BP-360E
CANADA'S NUCLEAR
FUEL INDUSTRY:
AN OVERVIEW
Prepared by
Alan Nixon
Science and Technology Division
November 1993
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
THE
BEGINNING OF THE CANADIAN URANIUM INDUSTRY
NUCLEAR
FUEL PRODUCTION
A.
Ore to Fuel
B.
Mining and Milling
1.
Distribution of Uranium Deposits
2.
Uranium Mining in Saskatchewan
3.
Uranium Mining in Ontario
4.
The Uranium Market
C.
Refining and Conversion
1. Background
2. Plants
3. Production
4. Developments
D.
Fabrication
OUTLOOK
CANADA'S NUCLEAR
FUEL INDUSTRY:
AN OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
On 2 December 1942,
the world's first nuclear reactor "went critical," that is,
the nuclear chain reaction became self-sustaining, and the nuclear age
was born. The experiment, carried out on the campus of the University
of Chicago and led by Enrico Fermi, was a crucial step toward the development
of both nuclear weapons and, somewhat later, nuclear power.
Nuclear fission was discovered
by European scientists shortly before the Second World War. From the beginning,
the potential of fission as a source of energy and as the basis of a weapon
of unprecedented destructive power was appreciated. Initially, however,
it was the military applications that motivated the pursuit of nuclear
technology. During the Second World War and for a number of years after,
the main focus of nuclear programs was the development of nuclear weapons.
Shortly after the Second
World War, interest turned to peaceful applications of nuclear technology
for the generation of electricity. Nuclear power was embraced with high
expectations. It appeared to offer the prospect of a new, cheap, abundant
source of energy with the potential to enhance world prosperity. Initially
it was widely believed that uranium, like coal and oil, was simply another
source of energy that could be harnessed by largely conventional technology.
Nuclear energy was widely viewed as the only practical way of meeting
a demand for energy that had increased rapidly since the end of the Second
World War; through the mid-1960s to mid-1970s utilities, especially in
the United States, placed numerous orders for nuclear reactors.
Those early expectations
have now faded as the nuclear power industry around the world has stagnated
and is facing an uncertain future. There are a number of reasons for the
decline in fortune. These include escalating costs, increasing regulatory
requirements, and continuing public concern over safety and waste disposal.
As a result, orders for new nuclear power stations around the world have
been either cancelled or delayed. As of August 1992, the number of nuclear
power stations cancelled, indefinitely deferred or suspended exceeded
the number of stations planned or under construction by a margin of almost
two to one.(1) For the most part, nuclear
power development programs around the world have been put on hold and
only a few countries, like Japan and South Korea, remain committed to
building significant numbers of new nuclear power stations.(2)
The result has been that
potential domestic and export markets for new nuclear plants have shrunk
very markedly and competition for the export of nuclear technology to
the few remaining countries with active nuclear programs has been intense.
Because of an oversupply of nuclear fuels, the price of uranium has plummeted
since the late 1970s.
In some ways, Canada's nuclear
industry is a microcosm of the world nuclear industry. Ontario, Canada's
largest consumer of nuclear power, currently has a large surplus of electrical
capacity. Ontario's latest nuclear installation at Darlington has cost
an estimated $13.8 billion, almost 90% more than originally planned.(3)
Older nuclear installations have experienced technical problems that might
curtail their planned lives or necessitate costly repairs or overhauls.
No new domestic orders for nuclear power stations have been placed since
1974 and, until the sales of CANDU reactors to South Korea in 1900 and
1992, there had been no export sales of reactors since 1985, when Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) last sold a reactor to Romania.(4)
In other respects, however, Canada's nuclear industry is distinct. Canada
has developed its own indigenous line of nuclear reactors in the CANDU
and is the western world's largest producer and exporter of uranium.
Now, half a century since
Enrico Fermi conducted that first demonstration of a controlled nuclear
chain reaction at the University of Chicago, is perhaps an appropriate
time to review the situation of the nuclear power industry and to ask
what the future might and should hold. This background paper, one of a
series examining various aspects of nuclear power both in the Canadian
and the broader global contexts, will review the Canadian nuclear fuels
industry.
THE
BEGINNING OF THE CANADIAN URANIUM INDUSTRY
Canada was among the first
countries to mine and process uranium-bearing ores. Such ores contain
trace amounts of radium, which was in great demand for medical treatment
and for use by research laboratories in the early part of the century.
At the height of the demand, radium sold for the equivalent of several
million dollars an ounce. Uranium, which had only limited uses, primarily
in the ceramics industry, was essentially a by-product of radium production.
In 1930, one of the world's
richest uranium deposits was discovered by Gilbert LaBine on the shore
of Great Bear Lake in the North West Territories.(5)
The deposit was developed for its radium content by Eldorado Gold Mines
Limited, a company formed several years earlier by Gilbert and his brother
Charles to develop a gold claim in Manitoba.
Concentrate from the mine
at Great Bear Lake was shipped across Canada to a refinery built in Port
Hope, Ontario, where the radium and uranium were extracted. At the time,
the Port Hope refinery may have been the largest of its kind in the world.(6)
It was the only one in North America, and one of only two in the world
that could refine uranium.(7) Canada
and Eldorado were thus in a unique position at the outset of the Second
World War when uranium was needed for the Manhattan project.
In the spring of 1941, the
U.S. placed an initial order for refined uranium oxide with Eldorado(8)
and, by the end of that year, U.S. contracts for uranium had committed
Eldorado's entire production until almost the end of 1945.(9)
Eldorado already had a stockpile of several hundred tonnes of uranium
concentrates accumulated on the site of its Port Hope refinery. In addition,
Eldorado also processed African uranium ore from the Belgian Congo which
the U.S. had purchased from the Belgian company, Union Minière.(10)
In 1942, Eldorado reopened the mine at Great Bear Lake, which had been
shut down in 1940 because of falling demand for radium.(11)
After the war, the mine
at Great Bear Lake continued to operate until 1960, when the deposit was
finally exhausted.(12) By this time,
Canada had a thriving uranium mining industry with mines at Beaverlodge,
north of Lake Athabasca; in the Elliot Lake area of Ontario; and at Bancroft,
Ontario. The boom that had been created by the nuclear weapons industry
was about to end, however. In 1959, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
announced that it would not exercise its options to purchase additional
Canadian uranium and thereafter the industry went into a decline. Its
bare survival of the ensuing slump was thanks in large measure to a Canadian
government stockpiling program. It would not be until 1986 that production
matched the level achieved in 1960.(13)(14)
NUCLEAR
FUEL PRODUCTION
A.
Ore to Fuel
For the last half century,
the same basic processes have been used to extract uranium from its ores
and convert it to a form suitable for use in nuclear reactors. The process
described here is that currently in use in Canada.
Mining can take a variety
of forms, from open-pit to deep, hard-rock. Mining is typically the most
costly step in the process, particularly for lower-grade ores. The ore
is crushed and ground in the mill to the consistency of fine sand from
which the uranium is extracted chemically to produce the impure concentrate
known as "yellowcake." The mill is usually located close to
the mine to avoid hauling the ore over long distances. After the uranium
is extracted, the bulk of the ore remains as the mineral residue known
as "tailings"; these are slightly radioactive, due to the presence
of other naturally occurring radionuclides such as radium and thorium.
In the next step, the impure
uranium concentrate is chemically refined into highly purified, nuclear-grade,
uranium trioxide (UO3). Uranium trioxide is then converted,
in two separate chemical processes, into uranium dioxide (UO2),
which is destined for domestic consumption, and uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
which is exported.
In Canada, fabrication is
the final step of the fuel production process. Uranium dioxide powder
is compressed and sintered into very dense "ceramic" pellets
which are then sealed in zirconium tubes and assembled into fuel bundles
for CANDU reactors. Since CANDU reactors do not require enriched uranium,
the uranium is "natural" in the sense that it contains the naturally
occurring concentration of the fissionable isotope 235U.
Almost all other reactor
types in use around the world require slightly enriched uranium, for which
uranium hexafluoride is used as the feed. After enrichment, the UF6
must still be converted back to a form suitable for reactor use. Enrichment
also generates a considerable quantity of depleted uranium which contains
a lower than natural concentration of 235U. Depleted uranium
has very limited uses but the fact that these include both conventional
and nuclear armaments has caused concern and controversy. All of the UF6
produced in Canada is exported as Canada has neither enrichment facilities
nor the light-water reactors that require enriched uranium as fuel.
One of the interesting features
of its production is that uranium is normally purchased by electric utilities
in the form of concentrate from the mining companies. The utilities then
contract with other processors for refining, conversion, enrichment, and
fabrication services to produce the finished fuel.
B.
Mining and Milling
1.
Distribution of Uranium Deposits
Although deposits of uranium
are found in a number of areas of Canada, the Athabasca Basin of northern
Saskatchewan and the Elliot Lake area of Ontario are by far the largest
known and are currently the only areas producing uranium. About half the
known reserves are located in Saskatchewan and somewhat less than half
are in Ontario.(15) Total recoverable
uranium resources are estimated to be about 450 kilotonnes (kt).(16)(17)
Most of Canada's uranium is now produced in Saskatchewan with the share
produced in Ontario rapidly decreasing.
Production is summarized
in Figure 1.
![](../images/bp360-e1.gif)
2.
Uranium Mining in Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan now dominates
Canadian uranium production with the Athabasca basin in the north of the
province the site of some of the world's richest deposits of uranium.
Cigar Lake, for example, is believed to be the largest high-grade uranium
deposit in the world; it has reserves of almost 150,000 tonnes of uranium
(tU) at an average grade of 9% uranium (U).(18)
Although the deposit is smaller, some remarkably high grades of up to
65% U have been reported at the McArthur River.(19)
Some high-grade ores will require the development of specialized mining
methods in order to avoid exposing miners to high levels of radiation.
Cameco is already using remotely controlled equipment at the Eagle Point
test mine at Rabbit Lake.(20)
As mining and milling account
for a major part of the cost of producing concentrate, Saskatchewan ores,
with average grades of 1-2% U, can be processed much more economically
than the low-grade Ontario ores with less than 0.1% U. There are currently
three operational mine/mill facilities in the Athabasca region: Key Lake,
Rabbit Lake, and Cluff Lake. The combined capacity is almost 13,600 tU/year(21)
but recent production has been well below capacity.(22)
The uranium production workforce in Saskatchewan is quite small; from
1989 to 1991, it numbered around 700.(23)(24)
Saskatchewan's currently
operating mines will be exhausted sometime between the mid-1990s and early
next century.(25) There is, however,
a great deal of potential for the development of new high-grade ore bodies
that could extend uranium mining operations for several decades.
On the other hand, uranium
mining has been controversial in Saskatchewan and there has been considerable
public debate over the expansion and even continuation of the industry.
Until recently, the Saskatchewan New Democratic Party had favoured a phase-out
of the uranium mining industry but, at its November 1992 annual convention,
the party reversed the nine-year-old policy that would have placed a moratorium
on uranium exploration and would have phased out existing mines.(26)
This issue has caused significant dissent within the party. In April 1991,
six new mines were referred for public review under the federal government's
Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines. One of these,
the expansion of Cameco's Rabbit Lake operation, has already received
conditional approval from Saskatchewan and has now been reviewed by a
federal panel which is expected to make its recommendation in the fall
of 1993.(27)
A report of the joint panel
on three of the other projects was released in October 1993. The panel
recommended that one of the projects, the extension of the Dominique-Janine
mine at Cluff Lake, should be allowed to go ahead subject to a number
of conditions; that the Midwest Joint venture should not be permitted;
and, that the McClean Lake project should be delayed for at least five
years, in part to provide time to allow an evaluation of the tailings
system at Rabbit Lake.(28)
3.
Uranium Mining in Ontario
Low ore grades, high production
costs, and a depressed market have hastened the demise of uranium mining
in Ontario. Long-term contracts with Ontario Hydro that provided stability
to the area's producers have either already run out or are being accelerated.
Of eleven mines once active in the Elliot Lake area of northern Ontario,
only one, Rio Algom's Stanleigh, remains in operation and it will close
by mid decade.(29)
Ontario's uranium production
workforce has historically been much larger than that of Saskatchewan
but it is now decreasing rapidly. From 1987 to 1989, it numbered around
3,700, but by 1990 it had already been fallen to under 2,000, primarily
because of the closing of the Quirke and Panel mines,(30)
while in 1992, a further 580 workers were laid off with the closing of
the Denison mine.(31) The mine closures
and the loss of jobs have had a profound effect on the local economy.
Both the Government of Ontario and Ontario Hydro are providing economic
support to assist the Elliot Lake area shift its economy from a dependence
on uranium to a more diversified base.(32)
4.
The Uranium Market
Canada has been the western
world's leading producer of uranium concentrates since 1984.(33)
In 1991, Canada produced 30% of the western world's uranium, well ahead
of its closest rivals, Australia and the U.S, which accounted for 14 and
11% respectively.(34) In 1992, Canada's
share increased still further to 40%.(35)
Even though Canada has been
the leading producer, production has fallen in recent years. In 1987,
it peaked at 13.6 kt worth $1.18 billion but by 1991 it had fallen to
8.2 kt worth valued at only $0.6 billion.(36)(37)
In 1992, however, production recovered to 9.3 kt although value continued
to fall to slightly below $0.6 billion. Despite Canada's position as the
leading producer of uranium, that mineral ranks only sixth in leading
metals after gold, copper, nickel, zinc, and iron ore(38)
and thirteenth in overall mineral production.(39)
Domestic consumption currently
accounts for about 20% of total production. The remainder is exported,
making Canada the major uranium exporter in the western world. Canada's
principal customers are the U.S. and Japan, which have accounted for about
45% and 13% respectively of Canada's uranium exports over recent years.
Other important customers include France, Germany, South Korea, Sweden,
and the U.K.
Uranium is sold both in
medium and long-term supply contracts and on the spot market. Historically,
the price of uranium in supply contracts, which assure a secure supply
to the customer, is significantly higher than spot market prices, although
both markets generally show similar trends over an extended period. Over
the last decade uranium prices have dropped dramatically; by 1991, the
Canadian export price of uranium had dropped to about half of its 1981
price, while over the same period the spot market price dropped by about
two-thirds.(40)
Virtually all Canadian uranium
is currently sold on contract. Since 1989, very little Canadian uranium
has been sold on the spot market;(41)
for example, since it was formed in 1988, Cameco has not offered uranium
for sale on the spot market.(42) Canadian
producers have been able to command higher prices for their uranium through
long-term contracts in large part because of their credibility as reliable
suppliers.
Two factors have been largely
responsible for the current low uranium prices: large inventories of uranium
which had been stockpiled by the utilities in anticipation of increased
electricity demand and, more recently, an increase in uranium exports
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Since 1985, demand
has exceeded supply causing inventories to fall and thus creating an expectation
that the uranium market will recover. A recovery has been impeded, however,
by a rapid expansion of uranium exports from the CIS between 1988 and
1991.(43) In 1991, the quantity of
uranium reaching U.S. and European markets from the CIS may have exceeded
9,000 tonnes (t), so that the CIS is rivalling Canada as the world's leading
uranium exporter.(44)
In 1991, a group of U.S.
uranium producers filed an anti-dumping petition against the CIS and in
1992 six republics of the CIS and the U.S. Department of Commerce reached
a "suspension" agreement. The agreement blocks shipments of
uranium into the U.S. at prices below US$13/pound and imposes import quotas
at prices up to US$21/pound.(45) A
similar agreement has been reached between the CIS and the Euratom supply
agency to limit the imports into the European community. The suspension
agreement does not apply, however, to separate agreements to sell highly-enriched
uranium to the U.S. Department of Energy.(46)
The suspension agreement, if it lasts, should help to stabilize uranium
prices to the advantage of low-cost Saskatchewan producers. Nevertheless,
it is likely that the CIS will still gain a significant share of western
markets.
Another development that
should help Canadian producers is that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
has lifted both Canadian and U.S. restrictions on the export of Canadian
uranium to the U.S.(47) This means
that the Canadian requirement to upgrade uranium before export will be
phased out and Canadian producers should have better access to the U.S.
markets.
C.
Refining and Conversion
1. Background
Only one Canadian company,
Cameco Corporation, refines and converts uranium. Cameco was formed in
1988 by the merger of the federal Crown corporation Eldorado Nuclear,
and the provincial Crown corporation Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation
(SMDC), the initial step toward the eventual privatization of the two
governments' uranium interests.(48)
Until recently, Cameco was
one of only five major operators in the western world providing uranium
refining and conversion services. In November 1992, Sequoyah Fuels Corporation
announced that it was ceasing UF6 production at its plant in
Gore, Oklahoma.(49) This leaves the
Allied-Signal plant in Metropolis, Illinois, as the only remaining U.S.
producer of UF6. The other two major producers are British
Nuclear Fuels Limited, in the U.K., and Comurhex, in France.
2. Plants
Cameco's uranium refinery
is located in Blind River, Ontario, on the north shore of Lake Huron,
close to the Elliot Lake area. It was built by Eldorado Nuclear in the
early 1980s, to replace an older refinery that had operated at the Port
Hope site. The Blind River refinery, which began operating in 1983, has
capacity of 18,000 tU/year as UO3, making it the largest uranium
refinery in the western world.(50)
From Blind River, the UO3
is transported by road to Port Hope, Ontario, where the bulk is converted
to UF6 in the "West UF6" plant, which
has a capacity of 10,500 tU/year.(51)
It began operation in 1984, replacing the older East UF6 plant
on the Port Hope site. The rest of the UO3 is converted in
the South UO2 plant to the ceramic grade UO2 which
will be shipped to fabricators of the fuel bundles for use in CANDU reactors.
The capacity of the UO2 plant is 2,500 tUO2/year.(52)
3. Production
Because of weak markets,
production at both the refinery and the conversion plants has been well
below capacity in recent years. In 1990 and 1991, the Blind River refinery
operated at about half capacity while the combined throughput of UF6
and UO2 conversion was two-thirds of capacity.(53)
In 1992, Cameco cut back production still further to about one-third capacity
at the Blind River Plant and to less than half capacity at the conversion
plants.(54)
Cameco has also reduced
its workforce at both locations to lower operating costs. Between 1989
and 1992, the Port Hope workforce was cut from 280 to 198 while the Blind
River workforce was reduced from 127 to 79 over the same period.(55)(56)
Cameco also closed its specialty metals plant at Port Hope in 1992. The
plant had produced mainly depleted uranium metal and depleted uranium
castings for use as counterweights and shielding in the aerospace and
medical industries.
4. Developments
Canada has had a long-standing
policy requiring uranium to be upgraded in this country before export.
In principle, the policy provided a captive market for Canadian refining
and conversion services, although in practice it was not rigidly enforced.
As of 15 December 1991, new export contracts were no longer subject
to the further processing requirement but for existing contracts the requirement
will remain until 31 December 1995, when it will be eliminated.(57)
The loss of a partially
captive market for conversion services should be offset to some extent
by the closure of the Sequoyah UF6 plant, which has a UF6
production capacity of 9,000 t, equivalent to 42% of the existing U.S.
capacity and 17% of western world capacity. This leaves Cameco with 24%
of the remaining western world capacity.(58)
Unlike uranium exports, which are dominated by sales to the U.S. market,
sales of UF6 conversion services are more evenly divided between
the U.S. (38%), Europe (40%), and Asia (22%).(59)
Cameco currently processes about 70% of its own uranium production; most
of the remainder is shipped to the U.S. for conversion.(60)
The capacity of the remaining
four converters will not be sufficient to meet future western world demand
for UF6. In 1992, demand already slightly exceeded supply,
bringing a modest recovery of the spot price for UF6. The potential
supply of both low and highly enriched uranium from Russia, however, creates
significant uncertainty.(61) Cameco
is cautiously optimistic about the market for its conversion services.
D.
Fabrication
In Canada, fabrication of
fuel elements is the final step in the production of nuclear fuels. Two
Canadian companies fabricate fuel elements, Canadian General Electric
Incorporated (CGE) and Zircatec Precision Industries Incorporated. CGE
has two plants: one in Toronto where the pellets are made and the other
in Peterborough, Ontario, where the fuel bundles are assembled. The plant
capacities are 1,050 tU/year and 1,000 tU/year respectively.(62)
The Zircatec plant in Port Hope, Ontario, produces both fuel pellets and
assembled fuel bundles. It has a capacity of 1,200 tU/year.(63)
Nearly all of the production
of the two Canadian fabricators goes to supply Canadian domestic requirements,
primarily to Ontario Hydro but also to Hydro Québec and New Brunswick
Power Corporation. Although the fabricators process some export contracts,
the export market for fabrication services is small and unreliable since
most countries with nuclear facilities have their own fabrication plants.
Precise production and workforce
figures for the fabricators are not available; however, both are currently
operating at significantly less than their maximum capacities. In the
short term, the workforce is probably fairly stable. Zircatec's workforce
is not expected to change significantly in the foreseeable future.(64)
Over the long term, however, the trend has been to increase production
with a smaller workforce because of the drive for improved cost-efficiency
and technological changes that have improved quality and made the fabrication
process less labour-intensive.(65)
OUTLOOK
Although Canada is the leading
western world producer and exporter, uranium accounts for only 1.6% of
the value of domestic mineral production (including oil and gas). The
industry is nevertheless important in terms of exports and particularly
to the economies of the areas where uranium is produced and processed.
Over recent years, production
and employment have fallen and revenues have decreased; however, there
are now some encouraging signs that the industry may be on the verge of
a modest recovery. Although there are no immediate prospects for the expansion
of nuclear power in Canada, domestic requirements should continue to provide
a stable core demand for nuclear fuels for the foreseeable future. Saskatchewan's
high grade-ores enable Canadian producers to be very competitive on world
markets and should enable Canada to maintain its position as a leading
world supplier of uranium Unfortunately, even though it will be controlled,
the supply of uranium from the CIS will tend to prevent a major recovery
of uranium prices in the near future.
Canada's only refiner and
converter of uranium, Cameco, has significantly streamlined its operations
in order to become more competitive. Although the further processing requirement
for uranium is being phased out, the loss of conversion capacity in the
U.S. and Canada's proximity to U.S. market place Canada in a strong position
to compete for the sale of refining and conversion services.
The Canadian uranium mining
and processing industry has had a long and interesting history and in
a modest but significant way has become part of the cultural fabric of
the country. Despite its current position as a world-leader, the industry
is unlikely ever to relive its early days, when it played a role close
to the centre stage of world affairs. In the present day it continues
to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances both within Canada and abroad.
In the short term its fate appears relatively secure, though this will
ultimately depend on the still unresolved issue of the long-term future
of nuclear power.
(1)
World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1993, Nuclear Engineering International,
Sutton, England, 1993, p. 10, 26-49.
(2)
Ibid., p. 10.
(3)
Geoff McCaffrey, Manager CANDU Communications, AECL, personal communication/unpublished
background on Darlington costs.
(4)
World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1993, p. 37.
(5)
Earle Gray, The Great Uranium Cartel, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto,
1982, p. 19.
(6)
Wilfred Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story, Harrap Research Publications,
London, 1966, p. 20.
(7)
Gray (1982), p. 28.
(8)
Eggleston (1966), p. 44.
(9)
Gray (1982), p. 29.
(10)
Ibid., p. 29.
(11)
Ibid., p. 19-29.
(12)
Ibid., p. 33.
(13)
1970-71 Canada Yearbook, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Information
Canada, Ottawa, 1971, p. 702.
(14)
1992 Canada Yearbook, Statistics Canada, Minister of Industry, Science
and Technology, 1991, p. 412.
(15)
Southam Energy Group, Energy in Canada 1990-1991, Debbie Thomas
(ed.), Southam Energy Group, Don Mills, Ontario, 1990, p. 194.
(16)
R. Whillans, Annual Assessment of Canada's Uranium Supply Capabilities,
Energy Mines and Resources, Ottawa, 1 January 1993, p. 5.
(17)
Resources estimated at prices of $150/kg U or less.
(18)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan,
1993, p. 23.
(19)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, Energy, Mines and Resources, Ottawa,
1992, p. 50.6.
(20)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 13.
(21)
Atomic Energy Control Board, Annual Report 1991-1992, Minister
of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1992, p. 37.
(22)
Whillans (1993), p. 5.
(23)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.13.
(24)
1992 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, Energy, Mines and Resources, Ottawa,
1993, p. 53.15.
(25)
R.T. Whillans, Energy, Mines and Resources, personal communication, 25
May 1993.
(26)
David Roberts, "Saskatchewan NDP Reverses Uranium Stand," The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 9 November 1992, p. A1-A2.
(27)
"Rabbit Lake Hearings End," The Source, Cameco Corporation,
August 1993, p. 1.
(28)
Uranium Mining Developments in Northern Saskatchewan: Dominique-Janine
Extension, McClean Lake Project, and Midwest Joint Venture, Joint
Federal-Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Developments in Northern Saskatchewan,
Minister of Supply and Services, October 1993, p. 1.
(29)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.2.
(30)
Ibid., p. 50.13.
(31)
"Denison Ends 35-Year Run of Elliot Lake Mining," Northern
Miner, 16 March 1992, p. 13.
(32)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.2.
(33)
Energy in Canada 1990-1991, p. 195.
(34)
1992 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 53.9.
(35)
Whillans (1993), p. 1.
(36)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p 50.13.
(37)
Whillans (1993), p. 5.
(38)
1992 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 1.12.
(39)
Ibid., p. 58.16.
(40)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 9.
(41)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.16.
(42)
Cameco Corporation, 1991 Annual Report, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan,
1992, p. 9.
(43)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 8.
(44)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.7.
(45)
Allan Robinson, "Cameco Shares Jump," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), 21 October 1992, p. B17.
(46)
Ibid.
(47)
Jon R. Johnson and Joel S. Schachter, The Free Trade Agreement: A Comprehensive
Guide, Canada Law Book Inc., Aurora, Ontario, 1988, p. 71.
(48)
1989 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, Energy, Mines and Resources, Ottawa,
1990, p. 65.3.
(49)
"Nuke Panel Seeks Cost, Timetable for Gore Cleanup," The
Daily Oklahoman, 30 December 1992, p. 19.
(50)
World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1992, Nuclear Engineering International,
Sutton, England, 1992, p. 136.
(51)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 22.
(52)
Ibid.
(53)
Cameco Corporation, 1991 Annual Report, p. 3.
(54)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 22.
(55)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.9.
(56)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 22.
(57)
1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, p. 50.7.
(58)
"Cameco Loses a Competitor," The Source, Cameco Corporation,
May 1993, p. 1.
(59)
Cameco Corporation, 1992 Annual Report, p. 8.
(60)
Cameco Corporation, 1991 Annual Report, p. 13.
(61)
"Cameco Loses a Competitor," p. 1.
(62)
Atomic Energy Control Board, Annual Report 1991-1992, p. 39.
(63)
World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1993, p. 140.
(64)
Martin Wash, Marketing Manager, Zircatec Precision Industries Inc., personal
communication, 28 September 1993.
(65)
Wayne Flood, Fuel Sales and Marketing, General Electric Canada Inc., Nuclear
Products Section, personal communication, 30 September 1993.
|