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EDITORIAL

06 Editorial: A Formidable Legacy Indeed! *Major Chris J. Young*

ARTICLES

"No Waiting for George": The Question of Support for the Black Watch assault on Verrières Ridge in Operation SPRING, Normandy, 25 July 1944

David R. O'Keefe

31 "Every Kind of Machiavellian Plot": Curley Hutton and Canada's march to a war in South Africa

Dr. Craig Stockings

- 55 Organizing Canada's Infantry

 Major Cole Petersen
- 91 Corporate Allies: Canadian Armed Forces and the use of Private Military, Security and Logistic Companies

Dr. David A. Borys and Joshua Matthewman

BIOGRAPHY

107 An Average Joe

Daniel J. Demers

NOTE TO FILE

117 Mapping the Human Terrain for Domestic Operations

Major Derek Spencer

BOOK REVIEWS

- 130 The Siege of Brest 1941: A Legend of Red Army Resistance on the Eastern Front Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham
- **132** July 1914: Countdown to War

 Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald
- 134 Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian–Chechen Wars, 1994–2009 Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham
- 136 A Companion to Women's Military History

 Reviewed by Major Chris J. Young



138 Last Man Standing: The Life of Smokey Smith VC, 1914–2005

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy

- 140 A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald
- 142 Building Sanctuary: The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965–73 Reviewed by John MacFarlane
- 145 A Small Price to Pay: Consumer Culture on the Canadian Home Front, 1939–45Reviewed by Colonel Peter J. Williams
- 148 Pictorial History of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers: British Columbia's Guerrilla Army, 1942–1945

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy

150 Where the Iron Crosses Grow: the Crimea 1941–44

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Chris Rankin



EDITORIAL: A FORMIDABLE LEGACY INDEED!



The sudden passing of retired General Ramsey Muir Withers, CMM, CStJ, CD, D Eng, D Mil Sc, P Eng, just prior to Christmas last year, left a gaping hole in the pantheon of exceptional Canadians. It is not my intent here to outline his many accomplishments from a long and distinguished career.¹

Suffice it to say that General Withers, a combat veteran from the Korean War, achieved the highest pinnacle within the Canadian Forces (that of Chief of the Defence Staff); made a very successful transition into the civil service, achieving the position of Deputy Minister; and then moved into the private sector, achieving considerable success there as well!

My intent is, rather, to highlight a couple of areas from General Withers' long and distinguished career that are often overlooked. Few people are aware, for example, of the enormous amount of time and energy General Withers devoted to a long list of volunteer activities, including service as a Trustee of the Canadian Museum of Civilization; one-time Chairmanship of the Canadian War Museum Committee; and membership in the Canadian War Museum's "A Team" of volunteers. Indeed, it was during a recent 2014 interview with "A Team" members that he spelled out why he remained so active as a volunteer: "To pass the torch. To make sure people remember why we shouldn't have wars..."

The other area often overlooked is arguably where he made one of his strongest contributions to changing the Canadian Forces for the better. That came about through his leadership of what became known as the 1998 Withers Study Group. He was presented with quite a substantial mandate:

"To ensure for each graduate, a broad-based education, well grounded in the sciences and the humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics and leadership skills needed for responsibilities and service to country."

From the start, it became clear that the choice of General Withers for the task was nothing less than brilliant. As an ex-cadet who had started his service at Royal Roads Military College (then the Canadian Services College Royal Roads) in 1948, General Withers would have been quite aware of the need for an overhaul to the Colleges' program then in place. It is worth highlighting two of the Group's recommendations.

One recommendation sought to reinforce the development of the values, ethics and leadership skills required by military cadets for service to Canada, so that future military leaders emerging from the Military Colleges would be firmly integrated into the profession of arms. The significance of this recommendation lay in re-orienting the relationship between the



Colleges and the Canadian Forces, and ensuring that those cadets who succeeded in graduating from the Military Colleges were the type of leaders and professionals required by the CAF going forward.

The second recommendation worth identifying was also perhaps the most radical of the three: the philosophical overhaul of the evaluation model. General Withers stated in a recent 2012 interview that "when my class arrived at Royal Roads in 1948, we were fortunate to have had seniors, Cadets who were a year ahead of us, to provide leadership, caring and to convey Naval & Air Force traditions. I credit the seniors and faculty for my positive first year experience at

Royal Roads." That experience likely led him to include the recommendation that the Military Colleges move towards a philosophy based on mentoring and guiding the cadets towards excellence, and away from "the more Darwinian model of evaluation for filtering out the unfit."

I mention General Withers' achievements in these two areas not simply because they deserve more attention, but more so because they reflect the type of attitude we as professional officers should aspire to emulate. Clearly, few of us are going to have the level of influence over Canadian military policy that General Withers achieved. But each of us, in our own way, can indeed contribute to the Canadian Army and potentially influence Army policy.




A profession of arms requires a strong intellectual basis, something General Withers acknowledged through the Withers Study Group's recommendations. I believe that supporting the CAJ through the submission of thoughtful, well-written articles on topical Army issues is one way in which we can continue to honour General Withers' legacy. Please consider contributing today!

Major Chris J. Young, CD, MA Editor-in-chief

ENDNOTES

- Indeed, for an excellent obituary of General Withers that provides a thorough enunciation of his life story, I would recommend the one posted online by the Kingston-based Communications and Electronics Museum at http://www.c-and-e-museum.org/Docs/Ramsey%20Withers%20Obituary.pdf.
- 2. The Ottawa Magazine provided an excellent interview and synopsis of the "A Team" in its 19 January 2015 edition, online at http://www.ottawamagazine.com/society/2011/11/11/from-the-print-edition-fighting-the-good-fight/.
- 3. Victoria Edwards, "Victoria Edwards in Conversation: H2951 Ramsay Withers," eVeritas, 14 Oct 2014. Online at http://everitas.rmcclub.ca/?p=87370.








"NO WAITING FOR GEORGE":

The Question of Support for the Black Watch assault on Verrières Ridge in Operation SPRING, Normandy, 25 July 1944

David R. O'Keefe, MA, PhD

The Canadian attack on Verrières Ridge during the morning of 25 July 1944 ranks as the second-costliest single-day engagement for the Canadian Army in the Second World War, exceeded only by the disaster at Dieppe. In less than 24 hours, a force of two infantry and two armoured divisions under the command of Lt-Gen Guy Simonds's 2nd Canadian Corps suffered more than 1,500 casualties in Operation SPRING, leaving a legacy of recrimination and controversy. Among the casualties, the loss of 300 of the 320 riflemen of the Black Watch remains a source of unending debate. One of many contentious issues is the question of tank and artillery support for the assault by the Black Watch on their objective in phase II, the village of Fontenay-le-Marmion. Sixty-five years later, embittered survivors still state categorically that neither tank nor artillery support materialized during their mid-morning assault, and that the lack of support led directly to the failure of the four-hour attack, in which they suffered 94% casualties. Not surprisingly, veterans from both the 5th Field Artillery Regiment and the First Hussars refute these claims to varying degrees, and no historical account or military study has remedied the finger-pointing or provided much-needed understanding of the events of 25 July. For the most part, this is due to the failure to examine the situation faced by the Black Watch and their supporting arms within the overall context of Operation SPRING. This examination not only silences the lingering tempest in a teapot; it also transcends the inquiry to provide insight into the questions of leadership, decision-making, command and control, tank/infantry cooperation and the Clausewitzian "friction" and "fog of war" in this brutal chapter of Canadian military history.³


Designed by Simonds under the auspices of General Miles Dempsey's Second British Army, SPRING reflected the Canadian Corps commander's gunner training and his highly centralized command style. The plan was both complicated and complex, relying on strict timings and even stricter control for success. Simonds's plan, originally conceived on the morning of 20 July, envisioned a four-phase operation to



continue what Operation GOODWOOD and its Canadian adjunct Operation ATLANTIC failed to accomplish: a clean "break-in" and "breakthrough" of the nascent German positions on the Verrières–Bourguebus ridge. What ATLANTIC did achieve was an unexpected turn of the German line on the western edge along the banks of the Orne River, and Simonds hoped to exploit it by effecting a "break-in" and "breakthrough" in phases I and II, followed by a "breakout" in phase III and exploitation to Falaise in phase IV.

Before the ink dried on his first draft, however, inclement weather and the disappointing performance of Major-General Charles Foulkes's 2nd Canadian Infantry Division during ATLANTIC postponed the operation for a crucial 48 hours. During those two days, intelligence sources revealed the start of a significant thickening of the German line that placed the overall success of his ambitious plan in doubt.⁵ Faced with the incremental build-up of sizeable panzer reserves within striking distance of the ridge, Simonds changed the complexion of SPRING.

By 21 July, he had concluded that Falaise was no longer in reach, but he believed that the ridge itself, and the tactically enticing Cramesnil Spur to the south, remained firmly in view. In consultation with Dempsey, Simonds reshaped SPRING along the lines of the Second Army commander's "Tennis Over the Orne" concept: instead of embarking on a clean break-in, breakthrough and breakout to Falaise, Simonds tore a page from Arthur Currie's playbook at Hill 70 in 1917 and adopted a "bite and hold" approach to lure his German counterpart, I SS Panzer Korp commander General Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, into a costly and potentially decisive battle of attrition. The unhinging of the German defences at this point, coupled with imperilling the I SS Panzer Division by grabbing the ridge and the Spur, formed the required bait.



Counting on the inevitable German counterthrust to restore the precarious situation, Simonds planned to unleash the preponderance of Allied air, artillery, tank and anti-tank fire on Dietrich's panzers from the commanding positions on the newly won ground. The caveat, of course, was that Simonds faced the unenviable task of getting his assault units up and over Verrières Ridge and consolidated on the Spur before Sepp Dietrich's I SS Panzer Korps could be effectively reinforced and turn the tables against him. SPRING evolved into a race against time as the chance of Canadian success diminished exponentially with each passing hour.

Taking this inevitability into account, Simonds augmented the plan "for both success and failure," leaving the final phases of SPRING conditional upon the success of the first two.⁷ He called for the nighttime capture of the towns of Verrières, May-sur-Orne and Tilly-la-Campagne in phase I by infantry battalions from 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions followed in phase II by battalion-sized tank/infantry attacks at first light on the towns of Garcelles, Fontenay-le-Marmion (the Black Watch objective), and Rocquancourt. Simonds

considered the capture of the latter two built-up areas on the reverse slope of Verrières as vital to the overall success of SPRING as they provided "shoulders" for a breach in which Simonds would pass his two armoured divisions in order to secure the area around Cintheaux (Cramesnil Spur) and the woods east of Garcelles in phases III and IV. The capture of the Spur by the British 7th Armoured Division (the famed Desert Rats) would bring the key to the German defensive positions on the eastern end of the Normandy bridgehead into Simonds's hands, while the capture of the Garcelles area by the Guards Armoured Division would outflank and imperil the elite I SS Panzer Division.

The capture of Fontenay-le-Marmion and Rocquancourt fell to the brigades of Major-General Charles Foulkes's 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, while the former village was the responsibility of 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (containing the Black Watch) under Brigadier W.J. Megill. As a precursor to the phase I attack on May-sur-Orne by the Calgary Highlanders, the plan called for the clearing of the twin towns of St. Andre and St. Martin by the Cameron Highlanders before H-hour at 0330 hrs. Simonds allotted two hours for the completion of this phase before the Black Watch and the Sherman tanks from B Squadron of the First Hussars attacked Fontenay-le-Marmion from the outskirts of May-sur-Orne. In conjunction with this portion of phase II, the Royal Regiment of Canada from 4th Brigade would seize Rocquancourt as the lead elements of the 7th Armoured Division squeezed in between to take advantage of the developing breach. For this crucial phase of SPRING to succeed, all elements had to come into play simultaneously, akin to the crescendo of a great symphony. If any element proved disharmonious, it would leave the plan dangerously off balance and place the assaulting units at the mercy of the German defenders on the ridge.

In addition to the thickening German defences on and behind the ridge, Simonds faced other challenges: first, Foulkes's 2nd Division had to assault over open ground up a long, steady gradient on the forward slope that was under full observation by the enemy from the ridge and from positions west of the Orne in 12th British Corps's operational corridor. To offset the natural advantages of the defenders, Simonds chose to attack at night in phase I, using the cover of darkness to mask observation and provide a solid base for the assault up the ridge. In phase II, the half-light of dawn and the early morning mist would cover the infantry and tank assault up and over the ridge onto their reverse slope objectives. To prevent interference from German positions west of the Orne, Ritchie's 12th Corps was ordered to stage a series of small-scale holding attacks in the days leading up to SPRING to draw German attention away from the western slope of Verrières.

Once the forward positions at the foot of the ridge were secure, tank and infantry would assault at first light up and over the ridge and descend into the main German positions on the reverse slope for the dogfight. When and if this was accomplished and a breach had been effected, Simonds would then launch his armour to capture the Cramesnil Spur and outflank the I SS positions around La Hogue.

25 July "was the nightmare of my life," Troop leader T.E. Williamson recalled about his first—and last—battle in Normandy. For Williamson and the veterans of B Squadron of the First Hussars, who had been fighting for over 50 days without respite, Operation SPRING

started on an ominous note.¹² Just before H-hour for phase I, a Luftwaffe night raid hit their concentration area near the village of Ifs, inflicting casualties that left Williamson and his fellow tankers with the distinct impression that bad luck would be riding with them all day.¹³ An hour later, B Squadron, under the command of Major Walter Harris, moved out from Ifs and headed cross-country in the dead of night, aided only by the novel use of searchlights that bounced their beams off low cloud to create "artificial twilight." The immediate task for B Squadron was to negotiate the countryside, push through the streets of St. Martin, and link up with the Black Watch at the eastern outskirts near the village church.¹⁵



Officers of The First Battalion, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, 24 September 1943

Front row: Captain R.E. Bennett, Captain E. Motzfeldt, Captain J.P.W. Taylor, Captain V.E. Traversy, Lieutenant-Colonel S.S.T. Cantlie, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, Major B.R. Ritchie, Major A.G. Stevenson, Captain F.P. Griffin, Captain J.L. Duchastel de Montrouge, Captain J.P.G. Kemp.

Middle row: Lieutenant R.A. Horwood, Captain G.A. Demers (RCAPC), Lieutenant R.D. Yuile, Lieutenant E.S. Duffield, Captain A.P. Bates, Lieutenant J.P. Cowans, Lieutenant A.R.W. Robinson, Lieutenant M.H. Cassils, Lieutenant G. Birks, Lieutenant I.H. Louso.

Back row: Lieutenant J.G. Smith (RCCS), Lieutenant J.E. Fox, Lieutenant F.A Heubach, Lieutenant C.G. Bourne, Lieutenant S.E. Griffin, Lieutenant F.T. Rea, Lieutenant D.A McAlpine, Lieutenant G.S. MacInnes, Lieutenant J.K. Neil.

For the first hour, all went well for both the Black Watch and the tanks of B Squadron until they reached St. Martin. ¹⁶ Despite assurances that the Cameron Highlanders had cleared the town, there was still "much cleaning up...going on" and the lead Sherman hit a *Tellermine* near the main crossroads, blocking the route for the remaining tanks. ¹⁷ Williams noted that "much time was lost" while the Shermans pushed their way through brick walls and backyards, attempting to reach the Black Watch. ¹⁸ Despite the Hussars' fears that they had missed their timing south of the churchyard, the situation in St. Martin rendered their late arrival moot, as enemy fire from the eastern rise of the ridge forced the Black Watch to seek cover in the farmyards, orchards and hedgerows of St. Martin. ¹⁹

The unexpected entry of the Black Watch into the town stirred up a hornets' nest. During the night, a battalion's worth of infantry from the German 272nd Infantry Division infiltrated the town through a mine head south of St. Martin known as "the Factory" and gave both the



Camerons and the Calgary Highlanders a rough time as they came through.²⁰ As a result, the Black Watch, strung out and in danger of dispersion, needed to fight every inch of the way towards their assembly area. Advancing 100 yards every 15 minutes, they were still 400 yards short of their form-up point at the church in St. Martin and 1.5 kilometres from their start line when H-hour (and their artillery support) came and went.²¹

After reaching the churchyard sometime between 0545 and 0600 hrs, the lead company of the Black Watch stumbled upon a mixed group of Calgary and Cameron Highlanders "milling around" and exchanging intermittent fire with the enemy.²² The Black Watch CO, Lt-Col Stuart Cantlie, attempted to get a firm grip on the situation and called his company commanders in for an O Group. While waiting for them to arrive, he learned that heavy machine gun and 88-mm fire from the ridge, coupled with tank gun fire from heights on the western bank of the Orne River and machine-gun fire from the Factory area, had caused heavy casualties and reduced command and control within the Calgary Highlanders to almost nil.²³ In addition, spotty communications, conflicting messages and poor navigation on the part of one Calgary Highlander company made the situation in May-sur-Orne obscure at best.²⁴

Accompanied by three of the four company commanders who were able to reach him at the churchyard, Cantlie moved the group to a gap in a hedge and began to point out the situation on his map. Within seconds, a machine gun about 50 yards away opened fire on the silhouetted figures.²⁵ In an instant, Cantlie was dead and his senior company commander, Major Eric Motzfeldt, lay seriously wounded, leaving command of the Black Watch briefly in the hands of the nearest officer.²⁶ With the surviving senior company commander still trying to make his way through St. Martin, command of the battalion briefly rested in the hands of two former company 2ICs who had been promoted in the field to acting majors just days before.²⁷ For the next half-hour, confusion reigned as orders and counter-orders were issued,

leaving the Black Watch effectively prostrate until Major Phillip Griffin (commander of A Company) arrived from the back of the battalion to take command. ²⁸ Griffin, considered by his peers to be a "brilliant" officer of "outstanding courage and ability," also possessed "good powers of command" and an "equable…well balanced" temperament. ²⁹ During training, the young major proved a "quick learner" who not only instantly grasped new ideas, but demonstrated a "very good" knowledge of infantry operations in addition to a "good" understanding of the supporting arms. Both in training and in his brief experience in Normandy, it was clear that Griffin could get "well into the tactical picture," where he produced decisions that were "always sound," marking him as a natural for battalion command. ³⁰

By the time Griffin took over, the tanks of B Squadron had linked up with the Support Company of the Black Watch north of the churchyard, where they engaged German machine-gun positions on the ridge while waiting for word of the Calgary Highlanders' success in May-sur-Orne. However, the delay and confusion in St. Martin, coupled with increasing enemy resistance and contradictory messages, created doubt in some minds as to whether or not phase II was still on. Instead of commencing in the half-light of dawn, the assault would now go in with the Black Watch moving up an open slope under full observation by the enemy in broad daylight. It is reported that Griffin's first action upon taking command was to send a lengthy message to Megill's headquarters stating that under the prevalent conditions it was not prudent to go forward as planned.

But Griffin's well-reasoned plea, which pointed out that both St. Martin and the start line were insecure, the whereabouts of the Calgary Highlanders uncertain, and the prospect of fire from the ridge and the Factory a serious concern, was rebuffed. The Calgary Highlanders were ordered to "go wide" and the Black Watch to "push on" as "speed [was] essential." ³³

Brigadier Megill, under intense pressure himself, followed this 30 minutes later with a direct order for the Black Watch and B Squadron to "go ahead" with phase II. ³⁴ Diligently, Griffin began to rearrange his artillery and tank support and obtain essential information while a continuous stream of messages designed to increase the pressure and speed up the process flooded his wireless. ³⁵

At this point, it was clear that Griffin's situation was not fully appreciated by higher command. During this period, life on the eastern edge of St. Martin had become increasingly difficult as German observation posts on the ridge brought down accurate artillery fire at such an alarming rate that Canadian troops began to refer to the area as "Shell Alley." ³⁶

In an effort to extricate the battalion from its predicament and regroup in good order, Griffin decided to move the Black Watch from the churchyard to the main crossroads in St. Martin in an effort to gain a solid and relatively secure base of operations.³⁷ The only problem with this course of action was that it took time.

From 2nd Division Tactical headquarters overlooking Verrières Ridge, General Foulkes, now joined by Simonds, wrestled with conflicting reports about the status of May-sur-Orne. To his credit, Simonds had taken such eventualities into account. He had made it perfectly clear in

his orders group days earlier that troops must "drive on wherever there is a gap" as there would be "no waiting for George" under any circumstances.³⁸

As early as 0750 hrs, message logs from 21st Army Group confirm Simonds's continued intention to bypass centres of resistance in an effort to expedite phase II.³⁹ Although there is no record of a direct order issued by Simonds to the Black Watch, the evidence points to the Corps Commander and his overly centralized plan as inspiration for the order to proceed. In fact, any suggestion that Foulkes or Megill acted independently does not hold water: on repeated occasions, Simonds made it forcefully clear to subordinates that "you follow the music—I will play the variations." In this case, the Maestro and only the Maestro could alter any movement in his grand symphony.

By 0830 hrs, reports available at Foulkes headquarters indicated that everything was falling into place for phase II: Verrières village was in Canadian hands despite furious counterattacks, and two companies of the Royal Regiment of Canada were moving towards Rocquancourt as lead elements of the 7th Armoured Division battled towards the nascent breach. Although May-sur-Orne was not secure, reports indicated it would be shortly; and three hours after phase II was set to begin, Simonds's second movement finally appeared to reach fruition—with one glaring exception. The sour note was the Black Watch, which remained inexplicably pinned down in the eastern part of St. Martin by machine-guns on the ridge. After informing Griffin that the guns of 5th Field Regiment had "plastered" these targets and it was "essential" that they "get on immediately," Megill, obviously exasperated by the lack of progress, facetiously "suggested" that the battalion take them on with their own guns and summoned Griffin to meet with him in the forward area of St. Martin. The implication of the request was obvious to the Black Watch: the Brigadier was coming down with "fire in his eyes" to ensure adherence both to his orders and consequently to Simonds's plan.

As the Black Watch were in the process of regrouping, Megill's "suggestion" proved impractical, so Harris's B Squadron took on the task while the Black Watch prepared to move towards the crossroads in St. Martin. ⁴³ By the time Megill departed for his rendezvous with Griffin, the acting Black Watch CO had rearranged both artillery and armour support and regrouped his strung-out battalion while under fire. ⁴⁴ Despite this, it was quite clear that any further delay would put the honour of the Regiment at stake. It was within this context that Griffin hastily called an orders group and soberly informed those gathered of the daunting task they faced. ⁴⁵

Griffin opened the meeting with a recap of the latest developments and explained the "great difficulties" that lay ahead as May-sur-Orne "had to be bypassed," forcing the Black Watch up a draw with the enemy holding three sides. ⁴⁶ Originally, the plan had called for the Black Watch to follow the Calgary Highlanders to the northern edge of May-sur-Orne, where they would narrowly skirt the town and head straight for Fontenay, using a dirt road as their start line. ⁴⁷

Based on information provided by his patrols, Griffin concluded that although May-sur-Orne appeared to be lightly held, the Factory contained a sizeable German element that posed a threat to the flank of the Battalion's advance up the ridge. To remedy that, he ordered fighting patrols into both areas to clear out German resistance as the main attack began.⁴⁸

In addition, flanking fire from the ridge and German panzer and anti-tank guns on the heights west of the Orne were of concern. As both were out of Griffin's grasp, he reworked the Black Watch axis of advance accordingly.⁴⁹ Instead of jumping off from the churchyard, the battalion would now move 300 yards west to the crossroads in St. Martin.⁵⁰ From there, it would move down the main road as far as the Factory, where it would veer left and clear the structure before moving into the dead ground just yards south-east of their original assembly area.

At this point, the four rifle companies would deploy into standard box formation (two companies forward and two trailing) and Griffin would take the battalion up and over Verrières Ridge towards Fontenay on a compass bearing that bypassed any entanglements in May-sur-Orne.⁵¹

In this reworked plan, the role of the supporting arms remained essentially the same. As in the original plan, B Squadron was to meet the Black Watch in the Factory area and send two troops (without infantry support) down the main road and through May-sur-Orne as the Black Watch went up the ridge. 52

Two factors seem to have been at play in this decision. The first was an erroneous patrol report which created the false impression that May-sur-Orne was not held on a continuous basis and that B Squadron would face little resistance moving through the streets of the village. More importantly, however, ducking into the streets of May-sur-Orne would deny the German guns on the west bank of the Orne the target-rich environment consisting of a squadron of Sherman tanks ascending the ridge in broad daylight with little or no cover. 53

Again, success depended upon accurate timing, as the tanks were to reappear on the eastern edge of May-sur-Orne in enfilade positions and "shoot" the Black Watch into Fontenay as they began their descent on the reverse slope of the ridge. ⁵⁴ Likewise, the artillery fire plan, consisting of timed concentrations and on-call defensive fire, was for the most part a repetition of the earlier one that came to naught. ⁵⁵ However, without any concrete news of the Calgary Highlanders' situation in and around May-sur-Orne, Griffin augmented the fire plan, fearing that original targets selected in the area might contain elements of the Calgary Highlanders. As a result, he cancelled concentrations in and directly behind the village for fear of hitting friendly troops, but the more distant targets were retained. ⁵⁶

Although Simonds expected the Black Watch to renew their assault at 0830 hrs, artillery support was not available until 0930 hrs, so that became the new H-hour for phase II. At the conclusion of the O Group, and perhaps to underscore the urgent nature of their role or to quell any groundswell of trepidation or dissent, Griffin took a firm stance and "ordered" the battalion to "push to its objective at all costs." ⁵⁷

The Black Watch was operating under both intense pressure and a direct order. It was clear that High Command required nothing less than an all-out effort rendering Griffin's order as a pragmatic and sober reaction to a tactical conundrum and the fog of war, and not an impulsive replay of the Charge of the Light Brigade of Balaclava fame.

After the O Group, Griffin made his way with the battalion to the crossroads in St. Martin while Harris returned to B Squadron and reported at 0844 hrs that they were ready to advance. Minutes before H-hour, Megill found Griffin on the forward edge of St. Martin as the Black Watch began their advance down the road to the Factory area. It was there that Griffin and Megill allegedly entered into a "heated discussion" between the "hard driving" Brigadier and the "headstrong" Major concerning the axis of the assault. But this historical canard lacks weight: when the dust settled, the plan remained unaltered. Salient, however, is the fact that Simonds, Foulkes and Megill refused to call off the attack or redirect the axis of advance into May-sur-Orne when they had the chance. Clearly, their collective silence confirmed their sanction of Griffin's course of action. But at the very moment when Megill and Griffin were engaged in their tête-à-tête, the ridge was being reinforced by the Germans in preparation for a counterattack that would have catastrophic consequences for the Black Watch and Simonds's plan. A strand of the str

Just before H-hour, the Hussars received word from 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade that their tanks were not to advance as planned into May-sur-Orne until *after* the Calgary Highlanders had succeeded in capturing the town. What prompted this decision is unknown, but it was most likely a reflection of the more experienced Brigade headquarters guiding Harris, who was fighting his first battle as Squadron commander. More importantly, though, the evidence suggests that Griffin was unaware of this caveat, as the message originated at approximately the same time as the Black Watch were deploying in the fields east of the Factory. There is no record that Harris, or anyone else, attempted to contact Griffin, although the possibility cannot be ruled out as Harris's communications were curtailed when a mortar shell ripped the aerial from his tank while it was still in the orchard area.

Even if the attempt had been made early in the assault, radio contact with the forward companies of the Black Watch and Griffin was lost minutes into the attack, leaving the Black Watch cut off from radio communication. Most likely, Harris assumed that Griffin had received word, and there seemed to be reason to at least hope that, despite the young Major's order, high command had indeed seen the light and called off the attack. Either way, Harris and B Squadron remained in a holding pattern in St. Martin as H-hour arrived and the Black Watch went in. 66

The news of the attack caught Harris "off guard," according to Black Watch Support Company commander Capt R.E. Bennett, whose job it was to guard the tank harbour and follow B Squadron into Fontenay.⁶⁷ In Bennett's estimation, Harris's tanks "suddenly...started to move" between "1030 and 1130" which if correct, would be a full 1 to 2 hours behind the Black Watch.⁶⁸ As if to underscore the general confusion of the morning, Bennett managed to catch up with Harris as his tank rolled out of the orchard in St. Martin and asked him "if the show was still on?" Harris confirmed that it was, and proceeded to furnish Bennett with the location of the Black Watch rifle companies, which seemed plausible to Bennett at the time.⁶⁹

Harris later claimed that the "sunken and narrow roads" south of St. Martin delayed his advance by no more than five minutes and that he was never out of visual contact with the infantry. The existing evidence does not support Bennett's claim that the tanks were "1–2 hours" late, but neither does it support Harris's claim that he was "five minutes" late. In fact, the message

logs reveal that the Hussars started their move at 1005 hrs—35 minutes after the timed artillery concentrations began to fall and the Black Watch assault commenced.⁷²

After the battle, Troop Leader Williamson recalled that tank/infantry cooperation on that day was practically "nil" and that Griffin was criticized by some in the Hussars who



were aghast that he did not wait for them to arrive before going ahead as planned.⁷³ However, as the "defining hand" for infantry operations was the artillery fire plan, infantry units were "wed" to their artillery support—a fact that was particularly evident in all of Simonds's operations. As a result, timings for the Black Watch were dictated by the fire plan and did not depend on the arrival of supporting armour, no matter how attractive the latter's inclusion might be.

If, for any reason, the tanks were not ready to go at 0930, Griffin would have no choice but to commence the assault or lose the pre-arranged fire support. In theory, one could argue that, knowing that the tanks were late, Griffin should have retimed the shoot yet again. But in reality the "whip was out" and Simonds only had until noon to decide whether or not to use the Guards Armoured Division that day. Any further delay in securing Fontenay would prevent the 7th British Armoured Division from punching through to the Cramesnil Spur, which in turn would check the advance of the Guards Armoured Division and render SPRING a failure. Less than two and half hours before Simonds's deadline, May-sur-Orne was still a going concern, the artillery shoot was coming down on the reverse slope, and the tanks of B Squadron were late. As a result, there was no possibility of a re-shoot (even if high command had been inclined to allow one). Time was of the essence, and the Black Watch pressed on expecting that tank support would eventually materialize as planned at the east end of May-sur-Orne.

By the time Troop Leader Teddy Williamson arrived at the Factory area, the Black Watch "had already gone in" and there was "so much stuff flying around" that he "failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation" up ahead until he saw wounded crawling back. The following Troop Leader, William Rawson, reported that when he arrived, the Black Watch were already in a "very sticky situation," pinned down by small arms and mortar fire from the right flank. When Captain J.W. "Jake" Powell (the B Squadron 2IC) arrived in the area accompanied by Major Harris and his rear link operator Lt Frank Allen, he estimated that the Black Watch were 300 yards from the Factory, suffering under the weight of "intense and accurate" mortar fire. The Factory area itself, which the Black Watch cleaned out, proved a continual "sticky spot" as German troops sporadically reappeared from the underground shelters and mineshafts to lay

down fire from behind.⁷⁸ Upon arrival, the tanks of B Squadron surrounded the structure and riddled it with machine-gun fire, temporarily suppressing German opposition.⁷⁹ However, by this time, the activity in the Factory area began to attract continual German anti-tank, mortar and rocket fire.⁸⁰ In a desperate attempt to support the Black Watch, Rawson ordered his troop to machine-gun all likely German positions on the ridge. However, due to the carefully crafted camouflage of a skilled and determined enemy, it was mostly "blind shooting."

By 1020 hrs, nearly an hour after the Black Watch began their assault, German fire from the ridge and the east corner of May-sur-Orne increased to the point where the Hussars' tanks were lost almost immediately when exposed outside the Factory area. Harris, having failed to locate the Black Watch or ascertain the movement of the 7th Armoured Division on the ridge, later claimed (in his last act before being wounded by sniper fire) that he ordered his remaining tanks to push towards the gap between May-sur-Orne and the ridge in a desperate attempt to reach Fontenay. Bennett from the Black Watch, who met up again with Harris in the Factory area, and Jake Powell, the B Squadron 2IC, tell a different story. Bennett claims that Harris told him his tanks should not move "due to the heavy 88-mm fire coming from the ridge" while Powell relates that, not having seen or heard from Harris for some time, he took command and personally directed both troops into May-sur-Orne.

When Rawson received orders via radio to advance to the east end of May-sur-Orne in an effort to link up with the Calgary Highlanders, who "needed tank support in the worst way," they could only have come from Powell, since Harris's radio was out. ⁸⁵ By 1030, Rawson's tank, which was in the lead, had reached the designated area but, contrary to reports, no Canadian troops could be found. ⁸⁶ Within seconds of reaching that point, Rawson's tank "brewed up" after being hit by German fire from concealed positions in the town. Immediately upon seeing the fate of their leader, the remainder of his troop took cover on the left flank, leaving a bloodied Rawson to be captured by the same German infantry section that had destroyed his tank. ⁸⁷

Williamson's troop, which was to the right of Rawson's, moved into and through May-sur-Orne following the main road, drawing fire from upstairs windows as they went. 88 Instead of meeting with units of the Calgary Highlanders in May-sur-Orne, the lead tanks of B Squadron ran into the teeth of a tactical counterattack spearheaded by elements of II Panzer Division pushing north through the town. 89 As Williamson's tank passed the last house on the street, it was hit twice at close range by a counterattacking panzer, killing the co-driver and fatally wounding another crewman. 90 Williamson managed to escape and make his way to Canadian lines while the rest of his crew remained trapped in May-sur-Orne, surviving for the next twelve days on carrots and wine. 91 After losing four tanks in May-sur-Orne to a combination of concealed anti-tank guns and counterattacking panzers, and having seen nothing of the Black Watch for over 30 minutes, Powell ordered the two troops to pull back to the Factory area. 92

It was unclear at this point whether the Black Watch had made it over the crest of the Ridge or had gone to ground in the wheat fields on the slopes of Verrières. The only thing Powell and Capt R.E. Bennett were certain of when they met in the Factory area around noon was that the Black Watch had "disappeared." Quickly, their bewilderment turned to horror when the first

Black Watch wounded came back with stories that made the assault appear to be "an absolute massacre." With every officer but one in B Squadron a casualty, Powell's remaining tanks, along with the survivors of the Black Watch and Calgary Highlanders, pulled back to the northern part of St. Martin. During their withdrawal, a final irony occurred when RAF Typhoons, mistaking the First Hussars' tanks for German ones, knocked out one with rocket and cannon fire, leaving the survivors somewhat resentful about the day's actions.

It is quite clear that the attack up Verrières Ridge was a daunting feat to begin with, as Simonds's command style, his time-dependent plan and his propensity to gamble came together to form the context into which the Black Watch and B Squadron were thrust on the morning of 25 July 1944. Seven decades later, it is understandable that the average frontline soldier, whose war in many cases was "fifty yards wide and fifty yards deep," would not grasp the complexity of an operation such as SPRING—particularly when his focus on the day was the job at hand and, as the battle progressed, mere survival. In addition, after assessing the evidence there is no need to wonder where the armour was; rather, we should ask whether its inclusion would have made the difference between success and failure for the Black Watch.

Some observers continue to believe it would have, while others disagree. The former opinion is centred on the fact that, a few days earlier, the Black Watch had successfully attacked the area near the village of Ifs with support from the Hussars and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. ⁹⁷ Yet on that day their opponents consisted of a mixture of rear guards and advanced outposts with limited anti-tank and armoured support, and low to non-existent morale. On 25 July, however, they tackled a prepared German Main Line of Resistance on ground that afforded the defenders excellent observation and superior fields of fire—particularly in broad daylight—backed up with a conservative estimate of roughly 100 panzers and an equal number of anti-tank guns either in reverse slope positions or on the heights west of the Orne river.⁹⁸ Having the B Squadron tanks move into May-sur-Orne as the Black Watch advanced up the open slopes was no guarantee of success either. In fact, as was later learned, elements of the 272nd Infantry Division, holding the southern portion of May-sur-Orne, exercised strict fire discipline and gave unseasoned troops the impression that the village was not held on a continuous basis when in fact it was. 99 Even if the tanks had managed to penetrate to the village's eastern edge as planned, they would have met the brunt of a German panzer counterattack that was forming up south of the town. Any support that B Squadron could have offered the Black Watch would have been forfeited in an effort to fend off the counterthrust. Although they would undoubtedly have drawn some of the fire away from the Black Watch, the infantry would have been left without direct fire support just when it needed it the most, as the artillery dissipated on its descent into Fontenay. Equally, it is highly unlikely that Major Harris's proposed rush to the gap between the ridge and May-sur-Orne would have been a success. With the Germans' defences strengthening on an hourly basis, coupled with their skilful use of the reverse slope, technological superiority in arms and armament, and a commanding view of the ridge from three sides, it is more than likely that B Squadron would have been engulfed in the same maelström and ultimately shared the same cruel fate as the Black Watch. 100 *

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Professor David R. O'Keefe is an award-winning historian, a professor, a documentarian and a best-selling author. He studied at Concordia and McGill Universities in Montreal before attending the University of Ottawa, where he earned his M.A. and PhD in History. He has taught Modern and Military History at the College level in Montreal.

He served as an infantry officer in The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) in Montreal and was later employed as their historian for close to a decade.

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O'Keefe's book on Dieppe, *One Day in August: The Unknown Story behind Canada's Tragedy at Dieppe*, was both a bestseller and a finalist for several prestigious literary awards, including the RBC Taylor Prize, the J.W. Dafoe Book Prize, and the Canadian Authors Association Lela Common Award for Canadian History. In 2012, he was awarded the Diamond Jubilee Medal by the Minister of Veteran's Affairs for his service to Canada in conducting historical research for his work on Dieppe.

ENDNOTES

- 1. The controversy surrounding SPRING stemmed from Simonds's claims that it was not intended as a breakthrough operation but rather as a sacrificial holding attack designed to aid the Americans in the western end of the bridgehead. The truth was that SPRING was neither. In fact, Simonds originally envisioned the operation as a breakout to cap off what Operation GOODWOOD had failed to accomplish days earlier. Heavy rains and strong German counterattacks in the days leading up to SPRING vastly changed the nature and scope of the operation, as it was clear to Simonds that the prospects for a sweeping breakout had evaporated by 23 July. By that date, it was clear that his corps faced the prospect of fighting a battle of attrition in efforts to wear down German reserves on the reverse slope of the ridge, in preparation for another breakout blow to follow in early August. The idea of a holding attack originated with Montgomery the day after SPRING was called off. On that day, Montgomery ordered Simonds to consolidate his position and "attract" German panzers in an effort to keep them from moving west in the path of the American Army surging south from St. Lo.
- Library and Archives Canada (hereinafter LAC) RG24 Vol. 10, 808. In 1945 the Army Historical Section under C.P. Stacey
 interviewed 31 Black Watch survivors from Verrières Ridge who all reported receiving neither artillery nor tank support
 during their attack.
- 3. Reginald Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1984); Terry Copp, The Brigade: The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade 1939–1945 (Stoney Creek, ON: Fortress Publications, 1992); David Bercuson, Battalion of Heroes: The Calgary Highlanders at War 1939–1945 (Calgary: Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Association, 1994); C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III: The Victory Campaign (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960); J.A. English, Canadian Army in Normandy: Failure in High Command (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
- 4. In addition to the units listed above, Simonds had the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade along with usual corps and divisional artillery allotment and one AGRA. In the air, he could call upon support from the medium and typhoon aircraft from the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force.
- ULTRA was the colloquial term used to denote intelligence derived from the breaking of high-level enemy codes and ciphers.
- 6. PRO, CAB106/1061, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart Notes Made By Captain Liddell-Hart on his 21/2/1952 Interview with General M.C. Dempsey. Operation "GOODWOOD" 18 July 1944. "By striking first on one side of the Orne and then on the other," Dempsey told Liddell-Hart, "we should force him to bring divisions across, and be able to hit them with our air

- force in the process of crossing, when they were particularly vulnerable." Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), King's College London, Liddell Hart Papers (LHP)1/679, Liddell Hart to Lord A. Tedder with attached questionnaire of interview with General Miles Dempsey. 1 May 1952. LHCMA, LHP1/679.
- 7. National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereinafter NAUK) WO171/439 WD of the 7th Arm Division. Operational Order No 6 July 24 1944; WO171/371 WD Guards Armoured Division Operational Order No 2 Operation SPRING July 24 1944; LAC RG 24 Vol. 10, 808 2nd Cdn Corps Operational Order No 3 Operation SPRING July 24 1944; LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,116 WD 6th Cdn Infantry Brigade "GOC's Conference 0900hrs 23 July 1944; LAC RG 24 Vol.13, 750 WD 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Operational Order No 1 July 24 1944; LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,109 WD 5th Cdn Infantry Brigade Operational Order No 1 July 24 1944.
- 8. LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,116 WD 6th Cdn Infantry Brigade; LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 WD 2nd Canadian Infantry Division; LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,109 WD 5th Cdn Infantry Brigade. Following Simonds's centralized command structure, which put the emphasis on fear rather than team building, Foulkes and Megill were stripped of any flexibility in command. Their roles in SPRING were limited to ensuring that the various components under command were synchronized to accomplish each phase of the operation in the time and manner called for by the Corps Commander.
- 9. LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,109 WD 5th Cdn Infantry Brigade Operational Order No 1. July 24 1944.
- 10. 4th Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Sherwood Lett.
- Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH) 92/252 Letter from T.E. Williamson Troop Leader B Sqn 6th Cdn Armd Regiment (1 Hussars) to DHS January 23 1946.
- 12. Michael R. McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars: A History of the First Hussars Regiment, 1856–2004 (London: First Hussars Cavalry Fund, 2004), p.168.
- 13. Williamson Letter.
- Williamson Letter; LAC RG 24 Vol.14, 221 WD 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (hereafter 2 CIB) and 2 Canadian Infantry Division War Diary Operation Order Operation "SPRING."
- DHH Memorandum of an interview with Major W.E. Harris, MP. Formerly OC B Squadron 6 Cdn Armd Regt. At historical Section GS, Department of National Defence 24 January 1946.
- 16. Williamson Letter.
- 17. Ibid.
- 18. Harris Interview.
- DHH Account by Major Bennett, D Company, RHC, of the Attack by the Black Watch on May-sur-Orne, 25 July 1944, as given to Capt Engler at Basse, 1 Aug 1944.
- LAC RG24 Vol.14, 109 Message Log HQ 5th Cdn Inf Bde: At 0710hrs 5th Brigade received word that "272nd Div 980&981 regts came in to line Sunday/Monday night. 230 strong."
- 21. LAC RG24 Vol. 14, 109 Message Log HQ 5th Cdn Inf Bde.
- 22. BWA Memo of Colonel Hutchison's Questions and Lt-Col Eric Motzfeldt's Answers. June 8 1945. In the memo, Motzfeldt mentions that it was members of the Camerons and the Régiment De Maisonneuve that were in the area. This recollection is slightly off, however, as the R de Mais were held in reserve farther to the north. There is plenty of evidence that puts at least one company from the Calgary Highlanders in the same area at that time.
- 23. Ibid.
- 24. David Bercuson, Battalion of Heroes: The Calgary Highlanders at War 1939–1945 (Calgary: Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Association, 1994).
- 25. Motzfeldt Memo; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde June 8 1945.
- LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde.
- 27. BWA WD July 1944. A/Majors John Kemp and John Taylor were the two officers on the scene. Taylor, who was promoted to Major on 19 July, "outranked" Kemp by all of five days, as the latter was promoted to company commander on the 24th.
- 28. Interview with Capt George Buch, Pioneer Platoon Commander, RHC, by the author, January 1993.
- 29. When the war broke out, Griffin had just started his graduate work at Macdonald College of McGill University with the intention of obtaining a PhD in biochemistry. BWA Personnel file of Major F.P. Griffin.

- 30. Bennett Report; Interview with Capt George Buch by the author, January 1993; LAC Personnel File of Major F.P. Griffin Final Report of the No 4 Wing CTS Infantry Company Commanders Tactical Course. In his concluding remarks on the May 1943 course, the commander of No. 4 Wing wrote this of Griffin: "Expresses himself very well and clearly in speech and writing. Learns quickly; quick at grasping new ideas. Instructions and persevering. Polite, conscientious in fulfilling obligations, helpful and considerate of others and generally liked. Has an equable and well-balanced temperament. Has a very good knowledge of the inf and a good knowledge of other arms and gets well in the tactical picture. His tactical and adm appreciations and decisions are always sound. Confident, shows initiative and readily inspires confidence. Has good powers of Command. Responsible, conscientious and reliable. After more experience as a coy commander this officer would probably be suitable for appt as 2IC of a battalion. Recommend for appt as an instructor of the Coy Commands Course." By the time Griffin attended this course in May 1943 he had held positions as platoon commander, IO, LO, Company 2IC and Company Commander. At the time this was written he was only 25 years of age.
- 31. Harris Interview; DHH 92/252 Message from CMHQ to DHS Jan 11 1946; DHH Account of the Attack by the Calgary Highlanders on May-sur-Orne Night 24/25 July 1944. Given by Capt Harrison, D Coy, to Capt Engler at Basse, 29 July 1944.
- 32. Stuart, "Notes on Action"; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report; Bennett Report.
- 33. LAC RG24 Vol.14, 109 Message Log HQ 5th Cdn Inf Bde. According to the message log of 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, at 0645 Foulkes ordered the Calgary Highlanders not to dig in but instead "go wide and keep going." Two minutes later, Brigadier Megill told the RHC to "push on" as "speed was essential" and half an hour later, at 0715, Megill issued a direct order to Griffin to "go ahead." In 1992, Campbell Stuart (the Black Watch Adjutant responsible for the radio link between higher command and Griffin) wrote, "I found myself receiving messages from Brigade to pass on to Major Griffin, demanding an immediate attack and replies from Griffin to pass back to Brigade explaining the situation, emphasizing the lack of Calgary success and stressing the foolhardiness of pressing an attack." According to CQMS Ritchie of the Black Watch, who worked under Cantlie, Griffin sent a "lengthy message" to the effect that St. Andre was heavily garrisoned, supporting troops could not be found, and the front was strongly held by enemy armour, artillery and infantry. Griffin asked for instructions, and the Brigade's reply was to "go ahead as originally ordered." This evidence is corroborated by Capt G.D. Powis, the artillery FOO attached to the Black Watch, who reported in an interview a year later that after Griffin sent his message the response was simply to "push on." Stuart, "Notes on Action"; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report; Bennett Report.
- 34. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div.
- 35. Stuart, "Notes on Action"; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report.
- DHH 92/252 Account of the Attack by the Calgary Highlanders on May-sur-Orne during the night of 24/25 July 1944.
 Given by Lt E.A. Michon, D Coy to Capt Engler at Basse, 29 July 1944.
- 37. Bennett Report.
- 38. LAC RG24 Vol. 10, 808 Notes from Corps Commander's O Group 1000 hrs 23 July 1944.
- 39. PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group TAC HQ Log 25 July: TOR 0750hrs from Second Army: 2nd Cdn Div. 5th Cdn Bde one Coy in May-sur-Orne. Mopping up continues in St. Martin. One Bn by-passed May-sur-Orne and moving on Fontenay. 4th Cdn Bde—one bn just south of Verrières, one bn just north of the village; bn by-passed town and going on to Rocquancourt. 3rd Cdn Div—9th Cdn bde still mopping up Tilly-la-Campagne. 7th Armd Div. 22 Armd bde with two regts up met enemy tanks 0360. Four enemy tanks brewed up: others withdrawing.; PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group TAC HQ Log 25 July: "1025hrs from Second Army: RHC of 5th Cdn Bde started moving towards Fontenay by passing May-sur-Orne at 0830hrs. Royal Regt of C of 4th Cdn Inf Bde making slow progress South of Verrières in face of hy mortar fire. 7th Armd Div engaging enemy inf at 035595. Gds Armd Div now at 2 hrs notice to move. Corps Comd will decide by 1200hrs whether Gds Armd Div will be employed today."
- LAC MG30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers: Vol. 2 Letter from Bob Moncel [Simonds's Operations OFFICER] to Reg Roy. May 18, 1981.
- 41. Unknown to the Black Watch and the Hussars, units of the veteran 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, engaged with the elite I SS Panzer Division at Tilly-la-Campagne, balked at Simonds's orders to bypass, refusing to carry out what seemed to be a "hopeless action." However, in Foulkes's division, which was fighting its first major engagement since Dieppe, there is no record of any outright refusal to conform to Simonds's orders.
- 42. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div: "July 25 0823hrs serial 2222 from 5th Cdn Inf Bde to RHC: Intercept—Fetch Sunray—I must see Sunray at once have your wireless comn with him. Can you relay a message for us? Understand the reason you are being held up is because of 3 MGs near burnt out tanks, have plastered them. It is essential you get on immediately. Suggest you take them on with your own guns. (Passed to Command post)."

- 43. Harris Report.
- 44. Bennett Report; Michon Report; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde.
- 45. All platoon and company commanders were in attendance, along with three artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) and B Squadron's commander, Major W.E. Harris. Bennett Report; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde; Stuart, "Notes on Action"; BWA Report on the Battle of St. Andre and May-sur-Orne 25 July 1944 General: This report is furnished in chronological sequence and is based upon the memories of Major E Motzfeldt (B Coy comd), Captain J.P.W. Taylor (C Company Comd), Capt JPG Kemp (D Coy Comd), Capt Campbell Stewart (Adjt) and Lt E.S. Duffield (IO).
- 46. In addition to his company commanders and platoon commanders, three artillery Forward Observation Officers, and B Squadron CO, Major Walter Harris attended the meeting. BWA February 26 1945 Report on the Actions of Major F.P. Griffin 1st Bn The Black Watch (RHR) of Canada. C.A.O. on July 25 1944 by Major J.P.G. Kemp (Black Watch).
- 47. DHH Outline Report on Battle May-sur-Orne—Fontenay-le-Marmion 25 July 1944 by Brigadier W.J. Megill Commander 5th Cdn Infantry Bde 16 August 1944 According to Megill, Cantlie decided to change the axis of advance after assessing the situation in St. Martin. However, there is no other evidence to corroborate this version of events.
- 48. DHH 145.2R15011 (6) Account by Sgt Benson, Scout Pl, RHC of the attack by the Black Watch on May-sur-Orne 25 July 1944 Given to Capt Engler at Basse, 2 Aug 1944; Michon Report According to Lt Emile Michon A/commander of C Company of the Calgary Highlanders, Griffin ordered him to take his company and clean the Factory area before the Black Watch went in. While teeing up his company for the attack, he recced the area and concluded that a company backed by artillery or smoke would be needed to clear the area. Griffin then ordered him to go ahead and secure the start line. Before that could happen, he was summoned to Calgary Highlander Battalion HQ, where their commander, Lt-Col MacLauchlan, countermanded the order and told Michon to push on to his original objective, May-sur-Orne. The other patrol, led by the Black Watch scout sergeant, failed to reach May-sur-Orne due to heavy enemy fire from the village which occurred when the Black Watch started their assault. Benson Report.
- 49. DHH Account of the Attack by the Calg Highrs on May-sur-Orne Carried out on 25 Jul 44 as Given by Lt-Col MacLauchlan, OC at Fleury-sur-Orne 28 Jul 44. In fact, this threat was considered so serious that during the night the CO of the Calgary Highlanders (Lt-Col D. MacLauchlan) reworked his axis of advance to avoid interference from the western bank. Instead of sending all four companies down the road to May-sur-Orne, MacLauchlan ordered that one company move down the original route clearing the right flank as they went, while the other three battalions would swing east of St. Martin and move through the fields to their objectives in and around May-sur-Orne. Very quickly the three lead companies making the flanking manoeuvre in the open fields south of St. Martin ran into German machine gun fire from the ridge and from the Factory area, where heavy casualties ensued. One company managed to get loose from the fire but, after a series of map-reading blunders, ended up advancing on St. Martin again after thinking they had overshot their objective. This company, under the command of a platoon leader, had the church in May-sur-Orne as its objective but, as first light was breaking, it arrived in the churchyard at St. Martin as the lead elements of the Black Watch were also arriving. According to Lt Emile Michon, who commanded the company, he had no idea of his map-reading error until the rest of the Black Watch battalion showed up around the church in St. Martin. Michon Report.
- 50. Griffin's decision was due to the fact that both neutralizing fire by the British 12th Corps and a smokescreen created by 2nd Canadian Division proved ineffective, leaving the western approach to Verrières in full view of German positions on the heights west of the Orne river. LAC RG 24 Vol.13, 750 WD 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Operational Order No 1 July 24 1944.
- 51. Megill Report.
- 52. Powell Interview; Harris Interview.
- 53. Interview of Brig Megill by Terry Copp. January 1988.
- 54. LAC RG24 Vol. 12745 Letter from William Rawson to Lt. Col. G.F.P. Stanley Historical Section January 24 1945.
- 55. Powis Report; Doug Amaron, *History of the 1st Battalion in WW II* (Unpublished manuscript 1946) Author's Collection; Benson Report.
- 56. Powis Report; Amaron, *History of the 1st Battalion in WW II* This is likely the reason why so many of the Black Watch who survived the assault reported after the war that artillery support had been non-existent. In contrast to what they had seen in training and in their earlier, albeit brief, experiences in Normandy, the concentrations on distant targets were unlikely to be seen, let alone heard, in the heat of battle as they plunged down the reverse slope of the ridge.
- 57. Ibid. According to Simonds's Chief of Staff, Brigadier Elliot Rodger, the situation leading up to SPRING was both "serious" and "urgent," while Brigadier Megill later confided that "we would have been ordered to continue attacking as long as troops could be persuaded to make the effort!" To the average young platoon commander in the front, like Lt Emile Michon

from the Calgary Highlanders, "it was clear that "there was shit to pay in there." Letter from Elliot Rodger to the author Feb 29 1996; LAC Reginald Roy Papers MG30 E374 Vol. 2 Letter from W.J. Megill to Reginald Roy, 22 Nov 1981; Museum of the Regiments, Interview with Lt Emile Michon Calgary Highlanders, March 1992.

- 58. LAC RG24 Vol. 14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde: 25 July 0844hrs.
- 59. Interview with Brigadier W.J. Megill by Terry Copp, January 1988.
- 60. In addition to elements of the 272nd Infantry Division in positions in and around St. Martin and the south side of May-sur-Orne, Panzer Grenadiers from II Panzer Division had infiltrated the Factory area while its tactical reserve (Kampgruppe Sterz) was moving towards May-sur-Orne from reserve positions on the reverse slope of Verrières Ridge. In addition to the formidable array on their immediate front, the 102nd SS heavy tank battalion, boasting Tiger tanks with deadly 88-mm guns, posed a significant threat from the west bank of the Orne. On the opposite flank, machine guns continued to pepper any movement south of St. Martin, while further back beyond the ridge, two Kampfgruppen from IX SS Panzer Division were preparing to launch a local counterattack with the support of rockets and artillery from I SS Panzer Korps. The two battle groups were Kampfgruppe Meyer and Kampfgruppe Zohlhoffer. Jarymowicz, The Quest for Operational; Jarymowicz "Der Gegangriff Vor Verrières"; Sauer, "Germany's I SS Panzer Korps: Defensive Operations June-September 1944"; Reynolds, Steel Inferno.
- 61. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div.
- 62. McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars, p.168.
- 63. Ibid.
- 64. Powell Interview.
- 65. For the attack, Griffin had his battalion radio and three FOOs attached to the forward companies for the assault. However, before the attack could begin, Lt Van Vliet from the 5th Field Rgt developed radio trouble and Griffin gave him permission to remain in St. Martin until his radio was fixed. By the time it was, the Black Watch wounded were already coming back and he made a vain attempt to get forward, only to be pinned down in a ditch by the side of the main road for the rest of the day. The rest of the radios that accompanied the Black Watch up the ridge were all knocked out early in the advance. Another FOO from the 5th Fd Regt, Capt Gordon Powis, had his knocked out and tried in vain to raise Brigade on the smaller infantry sets, as Griffin's battalion set had been knocked out when his jeep was destroyed about 300 yards into the advance. Another FOO, a Capt from the British 25th Medium Regiment, also had his carrier destroyed early in the assault and Griffin gave him permission to return to his unit. Powis Report.
- 66. Bennett Report.
- 67. Harris Interview; Bennett Report.
- 68. Bennett Report.
- 69. Ibid.
- 70. Harris Interview.
- 71. Ibid.; Bennett Report.
- 72. LAC RG 24 Vol. 14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde.
- 73. Powell Interview.
- 74. Megill Interview with Terry Copp; PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group TAC HQ Log 25 July.
- 75. Williamson Letter.
- 76. Rawson Letter.
- 77. Powell Interview; McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars, p.168.
- 78. LAC MG30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers: Vol. 2 Letter from Maj-Gen Megill to Reg Roy. April 16, 1980.
- 79. MacLauchlan Report.
- 80. Williamson Letter.
- 81. Rawson Letter.
- 82. Harris Interview.
- 83. Ibid.
- 84. Powell Interview; Bennett Report.

- 85. Rawson Letter.
- 86. Ibid.
- 87. Ibid.
- 88. Williamson Letter.
- 89. Jarymowicz, The Quest for Operational Manoeuvre in the Normandy Campaign; Jarymowicz, "Der Gegangriff Vor Verrières."
- 90. Williamson Letter.
- 91. Ibid.
- 92. Powell Interview.
- 93. Powell Interview.
- 94. Ibid.
- 95. N.A. A History of the First Hussars Regiment (London: Hunter Printing, 1951), p. 93; McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars, p. 168. By the end of the day, B Squadron was left with 7 tanks, while only 28 remained in the entire Regiment.
- 96. Just before Operation SPRING, Simonds introduced his battle rationale to the veterans of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and the 3rd Canadian Division: "I think you will remember General Montgomery's remarks when he spoke to all formations prior to D-Day and said that we had the war 'in the bag' if we made an all-out effort. My view is that we will have the war 'in the bag' this summer or at least in a matter of weeks if we pursue the advantage we now hold. I cannot stress too highly what effect this all-out effort will have on the enemy and its advantages to us, particularly from the point of view of our own troops. If the war drags out, normal wastage will ensue and casualties will mount up. On the other hand, by making use of an all-out effort our casualties may be initially high, but in the long run they will be less. I think that it is safe to compare the enemy in his present situation to a boxer who is groggy on his feet, and needs but the knockout blow to finish him off. I ask all Commanders here present to put first and foremost into their minds the idea of the all-out effort. You must always remember that if you rest, so does the enemy; and the final outcome takes considerably longer. You must therefore call on your troops for this all-out effort. I want it to be absolutely clear in your minds that occasions will arise when I will make heavy demands for you at a time when your troops are tired, but the enemy is groggy. This produces great results and saves casualties. There is always a tendency on our part to look at our troops after a particularly stiff engagement and consider them tired without appreciating, at the same time that the enemy is more so... Operational Points—First we must have the Offensive Spirit. This is absolutely essential, and the drive must always come from the top... If a commander finds himself up against stiff opposition he must keep finding a way to break through the enemy. It is fatal to stop. He must never sit down. He must always be doing something. Secondly, once you are committed to an offensive operation there is no holding your hand, regardless of casualties. As a Commander you must consider at the outset whether the losses incurred are going to be worth the final assault. You must determine where these losses are going to be the minimum you can afford in relation to the value of the objective. We can't fight the Boche without incurring casualties and every soldier must know this. My point of view is that if I can't embark upon an operation to take a certain feature, for example, unless it will be useful to me later, the operation is not worthwhile and I call it off with 50% casualties incurred, then I have achieved nothing but a waste of lives; if I continue, and incur a further 20% casualties and bring the operation to a successful conclusion, then the operation is worthwhile. I speak of casualties in grossly exaggerated figures. In no operations yet have I participated where casualties were not between 15% and 25%, and even at that, 25% is still a grossly exaggerated figure." LAC, RG24 Vol. 17, 506. Report on the Address by Lt. Gen. G.G. Simonds, CBE, DSO, GOC 2nd Cdn Corps, to Officers of 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde at the Chateau near Cairon by Major A.T. Sesia.
- 97. LAC RG24 Vol. 9879 Traversy, Capt. V.E. Battle Experience Questionnaire.
- 98. PRO, WO171/376, Guards Armoured Division Intsum No 14 2000 July 23 1944. One of the crucial problems with SPRING was that Simonds expected the British 12th Corps to successfully clear the heights on the west bank or at least dominate them with fire as SPRING developed.
- 99. Jarymowicz, The Quest for Operational; Jarymowicz "Der Gegangriff Vor Verrières".
- 100. The final casualty toll for Operation SPRING (not confirmed until over a decade later) was 1,634 total casualties of all ranks: 475 fatalities, 1,011 wounded and 148 taken prisoner. The Black Watch suffered 307 casualties: 118 were fatalities and the rest were wounded, missing or POWs. LAC, RG24, Vol. 18, 826, Statistic and Explanations 11 December 1956.



"EVERY KIND OF MACHIAVELLIAN PLOT":

Curley Hutton and Canada's march to a war in South Africa

Dr. Craig Stockings

Major-General Edward Thomas Henry "Curley" Hutton arrived in Ottawa on 23 August 1898 to take command of the Canadian militia. At 49 years of age and at a high point in his career, there was a spring in his step. Encouraged by what he believed to be steadfast backing from patrons within the War and Colonial Offices and the concurrent appointment of his old friend and fellow-Etonian Lord Minto as Governor General, and fired by his own internal zeal, arrogance and ambition, Hutton brought with him a triple agenda. He would aim at transforming the Canadian militia into an efficient and effective force for Canadian defence. That meant, in the process, remoulding it along the lines of a self-sufficient "army" complete in all arms and administrative services. The task also implied the removal of what was widely perceived in British defence circles as undue political interference in Canadian military affairs. In the process, both objectives would fit



General Edward Thomas Henry Hutton in uniform, c. 1898–1900

into his wider long-term designs for a cooperative imperial defence system.² To Hutton, the means by which he planned to achieve his goals in Canada were also tacitly approved by his superiors and patrons. He intended to work with the Canadian government to bring serious reform. Should the government block him, however, he had decided to appeal to the public (on the grounds that all they needed was to have his ideas explained in order for right-minded people to support them) and the militia itself. Feckless politicians would then act out of public pressure. Hutton felt he had the right to make use of all means at his disposal to make sure his aims were met.³ Never in any doubt as to the wisdom and importance of his own ideas, Hutton expected nothing but success in Canada.

In the first 12 months of his command, Hutton's reforms, though drastic, were generally well-received by the militia and the wider public and were noticed even outside the British sphere. In October 1901, Theodore Roosevelt, now president, expressed his "high appreciation of a really first-class volunteer force" that Hutton had built. There is no question the militia was set on a path of greater efficiency. At the same time, his relatively smooth ride was drawing to a sharp close. The slow but sure degeneration of Hutton's relationship with his minister, Frederick Borden, and the Canadian government, caused by his difficult, impulsive, vain, arrogant, outspoken and even dictatorial manner, was becoming more serious. The situation was made steadily worse by Hutton's mounting criticism and attacks upon "political patronage" within the militia organization—that is, his steady encroachment onto turf of real sensitivity to Canadian politicians. Such frictions were about to burst into something much more serious. A fuse had been lit in South Africa. What followed, from mid-1899, was a difficult path to war for Canada, and especially for Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government. For

his real or perceived role in these events, Hutton has been accused, over time, of "every kind of Machiavellian plot" to draw Canada into the conflict, often as part of a wider imperial defence conspiracy involving Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Minto. Desmond Morton, among others, was convinced Hutton masterminded "an effective campaign to push the government into sending a contingent. It was a line of thinking that was not only applicable to Canada. In Australia during the 1970s, for example, an academic orthodoxy of interpretation arose thanks to the work of C. Connolly and L. Field that Australians went to war unenthusiastically and under the coercive effect of British scheming. As in Canada, this was patently untrue. As Craig Wilcox argued, "Australians were more partners in the imperial cause than victims of it." The central purpose of this article is to provide a fresh interpretation of events surrounding the Canadian decision to send an official detachment to South Africa, and Hutton's role within it. There is more to this tale than has been traditionally portrayed.



Major-General Edward Thomas Henry "Curley" Hutton and wife Eleanor, November 1898, Ottawa

The sharp decline in Hutton's fortunes in Canada and a commensurate increase in interest in military affairs across the empire corresponded with, and was dramatically hastened by, the crisis surrounding the outbreak of the Boer War. As the diplomatic situation deteriorated in South Africa, Chamberlain sought to harness the imperial sentiment that he had been shepherding so assiduously. A few hundred militiamen around the empire had already offered service, including a detachment of New South Wales Lancers training at Aldershot. Lord Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, noted as preparations for an expeditionary force preceded that: "It would create an excellent feeling if each of the Australian

Colonies, Tasmania, and New Zealand furnished contingents of mounted troops" and if Canada were to offer "two battalions of foot." Certainly the idea of colonials fighting beside British regulars had been raised by Chamberlain at the 1897 Colonial Conference. Thus, on 3 July, without any thought at the War Office of what to do with any colonial contingents that did appear for service in South Africa, he cabled Minto in Canada and the governors in the Australasian colonies asking whether their governments might make formal offers of troops for "a military demonstration against the Transvaal." Such an offer, Chamberlain continued, "spontaneously made," would be welcomed here & might have a great effect in South Africa." The "effect" referred to was the sense of imperial unity they would symbolize, rather than the military power they represented.

Chamberlain received a reply to his initial request from the Queensland Premier, James Dickson, only a week later with an offer of a 250-man mounted contingent. The gaunt-let was thus thrown down to his fellow Australian premiers in an atmosphere of perpetual inter-colonial rivalry. Charles Cameron Kingston, of South Australia, told the Colonial Secretary that members of his defence force would no doubt volunteer if needed. Correspondence between 5–14 July from the governors in New South Wales and Victoria spoke of their government's likely support of the enlistments of volunteers, baulking only at this stage at bearing the cost of sending and maintaining such contingents. By mid-September, with the strength of public opinion growing stronger than ever in support of not only the war but colonial involvement in it, the Victorians began enrolling volunteers and called for a commandant's conference in Melbourne to discuss the idea of an "Australian" force. Despite considerable and ongoing colonial jealousies, the conference went ahead in late September, as the Boer commandos were mobilizing. It managed, in the face of Queensland hopes that its contingent might stand alone and distaste from New South Wales of any Victorian-led initiative, to cobble together a plan for a joint expeditionary force of a little over 2,000 men.

Meanwhile, across the Tasman, the New Zealanders might have been beaten to the punch by the Australians, but soon eclipsed them by sheer enthusiasm. On 28 September 1899, Premier Richard Seddon moved in parliament to raise a force of mounted rifles to be offered for service in South Africa, at his colony's expense. The atmosphere was emotional, and the motion passed overwhelmingly with loud applause followed by three cheers for the Queen. "We belong to and are an integral part of a great Empire," announced Seddon, "[t]he flag that floats over us and protects us was expected to protect our kindred and countrymen who are in the Transvaal." Developing Australian and New Zealand plans were, however, halted in their tracks on 3 October by another cable from Chamberlain.

On the other side of the empire, the largest of the self-governing colonies followed a path to war which was, in many respects, more complex than elsewhere. There was no question that the idea of imperial service should the empire face real danger, by official or unofficial contingents, was lauded by the majority of Canadians. Non-French-speaking Canadians at the end of the 19th century shared the same ever-growing fascination with the empire and spirit of imperialism—"the growth of Imperial sentiment," as Borden called it—as well as the same self-interested economic links and the same ties of history, ethnicity, culture and shared identity with all things "British" as their Anglo-Saxon cousins elsewhere. ²¹ This was mixed in

Canada with the idea of a new and more active cooperation with Britain, perhaps on more equal terms, thanks to stirring local aspirations.²² Yet the question was, for a larger proportion of Canadians than Australians (and certainly New Zealanders) at this early stage: Did the trouble brewing on the Rand really threaten the empire to an extent that warranted Canadian involvement?²³ With press reporting subdued in July 1899, even though the balance of opinion was in favour of British policies, in general terms traditional Canadian military apathy dominated.²⁴ Hutton's talk of an intense sympathy for the Uitlanders at this point spoke more to his social circles and personal outlook than anything else.²⁵

In Canadian politics, with a Liberal prime minister sensitive of his French-Canadian power base, which was not at all interested in British imperial scheming in southern Africa, things seemed clear-cut. Laurier told Minto on 20 July 1899 that neither he, nor parliament, supported the notion that Canada should offer material assistance in case of war as Chamberlain had implied in his 3 July cable. With no real danger posed to the empire by two small agrarian Boer republics, Laurier felt that the "present case does not seem to be one in which England, if there is war, ought to ask us, or even to expect us to take a part." Ten days later, the furthest Laurier was prepared to go was to secure a parliamentary expression of sympathy towards the Uitlanders. It would not do well, he told Minto, to "assume the burdens of military expenditure, except—which God forbid—in the case of pressing danger." The message was repeated privately by Borden to Hutton. Laurier and his government were quite happy to follow the previous practice of allowing Canadians to volunteer if they so wished, at British cost, but that was not the same as the type of official offer Chamberlain sought. Minto passed the disappointing news to Chamberlain.

The Governor General, however, remained convinced that war was on the way and that at some point troops would be despatched from Canada. He thus sent for Hutton and asked him "privately" to prepare a plan for such a contingent.³³ Hutton immediately wrote to Chamberlain to tell him—despite it being in contradiction to Laurier's known public position, yet too excited by the task given to him to still his pen—that nothing would be more "enthusiastically received by the Militia generally, and by Canada generally ... than such an opportunity for showing loyalty and determination to uphold Empire and Imperial interests."³⁴ Hutton subsequently prepared a detailed plan for a self-contained all-arms contingent of 1,209 men. At this point, however, all too conscious of the government's position, Minto and Hutton kept this "contingency" plan to themselves.

In August and September, Hutton distanced himself from Ottawa with a short holiday to the U.S., then went on to attend training camps in the eastern provinces. He trusted that the degeneration of the situation in South Africa, and the commensurate rise in press reporting and public feeling in support of the British cause, would soon force his government to change its position. Hutton was sensitive at this point to not be seen as leading the push for a Canadian expedition, believing "any appearance of an Imperial Officer such as myself having a hand in such coercion ... could only be much detrimental to its successful issue." He was pleased to find that Borden, for one, was of the opinion that, if war was declared, a contingent must follow. Moreover, he informed Minto on 3 September that, as soon such an offer was made, he intended to offer his services to lead it. Unable to contain himself, he made such an offer to Chamberlain

the next day. Chamberlain replied that he was needed in Canada.³⁶ Minto wrote back the following day to cool Hutton's fires, expressing that he saw no immediate prospect of the government "changing their decision." Hutton would have none of it, fretting that continuing to delay might see Canadian troops arrive too late to see any fighting, and suggested Minto exert his influence directly on Laurier.³⁸

By late September, however, Hutton's predictions of mounting press and public pressure on the government were coming to pass. Canadian pride was touched by the idea of being forestalled while other colonies made their commitments.³⁹ Sir Charles Tupper, leader of the Opposition, returned from a visit to London where Chamberlain had been careful to let him know that Britain would welcome any offer made by the Canadian government. Tupper henceforth put himself and his party at the head of the movement for sending a contingent. The pro-war and Conservative press grew militant in its attacks on Laurier and the government. With a growing sense that Laurier's administration was not responding to public will, community feelings became more fervent still. Ethnic tensions were excited, cries of loyalty and disloyalty abounded.40 French-speaking Canada's view was, initially, mostly ambivalent. While always less readily accepting of British decision-making Anglo-Canada, as the pressure mounted, it moved more strongly against what was increasingly perceived as a strictly colonial war.⁴¹ Other opposition voices, including classic liberals and some in the labour movement, were small and ineffective. 42 Meanwhile, the largely unanimous English-speaking public position gave Laurier less and less political room to manoeu-



Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada from 1896 to 1911



Hon. Sir Frederick William Borden, M.P. (Kings, N.S.) (Minister of Militia and Defence)

vre. ⁴³ At the same time, however, Cabinet opinion hardened in the opposite direction under the influence of Joseph Tarte, Minister of Public Works and a French Canadian with a temper that made it difficult to predict his position on any given issue, and Richard William Scott, Secretary of State and an Irishman with clear anti-British sentiments. ⁴⁴ Laurier, trapped in the middle, continued his policy of delay. Meanwhile, Chamberlain kept pressing Minto about the chances of an official offer but received no favourable replies. ⁴⁵

Hutton returned to Ottawa from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia on 25 September to find that the question of a Canadian contingent had become a pressing public issue. ⁴⁶ In Borden's absence, he was summoned to speak with Scott, who asked if a few volunteers might be

gathered together to go to South Africa. Hutton replied "not a few but 5,000 men without any difficulty," an idea Scott rejected, claiming Hutton "did not know the feeling of the Country." Hutton countered, arguing that, in the event of war, public opinion would force the government's hand. Scott was furious. It was a meeting that would return to haunt Hutton, as his inferred knowledge of the upcoming war, and Canada's place within it, undermined his efforts to appear uninvolved. Two days later, Hutton departed again, this time on an extended tour of the western provinces and prairie towns, more convinced than ever that the crisis in South Africa was close to breaking point and that the surge of public opinion would follow. 49

Hutton certainly *was* involved, despite his careful efforts to absent himself from Ottawa. His vociferous public speaking, which helped to turn government attitudes against him from mid-1899, was to some degree designed, in his words, "to raise military enthusiasm and active patriotism" to a "white hot" level—just as Laurier sought to cool it.⁵⁰ Few direct references to South Africa were made, but the looming war, particularly from August on, was the clear context. The French-Canadian press accused him in early September of deliberately arousing public feelings to "influence the policy of the Government." Hutton was also involved at a practical level. He told Borden of the plan he had developed at Minto's suggestion in September. Dorden was not displeased. Without publicity, the minister immediately instructed Hutton to "place the Canadian forces in a state of readiness, pending a call to arms."

The bombshell dropped in Canada with Chamberlain's fateful, circular 3 October message to Minto and the Australasian governors. It read: "Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief desire that you express high appreciation of signal exhibition of patriotic feeling of people of Canada shown by offers to serve in South Africa." Borden's deputy minister, Louis-Félix Pinault, made an unauthorized press release of the contents of the cable but, even had he not, it would soon have been public news as the message was published, more or less, in the British press soon after the event. The Australians were surprised by the message, whose immediate effect was to end the continuing commandants' conference and any chance of a federal contingent. All six Australian colonies then got on with planning their contingents in accordance with London's request. Laurier's government was somewhat more perplexed, however, given no official offer of any type had yet been made. The wording of the cable to the Canadians may well have been the result of confusion between the War Office and the Colonial Office, or else it might have been taken to refer to the individual or non-government offers of service already received from various Canadians. Certainly, Chamberlain was well-aware that there was still no official offer from Laurier's government.

Surprise in Ottawa soon gave way to suspicion, and then fury, largely due to the fact that, on the same day Chamberlain's cable was received, the *Canadian Military Gazette* published the Borden-Hutton plan for a contingent. Moreover, the *Gazette* claimed: "If war should be commenced in the Transvaal ... the offer of a force from the Canadian militia for service will be made by the Canadian Government." Readers were left to conclude the decision must already have been made. The coincidence seemed more than suspicious; it smelled like a conspiracy to force the government's hands. This was doubly so in that special efforts had been made to publicize this article, with advance proofs sent to various newspapers, which published the story simultaneous with the *Gazette*.

The obvious culprit was Hutton. The *Gazette* had close ties to him and militia headquarters. He had the motive and the means. ⁶² Cabinet members began to wonder, especially after his confrontation with Scott only a week earlier, if Hutton had taken active steps; if he had not actually offered Canadian troops to the War Office behind the back of the government, then at the very least he had used the *Gazette* to back them further into a corner. ⁶³ Hutton had, of course, made no such secret offers. The closest he had come were letters to Minto and Chamberlain in early September telling them that Borden believed that, if war broke out, the government would despatch troops. ⁶⁴ On the other hand, although there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that ever connected Hutton to the article, it is possible that he had a hand in its instigation. If that was so, it was a daring risk—but one not beyond his character. ⁶⁵ At the same time, Hutton's correspondence showed that he was convinced that the government must soon yield, especially if war was declared. If he was involved with the article, it was a gamble, in this regard, without much of a purpose. Nonetheless, appearances and passions at this heated moment in Canadian politics well and truly trumped balanced analysis. Hutton was in trouble.

From 3 October, ever more serious pressure was applied to Laurier and his government. Laurier used the Liberal-oriented *Globe* to deflect the inferences of the Colonial Secretary's cable and the *Gazette*, but that did not stop a large section of the pro-war lobby from interpreting Chamberlain's thanks to the "people of Canada" as censure of the lack of government action. Agitation rose to new heights. ⁶⁶ On 5 October, Tupper made speeches urging a contingent, and on the same day news arrived of the official British acceptance of troops from Queensland and New Zealand. Formal offers had also been made by Jamaica, Trinidad, Malaya, Hong Kong and Lagos. The *New York Tribune* reported Canada as "the one important British colony which makes no offer of martial aid." ⁶⁷According to Hutton, "Anglo-Canada rose like one man, and the whole press of Upper Canada and the Eastern Provinces, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, took up the cudgels." ⁶⁸ The *Ottawa Citizen* ran letters complaining that, "[a]fter all our protestations of Imperial loyalty, our parliamentary resolutions on the Transvaal question, and singing of God Save the Queen, the government crawls into its shell and refuses to do anything." ⁶⁹ Representations by militiamen themselves were just as stinging.

Laurier was now caught in an inescapable quandary. With the contents of Chamberlain's cable open knowledge, private non-official volunteering was no longer a viable alternative. The government could now reverse its position and raise a contingent, decline to do so in the face of crushing public opinion, or resign. ⁷¹ Pressure continued to mount on Laurier from Chamberlain through Minto, and from Lord Strathcona, Canada's High Commissioner in London, who reminded him on 11 October, the day that war was declared, that the Colonial Office had now accepted contingents from Western Australia and Tasmania, that the Victorian government had the previous day voted to send its men, and that similar outcomes were expected at any moment from New South Wales and South Australia. ⁷² *The Times* noted that, if Canada had not yet offered anything, it was not for want of public opinion but "solely on account of hesitation on part of Government."

By now, with war declared, Laurier's position was no longer tenable. Hastening back from a conference in Chicago, the Prime Minister met with his Cabinet. A stormy six-hour meeting ensued.⁷⁴ Tarte and Scott opposed involvement, attacking Chamberlain, Hutton and Minto.



Soldiers going to the Boer War, near the Post Office in Ottawa

Borden and William Mulock, the Postmaster General, declared in favour. Other members vacillated in between those two positions. No result was obtained and a new meeting was scheduled for the next day. In the meantime, Laurier passed a message to Chamberlain that his views had not varied and, moreover, in sharp tones, noted "the clandestine attempt which is made to force our hands must unavoidably result in impeding rather than in facilitating whatever action we may have to take." The next day, 13 October, with no real alternative, Cabinet voted in favour of sending troops. The Canadian contingent was on its way. Chamberlain wrote to Minto that "[a]ll's well that ends well."

For his part, Hutton had been under siege. His chief staff officer, Colonel Hubert Foster, warned him on 7 October that an "astonished" Cabinet believed he had offered Canadian troops to London, and hence Chamberlain's cable. Hutton was forced to reassure Minto two days later that he was not the source of the *Gazette's* information. Foster was summoned by Borden on 12 October and told to get from Hutton "some denial" of having communicated to London a secret offer of Canadian troops. Borden did not believe it, but wished for something concrete with which to reassure his colleagues. Rather than giving his minister what he needed, however, Hutton replied to Foster than the idea that he offered the contingent was "too absurd" for a denial. Angry such a message had not come directly to him, Hutton declined to respond to Borden's request. Meanwhile, *La Patrie*, Tarte's newspaper, directly accused Hutton of



Personnel of Strathcona's Horse en route to South Africa aboard S.S. MONTEREY

"trying to force the hands of the Government," and hinted at his removal. ⁸⁴ While the government could do nothing immediately against him, from that point forward there was an open antagonism between it and its GOC. Even those willing to accept that Hutton had not made direct, unauthorized offers of troops to Chamberlain remained bitter that he had nonetheless, in their eyes, engineered the demonstration of public feeling that had arisen.

The wider problem for Hutton by this stage, even though he did not yet realize it, was that after the controversies of 3 October he no longer worked under the lax supervision of Borden but under the watchful, shaken and suspicious eyes of a hostile Prime Minister and Cabinet. ⁸⁵ The militia had now become central to Canadian political calculations. Laurier began to complain directly to Minto of Hutton's speeches on "political" issues, which he argued were "absolutely out of place." At the same time, Hutton himself became more uncompromising; as though now he felt Cabinet was against him, he had no reason to "soften" his policies. He was further frustrated by "missing" the war and his continuing requests for active service in South Africa continued, to no avail. ⁸⁷ From this point Borden, now caught between pressure from his senior Cabinet colleagues, and irritated by Hutton's new approach, himself took a much firmer stand. ⁸⁸ Not only was trust broken between the two men, but they were now on a collision course.

Hutton joined the entourage of officials bound for Quebec on 26 October to farewell the first Canadian contingent for South Africa. On the night of 28 October, both he and Borden were

guests at a banquet given by the Garrison Club to the officers of the contingent. Both delivered speeches. Hutton, intoxicated by the spirit of the moment, predicted that Canada would send 50,000 to 100,000 men to defend the empire's integrity if required. That declaration directly repudiated the government's public promise that the 1,000-man contingent constituted no precedent for the future. Hutton further chastised the government about its continuing efforts to interfere with the militia, this time with regards to the selection of officers for South Africa. Borden was incensed and later, drunk, after verbally abusing Hutton, got into a "discreditable" fracas over the contents of the GOC's speech with a former militia officer before retiring to bed "in a helpless state." The whole messy business made the newspapers. The following evening, this time at a reception hosted by Minto, Borden again managed to get himself intoxicated and arrived late to the next day's review of the contingent. Hutton asked him to address the officers who were embarking about their pay, a provocative move given that the two had argued on the issue at the previous evening's event. Borden replied, recalled Hutton, "in the most offensive and insolent tone that ... I was always interfering etc, etc." Believing him drunk once more, Hutton turned away.

Soon aware of events in Quebec, Laurier moved quickly to support Borden against Hutton. The Prime Minister complained to Minto that Hutton's remarks were inappropriate and insubordinate and, moreover, that it was "not in the traditions of the British Army ... [that] ... soldiers of high or low rank should ever venture into political ground." Hutton comments of government policy, Laurier warned, brought him perilously close to breaching "the duties entrusted to the General Commanding the Militia." Clearly Laurier was unaware that the "tradition" in London was, if anything, the reverse. The Prime Minister wrote again the next day, concerned that the press had picked up Hutton's remarks about 100,000 Canadian volunteers and was making it a political issue. By this stage, Hutton was convinced that the tide of political opinion was actively set against him and that it had been decided, "tacitly or otherwise, that I must be got rid of," by making his position uncomfortable to the point of being intolerable such that he would either resign or perhaps abandon his command for a position in South Africa.

On 2 November 1899, after witnessing the swell of Canadian opinion in support of the first contingent, and with some early Boer military success stirring the public mood further, Laurier offered a second contingent to London. The offer was politely refused, however, much to Hutton's disappointment, as the gesture to imperial unity had already been made in the initial contingent and there was as yet no perceived military need for more colonials. By mid-December, that British position had been dramatically reversed thanks to the deep shock and humiliation of Black Week. In the wake of the crisis, Hutton appealed to the War Office once more to be allowed to serve in South Africa, but again he was refused. For Hutton and many across the empire, defeat at the hands of Boer farmers was bad enough, but even worse was the concern that such a display of British weakness would invite European intervention and a general war, a prospect no less fearful in the colonies than in Britain. Support for the war was thus all but sealed in English-speaking Canada, and much French-speaking Canadian opposition was muted. In general terms, across the empire, lingering cries of opposition grew quiet. An air of seriousness took hold. In Australia, even the radical and irreverent *Bulletin* now declared: The Empire right or wrong.

On 16 December, in the aftermath of the Black Week disasters in South Africa, Chamberlain informed the colonies that he would now "entertain favourably" further offers of troops. ¹⁰² The empire heeded the call. In the Australian colonial legislatures, no more than four votes in total were recorded against making such offers. ¹⁰³ In New Zealand, only four parliamentarians voted against a 266-man second contingent. ¹⁰⁴ Chamberlain was also now pleased to accept Canada's earlier offer of its own second contingent. ¹⁰⁵ Its subsequent recruitment, however, widened the gap between Hutton and Borden even further. Appointments soon became an issue, and even though Hutton won his refusal to accept Borden's "political" nominees, more damage was done. So too, many large contracts for equipment, forage and horses were needed, which increased clashes over patronage. ¹⁰⁶ "General, I ask myself this question," an angry Borden quipped to Hutton on 10 January 1900, "is it worth Canada's while to remain part of an Empire, which can suffer disasters such as those of Methuen, Gatacre, and Buller?" Hutton responded with the veiled threat that "the Canadian public would see to it."

Throughout this period, the rapidly degenerating relationship between Borden, the government and their GOC was punctuated and accentuated by a series of key incidents that were, in themselves, of little consequence. Each took on an undue significance, however, making a difficult situation untenable. The first of those involved the purchase of horses for the second contingent. Hutton was initially informed that the mounts were to be bought from Robert Beith, a Liberal parliamentarian and horse dealer. Hutton did not approve, correctly sensing political patronage, and directed that they be bought by Colonel Kitson, under his orders, on the open market. On 5 January Borden ordered Kitson to Ottawa with his purchase book and accused both he and Hutton of giving preference to a Conservative dealer. Sharp exchanges of correspondence followed. Borden considered Hutton's communications "unsatisfactory if not intentionally rude." 109 Hutton took Borden's position as a vote of no confidence in him and as being born of Liberal log-rolling. Both men were influenced by emotions and growing personal antipathy. Both appealed to Laurier, who, predictably, judged in favour of Borden. 110 The Prime Minister told Minto that Borden and Hutton were at an unsolvable impasse. 111 Hutton complained to Wolseley, with some justification, that Borden's actions were "intentionally meant to insult myself" and that he was supported by a Cabinet "determined to see me removed from the command." Subject to "every kind of petty annoyance, and discourtesy," he saw no alternative but to ask for permission to resign his appointment. 113 Wolseley refused.

There was, of course, far more afoot than horse contracts. By mid-January, Borden was exhausted. The last three months of 1899 had averaged seven times more departmental correspondence than the previous nine months. On top of that, Borden's private business ventures were failing such that the minister was in debt and facing legal action. Heanwhile, on 12 January, Strathcona asked Hutton to take direct control of raising a force of mounted troops for South African service, privately funded by Strathcona himself. The next day, Strathcona informed Laurier of his plans, hoping Hutton might avoid "political" appointments. That was unacceptable to both Laurier and Borden in its implied censure and in that it would remove \$260,000 worth of contracts that might otherwise be used to political advantage. Indeed, in an example of outright corruption, Borden's financial problems led him to secretly arrange for his own company in Nova Scotia to supply meat to Strathcona's force. He Hutton



Troops of the Royal Canadian Regiment crossing Paardeberg Drift, February 1900

had control of its procurement and finances, he would have discovered the truth. Further, Strathcona's plan would allow Hutton to assume the functions of the civilian branch of the militia department, even if only temporarily and for a specific purpose. Neither politician could accept this new role for the GOC. Their solution lay in "exploiting the tension that already existed." That is, Laurier and Borden collaborated at this point to see Hutton removed, which to some extent explains the further hardening of attitudes of both men from mid-January. Laurier moved quickly to pressure Strathcona to reverse his decision to place Hutton, outside of normal departmental chains, in charge of overseeing his force. He disingenuously assured Strathcona there had been no "politics" in the raising of either contingent thus far. Strathcona conceded the issue to Laurier.

In the wake of such controversies, Hutton went to Halifax to oversee the departure of the second Canadian contingent, leaving Minto to deal with Laurier and the ever-deepening rift between the GOC and his political masters. Hinto's plan to deal with the government's clear desire to remove Hutton was to delay and to consult London. A subsequent series of interviews between Minto and Laurier were heated. Laurier complained that Hutton was meddlesome and insubordinate. Minto defended his old friend to the hilt, telling the Prime Minister that political interference in the Militia Department prevented Hutton from doing "good work," and that, if compelled to ask London for his removal, he would place his own official opinion on the matter before the Colonial Secretary. Such an action, Laurier retorted, might compel his government to resign. Minto wrote to Chamberlain that in such circumstances he would accept its resignation. After a further interview between the two men on 20 January, Minto wrote a memo protesting against both ongoing political interference in military affairs and Borden's discourtesies towards Hutton. This memo, according to Minto, fell accidentally into Cabinet hands rather than into the possession of a Cabinet committee as he had intended.

Meanwhile, Hutton, anxious of his fate, continued to pepper Minto with his own perspective on events, complaining of ever more offensive communications by Borden and guessing correctly that the government wanted to force him to resign or, failing that, demand his recall. Is suppose that Sir Wilfrid has seen you about myself, he wrote, I have been distant with Dr. Borden, and by the wild look of the gentleman I gather that he is in a suppressed state of indignation and whisky. At the same time, Hutton appealed to his patrons back home for support and prepared them to accept his version of the unfolding crisis. Ceneral Sir Evelyn Wood, Adjutant-General to the British Army, he explained that the Laurier government had "credited me with having forced their hands and aroused public opinion" and that, as a result, I am viewed with jealousy and suspicion. For this reason, he continued, I am now the victim of petty unpleasantness and discourtesies, which if they are seriously augmented may make it almost impossible for me to remain.

A week later Laurier again met with Minto, bringing with him the Governor General's earlier memo, and pointing out that he and his colleagues believed Minto to have misunderstood the relative authority of the minister and general. 130 Minto, nonetheless, again warned that he would write a protest if Laurier demanded Hutton's recall, and that he would see it placed on the official record. Laurier was unimpressed, hoping to keep matters confidential, but he would not be deterred. 131 Two days later, on 29 January, despite Minto's threats, Laurier wrote his own note to Council, initiating Hutton's recall. It described conditions within the Department of Militia as "very unsatisfactory by reason of the attitude of Major-General Hutton towards the Minister of Militia and the Government." ¹³² Laurier requested that the Colonial Office expedite the general's immediate recall. 133 The next day Minto told Laurier that given "the present anxious condition of the Empire," he was considering declining to sign the Prime Minister's order, "even though my refusal might be unconstitutional," 134 Minto also told Laurier that he believed that the possibility existed that the Imperial government might refuse to consider the request for Hutton's recall, in order to avoid removing a "most capable officer" at such a critical time. 135 Minto warned Laurier that his government was taking on a grave public and political risk in its course of action and suggested rearranging Cabinet. Laurier retorted that no minister would serve with Hutton. The meeting closed with the Prime Minister leaving his Orderin-Council with Minto. Hutton's spirits sagged. He wrote to the Military Secretary at the War Office, Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, this time not to plead for service in South Africa but rather to inquire about the possibility of ending his appointment in Canada. Grove replied that he was quite aware of "the extent to which politics permeate the military administration in Canada" but indicated that Hutton would have to resign if he wanted to come home. 136

Meanwhile, Borden maintained the pressure on Laurier to see Hutton removed. On 3 February, in a rage, he sent Laurier a new set of accusations regarding a system of "secret orders" that he had discovered that morning in Hutton's headquarters. It appeared that the GOC had directed his subordinates not to respond to any correspondence from the minister, or meet with him directly if possible, without first getting Hutton's permission and thereafter reporting back anything that had transpired. ¹³⁷ Such conduct, according to Borden, was "unprecedented in our history," "unsupported by the rules and practice of the English War Office," and was certainly opposed to the efficient working of the department. ¹³⁸ In truth, however, the idea of a "secret orders" scandal was an invention of the minister for his own purposes. ¹³⁹

Indeed, Borden's claim that Hutton had contravened War Office practice proved only his own ignorance of the way things worked in London. Wolseley, for one, had never accepted the principle that his subordinates should have direct access to the Secretary of State for War. Indeed, he openly directed that all correspondence to his minister would go through him, exactly as Hutton implemented in Ottawa. ¹⁴⁰ The chain of command was sacrosanct for Hutton in his own branch and the practice was especially appropriate in his view, given his strained relationship with Borden. ¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, Borden's "secret orders" storm in a teacup swept away any remaining political sympathy for Hutton.

All that now stood between Hutton and an embarrassing official recall to London was Minto's intransigence. Both Ottawa and London would have avoided the awkwardness of a scandal if they could and seen Hutton unofficially recalled, but the Governor General would have none of it, determined to use the crisis to force a showdown. Minto wrote to the Privy Council the day of Borden's exposure of Hutton's "secret orders" suggesting that Hutton's attempts to eradicate "political influence" in the militia was the true reason for problems between himself and the government, just as it had been with his predecessors. ¹⁴² Cabinet responded to Minto's 3 February memo with accusations of its own in that Hutton had looked to "establish for himself a position in the public service wholly independent of all Ministerial control. ¹⁴³ It was not the minister who was in "want of appreciation for Hutton"; rather, it was Hutton who was "under the delusion" that he was not under Borden's control. ¹⁴⁴ It was a clear sign that the government would not back down.

Over the next few days, Hutton, ill in bed with a cold, busied his pen explaining to Chamberlain all the failings of the Canadian government and his own never-ending patience in dealing with "every sort of discourtesy" heaped upon him as a consequence of the effectiveness of his reforms and attempts to remove political interference. Meanwhile, Minto's temper now began to cool and the reality of his own untenable position began to dawn. The Governor General began to back-peddle and to withdraw some of his earlier sting. On 7 February, Laurier called on him again, once more carrying the Privy Council Order for Hutton's recall. This time Minto signed. The order was sent to Chamberlain the next day with Minto's cover sheet putting his opinion of the whole affair on the official record, not that the Colonial Secretary appreciated the official Vice-Regal "complaint" any more than Laurier. The GOC himself, never one for humility, could hardly have penned a more supportive note back to the Colonial Office. Hutton called on Minto that afternoon and received the news, "very much dispirited."

The next day, furious and embarrassed in equal measure, Hutton assured Minto that "the Can. Govt shall pay my passage and I shall fire a parting shot when my Canadian military mantle has been dropped." ¹⁵² In desperation more than hope, he also began to talk of using the limited time he had left to instigate a Royal Commission "which shall carefully and publicly enquire into and report upon the administration of the Department of Militia and Defence." ¹⁵³ It was, however, a path left untrodden, for at the moment of Hutton's deepest despair, as he set himself to wait for the order directing him home, Hutton received instead cable from the Adjutant-General in London on 9 February telling him the following: "You have been selected for special service in South Africa … proceed at once and acknowledge receipt." ¹⁵⁴ Hutton replied by telegram the same day, noting: "Honour of selection for active service much appreciated," and

resigned his Canadian appointment the next day.¹⁵⁵ The impasse was broken. Borden wrote back the same night that Hutton's resignation was accepted and that an order-in-council to that effect had already been passed and forwarded to Minto for approval.¹⁵⁶ It was a remarkable 48-hour turnaround of fortunes.

Three factors had saved Hutton's career and reputation, and at the same time granted him his fondest wish of serving in South Africa. Foremost, the decision to send him on active service was a Colonial Office effort to avoid the controversy of a recall. Chamberlain had become all too aware of the crisis and of Minto's efforts to force the Canadian government into a public position rather than facilitate a quiet recall. By the time Minto signed the Order-in-Council for Hutton's recall, therefore, Chamberlain had hit on his own solution. It was not so much that the Colonial Secretary agreed with the Canadian government's position as much as he had an understandable sensitivity to preserve London's relationship with Ottawa. Without Minto's determination to support his friend and to "make a stand," on principle, Hutton would have been quietly recalled. The other two key considerations were the persistent influence of Hutton's War Office friends and Minto's consistently strongly worded communications home praising the GOC's achievements while denigrating the actions of his government. See "Whatever small mistakes he may have made here," Minto assured Chamberlain, for example, "his great energy and ability under difficult circumstances deserve recognition.

Hutton's considerable ego, however, and his resentment towards the Laurier government, prevented him from quietly thanking his good fortune and sailing for South Africa. The problem was that he worried the press and public in Canada would assume he was leaving *only* for active service, with no knowledge of the government's "conspiracy" against him. Hutton therefore used two banquets given in his honour—at the Rideau Club in Ottawa on 13 February and another given by Ottawa District Troops the next evening—to provide a thinly veiled account of his view of the Canadian political situation and the issues between him and the government. More, and unnecessary, offence was caused to the government when the speeches were reported upon in the press. He Military Gazette responded, for example, with a claim that Hutton was forced out because he was a "standing menace and a continual source of discomfiture to the wire pullers and managers who manipulate the militia" and because of his role in "making a Canadian contingent to South Africa an accomplished fact." 162

Hutton's actual departure from Canada belied the circumstances of his leaving. He and Eleanor left Ottawa in a special carriage decked with flowers on 15 February. The Ottawa Citizen reported a crowd of 2,500 to see him off. "All ranks and classes were there," it noted, "including many women who formed part of the Soldiers' Wives league [who] presented Mrs. Hutton with two bouquets." The 43rd Battalion provided an escort accompanied by a regimental band. At 1600 hours, a militia artillery detachment provided a final salute, signifying the end of Hutton's time in Canada. Though he later reflected fondly upon his departure, Hutton never forgave those he thought responsible for his removal. "I have the deepest and most profound contempt for the present Canadian Government," he later wrote, "and have the worst opinion of their integrity and honour." No man of independent value or of any manly individuality as a soldier," he spat to Minto, "would ever consent to accept the position of G.O.C. as it exists at present in Canada." 167

Meanwhile, Hutton's departure and his "valedictory" speeches caused much less public outcry than Laurier had feared, as the war had tarnished British military reputations and Hutton's various other quarrels had by this stage cost him a large measure of his popularity. Hutton's words did, however, ensure that the Laurier government gave official and public voice to its own grievances after he had departed. Laurier told the House that the GOC had been recalled for being consistently "insubordinate and indiscreet, and [having] deliberately ignored the authority of the minister. For his part, Borden reflected that "since the time of Alexander I doubt if a more ambitious and unscrupulous warrior ever lived. He was always playing to the galleries, always thinking about the possible effect of any move upon his own name and fame. It was Hutton first and the devil take whoever came afterwards. The trauma had cut both ways. It was not by coincidence that, after Hutton's departure, the *Canadian Militia Act* was soon revised to allow for command of the Militia to go to a Canadian. None were appointed, however, as shortly afterwards the position of GOC was replaced with a Militia Council under which the powers of the Minister were made clearer and many command ambiguities removed.

So what can be said of Canada's path to war, Hutton's role within it, and the wider issue of imperial defence? It is clear that, following the disappointment of the Colonial Conference of 1897, where Chamberlain had tried unsuccessfully to interest the self-governing colonies in cooperative defence arrangements, he nonetheless continued to hope for and work towards a closer unity across the "white" empire. That imperative continued throughout Hutton's tenure in Canada and, for the Colonial Secretary, the worsening situation in South Africa seemed to offer an opportunity.¹⁷² Following the breakdown of the Bloemfontein Conference on 9 June 1899, for example, Chamberlain drafted (but never sent) a note to Minto suggesting that, in the event of war, "the colonies should join with the mother country in a show of imperial loyalty." Three weeks later, he renewed the suggestion in a secret communication explaining that he felt the mounting crisis was an "opportunity of showing the solidarity of the Empire." ¹⁷⁴ When Chamberlain asked Minto if an offer of troops was "probable," he noted: "I do not desire that it should be the result of external pressure or suggestion," as that would defeat the purpose of creating an appearance of imperial unity with which to help coerce the Boers. 175 The object here was not to build any form of imperial defence arrangement per se. The point was not to secure the services of colonial troops, but rather to garner official colonial support. The small numbers suggested by Wolseley for the initial contingents—sufficient to achieve symbolic value and small enough not to cost too much—were further evidence of that.

Yet there never was any secret accord between the three men. They certainly shared a wish to see Canadians in South Africa, but in that they were hardly alone. Hutton's attempts to explain and justify his actions to Chamberlain in October would hardly have been necessary if he was simply following instructions. The closest Hutton ever came to conspiracy was telling Wolseley in August of the plan he had developed on Minto's suggestion for such a contingent, should it be approved by the Canadian government. He received nothing in reply. It should be noted that that "secret" plan, initially drafted without Borden's knowledge, certainly had his blessing from September. Hutton is far less "guilty" here than many of his fellow commandants, such as George Arthur French (in New South Wales) and Joseph Maria Gordon (in South



Canadian soldiers return from South Africa, Ottawa, 1901

Australia), who actively, openly, and unashamedly tried to shape their governments into committing troops, publically as well as privately, and who corresponded directly to the War Office concerning the issue to a far greater extent than Hutton ever did.¹⁷⁸

Complicating the issue, however, were Hutton's own self-delusions regarding his role in bringing Canada into the war. In March 1900, after returning to England, he boasted to Lord Lansdowne that it was because of his influence "that the French Canadian element in the Cabinet was over-ridden and troops sent." Hutton later reflected to Minto: "As years pass we shall both of us (you and I) more clearly realize the importance of our successful action in indirectly forcing the weak-kneed and vacillating Laurier Government with their ill-disguised French and pro-Boer proclivities to take part." Hutton's correspondence to all and sundry crediting himself and Minto with forcing the Laurier government to war continued for the rest of his life. [81]

Hutton's personal role and influence in bringing Canada into the war was, in reality, much less than either he, or many of his subsequent critics, would have it. Hutton blatantly and consistently misunderstood Minto's position, and his own influence, while underestimating the role of other key figures and forces. ¹⁸² In the end, the decision to send troops was a reluctant, politically motivated capitulation by the government to the strident demands of Canada's pro-war advocates—the overwhelming majority position by 13 October—measured against the risk of domestic disharmony and a mounting state of British expectancy. ¹⁸³ Hutton's touring and public speaking played some part in stirring militia and public feelings towards the imperial cause, but that was but one voice within a much wider chorus of support for the war that engulfed Canada in the autumn of 1899. ¹⁸⁴ Hutton was a tiny player and was by no means a prime mover of the spirit of imperialism in Canada at the time. That was the same spirit that animated pro-war movements across the self-governing colonies; in the words of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, as his first contingent sailed: "for one flag, one Queen, one tongue, and for one country—Britain." ¹⁸⁵

Importantly for Hutton, during the voyage back to Britain, his misinterpretation of his role in bringing Canada to war began to merge with thoughts regarding the wider cooperative defence of the empire. Somehow his helping to "force" Canada to war, Hutton concluded, was in itself an important step in successful implementation of this grand idea. "The Canadian public had gradually been led up to accept as a matter of course the principles thus indicated," he later wrote, "which, inferentially understood, meant a share in the defence of the Empire." The subsequent conduct of the war was thus, for him, "more pregnant of great results than any event in the last half century." That was especially so as Hutton remained, like many of his contemporaries, convinced that this conflict was itself only a prelude to the far greater European struggle.

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ORGANIZING CANADA'S INFANTRY

Major Cole Petersen, CD

With the end of Canada's 12-year mission in Afghanistan, the infantry has again proven its role as the foundation on which the Canadian Armed Forces builds ground combat power. Throughout the mission, the infantry was able to adapt to and overcome challenges in numerous different settings, from framework security patrolling, to mentoring and training Afghan security forces, to combat operations against insurgents. In all such instances, the infantry met the challenge and proved that Canada still produces some of the best infantry soldiers in the world.

Despite this, the Infantry Corps seems to be entering another crisis of identity—not necessarily a new crisis, but rather one that has continued to various degrees since the late 1990s with the introduction of the LAV III and the creation of the light battalions. In recent times, the question of how to organize the infantry unfolded with *Force 2013*, which introduced new equipment in the Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) and the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) and created four variants of companies intermixed within the nine existing battalions. Establishment shortfalls resulted in vacant positions down to the section level to be filled by reservists, and what was produced was the *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion. Today's battalions are based on this *Force 2013* model but, with vehicle projects cancelled or significantly delayed, renewed discussions of battalion symmetry have recently arisen. All the while, current practice and policy and extant doctrine have drifted apart, with battalion and company manuals decades out of date and, in some cases, still labelled "interim."

The lack of current, relevant and overarching doctrine and the mercurial nature of Army and corps organizational proposals have led to an incoherent situation for today's infantry. At the coal face, infantry battalions continue to train world-class ground fighters, but after *Force 2013*'s organizations failed to develop due to the cancellation of equipment programs, there has been trepidation and uncertainty within the units over what tomorrow's roles and tasks will be. This is in direct contrast to our allies, who over the past few years have all been able to carry out thorough appreciations of the role of the infantry within their armies, definitively frame organizational tasks and principles for their battalions and publish capstone documents and execute the plan, all while in contact with the enemy.¹

This article will analyze how and why we organize the infantry. In light of *Force 2016*, the Army's next organizational review, this article will review the current *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion and propose recommendations for a better battalion organization for force generation and force employment purposes, while still addressing the very real resource constraints that face the Army today.

TODAY'S INFANTRY AND TODAY'S REQUIREMENTS

The foundations for the Canadian Army's current infantry doctrine and organizations are varied and scattered. The aging B-GL-309-001, *The Infantry Battalion in Battle* (published in 1995), until replaced, is the official published source for battalion organization and employment, but the manual is problematic in that it describes only mechanized battalions

based on older equipment. The infantry sub-unit is only partially covered by B-GL-321-007, *LAV Company Tactics (Interim)* (2003), a manual intended as an interim tactical introduction to the LAV III (the final version discussed in this manual has yet to materialize 12 years later) and does not cover tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for light infantry companies. The new B-GL-309-003, *The Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations* (2013) provides details on platoon and section employment while briefly summarizing the battalion and company.

Alongside this doctrine is the Army's field force review initiative, *Force 2013*. Issued in 2010 and 2011, this series of policy documents and presentations was a comprehensive revision of the Army's force structures for both generation (training) and employment (operations) under the aegis of the Managed Readiness Plan. With respect to the infantry, *Force 2013* stipulated interim establishments for six mechanized infantry battalions and three light infantry battalions, each of three rifle companies, a combat support company and an administration company. These battalions, regardless of role (mechanized or light) are symmetrical in manning in both generation and employment, with the difference between the two simply being the nature of the vehicle (if any) that their rifle companies are equipped with. The structures, created in 2011, were described as interim until the implications of new vehicle projects, the CCV and the TAPV, on doctrine and establishments were determined.²

The mechanized infantry battalions, with companies equipped with a mix of LAVs and the now-defunct CCV, are established at 833 personnel all ranks for employment, with many of these positions filled through out-of-unit and reserve augmentation for operational purposes only, leaving the force generation strength for garrison training of these battalions set at 593. The light battalions possess one additional soldier (a parachute rigger) for 834 personnel all ranks for employment, but are reduced to 560 personnel in garrison for training purposes. (Originally also at 593 personnel, the three light battalions lost a rifle platoon's worth of positions each to provide positions for other Army initiatives.)

The *Force 2013* rifle company, established at 176 personnel for operations and 138 for training, consists of large headquarters (with a company operations cell and company weapons detachment) and a complete echelon with supply, maintenance, medical and messing elements. The company possesses three 40-soldier platoons, each possessing a headquarters, a weapons detachment (consisting of four soldiers for a mechanized company and seven for a light company) and three 10-person rifle sections. This structure, based on the mechanized platoon, is the same for any variant of the rifle company, whether equipped with LAV, CCV, TAPV or in the light role. This organizational concept was deliberately established to simplify any rerolling for operations and is reflected in doctrine in *The Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations*.

Regardless of role, all battalion combat support companies and administration companies are organized in the same way. The combat support company, with a reconnaissance (recce) platoon, a sniper group and a signals platoon, is established at 86 personnel all ranks in garrison with augmentation bringing up strength to 122 for operations. The administration company, with supply, transport and maintenance platoons, is allocated 62 personnel in garrison and augmented to 92 for operations (the lower establishment is due to the large rifle

company echelons). Command of the battalion is exercised through the battalion headquarters, which contains the traditional operations/training, intelligence, personnel and tactical command posts and is established at 40 personnel in garrison but sees augmentation to an astounding 91 personnel for operations.

There is obvious dissonance between the varied published doctrinal organizations and the Force 2013 interim organizations. As well, current structures have some glaring issues with implications for the battalion in training and operations. This creates questions that need to be asked, analyzed and addressed. First and foremost, the Force 2013 interim infantry battalion is a shadow of its predecessors in terms of organic capability; not since 1914 has a Canadian infantry battalion possessed so few complementary weapon systems. With the elimination of combat support organizations and the divestment of equipment like the 60-mm mortar and the Eryx, the current infantry battalion is largely limited to small arms to achieve its mission. The C6 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) and the heavy C16 Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) are the only available crew-served direct-fire systems, while anti-armour defence is limited to the 84-mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifle. The complete lack of any indirect fire systems and modern ATGMs means that the infantry battalion is limited in the battlefield lethal and non-lethal effects it can produce and critically vulnerable to armoured vehicles. The infantry, by its very nature, operates on foot, and, while various forms of lift can be integral to getting the infantry to its objective, it is not dependent upon these vehicles to achieve its core tasks. Thus, the LAV-mounted M242 Bushmaster, an exceptional weapon, must not be relied upon by the infantry as its dominant source of firepower.

The first issue is that the modern battalion is extremely limited in terms of integral capabilities and must be heavily augmented to avoid being a battlefield liability. The infantry battalion, as the foundation for land power, needs to be viewed as a complete system able to achieve its primary tasks. Other arms and services approach organizations this way; for example, the artillery regiment and battery are systems built on control stations, firing systems, and observers to produce indirect fires on the battlefield. The infantry battalion is a system required to produce manoeuvre at each echelon of command, and if it is heavily or completely dependent upon other units or organizations to achieve this, then there are organizational flaws. Battle grouping is a well-proven measure to produce combined arms manoeuvre elements, but these are doctrinally expressed as ad hoc and temporary in nature and should not be viewed as a primary requirement to enable the infantry to conduct manoeuvre. It would be foolish to break up the integral components of an artillery regiment due to perceived redundancies in the Army. Likewise, the infantry must be able to achieve its core tasks without complete dependence on enablers that can be limited by terrain, weather or higher-priority demands.

The second issue is providing vehicle crew. The *Force 2013* interim infantry battalions have assigned a total of 846 soldiers to crew the 47 LAVs for the six mechanized infantry battalions. The TAPV, yet to be fielded but with a planned 50 vehicles for each light battalion (with some additional platforms for all recce platoons), will only exacerbate the existing crew-to-dismount ratio issue as it will require an additional 348 (with only driver and gunner) or 522 (if a crew commander is required) crew members. This means that the *Force 2013* interim infantry

battalions, manned to 5,238 positions, would be committing up to 1,386 infantry soldiers to crewing vehicles. With up to 26% of the Corps' F echelon focused on crewing a vehicle, we lose the soldiers required to fight on foot—the corps raison d'être—and the infantry risks becoming Canada's second-best armoured corps.

A final issue is the force-generation training strength and the concept of reserve affiliation and integration. The *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion plans for significant augmentation by reservists to fill out the organization. Although there are merits in the concept of leveraging the manpower available in the Primary Reserve (the British Army makes extensive use of reserves in *Army 2020*), the method that *Force 2013* uses to do so is extremely inefficient and disruptive. Designating reserve positions throughout the battalion, down to the section level where two of 10 positions are to be filled by reservists, creates holes everywhere. Not only does this make it nearly impossible to train cohesive infantry organizations unless the reservists are present but, in addition, reserve augmentation has been curtailed in the absence of a mission, meaning that, for all intents and purposes, the positions are vacant. Better approaches to regular/reserve integration are required in order to optimize the benefits of using reservists to augment infantry battalion strength.

What follows below is a proposal to replace the *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion with a more complete organization designed to address the above-mentioned issues. Historically, the organization of the infantry battalion has been driven by the tactical requirements of the time. The battalion fundamentally changed in 1913 and again in 1917 to accommodate the challenges of trench warfare, in 1936 for mobile warfare and in 1964 for the atomic, highly mechanized conflict anticipated during the Cold War. What operational requirements drive the organizational requirements of the modern infantry battalion?

First, while all Army corps and branches must be capable of conducting offensive, defensive, enabling and stability operations across the spectrum of conflict, the infantry alone, due to its role of closing with and destroying the enemy and its ability to engage local populations and take and hold terrain, has the unique requirement of generating manoeuvre at each echelon of command. To achieve its primary role (and enable or be enabled by the other branches and corps), the infantry must disperse or concentrate its components based on the nature of the terrain, the enemy, and the mission, and these components must be able to generate fire and movement to manoeuvre to a position of advantage, creating suppression, neutralization and destruction of the enemy.⁴ To be effective, the infantry battalion as a system must be able to independently generate this manoeuvre; it must be capable of working with other arms and services to produce the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms manoeuvre but, at the same time, it cannot be entirely dependent on others to achieve its most basic task. This is driven by the fact that conditions such as prioritization of tasks, terrain, weather or logistical support may limit the availability of other elements. If required, the infantry must be able to move about and conduct its tasks independently, utilizing organic capabilities at each level of the battalion's organization to enable sub-unit and unit manoeuvre. Even in proposed future operating proposals, the concept of integral capability to generate manoeuvre will continue to be critical to the infantry as long as its fundamental battlefield role endures.

Flexibility in achieving its mission is a second critical organizational factor for the infantry. The infantry achieves its primary goal of closing with and destroying the enemy on its feet, which implies that it must be organized to get onto its objectives through the most appropriate means possible. This flexibility of insertion must not be a trait unique to light battalions, but rather a general characteristic of the infantry. The infantry must be supported by vehicles, not defined by them, and doctrine and organization cannot view vehicle-enabled manoeuvre as the baseline for mission success. The infantry achieves its flexibility through arming the man, not manning the arms.

Finally, the modern infantry battalion must be inherently deployable. Deployability comes from having highly trained, cohesive teams in peacetime, minimal movement requirements in terms of stores and vehicles, and small logistical footprints in theatre to reduce sustainment requirements. In the dynamic environments where today's infantry battalions can be expected to deploy, there may not be forward bases to stage into or operate from. Being able to pick up and move gives the infantry battalion strategic currency. This also relates back to the factor of independent effectiveness. The nature of the mission may preclude the deployment of heavier and/or costlier supporting assets. Deployability also implies peacetime structures requiring minimal augmentation or reorganization for deployment, reducing costly work-up and preparation time.

THE SECTION

Our discussion on the best way to organize today's infantry must start with the section. Often viewed as the building block of the infantry battalion, the section has, since its modern creation, been a small grouping of soldiers commanded by an NCO (corporal or sergeant). Historically, in the First World War, sections were specialist organizations organized around specific weapons and designed for trench warfare. Change occurred in the interwar period: a section became a symmetrical 10-person organization with an assault group and a support group built around two Bren guns. Although the section remained at 10 soldiers throughout the Cold War, with mechanization came the loss of two dismounts to crew the M113, and later three to crew the LAV, leaving eight and then seven effective ground fighters. With the introduction of the C7/C9 family of small arms, the section gradually moved away from the concept of support and assault groups and toward two mutually supporting assault groups (presumably supported by the weapons in the vehicle).

Is this the best way to organize the section (or squad in U.S. parlance)? How many soldiers are required to enable the section to optimally conduct fire, movement and other battlefield tasks? The importance of numbers is related to two factors: controllability and resilience. The U.S. Army, in the decades between the Second World War and the Vietnam War, conducted and published numerous significant studies on the infantry squad to determine an optimal organization. A consistent finding was that if the squad was too small, it would be unable to withstand battlefield casualties (20%–30% was viewed as the norm) but if it was too large, it would be too much for one leader to handle effectively (three to five was seen as optimal, but up to eight was feasible, especially with an assistant). One of the most significant studies, the 1946 Infantry Conference, whose panels featured much of the highly experienced leadership of the Second World War, determined that a nine-person squad (with an assistant) offered the optimal balance.⁵



The answer to this question of numbers is that the number of soldiers does not matter, provided the section is controllable and can handle casualties. Sections (squads) have ranged from eight (U.K.) to nine (U.S. Army) to 10 (Canadian Army) to 13 (U.S. Marines). The Australians have a modular view of the section which puts it between 8 and 12 (more on this below). There is no specific tactical or doctrinal reason for the Canadian Army to settle on 10-person sections, as other combinations and sizes have shown to be equally resilient on the battlefield; rather, it was decided based on the uncritical assertion that it was simply "the way things have been done." Analyst William F. Owen points out that "modern infantry organizations are essentially arbitrary, and underpinned with a rationale that supports the status quo" and that modern infantry organizations are "more shaped by cost, career, and manpower issues, [leading to a debate] between soldier and accountant..."



What is critical is flexibility and adaptability to battlefield conditions and tasks. Some studies indicated that the section on the offence was only capable of generating fire or movement, not fire and movement for independent manoeuvre. But infantry rifle sections have numerous tasks aside from assaulting enemy positions, and formalized sub-section groupings remain useful for other tasks such as defensive action (where two- to four-man positions are the norm) and patrolling. As well, these sub-section groupings can assist the platoon commander in task-organizing the platoon for specific mission requirements. The Australian Army has recognized this and has made the four-soldier fire team the "basic building block of the company," enshrining it as the fundamental tactical element in their current infantry doctrine. This is a longstanding organizational principle in the U.S. military, where squads are built around two (U.S. Army) or three (U.S. Marines) fire teams of four.

Objective evidence supports the concept of modular flexibility. A series of documented British Army trials, known as Exercise SEA WALL, broke down the span of control of the section commander and focused on four-soldier elements. Although more radical in essentially removing section-level command, the experiment highlighted the value of reducing low-level command-and-control demands and the increased flexibility of small teams. The SEA WALL platoons and companies, using four-soldier fire teams, benefited greatly from improved battle command in the midst of simulated battle. While in the offence, attacking fire teams and platoons moved 77% faster, spent 43% less time being engaged by the enemy, suffered 26% fewer casualties and were 2.5 times more likely to bypass enemy positions to strike from the rear.¹⁰




Figure 1: Rifle section and fire teams

In light of all the studies and variations, and understanding that casualties will generally mean a swift deviation from the doctrinal norm, this article must settle on a proposal. The four-soldier assault group should be re-termed in doctrine as the fire team and enshrined as the basic building block of the infantry. As mentioned, this is not a new tactical concept in infantry doctrine; rather, it puts more formal, additional emphasis on the independent nature of sub-section groupings to support flexibility for task organization. As in the Australian Army, the section would become a modular organization of two to four fire teams, led by an

experienced NCO, and teams could be added if the nature of the mission requires them. ¹¹ Two fire teams will constitute a rifle section. Led by a sergeant, with the second fire team commanded by a master corporal, the eight-soldier rifle section will be the universal rifle section for the corps, regardless of role, as the eight-man section offers the best compromise between economy and sustainability. With two fire teams, the section is in the "sweet spot": large enough to handle casualties but not so large as to be difficult to control, while giving it some flexibility for modular tasking by the section commander or platoon commander.

The rifle section will be equipped with individual small arms to generate fire and movement or to patrol as part of higher-level offensive, defensive, enabling and stability operations. This small arms mix should continue to include the C7/C8 rifle and the M203 underslung grenade launcher (UGL) to produce a good mix of individual direct fire. For section suppressive effects, the C9 light machine gun (LMG) should be re-evaluated, as operational trials have indicated that employment of a machine gun by an individual provides poor suppressive fires while creating greater weight load requirements, perhaps through replacement of two C9s by a single C6. As well, higher rates of high explosive (HE) fire may provide better effect for the rifle section, and an ideal system may be a grenade launcher similar to the M32 multiple grenade launcher (MGL) adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps or an updated M79 grenade launcher, which has gained popularity over the last decade.¹²

THE PLATOON AND COMPANY

With rifle sections of two fire teams as the base for creating fire and movement across the battlefield, it is the platoon and company that add the effects of crew-served weapons to provide the infantry with sustained suppressive fires and killing effects, combining with the fire and movement of the rifle sections to produce manoeuvre. Current organizations for the Force 2013 interim infantry battalion standardize the platoon and company regardless of role or equipment, using the LAV-equipped mechanized organization as the template. Crew-served weapons are found in platoon and company weapons detachments.

Organization of the platoon and company, like that of the fire team and rifle section, should be based on considerations for optimizing their employment. On offensive operations, platoons and companies are capable of conducting independent manoeuvre for a limited duration. The likelihood of the enemy leaving small elements out, isolated and unsupported, to be defeated in detail is unlikely and therefore it can be safely assumed that most offensive operations occur in the context of company or larger operations. Both the platoon and company are capable of defensive operations of limited duration, generally in the form of strongpoints (either man-made or natural).

To enable manoeuvre, platoon and company commanders must be able to provide immediate sustained direct fires and plunging or indirect fires to enable the movement of the rifle sections, creating tactical dilemmas for opposing forces. The C6 GPMG provides suitable direct fires in all operations, while the C16 GMG can augment these fires in defensive operations only due to its lack of portability unless mounted on a vehicle. The mission-dependent 84-mm Carl Gustav can also augment these fires with HE support, although investment in a tripod and sight should be made to increase the effective distance. The glaring deficiency is the ability

to producing plunging or indirect fires, which not only means a lack of lethal indirect fires to complement sustained direct fires, but also an inability to blind or screen the enemy to movement or augment night fighting capabilities through illumination. The divestment of the 60-mm mortar stripped this vital capability away, one the C16 GMG is unable to make up for. The requirement exists for a man-portable, lightweight indirect fire system for small infantry units, and procurement of a new system should be made a priority requirement.

The employment of crew-served weapons to enable manoeuvre is a fundamental factor in platoon and company organization. Crew-served weapons should be concentrated in a company weapons platoon. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the delivery of crew-served weapons effects is most effective when fires are massed; the current concept of weapons detachments generally means singular (and thus less effective) employment. Second, we have determined that the likely scenario for offensive and defensive operations is in a company context where such systems will need to be massed to either enable the platoons to manoeuvre onto the objective or to hold terrain. In the event of independent platoon operations, crew-served weapon fire teams can be detached to platoons and sections as required. Lastly, consolidation of these weapons under a single commander allows for optimum training on their employment.

If crew-served weapons are to be concentrated in a weapons platoon, then the organization of a rifle platoon is straightforward, consisting of three rifle sections and a platoon headquarters with commander, 2IC, signaller and runner (who adds versatility to the platoon HQ through acting as security for the HQ, as a signaller to the 2IC or as a platoon designated marksman). Aside from the small arms mentioned for the section and fire team organization, the platoon should have a small "arms room" of a C6 GPMG and an 84-mm Carl Gustav available for the platoon commander to assign to the sections based upon mission requirements. This organization suits a transition to a doctrinal patrolling organization with sections assigned as security, support and assault elements.




Figure 2: Rifle platoon organization

The weapons platoon must be able to deliver both direct and indirect sustained fires for the company. Direct fire is best delivered through the medium machine gun, the C6 GPMG. In the weapons platoon is an MG section consisting of three fire teams under the command of a sergeant. Each fire team possesses the manpower to carry the gun, the tripod and sufficient ammunition for full employment of the GPMG. As well, MG fire teams can be assigned a C16 to augment firepower for static, generally defensive, tasks. Along with an MG section, a mortar section of three fire teams under the command of a sergeant should also be established and, like the MG section, each fire team should operate a single lightweight mortar with its ancillary equipment and ammunition. The weapons platoon has a small headquarters with a commander, a 2IC, a signaller and a runner; in counter-insurgency or peace support operations this headquarters can receive additional training to assume the vital role of a company operations and intelligence centre.




Figure 3: Weapons platoon

The company headquarters, consisting of the OC's tactical CP, the 2IC's command post, and the CQMS and transport detachments, produce a rifle company of 128 personnel all ranks.

THE BATTALION

Thus far, our examination has reemphasized flexibility within the rifle section while enhancing the ability of the platoon and company to manoeuvre through consolidation of crew-served weapons into a weapons platoon. We now move to the battalion. The infantry battalion continues to serve as the basic currency of ground power due to its supporting and sustaining elements and planning and administrative staff. To accomplish this, the battalion must be able




Figure 4: Rifle company

to find, fix and strike battalion objectives using its organic resources. The battalion's organic element to facilitate the find function is the reconnaissance (recce) platoon, which contains a headquarters, recce sections and the sniper group. The battalion is a large and robust organization: both the recce and sniper elements have grown over the last 20 years. The most current doctrinal source, B-GL-394-002, *Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance*, establishes infantry recce platoons at four recce sections of eight and two sniper sections of eight. Combined with a headquarters and the two warrant officers with stores, this organization is large at 61 personnel.

Is this doctrinal recce platoon fit for the purpose? The four-soldier fire team, called a patrol or detachment in recce/sniper parlance, is entirely suitable in allowing for sustainable missions forward of friendly forces able to conduct adequate security and rest, something impossible with two and difficult with three. However, the large recce platoon may be a case of too much of a good thing. Generally composed of the top soldiers (with snipers drawn from the best of the recce patrolmen), the recce platoon draws personnel for highly skilled positions, creating a large demand on the companies to provide soldiers and the requirement to run numerous courses to sustain enough through-put to properly man recce organizations.¹⁴

What may be optimal is a small reduction in the number of snipers and patrolmen in the battalion to a more sustainable figure. Moving to a single section of three four-person sniper teams (detachments) for a total of 12 snipers still provides the CO with excellent capability.




Figure 5: Reconnaissance platoon

Likewise, the recce platoon should transition from four sections of two teams (detachments) to two sections of three teams (detachments), reducing the patrolman requirement, streamlining accession within the platoon and improving the ratio of master corporals to sergeants. When combined with the headquarters, this results in a recce platoon of 46 personnel, far more achievable with the pool of soldiers to draw from while still perfectly suitable in providing the CO with an ability to find the enemy. Light utility vehicles should be provided to give the detachments enhanced mobility if required.

While the recce platoon provides the CO with an excellent ability to execute the find function, the cupboard is bereft of any organic assets to fix the enemy. As already mentioned, the decision to disband the mortar, pioneer and anti-armour platoons and divest these capabilities to other arms was a significant loss for the infantry. There was no doctrinal reason to eliminate these capabilities from the CO's tool belt; rather, they were discarded by the accountants, cut after what many viewed as a faulty understanding of complementary versus redundant capability. In retrospect, considering the value that these combat support capabilities offered as "force multipliers," it would have been wiser to assuage the accountant's axe by cutting away more basic elements of the battalion, while preserving specialist skill sets. As a consequence, today the commander of a *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion faces an even starker scenario than the battalion's company commanders, as the CO simply owns nothing that he or she can use to support the companies. The lack of organic direct and indirect fire elements at the

battalion level means that the CO is entirely dependent upon attached enablers to provide the support to the companies and is completely dependent upon outside organizations to do his or her job. This does not set a modern infantry battalion up for success.

Sustained direct fire is required to assist in the suppression, neutralization or destruction of enemy positions and to defeat enemy armoured vehicles. Currently, the CO possesses a single organic system in the C16 GMG, limited by the relatively small destructive power of the 40-mm grenade, and no organization formed, manned and equipped to employ it. The 120-mm cannon of the Leopard 2 is a very capable system, but tanks may be required in other areas or may be undeployable due to the theatre. Relying upon a GMG as the sole asset to deal with hardened positions and armoured vehicles puts Canadian infantry battalions at great risk.

A direct fire support (DFS) platoon needs to be established to provide the CO with organic heavy weapons capable of providing direct fires with attendant breaching, anti-armour and anti-personnel effects in the 1,000-metre to 2,000-metre zone. Such organizations are deemed essential and exist in U.S., British and Australian infantry battalions. To provide this capability, the DFS platoon needs to employ a mix of systems to defeat any ground-based threat to the rifle companies. For direct fire, a heavy machine gun (for example, the M2A1 50-cal HMG) serves as a useful baseline weapon system due to its ability to put sustained fire out to an effective range of 1,800 metres. The DFS platoon would also become the primary employment organization for the C16 GMG already issued to battalions.

The most critical requirement is for a modern anti-armour system in the form of an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). With the divestment of the TOW system, the Canadian infantry is unable to repel any form of modern armoured vehicle. As recent fighting around the world in places like Somalia and Syria/Iraq has demonstrated, even irregular opponents can seize and operate MBTs. The lack of a modern ATGM, such as the Javelin, is a glaring vulnerability for our infantry and, along with a lightweight mortar, should become a priority procurement project for concentration in infantry battalion DFS platoons. This would also reduce a significant demand on the armoured corps, possessing in essence the Army's only anti-armour capability with the Leopard 2 MBT, to provide tanks for employment as pillboxes to protect the infantry. One characteristic of all of these weapon systems is that they can be fired from a vehicle or from a ground mount. The HMG and GMG are only man-portable for very short distances, but the ability to dismount them for movement to a nearby fire position is useful. The DFS platoon would be mounted in a light vehicle and trailer, enabling its sections to manoeuvre into a fire position to employ its systems in either the vehicle-mounted or ground-mounted role.

An optimal DFS platoon would have three DFS sections of 12 soldiers in three fire teams, each fire team mounted in a light utility vehicle. Each DFS section would possess two HMGs and one GMG, and each fire team would also possess an ATGM guidance post and missiles to employ against enemy armour or hardened targets. Combined with a small platoon headquarters with a command vehicle and the platoon 2IC with an echelon primarily for ammo resupply, the platoon would total 44 soldiers, 10 light utility vehicles and two trucks. The DFS

platoon could be employed by the CO as a concentrated platoon to mass direct fires on targets to support the battalion's main effort, or sections could be assigned to companies, pushing enhanced direct fire capability down to the company commanders to support their manoeuvre.




Figure 6: Direct fire support platoon

Indirect fire for the battalion is usually a mix of cannon and mortar fire. Since the elimination of the mortar platoons, all indirect fires have been the responsibility of the artillery regiments, with the 81-mm medium mortars being moved to these units. However, due to their own manning issues and the imperative to man the sterling M777, the mortars are only manned as an alternative to the howitzer. Due to the either/or employment concept of medium mortars in the artillery regiments and the primacy of the howitzer, the medium mortar is effectively lost as a capability to the Army. There is no ability to mass mortar and cannon fires, as the employment of mortars means the howitzers are offline. This either/or concept also means that the siting of the howitzers will take priority and that the fire position will likely not be in a location for optimal mortar employment. Finally, like the company commander, the infantry CO is denied the ability to utilize the non-lethal effects of smoke and illumination, forcing the artillery to provide these in situations even when use of M777 munitions may overmatch the mission requirements. Although there were numerous factors in moving the capability to the artillery, none were militarily sound, and anecdotal evidence this author has seen suggests that many members of both the infantry and the artillery would be happy to see the medium mortar returned to the infantry.

There is a critical requirement for organic, mobile indirect fires responsive to the CO, freeing him or her from the circumstances and demands on supporting artillery organizations and providing guaranteed independent fire support so that the CO may influence the battlespace. The imperative must be to re-establish the mortar capability in the infantry battalions with the stand-up of battalion mortar platoons. The fact that we are unique among our ABCA allies in our lack of infantry mortar platoons should cause us to question the soundness of discarding this capability.




Figure 7: Mortar platoon

The re-establishment of the mortar platoon would give the CO the ability to support the companies with heavier indirect fires than those provided by the light, integral company mortars discussed earlier. As well, the command and control ability of the mortar platoon allows the establishment of a permanent FSCC within the battalion headquarters, enhancing the HQ's understanding and ability to coordinate fires. The advantage that a mortar platoon brings is evident: organic mortars are on call, they require less coordination due to proximity to the tactical situation, and they free up the higher supporting artillery to mass at the critical time and place, which may or may not be in the CO's area of operations.

A balanced mortar platoon would operate six tubes, with each tube manned by a fire team contained within two mortar sections of 12 soldiers each. In addition, there would be two three-soldier mortar fire control teams, the platoon 2IC leading the recce element, a small

ammunition echelon and the platoon headquarters, for an establishment of 42 soldiers. The mortar platoon can be equipped with the L16 81-mm medium mortars that the infantry handed to the artillery corps a decade ago, but a worthwhile project would be to replace these aging tubes with an updated system, with the reduced-weight M252A1 medium mortar as an ideal candidate.

With the DFS and mortar platoons, the battalion can fix opposing forces. The battalion executes the strike function with its rifle companies; in the offence, they manoeuvre onto the enemy to take and hold ground, but in the defence they are the anvil that the enemy breaks itself upon, while also capable of providing a counter-attack force to sweep the enemy off the position. If, based on the proposals above, the infantry battalion possesses the organic ability to find and fix the enemy with its combat support platoons and attached/supporting enablers, then what is required for the strike? How many rifle companies does the battalion require to achieve its tasks?

Historically, in both World Wars and Korea, the infantry battalion had four companies. For a time, the brigade in Germany, when kept at full strength, had four companies in its infantry battalions. However, peacetime economy meant that with reductions in manpower, the fourth companies were the first to go and, despite outside events when fourth companies were raised for operational deployment (generally by combing out other battalions or through reservist augmentation), three-company battalions have been the norm.

Dissonance exists between published doctrine (old and new) and the *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion. Both *The Infantry Battalion in Battle and The Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations* describe four rifle companies as the establishment for an infantry battalion. The *Force 2013* interim infantry battalions are established at three while operational FE structures are mission-dependent. It appears that the Army has an inability to man four rifle companies per battalion (or no desire to reduce the number of battalions to maintain four company battalions) but still wishes to retain four as the doctrinal establishment for the battalion. However, are four companies really required? Should the Army continue to hold on to structures that it is unwilling to man? Upon review, it appears that the infantry's desire to retain four rifle companies for the battalion is simply another case of doing things because "it's the way things have been done."

Although tactical reasoning has been given as the rationale for four rifle companies (indeed, the old battalion manual states that this is the minimum number required to achieve balance), that is not the real reason. Four companies were the norm because the modern battalion's predecessor contained eight; the British Army, to assist with control in the face of open-order tactics, reduced span of control by merging the eight companies of the existing battalion into four shortly before the First World War.¹⁵ History shows that battalions can achieve their doctrinal tasks with three companies—in fact, U.S. Army and Marine infantry battalions do just this, and, since the Second World War and continuing to the present day, they have been organized with three properly supported rifle companies. With a properly constituted combat support company to find and fix the enemy, three rifle companies provide adequate elements to execute the strike function while furnishing depth/reserve elements for exploitation.

Although it may be nice for a CO to have a fourth rifle company as deep reserve, it is not an absolute requirement in order to complete assigned tasks or enable the battalion to manoeuvre. Instead of finding methods to raise fourth rifle companies, we are better off dedicating that manpower to additional battalions or enhanced support capabilities. Therefore, our doctrine should formally establish the infantry battalion at three rifle companies.

Obviously, the now-defunct pioneer platoon has been excluded from this proposal. The reason for that omission is as follows. The primary purpose of the pioneer platoon was to assist in mobility and counter-mobility, along with limited decontamination, essentially conducting basic engineering tasks to save the combat engineers for the most vital work. This proposal must take economy into account, and a formed pioneer element is simply too much for too little capability gain, given that a battalion can find, fix and strike without a pioneer platoon. This does not mean that the battalion should be without basic breaching and demolition capability; recreating pared-down basic and advanced pioneering qualifications for the infantry and building this capability within the rifle companies (perhaps at one to two soldiers per section) would help to reduce the demand for combat engineers to be penny-packeted out to the infantry to conduct basic explosive work.

Along with our analysis of the essential elements for the battalion to find, fix and strike is the requirement to determine the needs of its headquarters. Afghanistan has given us staff bloat, with majors, MWOs and supernumeraries making their way onto the battalion staff, and the *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion, with a 91-person headquarters for force employment, is a perfect example of this bloat. Objective analyses of headquarters and staff are hard to come by, but those published point to staff performance in process and productivity being related to smaller size and streamlined rank and appointment; smaller is better and the infantry battalion needs a small, well-run headquarters.¹⁶

The battalion's headquarters requires an operations officer at the rank of captain. This is a suitable rank for the position and maintains the crucial Commonwealth staffing maxim that staff officers are subordinate in rank to their corresponding line commanders. Assisted by an operations WO and two pairs of lieutenants/captains and sergeants, these six officers and senior NCMs, with three soldiers as operations clerks for routine command post assistance and a battalion intelligence cell, provide sufficient oversight for 24-hour operations and planning both in garrison and on operations, all supported by the battalion's signal platoon. Additional tactical requirements (ISTAR, liaison, etc) can be filled by the OC, 2IC and CSM of the combat support company, who have no established tactical role.

Aside from the FSCC provided by the mortar platoon headquarters, the battalion command post should expect higher fires augmentation to the FSCC from an affiliated artillery battery, perhaps a TACP for joint air-delivered fires, and a small engineering coordination centre. The command post, like the battalion itself, must be flexible and deployable through a variety of means and cannot be fixed to any specific platform.

The final piece is the sustainment function. The infantry learned a hard lesson by moving away from its proven integral administration company model during the early days of the

Afghanistan mission.¹⁷ The current echelon model is sound and should be retained with minimal change. The administration company requires a quartermaster platoon to carry the battalion's maintenance load and interface with second-line supply organizations and a maintenance platoon to repair and recover the battalion's vehicles and equipment. The maintenance platoon can be reduced in size from the current *Force 2013* model, since non-mechanized battalions, with much more centralized maintenance, do not require robust echelons. A unit medical team attached from a field ambulance unit provides first-line medical support. Finally, the transport platoon must be a versatile organization with sections focused on cargo movement by truck, ammo and POL delivery and aerial delivery skills required to move supplies by helicopter or parachute delivery.

VEHICLES

The discussion of sustainment inevitably leads us to the discussion of the vehicle requirements of the infantry battalion. The *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion organization contained detailed assignment of B fleet support vehicles. However, these allotments were based off the MSVS-SMP and the LVM-L/H projects designed to replace the current fleet of B vehicles. These projects stalled and the current holdings were divested, severely reducing the self-sufficiency and capabilities of units across the Army.

As the specific capabilities of future B vehicle fleets are unknown, this proposal will only make recommendations based on anticipated capabilities. As the standard setting for the rifle companies is to operate on foot, they will require minimal integral vehicles. The company commander and 2IC require two small utility vehicles for command and control purposes, while the company echelons, under the quartermaster, require four trucks for transport of baggage and stores. This totals six light and medium platforms for each rifle company.

The combat support company requires self-sufficiency in transport through light utility vehicles. These enable mounted recce and the movement of medium and heavy crew-served weapons around the battlespace. The administration company is required to be self-sufficient in transport with a mix of trucks. The supply platoon requires trucks with material-handling crane (MHC) and palletized load system (PLS) capability to move bulk supplies with ease. The transport platoon requires sufficient trucks to move the F echelons of two rifle companies (224 seats) at once; when combined with company echelons, this allows the battalion to be self-sufficient for administrative movement of itself with its trucks.

Operational requirements may require mobility to patrol at extended distances beyond the manoeuvre envelopes of battalions and their sub-units. In some cases, the threat dictates that this mobility must be protected. Vehicles can provide greater mobility, protection to the soldiers, and increased firepower in terms of volume, type range and precision. They also provide onboard communication and sensory augmentation and carry additional ammunition and supplies, reducing the soldier's load. There is no denying the utility of vehicles in expanding the reach of the infantry and enabling it to get to its objective.

The *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion assigns the TAPV to some non-mechanized companies to provide protected mobility. The TAPV, based on the M1117 security vehicle, is an



STK Bronco as an infantry marginal terrain vehicle

awkward fit for infantry rifle companies. It is a large, heavy vehicle and is not designed to be fought from. As well, with seats for three crew and three passengers, it has minimal space for dismounts, resulting in a high crew-to-dismount ratio. Except for serving as an armoured bus for a small number of soldiers, it cannot be practically integrated into the companies and platoons of the infantry, as it places large demands on battalion maintenance and training and occupies too many soldiers with crew responsibilities. The Army needs to admit that requirements were poorly framed and that the TAPV should not be allocated to the infantry battalions. Rather, many of the vehicles should be assigned to other branches which could more easily integrate them into existing organizations (the MPs, or perhaps as replacements for the artillery's M113 gun line transport), with the remainder placed into a deployment pool of vehicles for use by specified forces for missions requiring protected mobility.

For operations against a capable threat, the ideal form of protected mobility is a tracked vehicle capable of operating in all environments, providing a close match to infantry foot mobility. It should provide sufficient armoured protection and carry large numbers of soldiers. The British success with the BVS-10 Viking and the STK Bronco in Afghanistan prove these to be the ideal platforms. They are half the weight of an upgraded LAV and capable of amphibious and Arctic/winter mobility and moving 10 to 14 passengers. A small number of Vikings or Broncos would provide outstanding mobility for the infantry battalions if required by the mission. An armoured carrier squadron, perhaps manned by the armoured corps, could provide a troop of 14 vehicles to move a rifle company, while a squadron of 50 could move an entire battalion. These platforms would be of special relevance to the domestic Arctic sovereignty mission, and the Army should investigate the feasibility of one to two squadrons to provide the flexibility of allowing any infantry battalion to plug into a highly mobile and protected battlefield transport organization.




Figure 9: Infantry battalion

THE INFANTRY BATTALION

Thus far, this article has proposed the manning and equipping of what should be termed the infantry battalion (IB). The IB meets the requirements established earlier of effectiveness at all levels, flexibility in employment and relative ease of deployment. It is effective across the spectrum of conflict and has self-sufficiency to conduct offensive, defensive, enabling and stability operations. It requires a low level of inter-theatre lift and logistical support. Self-sufficient in administrative road movement by truck, the IB can easily be supported by other ground or air lift, giving it wide operational reach. The IB is optimized for seizing, holding and dominating close terrain such as swamps, woodland, and hills and mountains, and the dense urban environments likely to be the operational theatres of the 21st century. A detailed table of organization and equipment for the IB is at Annex A.

THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

The glaring omission so far—a deliberate one—has been discussion of the LAV's role. This platform was a big part of the infantry's Afghanistan experience. With the new LAV-UP project producing the LAV VI currently being integrated into the mechanized battalions, it will be an important part of the infantry's arsenal for the foreseeable future. While the IB provides for an organization designed to fight through any terrain primarily on foot, what is required is the corresponding organization for a mechanized infantry battalion (MIB). A distinctly organized MIB provides the Army with an infantry component designed to work with the armoured corps to produce rapid manoeuvre through shock and speed. Accordingly, that increase in striking power means more equipment, personnel and resources to deploy abroad and incurs higher sustainment demands, with fuel potentially producing an operational tether. The MIB, generally as part of a tank-infantry team, is ideally suited for more open terrain such as deserts, plains and rolling grasslands, but has the protection and firepower to succeed in certain operations in close terrain.

The Force 2013 interim infantry battalion makes no distinction between mechanized and non-mechanized battalions in terms of section, platoon and company organization. Although valid in principle, mechanized battalions are by nature different organizations due primarily to the firepower the vehicles possess and the seating capacity available within the vehicles to transport the riflemen. The American, British and Australian models acknowledge this with organizational variation between their light role and mechanized battalions.

Of primary concern is the crewing issue. In Canadian doctrine, the LAV is integral to the section, is assigned to the section commander and is crewed by members of the section. This is the continuation of the same method of organizing the infantry with the M113. The issue is that, organized like this, the LAV automatically assumes the central role in the section; it occupies much of the section's time and, as many have lamented, detracts from the infantry's job of training to fight on foot. There are other ways of more effectively organizing the LAV into the infantry. The Australians have moved their APCs to their armoured regiments, with marry-up occurring with infantry organizations to "mech up" when required. There have also been similar proposals to do this in the Canadian Army. The other alternative is to retain the LAV as an infantry-crewed vehicle, but organize it at a level separate from the section. The U.S. Army does this with Bradley-equipped mechanized infantry companies, where the Bradley Fighting Vehicles are consolidated into a separate section under the mechanized platoon commander.

This article will propose something akin to the latter approach, creating an IFV platoon (or LAV platoon) within the mechanized rifle company that replaces the weapons platoon in a rifle company. Due to the presence of the LAV and its turret, the requirement for a weapons platoon is largely nullified (although each platoon should be allotted a light mortar for carriage in the vehicle). This approach to organization has numerous advantages. The IFV platoon centralizes all IFV command, training and maintenance under a single platoon commander and 2IC (currently, this is coordinated by the LAV captain). This also creates the condition for infantry platoons, sections and fire teams to remain universal in organization, regardless of the type of battalion, allowing training for officers and NCMs up to the platoon level to be standardized

across the corps. The LAV-equipped IFV platoon is essentially a bolt-on capability (requiring some specialization), replacing the weapons platoon, that a company commander uses to transport and support the company's platoons.




Figure 10: Mechanized rifle company

The IFV platoon contains 14 LAVs and 42 soldiers in three sections led by the platoon commander, who fulfills the LAV captain's role of commanding the vehicle component of a mechanized rifle company. The 15th LAV in current companies, used solely by the LAV captain, is eliminated as a "nice to have"; the LAV platoon commander utilizes the LAV carrying the company commander. The IFV platoon can carry the three rifle platoons through the battlespace, support them with direct fires from the 25-mm cannon, and work with the Leopard 2 in a combat team setting. While the critique may be made that a LAV does not carry a rifle section of two fire teams, four LAVs carry a 28-soldier rifle platoon. Reorganization should occur as a deliberate action upon dismount, and there is a strong case to be made that the current practice of dismounting on the objective is not a sound one for a light armoured vehicle, due to both the vulnerability of the vehicle and the additional dismounted protection requirements of extra vehicles on positions that require infantry soldiers who should be fighting into the objective. 19

Along with replacing company weapons platoons with IFV platoons, another key difference between the IB and the MIB lies with the combat support company. With three mechanized



Potential LAV-based DFS using the Cockerill 90-mm turret

rifle companies, the manoeuvre space and reach for an MIB is greater due to the increased range and effect of its weapons and sensors, with implications for the CO's combat support organizations. The mortar platoon's medium mortars can still support companies in the 2,000-metre to 4,000-metre range. The DFS platoon, with heavy direct fire support weapons, which are out-ranged by the 25-mm cannon, can only offer the mechanized battalion the proposed ATGM capability. Like the U.S. Stryker battalions, the DFS element of an MIB may be more effective with a mix of armoured vehicles. An innovative mechanized DFS organization using LAV hulls with anti-armour missile–equipped turrets and/or a large-calibre gun-system turret such as the Cockerill 90-mm turret (potentially manned by the armoured corps) is an option which should be investigated for future capabilities. As France's recent campaign in Mali demonstrated, a lighter, wheeled DFS platform—more deployable and easier to maintain than an MBT—was a very effective platform in supporting dismounted infantry forces in an expeditionary contingency.²⁰

In the interim, the MIB combat support company will be organized in the same manner but based on LAVs as opposed to light utility vehicles. More work should be done to address the combat support requirements of an MIB with longer-range integral weapon systems. The final organizational difference would be in the battalion's maintenance platoon. As opposed to the smaller maintenance requirements of the lighter IB, the MIB with mechanized rifle companies and combat support platoons requires additional RCEME soldiers. A detailed table of organization and equipment for the MIB is found below at Annex B.




Figure 12: Mechanized infantry battalion

GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE

This article has proposed, in detail, two separate infantry battalions. However, *Force 2013* was built around very real manpower and resource constraints, constraints that have only increased further since the original implementation of the interim infantry battalion. The CCV project has been cancelled, but the LAVs they were slated to replace were allocated to the armoured corps to allow Coyote divestment. The TAPV and B fleet replacement projects have been significantly delayed. The Army can choose to remain with the status quo *Force 2013* interim infantry battalions, but as this article has stated, there are unacceptable capability gaps and manpower shortages that create hollow battalions. Like our American, British and Australian counterparts, we must make adjustments to our organization to retain infantry battalions that are effective, flexible and deployable.

The infantry corps currently has 5,238 person years (PYs, another term for positions) of all ranks and trades to fill its six mechanized and three light infantry battalions. Moving to six MIBs and three IBs as proposed here would require 6,390 PYs. Obviously the 1,100+ PY shortfall, along with the lack of available existing and proposed platforms, means this proposal is not feasible.

Therefore, this article will propose force generation variants of the IB and MIB to allow these organizations to be adopted with minimal cost and reorganization:

- 1. The Army shifts from an organization of six mechanized and three light infantry battalions to one of three mechanized infantry and six infantry battalions.
- 2. The DFS platoon, requiring resources that are not available today, is zero filled at this time.
- 3. The third rifle platoon in each rifle company/mechanized rifle company is zero filled by Regular Force soldiers and is filled by reservists for training and operations.

The first proposal, reducing the number of MIBs in the army, is based on the resources available to the corps. The infantry cannot afford to continue maintaining the current nine-battalion mix with its lack of required organic capabilities and its never-filled positions. The proposed mix of three MIBs and six IBs is similar to the ratios in our allies' armies, indicating that a high degree of mechanization is not sustainable. The impact on the current iteration of the MRP will be minimal and the Army will still be capable of performing its assigned tasks. The LOO 3 mechanized battle group can be covered off by the CMBG's MIB while LOO 4 and the joint force elements (NEO Vanguard Company, Joint Force Protection Companies) can be covered by the two IBs.

The second proposal is quite straightforward. The DFS platoon capability, which remains essential and must be incorporated in updated doctrine, should be proposed as a required capability, with PY growth and new systems, to the Army as part of the FD process. Until then, it is a bridge too far and cannot be filled within the current resource and manpower envelope.

The final proposal is merely a formalization of the affiliations that the *Force 2013* infantry concept sought to establish. If all reserve augmentation is concentrated into three rifle platoons, the reservists' absence during much of the battalion's annual training is mitigated in a less disruptive fashion than with the current format, which leaves holes in every organization down to the rifle section. Regular Force rifle companies and mechanized rifle companies, possessing two of three rifle platoons and their weapons/IFV platoons to provide manoeuvre support, would still be capable of conducting meaningful training in garrison. Baseline infantry positions in these third rifle platoons are filled by reservists (minimizing the experience delta) while specialist positions, such as vehicle crewing or manning a mortar, are filled by Regular Force soldiers with the time to maintain proficiency, meaning that a reserve rifle platoon can integrate into a mechanized rifle company with no organizational changes (proper marry-up drills help familiarize reservists with the vehicle).

Since the rifle platoon organization would be standardized, Reserve training could focus on force generating platoons up to level 3 and marrying up with Regular Force battalions in the spring when Level 4 to 6 training is generally conducted. This is the approach the British Army has taken for its *Army 2020* plan through affiliation of regular and reserve battalions. It would also give Regular Force battalion and brigade commanders a vested interest in fostering the affiliation and working with the regional divisions to synchronize Regular and Reserve training opportunities. While this demands more work to properly plan and integrate reservists, in today's resource-constrained environment, the Army and the corps cannot afford to ignore the potential available in the Primary Reserve.

By adopting these amendments, we get reduced IB and MIB establishments for force generation purposes. The zero filling of the DFS platoon and backfilling of three of the nine rifle platoons with Reserve platoons reduces manning requirements by 128 PYs per battalion, or 1,152 PYs across the corps. This creates a force generation IB established at 562 Regular Force PYs and a force generation MIB established at 616 Regular Force PYs. The total manpower requirement for six force generation IBs and three force generation MIBs is 5,220 PYs all ranks and trades, with the 18 PY savings being the balance of RCEME PYs remaining after IB/MIB maintenance platoon realignment. The following tables expand on the PY allocation, demonstrating the feasibility of the proposal:

CURRENT	6 x mech battalion	3 x light battalion	Force 2013 Interim Total
ORGANIZATION	593 PY each = 3,558 PY	560 PY each = 1,680 PY	= 5,238 PY
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION	3 x MIB	6 x IB	Proposed battalion total
	616 PY each = 1,848 PY	562 PY each = 3,372 PY	= 5,220 PY

Figure 13: Current and proposed battalion PY requirements

RANK	FORCE 2013 BATTALIONS INFANTRY PY (OTHER MOSID PY)	PROPOSED BATTALIONS INFANTRY PY (OTHER MOSID PY)
LCol	9 (0) = 9 PY	9 (0) = 9 PY
Maj	63 (0) = 63 PY	54 (0) = 54 PY
Capt	126 (18) = 144 PY	99 (45) = 144 PY
Lt/Capt	105 (27) = 132 PY	117 (0) = 117 PY
CWO	9 (0) = 9 PY	9 (0) = 9 PY
MWO	63 (18) = 81 PY	54 (18) = 72 PY
WO	195 (36) = 231 PY	171 (36) = 207 PY
Sgt	429 (118) = 547 PY	396 (114) = 510 PY
MCpI	528 (360) = 888 PY	555 (348) = 903 PY
CpI/Pte	2,657 (477) = 3,134 PY	2,700 (495) = 3,195 PY
Total	4,184 (1,054) = 5,238 PY	4,164 (1056) = 5,220 PY

Figure 14: Current and proposed PY breakdown by rank and MOSID

Taken as a whole, the recommendations in this article which should be considered by the Canadian Army as part of its *Force 2016* initiative are the following, in order of priority:

- 1. Adopt the infantry battalion and mechanized infantry battalion as detailed at Annex A and B into doctrine. This includes the concepts of the four-soldier fire team and divisible rifle section as the building block of the infantry, company weapons platoons and IFV platoons, improved combat support company organizations and realigned maintenance platoons. B-GL-309-001, long in need of an update, should be rewritten to describe these organizations. B-GL-309-002 needs to be written for the rifle company and its weapons platoon, as nothing currently exists. A second manual describing the mechanized rifle company and replacing the interim B-GL-321-007 is also required. B-GL-309-003 needs to be rewritten to reflect the new, universal rifle platoon.
- 2. Transition to a new structure of six force generation infantry battalions and three force generation mechanized infantry battalions. What battalions of each regiment are designated to transition to IBs is up for further analysis. This frees up at least 150 LAV hulls for other uses, through either conversion to other variants or use by other corps. As well, this mix still allows the infantry battalions to meet their remit in the current MRP.
- 3. Reinvigorate Regular/Reserve relationships and unit-to-unit affiliation to improve integration of force-generated Reserve rifle platoons to operate in rifle and mechanized rifle companies as part of annual training. Divisions, brigades and battalions cannot afford to continue with two separate Regular and Reserve systems of force generating combat power.
- 4. Re-establish mortar platoons in all battalions as soon as possible. The 81-mm L16 mortars are transferred from the artillery to the infantry, and the Infantry School must work with the Artillery School to revive the mortar skill set in the infantry corps. The two highest-priority projects for the infantry corps are a replacement for the L16 medium mortar (now long in the tooth) and a new lightweight mortar for the company weapons platoons (the M224 A1 light mortar and M252 A1 medium mortar, with weight-saving reductions, are examples of good candidates).
- 5. Use 18+ surplus LAVs for a LAV-mortar program and redesign them as mortar carriers, similar to the divested Bison-based Wolf, to be allocated to the mortar platoons of mechanized infantry battalions to increase their mobility and survivability while supporting combat team operations.
- 6. Have the infantry corps re-establish the Basic and Advanced Pioneer courses, which are pared-down versions of the previous incarnations aiming to provide rifle sections, platoons and companies with integral basic demolition capability and improved understanding of elementary mobility and counter-mobility techniques. These courses will take pressure off the combat engineers to provide pioneering capability to the infantry, enabling those squadrons and regiments to focus on the more demanding and technical battlefield engineering tasks.

- 7. Have the infantry corps formally initiate the force development process to create direct fire support platoons for each battalion. This will require 396 PYs and the procurement of a heavy machine gun and an ATGM system.
- 8. Have the infantry corps work with the armoured corps to develop the armoured carrier squadron concept. One to two of these sub-units, each consisting of about 50 Marginal Terrain Vehicles (MTVs) broken into a headquarters and troops of 14 MTVs, would be capable of providing an IB with protected, armed mobility in any terrain, including the Arctic and mountainous, winter or amphibious terrain. The MTV, armoured and armed, would become the primary protected mobility vehicle for the IBs for combat operations as well as offering true mobility in the Arctic. The TAPV, unsuitable for infantry service except when assigned from a mission-specific pool, should see a majority of the vehicles currently planned for the infantry assigned to another area of the Army where they can be more suitably employed.
- 9. Have the infantry and armoured corps investigate potential DFS solutions for the MIBs, to include LAV hulls with ATGM or cannon turrets to meet the expanded manoeuvre and weapons ranges of the MIBs, providing the Army with an alternative DFS platform that can complement the Leopard 2 MBT through greater deployability.

Recommendations 1 through 4 are possible with the resources and manpower available today (except the new lightweight mortar) and should be pursued as soon as possible to improve the capabilities of the existing infantry battalions. Proposals 5 and 6 demand some redesign of currently existing TPs and vehicles. Proposals 7 through 9 require FD efforts and investments of resources and PYs, but this article has provided firm analysis for doctrinal requirements to support these programs as viable projects for future capability development.

CONCLUSION

This article has reviewed the current *Force 2013* interim infantry battalion establishment and found it unfit for the task. It has provided an alternative proposal for organization based on infantry battalions and mechanized infantry battalions. For zero PY growth, minimal resource reallocation, and better integration of reservists, the Army can adopt the proposed battalions featuring company direct and indirect fire capabilities, the return of battalion mortar platoons, and standardized rifle platoons with no manning shortfalls. These will be more cohesive organizations and are better able to train and deploy with minimal augmentation. These are not radical new organizations and are similar to what our allies currently field.

In the end, adoption of these recommendations will create well-rounded, flexible infantry battalions for the Army. These battalions are effective with organic assets within their manoeuvre envelopes, are flexible in organization and are deployable with far less augmentation than the current *Force 2013* interim battalions. The infantry battalion has, throughout the last century, been organized to reflect not only the tactical requirements of the time but also the economic realities of the garrison army. The proposals here recognize the former while creating the best possible organization to address the latter.

ANNEX A TO ORGANIZING CANADA'S INFANTRY

INFANTRY BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT

		RII	LE COY	(X3)		CBT SP COY		
	BN HQ	COY HQ	RIFLE PL (X3)	WPNS PL	COY HQ	SIG PL	RECCE PL	
PERSONNEL								
Officer – Inf	7	2	1	1	2	0	2	
Officer – Other	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	
Snr NCO/WO – Infmn	6	3	4	3	3	0	5	
Snr NCO/WO – Other	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	
Jr NCM – Infmn	10	9	23	24	3	0	38	
Jr NCM — Other	11	2	0	0	0	25	1	
WEAPONS								
C7/C8 Rifle	40	16	22	25	8	30	37	
C9 LMG	0	0	6	0	0	0	9	
M-203 UGL/ GL / MGL	0	0	6	6	0	0	9	
C6 GPMG	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	
HMG (to be procured)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
C16 GMG	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
84-mm Carl Gustav	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	
ATGM LCU (TBC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Light Mortar (TBC)	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	
L-16 81-mm mortar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Med Sniper Rifle	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	
Hvy Sniper Rifle	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
VEHICLES								
LUVW	6	2	0	0	1	1	11	
LVM-L Cargo	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	
LVM-L Office/CP	3	0	0	0	0	6	0	
LVM-L Specialist	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
MSVS-SMP Cargo	0	3	0	0	1	2	1	
LVM-H Cargo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LVM-H MHC/PLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LVM-H Recovery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LVM-H Refueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LAV 6.0 IFV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LAV CP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LAV Maint	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

CBT SP COY			ADM COY					
MORTAR PL	DFS PL	COY HQ	TPT PL	SUPP PL	MAINT PL	TOTAL		
2	1	2	1	0	0	35		
0	0	0	0	1	1	5		
7	4	2	4	0	0	85		
0	0	0	0	4	6	18		
32	39	7	22	0	0	457		
1	0	1	1	18	26	90		
42	44	12	28	23	33	618		
0	0	0	0	0	0	63		
8	9	0	0	0	0	98		
0	10	0	6	0	0	34		
0	7	0	0	0	0	7		
0	3	0	0	0	0	6		
0	0	0	0	0	0	15		
0	9	0	0	0	0	9		
0	0	0	0	0	0	9		
6	0	0	0	0	0	6		
0	0	0	0	0	0	6		
0	0	0	0	0	0	3		
9	10	1	0	0	0	45		
0	0	1	0	1	0	7		
1	0	1	1	0	1	13		
0	0	0	0	0	8	10		
2	2	1	4	5	1	28		
0	0	0	4	0	1	5		
0	0	0	2	5	2	9		
0	0	0	0	0	2	2		
0	0	0	2	0	0	2		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

ANNEX B TO ORGANIZING CANADA'S INFANTRY

MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

		RIF	LE COY ((X3)		CBT SP C	OY
	BN HQ	COY HQ	RIFLE PL (X3)	IFV PL	COY HQ	SIG PL	RECCE PL
PERSONNEL							
Officer – Inf	7	2	1	1	2	0	2
Officer – Other	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Snr NCO/WO – Infmn	6	3	4	4	3	0	5
Snr NCO/WO – Other	4	0	0	0	0	4	0
Jr NCM – Infmn	10	9	23	37	3	0	38
Jr NCM – Other	11	2	0	0	0	25	1
WEAPONS							
C7/C8 Rifle	40	16	22	32	8	30	37
C9 LMG	0	0	6	0	0	0	9
M-203 UGL/ GL / MGL	0	0	6	0	0	0	9
C6 GPMG	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
HMG (to be procured)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C16 GMG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
84-mm Carl Gustav	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
ATGM LCU (TBC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Light Mortar (TBC)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
L-16 81-mm mortar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Med Sniper Rifle	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Hvy Sniper Rifle	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
VEHICLES							
LUVW	4	1	0	0	1	1	11
LVM-L Cargo	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
LVM-L Office/CP	3	0	0	0	0	4	0
LVM-L Specialist	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
MSVS-SMP Cargo	0	3	0	0	1	2	1
LVM-H Cargo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LVM-H MHC/PLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LVM-H Recovery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LVM-H Refueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LAV 6.0 IFV	2	0	0	14	0	0	0
LAV CP	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
LAV Maint	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

		COY	CBT SP COY			
TOTAL	MAINT PL	SUPP PL	TPT PL	COY HQ	DFS PL	MORTAR PL
35	0	0	1	2	1	2
5	1	1	0	0	0	0
88	0	0	4	2	4	7
20	8	4	0	0	0	0
496	0	0	22	7	39	32
100	36	18	1	1	0	1
639	33	23	28	12	44	42
63	0	0	0	0	0	0
80	0	0	0	0	9	8
25	0	0	6	0	10	0
7	0	0	0	0	7	0
6	0	0	0	0	3	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	9	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	6
6	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0
39	0	0	0	1	10	2
7	0	1	0	1	0	0
11	1	0	1	1	0	1
6	4	0	0	0	0	0
26	1	5	2	1	2	2
5	1	0	4	0	0	0
9	2	5	2	0	0	0
2	2	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	4	0	0	0
44	0	0	0	0	0	6
5	0	0	0	0	0	1
4	4	0	0	0	0	0

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Cole Petersen is the Officer Commanding C Company, 3 PPCLI. He has service with both the First and Third battalions as a Platoon Commander, 2IC Administration Company and Operations Officer as well as serving on the staff of HQ 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.

ENDNOTES

- The U.S. Army executed its *Transformation* initiative, moving from divisional to brigade-based structures and redesigning
 its infantry battalions. Through Iraq and Afghanistan, it conducted a revision and reissue of its infantry doctrine. With *Army 2020*, the British Army has redefined its infantry structures, integrating the reserves and rebasing its units based off
 new brigade structures. Finally, with *Plan BEERSHEBA*, the Australian Army adopted the standard infantry battalion and
 reoriented toward an amphibious strategy and modular brigades.
- 2. Key documents for Force 2013 and the infantry's part in it are 1901-1 (DLFD) Master Implementation Plan (MIP) Force 2013 Consolidation Army Transformation (dated 31 Aug 2010), of which Annex E relates to infantry structures, 1901-1 (DLFD) Force 2013 Master Implementation Directive (MID) (dated 30 Jun 2011) which, in Annex G, lays out FG structures for the Army, and 1901-1 (DLFD 3) Army Strategic Transition Roadmap (dated 13 Apr 2012), updating key equipment distribution. The fact that the most systematic reorganization of the infantry in over 20 years is delivered through accounting-focused annexes to internal Army correspondence and not through a more fundamental doctrinal analysis and publication is unsettling.
- 3. See the Canadian Army's B-GL-309-003/FP-001, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Operations, pp. 2-4 to 2-10.
- 4. Jim Storr's expansion on the conventional NATO definition of these terms and their role in the mechanics of battle is useful. Suppression is the degrading effect of weapons on a target for the duration of the fire. Suppression can result in neutralization, which is a temporary incapacitation of the target beyond the duration of suppressive fire. Thus, suppression produces neutralization. Destruction is simply death or lasting incapacitation. A neutralized enemy is prone to destruction, which will result in tactical success with the enemy dying in place, running away or surrendering. A force therefore uses manoeuvre, fire and movement to gain a position of advantage where it is able to create suppression, neutralization and destruction. See Jim Storr, "High Explosive: Shock Effect in Dismounted Combat" in RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), pp. 56–60, and Jim Storr, "Manoeuvre and Weapons Effect on the Battlefield" in RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2010), pp. 61–63.
- 5. For an excellent synopsis of U.S. Infantry Squad studies, see Paul E. Melody, The Infantry Rifle Squad: Size is Not the Only Problem. Unpublished monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1990). See also Timothy M. Karcher, Enhancing Combat Effectiveness: The Evolution of the United States Army Infantry Rifle Squad Since the End of World War II. Unpublished monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Command and General Staff College, 2002). Notable amongst these (and numerous other) surveys of the squad is that the recommended optimal organization is consistently different, ranging between 9 and 12 soldiers in various configurations.
- 6. See p. 28 of William F. Owen, "Organizing Infantry" in Army Doctrine and Training News No. 19 (2003), pp. 28–30. Also see p. 144 of William F. Owen, "The Universal Infantry" in Australian Army Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2010), pp. 143–49. Karcher, Enhancing Combat Effectiveness, pp. 67–68, highlights how, in the 1980s, the U.S. Army reverted back to nine-person squads not due to any tactical studies or doctrinal reasoning, but merely as an accounting measure to support changes in divisional TO&E.
- 7. See Melody, The Infantry Rifle Squad, pp. 7-8, 31-38, for a discussion on infantry section/squad tasks.
- 8. See p. 54 of Greg Colton, "Enhancing Operational Capability: Making Infantry More Deployable" in *The Australian Army Journal*, Vol. V, No. 1 (2008), pp. 51–64. See also *Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-3-7: Employment of Infantry*. For another review of sections built on four-soldier fire teams, see Chris Shaw, "Adapting the British Light Infantry Section and Platoon Structure for the Contemporary and Future Operating Environment" in *Small Wars Journal* (June 2009), posted at http://174.143.214.137:8080/jrnl/art/adapting-the-british-light-infantry-section-and-platoon-structure.

- See pp. 1-14 to 1-19 of US Army FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad and the first chapter of USMC MCWP 3-11.2 Marine Rifle Squad.
- 10. See p. 44 of Jim Storr, "Exercise SEA WALL: Infantry Tactics in an Era of Manoeuvre Warfare" in *The British Army Review*, No. 119 (August 1998), pp. 38–46.
- 11. The question remains: should we move to adopt the U.S. model of having a section commander independent of the fire teams? Relieving a section commander of the duty of commanding his or her own fire team and simply commanding two others is a useful concept. However, this demands additional personnel and leadership-qualified personnel; for the sake of the argument, this proposal will mirror the Australian model and put the section commander in one of the fire teams.
- 12. For poor suppressive performance of the Minimi LMG, see p. 46 of Jim Storr, "The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat" in *RUSI Defence Systems*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009), pp. 44–46. On the value of higher rates of high explosive fire for suppressive effects, see Storr, "High Explosive." Also see Melody, *The Infantry Rifle Squad*, pp. 27–28, for a discussion of the balance between firepower and riflemen and the observed problem of having too many unique weapons and not enough basic riflemen. Melody argued that a single LMG and grenade launcher was sufficient for a squad and that performance deteriorated with the addition of more of these weapons.
- 13. A good synopsis of infantry small unit manoeuvre is provided by David Kilcullen, "Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat" in Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003), pp. 29–40. Also see operational analysis with Dean K. Bowley, Taryn D. Castles and Alex Ryan, Attrition and Suppression: Defining the Nature of Close Combat (Edinburgh, South Australia: DSTO Information Sciences Library, 2004).
- 14. To put the training cost into perspective, in accordance with published training plans, it takes 32 days to produce a recce patrolman and 92 days for an advanced patrolman (section or platoon leadership). Likewise, it takes 80 training days to produce a basic sniper (Basic Recce and Basic Sniper course), an additional 32 days for a sniper detachment commander and an additional 25 for a unit master sniper. Although these courses produce world-class specialists, their opportunity costs need to be considered and balanced with the battalion's requirements.
- For a good summary of the move from the eight- to four-company battalion, see I.F. Maxse, "Battalion Organization" in The Royal United Services Institution Journal, Vol. 56, No. 407 (1912), pp. 53–86. Not all were convinced; see R.J. Kentish, "The Case for the Eight Company Battalion" in The Royal United Services Institution Journal. Vol. 56, No. 413 (1912), pp. 891–928.
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CORPORATE ALLIES:

Canadian Armed Forces and the use of Private Military, Security and Logistic Companies

Dr. David A. Borys and Joshua Matthewman

The past two decades have seen a significant rise in the use of private military, security and logistic companies (PMSLC) by states, corporations and non-governmental organizations. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, PMSLCs have played a significant role in training, security and logistical support and, in rare cases, have even participated actively in combat operations. Canada has not been immune to this growing trend and has utilized PMSLCs to alleviate the strain on manpower in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). While private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been hired for more active roles, the CAF have also begun to augment and even replace their logistical personnel with contracted non-military labour. This paper seeks to analyze the increasing trend by the Canadian Armed Forces to hire private military, security and logistic companies. It will examine the historical relationship between the CAF and these groups since the end of the Cold War, highlight current international efforts to codify behaviour in line with humanitarian and human rights law, and discuss changes in CAF policy towards PMSCs and non-military personnel. Finally, there will be a discussion on the areas where doctrinal and policy development needs to be expanded to allow for more efficient cooperation with PMSLCs while providing oversight on their behaviour and ensuring their compliance with international standards of humanitarian and human rights law. Canada lags behind its two traditional military allies, the U.S. and the U.K., in this domain, and the lack of a coordinated policy at the federal level could have major repercussions on our utilization of these resources. As will be explored below, it could be argued that Canada has dodged several bullets to date in terms of maximal coordination with PMSLCs and the legal ramifications of employing such partners.

A few terms need to be defined for the purposes of this paper. Private military and security companies, according to the Montreux document, are "private business entities that provide military and/or security services...Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel." A mercenary, according to the United Nations, is "any person who is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain...A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation, is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a government... undermining the territorial integrity of a state." Article 1 goes on to provide further clarification on what constitutes a mercenary and, although one can identify a murky overlap between PMSCs and mercenaries, they are not, in the eyes of international law and within the terms of this paper, the same thing.

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

The use of PMSLCs by the CAF has grown considerably since the force reductions of the 1990s. Central America, Europe, Asia, and South America are all regions where these companies have been employed by the Canadian Government, the Department of National Defence or the CAF. Afghanistan, however, witnessed the most rapid increase in the use of PMSLCs as the CAF coped with serious strains on its manpower due to the length and intensity of the conflict. Canada utilized these companies in non-combat roles such as security, training and logistical support. It should also be noted that several large PMSLCs are headquartered in Canada and thus fall under Canadian regulations even though they operate globally.

Since the mid-90s, Calian industries has been contracted to provide CAF personnel with training through combat simulation exercises and give them technical and operational support in the training, planning and execution of complex combat exercises using advanced computer simulations systems. Recently, Calian received a two-year training contract worth four to eight million dollars on DND's Air Technical Training Renewal (ATTR) project.

Bombardier holds a twenty year support services contract for the world-renowned NATO Flying Training in Canada (NTFC) program. Based out of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, and Cold Lake, Alberta, this elite flight-training program is a unique blend of military and industry professionals who work side by side. Bombardier offers a wide range of support services, including classroom and flight training device (FTD) instructors, equipment training and material and facilities maintenance.

The infamous private security firm, Blackwater, which was later renamed Xe Enterprises before being purchased by Academi, has been contracted in the past to train Canadian military police, members of the Strategic Advisory team and members of the Canadian elite JTF-2 in areas like bodyguard training, sharpshooting and counter-terrorism tactics. The now defunct Terrorism Research Centre, a subsidiary of Blackwater, staged complex counter-terrorism exercises participated in by CAF personnel.³ One of these contracts was reported to have cost 29,000 dollars for a two-day course on hostile-environment defensive driving attended by eighteen members of the Strategic Advisory Team.⁴

Several private security firms have been contracted to operate in volatile security environments throughout the world. ArmorGroup has reportedly provided services to protect Canadian diplomatic and development personnel in Africa while Golan Group has provided Canadian diplomatic personnel with similar services in Central America. Saladin Security, Hart Security and Blue Hackle Security, all British-based PMSCs, protected the Canadian embassy in Kabul and the Joint Coordination Centre in Kandahar and provided security for diplomats and VIPS and the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team. Saladin was even hired to protect the Prime Minister on his visit to Afghanistan in 2007. According to one report, Saladin provided "perimeter security, operated checkpoints, served as bodyguards and formed a heavily armed rapid-reaction force in Kabul." For their 2006 contract, for instance, Saladin was reportedly paid 425,700 dollars for services rendered.





In 2008, the CAF leased six Mi-8 helicopters from Skylink Aviation to deliver supplies in southern Afghanistan. Employees of Skylink, not CAF personnel, flew the helicopters. This contract was designed to increase the frequency of air supply and thus reduce road casualties on traditional convoy supply routes.⁸

Canada's signature rehabilitation project, the Dhala Dam in Kandahar province, was contracted to SNC-Lavelin, who in turn contracted the dam's security to the now infamous Watan Risk Management, an Afghanistan private security firm with ties to President Karzai's family. The US Army banned contracts with Watan in 2010, and the company's contracts for the protection of NATO convoys were terminated that same year (although the contract was later reinstated



due to manpower shortages). SNC maintained its security contract into 2011 when it finally severed ties with the controversial security firm. The corruption allegations leveled at Watan included a tale of an armed standoff between members of the Watan group and two Canadian security personnel.⁹ The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) paid approximately ten million dollars towards security on the dam project.¹⁰

Not only does Canada have a history of dealings with private military and security firms, several of these companies actually work out of this country and are therefore subject to Canadian laws and business legislation. Tundra Group, based out of Clearview, Ontario, has three subsidiaries one of which, Tundra SCA, is a wholly Afghanistan-based PMSC. Globe Risk International,

headquartered in Toronto, is an advanced security consultancy company that includes Globe Risk Institute, a security-training company that specializes in close-protection. In Montreal, GardaWorld is the fifth largest private security provider in the world. Its contracts have included protecting USAID personnel in Iraq, providing security for the British consulate in Basra and the British embassy in Baghdad and helping the UN during the Afghanistan elections in 2005. 11

The history of DND/CAF's (Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces) use of PMSCs would not be complete without mentioning the out-sourcing of Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) programs as a result of cutbacks in CAF's logistical support services in the 1990s. Essentially, the cutbacks involved "re-engineering, total quality management, better use of information technology, public-private sector partnerships, increased use of contracting in service delivery, and the adoption of business case analysis as an analytical device for evaluating the attractiveness of private sector proposals". Subsequent to that, the 1998 Military Occupation Structure Review and the 1999 National Military Support Capability Project both highlighted significant deficiencies in CAF readiness and sustainability resulting from the high operational tempo that characterized the 1990s. One of the earliest contract support projects utilized by the CAF was Logistics Contractor Augmentation Support (LOGCAS), which was signed with Atco-Frontec Europe, a subsidiary of Atco Structures and Logistics. This contract anticipated logistical problems resulting from Y2K computer malfunctions. The contractor would provide CAF personnel across the country with fuel, food and shelter as needed while the military responded to any technical disruptions to its logistical network.

Although LOGCAS was never operationally tested, this contract validated the use of private companies in military support operations. This was all the more perturbing given the significant force reductions taking place during that decade. Combat support and combat service support functions were being slashed, thus heightening the job stress on the remaining CAF personnel and seriously disrupting the CAF's ability to operate internationally. This shortage of CAF personnel, especially in logistical support services, and the resulting pressure on the Canadians serving with Stabilization Force (SFOR) Bosnia Herzegovina in support of Operation PALLADIUM led to the signing of the Contractor Support Project with Atco-Frontec in 2000. This contract called for Atco-Frontec to deliver a multitude of services, including secure satellite communications, utilities, transportation, vehicle maintenance, fuel, facilities and ground maintenance, fire safety, billeting, catering, and supply and environmental protection at five installations. The rationale behind this contract was to address the obvious manpower problems plaguing the service support operations and thus mitigate "serious quality of life issues by reducing excessive deployments."¹³ The program went on to reduce deployments by approximately 152 soldiers per rotation. However, the CSP was for all intents and purposes a temporary solution to the wider problem of establishing a flexible, large-scale contract support program that could deploy internationally in support of CAF operations during periods of high-tempo deployment. The CSP therefore became the forerunner to the large-scale contract program known as the Canadian Armed Forces Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP).

Modeled along similar lines to the US LOGCAP program, CANCAP provided the CAF with a single contracted logistics program capable of operating internationally in line with Canadian

operational needs without the need to retender contracts for every individual operation. CANCAP was designed to offer the CAF greater operational flexibility thanks to a privately contracted military-support capacity and was viewed by CAF leadership as a resounding success in that respect.¹⁴ As one retired Canadian officer wrote, "CANCAP provides the capability to plan, mobilize and deploy key employees and equipment, hire local labour and manage the delivery of a broad range of support services." These services can include administration and management, food services, material management and distribution, ammunition (handling only), communications, equipment maintenance, health services, transportation, accommodations, construction, engineering, power and water supply, waste management, roads, grounds and facilities management, fire services and geomatics support."16 The initial contract, valued at 200 million dollars for five years, was granted in 2002 to SNC-Lavelin and American PAE Government Services, who signed as a joint venture company called SNC-Lavelin PAE Government Services (SNCL/PAE). In 2003, SNCL/PAE took over from Atco-Frontec in Bosnia and offered support to Canadian troops as part of TFBH in the first implementation of CANCAP. At its peak, between 2002 and 2004, 300 CANCAP employees supported 1200 soldiers at an estimated cost of 56 million dollars. 17 As one report stated, "The transition from ATCO-Frontec to SNCL/PAE TFBH was relatively seamless, and the service was generally considered to be excellent." The real test for CANCAP, however, came in 2003 when it was utilized to support the Canadian contribution to ISAF and helped build Camps Julien and Warehouse in preparation for Roto 0 and the start of deployment in and around Kabul. At its peak, approximately four hundred CANCAP employees supported 2,300 Canadian soldiers. A total of 6,000 Canadian soldiers were billeted in Camp Julien between 2003 and 2005. The contract was renewed for another five years as Canadian assets were shifted from Kabul to Kandahar during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the eventual establishment of ISAF in that area. As one veteran CANCAP employee wrote, "From a work point of view, we had a mature workforce in Kandahar and many employees were on their second or more six month tour and were used to working with the military and to the theatre conditions."19

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CODIFY BEHAVIOUR OF PMSCS

With the growing usage of PMSCs comes a need to better regulate the industry using international guidelines similar to those governing the conduct of state militaries during combat operations. The primary concern for Canada is ensuring that companies contracted by the Canadian government, based out of Canada or operating within Canada's borders, conduct themselves according to the guidelines set by the Montreux Document and the ICoC (the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers). Both these documents codify PMSLC behaviour within the framework of accepted humanitarian and human rights law and represent significant steps towards providing an ethical and legal framework for better industry regulation.

The Montreux Document was the result of a joint initiative between the government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross and is the first international document to review international laws as they apply to PMSCs. Seventeen nations, including the United States, Great Britain and Canada, supported the creation of the document in 2008, and since its inception forty-six states and the European Union have adopted the Montreux



Document as a guideline for PMSC practice. This non-legal document states that international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL) are indeed applicable to the operations of PMSCs. It cites previously established legal precedent for IHL and IHRL and lists a series of recommended best practices for states that contract PMSCs and for countries where PMSC headquarters are located.

An obvious criticism of the Montreux Document is that it fails to actually engage the PMSCs themselves, although it is true that PMSC trade associations like the International Peace Operations Association (now the International Stability Operations Association or ISOA) and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) contributed to the section on recommended best practices.

The establishment of the ICoC, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, in November 2010 addressed this criticism of the document by specifically engaging companies in the private military and security industry. This code, again a Swiss-led initiative, articulates human rights-based principles that guide the conduct of PMSCs in complex security environments. Unlike the Montreux Document, this code was conceived to be signed



by private security and military companies. As of April 2013, the ICoC has 602 signatures from companies that agree to adhere to its fundamental principles. This code not only defines operational guidelines based on IHL and IHRL, it also establishes oversight mechanisms and helps to better regulate the industry.

CANADA AS A CLIENT OF PMSLCS: MILITARY SUPPORT CONTRACTS

As discussed earlier, the rationale for Canada's use of PMSLCs dates back to the 1990s, when DND reacted to budget cuts mandated by the Chrétien administration by adopting an alternative service delivery policy for non-core defence service activities. There is no question that CANCAP provides a valuable service. It provides crucial logistical support and frees up military personnel for more active roles in theatre. However, CANCAP suffers from several management challenges that demand further analysis. From a federal standpoint, the challenge of formulating policy governing the use of PMSLCs stems from the fact that contracted workers are not now and may never be covered by the same domestic and international laws and regulations that cover members of the Canadian (and other state) Armed Forces. Beginning with the domestic realm, that reality has led to "differing interpretations and thus inconsistency in applying the CANCAP contract". For example, while deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

CANCAP employees had access to certain morale and welfare programs provided by the Canadian government while such employees deployed in Kandahar were excluded from such programs on the argument that such services were a contractor responsibility. A Joint Support Group HQ senior staff officer explained to the Chief Review Services (CRS) that "the lack of a policy leads to constant negotiation. It's time-consuming, and things get off track". In the field, these constant negotiations regarding a contractor's status land on the shoulders of Task Force Commanders who, in the opinion of CRS, "receive inadequate pre-deployment preparation on the contract and contractor relationships". A similar problem has dogged the U.S. Armed Forces' use of PMSLCs, in that officers were given "limited or no training of military personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education". Thus, one could argue that the lack of symbiosis between national armies and PMSLCs is a problem that characterizes the still-new relationship between those two parties, one that may resolve itself as they engage in more and more cooperative operations (a probable scenario based on current trends).

Nevertheless, one might argue that the current relationship between the CAF and CANCAP service providers is straining relations between the two parties, with the end-result that their cooperation may produce less-than-optimal outcomes. Notably, General (Ret'd) Andrew Leslie, who has extensive Command experience dealing with CANCAP in both the Balkans and Afghanistan, disagrees with that characterization. Leslie asserts that Task Force Commanders are trained to deal with ambiguity and that, in the Canadian context, the dearth of federal documents addressing policy on contractors is more than offset by clear lines of communication within the CAF command structure.²⁵ Nonetheless, other states have endeavoured to provide military officers with public policy guidelines on the use of PMSLCs. For example, the U.K. version of CANCAP, a program called CONLOG, is governed by a policy document entitled Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO). CONDO was developed by a Partnering Support Steering Group that had been tasked with defining the legal status of contractors and their relationship with military Commanders. Written into the CONDO policy are rules governing the training and briefing of contracted personnel on safety and security issues, disciplinary guidelines, insurance and indemnity agreements, and detailed best practices for Commanders on the legal issues surrounding the use of contractors on deployments. Meanwhile, in 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report entitled High-Level DoD Co-ordination Is Needed to Further Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract, which identified the need for leadership and policy formulation above the combatant commander level in order to maximize the benefits of PMSLC use by the U.S. Armed Forces.²⁶ Notwithstanding the competency of the CAF senior command, the development of similar doctrine by DND/the CAF stands to improve the relationship between PMSLC contractors and CAF employees in the field, thus strengthening the capacity of CANCAP II to become even more successful than was CANCAP.

From an international standpoint, the CANCAP service provider operates in a context of international conflict, and the status of contracted personnel in a warzone is confused at best. The four *Geneva Conventions* and the associated *Additional Protocols* protect civilians from being targeted in battle, but civilians who engage in hostilities lose that protection and also bear legal liability for acts that would be legal were they committed by a combatant.



CANCAP contractors are protected by the CAF and use government-furnished equipment (GFE) in support of CAF activities. In a combat zone, this places CANCAP contractors in a gray zone, and in an era of counter-insurgencies many adversaries of the CAF might not recognize CANCAP contractors as having civilian status. This reality puts Canada in a potentially litigious position in situations where a CANCAP contractor is killed or engages in combat while deployed. Indeed, CRS concludes that "contracting for support raises 'employer-employee' issues, including liability. For example, undesirable events involving the exposure of CANCAP contractor and sub-contractor personnel to hostile environments or the use of GFE could result in litigation against the Crown". Granted, a resolution to that situation is only partially within Canada's control, since the evolving status of contractors is by and large an issue that calls for international dialogue. It would be prudent, however, to insert a policy in CANCAP II that clearly indicates that Canada sees military-support contractors as civilians and expects them to conduct themselves and be treated by other parties as such. Such a statement is contained in the United Kingdom's Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations document, which states that "personnel employed under CSO arrangements remain the employees of the contractor and retain their civilian status. There are no circumstances where contractors employed by the UK will be authorised to conduct an armed role". 28 It would be in the interests of the CAF to develop a similar policy doctrine in order to clarify the relationship between the CAF and military support contractors, to publicly define Canada's position on the expected conduct of military support contractors and to show leadership in the global effort to rationalize the use of PMSCs.

CANADA AS A CLIENT OF PMSLCS: TRAINING AND SECURITY-ORIENTED CONTRACTS

As noted earlier, Canada also uses private military and security companies to train certain CAF members and to provide some DND and DFAIT staff with close protection in combat theatres. These types of 'security-oriented' contracts raise additional issues that are less important in the case of military support contracts. A few pertinent case studies have concluded that Canada would benefit from a more coherent policy governing its use of PMSCs for training and security purposes.

Starting with the issue of training, Canada has invested in the use of PMSCs for training CAF members. In 2007, then-Minister of Defence Peter MacKay asserted that "private security firms have been used from time to time depending on the issue, depending on the type of training that is required... and we are very judicious when we enter into these contracts". While this judiciousness may be admirable, it has not prevented Canada from being caught up in some of the more controversial aspects of the private military industry. In particular, the amount that Canada has paid to Academi for military training services garnered negative media attention. Between 2005 and the end of 2010, Canada paid almost eight million dollars to Academi for various training initiatives, including the instruction of personnel from JTF-2 and CAF military police. When Academi was called Blackwater, the corporation was involved in several controversial incidences in Iraq, including a confrontation when several Blackwater employees opened fire with automatic weapons in a public area crowded with civilians, killing 17 Iraqis. That and other issues eventually led to the company becoming entangled in several legal actions with both the U.S. government and private parties and ultimately pushed the company to change its name in an apparent effort to rehabilitate its brand. The optics of

Canada's continued patronage of Academi under such circumstances are not helped by the fact that Canada was one of the 17 countries that jointly established and ratified the Montreux Document in 2008. Amongst other applicable standards, the document establishes that a contracting state must:

"... take into account... the past conduct of the PMSC and its personnel, which includes ensuring that the PMSC has no reliably attested record of involvement in serious crime (including organized crime, violent crime, sexual offences, violations of international humanitarian law, bribery and corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or its personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct, has appropriately remedied such conduct, including by effectively cooperating with official authorities, taking disciplinary measures against those involved, and, where appropriate and consistent with findings of wrongdoing, providing individuals injured by their conduct with appropriate reparation." ³⁰

It is doubtful that this provision of The Montreux Document was met in the case of Academi, and, while appropriate documentation may not always exist to fully meet the criteria of that excerpt from The Montreux Document, in the case of Academi such documentation certainly did exist.

Meanwhile, both DND and DFAIT have employed PMSCs in the field for security purposes. The employment of Saladin Security, Hart Security, and Blue Hackle Security are prominent examples. The use of such contracts dates back to the 1990s and has been virtually without incident. During the War in Afghanistan, however, a crisis arose that speaks to the need for a Canadian public policy on the use of PMSCs. Specifically, the August 2008 death of Master Corporal Joshua Roberts led to accusations that Roberts had been felled by friendly fire from a convoy of allied private contractors. An investigation subsequently found a lack of evidence to support that conclusion, but the circumstances of Roberts' death remain murky and serve to highlight the need for close strategic and operational cooperation between the CAF and private contractors. At present, there is no single body that assumes primary responsibility for ensuring that PMSCs contracted by Canada adhere to best practices in battle and that CAF staff in the field are prepared to coordinate with foreign-contracted PMSCs in the field.³¹ The establishment of more clearly defined 'rules of engagement' for the CAF and PMSCs would benefit both parties, strategically, operationally and legally.

CANADA AS A CLIENT OF PMSLCS: CONCLUSION

The emergence of PMSLCs as a significant player in international security has been rapid and transformative. As a result, the upsurge in the use of PMSLCs by numerous states occurred in a manner that precluded the concurrent development of legal doctrine and regulations for their usage. The United Kingdom's Armed Forces came to that conclusion in 2001, when the country's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre concluded that, in the absence of an overarching policy, issues like the status and security of contractors remained unresolved. Since then, the U.K. has been a leader in developing doctrine for the use of PMSLCs in joint operations with national armed forces. Meanwhile, in 2006, the U.S. Quadrennial Defence Review Report went so far as to declare that PMSLCs were one of the four components of the U.S. "total force" the use of the U.S. "total force" to the use of the use of

which also included active and reserve military staff and defence industry actors. In fact, since the mid 1980s, different branches of the U.S. government and military have issued a continuous stream of documents that define and refine regulations for the use of PMSLCs by the U.S. Armed Forces. In comparison to the U.K. and the U.S., Canada's usage of PMSLCs remains almost completely unguided by doctrine and policy. There is currently no DND/CF policy and doctrine that provides an exhaustive and coherent framework for the employment of contractors on deployed operations, whether in Canada or abroad. The U.K. example would be a useful model to guide the development of a Canadian policy on this issue (which, incidentally, is an opinion shared by CRS). To be sure, in the glaring absence of cabinet-level political guidance, the CAF have taken great strides towards codifying the role of PMSLCs in Canadian operations. For example, leading Army thinkers have called for the Canadian Army to "actively engage" PMSLCs "in a cooperative, collaborative relationship in pursuit of a desired end-state". To date, however, such efforts remain largely focussed on strategic considerations, which, while essential, leave Canada exposed to broader legal and regulatory issues surrounding the use of PMSLCs. It is likely that by the time Canada once again becomes engaged in a major combat operation PMSLCs will be even more firmly entrenched on the international security stage. A federal Canadian policy on the use of military contractors would help the country maximize the benefits to be accrued from the use of PMSLCs. Moreover, such a policy would protect DND, DFAIT and other governmental users of PMSLCs from the absence of binding international laws and regulations governing such corporations, which do not now, and may never, exist. 🧚

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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CITY OFFICIAL PAPER

DAILY EVENING EDITION

JOE DESPAIN, FORMER SCOUT, IS MADE COMPANY RUNNER

BAND AND TOWN PEOPLE GAVE JOE DESPAIN BIG RECEPTION HE HAD NOT ANTICIPATED

He left here as a less and the less't much more than that now, for dealth and the retarded the highly after cover to the second tion highly after cover to come service as a member of receiption, disasterny, is only twenty one, due showed some who price and some transcernation, when his step-

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PENDLETON BOY TO FIGHT WITH ALLIES

or Bespain Enlists With Ca Troops and is New "Somewh Prance."

With Canadians at Front; Was Wounded Once Joe Despain Has Had Thrilling Service

JOE DESPAIN, CORPORAL, TELLS MAMMOTH WORK OF BATTALION

JOE DESPAIN WILL **BRING SCOTCH BRIDE**

Joe Despain, ison hero in the Canadian army will arrive home some time in April and when he comes be will bring with him a bride, acquired in Sextland, and 2000 in cash which he saved up from his pay during the years he was in the army.

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JOE DESPAIN FIGHTS FOR

TWO YEARS, WOUNDED

"We have been 22 times over the top' and never failed to take and hold the objective," says the latest leiter from Joe Despain, Pendicton man who say lines pears of war in the Chambers and the says in part.

"We have placeds of it is necessiful through the satisfaction of the battlelow part in the war. Ospitalist of it is necessiful through the battles of Yingy Ridge, through the battles of Yingy Ridge, Market and Joecourt. Quesant line, Cambrian, Drecourt, Quesant line, Cambri

NEWS STILL SCARCE

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Design of Pendleton.

Has letter is an follows:
"Just a wee better to let you know that I am sell ou top and feeling tine. Any our of the hospital and as good as ever My wounds are all besled up now and I don't think they will over bother me amin. I was exwon't be able to get my leave notil I he for a while yet. I was dury unthe Canadinas were in for I am miss ing all the murch to Gernuny, probably he stoing garrien, duty for a while in Germany but hope not for long as I want to get back home as steen as possible.

"It be sure areas to brow that the man is over and we do not have to seend another white in the trenches on very thankful to some through this war on lucio us I have. If has that we came over to do and the

AN AVERAGE JOE

Daniel J. Demers

Nineteen year-old Joe Despain, along with four other American companions, enlisted in the Canadian Army in December of 1916. Despain, a native of Pendleton, Oregon, had been serving with the U.S. Army along the Mexican border. "As soon as he had been mustered out... he left for Sydney [*sic*], Canada to enlist in active service in Europe," announced Pendleton's *East Oregonian* newspaper. Private Despain was immediately attached to the 47th Canadian Battalion, British Expeditionary Force in France.

He became a local celebrity with his letters home which allowed Pendletonians to follow his military career and focus on the world war raging in Europe. These were times before signal communications. Radio was in its infancy and pictorial newsreels at local movie houses were an emerging communication revolution—even so, they were silent with subtitles, as were the movies themselves. Talkies wouldn't come about until 1927. Mostly it was local newspapers such as the *East Oregonian* that educated the public about local, national and international events as they unfolded on a daily basis.

In April of 1917 Pendleton citizens learned that Despain had been shot in the arm and was recuperating in an English hospital. In a letter to his brother Grover he relates the "good time" he was having taking in "the sights of London…Buckingham Palace, Trafalgar Square, Westminster Abbey…the London Zoo and the Bridge of Sighs [at Cambridge University]"²

By April 1917 the United States had joined the Allies in their efforts to subdue Germany and the other Central Powers. Despain, a private in the trenches, reported in a September letter to Grover, "two of my old chums from the States were killed the other day. I am the last of the original five that came up from the [Mexican] border last year and I hope to see it through to the end." He was also excited about America's entry into the war, hoping "[U.S. troops] will soon be going over the top…to push Heiny back to Germany and then push Germany off the map." ³

Three months later, in a letter to a Mrs. Daniels, Despain thanked her for the cake she had sent him. It "arrived in fine shape after such a long journey." Seeing the hometown bakery's trademark "The Delta" on the box made him "homesick...as it brought back memories of childhood days in dear old Pendleton." He also revealed that he carried "a little American flag... since I left the U.S.... it is one of my most precious things." He had carried that flag since his soldiering on the Mexican border. Despain expressed his frustration with the routine of going "in the trenches, coming out for a rest, then back in again...[but] we know we are fighting for the right and will win in the end."

At the end of January 1918, in another letter to Grover, Private Despain was "resting in a little French village...in a little French estimaminet [café/bar] smoking good old Prince Albert tobacco and longing" for the day he would go home to Pendleton. But, he acknowledged, that was only a "pipe dream for we have a big job to do...getting ready for a few more whacks at Fritz. The Canadians have caused the Kaiser a good many headaches and when the Yankee

boys get over here full force we'll make him ache all over...and make him wish he had stayed in his own backyard and not started this trouble." His Canadian battalion, he relates, "has a fine record of service in France...it has been in a lot of hard fighting and the boys have never failed to take and hold every objective we have been sent after so far." 5



Canadians going into Valenciennes over an improvised bridge, 1 November 1918

At the end of April, Grover received two letters. One revealed that another brother, Charles Despain, "a lieutenant in the American Army," was stationed in England and was "working to secure [Joe's] transfer [to the American Army]...[Charles had] completed arrangements with the Canadian headquarters at the end of March." Charles went on to say, "the Captain of [Joe's] Canadian company...has been trying to block the transfer...[Joe] is one of his best men and always the first over the top [of the trenches in offensives]." The second letter finds Joe expressing his frustration at sending letters home of little interest: "All we see is trenches, ruined villages, some hard fighting and part of the year it's all mud, the rest is dust. All we have to do is to fight and rest." Longing to return home, he expressed his gratitude to the people of Pendleton for "writing letters and sending parcels. I believe I get more parcels and more letters than anyone else in the company."

Joe's June letter to Grover was brief. He was "happy and smiling...laying [sic] in the sun in a lovely wood, full of beautiful flowers" in a rest camp "somewhere in France." The big guns, he tells Grover, "have been sending Heiny some 'iron rations,' and every time they shoot I think 'that's the stuff to give 'em." He was upset that parcels were no longer allowed, "for it means we have to use English tobacco and it sure is awful stuff...about every three puffs...you have to stop and splutter and groan before you can start again."



A Canadian post in Valenciennes, 1 November 1918

Towards the end of August, Grover received another letter which revealed that parcels and letters were flowing through again. Joe was "a tickled boy...two parcels and a bunch of letters will almost bring a dead man to life over here." He was looking forward to drinking a can of Marigold condensed milk, "good old Oregon milk from Newburg, Oregon, for supper." He didn't like the rest camp: "there is no *estimaminets* near and they mean mademoiselles and m'sells, mean 'parley vou francaise' and it all helps to pass the time away."

In September 1918, the *East Oregonian* ran a short story which shed light on a number of facts about Joe Despain's military accomplishments since his enlistment in the Canadian Army twenty-one months earlier. Besides his arm wound, he had suffered from "trench foot" and army life had made a "huskier' man of him." Even so, he weighed only 150 pounds. He had

experienced a miracle escape when an "army hut [which Despain occupied] was blown up by the enemy. Every one of his 12 companions were killed but Joe escaped without a scratch." He asked Grover to place several souvenirs he had collected—a German cap with bloodstains from its dead owner, a number of shoulder straps, and buttons from German soldiers—on display at Griggs Grocery Store in Pendleton, where Grover was employed. ¹⁰



The first Canadian platoon to enter Valenciennes from the west, advancing towards the Canal

The same edition contained, in a second story, another letter to Grover in which Despain expresses his luck in a recent battle he had come through almost unscathed: "I had a bullet through my water bottle, one through my gas mask and a lovely black and blue bruise on my knee from a piece of shrapnel, all in the short time of about ten seconds...an awful scrap in one town with Fritz. Regular old house to house fighting, but the good old Canadian bomb and bayonet method of fighting soon won out and what Fritzes couldn't get away beat it 'tout suite'...we took a bunch of villages, a good many thousand prisoners, quite a lot of artillery and dozens and dozens of machine guns...burying parties have to work overtime to bury the dead...mostly Fritzes."

A week later, Grover revealed that "one of [Joe's] ears is almost deaf from shell shock." In time he would recover his hearing, his doctors told him. He had also suffered as a result of a slight gas attack but "consider[ed] himself unusually lucky, for out of the 180 men who came to France with him, he and his 'pal' are the only two survivors...we have been through some hard

fighting...but the boys are still smiling and happy." Because of the deafness, he was now a "company runner...not a bad job as it consists of carrying messages" and guard duty. 12

The 12 November 1918 edition of the *Eastern Oregonian* announced that Joe had been wounded again. This time he had been shot in the left foot. The newspaper lamented that Joe had been shot on 1 November—ten days before Germany's surrender—and noted that he had "had many



A Canadian wounded while crossing the remains of the lock in the Canal de l'Escaut, being attended to by First Aid men, 1 November 1918

miraculous escapes" in his two years at the front with the Canadian army. He was still in the Canadian army and had "the record in his company for being the first man over the top." Hospitalized in a Canadian field hospital in Nuns, France, he disclosed that the wound was from a machine gun in the Battle of Valenciennes. It was a "swell hospital. The sisters [nuns who were nurses] seem more like angels than real people after what we have been through lately...it sure is grand to be between white sheets again," he marvelled.

The day before Christmas, Grover related that Joe was out of the hospital and writing, "my wounds are all healed up now and I don't think they will ever bother me again." He was upset that he had gotten shot in the foot so near the armistice because he was missing "the march to Germany... [but] it sure is great the war is over and we do not have to spend another winter in the trenches." He was amazed, he wrote Grover, "to have come through this war as lucky as I have. It has sure been terrible but we have done what we came over to do and the great principles for which we have been fighting have triumphed." ¹⁵

Towards the end of January 1919, Grover received a postcard from Joe advising that he was on furlough in Edinburgh, Scotland. Grover noted that it was his brother's second furlough in Scotland and was wondering "if a Scotch lassie has anything to do with his fondness for that country."

Two weeks later Grover received yet another letter in which Joe said he was touring the cities of Belgium. "The Belgian people are treating us fine and they think there is nobody like the Canadians...it doesn't cost us anything to ride on the trains, so we get to see lots of the country." He wrote Grover that he was anxious to come home, but while he awaited his return, "rations are very good now so I may get fat yet...we are having some great football and baseball games...and La Crosse, so you see there are plenty of sports here." ¹⁶

As springtime approached, a March letter revealed that Joe "would bring with him a bride, acquired in Scotland and \$900 in cash [equivalent to \$12,500 in 2015] which he saved up from his pay during the years he was in the [Canadian] army." The newspaper reported Joe's letters, discussed his trips to Scotland and noted that the news he "is to marry a Scotch lassie has occasioned no real surprise." ¹⁷

Three weeks later, Joe summed up his battalion's accomplishments: "We have been 'over the top' 22 times and never failed to take and hold the objective," he bragged. "We have pulled off 17 successful and two failure raids." He had taken part in fourteen battles and sieges. His battalion had liberated 60,000 civilians and experienced 7,500 casualties, killed and wounded, and over 1,500 men invalided out sick, "who could not stand the strain of trench fighting. That is enough about the war. I want to forget the war now, for it has no pleasant memories for me," he concluded. He had been promoted to corporal, a position he didn't want, but "his captain put through the orders and I couldn't help it." Is accomplishments:

Joe Despain returned to Pendleton on 18 June 1919. The *East Oregonian* editorialized on the occasion and "the cordial greeting given him by his old home town." The editorial recounted his many deeds: "He was at the front when all looked black for the allies [fighting] with their backs to the wall...he was there during the hardest fighting...[and participated in] throwing the enemy back in defeat...he is known by his deeds." Despain, we are told, "showed surprise and consternation" when a local band played in his honour at the railroad station. He wasn't impressed by his own deeds. A modest young Joe simply told the assembled crowd: "I'm just a make-believe soldier in a little Maple leaf battalion." But he was much more than that, the *East Oregonian* reminded its readers: He "was a sharpshooter, grenade thrower, dispatch bearer—Despain has filled all the roles while serving during all the important engagements which marked the world war." Despain has filled war." Despain has filled all the roles while serving during all the important engagements which marked the world war."

Joe Despain had a 41-year career with the United States Post Office in Pendleton, Oregon, beginning in 1923. In 1949 he was appointed postmaster, a position he held until his retirement in 1964. He died in 1975 at the age of 78. He never married the "Scottish lassie." In 1921 he married a local girl, Ester Robbins, and the couple had two children, Clark and Barbara. During his lifetime Despain was active in the local Presbyterian Church and the Pendleton chapter of the Kiwanis International. **

BIOGRAPHY

Daniel J. Demers is a semi-retired businessman who resides in Guerneville, California, amid the Sonoma County wine country and redwood forests. He and his wife, Chrissy, are owner-operators of McT's Bullpen, a local sports bar. Daniel holds a BA in History from the George Washington University (Washington, DC) and an MBA from Chapman University (Orange, California).

Currently he is pioneering the exploitation of free digital newspaper archives available through the United States Library of Congress, which has digitalized over 1,450,000 American newspapers from 1836 through 1922 (see www.chroniclingamerica.com). This article is a result of his research. His published articles can be viewed at his website, www.danieldemers.com.

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Reverend Roger Harwerth, Pastor, Pendleton Presbyterian Church, 15 January 2015

Jenny Lynch, Historian, United States Postal Service, 16 January 2015

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- 2. Joe Despain Is Wounded, Is Game, East Oregonian, 17 April 1917, page 1
- 3. Joe Despain Only One Left of Five Companions in War, East Oregonian, 13 September 1917, page 1
- 4. Joe Despain Says Boys Still "Smile and Keep Fighting," East Oregonian, 9 January 1918, page 2
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MAPPING THE HUMAN TERRAIN FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS


Major Derek Spencer, CD

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the military mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian Army has been strongly committed to preparing for future operations. The release of "Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow" marks the start of this process by outlining a roadmap 2021. Building upon its force employment concept, Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO), the Army has detailed a number of substantial changes and developments to support the missions it expects to face in the next decade. One consistent theme is that the Canadian Army must operate effectively across the physical, moral and informational planes of any conflict. Thus, while new equipment and weapons catch the attention of the media, development of the Army's capabilities must also be focused on all three domains. This is echoed throughout both documents in the discussion on influence activities: "in order to effectively influence people in the operating space, [they] will be important tools in the conduct of operations across the spectrum of operations in the future security environment."3

The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy and ADO lay out the six missions of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and, by extension, the Canadian Army (CA):

- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations.
- Support a major international event in Canada.
- Respond to a major terrorist attack.



- Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
- Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period.
- Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world.⁴

A significant focus for the Government of Canada, then, is on domestic operations (hence the naming of the Defence Strategy "Canada First") and is reflected within the planning for the Army of Tomorrow. While expeditionary missions are often complex and difficult, there is recognition that domestic operations "are typically done well using capability designed for international operations and war fighting." The Army then seeks to balance its international and domestic priorities in a way that reflects both as being of more or less equal importance through its capability development process.

When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were at their heights, the 61st Canada–United States Geospatial and Imagery Working Group in 2008 in Washington, DC, proposed that human terrain mapping (HTM) should be examined in the context of North American domestic operations. The conclusion of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan and the paring down of its contribution to that theatre of operations presents a window of opportunity



for the examination of HTM lessons which have emerged and a determination of their application to domestic operations. However, any such analysis will be complicated by the absence of a codified doctrine amongst any of the OIF, OEF or ISAF nations.

HTM has seen a rapid evolution and now has an established theoretical basis across the entire spectrum of operations, yet during the preparations for the security arrangements surrounding the 2010 Winter Olympics and the G8 Summit in Huntsville, for a variety of technical and capacity reasons, the CAF did not use its HTM capability to support either of the events. A significant factor in the reluctance to use HTM is its perceived linkage to the strategies of racial profiling and geo-profiling, both of which carry significant emotional baggage. Thus, although HTM has intriguing potential to be beneficial to domestic operations, its unfortunate linkage to profiling may cause it to be excluded from use for political and policy reasons.

LAYING THE FOUNDATION

ADO clearly identifies "an increased focus on people—the human terrain—within the future operating environment." The term "human terrain" has a very distinct meaning, particularly when applied to counter-insurgency operations. Too often, because of the inclusion of the word

"terrain," the term has been identified solely with geography. The reality is that human terrain moves well beyond geography and must be seen as much more inclusive. It encompasses the social, political, economic and infrastructure concerns of the human population within the environment in which our soldiers operate. For military purposes, then, an operational environment should be seen as a combination of both physical and human terrain.

Understanding the relationship and implications of those various social, political, economic and infrastructure concerns is the job of Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). HTA is a systemic process which seeks to organize the social, cultural, political and geographic data coherently so that it can inform full-spectrum military planning and operations. Although the term includes "terrain," HTA is much more comprehensive in its analysis. For example, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) has an emerging and vital role in HTA. It must be remembered that HTA is a new concept in CAF doctrine, and there has been little doctrinal writing on the subject. Prior to examining its potential within DOMOPS, it is first worth establishing its foundation within military operations generally.

HTA is a process for achieving understanding of the human terrain. It necessarily involves an all-arms and all-source intelligence processing approach, which in turn informs the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE)¹⁰ or NATO's Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE).¹¹ HTA analysis is typically organized and presented to the commander and his or her staff within one of two frameworks: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) or Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP).

HTM, then, is the process by which the measurable aspects of the HTA analysis are rendered onto a geographic map within either the PMESII or the JIMP framework. For example, that may include comparatively static demographic features such as population density and distribution of income, social features like ethnicity or religion, and location of physical items of symbolic and ideological importance such as places of worship and historic landmarks. The use of the PMSEII or the JIMP framework allows the analysis to be presented in a coherent structure within which specific characteristics and patterns can be determined through an interactive medium.

There is an emotional reaction to the idea of analyzing social trends among Canadians to support potential future operations. Canadians' privacy is a concern that the CAF must take seriously. With regard to HTM in a domestic context, such concerns are not well founded: data concerning Canadians is publicly available because it is aggregated to protect against identification of individuals. An ethical evaluation of HTM should go one step further, however. The Army of Tomorrow plan often discusses how the human dimension interacts with military operations.

Obviously, to be effective, military operations must include an evaluation of the physical terrain. It is important to consider whether a specific river can flood or how to traverse a mountain pass on a critical humanitarian aid route. The importance of the human dimension demands that the military understand the nature and characteristics of our Canadian

population just as well. A military disaster relief operation might be seen to be more successful if the cultural and linguistic situation within an isolated community in a flood zone was well understood. The roadmap for the Army of Tomorrow states that the "judicious application of force will require education and training to guide soldiers' conduct." Without an analysis of the human terrain of our own nation, the Canadian Army risks getting it wrong just when all eyes are focused upon us.



RCMP Sgt briefs CAF personnel during Sovereignty Operation NANOOK

ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES

HTA has followed one of two paths. The most recent, **Socio-Cultural Analysis**, was pioneered in Afghanistan, largely within the U.S. Marine Corps. Analysis was a two-stage process in which specialized collection teams would mine the environment for human terrain data and then submit the data to a second specialized team of experts in social geography and cultural dynamics. There were a number of lessons learned from the Marines' experience. The first was that although the HTA filled a gap within the traditional intelligence sensor arrays (specifically, electro-optical imagery and EW sources) regarding the capture of cultural and social information, in doing so it created a significant demand for specialized personnel. Rather than manning that capability requirement using internal resources, the Marines instead contracted out for the services required. That did not prove to be a particularly good solution: a December 2008 *Nature* magazine article saw it as "another example of yet another good idea



Members of the Arctic Response Company Group offload equipment from a Coast Guard vessel near Iqaluit in August 2013

gone wrong in Afghanistan."¹³ However, the article then noted, "we continue to believe that the insights of science have much to offer strategies in a war zone—not least through training combat troops to understand the local cultures within which they operate." Thus, the U.S. experience demonstrated that HTA and HTM could add value to operations but required proper, careful development.

The more traditional method, **Encyclopedic Country Studies**, is typical of the routine staff work done within Canadian, U.S. and British army staffs in preparation for operational overseas deployments. Geographic studies are begun by mining all available published sources for a variety of geographic and cultural details (e.g., population density, small-scale ethno-cultural laydown, industrial activities, the locations of key cultural features and critical infrastructure). While those country studies end up forming a significant foundation for all-source intelligence analysis, the skill of GEOINT personnel on this work is typically at what can be described as an apprentice trades training level. It needs to be taken to the next level: advanced GEOINT analysis as described in the following paragraph.

Advanced GEOINT Analysis is the next stage. It seeks to build upon the GEOINT analysis conducted during the encyclopedic country study process. The method includes a detailed examination of the various themes and layers of available geographic information to determine how they interact. There is no formal doctrinal foundation for this method at present. However, my previous paper did include a proposal using sources of geospatial data not typically



RMCP Officer and Royal Winnipeg Rifles NCO consult a map during an Operation PODIUM backcountry security patrol

employed during military analysis. The intent was to determine how best that data could support the decision-making process in non-traditional operations and to understand how military actions operate within the JIMP environment. As a specialized activity, HTM clearly required the full support of the geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) community to be successful. Intelligence from our sensors only becomes useful if we are able to act upon it. Advanced GEOINT analysis must be seen as the means by which we make geography-related intelligence actionable. That earlier foundation work on HTM strongly points to advanced GEOINT analysis as the preferred approach for domestic operations: accordingly, this paper will focus on that line of analysis.

HTM AND SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

As discussed in a previous CAJ article, HTM has the potential to support military operations in four key areas:

- human intelligence (HUMINT);
- information operations (IO);
- · manoeuvre warfare; and
- civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC).14

It's important to remember that domestic operations are more likely to involve a smaller number of potential customers of HTM than is expeditionary COIN, that the military is

subject to significant constraints and restraints during domestic operations, and that HUMINT and IO, for example, are not practised by the CAF in Canada on its own citizens. Nonetheless, there is a role for HTM during domestic operations. My focus in this paper will be on CIMIC within domestic operations.

HTM AND POTENTIAL MISSIONS

Let us look to further refine potential employment of HTM on domestic operations. Military missions carried out within the context of DOMOPS are primarily but not exclusively reactive. The majority are responses to crises or civil emergencies. That being said, because HTM is the result of specialized data and time-consuming analysis, it is clearly best done proactively and broadly, which likely precludes it from being used in the majority of reactionary crises or civil emergencies. The notable exceptions to this qualification are Sovereignty Operations (SOVOPS) and National Special Security Events (NSSE), both of which are deliberate and planned events.

SOVOPS are fairly straightforward and conducted mostly within the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, the intent being to demonstrate national sovereignty and control of the regions. SOVOPS are force-projection missions that are strongly enabled by Canadian Rangers (there are approximately 5,000 Rangers organized into the five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups (CRPGs)). The Rangers, who are recruited and employed locally, have intimate local knowledge and skills that support CAF missions in the North. Given the lower population density of the North, the value of standard HTM to a SOVOP can be seen as limited at best and would more than likely be outstripped by the knowledge of CRPG personnel. Based on those factors, HTM would likely be of limited benefit to SOVOPS and would not be recommended from a cost perspective.

An NSSE, on the other hand, while having no formal definition, represents a significant Canadian event which is not restricted to any specific location or region. A typical example includes Olympic sporting events or an international summit hosted by Canada, like the 2010 G8 summit in Huntsville, Ontario. Such events are planned years in advance and involve a substantial security footprint. They usually have a federal government department in the lead, with security being delegated to the RCMP as lead and DND/CAF in support. One of the potential areas of support from the CAF would be GEOINT, which the CAF provided for both the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and the G8 summit that same year.

From a CIMIC point of view, the process by which DND and the CAF provide support to other government departments requires initiation by way of a formal ministerial-level request. In the case of an NSSE, it typically comes from either the head of the RCMP (or another law enforcement agency (LEA)) direct to the Minister of National Defence. The request would begin a very detailed dialogue to outline the legal and other factors prescribing how DND/ CAF support would be provided. For GEOINT, this would include a discussion of privacy issues related to the intelligence provided and any products resulting from it.

There are some obstacles to including HTM in NSSE planning. In the past, a lack of explicit doctrine and policy has hampered negotiations and cooperation between DND/CAF and other departments. A lack of explanation and/or understanding of capabilities meant that



Canadian Rangers assist Royal New Brunswick Regiment soldiers of the Arctic Response Company Group during Operation NANOOK 2012 in Tsiigehtchic

consequence management was very poor. This issue can be mitigated: for example, inter-agency teams could be formed and made responsible for the preparatory HTM analysis. This would accomplish two aims: first, it would help make the HTM process and products understandable and accessible to a greater number of government departments and decision-makers; second, it would help mediate against myopic fear regarding HTM. In any case, there are definite legal and operational issues that need to be considered when including HTM.

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF HTM

The most significant factors affecting HTA tasks, and by extension HTM, are not the quality, quantity or accessibility data to support analysis, but rather those social and legal restraints we as an institution place upon its employment in order to avoid infringement on Canadian rights and freedoms. In fact, there is nothing to prevent an individual from doing research on the Internet, for example, and undertaking a crude type of HTM. Commercial firms make use of HTM on a regular basis in the guise of market analysis supplied to a host of individuals, organizations, commercial enterprises and government departments. Their products are provided at varying stages of analysis, and individual privacy concerns are often mitigated by deliberately aggregating data.

The broad range of data available to the average interested party and the current lack of restraints on its use provide a number of potential products, including the following:

- **Population density maps.** These maps are commonly produced now for most geographic areas and are a useful tool for all military operations. This type of product is very useful at the tactical level, providing an overview of the local neighbourhood levels. Population density maps support evacuation planning, consequence management and the establishment of primacy of effort on domestic operations.
- Land use maps. Land use maps provide an understanding of urban and rural zoning and land use. These maps can support force-protection measures, for example, through the identification of hazardous environmental areas.
- Language distribution maps. As a multicultural country, Canada has substantial communities where languages other than French and English are spoken regularly. Knowledge of these types of conditions would be of benefit to CIMIC and Operations planners. It could lead to more effective messaging in the event of a disaster: CIMIC and/or disaster-response teams could be linguistically programmed and targeted for increased effectiveness. Combining linguistic ability with an understanding of local ethnicity would lead to an improvement in cultural sensitivity that would certainly benefit civilian—military relations.
- Vulnerable person maps. These maps are typically prepared at the national level by
 the UN and aid agencies as a tool for understanding the magnitude of the human
 condition within the state. The goal in a domestic operation is to use the data available
 to produce maps of better scale. These would be useful in evacuation operations and
 consequence management planning.
- **Health facilities and catchment.** This analysis would match up infrastructure locations and capabilities with the condition of the people around them.
- Crime mapping. Crime mapping is used by law enforcement analysts to map, visualize, and analyze criminal patterns. While geographic profiling can be considered a subset within criminal science and is a first step within a law enforcement investigation, it does not mean that the investigation *in toto* is being employed as an HTM product. Rather, it is the data that results from the reporting of criminal behaviour that should be considered, albeit refined for CAF planning purposes. Crime mapping tools are being used in major urban centres now: police services in Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa, for example, employ these systems. Crime mapping has value within force protection planning, providing situational awareness and a better understanding of specific areas within a disaster response effort.

DATA SOURCES

The data to support these potential products must come from a number of non-traditional sources. ¹⁷ Geospatial data on demographics in Canada is arguably the best in the world in terms of theme, coverage, currency, periodicity and availability. Development of products to support DOMOPS is substantially easier than in expeditionary operations.



CAF, RCMP and Sûreté du Québec personnel during Op PODIUM

Potential data and sources include the following:

- Population density figures; basic demographic data including age, gender, language and ethnicity; and income levels can typically be obtained from Statistics Canada census data.
- Land use information is available through a number of sources. While land cover is a federal responsibility through Agriculture Canada, it should be noted that land use data is often generated by a number of users within multiple jurisdictions (municipal, provincial and federal, as well as commercial). The real estate industry, for example, may be a useful source.
- Crime statistics are available from federal, provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies. Much of this data is obtainable now; the question is how to separate the data from the applications being used to display the information.
- Medical and emergency response facility information is available through a variety of sources, including the Internet (Google maps, for example). The major issue becomes confirming the accuracy of the data, which requires confirming the source.



CAF and RCMP personnel during Op NANOOK

- Data about landmarks, cultural centres and historical points of interest can be obtained in the same manner as medical facilities data.
- Strategic buildings present a challenge: there is no doctrinal definition of a "strategic building," even though strategic buildings are included in level 1 of the NGA Data Hierarchy. For that reason, there is no extant data within DND. A solution would, at a minimum, involve combining the mapping of medical and emergency response facilities with key landmarks, cultural centres and historical points of interest, plus specific classes of land use, to build a customized data list that would be task-tailored to support the commander's planning and risk assessment requirements with other federal departments.

CONCLUSION

Domestic operations have the potential to be considerably improved through the use of HTM. As a specific subset of HTA, HTM provides a better product when employed within a deliberate and proactive planning cycle. Reactive operations may not result in the best HTM products, due to time limitations and rushed analysis. That said, the data available does indicate that HTM is beneficial when time permits its use. It should therefore be considered for inclusion within training and standing production tasks. Training in particular is critical for identifying what are largely non-traditional data sources. Operators require training in order

to understand the data generated and its application in domestic operations. Training also helps acclimatize JIMP partners on domestic operations with the benefits of HTM while calming fears associated with profiling.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Derek Spencer, CD, is Chief Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices at the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (Turkey) and an alumnus of Mapping and Charting Establishment and 1 Combat Engineer Regiment.

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Disclaimer—This document and proposals reflect the opinions of the author and in no way state a position, policy or directive of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces or any of its units.



THE SIEGE OF BREST 1941:

A Legend of Red Army Resistance on the Eastern Front

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

ALIEV, Rostislav. (Translation by Stuart Britton), South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword, hardcover, 224 pages, \$39.95 USD, ISBN 978-1-78159-08-0

Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham, CD, Air Logistics Transport Officer, A5, 1st Canadian Air Division.

The battle for the fortress of Brest commenced as soon as the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Located upon a strategic line of advance, it was the focus and task of the German 45th Infantry Division to capture the fortress within the first 24 hours. To accomplish that feat, a heavy concentration of artillery, including two massive

600-mm siege mortars, were employed to reduce both the fortress and the garrison.

However, although the Germans achieved complete surprise on the garrison, steadfast leadership and dogged determination on the part of the Soviet survivors resulted in a brutal battle of attrition that lasted for seven days before the final contingent of Soviets surrendered (individual soldiers continued to fight until as late as August 1941).

Aliev's most noteworthy achievement with this work lies not in the depth of detail or the lucidity of the text but in the fact that he has superbly rendered the story of the lead up and execution of the battle with a degree of suspense and drama rarely achieved in historical narrative. His humanization of key Russian and German figures adds life and dimension to this trial by combat.

By switching his storyline back and forth between the opposing sides, thereby creating concurrent lines of narrative, he gives the reader a clear vision of the perspective, stresses and decision influencers of each. One truly begins to appreciate the horror of the conditions under which the Russians fought and the cold-blooded realities facing those wounded or captured by either side. Interspersed with those episodes were instances of true humanity as Germans, while frustrated at the continued intransigence of the Russians, nevertheless came to see their opponents as warriors worthy of respect. Aliev is able to convey with startling clarity the responsibility assumed by the most junior of Russian officers as well as give a real sense of the brutality of the hand to hand fighting, the fear of close quarter combat with knives and grenades in the confined spaces of the fortress casemates and the suffering of the wounded and civilians trapped within the fortress.

The major critical observations on this book centre upon two points: there is no index or bibliography—which are always important for reference at a later date—and, while there are excellent maps tracing the unfolding combat, there is no map that provides a single overview of the fortress itself. It would have been quite useful to have had a single reference for the layout.

Aliev, for his part, does refer to sources that he used in his introduction (German Bundeswehr archives in Freiburg and Soviet recollections gathered in the 1950s by Sergei Smirnov as well as the report by the commander of the 45th Infantry Div entitled "Account of the taking of Brest-Litovsk"). By doing so, he is able to compare and confirm recollections and timelines using sources from the opposing camps.



A GI runs in the streets of Brest, 1944

The efforts, names and valour of the warriors of Brest-Litovsk were unknown to the Soviet leadership for a long time, and it was not until the late 1950s that excavations of the fort recovered the final remains of many who had held out long after all hope had expired. For the Russians, Brest served as a shining example of courage and fidelity during a period of great loss and collapse.

Stuart Britton undertook the translation of the original Russian transcript and did a remarkable job of not only reproducing the work in English but also ensuring that the "essence" of the narrative conveyed in the original work was maintained. The book is an excellent rendition of a little known battle that was literally a footnote in the massive campaign that was Barbarossa or the Great Patriotic War. It serves as an excellent example of the effect that inspired leadership at the lowest level can have on the outcome of a battle. Aliev has ensured through his efforts that the valour and sacrifice of both the defenders and the aggressors will not be forgotten.



JULY 1914:

Countdown to War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

McMEEKIN, Sean. New York: Basic Books, 2013, softcover, 460 pages, \$21.00, ISBN 978-0-465-06074-0

Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald, CD, Senior Counsel with the Ontario Office of the Crown Attorney.

Conventional historiography has it that the First World War was caused by unbridled German aggression combined with international imperial rivalry. The speed with which war was declared following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 by Gavrilo Princip was ascribed to inflexible German and Russian mobilization plans. But Sean McMeekin's new book, *July 1914: Countdown to War*, convincingly demonstrates that war plans and

imperialism do not completely explain the outbreak of the war and that there existed enough personal "war guilt" to go around during the month leading up to the Habsburg declaration of war on Serbia on 28 July 1914.

Superbly researched and drawing on previously undisclosed primary sources, July 1914 recounts the diplomatic and political manoeuvrings of the great and less-than-great powers that turned a minor event—the Sarajevo "outrage," as the author describes it—into a world war. The machinations of the European powers had begun before the assassination. Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg had received information from disparate intelligence sources that an "incident" had been planned to coincide with the Archduke's visit to the city. Few precautions were taken to protect the ducal family, even after an unsuccessful attempt earlier in the morning on 28 June. Following the double regicide, the enfeebled Habsburg government, principally through the efforts of its foreign minister, Leopold von Berchtold, saw the murders as a means to avenge the empire's humiliation during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Armed with the now famous "blank cheque" from Berlin, which provided the necessary moral support for Austrian aggression, Vienna issued an ultimatum knowing that it would be rejected by the Serbian government. When it was, the dual monarchy had the causus belli it desired. Foreknowledge of the ultimatum by St. Petersburg led to Russia's secret mobilization, which, when discovered by Berlin, led to Germany's. All this led inexorably to a European war, then to a world war.

World War I must surely rank as a prime example of how not to conduct a war. Missteps, mistakes, deceits and outright blunders between all the combatants abounded. One ally did not know what the other was doing. There was a disconnect between the political and military leaders and their expectations of each other. War was declared before the means to prosecute it were in place. Political hesitancy, though laudable under the circumstances, was destructive when orders for mobilization were issued, then rescinded. It is painfully evident upon reading *July 1914* that there were many instances when the outbreak of war was not the only possible

result. It could have been prevented many times over by men of vision and determination. It was only with the German invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium that the Rubicon had been crossed and war became inevitable. Had any of the "statesmen" involved paused and reflected, a different outcome could clearly have been achieved. It was the desire of all not to be politically or militarily outmanoeuvred that lay at the heart of the tragedy.

Who, then, was ultimately responsible for the war? Writers such as Tuchman and Fischer are unanimous in their condemnation of Germany as the chief culprit and deserving of the opprobrium it has traditionally been served. July 1914 takes a more nuanced approach. War was not inevitable. Many of the underlying reasons cited as causes for the war had existed for years, even decades. McMeekin argues that all powers were guilty of sins of omission



Crowds on the streets in the aftermath of the anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo, 29 June 1914

and commission. Each pushed Europe closer to a shooting war. No one had the ability or the desire to perceive where this would all end. By the time it did end, three Empires had vanished, a new superpower had emerged, nine million people had died, and countless millions had been wounded and displaced. That, surely, is the final tragedy of *July 1914*.

OTHER RECOMMENDED READING


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FANGS OF THE LONE WOLF:

Chechen Tactics in the Russian–Chechen Wars, 1994–2009

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BILLINGSLEY, Dodge. Solihull, UK: Helion Publishing, 2013, hardcover, 181 pages, \$52.29, Photos/Maps: 11/30, ISBN 978-1-909384-77-4

Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham, CD, Air Logistics Transport Officer, A5, 1st Canadian Air Division.

Between 1994 and 2009 the Russian Federation and the Chechen fighters fought two distinct wars over the question of independence for Chechnya. These wars were interesting in that, although both were fought between the same adversaries, the nature, doctrine and skill sets evident in each conflict were unique and gave each conflict a very individual character. The author, an experienced conflict reporter, was embedded regionally during the fighting and was able to interview a number of Chechen combatants about how they planned and executed operations.

One of the most evident and consistent conclusions drawn by the author was that critical limitations were imposed upon the Chechens by their lack of a coherent or reliable logistics system. Throughout both wars they were utterly unable to hold territory for any length of time due to their inability to resupply and maintain their forces. Thus, during the initial fighting in 1994–1995, although Chechen forces had artillery, tanks and other advanced weapon systems, they quickly became ineffective due to a lack of munitions, spares and recovery capabilities.

The Chechens were also hampered by their ad hoc fighting and command and control structures. Units were formed around individuals from the same town or village and were loyal only to their elected leaders. They would frequently depart a battlefield for personal or clan reasons without notifying their central command. Orders from the centre were extremely general, often only outlining roughly where units were to deploy. Individual unit leaders would then determine tactics and plans without consulting neighbouring sections. This often resulted in fractured responses and a lack of confidence in other units' reliability.

Nevertheless, as the author relates, the Chechens were not lacking in courage or tactical capability. Employing advanced defensive techniques, they were regularly able to counter Russian offensive doctrine and inflict significant damage upon armour and air assets. They were also able to take advantage of local support to obtain food, shelter and information, depending upon the region where they were operating. This changed as the second war dragged on: local sources of support were sapped as the civilian population grew tired of the conflict, and the Russians succeeded in promoting intense conflict between Chechen groups.

Another area where the Chechens excelled was their ability to improvise weapon systems out of everyday parts. Thus, despite the fact that they lacked access to formal weapon systems such as rocket launchers, they were able to maintain stocks by building their own. For example, they would salvage the driveshaft covers from MAZ trucks to serve as the launch tube for 57-mm S-5 rockets and, similarly, the driveshaft covers from Ural trucks for 80-mm S-8 rockets. Sights for these weapons were developed by utilizing half-binoculars or something similar. The rockets themselves were usually salvaged from shot-down helicopters.


Billingsley has drafted his text in a series of vignettes, each accompanied by a map in colour, that serve to highlight a different aspect of Chechen asymmetric warfare techniques. He emphasizes Chechen strengths and weaknesses under different fighting scenarios, providing detailed accounts of the battles as recounted by individuals present on the field, followed by a commentary that encapsulates the lessons to be drawn from the encounter. His chapters are broken out by operational type, such as "Defense of an Urban Area," "Raids," "Ambush and Counterambush" and "Defense of Lines of Communications," and may be read all together or individually without breaking the flow of the narrative.



A Chechen fighter near the burned-out ruins of the Presidential Palace in Grozny, January 1995

I liked Billingsley's writing style and the way he summarizes the chapters, providing a quick and accurate synopsis of the lessons to be gleaned from the Chechen experience. Although the book is focused exclusively upon the Chechens themselves, it is evident from the accounts of the later battles in the 2000s that the quality and professionalism of the Russian forces had also improved dramatically. The book includes a good bibliography of printed works and videos.

Helion Publishing has produced another high-quality book that is worth the reader's investment of time and money. The author's unique insights, backed up by his close working relationship with the Chechens, makes for a technical but interesting read. His narrative is blunt, honest and balanced, and he does not shy away from critical conclusions about the Chechen efforts where warranted.



A COMPANION TO WOMEN'S MILITARY HISTORY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

HACKER, Barton C., & Margaret Vining, eds., Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2012, hardcover, 720 pages, \$273 USD, ISBN 978-9-00421-217-6 (E-ISBN 978-9-00420-682-3)

Reviewed by Major Chris J. Young, CD, MA, member of the Concepts Team at the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (CALWC).

The editors of this massive 720-page tome are both curators of armed forces history at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History, and they have managed to put together a very interesting collection of essays from assorted experts on women's military history. Where this compilation succeeds is by providing—dare I say it—muchneeded attention to the role of women within the

military environment. Women's military history, as the editors point out, has too often been subsumed into other historical areas or events.

This collection is intended to further the institutionalization of this field as a distinct historical field of study by providing a focal point for further research. Specifically, the essays within represent a significant contribution from a historiographical point of view. Each essay provides a very clear outline of the literature available within the field, backstopped by detailed and quite useful bibliographies. That being said, this collection does represent a very (perhaps overly) ambitious project intended to cover the entire timeframe from the Classical period through to the present. There is one significant gap in that coverage—as the editors note up front, material on the Dark and Middle Ages is missing, the result of commissioned work failing to appear.

The book is divided into three parts and provides coverage beginning with the Classical period, jumping to the 1400s and pushing forward through the two world wars to the present. Given the timeframe covered, it is not surprising that the essays are quite broad in scope. The first part begins with an exploration of the traditional and non-traditional female roles within the military, generally broken down by specific periods of time. The eight "survey articles" explore a host of female roles, including those of camp followers, military wives, war fighters, civil defence specialists and military medical staff, among others. The papers are well written and quite illuminating in their coverage, and they do a very good job of balancing history with historiographic coverage. There is one issue, and again, the editors have acknowledged it up front: material featuring non-Western experiences is quite sparse. As they point out, "too little of the necessary spadework has yet been done." That being said, there is some coverage of experiences with Russian and Chinese militaries (regular and otherwise), and it does represent a good first step.

The second part of the book is a thought-provoking pictorial record featuring an assortment of lithographs, drawings, paintings and photographs, from the 16th century through to the

present, of women and their connection to armies. The images run the gamut from fighting women through to scenes of daily military life, and include an excellent selection of enlistment posters that featured women front and centre. My favourite, as an armoured officer, was a 1909 photo of two horse-mounted members of the British First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (or FANY—a most unfortunate acronym, to say the least) serving in Africa.



Personnel of the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) taking part in a firefighting exercise, London, England, 28 February 1943

The final part of the book explores specific case studies of women. The eight essays within this part of the book include an examination of women in 17th and 18th century Russia; US military wives in the Philippines from the Philippine War through to World War I; a study of women and their representation on World War I posters; German women during the world wars; the role of Jewish women during the Holocaust; a fascinating study of "wartime representations of foreign women in English-Canadian Press, 1941–1943"; the experience of women who enlisted in the US Army during the post-World War II era through to the present; and a fascinating article by Jan Noel that explores the activities of religious women (nuns and others) in Quebec during the conflict of the years 1640 to 1775.

Overall, *A Companion to Women's Military History* is a solid addition to the field of military history and an excellent start to the authors' goal of "institutionalizing women's military history as a distinct historical field of study." From a historiographical point of view, this Companion volume is a recommended first stop.

Note that this is Volume 74 of Brill's "History of Warfare" series and is available as an e-book as well. ❤



LAST MAN STANDING:

The Life of Smokey Smith VC, 1914-2005

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

LOCKHART, Thomas Glen. Victoria: Friesen Press, 2013, hardcover, 105 pages, \$19.99, ISBN 978-1-46-020509-9

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, member of the Concepts Team at the CALWC.

Since its creation by Queen Victoria in January 1856 to honour acts of valour in the face of the enemy during the Crimean War, the Victoria Cross has been awarded 1,357 times to 1,354 individual recipients. Of these awards, 96 have been presented to Canadians or people closely associated with Canada, 16 of them during the Second World War. In his recent book, Last Man Standing: The Life of Smokey Smith VC, 1914–2005, Thomas Glen Lockhart introduces us to one of these remarkable gentlemen.

Earnest Alvia "Smokey" Smith was born in New Westminster, British Columbia, in the summer of 1914. In March 1940. he left his contracting job and walked into the recruiting station at the old Hotel Vancouver to enlist in the Canadian Army. He completed his basic training at Oakridge Depot over the summer and left for overseas duty in September as a private in the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. After extensive training in England, the 1st Canadian Division embarked with other formations to take part in the



Allied invasion of Sicily. Smokey's regiment, as part of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, landed at Pachino Beach in July 1943. After weeks of fierce fighting on the island, the Allies emerged victorious. It was not long, however, before the next phase of the assault on Fortress Europe began and Smokey joined the invasion of the Italian mainland in September.

Smokey Smith earned his VC during fighting at the Savio River in October 1944. The Seaforth Highlanders had led the Canadian attack across the river to form a bridgehead, and as a member of an anti-tank team, Smith singlehandedly blunted a German counter-attack against the foothold with PIAT and small-arms fire. His determination deterred the enemy long

138


enough for his battalion to consolidate their position across the river and bring up reinforcements. Though Smith himself did not see his actions as anything exceptional, his decision to attack at that moment undoubtedly helped alter the final outcome of the battle.

The full story of Smith's heroism at the Savio River on that fateful night in October 1944 has been told many times over, perhaps leading one to wonder what Lockhart's book might offer that is new. While not a comprehensive biography of Earnest Smith VC, this book brings together a wide range of interesting material associated with the man as it traces his life both during and after the war. Of particular interest to readers will be those parts focusing on Smith's postwar life and ultimately the events surrounding his passing. As the last living VC recipient, Smith was indeed the "last man standing" of that generation of legends who emerged



Private Ernest Alvia "Smokey" Smith, VC

from the Second World War. This book focuses on his unique role in Canadian society in that regard. For those interested in Canada's VCs during the Second World War, Lockhart's short book offers a fresh look at one of our best-known heroes.



A MAD CATASTROPHE:

The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

WAWRO, Geoffrey. New York: Basic Books, 2014, hardcover, 440 pages, \$34.50, ISBN 978-0-465-02835

Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald, CD, Senior Counsel with the Ontario Office of the Crown Attorney.

The centenary of the First World War brings with it a small library of books seeking to explain its causes, chart its course and explain its impact on history. The historiography of the war tends to focus on the western front, with an emphasis on the British and French land battles with Germany. If any regard is paid to the war in the east, it is concentrated on the Russian contribution and how Russia's military defeats contributed to its revolution.

Scant attention is paid to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire's disastrous efforts in the first six months of the war in Serbia and Galicia and how, in the end, they contributed to Germany's ultimate defeat. Author and university history professor Geoffrey Wawro admirably fills this gap with his aptly titled book, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War One and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire.

One is left to ask, after reading A Mad Catastrophe, "Just what were the Habsburgs thinking?" and, as a corollary to that first question, "Why did Berlin permit itself to be shackled to the "old man of Europe?" There were a number of internal problems which divided the Empire and prevented it from projecting a unified modern military presence. Vienna was a "fading great power" which was at war with itself. Its "Common



During the fighting in 1914, Sich archers showed themselves to be welltrained and reliable soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian military formations.

Army" had lost its last war more than fifty years ago and not learned anything from that defeat. Its military doctrine remained unchanged in the intervening years. Its government was divided, as a result of the "Great Compromise" of 1867, into Austrian and Hungarian factions, with the latter group denying the country necessary military appropriations and recruitment among its own population. German was the language of command, a language which most of its soldiers and many of its junior officers did not understand. Its largely agrarian economy lacked a sound industrial base to support modern industrialized war. The country had recently been racked by a spy scandal which saw its secret plans sold to the Russians. Its heavy armament was



Austrian fieldworks in Galicia on the front lines


outmoded. It had no air force to speak of. Its single ally, Imperial Germany, had no confidence in the Empire's military abilities and designed its own war plans with scant regard for Vienna's military objectives. As if that were not enough, its senior officer, a middling strategist at best, was enamoured with the charms of a married woman half his age and paid little attention to his command responsibilities. This was a recipe for disaster.

It is therefore no surprise, as Wawro writes, that Vienna's initial campaigns against Serbia and in Galicia against Russia were doomed to failure. Demonstrating that one should never reinforce failure, Vienna launched a series of unsuccessful offensive campaigns against the smaller but better-equipped Serbian army, resulting in heavy casualties. Without the assistance of the Germans in 1916, the author rightly asserts, Austria-Hungary would have been forced to sue for peace, as by that time its armies were an undisciplined, leaderless rabble which was surrendering to the enemy at every opportunity, dying from untreated wounds, or freezing to death due to an antiquated and corrupt supply system. It was this military assistance which diverted battle-hardened German troops from the Western Front, giving the western allies a much-needed respite to reorganize and regroup, and which ultimately, through a series of bloody campaigns against the Russians, attrited these German battalions and denied their further use in 1918 against the West. It is said that Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger), Chief of the German General Staff, once remarked that the war in the east would be won on the Marne, not on the Bug. It is not an exaggeration to suggest, as Wawro implies, that the war in the west was actually won in the east.

RECOMMENDED READING

Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper, 2014).

Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (New York: Basic Books, 2013).



BUILDING SANCTUARY:

The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965–73

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

SQUIRES, Jessica. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013, hardcover, 349 pages, \$34.95, ISBN 978-0-7748-2525-2

Reviewed by John MacFarlane, Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence

Building Sanctuary is about the movement to support Vietnam War resisters in Canada. Jessica Squires specifies that her focus is not on "draft dodgers" but on "Canadian support for resisters," with resisters including deserters as well as draft dodgers. Earlier studies by Hagan and Churchill that focused on resisters are included in an extensive bibliography.¹

Sources for the study include interviews with activists which "help to provide an accurate picture of the culture of the anti-draft movement." Government documents, with the notable exception of those from DND, as well as files from the groups associated with the movement, help provide a fascinating look into this unique movement.

The movement included "a complex and varied set of relationships, actions and interactions by and among various individuals, institutions and groups." Beginning in 1967, but most active in 1968 and 1969, 51 groups of various sizes (listed in Appendix 1) worked across Canada. They provided direct support for arriving immigrants, notably legal advice, as well as political advocacy to shape public perception, improve border conditions and affect public policy. These groups relied on the support of church groups, university students' associations, women's groups and increasingly on recent immigrants from the United States. Not surprisingly, members held a wide variety of opinions on subjects such as the priority to be given to helping immigrants as opposed to anti-war work and the related debates about effective resistance to the war: draft-dodging, deserting, or actions inside the U.S. As in Canada during the two world wars, opposition to conscription did not mean opposition to the war, and that caused some tensions, particularly among communist supporters and opponents. 4

The author argues that the various forms of this movement helped shape immigration policy. Appendix 2 contains a helpful chart that details changes from 1967 to 1973: "Shifts in Immigration Regulations and Tactics of Counselling and Border Crossing." Particular attention is given to the important May 1969 decision to "open the border" to deserters coming to Canada. A letter-writing campaign is credited with helping to influence Ottawa's decision: "In the context of questioning in the House of Commons, media attention to the issue, and pressure through other means, such as lobbying and briefs, Minister [Allan] MacEachen and his staff must increasingly have seen the letters as a reflection of public opinion." Advances were made despite the RCMP's "[c]onstant surveillance throughout the period" of dozens of groups.



Draft-age Americans being counselled by Mark Satin (far left) at the Anti-Draft Programme office on Spadina Avenue in Toronto, August 1967. The front room was so crowded at the time that the counselling session here is taking place in one of the small side rooms. The Toronto Anti-Draft Programme was Canada's largest organization providing pre-emigration counselling and post-emigration services to American Vietnam War resisters.

The author also affirms that the movement helped shape Canadian identity, estimating that from 1967 to 1972 about 40,000 US immigrants came to Canada, many of them war resisters of draft age. She affirms that "the image of Canada as a harbour for Americans of conscience, 'draft dodgers,' to a lesser extent 'deserters,' and their families and friends has become an important Canadian legend and part of Canadian identity." And later: "Almost entirely because of the efforts of its activists, Canada came to represent a refuge for Vietnam-era American war resisters." On Canada–US relations, the author notes that "allies to the south might reasonably be expected to react negatively to the presence of war resisters in Canada, and indeed, many internal communications at the Department of Manpower and Immigration reflected exactly that anxiety. However, as time wore on and the negative reaction was not, to all appearances, forthcoming, the historic bloc came to see the advantages of opening the border as outweighing the more nebulous disadvantages. The movement to support war resisters took full advantage of this underlying ambivalence, and in the end, they tipped the scales."

One limitation of the study is the lack of information about other groups involved. As the author correctly points out, "The influence of populations, or sections of populations, on state departments and officials and their behaviour and decisions, and vice versa, is an important part of the story of support for war resisters." Would the Canadian population, media, politicians and other actors have arrived at different conclusions without the efforts of the movement? Measuring influence is always complicated, and some conclusions about the impact of the movement go beyond what the evidence presented can justify. For example, an equal number of Canadians crossed the border in the other direction to join US forces. A lesser number, approximately 1,000, served with international peacekeeping missions in Vietnam. These are not unimportant parts of Canadian identity and certainly a consideration in




Anti-Vietnam War placards surround Toronto's war memorial in 1969

Canada–US relations regarding resisters.¹⁰ A second limitation is the curious lack of information about the war. The reduction in the numbers of American immigrants arriving in 1971 is explained by "rising unemployment in Canada and the evolving antiwar mood in the United States"; no reference is made to the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam or their exit in early 1973. ¹¹

Nevertheless, there is much very worthwhile information in this book. Of particular interest is the multi-disciplinary approach, which is effective in portraying the origins and internal debates of the many groups that made up this diverse movement. The work will be of interest to researchers studying all aspects of this period.

ENDNOTES

- John Hagan, Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001);
 David Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State and Cold War Containment," Social History / Histoire sociale 27, 73 (2004), 1–26.
- Squires, Building Sanctuary, pp. vii–viii. On other groups, see Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954–1973 (Toronto: UTP, 1984).
- 3. Squires, Sanctuary, quote on viii. Other information on 20–47, 185.
- 4. Squires, Sanctuary, 69-71, 83, 185.
- Squires, Sanctuary, 155, also 143–75.
- 6. Squires, Sanctuary, 106, also 71, 82-83.
- 7. Squires, Sanctuary, quotes on 2, 231, stats on 228.
- 8. Squires, Sanctuary, 113.
- 9. Squires, Sanctuary, 15.
- See Fred Gaffen, Unknown Warriors: Canadians in Vietnam (Toronto: Dundurn, 1990); The Canadian Vietnam Veterans Memorial Association uses 40,000 in their publications.
- 11. Squires, Sanctuary, 202 and 209 refers to activities in 1973.



A SMALL PRICE TO PAY:

Consumer Culture on the Canadian Home Front, 1939–45

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BROAD, Graham. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013, softcover, 275 pages, \$95.00, ISBN 978-0-7748-2364-7

Reviewed by Colonel Peter J. Williams, CD, Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff.

High school was a bit of a turning point for me. I had to choose between Economics and French as an elective. Having studied our other official language for much of my school years, I opted to go with what I knew, and to abandon any pretense of trying to understand numbers and the like. Strange that I ended up as a gunner! In any case, it was with some degree of trepidation that I decided to review this

book for the *Canadian Army Journal*, half fearing that I would be baffled by figures and other things besides. Not a bit of it, as it turned out. I found this book to be a highly readable account of life on Canada's so-called "home front" in the Second World War. It is part of a series called Studies in Canadian Military History produced by the University of British Columbia.

The author, a member of the History Department at Western University, sets out to describe how the key stakeholders in the consumer culture (the buyers, sellers and advertisers) responded to the various challenges associated with supporting the war effort while ensuring that their own desires and needs were met. Indeed, the author argues that life on the home front was actually quite comfortable for Canadian consumers, particularly in comparison to their American or British counterparts. As the author concludes, consumerism (in Canada at least) was the ideology whose victory was complete, with Canadians choosing both guns and butter.

An austere home front life was not anticipated at the outset. The book's title comes from the sentiment, much in evidence at the start of the war, that the war itself and the privations which many Canadians thought they would endure were but "a small price to pay" for the peace and prosperity which would come with Allied victory—things which had been somewhat elusive after the last go-around in 1918. Mr. Broad argues that there is some evidence that Canada's economic boom started before 1939, and makes the case that it was more of a "post-Depression" than a "post-war" boom, and he provides the facts and figures to back up this assertion. In any case it was consumer spending, not government intervention with financial resources, which accounted for most Canadian economic activity between 1939 and 1945. Women may have had much to do with this, and the author devotes an entire chapter to the role of women (known as "Mrs. Consumer") on the home front and the "patriotic consumerism" in which they were to play a leading role.



Buying food at Eaton's using ration stamps, 30 March 1943

Not that the Canadian government did not play a part. Broad describes the critical role of the Wartime Price and Trade Board (WPTB), which was established on the day that Britain declared war on Germany, a week before Canada itself did so. The name of the organization might suggest that the Board tried to run a command economy in wartime, but the author also notes that it only instituted rationing in 1942, a full 34 months after Canada had been at war. Other chapters are illuminating for the perspective they provide on the role of advertising, which enjoyed a profitable renaissance, as did the film industry, which saw a dramatic increase in attendance rates over the course of the war. Time and again I found that most, if not all, of my preconceptions of life in wartime Canada were shattered.


The book is well illustrated with contemporary photos (including a well-stocked Montreal drug store, complete with soda fountain) and advertisements (including one predicting a post-war world which would not be unfamiliar to the Jetsons). There is a highly detailed appendix with figures on everything from retail sales of lumber, food and alcohol (all of which generally trended upwards over the course of the war), as well as charts depicting personal expenditure as a percentage of disposable income. The notes run to some 36 pages, and the bibliography includes a wide variety of primary sources and contemporary periodicals—including *Soda Fountains in Canada!*



Small Arms Manufacturing, 13 October 1943

One of my undergraduate history professors at the Royal Military College of Canada, the late Dr. Barry Hunt, used to say that good history should teach one something new and not merely be a recitation of facts and figures. It often takes many decades and declassification of archives to produce such work, but it is definitely worth the wait. I would certainly place this wonderful book in that category, as it shattered the myth I had believed for so long: that, for the majority of Canadians, wartime in Canada was one of extreme doing without and severe rationing. Graham Broad's work reverses this view, and indeed he is to be strongly commended for writing in such a way as to make the topic, which could easily have been very dry, quite interesting. One wonders if the Department of Finance might take a few lessons from this book in terms of how to make an ostensibly fiscally tragic national event (war, in this case) turn out to be a boon for the economy. It might be interesting to do a similar study of the economic impacts of the First World War on the Canadian economy, as well as the impacts of other military conflicts and campaigns in which we have engaged.

Highly recommended, but given the sticker price (a bit of a shocker, actually, but that's how it was listed on the Chapters/Indigo* website), you might be better off borrowing it from a library or asking your local DND library to order it for you. That's good, *modern* consumer culture, I reckon.



PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC COAST MILITIA RANGERS:

British Columbia's Guerrilla Army, 1942-1945

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

CLARK, David B., with James A. Goguen, Victoria: Privately Printed, 2013, 359 pages, illus., ISBN 978-0-9868772-3-0

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, member of the Concepts Team at the CALWC.

In light of the potential, if remote, threat against North America posed by Japanese forces operating in the Eastern Pacific during the Second World War, the Canadian government authorized the formation of local units in British Columbia whose mission was to monitor, patrol and, if needed, help defend the coastline locally.

Officially created on 3 March 1942, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) at its height consisted of 15,000 volunteers organized into 138 companies. Assigned to three major patrol areas—Vancouver Island, the lower Fraser Valley, and the Bridge River Area—the PCMR provided a visible sense of local security until its disbandment shortly after the war's end on 30 September 1945.

In their recent book, *Pictorial History of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers*, David B. Clark and James A. Goguen offer a popular and richly illustrated look at this unique wartime organization that served as the model for Canada's modern-day Canadian Rangers. Not presented in the typical form of a written narrative, the authors have instead collected 19 illustrated chapters and 5 appendices—accompanied by hundreds of




photos, copious notes, a glossary and a bibliography—into an impressive and comprehensive resource for historians and collectors alike. Additionally, the book includes a capsule history of Company No.1, the South Vancouver Island Rangers, as well as detailed lists of all PCMR companies and their operational areas. Good maps are also included in the book, identifying all headquarter locations as well as a number of other important sites associated with the organization.

For those familiar with the works of local historians, this book will be a welcome addition to any military history library. For others, however, the casual layout and approach that is often

148




taken in the production of such volumes may prove frustrating at times. For example, there is no index, which means that readers will need to have some familiarity with the subject matter to get the most out of the book or that they must be prepared to mark it up in order to identify often consulted passages. Some of the illustrations are also of poor quality, particularly some of the printed sources, and really should have been reproduced at higher resolution. If such passages are not clearly legible to the reader because the image is too low fidelity, it begs the question as to why they were included in the book in the first place. In fairness to the authors, they issued an advisory to this effect on the table of contents page, but that does not excuse poor production methods. Some of the photocopied documents illustrated in the book also lack proper context or source



citations, meaning that readers wishing to consult the originals may have difficulty locating them. Though, overall, the authors have kept such flaws to a minimum, they can be vexing.

Those observations aside, Clark and Goguen have nevertheless made a considerable effort to collect together a huge mass of material into a single book, and the result is a very enjoyable and fascinating read. For those with an interest in Canadian military unit history and/or the history of the Pacific coast in wartime, this book is definitely recommended. Privately published copies may be obtained directly from the author at pcmr.history@shaw.ca.



WHERE THE IRON CROSSES GROW:

The Crimea 1941-44

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

FORCZYK, Robert. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014, hardcover, 304 pages, \$20.09, ISBN-13 978-1-78200-625-1

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Chris Rankin, CD, MA, Chief, Army Lessons Learned Centre.

Most people with a keen interest in the war on the Eastern Front will quickly recognize the quote by Feldwebel Rolf Steiner from the 1977 Sam Peckinpah directed film *Cross of Iron*: "And I will show you where the Iron Crosses grow." Based upon Willi Heinrich's 1956 novel, *The Willing Flesh*, the film is set during the German Army's defence of the Kuban bridgehead in 1943 and covers the German retreat from the Caucasus across the Strait of Kerch to the Crimea.

Robert Forczyk's latest book, *Where the Iron Crosses Grow: The Crimea 1941–44*, tells the more complete story of the battles between the German and Soviet armies for the control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula throughout the course of the Second World War. Given the recent events that began to unfold in the Crimea in 2014, this book is both timely and informative, adding some historical perspective to this recent flash point.

Forczyk opens Where the Iron Crosses Grow by taking a step back, setting the scene with a short prologue and quickly covering the history of the Crimea from the 16th century to the establishment of Soviet authority after the revolution. The subsequent nine chapters outline the campaign that saw the destruction of first the Soviet and then the German armies. Throughout the book, Forczyk outlines the importance of



the campaign's air and naval components, the insurgency conducted in the background of the main contest between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, and the atrocities committed by both sides. The book also touches on the role played by the Romanian forces, whose efforts on the Eastern Front, along with those of other German allies, are often overlooked. The book is well balanced in its account and ends with a rather ominous postscript of the events in Crimea in 2014: "Amazingly, the Crimea is going to remain a cockpit of war, with ancient fortifications refurbished and pressed back into service so that new generations of heroes can be asked to make sacrifices for an arid peninsula that has consistently proven to be an empty prize."



Coastal position of Soviet troops, Battle of Sevastopol

Forczyk is no stranger to the subject of war on the Eastern Front, having published numerous books in the various Osprey series and with Pen and Sword Books. With a PhD in international relations and a combined total of eighteen years as an Army and National Guard armour and intelligence officer, Forczyk demonstrates a flare for analyzing the significance of the action throughout the campaign. Forczyk gives an outstanding account of the operations by both German and Soviet forces, mainly at the battalion/regimental level, with sufficient maps included for the reader to visualize the ebb and flow of the campaign. Indeed, there is quite a bit of detail here and those unfamiliar with the campaign or used to reading military history through a wider aperture may not want to make this their first read on the subject. That said, the more initiated will find this an excellent source that utilizes newly available archives and contains additional appendixes that include a biographical outline of the key commanders on each side and useful orders of battle. There are also two sections of photographs that really give a sense of both the equipment employed and the landscape upon which the forces fought.

Overall, *Forczyk's Where the Iron Crosses Grow* is a timely, detailed and well-constructed account of this critical campaign on the Eastern Front.

NOTES

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