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BP-435E
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
Prepared by:
Diane Leduc, James Lee
Political and Social Affairs Division
November 1996
Revised February 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG TRADE
THE UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME
RECENT CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG TRADE
CANADA AND THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG
TRADE
CONCLUSION
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
INTRODUCTION
Trade in drugs of abuse such as cocaine, heroin and
amphetamines (synthetic stimulants) has long been a frustrating feature
of the international scene.(1) After
attempting for years to combat the drug trade on an individual or bilateral
basis, nations have belatedly come to realize that coordinated international
action is the only effective way to restrain the trade and, in addition,
that social and other broad action is the only means to reduce incentives
to participate in it.
THE
INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE
Drugs have played an important medicinal role in human
society, and “harmless” drugs such as caffeine are widely and legally
used in all parts of the globe. The international trade in drugs has
a long history; imperial Britain, for example, shaped the 19th-century
opium trade by selling Indian-produced opium to China in exchange for
tea and silk, and fought “Opium Wars” to defend its right to do so.(2)
In the early 20th century, the United States, Britain and
other countries began to change their position on drug use, although,
as the history of prohibition shows, their concept and acceptance of
“dangerous” drugs was not identical to our own.
By the 1970s and 1980s, the international drug trade
had taken on many of the key features we recognize today, the most notable
of which are its pervasiveness and its scale. According to a United Nations
survey, the worldwide dollar value of illegal drugs is second only to
the amount spent on the arms trade. Estimating the value of an illegal
enterprise carried on in dozens of currencies around the world is tremendously
difficult, but the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
generally describes the production, trafficking and sales of illicit drugs
as a $400-billion-a-year industry. (3)
Some of these drugs are produced and consumed domestically, but much of
the drug trade takes place between states. Unlike the international trade
in arms, however, which largely flows from developed nations that produce
arms to less developed nations that use arms, the international drug trade
has traditionally flowed from developing to developed nations. At the
risk of oversimplification, cocaine production has dominated in Central
and South America, while heroin has dominated in both Southeast and Southwest
Asia.
THE UNITED STATES
With the largest affected population and the largest
budget for combating the problem, the United States has traditionally
taken the role of leading “victim nation” of the drug trade. It has
long been the most active in combating the trade, both alone and bilaterally
with other countries. U.S. action has generally focused on enforcement,
with some 60% of anti-drug funds devoted to criminal law enforcement
and 30% to treatment. President Richard Nixon declared a “War on Drugs”
in 1972, but it was only in the 1980s that the Reagan and (especially)
Bush administrations engaged in such a high-profile “War” in earnest.
In the 1980s, South American cocaine displaced Southeast Asian heroin
as the major drug threat to the United States. In 1986, President Ronald
Reagan signed National Security Directive No. 221, making drug enforcement
a national security priority. Between 1980 and 1990, U.S. federal spending
on drug control rose (in constant dollars) from $1.5 billion to
$6.7 billion, and the number of adult arrests for illegal drug sale
or manufacture in the United States increased from about 103,000 in
1980 to more than 404,000 in 1989. (Arrests for illegal possession
also increased, from about 368,000 to more than 843,000 per year over
this period.)(4) The United States
also increased its anti-drug cooperation with other governments, sending
drug enforcement and other agents to countries in Latin America to concentrate
on the cocaine trade, and to Thailand, France and elsewhere to combat
the heroin threat. While the casual (or non-addicting) use of drugs
declined as a result of these increased measures, hard-core drug users,
who account for some 80% of drug users in the United States, continued
to use drugs at much the same rate.(5)
In the words of Lee P. Brown, then Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (and widely referred to as America’s “Drug Czar”),
“in the United States we have made great progress in reducing casual,
or non-addictive, drug use. Now, chronic, addictive drug use is our
greatest concern.” In Brown’s opinion, nations must take an integrated
approach to fighting the international drug problem. This would involve
law enforcement, education, treatment and economic development.(6)
The Clinton administration initially reduced the funds
devoted to the office of the “Drug Czar” and put more emphasis on reducing
the domestic demand for drugs. By 1996, an increase in the rate of
drug abuse among teenagers and others, however, allowed Republicans
to charge during the election campaign that President Clinton was “soft
on drugs.” In fact, when Clinton named widely respected Army General
Barry McCaffrey to replace Lee Brown as Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy in the fall of 1995, he gave the office cabinet
rank for the first time and substantially increased its staff.(7)
In the spring of 1996, Clinton had also announced a new National Drug
Control Strategy, the first priority of which was “to get young people
to reject drugs.”(8) As The
Economist has pointed out, drug abuse seems to move in natural
cycles, like the economy; the Clinton administration’s mistake had probably
been failure to anticipate the turn of the cycle and work adequately
against it.
In its quest “to stem the flow of drugs to the U.S.,”
the American government continues to provide financial assistance to
countries that make an attempt at crop eradication and the like. Notably,
in 2000, it signed a comprehensive $1.3-billion assistance package in
support of Plan Colombia and the Colombian government’s efforts to “address
the array of challenges it faces – its efforts to fight the illicit
drug trade, to increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to
expand economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster
peace.”(9) Moreover, in 2001,
the United States proposed to fund also the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI), a program intended to expand counter-narcotics programs begun
under Plan Colombia and to help support law enforcement and alternative
development in countries of the Andean region threatened by drug trafficking.
In February 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled
a new National Drug Control Strategy, based on three core principles:
-
stopping drug use before it starts;
-
healing America’s drug users; and
-
disrupting the market [for illegal drugs].
This latest strategy is intended to “emphasize a balance
between supply and demand reduction efforts.” It represents attempts
at prevention and treatment, and thereby at reducing the demand for
drugs. Much emphasis, however, remains on reducing the supply of drugs,
that is, stemming their flow into the United States from outside, and
apprehending and punishing dealers and users. Finally, underlining
the United States’ determination to pursue the fight against drugs (and
drug trafficking), as much as $19.2 billion was set aside in the 2003
budget for “drug control.”(10)
At the same time, according to The Economist, “the official
estimate of retail drug sales in the United States is $60 billion,
making America easily the world’s most valuable market.”(11)
For its part, the U.S. Congressional Research Service further estimates
that more than 13 million Americans still buy illicit drugs on a regular
basis (that is, more than once a month) and that the economic costs
associated with drug abuse in the United States could well add up to
as much as $110 billion.(12) Meanwhile,
arrests (and sentencing) for drug violations continue to grow almost
unabated; the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that between 1984
and 1999, the annual number of defendants charged with a drug offence
in Federal Courts increased from 11,854 to 29,306.(13)
Other sources, moreover, estimate that between 1970 and 1999, adult
drug arrests more than quadrupled, from 322,300 to 1,337,600, while
juvenile arrests doubled, from 93,300 to 194,600.(14)
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
Since the scope of the drug abuse problem varies from
country to country, states have traditionally addressed the issue individually.
In the words of The Economist, “The attitude of most electorates
and governments is to deplore the problems that the illegal drug trade
brings, view the whole matter with distaste, and sit on the status quo
– a policy of sweeping prohibition.”(15)
A number of politicians in Latin America and elsewhere have argued that
close international cooperation to address the drug trade would endanger
national “sovereignty.” Because Europeans have long claimed that most
drugs were only “passing through,” stopping the traffic was given a
low priority.
The United States took the lead both in addressing
the drug trade itself and in signing bilateral agreements with other
nations to combat it; however, real international cooperation began
only with the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which
banned a wide range of drugs. This convention was amended and strengthened
by a protocol in 1972. In addition, the UN agreed to the Vienna
Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1971 in order to control
trade in hallucinogens and amphetamines (psychotropic substances had
not been included in the 1961 Convention). Between them, “these three
Conventions regulate the legal production, distribution and supply of
controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes and make illegal
all other such activities.”(16)
Also in 1971, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)
was established; the United States, Germany, Sweden and Norway have
been leading supporters of this body. In 1984, the UN General Assembly
unanimously requested the preparation of a draft convention to complement
the 1961 Single Convention (as amended) and the 1971 Psychotropic
Substances Convention. A UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was adopted and prepared
for signature in late 1988. This convention reiterates that it is concerned
with reinforcing and supplementing the earlier conventions, and “strengthening
and enhancing effective legal means for international co-operation in
criminal matters for suppressing the international criminal activities
of illicit traffic.”(17) As of
May 2002, 166 countries and the European Union had become parties to
the Convention.
The UN has continued to address the drug trade issue
at the broadest level. In December 1995, the General Assembly adopted
a seven-part resolution calling upon states to intensify actions to
promote effective cooperation in this area.(18)
In April 1996, the 53-member Commission on Narcotic Drugs, established
by the UN in February 1946, recommended a special session of the UN
General Assembly in 1998 on new strategies to combat the international
drug trade and its effects.(19)
The importance of that issue to the global community was underscored
when the proposed Special Session on the World Drug Problem was held
in New York in June 1998. At that time, 185 member states adopted
– and signed – a Political Declaration (on the Guiding Principles
of Drug Demand Reduction), which begins by stating that:
Drugs destroy lives and communities, undermine
sustainable human development and generate crime. Drugs affect
all sectors of society in all countries; in particular, drug abuse
affects the freedom and development of young people, the world’s
most valuable asset. Drugs are a grave threat to the health and
well-being of all mankind, the independence of States, democracy,
the stability of nations, the structure of all societies, and the
dignity and hope of millions of people and their families .(20)
After identifying weaknesses in six main areas (controls
on precursor chemicals, amphetamine-type stimulants, judicial cooperation,
money laundering controls, demand reduction, and alternative development),
signatories to the 1998 Declaration pledged to significantly reduce
both the demand for, and the supply of, illicit drugs by the year 2008.
They also agreed to three main objectives:
-
All participants agreed to develop national strategies
on illegal drugs, to be put in place by 2003;
-
All participants agreed to work for “significant
and measurable results” in reducing illegal drugs consumption by
2008, with a 50% reduction informally taken as an indicative target;
-
States where illegal production has taken place
committed themselves to a total elimination of production, also
by 2008. Alternative development was acknowledged as the only long-term
solution to the problem of illicit narcotic cultivation. (21)
More recently, in December 2000, UN member states met
in Palermo, Italy, to adopt yet another convention, the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The “Palermo
Convention” is accompanied by two protocols, one on the trafficking
of persons, the other on the smuggling of migrants. It is meant to
promote international cooperation in order to “significantly reduce
illegal and exploitive transborder activities” and will, it is hoped,
also serve as a valuable tool in the fight against transborder drug
trafficking.
THE
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME
In 1991, the UN International Drug Control Programme
(UNDCP) was established to coordinate UN drug control activities and
to serve as the focal point for the UN Decade against Drug Abuse (1991-2000).
The UNDCP subsequently continued its activities, expanded the scope
of its efforts and increased the number of projects it oversees. While
international cooperation has traditionally focused on enforcement,
some move toward complementary action has taken place. In March 1993,
delegates at the 36th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic
Drugs adopted a resolution calling on governments to give priority to
preventing drug abuse and to treating and reintegrating drug abusers
in society. This new focus on reducing demand was seen by many countries
as a complement to the traditional focus on enforcement, and as an important
part of a balanced strategy to combat drug abuse.(22)
The UNDCP’s budget is now about US$160 million a year
– slightly less than in the late 1990s – and a substantive portion of
that budget goes towards reducing the supply of drugs through alternative
development. Apart from the general decline in regular budget resources
that is affecting all parts of the UN, 90% of the UNDCP’s funds come
from voluntary contributions by seven governments and the European Union.
This raises questions about both the nature of future expertise and
the international “ownership” of the UNDCP.
RECENT CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG TRADE
The end of the Cold War brought several important changes
in the international drug trade, as the collapse of the Soviet Union
and its empire in Eastern Europe caused an increased flow of people
and goods from these areas to the West. According to the RCMP,
The emergence of new trafficking/smuggling groups is often a function
of global political and economic imperatives. Many Eastern European
and former Soviet bloc nations have reached a state of virtual collapse.
The desperate plight of their citizens renders them particularly vulnerable
to exploitation by both domestic and foreign drug trafficking groups.
Incidents of this type involving former Soviet/East bloc nationals
are likely to increase, particularly where the subjects involved have
jobs which involve international travel. (23)
Three significant new threats were identified with
the end of the Cold War: 1) the shipment of Colombian cocaine to Eastern
Europe and then on to the West; 2) the increased cultivation of opium
poppies in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, their manufacture
into heroin and shipment overland or through the Baltic ports into Europe;
and 3) the production of amphetamines in Central and Eastern European
states such as Poland, and their distribution to the West.(24)
While these new threats are serious, the end of the Cold War also opened
up the possibility of combating the drug trade through increased coordinated
use of intelligence resources formerly devoted to the Cold War. Most
intelligence agencies attempted to redefine their role in the wake of
the Cold War, and included the international drug trade as a new priority,
along with terrorism and nuclear proliferation.(25)
A further development singled out by the 1996 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report is the “astonishing spread of
synthetic drugs, especially methanphetamine, on the illicit world drug
market.” Since synthetic drugs are produced in laboratories, they allow
trafficking organizations to control the whole process from manufacture
to sale, and decrease reliance on potentially vulnerable crops such
as coca or opium.
Increasingly, sophisticated money laundering has become
a key element of the international drug trade, which may now account
for half of all money laundered. Since experts have concluded that
it may be an important weakness of international drug smugglers, money
laundering has become the focus of increased international cooperation.
When agreeing to the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, governments added measures to
detect and punish money-laundering activities. At a G-7 Summit held
in Paris in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
was formed to coordinate international action to counter money laundering.
At a meeting held in June 1996 the 28 member states, which include the
major financial nations, updated the 40 principles that form a common
standard for combating money laundering. During the early 1990s, the
international community had more success in countering drug-money laundering
than in reducing demand or drug interdiction; increased international
cooperation resulted in quadrupling the cost of money laundering (from
6% of the total amount involved to 26%).(26)
The role of organized crime remains pivotal in the
international drug trade. This includes ethnic criminal gangs that
can benefit from their international links and intimidation of immigrant
populations. According to reports, ethnic Chinese triad and other gangs
are increasing their involvement in the international drug trade, as
are Russian Mafiya groups, Japanese Yakuza and others.
In some cases, this may simply mean that more experienced traffickers
are using ethnic gangs in some locations. In other cases, however,
the situation might be more complicated; for example, a reported agreement
between Russian Mafiya and Italian organized crime groups sets
out respective spheres of influence in Europe, and aims to formalize
cooperation in drug sales and money laundering.(27)
At the same time, the increasing sophistication of the drug trade raises
problems on many deeper levels. According to a 1996 UN report,
The link between crime and drugs is increasingly affecting societies.
Trafficking begets other criminal activity, such as violence between
groups competing for market share at the wholesale and retail levels.
At the same time, the sums involved give criminals substantial resources
with which to organise themselves efficiently, with little or no regard
for the fiscal regulatory and legal constraints on normal businesses.
Their capital resources are increasingly being used to finance diversification
into legitimate business activity. Such intermingling of illicit
and legitimate activities poses a serious threat to tackling the drugs
problem. (28)
While drug trafficking remains a pressing issue, the
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention issued a
reminder in its World Drug Report, 2000 that “the history of
addictive drugs is not one of a steady and inexorable deterioration.
Rather … [one of] fluctuating trends.”(29)
At the same time, the UNODCCP points out that the fight against drug
trafficking has met with some successes in recent years – largely because
of the combined efforts of the international community:
-
Large-scale cultivation of opium poppy was successfully
prevented in the 1990s in the countries of Central Asia. As a consequence,
production is increasingly concentrated in an ever-smaller number
of countries. Afghanistan and Myanmar together accounted for about
90% of global illicit opium production in recent years (almost 95%
in 1999).
-
The three Andean countries – Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia – account for almost all coca leaf production. In 1999,
Colombia alone was responsible for two-thirds of global coca leaf
production, and for an even higher share in global cocaine manufacture
(around 80%).
-
The global area under opium poppy cultivation is
at its lowest level since 1988, some 17% smaller in 1999 than 1990;
similarly, the area under coca cultivation is at its lowest level
since 1987, about 14% less in 1999 than in 1990.
-
The profile of illegal drugs in the economies
of the main producing countries has posted a decisive trend of decline.
Even in countries where production levels have remained stubbornly
high, the share of GDP has been falling, with drugs contributing
some 2.5% of Colombia’s economic output, down from a mid-1980s high
of around 7%.
-
During the 1990s, consumption trends of the main
problem drugs in the developed countries have been stable or declining;
the abuse of cocaine fell in North America as compared to a decade
earlier and heroin abuse was stable in Western Europe. (30)
CANADA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG TRADE
Generally speaking, Canada has followed the U.S. approach
to the international drug trade, although it has been less strident
in its “War on Drugs” and has devoted more resources to treatment than
to enforcement. Canada’s National Drug Strategy, launched in 1987 and
renewed in 1992 and 1998, emphasizes reducing demand and increasing
the number of effective treatment programs. It focuses on the abuse
of alcohol and pharmaceuticals as well as street drugs. At the same
time, Canada cooperates fully with the international community to counter
the drug trade, participating in such anti-drug forums as the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering, the UNDCP, and the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American
States.
Canada is party to a number of international instruments,
including the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In 1990, shortly
after it ratified the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,Canada undertook a
major revision of its legislation regarding drugs and narcotics – in
part to better fulfil its international obligations under the above
conventions. After several abortive attempts, the Government of Canada
finally adopted new legislation, Bill C-8, the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act, on 20 June 1996. Bill C‑8 formed part of
Canada’s National Drug Strategy and was intended “to provide a framework
for the control of import, production, export, distribution and use
of mind-altering substances.”(31)
Money laundering has proven a significant problem in
Canada, with an estimated $10 to 12 billion annually in drug-related
proceeds passing through Canadian financial institutions. New regulations
and measures designed to counter money laundering in Canada were adopted
in the 1980s and 1990s, and special anti-drug-money laundering teams
made up of RCMP officers, full-time prosecutors, administrative staff
and local police officers became fully operational in 1993.(32)
In June 2000, new legislation considerably bolstered Canada’s anti-laundering
efforts and made it mandatory for financial agencies to report data
relating to certain types of transaction (Bill C‑22, An Act
to Facilitate Combatting the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime…).(33)
In December 2001, the Government of Canada adopted
Bill C‑24, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime
and Law Enforcement). Ushered in as “strong anti-gang legislation,”
Bill C‑24 was intended to provide law enforcement officials with
the tools necessary to combat organized criminal groups effectively
and to help, among other things, to make inroads against drug trafficking
and the various social problems that normally accompany it. The magnitude
of those problems is indicated by the sums of money involved: illegal
drug sales in Canada have reached an estimated $7 or $18 billion a year,(34)
and their economic costs (including costs to the health care system,
lost productivity, enforcement, property crimes committed by addicts,
etc.) as much as $5 billion a year.(35)
While cannabis derivatives such as marijuana and hashish
are the major illicit drugs of choice in Canada, cocaine (including
crack) is also quite popular, with the number of cocaine users estimated
at over 250,000. Cocaine use has largely stabilized in Canada, and
is centred mostly in major cities in central Canada such as Toronto
and Montréal.(36) “Crack” cocaine
remains readily available in eastern and central Canada, particularly
the heavily urbanized Windsor-Toronto corridor. Most cocaine in Canada
comes from Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. A variety of participants
dominate the Canadian cocaine trade, including Asian, Italian and South
American trafficking organizations, outlaw motorcycle gangs and “generic”
Canadian organizations.(37) Most
cocaine enters Canada by sea, with smaller amounts entering by land
and air.
The RCMP estimates the demand for heroin in Canada
as “far less” than that for cannabis and cocaine, but heroin trafficking
“still constitutes a very lucrative activity.” Heroin use is centred
in the major cities of Vancouver, Montréal and Toronto. There are an
estimated 35,000-40,000 heroin users in Canada. Most of the heroin
they consume comes from Southeast and Southwest Asia, as well as – to
a smaller degree – Lebanon and Latin America. Shipment by air (mainly
couriers on board commercial aircraft) is estimated to account for most
of the heroin smuggled into Canada. According to the RCMP, “Criminal
groups with connections to Asian source countries will continue to be
largely responsible for importing and trafficking in Canada.”(38)
In recent years, drug cartels have increasingly viewed Canada’s west
coast as an easy entry point into North America. This is partly a factor
of geography and the weather conditions on the west coast, and partly
a result of the so-called “balloon effect,” whereby drug traffickers
have turned increasingly to Canada because the United States has strengthened
its enforcement efforts. The RCMP also believes that South American
drug organizations are making use of the easier movement of people and
goods under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to increase
their activities.
Finally, although they have long been part of the Canadian
illicit drug culture, only in recent years have synthetic or chemical
substances begun to pose a major threat (compared to heroin, cocaine,
and cannabis products). Because increased trafficking in ecstasy and
other synthetic drugs has significantly raised the level of that threat,
the Government of Canada is looking at ways of better regulating or
controlling the purchase and sale of so-called precursor chemicals,
as a means of reducing domestic clandestine lab activity. In addition,
the government has established a new office, the RCMP National Precursor
Chemical Diversion Program, and it intends to strengthen still further
its collaboration with law enforcement authorities from other jurisdictions
to control trafficking in synthetic drugs.(39)
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, it has become evident that the
traditional view of the drug trade as a northern, and particularly American,
problem is too simplistic. As former Colombian Minister of Justice
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla pointed out, countries that begin by producing
and trafficking in drugs end up by consuming them.(40)
The main beneficiaries of the international drug trade may be a relatively
small number of sophisticated trafficking organizations, but the victims
include countless drug addicts around the world and innocent victims
of crimes committed to support drug habits. Moreover, it has also become
increasingly evident that the illicit drug trade has a substantial negative
impact on all aspects of development.
Important success has been achieved in the past two
decades through countries’ individual action and through bilateral and
multilateral cooperation on enforcement measures, and work is continuing
along these lines. At the same time, it is essential to recognize the
deep social roots of the international drug problem and the need for
cooperation on a much broader basis than simple enforcement. According
to Canada’s former Solicitor General, Herb Gray,
The drug trade is dependent on demand and only by developing
preventative strategies that strike at the underlying factors
that lead people to use drugs in the first place can we curb drug
abuse and trafficking.
These factors, or root causes, such as sexual abuse, broken homes,
illiteracy, physical abuse, and lack of parental guidance are
more social problems than they are problems of crime.(41)
(1) This paper
follows the practice of the National Drug Intelligence Estimate
1994 (NDIE), prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
which states: “In this publication, where it is stated that a
particular country produced or supplied quantities of illicit drugs,
it is not suggested that the government of that country or its lawful
agencies permitted or participated in these illegal activities. These
references allude to the illegal activities of individuals or criminal
organisations operating within the noted jurisdictions” (emphasis
in original). RCMP, National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1994,
Ottawa, December 1994, p. 6.
(2) See Gerald
Segal, “The Drug Trade,” in the World Affairs Companion, Simon
& Schuster, New York, 1996, pp. 99-102.
(3) Quoted in
“Stumbling in the Dark,” The Economist, 28 July 2001, p. 1
of a 16-page “Survey” on illicit drugs.
(4) James Adams,
The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Intelligence, Hutchinson,
London, 1994, p. 297.
(5) “Drugs Policy: The Enemy
Within,” The Economist, 15 May 1993, p. 31.
(6) Lee P. Brown, “The International
Drug Problem: Law Enforcement, Education, Treatment and Economic
Development,” speech delivered before the First Latin American Drug
Experts Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 March 1994, reproduced
in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LX #16, 1 June 1994,
p. 491.
(7) “All The President’s Fault?”
The Economist, 14 September 1996, pp. 26-27.
(8) Jeffrey Stilkind, “Clinton
Outlines New Strategy to Combat Illegal Drug Use,” United States
Information Agency, 29 April 1996.
(10) Fact Sheet: The
President’s National Drug Control Strategy,The White House,
Washington, 12 February 2002, p. 2.
(11) “Stumbling in the Dark”
(2001), p. 1.
(12) Lee Rensselaer and Raphael
Perl, Drug Control: International Policy and Options, Library
of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 18 March
2002, p. 1.
(13) John Scalia, Federal
Drug Offenders, 1999 – with Trends 1984-99, U.S. Department
of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics Program, Washington, August
2001, p. 1.
(14) Erich Goode, “Drug Arrests
at the Millennium,” Society, July-August 2002, p. 42.
(15) “Bring Drugs Within
the Law,” The Economist, 15 May 1993, p. 13.
(16) Russell Fox and Ian
Matthews, Drugs Policy: Fact, Fiction and the Future, The
Federation Press, Sydney, 1992, p. 75.
(18) “Assembly Calls for
Intensified Cooperation among States to Combat Drug Abuse,” UN
Chronicle, Spring 1996, p. 63.
(19) “1998 Special Session
on Drugs Recommended,” UN Chronicle, No. 2, 1996, p. 77.
(20) Political Declaration
adopted by the UN General Assembly, 10 June 1998, Resolution
No. A/RES/S‑20/2.
(21) World Drug Report,
2000, United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
New York, 2000, p. 5.
(22) “Commission Sets Priorities:
Prevention, Treatment and Social Integration,” UN Chronicle,
September 1993, p. 70.
(24) Adams (1994), p. 304.
(26) David A. Andelman, “The
Drug Money Maze,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, p. 108.
(27) Dr. Mark Galeotti, “MAFIYA:
Organized Crime in Russia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review Special
Report No. 10, June 1996.
(28) International Cooperation
against the Illicit Production, Sale, Demand, Traffic and Distribution
of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities,
Report to the Secretary-General, United Nations Economic and Social
Council, 4 June 1996, E/1996/57, p. 5.
(30) The above five observations
are reproduced from World Drug Report, 2000, p. 2, and/or
the Highlights to that report, also on p. 2.
(32) International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, 1994, pp. 139-141.
(34) Estimates vary so widely
because such profits are extremely difficult to ascertain; they
are illegal, hidden and for the most part go unreported.
(35) Speaking Notes for
the Hon. Lawrence MacAuley, Solicitor General of Canada, to the
World Forum on Drugs and Dependencies, Montréal, Quebec, 23 September
2002, p. 1.
(36) International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, 1994, p. 139.
(40) Cited in Brown (1994),
p. 490.
(41) “Message From the Solicitor
General,” RCMP (1994), p. 2.
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