




CANADIAN *Social Trends*

WINTER
2005 NO. 79



FEATURES

- Youth in politics
- Immigrants' educational goals
- Getting to work
- Visible minority projections
- Seniors on the move

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Acknowledgements
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Canadian Social Trends

December 2005

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ISSN 0831-5698
(Print)

ISSN 1481-1634
(Electronic)



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Willing to participate: Political engagement of young adults

by Anne Milan

Young adults are often viewed as uninterested in political activity. Is it true that they are more disillusioned by traditional methods of participation than other age groups, as shown by the proportion who cast ballots in the municipal, provincial or federal elections? Do young adults engage in politics through activities outside of the ballot box? Or do those who vote also engage in non-voting political behaviour?

Using the 2003 General Social Survey (GSS), this article outlines the extent of political engagement among young adults aged 22 to 29,¹ as measured by traditional (voting) and alternative (non-voting) political participation. It then examines some of the links between young adults' selected characteristics and their political behaviours such as voting, signing petitions, boycotting certain products, attending public meetings or participating in demonstrations.

Young adults less likely to vote than older adults

In a democracy, electoral voting is generally seen as the classic or traditional type of participation in the political process. Indeed, many adults do exercise their right to vote, although voter turnout at federal elections has decreased over the last 20 years.² Despite the fact that 77% of the voting-age population voted in at least one of the last elections prior to the survey in 2003, there were large

GST What you should know about this study

This study draws from the 2003 General Social Survey (GSS), which interviewed nearly 25,000 individuals aged 15 and over, living in the 10 provinces in private households. It focuses on individuals aged 22 to 29, resulting in a sample of roughly 3,000 people representing about 3.4 million Canadians in this age group. This particular age group was chosen in order to include those individuals who were aged 18 or over in 2000, the year of the most recent federal election prior to the survey date.

To conduct its analysis, the study developed a non-voting or alternative political involvement scale ranging from 0 to 8, based on whether the respondent had, in the past 12 months, searched for information on a political issue; volunteered for a political party; expressed his/her views on an issue by contacting a newspaper or a politician; signed a petition; boycotted a product or chosen a product for ethical reasons; attended a public meeting; spoken out at a public meeting; participated in a demonstration or march.

A score of 0 indicates no non-voting political participation, while a score of 8 reflects participation on all possible indicators.

Two statistical models were developed to examine the impact of specific characteristics on young people's political engagement. The first model identifies selected factors associated with non-voting alternative political participation; the second model determines the influence of the same factors on voting behaviour. These factors include age, youth involvement in community activities, group affiliation, sex, place of birth, religious attendance, volunteering, sense of belonging to community, region, educational level, main activity, household income, and (for the first model on non-voting political engagement) voting behaviour.

differences in voting participation by age. According to GSS data, only 59% of those in their twenties voted, compared with 71% of 30- to 44-year-olds and 85% or more of individuals

aged 45 and over. As with the older age groups, young adults were less likely to vote in local than in federal and provincial elections.

	Political participation (%)					
	Age group					
	Total	15 to 21	22 to 29	30 to 44	45 to 64	65 or older
Follow news and current affairs daily	68*	35*	51	66*	81*	89*
Voting behaviour						
Voted in at least one election	77*	---	59	71*	85*	89*
last federal	74*	---	52	68*	83*	89*
last provincial	73*	---	50	66*	82*	88*
last municipal or local	60*	---	35	52*	70*	79*
Non-voting political behaviour						
At least one non-voting political behaviour	54*	59	58	57	56	39*
searched for information on a political issue	26*	36	32	26*	25*	17*
signed a petition	28*	27*	31	31	29	16*
boycotted a product or chose a product for ethical reasons	20*	16*	25	25	21*	8*
attended a public meeting	22*	17	16	23*	25*	20*
expressed his/her views on an issue by contacting a newspaper or a politician	13*	8	9	13*	16*	12*
participated in a demonstration or march	6*	12*	8	6	6*	2*
spoke out at a public meeting	8*	4	5	9*	10*	7*
volunteered for a political party	3	2	3	2	4*	4

--- Not applicable

* Statistically significant difference from 22- to 29-year-olds ($p < 0.05$).

Note: Voting rates will differ from those of Elections Canada, which calculates voter participation rates based on number of eligible voters.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2003.

Why don't young people vote?

There are several possible reasons why young adults are not as likely to go to the polls as their older counterparts. According to some researchers, compared to previous generations, young adults are simply tuned out of the political process,³ lacking the ability, the motivation or both to get involved. In some ways, the sheer volume of available information coming from the Internet and television, as well as other media, can be overwhelming when trying to find a starting point for becoming informed.⁴ Consequently, young adults may be less aware of the relevance of elections, and feel removed from the idea that decisions made by politicians affect them directly.⁵

One Canadian researcher has argued that young adults today feel marginalized from mainstream political discourse.⁶ She contends that youth account for a declining share of the voting-age population, a situation that limits their political clout. At the same time, government has reduced or limited its support for issues that interest young adults, such as postsecondary education, equality and human rights.

Yet it seems that young adults share at least some of the same political interests as older Canadians. A 2005 study found that, following the last election, 18- to 29-year-olds ranked health care as the issue that was most important to them personally.⁷ In fact, all respondents,

regardless of age, rated health care as the primary concern, although proportionally more older Canadians did so. Furthermore, the study found that levels of political alienation were similar for younger and older adults.

Some researchers have referred to young people as "engaged sceptics"—interested in political issues, but wary of politicians.⁸ In other words, they are committed to the tenets of democracy, but tend to be more interested in participative political behaviour and issues which are immediately pertinent to their lives. Young people's feeling of disconnect from conventional political parties may partially account for their negative view of traditional politics and for their interest in alternative forms of political behaviour.⁹

Most adults under 65 engage in at least one non-voting political activity

While young adults are less likely to vote than those over 30, this is not true of their political behaviour on other fronts. In the year preceding the survey, nearly three in five (58%) 22- to 29-year-olds engaged in at least one non-voting political activity, virtually the same proportion as that of 30- to 64-year-olds (56%). In contrast, only two in five (39%) Canadians aged 65 or over took part in any alternative political behaviour, although this age group was the most likely to vote.

Because participating in a non-voting or alternative activity "can be a valuable source of political education, [which develops] politically relevant knowledge, awareness, understanding and skills,"¹⁰ young people's involvement in alternative political behaviour is central to assessing their level of political interest.

According to the 2003 GSS, the most common non-voting political behaviours young adults engaged in during the year were searching for information on a political issue (32%) and signing a petition (31%).

One-quarter of young adults boycotted—or chose—a product for ethical reasons, while over one-sixth attended a public meeting. About 1 in 10 expressed their views on an issue by contacting a newspaper or a politician, or participating in a demonstration or protest march. A very small proportion (3%) had worked as a volunteer for a political party.

Overall, young adults in their twenties were much more likely than seniors to seek to inform themselves about a political issue, to sign a petition, to boycott (or purchase) products for ethical reasons or to participate in demonstrations or marches. However, they were significantly less likely than older adults to attend and speak up in public meetings and to express their views to the media or politicians.

Community involvement connected to political engagement

It appears that individuals' level of involvement in various community-oriented activities may contribute to greater civic-mindedness. Whether it's belonging to a sports team, book club, volunteer group or religious association, groups can meet the personal needs of participants as well as connect them to the wider society. Indeed, the proportion of young adults engaged in non-voting political activity was nearly twice as high among those involved with three or more organizations as among their peers with no group affiliation (81% versus 43%). Similarly, individuals who, as children or young adults, took part in a number of community activities were considerably more likely than others to be engaged in alternative political behaviour as adults.

Perhaps because volunteering also reflects a sense of civic responsibility and a desire to help others, young adults who volunteered in the year prior to the survey were much more likely to be involved in at least one political activity (voting or non-voting) than those who did not volunteer (71% compared with 52%).


Statistical regression models were developed to identify the factors that influence a person's level of political engagement.¹¹ The results of these models show that, even after controlling for all other variables, volunteering or being affiliated with a group were both strongly associated with non-voting political participation. Furthermore, the more groups a person belonged to, the more non-voting activities they took part in. Similarly, if people were volunteers or involved with multiple groups, the odds that they voted increased substantially.

Interestingly, engaging in community-oriented activities as a child or teenager was positively associated with non-voting political behaviour, but not with voting. On the other hand, a strong sense of belonging to the community as a young adult resulted in higher odds of voting, but did not influence non-voting political participation.

Nearly 7 in 10 university-educated young adults participate in non-voting political behaviour

The models reveal a positive relationship between educational level and political engagement, even when controlling for other factors. Some 32% of young adults with less than a high school education engaged in at least one non-voting activity, compared with 69% of those with a university degree. Higher levels of education were also associated with higher odds of voting.

The effect of household income on political participation is mixed: 22- to 29-year-olds with household



	Odds ratio		Odds ratio
Age ¹	1.03	Region	
Youth involvement ²	1.03	Quebec	1.00
Number of groups of which a member	1.11 ³	Atlantic	0.38*
Sex		Ontario	0.30*
Female	1.00	Prairies	0.32*
Male	1.08	British Columbia	0.36*
Place of birth		Educational level	
Foreign-born	1.00	University degree	1.00
Canadian-born	4.27*	Less than high school	0.25*
Religious observance		High school graduate	0.48*
Rarely/never	1.00	Some post-secondary	0.74
Weekly	0.86	Diploma or certificate	0.68*
Sometimes	1.40*	Main activity	
Volunteer in past year		Other ⁴	1.00
No	1.00	Labour force	1.10
Yes	1.42*	Student	0.81
Sense of belonging to community		Household income	
Very weak	1.00	\$60,000 or more	1.00
Very strong	1.74*	Less than \$20,000	0.51*
Somewhat strong	1.30	\$20,000 to \$29,999	0.74
Somewhat weak	1.26	\$30,000 to \$39,999	0.75
		\$40,000 to \$49,999	1.00
		\$50,000 to \$59,999	0.66*

Note: This table presents the odds that a respondent voted in the last election prior to the survey, relative to the odds of a benchmark group when all other variables in the analysis are held constant. Benchmark group is shown in italics.

* Statistically significant difference from benchmark group (p < 0.05).

1. For each additional year, the odds of voting increase by 3%.
2. For each additional activity during youth, the odds of voting increase by 3%.
3. For each additional group, the odds of voting increase by 11%, which is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
4. "Other" includes activities such as homemaking, retirement, volunteer work or illness.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2003.

incomes under \$20,000 engaged in more non-voting behaviours than did those with household incomes of \$60,000 or more. On the other hand, young adults in low-income households had almost 50% lower odds of voting than those in high-income households, even when other factors (including student status) were taken into account.

Young adults most likely to vote in Quebec

Across the country, there are differences in the extent of political engagement. The share of young people who turned out to vote was highest in Quebec (74%), followed by the Atlantic provinces (64%), the

Prairies (56%), Ontario (53%), and British Columbia (49%), a relationship which continued after controlling for other factors.

A 2003 review of youth participation in Quebec suggests that activities beyond voting, such as pressure groups and demonstrations on issues ranging from education to anti-globalization, are also an important component of their political involvement.¹² According to the GSS, young adults in the Atlantic provinces engaged in fewer alternative political activities than their Quebec counterparts. However, the differences between other regions and Quebec were not statistically significant.

Canadian-born more politically engaged than immigrants

Some 66% of young Canadian-born adults cast a ballot in the last election prior to the survey, compared with only 29% of foreign-born youth. Of course, because Canadian citizenship is a prerequisite for voting, it is possible that not all of the foreign-born respondents to the GSS were eligible to vote. However, there would be no such restrictions on the ability to engage in non-voting political behaviour. Yet, the Canadian-born were still more likely to engage in at least one non-voting form of political behaviour: 61% compared with 44% of foreign-born. The strong relationship between place of birth and political

GST Frequency of following news and current affairs

Patterns of following news and current affairs tend to reflect other types of political participation. According to the 2003 General Social Survey, 51% of young adults in their twenties followed news and current affairs on a daily basis. An additional 31% apprised themselves several times a week, and 8% did so several times a month. This is far lower than the rates for other adults, particularly seniors, 89% of whom follow news and current affairs daily (perhaps reflecting their greater interest, more free time, or both).

The results also showed that young men were more likely to follow current affairs daily than were young women (56% compared to 46%). Voting in any type of election—municipal, provincial, or federal—was also associated with a greater likelihood of following current affairs. For example, 56% of those who had cast a ballot followed current affairs on a daily basis, compared to 45% of those who had not voted. Similarly, 57% of young adults who had engaged in a non-voting political activity followed news every day, compared to 44% of those with no such behaviour. Residents of Quebec followed the news most closely of all regions (59% did so daily), particularly compared to the Atlantic provinces (42%). Young adults who had less than a high school education were less inclined to follow the news daily (45% compared to 57% of those with a university degree).

engagement remained even when other factors, such as education, income, and province of residence, were taken into account.

Voting and non-voting behaviour go hand in hand

Although voting is a more traditional method of political behaviour than activities such as boycotting a product or signing a petition, there is a connection between these political activities. Two-thirds (66%) of young adults who voted had also engaged in at least one form of non-voting behaviour, compared to less than half (46%) of those who had not voted. This relationship held in the statistical model, even when other factors were taken into account.

In other words, young adults who went to the polls were also more apt to be politically engaged in other ways. However, it is also important to note that many individuals who did not cast a ballot still acted

in a political manner, even when they themselves might not have necessarily recognized that they were behaving politically. For example, a 2004 study of 20- to 29-year-olds found that they were fairly active in their communities, although they did not always identify their behaviour as volunteering.¹³ Many people express interest in issues and activities that could be seen as political, such as the environment or the community, but they do not always view their involvement as political engagement.

Summary

The political engagement of adults in their twenties is a complex issue. Young adults are politically involved, but in a different manner than older Canadians. Specifically, adults in their twenties voted less than any other age group; however, their rate of participation in non-voting political activities was comparable to that of

adults aged 30 to 64, and exceeded that of seniors, who have the highest voter participation rates of all age groups. Results of statistical models developed to isolate significant factors associated with engagement in the political process identified the following factors to be strongly associated with both voting and non-voting political behaviour: educational level, group involvement, and activities which promote civic-mindedness and public service, such as volunteering. Finally, young adults who voted were more likely to engage in non-voting political behaviour, but not casting a ballot did not preclude them from participating in non-voting activities.



Anne Milan is an analyst with *Canadian Social Trends*.

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Aiming high: Educational aspirations of visible minority immigrant youth

by Alison Taylor and Harvey Krahn

A longer version of this article, titled "Resilient teenagers: explaining the high educational aspirations of visible minority immigrant youth in Canada," appears in the *Journal of International Migration and Immigration*, volume 6, issue 3, November 2005.

Acquiring a postsecondary education has become increasingly important as young people seek to make educational and labour market choices that allow them to participate fully in the knowledge economy. Studies of the postsecondary attainment of young adults are informative, but it is also useful to examine the educational aspirations of teenagers. Such studies profile the value placed on different types of formal education by youth as well as perceived opportunities for upward occupational mobility.

Differences in aspirations across groups of youth and reasons for such differences are also important to consider. For example, given widespread concerns about the educational disadvantages faced by particular groups of visible minority immigrant youth, we might expect their educational aspirations to be lower than those of other Canadian teens. In fact, the opposite is true. Recent findings indicate that the educational goals of these young people are even higher than average: in 2000, some 79% of them hoped to go to university, compared with 57% of their Canadian-born non-visible minority counterparts.

Using data from the 2000 Youth in Transition Survey (YITS), this article explores the educational aspirations of 15-year-old visible minority immigrant students and compares them with those of Canadian-born youth who are not part of a visible minority group. It then identifies the most important factors that explain the large ethnocultural differences in university aspirations.

A snapshot of educational aspirations

Previous research has identified a range of socio-demographic, social psychological and school performance factors that can influence the educational aspirations of young people. Some studies focusing on visible minority and/or immigrant youth have emphasized the extent to which aspirations can be undermined by lower than average family incomes, systemic discrimination and barriers associated with having a first language other than English or French.¹

Other studies have highlighted the personal, family or community characteristics that promote high postsecondary aspirations such as higher than average parents' education levels, high parental



aspirations for their children, and "social capital" provided by ethnic communities.²

In 2000, just over 6 in 10 (61%) Canadian 15-year-olds reported that they planned on attaining one or more university degrees. A similar proportion (64%) of parents hoped their teenager would acquire one or more degrees. The completion of college or CEGEP featured as the main educational goal for 16% of

teens and 26% of parents, while only 6% of students and 3% of parents felt that high school or less was sufficient. Few students (6%) and parents (7%) mentioned a trade/vocational or apprenticeship qualification as the end goal.

Visible minority immigrant students have higher educational aspirations than others

In general, educational goals tend to be influenced by many characteristics. For example, among 15-year-olds, girls were generally more likely than boys to expect to get a postsecondary education. As well, students from larger urban centres (those with populations of 100,000 or over) were more likely than youth from smaller communities to set these goals for themselves.³ Regionally, students in Quebec were less likely to plan a university education than those in other provinces and regions. This is due to structural differences in the Quebec education system, which result in more students aiming for a college or CEGEP education.

Yet, regardless of other characteristics (gender, family structure, region, community size, and first language), visible minority immigrant students were still considerably more likely to have university aspirations than Canadian-born non-visible minority students. Among girls, for example, 84% of visible minority immigrant students compared with 63% of their Canadian-born non-visible minority counterparts planned on attending university. The corresponding proportions among boys were 75% and 51%, respectively.

The difference between the university aspirations of the two groups held across all five regions, with visible minority immigrant students having higher goals throughout the country. And although nearly two-thirds of visible minority immigrant students had a first language other than English or French, their university ambitions exceeded those of others. Within this "other language" group, 81% of visible minority immigrant

GST What you should know about this study

This article uses data from the 2000 Youth in Transition Survey (YITS) of 15-year-olds. YITS data were linked with testing scores for mathematics, science and reading from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) as well as with additional information collected from school administrators in over 1,000 schools and from parental interviews. Response rates were around 90% for schools, students and parents. Over 26,000 teenagers were interviewed, representing more than 348,000 15-year-olds across the 10 provinces, excluding those attending school on Indian reserves, those in special-needs schools, and those being home-schooled.

The educational aspirations of 15-year-olds were measured by asking "What is the highest level of education that you would like to get?" Possible responses ranged from "less than high school" to "more than one university degree." Parental aspirations were measured by asking: "What is the highest level of education that you hope [child's name] will get?" Parents were offered the same response categories.

This article focuses on differences between visible minority immigrant students¹ (first- or second-generation immigrants)² and those who were Canadian-born and not a member of a visible minority group. The majority of both first- and second-generation immigrant youth were members of a visible minority group (66% and 52%, respectively). Visible minority immigrant youth accounted for 12% of YITS participants while 75% were Canadian-born non-visible minority students. Aboriginal respondents were included in the Canadian-born non-visible minority category.

One in 10 (11%) YITS respondents were non-visible minority immigrants or members of visible minority groups but not first- or second-generation immigrants. While this "mixed" category is not shown in the table or charts in this paper, it is combined with Canadian-born non-visible minority students (as the reference category) in the logistic regression analysis. A small number (2%) of YITS participants could not be classified because of missing data.


1. Visible minorities in this article are defined based on the *Employment Equity Act* definition as persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour and include Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Japanese, Korean, other visible minorities and multiple visible minorities.
2. First-generation immigrant youths are 15-year-olds born abroad. Second generation refers to Canadian-born 15-year-olds who have at least one immigrant parent.

youth, compared with 73% of their Canadian-born non-visible minority counterparts, held on to the goal of a university education.

Nearly 4 in 10 visible minority students have university educated parents

While visible minority immigrant students have, on average, more highly educated parents, these students are also overrepresented in lower-income

Three in five 15-year-olds hope to obtain at least one university degree; parents have similar hopes for their children



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth in Transition Survey 2000.

households. For example, 35% of visible minority immigrant teenagers come from households where at least one parent has a university degree, compared with 21% of Canadian-born non-visible minority students. At the same time, 59% of visible minority immigrant students lived in households with a total annual income of less than \$60,000, compared with 46% of Canadian-born non-visible minority youth.

Despite these differences, the “visible minority immigrant” effect is apparent, regardless of the education or income level of parents. In fact, among families where neither parent has a university degree, 75% of visible minority immigrant students aspired to a university education compared with only 51% of Canadian-born non-visible minority teens. Similarly, three-quarters of visible minority immigrant youth in families with household incomes below \$30,000 aspired to a university education compared with less than half of Canadian-born non-visible minority youth in similar circumstances.

Nearly four in five visible minority immigrant youth want a university degree




	% of 15-year-olds who would like to get a university degree	
	Visible minority immigrants	Canadian-born non-visible minority youth
Total	79	57
Sex		
Female	84	63
Male	75	51
Family structure		
Single parent	79	54
Mixed/other	74	49
Nuclear family	80	59
Region		
Atlantic	93	65
Quebec	70	49
Ontario	82	60
Prairies	80	58
British Columbia	79	59
Community size		
Under 15,000	79	53
15,000 to under 100,000	80	54
100,000 to under 1,000,000	81	64
More than 1,000,000	77	71
Language first learned		
English/French	77	57
Other	81	73

Source: Statistics Canada, Youth in Transition Survey, 2000.

Parents’ hopes for their children strongly affect university aspirations

To isolate the effect of visible minority immigrant status as well as other selected characteristics on university aspirations, several logistic regression models were developed. These models describe the net effect of each variable on a 15-year-old’s hopes of getting a university education, after accounting for the effects of all other predictors. For example, after factoring out the impact of gender, family structure, region, community size, parents’ education, household income, overall grades, university preparation courses, and language first learned, the predicted probability that visible minority immigrant students would have university aspirations fell from the original 79% to 66%.

To further explain ethnocultural differences in educational aspirations, indices of parents’ school



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth in Transition Survey, 2000.

involvement, parents' supervision of the student, the student's school engagement, and the student's friends' school engagement were added to the model. Including these factors further reduced the predicted probability of visible minority immigrant students having university aspirations to 59%.

Examining the net effects of the range of other predictor variables, it appears that parents' aspirations for their child, parents' education, and overall grades have very strong positive effects on university aspirations: all produce predicted probabilities of 69% or higher. Students' school engagement, their friends' school engagement, university preparation courses and household income have moderately strong effects: the predicted probabilities range from 62% to 66%. In contrast, family structure, language first learned, parents' school involvement, and parents' supervision of their teenager had little effect on the postsecondary aspirations of Canadian 15-year-olds.

Summary

The educational aspirations of 15-year-old Canadians are very high, while those of visible minority immigrant youth are even higher. A consistent visible minority immigrant effect is observed even after accounting for a variety of socio-demographic and school performance variables. Further, disadvantages related to community size, parents' education, household income and grades appear to have less dampening effect on the educational aspirations of visible minority immigrants than on those of Canadian-born non-visible minority youth.

The logistic regression analysis shows that higher parental education and aspirations for their children, and higher grades and school engagement of visible minority immigrant youth explain a substantial amount, but certainly not all, of the visible minority immigrant effect on university aspirations. The

educational values promoted within visible minority immigrant families appear to leave a mark on young people in these families and may assist them in dealing with some of the barriers they might face within the education system.



Alison Taylor is Associate Professor of Education with the Department of Educational Policy Studies and **Harvey Krahn** is Professor of Sociology with the Department of Sociology, University of Alberta.

1. See for example, Beiser, M., A. Shik and M. Curyk. 1999. *New Canadian children and youth study: Literature review*. <http://ceris.metropolis.net> (accessed July 26, 2005); Dei, G., J. Mazucca, E. Mclsaac and J. Zine. 1997. *Reconstructing 'Drop-out': A Critical Ethnography of the Dynamics of Black Students' Disengagement from School*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press; Watt, D. and H. Roessingh. 2001. "The dynamics of ESL dropout: Plus ça change..." *The Canadian Modern Language Review* 58, 2: 203-222.
2. See for example, Statistics Canada. 2003. *Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada: Process, Progress and prospects* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-611-XIE). Anisef, P., P. Axelrod, E. Baichman-Anisef, C. James and A. Turritin. 2000. *Opportunity and Uncertainty: Life Course Experiences of the Class of '73*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press; Boyd, M. 2000. "Ethnicity and immigrant offspring." In *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada*. M. Kalbach and W. Kalbach (eds.). Toronto, ON: Harcourt.
3. For evidence on higher postsecondary attainment see, for example, Bowlby, J. and K. McMullen. 2002. *At a Crossroads: First Results for the 18- to 20-year-old Cohort of the Youth in Transition Survey* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 81-591-XIE); and Andres, L. and D. Looker. 2001. "Rurality and capital: Educational expectations and attainments of rural, urban/rural, and metropolitan youth." *Canadian Journal of Higher Education* 31, 2: 1-46.



KEEPING TRACK

Canada's Aboriginal population in 2017



The Aboriginal population could account for roughly 4.1% of Canada's population by 2017, when the nation celebrates its 150th anniversary. The Aboriginal population has been growing much faster than the total population, a trend which will continue. The Aboriginal population is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 1.8%, compared to 0.7% for the general population. The biggest contributing factor is fertility, as the current Aboriginal birth rate is about 1.5 times the overall Canadian rate. By 2017, there would be 971,200 North American Indians (68% of the Aboriginal population), 380,500 Métis (27%) and 68,400 Inuit (5%). The biggest challenge confronting the Aboriginal population by 2017 would be the large number of young adults aged 20 to 29 entering the labour market. This age group is projected to increase by over 40% to 242,000, more than four times the projected growth rate of 9% among the same age group in the general population.

Projections of the Aboriginal populations

Catalogue no. 91-547

Personal safety



A growing proportion of Canadians are satisfied that they are safe from crime. In 2004 almost all (94%) thought they were safe from becoming a victim, up from 86% in 1993 and 91% in 1999. Overall, 95% of men and 93% of women felt safe from crime, but specific situations revealed substantial differences between the sexes. For example, 58% of female night-time transit users worried when taking transit alone at night, versus only 29% of male night-time users. Likewise, 27% of women worried when they were home alone at night, compared with only 12% of men. Women were almost three times as likely to be afraid for their safety when walking alone after dark.

General Social Survey on Victimization, Cycle 18: An Overview of Findings

Catalogue no. 85-565

Gift cards



Gift cards resembling credit cards are resulting in a shift of retail sales. During the Christmas season of 2003, 53% of 80 of the nation's largest retailers offered gift cards. Only a year later this proportion had increased to two-thirds (68%). On average, stores that introduced the cards had higher sales. Among those stores that introduced the cards in 2004, sales per store amounted to \$10 million, up from \$9.4 million in 2003. In contrast, sales for the group of stores that did not offer gift cards were only \$3.3 million per store in 2004. For those that offered the cards in both years, sales per store amounted to \$10.9 million in each year.

"A Win-win way to give" Analysis in Brief

Catalogue no. 11-621-MIE2005029

Youth court statistics



Judges heard 70,465 cases during the 2004 fiscal year, down 17% from the previous year. It was the single largest annual decline since 1992, the first year for which complete national data coverage was available from the Youth Court Survey.

Overall, the youth court caseload has declined by one-third since 1992, primarily due to the steady drop in the number of cases involving crimes against property.

The *Youth Criminal Justice Act*, introduced in April 2003, emphasizes keeping the less serious cases out of court by dealing with them less formally while still stressing the importance of providing meaningful consequences for youth, such as repairing any harm done to victims.

The rate of youth who received a warning, caution, referral to community program, or no further action by the police in lieu of charges, increased by 30%.

Juristat vol. 25, no. 4

Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE

Getting to work

by Andrew Heisz and Sébastien LaRoche-Côté

This article has been adapted from "Work and commuting in census metropolitan areas, 1996-2001," the seventh research paper in the new Statistics Canada series entitled *Trends and Conditions in Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas*. For a full list of references, please see the original paper, which is available free of charge at www.statcan.ca/english/research/89-613-MIE2005007.pdf.

How people get to their place of work depends, among other things, on where they live, where they work and what type of transportation is available to them. Traditionally, the majority of people have commuted from their residence in the suburbs to their place of work in the city. Consequently, public transit systems transport most commuters from suburbs to the urban core.

In recent years, however, commuting patterns have become more complex as employment has grown more rapidly in the suburbs than in city core areas. While the city centre still dominates as location of work, its relative importance has declined. Faced with few convenient public transit options, the increasing numbers of people who now commute cross-town to jobs in these suburbs overwhelmingly drive to work.

Using data from the Census of Population, this article examines commuting patterns between 1996 and 2001 as they relate to recent job growth in the suburbs. It briefly looks at the demographic characteristics of commuters and explores some of the implications that changing work locations and commute patterns have for infrastructure in Canadian cities.

GST What you should know about this study

Data in this article come from the 1996 and 2001 Censuses of Population. The Census is administered to the entire population of the country, but more detailed questions were sent to one in five Canadian households. These questions covered information about place of work and mode of transportation respondents most frequently use to commute from home to work. This study focuses primarily on the population aged 15 and over who reported a specific place of work. Individuals working at home, working outside the country or with no fixed workplace address were excluded from the analysis.

Census metropolitan area (CMA): the area formed by one or more municipalities centred on a large urban area (known as the urban core) with a population of at least 100,000. To be included in the CMA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area, as measured by urban flows. The following is the list of CMAs as of 2001: St. John's, Halifax, Saint John, Saguenay, Québec, Sherbrooke, Trois Rivières, Montréal, Ottawa-Gatineau, Kingston, Oshawa, Toronto, Hamilton, St. Catharines-Niagara, Kitchener, London, Windsor, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, Edmonton, Abbotsford, Vancouver and Victoria.

CMA workers: respondents who worked in a CMA, but did not necessarily live in the same CMA. They could have lived in another CMA or in a non-CMA area. For example, many individuals working in Toronto actually live in Oshawa or Hamilton.

City centre: defined in relation to the location of city hall in the core municipality.

Employment cluster: areas of high employment concentration. Employment clusters are a group of census tracts or a single census tract where employment is greater than the population. Each tract has a place of work of at least 5,000 workers. This article focuses specifically on primary clusters, which have at least one tract with 15,000 or more workers.

Driving is by far the most popular way of getting to work

For most workers, the commute is a basic fact of life. In virtually all census metropolitan areas (CMAs), more than half of all workers commuted more than 5 km to get to work, and for some, the commute was longer than 25 km. In Oshawa and Hamilton, 31% and 19% of commuters, respectively, travelled more than 25 km to work, probably to jobs in the nearby CMA of Toronto.

The vast majority of commuters drive a car to work. While Ottawa–Gatineau, Montréal and Toronto have the best records for diverting commuters to something other than a “car as driver” mode of transport, nearly two-thirds of commuters in these CMAs still drive to work. In at least 10 CMAs, the proportion of commuters travelling to work by driving a car is 80% or higher.¹

Employment growth concentrated in suburbs

In most urban centres, jobs are still heavily concentrated in downtown core areas. Between 1996 and 2001, however, the relative economic importance of these downtown locations declined, as the number of jobs in the suburbs increased more than four times faster than in the core areas. As a result, more and more people are commuting cross-town to these suburban areas.

In Toronto, for example, where more of the job growth was in the suburbs, 208,300 more workers commuted to workplaces farther than 20 km from the city centre in 2001 than in 1996. Nearly 90% of these commuters travelled by car, increasing the number of car commuters both within the CMA of Toronto (12%) and to locations more than 20 km from the city centre (26%).

One of the characteristics of growing suburban employment was the shifting of manufacturing activities to the suburbs. In Toronto, the proportion of manufacturing workers in areas at least 20 km from

	Location of job	
	Within 5 km of city centre	More than 5 km from city centre
	Change in the number of jobs, 1996-2001	
	('000)	
All CMAs	156	733.2
St. John's	-1.8	6.9
Halifax	-0.2	15.1
Saint John	-1.1	4.4
Saguenay	-0.1	1.5
Québec	-2.2	15.2
Sherbrooke	1.6	4.3
Trois Rivières	-2.2	1.4
Montréal	31.9	102.5
Ottawa–Gatineau	11.9	51.7
Kingston	-3.4	6.0
Oshawa	0.8	10.3
Toronto	72.7	237.2
Hamilton	-2.3	14.7
St. Catharines–Niagara	0.5	9.4
Kitchener	2.3	20.1
London	2.9	15.5
Windsor	4.6**	7.2**
Greater Sudbury	-3.4	1.6
Thunder Bay	-2.4	-0.3
Winnipeg	-3.3	21.8
Regina	2.4	1.8
Saskatoon	3.8	4.7
Calgary	29.7	52.7
Edmonton	4.2	51.3
Abbotsford	4.1	2.4
Vancouver	4.8	68.8
Victoria	0.2	5.0

Note: Includes all individuals aged 15 and over working at a usual place of work within CMAs.
 * City centre is defined as the census tract where the city hall of the core municipality is located.
 ** Windsor values are “within 10 km of” and “more than 10 km from” city centre.
 Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population, 1996 and 2001.

the city centre rose from 51% in 1996 to 57% in 2001. Retail trade, as well as lower skilled and lower paid jobs, also shifted towards more suburban locations. In contrast, city centre jobs were more likely to be high paid, high skilled and in producer services. For example, in Vancouver, workers employed within 5 km of the city centre earned \$51,300 on average in 2001. In comparison, individuals who

worked between 10 and 15 km from downtown had average earnings of \$46,500 that same year.

Access to public transit varies with location of work

Because public transit systems are centrally-focused, it is not surprising to find that those who work in city centres are most likely to commute via public transit. For these people,

public transit is often available and convenient. Some 59% of workers heading for the central business district (CBD)² in Toronto, 55% in Montréal and 38% in Ottawa–Gatineau used public transit for their commute. In Winnipeg, the proportion of CBD workers commuting on public transit was only 27% but this was still more than twice the rate of those in other employment clusters (12%).

In contrast, relatively small shares of commuters travelling to suburban jobs take public transit to work. For instance, 28% of workers in the Montréal North cluster (the intersection of Highways 15 and 40) arrive by public transit, while in Montréal East (Anjou) the figure is only 18%. The situation in other CMAs is similar with relatively few commuters travelling to employment clusters outside CBDs by public transit.

According to some researchers, suburban employers encourage non-transit commuting through the locations they favour and their patterns of land-use. Employment locations are often chosen for their accessibility to major expressways, airports or other transportation nodes, rather than their proximity to local labour markets or public transit centres. Abundant land zoned for employment purposes allows companies to build low-lying warehouses, large factory floors and sprawling parking lots, which together contribute to low employment densities in such areas. In turn, these low densities impede the efficient transportation of workers to these sites on public transit.

Commute patterns are becoming more complex

Over recent years, commute patterns have become more complex. Compared to past decades, commutes are occurring more often within or between suburban locations, or have their origin in the city centre and their destination in the suburbs.³

Commutes can be divided into five different categories: (1) *within the city centre*, that is, both residence and job are located within 10 km of the city centre; (2) *traditional commutes*, where

the job is within 10 km of the city centre and the residence is further than 10 km from the city centre; (3) *reverse commutes*, where job location is more than 10 km from the city centre and the residence within 10 km of the city centre; (4) *short suburban (or within-suburb) commutes*, where both the residence and job locations are farther than 10 km from the city centre, and the commute distance is less than 10 km; and (5) *long suburban (or between-suburb) commutes*, where both the residence and job locations are over 10 km from the city centre, and the commute distance is more than 10 km.⁴

As the three largest CMAs, Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver have smaller shares of commutes within the city centre zone and along the “traditional” commuting pattern of suburb to downtown, and larger shares within and between suburbs than other CMAs. However, Québec, Montréal, Ottawa–Gatineau, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver (the eight largest CMAs) all have similar shares of workers travelling reverse commutes.

Non-traditional commutes are on the rise

The years between 1996 and 2001 saw substantial increases in the proportion of non-traditional commutes. For example, in Ottawa–Gatineau the number of reverse commuters grew by nearly 40%, probably reflecting fast employment growth in the west-end cluster of Kanata. Calgary, likewise, saw reverse commuters grow by 42%. Long suburban commutes became more common in most CMAs, with the number of commuters travelling more than 10 km to work rising by 38% in Calgary, 19% in Ottawa–Gatineau, 17% in Toronto, and 13% in Edmonton.

In Ottawa–Gatineau, 19% of new commuters joining the rush hour between 1996 and 2001 were reverse commuters, 22% were short-suburban commuters, and 19% were long suburban commuters. In Toronto, the lion’s share of the new commuters were travelling outside the downtown core (36% short suburban commutes and 37% long suburban commutes).

In all CMAs, the percentage of workers taking public transit was lower on non-traditional than on

GST The number of reverse commuters grew dramatically in several CMAs**

	Types of commutes					
	All	City centre* to city centre	Traditional (outside to inside city centre)	Reverse (inside to outside city centre)	Within suburb (less than 10 km)	Between suburbs (more than 10 km)**
	% growth, 1996 to 2001					
Québec	4	3	1	11	18	2
Montréal	9	9	2	10	15	9
Ottawa–Gatineau	13	7	7	40	33	19
Toronto	14	11	12	3	18	17
Winnipeg	6	8	-6	29	12	5
Calgary	20	6	25	42	77	38
Edmonton	14	8	10	24	46	13
Vancouver	9	10	12	-3	11	5

* For this table, the city centre is defined as being within 10 km of the central municipality’s city hall.
 ** Includes commutes from outside CMA to inside CMA.
 Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population, 1996 and 2001.

traditional commuter routes. This is not surprising, given the city centre focus of public transit systems in the largest urban areas. Whether or not public transit is a feasible option for between-suburb commuters, some individuals may prefer to drive to work because of cost, timeliness or convenience.

Distance between home, job and city centre linked to how people commute

Several geographic characteristics are also associated with commuting behaviour: commuting distance or the distance from home to job; residence distance, or the distance from home to the city centre (which reflects the degree of suburbanization of the worker); and employment distance, or the distance between the job and the city centre (which reflects the degree of suburbanization of the job). As the commuting distance grows longer, public transit may become less available or less convenient than the car. For example, travelling longer distances generally involves transfers which, in turn, imply more time spent in transit, a situation that encourages driving to work instead.

Not surprisingly, then, commuters who lived farther away from work in 2001 were more likely to drive than those who lived closer. Nevertheless, 57% of those living less than 5 km from work also used their car to get to their job. All in all, workers who lived 5 to 10 km from work were the most likely to take public transit, individuals who lived farther preferred driving, and a significant share of those living closer to work walked.

Commuting patterns were similar when location of work relative to the downtown core was examined: those who worked and lived close to the city centre tended to take public transit, while individuals working and living farther away were more likely to drive.

Summary

The vast majority of commuters drive to work. However, location of home and work also influence the choice of transportation. The public transit system is not very popular for individuals working in the increasing number of relatively new suburban work locations. Therefore, people who work in city centres are most likely to commute on public transit, while those whose jobs are in the

suburbs overwhelmingly drive to work. As commute patterns become more complex with the creation of new work places in the suburbs, cities will face the challenging task of encouraging their residents to make more use of public transit.



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1. These CMAs are Saguenay, Sherbrooke, Trois Rivières, Oshawa, St. Catharines–Niagara, Kitchener, Windsor, Thunder Bay, Regina and Abbotsford.
 2. The central business district is an area of high-employment concentration located in the downtown core of the CMA, and is made of a group of contiguous census tracts in which employment is greater than the population and in which each tract is the place of work of at least 5,000 workers.
 3. Statistics Canada. 2003. *Where Canadians Work and How They Get there, 2001 Census* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001010).
 4. This last category also includes those who work in the CMA but live outside the CMA.

Ethnocultural diversity in Canada: Prospects for 2017

by Alain Bélanger and Éric Caron Malenfant

This article is adapted from *Population projections of visible minority groups, Canada, provinces and regions: 2001-2017* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE), published in March 2005. The report is available free from the Statistics Canada website at www.statcan.ca/cgi-bin/downpub/listpub.cgi?catno=91-541-XIE2005001.

Canada's ethnic and cultural makeup is undergoing rapid change, especially in major urban centres. Sustained immigration from non-European countries has increased Canada's cultural diversity in recent decades. Statistics from the 2001 Census of Population show an increase in the number and proportion of immigrants, people whose mother tongue is neither English nor French, members of visible minority groups, and people whose religion is non-Christian.

These developments present decision-makers with a number of challenges, particularly in the areas of urban development, labour market integration, health and social services, and public institutions. It is understandable that one would want to consider how the country's ethnocultural landscape is likely to evolve over the next several years.

This article uses Statistics Canada's most recent population projections for visible minority groups to draw a picture of the possible ethnocultural composition of the country when Canada celebrates its 150th anniversary in 2017.¹ It focuses on a number of issues: How many Canadians might belong to a visible minority group in the near future?

GST What you should know about this study

The data in this article were taken from Statistics Canada's most recent population projections for visible minorities for the period 2001 to 2017. These projections are designed to produce plausible scenarios based on assumptions about the evolution of the demographic components of the population. They are not to be regarded as predictions, but rather as one of several aids available to program planners and policy-makers.

Five scenarios were developed for analytical purposes. One of the scenarios, the so-called low-growth scenario, uses the assumptions of relatively low immigration and fertility, along with internal migration levels consistent with those observed in the 2001 Census. A high-growth scenario is based on relatively high fertility and immigration assumptions. A third scenario, *the reference scenario*, reflects the impact that recent trends in the components of demographic change have on the projected population, while the fourth scenario uses slightly different assumptions about internal migration. The fifth scenario illustrates the effect that higher immigration levels (equivalent to 1% of the total population) might have on the size, age structure and ethnocultural composition of the Canadian population.

Visible minority: Under the *Employment Equity Act*, members of visible minorities are "persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". The 10 visible minority groups included are the Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Japanese and Korean groups.

How many landed immigrants might there be? What are the predominant visible minority groups likely to be? Is

diversity likely to remain concentrated in Canada's major urban centres?

One Canadian in five could be a visible minority person in 2017

Depending on the projection scenario used, Canada's visible minority population could number between 6.3 million and 8.5 million in 2017; that is, it could be anywhere from 56% to 111% larger than in 2001. Under the *reference scenario*, the visible minority population would grow by 76%, to 7.1 million persons. In contrast, the rest of the population would increase by only 1% to 7%. This scenario continues the trends evident between 1981 and 2001, when the visible minority population increased from 1.1 to 4.0 million.

By 2017, about one Canadian in five could be a member of a visible minority group. This contrasts with 13% in 2001 and less than 5% of the Canadian population in 1981. A number of factors account for this increase. Certainly the most important is sustained immigration because visible minority persons make up a high percentage of newcomers.² Other factors include a higher fertility³ and higher life expectancy,⁴ as well as a younger age structure resulting in fewer deaths and more births among visible minority groups than the rest of the population.


Under the reference scenario, visible minority groups would account for about 85% of overall population growth in 2017. They would account for most of the increase attributable to migratory growth (which will be the primary driver of population growth) as well as the largest share of growth due to natural increase.

Same proportion of immigrants as in the early 20th century

Canada, along with Australia, is different from most other Western countries in that immigrants comprise a much larger share of its population. In 2001, 18% of Canada's population was foreign-born, a far higher proportion than in the United States and most European countries.⁵




One Canadian in five could be a visible minority in 2017



Note: Projections are based on the reference scenario, which uses assumptions based on trends observed in the 2001 Census and preceding years. See "What you should know about this study" for details.
Sources: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population, and Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE.



In 2017, the proportion of immigrants in Canada could equal that observed in the early 20th century



Note: Projections are based on the reference scenario, which uses assumptions based on trends observed in the 2001 Census and the preceding years. See "What you should know about this study" for details.
Sources: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population, and Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE.

Subject to the immigration levels set for the projection scenario, Canada's immigrant population would be between 7.0 million and 9.3 million in 2017. This represents an increase of 24% to 65% over 2001, when immigrants numbered 5.4 million. Over the same period, the non-immigrant population in Canada would grow much more modestly, a rate ranging from 4% to 12%. Under the reference scenario, immigrants would account for 22% of the total population in 2017. The last time immigrants comprised such a high percentage of the Canadian population was in the early decades of the 20th century, between 1911 and 1931.

In 2001, a little more than two-thirds of the visible minority population had been born outside Canada. In 2017, according to the reference scenario, this proportion would remain about the same, with 4.8 million of 7.1 million visible minority persons being immigrants. However, the number of visible minority persons born in Canada could almost double between 2001 and 2017, to reach 2.3 million people.

South Asians and Chinese would remain the largest visible minority groups

Visible minority populations vary a great deal in terms of origin, linguistic characteristics and religious affiliations. There is also considerable variation in the size of visible minority groups in Canada. In 2001, the Chinese and South Asians were the two largest groups; in 2017, they are projected to remain the largest and to account for almost half of all visible minority persons.

But while the Chinese were more numerous than the South Asian group in 2001, the latter may catch up by 2017. The South Asian group has a higher fertility rate than the Chinese and almost as large a share of immigration. Consequently, it is projected that the South Asian population could grow by 72% to 137% between 2001 and 2017,

compared with 51% to 111% for the Chinese population (depending on the projection).

The third and fourth largest visible minority groups in 2017 would be the Black and the Filipino populations. Under the projection scenarios, Blacks would number 950,000 to 1.2 million and Filipinos between 476,000 and 650,000, both populations up sharply compared with 2001.


The highest growth rates between now and 2017 are projected for the West Asian, Korean and Arab groups. Under most of the projection scenarios, their populations would more than double over this period. However, in absolute terms, their numbers would remain small relative to the Chinese, South Asian and Black groups.

Continued high concentrations in the major urban areas

The changing ethnocultural characteristics of the Canadian population would continue to be most apparent in Canada's largest urban areas, as this is where most immigrants

settle. Indeed, more than 70% of the immigrants who came to Canada between 1996 and 2001 chose to live in the census metropolitan areas (CMAs) of Montréal, Toronto or Vancouver. For many of these immigrants, the presence of family and friends in these cities was a key reason for their decision to move there.⁶

The concentration of visible minority persons in large urban areas mirrors the pattern among recent immigrants. Nearly 95% of visible minority persons would live in one of Canada's 27 CMAs in 2017, roughly the same proportion as in 2001. Moreover, under the projection scenarios, nearly 75% of visible minorities would live in the CMAs of Montréal, Toronto or Vancouver compared with just over one-quarter of the rest of the population. In 2017, Toronto alone would have 2.8 to 3.9 million visible minority residents, Vancouver 1.1 to 1.5 million, and Montréal between 666,000 and 895,000.



Half of population in Toronto and Vancouver may be visible minority by 2017

Depending on the projection scenario used, the CMA of Toronto would have a population of 5.8 to 7.1 million, about one-half of whom (2.8 to 3.9 million) would be visible minority persons; this compares with 37% in 2001. Vancouver is projected to have a population of 1.1 to 1.5 million visible minority persons in 2017, accounting for 47% to 53% of the population. In 2001, visible minorities accounted for 36% of Vancouver's total population.

Under the reference scenario, visible minority groups are projected to account for between 23% and 28% of the total populations in the CMAs of Ottawa, Abbotsford, Calgary and Windsor. It is worth noting that ethnocultural diversity is not limited to Canada's largest urban centres; even in smaller CMAs such as Windsor and Abbotsford, about one-quarter of the population may be composed of visible minority groups by 2017.

Summary

The population projections discussed in this article point to the changing ethnocultural composition of the Canadian population until 2017. The number of Canadians who belong to a visible minority group would continue to grow more rapidly than the rest of the population. By 2017, visible minority groups would account for about half of the residents in the CMAs of Toronto and Vancouver. Immigration is the driving force behind this development, although differing age structures and fertility rates among different groups play a role as well.



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Visible minority groups could comprise half the population of Toronto and Vancouver by 2017

	Number of visible minority persons ('000)		Percent of total population	
	2001	2017	2001	2017
Canada	4,038	7,121	13	21
<i>Census metropolitan area</i>				
Toronto	1,753	3,194	37	51
Vancouver	741	1,261	36	49
Montréal	454	749	13	19
Ottawa–Gatineau*	139	316	17	28
Calgary	166	295	17	24
Edmonton	136	211	14	18
Hamilton	64	125	9	15
Winnipeg	84	115	12	16
Windsor	40	97	13	23
Kitchener	45	79	10	15
<i>Rest of Canada</i>	418	679	3	4

Note: Projections are based on the reference scenario, which uses assumptions based on trends observed in the 2001 Census and the preceding years. See "What you should know about this study" for details.

* Ontario part only.

Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE.

1. The method, assumptions and results associated with the projections are described in detail in *Population projections of visible minority groups, Canada, provinces and regions, 2001-2017* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE), 2005. This can be consulted free of charge on Statistics Canada's website at www.statcan.ca.
2. During the 1990s, on average, 225,000 immigrants arrived in Canada annually and about 70% of them were visible minorities.
3. The analyses on which the population projection assumptions were based established that in 2000/01, the total fertility rate was 1.7 children per visible minority woman and about 1.5 children per white woman. For more on the fertility of Canada's immigrants and visible minorities, see A. Bélanger and S. Gilbert. 2003. "The fertility of immigrant women and their Canadian-born daughters." *Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada 2002, Current Demographic Analysis*, (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 91-209-XPE).
4. Mortality studies conducted for the projections estimated the life expectancy of visible minorities at 79.7 years for men and 84.3 years for women, compared with 76.2 years and 82.5 years for the rest of the population in 2001. These differences are due to the low mortality rates of recent immigrants, who are proportionally more numerous in the visible minority population. For more on the life expectancy of immigrants to Canada, see J. Chen, R. Wilkins and E. Ng, "Health expectancy by immigrant status, 1986 and 1991." *Health Reports* vol. 8, no. 3 (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 82-003) 1996.
5. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trends in International Migration, 2003 Annual Report*, SOPEMI Editions, 2004.
6. Statistics Canada. September 4, 2003. "Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, 2001." *The Daily* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-001).

The housing transitions of seniors

by Jane Lin

Soaring sales of new and existing homes in 2004 brought to the forefront questions about the types of housing transitions people make at various stages in their lives: first-time homebuyers just starting out, families who have outgrown their homes, and seniors who are moving to accommodate their change in lifestyle. In fact, the housing transition patterns of seniors had been the focus of some attention in 2004 against a backdrop of concerns about the dwindling demand for rental properties.¹

This article takes a closer look at this last group—seniors who downsize, those who upsize and others who move for lifestyle reasons. Using data from the longitudinal Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) from 1999 to 2001, the article identifies the characteristics of senior movers, the life events associated with their move, and the various types of housing transitions they made.

Seniors make up a small fraction of movers

An estimated 240,000 seniors (those aged 65 and older) made a residential move between 1999 and 2001. But while seniors accounted for 17% of the population aged 25 years and older, they were under-represented among movers at 9%. In contrast, the youngest age group, the 25- to 34-year-olds, accounted for more than their fair share; they represented 39% of movers, but accounted for just 21% of the population.



It is interesting to compare senior movers with pre-seniors (those aged 55 to 64) given that these two groups comprise roughly the same proportion of movers. Pre-seniors made up 14% of the population and accounted for 8% of movers. In addition, housing decisions made by pre-seniors may hint at future patterns and housing needs as baby boomers enter their senior years.

When senior Canadians moved, three-quarters of them stayed within 50 kilometres of their former residence. Their primary reason for moving was the desire to live in a smaller home, followed by purchasing or building a home, wanting to be close to family, relocating to a better neighbourhood, a decline in health, and access to more recreation and leisure activities.²

Nearly one-half of senior movers are married

What are senior movers like as a group? To examine their profile, one needs to look at a breakdown of their characteristics. For example, nearly one-half of senior movers were married, more than three in

five owned their homes, and about three in five were women. In terms of life events, the vast majority did not have anyone join (89%) or leave (79%) the family between 1999 and 2001. And during these three years, only 5% experienced the death of their spouse.

Widowed seniors are more likely to move than their married counterparts

While married/common-law seniors moved at a rate of 7%, their widowed counterparts had a significantly higher moving rate (12%). In contrast, divorced seniors moved at nearly the same rate (8%) as married individuals. Perhaps by the time people have finalized their divorces, they have already made the transition to a new living arrangement and have been settled in their homes for some time.

Senior renters were more than twice as likely to move as owners (14% versus 7%), perhaps because those who own their homes feel more settled and stable in their living quarters. A similar relationship exists between the moving rates of seniors

This article uses data from the longitudinal Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to follow seniors and pre-seniors who made a residential move and to look at the types of housing transitions they made. Housing transitions include changes in tenure status from renter to owner or vice versa, and moving from a smaller to larger home or from a larger to smaller home (measured in terms of the number of bedrooms).

The sample in this study consists of seniors, those 65 years old and older (7,502 individuals), and pre-seniors, 55 to 64 years old (5,497 individuals), in 1999 who lived in private households in the 10 provinces. Only those who were present in the survey for all three years (1999, 2000 and 2001) were included in this study.

Movers versus non-movers: If seniors changed residences between 1999 and 2001, they were called “movers.” If not, they were classified as “non-movers.”

Life events occurred at any time during the three years from 1999 to 2001 to any member of the person’s economic family, that is, members who lived in the same household and were related by blood, marriage, common-law or adoption. As an example: A senior widow, who lives with her adult son, is said to have had a *marriage in the family* if her son was married during the course of the study.

Housing tenure: Owner households have at least one member of the household who owns the home. For simplicity, a household which does not own its residence is assumed

to be renting. The study looks at tenure only in 1999 and 2001, not in 2000. Thus, multiple movers, who represented 15% of senior movers and 15% of pre-senior movers, were categorized as owners for all three years if the tenure pattern was owner in year one, renter in year two, and owner again in year three.

Downsize: If a senior was a mover, then the number of bedrooms in 2001 was compared to the number of bedrooms in 1999. If the number of bedrooms decreased, then these seniors were said to have “downsized” to a home with fewer bedrooms; if the number of bedrooms increased, an “upsized” had occurred. Changes in tenure status were then investigated within the downsizer group. A limitation of using this variable is that the number of bedrooms is only an estimate of downsizing at the time of the study. Because unused bedrooms may sometimes be reported as a den/computer room or vice versa, number of rooms or size of the dwelling in square feet or metres would have been a preferred measure had it been available.

Logistic regression was used to examine the determinants of moving for older Canadians 55 years and over. Logistic regression estimates the probability that a particular outcome—in this study, a residential move—will occur as a function of several explanatory variables. The association between each explanatory variable and the probability of moving is examined while holding all other variables constant.

living in apartments (13%) and those who reside in houses (7%).

Seniors who had a person leave the family moved at a significantly higher rate than those whose family stayed unchanged (16% versus 8%). This shift in household composition could reflect new needs for space, or preferences for different lifestyles. For example, after an adult son leaves his elderly mother’s home, she might decide to move into a more senior-friendly dwelling that is easier to maintain.

The patterns of moving rates for pre-seniors aged 55 to 64 were similar to those of seniors.

Seniors are more likely to move when they are renters...

A logistic regression model was used to see if certain life events and characteristics were linked to a senior’s likelihood of moving. To illustrate this, a reference person with a specific set of features was chosen. By varying each characteristic one at a time, while holding all others constant, the impact of the specific characteristic on the probability of moving can be seen. The selected characteristics were those most frequently occurring among seniors: the reference senior was a woman who was married or living common-

law, had an annual after-tax family income of \$20,500 to \$31,999, lived in an owned house³ and did not experience any of the life events. According to the regression results, this woman had nearly a 5% chance of moving between 1999 and 2001.

Regardless of age, when all other factors are held constant, renters were more likely to have moved than owners. Among pre-seniors, however, renters were more than twice as likely to have moved as owners, while among seniors, renters were roughly one and a half times more likely than owners to have changed residences. For pre-seniors, renting could be

Estimated number	Senior movers	Moving rate	
	239,000	Seniors	Pre-seniors
	%		%
Total		9	10
Male	40	8	10
Female	60	9	10
Marital status (1999)			
Married/common-law	49	7	9
Separated	3	17	26*
Divorced	4	8	13
Widowed	36	12*	15*
Single (never married)	7	12	13
Tenure (1999)			
Owned	62	7	8
Rented	38	14*	21*
Housing type (1999)			
House	59	7	8
Apartment	41	13*	17*
Income (1999)¹			
Under \$20,500	28	10	13
\$20,500-\$31,999	29	8	10
\$32,000-\$45,299	26	11*	10
\$45,300-\$63,999	7	4*	12
\$64,000 and over	10	8	7*
Life events (1999, 2000, 2001)			
Person joined family/marriage in family			
Yes	11	18*	20*
No	89	8	9
Person left family/separation in family			
Yes	21	16*	17*
No	79	8	9
Death of spouse			
Yes	5	11	9
No	95	9	F

Note: Reference categories are marked in italics.

* Significantly different from reference category (p < 0.05).

F Too unreliable to be published.

1. Annual after-tax family income was split into five groups, each representing roughly 20% of all families.

Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2001.

or common-law. Interestingly, those who were divorced or single (never married) were not significantly more likely to have moved than their married counterparts when other factors in the model were held constant. Seniors living in apartments also had a slightly higher chance of moving (7%) than those who lived in houses.⁴

...or someone leaves or joins the family

Seniors who experienced a separation in their family during the past three years, such as a family member moving out, were twice as likely to move (11%) as those who had not experienced these life events.

Similarly, if a person joined the family or if there was a marriage in the family, the chance of the senior moving rose, once again, to 9%. Since these events could happen at any point during the three years, the move might have occurred in anticipation of or subsequent to a change in family composition.

Death of spouse lowers chances of moving

Seniors whose spouse died during the three years of the study had a lower chance (3%) of moving in 2000 or 2001 than those who were still married, all other things being equal. Because death of one's spouse is one of the most traumatic life events, it is possible that the surviving partner does not want to compound this stress even further by moving to another location at this time.


It may appear puzzling that, while death of a spouse was associated with a lower probability of moving, being widowed was linked to a higher probability of doing so. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that seniors who were widows may have lost their spouse many years ago, while those who reported the death of their spouse went through this life event quite recently.⁵

a temporary solution as they face retirement and/or become empty nesters. Meanwhile, for many seniors, especially older ones, renting may be a more permanent choice and they may also be less inclined to move in the future.

... they are widowed or separated...


The predicted probability of moving between 1999 and 2001 was higher for widowed (7%) or separated (9%) seniors than for those who were married

Seniors were most likely to move if someone left or joined the family



Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2001.

Seniors were more likely to downsize than pre-seniors



* Statistically significant difference between seniors and pre-seniors ($p < 0.05$).
Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2001.

Two in five senior movers downsize to smaller home

Between 1999 and 2001, 43% of seniors who moved downsized to a residence with fewer bedrooms. Another 38% moved to a home with the same number of bedrooms and the remaining 20% moved up in size to a place with more bedrooms. In contrast, most pre-seniors who moved chose a home with the same number of bedrooms (41%), about one-third (33%) downsized, and roughly one-quarter (26%) moved up in size.

Seniors who downsized tended to move from a house into an apartment or from one house into another house, and the majority also lived in a single generation household. Other studies confirm these senior living arrangements, in which nearly three in four seniors lived alone or with his/her spouse or common-law partner.⁶

While the reasons seniors downsize are clear,⁷ their reasons for up-sizing—and one in five senior movers do so—are less obvious. It could be that these seniors up-sized to accommodate a live-in caregiver,⁸ or perhaps they moved in with extended family. Furthermore, many of the seniors who up-sized were living in a single generation household in 1999 either by themselves or with a spouse, as opposed to living with their children or grandchildren. Most moved from one house to another house or from an apartment into a house.

Older seniors are more likely than younger seniors to favour apartments over houses. According to the 2001 Census, 70% of all seniors lived in houses and 29% in apartments. However, among older seniors—those 85 years and over—58% lived in houses and 41% in apartments.⁹ Older seniors may trade their houses for apartments to reduce home maintenance costs or the amount of work it takes to keep up a home with a driveway, backyard and all their associated chores.

GST Most seniors live in private homes

The vast majority of Canadian seniors live in private dwellings. According to the 2001 Census, of the total 3.9 million individuals aged 65 and over, 93% lived in private homes and the rest in collective dwellings.¹

According to the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), between 1999 and 2001 only 1% of seniors moved from a private dwelling into an institution. Results from the National Population Health Survey (NPHS) also showed that from 1994/95 to 1996/97, 1.7% of the senior household population moved from a private dwelling into an institution for long-term care. Most of these movers were older seniors, with 54% of them aged 80 years and over.²

Certain health conditions were found to be strongly linked to the likelihood of seniors living in a long-term health-care facility. Advanced age, lack of a spouse and few sources of income were also associated with institutionalization.³

1. Collective dwellings include, among others: hospitals, nursing care homes, and residences for seniors and facilities for the disabled. For more information on Census definitions of collective dwellings, please refer to the 2001 Census Dictionary available on-line at www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Reference/dict/index.htm.
2. Statistics Canada. June 25, 1999. "National Population Health Survey, Cycle 2 - Residents of health care institutions." *The Daily*.
3. Trottier, H., L. Martel, C. Houle, J. Berthelot and J. Légaré. Spring 2000. "Living at home or an institution; what makes the difference for seniors?" *Health Reports* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 82-003): 11, 4.

Most senior downsizers left home ownership to rent

Many seniors who downsized also sold their homes in favour of renting.¹⁰ While in 1999 nearly three-quarters (72%) of senior downsizers owned their home, by 2001 this proportion dropped to 29%. Overall, a smaller proportion of pre-seniors than seniors downsized during their last move.

While 43% of seniors who downsized sold their homes to rent, only 20% of pre-senior downsizers were in this situation. Most pre-seniors were owners to begin with and stayed owners even as they moved into a home with fewer bedrooms (45%). Just over one-quarter of pre-senior downsizers (27%) remained renters.

Summary

The proportion of movers who were seniors was small between 1999 and 2001. However, the total number of senior movers is likely to be on the increase in the years ahead as the baby boom cohort enters its senior years. This analysis showed that having a person leave or join the family, being widowed or separated, living in an apartment, and being a renter, was each associated with a higher likelihood of a move for the senior reference person. Conversely, the death of a senior's spouse was associated with a lower chance of a residential move.

Housing transition patterns were quite different for pre-seniors and seniors. From 1999 to 2001, many senior movers downsized to a home with fewer bedrooms, some of whom traded in their homeownership status to become renters. In contrast, most pre-seniors moved into a home with the same number of bedrooms as their previous residence and remained primarily homeowners.



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1. Partridge, J. September 30, 2004. "Demographics seen affecting rental sector." *Globe and Mail*. B10.
2. Che-Alford, J. and K. Stevenson. Spring 1998. "Older Canadians on the move," *Canadian Social Trends*. p. 15-18.
3. House or equivalent is defined as a single detached house, double, row, terrace or duplex building.
4. Although dwelling type and tenure status are related, just over a quarter of renters lived in houses, and nearly 10% of owners lived in apartments; therefore both variables are included in the model.
5. For information on the economic impact of death of a spouse, see Li, C. "Widowhood: Consequences on income for senior women." *Analysis in Brief* (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-621-MIE2004015).
6. Clark, W. Autumn 2005. "What do seniors spend on housing?" *Canadian Social Trends*. p. 2-7.
7. Che-Alford and Stevenson. 1998.
8. Cranswick, K. and D. Thomas. Summer 2005. "Elder care and the complexities of social networks." *Canadian Social Trends*. p. 14.
9. Clark. 2005.
10. Looking at tenure only in the first year (1999) and last year (2001) underestimates tenure transitions and overestimates tenure maintenance because one could have been an owner in year one, then a renter in year two, and then an owner again in year three. This person would have been categorized as an owner all three years.



SOCIAL INDICATORS

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
POPULATION								
<i>Total population (July 1)</i>	29,907,172	30,157,082	30,403,878	30,689,035	31,021,251	31,372,587	31,660,466	31,946,316
0-17 years	7,201,692	7,189,595	7,157,941	7,137,778	7,121,952	7,089,944	7,034,225	6,982,780
18-64 years	19,050,774	19,243,135	19,459,398	19,698,290	19,976,237	20,289,490	20,560,064	20,822,517
65 years and over	3,654,706	3,724,352	3,786,539	3,852,967	3,923,062	3,993,153	4,066,177	4,141,019
<i>Population rates (per 1,000)</i>								
Total growth	9.3	7.7	8.8	9.8	11.4	10.0	9.2	9.1
Birth	11.7	11.4	11.1	10.7	10.8	10.5	10.5	10.4
Death	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.3
Natural increase	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.0
Immigration	7.2	5.8	6.2	7.4	8.1	7.3	7.0	7.4
Total emigration ¹	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Interprovincial migration	9.8	9.9	9.1	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.9	9.4
Marriage	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6
<i>Percent growth in largest census metropolitan areas (to July 1)</i>								
Toronto	1.9	1.8	2.2	2.9	2.8	1.9	1.7	..
Montréal	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	..
Vancouver	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.4	0.9	..
HEALTH								
Total fertility per woman	1.55	1.54	1.53	1.49	1.51	1.50	1.53	..
Teenage pregnancies	42,169	42,320	40,432	38,649	37,081	35,077
Pregnancy rate per 1,000 women aged 15-19	42.8	42.4	40.1	38.0	36.1	33.9
Low birthweight babies (< 2,500 grams) as % of all births	5.8	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.7	5.8	..
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.4
<i>Life expectancy at birth (years)</i>								
Men	75.7	76.0	76.2	76.7	77.0	77.2
Women	81.3	81.5	81.7	81.9	82.1	82.1
<i>Selected causes of death for men (per 100,000 males)^{2,4}</i>								
Cancer	230.7	231.1	228.9	225.3	223.8	220.5
Lung	69.9	70.1	70.3	64.3	64.6	64.5
Colorectal	23.5	24.1	24.1	24.0	22.8	24.1
Prostate	28.4	27.9	26.7	26.7	26.6	25.2
Heart diseases	231.8	227.8	220.8	202.9	189.7	183.1
Cerebrovascular diseases	52.4	49.6	47.3	46.4	44.6	43.7
External causes ³	60.8	61.2	63.7	58.6	57.9	58.1
<i>Selected causes of death for women (per 100,000 females)^{2,4}</i>								
Cancer	149.1	151.6	149.4	149.4	147.6	149.3
Lung	32.3	34.5	34.8	34.4	34.4	35.3
Colorectal	15.2	15.7	15.2	15.1	14.9	15.2
Breast	27.4	26.4	25.2	25.0	24.9	24.4
Heart diseases	130.2	126.2	121.1	113.4	107.6	104.6
Cerebrovascular diseases	44.2	41.9	40.0	38.8	37.1	36.3
External causes ³	24.4	24.4	25.0	23.5	22.6	24.3

.. Data not available.

1. Sum of the following components: emigration, returning emigration and net temporary emigration

2. Age-standardized to the July 1, 1991 Census of Population (both sexes combined).

3. Includes environmental events, circumstances and conditions as the cause of injury, poisoning and other adverse effects.

4. Significant disruption of some mortality trends was caused by the implementation of ICD-10 as the Canadian mortality classification standard, effective in 2000. The impact of the implementation of ICD-10 on Canadian mortality trends is assessed in Health Statistics Division's ICD-9/ICD-10 comparability study.

Sources: Population estimates come from Demography Division, and birth and death statistics come from Health Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.



LESSON PLAN

Suggestions for using *Canadian Social Trends* in the classroom

“Willing to participate: Political engagement of young adults”

Objectives

- To consider the variety of ways in which political involvement might occur.
- To understand how and why individuals could affect social change.

Curriculum areas: civics, political science, social studies

Classroom instructions

1. Ask your students what it means to be politically involved. Have them explore whether certain actions could be considered political without necessarily being recognized as such. Have them provide examples of such behaviour. What are acceptable and unacceptable forms of political participation? In general, what are the political responsibilities of government? Of individual citizens?
2. Think of some problems of which students may have first-hand knowledge, for example, knowing someone who has been laid off or experiencing health challenges. How can someone at the individual level work to bring about change as a consequence of a personal experience? Ask the students how they would go about trying to implement change.
3. Ask the class what they think draws someone to choose politics as a vocation. Are some individuals or groups in society more likely to participate or have their voices heard? How can Canadians ensure that the most qualified candidates are selected to represent them?
4. Engage your class in a discussion of voting as a right or a privilege. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of the political system in Canada in terms of the political system in other countries. Why might young Canadian-born adults be more likely to vote than young people born abroad? Discuss the importance of voting.
5. Young adults are much less likely to vote than seniors, but they are much more engaged in non-voting political activity. Explore reasons why these seemingly contradictory trends exist. Explore various innovative techniques to promote voting among young adults.

Using other resources

See teacher resources by subject for Civics at www.statcan.ca/english/kits/courses/civics.htm
Crompton, S. Autumn 2002. “Vox populi: Canadians who speak up.” *Canadian Social Trends*.

Educators

You may photocopy “Lesson plan” or any item or article in *Canadian Social Trends* for use in your classroom.

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Table 1: Housing affordability problems have remained the same with the recent boom

Year	Home ownership rate (%)	Home ownership rate (%)
2001	68.1	68.1
2002	68.1	68.1
2003	68.1	68.1
2004	68.1	68.1
2005	68.1	68.1
2006	68.1	68.1
2007	68.1	68.1
2008	68.1	68.1
2009	68.1	68.1
2010	68.1	68.1
2011	68.1	68.1
2012	68.1	68.1
2013	68.1	68.1
2014	68.1	68.1
2015	68.1	68.1
2016	68.1	68.1
2017	68.1	68.1
2018	68.1	68.1
2019	68.1	68.1
2020	68.1	68.1
2021	68.1	68.1
2022	68.1	68.1
2023	68.1	68.1
2024	68.1	68.1
2025	68.1	68.1
2026	68.1	68.1
2027	68.1	68.1
2028	68.1	68.1
2029	68.1	68.1
2030	68.1	68.1

Table 2: Housing affordability problems have remained the same with the recent boom

Year	Home ownership rate (%)	Home ownership rate (%)
2001	68.1	68.1
2002	68.1	68.1
2003	68.1	68.1
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