

**ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTUAL  
BASIS OF CERTAIN  
ALLEGATIONS MADE BEFORE THE  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS  
CONCERNING THE RELOCATION  
OF INUKJUAQ INUIT FAMILIES  
IN THE 1950s**

**REPORT**

**Submitted to:**


**DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT  
NORTHERN PROGRAM**

**Prepared by:**

**HICKLING CORPORATION**

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**SEPTEMBER, 1990**



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CONCERNING THE RELOCATION OF INUIT FAMILIES TO THE HIGH ARCTIC  
IN THE 1950s

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At its meeting on March 19, 1990, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs heard Inuit witnesses and received written evidence from them, alleging that the federal government actively promoted the relocation of Inuit families from the community of Port Harrison, now called Inukjuak, in Arctic Quebec, to Craig Harbour, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the Northwest Territories, in the 1950s, primarily out of concern for the protection of Canadian sovereignty.

The Inuit claim that the Government kept this concern hidden from those who were relocated and lead them to believe, instead, that they were being moved from the depressed conditions existing in Arctic Quebec at that time, to areas further north, offering better hunting, trapping and wage employment opportunities. The Inuit assert that these predictions of abundance did not materialize in the High Arctic. They say, in fact, game was in short supply and they were often hungry.

They also allege that the Federal Government lead them to understand that they would be moved back to Port Harrison, if they were unhappy in their new environment, and that this promise was not kept.

On June 19, 1990, the Committee also heard an oral presentation on this subject by Mr. Robert Pilot, a former member of the R.C.M.P. and later Assistant Commissioner of the Government of the Northwest Territories. Mr. Pilot, now retired from public service, initiated his own appearance before the Standing Committee because of his personal wish to respond to certain allegations made by the Inuit concerning the conduct of the police in the relocation project.

After reviewing the information presented to it on this matter, the Standing Committee, in its Third Report to Parliament, made five recommendations which would require the Government to:

- acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in the protection of Canadian sovereignty in the North;
- make an apology for the wrongdoing which the government inflicted on the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, at that time, a result of these concerns about northern sovereignty;
- carry out such an apology with due solemnity;
- accompany the apology with some form of recognition of the contribution to Canadian sovereignty made by the Inuit people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay; and
- consider compensation to the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay for their service to Canada and the wrongdoing inflicted upon them.

In preparing its report, the Standing Committee took into account the oral and written evidence presented to it at the meeting of March 19, 1990, by some Inuit members of the original groups who had been relocated from Inukjuak in Arctic Quebec, to Craig Harbour, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the Northwest Territories, in the 1950s. The written evidence included a joint submission, prepared by Makivik Corporation of Quebec and Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, dated March, 1990, containing various reports, correspondence, a position paper and other documents dealing with the claim; and, an interim response to the Committee, submitted by the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, dated May 15, 1990.

Pursuant to the Standing Committee's request, the Government of Canada is required to table a formal, comprehensive response to the Committee's report within 150 days (i.e., by November 16, 1990), in accordance with Standing Order 109.

The HICKLING report, which follows, responds to a request by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a study by an independent, outside consultant, mutually acceptable to Makivik Corporation of Quebec and the Department, to assess the factual basis of the allegations mentioned above, as they relate to the Department. It was

understood that the contractor would not be expected to deal with allegations that might be considered to fall under the Criminal Code.

Our assessment of the factual basis of the allegations included in our study is based on an extensive survey of official government files, documents, published and unpublished reports, and learned papers in the possession of the National Archives of Canada, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, various libraries in other Government departments, public libraries and sources within Makivik Corporation. We also interviewed a number of key informants, including some members of the Inuit groups that were involved in the relocations that are the subject of our study.

We found that the decision by the Government to actively encourage the relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic in 1953, and in the two or three years subsequent to that, was not motivated by a concern to strengthen Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands at that time. Canada felt secure in her claim of ownership of the Islands at that time, as a result of an exchange of Notes between Canada and Norway in 1930, and because the Canadian Government had consistently displayed its sovereignty in that area for so long and in so many ways as to firmly establish its title to all of the Arctic Islands in a manner consistent with International Law.

The R.C.M.P. participated in the exercise of Canadian sovereignty in the North by their very presence in those areas and in the various roles they were called upon to carry out on their own, and on behalf of other federal departments. They were required from time to time to deal with the illegal hunting of polar bear and muskoxen by Greenlanders, which was prohibited under the NWT Game Ordinance. In carrying out this function, they did indeed assist in asserting Canadian sovereignty.

The Inuit families in question were not relocated to the High Arctic to assist the RCMP in the administration of the NWT Game Ordinance, although, in fact, they did so on occasion. They also asserted Canadian Arctic sovereignty by the very fact of living there but that was not the purpose of their relocation.

Our study reveals that the main reason for the decision by the Government to encourage some Inuit families to relocate to the High Arctic at that time was a concern to improve the living conditions of Inuit, particularly in the Hudson Bay region. Relocation from those depressed areas was seen, by both Government officials and the Inuit themselves, as a way



of breaking out of a growing pattern of welfare dependency, and as a means of providing the Inuit with new and better economic opportunities through improved hunting, trapping and wage employment.

Reasonable steps were taken by the Government officials to establish and apply suitable criteria for the selection of families, so as to ensure the success of the project and the security of the participants. These criteria were developed over a period of several years, with input from a number of sources. Those who were transported to the new location by the "C.D.Howe" were x-rayed before their departure and appear to have been found to be free of serious infectious diseases. Some of the participants who were included were quite aged and at least one was physically disabled, but their participation in the relocation project was not out of line with Inuit cultural values nor with the realities of life in the Arctic in those years. The difficulties of life in the High Arctic were recognized and explored beforehand by the officials and a reasonable plan was articulated to ensure that those who were relocated were well supported by experienced R.C.M.P. officers who knew the families personally and who were knowledgeable of Inuit ways and language. Experienced Inuit families from the most northern settlements at the time were approached to assist with the project. They agreed to do so and to transfer their hunting and trapping skills to the Inuit participants from Arctic Quebec. The first group of Inuit relocated were not as well equipped as they might have been, but apparently this was dealt with after their arrival.

Reasonable efforts seem to have been made to explain the project to both of the Inuit groups involved before their departure, and to communicate the fact that participation in it was voluntary. It is more than likely that some of the Inuit could not completely envisage what conditions in the High Arctic would be like because these things were outside the range of personal experience at the time. While this is truly regrettable, it should not imply a deliberate attempt by the Government officials to deceive or mislead the Inuit participants.

A number of the Inuit families in the project stated in letters written to the Department in the period 1956 to 1963 that game and fur were plentiful in the vicinity of both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, and that hunger was not a problem. The frequency of letter-writing from Inuit at Resolute Bay dropped off considerably after 1963 and nearly completely, after 1966, with the transfer of responsibility for most aspects of Inuit affairs to the Government of the NWT. It is not possible, therefore, to say whether game and fur continued to be

plentiful after the letters stopped coming but on the other hand, there is no reason to believe otherwise.

We believe that the Department gave the Inuit an understanding that they would be returned to their original communities after one, two, or three years, if this was requested. There is no evidence to suggest that the Department intended this undertaking to remain in force indefinitely.

The files show that some of the Inuit families living in Resolute Bay wrote to Ottawa, asking to return to Port Harrison for a visit. The earliest example of such a request, that we could find, occurred around 1960. The determination of the length of the proposed visits quite often required several exchanges of letters. On one known occasion, in 1961, Ottawa responded to such proposals by seeming to suggest that those wishing to visit Port Harrison should collaborate in chartering an aircraft for this purpose, at their own expense. The files would indicate that one group did this in 1962, but no further details are provided. It is uncertain if there was an official policy on the matter at that time. Our speculation is that the Department took this position because it considered the individuals involved to be economically self-sufficient. This was the practice followed with respect to Fort Chimo Inuit working at Churchill and wishing to visit their home community.

Early in the 1970s, however, the Government of the Northwest Territories arranged and paid for the transportation of several groups of Inuit, from both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, to Port Harrison, to visit relatives and to assess whether they wished to be returned to that community on a permanent basis. Several families subsequently requested relocation and this was done. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development reimbursed the Territorial Government for the costs of both the visits and relocation.

On one occasion, the R.C.M.P. used their own aircraft to permit several families living at Grise Fiord to visit relatives in Port Harrison and subsequently relocated them. The R.C.M.P. apparently absorbed these costs.

An additional number of Inuit families living at Resolute Bay were relocated to Port Harrison in 1988, initially at their own expense or with assistance from the Makivik Corporation of Quebec. The Department agreed to re-imburse the transportation costs for those families who had already moved back to Inukjuak. This offer was subsequently extended to include the costs of transporting a number of other families who had not yet

moved but who had indicated that they intended to do so. These re-imbursements , totalling approximately \$ 250,000.00, were paid out of the Department's 1988-1989 appropriations. In 1988, the Department also undertook to provide the Government of Quebec with funds, amounting to approximately \$700,000, to permit Quebec to add ten houses to the pool of housing identified for Port Harrison, in recognition of the impact that this inflow of people would have on the 1989 housing plans for that community.

The evidence that we examined does not support the allegation that the Government committed wrongdoing in the planning and conduct of this project. The material we examined leads us to a different conclusion, namely that the project was conscientiously planned, was carried out in a reasonably effective manner and that the Inuit participated in it voluntarily, in their own search for a better life, and benefited from the experience.

We do not see the grounds for an apology by the Government for the manner in which the relocation project was conceived, planned and carried out. In our view, to apologize for a wrongdoing it did not commit would constitute deception on the part of the Government. It would also imply that the project had not been reasonably successful whereas this is not the case.

In our opinion, the delay in settling the matter of the return of the remaining original families still at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord is the only real basis for criticism of the Department, as far as this project is concerned. The circumstances that caused this delay, however, have already been explained by several Deputy Ministers and Ministers since the claim was first formally raised with the Department in 1982. At this point, therefore, a concrete and definitive statement on what action the Department now intends to take on this matter would be most meaningful.

We would suggest that the Department consider extending for a further one or so years the offer previously made to the Inuit families who have already returned to Inukjuak and Pond Inlet from Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. This would permit any of the remaining families at Resolute and Grise Fiord to undertake an exploratory visit to their original communities and to relocate on a permanent basis if they so choose.

Also, we suggest that the Department agree to support any proposal to note the contribution which Inuit throughout the Arctic have made over the years to the social, political and economic development of the High Arctic.



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## 1.0 CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

This is the report of the study conducted to assess the factual basis of allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on March 19, 1990, concerning the motivation behind, and the conduct of, a project initiated by the then Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources to relocate Inuit families to the High Arctic in the 1950s. The results of our study are required to permit the current Department to table a comprehensive and official government response to the allegations in question and to the Committee's recommendations.

## 2.0 CHAPTER TWO

### 2.1 BACKGROUND

At its meeting on March 19, 1990, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs heard Inuit witnesses and received written evidence from them, alleging that the federal government actively promoted the relocation of Inuit families from the community of Port Harrison, now called Inukjuak, in Arctic Quebec, to Craig Harbour, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the Northwest Territories, in the 1950s, primarily out of concern for the protection of Canadian sovereignty.

The Inuit claim that the Government kept this concern hidden from those who were relocated and lead them to believe, instead, that they were being moved from the depressed conditions existing in Arctic Quebec at that time, to areas further north, offering better hunting, trapping and wage employment opportunities. The Inuit assert that these predictions of abundance did not materialize in the High Arctic. They say, in fact, game was in short supply and they were often hungry.

They also allege that the Federal Government lead them to understand that they would be moved back to Port Harrison if they were unhappy in their new environment, and that this promise was not kept.

On June 19, 1990, the Committee also heard an oral presentation on this subject by Mr. Robert Pilot, a former member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) and later Assistant Commissioner of the Government of the Northwest Territories. Mr. Pilot, now retired from public service, initiated his own appearance before the Standing Committee because of his personal wish to respond to certain allegations made by the Inuit concerning the conduct of the Police in the relocation project.

After reviewing the information presented to it on this matter, the Standing Committee, in its Third Report to Parliament, made five recommendations which would require the Government to:

- acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in the protection of Canadian sovereignty in the North;

- make an apology for the wrongdoing which the government inflicted on the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, at that time, as a result of these concerns about northern sovereignty;
- carry out such an apology with due solemnity;
- accompany the apology with some form of recognition of the contribution to Canadian sovereignty made by the Inuit people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay; and
- consider compensation to the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay for their service to Canada and the wrongdoing inflicted upon them.

In preparing its report, the Standing Committee took into account oral and written evidence presented to it at the meeting of March 19, 1990, by Inuit members of the original groups who had been relocated from Inukjuak. The written evidence included a joint submission, prepared by Makivik Corporation of Quebec and Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, dated March, 1990 containing various reports, correspondence, a position paper and other documents dealing with the claim; and, an interim response to the Committee, submitted by the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, dated May 15, 1990.

Pursuant to the Standing Committee's request, the Government of Canada is required to table a formal, comprehensive response to the Committee's report within 150 days (i.e., by November 16, 1990), in accordance with Standing Order 109.

Our report, which follows, responds to a request by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a study, by an independent, outside consultant, mutually acceptable to Makivik Corporation of Quebec and the Department, to assess the factual basis of the allegations made by the witnesses before the Standing Committee on March 19, 1990, as they relate to the Department.



### **3.0 CHAPTER THREE**

#### **3.1 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY**

##### **3.1.1 Scope**

The study is confined to an examination of allegations made by Inuit witnesses before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, and later repeated to us by some of the witnesses in a meeting held at Inukjuak on August 29, 1990, and which concern only the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in its several earlier manifestations. To expand on this later point, certain of these allegations relate to the conduct of members of the R.C.M.P., while acting on behalf of the then Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, in the administration of Inuit affairs and in the planning and implementation of the relocation project. Since the R.C.M.P. have indicated to the Department that they also intend to review those allegations that touch upon the conduct of their members at that time, we endeavoured, as much as possible, to scope out the latter from our study. In spite of our best efforts, we may not have been entirely successful in this endeavour, because of the overlapping nature of the roles carried out by the police in these circumstances.

##### **3.1.2 Methodology**

###### **a) Launching the Study**

To initiate the study, the HICKLING Project Manager met first with Departmental officials to review the history of this claim, including, in particular, previous approaches to the Department by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and by Makivik Corporation, requesting settlement of the claim and the responses by the Department on those occasions. The events leading up to the appearance of the Inuit before the Standing Committee on March 19 of this year to discuss the claim, the published proceedings of the Committee meeting of that date and the ensuing interim response by the Department, were also examined.

The initial meeting was also used to identify the specific allegations that the study would address and the means by which information on these issues would be gathered and assessed. We also dealt with a range of practical research considerations, including the

identification of information sources and confirmation of the level of security clearance required to permit HICKLING team members to access files and documents in the possession of the Department and the National Archives of Canada

b) Grouping and Priorizing of Allegations

Members of the HICKLING team then met together to determine the best way of grouping and prioritizing the allegations that would be examined, many of which overlap one another, to ensure that they would be dealt with thoroughly and within the tight time frame set for completion of the study. These discussions resulted in a decision to group the allegations under three broad headings:

- The Sovereignty Issue
- Planning and Implementation of the Project
- Promises made by the Department to the Inuit participants

The following is a summary of the various allegations under each of these headings:

***THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE*** - to include all allegations to the effect that Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands was the main reason behind the Government's plan to relocate Inuit families to Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the 1950s; the purported withholding of this information by the Department from Inuit project participants; and, the reasons given by the Government for the project.

***PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT*** - to include all allegations to the effect that the project was poorly conceived and executed; that it was based on faulty assumptions about economic conditions in Arctic Quebec and game resources in the High Arctic, with the result that the Inuit families involved suffered unnecessarily; and that the Inuit agreed to participate in the project because they feared the Government representatives and did not believe themselves to be free to refuse;

***PROMISES MADE TO THE INUIT PARTICIPANTS***- to include all allegations to the effect that the government promised to return these families to their original communities, at its expense, if they were not satisfied with life in the High Arctic, but did not honour this commitment.

Excluded from the study were a number of allegations relating to problems encountered by Inuit wives, husbands or children while they were patients in hospitals in southern Canada in the period under review. These exclusions were made, not because the problems involved were considered to be of any less importance, but because they were common to all Inuit patients or relatives of patients in those years and not just to the particular groups who were the subject of our study.

We also excluded from our study, allegations involving non-payment of wages for work done by Inuit residents of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay communities, theft of the contents of mail and other acts purportedly committed by government representatives during the life of the relocation project, that might be considered as offences under the Criminal Code.

#### c) Identification of Information Sources

The Project Team subsequently drew up and requisitioned an initial list of files and other documents for review. These were in the possession of both the Department and the National Archives of Canada. It was decided, in this connection, that in exploring the issue of sovereignty, we would focus on those files most likely to contain official policy statements on the development of the North and its people in the years immediately prior to 1953 and running through to 1963. Files of Meetings of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND), held during those years, were considered to be the most likely and authoritative source of this information. More recent files on this subject were also identified and searched for ministerial and senior official-level speeches containing historical references to the sovereignty question and to the relocation project in general.

Staff of the Constitutional Development and Aboriginal Affairs Directorate in the Department's Northern Affairs Program, the Departmental Library and the Circumpolar and Scientific Affairs Directorate were also contacted and their assistance sought in identifying relevant documents, publications and unpublished articles that might provide further insights into our subject. We also sought the assistance of the Government of the Northwest Territories in searching out possible references to the relocation project in the files that had been sent to them in the course of the transfer of federal responsibilities to the Government of the NWT in the years 1966 to 1970.

A complete bibliography for the study can be found in Appendix One of this report.

d) Weighting of Evidence

One of the problems presented by a study of this nature, is to decide what validity is to be assigned to the various types of evidence that one must deal with in establishing the factual validity of the allegations in question. Are oral statements made today by those who participated in the project 35 years ago, whether Inuit or Government official, to be assigned the same, or greater or less validity than recorded statements made by these same people at the time the project was actually taking place? Is the recorded information on the files to be taken as objective truth? Are the files and other materials to be examined likely to contain highly confidential concerns and confessions of wrongdoings by public servants, or admissions of non-truths by Inuit or officials who participated in the project? Can the researcher be sure that he or she has seen all of the relevant evidence? There are no simple answers to most of these questions. In circumstances such as these, the researchers can only resolve to bring as much common sense and professional objectivity as possible to the manner in which the material is handled and conclusions are reached. These are limitations to the study, and we draw the readers attention to them.

In keeping with sound acceptable practice, we attributed the highest validity to recorded statements made, in situ, by the project participants themselves - both Inuit and Government officials, that is, at the very point in time when the project was taking place. We felt that this type of evidence should be assigned higher marks, if one can put it that way, than that based on the recollection of events, thirty or more years later. We were very fortunate in this regard. The Department was able to make available to us exchanges of correspondence between some of the Inuit project participants and Inuit-speaking welfare workers in Ottawa, during the years 1953 through to about 1963, which bear directly upon some of the allegations under the claim.

To insure that this latter material was handled with the utmost confidentiality and objectivity, a panel of four persons was established to sort through approximately 400 such letters in search of those relevant to one or another of the allegations in question. The panel was composed of four persons, namely, Mr. G. W. Rowley, an internationally known expert on northern affairs, whose personal and professional credibility is acknowledged by both the Inuit community and the Government, two members of the Constitutional

Development and Aboriginal Affairs Directorate in the Department and the HICKLING Project Leader. The panel convened on August 23, 1990, and selected approximately 40 pieces of correspondence for use in the assessment exercise. Some of these letters contain confidential information, not directly related to the subject of the study. This material was excised from the letters that are quoted in our report and their authors are referred to only by the disc numbers that were used to identify them at that time.

e) Interviews

After reviewing the 1984 report by Mr. Marc Hammond, which was one of several documents included in the published proceedings of the March 19, 1990 Meeting of the Standing Committee, we decided that there would be no need to re-interview all of the informants whose names appear in that document. However, we thought it would be instructive to interview a number of other officials or former officials whose knowledge of the major northern development policies of the period were widely recognized and respected or who had actually participated in the Eastern Arctic Patrol in the 1950s. A list of the names of such persons was drawn up and arrangements made to interview them. Their names appear as part of Appendix II of this report.

Our review of the oral and written evidence presented to the Standing Committee by the Inuit on March 19, and by Mr. Robert Pilot three months later, left unanswered, at least for us, a number of important questions concerning the matter of the alleged promise made by the Government to the Inuit participants in the project. We decided, therefore, to request interviews with Mr. Pilot and with as many of the Inuit participants as time would permit. Mr Pilot was interviewed twice, once by telephone from Ottawa and, on the second occasion, in his home in Pembroke. The interviews with the Inuit participants, whose names also appear as part of Appendix II, took place in Inukjuak, Arctic Quebec, in August. The interview guide used on that occasion can be found in Appendix III of this report.

f) Assessment Criteria

From the outset of the study, it was evident that while the Inuit claimants considered all of the allegations to be important, they attached particular significance to the sovereignty issue. Indeed, it seemed to us that the Department would be of the same view, since the



charge involved is a most serious one - implying, as it does, that the Government had deliberately misled and manipulated the Inuit people in its trust. The Team decided, therefore, to pay particular attention to this issue and to establish a set of criteria that would ensure that the evidence gathered would be assessed with as much objectivity as possible. This is standard practice in the field of evaluation and is the procedure routinely followed by HICKLING in such circumstances. The details of the criteria that were applied in this instance can be found under the section dealing with the sovereignty issue, later in this report.

g) Analytic Framework

An analytic framework was developed, based essentially on the grouping of allegations shown in b), above, and on the weighting and assessment criteria described in d) and f) , above.

h) Conclusions

It was not possible for us to reach conclusions as to the factual basis of each and every one of the allegations raised by the Inuit, because of a lack of hard information in some of these areas. An example in point, was the problem of establishing the factual basis of the purported fear which the Inuit felt towards the Government officials in the 1950s, and which is given by them as the reason for agreeing to participate in the relocation project. We uncovered no direct evidence that would support this assertion. Where we encountered an assertion of this order, and where it was thought to be important enough, we resorted to logical argument in reaching a conclusion. Where we adopted this approach, we were careful to identify it as such.

j) Government Response to the Claim to Date

We reviewed all of the official correspondence on the claim between officials of the Department and between the Department and representatives of the Inuit, since it was first raised formally with the Department, in 1982. This was done to gain as thorough an appreciation as possible of the evolution of the claim over time, the developments that impacted on its resolution and the positions of the parties with respect to the various

elements of the claim. In this part of the study, we also assessed the significance of the actions taken by the Department to date towards settlement of the claim.

j) Suggestions for Responding to the Standing Committee

We searched for information on other aboriginal claims of a similar nature, involving the Department, to assist in formulating suggestions which the Department might wish to consider in responding to the recommendations of the Standing Committee.

## 4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.1 THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The essence of the allegation on this subject is:

- The Government was primarily motivated by a concern to strengthen its claim of sovereignty over the Arctic Islands when it actively encouraged Inuit families to relocate to Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour / Grise Fiord in the years 1953 to 1957
- The Government deliberately withheld this motivation from the Inuit families who were contacted and encouraged to move to these northern areas. Inuit families at Port Harrison were told that the reasons for relocation were the depressed economic conditions in Arctic Quebec and the prospect of finding better hunting, trapping and wage employment opportunities in the High Arctic.
- The Inuit families did not freely agree to relocation but consented to it out of fear of Government officials.

In support of this allegation before the Standing Committee on March 19, 1990, the claimants cited an impressive number of references in files in the possession of the R.C.M.P. and the National Archives of Canada, including correspondence between Makivik Corporation of Quebec and the Department; a report prepared by Marc M. Hammond in 1984 for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development; and a number of other documents. Subsequently, Mr. Robert Pilot, who appeared before the Standing Committee at his own request on June 19, 1990, also indicated that he believed that sovereignty was a consideration in the relocations, although not the primary one.

We applied what is normally termed "the reasonable person's argument" in establishing the factual basis of the sovereignty question. This involved the creation of a set of hypothetical conditions that would have had to exist before Arctic sovereignty could be said to be the primary motivation for the launching of the relocation project. These conditions were:

- The Government was seriously concerned about its claim of ownership of the Arctic Islands at that time, as revealed in Cabinet and other official documents and pronouncements made by persons mandated to articulate the Government's official views on this matter
- The Government adopted a policy in 1953 of actively encouraging Inuit families to relocate to the High Arctic, believing that this would strengthen its claim of sovereignty over the Islands. The concern about sovereignty outweighed all other considerations in the decision to relocate Inuit people to the High Arctic at that time.
- The Government purposefully hid this motivation from the Inuit families concerned, believing that it might deter them from relocating or because of some other identifiable reason.

We reviewed a number of historical documents and learned papers, written by recognized authorities, dealing with Canadian Arctic sovereignty in those years, for possible references to this purported concern. We also examined the Minutes of the Meetings of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) covering the period 1949 to 1963 in search of definitive policy statements and other similar pronouncements that would satisfy our criteria. The ACND files were thought to be the most likely repository of information on any major federal government policy pronouncements affecting the North and its people in those years, because of the immensely important role that had been assigned to the Committee by Cabinet for coordinating the efforts of the ten or more constituent departments with major responsibilities in that part of Canada.

Our search failed to turn up any hard evidence that would satisfy all our conditions. There was, of course, R.C.M.P. Commissioner Nicholson's letter, dated February 11, 1952, to General Young, Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, to be considered. This piece of correspondence includes a quotation from an earlier letter which the Commissioner had received from Inspector Larson referring to the maintenance of sovereignty on Ellesmere Island. This reference was cited by the Inuit claimants in their statement to the Standing Committee, on March 19,

1990, as proof of the R.C.M.P's concern about the maintenance of sovereignty over the Islands at that time. The particular passage referred to by the Inuit runs as follows:

"The advantages of placing our Detachment directly across from Greenland would be that we then would have full control and supervision of Greenland Eskimos and others travelling back and forth and over hunting activities they may engage in. As you know we had a detachment established at Bache Peninsula in 1926, primarily for the maintenance of sovereignty. This detachment was closed in 1933, owing to the difficulties of supplying same."

This passage is also cited by Marc Hammond in his report in 1984. It would appear, however, that Mr. Hammond did not offer this reference as proof of government concern about Arctic sovereignty, but rather as proof that the Government gave the relocated families an undertaking to return them to Inukjuak, if they were unhappy with life in their new surroundings.

There is no doubt in our minds that the R.C.M.P. considered the exercise of sovereignty to be a reason for the police presence on Ellesmere Island, opposite Greenland, in those years. As Pilot said in his statement before the Committee on June 19, the members of "G" Division felt that they were there, in the High Arctic, "to show the flag and to establish sovereignty". Pilot goes on to add that he believed that the Inuit who were living and hunting there on a permanent basis were also helping to maintain and establish sovereignty but that this was a secondary motive for their relocation to those areas.

The R.C.M.P's concern about sovereignty over the Arctic Islands, however, can hardly be accepted as proof that this was the primary reason for the decision by the federal government to encourage the relocation of Inuit families to Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour/ Grise Fiord in 1953-57. Under ACND, the responsibility for initiating a policy of this nature rested squarely with the then Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Responsibility for international relations and sovereignty matters in the North was assigned to the Department of External Affairs. Defence matters were the responsibility of the Department of National Defence. The R.C.M.P. were responsible for the police function on the ground, including the administration of N.W.T. Game Ordinances, although, as the records show, their members spent most of their time representing other departments and administering federal and territorial welfare programs



administering federal and territorial welfare programs until the arrival on the scene of the Northern Service Officers and Social Workers of NA&NR in the mid 1950s.

We found several documents and references in the ACND files that show quite conclusively that Canadian Arctic sovereignty was not a serious concern and, therefore, could not likely have been the primary motive for the relocations that took place in the 1950s. The first of these is an "Exchange of Notes" between Canada and Norway in 1930, which formally and officially recognized Canada's ownership of the Sverdrup Islands. This document can be read in its entirety in Appendix Four of this report.

Mr. R. G. Robertson who was Deputy Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources from 1953 to 1963, and whose legal expertise and experience in international and northern affairs is widely known and respected, was consulted on this matter. We asked him specifically for his assessment of the significance of the 1930 Exchange of Notes with Norway for Canadian sovereignty in the North. According to Robertson, this statement effectively put to rest the earlier concern, (referred to by the Hon. John Monro in the latter's address to the Third Circumpolar Conference in July 1983) about Canada's ownership of and sovereignty over the lands of the Arctic Islands. The Note also served notice that it was the established policy of the Government of Canada to protect Arctic areas as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories.

It is true that this Note did not remove concerns about Canadian sovereignty over the waters and ice between the Arctic Islands. On the other hand, it seems highly improbable that the Government would have resorted to a very modest sized relocation of about twelve Inuit families over three years as a means of solving that problem. In any event, a second reference on this subject, uncovered in our review of the ACND files, indicates, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the Government felt quite secure about its sovereignty over the North. The reference in question is part of an ACND Annual Report, drafted by G. W. Rowley, in November, 1960, and destined for the information of Cabinet. The operative section states:

"Canada has asserted its claim to sovereignty over the Arctic Islands since the 1860s and published the limits of its claim as early as 1895. No protest by other nations has been received apart from that of Norway in 1930 and that was settled.

Apart from such formal assertions of sovereignty, Canada has made so many displays of effective sovereignty in so many respects and for so long a period as to establish its title to all of the islands in the Archipelago upon the doctrine of effective occupation in conformity with International Law."

If Arctic sovereignty was thought to be a serious issue at that time, this report would have been the logical occasion to raise it with Cabinet.

Finally, we considered the hypothetical question as to why the government would have felt that by disclosing its concern about Arctic sovereignty, the Inuit would be less inclined to participate in the project, assuming that the latter knew that they would still receive the material benefits envisaged in the relocation project. The files did not answer this question and we could think of no logical reason why the Government would not have mentioned the sovereignty aspect in those circumstances, if it were a concern.

These various references lead us to conclude that sovereignty could not have been the primary concern that motivated the government to encourage Inuit families to move to the High Arctic in the early 1950s. But if that is so, what was the concern or concerns that would have prompted this project?

An article written in 1988 by P.G.Nixon, entitled "Early Administrative Developments in the Fighting of Tuberculosis among Canadian Inuit: Bringing State Institutions Back In", which appeared in the Northern Review, A Multidisciplinary Journal of the Arts and Social Sciences of the North (Yukon College ), would seem to provide a partial answer to this question. Referring to views expressed by General H. A. Young, then Director of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, in the latter's opening statement to the 1952 Conference on Northern Affairs, Nixon states :

"The position that Young and the pre-Lesage/Robertson northern administration in general were expounding was one of minimal intervention into Inuit lives...encourage them to continue in their aboriginal ways of hunting in widely scattered small groups ".

We found many references in the NA&NR files that substantiate Nixon's contention that the period immediately after the Second World War through to the first years of the 1950s

was a transitional one in terms of northern development philosophy and policy. The North and the Inuit were at a cross-roads. The documents and file entries of the period, including in particular, the Minutes of the Eskimo Affairs Advisory Committee, speak of the fact that fur prices had plummeted, forcing greater numbers of Inuit to depend more and more on government hand-outs, of one kind or another, and less and less on themselves. Inuit in the Hudson Bay area were particularly hard hit. Large scale economic development of the non-renewable resources of the North was still a distant dream. The Cold War held promise of generating considerable joint Canada/U.S. defence activity in the Arctic and Sub Arctic, which might provide wage employment opportunities for some Inuit. But these opportunities had not yet materialized to any great extent in 1951 and 1952. Furthermore, the Churches in the North had mixed feelings about the impact that wage employment would have on traditional Inuit lifestyle. The Department was clearly searching, at that time, for a policy or set of policies that would allow Inuit to retain their economic and cultural independence as much as possible, and at the same time, to participate in northern development in their own way and at their own pace.

The following excerpt from the Minutes of the August 10, 1953 ACND Meeting, which can also be read in full in Appendix Five of this report, provides further insights into the set of policies that emerged from these ruminations and which are perhaps the best explanation of the genesis of the relocation project:

- "1. In areas where the natural resources will support the Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.
2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up, the Eskimo will be educated to adapt them to this new situation.
3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the Eskimos to areas with greater natural resources."

The same document also contains a comment by B. G. Sivertz, who was, at the time, a member of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development in which he is quoted by the Secretary of the Committee as saying:

"The Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the North as possible and it appeared that, in many cases, the Eskimos were the only people capable of doing this."

We interpret this comment as being a reference to Canada's interest in exercising its sovereignty in the North. For the reasons mentioned earlier however, we can only speculate that Sivertz was expressing a personal view on the subject, perhaps to the effect that where ownership is in dispute, occupation is nine-tenths of the law.

A further reference to this evolving northern development policy is found in the report of the Arctic Division of the then Department of Northern Affairs and National Development which formed part of the Annual Report to Cabinet by the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, for the year 1954. In describing its responsibilities and long term plans, the document states:

"Where primitive Eskimos in remote areas are relatively free from contact with the white civilization, it is planned to leave their present economy as undisturbed as possible. In those areas where there is already permanent contact, integration with the white economy will be encouraged. Between these two extremes, employment of Eskimos will be encouraged provided it does not interfere unduly with their normal life. It is also planned to diversify the Eskimo economy and to transfer families from unproductive areas to regions where game is more abundant or employment is available."

This report later goes on to summarize for Cabinet the extent and relative success of the various relocations that had been carried out up to that time under this policy. The relevant portions of that summary is as follows:

"The fifteen families transferred from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet to Craig Harbour, Resolute Bay and Alexandra Fiord were very successful in hunting and trapping and seemed very happy in their surroundings. Advances of \$15,000 under the Eskimo Loan Fund...were met satisfactorily."

"Fifteen families wintered on Banks Island during the year...They should be able to pay off their indebtedness ...and

"Seventeen Eskimo men were employed on the civilian maintenance staff at Fort Churchill during the year, fifteen from Fort Chimo and two from the Keewatin District."

In our opinion, these passages are convincing evidence of the mindset of the Government of the day and of the importance it attached to personal industry and self-sufficiency on the part of the Inuit, regardless of which of these divergent paths were chosen by them.

### *Conclusion*

*The Government was not primarily motivated by concern about Canadian ownership of and sovereignty over the Arctic Islands when it actively encouraged about seventeen Inuit families to relocate to the High Arctic in the 1950s. The R.C.M.P. participated in the exercise of sovereignty in the North through the various roles they were called upon to carry out in their own name and on behalf of other federal departments. They certainly exercised sovereignty when they were called upon, from time to time, to deal with the illegal hunting of polar bear and muskoxen by Greenlanders, which was prohibited under the NWT Game Ordinance. The Inuit families who were relocated to Craig Harbour, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the 1950s helped the RCMP with this work, on occasion, and in that sense aided in the exercise of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These families however were not encouraged to move there for that purpose. Concern about pressure on limited game resources, a desire to improve the poor living conditions of the Inuit of the Hudson Bay area and to break the growing pattern of welfare dependency by offering them better opportunities for hunting, trapping and wage employment further north, were the primary considerations behind this project.*



## 5.0 CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.1 PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT

The statements made by the Inuit before the Standing Committee contain a number of references to the effect that the project was poorly conceived and executed and that, as a result, they suffered needlessly. The allegations involved may be expressed in more specific terms as follows:

- a) The criteria used to select families for relocation were faulty; many among the group were unhealthy and unfit for the life they were subsequently exposed to.
- b) The project was not well explained to the prospective participants and consequently they did not understand what they were accepting to. The Inuit agreed to the move because they both trusted and feared Government officials and did not believe that they had any real choice in the matter.
- c) The families were poorly equipped to contend with the harsh conditions that confronted them at the end of their journey and they suffered needlessly as a result.
- d) The Government's assumptions about economic conditions in Arctic Quebec and about the abundance of game in the High Arctic were not founded on sound studies and, as a result, the Inuit who were relocated were frequently hungry and without food in their new environment.

In reaching conclusions about the factual basis of these allegations, we examined a series of files in the possession of the National Archives of Canada, reviewed several relevant published articles and personally interviewed a number of the Inuit who participated in the relocation project. We discovered no single document that could be called the master blueprint of the relocation project, which could be used to address all of these concerns in their proper chronological order. Our findings, therefore, may not always reflect the order in which things happened.

a) Selection Criteria

Scattered through the files are many references that indicate that criteria for the selection of Inuit families to participate in the relocation project were developed, with input from a number of sources, over a period of about 24 months prior to the departure of the first group in the summer of 1953. The earliest identified and the most elementary of the criterion was frequently described as:

- Inuit families living in the most economically repressed and resource-poor areas.

Another criterion, which was perhaps simply a further elaboration of the first, was generally expressed in the terminology of the day as being:

- demonstrated interest in the project and ability to follow the traditional Eskimo way of life, involving little contact with or dependency on the whiteman .

Sometime towards the end of 1952, officials within the Department seem to have come to focus on still another requirement of those who would participate in the project:

- ability to adjust to conditions in the High Arctic.

These three very broad criteria appear to capture all the characteristics which the Department and the Police felt were necessary for the success of the project and were the ones that were applied when considering potential Inuit candidates in the Eastern Arctic.

At one point, Inuit living in the Keewatin District were considered for the project, as mentioned in the following excerpt from a letter (NAC. File 251-4, Part 1, Vol 1070 ) to J. J. Atherton, R.C.M.P., written by F. J. G. Cunningham, NA&NR, on May 7, 1953:

"Our original intention had been to take only Eskimos who had been accustomed to living in snow houses in the Barren Lands."

We were unable to find the reason as to why Inuit from that area were finally not chosen for the project, except that there seemed to be a consensus that conditions in Arctic Quebec were worse.

The same letter also mentions that the names of some Inuit families from Fort Chimo, who had heard about the project through the R.C.M.P. detachment there and had expressed interest, had been sent to Ottawa for consideration. These families were considered to meet the first of these criteria, but not the second. They had become used to living in wooden houses and using wood for fuel, and it was recognized that they would expect to have these things if they were to participate in the project. Their names therefore, were taken off this list and added to another list of Inuit seeking wage employment at Churchill or elsewhere.

The Inuit of the Port Harrison area seem to have been identified as potential candidates for relocation, early in the planning of the project. At one point in the planning phase some officials in the Department including, in particular, Alex Stevenson, expressed misgivings as to whether these people could satisfy the last criterion. The group's ability to adjust to conditions in the High Arctic could make or break the project. Stevenson was obviously aware of and concerned about this and felt that he should not only raise the issue, but actively propose a solution to it. In a memorandum he wrote to James Cantley, Head of Arctic Services, (both of NA&NR), dated December 1952, Stevenson states:

"I understand that you are considering the transfer of about ten families from the Port Harrison area of Northern Quebec to Ellesmere Island where they can be looked after by the present R.C.M.P. Detachment at Craig Harbour and by the proposed detachment near Cape Hershel. As you are well aware, the Port Harrison natives will have to contend with the dark period which they are not familiar with and although the terrain is similar to the Quebec Coast, I know from past experience with the Dorset natives that the dark period causes some discontentment. In connection with the above, I would suggest that one or two families from Northern Baffin Island be moved with the Port Harrison group. These natives would be familiar with conditions and could greatly assist the Port Harrison people and would help sustain the morale."

The families finally selected from Arctic Quebec for the project were apparently all "camp " Inuit, living within a radius of about thirty miles of Port Harrison.

The criteria used in selecting families from the Pond Inlet area were rather different, since their circumstances and the role envisaged for them in the project were different. The criteria applied to them could be fairly described, in our own words, as:

"demonstrated industry as hunters and trappers"; and,

"willingness to participate in the project and to play a supporting and leadership role in transferring hunting and trapping skills to the less experienced Port Harrison people".

There is one further aspect of the issue around selection criteria that deserves comment. This concerns the allegations made by the Inuit to the effect that the Government did not have any criteria at that time that would have assured that only the healthy and able-bodied were selected for relocation. In support of this criticism, they cite the fact that among the group sent to the High Arctic were aged and disabled persons, as well as those suffering from infectious diseases. Tuberculosis was not specifically identified as the infectious disease in question, but it seems clear that this was the illness they were referring to. They assert that, as a consequence, the entire group eventually contracted the infectious disease, the disabled and elderly were subjected to greater risk and suffering and that the life of the entire group was made more difficult.

We regarded these accusations also to be especially serious, and we therefore spent considerable time searching the files and talking to sources whom we felt were most able to shed light onto them. We simply did not have time, however, to engage National Health and Welfare in a search for the medical files of the members of these groups that would have quickly settled the question as to whether one of their number was infected with tuberculosis on leaving Port Harrison. We have no reason to doubt, however, that the X-Ray survey carried out at Port Harrison in the summer of 1953 would have included all of those who were being selected for the project. Lack of time would not have been a factor in that instance, since the entire group was aboard the "C. D. Howe", which housed the X-Ray team for the many weeks it took to reach Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay.

The Minutes of the August 10, 1953 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, cited earlier, has this to say on the subject:

"A discussion of medical facilities available at Resolute followed. Mr. Cantley stated that all of the families taking part in the experiment had been examined beforehand by a doctor and given a clean bill of health."

There is, however, some evidence on the files to support the Inuit claim that many of these people were subsequently treated in sanatoriums in the south, within a year or two of their relocation. This is not surprising however, considering that an alarming number of Inuit from all parts of the North were under treatment in southern Canadian medical institutions for tuberculosis, as a result of inadequate housing and poor living conditions throughout the Arctic in those years. We consider it impossible to draw any firm conclusions as to whether these people were put to particular risk by being relocated to the High Arctic or whether they would have contracted tuberculosis in any event had they continued to live in the depressed conditions that were said to exist in their camps, thirty or more miles from Port Harrison.

The issue of the inclusion of some very elderly and disabled persons in the groups relocated was also examined. While we did not go to the extent of determining the age and able-bodiedness of each of the persons selected for the project in the various groups that were moved, we did make some enquiries along these lines during our personal interviews with some of the participants at Port Harrison. This questioning yielded the following information:

- at least one of the persons among those relocated to Craig Harbour was severely disabled, a victim of poliomyelitis, who had not had the use of her legs since the age of two. This woman, Annie, was about 35 years of age when she was relocated to Craig Harbour as a member of one of the families.
- at least two of the participants were over 70 years of age when relocated in 1953.

Our first reaction to this discovery was to conclude that the criteria established for selecting the participants for the project were not as refined as it should have been, or else, they were not applied with sufficient rigour in this instance. On second thought, however, this



seemed too superficial an explanation. It did not account for the fact that the families involved also had a role, and without doubt the greater one, in deciding whether their old and disabled members would accompany them, or be left behind, or, indeed whether the entire family would opt out of the project altogether, giving this problem as a reason. The answer we arrived at in this regard, was not derived from the files, but from a discussion on the subject with Robert Pilot, and from our own lengthy experience in the Arctic in those years. Inuit families did not regard aged and disabled members as burdens to be dumped on any pretext. Family ties were strong and all members, particularly the aged, were revered and consulted on all important matters. These members were certainly not economic burdens. In fact, as recipients of federal or provincial assistance programs, they were often the only truly reliable source of income in many households, particularly when game was scarce. Nor did families see these members as obstacles that would prevent them from moving from one place to another. Life everywhere in the Arctic, including the camps in the Port Harrison area, was always a challenge. Perhaps the most chilling proof of this is the fact that the average age at death for Inuit as a group in that period was still only about 39 years of age. There was no housing as we understand it to-day in most communities; there were still no institutions to care for the aged and the disabled in the North: there were no ramps or sturdy paths to ease the way for the disabled. Paraplegics could be found living in isolated camps in many parts of the North. Life was difficult at any time and was accepted on those terms. In our opinion, therefore, the inclusion of the aged and disabled in the groups who were relocated, is not proof of Government ineptness in the planning of the relocation program, but rather, a reflection of the harsh realities of Inuit life in the Arctic at that time. This is not to say, of course, that removal of the aged and the disabled from other relatives, friends and generally from things familiar and the need to adjust to quite a different set of circumstances in the High Arctic, did not add stress and discomfort to an already demanding way of life. Indeed, the relocation experience must have been a difficult experience for them at least in the initial months.

### *Conclusion*

*The Department developed and applied what appears to have been appropriate criteria in selecting Inuit families for relocation to the High Arctic. Reasonable care seems to have been taken to ensure that those chosen were free of tuberculosis and other serious infectious diseases, on leaving Port Harrison. Some of the members of the group moved in 1953*

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*were quite elderly, by any standards, and at least one of these people was paraplegic. However their families did not consider this to be a reason for leaving them behind, nor was it unusual to find disabled and very elderly people living in isolated camp conditions throughout the Arctic in those days.*

b) Explaining the Project

The Inuit have also alleged that those families who were approached about the project did not fully understand what they were being asked to do, nor what life would be like in the High Arctic, but agreed to go along because they both trusted and feared Government officials and did not believe they were free to refuse. We view these also as serious allegations, implying, as they do, deliberate deception and possibly coercion on the part of the representatives of the Government.

We found considerable evidence on the files that would suggest that significant efforts were made by the two R.C.M.P. Officers, most directly involved in selecting the people for the project, to explain what it was about and to convey to them that participation was voluntary. A number of the Police dispatches from both the Pond Inlet and Port Harrison Detachments, (reporting progress, asking for further instructions, and reporting results), confirm this point of view.

In addition, we came across several references in the NA&NR files that indicate that a number of other people, including the Welfare Teacher and the Hudson's Bay Company Post Manager at Port Harrison, made an effort to explain the project to the group and to ensure that the perspective candidates understood that participation was voluntary.

We found nothing on the files that could be regarded as direct confirmation by the Inuit themselves that they were being told everything and understood everything about the project. Our evidence is limited, in large part, to statements made by seemingly reliable persons who participated in the interpretation exercise at that time and by the recollections of some Inuit participants, thirty years after the fact.

In his report on an interpretative session, held with two of the Port Harrison families before they boarded the "C. D. Howe" en route to Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay in July 1953, Alex Stevenson, states:

"As the majority of the natives to be moved were camped some distance from Port Harrison, I only had the opportunity to interview two of the men who happened to be at the post trading some handicrafts. I discussed the whole project with them and they fully understood the plan for their movement."

All of the major reports on the project, originating with NA&NR and destined for the information of Cabinet, always referred to the the project as being one that was agreed to voluntarily by the participants.

We also accept as deductive evidence of Inuit understanding and real interest in the project, the fact that those who were relocated in 1953 communicated their experience to their relatives back at Port Harrison, by radio and letter, and that as a result of this, the project continued to attract more families from that community, at least for the next several years. In fact, the number of families seeking to relocate to the two new communities finally had to be restricted, in about 1957, for fear of over-taxing the resources of those areas.

Alex Stevenson, in the report he prepared on January 13, 1983, for John Parker, Commissioner of the N.W.T, on the history of the relocation, also states:

"The people involved in the whole operation were experienced northerners with a good knowledge of the Inuit and their language and that included me."

At another point in his report, however, Stevenson utters a realistic qualifier to the question of how completely the Inuit understood the project, when he says:

"That is not to say however that misunderstandings were not possible, regardless of the precautions."

We support this latter point of view, not only for its practical logic, but because of several statements made by the Inuit in their presentation before the Standing Committee on March 19, 1990 and in the interviews we had with some of them on August 29 in Inukjuak. In

response to our question as to whether they knew if they would be going to Craig Harbour or Resolute Bay on leaving Port Harrison, one of their members, Annie, probably summed it up best, when she replied ;

"We did not really know where we were going until we got there."

We have no trouble accepting that statement as being descriptive of the level of understanding of where they were going at that time, particularly when one considers that the Port Harrison people had no names in their dialect for either of these new places, since they were both new communities, nor could they have had any idea of how far each of them was from Port Harrison or how difficult it was going to be to return to their original community and their friends once they were relocated. In our opinion, these things could not have been fully comprehensible because they were beyond the range of their experience at that time. This was not as big a problem for the Pond Inlet people, however, because they were quite accustomed to life in the High Arctic and could make their way back to their original community, if they really wanted to do so.

As mentioned in the Methodology section of our report, we did not attempt to deal with the assertion that the Inuit agreed to participate in the project because they both trusted and feared the whiteman and did not think they could choose otherwise.

### *Conclusion*

*Reasonable steps appear to have been taken to explain the project to the prospective Inuit participants by the representatives of the Government in 1953. The latter seem to have believed that the Inuit understood what was being explained to them and that they volunteered to participate. More Inuit families from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet requested to be relocated to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord in several subsequent years, after 1953, as a result of feedback from their relatives, friends and Government representatives. It is reasonable to conclude from this, that they understood and were interested in participating in the project. Nevertheless, it is very likely that some of the original Inuit participants could not completely envisage what conditions in the High Arctic would be like nor the distances that would separate them from their relatives and*

*friends back in Port Harrison because these things were outside the range of their personal experience. While this is indeed unfortunate, it should not imply a deliberate attempt by the Government officials to deceive or mislead the Inuit participants.*

c) Conditions on Arrival

The Inuit claimants dwelt at some length on the hardships that awaited them on their arrival at their respective destinations, because of lack of adequate equipment.

We found several references in the files that confirm the assertion that those relocated were not as well equipped as they might have been and that until new canvas could be unpacked from the supplies brought ashore with them and new tents had been sewn or old ones patched, the group must have suffered considerable discomfort. The Police, themselves, refer to this in some of their correspondence with their headquarters and with the Department. Marc Hammond also cites a comment made by Inspector Larsen of the R.C.M.P., on visiting the Grise Fiord community in 1956, which would indicate that the Inuit were not well equipped when they arrived there in 1953:

"All told, thanks to the assistance and effort made by our men, the native settlement has prospered and it was hard for me to realize that they were the same people that I saw landed there in 1953, all in rags and with little or no equipment of any kind."

With respect to the group that were landed at Resolute Bay, in the summer of 1953 a report made shortly thereafter by C. Marshall, who, at the time, was Secretary to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, is particularly critical of the conditions facing this group on their arrival at their destination. He mentions that the group arrived with tents and canoes in poor condition and lists shortages of various kinds of supplies for the small cooperative store that was to be set up at Resolute Bay for the benefit of the group. Marshall's criticisms were largely turned aside by some officials in Ottawa, who argued that he lacked Arctic experience and did not realize that the supplies in the store were simply supplemental to the equipment they brought with them.

We are unable to come down on one side or other of this argument but, considering the amount of time allowed for the final planning stage of the project, we are inclined to



conclude that there may well have been some oversights which caused this group some discomfort at the end of their journey. This criticism has to be off-set, to some extent, however, by the frequent references in the files to the interminable problems associated with Arctic shipping in those years, which seemed to plague all northern projects .

### *Conclusions*

*The Inuit participants were not as well equipped as they should have been to embark on a journey as difficult as this. The reasons for this are not clear but it would appear that more time should have been provided to look after such matters before the Inuit embarked. This criticism has to be off-set, to some extent, by the interminable problems associated with all Arctic shipping and which continue to plague all northern projects down to the present day.*

#### d) Assumptions about Economic Conditions in Arctic Quebec and Game Resources in the High Arctic

The Inuit have queried the basis for the Government's assumption that Arctic Quebec was economically worse off than other communities in the Arctic. In our examination of this issue we came across several references and articles referring to the depressed economic conditions among Inuit trappers throughout the entire Hudson's Bay area. Writing on this subject in his authoritative work "Eskimo Administration, Vol.2- Canada," (Chapter 9), in 1966, Diamond Jenness notes:

"Hardest hit, perhaps, were the Eskimos of the Hudson's Bay region... when furs plummeted in 1948/9 to only half of their earlier value, the situation of the natives became desperate. Trapping now brought in virtually no return and even the most energetic hunter could rarely avoid depending on relief. In 1950, an official investigator estimated that from their own earnings the Hudson Bay Eskimos were defraying only about 40% of their purchases at the trading stores and that the federal government was contributing up to 60% through various hand-outs."



While this reference conveys something of the Government's concern about the poverty of the Inuit of the Hudson Bay region, it does not explain why Arctic Quebec was singled out for special attention, over communities in the Keewatin District on the other side of the Bay.

We checked with Statistics Canada for statistical data that might permit us to compare living conditions among Inuit living in communities on the east and west sides of Hudson Bay in the early 1950s, as reflected in infant mortality rates, incidence of hospital admissions for tuberculosis and other indicators. Statistics Canada was most helpful with this part of the work, but unfortunately the data available did not break down to that level and hence we could not pursue this line of enquiry.

The prevailing view on this subject within the Department at that time was that Arctic Quebec's increasing Inuit and Indian populations were putting severe stress on the region's already limited game resources, more so than in other areas. It seemed to be this concern that tipped the balance in favour of Arctic Quebec.

The files also confirmed the related Inuit allegation that no large-scale and truly scientific studies of game resources preceded the choice of Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay as the two sites for the project. The desirability of conducting such studies was recognized early in the planning of these projects, but not acted upon. Definite plans to proceed with a full scale study of terrestrial and marine resources in the entire area, between Dundas Harbour and Pond Inlet, as part of the information required in planning new communities in the High Arctic, were discussed as early as 1954, but this study also never got off the ground due, primarily, to a decision by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, in 1956, to suspend plans for the development of additional new communities in the High Arctic.

It is evident from a reading of the files for that period, that this decision was not the result of any assessment of the success or failure of the Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord relocation projects. One receives very much the impression that both projects were regarded by the Department, the Police and the Inuit participants, as being quite successful. In fact, Resolute Bay, in particular, was often viewed in those years, as a kind of "model community" in that it provided a balanced mix of wage employment, hunting and trapping to the participants. It was one of the few communities in the North where wage employed

Inuit could still enjoy a diet of traditional country food and retain their hunting and trapping skills.

The explanation for the suspension of plans for the development of new communities in the High Arctic was made by the Department in order to respond effectively to new, rapidly emerging and relatively large-scale wage employment opportunities for Inuit, generated by increased defence and resource exploration activity throughout the North. The Mid Canada and Early Warning Defence Systems, the start-up of a mine at Rankin Inlet, and resource exploration in many areas of the Arctic all burst upon the scene almost simultaneously, in 1956, dictating a dramatic shift in Departmental priorities and resource allocations.

The absence of such studies, however, does not appear to us to mean that the Department and the Police did not have a reasonable sense of the relative abundance of game resources in the areas chosen for relocation, before the decision to develop those communities was taken. The historical records of extensive police patrols over large sections of Ellesmere Island, dating as far back as the 1920s, and more recent visits by Canadian wildlife scientists, albeit periodic, to Cornwallis and other of the Arctic Islands, would certainly seem to have established at least baseline data on the relative abundance of terrestrial and marine wildlife in those areas. What was not yet known in 1953 was the rate at which wildlife in those areas could replenish themselves and exactly how many families could safely be introduced to harvest these resources on a sustainable yield basis. This absence of knowledge, however, seemed to have been taken into account in planning the relocation project, in that it was decided to introduce only a few families each year.

The information sources we consulted tend to lead us to the conclusion that these assumptions about game in those areas were basically sound and that the participants in the project fared quite well in the hunt. In his presentation to the Standing Committee on March 19, one of the Inuit, Samwillie Eliasialuk, who was among those relocated to Craig Harbour in 1953, quotes a Greenland hunter whom he encountered on a hunting trip at that time, as saying to him:

"Why do you carry so much dog food when animals are plentiful over here "

This would suggest that game was plentiful enough in that area, at that time. The following excerpts from an article in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Quarterly, dated October 1954, contributed by Constable A. C. Fryer, who was stationed at Craig Harbour when the Port Harrison group arrived the previous year, would also seem to support this point of view:

"After the natives were temporarily encamped, close to the detachment, the men were taken on a hunting trip...For the majority of the natives, it was the first time they had ever shot a walrus...Three walruses were killed and at least 50 others were counted. We returned to Craig Harbour with a spirited group of natives, who were enthusiastic about the abundance of game."

"Following the walrus hunt, the younger Eskimos were taken on a caribou hunting trip in Fram Fiord. Ten caribou were taken, mainly for the purpose of supplying natives with skins with which to make clothing."

Later, in the same article, the author, in referring to the relocation of the Craig Harbour Detachment and the Inuit encampment to Grise Fiord, states:

"The new site is on the south-eastern tip of Linstrom Peninsula, approximately 40 miles from the Craig Harbour Detachment. This location was chosen because of the known abundance of sea game, especially the harp seal...In three trips with the Police power boat, all the natives and their belongings were transported to Grise Fiord. During these trips, six walruses, two bearded seals and several common seals were contributed to the natives caches of meat...All the Eskimos, except one old character from Port Harrison, were delighted with their camp location."

There were many more references to the abundance of game and the general satisfaction with living conditions in the Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay areas in that and other sources we reviewed. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this, however, is not to be found in published articles and government documents, but in letters written by the Inuit residents, themselves, to the Social Workers in Ottawa during the years 1953 to 1963, a sampling of which follows:

E9-1635

Resolute Bay, N.W.T.

March 21, 1960.

J. is writing to Bobby. I want you to tell me what you think. Esa, E9-706 wrote to me and saying that he wants to come here to live in the High Arctic. If it is possible for him to come I would like to have him and he also wants to come. He also said in his letter that he was not happy last winter at Port Harrison, because he finds it very difficult to get the dog food. He has been hunting and trapping (but) there is nothing. At this place (there are) lots of walrus and plenty of seals and it has more foxes than Port Harrison and lots of square flipper seals, lots of whales. He can get more dog food here than at Port Harrison. It is a good place to live. No wonder Isa is wanting to come."

Translator: Mary Panegoosho

E9-1762

Resolute Bay, N.W.T.

October 26, 1959

L. is writing to Bobby. I hail from Port Harrison but now, at present, I am living where there is no daylight. Resolute Bay is my new land. It was in 1955 when I came to this land. I want my mother-in-law and my brother who are at Port Harrison to come...to stay with us by next year. Maggie's disc number is E9-709. Kilopak's number is E9-711.

I want them to come here next year. This is why I am writing to Ottawa; also do write to Port Harrison and if they say yes, please write to me and let me know. I do need them in the worse way. Maggie and Kilopak with his children. I want them to come and stay with me if this could be done. I really do need someone to help me because this place of darkness has white foxes. It is a good place. Also people never go hungry here, because there is plenty of animals to hunt. Write to me.

Translator --Abraham Okpik

E5-766

Resolute Bay, N.W.T.

March 20, 1957

I. writes to Leo. Thanks very much for your letter. It was understandable. No, Leo, I do not want to live any other place than here. I only wish to visit Spence Bay someday on account of my son P, to try to get him to live with us here. I do not think I can make it this spring though.

I want you to know that I do not intend to go back to Pond Inlet because I think Resolute Bay is a better place for game. There are many more seals here than at Pond Inlet and also caribou close by at Bathurst Island which is at the point of Bedford. There are still some remaining caribou at Resolute itself too.

I am happy to tell you that the ex-Port Harrison men are more keen in hunting seals by seal holes now. Better than they were last year. There is good food for more than a hundred people if there were that many here.

I think I may go to Spence Bay in the spring to trade my fox skins. If you do not think it's a good idea, let me know by letter. I will be happy to hear from you.

Within a few years of their arrival at Resolute Bay, employment opportunities opened up for at least some of the men, as the following excerpt from a letter written by one of them indicates:

E9-1635

Resolute Bay, N.W.T..

July 4, 1960

J. writes to Bobby, in Ottawa. "I am going to write a short letter to Bobby because I don't have much to say. All of us been kept well. We are working for the whiteman at the airbase; we probably work for six months. All of us men started to work during spring, on June 16. If the airforce people are telling the truth, we will

be working during June, July, August, September, October and November. We are getting a lot of help making money because the white people are very kind to us. We are happy to work and all of us are well look after. And the Police is very kind and he is alright but sometimes we do not obey what he asks us to do."

As with all communities, however, things did not always go smoothly and all needs were not always met:

E9-1765

Resolute Bay, NWT.

March 14, 1962.

S. writes to the Social Workers in Ottawa.

"This is S. from Resolute Bay, who used to live in Port Harrison, writing. I am now working for the Air Force, as a sweeper and earning money for it.

I came here in 1953 and I have been here for 9 years now. I was the first one here before the Eskimos came. I am grateful to the Government for they are helping us and we are helped also by "Inuktitut " magazine.

I would like to find out something from the Welfare Workers. Many Eskimos now have houses from the Government but here we have only houses made out of boxes and pieces of wood and its much colder here than any other place. I think its about time we should get houses too from the Government, if its possible. Please answer and let me know what you think about this. Even if you don't answer me right away, I'll still keep writing to you what I have in mind. That's all for now."

Translator- E.Erkloo



## *Conclusions*

*Economic conditions were considered by experts in the field to be worse in Arctic Quebec than elsewhere in the North, because the aboriginal population was increasing, game resources were under pressure, and increasing numbers of Inuit were becoming dependent on government welfare programs in that area. No large scale scientific surveys of renewable resources was carried out in the Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay areas before these sites were chosen for new settlements. However, considerable information had nevertheless been gathered on game resources in those areas. Published articles by the R.C.M.P. and Inuit letters in the possession of the Department indicate that game was plentiful around both the new communities. The Inuit state in their letters during this period that they were not hungry and generally liked their new environment.*

## 6.0 CHAPTER SIX

### 6.1 PROMISES MADE BUT NOT KEPT

We understand this allegation to be that when the government spokesmen discussed relocation to the High Arctic with the Inukjuak families, the latter were promised that if they were not satisfied with life at their new location they would be returned to Inukjuak, at government expense. The Inuit claim that they were unhappy at Resolute and Grise Fiord and asked the government representatives to return them to Port Harrison, beginning in 1954 and for a number of years subsequently, but their request was not acted upon until their formal claim was presented to the government in 1982.

We reviewed all of the statements and written evidence presented to the Standing Committee on March 19 and June 19, 1990, touching on these grievances. We also searched a large number of files in the possession of both the National Archives of Canada and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, for information that would throw further light onto these claims. In addition, we personally interviewed eight Inuit, now living at Inukjuak, who were part of the original group relocated to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord in the 1950s, to gather additional insights into their understanding and recollection of the events of those days. Our findings and conclusions are presented below, on an issue-by-issue basis.

a) Promise to return them to their original communities, if requested.

Our findings on this point accord with those mentioned in Marc Hammond's 1984 report to the Department. The evidence he presents, and the hypotheses he articulates where he could find no direct evidence, lead us also to the conclusion that such a promise was definitely made to the Pond Inlet group. We conclude, as well, that a similar undertaking was given by the Department to the Port Harrison group in 1953, and that it continued to apply to groups subsequently moved through to 1957. Our conclusions on this matter are based on comments found in a number of documents which deal specifically with this issue.

The first of these is an excerpt from a report of Alex Stevenson's visit to Port Harrison in the summer of 1953, prior to the embarkation of the first group . The excerpt in question can be found on File 201-1-8 pt 3, which is in the possession of the National Archives of Canada. It states:

"...One final item regarding the movement is that the Eskimos agreed that they would go north for a period of two years at least. Then, if they were dissatisfied or unhappy in their new environment, they could return to Port Harrison."

The second reference to such an undertaking is contained in a memorandum from Mr. B. G. Sivertz, to the Director, Northern Administration Branch, dated November 8, 1956, the relevant portion of which reads:

"It should be remembered that we are feeling our way in these projects. So far things have gone well...better than we probably have hoped. After two years the people seem content to stay on, whereas they only agreed to go in the first place on condition that we promise to return them to their former homes after two or three years."

We interpret these comments to mean that the promise in question was made to all Inuit families relocated from both Port Harrison and Pond Inlet and in all of the years in which relocations occurred.

We also agree with Hammond's view that inherent in the Government's undertaking to return the relocated families to their original communities after two or three years, should they request to do so, was the undertaking to absorb the costs involved.

The question of how long this promise was good for, is, of course, much more difficult to answer. The substantive reference on the subject by Stevenson, says: "at least two years"; the comment by Sivertz mentions: "two or three years". One is left to surmise from this that the Department reasoned that, after two or three years experience at these new locations, the Inuit would have made up their minds as to whether they wished to stay on there or return to their original communities. We question whether the Department intended to leave this offer on the table, indefinitely considering the tendencies of governments

generally to want to place time limits on their financial obligations and, as in this case, to avoid the problem of determining eligible antecedents years down the road.

Statements by the Inuit before the Standing Committee indicate that at least some of the relocated families ( e.g., the father of Markussie Patsauq and M. Amagoalik ) asked to be returned to their home communities after the first year and in subsequent years, but were refused. The government representatives purportedly responded by proposing instead that they write and encourage their relatives in Port Harrison to relocate to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. This accusation was repeated to us by all of the Inuit whom we personally interviewed at Inukjuak during the week of August 19, 1990. When questioned further on this matter, a number of them stated that once they sensed that the government representatives did not want to agree to return them to their original communities, they stopped asking because they did not want to anger these people who had so much control over their lives.

We also sorted through something in the order of 400 letters written during the years 1953 to 1963, by the Inuit residents at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord and their relatives in those communities and in sanatoria in the south, to the Inuit-speaking social workers in the Eskimology Section (later the Welfare Division) in Ottawa, for possible further references to this issue. These sources yielded several examples of requests made by the Inuit in question to be returned to, or to visit on an extended basis ( e.g., a year or more), their original communities, or to have their relatives join them in the High Arctic, and the replies sent by Ottawa in response. The following sample is typical of this correspondence.

E9-1523, a former resident of Port Harrison and now at Resolute Bay writes to the social workers in Ottawa on January 30, 1961, stating:

"I would like to go back to Port Harrison this coming summer. Here at Resolute they helped me a great deal and I am happy here but someone who lives at Port Harrison wants me to return there this summer and I would like to go back if its possible, if the social workers agree. If they don't agree with me I think I will find it difficult. The white people help me a great deal and I am happy about it. I would like you to write to me and let me know if they agree with me...Also my mother, Elizabeth and my sisters Minnie and Annie, they are all in hospital. It's up to them

what they want to do. Elizabeth will do what she wants; its up to her. I am writing only for myself."

Quite often such requests did not contain sufficient information to permit the recipient to respond in a simple "yes " or "no" fashion. Many factors had to be considered in preparing the reply, not the least of which were the questions of whether the writer was requesting only a brief or a protracted visit back to Port Harrison, or whether permanent repatriation with family, dogs, canoes and other property was contemplated. The availability of housing back in Port Harrison, to receive the visitors, was always a question that needed to be explored, because wooden houses in all communities in those years, if they existed at all, were virtually always overcrowded. These questions and concerns were raised with the author and additional information sought, sometimes involving two or three exchanges of letters, as shown in the reply in this instance:

February 3, 1961

B. writes to P, translated by Elijah Erkloo.

"I do remember you from the summer of 1957. Thank you for your letters which you wrote on October 5 and January 19. We would like some more information as to why you would like to go back to Port Harrison. Please contact the R.C.M.P. (at Resolute ) about this information; it is always best to give the report to the R.C.M.P. so that we have something on paper. Also tell the R.C.M.P. how you are doing at Resolute and whether or not you are enjoying it.

You wrote in your letter that you wanted to return to Port Harrison, but you also mentioned that you were asked by William to return. If you decide to return to William, you must also consider your wife's and your children's feelings on the matter. Also, if you go back to Port Harrison, would you be able to live like you do at Resolute Bay? Would you be comfortable living at Port Harrison? Would it be better if William were sent to Resolute Bay instead?

I do not want to dictate to you what you should do, but you must take time to think things over before you make any real decisions. I can offer you advice as to what you should do or as to what is the best way to handle things, but you must discuss



the situation with the R.C.M.P. there. Where do your wife and children stand in this situation? Please go and speak to the R.C.M.P. about this.

We have a new social worker at Port Harrison and we have asked that person to contact William and to see how he is doing. We will keep you informed.

The next piece of correspondence in the files on this case, many months later, indicate that he had returned to Port Harrison although the correspondence does not say whether this was for a visit or on a permanent basis.

Several letters were received in Ottawa from residents of Resolute Bay in 1961, proposing visits back to Port Harrison. The following reply to one such letter, by the social workers in Ottawa, sheds some light onto the thinking of the Department, by that time, in responding to this type of request:

To: E9-1635  
Resolute Bay, NWT.  
November 28, 1961

Dear J:

This is Leah writing to you from the office in Ottawa. The Director of the Social Services Department has requested that we send you a letter in reply to your letter of September. At this time we are unable to entertain your request to travel from Resolute Bay to Port Harrison until we receive more information. We would like to know your reasons for wanting to return to Port Harrison.

Many people have asked to return to Port Harrison for a visit, so what we are suggesting is that maybe if a group travelled to Port Harrison, perhaps on the Air Force plane to Churchill, Manitoba and then from there the group would switch planes and travel to Port Harrison and the cost would be about \$ 2000.00. This can all be arranged through the R.C.M.P. in your community."



We cannot determine from this correspondence what the official position or policy of the Department was, in 1961, seven years after the launching of the project, with respect to requests by the Inuit of these two communities to be returned to Port Harrison, on a permanent basis. In fact, we hesitate to draw too many conclusions from this material as to what the official response might have been on the question of paid visits back to Port Harrison at that time. The letter quoted above is not clear on this point. Our speculation on the latter, however, would be that the Department considered that because the Resolute Bay people had been wage employed, by that time for a number of years, they should be quite capable of financing their own visits. This position was not inconsistent with that applied in the case of the Fort Chimo Inuit who moved to Churchill to take wage employment at the Military Base, under the Department's auspices, and who wished to return to their home community for a visit from time to time. We don't think, however, that the same reasoning could be applied to the group at Grise Fiord.

The records indicate that early in the 1970s Inuit families living at both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay approached the Government of the Northwest Territories requesting assistance to travel to Inukjuak to visit relatives and assess whether they wished to be relocated to that community on a permanent basis. The Territorial Government, which had by that time assumed responsibility for the administration of Inuit Affairs from the Federal Government, acceded to this request and paid the costs of both the exploratory visits and the permanent relocation. These costs were later recovered from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The R.C.M.P. used their own aircraft on at least one occasion for this purpose during the same period and appear to have absorbed the costs involved. During the 1980s, additional families from both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay returned to Inukjuak, initially at their own expense or with help from Makivik Corporation. These transportation costs were also re-imbursed by the Department in 1988-89. In the same year, the Department also contributed approximately \$ 700,000.00 to the Government of Quebec to offset the impact of this influx of people on the province's housing plan for Inukjuak. An offer to transport any of the original families, still at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, who might wish to return to Inukjuak or Pond Inlet, at Departmental expense, would be consistent with these precedents and would appear to satisfy any remaining obligations in this regard. To ensure, however, that the claim can be definitively concluded, we would suggest that a time limit of one or so years should be attached to this offer.

## *Conclusions*

*The Inuit living at Resolute Bay wrote to the Government officials from time to time requesting assistance to visit relatives in Inukjuak. It was frequently difficult to ascertain if the request was for a short visit, a protracted visit or for permanent resettlement back to their original community. No such requests were discovered from Inuit living at Grise Fiord. Some families did visit Inukjuak in 1962, but it is unclear as to whether the Government or the Inuit covered the costs involved. We did not discover a definitive Departmental policy that would have answered this question. Fort Chimo Inuit who were relocated to Churchill during this same period to take wage employment were expected to pay for visits back to their home community. The Government of the NWT paid for both visits and permanent resettlement of a number of Inuit families from Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to Inukjuak in 1973/74 and were subsequently reimbursed by the Federal Government. The R.C.M.P. apparently also used their own aircraft to return families to Inukjuak in the same period. More families returned in the 1980s, initially at their own expense or with help from Makivik Corporation. The Department also reimbursed these costs and contributed funds to off-set the impact of this inflow of people on Quebec housing plans for the Inukjuak community in 1988-89. An offer to return any of the original families still remaining families at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay ,who would like to be returned to Inukjuak or Pond Inlet, would be consistent with these precedents.*

## 7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN

### 7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

#### 7.1.1 Findings and Conclusions

The decision by the Government to actively encourage the relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic in 1953, and in the two or three years subsequent to that, was not motivated primarily by a concern to strengthen Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands. Canada felt secure in her claim of ownership of the Islands as a result of an exchange of Notes between Canada and Norway in 1930 and because the Canadian Government had consistently displayed its sovereignty in that area for so long and in so many ways as to firmly establish its title to all of the Arctic Islands in a manner consistent with International Law.

The R.C.M.P. participated in the exercise of Canadian sovereignty in the north by their very presence in those areas and in the various roles they were called upon to carry out on their own behalf and on behalf of other federal departments. They were required, from time to time, to deal with the illegal hunting of polar bear and muskoxen by Greenlanders. In carrying out this function, they did indeed assist in asserting Canadian sovereignty.

The Inuit people were not relocated to the High Arctic to assist the R.C.M.P. in the administration of the NWT Game Ordinances, although, in fact, they did so on occasion. They exercised Canadian Arctic sovereignty in their own right by the very fact of living there but that was not the purpose of their relocation. The main reason for the decision by the Government to encourage some Inuit families to relocate to the High Arctic at that time was a concern to improve the living conditions of the Inuit, particularly in the Hudson Bay region. Relocation from these depressed areas was seen as a means of breaking a growing pattern of welfare dependency, which becomes the heritage of poverty, by providing the Inuit with new and better economic opportunities through improved hunting, trapping and possible wage employment.

Reasonable steps were taken to establish and apply suitable criteria for the selection of Inuit families that would ensure the success of the project and the security of the participants.

These criteria were developed over a period of several years, with input from a number of sources. Those who were transported to the project by the "C. D. Howe" were X-rayed and appear to have passed this examination. A few of the participants who were included were quite aged and one was physically disabled, but this was not out of line with Inuit cultural values nor with the realities of life in the Arctic in those years.

The difficulties of life in the High Arctic were recognized and explored and a reasonable plan was articulated to ensure that those who were relocated were also supported by R.C.M.P. officers who knew them personally and who were knowledgeable of Inuit ways and language. Experienced Inuit families from the most northern settlements at the time were approached to assist with the project. They agreed to do so and to transfer their hunting and trapping skills to the Inuit participants from Arctic Quebec. The first group from Port Harrison were not as well equipped upon arrival at their destination as they might have been.

Reasonable efforts seem to have been made to explain the project to both of the Inuit groups involved before their departure, and to communicate the fact that participation in it was voluntary. It is more than likely that some of the Inuit could not completely envisage what conditions in the High Arctic would be like because these things were outside the range of personal experience at the time. While this is truly regrettable, it should not imply a deliberate attempt by the Government officials to deceive or mislead the Inuit participants.

A number of the Inuit participants in the project indicated in letters written to the Department in the period 1956 to 1963 that game and fur were plentiful in the vicinity of both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, and that hunger was not a problem.

The Department gave the Inuit an understanding that they would be returned to their original communities after one, two, or three years, if this was requested. There is no evidence to suggest that the Department intended this undertaking to remain in force indefinitely. The files show that some of the Inuit families living in Resolute Bay wrote to Ottawa, asking to return to Port Harrison for a visit. The earliest example of such a request, that we could find, occurred around 1960. The determination of the length of the proposed visits quite often required several exchanges of letters. On one known occasion, in 1961, Ottawa responded to such proposals by seeming to suggest that those wishing to visit Port Harrison should collaborate in chartering an aircraft for this purpose, at their own

expense. The files would indicate that one group did this in 1962, but no further details are provided. It is uncertain if there was an official policy on the matter at that time. Our speculation is that the Department took this position because it considered the individuals involved to be economically self-sufficient. This was certainly the practice followed, with respect to Fort Chimo Inuit working at Churchill and wishing to visit their home community.

In 1973-74, after the transfer of federal responsibility for the administration of Inuit affairs to the Government of the Northwest Territories, the latter received requests from and assisted a number of Inuit families living at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord to visit and return permanently to live at Inukjuak. The Territorial Government was reimbursed by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for these expenses. The R.C.M.P. used their own aircraft to return several families from Grise Fiord to Inukjuak, also about 1974, and absorbed the costs involved.

During the 1980s, more of the Inuit families returned to Port Harrison at their own expense or with assistance from the Makivik Corporation of Quebec.

When this issue was first raised in a formal claim against the Department, in 1982, the Deputy Minister of the day expressed understanding and sympathy for the concerns raised by the Inuit. In 1987, he also undertook to reimburse the Inuit involved and the Makivik Corporation of Quebec for the relocation expenses incurred in moving families back to Port Harrison, amounting to approximately \$250,000. In 1988, the Department also undertook to provide the Government of Quebec with funds amounting to approximately \$700,000 to permit the Province to add ten houses to the pool of housing identified for Port Harrison.

#### 7.1.2 Observations

We do not claim to have found and unerringly assessed all of the material that would reveal the truth in this complex maze of events. There may well be much more evidence out there than we were able to discover and that could indeed provide quite a different view of what actually took place. Based on the evidence we were able to find, however, we do not see in these events a willful intent on the part of the Government to manipulate, mislead and put at risk a group of people in its charge, in order to achieve some other national purpose. Nor do we see the Inuit in this piece as gullible and ineffectual participants in some kind of



ill conceived endeavour. Quite the opposite, the evidence points to conscientious, caring and reasonably intelligent Government officials and equally intelligent, and enterprising Inuit people, both of whom collaborated in an undertaking intended to provide the Inuit with new opportunities for a much better way of life.

Inevitably, some aspects of the planning and implementation of the project could have been improved upon, although we did not uncover any deficiencies that could be said to be life-threatening. It would appear to us that the relocation project achieved its objectives in that the Inuit participants were exposed to and took advantage of the new opportunities that it presented to them. The fact that the project did not last forever, does not mean that it was not successful, any more than the closure of the mine at Rankin Inlet, in the NWT, after six years of operation, meant that that endeavour was a disaster.

The material we poured over in the study does not reveal the reasons why, after so many years, the High Arctic ceased to hold the attention of the Inuit from Inukjuak or to satisfy their needs. We are left to speculate on these reasons.

By the early 1970s, the Inuit of Arctic Quebec had begun to organize themselves for the ensuing and totally absorbing land claim negotiations that culminated in the signing of the James Bay and Nouveau Quebec Agreement in 1975. The Inuit of Arctic Quebec fared well in these negotiations. Understandably, the Inuit of our study who were covered under the Agreement may well have felt that their interests in this matter could best be protected and their rights exercised by being on the spot, as it were.

As mentioned to us by Samwillie Eliasialuk, during our visit to Inukjuak in August of this year, the death of their elders over the years deprived the communities of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay of the wisdom, direction and sense of security which they traditionally derive from these sources, and left them feeling that the only remaining links with their past were back in their ancestral community. It is difficult for southern non-aboriginal Canadians to appreciate this sentiment but the loss of the elders obviously had considerable influence on their wish to return to Inukjuak.

Another dimension of this same concern is described by Milton M.R. Freeman, a well-known Canadian sociologist who spent considerable time at Grise Fiord in the 1970s. In an article written for "Arctic" a publication of the Smithsonian Institute, Washington, in



1984, Freeman describes at length the strained relationships between the Pond Inlet and the Port Harrison groups. The Pond Inlet group appears to have exercised considerably more influence over the direction the community was taking in a number of areas. This may also have caused the Inukjuak group to feel that control over their own affairs had slipped away.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the exposure of the younger people in the community to T.V. and to formal education through a now mature elementary school system, must inevitably have produced a different paradigm with which to interpret the past, a new way of looking at life and new expectations, that the High Arctic, with its isolation, harsh climate and lengthy periods of darkness, could no longer satisfy. This is not, of course, something to be regretted but is rather the inevitable destiny of all dynamic human societies.

## **8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **8.1 RESPONSE TO THE CLAIM TO DATE BY THE DEPARTMENT**

Two aspects of the claim are dealt with in this chapter. The first of these concerns the official response by the government, to date, with respect to the various allegations that make up the claim. The second, which, in a sense, is a corollary of the first, are the actions the Government has taken to date or has indicated that it is prepared to take by way of response to the claim. The information on both of these aspects is derived from the proceedings of the June 19, 1990 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and its attachments and from a number of internal Departmental memoranda on this subject, through the years 1982 to 1989.

#### **8.1.1 The Sovereignty Issue**

The earliest departmental reaction to the assertion that Arctic sovereignty was the primary motivation behind the relocation project of the 1950s is contained in a letter written by M. A. F. Lafontaine, Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to Mr. John Amagoalik, President of Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, on December 14, 1982. In this letter, Mr. Lafontaine is replying on behalf of his predecessor, Mr. Paul Tellier, to a request by Mr. Amagoalik on October 7, 1982, for assistance with the purchase and construction of sixteen houses and for marine transport to permit sixteen families to be returned to Port Harrison from Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The Deputy Minister's reply does not mention sovereignty as such, but considering the context, it would be difficult to imagine that he meant anything else:

"I believe these requests should be given every consideration since the original impetus for relocation came from the Federal Government, motivated at least in part by concerns of national interest."

The Hon. John Monro, former Minister of DIAND, is also quoted by Makivik Corporation of Quebec in their several submissions to the Department and in the evidence they presented to the Standing Committee on March 19, 1990, as conceding, in a speech he made in 1983,

that Inuit were co-partners with the Government, even before the Second World War, in helping to establish Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic. This acknowledgement is quite specific when Mr. Monro states:

"To further entrench the sovereignty claim, the government relocated Inuit people from northern Quebec to the Arctic Islands in the mid 1950s "

A comment made by Mr. B. G. Sivertz in a meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee in 1956, and by Mr. Robert Pilot, in his appearance before the Standing Committee on June 19, 1990, both of which are cited by us elsewhere in this report, are interpreted by Makivik Corporation as further evidence of the Government's acknowledgement of the tie-in between sovereignty and the relocation project . In both of these latter cases, however, sovereignty is not claimed to be more than a secondary consideration.

At least two former Ministers of Indian Affairs and Northern Development are on public record as indicating that they would be prepared to support a proposal that would acknowledge the contribution made by the Inuit towards Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic Islands, by designating one of these communities as a historic site or by erecting a historic plaque to mark these past events. The Ministers apparently did not undertake to initiate such a proposal, but simply indicated that they would offer their support if it were made. We contacted officials of the Historic Sites and Monuments Board to determine where this suggestion stood. They were unable to discover any correspondence on this subject in their files.

The public announcements by Ministers on this question can be expected to be taken as at least a degree of acknowledgement that sovereignty played some kind of role in the Inuit relocations of the 1950s.

The Department's interim, written response of May 15, 1990 to the Standing Committee, following its appearance before the Committee on March 19, states quite categorically that sovereignty was not the motivation behind the Government's decision to actively encourage the relocation of some Inuit families in the 1950s. The Government's reply cited depressed conditions in Arctic Quebec, the growing dependence of Inuit from that region on welfare assistance, the prospects of better hunting and trapping and the possibilities of wage employment as reasons involved.

In summary, some of the statements that have been made on this issue to date will be interpreted by the Inuit claimants as public acknowledgement by the Government that concern over sovereignty prompted it to encourage Inuit people to relocate to the Arctic Islands, in the 1950s, regardless of Departmental assertions to the contrary. In our opinion, however, it would be difficult to argue that this concern was ever referred to as being more than a secondary consideration.

### **8.1.2 Wrongdoing and Failure to Effectively Plan and Carry Out the Project**

The Department has consistently rejected all allegations to the effect that it is guilty of willfully perpetrating wrongdoings of one kind or another in the conduct of the relocations. Our findings do not support the Inuit allegations and the Department would, therefore, appear to be justified in maintaining its stance on these matters.

### **8.3 Promise to Return Families**

Many statements have been made by government officials on this issue since the claim was first raised in 1982. These statements effectively acknowledge that some kind of promise or undertaking was given to the Inuit families involved by the government to return them to their original communities, at government expense, if they were dissatisfied with life in their new environment. The acknowledgement has usually been accompanied by a qualification running to the effect that the assumed promise also probably had a time limit attached to it. This position has been defended by references to a promise in several documents that mention periods of two or three years.

Acknowledgement by government of a promise associated with the relocation project can also be claimed as a result of the action taken by the Department to cover certain relocation costs for those who have already returned to Port Harrison, along with a \$700,000 contribution to the Government of Quebec to offset the costs of constructing ten additional houses for returnees and a number of other associated costs. On the other hand, the Department has stated publicly on a number of occasions that the decision to cover these costs now is based on moral or humanitarian considerations rather than on legal grounds.

It has maintained that it can find no reasonable basis for believing that the original intention was to let this promise run in perpetuity.

The response of the Department to the Makivik Corporation on the matter of housing has been carefully worded to avoid giving the mistaken impression that the houses in question, as a consequence, become the property of the relocated families. Appendix Eight of this report will provide the reader with a visual appreciation of the quality of housing currently being built at Inukjuak.

## 9.0 CHAPTER NINE

### 9.1 SUGGESTED RESPONSES TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

We would suggest that the Department consider the following findings, conclusions and observations emanating from our study, in preparing its response to the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in compliance with Standing Order 109.

- The evidence does not support the allegation by the Inuit that the Government was motivated primarily by concern about its ownership of and sovereignty over the Arctic Islands when it actively encouraged Inuit families to relocate to the High Arctic in the early 1950s. The Government felt secure in its claim of ownership of the Islands at that time as a result of an Exchange of Notes between Canada and Norway in 1930, which recognized this claim. In addition, the Canadian Government had consistently displayed its sovereignty in that area for so long and in so many ways as to have firmly established its title to all of the Arctic Islands in a manner consistent with International Law.
- The R.C.M.P. participated in the exercise of Canadian sovereignty in the North through the various roles it was called upon to carry out on its own, and on behalf of other federal departments. In this case, the R.C.M.P. exercised sovereignty principally when they were called upon, from time to time, to prevent or deal with the illegal hunting of polar bear and muskoxen by Greenlanders, which was prohibited under the NWT Game Ordinance.
- The Inuit families, who were relocated to Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay as part of the Government's relocation program in the 1950s helped the R.C.M.P. in this type of police work on occasion, and in that sense, aided in the exercise Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These Inuit families, however, were not relocated to assist the R.C.M.P. in these matters.



- The official files and documents from that period leave no doubt that the main reason for the decision by the Government to encourage families, on a selective basis, to relocate to the High Arctic at that time, was a concern to improve the living conditions of Inuit, particularly in the Hudson Bay region. Relocation was seen by both Government officials and the Inuit themselves, as a way of breaking out of a growing pattern of welfare dependency, and as a means of providing the Inuit with new and better economic opportunities for hunting, trapping and wage employment further north.
- Reasonable steps were taken by the Government officials to establish and apply suitable criteria for the selection of families, so as to ensure the success of the project and the security of the participants. These criteria were developed over a period of several years, with input from a number of sources. Those who were transported to the new location were x-rayed and medically examined beforehand and appeared to have been found free of serious infectious diseases. Some of the participants who were included were quite aged and at least one was physically disabled, but their participation in the relocation project was not out of line with Inuit cultural values nor with the realities of life in the Arctic in those years. The difficulties of life in the High Arctic were recognized and explored beforehand by the officials and a plan was articulated to ensure that those who were relocated were well supported by experienced R.C.M.P. officers who knew the families personally and who were knowledgeable of Inuit ways and language. Experienced Inuit families from the most northern settlements at the time were approached to assist with the project. They agreed to do so and to transfer their hunting and trapping skills to the Inuit participants from Arctic Quebec.
- Reasonable efforts were made to explain the project to both of the Inuit groups involved before their departure, and to communicate the fact that participation in it was voluntary. It is more than likely that some of the Inuit could not completely envisage what conditions in the High Arctic would be like because these things were outside the range of personal experience at the time. While this is truly regrettable, this lack of knowledge should not

imply a deliberate attempt by the Government officials to deceive or mislead the Inuit participants.

- A number of the Inuit families in the project stated in letters written to the Department in the period 1956 to 1963 that game and fur were plentiful in the vicinity of both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, and that hunger was not a problem. The frequency of letter-writing from Inuit at Resolute Bay dropped off considerably after 1963 and nearly completely, after 1966, with the transfer of responsibility for most aspects of Inuit affairs to the Government of the NWT. It is not possible, therefore, to say whether game and fur continued to be plentiful after the letters stopped coming but on the other hand, there is no reason to believe otherwise.
- The Department gave the Inuit an understanding that they would be returned to their original communities after one, two, or three years, if this was requested. There is no evidence to suggest that the Department intended this undertaking to remain in force indefinitely.
- The files show that some of the Inuit families living in Resolute Bay wrote to Ottawa, asking to return to Port Harrison for a visit. The earliest example of such a request, that we could find, occurred around 1960. The determination of the length of the proposed visits quite often required several exchanges of letters. On one known occasion, in 1961, Ottawa responded to such proposals by seeming to suggest that those wishing to visit Port Harrison should collaborate in chartering an aircraft for this purpose, at their own expense. The files would indicate that one group did this in 1962, but no further details are provided. It is uncertain if there was an official policy on the matter at that time but it would appear that the Department took this position because it considered the individuals involved to be economically self-sufficient and therefore capable of arranging their own visits to any destination they wished. This was the practice followed with respect to Fort Chimo Inuit working at Churchill and wishing to visit their home community. We found no references to requests from families living at Grise Fiord for visits or for permanent relocation to Inukjuak.

- Early in the 1970s, the Government of the Northwest Territories arranged and paid for the transportation of several Inuit families, from both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, to Port Harrison, to visit relatives and to assess whether they wished to be returned to that community on a permanent basis. A number of these families subsequently requested relocation and this was done. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development reimbursed the Territorial Government for the costs of both visits and relocation.
- On one occasion, the R.C.M.P. used their own aircraft to permit several families living at Grise Fiord to visit relatives in Port Harrison and later relocated them. The R.C.M.P. apparently absorbed these costs.
- Additional families from both communities returned to Port Harrison in the period 1982 to 1988, at their own expense or with assistance from the Makivik Corporation of Quebec.
- When this issue was first raised in a formal claim against the Department, in 1982, the Deputy Minister of the day expressed understanding and sympathy for the concerns raised by the Inuit and undertook to reimburse the transportation costs incurred by the families who had moved back at their own expense, up to that time. Several changes in Ministers occurred subsequently, which resulted in a delay in carrying through on this commitment. Additional families returned in 1988, with the help of the Makivik Corporation. In the same year, the Department allocated an amount of approximately \$ 250,000.00 to reimburse all individual families, as well as Makivik Corporation, for the transportation costs of these several relocations . In 1988, the Department also undertook to provide the Government of Quebec with funds, amounting to approximately \$700,000, to permit Quebec to add ten more houses to the pool of housing already identified for Port Harrison for 1989. Both these accounts have since been paid.
- In the circumstances, we do not see the grounds for an apology by the government for the manner in which the relocation project was conceived,

planned and carried out. To apologize for a wrongdoing it did not commit would constitute deception on the part of the Government and would imply that the project was a failure, when, in fact, it was a reasonably successful endeavour.

- The Department might consider extending for a further year or so, the offer previously made to the Inuit families who have since returned to Inukjuak from Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. This would permit any of the remaining families at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord to undertake an exploratory visit to their original communities and to relocate on a permanent basis if they so choose.
- The Department might also indicate once again that it is prepared to support any proposal that would recognize the contribution made by the Inuit to the social, political and economic development of the High Arctic over the years. We do not think, however, that this recognition should single out the Inukjuak Inuit or that it should be tied specifically to this particular relocation project, since the Inuit contribution over the years has been much more extensive than that.

APPENDIX ONE

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APPENDIX TWO  
PERSONS INTERVIEWED

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

NAME	TITLE	ORGANIZATION
1. C. Baker	Director, Constitutional Development and Aboriginal Affairs	D.I.A.N.D
2. R. Bill	Director, Circumpolar and Scientific Directorate	D.I.A.N.D
3. C. Bolger	Former Administrator of the Arctic D.I.A.N.D	Retired
4. A. Brancker	Senior Analyst, Mortality Canadian Centre for Health Info.	Statistics Canada
5. P. Burden	Historical Research Branch	National Archives of Canada
6. W. Clevette	Director Self Government, Implementation Directorate	D.I.A.N.D
7. M.E. Gillan	Research Officer B.C. Regional Office	D.I.A.N.D
8. D. Evaluarjuak	Translator/Communicator Inuit Cultural and Linguistic Centre	D.I.A.N.D
9. R. Glass	Former Director General Constitutional Development and Aboriginal Affairs Directorate D.I.A.N.D.	National Energy Board
10. P. Greygier	author	
11. B. Gunn	Manager	Avataque Corporation, Inukjuak, Quebec
12. M. Kline	Acting Director Specific Claims Branch	D.I.A.N.D
13. S. Meldrum	Liason Officer Native Claims Division Northern Program	D.I.A.N.D

14. Z. Nungak	Vice President	Makivik Corporation of Quebec
15. Dr.D. Penman	Medical Care Consultant, Director's Office, Community Health, Medical Services Branch	Health and Welfare Canada
16. R.A.J. Phillips	Former Director, Northern Administration Branch D.I.A.N.D.	Retired
17. I. Potter	Director General Comprehensive Claims Branch Northern Program	D.I.A.N.D
18. R.G. Robertson	Former Deputy Minister D.I.A.N.D.	Retired
19. G. Rowley	Former Science Advisor to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources	Retired
20. B. Sander	Manager Information Development Section	Statistics Canada
21. S. Silverstone	Legal Advisor	Makivik Corporation of Quebec
22. D. Webster	Manager, Inuit Culture and Linguistic Centre	D.I.A.N.D

#### **GROUP INTERVIEW**

Inukjuak, Quebec  
August 29, 1990

1. M. Patsauq                      former resident -- Resolute Bay, NWT.
2. E. Samwillie                    former resident -- Grise Fiord, NWT.
3. A. Iqaluq                        former resident -- Resolute Bay, NWT.
4. E. Nutarak                       former resident -- Grise Fiord, NWT
5. J. Amagoalik                    former resident -- Resolute Bay, NWT.
6. L. Amagoalik                   former resident -- Resolute Bay, NWT.
7. A. Nungak                       former resident -- Grise Fiord, NWT ( at home )

APPENDIX THREE  
INTERVIEW GUIDE

## INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following questions were asked of returnees from Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour, when interviewed an Inukjuak, on August 28 and 29, 1990:

1. Who interviewed you/your father/mother when the move to Resolute Bay/Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord was discussed?
2. Did you/they know that you/they were going specifically to Resolute Bay/Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord when relocation was being discussed?  
Did you/they have a preference as to which community you/they would be going to?  
Why did you/they prefer one community over another?
3. What year did you go there?  
How long did you stay there?  
When did you return to Inukjuak?
4. Did you ask to return to Inukjuak after your resettlement at Resolute/Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord?  
When did you first ask?  
How did you/they ask?  
Who did you/they ask?  
What did those you asked say to your/their request?
5. How did you come back to Inukjuak? -- i.e. by boat/plane  
Did you pay your own way back?
6. Did you/they get a house right away?  
If not, where did you live while you/they were waiting for a house?

APPENDIX FOUR

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN  
THE DOMINION OF CANADA AND NORWAY



DOMINION OF CANADA

TREATY SERIES, 1930

No. 17

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

(August 8, 1930, and November 5, 1930)

regarding the

RECOGNITION BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT

of the

SOVEREIGNTY OF HIS MAJESTY

over the

SVERDRUP ISLANDS



OTTAWA  
F. A. ACLAND  
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY  
1931

Exchange of Notes August 8, 1930, and November 5, 1930  
regarding the recognition by the Norwegian Government of  
the Sovereignty of His Majesty over the Sverdrup Islands.

*From the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires, London,  
To the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.*

Royal Norwegian Legation.  
No. 95/1930.

LONDON, August 8th, 1930.

SIR,—Acting on instructions from my Government I have the honour to request you to be good enough to inform His Majesty's Government in Canada that the Norwegian Government, who do not as far as they are concerned claim sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands, formally recognise the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands.

At the same time my Government is anxious to emphasize that their recognition of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands is in no way based on any sanction whatever of what is named "the sector principle".

I have the honour to be, etc.,

DANIEL STEEN,  
*Chargé d'Affaires a. i.*

The Right Honourable  
ARTHUR HENDERSON, P.C., M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

*From the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires, London,  
To the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.*

Royal Norwegian Legation,  
No. 96/1930.

LONDON, August 8th, 1930.

SIR,—With reference to my note of to-day in regard to my Government's recognition of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over the Sverdrup Islands, I have the honour, under instructions from my Government, to inform you that the said note has been despatched on the assumption on the part of the Norwegian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government in Canada will declare themselves willing not to interpose any obstacles to Norwegian fishing, hunting or industrial and trading activities in the areas which the recognition comprises.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

DANIEL STEEN,  
*Chargé d'Affaires a. i.*

The Right Honourable  
ARTHUR HENDERSON, P.C., M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

*From the British Chargé d'Affaires, Oslo,  
To the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oslo.*

No. 122

BRITISH LEGATION,

OSLO, 5th November, 1930.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE D'ETAT,—At the instance of His Majesty's Government in Canada and under the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to invite reference to the two notes addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires in London on August 8th last, in regard to the recognition by the Norwegian Government of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over the Otto Sverdrup Islands, and to inform you that His Majesty's Government in Canada has noted the desire on the part of the Norwegian Government that no obstacles should be interposed to Norwegian fishing, hunting, or industrial and trading activities in the area which the recognition comprises, and wishes to assure the Norwegian Government that it would have pleasure in according any possible facilities. It wishes, however, to draw attention to the fact that it is the established policy of the Government of Canada, as set forth in an Order in Council of July 19, 1926, and subsequent Orders, to protect the Arctic areas as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories, in order to avert the danger of want and starvation through the exploitation of the wild life by white hunters and traders. Except with the permission of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, no person other than native Indians or Eskimos is allowed to hunt, trap, trade, or traffic for any purpose whatsoever in a large area of the mainland and in the whole Arctic island area, with the exception of the southern portion of Baffin Island. It is further provided that no person may hunt or kill or traffic in the skins of the musk-ox, buffalo, wapiti, or elk. These prohibitions apply to all persons, including Canadian nationals. Should, however, the regulations be altered at any time in the future, His Majesty's Government in Canada would treat with the most friendly consideration any application by Norwegians to share in any fishing, hunting, industrial, or trading activities in the areas which the recognition comprises.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you, Monsieur le Ministre d'Etat, of my highest consideration.

KENNETH JOHNSTONE.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur J. L. MOWINCKEL,  
etc., etc., etc.

*From the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oslo,  
To the British Chargé d'Affaires, Oslo.*

DET KGL. UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENT,

OSLO, 5. november 1930.

HR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES,—Jeg har den ære å erkjenne mottagelsen av Deres note av 5. ds., avgitt i svar på de to noter fra den norske chargé d'affaires i London til den britiske utenriksminister av 8. august d.å. angående Norges anerkjennelse av Hans Britanniske Majestets suverenitet over Otto Sverdrups øyene.

Den norske regjering har bemerket sig, at den kanadiske Regjering gjerne vilde ha innrømmet norsk fangst-og næringsdrift innen disse områder enhver mulig lettelse, men at det er et ledende prinsipp i den Kanadiske Regjerings politikk å søke bevaret de arktiske områder til utelukkende bruk som jakt-og fangstområder for Nordvestterritoriernes urbe folkning for å hindre, at den kommer i nød som følge av hvite jegeres og fangstfolks utnyttelse av vildtbestanden, og at den ved en flerhet av forordninger har utferdiget nærmere forskrifter i det øiemed.

Den norske regjering har videre bemerket sig, at den Kanadiske Regjering, om disse forskrifter fremtidig skulde bli endret, vil behandle på den velvilligste måte enhver henvendelse fra nordmenn om adgang til å drive fiske, fangst, industriell eller handelsvirksomhet innen de områder, den norske regjerings anerkjennelse omfatter.

Jeg tillater mig å meddele, at den norske regjering finder efter omstendighetene å kunne akviesere ved det således avgivne svar på før nevnte noter av 8. august d.å.

Motta, Hr. Chargé d'Affaires, forsikringen om min særlige høiaktelse.

For utenriksministeren

AUG. ESMARCH.

HR. KENNETH JOHNSTONE,  
Det Britiske Rikes Chargé d'Affaires,  
etc., etc.

(Translation)

ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

OSLO, 5th November, 1930.

MONSIEUR LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 5th instant in reply to the two notes from the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires in London to the British Foreign Minister of the 8th August last regarding Norway's recognition of His Britannic Majesty's sovereignty over the Otto Sverdrup Islands.

The Norwegian Government has noted that the Canadian Government would willingly have granted every possible facility to Norwegian fishing, hunting or industrial and trading activities in these regions, but that it is a leading principle in the policy of the Canadian Government to preserve the Arctic regions as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories, in order to prevent their being in want as a consequence of the exploitation of the wild life by white hunters and trappers, and that they have drawn up more definite regulations to this end by means of several Orders in Council.

The Norwegian Government has further noted that should these regulations be altered in the future, the Canadian Government will treat in the most friendly manner any application from Norwegians for facilities to carry on fishing, hunting, industrial or trading activities in the areas which the Norwegian Government's recognition comprises.

I beg to inform you that in these circumstances the Norwegian Government find themselves able to concur in this reply to the above-mentioned notes of 8th August last.

I avail myself, etc.

(for the Minister for Foreign Affairs)

AUG. ESMARCH.


KENNETH JOHNSTONE, Esq.,  
The British Government's Chargé d'Affaires,  
etc., etc.

APPENDIX FIVE  
MINUTES OF A.C.N.D. MEETING  
AUGUST 10, 1953



(25436)

Minutes of a Meeting Held at 10:00 A.M.  
August 10, 1953, in Room 304, Langevin  
Block, to Discuss the Transfer of Certain  
Eskimo Families from Northern Quebec to  
Cornwallis and Ellesmere Islands.



Chairman -

Col. F.J.G. Cunningham - Resources and Development.

Those Present -

W/C W. D. Brodribb - A.P.H.Q., R.C.A.P.  
Mr. L. T. Campbell - Meteorological Division, Transport.  
Mr. Jas. Cantley - Resources and Development.  
Mr. Fred Fraser - Resources and Development.  
Mr. C. J. Marshall - Secretariat of the ACND.  
S/L P. E. O'Neill - A.T.C., R.C.A.P.  
Supt. J. A. Peacock - R.C.M.P.  
Dr. H. A. Procter - Indian Health Services, National  
Health and Welfare.  
Mr. B. G. Siverts - Resources and Development.  
Mr. W. B. Smith - Telecommunications Division, Transport.

Col. Cunningham, Director of the Northern Administration and  
Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, opened the  
meeting with a resume of the duties and responsibilities of the  
Department towards the Eskimo of northern Canada and the policy of  
the Department in providing for their health and welfare. He pointed  
out that three different types of situations now have to be dealt with;

1. In areas where the natural resources will support the Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.
2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up, the Eskimos will be educated to adapt them to this new situation.
3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the Eskimo to areas with greater natural resources.

The Administration has found that the eastern coast of Hudson Bay cannot continue to supply the Eskimo there with a reasonable standard of living and, therefore, efforts will be made to re-settle some of the inhabitants in more prosperous areas. This year the Administration is carrying out an experiment in which it will transplant a small number of Eskimo families from the eastern shore of Hudson Bay to certain settlements in the High North to see if they can find a better living there.

Mr. Fraser, Chief of the Northern Administration Division, then took the chair and asked Mr. Cantley, Head of the Arctic Services Section of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, to explain the details of the Administration's experiment.

Mr. Cantley said that eleven Eskimo families in all were involved in this year's experiment. Most of these were taken from Port Harrison, Que. Three families were from Pond Inlet and would be used to help adjust the other families to conditions in the High North. All of the people involved were volunteers and each had been told of the type of

environment and conditions which would be found where he was going. Families are to be settled at Resolute, Craig Harbour, and Cape Herschel. At each of these points the local R.C.M.P. constable will supervise the experiment. Each group will be provided with sufficient supplies to last a year. Of the three points where the families will be settled, Resolute is the only one where there may be the possibility of the Eskimos finding employment. However, the possibility of securing employment was not an important factor in deciding where the Eskimo should be settled. The men of the group are primarily hunters and the main purpose of the experiment is to see if it is possible for the people to adapt themselves to the conditions of the High North and secure a living from the land.

Mr. Fraser asked the R.C.A.F. representatives if they were afraid that the Eskimos taking part in the experiment might become dependent on the R.C.A.F. for food and clothing if the experiment was not successful. S/L O'Neill stated that this was the case and that the R.C.A.F. did not expect to be able to offer any employment at Resolute except if Eskimos there had some type of technical training. He asked how many families would be going to each of the three settlement areas. Mr. Cantley stated that this would be decided on the boat taking the Eskimo to their destination. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible.

Mr. Smith said that the Telecommunications Division of the Department of Transport operates ionosphere stations at various points in the north and had found Eskimos very useful particularly at Baker Lake and Fort Chimo where they worked as general handymen and kitchen help. The Department of Transport would like to hire at least one Eskimo as a general handyman for the ionosphere station at Resolute if any of those settling there are found to be suitable. He asked what arrangements would be made for payment in the event that an Eskimo was hired at Resolute.

Mr. Cantley said that one of the Eskimo at Resolute, under the supervision of the R.C.M.P. constable, would act as trader for the group. An Eskimo employed by the Department of Transport would receive credit on the trader for his services, the bill would be sent to the Department of Resources and Development in Ottawa and forwarded to the Department of Transport.

Mr. Campbell stated that the Meteorological Division did not expect to be able to offer employment to any Eskimos at Resolute for the time being at least since the housekeeping arrangements there were provided by the R.C.A.F.

S/L O'Neill stated that he was afraid that there was not sufficient wildlife in the Resolute area to provide for the proposed Eskimo population. Mr. Cantley replied that he had reason to believe that there was sufficient marine life to support the Eskimo families concerned. No one could say for sure that this was the case and, consequently, the experiment was being staged.

Mr. Siverts pointed out that the Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this.

Mr. Fraser outlined some steps being taken to provide technical training for Eskimo, particularly the trade school to be opened soon at Aklavik. Mr. Smith said that diesel mechanics were always very scarce and that his Department would welcome such a training programme if it could provide qualified diesel mechanics.

A discussion of medical facilities available at Resolute followed. Mr. Cantley stated that all the families taking part in the experiment had been examined beforehand by a doctor and given a clean bill of health. S/L O'Neill said that he understood the R.C.M.P. would be responsible for medical attention given to the Eskimo. Supt. Peacock said that the R.C.M.P. representative had first-aid training and would have first-aid

supplies available. S/L O'Neill said that a doctor visited the Resolute base once a month and that a medical orderly was on duty at all times.

W/C Brodribb requested that in future, when such experiments were being planned, that the Air Force be informed well in advance so that it would have a chance to comment on the plans.

Mr. Siverts summarized the situation by stating that the R.C.M.P. constable in charge of the experiment was representing the Department of Resources and Development, that the Eskimos' prime purpose in going to the High North was to see if it were possible for them to adapt themselves to conditions there and secure a reasonable living. Steps will be taken to see that the Eskimo are provided for in case the experiment is not successful and that every effort will be made to see that the R.C.A.F. is not inconvenienced.

Mr. Cantley stated that those taking part in the experiment were not seeking employment but that the Administration would not stand in their way if employment became available.

At the conclusion of the meeting those attending were satisfied that the arrangements and planning of the experiment were such that the Eskimo families involved would not become a liability to the R.C.A.F.

C. J. Marshall,  
Secretariat, ACHD.

APPENDIX SIX  
SEARCH FOR SIMILAR CLAIMS

## SEARCH FOR SIMILAR CLAIMS

Time allowed for only a limited search for aboriginal claims whose circumstances could be considered to be sufficiently similar as to provide some guidance to the Department in formulating a definitive response to this Inuit claim and to the recommendations of the Standing Committee. The Comprehensive Claims Branch and the Specific Claims Branch of the Department constituted the sole sources of the information we were able to gather on this subject.

A number of claims involving the relocation of Indians Bands or parts of Bands in British Columbia were brought to our attention, namely the Cheslata Band Claim (early 1950s) and the Ingenika Band Claim (early in the 1960s).

Both of these claims involved the relocation of Band members precipitated by the flooding of Band lands, by Alcan in the case of the first and by B.C.Hydro in the case of the second, and involved the selection and granting of new lands and other forms of compensation.

The Peace River Project in Northern British Columbia also involved the flooding of aboriginal lands, the relocation of the people involved, the replacement of lands lost and other forms of compensation

The diversion of the Nelson and Churchill Rivers and some of their tributaries in Northern Manitoba, for hydro development in the 1970s requiring the relocation of Indian Bands and some non-status Indians, evoked a large claim involving the payment of compensation in various forms, primarily by the Manitoba Hydro and the signing of a number of agreements jointly by Manitoba, Manitoba Hydro and the Government of Canada. This claim is still active.

The flooding of Indian lands under the James Bay and Nouveau Quebec Agreement, which permitted the immense James Bay Hydro Development Program to proceed also involved

the relocation of Indian people and has many of the characteristics of the Nelson River Project, but on a much larger scale.

A common characteristic of this sampling of claims is that they all involve, effectively, a forced relocation of people and destruction or damage to property as a result of an action taken by government or private enterprise. These characteristics are not found in the Inuit claim in question and therefore we would regard them as largely irrelevant in this case.

The Killinek or Port Burwell Claim, involving the relocation of Inuit families from Port Burwell in the Northwest Territories to communities, principally in the Ungava Bay area of Arctic Quebec, has some of the characteristics of the subject Inuit claim. Under the Killinek Claim, members of the group were integrated into the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, new sites were selected and shelter and other forms of compensation provided. We did not have time to examine this claim in depth but it would appear to us to be a candidate for further study.

In the last few days of our study we were made aware of still another claim that is now under way and that would appear to have some similarities to the claim which is the subject of our study. This is the claim by the Churchill Band who were resettled from one area of Northern Manitoba to the Churchill area in the 1950s. The similarity between the two claims would seem to reside in part in the fact that the basic motivation behind the relocation of both groups was concern over poor hunting and trapping conditions in the areas in question, which were putting the people at risk. Other similarities relate to the purported dissatisfaction of the groups with their circumstances after relocation. We would recommend that this claim be examined in greater detail.



APPENDIX SEVEN  
DICTIONARY OF TERMS

## DICTIONARY OF TERMS

**ESKIMOLOGY/WELFARE SECTION:** In the early 1950s, an Eskimology Section was established within the Administration and Lands Branch of the Department of Resources and Development to respond to letters written by Inuit in the various dialects of Inuktitut, on a broad range of subjects. Inuit speaking staff knowledgeable in the several dialects of the language were employed to translate and prepare replies to incoming letters on behalf of the departmental officials.

Many of the letters dealt with the problems of Inuit mothers, fathers and children while under treatment in hospitals in southern Canada. The unit endeavoured to maintain communications between the patients, the families in the home communities and policy sections of the department.

Over time this elementary service expanded to include visits to hospitals and participation in the evacuation, discharge and repatriation of Inuit patients. The Section became a Welfare Division in 1956 and gradually expanded to become the equivalent of a provincial department of social welfare and cultural development. The functions were largely transferred to the Territorial Government in 1966.

**GRISE FIORD, N.W.T.** Settlement, pop 114 (1986c), 106 (1981c) is located on the south coast of Ellesmere Island and is Canada's most northerly Inuit community. It is situated in game-rich country from which the residents derive their living. The settlement is the result of federal government efforts to alleviate poor economic conditions among the Inuit in the more depressed areas of the Arctic. Inuit families from other areas of the North were first settled in the area in 1953. Many N.W.T. residents consider the community setting the most beautiful in the North.

**INUIT TAPIRISAT OF CANADA (ITC;** formerly the Inuit Brotherhood) was founded in 1971 when an organizing committee of Inuit decided it was time to speak with a united voice on various issues concerning development of the Canadian North and preservation of Inuit culture.

The goals of ITC are to preserve Inuit language and culture; to promote a sense of dignity and pride in Inuit heritage; to provide a focal point for determining the needs and wishes of all Inuit; to represent Inuit on matters affecting their well being; to improve communications to and between Inuit communities; and to help Inuit achieve full participation in Canadian society.

ITC is a non-profit organization; its funding sources are mainly government agencies and private foundations in Canada.

**INUKJUAK (PORT HARRISON)** is located on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay about 490 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle. Like many arctic communities, Inukjuak was originally used by Inuit as a large seasonal village. Later it became the site of a Hudson Bay Company post that served the outlying villages. By the early 1960s, it became a central community site and a consolidation of much of the dispersed regional population. By the 1980s, the community had become an important center of the region and is presently the headquarters of the Makivik Corporation of Quebec. The population currently is about 850 people.

**MAKIVIK CORPORATION OF QUEBEC** was the first Inuit development corporation, the successor to NQT. Its founder and president is Senator Charlie Watt.

An example of Makivik's activities is the tentative agreement reached in 1989 with the federal government over Canada's outstanding obligations under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. The JBNQA implementation agreement seeks to improve delivery of provincial and federal programs and services by devolving them to local institutions. The implementation agreement commits the federal government to establishing a Northern Quebec Marine Transportation Infrastructure program and to participating in a review of the justice system in Nunavik. Moreover, the implementation agreement provides for a payment of \$20.5 million to Nunavik Inuit at a time of government spending cutbacks.


RESOLUTE is located 1,561 air km NE of Yellowknife on the northeast shore of Resolute Bay and on the south coast of Cornwallis Island in the Queen Elizabeth Islands in the Baffin Region. It is approximately 950 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle.

The area and site have been used by Inuit for centuries however the development sequence is largely attributable to government activities. An airfield was established at Resolute Bay in 1947 during construction of a joint US-Canadian meteorological station. The island then became one of the most easily accessible parts of the Arctic. In 1953, Inuit from Port Harrison, Quebec and Pond Inlet were relocated to Resolute to take advantage of the island's superior game resources. The move was successful enough that they requested some of their relatives to join them, and in 1955 a number of other families were moved in.

APPENDIX EIGHT  
NEW HOUSING AT PORT HARRISON

NEW HOUSING  
AT  
PORT HARRISON

AUGUST, 1990







APPENDIX NINE

CHRONOLOGY OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN AFFAIRS

## CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN AFFAIRS

1867-1873

Under the Department of the Secretary of State for the Provinces

1873-1936

Under the Department of the Interior

1937-1949

Under the Department of Mines and Resources

1950-1953

Under the Department of Resources and Development

1953-1966 (October 3)

Under the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources

1966 (October 3)

Under the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

APPENDIX TEN  
EASTERN ARCTIC PATROL

REPORT OF THE 1950  
EASTERN ARCTIC PATROL  
CHURCHILL, ON LAK

PART I - POINTS OF CALL

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GRISE FJORD - GRISE FJORD, August 25-26

Loading of material to be transferred to Grise Fjord, took place on August 25 and the ship left for Grise Fjord at 1245 with ten Eskimos on board, the remainder already being at Grise. Superintendent Larsen and Corporal Sargent with S/C Mayon decided to make the trip in the Peterhead.

The new site at Grise Fjord seems to be a better location subject to the qualification that anchorage (less than 50 fathoms) could only be located quite close to shore. A safer anchorage in rough weather will likely be found further up the Fjord. Two small buildings had been dismantled, freighted over by dog team and erected so that the main problem was the erection of the new prefabricated dwelling.

The people at Grise Fjord are doing quite well. Aside from Family Allowances where there are three families with total credits of over \$500, most of the men have credits with the trader varying from \$350 down. One or two are slightly in debt, but these latter are men brought up last year who are still bringing their equipment up to a reasonable level.

However, the group is small (45 in all) and they want to bring relatives in. Angnekadlok E5-727 wants to bring his father Keepume in from Pond and won't stay unless the old man can join him. Corporal Sargent says Keepume is a natural leader and would be an asset. Akpslesepik E5-834 wants to bring his brother from Pond. Corporal Sargent recommends that the above two families be brought in and possibly two Port Harrison families. If Angnekadlok leaves, he suggests bringing in three or four younger families from Port Harrison. Corporal Sargent claims the area can easily support more people as there are lots of seal and bearded seal. The group at Grise Fjord could stand two or three additional families and if there were any need to find additional locations for another group, it is quite likely other Fjords could be found in the general area with an abundance of seal and other wildlife resources. Alexandria Fjord and Dundas Harbor were also mentioned as suitable locations for communities.

The ostensible trader now is Tholassie E5-1539. Corporal Sargent has adopted the practice of employing a different trader yearly



with the aim of training several people in thoroughness and systematic operation. Books similar to a pass book are used to record credits, debits and balances. Each man also uses this book to record his spare time as well.

Shortly after leaving base at 21:30, August 26, Mr. Kennedy and I saw the Captain regarding diversion of the ship to Arctic Bay to pick up an emergency case--by 9:30 August 27, this proved unnecessary as word was received a Canoe would pick up the patient.

#### NAVY BOARD INLET

As Pond Inlet had advised it was impossible to bring in three camps on Navy Board Inlet, the location of the camps was secured by radio from the R.C.M. Police at Pond Inlet and the Captain agreed to go through Navy Board Inlet and do these camps.

The first two camps were located at 17:30 and 20:30 and the helicopter was used to ferry the people aboard and back to their camps. The third camp was very difficult to find at 2:30 a.m. and with the weather getting rougher. It was located and since the swells were too rough for the use of boats, the helicopter was employed again.

#### POND INLET, August 28-29

We had some difficulty at Pond Inlet persuading a woman with four small children and a husband already in the sanatorium, to go out. Having no close relatives to care for the children, she was reluctant to go until it was pointed out her only chance of living to bring up her children and to see them grow up without tuberculosis, was to go out and recover. She arranged with two other families to take over the children and Constable Johnson undertook to issue rations as necessary to ensure proper care of the children. We had hoped to drop anchor in Hamilton Bay midway between Pond and Clyde to do an otherwise inaccessible camp near Adams Island, but according to information at Pond, the camp was about 50 miles up an inlet and the Captain could not see his way clear to risk the ship any further in unknown waters.

#### CAMP ON ISTHOS, August 30

This is a U.S. Coast Guard Loran Station with a staff of 22. The camp was camped nearby. His station is well maintained and

Alex Stevenson  
Arctic Division, Northwest Territories Administration

On Monday, July 17, the "C.D. Howe" sailed from Montreal on her maiden voyage carrying supplies and personnel to a number of settlements in the Eastern Arctic. This 3,600-ton vessel, the latest of the Department of Transport's fleet, with Captain A. Chouinard as Master, was built to undertake the duties of the Eastern Arctic Patrol which, in former years was carried out on the R.M.S. "Nascopie". Calls were made at the various points as follows:

	<u>Date of Arrival</u>	<u>Date of Departure</u>
Montreal, Quebec		July 17
Quebec, Quebec	July 17	July 25
Cape Harrison, Labrador	July 29	July 31
Port Burwell, N.W.T.	Aug. 2	Aug. 3
Fort Chimo, Quebec	Aug. 4	Aug. 11
Churchill, Manitoba	Aug. 15	Aug. 23
Cape Dorset, N.W.T.	Aug. 26	Aug. 27
Lake Harbour, N.W.T.	Aug. 28	Aug. 29
Pangnirtung, N.W.T.	Sept. 1	Sept. 1
River Clyde, N.W.T.	Sept. 4	Sept. 5
Pond Inlet, N.W.T.	Sept. 6	Sept. 7
Arctic Bay, N.W.T.	Sept. 8	Sept. 8
Dundas Harbour, N.W.T.	Sept. 9	Sept. 9
Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.	Sept. 13	Sept. 15
Quebec, Quebec	Sept. 22	

The following is a list of the Government party that sailed from Montreal:

Mr. A. Stevenson	Resources & Development	O.I.C. Eastern Arctic Patrol.
Mr. R.E.G. Johnston	Resources & Development	Asst. to O.I.C., Eastern Arctic Patrol.
Mr. R. A. Haddon	Post Office	Postmaster.
Dr. J. H. Nesbitt	Nat. Health & Welfare	Senior Medical Officer.
Dr. H. S. Robertson	Nat. Health & Welfare	Dentist.
Mr. W. Lezewski	Nat. Health & Welfare	X-ray Technician.
Mr. W. Procter	Nat. Health & Welfare	Medical Attendant.
Mr. C. A. Parkin	Dept. of Transport	Helicopter Pilot.
Mr. K. Wallingford	Dept. of Transport	Flight Engineer.

Owing to the railway strikes being on when we arrived at Churchill we missed part of the vessel's oil shipment. The Captain was quite concerned about this shortage and felt that there was some danger of the vessel encountering so much ice that we would consume more fuel than would allow us to complete the itinerary. With this in mind and the exceptionally good weather no time was lost and each post was visited in rapid succession. Furthermore, the stay at each settlement was cut short. I may say that this was not entirely satisfactory from an administrative point of view or for the medical services rendered to the Eskimo.