953, p. 90; NA, RG 29, Vol. 650, File 102-1-1, Vol. 2, attachment to memo, Hatton to Minister of National Health and Welfare, 11 Oct. 1957, p. 2. .

57. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1958, p. 123.

58. Canada, Annual Report of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1959, p. 121.

# Chapter II

# The Rise and Fall of the Emergency Measures Organization: 1957-1968

## I Creation of the Emergency Measures Organization

### 1 *Civil Defence Reassessed*

In the decade following the Second World War, the *Government War Book* was revised, up-dating the contingency plans of federal government departments and agencies in the event of war. At the same time the federal government established a Civil Defence planning and training organization, first in the Department of National Defence and then in the Department of National Health and Welfare. Its purpose was to coordinate civil defence planning across the country. After 1954, however, the Liberal government began to worry about the efficacy of the civil defence program. The development of the hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union and its capability of delivering thermonuclear weapons to the heart of North America by long range bombers and then by ICBMs heightened government fears. Revelation that Canada's population was endangered by wind-borne radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions even if Canadian targets were not directly attacked further emphasized the horrific danger of nuclear war. At a time when the military of both the United States and Canada were actively organizing the air defence of North America, civil defence planning seemed out of balance with its military counterpart.

Consequently in 1956, the federal government set up of an Interdepartmental Working Group on War Measures, reporting through the War Book Committee, to consider the whole problem of civilian preparations for a nuclear war. Its terms of reference were:

> 1. Generally, to undertake a preliminary review of the civil measures that appear necessary to prepare for war under the conditions now anticipated should a major war break out.
>
> 2. Specifically,
>
> (a) To isolate in as much detail as possible the problems that will have to be solved to meet the following possible contingencies of a nuclear war:
>
> (i) Evacuation of thirteen major urban areas;
>
> (ii) Destruction of some of these and/or other areas;
>
> (iii) Contamination of some of these and/or other areas by radioactive fall- out.
>
> (b) To consider whether any changes should be made in the present inter-governmental division of responsibility for civil defence and decide on the precise boundaries of Civil Defence's responsibilities as an agency.
>
> (c) To suggest outlines of possible solutions to the problems selected under (a) above.
>
> (d) To suggest forms of organization to continue the study of these problems to the point where concrete and properly co-ordinated plans will emerge.(1)

The Working Group submitted its report in January 1957.

In its assessment of the status of civil defence and civil emergency planning, the

Working Group took into account certain general assumptions concerning the characteristics of a future major war, considering both the nature and implications of the threat. It was assumed that nuclear weapons of all sizes would be used in another major war, with little or no warning of impending attack on North America. Such a war, it was anticipated, would be characterized by an initial stage lasting a few days or weeks of maximum destruction. This would be followed by a second phase of indeterminate length, the nature of which would depend on the outcome of the initial nuclear exchange. Canada would have to expect random explosions of nuclear weapons and probably also deliberate attack on one or more of her major cities. Such a threat would imply the evacuation of some major Canadian urban areas as soon as war started, as well as widespread destruction, and contamination by radioactive fallout. Provision would therefore have to be made for both the maintenance of government authority (to ensure the survival of Canada as a nation) and for civil defence (to ensure the survival of the Canadian population).

Planning for the maintenance of government authority considered communications, law and order, legal problems, and essential records. It also included provision for emergency government headquarters at the federal, provincial (regional), and local (sector) levels. Because some governments were located in areas liable to deliberate attack (and therefore subject to evacuation), the Working Group pointed out:

> If provision is not made in peacetime for emergency re-location sites, these governments may be unable to function when war starts. There will be no time then to improvise the necessary facilities outside the present capitals....It is therefore considered that steps should be taken now to develop an emergency government organization comprising a federal emergency headquarters in the vicinity of Ottawa, a regional emergency headquarters in each province that would include both a federal and provincial component as well as an army component, and possibly a number of sector headquarters in each province. The various headquarters would be interconnected by an integrated, government communications network so designed as to permit the exercise of either decentralized or centralized control.(2)

It also recommended that, since the federal government would have to bear the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of war, it should also bear the cost of both regional and federal headquarters. The cost of sector headquarters should be divided in proportion to the extent to which provincial and municipal authorities wished to share in their creation and peacetime control. Such an arrangement would ensure that there would be financial obligations to match provincial and municipal responsibility for peacetime decisions.

The Working Group recognized that public support for such a program was essential. Consensus could only be obtained if the Government created it.

> The implication is unavoidable that if the Government approves the programme, a vigorous public education campaign should be initiated to convince people of the dangers of our situation, and at an appropriate time a general enabling statute would be needed. It seems clear, also, that a special federal agency will have to be formed to provide direction and coordination for the program, to give it the necessary momentum, and to take charge of the physical preparation of the federal emergency headquarters. This will be referred to as the Emergency Measures Organization.(3)

The Working Group also reviewed the status of the civil defence program, concluding that, however notable its achievements to date, much more had to be done: "There does not appear to exist in any Canadian city a Civil Defence organization capable at present of meeting effectively the challenge of nuclear warfare." The principal weaknesses were seen to be:

> (a) The dependence of the federal authorities on persuasion to get things done at the

> provincial and local levels.
>
> (b) The inability, or the reluctance, of provincial and/or municipal authorities to provide funds for civil defence purposes.
>
> (c) The uneven progress and the lack of uniformity in civil defence preparations among even those provinces and municipalities that have made some effort in this direction.
>
> (d) The stand taken by at least one province [Quebec] and certain municipalities that civil defence is exclusively a federal responsibility, resulting in almost a complete lack of preparation in these places.(4)

The Working Group suggested three ways of creating an effective civil defence organization in Canada. The first was to make greater use of incentives to evoke the necessary cooperation at the provincial and local levels. The second was to arrange for the Federal Government to assume primary responsibility for civil defence. The third was to re-divide responsibility among the three levels of government on a functional or other mutually agreeable basis. The Working Group believed that a more determined effort should be made to make the existing system work before embarking on fundamental alterations. The government should make a full statement of the threat confronting Canada and of the consequent need for effective civil defence preparation. Federal financial assistance to provinces and municipalities should also be substantially increased. As a further consideration, the Working Group added the following advice:

> If the Federal Government initiated a vigorous programme of emergency planning within its own sphere of responsibility, this would set the necessary example. The creation of an Emergency Measures Organization, if known by the public, would for instance be a clear and practical demonstration of the Government's concern about the situation. If Civil Defence at the federal level were brought within the orbit of this agency, the impact on the public would be even greater.(5)

In stressing the need to find a way to make civil defence more effective, the Working Group pointed out that the present division of governmental responsibility had been decided upon before the days of thermonuclear weapons. Then, it was possible to think in terms of strictly community efforts in executing passive defence measures, of people taking shelter against bombs and relying on the principle of 'self-help' to see them through an emergency. Under nuclear attack, on the other hand, no community could be expected to be self sufficient, no shelter would save people within the immediate area of an explosion, and 'self-help' could have only a limited application. The Working Group emphasized that should the present policy fail to produce a national civil defence organization adequate to meet the new condition, provinces and municipalities might well conclude that such a task was entirely beyond their capabilities. In such a case, it would be necessary for the federal government to accept primary responsibility for civil defence. A province or municipality which was unable or unwilling to undertake civil defence preparations might well damage or destroy the total ability of the nation to fight back.

After considering measures for a more effective civil defence organization, the Working Group had a further suggestion to make. For peacetime purposes, Civil Defence in the Department of National Health and Welfare could well be incorporated into the proposed Emergency Measures Organization. This would potentially provide a single channel of ministerial authority for the development of emergency planning policy and overall plans. It would also facilitate the coordination of present and future plans with those of agencies responsible for transportation, food distribution, manpower mobilization, and so forth. Moreover, if Civil Defence was to function in wartime as an integral part of the emergency government structure, it should be a peacetime component of the agency charged with the responsibility of developing the wartime

organization to avoid confusion in the moment of crisis. The Working Group also recommended that, as emergency planning in fields other than civil defence developed, responsibility should be transferred from Civil Defence to other government agencies for such things as medical and hospital services, public health and sanitary measures, and welfare services for the billeting, shelter, feeding, and protection of evacuees. This would restrict Civil Defence to the following functions:

(a) Warning of attacks and instructions for leaving dangerous areas.

(b) Management of the movement of persons from dangerous areas to reception areas.

(c) Preparation of the public for evacuation and relocation.

(d) Firefighting.

(e) Rescue operations to the extent radiation hazards make this possible.

(f) Detection and monitoring of radiation hazards and prediction of fall-out dangers.

(g) Decontamination.

(h) Treatment of casualties (but not necessarily the operation of emergency hospitals handle all medical requirements during the emergency period).

(i) Provision of shelters for the public at large and for Civil Defence forces (but not for emergency government headquarters).(6)

In its review of departmental emergency planning, the Working Group found evidence of conflict and duplication in the arrangements of many government departments. This, in fact, was one of the strongest reasons for proposing the establishment of an Emergency Measures Organization. An agency of this kind would bring unresolved questions to the attention of the inter-departmental emergency measures committee, and ensure that departmental planning was in harmony with the plans and measures adopted by related departments and with the larger conception of civil emergency arrangements.

The Working Group concluded its report with a detailed proposal for the Emergency Measures Organization, assigning as special functions:

(a) Initiation of an overall federal programme of emergency planning;

(b) Stimulation and co-ordination of planning within departments of government;

(c) Development of an emergency government organization with regional and local sub-divisions as required;

(d) Preparation of an emergency headquarters for the Federal Government;

(e) Preparation, in conjunction with the provinces, of regional emergency headquarters;

(f) Planning of the required communications in such a way as to procure the necessary co-ordination for all services;

(g) Arranging with departments for the recruiting of an "Executive Reserve";

(h) Responsibility for planning, in connection with a major war, in areas not specifically the responsibility of any existing department;

(i) Development of a system for coordinating damage-intelligence;

(j) Liaison, as appropriate, with emergency planning organizations in the provinces and other countries.(7)

In peacetime, EMO would coordinate departmental planning in preparation for nuclear war. In the event of war, its principal operating responsibility would be civil defence, although it would also form part of the emergency government structure. The Working Group made it clear, however, that the Emergency Measures Organization would not be an entity which would take away responsibility from existing departments:

> The creation of an Emergency Measures Organization is altogether consistent with retention of responsibility by the various departments of government....Although the organization envisaged will be a working entity going beyond anything in the nature of a coordinating committee, and will have certain operating functions, its principal purpose will be to aid departments of government to further their own internal emergency planning. It will give the departments concerned the general assumptions, kept up-to-date, against which they should make plans and develop programmes. The Emergency Measures Organization will, by working in close liaison with the departments, ensure that their planning and programmes are in focus with the single objective, how best to prepare civilians for a possible nuclear war.(8)

2 *The Creation of the Emergency Measures Organization*

The Working Group's principal recommendation that a central coordinating agency be constituted, preferably responsible to the Prime Minister, was accepted by the Liberal Cabinet in April 1957, then subsequently by the new Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker. In June, an agency known as the Emergency Measures Organization was set up in the Privy Council Office with R. B. Curry as its first director. The new organization was given a number of specific assignments:

> (a) planning for the continuity of government in wartime;
>
> (b) revision of the War Book (an over-all statement of governmental emergency plans);
>
> (c) planning for the general control of communications in wartime;
>
> (d) planning for the wartime control of road transport; and
>
> (e) assuming responsibilities for civilian emergency planning in NATO.

At the same time, EMO was also assigned the general function of stimulating and coordinating emergency planning among the departments and agencies of the Canadian government. To carry out this assignment, it formed an interdepartmental committee to ensure appropriate planning within individual departments. Bridges had to be built between the civilian departments as well as the Department of National Defence and Civil Defence which remained within the Department of National Health and Welfare.(9)

In effect, there were now two planning agencies concerned with civil defence -- EMO in the Privy Council Office with responsibility for continuity of government and overall planning coordination, and Civil Defence in National Health and Welfare with responsibility for the well-being and survival of the Canadian people following a nuclear attack. This arrangement might have worked had Worthington remained as Co-ordinator of Civil Defence. But Worthington retired in September 1957, and his successor soon began to argue with the Privy Council Office.(10) Before a final decision on the future of the two agencies was made, a further study of civil defence was undertaken by Lieutenant General Howard D. Graham, who had just retired as Chief of the General Staff. In 1958, Graham toured the country and was appalled to find that the provincial political leaders and the general public knew little about civil defence. Moreover, he observed that there was no coordination of provincial planning. He also came to the conclusion that mass evacuation was impractical and unacceptable to the population. In the end, Graham recommended that the federal government should accept full responsibility for, and bear the full cost of, civil defence. The responsibility

should lie with the Department of National Defence. Graham's report was dated 31 December 1958 but it was not delivered until mid-January 1959.(11)

On 23 March 1959, the Prime Minister, John G. Diefenbaker, announced in the House of Commons that the government had reviewed the arrangement of responsibility for civil defence tasks in the light of the Graham Report and other studies by military and civilian officers, and that

> the government proposes to transfer certain of the responsibilities for civil defence functions insofar as the dominion is concerned, and to offer to assume directly certain responsibilities hitherto assumed by the provinces and the municipalities.

The Prime Minister explained that the proposed change meant that the Army would undertake responsibility for certain technical civil defence functions which previously had been carried out by provincial and municipal civil defence organizations. These tasks were to include warning of attack, the location and monitoring of explosions and radioactive fallout, the assessment of damaged areas, the decontamination and clearing of such areas, and the rescue of the injured in such areas. The provinces were to retain direct responsibility for medical and hospital services, public health measures, emergency billeting and feeding, and other welfare services, but they would be assisted by increased financial and technical assistance from the federal Department of National Health and Welfare. Federal aid for approved provincial and local civil defence projects was raised from 50 to 75 percent under the Financial Assistance Program. The Prime Minister indicated that the federal government would permit civil defence personnel and facilities to be used to meet the humanitarian requirements of peacetime disasters as well. The effect of this rearrangement of civil defence functions on the provinces was to lessen their responsibility for technical tasks (to be assumed by the Army) and to increase considerably their responsibility for health and welfare services.

The Emergency Measures Organization would coordinate the work of other departments and agencies for civil defence as it was already doing for continuity of government. EMO would undertake any work that was not the responsibility of other departments and assume general responsibility for relations with provincial authorities.(12) What the Prime Minister did not make explicit was that the Civil Defence organization in the Department of National Health and Welfare was abolished although, as indicated above, the department retained civil defence responsibilities for medical and welfare service planning. EMO had won the conflict between the two civil defence agencies.(13)

These changes, outlined by the Prime Minister, were incorporated in the Order-in Council, PC 1959-656.(14) A Dominion-Provincial Conference on civil defence arrangements was subsequently held in Ottawa in April and then in October 1959, and the provinces agreed to accept their new responsibilities.

In March 1959, the federal government's general attitude to civil defence was expressed by the Prime Minister in his statement to the House of Commons:

> I should like to take this opportunity to emphasize that this government believes that civil measures to prepare for the possibility of nuclear war must be taken as seriously as are military measures. Civil defence can serve a deterrent purpose by demonstrating to a potential aggressor that Canada is determined to survive even a nuclear war and carry on as an organized society and united nation in the face of the utmost perils and hardships.(15)

The government's decision to alter the structure and direction of civil emergency planning was to have far reaching consequences in the years to come. The Privy Council Order created a new character for civil emergency planning in that, for the first

time, programs to ensure the survival of the population were fully integrated with programs to maintain continuity of government. Emergency preparations were divided into clearly defined tasks and assigned to those levels of government and departments which could best fulfill them.

## II Civil Defence Order 1959 and the Division of Responsibilities

### 1 *Emergency Measures Organization*

Under the Prime Minister, EMO had acquired general responsibility for both civil defence and continuity of government. The new Civil Defence Order spelled out what this meant:

> a) the co-ordination of civil defence planning by departments and agencies of the Government of Canada;
>
> b) the preparation of civil defence plans in relation to matters that are not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the Government of Canada;
>
> c) assistance to provincial governments and municipalities in respect of preparation of civil defence where assistance is not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the government of Canada; and
>
> d) general liaison with other countries, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with provincial governments on matters relating to civil defence.(16)

The responsibilities of three departments were specifically outlined in the Civil Defence Order.

### 2 *Department of National Defence*

The 1959 Civil Defence Order assigned to the Canadian Army technical tasks for which it was especially suited. One of these was to provide a public warning system in case of attack. Another was to determine the location of nuclear explosions and the patterns of fallout. After an attack, the Army was responsible for assessing damage and casualties and, along with local agencies, for controlling, directing, and carrying out rescue operations of the injured and trapped, repair and maintenance of essential services, and supporting provincial and municipal authorities in maintaining law and order.(17) In addition, the Army agreed to construct the central and regional emergency government headquarters.

There were two aspects of public warning. The first was the necessity to relay tactical warning of nuclear attack. Communications stretched from NORAD to National Defence Headquarters to the operational centres set up in each province which were responsible for coordinating the local civil defence efforts. To accomplish this task, the Army developed a national teletype network, the National Survival Attack Warning System. The second was the need to warn the public directly. It was decided to continue to use sirens for this purpose.(18) By 1960, approximately 350 sirens had been installed in Canadian cities. The Army installed another 1,360 during the next two years. By then, all potential target cities had an operational warning system which relayed the information received to provincial radio networks, and they in turn broadcast warnings and other information to the public. By 1962, the warning systems were in place and manned around-the-clock.

To determine the location of nuclear explosions and to monitor the patterns of fallout, the Army created the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System (NDFRS). It consisted of four elements. Nuclear Detonating Reporting Posts were set up around

potential target cities. Farther afield, some 2000 Fallout Reporting Posts were established to record the incidence and radioactivity of fallout. The Army made plans to predict nuclear explosions and the pattern of fallout at the central and provincial warning centres. Lastly, Filter Centres were set up to monitor reports coming in from the Fallout Reporting Posts.(19)

The Army was assigned the responsibility of building facilities to house the national and provincial emergency governments which would direct the nation during and after a nuclear war. The Central Emergency Government Headquarters was built at Carp near Ottawa with a transmitting station a few miles away. Essentially a hardened concrete box of four levels, surrounded by a gravel envelope and buried in sandy soil, the Central Headquarters (irreverently referred to as the Diefenbunker) was capable of withstanding a 5 megaton hydrogen bomb blast with a ground zero at 1.1 miles. After detecting a nuclear blast the building shut down automatically and became almost completely self-contained. It was capable of sustaining over 400 people for 30 days without resupply. It was to operate as an Army signal centre in peacetime. Excavation began in the summer of 1959 and the bunker was operational by December 1961.

While the federal government initially intended to build 10 regional headquarters, cost considerations reduced the number to six in 1960. They were located on Army bases at Nanaimo B.C., Penhold Alta., Shilo Man., Camp Borden Ont., Valcartier Que., and Debert N.S. Design and construction began in May 1960, and all six centres became operational between May and November 1964. In peacetime these sites were part of the Army's communication network. In wartime they would house elements of the federal and provincial governments as well as Army command and communication units. Although the other four regional headquarters were never built, temporary facilities were set up in federal buildings in Regina, Camp Gagetown, N.B., Charlottetown, and St John's.(20)

3 *Department of National Health and Welfare*

After the promulgation of Civil Defence Order 1959, the Minister of National Health and Welfare no longer retained general responsibility for civil defence. His department nevertheless continued to aide the provincial and local governments and private agencies in organizing, preparing, and operating medical and welfare services. As well, it retained control over the Canadian Civil Defence College at Arnprior.(21)

Within the Department of National Health and Welfare, the Emergency Health Services Division developed four major programs. It set up offices in federal, provincial, and local emergency government facilities. It encouraged hospitals to carry out disaster planning. It published pamphlets, brochures, and other publications to help people plan to be self-sufficient if an emergency arose. It also continued to stockpile emergency medical supplies at strategic locations. By 1963, the value of these emergency medical supplies and facilities had increased to $12 million of an authorized total of $18 million. (22)

The Emergency Welfare Services Division was responsible for planning programs for emergency clothing, lodging, and feeding of people displaced by a serious emergency as well as offering advice on registration of evacuees and providing counselling services. In keeping with the jurisdictional primacy of the provincial and local governments in these areas, the Division offered guidance and assistance to the lower levels of government in planning, organizing, and operating emergency welfare services. As in the past, the Department of National Health and Welfare continued to stress individual self-help in coping with serious emergencies.

While it would have made sense to transfer responsibility for the Canadian Civil Defence College to EMO, the college remained under the authority of the Minister of National Health and Welfare. Since the Director of EMO chaired the Interdepartmental Training Policy Committee formed in November 1959, EMO did assert some control over training policy. Membership included the College Commandant, and representatives of the Departments of National Defence and National Health and Welfare and of the RCMP. The College had two main functions. It conducted courses that both trained specialists in aspects of civil defence work and assisted those with local civil defence responsibilities. Primary among these were courses on National Survival Orientation and National Survival Operations. The College also convened conferences of mayors and other civic officials to indoctrinate them in the philosophy and practice of civil defence and emergency planning. In March 1962, the government explicitly made civil emergency training the responsibility of EMO and set up an Interdepartmental Civilian Training Committee to advise EMO on training policy.

4 *Department of Justice*

The Minister of Justice exercised his civil defence power through the RCMP. The civil defence order specified that in conjunction with the Army, the RCMP would be responsible for maintaining law and order and controlling and directing traffic for civil defence exercises and operations.(23) Since the federal force acted as provincial police in eight of the ten provinces, these duties were essentially extensions of their peacetime responsibilities. Only in Ontario and Quebec would it be necessary to ensure cooperation with provincial police. Some progress was made in 1960 when a police conference was held at Gravenhurst involving Ontario authorities. At the same time the RCMP stepped up its training program. It developed a direct liaison with the Army for survival planning and for purposes of maintaining law and order and traffic control.

5 *Other Departments*

As well as the three departments specified in the Defence Order, other federal departments were instructed to cooperate with EMO in preparing emergency plans. The Department of Transport began to prepare emergency control plans in four transportation fields: rail, air, water, and road. The Department of Defence Production, in conjunction with the departments of Trade and Commerce, Agriculture, and Fisheries, set about coordinating plans to procure food, fuel, and other essentials in the event of a national disaster. The Department of Labour and the National Employment Service began working out policy plans on manpower allocation.(24)

6 *The Role of the Provinces*

The Civil Defence Order did not, of course, assign responsibilities to provincial authorities. The federal government recognized that it had no power to do so. Although the Department of National Defence once contemplated requesting a law making civil defence mandatory, no federal cabinet minister was ever foolhardy enough to bring it forward.(25) The federal government continued to rely on persuasion and financial incentives. Accordingly a series of Federal-Provincial Conferences were held between April 1959 and December 1962 to work out the responsibilities of the provincial governments.

The provinces agreed to undertake certain wartime civil defence responsibilities:

> 1 *Preservation of law and order* and prevention of panic, by the use of their own police, municipal police, and special constables, with whatever support is necessary and feasible from the RCMP and the Armed Services at provincial request.

2 *Control of road traffic*, except in areas damaged or covered by heavy fallout, including special measures to assist in the emergency movement of people from areas likely to be attacked or affected by heavy fallout.

3 *Reception services*, including arrangements for providing accommodation, emergency feeding and other emergency supplies and welfare services for people who have lost or left their homes or who require assistance because of the breakdown of normal facilities.

4 Organization and control of *medical services*, hospitals, and public health measures.

5 Maintenance, clearance and repair of *highways*.

6 Organization of municipal and other services for the maintenance and repair of *water and sewage* systems.

7 Organization of municipal and other *fire-fighting services*, and control over and direction of these services in wartime except in damaged or heavy fallout areas, where fire-fighting services would be under the direction of the Army as part of the re-entry operation.

8 Maintenance and repair of *electrical utilities*, and the allocation of the use of electricity to meet emergency requirements.

9 *Training of civilians* as civil defence workers.(26)

Once these responsibilities were clear, each province had to put in place the proper organization to carry them out. The federal government offered advice, training, and of course, financing of approved projects. By 1963 all provinces were engaged (to varying degrees) in civil emergency planning. Emergency legislation was passed, provincial EMOs were created with tasks similar to the federal agency, part-time planners were hired, and cabinet ministers were designated responsibility for civil emergency measures.

## III EMO and its Programs

In general, EMO had two major responsibilities for civil emergency planning:

(a) Governmental arrangements, dealing with matters related to continuity of government;

(b) Public arrangements, dealing with matters related to public survival.(27)

### 1 *Continuity of Government*

To provide for the continuity of government during and after a nuclear war, EMO was given the responsibility of developing a system of decentralized government which had central, regional, and zonal elements, each of which could function independently if necessary. The central organization would consist of a small core of cabinet ministers, including the prime minister, the governor general, and senior departmental officials who would be located near Ottawa at the Central Emergency Government Headquarters. They would be supported by larger departmental elements located further afield in relocation units. During the first days of attack the emergency central government was expected to do little more than issue general policy guidance. Its next important role would be to bolster morale by providing evidence that the Canadian government continued to exist and was in control.

The country was divided into ten administrative regions each of which corresponded to a province (except Alberta which included the Yukon and Northwest Territories). Each region was to have a federal Regional Emergency Government Headquarters.

Depending on regional need, the federal staff would more or less correspond to the departments and agencies represented at the Central Headquarters. The premier, ministers and other key provincial government officials, including the lieutenant-governor, would also be present. These officials would be supported by larger groups at regional relocation units.

Beneath the regional was the zonal organization. (It was intended to have a sub-regional structure between the region and the zone in Ontario and Quebec because of their size, but it was never implemented.) The number of zones varied from about eight in the largest province to one in the smallest. The exact make-up of officials at this level was subject to negotiation between the federal government and provincial governments and seems never to have been worked out precisely. Presumably departments with essential survival functions as well as local and municipal governments would be represented. Provision was made to connect all three levels of emergency government through the emergency government communications network.

Beneath the zone were various local government headquarters and organizations. Planning at this level was entirely a local responsibility and the federal government could only persuade, lead by example, and encourage through financial assistance.(28)

Plans of course needed to be tested. In 1960 and 1961 three exercises, known by the code name TOCSIN (a tocsin is an alarm sounded on a bell), were held to test the effectiveness of the continuity of government program and to identify problems of implementation. One scholar was of the opinion that

> If an enemy attack followed a counter-force pattern against American Strategic Air Command bases, the COG [continuity of government] system as it existed between 1960 and 1963 would probably have been adequate, since damage to Canada would be less than other forms of attack.(29)

If Canadian cities or bases were targeted directly the effects would be more catastrophic.

The first TOCSIN was held on 3 May 1960. It had two general purposes. First, it was designed to test the attack warning and emergency communications system. Secondly, it was intended to check out the manning procedures at emergency government headquarters and to attempt to create the working conditions of an actual attack. The participants had three hours warning time and the exercise lasted 10 hours. It is not clear precisely what was learned by the exercise but there was some evidence that government staff was unable to work effectively in teams and that the communications became rapidly overloaded with traffic.(30) In the opinion of an anonymous official in EMO,

> The principal value of the exercise was that it brought the components of emergency government at the national and provincial together for the first time.(31)

The second TOCSIN was held on 5-6 May 1961. Similar in assumptions and purpose to the earlier exercise, it was designed to practise manning interim emergency government sites and to solve post-attack problems. Attack warning and emergency communications systems were tested, and an attempt was made to raise the consciousness of the general public about survival operations.(32) This exercise included the participation of three cabinet ministers and staff who were moved by special train from Ottawa to interim federal government headquarters at Pettawawa. Unlike TOCSIN 1960, nine Canadian cities were targeted. The conclusions of this exercise were that while the army staff in the emergency headquarters worked well, the civilians once again had trouble working productively in *ad hoc* teams. A final report stated:

> The scale of attack simulated in the EMO exercise was so heavy that little action could have been taken...to influence the battle for some days. The only role left would have been to gather information, think ahead, and plan to resume centralized control when possible.

TOCSIN 1961B, held on 13-14 November was hastily put together in response to the Berlin crisis of August and a substantial increase in Soviet nuclear testing. It was coordinated with a NORAD air defence exercise in which a missile and bomber attack was simulated on air bases, defence bases, and cities in both Canada and the United States. Direct hits and radiation fallout were postulated. Federal government participation was extensive (17 departments and agencies and six cabinet ministers). Provincial and municipal authorities participated more actively than before. Everything did not go according to plan, of course -- some sirens did not go off and the government staff did not clear Edmonton before it was destroyed by a missile. The exercise pointed out the effect of poor living conditions on staff performance and demonstrated the need for much greater interdepartmental cooperation.(33)

2 *Public Survival*

i Shelter and Evacuation Policy

Before the development of the ICBM, the North American air defence system could give a tactical warning of a manned bomber attack of about three hours. This was considered sufficient time to evacuate the main Canadian urban areas. The development of the ICBM reduced tactical warning time to 15 minutes or less, making large scale evacuation impossible, perhaps suicidal. Consequently in 1959, the government announced a new national survival policy. Although traffic plans were developed to facilitate voluntary evacuation from potential target cities (presumably during the longer strategic warning period), the government endorsed individual family fallout shelters as the main hope of survival of the population.

As a result, the federal government undertook an energetic program to encourage families to build fallout shelters. With the understanding that substantial protection from radioactive fallout could be secured at a reasonable cost of two or three hundred dollars, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation was persuaded to allow shelter financing through its loan programs. EMO published a complete range of shelter designs in its "Blueprint for Survival " series. It established a system of evaluation, approval, and registration of private and commercial designs. Despite all this effort the program was a dismal failure. The cost was manageable but still significant. Most Canadians considered that the provision of shelters was a government responsibility. Moreover, the government did not lead by example, refusing to spend large sums of money on schemes to integrate them into the Toronto subway system or the proposed Montréal Métro.(34)

Realizing the failure of its self-help shelter policy, EMO began to move toward creating public shelters by initiating a series of surveys to assess the possibility of creating adequate fallout protection in existing buildings. In 1961, the Department of Public Works surveyed 5000 federal buildings across Canada and EMO encouraged the provinces and municipalities to carry out similar surveys. The same year, the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys assessed suitable mines as potential refuges but immediately rejected them because they were too far from populated areas. By 1963, EMO had decided that a comprehensive national survey of potential fallout shelters was necessary if a credible public shelter program was to be produced.

ii Public Information

EMO was responsible for keeping the public informed about civil defence. To fulfill this mandate it sent out information to publicize the programs, coordinated the emergency information publication programs of all federal departments, and assisted the provinces and municipalities in their information initiatives. In early 1961, EMO developed its own Public Information Plan to inform the public about the effects of nuclear weapons, the plans of the government, and those actions which individuals, groups, and families could take to provide increased protection. Of note was "Blueprint for Survival", a series of six pamphlets on basement fallout shelters, blast shelters, fallout in rural areas, and steps to take to increase the chances of survival. Numerous pamphlets, leaflets, posters, and displays were made available to the public free of charge. Newspapers, radio, and television were also employed to keep the civil defence message before the public.

Late in 1961, the government approved the wartime information plan, the Emergency Public Information Service which would keep the public up to date on developments and issue warnings, instructions, and advice. The Emergency Broadcasting Plan was developed, organized, and operated by the CBC. It resulted in the formation of the Emergency Broadcasting System, a hook-up of virtually all the radio and television stations in Canada. The network was connected to the Army's Attack Warning System. The sounding of sirens was the signal for the public to listen to the radio for instructions. The plan also envisaged the presence of representatives of Canadian Press and United Press International in the Central and Regional Emergency Government Headquarters where they would be briefed on developments and be available to distribute warnings, instructions, and advice to the public.(35)

iii Financial Assistance Program

With the reorganization of civil defence responsibilities in 1959, the administration of the Financial Assistance Program to the provinces and municipalities was transferred to EMO. The federal government had inaugurated the program in 1952 to provide financial support for personnel and administration costs, supplies and equipment, training, and all the other items that arose in the course of local planning. These included communications equipment, construction costs for local emergency government headquarters, payment of fees for first aid training, purchase of protective clothing for volunteers and other emergency personnel, rescue equipment, vehicles, cost of local training exercises, and publication of local survival plans. The government increased its share of the cost of approved items from 50% to 75%. Moreover, there was now a straightforward list of items on which money could be spent which eliminated much of the delays and bickering of the past. Federal appropriations for the program increased from $4 million in fiscal 1960-1 to $4.8 million in 1962-3. At the same time, federal contributions to provincial workman's compensation programs for civil defence workers injured or killed while on duty was increased from 50% to 75%, but this was never a major expenditure.(36)

iv *International Commitments*

While most of EMO's energy was directed to its domestic civil emergency programs, it also had international commitments. Under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, Canada pledged to resist armed attack and to assist its partners in resisting aggression. In terms of emergency planning, this resulted in the appointment of the Director of EMO to the Senior Committee on Civil Emergency Planning in 1963. Canadian representatives were appointed to NATO wartime agencies dealing with such matters as international telecommunications, ocean shipping, food resources, oil resources, and other technical subjects. Several Canadian government departments and agencies were actively involved in planning in these areas. Canadian expertise made significant

contributions to the development of civil emergency planning in NATO.(37)

EMOs civil emergency arrangements with the United States have been governed by three agreements between the two countries signed on 27 March 1951, 15 November 1963, and 8 August 1967. The first agreement simply called for cooperative civil defence planning. The others called for technical consultation between Canada and the United States. Following the 1963 agreement a new committee, the United States/Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee, was constituted to study common civil emergency problems. Much planning was already proceeding on parallel lines. Emergency communication links were established between border regions. Operating procedures for reporting radiation fallout were standardized and arrangements were made by several states and provinces to implement them. Emergency radio broadcast messages were reviewed to ensure that they were consistent on both sides of the border to prevent public confusion. Contiguous states and provinces held meetings to ensure the consistency of planned operational activities. In 1964-5 a joint study considered the effects of a nuclear war on the economies of Canada and the United States. The 1967 agreement in particular required close cooperation and technical consultation in civil emergency planning in adjacent areas of Canada and the United States. The Director (or later Director General) of EMO also served as joint chairman of the United States/Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee meetings.(38)

## IV The Decline of EMO

The decline of EMO began in 1963 when it was moved out of the Privy Council Office and placed under the authority of the Minister of Defence Production. Although apparently a minor administrative move, the decision to transfer the agency reflected new forces at work in Canada and abroad. The Diefenbaker years had been a period of increasing international tension culminating in the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 when the Soviet Union and the United States appeared on the verge of nuclear war. Having approached the brink, the Soviets and the Americans backed off and began to take steps to normalize relations and reduce tension. In 1963, for example, the two powers negotiated an agreement to restrict the testing of nuclear missiles. While the danger of nuclear war remained, the likelihood began receding and as it did, so did the public perception of the need for EMO and emergency planning.

Election of a Liberal minority government in the Spring 1963 also did not bode well for EMO. Although the new prime minister, Lester Pearson, had managed to reverse Liberal policy from rejection to acceptance of nuclear weapons during the election campaign, there were many in the Liberal Party opposed to this policy. At the same time, there was a growing peace and disarmament movement in the country. EMO and emergency planning began to occupy a lower priority.

R. B. Bryce, the clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, undoubtedly recognized that Pearson and his chief ministers and advisers would have little time for EMO and emergency planning. Pearson had agreed to accept nuclear weapons while stating that he would attempt to renegotiate the commitment. Unlike Diefenbaker, he did not feel the need to have his finger in every administrative pie.(39) Among the newly appointed cabinet ministers, Bryce discovered that C. M. "Bud" Drury, Minister of Defence Production, was sympathetic to the aims of EMO. During the Second World War, Drury had risen to the rank of brigadier in the Canadian army. From 1948 to 1955, he served as deputy minister of the Department of National Defence. At the time, Civil Defence was being organized in that department and may have piqued Drury's interest.(40) Whatever the reasons, before Bryce left the Privy Council Office for the Department of Finance, he arranged for the transfer of EMO to Drury's responsibility in

June 1963. (At the same time the Canadian Civil Defence College at Arnprior was transferred from the Department of National Health and Welfare to EMO.)(41) While EMO was deemed a department, reporting directly to the minister, it was no longer at the centre of power. It had begun to lose status and prestige.

The immediate effect EMO's transfer out of the Privy Council Office was negligible. Under Drury, EMO continued the programs that had been developed under the Diefenbaker government, modifying, completing, or amplifying them. In the field of emergency communications, for example, the CBC brought its capacity for conveying public information and instruction to a 24-hour a day level. In conjunction with the Defence Research Board and with personnel from the United States and the United Kingdom, EMO developed and tested prototype shelters at Suffield, Alberta. Its research engineers were also developing dual purpose shelters which would have both a wartime and peacetime use. At the bureaucratic level, emergency legislation required by various federal departments had been prepared and was ready to be put into effect almost immediately. The Financial Assistance Program was continued, even increased in 1963-4. The emergency planning guide for municipalities was revised. As before, EMO continued to plan, coordinate, advise, train and publicize to carry out its twin mandates of public survival and continuity of government.(42)

A little more than a year after assuming responsibility for EMO, in June 1964, Drury along with the recently appointed Director of EMO, Paul Faguy, appeared before the Special Committee on Defence which was reviewing defence policy. In his remarks, Drury emphasized that his responsibilities for civil emergency planning encompassed both civil defence and continuity of government. He delineated the three aims of EMO: 1) to plan measures to assist the population to survive a nuclear war; 2) to plan for the continuity of government; and 3) to provide financial assistance to provinces and municipalities to develop their emergency services, to provide courses at the Canadian Civil Defence College, and to prepare planning guides. He went on to point out that 12 federal departments and five agencies had emergency roles and were involved in varying degrees of planning. He outlined the high priority programs that EMO had instituted to ensure public survival and continuity of government.

Once he had listed the achievements of the agency, Drury put forward an ambitious five year plan to complete the program:

> 1. Completion of the warning of attack systems, including location of nuclear detonations and fallout reporting.
>
> 2. Protection of the emergency broadcasting facilities and personnel.
>
> 3. Completion of the network of emergency headquarters with communications. The zone programme is now underway.
>
> 4. Completion of the medical stockpile programme and provision of additional welfare supplies and services.
>
> 5. Consideration is being given to the initiation of a public shelter programme by the identification of available shelter space in existing buildings and with the provision of only the minimum of ventilation, water and sanitation. A survey of all federal buildings has been completed. Another survey of all buildings is being carried out in Alberta to develop techniques which could be applied in a national survey, and to determine the amount of fallout protection which could be made available for public use generally.

This was a logical but expensive proposal to complete the system. It was by no means clear that Drury could get sufficient funds to accomplish it.(43)

When the committee concluded its deliberations, its report noted that EMO, while

carrying out its central planning and coordinating functions, had neglected communication and liaison with the provincial authorities.

> There has not been a meeting of the Federal-Provincial Conference on Emergency Measures since December 1962, and no meeting is currently scheduled. There has been no national exercise for a number of years. The Committee is concerned that this lack of continuing liaison and exercise with the provinces has seriously impaired the validity of the planning.

It also pointed out a failure that was likely obvious to federal officials: the programs -- mortgage loans, bank loans, and publicity -- to encourage people to build back yard fallout shelters had been dismal failures. As for EMO's publicity program, the committee suggested that it fell on deaf ears. The public was not interested in times of relative peace.(44)

> The committee then made a number of recommendations to rectify these shortcomings:
>
> (a) that a federal-provincial meeting on Emergency Planning be held before the year end. Future meetings should be held at least annually in order to ensure continuing liaison between the two levels of government. Joint planning must be developed, that recognizes clearly the responsibilities of the various governmental levels;
>
> (b) that EMO national exercises be resumed and conducted on a regular basis;
>
> (c) that expenditures of funds for the current home shelter programme be discontinued;
>
> (d) that research be carried forward so that techniques of providing home protection quickly, with materials at hand, may be developed;
>
> (e) that the study of public fallout shelters in Alberta be completed. An analysis should then be done, based on the data it reveals, as to the cost of providing public fallout shelters across the country and the percentage of population that may be so protected;
>
> (f) that a decision be made concerning fallout protection. The public will not build shelters. It is financially impossible for the Federal Government to provide fallout shelters for the entire population. Therefore the government must decide, based on the costs revealed by the Alberta survey, whether or not it will provide protection for a portion of the population;
>
> (g) that public information programmes be instituted to provide basic information. They should be on a periodic basis on television, radio and in the press; and
>
> (h) that consideration be given to the regular testing of the alarm system in all communities across the country.(45)

These recommendations were designed to improve communications with the provinces, conduct exercises and tests, abandon the home shelter program, and decide about a policy of public shelters. The suggestion of a public information program is curious since EMO had a very extensive set of publications.

In June 1965, the Governor in Council approved the Civil Emergency Planning Order 1965 which replaced the Civil Defence Order 1959 as amended in 1963. In presenting the new order, Drury explained:

> It was felt for some time that the 1959 Civil Defence Order was inadequate and that there should be a more definite allocation of emergency powers, duties and functions to all essential federal departments. Whereas only four federal Ministers were mentioned in 1959, twelve now have been assigned emergency responsibilities.(46)

In the past EMO had to rely on persuasion and its responsibility to coordinate the

emergency work of federal departments and agencies. As international tensions relaxed they quite naturally neglected their emergency planning duties. These emergency measures assignments were regularized with the approval of the order-in-council.

Although the new planning order can be seen as a consolidation of existing practices (a housekeeping item), there were certain subtleties that should be noted. The two functions of civil defence and continuity of government were brought together under one planning order and then subsumed, as Drury had noted a year before, by the term "civil emergency measures." There was a change in ministerial responsibility. EMO followed Drury when he became the Minister of Industry. Essentially, the duties of EMO remained the same as before -- responsibility for continuity of government planning, coordination of the emergency planning work of other federal departments, the planning of civil emergency measures not the responsibility of other federal departments, assistance to the provincial and municipal governments, and liaison with other countries and NATO. The Canadian Civil Defence College, which had been transferred to EMO in 1963, remained there. The only new responsibility was "in conjunction with provincial authorities, develop policies and a programme for the control of civil road transport resources in an emergency." It is not clear why this work was not left to the Department of Transport.(47)

On 17 June 1965, a federal-provincial conference on civil emergency planning was held in Ottawa under Drury's chairmanship. While EMO may have been merely responding to the Defence Review Committee's criticism of a year before, the conference expressed a recognition that if the EMO program was to succeed, the provinces had to be persuaded to participate. Indeed, in the decentralized system of emergency government provincial support was essential. Drury's lead-off address noted that even though this was the first federal-provincial conference on emergency measures since 1962, consultations had continued at the bureaucratic level quite successfully.

> However, I think this conference is timely in that this ministerial conference can confirm the acceptance of some of the proposals submitted and give general guidance to our respective emergency planners.(48)

One purpose of the conference was to bring the provincial authorities up to date on federal activities. The new Civil Emergency Planning Order was introduced and explained. Participants also learned about the National Fallout Shelter Survey which was to begin shortly as the first phase in public shelter planning. EMO made a commitment to build regional emergency government headquarters in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland. Conference participants were assured that the recent reorganization of the Canadian armed forces under Paul Hellyer had not changed the Army's role in ensuring civilian survival. The Army remained responsible for re-entry and rescue, warning systems, nuclear detonation and fallout reporting, and the maintenance of the emergency government headquarters. These matters were entirely under federal control.

Other questions were of more concern to the provincial officials. One was the issue of the designation of Regional Commissioners. In the early stages of a nuclear war it was likely that the regional emergency government headquarters would be cut off from central control and must act independently. Consequently, it was necessary to have someone in authority to give direction to the combined federal and provincial governments. Rather than have a federal appointee as Regional Commissioner, it was agreed that the premier or prime minister of the province would be the appropriate choice.

Two other issues were discussed. Although Ottawa contributed 75% of many of the

costs of emergency measures in the regions through the Financial Assistance Program, the conference agreed that there was a need to improve program management with an emphasis on priority planning, proper evaluation, and long range forecasts. Finally, the conference devoted a great deal of attention to the role of civil emergency planning and emergency organizations in dealing with peacetime disasters, a subject provincial authorities had always stressed. The delegates agreed on the need for planning to cope with peacetime disasters and suggested that joint study groups review the issue.(49)

EMO moved quickly on this last suggestion and convened a federal-provincial study group in the following October to exchange information. The federal officials may have regarded attention to peacetime disasters as a way to keep the provinces involved and to secure additional funding. Their attitude had been expressed a year and a half earlier by a former director, R. B. Curry:

> It is most important that emergency measures organizations throughout Canada be fully prepared to turn their personnel and facilities to instant use in the event of natural disasters. This ability will go a long way to justify in the minds of Canadians the effort and expense arising from emergency planning....Canadians will be much more inclined to accept and support vigorously civil emergency planning if they are convinced that it has a real place in respect to natural disasters as well as serving as most worthwhile insurance against wartime hazards.(50)

Nevertheless, it was still wartime planning with a peacetime application.

The need to plan and coordinate reaction to peacetime disasters was emphasized on 9 November 1965 when a power failure plunged eastern North America into darkness. On 1 February 1966, the Cabinet specifically made the Minister of Industry and through him Canada EMO (the name had been slightly changed) responsible for coordinating the initial response to a peacetime disaster. The Manitoba flood of 1966 provided an almost immediate occasion for examining, assessing, and testing current plans and procedure.(51)

In October 1966, Canada EMO answered another of the criticisms of the Defence Review Committee. From 12 to 21 October, TOCSIN 66, a national civil emergency planning exercise, was held "...to further develop an operational capability for national survival in the event of a nuclear attack on North America." This was the fourth in the TOCSIN series, but the first since 1961. (An exercise planned for 1963 had been canceled.) It was the culmination of a two-year cycle of exercises and studies involving provincial and federal government personnel. The public were not involved.

Assumptions about the nature of nuclear attack had changed since 1961. By 1966 planners anticipated that there would be a longer period of strategic warning as international relations gradually worsened and the great powers moved progressively towards nuclear war. Consequently, the exercise was composed of two phases. Phase one was a nine day period in which plans and procedures of the government in response to a deteriorating international situation were reviewed. An Exercise Cabinet of senior Canada EMO and selected departmental officials met daily to consider actions arising from planned incidents and alert measures. Phase two was a one day exercise consisting of the manning of an Exercise Headquarters at the Canadian Emergency Measures College at Arnprior and of certain relocation sites. It took the form of briefing presentations and departmental discussions. Regional exercises took place at the same time based on the same assumptions, but they varied in accordance with the physical facilities available in the regions.(52)

## V The Fall of EMO

By 1967, Canada EMO was making progress under Drury's leadership. A reorganization of the agency had been completed and new offices occupied. A Canada Survival Plan had been drafted for the period 1966-71. Treasury Board had agreed to finance a major construction program which included the four remaining Regional Emergency Government Headquarters. A nation wide survey of buildings was under way to determine the number of shelter spaces available for public use. Canada EMO continued to assist the provinces financially in upgrading the National Radiological Defence System. The Urban Characteristics Study of major cities in Canada, begun in 1963, was moving ahead. Planning for peacetime disasters was growing in importance. Money was budgeted to bring EMO publications up to date. The first TOCSIN since 1961 had been organized. The work of Canada EMO had progressed and plans were in place for the next five years.(53) Then the axe fell.

In August 1967, the government of Canada announced its intention to reduce government spending in many areas, including civil emergency measures. The international situation was changing dramatically. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 seemed far away, the Cold War was de-escalating, and *détente* was the order of the day. Official thinking concerning the amount of warning time preceding nuclear attack had changed. Surprise attack was considered unlikely. Instead there would be a period of increasing international tension which would allow governments some time to get ready for war. As the danger of the nuclear threat seemed to lessen, the need for budgetary retrenchment increased.

Consequently, Drury asked Canada EMO to develop recommendations for continued emergency measures activity in Canada on a very economical spending budget. When he took these recommendations to Cabinet, the government decided to make substantial changes to the civil emergency measures program.(54) The target year for the substantial completion of projects already approved for 1971-2 was deferred until 1975. In practice, this meant the postponement of construction of the regional emergency government headquarters; as it turned out, they were never built. New construction and the acquisition of high cost equipment was set aside for 1968-9. Emergency planning began to be considered an everyday part of government activity and not something extraneous to normal departmental activity. Training at the Canadian Emergency Measures College was restricted. Plans were developed with flexibility for rapid expansion when an emergency arose. Financial assistance to the provinces was progressively reduced.(55) In a statement to the House of Commons, Drury stressed that it was not the government's intention to shut down the emergency measures system:

> While it is the government's purpose to reduce recurring administrative and maintenance costs, it is not proposed to proceed with the wholesale dismantling of existing facilities. Major systems such as the emergency broadcasting capacity and emergency government operating centres which have been developed over the past several years will be maintained, in a reduced state but in a condition that will allow their activation in short order in the event of a crisis.(56)

The basis of the government's thought seemed to be that if the physical facilities were there (even if moth-balled) and plans were in place, there would be time to react to an emergency.

Bluntly put, Cabinet decided to reduce EMO's budget, cut its staff, and decrease financial aid to the provinces. The Civil Emergency Measures program was nevertheless to remain in operation. The 1968-9 budget was reduced to about $7 million from the $10.7 million of the previous year. Staff shrunk from 140 to 92. (57) In July 1968, Canada EMO was transferred to the Department of National Defence where it became a branch in the deputy minister's office.(58) On top of the staff and financial

loss, EMO also suffered a loss in status and prestige.

## VI Conclusion

The period from 1957 to 1963 was the heyday of emergency planning in Canada. Although the re-evaluation of the nuclear threat and the need for civil defence had been carried out under the Liberal government, the reform of civil defence was executed under the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker. The Emergency Measures Organization was established in the Privy Council Office in 1957 to plan the continuity of government program and to coordinate the emergency planning of other federal government departments. Initially, Civil Defence was left in the Department of National Health and Welfare, but after further consideration the civil defence function was brought under the control of EMO in 1959. This consolidated the two major functions of civil emergency measures planning -- continuity of government and civil defence -- under one agency. The Civil Defence Order of 1959 assigned specific technical responsibilities to the Army -- attack warning, detonation and fallout monitoring, emergency communications, re-entry and rescue, and the construction and maintenance of central and regional emergency government headquarters. Meanwhile, the Department of National Health and Welfare retained responsibility for planning for the provision of medical and welfare services and for stockpiling drugs and medical equipment. Through a series of Federal-Provincial Conferences, provincial and municipal responsibilities to put in place the organizations to look after the well-being of the civil population during and after a nuclear attack were defined. To encourage local planning and training the federal government instituted a generous Financial Assistance Program.

Election of the Liberal minority government in 1963 resulted in EMO being transferred out of the Privy Council Office and placed under the responsibility of the Minister of Defence Production, C. M. Drury. This loss of status did not initially result in adverse changes in the agency. Under Drury its work continued to progress. Six regional emergency government headquarters were completed. The work of the agency was reviewed by the Defence Review Committee of the House of Commons in 1964. A new Emergency Planning Order was issued in 1965 which set out in detail not only the duties of EMO but also those of 12 federal departments and four agencies. A Federal-Provincial Conference was convened to reinvigorate provincial efforts and a national exercise was held to test the emergency measures system. Planning went ahead and a five year plan was developed to complete the system by 1972. By 1967, however, the Liberal government began a program of financial retrenchment. International tensions had decreased since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and war seemed much less likely. Under these circumstances the government froze the EMO program in 1968. The budget was cut and staff reduced, although the government hastened to reassure the public that the existing structure of civil emergency measures was not being dismantled. The final blow to EMO's prestige was its transfer to the Department of National Defence. There it reported, not to a minister, but to a deputy minister.

By 1968, EMO had an identity crisis. Even though its professional staff faced a hostile government and an indifferent public, EMO remained convinced of the importance of its work.

> We are looked upon by well meaning, and not so well meaning, people as being passe [sic], militarists, theorists, impractical and so forth. Yet it was not so many decades ago that those who were pioneering public health were confronted with similar opposition. Today everybody wants more and better public health. Who knows, and God permitting, we may see a similar acceptance of our programme in years to come.(59)

EMO needed to rise from the ashes of despair, redefine itself, and convince the

government and the public of its usefulness. It would take it a decade to accomplish this mission.

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**Endnotes**

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3. Ibid., p. 16.

4. Ibid., p. 31.

5. Ibid., p. 33.

6. Ibid., p. 36.

7. Ibid., pp. 90-1.

8. Ibid., p. 91.

9. R. B. Curry, "The Emergency Measures Organization", Canadian Army Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (Spring 1960), p. 9.

10. Joseph Scanlon, "The Roller Coaster Story of Civil Defence Planning in Canada", Emergency Planning Digest, Vol. 9, No.2 (April-June 1982), p. 5.

11. A copy of the report has not been found but Graham comments on it in his memoirs. See Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), pp. 243-5.

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13. Scanlon, op. cit., p. 5.

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23. NA, RG 2, Vol. 2233, PC 1959-656, 28 May 1959.

24. F. F. Worthington, op. cit., pp. 8, 10-11.

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29. Maloney, op. cit., p. 52.

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31. "Exercise TOCSIN 1961", EMO National Digest (April 1961), p. 5.

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33. Maloney, op. cit., p. 54.

34. Lawrence S. Hagen, Civil Defence: the Case for Reconsideration, National Security Series No. 7 (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1977), p.48.

35. J. D. Donoghue, "Public Information and Nuclear War", Canadian Army Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (1962), pp. 26-30.

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38. "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence", EMO National Digest (Aug 1964), p. 9; J. F. Wallace, "Civil Defence in North America", EMO National Digest (Dec. 1965), p. 21; NA, RG 57, Acc 1984-85/658, Box 8, File 1000-2, Memorandum to Cabinet, Emergency Measures Program Policy Guidelines, 27 Nov. 1967, p.4; Scanlon, op. cit., p.11 fn. 6.

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41. Scanlon, op. cit., p. 5; RG 2, Vol. 2290, PC 1963-993, 27 June 1963.

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43. "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence", EMO National Digest (Aug. 1964), pp. 1-10.

44. Canada, House of Commons, Reports of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), pp. 11-12.

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46. EMO National Digest (Aug 1965), p. 4. The twelve departments and four agencies were: Agriculture, Defence Production, External Affairs, Finance, Fisheries, Justice, Labour, National Defence, National Health and Welfare, Postmaster General, Public Works, Transport, Bank of Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

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56. Statement in House of Commons by C. M. Drury, 6 Feb. 1968, in EMO National Digest (Feb. 1968), p. 1.

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# Chapter III

# The Fall and Rise of Civil Emergency Measures: 1968-1981

In 1968, Canada Emergency Measures Organization faced an identity crisis. Its very existence seemed to be called into question by drastic budget cuts which severely limited its ability to carry out its mandate. Its prestige was severely reduced when it was removed from the Department of Industry where it reported directly to a minister and transferred to the Department of National Defence where it reported to a deputy. During the next decade the organization strove to redefine its role in a hostile department and to an indifferent public. The 1970s is the story of its descent to the nadir of its existence, of more budget and staff cuts, of depressed morale, of reorganizations, of the loss of more prestige and control over its own destiny. But it survived. In the late 1970s its fortunes began to improve as the international situation changed, public attitudes shifted, and the government began to see that the program could be sold politically.

## I Project Phoenix

Even before the transfer of CEMO to the Department of National Defence, officials recognized that the legitimacy of the organization was coming under attack. External forces necessitated a re-evaluation of civil emergency planning. The contest between East and West was entering a new phase as each side realized that the other possessed sufficient second strike capability to render surprise attack increasingly unattractive. *Détente*, as this development was called, meant that nuclear war, while still possible, was becoming less likely. If it did occur, moreover, it would likely be preceded by adequate strategic warning. With the public perception of the danger of nuclear war receding, other economic and social programs moved to the fore to compete for scarce resources. At the same time, the PMO was encouraging the introduction of new scientific management techniques and procedures to analyse objectives and evaluate programs in terms of their achievements. As a result civil emergency planning was to be reviewed in depth. The need for decision making was propelled by the impending financial reductions, and Project Phoenix was launched in January 1968.

Project Phoenix, it was hoped, would suggest ways to overcome four major shortcomings that had been identified in civil emergency planning. First, there was no satisfactory method of assessing the nation's readiness and capability to deal with a war emergency. Secondly, there was no means of prioritizing civil emergency measures to receive the limited funds available. Thirdly, the statements of goals in the various agencies were inconsistent and in many cases not co-ordinated with each other. Finally, the program was unbalanced because the zeal and energy of managers varied greatly resulting in some activities being better developed than others. These faults were seen as procedural, not substantial; Project Phoenix would devise systems to correct them.

The Phoenix team made a detailed analysis of everything that comprised national civil emergency measures. Team members identified and described each emergency function that contributed to the national objective and provided each function with a realistic, measurable goal. The sum total of these goals equaled the national capability to meet a war emergency. It was recognized, moreover, that these goals were interrelated and that provision had to be made for the implications of the effects of one goal on another. Once this analysis was completed -- in effect disassembling the system into its component parts -- the project team faced the challenge of

> putting together the component parts in a manner which would most readily adapt itself to the process of planning, programming and budgeting, of coordination and of evaluation....

The team recommended that the functions, or activities, be grouped into six sub-programs, namely:

> Public Protection
> Public Information
> Essential Societal Services
> Continuity of Government
> Essential Utilities and Special Services
> Economic Planning and Resource Control

Then a network diagram was prepared for each of these sub-programs which illustrated how the various activities interacted within the program and, as well, how the sub-programs related to each other. The process of preparing this report took six months, from January to June 1968. In the words of one official: "It probably represents in terms of man-hours, one of the largest studies of civil emergency measures ever undertaken."

In its recommendations the report stressed the extent of the national civil emergency measures program, stretching as it did from the federal government, through the provincial and municipal governments, down to the individual citizen. Of necessity the procedures to make such a program work would be complex and they needed to be more formalized to succeed. The report recommended that the coordinating agencies of the various levels of government consult with each other more frequently and more directly in order to establish the objectives, goals, and priorities necessary to allocate resources. It indicated that CEMO would be the prime facilitator. Its role would be to stimulate and to lead consultations with all federal departments and agencies and with the provincial and territorial governments. It would be its responsibility for achieving consensus on priorities and objectives, maintaining flexibility so that the details of the program

could vary region by region, department by department, as the case may be. It argued for a regular evaluation of the program and indicated how modern methods of planning, programming, and budgeting could be applied to civil emergency measures planning. The project's "...real achievement has been to point the way towards unity and cohesiveness in civil emergency planning, towards purpose and credibility and towards consistency and balance."(1)

## II Federal-Provincial Conference 1969

The Phoenix Report had recommended more frequent consultations between the various levels of government involved in emergency measures planning. It was essential, of course, that the provinces be consulted, especially as the federal government was not only reducing CEMO's budget but also the Federal Assistance Program to the provinces. FAP was slashed from $5.2 million in 1967-8 to $3.0 million in 1969-70, a yearly figure at which it would remain until it was reduced to $1.5 million in 1973-4.(2) Consequently the Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux, convened a Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa on 13 November 1969 to explain the civil emergencies measures that the federal government was taking.

The conference dealt with current federal civil emergency planning measures, federal proposals for future activities, federal-provincial planning responsibilities for wartime emergencies and peacetime disasters, federal financial contributions to the provinces, civil-military cooperation in emergencies, and other subjects related to the total defence

of the nation. The severity of the effects of a nuclear attack was stressed , perhaps as a way of keeping the provinces involved even while the federal government was cutting back funding. In his address to the conference, Cadieux summarized the accomplishments of the emergency measures program over twenty years. He noted that recently there had been a break from the old to a new approach. This development, common to all the members of the Western Alliance, was necessitated by fiscal restraint and a realization that existing systems within a country's economic and social structure were often capable of undertaking emergency measures responsibilities. Cadieux acknowledged that the federal government's reductions to the civil emergency measures program had caused pain, but

> It has carved organizations down to a basic core of planners, a basic training arrangement of officials and experts and arrangements to use existing resources if they are needed in an emergency.

At the same time, his predecessor had instructed CEMO to carry out an in-depth investigation of the whole structure of civil emergency measures in Canada and to suggest remedies to weaknesses discovered (undoubtedly a reference to Project Phoenix).

Cadieux's prescription for the need "...to enhance our state of national preparedness" was planning.

> The making of plans [he said] is not an expensive process....As sound planning is the beginning of all emergency preparations there is, therefore, no reason why we cannot make significant headway with the development of competent and professional plans.

Plans should be developed, moreover, which allowed the individual to take relatively low cost measures to reduce the vulnerability of his family. He noted that the federal government had already undertaken a fallout protection survey of Canada (which, it turned out was never developed to a useful level). As well as this, he suggested that an effective information system offering the public guidance on self protection was required. This would ensure that people were kept well informed of current emergency measures activities, adding considerably to the nation's ability to survive a nuclear attack.

If the dangers from nuclear war did not encourage the provinces to remain in the program in the face of federal funding cuts, Cadieux provided additional incentives. He revived an undertaking from the last Federal-Provincial Conference in 1965, a consensus that emergency resources developed for wartime crisis could and should be used to cope with peace time disasters.

> I reiterate...that the federal government assumes that any emergency capacity we thus develop for a war disaster, has a useful potential for peacetime catastrophes and that this capacity should be used, where suitable, in such emergencies.

This statement played directly to provincial prejudices favouring natural disaster emergency planning and was a theme which would be picked up in the mid-1970s.(3)

## III Reorganization

Concurrent with this heightened awareness of planning in 1968-69, CEMO underwent a re-organization. The National Coordinator, Civil Emergency Measures (who reported to the Deputy Minister of National Defence) became responsible for an organization that was divided into three major functional branches:

National Survival and Recovery Program Branch