Doctrine, Strategy and Military Culture:

Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 1987–2007

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Editor's note: Where it does not interfere with the text, changes to spelling and punctuation have been made to reflect Canadian preferences; however, the Australian and New Zealand spelling and writing conventions have been retained where appropriate.

To my parents

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Synopsis

Between 1987 and 2007, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces underwent a significant doctrinal renaissance. The hallmark of this renaissance was the production for the first time of military-strategic doctrine manuals. Constituting officially sanctioned, formalized and written expressions of institutionally accepted ideas about what armed forces do and how they do it, these manuals established fundamental principles to guide the application of military force in the pursuit of national strategic objectives. This study analyses the emergence and subsequent evolution of military-strategic doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand during the 20-year period beginning with the 1987 release in all three countries of Defence White Papers.

In addition to discussing the history of military-strategic doctrine development in the three armed forces, this study examines the broader significance of the doctrine itself. Informed by a comprehensive background discussion that focuses primarily on Australian, Canadian and New Zealand strategic policy developments and operational undertakings during this 20-year period, the examination of the broader significance of military-strategic doctrine manuals pays particular attention to the factors that influenced doctrine development and the intended effects of the doctrine manuals of the armed forces.

Based on this examination, this study includes models developed to explain how army, navy, air force and joint doctrine development was shaped by and in turn shaped the broader political context in which the armed forces under study existed. Furthermore, it reveals several nuances about the nature, scope, role and utility of military-strategic doctrine. Finally, it establishes that the strongest connection between the many doctrine manuals is that they were all used pragmatically by the armed forces studied as a mechanism for attempting to shape the environment in which they each existed.

The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.[1]

– Sir William Francis Butler

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory.[2]

– General Curtis Emerson LeMay

Who would have guessed reading and writing would pay off?[3]

– Homer J. Simpson

1. Goodreads, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/13112-the-nation-that-will-insist-upon-drawing-a-broad-line (accessed October 29, 2012).

2. Quoted in Paul D. Berg, "Doctrine and Technology," *Air and Space Power Journal* (Spring 2008), 20, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/spr08.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

3. George Meyer, "Mr Lisa Goes to Washington," *The Simpsons* video, season 3, episode 2, http://www.tvfanatic.com/quotes/shows/the-simpsons/season-3/page-23.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

Introduction

Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 1987–2007

During the decade following the release of their countries' 1987 Defence White Papers, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces confronted strategic policy and operational environments characterized by uncertainty. This uncertainty was driven by several factors, including the abrupt end of the cold war; the emergence of peace enforcement operations; debate about the nature of future conflict that was as prolific as it was varied; and a changing pattern of civil-military relations that had consequences for recruiting, training, retention and, ultimately, military culture. By the mid-1990s, the changing situation had led some to assert that Western militaries, including the three studied, were becoming "post-modern" organizations.[4] Yet by the early 2000s, there was growing recognition that complexity, not uncertainty, had become a major characteristic of contemporary military endeavour. Since the late 1980s, operations had become more varied and frequent, requiring armed forces to adopt more flexible approaches.

Against this backdrop, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces also underwent a significant, yet hitherto largely unrecognized, doctrinal renaissance. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies, navies and air forces all produced at least one military-strategic doctrine manual. In the early 2000s, the doctrinal scope was expanded to encompass the publication of military-strategic joint doctrine by all three armed forces.[5] This was unprecedented; prior to the late 1980s, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces had never produced doctrine designed to provide guidance at the military-strategic level.

This study analyses the emergence and evolution of military-strategic doctrine in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces during the 20-year period beginning in 1987, a significant year for two reasons. First, the governments of all three countries published Defence White Papers that promised to establish new strategic directions. Second, in 1987, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) became the first of the services studied to commence production of a military-strategic doctrine manual.

In addition to providing a comprehensive history of the development of military-strategic doctrine in the three countries examined, this study conducts a detailed analysis of the doctrine development process. This analysis pays particular attention to the factors that influenced doctrine development and the intended effects of military-strategic doctrine, in order to extrapolate its role and significance within the armed forces. Prior to elaborating further about the scope of the study, however, it is first necessary to provide a definition of the word "doctrine" as it has been applied within the armed forces studied and to determine exactly what constitutes doctrine at the military-strategic level.

Military-Strategic Doctrine

The first problem encountered when studying doctrine development is definitional. This problem arises not only because of the sheer volume of publications that have been labelled doctrine but also because the term has represented very different things to different people at different times. This problem was summarized by Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, who have argued that "doctrine is an ill-defined,

4. Franklin C. Pinch, "Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources," in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 156–81; and Cathy Downes, "Australia and New Zealand: Contingent and Concordant Militaries," in *The Postmodern Military* (see this note), 182–204.

5. "Joint" is defined as the "activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate." The nature of jointery is discussed in further detail in Chapter 7. *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms* (Brussels: NATO-Russia Joint Editorial Working Group, undated, promulgated online on June 8, 2001) http://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm (accessed October 29, 2012), 107 (hereafter cited as *NATO-Russia Glossary*).

poorly understood and often confusing subject in spite of its considerable importance."[6] Even though more than 20 years have passed since they made this claim, it continues to ring true. In light of this definitional problem, the discussion here begins with a brief examination of the origin of the word itself.

Originally derived from the Latin word *doctrina*, meaning "teaching, body of teachings, or learning,"[7] the term doctrine was first used by members of the Catholic Church in reference to the beliefs taught by the Church. Today, the term can be used to refer to any collective set of teachings or any principle(s) that are taught or advocated, including those of armed forces. As Paul Johnston observed: "This original concept [of doctrine] has been adopted by militaries to describe the body of concepts and precepts which they teach." Furthermore, for militaries, "there has always been a strong element of written word to doctrine. Doctrine is what is written down, usually at the highest levels, for dissemination throughout an army [or navy or air force] the usual intention being therefore to instruct and standardize."[8]

In its modern form, military doctrine has a lineage of approximately two centuries. According to John Gooch: "Its roots can be found in two important developments in late eighteenth century Europe: the identification and study of tactics as a branch of war, and the founding of military academies to give would-be officers a formal education which would fit them for their craft."[9] Over the 100 years following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars (1802–1815), both the scope and significance of military doctrine greatly, if somewhat gradually, expanded. This expansion is summarized by Johnston:

> [N]either Wellington nor Napoleon had doctrinal manuals describing for them the principles of war and the approach they should take towards operations. However, even while Napoleon was still campaigning, the famous Swiss military commentator Baron Henri Jomini began publishing works purporting to explain Napoleon's method. … As militaries professionalized and standardized (and bureaucratized), there came about an increasing tendency to formalize not just the tactical details of drill, but the very approach to war that higher commanders should take. … [B]y 1914 this approach was quite formally established in all major Western forces, to a greater or lesser extent.[10]

More recently, the scope and role of doctrine has frequently been discussed by practitioners and commentators alike, particularly in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) as well as within the three countries studied. Despite this discussion, or perhaps because of it, there has been a great degree of debate about the precise nature of military doctrine.

Notwithstanding this debate, there has been general agreement about a few key aspects of the nature of military doctrine—for example, that it consists of written tomes. Beyond this, much of the agreement has been about what doctrine *is not*, rather than about what it *is*. First, there has been general agreement that doctrine is not the same as strategic policy; however, it has often been observed that there is (or should be) a symbiotic relationship between the two. Drew and Snow, for example, argue that "[d]octrine has, or should have, an extraordinary impact on the strategy process."[11] Inversely, Michael Rampy stated that "security policy is fundamental to the revision of doctrine."[12]

6. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems* (Maxwell: Air University Press, 1988), 163.

7. *Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2nd. Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

8. Paul Johnston, "Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies," *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 30.

9. John Gooch, "Introduction: Military Doctrine and Military History," in *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine: Papers Presented at a Conference Sponsored by the Director General of Development and Doctrine at Larkhill, March 1997*, ed. John Gooch, Occasional Paper no. 30 (United Kingdom: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, September 1997), 5.

10. Johnston, "Doctrine Is Not Enough," 31–32.

11. Drew and Snow, 163.

12. Michael R. Rampy, "The Keystone Doctrine: FM 100-5, Operations," *Military Review* 74, no. 6 (June 1994): 18.

Second, as Brian Holden-Reid contended, it is generally agreed that "military thought and doctrine are not synonymous." Although military theory and several prominent theorists have influenced military conduct for centuries, theory is not doctrine because "[t]he first is personal, the latter institutional."[13] In essence, Holden-Reid's assertion summarizes the core reason why there has been general agreement that doctrine is different from strategic policy and military theory, despite its link to both. This reason was later confirmed by Michael Evans, who stated that doctrine "is usually institutional in focus and internal in nature."[14] Strategic policy and military theory are not. In a discussion about the differences between concepts, principles and doctrine, I. B. Holley concluded that doctrine differed from concepts and principles for much the same reason: "[d]octrine … is an officially approved teaching based on accumulated experience."[15]

From these generally agreed upon ideas about what military doctrine *is not*, it is possible to extrapolate a basic notion of what it *is*. In essence, military doctrine is an officially sanctioned, formalized and written expression of institutionally accepted ideas about what armed forces do and how they do it. That doctrine is produced by armed forces themselves is one of the most important factors separating it from other bodies of literature, such as strategic policy and military theory.

Applying only this basic definition, however, doctrine has the potential to address almost any facet of military life. This characteristic of the basic nature of doctrine was attested to by Deborah Avant, who observed that:

> Most agree that doctrine falls between the technical details of tactics and the broad outline of grand strategy. Whereas tactics deal with issues about how battles are fought, doctrine encompasses the broader set of issues about how one wages war, including ideas about how to best fight the enemy and assumptions about what part of the enemy is most important.[16]

The official definitions of military doctrine promulgated by the three armed forces studied do not help to narrow the potential scope of military doctrine. This is because all three armed forces have derived their definitions of doctrine from (or, more accurately, have slightly altered) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition of military doctrine, which is itself vague: "[doctrine is] fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application."[17] This definition of military doctrine has probably been kept intentionally vague so as to enable armed forces to flexibly apply the term as they deem necessary.

In summary, the broad scope and flexible nature of military doctrine means that it is difficult to define beyond what has been determined above. It is possible, however, to categorize doctrine manuals based upon their function and intent. Within the three armed forces studied (as well as within the American and British armed forces), doctrine is often divided into categories based upon the level of conflict it is intended to guide. Although there have been minor definitional variations between coun-

13. Brian Holden-Reid, *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98*, Occasional Paper no. 33 (UK: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, May 1998), 13.

14. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–Present*, Study Paper no. 301 (Canberra: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, August 1999), 4.

15. I. B. Holley, "Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?" *Air University Review*, July–August 1984, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/jul-aug/holley.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

16. Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 410–11.

17. *NATO-Russia Glossary*, 77. For the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand variations of this definition, see ADF, *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine (ADDP–D) Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2005), 4; Department of National Defence (DND), B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND, March 2003), 1; and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), *New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine (NZDDP–D) Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*, 1st ed. (Wellington: Development Branch, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, 2004), G-4.

tries, it is generally accepted that there are three levels of conflict: tactical, operational and strategic.[18] A brief definition of each level is provided at this juncture.[19]

a. **Tactical**. At the tactical level, small-scale military engagements and battles are planned and executed, and military force is applied directly against enemy forces to achieve victory at a particular time and place. This could also be termed the "micro" level of conflict.

b. **Operational**. The operational level exists to provide a bridge between the tactical and strategic levels of conflict. At the operational level, military undertakings such as campaigns (which require more time and space than tactical encounters) are planned and conducted, with the aim of translating strategic objectives into a series of tactical successes. Hence, operational planning encompasses the provision and sustainment of logistics and administrative support as well as the manoeuvre of tactical units.

c. **Strategic**. The strategic level could also be termed the "macro" level of conflict. Activities at this level include the establishment of national strategic policy goals and strategic military objectives as well as the development of strategic plans to achieve these goals and objectives. Furthermore, the strategic level is often divided into two sublevels: the national- (or grand-) strategic level and the military-strategic level. At the national-strategic level, governments determine overarching defence strategies that have military as well as other aspects; whereas, at the military-strategic level, armed forces develop institutional strategies to enable them to implement the military aspects of national strategies.

This construct is a useful prism through which to view military doctrine because the nature of doctrine usually varies, depending on which level of conflict it is intended to guide. It must be noted, however, that even within this construct it may be difficult to determine exactly where one level ends and another begins. Furthermore, doctrine primarily designed to guide one level can have an impact within the others. Thus, the division of doctrine into tactical, operational and military-strategic manuals has not always produced a neat fit. Nevertheless, there are several overarching criteria that are useful in determining which of the levels doctrine manuals are designed to guide.

Tactical doctrine tends to be the most prescriptive, often taking the form of instruction manuals or what is referred to within armed forces as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).[20] Although the prescriptive nature of many of these manuals has led some to assert that they should not be considered doctrine (John Clay, for example, argued that "[g]uidance ceases to be doctrine" at the tactical level),[21] this remains a minority viewpoint. Tactical manuals are considered doctrinal for the purposes of the discussion herein and are referred to as such.

Operational doctrine encompasses the integration of theatre-wide assets in order to facilitate the coordination and synchronization of multiple units in pursuit of a common goal. By nature, it tends to provide guidelines for operational conduct rather than attempting to instruct. In the words of R. K. Taylor, operational doctrine "is more about creating a framework within which to prepare, plan and conduct operations … rather than procedures on 'how to fight.'"[22]

18. The evolution of the "levels of conflict" model is discussed in more detail in Gordon R. Peskett, "Levels of War: A New Canadian Model to Begin the 21st Century," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts*, eds. Allan English and others (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 100–06.

19. The definitions given herein have been synthesized from the definitions given within the joint doctrine of the three countries studied. ADF, *ADDP–D,* 2nd ed., 3.3–3.5; DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine,* 13–14; and NZDF, *NZDDP–D*, 1st ed., Chapter 3.

20. The term "TTP" originated within armies; however, its use by navies and air forces has increased in recent decades, probably because the term has been used in joint doctrine. Historically, navies have referred to their tactical doctrine as "fleet orders" or "fighting instructions." Royal Navy, *BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine*, 3rd ed. (London: The Stationary Office, 2004), 1–2.

21. John S. Clay, "The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996–97): 32.

22. R. K. Taylor, "2020 Vision: Canadian Forces Operational-Level Doctrine," *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 36.

Doctrine at the military-strategic level is more philosophical in nature, establishing fundamental principles to guide the application of military force in pursuit of national strategic objectives. Beyond this, the nature of military-strategic doctrine manuals varies between the three services and at the joint level. This variation was concisely summarized by Michael Codner:

> The Army presents a preferred style of warfare. The Navy is cautious about prescription and offers what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory. The Royal Air Force provides a rigorous and coherent analysis of tasks within an overall framework of principles—and in so doing makes a logical case for an independent air force.[23]

Although he was discussing military-strategic doctrine within the British armed forces, discussion in Chapters 4 to 7 of this study will demonstrate that the basic variation Codner identified also applied within the three armed forces studied, albeit with some slight discrepancies.

Scope and Methodology

Given the hierarchical nature of military organizations, it is unsurprising that doctrine has also been organized into hierarchies, where lower manuals on the hierarchy have to conform to discussion in higher-level manuals. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, military-strategic doctrine has been placed at the top of the doctrine hierarchy, with a "keystone" (single-service) or "capstone" (joint) manual at its pinnacle.[24]

Purporting to contain the core conceptual framework that guides how armed forces operate, along with discussing their role in relation to strategic policy, keystone and capstone manuals often constitute the only military-strategic doctrine manual produced by a single service or jointly by a country's armed forces. In theory, keystone and capstone manuals constitute "the authoritative source from which all other … doctrine is derived."[25] Due to their significance, analysis in this study is limited to the military-strategic keystone and capstone doctrine manuals produced by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces. When it is necessary to facilitate a more detailed analysis of the manuals, however, the study also briefly examines allied (especially American and British) doctrine as well as some operational manuals produced by the three armed forces studied.

In addition to the examination of doctrine, a comprehensive background discussion is provided, which is twofold. First, it justifies the selection of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces as suitable subjects for comparison. Second, it outlines the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred. The second aspect of the background discussion consists primarily of an analysis of strategic policy developments and operational undertakings from 1987 to 2007. These developments are discussed in detail because they were two of the major elements shaping the broader political context and they also had a substantial influence on military-strategic doctrine development.

The analysis of doctrine conducted thereafter draws on this background throughout, as required. It also focuses on four core areas: the history and evolution of doctrine development, the content of the doctrine manuals, the factors that influenced decisions to produce doctrine (and those that subsequently impacted on its development), and its intended and actual effects. Discussion of the first two of the core focus areas has been included primarily because it provides a background for discussion of the latter two areas, along with providing evidence in support of the findings in these areas. Although it is not the main

23. Michael Codner, "Purple Prose and Purple Passion: The Joint Defence Centre," Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), *RUSI Journal* 144, no. 1 (February/March 1999): 38.

24. In all three countries studied, joint doctrine is above single-service doctrine in the hierarchy. The variation in terminology is symbolic of this. Furthermore, the foremost operational joint doctrine manual within a joint doctrine hierarchy has occasionally been referred to as a "keystone" manual.

25. ADF, *ADDP–D*, 2nd ed., 1.2.

focus of the study, the historical dimension is also important in its own right because it presents the first comprehensive account of military-strategic doctrine development in the countries studied.

Discussion about doctrine development is undertaken using what is best described as a "service-centric approach." This approach allows for the chronological conduct of a comparison between doctrine development within each of the three armies, navies and air forces as well as between joint doctrine developed by the three armed forces. This approach is taken because, as discussed above, the individual services of the three countries have histories and cultures that are arguably closer to one another than to the other services of the same country. Importantly, however, discussion about joint doctrine will later reveal that cultural differences have not prevented multiple services of a single country from working together to achieve common goals.[26]

The use of a service-centric approach also allows the study to synthesize and greatly expand upon what little literature already exists in this area. Hitherto, military-strategic doctrine development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces has been the subject of only limited and ad hoc analysis. While there have been sporadic reviews of individual doctrine publications,[27] broader studies have been rare.[28] Often, the history of doctrine development within a particular service has received only limited attention within official reports.[29] Existing analysis is almost entirely limited to the evolution of doctrine within a single service, and the literature that is available does not address some of the single services at all. There has been a notable absence of comparative study, both between services and countries, and there has also been scant literature produced about joint doctrine development.

This study has primarily employed two research methods to fill these gaps in the literature. The first has been to draw upon the range of available primary and secondary sources that discuss issues related to doctrine development, such as strategic policy, operational conduct, technological advances and the state of civil-military relations. Using these more prevalent sources to develop a detailed background to the study has enabled the analysis of doctrine development to be placed within a broader political context. Situating doctrine development within this context has also enabled a more comprehensive analysis of the motives underlying doctrine development to be conducted; it also allows for an exploration of the relationship between these motives and the environment in which the armed forces functioned. Furthermore, analysis of the content of the doctrine manuals examined takes into account the broader political context in which they were produced, allowing several observations to be made regarding the nature, scope, role and utility of military-strategic doctrine.

26. By admitting that a service-centric approach has been adopted due to the nuances of service culture, this study implicitly and unavoidably becomes situated on the cultural side of what Elizabeth Kier described as "a larger debate in the social sciences between the intersubjective, cultural, and constructivist approaches and the more conventional structural, functional, and 'rationalistic' methods." No attempt is made herein to enter explicitly into the debate between the advocates of these competing approaches, however, as addressing this divide is not a focus of this study. Instead, its analysis concentrates on doctrine development in the three countries studied, and the concept of service culture is employed primarily to enable analysis and as an explanatory factor underlying some of the assertions made herein. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 66–67.

27. For example, see Graeme Cheeseman, "Army's Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A Doctrine for New Times?" (working paper no. 58, Australian Defence Studies Centre, April 2000); Peter Haydon, "Adjusting Course: Some Observations," *Maritime Affairs* (Spring/Summer 1998): 23–26; Eric Grove, "Review of Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada," *The Northern Mariner* 8, no. 2 (April 1998):134–35; Martin Shadwick, "The Leadmark Chronicles," *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 75; Paul Johnston, "Canopy Glint: Reflections on *Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces*," in *Air Force Command and Control*, eds. Douglas L. Erlandson and Allan English (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Training Material Production Centre, 2002), 83–97; and Brian Kavanagh and David Schubert, "The RAAF Writes its Doctrine," in *RAAF Air Power Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays*, ed. Gary Waters, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 71 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1990), 1–13.

28. Only two studies that were specifically concerned with doctrine development were found, although each of these covered only part of the period studied herein: Alan Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921–1991* (Canberra: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, 1992); and Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*.

29. For example, see John Westrop, Chair, *Aerospace Doctrine Study: Final Report* (Ottawa: DND, April 30, 1992), Annex A; Canada, DND, Chief Review Services (CRS), *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, Report No. 1258-153 (CRS), March 2007; and Department of Defence (DOD), Inspector-General Division, Portfolio Evaluation and Review Directorate, *Portfolio Evaluation Report: Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organization*, July 2003.

The second method used to fill the gaps in the existing literature has been the conduct of primary research. This has mainly involved the conduct of several interviews in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, although these have been supplemented with email correspondence where necessary. These interviews were mainly conducted with the authors of the various doctrine manuals, although senior military officers, public servants and academics have also been interviewed in instances where they have been able to contribute further information about doctrine development. Drawing on these interviews, as well as on other research, this study has been able to piece together the history of doctrine development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand in an unprecedented level of detail. This, in turn, has greatly improved the depth and quality of the analysis of doctrine development undertaken.

Key Findings

This study is unique because it is the first analysis to holistically address military-strategic doctrine development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces. The only other study to have attempted to address a similar scope was Markus Mader's analysis of the evolution of military-strategic doctrine in the British armed forces after the conclusion of the cold war.[30] Although comprehensive, Mader's treatise differed from this study because it lacked the extra depth brought by comparative analysis. At the crux of his argument, Mader asserted that between 1989 and 2002, the British armed forces embraced doctrine as a key means to allow them to cope with the strategic, operational, technological and societal shifts that emerged during this period.[31]

His analysis of doctrine development in the British armed forces also led Mader to conclude that:

> Doctrine is more than the formal publication of military concepts. It stands for an institutional culture of conceptual thinking on the nature of conflict and the best conduct of warfare. It is the military's instrument for analysing past experience, guiding current operations and exploring future challenges.[32]

This study takes Mader's argument one step further. Based on the analysis of military-strategic doctrine development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, it is argued that in addition to representing an institutional culture of conceptual thinking, doctrine was also pragmatically employed by the armed forces as leverage when attempting to shape their environment. The primary focus of these attempts varied depending on the service producing the doctrine, the timing of its production and the broader political context in which development occurred. Generally, doctrine was used in attempts to shape the following aspects of this environment: operational conduct, national strategic events such as the development of strategic or acquisitions policy (although joint doctrine was also used to explain how higher command arrangements functioned), the delivery of professional military education (PME) and/or the generation of a change in service culture, and the broader political context in which armed forces operated (often through attempts to generate public support). These could be termed the downward, upward, inward and outward foci of doctrine.

That these four focal areas constituted the key intended effects of doctrine is one of two major findings presented within the study. The other regards the factors that influenced doctrine development. Overall, the analysis determined that four key factors were prominent influences during the production of military-strategic doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, although the relative influence of these factors varied from manual to manual. These factors were: strategic policy, opera-

30. Markus Mader, *In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989–2002*, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy no. 13 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).

31. Ibid., 297–311.

32. Ibid., 22.

tional experiences and requirements, allied conceptual and doctrinal developments (especially British and American doctrine), and influential individuals (who came almost entirely from within whichever service was developing a particular doctrine manual). These influences were often linked and were shaped by the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred.

In the case of both the key intended effects of doctrine and the key influences on doctrine development, it must be noted that these were consistently the most significant intended effects and influences. Their prevalence did not preclude the more transient presence of other factors, which are discussed throughout the study in instances when they played a noticeable role during the development of the doctrine manuals examined.

Due to these findings, the study also builds upon existing work by James Tritten, who developed the only graphic models within existing literature that purport to explain what affects doctrine and what doctrine affects.[33] These models (summarized in Table 1) were proposed within a monograph in which Tritten addressed the question: "can joint doctrine be an 'engine of change?'" However, of the many affects his models included, Tritten only discussed the few that he deemed most relevant to his discussion about doctrine as an agent for organizational change. He did not discuss how he had arrived at these models or from what sources they were derived.[34] Given the findings of this study, it appears that Tritten's models are more representative of what ideally *should* influence doctrine and what doctrine *should* ideally influence than they are of what has actually been the case.

What Doctrine Affects	What Affects Doctrine
policy and strategy organization programming and force structure planning concepts education and training/exercises local tactical directives and rules of engagement tactics, techniques and procedures other doctrine	existing doctrine threat geography/demographics technology resources strategy / military culture other policy concepts tactics, techniques and procedures strategy and campaign concepts change of government history / lessons learned

Table 1. *Tritten's models: What affects doctrine and what doctrine affects*[35]

The findings of this study are represented in Figure 1, which shows the prominent influences on doctrine development, and Figure 2, which shows the key intended effects of doctrine. In both cases, the terminology used has been carefully selected to ensure it is accurately representative of the findings of this study. As can be seen from these models, the findings of this study greatly diverge from Tritten's earlier work.

33. Tritten's models have been reproduced within Canadian Forces doctrine development guideline manuals as well as within an Australian Department of Defence report about doctrine development responsibilities. DND, A-AE-025-000/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine Development*, May 12, 2003, 1.5; Canada, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre (CFEC), Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP)-A1, *Joint Doctrine Development Manual* (Ottawa: Chief of the Defence Staff [CDS], May 2008), 1.2; and Australia, Inspector-General Division, Portfolio Evaluation and Review Directorate, *Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organization*, 2.4.

34. James John Tritten, "Can Joint Doctrine be an 'Engine of Change?'" http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/docenginechange.pdf (accessed February 2, 2009, site discontinued).

35. Stephen J. Cimbala and James J. Tritten, "Joint Doctrine—Engine of Change?" *Joint Force Quarterly* 33, (Winter 2002–03): 93.



Figure 1. *Prominent influences on doctrine development*



Figure 2. *Key intended effects of doctrine*

Despite their significance, Figures 1 and 2 are nonetheless simplifications designed to illustrate the major findings of the study. Despite their common and ongoing presence, the relative importance and exact nature of the prominent influences on, and key intended effects of, doctrine varied quite substantially, especially between services. To explain the more complex way in which these influences and key intended effects interacted with doctrine development as well as with each other, additional models have also been developed, based upon the analysis within each of this study's four chapters about doctrine development. Featured in the conclusion of each of these chapters, the more complex models provide a much greater level of detail about the nature and significance of the prominent influences on, and key intended effects of, military-strategic army, navy, air force and joint doctrine.

In addition to supporting the major findings of the study, the analysis in each of these four chapters also allows several overarching observations to be made about the nature, scope, role and utility of

military-strategic doctrine in the three countries. These observations encompass an exploration of the relationship between the key influences on doctrine development and the emergence, or otherwise, of a doctrinal culture within the services and armed forces studied. They also shed light upon the reasons underlying variations in the nature of doctrine manuals produced by the different services as well as among the three armed forces jointly. Overall, the key findings of the study, along with the accompanying observations, demonstrate that the production of military-strategic doctrine, along with its structure, role and scope, was closely intertwined with service culture. Furthermore, doctrine manuals were pragmatically applied by the armed forces as a mechanism for attempting to shape their environment, although the nature of these attempts varied greatly depending on the service producing the manual and the broader political context at the time of its production.

Structure

The study is divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of three chapters, provides a comprehensive background to the study. Chapter 1 establishes the grounds for comparing Australia, Canada and New Zealand. It achieves this by discussing the factors that separate them from other countries with which they could potentially be compared, examining their historical and contemporary similarities and, finally, discussing some of the key differences among them. Despite these differences, it concludes that there are far more similarities and that these render Australia, Canada and New Zealand suitable choices for comparison.

Discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 establishes the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred during the period studied. This discussion focuses primarily on strategic policy developments and operational undertakings from 1987 to 1997 (Chapter 2) and from 1997 to 2007 (Chapter 3). Strategic policy and operational undertakings have been selected as the focus of these chapters for two reasons. First, both had a major impact on the development of military-strategic doctrine in all three countries. Second, strategic policy developments and the evolving nature of operations substantially shaped the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred. In conclusion, these chapters explicitly discuss the broader political context, laying the foundation for the subsequent analysis of doctrine development.

A comprehensive analysis of military-strategic doctrine development is undertaken in the second part, which consists of four chapters. Three of these chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) analyse single-service doctrine, while the last (Chapter 7) examines joint doctrine. Each of the three chapters analysing single-service doctrine is divided into four sections. First, each chapter provides a service-specific background by discussing service culture, the internal environment in which each service produced its doctrine, and how this related to the broader political context established in Part 1. The second section examines doctrine developments during the first decade (except in Chapter 4, where discussion extends to 1998 rather than 1997, owing to the timing of the release of a key doctrine manual). The third section examines doctrine development during the second decade. Specifically, the second and third sections of these chapters describe the doctrine development process, factors that influenced development, the intended effects of each doctrine manual, and the content of the doctrine itself.

Finally, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consider the implications of the discussion in their second and third sections. In particular, this consideration focuses on the similarities and differences between military-strategic doctrine development in the armies, navies and air forces studied. This is accompanied by the development of models that explain the common influences on, and key intended effects of, military-strategic army, navy and air force doctrine. Although the prominent influences on doctrine development shown in Figure 1 were all present while the services developed their doctrine, the discussion in the conclusion of these chapters explains the nature of each influence and provides more details

about the manner in which they interacted with and influenced doctrine development. Furthermore, observations about doctrine development in each of the armies, navies and air forces studied reveal that while some element of each of the four key intended effects of doctrine shown in Figure 2 was present within each service, army doctrine was primarily downward focused, navy doctrine was primarily upward focused, and air force doctrine was primarily inward focused. The reasons for this variation are closely related to the unique organizational cultures of the armies, navies and air forces.

Due to the late release of joint doctrine (relative to single-service doctrine), Chapter 7 has a slightly different structure to the other chapters that analyse doctrine development. Although it is divided into four sections, the first discusses definitions of the term "joint" prior to examining the history of the concept in its contemporary context. This section asserts that there are four core components of contemporary jointery: operational, organizational, educational and doctrinal. The second section examines the move towards jointery by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces, providing a comprehensive overview of the emergence and evolution of the operational, organizational and educational aspects of jointery in these three armed forces. The third section examines the development of military-strategic joint doctrine and how it is related to the broader trend towards jointery in the three armed forces. Chapter 7 ends by considering the implications of the similarities of and differences among joint doctrine produced by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces, and a model is developed to explain the common influences on, and key intended effects of, military-strategic joint doctrine. It is also construed that joint doctrine had a quadripartite focus, which was downward, upward, inward and outward.

In conclusion, the book returns to the major findings of the study. Examining the four consistent influences on doctrine development and the four key intended effects of doctrine in light of the findings in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the conclusion discusses the broader significance of military-strategic doctrine for the three armed forces.

Terminology

As this study examines doctrine development in three different armed forces, it is unsurprising that numerous issues have arisen concerning terminology. Usually, these issues have arisen because different services or armed forces use different terms to describe the same or similar things or because a single term can have a different meaning within different services or armed forces. Furthermore, these issues have been compounded by an occasional tendency amongst military practitioners to myopically focus on terminology, regardless of how small a part it may play in relation to the broader issue to which the terminology is related.

While every attempt has been made to ensure that accurate terminology has been used throughout the study, there are some occasions where exactitude has been sacrificed in favour of clarity or simplicity. For example, there are some who consider that the term "military" should apply exclusively to land forces; to them the phrase "military-strategic doctrine" inherently means army doctrine. For the sake of simplicity, this study uses a broader definition of the term "military," applying it in relation to armed forces as a whole and to any of their component parts. Where distinction is required, it is subsequently specified, for example, by the use of the phrase "military-strategic army doctrine" or "military-strategic navy doctrine."

Individual doctrine documents are referred to as "manuals," rather than "publications," since not all of the doctrine studied herein was published. (Although doctrine was almost always *distributed* in some way, this is not the same as being *published*.) While some may consider the term "manual" to imply that the doctrine was inherently prescriptive, that is simply not the case; although the doctrine manuals often purported to provide "guidance," military-strategic doctrine was non-prescriptive by design.

Some terms used within the study have a narrower definition than would normally be the case. This has been done for the sake of clarity and accuracy. For example, the use of the term "service" or "services" refers to the individual branches of the armed forces studied or their allies (these branches are armies, navies and air forces). The use of the term "armed forces" refers to the three services together and is not used in relation to any individual service. In other cases, where a narrower-than-usual definition has been used, the definition is specified at the time of first usage.

In instances where two or more terms that have the same or a very similar meaning have been encountered, one of the terms has been selected and used throughout the study for the sake of consistency. While selection of some of these terms has been based on the slight differences in their meaning or on their aesthetics (such as the use of the British term "jointery" in preference to the American term "jointness"), in other cases, selection of a single term has had to be somewhat more arbitrary. For example, the terms "naval doctrine" and "maritime doctrine" have both been used to describe the doctrine produced by the navies studied. For the sake of consistency, "naval doctrine" is used exclusively throughout the study.

Where the three militaries have developed different definitions for the same term, the definition given in the *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms* has been used throughout the study. A good example of this is the term "joint," which is defined differently (yet similarly) in the three countries. The use of the *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms* has allowed any definitional ambiguity to be removed, while at the same time ensuring the use of terminology that is similar enough to the definitions promulgated by the three armed forces that it remains applicable to the discussion within the study.

In the case of the Canadian Forces (CF), the unification of the three services on February 1, 1968, resulted in a unique situation wherein, legally, the Canadian army, navy and air force did not exist.[36] Rather, the environmental elements of the unified CF were referred to as "army," "navy" and "air force" only by convention. However, since August 2011, the specific environmental elements of the CF have returned to their pre-unification nomenclature—Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). To avoid confusion, therefore, the present-day titles are used. However, quotations do not necessarily follow this rule. The reader is, therefore, advised to use discretion in the case of quotations about the CF; in most cases, the period referred to can be deduced from the context in which the quotation appears.

36. This situation is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Part One: Background

Chapter 1

A Suitable Choice: The Grounds for Comparing Australia, Canada and New Zealand

Prior to analysing the development of military-strategic doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, it is necessary to determine the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred. As the first of three background chapters that establish the nature of this context, this chapter examines the grounds for comparing Australia, Canada and New Zealand. It achieves this through a discussion of their similarities and differences, demonstrating that these countries are very suitable choices for comparison. Furthermore, the chapter pays particular attention to military history as this had an ongoing impact on the culture and structure of the militaries in question.

The chapter is divided into four sections. First, a discussion of the factors separating Australia, Canada and New Zealand from other countries to which they could potentially be compared is undertaken. Second, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand historical similarities are determined. Third, contemporary societal similarities are discussed, both justifying the selection of Australia, Canada and New Zealand for comparison and further contributing to the foundation for discussion in subsequent chapters. Finally, some of the key ongoing differences between Australia, Canada and New Zealand are discussed in relation to their impact on the conduct of this study. Overall, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that Australia's, Canada's and New Zealand's many broad similarities make them compelling subjects for comparison.

Factors Setting Australia, Canada and New Zealand Apart

Given how much Australia, Canada and New Zealand have in common, it is surprising that there have been so few comparisons made among all three, although there have been occasional comparative studies conducted about two of the three (and several conducted about Australia and New Zealand). Furthermore, all three have been compared to their larger allies—Britain and the US—more frequently than to each other. Generally, this is because Britain and the US have been Australia's, Canada's and New Zealand's most significant allies throughout their modern histories.[1]

Australia, Canada and New Zealand share a common history as British colonies. For a significant portion of their histories, all three have held the British "mother country" on a pedestal, often acting unquestioningly to assist Britain in times of crisis, war and economic depression. Yet, as John Blaxland asserts, "Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders appeared to have a far stronger emotional attachment to Britain than was returned," and the British tendency to focus on the home affairs of the UK at the expense of supporting its former colonies, particularly following the Second World War (WWII), "triggered anxiety and resentment."[2] This pattern in relationships, combined with Britain's decline as an imperial power following the conclusion of WWII and the ascendancy of the US as a great power, resulted in the US replacing Britain as Australia's, Canada's and New Zealand's key ally in the latter half of the 20th century. Yet for the most part, comparisons between Australia, Canada or New Zealand on the one hand and Britain or the US on the other are of limited value, owing to the more substantial differences among them.

1. By "modern histories," this study is referring to national history following colonization by European powers.

2. John C. Blaxland, "Strategic Cousins: Australia, Canada and Their Use of Expeditionary Forces from the Boer War to the War on Terror" (PhD thesis, Royal Military College, Kingston, November 2003), 32. Due to the timing of the release of Blaxland's PhD thesis and subsequent book based thereon, the first chapter of this study refers exclusively to his thesis; whereas, subsequent chapters refer exclusively to his book.

These differences often relate to the vastly different sizes of the countries in question. This is especially true in the realm of military endeavour, as different size often necessitates different strategies and cultures. British regular armed forces, for example, number just over 200,000, making them almost 4 times the size of Australia's and Canada's and 24 times the size of New Zealand's. Britain is also an established European power with a military history spanning centuries; by contrast, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have military histories that began only recently.[3] Furthermore, while all three have military structures and traditions founded on British models, all have developed their own unique features over time, which today are arguably as close to each other as they are to the British system on which they are based.[4] Finally, Britain's status as a large European power and nuclear weapons state, symbolized by its permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), makes it inherently different from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Britain's global importance as a result of this status is something its smaller allies could never realistically hope to achieve.

Likewise, Australia, Canada and New Zealand could never hope to compete with the US, which far surpasses all three in terms of its population, resource endowment, political clout, economic capacity and military power. The US, like Britain, is a nuclear weapons state and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its economy is large enough to make the US a "price setter" in several key areas (meaning its domestic pricing policy is able to dictate its international terms of trade).[5] This is something Australia, Canada and New Zealand cannot achieve owing to the smaller size of their economies.

As a result of America's economic capacity, its military is even larger than Britain's. In 2007 (the final year of this study), the US military comprised 1,506,757 regulars and 973,675 reservists. Totalling 595,946 soldiers, the US Regular Army alone was over two and a half times the combined size of Australia's, Canada's and New Zealand's total armed forces.[6] The percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) the US is willing to devote to military expenditure is far higher than Australia, Canada or New Zealand—3 per cent compared to 1.9 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively.[7] In dollar terms, the US defence budget is larger than the next twelve highest spending countries combined.[8] As a result of its high military expenditure, the US is able to maintain a technological advantage over potential peer competitors that smaller countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand cannot. This is not to say that Australia, Canada and New Zealand do not have technologically capable militaries; on the contrary, they are among the foremost in the world in terms of their technological capabilities. The key difference between them and the US is that the US can (and does) devote money to military research and development on a scale the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand militaries could never achieve.[9] Furthermore, the US military can undertake operations on a scale Australia, Canada and New Zealand can not even contemplate.

3. David Chandler and Ian Beckett, eds., *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); J. R. Hill, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia,* 3rd ed. (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War,* 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992); and Ian McGibbon, ed., *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000).

4. Con Flinkenberg, "The Best of British," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, no. 26 (Spring 1999): 18–24; Mike Capstick, "The Regimental System and Army Transformation: Getting Past the Story," *Canadian Army Journal* 7, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 24–25; and Peter Stanley, "Heritage of Strangers: The Australian Army's British Legacy," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 87 (March/April 1991): 21–26.

5. Dennis Appleyard and Alfred Field, *International Economics,* 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 106.

6. Statistics from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 107, no. 1 (London: Routledge, 2007): 28–29. Note: US Regular Army personnel figure includes mobilized Reservists.

7. Elane Cardenas, ed., *The Book of Rule: How the World Is Governed* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2004), 110, 115, 134, 213.

8. Michael G. Krause, "Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt," (working paper no. 132, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, June 2007), 11.

9. Ibid., 10–12.

There are also several historic and (in terms of the conduct of military operations) cultural differences that separate the US from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The early US experience of war was that of the War of Independence, the War of 1812 and the US Civil War, all of which involved the deployment of large armies and, in the case of the US Civil War, the reliance on technological developments to gain advantage over the enemy. Where the US found itself fighting Britain during the War of Independence and the War of 1812, Australia, Canada and New Zealand remained recipients of British military advice and occasional assistance into the early 20th century, shaping their military cultures in entirely different ways. Indeed, US military culture has historically emphasized numerically overwhelming the enemy; although since the end of the Vietnam War, a supposed public reluctance to accept casualties has led to the substitution of numerical superiority with technological superiority.[10] This is in contrast to the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand (and arguably British) emphasis on small-unit operations that rely on skill of arms of individual soldiers rather than on numeric advantage or the capabilities of weapons systems alone.[11]

Despite these differences, the attractiveness of making comparisons between Australia, Canada or New Zealand on the one hand and Britain or the US on the other is often the result of the global power of the latter two. In the British case, the First World War (WWI) brought this global power into eclipse, although the extent of British imperialism and its influence on the world over the two centuries prior to this remains well known.[12] In America's case, its global influence in military and economic terms is also widely documented, and there has been much debate over whether or not the US constitutes a modern imperial power.[13] Regardless of whether it does or not, the US wields much "soft" as well as "hard" power,[14] and remains a global hegemonic power.[15] Because Australia, Canada and New Zealand cannot possibly attain such a status, they remain unencumbered by the challenges it brings—meaning that not just their position within the international system, but by necessity their entire security outlook, remains fundamentally different to those of the great powers. Hence, the very thing that makes comparison between Australia, Canada or New Zealand and Britain or the US attractive, also serves to ensure its utility is severely constrained.

Beyond Britain and the US, many comparisons have also been made between Australia, Canada and New Zealand and a plethora of other countries with which there are similarities. Canada, for example, was frequently compared to France, Spain, Germany, Norway, Italy, Greece and Turkey during the cold war, as all were members of NATO and all contributed to the defence of Western Europe. This is one example among many. Given the number of international organizations of which Australia, Canada and New Zealand are members (see below), numerous comparisons could be made along these lines. These comparisons would, however, ignore the underlying reality that the histories and cultures of Eastern European, Asian, African, Middle Eastern and South American countries differ greatly from those of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Furthermore, countries in these regions face vastly different contemporary security challenges, and their inhabitants generally speak different languages, practice different religions and, as discussed below, emphasize the importance of different values relative to those held most dear by the citizens of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

10. For a particularly scathing critique of US military culture and the reliance on technology and large-unit operations, see Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* (November–December 2005): 2–15.

11. Michael Evans, "Contemporary Military Operations," in *Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific*, eds. Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 52–53. On British Army small-unit operations, see Robert Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 53–59; and Gavin Bulloch, "Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective," *Parameters* 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 4–16.

12. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

13. Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 1–32.

14. Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4–12.

15. Patrick O'Brien, "The Pax Britannia and American Hegemony: Precedent, Antecedent or Just Another History?" in *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2000*, eds. Patrick O'Brien and Armand Cleese (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 3–66.

Even Western European countries (including NATO members) are significantly different from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The countries' military institutions are similar to those of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and their citizens hold similar values and religious practices; however, their national and military histories are generally substantially different. This is due largely to their geography, which has led to centuries of mutual invasion and occupation—two things that have never affected Australia, Canada or New Zealand. As a result, Western European countries have historically emphasized large standing armies; whereas, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have more frequently embraced maritime strategies and have been able to rely on volunteer forces during peacetime, mobilizing large armies only during times of war. This difference in experience has led to the development of different national outlooks, which in turn has resulted in the countries of Western (and, increasingly, Eastern) Europe embracing a uniquely European experiment: the European Union and the ideal of common security.[16] This idea is also alien to the circumstances Australia, Canada and New Zealand find themselves in.[17]

Building Common Military Cultures: Historic Similarities

From the outset, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have shared many similarities. All are former British colonies, and all remain members of the Commonwealth. English is the primary language used in all three (although in Canada, French is also commonly used owing to the strong French culture in Quebec), and all three maintain the British monarch as their head of state.[18] From the time of their colonization, all three have been immigrant societies, although despite recent national policies emphasizing multiculturalism, all three have histories of assimilationist immigration policies and the open preference for European settlers over people from other regions.[19]

Despite these similarities stemming from British colonization, how each came to be a British colony varies substantially. Canada, the oldest of the three colonies, was originally a French possession that was conceded to England following the French defeat in the Seven Years' War (1756–63).[20] The decision to colonize Australia was largely an indirect result of the American War of Independence, as Britain was no longer able to deport convicts to the southern US as it had done prior to that war. So that Britain could continue this practice, Australia was claimed as a colony in 1788, and its initial settlement, Sydney, began life as a destination for exiled British convicts.[21] Despite being the last of the three countries colonized, New Zealand had been home to European settlers since the 1780s. The eventual British decision to colonize in 1840 was prompted by a combination of French interest in the region and lobbying by the Church Missionary Society.[22]

16. Helene Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy," in *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP* [Common Foreign and Security Policy] eds. John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (London: Routledge, 1998), 95–112.

17. Although it could be argued that Canada and New Zealand exercise a form of collective security by default, owing to their proximity to larger allies (the US and Australia respectively), this manifests itself in a substantially different way than European efforts to implement common security arrangements.

18. Cardenas, 110, 115, 134.

19. James Jupp, *Immigration* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1991); Sean Brawley, *The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919–78* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1995); and Freda Hawkins, *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989).

20. In North America, the Seven Years War is also known as the "French and Indian War," and war on the North American continent began in 1754, rather than 1756, as was the case in Europe. See Noel St John Williams, *Redcoats Along the Hudson: The Struggle for North America, 1754–63* (London: Brassey's, 1997).

21. A. G. L. Shaw, *Convicts and the Colonies: A Study of Penal Transportation from Great Britain and Ireland to Australia and Other Parts of the British Empire* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1966), 38–57.

22. Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (London: Allen Lane, 1959), 63–69.

Following their colonization, all three countries developed strong attachments to Britain, which led them to adopt many British customs, traditions and values. As a result, all three have parliaments modelled on the Westminster system; although in each country, it has been altered, as required, to meet local needs. Of the three, New Zealand has remained most similar to Britain, as both are unitary states; whereas, Australia and Canada are both federal states, having also been influenced by the Washington system.[23] Additionally, New Zealand has only a House of Representatives; whereas, the Australian and Canadian parliaments each have two houses. (The Australian upper house is elected; whereas, the Canadian upper house is appointed by its lower house.)[24] All three also have legal systems based on the British model[25] and have imitated British military structures within their own militaries.[26] Hence, all three have been labelled "derivative societies" of Britain. Unlike the US, all moved towards national independence gradually and peacefully.[27]

Yet the peaceful origins of their independence have left Australia, Canada and New Zealand with a need to look elsewhere in order to establish a national identity. As Blaxland asserted regarding Australia and Canada (although his argument applies equally to New Zealand):

> [B]ecause they are derivative societies, the process of becoming recognisably Australian or Canadian rather than British (or, to some extent, French, for Quebec) occurred over many years. This process lagged behind the phenomenon of nationalism in the United States in the eighteenth century and in Europe in the nineteenth century. … Instead, both Canada and Australia would look to their own armies and their accomplishments in the field of battle in the twentieth century to help define them.[28]

Indeed, mythology derived from the experience of WWI in particular is a common distinguishing feature within all three countries.[29]

For Australia and New Zealand, whose troops were organized together into the Australian and New Zealand Army Corp (ANZAC), this mythology has focused on the landing at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915. Over the past nine and a half decades, the landings have taken on a legendary status in both countries, becoming "the standard by which many Australians see the world and their place in it."[30] Likewise, the landings have "come to celebrate values that many New Zealanders consider either distinctive or admirable about their nation."[31] The common celebration of "ANZAC Day" remains a major tie between the two countries. Underlying this celebration is the fact that, for the first time, Australians and New Zealanders performed a noticeable role on the world stage and individual soldiers—or "diggers," as they became known—inspired feelings of honour and pride in their fledgling countries.

23. Cardenas, 110, 115, 134.

24. David Lovell and others, *The Australian Political System* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995): 47–50; and Ted Tjadeu, "Canadian Top 40: What You Need to Know about Canada's Legal System," *Association of American Law Libraries Spectrum* 9, no. 5 (March 2005): 10.

25. All have a British-style common-law system, as opposed to an investigatory system. See Patrick Parkinson, *Tradition and Change in Australian Law*, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2005), 61–72.

26. Flinkenberg, "The Best of British," 18–24.

27. Cardenas, 104–105, 112–113, 134.

28. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2003), 46–47.

29. Note that the use of the term "mythology" in this instance is deliberate despite the implications that arise from the definition of myths as stories, ideas or beliefs that are not necessarily true. In the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand cases, stories of heroism and endurance that emerged about their soldiers' conduct during WWI, which have come to form the foundation of their national mythologies, are for the most part true or, at worst, are embellishments of actual events. The term "mythology" is, thus, used in reference to the "larger-than-life" status that these stories have since taken on, to the obscurity that has come to surround the specific details and origins of many popular stories, and to the collective influence these stories have had on the consciousness of modern society in all three countries. See Graham Seal, *Inventing Anzac: The Digger and National Mythology* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2004), 6–9.

30. Ibid., 169–70.

31. McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 30.

For Canada, a similar event was the Battle of Vimy Ridge on the Western Front. There, all four of the Canadian Divisions attacked together for the first time, and on April 9, 1917, they drove the Germans from the high ground despite heavy resistance and very heavy casualties. It was a feat that the French, then the British, had been unable to achieve despite numerous attempts over the preceding two and a half years.[32] The action arguably won Canada "a seat at the table" at the Versailles Treaty negotiations, the first time Canada had played such a significant role on the world stage. Despite this significance, celebration of the battle for Vimy Ridge has not become a national holiday in Canada as ANZAC Day has in Australia and New Zealand, and Canada has no national equivalent to the popular digger mythology.[33]

Although not as influential in their national psyche as the major wars of the 20th century, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have remarkably similar military histories dating from their initial colonization. These histories began with settler-colonial wars against the native populations of all three countries, although the American Indians and New Zealand Maoris presented more of a military challenge to British colonists than the Australian Aborigines, whose tribes were frequently slaughtered during Australia's early colonial history.[34]

Aside from these small-scale conflicts between British soldiers and settlers and the indigenous populations of their newly acquired colonies, Australians and New Zealanders have never fought wars on their own soil; since the end of the War of 1812, Canadians have not either.[35] Instead, all three have deployed numerous expeditionary forces overseas to fight alongside their allies, chiefly Britain and later the US. This first occurred in 1863–64, when Australians from the New South Wales colony were recruited by the British to fight in the Waikato War (one of the Maori Wars that occurred between 1845 and 1872).[36] Pursuing a similar strategy, the British recruited Canadian boatmen to assist them in navigating the Nile during the Sudan War of 1885. The New South Wales colony raised a contingent of 770 men for service in that conflict.[37] Although the contingent arrived too late to participate in the major fighting, it set the precedent for the raising and dispatching of Australian, Canadian and New Zealander contingents to the Boer War, to the First and Second World Wars and, finally, to the Korean War.

Geographic distance from conflict and the repeated deployment of forces to overseas wars has been another important link between Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Throughout the latter part of the 19th and the 20th centuries, none experienced an external military threat to its territory, let alone an invasion, with the exception of the Japanese threat to Australia in 1942.[38] This has had a significant effect on the national outlook and on public opinion in all three countries. According to Hensley, the continual deployment of forces overseas meant that

32. Norm Christie, *For King and Empire: The Canadians at Vimy, April 1917* (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1996), 13–24.

33. Although Blaxland asserted that the closest Canadian equivalent is the legend of the early Canadian Northwest Mounted Police (Mounties), he rightly points out that "[s]uch an image of a defender of the establishment would win little popularity amongst irreverent Australians, many of whom are descended from convicts." Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2003), 105.

34. John Coats, *An Atlas of Australia's Wars*, vol. 7, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6–12.

35. Although, during the 19th century, the Canadian military was used to put down several insurrections, particularly in the western provinces where there was no effective police force until 1873. Ronald Atkin, *Maintain the Right: The Early History of the North West Mounted Police, 1873–1900* (London: McMillan, 1973), 15–16.

36. Leonard Barton, *Australians in the Waikato War, 1863–1864* (Marrickville: Southwood Press, 1979).

37. Ian Kuring, *Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry, 1788–2001* (Canberra: Australian Army History Unit, 2004), 16.

38. It has since been shown that despite bombing raids on northern Australian towns and a submarine attack against Sydney Harbour, the Japanese did not have the capability to invade or occupy Australia. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, *Threats to Australia's Security: Their Nature and Probability* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 62, Annex C; and H. P. Willmott, *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 437.

> few saw any point in soldiering when there was no war. We accepted the old rhythm, traditional in the English-speaking world, of neglecting the armed forces in peace and gathering them up for war. We saw no necessity for standing forces and defence planning was sporadic to say the least. When a clear threat emerged we recruited as many as possible, gave them a hasty training and dispatched an expeditionary force. That too became part of our national consciousness, the emotional recollections of crowded troopships sailing, streamers breaking and wives and sweethearts waving from the wharves.[39]

In all three countries, the experience of war as distant for all but the servicemen and women involved has led it to be viewed as something foreign. This view has traditionally been accompanied by a public propensity to question the need for defence expenditure during peacetime.[40]

This propensity is reflected in the fact that for most of their histories, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have maintained only skeletal regular armed forces during peacetime, often exclusively for the purposes of supporting the reserve or militia forces that have traditionally formed the bulk of their peacetime militaries. In Australia and New Zealand, which had always relied on part-time militia to form the bulk of their defence forces, it was not until after WWII that their regular armies were established (by coincidence in 1950).[41] The regular element of Canada's army also remained small until the early 1950s, when it was substantially expanded as a result of the Korean War and the establishment of NATO.[42]

Throughout the cold war, the expanded regular armies of all three countries played a role in the anti-communist Western alliance. The extent of this participation, however, varied due to several factors, including geography, military capabilities and domestic politics. Australia, Canada and New Zealand all sent contingents to the Korean War;[43] Australia and New Zealand also made military contributions to the Malayan Emergency,[44] and even more substantial contributions to the Vietnam War.[45] Canada maintained a military presence in Europe throughout the cold war.[46] Additionally, all three also began to contribute forces to a new type of military operation—peacekeeping. Under the banner of the United Nations (UN), Australian, New Zealand and, particularly, Canadian troops served during the cold war as peacekeepers in Kashmir, the Middle East, Cyprus and Africa, amongst other places.[47] Yet largely because of the cold war, activities of this kind were severely limited in both scope and number until the early 1990s.

Beyond their military histories, each shares a number of other common historical experiences that have influenced the development of their national and military cultures. Yet some of the most salient

39. Gerald Hensley, "The Effect of War on New Zealand," in *Pacific Prospects: Australia, New Zealand and Future Conflicts*, ed., Carl Bridge (London: Kings College, 2002), 66.

40. Bill Robinson and Steven Staples, *It's Never Enough: Canada's Alarming Rise in Military Spending* (Ottawa: The Polaris Institute, 2005); Stephen Thorne, "Too Much Spent on Military: Critic," *Canada.com*, http://www.canada.com/components/print/aspx?id=16e3ba4d-2555-4f39-a216-6f3653c (accessed June 6, 2006, site discontinued); and Gregory Hywood, "Can Australia Afford a Big Increase in Defence Spending?" *The Age* (Fairfax Digital), http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/16/1058035069317.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

41. Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Army*, vol. 1, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 170; and McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 359–60.

42. George Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McMillan of Canada, 1974), 387–94.

43. Jeffery Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 88–108.

44. Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation: Australia in Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966* (St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1996), 173–74.

45. See Peter King, ed., *Australia's Vietnam: Australia and the Second Indo-China War* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983); and Roberto Rabel, "Vietnam War," in *The Oxford Companion* (see note 3), 561–66.

46. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 394–99.

47. Peter Londey, *Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 39–146; Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 416–22; and John Crawford, *In the Field of Peace: New Zealand's Contribution to International Peace Support Operations, 1950–1995* (Wellington: New Zealand Defence Force, 1996), 12–77.

historical similarities are those limited to two of the three countries. Canada and Australia, although not New Zealand, have both experienced domestic uprisings, for example. In Australia, the Eureka Stockade incident occurred in response to the harsh enforcement of a strict prospecting licence in the Victorian gold fields in 1851.[48] In Canada, a rebellion in the Western Territories in 1885 constituted something between a crisis and a localized civil war, although it did not gain popular support beyond its members and was quickly put down by the military.[49] Furthermore, Canada and Australia also have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the US; whereas, New Zealand does not.[50] Canada and New Zealand are both located next to a more powerful neighbour (the US and Australia respectively). As a result, both have become disproportionately reliant economically on this neighbour. In both, the Canadian and New Zealand cases, this reliance gives its neighbour a disproportionate advantage in setting the terms of trade.

This reliance, however, should be viewed as part of a broader pattern common to Australia as well as Canada and New Zealand: the prominence of alliances as a core component of defence strategy. Prior to WWII, the alliance relationship focused on membership of the British Empire, and it was commonly assumed that although the three dominions would be required to provide their own day-to-day security, Britain would readily provide assistance in extreme crises.[51]

Following WWII and Britain's decline as a global power, the pattern of alliance relationships with great powers continued, with all three countries becoming part of the Western alliance system. In Canada's case, its primary post-WWII alliance relationships existed under the auspices of NATO and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Canada's relationship with other NATO countries, particularly the US, was a central pillar of its cold war defence strategy.[52] Australia and New Zealand, sharing a common geographical location with one another but not with Canada, were both signatories to the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS),[53] although New Zealand's suspension from the treaty in 1986 has set it apart from Australia and Canada in more recent times.

The centrality of alliance relationships within Australian, Canadian and New Zealand defence policies has often been driven by pragmatic concerns over national security. Specifically, concerns have arisen within each country that alone they do not have the capacity to provide for their own defence against more powerful aggressors. To fill this capability deficit, each has turned to what former Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies referred to as "great and powerful friends."[54] During the cold war, a principal manifestation of this alliance logic was frequent contributions to military endeavours that took place well beyond the national borders of each country. These military endeavours came with the expectation that a quid pro quo for ongoing loyalty would be the US providing military assistance should Australia's, Canada's or New Zealand's national survival ever be at stake, a policy that was in many ways a continuation of pre-WWII policy (substituting Britain with the US).

48. John Molony, *Eureka* (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001).

49. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 99–107.

50. Ann Capling, *All the Way with the USA: Australia, the US and Free Trade* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005); and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bilateral Free Trade with the United States: Lessons from Canada," paper presented to the seminar An American Free Trade Agreement? (Adelaide: Flinders University, May 25, 2001).

51. For Australia and New Zealand, this proved to be an inaccurate assumption, and in their utmost time of need (when confronting the prospect of Japanese invasion), Britain was unable to provide sufficient assistance. See David Day, *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–1942* (New South Wales: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1988).

52. Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out*, Washington Paper no. 121 (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1986), 36–39.

53. *The ANZUS Treaty: Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, signed in San Francisco, September 1, 1951.

54. Quoted in Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), 23.

In addition to relying on the promise of support from great and powerful friends, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have frequently turned to coalition building in order to attain a level of international influence that they cannot attain individually. The theory underlying this phenomenon has been termed middle-power diplomacy, and although it is not a major theme within this study, it nonetheless warrants some discussion. It is worth noting, however, that the concept of middle-power diplomacy is itself an ambiguous one. As Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, observed: "There are no agreed criteria [for being a middle power]: it is a matter of balancing out GDP and population size, and perhaps military capacity and physical size as well, then having regard to the perceptions of others."[55] Adam Chapnick concurred, stating that "'middle power' is rarely defined, and limited explanations are never specific."[56]

There are, however, some common indicators as to what constitutes a middle power. Canadian scholar Kim Richard Nossal argued:

> Middlepowermanship … refers to a style of foreign policy behaviour, typically engaged in by states which are neither great powers nor small powers; this diplomacy stresses mediation, international institution-building, and conflict-resolution. … There are five inter-related characteristics of middlepowermanship: scope, style, focus, form, and forum.[57]

Nossal goes on to provide a definition of each of these characteristics; however, they were more succinctly summed up by Evans and Grant:

> The characteristic method of middle power diplomacy is coalition building with "like minded" countries. It also usually involves "niche" diplomacy, which means concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field. By definition, middle powers are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will, but they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view, and to act accordingly.[58]

Activities of this kind can be seen in the case of all three countries.[59] For example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand were all members of the Cairns Group, and all remain members of the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All are members of the "Group of Eleven," which has enabled like-minded middle-power states to visibly distinguish their policies from the US, Soviet Union / Russia and the Non-aligned Movement at Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conferences. All were among the original 51 member states of the UN and were also among the founding members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. All are involved, to one extent or another, in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the Pacific Basin Economic Conference and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.[60] Through these and other multilateral organizations, all have acted to advance their interests beyond what their individual abilities allow.

55. Evans and Grant, 344.

56. Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 188.

57. Kim Richard Nossal, "Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and Canada Compared," in *The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses*, eds. Richard Leaver and James Richardson (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 211.

58. Evans and Grant, 345.

59. For a historical account of the evolution of the idea of middle-power diplomacy in Australian foreign policy, which assesses the idea's validity in the case of Australia, as well as providing an interesting comparison with the idea's early role in Canadian foreign policy, see Carl Ungerer, "Australia's Place in the International System: Middle Power, Pivotal Power or Dependant Power?" in *Australian Foreign Policy in the Age of Terror,* ed. Carl Ungerer (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2008), 26–32.

60. Membership lists for each of these organizations can be found at their websites.

While there is general agreement that Australia and Canada should be regarded as middle powers,[61] few have argued New Zealand fits into this category. Yet those who argue against New Zealand's inclusion as a middle power usually base their arguments on New Zealand's small population or its remote geography. Gerald Hensley, for example, stated that "[a]s an island nation remote from the world's troubles, of no strategic significance ('a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica') and with only a minute part of international trade, there is little to distinguish New Zealand from a score of other small countries."[62]

This view fails to take into account New Zealand's history of coalition building and active diplomacy as well as its tendency to support and contribute to international institutions and multilateral forums to achieve its foreign policy goals. All are indicators that New Zealand practices middle-power diplomacy where it can, despite its small size relative to Australia and Canada. Furthermore, New Zealand prides itself on a tradition of good international citizenship, often associated with the middle-power outlook.[63] Hence, for the purposes of this discussion, New Zealand, though smaller in terms of population and geography, has sufficient similarities in terms of its national outlook and behaviour to warrant inclusion as a middle power.

However, as the phrase implies, middle-power diplomacy is a concept developed to describe the behaviour of a similar group of states *in the diplomatic realm*. How a country's status as a middle power affects its military thinking and behaviour is an issue rarely discussed within the existing literature. Often, military size is cited as one of the many factors determining a country's middle-power status. Many texts go no further than this, however, and as a result, the comparative importance of middle-power military capabilities compared to the other facets of their power base remains ill-defined. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether sheer military size alone contributes to a country's middle-power status or whether a country's willingness to use (or threaten to use) its military to achieve political objectives is more important.

Clearly, however, middle powers are limited in their resource allocation; hence, one would infrequently expect them to undertake large-scale military endeavours in their own right. Australia, Canada and New Zealand clearly adhere to this expectation. These countries tend to participate in wars through the deployment of expeditionary forces that, while on occasion comparable to or even greater than large countries as a percentage of population (WWI and WWII, for example), are almost always far smaller in terms of overall size.

The exceptions to this general rule have thus far been small- or medium-scale operations with a focus on peacekeeping or intervention. These include Canada's role in ending the Suez Crisis (1956), the Australian-led peacekeeping mission in East Timor (1999–2002) and New Zealand's role in fostering peace in Bougainville (New Zealand hosted peace talks in 1997 and subsequently led an international truce monitoring group on the island).[64] Missions such as these are among the few examples of Australia, Canada and New Zealand playing proactive, military leadership roles. For the remainder of the time, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have deployed military forces in coalitions at the request of either an international organization (such as the UN) or a more powerful ally (such as the US); something they have done frequently. As one might expect, this military behaviour echoes the

61. For an argument against this position, see Chapnick, 188–206.

62. Gerald Hensley, "Will New Zealand Ever Rejoin ANZUS?" *Policy* 19, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 36.

63. Nossal, "Middle Power Diplomacy," 213–15.

64. Jocelyn Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 18–27; Bob Breen, *Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET)* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 1–122; Guy Wilson-Roberts, "The Bougainville Conflict: An Historical Overview," in *Peace on Bougainville – Truce Monitoring Group: Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace*, ed. Rebecca Adams (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001), 23–32; and Roger Mortlock, "A Good Thing to Do," in Adams, *Peace on Bougainville* (see this note), 69–82.

diplomatic behaviour commonly associated with middle powers—adhering to a status as "first follower" has been cited as one of their consistent characteristics over time. In the military realm, all have frequently fitted this description.

Another mechanism that can be used to analyse the similarities among the three is the concept of "strategic culture." Like middle-power diplomacy, strategic culture is not a major theme within this study but nonetheless warrants brief discussion.[65] Also, as with middle-power diplomacy, the definition of strategic culture is ambiguous, although Lawrence Sondhaus identified five scholars whose definitional works have been the most frequently cited.[66] Among these scholars, the most recent to offer a definition is Kerry Longhurst, who defined a strategic culture as "a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process."[67] For the purposes of the brief discussion of strategic culture herein, this definition will suffice.

In the case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, their strategic cultures are remarkably similar, largely because of several of the common historical experiences discussed above. Sondhaus, for example, observed that "Graeme Cheeseman has characterized Australia's strategic identity as that of a 'dependent ally,' not unlike Canada, whose loyal support for 'great and powerful friends'—first Britain, then the United States—allows it to claim the protection of those friends for itself."[68] Sondhaus also asserted that all three countries have strategic cultures shaped by their historical experience of expeditionary warfare in the context of the British Empire and Commonwealth and later in the context of the US alliance.[69] While Australia and Canada continue to maintain this tradition, "[i]n the post-Cold War world, New Zealand has based its foreign policy on support for the UN rather than the United States."[70] Despite this recent shift in the manifestation of New Zealand's strategic culture, however, its characteristics nonetheless remain similar to those of the strategic cultures of Australia and Canada.

Contemporary Societal Similarities

In addition to their common historical experiences, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have many contemporary similarities that affect their military outlooks and policies. Although those that relate directly to their armed forces and strategic policies are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, the broader societal similarities that shape the environments in which the contemporary Australian, Canadian and New Zealand militaries exist are briefly summarized at this juncture. This summary is provided for two reasons: to illustrate the wider context in which doctrine development occurred and to further justify the selection of these three countries as subjects for comparison.

The first of these broader similarities is that Australia, Canada and New Zealand all have modern, vibrant economies. It has been proposed that the contemporary world can be divided into an economically determined "North" (characterized by high incomes, low unemployment, high life expectancy and entry into the "information age") and "South" (characterized by low incomes, high unemployment,

65. As noted in the introduction, the concept of service culture is employed within this study, primarily to enable analysis of doctrine development and as an explanatory factor underlying some of the assertions made herein. Importantly, service culture is not synonymous with strategic culture because unlike strategic culture, "the military's organizational culture is not equivalent to the national character." Kier, 70.

66. These scholars are Jack Snyder, Ken Booth, Alastair Iain Johston, Colin Gray and Kerry Longhurst. Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 123.

67. Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 17.

68. Sondhaus, 114; see also Graeme Cheeseman, "Australia: The White Experience of Fear and Dependence," in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, eds. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999), 273–98.

69. Sondhaus, 69–71, 114–16.

70. Ibid.,116.

mass poverty and a rapidly increasing birth rate.)[71] As an examination of key world economic indicators at the end of 2007 shows, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are all clearly situated within the economic North. Each had a high level of per capita gross national income in purchasing power parity terms: $33,340 for Australia, $35,310 for Canada and $26,340 for New Zealand.[72] This was accompanied by low infant mortality rates, high life-expectancy rates and low population-growth rates. Education levels were also high, with all three countries having adult literacy levels close to 100 per cent.[73] Additionally, all had extensive service sectors (a characteristic of highly developed economies) and comparably sized industrial sectors. Finally, each had high Internet connection rates (another characteristic of highly developed economies), with Canada, New Zealand and Australia ranked eighth, ninth and tenth in the world (in that order) in terms of Internet connectivity rates per capita.[74]

Second, citizens of Australia, Canada and New Zealand have embraced similar values, which are reflected in each country's national attitude. In the World Value Survey Cultural Map 1999–2004,[75] Australia, Canada and New Zealand have national values that make them closer to one another than to any other countries surveyed. As the map also demonstrates, they are all clearly situated within the same "value block," which Inglehart and Welzel have labelled English Speaking Countries.[76] On its vertical axis, the map shows the difference between countries whose populations hold either "traditional" or "secular-rational" values. According to Inglehart, traditional societies are those that

> emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.[77]

As shown on the map, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are slightly to the traditional side of centre, which is reflective of the polarization of public opinion within each over the issues mentioned above—particularly abortion and euthanasia, which have been the subject of considerable public debate within all three countries.

The map shows the difference between countries whose populations hold primarily "survival" or "self-expression" values. As Inglehart and Welzel observe, industrialization generally leads to a societal shift away from traditional and towards secular rational values. However, it is only on the shift from an industrial to an information-technology based economy that societal values begin to shift away from survivalist towards self-expressionist values.[78] This is because societies with information-technology-based economies have highly developed infrastructure systems which ensure their populations have easy access to survival necessities such as food, water and shelter. Hence, populations in these countries are more likely to take survival for granted, leading to an attitudinal shift towards an emphasis on

71. Although there has been much debate as to the exact criteria defining "North" and "South," these simplistic descriptions will suffice for the purposes of the brief discussion of this concept herein. For a more detailed summary of the debate, see Geir Lundestad, *East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics Since 1945*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 301–340.

72. US$ per capita in 2007. See The World Bank, "Selected Indicators," *World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography*, Washington DC, 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2009/Resources/4231006-1225840759068/WDR09_22_SWDIweb.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

73. Ibid.

74. Figures are from 2003. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2003), 65.

75. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "The WVS Cultural Map of the World," World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54 (accessed October 29, 2012).

76. Note that this is similar to Huntington's concept of Western civilization, although the World Value Survey Cultural Map has been less controversial as it has approached the concept from a more neutral perspective. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

77. World Values Survey Association, *World Values Survey*, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/ (accessed October 29, 2012).

78. Ibid.

> environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values also reflect mass polarization over tolerance of outgroups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere of tolerance, trust and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust.[79]

As the economic statistics given above show, Australia, Canada and New Zealand all have characteristics common to highly developed economies. Their practically identical position on the right hand side of the horizontal axis of the Values Map is, therefore, unsurprising, as this position is indicative of highly developed economies with widespread Internet access, large service sectors and high education standards. It is also indicative of their national policies towards multiculturalism; an emphasis on creativity, which is present in their education systems;[80] and their open, democratic governmental systems.

Key Differences

Despite their many similarities, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are not identical. Indeed, simple differences are easily observed. For example, Canada is located in a different hemisphere from Australia and New Zealand; citizens of all three countries follow different national sporting codes;[81] and the electoral cycle has often resulted in the ideological leanings of their governments being contrary in any given year.[82] Yet there are also more complex differences that warrant mention, especially those that relate to military culture and history.

The first of these differences is geography, as proximity to (or distance from) both major allies and potential security threats have been significant factors shaping national defence policies in all three countries. In this case, Australia is the odd one out, due to its proximity to its Asian and Pacific neighbours and the distance from its major European and American allies. Canada and New Zealand, by contrast, have (at least during the 20th century, in Canada's case)[83] been geographically shielded by a more powerful ally—Canada by the US to its south and New Zealand by Australia to its west. Even during the cold war, when Canada became a "front-line" nation (situated along the shortest aerial route between the US and the Soviet Union), the remote northern radar installations that formed the main line of North American defence, and Canada's contribution to security in far-off Western Europe,

79. Ibid.

80. Imagine Australia, *The Role of Creativity in the Innovation Economy*, Prime Minister's Science Engineering and Innovation Council (Canberra: Australian Government, 2005), 20; The Innovation Council, Conference Board of Canada, *Submission – Response to the Government of Canada's Innovation Strategy*, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071115002346/http://www.innovation.gc.ca/gol/innovation/site.nsf/en/index.html (accessed October 29, 2012); and New Zealand, Minister for Education, *Making a Bigger Difference for all Students: Schooling Strategy 2005–2010* (Auckland: New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2005), 26.

81. Australia's most widely followed national sport is Australian rules football, followed closely by rugby league. Canada's is ice hockey, and New Zealand's is rugby union. See Jim Coleman, *Hockey Is Our Game: Canada in the World of International Hockey* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987); and Philip Derriman, "If You Can Kick It, Australia Will Watch It," *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 22, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/22/1053196670542.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

82. In Australia, the Liberal Party (conservative) was elected to government in 1996, holding office until the Labor Party (left wing) won a general election in 2007; in Canada, the Liberals (left wing) have held government for 61 of the past 75 years, being defeated by the Tories (conservative) in 2006; in New Zealand, Labour (left wing) held coalition governments with various minor parties from 1999 to 2008, when it was defeated by the National Party (conservative). Cardenas, 134; David Nason, *The Australian*, "Howard's New Best Friend," May 18, 2006, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,19170618,00.html (accessed June 7, 2006, site discontinued); and *The Australian*, "Kiwi PM is 'Living the Dream,'" November 20, 2008, 8.

83. Prior to the 20th century, the US was considered by most Canadians to be the primary threat to Canadian security. This attitude shifted in the first half of the 20th century, largely due to America's growing prominence as a British ally and increased Canadian-American economic links. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 41–98, 173.

remained out of sight to most Canadians. The proximity has allowed Canadians and New Zealanders to pay less attention to territorial defence than citizens of other Western countries, including Australians.[84]

As a result of these geographic differences (and the security perceptions related to them), Australia has generally approached its territorial security more robustly than Canada and New Zealand. Accompanying this, however, has been an occasional tendency for Australian security policy to be driven by paranoia over potential security threats posed by its Asian and Pacific neighbours. This facet of Australian security policy formulation can be traced to its colonial era. For example, a fear of being "overrun" by Asian immigrants took root at the time of white settlement and eventually led to the infamous White Australia Policy that prevented Asian immigration to Australia until the 1970s.[85]

Overall, security perceptions related to geography have frequently led to vastly different Australian, Canadian and New Zealand responses to the same or similar situations. Typical of this historical difference is their response to Japanese naval expansion in the Pacific during the early 20th century. As early as 1902, Australian concerns were triggered by the British withdrawal of the majority of its Pacific fleet to the Mediterranean in order to compete with Germany in the burgeoning pre-WWI European arms race.[86] Following the Japanese victory over the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima in 1905, Australian security concerns intensified, and in light of continued British absence from the region, Australia turned instead to the US for protection, inviting the US "White Fleet" to visit Sydney and Melbourne in 1908, despite incurring British naval resentment as a result. When this display of solidarity failed to quell Australia's security concerns sufficiently, the potential Japanese threat became a substantial factor in generating support for the establishment of the Royal Australian Navy in 1913.[87]

By contrast, New Zealand and Canada during the same period saw no naval security threat, something reflected in their naval policies. The RCN, like the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), was established as a result of the British naval withdrawal from the Pacific, although where Australia made the decision to establish the RAN in response to a perceived security threat, the RCN was only established in response to a British request that Canada contribute a fleet unit to the Pacific to fill the void the Royal Navy had created as a result of its redeployment.[88] It was a task the RCN was unable to undertake, although for reasons beyond its control. Immediately after its establishment in 1910, the RCN found itself at the centre of a political melee that resulted in its neglect and, by 1914, utter degradation.[89] This degradation occurred to such an extent that the Imperial Japanese Navy was invited to protect Canada's Pacific coast in order to allow Canada's few ships to be deployed in the Atlantic in support of the British fleet during WWI—something that would have alarmed the vast majority of Australians had it been their coastline.[90]

New Zealand's position during this period was somewhere between that of Australia and Canada. Although the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) was not established until after WWII, New Zealand saw the need to provide its own coastal defence as early as the 1880s and acquired a small-white water fleet of torpedo boats and mine laying vessels for this purpose. However, by the early 20th century, this fleet was aging, and as had occurred in the Canadian case, New Zealanders became embroiled in

84. Jockel and Sokolsky, 1–34.

85. Cheeseman, "Australia: The White Experience of Fear and Dependence," 273–98; see also Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Annandale: Pluto Press Australia Ltd., 2001).

86. E. M. Andrews, *A History of Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988), 11–12.

87. Tom Frame, *No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the Royal Australian Navy* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 87–99.

88. Gilbert Tucker, *Origins and Early Years*, vol.1, *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), 121–69.

89. Ibid., 170–211.

90. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 126.

debate over the need to allocate naval funding. The eventual outcome of the debate was the Naval Defence Act of 1913, which established the New Zealand branch of the Royal Naval Reserve; few in New Zealand saw the need to establish a separate Navy as Australia had done, just as few New Zealanders saw Japan as a potential security threat during the period.[91]

These contrasting concerns over a potential Japanese security threat at the beginning of the 20th century serve as merely one example of a longer-term trend: a strong Australian response to a perceived (if somewhat exaggerated) threat to national security, juxtaposed by lackadaisical (or on occasion even feeble) Canadian and New Zealand responses to the same event. This difference in security perceptions among the three countries, and the resultant discrepancy in defence policies, is one that has recurred throughout their histories.

It should also be noted that this difference in security perceptions is similar to the different levels of importance the three countries have traditionally accorded to actively maintaining defence relationships with their great and powerful friends. Where Australian governments have frequently felt the need to demonstrate to their allies the benefits of remaining regionally engaged in Southeast Asia, governments in Canada and New Zealand have tended to take alliance relationships with the US and Australia, respectively, for granted.

This is most likely due to geography. In Canada's case, a territorial security threat would also present a direct threat to the US, which would, therefore, intervene to protect Canada regardless of whether Ottawa requested (or even desired) such assistance.[92] Likewise, any major military threat to New Zealand would first have to pass across or near Australian territory, thus ensuring Australian assistance to New Zealand. Australia, however, is geographically isolated from its traditional major allies—Britain and the US, and Australia cannot rely on geographic proximity alone to maintain its alliance relationships. Hence, Australian governments have felt a stronger need to demonstrate the benefits of alliances to their larger allies.[93] An example of this attitudinal difference is the alliance logic underlying the Australian government's decision to contribute forces to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in contrast to the Canadian and New Zealand governments' decisions not to.

Strategic focus is a second point of contrast, with Canada's strategic focus on the North Atlantic and Europe making it different from Australia and New Zealand, which focus instead on Asia and the Pacific.[94] In Australia and New Zealand's case, this focus is largely due to geographic necessity.[95] For Canada, which has a Pacific as well as an Atlantic coast, history and politics have played a greater role. Prior to WWI, the Canadian focus on Europe was largely due to the central role European powers, particularly Britain, played in Canada's foreign affairs. During the 18th and 19th centuries, Canada often found itself embroiled in European wars, usually involuntarily. Indeed, Canada's history as a British colony began with the Seven Years War, which was promptly followed by Canada's role on the British side during the American War of Independence and the War of 1812,[96] events that drove a necessary Canadian interest in European affairs.

91. McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 353.

92. The US position was established beyond doubt in 1938 when President Roosevelt declared that "the people of the United States would not stand idly by if Canada soil [sic] is threatened by any other empire." Thomas S. Axeworthy, "An Independent Canada in a Shared North America: Must We Be in Love or Will an Arranged Marriage Do?" *International Journal* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 761–82.

93. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 212–13.

94. In New Zealand's case, focus is more squarely on the South Pacific, as most New Zealanders view themselves as a part of this subregion.

95. This necessity was perhaps best expressed by Sir Robert Menzies when he commented in 1939 that "Europe's far east is Australia's near north." Quoted in Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938–1965 (*Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 24.

96. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 98–177.

However, these wars were not the primary force behind Canada's strategic focus on Europe, and heavy European immigration combined with ongoing population concentration in Canada's eastern provinces have done more to maintain the Canadian focus on Europe.[97] Indeed, Canada's western frontier was not settled until the 19th century, with British Columbia only being claimed as a territory in 1871, over two centuries after the colonization of the Atlantic side of the country.[98] Since WWII, Canada's strategic focus on the Atlantic and Europe has centred on its role in NATO and its alliance with the United States. As Blaxland acknowledges, "[t]he NATO connection draws Canadian military practitioners in a trans-Atlantic rather than a trans-Pacific direction,"[99] a factor that continues to set Canada apart from Australia and New Zealand.

Another major difference among Australia, Canada and New Zealand is the level of influence various ethnic minorities have had over the armed forces. In Australia's case, the strictly selective White Australia Policy has resulted in continued ethnic unity in Australia, despite its abolition in the early 1970s.[100] In Canada and New Zealand, ethnicity has been less coherent. In New Zealand, Maori warrior culture has led to a substantial Maori presence in the armed forces, particularly the Army, which has in turn affected military culture through the adoption of certain Maori customs and traditions. In Canada, the French-Canadian population (approximately 23 per cent of the total Canadian population in 2007)[101] has had an even more noticeable and profound effect on the armed forces.

Since Canada's transfer from French to British control in 1763, its history has been marred by continued friction between Anglo and French-Canadians, something particularly salient during wartime. This friction has its roots in the French loss of its Canadian colonies to the British following the French defeat in the Seven Years War. Ever since, French-Canadians have "been inculcated with a version of history stressing the plight of the French,"[102] and two noticeably different cultures have continued to coexist in Quebec. From time to time, this latent ethnic divide has led to open conflict; the first occasion being the insurrection of 1837–38, which cost the lives of several hundred Canadians on both sides.[103] Following the insurrection, most of the leaders of the Quebecois independence movement were arrested, resulting in the issue disappearing from the mainstream agenda until the 1950s.

In the interim period, the Quebecois maintained their unique identity and Francophile worldview, something that frequently saw them oppose Anglo-Canadians in Parliament, especially where war was concerned. This was especially true of the Boer War. Anglo-Canadians considered it a duty to assist the British "mother country" as much as they could; French-Canadians saw the war as a symptom of British Imperialism that need not concern Canada. The result was that, while a large Canadian volunteer expeditionary force did serve in the Boer War, the decision to deploy it almost split the cabinet and was made without consulting Parliament for fear of a split emerging in the ruling party. The compromise that eventually muted the debate—that Canada would send volunteer forces but that Britain would pay for them—stood in contrast to Australia and New Zealand offering Britain unconditional assistance.[104]

97. Margaret Conrad and Alvin Finkle, *History of the Canadian Peoples*, vol. 2, *1867 to the Present* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 415–19.

98. Ibid., 41.

99. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2003), 96.

100. In 2007, Caucasians (mostly of European decent) constituted 92 per cent of the Australian population. United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, "Australia," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html (accessed October 29, 2012); and Huw Jones, "Immigration Policy and the New World Order: The Case of Australia" in *Population Migration and the Changing World Order*, eds. W. T. S. Gould and A. M. Findlay (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), 163.

101. United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook,* "Canada," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

102. Quoted in Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2003), 85.

103. Marcel Rioux, "The Development of Ideologies in Quebec," in *A Passion for Identity: An Introduction to Canadian Studies*, 2nd ed., eds. David Taras, Beverly Rasporich, and Eli Mandel (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1993), 72–74.

104. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 114–15.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Quebecois nationalism again began to stir, this time manifesting itself politically rather than violently. After three decades of debate, the culmination of this nationalist drive was a 1995 independence referendum in Quebec that was narrowly defeated.[105] During this period, the effect of Quebecois nationalism has been to make the military an instrument for maintaining national unity in addition to providing national defence. Seen as an inclusive body symbolic of Canadian unity, the military (like the rest of the Canadian government) is now a bilingual entity, recognizing both French and English as official languages, and since the early 1970s, requiring senior officers to be fluent in both.[106] Furthermore, several military and defence issues have continued to divide Anglo- from French-Canadians, sometimes to the detriment of pragmatic defence policy. Such division along ethnic lines is one that does not exist in Australia and New Zealand; hence, it remains a major point of contrast among the three countries.

Conclusion: A Suitable Choice for Comparison

The discussion above has demonstrated that Australia, Canada and New Zealand, despite a few substantial differences, have much in common with each other. These commonalities are both historic and contemporary and are broad in scope, ranging from common governmental systems and national values to common national experiences of war. Indeed, many substantial similarities exist between the military histories of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Most prominent among these similarities are their ties to their larger allies (especially to Britain and the US), the links between military endeavours (particularly WWI) as well as the development of their national identities and their common experience of war as foreign in the sense that none has been invaded or occupied (since the conclusion of the War of 1812 in Canada's case).

The result of these common experiences is that even today their societies and especially their militaries bear much resemblance to one another. All three have technologically advanced militaries and, since 1987, have experienced similar debates over the existence and utility of concepts such as the information-technology revolution in military affairs (RMA).[107] Underlying these debates has been the ability of all three countries to purchase and employ cutting edge military communications technologies, navigation systems and enemy detection devices, although often in limited numbers due to typical middle-power funding constraints.

Each of the three militaries is still shaped to a large degree by the ongoing need for interoperability with allies (derived in part from their middle-power military status). Due to this requirement, all three generally adhere to multinational or interservice interoperability standards, such as those established by NATO; the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) Armies' Standardization Programme; or the Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States (AUSCANZUKUS) maritime interoperability organization. Variants of the same aircraft, armoured vehicles and naval craft can also be found throughout the three countries' armed forces.

105. Louis Balthazar, "The Faces of Quebec Nationalism," in *A Passion for Identity* (see note 102), 97–107.

106. DND / Canadian Forces, *A National Institution*, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about/roles_e.asp (accessed June 7, 2006, site discontinued).

107. Michael Evans, "Australia and the Revolution in Military Affairs" (working paper no. 115, Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon 2001); Andrew Richter, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Canada: The Challenge and the Consequences" (working paper no. 28, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1999); and David Dickens, "Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Zealand View – Part I" (working paper 14/99, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Victoria 1999). A "revolution in military affairs" has been defined as "a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations," in this case brought about by technological advances since the end of the Vietnam War and evident initially during the 1991 Gulf War. The concept was highly popular during the 1990s, although it has since been brought into doubt as a result of the asymmetric nature of the post-September 11, 2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, it is referred to herein as a concept, rather than as a definite occurrence. On the RMA concept, see R. Hindley, *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the US Military?* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999); Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993); and Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 37–54.

Once the many individual similarities identified above are looked at broadly, it becomes clear that Australia, Canada and New Zealand are compelling subjects for comparison. This is especially true of their militaries, and given the many commonalities between them, it is surprising that so few comparisons have previously been made in this area. This study addresses one of these gaps: the development of military-strategic doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand from 1987 to 2007.

Chapter 2

The Decade of Uncertainty: Strategic Policy Developments and Operational Undertakings, 1987–1997

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, followed promptly by the Gulf War, combined to render 1989 to 1991 a period of profound change within the international system. Yet for Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as smaller powers, the year 1987 was arguably more significant from a strategic policy perspective. In all three countries, policy was shaped by the release of Defence White Papers that, although starkly different in the policy directions they set and the context in which they were written, were nonetheless similar in that they promised to establish a new strategic direction. It is with the release of these White Papers that the period examined by this study begins.

These documents, however, were not developed in a political and strategic vacuum. Hence, the analysis in this chapter begins with an overview of the key ongoing strategic policy themes that influenced the development of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Defence White Papers published in 1987. Then, following a brief examination of the strategies detailed within the White Papers, the remainder of the discussion in this chapter is divided into two sections: the first examining strategic policy developments and operational undertakings in Australia, Canada and New Zealand from 1987 to 1992 and the second examining the period 1992 to 1997. By focusing particularly on strategic policy and military operations, this discussion establishes the developments that occurred in two of the key areas that influenced doctrine writing in all three countries throughout this period. Of equal importance, this discussion also provides an overview of the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred during this period. In conclusion, the key factors shaping this political context are made explicit, and it can be seen that strategic uncertainty was a key feature of the period.

Strategic Policy Themes Prior to 1987

For Australia and New Zealand, the conclusion of the Vietnam War ushered in the end of what had been an era of strategic policy stability in the face of regional instability. Prior to the early 1970s, Southeast Asia had been at the forefront of the cold war for over two decades, beginning with the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[1] Subsequently, several wars were waged by Western powers with the aim of preventing the spread of communism within the region, all involving Australian and New Zealand military contributions.[2] Furthermore, Indonesian foreign policy went through a period of *Konfrontasi* in the late 1960s, which posed a security threat to Australia in particular, with broader ramifications for New Zealand.[3] This, coupled with the period of rule by Sukarno (during which there was the possibility that Indonesia could fall under communist control), fostered a widespread feeling of insecurity in Australia and New Zealand.[4] Finally, fears over the prospects of an expansionist Chinese foreign policy grew in Canberra and Wellington during the

1. William Wei, "'Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun': Mao and the Red Army" in *A Military History of China*, eds. David Graff and Robin Higham (Cambridge: Westview, 2002), 229–48.

2. The first of these was the Malayan Emergency (1948–60); the second was the Korean War (1950–53), which also involved a significant Canadian contribution; and the third was the American-led Vietnam War (1962–75). Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 173–74; and Grey, *The Commonwealth Arwqwmies,* 88–108. Note that the French War in Indochina (1946–54) is not included in this list, as France's primary motivation for the war was not anti-communism but rather an attempt to reassert its colonial domination within the region. Bernard Fall, *Street without Joy* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 22–31.

3. J. Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soekarno* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 1–7.

4. Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 152–56.

1950s and intensified further following the Chinese nuclear tests in 1960s.[5] Although this fear had largely dissipated by the end of the decade, it created yet another challenge for defence planners in the interim.[6]

To address this plethora of security challenges, Australia and New Zealand embraced a strategy of "forward defence" in the early 1950s. Essentially, this strategy focused on neutralizing threats to national security before they reached the shores of either country. To ensure this occurred, both countries pursued a dual-policy approach, dispatching military forces to fight in regional conflicts while carefully nurturing their alliance relationships with Britain and the US in the expectation that these allies would provide defence assistance if the national survival of either country was directly threatened.[7]

By the early 1970s, however, the forward defence strategy was becoming increasingly unpopular in both countries, and anti-Vietnam War movements led many ordinary citizens to question its utility. Yet, it was international events that ultimately rendered forward defence unfeasible. The first of these events was the announcement by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1968 that Britain was withdrawing its military forces from "East of Suez."[8] This was followed in 1969 by America's adoption of the "Guam Doctrine," which ended the automatic guarantee of American military assistance to its Southeast Asian allies.[9] Within the space of only two years, two of the fundamental pillars upon which Australian and New Zealand security policy had long been built had disintegrated, necessitating a strategic policy shift in both countries.

In Australia, the McMahon Government's March 1972 Defence White Paper (the *Australian Defence Review*) was the first widely circulated official document to acknowledge the British and American strategic policy shifts. In declaring that Australia "should not allow its expectation of external support for its defence … to overshadow its obligations to assume, within the limits of its resources, the primary responsibility for its own conventional defence,"[10] the *Australian Defence Review* heralded the beginning of a policy shift towards defence "self-reliance."[11] Despite this shift, the *Review* did not totally abandon Australia's forward defence strategy, outlining where Australian forces may have been required to deploy overseas, most notably in support of Papua New Guinean interests prior to its 1975 independence (though ultimately forces were not required).[12]

5. Gregory Clark, *In Fear of China* (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967), 161–211.

6. Lachlan Strahan, *Australia's China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 160–80.

7. This approach led to the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951.

8. John Darwin, "Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez," in *Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States Since the 1930s*, ed. Carl Bridge (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 140–58.

9. Robert Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 52–54.

10. DOD, *Australian Defence Review*, 1972, 14.

11. "Self-reliance" in this context is defined as Australia's ability to defend its national territory without relying on assistance from its allies. Michael Lankowski, "Assessing Self-Reliance in Australian Defence and Alliance Policy, 1966–2006" (PhD study, University of Queensland, 2006), 23–26.

12. DOD, *Australian Defence Review*, 1972, 5.

It was not until the election of the Whitlam Government in December 1972 (Australia's first Labor government in 23 years) that a number of radical defence reforms occurred, at a pace some found alarming. Within months of taking office, the Whitlam Government had ended Australian involvement in the Vietnam War; abolished conscription; arranged for the Australian garrison to be withdrawn from Singapore; and officially recognized the Communist government in Beijing, ending any lingering fears about an immediate Chinese security threat to Australia.[13] Shortly afterward, Australia's five autonomous (and competitive) government departments that had previously been responsible for formulating and implementing defence policy were amalgamated into a single Department of Defence (DOD).[14]

More radical, however, was the ideological shift away from forward defence that underlay these reforms. Immediately upon entering office, the Whitlam Government adopted a policy of "continental defence," focusing exclusively on the direct protection of the Australian continent, while substantially furthering the shift towards self-reliance.[15] This policy shift was officially expressed in the 1976 Defence White Paper (*Australian Defence*),[16] although, importantly, *Australian Defence* was not released until after the sacking of the Whitlam Government and the entry into office of the Liberal (conservative) Fraser Government. Owing largely to the ideological gap between the Whitlam and Fraser Governments, the Fraser Government never fully came to terms with the strategy espoused in the 1976 White Paper.[17] Instead, defence policy under the Fraser Government underwent what David Lee has described as a "return to the rhetoric, if not the substance, of forward defence."[18]

In order to justify its rhetoric, throughout its time in office, the Fraser Government often cited what it perceived as a growing "Soviet threat" to Australian security.[19] At the same time, however, the defence concerns underlying this rhetoric were not substantial enough to warrant an increase in defence spending, let alone a major review of the national defence strategy. As a result, Australian defence practice under Fraser moved further towards continental defence, if only because ongoing budget cuts first imposed by the Whitlam Government (which were continued by the Fraser Government) had resulted in a substantial degradation of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) ability to deploy forces overseas and, for those forces that could be deployed, sustain them once they were there.[20]

As was the case in Australia, there had been growing public objection in New Zealand to the forward defence strategy. By the early 1970s, the key justifications underlying New Zealand's adoption of the strategy—the threats posed by communist forces in Indonesia and Malaysia—had vanished. New Zealand, like Australia, experienced a change of government from National Party (conservative) to Labour in 1972. Unlike its Australian counterpart, the incoming Kirk Government found it advantageous to maintain several elements of the forward defence strategy despite its increasing unpopularity.

13. Graeme Cheeseman, "From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and Continuities in Australian Defence Policy 1965–90," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1991): 433; and Strahan, 291–92.

14. Eric Andrews, *The Department of Defence*, vol. 5, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 196–98.

15. David Lee, *Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Post-war Foreign and Defence Policy* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 73–74.

16. DOD, *Australian Defence* (1976 Defence White Paper), 10.

17. It is worth noting at this juncture that the divide between various incarnations of forward defence and continental defence has been an ongoing feature of Australian politics since Federation, with Conservative governments generally preferring policies akin to forward defence and Labor governments pursuing variations of continental defence. See Michael Evans, "Overcoming the Creswell-Foster Divide in Australian Strategy: The Challenge for Twenty-First Century Policy Makers," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 2 (June 2007): 193–214.

18. David Lee, "Australia's Defence Policy, A Historic Overview" in *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Mohan Malik (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 27.

19. Graeme Gill, "Australia and the Eastern Bloc" in *Diplomacy in the Market Place: Australia in World Affairs, Vol. 7, 1981–90*, eds. P. J. Boyce and J. R. Angel (Sydney: Longman Cheshire, 1992), 227.

20. Lee, "Australia's Defence Policy," 28.

The Kirk Government's motives, however, were not necessarily based on national security but rather on the diplomatic and economic benefits New Zealand received as an indirect result of its ongoing overseas military engagement. The New Zealand infantry battalion garrisoned in Singapore, for example, remained there until 1989, despite the British and Australian withdrawals from Singapore that rendered it strategically irrelevant in the early 1970s. This was partly because housing the garrison in New Zealand would have been far more expensive, partly because of the positive effect the prospect of overseas travel had on recruiting, and also because of the diplomatic goodwill generated by the garrison's participation in multinational exercises with New Zealand's Southeast Asian allies, particularly Malaysia and Singapore.[21]

The Kirk Government also continued New Zealand's participation in the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, which had been entered into by the National Party government in 1971 in an attempt to ensure that Singapore and Malaysia remained part of the Western alliance structure and that a nominal British presence was maintained in the region.[22] Again, the Kirk Government's decision was motivated by diplomatic rather than strategic concerns—New Zealand's military contribution to the annual exercises (held as a condition of the Agreement) provided a convenient display of solidarity that could be cited whenever New Zealand's relationship with Singapore and Malaysia required it.[23] In light of these benefits, the New Zealand Defence Force remained configured for forward defence despite the absence of a major threat and popular domestic sentiment against the strategy.

Following the return of the National Party to power in 1975, the focus of New Zealand's forward defence strategy shifted to the South Pacific, driven by concerns over the internal stability of New Zealand's northern neighbours. The National government also maintained New Zealand's broader alliance policies, expanding New Zealand's contribution to FPDA exercises in 1981 to include an army component (prior contributions had been made almost exclusively by the Royal New Zealand Air Force [RNZAF]).[24]

Under Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, New Zealand also continued to contribute to combined military exercises with the US. In return for ongoing American participation in the ANZUS alliance, Australia maintained several combined facilities with the US military; New Zealand "upheld its end of the bargain" primarily by providing port access to US naval vessels on request.[25] It was this policy that became the growing focus for opponents of forward defence.

Opposition to forward defence had remained popular in New Zealand throughout the 1970s. In the early 1980s, this opposition underwent something of a rebirth, shifting its focus away from forward defence in its entirety and towards one element of the policy in particular: the conditions of New Zealand's participation in the ANZUS alliance. Largely, this rebirth was a response to the Reagan Administration's hard-line anti-communist stance, which many in New Zealand saw as a greater threat to global security than the Soviet Union. In this regard, something of a paradox developed. While a majority of New Zealanders remained in favour of the alliance, an increasing number also felt that the benefits derived from New Zealand's participation in ANZUS were not substantial enough to justify its contributions. Over time, one contribution in particular became the focal point of broader objection

21. James Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships* (Wellington: The Printing Press, 1993), 97–106.

22. Carlyle Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever," *Security Challenges* 3, no. 1 (February 2007): 81.

23. Ian McGibbon, "The Defence Dimension," in *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, ed. Anthony L. Smith (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 26–27.

24. Ibid., 27.

25. Joseph A. Camilleri, *ANZUS: Australia's Predicament in the Nuclear Age* (South Melbourne: McMillan, 1987), 133.

to the policy: the use of New Zealand's ports by nuclear- armed and/or powered US warships.[26] The reason for this focus was simple enough. The growing public perception within New Zealand was that the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific had a destabilizing impact on regional security.

Throughout the early 1980s, protests against US foreign policy and the docking of US warships in New Zealand's ports grew in size and frequency. The election of the Lange Labour government in 1984 was the catalyst that brought events to a head (one of the Labour Party's election platforms had been its anti-nuclear stance). Following an ANZUS exercise in the Tasman early in 1985, the US requested permission for the United States Ship (USS) *Buchanan*, a warship capable of carrying nuclear weapons, to dock in a New Zealand port. The Lange Government responded to the US request by declaring that docking rights would only be granted if the *Buchanan* was not armed with nuclear weapons. In line with its "neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy, Washington refused to declare if the *Buchanan* was armed with nuclear weapons. In response, the Lange Government denied the US docking request, prompting the US State Department to warn that "New Zealand's action would not be 'cost-free.'"[27] What followed became known as the "ANZUS Crisis."

In summary, the ANZUS Crisis involved three years of diplomacy and negotiations on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the US in an ultimately futile attempt to maintain the ANZUS Treaty.[28] More importantly for New Zealand's defence policy than the crisis itself, however, was its ramifications. By the late 1980s, the US had effectively severed its ANZUS connections with New Zealand, opting instead for the continuation of a bilateral defence relationship with Australia (loosely under the ongoing label of ANZUS).[29] New Zealand, having lost the defence connection with the second of its great and powerful friends, was forced to re-evaluate its entire defence policy.

In contrast to Australia and New Zealand, Canada's geography and strategic focus on Europe meant that the British East-of-Suez withdrawal and the US Guam Doctrine had little, if any, impact in Ottawa. Furthermore, the Canadian military never fought in the Vietnam War;[30] hence, the war's fallout was far less significant in Canada than it was in Australia and New Zealand. Whereas the populations of those countries became embroiled in divisive debate over strategic policy as a result of their participation in the Vietnam War, many Canadians grew increasingly apathetic towards their military and strategic policy during the same period. Canadian forces stationed in faraway Europe or manning radar stations in the country's sparsely-populated north remained "out of sight, out of mind" to most Canadians.[31] As a result, Canada's armed forces, among the best resourced and equipped in the world in the early 1950s, had by the late 1960s become largely run-down, with much of their equipment in a state of obsolescence.

The most significant strategic policy shift in Canada during this period was the 1968 decision to unify the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF into a single service—the Canadian Forces. Driven by Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson's ambitious Defence Minister, Paul Hellyer, the unification

26. Paul Landais-Stamp and Paul Rogers, *Rocking the Boat: New Zealand, the United States and the Nuclear-Free Zone Controversy in the 1980s* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 17–22.

27. Hyam Gold, "Labour's First 300 Days," in *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Hyam Gold (Auckland: Benton Ross Publishers, 1985), 2.

28. For details of how the ANZUS Crisis unfolded, see Michael Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

29. Camilleri, 140–47.

30. Although Canadian Army officers were deployed to Vietnam as part of the International Commissions on Supervision and Control, established during the 1954 Geneva Peace Talks, they did not participate in the American-led Vietnam War in a combat capacity. Shane B. Schreiber, "The Road to Hell, Part 1: Canada in Vietnam, 1954–1973," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 73–85.

31. This is still the case regarding Canada's northern security. Peter Haydon, "Editorial: Arctic Security," *Canadian Naval Review* 1, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 4. See also Aaron P. Jackson, "Defending the 'Empty North': Comparing Canadian and Australian Challenges and Strategies," *Canadian Naval Review* 3, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 4–9.

of Canada's armed forces has often been written off by defence commentators as a mere cost-cutting measure.[32] While cost cutting was undoubtedly one motive underlying the decision to unify the CF, the decision appears to have also been an early attempt to create what would today be referred to as "jointery" within the CF. As R. J. Clark observed:

> In many respects, it was an insightful first step in the direction of joint command and control at the national strategic level, a concept that was well ahead of its time …. [H]istory has now shown that this idea of strategic joint command of individual services has taken root amongst most [W]estern militaries …. Unification into a single service, however, has remained a uniquely Canadian experiment.[33]

Unfortunately, unification did not result in the creation of a dynamic "joint" force decades ahead of its time. On the contrary, the experiment failed for several reasons. Objections arose on the grounds that the decision would ruin the long-standing traditions of each of the individual services, and the creation of a single uniform soon came to symbolize the cause of these objections.[34] Several senior officers from all three services resigned in protest, and as a result, the professionalism of the CF suffered. Furthermore, the six new "commands" that took the place of the three services—Mobile Command, Maritime Command, Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, Training Command and Material Command—took time to implement, required substantial financial investment, and were not any more conducive to cooperation or jointery than the three individual services they replaced. Indeed, the new commands did little to abolish pre-existing service rivalries, and by the mid-1970s, it was clear that distinct army, navy and air force cultures had survived in Mobile, Maritime and Air Commands respectively.[35]

Under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau, who assumed the prime ministership in 1968 (within months of unification), things only became worse for the CF. Defence budgets were continually tightened and major, often urgent, equipment purchases were frequently deferred during his 16-year tenure as prime minister.[36] In order to cut costs, on taking office one of Trudeau's first reforms dealt with Canada's contribution to NATO. In essence, he halved the number of Canadian personnel stationed in Europe and shifted the remaining forces from a front-line role to what was effectively a reserve role.[37]

This reform was then retrospectively justified by the publication of the 1971 Defence White Paper (*Defence in the 70s*). The White Paper set four defence priorities for Canada, in a descending order: the protection of national sovereignty, the defence of North America (in cooperation with the US), the contribution of forces to NATO, and contributing to international peacekeeping missions.[38] This order of priority was rapidly upturned, as Canadian involvement in NATO became "the government's 'de facto [sic] top defense priority.'"[39] Peacekeeping, which was popular among the Canadian public, also

32. J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging the War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 354.

33. R. J. Clark, "Joint Organization: A Canadian Way Ahead," (research paper, Command and Staff Course 31, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, n.d.), 14–15.

34. While this may seem trivial to the casual observer, to most military personnel—who commonly embrace a set of values that emphasize "honour," recognize deeds of hardship and feel a strong sense of belonging to the sub-community within their unit—the wearing of uniforms that emphasize their values (often by embodying the history of a unit) is the source of great pride and, hence, morale.

35. Air Command was formed in 1975 following the merging of Air Defence and Air Transport Commands. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 261.

36. Trudeau was prime minister from April 4, 1968 to June 3, 1979 and, following a nine-month stint in opposition, from March 3, 1980 to June 29, 1984. Cardenas, 107.

37. Edna Keeble, "Rethinking the 1971 White Paper and (Pierre Elliott) Trudeau's Impact on Canadian Defence Policy," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 27, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 545–69.

38. Canada, DND, *Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence*, 1971, 16.

39. Quoted in Keeble, 553.

received more attention than the priority the 1971 White Paper accorded it.[40] Yet, without budgets that reflected the priorities set by the White Paper, exacerbated by the lack of a strategic policy update as the years passed and priorities changed (a subsequent White Paper was not released until 1987), the CF was forced to rely on overstretched resources and improvised military strategies to fulfil its obligations.

As time went by, however, the CF began to recover from the setbacks suffered as a result of unification and the associated reforms. By the late 1970s, it had again become politically acceptable to refer to the personnel attached to Mobile, Maritime or Air Commands as "army," "navy" and "air force." In 1985, the Mulroney (Progressive Conservative) Government, elected the previous year, reintroduced separate uniforms for the three services, although they were modelled on American rather than the pre-unification British designs. And, above all, for personnel recruited after 1968, the morale-crushing effect of unification was something of a non-issue. By the late 1980s, most personnel had not served before unification and did not lament the days of visibly separate services.[41] What is more noteworthy, therefore, is that the neglect of the CF continued throughout the cold war despite this reintroduction of a limited separation of the three services. As a result, the 1970s and early 1980s are remembered in Canadian military circles similarly to how they are in Australian military circles—as a period marked by heavy budget cuts and the degradation of capabilities.

Proclaiming New Agendas: The 1987 Defence White Papers

The year 1987 was significant for Australia, Canada and New Zealand as it constituted the beginning of a period of strategic refocus, commencing in all three countries with the release of a Defence White Paper.

In 1985, the Australian Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, commissioned Paul Dibb, a former public servant within the DOD, to undertake a broad assessment of Australia's defence situation. His report, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, but more commonly referred to as "the Dibb Report," was delivered in March 1986. It set forth a number of recommendations for the conduct of Australian defence and went on to form the basis of the 1987 Defence White Paper (*The Defence of Australia 1987*).

Primarily, Dibb's recommendations stemmed from his assessment of Australia's security situation. Beginning with the statement "Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world," the Dibb Report went on to assert that "Australia faces no identifiable direct military threat and there is every prospect that our favourable security circumstances will continue. … It would take at least 10 years and massive external support for the development of a regional capacity to threaten us with substantial assault."[42] Furthermore, the report recommended that "there is no need for Australia to become involved in the United States contingency planning for global war," concluding that combined Australian-US defence facilities, and continued access to Australian ports and airfields by US ships and warplanes, was a sufficient Australian contribution to maintain the US alliance.[43]

In light of this strategic situation, the Dibb Report recommended continuing the policy of self-reliance and proposed Australian defence policy opt for a "strategy of denial," in essence a new variant on the continental defence strategy.[44] At its core, the strategy of denial emphasized that "our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing

40. Henning A. Frantzen, *NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines*, (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 120–21.

41. Granatstein, 377.

42. Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Report to the Minister for Defence, 1986, 1.

43. Ibid., 4.

44. Ibid., 5–6.

the sea and air gap [to Australia's north]. … To the extent that lesser enemy forces might land we will need highly mobile land forces capable of dispersed operations and having the ability to protect … the north of the continent."[45] In March 1987, a year after the publication of the Dibb Report, Beazley presented the 1987 White Paper to Parliament. The strategy it espoused aligned almost identically with the Dibb Report's recommendations.[46]

In Canada, the 1987 Defence White Paper (*Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*) did not establish any new strategic goals despite the 16-year hiatus since the release of its predecessor. Instead, it reprioritized strategic goals in order to bring strategic and procurement policy into alignment with practice. Hence, *Challenge and Commitment* renewed the Canadian Forces' commitment to NATO, to the protection of North America as well as to Canada's own territorial sovereignty, and to peacekeeping, in that order of priority.[47]

Beyond strategic priorities, the White Paper nonetheless signalled some substantial policy shifts. Emphasizing the severity of the Soviet threat, it was largely reflective of the prevailing strategic environment (namely the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, the end of détente and the renewal of cold war tensions) and the election promises made by the Progressive Conservatives prior to their election victory in 1984. Especially noteworthy was that *Challenge and Commitment* proposed some tentative solutions to address the effects of the neglect the CF had suffered over the past 16 years—what it described as "the commitment-capability gap."[48] This included an ongoing increase in the defence budget of two per cent per year after inflation, a boost in troop numbers and new equipment, including main battle tanks, fighter aircraft and (almost fantastically, given financial constraints and the small size of Canada's navy) nuclear-powered attack submarines. Canada's NATO contingent was also to be substantially reinforced, and most of its equipment updated.[49]

Meanwhile, the late 1980s saw New Zealand busily (and quickly) re-evaluating its defence policy in the wake of the ANZUS Crisis. The first step in this process was the release in 1985 of *The Defence Question: A Discussion Paper*. In addition to calling for public submissions, the paper established a "Committee of Enquiry on the Future of New Zealand Strategic and Security Policies" and outlined seven areas of general enquiry. Among these, the paper mused over what "kinds of defence policies [were] appropriate to New Zealand's stance and geographical position," and "the importance we attach to defence cooperation in the context of our inter-relationships with Australia, our partners in the South Pacific, and others."[50]

New Zealand's 1987 Defence White Paper built upon the discussion contained in, and subsequent to, the 1985 discussion paper (titled *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*); the White Paper is often referred to as "the Defence Review." Like Australia's 1987 White Paper, it acknowledged that "New Zealand is not threatened by invasion or large-scale attack, and no likelihood of such an attack is foreseen in the next decade."[51] The White Paper did, however, identify several threats "which may evolve over the next decade," including interference with trade routes and harassment of merchant shipping to or from New Zealand.[52]

45. Ibid., 5.

46. DOD, *The Defence of Australia 1987*, Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence, Kim C. Beazley, 1987. This correlation was partly because Dibb himself was one of the authors of the White Paper.

47. DND, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, 1987, Chapter 4.

48. Ibid., 43.

49. Ibid., 43–67.

50. New Zealand, Ministry of Defence (MOD), *The Defence Question: A Discussion Paper* (1985), 2, 21.

51. MOD, *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*, 11.

52. Ibid., 10.

Regarding the ANZUS Crisis, the White Paper stated that "defence planning must proceed in recognition of the reality that, between the United States and New Zealand, ANZUS is 'inoperative.'"[53] In place of the ANZUS alliance, the White Paper focused on New Zealand's alliance relationship with Australia and its security role in the South Pacific. This was accompanied by a policy shift towards a greater level of self-reliance. Overall, the White Paper signalled a major shift in New Zealand's defence policy: "For the first time we have adopted in formal policy terms the concept that New Zealand armed forces will have a capacity to operate independently, although more probably in concert with Australia, to counter low-level contingencies in our region of direct strategic concern."[54]

Ignoring Agendas or Just Coping with Change? 1987–1992

As had been the case earlier in their strategic policy history, Australia and New Zealand's geographic remoteness from Europe—the main theatre of the cold war in the late 1980s—meant that their strategic policy was not substantially influenced by the turbulent events of that period. Canada, on the other hand, was heavily and immediately influenced by the course of European events, especially given the priority its 1987 Defence White Paper had accorded to NATO defence in Europe. So rapid was the change in Canada's strategic circumstances in the years following the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper that even the need to station troops in Europe had come under question by the end of the 1980s, although the emergence of this debate was by no means exclusively Canadian.[55]

Furthermore, rapidly shifting European strategic circumstances were compounded by Canada's spiralling national debt, which was a rapidly growing public concern by the late 1980s. The result was that the equipment updates promised in the 1987 Defence White Paper (itself rendered redundant within two years of its release by the changing strategic circumstances) were easy prey in a time of increasing budget consciousness. Indeed, the 1989 budget was the death knell for most of the equipment purchases promised within the 1987 White Paper, including Canada's new submarines, main battle tanks and fighter aircraft.[56] For the CF, the immediate result of the cancellation was a major blow to morale, which had been temporarily boosted by the prospect of finally receiving a much-needed equipment update following two decades of neglect. Far more serious, however, was the prospect that the CF would be required to continue to operate with obsolete equipment.

Despite Canada's newfound strategic aimlessness and ongoing defence budget cuts, operational demands on the CF increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Commitments to peacekeeping, widely popular in Canada since the 1956 Suez Crisis, had been cemented even deeper within the national consciousness as a result of the awarding of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize to all UN peacekeepers. In honour of this event, a National Peacekeeping Memorial was built in Ottawa. As Granatstein asserted, "Canadians seemed unanimously to believe that the prize was really theirs."[57] Over the next few years, the Canadian government seemed to develop an inability to refuse requests to contribute to the ever-expanding array of UN-led peacekeeping missions. In 1988, there were 13 UN peacekeeping missions. The CF contributed to all of them to one extent or another. By 1992, the number of missions had increased to 18.[58]

53. Ibid., 18.

54. Ibid., 38.

55. David G. Haglund and Olaf Mager, "Bound to Leave? The Future of the Allied Stationing Regime in Germany," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (February 1992): 35–43.

56. Donald A. Neill, "Back to the Basics: Defence Interests and Defence Policy in Canada," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (December 1991): 41.

57. Granatstein, 397.

58. Ibid.

However, peacekeeping was not the only type of operation the CF was required to conduct during this period, and in 1990–91, two very different operations (to both peacekeeping and each other) further stretched the CF's limited resources. The first of these was the Canadian contribution to the Gulf War, which involved the deployment of 2,500 personnel. The most significant Canadian contributions to the war were made by CF18s, which flew sorties against Iraqi targets, and by a Canadian naval task force that contributed to the blockade of Iraq.[59] The second operation involved the provision of military aid to the civil power. Following a shootout at Oka between police and a heavily armed group of self-described "Mohawk warriors," which resulted in the death of a police officer, the CF was mobilized by the Sureté du Quebec. Even more so than during the deployment to the Gulf War, this deployment required a high level of military professionalism and media management to be successful. The CF delivered, and the incident was ended without bloodshed, largely due to the discipline of the Canadian soldiers involved.[60] Nonetheless, the incident tied up CF resources for several weeks and further drained the already deficient defence budget.

In light of the changed strategic circumstances, fiscal restraints and Canada's increasing operational tempo, there was soon talk of another Defence White Paper. It was, however, to no avail. In April 1991, the *Toronto Star* reported that "completion of the White Paper has been repeatedly postponed because of the rapidly changing East-West security situation [and] the Persian Gulf War."[61] Academic discourse during this period did little to speed a return to stability. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars had begun questioning almost every facet of Canada's surviving cold war defence policies, including the future of NATO itself.[62] Shortly thereafter, the nature and future of the entire international system came into question.[63] The swift allied victory in the Gulf War soon added an additional dimension to the discourse, as defence commentators began talking about a technology-driven (and therefore high cost) RMA.[64]

Instead of releasing a new White Paper, the government announced a "new framework" for Canadian defence in September 1991. In April 1992, a defence policy statement (DPS) was released to expand upon the framework. Titled *Canadian Defence Policy 1992,* the statement was similar to a White Paper. It was, however, less detailed and, importantly, appears to have been designed to allow greater flexibility in the application of its agenda without leaving the government open to criticism.[65] Signalling a major policy shift, the statement announced that the CF would be withdrawn from Europe within two years. It also announced that the strength of the regular component of the CF would be reduced from 84,000 to 75,000 by 1995–96 (offset to an extent by an expansion of the reserve element of the force).[66] Beyond this, the statement could do little but acknowledge Canada's ongoing strategic uncertainty.

59. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 274–75.

60. Desmond Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets: The Canadian Experience of Aid to the Civil Power 1867–1990," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (April 1991): 34; and Claude Beauregard, "The Military Intervention in Oka: Strategy, Communication and Press Coverage," *Canadian Military History* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 23–48.

61. Quoted in James H. Allan, "Canadian Defence Policy after the Gulf," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (October 1991): 21, http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/cdq/Allan%20October%201991.PDF (accessed October 29, 2012).

62. Allen Sens, "Canada, NATO and the Widening Atlantic: Canadian Defence Policy into the 1990s," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (February 1991): 11–16.

63. For two popular examples that are illustrative of the diversity of the debate, see John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 2 (August 1990): 35–50; and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).

64. For example, see: Toffler and Toffler; and Cohen, 37–54.

65. DND, *Canadian Defence Policy 1992.*

66. Ibid., 9, 14.

For Australia, the ramifications of the end of the cold war were comparatively minor. *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s* (*ASP90*), endorsed by the government in November 1989, noted that "[r]elations between the US and the Soviet Union are changing dramatically," and that "East-West tensions may decline in a lasting way."[67] Beyond this, however, there was little focus on the East-West relationship. The *ASP90*, instead, focused on regional developments and, in conclusion, justified the government's decision to continue its policy of "self reliance" and the "strategy of denial."

Despite the rhetoric, the late 1980s were characterized by a growing rift between Australian defence policy and practice. As Graeme Cheeseman has observed, by the end of 1987, Australia had already begun to drift slowly back towards a limited form of forward defence:

> The first indication that the government was moving back towards a more regionally oriented defence posture occurred on 20 February 1987. In a speech to Parliament on Australia's proposed defence initiatives in the South Pacific, Defence Minister Beazley announced that his government was "concerned to explore and develop the opportunities for defence cooperation among our island neighbours" and "to give them the same priority we give to our much older and more substantial defence relations … with the nations of South East Asia."[68]

This slide back towards an unacknowledged (publicly at least) regional forward defence strategy was soon destined to make the continental defence strategy promulgated in the 1987 White Paper redundant.

Initially, it was claimed that the motive behind this unofficial policy shift was concern over renewed Soviet interest in the Pacific.[69] It quickly became apparent, however, that any such concerns were relatively minor. Rather, disquiet over domestic developments within several Pacific countries was the primary cause of the shift. In May 1987, for example, a small naval task force along with a rifle company was deployed to Fijian waters following a military coup. However, the situation stabilized within days, and the force promptly returned to Australia with the rifle company never having been disembarked. A subsequent evaluation of the operation identified a number of equipment and training shortfalls within the ADF and made a number of recommendations for changes to its structure to better allow it to conduct regional missions.[70]

In December 1989, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans released a ministerial statement asserting that Australia was now prepared to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.[71] In 1991, *Force Structure Review* made the strategic policy shift official. In addition to confirming the objectives set in the 1987 Defence White Paper, it added an additional task to be undertaken by the ADF: the provision of military assistance to countries in the South Pacific should they request it.[72] Henceforth, the ADF would be required to implement a dual strategy of denial and limited forward defence, although it was not given a funding increase to match the broad variety of tasks that might consequently have been required of it.

As it turned out, the ADF was not required to undertake many operations during this period. The end of the Vietnam War in 1972 had brought about what is remembered in Australian defence circles (particularly within the Army) as "the long peace." During the long peace, the ADF conducted very few operations, most of which were tokenistic contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

67. The public version of *ASP90* was not released until 1992. DOD, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, endorsed November 27, 1989, 1.

68. Graeme Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993), 16.

69. Gill, 240.

70. Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance*, 18–19.

71. Ibid., 19.

72. Australia, DOD, *Force Structure Review: Report to the Minister of Defence*, 1991, 1–2, 28.

Although not truly over until the deployment to East Timor in 1999, the long peace receded somewhat in the late 1980s, beginning with the deployment of a contingent of Royal Australian Engineers to Namibia in April 1989 (subsequently withdrawn a year later). This was followed by the deployment of RAN ships to the Persian Gulf in August 1990 to participate in the blockade of Iraq (Australia's contribution to the Gulf War) and the deployment of 500 ADF personnel to Cambodia in 1991.[73]

Despite the comparative dearth of Australian operations, detrimental effects resulting from a significant funding shortage were common to both the ADF and the CF during this period. In Australia's case, the 1987 Defence White Paper had not provided any details about the costs of the acquisition proposals contained within it. Instead, it was commonly assumed that the figures contained within the Dibb Report, which called for a 3.1 per cent growth in the defence budget in real terms from 1986 to 1991, were an accurate account of spending requirements.[74] As it transpired, the Australian defence budgets during this period left the ADF $AU3 billion short of reaching Dibb's goal. Consequently, the DOD and ADF were forced to close the acquisitions funding gap by "diverting resources from the other 'softer' areas of the defence budget—primarily personnel and operating costs … or deferring or cancelling certain smaller projects."[75] Although not as rundown as the CF, the ADF also entered the 1990s grossly underfunded and with much of its equipment in a state of obsolescence.

For New Zealand, the effects of the ANZUS Crisis continued to be the cause of ongoing strategic uncertainty during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was despite the policy shift detailed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, the release of which had been followed by much discussion; drawing on this, New Zealand's 1991 Defence White Paper (*The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*) presented a substantial refinement of the defence policy shift first outlined in 1987. New Zealand was to continue a forward defence strategy within the South Pacific despite the loss of its American ally (although the White Paper labelled this "greater self-reliance" rather than forward defence, which it defined as including the permanent stationing of forces abroad).[76] Rather than relying on America, the 1991 White Paper instead shifted New Zealand towards Australia and broader coalition operations:

> [New Zealand's core defence strategy is] self reliance [sic] in partnership: to protect the sovereignty and advance the well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved.[77]

However, owing to a change of government in 1990 that saw the National Party under the leadership of Jim Bolger oust Labour, the goal of re-establishing New Zealand's defence ties with the US had also been included in the White Paper.[78]

Despite this, New Zealand's strategic policy was nonetheless more closely aligned with operational realities and capabilities than Australia's or Canada's during the same period. By the late 1980s, although much of New Zealand's military equipment was aging and the country's defence expenditure had been cut, underfunding was not yet as bad in New Zealand as it was in Australia and Canada. When New Zealand responded to the 1987 coup in Fiji by dispatching naval vessels to Fijian waters, it did not encounter the same difficulties Australia did, albeit that this may have been due to New

73. N. F. James, "A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 104 (January/February 1994): 10–13.

74. Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance*, 108.

75. Ibid., 109–110.

76. MOD, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper*, 49, 53.

77. Ibid., 9–10.

78. Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand: The Security and Tyranny of Isolation," in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (see note 68, Chapter 1), 305.

Zealand's response being substantially smaller in scale.[79] New Zealand's strategy of greater self-reliance was well-defined (if inaccurately named) and suited the country's circumstances. As a result, New Zealand did not suffer from the same strategic policy duality that Australia did during this period.

What the deployment to Fiji did reveal was the lack of an apparatus for operational coordination between Australia and New Zealand. Given the emphasis New Zealand's strategic policy was now placing on its alliance with Australia, this revelation was deeply worrying in Wellington (and somewhat perturbing in Canberra). The situation was quickly rectified, and when riots occurred in Vanuatu in 1988, Australia and New Zealand had a coordinated plan in place for the possible evacuation of their nationals, although on that occasion implementing the plan turned out to be unnecessary.[80] Moves towards Australian and New Zealand defence cooperation continued rapidly, and in 1991, the overhaul was labelled "Closer Defence Relations" (CDR). Under the rubric of CDR, Australia and New Zealand continued to act to enhance their interoperability across all three services, to the extent that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) began to prepare to participate in the continental defence of Australia in addition to pursuing New Zealand's own strategic interests.[81]

However, the relationship with Australia was not the only one New Zealand pursued, even if it was by far of the highest priority. In addition to fostering relationships with South Pacific countries, New Zealand, like Australia and to an even greater extent Canada, prided itself on its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. As with Australia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, New Zealand dispatched contingents to Namibia and Cambodia as well as sending a frigate to the Persian Gulf in 1990 as a display of support for the Gulf War coalition.[82] Owing to the smaller size of the NZDF, these deployments meant it was operating at a higher tempo than the ADF during this period.

In 1991, the Bolger Government cut the defence budget by 10 per cent in real terms. This was, to an extent, justified by the 1991 Defence White Paper, which in light of the lack of an identifiable threat to New Zealand had determined that the country required only a "credible minimum" defence force. The White Paper did not, however, define exactly what a credible minimum was, leaving the matter open to much debate. Furthermore, the 1991 budget established a trend that was to continue into the mid-1990s: between 1990 and 1994, New Zealand's defence spending fell by 23 per cent overall.[83] Over the same period, personnel numbers fell from 12,400 to 10,000, and a further 770 civilian staff were also downsized.[84] Aside from this reduction, a few base closures and a decline in the number of annual training exercises, the NZDF initially weathered the cuts fairly well, especially since virtually overnight it had found itself suffering from the same budgetary constraints as the ADF and CF. As James Rolfe noted, "there seems to have been little reduction in defence outputs to show where savings had been made. Instead, it seems that there are greater efficiencies within the system to compensate for reduced allocations."[85]

79. McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 170.

80. Thakur, 313.

81. Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand*, 11.

82. John Thomson, *Warrior Nation: New Zealanders at the Front, 1900–2000* (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 2000), 333–34.

83. Colin James, "A Force Still Fit to Fight?" *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, no. 5 (Winter 1994): 5.

84. Ibid.; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1989–1990* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 170; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1994–1995* (London: Brassey's, 1994), 184.

85. Rolfe, *Defending New Zealand*, 12.

Responding to Ongoing Uncertainty, 1992–1997

As the above discussion reveals, there were many similarities between Australian, Canadian and New Zealand strategic policy and operational undertakings between 1987 and 1992. In addition to their forces serving in many of the same theatres, budgetary constraints, already a detriment to the maintenance of robust forces prior to 1987, worsened for all three countries' forces. Albeit for vastly different reasons, strategic policy in all three countries was also undergoing substantial upheaval. In Australia, this was caused by ongoing tension between continental and forward defence strategies; in Canada, by the strategic turbulence brought about by the end of the cold war; and in New Zealand, by ongoing adjustment to a post-ANZUS defence strategy. For all three countries, this upheaval continued to have ramifications into the mid-1990s.

Yet by 1992, the emergence of a new global security environment had also begun to impact on the development of Australian, New Zealand and, especially, Canadian national defence strategies. The concept of a "new world order," first proclaimed by US President George H. W. Bush in a speech explaining the reasons underlying the US decision to participate in the Gulf War, had by 1992 become a widely used term, although disagreement as to its nature and consequences was also widespread.[86] Related to the debate over the shape of the new world order was the concept of "collective security," which foresaw an increased role for the UN in resolving world conflict. This theory was initially supported by the rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping operations; as stated above, they had increased from 13 in 1988 to 18 in 1992. The trend continued, and by the end of 1994, the number had ballooned to 35, with the additional 17 operations requiring a total of 80,000 new peacekeepers.[87]

For Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the most significant of these operations were those undertaken in Somalia (1992–93), Rwanda (1994) and the Balkans (1992–95). In these locations, as well as in several others, the nature of peacekeeping began to change. Traditional facets of peacekeeping (such as well-defined mandates, the consent of all the warring parties to the presence of peacekeepers, and a mission designed to monitor a ceasefire agreement between states) failed to apply in these locations. Instead, UN peacekeepers found themselves arbitrating intrastate wars that had disabled or destroyed the state apparatus. With weak mandates for the application of force (such as in Rwanda, where Australian peacekeepers witnessed the slaughter of thousands of Hutu without being allowed to intervene to prevent it),[88] UN forces found themselves caught between warring factions or tribes that did not necessarily abide by ceasefire agreements. For the armed forces of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the awkward move towards "peace enforcement" had begun.[89] In each of the three countries, this shift would have a different effect on strategic policy as well as societal perceptions of, and relations with, the military.

The effect was most profound—and, from a military perspective, most detrimental—in Canada, following the revelation that in March 1993 peacekeepers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) had tortured a Somali teenager to death. According to Jocelyn Coulon, the incident went on to "unleash a political storm in Canada."[90] Under political pressure, Kim Campbell, then Minister of Defence, announced the establishment of a military board of inquiry into CAR's activities in Somalia. Eight soldiers were also tried by courts martial for various offences ranging from negligent conduct to

86. G. Wahlert, "The New World Order: Meaning and Effect – Two Years On," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 96 (September/October 1992): 12–16.

87. Granatstein, 397.

88. The incident is commonly known as the Kibeho Massacre. Londey, 203–5.

89. Ann Hughes, "Peace Enforcement," in *Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, ed. Martin Griffiths (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 643–46.

90. Coulon, 96.

murder. In early 1994, as the courts martial continued, the Canadian media reported that a cover-up of certain aspects of CAR's activities had been attempted by senior military officers. This prompted the newly appointed Liberal Minister of Defence, David Collenette (the Liberals had defeated the Progressive Conservatives in the 1993 general election), to establish a civilian commission of inquiry into the entire Somalia operation, including pre- and post-operational developments.[91]

Meanwhile, the newly elected Jean Chrétien Government had also begun a defence review immediately after its election, leading to the release of Canada's most significant strategic policy document of the period, the 1994 Defence White Paper. In a far more confident tone than the 1992 defence policy statement, the 1994 White Paper stated that:

> Progress toward a safer world, most evident in the dramatically reduced threat of global war, is balanced by the persistence of conflict within and between states. It is impossible to predict what will emerge from the current period of transition, but it is clear that we can expect pockets of chaos and instability that will threaten international peace and security. In short, Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity.[92]

In its attempt to establish Canada's place in this paradoxical world, the 1994 Defence White Paper continued what had become a longstanding tradition in Canadian defence policy—it emphasized the need for "multi-purpose, combat capable forces" but did not set aside much funding for them. As Douglas Bland contended, the programme it established was designed "to substantially rebuild the armed forces, but rejected the obvious need to pay for the renewal."[93]

Of equal importance was a break with tradition. Unlike the 1971 and 1987 Defence White Papers, the 1994 Defence White Paper did not establish a hierarchical list of defence policy priorities. Instead, the security policy issues confronting Canada were examined in three chapters, by discussing issues relating to domestic security and sovereignty, Canada-US defence cooperation, and Canada's contribution to international security.[94] Canada's participation in NATO was relegated to a section within the third of these chapters, alongside a new-found focus on collective security.[95]

The public focus was, however, elsewhere. "After he tabled the 1994 Defence White Paper," wrote Bland, "Collonette became increasingly embroiled in the so-called Somalia Affair and he was not able to devote his full attention to managing defence policy."[96] Slow to get underway, the commission of inquiry had not begun hearings until September 1995. Further controversy followed as the commission unearthed what appeared to be a systemic failure in the leadership of the CF, exacerbated to a great extent by a funding crisis and operational overstretch. As it investigated further, the commission began to probe the role government policy had played in the CF failure in Somalia. Then, in January 1997, "the government wound up the commission just before it started scrutinizing the role played in the fiasco by … politicians and higher machinery of government."[97]

91. Ibid., 88–100.

92. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 1994, 3, http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/defence_policy_archives-eng.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

93. Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 1, *Defence Policy* (Kingston: School of Political Studies, Queens University, 1997), 282.

94. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, Chapters 4–6.

95. Bland, *Defence Policy*, 284–85.

96. Ibid., 285.

97. John C. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 176.

On July 2, 1997, the commission delivered its 1600-page, four-volume report, titled *Dishonoured Legacy: Lessons of the Somalia Affair*.[98] The report offered a scathing indictment of CF culture, which was summarized by John English:

> Constant buffeting by the cross-currents of unification, bilingualism, and peacekeeping had, in addition to the overt civilianization of NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] seriously eroded the professional foundations of army educational and training establishments set up after the [Second World War] … the only kind of experience that counted was one's own, preferably gained in officially approved usually highly bureaucratized slots.[99]

Over the course of the commission's investigation, three chiefs of the defence staff had resigned or been dismissed. In 1995, following the release of video footage of an unsavoury regimental induction ritual, CAR itself was disbanded.[100] Amid the political tempest generated by the Somalia affair, the video was "the straw that broke the camel's back."

By 1997, the Somalia Affair had dominated the CF's public relations for four years, despite its other activities, which included a comparatively (if not absolutely) successful deployment to the Balkans from 1992 to 1995.[101] Over the months following the publication of *Dishonoured Legacy*, an organizational self re-evaluation began within the CF on a scale comparable to the US military's post-Vietnam War adjustment.[102] Like the post-Vietnam War US military, the CF would ultimately take several years to adjust its organizational culture in the wake of the Somalia Affair. Towards the end of 1997, determining an appropriate strategy to address the 160 recommendations contained within *Dishonoured Legacy* was the top priority for the CF, to the extent that it eclipsed any other issues regardless of their importance.

The ADF and the NZDF did not undergo any comparable experiences to the Somalia Affair and emerged from the mid-1990s with their reputations unsullied. Furthermore, for Australia, which released a *Strategic Review* in 1993, strategic policy remained fairly stable. In its opening, the *Review* highlighted numerous changes in the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including the force-modernization occurring within several countries; the shifting focus of US foreign policy interests; and the growing significance of China, Japan and India.[103] Despite these changes, however, the *Review* did not substantially shift Australia's defence strategy. In much the same vein as the 1991 *Force Structure Review*, it prioritized continental defence but also catered for the limited dispatch of forces overseas if required to participate in collective security activities.[104]

What *Strategic Review 1993* did change was some of the strategies for maintaining continental defence. Self-reliance was continued virtually unaltered, but instead of the strategy of denial, Australia was to adopt a defence-in-depth posture. This involved "meeting credible levels of threat by presenting an adversary with a comprehensive array of military capabilities, capable of independent defensive and offensive operations in the sea-air gap to our north and throughout Australian territory."[105] The phrase "short-warning conflict" was coined to describe the most likely type of attack Australia could expect

98. Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, 1997.

99. Quoted in Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2006), 176–77.

100. Granatstein, 407.

101. Sean M. Maloney and John Llambias, *Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans, 1992–1995* (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 1–24.

102. Granatstein, 412.

103. DOD, *Strategic Review 1993*, 1–2.

104. Ibid., 14.

105. Ibid., 44.

against its territory. Although who would perpetrate it or why was not mentioned, the concept envisaged that the greatest threat to Australian security would take the form of small, limited-scale attacks against Australia's economic assets in its northern territories or against its sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Although not a danger to national survival, such attacks were a security concern as they threatened to substantially disrupt Australia's economic well-being.[106]

Less than a year later, the Keating Labor Government released what would be its last major strategic policy statement prior to its defeat in the 1996 federal election. Titled *Defending Australia*, the 1994 Defence White Paper constituted "an incremental advance … rather than a bold new statement."[107] Largely a refinement of the *Strategic Review 1993*, it too perpetuated the primacy of Australia's continental defence strategy while confirming that limited overseas deployments (mostly under UN auspices) would continue.[108]

Yet the 1994 Defence White Paper was subtly influenced by the fluidity of the international, and especially the South-East Asian, security environment. For example, concerns about the post-cold war modernization of several military forces within the Asia-Pacific region as well as the ongoing RMA debate and lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War appear to have influenced a discussion about the possibility of, and threat posed by, a short-warning conflict.[109] The increasing volatility of peacekeeping was also acknowledged, with the White Paper noting that "[t]he experience of the last few years has shown the limits as well as the potential of peace operations."[110]

Despite these limits, the ADF's major deployments during the mid-1990s were all peacekeeping operations. The first (and largest) of these was the deployment of a battalion group to Somalia in 1992–93. This was followed by the deployment of a contingent of 300 personnel to Rwanda in 1994. In 1997, a truce-monitoring group was sent to Bougainville.[111]

Accompanying these deployments was a growing debate over whether the ADF should continue to be structured for "traditional" conflicts or whether a lighter force, geared more towards peacekeeping, would be more appropriate. This was resolved largely by the 1994 White Paper, which made it clear that "[t]he structure of the Defence Force is determined by its essential roles in providing for the defence of Australia."[112]

The final noteworthy Australian event of the period 1992 to 1997 was the election of the Howard Liberal / National Coalition (conservative) Government in 1996, following 13 years of Labor Party Government. Owing to the ongoing dichotomy between the Labor Party's preference for continental defence and the Liberal and National Parties' preference for forward defence, Howard's election was the catalyst for a shift in Australian strategic policy. Although the majority of the shift would occur in the late-1990s and early-2000s, Ian McLachlan, the incoming Minister for Defence, foreshadowed the direction it was likely to take as early as May 1996. Importantly, the new direction included a renewed focus on the US alliance and the possibility of an increased role for the ADF in maintaining regional security.[113]

106. Ibid., 43.

107. Zhivan Jared Alach, "Facing New Challenges: Adapting the NZDF and ADF to the Post-Cold War Security Environment" (PhD thesis, Auckland University, 2006), 272.

108. DOD, *Defending Australia*, 1994.

109. Ibid., 24–25.

110. Ibid., 105.

111. Londey, 179–206, 216–25.

112. DOD, *Defending Australia*, 1994, 5.

113. Alach, 276.

New Zealand entered 1992 in recession, and as a result, the Bolger Government maintained an economic rather than defence policy focus into the mid-1990s. As noted above, this focus had already resulted in substantial defence budget cuts. As the decade wore on, these began to take their toll on the effectiveness of the NZDF. With the single exception of a new strategic sealift ship (Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship [HMNZS] *Charles Upham*), no new acquisitions were authorized between 1991 and 1996. Following the release of the 1991 Defence White Paper, a force structure review was undertaken for each of the three services. Insignificant in themselves, as they recommended few changes to the existing force structure, all three nevertheless influenced the development of a *Long-Term Force Structure and Consolidated Resources Plan* that was presented to cabinet in February 1993.[114] The *Plan* was rejected by cabinet, which did not want to commit to funding a long-term acquisitions plan in the midst of a recession.[115] It would be a further three years before another strategic policy review occurred in New Zealand.

In the interim, the NZDF's high operational tempo continued. A small deployment of peacekeepers sent to Bosnia in 1992 was supplemented in 1994, the same year the RNZAF flew supplies to Rwanda in support of the UN mission there.[116] In 1997, a truce-monitoring group was sent to Bougainville following the cessation of conflict on the island.[117]

The supplemented deployment to Bosnia, which reached 250 in August 1994, was the first time New Zealand's soldiers had deployed to a war zone since the end of the Vietnam War. Like the mixed Australian-New Zealand infantry unit that had deployed to Vietnam, the New Zealand force deployed to Bosnia with its own equipment but was under the operational command of a British battalion.[118] Unsurprisingly, given the budget cuts of the early-1990s, the deployment revealed several capability "gaps," for example, insufficiently ranged weapons on armoured personnel carriers that rendered them unable to retaliate when engaged.[119]

Despite the insufficient capabilities revealed by the Bosnia deployment, the strategic policy debate in New Zealand had, by the mid-1990s, greatly subsided from the post-ANZUS Crisis hype that had surrounded it in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Hence, when the government began a strategic review process in March 1996 that would eventually lead to the classified November 1997 *Defence Assessment* and a publicly released Defence White Paper based thereon, there was little public reaction.[120]

Similar to Australia's 1994 Defence White Paper, New Zealand's 1997 White Paper (*The Shape of New Zealand's Defence: A White Paper*) was not a bold new policy statement. Rather, it explicitly confirmed the continuation of the defence policy that had been established by the 1991 White Paper, stating: "The defence policy set out in the 1991 White Paper continues to be the most appropriate policy framework to guide our defence effort in response to the future security environment. … Self-Reliance in Partnership is the strategy used for implementing this policy."[121] In response to New Zealand's aging military equipment and capability shortfalls, the White Paper offered only modest relief, outlining an average annual increase in funding of $NZ72 million over five years and "capital injections" of up to

114. New Zealand, Minister of Defence, *Long-Term Force Structure and Consolidated Resources Plan of the New Zealand Defence Force* (Wellington: Letter to the Chair of the Cabinet Committee on External Relations, Defence and Security, 1993).

115. Alach, 184–85, 187.

116. Thomson, 333.

117. Judith Martin, "Bougainville Brokers," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Autumn 1998): 2–7.

118. James Rolfe, "Bosnia: Where Being Shot at May Mean No Shooting Back," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Winter 1994): 20–21.

119. Alach, 186–87.

120. Ibid., 189–90.

121. MOD, *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence: A White Paper* (1997), 7.

$NZ300 million.[122] As Rolfe contended: "What this White Paper does not do is make hard expenditure decisions."[123] These were deferred, although until when was not stated. In the interim, the NZDF would have to continue to make do with its existing equipment.

Conclusion: The Broader Political Context During the Decade of Uncertainty

As the discussion in this chapter has shown, there were several common themes between Australian, Canadian and New Zealand strategic policy and operational undertakings during 1987–1997. Importantly, however, there were also several differences among all three countries, especially regarding the concepts each developed or adapted to form the basis of their strategic policies. These common themes, along with the key unique developments within each country, substantially contributed to shaping the broader political context in which doctrine development was undertaken from 1987 to 1997.

The first and most important common denominator was the benign threat environment that characterized the period. The results of this environment were that the armed forces in all three countries were neglected and that other issues that attracted more public attention were accorded higher priority. One such issue was the economic recession that gripped all three countries during this decade. As there was no immediate threat to national sovereignty, military budgets proved an easy target when budget cuts were required. In turn, budget cuts had numerous flow-on effects, including the ongoing use of antiquated or obsolete equipment as acquisition funding dried up. Training exercises were also wound back, and attempts to generate savings through cuts to personnel numbers were commonplace. Overall, this had a negative influence on the professionalism of the armed forces in all three countries that increased in severity as the decade progressed.

Budget cuts and their flow-on effects had two major ramifications for the shape of the broader political context during this period. The first was the generation of competition between different branches of the services of each country, as each vied to get a slightly larger slice of the funding pie. The second ramification was civil-military relations, which soured as budget cuts increased. Although the democratic structure and stability of all three countries prevented this from having serious political consequences, it nonetheless caused much disillusionment amongst senior military personnel. At the lower levels, budget cuts or, more precisely, knowledge that acquisitions that would have made life easier were passed over due to budgetary constraints had a detrimental impact on morale.

Another common denominator that characterized this period was the impact of the transformation of the global security environment. Despite the lack of threat to the sovereignty of any of the three countries (with the exception of the Soviet threat to Canada, which had vanished by 1991), the operational tempo of the armed forces of all three gradually, but steadily, increased. This was due largely to the proliferation of peacekeeping operations and the experimentation with "collective security" that occurred in the wake of the cold war. It was also accompanied by a shift in the nature of peacekeeping, which led to the emergence of the concept of peace enforcement. Inevitably, operational lessons learned as a result of this new type of mission influenced doctrinal development in all three countries throughout the decade, particularly at the operational level.

Furthermore, the conduct of the ADF, CF and NZDF elements that were involved in these operations shaped the civil-military relations of the period. Most often this took place through a media conduit, and the reporting of controversial activities occurred far more frequently than the reporting of good deeds. Hence, the importance of the good conduct of soldiers while on operations became an increasingly important factor in the success of operational deployments. That said, despite the occasional

122. Ibid., 38–39.

123. James Rolfe, "Hard Decisions Deferred – For Now," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Summer 1997): 12–13.

reaction to a widely-publicized incident, the public attitude to the armed forces of all three countries remained largely apathetic throughout the period; hence, it was only catastrophic events such as the Somalia Affair that were able to sustain public attention over a prolonged period.

Alliance relationships, particularly the alliance with the US, must be considered as an additional common denominator influencing strategic policy development throughout this period, although the impact within each country was different. For Australia, maintaining the US alliance remained important; it was not, however, the driving force for Australian strategic policy development. As a result, Australia's alliance with the US remained both stable and largely unchanged throughout the period. For New Zealand, the opposite transpired, and managing the fall out from the ANZUS Crisis was a major strategic policy driver during this period. Having lost the US alliance in the mid-1980s, New Zealand had not regained it by the mid-1990s; the alliance relationship with Australia instead came to fill the void. Lastly, for Canada, the US alliance also remained fairly stable. More important was the NATO alliance, which was Canada's key priority in 1987. By 1997, however, its priority had substantially declined, and the CF had been withdrawn from Europe without causing much upset amongst Canada's allies.

Finally, key differences between the strategic policies of Australia, Canada and New Zealand affected the political context within each country during this period. Concepts such as Australia's "strategy of denial," New Zealand's "self-reliance in partnership" and Canada's pursuit of "multi-purpose, combat-capable forces" had ramifications for force structures and, hence, doctrine and significantly shaped the political context (particularly with regard to individual services). Despite the different defence concepts embraced within each country, however, it is noteworthy that the variety of roles the armed forces of each were required to undertake remained similar. The difference in strategic policy mainly influenced the priority each role (and hence each service) was given in relation to the others.

From overarching shifts in the strategic environment to the planning ramifications of insufficient budgets, the decade from 1987 to 1997 was characterized by consistent, rapid change. Over the course of the decade, this change permeated every facet of the armed forces of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, from their public relations to their personnel numbers, from government strategic policy to the operational conduct of the forces themselves. Yet often this change was unforeseen, and it is only with the benefit of hindsight that it can be said that the key characteristic of the period was the uncertainty that played a major role in shaping events.

Chapter 3

The Decade of Complexity: Strategic Policy Developments and Operational Undertakings, 1997–2007

If uncertainty was the key characteristic of the decade from 1987 to 1997, the key characteristic of the decade that followed was the shift from uncertainty to complexity. This was particularly true regarding the conduct of land operations. "We live in an era of limited wars, both interstate and intrastate conflicts," observed Major General Peter Abigail, former Land Commander Australia. "We also live in an era of intervention in such conflicts. … These actions have broadened the spectrum of conflict and the type of operations for which forces must be prepared."[1]

As the decade between 1997 and 2007 evolved, the operational tempo increased for all three services of all three countries. In 1999, the ADF and NZDF were deployed to East Timor to conduct their most significant (and largest) operation of the entire decade. In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), Canada's most significant operational deployment—to Afghanistan—began. At the end of 2007, the armed forces of all three countries were on operations in Afghanistan; the Australian and Canadian navies were active in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; the Australian and New Zealand armies were deployed to East Timor and Solomon Islands; and the ADF was conducting operations in Iraq. Each of these operations was against a different enemy, in different terrain, and each operation required a different approach in order to ensure its success. Ultimately, it was the concurrent existence of these disparities that determined the shift to complexity as the defining hallmark of the decade 1997 to 2007.

As the third of three background chapters, this chapter follows on from the previous one by exploring the development of the shift to complexity that occurred between 1997 and 2007. This exploration is undertaken in two sections: the first examining the period 1997 to 2001 and the second examining post-9/11 developments. As in Chapter 2, discussion focuses primarily on strategic policy and operational developments, although the broader political context in which doctrinal development occurred is alluded to throughout and made explicit in the conclusion.

A Period of Reform, 1997–2001

For Australia, the election of the Howard Government in March 1996 heralded the onset of a major shift in strategic policy. Prior to the election, incoming Minister for Defence Ian McLachlan had foreshadowed that the shift would involve a renewed focus on the US alliance and an increased role for the ADF in maintaining regional stability in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.[2] Once in power, the Howard Government immediately initiated a defence efficiency review. The review's final report—*Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence*—was released in March 1997.[3] Undertaken with the intention of freeing up existing funding so that it could be used to enhance operational capabilities, the review's report outlined several areas where the DOD and ADF could save money by improving organizational efficiency.[4]

Shortly after the release of the review's report, the Howard Government (several senior members of which objected to the "defence of Australia" policy for a variety of reasons) determined that a broad-

1. Peter Abigail, "Preparing the Australian Army for 21st Century Conflict: Problems and Perspectives," in *Future Armies Future Challenges: Land Warfare in the Information Age*, eds. Michael Evans, Russell Parkin, and Alan Ryan (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 238.

2. Alach, 276.

3. DOD, *Future Directions.*

4. Alach, 278.

er-ranging strategic review was required. The result—*Australia's Strategic Policy* (*ASP97*)—was "not a White Paper in name, [however] it was one in nature."[5] Although it did not abandon the concept of "continental defence" completely, *ASP97* outlined a major shift in how it was to be achieved. Self-reliance would be maintained, although *ASP97* made it clear that this did not "mean that we adopt a purely defensive strategy—our self-reliant posture may require us to undertake highly offensive operations in defence of our country."[6] Furthermore, *ASP97* asserted:

> Australia needs a strategic approach which takes full account of the new challenges we face. Moreover, Australia needs an approach which explicitly reflects the full breadth of our security interests. Australia's strategic interests do not begin and end at our shoreline. The interests of future generations of Australians will not be served by encouraging an isolationist mentality at a time when international inter-dependencies are increasing.[7]

Australia's Strategic Policy set four priorities for the ADF: defeating attacks against Australia, defending Australia's interests within the region, "supporting" Australia's global interests, and providing defence aid to the civil power in times of national emergency.[8] To achieve these aims, *ASP97* also outlined four "force structure development priorities." The first of these, establishing a defence force that could exploit the "knowledge edge," was designed to ensure Australia's comparatively small force would maintain a qualitative advantage over several rapidly modernizing militaries within the region.[9] It was also designed to capitalize on the RMA, a concept at the height of its popularity in the latter 1990s. The second priority was the ability to defeat threats to Australia in the maritime approaches to the country's north, and the third—a significant policy shift—was "the capability to attack targets in an adversary's own territory."[10] The last priority was Australia's land forces.[11] In line with these priorities, *ASP97* gave precedence to RAN and RAAF procurements; funding limitations resulted in the Army continuing to take a back seat.[12] Finally, it is worth noting that *ASP97* emphasized the new government's desire to strengthen the US alliance.[13]

As the ADF was adjusting its military strategy to match the strategic policy shifts underlying *ASP97*, international events began to shift at a dramatic pace. The catalyst for this shift was the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. As a consequence of the crisis, regional political instability increased substantially. At the same time, the Asian financial crisis had the effect of curtailing growing fears in Australia that, as its neighbours' militaries modernized, it would become difficult to sustain the "knowledge edge." With the onset of the crisis, the funding for military modernization programmes within the region dried up almost overnight. Yet, the major ramification for Australian defence planners was the impact the crisis had in Indonesia. There, the Suharto regime collapsed in May 1998 after having been in power for almost 32 years.[14] In the wake of the collapse, Indonesia's newly appointed President Habibie granted East Timor, which had been annexed by Indonesia in 1975, a "popular consultation" on its future political status. Unexpectedly, Habibie had approved what was effectively

5. Ibid., 275.

6. DOD, *Australian Strategic Policy*, 1997, 30.

7. Ibid., iii.

8. Ibid., 29–36.

9. Ibid., 56. *ASP97* defined the "knowledge edge" as "the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effectiveness."

10. Ibid., 63.

11. Ibid., 64–65.

12. Stewart Woodman, "Punching Above its Weight? Australia's 1997 Strategic Review," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Autumn 1998): 8–11.

13. This desire had already been enunciated by Minister McLachlan. Ian McLachlan, "Australian Defence Policy after the Year 2000," in *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*, eds. Helen Hookey and Denny Roy, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 120 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1997), 1–12.

14. Derek McDougall, *Australian Foreign Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (South Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), 208–9.

an East Timorese referendum on independence from Indonesia. In the lead-up to the vote, a wave of violence gripped East Timor (perpetrated mainly by pro-Indonesian militia groups), the level of which increased after the vote was overwhelmingly cast in favour of independence.[15]

After initially preparing to evacuate foreign nationals and UN staff who had been overseeing the referendum, the ADF soon found itself preparing to lead a large-scale multinational peace enforcement operation.[16] Events moved quickly. On September 20, 1999, three weeks after the ballot was cast, the lead ADF elements arrived in East Timor to be greeted by scenes of chaos and bloodshed.[17] The operation, conducted under the auspices of the UN and designated International Force East Timor (INTERFET), would become the largest ADF operation since the Vietnam War, involving the deployment of 11,000 ADF personnel.[18] The operation was a success for the ADF, and within five months, INTERFET had achieved its mission of restoring order and security to East Timor. In February 2000, operations officially transitioned from peace enforcement to peacekeeping, and operational control was transferred from the ADF to a multinational command under the authority of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), although the ADF continued to provide the bulk of the forces.[19]

In Australia, INTERFET's operational success substantially boosted the public profile of the ADF and, in particular, the Army. From the outset, the mission was conducted in a tense political environment, both between Australia and Indonesia and domestically in Australia. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the majority of Australians had become so incensed by images of violence in East Timor that by the time INTERFET began many were prepared to risk war with Indonesia in order to intervene.[20] In light of this situation, and given the extent of the violence and chaos in East Timor, the speed with which the ADF prosecuted the INTERFET mission—returning the province to stability with relatively few shots fired and no Australian fatalities—seemed almost incredible.[21] The title of Bob Breen's book about INTERFET—*Mission Accomplished East Timor*—is indicative of the Australian national attitude to the mission in its immediate aftermath.[22]

In addition to INTERFET's military success, the subsequent popularity of the ADF within Australia was also a product of careful media management. John Birmingham credits this in large part to then Major General Peter Cosgrove, Commander INTERFET, whose approach to the media was critical: "Rather than shutting the media out … he used them to pitch a reassuring message back home."[23] Cosgrove's personality and public appeal were instrumental in shaping popular Australian perceptions of the INTERFET mission and the conduct of the ADF members who served on it. After the conclusion of INTERFET, Cosgrove was credited with "reconnecting Australians to the defence forces, [and for] healing the legacy of alienation after the Vietnam War."[24]

Despite the positive publicity it received, behind the scenes it was clear that INTERFET had stretched the ADF to its limits and had revealed numerous equipment shortfalls and other problems,

15. Alan Ryan, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor" (Study Paper no. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, November 2000), 13–15.

16. Breen, *Mission Accomplished, East Timor*, 1–29.

17. Ibid., 31–59.

18. Bob Breen, "INTERFET: Some Wake Up Calls for the Australian Defence Force," *United Service* 53, no. 1 (2001): 9.

19. Duncan Lewis, "Lessons from East Timor," in *Future Armies Future Challenges* (see note 1), 264–67.

20. John Birmingham, "A Time for War: Australia as a Military Power," *Quarterly Essay*, no. 20 (2005): 42–43.

21. Breen, *Mission Accomplished, East Timor*, 31–121.

22. Ibid.

23. Birmingham, 44.

24. Admiral Chris Barrie, quoted in Birmingham, 48.

especially within the Army. Several of these problems were caused by the lack of sufficient organic logistic support within the ADF, which had relied increasingly upon contractors to provide its logistic support over the decade prior to the East Timor deployment.[25] Other problems related to the near-antiquated state of much of the Army's equipment and to equipment and personnel shortages stemming from the scale of the operation. A subsequent Parliamentary review of army capabilities, titled *From Phantom to Force*, observed that the ongoing de-prioritization of Army funding and acquisitions since the release of 1987 Defence White Paper had been responsible for many of these problems.[26] To remedy this, the review made several recommendations; although, most importantly, it emphasized that future funding for the Army should be prioritized.[27]

In the wake of the INTERFET mission and *From Phantom to Force*, the Howard Government's new Defence Minister John Moore announced in June 2000 that the Government would conduct "the most extensive public consultation process ever undertaken [in Australian history] on defence and security issues."[28] The announcement was accompanied by the release of *Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force: A Discussion Paper*, and a broad range of public submissions was called for in response to it.[29] The ensuing review process has been the subject of much contention and the extent to which public discussion ultimately shaped the outcome of the review remains debatable.[30] In part, this contention was caused by the content of the *Discussion Paper*, which made several assertions regarding future policy directions, rather than merely attempting to stimulate public debate.[31]

Parallel to the public consultation, an internal consultation process also occurred within the Australian public service, DOD and ADF. This element of the review appears to have yielded results characterized by much greater cohesion than the public consultation. Alach, for example, observed that:

> Generally, there were few advocates for major defence innovation. Most participants felt there was no pressure for radical change, but rather that a steady process of evolution and development was needed. As such, many of the major defence issues came down to costing issues: what capabilities could be acquired, when, and what other capabilities would have to give way?[32]

Unsurprisingly, the internal consultation also appears to have had a greater influence over the outcome of the review than the public consultation. Despite this, the review was the broadest undertaken during the period studied in terms of the variety of sources consulted.

The result of the review process was the December 2000 Defence White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*.[33] Given the general consensus reached by the internal consultation, it is of little surprise that the strategy espoused within the 2000 Defence White Paper deviated little from

25. Breen, "INTERFET," 9.

26. Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army* (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), 65–104.

27. Ibid., 186–87.

28. John Moore, "Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force: A Public Discussion Paper," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 143 (July/August 2000): 3.

29. Australia, DOD, *Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force: A Discussion Paper*.

30. Edition 143 of the *Australian Defence Force Journal* was dedicated to discussion of the *Defence Review*, and the varying opinions of its contributors are illustrative of the broader debate. Interestingly, defence academics and analysts, many of whom felt shut out of the consultation process (a claim which holds some credit), were much more critical of the review process and the perceived underlying intent than their retired ADF counterparts. See, for example, Graeme Cheeseman, "Choosing to Make Choices," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 143 (July/August 2000): 25–26; and David Evans, "The Defence of Australia and Its Interests," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 143 (July/August 2000): 31.

31. Graeme Cheeseman, "The Howard Government's Defence White Paper: Policy, Process and Politics," *The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs* 2, no. 1 (July 2001): 15–20.

32. Alach, 299.

33. Australia, *Defence 2000*.

ASP97. This is especially true in terms of strategic priorities, which were essentially an elaboration of those contained in *ASP97*. The defence of the Australian continent and the approaches to it remained the ADF's top priority, followed by security in the "immediate neighbourhood," stability in Southeast Asia, strategic stability in the "wider Asia Pacific region" and, finally, the support of global security.[34] The continuation of the gradual policy shift towards "forward defence" was also evident. In the unlikely event of an attack against the Australian continent, the strategy for national defence would be a combination of ongoing "self-reliance," the adoption of a "maritime strategy" (centred on the destruction of enemy forces in the "sea and air gap" to Australia's north) and the conduct of "proactive operations" against an enemy force in their territory.[35] In defence of Australia's broader interests, the White Paper emphasized the requirement for the ADF to be capable of conducting joint and coalition operations well beyond Australia's shores, with particular emphasis being placed on the importance of the US alliance.[36]

Despite their overall confluence, the 2000 White Paper did deviate from *ASP97* in three important areas. First, it envisaged a much broader variety of roles for the ADF (especially within the Asia-Pacific region) and placed a much higher emphasis on readiness for short-notice overseas deployment.[37] Second, it contained a comparatively high level of detail regarding defence capabilities and funding, which was to be increased by three per cent per annum in real terms over a 10-year period.[38] While significant capability upgrades were approved for all three of the services and exploiting the perceived information-technology RMA was also accorded high priority, the needs of the Army had clearly been given precedence that stood in contrast to *ASP97*.[39] Third, *Defence 2000* established the "Defence Capability Plan," which detailed the predicted costs of capability purchases, personnel and operations until 2011.[40] Overall, the ADF's new-found popularity in the wake of the INTERFET mission, combined with the generous funding and procurement programmes established in *Defence 2000*, ensured the ADF entered the new millennium on a high note.

For New Zealand, 1997 to 2001 also heralded significant strategic policy shifts, albeit in a different direction than Australia's. This difference in direction was initially evident in the contrast between *ASP97* and New Zealand's 1997 Defence White Paper, which had been released only months previously. Fundamentally, the difference stemmed from the priorities New Zealand and Australia accorded to "collective security" and territorial defence; whereas, New Zealand had accorded the former higher priority, Australia continued to prefer the latter.[41] The contrasting priority accorded to acquisitions was a noticeable symptom of the broader policy difference: where *ASP97* gave priority to RAN and RAAF procurements, New Zealand's 1997 White Paper gave preference to the Army.[42]

Even before the release of the 1997 White Paper, Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee had begun a separate review of New Zealand's defence policy, titled *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000* (*DB2000*). Eventually, the inquiry produced two reports: an interim report for

34. Ibid., 29–32.
35. Ibid., 46–48.
36. Ibid., 34–36.
37. Alach, 305.
38. Australia, *Defence 2000*, 117.
39. Ibid., 77–97.
40. Ibid., 97.
41. Colin James, "Mates Yes, Bedmates No," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Winter 1998): 2–5.
42. Woodman, 11.

public comment,[43] delivered in November 1998, and a final report, delivered in August 1999.[44] In a similar vein to the consultation process that occurred during the development of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper, the public consultation process undertaken as part of *DB2000* was claimed to be the broadest ranging in New Zealand's history.[45] Its findings were equally as comprehensive.

As had the 1997 White Paper, the inquiry's final report gave priority to the Army ahead of the RNZN and RNZAF, recommending the establishment of a higher-readiness land force including both combat and support forces. Maritime and air forces capable of deploying and maintaining the land forces were accorded second priority, albeit that the report emphasized the benefits of adopting an approach that was fundamentally joint in nature.[46] Importantly, *DB2000* determined that New Zealand's force structure should be designed to facilitate the successful conduct of contemporary operations, particularly peacekeeping and peace enforcement, instead of being designed to defend the country or its interests in the unlikely event of a direct attack or a major war in Asia.[47] The priority was, therefore, preparing the NZDF to conduct "collective security" type operations (though not necessarily low-intensity ones). In light of this priority, *DB2000* identified several discretionary capabilities that could be relinquished in order to free up funding for what it deemed to be more relevant NZDF elements. Key among the discretionary capabilities was the RNZAF's air combat capability.[48]

Meanwhile, the NZDF's already high operational tempo continued to increase, albeit that ongoing overstretch was partially offset by the modest funding increase that came in the wake of the 1997 White Paper. Like the ADF, the NZDF's most significant operation of the period was the INTERFET mission in East Timor.[49] The deployment was significant for two reasons. First, it was New Zealand's largest since the Korean War.[50] Second, it was the first time a New Zealand force of its size had deployed under its own operational command, with one of New Zealand's battalions and its support elements assuming responsibility for security within the Suai district of East Timor.[51] As had been the case in Australia, the INTERFET mission was highly popular in New Zealand. Furthermore, the force maintained a high level of professionalism throughout, having the effect of improving perceptions of the NZDF within Australia.[52]

In December 1999, the Labour Party under the leadership of Helen Clark defeated the National Party in a general election, Labour's first election victory since 1990. On entering office, the Labour Government inherited a NZDF that had become run down by years of budget cuts and an ongoing dearth in new acquisitions. Much of its equipment had reached a state of obsolescence, which had

43. The interim report contained numerous "radical" reform proposals and attracted much criticism. See Colin James, "Defence Beyond 2000: Headaches Ahead for Government Policy Makers," *New Zealand Defence Quarterly* (Autumn 1999): 8–11; Alach, 212–18; the collection of conference papers released in New Zealand under the title: "Papers on the Interim Report of the Defence Beyond 2000 Inquiry of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade," from "Seminar of New Zealand's Defence" Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, April 15, 1999; and Inaugural Meeting of the Defence Working Group, Waikato University, 1–2 May 1999.

44. New Zealand, House of Representatives, "Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee," November 1998; and New Zealand, House of Representatives, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee*, August 1999, http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/archive-publications/inquiry-defence-beyond-2000.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

45. Alach, 218–19.

46. NZ, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000*, 68–99.

47. Ibid., 56.

48. Ibid., 93–99.

49. Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, *New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor*, 2001, 11–29.

50. John Crawford and Glyn Harper, *Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999–2001* (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2001), 52.

51. Ibid., 89–125.

52. Derek Quigley, "The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy," *Security Challenges* 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 52–53.

become glaringly obvious during the deployment to East Timor.[53] To make matters worse, the cost of the procurement programme outlined in the 1997 White Paper had ballooned and, subsequently, stalled due to a funding shortfall.[54] In response to the situation, the Clark Government initiated a series of broad-ranging defence reforms based on the findings of *DB2000*. The major policy reforms initiated by the Clark Government are manifest in two documents released in short succession: *The Government's Defence Policy Framework* (*GDPF*), released in June 2000, and the *Government Defence Statement* (*GDS*), dated 8 May 2001.[55]

The first of these documents established New Zealand's strategic priorities. Overall, the roles of the NZDF were little changed from those established in previous White Papers. In order of importance (although not in likelihood), the NZDF's roles included the defence of New Zealand, contributing to the maintenance of the alliance with Australia, the preservation of security in the Pacific, ongoing participation in the FPDA, and contributing to multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.[56] There was a radical change, however, in the priority the *GDPF* accorded these roles. Rather than structuring the NZDF for the most important role, it was determined that the NZDF should be structured for the most likely. In line with this policy shift, the *GDPF* identified "seven principles" that would guide NZDF restructuring. These were: a force "[e]quipped and trained for combat and peacekeeping," a more readily deployable force more easily able to operate alongside allies, increased readiness for deployment, operational sustainability once deployed, up-to-date doctrine and technology (here the *GDPF* specifically mentioned the RMA), and an affordable force over the longer term.[57]

Designed to flesh out the policy proposed within the *GDPF*, the *GDS* provided greater detail about force structure and procurements. It determined that overall the NZDF was to adopt a joint approach to operations. Army modernization was accorded top priority, and several Army acquisition proposals were approved, including the purchase of 105 light armoured vehicles, tactical communications equipment and several hundred light operational vehicles.[58] The RNZN and RNZAF also had a role to play in the defence of New Zealand's interests, although the decision was made to scrap the air combat capability entirely and to cancel the purchase of a third ANZAC-class frigate in order to free up funding for other priorities, including the purchase of a multirole ship.[59] While these procurement decisions generated much controversy within New Zealand and Australia,[60] the *GDS* was realistic in its assessment of how much funding was required to pay for the programme it established.[61] In a break with precedent, the procurement programme contained within the *GDS* was promptly matched by a much needed increase in funding that enabled its implementation.[62]

Contrary to the situation faced by the ADF and NZDF, public perceptions of the CF deteriorated further from 1997 to 2001, although they had begun to move along a tenuous path to recovery towards the end of the period. The cause of this situation was the ongoing fallout from the Somalia

53. Piers Reid, "The Lessons of East Timor" (paper presented to The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Discussion: Defence Policy after East Timor, Victoria University, Wellington, February 17, 2000).

54. Alach, 231.

55. MOD, *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*, June 2000; and MOD, *Government Defence Statement: A Modern, Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs*, May 8, 2001.

56. MOD, *Government's Defence Policy Framework*, 4.

57. Ibid., 7.

58. MOD, *Government Defence Statement*, 6–7.

59. Ibid., 8–11.

60. Peter Greener, "Controversy and Accusation – The Acquisition and Introduction into Service of the LAV IIIs," *New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies* 1 (March 2007): 21–33; and Damian Fenton, "Has New Zealand Let Down the ANZAC Tradition?" *New Zealand International Review* 26, no. 4 (July/August 2001): 19–22.

61. MOD, *Government Defence Statement*, 12–13.

62. Quigley, 56.

Affair, which continued to take a toll on the CF throughout the late 1990s. Frustrated with the slow pace of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia, Minister of National Defence Douglas Young initiated a separate report into the state of CF leadership in January 1997. The report was prepared by four academics and delivered two months later.[63] It concluded that many of the CF's organizational difficulties stemmed from a lack of education within its officer corps.[64] *Dishonoured Legacy*, the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia, was delivered in July.[65] Read in conjunction with one another, the reports made it apparent that a culture of unethical behaviour had developed within the CF—its officer corps and the Army in particular—as a result of years of underfunding, strategic uncertainty, operational overstretch as well as public and government apathy towards the plight of its members.

Under the direction of newly appointed Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton,[66] the CF was obliged to implement 134 of the 160 recommendations contained in *Dishonoured Legacy*.[67] Furthermore, an oversight committee was established to ensure the CF complied with this obligation.[68] Numerous recommendations contained within Young's report, *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, were also to be implemented. Importantly, a university education was to become a mandatory requirement for CF officers.[69]

The scope and relevance of the implementation of the recommendations and the manner in which they were implemented was a contentious issue in Canada, and there was initially much resentment within the CF. In particular, the oversight committee has been criticized for its disruptive effects. Granatstein, for example, observed that within the Canadian Army:

> No one wanted to take a chance if the certain result was trouble with the oversight committee, Parliament, the Minister or the media. … Officers and [non-commissioned members] knew the worst thing that could happen to their career was to be in the media. The unwillingness to show initiative developed and grew, the managers displaced the leaders, and the army turned inwards, its élan drying up.[70]

The situation had not been helped by the resignation or removal of numerous senior officers as scandal after scandal emerged during the mid-1990s or by a freeze on promotions and postings announced in late 1996, pending the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia.[71] Overall, in 1997, the CF was in a state of disarray.

The catalyst for the reversal of this situation was a change in the senior leadership of the CF. In particular, it was the appointment of General Maurice Baril as Chief of the Defence Staff in September 1997 that allowed a process of institutional change to begin.[72] During his tenure as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Baril oversaw the implementation of most of the 134 *Dishonoured Legacy* recommendations that the CF had been obliged to implement. Going beyond merely implementing them,

63. Douglas Young (Minister of National Defence), *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: DND, March 1997).

64. The report also made recommendations about discipline, the criteria for promotion and command appointments, joint operational command and control, the integration of military personnel and civilians in NDHQ, and conditions of service. See Fraser Holman, "The State of the Canadian Forces: The Minister's Report of March 1997," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (Summer 1997): 32–37.

65. Commission of Inquiry.

66. Canada's third Minister for National Defence in short succession, Eggleton succeeded Young following the latter's loss of his seat in the June 1997 national election.

67. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 290.

68. Granatstein, 411.

69. Holman, "The State of the Canadian Forces," 33–34.

70. Granatstein, 411.

71. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 285–90.

72. Granatstein, 412.

however, he also oversaw the beginning of a fundamental shift in CF culture and what was effectively a renegotiation of the CF's role between senior military and civilian leaders.

In regards to the first of these achievements, Baril was instrumental in embracing PME as a means of better preparing all levels of the Canadian officer corps for operational challenges. He oversaw the establishment of the *Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* (later the *Canadian Army Journal*) and the *Canadian Military Journal* as forums for the "frank and open discussion of … ideas, policies and practices."[73] He also oversaw the establishment of organizations designed to enhance the CF's ability to deliver PME, including the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) and Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI).[74] Of equal importance, Baril was able to convince the government that it was not obliged to contribute forces to peacekeeping missions every time a request was received.[75] This brought minor (although significant) relief to the long-overstretched CF.

Nevertheless, the CF's operational tempo remained high throughout 1997 to 2001, and it was deployed to a greater number of locations and in a broader variety of roles than either the ADF or NZDF. Primarily, deployments were to the former Yugoslavia. The UN mission there had ceased in 1995 and, following the signing of the Dayton Accords, had been replaced by the Implementation Force (IFOR). Importantly, IFOR operated under NATO auspices and deployed with more robust rules of engagement than the UN force it replaced. Furthermore, NATO's membership was substantially smaller than the UN's, so reaching consensus over operational issues was easier. As a result, IFOR overcame several of the problems peace enforcement missions had encountered earlier in the decade. In December 1996, IFOR was in turn replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which continued to operate until December 2005.[76] Over the course of its nine-year existence, every unit in the Canadian Army was deployed at least once as part of SFOR.[77] In 1999, Canadian CF18 aircraft flew ground attack sorties against Serbian targets as part of Operation ALLIED FORCE.[78]

In addition to operations in the former Yugoslavia, the CF continued to contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions around the globe. Most significantly, a mechanized infantry company was deployed to Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000; the force remained there until 2003.[79] In 1999, a light infantry company was deployed to East Timor as part of the INTERFET mission; although contrary to Australia and New Zealand, the deployment attracted virtually no media attention in Canada.[80]

Compared to the CF's operational tempo, Canadian strategic policy developed relatively slowly. The most significant strategic policy document of the period was *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* (usually referred to simply as *Strategy 2020*), released in June 1999.[81] In the

73. J. M. G. Baril, "Message from the Chief of the Defence Staff," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 4.

74. Although the CDA was not officially opened until the year after Baril retired, he was nonetheless fundamental in instigating and overseeing the process that led to its establishment. DND, "Canadian Defence Academy – History," http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/Index/engraph/about/history_e.asp (accessed September 12, 2007, site discontinued); and DND, "Role of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute," http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/about/mandate_e.asp (accessed September 12, 2007, site discontinued).

75. Granatstein, 415–16.

76. NATO, "History of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

77. Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 234.

78. Ibid., 235.

79. Ibid., 249.

80. Jessica Blitt, "OP Toucan and Beyond: Contradictions in Canadian Policy in East Timor," *Datalink #87* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2000), 1–4.

81. DND, "Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020," June 1999, http://www.cds-cemd.forces.gc.ca/str/index-eng.asp (accessed October 29, 2012).

words of the *Strategy* itself, "it provides a roadmap on how best to implement Canada's Defence Policy in light of current and emerging challenges."[82] In reality, *Strategy 2020* was a hollow document. It listed eight key strategic objectives, the first of which was the creation of an "adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future."[83] Others included the development of decisive leaders, force modernization, enhanced deployability and interoperability as well as the creation of career incentives for members of the CF. In several of these areas, the document appears to have been heavily influenced by the RMA concept.[84] Each of the key strategic objectives was accompanied by an equally abstract list of five-year targets, although with the exception of an assertion that 23 per cent of the defence budget should be set aside for procurements, no specific goals or timelines were established.[85]

Furthermore, *Strategy 2020* did not fundamentally alter the policy direction set by the 1994 Defence White Paper. Nor did it clarify or update it. A background document sheds some light on why this may have been the case:

> The 1994 White Paper set the policy agenda for DND [Department of National Defence] / CF. However, 19 successive budget cuts resulting in fiscal pressures amounting to some $1 billion, and a number of far-reaching inquiries recommending over three hundred changes to Defence, compelled the leadership to produce an institutional strategy to set the course for the future.[86]

While it was strategic in nature, *Strategy 2020* was a departmental, rather than a political, document. Although it examined strategic issues, it did not have the same authority as the preceding White Papers and, hence, was constrained in terms of the strategic policy reforms it could recommend. Following its promulgation, a minor budget increase was nonetheless approved, although it soon became clear that the increase would not be enough to reach the 23 per cent procurement goal while also maintaining such a high operational tempo.[87]

As had long been the case, the CF remained underfunded and overstretched. It was observed that towards the end of 2001 morale had significantly increased from its post-*Dishonoured Legacy* low, although there was still much ground to be covered.[88] Under Baril's leadership, the CF had taken many steps towards institutional reform. When he resigned in June 2001, it had arguably reached a limit that would have been difficult to surpass without additional government support, especially funding.

Adjusting to the Post-9/11 Security Environment, 2001–2007

On the morning of September 11, 2001, America's strategic direction was suddenly and violently changed, as a result of terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, DC. Within hours of the attacks, US President George W. Bush had privately acknowledged that "we're at war,"[89] although it would be several more days before it was clear exactly who with. By early October, military action had commenced in Afghanistan, where the ruling Taliban were harbouring senior members of Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks against the US.[90]

82. Ibid., 1.

83. Ibid., 9.

84. Elinor Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 124–25.

85. DND, *Strategy 2020*, 9–11 (especially 9).

86. DND, "Defence Strategy 2020: Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00Native/rep-pub/dda/cosstrat/2020/Defence_Strategy_2020_Ver4_e.pdf (accessed 10 September 2007, site discontinued), 2.

87. Sharon Hobson, "Readiness at a Price," *Janes Defence Weekly* 40, no. 11 (September 17, 2003): 21.

88. Granatstein, 415.

89. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 17.

90. Ibid., 195–224.

As American allies, Australia, Canada and even New Zealand (despite its ongoing military isolation from the US) were all swept up, to varying degrees, in the wave of America's newfound strategic priority—prosecuting what was soon dubbed the "global war on terrorism" (GWOT).[91] In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the governments of all three countries condemned the terrorists and issued statements supporting the US. As will be discussed below, moral support for the US and its initial retaliatory actions soon translated into the provision of military support, and Australia, Canada and New Zealand have all contributed military forces to the GWOT. Yet for Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 9/11 was not the major strategic paradigm shift that it was for the US. Although strategic policy in all three countries eventually shifted to reflect the post-9/11 security environment (in the case of Australia and New Zealand, strategic policy was also affected by the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002),[92] several strategic policy themes nonetheless remained consistent in each country.

In Canada, for example, the post-Somalia Affair adjustment continued, although by the end of 2002 most new reforms were instigated by the internal organizations or, as a result of the administrative processes, established during the initial reforms imposed upon the CF during the late 1990s. The CFLI, for example, has published numerous books on professional development within the CF[93] and, in 2005, released comprehensive joint leadership doctrine.[94] The delivery of PME within the CF also continued to improve. This trend, which was related to the broader shift in organizational culture that had begun in the late 1990s, allowed the CF to finally move beyond the Somalia Affair and surrounding controversies that had plagued the force and its public relations since the mid-1990s.

The events of 9/11, or more precisely the impact they had on Canada and Canadian strategic policy, also helped shift the Canadian public's attention away from the controversy that had plagued the CF since the mid-1990s. The US decision to close its borders in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was substantially detrimental to the Canadian economy and served to remind Canadians of the importance of American security to their own well-being. In light of this reminder, the Canadian strategic agenda shifted focus quickly. "After September 11," wrote David Rudd in early 2002, "counter-terrorism and defence against attacks by weapons of mass destruction have risen to the top of the security agenda."[95]

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the CF was deployed in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan. Initially, the RCN was deployed to the Arabian Sea, where it provided logistic assistance and conducted numerous board and search operations to ensure the security of the coalition fleet.[96] The subsequent operational tempo was the highest in recent Canadian naval history: by June 2003, 15 of the RCN's 18 major surface warships had been rotated through deployment to either the

91. Although it was broadly acknowledged that "GWOT" is a misnomer, as terrorism is a tactic rather than a tangible enemy, the term nonetheless remained in common usage throughout the period studied; hence, its use within this study. It should be noted, however, that towards the end of the period studied, GWOT was gradually being superseded by "the Long War," particularly in reference to operations in Afghanistan.

92. John Henderson, "Security in Oceania in the Post-9/11 and -Bali Era," in *New Zealand in a Globalising World*, ed. Ralph Pettman (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 73–82.

93. Franklin Pinch, Allister MacIntyre, Phyllis Browne, and Alan Okros, eds., *Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2004); Bernd Horn, ed., *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005); Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., *The Unwilling and the Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives on Disobedience in the Military* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006); and DND, A-PA-005-000/AP-007, *The Canadian Forces Professional Studies Reading List 2006: A Guide to Reading on Professionalism and Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006).

94. DND, A-PA-005-000/AP-003, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005); and DND, A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005).

95. David Rudd, "Canada's Defence Policy after September 11: To Review or Not to Review?" *Datalink #103* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2002), 2.

96. Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War against Terrorism* (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 44–61.

Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf.[97] In January 2002, an Army task force was deployed to Kandahar alongside US Army units.[98]

In February 2003, the Canadian task force in Afghanistan was substantially enlarged when Prime Minister Chrétien opted to dispatch an additional 1900 troops to Afghanistan rather than participate in the controversial US-led Iraq War.[99] The decision, which was announced with no prior public warning, walked a careful path between Canadian public opinion (which was deeply opposed to the Iraq War) and US demands that its Canadian ally support its security policy. By increasing CF participation in operations in Afghanistan, Chrétien was able to demonstrate Canada's support for the GWOT while also being able to claim—with a great degree of credibility—that the Canadian Army simply did not have the resources to support US operations in Iraq.[100] Furthermore, Canadian forces in Afghanistan were deployed in a particularly risky and demanding role as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.[101] In this role, the CF's primary responsibility was to help ensure the security of the Afghan capital, although intelligence gathering and reconstruction assistance were also major roles.[102]

Canada's most significant deployment during the period—operations in Afghanistan—has attracted as much media attention in Canada as INTERFET did in Australia and New Zealand,[103] although the Canadian media coverage has not been uniformly positive. As Canadian casualties mounted in Afghanistan (the number of Canadian military fatalities in Afghanistan had reached 74 by the close of 2007),[104] so too did public objection to the deployment grow.[105] At the close of 2007, however, the growing public objection had not yet resulted in a Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan, and 2500 troops remained deployed as a part of the International Security Assistance Force.[106]

While Afghanistan was the most significant deployment, it was not the CF's only deployment during 2001 to 2007. Canada's other substantial deployment during this period commenced in March 2004, when 500 personnel were deployed to Haiti as part of the UN Multinational Interim Force (MIF). The personnel were subsequently withdrawn in July following the transition of the mission from peace enforcement to stabilization operations.[107]

97. Hobson, "Readiness at a Price," 21.

98. Gimblett, *Operation Apollo*, 48.

99. Hobson, "Readiness at a Price," 21.

100. Ibid.

101. Sean M. Maloney, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 3–11.

102. Alain Tremblay, "The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan" in *The New World of Robust International Peacekeeping Operations: What Roles for NATO and Canada? Proceedings of the Joint Research Conference 2004,* eds. Brian MacDonald and David McDonough (Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2005), 45–47.

103. Illustrative of the significance of the Canadian media coverage of operations in Afghanistan, *The Globe and Mail* (one of Canada's largest newspapers) established an online site dedicated to its coverage of operations in Afghanistan. This level of media attention was unprecedented in Canadian military history. The site was updated regularly until 2009. See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/afghanistan (accessed October 29, 2012).

104. *CanWest News Service*, "Death Toll in Afghanistan," *Canada.com*, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/features/afghanistan/story.html?id=e12d7e64-f615-457a-bb9b-b9d1596eccf1 (accessed October 29, 2012).

105. Peter T. Haydon, "Editorial: Are We Overreacting to the Afghanistan Casualties?" *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 2–4; and John Geddes, "Bullets Fly. Ottawa Ducks: How Canada Slipped into a War Our Leaders Can't—Or Won'— Explain," *MacLeans.ca*, August 25, 2006, http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20060828_132392_132392 (accessed October 29, 2012).

106. DND, "Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan," posted August 14, 2007, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703 (accessed October 7, 2007, site discontinued).

107. DND, "Operation Halo – CF Commitment to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)," http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/halo/index-eng.asp (accessed September 13, 2012, site discontinued).

The significance of Canada's operations in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Haiti) and the country's post-9/11 shift in strategic focus towards domestic counterterrorism operations soon necessitated a formal strategic policy update. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 2004, was not only the first major post-9/11 strategic policy statement released in Canada[108] but also the first Canadian document of its kind ever. Focusing almost exclusively on domestic security, the *Security Policy* reviewed intelligence gathering, emergency planning and management, transport security, and border security and emphasized the importance of working in cooperation with the US.[109] While the CF was only a minor focus in the *Security Policy*, the *Policy* nonetheless asserted that "getting the right balance between domestic and international security concerns will be an important consideration in determining the roles and force structure of the Canadian Forces."[110]

Following the accession of Paul Martin to the prime ministership in December 2003, the Government also commenced a wholesale review of Canadian foreign policy. The final result of the review was the 2005 *International Policy Statement* (*IPS*), which contained four separate reports, including one on defence policy.[111] Read as a de facto White Paper, the *IPS*'s report on defence policy acknowledged that the CF had been challenged by a consistently high operational tempo (which it asserted had "tripled compared to the period between 1945 and 1989")[112] and there had been a shift in operational trends away from traditional peacekeeping.[113] To overcome these challenges, the *IPS* declared that the CF would undergo a broad-ranging transformation, which would include the establishment of a special operations group, a standing contingency task force ready to deploy at ten days' notice and a unified national command system.[114]

To allow the CF to transform, the *IPS* proposed several acquisitions and foreshadowed a significant boost in personnel numbers. Acquisitions were to include ships that could pre-position or deploy the standing contingency task force, medium or heavy-lift helicopters and two air-to-air refuelling aircraft. The Army was to be expanded by 5000 regular personnel and 3000 reservists in order to enable it to simultaneously sustain two task forces of 1200 personnel each, with the option of temporarily deploying a third task force of up to 1000 personnel.[115] By the time the *IPS* was released, the 2005 Budget had already established a $C12.8 billion funding increase for the CF over five years, although significantly only $C500 million was injected into DND and the CF immediately. Most of the rest of the increase was scheduled to be delivered during 2008 to 2010.[116]

After the release of the *IPS*, transformation became the key concept underlying CF reform. In light of lessons learned by the CF during operations in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Afghanistan, the training focus was officially shifted towards prosecuting operations that involved what was dubbed the "three D's"—diplomacy, development and defence[117]—although the Army had already been training to fight a "three-block war" scenario for some time.[118] Furthermore, in line with the strategies espoused in

108. Canadian Privy Council Office (PCO), *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, April 2004, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=aarchives/natsec-secnat/natsec-secnat-eng.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

109. Ibid., Chapter 1.

110. Ibid., Chapter 4.

111. Andrew Richter, "Towards a More Strategic Future? An Examination of the Canadian Government's Recent Defence Policy Statements," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 33.

112. DND, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence,* April 2005, 8.

113. Ibid., 8–9.

114. Ibid., 11–13.

115. Ibid., 14–15, 31.

116. Sharon Hobson, "Canada Boosts Defence Budget," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 42, no. 9 (March 2, 2005): 8.

117. Tremblay, "The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan," 45.

118. DND, "A Soldier's Guide to Army Transformation: Three Block War," http://www.army.gc.ca/lf/English/5_4_1_1.asp (accessed November 14, 2006, site discontinued).

the *Security Policy* and *IPS*, in late 2005, the CF was reorganized into four operational commands at the joint level. These were: Canada Command (CANCOM), responsible for domestic security operations; Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM); Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM); and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), which was to provide combat support and combat services support to the other three commands.[119]

Subsequently, transformation of the CF continued to be the major theme in Canadian strategic policy until after the conclusion of the period studied. Charismatic and publicly popular Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hiller, appointed in February 2005, was instrumental in ensuring the transformation process continued without stalling, although this is unsurprising given information that has since surfaced about Hillier's role in the production of the *IPS*. As Major-General Daniel Gosselin observed in late 2008 (shortly after Hillier had retired): "[Prime Minister] Martin and Minister of Defence Bill Graham gave Hillier unprecedented influence and control during the writing of a new defence policy statement, one that favoured the CDS's policies, perspectives, force structure objectives, and procurement goals."[120] Given this influence, it is unsurprising that Hillier continued to implement the transformation agenda the *IPS* established even after the Martin Government lost office, although it is likely that support from the incoming Harper Government made it much easier for Hillier to do this than would otherwise have been the case.

Canada's Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government was elected in January 2006, was a strong supporter of the CF and its mission in Afghanistan in particular. Although his Government did not release a new defence policy prior to the end of 2007, Harper, whose political outlook has been compared to that of Australian Prime Minister John Howard,[121] was nonetheless responsible for further increasing CF funding. This included the announcement in June 2006 that $C2.1 billion would be provided to enable the Navy to buy the three supply ships promised it by the *IPS*. The Harper Government also approved the funding that allowed the CF's shift to four operational commands to occur.[122]

Overall, transformation and the much-needed funding increase that accompanied it ensured that at the close of 2007 the CF was faring much better than at most other times during the period studied.

For the ADF, the high operational tempo continued to increase after 9/11. This was due to Australia's contributions to the GWOT and an increase in regional military commitments. Like Canada, Australia was quick to commit forces to US-led coalition operations in Afghanistan. Initially, the Australian government committed a special operations task group (SOTG) comprised of up to 300 personnel, primarily from the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).[123] The SOTG was involved in combat operations against the Taliban almost immediately after its deployment.[124] Following the overthrow of the Taliban, the Australian contribution was expanded to include a reconstruction task force that helped to rebuild infrastructure in Oruzgan Provence.[125] Although the force was involved in sporadic combat against the Taliban, by the end of 2007, it had suffered only three fatalities as the

119. Rick Hillier, "Setting Our Course," in *Implementing Canada's Defence Policy Statement*, eds., David Rudd, Deborah Bayley, and Karen Everett (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005), 70–71.

120. Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghost: Unification of the Canadian Forces Is 40 Years Old – Part One," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2008): 9.

121. Nason.

122. Glenn A. Crowther, "Editorial: Canadian Defence Policy – A Breath of Fresh Air," *Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter*, July 2006, 1–2.

123. Australia, DOD, "Afghanistan," http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/default.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

124. Ian McPhedran, *The Amazing SAS* (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2005), 145–236.

125. Australia, DOD, *Reconstruction Task Force*, http://www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/RTF.htm (accessed October 3, 2007, site discontinued).

result of direct enemy action.[126] This, combined with a positive and well-managed media campaign in Australia,[127] ensured that the Australian deployment to Afghanistan was not as controversial as its Canadian equivalent.

Not all Australian military commitments were free of controversy, however. In 2003, elements of the Special Air Service Regiment were deployed to Iraq in support of the US-led invasion.[128] The deployment was accompanied by increased naval operations in the Persian Gulf[129] and, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, by the deployment of further elements of the Army, including a security detachment in Baghdad, an Australian Army training team and an overwatch battle group comprised of over 500 personnel.[130] Significantly, Australia was the only country of the three to deploy a substantial military force in the US-led Iraq War. This was despite the fact that, in a similar vein to the prevailing mood in Canada and New Zealand, the war was highly unpopular in Australia from its outset.

There are several possible reasons why the Howard Government, contrary to its Canadian and New Zealand counterparts, chose to commit troops to Iraq. According to Greg Sheridan:

> [Howard] was clear that the primary justification for action was the threat of Iraqi WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. He and [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Downer also did argue the human rights case and they did argue that part of the Australian decision was about alliance management, but they were explicit that the main justification was WMD.[131]

While Iraqi WMD may have been the ostensible reason for the Australian military commitment to the Iraq War, it is likely that alliance considerations were a much more powerful driver than Sheridan suggests. Indeed, following the commencement of the Iraq War, Australia became a much closer US ally than at any other time during the period studied. In July 2004, Australia-US intelligence sharing was upgraded, and Australia subsequently gained greater access to US intelligence than any other country in the world, except perhaps the UK.[132] Furthermore, the deployment to Iraq yielded economic opportunities for Australia, including hastening the negotiation process toward a free trade agreement with the US.[133]

In the Asia-Pacific region, Australia's deployment to East Timor was substantially scaled back following a successful East Timorese election in August 2001, which allowed the UN to gradually transfer power to the Timorese government, with the intention of withdrawing totally from the country by mid-2006. Unfortunately, tribal and ethnic tensions, which had long been set aside owing to the priority all East Timorese had accorded to the push for independence from Indonesia, again came to the fore in the wake of independence. In April 2006, tensions reached boiling point with riots erupting in Dili (East Timor's capital). These were accompanied by a mutiny in part of the army that rendered

126. Paul Maley, "Third Digger Killed by Taliban," *The Australian*, November 24, 2007, 1–2.

127. One example of this campaign is the hour-long *Four Corners* report about Australian operations in Afghanistan, which was first broadcast on Australian national television on July 2, 2007. The report, delivered by a journalist embedded with the reconstruction task force, gave roughly equal focus to combat and reconstruction operations, conveying an impression of Australian operations as noble, post-modern and compassionate. See Chris Masters, "Forward Base Afghanistan," *Four Corners*, summary and transcripts available at http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2007/s1964845.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

128. McPhedran, 239–325.

129. Greg Nash and David Stevens, *Australia's Navy in the Gulf: From Countenance to Catalyst, 1941–2006* (Silverwater: Topmill, 2006), 78–90.

130. Australia, DOD, Operation CATALYST, http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/default.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

131. Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006), 65.

132. Ibid., 97–99.

133. The terms of the Australia-US FTA have been the subject of much contention within Australia. See Capling.

East Timor's security forces incapable of stopping the violence.[134] In response to the disintegrating security situation, the East Timorese president requested Australian assistance to re-impose law and order. In response to the request, Australia promptly dispatched a combined joint task force (CJTF) to East Timor. Initially numbering 3000 personnel, the CJTF was gradually scaled-down as stability returned to East Timor. By the end of 2007, it comprised 900 personnel, most of whom were army.[135]

In July 2003, Australia's fourth major operation undertaken during the post-9/11 period commenced in Solomon Islands. An intertribal civil war had led to what was effectively state failure, and although a peace settlement had been reached prior to the commencement of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), it had done little to avert ongoing violence in the country.[136] Once RAMSI commenced, the violence was rapidly curtailed, although an ongoing military and police presence continued to be required in the country to ensure the maintenance of law and order.[137] Significantly, RAMSI was characterized by its multi-agency composition, with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) playing a substantial role in law enforcement in Solomon Islands, supported by the ADF where necessary. "[T]his bringing together," wrote James Watson, "was a crucial test for existing doctrine, as these major contributors to the operation had not previously engaged in joint work or planning for such a task."[138]

In short, the ADF, which was not engaged in any major operations in 1997, was a decade later engaged in four: in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor and Solomon Islands. Furthermore, all the operations except that in East Timor had commenced post-9/11, meaning that the ADF, and the Army in particular, found itself suddenly overstretched. Not surprisingly, the rapidly increased operational tempo necessitated a shift in strategic policy, along with an increase in defence expenditure. Yet the Howard Government was reluctant to release a new Defence White Paper, instead opting to release a *Defence Update* in 2003. The *Update* was to be the first of three, its successors being released in 2005 and 2007.

The 2003 *Defence Update* (officially titled *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003*) observed four major shifts in Australia's security environment since the release of the 2000 Defence White Paper: an increased threat from terrorism, an increased threat from WMD (especially if they should fall into the hands of terrorists), increased prospects of regional instability, and a diminished conventional threat to Australia's sovereignty.[139] In response to these shifts, *Defence Update 2003* announced that the government would expand Australia's special forces, create a special operations command (that would be similar to CANSOFCOM), enhance the ADF's counterterrorism capabilities, and update the *Defence Capability Plan* to include several additional minor purchases.[140]

Slightly more substantial in terms of content than its predecessor, the 2005 *Defence Update* emphasized the significance of the global reach of Australia's security interests and the need for joint and interagency approaches to national security:

> Australia's defence policy … has two major elements. The first is to shape and build a defence capability that is versatile and adaptable, and which links easily with other arms of the Aus-

134. John Hutcheson, "The Lessons of 2006: Army Operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands," *Australian Army Journal* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 96.

135. Ibid., 96–97.

136. James Watson, "A Model Pacific Solution? A Study of the Deployment of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands" (working paper no. 126, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, October 2005), 3–16.

137. Hutcheson, 95.

138. Watson, 1.

139. DOD, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003,* 11–22.

140. Ibid, 23–25.

> tralian Government. Australia has and will continue to build a force that is joint, balanced, networked and deployable. … The second is to build strong security relationships both regionally and globally.[141]

In separate sections addressing the three services, the *Update* announced several major acquisitions for each. As its centrepiece, it announced that the Army was to be "hardened and networked," with major reforms to include the conversion of a second battalion to a mechanized role, the purchase of new tanks ("armed reconnaissance") and heavy-lift helicopters, and a personnel increase of 1485.[142] The RAN was to acquire amphibious ships (to allow it to transport and support the hardened and networked Army [HNA]) and air warfare destroyers, and funding was set aside for the RAAF to acquire joint strike fighters.[143] To pay for the acquisitions, the government committed to a three per cent annual increase in the defence budget in real terms until 2016.[144]

Australia's final major strategic policy document of the period was the 2007 *Defence Update*, which was substantially longer and more detailed than either the 2003 or 2005 *Defence Updates*. Furthermore, its scope and content made it read more like a White Paper than an update, as did the new strategic direction it contained. Significantly, it asserted that:

> [I]t is essential for the ADF to have the capacity to act decisively on security issues and be able to deter and if necessary defeat any aggressive act against Australia or our interests in [our area of paramount defence interest]. Our area of paramount defence interest includes the archipelago and the maritime approaches to Australia to our west, north and east, the islands of the South Pacific as far as New Zealand, our island territories and the southern waters down to Antarctica.[145]

Furthermore, the *Update* went on to establish that:

> Further afield, Australia cannot expect to predominate as a military power nor ordinarily would it act alone. … Australia will aim to make significant contributions to coalition operations where our national interests are closely engaged.[146]

With these declarations, the 2007 *Defence Update* signalled an effective abandonment of the continental defence strategy established within the 1987 Defence White Paper. Although the slide back towards forward defence had occurred gradually (over the entirety of the twenty years examined within this study), it was, by the end of 2007, complete.[147]

141. DOD, Australia's National Security: Defence Update 2005, 12.

142. The *Update* itself did not contain much detail about Army procurements. This was compensated for by a detailed HNA insert. DOD, *Defence Update 2005*, 21–23. See also "HNA Insert," *Defence Update 2005*, 1–4.

143. Ibid, 23.

144. DOD, *Budget 2006–07: To Defend Australia* (Canberra: Pirion, 2006), 3.

145. DOD, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007*, 26–27.

146. Ibid., 27.

147. Prime Minister John Howard had already confirmed this during an address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in September 2006, in which he stated that the ADF must be prepared "to protect and defend our people, and our interests, and our way of life … well beyond our shores." John Howard, "Address to the ASPI Global Forces 2006 Conference – Australia's Security Agenda," Hyatt Hotel, Canberra, September 26, 2006, http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech2150.html (accessed November 14, 2006, site discontinued).

While the shift back to a forward defence strategy was lamented by some,[148] for many others it was long overdue.[149] Regardless of the state of the debate, there can be little doubt that the funding and acquisitions that accompanied the policy shift greatly benefitted the morale and operational capabilities of the ADF. Hence, it can be said that, similar to the CF, at the end of 2007 the ADF was faring much better than at most other periods during the preceding twenty years.

In November 2007, the Labor Party under the leadership of Kevin Rudd ousted the Howard Government in a general election. During the campaign, both parties announced similar defence policies; however, at the close of 2007, it was still too early to determine what impact the change of government would eventually have on Australian strategic policy.[150]

Unlike in Australia and Canada, no major new defence policy statements were released in New Zealand between 2002 and 2007. What was released, however, was a *Defence Long-Term Development Plan* (*LTDP*), the first edition of which was dated 11 June 2002.[151] Discussing its relationship to prior policy, Alach observed that: "It might be said that the Framework established what the NZDF was to do, the Statement identified what was required in general terms, and the *LTDP* identified the specific equipment that would be purchased to fulfil those requirements."[152] Congruent with prior policy developments, acquisition programmes addressed within the *LTDP* were divided into four sections: those that had already been approved in principle by the Government, those that were "necessary to avoid the failure of policy," those that were "necessary to avoid significant risks to policy," and other discretionary purchases that were not necessary but would be nice to have.[153] Addressing a 10-year time frame, the *LTDP* set aside $NZ1 billion to fund its acquisition programmes.[154]

Subsequent to the release of its first edition, the *LTDP* was revised three times,[155] although more recent editions tended to provide updates about the status of existing programmes and revise time lines rather than announce additional major new acquisitions. That said, since the release of the first edition of the *LTDP*, funding was approved for numerous major projects. Key among these projects was the Project Protector, which involved the $NZ500 million purchase of seven new ships, including a multirole ship (the purchase of which was initially announced in the *GDS*), two offshore patrol vessels and four inshore patrol vessels.[156] Other significant acquisitions included an upgrade of the RNZAF's Orion aircraft fleet, Javelin antitank missile systems and light operational vehicles for the Army.[157]

Despite the positive effect the much-needed funding increase and acquisitions had on the NZDF, it nonetheless required some additional structural reforms. In September 2002, the Hunn Review (officially the *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force*) reported that the relationship between the NZDF and Ministry

148. Paul Dibb, "Is Strategic Geography Relevant to Australia's Current Defence Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (June 2006): 247–64; also, see Hugh White, "Australian Defence Policy and the Possibility of War," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (July 2002): 253–64.

149. Michael Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901–2005* (study paper no. 306, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, February 2005); Mark O'Neill, "Time to Move on in the Defence Policy Debate," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 3 (September 2006): 358–63; and Michael Evans, "Overcoming the Creswell-Foster Divide in Australian Strategy," 193–214.

150. Andrew Davies, "Defence under Australia's New Government," *RUSI Commentary*, Royal United Services Institute, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C474D7EFB631A6/ (accessed October 29, 2012).

151. New Zealand, MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan*, 2002.

152. Alach, 255.

153. MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan*, 2002.

154. Ibid., 3.

155. New Zealand, MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan: Update June 2003*; New Zealand, MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan: Update November 2004*; and New Zealand, MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan: 2006 Update*.

156. Quigley, 57–58.

157. Alach, 256.

of Defence (MOD) was not working effectively. It noted that "[f]undamental change is needed to reverse the policy of separation of civilian and military responsibility," and that "the problem is cultural and attitudinal as well as organizational and systemic."[158] In February 2005, the *Defence Capability and Resourcing Review* (*DCARR*) observed that the ongoing effects of underfunding during the 1990s and operational overstretch since 1998 had combined to create several major deficiencies within the NZDF.[159] Notwithstanding the funding increases that had begun following the election of the Labour Government, the *Defence Capability and Resourcing Review* assessed that the NZDF required approximately 2500 additional personnel in order to sustain its operational tempo.[160]

Although the major findings of the Hunn Review were not adopted into policy,[161] the government was quick to respond to the findings of the *Defence Capability and Resourcing Review*. On 2 May 2005, it announced the *Defence Sustainability Initiative*, which included a $NZ4.6 billion increase in the defence budget over a 10-year period.[162] This included $NZ200 million for new acquisitions and $NZ4.4 billion to cover operating costs.[163] The commitment—large by New Zealand's standards—was a testament to the consistency of the Clark Government. Having determined (following its ascent to power in 1999) to pursue a policy based on the ability to deploy and sustain forces on peacekeeping and peace enforcement (although not necessarily low-intensity) operations, the Clark Government's subsequent policy statements all aligned with this determination. In the face of weak opposition, Labour's defence policy went virtually unchallenged in New Zealand. Despite the significance of the funding increase announced in the *Defence Sustainability Initiative,* it was largely unnoticed by the New Zealand public, and defence issues played only a minor part in the 2005 general election.[164]

Operationally, the NZDF had a tempo as high as that of the ADF and CF throughout the post-9/11 period. Despite an ongoing lack of direct military contact with the US since the ANZUS Crisis of the late 1980s, a small special air service regiment contingent was dispatched to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. While the exact details of the contingent have not been released, there were at least three rotations, with the last being withdrawn in November 2005.[165] Furthermore, the unit was in Afghanistan as early as October 2001, being awarded a US Presidential Unit Citation for its service between 17 October 2001 and 30 March 2002.[166] Beginning in September 2003, New Zealand's contribution to Afghanistan was expanded with the deployment of a provincial reconstruction team in Bamyan Provence; the team remained there at the conclusion of the period studied.[167] While the Afghanistan deployment undoubtedly had the effect of thawing military relations between New Zealand and the US to a small extent, public objection in New Zealand to the Iraq War was substantial enough to ensure New Zealand did not support US operations there.[168]

158. D. K. Hunn, *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force* (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, September 30, 2002), iii.

159. New Zealand, MOD, *Defence Capability and Resourcing Review: Final Report*, February 2005, 4.

160. Ibid., 10.

161. Alach, 253.

162. New Zealand, MOD, *The Defence Sustainability Initiative: Building a Long-Term Future for the New Zealand Defence Force*, May 2, 2005, 11.

163. Phillip McKinnon, "New Zealand Boosts Defence Funds," *Janes Defence Weekly* 42, no. 19 (May 11, 2005): 5.

164. Stephen Levine, "Defence, Politics and the 2005 New Zealand General Election," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 170 (2006): 87–96.

165. *New Zealand Herald*, "SAS Back in NZ, No Plans to Return," November 22, 2005, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10356420 (accessed October 29, 2012).

166. New Zealand Defence Force, "Approval for the Acceptance and Wear of the United States Navy Presidential Unit Citation for Service by the NZ SAS in Afghanistan," http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/news/archive2006.html#sas (accessed October 29, 2012).

167. New Zealand Defence Force, "NZ PRT: New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team Ten," http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm (accessed October 10, 2007, site discontinued); and New Zealand, MOD, Evaluation Division, "Deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan," Report No. 10/2005, June 10, 2005.

168. Levine, 87–96.

In the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand's most significant post-9/11 military commitments have predominantly been in the same locations as Australia's. Since July 2003, the NZDF has had an ongoing presence in Solomon Islands. At its peak, the deployment reached 222; at the close of 2007, it had been scaled back to just under 50.[169] In May 2006, following the riots in Dili, New Zealand troops were redeployed to East Timor alongside their Australian counterparts. They too remained deployed until after the conclusion of the period studied.[170]

Conclusion: The Broader Political Context During the Decade of Complexity

For Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the years 1997 to 2007 were marked by the gradual shift from a strategic and operational environment characterized by uncertainty to one characterized by complexity. Where a benign threat environment had characterized 1987 to 1997, the following decade saw the emergence of several new threats to the national security of all three countries. Primarily, the threat of terrorism emerged as key strategic policy concern following 9/11 and, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, the Bali Bombing of October 12, 2002. This was accompanied by an increase in the prominence of border and sovereignty protection; for Australia and New Zealand, preventing instability in the Pacific region was also of paramount concern.[171] Importantly, emerging threats had a major impact on strategic policy development even though none of the threats directly challenged the national survival of any of the three countries.

Of major significance, the shift towards complexity was accompanied by a shift towards the defence of broadly defined national interests as the primary policy driver in all three countries. For Australia, this was accompanied by an ongoing policy move away from the centrality of geographical determinism, although this shift had initially commenced almost immediately following the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper. In Canada, the professionalism of the CF increased substantially as a result of a successful post-Somalia Affair cultural adjustment. Following 9/11, the commitment to Afghanistan gave both Canadian security policy and the CF a renewed focus—the resulting policy cohesion had not existed in Canada since the conclusion of the cold war. Finally, for New Zealand, the prioritization of the defence of broad-ranging national interests necessitated difficult policy choices. Ultimately, the eventual decision to scrap some capabilities in order to free up funding to concentrate on those deemed most important ensured the NZDF remained a relevant and affordable foreign policy tool for the Government of New Zealand.

For the armed forces of all three countries, an important consequence of the policy shift towards the centrality of the defence of national interests broadly defined was the need to be able to defend these interests abroad. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, defence strategy increasingly called on the armed forces to prepare for and conduct expeditionary operations. Furthermore, it was acknowledged in all three countries that expeditionary operations would need to be joint in order to succeed, that they would most often require interagency cooperation, and that they would frequently be conducted in coalition with other countries. As the decade wore on, the acquisition proposals contained in Australian, Canadian and New Zealand strategic policy also became increasingly similar. To facilitate expeditionary operations, the army became the primary focus, and an expansion in troop numbers was approved in all three countries. The purchase of multirole or amphibious support ships and an upgrade in air transport capabilities were also approved in all three, in order to permit the deployment and sustainment of expeditionary forces.

169. New Zealand Defence Force, "Solomon Islands," http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/solomon-islands/default.htm (accessed October 10, 2007, site discontinued).

170. New Zealand Defence Force, "Timor Leste," http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/east-timor/default.htm (accessed October 10, 2007, site discontinued).

171. In Australian and New Zealand foreign policy circles, the Pacific region has been dubbed "the arc of instability." Robert Ayson, "The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 2 (June 2007): 215–31.

Enabling these acquisitions to take place was an increase in the defence budget in all three countries, although the increase was particularly large in Australia. Importantly, economic recovery from the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that by the close of 2007 the economies of all three countries were stronger than at any other time during the period studied. In addition to enabling the dispatch of expeditionary forces, budget increases were accompanied by the increased morale of the armed forces in all three countries and by an ease in (although by no means the disappearance of) competition between the different services of the armed forces for funding.

Civil/military relations in all three countries also improved from 1997 to 2007, although to vastly different extents and for vastly different reasons. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, widespread public apathy was swept away and replaced with widespread support for the ADF and NZDF following the positive media attention accorded to the INTERFET mission. In New Zealand, this attention subsided following the conclusion of the mission and by the end of 2007 widespread apathy had returned.

In Australia, widespread public support for ADF operations continued until the end of 2007. So strong was the public support for the ADF in the early 21st century that even the most outspoken opponents of the highly unpopular deployment to the Iraq War were careful to blame the Government, not the ADF, for the decision to deploy. Indeed, the consistently high level of public support for the ADF led John Birmingham to conclude that Australians had become conditioned to view the deployment of the ADF in the pursuit of perceived broader national interests as normal.[172] If this was the case, it was the ADF's consistently impressive performance, combined with careful media management, which led to ongoing public support.

In 1997, the opposite could have been said of the CF. As a result of the Somalia Affair and subsequent emergence of numerous scandals, the CF by the mid-1990s had become the subject of much negative media attention in Canada. Canadian public opinion, traditionally characterized by apathy towards the plight of the CF, reached a historic low in the late 1990s. As the CF underwent its post-Somalia Affair cultural adjustment, the media attention gradually subsided, although the post-9/11 deployment to Afghanistan deferred a return to outright public apathy toward the CF. Instead, the deployment—highly controversial in Canada—led to the polarization of public opinion. The Harper Government's decision to ban broadcasts of images of Canadian coffins being unloaded from military aircraft is demonstrative of the media's role in this polarization.[173] It is also testament to another commonality between Australia, Canada and New Zealand: the increasingly obvious role the media has played in shaping public opinion in all three countries.

A final commonality that warrants mentioning is one that has remained consistent throughout the entire period studied—the role of alliance relationships in Australian, Canadian and New Zealand defence policy. As was the case during the previous period, the US alliance was the most prominent and important for Australia and Canada. In Australia, maintenance of the US alliance was consistently a high priority for the Howard Government, and by 2007, Australia had significantly risen in prominence as a US ally. For Canada, geography rendered its prominence as a US ally somewhat less discretionary. Particularly after 9/11, Canada had to carefully manage its security relationship with the US. New Zealand, however, was not closely allied to the US. A lack of direct military contact (an ongoing ramification of the ANZUS Crisis) characterized the New Zealand / US relationship, and as a result, New Zealand's defence relationship with Australia was its most significant. That said, it should be noted that following New Zealand's deployment to Afghanistan, its defence relationship with the US improved substantially.

172. Birmingham, 36–43.

173. Nason.

Overall, the plethora of concurrent operations; the different conditions encountered during each operation; and the shift towards joint, interagency and coalition operations resulted in the decade 1997 to 2007 being characterized by complexity. As the decade wore on, strategies to manage complexity had an increasing influence over strategic policy and acquisitions and, hence, the overall development of military-strategic doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

Part Two: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development

Chapter 4

Conceptualizing Land Power: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Armies, 1987–2007

Prior to 1987, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies (like the other branches of their armed forces) had no military-strategic doctrine. A shift to the production of such doctrine did not begin in any of the three countries until after the release of their 1987 Defence White Papers. Despite this, several of the conditions that allowed post-1987 military-strategic doctrine development to occur were already present before 1987. Armies, in particular, have traditionally been strong proponents of written doctrine designed to guide the tactical level of conflict.[1]

Historically, the acceptance of doctrine within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies has its lineage in the cultural traditions of the British Army. In the British Army, tactical doctrine dates to the 19th century.[2] In the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies, a plethora of tactical doctrine has existed since shortly after their inception, although early publications were often exact copies of British manuals. Over time, American doctrine also grew in influence, as did tactical doctrine derived from the experiences of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies themselves.[3]

As the first of four chapters discussing military-strategic doctrine development, this chapter heralds a narrowing of focus within this study. Where previous discussion has provided a background by establishing the commonalities between Australia, Canada and New Zealand and by examining their strategic policy developments and operational experiences within the broader political context that existed in each country from 1987 to 2007, this chapter focuses on doctrine development, the core theme of this study.

The chapter begins by examining the emergence during the early 1980s of the concept of the operational level of conflict. The different effects this concept had on doctrine development within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies is discussed in the first section, since these developments were a precursor to the subsequent production of military-strategic doctrine. The second section examines the development of the initial military-strategic doctrine manuals produced by each army, and the third discusses subsequent military-strategic doctrinal developments. These sections also describe the doctrine development process, factors that influenced development, the intended effects of each doctrine manual, and the content of the doctrine itself, drawing when required on the discussion in earlier chapters. In conclusion, similarities and differences between doctrine developments in the three armies are considered, and a model is established to explain the common influences on and key intended effects of military-strategic army doctrine.

1. Gooch, 5–6.

2. See, for example, *Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry, as Revised by Her Majesty's Command* (London: Gorge E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, for Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1859).

3. On early doctrinal development in Australia, see Mark C. J. Welburn, *The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1945–1964* (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 108, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994); and Richard N. Bushby, *Educating an Army: Australian Army Doctrinal Development and the Operational Experience in South Vietnam, 1965–72* (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 126, Australian National University, Canberra, 1998). Early doctrinal development in Canada and New Zealand has not been studied in as much detail; hence, the assertion herein is based upon a combination of interviews and various written sources, mostly located in achieves and libraries in Canada and New Zealand.

Doctrine Development During the 1980s: The Emergence of Operational Doctrine

By the mid-1980s, doctrine in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies had ceased to exist primarily in the form of exact copies of British Army manuals. While most doctrine was still directed at the tactical level of conflict, since the conclusion of WWII the influence of the direct operational experience of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies on doctrine development had continually increased,[4] and while allied doctrine continued to influence conceptual development in all three countries, by the 1980s, it occurred primarily as a result of NATO and ABCA interoperability agreements.[5] Nonetheless, during the 1980s, American doctrinal developments had particular influence on conceptual and doctrinal developments in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies.

Following the Vietnam War—which for America was characterized by a dissonance between tactical success and strategic failure—the US Army underwent "a revolution in Army thinking."[6] From the outset, the US Army's reform process was inextricably linked to doctrine development, in particular to three editions of *FM 100-5 Operations*, published in 1976, 1982 and 1986.[7] While these publications were instrumental in stimulating wide-ranging debate within the US Army about its role and operational conduct, they were also influential (to varied extents) in the armies of US allies Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Of particular importance, due to its influence on the development of subsequent doctrine, was the inclusion of a discussion in the 1982 edition of *FM 100-5* about the operational level of conflict—the first time the concept had been included in US Army doctrine.[8] The operational level of conflict—and the related concept of the operational art[9]—quickly found its way into the lexicon of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies.

In the Australian Army, the conceptual debate about the operational level of conflict and operational art that followed the release of the 1982 edition of *FM 100-5* occurred in a more formal manner than in the Canadian and New Zealand armies. This is understandable given the concept's suitability to Australia's strategic circumstances. From the outset, the Australian Army's debate about the operational level of conflict was closely tied to the developing continental defence strategy, which required the Army to be capable of repelling an enemy lodgement on the Australian continent.[10] In May 1977, the year following the publication of the 1976 Defence White Paper, the Australian Army released a new series of doctrine, the *Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare* (*MLW*). It consisted of three parts, the first two designed for the operational and tactical levels of conflict, and the third designed as a training aid in support of the first two.[11] The first edition of the keystone publication within the series, *MLW One 1.1 Fundamentals of Land Force Operations*, was released in 1977 under the label "provisional."[12]

4. Welburn; and Bushby. While he does not mention doctrine, Granatstein describes several Canadian Army experiences between 1945 and 1968 that demonstrate a move towards a more independent outlook. These experiences would surely have influenced Canadian tactical doctrinal development during the period. Granatstein, 310–58.

5. Richard A. Cody and Robert L. Maginnis, "Note to File – Coalition Interoperability: ABCA's New Focus," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 86–90.

6. Richard Lock-Pullan, *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 77.

7. US Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1, 1976); US Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 20, 1982); and US Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).

8. John L. Romjue, *American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War* (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Monograph Series, 1997), 7–8.

9. The operational art has been defined as "concern[ing] the conduct of campaigns, the actions of corps to combined joint task forces. Campaigns involve the employment of military forces and capabilities in a series of orchestrated, timely movements linking tactical means to the achievement of strategic ends. The art of operations involves execution, coordination, and the collective effort of organizations." Montgomery C. Meigs, "Operational Art in the New Century," *Parameters* 31, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 4.

10. DOD, *Australian Defence* (1976 Defence White Paper), 10.

11. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past,* 16–17.

12. Michael Evans, "An Engine for Change: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–97," in *Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine, Development and Training*, ed. Michael Evans, (Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 57–59.

A second edition of *MLW One 1.1* was released in 1985. This edition was far more significant than its predecessor, as it introduced the concept of the operational level of conflict to the Australian Army and discussed measures for the conduct of campaigns at the operational level. Although the inclusion of the operational level of war within *MLW One 1.1* was heavily influenced by the US Army's inclusion of the concept in the 1982 edition of *FM 100-5*, Evans has observed that discussion of the concept within *MLW One 1.1* differentiated from the American publication as it "sought to define an Australian context for campaign planning."[13] The related concept of operational art, despite its American origins, was subsequently adapted by the Australian Army as a method of encouraging senior officers to consider the operational aspects of the Army's role in the provision of continental defence, although the concept was not discussed within the doctrine itself.

Importantly, *MLW One 1.1* introduced the concept of manoeuvre, stating: "At the operational level of war, manoeuvre is aimed at decisively influencing the outcome of future operations by throwing the enemy off balance, wresting the initiative from him and gaining the freedom of action to implement one's own operations."[14] This was important, as it began the Australian Army's doctrinal embrace of what is now termed "the manoeuvrist approach to operations." Over the next fifteen years, as this approach was conceptually developed, it became increasingly central within Australian Army military-strategic doctrine. It also provided a point of commonality with the Canadian and New Zealand armies, which both incorporated manoeuvre into their own doctrine during the 1990s. In the mid-1980s, however, the concept of manoeuvre was still in the early stages of development, and in the 1985 edition of *MLW One 1,* it was discussed as one of three elements of "combat power," alongside firepower and morale.[15]

Throughout the history of the New Zealand Army, its small size and limited resources have resulted in a tendency for it to draw more heavily on allied doctrine than the Australian and Canadian armies, even at the tactical level. During the early part of the 20th century, doctrine development in the New Zealand Army frequently paralleled developments in its Australian counterpart because British Army tactical doctrine was generally used by both armies. In the New Zealand Army's case, this changed as a result of the Vietnam War, and subsequently, it began to draw more heavily on Australian and American tactical doctrine. This situation lasted until the ANZUS Crisis, one of the ramifications of which was an American decision to discontinue New Zealand's access to its tactical doctrine (most of which is classified).[16] In the wake of the ANZUS Crisis, the New Zealand Army adopted the Australian Army's *MLW* series of publications.[17] As a result of this decision, the New Zealand Army effectively adopted the operational level of war and manoeuvre into its military thinking.

Regarding the New Zealand Army's internal doctrinal development process, the ANZUS Crisis was ultimately a blessing in disguise. While the obvious and immediate effect of the crisis was a loss of access to US doctrine, a secondary effect was the gradual emergence of a cadre within the Army that was willing to reconsider its entire doctrinal development processes.[18] This reconsideration was, however, in its infancy at the beginning of the period studied and had not yet had any noticeable impact on the development of New Zealand Army doctrine.

13. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 28.

14. Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare Part One, Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (DOD, Army Office, 1985), para. 309.

15. Australian Army, *MLW One 1.1,* 1985 ed., 3.2–3.4.

16. Most tactical-level Army doctrine in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well as in the US and UK, is classified. Despite this, these armies have usually been able to access each others' doctrine as a result of the ABCA Agreement. Operational and military-strategic doctrine, by contrast, is generally unclassified.

17. Interview with a senior officer, NZ Army, conducted at New Zealand Command and Staff College (NZ CSC), April 30, 2007.

18. Ibid.

Due to the unification of its armed forces, Canada is different from Australia and New Zealand, as there was an absence of independent army doctrine after 1968. Nonetheless, Mobile Command did maintain tactical doctrine for the conduct of land operations.[19] Despite this, the land element of the CF (which was unofficially redesignated the Canadian Army following the limited separation of the three services implemented by the Mulroney Government) has often been accused of suffering from a dearth of doctrine development. This dearth becomes especially evident when the Canadian Army is compared to its allies, and the gap was especially noticeable prior to the 1990s.[20] As Taylor observed:

> [I]t is only since the late 1980s that Canadian doctrinal development gained momentum. Prior to this period, the intellectual, interactive and predictive component factors of doctrine did not alter sufficiently to drive doctrinal change, nor apparently did the institutional shake-up in the 1960s. Inextricably linked to NATO and North American defence plans in the Cold War context, there was no driving impulse for change for at least twenty years.[21]

Prior to the 1990s, the Canadian Army, similar to the New Zealand Army, opted to borrow its ally's doctrine rather than develop its own. In the Canadian Army's case, it frequently deferred to NATO operational planning. Contrary to the New Zealand Army, however, the Canadian Army attracted more criticism for this deferral. This criticism was most likely due to the larger size of the Canadian Army, which was comparable to the Australian Army during the 1980s.[22]

The primary cause of the difference between the Australian Army, which had developed a comprehensive series of tactical and operational doctrine during the 1970s and 1980s, and the Canadian Army, which has been accused of suffering from a lack of doctrine development during the same period, appears to be closely related to strategic policy and geography. Australia's strategic policy of continental defence and self-reliance established that the direct defence of the Australian continent, without any assistance from Australia's allies if necessary, was the primary task of the ADF, including the Army. While Canada's 1971 Defence White Paper had accorded the defence of Canadian territory top priority, in reality, this was soon overshadowed by the prominence of Canada's contribution to NATO defence in Europe and, to a lesser extent, by peacekeeping.

In light of the different requirements of these defence strategies, the vastly different roles played by allies in Australia's and Canada's defence planning had major implications for doctrinal development. The Australian Army, required to be self-sufficient in conducting the unique task of Australian continental defence, developed comprehensive doctrine centred on enabling it to do so successfully. The Canadian Army, by contrast, was seldom required to work without allies. The result was a tendency to focus on achieving interoperability, at the cost of developing Canadian Army doctrine. This argument has been advanced a step further by some, who argue that the Canadian focus was on tactical interoperability, to the detriment of Canadian operational and strategic thinking about the conduct of military operations in general. Howard Coombs, for example, observed that: "As the Cold War progressed, NATO operational plans for forward defence shaped concepts of operational thought by forcing the formulation of defensive strategies based on holding terrain regardless of losses, until reinforcements could arrive."[23] About peacekeeping, he added:

19. Sean M. Maloney, "Global Mobile, Part 2: The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965–1972," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 7–23.

20. K. T. Eddy, "The Canadian Forces and the Operational Level of War," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (April 1992): 18–24; and Peskett, 102–3.

21. Taylor, 36–37.

22. In 1987, the Canadian land forces strength was 22,500; the Australian Army strength was 32,000. In Canada's case, unification has resulted in this figure being artificially low, with an additional 29,000 personnel in support roles not listed by service. Of these personnel, many provided support primarily to the land forces. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1987–1988* (Letchworth: Garden City Press, 1987), 57–59, 152.

23. Howard Coombs, "Perspectives on Operational Thought" in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts* (see note 14, Introduction), 77.

> Traditional peacekeeping does not lend itself to the constructs required for operational thought as it requires centralized control and resolution of problems at the highest level. An unfortunate side effect of this perspective is a tactical focus that absorbs commanders at the operational and strategic levels.[24]

If Coombs' observations are correct, it is likely that one consequence of this tactical focus was the lack of Canadian Army doctrinal development at the operational or strategic levels, despite the establishment of operational doctrine within allied armies during the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s.

The argument that Canadian Army commanders focused too frequently on tactics at the cost of operational and strategic thinking has not been without its critics, however. Gordon Peskett, for example, asserted that operational- and strategic-level thought occurred in the Canadian Army to a similar extent to the armies of Canada's NATO allies; it is just that this thinking did not manifest itself doctrinally in Canada's case. To support this claim, Peskett points out that during the late 1980s, the Canadian Army was an active participant in the process of "getting the operational art and operational concepts included in the foreword to ATP 35 (A), *NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine*. The Army also used this NATO work for inclusion in its rewrite of the 1984 version of Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 300 *The Army*."[25]

Regardless of which of the arguments about Canadian operational thinking is correct, the result of the Canadian Army's focus on interoperability was a dearth in its doctrine beyond the tactical level. This dearth would not be addressed until the mid-1990s.

Towards Military-Strategic Army Doctrine, 1987–1998

Of the three armies, the Australian Army was the first to develop a comprehensive military-strategic doctrinal publication. In the Australian case, national strategic policy had a strong degree of influence during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although Australia's continental defence and self-reliance strategies had influenced the development of Army doctrine since the promulgation of the *MLW* series in the mid-1970s, the 1987 Defence White Paper had the effect of greatly clarifying national-strategic policy and the Army's role within it:

> [T]he Army's structure must include highly mobile forces capable of rapid deployment anywhere within Australia and its territories. The ground force must be able to conduct protracted and dispersed operations in harsh terrain where the existing infrastructure and resources are sparse, and be logistically supportable within Australia's resources. … We need a force structure that includes a light air portable force, capable of rapid deployment; forces capable of following up an initial deployment; and the availability of greater combat power to reinforce deployed formations if necessary.[26]

To outline how it was going to implement this strategy, the Army released *Training Information Bulletin No. 68: Low Level Conflict 1988* (*TIB68*) in September 1988.[27]

24. Ibid.

25. Peskett, 102. This author's attempts to find a copy of *CFP 300 The Army* for discussion herein were fruitless, despite detailed searches of the Canadian Defence Academy, Royal Military College of Canada and Canadian War Museum libraries. Some of the Canadian scholars interviewed as part of the research for this study expressed frustration that their own searches for *CFP 300* had yielded the same fruitless result.

26. DOD, *Defence of Australia 1987*, 53.

27. Australian Army, *Training Information Bulletin No. 68 (TIB68): Low Level Conflict 1988* (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, September 1988).

Although not military-strategic doctrine per se, *TIB68* nonetheless contained the Army's military strategy for implementing its part of Australia's national defence strategy. *TIB68* assigned specific roles to different units in order to enable the Army to rapidly deploy a light infantry-based force by air and follow it up with a more substantial force. It determined that the Army would most likely be required to conduct low-level conflict, in which "the opponent engages in politically motivated hostile acts ranging from non-violent infringements of, to small scale military actions against, Australian sovereignty or interests."[28] *TIB68* also determined the Army's primary roles in prosecuting this type of conflict.

Two months later, a second publication, *Training Information Letter 1/88: Directive Control 1988* (*TIL 1/88*), was released.[29] It established a new command philosophy designed for dispersed operations on the Australian continent. The philosophy, labelled "directive control," was described as:

> [I]ncreasing a subordinate's knowledge of a superior commander's intent. A subordinate commander would, in turn, gain greater freedom to modify plans and adopt new tasks within the general framework of a mission. The overall aim was to decrease detailed control of operations at formation level, bringing greater certainty of execution at unit or sub-unit level and bringing a more rapid response to local tactical situations.[30]

In 1989, a major exercise, KANGAROO, was used to test the Army's new strategy and leadership doctrine. It was determined that while the exercise had validated the strategy outlined in *TIB68* and the command philosophy detailed in *TIL 1/88*, several further modifications were required.[31]

The release of *ASP90* and the 1991 *Force Structure Review* provided further impetus for subsequent doctrinal reform, as both documents had ramifications for the Army's role, composition and funding. Seemingly written to confirm the suitability of the 1987 Defence White Paper to Australia's strategic circumstances post-Soviet collapse, *ASP90* confirmed the defence of Australia policy and related "strategy of denial" and "self-reliance" policy.[32] It also envisaged that the ADF would most likely be required to undertake low-level or escalated low-level conflict, confirming that the strategy outlined in *TIB68* remained valid.[33] The 1991 *Force Structure Review*, on the other hand, contained several changes to the Army's structure and composition. Significantly, most of the regular Army was to be relocated to Australia's north (rapidly accelerating a change that had begun following the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper), and the strength of the Army was to be set at 11,000 Regular, 3,200 "Ready Reserve" and 21,000 Reserve personnel organized into 10 brigades. Furthermore, Headquarters 1 Division was to undertake an additional role as Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) if required.[34]

It was against this background that the Australian Army developed its first military-strategic doctrinal publication. "In his Development and Training Directive for the period 1 July 1990 to 30 June 1993," wrote Michael Evans: "the [Chief of the General Staff], Lieutenant General John Coates, tasked Training Command to review Army doctrine. His aim was to ensure that existing doctrine accorded with strategic guidance and was focused on the most likely, rather than the least likely possibilities."[35]

28. *TIB68*, quoted in: Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past,* 32.
29. Australian Army, *Training Information Letter 1/88: Directive Control 1988* (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, November 1988).
30. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 35.
31. Ibid., 35–36.
32. Australia, DOD, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, November 27, 1989, 1.
33. Ibid., 22.
34. DOD, *Force Structure Review*, 22–27.
35. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 40.

In compliance with the instruction, a third edition of *MLW One 1.1*, retitled *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, was produced in 1992. An unrestricted version was subsequently published on 29 March 1993.[36] According to the publication itself, its production had been undertaken by a small team of mid-ranking and senior officers.[37] Thus, *Fundamentals* established a common trend amongst the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies over the next decade—the production of doctrine by a dedicated (usually specifically assembled) team of mid-ranking and senior officers.

Fundamentals was divided into two parts, the first examining land warfare in a general sense and the second applying the principles established in the first to the Australian strategic context. Discussion within *Fundamentals* appears to have been heavily influenced by *TIL 1/88* (the "directive control" philosophy was outlined in Chapter 3)[38] and the military strategy initially outlined in *TIB68*. In many ways, *Fundamentals* was a consolidation and refinement of these documents; although, it is clear that *ASP90* and the *Force Structure Review* were also influential, as was recent Australian and allied (particularly American) operational experience.[39]

A section on the nature of future land warfare is most illustrative of the latter of these influences. Although unstated, it is clear that this section of *Fundamentals* was primarily influenced by America's conduct of the 1991 Gulf War. The increasing influence of public opinion and the media's role in shaping it, the increased lethality of technology and the resultant need for dispersed battlefield formations, and the role of intelligence and surveillance on the battlefield were the primary subjects of discussion.[40] The increasing number and changing nature of peacekeeping missions were mentioned only briefly, and the lack of Australian Army operational experience during this period is evident when the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals* is read in conjunction with later editions.[41] Overall, it was concluded that "these factors suggest that, in the future, limited wars in the low to medium levels of conflict will be the most likely type of warfare to occur."[42]

The first section of *Fundamentals* also discussed the Army's role in each level of conflict and, for the first time in Australian doctrine, the concept of operational art was explicitly discussed.[43] An emphasis on the importance of manoeuvre was carried forward from the 1985 edition of *MLW One 1.1*, although it was still grouped with firepower and morale under the common heading "combat power."[44] The application of directive control appears to have been intended to facilitate the application of the other concepts contained in *Fundamentals*, although this role was not directly acknowledged.

In applying these concepts to the Australian strategic context, the second section of *Fundamentals* envisaged six types of operational scenario the Army should be prepared for. The first two, low-level and escalated low-level conflict, were drawn from *TIB68* and *ASP90*.[45] The third type, labelled "more

36. Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare (MLW) One 1.1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (Georges Heights: Doctrine Branch, Headquarters Training Command, March 29, 1993), i.

37. Ibid., ii.

38. Ibid., 32–33.

39. Ibid., 105. Note that *Fundamentals* identified six broad influences on Australian doctrine: defence policy, strategic circumstances, the level of threat, technological advances, experience from operational service and training, and agreements with allies. Beyond this generalized list, no specific account of what influenced its development was given within the publication itself.

40. Ibid., 10–16.

41. At the time of writing the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals*, the Australian Army was still in the middle of "the long peace." Although the deployments to Namibia, Cambodia and Somalia would have yielded some operational lessons about peacekeeping, they would not have been of much assistance to the Australian Army in formulating a strategy for the defence of the Australian continent in a war scenario, which was required by strategic policy. This is the most likely reason why the American experience of the Gulf War was heavily drawn upon.

42. Ibid., 16.

43. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 43.

44. Australian Army, *MLW One 1.1*, 1993 ed., 39–47.

45. Ibid., 76–80.

substantial conflict," was deemed unlikely, as was the fourth—civil-military operations. Discussion of these types of operations was, therefore, minimal, and the Army's structure and approach to operations was not designed for their conduct, although it was deemed flexible enough to be able to adapt to them if necessary.[46] The inclusion of the fifth and sixth types of operation, offshore operations and peacekeeping operations, reflected their inclusion in the *Force Structure Review*, and discussion of these types of operation within *Fundamentals* appears to have been undertaken cautiously in light of political considerations.[47] Overall, *Fundamentals* determined that:

> [T]hese tasks define a defensive posture by Australian forces. The execution of these security operations, however, will be offensive. The objective will be to commit small forces with high mobility and firepower to dislocate the enemy by aggressive action, manoeuvre, concealment, timely intelligence and effective deception. This concept for operations seeks to wrest the initiative from the enemy through effective manoeuvre, not through attrition. Hence, it may be regarded as an indirect approach.[48]

Fundamentals, therefore, furthered the military-strategic shift begun in the 1985 edition of *MLW One 1.1*: the Australian Army had adopted the manoeuvrist approach to operations.

As mentioned above, in the New Zealand Army's case the ANZUS Crisis had the immediate effect of triggering the decision to defer to the Australian Army's *MLW* series of publications. A more gradual effect of the crisis, however, was the emergence of a cadre within the Army that was willing to reconsider the entire doctrinal development process.[49] In the mid-1990s, the efforts of this cadre resulted in the publication of *NZ P-12 – Doctrine*, dated 30 August 30 1994.[50]

Unlike allied doctrine, *NZ P-12* was divided into two parts, the first discussing military-strategic concepts and the second discussing the operational level of conflict.[51] While not explicitly stated in the document itself, this unique division was most likely due to the smaller size of the New Zealand Army and need to create cost efficiencies (during the period in which *NZ P-12* was produced, the defence budget had been cut by 23 per cent).[52] The first section of the first part primarily discussed the Army's response to government policy and the key military-strategic concepts that would be employed to achieve its implementation, with subsequent sections discussing how these concepts applied to operations. The second part went on to discuss different types of operations, making the distinction between conventional operations (war), operations other than war and peace support operations.[53]

Similar to the Australian Army's *Fundamentals*, *NZ P-12* made it clear that the New Zealand Army had embraced the manoeuvrist approach, declaring that the New Zealand Army's operational focus would be on "[m]anoeuvre warfare by light infantry orientated forces within the framework of directive control." In accordance with this focus, the Army's mission was "[t]o provide an operationally prepared light infantry orientated force in order to be capable of contributing to New Zealand security objectives."[54] As noted in the 1996 *Army Strategic Vision*:

46. Ibid., 83–85, 88–91.

47. Ibid., 80–83, 85–88.

48. Ibid., 78–79.

49. Interview with a senior NZ Army officer, conducted at New Zealand Command and Staff College (NZ CSC), April 30, 2007.

50. New Zealand Army, *NZ P12 – Doctrine*, August 30, 1994.

51. The Australian, Canadian, British and American armies have all released separate keystone military-strategic and operational doctrine manuals.

52. James, "A Force Still Fit to Fight?" 5.

53. New Zealand Army, *NZ P-12,* Parts 1–2.

54. Ibid., 14.

> This doctrine contrasts with previous perceptions that the Army would be involved in conventional positional and attritional warfare, alongside more heavily equipped allies. The change does not preclude NZ Army involvement in higher intensity conventional operations; it does, however, limit the extent of the roles the Army can undertake in such operations.[55]

According to *NZ P-12* itself, this change in military strategy had been necessitated by post-ANZUS Crisis strategic policy changes, specifically those outlined in the 1991 Defence White Paper.[56] As part of New Zealand's post-ANZUS Crisis strategic policy shift, the NZDF, including the Army, was required for the first time to be able to maintain "a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region," possibly without allied assistance.[57] The manoeuvrist approach and directive control were adopted as a means of enabling the Army to achieve this objective.

While the motive underlying the adoption of the manoeuvrist approach was New Zealand's strategic policy shift, the development of the concept itself had originated in the doctrine of allied armies. Prior to the publication of *NZ P-12*, the New Zealand Army had briefly deferred to Australian doctrine, which had first included the manoeuvrist approach to operations in the 1985 edition of *MLW One 1.1*.[58]

There has, however, been some contention over whether this was the source the New Zealand Army drew upon when writing its own doctrine. According to a retired general officer, the New Zealand Army's development of the manoeuvrist approach was based on United States Marine Corps (USMC) doctrine.[59] However, it was asserted by a different senior officer that despite the ANZUS Crisis, the New Zealand Army was heavily influenced by the US Army's *FM 100-5* series,[60] although neither officer was able to comment about whether these publications had directly influenced the development of *NZ P-12*. Reading both allied publications, it appears that USMC doctrine was most likely of greater influence, as it was conceptually quite close to *NZ P-12*. There were also some similarities between *NZ P-12* and the 1994 edition of *FM 100-5*, however, indicating US Army doctrine may also have been influential, albeit to a lesser extent than USMC doctrine.[61] Regardless, it is clear that developments within allied armies were influential during the development of *NZ P-12*.

Of the three armies, the Canadian Army was the last to produce military-strategic doctrine, releasing B-GL-300-000/FP-000, *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee* on 1 April 1998. The comparatively late release of the Canadian Army's military-strategic doctrine was due to a plethora of factors that influenced the Canadian Army from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.

The first of these factors was strategic policy uncertainty. Whereas Australian and (despite a period of post-ANZUS Crisis readjustment) New Zealand strategic policy provided well-defined guidance for their armed forces, Canadian strategic policy has been said to have "probably never represented a deliberately chosen course of strategic direction, or a thoughtfully integrated element of national

55. New Zealand Army, *The New Zealand Army Strategic Vision: Serving New Zealand into the 21st Century and Beyond*, March 1996, 13.

56. New Zealand Army, *NZ P-12*, 11–12.

57. MOD, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991*, 9–10.

58. In turn, the Australian Army had derived its version of the concept from the US Army's *FM 100-5*.

59. Interview with a retired NZ Army general officer conducted at Massey University, April 27, 2007. The USMC publication that first detailed the manoeuvrist approach was USMC, *Fleet Marine Force Manual 1: Warfighting* (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 1989), reproduced as *Warfighting: The US Marine Corps Book of Strategy* (New York: Doubleday, 1994). An updated version was later released as: Department of the Navy (US), *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting* (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1997).

60. Interview with a senior NZ Army officer (Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force), conducted May 2, 2007.

61. USMC, esp. 75–84; and United States, Department of the Army, *US Army Field Manual 100-5: Fighting Future Wars* (Washington: Brassey's, 1994).

purpose and objectives."[62] As noted above, it has been argued by some that this situation prevented the development of Canadian Army operational doctrine prior to the period studied. Following the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper—one of Canada's few White Papers to have set a firm strategic direction—the lack of strategic policy guidance continued to be an issue. The White Paper itself was rendered obsolete within two years of its release, although it was not superseded until three years after that by the release of the 1992 *Defence Policy Statement*. The *Statement*, however, provided little strategic direction for the CF, including the Army.

Exacerbating the effects of the lack of strategic policy guidance were severe budget cuts (which substantially increased in 1989).[63] By the early 1990s, these cuts had resulted in the Army eliminating all but the most essential programmes and activities. It has since been asserted that a consequence of this situation was the de-prioritization of doctrinal development, to the extent that between 1990 and 1994 the Canadian Army produced almost no doctrine at all.[64]

It was not until the release of the *1994 Defence White Paper* that the Canadian Army was finally provided with post-cold war strategic policy guidance. Compared to Australian and New Zealand strategic policy, however, the *1994 Defence White Paper* still provided general, rather than specific, guidance for the army.[65] The strategic direction it set was similar to previous policy:

> Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent—that is, able to fight "alongside the best, against the best" …. The retention of multi-purpose, combat capable forces represents the only prudent choice for Canada.[66]

The protection of Canadian sovereignty, the provision of defence assistance to the civil power, the maintenance of defence ties with the US, and being able to participate in multilateral expeditionary operations (such as peacekeeping) were all tasks that would be required of the Army.[67]

Accompanying the *1994 Defence White Pape*r was some (albeit scant) financial relief for the Army, which weathered the following few years relatively well when compared to the Navy and Air Force. This was largely due to the relative priority the Army was accorded within the White Paper, which noted that:

> The relative weights of the naval, land and air establishments that have prevailed for many years will be adjusted, primarily to allow for the transfer of resources to where they are most needed—mainly to land combat and combat support forces—in response to the added emphasis being placed on multilateral activities, and particularly peace and stability operations.[68]

Despite an overall personnel cut from 74,900 to 60,000, the Army was to be increased in size by 3,000 personnel to enable it to cope with its expanded operational commitments.[69]

62. G. C. E. Theriault, "Reflections on Canadian Defence Policy and its Underlying Structural Problems," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (July 1993): 3, http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/cdq/Theriault%20July%201993.PDF (accessed October 29, 2012).

63. Neill, 41.

64. Interview with a senior Canadian Army officer conducted at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, August 13, 2008.

65. Scot Robertson has argued that Canadian strategic policy during the period from the fall of the Berlin Wall to 9/11 was characterized by "innocence and drift" brought about by overly-optimistic interpretations of the post-cold war security environment. If true, this theory goes a long way towards explaining the comparative vagary of Canadian strategic policy during the early 1990s. Scot Robinson, "Years of Innocence and Drift: The Canadian Way of War in the Post-Cold War Era" in *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dun Durn Press, 2006), 359–77.

66. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 14.

67. Ibid., Chapters 4–6.

68. Ibid., 40.

69. Ibid., 45.

By the time the 1994 White Paper provided some much-needed strategic guidance, the Canadian Army had already become embroiled in the second factor that prevented the development of military-strategic doctrine during the mid-1990s—the so-called Somalia Affair. The overall effect of the inquiries and reports into the underlying causes of the Somalia Affair was four years of organizational disruption for the CF. This disruption was particularly acute for the Army, which was the branch of the CF most substantially affected by many of the issues that emerged.[70]

As a result, the Army went through a period characterized by intense (and unwanted) media scrutiny, and its public relations were soured by the emergence of numerous scandals, some embroidered for public consumption and others not. In such an environment, "[t]he unwillingness to show initiative developed and grew, the managers displaced the leaders, and the army turned inwards, its élan drying up."[71] Furthermore, a risk adverse culture developed within the CF as a result of the adverse publicity generated by the Somalia Affair, a CF report released in 2001 noting "[i]n recent years … the development of a risk adverse organizational culture combined with the erosion of trust at all levels has led to a military environment that suppresses initiative and fosters micro-management."[72] In such an environment, it is not surprising that there was little momentum or enthusiasm within the Canadian Army to produce a military-strategic doctrine manual for public consumption.

More importantly, the investigation into the Somalia Affair publicly exposed the third factor that hampered military-strategic doctrine development in the Canadian Army. This factor, which had existed prior to the Somalia Affair but had only been exposed in its aftermath, can be labelled "a crisis in culture and ethics." Although it had many broader implications, it was likely to have been responsible, at least in part, for the Canadian Army's lack of military-strategic doctrine development during the early 1990s. In a report prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia Affair, Bland asserted that by the late 1980s:

> The signs of a systemic breakdown of ethics in the defence establishment were subtle, but real and very serious. … According to the CDS, some officers and factions in NDHQ were simply "creating commitments to enhance their own interests." Meanwhile, the strategic rational for the defence programme became increasingly suspect, capabilities atrophied and the ability and interest in operational planning gradually disappeared at NDHQ.[73]

Accompanying and at least partly responsible for the breakdown of ethics was an overt "civilianization" of NDHQ, which along with unification had the effect of gradually diluting the Army's warfighting ethos.[74]

While the crisis in culture and ethics was likely to have had an adverse impact on military-strategic doctrine development in its own right, its existence in combination with the other factors discussed above certainly compounded this effect. In his study of doctrine development in the British armed forces, Mader observed that military-strategic doctrine "is more than the formal publication of military concepts. It stands for an institutional culture of conceptual thinking on the nature of conflict and the best conduct of warfare."[75] In the early and mid-1990s, it is likely that cultural and ethical problems, abetted by an adverse political environment and a lack of strategic policy guidance, prevented the

70. See David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996).

71. Granatstein, 411.

72. Quoted in Granatstein, 412.

73. Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*, study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia, 1997, 50–51.

74. Ibid., 47–60.

75. Mader, 22.

emergence of an institutional culture within the Canadian Army that was willing to embrace doctrine development as a means of expressing conceptual thinking about its role and conduct.[76]

Despite the lack of doctrine production in the Canadian Army during the early 1990s, work on updating and refining tactical doctrine manuals, especially TTP, appears to have resumed around 1994. This was accompanied by the development of a limited range of new manuals, which were also mostly tactical in nature.[77] While the factors discussed above prevented the translation of conceptual thinking into operational or military-strategic doctrine development, there were still some within the Army, as well as several external commentators, willing to participate in debate about the role and conduct of the Canadian Army. With a lack of official guidance and an absence of direction from more senior levels, however, much of this debate occurred informally in academic and service journals, and much of it simply borrowed conceptual developments from the US and UK, limiting the majority of the debate to a discussion of the possible application of existing concepts within the Canadian context.[78]

By 1997, perceptions of the utility of operational and military-strategic doctrine within the Canadian Army were beginning to shift. Importantly, as the Army came to terms with the Somalia Affair and began to adjust its culture in the Affair's aftermath, the need for a formal code of ethics was recognized. Military-strategic doctrine came to be seen as a means of establishing and promulgating such a code within the Army,[79] and its wide dissemination became a means of publically demonstrating that the Army was overcoming the problems exposed as a result of the Somalia Affair.

Beyond the need to adjust army culture post-Somalia Affair, the desire to incorporate the informal conceptual debates of the early and mid-1990s into a more formalized doctrine gradually gained momentum, particularly within the lower ranks of the Canadian Army. Illustrative of this is an assertion made in a 1995 article by (then) Captain Ian Hope that:

> Canadian Army doctrine remains very much bound to the cold war European scenario of positional defence. … If the Canadian Army wants to change its approach to war, it must also formulate a higher level military doctrine. The doctrine would need to be based upon a comprehensive philosophy of war, consistent with our national interests.[80]

A few years later, the Canadian Army commenced work on such a "higher level" doctrine.[81]

Divided into six chapters, *We Stand on Guard for Thee* was reflective of the Army's dual requirements for the wide promulgation of an ethical code and the establishment of a common warfighting philosophy.[82] In contrast to Australian and New Zealand military-strategic doctrine, which did not

76. It should be noted that thinking about the conduct of warfare and the role of the Canadian Army almost certainly did occur in some quarters of the Army during this period; the factors discussed herein did, however, prevent the process of translating this discussion into doctrine from occurring.

77. Most prominent among the new manuals was *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, which was designed to provide overarching tactical guidance for land force commanders. Canada, Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD), B-GL-300-002/FP-000, *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND, May 16, 1997).

78. For example see: Eddy, 18–24; C. S. Oliviero, "Manoeuvre Warfare: Smaller Can Be Better," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (Autumn 1988): 67–72; Ian Hope, "Part 1: Changing a Military Culture: Manoeuvre Warfare and a Canadian Operational Doctrine," *The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College Quarterly Review* 5, no. 1/2 (Spring 1995): 1–6; and Ian Hope, "Part 2: Manoeuvre Warfare and Directive Control: The Basis for a New Canadian Military Doctrine," *The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College Quarterly Review* 5, no. 1/2 (Spring 1995): 7–15.

79. DAD, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa: DND, April 1, 1998), i–ii.

80. Hope, "Part 2: Manoeuvre Warfare and Directive Control," 12.

81. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian Army officer, November 12, 2008.

82. Even the name *We Stand on Guard for Thee* is illustrative of this dual intent—its connotations appearing to have been designed to garner public sympathy for the Army's role in relation to Canadian society. This can be contrasted with the very different connotation of the title of the Australian Army's doctrine, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, which focused almost exclusively on promulgating a warfighting philosophy.

contain ethical discussions, *We Stand on Guard for Thee* addressed the first of the Canadian Army's requirements at length in a chapter about military professionalism and ethos. It also established a list of "military virtues" and defined the ethical duties and requirements of officers and non-commissioned members at all levels of the Canadian Army.[83]

Regarding the requirement for a common warfighting philosophy, *We Stand on Guard for Thee* was almost analogous to Australian and New Zealand military-strategic doctrine of the early 1990s, since it discussed operational art and several related concepts, along with advancing a leadership model similar to directive control.[84] However, the authors of *We Stand on Guard for Thee* chose not to allocate the same well-defined terminology to the concepts of manoeuvre and directive control as Australian and New Zealand doctrine did, as they felt labels may have had the effect of constraining flexible thinking about the application of the concepts. The same omission occurred regarding the inclusion of the term manoeuvre warfare, although the approach to operations described in *We Stand on Guard for Thee* was clearly manoeuvrist.[85] *We Stand on Guard for Thee* did use direct terminology when discussing the spectrum of conflict and levels of conflict, however, and both of these concepts were clearly defined.[86]

Similar to the 1993 edition of the Australian Army's *Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, discussion in *We Stand on Guard for Thee* about the likely nature of future warfare was influenced by the operational experience of Canada's allies, particularly the US. However, since it had been developed five years after *Fundamentals*, the discussion in *We Stand on Guard for Thee* aligns with a later period in the conceptual debate about the possible existence of an RMA. As a result, *We Stand on Guard for Thee* addressed the concept explicitly; whereas, *Fundamentals* did not.[87] *We Stand on Guard for Thee* also determined that, given the uncertainty that characterized the period, capability-based force planning was the best way to prepare for future operations, which were likely to be characterized by the increased importance of information, joint operations and dispersed forces.[88]

Although it established a warfighting philosophy for the Canadian Army and made predictions about the nature of future operations, it is noteworthy that *We Stand on Guard for Thee* did not refer directly to any strategic policy documents. This is most likely indicative of problems presented by the ongoing vagary of Canadian strategic policy. Instead, *We Stand on Guard for Thee* discussed themes in Canadian strategic policy requirements since the conclusion of WWII. In this regard, it identified three consistent requirements of the Army—the defence of Canadian sovereignty, meeting Canada's broader defence needs through participation in collective security arrangements with allied countries, and contributing to broader security, primarily through participation in peacekeeping operations.[89]

Finally, it is pertinent to note that the Canadian Army developed similar concepts to Australian and New Zealand Army military-strategic doctrine in its doctrine written to guide the operational, rather than the military-strategic, level of conflict. Hence *We Stand on Guard for Thee* needs to be read

83. DAD, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, Chapter 2.

84. Ibid., 95–104, 86–88.

85. Ibid., Chapter 5. Regarding the decision not to use specific terminology, see Ian Hope, "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine," *Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2001–2): 19. While the terminology was avoided, the Canadian Army nonetheless embraced the manoeuvrist approach, with one senior officer noting: "As [Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts] began its own work, manoeuvre warfare theory, an increasingly popular concept amongst US land warfare thinkers at the time, dominated Canadian doctrinal thinking, and eventually formed the basis of the current army's doctrinal design." Andrew B. Godefroy, "Chasing the Silver Bullet: The Evolution of Capability Development in the Canadian Army," *Canadian Military Journal* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 61.

86. DAD, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, Chapter 5.

87. Ibid., 113–114.

88. Ibid., 115–120.

89. Ibid., 57.

in conjunction with the Army's keystone operational doctrine, *Conduct of Land Operations*, which was published three months after *We Stand on Guard for Thee*.[90] It was the operational publication that described the Canadian Army's operational philosophy using terminology consistent with Canada's allies: "the Canadian Army seeks manoeuvrist approach [sic] to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion … rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition."[91] Furthermore, the influence the British Army and USMC doctrine had on Canadian Army conceptual development was indirectly acknowledged within *Conduct of Land Operations*.[92] This acknowledgement indicated that allied doctrine may also have been influential during the development of *We Stand on Guard for Thee*.

Conceptual and Doctrinal Developments, 1998–2007

By mid-1998, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies had all released military-strategic doctrine manuals. Over the following decade, doctrine development in all three armies followed divergent paths, although many of the concepts each army developed remained similar.

Of the three armies, the Australian Army has developed the most comprehensive military-strategic doctrine. In 1998, the *MLW* series of publications was superseded by a new doctrinal hierarchy in which different designations delineated between philosophical-level, application-level and procedural-level doctrine.[93] At the philosophical and application levels, doctrine was designated Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD).[94] Also in 1998, a new edition of the Army's keystone publication, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare,* was developed under the new designation, *LWD1*.[95] Subsequent editions were released in 2002 and 2006.[96] By the close of the period studied, the 2006 edition had already been rendered out of date by the Enhanced Land Force (ELF)[97] initiative, and an additional update was being developed.[98]

Of the three new editions of *LWD1*, the 1998 edition was the most significant as it signalled a substantial change in the Army's military strategy. By 1998, this change was arguably long overdue, especially since Australian strategic policy had gradually shifted away from continental defence and towards a renewed form of forward defence during the 1990s (particularly following the election of the Howard Government in 1996). Discussing Army doctrine development during the 1990s, Evans observed:

> [T]he case of Australian Army doctrine for continental operations is a cautionary tale of how the development of detailed planning for a doctrine of war can become so ingrained in the logic of its authors that it becomes, as was the case with the French Army during the 1930s, an elegant but abstract dogma unrelated to broader political realities.[99]

90. DAD, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: DND, July 1, 1998).

91. Ibid., 17.

92. Ibid., 17, fn. 3.

93. Although the Australian Army has adopted the terms *philosophical*, *application* and *procedural* to describe the levels of its doctrine, these terms are roughly applicable to the military-strategic, operational- and tactical-levels of conflict respectively. Hence, subsequent discussion herein focuses on the Australian Army's keystone philosophical level doctrinal publication, as this constitutes its keystone military-strategic doctrine.

94. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 58–59.

95. DOD, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre (CATDC), *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (*LWD1*), 1998. Although it is dated 1998, it should be noted that this edition of *LWD1* was not publically released until March 1999.

96. DOD, Doctrine Wing, Training and Doctrine Group, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (Puckapunyal: Land Warfare and Development Centre, 2002); and Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, 2006.

97. The ELF initiative was essentially an expansion of the HNA initiative, the latter having been explicated in the *2003 Defence Update* and the former in the *2007 Defence Update*. In addition to the acquisitions announced as part of the HNA initiative, the ELF initiative increased the size of the Army by two infantry battalions. DOD, *Defence Update 2007*, 51.

98. Interview with a senior company representative, conducted at the Noetic Solutions offices, Canberra, August 24, 2007. The updated edition of *LWD1* was released in 2008; however, it is not discussed herein as this is after the period studied. Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine*.

99. Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past*, 36.

Although this analogy is somewhat overstated, it is certainly true that by 1998 strategic policy shifts had rendered discussion in the second part of the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals* redundant.[100]

The 1998 edition of *LWD1* maintained (and in most cases developed and updated) several of the key concepts espoused in the first section of the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals*, while also outlining a major change in the Army's strategy. Among the concepts maintained were the spectrum and levels of conflict, operational art and directive control, although the latter concept was not accorded the prevalence it had received in 1993. The concept of the manoeuvrist approach was updated and developed at length under the heading "tactical manoeuvre and battle cunning,"[101] and a discussion of the Army's roles identified "manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment" (MOLE) as the Army's most likely future role.[102] A new conceptual discussion about "fighting power" was introduced, and it was determined that a combination of intellectual, moral and physical components is necessary to generate and maintain an army's fighting power.[103]

The military strategy contained within the 1998 edition of *LWD1* proved far more controversial than the concepts it developed, with one sentence in particular responsible for most of the controversy: "The Army provides expeditionary forces to support Australia's national interests offshore and territorial forces to protect Australian sovereignty."[104] In particular, the perceived implications of the term "expeditionary" generated widespread media coverage, bringing about comparisons to the Vietnam War era and drawing attention to whether the Army actually had the resources to implement such a doctrine.[105] The document also generated an unusually high level of debate within academia,[106] and this was one of *LWD1*'s intended effects, the Chief of Army (COA) noting that *LWD1* was "a dynamic document aimed at encouraging vigorous analysis and debate."[107]

As a result of the controversy, the COA, Major General Frank Hickling, was rebuked (presumably by someone within the Defence Minister's office, or possibly by the Minister himself) for developing a military strategy that was out of step with strategic policy.[108] Ironically, the same government that had rebuked him would incorporate the term "expeditionary forces" into strategic policy within only eight years.[109] Furthermore, the INTERFET operation, which commenced within a year of the publication of *LWD1*, included the deployment of forces in MOLE. While the experience validated the overall concept, it also identified several areas where improvements were required, providing part of the impetus behind the review of *LWD1* conducted in the early 2000s.

In developmental terms, the 1998 edition of *LWD1* is an example of the influence senior military officers can have over doctrinal development. In this case, Major General Hickling himself, or more precisely the vigour with which he embraced the Army's operational shift away from continental defence and toward the prosecution of MOLE, was a principal driving force underlying doctrinal

100. On interwar French Army doctrine, see Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between World Wars* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1984), 105–40; and Robert Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939* (Hamden: Archon, 1986).

101. CATDC, *LWD1* (1998), 6.3–6.8.

102. Ibid., 3.18.

103. Ibid., Chapter 5.

104. Ibid., 3.14.

105. Robert Garran, "Army Has Foreign Shores in Its Sights," *The Australian*, March 4, 1999, 2, 6.

106. For example, see: Graeme Cheeseman, *Army's Fundamentals of Land Warfare*; and Alan Ryan, "The Challenge of 'New Times': Developing Doctrine for an Uncertain Future," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 142 (May/June 2000): 49–54.

107. Frank Hickling, "Chief of Army's Message," in CATDC, *LWD1* (1998), ii.

108. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official, conducted at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS), Canberra, August 21, 2007.

109. DOD, *Defence Update 2005*, 23.

development. Strategic policy shifts were only indirectly influential because the strategy set forth within *ASP97* had provided impetus for Major General Hickling to embrace MOLE as a way to enable the Army to contribute to the implementation of the strategy.[110] The doctrine itself was written by a small team of officers under the leadership of (then) Brigadier Mike Smith, although it was no doubt circulated for comment to a wider audience within the Army prior to its finalization.[111]

The 2002 edition was substantially more abstract and philosophical in nature than its predecessors, discussing conceptual developments and the role of land power in implementing strategic policy in greater detail.[112] While it discussed the Army's roles in achieving Australia's national security strategy, the conclusion reached about the roles was substantially broader than that of the 1998 edition, and the 2002 edition avoided tying the Army to preparations for a particular type of operational scenario (such as MOLE).[113] The prominent inclusion of discussion about the manoeuvrist approach to operations left little doubt that the concept had become enshrined as the Army's preferred tool for implementing strategic goals at the operational and tactical levels.[114] The focus on command methodology (central to the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals*) was further toned down from the 1998 edition, and although the Army's renamed command philosophy—"mission command"—was summarized in *LWD1*,[115] a detailed description was relegated to a different publication further down the doctrine hierarchy.[116]

As with its predecessors, the 2002 edition of *LWD1* was developed by a small team consisting of Army officers and academics, who developed most of the concepts during a week of brainstorming in 2001.[117] Overall, the 2002 edition of *LWD1* represents a deliberate and fairly successful attempt to develop a conceptually sound, philosophically-based, military-strategic doctrinal publication. As noted within *LWD1* itself, doctrine should be "derived from a mixture of operational experience, observation and applied thought."[118] Reading the 2002 edition of *LWD1*, this mixture of influences becomes apparent, as does the influence of contemporary strategic policy (the 2000 Defence White Paper and lessons learned from INTERFET were especially influential).

Given the success of the 2002 edition of *LWD1*, it is unsurprising that the 2006 edition constituted only a minor update to the contents of the earlier manual. The six-chapter structure is the same within both editions, with the discussion of strategic policy in the 2006 edition updated to reflect post-2000 Defence White Paper strategic policy developments.[119] The HNA initiative is taken into account in a discussion about preparedness and equipment modernization timelines, as are operational lessons (especially from Iraq and Afghanistan).[120] The influence of this latter factor becomes evident in an updated discussion of the manoeuvrist approach, which addresses the "whole of government approach" and use of "combined arms teams" in both operational theatres.[121]

110. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official conducted at CDSS, Canberra, August 28, 2007.

111. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official, conducted at CDSS, Canberra, August 21, 2007.

112. Of its six chapters, only Chapter 3 directly discussed strategic policy; the remaining five chapters addressed the nature of land warfare, influences on its conduct, the manoeuvrist approach, and the generation of fighting power and land warfare capabilities. Training and Doctrine Group, *LWD1* (2002 ed.).

113. Ibid., 53–61. This avoidance may have been due to a desire to avoid a repeat of the rebuking Major General Hickling received following the release of the 1998 edition.

114. Ibid., Chapter 4.

115. Ibid., 68–69, 74.

116. Doctrine Wing, Doctrine and Simulation Group, *Land Warfare Doctrine 0.0: Command, Leadership and Management* (Puckapunyal: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2003).

117. Interviews with senior Australian DOD officials, a senior representative from Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd., and a senior Australian Army officer, conducted in Canberra during August 2007.

118. Training and Doctrine Group, *LWD1* (2002 ed.), 103.

119. Australian Army, *LWD1* (2006 ed.), Chapter 3.

120. Ibid., 63–67.

121. Ibid., Chapter 4.

The influence of conceptual developments within allied armed forces (particularly the US and UK) is also evident, especially regarding the "principles of war," which were first included in the 1993 edition of *Fundamentals*. Prominently placed in the 1998 and 2002 editions, the principles are relegated to an annex in the 2006 edition, with the COA noting in his introduction: "The Army continues to recognise the Principles of War but there is a growing international debate about their relevance to today's world."[122]

Interestingly, the 2006 edition of *Fundamentals* was prepared by a consultancy firm, Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd. As a result of its increasing operational tempo, it became difficult for the Australian Army to spare the manpower to maintain up-to-date doctrine following its deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, Noetic was awarded a contract in 2002 to maintain the currency of most Australian Army doctrine publications, including *LWD1*. Noetic had, by the close of 2007, written or updated over 70 doctrinal publications on behalf of and in conjunction with the ADF (mostly Army and joint doctrine).[123]

Despite the potential for friction, it appears that this arrangement has been highly suitable for the Army, which has continued to have a high level of input into the content of the doctrine prepared by Noetic.[124] In the case of the 2006 edition of *LWD1*, work on the update began in 2005, and the writing team included Army representatives from the outset. Individual chapters were circulated to a wider audience within the Army for comment, and the entire document was approved by the COA's Advisory Committee prior to publication.[125] Furthermore, the awarding of the contract to Noetic has allowed the Army to maintain a range of up-to-date doctrine it would not otherwise have been able to and is a key reason why the Australian Army has the most comprehensive military-strategic doctrine of the three armies.

Following the publication of *We Stand on Guard for Thee*, the Canadian Army did not release an updated edition of its military-strategic doctrine during the period studied. Despite this, officially endorsed Canadian Army conceptual developments actually increased in frequency and scope during the early 2000s. Why the increased frequency of conceptual developments had not manifested itself doctrinally at the military-strategic level by the close of the period studied is an interesting question and is examined below. Prior to undertaking this examination, an overview of Canadian Army conceptual developments during the early 2000s is warranted.

During the mid-1990s, concurrent to the development of *We Stand on Guard for Thee*, the factors that brought about the Army's conceptual developments during the early 2000s were already emerging. The first step towards renewed Canadian Army conceptual development was an organizational reshuffle in 1996. The result of the reshuffle was summarized by Henning Frantzen: "Doctrine within the Army has since 1996 been the responsibility of the Directorate of Army Doctrine [DAD], a part of the Land Force Doctrine and Training System commanded by a two-star general located within the Land Force Command and Staff College."[126] The primary reason for this reshuffle was recognition that regardless of budgetary constraints, the lack of strategic policy guidance or public relations problems (such as those caused by the Somalia Affair), the Army could no longer afford to neglect future planning.[127]

122. Ibid., Annex A, 2.

123. Interviews with a senior company representative, Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd. and with a senior officer at the ADF Warfare Centre, conducted at the Noetic offices, Canberra, and at the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre during August 2007.

124. Amongst the Australian Army officers interviewed as part of the research for this study, all who had dealt with Noetic were impressed by the company's performance. Even those officers who were interviewed "off the record" had nothing but praise for Noetic.

125. Interview with a senior company representative, Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd, conducted at the Noetic offices, Canberra, August 27, 2007.

126. Frantzen, 137.

127. Interview with a senior Canadian Army officer conducted at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, August 13, 2008.

Initially, progress toward renewed conceptual development was slow. As Denis Brazeau noted, attempts to review the Army strategy between 1997 and 2000 fell short of expectations. Hence:

> It took the appointment of [Lieutenant-General] Mike Jeffery as Chief of Land Staff in the summer 2000 to launch a concerted effort at transformation by way of a new strategy. The "Army Strategic Refocus" was followed by five strategic planning sessions with broad participation from within the Army.
>
> The study used Strategy 2020 as a fundamental start point.[128]

Indeed, during the late 1990s, only one document of any significance had been released—*The Future Security Environment*—within which analysis was divided into three sections. These were the "army of today" (or the force in being), the "army of tomorrow" (how the army should be structured 5 to 10 years in the future) and the "future army" (a concept designed to provide a conceptual framework to enable long-term directions to be set, although without going into too much prescriptive detail).[129] This division was important because it established a framework for future Canadian Army planning and conceptual development.

Working within this framework, it was quickly recognized that the Canadian Army required a more detailed understanding of its current situation (the army of today) to serve as a starting point for transformation to the army of tomorrow. As a result, the concept of an "interim army" (IA), essentially a rehash of the army of today concept, was developed "to provide an intermediate milestone for conceptual and doctrinal design."[130] Details of this milestone were promulgated within *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy*, published in May 2002.

Divided into three parts, *Advancing with Purpose* examined the role of the Army, established an Army strategy consisting of four core objectives, set 5- and 10-year goals for each objective and discussed their implementation.[131] Unsurprisingly, given Brazeau's assertion, *Strategy 2020* had a major influence over the content and format of *Advancing with Purpose*.[132] The inclusion of 5- and 10-year goals and a discussion about their implementation precluded the document from being doctrinal, as it was overly prescriptive and driven by public relations, acquisitions and the generation of readiness rather than by conceptual developments.

In March 2004, another publication, *Purpose Defined: The Force Employment Concept for the Army*, established "how the Army's way of fighting will evolve over the next few years. Specifically, it describe[ed] the projected capabilities of the Army and how they would be applied."[133] Conceptually, discussion in *Purpose Defined* addressed five operational functions (act, sense, shield, sustain and command), which provided

> a framework for concept and combat development. … The strength of the operational functions stems from the indivisible integration of capabilities and on the incorporation of the moral and physical planes. The functions retain their viability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.[134]

128. Denis Brazeau, "From Pentomic Divisions to Canada's Army of Tomorrow: A Study on Transformation," *Canadian Army Journal* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 43.

129. Canada, DND, *Report No. 99-2: The Future Security Environment* (Kingston: Directorate – Land Strategic Concepts, August 1999), 1–3.

130. Godefroy, "Chasing the Silver Bullet," 63.

131. Canada, Director Land Strategic Planning (ed.), *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy* (Ottawa: Land Force Command, May 2002).

132. Ibid., 1.

133. Canada, DND, *Purpose Defined: The Force Employment Concept for the Army*, March 31, 2004, 6.

134. Ibid., 13. The five operational functions had originally been promulgated in a separate publication. See Canada, DND, *Report No. 01/01: Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, January 2001).

In a discussion defining the five functions, lessons learned from post-9/11 operations were clearly influential.[135] Furthermore, a chapter on achieving tactical decisiveness discussed several emerging land power concepts, such as effects-based operations and network-enabled warfare, which had emerged as a result of both the Canadian and US experience in fighting the GWOT.[136]

While *Advancing with Purpose* had been a starting point for IA force development, *Purpose Defined* provided the IA with a conceptual foundation for operational conduct. Its release was accompanied by the launch of "The Futures Project," which constituted the next step of transformation—the move from the IA to the army of tomorrow.[137] Initially, The Futures Project resulted in the production of working papers (and even a fictional text about future force requirements), and workshops were held to generate feedback on concepts under development.[138] Eventually, conceptual development culminated in the release of B-GL-310-001/AG-001, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, dated March 31, 2007.[139]

Although the content of *Land Operations 2021* built on concepts promulgated in previous doctrine (including the spectrum of conflict, the manoeuvrist approach and the five operational functions), it was the development of the "adaptive dispersed operations" (ADO) concept that made the document important. Significantly, ADO was a Canadian-developed approach to military strategy, as opposed to a foreign concept adapted to Canada's circumstances.[140] Explicitly grounded in manoeuvre warfare theory and an effects-based approach,[141] ADO was summarized as follows: "The essence of adaptive dispersed operations is the ability to conduct coordinated, interdependent, full spectrum actions by widely dispersed teams across the moral, physical and informational planes of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an operational design created to achieve a desired end state."[142]

The commander of the newly created Land Forces Command, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, noted in his preface to *Land Operations 2021* that the ADO concept was "ambitious and forward thinking, but at the same time well grounded in the lessons that we have captured from today's operations."[143] In particular, operations in Afghanistan had a noticeable influence on the development of ADO, although the Canadian Army's operational experience in the former Yugoslavia was also highly influential.[144] Furthermore, while previous force planning and conceptual developments since the late 1990s had flowed into the development of ADO, Canadian strategic policy developments did not have

135. DND, *Purpose Defined*, Part 3.

136. Ibid., 39–40; see also Paul Murdock, "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force," *Parameters* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 86–95; Peter Gizewski, *Toward a Network-Enabled Land Force: Problems and Prospects* (Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, June 2004); and David W. Pendall, "Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power," *Military Review* (January–February 2004): 20–31.

137. Godefroy, "Chasing the Silver Bullet," 61–63.

138. Bernd Horn and Peter Gizewski, eds., *Towards the Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003); DND, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003); and Karl Schroeder, *Crisis in Zefra* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2005).

139. Andrew B. Godefroy, ed., B-GL-310-001/AG-001, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2007).

140. Godefroy, "Chasing the Silver Bullet," 63. Towards the end of the period studied the Australian Army developed a similar concept, titled "adaptive campaigning." This concept is not examined herein, however, as it was not incorporated into doctrine until the 2008 edition of *LWD1*. See DOD, Australian Army Concept, *Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting,* version 4.18, correct as of November 24, 2006, reproduced as Appendix 2 to Scott Hopkins, ed., *Chief of Army's Exercise Proceedings 2006* (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2006), 143–71; Aaron P. Jackson, "Moving Beyond Manoeuvre: A Conceptual Coming-of-Age for the Australian and Canadian Armies," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 177 (November/December 2008): 85–100; and M. J. Birtles, "More Than Warriors: Adaptive Campaigning and What It Means to the Australian Infantryman," *Australian Infantry Magazine* (October 2007–April 2008): 34–39.

141. Godefroy, *Land Operations 2021,* 21.

142. Ibid., 18.

143. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, "Preface" in Godefroy, *Land Operations 2021,* 2–3.

144. Email correspondence with a senior officer of the Canadian Army, March 6, 2008.

a direct impact.[145] This was most likely due to the operational focus of ADO; the military operations that Canadian strategic policy brought about were influential instead of the policy itself.

Despite its official status as a concept paper, the Director Land Concepts and Design referred to *Land Operations 2021* as a "capstone document" in a letter that accompanied its initial distribution, and the document constitutes a watershed in Canadian Army conceptual development.[146] Furthermore, members of the Canadian Army's Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs stated that the intent was that concepts developed within *Land Operations 2021* would flow into doctrine "across publications."[147] As this is the same effect military-strategic doctrine generally has on operational and tactical publications, it can be concluded that *Land Operations 2021* is inherently doctrinal in nature, even though it has not received official recognition as doctrine.

From the perspective of this study, the most pertinent issue relating to Canadian Army conceptual developments during the early 2000s is why they were not formalized into military-strategic doctrine. During interviews conducted as part of the research for this study, several theories were advanced by interviewees to explain the lack of translation of conceptual developments into doctrine.[148] These included that the Army had deferred to joint military-strategic doctrine in lieu of continuing to develop its own manuals and that a focus on interoperability may have hampered domestic doctrine development (this latter theory is akin to Peskett's observation about Canadian operational thought during the early to mid-1980s).[149] While there are elements of truth in both these theories, it appears that the primary reason underlying the lack of an update to Canadian Army military-strategic doctrine was actually a perception within key departments of the Army itself, such as the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, that an update was not required. This perception was generally accompanied by the belief that the content of *We Stand on Guard for Thee* remained valid, despite a decade having elapsed since its release.[150]

It can, therefore, be concluded that the Canadian Army's lack of military-strategic doctrine development after the release of *We Stand on Guard for Thee* was primarily due to its culture. Specifically, it appears that a culture of formally endorsing conceptual development through military-strategic doctrine never developed in the Canadian Army and that *We Stand on Guard for Thee* was the result of a bottom-up push that lost momentum once the officers responsible for its production had moved on. This stands in stark contrast to the Australian Army which, over the same period, developed a culture of formalizing innovation through military-strategic doctrine development. In the Australian Army, doctrine development during the mid-1990s was the result of a top-down push (Major General Hickling was a key driving force behind the 1998 edition of *LWD1*), and this difference is probably responsible for the divergent cultures that subsequently emerged within each army regarding the production of formalized military-strategic doctrine.

In Canada's case, the lack of production of military-strategic army doctrine after 1998 did not indicate a lack of institutional innovation. A major difference between 1987 to 1997 and 1997 to 2007 is that while informal conceptual developments dominated the earlier period (expressed mainly through the medium of academic and service journals), the later period was characterized by officially

145. Alain J. Tremblay, *Land Capability Development Programme: Standard Presentation*, PowerPoint presentation by Chief of Staff Land Strategy (Canada), dated August 2008.

146. Colonel J. Simms, "A Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow" (letter), Ref. No. 3185-2 (DLCD [Director of Land Concepts and Designs]), dated March 31, 2007.

147. Interviews with senior Canadian Army officers from the DLCD, conducted at the DLCD, Kingston, August 19, 2008.

148. These assertions were made during three different interviews conducted with four Canadian Army officers in May 2007.

149. Peskett, 102–3.

150. Interviews with senior Canadian Army officers from the DLCD, conducted at the DLCD, Kingston, August 19, 2008.

sanctioned conceptual development from within the Canadian Army itself. Since this change did not translate into formalized doctrine, concept papers came to represent de facto doctrine in order to achieve an important function usually performed by military-strategic doctrine. Specifically, they had the effect of guiding the development of operational and tactical doctrine. A prominent example of this is the operational functions, which were incorporated into a major operational and tactical doctrine update in late 2007.[151]

One of the most interesting developments following the initial publication of military-strategic doctrine is the case of the New Zealand Army. Over the five years following the release of *NZ P-12,* operational experience revealed the flawed nature of the mission and operational focus it had established. The initial indicator that the strategy it established was unsuitable for the Army came as a result of the deployment to Bosnia, which revealed that the Army's existing equipment was not capable of supporting the manoeuvrist approach *NZ P-12* detailed.[152]

The cabinet decision to purchase the Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAVIII) in May 1999 was the final undoing of the military strategy set forth in *NZ P-12*. With this purchase, the Army moved from a primarily light infantry force to a motorized infantry force, and its military strategy was altered drastically from that contained in *NZ P-12*. Possibly due to concerns over the adverse effect the strategy it contained may have had during the lead-up to the already controversial LAVIII purchase, *NZ P-12* was effectively "outlawed" by a senior Army officer (most likely the COA, but this could not be confirmed) sometime during 1998 or 1999.[153] The publication was subsequently recalled and most copies destroyed, the only instance of such an occurrence throughout the entirety of this study.[154]

To address the operational- and tactical-level aspects of motorized infantry operations, *Motorised Battalion Group Doctrine* was released as a developing doctrine publication in December 2001. Although it established that "[o]ur doctrine is that of the Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations and Mission Command,"[155] there was little further similarity between *Motorised Battalion Group Doctrine* and *NZ P-12*. Subsequently, the Army returned to its pre-1990's inclination to draw heavily on doctrinal developments within allied armies, most likely due to a combination of limited resources and operational overstretch. Although Australian doctrine has generally been used as a default where New Zealand Army doctrine has not been developed, a Defence Force Order (DFO) dated May 8, 2006, asserted that the US Army's *FM 3-0 Operations* was being used as the New Zealand Army's keystone military-strategic doctrine.[156]

As with the Canadian Army, towards the end of the period studied, the New Zealand Army produced a concept paper that was akin to doctrine but not labelled as such. The *New Zealand Army Future Land Operating Concept: Precision Manoeuvre 2020,* released in 2007 but not publically distributed, was similar to Canada's *Land Operations 2021*, as it was future focused and drew upon several existing con-

151. Canada, DND, Directorate of Army Doctrine, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Land Operations* (draft) (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, November 15, 2007), 4.21–4.26. Note that at the end of the period studied it was probably still too soon for ADO to have filtered into lower-level doctrine, hence the concept did not appear in this publication.

152. Peter Greener, "New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making: Politics and Processes" (PhD thesis, The University of Auckland, 2005), 220–24, esp. 223.

153. As it transpired, *NZ P-12* does not appear to have been mentioned during the debate about the LAVIII purchase. Greener, "Controversy and Accusation," 21–33.

154. Interview with a senior NZ Army officer, conducted at Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, May 2, 2007.

155. New Zealand Army, *New Zealand Army Motorised Battalion Group Doctrine* (Developing Doctrine, Capabilities Analysis and Doctrine, Army General Staff, December 19, 2001), 3.

156. New Zealand Defence Force, *Defence Force Order (DFO) 05/2006: NZDF Joint Doctrine Management*, New Zealand Defence Force, May 8, 2006, Annex D. Note that US Army *FM 100-5 Operations* was redesignated *FM 3-0 Operations* in 2001 in order to bring it into alignment with the US military's joint doctrine referencing system. See Allan English, "The Operational Art: Theory, Practise and Implications for the Future," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts* (see note 14, Introduction), 17. Note also that New Zealand can access *FM 3-0* regardless of the alliance status with the US as the document is publicly available.

cepts. Primarily, however, it developed the concept of "precision manoeuvre," which "seeks to improve force agility by building upon the established tenets of Manoeuvre Warfare, enhanced by improved information linkages and systems to more precisely apply combat power at decisive points and times."[157]

Based on an expansion of the Canadian Army's five operational functions, precision manoeuvre was designed to provide a conceptual basis for New Zealand Army thinking in an era of operational complexity.[158] Reading the document, it is clear its content had been influenced by a combination of New Zealand Army and allied operational experience, particularly in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, as several illustrative examples from operations within these theatres were given in support of the conceptual discussion.[159] Allied doctrinal and conceptual developments were also influential, with an acknowledgements section citing the influence of specific doctrine and concept papers produced by each of the other ABCA armies.[160] At the end of the period studied, however, it was still unclear what impact this concept paper would eventually have on New Zealand Army doctrine.

Summary and Implications: Military-Strategic Army Doctrine

Examining the influences on and intended effects of military-strategic army doctrine produced during 1987–2007, several similarities are evident between the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies. Regarding the key influences on doctrine development, four remained prominent within all three armies over the entire period: the role of prominent individual officers, usually on doctrine writing teams but occasionally in senior positions; the impact of conceptual developments within allied militaries, particularly the British Army, US Army and USMC; the operational experiences of the three armies themselves; and strategic policy guidance, when it was available.

The intended effects of military-strategic army doctrine also present commonalities between the three armies and between publications. For all three armies, military-strategic doctrine has been a means of formally expressing the institutional acceptance of selected warfighting philosophies. Conceptually, the move towards military-strategic doctrine during the 1990s is largely the story of the embrace of the manoeuvrist approach within all three armies. While this was more contentious in Canada, the common reason for adopting the manoeuvrist approach was that it was seen as a way to maximize the results that can be achieved with a small force. Despite the divergent directions in each army's conceptual and doctrinal development since the mid-1990s, the manoeuvrist approach continued to have a significant influence on the operational conduct of all three until after the end of the period studied.

What has varied between countries and publications is the extent of the prominence of the four influences mentioned above in relation to each other. Even when short periods have elapsed between the release of different military-strategic doctrine manuals, the relative weighting of these factors has varied substantially. For example, the influence Major General Hickling had during the production of the 1998 edition of *LWD1* was significant; during the development of the 2002 edition, the COA's direct role was far more limited. Chiefly, these variances have occurred due to the broader political climate in which each publication was produced, with factors such as government programmes, the state of an army's public relations, the funding available, and the personalities and agendas of individual officers all having impacts. Furthermore, additional factors have occasionally influenced the development of certain publications, such as the desire to establish a formalized code of ethics for the Canadian Army having a major influence on the content of *We Stand on Guard for Thee*.

157. Assistant Chief of General Staff (ACGS) Capability, *New Zealand Army Future Land Operating Concept: Precision Manoeuvre 2020* (Upper Hutt: Force Development Cell, Army General Staff, 2007), 2.1.

158. The New Zealand derivative of the concept lists seven operational functions (although they are not labelled as such): command; inform (sense); protect (shield); prepare; project; operate (act); and sustain. Ibid., Chapter 3.

159. Ibid., 2.11–2.12, 2.15, 2.17.

160. Ibid., v.

The broader political context within each country, along with a difference in army culture, also led to differences in doctrine between the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies. In the Australian Army, for example, the impact strategic policy has had on doctrine has been consistently high; whereas, in the Canadian Army, it has just as consistently been much lower. In the New Zealand Army, not only strategic policy but also acquisitions (particularly the purchase of the LAVIII) have had considerable influence over military-strategic doctrine development, both positively and negatively. This difference is because the Australian and New Zealand armies exist in an environment where strategic policy provides more comprehensive guidance than in Canada. Arguably, this in turn is a result of the broader historic and cultural aspects of each country, which were examined in the first three chapters.

Throughout the period studied, the primary intended role of military-strategic army doctrine (and certain concept papers in the case of the post-1998 Canadian Army) was to explain how the armies studied would achieve strategic policy objectives by stipulating how land operations should be conducted. For this reason, it can be said that military-strategic army doctrine is primarily *downward focused*. An often-present secondary motive for the production of military-strategic doctrine is public relations. This is generally considered important as it is perceived that good public relations indirectly influence the priority armies are accorded in national strategic policy and, more importantly, when funding decisions are made.

The relative weights of the common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic army doctrine are represented in Figure 3. In this model, solid, thin, black arrows represent influences and effects that occurred consistently across countries and publications; dotted, thin, black arrows represent either indirect influences and effects, or influences and effects that occurred frequently (but not always); and the solid, thick black arrow linking doctrine to military operations indicates the downward focus that was the primary role of army doctrine.



Figure 3. *Common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic army doctrine*

As can be seen in the model, influential individuals (services chiefs and writing team members), national strategic policy and allied conceptual developments (frequently disseminated by their doctrine) all have direct effects on the content of doctrine development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies. In the case of armies (as opposed to navies and air forces), conceptual and doctrinal exchanges with allies frequently occur through formalized forums such as ABCA and, to a lesser extent, NATO meetings. The significance of the role of these forums is indicated with solid and dotted grey arrows, and this exchange could be termed the "allied idea-sharing nexus."

The impact on military-strategic doctrine of the operational experiences of the three armies in question has been consistently prominent but has generally been derived following periods of evaluation of trends in operational conduct. In the short term, this evaluation may even be conducted locally in a theatre of operations and tends to flow directly into tactical doctrine or TTP. Over the medium or longer term, however, evaluation tends to lead to more detailed conceptual developments (such as ADO) that apply at different levels of conflict (depending on the concept). The developments that are then incorporated into formal military-strategic doctrine flow back into operational conduct (often through their effect on doctrine at the operational and tactical levels) and the cycle begins anew.

Depending on the army and period, this cycle can take several years or, as in the case of the Australian Army at the close of the period studied, several months. It is also noteworthy that in the case of the post-1998 Canadian Army, institutional culture resulted in conceptual developments flowing straight back into operational and tactical doctrine without being formalized at the military-strategic level (this is not shown in the model).

Overall, military-strategic doctrine provided a way for the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies to define their organizational roles and purpose, along with formally embracing conceptual developments that were designed to enhance operational effectiveness. Furthermore, during the early and mid-1990s, when armies were still coming to terms with the emerging uncertainty and complexity of the post-cold war security environment, doctrine provided a means to enable armies to cope with the rapidly changing environment in which they found themselves. For this reason, military-strategic doctrine has played a vital role in the conceptualization of land power in all three of the armies.

Chapter 5

Explaining the Naval Rationale: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy, 1987–2007

While armies have a reputation for their historic embrace of written doctrine, navies have a reputation for their aversion to it. This reputation has been only partly earned, however, and like armies, navies have always maintained a plethora of tactical doctrine. Navies have traditionally referred to their tactical doctrine as "procedural manuals," "fighting instructions" or "fleet orders," rather than doctrine, and this practice has tended to create an erroneous perception (particularly amongst army officers) that navies did not historically have any doctrine at all.[1]

At the military-strategic level, however, it is true that navies have traditionally been doctrine adverse. This aversion has not been limited to the three navies studied herein. Michael Codner, for example, noted that during the early 1990s, Royal Navy (RN) commanders worried that military-strategic doctrine would be "inherently prescriptive" and that its publication would limit commanders' freedom of action.[2] The result was that the RN did not produce military-strategic doctrine until well after the British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF).[3] Just as the 1990s brought about a reverse in such thinking within the RN, so too did the decade witness the production of military-strategic doctrine within the RAN, the RCN and RNZN.

This chapter analyses the factors underlying the decision to produce naval military-strategic doctrine and examines its development within the RAN, RCN and RNZN. It begins with a discussion of the changing role of navies in national strategy from the cold war to the 1990s, explaining how this changing role paved the way for the publication of military-strategic doctrine in all three navies. The second section examines naval military-strategic doctrine development from 1987 to 1997, and the third section examines military-strategic doctrine development from 1997 to 2007. The second and third sections also describe the doctrine development process, factors that influenced development, the intended effects of each doctrine manual, and the content of the doctrine itself. In conclusion, similarities and differences between doctrine developments in the three navies are considered, and a model is established to explain the common influences on and key intended effects of military-strategic navy doctrine.

The Naval Role in National Strategy

When compared to the sheer volume of theories of warfare, in general, and land warfare, specifically, that have been advanced over the years, theories of naval warfare are relatively sparse. Indeed, the first written theories of modern naval warfare were not published until the latter part of the 19th century, and the evolution of naval warfare theory is largely the story of a small group of prominent theorists, whose theories are worthy of brief discussion for two reasons.[4] First, many of the concepts

1. Interview with senior Australian DOD official, conducted at the Sea Power Centre – Australia (SPC-A), Canberra, August 23, 2007; and James J. Tritten, "Maritime Expeditionary Operations and Intervention: A Doctrinal Perspective" in *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective*, eds. Robert H. Edwards and Ann L. Griffiths, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), 170. For an early history of Royal Navy fighting instructions, see Julian S. Corbett, ed., *Fighting Instructions, 1530–1816*, Research & Source Works Series No. 182 [originally published 1905] (New York: Bert Franklin, 1967).

2. Michael Codner, "British Maritime Doctrine and National Military Strategy," in *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1996*, ed. Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London (London: Brassey's, 1996), 88–104.

3. Mader, Chapter 5.

4. Martin van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought* (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), 146–59. The theorists include Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Herbert Richmond, Ken Booth, Geoffrey Till, and Colin S. Gray. See *Royal Australian Navy Reading List* (Canberra: Sea Power Centre – Australia, March 2006).

they developed have been prominently included in naval doctrine in all three of the countries studied. Second, the concepts they developed provide convenient models to facilitate discussion of the shifting role of the RAN, RCN and RNZN during the 1980s and 1990s.

Key among earlier conceptual developments are "command of the sea," "sea control," "sea denial" and "power projection." Notably, each of these concepts exists primarily at the military-strategic level of conflict. The first concept, command of the sea, exists where one state (or group of allied states) has naval superiority to the extent that an opponent simply cannot use the sea at all.[5] Generally, it is accepted that command of the sea is brought about by the total destruction of the enemy's naval forces; although as *RAN Doctrine 1* noted, command of the sea is difficult to achieve in the modern environment owing to asymmetric threats and technology such as mines, torpedoes, aircraft and long-range missiles.[6]

As a result of this situation, sea control, sea denial and power projection are arguably more useful concepts in the contemporary world. The difference between sea control and sea denial is subtle. Sea control is obtained when a state has a monopoly over the use of an area of the sea for a period of time; whereas, sea denial is obtained by denying an enemy state the use of an area of the sea for a period of time.[7] Power projection refers to the ability of navies to influence events ashore though the application of combat power, either directly (such as by naval gunfire directed at targets ashore) or through the amphibious insertion of land forces.[8]

Given the size and resource limitations of the RAN, RCN and RNZN, their fleets could only reasonably be expected to obtain sea control or sea denial for limited periods, and over a geographically limited area. Hence, the RAN, RCN and RNZN are more likely to operate under these conditions when working in coalition with larger navies, in particular the United States Navy (USN), and their fleets have traditionally been structured to enable them to work effectively alongside their allies. RAN and RCN operations as part of the coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War are an example of their participation in an operation with allied navies, under the condition of sea control.[9]

Other more recent theories are, therefore, more readily applicable to the RAN, RCN and RNZN. In particular, British naval historian Ken Booth's discussion of the roles of navies is fundamental in explaining the spectrum of activities undertaken by modern navies. His model[10] divides naval tasks into three categories—diplomatic, policing and military—centred on the use of the sea. A further breakdown is undertaken within each of the categories, and Booth offers a detailed analysis of the many options navies offer to strategic policy makers. In their first role (diplomacy), navies are a useful foreign policy tool, and the presence of warships can be used to reassure or reinforce allied governments, deter potential aggressors, manipulate the decisions of foreign governments, or simply enhance a state's prestige.[11] In their second role (policing), navies contribute to the protection of national sovereignty; assist in state-building and peacekeeping missions; and are vital in enforcing state, maritime and international law.[12] In their third role, navies provide states with military power in the "traditional" sense, acting as a vital component of national military strength.[13]

5. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* [originally published 1911] (London: Brassey's, 1988), 91–106.

6. DOD, *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1: Australian Maritime Doctrine* (SPC-A, 2000), 38 (hereafter cited as SPC-A, *RAN Doctrine 1*)

7. Ibid., 39.

8. Ibid., 3.

9. Nash and Stevens, 14–32; and Richard Gimblett, "Multinational Naval Operations: The Canadian Navy in the Persian Gulf 1990–91," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (August 1992): 25–31, http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/cdq/Gimblett%20August%201992.PDF (accessed October 29, 2012).

10. Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 16.

11. Ibid., 18–20.

12. Ibid., 17–18.

13. Ibid., 20–24.

The Booth model is particularly useful in explaining the changing roles and priorities within the RAN, RCN and RNZN between the mid-1980s and late-1990s. During the 1980s, the main effort of all three navies was directed towards warfighting (the key component of the military role identified by Booth). This is not to say that the RAN, RCN and RNZN never performed Booth's other roles. On the contrary, since WWII, all three have almost constantly performed diplomatic and policing tasks. Rather, the strategic policy, training and acquisition focus of all three navies was primarily on the warfighting role.

For the RAN, this focus was closely linked to its role in Australia's continental defence strategy. The priority the Dibb Report and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper accorded to the destruction of enemy forces in the "sea and air gap" to Australia's north ensured a prominent role for the RAN in national defence. While there was some concern within the RAN that the Dibb Report "demonstrated some fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of maritime operations,"[14] overall, the Navy was happy with the 1987 White Paper's strategy, which recognized that "[b]y its very nature, the defence of Australia and its territories emphasizes maritime warfare capabilities."[15] Furthermore, the White Paper established that "[t]he fundamental importance of the sea and air gap to our security gives high priority to maritime (naval and air) forces capable of preventing an adversary from substantial operations in that area."[16] Despite the prevailing environment being characterized by funding constraints, the fleet was to be expanded from 12 to 16 or 17 major surface ships, and the purchase of six submarines was also approved.

Yet neither the Dibb Report nor the 1987 White Paper gave specific details about the nature or origin of any potential future threat to Australia. As a result, the RAN was compelled to prepare for several contingencies. A key concern from the 1970s to the mid-1980s was increasing Soviet naval activity in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. In the Pacific, concerns arose over growing Soviet engagement with Pacific island states, which was ostensibly for economic reasons. It was, however, accompanied by an increased naval presence. In the Indian Ocean, Soviet engagement in Afghanistan brought about an increase in naval activity, which was greeted warily in Canberra.[17] Additionally, beginning in the mid-1980s, India expanded and modernized its navy, an endeavour that was accompanied by an attempt to increase its profile in the Indian Ocean. For some within the RAN, this presented a significant additional security challenge, and although fears eventually dissipated, it nonetheless provided a major incentive for maintaining the RAN's "two-ocean" fleet structure.[18]

In addition to these "traditional" naval threats, the RAN continued to participate in several international exercises that focused on warfighting scenarios. The FPDA exercises were expanded during the 1980s, partly in response to the increased Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. By the close of the decade, annual FPDA maritime exercises involved surface ships, submarines and naval air as well as air force support.[19] Beginning in 1971, the RAN was also involved in Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC), a major multinational naval exercise hosted biennially by the USN.[20] In addition, several smaller, often bilateral exercises were conducted with regional navies and with the USN throughout

14. Peter Jones, "1983–1991: A Period of Change and Uncertainty," in *The Royal Australian Navy: A History*, ed. David Stevens (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 241.

15. DOD, *The Defence of Australia 1987,* 43.

16. Ibid., 31.

17. Gill, 229–34; and Alexey D. Muraviev, *The Russian Pacific Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika*, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 20 (Canberra: SPC-A, 2007), 22–36.

18. Frame, 258–59.

19. Thayer, 86.

20. DOD, *Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC: Ex RIMPAC '04*, http://www.defence.gov.au/rimpac04/, (accessed November 25, 2008, site discontinued). It is worth noting that the RCN has also been involved in RIMPAC exercises since 1971.

the 1980s and early 1990s.[21] The overall result of these exercises, combined with the need to address potential interstate security threats and implement the naval role prescribed by Australian strategic policy, was a major focus within the RAN on the traditional warfighting role of navies.

The RCN's warfighting focus was a result of Canada's cold war NATO commitments. Its designated role within NATO as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) specialist navy has a legacy dating to WWII, when the RCN was involved in the protection of trans-Atlantic shipping convoys from attack by German submarines.[22] The RCN's ASW capabilities were maintained during the early years of the cold war, although it was not until the late 1950s that ASW began to emerge as a primary role.[23]

This shift of focus primarily occurred for two reasons. The first was the changing nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Navy. Under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1955 to 1985, Soviet submarine production increased dramatically. As Tom Frame observed:

> [T]he Soviet Navy was not a balanced fleet like the US Navy. … It boasted a massive nuclear and conventional submarine capability. Between 1949 and 1972, the Soviet Navy developed 24 new classes of submarine. … By 1980 the Soviet Union deployed 280 nuclear and nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines. Three-quarters of the Soviet submarine fleet was nuclear powered. But the Soviet Navy lacked aircraft carriers, while the surface fleet suffered from vasty deficient air protection. The size and potency of the submarine fleet was, however, sufficient to cause a reorientation of force structures in most Western navies.[24]

For the RCN, this reorientation accelerated during the late 1960s due to the unification of the CF. This was largely because of the acquisition "carrot" Hellyer dangled in front of the Navy in an attempt to convince the admiralty to accept unification—most of the acquisitions offered were designed primarily for ASW.[25]

The second factor influencing the decision to reorientate the RCN's role to ASW was budgetary constraints. Since the Navy did not have the resources to make a substantial contribution to NATO defence of the Atlantic across the spectrum of maritime warfare, the provision of a highly specialized ASW force enabled the RCN to provide a worthwhile contribution in at least one area.[26] It also (by coincidence) ensured the Navy's primary focus remained on its warfighting role. The 1987 Defence White Paper confirmed that ASW remained a key focus at the outset of the period studied, stating that "maritime forces on the East Coast consist of two destroyer squadrons. … The destroyers, embarked with helicopters, and support ships operate in anti-submarine task groups."[27]

The RNZN, despite being smaller than the RAN or RCN, nonetheless maintained a focus on warfighting operations. Although resource constraints had resulted in a debate developing during the 1960s and 1970s over whether New Zealand needed a "blue-water" navy capable of combat operations, this debate was resolved, at least for the coming decade, by the 1978 defence review. By determining

21. Jack McCaffrie, "Regional Cooperation – A RAN Perspective," in *Issues in Maritime Strategy: Presentations of the Royal Australian Navy Studies Programme, 1994*, ed. Greg Cox (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 1994), 50.

22. Robert A. Darlington and Fraser McKee, *The Canadian Naval Chronicle, 1939–45: The Successes and Losses of the Canadian Navy in World War II* (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 1996).

23. Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 219, 223–29.

24. Frame, 254.

25. Milner, 247–48.

26. Ibid., 279–80. Despite the RCN's ASW capabilities, it must be noted that the remainder of the fleet's capabilities were obsolete by the early 1980s, and there were serious concerns within the Navy about "rust-out" of the fleet.

27. DND, *Challenge and Commitment*, 30.

that "the maritime security of New Zealand demanded that the RNZN continue to be a combat force, albeit one impaired by the reduction in the number of its major warships to three only" (the RNZN had previously deployed six frigates), the review established the ongoing prominence of warfighting as the primary task of the RNZN.[28] Like the RAN, the RNZN participated in several exercises with a warfighting focus during the 1970s and 1980s, most notably as part of the FPDA. Prior to the 1985 ANZUS Crisis, exercises with the USN were also held regularly.[29] Like the RAN and RCN, at the opening of the period studied, the RNZN's training focus was primarily on warfighting.

For all three navies, however, the operational reality was not one of traditional warfighting. Despite the training and strategic policy focus on warfighting, in 1987, the RCN and RNZN had not been involved in warlike operations since the Korean War.[30] Since the end of the Vietnam War, the RAN had not either.[31] Instead, operations frequently included the activities Booth classified as diplomacy and policing. For the RAN and RNZN, their deployment to Fiji in 1987 was illustrative of the prevailing operational environment.[32] In 1987 alone, the RAN also conducted 35 visits to foreign ports.[33] Because of Canada's frequent contributions to peacekeeping missions, the RCN had been frequently deployed in policing roles.[34]

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, diplomatic and policing tasks continued to be the operational reality for all three navies. The only exception to this during the "decade of uncertainty" was the 1991 Gulf War, during which RAN and RCN ships served on warlike operations as part of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf.[35] The longer-term effect of the Gulf War for the RAN, however, was an increase in the number of policing missions it conducted, as it subsequently participated in the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq throughout the 1990s.[36] Importantly, however, during the late 1980s and 1990s, operational consistencies were overshadowed by strategic upheaval. The sources and effects of this upheaval were different in each of the three countries studied.

In Canada's case, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the cold war was the primary trigger for strategic uncertainty in the early 1990s. For the RCN, the end of the cold war brought its specialist ASW role into question. Cuts to the defence budget, particularly in 1989, led to the cancellation of many of the modernization and acquisition programmes that had been approved for the Navy in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union initially left the Navy without any strategic policy guidance, although it has since been observed that its fleet structure ensured it was flexible enough to adapt to the post-cold war operational environment.[37] Despite a declaration that naval assets would be more evenly distributed between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the 1992 defence policy statement did little to alleviate the uncertainty this situation created. Instead, it determined that in the future the Navy would be required to "maintain versatile, general-purpose maritime forces" capable of undertaking a variety of roles both close to Canada and abroad.[38]

28. Denis Fairfax, "Royal New Zealand Navy," in *The Oxford Companion* (see note 3, Chapter 1), 467.

29. "Exercises," in *The Oxford Companion* (see note 3, Chapter 1), 162.

30. DND, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001), Appendix C; and Alach, 100.

31. Alastair Cooper, "1955–1972: The Era of Forward Defence," in *The Royal Australian Navy* (see note 14), 181–209.

32. Frame, 269; and McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 170.

33. Frame, 270.

34. David N. Griffiths, "The Maritime Face of Peacekeeping," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (September 1995), 12–16, http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/cdq/Griffiths%20September%201995.PDF (accessed October 29, 2012).

35. Nash and Stevens, 14–32; and Gimblett, "Multinational Naval Operations," 25–31.

36. Nash and Stevens, 36–43.

37. Richard Gimblett, "A Century of Canadian Maritime Force Development: A Reinterpretive History," in *Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Maritime Security Paper No. 11, ed. Edward L. Tummers, (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000), 13–26.

38. DND, *Canadian Defence Policy 1992*, 20–23 (quote on page 21).

For the RAN, the end of the 1991 Gulf War was also the beginning of a shift in military-strategic emphasis. As Frame noted: "As the RAN would be contributing to the enforcement of trade sanctions against Iraq for the next decade, the 1990s saw a shift in focus from war-fighting to a range of 'peace operations.'"[39] The changing training emphasis was accompanied by growing budgetary constraints, which further curtailed the RAN's ability to train for its traditional warfighting role, since less funding was available to conduct exercises.[40] This is not to say that the RAN ceased to prepare for warfighting altogether. Rather, during the early 1990s, the RAN's focus shifted towards a more balanced mix of training for warfighting, diplomatic and policing roles.

Contrary to the RCN, the RAN did not suffer from a lack of strategic policy guidance during the period. Even the dissonance between the continental defence strategy established by the 1987 Defence White Paper and Australian defence practice during the late 1980s—characterized by limited regional forward defence—did not adversely affect the RAN, which frequently deployed far from Australia to participate in multinational exercises regardless of the prevailing strategic policy situation. If anything, the strategy espoused within the 1991 *Force Structure Review* was useful for the RAN as it established the possibility of the ADF being required to provide military assistance to countries in the South Pacific.[41] This had the effect of clarifying the range of the RAN's tasks, enabling it to train accordingly. The ongoing prominence of continental defence in Australian strategic policy under the Hawke and Keating governments was also favourable to the RAN, which was prioritized owing to its potential role in defending the sea and air gap.

In New Zealand, the ANZUS Crisis caused much strategic policy uncertainty during the late 1980s and early 1990s. For the RNZN, the implications of this uncertainty were relatively minor. Although the Crisis led to the official barring of the RNZN from participating in multinational exercises that also involved the USN, the RNZN continued to conduct most of its other activities in the region unabated. Furthermore, the 1987 Defence White Paper's discussion of possible future threats to New Zealand's security highlighted several areas in which the RNZN would be required to play a leading role. These included the possibility of sea raids against New Zealand, interference with trade routes, harassment of merchant shipping, and infringements of New Zealand's exclusive economic zone.[42] The 1991 Defence White Paper was less specific, although it did list several defence priorities that would require the use of naval forces.[43] Overall, New Zealand's strategic policy during the period provided clear guidance to the RNZN about its actual and potential roles.

Hence, the strategic upheaval that adversely affected the RNZN was not related to strategic policy or the ANZUS Crisis but, rather, was brought about by the budget cuts of the early 1990s. Establishing naval tasks in Defence White Papers was one thing. Providing the fleet structure and covering the operating costs to enable the RNZN to achieve these tasks was another. Between 1990 and 1994, the New Zealand defence budget was slashed by 23 per cent.[44] Between 1991 and 1996, the only new acquisition authorized was a much-needed sealift ship, HMNZS *Charles Upham*. Even this purchase was not without controversy, and the ship was described by one commentator as "a passable imitation between a lemon and a white elephant."[45] As a result of the fiscal constraints, RNZN capabilities sub-

39. Frame, 281.

40. Cheeseman, *The Search for Self-Reliance*, 108–14.

41. DOD, *Force Structure Review* 1991, 1–2, 28.

42. MOD, *Defence of New Zealand*, 9–10.

43. MOD, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991*, 45.

44. James, "A Force Still Fit to Fight?" 5.

45. Quoted in: Greener, *New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making,* 116. The HMNZS *Charles Upham* was eventually sold in 2001 following a brief operational life, 16 months at anchor in Devonport awaiting modifications, and two years under lease to a Spanish merchant company. See Greener, *New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making,* 104–36.

stantially deteriorated during the early and mid-1990s, and the lack of acquisitions led to it operating an increasingly obsolescent fleet.

Naval Military-Strategic Doctrine Development, 1987–1997

Of the three navies studied, the RCN was the first to produce a military-strategic doctrine manual, releasing *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* in May 1994.[46] Interestingly, it is also the only navy that released military-strategic doctrine before the RN, and within only months of the USN.[47] Because of this, the RCN stands in stark contrast to the Canadian Army, although the navy's contribution to Canadian doctrinal innovation during the early 1990s has gone largely unacknowledged.

This lack of acknowledgement is most likely because the RCN's doctrine manuals have generally been couched as strategy or "reference documents," rather than doctrine. This is especially true of the navy's first two military-strategic doctrine manuals. In their case, one reason for this lack of acknowledgement is their early release dates compared to other navies and other branches of the CF; during the late-1980s and early to mid-1990s, military-strategic doctrine was still stigmatized as dogma by many Canadian naval officers.[48] Avoiding the term "doctrine" in turn avoided much of the stigma that the use of the term would have attracted. Regardless of their terminology, the RCN's military-strategic publications are clearly doctrinal. This is confirmed by their content, which always contained a discussion of the fundamental principles that guided the Navy at the time of their release, and they always set a strategic direction for the Navy, within the framework of a national strategy. This is significant because both of these factors align with the definition of doctrine since established by Canadian joint doctrine.[49] Furthermore, the publications have been regarded as doctrine by several RCN officers and have subsequently been referred to as such.[50]

The catalyst for the production of the RCN's first military-strategic doctrine manual was the election of the Chrétien Government in late 1993. When Chrétien came to power, his government did not have an established defence policy (beyond the desire to cut costs). The Government began a strategic policy review process, which eventually culminated in the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper.[51] As part of the review, each of the three services was asked to express its views about the future direction Canadian strategic policy should take. At the time, the prevailing environment was unfavourable for the Navy. As discussed above, the conclusion of the cold war had left the Navy without any strategic guidance and called its specialist ASW role into question. By late 1993, the growing number of peacekeeping operations had led some to question why Canada needed to prepare for traditional

46. DND, *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century* (Halifax: Canadian Forces Maritime Command, May 1994).

47. The USN published its first military-strategic doctrine in March 1994, only two months before the RCN. The RN did not publish military-strategic doctrine until 1995. See USN Doctrine Command, *United States Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994); and By Command of the Defence Council, *BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* (1st ed.) (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1995).

48. For example, see P. Richard Moller, "The Dangers of Doctrine," in *Maritime Security Working Paper No. 5* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, December 1996), 57–71.

49. DND, B-GJ-005-000/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003, 1. This definition also aligns with the definition of doctrine used within this study, as well as with the nature of military-strategic doctrine discussed in the introduction.

50. This is contentious, however, and varies depending on the publication. Where certain senior Canadian naval officers tended to use the terms "doctrine" and "strategy" interchangeably, another senior naval officer made a point of using the term "strategy," although elsewhere in his interview, his description of the development process and developer's intent clearly indicated the doctrinal nature of the publications he discussed. This individual later stated that in the case of the 2001 doctrine manual *Leadmark*, the term "strategy" was used because of direction issued by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff's (VCDS's) office, even though some members of the writing team would have preferred to use the term "doctrine" or "vision" instead. Interviews with senior Canadian naval officers, conducted at Dalhousie University, Halifax, May 31, 2007; and Richard H. Gimblett, Interview Transcript: Canadian War Museum Oral History Project, Interview Control Number: 31D 4 GIMBLETT R. Interview conducted at Ottawa, January 7, 2004, 19; and Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, May 15, 2009.

51. Bland, *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1*, 281–82.

warfighting at all. Furthermore, the expression of such views had, on occasion, been accompanied by the calling into question of the need for naval forces altogether.[52]

In light of this situation, the Navy acted to justify its existence and shape the Chrétien Government's strategic policy review in its favour. *The Naval Vision*, released in May 1994, was a crucial part of the Navy's response to the prevailing political situation. As one senior RCN officer noted, *The Naval Vision* was intended to explain the RCN's role to the public "at a grade twelve level." It was squarely (and intentionally) focused on winning over to the Navy's cause the members of the Special Committee of the Senate and House of Commons that had been charged with conducting Chrétien's strategic policy review.[53]

Despite this intent, production of what eventually became *The Naval Vision* was already underway prior to the 1993 election. At the time of the election, however, the requirement for a military-strategic publication had not yet been identified, and the project's intended outcome was merely to update the navy's *Maritime Development Plan*, an internal planning document that had been circulated from time-to-time, most recently during the 1980s.[54] As the Navy responded to the Chrétien Government's election and subsequent strategic policy review, the need for a much wider-ranging, military-strategic publication was identified, and the project was expanded, bringing about production of *The Naval Vision*.[55]

As a result of the circumstances of its production and timing of its release, *The Naval Vision* is unique amongst most ADF, CF and NZDF military-strategic doctrine manuals. Specifically, it was not influenced by doctrine developments in allied countries, either directly or indirectly. Even though it was released in close temporal proximity to the USN's *Naval Warfare*, the two documents are substantially different. Simply written and straightforward to read, *The Naval Vision* was divided into three parts. The first provided an overview of the Navy's recent activities; the second explained the strategic rationale for maintaining naval forces; and the third set forth the RCN's vision for the 21st century. Although *Naval Warfare's* fourth and final chapter examined the USN's vision for the 21st century, this is where the similarities between the two documents ended.[56]

Overall, the impact of *The Naval Vision* on strategic policy formulation is questionable. Although one senior Canadian naval officer asserted that it led to the Navy "winning" the interservice funding battle for the few years following its release (since the Army and Air Force had no similar "vision" or mission statement to fall back on),[57] it is not directly mentioned in the 1994 Defence White Paper.[58] However, there are parts of the White Paper that align with *The Naval Vision*; among these a brief discussion of "operational maritime forces" is particularly notable.[59] Furthermore, the few naval

52. As Chief of the Land Staff, (then) Lieutenant-General Hillier argued that "[t]he reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in 'blue skies or blue waters,' and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects." Although this argument was made in 2003, similar opinions had been expressed a decade earlier. R. J. Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan – Land Effect*, Ref. No.: 3136-5 CLS (Ottawa: Office of the Chief of the Land Staff [CLS], June 26, 2003), 4.

53. Interviews with senior Canadian naval officers, conducted at Dalhousie University, Halifax, May 31, 2007.

54. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, March 18, 2009.

55. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer conducted at Dalhousie University, August 25, 2008.

56. Reading the two documents in conjunction, what stands out the most is that *Naval Warfare* was more abstract and theoretical throughout. This may be because its target audience was not politicians. Instead, its aim was to explain how the USN worked in a joint environment, and its target audience was the USN itself, along with the other branches of the US armed forces. John B. Hattendorf, ed., *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*, Newport Papers No. 27 (Newport: Naval War College Press, September 2006).

57. Interviews a senior Canadian naval officer and a senior retired Canadian naval officer conducted at Dalhousie University, Halifax, May 31, 2007.

58. Likewise, *The Naval Vision* was not mentioned in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, although this document did echo some of the discussion within *The Naval Vision*. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, *Security in a Changing World*, October 25, 1994.

59. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 46–47.

acquisitions approved within the White Paper all align with discussion in the third section of *The Naval Vision*, although whether there is a direct connection between the two documents or whether the alignment is merely a coincidence remains unclear. Regardless of its impact on strategic policy, *The Naval Vision* remains an easy-to-read guide to the RCN's position and institutional strategy during the early 1990s.

Despite the limited respite signalled by the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Canadian political climate and strategic policy situation during the mid-1990s continued to be characterized by a high degree of strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, several years of post-cold war defence spending cuts meant that no major capital purchases were approved for the Navy until nearly a decade after the conclusion of the cold war.[60] As a result of this situation, the development of the RCN's second military-strategic doctrine publication, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, released in April 1997, was closely linked to the Navy's attempt to generate renewed funding for its acquisitions programme.[61] In particular, the Navy was attempting to generate political support for the purchase of a new submarine fleet to replace its OBERON class submarines, which had been purchased during the 1960s and had become obsolete by the early 1990s.[62]

Initial attempts to find a replacement for the OBERON class had failed following the Mulroney Government's 1987 decision to acquire nuclear rather than diesel-electric submarines. A few years after the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper, it was determined that the nuclear option was too costly and the project fell by the wayside entirely.[63] Following the election of the Chrétien Government in 1993, renewed Navy lobbying reopened the door for the possible acquisition of a diesel electric replacement for the OBERON class.[64] Importantly, the 1994 Defence White Paper endorsed the acquisition on conditional terms:

> It [is] also recommended that, if it should prove possible in the current environment of military downsizing around the world to acquire three to six modern diesel-electric submarines on a basis that was demonstrably cost-effective (i.e., that could be managed within the existing capital budget), then the Government should seriously consider such an initiative.[65]

Despite this conditional endorsement, the project soon stalled again, and as a result, it took the RCN another four years of unduly protracted but ultimately successful lobbying before the acquisition of a replacement submarine fleet was finalized in April 1998.

The eventual purchase of four UPHOLDER class diesel-electric submarines from Britain was a hard-won funding victory for the RCN.[66] As Peter Haydon observed about post-1994 White Paper developments, "[m]uch of the delay was a simple function of the need for submarines not having enough political support in Canada despite the new defence policy decision."[67] Michael Craven has

60. R. E. Bush, "The Victoria-class Submarine Programme," *Canadian Naval Review* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 4.

61. DND, Maritime Force Development Cell, Canadian Forces Maritime Command, *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*, April 1997.

62. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted in Vancouver, July 31, 2008; and Peter T. Haydon, "The *Chicoutimi* Accident: Lessons Learned and Not Learned," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 17–18.

63. Ibid., 18.

64. Bush, "The Victoria-class Submarine Programme," 4–5. Although a section of *The Naval Vision* discussed the role and importance of submarines, this was limited in length and scope and did not form a major part of the document. Hence, in shaping the Chrétien Government's strategic policy review's conclusions about the benefits of submarines, it is likely that lobbying on the part of naval personnel and other interested parties had a much greater influence than doctrine.

65. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 47.

66. Once purchased, the UPHOLDER class submarines were redesignated the VICTORIA class by the RCN, although the two names have occasionally been used interchangeably. To avoid confusion, the submarines are only referred to as UPHOLDER class within this study.

67. Haydon, "The *Chicoutimi* Accident," 19.

since expanded on this observation, noting that "[f]rom 1994 until the summer of 1997, significant departmental effort was expended educating Cabinet and Canadians as to the rationale for replacement submarines." As part of this effort, "[a] series of documents drafted for government consideration stressed common themes" about the relevance and utility of submarines.[68] *Adjusting Course* constitutes one of these documents, and a major intention underlying its publication was the provision of a comprehensive justification of the Navy's roles, in support of its acquisition programmes.[69]

Reading *Adjusting Course* in light of this situation, it is unsurprising that the doctrine tends to read in places as though it were a 39-page justification for the UPHOLDER purchase. This is most obvious in the conclusion, where it is stated bluntly that: "[i]n the near term, the most serious problem is represented by the aging submarine force. Submarines provide a unique capability that cannot be adequately replaced by other platforms."[70] While the exact extent to which *Adjusting Course* was responsible for the eventual purchase of the UPHOLDER class cannot be determined, it is likely that the doctrine at least formed part of the Navy's overall strategy to bring about the purchase.

Beyond this objective, *Adjusting Course* also undertook a more general discussion about the links between navies and foreign policy. This set the tone for subsequent doctrine in all three countries by including a discussion of the concepts of sea control and sea denial.[71] It also touched on the roles of navies developed by Booth, discussing the navy's role in protecting Canada's sovereignty, the conduct of naval diplomacy and the utility of naval power projection; although, Booth was not credited and his model was not included (instead, *Adjusting Course* provided a table that summarized the navy's roles and missions, which loosely corresponded to Booth's model).[72] The extent to which the content of *Adjusting Course* was influenced by American and British naval doctrine is unclear. Although RN doctrine was referred to in *Adjusting Course*'s glossary, it was not referred to within the text itself.

Just as *The Naval Vision* was considered by some to be overly simplistic, others have asserted that *Adjusting Course* swung the pendulum too far the other way. Indeed, it attracted an unusually high level of public criticism, particularly from British commentators. For example, when contrasting it with the RN's 1995 doctrine, *BR 1806: Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, one RN officer observed about the Canadian publication: "There are shades of doctrine here, though at a much less 'fundamental' level than our own BR 1806."[73]

In a particularly scathing critique, British naval historian Eric Grove took this argument one step further:

> This is a rather curious publication in many ways. It seems to be an in-house Naval paper but it is clearly intended to achieve the laudable objective of putting the Canadian "naval case" to a wider audience. In this it succeeds, but only up to a point. Its good intentions are marred somewhat by some needless errors of analysis that weaken it significantly and give the document the feel of a slightly below-average postgraduate thesis.[74]

Additionally, Grove made numerous further criticisms, for example, that "[t]here are serious problems with the discussion of naval diplomacy," "[t]he document gives the general impression of being badly

68. Michael Craven, "A Rational Choice Revisited – Submarine Capability in a Transformational Era," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 2006–07): 25.

69. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted in Vancouver, July 31, 2008.

70. DND, *Adjusting Course*, 38.

71. Ibid., 31.

72. Ibid., 30–34.

73. Jeremy R. Stocker, "Book Review: Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada," *The Naval Review* 86, no. 1 (January 1998): 79.

74. Eric Grove, "Review of Adjusting Course," 134.

staffed," "[t]he authors seem confused as to the basic dynamics of warship design," and "[t]he discussion of threats to naval forces is particularly disappointing."[75] His critique led to a rebuttal by Canadian scholar Peter Haydon, who asserted: "In reading Grove's full commentary one could get the impression that his rather condescending criticism of *Adjusting Course* is merely a form of scolding the 'colonials' for not following mother's advice. He really seems concerned that the RCN had the audacity to engage in independent naval thought."[76] Importantly, Haydon's rebuttal indicates that allied naval doctrine—British in particular—had little influence during the development of *Adjusting Course*.

Despite the limited academic debate it garnered, there is little evidence that *Adjusting Course* was an effective tool for generating widespread public support for the RCN. The role it played as part of the Navy's case in support of the UPHOLDER purchase aside, *Adjusting Course* appears to have been of only limited utility to the Navy, particularly once the UPHOLDER purchase had finally been made. As one Canadian naval officer later noted: "*Adjusting Course* was never fully accepted as meeting the remit of explaining the RCN's raison d'être in the same way that *BR 1806* did for the Brits."[77] Soon after the release of *Strategy 2020*, the Navy began to develop a third military-strategic doctrine publication. The product of this development is discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

One month prior to the publication of *Adjusting Course*, the RNZN had, by coincidence, released its own military-strategic doctrine, *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*.[78] Considerably longer and more philosophical than either Canadian naval publication of the 1990s, *Maritime Doctrine* provided a comprehensive examination of the philosophies underlying sea power and its many uses. Its production, however, was motivated by similar factors to Canadian naval doctrine, particularly *The Naval Vision*.

Maritime Doctrine is an example of the influence senior officers can have on doctrinal development. In this case it was Rear Admiral Jack Welch, then Chief of Naval Staff, who was most directly responsible for the development of *Maritime Doctrine*. Apparently, the impetus underlying his direction that the RNZN produce a doctrinal publication began with his attendance at a conference in Wellington in December 1995.[79] The conference, titled "New Zealand's Maritime Environment and Security," was significant because it "was effectively the first at which interested parties from shipping, trade, economics, law, fishing, minerals, science, environment, tangata whenua [indigenous New Zealanders], government and defence came together under one roof, to share perceptions about New Zealand's maritime circumstances and security."[80]

Rear Admiral Welch presented a paper at the conference, which addressed the role of the RNZN in the defence of New Zealand and its interests. His paper also discussed the roles of navies and gave an overview of several of the concepts discussed above, including sea control and sea denial, which would later be discussed in greater detail in *Maritime Doctrine*.[81] Importantly, because of the conference, Welch identified something he considered to be a deficiency within the RNZN and the community more broadly—debate about the role of the RNZN.[82] His introduction to *Maritime Doctrine* indicates his intent to use doctrine as a means of rectifying the deficiency:

75. Ibid., 134–35.

76. Haydon, "Adjusting Course: Some Observations," 24.

77. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, March 5, 2008.

78. MOD, *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*, March 1997.

79. Interview with a senior MOD official, conducted at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, April 26, 2007.

80. The conference proceedings were later published as a book. Peter Cozens, ed., *A Maritime Nation: New Zealand's Maritime Environment & Security* (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996), 231.

81. Jack Welch, "The Role of the Navy in the Application of Maritime Security," in *A Maritime Nation* (see note 80), 221–30.

82. Interview with senior MOD official, conducted at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, April 26, 2007.

> [D]espite such a fundamental interest in the sea, maritime issues are the subject of so little debate in this country. We have no maritime doctrine, and the concepts of sea power are unknown to all but a few. … [Maritime doctrine] is intended to inform and to generate debate.[83]

Beyond its intention of generating public debate, the content of *Maritime Doctrine* indicates that parts of it were written in response to strategic policy (and to the period of severe fiscal restraint that was still drawing to a close at the time it was published).

In terms of its content, *Maritime Doctrine* was divided into nine chapters (including a conclusion). Unique amongst the naval doctrine studied, *Maritime Doctrine* discussed the levels and principles of warfare in detail, two areas traditionally more akin to army doctrine than to naval doctrine.[84] Beyond this, the philosophical and conceptual discussion it contained was more typical—a chapter was dedicated to discussing the maritime environment, another to the elements and characteristics of sea power, and a third to "sea power strategies," including sea control, sea denial, maritime power projection as well as maritime presence and support.[85] Discussion of these concepts drew on several prominent sea power strategists including Corbett, Mahan, Gorshkov and Till. Booth was not mentioned, although the naval roles he established were developed and elaborated on in some detail.[86] British naval doctrine was also influential, and *Maritime Doctrine* cited the first edition of *BR 1806* several times.[87]

In Chapters 7 and 8, discussion was linked to strategic policy and force structure. Since the release of the 1997 Defence White Paper was still eight months away, *Maritime Doctrine* referred to New Zealand's most recent strategic policy document, the 1991 Defence White Paper. In particular, the concept of "a credible minimum" was discussed in detail in relation to maritime forces, and despite its explicit support for the concept, *Maritime Doctrine* can be interpreted as an appeal for funding for what the RNZN considered to be a credible minimum force structure.[88] Given the tight fiscal circumstances in which it was written, this appeal is understandable. In conclusion, the RNZN's appeal for funding was reinforced; *Maritime Doctrine* argued that "naval power must be a significant component of the nation's overall military posture."[89]

Overall, *Maritime Doctrine* presented a detailed account of the RNZN's organizational strategy and raison d'être at the time of its publication. Following its release, however, it was not superseded, updated or supplemented. Consequently, it remained the RNZN's only military-strategic doctrine manual produced during the period studied. The lack of a revised edition was most likely due to the departure of Rear Admiral Welch from the position of Chief of Naval Staff. Following his retirement, the impetus underlying the production of military-strategic doctrine in the RNZN seems to have simply disappeared.[90] This is a pity because *Maritime Doctrine* was a well-developed document. Indeed, several parts of it remained relevant at the end of 2007, and if appropriately updated to reflect the much-changed strategic policy environment in New Zealand, it could no doubt have continued to provide a useful treatise on New Zealand's maritime security and the strategic direction of the RNZN.

83. Jack Welch, "Introduction," in MOD, *Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN*, 4. Note that the first part of this introduction is reproduced verbatim from the paper Admiral Welch presented in Wellington in 1995.

84. MOD, *Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN*, 12–13, 18–23.

85. Ibid., Chapters 3–5.

86. Ibid., Chapter 6.

87. Perhaps the best evidence of the influence *BR 1806* had on the development of *Maritime Doctrine* was that the layout of the chapters in *Maritime Doctrine* mimicked the layout of the chapters in *BR 1806*.

88. MOD, *Maritime Doctrine for the RNZN*, Chapters 7–8.

89. Ibid., 100.

90. Interview with a senior NZ MOD official, conducted at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, April 26, 2007.

The Refinement of Naval Military-Strategic Doctrine, 1997–2007

Although no naval military-strategic doctrine was released during the last few years of the 1990s, the period was nonetheless a busy one behind the scenes, with both the RAN and RCN commencing work on new doctrine manuals. The first of these to be released was *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1: Australian Maritime Doctrine*, released in October 2000.

The comparatively late publication of the RAN's military-strategic doctrine was due to a combination of factors, both internal and external to the RAN. Internally, members of the RAN Maritime Studies Programme (MSP) were interested in writing military-strategic doctrine as early as 1993; however, they failed to generate support for the idea for several reasons. These varied over time and included objections from senior officers on the grounds that doctrine would be "too prescriptive," and there would be a too frequent turnover of MSP members, especially the Director General. It was only during the last few years of the 1990s that this situation began to change.[91]

Furthermore, attempts by members of the MSP to gain support for the production of doctrine were also likely to have been indirectly influenced by external events. For most of the 1990s, the RAN maintained a position of priority within Australian strategic policy. Despite the shift in training away from an almost exclusive focus on traditional warfighting that characterized the 1980s, the ongoing pre-eminence of continental defence in Australia's 1994 White Paper ensured that the RAN weathered the immediate post-cold war period of the "peace dividend" relatively well.[92]

By the late 1990s, however, the government's funding priorities had begun to shift away from the RAN, a shift that greatly accelerated following the deployment to East Timor in 1999. Over the next few years, the RAN found itself rapidly de-prioritized, and government publications such as *From Phantom to Force* did much to swing the funding pendulum towards the Army. The changing situation (which further shifted as a result of the *Defence Review* that began in June 2000) led many within the RAN to feel increasing pressure to justify the organization's activities to the Australian public.[93] As a result, receptiveness to military-strategic doctrine rapidly grew, and many of the objections and barriers faced by members of the MSP during the 1990s seemed to have disappeared.

Related to these changes in attitude were changes to key appointments, including a new Director General of the MSP, Captain James Goldrick (appointed January 1999), and a new Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Shackleton (appointed July 1999).[94] Although Shackleton's predecessor, Vice Admiral Chalmers, had initiated the project in early 1999, Shackleton proved to be highly supportive.[95] The primary author, however, was Captain Goldrick. Due to an emergency posting back to sea, little of the actual writing was undertaken until early 2000, although the document was produced fairly quickly after this. Once Captain Goldrick had completed a draft, it was circulated "very widely for comment and this included overseas experts."[96] Following a partial redrafting to incorporate the feedback Captain Goldrick had received, the doctrine was then approved by Vice Admiral Shackleton prior to its release in October 2000.

91. Email correspondence with staff of the SPC–A, May 21, 2008.

92. DOD, *Defending Australia*, 42–46.

93. In the development of its doctrine, RAN's key goals were to identify how it was different from other navies and to make the wider community more aware of what it actually did. Interview with staff of the SPC–A, conducted August 23, 2007.

94. Note that in January 2000 the Maritime Studies Programme was incorporated in the newly established Sea Power Centre. See Royal Australian Navy, *Defence Instructions (Navy) ADMIN 3-103* (Canberra: Department of Defence, Navy Headquarters, May 14, 2003), http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/docs/Defence%20Instructions%20(Navy).pdf (accessed May 11, 2008, site discontinued).

95. Email correspondence with a senior RAN officer, April 29, 2008.

96. Ibid.

Interestingly, *RAN Doctrine 1* contained a short note on sources that had been referred to during its development.[97] Like the RNZN's *Maritime Doctrine*, the content of *RAN Doctrine 1* was influenced by the RN's *BR 1806*.[98] Furthermore, *RAN Doctrine* drew on the RNZN's *Maritime Doctrine* publication, which it credited as "an excellent book, more apt for New Zealand's situation and less derivative than it may have appeared to many."[99] The works of several naval warfare theorists were also consulted during the writing of *RAN Doctrine 1*, as was USN doctrine, although the latter's influence was less direct.

The content of *RAN Doctrine 1* was well developed. Divided into 12 chapters, it sought to explain "how the Royal Australian Navy thinks about, prepares for and operates in peace and conflict."[100] This it did quite well, examining the concept of doctrine itself, Australia's maritime environment, the nature of armed conflict, and ongoing themes in Australian strategic policy.[101] (Cleverly, *RAN Doctrine 1* focused on trends over time and avoided discussing specific strategic policy documents, something which has resulted in its ongoing relevance over a longer time frame than most other naval doctrine studied.) It then provided a detailed discussion of maritime strategic and operational concepts, including sea control, sea denial and command of the sea. In this discussion, it drew heavily on many prominent naval theorists, and a subsequent overview of maritime operations drew heavily on the Booth model and substantially developed it.[102]

In its latter chapters, *RAN Doctrine 1* offered a justification for the RAN's fleet structure, explaining the importance of maritime logistics, and providing a brief overview of the role of the RAN's many types of ships.[103] This conversation appears to have been dually motivated by the desire to explain the RAN's activities to the public and by the desire to justify its funding requirements to government. Although this latter motivation is not directly mentioned anywhere in the doctrine; it is the impression one gets from reading the text. In its final chapter, *RAN Doctrine 1* briefly examined the future requirements of Australian maritime forces, although discussion was limited to general trends.[104] As with its discussion of themes in Australian strategic policy, this vagary helped maintain the document's relevance over a longer time frame.

The ongoing applicability of *RAN Doctrine 1* over a longer time frame than most other naval doctrine was convenient for the RAN, which did not release an updated edition during the period studied. This was largely due to the RAN's high operational tempo, and plans to revise *RAN Doctrine 1* in 2007 fell through because the RAN was unable to allocate an officer to its doctrine-writing position.[105] Despite this, the RAN's doctrinal development did not come to a total halt following the publication of *RAN Doctrine 1*. Overall, *RAN Doctrine 1* was received very well both within the Australian naval community and by the public, and in March 2005 a supplemental publication, *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 2: The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations*, was released.[106]

97. DOD, *RAN Doctrine 1*, 129–30.

98. By the time *RAN Doctrine 1* was published, *BR 1806* was up to its second edition. Furthermore, *RAN Doctrine 1* noted the influence of the "old" version of *BR 1806*, editions of which had been released in 1948, 1958, and 1969. Ibid., 129. See also United Kingdom, By Command of the Defence Council, *BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine,* 2nd ed., 1999.

99. DOD, *RAN Doctrine 1*, 129.

100. Ibid., 1.

101. Ibid., Chapters 1–4.

102. Ibid., 57. It was noted in *RAN Doctrine 1* that the derivative of Booth's model that it contained had also been influenced by Eric Grove's subsequent development of the model. See also Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1990), esp. 232–36.

103. Ibid., Chapters 9–10.

104. Ibid., Chapter 12.

105. Interview with staff of the SPC-A, conducted August 23, 2007.

106. DOD, *Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 2: The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations*, SPC-A, 2005 (hereafter cited as SPC-A, *RAN Doctrine 2)*.

RAN Doctrine 2 was intentionally developed as a supplement to expand on discussion in the latter part of *RAN Doctrine 1*, especially its 9th and 10th chapters. As Vice Admiral Ritchie noted in the foreword to *RAN Doctrine 2*: "Where *Australian Maritime Doctrine* focuses on the strategic rationale for and components of maritime operations, the purpose of this volume is to examine in greater detail the operational capabilities, and indeed limitations, of our Navy."[107] This intent was made even clearer in the introduction: "[*RAN Doctrine 2*] could be considered to address the general questions: *What is each principal element of the RAN, and how does each operate?*" [emphasis in original].[108]

As staff of the RAN's Sea Power Centre – Australia later explained, the Navy frequently received enquiries from the media and public along the lines of "what do your submarines actually do?" *RAN Doctrine 2* was written as a public reference the Navy could refer to when answering such questions, and it is intended for both Navy internal use as doctrine and also to provide a platform for public relations and international engagement. As such, it is less doctrinal per se than the conceptually focused *RAN Doctrine 1*. Unlike *RAN Doctrine 1*, each chapter of *RAN Doctrine 2* was written by subject matter specialists from within the relevant area of the RAN, under the direction of Captain Richard McMillan (then Director of the Sea Power Centre – Australia), who was also the lead writer. Because of this, the publication of *RAN Doctrine 2* occurred following an extensive review process to ensure consistency between chapters.[109]

The content of *RAN Doctrine 2* is divided into chapters with each discussing a particular capability (such as command and control or personnel) or the role of a particular type of naval platform (such as patrol boats, submarines, surface combatants and naval aviation). Of note, discussion in the introduction briefly addressed strategic policy developments since 2000, although it is clear from this discussion that *RAN Doctrine 2* was influenced more by existing maritime theory than by strategic policy developments. As such, a brief overview of the 2000 Defence White Paper was quickly passed over, with discussion moving on to summarize the roles of navies as established by the Booth model, before tying these in with recently developed operational concepts such as network-centric warfare and effects-based operations.[110]

Overall, *RAN Doctrine 2* succinctly answered the questions it posed for itself, and it continues to provide the RAN with a useful public-relations tool. However, because of this focus, its utility as a military-strategic doctrinal publication is severely limited, and *RAN Doctrine 1* remains the key military-strategic doctrinal publication produced by the RAN.

As noted above, by the end of the 1990s, the RCN was working on the production of its third military-strategic doctrine publication. As with its predecessors, it was future focused, as its title suggests—*Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. Another similarity with its predecessors was that it was couched as strategy, while it was even more doctrinal in nature than either *The Naval Vision* or *Adjusting Course*. Even though he referred to *Leadmark* exclusively as a strategy, the manual's initial author, Richard Gimblett, clearly signalled that the publication was doctrinal in nature when he asserted that it included a deliberate attempt to define the fundamentals of naval strategy and the principles of maritime warfare within the Canadian strategic context, two of the principal characteristics of the content of military-strategic doctrine.[111]

107. C. A. Ritchie, "Foreword" in SPC-A, *RAN Doctrine 2*, v.

108. Ibid., 4.

109. Interview with staff of the SPC-A, conducted August 23, 2007.

110. SPC-A, *RAN Doctrine 2*, 6–11.

111. Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett.

Furthermore, there were some who felt that *Adjusting Course* had failed to adequately explain the RCN's raison d'être to the public. As Haydon observed:

> Ideally, the public expression of support, in both the "grand" and the naval strategies, should be a political statement or, as in long-established maritime states … , be an entrenched part of the national character. Unfortunately, a Canadian maritime "character" does not exist. …
>
> …If the politicians cannot, or will not, produce the necessary statement entrenching the navy as part of the national fabric, the naval and maritime communities must take the necessary steps to gain public support.[112]

In an assessment of *Adjusting Course*, he concluded:

> At the moment it presents a good argument but is not a complete strategy because it does not adequately answer the question: "What function does the navy perform which obligates Canadian society to assume responsibility for its maintenance?" Moreover, *Adjusting Course* is a strategic orphan because it is not tied to an overarching national strategic vision free of the constraints of today's short-term political imperatives and locked tightly on the future of this country in the longer term.[113]

Although it was a departmental strategy rather than a strategic policy document, *Strategy 2020* provided the first such strategic vision since the 1994 Defence White Paper. Following its release, Vice-Admiral Maddison, then Chief of the Maritime Staff, ordered the Directorate of Maritime Strategy to begin work on a new publication that was designed to fit within the vision established within *Strategy 2020*.

The link to *Strategy 2020* was evident throughout *Leadmark*, the foreword to which noted that "*Leadmark* is a critical link to the capability-based planning framework set in place by *Strategy 2020*."[114] Others have also noted *Strategy 2020*'s influence during the development of *Leadmark*, which was substantially broader and more considered than the development of its predecessors. As Gimblett recalled, at the outset of *Leadmark*'s development, "[w]e had a general concept of what the naval strategy [*Leadmark*] should look like—basically, look a lot like *Strategy 2020* … something of about 20- to 25-page synopsis of where the navy was going to go over the next 20 years was generally it." However, once research began into the exact content and structure the Navy's strategy should have, the scope of the task rapidly expanded. The result was that "*Leadmark* was suddenly becoming more than a one-man, twenty-page writing assignment … we started developing the idea of a team concept."[115]

It was at this point in its development that *Leadmark* began to move away from being a strategy document in all but name. Rather, it developed into the RCN's most comprehensive military-strategic doctrine manual produced during the period studied. Eventually, the core writing team was expanded to include three mid-level and one senior naval officer and a civilian academic.[116] Early drafts were widely circulated both within and outside the Navy for feedback, and the process was further enhanced

112. Peter Haydon, "'Adjusting Course'… A Strategic Orphan?" *Maritime Affairs*, http://www.noac-national.ca/article/haydon/strategy_bypeterhaydon.html (accessed September 13, 2012, site discontinued), 3.

113. Ibid.

114. G. R. Maddison, "Foreword," in *Leadmark*, i.

115. Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett.

116. Ibid. This is also noted in the "Acknowledgements" section of *Leadmark*. See *Leadmark*, 176.

by the development of related academic conference papers and commentaries.[117] In addition to this feedback, *Leadmark* was influenced by allied—particularly American and British—naval doctrine and by the operational experience of the members of the writing team.[118] However, *Strategy 2020* remained the key catalyst underlying the production of *Leadmark*, and its influence was particularly prominent.

Following a discussion about its relationship to strategic policy and the force development process, *Leadmark* elaborated the roles of navies, a discussion which had several similarities with the equivalent section in *RAN Doctrine 1*. Of particular note is that *Leadmark* also drew heavily on the Booth model, developing a Canadian derivative.[119] It also drew on the discussion of several theorists already mentioned and provided definitions of sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, amongst other concepts.[120] Interestingly, it developed the concept of middle-power naval roles and responsibilities to a far greater extent than either RAN or RNZN doctrine did, which may have been due to the concepts' prominence in academia at the time *Leadmark* was developed.[121] Regardless of the reasons for its inclusion, the discussion of "medium-power naval strategy" provided an interesting means for facilitating the development of a Canadian concept of naval strategy.

In its final part, *Leadmark* established a naval strategy for 2020. Although the strategy was deliberately broad and succinct (totalling only two paragraphs), it nonetheless served to link the document to its original intent, which was to develop a naval strategy that aligned with *Strategy 2020*.[122] In this sense, *Leadmark* was a success; although and importantly, its doctrinal style ensured that it constituted a well-balanced military-strategic treatise that was more broadly relevant than a strategy alone could have been.

Indeed, *Leadmark* was far more effective than its predecessors in achieving the goal of promoting awareness of the RCN's roles and in establishing a military strategy for the Navy. This is because it avoided the pitfalls of both of its predecessors—it was comprehensive and easy to understand, but not overly simplistic—and because it was more widely and prominently distributed. As a result, *Leadmark* was highly successful in making an impact in the public realm, even though it attracted occasional criticism.[123] As one senior RCN officer recalled, *Leadmark* temporarily gave the Navy the edge it required to secure funding for its priorities ahead of the Army and Air Force, precisely because at the time *Leadmark* was released neither of the other organizations had an equivalent "glossy publication you could give to a politician."[124]

The military strategy it set was also highly versatile. *Leadmark* was released in June 2001, only three months prior to 9/11. Because of this release date, there was concern in the wake of 9/11 that events had rendered *Leadmark* prematurely redundant. However, this concern was unfounded. Following 9/11, the RCN commenced Operation APOLLO in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, which

117. Similarly to the development of the RNZN's *Maritime Doctrine*, a conference held at the University of Calgary in March 2001 was fundamental in the conceptual development of *Leadmark*. Although a footnote within *Leadmark* observed that the conference proceedings were due to be published as a book in 2002, this did not come to pass. Instead, a second collection of study papers written to assist in the development of *Leadmark* was published by Dalhousie University. See Edward L. Tummers, ed., *Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century* Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11. (Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies), 2000.

118. Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett.

119. RCN, *Leadmark*, 34. Note that the RCN's development of its derivative of the Booth model occurred independently of the RAN's development of its own derivative. The inclusion of the Booth model in both doctrine manuals was entirely coincidental.

120. RCN, *Leadmark*, Part 3.

121. Interview Transcript: Richard H. Gimblett. Reading *Leadmark*, it quickly becomes clear that concepts developed by Eric Grove also had a significant influence during the development of this aspect of the content of *Leadmark*. See Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, esp. 236–40.

122. RCN, *Leadmark*, 16–69.

123. Shadwick, 75.

124. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, Halifax, Canada, June 1, 2007.

resulted in the highest operational tempo in its recent history. As Gimblett later wrote, "the experience of Operation Apollo [sic] has been to validate the strategy described in *Leadmark*."[125] Nonetheless, some within the Navy still felt the need to demonstrate that it was responding proactively to the events of 9/11.[126] The result was the development of what was described as "an additional chapter" to *Leadmark*[127]—*Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (*SCOF*) was released in May 2005.[128]

As *SCOF* was released shortly after the publication of the report on defence policy that constituted part of Canada's *IPS*, the opportunity was taken to incorporate into *SCOF* a brief discussion of the strategy the *IPS* set.[129] While this gave *SCOF* some additional depth, overall, it remained little more than a validation of *Leadmark*. In the introduction, it noted that "[j]ust as the Canadian experience of Operation Apollo [sic] served to validate many of *Leadmark*'s strategic tenets, the Global War on Terrorism also confirmed many of its predictions."[130]

Although most of *SCOF* was dedicated to an elaboration of the argument that *Leadmark* continued to be relevant, there was some limited "new" discussion about emerging naval missions.[131] Regarding the Booth model, it was noted that "the prevailing pre-9/11 strategic context skewed the construct towards the more purely military roles and functions. The future security environment … demands a restoration of balance to the triangle."[132] Given that the end of the cold war and subsequent operations during the 1990s had already shifted the RCN's focus away from the warfighting role, this assertion seems strange. It was most likely made, therefore, to provide an additional justification for the planned purchase of sealift and multi-purpose ships, which had been outlined in the *IPS* but which had not yet been funded at the time of *SCOF*'s release.[133]

Because *SCOF* was written as a supplement to *Leadmark*, rather than as an update or replacement, *Leadmark* has maintained its primacy as the RCN's keystone doctrinal publication. In this sense, *SCOF* is similar to *RAN Doctrine 2*; both documents were written to elaborate upon and enhance existing doctrine, rather than to replace it. With respect to the *SCOF*, "the doc[ument] [*SCOF*] (like *Naval Vision* and *Adjusting Course*) has never really developed traction. Others on the naval staff tell me they keep returning to LM [*Leadmark*] for any substantiation required in development of other staff work, or in the academic community to explain some naval concept."[134]

125. Gimblett, *Operation Apollo*, 40.

126. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, Halifax, Canada, June 1, 2007.

127. Canada, DND, "Navy Charts New Waters in Its Strategic Vision," RCN Press Release, http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a_eng.asp?category=7&id=245 (accessed October 29, 2012).

128. This publication is frequently informally referred to within the RCN as "son of *Leadmark*." DND, *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2005).

129. Peter T. Haydon, "A New Maritime Security Framework: Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien, non?" *Canadian Naval Review* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 34–36.

130. DND, *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers*, 4.

131. Ibid., 19–29.

132. Ibid., 18.

133. Shortly after taking office in January 2006, the Harper Government approved $C2.1 billion for the purchase of three ships, although this purchase was subsequently cancelled as this funding was not sufficient. The RCN instead investigated the possibility of purchasing two new fuel-tankers and a transport ship, before the project for a multi-purpose ship was reinvigorated under the rubric "joint support ship" in mid-2009. The project had once again run into financial difficulties by the end of the year, however, and has again stalled, perhaps indefinitely. Crowther, 1–2; David Pugliese, "Navy Looks into Buying Fuel Tankers; Earlier Plans for Multi-Role Vessels Ran Aground," *National Post*, August 28, 2008, A6; and David Pugliese, "Hoping to Shake Loose the Backlog: Canadian Industry Awaits Progress on Delayed Programmes," *Defense News* (December 14, 2009), http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4417467 (accessed February 6, 2010, site discontinued).

134. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, July 4, 2007.

Summary and Implications: Military-Strategic Navy Doctrine

From 1987 to 2007, several similarities can be observed in both the influences on and intended effects of military-strategic doctrine developed by the RAN, RCN and RNZN. Regarding the key influences on doctrinal development, the same four that remained prominent for the three armies (see Chapter 4) also remained prominent for the navies. These four influences were: the role of individual officers, sometimes in senior positions, but more often as members of doctrine writing teams or as individual authors; the influence of allied military-strategic doctrinal developments, particularly RN doctrine; the operational experience of the navies and their allies; and the relationship between navies and strategic policy.

As was the case for the three armies, for the navies the relative influence of these four factors varied between countries as well as between individual doctrine manuals. These variances occurred due to the broader political climate in which each publication was produced (see the first three chapters for more details), acquisition programmes (or lack thereof), changes in the naval objectives prioritized by different strategic-policy documents, public relations concerns, and the personalities and agendas of individual officers. Despite variances in the relative weighting of each factor, however, all four were nonetheless influential to a greater or lesser extent in the development of all the naval doctrine publications studied, with the exception of *The Naval Vision*, which was not influenced by allied doctrine at all due to its relatively early release date.

Another point of similarity between the three navies was the intended effects of their military-strategic doctrine. Like armies, the three navies used doctrine as a way to explain how they contributed to achieving strategic policy objectives. What separated navies from armies was the manner in which their doctrine was designed to do this. Specifically, while army doctrine stipulated how land operations should be conducted in order to enable armies to fulfil strategic policy goals, navy doctrine explained what navies had to offer to strategic policy makers and governments at a much more foundational level. The reason for this difference is most likely cultural, although this in itself has several important dimensions.

The first of these is that the three navies all suffered due to public ignorance about what they did and why. As Haydon observed: "Because the majority of Canadians do not understand or even recognize the maritime dimensions of their country, naval programmes seldom enjoy public or political support."[135] Although this was written about Canada, a similar assertion could be made about Australia and New Zealand. In an attempt to change this situation, one of the major intended roles of military-strategic navy doctrine was the generation of public awareness about what navies did and why they did it.

The second important dimension of naval culture in the three countries was caused by the high relative importance of platforms such as warships, submarines and helicopters. To a much greater extent than army operations, naval operations could be said to be platform-driven. The impact this platform-driven culture had on doctrinal development was that it led to a greater emphasis within doctrine on explaining the role and importance of fighting platforms.

Closely linked to this was the most important intended role of military-strategic navy doctrine: the generation of political and strategic policy support for the acquisition and maintenance of naval platforms. In some cases this intended effect was quite obvious, with the direct link between *Adjusting Course* and the RCN's campaign to bring about the UPHOLDER class submarine purchase being the most prominent example. In most cases, however, this intent manifested itself more subtlety. In addi-

135. Haydon, "'Adjusting Course'" … A Strategic Orphan?" 1.

tion to generating public awareness about how navies contributed to achieving strategic policy goals, doctrine was also intended to generate awareness among strategic policy makers, who would ultimately decide on acquisitions and funding for the maintenance of existing platforms.

Because this was the most important intended role of military-strategic naval doctrine, the doctrine could be said to be primarily *upward focused*.[136] This is opposite to army doctrine, which is primarily downward focused towards the conduct of operations.

Aside from the cultural dimensions already discussed, an important factor in explaining the upward focus of naval doctrine is the fairly consistent nature of naval operations over the period studied. As outlined in the first part of this chapter, naval operations have always fit into the three categories identified by Booth—diplomatic, policing and military. This has remained consistent even though the training emphasis has shifted over time. Furthermore, every time a ship goes to sea, even if only for training purposes, the situation is nonetheless operational, if only because of the unpredictable and potentially dangerous nature of the oceans in which navies operate. Finally, naval operations are more flexible than army operations, and on a single voyage a warship is capable of undertaking several missions, each of which may fall under the auspices of any of the different naval roles identified by Booth. The result of this combination of factors is that, overall, naval doctrine can afford to be less operationally focused than army doctrine.

The relative weights of these influences on and intended effects of military-strategic navy doctrine are represented in Figure 4. In this model, solid, thin arrows represent influences and effects that occurred consistently across countries and publications; dotted, thin arrows represent either indirect influences and effects, or influences and effects that occurred frequently (but not always); and the dotted, thick arrow linking doctrine to national strategic policy indicates the primary upward focus of navy doctrine (this line is dashed since doctrine was only one component of navies' efforts to favourably shape strategic policy, and because it is difficult to precisely measure the impact doctrine actually had).

136. Note the word "intended" is used because naval doctrine was always one of many factors that may have contributed to the formulation of acquisition policy and the provision of naval funding. As a result, the precise influence of any individual publication is largely intangible.



Figure 4. *Common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic navy doctrine*

Within the model, the solid, thick arrow has been used to indicate the prominent influence academic discourse has had on the development of military-strategic naval doctrine. This prominent influence provides another interesting contrast to army doctrine, which instead draws more heavily on conceptual developments derived from operational experiences. For navies, incorporation of the academic discourse into doctrine has provided a convenient means of enabling doctrine to fulfil its role of explaining what navies have to offer strategic policymakers and governments. An excellent example of this occurrence is the incorporation of the Booth model into both RAN and RCN doctrine, although this occurrence is not limited to Booth. Discussion of other academic concepts, including command of the sea, sea control and sea denial was also prominently featured within the doctrine of all three navies.

As can also be seen in Figure 4, influential individuals played much the same role in the development of navy doctrine as they did in the development of army doctrine. However, the role of allies and operations were quite different in the case of navies. This is because of the nature of naval operations, which necessitated that allied navies work together much more frequently and at a much lower level than armies. As a result, allied operations often blended into one (as in the Persian Gulf, where RAN and RCN ships frequently supported USN-led fleets). This is represented in the model by the

combining of "own and allied naval operations" into one box. (The same concept is represented by two distinct but linked boxes in Figure 3, the equivalent model about army doctrine development.)

With regard to conceptual developments, however, allies played a less prominent role in the development of naval doctrine than army doctrine, as navies lacked an equivalent formalized ideas-sharing forum akin to ABCA meetings.[137] As noted in Figure 4, the evaluation of operational experiences conducted by the three navies and their allies was frequently done on an ad hoc and informal basis. Although TTP were derived and disseminated throughout the period studied (and exchanged between navies working together in the same operational theatre), navies did far less higher-level conceptual development as a result of their operational experiences than armies did over the same period. This situation also helps explain the prominent influence of the academic discourse in the content of military-strategic naval doctrine.

Overall, during the period studied, military-strategic navy doctrine provided a tool for the RAN, RCN and RNZN to promote their interests. It did this by offering both policy makers and the general public an explanation of the importance of the role navies played in fulfilling strategic policy goals.

137. Navies did have formalized interoperability forums, most prominently AUSCANZUKUS. These forums did not have a strong idea-sharing or doctrinal focus, however, and instead concentrated on generating interoperability in areas such as command, control, communications and computer technology. *AUSCANZUKUS Information Portal*, AUSCANZUKUS Organization, http://www.auscannzukus.net/ (accessed March 16, 2009, site discontinued).

Chapter 6

Enabling Air Power Education: Military-Strategic Doctrine Development in the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force, 1987–2007

Similar to the other branches of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces, air forces did not publish military-strategic doctrine until after the release of the 1987 Defence White Papers. Prior to this, they developed—or, more frequently, borrowed from the RAF or the United States Air Force (USAF)—several technical manuals and a smattering of mostly tactical doctrine, as there appeared to be a culture characterized by the oral dissemination of ideas between senior and junior officers in place of a culture of written doctrine development. Between the early 1980s and mid-1990s, this culture began to change, resulting in the production of military-strategic doctrine by all of the three air forces. This chapter explores this cultural shift, the factors underlying it, and the military-strategic doctrine that has been produced by each air force since 1987.

As the final chapter analysing the development of single-service, military-strategic doctrine, this chapter follows the same structure as the previous two. Discussion is divided into three sections. The first section examines the development of air forces in general terms, providing an analysis of the impact their origin and relationship with the other two services has had on their culture and, consequently, on their doctrine. The second and third sections examine doctrine development from 1987 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2007 respectively. These sections also describe the doctrine development process, factors that influenced development, the intended effects of each doctrine manual, and the content of the doctrine itself. In conclusion, similarities and differences between doctrine developments in the three air forces are considered, and a model is established to explain the common influences on and key intended effects of military-strategic air force doctrine.

The Establishment, Development and Culture of Air Forces

Air forces are the most recently established branch of Western armed forces. Whereas land and naval warfare have existed for centuries, air warfare only began to emerge during WWI.[1] Indeed, the three air forces studied, along with their British and American counterparts, have existed for less than a century.[2]

Unsurprisingly, therefore, theoretical discussion about the nature and scope of modern air warfare commenced even more recently than the development of the theoretical framework guiding modern naval warfare, and similarly, prominent theories of air warfare are largely the product of a small group of theorists.[3] However, the unique culture of air forces—derived as much from the circumstances and politics of their emergence and their subsequent relationship with armies and navies as it is from their

1. Although there were several experiments and incidents of the use of the air for military purposes prior to WWI, these were limited in scope, effect and vision, and the evolution of air warfare and the application of air power can not be considered to have taken on its "modern" form until after the outbreak of WWI. For an early history of air power, see Basil Collier, *A History of Air Power* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), 1–82.

2. The RAF was the world's first independent air force, formed on April 1, 1918. The RAAF was established on March 31, 1921, the RCAF on April 1, 1924, and the RNZAF on April 1, 1937. The USAF became independent of the US Army on September 18, 1947. Roy Conyers Nesbit, *An Illustrated History of the RAF* (Surrey: Colour Library Books Ltd., 1990), 20; Alan Stephens, *The Royal Australian Air Force: A History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 29; Brereton Greenhous and Hugh A. Halliday, *Canada's Air Forces 1914–1999* (Montreal: Art Global, 1999), 28; Paul A. Harrison, "Royal New Zealand Air Force," in *The Oxford Companion* (see note 3, Chapter 1), 459; and David A. Anderton, *The History of the US Air Force* (London: Hamlyn-Aerospace, 1981), 134.

3. For an overview of the early development of air power theory, including a discussion of key air power theorists, see Timothy Garden, "Air Power: Theory and Practice," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, eds. John Baylis and others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 137–57.

operational experience—has resulted in theoretical analysis playing a different role within air forces than it does within armies or navies. This difference in organizational culture and the role of the theoretical discourse is, in turn, reflected in the development of air warfare and aerospace doctrine in the RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF. Hence, a brief overview of the culture and history of the air forces is warranted, as this shaped to a great extent the political environment in which they eventually developed their doctrine.

During WWI, aeroplanes were used by navies and especially armies to conduct reconnaissance and, in the case of armies, to locate ground targets for engagement by artillery. Counter-reconnaissance efforts soon led to the addition of interception missions to the role of air crews, and the development of technology, such as forward-mounted machine guns, soon made aeroplanes much more effective at conducting air-to-air combat.[4] Another important role soon added to the growing list of missions was aerial bombardment of ground forces, which led to the development of the concept of "strategic bombardment," something that was to have a great impact on the development of air warfare theory in the decade following the end of the war. During the war itself, however, air power played a comparatively minor role, being overshadowed by the vast land and naval campaigns that were its principal characteristics.[5]

Nevertheless, the development of air power during the war fuelled the early theories that gained traction in its aftermath. One of the key early proponents of air power was Italian General Giulio Douhet. His most influential work, *The Command of the Air*, was first published in 1921. "To have command of the air," wrote Douhet, "means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself."[6] More important was Douhet's belief that "[t]o conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose."[7] Subsequently, he postulated:

> From this axiom we come immediately to this first corollary: *In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary—and sufficient—to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air*. And from that we arrive at this second corollary: *All that a nation does to assure her own defence should have as its aim procuring for herself those means which, in case of war, are most effective for the conquest of the command of the air* [emphasis in original].[8]

Furthermore, Douhet envisaged a key role for strategic bombardment in future warfare, reasoning that bombardment of targets within enemy territory would "cut off the enemy's army and navy from their bases of operation, spread terror and havoc in the interior of his country, and break down the moral and physical resistance of his people."[9]

Writing during the same period, other air warfare theorists made similar arguments, particularly regarding the potential effects of strategic bombing. In the US, General William "Billy" Mitchell demonstrated the potential of air power at sea in 1921 by sinking a captured German warship using aerial bombardment. In his writings, Mitchell advocated strategic bombing as a means to win wars. Where he differed from Douhet, however, was that he did not advocate the use of air power to "spread terror and havoc" among a civilian population. Instead, he emphasized the strategic effect bombing

4. Tami Biddle, "Learning in Real Time: The Development and Implementation of Air Power in the First World War," in *Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo*, eds. Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 6.

5. Ibid., 4.

6. Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* [originally published 1921] (Arno Press: New York, 1972), 24.

7. Ibid., 28.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 35.

would have on the enemy's industrial and economic infrastructure and thus on his ability to sustain the war effort.[10]

In England, Lord Trenchard, the inaugural Chief of the Air Staff of the RAF, argued that air power could be used to substitute for land power in maintaining control over the colonies. The idea was tested with mixed success during the 1920s.[11] Given the political environment at the time, Trenchard's ideas lent much support to the ongoing independence of the RAF, which had to frequently fight attempts by army and naval officers to reabsorb it back into their own services.

Such an environment did not just affect the RAF. During the interwar years, the strategic environment facing all Western air forces was one of fiscal constraint and strong opposition to their existence by armies and navies. In Australia, "[t]he question of air force independence was intensely political. Generals and admirals might dismiss the claim of this 'third brother' to equal and independent status, but they valued their new-found capability and did not want to lose control over it."[12] For similar reasons, the RCAF remained only semi-autonomous during its first 14 years, with its headquarters officially a directorate within Militia Headquarters until 1938; a mixture of funding and political constraints prevented its independent development during this period.[13] In New Zealand, a lack of advocacy for independent air power resulted in the country's various air combat organizations of the 1920s and early 1930s remaining under the command of the Army or New Zealand branch of the RN Reserve, and budget constraints (particularly during the 1930s) seriously limited force development prior to 1937.[14]

Overall, the political circumstances surrounding the establishment of independent air forces were frequently hostile, and the early existence of air forces coincided with a period of severe fiscal constraints, in an environment in which interservice competition for resources was the norm. As Alan Stephens asserted regarding Australia (although, importantly, the same could be said of Canada and New Zealand), "one of the strongest, most persistent pressures on air force attitudes has been the hostility of admirals and generals to independent air power."[15] As will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, this pressure continued to affect the air forces during the period studied, with an organizational fear of being dissolved into armies and navies having a noteworthy influence on doctrine development during some key phases.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the emergence of the theoretical debate about command of the air and the potential of strategic bombardment proved to be a "double-edged sword" for fledgling air forces. On one hand, the idea that air power could prove the decisive factor in future wars provided a potent argument for the advocates of air power to justify its funding and, more importantly, the ongoing independence of air forces. On the other hand, the theories themselves "provided their opponents with the means to refute them,"[16] since they were often overstated, and the concepts they developed were still, in some cases, decades ahead of what contemporary technology could achieve.[17] As a result,

10. David McIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 630–31.

11. David E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919–1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); and Garden, "Air Power: Theory and Practice," 142–43.

12. Stephens, *The Royal Australian Air Force*, 25.

13. Greenhous and Halliday, 41; see also Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 170–79.

14. Harrison, "Royal New Zealand Air Force," 459.

15. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude,* 11.

16. Ibid, 7.

17. A good example of this is Douhet's concept of the "battleplane." Douhet, 117–20. For further examples, see McIsaac, 634–35.

the theories remained largely untested.[18] Furthermore, the potential significance of air power provided an additional incentive for generals and admirals to attempt to maintain control over air assets.[19]

The Second World War provided a testing ground for several of the theories developed in the early 1920s, initially yielding many disappointing results for the advocates of strategic bombardment. Instead of having the effect of spreading "terror and havoc," the bombing of London during the Blitz (1940–41) and of Germany (1941–43) had the overall effect of strengthening the resolve of civilian populations. "During the early years of World War II," wrote Stephens, "the apparent failure of strategic bombing to meet its supporters' claims damaged the credibility of air power generally."[20]

The Second World War promoted the development of air power in a different way, however. The course of the war saw the development, application and refinement of most of the contemporary roles of air power. These included recognition of the importance of air supremacy,[21] the development of close air support (CAS) to land forces, the role of aeroplanes in the protection of SLOCs, and the development of tactics for air-to-air combat.[22] Finally, the atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the close of the war reinvigorated the debate about the potential of strategic bombing and whether or not the theory had gained a renewed applicability in the atomic age. As Mader observed: "In sum, the Second World War witnessed the emergence of modern air power and laid the foundation for the broad spectrum of roles evolving in its aftermath."[23]

Despite the many lessons the proponents of air power learned during WWII, the experience of the interwar period and the early stages of the war itself provoked scepticism regarding the utility of written theory. The intense criticism that early conceptual thinkers had attracted combined with the early failure of strategic bombing during the war and the ongoing gap between technology and theory (which, despite narrowing, persisted to the war's end) made most air force personnel reluctant to commit their thoughts to paper.[24] Ongoing concerns about being absorbed back into armies and navies appear to have reinforced this aversion, and the prospect of attracting unnecessary criticism from army and naval officers dissuaded many within air forces from recording theoretical developments. The result was that within Western air forces, including the three studied, a strong oral (rather than written) tradition of passing lessons from senior to junior officers developed.[25]

Despite this tradition, during the cold war the RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF often adopted RAF and USAF tactical and operational doctrine, subject to its existence. As a result, in the case of the RAAF, this practice "proved a disincentive to the independent development of air power strategic thought."[26] The effect was similar in New Zealand, even though New Zealand's small size meant that

18. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 5–9.

19. Stephens, *The Royal Australian Air Force,* 25–26.

20. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 8–9.

21. Air supremacy exists where enemy air power cannot present a threat to one's own forces or territory. Ian McFarling, *Air Power Terminology,* 2nd ed. (Canberra: The Aerospace Centre, 2001), 10.

22. Richard P. Hallion, "The Second World War as a Turning Point in Air Power," in *Air Power History* (see note 4), 93–124.

23. Mader, 108.

24. There was, of course, much debate about the potential role of nuclear weapons during this period, with much of it related to notions of strategic bombardment. However, participation in the written aspect of the debate by members of Western air forces was sparse. Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy* (see note 10), 735–78, esp. 736–37.

25. Although it has often been observed that air forces have historically been inclined to have oral rather than written traditions of developing and disseminating ideas, little research has actually been done about why this is the case. One of the few studies to offer some explanation, Futrell's analysis of early conceptual thinking in the USAF, suggests that the nature of air forces tend to attract people with an "active" rather than "literary" focus. According to Futrell, an existing propensity to eschew written theory was greatly exacerbated by the heavy criticism the few prominent interwar air power theorists attracted. Robert Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine*, vol. 1, *Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, 1989), 2–3.

26. Kavanagh and Schubert, 2–3.

allied doctrine had limited applicability at best.[27] At the military-strategic level, almost all of the few doctrinal publications produced by the RAF and USAF during the cold war were not applicable to the RAAF, RCAF or RNZAF since they related to the deployment of nuclear weapons that the three smaller air forces did not possess.[28]

Of the three air forces, the closest any came to maintaining an ongoing, written institutional strategy during the cold war was the RCAF. However, updates and alterations to its strategy were ad hoc and undertaken primarily to ensure the Air Force could continue to meet Canada's NORAD commitments. As a result, the strategy was heavily focused on interoperability, to the detriment of RCAF doctrinal development.[29]

The unification of the Canadian Forces in 1968 warrants mention at this juncture in relation to its effect on the RCAF. As mentioned above, a long-standing concern within all three air forces was the possibility they might be reabsorbed into armies and navies. In Canada, unification effectively had the same result; that the RCAF was divided between the unified CF's newly established "commands" rather than being divided between the army and navy was merely a detail. Since the Mulroney Government reintroduced a limited form of separation of the services in the mid-1980s, however, there has been little evidence that the RCAF has continued to be wary about the potential division of its assets into the other CF commands, and this concern does not seem to be as prominent as one might suspect.[30] Rather, the key ongoing effect of unification on the RCAF with regard to doctrine development has been to heighten the prominence of "communities" within the Air Force.

Communities refer to the different capability components that constitute an air force or, more accurately, to the attitudes of the individuals within them. Just as armies have corps and regiments and navies have different classes of ships to perform different roles, so too are air forces comprised of different components, each charged with performing a different primary role. Examples of air force communities based on these components include the personnel primarily involved with the flight and maintenance of "fast-jets" (mostly fighter aircraft), surveillance aircraft, helicopters, tactical (or battlefield) and strategic transport aircraft, and so on. Furthermore, other communities exist that overlap these component-based groupings. These additional communities may be based on occupation (such as maintenance personnel, logisticians, pilots, etc.) or on the type of service an individual renders (such as Reserve or Regular service).[31] Although these divisions exist in most air forces, including all three studied here, in Canada, unification had the effect of increasing the significance of the division between the Air Force's capability-based communities.

This was most likely because unification divided the former RCAF units between the CF's six new commands according to capability. Maritime Command, for example, was assigned the former RCAF antisubmarine and other maritime-based assets, Mobile Command the CAS assets, and Air

27. Shaun Clarke, *Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations* (Canberra: Aerospace Centre, 2001), 76.

28. On RAF and USAF doctrine development during the cold war, see Mader, 105–12; and Johnny R. Jones, *Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1947–1992* (Maxwell: Air University Press, April 1997).

29. On NORAD, see Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), esp. 15–17; and Joseph Jockel, "NORAD: Interoperability at 'The Zenith,'" in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability* (see this note), 126–34.

30. Interview with a retired RCAF general officer, conducted in Ottawa, August 22, 2008, supplemented by email correspondence received December 15, 2008. Quoting Douglas Bland, Allan English offered a possible explanation for the RCAF's recent nonchalance in this regard: "Bland tells us that 'few senior officers would be so bold as to advocate the dismantling of a rival service, at least overtly,' because they understand that 'appearing to share scarce resources protects them from criticism.'" Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 105.

31. Allan English and John Westrop, *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations* (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Production Section, 2007), 156–227.

Transport Command the strategic and some tactical-lift assets.[32] Although the period of such stark division was short-lived (the amalgamation of Air Defence and Air Transport Commands into Air Command in 1975, accompanied by the amalgamation of all other Canadian air assets into this new command regardless of their primary function, provided a foundation upon which an air force culture could be rebuilt),[33] it nonetheless had ongoing ramifications for doctrine development, which will be discussed below.

Finally, the application of air power during the 1991 Gulf War substantially furthered the development of air power theory shortly after the opening of the period studied. During the 1990s, theoretical developments that emerged in the wake of the Gulf War influenced the content of the doctrine produced by all three air forces studied. Regarding the Gulf War itself, Mader asserted:

> The contribution of the allied air forces to the campaign proved to be more than a supporting role and was in fact interpreted by many as a war-winning role. Airmen were henceforth considered to be equal partners to their military and maritime counterparts in the all-arms high-intensity warfare. Finally, it appeared, military aviation could apply its technological edge to a degree which proved decisive, and live up to early 20th century imaginations.[34]

Largely responsible for the debate about air power's new-found decisiveness was the widespread use of precision-guided munitions in both tactical and strategic roles. The use of these munitions was a major contributing factor to the emergence of the RMA debate during the early 1990s, which focused primarily on technological advances that were perceived as somehow radical.[35]

Most importantly of all, however, the Gulf War led to the re-emergence of the theoretical debate about the role of air power at a time when military-strategic doctrine development was beginning to become the norm in Western militaries.[36] The result was described by Mader as "the emancipation of air power."[37] In the RAAF especially, although also to a noticeable degree in the RCAF and RNZAF, this emancipation meant that during the early 1990s there was an increasing willingness on the part of air force officers to discuss in writing what it was that they did, and how and why they did it. It is against this background that the initial development of military-strategic air power doctrine proceeded.

Military-Strategic Air Power Doctrine Emerges, 1987–1997

One of the key similarities between armies, navies and air forces in Australia, Canada and New Zealand is that none published military-strategic doctrine prior to 1987. While the exact reasons for this vary between services, the RAAF stands out as one of the first services to have begun work on

32. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 251.

33. Ibid., 261.

34. Mader, 117.

35. Given the more limited role that air power has played in the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the RMA debate, and the role it envisaged for air power, now seems to have been somewhat overstated from the outset. However, while the RMA concept has always had its critics, it has not attracted the same depth of sustained criticism as similarly overstated theories of strategic bombardment did during the 1920s and 1930s. Interestingly, one of the most realistic discussions to emerge during the early years of the RMA debate was published in early 1993 in *Australian Defence Force Journal*. The article, by RAAF Group Captain Gary Waters, unashamedly declared that "*Desert Storm* witnessed a revolution in warfare." However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that Waters also made one of the earliest accurate predictions about the role of air power in post-9/11 warfare, observing that "[d]esert warfare does not translate directly across to guerrilla warfare in mountainous and jungle terrain, where even with air superiority, the contribution of air power to ground battles may be quite limited." Had he used the term "urban" instead of "jungle," Waters would have been spot on. Gary Waters, "Conclusions for Doctrine from the Air War in the Gulf," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 98 (January/February 1993): 37.

36. In the case of the RAF, it has been argued that the role air power played in the Gulf War was the decisive factor in the subsequent decision to produce military-strategic doctrine. See Sebastian Cox and Sebastian Ritchie, "The Gulf War and UK Air Power Doctrine and Practice," in *Air Power History* (see note 4), 287–300.

37. Mader, 104.

military-strategic doctrine. Indeed, the initial development of *AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual* commenced in mid-1987, although the first edition was not released until August 1990.[38]

The primary motive underlying the comparatively early development of the RAAF's doctrine was recognition of the need to create a common foundation for the education of its personnel about their profession.[39] As Stephens observed, the traditional emphasis of the RAAF's professional education programmes "was largely practical and contemporary, and was not the same thing as examining the RAAF's theoretical raison d'être and the basis of air power."[40] Beginning in the early 1970s, this emphasis had slowly begun to change, primarily as a result of the decision in 1971 to send a few officers to the USAF War College each year. Over time, this led to the emergence within the RAAF of "a group of scholars with a deep theoretical and practical knowledge of air power."[41] As this group grew in size, and its members' careers progressed, their influence gradually brought about the impetus towards reform of PME within the RAAF.

This educational reform was accompanied by military-strategic doctrine development because doctrine was viewed as a means for RAAF personnel to be enlightened about and aligned with the nature and role of air power.[42] Partly because of the link to education, the doctrine development process involved the production of numerous research and discussion papers and, uniquely amongst the doctrine publications studied herein, the development process itself was well documented.[43]

The other motive for the production of research and study papers during the development of *The Air Power Manual* was the lessons learned from an earlier unsuccessful attempt by the RAAF to produce military-strategic doctrine. That attempt had begun in the early 1980s and had quickly become the victim of the involvement of too many contributors and the lack of an overarching Australian strategic framework to guide its development. As a result, the project "simply ran out of steam" and was cancelled in early 1984.[44] When it was resurrected in 1987 by Air Marshal R. G. Funnell, Chief of the Air Staff, the primary writing team was limited to a core group of three senior officers in order to prevent the same thing from impeding doctrine development a second time. Due to the link to be fostered between education and doctrine, two of the appointed writing team members had graduated from the USAF War College and the third from the RAF Staff College.[45]

In addition to the desire of some of the RAAF's senior officers to educate other personnel about the organization's theoretical and philosophical raison d'être, three additional factors drove the RAAF's doctrine development. The first was developments in Australia's strategic policy, which, following the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper, was finally comprehensive enough to provide a framework within which RAAF doctrine could be located.[46] The second factor was the perceived need to inform those in Australia's broader defence community about the RAAF and what it did. This factor was particularly salient following the release of the Dibb Report, and it was observed:

38. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual*, 1st ed. (RAAF Base Fairbairn: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, August 1990).

39. Kavanagh and Schubert, 9–10.

40. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 185.

41. Ibid., 185–86.

42. Kavanagh and Schubert, 13.

43. In 1989, two articles published in *Australian Defence Force Journal* discussed the framework used to develop *AAP 1000*. These were reproduced in 1990, along with four other articles based on the content of *AAP 1000*, as *Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 71*. During the period *AAP 1000* was being developed, Alan Stephens, a former RAAF pilot, provided a broader historical grounding by developing (and subsequently publishing) a PhD dissertation about "ideas, strategy and doctrine in the RAAF." Kavanagh and Schubert, 13–18; Brian Kavanagh, "One-a-Penny, Two-a-Penny …" *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 76 (May/June 1989): 3–10; Gary Waters, ed., *RAAF Air Power Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 71 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1990); and interview with staff of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, conducted in Canberra, August 24, 2007.

44. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 187.

45. These officers were Wing Commanders Brian Kavanagh, David Schubert and Gary Waters. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 190.

46. Kavanagh and Schubert, 3.

> Dibb's strategy of denial and his threat assessment created a doctrinal challenge for the RAAF. By emphasizing a defensive strategy and low-level contingencies, Dibb raised doubts, at least in some Air Force minds, about the RAAF's raison d'être, especially in relation to independent strike operations. That concern seemed justified. Dibb had questioned the utility of the RAAF's strategic strike and interdiction forces in dealing with the most likely (low-level) threats he perceived, and it was with apparent reluctance that he had recorded his "inclination" to recommend the retention of the fleet of F-111 bombers.[47]

The final factor driving the RAAF's early doctrinal development was the re-emergence of the RAAF's old fears of being devolved back into the other services. Largely responsible for kick-starting this resurgence was the 1987 decision to remove the RAAF's rotary-wing tactical-lift capabilities and give their operational control to the Army.[48]

Against this backdrop, the RAAF not only developed a comprehensive military-strategic doctrine, but it also established the Air Power Studies Centre as an intellectual think tank for furthering the philosophical and theoretical development of Australian air power. This establishment amounted to nothing less than a major cultural shift within the RAAF towards a culture of expressing conceptual developments in writing, then formally accepting selected developments by incorporating them into doctrine. Air Marshal Funnell's role in instituting this change should not be overlooked; he was personally responsible for initiating the establishment of the Air Power Studies Centre, and he subsequently had a high degree of influence during the development of the first edition of *AAP 1000*.[49] Since its inauguration in August 1989, the Air Power Studies Centre (since renamed the Air Power Development Centre) has published several works on air power and has also been responsible for undertaking regular updates of RAAF military-strategic doctrine.[50]

The first edition of RAAF doctrine was particularly successful in achieving the goal of educating RAAF members and the general public about the theoretical and philosophical raison d'être underlying Australian air power. This was as much due to the strategy the RAAF used for distributing and raising awareness of the doctrine as it was due to the content of the doctrine itself. A comprehensive educational programme involving visits to air force bases by members of the Air Power Studies Centre, a high-profile launch by the Chief of the Air Staff, and a wide distribution programme all contributed to the doctrine's success in achieving the goals underlying its development.[51]

The Air Power Manual was not accepted by everyone, however. Several positive comments and reviews by academics, the Minister for Defence, the Governor General and members of overseas air forces were tempered by harsh criticism and, on occasion, outright dismissal from within the Army and RAN.[52]

Running to 273 pages, *The Air Power Manual* was divided into three parts. The first part placed the study in a broader context, examining the nature and characteristics of warfare and air power. In the chapter on air power, a discussion of the nature, characteristics and maxims of air power was un-

47. Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude*, 168.

48. Ibid., 188.

49. Ibid., 187.

50. The RAAF Air Power Studies Centre and the role it played in furthering the awareness of air power within the Australian community was a great success. Eventually, this success contributed to the establishment of equivalent organizations within Australia's other services—the Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre, established in 1997, and the RAN's Sea Power Centre, established in 1999 (the latter was preceded by a limited maritime studies programme funded by RAN since 1990). As a result of the endeavours of these three studies centres, the material available on Australian doctrine development has been far more comprehensive, coherent and easily accessible than is the case in the other countries studied.

51. Ibid., 194.

52. Ibid.

dertaken, and three types of air campaign were established: control of the air, air bombardment and air support for combat forces. Of these, air control was deemed to be the "prime campaign" an air force should undertake, as "[t]he possession of control of the air does not of itself guarantee success; however, its absence generally accompanies failure."[53]

The second part moved the general discussion from the first part to within the Australian context and greatly elaborated on the different types of air force operations. In the early chapters within this part, the strategy established by the 1987 Defence White Paper was clearly influential.[54] In the final part, perhaps the most important for driving future developments, the RAAF's doctrine process was established. As part of this process, responsibility for reviewing and updating RAAF doctrine was delegated, effectively enshrining RAAF doctrine at an institutional level.[55] As a result, the RAAF almost instantaneously transformed from an institution with no military-strategic doctrine to one with an ongoing doctrine development process akin to that of the Australian Army, although the RAAF's process was more explicitly stated. Hence, it could be said that the first edition of *The Air Power Manual* represents more than just doctrine; it is symbolic of a significant shift in the RAAF's institutional culture.

The first edition of *The Air Power Manual* was the only air force military-strategic doctrine publication produced in any of the three countries studied prior to the 1991 Gulf War. Although the RAAF and RNZAF did not directly participate in the war (by contrast, the RCAF contributed a squadron plus of CF18s that flew combat missions over Kuwait, Iraq and the Persian Gulf),[56] they were nonetheless affected by its outcome and the possible consequences it presented for the future application of air power.

Given the significant effect the Gulf War had on the development of air power theory during the early 1990s, it is interesting that air power doctrine produced in all three countries during this period mentioned the Gulf War and subsequently proclaimed RMA only in passing, if at all. Indeed, more frequently than not the concept was avoided altogether. This is true of the first air force military-strategic doctrine publication produced following the Gulf War—the *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*—released in November 1992. Divided into 11 chapters, the *Statement* avoided reference to the Gulf War or the RMA, instead briefly discussing "contemporary, new and emerging technologies that influence warfare in the air environment" in its final chapter. This discussion barely filled three pages.[57]

The remainder of the *Statement* tended more towards a discussion of the theoretical aspects of air power and, similarly to *The Air Power Manual*, its opening chapters discussed the nature of air power and warfare itself, outlining the types of warfare, its levels and fundamental principles. The hierarchy of air campaigns, operations and roles it established was almost identical to *The Air Power Manual*, leading one to conclude that the Australian publication was highly influential in the development of this discussion. However, the *Statement* differed from *The Air Power Manual* by including a subsequent elaboration about the nature of military doctrine and the "purpose of national defence forces."[58]

In its latter chapters, the *Statement* went on to discuss the force structures and equipment associated with air warfare. Finally, it established guidelines for equipping an air force. In addition to the influence of Australian doctrine, the influence of New Zealand's defence policy was also clearly evident. For example, the *Statement* elaborated on the 1991 Defence White Paper's ill-defined concept

53. RAAF, *AAP 1000*, 1st ed., 33.
54. Ibid., Chapters 3–4.
55. Ibid., Chapter 12.
56. Greenhous and Halliday, 154.
57. MOD, RNZAF, *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*, November 24, 1992, Chapter 11.
58. Ibid., Chapters 2–7.

of a credible minimum defence force,[59] attempting to refine the term and explain the RNZAF's role in helping provide it.[60]

Despite the merits of its discussion, it appears that the *Statement* was not widely circulated. Indeed, there is some doubt as to whether it was circulated at all, even within the RNZAF, and only scarce evidence of its distribution and impact (if it had any) exists. Instead of revising it, sometime during the 1990s, the RNZAF began informally deferring to a mixture of Australian and British military-strategic aerospace doctrine. In the late 1990s, the decision was made to officially defer to RAAF military-strategic doctrine, possibly because at the time the decision was made it was more up to date than the British equivalent.[61] Despite occasional calls for a new military-strategic air power doctrine publication to be developed within New Zealand,[62] deferral to the RAAF remained RNZAF practice until the conclusion of the period studied.

Interestingly, despite a dearth in the formal development of doctrine, a few RNZAF officers continued to further the conceptual development of air power in the New Zealand context throughout the 1990s. Similar to the effect the exchange postings to the USAF War College had within the RAAF during the 1970s and 1980s, the most notable of these developments occurred as a result of exchange postings to the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, the first of which occurred in 1994.[63]

The result of the inaugural exchange was the production by Squadron Leader Stuart Mackenzie of a monograph titled *Strategic Air Power Doctrine for Small Air Forces*.[64] Although he discussed several existing air power concepts at length, Mackenzie's key contribution was to establish that "[a]lthough small air forces will have command levels equating to tactical, operational and strategic operations, it is likely that most small air forces effectively operate at only two levels: tactical and strategic." Furthermore, he went on to assert that "[a] scarcity of doctrine at the operational level of war and a lack of air campaign planning experience often results in strategic level doctrine and thinking collapsing down on top of the tactical level."[65] In the RNZAF, it is possible that this process of "collapsing" occurred during the 1990s. If so, Mackenzie's theory goes a long way towards explaining the institutional culture underlying the RNZAF's lack of production of military-strategic doctrine after 1992.

The RAAF, in line with the doctrine development process outlined in the first edition of *The Air Power Manual*, released an updated edition of its doctrine in March 1994.[66] As with the first edition, it was lengthy—totalling 243 pages—although its structure had changed somewhat. This edition was divided into four parts, with the first examining war, doctrine and air power in both the general and Australian contexts. The second part examined the roles of the RAAF in detail, and the third examined support functions such as command and control, personnel, and training. The final part, titled "air power in context," examined the application of air power concepts independently as well as in relation to the maritime and land environments. This change in structure was a result of the motive underlying

59. MOD, *The Defence of New Zealand 1991*, 28-30

60. MOD, RNZAF, *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*, 1.1

61. Email correspondence with a senior RNZAF officer, December 13, 2007.

62. Squadron Leader Donald B. Sutherland, *Unit 49.799 – Research Project: Airpower Doctrine for the RNZAF,* RNZAF Command and Staff College, undated, but circa 1997.

63. This exchange posting has occurred every other year since 1994, with the "RNZAF Fellow" undertaking the exchange in the year following their graduation from Australian Command and Staff College (where they are also posted on exchange). Email correspondence with staff of the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, December 15, 2008.

64. Stuart Mackenzie, *Strategic Air Power Doctrine for Small Air Forces* (Canberra: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, 1994). Of note, Mackenzie's work is the only one known to this author to have cited the *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*. Other than its inclusion in Mackenzie's bibliography, there is no evidence to indicate the *Statement* was ever distributed.

65. Ibid., 43.

66. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual*, 2nd ed. (RAAF Base Fairbairn: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, March 1994).

the production of the second edition of *The Air Power Manual*: it was published primarily to address feedback received about the first edition.[67]

The final military-strategic air force doctrine publication released during the "decade of uncertainty" was the RCAF publication *Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces*, dated July 20, 1997.[68] Although this was almost seven years after the RAAF had first released its military-strategic doctrine, the RCAF had nonetheless undertaken some doctrine development during the intervening period.

A good starting point for analysis of Canadian air power doctrine development is the unification of the CF in 1968, as this dissolved the components of the RCAF into the six newly established CF commands. With this division, the organization formerly responsible for Canadian air power doctrine development was eliminated, although no indication was given as to which organization would replace it. As a result, virtually no air power doctrine, including that designed to guide the tactical level of conflict, was produced until the creation of Air Command in 1975. Even after this, doctrine development progressed slowly. The first noteworthy air power doctrine published after unification, B-GA-283-000/FP-000, *Conduct of Air Operations*, was not released until June 1981.[69] This publication was, however, only an update to a pre-1968 publication, and its scope and utility were severely limited.[70]

In 1984, Lieutenant-General Paul Manson, then Commander Air Command, convened a conference to address "the fragmented state of aerospace doctrine."[71] The outcome of the conference was the establishment of an Aerospace Doctrine Board (ADB) in 1986, which quickly endorsed a new doctrine hierarchy. From the outset, this hierarchy included a keystone doctrine, which was published in 1989 under the title B-GA-400-000/FP-000, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*.[72]

Although its initial chapters included brief explanations of military doctrine, "Canadian strategic doctrine" (strategic policy), the principles of war, and the relationship between war and the nation, as far as this study is concerned, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* did not constitute military-strategic doctrine.[73] There are two reasons for this classification decision. Firstly, the doctrine never had a public relations role, as its distribution seems to have been limited to within the CF, even though it is unlikely that it ever had a "restricted" status. Secondly, and more importantly, it was observed that the entire doctrine hierarchy, including *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, failed to sufficiently address strategic considerations, "in particular space and strategic aerospace defence."[74]

Following the release of *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, the RCAF's doctrine hierarchy fell into a state of disrepair, largely due to the lack of manpower and expertise available to maintain the hierarchy's currency on an ongoing basis.[75] As a result, RCAF doctrine development again waned during the early

67. Email correspondence with staff of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, May 5, 2009.

68. DND, B-GA-400-000/AF-000, *Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces*, July 20, 1997. Two copies of *Out of the Sun* were obtained during research for this study. While both are otherwise identical, one is dated July 20, 1997, and the other is dated July 20, 1998. As no other discrepancies between the two copies could be found, it is assumed that the later version is a reprint of the earlier one, rather than an updated edition. Given the edition with the later date is spiral-bound and was found in a box in the library basement at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, it is highly likely that it was reproduced as a textbook for a Land Forces Command and Staff College course. Why the date was changed when no other amendments were made remains a mystery. The copy with the earlier date, obtained electronically with the help of an officer posted to the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, is, therefore, referred to exclusively throughout this study.

69. Canada, DND, B-GA-283-000/FP-000, *Conduct of Air Operations*, June 1, 1981.

70. "The Evolution of CF Aerospace Doctrine," Annex A, in Westrop, 39.

71. Ibid.

72. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, June 30, 1989. This is the same title given to USAF military-strategic doctrine, indicating the prominent influence this allied air force had on RCAF doctrinal thinking during this period.

73. Ibid., Chapters 1–3.

74. "The Evolution of CF Aerospace Doctrine," in Westrop, 40.

75. Ibid., 41.

1990s. At the military-strategic level, this was most likely compounded by additional factors, most prominently the lack of Canadian strategic policy guidance during the period.

Even after the *1994 Defence White Paper* finally provided some respite from Canada's strategic policy uncertainty, the RCAF continued to suffer from a declining budgetary allocation. Although the White Paper had established a requirement for "[t]he retention of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces,"[76] it also shifted the operational emphasis towards the Army. As a result of this new emphasis, the RCAF's budget fell from $C3 billion in 1994 to $C2.2 billion in 1998.[77]

Furthermore, it is likely that the RCAF's lack of military-strategic doctrine development during the early 1990s was compounded by the close link between the Air Force and its US counterpart. As Allan English observed, "the Canadian Air Force has moved its culture closer to its American cousin's than have the other two Canadian services to their American analogues."[78] In the early 1990s, it is likely that this led to an inclination to refer to USAF military-strategic doctrine in preference to undertaking doctrine development domestically.[79]

Despite these factors, the eventual catalyst for the production of *Out of the Sun* was a meeting of the ADB in October 1994, at which it was determined that a replacement for *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* was required. This was because *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* "lacked consistency and balance, perpetuated 'stove piping,' and did not reflect current thinking about air power."[80] Although this determination was made in late 1994, it took almost three years for a replacement publication to be developed, the delay primarily resulting from "organizational friction" within Air Command Headquarters.[81] Furthermore, when production finally did occur, it was rushed so that something could be published in time for the 1997 Aerospace Power Conference. The result, *Out of the Sun,* "was based primarily upon a précis on air power theory developed at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto."[82]

From the outset, *Out of the Sun* encountered a multitude of problems, which ultimately led to its failure. The first of these problems was that (as had been the case with *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*) there was no authority charged with distributing, publicizing, updating or maintaining it. Abetting this problem was the unique format of *Out of the Sun*, which was originally released as a unilingual publication without a National Defence Index of Documentation (NDID) number, meaning that it could not be traced or ordered through official channels.[83]

The second problem *Out of the Sun* encountered was that its content was intellectually questionable. Ten chapters in length, it began in the same way as its RAAF and RNZAF counterparts,

76. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 14.

77. Greenhous and Halliday, 156.

78. English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 95.

79. Westrop, iv. A revised edition of USAF *AFDD1: Basic Doctrine* was released in 1992. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Manual 1-1*, vol 1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington DC: Headquarters USAF, March 1992); Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Manual 1-1*, vol 2, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington DC: Headquarters USAF, March 1992).

80. "The Evolution of CF Aerospace Doctrine," in Westrop, 41. "Stove piping" is defined as "the condition that exists when staff or support personnel forget that they are subordinate to a line commander," instead, following instructions from higher up within the staff or support branch hierarchy. Richard Szafranski, "Desert Storm Lessons from the Rear," *Parameters* 21, no. 4 (Winter 1991–92): 45. See also Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the US Air Force* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), xiii–xix. In the case of the Canadian Air Force, its stovepipes were divided along similar lines to its various capability-based community groups, with loyalties being directed upward within each community. English and Westrop, 156–58.

81. Information obtained via email correspondence with a senior RCAF officer, May 6, 2009.

82. Paul Johnston, "Canopy Glint," 83. The document on which *Out of the Sun* was based was titled *ACSP-1 Air Doctrine Manual*. "The Evolution of CF Aerospace Doctrine," in Westrop, 41.

83. Johnston, "Canopy Glint," 84. At some point since its original release, *Out of the Sun* has been allocated an NDID number, as the version obtained for this study was labelled B-GA-400-000/AF-000.

describing key terminology—in this case, the principles of war and the principles of aerospace power.[84] Following this, the bulk of *Out of the Sun* discussed the spectrum of air force operations under three headings: air combat, supporting air and sustainment operations.[85] It was this aspect of *Out of the Sun* that attracted the most criticism, particularly as the accompanying definitions it gave were often simplistic and occasionally contradictory.[86] Furthermore, *Out of the Sun* failed to explain the rationale underlying the existence of Canada's Air Force. As Paul Mitchell noted, "*Out of the Sun* tells one how the air force seeks to accomplish its missions, but not why, nor more importantly, why this is critical to Canada as a nation."[87] Because of this omission, *Out of the Sun* failed to achieve one of military-strategic doctrine's key objectives.

Finally, *Out of the Sun* fell victim to the strong influence capability-based communities had within the RCAF. Indeed, the content of *Out of the Sun* provoked the objection of elements within almost all of the RCAF's capability-based communities. As a result, the majority of the Air Force itself failed to embrace the doctrine, and like the *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*, its effect—if it had one—is barely noticeable.[88] Following the 1997 Aerospace Power Conference, *Out of the Sun* appears to have been unofficially relegated to use as an instruction manual at CFC. As Johnston asserted: "there is scant evidence that it is ever used or referred to by anyone actually applying air power."[89]

The Divergence of Air Power Doctrine Development, 1997–2007

From 1987 to 1997, the RAAF was the only one of the three air forces studied to successfully produce, distribute, implement and update its doctrine. Although the RCAF and RNZAF produced military-strategic doctrine, there is evidence of only limited distribution, and furthermore, it appears that the doctrine failed to gain traction within the air forces themselves. As Codner asserted about RAF doctrine (although his argument also applies to the three air forces studied): "Air force doctrine has a function of explaining to the unconvinced the utility and effectiveness of centrally directed air power."[90] Due to the failure of many within the RCAF and the RNZAF to embrace their doctrine during the early and mid-1990s, it is unsurprising that the doctrine produced by these air forces failed to achieve this key objective.

Throughout the decade from 1997 to 2007, military-strategic doctrine development within the three air forces diverged greatly. In the case of the RAAF and RCAF, the content of the doctrine they produced was markedly different, although the intended effects of their doctrine remained similar. As stated above, following the release of the *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement* in 1992, the RNZAF did not produce a second military-strategic doctrine publication during the period studied. In the late 1990s, its decision to defer to RAAF doctrine in place of undertaking further domestic doctrine development became official.[91]

Because of this decision, the conceptual development of air power in the New Zealand context informally fell onto the shoulders of a few RNZAF officers. Following Squadron Leader Mackenzie's precedent, Wing Commander Shaun Clarke's book *Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations* (published in 2001) presented a unique contribution to the air power debate in the RNZAF context.[92]

84. DND, *Out of the Sun,* Chapter 3.

85. Ibid., Chapters 8–10.

86. Johnston, "Canopy Glint," 84–85.

87. Paul Mitchell, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Canadian Air Force," in *Air Power at the Turn of the Millennium*, eds. David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Andre Beauregard (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), 43.

88. Interview with a senior Canadian Air Force officer, conducted at the Royal Military College of Canada, May 24, 2007.

89. Johnston, "Canopy Glint," 83.

90. Codner, "British Maritime Doctrine and National Military Strategy," 89.

91. Email correspondence with a senior RNZAF officer, December 13, 2007.

92. Clarke, *Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations*.

Written in the wake of the air power theoretical developments of the 1990s and the 1999 air war in the Balkans—which had substantially furthered the notion that air power was now capable of achieving the strategic results its early proponents had envisaged—Clarke's work was understandably optimistic about the advantages air power could offer small states.[93] His central thesis was:

> A fundamental re-examination of the nature of war and the utility of air strikes reveals the possibility that what has been popularly perceived as the standard shape of strategic bombing operations is actually just the superpower interpretation. … History reveals a handful of campaigns … which have directly pursued very high order strategic aims with quite limited air campaigns. The suggestion that some form of strategic air strike might be achievable by small nations and small coalitions is thus made. … The challenge this thesis puts to small nations is to raise the strategic order of air strike operations—to prepare not just for the direct and indirect support of fielded battle, but for the exploitation of opportunity to more directly influence the ultimate strategic aims of conflict.[94]

In making this assertion, Clarke's thesis constituted an original contribution that had the potential to significantly promote the development of RNZAF doctrine.

However, before the RNZAF had the opportunity to debate Clarke's work in detail, or take steps towards incorporating his ideas into doctrine, the recently elected Labour Government made the decision in mid-2001 to scrap New Zealand's air combat capability in order to free up funding for other priorities.[95] The result was that the RNZAF lost one of its three primary roles (as Clarke had observed, air power has "three generic applications," these being reconnaissance, transport and the destruction of the enemy).[96] Suddenly, the RNZAF found its role changed from that of potential combat multiplier to exclusively that of a combat enabler.

Given this sudden shift, the traditional air force fear of being reabsorbed into the army and navy soon spread through the RNZAF. A second prominent publication, released the year after the decision to scrap New Zealand's air combat capability was announced, is somewhat revealing. The publication—titled *Air Force or Air Corps? Does New Zealand Need an Independent Air Force in a Joint Environment?*—not surprisingly concluded that "New Zealand should retain an independent air force, not because of any specific aircraft type or role, but because an air force adds strength, flexibility and utility to the NZDF as a whole."[97] While these fears appeared to have receded by the close of 2007, the RNZAF nonetheless continued to defer to RAAF doctrine in place of developing its own.

On a related note, an interesting question arises over whether the existence of well-publicized and up-to-date military-strategic doctrine may have prevented the government's decision to scrap the air combat capability. What little evidence there is suggests it is more likely that in New Zealand's case the existence of well-publicized and up-to-date doctrine would not have been able to save the air combat capability.

As it was, the *Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability*, released in February 2001, conducted a comprehensive survey of New Zealand's air combat capability within the broader strategic context. It is clear that the authors of the report had a comprehensive understanding of the role of a

93. For details of the air war in the Balkans, see Sebastian Ritchie, "Air Power Victorious? Britain and NATO Strategy during the Kosovo Conflict," in *Air Power History* (see note 4), 318–29; Peter W. Gray, "The Balkans: An Air Power Basket Case?" in *Air Power History* (see note 4), 330–44; and Joel Hayward, "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis," *New Zealand Army Journal*, no. 21 (July 1999): 1–17.

94. Clarke, *Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations*, 179–80.

95. MOD, *Government Defence Statement*, 8–11.

96. Clarke, *Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations*, 6.

97. Andrew Clark, *Air Force or Air Corps? Does New Zealand Need an Independent Air Force in a Joint Environment?* (Canberra: RAAF Aerospace Centre, 2002), 97.

country's air combat capability.[98] Their assessment that it was unlikely that in the foreseeable future New Zealand's strategic environment would require the possession of such capability was, therefore, driven by strategic imperatives, rather than by ignorance about what the air combat forces had to offer. In light of this, it is unlikely that the educational effect of doctrine would have altered the government's decision. Although there was possibly an outside chance that a combination of the right personalities in key positions within the RNZAF at the right times, with comprehensive doctrine to support them, might somehow have been able to convince the government to make an alternative decision, it is far more likely that funding constraints combined with an unfavourable hierarchy of strategic priorities were simply beyond the RNZAF's control.

The New Zealand government's decision to scrap the air combat capability, therefore, demonstrates one of the limitations of doctrine. While doctrine can be very useful in saving capabilities where they are at risk due to ignorance on behalf of the public or government decision makers, there is little that doctrine can do to save capabilities if decision makers are already well informed and acting in pursuit of bigger-picture economic, political or strategic policy concerns.

For the RAAF and RCAF, 1997 to 2007 did not yield significant changes to the same extent as those that affected the RNZAF. In the case of the RAAF, its doctrine development process (established by the first edition of *The Air Power Manual*) remained in place, leading to the development and release of a third edition of *The Air Power Manual* in February 1998, a fourth in August 2002 and a fifth in March 2007. Given the number of editions, examination of the third and fourth editions will be limited to a brief overview of the major themes in the development and content of each publication. This is done in order to allow analysis to focus on the fifth edition, as this edition embodies a much more significant change in the nature and role of air power doctrine in the Australian context than either of its immediate predecessors.

The most obvious difference between the second and third editions of *The Air Power Manual* was that the length of the publication was cut from 243 to 57 pages.[99] Although this observation may appear rudimentary, it is nonetheless important as the length change is representative of a substantial shift in thinking between the second and third editions. This difference was explained by the Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal L. B. Fisher:

> Unlike the first and second editions of the Manual, the third edition does *not* present the "how to" of air power doctrine. That is, the operational aspects of doctrine have been removed in the interests of presenting our basic philosophy as clearly and concisely as possible [emphasis in original].[100]

In other words, the shortening of the doctrine was designed to make it easier to read and, therefore, increase the scope of its appeal. The "operational aspects" it omitted were to be included instead in a future operational doctrine manual.[101] The omissions included the detailed discussion of air roles and support functions that had encompassed 8 of the second edition's 14 chapters.[102]

As it transpired, the trend of shortening doctrine to increase its appeal was short-lived. The fourth edition ran to a lengthy 367 pages and reintroduced most of the conceptual discussion that had been

98. *Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability* (Wellington: New Zealand Government, February 2001), esp. 10–17.

99. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual*, 3rd ed. (RAAF Base Fairbairn: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, February 1998).

100. L. B. Fisher, "Official Release: The Air Power Manual – Third Edition" in *Testing the Limits: The Proceedings of a Conference Held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, March 1998,* ed. Shaun Clarke (Fairbairn: Air Power Studies Centre, 1998), 3.

101. Ibid., 3–5.

102. RAAF, *AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual,* 2nd ed., Chapters 5–12.

omitted from the third edition.[103] More important than this reversal was a change in terminology represented by a name change to the fourth edition, which was titled *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power*. The shift in terminology from "air power" to "aerospace power" was designed to facilitate a broadening of the doctrinal scope, as discussion of the term aerospace could also encompass the area above the Earth's atmosphere.[104]

Despite the change in terminology, *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power* elaborated on similar themes to those discussed in its predecessors, and many of the differences between it and previous editions appear unrelated to terminology. For example, the update to its discussion of "the characteristics of aerospace power" was ostensibly motivated by reaction to the layout of previous editions:

> In previous editions of aerospace power doctrine, the characteristics of aerospace power were portrayed as either strengths or weaknesses, implying that they were absolute. This often resulted in unnecessary and odious comparisons with sea and land power. However, this failed to take into account the context in which aerospace power might be applied. For example, a characteristic that is clearly a strength in one scenario could well be a limitation in another.[105]

When it came to the space component of aerospace, the doctrine discussed the theme only briefly, acknowledging that "cost currently prohibits the RAAF from exploiting the space environment."[106]

In the fifth (2007) edition, the terminology was changed again, from "aerospace" to "air and space." Although this change was made in order to better reflect the different operational requirements of the two environments, the new terminology brought RAAF doctrine into alignment with the USAF *Basic Doctrine*, which had referred to "air and space" in both its 1997 and 2003 editions.[107]

Unlike the second, third and fourth editions of RAAF military-strategic doctrine, which had all contained substantial but not pioneering conceptual developments, the 2007 edition constituted a major change to the nature and role of RAAF doctrine. Along with this change, and partly the result of it, was the division of the doctrine's structure into three component manuals. The first manual, *AAP 1000-H The Australian Experience of Air Power*, provided a comprehensive history of the RAAF from WWI to the "War Against Terror."[108] The second manual, *AAP 1000–D The Air Power Manual* (which returned the series to its original title), was doctrinal, discussing and developing air and space power concepts and their application in the Australian context.[109] Finally, *AAP 1000-F The Future Air and Space Operating Concept* established the RAAF's "developmental imperatives and preferences primarily from the operational dimension" from roughly 2007 until "about 2025."[110]

For the RAAF's doctrine writers, this division had the benefit of separating the doctrine's historical component from its conceptual component. This was intended to allow future updates to be streamlined, since the separation would allow the conceptual component to be updated without an accompanying need to also rewrite the historical component. More significant, however, was the in-

103. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000 Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power*, 4th ed. (Canberra: RAAF Aerospace Centre, August 2002).

104. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official, conducted at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, August 23, 2007.

105. RAAF, *AAP 1000*, 4th ed., 122.

106. Ibid., 291.

107. Secretary of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine* (Maxwell: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Centre, September 1997); and Secretary of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine* (Maxwell: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Centre, November 17, 2003).

108. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000-H The Australian Experience of Air Power* (Tuggeranong: RAAF Air Power Development Centre, March 2007).

109. DOD, RAAF, *AAP 1000-D The Air Power Manual*, 5th ed. (Tuggeranong: RAAF Air Power Development Centre, March 2007).

110. DOD, RAAF, AAP *1000-F The Future Air and Space Operating Concept* (Tuggeranong: RAAF Air Power Development Centre, March 2007), 1.

clusion of *The Future Air and Space Operating Concept*, as it was the first time any Western air force had incorporated into its keystone doctrine a strategic document that worked backwards from a potential future operating environment to current government policy.[111]

Accompanying this innovation was a shift in the doctrine's framework from one that was platform driven (the traditional framework used for developing RAAF doctrine) to one that was capability-effects driven.[112] This was significant for two reasons: first, it reduced the RAAF's reliance on aircraft currently in service to achieve doctrinal aims; second, it facilitated integration between the content of the theoretically inclined *Air Power Manual* and the future-focused *Future Air and Space Operating Concept*.

The RAAF's doctrinal shift from being platform driven to capability-effects driven was also timely in light of Australian strategic policy shifts. Since *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power* had been released in 2002, Australian strategic policy had substantially shifted towards a forward defence posture. To give substance to the philosophical aspects of the policy shift, the 2005 *Defence Update* set aside funding for the purchase of joint strike fighters.[113] Beyond merely confirming the purchase, the 2007 *Defence Update* declared that "one of the highest priorities for the Government is to ensure the Air Force's air combat capability is second to none in our region."[114] In addition to the joint strike fighter, most of the RAAF's fleet was scheduled for replacement during 2008 to 2020.[115] The shift in the doctrinal framework was deliberately designed to help enable the RAAF to manage the transition to its new platforms (the scale of the replacements made the acquisition programme the most substantial modernization in the RAAF's recent history).[116]

It can, thus, be concluded that the RAAF's need to manage the transition to its new platforms was the primary factor driving the development and structure of the 2007 edition of *The Air Power Manual*. The conduct of operations constituted a significant additional influence, and a large portion of *The Air Power Manual* was dedicated to an elaboration about the types and effects of air force operations (it was in this part of the discussion that the capability-effects driven framework was most immediately apparent).[117] Since strategic policy established acquisitions priorities and determined the types of operations the RAAF may have been called upon to conduct, it can be said that strategic policy also had a significant influence over the content of *The Air Power Manual*, although this influence was mostly indirect.[118] Finally, allied doctrine was also influential, with an acknowledgements section noting the guidance provided by RAF and USAF doctrine during the development of *The Air Power Manual*.[119]

Also in 2007, the RCAF released a new doctrine publication titled *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*.[120] Its development was part of a broader transformation programme that began in late 1999. Like both the Canadian Army and Navy, the Air Force had been heavily influenced by the 1999 release of *Strategy 2020*, which was fundamental in driving the early phases of its transformation. Just as the Navy's production of *Leadmark* began as an institutional response to *Strategy 2020*, in 2000 the

111. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official, conducted at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, August 23, 2007.

112. Ibid.

113. DOD, *Defence Update 2005*, 23.

114. DOD, *Defence Update 2007*, 52.

115. Andrew Davies, "ADF Capability Review: Royal Australian Air Force," *Policy Analysis No. 26* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008).

116. Interview with a senior Australian DOD official, conducted at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, August 23, 2007.

117. RAAF, *AAP 1000-D The Air Power Manual*, 5th ed., Chapter 6.

118. The fourth chapter of *The Air Power Manual* elaborated about the link between national strategy and air power, discussing the requirements of Australia's defence strategy in broad terms. It did not mention any specific strategic policy documents, nor did it mention any specific acquisitions. RAAF, *AAP 1000-D The Air Power Manual*, 5th ed., Chapter 4.

119. Ibid., xiii.

120. DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, 2007.

Air Force released its own response to the strategy, titled *Vectors 2020: An Air Force Strategic Assessment*. Primarily, it provided "a series of signposts about air operations in 2020 so as to assist us in developing the air force of the future."[121] Unlike *Leadmark*, which morphed into a comprehensive doctrine during its early development, *Vectors 2020* remained an institutional strategy that linked the Air Force to *Strategy 2020*.

Over the following few years, Air Force transformation was advanced conceptually by the release of two further documents. The first of these was *The Aerospace Capability Framework*, which established a comprehensive short-to-medium-term agenda designed to provide more detail about the early steps in the transformation process.[122] The second document was *Strategic Vectors: The Air Force Transformation Vision*. This document established eight "vectors," which focused on a broad variety of operational, personnel and public relations priorities.[123] While the vectors were broader in scope and substantially less specific than the transformation agenda set within *The Aerospace Capability Framework*, they were also longer-term in their focus.[124] Importantly, both of these documents considered doctrine development to be a central component of transformation.[125]

To understand how doctrine development came to occupy a central role within the RCAF's transformation programme, it is necessary to briefly examine reforms to the Air Force's doctrine development process that commenced shortly after the release of *Out of the Sun*. In 1997, a restructuring of Air Force Headquarters necessitated changes to the ADB, which was renamed the Air Doctrine and Concepts Board (ADCB). At its inaugural meeting in November 1997, the ADCB endorsed a new doctrine hierarchy to replace the hierarchy that had been endorsed in 1986.[126] The progress of events thereafter was later summarized by Colonel John Westrop:

> The inaugural session of the ADCB was convened at NDHQ on 29 Nov 97, and the subsequent (and final) session took place on 26 May 98. Since then there has been little activity by the ADCB; in particular, there has been no progress on developing the "new" hierarchy of aerospace doctrine manuals. Instead, sporadic action has taken place to update some doctrine publications in the "old" hierarchy. With minor exceptions, since the reconfiguration of the ADB into the ADCB, the coherent promulgation of CF aerospace doctrine has virtually ceased.[127]

In December 2000, this situation was formally acknowledged by the Air Force Development Committee, which also proposed a study be conducted to determine a course of action for rectifying the absence of up-to-date Air Force doctrine. In August 2001, an aerospace doctrine study commenced under the direction of Colonel Westrop.[128]

The study's final report, dated 30 April 2002, made several recommendations. Key among these were the creation of an Aerospace Doctrine Authority (ADA) and an aerospace doctrine system framework to allow doctrine to be developed and disseminated, and also to undertake the "research, education, lessons learned, experimentation and simulation, and possibly history and heritage"

121. Canada, DND, *Vectors 2020: An Air Force Strategic Assessment*, 2000, 1.

122. DND, Director General Air Force Development, A-GA-007-000/AF-002, *The Aerospace Capability Framework: A Guide to Transform and Develop Canada's Air Force*, 2003.

123. Canada, DND, A-GA-007-000/AF-004, *Strategic Vectors: The Air Force Transformation Vision*, 2004, 44–52.

124. Ken R. Pennie, "Transforming Canada's Air Force: Vectors for the Future," *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2004–05): 41.

125. DND, A-GA-007-000/AF-002, *The Aerospace Capability Framework*, 64; and DND, A-GA-007-000/AF-004, *Strategic Vectors*, 48–49.

126. "The Evolution of CF Aerospace Doctrine," in Westrop, 41–42.

127. Westrop, v.

128. Ibid., iv–v.

functions associated with the development and application of doctrine.[129] To supplement this, it was also recommended that an Air Force publications centre be established and that the ADA be given a secondary role as the CF aerospace warfare authority, in order to ensure it was operating from a position of authority when developing and disseminating doctrine.[130]

By coincidence, the delivery of the final report of the aerospace doctrine study coincided with the development of the RCAF's transformation programme. The result was that several of the study's recommendations were implemented as a central part of the programme. Most importantly, *The Aerospace Capability Framework* directed the establishment of the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC).[131] The establishment of the Centre was also a key part of the fourth vector contained within *Strategic Vectors*.[132] CFAWC was mandated to develop RCAF doctrine and distribute it as well as to conduct the related research, education, experimentation, simulation, lessons learned and conceptual development functions that had been identified as requirements by the aerospace doctrine study.[133]

Because of this mandate, CFAWC had much in common with the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre. Although this was coincidental, commonalities are especially noticeable regarding the roles both had in the education of air force personnel about their profession and in furthering the philosophical and theoretical development of air power in their national contexts. Furthermore, just as Air Marshal Funnell's influence had been instrumental in the establishment of the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Lieutenant-General Ken Pennie's support for CFAWC was an instrumental factor in its establishment and in determining the broad scope of its mandate.[134]

Following its inauguration in October 2005, CFAWC undertook its educational and theoretical development functions through the commission of studies and, more prominently, through the establishment of the *Canadian Air Force Journal*.[135] Its primary responsibility, however, was the production of doctrine. Work on a new keystone manual commenced immediately after the inauguration of the Centre, leading to the release of *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* in early 2007.[136]

In terms of its content, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* varied substantially from *Out of the Sun*. Although both documents defined key terminology, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* also provided a brief chronological history of Canada's air forces since WWI.[137] The terms and concepts it defined included "doctrine," "national security," "aerospace power," the nature of conflict, and the principles of war.[138]

However, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*'s major conceptual contribution occurred in its fifth chapter, which developed "the functions of Canada's air force."[139] The five functions it developed—sense, shape, move, sustain and command—were derived from the Army's "combat functions," which had constituted a fundamental component of the evolution of Canadian Army conceptual thinking since 2001 (see Chapter 4). This interservice influence was unique amongst the doctrine studied. As the other examples examined testify, single-service doctrine is usually influenced by the equivalent service in allied countries, not by another service in the same country.

129. Ibid., 32.

130. Ibid., 32–34.

131. DND, A-GA-007-000/AF-002, *The Aerospace Capability Framework,* 64.

132. DND, A-GA-007-000/AF-004, *Strategic Vectors*, 48–49.

133. DND, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Concept of Operations (Final)*, June 7, 2005, http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/ConOps/ConOps_e.asp (accessed October 29, 2012).

134. Interview with a senior RCAF officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, August 15, 2008.

135. DND, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre*.

136. Interview with a senior RCAF officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, August 15, 2008.

137. DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine,* Chapter 2.

138. Ibid., Chapters 1, 3–4.

139. Ibid., Chapter 5.

In the case of *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, the Army's influence came about due to a growing feeling within the RCAF during the early 2000s that "the Army and Navy appears [sic] to have been able to make a politically better case for their service than the Air Force has."[140] Despite this feeling, the writing team had initially planned to produce a more typically structured military-strategic doctrine manual that had a similar content to the doctrine produced by other Western air forces. In spring 2006, the writing team was ordered by the Chief of the Air Staff, Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas, to shelve their previous draft as it was felt the traditional concepts were "too inflexible." The writing team was also ordered to instead develop a functions-based approach (this provides a good example of a service chief exerting indirect influence over the content of doctrine).[141] After a brief investigation, Army doctrine was selected as the "blueprint" for this development because Army conceptual development was perceived as comparatively advanced.[142] The land-centric nature of post-9/11 operations (particularly in Afghanistan) and the desire to garner support from the CDS, General Hillier (who had an army background), provided additional incentives for the adaption of an Army operational concept.[143]

Although the decision by the RCAF to adapt an Army operational concept for use within its own doctrine made operational and tactical sense (since the RCAF was primarily supporting Army operations during the post-9/11 period), the decision was not made solely for this reason. Instead, the Air Force's desire to compete with perceived Army conceptual superiority played a major part in the decision. Yet this motive is unsurprising, as it is a variation of one of the more common themes underlying the production of military-strategic doctrine across all three air forces. By couching its doctrine in terms with which the Army would be familiar, the RCAF was attempting to use its doctrine as a means to explain and justify its raison d'être to senior Army officers in a familiar doctrinal language. Although its method and, therefore, its content were unique, the motive underlying the production of *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* was not.

Another significant benefit of the development of the five functions was that the RCAF appears to have been able to successfully tie the roles of its various communities into this broader conceptual model. This served to remove the problem of acceptance encountered following the release of *Out of the Sun*, and *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* appears to have been accepted by the Air Force's community-based groups. Finally, the doctrine was more influential than *Out of the Sun* because it was more widely distributed.[144] Although at the end of the period studied it was still too soon to tell what impact *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* would ultimately have, these factors had already resulted in it achieving greater success than its predecessor.

Summary and Implications: Military-Strategic Air Force Doctrine

An examination of the influences on and intended effects of military-strategic doctrine produced by the RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF from 1987 to 2007 reveals several similarities. As was also the case for the armies and navies (see Chapters 4 and 5), four key influences on doctrine development remained prominent within all three air forces for the entire period. These four influences were the role of individual officers, occasionally in senior positions, but more often as members of doctrine writing teams; the influence of allied doctrinal developments (or in the case of the RCAF after 2005, Canadian Army conceptual developments); the operational experiences of the three air forces; and strategic policy guidance, when it was available.

140. J. L. Christian Carrier, *Transformation of the Canadian Forces: Is Aerospace Power Relevant?* (NSSC 5, Canadian Forces College, June 2003), 20.

141. Email correspondence with senior RCAF officers, January 6, 2009.

142. Interview with a senior RCAF officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, May 24, 2008.

143. Interview with a senior RCAF officer, conducted at the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, August 15, 2008.

144. Ibid.

As was the case for the armies and navies, for the three air forces the relative influence of each of these factors differed between countries and over time, meaning the relative importance of each factor was different for each of the doctrine manuals. The high degree of influence occasionally asserted by service chiefs provides a good example of this variation. Specifically, in the case of both the first edition of *The Air Power Manual* and *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, service chiefs (Air Marshal Funnell and Lieutenant-General Lucas respectively) were highly influential in either enabling the production of doctrine to occur or in indirectly shaping its content. This influence was not as prominent in the case of the other military-strategic air force doctrine publications.

The way in which these service chiefs asserted their influence on the production of doctrine also provides an interesting point of contrast between armies and navies on one hand and air forces on the other. In the case of armies and navies, when service chiefs influenced doctrine production, their influence was usually direct: the chiefs provided personal guidance about what should be included in the doctrine, what its objective(s) should be, or about the military strategy it should establish. The Australian Army's Major General Hickling and the RNZN's Rear Admiral Welch both provide prominent examples of this direct influence. In the case of influential air force chiefs, however, their role was more indirect: their support generated momentum that led to the establishment within each air force of what could be termed an "air power studies and conceptual development centre." These centres then produced and distributed doctrine, with the strong endorsement of the chief.

The reason each of the four key influences identified above was prominent to a different degree during the production of each doctrine publication was the broader political context in which each publication was produced. For example, the RCAF's decision to adapt an army concept for use in its own doctrine was related to both the operational environment (which during the early part of the 21st century was characterized by the pre-eminence of land operations) and by the internal politics surrounding its production. In this case, "internal politics" included the situation within the RCAF (which needed a doctrinal framework acceptable to its capability-based community groups) and within the CF more broadly, which was undertaking a transformation programme under the leadership of General Rick Hillier, who had an army background. Beyond this example, the broader political circumstances are discussed in more detail in the first three chapters.

Another factor that influenced the development of their doctrine was the history and culture of the three air forces. At the opening of the period studied, the cultures of the three air forces were characterized by a strong oral tradition of passing lessons from senior to junior officers. In the RAAF and RCAF, a key motive underlying their doctrine development was the education of their own personnel about the philosophical and theoretical raison d'être underlying the role air forces played in achieving strategic policy objectives. Although there was no evidence of this motive being especially prominent within the RNZAF, its decision to adopt RAAF doctrine in lieu of producing its own ensured it had access to a regularly updated series of military-strategic doctrine publications that were designed with the education of air force personnel in mind.

The role military-strategic air force doctrine was intended to play in the education of air force personnel themselves means the doctrine could be said to be *inward focused*. This is in contrast to both army and navy doctrine, which are primarily downward and upward focused respectively.

The education of air force personnel about the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of their profession was not the only intended effect of military-strategic air force doctrine. Another commonality between the three air forces (including the RNZAF) was that their doctrine was also designed to educate the general public about the role independent air forces had to play in national

strategy. The prominence of this influence did, however, vary between countries and was consistently more influential in the development and distribution of RAAF doctrine.

An interesting contrast did, however, emerge between the motives underlying the production of RAAF and RCAF doctrine towards the end of the period studied. Although the educational role of doctrine (both internal and external) continued to constitute a motive underlying doctrine development, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* and the 2007 edition of *The Air Power Manual* were both motivated by additional factors. In the case of *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine,* it was intended to enable the RCAF to enhance its competitiveness with the Army at the joint planning level and during the formulation of Canadian strategic and acquisitions policy. In the case of *The Air Power Manual,* it was written to enable the RAAF to conceptually adjust to the many new platforms it was set to acquire during the years following the doctrine's release.

The relative weights of the common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic air force doctrine are represented in Figure 5. In this model, solid, thin, black arrows (style 1) represent influences and effects that occurred consistently across countries and publications; dotted, thin, black arrows (style 2) represent indirect influences and effects, or influences and effects that occurred frequently (but not always); and the solid, thick styles 3 and 4 arrows linking doctrine to its educational functions (internal and external) represent the primary inward focus of air force doctrine.



Figure 5. *Common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic air force doctrine*

The discrepancies in the influences on and intended effects of air force doctrine discussed above are also represented within the model by the use of grey (styles 4 to 7) boxes and arrows. The styles 4 and 6 boxes and arrows represent factors that, although applicable to all three air forces, were more prominent in the case of the RAAF. These factors were the education of the general public about the role an independent air force had to play in achieving strategic policy goals, which was a more consistent influence during the development and dissemination of RAAF doctrine, and the role of allied conceptual and doctrinal developments. While the doctrine of allied air forces influenced doctrine development in all three air forces studied (RAF and USAF doctrine was especially influential, although RAAF doctrine was also influential during the production of the *RNZAF Air Power Doctrine Statement*), after 2005 the RCAF was instead influenced primarily by Canadian Army conceptual developments.

This influence during the production of RCAF doctrine after 2005 is represented by the use of style 5 boxes and arrows. The Air Force's desire to influence CF joint planning and Canadian strategic policy formulation, which was one of the primary motives underlying the decision to adapt an Army concept for use within Air Force doctrine, is also shown with style 5. By coincidence, this resulted in a major motive underlying the post-2005 production of RCAF doctrine to align with the primary motive underlying the production of military-strategic naval doctrine.

Most interesting, however, are the style 7 boxes and arrows, which represent the most significant and most consistent intended effect of air force doctrine. These boxes are what doctrine is intended to *generate* within air forces themselves—a culture of evaluating, learning and, most importantly, writing about operational experiences and strategic air concepts. This could then filter back into future doctrine development or into operational conduct (perhaps through the subsequent production of operational and tactical doctrine).

Additionally, the model portrays the role of strategic policy, influential individuals (service chiefs and members of the doctrine writing teams themselves), the academic discourse about air power, and the conduct of operations. Although service chiefs played a less direct role in the development of air force doctrine, their influence—as well as the influence of members of doctrine writing teams and strategic policy—is nonetheless similar enough to the armies and navies studied to enable it to be represented in the same way. While the academic discourse was accorded greater prominence within air force doctrine than within army doctrine, its influence decreased over time, as earlier editions of doctrine allowed internal conceptual development to gain momentum (and, in the case of the post-2005 RCAF, as it was substituted with the adaption of Army conceptual developments).

Due to the nature of air force operations, the link between the operations of the air forces studied and the operations of allied air forces is represented in the same way as the link between army operations is represented in model about army doctrine (see Figure 3). As with armies and navies, air forces have always conducted at least limited evaluations of their operational experiences, and these have generally led to the dissemination of TTP. The link between operational evaluation and higher-level doctrine is, however, still a tenuous one for the air forces studied. Where the link does exist, it is because it has been brought about as part of the written culture earlier editions of doctrine were influential in creating.

Overall, the development of military-strategic air force doctrine by the RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF has been part of an ongoing effort to educate both air force personnel and the broader community about the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of air power. In the case of air force personnel,

this education was intended to encourage a deeper understanding of the theoretical foundations of air power. In the case of the broader community, this education was intended to promote an understanding of why an independent air force was in the national interest. For all three air forces, it was this dual motive that drove the educational focus underlying doctrine development.

Chapter 7

Writing the Little Purple Book: Military-Strategic Joint Doctrine Development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Armed Forces, 1987–2007

Military-strategic doctrine development simply did not occur in Australia, Canada or New Zealand until the RAAF commenced production of a military-strategic doctrine manual in mid-1987. During a decade marked at one end by the RAAF's publication of *The Air Power Manual* in 1990 and at the other by the publication of *RAN Doctrine 1: Australian Maritime Doctrine* in 2000, each of the armies, navies and air forces produced at least one keystone military-strategic doctrine manual. During the early 2000s, the scope of military-strategic doctrine development underwent what was arguably a natural and unsurprising extension. Specifically, it came to encompass the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces in the joint environment. This chapter examines the development of military-strategic joint doctrine within the broader context of the move to jointery[1] within the three armed forces.

In keeping with the previous three chapters, discussion in this chapter describes the doctrine development process, factors that influenced development, the intended effects of each joint doctrine manual and the content of the doctrine itself. However, owing to the late release of joint doctrine (relative to single-service doctrine), this chapter is structured differently than the previous three. The first section discusses definitions of the term "joint," prior to examining the history of the concept in its contemporary context. This sets the foundation for discussion in the second section, which examines the move towards jointery by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces. The third section examines the development of their military-strategic joint doctrine. In conclusion, similarities and differences between doctrine developments in the three armed forces are considered and a model is established to explain the common influences on, and key intended effects of, military-strategic joint doctrine.

An Overview of the Conceptual Evolution of Jointery

The term joint is defined by the *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms* as the "[a]djective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate."[2] Often, the word joint is mistakenly used to describe operations conducted by more than one country (what NATO terms "combined" or "multinational" operations).[3] To avoid confusion, this study uses the NATO definitions throughout.

The use of the NATO definition of joint is also convenient because the definitions promulgated by the three armed forces differ from it only in the semantics of their terminology. Australia and New Zealand define the term joint as connoting "activities, operations, organizations, etc. in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate."[4] The CF definition of joint varies

1. The term "jointery" originated in the UK armed forces. In the US armed forces, the term "jointness" is used instead, although both terms have the same meaning. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, both terms have been used fairly interchangeably. Indeed, selection of terminology has generally been at the discretion of the user, and the coexistence of dual terminology has probably come about because of the ongoing influence both allied militaries have had on the lexicon of all three armed forces. In this study, the term "jointery" is used exclusively, if only to avoid confusion.

2. *NATO-Russia Glossary*, 107.

3. Joel Hayward, "Editor's Introduction," in *A Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force*, ed. Joel Hayward (Palmerston North: Massey University, 2000), xii; and *NATO-Russia Glossary*, 48. The word joint is also occasionally used incorrectly to refer to operations conducted by militaries in conjunction with other government departments. These are correctly referred to as "interagency" operations throughout this study.

4. DOD, *ADDP–D Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2005), glossary, 5; and MOD, *NZDDP–D*, 1st ed. G-6.

from the Australian and New Zealand definition only because it substitutes the word "Services" with the word "environment."[5] This discrepancy is due to the unification of the CF, which resulted in the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF losing their legal status as separate entities and instead becoming environmentally focused (i.e., land, sea and air) elements of a unified force.[6]

Historically, joint operations have been conducted from time to time throughout the history of warfare. An often-cited early example of a joint land and naval operation was the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC, wherein the Greeks embarked a force of hoplites (light infantry) on their warships in order to defeat a much larger Persian fleet in the Bay of Salamis. Once the Persian fleet had been defeated, the Greeks then conducted amphibious landings around the Bay so that the hoplites could destroy the few Persian invaders that had made it ashore.[7] More recent examples of joint operations have occurred in the histories of all three countries studied. The British capture of Quebec in 1759 is Canadian history's most prominent example of a joint land and naval operation.[8] Australian operations in German New Guinea and New Zealand operations in Samoa in 1914 are little known; however, they are the earliest examples of joint military operations in the history of these two countries.[9]

Despite numerous historic examples of joint land and naval operations, they have nonetheless been a scant occurrence when compared to operations undertaken solely by armies or navies. Indeed, for most of the history of warfare, land forces have fought other land forces on land, and naval forces have fought other naval forces at sea.[10] When they did occur, joint operations were generally confined to the littoral environment and were usually conducted only when the amphibious lodgement of land forces or the naval bombardment of coastal defence sites was required. As a result, joint operations have historically been limited in scale and objective. Furthermore, their conduct has not traditionally required *integration* between land and naval forces. Instead, once the specific task that had brought about a joint operation had been completed, land and naval forces returned to their own mediums and continued to operate separately from one another.[11]

The emergence of air power during WWI was the catalyst for the gradual evolution of joint operations into their contemporary form. Once armies and navies realized that the aeroplane was an effective weapon, neither service could afford to neglect its potential when applied above or within their own mediums. Yet the effects of air power within each of these mediums were fundamentally different. For armies, the key role of air power was (and still is) the provision of CAS to ground forces. The issues related to the provision of CAS that armies tended to emphasize were coordination, precision timing and accuracy when hitting targets. As engagements during WWII later confirmed, getting these right could result in CAS being the difference between victory and defeat at the tactical level.[12]

5. DND, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP-01), *Canadian Military Doctrine: Ratification, Draft 1,* 2009, GL-4.

6. Jeremy R. Stocker, "Canadian 'Jointery,'" *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 10 (Winter 1995–6): 116–18.

7. Roger A. Beaumont, *Joint Military Operations: A Short History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 3.

8. Williams, 163–95.

9. Glenn Kerr, "Before Gallipoli: Australian Operations in 1914," in *Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annual*, ed. Glenn Kerr, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 12 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2004), 27–30; and Peter Dennerly, "An Undertaking within Our Capabilities: New Zealand's Expedition to Samoa, 1914," in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 95–101.

10. A notable exception to this is marines, who have traditionally adapted land force (in particular, infantry) tactics for use aboard ships. Although in the past few centuries, some marine forces have evolved into separate organizations, usually with a special focus on amphibious assault operations (the USMC presents the most obvious example), this is an exception rather than a rule. In general, marines have remained under the exclusive control of navies and have been deployed at sea as a part of naval battles. For this reason, their use would not usually be considered to constitute a joint endeavour.

11. Alan Stephens, "The Clash of Cultures: Command and Control in Joint Warfare," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 174 (November/December 2007): 4. For a history of joint cooperation between armies and navies prior to the emergence of air power, see Beaumont, 1–35.

12 Stephens, "The Clash of Cultures," 5–7.

For navies, the use of aircraft eventually resulted in major changes to the conduct of naval warfare. Prior to the use of aeroplanes at sea, naval battles were fought primarily by battleships that engaged each other with surface-to-surface gunfire. Early in WWII, however, it was proven beyond doubt that battleships were vulnerable to attack from the air.[13] As the war progressed, this situation resulted in a fundamental change in the nature of naval battles, with aircraft carriers assuming primacy as the most important type of capital ship. By the time the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway took place in May and June 1942, aircraft were an essential component of naval warfare to the extent that the battles were decided by aeroplanes without the opposing fleets ever coming into sight of one another.[14]

Although the emergence of air power was the catalyst for the evolution of joint operations in their modern form, it was the establishment of air forces as independent military organizations of equal standing to armies and navies that necessitated a substantial increase in joint operations. This is because air forces extended the requirement for interservice cooperation beyond the littoral environment and beyond the confines of specific types of missions. As Cassidy observed, this was one of the historic paradoxes of jointery—the separation of air forces from armies and navies created a new, independent service while at the same time generating a much greater need for integration between services.[15]

Yet the rationale for independent air forces was significant enough to justify their separation from armies and navies despite the joint coordination issues that ensued. This rationale, which remains unchanged today, is a result of the finite numbers of aircraft available to achieve a multitude of missions during a campaign. Because of this limitation, the centralization of the command and control of aircraft allowed them to be deployed en masse to achieve missions in descending order of strategic priority. This was important because several of the missions that have traditionally been accorded the highest priority by air forces—for example, establishing air control during the initial phases of a campaign—often did not align with army or navy priorities for the deployment of aircraft in their support. Allowing air forces to undertake independent operations in their own medium permitted them to shape the conditions under which they subsequently provided support to armies and navies, a factor that tended to make the completion of support tasks easier.[16]

One of the key results of the need to manage competing priorities for the use of air power has been the concomitant need for ongoing joint coordination on land and at sea as well as in the littoral environment. However, this need has not traditionally been the priority of armies, navies and air forces, which have instead tended to pursue independent operations in their own mediums, orchestrating joint operations only when unavoidable. The US military's experience from the beginning of WWII until the late 1980s is a good example of this situation.

During WWII, the US Army concentrated on fighting land campaigns, primarily in North Africa and Europe. The US Navy, meanwhile, concentrated on keeping the Atlantic SLOCs between North America and Europe open and on winning sea battles against Japanese forces in the Pacific. The United States Army Air Force (USAAF), which operated independently despite its official status as a branch of the US Army, concentrated on conducting strategic bombing campaigns against Japan and (to an even greater extent) Germany.[17] When air power was applied at sea, particularly in the Pacific Ocean,

13 Although tests conducted in the 1920s by early air power theorists, most notably Billy Mitchell, indicated this was the case, the results of such tests were not widely accepted within navies. It took the events of WWII to convince the majority of naval officers that aircraft had a major role to play in naval warfare.

14. Stanley Johnston, "Coral Sea: 'Scratch One Flat-Top,'" in *Great Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century*, ed. William H. Honan (London: Robson Books, 1993), 239–40; and Tom Moore, "Midway: I Dive-Bombed a Jap Carrier," in *Great Naval Battles* (see this note), 246.

15. Richard Cassidy, "In the Footsteps of Others: Team NZDF's Quest for Jointness," in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 74.

16. Stephens, "The Clash of Cultures," 4–10.

17. Ibid.; and Anderton, 49–133.

it was usually by aircraft controlled by the Navy and launched from carriers. This eliminated much of the need for joint cooperation. On land, however, the USAAF played a much more prominent role in providing CAS to the Army, despite its primary focus being elsewhere.[18] When major joint operations occurred—particularly those involving all three services—it was usually when the strategic situation left no other options. The D-Day landings and the Pacific island-hopping campaign are good examples of such operations.[19]

In the aftermath of WWII, interservice rivalries and disputes over the allocation of decreasing funds became increasingly prominent. The result was that many of the joint coordination lessons learned during WWII were lost, as later operations in Korea (1950–53) and Vietnam (1962–75) demonstrated.[20] By the 1980s, the US military was characterized by four separate, competing services (the fourth being the USMC). Even small-scale (by US standards) operations presented major joint coordination problems, as the aborted mission to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980 and the dismal (if ultimately successful) invasion of Grenada in 1983 revealed.[21]

Due to the extent of the organizational problems facing each of the four services at the end of the Vietnam War, it was only after the operational mishaps of the early 1980s that momentum grew for reform at the joint level. This was because almost all of the US military's reform efforts during the late 1970s and early 1980s were single-service driven, motivated by strong desires within each service to "put its own house in order."[22] Due to this single-service focus, it was not until the mid-1980s that joint reforms were finally made a priority. The catalyst for major upheaval at the joint level was the passage of the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act* in 1986. So entrenched were interservice rivalries during this period that the legislation of the *Act* was only possible following four years of bickering between service chiefs, the military Joint Chiefs of Staff, the civilian Department of Defense, the Congress, and Senate Armed Services Committees.[23]

Without going into too much detail that would be superfluous to this study, the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act* was designed to balance single-service interests with joint operational and organizational imperatives. It did this by shifting key functions such as operational planning and command away from the services and giving these functions instead to joint command structures, by making joint postings an essential criterion for promotion to senior ranks, and by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of senior military and civilian positions within the US military and Department of Defense.[24] What is important from this study's perspective is that the passage of the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act* began the trend towards jointery that characterized the US military throughout the period studied.

Shortly after the passage of the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act*, the 1991 Gulf War provided a prominent and highly successful (if not entirely flawless) example of a joint operation, especially where coordination between the US Army and USAF was concerned. Even more importantly, the Gulf War demonstrated that joint operations had become an essential prerequisite for the successful

18. Benjamin Cooling, ed., *Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support* (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990) contains four essays which, when read together, provide a comprehensive history of the development of CAS within the US military during WWII (these essays constitute Chapters 4–7).

19. Williamson Murray, "The Evolution of Joint Warfare," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 31 (Summer 2002): 35.

20. David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 25.

21. Ronald H. Cole, "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998–99): 57–59.

22. Murray, 36.

23. James R. Locher, "Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 99–103.

24. For a more detailed overview of the development and objectives of the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act*, see Ibid., 95–115.

application of newly emergent technologies.[25] In addition to reinforcing the joint reform movement within the US military and substantially boosting its momentum, the Gulf War either generated or, in some cases, renewed organizational shifts towards jointery within other Western militaries. In the case of the British armed forces, for example, the Gulf War and subsequent RMA debate led to the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in August 1996; the combining of military education institutions into a newly established Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) in January 1997; and the raising of a tri-service Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF), which became operational in April 1999.[26]

Almost without exception, the major operations conducted by Western militaries since the early 1990s confirmed that joint operational planning and execution had become a vital prerequisite to success. During the remainder of the period studied, the increasing extent of joint cooperation during operations was accompanied by ongoing organizational reforms toward the development of joint structures and hierarchies, especially at senior levels. In addition to the three armed forces studied, this was especially evident in the US and UK, leading to what Dandeker termed the "purple trend."[27]

In generic terms, since the early 1990s, the purple trend in Western armed forces has been characterized by four core components. These could be labelled as the operational, organizational (or structural), educational and doctrinal aspects of jointery.

The first aspect of the joint trend that emerged during the early 1990s, the operational aspect, has the longest lineage. This is because when armies, navies and air forces have traditionally worked together, it has generally been in the pursuit of operational goals. Where the jointery of the 1990s and early 2000s parted from the traditional nature of this aspect was that it involved the formal establishment of permanent joint operational commands to replace previously ad hoc joint command and control arrangements, which had often been established from scratch with the onset of each new operation. In the US military, reforms to the role of regional commands had this effect; in the British armed forces, it was the creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters.[28]

The second aspect of the move to jointery during the 1990s and early 2000s was organizational. This involved the establishment, often for the first time, of joint organizations within Western armed forces. This was generally achieved by integrating, to various extents, hitherto separate elements of each of the single services. Often integration occurred in areas where there had previously been duplication within different services—logistics, training and personnel agencies were typical areas where joint structures evolved.[29] The integration of elements of the higher command arrangements of each service was often seen as an additional way to develop a more cohesive joint command structure. The formation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force by the British armed forces took this idea a step further by integrating the command of operational and tactical units on a permanent basis.[30]

It must be noted, however, that this aspect of jointery has attracted much criticism, sometimes justified and other times not. Generally, criticism has been on the grounds that the creation of joint

25. Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006), Chapter 10, esp. 333–34.

26. Mader, 230–34, 362.

27. The colour purple is used by Western militaries, including the three studied, to symbolize jointery. This is because it represents a blend of army green, navy dark blue and air force light blue. Christopher Dandeker, "On 'The Need to be Different': Recent Trends in Military Culture," in *The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 177. See also: Mader, 230–32.

28. Cassidy, "In the Footsteps of Others," 69.

29. Ibid.

30. Richard M. Connaughton, "Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 26 (Autumn 2000): 87–94.

organizations and command structures has not occurred in the interests of creating operational efficiencies but has, instead, been undertaken as a cost-cutting measure.[31] Criticisms of this nature were especially prominent during the early 1990s, when most Western militaries suffered from significant post-cold war budget cuts.

The third aspect of the trend towards jointery was educational. To cultivate fledgling joint cultures, the move to jointery was typically accompanied by the establishment of joint military education institutions. This is especially the case regarding mid-level and senior-officer education. Sometimes joint education institutions were established by amalgamating previously disparate single-service institutions. The Joint Services Command and Staff College opened by the British armed forces in 1997 is a good example of such an amalgamation.[32] In the US military, single-service and joint educational institutions had existed alongside one another prior to the 1990s. During the early 1990s, joint institutions were given an expanded role, and measures were taken to encourage members of each service to enrol in their courses. Additional reforms were also implemented to encourage single-service educational institutions to change their curriculums to include a greater focus on the joint aspects of operations.[33]

Finally, the joint trend that has emerged within Western armed forces since the early 1990s has involved the production of joint doctrine. Due to the prominent operational focus that characterized post-Gulf War jointery, joint operational doctrine has been the most prominent, with tactical doctrine usually remaining within the purview of single services. As the organizational and educational aspects of the joint trend emerged, the need for military-strategic joint doctrine was recognized by most Western militaries. Often, this recognition was accompanied by the establishment of a joint doctrine development centre, either as a separate organization or as part of an existing joint organization.[34] This aspect of the joint trend and how it emerged within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces is the primary focus of this chapter.

Becoming Joint: The Evolution of Jointery within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Armed Forces

Prior to examining the development of joint doctrine in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the trend towards jointery within each. Just as the US military was not traditionally a joint force, with its individual services instead pushing their own (often competing) agendas, so too were the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces characterized by the separation of their individual services. In the case of the three smaller powers, however, the factors that led to this situation were quite different from the example of the US military discussed above. The primary reasons for this difference were the smaller size of the three armed forces and, more importantly, the role each has historically played because of its size.

Before the conclusion of WWII, the primary role of each Australian, Canadian and New Zealand single service had been to contribute forces to bolster the capabilities of their British counterparts. Major General (Retired) Piers Reid summarized this situation regarding New Zealand's military history, although similar observations could be made about Australia and Canada:

31. Cassidy, "In the Footsteps of Others," 69–70.

32. "Background," Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/About%20JSCSC (accessed October 29, 2012).

33. Locher, 106–07; and "History of the National Defense University," National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, http://www.ndu.edu/info/history.cfm (accessed October 29, 2012).

34. In the UK, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre was established in October 2000. In the US a Joint Doctrine Centre was established as a part of the reforms mandated by the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act*. Mader, 363; Michael Codner, "Purple Prose and Purple Passion," 36–40; and United States, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, September 10, 2001, 91–92.

> New Zealand would add what it could to allied forces who would use what we gave to best advantage within their own structures and probably according to their own strategic, operational and tactical ideas. This was how World War Two was fought where our airmen and sailors seldom saw each other, let alone a Kiwi soldier, during long years overseas.[35]

In addition to its mutual applicability to all three countries, this situation was not limited to WWII. As discussion in the first chapter highlighted, the same observation could also be made about the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces during the Boer War and WWI.

Furthermore, this situation continued following the conclusion of WWII, albeit that strategic policy and geographic circumstance had a greater impact due to the evolving nature of the global strategic environment. For all three armed forces, the Korean War was waged along similar lines to its predecessors.[36] For Australia and New Zealand, the Vietnam War also repeated the historic pattern of separating the army, navy and air force and slotting them in alongside their great power equivalents, although by this stage the US had replaced Britain as the great power military each service was expected to bolster.[37] At the end of the Vietnam War, the three Australian and New Zealand services were much more accustomed to working with their larger allied counterparts than they were to working with each other.

By the late 1960s, the three Canadian services had also become accustomed to operating with the equivalent services of allied countries, something which they did far more frequently than operating with each other. While the Canadian Army concentrated on its role as part of NATO's continental European defence strategy, the RCN focused on its growing antisubmarine warfare role, and the RCAF on its NORAD commitments.[38] The separation of the three services and their different operational priorities were reinforced by several peacekeeping missions, which usually conformed to the historic pattern of individual services being slotted into operational forces alongside their counterpart services from other countries, rather than operating together. As well as the Canadian armed forces, this characteristic of peacekeeping missions also affected the Australian and New Zealand armed forces.[39]

Despite their histories, each of the three armed forces eventually made substantial moves towards enshrining a joint ethos as a central part of their organizational culture. Accordingly, by the end of 2007, the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces had all instituted reforms designed to make their armed forces more joint in nature. Furthermore, these reforms were generally operational, organizational, educational or doctrinal. Notwithstanding these similarities, how each of the three armed forces came to be a joint force varies substantially.

For the Canadian Forces, the move towards jointery began in 1964 with the initiation of an "integration" programme. As the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff explained in 1967, integration was "the process by which the three Services are brought together under single control and management with common logistics supply and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure but retaining the legal identities of the three services and the legal barriers between them."[40]

35. Piers Reid, "Jointness: Lessons from Recent NZDF Peace Support Missions," in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 44.

36. John C. Blaxland, "The Korean War: Reflections on Shared Australian and Canadian Military Experiences," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2003–04): 25–34.

37. Although the Australian Army operated independently within its own area of operations after 1966, it had previously conducted operations alongside the US Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade. After 1966, on the occasions when the Australian Army operated alongside other forces, these were more likely to be drawn from the US or New Zealand armies than from the RAN or RAAF, with the exception of the support provided by RAAF tactical lift helicopters. In the New Zealand Army's case, its units were placed under American then Australian operational control for the duration of the war. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins* (2006), 145–47; and Rabel, 562–63.

38. Stocker, "Canadian 'Jointery,'" 117.

39. Piers Reid, "Jointness: Lessons from Recent NZDF Peace Support Missions," in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 44.

40. Air Marshal F. R. Sharp's testimony to the Standing Committee on National Defence, February 7, 1967, quoted in G. M. Fyffe (Chairman), *Task Force Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report*, March 15, 1980, 5.

Although the term "joint" was not used to describe CF integration at the time, the integration programme had several commonalities with the joint trend of the 1990s. Indeed, when compared to the joint reform programmes initiated by Canada's allies during the 1990s, it becomes apparent that the integration programme was thirty years ahead of its time. Most of its changes were, however, organizational, rather than operational, educational or doctrinal.

At its core, integration involved the establishment of six commands, organized along functional lines. Existing RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF units were then placed under the control of the commands. For example, most Army units were grouped with the RCAF's CAS and tactical-lift assets to form Mobile Command; the RCN was grouped with the RCAF's maritime surveillance aircraft to form Maritime Command; and the RCAF units tasked with defending North America as part of NORAD were grouped with the radar installations in northern Canada to form Air Defence Command.[41] At the top of the organizational hierarchy, the three single-service chiefs were replaced by a single Chief of the Defence Staff.[42] This was accompanied by the blending of the three single-service headquarters into an integrated staff structure, although this aspect of integration brought about "a pragmatic grouping, not specifically based upon any staff doctrine."[43] As a result, this aspect of integration limited the ability of the new staff structure to exercise effective operational command, something that would not be addressed until after the 1991 Gulf War.[44]

In 1968, the integration programme was taken a step further when the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF were disbanded and their former elements unified into a single organization—the Canadian Forces. Upon unification, the CF adopted a common uniform, a common rank structure and a common personnel system, along with commencing common recruit training programmes.[45] As discussion in Chapter 2 emphasized, it appears that unification was intended to constitute a further step towards institutionalizing the organizational aspect of jointery. However, unlike integration, which was decades ahead of similar innovations in allied militaries, unification "has remained a uniquely Canadian experiment."[46]

Ultimately, unification was an experiment that was doomed to failure for numerous reasons. From a joint perspective, the most significant facet of this failure was that unification did not resolve the interservice rivalries that had previously characterized the three services. Instead, distinctive army, navy and air force cultures continued within Land Command, Maritime Command and, following its creation in 1975, Air Command.[47] Accompanying this was the perpetuation of the different operational priorities that had characterized the three services prior to unification. Worse still, unification exacerbated interservice rivalry since it removed the support branches from the combat elements of the force and integrated them into semi-autonomous organizations. This led the larger support branches, especially logistics and communications, to develop their own organizational cultures that came to coexist alongside the three environmental cultures.[48]

41. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 251; and Granatstein, 354–55.

42. Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and Its Present Transformation," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2005–06): 7.

43. Paul Johnston, "Staff Systems and the Canadian Air Force; Part Two: A Convoluted Evolution," *Canadian Air Force Journal* 1, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 21.

44. Ibid.

45. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 252; and Granatstein, 354.

46. Clark, *Joint Organization*, 14–15.

47. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 261.

48. Dick Gentles, "Canadian Forces and Unification: A Model for the New Zealand Defence Force's Joint Future?" in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 54.

Furthermore, in 1972, CF Headquarters was amalgamated with the civilian Department of National Defence staff to form National Defence Headquarters.[49] Although this provided an opportunity to fix the problems with the staff system that had been created by integration, ultimately, it was a lost opportunity. The end result of the establishment of NDHQ was the creation of a highly bureaucratic organization that generated stove piping, led to the civilianization of formerly military roles and often blurred or duplicated responsibilities. At the top of the system, a diarchy was created by blurring the responsibilities of the military CDS and the civilian Deputy Minister for Defence.[50] Like unification, the creation of NDHQ did little to further the establishment of a joint culture or effective joint operational command within the CF.

The stymieing effect on operational planning and coordination caused by the lack of a joint ethos within the CF, combined with the lack of an effective operational command structure within NDHQ, became increasingly apparent during a series of exercises and short-notice operations conducted during the late 1980s.[51] This led to the commissioning in 1988 of a study on *The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War*. Better known as the Little/Hunter Study (after its primary authors), it was delivered in February 1989.[52] Overall, the Little/Hunter Study highlighted the problems with the structure and focus of NDHQ that were described above. It also made recommendations about how to fix them, although these were not optimal as the study had been constrained from the outset by tight parameters set by the CDS and Deputy Minister. As a result, the study was dismissed by the CDS and Deputy Minister as having been "overtaken by events."[53]

These events included the military aid to the civil power provided by the CF at Oka in 1990 and the Canadian role in the 1991 Gulf War. In both of these operations, NDHQ's muddled command and control situation quickly became apparent despite tactical-level successes.[54] As a result of the situation at Oka, an "ad hoc crisis management committee" was quickly established, which led to "the creation of a Joint Staff philosophy … within National Defence Headquarters."[55] However, it was the Gulf War that proved more influential as a catalyst for organizational change. Due to the size of the operation (which involved the deployment of 2500 personnel) and the distance from Canada at which it occurred, the decision was made to establish the Joint Headquarters in the Middle East (JHQME). Interestingly, the CF's lack of corporate knowledge about joint command and control led to a decision to use the ADF as a model, since it was believed that the Australian joint operational command structure would be suitable to Canada's needs.[56]

In NDHQ, operations during the Gulf War led to recognition of the need to appoint a dedicated joint operational staff. This need was confirmed by a departmental report in 1994, which highlighted "a

49. Todd Fitzgerald and Michael A. Hennessy, "An Expedient Reorganization: The NDHQ J-Staff System in the Gulf War," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 23.

50. Ibid., 24.

51. Most prominently, these included Exercise BRAVE LION and Operations BANDIT and VAGABOND. Exercise BRAVE LION was the 1986 deployment of the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade to Norway to test Canada's ability to meet its NATO commitments. Operation BANDIT involved the dispatch of a joint task force (JTF) to Haitian waters in 1987–88 in case the evacuation of Canadian nationals was required. Operation VAGABOND was the Canadian contribution to the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), which deployed to the Middle East in 1988. For further details of the joint operational planning (and conduct) problems encountered during these exercises/operations, see Sean M. Maloney, "Purple Haze: Joint Planning in the Canadian Forces from Mobile Command to J-Staff, 1975–1991 (Part One)," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2002–03): 57–72.

52. W. E. Little and D. P. Hunter, *NDHQ Study S1/88: The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War: Final Report* (February 1989), reproduced in Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, *Defence Organization* (Kingston: School of Political Studies, Queen's University, 1998), 417–509.

53. Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, vol. 2, 407–15, quote, 415.

54. Ibid.

55. Fitzgerald and Hennessy, 25.

56. Ibid., 26.

need to learn how to set up and run a Joint Task Force HQ under a Joint Commander."[57] Shortly thereafter, a deployable joint command and control capability was established, initially by posting Navy and Air Force representatives into the Army's 1 Canadian Division Headquarters, effectively double tasking it. This arrangement was subjected to much alteration during the course of the 1990s, as it gradually became apparent that joint operations were occurring too frequently to enable the double-tasking approach to function effectively. On June 1, 2000, the CF's joint deployable command and control function was finally passed to a separate, purpose-designed organization—the Joint Operations Group (JOG)—which reported to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS).[58]

Although it appears to have been the result of a separate planning process, the establishment of the JOG nonetheless fulfilled one of the five-year targets set by *Strategy 2020*.[59] The first Canadian strategic document to have used the term "joint" in a meaningful way,[60] *Strategy 2020* asserted: "At its core, the strategy is to position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, *in joint or combined operations* [emphasis added]."[61] In addition to calling for changes to the CF's joint operational command and control arrangements, *Strategy 2020* indicated the CF's intent to expand its joint and combined exercise programme and to introduce a joint experimentation programme.[62] The second of these objectives led to the establishment in May 2001 of the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre (CFEC).[63]

During the early and mid-2000s, the evolution of jointery continued unabated within the CF. The period was characterized by the establishment of several additional joint organizations, including the Joint Support Group; Joint Signals Regiment; 1st Engineering Support Unit; and a Joint Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence Company. All of these were placed under the command of the DCDS, leading some to assert that the DCDS had come to command a de facto fourth service.[64] In addition to the organizational and operational changes, the opening of the Canadian Defence Academy on April 1, 2002, greatly expanded the educational aspect of CF jointery,[65] as well as being the catalyst for a conceptual re-evaluation of the theory and practice of the operational art in the Canadian context.[66]

Following General Hillier's appointment as CDS in February 2005, the transformation programme he oversaw led to further joint organizational and operational reforms. The first of these was the removal of most of the joint organizations from the control of the DCDS. Instead, they were placed under the control of a newly created Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), which reported directly to the

57. G. L. Garnett, "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level," *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 4 (Winter 2002–03): 4. The report itself, *Chief of Review Services Report E3/92*, remains classified.

58. Ibid., 5–6.

59. Ibid., 6.

60. The *1994 Defence White Paper* frequently used the term "joint" erroneously to describe combined operations with the US military. Where it did use the term to refer to interservice operations, it did so retrospectively.

61. DND, *Strategy 2020*, 6.

62. Ibid., 9–10.

63. Garnett, 6.

64. Daniel Gosselin, "A 50-Year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and the Strong Service Idea," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts* (see note 14, Introduction), 175–76.

65. Canadian Forces, "Canadian Defence Academy – History," http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/Index/engraph/about/history_e.asp (accessed September 12, 2007, site discontinued). Although several educational organizations were placed under the command of the CDA, those that were old enough had already become joint institutions following unification (the Canadian Forces College provides a good example). Hence it is stated above that the establishment of the CDA *expanded* the educational aspect of Canadian jointery, rather than established it.

66. This re-evaluation led to the production of a series of edited books about the theory and practice of the operational art within the CF. See Allan English and others, eds., *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts* (see note 14, Introduction); Allan English, ed., *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Leadership and Command* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006); and Allan English and James C. Taylor, eds., *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Health Service Support* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006).

CDS.[67] This was accompanied in late 2005 by the creation of four joint operational commands. Two of these were geographically focused, with one responsible for domestic security operations and the other for expeditionary operations. The third and fourth commands were functional, with the third responsible for special forces operations, and the fourth responsible for the provision of combat support and combat services support to the other three.[68]

Overall, by the close of 2007, there was no doubt the CF had wholeheartedly embraced the purple trend. As (then) Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin, Commandant of Canadian Forces College, asserted in 2005: "For the CF, unification died at some indeterminate point in the late 1990s, and jointness was born."[69]

For the Australian Defence Force, the move towards jointery began inconspicuously in 1968 when a Joint Staff Organization was created within the Department of Defence. Although this enabled the Department to conduct joint operational planning, the three services remained in command and control of the forces themselves.[70] Shortly afterwards, drastic changes in Australia's strategic circumstances, combined with resultant policy shifts, provided a catalyst for the ADF to commence further joint organizational reforms. The most important changes in Australia's strategic circumstances during this period were the British withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1968 and America's adoption of the "Guam Doctrine" the following year.[71] These changes led the March 1972 Defence White Paper to articulate a policy of defence self-reliance.[72]

Following the election of the Whitlam Government in December 1972, Australia's strategic policy shifts rapidly accelerated.[73] From a joint forces development perspective, the most important change the Whitlam Government initiated was to shift the basis of Australian defence planning from a forward defence to a continental defence strategy.[74] Although discussion of the merits and pitfalls of these competing strategies has dominated the Australian defence debate since shortly after Federation,[75] a clear benefit of the adoption of a continental defence strategy in 1972 was the momentum towards jointery it generated within the ADF. This situation was summarized by Thomas-Durrell Young, who observed: "Post-1972 defense [strategy] gave Canberra a twenty-year head start in planning to operate jointly in a threat-ambiguous regional environment. Moreover, geostrategic realities, financial exigencies, and defense guidance forced [the] ADF to take jointness seriously."[76]

Despite this catalyst, the ADF's move to jointery was gradual and evolutionary, rather than a radical transformation akin to the unification of the CF. In 1973, a review of the Australian DOD was conducted by its Secretary, Sir Arthur Tange. The review recommended that Australia's five autonomous departments previously responsible for the implementation of defence policy be reorganized into

67. Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghost," 13.

68. The four joint operational commands were titled Canada Command (CANCOM), Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). For further details, see Chapter 3. Alternatively, see Hillier, "Setting Our Course," 70–71.

69. Gosselin, "A 50-Year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads," 172.

70. Allan Behm, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," in *A Joint Future?* (see note 3), 11.

71. For further details, see Chapter 2. Alternatively, see Darwin, 140–58; and Litwak, 52–54.

72. DOD, *Australian Defence Review*, 1972, 14.

73. The broader nature and effects of these shifts are discussed in Chapter 2. Only those that had implications for the ADF's move towards jointery are discussed at this juncture.

74. Lee, *Search for Security*, 73–74.

75. For an analysis of this debate, see Michael Evans, "Overcoming the Creswell-Foster Divide in Australian Strategy," 193–214.

76. Thomas-Durell Young, "'Top Down' Planning and Joint Doctrine: The Australian Experience," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 66.

a single DOD structure.[77] This change was immediately endorsed by the Government, although it was not until 1976 that legislation was passed allowing it to occur.[78] In 1984, this organizational change was supplemented by the establishment of Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF), although it must be noted that HQADF was initially organizational and administrative. The operational command functions remained under the purview of the three single-service headquarters. Accompanying the establishment of HQADF, the position of Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) was created and the three single-service chiefs were made subordinate to the new position. As Allan Behm noted, this "gave the ADF, for the first time, a single tri-Service commander."[79]

In the same year, a parliamentary report was released that issued recommendations for the ADF's further development as a joint force. The report, titled *The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities,* made two significant recommendations. First, it recommended that command of the ADF be reorganized along functional lines. Second, it recommended the single-service chiefs be removed from the operational chain of command.[80] The first of these recommendations was implemented in 1985 and 1986 by the creation of Maritime, Land and Air Headquarters. The new organizations were staffed by members of the three single-service headquarters, with representatives from the other services posted to them as required by the demands of each environment. Initially, this led to some friction, since deployable force elements remained under the command of their own service, as did members of the three new headquarters.[81]

Although the reason for the delay remains somewhat obscure, the report's second recommendation was not implemented until 1987. At this time, the single-service chiefs were removed from the operational chain of command when the CDF made the decision to merge the three single-service operational headquarters into a single joint operations headquarters within HQADF.[82] This could be said to be the point at which the operational aspect became a significant component of Australian jointery.

This change was also timely in light of strategic policy developments, since it occurred in the same year as the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper. Importantly, the White Paper perpetuated the centrality of self-reliance and continental defence as the core components of Australian defence strategy, conceptually refining the latter by proclaiming a strategy of denial.[83] In mid-1988, Northern Command Australia (NORCOM) was established, most probably as part of the ADF's implementation of the White Paper's defence strategy. This constituted "a very significant step along Australia's path to an effective joint operational command structure … [since] it constituted the first joint theatre headquarters established in Australia."[84]

Although the establishment of NORCOM was the last major Australian joint reform of the 1980s, the 1989 delivery of *The Report on the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements*, more commonly known as the Sanderson Report (after its author), gave joint reforms a renewed momentum in the early 1990s.[85] Commissioned because of a need to create cost efficiencies in the wake of

77. David Horner, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence*, vol. 4, *Making the Australian Defence Force* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46–49.

78. Andrews, *The Department of Defence*, 196–98.

79. Behm, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," 11.

80. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities*, 1984, paras. 7.62, 7.89.

81. Behm, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," 11–12.

82. Ibid., 12.

83. For further details, see Chapter 2. Alternatively, see: Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, 5.

84. Allan Behm and others, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 149 (July/August 2001): 18.

85. J. M. Sanderson, *The Report on the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements*, presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, June 1989.

decreasing defence budgets, the Sanderson Report determined the extent to which the duplication of functions and overstaffing was occurring within the ADF. Its recommendations that HQADF be reorganized and take on functions and staff previously assigned to the single services were implemented in 1990.[86] Also in 1990, the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) was established to enhance joint conceptual development and training.[87]

Although the ADF deployed forces as part of the 1991 Gulf War, its contribution was far smaller than the CF's. In a display of solidarity with the UN, the Australian government dispatched a RAN task force of three ships, accompanied by a smattering of other, mostly medical, personnel.[88] Due to the small scale of Australia's contribution, the Gulf War did not have a major impact on the ADF's joint reforms in the way that it did within the militaries of several of Australia's allies. It did, however, serve to validate several of the ADF's previously implemented joint reforms, along with demonstrating the necessity of joint operations in enabling the application of several new technologies.[89]

During the early 1990s, several strategic policy documents led to further joint organizational and operational reforms. The first of these was the 1991 *Force Structure Review*, which determined the need for a deployable joint force headquarters. Initially, the Army's Headquarters 1 Division was double tasked with this role (creating an interesting parallel to the CF's deployable joint command and control arrangements during the same period).[90] The second strategic policy document was the *Strategic Review 1993*, which enshrined jointery as the ADF's top priority: "To optimise the ADF's effectiveness in the defence of Australia, the first priority is for the ADF to develop and exercise joint capabilities, and to plan and conduct joint ADF activities."[91] The level of priority accorded to developing jointery was continued within the 1994 Defence White Paper, which contained as part of its strategy the establishment of an ADF joint operational headquarters and joint force commander by the end of the decade.[92]

The objectives set by the 1994 Defence White Paper were implemented in 1996, four years ahead of the deadline it set. This was achieved by the establishment of Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST), commanded by the newly created joint position of Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST). On its inauguration, HQAST assumed command of most of the previously disparate joint organizations that had been established over the previous decade. These included Maritime, Land and Air Commands as well as the ADFWC, NORCOM and the DJFHQ.[93]

In 1997, the Defence Efficiency Review brought about further joint reforms. The Review, designed to create organizational efficiencies in order to free up funding for operational capabilities, led to the creation of joint logistics and personnel organizations.[94] It also led to a reorganization of HQADF, which removed its remaining operational functions (the rest had already been taken over by HQAST). This was accompanied by a name change from HQADF to Australian Defence Headquarters.[95] Finally, the Review greatly furthered the educational aspect of Australian jointery, leading to the creation of

86. Behm and others, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," 18.

87. DOD, "Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre: History," http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/about.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

88. James, "A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping," 11–12.

89. Behm and others, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," 20.

90. DOD, *Force Structure Review*, 23–24.

91. DOD, *Strategic Review 1993*, para. 5.40.

92. DOD, *Defending Australia*, 37–38.

93. Horner, *Making the Australian Defence Force*, 124–28.

94. Behm and others, "Joint Warfare – Australia's Approach to Joint Operations," 20–21.

95. David Horner, "The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations," in *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 167, eds. Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (Canberra: Australian National University EPress, 2007), 154.

the Australian Defence College (ADC), which was opened in January 1999. In 2001, Australia's three single-service staff colleges were amalgamated to form the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC), which, together with Australia's other joint professional military education institutions, was placed under the command of the ADC.[96]

Over the following years, the ADF's joint operational command and control arrangements were tested by several major operations, especially in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. Commencing in March 2004, this operational experience led to a major streamlining of Australia's joint operational command and control processes. As part of the streamlining, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established to replace HQAST. Additionally, the position of Commander Australian Theatre ceased to exist, with the JOC instead being commanded by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), assisted by the newly created position of Deputy Chief of Joint Operations. With the exception of NORCOM (which was replaced by the Joint Offshore Protection Command [JOPC]), the JOC assumed command of all of the organizations that had previously been commanded by HQAST.[97]

Finally, in 2001, it was announced that Bungendore, near Canberra, had been selected as the future location of the ADF's joint operational headquarters (what would become Headquarters JOC after 2004). Due to the joint operational command restructuring that occurred during the mid-2000s, there were numerous delays to construction while the exact requirements of the site were determined.[98] Construction finally began in November 2006.[99] This was significant because, once complete, the new headquarters would mean that "with the exception of the Joint Offshore Protection Command, there will be only one operational headquarters in Australia, with one operations room—or control centre—namely, Headquarters Joint Operations Command."[100]

In comparison to the CF and ADF, joint restructuring within the New Zealand Defence Force commenced relatively late.[101] As recently as 1999 it was observed that "New Zealand's armed forces do not plan or train (except at the most basic level) to operate as a national joint force."[102] This was due to the smaller size of the NZDF combined with New Zealand's strategic circumstances, both of which allowed New Zealand to adhere for far longer than Australia or Canada to the historic pattern wherein each service provided forces to supplement the equivalent service of an allied military.[103] This situation was evident as recently as the deployment to Bosnia in the early 1990s, during which a New Zealand infantry company was placed under the operational command and control of a British battalion. From a NZDF perspective, little coordination was required between the services and "effectively the operation remained an in-house Army activity."[104]

Organizationally, the NZDF was formally established in November 1989 following the separation of the RNZN, New Zealand Army and RNZAF from the Ministry of Defence.[105] Instead of the MOD, the services were placed under the command of Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force

96. "A History of the Australian Defence College," Australian Defence College, https://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/ADC/History%20of%20the%20ADC.pdf (accessed October 29, 2012).

97. Horner, "The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations," 155–59.

98. Ibid., 159.

99. Ross Peake, "Start on New Defence HQ," *The Canberra Times*, November 4, 2006, 8.

100. Horner, "The Higher Command Structure for Joint ADF Operations," 159. Construction of the new headquarters was not completed until after the conclusion of the period studied.

101. There has also been a near absence of writing about jointery within the NZDF. Due to this dearth in the literature, discussion herein is based upon very few sources.

102. James Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 35.

103. Ibid., 35–37.

104. Reid, "Jointness: Lessons from Recent NZDF Peace Support Missions," 44.

105. James Rolfe, "Defence, Higher Organization of," in *The Oxford Companion* (see note 3, Chapter 1), 136–37; and McGibbon, *The Oxford Companion*, 362.

(HQNZDF), which was restructured as part of the organizational change.[106] Despite the reorganization, however, HQNZDF was given a limited and primarily administrative role. The three service chiefs remained responsible for the operational command and control of their forces, with HQNZDF exercising limited joint operational command only when the circumstances required it.[107] It is unsurprising, therefore, that during the 1990s the evolution of jointery within the NZDF was limited to the ad hoc establishment of joint operational command structures on an operation-by-operation basis.[108]

Reid's analysis of three "peace support" missions conducted during the 1990s provides possibly the only general overview of the evolution of the operational aspect of NZDF jointery during this period. As discussed above, the first of the operations Reid analysed—the deployment to Bosnia in 1994—was essentially an Army operation, with a notable absence of jointery on the part of New Zealand's three services. In contrast, the second operation—the deployment to Bougainville in 1997—involved contributions by all three services and the appointment of a joint commander within the theatre of operations. However, the deployed elements of the three services also remained accountable to their own service commands in New Zealand, leading to the in-theatre commander being "second guessed" on numerous occasions.[109]

The year prior to the commencement of the third operation analysed by Reid—the deployment to East Timor in 1999—the NZDF adopted Australian doctrine for joint operational planning. Although the origin of the decision to do so and the exact reasons why the decision was made remain unclear, the adoption of Australian operational planning doctrine led to significant changes in the joint operational planning processes the NZDF used during the operation in East Timor. Prior to the deployment, a joint planning group (JPG) was hastily assembled from elements of the three individual service headquarters. The JPG provided recommendations to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) about what type of force should be deployed and the resources that should be allocated to the operation. Once the operation commenced, the JPG was dissolved and replaced by a joint operations planning group (JOPG), the focus of which was on operational planning. As had been the case in Bougainville, a joint commander was appointed to command NZDF elements within the area of operations.[110]

Despite the joint planning process, the deployment to East Timor itself was not entirely joint in nature. Although the problem of dual accountability that had been encountered in Bougainville was resolved, the operational command of most of New Zealand's maritime and air assets was assigned to the INTERFET maritime and air component commanders, rather than to the Joint Commander New Zealand Forces East Timor. As a result, the joint commander only had operational command of the land forces and some rotary-wing assets, rather than over the entire NZDF contribution. Despite this limitation, the joint aspects of the operation in East Timor, when contrasted with previous operations in Bosnia and Bougainville, allowed Reid to conclude that during the 1990s "there was a considerable move, albeit … a begrudging one, towards joint command and control."[111] The "begrudging" attitude of the three services towards joint reforms was also noted during a subsequent interview with a former New Zealand Chief of Army and was most probably a contributing factor to the relatively slow emergence of jointery within the NZDF.[112]

106. One of the key motives underlying this restructure was the desire to eliminate the diarchy that had previously existed between the CDF and Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. Prior to the 1989 restructure, several problems with the senior command arrangements in New Zealand were akin to those that existed within Canadian NDHQ during the same period. Regarding this situation in New Zealand, see Rolfe, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand*, 37–41.

107. Ibid, 43–44.

108. This is comparable to the situation within Canada during the 1980s. For an account of the Canadian joint operational command experience during this period, see Maloney, "Purple Haze," 57–72.

109. Reid, "Jointness: Lessons from Recent NZDF Peace Support Missions." 43–46.

110. Ibid., 47.

111. Ibid., 43.

112. Interview with a retired NZ Army general officer, conducted at Massey University, April 27, 2007.

During the late 1990s, as the ad hoc evolution of joint operational command structures continued, New Zealand's strategic policy became a vessel for furthering joint reforms.[113] New Zealand's first strategic document to place significant emphasis on jointery was *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000*, the final report of which was delivered in August 1999. In step with Reid's assertions regarding single-service resistance to joint reforms, it observed that "NZDF force structures and doctrines are still driven by single-service traditions and ethos at a time when most progressive overseas defence forces are more and more looking to joint-service approaches to missions and tasks."[114] To rectify this problem, *DB2000* advocated the adoption of a joint-force approach by the NZDF, central to which would be the establishment of a joint staff headquarters and a joint operational headquarters.[115]

Almost immediately upon its election in December 1999, the Clark Government initiated a series of broad-ranging defence reforms based on the findings of *DB2000*. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the establishment of a joint operational headquarters featured prominently in subsequent strategic policy documents. In June 2000, *The Government's Defence Policy Framework* asserted: "To ensure a fully coordinated and structured approach to joint operations, the existing Navy, Army and Air Force operational headquarters will be combined into a joint operational headquarters."[116] The following year, the *Government Defence Statement* established five key components of the NZDF. The first of these was "a joint approach to structure and operational orientation."[117] Subsequently, joint operational reforms were quickly implemented and on 1 July 2001, Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQJFNZ) was inaugurated, giving the NZDF a permanent joint operational headquarters for the first time in its history.[118]

Alongside the establishment of HQJFNZ, the position of Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) was created, and the single-service commanders were removed from the operational chain of command. Instead, the headquarters was structured along functional lines, with three component commanders (maritime, land and air) reporting to COMJFNZ. In turn, COMJFNZ reported directly to the CDF.[119] While the service chiefs remained responsible for raising, training and sustaining their services, HQJFNZ took over command and control of all forces deployed on operations or major exercises.[120] Although a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of this arrangement is yet to be conducted, a cursory assessment of the performance of the headquarters during the Boxing Day Tsunami relief operation (conducted in early 2005) provided an initial indication that the command arrangement was working effectively.[121]

During the early and mid-2000s, several other joint reforms indicated that the purple trend had quickly become an important component of NZDF development. In 2002, the CDF, COMJFNZ and the three service chiefs signed a statement of commitment to undertake further joint reforms, titled *Three Services – One Force*.[122] In the same year, NZDF joint reforms were expanded to include a significant educational aspect when the RNZAF Command and Staff College became the New Zealand Command and Staff College (NZCSC). In 2005, this was accompanied by the establishment of

113. Strategic policy development within New Zealand during this period is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Only the aspects of strategic policy that had implications for the NZDF's move towards jointery are discussed at this juncture.

114. New Zealand, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000*, 63.

115. Ibid., 68–70.

116. MOD, *Government's Defence Policy Framework*, 6.

117. MOD, *Government Defence Statement,* 1.

118. MOD, "Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ)," New Zealand Defence Force, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/about-us/hqjfnz/hqjfnz.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Judith Martin, "Tsunami! The Head Sheds React," *Navy Today*, no. 98 (April 2005): 15.

122. New Zealand, MOD, "Defence Portfolio: Briefing to the Incoming Government 2005," online summary, http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/election-brief-2005/roles-org-jointness.html (accessed October 29, 2012).

the New Zealand Defence College (NZDC), which took over command of the NZCSC, along with assuming responsibility for the conduct of a few other PME-related activities.[123]

In 2003, the *Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force*, more commonly known as the Hunn Review (after its primary author), led to further joint reforms. The review, designed to eliminate the duplication of functions between HQNZDF, HQJFNZ and the MOD, led to a clearer delineation between the roles of the single-service commanders, the CDF and COMJFNZ.[124] Subsequently, there could be little doubt that HQNZDF encompassed the organizational aspects of NZDF jointery, while HQJFNZ constituted its operational aspect. By the close of the period studied, the NZDF, like its Australian and Canadian counterparts, had clearly embraced a joint ethos as a central part of its organizational culture.

Joint Doctrine Development in Australia, Canada and New Zealand

In addition to the operational, organizational and educational aspects of ADF, CF and NZDF jointery, a significant doctrinal aspect also emerged within all three armed forces. Initially, joint doctrine was produced (or in New Zealand's case, adopted) to guide the operational level of conflict.[125] The emergence of joint doctrine at this level is unsurprising, since this is where it was most immediately required—at the operational level, the failure of the services to cooperate can potentially lead entire operations to fail.[126] To ensure the services could operate together as smoothly as possible, joint operational doctrine was developed to provide a common point of reference for joint operational planning and conduct.

Just as the single services examined in earlier chapters had recognized the need for military-strategic doctrine during the late 1980s or, in most cases, the 1990s, it was also eventually recognized that there was a need for military-strategic joint doctrine. Due to the way in which jointery evolved, however, this recognition did not occur until the early 2000s. Hence, the first of the three armed forces to release a capstone military-strategic joint doctrine publication, the ADF, did not do so until May 2002.[127] The release of the doctrine, titled *ADDP–D Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, coincided with a restructure of the ADF's joint doctrine management system. A brief overview of the restructure, which was undertaken following recognition that the previous joint doctrine development system was no longer functioning, provides a useful background to the development and publication of *Foundations*.

Since the ADFWC's establishment in 1990, it had been responsible for joint doctrine development within the ADF. Accordingly, the Joint Operations Doctrine Group (JODG) was formed within the Centre. During the early and mid-1990s, a series of doctrine publications was developed, labelled Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP), although this series was operational or procedural in nature rather than military-strategic. Even the keystone publication within the series, ADFP 1, *Doctrine*, was designed to guide the operational level of conflict.[128] Additionally, following its release in 1993, ADFP 1 was not updated.

123. Since the RNZAF Command and Staff College had accepted members of the RNZN and New Zealand Army as students (along with accepting members of other government organizations and personnel from foreign militaries), it could be said that the staff course was joint in nature prior to 2002. Importantly, however, the College itself was not commanded jointly until 2002. Prior to this, it was commanded by the RNZAF. Email correspondence with a senior RNZAF officer, January 12, 2009.

124. Hunn. Regarding the implementation of the Hunn Review, see MOD, *Defence Portfolio: Briefing to the Incoming Government 2005*, 2005, 60.

125. At the tactical level, military units or subunits tend to belong to a single service; hence, tactical doctrine has tended to remain within the purview of each of the services, except for within a few areas where the need for joint cooperation has been easily identified (such as doctrine guiding the provision of CAS, for example).

126. The aborted US mission to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980 provides an excellent example of such an occurrence. Cole, 57–58.

127. ADF, *ADDP–D*, *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, 1st ed., released May 2002, printed September 2002.

128. ADF, Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 1, *Doctrine*, November 30, 1993.

This is unsurprising, however, since the pace of joint doctrine development had slackened following the amalgamation of the ADFWC and the Joint Exercise and Planning Staff in 1997. The amalgamation changed the ADFWC's focus to joint exercise planning and substantially increased its workload.[129] The result was that by 2002 most of the ADF's joint doctrine publications were out of date. The 2002 joint doctrine management restructure was intended to fix this problem. It did this by instituting two major changes. The first was the establishment of the Joint Doctrine Steering Group (JDSG) chaired by the VCDF. The JDSG was tasked with establishing joint doctrine development priorities and overseeing the doctrine development and review process.[130] The appointment of the VCDF as chair generated a top-down push, which rekindled the ADF's joint doctrine development programme.

The second major change instituted in 2002 was the outsourcing of doctrine production to consultancy firms.[131] Following a successful trial period, this practice was expanded in 2004 and again in 2005, after which a total of six consultancy firms remained under contract to produce ADF doctrine until after the close of the period studied.[132] As was the case for the Australian Army (the only single service that outsourced its doctrine development), this arrangement proved highly beneficial for the ADF and no evidence was found of friction between the ADF and the consultancy firms it hired.[133] As a result of this arrangement, the ADF was able to update 70 per cent of its joint doctrine by 2007,[134] a figure that would have been unachievable without the assistance of the consultancy firms. However, military-strategic capstone doctrine was deemed too important to be prepared by a consultancy firm, even with ADF consultation, and it appears that *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* was produced within the Policy, Guidance and Analysis Division of Australian Defence Headquarters.[135]

The content of *Foundations* was divided into eight chapters. While the first four chapters established the intellectual foundations of Australian military power, the final four discussed different aspects of its application. These aspects included military-strategic warfare concepts, legal and public policy considerations, command and control arrangements, and force preparedness and mobilization.[136] Among the latter chapters, the most conceptually significant was the chapter discussing military-strategic warfare concepts, since it "articulates concepts that guide the ADF as it undertakes the various tasks required of it by government in pursuit of national strategic policy. In particular, these concepts give guidance to the development of warfighting concepts for the conduct of operations by the ADF."[137]

In total, five concepts were developed as the key ADF warfighting values. These were: the manoeuvrist approach, a knowledge edge, cooperation (with allies, other government agencies, etc.), operational versatility and flexibility, and morally and legally justifiable action.[138] Although the doctrine gave equal weighting to all five, the first two were clearly the most important as components of an overarching warfighting culture. At its core, *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* asserted:

129. DOD, *Portfolio Evaluation Report: Doctrine Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organization*, 3.8.

130. Interview with a senior New Zealand Army officer serving on exchange in Australia, conducted August 27, 2007.

131. One of the consultancy firms contracted to write joint doctrine was Noetic Solutions, which also produced the 2006 edition of the Australian Army's *LWD1*. Interview with a senior representative of Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd, conducted August 24, 2007.

132. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Milward, *ADFWC Joint Doctrine: Introduction*, PowerPoint presentation prepared for the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, undated but first delivered during 2007, copy obtained by author August 27, 2007.

133. All of the ADF officers interviewed about joint doctrine development (even those interviewed "off the record") were satisfied with the performance of the consultancy firms hired to produce ADF joint doctrine.

134. Milward.

135. ADF, *ADDP–D*, *Foundations*, 1st ed., v.

136. Ibid., 5–8.

137. Ibid., para 5.3.

138. Ibid., paras 5.1–5.10.

"For the ADF, manoeuvre is generally preferred as a form of warfare."[139] Obtaining a "knowledge edge" was a key enabler of manoeuvre warfare, since a knowledge edge would allow the ADF to "achieve decision superiority" over the enemy, thus capitalizing on Australian military strengths (a highly technological, well-educated defence force) while avoiding its weaknesses (small personnel numbers and limited resources).[140] The remaining three key ADF warfighting values appear to have been determined from a mixture of observations about the nature of past military operations, Australian strategic policy objectives and perceived national values.

The intellectual foundations of Australian military power that were established in the first four chapters were vital in enabling the determination of the five key ADF warfighting values. While the first chapter was brief, outlining the role and scope of the publication (and summarizing the nature of doctrine), the subsequent chapters were far more detailed. The second chapter analysed national security requirements in a philosophical sense prior to examining the role of the military as a component of the provision of national security. It then provided a link to strategic policy by analysing the government's requirements of the ADF, drawing heavily on the defence strategy established by the 2000 Defence White Paper. The third chapter analysed war and conflict, stipulating the types of operations that the ADF was required to undertake. Finally, the fourth chapter established ten principles of war.[141]

Interestingly, a brief acknowledgements section mentioned the "intellectual debt" owed to four military-strategic doctrine manuals produced by allied militaries. Although only one of these—the 1997 edition of Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, *British Military Doctrine*—was a joint doctrine manual (the other three being released by the RN, USN and USMC), this section nonetheless indicates that allied doctrine played a prominent role during the development of Australian joint doctrine.[142]

In addition to constituting the ADF's capstone joint military-strategic doctrine publication, *Foundations* was part of a new series of doctrine, labelled Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP).[143] Within this series, publications were divided into nine categories, eight of which were determined functionally (operations, logistics, personnel, etc.). The ninth category was situated above the other eight in the doctrine hierarchy and was labelled the "capstone series." As the ADF's capstone publication, *Foundations* was the first document in the capstone series.[144]

The CF was the second of the three armed forces to publish a capstone military-strategic joint doctrine manual. B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine* was released in 2003, although the doctrine itself was undated.[145] In the foreword, the CDS stated that the doctrine's intent was twofold: to "set out the doctrinal component of Canada's military strategy" and to "provide a broad strategic framework for the CF."[146] In accordance with this intent, *Canadian Forces Doctrine* discussed many of

139. Ibid., para. 5.11.

140. Ibid., paras 5.5–5.7.

141. Ibid., Chapters 1–4.

142. Ibid., v.

143. Production of some publications within the ADFP series was continued; although, these were, henceforth, limited to procedural doctrine or tactics, techniques and procedures.

144. ADF, *ADDP–D*, 1st ed., Annex A. There were five other manuals in the capstone series, although as Pizzuto asserted: "With the exception of ADDP–D.4, *Joint Warfighting*, these publications are conceptual works vice doctrine, and their inclusion in the hierarchy seems misguided." Richard Pizzuto, "Reorganising Air Force Doctrine," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 171 (July/August 2006): 79. The manuals in the capstone series were: Australian Defence Force, ADDP–D.1, *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, released June 2002, reprinted May 2003; Australian Defence Force, ADDP–D.2, *Force 2020*, June 2002; Australian Defence Force, ADDP–D.3, *Future Warfighting Concept*, December 2002; and Australian Defence Force, ADDP–D.3.1, *Enabling Future Warfighting: Network Centric Warfare*, February 2004. Despite a detailed search, a copy of the final manual in the series, ADDP–D.4, *Joint Warfighting*, could not be obtained during the research for this study. It appears that this manual was never actually produced.

145. DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003; Interview with senior Canadian naval officer, conducted in Ottawa, August 22, 2008.

146. DND, CDS, "Foreword" in DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003, i.

the same topics as *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*. Most prominent among the common topics discussed were the purpose and nature of doctrine, the relationship between national strategy and military power, the legal aspects of the use of military power, the principles of war, and command and control arrangements.[147] Unsurprisingly, however, the space *Canadian Forces Doctrine* allocated to the discussion of these topics varied substantially from *Foundations*, as did the relative importance accorded to each. The principles of war, for example, constituted an entire chapter of *Foundations*; in *Canadian Forces Doctrine* they were summarized in only four pages.[148]

Where *Canadian Forces Doctrine* differed substantially from the Australian equivalent was its structure, which was divided topically rather than progressing sequentially. Accordingly, each of its chapters discussed aspects of a different military-strategic concept. For example, different chapters discussed the nature and types of CF operations, the processes of joint command and control, the emerging warfare trends, and the associated challenges facing the CF.[149]

In addition to its structure, several elements of its content made *Canadian Forces Doctrine* a unique document. Especially noteworthy were two sections that discussed CF ethos, ethics and military values, and the provision of military aid to the civil power in times of emergency and crisis.[150] In both of these sections, the CF's unique history was clearly influential. Although it was not explicitly stated, the inclusion of the discussion about ethics and military values was most probably an indirect result of the fallout from the Somalia Affair. The discussion of military aid to the civil power in times of emergency and crisis was influenced by events such as the CF's intervention at Oka in 1990 and its role in providing disaster relief following a major ice storm in January 1998.[151] Furthermore, *Canadian Forces Doctrine* was unique because it was not grounded in strategic policy in the same way that *Foundations* had drawn heavily on Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper. This is most probably because of the comparative lack of strategic policy guidance available to the CF. Instead, emphasis throughout the doctrine was placed on the diversity of CF operations and, in particular, on the importance of successful cooperation during coalition operations.[152]

Finally, the Canadian doctrine was unique because it did not explicitly stipulate a preferred Canadian approach to warfare. This may, however, have been due to the scope of existing CF operational joint doctrine. Similar to the situation within the Canadian Army during the mid-1990s, operational joint doctrine played a prominent role within the CF and featured similar concepts to those developed within Australian and New Zealand military-strategic doctrine.[153] Thus, a brief overview of the CF's keystone operational joint doctrine, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Operations,* is warranted.[154] Surprisingly, CF operations in Oka in 1990 and in the Persian Gulf in 1991 had little impact on operational joint doctrine development, despite the key role they played in bringing about the establishment of a permanent joint operational command and control capability within the CF. Instead, the production of the first edition of *Canadian Forces Operations* (published in 1995) was the result of

147. DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003, 1–4, 15–17, 18–24, 36–40.

148. ADF, *ADDP–D*, 1st ed., Chapter 4; and DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003, 36–40.

149. DND, *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, 2003, Chapters 5–6, 8.

150. Ibid., 26–29, Chapter 7.

151. Neville Nankivell, "Troops Show Their Mettle in Crisis: Great Ice Storm Puts Armed Forces in Positive Light," *The Financial Post*, January 15, 1998, 15.

152. This emphasis was deliberate, due to the prominence of coalition operations in Canadian military history. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted in Ottawa, August 22, 2008.

153. These included discussion of the relationship between national security policy and military operations, the levels and spectrum of conflict, and principles of command.

154. Different editions of *Canadian Forces Operations* have been given different NDID numbers. The one given above is for the first edition, dated 1995. It appears that sometime in the early 2000s the number was changed to B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, although the title of the doctrine remained unchanged (during research for this study, the earliest edition found with the latter number was dated 2003).

pedagogical debate driven by the perceived need for PME reform and was heavily influenced by theoretical developments in the US, particularly within the US Army.[155]

Although the evolution of *Canadian Forces Operations* has proceeded in an ad hoc and occasionally confusing manner,[156] the 2000 edition observed that it "provides the fundamental tenets for the employment of military forces to translate the CF mission and strategic objectives into action."[157] Although most of the document was dedicated to a detailed elaboration of each of the many types of CF operations, the first section—in particular the first three chapters—discussed several concepts that arguably applied at the military-strategic level as much as at the operational level. Perhaps most importantly, the first chapter discussed the strategic priorities set by the 1994 Defence White Paper and their relationship to military operations.[158] Although it stopped short of formally expressing a preferred Canadian approach to operations, overall, it provided a clear enough idea about their conduct that the writers of *Canadian Forces Doctrine* may not have seen the need to examine more formally the Canadian approach to warfare at the military-strategic level.

Returning to *Canadian Forces Doctrine*, its development had commenced in 2002 following the expansion of the office of the Director Plans, Doctrine and Training (DPDT), which was part of NDHQ. The expansion, which occurred in response to a report that highlighted several shortfalls in CF joint doctrine production, created a Doctrine and Standardization staff within the office of the DPDT. The staff was theoretically comprised of six mid-ranking officers, although not all positions were filled.[159]

Due to this staff shortage, in March 2002, the development of *Canadian Forces Doctrine* was contracted to two recently retired senior officers (an Army colonel and a Navy captain), allowing the in-house staff to concentrate on other priorities, including developing other manuals further down the joint doctrine hierarchy.[160] According to the minutes of a CF Doctrine Board meeting held on April 25, 2002, the contractors were due to deliver the ratification draft of the new capstone manual by the end of January 2003.[161] Other documents obtained during the research conducted as part of this study indicate that all three services were given the opportunity to provide feedback on an early draft of the document.[162] Furthermore, parts of the doctrine's content appear to have been influenced by allied joint doctrine, especially American and British, supplemented by consultation with American and NATO doctrine writers where it was deemed necessary.[163]

155. Howard G. Coombs, "Creation of a Paradigm Shift: The Canadian Forces College and the Operational Level of War 1987–1995" (paper prepared for the Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare Conference, held October 30 to November 1, 2007 at the Alfred M. Grey Research Centre, USMC Base Quantico, Virginia).

156. During research for this study, English editions of *Canadian Forces Operations* were found dated 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2005. Another edition, labelled "edition 2, ratification draft," was dated 2003. Furthermore, one interviewee asserted that there were discrepancies between English and French editions released during the mid 2000s, although the reasons for this are unclear (usually each edition of a doctrinal publication is produced in English and then translated into French). The result of this situation was periodic confusion within the CF as to which edition of *Canadian Forces Operations* was the current one. Interview with a senior Canadian Army officer, conducted in Kingston, August 17, 2008.

157. The 2000 edition of *Canadian Forces Operations* has been examined herein since it was the most recent edition released prior to the publication of *Canadian Forces Doctrine*. DND, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Operations*, October 2, 2000, 1.2.

158. Ibid., 1.1.

159. A copy of the 2002 *Joint Doctrine Interoperability Report* could not be obtained during research for this study. The information given herein was taken instead from a subsequent report, supplemented by information obtained in interviews. See DND, *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, Report, 8.

160. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, March 22, 2009.

161. DND, *Record of Decision of the 26th Meeting of the Canadian Forces Doctrine Board (CFDB), Held in the NDHQ/COS J3 Conference Room at 1300 Hours on Thursday, 25 April 2002*, File Ref No. 1180-2 (J7 DLLS 2), April 25, 2002. Editor's note: Since that time, a multitude of policy and operational documents have been and continue to be published by the CF and also individually by the three environments of the CF.

162. For example, DND, RCN, *Directorate Maritime Strategy Submission to CF Doctrine (Capstone) Draft Review*, Annex A to File Ref No. 3350-1 (DMarStrat), December 2002.

163. Interview with a senior Canadian naval officer, conducted in Ottawa, August 22, 2008.

Post-production, *Canadian Forces Doctrine* encountered a significant distribution problem that ultimately hampered its success. This was partly the result of understaffing in NDHQ, combined with the low priority doctrine was accorded in relation to more urgent activities, such as the planning and conduct of operations. Put simply, there was not enough staff time available to ensure the doctrine was widely distributed.[164] Another factor contributing to the distribution problem was that the doctrine was made available online, but not printed or distributed in hard copy. While this need not have been an issue, there is scant evidence to suggest that anyone outside of NDHQ or CFC was ever made aware that the website containing the doctrine existed. Another reason for this lack of distribution was later explained by an RCN officer who had been involved in the development of the manual:

> [W]e knew something was afoot pre-Hillier, aside from a staffing issue, so were reluctant to progress the document until more was known. Until these organizational changes [which occurred under the leadership of General Hillier] were implemented/completed there was no real reason to publish/approve a document until all was understood and finalized; thus, [*Canadian Forces Doctrine* was] a publication that became victim of something ready to implement but at a wrong time due to organizational shift.[165]

As a result, with the exception of CF personnel posted to NDHQ or CFC after 2002, none of the Canadian interviewees consulted during the research for this study had heard of *Canadian Forces Doctrine*. In the end, it seems to have suffered the same fate as *Out of the Sun*: while it was used as a reference and possibly as an instruction manual at CFC, it appears that the doctrine did not have any impact outside of this role.[166]

The NZDF was the last of the three armed forces to publish a capstone military-strategic joint doctrine manual, releasing *NZDDP–D Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine* in February 2004.[167] Its production was a direct result of the establishment of HQJFNZ, which included the Joint Evaluation Requirements and Development Branch (JERDB) responsible for doctrine development. This was significant because it was the first time the NZDF had contained an organization responsible for the development of joint doctrine. In late 2002, JERDB's Doctrine and Evaluation Officer commenced work on a draft of a military-strategic joint doctrine manual. Beginning in mid-2003, the draft was substantially rewritten by a senior NZ Army officer, who at the time was on an exchange posting to the ADFWC. During the redrafting process, he was assisted by the staff at ADFWC, a RNZN officer posted to HQNZDF and "content assistants" from each of the three services and from HQJFNZ. Once earlier drafts had been circulated to each of the three services for comment and approval, the final draft was approved by the CDF prior to publication.[168]

Like its Australian and Canadian equivalents, *NZDDP–D* discussed the nature and role of military doctrine and the principles of war.[169] Similarly to the ADF's *Fundamentals*, it also discussed the link between strategic policy and military strategy (in New Zealand's case *The Government's Defence Policy*

164. Ibid.

165. Email correspondence with a senior Canadian naval officer, May 15, 2009.

166. *Canadian Forces Doctrine* has since been removed from the Internet. A printed and bound copy, found in the CFC library, has been referred to in this study. Interestingly, an edition dated October 2002 and labelled "first draft" was also found in the CFC library. Although its eight-chapter structure is the same as in the final version, there are minor differences in the contents of most of the chapters. It is likely that this was the version circulated to the three services for comment, although why a copy was retained by the CFC library remains unknown. DND, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine (First Draft)*, October 2002.

167. For a more detailed evaluation of this publication, see Aaron P. Jackson, "Getting it Right? Military-Strategic-Level Doctrine Development in New Zealand," *New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies* 3 (August 2008): 11–17.

168. Interview with a senior NZ Army officer, conducted in Wellington, May 2, 2007.

169. NZDF, *NZDDP–D*, 1st ed., 1.1–1.8, 6.11–6.17.

Framework was directly quoted but not explicitly acknowledged).[170] Like *Canadian Forces Doctrine,* it contained a future-focused chapter, although this examined NZDF capability concepts rather than emerging warfare trends.[171] A further similarity it had with both the ADF and CF equivalents was that its content was influenced by allied publications. In New Zealand's case, the primary influence was JWP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine*, although *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* also had some influence due to a senior NZ Army officer's experience at ADFWC.[172]

Uniquely, however, *NZDDP–D* established six operational tenets to guide the conduct of military operations.[173] The tenets were the promulgation of a warfighting ethos, the adoption of an effects-based approach to the conduct of military operations, the application of the principles of war, the adoption of the manoeuvrist approach to operations, the adoption of mission command as a command philosophy, and the development of an inherently flexible and pragmatic approach to military operations.[174] Importantly, the tenets were equivalent to the five key ADF warfighting values, and, accordingly, they had the effect of establishing a common NZDF warfighting culture. Although none of the six tenets was given precedence over the others, the inclusion of the manoeuvrist approach provided a further commonality with Australian doctrine.

Another unique component of *NZDDP–D* was the joint doctrine development process it established. A three-tiered process, it is best described as the "development, adaptation, adoption" model. According to the model, when it was assessed that the NZDF required a unique doctrine, it would be developed internally (although when developing its own doctrine, the NZDF would draw on allied doctrine as required). Due to the costs associated with doctrine development, it was determined that the NZDF would only develop its own joint doctrine when government policy required it, when the NZDF maintained a unique capability that required a unique doctrine or when there was a philosophical difference between how New Zealand and its allies conducted the same task. To fulfil its remaining joint doctrinal requirements, the NZDF would either adapt allies' doctrine publications (usually by adding a chapter to each explaining how it applied within the New Zealand context) or simply adopt publications unaltered.[175] The establishment of this process subsequently allowed the NZDF to access a broad variety of joint doctrine it would have been unable to afford to produce internally.

Following the release of *NZDDP–D*, New Zealand's joint doctrine development process evolved at a rapid pace. In late 2004, it was determined that the development, adaptation, adoption model should conform to the requirements of the CDR programme with Australia. To generate this conformity, adapted and adopted doctrine was thereafter drawn exclusively from Australian joint doctrine (providing appropriate publications were available). On 1 April 2005, Doctrine Cell was established within the JERDB. Its primary task was to coordinate joint doctrine development and management, although it was also responsible for distribution and for ensuring doctrine-enabled interoperability with New Zealand's allies.[176]

Importantly, Doctrine Cell was instrumental in developing Defence Force Order 05/2006: NZDF Joint Doctrine Management, which "provides the guidance, processes and procedures for the

170. Ibid., 2.2.

171. Ibid., Chapter 10.

172. The second edition of *British Defence Doctrine* was released in 2001. British Ministry of Defence, Prepared under the Direction of the Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, on Behalf of the Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP 0-01), *British Defence Doctrine,* 2nd ed., October 2001 (hereafter cited as UK, JWP 0-01, 2nd ed.).

173. While the concepts themselves were not unique, their grouping together as the six operational tenets that would guide the conduct of NZDF operations was.

174. NZDF, *NZDDP–D*, 1st ed., Chapter 6.

175. Ibid., 4.3.

176. Interview with a senior official of the NZ MOD, conducted at the Development Branch, HQJFNZ, May 2, 2007.

management of joint doctrine and the joint doctrine hierarchy within the NZDF."[177] DFO 05/2006 also established a Defence Coordinating Committee – Doctrine (DCC–D), chaired by the VCDF, and a Doctrine Working Group (DWG). Together, these committees were responsible for ensuring the ongoing currency of military-strategic and operational joint doctrine in New Zealand, in accordance with the development, adaptation, adoption model.[178] To avoid confusion, DFO 05/2006 also explained the doctrine development process from start to finish, detailing which committee was responsible for each step within the process.[179] As a result of these developments, by the close of the period studied, the NZDF had not only produced a capstone military-strategic joint doctrine publication but had also established a comprehensive system that would ensure it remained up to date. Accordingly, towards the end of 2007, a review and update of NZDDP–D commenced, and an updated edition was released in November 2008.[180]

The ADF, on the other hand, released an updated edition of *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* in August 2005, although this second edition was very similar to the first. Even its discussion about Australian strategic policy drew heavily on the 2000 Defence White Paper despite the subsequent release of *Defence Updates* in 2003 and 2005. Furthermore, the five key ADF warfighting values were entirely unaltered, with the manoeuvrist approach maintaining its centrality within the doctrine. Indeed, the second edition of *Fundamentals* differed from the first only because it included two extra areas of discussion. The first was a section about geo-strategic influences within the chapter about the link between national security and military power.[181] The second was a chapter titled "The Australian Approach to Warfare."[182]

However, a closer investigation of Australian joint doctrine reveals that these extra areas of discussion were not new. Rather, they were taken (almost verbatim) from ADDP–D.1, *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, another publication within what the ADF labelled its capstone series of doctrine manuals.[183] Essentially, the content of the 2005 edition of *Foundations* synthesized the previous edition and *The Australian Approach to Warfare* into a single document.

Beyond the production of the second edition of *Foundations*, the joint doctrine management reforms the ADF had undertaken in 2002 were fundamental in bringing about a renewed focus on joint doctrine development. Over the next five years, the ADFWC, in conjunction with consultancy firms, either developed and released or reviewed and updated 55 joint doctrine manuals (the review and update of 19 more was still underway in late 2007).[184] Furthermore, in mid-2007 the ADF's joint doctrine management process was tweaked, leading to further improvements, although these were relatively minor in comparison with the changes that had been implemented in 2002. The newly revised doctrine development process was detailed within a draft version of a Defence Instruction (General) Administration released in June 2007.[185]

177. NZDF, *DFO 05/2006*, 1.

178. Ibid., Annex A, Annex B.

179. Ibid., Annex C.

180. This edition of the manual is not examined in this study, since it was published after the conclusion of the period studied. New Zealand Defence Force, *New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine (NZDDP–D) Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Wellington: Development Branch, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, 2008); Email correspondence with a senior official at the NZ MOD, October 29, 2007.

181. ADF, *ADDP–D,* 2nd ed., 2.6–2.8.

182. Ibid., Chapter 5.

183. ADF, ADDP–D.1 *The Australian Approach to Warfare*.

184. Milward.

185. The 2007 DI(G) Admin superseded a previous version that had been promulgated in 2005. ADF, Chief of Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, *Defence Instruction (General) Administration (DI [G] Admin) 20-1: Australian Defence Force Joint Doctrine*, June 2007.

By the close of 2007, the ADF and NZDF had instituted comprehensive joint doctrine development processes. As well as bringing about reviews of their capstone military-strategic joint doctrine manuals, these processes created systems for the development, distribution, review and update of other joint doctrine manuals. Although the CF had not implemented such a process by the end of 2007, several steps towards this had nonetheless been taken.

Major changes to the joint doctrine development process within the CF began with the transformation programme initiated by General Hillier in 2005. Coinciding with the restructure that removed the DCDS from the joint chain of command and established instead the Strategic Joint Staff, the Doctrine and Standardization Staff was dissolved, with no clear indication given about which organization would take over its role. Even though this situation was reversed in November 2006 when responsibility for joint doctrine development was assigned to the Chief of Force Development (CFD), the situation nevertheless renewed concerns about the state of CF joint doctrine. These concerns brought about the conduct of an *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, the final report of which was delivered in March 2007. The *Evaluation* found that following the 2005 restructuring, "with a few notable exceptions, doctrine development and production at the strategic and joint operational levels has effectively ceased."[186]

The *Evaluation* also found that prior to the 2005 restructuring, joint doctrine development within the CF had been inconsistent at best, even after the creation of the Doctrine and Standardization staff in 2002. Regarding the doctrine development process subsequently implemented in 2003,[187] it determined that some aspects of the process, for example, the validation of operational doctrine, had not occurred "within the corporate memory" of CF joint doctrine writers.[188] Furthermore, the Doctrine and Standardization staff had "struggled from the outset to create and maintain the currency of out-of-date CF publications."[189] This problem was exacerbated by continued undermanning and the posting of inexperienced or inappropriately experienced officers to doctrine-writing positions.[190] In its overall assessment, the *Evaluation* bluntly stated:

> Doctrine development above the tactical level has not kept pace with recent changes to CF command and control architecture and new capabilities introduced through CF transformation. … Remedial action is urgently required to ensure that current deficiencies do not negatively influence the achievement of military objectives.[191]

The first of the eight recommendations made within the *Evaluation* was: "Introduce a military-strategic capstone doctrine manual for the CF on a priority basis."[192]

Following the delivery of the *Evaluation's* final report, several steps were taken to address the problems it identified. The CFD, tasked with the production of joint doctrine in November 2006, had delegated responsibility to CFEC, which established the Joint Doctrine Branch (JDB) to undertake the writing.[193] Commencing in early 2007, the JDB began to review and update the CF's joint doctrine publications, along with reviewing the doctrine development process itself. Although the review was

186. DND, *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, 2.

187. This process is outlined in DND, A-AE-025-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Doctrine Development*, May 12, 2003, Chapter 2.

188. DND, *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, 7.

189. Ibid., 8

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid., iii.

192. Ibid., 29.

193. Interview with senior CF officers, conducted at the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, August 22, 2008; Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Savard, *CF Joint Doctrine: Briefing to Australian Doctrine Rep*, PowerPoint presentation prepared for the Directorate Strategic Concepts and Doctrine, December 14, 2006, copy obtained by author August 22, 2008.

still underway at the close of 2007, several indicators appeared in early and mid-2008, which suggested the CF was gradually implementing a comprehensive joint doctrine management process similar to those in the ADF and NZDF.[194] One of the indicators was the publication in July 2008 of a new capstone military-strategic joint doctrine manual, although this manual is not examined in this study since it was published after the conclusion of the period studied.[195]

Summary and Implications: Military-Strategic Joint Doctrine

An examination of the influences on and intended effects of military-strategic joint doctrine published by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces between 2002 and 2007 reveals many similarities. As was the case for each of the single services (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6), four key influences remained prominent during the development of joint doctrine: the role of individual officers; the influence of allied joint operations and reforms, most prominently joint doctrine development (British, US, NATO and, in New Zealand's case, Australian joint doctrine being the most influential); the joint operational experiences of each of the armed forces; and strategic policy guidance, when it was available. As in each of the single services studied, the relative importance of these influences varied between the three countries and between publications.

Despite this similarity with the individual services, each of the four key influences manifested themselves in a distinct manner in the case of joint doctrine development. For example, individuals frequently exerted influence either as members of doctrine writing teams or as senior officers (for joint doctrine, the CDF/CDS played the same role that single-service chiefs did for individual service doctrine). In the case of joint doctrine development, the influence of senior officers was much less direct than in the case of the single services, but instead there were more sources of indirect influence. In addition to the CDF approving joint doctrine publications, Australia and New Zealand established senior-level, joint-doctrine steering committees chaired by the VCDF. These determined development priorities and gave top-down momentum to joint doctrine development. In Canada, the CFD (who in turn reported to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff) had a similar responsibility after November 2006.

The content of joint doctrine also reveals many similarities between the three countries and their allies as well as between joint and single-service doctrine. The discussion of similar or occasionally identical concepts within joint doctrine (the ten principles of war is a good example of an identical concept) has been partly due to the influence of allied doctrine development. Similar to armies, all three countries were easily able to access allied joint doctrinal and conceptual developments through their participation in formalized ideas-sharing forums. Most prominent amongst these were the Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conferences (QCJWC), held annually and attended by representatives from the US, British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces and the NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG), which all three armed forces attended, even though Australia and New Zealand were not NATO members.[196]

Additionally, elements of the operational, organizational and educational aspects of jointery within allied armed forces impacted on the development of joint doctrine within the three countries. For

194. One of the key indicators was the release of a new *Joint Doctrine Development Manual* in May 2008, which was intended to provide guidance to joint doctrine writers. It included a section detailing a joint doctrine development process. DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP-A1), *Joint Doctrine Development Manual* (CDS, CFEC, May 2008), 2.2–2.14.

195. DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP-01), *Canadian Military Doctrine: Ratification Draft 1* (CDS, CFEC, July 9, 2008). The ratified version of this manual was subsequently released in April 2009. DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP-0), *Canadian Military Doctrine* (CDS, CFEC, April 2009).

196. Lieutenant-Colonel P. D. Nicholson, "CF Participation to [sic] International Doctrine Activities" (unpublished briefing note for CFD, Doctrine Section, CFEC, February 2007); Ross L. Fisher, "The New Zealand Defence Force and Multinational Interoperability Forums" (unpublished paper prepared for Development Branch, HQJFNZ, August 2006); and *Charter of the Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference*, May 2006, para. 3.

example, conclusions about the nature of contemporary military operations could be drawn by observing allied operations without necessarily needing to participate in them. However, due to the indirect nature and transience of this influence, it is difficult to measure exactly. As a result, the extent to which it was a contributing factor in joint doctrine development remains largely intangible.

The influence of single-service doctrine on joint doctrine development is also evident, because several concepts that appear in joint doctrine were previously developed within military-strategic single-service doctrine. For example, while the inclusion of the manoeuvrist approach in Australian and New Zealand joint doctrine provides a conceptual link to British joint doctrine,[197] it also provides a conceptual link with the doctrine of their armies. Yet the relative influence of each of the service doctrines has fluctuated over time, sometimes even during different phases of the production of a single joint doctrine manual. This variation has occurred for a plethora of reasons, including the service background of members of doctrine writing teams as well as the background of senior officers in influential positions. Additional reasons relate to the broader political context in which joint doctrine production has occurred.[198] These reasons include the relative primacy of each service within national strategic policy, the different requirements each service has of joint doctrine, and differing levels of utility the concepts contained within each service's doctrine have when applied at the military-strategic joint level.

Regardless of the fluctuating nature of these factors, contrasting military-strategic single-service and joint doctrine reveals that army doctrine has consistently been the most similar in nature to joint doctrine. While at first glance this appears to indicate that armies have dominated joint doctrine development processes (this would be unsurprising given the importance historically placed on doctrine by armies relative to navies and air forces), closer investigation reveals that this is simply not the case. Rather, the reason army and joint doctrine more readily align is because military-strategic land warfare concepts are more readily applicable at the joint level. As Cassidy explained regarding US joint doctrine:

> At [the USMC's Combat Development Command at] Quantico, the study of single-service doctrine led to a common view that land doctrine by necessity and by history is the most joint of the three. To succeed in the land environment, one needs to have joined together the land, sea and air campaigns. Joint warfare is also a natural extension of the land concept of combined arms warfare as a means to fight asymmetrically and with maximum synergy.[199]

An example drawn from the conceptual underpinnings of the single-service doctrine demonstrates that this assertion could also be applied within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces. Whereas the Booth model reproduced within naval doctrine and the theories of air power discussed within air force doctrine provide effective mediums for explaining what these services do, along with how and why they do it, these concepts do not translate to the other services. In contrast, the land concept of manoeuvre, which emphasizes victory through the exploitation of enemy weaknesses in the most efficient way possible, while at the same time protecting one's own vulnerabilities, is generic enough that it can also be applied by navies and air forces. Hence, it has been included in joint doctrine; whereas, the equivalent core naval and air warfare theories have not.

Despite the prevalence of army concepts in joint doctrine and the varying nature of single-service influence over time, it has not unduly skewed any of the joint doctrine publications in the direction of any of the services. As one USN officer observed when discussing his experience as a joint doctrine writer, the hijacking of joint doctrine by one of the services is a potential problem with joint doctrine development:

197. The manoeuvrist approach also occupies a central position within British joint doctrine. UK, JWP 0-01, 2nd ed., 3.5–3.6.

198. In addition to the discussion in the first two sections of this chapter, the broader political context is discussed in more detail in the first three chapters.

199. Cassidy, "In the Footsteps of Others," 71.

> Tasked with the distribution and review of joint doctrine publications … I quickly learned they fall into two categories. One consists of well-written pubs [publications] that truly present joint principles and precepts, the other of thinly veiled service works masquerading as joint doctrine.[200]

That the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand joint doctrine publications all fit into the former of these two categories is testimony that joint doctrine development in all three countries was the result of joint processes, in which all three services were able to contribute to one extent or another.

In the study of army, navy and air force doctrine in the preceding chapters, it was concluded that army doctrine was *downward focused*, since it was primarily intended to guide the conduct of operations. In contrast, navy doctrine was *upward focused*, designed primarily to generate political support for the acquisition and maintenance of naval platforms. Air force doctrine was primary *inward focused* and was intended as a vessel for the education of personnel about the theoretical underpinnings of their profession. In light of these findings, an examination of the intended effects of joint doctrine reveals a seemingly paradoxical situation, since joint doctrine both aligns with single-service doctrine yet remains unique. This is because joint doctrine had a *quadripartite focus* due to its four primary roles, of which none seems to have been more prominent or important than the others. These four roles could be termed the downward, upward, inward and outward foci of joint doctrine.

The downward focus involved determining a warfighting culture that would explain the nature of joint operations and how they should be conducted (for reasons examined above, this focus was not as prominent in Canadian doctrine as it was in Australian or New Zealand doctrine). This determination was based on a mixture of historical experience, geography, strategic priorities, force structures and national cultures. This had the additional effect of explaining how armed forces implemented national strategic policy through the conduct of joint operations. The upward focus of joint doctrine was chiefly manifest in explanations of how higher-level joint command and control structures (such as headquarters elements) functioned. This also contributed to the doctrine's explanation of how militaries implemented national strategic policy objectives.

While the first two foci of joint doctrine were reflected in its contents, the third and fourth foci became prominent after its publication and distribution. The third focus of joint doctrine, its inward focus, was manifest in the doctrine's use as a textbook during the delivery of joint PME. In this role, joint doctrine was used as a tool to assist in the education of army, navy and air force personnel about the importance of jointery and the conduct of joint operations. In turn, a thorough understanding of the joint warfighting culture and higher-level command structures discussed within joint doctrine constituted a core component of the process of further developing a joint ethos in each of the three services.

Fourth, joint doctrine had an outward focus, being used to explain to the general public how militaries implemented strategic policy goals. Yet the public relations role of joint doctrine varied significantly from the public relations role of single-service doctrine, which was designed to indirectly shape strategic policy by generating public support for the services. At the joint level, fostering good public relations appears to have been an end in itself.

The lack of leverage of joint doctrine to influence the development of strategic policy was probably due to two factors. The first was that at the joint level there was less concern about budget allocations. While the single services competed with each other for budget allocations, at the joint level, budget allocation was more readily forthcoming. This is because most "purple dollars" were allocated to joint organizations such as headquarters elements or to the conduct of joint operations, both of which were

200. Charles M. Edmondson, "Writing Joint Doctrine," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 7 (Spring 1995): 109.

consistently a high strategic priority. The second factor explaining why joint doctrine was not designed to influence strategic policy development was that at the joint level there were several alternative ways senior officers, especially the CDF/CDS, could influence strategic policy development. These options were not always available to the individual services, and they, therefore, had a greater incentive to use doctrine to influence policy development.

The quadripartite focus of joint doctrine is represented in Figure 6, which also shows the common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic joint doctrine. In this model, solid, thin arrows represent influences and effects that occurred consistently across countries and publications; dotted, thin arrows represent either indirect influences or effects, or influences and effects that occurred frequently (but not always); and, the four solid, thick arrows represent the four roles that constituted the quadripartite focus of joint doctrine.



Figure 6. *Common influences on and intended effects of military-strategic joint doctrine*

In addition to the factors discussed above, the model shows the interaction between joint military-strategic and operational doctrine (since discussion within military-strategic joint doctrine directly influenced the content of operational joint doctrine and, in Canada, operational doctrine discussed some military-strategic concepts). It is also pertinent to note that unlike during the development of single-service doctrine, academic discourse was not influential during the development of joint doctrine. This is, therefore, not represented in the model because there has been virtually no academic development of a body of scholarly thought about joint warfare. Given the lack of academic development of joint concepts, single-service and allied joint doctrine has instead filled the conceptual void.

Finally, components of the operational, organizational, educational and doctrinal aspects of the "purple trend" are represented in the model by the ovals. The boxes that overlap the ovals are elements of the aspect of jointery represented by each oval. This shows the role military-strategic joint doctrine has played in relation to the other aspects of the development of jointery in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, demonstrating the importance of the doctrinal aspect of jointery within each country. It also emphasizes that during the period studied, military-strategic joint doctrine came to constitute a significant aspect of the move to jointery that characterized the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces.

Conclusion

Dissecting Military-Strategic Doctrine

The analysis in this study has focused on the emergence and subsequent development of military-strategic doctrine within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces from 1987 to 2007. In the four chapters that examined the evolution of army, navy, air force and joint doctrine, the analysis enabled the development of models explaining the common influences on and key intended effects of military-strategic doctrine produced by each of the services and jointly by the three armed forces. Examined together, these models allow several observations to be made about the nature, scope, role and utility of military-strategic doctrine in the three countries. Two of these observations constitute the key findings of this study, with additional observations providing extra details that expand upon and reinforce them.

The first key finding is that there were four prominent influences on doctrine development within the three countries. These influences were: (1) strategic policy; (2) influential individuals (who came almost entirely from within whichever service was developing a particular doctrine manual); (3) operational experiences and requirements; and (4) allied doctrinal and conceptual developments (especially British and American doctrine). These influences were often linked to and were almost always shaped by the broader political context in which doctrine development occurred (the nature and key elements of this context were established in the first three chapters). Furthermore, it must be noted that while these were the most prominent influences on doctrine development, their prevalence did not preclude the more transient presence of numerous other influences.

The second key finding is that doctrine was pragmatically applied by the armed forces in an attempt to shape their environment. The exact nature and primary focus of these attempts varied, however, depending on the service producing the doctrine, the timing of its production and the broader political context in which doctrine production occurred. Generally, doctrine was used in attempts to shape the following four aspects of this environment: (1) operational conduct (downward focus); (2) national strategic events (upward focus), such as strategic policy formulation and acquisition decisions (although joint doctrine was also used to explain how higher command arrangements functioned); (3) the delivery of PME and/or the generation of a change in service culture (inward focus); and (4) the broader political context in which armed forces operated (outward focus), often through attempts to generate public support. The significance of this finding is discussed in greater detail following an elaboration of the four prominent influences on doctrine development.

Prominent Influences on Doctrine Development

The first of the four prominent influences on military-strategic doctrine was strategic policy. This prominence was evident in the content of the doctrine examined—even though specific strategic policy documents were not always discussed in detail within a doctrine manual, discussion usually included at least a short section describing overarching strategic policy themes. Given that one of the ostensible aims of military-strategic doctrine was to explain how armed forces contributed to the implementation of national strategy, the discussion of strategic policy within doctrine manuals is unsurprising. What is far more significant is the link between strategic policy and the organizational culture of the services (as well as the joint culture of the three armed forces). Put simply, the more detailed a country's strategic policy, the more advanced the "doctrinal culture" of its armed forces. A brief overview of the nature of strategic policy and the extent of the doctrinal culture within each of the three countries is illustrative.

Of the three countries, Australia had the most frequently updated strategic policy, which consistently contained a well-developed national security strategy. Its armed forces also had the strongest doctrinal culture. Although the roles of the three services varied over the period, as Australian national strategy incrementally shifted from continental defence to forward defence, their roles were always well defined in strategic policy documents. The requirement for a joint military strategy was also well defined in strategic policy. The RAAF and Australian Army, both of which developed strong doctrinal cultures early, consistently used their military-strategic doctrine to explain and develop their roles within this broader strategy. Although the RAN did not publish a military-strategic doctrine manual until much later, it too used doctrine as a means to explain how it helped achieve Australia's strategic policy goals. Finally, in the early 2000s, the emergence of a joint doctrinal culture led to the production of joint military-strategic doctrine that explained how the ADF jointly contributed to implementing Australian strategic policy.

Canadian strategic policy was seldom updated, and when it was, it tended either to list a vague series of goals or to develop strategic policy objectives that were out of touch with strategic practice. The CF had a weak doctrinal culture. In the Canadian Army, military-strategic doctrine development during the mid-1990s was not accompanied by the emergence of a doctrinal culture, although a culture of operationally focused conceptual development emerged instead during the mid-2000s (this is discussed in more detail below). Despite the earlier publication of some (largely unsuccessful) military-strategic doctrine manuals, doctrinal cultures were only beginning to emerge within the RCAF and the CF jointly in the last few years of the period studied.[1] Importantly, this was after the 2005 international policy statement had finally provided a comprehensive (and realistic) strategic policy for the CF to implement. The RCN, which was the only Canadian service to develop a strong doctrinal culture early, did not use doctrine as a means to explain how it contributed to achieving strategic policy goals. Rather, it used doctrine in attempts to shape strategic policy and acquisitions decisions. Only after the 1999 release of *Strategy 2020* did its doctrine attempt to explain its role in implementing national strategy.

New Zealand's strategic policy development appears to have gone through two distinct phases. The first began in the wake of the ANZUS Crisis and involved the development of a series of strategic policy documents, culminating in the release of the 1991 Defence White Paper.[2] The second phase commenced in the late 1990s, although it did not result in the release of new strategic policy documents until after the election of the Clark Government in 1999.

The development of military-strategic doctrine within the NZDF aligns roughly with these two strategic policy phases. During the early and mid-1990s, the three single services all released military-strategic doctrine manuals. Although these attempted to explain the role each service played in implementing national strategy, their discussion focused on defining the 1991 Defence White Paper's vague concept of a "credible minimum" defence force. As a result, the doctrinal discussion was not as in-depth as it could have been had the services been allocated more specific roles within the White Paper itself. The production of these doctrine manuals was not accompanied by the emergence of a doctrinal culture within any of New Zealand's three services.

The strategic policy documents released by the Clark Government in the early 2000s differed from earlier strategic policy because they emphasized for the first time the importance of a joint approach.

1. The relegation of earlier RCAF and CF joint doctrine manuals to use as instruction manuals at the CFC is indicative of the failure of these services to develop a doctrinal culture, since widely distributed, well-known (and widely read) doctrine is one of the signs of a well-developed doctrinal culture.

2. The 1997 Defence White Paper was a remnant of the first phase and mostly rehashed the strategies contained within the 1991 Defence White Paper. It did not have as much of an impact as its predecessor.

A strong joint doctrinal culture subsequently emerged within the NZDF, although this was not accompanied by a corresponding emergence within the services themselves.

The second of the four prominent influences on doctrine development—the role of influential individuals—was also linked to the emergence of a doctrinal culture within the single services and armed forces. Because members of doctrine writing teams consistently influenced the content of the doctrine manual they were producing, the role played by senior officers was far more important. In addition to the presence of detailed strategic policy, the services that developed strong doctrinal cultures all produced doctrine as a result of a "top-down push." While this top-down push need not have originated with any one individual (the emergence of a doctrinal culture within the RCN is not linked to any individual in particular, although the emergence of joint doctrinal cultures in all three countries is perhaps the best example of this), the support of several senior officers or, on numerous occasions, the initial support of a prominent service chief was present during the emergence of a doctrinal culture.

In cases where a prominent service chief was a major contributor to the emergence of a doctrinal culture within a service, their role in establishing favourable conditions for doctrine development and acting as a champion of the doctrine after its release was more important than any degree of influence they exerted over the content of the doctrine itself. Air Marshal Funnell's role in establishing of the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre is a good example of this. By establishing the Air Power Studies Centre, Air Marshal Funnell created an organization within the RAAF responsible for the development and promulgation of doctrine on an ongoing basis, effectively giving doctrine a permanent (and prominent) place within RAAF culture. This can be contrasted with Rear Admiral Welch's influence over the content of *Maritime Doctrine for the Royal New Zealand Navy*. Although Rear Admiral Welch was highly influential during the production of this manual, his interest in doctrine did not lead to the establishment of an institutional mechanism for updating it. Nor did it lead to the proliferation of a doctrinal culture within the RNZN. As a result, following Rear Admiral Welch's departure from his position as Chief of the Naval Staff, the RNZN did not produce any other military-strategic doctrine manuals.

Inversely, doctrine that was produced because of a "bottom-up push" did not lead to the development of an ongoing doctrinal culture in any of the armed forces studied. The most prominent example of a bottom-up push was the Canadian Army's development of *We Stand on Guard for Thee*, which was conceptually sound, but which was not fated to be the first in a series of military-strategic doctrine manuals. Instead, the Canadian Army's culture of operationally focused conceptual development that subsequently emerged during the early 2000s had top-down momentum from the outset. Finally, there was no discernable link between the quality and innovativeness of doctrine manuals and whether they were produced due to a top-down or a bottom-up push.

The third of the four prominent influences was operations, specifically operational experience and requirements. Unlike the previous two influences, operational experience and requirements were not linked to the development of a doctrinal culture. This is because, unlike strategic policy and influential individuals, the conduct of operations was always a factor to be taken into account. Regardless of the state of strategic policy or which individuals were driving doctrine development, all of the armed forces were continually conducting or training for operations. Because of the ongoing nature of the operational experience and requirements of the services, this influence is most evident in the content of the doctrine manuals themselves. Furthermore, operational experience tended to generate a cyclical feedback loop with doctrine development: operational experiences led to evaluation; evaluation led to conceptual development; selected conceptual developments were incorporated into doctrine; and doctrine then guided the conduct of operations.

The speed and relative importance of this cycle tended to vary substantially between services, however, depending on the requirements of each. Naval operations remained fairly consistent. In contrast, army operations varied greatly between theatres (and even within the same theatre), while air force operations occupied a middle ground, evolving continually but at a slower rate of frequency than army operations. The result of this variance between services is most clearly evident in the intended effects of the doctrine each produced, as will be discussed below.

Regarding the influence of operations on the content of doctrine, the faster the rate of operational changes over time, the greater the portion of the content of a particular service's doctrine was dedicated to the discussion of operationally focused conceptual developments. This observation explains why the academic discourse had a much greater influence on the content of navy doctrine. Due to the consistent nature of naval operations, the conceptual evolution of maritime warfare was far slower than the conceptual evolution of land and air warfare. Because of this, navies did not have to dedicate large portions of their doctrine to formally expressing the institutional acceptance of selected operational concepts. Instead, they were able to dedicate a more substantial portion of its content to theoretically driven discussions of their role in the implementation of national strategy.

The final of the four prominent influences on doctrine development was allied conceptual and doctrinal developments, especially those that originated within the American and British armed forces. Like operational experience and requirements, the influence of allied conceptual and doctrinal developments was also evident most clearly in the content of the doctrine manuals, and doctrine development in allied countries had little, if any, influence on the emergence of a doctrinal culture within the armed forces studied.

The allied conceptual and doctrinal influence is hardly surprising, for two reasons. The first is the historic nature of the relationship between Australia, Canada and New Zealand on the one hand and Britain and the US on the other. As discussion in the first chapter in particular established, this relationship has involved close military ties throughout the history of the three countries. The flow of conceptual and doctrinal ideas between these countries and their larger allies can be viewed as a component of the contemporary manifestation of this broader historical linkage.

The second reason is more contemporary and pragmatic. Although the sharing of ideas between countries frequently occurred on an informal and ad hoc basis, this was accompanied by the existence of formal or semi-formal idea-sharing forums, such as ABCA and QCJWC. These forums were established to encourage a conceptual and doctrinal exchange that would enable interoperability between the three forces and their American and British allies. Since these five forces frequently operated alongside one another in the same theatres, interoperability facilitated easy and effective operational conduct and support. Whether it occurred through informal exchanges or formal forums, the sharing of ideas was an important enabler of interoperability because it created a common conceptual foundation for operational conduct. As one senior New Zealand officer remarked during an interview conducted as part of this study, "doctrine is all about plagiarism, but we call it interoperability."[3] Maintaining conceptually similar doctrine helped facilitate interoperability, which in turn increased the likelihood of operational success.

As shown in Figure 7, of the four prominent influences on doctrine development, the two most variable influences (strategic policy and influential individuals) were closely linked to the emergence (or lack of emergence) of a doctrinal culture within the services and armed forces. The two more consistent influences (operational experiences and requirements as well as allied conceptual and doctrinal

3. Interview with a senior NZ Army officer, conducted in Wellington, May 2, 2007.

developments) instead played significant roles in shaping the content of doctrine manuals. Yet with the exception of the link between doctrine and the conduct of operations, the intended effects of the doctrine manuals did not directly stem from the prominent influences on doctrine production. As the following elaboration about the downward, upward, inward and outward foci of doctrine attests, the intended effects of doctrine instead related to the different nature of the doctrine produced by armies, navies, air forces and jointly. This difference is in turn indicative of the unique organizational cultures that existed within the armies, navies and air forces studied as well as the nature of the joint organizational culture that evolved within the three armed forces.



Figure 7. *Variable and consistent influences on doctrine development*

Key Intended Effects of Doctrine

The downward or operational focus of military-strategic doctrine was closely related to the influence of operational experience and requirements during the doctrine development process. Indeed, the downward focus of doctrine was the final step of the cyclical feedback loop mentioned above. This focus was manifested most clearly in the content of doctrine manuals, which was partly designed to provide guidance for the conduct of operations. Just as the rate of operational change over time was a major factor in determining the proportion of doctrine that was dedicated to the discussion of operationally focused conceptual developments, so too was it a crucial factor in determining the relative significance of the downward focus of the doctrine. It is, therefore, unsurprising that army doctrine had the strongest downward focus and navy doctrine the weakest.

The upward focus of doctrine refers to the extent of the influence it was intended to have on national strategic events, such as strategic policy formulation and acquisition decisions. Unlike the downward focus, this focus was not closely related to the corresponding influence strategic policy had during doctrine development. Instead, the extent of the upward focus of doctrine was determined by service

interests in relation to the national strategic environment, taking into account the broader political context at the time a doctrine manual was being written. During periods of strategic policy uncertainty or periods corresponding with the existence of an unfavourable national strategy, the services were more likely to use doctrine to shape the evolution of national strategy. Hence, it is unsurprising that Canadian doctrine was more frequently (and noticeably) upward focused than the doctrine produced in the other countries studied. *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine* provides a good example of upward focused doctrine—its adaptation of an army concept was part of an attempt by the RCAF to generate support within the land-centric strategic environment in which the doctrine manual was written.

Yet this is not the only pattern that can be observed about the upward focus of doctrine. Navies were far more inclined than the other services to use doctrine as a tool to shape the national strategic environment. While on occasion they did this directly by writing doctrine manuals specifically designed to appeal to members of parliament or other strategic policymakers, more often they took an indirect approach wherein doctrine manuals were one of many aspects of attempts to generate favourable national strategic outcomes. While at first glance this inclination on the part of navies appears to be linked to the slower rate of operational change they experienced (as this freed them from the need to use doctrine primarily as a means to provide up to date guidance for operational conduct), the available evidence actually suggests that while this situation helped enable navies to write upward focused doctrine, it was not the main reason why they did.

Instead, the increased inclination of navies to use doctrine as a means to shape the national strategic environment was a result of the relatively platform-centric nature of their operations. Naval doctrine was used as a mechanism for explaining to strategic policy makers what different naval platforms did and how this fit within national strategy, thus justifying the acquisition of expensive replacement platforms. The RCN's use of *Adjusting Course* as part of its attempt to bring about the UPHOLDER class submarine purchase is the most obvious example of this occurrence.

On the flip side, there was one occurrence during this study of a doctrine manual establishing a military strategy that was clearly contrary to a subsequent attempt by a service to bring about a major acquisition. In this case, the service was not a navy but the New Zealand Army, and the decision to recall and destroy all copies of the doctrine manual in question can be seen as an alternative manifestation of the upward focus of doctrine.

The inward focus of doctrine was manifest through the role doctrine played in the delivery of PME and, in the case of air forces, in attempts to bring about a change in service culture. The first of these manifestations was evident in the use of doctrine manuals as textbooks and references during training courses, particularly at the joint level. This aspect of the inward focus of doctrine was often indirectly linked to its downward focus, since a sound understanding of doctrine was necessary before doctrinal concepts could be applied during operations. In the case of joint PME, single-service manuals were used to educate the officers of each service about the roles of the other services, and joint doctrine had several additional functions that are discussed below.

The use of doctrine by air forces as a means to bring about a change in service culture was significant, but this doctrinal role was also unique and circumstantial.[4] As the first section of Chapter 6 highlighted, air force culture was traditionally characterized by the informal and oral dissemination of

4. Although joint doctrine played a significant role in furthering the development of a joint culture within the three armed forces studied, it was different from air force doctrine since it was not used, as air force doctrine was, as a primary means of *initiating* a cultural change from the outset. Instead, joint doctrine was one of four components that characterized the development of a joint culture (the others were operational, organizational and educational). The late emergence of joint doctrine relative to the other three components of joint culture indicates its role was one of *consolidation* rather than initiation.

ideas and concepts between officers, rather than by promulgating written theory. The desire of a core group of air force officers to change this culture to one characterized by the written dissemination of ideas came about in response to changes in the broader political context that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the outset, attempts to generate this cultural change focused on establishing theoretically driven PME programmes. Military-strategic doctrine was viewed as having a vital role within these programmes, in addition to generating a broader conceptual debate that would itself encourage an increased volume of professional writing. In the longer term, it was intended that doctrine would become a mechanism for formally expressing the official acceptance of selected theoretical developments.

The result was different for the three air forces. In the RAAF, doctrine development was accompanied by the quick emergence of a doctrinal culture, as well as fostering a broader written culture. The RCAF's initial military-strategic doctrine manual failed to have much of an effect at all. However, a second manual released in 2007 and accompanied by a broader reform programme had more success. At the close of the period studied, it appeared that a tentative doctrinal and written culture was finally emerging within the RCAF. Despite several positive signs, it was still too early to determine whether this culture was permanent or transient in nature.[5] The RNZAF's brief flirtation with military-strategic doctrine during the early 1990s did not have any discernable effect on the organization. Although a small volume of literature was subsequently produced by a few RNZAF officers, the organization does not appear to have developed a written culture. Despite the different results doctrine ultimately had on organizational culture, the link between doctrine and the desire for cultural change nonetheless led air force doctrine to have a more prominent inward focus than either army or navy doctrine.

The outward focus of doctrine encompassed attempts to use it as a means for shaping the broader political context in which the armed forces existed. Generally, these attempts were manifested through the use of doctrine as a public relations tool, a secondary yet ever-present doctrinal role within all of the services and jointly within all three armed forces. Unlike the previous three foci, the outward focus was not more prominent within any of the three services. Rather, the way each service went about using doctrine as a public relations tool was indicative of the differences between them. Armies tended to apply doctrine as public relations tool in order to foster a wide understanding of their operational conduct and requirements. Navies tended to apply doctrine as a public relations tool in order to increase public awareness of what they did and why. Air forces tended to apply doctrine as a public relations tool as part of efforts to educate the general public about the nature and role of air power.

The different way in which each service went about using doctrine as a public relations tool is indicative of the different organizational cultures of the armies, navies and air forces studied. Yet the desired result of their efforts was the same: each service sought to influence the broader political context in which they operated, with the ultimate aim of improving their environment. This desired result was often linked to the upward focus of doctrine, since public support for service agendas was generally considered to have a positive if indirect influence during the development of strategic policy. Public support may also have indirectly contributed to positive funding decisions (at the very least curtailing the extent of budget cuts). Unfortunately, the overall extent to which doctrine contributed to shaping the broader political context in which armed forces operated is immeasurable, since doctrine manuals always existed alongside a diverse array of other programmes and projects that were also designed with this end in mind.

5. Editor's note: Since this study was concluded, a doctrinal culture seems to have solidified within the RCAF. Since 2007, the RCAF has steadily released a series of doctrine and policy documents and continues to do so. CFAWC remains responsible for the development of RCAF doctrine. DND, "About CFAWC," Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/CFAWC_e.asp (accessed October 29, 2012).

Overall, it can be observed that although each service's doctrine exhibited elements of each focus, army doctrine was primarily downward focused, navy doctrine was primarily upward focused, and air force doctrine was primarily inward focused. The outward focus was a prominent, if secondary, concern for all three services.

Joint military-strategic doctrine was similar to single-service doctrine because it had the same four foci, yet it was also unique because its emphasis was quadripartite, rather than having a clear and prominent primary focus. Furthermore, the manifestation of the four foci was slightly different in the case of joint doctrine, due to the nature of jointery within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces. In common with single-service doctrine, the downward focus of joint doctrine was evident in its content. Within joint doctrine, however, discussion tended to concentrate on the development of a joint warfighting culture, a discourse that was designed to explain the nature of joint operations as much as—if not more than—providing guidance about how they should be conducted.

The upward focus of joint doctrine was not linked to attempts to influence national strategic-level events in the same way single-service doctrine was. Instead, the upward focus of joint doctrine concentrated on developing the link between national strategy and joint organizational structures. This difference stemmed from the unique roles and structures of joint organizations, which were different from those of the single services. Importantly, joint structures tended either to be operational or to encompass the higher command elements of the three armed forces. Both of these areas were consistently a high funding priority, and unlike the three services, at the joint level, armed forces had no obvious rivals for acquisitions funding allocation. In all three countries, the chief of defence force/staff was a joint position, giving joint organizations a direct link to national strategic-level policymakers. As a result, joint organizations had fewer incentives to use doctrine as part of attempts to shape national strategic-level events—using doctrine to explain how joint organizations fit within existing strategy was sufficient.

The inward and outward foci of joint doctrine were closely linked to the upward and downward foci. This is because the upward and downward foci of joint military-strategic doctrine led large portions of its content to be dedicated to offering explanations of the nature of joint operations and the structure of joint higher command organizations. This content resulted in joint doctrine manuals constituting ideal textbooks for joint PME courses, particularly for mid- and senior-level officers, thus generating an inward focus. The same features of its content also made joint doctrine a meaningful public relations tool, and it was used as a means of explaining to the general public how joint operations and organizations enabled the three armed forces to fulfil strategic policy goals. Like single-service doctrine, this outward focus of joint doctrine was designed to favourably shape the broader political context in which the armed forces existed.

Notwithstanding the discussion above, two overarching observations about the fundamental nature of military-strategic doctrine warrant further elaboration. First, military-strategic doctrine is a product of service culture, and the scope, content and intent of doctrine manuals remains inextricably intertwined with this culture. This linkage explains why the doctrine manuals that were not accepted within the service that produced them consistently failed to gain broader traction. It also explains why all three armies, navies, air forces and joint armed forces produced doctrine manuals that were usually closer in nature to one another than to the doctrine manuals produced by the other services within their own countries.

Most significantly, since the different cultures of each service have been derived from their unique operational mediums and from their different organizational experiences, the link between doctrine

and service culture also explains the different nature of the doctrine produced by each service. Although doctrine development in all of the services was primarily influenced by the four factors discussed above, the nature of the doctrine each service produced was nonetheless different. As well as shaping the traditional perceptions each service had about doctrine, the different culture of each service was evident in the alternate primary focus of the doctrine manuals produced by each service (and jointly). Essentially, and unsurprisingly, each of the services produced doctrine manuals that fit within their unique organizational cultures.

Second, military-strategic doctrine was used by the armed forces as a pragmatic tool for furthering their interests. In light of this observation, it appears that previous assertions that doctrine signalled an institutional culture of conceptual innovation only reveal part of the story. It is true that the armed forces studied used doctrine to formally express institutional acceptance of selected conceptual developments. They also used doctrine as a means to enable their officers to come to terms with the shifting requirements of military service during periods of operational and strategic level uncertainty. Beyond these uses, however, the findings of this study have revealed an important extra dimension to military-strategic doctrine: that it was also a means by which the armed forces attempted to favourably shape their environment by influencing it, both directly and indirectly.

As discussion throughout the study has demonstrated, there are several examples of doctrinal pragmatism, and it has been evident in numerous ways. Most significantly, the four foci of military-strategic doctrine discussed above were all inherently pragmatic, as were the reasons underlying the different primary focus of each service's (and joint) doctrine. In addition to these examples of doctrinal pragmatism, there have been numerous others. These include the RCAF's decision to use an Army concept within *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, the RCN's use of doctrine to help bring about the UPHOLDER class submarine purchase, the New Zealand Army's recall of all copies of *NZ P-12 – Doctrine* when it conflicted with an attempt to influence an acquisition decision, and the use of doctrine by all three of New Zealand's services to favourably define what constituted a credible minimum defence force. The RAAF's use of the 2007 edition of *The Air Power Manual* as a means to enable the organization to cope with the transition to numerous new platforms and the Australian Army's use of the 1998 edition of *Fundamentals of Land Warfare* to promulgate a major new operating concept (MOLE) are examples of a more subtle form of doctrinal pragmatism.

That none of the armed forces studied attempted to leverage joint doctrine to shape national strategic-level events is the "exception that proves the rule" of doctrinal pragmatism. As discussed above, the joint environment was different from the single-service environments in all three countries studied. At the joint level, all three armed forces could influence national strategic-level events using means that were unavailable to the single services. Thus, while the single services pragmatically used doctrine in attempts to shape national strategic-level events, joint doctrine was seldom used for this purpose. It was nonetheless pragmatically applied, however, as a part of the process of establishing and enshrining a joint culture within the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armed forces and as a means of fostering cooperation among the services.

Summary

In summary, this study's findings regarding each of the four prominent influences on military-strategic doctrine development and each of the four foci of military-strategic doctrine have revealed several nuances about its scope, role and utility. In particular, these findings have allowed observations to be made about the factors that contributed to the development or otherwise of a doctrinal culture within the services and armed forces studied, about which factors influenced the content of doctrine manuals

and why, and about the effects (intended and actual) that the doctrine manuals studied have had. This latter area of discussion has also revealed much about the variation between doctrine manuals produced by the different single services studied, as well as between the three armed forces jointly. Overall, the key findings of the study, along with these accompanying observations, demonstrated that the production of military-strategic doctrine, along with its structure, role and scope, was closely intertwined with service culture. Furthermore, doctrine was pragmatically applied by the armed forces studied as a mechanism for attempting to shape their environment. While the nature of these attempts varied greatly, this aspect of doctrine nonetheless presents the strongest common denominator between the many manuals studied.

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Abbreviations

Due to the inclination of the three armed forces studied to use acronyms for almost everything, several have by necessity been included within this study. Where an acronym or abbreviation listed below originated within or is applicable to a particular service, or armed forces, or country, or group of countries, or region, etc., this appears in brackets after the term. Likewise, where an abbreviation has been used for a publication title, the nature of the publication, country (or service) that published it and the year in which it was published is given in brackets after the title.

$AU	Australian dollars
$C	Canadian dollars
$NZ	New Zealand dollars
ABCA	American, British, Canadian and Australian Armies' Standardization Programme (since 2006 membership has also included New Zealand)
ADA	Aerospace Doctrine Authority (RCAF)
ADB	Aerospace Doctrine Board (RCAF)
ADC	Australian Defence College
ADCB	Air Doctrine and Concepts Board (RCAF)
ADDP–D	*Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine* (denotes the capstone Australian military-strategic joint doctrine manual)
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
ADO	adaptive dispersed operations (Canadian Army)
ANZAC	Australian and New Zealand Army Corp
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASP90	*Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s* (Australian strategic policy document, endorsed in 1989, publically released in 1992)
ASP97	*Australia's Strategic Policy* (Australian strategic policy document, published in 1997)
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
AUSCANZUKUS	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States maritime interoperability organization (multinational naval working group established to address command, control, communications and computer interoperability)
CANSOFCOM	Canadian Special Operations Forces Command

CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CAS	close air support
CATDC	Combined Arms Training and Development Centre (Australian Army)
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force (Australia and New Zealand)
CDR	closer defence relations (between Australia and New Zealand)
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff (Canada)
CDSS	Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (Australia)
CF	Canadian Forces
CFAWC	Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFD	Chief of Force Development (Canada)
CFEC	Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre
CFLI	Canadian Forces Leadership Institute
CJTF	combined joint task force
COA	Chief of Army (Australia and New Zealand)
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
DAD	Directorate of Army Doctrine (Canada)
DB2000	*Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000* (New Zealand strategic policy document, final report delivered to Parliament in 1999)
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Canada)
DFO	Defence Force Order (New Zealand)
DJFHQ	Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Australia)
DLCD	Director of Land Concepts and Designs (Canada)
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DOD	Department of Defence (Australia)
DPDT	Director Plans, Doctrine and Training (Canada)
ELF	Enhanced Land Force (Australia)
FPDA	Five Power Defence Agreement (between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore)
FTA	free trade agreement

GDPF	*The Government's Defence Policy Framework* (New Zealand strategic policy document, published in 2000)
GDS	*Government Defence Statement* (New Zealand strategic policy document, published in 2001)
GWOT	global war on terrorism
HMNZS	Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship
HNA	hardened and networked Army (Australia)
HQADF	Headquarters Australian Defence Force
HQAST	Headquarters Australian Theatre
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
HQNZDF	Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
IA	interim army (Canada)
IFOR	Implementation Force (in the former Yugoslavia)
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IPS	*International Policy Statement* (Canadian strategic policy document, published in 2005)
JDB	Joint Doctrine Branch (Canada)
JDSG	Joint Doctrine Steering Group (Australia)
JERDB	Joint Evaluation Requirements Development Branch (New Zealand)
JOC	Joint Operations Command (Australia)
JOG	Joint Operations Group (Canada)
JPG	joint planning group
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication (UK)
LAVIII	Light Armoured Vehicle III (New Zealand)
LTDP	*Defence Long-Term Development Plan* (New Zealand strategic policy document, editions published in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006)
LWD1	*Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (Australian Army)
MLW	*Manual of Land Warfare* (Australian Army)
MOD	Ministry of Defence (New Zealand)
MOLE	manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment (Australian Army)
MSP	Maritime Studies Programme (Australia)

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ_	National Defence Headquarters (Canada)
NDID	National Defence Index of Documentation (Canada)
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NORCOM	Northern Command Australia
NZCSC	New Zealand Command and Staff Course
NZDDP–D	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine (denotes the capstone New Zealand military-strategic joint doctrine manual)
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
PME	professional military education
QCJWC	Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (attended by representatives from the armed forces of the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand)
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force (pre-1 February 1968 and post-1 August 2011)
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy (pre-1 February 1968 and post-1 August 2011)
RMA	revolution in military affairs
RN	Royal Navy
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
SCOF	*Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark* (RCN doctrine manual, published in 2005)
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SLOC	sea line of communication
SOTG	special operations task group
SPC–A	Sea Power Centre – Australia

TIB68	*Training Information Bulletin No. 68: Low Level Conflict 1988* (Australian Army military strategy document)
TIL 1/88	*Training Information Letter 1/88: Directive Control 1988* (Australian Army military strategy document)
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USAF	United States Air Force (post-18 September 1947)
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
VCDF	Vice Chief of the Defence Force (Australia and New Zealand)
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

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