COUNTERING THE TERRORIST THREAT IN CANADA: AN INTERIM REPORT

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

The Honourable Daniel Lang
Chair

The Honourable Grant Mitchell
Deputy Chair

2015
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DEDICATION

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
DEDICATES THIS REPORT IN HONOUR OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

WARRANT OFFICER PATRICE VINCENT

CORPORAL NATHAN CIRILLO

9/11 VICTIMS

AND

VICTIMS OF THE AIR INDIA FLIGHT 182 TERRORIST ATTACK
WHICH OCCURRED 30 YEARS AGO ON JUNE 23, 1985

YOU WILL NEVER BE FORGOTTEN
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MEMBERS

The Honourable Daniel Lang, Chair
The Honourable Grant Mitchell, Deputy Chair

and

The Honourable Lynn Beyak
The Honourable Jean-Guy Dagenais
The Honourable Joseph A. Day
The Honourable Colin Kenny
The Honourable Thanh Hai Ngo
The Honourable Carolyn Stewart Olsen
The Honourable Vernon White

Ex-officio members of the Committee:
The Honourable Senators Claude Carignan, P.C., (or Yonah Martin) and James S. Cowan (or Joan Fraser).

Other Senators who participated in the work of the Committee:
The Honourable Senators George Baker, P.C., Marie-P. Charette-Poulin**, Tobias C. Enverga, and Suzanne Fortin-Duplessis**.

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ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Thursday, June 19, 2014:

The Honourable Senator Lang moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Housakos:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to study and report on security threats facing Canada, including but not limited to:

(a) Cyber espionage;

(b) Threats to critical infrastructure;

(c) Terrorist recruitment and financing;

(d) Terrorist operations and prosecutions; and

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2015, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Gary W. O’Brien

*Clerk of the Senate*
On June 19, 2014, the Senate authorized the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence “to study and report on security threats facing Canada.”

In its interim report, the Committee examines terrorist recruitment, operations, financing, prosecutions and other aspects of the security threats Canadians face. At a future time, the Committee will report on cyber espionage and threats to Canada’s critical infrastructure.

The Standing Senate Committee has heard from many witnesses, among them some of the foremost experts on terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism, as well as many individuals with first-hand experience of radicalization in Canada.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the threats Canadians face and the measures which will be required to address them. Since the start of this study, two members of the Canadian Armed Forces have fallen victims to terrorist acts. On October 20th, 2014, an extremist Islamist fundamentalist terrorist murdered Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in St. Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec; two days later, another jihadist murdered, Corporal Nathan Cirillo of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment as he stood sentry duty at the National War Memorial in Ottawa, and then proceeded to storm through the front doors of Parliament, seeking to inflict murder and mayhem.

During its hearings, the Committee learned 93 Canadians have been identified as seeking to join Islamist extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al Qaeda, Boko Harem, and al Shabaab. Eighty radicalized Canadians have been identified as participating with terrorists overseas and have returned to Canada and approximately 145 Canadians are believed to be abroad providing support to terrorist groups. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director, Michel Coulombe, advised the committee in the spring of 2015 that these numbers have since increased.

The Committee also learned that the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) identified 683 transactions linked to terrorist financing between 2009 and 2014. No charges have been laid on these grounds.

Over the course of its hearings, the Committee undertook a fact-finding mission to Toronto to meet with security and intelligence officials, members of the Toronto Police Service and some representatives of Toronto’s ethno cultural community who are concerned about terrorism and radicalization.

Canadians must be vigilant, because violent extremism is a genuine threat, both to Canadian lives and to the Canadian way of life. But we must be vigilant in a thoughtful, balanced way, without undermining the values that make us great. We must find every resource, tool and technique available to a civilised society to diminish and defeat a most uncivilised force. Our goal is to lessen the risk to all Canadians, including the risk to vulnerable young Canadians who might be lured to extreme ideas and violent action.
Now, while the threat of terrorism and radicalization is vivid, we need to understand that we are in this together, and the solutions recommended in this report are as important to all Canadians. Solutions that will work to bring us together are those that are truthful, honest and direct.

The Committee trusts that the findings herein will assist the Government in making Canada safer in a world facing the growing menace of terrorism. The Committee intends to review progress made in implementing its recommendations.
BACKGROUND

Mounting evidence of radicalization, extremist agitation and terrorist threats and violence in Canada and around the world, has galvanized the attention of many. Around the world, thousands have been maimed, tortured, killed and forced into sex-slavery, as a result of the surge in the violent Islamist fundamentalist ideology.

Even in Canada, we have experienced terrorist attacks and police and national security agencies have prevented a number of terrorist plots from materializing. Other terrorist threats exist, as well, some focused on other ideologies. Anti-government groups, like the Sovereign Citizens movement or Freeman on the Land have captured the attention of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other law enforcement agencies in recent years.

Witnesses testified that the terrorist threats that Canada faces are multi-dimensional. They come from many different sources, both international and domestic, and they are continually changing.

The terrorist threat is real and at a time of increasing international mobility and proliferating weapons and materiel of mass destruction, the trends call for citizens and policy-makers alike to seriously consider both the dangers and solutions which might be available.

While all members of the committee share a belief in the importance of protecting Canadians against threats of terrorism, differences in how to approach this became clear. Despite great efforts to arrive at a consensus, ultimately, the report contains the conclusions of the majority of members, and Senator Mitchell, Senator Day, and Senator Kenny dissent from the report.
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that:

Recommendation 1 – The Government make it a criminal offence to be a member of a terrorist group in Canada.

Recommendation 2 – The Government investigate and discourage the spread of violent extremism in Canada as a priority, especially the ideology promoted by the global Islamist fundamentalist movement.

Recommendation 3 – The Government work with “at-risk communities”, especially women, to encourage and support practices which are in keeping with Canadian values.

Recommendation 4 – The Government work to establish a program which provides information about clear and specific indicators of radicalization to frontline workers including teachers, police officers, prison workers, nurses and doctors. It should do more to encourage Canadians to anonymously report information regarding terrorism, criminal extremism or suspicious activities which could pose a threat to safety and security by calling the national security tip line – 1-800-420-5805.

Recommendation 5 – The Government establish a program to support families who report radicalization and are seeking help.

Recommendation 6 – The Government work with Muslim communities to create an effective counter-narrative to denounce the ideology of Islamist fundamentalism.

Recommendation 7 – The Government establish a publicly accessible “No-Visit List,” which identifies ideological radicals who pose a threat to the security of Canada and who will be prohibited from visiting.

Recommendation 8 – The federal government establish a regular dialogue with the provinces for the purpose of preventing extremism and radicalization within areas of provincial jurisdiction including, but not limited to schools, colleges, universities and prisons.

Recommendation 9 – The federal government work with the provinces and the Muslim communities to investigate the options that are available for the training and certification of imams in Canada.

Recommendation 10 – The Government establish a publicly accessible database of those organizations which have had their charitable status removed on the basis of links to terrorism.

Recommendation 11 – When the Government removes charitable status on the basis of terrorism, it holds individuals responsible for being party to, or providing material support, for terrorist activity.
Recommendation 12 – The Government update the hate laws of Canada and consider including a prohibition on the glorification of terrorists, terrorist acts and terrorist symbols connected to terrorism and radicalization.

Recommendation 13 – The Government inform Canadians of the threat to the security of Canada, and that the communications be clear, quantitative, and unambiguous in providing a realistic overview of the national security situation in Canada and abroad.

Recommendation 14 – The Government publish a “Wanted Terrorist List,” of those Canadians for whom a warrant (national or international) has been issued on grounds of terror related activities.

Recommendation 15 – The Government develop measures to prevent foreign funds from entering Canada, where such funds, donors or recipients have been linked to radicalization.

Recommendation 16 – The Government work with Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the National Security Advisor to ensure a briefing is available to appropriate federal and provincial leaders, at least once per year, to ensure they are aware of threats to the security of Canada within their jurisdiction.

Recommendation 17 – Government authorities establish a protocol with Canadian Security Intelligence Service to require mandatory screening of citizens involved in public outreach.

Recommendation 18 – The Government establish a specialized team of lawyers within the department of the Attorney General of Canada to prosecute terrorism cases and ensure judges who are selected to hear terrorism cases have specialized background and training about terrorism.

Recommendation 19 – The Government encourage police and Crown prosecutors to enforce provisions of the Criminal Code in all relevant matters involving terrorism in the criminal and pre-criminal space.

Recommendation 20 – The Criminal Code be amended in order to empower relevant law enforcement agencies to lay terrorism charges, without first requiring approval of the Attorney General of Canada or any other federal or provincial minister of the Crown.

Recommendation 21 – The Muslim Brotherhood and entities closely associated with it, be reviewed by CSIS as a priority, with the intent of determining whether it should be designated a terrorist entity.

Recommendation 22 – The Government should encourage provincial governments to implement legislation that protect Canadians who are participating in the public discourse from vexatious litigation.

Recommendation 23 – The Government develop and implement statutory authorities among the national security review bodies, in order to provide for the exchange of operational
information, referral of investigations, conduct of joint investigations and coordination in the preparation of reports and that independent reviews be implemented for any department or agency involved in national security where none currently exists;

**Recommendation 24** – The Government redesign the Kanishka Project in partnership with provinces and municipalities on a cost shared basis to emphasize practical projects that empower “at-risk communities” – especially women – and encourage post-secondary institutions to work on issues related to terrorism and radicalization.

**Recommendation 25** – The Government encourage greater coordination, on the part of Public Safety Canada, for the purposes of facilitating terrorism-related emergency preparedness with municipalities, provinces and the private sector, and this effort include an analysis of the continuing utility and appropriateness of the *Emergencies Act*. 
RADICALIZATION IN CANADA

A. Context

Canada faces a variety of terrorist threats, derived in part from extremist ideas and orientations. Canadian based Sikh nationalists were responsible for the 1985 Air India bombing, which was at the time the world's worst act of aviation-based terrorism. The murder of two Canadian Armed Forces members, in 2014, by self-proclaimed jihadists, definitively demonstrated the reach of the global Islamist fundamentalist movements.

Externally, Canada has been explicitly threatened by Islamist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. These groups continue to recruit Canadians to launch individual attacks within Canada and to join their cause. The murders of Warrant Officer Vincent and Corporal Cirillo are considered to be a response to such calls.

Several witnesses from the national security and law enforcement community indicated that violent extremism is, as Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner (RCMP) Bob Paulson put it, a "serious and present threat."¹

Violent Islamist terrorism is of particular concern to the Government, in his appearance before the Committee, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Steven Blaney, stated:

> Canadians know that the threats posed by violent jihadism, radicalization and terrorist attacks are not future possibilities in a faraway land. We saw it in Montreal last week, with 10 young individuals. We have also seen, as you know, an attack here in the federal Parliament. We have seen the B.C. plot, the CN Tower, the Toronto 18, the VIA Rail plot.²

While the most recent threats derive from organizations like ISIS (aka ISIL; the Islamic State) in Iraq and Syria which involves the foreign participation of more than 130 Canadians, Canadian law enforcement agencies deal with many forms of extremism, hate and violence. Lieutenant Sylvain Guertin, Chief of the Sûreté du Québec’s Division of Investigations on Extremist Threats, provided the following breakdown:

> The majority of the service’s active files deal with the extreme right and, for 25 per cent of the files, with hate crimes. Then we have the files on Islamic radicalism, a little under 25 per cent of the cases, lone violent offenders and anti-government

¹ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Paulson), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 October 2014.
movements. In total, those four areas account for about 70 per cent of our activities. The other 30% is devoted to other extremist elements.\(^3\)

Taking note of the evidence presented, the committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 1** – The Government make it a criminal offence to be a member of a terrorist group.

### B. Where it happens

Testimony indicated that the Internet plays an important, although not a definitive role, in delivering radical ideologies. If Professor Bélanger is correct in saying that most people who turn to violent extremism are searching for the closest ideology that will give their lives meaning, the power of the Internet to offer up simplistic solutions to complex problems should not be discounted.

As a *National Post* story pointed out on June 26, 2015:

> It takes about 30 seconds to create a Twitter account and connect to somebody in Syria [and then] Facebook’s algorithm suggests similar sites and friends with the same interests. A constant stream of beheadings and images of children with guns soon start to seem normal. ISIL has put out a guide to travelling to the territory they control, as well as a guide on how to be a jihadi in the West…. Both ISIL and al-Qaeda produce English-language magazines.\(^4\)

For example, in his appearance before the Committee, University of Ottawa Law Professor, Craig Forcese noted:

> Empirical literature on the role of the Internet in terms of radicalization...suggests that it may be a facilitator, but it's not a cause. Radicalization to violence depends on close personal contact and the presence of a charismatic leader figure at the core of a radicalizing movement, and so it's not Internet as cause. I think we have to be wary about trying to regulate the Internet with the thought that that somehow will resolve our radicalization to violence problems.\(^5\)

Another witness noted the importance of human interaction to the process of radicalization. Professor Littlewood of Carleton University advised the committee “crossing over into violence and action very often involves some other form of person-to-person contact, peer group

\(^3\) Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence* (Guertin), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 December 2014.

\(^4\) Catherine Solyum, "Bomb-making instructions, execution videos and 46K pro-ISIL Twitter accounts: Path to jihad runs wild online," *National Post*, 26 June 2015.

pressure and those kinds of things. Regulating the Internet and regulating images, those kinds of things, are not going to make our problem go away.”

So where does this person-to-person contact and peer group pressure take place? The answer depends upon the violent radical ideology in question. For example, Anders Behring Breivik, the terrorist who killed 77 Norwegian citizens on 22 July 2011, claimed membership with many extremist groups.

Countering the violent narrative requires identifying problematic elements in the jihadist ideology. Some witnesses told the committee that some mosques and religious schools are centres of radical messaging in Canada. The Committee heard from Ms. Michelle Waldron, who stated that her son was radicalized at a mosque in Ottawa. He was arrested on assault charges shortly after the October 22, 2014, attack on Parliament Hill. According to Ms. Waldron, her son was deeply influenced by what he was taught at an Ottawa mosque during the 1990s. She testified:

Wahhabism, also called Salafi’ism, whose adherents might refer to themselves as Ahl al-Hadith, Ahl al Sunnah or Zahiris, is the same ideology at the foundation of the uncontrollable monsters ISIS, al Qaeda, al Shabaab and Boko Haram. It may not be the only ultra-conservative influence that exists among Muslims, but because of the Saudi billions used to fuel their politically motivated propaganda machine, it is the most prolific and ubiquitous. And it is the ideology that my son was taught right here in Ottawa.

Supporting the seriousness of the threat, Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, ex-parliamentarian and presently, a bestselling author and senior fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University told the Committee:

For the outside, for the non-Muslim, especially in the West where we believe in the freedom of religion and the freedom of conscience, when people come here and establish a network of schools, Islamic centres, mosques, it all falls within our freedoms and our laws but we rarely take an interest in the content of what is being preached and what's being disseminated.

Ms. Ali told the Committee that “effectively combating radical influences and the resulting spread of Islamic terrorism has not, and will not, happen until Canada, the United States and other western nations really define what the problem is and how to identify it.”

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6 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Littlewood), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 December 2014
7 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Walrond), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 1 December 2014.
8 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Ali), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 June 2015
9 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Ali), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 June 2015
The National Council of Canadian Muslims disagreed with this assessment.

C. Why it happens

Jocelyn Bélanger, a professor of psychology at the Université du Québec à Montréal, told the committee that “[t]o believe that radicalized individuals are crazy or are not playing with a full deck would be our first mistake in developing effective counter-terrorism strategies. The mental instability hypothesis rather reflects our profound misunderstanding of the process of radicalization.”\(^{10}\)

He went on to suggest that “the need to hold radical attitudes is typically based on the need to be someone, to matter, to be respected.” In essence, people cleave to radical ideologies in a “quest for personal significance.”\(^{11}\)

Noting the concerns raised by witnesses about the ideological dimension of radicalization, the Committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 2** – The Government investigate and discourage the spread of violent extremism in Canada as a priority, especially the ideology promoted by the global Islamist fundamentalist movement.

D. How families are affected and what supports are available to them

Terrorism and radicalization do not occur in isolation. There are often indicators of radicalization which can be noticed by families, friends and frontline workers. More must be done to provide support to these groups and help empower them in the struggle against radicalization and violent extremism.

Much can and needs to be done at the community level.

Police and intelligence officials noted that stigmatization is counterproductive to their investigative efforts. They need the trust of community members to do community outreach work in the ‘pre-criminal space’ – before push comes to shove and individuals have moved past thinking about things to doing things. People need to be comfortable enough with police to approach them with critical information so that they can prevent violent action before it happens.

Required action also includes preventative programs, effective counter-narrative initiatives and support for “at risk communities” to deal with the issues. Police officers said that some of their most effective work, was in community outreach in the “pre-criminal space.”

\(^{10}\) Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence*, (Belanger), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 8 December 2014

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
There is also clearly a need to push back against violent extremism on the Internet to communicate effective counter narratives. Pushing back on the Internet is a difficult challenge, according to Rafal Rohozinski, a senior fellow at Ottawa-based SecDev Foundation. He told the committee about his organization’s research into how extremists use social media to spread their ideologies.\(^{12}\) This research is being used to better calibrate the development and delivery of counter-narrative messages to “at risk communities.”

SecDev works with data analytics to identify “hallmark content” of dangerously radical views expressed through social media. The point, Rohozinski said: is not to identify or target groups or individuals but rather to use hallmark content to develop counter-narrative materials that teachers, schools, community groups, leaders and medical or mental health practitioners – what he termed “community gatekeepers” – can deliver where it is most needed.

Efforts are being made to push back within at-risk communities, where parents have often been slow to react to dangerous personality transformations in their children, law enforcement personnel have not always been alert to signals of transformation, and people who become aware of extremist radicals within a community have sometimes been hesitant to communicate their concerns to authorities.

Concerns were raised about the treatment of women in some “at-risk communities”. One witness, Ms. Homa Arjomand, spoke of fleeing Iran only to find herself faced with the same kinds of oppressions here. Working in a Canadian women’s shelter, she said she encounters “Gender apartheid, segregation of men and women and oppression of women take the grossest and the most outrageous forms in these so-called Islamic communities – polygamy, arranged marriages, child brides, [and] child trafficking for the purpose of marriage.”\(^{13}\)

The committee recognizes that women can be a powerful influence in combating radicalization and terrorism.

Noting these concerns and the significant risks to women and girls, the Committee recommends:

**Recommendation 3** – The Government work with “at-risk communities”, especially women, to encourage and support practices which are in keeping with Canadian values.

On its fact-finding trip to Toronto, the Committee heard about the efforts which are being made to train police to recognize the indicators of radicalization. An officer with the Toronto Police Service told the Committee that over 600 of its police officers had received this type of training.

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These front-line officers “can now go out on a domestic dispute call and, if they see a certain flag, understand that they need to report it.”\textsuperscript{14}

Also in Toronto, a CSIS official told the Committee that the Service has been contacted by school boards to provide terrorism training and advice. The Committee believes having more informed “eyes and ears” is vital to terrorism prevention and that such training should be extended to all first-responders.

The Committee recommends that:

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**Recommendation 4** – The Government work to establish a program which provides information about clear and specific indicators of radicalization to frontline workers including teachers, police officers, prison workers, nurses and doctors. It should do more to encourage Canadians to anonymously report information regarding terrorism, criminal extremism or suspicious activities which could pose a threat to safety and security by calling the national security tip line – 1-800-420-5805.

**Recommendation 5** – The Government establish a program to support families who report radicalization and are seeking help.
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\textsuperscript{14} Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Fact-Finding Trip, 26-27 March 2015.
PREVENTION

A. Countering radicalization

Concerns expressed in testimony and elsewhere about the increase in radicalism and extremism in Canadian society, call for greater government support for carefully vetted, moderate groups who embody a potential answer to the extremist narrative.

To address these concerns with building the counter-radicalization narrative, the Committee recommends:

**Recommendation 6** – The Government work with Muslim communities to create an effective counter-narrative to denounce the ideology of Islamist fundamentalism.

Another issue of concern for the Committee has been that some groups in Canada have invited radical foreign nationals into the country and presented them with speaking opportunities. Witnesses reported that large audiences, including considerable numbers of Canadian youth, have been exposed to extremist views. The Committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 7** – The Government establish a publicly accessible “No-Visit List,” which identifies ideological radicals who pose a threat to the security of Canada and who will be prohibited from visiting.

B. Federal-provincial partnerships

The responsibility for managing the terrorist threat overlaps between the federal and provincial governments. Relevant provincial responsibilities include policing, education, and prisons where radicalization could take place, as well as mental health services. Federal responsibilities include RCMP policing, national security and intelligence bodies. Coordination and cooperation is needed.

Witnesses, such as Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, noted that prisons are an “incubator of radicalization” within the European Union. Closer to home, the committee heard from those with direct experience providing counselling services to prison inmates in Canada. Dr. Robert Groves, an Ottawa-based clinical psychologist who served as a volunteer psychological counsellor in the Kingston Penitentiary prior to its closure in 2013, reinforced the view that a watchful eye needs to be kept on amateur prison proselytizers, as well as fellow

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inmates. He spoke of having witnessed the surprising hold that convicted murderer Mohammad Shafia had over approximately 25 prisoners and of him leading Friday prayers. The Commissioner of Correctional Service Canada, Don Head, told the committee that as far as he knew, this did not take place, but did note that Islam is the fastest growing religious population in prisons with, “close to a thousand offenders that proclaim Islam as their faith of choice, faith of following.”

The Committee notes concerns about radicalization within prisons and schools and the interprovincial cooperation required to combat it.

The Committee recommends:

**Recommendation 8** – The federal government establish a regular dialogue with the provinces for the purpose of preventing extremism and radicalization within areas of provincial jurisdiction including, but not limited to schools, colleges, universities and prisons.

The committee heard testimony from members of the Muslim community and others that some foreign-trained imams have been spreading extremist religious ideology and messages that are not in keeping with Canadian values. These extremist ideas are said to be contributing to radicalization and raise serious concerns if they continue to go unchecked. As is the case now in Europe, the committee recommends:

**Recommendation 9** – The federal government work with the provinces and the Muslim communities to investigate the options that are available for the training and certification of Imams in Canada.

**C. Terrorism financing**

The committee emphasizes the importance of money in enabling terrorists to maintain their organizations, propagate dangerous messages, finance terrorist operations, and recruit. It is important to recall that major terrorist attacks may require extremely limited financial outlays, relative to the resultant loss of life and economic cost. **17** Terrorist propaganda can spread and reinforce narratives tending to alienate fellow-citizens from the mainstream and to draw them

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closer to violent action. As in the case of terrorist activity, limited funding can advance the aims of extremists to a significant degree.\(^\text{18}\)

The committee heard concerns raised by witnesses about funding entering Canada from foreign entities. Foreign money need not travel from far-distant nations in order to invite questions about attempts by radicals to secure influence in Canadian institutions.

Concerns were raised about the capacity of security organizations to identify money laundering and terror-financing, given the complicated nature of money flows, and problems with interagency information-sharing.\(^\text{19}\) The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) confirmed to the Committee its mandate for tracking foreign money entering Canada for religious, political and educational purposes. Ms. Hawara, the Director General for the Charities Directorate informed the committee that:

> Registered charities cannot receive funds from state sponsors of terrorism, and there are two currently: Iran and Syria. That's currently the only exception when it comes to foreign funds. But, in their annual returns, charities are required to provide certain pieces of information about foreign donations and more detailed information on donations above $10,000. That information is, however, confidential and is used only by us. It isn't available to the public.\(^\text{20}\)

The committee was informed that eight charities have had their status revoked as a result of a link to terrorism, and one, the Islamic Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN), has been designated a terrorist entity for funding Hamas. It is concerning that this specific terrorist designation took ten years from the time concerns were initially raised by a parliamentarian in 2004. In spite of confirmed links to terrorism, the Committee is concerned there appears to be no liability for the directors and staff of these charities who have been linked to terrorism.

The committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 10** – The Government publish a publically accessible database of those organizations which have had their charitable status removed on the basis of links to terrorism.

**Recommendation 11** – When the Government removes charitable status on the basis of terrorism, it holds individuals responsible for being party to, or providing material support, for terrorist activity.

\(^{18}\) See discussion about financing in Syed Sohail Raza, Michelle Walrond, Dr. Salim Mansur, cited above.

\(^{19}\) Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence* (Tod), 41\(^{\text{st}}\) Parliament, 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Session, 17 November 2014. See also, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence. See also, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence* (Lamothe), 41\(^{\text{st}}\) Parliament, 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Session, 1 December 2014.

\(^{20}\) Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence* (Hawara), 41\(^{\text{st}}\) Parliament, 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Session, 1 June 2015.
D. Terrorist glorification

A number of witnesses, including retired Justice John Major and Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh and victims of terrorism raised concerns about the ongoing promotion and glorification of terrorists, which were at the root of the terrorist bombing of Air India Flight 182 and ongoing radicalization in the Sikh Canadian community.

The committee believes that the glorifying of terrorists and their causes can encourage emulation of the terrorist example, with terrible consequences for innocent people. It has therefore been disturbing to see, from time to time in Canada, flags, banners, and pictures of “martyrs” connected to terrorism, displayed in public places and houses of worship, particularly in the presence of youths. While recognizing that sensitive Charter of Rights and Freedoms issues must be contemplated, the committee takes note of the actions taken in France and the United Kingdom to prohibit terrorist glorification and recommends that:

**Recommendation 12** – The Government update the hate laws of Canada and consider including glorification of terrorists, terrorist acts and terrorist symbols connected to extremism.

E. Public information

The Committee believes the public must be informed about the terrorism threat facing Canada, and be in a position to make knowledgeable judgments and choices about the direction of security policy- and decision-making. As part of this, public awareness about extremism and terrorism requires that Canadians be given notice of the status of certain persons and organizations connected to terrorist activity, including charitable organizations.

It is important that the Government communicate directly with Canadians about terrorist threats. The committee is concerned that some federal security statements have resorted to terminology that obscures material information about sources and trends in terrorism. The 2014 Public Report On The Terrorist Threat to Canada, for example, which represents a prime means of enlightening Canadians about terror threats, was purged of language that would identify the specific religious political or ideological motivations claimed by today’s international terror-perpetrators.

During its hearings, the committee was concerned by its inability to extract a direct answer from officials about the number of Canadians that have left to join terrorist groups abroad.

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For example, the Director of CSIS, Michel Coulombe, provided the following response to the Chair’s request for an updated foreign fighter count:

In terms of an update, the last time I was here I was reluctant to give you numbers, but I can say that they are increasing. Maybe to correct the record, you mentioned at the beginning at the time 145 people in Iraq and Syria. It's 145 known Canadians around the world, with about one third in Iraq and Syria and some in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. That overall number is slowly increasing, with the sharpest increase in Iraq and Syria. In fact, over the last three or four months, we have probably seen an increase of 50 per cent in the number of people who have left for Iraq and Syria.²³

To better inform Canadians about the threats to the security of Canada, the committee recommends:

**Recommendation 13** – The Government inform Canadians of the threat to the security of Canada and that the communications be clear, quantitative, and unambiguous in providing a realistic overview of the national security situation in Canada and abroad.

**Recommendation 14** – The Government establish and publish a “Wanted Terrorist List,” of those Canadians for whom a warrant (national or international) has been issued on grounds of terror related activities.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN CANADA

A. Foreign Funding

To promote their own fundamentalist brand of Islam – Wahhabism – here in Canada, the committee has heard that wealthy Saudis, Qatars and Kuwaitis are using charities as conduits to finance Canadian mosques and community centres.\(^{24}\) Though he avoided naming any countries outright, Richard Fadden, the current National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and former Director of CSIS, confirmed that there are concerns about foreign financing of Canadian religious and “quasi-religious” institutions. On this, he stated:

I think it is a problem. I think it's one that we're becoming increasingly aware of. It's one that we share with a number of our other Western allies and, insofar as I've been able to make out, nobody has found a systemic solution. What I think has occurred on a number of cases, you can find out about a specific case and you can do something about it. The problem is finding out about the specific case.

[...]

In fact, in my previous job, I actually raised with representatives from some of the countries who might be involved in this and suggested to them this was not helpful. The difficulty in most cases is that the monies are not coming from governments. They're coming from fairly wealthy institutions or individuals within some of these countries. It makes it doubly difficult to track. It doesn't mean you're not right in raising it. I just don't have an easy solution.\(^{25}\)

Calgary Imam, Syed Soharwardy, as well as other witnesses, advised the Committee that extremist jihadist ideology is being spread at schools and universities, often under the guise of academic freedom and away from the eyes of CSIS. He told the Committee:

The money comes in different ways, in secret ways. Money comes through institutions. There are two organizations in Canada. Basically they are U.S. organizations that are operating in Canada. One is called Al Maghrib Institute; the other is called Al Kauthar Institute. Both work in universities, not in mosques. Both give lectures. Both organize seminars. They are the ones who brainwash these young kids in lectures.\(^{26}\)


\(^{26}\) Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Evidence* (Soharwardy), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 2 February 2015.
Similarly, Ms. Ali told the Committee that organisations in, “countries like Saudi Arabia and the oil wealthy Gulf countries that have absolutely everything that money can buy, yet many of them choose, for their philanthropy, radical Islamic goals, institutions, activities, jihad.”  

The committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 15** – The Government develop measures to prevent foreign funds from entering Canada, where such funds, donors or recipients have been linked to radicalization.

B. Infiltration of Canadian organizations and events

The Committee was surprised to learn that the RCMP does not have an explicit national policy to check with CSIS on a regular basis when it is conducting outreach and other such engagement. Local law enforcement officials may also not be fully aware of the people with whom they are doing outreach and whether such persons are identified as radicals, extremists, supporters or terrorists by CSIS. Former British Columbia Premier and federal minister, Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh, a victim of terrorism himself, told the committee that political leaders are regularly invited to events and often do not know who they are meeting and what access is being provided.

While some support is available to those in leadership positions it is clear that many do not know where to find help or do not regularly seek the guidance of experts like CSIS or the Integrated Terrorist Assessment Centre which is able to provide classified and unclassified briefings about individuals and organizations. Clearly more must be done when it comes to due diligence and more information needs to be accessible to senior government and political leaders.

The Committee recommends:

**Recommendation 16** – The Government work with CSIS and the National Security Advisor to ensure a briefing is available to appropriate federal and provincial leaders, at least once per year, to ensure they are aware of threats to the security of Canada within their jurisdiction.

**Recommendation 17** – Government authorities establish a protocol with CSIS to require mandatory screening of citizens involved in public outreach.

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The Committee notes the terrorist threat to the security of Canada has increased significantly. In recent decades, a number of Canadians have been convicted in court for planning multi-target, mass-casualty strikes in this country. Threats have been forthcoming from Canadians who have joined terrorists hostile to Canada and its allies. The committee heard evidence that eighty Canadians have returned to Canada after participating with Islamist fundamentalist groups. Many of these people return with terrorist training, combat experience and may therefore pose a security risk to Canada. There have been relatively few charges, prosecutions or convictions for participating in or providing material support to the jihadist movement.

The Committee is concerned about the lack of prosecutions in the area of terrorist financing. The Committee learned that between 2009 and 2014, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada identified 683 terrorist financing incidences and we have yet to have any prosecutions under the relevant sections of the criminal code.

Similarly, in the area of supporting listed terrorist entities like the LTTE (Tamil Tigers), Hamas, Hezbollah or the Islamic Relief Fund for the Needy and Afflicted, there have been no charges with the exception of the 2010 conviction of Prapaharan Thambithurai, who was charged with raising money for the LTTE.

The Committee heard from police and security witnesses' evidence that their forces are stretched by the weight of their counter-terrorism responsibilities. Mr. de Kerchove told the committee that in Europe, radical jihadists consume a significant amount of resources, once they have returned. He noted “where you don't have evidence, you need to monitor them discreetly. I'm told by professionals that you need between 20 and 25 members of a security service to do that 24/7 which, if I take the country [Belgium] I know best, it's beyond our resources.”

The RCMP's recent announcement that six hundred officers have been diverted from other pressing public-safety duties, in order to fight terrorism is an indication of the priority it has placed on confronting this threat.

Outreach, including forms of counselling and liaising with communities and individuals, was recommended to the committee by police officials as a way of dealing with the Islamist fundamentalist menace. The effect of these options is unclear and unproven. Indeed, the 2014 murder of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent by Martin Couture-Rouleau was an example of a failure of an extensive police counter-radicalization effort, after his father had alerted police to his radicalization and the local imam was engaged to de-radicalize him. While a peace bond was initially sought by police in the case of Mr. Couture- Rouleau, it was rejected by the Public Prosecution Service.

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29 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (de Kerchove), 41 Parliament, 2nd Session, 1 June 2015
The committee observes that peace bonds only offer a limited solution in managing the threat of radical jihadists. Law enforcement and the Public Prosecution Service must work harder to bring cases before the courts so the accused can have a fair hearing and the evidence can be tested. Moreover, Canadians expect the RCMP and the Attorney General of Canada to apply the harshest penalties when it comes to terrorism threats and use our laws as a deterrent whenever possible.

A senior RCMP officer testified that her organization’s Countering Violent Extremism program, incorporating certain non-prosecution outreach aspects, “is limited to those individuals who have not yet committed violent action.” A host of provisions in the Criminal Code identify crimes that have nothing to do with “violent action”, but are crimes requiring prosecution.

With some 145 Canadians having left Canada to join terrorist groups abroad, the committee questions whether national security and law enforcement agencies have fully exercise existing legal options. For example, new provisions under section 83.181 of the Criminal Code that criminalized leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purposes of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity came into effect on 15 July 2013. Why then, has this provision been used so rarely prior to a suspect’s departure? So far, it has been used to convict Mohamed Hersi in 2014 of attempting to travel abroad to join a terrorist group and, more recently, to charge two Ottawa brothers – Carlos and Ashton Larmond.

This is concerning, given, that there are approximately 93 Canadians – so-called “high-risk travellers” – the authorities believe want to leave Canada to engage in terrorist activities.

When he appeared before the committee, The Honourable John Major, a former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada and head of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, reiterated his commission’s call for a specialized terrorism prosecution team within the Department of Justice Canada, saying:

Well, what I would envisage off the top of my head is that the Justice Department would form a group of lawyers within the Justice Department whose sole duty would be terrorist prosecutions. It would be similar to what you have now with drug prosecutions. There are lawyers in the department who are responsible for prosecution of drug offences. A lot of that work is done in provinces by agents appointed by the Justice Department.

What I would see in the terrorist investigations and prosecutions is the same format. You would have lawyers exclusively dedicated to that task. They would be part of the Department of Justice. They would operate in a

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30 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Cuillierrier), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 17 November 2014.

31 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Paulson), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 27 October 2014.
similar fashion to prosecutions that are already being performed by the federal government.\textsuperscript{32}

Noting the challenges obtaining terrorism charges, prosecutions and convictions, and the need to enhance Canada’s capacity to combat terrorist threats by utilizing the laws passed by Parliament as effective deterrence, the committee recommends that:

\textbf{Recommendation 18} – The Government establish a specialized team of lawyers within the department of the Attorney General of Canada to prosecute terrorism cases and ensure judges who are selected to hear terrorism cases have specialized background and training about terrorism.

\textbf{Recommendation 19} – The Government encourage police and Crown prosecutors to enforce provisions of the \textit{Criminal Code} in all relevant matters, including those involving terrorism in the criminal and pre-criminal space.

Some witnesses raised concerns about the role of the Attorneys General at the federal and provincial levels, suggesting that having to obtain the consent of these offices prior to laying terrorism-related charges introduces unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles. For example, Marc Parent, Director of the Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal, indicated that obtaining Attorney General consent requires several steps, which slows things down. For a solution, he looked to “narrowing” the Public Prosecution Service of Canada’s area of jurisdiction to create a single point of contact.\textsuperscript{33}

The centralizing of criminal proceedings under the RCMP and the Public Prosecution Service for section 83 terrorism charges appears to be overly complicated. It also utilizes an extremely cautious approach to the laying of charges, which may undermine the deterrence value of the law and the intent of Parliament.

To address this, the committee recommends that:

\textbf{Recommendation 20} – The \textit{Criminal Code} be amended in order to empower relevant law enforcement agencies to lay terrorism charges, without first requiring approval of the Attorney General of Canada or of any other federal or provincial minister of the Crown.

\textsuperscript{32} Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, \textit{Evidence} (Major), 41\textsuperscript{st} Parliament, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 16 February 2015.

\textsuperscript{33} Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, \textit{Evidence} (Parent), 41\textsuperscript{st} Parliament, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 1 December 2014.
DILIGENCE AND DETERRENCE

A. Pre-engagement analysis

Pre-engagement analysis should extend well beyond criminal record checks and include assessments of whether individuals and groups have facilitated divisive or intolerant messaging. Government outreach can confer legitimacy on undeserving elements when due diligence is not properly undertaken.

In this regard, the Committee recognizes the adverse consequences of the RCMP’s role in collaborating in producing what was described as a “counter-radicalization manual,” United Against Terrorism. Although the RCMP gave evidence to the Committee that it had withdrawn support for the handbook shortly before it was published, the Committee remains concerned that this book is being circulated nationally and internationally with the impression that it is supported by the RCMP.

When it comes to due diligence and screening, the committee was told that more attention needs to be paid to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that is reported to have strong linkages in Canada through various organisations which support its mandate. Witnesses who appeared before the committee stated that organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have a hidden agenda that does not necessarily coincide with Canadian values of pluralism, gender equality and secular views. Additionally, the Brotherhood has been known to encourage radicalization in society. For example, Lorenzo Vidino, a recognized expert on the Brotherhood appeared before the committee and summed up the issue as follows:

First of all, these organizations have not, from an ideological point of view, completely condemned violence. I'm talking about heterogeneous transnational movements, so I'm simplifying things. Generally speaking, the movement has not abandoned violence as a tool to advance its agenda. It's abandoned its tactics, but it's not heartfelt.

Secondly, in some cases, they do directly support violence. I think we have many cases of Brotherhood organizations, including here in Canada, funding terrorist-designated organizations: Hamas and what we see in Libya now, for example, with the Brotherhood being actively involved in violence, together with jihadist groups. That's a very interesting dynamic.

Third, the other reason the Brotherhood in the West is concerning is it embraces a certain narrative that is very conducive to violent radicalization. In certain parts of Muslim communities, it mainstreams a narrative of support of violence and "victimism" that are extremely dangerous when combined.34

Noting previous initiatives to list Hamas, Hezbollah and the LTTE as terrorist entities and the urgent need to prevent radicalization, the Committee recommends:

**Recommendation 21** – The Muslim Brotherhood and entities closely associated with it, be reviewed by CSIS as a priority, with the intent of determining whether it should be designated a terrorist entity.

B. **Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP)**

Open discourse is vital in a democracy, and it is for good reason that freedom of expression has been termed “the first freedom.” Without it, governments and their officials could not be challenged, and ideas, tested. Canada, like many other liberal democracies, does recognize certain exceptions to free expression; however, people may be sued in Canada for libel, for instance. This is to enable individuals to protect their good names.

In recent years, this exception to free expression has triggered questions about the way in which libel law is used to deter people from discussing in frank terms, terrorist and other threats to security. On a number of occasions, primarily in the context of public debate about terrorism, extremism and radicalization, plaintiffs have claimed to be defamed, and have launched lawsuits against those whom they alleged to have inflicted reputational damage upon them by stating or implying they had an association or affinity with radicalism.

It is a growing worry, including in the province of Ontario, that some interests may be abusing their access to courts by commencing lawsuits aimed at chilling the speech of defendants, and sending a deterrent signal to the broader population. Targets of such proceedings, including media, know that even responsible discussion of certain individuals and organizations could lead to expensive litigation. Even if a defendant were to prevail in court, it would be unlikely that full costs sustained would be regained by that party. The message would be conveyed: some people or organizations, no matter how compelling the evidence against them, would be off limits for the purposes of responsible public examination of their possible extremist connections.

Other witnesses such as Mr. Dosanjh and Justice Major noted the threat of such lawsuits being used to silence public comments to the determent of Canadian freedom of speech and the principle of responsible comments on issues of national or regional importance.

The committee commends the recent review on the subject by Ontario Government and notes positively the provincial Attorney General’s legislation to address this important issue.

The committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 22** – The Government should encourage provincial governments to implement legislation that protect Canadians who are participating in the public discourse from vexatious litigation.
LOOKING AHEAD

A. Review and oversight

The committee heard from many witnesses that, as Canada’s response to the terrorist threat evolves, so too must its review and accountability capabilities. For example, Executive Director of SIRC, Michael Doucet, underscored the need to integrate the work of his and other oversight bodies, saying,

SIRC’s ability to follow the thread and conduct joint reviews is absolutely vital to accountability. With Bill C-51 comes increased information sharing for the purposes of national security. As a result, over 100 Government of Canada institutions can share information in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada without any clear standards for disclosure. Seventeen departments with a national security nexus, including CSIS, are listed in the legislation as the recipients of this information sharing. Of those 17 departments, only 3 are subject to a dedicated review body; and those review bodies represented here today are constrained from following the information of the agency they examine into other Government of Canada institutions and from performing joint reviews. These legislative constraints on SIRC will make it increasingly difficult for us to provide robust assurances on CSIS’s activities to Parliament and Canadians.35

Further integrating national security departments and agencies while leaving review and accountability mechanisms siloed could result in the diminution of public trust in the system, as questions of propriety go unanswered.

The committee agrees with security officials and specialists who have emphasized the importance of having credible monitoring of the government’s security-and-intelligence apparatus, through review or oversight mechanisms, as appropriate. Such mechanisms, including the independent government “watchdog” Security and Intelligence Review Committee, can be effective in encouraging efficient, effective, responsible and accountable activity in departments and agencies subject to their examination. This, in turn, can build public confidence in security institutions and activity, and increase public co-operation in counter-terrorism.

The committee recommends that:

Recommendation 23 – The government develops statutory authorities among the national security review bodies, in order to provide for the exchange of operational information, referral of investigations, conduct of joint investigations and coordination in the preparation of reports and that independent review be implemented for any department or agency involved in national security where none currently exists.

35 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Evidence (Doucet), 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 23 April 2015.
B. Research

The committee recognizes that terrorism in its many varieties raises serious and complicated questions that must be answered if we are to meet the challenge of defeating it. As testimony has indicated, an understanding of religious, political and other ideology is key, depending on the context. Psychology and psychological insights can prove invaluable, especially where radicalization plays a part. Financial analysis is crucial. Competence in the intelligence field is necessary. Much depends on the capacity of Canada to conduct accurate, focused research into appropriate matter.

During the past five years, over ten million dollars have been allocated to terrorism research by Public Safety Canada under the name Kaniskha, as a legacy to understanding the radicalization which took the lives of 331 people, 268 Canadians, when Air India Flight 182 was bombed. The federal funding has provided a valuable basis for understanding terrorism. Today, there is an urgent need to support direct and practical projects for at risk communities, especially women to combat the increasing threat of radicalization and extremism.

Noting this need, the committee recommends that:

Recommendation 24 – The Government redesign the Kanishka Project in partnership with provinces and municipalities on a cost shared basis to emphasize practical initiatives that empower "at-risk communities" – especially women – and encourage post-secondary institutions to work on issues related to terrorism and radicalization.

C. Emergency planning

International experience has been replete with examples of simultaneous multi-nodal attacks in given locales, such as those perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army, and those inflicted upon Mumbai, India in 2008. The Toronto 18 plot anticipated attacks in two major Canadian cities, with multiple targets in one of them, Toronto. Following the terrorist attack on Parliament Hill in Ottawa in 2014, numerous questions were raised about Canada’s emergency preparedness.

On its fact-finding trip to Toronto, the Toronto Police Service voiced concern about interoperability issues between municipal, provincial and federal emergency responders. As well, the Toronto Police Service indicated that it and other municipal police forces are looking for greater leadership from Public Safety Canada in provision of standardized training for first response to terrorism emergencies. It is important that all levels of government in Canada be able to work together for the purposes of emergency preparedness.

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36 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Fact-Finding Trip, 26-27 March 2015.
The committee recommends that:

**Recommendation 25** – The Government encourage greater coordination, on the part of Public Safety Canada, for the purposes of facilitating terrorism-related emergency preparedness with municipalities, provinces and private sector, and that this effort include an analysis of the continuing utility and appropriateness of the *Emergencies Act*
## APPENDIX 1 – WITNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name/Title</th>
<th>Date Of Appearance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>41st Parliament – 2nd Session</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Founder, AHA Foundation</td>
<td>June 8, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Revenue Agency</td>
<td>Alastair Bland, Director, Review and Analysis Division, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch</td>
<td>June 1, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
<td>June 1, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada Revenue Agency</td>
<td>Cathy Hawara, Director General, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch</td>
<td>June 1, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Christine Duhaime, Barrister and Solicitor, Duhaime Law</td>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correctional Service Canada</td>
<td>Don Head, Commissioner</td>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute</td>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Lorenzo Vidino, Director, Program on Extremism, Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, George Washington University</td>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Anita Anand, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto</td>
<td>May 4, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Robert Groves, Psychologist</td>
<td>May 4, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Christian Leuprecht, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada</td>
<td>May 4, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Clark R. McCauley Jr., Professor, Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College</td>
<td>May 4, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization/Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS)</td>
<td>Lorne Dawson, Co-Director, University of Waterloo</td>
<td>February 23, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS)</td>
<td>Daniel Hiebert, Co-Director, University of British Columbia</td>
<td>February 23, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Point de Bascule</td>
<td>Marc Lebuis, Director</td>
<td>February 23, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Mahdi Qasqas, Registered Provisional Psychologist, Muslim Youth and Family Services</td>
<td>February 23, 2015</td>
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<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Shahina Siddiqui, Islamic Social Services Association</td>
<td>February 23, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Balraj Deol</td>
<td>February 16, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>The Honourable Ujjal Dosanjh, P.C., former Minister</td>
<td>February 16, 2015</td>
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<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Dave Hayer</td>
<td>February 16, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>The Honourable John Charles Major, former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada</td>
<td>February 16, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Homa Arjomand, Coordinator of The Campaign in Defense of Women's Rights in Iran</td>
<td>February 2, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Zijad Delic, Imam</td>
<td>February 2, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Kent Roach, Professor, Prichard-Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto</td>
<td>February 2, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Syed Badiuddin Sohanwardy, Imam</td>
<td>February 2, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Jocelyn Bélanger, Professor, Faculty of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montréal</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Craig Forcese, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section), University of Ottawa</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sûreté du Québec</td>
<td>Lieutenant Sylvain Guertin, Chief, Division of Investigations on Extremist Threats</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sûreté du Québec</td>
<td>Jocelyn Latulippe, Deputy Director General, Investigations and Internal Security</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Jeremy Littlewood, Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Salim Mansur, Professor, University of Western Ontario</td>
<td>December 8, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peel Regional Police</td>
<td>Brian Adams, Deputy Chief</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Service of Montreal</td>
<td>François Bleau, Inspector, Intelligence Services Division</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton Police Service</td>
<td>Rod Knecht, Chief</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Service of Montreal</td>
<td>Bernard Lamothe, Assistant Director, Special Investigations</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Service of Montreal</td>
<td>Marc Parent, Director</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>Michelle Walrond, mother of a radicalized man</td>
<td>December 1, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Canadian Congress</td>
<td>Tarek Fatah, Founder</td>
<td>November 24, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims Facing Tomorrow</td>
<td>Syed Sohail Raza, Director</td>
<td>November 24, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDev Foundation</td>
<td>Rafal Rohozinski, Senior Fellow</td>
<td>November 24, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>Superintendent Shirley Cuillierrier, Director General, Partnerships and External Relations</td>
<td>November 17, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>Sergeant Renuka Dash, Acting Officer in Charge, Federal Policing, Public Engagement</td>
<td>November 17, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>John Davies, Director General, National Security Policy, National and Cyber Security Branch</td>
<td>November 17, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<td>Position/Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>Anna Gray-Henschel</td>
<td>Senior Director, National Security Policy Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>Gary Robertson</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner Scott Tod</td>
<td>Ontario Provincial Police, Co-chair of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Tom Venner</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Prosecution Service of Canada</td>
<td>George Dolhai</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>Public Prosecution Service of Canada</td>
<td>Ursula Hendel</td>
<td>Senior Counsel, Drug, National Security and Northern Prosecutions Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>As an Individual</td>
<td>The Honourable Senator Serge Joyal, P.C.</td>
<td>Former deputy chair of the Senate Special Committee on Anti-terrorism</td>
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<td>Public Prosecution Service of Canada</td>
<td>Brian Saunders</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>Mike Cabana</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing</td>
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<td>Peter Henschel</td>
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<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>Bob Paulson</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Michael Peirce</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada</td>
<td>Luc Beaudry, Manager, Terrorist Financing Intelligence Group</td>
<td>October 20, 2014</td>
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<td>Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada</td>
<td>Gérald Cossette, Director</td>
<td>October 20, 2014</td>
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<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Jeff Yaworski, Deputy Director of Operations</td>
<td>October 20, 2014</td>
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