



CANADIAN

CATALOGUE  
NO. 11-008

# SOCIAL TRENDS



## FEATURES

*Mixed unions*

*Visible minorities*

*Kids witnessing  
violence*

*Rural-urban migration*

*At-risk and problem  
gamblers*

**SUMMER 2004** NO. 73  
\$12 CANADA



Statistics  
Canada

Statistique  
Canada

Canada



# At your service...

## • Comments about *Canadian Social Trends*?

We welcome your views on articles and other items that have been published in *Canadian Social Trends*. For more information, specific inquiries or to comment, please contact:

Editor-in-Chief,  
*Canadian Social Trends*,  
7th floor, Jean Talon Bldg.,  
Statistics Canada,  
Ottawa, Ontario,  
K1A 0T6

Fax number: (613) 951-0387  
Internet e-mail at: [cstsc@statcan.ca](mailto:cstsc@statcan.ca)



## • Ordering/Subscription information

*Canadian Social Trends* can be ordered using any of the following methods:

- Telephone (Canada and United States)  
1 800 267-6677
- Fax (Canada and United States)  
1 877 287-4369
- E-mail  
[order@statcan.ca](mailto:order@statcan.ca)
- Mail  
Statistics Canada, Dissemination Division, Circulation Management,  
120 Parkdale Avenue, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0T6
- In person at the [Statistics Canada Regional Centre](#) nearest you,  
or from authorized agents and bookstores.

Users can obtain single issues or subscribe at  
<http://www.statcan.ca/english/IPS/Data/11-008-XIE.htm>



## • Need more information?

For information on the wide range of data available from Statistics Canada, you can contact us by calling one of our toll-free numbers (Canada and United States only). You can also contact us by e-mail or by visiting our Web site.

National enquiries line . . . . .	1 800 263-1136
National TTY line (teletype machine) . . . . .	1 800 363-7629
E-mail enquiries . . . . .	<a href="mailto:infostats@statcan.ca">infostats@statcan.ca</a>
Web site . . . . .	<a href="http://www.statcan.ca">www.statcan.ca</a>
Depository Services Program enquiries . . . . .	1 800 700-1033
Fax line for Depository Services Program . . . . .	1 800 889-9734



# CST

## Editors

WARREN CLARK,  
SUSAN CROMPTON,  
ANNA KEMENY,  
ANNE MILAN

## Research Officer

GILBERT MANSOUR

## Production Manager

CYNTHIA FORTURA

## Production Co-ordinator

SHIRLEY LI

## Marketing/Dissemination

ALEX SOLIS

## Art/Printing Direction

DISSEMINATION DIVISION,  
STATISTICS CANADA

## Design

GRIFFE DESIGN INC.

## Cover Illustration

ROBERT JOHANSEN

## Review Committee

M. BOYD, E. BOYKO, J. HAGEY,  
J. JACKSON, I. MACREDIE, D. NORRIS,  
M.J. SHERIDAN, P. WHITE

## Acknowledgements

J. BADETS, R. BOLLMAN, T. CHUI,  
G. GARNEAU, H. POLD, A. WRONSKI

**Canadian Social Trends** (Catalogue no. 11-008-XPE; aussi disponible en français, n° 11-008-XPF au catalogue) is published quarterly.

## SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

**Paper version:** CDN \$12.00 per issue

CDN \$39.00 for a one year subscription

Students: 30% discount

(plus applicable taxes in Canada or shipping charges outside Canada).

## Electronic version available on Internet

(Catalogue no. 11-008-XIE):

CDN \$9.00 per issue

CDN \$29.00 for a

one-year subscription

(plus applicable taxes in Canada).

Published by authority of the Minister responsible for Statistics Canada. © Minister of Industry, 2004. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from Licence Services, Marketing Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0T6.

Indexed in the **Academic ASAP**, **Academic Search Elite**, **Canadian Periodical Index**, **Canadian Serials**, **Expanded Academic ASAP**, **PAIS International**, **Periodical Abstracts**, **Periodical Abstracts Research II**, **ProQuest 5000**, **Proquest Research Library** and available on-line in the **Canadian Business and Current Affairs Database**.

ISSN 0831-5698  
(Print)

ISSN 1481-1634  
(Electronic)

# CANADIAN SOCIAL TRENDS

## FEATURES

### Mixed unions 2

by Anne Milan and Brian Hamm

### Visible minorities in the labour force: 20 years of change 7

by Kelly Tran

### Kids witnessing family violence 12

by Kathleen Moss

### Rural-urban migration in the 1990s 17

by Rick Audas and Ted McDonald

### Against the odds: A profile of at-risk and problem gamblers 25

by Katherine Marshall and Harold Wynne

### Keeping track 30

### Social indicators 31

### Lesson plan: "Rural-urban migration in the 1990s" 32

## Cover illustrator

**Robert Johansen** is a freelance illustrator located in Mississauga, Ontario. He was born in North Bay, Ontario and graduated with honours from the Illustration program at Sheridan College of Applied Arts and Technology. Robert creates his images in traditional and digital media. He has clients across North America.

# Mixed unions

by Anne Milan and Brian Hamm

In Canada, most people marry or live common-law with individuals from the same cultural group. However, with the growing diversity of Canada, an increased number of relationships involve individuals from different groups. Mixed unions between non-visible minorities and visible minorities or between two different visible minorities may be seen as an outcome of multiculturalism, which emphasizes the acceptance and interaction of all persons within a society. Mixed unions can be seen as “an engine of social change”<sup>1</sup> by fostering positive attitudes toward visible minority groups, and by linking the social and family networks of the two partners.<sup>2</sup>

This article uses data from the 2001 and 1991 Censuses of Population to examine the prevalence of mixed unions in Canada and to answer several questions related to mixed unions. Are particular visible minority groups more likely to form mixed couples? Does age, educational level, place of birth, or residence in large urban areas affect who is more likely to be in such a relationship? Are mixed unions more apt to be marriages or common-law relationships, and are these unions more or less likely to have children present? Are mixed unions as prevalent in Canada as they are in the United States?

## Over 3% of Canadians are in mixed unions

Of the 14.1 million persons in couples in 2001, 452,000 people were in mixed unions (marriages and common-law

CST

## What you should know about this study

Data in this article are drawn from the 1991 and 2001 Censuses. Mixed unions could refer to couples involving partners from different ethnic origins, religions, visible minority groups or some other characteristic. In this article, mixed couples include one member of a visible minority and one member of a non-visible minority, as well as couples comprised of two different visible minorities. Visible minorities are defined by the *Employment Equity Act* as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour”. “Person-level” data were used to obtain information on characteristics of individuals in mixed unions, such as age, educational level, and immigrant status. In addition, “couple-level” data included such information as whether the union was a marriage or common-law relationship, the extent of pairings within a particular visible minority group, and whether mixed couples had children present in their home.

unions) comprised of one visible minority and one non-visible minority or two different visible minority group members. This was up 35% from 1991, compared with an increase of 10% for all persons in couples. In 2001, mixed unions represented 3.2% of all persons in couples in Canada.<sup>3</sup> Mixed couples could be increasing for many reasons. In general, there is more societal acceptance of non-traditional behaviours, such as same-sex or opposite-sex common-law unions. Social and geographical mobility creates more opportunities to meet and develop relationships with people from a variety of backgrounds. Interaction with many different people can occur at school, work, through

family and friends, or other social networks. There is also greater cultural diversity in Canada than ever before. Indeed, in 2001, there were more visible minority persons in Canada than at any time in the past, creating a larger pool of potential mates. There

1. Goldstein, J.R. 1999. “Kinship networks that cross racial lines: the exception or the rule?” *Demography* 36, 3: 399-407.
2. Kalmijn, M. 1998. “Intermarriage and homogamy: Causes, patterns, trends.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 395-421.
3. In 2001, 86% of persons in couples were those in which both individuals were non-visible minorities, and an additional 10% of persons in couples were comprised of two people from the same visible minority group.

were 4.0 million visible minorities in 2001, or over 13% of the population.<sup>4</sup> This was up from 1.1 million in 1981, when they accounted for less than 5% of the population. Consequently, a more pluralistic society may decrease social distance between persons of different origins and produce more mixed unions.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, the most common type of mixed marriage or common-law union in Canada was between a visible minority person and someone who was not a visible minority. There were 394,300 people in such couples in 2001, accounting for 2.8% of all persons in couples, up from 2.4% in 1991. In 2001, of these couples, just over half (53%) included a non-visible minority man with a visible minority woman, while 47% involved a visible minority man and a non-visible minority woman. Among mixed couples, it was more common for a non-visible minority woman to be paired with a South Asian, Arab/West Asian, or Black man, while it was more likely for a non-visible minority man to be partnered with a woman who was Chinese, Filipino, Latin American, Japanese, Korean, or Southeast Asian.

Couples may also be comprised of individuals from two different visible minority groups, although this pairing occurred less frequently. There were 57,700 individuals in such couples (0.4% of all people in couples) in Canada in 2001, up from 34,000 a decade earlier (or 0.3% of all persons in couples). Of all mixed visible minority couples, Chinese-Southeast Asian pairings were the most frequent combination followed by Chinese-Filipino. However, there is much variation in the extent to which different visible minority groups form unions outside of their group.

#### Japanese most likely to partner outside their group

Japanese were the most likely visible minority group to marry or live common-law with a non-Japanese person. Although there were only 25,100 couples in Canada in 2001 which included at least one Japanese person, 70% of these pairings also included a non-Japanese partner. The long Canadian heritage of many Japanese may partially explain why they have the highest proportion of mixed unions. In 2001, almost two-thirds (65%) of Japanese were born in Canada. Previous

research found that mixed unions of immigrant groups may increase with subsequent generations, as adaptation to the host country may be easier for them.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the small number of Japanese in Canada might increase the level of contact with non-Japanese individuals.

The second and third most common groups to be in mixed unions were Latin Americans, followed closely by Blacks. Of the 57,800 couples involving Latin Americans, 45% were mixed unions, or 0.4% of all couples. One possible explanation is that Latin Americans are less likely to live in Latin American neighbourhoods within large cities compared to some other visible minority groups such as Chinese or South Asians. Consequently, Latin Americans may have more interaction outside of their group.<sup>7</sup>

About 43% of couples that included at least one Black person were mixed, which accounted for 0.7% of all couples in Canada. In terms of absolute numbers, Blacks had the largest number of mixed unions (50,400 out of 117,800 couples

### CST Proportion of mixed couples is highest for Japanese

Selected visible minority groups	Total couples	Partners within the same visible minority group	Mixed unions
	Number	% of couples	
Japanese	25,100	30	70
Latin American	57,800	55	45
Black	117,800	57	43
Filipino	78,700	67	33
Southeast Asian	45,200	74	26
Arab/West Asian	73,800	76	24
Korean	24,800	82	18
Chinese	265,600	84	16
South Asian	232,000	87	13

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2001.

4. Statistics Canada. 2003. *Canada's Ethno-cultural Portrait: The Changing Mosaic* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 96F0030 XIE2001008).

5. Tzeng, J.M. 2000. "Ethnically heterogeneous marriages: the case of Asian Canadians." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 31, 3: 321-337.

6. Lieberman, S. and M.C. Waters. 1988. *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

7. According to the 2001 Census, the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) has the largest Latin American visible minority population in Canada. Only 13% of the Latin American visible minorities live in neighbourhoods where 10% or more of the neighbourhood is Latin American. In contrast, over 70% of Chinese and South Asian visible minorities in Toronto live in neighbourhoods where at least 10% of the population in their neighbourhood is from their visible minority group. Latin American visible minorities are even less concentrated in other CMAs.

involving Blacks). Similar to the Japanese, many Blacks have a long history in Canada; close to half (45%) of Blacks were Canadian-born. Other visible minority populations had more moderate proportions of unions outside of their groups: Filipinos (33%), Southeast Asians (26%), Arab/West Asians (24%), and Koreans (18%).

### Chinese and South Asians least likely to form mixed unions

Among the least likely to partner outside of their group were South Asians (13%) and Chinese (16%). There were 29,100 mixed South Asian couples in 2001, or 0.4% of all couples.


Because Chinese are the largest visible minority group — now over one million people — even a lower probability of forming relationships outside their group still results in a high number of mixed Chinese couples (41,600 couples,<sup>8</sup> representing 0.6% of all couples in the country). The number of mixed couples comprised of a Chinese person paired with a non-Chinese visible minority was also high. There were 10,500 such couples in 2001, representing 0.1% of all couples. The growing number of Chinese in Canada may contribute to an increased number of mixed unions in the future.

### Young urban dwellers most commonly in mixed unions

Becoming part of a couple, either through marriage or a common-law union, remains an important process for men and women in their twenties. Despite the increase in the proportion of young adults living common-law, there has been an overall decrease in 20- to 29-year-olds living in couples during the last two decades.<sup>9</sup> Even though there are fewer young adults in unions, they are more likely to be in mixed unions than are older adults. While more than 5% of men and women in couples in their twenties were in a mixed union in 2001, this was true for only 1% of those in couples aged 65 and

## CST Young people are more likely to be in mixed unions than older adults


% of persons in couples who are in mixed unions



Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.

## CST Young Vancouver adults are more likely to be in mixed unions than young adults in other CMA

% of 20- to 29-year-olds in couples who are in mixed unions



Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.

over. Younger people, in general, tend to be more receptive to behaviours and attitudes that extend the boundaries of social norms, such as living common-law.<sup>10</sup> Another interpretation is that many older people would have married or established relationships at a time when there were fewer visible minority group members living in Canada and, therefore, there were fewer visible minorities available as potential mates.

Greater acceptance of diversity might also explain why persons in

8. Includes 31,200 couples where one partner is Chinese and the other is not a visible minority and 10,500 couples where one partner is Chinese and the other is another visible minority.

9. Statistics Canada. 2002a. *Profile of Canadian Families and Households: Diversification Continues* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001 003).

10. Statistics Canada. 2002b. *Changing Conjugal Life in Canada* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-576-XIE).

mixed couples are more likely to live in large urban areas. Big cities provide more opportunities to meet others from a variety of backgrounds. In addition, visible minority groups are more commonly found in larger cities, increasing the likelihood of forming a relationship with someone from a different group. Mixed unions accounted for 7% of persons in couples in Vancouver, 6% in Toronto, and 3% in Montréal. Among the 20- to 29-year-olds in couples, the proportions are even higher in Vancouver (13%), Toronto (11%) and Montréal (6%).

### Persons in mixed unions likely to have higher education and be foreign-born

According to the 2001 Census, about seven out of every 10 individuals who were visible minorities were born outside of Canada. Since the 1960s, an emphasis on the economic criteria for admitting immigrants means that many foreign-born persons are highly educated. Consequently, visible minority group members in couples also tend to have higher than average levels of education. About 28% of visible minorities in unions with a partner from the same visible minority group had a university degree, as did 31% of persons in mixed unions, and 18% of all persons in couples. Similar proportions of persons in same-group visible minority couples (27%) and the overall population in couples had less than high school, while this was true for only 13% of persons in mixed couples. With rising educational levels and higher social mobility, achieved characteristics in the form of socio-economic resources may become more significant than visible minority status or ethnicity when choosing a partner.<sup>11</sup>

More highly educated persons may have higher tolerance for differences, as well as a more universal outlook than persons with lower levels of education.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, ascribed characteristics, that is, attributes a

person is born with, such as skin colour, become less important in mate selection, as educational levels increase. Nearly four times as many people with university degrees were in mixed unions (5.6%) compared to those individuals with high school or less (1.5%). This difference in the prevalence of mixed unions by education levels is also age-related, as university degree-holders tend to be younger than those with high school or less and visible minorities are younger and more highly educated than the Canadian-born population.

Pursuing postsecondary education might provide exposure to an environment where individuals meet others from many cultures. In addition, having a higher education might open a

person to more situations where there could be contact with people from a variety of backgrounds.

In 2001, close to 7% of the foreign-born in unions were in a mixed union while this was true for only 2% of the Canadian-born. This likely reflects the high proportion of visible minority persons who are foreign-born compared to the overall population. Couples involving foreign-born persons tend to differ from the average in other respects as well — for example, they are more likely to be in age-discrepant marriages.<sup>13</sup> Marriages comprised of much older men and younger women may reflect the attitudes and behaviours found in their countries of origin.

Interestingly, Canadian-born visible minorities were more likely to be

Age	Mixed unions		
	Total	Two different visible minorities	One visible minority and one non-visible minority
	% of people in unions who are in mixed couples		
15 and over	3.2	0.4	2.8
15 to 19	5.4	0.7	4.6
20 to 29	5.3	0.6	4.6
30 to 44	4.3	0.6	3.8
45 to 64	2.5	0.3	2.2
65 and over	1.0	0.1	0.9
<b>Education</b>			
Less than high school	1.5	0.2	1.3
High school	2.3	0.3	2.0
Some postsecondary	3.6	0.5	3.1
University degree	5.6	0.7	5.0
<b>Place of birth</b>			
Canadian-born	2.1	0.1	2.0
Foreign-born	6.7	1.5	5.2

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2001.

11. Tzeng. 2000.

12. Kalmijn. 1998.

13. Boyd, M. and A. Li. Autumn 2003. "May-December: Canadians in age-discrepant marriages." *Canadian Social Trends*. p. 29-33.

in mixed unions than in unions with their same visible minority. In contrast, foreign-born visible minorities were far more likely to be in same visible minority unions than in mixed unions. In 2001, 8% of all visible minorities aged 15 and over in couples were in mixed unions, compared with 14% of Canadian-born visible minorities. The longer foreign-born visible minorities stayed in Canada, the more likely they were to be in mixed unions. Only 5% of visible minorities who arrived in Canada in the 1990s were in mixed unions, while 17% of those who arrived during the 1960s were in such unions.

#### **Mixed unions more frequent for common-law unions than marriages**

Overall, mixed unions are more likely to be common-law relationships than marriages. This is probably age-related as common-law unions are more prevalent among young people,<sup>14</sup> and visible minorities also have a younger age profile than the overall population. There may be a perception that common-law unions are temporary or involve less commitment than a marriage. In Canada, 4.0% of all common-law unions were mixed in 2001, compared with 2.9% of all marriages. For the overall population in couples in 2001, 16% lived in common-law unions, as did 22% for couples involving a non-visible minority and a visible minority, and 13% when the couple consisted of two different visible minorities.

#### **Children slightly more likely to be in mixed unions**

It cannot be determined with census data whether the children were born to mixed parents, only that they were present at the time of the census. In 2001, 3.3% of all couples with children were mixed unions while 2.8% of unions without children present were mixed. This difference is partly due to mixed couples being younger

than other couples and therefore more likely to have children.

In 2001, more mixed couples in Canada had children (60%) than not. In comparison, 57% of all couples had children. This proportion was slightly higher for couples in mixed visible/non-visible minority unions (59%), and much higher for couples comprised of two different visible minorities (69%). However, it may also be that visible minority groups have higher fertility in comparison to the total population. For example, over 77% of all couples involving Arabs and West Asians have children. Over four-fifths (82%) of couples in which both partners are Arab or West Asian have children. Yet, there is still a higher likelihood of mixed Arab or West Asian couples having children at home (64%) than for the overall population in couples.

#### **Proportion of mixed unions higher in Canada than in the United States**

International comparisons are difficult due to differences in the way visible minority groups and mixed unions are defined. However, data from the United States suggests that some of the mixed union patterns differ from those found in Canada. In the United States in 2000, 2.0% of all couples (married and common-law) were mixed, lower than the proportion in Canada in 2001 (3.1%). The most common American mixed couples were Whites paired with Asians or Pacific Islanders, which represented 1.2% of all couples. In addition, Whites and Blacks accounted for 0.7% of all couples (the same proportion as Canada). Also parallel to the Canadian experience, common-law relationships in the United States were more likely to be mixed relationships (4.3% of all common-law unions) than marriages (1.9%).<sup>15</sup>

#### **Summary**

Most people marry or live common-law with individuals from the same

cultural group. Although relatively rare, some relationships involve individuals from different groups. Overall, mixed unions are still a low percentage of the total unions in Canada, but they have increased over the last decade. This suggests that the social norms governing appropriate relationship partners are malleable and can change over time as attitudes evolve.

Persons engaged in these types of unions tend to be younger, live in large urban areas, have a higher education, and are foreign-born. Mixed couples are also more likely than non-mixed couples to live common-law and to have children present. High rates of immigration and the greater interaction between groups may encourage mixed unions, which, in turn, may increase the pool of potential mates who identify with multiple groups.

---

14. Statistics Canada. 2002b.

15. Fields, J. and L.M. Casper. 2001. "America's families and living arrangements." *Current Population Reports*. P20-537. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau.



**Anne Milan** is an analyst with *Canadian Social Trends* and **Brian Hamm** is a senior technical officer with Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.



# Visible minorities in the labour force: 20 years of change

by Kelly Tran

Over the past several decades the Canadian population has become more ethnically and culturally diverse. Immigration patterns have changed dramatically with people from Europe no longer dominating the flow of immigrants. More and more, immigrants are from Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. As a result, the visible minority population has been steadily increasing. Between 1981 and 2001, the visible minority population grew from 1.1 million to nearly 4.0 million, growing from 5% to 13% of the population in 20 years. According to the 2001 Census of Population, two-thirds of visible minorities were foreign-born, and one third were Canadian-born, some having lived for generations in Canada.

## CST What you should know about this study

This article uses data from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 Censuses of Population. It examines the labour market experiences of visible minorities and non-visible minorities in the 25- to 54-year-old age group over the 20-year period from 1981 to 2001 using employment and unemployment rates.

Four groups are compared: foreign-born visible minorities, Canadian-born visible minorities, foreign-born non-visible minorities and Canadian-born non-visible minorities. Visible minorities, as defined by the *Employment Equity Act*, are "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". In Canada, the visible minority population includes the following groups: Blacks, South Asians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Southeast Asians, Filipinos, Arabs and West Asians, Latin Americans and Pacific Islanders.

As visible minorities and non-visible minorities have very different demographic profiles, employment and unemployment rates have been age-standardized using the non-visible minority age distribution as the reference. This eliminates the impact of different age distributions of visible and non-visible minorities upon the rates.

**Employment rate:** Also known as the employment/population ratio. It represents the number of employed people during the week prior to the Census as a percentage of the population aged 15 and over. The employment rate for a particular group (age, visible minority group, place of birth, etc.) is the number employed in that group expressed as a percentage of the population for that group.


**Unemployment rate:** Refers to the unemployed (i.e. not employed and looking for work) expressed as a percentage of the labour force in the week prior to Census Day. The unemployment rate for a particular group is the number of individuals unemployed in that group, expressed as a percentage of the total number in the labour force in that group.

This article examines employment and unemployment rates of visible and non-visible minority groups aged 25 to 54 using census data from 1981 to 2001. These rates have been age-standardized to account for demographic differences between the groups. Canadian-born and foreign-born visible minorities are compared to their non-visible minority counterparts to understand the relationship between labour market outcomes and immigration issues, such as recognition of foreign education qualifications or language abilities. Employment and unemployment rates are examined separately by gender as men and women had different employment trends over the last 20 years.

Between 1981 and 2001, significant economic changes occurred in Canada, which may help to explain trends in visible and non-visible minority employment and unemployment rates. During the recession of the early 1980s, employment growth slowed compared with the previous decade.<sup>1</sup> The early 1990s also saw slow employment growth in conjunction with a weak economy.<sup>2</sup> Only in 1997 did the labour market show signs of increased job creation, helping to push up the employment rate in the 2001 Census compared with the rate observed in 1996.<sup>3</sup>

Other factors also contributed to visible minority labour market outcomes. Foreign-born visible minorities face greater challenges in workplace integration than Canadian-born visible minorities and non-visible minorities do. Barriers such as lack of fluency in an official language, lack of recognition of educational credentials, lack of relevant Canadian employment experience and discounting of previous work experience outside Canada are obstacles to favourable labour market outcomes.<sup>4</sup> Although immigrants may face these barriers regardless of their visible minority status, trends suggest that the foreign-born visible

**CST The employment rate gap between foreign-born visible minority men and Canadian-born non-visible minority men has widened**



Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.

minority groups experience more labour market difficulties than non-visible minorities. All of these factors may contribute to foreign-born visible minority difficulties in the labour market.


**Employment outcomes of foreign-born visible minority men deteriorated during the 1980s and early to mid-1990s**

While in 1981 foreign-born visible minority men aged 25 to 54 had better employment and unemployment rates than Canadian-born non-visible minorities, the 1980s and early to mid-1990s saw their employment situation deteriorate more quickly than that of other men of prime-working age.<sup>5</sup> By 1996, a wide gap had developed between foreign-born visible minority men of prime-working age and Canadian-born non-visible minority men.<sup>6</sup> In 2001, this gap had narrowed compared with 1996, but was still larger than it had been in 1981.

- Côté, M. 1990. "The labour force: into the '90s." *Perspectives on Labour and Income* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 75-001-XIE) 2, 1: 8-16.
- Picot, G. and A. Heisz. 2000. "The performance of the 1990s Canadian labour market." *Canadian Public Policy* 26, 1: S7-S24.
- Sunter, D. and G. Bowlby. March 2001. "Demography and the labour market." *Canadian Economic Observer* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-010-XPB) 14, 3: 3.1-3.24.
- Heisz, A., A. Jackson and G. Picot. 2002. "Winners and losers in the labour market of the 1990s." *Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE 2002 184).
- In 2001, Canadian-born non-visible minorities represented 77% of men of prime-working age, but foreign-born visible minorities represented 12%, the second largest group of men in this age group.
- Chui, T., J. Badets and K. Tran. 2003. *Labour Market Performance of the 1990s Immigrants to Canada*. Paper presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> annual meeting of the Canadian Population Society, June 5, Halifax.

**Visible minorities are more likely to be university-educated than non-visible minorities**


**% with a university education**



Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.

**In 2001, foreign-born visible minority men who arrived in Canada during the 1990s had higher unemployment rates than non-visible minority men**

**Age-standardized unemployment rate (%)**



Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.

The widening gap in labour market performance occurred even though visible minorities were more likely to be university-educated than non-visible minorities and the educational advantage of foreign-born visible minorities over Canadian-born non-visible minorities had increased. This pattern contradicts the widely-held view that workers benefit from more skills, education and experience and are in greater demand.

Other studies have made similar observations. One found differences in education, earnings, income, and labour force participation between visible minority groups and non-visible minorities.<sup>7</sup> According to another study using 1991 Census data, visible minorities earned less than non-visible minorities.<sup>8</sup> Another study found that although visible minorities are more likely to be university-educated than non-visible minorities, this education did not necessarily lead to better jobs or higher income.<sup>9</sup>

The labour market problems experienced during the 1990s by foreign-born visible minorities are directly related to the difficulties recent immigrants have had. In 2001, although visible minority prime-working age men who immigrated in the 1990s were more likely to be university-educated than Canadian-born men, their unemployment rate was higher than Canadian-born non-visible

7. Pendakur, K. and R. Pendakur. 1998. "The colour of money: Earnings differentials among ethnic groups in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 31, 3: 518-548; Hum, D. and W. Simpson. November 1998. "Wage opportunities for visible minorities in Canada." *Income and Labour Dynamics Working Paper Series* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 75F0002M); Chui, Badets and Tran. 2003.

8. Pendakur and Pendakur. 1998.

9. Kunz, J.L., A. Milan and S. Schetagne. 2000. *Unequal Access: A Canadian Profile of Racial Differences in Education, Employment and Income*. Toronto: Canadian Race Relations Foundation.

minority men (9.9% versus 6.3%). However, those who arrived earlier had similar or lower unemployment rates than Canadian-born non-visible minorities. In contrast, in 1981, foreign-born visible minority men who had recently immigrated had lower unemployment rates than Canadian-born non-visible minority men.

### Canadian-born visible minority and non-visible minority employment outcomes for prime-working age men are similar

Most visible minorities are immigrants, but in 2001, about 90,000 men aged 25 to 54 were Canadian-born visible minorities (1% of men aged 25 to 54). They probably were educated in Canada and able to speak at least one official language and in 2001 were nearly twice as likely to be university-educated than Canadian-born non-visible minority men. This education advantage grew throughout the 20-year period, but employment outcome trends remained very similar to Canadian-born non-visible minority men, with a small but growing disadvantage in employment rates during the 1990s.

Visible minorities are very diverse, originating from different countries




## The employment rate advantage of foreign-born visible minority women disappears

Age-standardized employment rate (%)

Age-standardized unemployment rate (%)

Women aged 25-54



Canadian-born  
 — Visible minority  
 — Non-visible minority  
 Foreign-born  
 — Visible minority  
 — Non-visible minority

Source: Statistics Canada, censuses of population.



## Employment Equity Act

In 1986, the Canadian government responded to the growing diversity of the work force and the disadvantaged position in the workplace of some groups by implementing the *Employment Equity Act*. This act identified four target groups as under-represented or disadvantaged in the workplace: Aboriginal people, women, people with disabilities and visible minorities. The aim of the *Employment Equity Act* was to increase representation of disadvantaged groups in the workforce by addressing issues such as hiring, occupational segregation and earnings gaps.<sup>1</sup> The goal was to ensure that an

individual's qualifications and abilities were to be the only criteria for employment opportunities. The act covers private and public sector employers under federal jurisdiction that employ 100 or more employees. After the passage of the *Act*, many provincial governments followed suit, signalling an awareness of possible discrepancies between different groups in the labour market.

1. Stelcner, M. 2000. "Earnings differentials among ethnic groups in Canada: A review of the research." *Review of Social Economy* 58, 3: 295-317.

with widely varying education and cultural backgrounds. In 2001, three-quarters of the Canadian-born visible minority men aged 25 to 54 were from the three largest groups: Blacks (31%), Chinese (29%) and South Asian (15%). About half of the Chinese and South Asians in this group were university-educated compared with less than one fifth (18%) of Blacks. This large difference in education levels may contribute to Canadian-born male Blacks of prime-working age having lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than either of the other two large Canadian-born visible minority groups.<sup>10</sup>

### Foreign-born visible minority women go from first to last in employment rates

Over the last 20 years, women in general, and especially women with children, have substantially increased their involvement in the labour market. While in 1981 foreign-born visible minority women aged 25 to 54 had the highest employment rate among women in that age group, by 2001 they had the lowest. They were the only group of prime-working age women to experience a decrease in employment rates between 1981 and 2001. This may reflect a shift in immigration from Europe to Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Women from these regions were less likely to participate in the labour force. In fact, previous research has found that women in Canada who were born in Europe, Southeast Asia or the United States had higher employment rates than Canadian-born women, while those born in Western Asia and the Middle East had lower employment rates.<sup>11</sup>

All other women had increasing employment rates. Canadian-born visible minority women had higher employment rates than Canadian-born non-visible minority women. This is not surprising because Canadian-born

visible minority women are nearly twice as likely to be university-educated.

Unemployment rates for women increased between 1981 and 1986 and continued to increase for foreign-born visible minority women until 1996. Between 1986 and 1996, unemployment rates remained stable or decreased slightly for other prime-working age women. In 2001, unemployment rates decreased for all women and especially for foreign-born visible minorities, but rates for this group of women remained above those of other groups of prime-working age women. Unemployment rates were quite similar for Canadian-born women, regardless of their visible minority status, despite the education advantage of Canadian-born visible minority women.

### Summary

Over the past 20 years, the visible minority population in Canada has nearly quadrupled, bringing increased diversity, especially in Canada's largest cities. In 1981, foreign-born visible minority men and women of prime working age had higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than Canadian-born non-visible minority men and women. The situation changed in the 1980s and 1990s as employment rates dropped and unemployment rates increased for both visible and non-visible minority men. Foreign-born visible minority men, especially recent immigrants, saw their labour market outcomes deteriorate faster than Canadian-born non-visible minority men. This gap in labour market outcomes for men of prime working age was largest in 1996, and subsided somewhat by 2001. For women, employment rates increased for all except foreign-born visible minorities although foreign-born visible minority women were more highly educated than most other women.

The gap in labour market outcomes for foreign-born visible minorities may be related to incidents of discrimination

or unfair treatment. According to the Ethnic Diversity Survey, about 20% of visible minorities aged 15 and over said they had sometimes or often experienced discrimination or unfair treatment in the previous five years because of their ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion. These incidents most often occur at work or when applying for a job or promotion.<sup>12</sup> More research needs to be done to pinpoint the causes of the gaps in labour market outcomes between visible minorities and non-visible minorities.

10. In 2001, foreign-born Blacks were more likely to be university-educated than Canadian-born Blacks (24% versus 18%), yet had a higher unemployment rate (8.7% versus 7.9%).

11. Chui, T. and M.S. Devereaux. Spring 1995. "Canada's newest workers." *Perspectives on Labour and Income* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 75-001-XPE) 7, 1: 17-23.

12. Statistics Canada. 2003. *Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-593-XIE).



**Kelly Tran** is an analyst with Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.

# Kids witnessing family violence

by Kathleen Moss

This article is adapted from "Witnessing violence — aggression and anxiety in young children," *How Healthy Are Canadians?*, December 2003 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 82-003-SIE). The article is available free online at [www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-003-SIE/82-003-SIE2003000.htm](http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-003-SIE/82-003-SIE2003000.htm).

Exposure to violence in the home is now recognized as a form of child maltreatment. Nonetheless, recent research on how witnessing violence may affect children is often unclear, contradictory and inconclusive.

Some studies have found that children exposed to family violence have more emotional and behavioural problems, such as anxiety and aggression, than do children who are not exposed. Other studies have not always found such relationships. As well, some children can experience effects over the short- and/or longer-term, while others seem unaffected by witnessing violence in the home. Furthermore, the immediate and longer-term associations between seeing violent behaviour and a child's aggression and anxiety appear to depend on a number of factors, such as the child's age and sex, the severity, intensity and frequency of the violence witnessed, the child's perception of his or her role in these episodes, and the parents' responses.<sup>1</sup>

To date, much of the research has been based on data collected at one point in time; for example, accounts

from adult survivors of family violence. In contrast, this article draws on both longitudinal and cross-sectional data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) to provide a more complete picture. First, it uses the most recent estimates (1998/99) to profile those children aged 4 to 7 who have witnessed violence at home; then it examines data from three cycles of the NLSCY to assess concurrent and longer-term impacts on the levels of aggression and anxiety observed among children who witnessed family violence in 1994/95.

## What is violence at home?

In this study, violence at home comprises physical aggression between adults or teenagers. Whether a child had witnessed violence was determined by asking the person most knowledgeable (almost invariably the

biological mother) "How often does the child see adults or teenagers in the home physically fighting, hitting or otherwise trying to hurt others?" The four possible responses were "never," "seldom," "sometimes" or "often." Children who saw any violent episodes were classified as having witnessed violence in the home.

Although the longitudinal nature<sup>2</sup> of the NLSCY makes it a valuable tool to assess effects of family violence over time, there are some limitations on the data. Because the analysis is based on information provided by a parent, it refers only to violence that they were aware of and were willing to disclose. Furthermore, the severity of the violence is unknown, and it is not known if the children may themselves have been victims. As well, the questions pertain only to physical aggression and do not include emotional abuse such as verbal insults.

1. Dauvergne, M. and H. Johnson. 2001. "Children witnessing family violence." *Juristat* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002) 21, 6: 1-13.

2. Longitudinal surveys follow the same respondents over time. This "follow-up" approach allows analysts to learn if an event that occurs in one year is associated with characteristics or behaviours in subsequent years.

The National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) has been conducted by Statistics Canada and Human Resources Development Canada every two years since 1994/95. It has both longitudinal and cross-sectional components. It follows a representative sample of Canadian children aged newborn to 11 in all provinces and territories into adulthood.

In each household, the person considered most knowledgeable about the child answers a set of questions designed to provide socio-economic and general health information about himself or herself, his or her spouse or partner, and about the child, including the child's health and social environment.

### Three time-frames of the study

The principal goal of this study is to learn whether or not exposure to family violence has concurrent or longer-term associations with children's behaviour; specifically, whether these children exhibit higher rates of overt aggression, indirect aggression and anxiety.<sup>1</sup> To address this question, children who witnessed violence in 1994/95 were followed over the next two cycles of the NLSCY, and their behaviours were compared with that of children living in non-violent homes.

First, this study used the cross-sectional component of the 1998/99 NLSCY to determine the prevalence of witnessing violence, in relation to selected characteristics of the child, parent and family. These data provide the most up-to-date profile (at time of writing) of children at risk of living in these types of situations.

Second, the study used the 1994/95 cross-sectional component to examine associations between witnessing violence at home and three possible outcomes indicating overt aggression, indirect aggression and anxiety. The strength of relationships

between violence at home and these behaviours were tested in a series of multivariate analytical models that controlled for demographic, socio-economic, family and parenting characteristics believed to play a role in the relationship.

Third, the longitudinal file was used to measure the association between witnessing violence at home in 1994/95 and high levels of overt aggression, indirect aggression and anxiety two years later (1996/97) and four years later (1998/99). Again, the associations were examined in multivariate models. The behaviour of children who had witnessed violence was compared with that of children who did not have the experience.

### Limitations of the data and the results

The NLSCY is a general survey designed to monitor child development; therefore, questions about physical violence in the home are limited. It asks only about violence that children see; no information is provided about the more covert ways in which children may be exposed to violence (heard a confrontation or experienced the aftermath). As well, the questions pertain only to physical violence and do not include emotional abuse such as verbal insults. Nor was it possible to determine who was involved in the violence, although this might influence the relationship between witnessing violence and the outcomes. In addition, parents may falsely assume that their children are not aware of the violence. Furthermore, a parent's wish to provide socially desirable answers may influence descriptions of parenting style and of the child's behaviour.

1. For a full definition of these behaviours, and the method used to determine if a child exhibited them, see the original article at [www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-003-SIE/82-003-SIE2003000.htm](http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-003-SIE/82-003-SIE2003000.htm).

### One in 12 young children saw violence at home

According to the 1998/99 NLSCY, one in 12 children aged 4 to 7 years old — 8%, or about 120,000 — had witnessed violence at home. More than one-third

of these children (35%) had "sometimes" or "often" seen such behaviour. Boys and girls were equally likely to have been witnesses.

Children with a parent aged 35 or older, as well as those with siblings in

the household, were more likely to have witnessed violence than those whose parents were younger or had no siblings. Four- to 7-year-olds from families with lower socio-economic status — a parent with less than high

	<b>% of children aged 4 to 7 who witnessed violence in the home</b>
<b>Both sexes</b>	<b>8.1</b>
Boy	8.2
Girl	8.0
<b>Child's age</b>	
4 or 5	8.3
6 or 7	7.9
<b>Parent's age</b>	
Under 35	6.8
35 or older	9.3
<b>Family type</b>	
Two biological/adoptive parents	7.5
Two parents (at least one stepparent)	6.9 <sup>E</sup>
Lone parent	11.4
<b>Siblings in household</b>	
None	4.7 <sup>E</sup>
One or more	8.7
<b>Parent's education</b>	
Less than secondary	11.9
Secondary	8.2
At least some postsecondary	7.4
<b>Parent employed</b>	
Yes	8.1
No	8.4 <sup>E</sup>
<b>Household income*</b>	
Lowest/lower-middle	13.1
Middle/upper-middle/high	7.3
<b>Parent has low emotional support</b>	
Yes	9.1
No	8.0
<b>Parenting style</b>	
<i>Low positive interaction</i>	
Yes	10.8
No	7.3
<i>Low consistency</i>	
Yes	11.8
No	7.1
<i>Hostile</i>	
Yes	12.1
No	7.0
<i>Punitive</i>	
Yes	12.3
No	7.3

<sup>E</sup> Use with caution.

\* "Lowest/lower-middle" households report total income under \$20,000 per year if the household numbers 1 to 4 person(s), and under \$30,000 per year if it numbers 5 or more. All other households are classified as "middle/upper-middle/high income."

Source: Statistics Canada and Human Resources Development Canada, National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, 1998/99.

school graduation and a lower or lower-middle family income — were also more likely to witness violence in the home. A high proportion (11%) of children in lone-parent families had been witnesses to family violence, compared with about 7% of children in two-parent families.

Parenting style was also a factor associated with witnessing violence at home. Higher rates of witnessing violence were reported for children whose parents gave little positive feedback, or were quite hostile or punitive in their interactions with the child.<sup>3</sup>

For the majority of children who saw violence in their home, these outbursts were not a recurring event. Close to 60% of those reported to have witnessed violence in 1994/95 did not do so two or four years later. Nevertheless, having witnessed violence had both an immediate and a longer-term association with children's aggression and anxiety.

### Children witnessing violence show concurrent effects

Fighting, making threats, getting angry and bullying are all signs of overt aggression. For both boys and girls in 1994/95, witnessing violence at home was associated with aggressive behaviour: 43% of boys and 27% of girls who had witnessed family violence, compared with 25% and 17%, respectively, of those who had not.

Of course, factors other than witnessing physical aggression between adults and teenagers in the family may contribute to a child's behaviour problems. A multivariate statistical analysis was used to control for a number of socio-economic influences,

3. Four parenting styles were selected for this study: positive interaction, consistent, hostile/ineffective, and punitive. For a description of the methods used to determine each style, refer to the original article.



	Adjusted odds ratio					
	Boys			Girls		
	Concurrent year (1994/95)	Short-term (1996/97)	Longer-term (1998/99)	Concurrent year (1994/95)	Short-term (1996/97)	Longer-term (1998/99)
Overt aggression	1.9*	1.7*	2.1*	1.8*	2.3*	2.1*
Indirect aggression	1.6*	1.1	1.5	1.4	2.0*	1.5
Anxiety	1.4	1.9*	1.0	2.6*	1.4	2.2*

\* Indicates statistically significant difference from the reference group.

Note: Adjusted odds ratio for those children aged 4 to 7 who witnessed violence in the home in 1994/95, compared with those who did not witness violence. Those who did not witness violence at home are the reference group and have an adjusted odds ratio of 1.0.

Source: Statistics Canada and Human Resources Development Canada, National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth.

thereby isolating the effect of a child's exposure to violence.<sup>4</sup> The magnitude of the association is expressed in terms of an odds ratio; that is, the estimated likelihood that children witnessing violence at home will exhibit emotional or behavioural problems compared to the likelihood for the reference group, which in this study is the children who did not witness violence. By definition, the odds for the reference group is 1.0, so a ratio over 1.0 for children who witnessed violence indicates a greater likelihood that their behaviour is associated with their experience in the home.

Even when other confounding factors were taken into account, the results of the statistical model show that witnessing violence continued to be associated with certain behaviours in the short-term. For both boys and girls, levels of overt aggression were significantly elevated in 1994/95. Girls who had witnessed violence recorded more than twice the odds of aggression compared to girls who had not.

Aggression is not necessarily physical or overt. It may involve more subtle behaviour, such as trying to get others to dislike or exclude a particular person, gossiping, and disclosing someone's secrets; in other words,

indirect aggression. In 1994/95, about one quarter of boys and girls who were reported to have witnessed violence at home displayed indirect aggression, compared with 13% of boys and 17% of girls who had not.

When other factors in the model were taken into consideration, the concurrent relationship between witnessing violence and indirect aggression differed between the sexes. Boys who witnessed violence at home in 1994/95 had higher odds of exhibiting indirectly aggressive behaviour that same year than boys who were not witnesses; meanwhile, for girls, it was not significantly associated with the likelihood that she would engage in such behaviour.

A child classified as having high anxiety was, in the parent's opinion, unhappy, fearful and tense. Such characteristics were relatively common among children who had witnessed violence in the home, compared with their contemporaries who

had not. In 1994/95, 12% of boys who had witnessed violence had a high level of anxiety, but only 6% of those who had not; the corresponding percentages for girls were 14% and 5%.

However, for boys, the relationship between anxiety and witnessing family violence did not persist when factors such as family type and parenting style were taken into account. By contrast, the odds of high anxiety in 1994/95 were over two times greater for girls who had witnessed violence, compared with those who had not, even allowing for the effects of other variables.

### Seeing violence linked to longer-term behaviour problems

Previous research has found that although children's reactions may be more pronounced immediately after they have been exposed to violence, they can also display longer-term developmental or psychological problems, or both, such as conduct disorder and antisocial or self-injurious behaviour.<sup>5</sup>

4. The variables in the model were: the child's age; reporting parent's age; presence of siblings in the household; family type (lone-parent, two-parent with at least one stepparent, two biological/adoptive parents); reporting parent's education; reporting parent's employment status; household income; reporting parent's level of emotional support; and parenting style.

5. Conduct disorders such as aggression in childhood may be the single best predictor of future conduct disorders. Bennett, K. 2001. "Screening for conduct problems: does the predictive accuracy of conduct disorder symptoms improve with age?" *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry* 40, 12: 1418-1425.

Analysis of the NLSCY results supports these conclusions from earlier studies. The odds that children who had witnessed violence at home in 1994/95 would continue to exhibit overt aggression behaviour remained significantly higher over the short- and longer-term than those of other children who did not witness violence. The high odds of overt aggression among girls is somewhat unexpected; other studies have found that girls are more likely to internalize the effects of violence with anxiety, rather than externalize them with physical aggression.

In contrast, the association of indirect aggression with violence did not persist over the longer-term. Girls who had witnessed violence in 1994/95 had higher levels of indirect aggression in 1996/97, but by 1998/99, the difference was no longer statistically significant. For boys, the odds were not significantly greater, in either year, than those for boys who had been living in homes that were not violent.

However, witnessing violence in 1994/95 was significantly associated with anxiety in subsequent years: two years later for boys and four years later for girls. The high odds of anxiety among boys is somewhat surprising. Other studies have found that boys are more likely to react with externalizing behaviour such as physical aggression. Furthermore, these findings are particularly notable given that anxiety is less visible than aggression and, therefore, more difficult to identify in younger children.

### Summary

A small but significant proportion of young children aged 4 to 7 — one in 12 in 1998/99 — have witnessed aggression at home. Statistical analysis indicates that witnessing violence in 1994/95 was associated with high levels of overt aggression. For boys, the experience was also linked with indirect aggression and, for girls, with anxiety.

For most of these young children, violence at home is an infrequent occurrence. However, compared with children who had not witnessed violence in 1994/95, boys and girls who had seen violent episodes at home continued to be overtly aggressive two and four years later. In addition, girls were more likely to display indirect aggression in 1996/97 and anxiety in 1998/99, while elevated anxiety was observed for boys in 1996/97. These results add to the emerging evidence that witnessing violence is associated with aggression and anxiety in young children, and that these problems persist in both the short- and longer-term.



**Kathleen Moss** is an analyst with Health Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.

## Need more information from Statistics Canada?

CALL OUR NATIONAL ENQUIRIES LINE:

**1 800 263-1136**

To order publications:

**NATIONAL ORDER LINE:** 1 800 267-6677

**INTERNET:** [order@statcan.ca](mailto:order@statcan.ca)

**National TDD Line:** 1 800 363-7629

STATISTICS CANADA HAS 8 REGIONAL REFERENCE CENTRES TO SERVE YOU:

### Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island

Halifax, Nova Scotia – (902) 426-5331  
Fax number (902) 426-9538

### Quebec and Territory of Nunavut

Montreal, Quebec – (514) 283-5725  
Fax number (514) 283-9350

### Ontario

Toronto – (416) 973-6586  
Fax number (416) 973-7475

### Manitoba

Winnipeg – (204) 983-4020  
Fax number (204) 983-7543

### Saskatchewan

Regina – (306) 780-5405  
Fax number (306) 780-5403

### Alberta and Northwest Territories

Edmonton, Alberta – (780) 495-3027  
Fax number (780) 495-5318

### British Columbia and Yukon

Vancouver, British Columbia – (604) 666-3691  
Fax number (604) 666-4863

### National Capital Region

(613) 951-8116  
Fax number (613) 951-0581

STANDARDS OF SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC

Statistics Canada is committed to serving its clients in a prompt, reliable and courteous manner and in the official language of their choice. To this end, the Agency has developed standards of service which its employees observe in serving its clients. To obtain a copy of these service standards, please contact Statistics Canada toll-free at 1 800 263-1136.

## If You're On the Move...

Make sure we know where to find you by forwarding the subscriber's name, old address, new address, telephone number and client reference number to:

**Statistics Canada  
Dissemination Division  
Circulation Management  
R.H. Coats Building, section 9-K  
120 Parkdale Avenue  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0T6**

or by phone at (613) 951-7277 or 1 800 700-1033;  
or by fax at (613) 951-1584 or 1 800 889-9734; or  
by Internet at [infostats@statcan.ca](mailto:infostats@statcan.ca).

*We require six weeks advance notice to ensure uninterrupted delivery, so please keep us informed when you're on the move!*

# Rural-urban migration in the 1990s

by Rick Audas and Ted McDonald

People often migrate to improve personal and economic circumstances for themselves and their families. While the reasons for migration are many and varied, a key factor for many working-age adults is to obtain better jobs — higher pay, more employment stability and a closer match between employment and personal skills. Migration also helps to balance labour markets by matching available jobs with people willing and able to fill them.

Out-migration is an issue of particular concern for rural communities. Many rural areas have a tenuous hold on public services — particularly health care and education — which may become even weaker if they lose people. Rural out-migration tends to involve young and educated people, which may contribute to an aging workforce in some rural areas and reduced capacity for economic growth.<sup>1</sup>

This article first profiles out-migration of adults aged 20 to 65 during the 1990s, comparing rural and urban migrants and the distance of the move — whether they changed community, region, or province. Second,



the changes in economic circumstances are compared before and after a move. Finally, a broader look at the

economic outcomes of spouses is examined as migration decisions have ramifications for all family members.

1. According to the 1996 Census of Population, in-migration of 20- to 28-year-olds to rural areas in Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and Quebec helps to offset population losses of younger people in those areas. Dupuy, R., F. Mayer and R. Morissette. 2000. "Rural youth: Stayers, leavers and return migrants." *Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series*, no. 152 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE2000152). However, rural areas of Atlantic Canada and the Prairies have experienced net population losses of younger people. See also Rothwell, N., R. Bollman, J. Tremblay and J. Marshall. 2002. "Migration to and from rural and small town Canada." *Rural and Small Town Canada - Analysis Bulletin* 3, 6 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 21-006-XIE) and Tremblay, J. 2001. "Rural youth migration between 1971 and 1996". *Agriculture and Rural Working Paper series*, no. 44 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 21-601-MIE2001044).

Data in this article come from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). SLID is a large annual longitudinal survey that covers all individuals in private households in Canada excluding residents of the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and persons living on Indian reserves. It was first conducted in 1993. Each SLID panel<sup>1</sup> consists of roughly 15,000 households and about 30,000 adults, and each panel is surveyed for a period of six consecutive years. This article is based on data from three overlapping panels: 1993-1998, 1996-2000, and 1999-2000.

Respondents aged 20 to 65 report their place of residence as of December 31 of a SLID reference year. The same respondents report their place of residence the following year and they are deemed to be migrants if they live in a different geographic area (i.e. province, economic region (ER) or census subdivision (CSD)). Out-migration rates are calculated based on data from all panels and years between 1993 and 2000 and represent a sample of over 232,000 person-years. The out-migration rates presented in this article represent the average annual percentage of the population who migrated during this period. People entering or leaving the country are not included in this analysis.

### Measuring the influence of migration on labour market outcomes

To assess how labour market outcomes are influenced by migration, changes in employment status, average change in the number of weeks worked, median change in wages and salaries and the prevalence of receiving Employment Insurance (EI) benefits are compared between the first and the third year of a reference period. Between the first and second year of the reference period a respondent may have moved. By waiting until the year after a possible move to compare labour market outcomes, enough time has passed for migrants to adjust to a new labour market.<sup>2</sup> Labour market outcomes of non-migrants are compared to determine if migration contributed to different outcomes than those experienced by non-migrants. This comparison contributes to the understanding of the economic consequences of migration.

To examine the net effect of migration on being employed, four groups of people are identified from the SLID survey:

- job continuers:** those people working during both the first and third year of a reference period;
- job starters:** those people not working during the first year, but working in the third year of a reference period;
- job leavers:** those people working during the first year of a reference period, but not in the third year;
- non-workers:** those people who did not work during either the first or third year of a reference period.

### Type of migrant

**Interprovincial migrants:** respondents who move from one province to another.<sup>3</sup>

**ER migrants:** respondents who move from one economic region (ER) to another within the same province. An economic region is a geographical unit generally composed of several census divisions within a province or, in the case of Prince Edward Island, the province constitutes one economic region. Economic regions are often thought of as local labour markets.

**CSD migrants:** respondents who move from one census subdivision (CSD) to another within the same economic region. CSDs generally correspond to municipalities.

In this article, respondents moving within a census subdivision are not considered to be migrants as the analysis concentrates on more substantial moves which are likely to involve a change in jobs or career paths.<sup>4</sup>

### Community size

Communities of four different sizes are examined: rural,<sup>5</sup> small or medium-sized towns (1,000 to 24,999 people), small or medium-sized cities (25,000 to 249,999) and large cities (250,000 and over).

1. A panel is a group of respondents who enter a longitudinal survey at the same time and who are repeatedly interviewed over several years.
2. Only respondents who have three consecutive years of SLID data are included and hence the analysis of changes in labour market outcomes is based on a somewhat smaller sample.
3. Interprovincial migrants have seen the most attention in the literature. See Lin, Z. 1998. "Foreign-born vs. native-born Canadians: A comparison of their inter-provincial labour mobility." *Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series*, no. 114. (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE1998114); Finnie, R. 2000. "Who moves? A panel logit model analysis of inter-provincial migration in Canada." *Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series*, no. 142 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11F0019MIE2000142); and Day, K. and S. Winer. 2001. "Policy-induced migration in Canada: An empirical study." Carleton University working paper 2001-08.
4. Some CSD migrants may not change jobs. Even some inter-provincial migrants may not change jobs if they move between contiguous border towns.
5. "Rural" refers, in general, to the rural population (i.e. the population outside centres of 1,000 or more) within rural and small town (RST) Canada. RST refers to the population outside of census metropolitan areas (CMAs) and census agglomerations (CAs). CMAs have urban cores of 100,000 or more and CAs have urban cores of 10,000 to 99,999, and in both cases, neighbouring towns and municipalities are included in the CMA or CA if 50% or more of the workforce commutes to the CMA or CA for work.

## Rural dwellers are just about as likely to move as large city dwellers

Over the reference period 1993-2000, an average of 7.6% of 20- to 65-year-olds migrated each year.<sup>2</sup> Out-migration rates fell with distance as moving costs (both financial and psychological) were higher and because people have less information about distant labour markets and are therefore less likely to risk a distant move. According to the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), 4.2% are census subdivision (CSD) migrants, 2.5% are economic region (ER) migrants, and 0.9% are interprovincial migrants. For people from both rural and urban areas, migration is most likely to be a CSD change and least likely to be a move between provinces.


Conventional wisdom suggests that rural areas experience higher rates of out-migration than urban areas, particularly by the young and skilled, as opportunities for local employment diminish. However, differences in annual out-migration rates are not large, varying from 8.1% in rural areas to 7.3% in large cities with much of the difference accounted for by differences in CSD migration. SLID data also suggests that rural areas were the only communities to have higher in-migration rates than out-migration rates. In fact, people in their mid-20s to mid-40s and at pre-retirement age were the most likely to be drawn to rural areas.

The proportion of Canadians living in rural areas has changed little over time, due to a balancing of rural to urban and urban to rural migration. Of course, rural areas in different parts of the country may not experience a similar balance of in- and out-migration, and so some rural areas may gain while others lose population and the characteristics of migrants may differ from non-migrants.<sup>3</sup>

CST


## Out-migration rates are similar for all community sizes...

Average annual out-migration rate (%)



## ... while in-migration rates are highest for rural communities

Average annual in-migration rate (%)




Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

CST

## Persons at family formation and pre-retirement phases are most likely to be drawn to rural areas

Average annual net migration rate (%)



Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

2. Preliminary research shows generally stable migration rates from 1993 to 2000.
3. The richness of the SLID data allows for an in-depth view of the characteristics and outcomes associated with migration. However, due to SLID's small sample size, the Census and administrative tax data are much better at measuring migration flows. Nevertheless, analysis of SLID data (not reported here) shows that the rural adult populations of Atlantic Canada, Quebec and the Prairies have not declined, while Ontario and British Columbia have experienced substantial increases in rural population, mainly from urban areas of the same province. This is broadly consistent with findings reported elsewhere (see Dupuy et al. 2000; Rothwell et al. 2002; and Tremblay. 2001).

## Migrants are more likely to be young, single and have a university degree

According to SLID, persons in their early to mid-20s are about three times as likely as the middle-aged to be migrants. Young adults from rural areas were more likely to leave than their peers from large cities (21% versus 15%). There are many reasons why young people are more likely to move than older people. Recent research suggests that moving costs significantly deter migration.<sup>4</sup> On average, moving costs are lower for younger people than for older people, partly because older people may have more family and community ties, and are more likely to be homeowners. In addition, younger people are more likely to have recently completed schooling and to be engaged in job search, and as such are likely to be more amenable to a move. Older people, however, have fewer years to recover their investment in moving expenses and have more firm-specific human capital, which encourages them to remain where they are.<sup>5</sup>

Not surprisingly, single persons were more likely than married persons to be migrants, and this difference is more pronounced in rural areas than in large cities. Lower moving costs for singles than for families contributes to higher out-migration rates for singles. In addition, families may have multiple earners, which makes moving a more difficult decision, especially if a spouse has a high-wage job. The psychological costs of moving also increase with the number of members in the family.

University degree holders were also more likely to be migrants than those without a degree, regardless of the size of the community. For example, among rural residents, 10% of rural university degree-holders left rural areas per year while 7% without degrees left. In large cities, 9% of university degree holders left compared with 7% of those without a degree.



## Young, single, university-educated persons are more likely to be migrants

	Size of community of origin				
	Total	Rural	Small or medium-sized towns	Small or medium-sized cities	Large cities
<b>Age</b>	<b>Average annual out-migration rate (%)</b>				
21-25	16.6	20.9	19.0	16.7	14.8
26-35	10.3	10.0	9.6	9.7	10.9
36-45	5.8	5.2	6.4	5.9	5.8
46-55	4.0	4.8	4.5	3.5	3.6
56-65	3.7	4.1	3.7	3.2	3.7
<b>Marital status</b>					
Single	12.1	15.1	13.8	12.2	11.3
Married	5.8	5.8	6.1	5.5	5.8
Other	9.3	11.6	9.4	9.0	8.8
<b>Highest level of schooling</b>					
No university degree	7.0	7.2	7.4	6.9	7.0
University degree	9.2	10.2	8.9	8.7	9.2

Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

Higher levels of education may facilitate migration because highly educated people have a broader range of employment opportunities and may have more awareness of opportunities in other places.

### Sales and service workers more likely to be migrants, especially those from rural areas

Occupation also influences out-migration rates. Regardless of the size of community, people in sales and service occupations are more likely to move than other occupational groups. This was especially so for rural sales and service workers. Sales and service workers from rural and small towns may gravitate to cities where higher-paying jobs are more plentiful, but those sales and service workers who live in large cities are less likely to gain from moving. Although blue-collar workers had among the highest unemployment rates in 2002, they were least likely to move, regardless of community size. With economic restructuring and the decline of the

primary and manufacturing industry base through the 1990s, there may be fewer employment opportunities available to blue-collar workers in other areas.


### Non-migrants more likely to work a full year

When people move, they often do so to improve their employment situation. Sometimes unemployment or non-standard work impels workers to migrate to a place where they believe employment opportunities are better. Those who have full-year employment (48 to 52 weeks) have less incentive to move, partly because the costs of moving may be higher than for those with a part-year job due to a loss

4. Day, K. and S. Winer. 2001. "Policy-induced migration in Canada: An empirical study." Carleton University working paper 2001-08.


5. Human capital is a term referring to the practical knowledge, acquired skills and learned abilities that makes a person potentially productive and equipped to earn income in exchange for labour.

**Sales and service workers are more likely to leave rural areas than blue-collar workers**




Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

**Interprovincial migrants are least likely to be employed for a full year prior to a move...**



**... especially interprovincial migrants from rural areas**



Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

who made shorter moves. About 65% of non-migrants report full-year employment compared with 62% of CSD migrants, 58% of ER migrants and 54% of interprovincial migrants. According to SLID, part-year workers are more likely to move than either full-year workers or non-workers.

The receipt of Employment Insurance (EI) benefits is an indicator of the mismatch between the supply and demand of labour and employment instability.<sup>6</sup> With high unemployment rates prevailing in many rural areas, more people in rural communities receive EI benefits.<sup>7</sup> As migrants are more likely to work part-year than non-migrants, they are also more likely to receive EI, and interprovincial migrants are most likely to receive EI prior to moving. On balance, higher out-migration rates are associated with higher likelihood of receiving EI, regardless of the size of the community.

This analysis reveals several important trends about migrants. The decision to migrate from rural to urban areas may be driven by a lack of economic opportunities, with those experiencing unemployment and relying on EI benefits being most likely to migrate.

**Only interprovincial migrants from cities have significantly larger employment rate gains than non-migrants**

Because people often move to improve their employment prospects, migrants are expected to work more, be less

of seniority and employment benefits and forgone income during a move. According to SLID, non-migrants are significantly more likely to work full-year than migrants and less likely to

work for part of the previous year. Not surprisingly, migrants who make longer moves are less likely to have worked full-year and more likely to have worked part-year than migrants

6. Employment Insurance provides temporary financial help to the unemployed while they look for work or upgrade their skills, while they are pregnant or caring for a newborn or adopted child, or while they are sick.

7. In high unemployment rate regions, fewer weeks of employment are required to qualify for EI benefits. It may be easier or more difficult than in other regions to accumulate the number of weeks of employment to qualify for EI.

	Size of community of origin				
	Total	Rural	Small or medium-sized towns	Small or medium-sized cities	Large cities
	<b>% receiving Employment Insurance benefits in the first year of a reference period</b>				
Non-migrant	14.7	19.8	17.1	14.9	11.9
CSD	18.4	24.0	21.9	21.6	14.2
ER	18.1	19.6	21.1	19.0	16.0
Interprovincial	22.4	26.7	25.5	23.5	19.8

Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

likely to receive EI benefits and have higher wages and salaries after a move than before. However, the expected gains may not materialize if conditions in the new labour market are unexpectedly tough. Thus, the absence of such gains may indicate that a migrant is having difficulty adjusting to the new labour market. Gains are measured by comparing labour market indicators such as employment rates, receipt of EI benefits and wages and salaries in the first year of a reference period with those of the third year, the year following a move of migrants.

Over the study period from 1993 to 2000, economic conditions improved. It is therefore not surprising that both migrants and non-migrants have higher employment rates in the third year of a reference period than in the first year. However, it is only interprovincial migrants from cities with a population of 25,000 or more that have significantly larger employment rate gains than non-migrants. Regardless of community size, the more distant the move, the more likely people are to be job starters after a move. After a move, migrants expect to improve their situation by starting a job, but unexpectedly, migrants are also more likely than non-migrants to leave employment during a reference period. In addition, the further people

move, the more likely they are to stop working. Although the decision to move is based on expected benefits derived from moving, these benefits sometimes do not materialize because of imperfect labour market information. Distant moves increase uncertainty and may contribute to job losses after a move.

Relocation may require a family member to give up a job, and so gains from migration may be unevenly distributed within families. It is therefore also important to consider the labour market outcomes of both spouses, before and after migration.

As expected, household heads (usually husbands)<sup>8</sup> are more likely to work in both periods than spouses (usually wives). As well, migrant heads and spouses are more likely than non-migrants to work in both periods and these differences are larger for more distant moves. However the flows into and out of employment are much larger for spouses than for household heads: for example, 17% of spousal interprovincial migrants are job starters, versus 8% of household heads. This suggests that migration is associated with more labour market turbulence for spouses than for household heads. The high prevalence of job starters for spouses suggests that many couples consider the potential

labour market outcomes for both partners in their migration decision.

### More weeks worked after moving

During the reference period, weeks worked increased for both migrants and non-migrants, but the biggest gains were for rural interprovincial migrants — 4.7 weeks. This suggests that rural underemployment may provide the impetus for some people to move to where more work is available. Overall, non-migrants worked 0.4 more weeks in year three of the reference period than in year one, while CSD migrants worked 1.2 additional weeks, ER migrants 2.6 additional weeks and interprovincial migrants 1.9 additional weeks.

As with employment rates, gains in weeks worked are quite different for household heads and spouses. Non-migrant household heads showed very little change in average weeks of work, but interprovincial migrant household heads worked an additional three weeks. In contrast, while non-migrant spouses worked about one more week in the third year of a reference period, interprovincial migrant spouses worked 0.6 additional weeks.

### Higher wages earned after moving

Migration also affects earnings. People may choose to move not just for more work, but also for higher paying jobs or the potential of receiving higher pay. Regardless of the size of community, those who moved between ERs or provinces showed significantly larger gains in annual wages and salaries than non-movers or short-distance movers. On average, non-migrants' median earnings grew by 4%, while CSD, ER and interprovincial migrants' earnings grew by 8%, 16% and 22%,

8. The household head refers to the person with the highest earnings in the family. In families including a married or common-in-law couple, 76% of the persons with the highest earnings were men.



respectively.<sup>9</sup> Undoubtedly, part of the reason for the larger increases for migrants is related to migrants being younger and more highly-educated than non-migrants.

Spouses experience large percentage increases in wages and salaries compared to household heads over the two-year reference period, ranging from 6% among non-migrants to 16% for ER migrants.<sup>10</sup> Increases for household heads are smaller, varying from 1% for non-migrants to 8% for interprovincial migrants.

### Migrants more likely to receive EI benefits than non-migrants after migration

Before migrants move they are more likely to receive EI benefits than non-migrants, which may have contributed to their decision to move. During a reference period, both migrants and non-migrants experience a similar decrease in the percentage receiving EI benefits, which is consistent with the growth in weeks of work and earnings for this group. All migrants regardless of community size were more likely to receive EI benefits in the third year of a reference period than non-migrants.

During the third year of a reference period, migrants, especially interprovincial migrants, are significantly more likely to either stop or start receipt of EI benefits than non-migrants. According to SLID, 13% of interprovincial migrants stopped receiving EI and 11% started while the same percentages

9. However, if pre-migration wages are low, a large percentage increase in wages may still not translate into a large wage gain in dollar terms.

10. Percentage changes in median wages and salaries are calculated only for people who are employed in the first and third years of the reference period.



## Spouses of household heads are more likely to start or end jobs after a move than household heads

	Change in job status during reference period				Employment rate	
	Job continuers	Job starters <sup>1</sup>	Job leavers <sup>2</sup>	Non-workers <sup>3</sup>	First year of reference period	Third year of reference period
<b>Type of migrant</b>	%					
Non-migrant	74.1	5.5	4.0	16.4	78	80
CSD	76.7	5.9	5.1	12.4	82	82
ER	75.4	8.1	6.7	9.7	82	84
Interprovincial	76.9	9.3	6.7	7.1	84	86
<b>Head of household</b>						
Non-migrant	86.6	4.9	1.3	7.2	88	91
CSD	87.9	5.0	1.6	5.5	90	93
ER	84.7	8.1	3.1	4.1	88	93
Interprovincial	87.8	8.0	1.6	2.6	89	96
<b>Spouse of head of household</b>						
Non-migrant	65.4	5.9	5.5	23.3	71	71
CSD	62.8	8.4	7.5	21.3	70	71
ER	60.9	14.0	7.4	17.6	68	75
Interprovincial	57.7	16.7	12.8	12.9	70	74

<sup>1</sup> Did not work in the first year and did work in the third year of a reference period.

<sup>2</sup> Worked in year the first year, but not in the third year of a reference period.


<sup>3</sup> Worked in neither the first or third year of a reference period.

Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.



## Only interprovincial migrants from cities had significantly larger employment rate gains than non-migrants

Percentage point change in employment rates\*



\* Change in employment rates between the first and third year of a reference period.

Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

Type of migrant	Size of community of origin					Head of household	Spouse of head of household
	Total	Rural	Small or medium-sized towns	Small or medium-sized cities	Large cities		
<b>Change in number of weeks worked</b>							
Weeks							
Non-migrant	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.1	1.2
CSD	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.8	0.6	1.3
ER	2.7	1.7	3.4	2.4	2.8	0.9	-0.5
Interprovincial	1.9	4.7	1.6	2.1	1.3	3.2	0.6
<b>Change in median annual wages and salaries</b>							
%							
Non-migrant	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.3	4.4	1.5	5.7
CSD	7.8	7.3	4.9	11.8	8.8	3.0	11.7
ER	16.0	9.0	10.1	25.6	18.8	4.2	15.7
Interprovincial	22.3	50.9	14.0	29.2	11.3	7.8	14.2
<b>Change in percentage receiving EI benefits</b>							
Percentage points							
Non-migrant	-2.4	-2.7	-2.8	-2.1	-2.2	..	..
CSD	-3.4	-3.6	-3.7	-2.4	-3.5	..	..
ER	-1.7	1.5	-2.2	-1.3	-2.7	..	..
Interprovincial	-1.5	-9.0	2.8	-2.9	-0.6	..	..

.. Not available.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1993-2000.

for non-migrants were 8% and 6%, respectively. This suggests that migration, especially interprovincial migration, is associated with increased labour market uncertainty.

### Summary

While there is a significant out-migration from rural areas, there is also a countervailing flow of people from urban to rural areas that more than offsets it. Young, single and university-educated people are most likely to be migrants. People with these characteristics are also more likely to be employed and work less than a full year than non-migrants. Thus, migrants tend to have the highest potential gains from moving and the lowest economic and psychological costs associated with moving.

Interprovincial migrants are also the youngest and most educated.

On average, migration brings considerable economic gains to migrants, with larger gains observed for migrants who move greater distances, especially for those who leave rural areas. They tend to earn and work more. In addition, for rural migrants, moving may contribute to breaking the cycle of reliance on EI. However, migration generally is also associated with increased employment instability, as migrants are more likely to both stop and start working than non-migrants. This increased instability may contribute to higher EI benefit usage rates for migrants than non-migrants both at the beginning and the end of a reference period as migrants seek new employment opportunities in unfamiliar labour markets.

While the net economic gains for migrants are significant, migration often involves the relocation of entire families. Some family members may increase earnings, weeks of work during a year and employment stability while others lose from the relocation. Household heads and spouses experience different outcomes from migration. Interestingly, migrant spouses experience more rapid wage growth and are more likely to shift in and out of jobs than migrant household heads.

This article provides additional evidence that migration involves the relocation of young, educated people and that the economic gains from migration in terms of higher pay and more secure employment are sizeable for many people. Migration may be an important labour market adjustment necessary to break a long-term cycle of irregular work and reliance on Employment Insurance. Perhaps most importantly it also establishes that it is necessary to evaluate migration in the broader context of the family. The economic gains by spouses are significantly more variable, but also in many cases larger than those of household heads.



**Rick Audas** is an assistant professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland, and **Ted McDonald** is an associate professor at the University of New Brunswick.

# Against the odds: A profile of at-risk and problem gamblers

by Katherine Marshall and Harold Wynne

This article is adapted from "Fighting the odds," *Perspectives on Labour and Income*, December 2003, vol. 4, no. 12, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 75-001-XIE, available for purchase at [www.statcan.ca/english/studies/75-001/comm/bis-ndp\\_a.html](http://www.statcan.ca/english/studies/75-001/comm/bis-ndp_a.html).


Over the past decade the gambling industry has flourished. Canadians have steadily increased their wagering — from an estimated \$2.7 billion in 1992 to about \$11.3 billion in 2002. While increased GDP, employment and government revenue may be the upside of gambling, rising social and health consequences of problem gambling are the downside.

An estimated 18.9 million Canadians aged 15 and over gambled in 2002, the great majority indulging for fun and entertainment (and the dream of a jackpot). However, 1.2 million — 5% of the adult population — exhibited behaviour that would classify them as being at-risk or problem gamblers. No trend data exist on problem gambling rates, but research has shown that the easier it is to gamble, the higher the prevalence of gambling-related problems.<sup>1</sup> Increased accessibility, poverty, low socio-economic status, and substance abuse have been linked with problem gambling.

This article uses data drawn from Cycle 1.2 of the Canadian Community Health Survey (Mental Health and Well-being) to examine gambling

CST

Gambling was problem or potential problem for 5% of the adult population



Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 1.2, 2002.

behaviour and socio-economic characteristics of non-problem, at-risk, and problem gamblers. Issues associated with problem gambling, such as income, health, and social relations are also explored.

## Gambling in its various forms

Three-quarters of Canadians aged 15 and over spent money on some form of gambling in 2002 — with 38% doing so at least once a week.<sup>2</sup> Buying lottery

tickets was by far the most popular gambling activity (65% of gamblers), followed by instant win tickets (36%),

1. Volberg, R.A. February 1994. "The prevalence and demographics of pathological gamblers: Implications for public health." *American Journal of Public Health* 84, 2: 237-241.
2. Similar to alcohol consumption, frequency and expenditure rates for gambling are regularly under-reported.

The Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) provides regular and timely cross-sectional estimates of health determinants, health status, and health system utilization. The initial year (2000) and every odd year thereafter (from 2001) collects generic health information from 130,000 respondents. During the even years, the survey sample is smaller (roughly 30,000) and addresses a specialized topic.

Cycle 1.2, on Mental Health and Well-Being, was held in 2002. Its main objective was to provide national and provincial estimates of major mental disorders and problems, and to illuminate the issues associated with disabilities and the need for and provision of health care. The survey contained questions on a wide range of disorders and problems, including a section on “pathological gambling.”

The target population of the CCHS Cycle 1.2 excludes those living in the three territories, individuals living on reserves or crown land, residents of institutions, full-time members of the Armed Forces, and residents of some remote regions.

The Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) is part of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index, an instrument

developed in the late 1990s. Based on numerous questions on gambling involvement, problem gambling behaviour, and adverse consequences (disruption of personal, family or professional life), the PGSI assesses gambling problems using a nine-item scale in which all nine items refer to the past 12 months. Scores can range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 27.

**Non-problem** gamblers gamble infrequently (less than five times per year), declare that they are not gamblers, or score zero on the PGSI. **Low- or moderate-risk** gamblers gamble more than five times a year and show some indication of problem gambling behaviour. Low-risk gamblers scored between 1 and 2 on the PGSI and have most likely not yet experienced any adverse consequences from gambling. Moderate-risk gamblers scored between 3 and 7 on the PGSI and may or may not have experienced adverse consequences. **Problem** gamblers gamble more than five times a year, and the gambling behaviour creates negative consequences for them, others in their social network, or the community. Problem gamblers scored between 8 and 27 on the PGSI.

For full definitions of terms and concepts, please see the original article.

and going to a casino (22%).<sup>3</sup> And although bingo was played by relatively few gamblers (8%), one in five participants played at least once a week.

About three-quarters of both men and women gambled in 2002, and the participation rate was 70% or higher among each age group over 24. Despite the legal age restriction of 18 in most provinces, a considerable number of adolescents aged 15 to 17 purchased provincially sanctioned lotteries and instant win games. Youth participation rates were highest in the “other gambling” category — predominantly betting on cards or board games outside casinos, or on games of skill such as pool or darts.

### Those most at risk

Men who gambled were significantly more likely than women to be at-risk

or problem gamblers — 8% versus 5%. Some claim this difference exists because men and women tend to gamble for different reasons and in different activities. Men were more likely to play video lottery terminals (VLTs) and bet on horse racing, while women preferred to play bingo. The cultural image of a gambler may also play a role: the archetypal gambler portrayed in movies, fiction and music has always been male.

At-risk and problem gamblers were also, on average, younger than non-problem gamblers (40 versus 45 years old). While gamblers with less than postsecondary schooling were significantly more likely than those with more education to be at-risk or problem gamblers, low-income gamblers (under \$20,000) were not significantly different from higher income

gamblers.<sup>4</sup> Off-reserve Aboriginal gamblers were significantly more likely to be at risk than non-Aboriginal gamblers, at 18% compared with 6%.

Almost one in three daily gamblers were either at risk or were already problem gamblers. Those who gambled two to six times a week were also significantly more likely to be at risk or to have a problem — 14% compared with 9% of those who gambled once a week.

3. Instant win tickets include Keno, Pick 3, Encore, Banco, and Extra. Lottery tickets include 6/49, Super 7, Sports Select, and Pro-Line.

4. Although at-risk and problem-gambling rates were quite similar for the various income groups, gambling participation rates differed. For example, 69% of individuals with less than \$20,000 gambled in 2002, compared with 82% of those with \$20,000 or more.

	Population aged 15 and over	At least one activity	Instant Lotteries	Instant win	Casinos	Bingos	VLTs not in casinos	Horse racing	Other*
<b>Total ('000)</b>	<b>24,997</b>	<b>18,911</b>	<b>16,225</b>	<b>9,039</b>	<b>5,420</b>	<b>2,099</b>	<b>1,514</b>	<b>1,040</b>	<b>5,276</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>
	<b>'000</b>				<b>%</b>				
<b>Men</b>	<b>12,286</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>27</b>
15 to 17	706	50	18	12	F	4 <sup>E</sup>	2 <sup>E</sup>	1 <sup>E</sup>	39
18 to 24	1,406	73	52	40	31	7	13	5	39
25 to 44	4,769	81	73	39	24	4	9	6	30
45 to 64	3,774	84	78	34	22	4	6	5	23
65 and over	1,632	74	65	28	19	5	3	4	15
<b>Women</b>	<b>12,710</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>
15 to 17	660	34	12	13	F	6 <sup>E</sup>	3 <sup>E</sup>	1 <sup>E</sup>	21
18 to 24	1,366	68	45	44	25	13	8	2 <sup>E</sup>	20
25 to 44	4,738	77	68	44	21	13	6	4	16
45 to 64	3,852	78	70	38	24	12	4	4	13
65 and over	2,095	70	59	29	20	12	3	3	11
<b>Gambling frequency**</b>	<b>18,911</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
At least once a week	7,271	38	37	23	3	21	11	5	15
1-3 times a month	4,374	23	23	26	8	17	18	6	18
1-11 times a year	7,266	38	40	51	88	62	71	89	68

<sup>E</sup> Use with caution.

<sup>F</sup> Too unreliable to be published.

\* Includes betting on cards outside casinos, Internet gambling, speculative investments or other forms of gambling.

\*\* Of those who gambled in the specified activity.

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 1.2, 2002.

Finally, at-risk and problem gambling rates varied considerably by the type of game played, suggesting that some games are more alluring than others. For example, one quarter of those who played VLTs were at risk or already problem gamblers, confirming the much-reported notion that VLTs are the “crack cocaine” of gambling. By contrast, buyers of lottery tickets, the game of choice for 16 million people, had the smallest proportion of at-risk and problem players.

### Gambling takes money

Inevitably, frequent gambling lightens the wallet. Overall, 6% of gamblers spent over \$1,000, but the amount depended very much on whether their

gambling behaviour was problematic. Almost two-thirds of problem gamblers spent more than \$1,000 per year, as did 43% of moderate-risk and 21% of low-risk gamblers. In contrast, only 4% of non-problem gamblers committed that much money to their gambling activities.<sup>5</sup>

Constant gambling and excessive spending can take its toll in many facets of life — particularly personal and family finances. The majority of problem gamblers (62%) reported that they always or most of the time spent more money on gambling than they wanted to; furthermore, 85% also said they sometimes or most of the time bet more than they could afford to lose. Without doubt, constant out-of-

control and unaffordable spending can lead to debt and unpaid bills, thus adding further emotional and financial strain.

Indeed, among problem gamblers, just over half said their gambling habits sometimes caused financial problems, and almost one fifth reported that they always or almost always did. Finally, almost 4 in 10 claimed that they sometimes borrowed money or sold things in order to continue gambling, a desperate action that risks further financial hardship.

5. Although it is not possible to identify problem gamblers from the Survey of Household Spending, gambling expenditures are available.

	Total gamblers	Non-problem gamblers	At-risk and problem gamblers
<b>Total ('000)</b>	<b>18,887</b>	<b>17,699</b>	<b>1,188</b>
%	100	93.7	6.3
	'000		%
Men	9,610	92.2	7.8
Women	9,277	95.2	4.8*
<b>Personal income</b>			
Less than \$20,000	6,392	93.3	6.7
\$20,000 or more	11,289	93.8	6.2
<b>Level of education</b>			
Less than postsecondary	9,689	92.4	7.6
Postsecondary	9,047	95.2	4.8*
<b>Racial background</b>			
Non-Aboriginal	18,593	93.8	6.2
Aboriginal	217	81.5	18.5*
<b>Gambling frequency</b>			
Daily	278	69.7	30.3*
2 to 6 times a week	2,784	85.7	14.3*
Once a week	4,198	91.3	8.7
Once a month	4,370	94.1	5.9*
Once a year	7,257	98.9	1.1*
<b>Gambling activity</b>			
Lotteries	16,202	93.5	6.5
Instant win	9,027	90.6	9.4*
Casinos	5,413	86.7	13.3*
Bingo	2,098	84.5	15.5*
VLTs outside casinos	1,512	74.4	25.6*
Horse racing	1,038	84.2	15.8*

\* Indicates statistically significant difference from the reference group.

Note: Reference group in italics.

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 1.2, 2002.

### Problem gamblers burdened with stress and health issues<sup>6</sup>

Relentless preoccupation with gambling consumes both time and money, and can also have a negative effect on physical and mental health. Problem gamblers were twice as likely (22% versus 11%) to report poor or fair health compared with non-problem gamblers. The likelihood of alcohol dependence increased as the at-risk gambling level increased. Only 2% of non-problem gamblers were afflicted with alcohol dependence, compared with 7% of low-risk and 15% of problem gamblers.<sup>7</sup>

Gambling can also lead to social problems. Half of all problem gamblers and one sixth of moderate-risk gamblers reported that their gambling caused relationship problems with their family or friends. Such problems were virtually unknown among non-problem gamblers. Furthermore, more than half of employed moderate-risk and problem gamblers reported that their gambling had previously interfered with their ability to do their job.

Stress is an inevitable outcome of the financial and social pressures created by problem gambling. Although gambling may not be the sole cause,

42% of problem gamblers reported a high or extreme level of stress in their life, compared with 23% of non-problem gamblers. Also, based on a number of psychological distress questions, 29% of problem gamblers were considered highly distressed, a rate three times higher than that of non-problem gamblers.

Persistent stress can be related to depression. The likelihood of ever having had a major clinical depression was significantly higher among problem gamblers. Only 11% of non-problem gamblers had ever had clinical depression during their life, compared with 24% of problem gamblers. Since major depression is a key risk factor for suicide, it is not unexpected that a significantly higher proportion of problem than non-problem gamblers had contemplated suicide in the past year (18% versus 3%).<sup>8</sup>

### Problem gamblers know they're in trouble

In 2002, more than one third of a million Canadians (2% of all gamblers) at least occasionally thought that they might have a gambling problem. Four in 10 problem gamblers almost always

6. Please see original article for full definitions of alcohol dependence, distress and depression.
7. Although methodology and definitions vary, other studies have also found a correlation (co-morbidity) between alcohol dependence and pathological gambling. Kidman, R. 2002. "The perfect match? Co-occurring problem drinking and gambling." *The Wager* 7, 20. [www.wager.org](http://www.wager.org) (accessed May 15, 2002).
8. Due to community pressure, as of June 2003, coroners across the country began coding suicides due to gambling. Although most provinces now keep track of gambling-related suicides, their methodologies and measurements differ, thus making comparability difficult. Bailey, S. October 2, 2003. "Gambling-related suicides soar five-fold in Quebec since VLTs legalized." *The Canadian Press*. <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/10/02/215489-cp.html> (accessed February 9, 2004).



## Financial problems worsen as the risk of being a problem gambler increases

	Type of gambler		Problem
	Low-risk	Moderate-risk	
	%		
<b>Spent more than \$1,000</b>	21	43	62
<b>Spent more than wanted to</b>			
Sometimes	52	64	30
Always/most of time	5 <sup>E</sup>	24	62
<b>Bet more than could afford to lose</b>			
Sometimes	14	44	47
Always/most of time	0	3 <sup>E</sup>	38
<b>Gambling caused financial problems</b>			
Sometimes	F	22	53
Always/most of time	0	F	17 <sup>E</sup>
<b>Borrowed money or sold things to gamble</b>			
Sometimes	5 <sup>E</sup>	18	39
Always/most of time	F	F	F

<sup>E</sup> Use with caution  
<sup>F</sup> Too unreliable to be published.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 1.2, 2002.

(26%) and problem gamblers (56%) had tried to quit, but could not. It is not known what means they tried nor why they failed.

### Summary

The surge in the gambling industry began in the 1990s when provincial governments began legalizing permanent casinos and VLTs. In 2002, 76% of Canadians reported gambling in the previous year — 4 in 10 on a weekly basis. The continuous expansion of the industry has led to much debate. In 2000, the Canadian Public Health Association adopted the position that the expansion of gambling is a public health issue; however, estimating the health and socio-economic costs and benefits of gambling is difficult, and no study has yet done it.

New information from the Canadian Community Health Survey identified 5% of the population as at-risk or problem gamblers. Those significantly more likely to be in this population were men, Aboriginal persons, people with less education, VLT and very frequent players.

The consequences of being an at-risk or problem gambler included higher rates of financial and relationship problems. Problem gamblers in particular suffered elevated levels of alcohol dependence, stress, emotional distress, and past episodes of depression. However, the vast majority of problem gamblers recognized they had a problem, and most had tried — unsuccessfully — to quit in the previous year.



## Problems with alcohol, family and stress are significant issues among problem gamblers

Within past 12 months (unless otherwise stated)	Type of gambler				Problem
	All gamblers	Non-problem	Low-risk	Moderate-risk	
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,887</b>	<b>17,699</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>118</b>
	%				
Fair or poor health	11	11	10	14	22 <sup>*E</sup>
Alcohol dependence	3	2	7 <sup>*</sup>	12 <sup>*</sup>	15 <sup>*E</sup>
Family problems from gambling	1	F	4 <sup>*E</sup>	16 <sup>*</sup>	49 <sup>*</sup>
Gambling interfered with ability to do job <sup>**</sup>	...	...	...	57	55
High or extreme stress	24	23	27	21	42 <sup>*</sup>
High distress level in past month	10	9	16 <sup>*</sup>	17 <sup>*</sup>	29 <sup>*</sup>
Had ever had clinical depression	11	11	12	15	24 <sup>*E</sup>

<sup>E</sup> Use with caution.  
<sup>\*</sup> Statistically significant difference from the non-problem group (.05 level).  
<sup>\*\*</sup> Of those employed, which included roughly 90% of all gamblers aged 25 to 55.  
... Not applicable.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey, Cycle 1.2, 2002.

felt they had a problem. In some ways it is surprising that 15% of problem gamblers did *not* think they had a problem.

The insidiousness of excessive gambling is revealed by the 27% of

moderate-risk and 64% of problem gamblers who had wanted to stop gambling in the previous year, but believed they could not. Furthermore, a strikingly high proportion of moderate-risk



**Katherine Marshall** is a senior analyst with Labour and Household Surveys Analysis Division, Statistics Canada, and **Harold Wynne** is an adjunct professor with McGill University and the University of Alberta.



## Impaired driving rates declining

The national rate of impaired driving incidents declined 4% in 2002 following a small increase in 2001. The rate is now 65% lower than the peak observed in 1981 and, with the decline in 2002, the rate has resumed its two-decade downward trend.

While most indicators point to a real decline in impaired driving incidents, some of the decrease in charges may be due to the increased use of discretionary procedures used by police, such as road-side suspensions. Police-reported impaired driving statistics may have been influenced downward by a variety of other factors, including changing attitudes and behaviours with respect to impaired driving, the aging population and the level of police enforcement activity.

Young drivers aged 19 to 24 continue to have the highest rates for impaired driving, according to data available from 94 police departments in nine provinces. These data indicate that the rates of impaired driving peak at age 21. Rates level off and remain relatively constant for 25- to 44-year-olds, followed by a drop in rates with persons aged 45 and over. Seniors aged 65 years and older had the lowest rates.

### Juristat,

vol. 23, no. 9

Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE2003009



## Obese parents more likely to have obese or overweight teenagers

Having an obese parent greatly increased the odds of obesity among adolescent boys and girls based on data from the 2001 Canadian Community Health Survey. Close to 5% of the adolescents in this study were considered obese, based on their body mass index. In 2000/01, the proportion of boys who were obese was about twice that for girls: 6% versus 3%. Another 17% of 12- to 19-year-old boys were considered overweight, as were about 10% of the girls.

Excess weight among parents was a major factor in excess weight for adolescent boys and girls. Among girls aged 12 to 19 who lived with an obese parent, 18% were overweight and 10% were obese. The situation was similar for boys: 22% of boys with an obese parent were overweight, and 12% were obese.

Aside from weight, other parental habits were associated with those of their children. These include physical activity, smoking and eating habits. To better understand the risk factors for youth obesity, adolescent and parental characteristics were examined together.

Girls who lived in the same household as an obese parent had much higher odds of being obese themselves — nearly six times as high compared with girls whose reporting parent was not obese. For boys, those with an obese parent were almost three times as likely to be obese.

### How Healthy Are Canadians?

Annual Report 2003

Catalogue no. 82-003-SIE2003000



## High stress sufferers have higher odds of developing chronic conditions

Stress may be a precursor of poor health, at least in some cases. In 1995, Canadians aged 18 or older reported experiencing an average of five stressors (that is, sources of stress), and about 10% reported 10 or more. The most commonly reported source of stress in 1995 was chronic strains — troublesome situations that persist over time, such as trying to do too much at once, not having enough money, problems in marital relationships, and concerns about children.

Time pressure was particularly common, with 44% of Canadians reporting they were trying to do too many things at once. Financial problems were reported by 38%, and 31% felt that others expected too much of them. One in five, or 21%, wanted to move but felt it was not possible.

Adults who suffered high stress in 1995 had higher odds of developing a number of chronic conditions by 2001. For both sexes, these conditions included arthritis and rheumatism, back problems, chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and stomach or intestinal ulcers. For men, they also included heart disease, and for women, asthma and migraine.

These relationships suggest that, at least in some cases, stress is a precursor of poor health. Of the various sources of stress (34 were considered in the analysis), chronic strains — continuing problems with crowded schedules, finances and relationships — appeared to be the most potent.

Each additional stressor reported in 1995 led to a 6% increase in the odds of reporting a chronic condition six years later for men, and an 8% increase for women.

### Health Reports

vol. 15, no. 1

Catalogue no. 82-003



## Girls have a lower self-concept than boys

According to a new study based on data from the National Population Health Survey, adolescent girls tend to have a lower self-concept than boys and are particularly susceptible to the effects of that perception. A positive self-concept (a sense of self-worth and a feeling of control) appears key to developing good mental and physical health.

The study found that girls with a weak self-concept in 2000/01 were at a greater risk of depression, poor self-perceived health and obesity six years later. Adolescent boys with a weak self-concept were more likely to become obese or physically inactive. In contrast, a strong self-concept in adolescence had a positive long-term effect on girls' self-perceived health, though not for boys.

Among boys who were at least moderately active in 1994/95, a stronger self-concept lowered their odds of becoming inactive by 2000/01. In contrast, girls' self-concept in adolescence had no long-term effect on their activity levels.

### How Healthy Are Canadians?

Annual Report 2003

Catalogue no. 82-003-SIE2003000



# S O C I A L I N D I C A T O R S

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<b>LABOUR FORCE<sup>1</sup></b>								
Labour force ('000)	14,900	15,153	15,418	15,721	15,999	16,246	16,689	17,047
Total employed ('000)	13,463	13,774	14,140	14,531	14,910	15,077	15,412	15,746
Men	7,346	7,508	7,661	7,866	8,049	8,110	8,262	8,407
Women	6,117	6,266	6,479	6,665	6,860	6,967	7,150	7,339
Workers employed part-time (%)	19.2	19.1	18.9	18.5	18.1	18.1	18.7	18.8
Men	10.8	10.5	10.6	10.3	10.3	10.4	10.9	11.0
Women	29.2	29.4	28.8	28.0	27.3	27.1	27.7	27.8
Involuntary part-time <sup>1</sup>	35.0	31.1	29.2	26.7	25.3	25.8	27.0	27.6
Looked for full-time work	--	10.6	10.0	9.0	7.4	7.5	8.2	8.9
% of women employed whose youngest child is under 6	15.9	15.6	15.0	14.7	14.3	13.7	13.4	12.9
% of workers who were self-employed	16.1	17.1	17.2	16.9	16.2	15.3	15.2	15.3
% of employed working over 40 hours per week <sup>2</sup>	21.2	18.9	18.9	18.4	18.0	17.5	16.9	16.6
% of workers employed in temporary/contract positions	--	9.4	9.8	10.0	10.5	10.9	11.0	10.5
% of full-time students employed in summer	47.9	45.7	47.2	48.8	50.9	51.3	52.3	53.1
Unemployment rate (%)	9.6	9.1	8.3	7.6	6.8	7.2	7.7	7.6
Men aged 15-24	16.9	17.1	16.6	15.3	13.9	14.5	15.3	15.6
25-54	8.9	8.0	7.2	6.5	5.7	6.3	6.9	6.6
Women aged 15-24	13.7	15.2	13.6	12.6	11.3	11.0	11.8	11.9
25-54	8.5	7.6	6.9	6.3	5.8	6.0	6.3	6.4
Population with high school or less	12.4	12.1	11.2	10.3	9.3	9.6	10.2	10.2
Population with postsecondary completion	8.1	7.4	6.5	5.9	5.2	5.8	6.0	5.9
Population with university degree	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.3	3.9	4.6	5.0	5.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>								
Total enrolment in elementary/secondary schools ('000)	5,415	5,386	5,370	5,442	--	--	--	--
Secondary school graduation rate (%)	76.4	76.3	76.0	76.3	77.1	76.9	--	--
Postsecondary enrolment ('000)								
Community college, full-time	397.3	398.6	403.5	408.8	--	--	--	--
Community college, part-time	87.1	91.6	91.4	85.4	--	--	--	--
University, full-time <sup>3</sup>	573.6	573.1	580.4	588.4	605.2	--	--	--
University, part-time <sup>3</sup>	256.1	249.7	246.0	255.4	256.4	--	--	--
% of population 18-24 enrolled full-time in postsecondary	34.6	34.3	34.4	34.4	--	--	--	--
% of population 18-21 in college	24.7	24.6	24.7	24.6	--	--	--	--
% of population 18-24 in university <sup>3</sup>	20.4	20.2	20.3	20.4	--	--	--	--
Community college diplomas granted ('000)	85.9	91.4	88.4	--	--	--	--	--
Bachelor's and first professional degrees granted <sup>4</sup> ('000)								
Agriculture, biological sciences	9,288	9,664	10,079	10,307	10,283	--	--	--
Education	21,421	20,638	19,374	20,352	20,779	--	--	--
Engineering and applied sciences	9,415	9,138	9,255	9,393	9,831	--	--	--
Fine and applied arts	4,142	4,105	4,276	4,198	4,367	--	--	--
Health professions	8,633	8,837	8,620	8,679	8,527	--	--	--
Humanities and related	15,889	15,014	14,721	14,373	14,221	--	--	--
Mathematics and physical sciences	7,005	7,091	7,239	7,537	8,527	--	--	--
Social sciences	48,422	47,751	47,760	47,912	47,471	--	--	--

-- Data not available.

1. 1996 is an eight-month average (January to August).
2. Hours usually worked in their main job by workers aged 25 and over.
3. Includes undergraduate and graduate studies.
4. Includes those whose field of study was not reported.

Sources: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey, *Education in Canada, 2000* (Catalogue no. 81-229) and Centre for Education Statistics.

# LESSON PLAN

*Suggestions for using Canadian Social Trends in the classroom*

## Lesson plan for “Rural-urban migration in the 1990s”

### Objectives

---

- To understand migration trends and who moves.
- To examine why people move.

### Classroom instructions

---

1. Survey the class to find out how many have moved in the last five years. How many have moved from one province to another, have moved between cities, have moved from a rural area to a town or city or vice versa? Discuss why distant moves (such as interprovincial moves) are less common than short-distance moves.
2. Discuss why people might move from a rural area to a big city. Why might people move from a city to a rural area? What factors contribute to people not moving?
3. Young, single, highly educated people are more likely to move than older married people with less education. Explore the reasons for this difference in migration rates. Do young people move for different reasons than older people?
4. What impact does moving have on families?

### Using other resources

---

“Migration to and from rural and small town Canada.” *Rural and Small Town Canada Analysis Bulletin*  
(Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 21-006-XIE, vol. 3, no. 6)  
([www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/21-006-XIE/free.htm](http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/21-006-XIE/free.htm))

*Profile of the Canadian Population by Mobility Status: Canada, a Nation on the Move*  
([www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/Index.cfm](http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/Index.cfm), then select Profile of the Canadian population by mobility status: Canada, a nation on the move)

- To find lesson plans, articles and data for elementary and secondary schools, check out the Statistics Canada Web site at [www.statcan.ca/english/kits/teach.htm](http://www.statcan.ca/english/kits/teach.htm). There are more than 30 lesson plans for high school students, many articles and access to E-STAT and other data.
- See the Family studies kit at [www.statcan.ca/english/kits/Family/intro.htm](http://www.statcan.ca/english/kits/Family/intro.htm) for detailed graphs that you can use to make overheads for your class.

### Educators

---

**You may photocopy “Lesson plan” or any item or article in *Canadian Social Trends* for use in your classroom.**

---

# Perspectives on Labour and Income



Bringing you insight into the Canadian labour market and incomes of Canadians

Subscribe for 2 years and save 20%!

Subscribe for 3 years and save 30%!

*Perspectives on Labour and Income* delivers vital data, articles and analysis on workplace and related issues facing contemporary Canada. It looks at:

- Work-life balance issues
- Self-employment patterns
- Regional trends of employment
- The aging of the labour force
- Savings and spending patterns
- Earnings and income in Canada
- Technological change affecting the workplace
- ... and many other subjects!

Order an annual subscription of the quarterly print version of *Perspectives on Labour and Income* (Cat. No. 75-001-XPE) for just \$63 + taxes or visit the Statistics Canada website at [www.statcan.ca](http://www.statcan.ca) to download the monthly electronic version (75-001-XIE)—just \$52 + taxes for an annual subscription.

In Canada, please add **either** GST and applicable PST **or** HST. Print version: no shipping charges for delivery in Canada. For shipments to the United States, add \$24. For shipments to other countries, add \$40. Federal government departments must include with all orders their IS Organization Code and IS Reference Code.

Subscribe to the print version for **2 years** and **save 20%!**  
Subscribe to the print version for **3 years** and **save 30%!**

**Use one of four convenient ways to order:**

**CALL** Toll-free 1 800 267-6677

**FAX** Toll-free 1 877 287-4369

**E-MAIL** [order@statcan.ca](mailto:order@statcan.ca)

**MAIL** Statistics Canada,  
Dissemination Division,  
Circulation Management,  
120 Parkdale Avenue,  
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0T6,  
Canada

Order your copy of *Perspective Today!*

[www.statcan.ca](http://www.statcan.ca)

# CANADIAN SOCIAL TRENDS

## Unparalleled insight on Canadians

### Subscribing to *Canadian Social Trends* means...

#### ...GETTING THE SCOOP ON TOPICAL SOCIAL ISSUES

What's happening today? Each quarterly issue of *Canadian Social Trends* explores the realities that we are dealing with now.

#### ... BEING ON THE FOREFRONT OF EMERGING TRENDS

*Canadian Social Trends* gives you the information you need to understand and prepare for what's coming down the road.

#### ... OBTAINING THE MOST ACCURATE DATA AVAILABLE ON CANADA

Experts analyze data collected by Statistics Canada, *the* first-hand source of information on Canada.

You can rely on this data to be the latest and most comprehensive available. *Canadian Social Trends* offers you insights about Canadians that you can use to develop pertinent programs, must-have products and innovative services that meet the needs of 21<sup>st</sup> century Canadians.

Take advantage of this opportunity today!

**Subscribe now** by using any one of the following methods:

Call toll-free 1 800 267-6677

Fax toll-free 1 877 287-4369

Email [order@statcan.ca](mailto:order@statcan.ca)

Contact the Regional Reference Centre nearest you by calling 1 800 263-1136.



*Canadian Social Trends* is \$39 /year for a print subscription. In Canada, please add **either** GST and applicable PST or HST. No shipping charges for delivery in Canada. Please add \$6 per issue for shipments to the U.S. or \$10 per issue for shipments to other countries. Visit our Web site at [www.statcan.ca](http://www.statcan.ca) for more information about ordering the online version of *Canadian Social Trends*. (A one-year electronic subscription is \$29 plus taxes.)