BP-365E
THE CANADIAN
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
Prepared by
Alan Nixon
Science and Technology Division
December 1993
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
EARLY CANADIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
THE CANDU REACTOR
NUCLEAR
POWER GENERATION IN CANADA
A. Background
B. Performance
C. Pickering Nuclear
Generating Station
D. Bruce Nuclear Generating
Station
1. Retubing
2. Pressure
Tube Frets
3.
Shut Down System Design Flaw
4. Steam Generators
E. Darlington
1. Start-up
Problems
2. Costs
AECL
A. Introduction
B.
CANDU-Design and Marketing
1. Design
2. Marketing
a. Export Markets
b. Domestic
Market
C. AECL Research
D. Recent
Developments
OUTLOOK
THE CANADIAN
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
Nuclear power, the production
of electricity from uranium through nuclear fission, is by far the most
prominent segment of the nuclear industry. The value of the electricity
produced, $3.7 billion in Canada in 1992, far exceeds the value of any
other product of the civilian nuclear industry. Power production employs
many more people than any other sector, the capital investment is much
greater, and nuclear power plants are much larger and more visible than
uranium mining and processing facilities. They are also often located
close to large population centres.
There is persistent public
unease over nuclear power. There are a number of reasons for this. Increasing
costs, particularly the escalating costs of building new power stations
and refurbishing older stations, calls into question the assumption that
nuclear power is cheaper than fossil-fuelled power. There is also a sense
that some of the costs of nuclear power, including the costs of waste
disposal and decommissioning, may not be fully accounted for. As well,
the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl heightened anxiety over
the safety and reliability of nuclear power systems. Reports of possible
adverse effects on health from releases of low-level radiation from power
plants also cause concern. Since, as yet, there is no decision on the
ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes, there is also some sense that the
industry is operating on borrowed time. Finally, for some, there is the
inevitable association between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, proponents
of nuclear power contend that it can still produce electricity safely
and economically and that high-level wastes can be safely disposed of,
particularly since the volume of such wastes is relatively small. Proponents
also argue that nuclear power is less damaging to the environment than
fossil-fuelled power generation.
This paper provides an overview
of some of the enormously complex issues surrounding nuclear power. It
describes the Canadian nuclear power industry, addressing in particular
its performance so far and future prospects.
EARLY
CANADIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
Over much of its history,
Canada's CANDU reactor has been one of the most technically successful
nuclear reactors. It may seem somewhat surprising that an intermediate
industrial power like Canada should have succeeded where other countries
have been considerably less successful. Two basic factors are primarily
responsible: a core of early experience with nuclear technology in Canada
and a decision to design a reactor tailored to Canadian circumstances.
The CANDU reactor has its
origins in Canadian collaboration in the Allied program to develop the
atomic bomb during the Second World War. In April 1944, a decision was
reached by the Combined Policy Committee of the U.S., the U.K., and Canada
that this country should build a heavy water reactor to produce plutonium
from uranium.(1) Chalk River, now the
location of AECL's Chalk River Laboratories, was selected as the site.
The first reactor, ZEEP
(Zero Energy Experimental Pile), was to be used for research and to provide
design information for the second, larger NRX (National Research Experimental)
reactor. The initial purpose of the NRX reactor was to demonstrate the
feasibility of making fissile material for atomic bombs in a heavy-water
reactor.(2)
Although ZEEP was the first
operational reactor in the world outside the United States, it did not
start up until September 1945, too late to be of any significance to the
war. In the years following, the emphasis of the work at Chalk River shifted
to peaceful developments and the NRX reactor, which began operation in
July 1947, gained a reputation as an outstanding research tool.
In 1946, Canada passed the
Atomic Energy Control Act, whose main purpose was to control and
supervise the domestic development of nuclear energy and to enable Canada
to participate in the international control of such energy.(3)
The Act also established the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), which
was initially intended to advise the government on policy(4)
but which would later also assume the role of regulation of Canada's nuclear
industry.
Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited (AECL) was formed on 1 April 1952, to conduct research and development
into the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. AECL took over
responsibility for the operation of the Chalk River Laboratories,(5)
which formed the core of the new corporation's activities.
Canada's first power reactor
was the 22 MWe prototype NPD (Nuclear Power Demonstration) at Rolphton
near Chalk River, which entered service in 1962. NPD was designed and
built by a consortium of AECL, Ontario Hydro, and Canadian General Electric.
The final NPD design incorporated all the basic characteristics of the
CANDU design: natural uranium fuel, separate heavy water moderator and
coolant, and a multi-channel horizontal pressure tube reactor core that
allows refuelling with the reactor in operation. The name CANDU is derived
from Canada Deuterium Uranium.(6)
The next stage of development
was the 200 MWe station at Douglas Point on Lake Huron. Construction of
Douglas Point was authorized in 1959 before the completion of its design
and development phase and before the completion of NPD. Part of the justification
for the construction of Douglas Point was to establish the real cost of
a full-scale plant. By the time NPD began operating in 1962, Douglas Point
was already under construction.(7)
Canada's first major commercial
generation plant was at Pickering, east of Toronto on the shore of Lake
Ontario. Plans for Pickering called for four units each of 500 MWe capacity;
when it was completed in the early 1970s, Pickering was the largest nuclear
generating station in the world.
Douglas Point was shut down
in 1984 and NPD was shut down in 1987 but the first four units at Pickering
continue to operate.
THE CANDU REACTOR
Conceptually, the production
of electricity from uranium is straightforward. The heat produced by the
controlled fission of uranium in the reactor core is used to generate
steam; this drives turbines which, in turn, drive electric generators.
All the power reactors in
Canada are Canadian-designed and built CANDU reactors. The CANDU differs
in a number of important respects from virtually all other power reactors.
Its principal distinguishing characteristics are: it uses natural rather
than enriched uranium; it uses heavy rather than light (normal) water
or graphite as the moderator; and the core is contained in pressure tubes
rather than in the massive pressure vessel characteristic of pressurized
light-water reactors. The core of the CANDU reactor is a large cylindrical
vessel called the calandria, which contains the heavy water moderator.
Several hundred "calandria tubes" pass from end to end of the
vessel. Through the centre of each calandria tube passes a pressure tube
containing fuel. Heavy water coolant, flowing through the pressure tubes
at high temperature and pressure, transports the heat generated by fission
to the steam generators.
The design of the reactor
is particularly well adapted to Canadian conditions. The efficiency of
heavy water as a moderator makes possible the use of natural rather than
enriched uranium as the fuel. This avoids the difficult and expensive
process of enrichment or, alternatively, dependence on foreign sources
of enriched uranium. The CANDU also makes very efficient use of its fuel.
A CANDU reactor uses about 160 kg of uranium to produce a megawatt-year
of electricity.(8) A fossil-fuelled power plant requires 10,000
barrels of oil or 2,100 tonnes of coal to produce the same amount of electricity.(9) The unit energy fuel costs for a CANDU reactor are less
than for either light water reactors or for fossil-fuelled power generation.(10)(11)
There are trade-offs, however.
The capital cost of a CANDU reactor is higher than that of a light-water
reactor of similar capacity. A significant portion of this cost is due
to the initial inventory of heavy water. Heavy water is relatively rare,
constituting only 0.015% of ordinary water, and is therefore expensive.
In 1988, the cost of a kilogram of heavy water was estimated at approximately
$550 and the initial inventory of heavy water was expected to contribute
almost 14% of the projected capital cost of the Darlington power station.(12)
NUCLEAR
POWER GENERATION IN CANADA
A. Background
Canada is one of the world's
major producers of nuclear energy. In terms of total generation, it ranks
sixth after the United States, France, the combined republics of the former
U.S.S.R., Japan and West Germany.(13) Canada's relative dependence on nuclear
power, however, is quite modest. In 1991, Canada generated 16.4% of its
electricity generated at nuclear power stations, less than most western
European countries, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and
a number of other countries. By comparison, France, which has the world's
most nuclear-intensive electricity generation, generated 73% (1991) of
its electricity from nuclear power.(14)
In fact, Canada generates
as much electricity from coal (17%) as it does from nuclear power. Hydro
still accounts for 62% of Canada's electricity while oil and natural gas
account for only 2.5 and 1.6% respectively.(15)
The national figures, however,
do not depict the distribution of nuclear power within Canada. Of the
22 power reactors currently licensed to operate in Canada, 20 are located
in Ontario, one in Quebec and one in New Brunswick. With this concentration
of nuclear generating capacity, 50% of Ontario's electricity is generated
by nuclear power; few countries exceed such a level. Although it has only
one nuclear power station, New Brunswick still generates 35% of its electricity
from nuclear power. Quebec, on the other hand, which relies almost exclusively
on hydro power, generates only 3% of its electricity from its single nuclear
power station.(16)
B. Performance
In recent years, Canada's
nuclear industry has been the focus of a good deal of criticism. How well
does it perform and how does it compare to the nuclear power industries
of other countries?
A useful indicator of performance
is "load factor." This is the ratio of electricity actually
generated by a given reactor to the maximum that it could theoretically
generate.(17) The load factor is important
from an economic point of view because, as this increases, the unit cost
of the electricity produced decreases.
For much of their lives,
Canada's CANDU reactors, as a whole, have performed well, while the performance
of some individual reactors has been exceptional. In fact, Point Lepreau
is one of the top three reactors in the world, achieving a load factor
of 90.7% over its 10-year life.(18) Point Lepreau is not the only outstanding reactor; in
terms of lifetime performance, six of the top 20 reactors out of over
350 around the world are Canadian CANDUs.(19)
Despite this outstanding
performance by some reactors, the overall performance at all operating
CANDUs is not as impressive. Table 1 lists load factors for countries
with more than four reactors of 150 MWe gross capacity. In terms of the
lifetime load factors, Canada ranks 8th with an average of 73.7%; however,
in 1992, Canada ranked only 13th, with an average annual load factor of
65.3%.(20)
Table 1
Performance by Country - Ranked by Lifetime Performance
Country
|
No. of
Reactors
|
Annual Load
Factor (%)
|
Lifetime Load
Factor (%)
|
Capacity
MWe
|
Hungary
Finland
Switzerland
Belgium
Czechoslovakia
Spain
South Korea
Canada
Germany
Sweden
Japan
Taiwan
France
Bulgaria
United States
United Kingdom
India
|
4
4
5
7
8
9
9
19
21
12
42
6
55
6
109
29
7
|
87.4
89.3
84.1
84.6
76.3
82.9
83.4
65.3
75.2
76.0
72.3
76.3
62.8
35.5
68.5
52.5
39.7
|
84.3
83.8
81.5
81.0
77.5
74.7
74.6
73.7
72.0
70.6
68.9
67.2
63.1
61.9
61.5
50.8
42.2
|
1,840
2,400
3,109
5,751
3,542
7,388
7,758
13,904
23,814
10,422
33,399
5,144
59,104
3,760
106,743
14,204
1,565
|
Source: Nuclear Engineering
International - February 1993; AECL Nuclear Sector Focus 1993.
Much of the decline in performance
can be attributed to aging at the oldest "A" stations; however,
teething problems experienced at Darlington have also had an impact. Another
general factor appears to have been insufficient maintenance at Ontario
Hydro's nuclear plants. The decline in the performance of Bruce A, for
example, has been attributed to reduced operations and maintenance budgets
through the mid-eighties, which resulted in a growing backlog of maintenance
work.(21) In 1993, the backlog of corrective
maintenance work for Ontario Hydro's five nuclear stations amounted to
18,000 hours.(22)
Deterioration of the pressure
tubes at Pickering A was one of the first major problems. Since then,
there have been a number of other well-publicized problems, which are
discussed in the following sections.
C. Pickering Nuclear Generating
Station
One of the first major setbacks
for the CANDU system occurred in 1983, when a pressure tube ruptured at
Pickering 2. This incident led to the eventual retubing of all four Pickering
A units. Retubing had been planned, but not as soon as proved necessary.
The CANDU is designed so
that the pressure tubes in the core of the reactor can be replaced. In
theory, this can effectively double the service life of the reactor. It
was originally expected that the pressure tubes would last 15 to 20 years,
but the pressure tube at Pickering 2 had been in service for only 11 years
when it failed.(23)
Several factors contributed
to the failure. During operation, the pressure tubes have a tendency to
elongate. Spacers, called garter springs, which should have kept the pressure
tubes centred inside the calandria tubes, had shifted out of position,
allowing the pressure tube to sag and in some cases contact the cooler,
outer calandria tube. The zirconium alloy used for the pressure tubes
at Pickering 1 and 2 was also more susceptible to hydrogen absorption
than expected. The hydrogen, which is produced by the effect of radiation
on the heavy water coolant, formed hydrides, which migrated to the cooler
contact points where they caused the alloy to become brittle, forming
blisters and eventually cracks. Later CANDUs used a more hydride-resistant
alloy for the pressure tubes and tighter-fitting garter springs with much
less tendency to move. These later CANDUs are thus much less susceptible
to pressure tube deterioration.
All four Pickering A units
have been now retubed. The first, Pickering 2, took four years to retube.
The last, Pickering 4, took only 19 months.(24)
Retubing is expensive, not only because of the direct cost but because
of the cost of buying replacement power. The direct cost of retubing Pickering
1 and 2, for example, was $402 million but the cost of replacement power
for each unit was approximately $200,000 to $250,000 a day.(25)
Since retubing, the first
three units to be retubed at Pickering A have performed well, with a combined
load factor of over 80% in 1992. In fact, the performance of Units 2 and
3 was outstanding, at close to 90% load factor for both.(26)
D. Bruce Nuclear Generating Station
1. Retubing
After Pickering A, Bruce
A, which started operation between 1977 and 1979, is the oldest multi-unit
station in Ontario Hydro's complex of nuclear generating stations. Until
recently it had been anticipated that the four stations at Bruce A would
be the next to be retubed and refurbished. In principle, this would allow
Bruce A to operate at high capacity until the end of its planned design
life around 2017. Without retubing, operation of Bruce A would have to
be phased out over the next decade.
As already noted, retubing
Bruce A would represent a massive expenditure for Ontario Hydro at a time
when it is already heavily in debt. The total cost has been estimated
at about $3 billion, approximately $2 billion for repairs to the
reactors and an additional $860 million to refurbish the station.(27) In March 1993, Ontario Hydro announced
that it had deferred plans to retube the four units at the Bruce A Nuclear
Generating Station, which would continue to be operated as long as safety
permitted.(28)
A recent technical development
may enable Ontario Hydro and other CANDU owners to avoid or delay the
difficult choice between expensive repairs or early retirement of some
CANDU reactors. The development is an improved version of a tool called
a SLAR, (Spacer Location and Repositioning).(29) The SLAR is used to recentre the pressure
tube inside the calandria tube and to reposition the garter springs. The
SLAR can also measure the amount of sag and can use an ultrasonic probe
to detect the location and severity of any blistering of the pressure
tube.
The SLAR has already been
used successfully at Bruce 4. If the tool continues to work as well as
expected, it will extend the life of the pressure tubes, at a conservative
estimate, by five to seven years. New Brunswick Power has already committed
itself to a full-scale SLAR program, which is expected to postpone the
scheduled retubing of its Point Lepreau reactor by ten years from 1998
to 2008.(30) By then, the pressure
tubes will have been in service for 25 years.
2. Pressure
Tube Frets
Another problem that has
received considerable attention is a condition known as fretting. The
station primarily affected is Bruce A. The cause is somewhat complex but
the end result is that vibration of the fuel bundle at the inlet end of
the pressure tube wears grooves or "fret marks" in the pressure
tube. The grooves are shallow (between 0.07 and 0.15 mm in Unit 1,(31) compared to a wall thickness of about
6 mm). By themselves, the fret marks do not pose much of a threat to the
integrity of the pressure tubes. The concern arises because of the potential
for the fret marks to act as stress points, which can encourage the formation
of hydrides. In certain circumstances, hydrides can cause a condition
known as "delayed hydride cracking," which could, potentially,
cause a pressure tube to rupture.
The probability of having
at one time all the specific conditions necessary to cause delayed hydride
cracking appears to be low and, so far, delayed hydride cracking from
fret marks has not been seen at any Bruce A reactor.(32) In addition, Ontario Hydro has carried
out an analysis indicating that a crack would be detected by coolant leaking
into the space between the pressure and calandria tube, thus allowing
the reactor to be shut down before the pressure tube could rupture.(33)
The AECB has decided that the risk is low enough to permit short-term
operation of Bruce A(34) but has limited the number of additional
operating cycles before ACEB approval will be required to continue operation.(35)
In November 1992, the AECB
issued a six-month extension to Bruce A's operating licence, rather than
renewing it for the normal two-year period. This was done to allow "time
to resolve uncertainties regarding the long-term pressure tube integrity."(36)
In May 1993, after reviewing the situation, the AECB granted a one-year
operating licence to Bruce A.
Some pressure tube fretting
has also been found at Bruce B; however, the problem is less severe than
at Bruce A. Pressure tubes at Bruce B were installed in such a way that
stresses are very low and the pressure tubes are consequently less likely
to develop cracks or fail.(37)
3.
Shut Down System Design Flaw
Another serious problem
at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station came to light during an Ontario
Hydro assessment of proposed changes to prevent further pressure tube
fretting. A flaw was found in the analysis of a major loss-of-coolant
accident. Under certain (highly improbable) conditions, the shut-down
systems would not have a sufficient margin of safety if a major loss of
coolant occurred while the reactors were operating at full power.(38)
As a result of this discovery, all the Bruce reactors were derated to
a maximum of 60% of full power, through the Bruce B reactors were subsequently
allowed to increase to 80% of full power. The economic penalty for derating
is very high; however, Ontario Hydro has already found solutions to the
problem and is making modifications at Bruce which will be completed by
the summer of 1994. The modifications will have the additional benefit
of eliminating the major cause of fretting in the pressure tubes.
4. Steam Generators
The steam generators have
also caused problems for Ontario Hydro both at Bruce A and to a lesser
extent at Bruce B. Leaking steam generator tubes have resulted in a number
of shutdowns of units at Bruce A. The cause of the leaks has been given
as a combination of vibration-induced fatigue and stress corrosion cracking.(39)
The problem was aggravated in one of the Unit 2 steam generators by a
lead shielding blanket that had been accidentally left in the steam during
an earlier shutdown.
The steam generators of
the Bruce A units are undergoing an $80-million refurbishing which should
be complete by the end of 1993. The program will restore Units 1, 3 and
4 steam generators to essentially new condition; however, the repairs
to the Unit 2 generators, which had suffered greater deterioration, will
not be as extensive.(40)
E. Darlington
Not all of Ontario Hydro's
problems with its nuclear generating stations have been with its older
units. The newest station of Ontario Hydro's complex of multi-unit nuclear
generating stations is Darlington, located to the east of Toronto not
far from Pickering.
1. Start-up
Problems
During its start-up phase,
Darlington has suffered from technical problems which have delayed its
coming on full stream. The most serious of these problems have been damage
to the fuel bundles and cracks in the main generator rotor shafts.
The fuel bundle damage,
which was first discovered in early 1991 in Unit 2, was found to be caused
by vibration of the fuel bundles inside the pressure tubes. The cause
was traced to the main heat transport pumps in the heavy-water primary
heat transport system. The pump impellers generated a 150-cycle per second
pressure fluctuation, which could be amplified at certain points in the
heat transport system causing excessive fuel bundle vibration.(41)
This problem has been corrected by replacing the original pump impellers
with impellers that shift the dominant frequency of the pressure fluctuation
from 150 to 210 cycles per second.(42)
The main rotor generator
shaft transfers mechanical power from the turbine to the rotor of the
electric generator. The generator is not part of the nuclear reactor system
but it is an essential part of the power station. The first five generator
rotor shafts delivered at Darlington were found to be susceptible to developing
cracks. The danger of this is that the cracks might grow and eventually
cause a catastrophic failure of the rotor shaft.
Small cracks discovered
in the generator shaft at Unit 2 caused lengthy shutdowns in both 1990
and 1991. In May 1992, a redesigned rotor shaft that eliminates the cracking
problem was installed in Unit 2. The rotors in Units 1, 3 and 4 have been
modified to allow the units to run, but will be replaced by the new design
rotor. This was to be done in May 1993 for Unit 1 and in March and August
1994 for Units 3 and 4.(43)
As a result of its teething
problems, power output from Darlington has been low. During its first
three and a half years of operation, Unit 2 achieved a lifetime load factor
of only 29.9% while Unit 1, between July 1992 and the end of June 1993,
achieved a load factor of 56.8%.(44) Units 3 and 4, which started up in late 1992 and early
1993, have not been operating long enough to establish reliable load factors.
2. Costs
One of the major targets
of criticism at Darlington has been its cost, which has far exceeded the
original estimate and has helped to confirm the perception of the high
cost of nuclear energy. Cost overruns are not unusual for large construction
projects and, in the case of Darlington, many of the reasons for them
were not directly related to the fact that it is a nuclear power plant.
Darlington was first ordered
in 1973, although construction did not begin until about a decade later,
between 1981 and 1985. Although earlier and lower figures have been used
to gauge the cost escalation of Darlington, a realistic reference point
is Ontario Hydro's estimate of $7.4 billion at the start of construction
in 1981. This estimate was the first to include detailed engineering design
and included allowances for inflation based on a 1988 project completion
date.(45)
The current estimate of
$13.8 billion amounts to an increase of $6.8 billion or 86% over the 1981
estimate. The major contributing factor to the cost escalation has been
delay in the construction schedule, which has added about $3.3 billion
through additional interest charges on the money borrowed to finance construction.
About half of the delays were due to construction problems. Other causes
were initiatives to reduce capital expenditures, which delayed Units 3
and 4 by two years; more stringent AECB requirements; and an electrical
workers' strike.
Financial policy changes
by Ontario Hydro, including changes in the way that capital on multi-unit
projects is brought into the rate base and the inclusion of the cost of
nuclear training (previously charged against current operation), added
a further $1.2 billion.
The two remaining contributing
factors were design changes during construction, mostly due to changes
in AECB regulations, which added about $0.9 billion, and a greater complexity
of design and construction requirements than had been anticipated in the
1981 estimate which added a further $1 billion to the cost.
AECL
A. Introduction
Although Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL) is not directly involved in the generation of nuclear
power, it plays a major and essential role in the Canadian nuclear industry.
AECL is the primary Canadian research and development agency in the field
of nuclear energy. As such, it is responsible for the design, engineering,
and marketing of CANDU reactors as well as providing engineering and scientific
support services to CANDU owners. In addition, it conducts research and
development in a wide range of basic and applied fields of science and
technology.
AECL was incorporated as
a federal Crown corporation in 1952 to carry out research and development
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. AECL's stated mission is to maintain
CANDU as a "long term, competitive electricity supply system"
in support of a federal government policy of maintaining a domestic nuclear
energy supply option.(46)
AECL has two main divisions,
AECL CANDU and AECL Research, under the direction of a Corporate Office.
The CANDU division is responsible for the design of CANDU plants, and
both foreign and domestic marketing. It also provides engineering and
project management services to its customers. The CANDU division is self-supporting
and in fact operates at a profit that helps to underwrite R&D operation.
The Research Division conducts research and development into the safety
and efficiency of existing CANDU plants and improvements to the technology
of future reactors.(47) The annual
operating budget of the Research Division is about $300 million, of which
about $160 million is provided by the federal government. Most of the
rest comes from commercial operations and cost recovery from third parties.
AECL's total workforce is made up of about 4,500 employees.
B.
CANDU-Design and Marketing
1. Design
AECL's design activities
are currently focused on the next generation of CANDU reactors: the 450
MWe CANDU-3 and the 900 MWe CANDU-9. AECL's top priority is the design
of the CANDU-3 reactor, which is now more than 70% complete. The CANDU-9
is at a much earlier stage of development.
The 450 MWe CANDU-3 is significantly
smaller than the standard AECL CANDU-6 (approximately 700 MWe). The CANDU-3
features a simplified modular design, which emphasizes a low capital cost,
shorter construction times, high adaptability, high reliability and easy
maintenance.(48)
This approach offers a number
of advantages. AECL anticipates that the construction time of a CANDU-3
reactor will be three years. By comparison, the shortest construction
time so far for a CANDU-6 has been about five years. A shorter construction
time reduces the capital costs by minimizing the accumulation of interest
charges. In principle, a shorter lead time should also allow generation
capacity to be better matched to demand. Another anticipated advantage
of the CANDU-3 is that, because of its greater simplicity, countries with
the basic technical abilities should be able to fabricate components for
the CANDU-3 system.
The CANDU-3 design phase
has been prolonged as a result of cutbacks at AECL and at present AECL
does not have a firm date for completion, which may depend on customer
commitment to CANDU-3.
Under the terms of a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) signed with the Government of Saskatchewan in December
1992, AECL is relocating its design and engineering team and marketing
office for the CANDU-3 to Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The relocation entails
placing a team of 115 employees in Saskatoon by December 1993 and increasing
the team to its full complement of 140 by December 1994.(49)
The larger CANDU-9 is still
at a very early stage of development. One of the factors driving its development
is the difficulty of licensing new nuclear reactor sites. In this situation,
maximum utilization of available sites tends to favour large capacity
reactors. It should be remarked that the design of the 900 MWe units
at Darlington, Ontario, was developed largely by Ontario Hydro and that
the Darlington reactors are not CANDU-9 designs.
2. Marketing
a. Export Markets
Although the growth of nuclear
power has slowed considerably, there are still a substantial number of
nuclear reactors around the world either under construction or planned.
Few orders have been placed for new reactors, however (only eight in 1991
and 1992).(50) Given the current market,
AECL has done well in selling three CANDU reactors, all to South Korea,
since 1990. The most recent sale of two CANDU-6 reactors to Korea Electric
Power Co. (KEPCO) was announced in September 1992. This brings the total
number of CANDUs sold to South Korea to four. Before these sales, the
last sales of CANDU reactors were to Romania in the early 1980s.
At present, South Korea
remains one of the best prospects for export sales. According to AECL,
South Korean long-range plans call for three additional CANDU units beyond
Wolsong 3 and 4. AECL anticipates that, after Wolsong 3 and 4, Korea will
probably prefer the larger CANDU-9 reactors.(51)
As noted above, AECL sold
five CANDUs to Romania between 1979 and 1985. Construction, which began
at Cernavoda between 1980 and 1986, stalled when the project got into
difficulties in the late 1980s. In 1991, the Canadian government made
a decision to provide financing for a project management contract for
Cernavoda 1 through the Canada Export Development Corporation.(52) The initiative should help to put the Romanian CANDU
program back on track and it is now planned that Cernavoda will start
supplying badly needed power by late 1994.(53)
In the longer term, the
best prospects for export sales will probably be among the rapidly expanding
economies of south-east Asia; however, there may also be some potential
for sales in western Europe.(54)
b. Domestic
Market
Prospects for the sale of
CANDU reactors within Canada appear to be remote in the near future. Three
provinces, Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, already have nuclear facilities.
Of the other provinces, only Saskatchewan has entertained the possibility
of developing nuclear power.
After it was elected to
power in September 1990, Ontario's NDP government placed a moratorium
on the construction of new nuclear facilities in the province.(55)
In reality, the moratorium is mostly symbolic. Ontario now has a substantial
surplus of electrical generating capacity. In December 1991, Ontario Hydro
presented an updated version of its 25-year demand/supply plan, which
now emphasizes demand-side management and non-utility generation and postpones
the need for new generating facilities for the foreseeable future.(56)
As far as Ontario is concerned, AECL CANDU's activities will be concentrated
on the rehabilitation of Ontario Hydro's older "A" stations.
Quebec has only one operating
nuclear power station, Gentilly 2, located near Trois Rivières. Quebec
is committed to hydro generation and currently has more than sufficient
hydro capacity to meet its expected needs. New Brunswick is the only other
Canadian province that currently operates a nuclear generating station.
AECL has had continuing discussions with New Brunswick Electric Power
Corporation regarding a second nuclear power unit to be on-line by the
end of the century but it is not yet clear if and when a firm project
commitment might be made.(57)
In March 1992, a new Saskatchewan
government decided not to proceed with the MOU reached between Saskatchewan
Power Corporation and AECL under the previous government, which had offered
some prospect of an expanded nuclear industry in Saskatchewan. In December
1992, the Saskatchewan government and AECL signed a new MOU, which, although
it explicitly stated that the Government of Saskatchewan had made no pre-commitment
to purchase a CANDU-3, did not rule out the possibility of its doing so.(58)
C. AECL Research
Most of AECL's nuclear-power-related
research activities are carried out at its Chalk River Laboratories near
Ottawa, Ontario, and at its Whiteshell Laboratories at Pinawa, in south
eastern Manitoba.
AECL's research and development
programs encompass a wide range of activities. A major portion of the
corporation's efforts are dedicated to supporting CANDU operations. For
example, AECL carries out research into means of reducing the probability
of cracking and failure of pressure tubes. The AECL research program has
also helped to determine the cause of the fuel bundle damage at Darlington.
Another major area of activity is the development of radioactive waste
disposal technologies, such as the concept of deep disposal of spent nuclear
fuel in the Canadian Shield. Much of this work has been carried out at
the Underground Research Laboratory near AECL's Whiteshell Laboratory
in Pinawa, Manitoba.
Other areas of research
include the environment and radiation biology. AECL also pursues the development
of commercial technologies in both nuclear and non-nuclear fields.
D. Recent
Developments
Like other sectors of the
nuclear industry, AECL is being forced to streamline its operations. In
January 1993, AECL announced that it would eliminate 250 positions from
its research division in order to cut $15 million from its $300-million
operating budget. This followed a federal government directive that AECL
must become more self-sustaining.(59) The job cuts involved both Chalk River and Whiteshell
and affected support staff rather than researchers. In an earlier move,
the number of head office staff in Ottawa was reduced by almost two thirds,
from 160 to 54.(60)
More recently, AECL has
established a corporate task force to look into restructuring the corporation
to increase its cost-effectiveness. The task force is to report its recommendations
by the end of 1993 and the transition is to be completed during the first
part of 1994.(61) Changes are necessary for AECL to meet its primary mission
of supporting and advancing CANDU technology.
As a further cost-cutting
measure, AECL has cancelled plans to build its new "Maple-X10"
reactor, which would have produced radioisotopes for Nordion International
and other customers.(62)
OUTLOOK
Energy is fundamental to
Canada's standard of living and Canada has one of the highest per capita
consumptions of energy of any country in the world. This is not the same
as saying that our economy uses energy inefficiently. Our high per capita
use of energy is partly due to the northern climate and large geographical
area of the country as well as to the fact that much of Canada's industry
is energy-intensive. Nuclear power makes an important contribution to
Canada's energy supply mix. Ontario, in particular, with 50% of its electricity
generated by nuclear power, is highly dependent on this source of power.
For Canada, nuclear power
has a number of advantages. With more than sufficient reserves of uranium
for its own requirements for the foreseeable future and a domestic nuclear
fuel industry fully capable of supporting the CANDU system, nuclear power
assures Canada of a secure domestic supply of energy. Rather than having
to import fossil fuels, Canada exports uranium, which contributes to a
positive balance of trade.
Nuclear technology is also
one of the few high-technology sectors where Canada has world-class capabilities.
Not only is Canada able to fulfil its own requirements for nuclear technology
but exports of nuclear technology far exceed imports. In addition, there
are other important spin-off industries, such as radio-isotope production,
food irradiation technology, and radiotherapy equipment, in which Canada
is a world leader.
On the other hand, nuclear
power appears to be losing its historical cost advantage over coal-fired
electricity generation. The costs of building new nuclear facilities continue
to escalate as do the costs of repairing the older power stations. In
addition there is persistent apprehension over the safety of nuclear power
and the disposal of radioactive wastes, particularly spent fuel.
There are also issues surrounding
the environmental impacts of energy production. Often the debate centres
on the relative merits of nuclear and coal-fired electricity generation.
Concern over acid emissions and greenhouse gases would seem to give some
advantage to nuclear power, although substantial gains have been made
in reducing acid emissions from coal-fired generating stations. Advocates
of sustainable development support a shift to energy conservation and
renewable sources of energy. Undoubtedly there are significant gains to
be made in energy conservation, but these will not occur overnight and,
at some stage, further measures will not be justified by the diminishing
returns. Moreover, renewable sources of energy, large hydro-electric developments
for example, are themselves not without environmental impact. Even with
greater reliance on renewable energy and conservation, conventional energy
sources will still be required. The question is: what part will nuclear
power play?
In the short term, there
is realistically no alternative, particularly for Ontario, to the continued
use of nuclear power. Since it has made the investment in nuclear facilities,
for Ontario to turn to another form of electricity generation would be
prohibitively costly.
The real issue is whether
nuclear power will be gradually phased out over the long term or whether
there will be a renewed commitment to further nuclear development as new
generating capacity is required. If this happens, it will not be for some
time. The current NDP government in Ontario has placed a moratorium on
further nuclear development in the province and Ontario Hydro's current
long-range plans do not foresee the need for new base load capacity in
the near future.
The installation of new
nuclear generating capacity elsewhere in Canada is uncertain. As discussed
above, the only provinces that might consider building new nuclear facilities
are Saskatchewan and New Brunswick. Low growth in electricity demand,
however, means that neither province is likely to need new generating
capacity until well into the next century.
Much will depend on whether
the nuclear industry is able to renew confidence in the performance of
its nuclear generating stations and whether it can produce electricity
at a competitive cost. Although many of the technical problems affecting
the older CANDU stations appear to have been resolved, it remains to be
seen whether the industry can restore load factors to the levels of the
1970s and early 1980s. The performance of the retubed units at Pickering
A would suggest that this is possible. We must wait to see the performance
of Darlington and whether it is now finally over the worst of its start-up
difficulties.
AECL faces a special challenge.
Although it will continue to play an important role in supporting the
established CANDU systems both in Canada and abroad, it will almost certainly
have to depend on export markets for new reactor sales. The CANDU-3, with
its emphasis on adaptability, safety, reliability, short construction
times, and ease of maintenance, should address many of the shortcomings
of the current generation of reactors. Nonetheless, the CANDU will face
stiff competition and, because of its relatively small capacity, will
not be the reactor of choice in all situations; however, it may be attractive
to utilities wishing to make smaller incremental additions to their base
load capacities.
Canada's nuclear industry has survived for
almost half a century but it is now at a critical juncture. Without sufficient
commitment it is possible that Canada could eventually lose the core of
expertise needed to support and develop the CANDU system. Once lost, this
expertise would be next to impossible to recover. Although this would
not preclude nuclear energy as an energy source in the future, it would
limit our options and leave Canada dependent on other countries for nuclear
technology.
(1)
Wilfred Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story, Harrap Research Publications,
London, 1965, p. 101.
(2)
Gordon H.E. Sims, A History of the Atomic Energy Control Board,
Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1981, p. 12-13.
(3)
Ibid., p. 177.
(4)
Ibid., p. 205.
(5)
Eggleston (1965), p. 148.
(6)
Sims (1981), p. 116.
(7)
Ibid., p. 116-117.
(8)
Alan Wyatt, The Nuclear Challenge: Understanding the Debate, The
Book Press Limited, Toronto, 1978, p. 120.
(9)
Fusion: Energy for the Future, National Fusion Program, AECL Research,
Chalk River, Ontario, 1991, p. 12.
(10)
House of Commons Standing Committee on Energy, Mines and Resources, Nuclear
Energy: Unmasking the Mystery, Queen's Printer for Canada, Ottawa,
1988, p. 138.
(11)
Ontario Hydro, Annual Report 1992, p. 48.
(12)
Nuclear Energy: Unmasking the Mystery (1988), p. 139.
(13)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Nuclear Sector Focus 1993, p.
B-9.
(14)
Ibid., p. C-13, C-14.
(15)
Ibid., p. E-6.
(16)
Ibid.
(17)
Load factors can give only a general indication of performance and strict
comparisons will not always be valid. If a country has a mix of different
types of generating capacity, nuclear power will generally be used to
supply the base load and load factors will tend to be high. However, a
country which relies predominantly on nuclear will need to use its nuclear
generating capacity to follow load requirements; therefore, it will not
always be used to full capacity and load factors will tend to be lower.
For individual stations, annual load factors will be high if they have
not had an outage to refuel during the measurement period. CANDU reactors
are refuelled on power and therefore do not incur refuelling outages.
(18)
"1992 Annual Review of Load Factors," Nuclear Engineering
International, April 1993, p. 24.
(19)
Nuclear Sector Focus 1993, p. G-2.
(20)
Ibid., p. G-5.
(21)
"The Cost of Not Doing Maintenance: a Cautionary Tale from Bruce
A.," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1993, p. 15.
(22)
Geoffrey Scotton, "Ontario Nuclear Plants Hit Safety Money Woes,"
Financial Post, 6 December 1993, p. 3.
(23)
Geoff McCaffrey, AECL CANDU, personal communication.
(24)
Ibid.
(25)
Nuclear Energy: Unmasking the Mystery (1988), p. 140.
(26)
"1992 Annual Review of Load Factors," Nuclear Engineering
International (1993), p. 20-21.
(27)
"Canada's Nuclear Watchdog..." CP Newswire, 1 May 1993.
(28)
Ontario Hydro, Annual Report 1992, p. 11.
(29)
"Revised SLAR Tool Puts Off Retubing," Nuclear Engineering
International, April 1993. p. 10.
(30)
Geoff McCaffrey, AECL CANDU, personal communication.
(31)
Atomic Energy Control Board, AECB Staff Annual Report of Bruce A NGS
for the Year 1991, Ottawa, November 1991, p. 11.
(32)
Atomic Energy Control Board, AECB Staff Annual Report on the Bruce
A Nuclear Generating Station for the Year 1992, Ottawa, September
1993, p. 11.
(33)
AECB Staff Annual Report of Bruce A NGS for the Year 1991, p. 11.
(34)
AECB Staff Annual Report on the Bruce A Nuclear Generating Station for
the Year 1992, p. 15.
(35)
Ibid., p. 12.
(36)
Ibid., p. 13.
(37)
Atomic Energy Control Board, AECB Staff Annual Report on the Bruce
B Nuclear Generating Station for the Year 1992, Ottawa, September
1993, p. 12-13.
(38)
Atomic Energy Control Board, Annual Report 1992-93, Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, p. 9.
(39)
AECB Staff Annual Report on the Bruce A Nuclear Generating Station for
the Year 1992, p. 10.
(40)
Geoff McCaffrey, AECL CANDU, personal communication, 21 December 1993.
(41)
"Cracked Fuel Halts Darlington Startup," Nuclear Engineering
International, April 1992, p. 7.
(42)
Atomic Energy Control Board, AECB Staff Annual Report on the Darlington
Nuclear Generating Station for the Year 1992, Ottawa, September 1993,
p. 13-14.
(43)
Ibid., p. 14.
(44)
"Load Factors to End June 1993," Nuclear Engineering International,
November 1993, p. 19.
(45)
Geoff McCaffrey, AECL CANDU, "Background-Darlington Costs,"
unpublished article.
(46)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Corporate Plan and Budgets Summary
1992/93-1996/97, Ottawa, April 1992, p. 1.
(47)
Ibid.
(48)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, CANDU Operations, Candu-3 Technical
Outline, Document Number 74-01010-TED-01 (Rev 9), September 1989,
p. 1.
(49)
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Saskatchewan and
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), 21 December 1992.
(50)
Nuclear Sector Focus 1993, p. C-21.
(51)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Corporate Plan and Budgets Summary
1992/93-1996/97, p. 3.
(52)
Ibid., p. 3.
(53)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1991-1992 Annual Review, Ottawa,
1992, p. 15.
(54)
Ibid., p. 17.
(55)
Energy Mines and Resources, 1990 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, Minister
of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1991, p. 67.8.
(56)
Energy Mines and Resources, 1991 Canadian Minerals Yearbook, Minister
of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1992, p. 50.10.
(57)
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Corporate Plan and Budgets Summary
1992/93-1996/97, p. 3.
(58)
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Saskatchewan and
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), 21 December 1992.
(59)
John Ibbitson, "Chalk River Feels Fiscal Pinch," Ottawa Citizen,
7 January 1993, p. A.1.
(60)
"Atomic Energy Axing 250 Jobs," Toronto Star, 7 January
1993, p. 62.
(61)
Tim Ruhnke, "Special AECL Task Team to Look at Restructuring,"
The North Renfrew Times, 29 September 1993, p. 6.
(62)
Tim Ruhnke, "AECL Stops Maple-X Project," The North Renfrew
Times, 17 November 1993, p. 1.
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