SPECIAL STUDIES

A CRITICAL MOMENT:
CAPTURING AND CONVEYING THE EVOLUTION OF THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SERVICE

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A WORD FROM THE SCHOOL

The Canada School of Public Service is embarking upon a new journey. In support of the new Public Service Learning Framework, we are working to strengthen and accelerate individual learning, organizational leadership, and innovation across the public service. One component of this work is to support the effective orientation of federal public servants at all levels so that they understand both the essential elements of the public service and what it means to be a public servant. This may be more important now than at any time in the past.

- Changes at several levels are driving significant turnover in the public service, especially at the executive levels. This has raised key questions about the institutional memory of the public service and the transfer of core knowledge to new generations of public servants.

- The federal public service is currently under stress. While an essential and valued institution, it is emerging from controversies that have raised challenging questions about its nature and how it functions.

- Past decades have brought numerous waves of change and reform. The extent to which these changes have been character-shifting for the public service is less than clear. Are the fundamental elements of the federal public service different today from what they were ten years ago?

Addressing these challenges and confidently moving forward requires a strong knowledge foundation. It is time to invest in this foundation, to better understand where we have been, where we are, and where we are going. In a similar vein, the author rightly notes that, with respect to the Canadian public service, "it is timely to determine its essential features, take stock, define future risks, and identify strategic priorities to guide future institutional development."

This is the purpose of *A Critical Moment: Capturing and Conveying the Evolution of the Canadian Public Service*, the latest publication from the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS) (http://www.myschoolmonecole.gc.ca/research/index_e.html). Written by Professor Evert Lindquist, Director of the School of Public Administration of the University of Victoria, it is one of a series of several CSPS studies exploring different facets of the Canadian model of public administration and public service.

Professor Lindquist successfully tackles and integrates a diverse literature on Canadian governance and public administration. He facilitates clear comprehension, learning, and dialogues by constructing a framework that focuses on three clusters: recruiting talent and

aligning effort; designing policy and delivering services; and learning, scrutiny, and reform. This, I would suggest, is the heart of the publication.

But Professor Lindquist does not stop there. He suggests that the public service is at a "critical moment" wherein it is key that institutional priorities be set to build greater confidence and enhance the public service's capacity to operate effectively within an increasingly complex environment. To this end, he explores priorities and opportunities for the public service, and he identifies areas and an approach for undertaking further research.

I am confident that public servants and scholars alike will find this study to be a valuable and insightful new contribution to the literature on Canadian public administration. The Canada School of Public Service is proud to make this new publication available.

Ruth Dantzer
President
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INTRODUCTION

The Canadian public service is an important national institution, a fundamental component of our Parliamentary system. Long acknowledged as an exemplar and innovator for those seeking to strengthen their public service institutions, it has a well-deserved reputation for reflecting on its progress and needs.

Yet, after more than a decade of grappling with many governance challenges, some unique to Canada and most encountered by all OECD governments, and as well as a series of reform initiatives by governments and public service leaders, there are decidedly mixed views about what has been accomplished and the state of the public service. On the one hand, there has been considerable restructuring and innovation to address significant challenges, resulting in deserved pride about accomplishments. On the other, there is a perception that the Canadian government has been less bold and coherent in its approach to public sector reform. More recently, several breaches of the public trust have fueled concerns about the quality of the Canadian public service, despite its considerable strengths, and stimulated interest in rebuilding confidence in the eyes of key stakeholders. For these reasons, leaders and academic observers have become interested in defining the contemporary Canadian model of public service.

There are three main reasons for this study. First, the Canadian public service continues to evolve and has recently become more complex, opaque and under stress. It is timely to determine its essential features, take stock, define future risks, and identify strategic priorities to guide future institutional development. Secondly, the current generation of political leaders and administrators may not fully understand the distinctive qualities of the Canadian public service, and future generations will need this information about its history and critical features. Thirdly, the Canadian public service continues to attract international interest and distilling a model will help to better communicate its essential features to outsiders.

The approach taken in this study was inspired by Philip Selznick's seminal book, *Leadership in Administration*, which reflects on values, leadership, organizational processes, and the balancing of internal and external environments. It introduced the notion of "organizational character" emerging from an organization's history, tasks, critical experiences, and leadership, as well as from its formal goals and objectives.[1] Selznick suggested that an institution is "an organization infused with value beyond the specific tasks at hand." He argued that a critical function of the executive was to balance values, resolve conflict, and perhaps develop new normative frameworks to address emerging internal and external challenges. Along with the need to defend institutional integrity to external audiences, Selznick observed that leaders must promote dynamic adaptation, foster new organizational competence, and cultivate an evolving sense of mission through "critical decisions" that alter institutional character in the longer term. Otherwise, institutions move out of synch with their external and internal environments.

Selznick's observations resonate when attempting to "model" the Canadian public service because it embraces institutional leadership and reform, the role of values, and the state of practice. The notion of institutional leadership usually describes efforts to articulate "vision" and cultivate "mission" in *specific* organizations.[2] However, leading a national public service encompasses a diverse complex of organizations, each possessing unique goals, tasks, experiences, competencies, and challenges. But public service institutions still must develop common norms if they are to become more than the sum of their parts, collectively interacting to serve governments and citizens in a broader, complex, and political environment. The complexity of the public service's mission increases the demands on institutional leaders seeking to foster a common identity, coordination, corporate initiatives, and higher values.[3] Finally, Selznick tells us that all institutions inevitably encounter difficult, often character-defining, moments. Adroit leadership will take advantage of such moments to assess risks, reconcile and perhaps instill new values, and move the institution in new strategic directions.

The flow of this study is as follows. **Chapter 1** reviews the recent flurry of writing on the "Canadian model of public administration and governance", with considerable diversity in perspectives, emphasis, and scope. The chapter suggests there are different reasons for this diversity: institutional leaders seek to build coherence; institutional reformers search for lessons to design; academics attempt to describe and provide explanations; and central agencies, standing committees, and the Auditor General monitor the performance of governments and the public service. Surprisingly little attention has been directed to modeling the evolution and character of the Canadian public service *per se* as an institution.

Chapter 2 sets out a framework and model to guide the study. The framework makes distinctions among governance challenges, the governance regime, sitting governments, and the public service. It proposes a model of the Canadian public service as a distinct entity that maintains, renews, and reshapes itself. The model is comprised of three clusters of functions (each cluster has three elements) crucial for a well-performing public service institution.[4] These clusters comprise the heart of the study and focus on:

- **Chapter 3** – *Recruiting Talent, Aligning Effort*. This cluster embraces how talent is brought into and developed by the public service, how the broader human resource system is managed, and how central agencies and the executive group are managed and mobilized to serve governments and achieve institutional goals.

- **Chapter 4** – *Designing Policy and Delivering Services*. This cluster focuses on the evolving approaches to providing policy advice to governments, delivering services to citizens and other groups, and engaging citizens about the design and delivery of policies and programs.

- **Chapter 5** – *Learning, Scrutiny, and Reform*. This cluster examines how learning and values have been promoted by the public service, the shifting emphasis on control and accountability, and approaches taken towards institutional reform.

Each chapter explores whether recent practice in the Canadian public service has evolved, and whether this might be distinctive compared to other countries. However, the available literature and data in many areas are general and impressionistic, limiting how definitive the findings can be, and some are necessarily speculative.

Chapter 6 aggregates the findings from the previous three chapters, noting positive and less celebrated practices. It speculates about whether these practices might be distinctive by international standards and whether the Canadian public service is an exemplar. However, recent government scandals and a lack of sufficiently detailed comparative data make it difficult to justify such claims. Empirical gaps are identified and a cross-jurisdictional program of research is proposed that would involve the Canada School of Public Service, central agencies, and public administration scholars.

These findings constitute an empirical "model" of the Canadian public service similar to how Henry Mintzberg captures the essential features of the world of executives.[5] It is neither a normative model, nor a theoretical or explanatory model. However, such forays uncover changes in practice and anomalies ripe for explanation. This study does not seek to explain findings, but notes the literature focuses on top-down reform and not bottom-up change. Potentially productive theoretical approaches are outlined in the Appendix.

Chapter 7 looks forward, considers whether the Canadian public service is at risk, and identifies priorities for institutional development. Even though it has proven a robust and adaptive institution over the decades, it is at a critical juncture. Recent improprieties risk obscuring its successes and raise questions about its competence in monitoring activities and completing reforms. Scenarios suggest that the Canadian public service must dramatically improve its capabilities to handle more scrutiny by elected representatives and better manage increasingly decentralized service delivery arrangements.

Public service leaders have the difficult task of not only addressing these and other challenges but also of re-building confidence in an institution in an increasingly exposed and hostile environment. Five strategic priorities for institutional development are identified: promoting learning as a feature of merit; cultivating and supporting an ethical sensibility; anticipating the demands for increased accountability and transparency; striking a new balance in executive development; and, perhaps most importantly, finding serious ways to concertedly convey the status and accomplishments of the public service to external audiences as part of a "new bargain" with elected representatives and citizens.

Chapter 8 reviews key findings and themes, and identifies two opportunities for action. First, both the *Public Service Modernization Act* (PSMA) and the March 2004 Budget call on the President of the Treasury Board to improve reporting on the Canadian public service. Second, to better inform and contextualize this reporting, the government should take a leadership role in building an international network of academics and central agencies to undertake a systematic, detailed comparative research agenda.

PART 1:
IDENTIFYING A FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1
PERSPECTIVES ON THE "CANADIAN MODEL"

There is a huge literature on public administration and public sector reform in Canada, but this chapter focuses on efforts to distil the essence of the evolving model of Canadian public service. It begins by reviewing the traditional conceptions of public service, the challenge emanating from what became known as the New Public Management, and the attempt of the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) Task Force on Values and Ethics to reconcile these views. There has been a flurry of effort to define the contemporary "model" of Canadian public sector reform and administration, including a call from a former Clerk, contributions from several Canadian academics, and comparative assessments that have attempted to put Canadian practice in context.

Many academics and practitioners have sought to define the key values and attributes of the Canadian public service, perceived as critical foundations animating its work and integrity. But the number of relevant values and expectations at play has grown and evolved as a result of several waves of reform.[6] This has led to a complex normative environment for public servants, where many desirable values compete with each other.[7]

In addition to describing values and norms, the writing has examined reform and structural change of the Canadian public service, including its governance environment. However, there is confusion over what the "model" encompasses and what its focus should be. Moreover, no integrating framework has emerged to describe the public service's development as an institution, one that deals with norms and its patterns in activities and outcomes.

The Traditional Model and its Elaboration

The traditional model of the Canadian public service has been described in the writings of Ted Hodgetts, Ken Kernaghan, John Langford, Iain Gow, and O.P. Dwivedi. This work identified the key public service values and their relationship to the Westminster system of parliamentary government.[8] As Donald Savoie reminds us, many of these principles and practices animating the conduct of governments and public servants were developed in simpler times, some almost a hundred years ago.[9] The responsibilities of governments were smaller and the environment in which governments and civil servants worked was considerably less complicated, more personalized, and not mediated by huge institutions.

Since 1918, with the adoption of the merit principle, the Canadian public service has been described as a merit-based, non-partisan, and professional institution, which required

competence, discipline, skills, and knowledge appropriate for specific positions.[10] It was loyal to duly elected governments, who were accountable to the House of Commons and to the public for their decisions and programs. Advice provided by public servants to ministers was confidential; and, in return for this service and loyalty to the government of the day, public servants received the protection of anonymity. It was also understood that public servants should act with probity.

The early merit and recruitment systems meant that public servants began their careers with entry-level, position-based appointments. This implied, along with job protections strengthened over the years, that employees could have full careers in the public service. Training focused on improving skills and knowledge for current positions; career or professional development was either personally financed by employees or supported by mentors grooming a promising civil servant for a future position.

Important elaborations to the traditional model emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s as new expectations emerged. They included the following:

- **Representation.** Bilingualism and later minority-group representation both became important new ideas in the public service. They reflected the new desire to make the public service reflect the diversity of the citizens and to give all Canadians equal access to public service employment. Moreover, with such diversity, the public service could also provide better advice to ministers and better service to citizens.[11]

- **Employee protection.** The *Public Service Employment Act* and the *Public Service Staff Relations Act* adopted in the late 1960s formally recognized bargaining agents for different groups of public servants and introduced collective bargaining. This led to more job protection for public servants, regularized procedures for hiring, promoting and disciplining staff, and created opportunities to challenge the decisions of managers and their departments.[12]

- **Planning and coordination.** Since the 1960s, the number of government programs grew dramatically, as did the number of employees, departments and agencies. Beginning with the Pearson government, Prime Ministers instituted more complex cabinet and decision-making systems. Along with new statutory obligations, this increased the number and scope of central agencies.[13]

- **Control and accountability.** The rapid increase in the scope and size of government activities led to new approaches to budgeting, such as the Program, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS). Worry about the government's ability to monitor and control financial affairs led to the appointment of the Glassco Commission on Government Organization in 1960 and the Lambert Commission on Financial Management and Accountability in 1976. The Auditor General's role expanded, and the Office of the Comptroller General was created to improve the government's

financial management capabilities. The government also reformed the Estimates and introduced the Policy and Expenditure Management System in the late 1970s.[14]

By introducing these statutory and organizational reforms, the Canadian public service acquired an international reputation as a forward-looking, innovative institution.

By the early 1980s, the core values animating the Canadian government and its public service—merit, professionalism, non-partisanship, loyalty, and anonymity—remained highly valued and relevant. While the traditional understandings of the public service persisted, the complexity of its environment had changed dramatically. The public service had increased in scale and complexity, and more goals, values and rules had been put in place to guide and constrain departments and public servants.

The Challenge from the New Public Management

A broader challenge to traditional formulations came from a diverse group of ideas and initiatives that were eventually labelled the "new public management" (NPM) during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Inspired by private sector values, NPM perspectives rapidly gained currency as governments sought to lower costs, provide better service, contain deficits, and incorporate new technologies. These ideas emerged from thinking about how to improve specific programs or smaller organizations, often at the local, provincial or state levels. Sandford Borins identified elements of the new paradigm as

> *"providing high-quality services that citizens value; demanding, measuring, and rewarding improved organizational and individual performance; advocating managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing central controls; recognizing the importance of providing the human and technological resources managers need to meet their performance targets; and maintaining receptiveness to competition and open-mindedness about which public purposes should be performed by public servants, as opposed to the private sector or non-governmental organizations."* [15]

Borins noted that the NPM, "while recognizing the value of a professional public service, puts more emphasis on improving the quality and reducing the cost of public services. It is silent on life-time employment."[16]

Canadian governments and the public service never invoked the NPM as they introduced initiatives in the late 1980s and the 1990s—the concept was an academic invention that only recently seeped into the discourse of public service executives in Canada. And, as Dwivedi and Gow observed, many of the ideas have long animated public administration discourse and can be

found in the Glassco Commission, the Lambert Commission, the Public Service 2000 exercise, and many reports from the Treasury Board and the Office of the Auditor General.[17]

There are differing views as to whether the NPM entails significant structural change in addition to new ways of managing and rewarding work. Peter Aucoin, among others, has chronicled how profound structural system change (to an entire public service) can flow as a logical extension of public choice thinking: if the focus was to be on improving service, measuring results, and increasing accountability, then there could be an argument for separating policy development from service delivery capabilities. Such logic informed the dramatic restructuring of public service institutions in New Zealand and the UK.[18]

Borins observes that Canadian governments, in contrast, did not embrace this agenda as a result of conviction politics, but rather, over many years in a pragmatic, bottom-up way, often in response to growing economic pressures. In short, NPM values and initiatives do not require wholesale restructuring of government machinery and can get adopted in a variety of less dramatic but, over time, equally profound ways.

Reconciling Traditional and NPM Values

In 1996, the CCMD Task Force on Values and Ethics tried to reconcile traditional and new public sector management values with the downsizing and upheaval resulting from the June 1993 restructuring and Program Review decisions. The task force identified four overlapping clusters of values[19], which can be summarized as follows:

- **democratic values** embracing responsible government, respect for the rule of law, support for democracy, respect for the authority of elected office holders, neutrality and non-partisanship, due process, and the public interest and common good;

- **professional values**, which were grouped into two categories:

    - **traditional values**, such as neutrality, non-partisanship, merit, excellence, effectiveness, economy, frankness, objectivity/impartiality, speaking truth to power, balancing complexity, and fidelity to the public trust;

    - **new values**, such as quality, innovation, initiative, creativity, resourcefulness, horizontality, service orientation, and teamwork;

- **ethical values** promoting integrity, honesty, probity, prudence, impartiality, equity, disinterestedness, discretion, and the public trust;

"...these values, though all laudable, were often difficult to uphold in the face of downsizing, restructuring, time pressures and budget constraints..."

- **people values**, including respect, concern, caring, civility, courtesy, tolerance, openness, collegiality, participation, fairness, moderation, decency, reasonableness, humanity, and courage.[20]

The Task Force recognized that these values, though all laudable, were often difficult to uphold in the face of downsizing, restructuring, time pressures and budget constraints—and that this was a major reason for the loss of credibility of Public Service 2000 in the eyes of public servants. Interestingly, the Task Force disputed the notion of a guarantee of employment security.

Despite the multiplicity of values, the Task Force argued that "in a time of change, these core values, rooted in the democratic mission of government, are the bedrock, the solid foundation on which renewal can take place."[21] One cannot help but notice the sheer number and complexity of these values, and their focus on the expectations of public servants as individuals working as professionals in a democratic system of government—it was not intended to be a model of how the public service functions as an institution.

Discerning an Emergent Canadian Model

Early interest in defining the "Canadian model" was stimulated by Jocelyne Bourgon, then Clerk of the Privy Council, in her 1998 report on the state of the public service to the Prime Minister. This interest continued when Bourgon became President of CCMD, and was taken up by several Canadian scholars.

Bourgon's motivation in discerning the Canadian model was to provide coherence in the wake of the Program Review after a decade's worth of reform, and to articulate how the Canadian experience might serve as an alternative model, a contrast to the more dramatic exemplars of reform. It was also a reaction to an international literature on public sector reform celebrating the more decisive approaches taken by New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Australia in the 1980s that involved privatization and creating executive agencies, among other things, and sought to take stock and capture what had transpired in Canada. She argued that public service reform in Canada was carried out "calmly, competently, without much fanfare". She suggested that the Canadian model

- presumes that government and government institutions are essential to a well-performing society;

- asserts that public sector reform must start by examining the role that government is expected to play in the future;

- affirms that a well-performing public sector requires both a strong policy capacity and a modern service delivery function;

"Bourgon's motivation... was to provide coherence in the wake of the Program Review... and to articulate how the Canadian experience might serve as an alternative model..."

- recognizes the importance of a well-performing, professional, non-partisan public service; and

- requires leadership from both elected and appointed officials.[22]

Her proposed model, though, was effectively a normative framework that provided a context for future reform initiatives to strengthen policy capacity, improve service delivery to citizens, and encourage renewal in the public service.

Peter Aucoin subsequently elaborated these ideas.[23] He identifies several implicit premises in Bourgon's approach: that the public service is not self-serving, that it can be innovative, that it can achieve efficiency without market testing, and that it does not need to separate policy and operations to improve performance. Aucoin argues that significant public sector reform in Canada has not been a priority of ministers and governments, which have relied on traditional forms of accountability and structures, and preferred more incremental approaches. On the other hand, Aucoin observes that citizens and ministers expect a more responsive public service, where public servants are less deferential, and believe they should work in well-supported workplaces.

Aucoin argues that Bourgon was "essentially positing the idea that the professional public service paradigm was *the* distinguishing feature of the Canadian approach" and that evidence for this proposition was bolstered by the priority attached to building policy capacity, improving service to citizens, and revitalizing the public service.[24] He sees governments working with and through the public service to design policy, with the public service sufficiently non-partisan and capable not only to provide confidential, high-quality advice but also to implement decisions.[25] Like Bourgon, Aucoin lauds the "seamless connection between policy and operations" galvanized by a results orientation, which means that it must function effectively as a *learning organization* dedicated to improving "the quality of policy advice and the quality of service delivery demanded by the requirements of governance."[26] This normative argument sets a high standard for government and its public service institutions. Achieving status as a learning organization requires leadership, resources, appropriate systems, and networks inside and outside government to facilitate and reap the benefits of learning.

Drawing on this work, David Good argues that a model of the public service should address the realities of Canadian governance, and not just the principles associated with parliamentary governance and the New Public Management.[27] He persuasively argues that the federal government needs to broker strong regional interests, notes the succession of strong majority governments and weak opposition parties, and observes that the media and the Auditor General function as independent and vocal critics of government. In his view, if the public service is to serve governments and the public well, it must understand the country and its regions, propose flexible programs, take into account Opposition members and committees, and gird for external criticism that focuses less on policy ideas and more on scandals and mismanagement through aggressive and simplified reporting. In addition to fostering risk aversion, Good argues this

requires of the public service a tolerance for ambiguity,[28] an ability to deal with conflicting values, and considerable political sensitivity not just at the apex of departments in Ottawa, but also in the regions.

Donald Savoie has highlighted the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, even though this is a common feature of parliamentary systems, a product of Cabinet government and party discipline.[29] He believes it has led to a new dynamic, which he describes as governing by "bolts of electricity", where the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance effectively control policy-making and resource allocation, and have used central agencies to deal with crises, implement key initiatives, and buffer the Prime Minister from non-essential issues. Moreover, he sees two very different cultures at play in the public service: one focused on monitoring and influencing "the centre", and the other dedicated to delivering programs and serving citizens in the regions. Savoie sees public service executives as far more exposed due to scrutiny from the media and the Auditor General, increased demands for citizen engagement, more transparency flowing from NPM styles of managing and freedom-of-information (FOI) laws, and ministers more willing to publicly blame officials for gaps in performance. Savoie argues against evaluating the performance of the Canadian public service without considering the governance context and representative institutions, a point to which we will return later.

Iain Gow has recently suggested that the "contours" of a Canadian model of public administration should embrace public service reform, managerial reform, different modes of operation, and relationships with the government, Parliament, provincial and territorial governments, the judiciary, Aboriginal governments, and with political parties, interest groups, the media, and citizens.[30]He creatively identifies studies and indicators of the extent to which Canada has patterns or seems distinctive in certain ways. He endorses Bourgon's formulation, agreeing that Canada's approach to public service reform has been "pragmatic and moderate".[31] He also suggests the following characteristics of the Canadian model are the most striking: **(1)** strong political control; **(2)** strong legal framework, through the Charter, courts and independent agencies; **(3)** an autonomous, professional public service; **(4)** pragmatism and moderation by political and public service leaders; and **(5)** fairly strong tolerance for ambiguity in a federal system with citizens who have multiple loyalties. Gow suggests that the most "original" features of the Canadian model include the power of the Prime Minister and central agencies, de-politicization of public service appointments, the accent on becoming learning organizations, recognition of minority rights, and moderation on the part of leaders and the public.

One could range further and also consider the state of federalism and citizen engagement, and describe how the Canadian government and its public service deal with provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal governments and citizens. There is a substantial literature, of course, on both, but for the most part the writing on the Canadian model does not delve into these perspectives.[32] Howlett and Lindquist, for example, argue that a moment's reflection on Canadian federalism "does not produce an image of orderly, productive, and co-operative processes. Rather, it is one of increasing distrust and rivalry between different orders of government."[33] Moreover, while

federal ministers, MPs, and the Canadian public service expend considerable time and energy undertaking consultations of one kind or another, it would be a stretch to argue that there is a culture of consultation and dialogue at the national level. One interpretation could be that the Canadian model is less exemplary along these dimensions.

Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Model

In recent years attempts to reform the Canadian public service (and the willingness of governments to do so) have been compared to the significant public service reforms initiated by the New Zealand, British, and Australian governments during the 1980s and 1990s. Their reforms have been considered to be exemplars of the NPM movement, the hallmark of which was separation of policy from service delivery functions, contestability in the provision of public services and commercialization, more flexibility for managers, and increased accountability with results reporting and performance.[34]

In the early 1990s, Donald Savoie and Peter Aucoin each contrasted Canada's reforms with those of the US, British, Australian, and New Zealand governments.[35] Although public service leaders and some ministers monitored those developments, the Canadian government was tentative, less certain about the benefits of restructuring, and worried about the potential impacts on the core public service. Reforming the public service was not a top priority of the Mulroney government, despite the rhetoric of the leader while in Opposition, and deputy ministers were divided on how to proceed. Despite worry about changing a public service institution that had served governments well, there had been abiding concern about the unwillingness of the government to tackle the federal deficit and how well-prepared the public service was for a new era of policy and administrative decision-making. The reluctance of the Canadian government to act more decisively created the impression that it was lagging behind key comparators.

This changed with the decisive, wholesale changes associated with the June 1993 restructuring of the public service and the 1994 Program Review, which proceeded respectively under the Campbell and Chrétien governments. Many observers have seen these changes as episodic, removing the appetite of governments and public service leaders for further comprehensive restructuring. From the mid-1990s until the end of its mandate, the Chrétien government announced selective machinery changes, numerous non-structural changes to change the culture of the public service, and decentralization to departments, which, as Aucoin observed, contrasted with the view held in some quarters that major structural change and strong oversight was necessary.[36] More recently, Aucoin has argued that the Canadian public service was distinctive, in contrast to other jurisdictions, in anticipating, adapting and responding to new governments; it worked hard to assist new political masters in implementing their policy agendas.[37]

In the late 1990s, John Halligan analyzed different patterns of public sector reform among OECD countries. He clusters Australia, New Zealand and the UK at one extreme as "comprehensive"

reformers, and Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and Norway as countries that "experienced comparatively little reform." He places Canada and the US in a group straddling the middle with Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands as more active reformers, but notes that Canada became even more "active" during the mid-1990s.[38] In their 2000 comparative study, Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert characterized Canada as a "modernizer" (along with Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The other categories include the "maintainers" (Germany, European Commission), "marketizers" (Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) and the "minimal state" (UK under Thatcher, Australia under Howard).[39] The World Bank released a comparative study in 2003, placing Canada in the middle of the continuum for extensive vs. selective reform, but notes that given the "combination of leverage and institutional malleability available to reformers"—or what they call "traction"—Canada had not undertaken as much reform as it could have.[40]

Finally, in a recent book comparing the civil service systems of Anglo-American countries, Halligan characterizes Canada as "dabbling in managerial reform for over 30 years without producing either comprehensive reform or the degree of change elsewhere." Moreover, he argues that "the implementation process was somewhat tentative, in that a number of initiatives petered out after a relatively short period of time, leaving only traces rather than the significant advances that had been predicted."[41] On the other hand, Halligan suggests that Canada is highly innovative,[42] and, along with O.P. Dwivedi, maintains that it has the potential to develop a more "balanced model."[43] Halligan also suggests that Canada and the UK might have produced alternative or "third way" models to the managerialist and marketized approaches.[44] This last intriguing observation echoes Bourgon's challenge to academics to determine whether a distinctive Canadian model has emerged.

Beyond Models: The Need for Clarity, Focus and an Integrating Framework

This chapter has reviewed recent efforts by scholars and public servants to identify the fundamental and distinctive features of Canadian governance and public administration, which includes its normative orientation, institutional contours, reform initiatives, and how it relates to Canadian governance traditions. Collectively they point to a complex and stunning array of issues and dimensions to consider. However, as illuminating as this work is, there are several problems to consider:

- The literature has a strong normative orientation which, in many instances, may neither be peculiarly Canadian nor describe actual performance or the processes for achieving espoused goals. Indeed, *how* Canadian political and administrative leaders have sought to achieve these goals might be more distinctive than *what* they aim to achieve.

"Halligan also suggests that Canada and the UK might have produced alternative or 'third way' models to the managerialist and marketized approaches. This last intriguing observation echoes Bourgon's challenge to academics to determine whether a distinctive Canadian model has emerged."

- The literature presumes certain stylized facts, such as the engagement of political leaders in public sector reform, the quality of the policy capacity of the Canadian public service and the decision not to separate operations from policy. However, these topics are deserving of more systematic empirical investigation to produce historical benchmarks or comparative points of reference.

- Contributors to the literature not only focus on different topics but also have different reasons for discerning a Canadian model: *institutional leaders* seek to develop narratives and coherence; *institutional designers and reformers* engage in lesson-drawing; *academics* are interested in description, explanation, and theory-building; and *monitors*—central agencies, standing committees, and the Auditor General—want to evaluate performance. Each perspective is legitimate but suggests different points of departure and emphasis when identifying what variables should comprise a model and the relationships among them.

- The term "model" has been used loosely, and it can have very different ethos and goals. Models can be *normative* (what should exist and what ought to be guiding principles?), *descriptive* (what exists or has changed?), *explanatory* (how things work or why they have changed?), or *architectural* (what should be put in place and what would make it successful?). Most of the literature, along with this paper, is normative or descriptive at a high level and, at best, are intermediate steps towards tapping into or specifying models for explanation or design.[45]

- In addition to the lack of clarity about purpose, most contributors have not carefully specified the elements of their models. They have not specified key dependent variables (what is to be described or explained) or independent variables (what drives or explains the event or phenomena under consideration). All models, though, should be parsimonious to some degree, and tailored and adjusted depending on their purpose.

- All countries will have distinctive and "recognizable patterns" and claim to have a unique model. However, to do so does not mean that the country or institution is an exemplar in certain areas or as an entire institution. Indeed, an institution can be known for what it has not accomplished, failures, and missed opportunities. Providing persuasive and empirically grounded descriptions of how public service institutions differ across jurisdictions is a difficult task.

- Some authors focus on how the country is governed or public administration in the most general sense, while others focus on trajectories in public service reform. The literature has not self-consciously attempted to model the public service as an institution and the ways in which it changes over time. Creating a model for this purpose is not the same thing as studying reform.

These points should not be interpreted as suggesting that the instincts and observations of contributors to the literature are irrelevant or misguided; quite the opposite. However, we need a broader organizing framework that distinguishes among and integrates key variables and influences, as well as enables observers—no matter their intentions—to have a common point of departure for focusing on certain issues, to indicate what they are and are not dealing with, and to put Canadian practice in perspective.

There is also a clear need to describe the state of the Canadian public service as an *institution* and to probe if it is well-performing and adaptive (or not so well-performing or moribund), and what factors produce the observed results. For this reason, this study will spend less time analyzing changes in the larger governance system, and more on identifying critical features, processes and challenges for the public service. In other words, we should try to grasp the public service's *modus operandi* in critical areas, as well as its accomplishments and shortcomings. Though not ignoring the larger governance regime and context, such a framework should encourage users to ask, "How is the institution of the Canadian public service evolving?". How much do we really know about practice in certain aspects of the Canadian public service?" and "How does this differ from practice in other jurisdictions?"

CHAPTER 2
FRAMEWORK FOR DISCERNING A CANADIAN MODEL OF PUBLIC SERVICE

This chapter proposes a model to capture the essential features of the Canadian public service as an institution. Models, whether descriptive or explanatory, should be situated in a broader conceptual framework that encompasses the surface features of the system as well as the conditions, premises, and values that animate them, and captures the forces affecting key variables. The framework should facilitate monitoring of the evolution of key practices and principles associated with the public service, comparisons with other jurisdictions, explanations and assessments of future challenges and risks, and provide a basis for future research. This study cannot take up all of the potential uses of the proposed framework, but it should help organize and parse out how we think about the Canadian public service, and show how different influences, factors and elements relate to each other, and allow for debate on what historical, current or future trends might be most relevant for certain issues, capabilities or functions.

The general logic underpinning the framework can be found in **Figure 1,** the details of which will be explained in this chapter. Though informed by the extensive literature on the Canadian model, this framework makes three distinctive contributions:

- It identifies the critical functions of a well-performing public service institution.[46] Here the term "well-performing" refers to an institution's ability to anticipate and respond to challenges, modify key functions, deal with key constituencies, recruit and deploy talent, coordinate and align effort, and learn from experience inside and outside the institution as a basis for reforming itself. Every public service institution has different traditions, approaches, and capabilities in each function, and different balances and trade-offs among those functions.

- It moves beyond just articulating desirable values to discerning which functions, processes and conditions can achieve them. For example, **Chapter 1** noted that the Canadian model has been depicted as having "strong policy capacity" and "leadership from appointed officials" and, more recently, the attributes of a learning organization. Such observations tend to assert Canadian distinctiveness or articulate desirable end-states, but they do not explain what pre-conditions are required to achieve them, whether the practices or capabilities of the Canadian public service are distinctive or more substantial when compared to similar institutions, or whether certain practices and capabilities are in need of reform.

• It makes a clear distinction between the public service as an institution and the governance regime. However, it explicitly acknowledges the critical influences of the governance regime and particular governments on the public service by identifying the interface and "walkovers" between them. One implication is that institutional change may be obtained in several possible ways: externally (induced by governments), internally (driven by public service leaders), or bottom-up in an evolutionary manner (innovation in departments and agencies).[47] Moreover, this distinction suggests that the Canadian public service *should* have considerable autonomy or independence from governments because it has to provide advice to successive governments, deliver legislated programs, and anticipate new challenges.[48]

The rest of this chapter provides more detail on each component of the framework, with particular attention directed to the rationale for the model of the Canadian public service. It concludes with an overview of the empirical approach for the next three chapters.

FIGURE 1 GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

THE EVOLVING GOVERNANCE CONTEXT

THE GOVERNANCE REGIME

INTERFACE WITH
SITTING GOVERNMENTS

WELL-PERFORMING
PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTION

1. Public Service Institutions: Critical Processes and Values

The work of Philip Selznick, though focusing on leadership, contains several points of departure to inform a model of a well-performing institution. From his writing we learn that recruitment is crucial for maintaining and developing organizational competence, particularly in areas crucial for maintaining credibility with important stakeholders. Leaders also need to coordinate and align effort of its component parts. Institutions should have fidelity to core values, but they also need to adapt and learn from experience, and thus require adroit leadership. Such leadership should be pivotal in developing the organization's norms, cultivating a sense of mission, representing the institution to internal and external audiences, and defending its integrity to key stakeholders.

These ideas take on special meaning in the context of public service institutions, which are large-scale, complex organizations serving duly elected governments by providing policy advice and delivering programs to citizens. When joined with themes from the literature reviewed earlier, we can create a model embracing nine processes and functions critical for sustaining and improving a well-performing public service (see **Figure 2**). These have been grouped into three "clusters", in part for aesthetic reasons, but also because they relate more to each other than to other processes and functions, though success or failure in one process or function might be attributable to developments in another cluster.[49] The model, of course, does not capture all facets of the public service, since models are meant to focus on critical features—here the focus is on the processes and functions essential for maintaining its capabilities, credibility, integrity, and adaptability as an institution.

FIGURE 2 CRITICAL PROCESSES AND VALUES IN A
WELL-PERFORMING PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTION

RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT **CHAPTER 3**	DESIGNING POLICY& DELIVERING SERVICES **CHAPTER 4**	LEARNING, SCRUTINY AND REFORM **CHAPTER 5**
ATTRACTING AND GROOMING TALENT	**POLICY ADVICE**	**PROMOTING LEARNING AND VALUES**
COORDINATING FROM THE CENTRE	**SERVICE DELIVERY**	**CONTROL, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
MANAGING THE HR SYSTEM	**CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT**	**REFORM: LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT**

Public Service Values: Democracy, People, Ethics, Professionalism (traditional and new)

The first cluster—**recruiting talent, aligning effort**—encompasses three processes. The first process embraces the recruitment and staffing functions, which involves attracting, monitoring, screening and grooming talent for leadership roles. The second process involves the ways in which the public service coordinates a diverse population of departments and agencies, and this includes central agency leadership and executive development. The final process, particularly important in a complex institution, concerns the broader macromanagement of human resource function across the public service, which provides the framework for recruitment and staffing.

The second cluster—**designing policy and delivering services**—focuses squarely on the central roles that the public service performs for governments and citizens. This includes not only the processes and functions of advising governments and delivering services (directly and indirectly) to citizens, but also working with governments to consult with citizens on the design of policy and the monitoring of services.

The third cluster—**promoting learning, scrutiny, and reform**—captures different ways that public service institutions learn and adapt. This includes support for learning, professional development, and promoting critical public service values and ethics. It also includes scrutiny of programs by means of internal control and challenge systems, as well as external accountability mechanisms. Finally, it includes ongoing efforts by the public service to reform practices, in a reactive or proactive manner.[50] However, change and innovation may occur without "official" programs of reform.

Finally, the model suggests that values in public service institutions should not be confined to the third cluster. **Figure 2** depicts the "core" values identified by the Task Force on Values and Ethics as animating all clusters. It presumes specific values are invoked or expressed in varying degrees in the course of coordination and managing staff, designing and delivering services, and fostering learning, control and reform. Some values may be more relevant, in conflict, or require balancing for certain activities.

In short, this model focuses on several critical processes for ensuring that a public service institution is competent, responsive, adaptable, and has integrity. It facilitates developing a comprehensive picture of how the Canadian public service has evolved over time. The model is the focal point of a larger framework, and the rest of this chapter reviews its remaining three elements.

2. The Governance Regime

The public service is deeply affected by Canada's brand of Westminster government and the federal system.[51] For our purposes, the governance regime has the following features:

- Prime Ministers have extensive power as long as they maintain the confidence of the House of Commons. They are not constrained by a strong party system, as in Australia, nor by an elected Senate or one with provincial representation, nor by proportional representation in the House of Commons. Moreover, Canadian Prime Ministers cannot be removed by caucus, as can happen in Australia and the UK;[52]

- Ministers act under the rule of law and are accountable to the House of Commons; but they are supported by strong central institutions, such as the Prime Minister's Office and the cabinet system. Canadians have also elected several Liberal majority

governments, occasionally flirting with other parties or minority governments. Combined with high turnover in the House, a tightly controlled and poorly funded Parliament, this leads to a weak Opposition;[53]

- Provincial and territorial governments have considerable powers, since Canada has one of the world's most decentralized federations and allows for asymmetry in relationships.[54] There is ongoing debate about primacy in different domains of responsibility, and about the fiscal imbalance due to the taxing power of the federal government. Governments compete to demonstrate relevance directly to citizens, communities, and sectors, despite efforts to coordinate services;

- Business, labour, and voluntary organizations are not strongly vertically integrated in Canada, and, governments generally do not share power with societal interests, even if they consult and seek advice.[55] Some interest groups may have strong influence in certain sectors, but this influence is mediated by federalism. Interest groups do not have strong influence on the shape of government nor on the public service.

In short, the governance regime typically concentrates power in the hands of majority governments led by strong Prime Ministers, whose principal source of rivalry are other levels of government, the Opposition, and media. As noted below, governments do not face external rivalry to shape and control the public service as an institution, and, if inclined, can wield enormous influence over its trajectory depending on political, policy, and management priorities.

3. The Interaction of Governments and the Public Service

Sitting governments have intricate relationships with, and considerable power over, the public service as an institution. Much of this power is exercised by the Prime Minister through the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. But expectations from the Cabinet, its committees, and individual ministers and their staff also influence these interactions with the public service. The framework identifies eight areas of government power and influence:

- The mandate and policy priorities of governments;

- The design of decision-making processes and machinery of government;

- The appointments of deputy ministers by the Prime Minister;

- The seeking of policy advice from the public service;

- The oversight of departments, agencies, and deputy minister performance;

"The way in which the Prime Minister, cabinet colleagues, and elected representatives exercise their authorities and responsibilities has important implications and effects on the public service as an institution."

- The government's ideas about public service structure and processes;

- The interest and capabilities of ministerial offices; and

- The amount of autonomy Parliament has from the government.

The way in which the Prime Minister, cabinet colleagues, and elected representatives exercise their authorities and responsibilities has important implications and effects on the public service as an institution. Interactions between elected representatives and the public service require strategic and sensitive handling by both political and bureaucratic leaders, and good relationships are essential for strong performance of the government and the public service.

There is not the space to explore the possibilities in detail, but each area noted above can be interpreted as *variables*. Changes will affect the nature of the relationship between governments, elected representatives, and the public service. The empirical focus of this study is on the Canadian public service, but we acknowledge the exercise of government authorities for each cluster in **Chapters 3, 4 and 5**. **Chapter 7** considers the implications of changes in the autonomy of Parliament and how the federal government may choose to deliver services to the public.

4. Governance Context: Streams of Influence and Pressure

The governance context is an ongoing source of challenges, trends, uncertainties, and even opportunities to policy-makers and public service institutions. The framework identifies four streams of inter-related pressures that constantly vary in importance and vie for the attention of governments. They include:

- **Challenges**, such as economic globalization, environmental issues, the information and communications technology revolution, international security and terrorism, geographical distance, regional diversity, income disparity, and identity politics;

- **Expectations** of other levels of government, including the provinces, territories, municipalities, other countries, and international organizations, as well as of the private sector, the non-profit sector, and citizens and their communities;

- **Ideas** about how to improve governance from intellectual movements, examples from other jurisdictions, and the culture and traditions of the country; and

- **Precipitating events**, such as elections, new governments or ministers, scandals, disasters, and developments in other jurisdictions.

These pressures are best understood as evolving streams of influence that constantly challenge successive governments and the public service, with some streams far more predictable than others.[56] Our purpose is not to delve into the intricacies of each stream but to show that the public service should anticipate and monitor external developments, advise and assist governments about dealing with the associated challenges, and adapt and renew its capabilities in order to undertake new roles and responsibilities.

The Framework in Perspective: Next Steps for Discerning a Model

Figure 3 presents the entire four-part framework, which has, as its centrepiece, a model of the Canadian public service as an institution. It sets the stage for more systematically describing its administrative style in different areas, and determining whether, in aggregate, this amounts to a distinctive approach and perhaps an exemplar by international standards. Even at the conceptual level it should be clear that different elements of managing the public service as an institution are integrally related to others, and to the broader governance regime, an important observation we return to later in this study.

In reviewing the framework, some readers will see the potential for "explanation" of current gaps and practices; for others "design" challenges will surface. However, the goal of this study is to identify patterns in how the public service works as an institution. Hypothesizing about what drives key shifts in aspects of how the public service works or performs, or how that differs from developments in other jurisdictions, moves into the realm of explanation and theory (see **Appendix**).

The next three chapters take a closer look at each of the three clusters associated with a well-performing public service institution. For the purposes of analysis, a two-pronged approach was adopted that involves outlining broad historical features of practice in each cluster and how they have changed in recent years, and then considering whether these evolving practices are distinctive or exemplars in comparative terms,[57] what Iain Gow refers to as surmising distinctiveness over "time and space".[58] Where pertinent, these chapters will also flag where the government-public service interface is a crucial factor, and instances where more substantial empirical investigation is required.

FIGURE 3 DETAILED FRAMEWORK AND MODEL

GOVERNANCE REGIME
Westminster-style government, strong Prime Minister, strong centre, first-past-the-post system, appointed Senate, weak opposition, federal state, inter-jurisdictional rivalry, regional diversity, independent Judiciary, Charter of Rights, independent oversight agencies

THE EVOLVING GOVERNANCE CONTEXT

CHALLENGES
- economic
- social
- environmental
- technological
- international

EXPECTATIONS
- provinces
- territories
- municipalities
- citizens, NGOs
- business
- international

IDEAS, NORMS
- political culture
- administration
- reform ideas
- exemplars

EVENTS
- elections
- disaster, failure
- scandals
- events elsewhere

GOVERNMENT—PUBLIC SERVICE INTERFACE

Mandate and policy priorities of government

Demand for good policy advice

Design of decision-making system (PM)

Challenge function from the centre

Legislation, structural change (PM)

Engagement in public service matters

Capabilities of ministerial offices

Appointment of Deputy Ministers (PM)

Amount of autonomy of Parliament

PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTIONS: CRITICAL PROCESSES AND VALUES

RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT **CHAPTER 3**	DESIGNING POLICY & DELIVERING SERVICES **CHAPTER 4**	LEARNING, SCRUTINY AND REFORM **CHAPTER 5**
ATTRACTING AND GROOMING TALENT	**POLICY ADVICE**	**PROMOTING LEARNING AND VALUES**
COORDINATING FROM THE CENTRE	**SERVICE DELIVERY**	**CONTROL, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
MANAGING THE HR SYSTEM	**CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT**	**REFORM: LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT**

Public Service Values: Democracy, People, Ethics, Professionalism (traditional and new)

PART 2:
EXPLORING THE CLUSTERS

CHAPTER 3
RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT

Public service organizations mobilize expertise and coordinate effort in order to achieve the policy aspirations of duly elected governments and to deliver or oversee programs. The character of a public service derives, in part, from how its employees and leaders are recruited, how they are developed, and the nature of leadership. In a complex institution like the Canadian public service, with a diverse array of departments and agencies all working in a political environment, the issues of coordination and corporate leadership by central agencies loom large – they function as the glue binding constituent organizational elements together.

This chapter first reviews the principles underpinning the emergence of a professional Canadian public service and its evolving norms and practices in more recent years concerning merit, careers, and diversity. The second part considers how the human resource function of the Canadian public service has been governed and evolved. The third section explores how the Prime Minister and the Clerk seek to coordinate the many components of the public service. Each part explores how policies, practice, and institutions have evolved, and how the Canadian public service might be distinctive.

Attracting and Grooming Talent

The ambition of creating and maintaining a professional, non-partisan public service has been a touchstone for Canadian governments for close to a hundred years. Critical steps for achieving this goal, though not the only ones, entailed adopting the merit principle in 1918 and developing an administrative regime to guide hiring and promotion. The latter was a complex, position-based classification system, considered innovative during the 1920s and implemented by the Civil Service Commission. It quickly became the bane of deputy ministers and managers because of its rules, procedures, paperwork, and delays, and the cost of administering the system worried Treasury Board ministers early on. The merit regime became more complicated in the late 1960s with the formal recognition of public service unions, collective bargaining, and the right of staff to appeal appointments made by managers—all layered over the position-based system.[59] Here we explore how the merit system gave birth to a career service and staff expectations, and was challenged by demands for flexibility and diversity.

The merit system was adopted to eliminate political patronage and improve the quality of the civil service, particularly important if administrative discretion was to be a feature of government. While the goal was not to create a "career" service, the decision effectively did so because of the

"The ambition of creating and maintaining a professional, non-partisan public service has been a touchstone for Canadian governments for close to a hundred years."

protections accorded to employees and the continuous growth in programs and departments until the 1990s.[60]

Most employees starting in entry-level positions gradually rose to higher levels of responsibility. Promotions proceeded under the merit system and were generally made from within. However, early on, the system was focused on defining, filling and regulating positions, rather than furthering the careers of those already employed. During the 1950s, concern emerged from within the public service about the lack of professional development and the recruitment of future managers and senior managers.[61]

Since the 1960s, the Canadian public service has been better able to assist staff with building their careers, even as ironclad employment security has waned. Several strides were made during the 1960-1990 period: establishing central planning capacity for professional development; increasing awareness about the need for professional development as opposed to training; recruiting and grooming as part of succession planning; and preparing interested public servants for increased responsibility. However, since World War II, public servants had come to expect life-long careers and regular promotions against the backdrop of continually expanding government programs. This faith was not dented by the restraint of the 1980s. However, the 1992 Budget, the June 1993 restructuring, and the 1994–95 Program Review process downsized or eliminated many organizations and programs, and many public servants either lost their positions or were transferred, sometimes outside the public service. This shocked public servants and reduced their loyalty. However, it also produced a new rationale for professional development: it was now touted as the best strategy for employment security, implying a shared responsibility between employees and the employer for continuous learning to maintain skill relevance.[62]

Even if leaders are reluctant to talk about a "career" public service, this does not mean that life-long careers have disappeared.[63] Interestingly, the Australian Public Service continues to emphasize its career public service despite a much more decentralized approach to HR management. In the Australian system, all departments function as separate employers but with similar provisions for lay-offs if public servants become redundant.[64] In contrast, the Canadian public service no longer relies exclusively on permanent staff to meet all of its needs for expertise and instead contracts to temporary workers, contractors, and networks. This is not a new phenomenon: the number of temporary workers has risen and fallen over several decades, depending on the objectives of governments. At the end of the 1990s, Gow and Simard suggested that the growth in the public service's use of temporary workers was somewhat higher than in other jurisdictions, but the data was not precise.[65] There have always been calls for limits to the temporary workforce; the *Public Service Modernization Act* (PSMA) is the latest such effort. Canada may not be out of step with other countries in wrestling with this balance, but it is an open empirical question as to how effective the public service has been with respect to recruitment and succession planning with respect to certain program areas, departments, and functional communities.

There has been less success in reforming the position-based public service. Canada's merit system has always frustrated deputy ministers and managers due to lengthy and cumbersome approval processes to post and then fill indeterminate positions.[66] Recently, this generated concern inside and outside the public service in the context of renewal initiatives.[67] Many managers found it quicker to hire and renew staff on a term basis, which retained budget flexibility, but created an entry-level contingent workforce.[68] By the late 1990s, when managers were authorized to hire staff into indeterminate positions, "insider" candidates were competing for these jobs. Moreover, some departments avoided external scrutiny by re-classifying existing positions. PS 2000 explored new approaches for classifying and evaluating positions, leading to a universal classification standard initiative that promised more flexibility for managers and comparability for central agencies. But after more than a decade, a new approach relying on existing occupational groups superseded the PS 2000 recommendations.[69] In 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien appointed a Task Force on Modernizing Human Resource Management in the Public Service, which eventually led to the *Public Service Modernization Act* (PSMA) in 2003. Among other things, it delegates responsibility for hiring and promoting staff to deputy ministers and requires new standards and rules for converting term appointments into indeterminate positions.[70]

Increasing diversity in the public service has always provided an interesting challenge to the merit principle. The Canadian government's drive to foster a bicultural and multicultural country in the 1960s and 1970s led to initiatives to create expanded career opportunities for Francophones, particularly in the managerial and executive ranks, and to provide service in both official languages where warranted. TBS introduced language-training programs for public servants at all levels, which were administered by the PSC. But a concerted effort to increase diversity in the public service did not take shape until the early 1990s.[71] The 1995 *Employment Equity Act* allowed employment equity programs and removal of barriers for designated groups. In 2002, the PSC expanded the definition of merit to encompass "competent, non-partisan and representative", noting that previous governments had instituted preferences for hiring veterans, local candidates, and Canadian citizens into the public service.[72] The *PSMA* gives deputy ministers even more opportunities to increase diversity. As well, it transfers language training from the PSC to the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS), allowing the former to focus on audit. Finally, as part of a larger initiative to increase bilingualism, Prime Minister Chrétien announced tougher requirements for entry and promotion in the executive ranks, linking language competence to performance pay and professional development, along with increased auditing.[73]

Fostering a merit-based, professional, non-partisan, bilingual, and representative national public service may not be entirely unique by international standards, but remains critically important in Canada. With a few exceptions,[74] the issue of political patronage in the public service receded many decades ago. But merit remains critical because the public service must retain government and public confidence in a linguistically and regionally diverse country. Canada is one of only a few countries that promote diversity and representation in the national public service. Diversity is no longer seen simply as a remedy for past injustice and imbalance, but also as an asset for organizational learning, providing better advice to ministers, and better service to citizens.

Human Resource Regime: Complex Centre, Unified Public Service?

The experience with HR reforms in the Canadian public service suggests that we examine the governance of the broader function. With the advent of collective bargaining in the late 1960s, the HR system underwent a threshold increase in complexity as TBS joined PSC and the Public Service Staff Relations Board, with direct roles in overseeing the human resource function in its capacity as "employer."[75] And until the late 1980s, TBS approved all organizational and staffing plans for new programs after policy decisions had been made. During the 1970s, PCO expanded its capabilities for making senior appointments and coordinating executives across the public service. In 1992, the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet was formally given an additional title: Head of the Public Service—and was also required to report annually to the Prime Minister on the state of the public service. CCMD was also established to promote executive and managerial development. Further complexity resulted from the practice of administrative delegation across central agencies and to department heads for staffing and official languages, the numerous consultative arrangements, task forces with overlapping representation, and cross-appointments to advisory committees.

"The breadth and complexity of the PSMA reforms required a complicated oversight structure and years to implement. Whether these changes will have an impact on front-line managers will be known through empirical research across departments and jurisdictions."

This complexity was not fundamentally changed by the *PSMA* reforms adopted by the outgoing Chrétien government, nor with the machinery changes introduced by the Martin government in December 2003. The new Canada School of Public Service (CSPS) combined CCMD and Training and Development Canada, and the focus of the PSC was sharpened by transferring language training responsibilities to CSPS. However, policy responsibilities for HR management were initially split across three departments: the new Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada (PSHRMAC), TBS, and Public Works and Government Services. The legislation also provided for a new Public Service Labour Relations Board, Public Service Staffing Tribunal, Public Interest Commission, and Labour Management Committees in all departments. The goals were to improve hiring processes by managers, promote more collaborative and streamlined labour-management relations, provide more integration for learning, and increase accountability for human resource management. Despite early confusion about which minister would be responsible for the PSHRMAC, this agency has returned to the ambit of the Treasury Board and its President, along with responsibility for collective bargaining and CSPS. The breadth and complexity of the *PSMA* reforms required a complicated oversight structure and years to implement.[76] Whether these changes will have an impact on front-line managers will be known through empirical research across departments and jurisdictions.

Many central resources have been committed to oversee the HR function in the Canadian public service, producing a peculiarly fragmented network of authorities. Not only have deputy ministers and managers had to navigate a complex playing field in terms of central strictures and initiatives pertaining to HR before and after the *PSMA*, so have those seeking to comprehensively reform the system. What explains this fragmentation and central investment, and what does this reveal about the Canadian public service as an institution?

One perspective takes seriously the aspiration of public service leaders for a "unified" public service, a phrase with more currency in the 1970s and 1980s. The goals that might be achieved with an unified institution include: **(1)** common norms and standards regarding merit, bilingualism, compensation, and service delivery; **(2)** increased mobility and career opportunities for employees across department and agency boundaries; **(3)** recognition of the value of staff who have worked in different roles in the public service as well as in different parts of the country; **(4)** a shared sense of the totality of the contribution of the Canadian public service across the country and across departments; and **(5)** being better able to produce its own leaders, rather than parachute executives from other jurisdictions or sectors to manage "rank and file" staff. These factors, when combined with the need to maintain the appearance if not the fact of a credible, high-quality, and representative public service in a geographically and culturally diverse country, constitute arguments for strong central capabilities to monitor and improve the public service.

An alternative interpretation explains this persistent complexity as a *response* to the existing complexity of already allocated central responsibilities. TBS and PSC manage so many HR-related policies that it has long been difficult to monitor and eliminate out-of-date policies and directives. Bureaucratic politics and worry about the culture of certain central agencies created incentive to establish new units or programs alongside old ones. Only a highly motivated government with a sympathetic deputy minister community could restructure the organizations and authorities (an example of such fundamental change occurred when the Australian government legislated workplace-based bargaining in all sectors, which meant each department had status as separate employers.) Hence the strategy of focused, selective reform and the tendency to create secretariats, task forces, and small agencies (which can be folded back into central agencies when the issue falls from the top of the agenda or can be better handled by absorbing the responsibility into the routines of a larger central agency).

A third perspective sees the investment in central coordination and oversight in the HR function as motivated by *fear* that a disaggregated institution would be more susceptible to patronage, and by *conviction* that an integrated institution better serves governments.[77] In this view, a unified public service would have a stronger value base, better attract and retain talent, and more easily grapple with governance challenges. The reluctance of public service leaders and the government to move in step with New Zealand and the UK in the 1980s went beyond theories about the merits of keeping policy capacity and service delivery capabilities in proximity, to encompass views about what constitutes a resilient, vibrant public service institution.

The currency of the notion of a "unified public service" diminished in the mid-1990s as a result of program review decisions, the creation of service agencies and independent foundations, and, as Bourgon has suggested, the more general process of marketizing the state and adopting private management practices.[78] Moreover, there has been increased diversity in HR practices across the public service as a result of special operating and service agencies, single operating budgets, reduced TBS scrutiny of program structure and positions, and, until very recently[79], less PSC monitoring and audit of hiring and re-classification practices. Moreover, many public service

workers now spend entire careers working in regional or front-line operations, or in one department or agency. Regardless of the extent of their pride as "public servants," many employees may have little understanding of their departments, let alone the larger public service. Indeed, the concept of a "unified public service" may only be of real concern to executives and other upwardly/laterally mobile staff.[80]

Since the early 1990s, public service leaders have spent considerable energy and resources to promote a new sense of corporate identity. PS 2000 and CCMD were supposed to foster cohesion and renewal. The Clerk was required to report annually on the status of the public service to the Prime Minister, an opportunity to review accomplishments and strategic directions for the institution.[81] CCMD and successive Clerks have spared no expense and effort to reach out to the public service by developing cross-government renewal and recruitment campaigns, promoting public-service wide identities for functional communities and levels of managers, dramatically increasing investment in professional development, and instituting recognition events and public service-wide employee surveys.[82] The language of a "unified public service" has been eclipsed by horizontal governance precepts and the strong interest in better coordinating policy and service delivery initiatives. However, the desire for cohesion and shared values remains strong, and certainly leaders have sought to *appear* to their staff to be promoting the public service to interested citizens and stakeholders (see **Chapter 7**).

The HR management regime is undeniably complex by international standards, at once indicating the importance attached to a professional public service, as well as the key interests and values at play. Despite the enormous energy devoted to exploring the need for change, reform has proceeded slowly. Resistance emerges from those worried about the risks of tampering with traditions and frameworks that produced a first-rate public service by international standards. On the other hand, others have argued that the failure to change more quickly creates new risks for the future.

Central Coordination and the Executive Group

Canada is one of a small group of countries with parliamentary systems and strong central agencies to advise governments on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy and programs across departments and agencies. Canada is often compared to Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, rather than to relatively weaker central structures in other countries due either to traditions of coalition governments, presidential or prime ministerial departments with less capacity, strong legislatures, or departments with greater administrative and legal autonomy.[83] Prime Ministers coordinate decision-making through the PMO and PCO, the meetings of Cabinet and its committees, bilateral relationships with ministers and deputy ministers, and most central agency processes (the exception is PSC, which reports directly to Parliament). Another important instrument for coordination is the cadre of public service executives spanning all central agencies and operating departments. Control over the executive group is exercised by the Prime Minister's appointment of DMs, and by the Clerk and various socialization processes.

The Canadian government has many central agencies, with varying degrees of scope. Depending on the policy or management issue, different central agencies get involved—such as PMO, PCO, Finance, TBS, and PSC—but the circle may also be broadened to include special secretariats or line departments like the Department of Justice or the Department of Foreign Affairs.[84] Since the 1960s, Canadian governments developed a reputation for experimentation and "fascination" with central agency structures and, to this day, has the most cluttered central apparatus of the Westminster systems.[85] The decision to transfer units out of the Department of Finance to create TBS in 1968 was not distinctive (the Australian government established its Department of Finance and Administration separate from the Treasury in 1976). Rather, Canada's reputation came as a result of expanding PCO capabilities in the early 1970s, creating the Office of the Comptroller General in 1978, establishing two new ministries of state a year later as part of the elaborate Policy and Expenditure Management System, and, initially, a separate Federal-Provincial Relations Office alongside PCO. While some of these agencies and capabilities have been eliminated or rationalized, there has been continued proliferation of central agencies and secretariats pertaining to specific initiatives.

Recent concern has focused on how the Prime Minister uses, among other instruments and authorities, central agencies to impose priorities on Cabinet and deflect issues not central to his agenda.[86] Aside from the comparatively insulated position of the Canadian prime minister from caucus and party coups, it remains that first ministers and presidents in many OECD countries have sought to increase coordinating and policy management capabilities to deal with their governance challenges, and the UK government under Blair provides a good example.[87] Ottawa's central apparatus, however, is without peer among the Westminster governments with respect to complexity, even though little systematic research has documented the evolving style and capacities of central agencies in different functional domains. The changes introduced by the *PSMA* and later by Prime Minister Martin in December 2003, while re-aligning and focusing certain central capabilities, did little to reduce central clutter and may have increased it further.

Some historical perspective shows how the executive cadre has been coordinated over time. During the "mandarin era" of the 1930s to 1950s, astute public service leaders relied heavily on personal networks to recruit promising civil servants from select universities and the private sector and then groomed them for leadership roles.[88] These practices reflected a desire to prepare the leadership of the Canadian public service for new challenges. After World War II, when the civil service grew and became less personalized, many believed it did not have the systems to recruit and groom the next generation of leaders.[89] There was also debate whether the public service should support more professional development as opposed to position-based training for staff. By the early 1970s, a secretariat for senior personnel in PCO and the Committee of Senior Officials started to provide advice on senior personnel and related matters to government.

By the late 1970s, the public service was supplying its own leaders, and new career paths were emerging for senior managers and executives across the growing institution.[90] The practice of systematically rotating executives across the public service was initiated not only to broaden

"Since the 1960s, Canadian governments developed a reputation for having experimentation and 'fascination' with central agency structures and, to this day, have the most cluttered central apparatus of the Westminster systems." [85]

experience but also to ensure cohesion, transfer knowledge, and disperse talent. This practice is crucial in a geographically and politically diverse country: public service executives need to be acutely aware of local contexts when advising governments and administering national programs. And, in contrast to past practice and some other jurisdictions, potential executives were no longer recruited from certain universities, disciplines or professions. Indeed, a dwindling proportion of senior appointments came from outside the Canadian public service.

The next shift took place in the 1980s after years of retrenchment and compression in the executive ranks, and a growing sense of anomie. In 1979, David Zussman and Jak Jabes documented the gulf between senior managers and the executive group and called for more professional development to foster executive careers in addition to more readily available position-based training.[91] This eventually led to PS 2000, the combining of the senior management and executive groups, and the creation of CCMD to handle executive development, which spawned the Advanced Management Program. So despite the upheavals associated with the June 1993 restructuring and the 1994–95 Program Review, executive development had a different institutional footing by the mid-1990s.

Stark demographic projections put the renewal and recruitment of senior and middle managers squarely on the agenda, leading to La Relève, the Leadership Network, and heightened interest in professional development.[92] Several recruitment programs for identifying and grooming entry-level executives were also instituted, such as the Accelerated Economist Training and Management Trainee programs; and the Career Assignment Program was overhauled and supplemented with an educational component. Some departments established recruitment programs or enhanced existing ones to complement broader PSC recruitment campaigns. During the 1990s, the Association of Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada became increasingly active, undertaking numerous studies of executives, often collaborating with PSC, CCMD, and TBS.[93] In short, the mandarin-style public service now stands in great contrast to today's public service, with its hundreds of DMs, associate DMs, and ADMs (assistant deputy minister) level executives with professional development, mentoring, selection processes, rotational assignments, and performance pay.[94]

"Canada is distinctive because of the extent to which the Prime Minister and the Clerk view the executive group as a corporate resource, to be informed as a group and used in advisory, reform, and learning initiatives."

Canada is distinctive because of the extent to which the Prime Minister and the Clerk view the executive group as a corporate resource, to be informed as a group and used in advisory, reform, and learning initiatives. The Clerk hosts DMs for a regular weekly breakfast meeting, invites them to regular retreats as part of the normal annual planning cycle, engages them in corporate planning processes for the Speech from the Throne, government transitions, and mandate planning (which became more open in the mid-1990s),[95] and calls on them to serve as "champions" for various initiatives or functional communities. Since the early 1990s, DMs and ADMs are encouraged to sit on advisory committees to central agencies (e.g., TBS Advisory Council), to take part on task forces (e.g., PS 2000, 1996 DM task forces), or lead action-research initiatives hosted by CSPS/CCMD. While enthusiasm varies among executives about the optimal amount of corporate involvement, given other demands on their time, it has evolved into a core

expectation of executives and part of their performance agreements.[96] At the apex of the DM community, the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) and its committees provide advice to Clerks on key issues, undertakes performance reviews of deputy ministers, and are an instrument for nurturing corporate culture.[97]

All deputy ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister, and candidates for the role of Clerk and Secretary to Cabinet are rarely drawn from outside the deputy minister ranks. Prime Ministers undoubtedly choose Clerks who are experienced, have a leadership style that will further the government agenda, and work well with ministers. Prime Ministers continue to resist politicizing the position, respecting a convention that the Clerk, as Head of the Public Service, should have credibility in the public service and among deputy minister colleagues and public servants, and because influence can be exerted via the PMO. Even though the position is pivotal and has steadily become more public, there has been no systematic study of how Clerks take up and balance their roles, how they manage PCO, and how they manage the corporate responsibilities of the public service through committees, meetings, and influencing career patterns of executives.[98]

Top executives in the Canadian public service are less likely to have long appointments with departments or agencies, and spend full careers with the public service. Since the late 1980s DMs and ADMs are rotated frequently and tend to leave earlier to take up positions with consulting firms, private sector leadership positions, trade and professional organizations, and other governments. This allows for more opportunity for those that follow, gives the Prime Minister room to manoeuvre when matching public servants to ministers, and ensures a well-informed group of former public sector executives available to advise governments and other policy actors. However, the public service exports a huge amount of experienced talent to firms, associations, and provincial governments. It is not clear that this approach can be sustained as the demographic bulge moves through the public service, nor that recruitment and rotational programs can easily produce sufficient high-quality replacements. The government is currently seeking to recruit and develop talent from outside the Canadian public service in anticipation of retirements (despite a poor record on this front), and is exploring ways to retain access to public service expertise.[99]

Like Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, the Canadian government has a "strong" center, unique with respect to the number and complexity of central agencies, and the willingness of governments to experiment with its central machinery.[100] In recent years Prime Minister Chrétien's use of central institutions to exert political will, monitor implementation, or buffer himself from certain demands has been cast as deplorable, a uniquely Canadian phenomenon, but similar trends occur elsewhere.[101] Another way to facilitate coordination is through skilful recruitment and development of executives. Since the 1960s, the Canadian public service has successfully produced its own leaders. The practices of governments and public service leaders indicate that they believe the skills and knowledge required to serve ministers and work with executive colleagues are highly specialized and cannot be left to chance, involving a lengthy process of

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recruitment, assignment to positions across departments and functions, special projects, professional development, mentoring, and monitoring. The lead times for developing such talent involve ten, twenty or more years; outside talent, except in certain functional areas, is rarely acquired from other jurisdictions or sectors. The Canadian public service has developed practices and expectations to foster cohesiveness, shared knowledge, and horizontal cooperation across departments and agencies.

CONCLUSION

The Canadian public service continues to be animated by the merit principle and effectively remains a career public service, despite the serious retrenchment of the mid-1990s and a recent upsurge in the temporary work force. Life-long learning has replaced employment security as the preferred strategy for encouraging continuity and full careers in the public service, although the government recently announced steps to convert temporary appointments into indeterminate status. The core public service continues to renew itself through entry-level hiring and grooms future leaders largely from within. This reflects strongly held ideas about the skills, experience, and system knowledge required by senior managers and, particularly, by executives to work with ministers and colleagues in a fast-paced and complex environment.

FIGURE 4 RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT: HIGHLIGHTS

ATTRACTING AND GROOMING TALENT

- Merit for hiring and promotion
- Leaders developed from within
- Less emphasis on a career service
- Strong commitment to diversity and bilingualism
- Temporary contingent workforce
- Difficulty reforming HR practices

MANAGING THE HR SYSTEM

- Multiple central agencies
- Overlapping task forces, councils
- Evolving ideas re: unified service
- A smaller core public service
- Fostering corporate identity
- Persistence of intrinsic complexity

COORDINATING FROM THE CENTRE

- A "strong" centre
- History of central experimentation
- Increased PM efforts to control
- Close managing of executive cadre
- Executives as corporate resource and recruited from within

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES (PM)

- Appointment of DMs
- Machinery decisions
- Creation of central agencies and agenda-setting

Canada remains distinctive with respect to the number of central agencies responsible for aspects of corporate human resource management, and its willingness to experiment with new capabilities and central initiatives in this area. The *PSMA* and the December 2003 machinery changes reallocated authorities and responsibilities but have not altered this fact. This "investment" in central capabilities suggests that managing human resources is considered a critical matter in the system, but the resulting complexity and contending interests has led to well-known difficulties in bringing about reform. Much attention has recently focused on the prerogatives of the Prime Minister in fostering coherence and control. However, Canada seems more distinctive in the extent to which the executive group has come to be groomed and managed as a corporate resource, not only with the recent goal of promoting horizontal coordination but also to further dialogue on reform.

"The core public service continues to renew itself through entry-level hiring and grooms future leaders largely from within."

CHAPTER 4
DESIGNING POLICY AND DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES

In democratic societies, public service institutions provide advice to duly elected governments, deliver services to citizens, and assist ministers in consulting with stakeholders and citizens. But throughout the OECD, public service institutions perform these functions in an increasingly contested environment. This chapter explores the Canadian model of public service with respect to policy advising, service delivery, and citizen engagement.

It begins by exploring the concern about the neglect of the policy function in Ottawa in the mid-1990s after years of cutbacks, and examines the strategies the government and public service utilized to strengthen that capacity in the post-deficit environment. The second part reviews the pragmatic, if tentative, approach to finding alternative ways to deliver services to the public, without necessarily separating service delivery from the responsibilities of the core public service. The final part considers the equally diverse array of consultation and citizen engagement exercises by the Canadian government that constitutes a quiet tradition and capability of the public service. Once again, interesting research questions emerge from this review.

Renewing Interest in Policy Capabilities

The public service has been the principal advisor to Canadian governments on policy and public administration. During the 1960s and 1970s, as the scope of government grew and cabinet decision-making became more sophisticated, the public service greatly expanded its policy-advising capacity. It did so by creating and expanding policy units; establishing government councils, royal commissions and advisory bodies; and encouraging think tanks to develop. Moreover, public service advice to ministers was increasingly contested by think tanks, consultants, and academics,[102] and, in the view of public service leadership, required strengthening by the mid-1990s. However, in contrast to many countries, Canadian governments continue to rely primarily on the expertise of public servants.

Following the Program Review decisions announced in early 1995, public service leaders were concerned about the system's policy capacity after a decade of restraint initiatives,[103] and an environment favouring promotion of deputy ministers with managerial as opposed to policy skills.[104] Moreover, by the late 1990s, the nature of governance challenges had changed and different tools were at the disposal of policy analysts. These worries led the Clerk to establish a deputy minister task force on policy capacity and, subsequently, the Task Force on Horizontal Policy Issues and the Policy Research Initiative (PRI). The goals were to increase the internal capacity of departments, improve linkages with external researchers and analysts, and respond

to the government's need for a whole-of-government perspective on policy issues that transcend the domain of any given department or even level of government.

Much has been made of these initiatives. Certainly the first round of activities in anticipation of a new government mandate led to the Policy Research Initiative, thematic conferences, workshops with researchers at universities and think tanks, a new journal, the Trends Project with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and a recruitment program for policy researchers similar to the Accelerated Economist Training Program. The Policy Research Secretariat was later established. However much good work and international recognition this generated, many of these initiatives were not sustained. Initially, the PRI had a strong client in PCO's Priorities and Planning Secretariat who believed the PRI's work was important for transition and mandate planning,[105] but in the early 2000s, the strength of this connection waned and budgets for the initiative declined, even though senior officials believe more needs to be done to improve demand for policy research and analysis and to increase the capacity of the functional policy community.[106]

The drive to increase policy capacity was not confined to the PRI. After funding was cut for several think tanks, government councils, and other advisory bodies in the early 1990s, the government and departments sought to rebuild relationships with research institutions. Several related strategies can be identified:

- many departments preserved world-class analytic and research capabilities, and Statistics Canada has long been known as an innovative, well-managed institution that provides good information to departments, agencies, and researchers in universities and think tanks;

- many central agencies and departments maintained, created or re-profiled internal capacities and cultivated networks with academics, think tanks, and consultants whether through advisory boards, contract work, or research programs. At times outside consultants and academics were engaged in corporate and department-based policy development exercises; and

- increasing funding for arm's length, collaborative and curiosity-driven research through the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (and more specifically, the New Economy and Metropolis projects), and through the Canadian Policy Research Network and collaboration with other think tanks.

Many departments have strengthened their policy advising without necessarily expanding internal capacity; they may rely more heavily on external capabilities and task forces to produce high-quality work.[107]

A recent study by Anthony Perl and Donald White reveals steady increases in policy consulting in the Canadian public service from 1981-2001 in absolute and relative terms.[108] Whether this has led to more outsourcing by departments or competing policy advice from ministers is an open question. Indeed, the supply of experienced consultants increased when the government cut the public service in the 1990s, and it is reported that some policy units rely at times on high-quality consultants to undertake critical studies and assist in preparing cabinet documents. One question is whether the supply of experienced talent from the public service for the consultancy pool can be sustained. Clearly, more systematic research needs to be conducted in this area.

Canada's policy capabilities may seem limited when compared to those found in the United States, with legions of huge departments and agencies, well-financed legislative committees and supporting agencies, think tanks, foundations, and universities working in a highly contested political environment. While the provision of policy advice to Canadian ministers is more contested than in the past, the public service does not appear to have been challenged or forced to re-orient its advising relationship to ministers in the manner of the British civil service with a reported tendency towards more "process coordination" under successive governments.[109] And, Canada's efforts to increase funding for research to universities, to increase internal policy capacity, and to foster networks of expertise has drawn interest from countries like Australia.[110] During the late 1980s, a less fiscally conservative Labour government under Helen Clark in New Zealand started to demand policy analysis revolving less around meeting performance and fiscal targets, and sought to strengthen the capabilities of policy ministries,[111] similar to Canada's experience as the Chrétien government sought policy ideas in the post-deficit environment.

As noted in **Chapter 1**, it has been argued that the decision by Canadian governments not to radically separate policy functions from service delivery has strengthened the policy capabilities of departments. However, this *presumes* that the linkages between operations and policy functions are well articulated and fully exploited. In theory, ministerial accountability for both policy and service delivery *should* lead to more fulsome transfer of information across boundaries than would be the case with policy ministries and independent executive agencies with different incentive systems. However, agencies in countries like Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand are not passive because they have a vested interest in the direction of policy advice, and conversely, policy ministries monitor and shape agency activities. It is an open empirical question as to whether policy ministries in these and other countries produce lower quality policy advice as a result.

Finally, when governments demand new policy ideas, it creates powerful incentives for deputy ministers to build or supplement policy capacity. There can be no doubt that in the post-deficit environment, the Chrétien and Martin government have signalled their need for policy alternatives dealing with big issues. One can anticipate similar demands from the Harper government. The quality and quantity of policy advising is not just a matter of supply but also one of demand.

Service Delivery: Structural Diversity and Continual Experimentation

During the late 1980s and early 1990s political and public service leaders in Canada were well aware of the restructuring of the New Zealand and UK public services, but adopted a more incremental posture in reforming government machinery and program operations.

In New Zealand, radical reform launched in the mid-1980s was driven by a theoretically coherent view about separating policy from operations, introducing market discipline into the public sector, and hiring CEOs as heads of department under a strong performance contract regime.[112] Much has been written about the New Zealand model, but, for all the innovation it rightly gained recognition for, much of that reform involved catching up to the practices of countries like Canada. The UK government began its Next Steps reforms in the late 1980s, and by "April 1997, over a hundred executive agencies employed 77 per cent of all permanent civil servants, leaving a central core around Whitehall of some 50,000, the size the service had been in 1900."[113] However, executive agencies are "administrative arrangements within departments" and the latter delegate responsibilities to the agencies and their CEOs under framework documents, involve regular annual and five-year reviews, and their employees remain civil servants. While the New Zealand reforms were introduced in a dramatic, concerted manner (since attenuated in certain areas), the British government took over ten years to re-shape how their departments worked.[114]

Canadian reformers proceeded with more modest initiatives such as the Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability agreements in 1986, and, in the early 1990s, created several small special operating agencies (SOAs) for very specific and often commercial functions. Unlike UK executive agencies, they were typically small, and remained under the aegis of deputy ministers and departments. Much of the hesitancy to create more SOAs, or adopt the more radical UK model, derived from worries about "hollowing out" the core professional public service, a lack of enthusiasm by deputy ministers who believed they would still be responsible for the proposed entities, and the fact that such structural change was not a high priority of the Mulroney government. Conversely, it was argued that improvements in service quality, management, and accountability could be achieved with active leadership animating the conventional structures of government. This logic led to Public Service 2000 and was evident in its recommendations. However, PS 2000 was quickly overtaken by events, including several cutbacks and wage restraint, the June 1993 restructuring, and the 1994 Program Review process.[115]

The June 1993 restructuring was notable for creating larger departments and ministerial portfolios in anticipation of broader policy challenges. This was quickly followed by the administrative consolidation of departments. The third phase involved identifying new strategies for delivering services. The Program Review exercise shifted the responsibility for many programs to other sectors, levels of government, or dispensed with them altogether. For example, Transport Canada devolved management and revenue-raising authorities to several community-governed local airport authorities across the country, and created NavCanada, which operates on a fee-for-

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service basis and has separate employer status. Many departments were profoundly affected by such decisions and developed new contours. Subsequently, the government established several service agencies (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Parks Canada) in the late 1990s with separate employer status to work around a restrictive HR regime, and moved just over 52,000 employees from the core public service.[116] The Chrétien government also utilized independent foundations to deliver specific services, effectively removing oversight from Parliament.[117]

This diversity in service delivery structures has not been based on any foundational theory about the structure, management, and oversight of government programs. Rather, it emerged from pragmatic deliberations about what might constitute the best governance arrangements for each program function and from the desire of ministers to demonstrate the relevance of the Canadian government to citizens.[118] The term "alternative service delivery" (ASD) was coined by Canadian academics and TBS to describe the new range of possibilities.[119] Some observers argue this approach was distinctively Canadian,[120] a contrast to the big structural reforms of the public service in the UK and New Zealand. However aside from different motivations and terminology, it is not clear if Canada's pragmatic posture is unique, particularly when one takes into account OECD countries.

Complementing this approach to structural change has been a strong commitment to finding new ways to improve service delivery, which, over time, promises to profoundly affect government structure and organization. Efforts to better comprehend and improve service to citizens began in the early 1990s with service standards, single windows for business and citizens, and electronic alternatives.[121] But perhaps the most significant initiative was systematic research by CCMD on what features of service mattered most to citizens and finding ways to better measure and compare different services delivered in the public and private sectors. This led to the Common Measurement Tool, the Citizens-First survey, a best practices database, and the Citizen-Centred Service Network with provincial and territorial partners (which, after winning an international award, became the Institute for Citizen-Centred Service).[122] Departments are expected to set targets for service lines and report on progress. Interestingly, Aucoin argues that because the Canadian government did not fragment the core public service in the manner of other Westminster systems, it was better positioned to implement the service quality agenda because operations remained part of larger departments.[123] This parallels the argument that the policy advising function remained stronger for the same reason, and deserves some close empirical research.

In 1999, building on several department-led electronic service delivery initiatives[124], the Chrétien government committed to providing Canadians electronic access to all services by 2005, leading to the ambitious, wide-ranging Government On-line initiative.[125] This has led to several successes, such as electronic filing for tax returns, employment insurance applications, and job queries, as well as considerable collaboration across central agencies and departments. The Canadian government has been acknowledged as a leader in international surveys, largely due to its main

on-line portal and links.[126] However, while the options for Canadians to tap into and experience government has expanded beyond over-the-counter, telephone, and mail, there is very little information on how the advent of web-based services actually affects the shape of the public service, the relative use of modalities for different services, and how this compares with other jurisdictions. Less recognized are the roles of regional councils,[127] and numerous efforts by departments and agencies to better coordinate and incorporate regional perspectives and programs into their decision-making and management structures, and, in turn, to coordinate service delivery with other departments and jurisdictions, though some of this is captured in the citizen-centered and government on-line initiatives.

There is need for systematic research that compares how service delivery models vary across jurisdictions in similar sectors (i.e., what levels of government and kind of agencies are responsible for transport or environmental regulation?), and that secures comparable evidence about different levels of performance. However, although the government and many observers have invoked the label of "alternative service delivery", there appears to be no distinctive model of Canadian public service in the sense of the government having adopted a favoured structural form; rather, it has taken shape as a *posture*, a willingness to innovate and keep abreast of developments and ideas emanating from other jurisdictions, even if this creates tensions with the traditional principles of Parliamentary governance. ASD has produced diversity in structures and service delivery models, but governments have not succeeded in conveying this diversity to citizens, public servants, and informed observers in a coherent manner. And, as will be discussed later, *how* such initiatives have been moved forward—central and deputy minister leadership, central secretariats, networks of executives, central pools of funding for pilot and other projects, lead departments, and reporting—are the latest examples of a distinctive approach to public sector reform emerging since the early 1990s.

Engaging Citizens: Normal but Uncelebrated Practice?

Improving citizen engagement and public dialogue have risen to the top of the agenda of Canada's public service, including mention by successive Clerks in annual reviews of the state of the public service. But similar ideas have been bandied about for at least three decades under the labels of consultation and citizen participation. More recent advocates of engagement and dialogue call for less persuasion and passive listening by governments and public servants, and for more interaction and learning with citizens.[128] New technological possibilities have renewed interest in engagement and dialogue but the focus has been on improving service and information to the public associated with the citizen-centered service delivery and e-government initiatives.

Successive Canadian governments have turned to parliamentary standing committees, task forces, royal commissions, and public conferences for consultation, often supported by the Canadian public service. Governments seem to have consulted more as citizen confidence has

declined, and certainly consultation with key stakeholders (the obverse of citizens, some would say) has become a routine activity for public servants. Perhaps the high watermark for consultation occurred during the early 1990s, when extensive consultations were organized in the wake of the Meech Lake process and to debate the Charlottetown Accord under the second Mulroney government, and for the Social Security Reform, the budget process, and the National Forum on Health during the first mandate of the Chrétien government.[129] These were extensive, public, and sometimes very experimental processes, which have not been since repeated with such scope. In less celebrated ways, many departments consult regularly with stakeholders, experts and citizens on a multitude of issues.[130] For over a decade, the Privy Council Office has had a secretariat for promoting, monitoring and coordinating consultations.

In recent years, there have been many calls for more citizen engagement, including messages from two previous Clerks of the Privy Council.[131] However, the government has only indirectly supported such activity: it has relied heavily on expert panels, task forces, and roundtables to consult sectors and citizens on an incredible array of issues; and it has supported consultants and think tanks, like the Canadian Policy Research Networks, or commissions, like the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, to undertake dialogues with the public.[132] A cynic might depict this as shirking responsibility but many citizens prefer that independent organizations host consultations, and governments avoid directly managing logistics. Moreover, with MPs anxious to recover their relevance in the policy process, there has been less enthusiasm for officials serving as the principal government interlocutors with citizens.

There is not space here to do justice to the diversity and number of consultation and citizen engagement exercises administered directly or indirectly by the government and the public service. Canada continues to experiment with a variety of approaches in every sector, but does not have a distinctive approach. On the international stage, although Canada has been ranked first in e-government surveys, these do not consider citizen engagement. PCO only recently introduced the Consulting Canadians web site (on the PWGSC server) to provide citizens and others with a cross-government view of current and recently held consultations.[133] However, this web site is not as sophisticated and user-friendly as the UK's Citizen Space web site and Open Government initiative, nor has the Canadian government actively promoted anything as comprehensive as the UK's citizen panels.[134] Because the Consulting Canadians web site was not designed to be a portal for e-consultation, planning for a more substantial web site is underway. Rather than the predictable pleas for more consultation and citizen engagement, there is need for more research that explores which instruments produce the best information at reasonable costs for the government.[135]

Nevertheless, the Canadian public service has developed a culture of consultation, centrally tracking and monitoring consultations since at least the early 1990s. It has produced an active community of public servants, elected representatives, consultants, think tanks, and academics who probe the possibilities, identify opportunities to use innovative consultation techniques, and monitor and contribute to international discussions in this area.

*"...the Canadian public service has developed a culture of consultation, centrally tracking and monitoring consultations since at least the early 1990s.... The Consulting Canadians web site may constitute a 'shallow innovation', but it draws attention to the considerable amount of consultation that already regularly proceeds across the face of government."*

The Consulting Canadians web site may constitute a "shallow innovation", but it draws attention to the considerable amount of consultation that already regularly proceeds across the face of government.[136]

CONCLUSION

In recent years, Canadian governments and the public service have addressed the challenges of policy advising, service delivery, and citizen engagement by means of a pragmatic posture of experimentation (see **Figure 5**). This has led to many corporate initiatives and themes, and great diversity in approaches and constant evolution. It is difficult to convey the shifting contours and practices of the public service with so many waves of overlapping initiatives, and with differing degrees of importance for specific departments and portfolios. High-level generalizations can be made on the state of play—but this is not a substitute for systematic studies about the shifts in the nature of advising capacity, service delivery models, and consultation efforts for departments and programs.

FIGURE 5 DESIGNING POLICY AND DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES: HIGHLIGHTS

POLICY ADVICE

- Persistence of worry about policy capacity
- Renewal through PRI and La Relève
- Sponsoring of research institutions
- More reliance on external networks
- New ways to manage policy function
- Increased contestability and government demand
- Public service still principal advisor

SERVICE DELIVERY

- Wholesale policy/ops split avoided
- Flexibility in inputs and structures
- Service standards and results
- Citizen-centered perspectives
- E-government and Government On-Line
- Innovation and diversity
- Problem of coherence

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

- Strong tradition of consultation
- Experimental flurry in the early 1990s
- PCO coordinating capacity
- Several governmental instruments
- Tension between MPs and officials
- Interest renewed with e-government
- New Consulting Canadians web site

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

- Demanding good policy advice
- Priorities to be identified
- Consultations, engagement
- Machinery and structural changes
- Ideas on structure, approach

The credibility of the public service as primary policy advisor to the government remains strong in Canada, but this cannot be fully attributed to decisions not to separate program operations from the policy function in a wholesale manner. In the post-deficit climate, governments have demanded more policy advice and deputy ministers responded with efforts to strengthen policy capabilities. Keeping more of the service delivery function inside the core public service may have served to strengthen policy advising (or ensure that it did not wane as much),[137] but whether this has led to better forward-looking capacity and more astute questions from ministers remains an open question. Moreover, the policy capacity of departments in portfolios retaining operational responsibilities has not been compared to the capacity of those that shed them, nor has anyone compared the experience of both approaches in other countries. Similar gaps in knowledge exist about whether service quality (and efficiency) has been improved by retaining or spinning off operational units.

CHAPTER 5
LEARNING, SCRUTINY, AND REFORM

Public service institutions must continually evolve to perform well in a constantly changing environment. But in doing so, they must respect and adhere to critical institutional values. Top-down reforms are not the only way that public service institutions change. Individual public servants, program units, and the public service as a whole can improve capabilities and expand intellectual horizons. There are a constant stream of innovations and practices emerging from specific programs and functional communities. And, controversies swirling around government decisions and how programs are managed by public servants can be an important impetus for change.

This chapter first considers how the Canadian public service has prepared its executives and employees to increase their knowledge, skills and moral sense in recent years. The second part explores the continuing efforts to balance the equally important values of control and accountability with those of flexibility and innovation, and the anomalous spectacle of recent scandals juxtaposed against prior efforts to improve comptrollership. Finally, we consider how Canadian governments and the public service have engaged, debated, and introduced reform. The chapter concludes by emphasizing that the public service needs to better convey how it has been evolving.

Promoting Learning and Values

In promoting a modern public service that innovates, but understands its obligations to serve ministers and citizens, governments have emphasized the importance of continuous learning and a strong ethical compass.[138] Recently, the government and the Treasury Board Secretariat adopted a public-service-wide learning policy and a values and ethics code. And, as part of the *PSMA*, the government established the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS) with an expanded mandate out of the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD).

CCMD was established in 1988 to expand opportunities, develop new skills, improve morale, and inculcate shared values among the executive and management groups. During its first few years, CCMD focused on establishing core programs for executives and managers, special courses and events, briefings for select client groups, and custom-designed programs for departments and agencies, as well as initiating a research program that tapped into Canadian and international academics as well as practitioners. But tighter budgets, Program Review decisions, growing reliance on cost-recovery and custom programs, and anticipating central renewal initiatives forced the CCMD to examine how it delivered its learning and research programs and to decide how it could align them with the work of other central institutions.[139]

CCMD moved to a new threshold when a previous "demander" of strategic alignment, Jocelyne Bourgon, became its President in 1998. As Clerk she set in motion several initiatives pertaining to renewal, values and ethics, and learning, among others. CCMD became a focal point for developing a learning strategy for the entire public service, initiating a unique form of action-research, linking executive development to international initiatives and liaison with other jurisdictions, launching a portal for e-learning as well as investing in computer-assisted learning for public servants, and encouraging universities to articulate MPA programs to Direxion, the educational component of the revamped Career Assignment Program.[140] Here we focus on the learning strategy.

The October 1999 Speech from the Throne outlined the government's commitment to prepare Canada to function in a knowledge-based world, as part of its broader Innovation Strategy. The government acknowledged the need to "focus on the recruitment, retention and continuous learning of a skilled federal workforce." The then Clerk, Mel Cappe, appointed three deputy minister committees to explore each issue. The Learning and Development Committee (LDC), which consisted of deputy and associate deputy ministers from departments and agencies with significant training and learning needs, undertook consultations, and produced two reports identifying scores of ways to further learning.[141] These reports laid the foundations for a new continuous learning policy, eventually adopted by the Treasury Board Secretariat in May 2002.[142] The new policy sought to create a life-long learning culture in the public service and increase allocations for learning as a percentage of the overall wage bill. Both departments and employees were expected to develop learning plans, and departments had to identify performance targets and report annually on progress. The CCMD hosted several conferences on learning, reaching out to national and international audiences. Subsequently, the LDC and the Network of Learning and Development Institutes (NLDI) established the Learning and Innovation Seed Fund to provide seed funding for projects.

In advancing the continuous learning policy, CCMD re-positioned itself and cultivated further appetite for reform. The LDC continued as a standing committee until spring 2003. It was complemented by the NLDI, comprised of directors general of the member institutes. Both were chaired by the President of CCMD, which provided the secretariat;[143] and the Clerk, as Head of the Public Service, chaired CCMD's Board of Governors. Altogether, this was a potent alignment for building support for corporate learning initiatives before they arrived on the cabinet agenda. On April 1, 2004, as part of the *PSMA*, CCMD merged with Training and Development Canada and Language Training Canada to form the Canada School of Public Service.[144] More recently, CSPS has secured a significant increase in base funding and announced a plan to focus and strengthen individual learning for certain target audiences (deputy ministers, new recruits, and officials with delegated authorities), to provide advice to deputy ministers on learning strategies for their departments and agencies, and to provide a scanning capability on emerging trends and smart practices in public sector management around the world.[145] One element of this strategy is to improve "foundational learning", particularly with regard to public sector values and ethics, but interest in such matters is hardly new.

A strong push to promote common values and ethics for executives and managers across the public service was consistent with the corporate learning policy.[146] A Values and Ethics Code was adopted in June 2003, but its origins date back to spring 1995 to a CCMD study team on public service values and ethics. Led by John Tait, it became one of the Deputy Minister task forces established by the Clerk after the Program Review decisions in early 1995. The task force (a precursor to the CCMD action-research initiatives of the late 1990s) was comprised of several executives, former executives and a well-known academic. The final report took the form of an extended dialogue and reflection entitled *A Strong Foundation* in December 1996 and called for a statement of principles by the government and more dialogue among public servants.[147] In 1998, the government endorsed principles identified by the OECD,[148] and the Office of the Auditor General launched a study. In 1999, TBS created an Office of Values and Ethics, and the Clerk appointed two deputy ministers to co-champion the Values and Ethics initiative, presumably in anticipation of the OAG report.[149] This led to a web site and additional documents outlining best practices and encouraging dialogues with employees.

In early 2000, TBS reported that most public servants had not heard of the Tait Report nor participated in discussions related to the report. This was noteworthy because values were underpinnings of other reform initiatives, such as Results for Canadians and Modern Comptrollership.[150] The Leadership Network concluded that departments were not well positioned to drive the ethics debate.[151] Moreover, the United Kingdom and Australia had already adopted formal codes of ethics for public servants. The CCMD hosted several armchair events focusing on values and ethics, published a case-book with TBS to promote discussion in departments, and re-issued the Tait Report. The OAG report also called for a comprehensive ethics regime for politicians and public servants.[152]

These developments led to new efforts to engage deputy ministers and public servants in discussion about the statement of principles.[153] There was an added sense of urgency for three reasons: (1) the Clerk had announced a deputy-led task force to modernize human resource management; (2) several embarrassing scandals involving ministers and senior officials had already occurred; and (3) the Prime Minister-in-waiting, Paul Martin, had indicated that an improved ethics regime for public office holders would be a centrepiece of his mandate.[154] In June 2003, TBS approved the *Values and Ethics Code* for the Public Service and the Prime Minister approved a revised *Guidance for Deputy Ministers*—both rooted in the Tait report and distributed widely. In late fall 2003, the Office of Public Service Values and Ethics was transferred to the newly established Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada, while Janice Cochrane, at the time President of CSPS, continued to champion the values and ethics initiative.

Continuous learning and values-driven management are clearly viewed as critical initiatives by public service leaders for renewing the Canadian public service. Both are seen as crucial to attracting and retaining future public servants, and to maintaining confidence in the institution. The creation of CCMD, the recently re-profiled CSPS, the LDC, NLDI, and the Continuous Learning Policy show that the government and the public service are committed to learning. These

initiatives are innovative by international standards, although other countries have civil service colleges.[155] However, despite its early, promising groundbreaking work on ethics and values, the Canadian public service soon found itself in "catch-up" mode compared to international exemplars, the proposed reforms set out in the Tait Report, and the needs of the government. But by 2003, the government had endorsed the new values and ethics regime and the public service had developed significant capabilities in this area.

Both the learning and the ethics initiatives are good examples of how the public service approaches institutional change: broad engagement and mobilization of central agencies, leadership from public sector executives, and dialogue with managers across the country led by deputy ministers. However, central initiatives do not necessarily have "traction" across the public service. There is no evidence yet that these initiatives have improved the quality of performance and ethical conduct of public servants.[156] Of course, it is difficult to demonstrate the impacts of learning, particularly in complicated public sector organizational contexts;[157] but the Management Accountability Framework requires departments to develop indicators and measures of performance for learning and values and ethics. This reporting could provide a useful point of departure for more systematic research, including case studies and finer comparative research.

Control, Oversight, and Accountability

Maintaining adequate controls and providing accountability for public spending are critical features of parliamentary governance. However, ensuring that the public service has sufficient flexibility to adapt and respond to government demands is equally important. Balancing these values and demands has been an ongoing challenge.

The Treasury Board Secretariat was established in 1968 to manage expenditures and government reporting in response to the modern public service and a rapidly growing federal budget. But by 1976, the Auditor General of Canada asserted that the government was near to losing control of its finances, and the Royal Commission on Financial Control and Accountability was initiated. As a result, the government created the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) to report independently to the Treasury Board of Canada and to improve financial systems and reporting to Parliament. The Clark government also introduced the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS), an innovation closely monitored by many other jurisdictions. Just five years later, and not long after the demise of PEMS, the Auditor General released a report identifying barriers to productive management,[158] a precursor to Treasury Board efforts to find a new balance late in the 1980s in the context of ever-tightening budgets. Crucial elements of the new "bargain" for the 1990s were fewer central controls and more flexibility for managers and departments in exchange for better reporting on performance, more robust financial information systems, and the articulation and promotion of values and ethics.

However, a decade later, achieving a proper balance seemed elusive following several high-profile controversies concerning HRDC grants and contributions, the national gun registry, the leadership of the Canadian Privacy Commission, and the sponsorship program.[159] Even if these practices were isolated and driven by political superiors, and did not represent the standards and values of the executive group, they nevertheless cast negative light on the public service. Reports by the OAG raised questions about the oversight of departments and agencies by TBS and PSC.[160] There appears to have been insufficient monitoring, and concerted action to remedy problems was taken only after scrutiny from the media and the OAG.

For those monitoring institutional development, this state of affairs is perplexing. On the one hand, one reason why governments did not adopt more significant structural reforms—such as creating executive agencies and granting separate employer status in the early 1990s—was because of worries about the increased potential for mismanagement.[161] On the other hand, during the 1990s governments launched several initiatives to improve financial stewardship. A closer look at these initiatives is warranted.

In 1992, the OCG was folded into TBS to streamline and integrate its work into overall monitoring and management reform. After Program Review, Treasury Board developed the Financial Management Initiative to improve financial reporting.[162] A new Secretary appointed an independent panel of experts to explore ways to improve comptrollership in the public service. After this panel reported in 1997, the Treasury Board endorsed its recommendations and launched government-wide reforms; and the Prime Minister designated the Treasury Board a "management board."[163] The Modern Comptrollership initiative began with several department pilots, a central fund to encourage innovation, and was adopted across government by the Treasury Board in spring 2001.[164] The Treasury Board also promoted performance reporting. Through a pilot process with departments, agencies and other stakeholders, TBS overhauled how the estimates were reported to Parliament. All of this led to the *Results for Canadians* report, a summary of the evolving approach, principles, and role of the Treasury Board of Canada.[165] Finally, the Treasury Board recently announced its new Management Accountability Framework (MAF) that identifies ten areas in which departments and deputy ministers will be monitored for performance.[166] Thus, over the last decade, considerable attention has been directed to issues of financial management, control, and reporting by the government and the leadership of the public service.

Several factors, though, have worked against those initiatives. Since the early 1990s, TBS and PSC put less emphasis on their roles as control and audit institutions and more emphasis on values, collegiality, learning, and positive inducements to further change.[167] Furthermore, Cabinet ministers and TBS have exercised far less of a sustained challenge function in the budget process compared to other jurisdictions, such as Australia and New Zealand. Although the deficit reduction strategy had succeeded by the late 1990s, the Program Review was episodic and largely consisted of self-managed cuts by departments to meet Department of Finance targets.[168] The June 1993 restructuring and Program Review decisions led to a downgrading of the financial

management community, perhaps inadvertently, because of the rationalization of corporate services functions in departments. Continuous organizational change in TBS meant that financial management and comptrollership became only one of their many priorities competing for the attention of Treasury Board ministers.[169] Only recently did TBS re-build its capabilities in the program and expenditure management sectors. The performance reporting of departments and agencies do not appear to have been actively used by MPs, central agencies, ministers, and COSO to evaluate the performance of deputy ministers and their management teams, and it is not clear if those reports fairly reflect the state of management in departments and agencies. Finally, the silence of officials in departments and central agencies in the face of questionable financial and management practices suggest some combination of indifference, ignorance about what constitutes improper behaviour, and worry about the consequences of whistle-blowing for future career opportunities inside or outside the public service.

Scandals exposed the gulf between central initiatives and operational realities. They also raised questions about ethics, the competence of public service executives, and, more generally, the ability of the public service to manage its own affairs. A new balance had to be struck because the credibility of the government was at stake. The outgoing Chrétien government tightened up procedures for approving and administering grants and contracts across the public service, rushed to legislate a new values and ethics package, and endorsed a comprehensive management accountability framework (MAF) developed under the auspices of the Treasury Board.

In December 2003, the new Martin government announced several initiatives in support of its theme of "Stronger Financial Management and Accountability": **(1)** establishing an Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet (ERC) chaired by the President of the Treasury Board; **(2)** shifting several functions away from TBS so that it can focus on expenditure review and financial management;[170] **(3)** enhancing the role of the Comptroller General as a separate office alongside TBS, with new roles in policy development and tighter linkages to counterparts in departments and agencies; and **(4)** endorsing the new Management Accountability Framework as the government's basis for reporting to the Treasury Board and holding ministers to account in Parliament.[171] A discussion paper in the March 2004 Budget identified an annual target of $1 billion for reallocation by the ERC and announced that the ERC would review programs, policy areas, and operations functions across government. It resolved to strengthen financial management and audit capabilities, consolidate financial and information systems across government, and introduced several restraint measures. Finally, the President of the Treasury Board would report annually on the state of the public service to Parliament.[172]

Some of these undertakings and institutional roles have since been modified and other initiatives have been announced.[173] There is not the space here to review nor analyze these initiatives, but the administrative policy mix and general direction of the Martin government were clear: more monitoring and review of programs and operations; more controls and systematic oversight on financial management; more detailed annual reporting on the state of the public service as an institution; and, with or without a minority government, more scrutiny from MPs and Standing

Committees in Parliament. Moving from episodic to sustained review of programs by the ERC promises to bring Canada in line with Australia and New Zealand, but the ERC process of 2004, which secured $12 billion in savings over five years was not repeated in 2005.[174] Clearly, sustained change will require a shift in Cabinet culture, namely, greater willingness to devote ministerial time to review and challenge the management and expenditures of departments and agencies. Determining the reach and impact of these reforms will require detailed research into ERC, OCG, and MAF processes.

Public Sector Reform: Pragmatism, Deliberation, Experimentation

Chapter 1 noted that the Canadian government is no longer considered a bold or comprehensive reformer. This represents a significant shift for the Canadian public service, since it was an international exemplar for reform during the 1960s and 1970s and enacted decisive and sweeping institutional and program change with the June 1993 restructuring and the February 1995 Program Review process. Observers do acknowledge that the Canadian public service is a high-quality institution, with no shortage of reforms proceeding in programs, departments and portfolios in a pragmatic fashion. Moreover, the literature tends to base its comparisons and assessments on the extent to which different governments follow an overarching theory of reform and a coherent plan, or adopt reforms involving the splitting of service provision away from policy capabilities in departments. Such assessments tend to focus on central initiatives in the short term, including the reform of central institutions and policies. They do not gauge how much service delivery has improved or public service institutions have become more responsive over a longer period of time.

Despite recent efforts to more subtlely capture and analyze NPM-inspired reforms,[175] there are impoverished notions about how reform and change occur in public service institutions. When one moves beyond press releases to probe the administrative history of reforms, it becomes clear that many comprehensive initiatives announced by prime ministers or central agencies embrace, gather up, and move along initiatives already underway, sometimes identifying new issues and dimensions or injecting momentum.[176] At the same time, public service systems always have many smaller, bottom-up initiatives and innovations underway at any time,[177] both within and across department boundaries, which may collectively result in great change across the institution, but might never be conveyed nor celebrated in a coherent manner. To further complicate matters, the arrival of new leaders and staff through recruitment may cause processes, culture, and horizons to evolve. This may not be reform or innovation in the grand sense, but may change the character of key elements of public service institutions. These alternative paths towards reform are not adequately represented in the research.

The Canadian public service has elements of both types of reform at play: comprehensive reforms and significant initiatives are announced from the centre, and many other reforms and innovations emerge from functional communities, departments and agencies across the system.

"...sustained change will require a shift in Cabinet culture, namely, greater willingness to devote ministerial time to review and challenge the management and expenditures of departments and agencies."

Reforms may be triggered by perceptions that central regimes or even the entire public service system are out of synch with governance challenges.[178] Such perceptions might emerge reactively (scandal, administrative or policy failures) or proactively (planning, best practices, etc.). Reform can be selective or comprehensive in scope, and can be led either by ministers or public service executives. They may also vary as to whether they engage public servants below the apex of the public service as well as other informed and interested stakeholders.[179] If driven by political leaders, reform is done *to* the public service; if led by public service leaders, presumably under the aegis of a government, it constitutes *self-reform*. But as ideas for self-reform become more comprehensive, involving structural and legislative change, they require support from the Prime Minister and the government because its authorities and possibly legislative time will be required. The most potent situation is when governments work *with* public service leaders to design and implement reforms; and the most worrisome is when neither governments nor public service leaders rise to the challenge.[180]

With these distinctions it is possible to identify patterns in how reform has been handled in the modern era.[181] Consider the following observations:

- Prime Ministers typically announce decisions about the structure and operations of Cabinet and key decision-making processes early in mandates because they are closely tied to assigning the responsibilities of ministers and implementing top priorities. Good examples are the Policy and Expenditure Management System in 1979 under Prime Minister Clark and the structural changes announced by Prime Minister Martin in late 2003.

- Exercises to reform the public service have typically been initiated towards the end of government mandates. They occur in the context of taking stock and planning transition in preparation for a new government, and usually get delegated to public service leaders. Examples include: Public Service 2000 and the de Cotret Task Force late in the second mandate of the Mulroney government, the Deputy Minister task forces led by the Clerk near the end of the first Chrétien mandate, and the Task Force on Modernizing Human Resource Management during the third mandate of the Chrétien government.

- Detailed scrutiny of programs delivered by the Canadian public service has been episodic. Examples include: the Nielsen Task Force, the short-lived working of the Expenditure Committee under Prime Minister Mulroney, and the 1994–95 Program Review under the Chrétien government. This practice stands in contrast with the annual review, vetting and challenges of departmental budgets in Australia and New Zealand by ministers and central agencies alike.

Generally, Canadian governments have not had strong ideological views about how to restructure the Canadian public service, which stands in contrast to some New Zealand, British, and Australian governments. Opposition parties in Canada have railed against the inefficiencies of the "bureaucracy" and have promised to take dramatic action once in power. However, once in power, they too have left the responsibility for managing the public service to the Treasury Board, the Clerk and other leaders of central agencies, and the deputy minister community. When decisive action has occurred (i.e., the June 1993 restructuring, the 1994 Program Review process, and the December 2003 machinery changes), it was rooted in pragmatic considerations about handling specific policy and managerial issues, and about ensuring that the public service would be well positioned to serve future governments.

However, governments and public service leaders have changed how they seek out ideas for reform. Previously, when governments sought fulsome reviews of the possibilities for public service reform, they appointed royal commissions: the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, and even the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects had a significant component on public service management. These commissions provided opportunities for hearings and submissions from interested groups, for research to be commissioned from academics, and for dialogue among individuals seconded from the government, the private sector, as well as universities.[182] These were also open-ended exercises. Using commissions to explore public service reform fell out of favour because of lead times, expense, and perhaps a belief that senior officials had the most acute sense of the special challenges and possibilities for reform.

"Fostering internal deliberation on reform in recent years has been complemented by assiduously positioning Canada at the nodes of international and domestic networks."

Since the mid-1980s, governments have relied on task forces and committees to probe issues and develop reform ideas. Usually led by deputy ministers, the task forces and committees consult with senior managers, employees, and outside experts. This is similar to the pattern of deliberation used in the learning and ethics reforms described in **Chapter 5**. Recent exceptions to this pattern include external task forces appointed to explore modern comptrollership and labour-management relations within clearly defined time frames. However, after the government received their recommendations, it endorsed decisions and left implementation to central agencies and internal committees. Often pilot projects test specific reforms in willing departments and later expand into government-wide initiatives, an approach utilized for the Government Online, Improved Reporting to Parliament, Risk Management, and Modern Comptrollership initiatives, to name only a few. While the Prime Minister—usually on the advice of key ministers, the Clerk and select public servants—has announced significant reforms of the public service without widespread input, there has emerged a tradition of internal corporate deliberation and participative consultation by officials on many issues.

Fostering internal deliberation on reform in recent years has been complemented by assiduously positioning Canada at the nodes of international and domestic networks. This has been done to keep abreast of the best thinking on public sector reform and to inject Canadian perspectives into

international discussions. One has only to consider Canada's involvement with the OECD, the International Institute for Administrative Sciences, the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration, the Commonwealth Association of Public Management, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, and others, largely through the Canada School of Public Service and its predecessor and other central agencies. Many other examples could be identified at the corporate level, and even more if departmental activities are considered. Canadian representations on the international stage are welcomed and well regarded.

CSPS/CCMD and other agencies have also actively supported domestic think tanks and academics for the purposes of research and consultation on reform. They include the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, the Public Policy Forum, the Conference Board of Canada, and Canadian Policy Research Networks. CSPS/CCMD has long supported research and teaching with the Annual University Seminar and the Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration and more recently sought to bring about renewal and richer links with the community of public administration researchers and programs across the country. In 1994, CCMD founded the International Governance Network, which had internationally recognized scholars from several countries contribute papers for books on governance and public management, and these visits included dialogues with deputy ministers and other officials.[183] Finally, the government provides speakers and participants to instant-conference organizations, like the Canadian Institute, which design events on aspects of public sector reform.

The Canadian government only intermittently initiates significant or comprehensive reforms of the structure and operations of the public service. In recent years, Canadian governments have tended to defer to public service leaders to identify issues and to then debate, propose, and implement reforms. Governments have not had strong, well-developed views on future directions for the public service. For its part, the Canadian public service cannot be said to have resisted change: it has clearly embraced reform on many issues and has kept abreast of developments in other jurisdictions. It has developed a reputation for collaborative debate on issues and reforms across the public service. However, questions have been raised about whether these reforms have traction, whether sufficient attention has been given to how they relate to each other, and whether the government and central agencies ensure there is closure and congruence among them. This raises the important issue of whether a coherent picture of the state of the public service can be conveyed, which is taken up in **Chapters 7 and 8** below.

Two recent developments may shift the institutional directions for review and reform. First, the Martin government announced an Expenditure Review Committee and a more focused role for TBS. This could mark the beginning of ministers more regularly and actively scrutinizing how expenditures, programs, and departments are managed. Second, the Martin government promised to strengthen the role of committees and MPs in the House of Commons, although the minority government arising from the June 2004 election complicated progress on this front. If the Harper government takes up these themes, it should lead to greater review of government programs and the public service, a prospect that will be further considered in **Chapter 6**.

Our knowledge of reform, though, is thin. There is little understanding of how deep central initiatives reach into the public service, how much they alter the workings of departments, programs, and managers, and, if successful, how long it takes. There is even less understanding of how particular practices (financial reporting, contract management or hiring) compare before and after reforms, across departments, and with practice in other jurisdictions. Finally, there is insufficient understanding of how central institutions drive change in different areas and whether the approach in Ottawa is efficient compared to, say, the approaches taken by the Australian, British, and New Zealand governments. Answering these questions requires detailed comparative research.

CONCLUSION

Running through this chapter is a seeming contradiction. Since the 1980s, governments have not appeared to have had a bold and coherent agenda for reform, notwithstanding the June 1993 restructuring and Program Review. And yet, the public service still seems a very innovative, forward-looking institution.

Governments have crucial roles for reforming the public service; but Canadian Prime Ministers, in particular, have tended to be pragmatic rather than ideological in dealing with the public service. Conversely, through mature transition planning, public service leaders have worked hard to anticipate and respond to the agendas of governments. Despite the inevitable tensions, governments and the public service have cultivated and maintained mutual respect, and governments have deferred to public service leaders to identify the need for reform and to inform and engage the government as required. In turn, deputy minister-driven and external task forces generate ideas, dialogue, and reform options. CSPS and central agencies tap into and cultivate international and national networks of expertise on public service reform. And, the collegial, deliberative posture of the executive group has led to a continuous learning regime for the entire public service, anchored by a strengthened CSPS.

FIGURE 6 LEARNING, SCRUTINY, AND REFORM: HIGHLIGHTS

PROMOTING LEARNING AND VALUES

- Continued focus on exec. development
- Learning policy approved in 2003
- CSPS central node for learning
- Engagement of clerk, centre, DMs
- DM task force on values, ethics
- Central Values and Ethics Office created
- MAF includes learning and values

CONTROL, OVERSIGHT, ACCOUNTABILITY

- Tension between control, flexibility
- Current concerns about oversight
- Inadvertent weakening of FMC
- Reduced audit roles of TBS, PSC
- Reactive posture to media, OAG
- Concern re: values and competence
- More aggressive parliamentarians

REFORM: LEADERSHIP, ENGAGEMENT

- Networked, experimental, evolutionary
- Middle-range reformer in OECD
- Myriad of corporate initiatives
- Regular rhythm of Cabinet, PS reforms
- Episodic reform, program reviews
- Gradual opening up of corp. planning
- Reliance on DM task forces to probe
- International, domestic networks

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

- Design of decision-making system
- Allocation of ministerial time
- Oversight of departments, programs
- Challenge function with centre
- Legislation, structural change
- Views/interest in PS structure/reform

The string of recent improprieties has, without question, sullied the reputation of the Canadian public service, no matter how politically-driven or isolated the misconduct. This has been complicated by waves of central reforms and initiatives under successive governments, Prime Ministers, Treasury Board Presidents, and Clerks, which blur into each other without closure or an identifiable threshold increase in performance. The by-product of both developments is that, to outsiders, the public service appears to have been unable to uphold the "control" part of the bargain while making progress on initiatives. Outside observers now wonder if, beyond the announcements and rhetoric, reforms will have traction. Government back-benchers in addition to Opposition MPs call for more proactive and regular scrutiny of how the government and the public service administer programs. Governments defer to the public service on reform and monitoring as long as they have confidence in the knowledge and competence of the public service. The combination of ethical and oversight lapses have combined to shake that confidence.

Two critical points must be made. First, although governments have been pragmatic, tended towards selective rather than comprehensive reforms, and relied heavily on the counsel of the public service in doing so, does <u>not</u> mean that the Canadian public service is not an innovative institution. Second, the profoundly negative public reaction to the scandals does <u>not</u> mean that the public service is not a value-driven and professional institution. However, these developments have created an external environment hostile to claims of excellence from public service leaders. Moreover, because governments have not continually reviewed programs nor articulated agendas for reforming the public service, it has been difficult to project a coherent, comprehensive picture of the strengths and progress of the Canadian public service. This will be a critical strategic challenge for its leaders to surmount.

"...because governments have not continually reviewed programs nor articulated agendas for reforming the public service, it has been difficult to project a coherent, comprehensive picture of the strengths and progress of the Canadian public service."

PART 3:
PROBING IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER 6
THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SERVICE IN PERSPECTIVE

Chapter 2 argued that pointing to what is "valued" by the Canadian government and its public service might not be the best way to determine what is distinctive about how the public service has evolved in Canada. Political and administrative leaders in different jurisdictions might subscribe to virtually the same list of values but have institutionalized them in very different ways and, in doing so, made very different trade-offs. By setting out a broader framework, this study has identified processes and decisions that might be distinctive or represent genuine innovation by the Canadian public service.

This chapter provides perspective on the observations from **Chapters 3, 4 and 5.** Using the framework categories, it begins by providing a summary and overview of the current practice and priorities of the Canadian public service, identifying features that might be positive and others less exemplary. The next section probes whether or not the aggregate picture that emerges is distinctive or an exemplar by international standards. The third section provides a roll-up of topics that warrant further, detailed empirical scrutiny.

Synopsis of Current Practice and Priorities

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provided a high-level review of how the Canadian public service has evolved over the last couple of decades, and placed those observations in comparative perspective. **Figure 7** provides a summary of the key findings about recent public sector developments and practices. Some of the observations may be familiar to readers, but others less so, particularly since the literature has paid more attention to changes in the governance regime than to the Canadian public service as an institution.

On the positive side, the following appears to be distinctive features of the Canadian public service in recent years:

- a public service that is non-partisan, professional, with few instances of corruption, and whose leadership is recruited from within its ranks;

- several central agencies involved in human resource management, and, more generally, in central coordination;

- a sustained effort to improve service delivery with the Service Improvement Initiative and the Government-On-Line strategy, both internationally recognized;

FIGURE 7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM CHAPTERS 3, 4, AND 5

RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT

Attracting and Grooming Talent
Canada is committed to a merit-based, non-partisan, professional and diverse PS. Bilingualism and diversity are part of the definition of merit to foster a representative and creative workforce. Leaders have been recruited and groomed from within, but efforts are made to recruit from the private sector. Workforce adjustments of the early 1990s changed expectations, but the PS remains a career service with a sizeable workforce. Learning is seen as providing employment security and career opportunities.

Managing the Human Resource System
The HR regime is complex, administered by central agencies with overlapping mandates. It is part of a commitment to an integrated PS and demonstrates the premium placed on common standards and a merit-based institution. The institutional and policy complexity makes it difficult to debate, design, and implement reforms, and imposes constraints on departments and agencies, even under the *PSMA*.

Coordinating From the Centre
The PS has a strong, if complex, centre. PMs and governments intermittently re-align central coordinating agencies and processes. Since the late 1980s, senior executives have been utilized as a corporate resource. Sophisticated approaches are used to develop and manage the executive group, highly integrated by international standards. The majority of executives are recruited from within; but DMs and ADMs are unlikely to complete their careers in the PS.

DESIGNING POLICY AND DELIVERING SERVICES

Renewing Interest in Policy Capabilities
The policy function is increasingly contested, but the PS has retained its role as principal advisor to governments. Concern emerged in the mid-1990s about whether policy capabilities were sufficient to advise ministers. The PS tried to renew capacity and to lever external expertise with network models. This was an effort to bolster the capabilities of the country and the PS to take advantage of a knowledge-based economy.

Service Delivery
Canadian governments have avoided taking a categorical approach to reform, seeking to expand flexibility for managers and clients, lower costs, and experiment with alternative arrangements. This diversity makes it difficult to define the reform of the PS to the public. The PS has taken a citizen-centred view of services, developing measurement tools, and increasing citizen and business access to services through e-platforms.

Citizen Engagement
The Canadian PS has a tradition of selective consultation and contributes to international dialogue in this area. Despite calls for more citizen engagement, the last innovative consultations took place in the early 1990s, and the PS has not since implemented bold experiments. The government relied on royal commissions and think tanks for this purpose. PCO has created a Web site portal to show the extent of consultation across government.

LEARNING, SCRUTINY, AND REFORM

Learning and Values
The Canadian PS sees itself as a knowledge-based institution and won government support to strengthen learning for executives and staff. It endorsed the Continuous Learning Policy, created the Canada School of Public Service based on CCMD, and cultivated international networks. The government adopted a Code of Values and Ethics for the PS, with a central office to promote it, in the wake of instances of misconduct.

Control and Accountability
Since the late 1980s, the Canadian PS used inducements and values-based leadership to achieve reforms, providing managerial flexibility in exchange for results-based monitoring. Incidents have revealed inadequate oversight, leading to strengthened control and audit capabilities in financial and HR management, and re-alignment of central agencies. The PS must work hard to restore the confidence of governments and citizens. Parliament is demanding closer scrutiny of government operations.

Public Service Reform
Canadian governments have taken a pragmatic approach to PS reform, and, by international standards, have been judged as moderate. PMs remain the leaders on machinery and legislative changes, but defer to the PS to identify and implement change. The government and the PS rely on DMs and external task forces to scope for change while cultivating international and domestic networks of expertise.

- a pragmatic, evolutionary approach to public sector reform, informed by a collegial, corporate approach involving deputy ministers and other executives to explore reforms and improve programs;

- a commitment to the executive group as a corporate resource as reflected by establishing a central executive development capability, collegial task forces to explore reform and undertake action-research, and regular meetings as a group;

- a strong commitment to support employee learning and improved bilingualism in executive and other designated positions by merging training, development and language teaching capabilities into the Canada School of Public Service, and creating corporate committees and reporting to support this goal; and

- corporate initiatives for strengthening the policy function and linkages with outside policy researchers, and a reputation for supporting and cultivating international and domestic networks for keeping abreast of developments in public sector reform.

Many of these features are ones that the Canadian public service likes to celebrate and promote: its professionalism, improved electronic access to government, the growing central commitment to provide learning opportunities for employees, and its strong reputation as a supporter and contributor to international debates on reform and best practices. Less celebrated is how the Canadian public service mobilizes its executive group as well as the number and reach (for better or for worse) of central agencies. These stand in contrast with continental European and Anglo-American counterparts where departments often have more autonomy, and recruitment and professional development are more likely to be department-specific.

The recent experience of the Canadian public service includes some less positive achievements. Several are related, and include the following:

- difficulty with policy implementation and administrative reform initiatives;

- insufficient challenge, oversight, and monitoring from central agencies;

- an overly complex human resource management regime, which has delayed reform initiatives and made them difficult to implement; and

- difficulty projecting a coherent image to citizens and staff about how the public service has evolved as an institution except at the broadest levels.

It is fair to say that as these gaps emerged, they surprised international observers, given the strong reputation of the Canadian public service and the quality of internal dialogue. The government and public service leaders have recently taken steps to deal with some of these issues: improving Cabinet oversight, refocusing the roles of central agencies in financial and HR

management, expanding capabilities and procedures for internal audit, educating public servants on values and ethics, and mandating training for new public servants and those with delegated authorities. However, it will take time to determine their impact and whether they restore confidence in the institution. While the government and public service leaders have had to play "catch-up" in the eyes of critics, they could establish new standards of practice by international standards for managing the public service that may be worth monitoring closely, even if some may have to be re-thought should they prove unproductive or not effective.

Taking a step back and looking at the whole, one could develop a somewhat negative narrative, depicting an innovative and engaged institution sideswiped by a succession of scandals, unable to convert dialogue and initiatives into results or to coherently project progress. A more generous perspective sees a record of accomplishment and a different trajectory for achieving institutional change. It could be considered a "third way", as John Halligan has suggested, but it remains one yet to be adequately defined.

Is a Distinctive Canadian Public Service an Exemplar?

The effort to designate a "Canadian model" presumes not only that it is distinct, but worthy of description, celebration, and emulation. While there should be pride in the achievements of the Canadian public service, there is risk of pretence.

First, the very notion of "distinctiveness" is problematic. Writing from Australia, Patrick Weller observed that "all countries have adapted, and are adapting, their systems to overcome perceived problems and to meet the challenges that come from outside. All of them reflect the institutional culture and historical norms that have been established over time."[184] In other words, by definition, each country's model is distinctive. Every government and its public service strive to demonstrate to international and domestic audiences that they are making progress on issues and reform agendas, such as those associated with the NPM. Certainly all OECD countries, and many others, have been striving to improve e-government, service quality, policy advising, horizontal coordination, citizen engagement and performance reporting. The real question, then, is whether the Canadian public service qualifies as an exemplar.

"...the Canadian public service certainly is distinct, can be included among a group of countries that have pursued modest structural reforms, and is acknowledged as a leader in citizen-centred service delivery, e-government, and learning."

Answering that question depends on what Canada's public service is compared to. It is an exemplar when compared to less democratic regimes, less robust economic systems, and poorly funded public service institutions attempting to adopt what Manning and Parison have referred to as "basic reforms."[185] Here, some of the basic tenets and practices of the Canadian public service—merit, professionalism, maintaining good relationships with sitting governments, accountability, good systems—are worthy of emulation. Moreover, by all accounts, the Canadian public service has been exemplary in the way it supports developing countries in expanding their own public service acquiring a reputation for listening to local needs and tailoring advice, rather than promulgating certain models.

It is more difficult to claim that the Canadian public service is an exemplar compared to many OECD countries, many of which have merit-based, professional, policy capable, democratically respectful, and innovative public services, even if they operate in different constitutional contexts. Indeed, it is hard to argue that the Canadian public service is superior to many other countries in the OECD. Guy Peters, for example, has noted that the often "dramatic" reforms associated with Anglo-American jurisdictions can be seen as "replicating patterns of administration that have long been common in other types of government, including the drive for more responsive public service institutions and more decentralized management systems."[186]

Often the standard invoked for "success" with respect to public sector reform is decisive, consistent, and coherent strategies. But an exemplar for public service reform is not necessarily an exemplar as an institution. Furthermore, significant restructuring, whether pragmatic or theoretically driven, is usually episodic; and even the exemplars—New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and later, Australia—adopted fairly pragmatic and moderate approaches in the wake of structural change. Indeed, some scholars note that there has been an incredible amount of diversity in how the scores of British executive agencies are managed.[187] So what appeared to be a coherent model may have been less so on closer examination.

Conversely, many jurisdictions may continually effect less dramatic change, whether structural or otherwise, that grows and results in an institution working at a higher level after many years. The question is whether such changes can be measured, sized up, and conveyed in a coherent manner. Without very detailed and systematic data gathering, it is difficult to get underneath the rhetoric of reform across countries.[188] Most academic comparative studies proceed at a very high level of abstraction, making it difficult to conclude which country is a leader of practice in certain areas.[189] This study, which has tried to take a closer look at institutional practices, does not surmount this problem. Moreover, as discussed in **Chapter 7**, this is not simply a question of reporting, but rather, a critical act of institutional leadership: reflecting the progress of an institution to itself as it evolves, defending its integrity to external and internal audiences, and identifying an agenda for change.

Thus, the Canadian public service certainly is distinct, can be included among a group of countries that have pursued modest structural reforms, and is acknowledged as a leader in citizen-centred service delivery, e-government, and learning. However, given its recent mixed record on several issues, and without more detailed information on practice and performance, it is difficult to make the case it is either an exemplar or representative of a "third way" for reform and institutional development.

"...the Canadian public service has been exemplary in the way it supports developing countries in expanding their own public service, acquiring a reputation for listening to local needs and tailoring advice, rather than promulgating certain models."

From Speculation to More Systematic Investigation: Research Agenda

With a few exceptions, the literature has tended to focus on corporate initiatives and the broad directions of public sector reform in Canada without delving into their impact on the workings of the public service. Nor has it explored how the effects of reform compare to those of other public service systems. Despite the recent resurgence in comparative research on public sector reform, many studies are so broad they cannot produce detailed information about the state of practice. This gap reflects the legitimate need to monitor what happens in day-to-day activities during a reform initiative, a significant accomplishment in its own right.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 identified several topics worthy of sustained empirical study, which are summarized in **Figure 8**, although other topics could be added. This agenda calls for closer, more detailed "probes" of the state of practice in the Canadian public service. In some instances useful information may have been collected by central agencies and departments, but has not been widely shared. This suggests a program of strategic and collaborative research among practitioners and academics brokered by the Canada School of Public Service.

The list of the topics in **Figure 8** is extensive, and other worthwhile topics will inevitably be identified. However, detailed collaborative research is well beyond the resources of individual researchers in Canada. This suggests assembling teams of researchers and practitioners across jurisdictions. The proposed program of research could build on and complement the previous work of the International Governance Network and the CSPS action-research roundtables. Depending on the target research topics, funding could be secured from different central agencies, operating departments, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and from counterparts in other jurisdictions.

A natural cluster for systematic comparative research would be with public service institutions in Westminster, Anglo-American parliamentary systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), which have parliamentary systems, strong executives and central institutions. However, depending on the issue at stake, other jurisdictions could be explored, including sub-national systems. A critical issue concerns where the responsibility for policy direction, coordination, and service delivery rests, and therefore it will also be essential to account for how responsibilities are distributed *within* and *across* levels of government. In other words, the work would have to control for the context of federal and multi-level governance systems.

The proposed strategy would delve into the finer workings of government and public service institutions. However, we should not dispense with high-level comparative research nor with studies that delve only into various facets of Canadian public service practice. Indeed, the literature in both areas would animate these research probes with key questions and provide critical context. Moreover, scrutiny of more narrowly defined topics would not supplant but could illuminate higher-level frameworks and debates.

FIGURE 8 AN AGENDA FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

RECRUITING TALENT, ALIGNING EFFORT

Attracting and Grooming Talent
- Evolving career patterns in the PS
- Trends and regimes for handling temporary staff
- Retention strategies, particularly in critical areas
- Recruitment and succession programs
- Complexity and time for staffing actions
- Employment protections for public servants
- Effects of PSMA delegation

Managing the Human Resource System
- How do HR practices vary in the Canadian PS?
- How will *PSMA* affect the quality and pace of recruiting in workplaces?
- Do executives and staff identify with departments or the entire PS?
- How long has it taken to introduce selective HR reforms in different jurisdictions?
- What are the audit regimes in HR systems?
- What is the efficiency of staffing actions in centralized and decentralized systems?
- Terminations, discipline, appeals , etc.

Coordinating From the Centre
- Patterns in managerial and executive careers
- Recruitment and proportion from other sectors and governments
- Role of PMs versus central agency autonomy
- Study of how different Clerks managed PCO, COSO, and the PS reform agenda
- Patterns in DM meetings, involvement in task forces, and the role of APEX compared
- Administrative styles of central agency units in different functional domains.

DESIGNING POLICY AND DELIVERING SERVICES

Renewing Interest in Policy Capabilities
- A baseline comparative study of policy capabilities, including FTEs and contracts
- To what extent are external networks used?
- Explore the differences between capabilities of operating vs. core policy departments
- Examine cohesiveness of functional community
- Examine the external competition in analysis
- Assess forward-looking capabilities/outputs?

Service Delivery
- How have the contours of departments changed over the last ten years?
- What services are delivered by the Canadian PS in contrast to other jurisdictions?
- Has service quality (and efficiency) been improved by retaining or spinning off units?
- Which services are handled electronically, and how has the modal mix been changing?
- Do programs in departments innovate more quickly than in SOAs and service agencies?
- Which are the evolving approaches to regional structures and representation in departments and agencies?

Citizen Engagement
- Role of department-based consultations versus those of standing committees or commissions
- Quality of consultation materials: do they convey sufficient complex information for the consultations at hand?
- The informational content and efficiency of different consultation instruments
- Inventory of annual consultations across the PS, perhaps by type

LEARNING, SCRUTINY, AND REFORM

Learning and Values
- What is the amount spent for learning and development per employee, and who pays?
- What is the best executive development for deputy ministers and other executives?
- What are the different sources of motivation for public servants in different roles?
- Comparative practice in whistle-blowing
- How many public servants are aware of the Code of Conduct?

Control and Accountability
- What are the impacts of tightening controls on public servants and clients/contractors?
- How does this compare with other countries?
- Do MPs and SCs use performance reports?
- What is the depth of review of programs by ERC, TBS, and standing committees? How does this compare to other jurisdictions?
- How do internal audit and external audit compare to that of other jurisdictions?
- How have the conduct of performance reviews of DMs and their departments evolved?

Public Service Reform
- How can governments convey the diverse reforms and institutional change to MPs and citizens?
- How are the effects of successive reforms felt in departments? Cumulative impact in terms of structure, service, FTEs, etc.
- How well do governments and PS leaders monitor the implementation of reforms?
- When do central reforms get to the front line?

This proposed program of research could inform the work of several constituencies interested in the evolution and performance of the Canadian public service. They include institutional leaders and observers seeking to foster better public understanding of the Canadian public service; reformers seeking new approaches to inform institutional design; central and independent agencies searching for a better basis for monitoring; and scholars in search of better theoretical explanations and new phenomena to comprehend.

CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed the findings on the evolution of the Canadian public service. Even though comprehensive reforms have not been launched since the early 1990s, there are many promising initiatives launched by the Canadian public service, such as Government Online, the Policy Research Initiative, the new Canada School of Public Service and the Continuous Learning Policy, restructuring of central budget and HR agencies and legislation, and more. In addition to its widely known professionalism, the Canadian public service is distinctive because of how the executive group is mobilized, the multitude of central agencies, and its willingness to engage in internal and external dialogue. Whether these initiatives deal with some recent gaps in performance is an entirely different matter.

"While the Canadian public service is distinctive, there is a lack of ready, detailed, comparative information about the practices and performance of high-performing public service institutions across different functions to determine if the Canadian public service is an exemplar."

While the Canadian public service is distinctive, there is a lack of ready, detailed, comparative information about the practices and performance of high-performing public service institutions across different functions to determine if the Canadian public service is an exemplar. Several research gaps worthy of further, more detailed investigation have been identified. The Canada School of Public Service, along with TBS, PSHRMAC, and the PSC should work with public administration scholars to create an international network of interested governments, central agencies, and academic institutions to further the proposed program of systematic comparative research.

CHAPTER 7
A CRITICAL MOMENT:
THE JOURNEY FORWARD

Selznick observed that every organization has defining moments, and that incongruities in values and practices with internal and external challenges, though long in the making, often crystallize in crisis. These moments reveal the values and competencies of an institution and affect its ability to control its destiny.[190] For Selznick, crises provide "character-defining" moments, when leaders can make "critical decisions" affecting the trajectory of institutional development and its long-term capabilities.[191] This chapter explores why this period of Canadian public service history is one of those critical moments, and how better monitoring and projecting its activities and character should be strategic priorities for its institutional leadership.

The current situation is not another run-of-the-mill challenge for the public service to overcome, but rather one fraught with risks for the future of the institution. In the future, all of the environments in which the Canadian public service will function will be more complex and difficult to navigate. But well-defined values and strategic priorities can guide the public service through current and emerging challenges. Current proposals to increase scrutiny of governments and the public service will further drive ministers and public servants along the path of what Donald Savoie usefully describes as "governing without space."[192] Can these proposals create enough room for public servants to defend and project the institutional integrity of the Canadian public service?

A Critical Moment: Restoring Credibility and Confidence

Cases of poor management and judgement by elected leaders and public servants have potentially damaged the credibility of the Canadian public service. These incidents may not represent the norms, practice or values of the vast majority of public servants, but they have put the institution at risk in several ways:

- Years of effort to improve public perceptions of the public service, particularly in *Results for Canadians*, have been set back significantly.

- The confidence of backbenchers and Opposition parties in the public service has eroded, putting added pressure on ministers. Many of these MPs may become ministers in future governments and work closely with the public service. [193]

- Scrutiny of ministers and the public service executives by the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates and the Public Accounts Committee resulting from these incidents will likely be more substantial and aggressive than constructive in tone.

- While ethics and accountability have been at issue, there has been little concern about politicization of the public service. What has been thrown into question is the capability of executives and central agencies to manage their own affairs.

- Earlier proactive efforts to establish a values and ethics regime and introduce whistle-blower legislation for public servants now look entirely reactive.

- The strained environment in which public servants work may affect the ability of the public service to recruit and retain top talent.

More generally, if governments, Opposition critics, and citizens continue to lose confidence in the public service, radical change may be the result.

Restoring confidence will require sustained political and bureaucratic leadership. Prime Minister Martin launched aggressive actions to restore confidence, including far greater ministerial engagement in the control, review and challenge functions, a long overdue step to bring the Canadian system closer to the Australian model. Central agencies and processes have been realigned, most notably with the ERC, TBS, PSC, and OCG. The then Clerk, Alex Himelfarb, acknowledged the gravity of the challenge in his *2003 Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service*. Additional changes will be forthcoming under the Harper government. Given another minority government, one can expect restrictive changes: ministers and MPs will devote more time to monitoring and challenging the public service; and central agencies will more aggressively seek out information that ministers and MPs need to monitor performance. This shift may not constitute a complete throwback to the previous era of *ex ante* controls on departments and agencies; but central agencies are now more likely to challenge deputy heads on policy implementation and program management.

The Canadian public service has been a resilient institution: it has overcome moments of crisis and distrust over the decades (consider the initial trepidations of Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker and Brian Mulroney), and did so through professionalism, flexibility, and by demonstrating loyalty to sitting governments. The insidious development has to do with the widespread view of a hapless public service, no longer the preserve of those with ideological agendas against "big government". The public service must respond to demands for new policy ideas, ongoing re-allocation, better human resource and financial management, improved service delivery and citizen engagement, and considerably more accountability. However, reversing the broader impression is a longer term challenge and requires a strategy. It will require considerable effort and much scrutiny before trust and confidence in the public service are restored in the eyes of government backbenchers, the Opposition, and the public. The crucial test will be what confidence future governments will have in the Canadian public service.

"The Canadian public service has been a resilient institution: it has overcome moments of crisis and distrust over the decades... and did so through professionalism, flexibility, and by demonstrating loyalty to sitting governments."

Beyond Credibility: Increasingly Complicated Waters to Navigate

Long in the making, the issues surrounding control and oversight precipitated into an unanticipated and sustained political crisis—both the government and public service leadership will wrestle with them for the foreseeable future. However, strategic planners always look for *emerging* pressures and uncertainties for organizations and whether they are prepared. The conceptual framework introduced in **Chapter 2** (see **Figure 3**) could be used as a basis for a full exploration. The goal here is more modest: to consider two proximate variables associated with current debates over how to reform the governance regime—building interest in reforming national representative institutions and more experimentation with alternative service delivery with other governments and partners in the non-profit and private sectors—and their implications for the Canadian public service.

Figure 9 summarizes four possible "futures" suggested by these critical contingencies.[194] Along one dimension, we see that reform of representative institutions could be quite modest, merely strengthening standing committees, increasing research budgets, and engaging MPs more systematically in the consultation and legislative process. But reform could be more substantial, moving towards some form of proportional representation in the House of Commons and an elected Senate (as in the Australian electoral system). The other dimensions points to other possibilities: the government could continue to proceed modestly, adopting new ways to deliver services, or it could commit to a more radical steering model, relying heavily on the for-profit and non-profit sectors and on more extensive collaboration with the provinces, territories, and cities.

FIGURE 9 DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SERVICE

EXTENT OF REFORM OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Strengthen What Exists ⟷ Significant Reform

Continue ASD Experiments

EXTENT OF FUTURE DECENTRALIZATION

Realign Roles

A	B
C	D

What challenges would the four resulting "futures" pose for the Canadian public service during the next five to ten years? In any future, public servants will face greater scrutiny by elected representatives and the public, and there will be greater pressures to be more transparent while serving the government of the day. Even in the least radical future—with a strengthened, more engaged House of Commons monitoring a modest stream of current and new ASD arrangements—there will be great interest in value-for-money issues, fairness in contracting, and monitoring performance. This suggests that public service leaders will have to be highly adroit and capable of dealing with complicated political and administrative environments, and that the boundaries and mutual responsibilities of ministers and public servants will have to be carefully managed.

A key risk in any of the futures concerns how ministers and public service executives will balance the need to attend to demands for external accountability and internal scrutiny with the need to pay close attention to policy advising, consider new service delivery models, and foster positive learning and work environments. These tensions will only increase if the public service moves away from Scenario A to the others in **Figure 9**. A proactive institution would invest in identifying appropriately skilled staff, develop more widely shared and understood rules of engagement, and identify efficient ways to gather and convey information to handle accountability demands.

But even without the current control and accountability crisis, these scenarios would still have emerged as possibilities for the future all the same. And, to be sure, other critical uncertainties and challenges could be identified. Unfortunately, it is sobering to realize that the building of new relationships, capabilities, and repertoires will occur at a time when trust in the public service is low and the political environment is hostile.

Critical Priorities for Institutional Development

Determining institutional bearings is always difficult in critical moments. Which "core" values ought to guide the Canadian public service over the next few years? This question is difficult to answer because there has been no shortage of values to guide (and sometimes confuse) public servants. Moreover, choosing a short list of values without linking them to strategic action and context serves no purpose and could foster even more cynicism. Here the goal is to identify strategic priorities for institutional development of the Canadian public service as opposed to specific departments and agencies. Many of these ideas are well known, since effective strategies should be rooted in existing values, but institutional leadership involves identifying new emphases and combinations.

First, we should dispatch with the notion that recent difficulties in Ottawa discredit the so-called New Public Management reforms, which were never launched under that banner. NPM has been used loosely to describe many different initiatives (indeed, many were previously labelled "managerialism" and "service quality"),[195] and the term was invoked retrospectively to describe a diverse array of reform initiatives in different jurisdictions. The debate over whether the NPM is superior to traditional approaches lurches from values to specific initiatives to deficit reduction strategies to downsizing or limiting the growth of certain programs.[196] Moreover, the debate rarely moves beyond rhetoric to describe how the operations of the Canadian public service have actually changed.[197] There has been surprising difficulty in squaring inspirational calls for bottom-up innovation with the top-down constraints of parliamentary accountability regimes and the challenge of furthering broad agendas for reform in a complex institutional environment. Indeed, some NPM "ills" are failures of successive Canadian governments to take up crucial roles that the approach calls for, such as providing close political and central agency oversight of the management of programs. And, government leaders and citizens have not lost interest in the constituent elements of the NPM.[198] Canada may not have been an exemplar of the "big bang" structural reform, but it never rejected the vast majority of the broader NPM reform agenda such as improving service, encouraging innovation, and monitoring performance.

Further reform will not likely proceed under the NPM label (neither did it previously move forward under its banner!), though its values will remain potent elements of any emerging program of reform and institutional development. More generally, public service leaders and scholars in many OECD countries seem to be taking stock with respect to public service reform, and where they should strategically invest resources and energies for the next wave of reform.

"Canada may not have been an exemplar of the 'big bang' structural reform, but it never rejected the vast majority of the broader NPM reform agenda such as improving service, encouraging innovation, and monitoring performance."

They seem to be waiting for the next acronym or rhetorical wave to motivate strategic initiatives (e-government has been one candidate, but has not taken off), but no convincing intellectual successor to the NPM has appeared. So, Canadian pragmatism and soul-searching are not distinctive in this regard, although its public service does seem to encourage more debate and research than most jurisdictions. In the immediate future it appears that reform and institutional change will be driven by the policy demands of governments,[199] service-related needs of citizens and groups, and efforts to re-allocate resources to higher priority programs and re-balance the Canadian federation, rather than some post-NPM acronym.

So then, what are the values and practices that might serve as strategic focal points for the institutional development of the Canadian public service over the medium to long term? Five broad strategic priorities will be essential if the Canadian public service is to negotiate the current environment as a vibrant, respected institution.

1. **Promoting learning as merit.** Given the fast-paced world of government decision-making and the range of policy and administrative challenges, the public service must attract, develop, and retain the very best talent. More than ever, public servants will have to provide high-quality policy advice, manage programs successfully, and demonstrate results. These challenges re-affirm the importance of protecting and securing merit in hiring and promotion but also suggest that learning will be critical for individuals and organizations alike,[200] including the practice of tapping into domestic and international networks of expertise. Indeed, as Lindquist, Langford, and Good argue, the tradition of merit in the public service should be expanded to include learning, supported by performance regimes to monitor this activity.[201]

    But even knowledgeable staff will be ineffective without the skills to properly engage ministers, colleagues, citizens, and other stakeholders in a complicated and contested environment. So, promoting professionalism by means of development, rotation, mentoring, or recognition will be equally important. If public servants need to excel and continuously learn, and if the best must be attracted and retained, then public service leaders must provide their staff with good working environments and make ongoing efforts to convey respect for their work to external stakeholders.

    Such understandings are generally well addressed in the rhetoric and recent decisions to adopt a learning policy and establish the Canada School of Public Service. However, a key challenge will be to convert these undertakings into real, productive opportunities for staff across the public service. This means aggressively informing staff of opportunities and their responsibility to revitalize knowledge and skills, educating executives and managers at all levels about how to promote professional development and factor it into workplace routines.[202] Another challenge will be to demonstrate the take-up and effectiveness of learning programs, particularly since they are expensive "investments."

2. **Developing ethical sensibility.** To function at a high level as a public servant requires more than getting introduced to the many values identified by the Tait Task Force (see **Chapter 1**). Espoused values must be converted into an ethical sensibility and competence throughout the public service. This includes having sound knowledge of the principles of parliamentary governance, the roles of politicians and public servants, and realistic perspectives about trade-offs inherent in complex, rapidly evolving environments.

   An ethical culture encourages managers to seek ethical advice, to probe the ethical dimensions of policy, managerial, and personal matters, and, as recently argued by John Langford, to identify concrete ways for public servants to address ethical dilemmas.[203] **Chapter 6** noted recent initiatives in this direction: creation of a *Code of Values and Ethics for Public Servants*; establishment of the Office of Public Service Values and Ethics under the new Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada; re-introduction of whistle-blower legislation in fall 2004; and expansion of the Canada School of Public Service to offer courses, dialogues, and studies for managers and executives. It is difficult, of course, to measure whether the knowledge and use of values and ethical codes and training make a difference, but there should be indirect ways to do so.

   Finally, ministers and public service executives must display integrity and serve as exemplars of the desired values and behaviour to colleagues and those reporting to them. They cannot ignore questionable or unethical practice, even if outside their direct spheres of authority. While the leadership of the public service needs to support executives that have provided years of service in very demanding jobs, it needs to be uncompromising when ethical and management standards are breached.

3. **Promoting accountability and transparency.** Probity and accountability have been enduring values of the Canadian public service, and increasing demands for transparency create new expectations and tensions for public servants, as has been well documented by Donald Savoie.[204] Recent improprieties, and the prospect of ever more exposed ministers and public servants, auger for sustained institutional focus on creating new expectations, rules of engagement, and internal and external forms of scrutiny.

   The government has several options for new accountability and transparency initiatives, as described by Aucoin and Jarvis and others: adopting the British practice of designating deputy ministers as accounting officers, able to place on record when his or her advice is contrary to the instructions of a minister; requiring the Committee of Senior Officials to vet candidates for deputy minister appointments; providing more scope for performance reviews undertaken by consultants, academics, and "peers" to supplement the work of the Office of the Auditor General; changing the rules of both houses of Parliament to strengthen the roles of committees in holding ministers and officials to account; and developing a charter to guide interactions between public servants and

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members of Parliament.[205] However, even if these reforms are not adopted, public servants should always act as if their actions will be subject to scrutiny. The public service needs to be rigorous and uncompromising in preparing departments and public servants for greater transparency, even if ministerial accountability prevents information from circulating freely.

Central agencies therefore need to continue to re-build their capacity to monitor and challenge the performance and budget of departments and agencies. Considerably more attention should be focused on completing initiatives or explaining why they cannot work according to plan, even if new initiatives will undoubtedly come along. This would not constitute a return to the pre-1990 "control" paradigm based on securing pre-transaction approvals from TBS; but ministers and central agencies must better monitor programs and intervene as required. Adopting the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) in 2003 was a good step; but data from this framework must be credible and known to influence the performance pay of executives. For this reason, MAF-based departmental assessments (but not individual assessments) should be made public.

Finally, none of these initiatives will make much difference unless ministers devote sufficient time to review annual performance and challenge programs. Ministerial attention will boost the credibility of central agencies, test the competence of the management teams, prepare them for reviews by standing committees and the Auditor General, and reduce the chances of unpleasant surprises. Indeed, without restoring credibility and its ability to self-manage, the public service may not have the confidence of governments in other areas such as providing policy advice.

4. **Recruiting and developing executives.** The demands on deputy ministers and executive teams will only increase,[206] and the challenges of advising governments and managing service delivery will become more complicated. The recent proposed reforms to increase accountability and transparency only serve to make already demanding and complex assignments even more so. More than ever, executives must be exemplary, actively seeking new ways to foster transparency without compromising relationships with ministers and the government, and reporting authoritatively on progress with files.

    Grooming and supporting top-quality executives should remain a top priority of the Clerk, and the Prime Minister and the public service should do everything possible to retain the best executives. It raises intriguing questions about whether current approaches to executive development and learning are sufficient to meet their needs and those of the public service, particularly when time is at such a premium, and whether the practice of providing "sabbaticals" for executives should be expanded further. Kroeger and Heynan have also collected several useful ideas for easing the transition of individuals from outside the federal public service into executive positions with the public service.[207]

One possible way to liberate time for executives is to reduce the expectations about collegiality, mentoring, and participating in dialogues and task forces exploring reform. However, it is hard to imagine that the next generation of public service executives, including an increasing proportion from the private sector, arriving fully experienced and knowledgeable enough to take on demanding roles without opportunities to learn from peers. Collegiality may offer a safety valve or quiet support for new and experienced executives when handling delicate moments. Deputy Ministers will require support beyond their executive teams in providing frank and fearless advice to ministers about the feasibility of proposals early in the process or, later, when re-assessing their viability.

Yet too much executive coordination and collegiality can come at the expense of "managing down" in departments and agencies. The Clerk and COSO must carefully evaluate the net returns to horizontal and collegial initiatives and perhaps strike new balances.[208] Central agencies should improve their capabilities for monitoring how well executive teams are coping with their ministers and evolving external environments; they must also be prepared to intervene as required. The ability to do so constitutes a litmus test of the effectiveness and relevance of central agencies.

5. **Marketing the public service.** One of the most sobering outcomes of the sponsorship and other scandals was how quickly they diminished the reputation of the Canadian public service. Years of effort to renew and restore pride in the public service, to measure and showcase how it performs, sailed out the window. These episodes have profoundly demonstrated the insufficiency of a decade of efforts to market the Canadian public service to external constituencies. Once the negative headlines were circulating in the media, it was difficult to find a countervailing story emphasizing the ongoing work and positive dimensions of the Canadian public service.

    This is not for want of trying. The Canadian public service has, in fits and starts, launched recruitment strategies for targeted groups at universities and colleges, and, most recently, targeted Canadian graduates students studying abroad at elite universities. It has invested considerable resources into the marketing of the former CCMD and the new CSPS, which have promoted learning and excellence. During the mid-to-late-1990s, it invested what seemed like a lot of resources and executive support into pride and recognition initiatives, including the Rediscovering Public Service campaign and the *A Day in the Life* vignettes.[209] Efforts by CCMD and TBS to measure and report on service levels and improve performance reporting have been part of this strategy to rebuild credibility. Public sector unions have also been keen to show the public value of their members. Even the designation of the Clerk as Head of the Public Service, along with the Clerk's annual report on the state of the public service to the Prime Minister, anticipated this need to better communicate challenges and successes.

> *"In a governance environment with 'less space' for public service executives and the public service as a whole, another element of the new bargain should be pursued: reasonably independent reporting and projection of the work, state, character, and readiness of the Canadian public service as an institution."*

Recent experience, though, reveals that this activity is merely preaching to the converted, or to public servants who need a renewed sense of purpose or pride in a hostile climate. It cannot be construed as a serious communications strategy with sufficient resources to reach citizens on a systematic basis. A proper communications strategy should not be confused with the ongoing efforts to promote government priorities and programs as part of a mandate. As Aucoin and Jarvis observe, performance data does not speak for itself; nor for that matter does it project a coherent picture of the progress and character of a complex institution like the Canadian public service. Launching a strategy focused on projecting the public service would require a significant increase in funding to support extensive and continuous advertising in the print, television, and web media. No other governance player will defend the integrity of the public service.

This should be part of the new bargain Donald Savoie recommends between public servants, the government, and Parliament.[210] The ideas currently under consideration include increasing the scrutiny of ministers and public service executives by standing committees, and creating new rules of engagement, including variations on the accounting officer concept and a charter for legislators and public servants when the latter provide testimony to Parliament.[211] But this leaves the public service exposed to the vicissitudes of partisan debate, the demands of sitting governments, and continuous scrutiny from the Auditor General and the media. In a governance environment with "less space" for public service executives and the public service as a whole, another element of the new bargain should be pursued: reasonably independent reporting and projection of the work, state, character, and readiness of the Canadian public service as an institution. Better reporting should be a top priority for the leaders of the Canadian public service.

CONCLUSION

Identifying strategic institutional priorities does not imply that other values—such as those itemized in the Report of the Task Force on Values and Ethics or the New Public Management— are unimportant. Many will continue to loom large as immediate priorities and guides for specific organizations or managerial challenges. The focus of this chapter was to identify strategic priorities for rebuilding longer term confidence in the Canadian public service as an institution.

Despite daunting challenges, and the strong possibility that governments may introduce too many internal controls and reporting requirements, the Canadian public service appears well poised to make progress in each priority area. Key values are aligned with established capabilities and practices, initiatives have been launched, or opportunities loom on the horizon. The recent decisions of the Martin government to invigorate and reshape the central machinery of the public service, institute new financial management and review processes, and improve reporting on the public service are consistent with the proposed strategic priorities. It is hard to imagine that future governments would not support these priorities. All are essential for restoring credibility of the Canadian public service as an institution. Most importantly, the public service must find its own ways to persuasively demonstrate progress to internal and external constituencies in each area.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION: CONVEYING THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SERVICE

This study has reviewed the recent literature on the Canadian model of public service and introduced a framework intended to capture many elements of that literature but with a focus on identifying its distinctive features as an institution. In doing so the goal was to move away from simply identifying normative values and to focus more on the critical processes and decisions that are shaping the current character of the Canadian public service. The framework acknowledges that the public service is shaped by governments of the day and its history and traditions as an institution, but, to facilitate analysis, separated out the distinctive features of the Canadian public service as an evolving institution from the government regime and the broader environment in which both work, comprising intersecting streams of challenges, expectations, ideas, and events.

The bulk of this study focused on reviewing the three clusters of variables associated with steering and managing a large, complex public service—recruiting talent and aligning effort, designing policy and delivering services, and learning, scrutiny and reform—and sought to identify new institutional practices and postures by historical and international standards. Despite significant empirical gaps, the findings suggest that the Canadian public service is distinctive for several reasons:

- Its complex configuration of central agency capacities for human resource management and coordination more generally;

- The development and use of the executive group as a corporate resource;

- The recent investment in learning policies and central coordinating capabilities;

- The strong interest in e-government flowing more generally from an experimental and pragmatic approach to service delivery; and

- Many efforts to improve the policy function and tap into domestic and international networks of expertise.

Less positively, the public service has had difficulty projecting coherence, completing major reform initiatives, and urgently needs to strengthen its challenge and oversight functions. In making these assessments, the study acknowledged the important role that the Prime Minister and ministers have in supporting or guiding the public service to fulfil its responsibilities and to

foster change. This study also identified an agenda for research, and proposed the establishment of an international network of governments and scholars to undertake systematic and relevant comparative research.

The Canadian Public Service is at critical juncture

Notwithstanding the many innovative and distinctive features of the Canadian public service, it is at a critical juncture as an institution. Improprieties have sullied its reputation and overshadowed its many accomplishments, and constitute a serious political issue for the government. Restoring trust and confidence in the public service will take time.

The Martin government has launched several initiatives—and there are several other accountability-related ideas squarely on the reform agenda. The Harper government, informed by the recommendations of the Gomery Commission, will send its own mix of initiatives to increase accountability, transparency, and control. All of these promise to constrain the public service in the short term but may be critical for rebuilding confidence in financial management, and, indirectly, in the areas of policy advice and service innovation. Other challenges await the public service.

This study identified two critical governance contingencies—the extent to which there is a more potent Parliament and more decentralized delivery of services—that will further complicate how the public service does its work and relates to ministers, and, along with other challenges, will test its mettle as it attempts to restore trust and confidence.

New strategic institutional priority: conveying public service work

Chapter 7 suggested that the leadership of the Canadian public service should consider the following areas as top strategic priorities for institutional development:

- promoting learning as a feature of merit;

- cultivating and supporting an ethical sensibility;

- encouraging accountability and transparency;

- striking a new balance in executive development; and

- seriously projecting the institution to external audiences.

"Notwithstanding the many innovative and distinctive features of the Canadian public service, it is at a critical juncture as an institution. Improprieties have sullied its reputation and overshadowed its many accomplishments, and constitute a serious political issue for the government."

Despite the time required to rebuild its reputation, and the difficulty in communicating the value of public sector work in a contested political environment, the Canadian public service is well positioned to make progress in each strategic area, partly because of its resilience and partly because it has sufficient engagement of the government and key ministers.

Governments must resist over-compensating for recent public controversies; to institute so many controls and unrestricted accountability and oversight will lead to unproductive, inefficient management of programs and other government business. The only way to lower the reflex towards control is to provide context and convey to members of Parliament and citizens the cost of those controls and the nature of public work.

In this context the fifth strategic area noted above becomes particularly important since the public service will receive even more external scrutiny from the government, Parliament, and the Auditor General—the rush to put ministers, executives, and the management of specific programs under a variety of microscopes has meant little thought has been given to "who will speak for the public service as institution". When striking a new bargain with the government and those organizations seeking to monitor it, the public service needs to be given more scope to systematically report and communicate how it works and performs as a professional, non-partisan, and essential institution.

Annual reporting of the Clerk needs strengthening

This study introduced a framework that identifies areas of institutional development for the Canadian public service. While others may agree or disagree with the choice of variables as a basis for discerning the contemporary model of public service, there should be more systematic, deeper, and regular attempts to monitor and project how the public service is performing and evolving as an institution.

The annual report of the Clerk to the Prime Minister on the Canadian public service has not addressed this need, and instead has reviewed issues, themes, and possibilities. It has never provided systematic data and analysis like the annual report of the Australian Public Service Commissioner, which monitors issues based on an increasingly thorough annual survey of departments and staff, and on other sources of information.[212]

The annual report of the Public Service Commission has recently been bolstered, using the "look, feel and content" of Auditor General reports as a model, but these reports will likely have a similar corrosive impact in the public domain, even if intended to promote and protect the merit principle and other human resource management practices. Finally, in their current form, the performance reports of departments and agencies fail to provide a comprehensive and detailed view of the state of the Canadian public service.

Another important reporting "window" has opened

The President of the Treasury Board is required under the PSMA to provide a report on human resource responsibilities and under the Strengthening Public Sector Management action plan to produce an annual report on the state of the public service. Presumably these reporting requirements will be consolidated.

One potential approach would use as a model the President of Treasury Board's annual report to Parliament on Canada's Performance, which identifies crucial areas to monitor and key indicators, linking to data from international and domestic organizations.[213] Data and other information from TBS, PSHRMAC, CSPS, PSC, and the Public Service Employee Survey could be assembled for systematic reporting to Parliament and particularly, to the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. It could be informed by department performance reports as well as TBS assessments of departments and agencies based on the Management Accountability Framework.[214]

Another model to emulate, of course, is Australia's State of the Service report, informed by surveys and delving into certain themes each year.[215] Regardless of the precise approach adopted, the reporting should provide a comprehensive perspective on the Canadian public service and attempt to put in context specific issues. It could use the framework guiding this study or the MAF to provide reporting on an annual basis and probe certain themes, areas or clusters every few years. Such reporting needs to go beyond showcasing government bona fides on management and focus primarily on conveying the state of the public service.

Improved reporting requires detailed comparative research and networks

Detailed comparative information would greatly assist the annual monitoring of the state of the Canadian public service. But a persistent frustration in undertaking this study was the lack of readily available and sufficiently detailed comparative information to properly situate Canadian practice. Almost every topic reviewed in **Chapters 3, 4, and 5** begs for substantial research. The comparative literature on public administration, though marked by excellent scholarship, typically proceeds at a high level, attempts to size up a wide range of issues in single studies, and is necessarily impressionistic.

To undertake proper comparative studies requires establishing networks of scholars and funding governments across jurisdictions to thoroughly compare practice on specific topics.[216] Undoubtedly useful comparative information is regularly collected across the Canadian public service in the context of particular program areas, and this might be so in other jurisdictions.

Such research would provide detailed assessments and comparisons of service delivery arrangements and performance, executive development and performance assessment, merit regimes, human resource practices, policy capacity, central agencies, learning capabilities, e-government, and more. It would improve scholarship and provide a much better basis for evaluating the progress and distinctiveness of the Canadian public service.

The origins of this study can be traced to the interest of Jocelyne Bourgon as Clerk, and later as President of CCMD, in better articulating the Canadian model of public service, and to the aspirations of the CSPS Governance Research Program, which aimed to provide public servants with foundational research about their roles and the institution of which they are a part. Although the Canadian public service has many distinctive attributes and exemplary practices in certain areas, the paucity of data on capabilities and practices at this time makes it difficult to argue that it stands as an exemplar or a "third way" model, even if it remains a beacon to many countries. Short of working with governments to introduce bold and theoretically-driven comprehensive reforms, the public service must do a better job of capturing bottom-up and evolutionary change in a coherent way and projecting those findings to internal and external audiences. This agenda has taken on added significance because the Canadian public service finds itself at a critical moment and, as part of the new accountability bargain with elected representatives and citizens, needs to do a far better job of projecting its strengths and challenges. Monitoring the impact of reforms and how the public service innovates and evolves as an institution requires qualitatively better reporting, systematic comparisons, and research networks. The strategic investment to realize this ambition can be built on a clear mutuality of interest among public service leaders, external monitors, reformers, and scholars, even if their respective ultimate goals are quite different.

"....the public service must do a better job of capturing bottom-up and evolutionary change in a coherent way and projecting those findings to internal and external audiences."

APPENDIX
THE CHALLENGE OF EXPLAINING PATTERNS AND DISTINCTIVENESS

This study has set out a framework for identifying the key features of the Canadian public service as an institution, offered several high-level findings, and proposes an agenda and an approach for research. By taking snapshots of current institutional practice, it has sketched out an empirical model or description of key features of the Canadian public service, but it has not tried to systematically invoke theory or explain certain findings, although there were some suggestive discussions. A proper analysis and discussion could easily be the subject of another lengthy study. Here I want to explore issues in explaining continuity and change in the distinctive nature of the Canadian public service.

There has emerged interesting work on modelling public service reform that draws variously from the literature on agenda-setting, policy change, and organization theory.[217] This literature provides several excellent complementary frameworks and analysis about how reform gets on the policy agenda of governments, how decisions are made and implemented, and, to a lesser extent, how effective the outcomes are. Manning and Parison, for example, in *International Public Sector Reform*, distinguish among different types and breadth of reform, the points of leverage that reform advocates can access in the governance system, and institutional malleability (the latter refers to the character of the administrative system and the extent to which it has a tradition of experimenting with alternative arrangements). Their framework and theory focuses on the propensity of government to launch reform, not on whether reform succeeds or the nature of its impact on a public service. In *Public Sector Reform*, Pollitt and Bouckaert attempt to gauge the macro outcomes of reforms on citizen perceptions, service improvements, expenditures, personnel changes, and more. However, like others, they note the difficulty of relating reforms to performance. Both studies contain little information about the variables that are centrepiece of this study (**Figure 1**). This should not be surprising: theories about why certain institutions pursue and adopt reforms in varying degrees are not necessarily good at explaining the nature and character of public service institutions.

This brings us back to the distinction between top-down reform, bottom-up innovation, and institutional evolution. Pollitt and Bouckaert acknowledge this a weakness of their study, which only mentions bottom-up innovation in the final paragraph.[218] Some Canadian scholars have chronicled case studies of bottom-up innovation, assessing the drivers for success as well as barriers to change.[219] However, this interesting body of work does not examine the impact these local changes have on the public service as an institution.

"...theories about why certain institutions pursue and adopt reforms in varying degrees are not necessarily good at explaining the nature and character of public service institutions."

There are several theoretical approaches that promise to illuminate how and why public service institutions persist and change. One approach embraces the history, structure, governance traditions, and cultures of institutions. It argues that these factors not only explain distinctiveness but also lead to resistance to change, and a path-dependency or "trajectory" in the way public service institutions approach tasks and issues that persist unless disrupted by significant policy, constitutional or environmental change.[220] Like the writers who focus on reform, this approach does not account for internally generated change and innovation. There are also Marxist perspectives on the evolving nature of the economy and globalization, and some scholars look at broad trends and how they impact on the state,[221] but again, they do not systematically delve into how the character of public service institutions is changing. Perhaps the most intriguing work, which has been tapped into by the authors on reform, examines agenda-setting, advocacy coalitions, and knowledge transfer. This work could shed light on the diverging views and beliefs of public servants and their leaders, how new exemplars and ideas (principal-agent theory, the New Public Management, learning organization, etc.) find their way into the public service and beliefs evolve, and under what circumstances external events may lead to the ascendancy of new administrative approaches.[222]

One way to understand these theories is that they animate and focus on different parts of the framework in **Figure 1** to explain particular dynamics of public service institutions and, in doing so, propose more specific causal models. Collectively, these theoretical perspectives suggest that as political and economic conditions shift, along with elite and public attitudes, the priorities of sitting governments and even aspects of the governance regime can change as well, perhaps leading to new priorities and approaches to managing and shaping the Canadian public service. However, these theories do not currently provide detailed or finer grained explanations of how public service institutions evolve over time, but there is potential to extend their insights to the variables identified in **Part 1** of the framework.

The framework outlined nine areas that public service leaders and governments need to focus on in order to maintain and improve a well-performing public service institution. However, **Chapters 3, 4 and 5** indicate that each of these areas evolve over time, with some becoming problematic and others taking strides forward. One task of theory is to explain why governments and public service leaders find themselves focusing on one or two, and not the others. Is this a question of the pendulum swinging?[223] Or is it a matter of the normal evolution and flux of any political or organizational system as Benson and others have noted?[224] Using the concept of bounded rationality,[225] we know that there are limits to the ability of governments, public service leaders, deputy ministers, and central agencies to focus strategic attention on all facets of institutional development, and this puts the issues of inattentiveness and overload on the explanatory table.

This study has identified macro patterns in institutional development that need to be explained, but other observers may want to account for developments in specific areas, such as the evolving nature of policy capability in the Canadian public service or the production and use of performance information (which would not be about the evolution of the public service per se). In these latter cases, scholars should tap into and develop theory and models proximate to these phenomena, but, in doing so, they will have to control and account for the larger variables identified in **Figure 1**. Finally, whether the focus is on the macro or micro aspects of the institutional evolution of the Canadian public service, comparative perspectives will usefully illuminate the framework and empirical research.

This digression on theory should illuminate the important differences between setting out frameworks to guide empirical inquiries, the working models or snapshots that might distil existing patterns and practice, and the search for explanation. Practitioners may presume theory is not practical, but theories frame how we think about the public service and governance more generally. They provide concepts and language that get insinuated into how we debate or evaluate developments in the public sector, overtly challenge these understandings and frames of reference, or illuminate experience. Theory also assists in searching for careful explanations about why a public service performs in certain ways, in drawing lessons from the past and the experiences of other jurisdictions, and in providing a better basis for capturing progress and designing reforms.

"Practitioners may presume theory is not practical, but theories frame how we think about the public service and governance more generally."

ENDNOTES

1 Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

2 See James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic, 1989).

3 Lindquist and Paquet discuss the notion of the "cosmology" guiding the public service: the intersecting ideas, principles, values and systems guiding the leadership and culture of its many institutions as well as its interactions with political leaders and citizens. Cosmologies are normative frameworks that leaders use to integrate diverse values and objectives in the face of complex challenges and to shape the character of institutions. See Evert Lindquist and Gilles Paquet, "*Government Restructuring and the Federal Public Service: The Search for a New Cosmology*," **Chapter 4** in Evert Lindquist (ed.), *Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada* (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000), pp. 71–111.

4 The terms "administrative style," "administrative tradition" or "governance tradition" could substitute for "model." The concept of administrative style better captures the practices and evolution at the heart of this analysis and goes beyond a more historical orientation. However, the term "Canadian model" is retained for continuity with the Canadian literature to date. See Mark Bevir, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Patrick Weller (eds.), "Traditions of Governance: History and Diversity," a special issue of *Public Administration* 81, 1 (2003), p.1-210; and Michael Howlett, "Administrative styles and the limits of administrative reform: A neo-institutional analysis of administrative culture." *Canadian Public Administration* 46, 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 471–94.

5 See Henry Mintzberg, "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact." *Harvard Business Review* (March-April 1990): 163-76; and Henry Mintzberg, "Part One: Developing a Model for Managing Publicly" in Henry Mintzberg and Jacques Bourgault, *Managing Publicly* (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000), pp.11–98.

6 Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, *A Strong Foundation* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, December 1996); O.P. Dwivedi and James Iain Gow, "The New Public Management Movement Comes to Canada" in *From Bureaucracy to Public Management: The Administrative Culture of the Government of Canada* (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1999); and Lindquist (ed.), *Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada, 2000.*

7 Robert E. Quinn, *Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,1988); John W. Langford, "Acting on Values: An Ethical Dead End for Public Servants." *Canadian Public Administration*, forthcoming; and Joseph Heath, *The Myth of Shared Values in Canada*, the 2003 John L. Manion Lecture (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2003).

8 J.E. Hodgetts, *The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government 1867-1970*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Kenneth Kernaghan and John Langford, *The Responsible Public Servant* (Toronto and Halifax: Institute of Public Administration of Canada and Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990); Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy to Public Management*; Iain Gow, *A Canadian Model of Public Administration?* (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004); and Lindquist, "Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada: Introduction and Overview" in Lindquist (ed.), *Government*

Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada. p. 7.

9 Donald Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

10 All of these ideas were supported by then-current Weberian precepts for managing large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such as chain of command, unity of command, hierarchy, rules and procedures, authority, spheres of responsibility, and specialist expertise.

11 Bey Benhamadi, "Governance and diversity within the public service in Canada: toward a viable and sustainable representation of designated groups (employment equity)." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 69 (2003), pp. 505–19.

12 Mark Thompson and John Fryer, "Changing Roles for Employers and Unions in the Public Service" in Lindquist, *Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada*, pp. 41–67.

13 Richard D. French with Richard Van Loon, *How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy-Making 1968-1984*. Second Edition (Toronto: Lorimer, 1984).

14 PEMS was an approach to setting priorities and financial discipline in a complex institutional environment that changed the cabinet committee system, budgeting and created additional central agencies. See Richard Van Loon, "Planning in the Eighties" in French with Van Loon, *How Ottawa Decides*, pp.157–90.

15 Sandford Borins, "Transformation of the Public Sector: Canada in Comparative Perspective" in Christopher Dunn (ed.), *The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 4.

16 Sanford Borins, p. 4.

17 Dwivedi and Gow, "The New Public Management Movement Comes to Canada" in *From Bureaucracy to Public Management*, pp. 125–159.

18 Peter Aucoin, *The New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1995).

19 From J. Tait, "A Strong Foundation: Report of the Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics (the summary)," *Canadian Public Administration*, 40, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1–22.

20 Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, *A Strong Foundation*.

21 Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, p. 58.

22 Jocelyne Bourgon, *Fifth Annual Report to The Prime Minister on The Public Service of Canada* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1998).

23 See Peter Aucoin, "The Public Service as a Learning Organization: Maintaining the Momentum in Public Service Reform" in Canadian Centre for Management Development, *Modernizing Governance: A Preliminary Exploration* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, November 2000), pp.147–185; and Peter Aucoin "Beyond the 'New' in Public Management Reform in Canada: Catching the Next Wave?" in Dunn (ed.), *The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration*, pp. 37–52.

24 Aucoin, "The Public Service as a Learning Organization" in *Modernizing Governance*, p. 160.

25 This stands in contrast to the other models where the reform of public institutions by duly elected governments is secured by politicization, privatization, and performance measurement of programs delivered by the public service. Aucoin, "The Public Service as a Learning Organization" in *Modernizing Governance*, p.160.

26 Aucoin, "The Public Service as a Learning Organization" in *Modernizing Governance*, p. 161.

27 David A. Good, "Looking Around: Implications for New Public Management" in *The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 152–179.

28 Also emphasized in Gow, *A Canadian Model of Public Administration?*.

29 Donald J. Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), and *Breaking the Bargain*.

30 Gow, *A Canadian Model of Public Administration?*

31 Gow, *A Canadian Model of Public Administration?*

32 *The State of the Federation* series from the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University provides an excellent source of information.

33 Michael Howlett and Evert Lindquist, "Policy Analysis and Governance: Analytical and Policy Styles in Canada." *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 6, 4 (2004), pp. 225–249.

34 Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and John Halligan, "Comparing Public Sector Reform in the OECD" in Brendan C. Nolan (ed.), *Public Sector Reform: An International Perspective* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.3–18.

35 Peter Aucoin and Herman Bakvis, "Consolidating cabinet portfolios: Australian lessons for Canada," *Canadian Public Administration*. 36, 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 392-420; Donald Savoie, Reagan. *Thatcher and Mulroney: In Search of a New Bureaucracy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); and Aucoin, *The New Public Management*.

36 See "Conclusion: An Agenda for Public Management" in Aucoin, *The New Public Management*. Comparative analysis showed that the capacities of the program sectors were quite limited compared to jurisdictions like Australia and the United Kingdom. See Evert A. Lindquist, "On the Cutting Edge: Program Review, Government Restructuring, and the Treasury Board of Canada" in Gene Swimmer (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1996-97: Life Under the Knife* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996).

37 Peter Aucoin, "Comparative Perspectives on Canadian Public Service Reform in the 1990s" in *Public Service Reform: Progress, Setbacks and Challenges* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, February 2001).

38 Halligan, "Comparing Public Sector Reform in the OECD" in *Public Sector Reform*, p. 9 and 17.

39 See "Trajectories of Modernization and Reform" in Christoper Pollit and Geert Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 62–96.

40 See Nick Manning and Neil Parison, *International Public Sector Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation* (Washington: World Bank, 2003).

41 John Halligan, "Anglo-American civil service perspectives: comparative perspectives" in John Halligan (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), pp. 205–06. On implementation capacity, Halligan cites the evidence in the annex on Canada provided by Pollitt and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*, pp. 213–14; and John Holmes, "*Public Service Reform: Progress, Setbacks and Challenges*" in *Public Service Reform: Progress, Setbacks and Challenges* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, February 2001), pp. 1–30.

42 Halligan, "Anglo-American civil service systems: an overview" in Halligan (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries*, p. 7.

43 O.P. Dwivedi and John Halligan, "The Canadian public service: balancing values and management" in Halligan (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries*, p. 171.

44 Halligan, "Anglo-American civil service perspectives: comparative perspectives" in *Civil Service Systems*, p. 209.

45 There has recently emerged interesting work that seeks to explain public sector reform. See Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management*," and Pollitt and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*.

46 The notion of a well-performing public service developed here is inspired by the work of Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*. It should not be confused with research on the well-performing government organization in Canada, which focused on the generic attributes of government departments and agencies as individual organizations and was contemporaneous with the "reinventing government" movement. See James C. McDavid and D. Brian Marson (eds.), *The Well-Performing Government Organization* (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada) and Otto Brodtrick, *Attributes of Well-Performing Organization*. Extract from *The Report of the Auditor General of Canada* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1988).

47 This framework shares some similarities with the Pollitt-Bouckaert and Barzelay frameworks regarding external forces, but differs regarding core elements. Their frameworks were developed to *explain* public management reform, whereas this framework seeks to facilitate description of key institutional features of the Canadian approach to managing the public service as an institution. If the purpose of this inquiry gravitates towards explaining shifts in features of the Canadian model, which may or may not have to do with reforms, then it will necessarily move closer to the Pollitt-Bouckaert formulation. See "Comparative Analysis of Public Management Policy-Making" in Barzelay, *The New Public Management*, pp. 51–98, and "Problems and Responses: A Model of Public Management Reform" in Pollit and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*, pp. 24–38. It also differs from that of the Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective project, which is more concerned about identifying administrative traditions, extent of politicization, nature of internal labour markets, public attitudes towards the public service, response to NPM reforms, and the diffusion of ideas. See H. Bekke, F.M. van der Meer (eds.), *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) and John Halligan (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries*.

48 The author is indebted to Peter Aucoin for bringing this to his attention. Drawing this sharp distinction at the normative level should lead to interesting debate. It also links to earlier work on the merit-based and non-partisan nature of the public service, the powers of the Prime Minister to appoint deputy ministers, and the practice of allowing political appointments to take up public service appointments. For discussion of these issues, see Peter Aucoin and Mark Jarvis, *Accountability: Ministers, Public Servants, and MPs* (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, forthcoming); Denis St. Martin, "L'Affaire Groupaction: un cas de politisation de la fonction publique fédérale? *Canadian Public Administration*. 46, 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 450–70; and Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament*.

49 As noted in the Appendix, depending on the practices, successes, or gaps that need to be explained, theoretical and practical explanations may turn to variables inside and outside the public service as an institution.

50 See Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintzman, "The dialectics of accountability for performance in public management reform," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 66 (2000), pp. 43–53.

51 See Peter Aucoin, Jennifer Smith, and Geoff Dinsdale, *Responsible Government: Clarifying Essentials, Dispelling Myths and Exploring Change* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2004).

52 This stands in considerable contrast to the United States, Australia, and many European countries which provide important checks and complications on prime ministerial or presidential leadership. With few qualifications, a Canadian prime minister's principal focus is to secure and maintain power in the House of Commons, though managing cabinet, the government caucus, and public opinion are critical challenges. See, for example, Patrick Weller, *Malcom Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia* (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1989); and Donald Savoie, *Governing From the Centre* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

53 A reviewer noted that in the last eleven elections, Canadians have elected six majority governments. Still, a high proportion of "governing time" over the last few decades has proceeded under majority governments.

54 See "Federalism in Canada" in Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*, p. 88.

55 In Sweden and Germany labour and business are coherently represented, which also obtains with the UK for the voluntary sector. See Michael Atkinson and William D. Coleman, *The State, Business and Industrial Policy*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); and Susan D. Phillips, "Voluntary Sector–Government Relationships in Transition: Learning from International Experience" in Kathy Brock and Keith G. Banting (eds.), *The NonProfit Sector in Interesting Times: Case Studies in a Changing Sector* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), pp. 17–71.

56 See John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

57 While this study examines aspects of the Canadian public service evolution as an institution, it is a preliminary step and often speculative. This should be put in context. First, most writing to date has proceeded at an even higher level of abstraction. Second, amassing and interpreting data on specific elements of the proposed framework would require considerably more financial and human resources than was available for this

study. Third, by focusing on the *public service*, this study could not delve into the contours and practices of departments, which could usefully inform assessments at the institutional level. Accordingly, **Chapters 6 and 8** of this study call for more resources to support an agenda and network for systematic comparative research.

[58] Gow, *A Canadian Model of Public Administration?* p. 4

[59] J.E. Hodgetts, *The Canadian Public Service*; J.E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker, and V. Seymour Wilson, *Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada*, 1908-1967 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); and Alasdair Roberts, *So-Called Experts: How American Consultants Remade the Civil Service, 1918–21* (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1996).

[60] Lindquist and Paquet, "Government Restructuring and Federal Public Service" in Lindquist, *Government Restructuring*, pp. 71–111.

[61] J. Deutsch, "Some Thoughts on the Public Service" in J.E. Hodgetts and D.E. Corbett (eds.), *Canadian Public Administration* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1960).

[62] In 1996, the Deputy Minister Task Force on Values and Ethics felt obliged to point out that job security had never been guaranteed in collective agreements even though the government had only recently instituted strong workforce adjustment protections in the early 1990s. See Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, pp. 21–3.

[63] Perhaps the recent reluctance of leaders in the Canadian public service to invoke "careers" arose from sensitivity to those who experienced the tribulations of the 1990s. It could also reflect attentiveness to the language required to attract high-quality prospects from a more contingent and fickle workforce, who do not believe in guarantees of life-time employment, even if most who work for the public service will likely spend their entire careers somewhere in the broader institution. See John Langford, Thea Vakil, and Evert A. Lindquist, *The Future of Work in the Public Sector: Tough Challenges and Practical Solutions*. Report on the conference proceedings held on March 26-28, 2000 in Victoria, BC (Victoria: School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, and the Victoria Regional Group of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000), pp. 14–15, http://www.futurework.telus.com/proceedings.pdf (accessed Spring 2004).

[64] Australian Public Service Commission, *The Australian Experience of Public Sector Reform*, Occasional Paper Two (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2003).

[65] Following the Auditor General of Canada's criticism of temporary hiring and the *Public Service Modernization Act*, the Treasury Board of Canada has instituted a new policy for dealing with temporary workers. See Office of the Auditor General, and, **Chapters 2 and 3** in *2001 Report of the Auditor General of Canada* (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2001); Jonathan Malloy, "The search for merit is killing Canada's civil service," *Globe and Mail* (10 September 2002) and "Term Employment Policy" on the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat site at www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/tb_856/pida-ipma7_e.asp (accessed January 16, 2006.) The Canadian public service relied heavily on temporary workers in the past, such as during World War II, during the 1970s with the rapid

growth in the public service, and during the 1980s and early 1990s when permanent positions were cut back. On this topic, see Hodgetts et al., *Biography of an Institution*, Lindquist and Paquet, "Government Restructuring and the Federal Public Service" in Lindquist, *Government Restructuring*, pp. 76–77; James Iain Gow and Francois Simard, "Introduction" to a Symposium on the Non-Career Public Service," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 65, 1 (March 1999), pp. 5-12; and James Iain Gow and Francois Simard, "Where old and new management meet: temporary staff in the Canadian federal administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 65, 1 (March 1999), pp. 71–86.

66 See **Chapters 10 and 11** in J.E. Hodgetts, *The Canadian Public Service*, respectively on the Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission.

67 Privy Council Office, *Recruitment and Results: Report of the COSO Sub-Committee on Recruitment* (July 2000).

68 Office of the Auditor General, "Recruiting for Canada's Future Public Service: Changing the System" and "Recruiting for Canada's Future Public Service: Changing the Practices," **Chapters 2 and 3** in *Report of the Auditor General of Canada—2001* (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2001); and Malloy, "The search for merit is killing Canada's civil service", *Globe and Mail* (10 September 2002).

69 See Auditor General of Canada, "Reform of Classification and Job Evaluation in the Federal Public Service," **Chapter 6** in *Report of the Auditor General of Canada—May 2003)*, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/ (accessed Spring 2004).

70 See Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "President of the Treasury Board Introduces Legislation to Modernize the Public Service of Canada" (6 February 2003), www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/nr-cp/2003/0206_e.asp ; and "President of the Treasury Board of Canada Very Satisfied with Passage of the *Public Service Modernization Act*" (4 November 2003), www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/nr-cp/2003/1104_e.asp; and various fact sheets and background at the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's web site for the *Public Service Modernization Act* at www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/psma-lmfp/.

71 Ian D. Clark, "Restraint, renewal, and the Treasury Board Secretariat, *Canadian Public Administration*. 37, 2 (1994), pp. 209-48.

72 Public Service Commission of Canada, *MERIT—A Competent, Non-Partisan and Representative Public Service* (February 2002). Similar modifications of the definition of merit have been enacted in British Columbia, from "most qualified" to "competence to undertake the work encompassed by the position."

73 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "President of the Treasury Board of Canada Announces New Directions for Official Languages" (20 November 2003); and Stephane Dion, "Implementing the Action Plan for Official Languages: a plan on paper becoming a reality." Speech delivered at the 28th Annual General Meeting of the Federation des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada, Ottawa (21 June 2002).

74 See St. Martin, "L'Affaire Groupaction", and Paco Francoli, "Abolish public service exemption: expert," *The Hill Times* (15 March 2004).

75 Thompson and Fryer, "Changing Roles for Employers and Unions in the Public Service"; and Gene Swimmer and Mark Thompson (eds.), *Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada: Beginning of the End or End of the*

Beginning (Kingston: Institute of Industrial Relations Press, 1995).

76 Monique Boudrias, "The *Public Service Modernization Act* (PSMA)." Presentation to the National Managers' and Human Resources Communities Professional Development Forum, Quebec City, 27 April 2004, http://www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/hrmm-mgrh/psma-lmfp/gi-ig/psma-lmfp_e.asp (accessed January 16, 2006).

77 But see Jocelyne Bourgon, "A Unified Public Service: Does it Matter?" *PA Times*. 27, 10 (October 2004), p. 4 and 6. Remarks originally presented at the CAPAM Biennial Conference 2002 in Glasgow, Scotland.

78 Bourgon, "A Unified Public Service: Does it Matter?" *PA Times*, p.4.

79 For evidence of this decisive recent shift, see the three chapters comprising Public Service Commission of Canada, *Public Service Commission 2004-05 Annual Report* as well as the four audit reports that accompanied its release on October 6, 2005. All of these reports have the look and feel of audits and studies from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada.

80 For data and interesting analysis, see David Zussman and Jak Jabes, *The Vertical Solitude: Managing in the Public Sector* (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989), pp.197–99. They argue that there was a lack of a strong corporate culture and a significant disjuncture between the perceptions and morale of executives at the deputy and ADM levels and in feeder groups in the executive and senior managerial ranks.

81 The Clerks' reports are not accountability documents like those of the Australian Public Service and Merit Commission, which are substantial and often critical, informed by detailed surveys of department and agency activities and practices.

82 The results of the 2002 Public-Service-Wide Employee Survey, which includes corporate and department results, along with follow-up and interpretative messages, can be found at PSHRA web site at http://www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/hr-rh/hrp-prh/index_e.asp. The results were compared with the 1999 survey results.

83 See Glyn Davis, "Executive Coordination Mechanisms" in Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis, and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.), *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 126–47; Evert A. Lindquist, "Reconceiving the Center: Leadership, Strategic Review and Coherence in Public Sector Reform" in OECD, *Government of the Future* (Paris: OECD, 2000), pp. 161-172; and Peter Aucoin, *The New Public Management*.

84 Evert Lindquist, Ian Clark, and James Mitchell, "Reshaping Ottawa's Centre of Government: Historical Perspectives on Martin's Reforms" (with Ian Clark and James Mitchell) in G. Bruce Doern (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 2004-2005: Mandate Change in the Martin Era* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004), pp. 317-347.

85 See "The Canadian fascination with coordinative machinery", **Chapter 4** in Colin Campbell, *Governments Under Stress: Political executives and key bureaucrats in Washington, London, and Ottawa* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), pp. 77–99.

86 See Savoie, *Governing From the Centre; and Breaking the Bargain*. For other views, see Paul G. Thomas, "Governing From the Centre: Reconceptualizing the Role of the PM and Cabinet," *Policy Options* (December 2003–January 2004), pp. 79–85.

87 See OECD, *Governance of the Future*; and B. Guy Peters, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Vincent Wright (eds.), *Administering the Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

88 J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins*, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

89 See J. Deutsch, "Some Thoughts on the Public Service." These concerns were identified in Canada, Royal Commission on Administrative Classification in the Public Service, Report (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946). This problem had largely been solved by the mid-1970s, when it was observed that "over seventy per cent of individuals in senior posts have spent their entire working lives in the federal public service." See Privy Council Office, "Senior Personnel in the Public Service of Canada: Deputy Ministers," Submission 3 (October 1977) in Privy Council Office, *Submissions to the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability* (Minister of Supply and Services, 1979), pp. 3–16.

90 See Canada, Privy Council Office, "Senior Personnel in the Public Service of Canada: Deputy Ministers," Submission 3 (October 1977) in Privy Council Office, *Submissions to the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability* (Minister of Supply and Services, 1979).

91 See "Managing Career Planning and Development" in Zussman and Jabes, *The Vertical Solitude*, pp. 188–90.

92 On La Relève, see the TBS site at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/iro-bri/profile/people_e.asp. Among other things La Relève was dedicated to improving human resource management, professional development, morale, and compensation; to introducing the practices of appointment to level and promotion through self-identification and competition; and to more systematically improving the roles and capabilities of functional communities.

93 There is no shortage of data on executive demographics, perceptions, and intentions. For one list of these studies, see Public Service Commission of Canada, Labour Market and Research Unit, Research Directorate, *Executive Succession Reconsidered: Planning for Public Service Renewal* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, October 2002), p. 6; or go to the APEX web site at: http://apex.gc.ca/.

94 J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men*.

95 Until recently, there was a gradual and subtle opening-up of the strategic planning cycle during the Chrétien governments and under several Clerks. Ministers and deputy ministers were more involved collectively (often through their respective retreats) in priority-setting, mandate planning, and providing input into the Speech from the Throne and budgets (even though final decisions clearly remain in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance). See Evert A. Lindquist, "How Ottawa Plans: The Evolution of Strategic Planning" in Leslie A. Pal (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 2001–02: Power in Transition* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 61–93.

96 Jacques Bourgault, *The Contemporary Role and Challenges of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada*. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, January 2003), pp. 21, 24, and 113–14.

97 Jacques Bourgault, Stéphane Dion, and Marc Lemay, "Creating a Corporate Culture: Lessons from the Canadian Federal Government," *Public Administration Review* 53, 1 (January–February 1993), pp. 73–80.

98 Consider two book-ends to the modern era of PCO: Michael Pitfield dramatically increased PCO's planning and coordinating capabilities during the early 1970s, and Jocelyne Bourgon significantly expanded the use of task forces and committees to foster horizontal collaboration across the executive group on policy and reform issues.

[99] See Arthur Kroeger and Jeff Heynen, *Making Transitions Work: Integrating External Executives into the Federal Public Service* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2003). Interestingly, this study notes that outside recruitment into the executive group has been increasing from almost 5% in 1994–95 to over 9% in 2001-02, but only 2–6% per year were recruited directly into the ADM ranks and presumably none into the deputy minister cadre.

[100] OECD, *Government of the Future*.

[101] See Peters, Rhodes, and Wright (eds.), *Administering the Summit*; Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, "The Blair Government and the Core Executive," *Government and Opposition* 39, 1 (2004), pp. 1–21; Richard Heffernan, "Prime ministerial predominance? Core executive politics in the UK," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5, 3 (August 2003), pp. 347–372; and Patrick Weller, "Cabinet Government: An Elusive Ideal?" *Public Administration* 81, 4 (2003), pp. 701–722.

[102] See Herman Bakvis, "Advising the Executive: Think Tanks, Consultants, Political Staff and Kitchen Cabinets" in *The Hollow Crown*, pp. 84–125; and Evert A. Lindquist, "Think tanks or policy clubs? Assessing the relevance and roles of Canadian policy institutes," *Canadian Public Administration* (Winter 1993), pp. 547–79.

[103] However, no study definitively documents budgets and FTE complements over time.

[104] See George Anderson, "The new focus on the policy capacity of the federal government," *Canadian Public Administration* 39, 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 469–88; Herman Bakvis, "Rebuilding Policy Capacity in the Era of the Fiscal Dividend," *Governance* 13, 1 (2000), pp. 71–104; and Evert A. Lindquist and James A. Desveaux, *Recruitment and Policy Capacity in Government* (Ottawa: Public Policy Forum, 1998).

[105] Lindquist, "How Ottawa Plans: The Evolution of Strategic Planning" in Leslie A. Pal (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 2001–02: Power in Transition* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 61–93.

[106] Jim Armstrong, Nick Mulder, and Russ Robinson, *Strengthening Policy Capacity: Report on Interviews with Senior Managers, February-March 2002* (Ottawa: The Governance Network, April 2002).

[107] Lindquist and Desveaux, *Recruitment and Policy Capacity in Government*.

[108] Anthony Perl and Donald J. White, "The Changing Role of Consultants in Canadian Policy Analysis," *Policy, Organization & Society* 21, 1 (June 2002), pp. 49–73.

[109] C.D. Foster, "The civil service under stress: the fall in civil service power and authority," *Public Administration* 79 (2001), pp. 725–49, provides a trenchant description of the loss of the civil service's role as principal policy advisor to the government, and sometimes even as process coordinator. Others, while not disputing more contestability, suggest departments have adapted to these new roles in varying degree. See David Marsh, David Richards, and Martin J. Smith, *Changing Patterns of Governance in the United Kingdom: Reinventing Whitehall?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); and Martin J. Smith, David Richards, and David Marsh, "The Changing Role of Central Government Departments" in R.A.W. Rhodes (ed.), *Transforming British Government, Vol. 2 Changing Roles and Relationships* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 146–63.

[110] See, for example, David Zussman, "Public Policy Formulation in Canada: Priorities, Processes, and Architecture" in National

Institute on Governance, *Facing the Future: Engaging stakeholders and citizens in developing public policy*, Proceedings from the National Institute on Governance and Australian Public Policy Research Network Conference, 23–24 April 2003 in Canberra (Canberra: National Institute on Governance, University of Canberra, 2003), pp. 24–34.

[111] See the following papers from New Zealand's State Services Commission: Ted Preston, *Gaining Through Training: Developing High Performing Policy Advisors*. Working Paper No. 2 (September 1999); Sally Washington, *Pieces of the Puzzle: Machinery of Government and the Quality of Policy Advice*. Working Paper No. 4 (June 1998); Dr Amanda Wolf, Building Advice: The Craft of the Policy Professional. Working Paper No. 7 (September 1999); *High Fliers: Developing High Performing Policy Units*. Occasional Paper No. 22 (December 1999); *Minds Over Matter: Human Resources Issues Affecting the Quality of Policy Advice*. Occasional Paper No. 8 (June 1999); and *Essential Ingredients: Improving the Quality of Policy Advice*. Occasional Paper No. 9 (June 1999).

[112] Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot, and Pat Walsh, *Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991), and Public *Management: The New Zealand Model* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[113] J.A. Chandler, "Britain" in J.A. Chandler (ed.), *Comparative Public Administration* (London: Routledge, 2000a), p. 24. See also Oliver James, *The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public Interest versus Bureau-Shaping Perspectives*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Francesca Gains, "Executive Agencies in Government: The Impact of Bureaucratic Networks on Policy Outcomes," *Journal of Public Policy* 23, 1 (2003), pp. 55–79.

[114] Brian W. Hogwood, David Judge, and Murray McVicar, "Agencies, ministers and civil servants in Britain" in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.), *Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform* (London: Routlege, 2001), pp. 36–8.

[115] For a detailed account of these developments until the Program Review, see Clark, "Restraint, renewal, and the Treasury Board Secretariat", *Canadian Public Administration*.

[116] Correspondence with Treasury Board Secretariat (3 October 2004).

[117] Peter Aucoin, "Independent foundations, public money and public accountability: Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?" *Canadian Public Administration* 46, 1 (Spring 2003).

[118] See "The Context For Public Sector Reform," **Chapter 2** in Good, *The Politics of Public Management*.

[119] For early publications on this topic, see Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, *Framework for Alternative Service Delivery* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1995); Evert Lindquist and Tammy Sica, *Canadian Governments and the Search for Alternative Service Delivery* (Toronto: KPMG Centre for Government Foundation and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, October 1995); and Robin Ford and David Zussman (eds.), *Alternative Service Delivery: Sharing Governance in Canada*. (Toronto: KPMG Centre for Government Foundation and Institute of Public Administration of Canada, April 1997).

[120] See *A Profile of the Public Service of Canada—Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: The Canadian Experience of Public Sector Management Reform (1995-2002)* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003) and web site http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/iro-bri/profile/index_e.asp.

[121] For a review of these and other initiatives, see "The Treasury Board Secretariat and implementation of PS 2000" in Clark, *Restraint, renewal, and the Treasury Board Secretariat*, pp. 219–27.

[122] For more information on the Common Measurement Tool, the Citizens First surveys, and the Institute and its history, see http://www.iccs-isac.org/.

[123] Peter Aucoin, "Comparative Perspectives on Canadian Public Service Reform in the 1990s" in *Public Service Reform*, p. 8.

[124] Examples include the Government of Canada web site, the MERX tendering service administered by Public Works and Government Services Canada, the Job Bank developed by Human Resources Development Canada, the Canadian Health Network, the Strategis web site for business developed by Industry Canada, among others. For a good review of its genesis and precursors, see Mohammed Charih and Jacynthe Robert, "Government On-line in the federal government of Canada: the organizational issues," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 70, 2 (June 2004), pp. 373–84.

[125] See the Government On-Line web site at http://www.ged-gol.gc.ca/ and Government On-Line Advisory Panel, *Connecting with Canadians: Pursuing Service Transformation* (Ottawa: December 2003). For a more critical perspective, see Jeffrey Roy, "Service, Security, Transparency & Trust: Government Online or Governance Renewal in Canada? International Journal of Electronic Governance Research 1, 1 (Jan-March 2005), pp. 39–57.

[126] Accenture, *eGovernment Leadership: Engaging the Customer* (April 2003) at, and Darrell M. West, Global E-Government, 2003 (September 2003) at www.InsidePolitics.org.

[127] See Luc Juillet, *The Federal Regional Councils and Horizontal Governance*, a report prepared for the Federal Regional Councils and the Treasury Board Secretariat (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, Sept. 15, 2000) at http://www.myschool-monecole.gc.ca/research/publications/pdfs.

[128] Centre for Public Dialogue, *What is Public Dialogue*? (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, January 2000).

[129] See, for example, Wendy F. Porteus, "Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future: Report on the Consultative Process" (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, March 1992); Robert P. Shepherd, "The Citizens' Forum: A Case Study in Public Consultation," *Optimum* 23, 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 18–27; Peter Harrison, *The Constitutional Conferences Secretariat: A Unique Response to a Public Management Challenge* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, June 1992); Evert A. Lindquist, "Citizens, Experts and Budgets: Evaluating Ottawa's Emerging Budget Process" in Susan D. Phillips (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1994-95: Making Change* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), pp. 91-128; Peter Harrison, *The Constitutional Conferences Secretariat: A Unique Response to a Public Management Challenge* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, June 1992); and Laurie Ham, "Consulting on Health Policy in Canada" in OECD, *Citizens as Partners: Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-making* (Paris:

OECD, 2001), pp. 85–106; and Evert A. Lindquist, "Organizing for mega-consultation: HRDC and the Social Security Reform", *Canadian Public Administration*, 48, 3 (Fall 2005), pp.348-85.

130 See, for example, Debora L. VanNignatten and Sheila Wray Gregoire, "Bureaucracy and Consultation: the Correctional Service and the requirements of being democratic," *Canadian Public Administration* 38, 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 204–221; and Hajo Versteeg, *A Case Study in Multi-Stakeholder Consultation: The Corporate History of the Federal Pesticide Registration Review*. Vol. 1 and 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, March 1992).

131 See, for example, Jocelyne Bourgon, "A voice for all: engaging Canadians for change," Notes for an address to the Institute on Governance Conference (October 27, 1998); and Mel Cappe, "Making Connections and Meeting the Challenge: E-Government and the Public Service of Canada," Notes for an Address at the Assistant Deputy Ministers' Forum (3 May 3 2000).

132 Evert A. Lindquist, "A Quarter-Century of Think Tanks in Canada" in Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, and Mark Garnett (eds.), *Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

133 See http://www.consultingcanadians.gc.ca, funded first as a pilot project of Government On-Line initiative, and informed by the UK, Australian, and Quebec examples.

134 See http://www.direct.gov.uk/DI/directories/ PublicConsultations/fs/en.

135 See the conclusion of Lindquist, "Organizing for Mega-Consultation" *Canadian Public Administration.*

136 For an explication of "shallow innovation," see James A. Desveaux, Evert A. Lindquist, and Glen Toner, "Organizing for Policy Innovation in Public Bureaucracy: AIDS, Energy and Environmental Policy in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 27, 3 (September 1994), pp. 493–538.

137 These arguments might include the following: (1) ministers are answerable for the performance of programs and therefore more likely to ask better questions; (2) staff from corporate policy shops are more likely to be recruited from program policy shops or operation divisions; and (3) policy staff are more likely to know more about operational issues and thus ask better questions and provide better analyses.

138 For a historical perspective on how training and development has been intertwined with many facets of public service reform, see V. Seymour Wilson, C. Lloyd Stanford, and O.P. Dwivedi, "From Witchcraft to Proposed Twenty-First Century Reforms: The Ongoing Saga of Training and Development in Canadian Government," *International Journal of Public Administration* 27, 3–4 (2004), pp. 259–85.

139 Canada, Canadian Centre for Management Development, Board of Governors, *Five-Year Review and Report to Parliament—December 1, 1991 to November 30, 1996* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development Canada, 1996).

140 Canada, Canadian Centre for Management Development, *CCMD 5 Year Review—Report to Parliament, December 2001* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2001). This thinking was also informed by previous research commissioned by CCMD. See Canadian Centre for Management Development, *Continuous Learning: A CCMD Report* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994).

141 Canada, *A Public Service Learning Organization: From Coast to Coast—Directions for the Future* (June 2000); and *A Public Service Learning Organization: From Coast to Coast—Policy Directions* (June 2000).

142 Canada, *A Proposed Continuous Learning Policy for the Public Service of Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, April 2001); and Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "A Policy for Continuous Learning in the Public Service of Canada" (May 2002), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/tb_856/pclpsc-pacfpc_e.asp (accessed January 2006).

143 Canada, Learning and Development Committee, *Progress Report 2002–2003*. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2002). For annual and other reports for the LDC and the NLDI, see http://www.myschool-monecole.gc.ca/ldc/index_e.html.

144 All of this had been anticipated in CCMD's 2001 five-year review, which played off the implied ambitions of public service leadership in recent government rhetoric and drew on international comparisons to point to the need for a government-wide approach based on network strategies and increased central capacities.

145 See the announcement by the President of the Treasury Board of Canada in October 2005 of substantial increase in base funding for CSPS at http://www.myschool-monecole.gc.ca/about/nr/24_10_05_e.html. For a summary of the themes of the new strategic vision, see http://www.myschool-monecole.gc.ca/about/index_e.html.

146 For a broader and more historical review beyond the focus here on values and ethics for public servants, see Eleanor D. Glor and Ian Greene, "The Government of Canada's Approach to Ethics: The Evolution of Ethical Government," *Public Integrity* 5, 1 (Winter 2002-3), pp. 39–65.

147 Canada, Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, *A Strong Foundation—Report of the Task Force on Values and Ethics*.

148 See OECD, "Ethics in the Public Sector: Challenges and Opportunities for OECD Countries," Issues Paper for a Symposium to be held at the OECD, Paris 3–4 November 1997; and OECD, Public Management Service, *Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service—OECD Recommendation*, PUMA Policy Brief No. 4 (May 1998), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/13/1899138.pdf (accessed January 2006).

149 The deputy ministers were the President of the Public Service Commission and the Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services. See Auditor General of Canada, "Values and Ethics in the Federal Public Sector," **Chapter 12** of *Report of the Auditor General October 2000* (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2000).

150 Catherine MacQuarrie, "Creating a Value Based Public Service." Notes for a speech, Office of Public Service Values and Ethics, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (July 11, 2001), http://www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/veo-bve/speeches/creatingavaluebasedpublicservice_e.asp.

151 Canada, Auditor General of Canada, "Values and Ethics in the Federal Public Sector" pp. 9–10. See Office of Public Service Values and Ethics, "Progress Report on the Statement of Principles of the Public Service of Canada" at http://www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/veo-bve/reports/principles_report/index_e.asp.

152 Canada, Auditor General of Canada, "Values and Ethics in the Federal Public Sector."

153 Canada, Office of Public Service Values and Ethics, "Progress Report."

154 Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Ethical Conduct" (December 2003) at http://www1.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=9.

155 The LDC was a finalist for CAPAM International Innovation Award in 2002. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Canadian Centre for Management Development Performance Report for the period ending March 31, 2003.* Before this, CCMD was described in passing as "high-powered" in a review of practices in several jurisdictions. See Gambhir Bhatta, *A Cross-Jurisdictional Scan of Practices in Senior Public Services: Implications for New Zealand.* Working Paper No.13 (Wellington: State Services Commission, New Zealand, August 2001), p. 22. See also Sandford Borins, "Trends in Training Public Managers: A Report on a Commonwealth Seminar," *International Public Management Journal* 2, 2 (1999) pp. 299–314.

156 Langford, "Acting on Values", *Canadian Public Administration.*

157 Ben Pollard, *A Learning and Performance Framework for the Leadership and Management Development Program.* Professional Report, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, April 2003; Phillips P.P. and J.J. Phillips *The Public Sector Challenge: Developing a Credible ROI Process* (ASTD: 2002); and D. Kirkpatrick, *Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels* 2nd Ed. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1998).

158 See "Constraints to Productive Management in the Public Sector" in Auditor General of Canada, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 1983* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1983).

159 Thirteen examples are identified in Association of Public Service Financial Administrators, *Checks and Balances Volume 1: Rebalancing the Service and Control Features of the Government of Canada (GOC) Financial Control Framework* (Ottawa: Association of Public Service Financial Administrators, December 2003), http://www.agffp.com/news/checksandbalances-e.pdf. See also the blunt remarks in Alex Himelfarb, *Tenth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2003).

160 See, for example, the following reports of the Auditor General: *Report on the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2003); *Report to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services on Three Contracts Awarded to Groupaction.* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, May 2002); and Department of Justice— "Costs of Implementing the Canadian Firearms Program," **Chapter 10** in *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons 2002* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, December 2002).

161 Alasdair Roberts, "Worrying about misconduct: The control lobby and the PS 2000 reforms," *Canadian Public Administration* 39, 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 489–523.

162 See "Financial and Information Management Branch: Ambitious Plans" in Lindquist, *On the Cutting Edge*, pp. 216–20.

163 Joanne Kelly and Evert Lindquist, "Metamorphisis in Kafka's Castle: the Changing Balance of Power among the Central Budget Agencies of Canada" in John Wanna, Lotte Jensen, and Jouke de Vries (eds.), *Controlling Public Expenditure: The*

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164 Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Modern Comptrollership Initiative: A Progress Report on Government-wide Implementation* (March 2003), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cmo_mfc/resources2/review_panel/rirp-e.asp (accessed January 2006).

165 See Evert A. Lindquist, "Getting Results Right: Reforming Ottawa's Estimates" in Leslie A. Pal (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1998-99: Balancing Act: The Post-Deficit Mandate*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 153–90; and Treasury Board of Canada, *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada*. (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2000).

166 The Treasury Board Secretariat Management Accountability Framework (Ottawa: President of the Treasury Board, 2003) can be found at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/maf-crg_e.asp.

167 Langford, "Acting on Values", *Canadian Public Administration*.

168 Lindquist, "On the Cutting Edge" in *How Ottawa Spends*, pp. 216–20.

169 Association of Public Service Financial Administrators, *Checks and Balances: Rebalancing the Service and Control Features of the Government of Canada (GOC) Financial Control Framework* (Ottawa: Association of Public Service Financial Administrators, December 2003), http://www.agffp.com/news/checksandbalances-e.pdf.

170 These functions include Government Online, collective bargaining, and human resource management.

171 Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Stronger Financial Management and Accountability," http://www1.pm.gc.ca/eng/accountability.asp (accessed January 2006).

172 Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Strengthening Public Sector Management: An Overview of the Government Action Plan and Key Initiatives* (Ottawa: March 24, 2004).

173 For a comprehensive review of initiatives and action plans under the themes of accountable, responsive, and innovative government, see Canada, *Management in the Government of Canada: A Commitment to Continuous Improvement* (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada, October 2005).

174 Canada, *Budget 2005: Expenditure Review for Sound Financial Management* (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, February 23, 2005) and Evert Lindquist, "How Ottawa Reviews Spending: Moving Beyond Ad*hocracy?" in G. Bruce Doern, *How Ottawa Spends 2006-2007* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Universities), 2006.

175 See, for example, the useful distinctions on different types, trajectories, and sequencing of NPM reforms in John Halligan, "Politicians, bureaucrats and public sector reform" in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.), *Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform*. (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 157–68.

176 Evert A. Lindquist and Graham White, "Streams, Springs and Stones: Ontario Public Service Reform in the 1980s and the 1990s," *Canadian Public Administration*. 37, 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 267–301.

[177] See Sanford Borins, *Innovating with Integrity: How Local Heroes Are Transforming American Government* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998); and James Iain Gow, *Learning From Others: Administrative Innovations Among Canadian Governments*. (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1994).

[178] On moments when centripetal and centrifugal pressures on the centre of government may be out of balance and require reform, see Evert Lindquist, Ian Clark, and James Mitchell, "Reshaping Ottawa's Centre of Government: Historical Perspectives on Martin's Reforms" in G. Bruce Doern (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 2004-2005: Mandate Change in the Martin Era* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004). On the notion of disequilibrium or partial disequilibrium moments, see Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 60.

[179] See "Theme two: change strategies" in Nolan (ed.), *Public Sector Reform*, pp. xxix-xxx, which draws on D. Dunphy and D. Stace, *Under New Management: Australian Organizations in Transition*. (Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1992).

[180] Significant reform necessarily involves authorities tightly held by Prime Ministers, but on the advice of the Clerk and PCO's machinery of-government group. See Lindquist, "Reconceiving the Center" in OECD, *Government of the Future*, pp. 161–172.

[181] See Lindquist, Clark and Mitchell, "Reshaping Ottawa's Centre" in *How Ottawa Spends 2004-2005*.

[182] The Canadian public administration literature often spends as much time reviewing commission recommendations as on the actual reforms adopted by governments.

[183] The flagship publications emerging from the International Governance Network were *Governance in a Changing Environment*. (Ottawa and Montreal: CCMD and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995); *Taking Stock: Assessing Public Sector Reforms*. (Ottawa and Montreal: CCMD and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998); and *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*. (Ottawa and Montreal: CCMD and McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), all edited by B.Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie.

[184] Patrick Weller, *Australia's Mandarins: The Frank and the Fearless*. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2001), p. 232.

[185] See the distinction made between basic and advanced reforms in Manning and Parison, *International Public Administration Reform*, pp. 16–24.

[186] See B. Guy Peters, "Public-Service Reform: Comparative Perspective" in Lindquist (ed.), *Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada*," pp. 36–37; and B. Guy Peters, "Administrative traditions and the Anglo-American democracies" in Halligan (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries*, pp. 10–26.

[187] See James, *The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall*.

[188] For an interesting attempt, see Pollitt and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*, but even this ambitious study does not provide detailed comparisons.

[189] Pollitt and Bouckaert, and Manning and Parison.

[190] Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, p. 35.

[191] Philip Selznick, pp. 56–61.

[192] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.

[193] Alex Himelfarb, *Tenth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of*

Canada For year ending March 31, 2003. (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2003), p. 7.

[194] For background on scenario building, see Steven A. Rosell, *Changing Maps: Governing in a World of Change* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995); Kees van der Heijden, *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation*. (New York: Wiley, 1996); and Gill Ringland, *Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future*. (New York: Wiley, 1998).

[195] See E. Ferlie, L. Ashburner, L. Fitzgerald, and A. Pettigrew, *The New Public Management in Action*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael Barzelay, *The New Public Management*, op.cit.; and Mohammed Charih and Art Daniels (eds.), *The New Public Management and Public Administration in Canada*. (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration in Canada, 1997). See also David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).

[196] See Donald Savoie, "What is wrong with the New Public Management," *Canadian Public Administration* 38, 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 112–21; Sandford Borins, "The New Public Management is here to stay," *Canadian Public Administration* 38, 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 122–32; Borins, *Innovating with Integrity*; and Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.

[197] The exception has been Christopher Pollitt, who has attempted to measure the claims of NPM advocates against actual outcomes. But he does not attempt to measure the impact of previous reform initiatives nor the efficacy of current rivals to the NPM. For a summary and citations, see Pollitt and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*.

[198] See Kenneth Kernaghan, Brian Marson and Sandford Borins, *The New Public Organization*. (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000).

[199] Bruce Cheadle, "Prime minister demands hurried policy brainstorming from top bureaucrats," *Canadian Press*, 8 March 2004.

[200] Aucoin, "The Public Service as a Learning Organization"; and Evert Lindquist, John Langford and David Good, "Promoting Excellence in Modern Governance: Strengthening Merit for BC's Public Service." A paper prepared for the Public Service Employee Relations Commission, Government of British Columbia (December 2001).

[201] Lindquist, Langford and Good, "Promoting Excellence in Modern Governance: Strengthening Merit for BC's Public Service."

[202] Iain Gow has also pointed out the government and managers may have an uphill battle because public servants may not be as interested as their leaders think in taking up learning opportunities. See "A Canadian Model of Public Administration?"

[203] Langford, "Acting on Values", *Canadian Public Administration*.

[204] Indeed, Savoie's assessment was more about current tensions and less about the future, where they can only be heightened. Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.

[205] See Aucoin and Jarvis, *Accountability*, and C.E.S. Franks, "Putting Accountability Back into the System of Government," *Policy Options* (October 2004), pp. 64–66; and Paco Francoli, "Government should have new charter of values: Savoie," *The Hill Times*, (13 September 2004).

206 For the challenges dealing with demographic change, see James R. Nininger and Marilyn J. Arditti, *Renewing Organizations: The Public Service in Transition*. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2004).

207 Kroeger and Heynen, *Making Transitions Work*.

208 See Evert A. Lindquist, "Strategy, Capacity, and Horizontal Governance: Perspectives from Australia and Canada," *Optimum Online: The Journal of Public Sector Management,* 34, 4 (December 2004), web site: http://optimumonline.ca/.

209 Jacques Bourgault and Mary Gusella, "Performance, pride and recognition in the Canadian federal civil service," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 67, 1 (2001), pp. 29–47; and Kenneth Kernaghan, *Rediscovering Public Service: Recognizing the Value of an Essential Institution*. (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000), a report on dialogues held across Canada in mid-1999 co-sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Conference Board of Canada, Business Council on National Issues, Public Policy Forum, Committee of Federal Deputy Ministers on Pride and Recognition, and the Leadership Network.

210 See conclusion, Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*.

211 See Francoli, "Government should have new charter of values."

212 See Australian Public Service Commission, *State of the Service Report 2001–2002* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) and its predecessors.

213 See President of the Treasury Board of Canada, *Canada's Performance 2004: Annual Report to Parliament* (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2004), the fourth report produced to date.

214 Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "TBS Management Account-ability Framework" (March 2004), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/maf-crg_e.asp (accessed January 2006).

215 The annual *State of the Service* reports can be found at http://www.apsc.gov.au/. An excellent example of such reporting and reflection has been produced by the Australian Public Service Commission with its thorough annual report on the state of the public service as well as a recent retrospective on public sector reform. See Australian Public Service Commission, *The Australian Experience of Public Sector Reform*. Occasional Paper Two (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003).

216 The Canada School of Public Service could function as a domestic and international node, working with Canadian scholars to collaborate with other governments as well as international organizations such as the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the United Nations Public Administration Network.

217 Manning and Parison; Pollitt and Bouckaert; and Barzelay.

218 Pollitt and Bouckaert, p. 191.

219 Borins, *Innovating with Integrity*; and Gow, *Learning From Others*.

220 See Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller, "Traditions of Governance: History and Diversity"; and Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutes Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis" in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

221 For example, see Gregory Albo, David Langille, and Leo Panitch (eds.), *A Different Kind of State? Popular Power and Democratic Administration*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993); and John Shields and B. Mitchell Evans, *Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1998).

222 Evert A. Lindquist, "New Agendas for Research on Policy Communities: Policy Analysis, Administration, and Governance" in Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett, and David Laycock (eds), *Policy Studies in Canada: The State of the Art*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 219–241.

223 Peter Aucoin, "Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, Principles, Paradoxes and Pendulums," *Governance*, 3, 2 (1990), pp. 115–37; see **Chapter 7** on "Trade-offs, balances, limits, dilemmas and paradoxes" in Pollitt and Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform*; and Good, *The Politics of Public Management*.

224 J. Kenneth Benson, "Organizations: A Dialectical View," *Administrative Science Quarterly 22*, 1 (March 1977), pp. 1–21.

225 Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour*. 3rd Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1976). Originally published in 1946.