Optimal capital regulation / by Stéphane Moyen and Josef Schroth. : FB3-5/2017-6E-PDF
“We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly. As a result, equity requirements are occasionally binding. Constrained-efficient regulation requires banks to build up additional equity buffers and compensates them for the cost of equity with a permanent increase in lending margins. When buffers are depleted, regulation relaxes the market-imposed equity requirements by raising bank future prospects through temporarily elevated lending margins"--Abstract, p. ii.
Lien permanent pour cette publication :
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.833268&sl=1
| Ministère/Organisme | Bank of Canada. |
|---|---|
| Titre | Optimal capital regulation / by Stéphane Moyen and Josef Schroth. |
| Titre de la série | Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2017-6 |
| Type de publication | Série - Voir l'enregistrement principal |
| Langue | [Anglais] |
| Format | Électronique |
| Document électronique | |
| Note(s) | "February 2017." Includes bibliographical references. Includes abstract in French. |
| Information sur la publication | [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2017. |
| Auteur / Contributeur | Moyen, Stéphane. Schroth, Josef. |
| Description | ii, 38 p. : charts |
| Numéro de catalogue |
|
| Descripteurs | Banks Capital Regulation |