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| 02026cam 2200301za 4500 |
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001 | 9.833265 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20221107150202 |
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007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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008 | 170302s2017 onc ob f000 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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041 | |aeng|bfre |
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043 | |an-cn--- |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2017-4E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aRaykov, Radoslav S. |
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245 | 10|aStability and efficiency in decentralized two-sided markets with weak preferences |h[electronic resource] / |cby Radoslav S. Raykov. |
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260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |c2017. |
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300 | |aii, 36 p. |
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490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2017-4 |
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500 | |a"February 2017." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
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520 | 3 |a"Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of acentral authority. A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. I show that when agent tastes are independent, the random stable match in a large-enough market is asymptotically Pareto efficient even with weak preferences. In fact, even moderate-sized markets can attain good efficiency levels. The average fraction of agents who can Pareto improve is below 10% in a market of size n = 79 when one side of the market has weak preferences; when both sides have weak preferences, the inefficiency falls below 10% for n > 158. This implies that approximate Pareto efficiency is attainable in a decentralized market even in the absence of a central matchmaker"--Abstract, p. ii. |
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546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aMarkets |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aModelling |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2017-4|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s661 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-4-eng.pdf |
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