responsible for planning and budgeting, program evaluation, continuity of government planning, public fallout protection planning, emergency public information planning, and road transport planning.

Long Range Planning and Policy Development Branch

responsible for economic planning, operational concepts and procedures, physical protection planning, radiological biological and chemical defence planning, organization system planning, and international civil emergency planning.

National Training and Exercises Branch

responsible for training development, national exercises planning, and supervision of the Canadian Emergency Measures College.(4)

The program for which the new organization of CEMO was responsible derived directly from the Project Phoenix study. The national objective was stated explicitly:

> The national objective of civil emergency measures planning is to develop in peace time, civil plans and preparations designed to enable the nation to survive and recover from any war emergency and which, together with military defence measures, represent the total national defence posture in Canada.

To achieve this objective three goals were set out:

> First -- to work out plans to help protect and safe-guard life and property. In other words, it is a question of measures that will help the people to survive.
>
> Secondly -- to set up and maintain a government structure to enable all government machinery which is vital in an emergency, to continue to furnish directives, and to direct the essential services entrusted to its care.
>
> Thirdly -- to protect resources, thanks to measures which would insure a systemic administration of all the reclaimed resources in such a way as to facilitate an economic recovery.

To accomplish these goals the program was organized into the six areas set out in the Project Phoenix study (see above) with the addition of a seventh, Service Activities, in which were activities to support the others. These seven areas, or divisions, were further divided into 40 activities. Most of these, 21 in all, were concerned with the organization of emergency measures. Provincial involvement was required in 33 of the 40 activities. (5)

IV Redefinition

Both Project Phoenix and the reorganization of CEMO were based on the assumption that CEMO's objective was to deal with a war, specifically a nuclear war, disaster. In 1970, this assumption was challenged and then expanded by officials within the organization. A threat, which previously had been defined in terms of war, was given a broader definition: "...anything which tends to create instability in our social, political or economic structure...."(6) As well as war, this included civil disorder and natural and man-made disasters. The effects of these disasters, whether in war or peacetime, it was argued, differed only in degree;

- loss of life and/or casualties
- physical damage
- impact on local, regional, or national economy

- impact on political and social organization and procedures

Consequently, there should be a similarity of approach to the development of plans at each level of government. There should also continue to be a single coordinating agency to ensure the preparation of effective civil emergency plans. These plans should be devoted to two general objectives: 1) to avert a disaster and 2) to restore stability after a disaster has happened. CEMO and local EMOs had advanced farthest with planning for the second eventuality. There remained a great deal of planning work to be done in relation to the first objective.(7)

This proposed redefinition of CEMO's responsibilities -- while prefigured in 1965 -- was occasioned by considerations of the implications of the Prime Minister's statement outlining the four aspects of Canadian defence policy in April 1970. In their order of importance they were:

- Sovereignty
- Defence of North America in cooperation with the United States
- Maintenance of NATO commitments
- Peacekeeping

Officials in CEMO interpreted the meaning of Sovereignty in terms of emergency planning very broadly. To them it implied

> the preparations made to meet floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, civil unrest and disorders -- in fact, any peacetime emergency which can disrupt, damage or destroy our civilian society and, hence, hinder national development.(8)

This was styled the Internal Threat with implications at all levels of government.

North American Defence implied armed attack, specifically nuclear attack, which was the threat that CEMO had been created to deal with. This was called the External Threat and it also had implications at all levels of government. In so far as NATO commitments were concerned, Canada would continue to maintain its undertakings to contribute effectively to certain of NATO's civil wartime agencies. This involved mainly federal departments or agencies. Peacekeeping did not have any major implications for civil emergency planning.

Once the implications of Canadian defence policy were seen in this light, it was necessary for CEMO to assume a new national objective:

> to develop throughout the nation non-military plans and preparations for responding to emergencies caused by internal or external threats to the social, political or economic structure of Canada.(9)

Planning for peacetime disasters was placed on an equal level with planning for wartime disasters.

Since the difference in the effects of either type of disaster was one of degree, the program which had evolved from Project Phoenix was to be retained. Planning for peacetime emergencies became allied with wartime emergency planning.

The initiative to redefine the purpose of CEMO came from within the organization. Although CEMO tried to justify its program in terms of defence policy, it was in a poor position within the Department of National Defence to bargain for the resources needed to carry out its expanded mandate. DND officials were not sympathetic to CEMO's aspirations. Rather they saw its role as extraneous to the objectives of the department.

They never accepted the view that the department's active defence role was linked to CEMO's passive defence role in a single national defence posture. CEMO's position was organizationally unsound for as "...the organization responsible for co-ordinating the emergency planning of other departments of government [it] had to pass its proposals through internal committees in one of those departments."(10) Matters often got sidetracked before they ever got to the deputy. Defence officials had little interest in saving CEMO's budget in a period of cutbacks; in fact it might be argued that the less for EMO the more for the Department.(11) The result was that "personal and bureaucratic conflicts were a major cause of the inability of civil defence to assert itself within the Ministry [of National Defence]."(12)

In 1986, a retired official of the emergency planning organization looked back over this period with somewhat jaundiced eyes and summed it up:

> It is not difficult to imagine the results. Emergency matters dropped out of sight except when a flood, blizzard or severe windstorm occurred. For most of these there were, in any case, well-tried arrangements in the provinces. Professional attitudes had not changed but there was no audience for their proposals. All that was left for EMO to do was to plan. And plan it did. A great many useful planning guides and manuals were produced during this period. Co-operation continued with the United States and with NATO; conferences and training periods were conducted with the provinces. Looked at from within, the professionals were productively busy, but viewed from outside there was little or no impact on the general state of national preparedness. Knowledge was being accumulated but not used effectively.(13)

CEMO had difficulty redefining its mandate while its legitimacy was constantly challenged in a hostile department.

V The Dare Report

During the same period, the federal government undertook a study of crisis management which would have a profound effect upon the emergency measures organization. Following the FLQ crisis in October 1970, the Trudeau government became concerned about "its ability to respond quickly, intelligently, and efficiently to situations not amenable to being handled in accord with routine decision making procedures."(14) Accordingly, on 22 July 1971, it initiated a study of crisis-handling methods and structures. On 1 May 1972, a study group was convened by the Secretary to the Cabinet headed by Lieutenant-General M. R. Dare to enquire into:

- the state of crisis handling preparedness within the Canadian federal government;
- problems of recognizing and anticipating approaching crises;
- procedures for handling crises.

The study group was to submit its report before 30 September 1972.(15)

In its survey of emergency preparedness in the federal government, the study group reported that there had been a considerable investment of financial resources and departmental effort over the years to make emergency preparations for defence. The measures that existed to reduce the vulnerability of the population, to ensure the continuity of government, and to facilitate control of the nation's economic resources represented a significant national capability. It noted, perhaps as an oblique reference to under-funding of the program, that these measures "...have been developed as far as past and present allocations of resources have permitted." The result was that

"...the general state of national preparedness has fallen below its realizable and

desirable potential."

In its analysis, the study group recognized three problems in particular. First, it noted that the Civil Emergency Planning Order which assigned departmental responsibilities was out of date, not having been amended to keep pace with the creation of new departments and agencies. The result in a number of cases was that the expertise necessary to undertake a wartime function existed outside the department charged with carrying it out. Consequently, all civil emergency responsibilities needed to be reviewed, amended or reassigned where necessary, and government plans modified accordingly.

Secondly, the study group commented on the inappropriateness of including CEMO within the Department of National Defence. It recalled that CEMO was originally created within the Privy Council Office specifically to stimulate and coordinate federal civil planning for the defence of Canada. It then pointed out that "[t]he divorce of the co-ordinating agency (Canada EMO) from its main source of authority (the Privy Council Office) has contributed to the present inadequate state of co-ordination." It called for a review of the goals and objectives of the emergency measures program to ensure their consistency with Canadian defence policy.

Finally, the study group found that there was a lack of balance and cohesion in the emergency measures planned and prepared by the federal governments. It suggested that review of departmental estimates individually by Treasury Board and Parliament was insufficient. It might be better to review these measures as an integrated emergency measures program. There was a need, moreover, to test and update existing plans and review them in the light of existing requirements and methods of operating.(16)

The study group highlighted potential for inefficiency. The federal government often became involved in peacetime emergencies, but usually on an *ad hoc* basis. Several departments were considering setting up specialized emergency response units to deal with emergencies, such as floods, that tended to recur with the consequent danger of duplication of resources. Neither approach was acceptable.

The state of crisis prediction was also inadequate. There were no standing arrangements for central collection and collation of crisis information. There was no provision for it to be displayed to enable decision making at Cabinet level or for Cabinet decisions and instructions to be disseminated to the appropriate departments. The expertise to respond to emergencies existed, but the mechanisms to apply it remained *ad hoc*. No department could deal single handedly with major events; each needed help from elsewhere. But no standing arrangement existed to manage common services in a crisis nor to review the compatibility of departmental plans.

> Because of the piecemeal way in which departments have become involved in emergencies and because the responsibility for co-ordinating assigned to Canada Emergency Measures Organization (Canada EMO) was only partial and lacked adequate authority, the state of co-ordination is inadequate.(17)

This situation needed to be rectified.

The study group reached the same conclusion as CEMO in regard to the need for similar methods to respond to peacetime and wartime crises. The major differences, it noted, were ones of degree and intensity

> It is, in fact, desirable to pattern defence emergency measures and procedures as far as possible on those used in peacetime, and defence emergency organizations on existing departments and agencies. It is believed, therefore, that there is so much in common between planning for peacetime emergencies and planning for war that it is not only possible but desirable to design a single organizational structure and set of mechanisms to

stimulate and co-ordinate the planning and preparations necessary for both.(18)

It should be noted that before the Dare Study Group was set up, planners at CEMO were struggling with the same problems. (It is not known what input CEMO made to the Dare study, but it is difficult to imagine that it was not consulted.) The Dare Report, however, recommended a different solution to the problems.

The Dare Study Group submitted its report in October 1972. Cabinet considered its recommendations in 1973, and on 12 March the Prime Minister tabled a condensation of the report entitled The Enhancement of Crisis handling Capability within the Canadian Federal Structure: Report of the Crisis Management Study Group in the House of Commons. At the same time he announced that the government had agreed to the main thrust of the proposals -- a new concept for emergency planning within the federal structure and new federal coordinating mechanisms to manage civil emergency planning in Canada.(19)

This acceptance provided legitimacy to a long standing pattern of federal involvement. It recognized that, although emergencies were usually dealt with at the local level, the federal government did become involved in certain circumstances. When the scope of the emergency was beyond the capacity of the local resources, federal assistance was often required, usually requested by provincial authorities. At other times when federal authorities recognized the danger of the emergency spreading they did intervene in anticipation of the need. This was usually accomplished by invoking special legislation, such as the War Measures Act, or under the Peace, Order and Good Government clause of the British North America Act. Finally, the federal government did intervene if the nature of the emergency involved major federal responsibilities, such as air or maritime rescue, oil spills, air crash, etc.

Recognizing that past federal involvement in civil emergencies had often been dictated by circumstances at the last moment, the Dare Report recommended a system which would regularize federal response. It set out six functions of government that it argued were necessary to mitigate the effects of a disaster:

> **Informing** -- providing information to assist individuals or organizations in coping with emergencies;
>
> **Warning** -- developing systems to forecast and warn of impending disasters;
>
> **Co-opting** -- developing systems to apply "normal" private resources effectively to emergencies;
>
> **Providing** -- maintaining and providing exceptional resources and the diversion of normal government resources to emergencies;
>
> **Restoring** -- using real and financial resources to return to normal;
>
> **Changing** -- effecting desirable policy changes.

All of these functions required both planning and action.(20)

It could be argued that this analysis merely applied CEMO's system, more or less, to all emergencies. Indeed, within this framework a war emergency became just one of many types of emergency. What was novel, however, was the allocation of responsibility to deal with a disaster in terms both of planning and of implementation. The Dare Report distinguished between a "lead" and a "resource" department. A lead department would

> have primary responsibility for general planning and would be expected to assume control in an emergency in which the predominant factor involved is one which comes within the department's normal responsibilities.

For example, the Department of Transport would be the lead department to handle a major rail disaster or a marine oil spill. Its activities would be supported by several resource departments. A resource department was defined as one which could place resources or services at the disposal of a lead department during an emergency. For example, the Department of Health and Welfare would provide medical supplies to assist the Department of Transport in its handling of the rail disaster. Depending on the nature of the emergency, of course, a department could be lead in one instance and resource in another.(21)

Cabinet acceptance of the concept of the lead department had an immediate effect even before the Dare Report was tabled in the House. In 1973, five long time responsibilities were removed from CEMO control. Radiological defence, which included the shelter program, was turned over to the Department of Public Works. Planning for emergency supplies became the responsibility of the Department of Supply and Services. Emergency transportation went to the Department of Transport. Emergency communications, other than what was provided by the Department of National Defence, was taken over by the Department of Communications. The physical operation of the Civil Emergency Measures College at Arnprior was turned over to the Public Works. These transfers decimated CEMO without providing any long term public benefit. All of the transferred programs languished except one. The shelter program prospered, largely due to the enthusiasm of the official responsible in the Department of Public Works.(22)

Along with the concept of lead department, Cabinet agreed to a reorganization of the administration and implementation of the emergency program. Recognizing that the program needed to be nearer the centre of power, Cabinet created a new secretariat in the Privy Council Office, called the Emergency Planning Secretariat (EPS). It was charged with the responsibilities of developing general emergency policy and facilitating the coordination of emergency planning within the federal government. Initially, EPS needed to consult with the various departments to work out a clear definition of departmental responsibilities in relation to emergency preparedness. It was to make its recommendations to a newly created Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Preparedness. This Committee would review all departmental emergency planning as an integrated emergency program and resolve any disputes that could not be worked out through normal channels. Ultimate responsibility to Parliament for emergency preparedness planning and action, however, rested with the minister of the department responsible for the most closely related normal function.

CEMO ceased to exist, but it was reincarnated as the National Emergency Planning Establishment (NEPE). In accordance with the concept of the lead department, CEMO had already lost a number of its program functions (see above). Under the new arrangement a large part of EPS's responsibilities for coordination was delegated to NEPE which was to function under the general direction of the secretariat. Only rarely would either EPS or NEPE become directly involved in carrying out plans in an emergency. NEPE was reorganized and reduced in size. Contact with the provinces was to continue to be maintained through the 10 Regional Directors who reported to the Director General of NEPE. (The Dare Report had recommended five regional directors, but this recommendation had been rejected by Cabinet.) Even though NEPE was to be directed by EPS, for administrative purposes it remained within the Department of National Defence, a rather anomalous arrangement.(23) (In 1975, NEPE was renamed

Emergency Planning Canada, EPC, under the Federal Identity Program.)

Planning for emergencies , whether peacetime or wartime, was now the responsibility of the lead departments. But how much planning would be done?

> How far departments should go in developing emergency plans and preparations in terms of full-time staff and dedicated resources is to be decided in the light of the Government's priorities and with a reasonable and sensible appreciation of the risks involved.(24)

Given budget cuts and hiring freezes, a directive as vague and ambiguous as this resulted in emergency planning receiving a low priority within government departments. Throughout the 1970s, the budgets of both CEMO/EPC and the Federal Assistance Program (FAP) to the provinces were reduced or remained static:(25)

Year	Total CEMO/EPC ($ millions)	Federal Assistance Program (FAP) ($ millions)
1967-8	10.7	5.2
1968-9	7.0	3.7
1969-70	5.0	3.0
1970-1	5.0	3.0
1971-2	5.0	3.0
1972-3	5.18	3.0
1973-4	3.2	1.5
1974-5	3.2	1.5
1975-6	3.25	1.5
1976-7	3.5	1.5
1977-8	3.86	1.6

Any planning that occurred under these budgetary circumstances was devoted to plans for natural disasters (which were seen as real and legitimate threats in comparison to wartime emergencies). The outcome was the creation of uneven and low-quality departmental emergency programs.(26)

VI The Fall of Civil Defence

The Federal Assistance Program, which had been reduced from $5.2 million in 1967-8 to $3.0 million annually from 1969 to 1973, was reduced by half in 1973-4 to $1.5 million. As a consequence many local EMOs protested that they could no longer continue their programs in the face of such drastic cuts. Ontario shortly confirmed this view by repealing its emergency legislation and disbanding its civil emergency program. Paradoxically, despite Ontario's withdrawal and dire predictions, "[d]isaster planning has thrived rather than died in the absence of federal prodding and federal money."(27) During the '70s strong provincial emergency programs and widespread municipal planning actually flourished. Many provinces required municipalities to have disaster plans and to appoint coordinators to ensure that they met this requirement. These were peacetime plans that addressed natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes. The local EMOs had demonstrated the efficacy of such plans when disaster struck.(28)

The tendency to devalue wartime emergency planning was also evident at the federal level. Because civil emergency planning was concerned with both peacetime and wartime disasters, there was an inclination to concentrate on those areas which had a dual applicability and ignore those areas peculiar to wartime planning. The result was that the federal civil defence program was in a sorry state by the late 1970s. EPC

officials indicated that Canada had the most deficient civil defence system in the Western Alliance. No federal-provincial ministerial meeting had occurred since 1969. The Interdepartmental Committee had stopped meeting. The last national exercise had been held in 1966 and it had been at the official level only. Emergency orders and regulations had not been revised since 1966.(29) One scholar summarized the situation:

> Cross-Canada civil defence planning no longer exists except in the sense that a number of regional headquarters are available, supplies have been stockpiled, booklets are still available and fallout shelters have been identified (though not marked or called to public attention).(30)

Budget allocations had been entirely inadequate. For example, in 1976-7, EPC's budget was set at $3.5 million. Of this, $1.5 million went into provincial assistance and $1.4 million toward salary and travel expenses. The remainder, about $600,000, was devoted to non-salary purposes for both civil defence and natural disaster capabilities. No funds were provided for capital acquisition in EPC's budget. Spending in this area was left up to the lead departments who had very different priorities.(31)

Planning to protect the population was inadequate. The fallout shelter program was at a standstill. Surveys of existing shelter spaces had been made but they had not been kept up to date and the shelter spaces had not been marked. No plans existed to upgrade them nor were there plans to acquire necessary vital accessories such as power supplies, ventilation equipment, or sanitation.(32) Moreover, most spaces identified as suitable shelter spaces were geographically distant from major centres of population.

As previously described, Emergency Government Headquarters (EGHQ) had been built near Ottawa for the federal government (the "Diefenbunker") and in six of the 10 provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia). While it was intended to complete the system, EGHQs were never built in the remaining four provinces although interim headquarters were provided. The existing headquarters were maintained, but there was serious doubt about their long term sustainability.

The National Survival Attack Warning System, composed of meteorological services, a national siren system, and the Emergency Broadcasting System continued to be maintained, although officials indicated that it was marginal and deteriorating. Actual testing (as opposed to silent testing every six months) of the siren system was last done in 1968. The Emergency Broadcasting System was inadequate and required several months work to reach operational level. As well, the fallout detection and reporting systems (RADEF), while alive on paper, required great effort to be made functional. Finally there was a morale and manpower crisis at EPC. The pool of expertise in wartime emergency planning had shrunk dramatically. Not one EPC employee was used full-time for civil defence purposes in 1976-7.(33)

Some critics found this state of affairs scandalous. J. F. Wallace, a former EPC official, bitterly stated:

> If a government could be charged with treason, then the present one in Canada should be cited....The neglected state of our civil emergency plans and preparations for a wartime emergency is a downright disgrace.(34)

VII The Revival of Emergency Planning

By the late 1970s, the spirit of *détente* was waning. The Soviet Union had modernized its tank armies to face depleted NATO divisions in Europe. It had deployed new batteries of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, turning Western European cities into

nuclear targets. In response the United States had agreed to post a new generation of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe to reassure European leaders that they would not be abandoned in a crisis. The Soviet fleet emerged as a world-wide force challenging American naval supremacy from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. During the 1970s, Soviet submarines discovered routes under the polar ice cap to reach underseas locations off North America. In 1979, the Soviet Union flexed her military might and invaded Afghanistan. Even Canada, who clung longer to *détente* than most of her allies, began to feel the increased pressure of international tensions. Before the 1979 federal general election, both the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives promised to add 4700 men and women to the armed forces and increase capital spending by a fifth of the defence budget.(35)

Coupled with this was an increased awareness of the threat of civil disasters. In February 1970, the shipwreck of the *Arrow* in Chedabucto Bay led to a major oil spill. In 1971 a serious mudslide had damaged St. Jean Vianney in Quebec and Hurricane Beth struck Nova Scotia. In January 1978, a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite crashed in Canada's north and scattered particles of radioactive debris. In November 1979, a CPR train derailed in Mississauga, Ontario, and sent poisonous gas into the air, necessitating the evacuation of 205,000 people. The crash of the satellite prompted a flood of applications for radiation detection courses which had often before had to be cancelled. The Mississauga crash revived the general interest in emergency planning and it made effective disaster response politically attractive.(36) Increased awareness of domestic disasters joined with escalating international tensions to create a sense of public vulnerability. Civil emergency planning in Canada was reinvigorated in response..

After a short Progressive Conservative hiatus, the Liberals returned to power in 1980. In July, Prime Minister Trudeau appointed Yvon Pinard, President of the Privy Council, to be the minister responsible for emergency planning in Canada. At the same time, the Emergency Planning Secretariat and Emergency Planning Canada were merged within the Privy Council Office, the new creation to be known as Emergency Planning Canada. Once again those responsible for civil emergency measures would have direct access to a minister close to the centre of power.

On 3 November 1980, Pinard announced the federal government's emergency policy. Emergencies beyond the control of private resources could best be met by joint cooperative planning by the federal, provincial, and local levels of government. The federal government pledged to set up appropriate mechanisms for consultation in conjunction with the provinces.

> Planning to achieve the desired state of emergency preparedness will be based on what is required to meet peacetime emergencies, together with those additional requirements for war contingencies which peacetime measures will not meet adequately.

For the first time, emergency peacetime planning was given priority over wartime planning in federal policy.

In order to accomplish this objective the federal government aimed:

- to provide leadership in working towards improved emergency planning in general;
- to develop a credible national capability to meet emergencies of all types;
- to work towards adequate and reasonably uniform standards of emergency service across the country;
- to be sensitive to humanitarian concerns.

> The new policy reaffirmed that the federal government would become involved in peacetime civil emergencies a) on request of provincial governments when local resources prove inadequate or b) in situations where the emergency clearly falls within federal jurisdiction. It also established a Joint Emergency Planning Program to fund emergency preparedness programs and to arrive at arrangements whereby the provinces may receive financial assistance to meet the costs of major disasters.(37)

To provide clear direction to carry out the federal government's emergency planning policy, a new Emergency Planning Order was approved by Cabinet in May 1981 to replace the badly outdated order in effect since 1965.(38) It set out the specific duties for both peace and war assigned to the federal government departments. All ministers were called upon to identify the types of emergencies that would fall within their areas of responsibility and to prepare plans and arrangements to deal with them. Any department that was assigned lead responsibility for an emergency was to coordinate federal planning and to secure and control necessary federal support. Supporting departments were to supply resources to ministers with lead responsibility. As part of their planning duties, departments were to provide emergency planning assistance to provincial and municipal governments and to assist in joint federal-provincial development of regional emergency plans. They were required to develop plans for war emergencies, from providing assistance to the armed forces, to meeting international obligations to NATO and the United States, and carrying out civil defence responsibilities. This order clearly built on past experience. It also drew from the concept of lead and resource departments elaborated in the Dare report.

Eleven ministers were specifically identified to develop and maintain plans to establish and operate National Emergency Agencies whose powers, duties, and functions were set out in Part I of the Schedule attached to the order.(39) It would be these agencies which would swing into action if an emergency arose necessitating federal involvement. In Part II of the Schedule, 11 ministers were assigned additional responsibilities to be carried out in case of war.(40) Part II provoked some unfavourable criticism in the House of Commons because it assigned the Solicitor General to set up civilian internment camps and the Prime Minister to establish a body to implement censorship controls. The Emergency Planning Order established a clear network of emergency activity responsibility.

The Emergency Planning Order, however, did not define the responsibilities of Emergency Planning Canada. EPC's role remained essentially what it had been in the 1970s following acceptance of the Dare Report. Generally, EPC was "...responsible for stimulating, facilitating, and coordinating emergency planning among federal departments, agencies and Crown corporations, and between them and the provincial and territorial governments." It also coordinated the federal response to emergency situations, either at the request of a provincial government or in areas of federal responsibility until a lead department was named to assume control. It was responsible for administering the newly established Joint Emergency Planning Program (JEPP) and the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA), two funding initiatives. It continued to coordinate Canada's civil defence arrangements with NATO and the United States. It was responsible for making preparations to ensure the continuity of government in the event of a nuclear war.(41)

Under the new arrangement in the Privy Council Office, EPC was headed by the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Emergency Planning who reported to the President of the Privy Council. Under the Assistant Secretary were two Directors General, one in charge of Plans Branch, the other of the Operations Branch.

The Plans Branch was responsible for:

- analysing trends and conditions that might have emergency implications;
- formulating emergency policy;
- developing and coordinating national emergency plans;
- evaluating the state of emergency preparedness in Canada on a regular basis;
- training key federal and provincial officials in their emergency functions;
- coordinating Canadian aspects of international emergency planning; and
- planning national exercises and Canada's participation in similar international events.

The Operations Branch was responsible for:

- identifying operational objectives and priorities, and developing federal crisis management procedures;
- coordinating federal-provincial emergency preparedness activities through negotiations with provincial officials;
- administering the Joint Emergency Planning Program and the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements on behalf of the federal government;
- providing the physical facilities necessary for continuity of government in time of war;
- developing an ongoing information program to ensure public awareness of potential emergencies; and
- directing the provision of administrative services for the entire organization.

The Director General, Operations, relied on 10 Regional Directors in the provincial capitals to gather information on impending emergencies and to coordinate the federal response when required. They also were to keep in close touch with federal government representatives in the regions to ensure a coordinated response to federal emergency planning. They also maintained a close liaison with provincial and municipal officials to make sure that federal plans were compatible with plans prepared locally.(42)

VIII Conclusion

By 1981, there was a marked increase in federal emergency measures activity. A new government emergency measures policy had been enunciated and, more importantly, a new Emergency Planning Order had been promulgated replacing the outdated order of 1965. This endorsed the Dare concept of lead department, allocating responsibility for specific emergency planning to various federal departments. Its effect was to ensure sufficient resources to permit an effective job to be done.

The new policy addressed planning for both wartime and peacetime disaster. While it completed the shift from war to peace as a basis for planning activity, it established conditions to ensure all aspects of disaster were adequately covered.

As a result of the new emphasis on emergency preparedness, the budget for EPC had been increased and more funds were earmarked for the provinces through two funding initiatives. Although EPC's mandate was unchanged, its position as coordinator of planning between federal departments and federal-provincial agencies was enhanced. By 1981, EPC was firmly entrenched in the PCO with a minister of its own. Emergency measures had emerged from its decade of trial and its prospects were brightening.

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36. Scanlon, op. cit., pp.8-9.

37. "Background to the Conference" (Summary of federal government's emergency policy), Emergency Planning Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1981).

38. Canada Gazette, 10 June 1981, PC 1981-1305, 21 May 1981.

39. Departments or agencies: Agriculture; Communications; Employment and Immigration; Energy, Mines and Resources; Finance; Health and Welfare; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Prime Minister; Public Works; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; Transport.

40. Departments or agencies: Communications; Emergency Planning; External Affairs; National Defence; Public Works; Solicitor General; Prime Minister; Postmaster General; Health and Welfare; Justice; Supply and Services.

41. "Emergency Planning Canada: A Profile", Emergency Planning Canada: Annual Review 1982, pp. 2-3.

42. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Chapter IV

The Reform of Civil Emergency Measures: 1981-1988

I Introduction

After the doldrums of the 1970s, the winds of reform began to blow briskly in the 1980s. The Minister Responsible for Emergency Planning, Yvon Pinard, had established the basis for a renewal of emergency planning when he announced the federal government policy in 1980 and followed it with the Emergency Planning Order in 1981. Over the next seven years, federal officials, under both Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments, took steps to reinvigorate a national emergency planning program. EPC provided a vehicle for federal reestablishment of the emergency planning relationship with the provincial governments, and, through them, with the municipalities. At the same time, the federal departments were urged to ensure that their programs were in place in accordance with the Emergency Planning Order. EPC undertook to fulfill its responsibilities with increased vigour -- coordinating, planning, training, conducting exercises, supervising research, and publicizing. It continued to fulfill Canadian civil emergency planning obligations and renewed a Canadian-American agreement for emergency planning in North America. Finally in 1988, the Progressive Conservative government followed through on a Liberal initiative and passed emergencies legislation to regularize the civil emergency planning program in Canada.

II Federal-Provincial Relations and Emergency Planning

1 *Federal-Provincial Conference 1981*

The federal government has always held that in a federal state such as Canada the responsibility of planning for, and responding to, emergencies beyond the resources of the private citizen was shared by all levels of government. In November 1980, when Yvon Pinard announced the federal government's emergency policy, he reaffirmed this doctrine:

> ...all levels of government have a responsibility to plan and prepare for emergencies for which an adequate response goes beyond what might reasonably be expected to be provided by private means.
>
> Government emergency planning will be most effective when the responsibilities, resources and aspirations of the federal, provincial and local governments are merged through joint cooperative planning into mutually acceptable arrangements covering the preparation for, the response to, and treating the consequences of, such emergencies. Such joint planning should seek to develop strength by providing a common purpose for the exercising of separate jurisdictional authorities.
>
> To ensure that there is an appropriate forum for consultation with the provinces on a cooperative approach to emergency planning, the federal government will in conjunction with the provinces, establish suitable mechanisms whereby such consultations may take place on a regular basis.(1)

Shortly after the promulgation of Emergency Planning Order 1981, which established the framework for federal emergency planning, Pinard moved to bring the provinces and territories

into the process he had alluded to in the policy announcement. As minister responsible

for emergency planning, he convened a Federal-Provincial Conference on 5 June 1981. In his opening address to the delegates, he outlined what the federal government wanted to accomplish:

- review the current approach to emergency planning;
- reaffirm, perhaps in a form more suited to current needs, some of the cooperative understandings currently in place;
- discuss financial arrangements in place for both emergency planning and response;
- discuss emergency legislation matters arising out of the Federal-Provincial Conference on Human Rights.(2)

During the remainder of the conference, Pinard and his officials elaborated on these four points.

The Minister stressed that the federal government was putting its house in order. He outlined the contents of Emergency Planning Order 1981 and explained that under its authority federal departments were preparing their estimates to fulfill the government's emergency planning policy. Henceforth, Cabinet would review their estimates as a single coordinated emergency planning package, but he warned that financial restraints might limit the funding of all proposed measures.(3)

A discussion paper proposed a joint emergency planning policy and outlined the mechanisms by which it could be accomplished. Significantly the federal government intended to treat each province or territory individually in determining types of emergencies, the nature of outside assistance needed, and the form and nature of the planning mechanisms. It proposed that working groups for each province be set up by the EPC Regional Director who would coordinate negotiations between provincial and federal officials.(4)

Pinard announced that, in the future, financial assistance to the provinces would be consolidated. EPC would administer the Disaster Financial Assistance (DFA) arrangements, in effect since 1970, to help provincial and territorial governments cover the costs of disasters.(5) It would also coordinate a new initiative, the Joint Emergency Planning Program (JEPP), which had been approved in October 1980. It would absorb and phase out the current Financial Assistance Program (FAP) and provide the provinces and territories with financing for projects which would support federal objectives and enhance national emergency response capability.(6)

The very short joint statement issued at the end of the conference, after summarizing the subjects discussed, made three points. First, all ministers agreed that a more structured form of governmental consultation and joint emergency planning would be helpful. Secondly, the federal government promised to take provincial preferences in mind before making any changes to disaster financial assistance. Thirdly, war emergency planning should be studied in depth by officials of both governments. Although the ministers agreed that they would meet as often as possible to review this work of their officials,(7) there would be only one other ministerial Federal-Provincial Conference in the next seven years. This conference in 1986 was mainly concerned with emergencies legislation.

As it turned out, the 1981 ministerial conference was the prelude to a series of lower level emergency planning conferences. Over the next seven years, federal, provincial, and territorial officials met yearly at informal gatherings to address matters of mutual interest and concern, to review areas of intergovernmental progress, and to set out

future goals. For example, the meeting held at Winnipeg, 1-2 February 1983, dealt with a variety of subjects:

- Memoranda of Understanding on Emergency Planning between the federal and provincial governments;
- operations of JEPP;
- possible amendments to Emergency Planning Order 1981;
- federal-provincial aspects of possible new emergencies legislation;
- increased provincial participation in federal exercises and training programs.

This meeting also established two task forces, one to study wartime public protection and another to deal with the training of on-scene commanders who must take charge during localized emergencies.(8) In 1985, officials who were becoming increasingly concerned with dangerous goods transportation set up a working group to study training for dangerous goods emergency response. A second meeting that year prepared the ground work for the ministerial conference in 1986. In 1986, 1987, and 1988, transportation of dangerous goods, major industrial accidents, media relations, training, and exercises were all pressing subjects of discussion.(9) These meetings became welcome occasions where "...potential sources of misunderstanding were clarified, and delegates felt at liberty to speak candidly on complicated and sensitive matters." Some officials cited them as "...further proof of 'a new era' in federal-provincial understanding among emergency planners".(10)

2 *The Role of Regional Directors*

While ministerial and official conferences were undoubtedly important, EPC's Regional Directors became key officials in day-to-day, face-to-face federal-provincial and -territorial liaison. EPC had 10 such Regional Directors, all reporting to the Director General, Operations. Each Regional Director had offices in a provincial capital and was responsible for that particular province. In addition, the Regional Director for Alberta shouldered responsibility for the Yukon and the Northwest Territories until, in October 1985, the Yukon was transferred to the jurisdiction of the British Columbia Regional Director. These regional managers helped administer federal emergency planning programs, facilitated provincial participation in joint preparedness ventures, and ensured that federal emergency planning initiatives were compatible with those being undertaken by the provinces and municipalities. They also coordinated the federal response to emergencies within their respective regions (if federal assistance was required) and assisted federal lead departments in dealing with specific emergencies. They coordinated the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program and the Disaster Financial Assistance arrangements in the provinces and territories, and, from time to time, they also participated in many provincial training exercises, conferences, symposia, and exhibitions.(11)

3 *Memoranda of Understanding*

One suggestion that emerged from the Federal-Provincial Conference was for a more structured approach to joint planning between federal and provincial authorities. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between each province or territory and the federal government was accepted as a device through which this would be accomplished. The MOU would enunciate the fundamental principles of joint planning for emergencies and set out the functions and responsibilities of each order of government for emergency preparedness. An umbrella agreement was worked out in January 1982 at the first annual meeting of federal and provincial officials,. Based on this, each province or territory engaged to negotiate a separate MOU noting specific

additions, exceptions, or qualifications. These individual agreements differed only in detail. Generally each signatory government agreed to:

- an identification of these emergency preparedness tasks best undertaken by each order of government
- negotiate multi-annual projects within the framework of the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program
- participate in the administration of Disaster Financial Assistance arrangements [sic] in case of disaster
- create training and public information programs to support common objectives
- communicate freely all information relating to emergency preparedness
- share human and material resources in case of emergency
- consult on agreements with the United States concerning emergency planning and emergency preparedness in the border areas.(12)

New Brunswick was the first province to negotiate an MOU, in October 1982, but not all provinces or territories were so eager to sign an agreement. Discussions continued year by year and by 1988, ten MOUs had been negotiated; only Quebec and Alberta had not agreed to terms.(13)

4 *Joint Emergency Planning Program*

It had always been recognized that as well as providing advice and expertise the federal government would help finance a national civil emergency system. Approved in October 1980, the Joint Emergency Planning Program (JEPP) was conceived to absorb and phase out the current Financial Assistance Program (FAP). This new initiative enabled the federal government either to contribute to or jointly engage in provincial or territorial planning projects which enhanced national response capability. Projects were normally submitted by provincial or territorial authorities with the support of the appropriate federal lead department. They would usually be evaluated by EPC Regional Directors first and then by EPC senior management. EPC would coordinate the evaluation and development of the projects with federal departments.

In order to be considered for funding a JEPP project must:

- support national objectives and priorities and enhance the national emergency response capability, with specific priorities identified through federal/provincial consultation;
- have a clear objective, an identifiable beginning and end and measurable progress;
- include a statement of the precise nature and extent of federal involvement and the method by which federal participation is to receive visibility and recognition;
- include an acceptable and approved provincial commitment to the project in funds or in kind, or to ongoing O&M costs, or any appropriate combination thereof; and
- either terminate within a twelve month period, or consist of a series of sub-projects, each of which can be completed in a twelve month period.(14)

The federal contribution was negotiated for each project and depended upon the extent of the project's contribution to national priorities and provincial needs, other projects under consideration, and the amount of funds available. Federal priorities included such matters as:

1. severe, but infrequent flooding;
2. saving of life and mitigation of human suffering;
3. preservation of peace, order and good government of Canada;
4. risk analysis, warning and communications; and

5. responsibilities normally in the federal sphere.(15)

The federal share of the cost varied anywhere from 75% of the total cost to 50%. In 1981, annual funding was set at $6 million. By 1988, it had been increased to $6.5 million, 38% of EPC's annual budget. The nature of the projects varied greatly but generally they fitted into three categories:

1. development and testing of emergency plans;
2. conduct of emergency-related training programs; and
3. purchase of communications and emergency response equipment.(16)

5 *Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements*

The other federal financial assistance package was designed to cover some of the costs of coping with the results of disasters. Its costs, consequently, were not predictable. Since the primary constitutional jurisdiction in matters relating to property is provincial, the provinces are responsible for responding to disasters involving property damage. The federal government indicated willingness to assist, however, if the cost of disaster recovery exceeded what a province could reasonably be expected to bear. Hence, in 1970, the federal government set up Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) to provide the administrative framework for providing aid to provinces and territories dealing with, and recovering from, disasters. Such disasters are usually caused by severe weather -- floods resulting from quick spring thaws and heavy rains, severe winter storms, or tornadoes. The same arrangements could serve to assist with other types of emergency. When, for example, an epidemic of western equine encephalitis (sleeping sickness) threatened Manitoba during the summer of 1983, federal assistance was provided under this program.(17)

The extent of the federal government's financial contribution was determined by a formula based on the population of the specific province or territory.

Per Capita Eligible Cost	Federal Share	Provincial Share
0 to $1	0%	100%
$1 to $3	50%	
$3 to $5	75%	
$5 plus	90%	

50%

25%

10%

Federal guidelines describing eligible costs were set out in Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements, published in September 1982. In general, such payments were made to restore public works to their pre-disaster condition and to help in the restoration of basic, essential personal property of private citizens, farmsteads, and small businesses. Usually the Regional Director for the province or territory affected maintained liaison with the provincial or territorial disaster assistance administration to advise and help in working out the financial assistance arrangements.(18) Although EPC administered DFAA, the funding did not come out of the agency's budget but from supplementary estimates providing central, flexible resources. Between 1970 when the arrangements were inaugurated and the end of 1988, the federal government paid out more than $134 million under DFAA, about $55 million since 1982.(19)

III Civil Emergency Planning in the Federal Government

1 *Departmental Planning and EPC*

In order to secure coordination at the highest level, the federal government created the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Planning. Chaired by EPC's Executive Director, it was composed of Assistant Deputy Ministers from 17 federal departments and agencies. It met several times a year to consider matters of policy and to evaluate operations in emergency planning. It advised the Minister on federal emergency policy and addressed issues requiring Cabinet consideration or interdepartmental consultation and coordination at the senior level. It was supported in its work by three subordinate bodies, all chaired by senior EPC officials. The Interdepartmental Working Group addressed emergency planning issues of general concern to all departments. The Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Mobilization focused on planning for the development of NEAs. The Interdepartmental Exercise Control Committee coordinated the participation of federal departments in national and international exercises. (The names of these three bodies varied slightly over the years, but their responsibilities remained unchanged .)(20)

The Emergency Planning Order 1981 had assigned to every Minister responsibility

> for the identification of possible types of emergencies within or directly related to his area of responsibility and for the preparation, evaluation, testing and implementation, when required, of appropriate related emergency plans and arrangements.(21)

While each Minister had his individual emergency planning responsibilities, it was EPC's mandate to stimulate, facilitate, and coordinate the departments' planning. Consequently early in 1983, EPC initiated discussions with the departments to produce an inventory of measures for dealing with peacetime and wartime emergencies. It was intended to list all of the plans and arrangements needed to respond to various types of disasters and to outline the concomitant responsibilities of federal governments and agencies. This listing would provide the framework from which to development departmental Emergency Books detailing the arrangements to implement each emergency assignment. Discussions between EPC and departmental planners led to the decision to produce two volumes, one listing measures for peacetime emergencies, the other for wartime crises. Although Pinard's 1980 policy had clearly given priority to peacetime emergency planning, the volume on wartime responses was undertaken first

because new arrangements were urgently needed to enhance Canada's ability to participate effectively in cyclical NATO sponsored emergency exercises.

Under the guidance of EPC, the Interdepartmental Working Group reviewed the existing system for alerting the public during a war emergency and then developed a revised listing of measures to deal with civil aspects of a wartime crisis. Each department prepared detailed procedures for those actions for which it had been assigned responsibility. As coordinator of the project, EPC moulded individual departmental submissions into a draft volume consistent in content and style. The draft was reviewed by the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Planning (ICEP) and approved as the War Emergency Book in January 1984. Testing in a national mobilization exercise organized by the Department of National Defence later that year resulted in amendments and refinements. Thus it was an improved War Emergency Book which, in February 1985, was available to guide Canadian civilian participation in the NATO exercise WINTEX-CIMTEX 85 "designed to exercise military commands and civilian authorities in the use of operational plans and procedures and emergency communications in the context of a fabricated wartime crisis."(22) Chaired by EPC, the Exercise Control Group, composed of representatives from key federal departments, used the Emergency Book to direct Canadian play. The exercise was carried out entirely on paper, however, with no actual movement of troops or equipment. Maintaining the War Emergency Book became an ongoing task as subsequent exercises led to new revisions. These were consolidated in a major revision in 1986. In the meantime a companion work on peacetime emergencies had yet to appear. Although consultation to prepare it were underway by 1984, it was regarded as a low priority.(23)

Although every federal Minister was required under the Planning Order to prepare plans to meet any aspect of a peace or war emergency that might lie within the responsibility of his portfolio, certain Ministers were singled out to set up special National Emergency Agencies (NEA). There were 11 such bodies, responsible for managing and controlling critical resources during a severe national emergency. Since each agency was charged with one aspect of national mobilization, planning for it became the responsibility of the analogous federal department. NEAs were to be created for Food, Energy, Transport, Industrial Production, Health and Welfare Services, Housing, Communications, Human Resources, Financial Control, Public Information, and Construction. Each department was expected to develop plans and procedures so that its NEA could be activated and brought to full readiness within 30 days.(24) The Emergency Planning Order did not indicate under what circumstances the NEAs would be activated, but EPC's reports indicate that they were designed primarily to deal with a grave international crisis or a war emergency and would be activated only in extreme circumstances during peacetime.(25)

Primary responsibility for developing and maintaining plans for the establishment of an NEA rested with the designated department, but EPC was involved at two levels. First, it advised individual departments on the preparation of their plans to set up NEAs. Secondly, one of its officials chaired the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Mobilization which was responsible for coordinating the planning of the NEAs.(26) In 1984, EPC was assigned the task of planning for the creation of the NEA for Public Information. In the Emergency Planning Order this responsibility was assigned to the Prime Minister, but EPC, through the Minister responsible for emergency planning, was asked to develop the plans for this agency.(27)

Not surprisingly, planning for the NEAs moved along more quickly in some departments than in others. Many lacked the manpower and resources to carry out the task. By 1986, EPC reported:

> Most government departments charged with National Emergency Agency planning have passed, or are about to pass, their first major milestone: the articulation of concepts of operations that will enable them to proceed with concrete policy, organizational, procedural and resource development. By the end of the decade, all departments should have developed their plans and arrangements to the point where the National Emergency Agencies' plans will be able to be tested in national exercises and used if necessary.(28)

Despite EPC's upbeat report, progress seems to have been rather slow.

2 *Civil Emergency Planning and EPC*

i Research

To keep abreast of the latest developments and discoveries in the field of emergency planning, EPC sponsored research on a variety of subjects. Some research was done in-house, but most was contracted out under the supervision of the scientists in the Evaluation and Analysis Division, Director General, Plans. During the 1980s, this research was directed in two general directions:

- the study of computers and their potential application in emergency planning;
- the study of human and organizational behaviour in crisis situations.(29)

On the first of these issues, EPC decided that computers could be a valuable teaching aid at the Federal Study Centre (later renamed the Canadian Emergency Planning College) at Arnprior. As early as 1982, the school had produced two computer programs for its recently purchased Audio Visual Computer Aided Tutor (AVCAT). Over the next few years, EPC identified computer-assisted learning systems available in Canada and evaluated the school's training requirements for computer-aided instruction technologies. In 1987, EPC designed and installed computer-aided simulation games at its Arnprior facility. These resembled war or business games, intended to help students develop group decision making skills.(30)

Computers could also assist in planning and decision making. In 1983, EPC decided to develop a database to enable planners to model the effects of emergencies on individual communities.(31) Over the next few years, EPC initiated studies of geographical data bases and population modelling techniques for casualty estimating.(32) By 1986, it was developing programs to integrate geographic information software, damage models, and population distribution to create nuclear attack models that could be used by civil defence planners to produce reasonably accurate representations of the damage effects of nuclear weapons on Canada. This program could also be used by planners for peacetime emergencies. The work continued throughout 1987 with a growing realization of the importance of multi-media work stations in emergency planning.(33) In 1988, EPC began to develop prototype software to simulate various emergencies in specific geographic areas across Canada, enabling emergency planners to track conditions ranging from chemical plume dispersion to radioactive fallout to satellite re-entry.(34)

The second major thrust of research during the 1980s was a continuing study of human and organizational behaviour in crisis situations. This project documented public reaction to emergencies, measuring the effectiveness with which authorities in charge of emergency response communicated with the public. It was carried out by the Emergency Communications Research Unit (ECRU), an organization headed by Professor Joseph Scanlon of the School of Journalism of Carleton University. Employing student volunteers from the university, Scanlon sent a team into a community immediately after a crisis to study public and organizational response to the

emergency and its immediate aftermath. Among the communities and emergencies studied were the following:

1982	Miramichi area, N.B.	patterns of communications during
1983	Corner Brook, Nfld.	earthquakes
	Courtney, B.C.	response to life-threatening toxic spills
1984	Princeton and Pemberton, B.C.	
	Medicine Hat	flooding
1985	various localities	train derailment involving dangerous goods
	Petawawa, Ont.	study of crowd management during papal tour
1987	Gander, Nfld.	train derailment
	Oromocto, N.B.	air crash
	Edmonton, Alta.	forest fire threat
		tornadoes(35)

In 1987, Scanlon was commissioned to produce a compendium of findings on the behaviour of organizations. His work was based mostly on Canadian sources, from information accumulated in these studies.(36)

While computer applications to emergency planning and human behaviour in crisis situations occupied a great deal of the research effort of EPC, other areas of study were not neglected. Two of these, earthquakes and strategic metals, are noteworthy. In 1982, a contract was awarded to an outside researcher to examine the nature of seismic sea waves and their effect on coastal environments with regard to the impact of the 1964 Alaska earthquake on Port Alberni.(37) In 1987, an ambitious two year pilot study was undertaken by a research team from Laval University. EPC commissioned the researchers to develop and demonstrate a methodology to predict the effects of earthquakes given certain factors such as soil structure and terrain. This study was to focus on Quebec City, the largest urban area near Charlevoix County where historically severe earthquakes were known to have occurred.(38)

Beginning in 1985, EPC began to show an interest in the availability of strategic minerals during an emergency situation. That year its officials conducted an economic impact assessment of the effect of interruptions in the supply of strategic minerals.(39) The next year EPC awarded a contract to a University of British Columbia research team to investigate the feasibility of using Leontieff's input/output approach to identify and assess the availability of critical minerals. (This approach was developed by the economist W. W. Leontieff and was widely used in economic planning.(40)) When the research team demonstrated the feasibility of the approach and recommended further research, EPC set up an input/output sub-committee to oversee the work. So significant was the research that other departments -- National Defence, Energy Mines and Resources, Regional Industrial Expansion, Statistics Canada, Supply and Services -- expressed an interest.(41) In 1987, the research team completed its work and submitted two reports on the application of input/output analysis to critical minerals within the overall context of the mobilization of natural resources in a national emergency.(42)

A related research initiative was EPC's sponsorship of a doctoral research fellowship. In 1984 it was named in honour of Stuart Nesbitt White, Director General, Plans, who retired from the Public Service in December of that year after 35 years devoted to emergency planning and preparedness.(43) The purpose of the fellowship was "...to encourage disaster research and emergency planning in Canada by developing a number of qualified professionals in the field." When their studies were completed the fellows had no formal obligation to EPC, but it was hoped that they would have developed a continuing interest in the subject. Almost any aspect of disasters or emergency planning

might be eligible for consideration of a study fellowship. For example, from 1982 to 1988, fellowships were awarded for studies in anthropology, strategic minerals, emergency telecommunications policy, urban planning, earthquake mitigation policy, emergency social services and disaster planning, and atmospheric sciences. These fellowships were held at the University of Toronto, University of British Columbia (2), Laval, McGill, and the University of Colorado.(44) The value was $10,800 annually as well as tuition and compulsory fees. A supplementary spousal allocation of $2000 and relocation costs might also be paid. The fellowship was tenable for up to four years, provided progress was satisfactory.(45)

ii Special Projects

From time to time on an "as needed" basis, EPC was called upon to undertake special projects. One such project related to communications. EPC relied upon commercial telephone networks to maintain communications between headquarters and the federal regional offices, a system which was extremely vulnerable to interruption during an emergency. In 1985, EPC obtained high frequency radio equipment to provide a backup system in case of commercial failure. When the system was set up, it provided enhanced communications between the federal regions and, where necessary, between Canadian and American civil emergency planners. At the same time, EPC established a special committee of emergency planning and communication experts to consider the feasibility of interconnecting provincial emergency communications systems. As a beginning, representatives from Communications Canada and from the provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick (provinces which had been especially active in the communications planning field) were invited to participate in initial studies.(46)

Another major concern, arising out of the Bhopal chemical disaster in India in December 1984, was the possibility that such an incident might happen in Canada. In March 1985, Environment Canada established a joint industry-government steering committee to examine the potential. It would review existing measures for preventing such accidents and assess the collective capabilities of industry and government to respond in the event of an actual chemical release. EPC was to play an increasingly important role as the investigation progressed.

Initially, EPC's Planning Coordinator for Public Protection was a permanent member of the committee and its Regional Directors were instrumental in getting input from the provinces.(47) Following completion of the steering committee's report in the mid-1980s, EPC set up a task force to respond to its recommendations.(48) Then, in May 1987, at the instigation of EPC and Environment Canada, the federal government struck a steering committee to launch the Major Industrial Accident Coordinating Committee (MIACC). Its mandate was to examine the potential for major industrial accidents in Canada and to improve the collective ability to prevent and respond to such incidents. Following a number of meetings of the steering committee and smaller working groups, "[t]here was a clear consensus that a cooperative approach to mitigation, response actions, information flow and education was required." The first annual meeting of MIACC was held in Ottawa toward the end of November 1988. Some 150 delegates from government and the private sector were in attendance.(49)

Three other special projects should also be noted. The first was a response to a request from a special African Famine Relief Committee established by the Canadian government. From December 1984 to April 1985, an officer of EPC was loaned to the Committee as a logistics advisor to coordinate arrangements for transporting Canadian relief supplies to African locations.(50) The second concerned Pope John Paul's visit to Canada in 1984. EPC staff played an important role in planning, setting up, and

operating communications at each mass site. They also assisted in establishing and manning the local emergency operations centres where most communications equipment was housed. Not only did EPC make the papal visit go smoothly but it also had a chance to exercise skills and capabilities that would be needed in actual emergency situations.(51) Finally, EPC helped to form the Task Group on Emergency Management/News Media Coordination made up of members of the Radio and Television News Directors Association and members of the federal and provincial emergency preparedness community. The Group met twice to discuss how the media and emergency planners might help each other, "...urging members to work together in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation." Such amity apparently had not characterized earlier relations.(52)

iii Training and Education

An important part of EPC's mandate was to provide a training and educational program in aspects of emergency planning and operations to federal, provincial, and municipal officials, both elected and appointed, who had emergency planning responsibilities. This was carried out at the Federal Training Centre (FSC) in the small Ottawa Valley town of Arnprior. As previously described, this facility was once the Civil Defence College, turned over to the Department of Public Works in the mid-1970s. Since EPC continued to be the most frequent user of the Centre, an agreement was negotiated with Public Works Canada to transfer responsibility for the facility to EPC early in 1985. It was renamed the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College (CEPC).(53)

EPC courses at Arnprior included accommodation and were offered free of charge, with EPC covering travel expenses. From 1982 to 1988, the Centre or College was used more and more. In 1982, 80 courses were offered; in 1988, the curriculum had increased to 110 courses. In 1982, about 1720 candidates participated in the program; by 1988, the number had risen to more than 3000. Under EPC, the College saw its budget rise from $2 million in 1985 to $2.5 million in 1988. That year, moreover, Treasury Board approved plans to add a $5 million, 120 unit residence to the College to replace the 85 sub-standard rooms in aging Second World War temporary buildings.(54)

The program of training and education offered at Arnprior had three components.(55) First, there were courses conducted by EPC officials. While additions were made from time to time, there was a core curriculum:

- Plans and Operations, Peace;
- Plans and Operations, War;
- Emergency Operations;
- Exercise Design.

Later courses included Emergency Communications and Emergency Public Information. EPC also organized an annual conference for mayors and elected officials to assist them in their responsibilities for the development and implementation of plans to meet emergencies at the local level. EPC considered these conferences especially important because emergency services would have to be delivered at the local level and therefore local planning was essential.

The second component was composed of courses sponsored by EPC but given by officials of departments with expertise in special aspects of emergency planning. Health and Welfare Canada gave general courses in emergency health services and social services planning and instructors' courses in casualty simulation and special care facilities. The Department of National Defence taught radiological defence, Transport

Canada the transportation of dangerous goods, Public Works Canada the design of fallout shelters, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada the problems of fisheries in an emergency, especially a nuclear war. New courses were added from time to time and others deleted.

The third component was made up of symposia, conferences, and workshops whose nature changed from year to year. EPC held an annual national symposium on a subject related to emergency planning, such as Public Information (1983), Emergency Preparedness Training (1985), or Emergency Communications (1987). The major conference was a yearly federal-provincial gathering on training. Until 1985, this group met only to consider the course requirements of CEPC, but in that year its mandate was expanded to include a broader consideration of cross-Canada training needs for emergency planning and response. The conference was intended to function as a national clearing house for the collection and dissemination of information on training needs at local, regional, and national levels. At the same time, it was to be kept informed of courses being offered in various parts of the country. The intent was to identify gaps and overlaps in current training and to coordinate recommendations for joint federal-provincial initiatives to resolve training problems.(56) Perhaps an immediate outcome of this more inclusive view was that CEPC arranged to pay travel and accommodation costs for two candidates from each province to attend a course given by the Alberta Public Safety Services in 1986. This was a course not offered by CEPC.(57)

Besides symposia and training conferences, a number of miscellaneous conferences and workshops were held from time to time. In 1983, EPC convened a conference on search and rescue. The next year it conducted a pilot course on emergency site management. In 1985 and 1986, it held orientation seminars for new departmental planners. Emergency public information was the subject of a seminar in 1987, followed by a workshop on earthquake emergency response the next year.

While EPC was very good at planning and education, its record of holding training exercises was less praiseworthy. Plans needed to be tested and a national exercise had not been held in Canada since 1966. Even the 1966 exercise involved only officials. Limited testing occurred when a paper exercise accompanied completion of the War Emergency Book in 1984, leading to participation in the NATO exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 85. EPC continued to coordinate Canadian participation in the cyclical NATO exercises HILEX and WINTEX-CIMEX. Interest in test activity picked up in 1987 when it was decided to plan a national exercise for 1990 to assess the country's capacity to respond to a national emergency. The next year was busy. EPC co-sponsored and participated in the development and conduct of a Canada-United States exercise that simulated a cross-border terrorist incident. Nearer home, EPC ran an exercise named Fourth Key at the CEGHQ in Carp to familiarize designated members of EPC staff with their duties in the event of a nuclear crisis. Planning proceeded for the NATO exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 89 and for the national mobilization exercise planned for 1990.(58)

iv Public Awareness

To fulfill its mandate to keep the public informed EPC staffed a Public Information Directorate, under the Director General, Operations. Its job was to answer questions from the public about the types of emergencies citizens may have to face and the preparations required to meet them. It met this mandate in three ways:

1. by publishing and sending out informational brochures, self-help advice

pamphlets, report manuals, and a quarterly digest of articles on emergency planning;
2. by preparing exhibits and displays for use at public exhibitions; and
3. by making its officers readily available to the media.

In April 1982, the senior management committee of EPC approved a completely revamped public information program which included 30 separate information packages. As well as the conventional means, this plan called for the use of broader media, such as updated radio and television spots, professionally produced audio-visual programs, direct mail, cooperative advertising ventures, and the provision of public speakers. Clearly, EPC was going to make a concerted effort to get its message to a broader audience.(59)

In 1983, the danger of nuclear war was a major preoccupation for EPC's Public Information Directorate. Nuclear arms negotiations had stalled, super-power rhetoric was becoming increasingly angry, and new weapons were being deployed. At the same time, disarmament groups were creating considerable publicity by arguing that civil defence was futile and contributed to the likelihood of nuclear war. "The Day After", a TV movie about the aftermath of nuclear war, prompted a flood of enquiries to EPC's regional staff. EPC took advantage of the heightened interest, making senior headquarters and regional officials available for interviews and panel discussions. This was a serious attempt "...to promote greater public awareness and understanding of federal initiatives to provide for the protection of Canadians in the event of nuclear war."(60)

Another public information initiative provided displays and information booths to major public exhibitions, such as the Pacific National Exhibition at Vancouver or the Quebec Provincial Exhibition. The scaled-down model of a basement fallout shelter provided for the Quebec Home Show in 1984 proved so popular that officials decided to build a full-scale model for the Montreal Home Show in March 1985. Working with Public Works Canada and SURVIVAL, a local firm, EPC created a major display on wartime public protection. It featured a full-size model of a basement fallout shelter, fully stocked with enough supplies for a family of five for two weeks.(61)

Throughout this period, relations with the media were an on-going concern. Although EPC made a point of ensuring its senior officials and Regional Directors were readily accessible and in 1984 organized two media training seminars, media relations were characterized by distrust. To overcome this, in 1985 the Radio and Television News Directors Association of Canada (RTNDA) proposed joint planning for media liaison in emergency situations. EPC responded by setting up a small working group of federal and provincial planners and representatives of RTNDA to develop a model media liaison plan. Together, the two groups held a seminar on emergency public information which stressed that an up-to-date and practised media information plan was essential. Senior federal and provincial information officers were instructed to *work* with the media not *deal* with them.(62)

There is evidence that senior management was less than satisfied with the information plan inaugurated in 1982 for in 1986 a new Director of Public Information was appointed followed by subsequent appointments to key positions within the directorate.(63) The function of the directorate was enlarged to provide communication advice, writing, editorial, graphic art, publishing, exposition, library, and audio-visual services to the Minister, senior EPC executives, and CEPC at Arnprior. EPC also took a hard look at its current publication program.(64)

Existing visual and printed materials were studied for effectiveness and recommendations

made for implementing a new corporate look consistent with the image of a dynamic organization responsible for encouraging preparedness across the country.(65)

This new look was based on a highly visible colour scheme of black and yellow which was reflected in all new public information material and in older material as it was redone and phased in. The quarterly digest was renamed Emergency Preparedness Digest (in keeping with the name change of the organization) and underwent a format revision with the first issue in 1987.

A number of new initiatives were launched. The Directorate became a clearing house for information on emergency preparedness in Canada and consolidated its position as a credible source of information on emergency preparedness to Parliament, the public, the media, and emergency response officials in Canada and elsewhere. It built up a research centre available to outside researchers which included books, reports, studies, videotapes, photos, and slides.

The Directorate continued its information program, keeping Canadians informed of the necessity to "Plan for Tomorrow...Today."(66) It prepared a series of public service announcements for TV and radio and produced videotapes for TV. It continued to send out self-help brochures and the Emergency Preparedness Digest. In 1988, it introduced a pilot study into 15 Ontario schools to test the practicality of introducing a multi-media program on emergency preparedness into school curricula. In sum, the Directorate was working aggressively to get the emergency preparedness message before the public.(67)

v Continuity of Government

The 1981 Emergency Planning Order assigned responsibility to "[d]irect the implementation of arrangements to provide for the protection and continuity of the Government of Canada during an emergency" to the Minister responsible for Emergency Planning.(68) This was, of course, not a new responsibility for EPC. The Continuity of Government Program was initiated by the Diefenbaker government in 1958, and considerable planning had taken place under both the Progressive Conservatives and the succeeding Liberal government. Emergency government headquarters had been built near Ottawa and in six of the provinces before the program was frozen to a halt in 1968. Drastic cuts in capital expenditure kept the system dormant, with only sufficient funds to maintain the buildings and prevent them from deteriorating irretrievably.

In 1983, the Federal-Provincial Conference of Senior Officials on Emergency Planning set up a task force to investigate, among other matters, the state of the Continuity of Government Program. On the one hand, the task force found that the purpose behind the Program were still sound:

- to preserve the thread of constitutional authority in Canada by protecting those in whom it is vested; and
- to provide a site from which survival operations could be directed by federal and provincial ministers.

On the other hand, its comments on the ability of the program to carry out its mandate were less than flattering: "The fact is that the continuity of government program is not in good shape today...." It questioned the ability of governments to be able to function out of the emergency government headquarters. They were not in good mechanical condition. Their communication equipment was badly out of date. Few essential records were stored in them. There was no capacity for electronic data processing in any of

them. Finally, they stood every chance of being isolated from the citizenry by electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). This phenomenon accompanies every nuclear blast and can knock out electronic equipment unless it is especially protected.(69)

After a decade and a half of neglect, the federal government began to take some steps to transform the Continuity of Government Program. Even before the Task Force reported in 1985, there were some efforts to modernize and repair existing facilities at the central and regional levels. Progress was slow because of financial restraints.(70) EPC also turned its attention to completing the system of regional emergency government headquarters, of which four were still unbuilt. In 1983, officials began discussions with the New Brunswick government about building a regional emergency government headquarters as part of the Maritime Forestry Complex near Fredericton, but negotiations fell through.(71) There was no progress on completing the other regional headquarters, and the system remained essentially as it was when funding was frozen in 1968.

In 1985, EPC began to take a greater interest in the Central Emergency Government Headquarters. It negotiated a revised Memorandum with DND for the operation and maintenance of the building at Carp. Under this agreement, DND retained responsibility for maintaining and equipping the physical facilities for emergency government in support of the planning arrangements developed by EPC. For its part, EPC began to revise the outdated plans and procedures for manning, activation, and operation of the CEGHQ. At the same time, it established an advisory committee composed of representatives of departments with emergency government functions to review and update their operations manuals; this group met at the central facility several times.(72) By 1987, EPC and Supply and Services Canada had completed a review of all material requirements for emergency government headquarters and EPC continued to evaluate proposed emergency rations to be stored in protected sites.(73) Finally, during 1985, 1986, and 1987, EPC conducted a number of training exercises at CEGHQ which simulated nuclear attacks on North America.(74)

IV International Relations

1 *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

EPC was responsible for coordinating Canada's civil emergency planning obligations under NATO. It maintained a permanent attaché to the Canadian delegation at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and EPC representatives sat on a number of NATO committees. The Executive Director attended the twice-yearly meetings of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) which reported directly to the NATO Council on emergency planning matters. The permanent attaché represented EPC at the Committee's monthly sessions.(75)

SCEPC planned and coordinated the activities of eight committees or boards, including the Civil Defence Committee, upon which the Director General, Plans, sat. Representatives to the other committees were provided by federal departments which were responsible for individual functions (for example, an official of Agriculture Canada on the Food and Agriculture Committee). These were planning committees concerned with preparing detailed operating procedures. They were responsible for manning NATO Civil Wartime Agencies (NCWA) which would come into being if NATO were faced with a serious crisis or war. (These appear to be analogous to the Canadian NEAs.) EPC arranged for an interdepartmental review of all emergency planning papers for NATO meetings to ensure consistency with federal policy.(76)

In the 1970s and early 1980s NATO paid little attention to civil emergency planning even as the armed forces of the member nations (which were suffering cutbacks to their logistical capabilities) were coming to depend more and more on civil resources to back them up.(77) This NATO emphasis began to shift by 1984. That year the Organization held a National Emergency Planning Symposium, and the next year it inaugurated a yearly training course on civil-military cooperation in wartime planning. EPC sent representatives to the symposium and participated in the training courses held in West Germany.(78)

In Canada, EPC contributed to enhancing NATO's civil emergency planning capabilities. In 1985, EPC officials briefed students from the NATO Defence College on Canadian civil emergency planning during a visit to Ottawa on their North American tour. EPC coordinated Canadian civil participation in NATO high level exercises in the HILEX and WINTEX-CIMEX series. Through the Interdepartmental Exercise Coordinating Committee, EPC was able to arrange for senior participation which contributed significantly to the success of the exercises and to practising and improving Canadian crisis management machinery.(79)

2 *United States of America*

Agreements on cooperation and coordination of the use of resources for the defence of Canada and the United States date back to the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 and the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941. Subsequent agreements in 1951 and 1963 addressed civil defence arrangements but proved inadequate. Consequently, in 1967 the United States/Canada Civil Emergency Planning Agreement was effected by an exchange of notes and signed in Ottawa on 8 August 1967. This agreement provided for consultation and cooperation in civil emergency planning between the two countries. Its purpose was to ensure that the national plans of each were as compatible as was considered desirable and possible by both parties. Between 1967 and 1972, there was considerable activity and a number of committees were set up to study different sectors of civil emergency planning, such as transportation, manpower, food, etc. At the same time, over 60 separate agreements were signed between contiguous provinces and states to arrange for assistance in emergencies. In 1972, all formal bilateral activities under the Agreement ceased. The civil emergency organizations in the United States and Canada were being restructured. The doctrine of mutual deterrence to prevent nuclear war downplayed the necessity for civil defence with a consequent reduction in funding. For about 10 years, the Agreement, while technically in effect, lay dormant.(80)

When the Cold War began to heat up again in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Canada's role in the joint defence of North America once again became a matter for discussion. This recognized the interdependence of the civil emergency planning in the two countries. Consultation was revived in February 1982 when American and Canadian officials met in Washington to determine if the 1967 agreement still provided an adequate framework for cooperation in civil emergency planning for war. They agreed that the accord should remain in effect while all existing bilateral arrangements covered by it were to be reviewed sector by sector (e.g. transportation, communications, etc.) to determine whether they were still valid. As this review went forward it was expanded to include planning for peace time emergencies as well. By June 1984, an umbrella agreement had been drafted. It provided for the negotiation of bilateral sub-agreements on specific emergency planning subjects of mutual concern. Over the next two years, discussions continued between EPC and the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Finally, in Ottawa in late April 1986, the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in Comprehensive Civil Emergency Planning and

Management was signed by W. B. Snarr, Executive Director of EPC and the Honorable Julius W. Becton, Jr., Director of FEMA.(81)

The centrepiece of the Agreement was a list of 10 principles of cooperation intended to establish a framework for the conclusion of future bilateral arrangements for civil emergency planning. It set out the reciprocal rules for treating citizens, workers, equipment, and other resources entering or in the other country's territory. Neither government was to levy taxes on or make unusual charges for the use of the other's equipment. Each government pledged to facilitate the movement of workers and equipment across the border when deemed necessary. The agreement's principles allowed for the proper security and cooperative use of equipment and personnel and the disposal of perishable goods on the other's territory. Finally, each government undertook to encourage contiguous provincial, state, and local governments to conclude cooperative emergency agreements.

The Agreement also established a consultative group of officials, co-chaired by the Executive Director of EPC and the Director of FEMA. Its mandate was to encourage, facilitate and oversee the coordination of civil emergency planning and management in all areas of mutual interest. Among its responsibilities was making recommendations to the governments of Canada and the United States about the development of studies, the exchange of information, and the development and coordination of emergency plans and recommendations. As well, this group was to encourage and facilitate the planning and development of mutual cooperation for comprehensive civil emergency management by provinces, states, and municipalities. It could establish working groups to carry out various tasks.(82) The Consultative Group very quickly began its work. By 1988, working groups had been set up to study exercises, communications, transportation, and health services with mandates to propose detailed bilateral arrangements.(83)

V Emergencies Legislation

At the Federal-Provincial Conference on emergency planning in June 1981, Yvon Pinard questioned the adequacy of Canadian emergencies legislation, in particular the War Measures Act. He pointed out that the War Measures Act was deficient on two grounds. First, it did not embody human rights safeguards as set out in the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 or in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil Rights to which Canada had been a signatory. Secondly, the War Measures Act was designed for a war emergency, not for civil disasters, and its use during the FLQ October Crisis of 1970 provoked adverse criticism. What was needed, Pinard argued, was a continuing statute on emergencies. Without such legislation in place, it would be necessary to enact hurriedly prepared and perhaps flawed provisions, or, if Parliament were not in session, to act extra-legally.

Pinard defined four categories of emergencies:

- public safety and welfare
- public order
- international crisis
- war

He argued that new legislation was necessary to deal with each type of emergency. Such legislation should embody a number of basic principles -- safeguards to protect individual rights, prompt confirmation of its invocation by Parliament, compensation for losses suffered by the use of exceptional powers, and timely consultation with

provincial governments and private interests directly affected.(84)

Soon responsibility for civil emergency planning was transferred from Pinard as Secretary of State to the Minister of National Defence. Perhaps this is the reason that reform of emergency legislation hung fire under the Liberal government. During the election campaign of 1984, the Progressive Conservatives promised to repeal the War Measures Act. In 1985, following their victory, the Minister of National Defence announced that it was the government's intention to enact comprehensive emergencies legislation covering the full spectrum of potential emergency situations. In consultation with the provincial governments and other federal departments, EPC undertook to develop drafting guidance for this legislation.(85)

The proposal put forward was very similar to that outlined by Pinard in 1981. The four categories of emergency that Pinard had defined were retained. Fundamental freedoms and civil rights were to be respected. Provincial governments were to be consulted. In February 1986, in preparation for introducing this legislation into the House of Commons, the Minister convened a Federal-Provincial Conference of ministers responsible for emergency planning. Work continued on the legislation throughout 1986 and into 1987. On 26 June, two bills were introduced into the House of Commons, the Emergency Preparedness Act (Bill C-76) and the Emergencies Act (Bill C-77). The Emergency Planning Order 1981 was revoked at the same time.(86)

The Emergencies Act, which replaced the War Measures Act, provided the government of Canada with the means to respond to national emergencies. Actions taken under its provisions would be subject to Parliament's right to review and the provinces were to be consulted. At the same time the fundamental rights of individuals were respected. The Act defined four types of emergency:

- Public Welfare Emergency
- Public Order Emergency
- International Emergency
- War Emergency

It provided for the Governor in Council to declare an emergency under one of these headings and then to make orders or regulations to deal with it. Such measures would be subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights. It must also take into account the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especially in regard to those fundamental rights that were not to be limited or abridged even in an emergency. Before the government could declare an emergency, moreover, the provincial authorities in the province or provinces affected had to be consulted.

The Act required that the government account for its actions before Parliament within a specified time. Before the government could extend or amend a declaration it had to come back to Parliament for approval. The period during which any declaration applied was limited and the nature of the emergency measures that could be undertaken were also restricted. Furthermore, the Act provided for compensation for loss, injury, or damage unfairly suffered by an individual as a result of its application. The Act was designed so that each part of it could be invoked separately, but in the unlikely event of an extreme situation more than one part could be invoked simultaneously.(87)

At the same time that the Emergencies Act was introduced into the House of Commons, the government also fulfilled another of its election promises. While in opposition the Progressive Conservatives had criticized Emergency Planning Order 1981 both for its

content and for its legal basis. The Order relied upon the Royal Prerogative rather than a statute, an unusual situation. Legally it was not clear how the National Emergency Agencies (NEA) set out in the Order could be activated to deal with a peacetime emergency since no special emergencies legislation existed. In wartime, of course, the War Measures Act applied. The official opposition also expressed grave concerns over certain powers to be exercised during a war emergency -- namely, the creation of internment camps and the imposition of censorship.(88) In addition the mandate, role, and responsibility of EPC had not been defined by statute. Consequently the government revoked Emergency Planning Order 1981 and introduced the Emergency Preparedness Act.

The Emergency Preparedness Act established EPC as a branch of the Public Service of Canada, presided over by a Minister and under the direction of an Executive Director. Its mission was clear:

> The purpose of Emergency Preparedness Canada is to advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types, including war and other armed conflict, by facilitating and coordinating, among government institutions and in cooperation with provincial governments, foreign governments and international organizations, the development and implementation of civil emergency plans.(89)

The act went on to detail the functions of EPC with respect to the development of civil emergency plans. These included provincial and local planning, providing training and education, enhancing public awareness, conducting research, providing for continuity of government, and coordinating and supporting the development and testing of civil emergency plans of government departments, provincial and local authorities, and international agencies. It also set out EPC's functions with respect to the implementation of civil emergency plans. These included monitoring potential, imminent, or actual emergencies, and the coordination or support, as required, of federal departmental plans and of assistance to a province during or after an emergency. The Act went on to define federal ministerial responsibilities to develop civil emergency plans for peace and war emergencies related to the minister's area of accountability. Finally, it made provision for the government to make orders and regulations dealing with departmental plans and the use of federal resources in response to emergencies.(90)

The Emergency Preparedness Act was finally approved on 27 April 1988 and proclaimed on 1 October 1988. Essentially it gave statutory recognition to an existing situation. In the words of one writer:

> Proclamation of C-76 [Emergency Preparedness Act] will mean little change to the work of emergency planners. The political and legal atmosphere in which it is carried out, however, stands to improve appreciably. Emergency preparedness now has a statutory base.(91)

VI Conclusion

At the beginning of the decade, civil emergency planning in Canada was moribund. By 1988, it had been given vigorous new life. In the interim, lines of communication were reopened between the federal government and the provinces and a series of Memoranda of Understanding had been signed which defined their respective responsibilities in the field of civil emergency planning. A new joint financial program (JEPP) had been put in place to encourage provincial participation. EPC had assumed the administration of the Disaster Financial Assistance (DFA) arrangements which helped to pay for disaster recovery. Federal departments (to a greater or lesser extent) were taking disaster planning more seriously and their plans were being considered in totality rather than piecemeal. EPC was actively pursuing its mandate.

Once it was transferred back to EPC, the Canadian Civil Emergencies College at Arnprior offered an increasing number of courses to federal, provincial, and local officials charged with emergency planning responsibilities. EPC sponsored research on a wide variety of subjects related to emergency planning, but in particular on computer applications for teaching and for decision making. A major continuing project also investigated the behaviour of organizations and individuals in crisis situations. EPC had been increasingly aware of the need for communication with the public and instituted an active publicity program through radio, television, publications, and exhibits. While there was new attention paid to the continuity of government program, the system of emergency government headquarters was not completed. Although EPC continued to work with NATO, major international attention focused on the renewal of Canada's lapsed emergency planning relationship with the United States. A new agreement was negotiated to provide the framework for a series of bilateral studies and agreements on emergency planning.

Finally, new emergencies legislation was enacted. When the Emergencies Act replaced the War Measures Act, it set out the rules for dealing with four types of emergencies (including war) while preserving fundamental human rights. For the first time the Emergency Preparedness Act established Emergency Preparedness Canada as an agency of the Public Service of Canada reporting to a minister and set out its responsibilities. The stage was set for Emergency Preparedness Canada to move on into the 1990s.

Endnotes

1. "Conference of Federal and Provincial Ministers, and Representatives of Territorial Governments, Responsible for Emergency Planning", Emergency Planning Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1981), p. 6. [henceforth Digest].

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

4. Ibid., p. 10.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

6. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

7. Ibid., p. 13.

8. Emergency Planning Canada Annual Review, 1983, p. 9. [henceforth Annual Review].

9. Annual Review, 1985, p. 8; 1986, p. 9; 1987, p. 9; 1988, p.15.

10. "Federal-Provincial Conference on Emergency Planning", Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1983), p. 12.

11. Annual Review, 1985, p. 9; 1986, p. 10; 1987, p. 10; 1988, p. 12.

12. Annual Review, 1987, p. 8.

13. Annual Review, 1988, p. 13.

14. "Joint Emergency Planning Program", Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1981), p. 16.

15. Ibid., p. 16.

16. Annual Review, 1987, p. 11.

17. See the Annual Review 1982-8, for examples of DFAA funding.

18. Annual Review, 1982, pp. 9-10.

19. Annual Review, 1988, p. 14.

20. Annual Review, 1982, p. 2; 1984, p.4; 1985, p. 3.

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23. Annual Review, 1983, p. 7; 1984, p. 4; 1985, p. 4; 1986, p. 13.

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27. Annual Review, 1984, p. 4.

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31. Annual Review, 1983, p. 12.

32. Annual Review, 1984, p. 13; 1985, p. 14.

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34. Annual Review, 1986, p. 20.

35. Annual Review, 1982, p. 13; 1983, pp. 12-13; 1984, p. 13; 1985, p. 14; 1986, p. 22.

36. Annual Review, 1987, p. 20.

37. Annual Review, 1982, p. 13.

38. Annual Review, 1987, p. 20; 1988, p. 20.

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41. Annual Review, 1986, p. 21.

42. Annual Review, 1987, p. 20.

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44. Annual Review, 1983, p. 13; 1987, p. 22; 1988, p.21.

45. "Research Fellowship", Digest, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1985), p.14.

46. Annual Review, 1985, p. 16.

47. Annual Review, 1985, p. 17.

48. Annual Review, 1986, p. 24.

49. Annual Review, 1987, p. 23; 1988, p. 15.

50. Annual Review, 1984, p. 16.

51. Annual Review, 1984, p. 16.

52. Annual Review, 1986, p. 24.

53. Annual Review, 1984, p. 12.

54. Annual Review, 1982, p. 12; 1985, p. 12; 1988, p. 19.

55. See the Annual Review, 1982-5, Appendix D, for a listing of some of the courses, symposia, and workshops.

56. Annual Review, 1985, p. 12.

57. Annual Review, 1986, p. 19.

58. Annual Review, 1987, p. 17; 1988, p. 18.

59. Annual Review, 1982, p. 14.

60. Annual Review, 1983, p. 13.

61. Annual Review, 1984, p. 15; 1985, p. 15.

62. Annual Review, 1985, p. 15; 1987, p. 24.

63. Annual Review, 1986, p. 25.

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65. Annual Review, 1986, p. 25.

66. Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1981), p. 19, slogan on an poster.

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70. Annual Review, 1984, p. 5.

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72. Annual Review, 1985, pp. 5-6.

73. Annual Review, 1987, p 13.

74. Annual Review, 1985, p 6; 1986, p. 14; 1987, p. 13..

75. Annual Review, 1983, p. 9.

76. William J. Yost, "Is Nato [sic] Civil Emergency Planning a Military Mystery?", Digest, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1981), pp. 4-5.

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84. Yvon Pinard, "Remarks on Emergencies Legislation", Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1981), pp. 11-12.

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88. "Emergency Planning Order P. C. 1981-1305", Digest, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1982), pp. 13-21, an extract from Hansard, 17 Dec. 1981, is an example of Progressive Conservative criticism; Janson, op. cit., p. 3.

89. Emergency Preparedness Act, Section 4, Chapter E-4.6, R. S., 1985, c. 6 (4th Supp.).

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Chapter V

Toward the Millennium -- Emergency Preparedness Planning in the 1990s

I Introduction

With the passing of the Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act, the statutory foundations of emergency preparedness planning and response in Canada were in place. Emergency Preparedness Canada needed to stand back and examine the implications of the legislation. The Emergencies Act defined four types of emergency requiring much broader planning and an increased emphasis on the need for provincial consultation in the preparation and implementation of emergency plans. At the same time, federal-provincial financial programs, like JEPP and DFA Arrangements, continued unchanged.

Under the Emergency Preparedness Act, EPC's role remained much as before. Its responsibilities continued to be to encourage, coordinate, and facilitate emergency preparedness planning within the federal government and between federal, provincial/territorial, and municipal authorities. EPC continued to emphasize research, training, and public awareness although it became more involved in exercising plans than it had been in the 1980s.

These new acts were passed in a relatively stable climate in 1988. Soon afterward, things rapidly began to change. The political revolutions that were unfolding in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union meant a refocusing of EPCs international commitments, especially in NATO. In Canada, budget cuts and downsizing began to have dramatic affects on EPC. During the 1990s, the organization would lose its departmental status and have to seek new ways to continue to fulfil its mandate. As the millennium approached it joined other government departments in the search for private sector partnerships.

II Civil Emergency Planning in the Federal Government

1 *Organizational Change*

At the highest level, emergency preparedness planning by the federal government was guided and coordinated by the Minister's Advisory Committee on Emergency Preparedness (MACEP). This Committee was set up following the creation of EPC as a separate agency within the Public Service of Canada. It was chaired by EPC's Executive Director and composed of assistant deputy ministers from the principal departments and agencies with policy and program responsibilities for emergencies. Its mandate was to advise the Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness on major policy and program issues affecting federal emergency preparedness as a whole. MACEP was also to be a vehicle to encourage cooperation among government departments and agencies. Its role was to reinforce the importance of emergency preparedness and response among senior officials.(1)

The Emergency Preparedness Act, which was proclaimed on 1 October 1988, designated EPC as a department within Schedule B of the Financial Administration Act. Under its provisions, EPC was no longer dependent upon the Department of National Defence for certain administrative matters, but instead was entirely

responsible for its own affairs.(2) This shift in responsibilities resulted in a reorganization of the agency. The major change was the creation of a third branch, Corporate Programs, under a director general. With four directors, this new branch was responsible for corporate planning and coordination, finance and administration, human resources, and informatics. The other two branches were renamed Readiness and Operations (formerly Operations) and Program Development (formerly Plans). While there were minor changes in these branches (as reflected by changes in nomenclature), their responsibilities continued much as before. There were now three Directors General under the Executive Director who in turn reported to the Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of National Defence.(3)

This organizational arrangement remained in effect until early in 1992. In February of that year, as a cost cutting measure, it was announced in the budget speech that EPC was to be rolled back into the Department of National Defence. Under the new arrangement, EPC no longer reported to the Minister of National Defence but to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. While the agency was still headed by the Executive Director, the positions of Directors General of Corporate Programs and Program Development were eliminated. The position of Director General, Readiness and Operations, to whom the nine Regional Directors reported, remained on the organization chart. Some of the administrative functions of the former Corporate Programs Branch were also diverted to the Department of National Defence.(4) These organizational changes did not affect EPC's responsibilities. These administrative changes have remained in effect throughout the 1990s (5), although they required confirmation by an amendment to the Emergency Preparedness Act under which EPC had been created. This statutory requirement was fulfilled when Bill C-65, an act to reorganize and dissolve certain federal agencies, received royal assent on 31 July 1995. Its amendments were entirely administrative and did not in any way affect the mandate of EPC.(6)

Following the decision to fold EPC back into the Department of National Defence, MACEP was replaced by the Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee which assumed its responsibilities. Although it was still composed of assistant deputy ministers of the federal departments and agencies directly involved in emergency preparedness, the advisory committee was chaired by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff who, as noted above, was directly responsible for EPC. The mandate of the Committee remained the same as that of MACEP.(7) In the words of the Annual Report of 1992-93:

> The Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee will be the main forum for interdepartmental consultation and management of the government's emergency preparedness program, balancing program priorities to ensure that high-probability, low impact emergencies can be responded to effectively in all parts of the country, while also providing for the development of emergency arrangements to deal with less likely, but large-scale emergencies.(8)

In other words, anything from a winter storm to a nuclear accident.

2 *Orders and Regulations*

Once the federal government began to consider the ramifications of the Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act, MACEP recommended that EPC begin developing the orders and regulations that were required to bring into effect provisions of the new acts.(9) EPC also began work with the Department of Justice to assemble materials so that it could advise the departments on the implications of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in their planning activities. This advice was especially important

as departments began to draft orders and regulations for use in a national emergency.(10)

EPC prepared model proclamations declaring in effect the four states of emergency defined by the Emergencies Act. These were drafted in such a way that the actual details of the emergency could be inserted as necessary for a draft proclamation to be immediately dispatched for Cabinet consideration. As legal instruments that would require immediate execution, they were carefully prepared in conjunction with the Department of Justice and vetted by the department's Privy Council Section.(11) EPC also prepared draft orders declaring certain provincial emergencies to be of concern to the federal government and authorizing financial assistance to provinces requesting aid. This action is allowed under Section 9 of the Emergency Preparedness Act.(12)

Part V of the Emergencies Act provides for paying reasonable compensation to any person who suffers loss, injury, or damage as a result of actions taken under Parts I to IV of the Act or of any proclamation, order, or regulation made under it. When the Gulf War prompted EPC to think seriously about the need for compensation regulations, it consulted with a number of interested departments to prepare draft regulations. Under the appropriate circumstances, these could be used to give effect to Part V of the Act.(13)

In consultation with key departments and agencies EPC also began to prepare the Civil Emergency Preparedness Management Order. In part, this Order was intended to replace the recently revoked 1981 Emergency Planning Order. It set out the particular responsibilities of Ministers for emergency planning in their respective sectors. By 1991, a consensus had been reached and the general form of the Order was ready for promulgation. By then, however, priorities had changed. Work on the Order was replaced by the more comprehensive review of Canada's 12-year-old federal policy for emergencies.(14)

3 *Emergency Preparedness Policy*

The Annual Report to Parliament, 1992-93, announcing EPC's integration into the Department of National Defence, noted that "[t]he federal government's emergency preparedness policy is not directly affected, but is under review for routine updating." (15) That policy originated in 1980. The other document defining government activity, the Emergency Planning Order 1981, which outlined the duties of key departments and agencies in an emergency, had been revoked in 1987. Therefore, a review of policy was both timely and necessary to make sure it conformed to the new emergencies legislation. In early May 1995, the Government approved a revised Federal Policy for Emergencies.(16)

The new policy was not a radical departure from preceding practices, although there were some features that should be noted. It included a description of the emergency planning responsibilities of key departments, agencies, and crown corporations. While individual Ministers remained responsible for identifying and planning for emergencies under Section 7 of the Emergency Preparedness Act, the nature of the emergencies to be accommodated had broadened. This was addressed by instituting two stages of planning. The first would handle emergencies of a lesser scale, which were within the department's normal legislative authority, such as providing assistance to a provincial or territorial government or dealing with a crisis in its jurisdiction. The second would relate to catastrophic natural disasters, threats to the public order, international crises, or war which might entail the use of extraordinary powers as outlined under the Emergencies Act.

Another new feature was the explicit statement of an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness. This provided formal recognition of a basic principle of emergency

preparedness in Canada and indeed in most Western nations. EPC had identified more than 60 potential causes for emergencies in Canada: devising response plans for each emergency was unrealistic. Instead, plans were keyed to the adverse effects common to most emergencies rather than to their diverse causes.

The 1995 revised Federal Policy for Emergencies reaffirmed the federal government's leadership role in developing a credible national capability to meet all types of emergencies. It recognized that working closely with other governments, voluntary and private agencies was necessary to achieve this capability. It also restated the mission of EPC:

> Emergency Preparedness Canada's role, on behalf of the Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness, is to advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types, including the four types of national emergencies set out in the Emergencies Act. This is accomplished by facilitating and coordinating, among government institutions and in cooperation with provincial governments, foreign governments and international organizations, the development of civil emergency plans and assisting, when required, in their implementation.(17)

4 *National Emergency Arrangements*

The 1980 Federal Policy on Emergency Planning and the 1981 Emergency Planning Order had assigned certain departments and agencies the responsibility of creating National Emergency Agencies (NEA). The purpose of these bodies was to control and regulate the use of national resources when a serious national emergency occurred, although it was not until the mid-1980s that departments were given additional resources to focus on this task. Even then, the initial planning of NEAs had focussed on the threat of war. This may have been because the only circumstances envisaged in which an NEA would be activated was a conventional war overseas or a nuclear attack on North America or because the War Measures Act was the only legislation which could be invoked to activate an NEA. In any case, when the passage of the Emergencies Act replaced the War Measures Act as the basis for crisis response, it provided a broader definition of national emergency, one which included public welfare, public order, and international causes as well as war.(18)

While creation of NEAs was the responsibility of certain departments, the Emergency Preparedness Act required that all departments develop emergency plans within their area of responsibility for peace or war. This would enable them to provide for the safety of their organizations and staffs, to ensure the continuity of essential services to the public, and to provide support to other departments and other levels of government facing an emergency. This system reduced the importance of NEAs. Rather than the main vehicles for federal emergency response, they became only one element in the wider range of national emergency arrangements for which all departments were responsible.

In its role of facilitator and coordinator, EPC attempted to establish milestones for the development of national emergency arrangements. It targeted the fall of 1990, the date established for the start of the exercise CANATEX 90, as the completion date for the federal component of national emergency arrangements planning. Most departments had completed the federal component of their national emergency arrangements for emergencies under Part III (international) and Part IV (war)of the Emergencies Act by this date. At the same time , all departments made good progress in the planning of their contributions to the National Earthquake Support Plan. Developed to meet the possibility of a major earthquake in British Columbia, this plan became a model for developing a generic set of national emergency arrangements for a Part I public welfare emergency. The departments also collaborated to create a national counter-terrorism

plan. This was to be the basis of national emergency arrangements for a Part II public order emergency.(19)

The Emergencies Act required consultation between the federal and provincial governments before an emergency could be proclaimed. These consultative requirements were especially stringent with regard to public welfare and public order emergencies which were under provincial government jurisdiction, with the federal government assigned a supportive rather than a lead role.(20) At a conference in February 1992, senior federal, provincial, and territorial officials endorsed a set of consultative guidelines which were to be followed in a national emergency.(21) Then, over the next few years, these governments began the complicated process of working out specific consultative arrangements and coordinating the application of their individual emergency plans. The emergency arrangements being devised were considered "national" not "federal", acknowledging the joint efforts of all orders of government as well as the private sector and non-governmental organizations.(22) Their work continued, but

> progress is to a considerable degree dependent upon the extent of intergovernmental consultation that can be undertaken with the limited planning resources and competing priorities common to many jurisdictions.(23)

III Federal-Provincial Relations and Emergency Planning

1 *Federal Provincial Conferences*

Consultation and cooperation between the federal and provincial/territorial governments has always been considered of prime importance in creating a national emergency preparedness program in Canada. For many years, this was facilitated by holding annual federal-provincial conferences for officials and meetings for ministers responsible for emergency measures as the occasion demanded. Such conferences "...provide[d] a high-level forum for discussion of policy and planning and operational matters of mutual concern."(24) This practice of high-level consultation continued after the new emergencies legislation was passed. Indeed, there seemed to be an increased interest at the ministerial level. Ministers met in Prince Edward Island in 1989, in Alberta in 1990, and in the Yukon in 1992.(25)

A number of decisions were made at these meetings. One was the creation of a Council of Ministers Responsible for Emergency Preparedness. Another endorsed Canada's participation in the International Decade for the Reduction of Natural Disasters and subsequently established federal, provincial, and territorial representation on the National Committee to organize Canadian activities. The Council recognized the importance of training at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College and instructed officials to develop a national training strategy. It also worked out the inter-relationship between provincial and municipal emergency plans and federal emergency plans for land under federal control, such as Indian reserves, national parks, and military bases.(26)

Senior officials hold annual meetings to deal with issues raised by the ministerial meetings and to work out other problems. In fact, the new emergencies legislation raised a need for more frequent and formal inter-governmental consultation. Before a state of emergency could be declared, the federal government was required to consult with the provincial government or governments affected.(27) The Emergency Preparedness Act made it incumbent upon EPC

> to establish arrangements with each province whereby any consultation with the lieutenant governor in council of the province with respect to a declaration of an

emergency under any Act of Parliament can be effectively carried out.(28)

EPC recognized its responsibilities, and at conferences in 1989 and early in 1990 officials began discussions to work out the appropriate consultative process.(29)

2 *The Role of the Regional Directors*

From a federal standpoint, the Regional Director in each provincial capital is the key figure in coordinating the cooperation that creates a national system of emergency preparedness and response. (By 1991-2, Prince Edward Island had become the responsibility of the Regional Director in Halifax.(30)) He works very closely with provincial, territorial, and other federal officials. He keeps the federal government attuned to provincial and territorial needs. He helps to administer federal emergency planning programs and ensures that federal emergency planning initiatives mesh with those undertaken by other governments. He facilitates joint ventures between various levels of government. At times of emergency, he coordinates federal support in the absence of a lead department or until such a department is designated.

The Regional Director provides a single point of access to the federal government on all emergency preparedness matters. As such, he handles all provincial requests for training at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College in Arnprior. He advises and coordinates the preparation and submission of JEPP proposals to the Headquarters of EPC. He assesses and processes claims made under the Federal Disaster Assistance Arrangements. In summary, the Regional Director serves as a critical conduit between each province/territory and the federal government.(31)

3 *Memoranda of Understanding*

During the 1980s the federal government had negotiated Memoranda of Understanding with provincial and territorial governments, setting out the functions and responsibilities of each for emergency preparedness. By 1988, 10 MOUs had been signed with the provinces and territories, with only Quebec and Alberta not formally agreeing to terms. This remains the case in 1998.

4 *Joint Emergency Preparedness Program*

The Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) was founded in 1980 to provide federal support to provincial/territorial projects intended to enhance national emergency response capability. During the 1990s, it continued to allocate substantial federal funds for this purpose. In 1988-89, this was a $6.5 million program, but as the federal government began to practise increased fiscal restraint, its funding began to decline year by year. By 1996-97, it had been reduced to $4.2 million. A similar amount was committed for 1997-98.(32) As in the past, the projects submitted for funding varied greatly. During the 1990s, they had ranged from purchase of specialized rescue equipment for Beauséjour, Manitoba, to funding for a multi-departmental radio system to improve emergency response for the Yukon, to support for a province-wide high-frequency-based emergency telecommunications system in Quebec. Projects approved had generally emphasized development and evaluation of emergency plans and training programs and the purchase of communications and emergency response equipment.

Although all the funds available were not used in the early years of the program, they were committed well before the end of the fiscal year in the 1990s. To ensure fair access to all provinces and territories EPC was prompted to make changes to the program. A new block funding arrangement was implemented in fiscal year 1994-95.

This set aside a certain sum of money -- "guarded funds" -- for each province or territory, making up about two-thirds of the annual allocation. The amount was calculated according to a set formula: a base amount of $150,000 plus $0.10 per head of population. (For example, in 1993 Prince Edward Island would receive $163,000 as compared to Ontario's allocation of $1,162,000.) Final approval for projects financed by this money lay with the Executive Director of EPC. JEPP committees in each province or territory performed a preliminary evaluation of proposals and, with the recommendation of the EPC Regional Director, then submitted prioritized lists to EPC headquarters on a fixed date. At the same time that they were reviewed, EPC evaluated proposals competing for non-guarded funds. This new system was designed to allow provinces to recommend the proposals best suited to their needs while escaping from the first-come first-serve situation which had characterized the timing of past applications.

Block funding was not the only change made to JEPP. In-kind contributions (as opposed to actual cash outlay) had been permitted as a form of project funding, but their presence had led to a variety of misunderstandings and aberrations. Consequently it was decided to restrict their use to Five Year Plans and national emergency arrangement planning. Funding for Five Year Plans was also regularized. Five Year Plans had been introduced as a formal approach to initiate some provincial programs with the expectation that federal contributions would decrease as provincial funding grew. When this expectation was not fulfilled, the federal government considered dropping them but realized that withdrawal would unfairly burden the smaller provinces. Eventually Five Year Programs were retained , but funded out of guarded funds only. Problems concerning inconsistent methods auditing projects were also addressed. EPC set out new guidelines, limiting provincial audit to projects with a federal contribution of $50,000 or more. EPC still required that supporting financial documentation be provided for all projects, and that all projects be subject to federal post audit. Finally, since national priorities for JEPP projects had never been properly stated, EPC proposed to collaborate with the provinces and territories to establish national priorities regularly and to review them annually. This would make possible a more efficient deployment of JEPP resources.(33)

5 *Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements*

These arrangements were inaugurated in 1970 to help provinces cope with the cost of disaster recovery. It was placed under EPC administration in the early 1980s and has continued to function. Requests for assistance under the Arrangements continued to be made in the normal manner following a disaster. Although it has not happened, Section 9 of the Emergency Preparedness Act allows the Governor in Council to declare a provincial emergency to be of concern to the federal government and to provide assistance, including financial aid under DFAA, if requested by the province.(34) Under DFAA, financial assistance has been provided for recovery from natural disasters such as floods and severe storms. In 1988, DFAA funds provided relief from earthquake damage in Quebec while also funding recovery from a man-made disaster, the PCB fire in St-Basil-le-Grand.(35) Payments under the DFAA have varied greatly from year to year. In 1990-91, they totalled about $7.5 million, while in 1996-97 they exceeded $144 million.

6 *Workers' Compensation*

Throughout the 1980s, the federal government renegotiated workers' compensation agreements with the provinces and territories that had been in effect since the 1960s. They provided for joint responsibility to share the costs of paying compensation to registered volunteers injured or to their heirs if they were killed during emergency

response duties. The federal government was willing to reimburse 75% of payments made by provincial workers' compensation boards for injury or death to encourage volunteers to participate in emergency response activities. By 1991-92, all provinces and territories, except Ontario and Quebec, had signed these agreements.(36) Over the years, federal expenditures under these agreements have never been very significant. In 1992-93, for example, the federal government paid out $29,242 for worker' compensation.(37)

IV Civil Emergency Planning and EPC

1 *Operations*

At the end of August 1988, all EPC Headquarters staff moved into new accommodation on the second floor of the Jackson Building, 122 Bank Street, Ottawa. This involved much more than merely moving people, desks, and filing cabinets. In particular, the Government Emergency Operations Coordination Centre (GEOCC) had to be brought to full operational readiness in the building. GEOCC, which serves as the ears and eyes of the government of Canada's emergency preparedness and response system, is a self-contained facility with independent telecommunications, electrical, heating, and ventilation systems. Through its highly sophisticated telecommunications system, it is able to access information from around the world and to monitor potential and actual emergencies around the clock. It collects, analyses, assembles, and distributes information to key decision makers, allowing them to decide which department to recommend to take the lead when an emergency arises. During emergencies, it gathers information vital to the planning of responding agencies.(38)

GEOCC is operational 24 hours a day. At night, it is staffed by a watch officer who alerts a senior "on call" officer as well as other federal government control centres if an emergency occurs. In the daytime, a supervisor, a watch officer, and three operations officers normally control the Centre. During an emergency, however, three shifts, each with 10 employees, keep GEOCC operational on a 24 hours basis.(39)

2 *Research*

It is an article of faith that "[e]mergency preparedness depends upon ongoing research and development as the basis for the better delivery of programs, better training methods, and faster and more effective methods of emergency response."(40) One of EPC's national aims is to stimulate related research and development activity. This is pursued by funding applied research, particularly at Canadian universities. To the same end, EPC sponsors annual symposia on topical subjects for those working in emergency preparedness and related fields. It also encourages the development of Canadian researchers by funding the Stuart Nesbitt White Fellowship. Generally, these projects address four concerns:

1) development of risk and damage assessment models;

2) development of simulation techniques for planning, training, and exercises;

3) development of computer assisted learning and training techniques; and

4) development of methods for evaluating the effectiveness of emergency preparedness measures.(41)

EPC has both initiated or sponsored many research projects. One example is an Earthquake Vulnerability Analysis, that was started in 1987 and completed during 1990-91. It was designed to help planners and officials to

understand better the behaviour of soils and buildings in earthquakes. Its conclusions could have an impact on land use, building codes, and retrofitting policy.(42) An associated Rockslide Hazard Analysis was supported to assess the probability and behavioural characteristics of rockslides in mountainous terrains. A second example is HERMES (Heuristic Emergency Response Management Expert System) and its successor HERMES II. Developed by EPC with a number of public and private sector partners, HERMES is an emergency response system applicable to dangerous goods mishaps. It uses geographical information systems to generate appropriate response plans specific to the characteristics of the incident.(43) A similar system creating an inventory of health and environmental hazards in the Quebec City area, as a pilot project, was to be used in conjunction with a Geomatic Hazards Simulation Workstation. It provides emergency managers with a comprehensive computer program identifying emergency resources, hazards, and potential effects for any geographical area contained in the database. The Workstation employs a map of Canada from a video disk developed in cooperation with Energy, Mines and Resources Canada.(44)

In keeping with the spirit of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), EPC has been active in creating and coordinating a three-layered multi-hazard approach to natural hazard risk assessment. These layers are made up of i) Atlases, ii)Electronic Map Assessment Tools, and iii) a Poster-Map. The Atlases are intended to be multi-disciplinary, integrated sources of natural hazard and socio-economic data. Several federal agencies gathered information to create such databases. The Atlases will be used by emergency planners and responders to identify potential risks from various natural hazards in the development of emergency plans. They are to be available on CD-Rom. The Canadian Natural Hazards Poster-Map, produced in 1996 by EPC in association with other private- and public-sector sponsors is a full-colour illustrated poster-map displaying a wealth of historical and technical information on the impact of various kinds of natural disasters across Canada.

The other layer is the Natural Hazards Electronics Map and Assessment Tools Information System (NHEMATIS). Developed by a consortium of private sector companies, NHEMATIS is a computer program for the collection, representation, and analysis of natural hazard information which, when combined with information on population and infrastructure, would enable planners and managers to conduct a wide range of analyses relating to risk and vulnerability. It uses an overall hazards display map of Canada along with detailed maps of various cities; more cities are to be added as the project progress.(45)

Finally, EPC continues to award the Stuart Nesbitt White Fellowship for doctoral work on disaster research and emergency planning. The subjects remain varied. During the 1990s, they encompassed psychological reactions to disaster, aspects of training, decision making, and the spread of heavier than air gases over land and water. One interesting award was given to a researcher at Oxford to conduct research on the organizational pitfalls of privatizing social services.(46) Over the years, the monetary ceiling awarded has been increased; while $10,000 awards have been common, more recently the amount has grown to $15,000 and $18,000.(47)

3 *Training and Education*

Following the creation of EPC as a separate agency, the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College at Arnprior remained the fountainhead for training in emergency preparedness and response in Canada. The College gave about 110 sessions of 4 ½ days each year in both official languages. An average of 3,000 participants attended yearly, mostly municipal officials or employees. The teaching staff could train up to 90 people

at a time, in three classes of 30 each. During July and August, the school was closed, and staff time was spent evaluating and updating course material.

The core program was taught by CEPC staff. The basic course, "Plans and Operations, Peace", was a prerequisite for such courses as "Exercise Design, Emergency Operations" or "Emergency Site Management." The curriculum also offered advanced and highly specialized courses by invitation only -- such courses as "Train the Trainer" or "School Board Emergencies Workshop". An essential 3 ½ day course entitled "Mayors and Elected Officials" was designed to acquaint municipal officials with their role in emergency planning. At the same time, CEPC cooperated with the Department of National Defence, Agriculture Canada, Employment and Immigration Canada, Ports Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Health And Welfare Canada to provide facilities for their specialized emergency courses. Finally the Arnprior campus was also the site for many one-time seminars as well as an annual national symposium on selected emergency preparedness or response subjects.(48) CEPC was a highly regarded institution. According to its Director, Hugh Gamble, "Canada was the first country to go into the business of training for peacetime emergencies. We're years ahead of everybody. In fact, the Americans come up and ask us for advice."(49) High praise, indeed!

Despite this success a radical change was in the wind. The first indication of change was the Northern Training Initiative. In 1989, college staff developed and taught a course designed for elected officials in the north. The first session was given in Iqualiut to an Inuit audience from all over the Eastern Arctic, and then in Fort Providence to Dene mayors and councillors from the lower Mackenzie region. Simultaneous translation into native languages was provided during both presentations. So successful was the course that it was repeated during succeeding summers in Rankin Inlet, Tuktoyaktuk, and again in Iqualiut.(50) An emergency preparedness training program for Indian reserves was similar to the Northern Training Initiative. Such a program was considered necessary because of the relative isolation of many reserves, the limitation of services generally available, and the dangers of natural disasters. EPC advised Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, which was the lead department for emergency preparedness on the reserves, on developing courses to train Band members in emergency preparedness and response.(51) The Northern Initiative was a minor change although indicative of a major shift in training philosophy that was to come.

In 1988, a Federal/Provincial/Territorial Conference decided that the number of people being trained in emergency preparedness and response was inadequate to meet the need. This decision was recognized the next year when the Federal-Provincial Committee of Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Preparedness created a Task Force on training, education, and research relating to emergency preparedness. The Task Force found that the current training capacity could meet, at most, only 10% of the essential needs across the country. In 1991, the Task Force report and recommendations were put before the Council of Ministers Responsible for Emergency Planning.

The Task Force recognized the need to train 30,000 workers a year in emergency preparedness and response. To accomplish this tremendous task, it recommended a decentralized program in which each provincial jurisdiction would handle its own basic training requirements in accordance with national standards. CEPC would remain the focal point for training, but it would offer only specialized courses and other training requirements which were primarily federal in nature. Federal training resources should remain at the current level or, if possible, be increased. In addition, each jurisdiction should draw up plans to take over the responsibility for training over the next three years. An implementation task force should also be established to develop a transition

plan to coordinate the process and to recommend a permanent mechanism to oversee emergency preparedness in Canada. The Council of Ministers accepted the report, approved the recommendations, and commissioned an Implementation Planning Group (IPG) to prepare a detailed plan to realize the federal-provincial strategy.

By September 1993, the IPG had submitted a national strategy for emergency preparedness training and education that was approved by the Council of Ministers. This plan provided for a transition period of five years, over which the provinces and territories would concentrate on the delivery of training courses. CEPC would focus on providing support through research, program development, and the training of instructors. Direction and coordination of the transition would be the responsibility of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Training Conference. While IPG recommended that each jurisdiction should allocate additional resources to implement the strategy, it also recommended that more JEPP funds be allocated to training purposes. Greater effort was required to involve other agencies and organizations, especially in the private sector.(52) The effect of the implementation of the plan on the college would be substantial. The number of courses would be reduced and the staff would be doing much more development work training the trainers and assisting other people doing training. The College, nevertheless, would remain a centre of excellence. According to the CEPC Director, "Our role, from now on, will be more that of an advanced training centre and a catalyst for emergency preparedness and response in Canada."(53)

4 *Planning and Exercises*

"One of the basic tenets of emergency preparedness is that an emergency plan that is never tested is next to worthless."(54) EPC continued to be involved in planning and conducting exercises on a number of levels -- departmental, provincial, national, and international. All departments were required by Section 7 of the Emergency Preparedness Act to produce emergency plans and to test them. Over the years EPC helped a number of departments to develop plans and stage training exercises. This background has been very important in civil emergencies. In the spring of 1997, for example, 24 departments and agencies successfully activated their emergency plans to respond to various circumstances of the Winnipeg floods.(55) Through its Regional Directors, EPC was often a key player in planning and staging joint federal-provincial exercises. REACT 90 in Nova Scotia, for example, involved EPC with private sector, municipal, provincial, and federal emergency response officials, in implementing the largest exercise of its kind ever held in the province.(56) These joint exercises were invaluable. As the Regional Director in Manitoba commented: "I was thankful during the Manitoba floods [of 1997] for all the joint exercises that we have had over the past few years. Although the situation was worse than any of the exercises practised, we were ready to take action."(57)

At the international level, EPC was responsible for Canadian government participation in NATO exercises and various bilateral exercises held under the authority of the Canada-United States Working Group. EPC and designated departments participated in NATO's WINTEX-CIMEX 89, designed to test arrangements within the Alliance for intergovernmental consultation and civil support for military activities in an international crisis. The next year, however, NATO cancelled its annual exercise to test member reaction to threats from the Warsaw Pact. As the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe changed, the international climate increasingly called for peace and disarmament.(58)

TRANSBORD III was perhaps the most important exercise held under the authority of the Canada-United States Working Group. It was a bilateral counter-terrorist exercise

which EPC co-sponsored with the Ministry of the Solicitor-General along with the collaboration of other departments. In December 1990, EPC hosted a follow-up table top exercise to help pinpoint the deficiencies in cross border and inter- and intra-governmental arrangements for handling terrorist incidents. Thereafter, EPC assisted the Solicitor-General's department in conducting a series of domestic counter-terrorist exercises.(59)

Another major training event was the annual Canadian participation in the Global War Game held at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. EPC coordinated the activity of Canadian representatives from eight departments, often at the assistant deputy minister level. These war games provided a comprehensive forum in which to discuss and test civil emergency procedures for responding to an international crisis.(60)

Nationally, EPC develops, conducts, and evaluates exercises to ensure that the plans of the various levels of government are compatible. CANATEX 90, held in 1990, was the first national emergency exercise conducted in over 20 years. In cooperation with 21 other federal departments, EPC developed and staged this national civil emergency exercise. Its purpose was "...to exercise crisis management plans and procedures during a national /international crisis requiring the potential mobilization of national resources, military and civil." Cabinet gave final approval to conduct the exercise in February with the constraint that in deference to the volatile international situation, EPC was "...not to attribute the simulated events of the exercise to real national or geographic areas." Since this directive precluded debate over geopolitical implications of hypothetical world events, it made the exercise more efficient. It restricted play to activities of departments after they received direction from Cabinet or the Privy Council Office Coordinating Secretariat.

The exercise was a success, if only because it highlighted a number of weak points in federal government emergency planning. The Government Emergency Book, on which Departmental Emergency Books were based, was revealed to be outdated. It needed to detail the transition from peace to international emergency more accurately. None of the four alert systems were found to be particularly helpful in giving officials adequate time to respond to an emergency situation. Departments often needed to intervene before a state of emergency was proclaimed under the Emergencies Act, and it was suggested that modest legislative changes were required to allow for this. Policies for public protection and continuity of government were judged inadequate. Canada required an industrial mobilization plan to support the armed forces. Communication arrangements were also insufficient and it was recommended that the federal government upgrade its secure communications network to meet the needs of an international emergency.

Although a few departments failed to participate sufficiently to gain any significant benefit from the exercise, most departments responded well. Generally, CANATEX 90 proved to be "...an excellent vehicle to evaluate a broad cross-section of emergency preparedness issues." It forcibly demonstrated the need for emergency planning. What was needed next was aggressive follow-up. The findings of the exercise needed to be implemented and tested to ensure emergency preparedness activity especially as it applied to Part III (international emergency) of the Emergencies Act.(61)

Four years later, from 2 to 13 May 1994, EPC conducted CANATEX 2. This was a test of the National Earthquake Support Plan in conjunction with the British Columbia Earthquake Response Plan and the Alberta Support Plan. The exercise hypothesized an earthquake off the British Columbia Coast with a consequent tsunami. The two combined to devastate Vancouver and the lower mainland. CANATEX 2 required extensive detailed planning with representatives from 14 federal departments and

agencies, the governments of British Columbia and Alberta, non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross, the St. John Ambulance, and the Salvation Army, the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency, and 14 municipalities in British Columbia's lower mainland. Other provinces provided response teams as well as personnel for control and evaluation of the exercise.

CANATEX 2 successfully engaged the cooperation of many participants. It emphasized the need to fine tune and improve plans, particularly those concerning federal and provincial elements at the British Columbia Response Centre. CANATEX 2 had also provided an opportunity to test successfully the prototype for public welfare emergency planning under Section I of the Emergencies Act.(62)

During the 1990s, EPC demonstrated serious commitment to planning and to testing the plans that it created. The result enhanced national emergency preparedness. In the words of one EPC official:

> The benefits of the CANATEX series of exercises are two-fold -- they not only provide an opportunity to test and evaluate our national plans in situations that involve all levels of government -- they also contribute to increased confidence-building between the participating levels of government through greater understanding and cooperation.(63)

5 Public Awareness

In the reorganized EPC, the Communications Directorate continued to pursue its public information strategy aggressively. Generally, its three objectives were to ensure:

i) that Canadians were aware of the nature and possible impact of emergencies;

ii) that they were aware of the means of preventing or mitigating their effects;

iii) that they were aware of the federal government's response plans.(64)

EPC used a variety of means to accomplish these goals.

One was public consultation. In the early 1990s, EPC began to conduct polls and surveys to determine public goals and to measure the effectiveness of its information program. These surveys revealed that most Canadians felt that they did not have enough information on what to do in an emergency. The public was interested in learning more about emergency preparedness and disaster planning. Surprisingly, most Canadians were well informed about what they should do to personally cope with crisis. They knew what items to have on hand (flashlight, extra batteries, battery-operated radio), and they had personal strategies for action in different kinds of emergencies.(65)

One effective method of informing the public was direct mailing. In 1992-3, EPC answered 3000 written and verbal enquiries, sent out 250,000 copies of brochures, 17,000 copies of guides, manuals, and course calendars, and 25,000 copies of fact sheets and backgrounders.(66) A quarterly, the Emergency Preparedness Digest, was sent out free of charge to about 16,000 subscribers. The Digest was an extremely popular publication, said to be the best in the world. Unfortunately, it was expensive and senior management decided that it must be published on a cost recovery basis. Working with Canada Communications Group, Supply and Services Canada, EPC turned the Digest into a priced publication that accepted paid advertising beginning with the April-June 1993 issue.(67)

A second way to get the emergency preparedness message out was through the media, both print and electronic. EPC reached all the major daily and weekly newspapers through a cross-Canada wire service. This resulted in unprecedented coverage and often brought follow-up requests for interviews. It also carried EPC's self-help hints to an estimated four million readers in the pages of community newspapers. The Communications Directorate also took advantage of numerous cheque presentations under JEPP or DFA Arrangements to explain the federal role in emergencies and the importance of being prepared.(68)

As well as using the press, EPC worked out cooperative arrangements with radio and television stations to air about $3 million worth of free public service announcements. These often featured well-known personalities performing dramatic vignettes. In 1990-1, for example, EPC distributed nationwide four television public service announcements which dramatized self-help hints on emergency preparedness.(69)

EPC also targeted the primary school system "...to inculcate awareness at an early age." In cooperation with provincial school authorities in Ontario, EPC introduced a multi-media, bilingual educational kit on emergency preparedness into 15 primary schools. There was a good mix of urban and rural, Anglophone and Francophone students and the reaction of both students and teachers was positive.(70) EPC then turned to the private sector and signed a licensing agreement with a private firm to market and distribute the kit.(71) This was followed up by a video in 1994. EPC cooperated with teachers and an eight member working committee to produce Emergency!, a video aimed at students in grades seven through 10. It came with a teachers' guide and was designed to make students aware of the need for emergency preparedness and self reliance.(72)

Along with other federal government departments and agencies, EPC suffered severe funding cutbacks as the 1990s progressed. In response it became more innovative in working cooperatively with other organizations with emergency preparedness objectives. Launched by EPC in 1995, SAFE GUARD has become the main vehicle for this activity. SAFE GUARD is basically a network of partners representing government, private, and voluntary organizations drawn together by the common goal of promoting public awareness of emergency preparedness and response in Canada. It provides a base from which to share ideas and pool scarce resources to create a comprehensive and focused, national-in-scope communications program. EPC set up a Secretariat to manage the cooperative program, and in October 1995 the first general meeting of SAFE GUARD partners was held (in person or by conference call) at EPC headquarters in Ottawa. There a steering committee was formed to assume strategic leadership of the SAFE GUARD program.(73)

Even before the first general meeting a new series of public service announcements were distributed to newspapers, radio, and television across Canada under the SAFE GUARD label, as a joint project of the Canadian Red Cross and EPC. During 1995 and 1996, SAFE GUARD cooperated with a number of partners to revise and re-issue a series of EPC publications. The first of the series, Expect the Unexpected, was produced in association with the Canadian Red Cross. A later booklet, Basic Rescue Skills, was supported by the St. John Ambulance, Sauvetage Canada Rescue, Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, City of Toronto Fire Academy, and Health Canada.(74) A number of other publications were reissued with the cooperation of different partners. Taking advantage of the latest technology, SAFE GUARD developed an Internet site in association with Simon Fraser University. This web site provided links to other partners' home pages.(75) During National Emergency Preparedness Week, 5-11 May 1997, SAFE GUARD partners organized a host of activities across the country to

illustrate the theme, "Can it happen here? -- Know the risks in YOUR community."(76)

SAFE GUARD grew into a very successful program encompassing more than 60 organizations. As a result, it was transferred to the management of a newly formed independent, stand alone, not-for-profit organization, Emergency Preparedness Partners. This was a new organization formed on 18 August 1997, to "...continue the work done by the communications team at Emergency Preparedness Canada...." In this new forum, SAFE GUARD could operate with fewer bureaucratic restraints and have access to an even larger pool of partners. There would be a three year transition period in which EPC would ensure stability by a continuing, although decreasing, financial contribution. EPC would remain a SAFE GUARD partner.(77)

6 *Essential Records Program and Business Resumption Planning*

EPC had always been aware of the need to identify and preserve records that would be essential for government to function during and after a national crisis. In the past, efforts to encourage departments to establish essential records programs had met with mixed success. In the 1990s, EPC continued to coordinate an essential records program although the agency felt the need to issue a warning:

> In a period of restraint, senior departmental managers will have to be particularly resourceful to ensure that each department meets its Minister's emergency preparedness responsibilities [in connection with this program].(78)

To help managers do their jobs, EPC revised a 1987 guide to record requirements. It was published in 1994 as The Preservation of Essential Records -- A guide for government, organizations, institutions and businesses. This guide provides a brief introduction to the concept of essential records and gives basic guidelines on establishing an essential records program within the context of emergency preparedness and business resumption planning.(79)

Business resumption planning originated in the private sector and is a relatively new concept within the federal government. Its objective was to maintain or restore the essential operations of an organization or a government department in a disaster. This capacity to resume operations was seen as particularly important to government departments or agencies that provide a direct and essential service to the Canadian public.

Treasury Board identified the benefits of business resumption planning and set up a working group to examine the concept and to determine how it could be applied to the public sector. The Working Group, which included representatives from EPC, produced a manual in February 1992 "...that defines the standard techniques for business resumption planning in federal departments and provides a methodology for applying the technique." Since then, information on business resumption planning has been made widely available to managers. EPC, in association with the RCMP and Transport Canada, produced a descriptive video of the technique. EPC also helped to design and conduct a series of training workshops for departmental managers.(80)

7 *Vital Points Program*

Certain plants, facilities, and services are vital to the ability of Canadian society to cope with national emergencies. Through the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Vital Points, EPC manages a program that identifies, and ensures access to, information on which installations should be protected. It has grouped Vital Points into three general categories for administrative purposes. Category I Vital Points are critical to the nation as a whole and are generally unique. Because of their importance, they are

protected by the Ministry of the Solicitor-General. Those in Category II and Category III may be either federal or provincial, and their protection is the responsibility of their owners.

Federal vital points are recorded in a computerized listing of approved facilities. This gives quick access to important information on each Vital Point, such as location, similar facilities in the area, and resources available to guard it in a crisis. Except for Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, which do not participate, every province maintains its own Vital Points list. Provincial Vital Points Committees are Chaired by EPC Regional Directors. Their purpose is to send lists of crucial installations to the Advisory Committee on Vital Points. These are entered in a master data base and centrally coordinated to prevent duplication. This is a continuing process.(81)

8 *Continuity of Government*

According to the Emergency Preparedness Act, one of the functions of Emergency Preparedness Canada was "to establish arrangements for ensuring the continuity of constitutional government during an emergency."(82) At first glance, this statement merely reaffirmed a responsibility first assumed when the original Emergency Measures Organization was formed in 1957. As EPC began to review the implications of the Act, however, increasing significance was attached to the addition of the word "constitutional" to the phrase "continuity of government". Earlier the governor general, prime minister, and a small group of ministers were assumed to be sufficient to re-establish legitimate government. The addition of the word "constitutional" has more recently forced revision of that opinion. To be constitutional provision needed to be made for all three branches of government -- the executive, legislature, and judiciary.

Although this review of the program went through a number of phases, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequently reduced threat of nuclear war removed much of the sense of urgency.(83) International developments as well as budget and personnel reductions at EPC pushed the Continuity of Government Program into the background. When the CEGHQ at Carp (the Diefenbunker) and the six REGHQs were closed in the 1995 budget announcement, the Department of National Defence moved with considerable alacrity to divest itself of these buildings and disposed of them to local interests.(84) Today the Program is still the statutory responsibility of EPC, but at present is dormant.

V Partnering -- The Shape of Things To Come

Like all other federal departments and agencies in the 1990s, EPC was subjected to budget cuts and downsizing. In 1992, EPC was allocated 112 person years; by 1998, this allocation had shrunk to 83, a reduction of 26%. The funding drop was even more dramatic, falling from a budget peak of $19.924 million in 1992-93 to $13.729 million in 1997-98, a drop of 31%.(85) Such severe reductions in staff and funding raised questions of how to maintain services to clients. EPC was forced to take a hard look at core services, objectives, and its mission.

The developing of partnerships was one of the solutions put forward. Today partnerships with other governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector businesses and institutions are being pursued aggressively. This mode of operation was not entirely new to EPC. By 1992, it had already had partnerships in place with provincial and municipal governments through the JEPP program. JEPP's budget, however, was being reduced (although not as dramatically as EPC's overall budget) from $5.5 million in 1992-93 to $4.5 million in 1997-98, a reduction of about 18%. The funding of the other major federal-provincial financial

partnership, DFAA, rose precipitately from $8.4 million in 1992-93 to $137.9 million in 1997-98.(86) Being largely uncontrollable, the cost of these arrangements was not funded out of EPC's budget.

One example of successful partnering was the creation of the Major Industrial Accident Coordinating Committee (MIACC) in 1987 following the Bhopal disaster (see the previous chapter). With continuing support from EPC, this organization was sponsored and funded by a variety of stakeholders from all levels of government, industry, labour, and the universities. In 1991, it was incorporated as the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada, a name change that left the initials intact. MIACC's role was to develop national processes that included standards and guidelines to help industries and municipalities prevent or mitigate industrial accidents. In March 1995, its Board of Directors took into account the increasing level of government cuts and decided to get more directly involved. MIACC shifted from developing tools to ensuring their implementation at the local level. It also undertook a new project, ER2000+, intended to develop a leading edge emergency response system. ER2000+ would use organizational, social, political, technical, and cost perspectives to define the ideal emergency management system for transportation and fixed-site emergencies involving hazardous substances in Canada.(87)

SAFE GUARD, which has been previously described (see above, Public Awareness), is a more recent partnership initiative in the area of public education. It actively seeks out partners in private and volunteer sectors for joint projects with EPC. Under this program, EPC has formed partnerships with the Canadian Red Cross, RCMP, National Search and Rescue Secretariat, Girl Guides and Boy Scouts, St. John Ambulance, and the Canadian Automobile Association. Partnership resources were pooled to produce public information materials on subjects of common interest with major cost savings all around.(88)

Another recent partnership innovation relates to the operation of the Government Emergency Operations Coordination Centre (GEOCC). During an emergency it is necessary to have three shifts of 10 employees each working around the clock. In an environment of cutbacks, EPC quickly realized that it would be practically impossible to operate GEOCC for an extended period of time and began looking for another solution. Operations Reserve was created. This was an EPC initiative which negotiated contracts with retired, experienced response officers in the community to return on an as-and-when requested basis. Reserve workers would be reimbursed out-of-pocket expenses and an hourly allowance for their work. After months of negotiations Treasury Board agreed to this program and several contracts are now in place. Short, regular training sessions are being held to keep the group up to date on policies, procedures, and equipment.(89)

Local success of Operations Reserve has led EPC to consider applying the idea nationally. Its proposal to establish a national association of emergency preparedness professionals has been well received. It would broker the services of professionals across the country, supplying well-trained volunteers or consultants in any location as the situation demanded. The idea is still in its formative stages.(90)

Partnering may be the wave of the future, but it needs to be approached cautiously. If a partnership fails, who picks up the pieces? Usually it is the government partner who bears the cost. Partnerships must be supported by well-constructed contracts, properly vetted by financial, legal, and regulatory advisors, in which the duties and responsibilities of each of the contracting parties are clearly spelled out and understood. Partnering is not a panacea, but it is an idea which may be right for these times.(91) In

the words of Eric Shipley, Executive Director of EPC:

> In an environment of declining budgets and rapidly changing economic and social conditions, meeting Canada's emergency preparedness challenge demands evermore innovative and creative responses. At Emergency Preparedness Canada, we believe that partnerships represent a proven, cost-effective and increasingly viable approach to building a safer world.(92)

VI International Relations

1 *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

As with so much else after EPC's statutory creation, relations with NATO continued unchanged. EPC maintained a permanent attaché at NATO headquarters in Brussels and supported civil emergency planning sponsored by the Alliance's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). EPC was represented on SCEPC, and the appropriate Canadian government officials sat on its boards and committees. As part of its contribution on behalf of the Canadian government, EPC hosted the NATO triennial Civil Emergency Planning Symposium in Ottawa on 1-3 May 1989. This was the first time that it was held in Canada.(93)

By the early '90s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanying political turmoil in central and eastern Europe (CEE) began to have a major impact on NATO and on civil emergency planning within the Alliance. With the danger of a major European war receding, the role and responsibilities of NATO civil emergency planning began to be redefined. Generally two proposals were mooted:

> 1) that civil emergency planning be extended to deal with peacetime disasters as well as retaining support for the military role;
>
> 2) that the civil role be expanded to include cooperation with, and assistance to, eastern European countries.

It was the latter suggestion that struck a responsive chord within EPC.(94)

Although NATO's 1991 Paris Declaration called for greater cooperation with CEE countries in a number of areas, emergency preparedness planning was not one of them. Despite this, Canadian officials pressed for an extension of ties to the Eastern Bloc countries. In 1992, the Canadian ambassador to NATO, James K. Bartleman, proposed that Canada develop a seminar on civil emergency preparedness for representatives of former Warsaw Pact nations.(95) This was held at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, from 16 to 20 November 1992, and attended by delegates from 15 CEE countries. Presentations were made by Germany, the United States, and some of the CEE countries. A major portion of the program, moreover, was devoted to emergency preparedness in Canada. The Canadian speakers explained the need to integrate information planning with operational planning, and gave specific examples of emergency preparedness planning in transportation, health and welfare, agri-food, and environment sectors. The seminar was a resounding success.(96) One delegate remarked: "You help us with fish and wheat, and now you are helping us make the 'netting' to protect ourselves from disaster. This sort of initiative is vital during the incredible transition we are undergoing."(97)

The first seminar generated so much interest that the Canadian initiative evolved into a larger long-term process involving a growing number of NATO and CEE countries. In May 1993, a second seminar was held at the German Civil Defence School near Bonn; in March of the next year a third seminar convened near Prague; in 1995, three seminars

were held in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. Through EPC, Canada continued to play a major role in all of these seminars. As the series evolved, the total cost of Canadian participation was reduced by the increased participation of a growing number of NATO countries as well as the support from CEE countries in hosting the gatherings. While participating in these multi-lateral seminars, EPC also embarked on a number of bilateral initiatives with Eastern Bloc countries, notably Russia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine.(98)

In the opinion of Mike Braham, an EPC official who was closely involved in organizing the seminars:

> Initiatives such as the seminar series as well as the bilateral relationships play an important part in promoting the Canadian foreign policy objective of furthering the process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. CEE countries are being helped in developing more effective civil emergency preparedness programs, legislation and structures. Slowly, the shift is being made from an almost complete reliance on a centralized response process to one based more on planning, preparedness and decentralization of responsibilities.(99)

To continue this process, delegates from Ukraine have come to Canada to take courses at CEPC at Arnprior and instructors from CEPC have travelled to Prague, Kiev, Budapest, and Bratislava to present the basic emergency course to officials there.(100)

2 *United States of America*

The passing of the Emergency Preparedness Act made little difference to the relationship between EPC in Canada and FEMA in the United States. The basis of that relationship was established earlier by the 1986 Agreement between the two countries. A Consultative Group of senior officials from both agencies meets annually to oversee cooperative civil emergency arrangements between Canada and the United States. Each country alternatively hosted these meetings, first in its capital city, and then after 1991 in a regional city. This arrangement recognizes the vital role regions played in bilateral emergency preparedness agreements.(101)

Working groups were set up early in these discussions. Their purpose was initially to enhance cooperation in trans-border transportation, telecommunications, health services, and in the development and execution of joint Canadian-American exercises. As they continued to meet they made progress in many important areas. The working group on health services, for example, finalized an agreement to facilitate the easy shipment of medical supplies and equipment across the border in an emergency. Before long, working groups in other areas were created. This included one to discuss agri-food emergency planning and another on nuclear safety.(102)

The Exercise Working Group is particularly active in arranging bilateral exercises. In 1989, EPC and the Solicitor General of Canada sponsored TRANSBORD III, a major bilateral counter-terrorist exercise which EPC, along with the Solicitor General, co-sponsored for Canada. The next year, EPC hosted a follow-up exercise, which engaged federal, provincial, and state officials from both countries in pin-pointing deficiencies in cross-border and inter- and intra-government arrangements for handling terrorist incidents.(103) This working group continues to meet alternatively in Canada and the United States to exchange information and to arrange for participation in future exercises.

3 *Other International Involvement*

When the United Nations declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural

Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), its intent was to promote worldwide disaster prevention and preparedness. The declaration provided an impetus to devise measures to mitigate the effects of disasters, and EPC was active in advancing these in Canada. Its Executive Director co-chaired the Federal Interdepartmental Committee for the International Decade (FICID) which was established to coordinate and encourage federal government departments to participate in IDNDR during the 1990s.(104) EPC also approached other federal departments, the Royal Society of Canada, and the Canadian Academy of Engineering for assistance in creating a Canadian National Committee for the International Decade. Its purpose was to develop national objectives and coordinate participation. Composed of Canadians from the three orders of government, business, industry, academia, and public interest groups, the National Committee held its inaugural meeting in Ottawa on 10 September 1993. EPC was represented by its senior official, Vice-Admiral L. E. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff. The federal government provided funding totalling $280,000 over five years through EPC and seven federal departments.(105) The National Committee's immediate task was to prepare and present a report on Canada's IDNDR-related activities at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction which took place in Yokohama, Japan, 23-27 May 1994.(106)

As well as co-chairing the Interdepartmental Committee, EPC also contributed directly to the work of IDNDR. For example, it researched, developed, and published Guidelines for the Design and Construction of Mobile Command Posts and Similar Emergency Response Vehicles. This publication was an attempt to address many requests from across Canada to create standard vehicle requirements. The Guidelines was made available in English, French, and Spanish in order to be useful internationally. Another contribution prepared for EPC was a report offering guidelines for dealing with large-scale events, Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Mass, Crowd-Intensive Events.(107)

VII Conclusion

Both emergency preparedness planning and EPC witnessed many changes in the decade from 1988 to 1998. A major accomplishment was the working out of the implications of the Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act. EPC prepared the draft orders and regulations necessary to bring parts of the Emergencies Act into effect. It also negotiated the arrangements for federal-provincial consultation required before parts of the Act could be proclaimed. EPC also facilitated and coordinated the development of departmental plans to deal with the four types of emergency defined in the Emergencies Act.

The practical effectiveness of emergency response was emphasized in the 1990s. CANATEX 90 was the first national emergency preparedness exercise held in over 20 years. Conducted on a large scale, it revealed many shortcomings in the emergency preparedness infrastructure in Canada. This exercise was followed up four years later with CANATEX 2. Although this was a test of the National Earthquake Support Plan, developed to respond to a very real threat in British Columbia, it also served as a prototype for a Part I social welfare emergency under the Emergencies Act. Both of these exercises were successful in pointing out weaknesses in emergency preparedness in Canada to be addressed by future planning.

EPC experienced tribulations over the decade. In 1988, it reported directly to the Minister of National Defence. In 1992, it lost status as it was folded back into the Department of National Defence and assigned to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. This organizational change preceded severe downsizing. EPC experienced a 26% staff

reduction and a 31% budget cut between 1992 and 1998. These difficulties were treated as opportunities to refocus efforts on core responsibilities and to discover new ways to fulfil the agency's mandate.

Despite these setbacks, EPC continues to pursue its responsibilities aggressively. In its new headquarters in downtown Ottawa, it created a state of the art communications centre to monitor emergencies and, when required, to coordinate response. EPC continued to put out its message to the public through SAFE GUARD, a partnership arrangement of many public and private sector organizations. Eventually, SAFE GUARD was incorporated into Emergency Preparedness Partners, an independent not-for-profit organization designed to carry out EPC's communication work. EPC's training and education program at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College at Arnprior was streamlined and adapted to new circumstances. Its operating philosophy shifted to emphasize train-the-trainer courses allowing more direct training to be done by local authorities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the political revolutions in central and eastern Europe brought about a reformulation of EPC's responsibilities in NATO. Instead of continuing to plan in expectation of a military confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, Canada led the way in sharing her expertise in emergency preparedness planning with CEE countries. EPC organized a number of conferences in western and eastern Europe for representatives of CEE countries. These provided a forum for EPC officials and other NATO experts to share their emergency preparedness knowledge with former antagonists.

The world in 1998 did not look like the world in 1988. EPC in 1998 was not the same organization that it had been a decade before. Despite a loss of status and reduction of personnel and funding, EPC continues to be an efficient organization dedicated to emergency preparedness and response in Canada. It has absorbed adversity. It has devised new ways of carrying out its mandate by working with private sector and volunteer organizations. It is ready to enter the new millennium with energy and confidence.

Endnotes

1. Report to Parliament on the operation of the Emergency Preparedness Act, April 1,1988-March 31, 1989, p. 5 [henceforth Annual Report].

2. Emergency Preparedness Canada Annual Review, 1988, p. 24.

3. Annual Report, 1988-89, "Appendix A, Emergency Preparedness Canada", pp. 13-15; 1989-90, "Organization Emergency Preparedness Canada", p. 66.

4. Annual Report, 1992-3, "Appendix C, Emergency Preparedness Canada", pp. 46-9.

5. EPC Organization Chart, July 1997. There have been some minor changes, such as the combining of International Programs and Exercises with Emergency Arrangements to create Emergency Programs and Exercises and the addition of the Senior Scientific Adviser.

6. Acts of the Parliament of Canada passed in the year 1995 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1996), ch. 29, sections 23-32; "Bill C-65 receives Royal Assent", Emergency Preparedness Digest, Vol.22, No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), p. 5 [henceforth Digest].

7. Annual Report, 1992-93, p. 6.

8. Annual Report, 1992-93, p. 6.

9. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 4.

10. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 8.

11. Ibid., p. 8.

12. Ibid., p. 8. The financial aid would be provided under DFA Arrangements.

13. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 9; 1991-92, p. 7.

14. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 9; 1991-92, p. 7.

15. Annual Report, 1992-93, p. 2.

16. "New Federal Emergency Policy outlines Departmental Responsibilities", Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1995), p. 10.

17. Ibid., p. 10; "A Federal Policy for Emergencies", EPC Fact Sheet, Aug. 1997.

18. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 5.

19. Annual Report, 1989-90, pp. 6, 29.

20. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 6.

21. Annual Report, 1991-2, p. 16.

22. Annual Report, 1992-93, pp.9-10.

23. Annual Report, 1992-93, p.10.

24. Annual Report, 1988-89, p. 8.

25. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 34; 1990-91, p.35; 1992-93, p. 19.

26. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 34; 1990-91, p.35.

27. Emergencies Act, Sections, 14 (1), (2); 25 (1), (2), (3); 35; 44, Chapter E-4.5, R.S., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.).

28. Emergency Preparedness Act, Section 5(1)(g), Chapter E-4.6, R.S., 1985, c. 6 (4th Supp.).

29. Annual Report, 1988-89, p. 7; 1989-90, p.34.

30. Annual Report, 1991-92, p. 17.

31. A statement of the role of the Regional Director can be found in a number of the Annual Reports; see Annual Report, 1990-91, pp. 33-5 as an example.

32. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 34; Digest, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1996), p. 3 7.

33. Allan Caldwell, "New Look for JEPP", Digest, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1993), pp. 24-6.

34. Annual Report, 1988-89, p. 8.

35. Annual Report, 1991-92, p. 20.

36. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 36; 1991-92, p. 20.

37. Annual Report, 1992-93, p. 26.

38. Annual Report, 1989-90, pp. 36-7; 1990-91, pp. 15-16; 1991-92, pp. 29-30.

39. Joanne Duguay, "Operations Reserve: Ready for action", Digest, Vol.24, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1997), p. 18.

40. Annual Report, 1992-93, p. 37.

41. Annual Report, 1988-89, p. 12; Joanne Duguay, "Building on 50 years of partnerships", Digest, Vol. 25, No.1 (Jan.-March 1998), p. 12.

42. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 52.

43. Annual Report, 190-91, p. 52; 1991-92, p. 32.

44. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 53; 1991-92, p. 32.

45. Chris Tucker and Jacques Hénault, "Risk assessment and natural hazards in Canada", Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April-June 1997), pp. 26-8.

46. Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1996), p. 29.

47. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 51; 1990-91, p. 54.; 1992-93, p. 38; Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1993), p. 25; Digest, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1994), p. 32; Digest, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1997), p. 25. The $18,000 award may have been in recognition of the high cost of living in Paris where the recipient was to study; Digest, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1996), p. 33.

48. Carole Oliver, "Profiles in Training: Federal Emergency Preparedness", Digest, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April-June 1993), pp. 4-5.

49. Ibid., p. 5.

50. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 44; 1990-91, p. 47; 1991-92, p. 25; 1992-93, p. 30.

51. Annual Report, 1991-92, pp. 21, 25.

52. Joanne Duguay, "Looking Ahead: emergency preparedness training for Canada in the nineties and beyond", Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1994), pp. 16-21.

53. Ibid., p. 21.

54. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 42.

55. Joanne Duguay, "Building on 50 years of partnership", Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1998), p. 11.

56. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 46.

57. Joanne Duguay, "Building on 50 Years of partnership", Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1998), p. 11.

58. Annual Report, p. 11; 1989-90, p. 43.

59. Annual Report, 1989-90, p.43; 1990-91, p. 46; 1991-92, p. 15; 1992-93, p. 16.

60. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 43; 1992-93, p. 16.

61. Annual Report, 1990-91, pp. 42-6.

62. Brad Mann, "When the Giant Awakens", Digest, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1994), pp. 5-9.

63. Joanne Duguay, "Building on 50 years of partnerships", Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1998), p. 11.

64. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 47.

65. Ibid., p. 47; "Canadian emergency preparedness survey", Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1996), p. 5.

66. Annual Report, 1992-93, pp. 27-8.

67. Annual Report, 1991-92, pp. 27-8; 1992-93, p. 31.

68. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 50; 1992-3, p. 31.

69. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 50.

70. Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 49.

71. Annual Report, 1990-91, p. 51.

72. "Emergency preparedness video for schoolchildren", Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1994), p. 29.

73. Brad Mann, "The SAFE GUARD Story", Digest, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), pp.2-3; Digest, Vol.23, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1996), p. 3.

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Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusion

Emergency Preparedness Canada has been safeguarding the welfare of Canadians in crisis for half a century. During this time it has been known by a variety of names, operated under the aegis of several federal departments, and employed a number of organizational configurations. The basic intent, however, has remained the same -- preparing the civilian population for times of crisis.

Although EPC was created 50 years ago, its origins go back to the Air Raid Precautions organization of the Second World War. In 1948, in response to the tensions of the Cold War and the destructive potential of the atomic bomb, the federal government appointed Major General F. F. Worthington as Civil Defence Co-ordinator and set up a civil defence organization in the Department of National Defence. In 1951, the responsibility for Civil Defence was transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare where it remained until 1959.

During the Cold War, the federal government realized that a nuclear attack on North America could endanger not only the lives of individuals but call into question the very existence of civil government itself. In 1957, it created the Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) in the Privy Council Office to plan for the continuity of government. A major reorganization abolished Civil Defence in the Department of National Health and Welfare in 1959, and merged it into the Emergency Measures Organization in the Privy Council Office. Civil Defence Order 1959 outlined the responsibilities of the Emergency Measures Organization, the Department of National Defence, the Department of National Health and Welfare, and the Department of Justice.

Under the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson, EMO was guided by C. M. Drury who had taken a personal interest in civil defence. It was transferred from the PCO to Drury's control first in the Department of Defence Production and then in the Department of Industry. Under Drury, EMO made great strides in civil emergency planning and a new, more comprehensive Civil Emergency Measures Planning Order was issued. In 1968, however, the federal government froze EMO's ambitious development program: its budget was cut and staff were reduced dramatically. The program, then called Canada Emergency Measures Organization, was transferred to the Department of National Defence where it became a branch reporting to the Deputy Minister.

The 1970s was a period of internal and external scrutiny, and of a general deterioration of emergency measures preparedness and response system. Through Project Phoenix , Canada EMO sought to refocus its work in the face of budget cuts. The Dare Report, a general analysis of the federal ability to manage crises, resulted in a number of Canada EMO's functions being stripped away. At the same time, an Emergency Planning Secretariat (EPS) was established in the PCO to oversee Canada EMO, now called the National Emergency Planning Establishment (NEPE), part of the Department of National Defence. (NEPE was shortly renamed Emergency Planning Canada (EPC).) After funding cuts, facilities across the country deteriorated through neglect. Toward the end of the 1970s, international tensions and a number of environmental disasters redirected public attention to emergency planning. The government responded by merging the Emergency Planning Secretariat and EPC under the Secretary of State, Yvon Pinard, breathing new life into the emergency measures program.

The 1980s was a period of revival. Pinard issued a new policy statement in 1980, and in 1981 promulgated a new Emergency Planning Order replacing the outdated Civil Emergency Measures Planning Order of 1965. Lines of communication with the provinces were reopened. The federal-provincial relationships in emergency planning were defined through a series of Memoranda of Understanding. New funding agreements were made. EPC responded with increased vigour, fulfilling its mandate of planning, coordinating, training, researching, and publicizing. It continued its work with NATO and signed a new cooperative agreement with its sister agency in the United States. In 1988, the federal government passed the Emergencies Act, which regularized emergency preparedness planning for both peace and war, and the Emergencies Preparedness Act, which formally established Emergency Preparedness Canada.

The period after 1988 was one of great activity as EPC began to work out the planning implications of the new acts. Proclamations had to be prepared to bring the parts of the Emergencies Act into effect in the event of a national emergency and procedures had to be in place to consult with the provinces. Planning for national emergencies went ahead and major national exercises were held to test the plan's effectiveness. Peacetime emergency planning surpassed war emergency planning when the breakup of the Soviet Union lessened the danger of nuclear war. EPC continued its traditional functions, coordinating federal emergency planning, training, publicizing, and conducting research. Although EPC faced severe budget cuts and downsizing along with all government departments in the 1990s, it responded with new partnership initiatives and continued to fulfil its mandate in different ways.

Certain themes can be perceived throughout the 50 year history of EPC. One, aptly called the "roller coaster", has been EPC's uneven path as it attempted to fulfill its mandate. Public interest in, government funding of and activity in, emergency measures had a direct relationship to the state of international affairs. The origins of EPC in 1948 are tied to the beginnings of the Cold War and the Korean War. Its next spurt of activity occurred between 1954 and 1962 when strategists determined that ICBMs could be used to attack North America with little warning. Following the Cuban missile crisis, international tensions lessened and the world entered into a period of *détente*. From 1967 through the 1970s was the nadir of emergency planning in Canada as the federal government directed its energies toward other social priorities. Interest picked up again in the late 1970s when the Soviet Union flexed its muscles and invaded Afghanistan. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1987, war planning retreated into the background. By then, planning for peacetime disasters had assumed greater importance.

The tension between peacetime and wartime disaster planning is a second major theme. For much of its history EPC and its predecessors have been intent on planning for a war emergency. Almost from the beginning, however, the provincial governments attempted to pressure the federal government into extending emergency planning to include natural and man-made disasters. As early as 1951, the provinces extracted a commitment that facilities and services created for civil defence could be used for dealing with natural disasters. While the federal government resisted these pressures at first, a shift in emphasis began in the mid-1960s as international tensions eased. Following the November 1965 power blackout in eastern North America, Cabinet directed EMO to be responsible for coordinating federal response to any peacetime emergency. At a Federal-Provincial Conference in 1969, the Minister of National Defence agreed that emergency resources developed for a wartime emergency could be used to deal with peacetime disasters. EMO subsequently attempted to redefine its role within the 1970 defence policy to place planning for peacetime threats to security on a level with wartime crisis planning. It was only with the completion of the Dare Report on crisis management within the federal government that federal departments were given peace- as well as war-oriented planning tasks. Government policy formally

changed in 1980 when Yvon Pinard announced that emergency peacetime planning would have priority over wartime planning. Despite this policy statement, much of the planning in the 1980s remained war-oriented largely because the War Measures Act remained the enabling legislation. It was only in 1988, with the approval of new emergencies legislation, that EPC began to emphasize plans to deal with man-made or natural disasters. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, war emergency planning moved farther into the background. The recent natural disasters -- the Saguenay flood, the Red River flood, and the ice storm in Eastern Ontario and Quebec -- have only emphasized the importance of peacetime civil emergency planning.

A third theme is volunteerism. While a professional cadre of planners, trainers, and specialists were employed at the federal and provincial level, all expected the delivery of local level service to be performed by volunteers. Whether these volunteers were individuals or organizations, such as the Red Cross or St. John Ambulance, the critical role that they played necessitated an extensive training program. It also initiated early federal-provincial conflict about compensation for registered workers who were injured or killed. Eventually to encourage volunteers to enroll in the program, the federal government agreed to pay 75% of compensation paid out through provincial workers' compensation boards. This tradition of volunteer service was taken to new lengths in the 1990s when EPC entered into partnering arrangements to carry out parts of its mandate.

Another theme was decentralization. From the beginning emergency planning in Canada has expected the responsibility to deliver services to be local. This was partly recognition of the logistical difficulty of centralizing control in a country the size of Canada. It was equally recognition of the nature of the Canadian federation and the federal desire not to intrude into provincial spheres of jurisdiction. Emergency assistance planning was based on the assumption that first response to an emergency was individual, then local, then provincial, and finally federal. The federal government would set the framework, establish national standards, conduct training courses, and provide much of the funding to create a national system of emergency preparedness and response. While it was agreed that war related emergency planning was primarily a federal responsibility, public welfare or public order emergencies were largely provincial concerns in which the federal government may play a supportive role. The Emergencies Act sets out stringent rules for provincial consultation before emergencies can be declared, especially public welfare and public order emergencies.

Finally, the dedication of public servants who have worked in EPC and its predecessors is remarkable. They have often had a thankless task. When international tensions were winding down, they frequently dealt with an indifferent public and hostile politicians. Their message of preparing for the worst has been interpreted as warmongering: EPC planners have been accused of hastening the event that they sought to mitigate. Through changes in public attitudes, funding cuts and frozen programs EPC's staff has continued to work confident in the sagacity of emergency planning in a dangerous world. Now that the threat of nuclear war has receded, Canadians are benefiting from their careful planning as natural disasters assume an increasingly prominent role in our lives.

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