

NOTE

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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

R E P O R T NO. 2
HISTORICAL SECTION
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Aug 65

Canadian-American Defence Relations
1867-1914

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1. This report will briefly outline the material uncovered in Washington, D.C. during the period 22 Jul 64 - 10 Aug 64. No attempt has been made to search secondary sources for information on the topics covered in this report, nor has any research been done into Canadian primary sources.

PART I - MATERIAL EXAMINED

2. Research was undertaken at the Office of the Chief of Military History, the United States National Archives, the Library of Congress, and upon my return to Canada at the Public Archives of Canada.

Office of the Chief of Military History

3. My work was greatly facilitated at OCMH through the kindness of the Chief Historian, Dr. Stetson Conn, and of the librarian, Mr. Charles Romanus. Dr. Conn also arranged interviews for me with gentlemen at the National Archives and at the Department of State.

4. At OCMH, which has a very small library, the following items were studied:

(a) Reports of the War Department, 1867-1914

- (i) These reports include the Reports of the Secretary, the Commanding General, the Adjutant General, and other heads of branches. The reports of the Adjutant General were valuable as they indicated the strength and geographical distribution of the Army. A chart, attached as Appendix "A", lists the total strength of the Army, and the number stationed in districts bordering on the Canadian boundary for the years, 1867-1914.

(b) General Orders, 1867-1914

There was nothing of value here.

(c) Army War College, Problems and Exercises

OCMH holds all the AWC Problems and Exercises from 1913 to the late 1930s. The only material of interest is found in the 1913 series which has one volume devoted to plans for an attack on Canada. This volume will be referred to below.

(d) Journal of the United States Infantry Association, 1904-1914

The Infantry Journal in its first few years did not deal with Canada in any serious way. One article only was discovered in the 1914 volume -- and this was an insignificant anecdotal account of the Canadian militia.

Library of Congress

5. At the Library of Congress, I examined a few dissertations which would be difficult to obtain in Canada. These will be referred to subsequently.

United States National Archives (USNA)

6. At the USNA, I worked in three sections: the State Department archives, the Navy Department archives, and the Old Army Archives.

(a) State Department

(i) Notes from the United Kingdom Minister to the Department of State

a. This material on microfilm had little of value for my purpose. Good material exists there, however, on the broad subjects of the Fenians, the fisheries disputes, and the Alaska boundary question.

(ii) Notes from the Department of State to the British Minister.

a. As per (6.) (a) (i).

(b) Navy Department Archives

(i) Office of Naval Intelligence

a. There was no information of value here.

(ii) Reports of the Navy Department, 1867-1914.

a. There was no information of value here.

(iii) Certain selected files.

a. Nothing of value.

(iv) I was advised that the Department of the Navy still holds most of the important historical material for the period in question, but this information was received too late for me to arrange an appointment there.

(c) Old Army Archives

(i) Records of the Adjutant General's Office (AGO)

a. This was the most valuable source of information for the period. Unfortunately, the indexing system is exceedingly cumbersome and, although the maximum care was exercised, it is possible that some material was overlooked.

(ii) Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 1894-1897

a. These records are so badly organized as to be almost useless.

(iii) Records of the Chief Engineer's Office.

a. These records seem to be devoted primarily to the civilian aspect of the work of the Corps of Engineers and are of a highly technical nature.

(iv) Records of the Army War College.

a. The subject file was examined for this collection, but little of value was discovered.

(v) Records of the Chief of Staff, 1903-1917.

a. These records contain nothing of value.

(vi) Records of the Joint Army-Navy Board, 1903-1919.

a. The minutes of the Board do not even mention Canada until 1914.

- (vii) Records of the Land Defence Board.
 - a. The records of this body, created to examine the coast defences of the United States, were of no importance.
- (viii) Records of the War Department, General Staff, War Plans Division.
 - a. This material was declassified especially that I might examine it. There was some good information in these files, and there was also a war plan, dated 1915, a copy of which has been placed on the Historical Section's files.

Public Archives of Canada

7. The only material examined at the PAC was that which had been secured on microfilm from the USNA.

- (a) Despatches of the Consul General at Montreal to the Department of State.
- (b) Despatches of Consul at Toronto to the Department of State.
- (c) Despatches of Consul at Moncton to the Department of State.
- (d) Despatches of the Consul at Vancouver to the Department of State.
- (e) Despatches of the Consul at Winnipeg to the Department of State.
- (f) Despatches of the Consul at Halifax to the Department of State.

PART II - CANADIAN-AMERICAN DEFENCE PROBLEMS

8. It is, unfortunately, impossible to write a coherent report covering the entire period from the scanty material in the American archives. Certain areas, however, yielded some important material and these have been treated below. Other important documents have been listed chronologically with a brief description of contents.

The Fenians, 1866-1870

9. The attitude of the United States Government to Canada in the years immediately preceding and following Confederation could perhaps best be described as one of non-benevolence. This attitude was well shown by the American handling of the problems of neutrality created by the Fenian raids upon Canada.

10. There seems little doubt that the Fenian raids of 1866 were undertaken with, at the very least, the tacit encouragement of the President and Secretary of State. Embroiled in a struggle with the "Radical Republicans", President Andrew Johnson needed the support of the burgeoning Irish-American population. His Secretary of State, Seward, no friend of the President's, also sympathized with the designs of the Fenians, and for much the same reasons. This sympathy was, to be sure, expressed in a non-committal way, but expressed nonetheless. Asked what the attitude of the American Government would be if the Fenians seized and held territory in Canada, the President is alleged to have replied that "the government would, in such a contingency, acknowledge accomplished facts."¹

11. The accommodating attitude of the American Government to the Fenians was, quite naturally, suspected in Canada. The effect of these suspicions was often harmful to what some American officials thought to be the best interests of the United States. The Consul General in Montreal, for example, strongly urged the Government to put a halt to the Fenian threats of invasion in early 1867 because he felt that this manifest unfriendliness was hurting the fortunes of the Liberal Party, "the friends of the United States".² Certainly, the Fenians frightened the Canadian population, for the British Minister in Washington was constantly sending notes to the State Department reporting Fenian preparations.³

12. American soldiers, however, were not quite as ambivalent in their attitude to the Fenians as was their Government. Major General Pope, Commanding the District of the Lakes, for example, regularly received reports on the Fenians from Allan Pinkerton, founder of the famous detective agency bearing his name. Pinkerton's reports, while minimizing the threat of the Fenians, regularly stated his opinion that the whole Irish brotherhood was nothing but a clever device used to milk the poor Irish of nickels and dimes in contributions.⁴

13. The great crisis in Canada with respect to the Fenians came in the Spring of 1870; again, as in 1866, the official American attitude was exceedingly casual. Despite explicit warnings of the preparations being made for an invasion of Quebec from both the British Minister⁵ and the officer in charge in the Department of the East, General Meade,⁶ no action was taken to block the threatened raids. Meade was informed that his letter reporting the threats had been placed before the Cabinet, but that it had been deemed unwise to seize the Fenian stockpiles of munitions. The Fenians, the General was told by the Commanding General of the Army, General Sherman, probably were hoping for just such an action in order to make political hay at the expense of the Government.⁷

14. The Canadian Government, through its agents, was fully informed of the Fenian preparations. Early in May the Militia was called out and posted to positions on the threatened border. The American Consul General in Montreal, however, ascribed these moves to

base political motives, maintaining in his despatches that this was done solely to provide a smokescreen behind which the Government could pass some highly unpopular bills through Parliament.⁸ A few weeks later, with excitement still at a peak, the Consul noted that the constant threats of invasion were very bad for American business in Canada. He hoped, his report concluded, that if this present threat be real, it would be of sufficient importance to end the situation one way or the other -- in other words, either to win or to lose decisively.⁹ A few days later, with the invasion attempt in progress the Consul gloomily noted that the attack had roused patriotic sentiment strongly and that this would hurt those working for annexation. Demands¹⁰ would likely be made, he said, for more British troops.

15. Once the invasion was under way and a clear breach of neutrality apparent, the US Army moved rapidly, and substantial numbers of troops were shifted to the states of Vermont, New York, and New Hampshire.¹¹ The main task of these troops was apparently to control the tattered Fenian soldiers, all of whom were reportedly very vexed at the refusal of the US Government to pay their transportation costs to their homes.¹²

16. The unsuccessful invasion did not cause a real breach in relations with the United States, and, indeed, the British Minister even thanked the President for his prompt action in moving troops to the area.¹³ The Canadian press, however, was not so polite, and editorials were sharply critical of the dilatory American military movements.¹⁴ The Consul in Montreal, however, ever seeking to advance the cause of his country, reported that the final result of the raids might yet be good for the annexation movement. Many Canadians were now aware of their defenceless state and angry with the Mother Country for its failure to defend them. It was quite possible, he reported, that a real demand for independence -- i.e. annexation -- would spring up.¹⁵

The Pembina Affair, 1871

17. Another of the minor disturbance along the frontier between Canada and the United States took place in 1871 in the area of Fort Pembina, Dakota Territory. Again, the bothersome Fenian Brotherhood was responsible for the trouble, but this time the American military reacted with unquestionable efficiency and despatch.

18. The fort at Pembina had been established in 1870 within a few miles of the indefinitely marked international boundary to meet the demands of American settlers for protection from marauding Indians stirred by the rebellion in Manitoba. ¹⁶ The fort, with its small garrison, had been in existence little more than a year before trouble arose.

19. The first warning of new disturbances came in a despatch from the American Consul at Winnipeg, Mr. Taylor, on 11 Sep 71. Taylor reported that rumours abounded in Winnipeg of large quantities of arms stored at or near Pembina for the use of the Fenians. He

feared that the construction of the Northern Pacific Railway, then underway in the Dakotas and Minnesota, had attracted "several hundred desperate characters" to the area. If there was a Fenian raid in the offing, he added, robbery would be the motive. 17 Within a few days corroboration of Taylor's report was provided in the form of a note from the British Minister to the State Department asking for preventive action "to baffle the plans of the intending evildoers, and to cause their leaders to be brought to account." 18

20. Early in October, 1871, Consul Taylor reported that the Fenian leader O'Neill was at Pembina with 100 armed men. He believed, he added, that French discontent in Manitoba was sufficient to encourage the raid, but not sufficient to provide success. 19 Intelligence of the impending raid was apparently known to the United States Army, too, for the Commander at Pembina, Captain Loyd Wheaton, was advised "to take all legitimate steps in your power to cause due respect to be paid to the neutrality laws of the United States." 20

21. There is some grounds for doubt, however, as to the seriousness with which American authorities viewed the Fenian threat to the Manitoba settlements, for as late as 5 Oct 71 the Secretary of War was writing the Secretary of State that his Department "entertains little apprehension of any organized invasion of Manitoba from the territory of the United States." 21 By this date, however, the raid had been launched and defeated by the garrison at Pembina.

22. In his report on the incident, Capt. Wheaton, the commander at Pembina, reported that "O'Neill, Curley and Donnelly, who addressed each other by the titles of 'General', 'Colonel', etc." had led "a body of men armed with muskets and marching in column of fours" against the Canadian establishments just across the 49th parallel. The Fenians had captured the Dominion Customs House in the name of the "Provisional Government of Rupert's Land", and had then looted the nearby Hudson's Bay Company post. 22

23. Wheaton continued by detailing his actions. He had loaded his command, two understrength companies of the 20th infantry, into wagons and proceeded with haste to a ravine 1000 yards from the trading post, formed skirmish lines, and then marched to the border. There he captured the leaders of the raid, 10 men, 94 muskets, 11 sabres, and 12000 rounds of ammunition. Only some forty to eighty men were involved, mostly Irish, and mostly strangers to the district. 23

24. Wheaton's prompt and effective action had squelched the raid before any real damage had been done. Most of the captured Fenian leaders, however, were released from jail on legal technicalities, apparently with the connivance of the United States Commissioner in the area, one Foster. 24 So changed had the American attitude become to unneutral intrusions into Canada, however, that the United States Attorney General undertook an investigation to determine if the Commissioner was fit to hold his post. 25

25. One final bone of contention between the two countries that could have led to trouble arose shortly after the events described above when 50 Canadian troops occupied the Hudson's Bay Company post recently looted by the Fenians. The post was situated south of the boundary claimed by the United States and north of that approved by the Dominion.²⁶ General Sheridan, commanding the Department of the Missouri from St. Louis, Mo., minuted Captain Wheaton's report of this event in a rather testy fashion. Wheaton, he wrote, had saved Manitoba for the Dominion, and now the United States was repaid for its consideration by this "annoying act which robs us of the justification of our action."²⁷ In forwarding this report to the Secretary of State, Secretary of War Belknap urged that British withdrawal be demanded.²⁸ The Secretary of State, however, refused to press the British for a withdrawal, claiming that it was well known that the boundary was unsettled and that it was extremely premature to call the occupation of the post "willful trespass."²⁹

Riel Rebellion 1885

26. By 1885, Canadian-American relations had reached a state of qualified friendliness. When the second Riel rebellion erupted, therefore, the American Government took immediate action to block any breaches of neutrality. Having received instructions from the Secretary of State after a British request for aid,³⁰ the Army was ordered to use "all diligence" to prevent any supplies or reinforcements from reaching Riel's forces from the United States.³¹

27. There is some doubt as to whether any serious attempt was made by the rebels to get supplies or Indian support from the United States. One officer reported that the Indians in his district were far more interested in their cash crop of wheat than in rendering any aid to Riel.³² The Fenian brotherhood, however, was ever anxious to aid rebels against the Crown, and reports were current that supplies were being prepared.³³ But, as a letter from "a Canadian girl" to President Cleveland showed, effective action was taken by the American authorities. "You have already won the hearts of Canadian women," the unidentified girl wrote, "by the prompt manner in which you have stationed your troops to prevent Fenians crossing into the now rebellious part of our Dominion."³⁴

Alaska Boundary, 1901-1903

28. In late 1901, the Canadian Government, through the British Minister at Washington, approached the Department of State with a request for aid in meeting a threatened insurrectionary movement in the Klondike. The American officer in command at Skagway, Alaska Territory, informed that he should exercise "vigilance" to prevent the use of American territory as a base for the threatening uprising,³⁵ dismissed the report as a "Canadian fancy" and, adding that no one in Alaska took this rumour seriously, suggested that possibly the Canadians had an ulterior motive.³⁶

29. In a later report, the American commander at Skagway expanded on his opinion of the motives of the Dominion:

I am led to believe after further investigation that the danger if any is to us....that this has been worked up on the other side to use as a lever in the settlement of the boundary questions and also as an excuse to enforce the Canadian alien law which will prevent Americans from working in that country....³⁷

Whether the officer was correct in his assessment or not is unknown, but there seems to be no doubt that the rumoured insurrection was a "Canadian fancy." Early the following year, the British Minister reported that the Canadian Government agreed that the earlier reports were based on dance hall talk." New rumours existed, the same communication added, however, of "mischief" in the spring of 1902. ³⁸

30. There was, perhaps, more foundation to the second warning of trouble, for the Administration soon took steps to reinforce the Alaska garrison. Cipher orders were issued on 29 Mar 02 for "an additional force as quietly as possible" to be sent to Southern Alaska "so as to be able promptly to prevent any disturbance along the disputed boundary line." ³⁹ At the same time, "a trusted officer" was sent to report on conditions in the area. The officer, Captain W.R. Richardson, reported that he could ascertain no prospect of contemplated aggression or mischief, but that much hostility in Alaska existed toward the "Special Canadian Customs Officer", one L.S. Busby, who seems to have been somewhat overzealous in the performance of his duties. ⁴⁰

PART III - MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

31. In this section, documents of interest have been listed chronologically with a brief description of contents.

Red River Rebellion, 1869

32. Three documents bear on the opening phases of the Rebellion.

- (a) USNA, AGO 1735.4/1869, Lt Gov McDougall, Pembina, to B Gen Hunt, Ft Abercrombie, 22 Nov 69.
 - (i) The Lieutenant Governor informs General Hunt that he has been barred from taking up his post at Ft Garry by French rebels and forced back into the United States.
 - (ii) McDougall informs the American Officer that he has heard rumours of a rebel attack on Georgetown, Min. where his baggage and some

Government of Canada supplies were stored in transit. He adds that because of this threat he has had his baggage shifted to Ft Abercrombie where he would like to store it temporarily.

- (b) USNA, AGO 1735M/1869, B Gen Hunt to AAG, St Paul Minn, 27 Nov 69.
 - (i) Hunt, relaying the Lieutenant Governor's request, advises that he had had to refuse storage on the post grounds because he could not spare the soldiers to guard the stores. He adds, though, that he has arranged for a sutler to provide storage.
- (c) USNA, AGO 1735M/1869, AAG to B Gen Hunt, 6 Dec 69.
 - (i) General Hunt's action in refusing storage on the grounds of the post is commended. He is ordered to repel any attack on American territory.

Military Prisons in Canada

33. American officers, handicapped by their apparent lack of a military prison system showed great interest in the prisons established in Canada by the British services.

- (a) Report of the Comdg Gen, Dept of the East, Gen McDowell, in Report of the War Department 1871 (Washington, GPO, 1871), p. 54.
 - (i) General McDowell reports that he sent a board of three officers to Montreal and Quebec to report on the British system of military prisons.
- (b) Ibid., 1872, p. 62
 - (ii) General McDowell notes that he took a recent trip to Halifax which "has confirmed me in the opinion I have heretofore expressed... that in matter of enforcing discipline we are much behind the British service." The General adds that "while their soldiers are worse paid, worse fed, and worse clothed, their punishments are milder and their discipline much better than with us."

Forts on Canadian Frontier

34. A brief notation that many forts on the border are being shut down provides an indication of the improving political situation with Canada.

(a) Report of the Comdg Gen of the Army, Gen Sherman, in Report of the Department of War, 1882 (Washington, GPO, 1882,) p. 10.

(i) Only the following forts are to be maintained:

- a. Ft Montgomery (L. Champlain)
- b. Ft Niagara
- c. Ft Wayne
- d. Mackinac
- e. Ft Brady (Sault Ste Marie)
- f. Ft Pembina
- g. Ft Buford (Dakota Territory)
- h. Ft Assiniboine
- j. Ft Colville
- k. Port Townsend.

Apprehended Invasion of Manitoba, 1873

35. An invasion of Manitoba from the United States to free prisoners was apparently contemplated.

(a) USNA, AGO 5227/1873, A/Sec State Davis to Sec War Belknap, 25 Aug 73.

(i) Davis reports rumours of an invasion to free prisoners held in Manitoba. He states that his Department is trying to secure a mitigation of sentences for the prisoners. He urges the military to take action to prevent any breach of neutrality.

Visit of General Selby-Smith to United States, 1875

36. General Selby-Smith becomes the first British general officer to visit the Northwest.

(a) USNA, AGO 3837/1875, Brit Min Thornton to Sec State Fish, 10 Jul 75.

(i) General Selby-Smith is to visit the NWT to report on the efficiency of the NWMP. He is supposed to meet American authorities with a view to establishing a "uniform system of Police and Military measures on both sides of the Boundary."

(b) USNA, AGO 3837/1875, Sec War Belknap to Sec State Fish, 23 Jul 75.

(i) All courtesies will be shown the General, but no mention will be made of a uniform police system with Canada pending word from the State Department.

Canadian Arms Trade with Indians, 1878

37. Canadian military authorities are accused of selling arms too freely to the Indians.

(a) USNA, AGO 3702/1878, Lt FD Baldwin, Poplar Creek, Mont. Terr. to Gen NH Miles, 13 Apr 78.

(i) Lieutenant Baldwin reports that Yanktonais Indians have been sold ammunition in large quantities by the Canadians. He cites the names of the Indians and reports their conversations with a Canadian, Major Walsh. He attaches copies of authorizations signed by Cornet A.B. Macdonnell giving the Indians the right to buy arms and ammunition freely.

(b) USNA, AGO 3702/1878, Brit Min Thornton to Sec State Fish, 4 Jul 78, enclos despatch Gov Gen Canada to Brit Min, 2 July 78.

(i) The Canadian Government is surprised at this charge, as orders had been given to stop the arms trade. The orders will be reiterated.

Canadians in the United States Army

38. A report listing the numbers of foreign-born in the US Army, includes Canadians.

(a) Report of the General of the Army 1883
(Washington, GPO, 1883) pp. 42-7.

(i) Canadian are listed as follows:

a. Infantry	78
b. Cavalry	115
c. District of Platte	2
d. District of California	2
e. District of Texas	1
f. District of Dakota	13
g. Dept. of Columbia	2
h. Dept. of Missouri	4
TOTAL	217

Defence of US Northern Frontier, 1890

39. American precautions for an attack from the north.

- (a) Report of the Sec War [Proctor] in Report of the War Department, 1890 (Washington, GPO, 1890), p. 8
 - (i) Secretary Proctor reports that the Board of Fortifications has reported on the northern defences and felt it was unnecessary to undertake extensive works. All that is required, the Board reported, is a nuclei of troops and emergency accommodations for others.

Intelligence Report on CPR, 1890

40. A careful report on the CPR main line in Western Canada.

- (a) USNA, Army War College, 3071-d, Lt AS Rowan, Report on the CPR, 1 Mar 90.
 - (i) This is a first class piece of work, listing every bridge, including its type and construction features, between Lake of the Woods and Calgary. Lt Rowan decided that the key point on the CPR was Rat Portage on the Winnipeg River. The report was produced in accord with a directive from the Adjutant General in July 89.

Invasion of Canada, 1896

41. A plan to invade Canada was prepared in 1896 at the time of the Venezuela boundary crisis with the United Kingdom.

- (a) USNA, Army War College, 3083 (record card), "Confidential Data - Canada".
 - (i) Unfortunately the documents listed on this card have been destroyed. One entry, however, records a memo prepared for the Secretary of War on 30 Sep 96 by the Assistant Adjutant General, T.M. Vincent, on an invasion plan for Canada.

War Plans, Canada, 1904

42. A Joint Army-Navy Board study deals with priorities in defence planning.

- (a) USNA, Records of the Joint Army-Navy Board, 1903-1919, file 325, Memo by RADM Taylor, 10 Jun 04, p. 4.
 - (i) Admiral Taylor notes that England is not a real threat to the United States, and he rates a war with the United Kingdom as low in priority for planning purposes.
 - (ii) His plans for such a contingency, however, in outline call for:
 - a. Defence of US island possessions
 - b. Defence of the Panama Canal
 - c. Control of the Great Lakes and the invasion of Canada.

Canadian Railway System, 1906

43. A report on the military resources of Canada assesses the strategic value of the railway system.

- (a) USNA, Army War College, 5268, Capt SC Vestal, lec notes, Ft Leavenworth, Kans, 1 Feb 06, p. 6.
 - (i) Capt Vestal cites the remark that "if the plans of [Canadian] railways had been submitted to their enemies few changes would have been suggested."

Canadian Militia, 1906

44. Captain Vestal comments on the much-maligned militia.

- (a) Ibid., p. 17
 - (i) Captain Vestal notes that the "Canadian Militia has been treated by Americans with unmerited contempt. It is small in numbers and the instruction given is unconsiderable, but it has advantages...." The advantages are as follows:
 - a. The Federal Government controls the militia, not the provinces.
 - b. There is no prejudice against the militia as in the United States.

Canadian Invasion of US, 1909

45. A study on the defences of the United States against an attack from the north.

- (a) USNA, AGO 1517645, Comdg Offr, Ft Wayne to AG, Dept of Lakes, 22 Apr 09, enclos essay by Lt PE Wilson, "The Defence of the Northern Border of the United States against Invasion."
- (i) Lt Wilson argues that Canada could not mount an invasion on her own resources. He feels the best American plan for any invasion would be to draw the enemy deep into the country, extending his line of communications and all the while training troops. When the volunteers are ready, the exposed communications are cut and victory assured.

United States Plans for Invasion of Canada

46. A series of War College papers dealing with attacks on Canada.

- (a) USNA, war Dept, GS, War Plans Div, Classified Gen Correspondence, 1900-1920, Box 20, File 8364-5, Maj JM Shaw, USMC, "Military Geography of the Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia," n.d.
 - (i) This paper was prepared by a War College student of the class of 1912-1913.
 - (ii) The author says the US should immediately take the offensive in the West in the event of war, destroying railway communications at Winnipeg and over the Fraser River, followed by an occupation of the main towns.
- (b) Ibid., Col Abner Pickering, 11th Inf, "Military Geography of Western Canada...", January 1914.
 - (i) This is a similar plan to that in para 46a.
- (c) Ibid., File 8364-2, Lt Col TB Dugan, Cav, "Military Geography of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec to include a Study of an Attack...by the United States", n.d.
 - (i) This is a competent study by another War College student of the 1912-1913 class.
 - (ii) The plan calls for an attack on Quebec City, with a threat at Ottawa and Montreal.
- (d) Ibid., File 8364-1, Lt Col BH Fuller, USMC, "Military Geography of Eastern Canada and a Study of the Invasion thereof...", n.d.

- (i) This is another study by a War College student, 1912-1913.
- (ii) The author feels that the Maritimes are not an immediate objective, and he stresses the natural defences of the region. He foresees a withdrawal to Halifax, creating the classic problem of reducing a fortress supplied from the sea.
- (c) Ibid., File 7524-2, Maj DC Cabell and Maj WH Hay, "Concentration of troops to Meet an Attack by Red", n.d.
 - (i) This is a War College Study, 1912-1913, which would appear capable of implementation as an actual war plan.
 - (ii) The study calls for troops to be concentrated at Moira, N.Y., for an attack on Cornwall, at Plattsburg, N.Y., for an attack on Montreal, and near Boston to defend that city. (No details are provided on the attacks).

Pacific Coast Defences, 1914

47. A study of land defences pin-points the enemy.

- (a) Ibid., File 7418-20, "Land Defences of Puget Sound and the Columbia River," 17 Apr 14.
 - (i) This is an actual staff plan which is of interest only because it completely discounts the possibility of an attack from Canada and deals with defence against Japan.

War with United Kingdom, 1913-1914

48. A lecture by the Director of the Army War College on the course a War with Great Britain would take.

- (a) Army War College, Course 1913-1914, Problems and Exercises, Vol. 1. Lecture by Maj BA Poore, 4 Sep 13.
 - (i) The lecturer assumes war is unlikely but possible. "As a result of studies pursued at the Army War College during the past few years, it seems beyond dispute that... Great Britain will be the aggressor..." (p.29). The objectives of the British would be the following:

- a. Control of the North Atlantic and Pacific
 - b. Destruction of the USN
 - c. Operations against the Panama Canal
 - d. Destruction of US Armies
 - e. Defence of Canada
 - f. Defence of United kingdom
- (ii) American objectives in such a war would be the following:
- a. Conservation of naval strength
 - b. Protection of coasts and island possessions
 - c. Destruction of British land forces
 - d. "Operations against Canada and incidentally the transfer of the theatre of war from United States to Canadian territory."
- (iii) Major Poore assumes that Canadian defence would be left to the militia. He further assumes that it will take the Royal Navy but one month to gain control of the seas, but feels that in that time an invasion of Canada could be launched "with the object of dividing or of changing the objective of the expeditionary forces of Great Britain." (p. 34).
- (iv) The attack on Canada calls for assaults on Ottawa and Montreal, the Welland Canal, London, Sault Ste Marie, the CPR north of Lake Superior, the CPR at Winnipeg and the CPR on the Fraser River. Heavy artillery would also be set up on the St Lawrence below Montreal.

PART IV - CONCLUSION

49. The material available in the American archives, as will be evident to the reader, is very limited. Additional information might be available at the Historical Branch of the US Navy, or at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

50. This report has been prepared by Lieutenant J.L. Granatstein.

(C.P. Stacey)
Director, Historical Section

UNITED STATES ARMY - STRENGTH ON
CANADIAN BORDER 1867-1914

Year	Total Strength	Strength on Canadian Border			
1868	48,081	(1) AL-573;	(2) Col-1440;	(3) East-2083;	(4) Lakes-626
1869	36,774	AL-572;	Col-1259;	East-4312;	Lakes-697
1870	(5) 37,358	DAK-3429;	Col-1259;	East-4225;	Lakes-916
1871	32,565	DAK-2560;	Col-1207;	East-3227;	Lakes-726
1872	32,555	DAK-3531;	Col-1120;	East-2334;	Lakes-608
1873	28,939	DAK-4755;	Col-1381;	East-1826;	Lakes-629
1874	26,441	DAK-3872;	Col-1116;	(6) Atl-2116	
1875	25,162	DAK-3357;	Col-1162;	Atl-2044	
1876	28,150	DAK-2052;	Col-1134;	Atl-1990	
1877	23,795	DAK-5100;	Col-1911;	Atl-2804	
1878	25,407	DAK-5331;	Col-1606;	(7) East-2242	
1879	26,389	DAK-5630;	Col-1751;	East-2134	
1880	26,411	DAK-4755;	Col-1647;	East-2084	
1881	Not Available				
1882	25,186	DAK-4604;	Col-1573;	East-2437	
1883	25,478	DAK-4728;	Col-1620;	East-2372	

Year	Total Strength	Strength on Canadian Border		
1884	26,383	DAK-4942;	Col-1804;	East-3100
1885	26,859	DAK-4855;	Col-1821;	East-2999
1886	26,544	DAK-4259;	Col-1776;	Atl-2989 ⁽⁸⁾
1887	26,436	DAK-3135;	Col-1673;	Atl-3155
1888	26,738	DAK-4448;	Col-1541;	Atl-3153
1889	27,478	DAK-4442;	Col-1526;	Atl-3454
1890	27,089	DAK-3910;	Col-1582;	Atl-3720
1891	26,175	DAK-3219;	Col-1559;	East-4492 ⁽⁹⁾
1892	26,900	DAK-3546;	Col-1503;	East-4878
1893	27,922	DAK-3814;	Col-1495;	East-5212
1894	27,934	DAK-3925;	Col-1528;	East-5360
1895	27,172	DAK-2733;	Col-1704;	East-7098
1896	27,038	DAK-2627;	Col-1625;	East-7192
1897	27,532	DAK-2602;	Col-1479;	East-7262
1898	⁽¹⁰⁾ 212,235	DAK-955;	Col-1416;	East-23248
1899	⁽¹¹⁾ 64,247	NOT AVAILABLE		
1900	70,756	NOT AVAILABLE except for AL-1125		
1901	79,337	"	"	" " AL-527
1902	69,589	"	"	" " AL-727

Year	Total Strength	Strength on Canadian Border
1903	59,187	NOT AVAILABLE except for AL-560
1904	60,183	" " " " AL-1042
1905	59,814	" " " " AL-1045
1906	58,368	" " " " AL-792
1907	53,940	NOT AVAILABLE
1908	72,628	NOT AVAILABLE except for AL-1102
1909		NOT AVAILABLE
1910	71,769	DAK-2497; Col-6152; Lakes-3388; AL-1128
1911	74,638	DAK-1281; Col-4776; Lakes-1996; AL-1084
1912	82,305	NOT AVAILABLE except for AL-1232
1913	79,986	" " " " AL-1105
1914	92,422	NOT AVAILABLE

NOTES to Appendix "A"

1. AL - Alaska - Troops in geographic limits of Alaska
2. Col - Columbia - Troops in Military District - includes whole Pacific North West
3. East - Includes troops on whole Eastern Seaboard
4. Lakes - Includes troops in States bordering Great Lakes
5. DAK - Troops in the Military District of Dakota
6. Atl - Atlantic - Includes troops formerly in districts of Lakes and East.
7. East - Includes troops formerly in Atlantic district
8. Atl - Atlantic - New title for District of the East
9. East - New Title for District of Atlantic
10. Includes volunteers
11. Regulars only

REFERENCE NOTES

1. William D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States 1886, (Ph. D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, Washington. D.C. 1947), pp. 84-85. See also Joe P. Smith, The Republican Expansionists of the Early Reconstruction Era (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1933), pp. 79 80.
2. Public Archives of Canada, Despatches from the US Consul Gen in Montreal, Consul Gen Averell to Sec State Seward, 25 Mar 67. (Microfilm Roll M-608; Copy of material in US National Archives) [Cited hereafter as PAC, Despatches.]
3. See for example, US National Archives, Notes from the British Legation to the Department of State, Brit Min Thornton to Sec State Seward, 23 Mar 68. (Microfilm T-86). [Cited hereafter as USNA, Notes]; see also USNA, Notes, Memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Thornton, 18 Aug 68. (Microfilm T-87).
4. US National Archives, Adjutant-General's Office, Document 44A/1869, Allan Pinkerton to Gen Pope, 13 Jan 69 [Cited hereafter as USNA, AGO]; see also USNA, AGO 39L/1870, ibid., 2 Feb 70.
5. USNA, AGO 481S/1870, Sec State Fish to Sec War Belknap, reporting conversation with Brit Min Thornton, 19 Apr 70.
6. See USNA, AGO 259A/1870 Capt Arnold to AAG, Dept of the East, 8 Apr 70, and the subsequent letter in the same file, Gen Meade to AG, 12 Apr 70.
7. USNA, AGO 259A/1870, Gen Sherman to Gen Meade, 15 Apr 70.
8. PAC, Despatches, Consul Gen Dart to Sec State Fish, 5 May 70 (Microfilm M-610).
9. Ibid., 24 May 70.
10. Ibid., 26 May 70.
11. USNA, AGO 370A/1870 and AGO 381A/1870 are large files detailing the troop movements on 24-25-26 May 70.
12. USNA, AGO 370A/1870, Gen Meade to Gen Sherman, from St. Alban's, Vt, 27 May 70.
13. USNA, Notes, Brit Min Thornton to Sec State Fish, (Microfilm T-89).
14. PAC, Despatches, Consul Gen Dart to Asst Sec State Davis, 31 May 70 (Microfilm M-610).
15. PAC, Despatches, Consul Gen Dart to Sec State Fish, 13 Jun 70 (Microfilm M-610).
16. Report of the Officer Commanding the Dakota Territory, General Hancock, in Report of the War Department, 1870, vol. 1, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1870), p. 27.

17. USNA, AGO 3343/1871, Consul Taylor, Winnipeg, to A/Sec State Davis, 11 Sep 71. A similar telegram was sent by Taylor to the Comdg Gen of the Army, Gen Sherman on the same date. AGO 3248/1871.
18. USNA, AGO 3319/1871, Brit Min Pakenham to A/Sec State Davis, 20 Sep 71.
19. USNA, AGO 3504/1871, Consul Taylor, Winnipeg, to Gen Sherman, Washington, 2 Oct 71.
20. USNA, AGO 3248/1871, AAG, Dakota Territory to Comdg Offr Ft Pembina, 2 Oct 71.
21. USNA, AGO 3343/1871, Sec War Belknap to Sec State Fish, 5 Oct 71.
22. USNA, AGO 3248/1871, Comdg Offr Ft Pembina to AAG, D.T., 5 Oct 71.
23. Ibid.
24. USNA, AGO 3713/1871, Col George Sykes, Comdg 20th Inf, Pembina, to AAG, D.T., 12 Oct 71.
25. USNA, AGO 4053/1871, Atty Gen to Sec War Belknap, 15 Nov 71.
26. USNA, AGO 4426/1871, Comdg Offr Ft Pembina to AAG, D.T., 1 Dec 71.
27. Minute to ibid., dated 20 Dec 71.
28. Ibid., enclosing letter Sec War Belknap to Sec State Fish, 28 Dec 71.
29. USNA, AGO 60/1872, Sec State Fish to Sec War Belknap, 5 Jan 72.
30. USNA, AGO 1748/1885, Brit Min Sackville West to Sec State Bayard, 28 Mar 85.
31. USNA, AGO 1744/1885, Gen Sheridan to Gen Schofield, Chicago, 30 Mar 85.
32. USNA, AGO 1991/1885, C. McKibbin [?], Ft Pembina, to AAG, D.T., Ft Snelling, Minn, 4 Apr 85.
33. USNA, Notes, Brit Min Sackville West to Sec State Bayard, 9 Apr 85 (Microfilm T-111).
34. USNA, AGO 1968/1885, "A Canadian Girl" to Pres Cleveland, 3 Apr 1885.
35. USNA, AGO 412889, AG to Comdg Gen, Dept of Columbia, 29 Nov 01.
36. USNA, AGO 412889, Capt HW Hovey, Skagway, to AG, Dept of Columbia, 4 Dec 01.
37. Ibid.
38. USNA, Notes. Brit Min Pauncefote to Sec State Hay, 8 Feb 02 (Microfilm T-136).

39. USNA, AGO 412889 Cipher telegram AG to B Gen GM Randall, Vancouver Barracks, Washington, 29 Mar 02. The rfts sent were 2 offr and 50 arty soldiers. Ibid., Randall to AG.
40. AGO 412889/N, Capt WP Richardson to AG, Dept of Columbia, 18 Apr 02.