Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan
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ATTACHEMENT/PIECE JOINTE

1 report/1 rapport

COMMENTS/COMMENTAIRES

Dear Prime Minister,

Please find attached the report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. This report represents the consensus views of all Panel members.

It is our sincere hope that our report will be of value to your government and to all Parliamentarians as they consider these important issues.

The Panel has been ably supported in its work by a talented secretariat led by Mr. David Mulroney. We are very grateful to the many Canadians and others who offered us their time and opinions as we considered our report.

Sincerely,

The Honourable John Manley, P.C. (Chair)

Derek H. Burney, O.C.

The Honourable Jake Epp, P.C.

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Chair’s Foreword

If I learned one thing from this enquiry, it is that there is no obvious answer to the question of Canada’s future role in Afghanistan. But our presence in that distant land does matter.

Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan matters because it concerns global and Canadian security, Canada’s international reputation, and the well-being of some of the world’s most impoverished and vulnerable people. Our commitment is important because it has already involved the sacrifice of Canadian lives.

At the same time, I realize many Canadians are uneasy about Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. They wonder what it’s all for, whether success is achievable, and in the end, whether the results will justify the human and other costs. The most difficult decision a country can make is to send its young men and women into harm’s way, particularly when the outcome may appear less than certain. I can assure Canadians that each of us on the Panel wrestled with this question throughout our enquiry.

We find ourselves, with our allies, in a situation of conflict in a land that is far from us, little known by us and where our interests do not seem self-evident. We are trying to help a country whose recent history has been one long, unending tragedy, and whose prospects still appear bleak.

The question of Canada’s future role defies a simple answer. It is complicated by the challenging nature of the mission and by the difficult neighborhood in which Afghanistan is situated, made even more volatile by the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto. It is made more complex because we assumed responsibility for fighting an insurgency in a dangerous province of the country and we did so with little political debate and not much public engagement. And that insurgency is far from defeated.

Our Panel consulted very broadly – both here at home and abroad. We traveled through four provinces in Afghanistan. We tried to assess progress made to date and the requirements for improved prospects. And we sought to answer the question of Canada’s appropriate role in the future.

Our assessment of the situation recognizes the enormity of the challenge: regional instability; slow progress on reconstruction and development; mounting insecurity and violence; corruption, criminality and increasing poppy production. But there can be no doubt that compared to the starting point in 2001, living conditions in Afghanistan have seen measurable, even significant improvement.
Whenever we asked Afghans what they thought ISAF or Canada should do, there was never any hesitation: “We want you to stay; we need you to stay.” Without the presence of the international security forces, they said, chaos would surely ensue.

The Panel learned early that we must be careful to define our expectations for success. Afghanistan is a deeply divided tribal society. It has been wracked by decades of war and is one of the poorest countries on Earth. There should be no thought that after five or even ten years of western military presence and aid, Afghanistan will resemble Europe or North America. But we came to the conviction that with patience, commitment, financial and other forms of assistance, there is a reasonable prospect that its people will be able to live together in relative peace and security, while living standards slowly improve.

The essential questions for Canada are: how do we move from a military role to a civilian one, and how do we oversee a shift in responsibility for Afghanistan’s security from the international community to Afghans themselves?

To achieve these objectives, much still needs to be done.

Institutions that are respected need to be built and the Afghan National Army and Police need to be further recruited and trained.

Agricultural districts need to be reclaimed from land mines and poppy fields, so that traditional crops can once again flourish where they have in the past.

Both the reality and the perception of corruption in the Government of Afghanistan must be rooted out. They are undermining not only the hope for an Afghan solution but also support for the Western forces sacrificing their lives to help secure the situation.

Roads, bridges and electrification must be enhanced, so that ordinary Afghans can see progress.

With all that needs to be done, no end date makes sense at this point.

Afghanistan presents an opportunity for Canada. For the first time in many years, we have brought a level of commitment to an international problem that gives us real weight and credibility. For once, our 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development assistance) are all pointed at the same problem, and officials from three departments are beginning to work together.

But the cost is real, and it is high.
Canadians don’t need any lessons in sacrifice. Our history is replete with examples of courage and fortitude in conflict against difficult odds when the cause was just and the determination to prevail was present. But our Panel concluded that the sacrifice of Canadian lives could only be justified if we and our allies and the Afghans share a coherent, comprehensive plan that can lead to success, and if our allies are willing to stand with us with the resources and commitment that are necessary to make success possible.

We like to talk about Canada’s role in the world. Well, we have a meaningful one in Afghanistan. As our report states, it should not be faint-hearted nor should it be open-ended. Above all, we must not abandon it prematurely.

Rather, we should use our hard-earned influence to ensure the job gets done and gets done properly.

Honourable John Manley, P.C.

Ottawa, January, 2008
Part I: Introduction

A Decision for Canadians

Afghanistan is at war, and Canadians are combatants. It is a war fought between an elected, democratic government and a zealous insurgency of proven brutality. The war has already exacted a terrible cost in Canadian lives—a sacrifice to be mourned and honoured by every Canadian. But Canadians are not alone in the conflict. Canada is one of some 39 countries (including most of the great democracies we know as our friends and allies) with troops deployed in Afghanistan. These forces are in Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government, under the express authority of the United Nations.

This is a conflict of ferocious complexity in a region of violent instability. History proves how readily Afghanistan can fall victim to regional rivalries and foreign invasion. The present crisis in Pakistan, which shares a lawless borderland with Afghanistan, adds new danger and new confusion to Afghanistan’s future. For Canadians, moreover, the news from Kabul and Kandahar in the past two years has been more often bad than good. It is natural for Canadians to reconsider the wisdom and rightness of Canada’s involvement in a war that has been so difficult and inconclusive.

The war in Afghanistan is a fact, but it is not the only fact about Afghanistan that concerns Canada. Afghanistan is a developing country, one of the world’s poorest. (Afghan per-capita gross domestic product is about half that of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.) But despite the violence and destruction of conflict, Afghans are achieving substantial development progress. The Afghan economy has been growing by about 10 per cent annually for the past five years, and per-capita incomes have doubled. More than five million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, a telling indicator of new hope for the future. Some six million children are in school, a third of them girls; school enrolment has tripled in six years. Child mortality rates are improving. Roads are being built, and power lines restored. In short, the evidence of real development is there to see.

After 30 years of strife—in Soviet occupation, civil war and the coercive repression of Taliban rule—Afghan men and women are building a government committed to the democratic rule of law and the full exercise of human rights. To preserve and pursue the progress made, Afghanistan relies on others for support. Canada is one of 51 countries committed to the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, a comprehensive international program of aid to Afghanistan’s security, governance and development. For the years 2002-2011, Canada has
authorized $1.2 billion in international assistance to Afghanistan. That country now receives more Canadian aid than any other, about three per cent of all Canadian aid during this period.

Warfare and reconstruction, bloodshed and progress—these are the contrary and complicated realities of conflict and development in Afghanistan. They defy easy answers. But to every member of our Panel, this much is clear: To make a difference in Afghanistan—to contribute to a more stable and peaceful, better governed and developing Afghanistan—Canadians will require sustained resolve and determined realism about what can be achieved. Furthermore, events in Afghanistan, and Canada’s participation in the outcomes, will directly affect Canada’s security, our reputation in the world, and our future ability to engage the international community in achieving objectives of peace, security and shared prosperity. Informed and fair-minded Canadians can differ on the policy choices before us. None need doubt that the future of Afghanistan matters to Canada.

Canadians have a decision to make. The Government has affirmed that Parliament will decide whether Canada will extend its military deployment in Afghanistan after February 2009. Reaching that decision requires a realistic assessment of conditions in Afghanistan, along with a pragmatic assessment of Canada’s engagement there. Just as importantly, it demands consideration of Canada’s own interests, our values, and our willingness and capacity to make a difference to Afghanistan’s future.

**PANEL MEETINGS AND TRAVEL**

Between October 12 and December 14, 2007, Panel members held face-to-face discussions in Ottawa, New York, Brussels and Washington, in addition to their trip to Afghanistan. They also met with individuals from elsewhere in Canada, the United States and Europe via video-conference.

While in Afghanistan, the Panel travelled across four provinces – Kabul, Balkh, Bamiyan and Kandahar. They held meetings in Kabul, Bamiyan, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar Airfield, Panjwai, Zhari, and Kandahar City. While in Kandahar province, the Panel met with the Provincial Reconstruction Team at Camp Nathan Smith, and personnel at two forward operating bases, a police sub-station, and other military facilities.
The Panel’s purpose in this Report is to explore these questions, to encourage an informed and constructive public deliberation, and to recommend effective actions to the Government and Parliament. Fully informed public involvement has the best chance of producing well-founded, sustainable policy. For one thing, it improves the likelihood of finding good answers to hard problems. And for another, full information can strengthen popular understanding and support of a policy when it is later put to the test of hard experience.

Our own immersion in this subject has been both intensive and exhaustive. We invited submissions from Canadians, and received more than 200. We consulted Canadian scholars, activists, government officials and military officers with first-hand knowledge of Afghanistan, its history and its people. We spoke with diplomats, cabinet members and senior public servants at the United Nations, and in London, Brussels and Washington. Most movingly, we witnessed compelling examples of courage and accomplishment in Afghanistan. During our visit to Kabul and to Kandahar and other provinces, we were profoundly impressed by the professionalism and commitment of the Canadian soldiers and civilians serving there—and by the tenacity and optimism of the Afghans we met there. Among Afghans, we spoke to government officials, national assembly representatives, academics, members of community development councils, health-care workers, teachers and others. We have been greatly informed by the experience.

In the following pages, we assess current conditions with respect to Afghanistan’s security, governance and development. We assess Canada’s military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan, and examine the strongest reasons for that engagement. And we propose a coherent set of initiatives that can, when complemented with practical standards for measuring performance, achieve progress in Afghanistan. We are recommending a Canadian commitment to Afghanistan that is neither open-ended nor faint-hearted—a commitment that reflects Canadian interests, gives faithful expression to our values, and corresponds to our national capacity.
Part II: Assessing Conditions in Afghanistan

Living conditions in Afghanistan are grim, reflecting the violence and deprivations suffered by Afghans for more than a quarter-century of foreign occupation and domestic misrule. Measured against the hardships and repressions of the past, however, the people of Afghanistan are making notable progress. Their progress and present challenges are best understood against the backdrop of Afghanistan’s recent history.

SETTING THE CONTEXT

By 2001, Afghanistan in large part was ruled by the Taliban, a radical Islamist regime of exceptional violence. Al Qaeda had found shelter in Taliban territory. It was from Afghanistan that Al Qaeda leaders planned and directed the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, against targets in the United States (and inspired later terrorism in Spain, Britain and elsewhere).

The day after 9/11, the UN Security Council formally recognized the right of individual and collective self-defence and called on all member states to cooperate in Afghanistan “to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks”—attacks that were understood to represent a threat to global peace and security. At the same time, governments in NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) invoked the collective-defence provisions of the NATO treaty and declared the attack against the United States as an attack against all NATO members. Within weeks, members of the NATO coalition and Afghan forces were engaged in military action against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As a consequence of that action, the Taliban regime collapsed in November 2001; it withdrew, deposed but not defeated, into the hinterland...
of Afghanistan’s East and South and neighbouring Pakistan. And it was replaced by an interim authority led by Hamid Karzai. In December, the United Nations authorized a new International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to prosecute the campaign and help the interim authority secure Kabul and surrounding areas. (In 2003, again under UN authority, NATO assumed command of ISAF.) The first ISAF troops arrived in Kabul in January 2002.

In February 2002, 850 Canadian troops deployed to Kandahar as part of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. That battalion was withdrawn at the completion of its mission in July 2002. From 2002 to 2005, various Canadian military units served in Kabul under ISAF command; those deployments peaked at more than 1,700 troops in 2004. In 2005, as we relate in Part III of this Report, Canada began to redeploy forces from Kabul back to Kandahar to complement Canada’s growing civilian aid presence in the province. This redeployment was completed in February 2006. Canadian troops have been fighting in Kandahar for about two years.

In recalling events since 2002, and assessing present conditions, two distinguishing facts are worth repeating. First, the international military and development presence in Afghanistan has been explicitly and repeatedly authorized by the UN Security Council—most recently in a Security Council resolution in September 2007; it has also been approved collectively by the 26 member countries of NATO. ISAF, which includes 13 countries along with all NATO members, is thereby defending and enforcing international law. In this defining way, and in others, the international presence in Afghanistan differs from the later invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its coalition partners in that war. The second distinguishing fact is that ISAF forces are in Afghanistan at the request, and with the approval, of Afghanistan’s own elected government. (President Karzai was elected in 2004 to a five-year term. Afghanistan’s national assembly was elected in 2005.) The ISAF presence in Afghanistan has the consent of the Afghan government and the support of the Afghan people.

In that historical context, the Panel assessed prevailing conditions in three connected dimensions: security, governance and development. Each dimension, of course, affects the others in dynamic interaction. Security enables development; effective governance enhances security; development creates opportunities, and multiplies the rewards, of improved security and good governance. In this virtuous circle of cause and effect, security is an essential condition of good governance and lasting development.
SECURITY
By many knowledgeable accounts, security generally has deteriorated in the South and East of Afghanistan, including Kandahar province where Canadian Forces are based, through 2006 and 2007. The Taliban insurgency to some degree has regrouped during the past 18 months; the frequency of its small attacks and the numbers of civilian fatalities it has inflicted were higher in 2007 than in 2006. The insurgency has continued to benefit from easy resort to safe havens inside Pakistan, where it is refinanced, rearmed and replenished with new recruits, including those from other countries. Pakistan’s own political disarray magnifies the destabilizing threat of the insurgency both to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

THE TALIBAN AND OTHER INSURGENTS
The Taliban are a Sunni Muslim and ethnic Pashtun movement that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, when they were removed from power by a cooperative military effort involving Afghan and international forces, including Canadians. Originating in the Frontier Tribal Areas of Pakistan, the Taliban is headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, and is composed primarily of ethnic Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan who adhere to a strict and extremely conservative combination of Sharia law and Pashtun tribal codes. Their mistreatment of women is particularly notorious.

From 2002 to 2007, the Taliban centre of government-in-exile has shifted to the Pashtun areas of Quetta, Pakistan, and today Taliban commanders who are responsible for the violence in Afghanistan are directing it primarily from sanctuaries in Pakistan. That said, in many respects the conflict in Afghanistan is a continuation of almost three decades of war involving many of the same players, not all of which are Taliban, resulting in a combination of anti-government insurgents and self-interested "spoilers" who, for reasons of personal power or economic interests, have no desire to see rule of law or central authority spread.

The insurgency receives external support and financial assistance from a number of global actors, including private sources originating in the Gulf states, as well as support from alienated local tribes, opium producers and other criminal elements within Afghanistan. Combined with material stockpiled over the past decades of conflict, most of the insurgents possess sufficient resources to purchase weaponry and other essentials through a regional black market awash in illicit material.
At the same time, Canadian and other ISAF forces report significant successes in their strategy of “clear, hold and develop,” pointing to communities where people are safer from violence and where reconstruction and development are under way. And there is no indication of popular Afghan enthusiasm for a return to Taliban rule.

What these mixed judgments demonstrate is a striking and troubling absence of reliable benchmarks for measuring progress in improving security for the people of Afghanistan. Without systematic performance standards, accounts of security successes or failures are mainly anecdotal (and predictably contentious). The Panel strongly believes that the Afghan and ISAF governments need first to craft a much more unified and coherent security strategy, and then to impose practical, verifiable criteria for gauging and analyzing the course of that strategy.

The insurgency has increasingly exploited “asymmetric” tactics against larger ISAF and Afghan forces. Improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, kidnappings and other small-scale attacks against civilians and soldiers, all intended to terrorize, are prominent. Insurgents rarely mass for battles against ISAF or the Afghan National Army (ANA). They never win in such encounters, but for their purposes the insurgents do not need to win many battles. Their objectives are to unsettle the population, shake popular confidence in the safety that can be provided by the government, and discourage the populations of ISAF countries enough to cause the withdrawal of their forces from the fight.

In the face of a serious and potentially strengthening Taliban insurgency, the Panel observed harmful shortcomings in the NATO/ISAF countersisturgency campaign. The most damaging shortfalls include an insufficiency of forces in the field, especially in high-risk zones in the South; a top-heavy command structure at ISAF headquarters in Kabul; an absence of a comprehensive strategy directing all ISAF forces in collaboration with the Afghan government; limitations placed by some NATO governments on the operations of their units, which effectively keep those forces out of the conflict; and inadequate coordination between military and civilian programs for security, stabilization, reconstruction and development. One source of ISAF inefficiencies, cited by senior NATO officers, is the too-frequent rotation of ISAF commanders at its Kabul headquarters and in the regional commands. These and other deficiencies reflect serious failures of strategic direction, and persistent fragmentation in the efforts of ISAF and NATO governments and between them and the Afghan government. Collaboration between ISAF and Afghan National Army operations would be improved by closer integration of ANA officers into ISAF command decisions. Most multinational commands are by nature inefficient. ISAF commanders must work around these inevitable obstacles, often using skills that are more diplomatic than military. Nonetheless, these deficiencies need correcting. Stronger strategy, and more cohesive strategic direction, are essential.
The Panel heard in many of its interviews, including those with NATO commanders, that NATO and ISAF have simply not deployed enough troops against the insurgency. Improving Afghan security requires more ISAF soldiers. Too many NATO governments have failed to contribute significant numbers of troops in the regions of Afghanistan most vulnerable to insurgent attack and destabilization. Others have placed caveats on their military activities—prohibiting night fighting, for instance, or refusing to authorize helicopter flights that might expose pilots to combat. As a result some countries, notably the United States, Britain and Canada, have borne more than a proportionate share of war-fighting in Afghanistan.

In the end, the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan will have to be won by Afghans. (Few counterinsurgencies in history have been won by foreign armies, particularly where the indigenous insurgents enjoy convenient sanctuary in a bordering country.) The Afghan National Army has shown measurable improvements. It is becoming larger, with a strength now of about 47,000 troops and a plan to reach at least 70,000 by the end of 2010. It is becoming better trained and better disciplined. And where it is present on the ground it generates support and confidence among Afghans. As Afghans themselves insist, the ANA needs to grow bigger and better still. Accelerating the training and equipping of the ANA is an increasingly urgent mission for Canadian and other ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

**Figure 1: Projected Afghan National Army Growth**

![Projected Afghan National Army Growth Graph](image)

Source: Afghan Ministry of Defence; Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
For governments fighting any insurgency, attracting and holding popular support and reinforcing local confidence are core objectives. Afghan public opinion, insofar as it can be measured by polls and other means, remains overwhelmingly hostile to any return of Taliban rule. To that important extent, the insurgency is a failure. But the Afghan government must demonstrate improving capacity to protect and provide services to its citizens. Many Afghans, having suffered in the past and now experiencing the uncertainties of daily life, are hedging their bets against the future—not investing any wholehearted loyalty either in the government or in the Taliban.

For these reasons, ISAF and Afghan commanders must take every precaution to respect local culture, and to prevent civilian casualties in military operations. These unintended civilian casualties cause deplorable suffering among innocent victims while undercutting the essential objective of securing public support. The numbers of Afghan civilians killed in conflict have doubled since 2005. Whether they die from suicide bombers, improvised explosives or ISAF bombing, the effect on public sentiment is inevitably demoralizing. In addition, insurgents exploit deaths caused by ISAF operations in Taliban propaganda.

Some polling suggests that popular confidence in the capacity of ISAF or Afghan authorities to protect the security of citizens has declined between 2005 and 2007. Arresting and reversing such a decline, not least by reasserting ISAF determination and effectiveness and improving Afghan government capacity, must be accepted as a pressing priority for every country engaged in Afghanistan.

The opium trade is a complicating factor in Afghan security, and it is both a result of violent instability and a contributor to it. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, opium production in 2007 was 34 per cent higher than in 2006. (This increase was partly attributable to weather that favoured poppy crops, and may not indicate a continuing trend.) Fully 90 per cent of the world’s illicit opium supply originates in Afghanistan. Opium profits flow to the Taliban, to criminal elements and to corrupt provincial and central-government officials. The Panel found that different and in some cases contradictory Afghan government and foreign counter-narcotics policies and practices have been working at cross-purposes. Coherent counter-narcotics strategies need to be adopted by all relevant authorities. These approaches must include justice-sector reforms to tighten the prosecution of traffickers. And they must offer effective economic provisions to induce would-be poppy farmers and middlemen to prefer and find alternative lines of work. As one possibility, a limited poppy-for-medicine project might be worth pursuing. Any good strategy will take time to yield results.
More fundamentally, military victories will count for little unless the Afghan government, with the help of others, can improve governance and provide better living conditions for the Afghan people. Again, success here requires stronger coordination among donor governments, and between those donors and Afghan authorities.

**GOVERNANCE**

Afghans have elected a president and parliament—no small accomplishment for a poor country in the midst of conflict. The popularity of President Karzai (whose term ends in 2009) is greater in some regions than others, and is no doubt subject to public perceptions of his government’s performance. New national institutions have been created and traditional local governance mechanisms are being re-established, allowing Afghans to take part personally in the management of their own communities.

Understandably (after decades of political, economic and social ruin) institutional capacity in the Afghan government is still very weak. The Panel met remarkably talented and dedicated public servants and political leaders in Afghanistan, but we also found a debilitating lack of experienced people with professional competence across the Afghan government. Some of Afghanistan’s ablest people fled the country during the Soviet and Taliban eras and have not returned. Corruption is widespread, characterized by cronyism, bribery and a variety of shakedown enterprises managed by government officials. Parts of the Afghan National Police (ANP) remain notoriously corrupt and ill-disciplined—perceived by many Afghans to be more a threat to public security than a source of protection. The judiciary is reportedly subject to interference from government officials and militia commanders; judges, lawyers and police are poorly paid and generally under-trained. The security and justice sectors overall—police, courts and prisons—display persisting inadequacies. The rights and security of ordinary Afghans are thereby undermined. In some districts, militias in the pay of chieftain-warlords menace local populations with protection rackets and other crime. Strengthening the justice and security sectors, especially the ANP, compels a coordinated and sustained international commitment. This commitment must recognize the reality that, in some cases, assisting Afghans to improve governance will not mean instituting Western concepts of law and justice. Often enough it will mean blending familiar international procedures with the best of traditional Afghan approaches to the peaceful settlement of community disputes and private differences.
Canadians have heard and expressed specific concerns about the handling by Afghan officials of prisoners turned over to them by Canadian soldiers. These concerns (shared in other ISAF countries) raise issues currently before Canadian courts. Two questions stand out. First, are detainees treated humanely, as required by treaties and other international law? And second, do ISAF countries retain obligations with regard to the safety and welfare of detainees after their transfer to Afghan custody? Our discussions with Canadian Forces officers in Afghanistan persuaded us that their procedures for handling and transferring detainees conform fully with international standards and with Canada’s own international legal obligations. However, the Panel did not have the opportunity to evaluate Afghan practices. As in other areas of governance, Canada and ISAF partners should continue working to enhance Afghan government capacity and performance in protecting the rights of detainees. The Afghan government must be held accountable for providing prisoners with due process and humane treatment. It must also be held to the terms of its formal agreements with the Canadian and other governments on detainee transfers.

Eventually, achieving a genuine and stable peace in Afghanistan will necessitate a more thoroughgoing political and social reconciliation among Afghans themselves—citizens who have been divided for generations on differences of tribal, regional and political identity. With time, better governance will involve a negotiated coming-to-terms between the present Afghan political leadership and some adherents of the former Taliban regime who renounce terror and repression and adopt the norms and practices of democracy. Members of the old Taliban regime guilty of the grossest violations of human rights—and responsible for the deaths of uncounted thousands of innocent Afghans—should be brought to justice. Others, who do not carry that guilt and who accept the provisions of the Afghan constitution, can be engaged in the long work of rebuilding Afghanistan’s unity. With that objective, Afghan authorities need to set ground rules to guide preparations for those negotiations. Canada should contribute to Afghanistan’s better governance by facilitating, where possible, the difficult process of reconciliation.

Improving governance is essential to improving security in Afghanistan. As many Afghans told the Panel, the weakness of the existing elected Afghan government compounds the threat of a Taliban return. Indeed, speeding the establishment of sustainable institutions of governance counts among the most valuable and urgent contributions that Canadians and others can make to the well-being of Afghans and their families. Afghan authorities—in the central government and in Afghanistan’s 34 provinces—will only earn legitimacy and public confidence by demonstrating an improved capacity for accountable, honest and effective governance.
Here again, the many UN agencies working in Afghanistan, and governments (like Canada’s) committing aid to Afghanistan, can do a far better job of coordinating good-governance activities for earlier and stronger effect. To achieve these better results, foreign organizations in Afghanistan must reduce the number of inconsistent and sometimes contradictory demands they place on slender Afghan institutions struggling to build their own capacity. The appointment of a newly empowered special civilian representative, to coordinate and consolidate these international activities in Afghanistan, can greatly enhance their effectiveness. Canada can apply its own diplomatic resources much more powerfully to those purposes of coordination and rationalization.

DEVELOPMENT

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Afghanistan’s economy has recorded impressive growth rates since the removal of the Taliban from power in 2001. Incomes, investment, currency reform, inflation control, government revenues, cross-border trade, access to health care and schooling—all these and other measures give evidence of real and widely-shared development. Still, Afghanistan remains a shockingly poor and dangerous place for too many Afghans.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2007 ranked Afghanistan 174th out of 178 countries on its global Human Development Index (a composite of education, health and economic indicators). Why the low score? UNDP says 6.6 million Afghans do not meet minimum food requirements. Gender discrimination remains pervasive; the illiteracy rate among women has been put at 87 per cent, as against 57 per cent among men. And Afghanistan reports one of the world’s highest rates of tuberculosis infection, another common marker of severe poverty.

That being said, Afghanistan displays great development potential: stores of unexploited natural resources, agricultural prospects, opportunities for light industry in several sectors, and (most of all, perhaps) a lively and resilient entrepreneurial spirit. Even the enormous Afghan diaspora abroad—several million people—represents development potential. Remittances back to Afghanistan, from Afghans living abroad, have totalled an estimated $5 billion since 2001.

The Afghanistan Compact of 2006, in which Canada is a partner, spells out priorities for Afghanistan’s development and for aid donors to Afghanistan. It identified the three critical areas of activity as security; governance (including rule of law and human rights); and economic and social development. The Compact
(which runs until 2011) also set out targets and timelines, all to be overseen by a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board comprising representatives of the Afghan and donor governments and the UN. In all, the Afghanistan Compact constitutes a critically important plan for concerted action by Afghans and the international community. But its targets have proved more formal than real, and performance assessments have been flimsy. Progress actually felt by Afghans has been slow and uncertain, in some areas due to the insurgency and generally because of the limited capacity of Afghan institutions to absorb the aid available. Positive action and coordination have been inadequate.

Fulfilling those Compact objectives and meeting the deadlines will require new commitments by Afghan and donor authorities—with fresh leadership and determination to execute effective development programming and build the capacity of Afghan institutions. More than that, progress demands systematic measures of effectiveness. Canada can help muster international action to put those measures in place—and to reinvest the multinational development presence in Afghanistan with high-level political direction. Canada’s own Afghan aid program also needs strengthening, a subject the Panel addresses in Parts III and IV below.
Part III: Assessing Canadian Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements

Canada’s military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan has been difficult and dangerous. Has it been effective and worthwhile?

An answer to that question, along with any assessment of Canadian performance in Afghanistan, must start with a clear sense of Canadian objectives there. Countering the terrorist threat, by foreclosing the regression of Afghanistan as a haven again for terrorists, is plainly one objective. To achieve that imperative, and to protect regional and international stability, most people (Canadians and Afghans alike) can agree on a larger and overarching purpose—to help build a stable and developing country in which the rights of all citizens are respected and their security is protected by their own government. This remains an ambitious purpose. Afghanistan is still, after all, a very poor country in a very hazardous region. But it is a purpose consistent with Canada’s history of international engagement, and with principles that Canadians recognize as just and reasonable.

In the turmoil of events in Afghanistan during the six years since 9/11, the nature and logic of Canadian engagement have not been well understood by Canadians. While public support for Canadian troops is strong, Canadians have been uncertain about Canada’s evolving mission in Afghanistan. To put things bluntly, Governments from the start of Canada’s Afghan involvement have failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement. Almost the only Government accounts that Canadians have received have come from the Department of National Defence. Important issues of Canadian diplomacy and aid in Afghanistan have scarcely been acknowledged and seldom asserted in public by ministers or officials responsible. Canada’s ambassadors in Kabul, NATO and other capitals have had limited authority to explain Canadian policy. The Panel believes that this information deficit needs to be redressed immediately in a comprehensive and more balanced communication strategy of open and continuous engagement with Canadians.

For our part, Panel members are persuaded by four strong reasons for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan:

First, Canada has sent soldiers, diplomats and aid workers to Afghanistan as part of an international response to the threat to peace and security inherent in Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. The world had largely abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989; civil war and state failure followed. The haven that the Taliban gave to Al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks showed how disorder and repressive extremism there could create a threat to the security of other countries—
including Canada—far distant from Afghanistan’s borders. A primary Canadian objective, while helping Afghans, has been to help ensure that Afghanistan itself does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism. Countries as fortunately endowed as Canada—and as interdependent with the rest of the world—owe obligations to the international community. Participating in the international intervention in Afghanistan, at the request of the Afghan government, has been one of those obligations. The consequences of international failure in Afghanistan—for Afghans and for the world—would be disastrous.

Second, Canadians are in Afghanistan in support of the United Nations, contributing to the UN’s capacity to respond to threats to peace and security and to foster better futures in the world’s developing countries. This is not the same UN peacekeeping that Canadians have known and supported in the past; in Afghanistan there is not yet a peace to keep, no truce to supervise or “green line” to watch. This is a peace-enforcement operation, as provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is a collective use of force, under international law, to address a threat to international peace and security posed by continuing disorder in Afghanistan. It reflects as well the changing nature of UN-mandated peace missions, which have become more robust in the use of force to protect civilians since the harsh lessons learned in the murderous disasters of Bosnia and Rwanda. Similarly-authorized enforcement missions have served in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In fact, these are the kinds of force the UN might be called upon to apply more often in future, where the human rights and human security of ordinary people are threatened. When the UN and its members authorize such a mission, Canadians have a choice: Canada can participate where Canadian capabilities allow, or we can leave the mission to others.

A third reason for Canada’s engagement is that the military mission in Afghanistan is chiefly, though not exclusively, a NATO endeavour (26 of the 39 ISAF partners are NATO members). NATO is the UN’s instrument for stabilizing a durable peace in Afghanistan, enabling that country’s development and the improvement of its governance. Canada’s political and security interests for almost 60 years have been advanced by Canadian membership in the NATO alliance, a history reaching from the early years of the Cold War to life-saving NATO interventions in the Balkans. More often than not, Canadian interests are well served by active membership in an organization of democracies that gives every member country a voice in protecting our shared security. Afghanistan represents a challenge to NATO’s credibility; to meet that challenge, NATO partners will have to assign more forces to Afghanistan and execute a more effective counterinsurgency strategy. NATO’s success in that conflict will serve Canada’s own security interests.
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

There is a fourth and equally powerful reason for Canadian engagement: the promotion and protection of human security in fragile states. Results in Afghanistan can influence the willingness of Canadians, and of others, to act in future to protect the lives and rights of people who cannot count on the protection of their own government. Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 proved what can happen when the world ignores impending catastrophe. Time and again, failed and fragile states—and governments that betray responsibilities to protect their own citizens—jeopardize international order and test the strength of our convictions. These are times for capable countries to take a stand. Far from breaching its responsibility to its citizens, the Afghan government has invited international help. An effective international response can serve Canadian interests and give practical force to our shared values. Reasserting Canada’s international reputation for reliability in Afghanistan can enhance Canada’s own influence in resolving crises in the future.

The Panel finds these reasons all the more persuasive because they are commonly reiterated by Canadians with deep professional experience in Afghanistan. Canadian soldiers and civilians have been articulate about their mission, and confident that they are making serious contributions to the well-being of Afghans and to the security of Canadians.

These are inescapable considerations that belong in any true assessment of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan. They have informed the Panel’s analysis of Canada’s military and civilian activities in Afghanistan so far, and they have shaped the recommendations that flow from the facts we have found on the ground.

CANADIAN PERFORMANCE

Canada’s military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan has become the most expansive expression of Canadian foreign policy since the Korean War more than 50 years ago. In size and complexity the Afghan mission has grown rapidly, and its character has changed significantly since those first interventions in Afghanistan after 9/11.

As soon as the UN Security Council authorized member states to take action against the “perpetrators, organizers and sponsors” of the 9/11 attacks, Canada deployed four warships and a tactical airlift detachment to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. In February 2002, Canadian troops landed in Afghanistan. (There have also been unheralded deployments of Canadian Special Forces.) By the end of 2002, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had signed its first post-9/11 aid agreement for Afghanistan. Also in 2002, Canada and Afghanistan restored their diplomatic relations, severed by Canada in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. The Canadian Embassy in Kabul opened in September 2003.
From 2002 to 2005 Canadian Forces personnel served in Afghanistan first in Kandahar and then providing security for large areas of Kabul. During the same period, NATO assumed command of ISAF, and the UN Security Council extended ISAF’s authority from the Kabul area throughout Afghanistan. From February to August 2004, Canadian General Rick Hillier (now Chief of the Defence Staff) served a rotation as ISAF’s commander in its Kabul headquarters. CIDA funding for Afghanistan was meanwhile gathering momentum.

In 2005 Canada chose, for whatever reason, to assume leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City and the security obligations that went with it. Canada took command of the Kandahar PRT in August 2005, and it has since become a centrepiece of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. As the lead country in the PRT, Canada helps facilitate and extend the Afghan government’s ability to protect and deliver services to the people of the province. The Kandahar PRT, one of 26 PRTs across Afghanistan, consists of about 335 people. Of these, 315 are drawn from the Canadian Forces and the rest from Foreign Affairs, CIDA, RCMP and municipal police, and Correctional Service Canada (working on reforms to Afghanistan’s prison system). One U.S. State Department official, one U.S. development officer and several U.S. police mentors also participate in the Kandahar PRT.

Along with Canada’s commitment to the Kandahar PRT, the Canadian Forces undertook a redeployment from Kabul to Kandahar, completed in February 2006. In July 2006, ISAF formally assumed command in Kandahar province and the rest of southern Afghanistan—a large region formerly patrolled by U.S. forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. (That operation, still led by the United States, remains in Afghanistan with a particular emphasis on counterterrorism.)
The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan now number about 2,500 soldiers, most in a battalion group and support elements in Kandahar. By comparison, all ISAF forces in Afghanistan, from 39 countries, now total about 41,700 personnel. The Canadian Forces are now responsible under ISAF for security in Kandahar province, and provide the predominant non-Afghan military presence there. Forces of several other countries lend support, both for day-to-day operations and special needs as required.

Critical to the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan is their contribution to training the Afghan National Army. Organized in Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), small groups of Forces personnel attached to ANA units are helping to develop the ANA’s own capacity to plan, lead and sustain operations in defence of security in the province. Canadian soldiers in these teams are currently working with 2,400 ANA soldiers in Kandahar province. Other Canadians in similar teams are mentoring in Afghan National Police detachments. Accelerating this training of Afghanistan’s security forces is an urgent Canadian and ISAF goal. Transferring responsibility for security to Afghan authorities is the ultimate objective. (Afghans as much as anyone else want this transfer to occur as soon as possible.) In Kabul, a smaller number of Canadian Forces personnel are participating in a multinational effort known as the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, building a security infrastructure in Afghanistan that includes the ANA and the Afghan National Police.
Canada’s civilian aid spending in Afghanistan, mainly through CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), now averages more than $100 million annually. A principal stated objective of Canadian aid has been, whenever possible, to help build the capacity, legitimacy and popular support of Afghan government and non-governmental institutions. Canadian assistance has aimed at a wide range of activities, including repair and construction of roads, irrigation and other infrastructure; microfinance to promote the start of small businesses (especially by women); education; rural development; and support of community development councils, which are proving themselves as valuable vehicles of local democracy and village development. In clinics and schoolrooms, villages and neighbourhoods, the Panel witnessed encouraging examples of development aid having strong effect.

**FIGURE 4: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN - BY CHANNEL**

![Graph showing international assistance by channel from 2001-02 to 2006-07.]

However, the Canadian aid program in Afghanistan has been impeded not only by the dangerous security environment in Kandahar but by CIDA’s own administrative constraints. More than half of CIDA funding in Afghanistan flows through multilateral agencies, and another 35 per cent is channelled through national programs administered by the central government in Kabul. This leaves little for locally managed quick-action projects that bring immediate
improvements to everyday life for Afghans, or for “signature” projects readily identifiable as supported by Canada. Funding allocations aside, CIDA staffers in Kandahar do not often venture beyond their base, in part, we were told, because of restrictive security regulations maintained by CIDA’s headquarters in Canada. While it is undeniably difficult to place civilians in a conflict zone, CIDA should delegate decisions about security of movement to civilian and military officials on the ground who are best placed to make such assessments. It makes little sense to post brave and talented professional staff to Kandahar only to restrict them from making regular contact with the people they are expected to help.

While we acknowledge the courage and professionalism of the civilians posted to Kandahar, the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar also displays signs of the fragmentation and uncoordinated effort that prevail throughout the programming of international development aid in Afghanistan. Effectiveness would be enhanced by aligning national and departmental priorities and operations more closely—and more collaboratively. We also believe that the Provincial Reconstruction Team, sooner rather than later, should be placed under civilian leadership.

The South of Afghanistan in general, and Kandahar in particular, have been more dangerous, and more exposed to insurgent violence, than most other parts of Afghanistan. (Kandahar PRT units do not move “outside the wire” without a military convoy including at least three armoured vehicles and 20 Canadian soldiers.) The intensity of insurgency in the South, and the relatively large number of Canadian soldiers active there, together help to explain why Canadians have suffered high casualty rates (the highest in ISAF as a proportion of troops deployed). But the Panel could elicit no conclusive explanation for the disproportionately high casualty rates suffered by Canadians in Afghanistan. This issue warrants closer scrutiny by the Government.

Many of these Canadian casualties occurred in late 2006. In September that year, the Canadian Forces led ISAF’s Operation Medusa, a major offensive against the insurgents in Kandahar province. Since then, Canadian casualty numbers declined through 2007.

In spite of successes in these operations, there is anecdotal evidence that the insurgency has since regained some ground. Canadian and other NATO/ISAF commanders attribute current security conditions in part at least to insufficient available forces both from the Afghan National Army and from NATO members. The Panel is aware that NATO commanders and defence ministers, including Canada’s, have pressed ISAF and NATO partners to contribute more troops to the Afghan mission, and to minimize the effects of “caveats” that limit the utility of deployed forces. This needs coherent and sustained diplomacy by Canada, led by the Prime Minister and specifically including interventions on the subject in his bilateral conversations with foreign leaders.
The Panel recognizes, however, that Afghans themselves must ultimately acquire the forces needed to defend their own security. The ISAF presence in Afghanistan, including Canada’s, can only be temporary.

The Panel has also heard that the safety and effectiveness of Canadian Forces in Kandahar would be markedly increased by the acquisition and deployment of new equipment. In particular, added helicopter airlift capacity and advanced unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles are needed now. No equipment can perfectly protect Canadian soldiers against improvised explosive devices. But helicopters can save lives by reducing reliance on transporting troops by road, and aerial surveillance can more effectively track insurgent movements.

Beyond its own borders, Afghanistan is surrounded by a violence-prone region. The mountainous western reaches of Pakistan, along the boundary with Afghanistan, harbour Afghan insurgents who are reinforced by recruits from countries around the Gulf and further abroad. Pakistan’s own domestic political upheavals and recurring crises—and its concerns about India’s growing economic and political presence in Afghanistan—complicate the region’s geopolitics. Iran, to Afghanistan’s West, has been a source of arms trafficking into Afghanistan. The actions of regional powers require focused consideration as policy-making proceeds. Canada, in concert with key allies, should adopt a coherent diplomatic strategy that addresses regional risks and engages all the region’s actors, in particular Pakistan, to establish a more stable security environment.

The Panel understands, moreover, that the U.S. government—heretofore preoccupied with the war in Iraq—has lately reconcentrated its attention on the urgency of establishing security in Afghanistan. This development seems to have bipartisan approval in Washington, and appears likely to withstand the U.S. elections this year. The recently reported U.S. plan to deploy 3,000 more Marines to ISAF’s southern region is welcome but not, by itself, sufficient. The Panel remains convinced that more ISAF troops are needed, specifically in Kandahar, to expand ISAF’s ability to hold territory and to help train Afghan security forces. Additionally, Britain has increased deployments in Helmand province next to Kandahar, and France has deployed fighter aircraft to Kandahar.

All of these circumstances argue for a redoubled and reorganized Canadian diplomatic effort—led by the Prime Minister—to improve prospects for security, governance and development in Afghanistan. The objective of this diplomatic effort should be to raise Canada’s voice, commensurate with the Canadian contribution in Afghanistan, to establish a comprehensive political-military ISAF strategy; to press for improvements in NATO/ISAF force structure, command organization and operational effectiveness; and to advocate the deployment of more forces to Afghanistan by other NATO partners. This Canadian diplomacy must also focus particularly on fast-changing developments in Pakistan.
No insurgency—and certainly not the Afghan insurgency—can be defeated by military force alone. The Panel holds strongly that it is urgent to complete practical, significant development projects of immediate value to Afghans, while at the same time contributing to the capacity and legitimacy of Afghan government institutions. Further, Panel members believe that Canada’s civilian programs have not achieved the scale or depth of engagement necessary to make a significant impact. (Currently, there are 47 Canadian government civilians in Afghanistan, divided between the embassy in Kabul, Kandahar Airfield and the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, and about 2,500 soldiers.) It is essential to adjust funding and staffing imbalances between the heavy Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan and the comparatively lighter civilian commitment to reconstruction, development and governance.

**FIGURE 5: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENTS (2002 - 2007)**

Similarly, the Canadian government needs to elevate coordination in Ottawa among Canadian departments and agencies engaged in Afghanistan for better efficiency and effectiveness, and to enhance the civilian content of Kandahar PRT activity.

In Ottawa, interdepartmental coordination is currently led by an associate deputy minister of foreign affairs working with representatives from National Defence, DFAIT, CIDA, Correctional Service Canada and the RCMP. CIDA has its own Afghan task force, and some other departments have parallel units responsible for activities in Afghanistan. Separate departmental task forces are not the answer to inadequate coordination of Canadian activities. These coordinating efforts would have stronger effect, and achieve greater cross-government coherence, if they were led by the Prime Minister, supported by a cabinet committee and staffed by a single full-time task force. Fulfilling Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan requires the political energy only a Prime Minister can impart.
Enhancing the civilian content of the Kandahar PRT would reflect the priorities of Canadians and the needs of Afghans. Completing “signature” reconstruction and development projects soon, and creating conditions in which Afghans take on more responsibilities for their own security and development, will require meaningful new investments in Canada’s civilian engagement.

Finally, Canada can significantly strengthen its diplomatic activity to bring about stronger international coordination of civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan. The international appointment of a high-level civilian, who can bring coherence to international security, governance and reconstruction programs, ought to be a priority objective. This special representative, armed with the right mandate and with explicit political support from the UN Secretary-General, the Afghan government and the countries most active in rebuilding Afghanistan, can coordinate intergovernmental cooperation across the civilian-military divide, and promote more effective action by Afghan authorities. Canada should help ensure the special representative has the resources and authority (including authority over UN agencies in Afghanistan) to perform this vital task. No less pressing is the rededication of a more productive international diplomacy, with a stronger and better organized Canadian participation, to address surrounding regional threats to Afghan security. Both objectives would be well served by a more vigorous Canadian participation proportionate to Canada’s contribution to Afghan security. These points are addressed in our Recommendations.
Part IV: Canada’s Future in Afghanistan: Considerations and Recommendations

In May 2006 the House of Commons resolved to support the Government’s extension of Canada’s military and civilian deployments in Afghanistan to February 2009. The Government has since undertaken that it would submit to Parliament the decision on any Canadian military commitment after 2009. So it will be for Canadians to decide, through Parliament, what Canada should do—and what it can do—in Afghanistan’s future.

No simple solutions present themselves. Conditions in Afghanistan are complicated; its future is in large measure unpredictable, and will be determined to some extent by the conduct of other governments with interests in Afghanistan. In the context of these uncertainties, reconciling diverse Canadian interests—including interests in helping people of other countries in dire peril—is not easy. But it is necessary.

In any event, the Panel could find no operational logic for choosing February 2009 as the end date for Canada’s military mission in Kandahar—and nothing to establish February 2009 as the date by which the mission would be completed.

At its core, the aim of Canadian policy is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country better governed, more peaceful and more secure. How can Canada, with others, best contribute to accomplishing that result within the limits of Canadian capacity and influence?

The Panel’s own Terms of Reference, set out by the Government, identified four options for consideration (without excluding others the Panel might contemplate). In general, the Panel concluded that all four are deficient. Specifically:

**Option 1** would have Canada continue training the Afghan army and police and begin withdrawing Canadian troops in February 2009. This option falsely implies a clear line between the training role and combat activity; in reality, training and mentoring Afghan forces means sometimes conducting combat operations with them. It is also silent on important diplomatic and development issues and options, including Canadian interests in fostering better governance in Afghanistan, strengthening institutions for international development and security, and reducing regional tensions. Because the Afghan National Army cannot by 2009 assume full security responsibilities in Kandahar, an abrupt departure of Canadian troops, without new ISAF forces to take their place, would trigger a security collapse in the province.
Option 2 would have Canada focus on development and governance, and rely on other countries to take charge of security in Kandahar province. This option omits mention of the Canadian Forces’ activities throughout Afghanistan, and presumes the capacity and willingness of another country to deploy more forces in Kandahar if Canada were to depart now. It also assumes that if another country were inserted into Kandahar, security, governance and development work would proceed together just as successfully. Fostering development, and improving governance, cannot proceed without security. Canada’s civilian and military efforts in Kandahar, after just two years of close collaboration, are now starting to achieve some real operational synergy that would be difficult to replicate quickly with the forces of another country. Furthermore, any precipitate Canadian military withdrawal from Kandahar would place an immediate and irresponsible demand on Canadian allies: Either they move troops to Kandahar to replace departing Canadians, or ISAF and Afghans face an imminent security crisis in the province. At the very least, such a demand would damage Canada’s standing as a trustworthy ally. Canada chose to deploy forces in Kandahar. To abandon an uncompleted commitment to allies and partners in this way would threaten the achievability of a secure peace in Afghanistan.

Option 3 would have Canada move its existing security, governance and development programs to another Afghan region. This option raises some of the same issues addressed in Option 2. In addition, it fails to acknowledge that the experience Canadian soldiers and civilians have acquired in Kandahar makes Canadians uniquely qualified to pursue progress there. Knowledge of local conditions and prospects, personal contacts in communities and among local officials, a feel for the dangers and opportunities that only time on the ground can develop—these are vital assets that are not easily transferable to another army or another aid team. Having chosen to lead ISAF operations in Kandahar, to jettison these assets, and relocate a Canadian presence to some other area of Afghanistan, would inevitably waste a large part of Canada’s human and financial investment in Kandahar. Worse still, it would mean taking troops out of Kandahar at precisely the time when more troops need to be deployed there.

Option 4 would have Canada withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan after February 2009, leaving only enough to protect aid workers and diplomats. Again, the Panel found no operational justification for setting February 2009 as the date to end the military mission. Still, several versions of this immediate-withdrawal option have attracted considerable attention among Canadians, and this option deserves a fuller discussion.

One variant would have Canada end its combat mission completely in February 2009. The Panel did not judge this to be a viable option. Bringing the Canadian combat mission to an end is the objective we all share, but the issue here is timing.
The Canadian combat mission should conclude when the Afghan National Army is ready to provide security in Kandahar province. Progress to that end will accelerate as training of the ANA intensifies; and without doubt, more military resources from other ISAF countries must be forthcoming. Ending Canada’s military contribution in Kandahar is therefore not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground.

Still another variant of the withdrawal option would have Canadian troops adopt what is described as a “traditional peacekeeping” role in Kandahar—using force only in self-defence. As we have earlier pointed out, however, there is not yet a peace to keep in Afghanistan. ISAF is conducting a UN-mandated peace-enforcement operation, using military force to suppress a very violent insurgency that threatens international peace and the survival of an elected Afghan government. It is the kind of mission that the UN must authorize on occasion if the international community is to prevent future Rwandas, future Bosnias.

But there are other arguments raised by advocates of quick military withdrawal. Some say that the financial cost of Canada’s military engagement ($6.1 billion from fiscal years 2000-01 to 2006-07) is excessive, or could be better spent elsewhere—in Afghan reconstruction and development, for instance, or in Darfur. They argue that the overall Canadian engagement in Afghanistan is misplaced and has failed to make progress, and that progress is unlikely. They argue that Canada, deliberately or not, has become part of a misdirected U.S. “war on terror,” damaging Canada’s international reputation and endangering Canadian security.

These arguments raise serious issues, and they require a serious response.

Truth be told, conditions have changed over the years in Afghanistan, and the Canadian military mission has changed as a consequence. The strongest impression formed by the Panel was that the Canadian Forces are doing a highly commendable job in a more violent and hazardous mission than was envisaged when they were first deployed to Afghanistan. The extent and character of the current Canadian commitment reflect this unpredicted flow of events, and the powerful effect of past decisions.

Canadian interests and values, and Canadian lives, are now invested in Afghanistan. The sacrifices made there, by Canadians and their families, must be respected. What we do there (or stop doing) affects the Afghan people. It can affect Canadian security. It can affect Canada’s reputation in the world. It can affect our influence in international affairs, particularly with respect to future international responses to the dangers and deprivations of failed and fragile states. Canada is a wealthy G8 country; our good fortune and standing impose on us both authority and obligations in global affairs.
The Panel is convinced that Canadian objectives in Afghanistan are both honourable and achievable. The aim there is not to create some fanciful model of prosperous democracy. Canadian objectives are more realistic: to contribute, with others, to a better governed, stable and developing Afghanistan whose government can protect the security of the country and its people. This is why we believe that Canada should press diplomatically, at the highest level, for a comprehensive political-military strategy and for more coherent leadership of international commitments to Afghanistan, combined with the strongest possible efforts of Afghan authorities.

A premature military withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether full or partial, would imperil Canadian interests and values. It would diminish the effectiveness of Canadian aid in Afghanistan, by further constraining the ability of Canadian aid workers to move among Afghans. It could encourage insurgents. It could weaken the confidence of some Afghans living in Kandahar in their own future and in their own government, increasing their susceptibility to the Taliban insurgency. It would undermine Canada’s influence in the UN and in NATO capitals, including Washington. It could curtail Canada’s capacity (and raise questions abroad about our future willingness) to act, and persuade others to act, in enforcing peace and restoring security where peace and security are threatened. In sum, an immediate military withdrawal from Afghanistan would cause more harm than good. Even an ill-prepared partial withdrawal would risk undercutting international confidence in Canadian commitments and impose new burdens on others obliged to take our place in Kandahar.

Canadians are not (as the Panel was reminded by an acknowledged expert in Afghan affairs) obliged to do the impossible. But to view the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as impossible is a belief the Panel does not share. Indeed, to withdraw now would make futility certain, and failure inescapable. Neither do we accept any parallel between the Afghanistan mission and the U.S.-led war in Iraq. To confuse the two is to overlook the authority of the UN, the collective decisions of NATO and the legitimacy of the Afghan government that has sought Canada’s engagement. What is evident is that the commitment to Afghanistan made by successive Canadian Governments has not yet been completed.

WHAT NEXT?

The Panel proposes a new and more comprehensive Canadian strategy for Afghanistan—a strategy that honours the sacrifices Canadians have already made in Afghanistan, serves Canadian interests, gives expression to Canadian values, and corresponds realistically to Canada’s capacity. These Recommendations are rooted in the logic of our preceding observations and assessments. The adoption
of these Recommendations would commit Canada to a more coherent diplomatic engagement in the international partnership working for Afghanistan’s security, better governance and development. It would reorient Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan more systematically from combat to the intensified training of the Afghan army and police. And it would improve the impact of Canada’s civilian aid to the Afghan people.

It bears re-emphasis that Canadian resources, and Canadians’ patience, are not limitless. To return to an observation we made in our Introduction, the commitment to Afghanistan we propose here is not faint-hearted—but nor is it open-ended. To achieve realizable results in Afghanistan, at realistic costs and within a practical period of time, the new Canadian policy approach should include the following elements:

First, the Government should take concerted diplomatic action to establish clearer, more comprehensive strategies and better coordination of the overall effort in Afghanistan by the international community, Afghan authorities and other governments in the region. To ensure systematic and sustained political oversight and more effective implementation, a better integrated and more consistent Canadian policy approach should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and a single full-time task force involving all key departments and agencies. The NATO summit meeting this April in Bucharest, where the elaboration of a comprehensive alliance strategy for Afghanistan is to be discussed, presents an opportunity for Canada to address these issues at the highest level. Parliament might wish to defer judgment on Canada’s future in Afghanistan until the NATO summit is concluded. The UN, having delegated security responsibilities in Afghanistan to NATO, needs to reactivate its own role there in partnership with NATO. UN agency operations in Afghanistan have suffered from a lack of leadership, direction and effective coordination from UN headquarters in New York. The appointment of a high-level representative to lead and coordinate both the UN and NATO commitments in Afghanistan can help achieve more productive UN-NATO collaboration. Canada can act with other governments participating in Afghanistan to see that the special representative’s mandate is fully and effectively exercised. Canadian diplomacy should work to ensure that Canada’s involvement in this new management and oversight matches the magnitude of Canada’s contributions to Afghanistan.

The situation in Pakistan is most difficult to assess, and it is evolving quickly. The Government will have to monitor events there very closely, and adjust its Afghanistan strategy as events warrant.
Second, the most damaging and obvious deficiency in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is the insufficiency of military forces deployed against the insurgents. Therefore, Canada’s military mission in Kandahar should be conditionally extended beyond February 2009—the extension to be expressly contingent on the deployment of additional troops by one or more ISAF countries to Kandahar province. This added deployment should consist of a battle group (about 1,000 soldiers) to reinforce ISAF’s “clear, hold and develop” strategy in Kandahar and to accelerate training of Afghan army and police units. These additional troops would serve to expand ISAF’s security coverage in Kandahar, and reinforce ISAF’s capacity to prevent incursions from Pakistan and facilitate Afghan training. To repeat: A successful counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan requires more ISAF forces. Despite recent indicators of imminent reinforcements, the entire ISAF mission is threatened by the current inadequacy of deployed military resources. As well, to improve the safety and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in Kandahar, the Government should secure for them, no later than February 2009, new medium-lift helicopters and high-performance unmanned aerial vehicles. Canadian soldiers currently must rely too much on allied forces for both of these necessary assets. If no undertakings on the battle group are received from ISAF partner countries by February 2009, or if the necessary equipment is not procured, the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar.

Many would have preferred us to find a basis on which to recommend an end to the Canadian military role by a certain date, but the timing of that withdrawal depends largely on increasing capacities of the Afghan army and police. There was no clear consensus among military officers or civilian experts as to when Afghan security forces will achieve sufficient size and competence for the withdrawal of ISAF forces in general, or from Kandahar in particular. The buildup of Afghan security forces will take time. Training, especially of the officer corps, requires both time and direct field experience. Indications of progress to date, especially from the Afghan National Army, are encouraging but modest. The hard truth is that an ISAF retreat from Afghanistan, before that country’s own forces can defend its security, would most likely condemn the Afghan people to a new and bloody cycle of civil war and misrule—and raise new threats to global peace and security.

The period between now and 2011 (when the terms of the Afghanistan Compact conclude) will see a gradual transition of lead responsibility for security from ISAF to Afghan security forces. This transition must be guided by objective, practical assessments of the capabilities of Afghan security forces and ISAF forces, with precise timelines, and should be conducted in consultation with the Afghan government and Canada’s allies. These assessments must be continuous, and the Afghan security forces should be able to assume the lead responsibility for some security operations in Kandahar well before 2011. The commitment of an
additional battle group would certainly promote the speedy progress of the transition. And it is the success of the transition that will allow for a rapid reduction of Canada’s military contribution. The quicker the transition occurs, the faster the Canadian Forces can reduce their combat activity in Kandahar.

Third, Canada’s civilian reconstruction and development engagement in Afghanistan should concentrate more on aid that will directly benefit the Afghan people. This calls for more emphasis on project assistance, including at least one “signature” project (a hospital, for example, or a major irrigation project) identified with Canada and led by Canadians. Projects of this sort should address urgent needs as defined by Afghan community leaders, generating local employment and other benefits. This project assistance should be intensified alongside longer-term projects to build the capacity of Afghan communities and institutions. CIDA’s internal procedures should be altered as necessary to facilitate this shift in emphasis. The Government should conduct a full-scale review of the performance of the Canadian civilian aid program. The findings of that overall review should be a basis for determining future aid allocations to Afghanistan, recognizing that development aid is inherently a multi-year commitment.

Fourth, the effectiveness of Canada’s military and civilian activities in Afghanistan, along with the progress of Afghan security, governance and development, must be tracked and assessed more thoroughly and systematically. Only by measuring the practical effects of policy, and understanding changing realities on the ground, can current or future Canadian commitments be productively deliberated or decided. The Afghanistan Compact lays out benchmarks and timelines for Afghan government and international programming. Required now are more practical standards for judging performance and actual results.

The Panel expects the parties to the Compact to conduct a full-scale review of the effectiveness of the security, governance and development effort as a whole in 2011. That multinational review should provide inform decisions on future Canadian commitments to Afghanistan.

Fifth, this new Canadian policy approach should include a rebalancing of the Government’s communications with Canadians about our activities in Afghanistan—providing more information and analysis on the diplomatic and reconstruction-development dimensions. The Government must engage Canadians in a continuous, frank and constructive dialogue about conditions in Afghanistan and the extent to which Canadian objectives are being achieved.

On the basis of our observations, and to meet the requirements of the new policy approach we propose, our Recommendations follow.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Our panel’s objective is to proffer our best advice to Parliament on the manner in which Canada can best contribute to stability in Afghanistan, and to arrange for a timely handover of lead responsibility for security and economic development to the Afghan authorities.

We believe that Canada’s role in Afghanistan should give greater emphasis to diplomacy, reconstruction and governance and that the military mission should shift increasingly towards the training of the Afghan National Security Forces.

These efforts should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and by a single task force directing the activities of all departments and agencies. The objective is to ensure better balance, tighter coordination and more systematic evaluation of Canada’s contributions.

We recommend that:

1. Canada should assert a stronger and more disciplined diplomatic position regarding Afghanistan and the regional players. Specifically, Canada, in concert with key allies, should press for:
   a. Early appointment of a high-level civilian representative of the UN Secretary-General to ensure greater coherence in the civilian and military effort in Afghanistan;
   b. Early adoption by NATO of a comprehensive political-military plan to address security concerns and imbalances, especially the need for more troops to bolster security and expedite training and equipment for the Afghan National Security Forces;
   c. Forceful representations with Afghanistan’s neighbours, in particular with Pakistan, to reduce the risks posed to regional stability and security by recent developments in that country; and
   d. Concerted efforts by the Afghan government to improve governance by tackling corruption and ensuring basic services to the Afghan people, and pursuing some degree of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

2. Canada should continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009, in a manner fully consistent with the UN mandate on Afghanistan, including its combat role, but with increasing emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Forces expeditiously to take lead responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole. As the Afghan National Security Forces gain capability, Canada’s combat role should be significantly reduced.
• This commitment is contingent on the assignment of an additional battle group (of about 1,000 soldiers) to Kandahar by NATO and/or other allies before February 2009.

• To better ensure the safety and effectiveness of the Canadian contingent, the Government should also secure medium helicopter lift capacity and high-performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance before February 2009.

3. Canada’s contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan should be revamped giving higher priority than at present to direct, bilateral project assistance that addresses the immediate, practical needs of the Afghan people, especially in Kandahar province, as well as longer-term capacity-building.

4. The Government should systematically assess the effectiveness of Canadian contributions and the extent to which the benchmarks and timelines of the Afghanistan Compact have been met. Future commitments should be based on those assessments.

5. The Government should provide the public with franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan, offering more assessments of Canada’s role and giving greater emphasis to the diplomatic and reconstruction efforts as well as those of the military.
Part V: Conclusion

Canadians have carried a heavy burden in Afghanistan. The toll in Canadian lives has been grievous, and it is painfully felt. The financial cost has been significant. The course of the conflict has caused us all to question whether Canada’s involvement has been right or effective, and whether it will succeed.

The Panel’s Report and Recommendations present our best answers to those hard questions. Taken together, the Recommendations would establish a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself. For best effect, all three components of the strategy—military, diplomatic and development—need to reinforce each other.

The importance of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan has earned Canadians considerable influence among the countries cooperating in Afghanistan’s progress. Helping to build a more stable, better governed Afghanistan with a growing economy is, we believe, an achievable Canadian objective. But success is not a certainty. The war in Afghanistan is complicated. The future there is dangerous and can frustrate the most confident plan or prediction.

After our three months of study, however, it is our conviction that the Recommendations in our Report—with their attached conditions—together carry a reasonable probability of success. In the circumstances now prevailing, that is the strongest assurance that can be credibly given.
Maps
Glossary of Key Terms

Afghanistan Compact

Launched on 31 January 2006 at the London Conference on Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact represents a five year framework for co-operation between the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and international community. It sets out agreed benchmarks so the Afghan people can live in peace and security under the rule of law, with good governance and human rights protection together with sustainable economic and social development.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

The Bonn talks in 2001 called for the establishment by the end of 2010 of a 70,000 person national, professional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Army as one of the five pillars of the Government of Afghanistan’s security reform strategy (this figure may increase upward to 80,000 in 2008 subject to formal approval). Once fully established, the ANA will be used to ensure national security, law enforcement and foreign defense. The ANA operates under the Ministry of National Defense.

Afghanistan National Assembly

Afghanistan’s nascent National Assembly (often referred to as its Parliament) is comprised of an Upper and Lower house, and has important legislative and oversight functions. In the event that the President rejects legislation approved by the National Assembly, the draft would still be considered endorsed and enforceable following a two-thirds majority vote in the Lower House. The National Assembly can also dismiss Ministers through a non-confidence vote. In the interest of national unity, political groups cannot be formed nor operated on tribal, linguistic, parochial, or religious lines.

Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms to achieve development in three areas: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.
Afghan National Police (ANP)

The Afghan National Police is Afghanistan’s over-arching police institution, which consists of Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Counter-Narcotics Police. The ANP operate under the Ministry of Interior. The Afghanistan Compact authorized a police of 62,000, but this was amended to 82,000 in April 2007 by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB).

Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)

The term “Afghan National Security Forces” broadly refers to all Afghan national institutions responsible for the provision of security to the people of Afghanistan. In simple terms, the ANSF comprises the Afghan National Army and all Afghan National Police forces.

Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (ANBP)

Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program is a project of the UN Development Program (UNDP). It was created in April 2003 to assist the Government of Afghanistan to undertake disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. ANBP is involved in two security related projects: the Anti Personnel Mines and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project and the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG).

Asymmetric Warfare

A conflict between two or more actors whose relative military power differs significantly, and where one actor adopts tactics or strategy that reflect this variance (e.g. the “weaker” combatant may seek to draw on strategies or tactics that off-set their deficiencies in quantity or quality of forces such as suicide attacks).

Bonn Agreement

The Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001 in Bonn, Germany (officially the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”), was organized under the auspices of the United Nations. It set out the initial framework that facilitated a democratic transition in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This framework included the adoption of a constitution, 2004 Presidential elections, 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections, and provisions for the Afghan legal system.
Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

CSTC-A is the US-led, multi-national agency that provides equipment and training to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

Community Development Councils (CDCs)

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) gives rural Afghans a voice in their country's development through elected Community Development Councils (CDCs). Some 19,200 CDCs have been elected as of December 2007, representing more than two-thirds of rural Afghans. CDCs determine development priorities and propose reconstruction projects on a local level.

District Development Assemblies (DDAs)

District Development Assemblies (DDAs) are made up of local district members and provide a participatory and consultative mechanism for local development mobilization and decision making. Approximately 41% of Afghanistan is represented by DDAs.

Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A)

JTF-A is the Canadian civil-military task force that provides security, development and governance assistance to Afghan authorities and citizens within Kandahar Province. This task force, commanded by a Canadian Brigadier-General and comprising approximately 2500 military and civilian personnel, has three key mission elements: the Battle Group, the Provincial Reconstruction Team and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams.

Improvised Explosive Device - IED

An Improvised Explosive Device or IED refers to a “homemade” device that causes death or injury by using explosives alone or in combination with toxic chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be made to vary in size, function, and containment and delivery method. They can be composed of commercial or military explosives, makeshift explosives, or military ordnance. In general, IEDs can be victim-initiated (e.g. by stepping on a pressure plate or tripping a wire); remotely detonated through an attached command detonation system; or can be initiated by a suicide attacker. IEDs vary widely in sophistication and effect and can be designed to inflict significant personnel casualties or damage or destroy vehicles. Afghan and Coalition forces in Afghanistan have encountered IEDs comprising hundreds of kilograms of explosives, designed to defeat the heaviest of combat vehicles, in addition to simple devices designed to wound or kill a single soldier.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

ISAF is the UN-mandated international military force whose core mandate is to assist the Government of Afghanistan to extend its authority and create a secure environment in which reconstruction and development can take place. ISAF was initially launched in 2001 following the Bonn Conference, and focused on Kabul. At the request of the UN and Government of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 increasingly moving across the country, and in 2006, ISAF expanded its responsibility for the provision of security in all regional commands in Afghanistan.

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)

The JCMB provides high-level political support for the Afghanistan Compact. It sets direction to address significant issues of coordination, implementation, financing, and other obstacles identified by the Afghan government or the international community. The JCMB consists of seven representatives of the Afghan government and 21 representatives of the international community, including Canada.

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)

The UNDP administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan finances priority police activities funded by donors. Under these arrangements, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for supporting the formation of a new police force and UNDP is entrusted with the fund management of LOTFA to address the priority activities of paying police salaries, procuring non-lethal equipment, rehabilitating police facilities, and training for police and institutional development. Canada has been a longstanding contributor to LOTFA, most recently allocating $30 million in FY 2006-2007.

London Conference on Afghanistan

The London Conference (31 January - 1 February, 2006) was co-chaired by the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations. Discussions focused on a five year international commitment to support Afghan security, governance, reconstruction and development, and counter-narcotics efforts, as outlined in the Afghanistan Compact, which was formally launched at the Conference. The Government of Afghanistan also presented its Interim National Development Strategy (which sets out its political and economic plans and priorities for five years).
Micro-finance institutions (MFIs)

A wide range of organizations dedicated to providing small-scale financial services such as savings and credit to poor and low-income people. It includes non-governmental organizations, credit unions, co-operatives, private commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions and parts of state-owned banks.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) – Government of Afghanistan

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics leads the coordination, policy-development, monitoring and evaluation of all counter-narcotics activities and efforts.

Ministry of Finance (MoF) – Government of Afghanistan

The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management and execution of Afghanistan’s budget, the collection of taxes and management of customs revenues, and the organization and control of public expenditures and payments.

Ministry of the Interior (MoI) – Government of Afghanistan

The Ministry of Interior is responsible for maintaining law and order in the country. It also regulates the working of various security forces, including the national and border police, and corrections services (but not the national army which falls under the Ministry of Defense).

Ministry of Justice (MoJ) – Government of Afghanistan

The Ministry of Justice is the central institution in the executive branch of Afghanistan’s government responsible for legal affairs across the country. It works closely with other government ministries and agencies to ensure the rule of law can be upheld, including by pursuing reforms or policies to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the justice and legal systems. It acts as the central liaison between individual cabinet ministries, the President’s Office and the Council of Ministers with respect to many legal-related issues.

Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) – Government of Afghanistan

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) was established to develop and implement programs promoting responsible social and financial growth in rural areas, primarily in the non-agricultural sector. It has employees in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, and delivers a wide range of programs funded both by the Ministry itself and the international community.
National Solidarity Program (NSP)

The National Solidarity Program is the Afghan Government's primary program for community development. It aims to reduce poverty by empowering communities to take initiative, improving local governance and increasing social, human and economic capital. Created by the Government of Afghanistan, the NSP gives rural Afghans a voice in their country’s development through the election of community leaders to community development councils (CDCs). The program supports the Community Development Councils (CDCs) to lead their communities through processes to identify, plan, manage, and monitor their own development projects.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

NATO is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe, guided by the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949. The fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the official name used by the U.S. government for its military response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. OEF-Afghanistan is the name of the predominantly US-led coalition military force that initially provided security assistance to the Government of Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban regime. In 2006, IASF officially assumed responsibility from OEF for conventional operations. However, OEF does maintain a special-forces counter-terrorist capability within Afghanistan. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, although working closely with ISAF, falls under OEF command and control.

Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT)

OMLTs are small teams of coalition personnel assigned to Afghan National Army units to provide training assistance and, during operations, access to ISAF resources such as surveillance aircraft and helicopters.
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams were introduced and employed by NATO and coalition members within Afghanistan in 2002-2003. There are currently 25 PRTs across Afghanistan, with the Czech Republic expected to assume responsibility for Logar Province in spring 2008. Their mandate is to help extend the authority of the democratically elected Afghan Government, and further development and governance activities. PRTs vary in size depending on the local situation. They receive operational direction and policy guidance from the PRT Executive Steering Committee in Kabul, which is chaired by the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the ISAF Commander. Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team is based in Kandahar City, in the southern province of Kandahar. The 335-person Canadian PRT is an integrated group of aid specialists, diplomats, military personnel, police and corrections officers that directly support development and reconstruction activities.

Regional Command (South) RC (S)

RC (S) is the ISAF theatre of operations that comprises the six southwestern Afghan provinces of Zabol, Oruzgan, Nimruz, Day Kundi, Helmand and Kandahar. Command of RC (S) rotates between Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Canada is the ISAF lead nation responsible for coalition security, development and governance assistance in Kandahar Province while the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States respectively are the lead nations for Oruzgan, Helmand and Zabol Provinces.
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference and Panel Biographies

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Canada is in Afghanistan at the request of the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led, UN-sanctioned mission. The current mission in Afghanistan includes a significant military role in Kandahar province where Canada is involved in establishing the security necessary to allow development, strengthen and enhance governance capacity, and facilitate the delivery of programs and projects that support the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan on a sustained basis.

Afghanistan will remain a key engagement for NATO, the United Nations, and a number of our key Allies for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the Afghanistan Compact, to which Canada is a signatory and key contributor along with 50 other countries and 10 international organizations, extends until 2011.

The decision to deploy Canada's troops to Kandahar and establish a provincial reconstruction team was announced in May 2005. The first deployment of troops was in August 2005. In May 2006 Parliament approved the extension of Canada's military commitment in southern Afghanistan to February 2009.

Achieving security in this area is a necessary prerequisite to development for the people of Kandahar. As the former Minister of National Defence said in September 2005: « L'Afghanistan peut encore être considéré comme un État fragile (...) Malgré des progrès substantiels à ce jour, ce pays a besoin que la communauté internationale poursuive ses efforts pour accéder à la paix, à la stabilité et à la prospérité. Faute d'une action internationale ferme, multiforme et durable, l'Afghanistan risque d'imploser et de se transformer en "narco-État". Or, ce n'est pas là dans notre intérêt. »

And as Prime Minister Harper said recently: "The stark reality is that there can be no progress in Afghanistan without security - the security provided by the sacrifice and determination of our men and women in uniform... Without security, development workers cannot provide reconstruction or humanitarian assistance; police and corrections officers cannot ensure justice and peace; diplomats cannot help build democracy and enhance human rights."

Canada's engagement has been guided by clear Canadian priorities with two main objectives:

1. Providing the necessary security to allow development to take place in southern Afghanistan; and

2. Supporting the Afghanistan government in establishing good governance and in building a better life for its citizens.
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

It is also consistent with the goal of Canada playing a meaningful role in the world and our tradition of support to collective action decided on by the international community.

Decisions will be required in the coming months regarding the nature of our commitment beyond that date. The government has been clear that the military mission would be brought back before Parliament for consideration prior to any final decision.

As the government decides on the way forward, and as Parliament considers the post-2009 phase of our military commitment in Afghanistan, it is important that independent views be sought on the full range of options.

The following options have been identified for consideration, without intending to exclude others:

Option 1: Train, support and develop the Afghan army and police towards a self-sustaining capacity in Kandahar Province, with a phased withdrawal of Canadian troops starting in February 2009 consistent with progress towards this objective.

Option 2: Focus on development and governance in Kandahar, with sufficient military to provide effective protection for our civilians engaged in development and governance efforts. This would require another country (or countries) to provide a military force sufficient to ensure the necessary security in which such efforts can take place in Kandahar province.

Option 3: Shift the focus of Canadian military and civilian security, development and governance efforts to another region of Afghanistan.

Option 4: Withdraw all Canadian military forces from Afghanistan after February 2009 except those required to provide personal security for any remaining civilian employees.

Each option carries inherent costs, risks and opportunities. Options are not mutually exclusive and a final decision could include elements of more than one option.

It is also difficult to predict the precise nature of the Afghan political and security context in February 2009. Afghanistan itself is scheduled to have presidential elections in 2009.

To canvas the range of factors which affect the decision on Canada’s role in Afghanistan post-2009 and to provide analysis, perspectives and recommendations regarding the way forward, an independent panel of eminent Canadians is being established. The panel will consist of 5 members including the Chair. It will have
adequate resources and staff support to ensure a full range of expert opinion can be consulted on these matters, both here and in Afghanistan. The necessary arrangements will be made to facilitate the Panel’s visit to Afghanistan. The Panel will report before the end of January, 2008, and the report will immediately be made public.

The following considerations will be taken into account in the Panel’s deliberations:

• Respect for the sacrifice Canadians have made to date supporting Afghans in achieving a more stable, self-reliant and democratic society and improving opportunities for their citizens.

• The significant investment of people, resources, effort and infrastructure that Canada has made in Afghanistan.

• The progress to date, and the potential for deterioration, in security and development conditions inherent in the various potential paths forward.

• Objectives of the U.N. and NATO that:
  - Afghanistan be supported by all NATO countries in its efforts to create the necessary security conditions for development and building a better life for its citizens; and
  - Afghanistan does not again become a base for international terrorism.

• Canada’s international reputation.

Any final decision regarding the next phase of Canada’s mission will need to be implemented in a safe and effective manner following appropriate consultations with the government of Afghanistan, NATO and other partners in Afghanistan.
PANEL MEMBERS

The Honourable John Manley, P.C.

The Honourable John Manley is Counsel at McCarthy Tétrault. Mr. Manley provides strategic advice in matters relating to public affairs, including trade, telecommunications, security and finance. He is also consulted by clients on matters concerning foreign governments.

Mr. Manley was first elected to Parliament as a Liberal in 1988, and re-elected three times. From 1993 to 2000, he served as Minister of Industry and also as Minister for each of three regional economic development departments of the federal government.

Mr. Manley served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2002. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he was named Chairman of a new Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-terrorism and counterpart to U.S. Homeland Security Chief, Governor Tom Ridge. For the role he played following 9/11, he was named TIME Canada Magazine's "Newsmaker of the Year" in December 2001.

In January 2002, Mr. Manley was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Political Minister for Ontario, Minister of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations, and Chairman of the principal Cabinet committees. He added the role of Finance Minister in June 2002 and presented the Government’s federal budget in February 2003.

After leaving the federal Cabinet, Mr. Manley advised the Ontario Minister of Energy on the future of the provincially owned electrical power generation company. He also co-chaired an independent Task Force on the future of North America for the Council on Foreign Relations.

He is a Director of Nortel Networks, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Canadian Pacific Railway. He is Chairman of the Board of Optosecurity Inc. He also sits on a number of advisory Boards and not-for-profit organizations including CARE Canada, MaRS, the University of Waterloo, the National Arts Centre Foundation, the Conference Board of Canada and the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Mr. Manley is a graduate of Carleton University (B.A., 1971) and University of Ottawa (LL.B., 1976) receiving the gold medal of his graduating class. He articled as a law clerk to the Rt. Hon. Bora Laskin, Chief Justice of Canada, and was called to the Ontario bar in 1978. He was granted the designation C. Dir. (Chartered Director) by McMaster University in February 2006 and has received Honourary Doctorates from the University of Ottawa and Carleton University.
Derek H. Burney, O.C., LL.D.
Senior Strategic Advisor, Ogilvy Renault

As Senior Strategic Advisor to the firm, Mr. Burney assists clients in dealing with cross-border and domestic issues as well as trade and investment policy matters. Prior to joining the firm, Mr. Burney played a central role in Canada’s economic and political development during a career that involved senior positions in both the Canadian public and private sectors.

Mr. Burney entered the Canadian Foreign Service in 1963. In 1981, following a seven-year posting to Japan and a further three years as Canada’s Ambassador to Korea, he was appointed the Administrator for the first G-7 Summit hosted by Canada and subsequently became Director General of the Bureau of Trade Policy and General Economic Affairs. In that capacity, he directed an extensive interdepartmental trade policy review which ultimately provided much of the analytic underpinnings for the free trade initiative.

In 1987, Mr. Burney became Chief of Staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, where he was directly involved in the negotiation and successful conclusion of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Mr. Burney was appointed Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1989. He served as the Prime Minister’s personal representative in the preparations for the G-7 Summits in 1990, 1991 and 1992 and played a central role in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade negotiations and the negotiations that led to the expansion of the Canada-U.S. trade agreement into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the conclusion of the Acid Rain Treaty.

Mr. Burney’s career in the private sector began in 1993 upon his appointment as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Bell Canada International (BCI). He oversaw successful investments by BCI in the United Kingdom, the United States, Asia and Latin America. From 1999 to 2004 Mr. Burney served as President and Chief Executive Officer of CAE Inc., now the world’s second largest independent provider of commercial aviation training.

Mr. Burney is Chairman of the Board of CanWest Global Communications Corp. and a director of TransCanada Pipelines Limited. He is also a Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.

In 2004, Mr. Burney became a Visiting Professor and Senior Distinguished Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

Mr. Burney headed the Conservative Transition Team following the federal election in early 2006.
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

In October 2007, Mr. Burney was appointed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper to be on the newly-created Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan.

Mr. Burney’s memoir of government service entitled Getting it Done was published in 2005. He has written articles for Canada’s public policy magazine Policy Options and for several major newspapers. Mr. Burney was awarded the Public Service of Canada’s Outstanding Achievement Award in 1992 and was named an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1993. He holds honorary doctorates of law from Lakehead, Queen’s, Wilfrid Laurier and Carleton Universities.

Education M.A. (Queen’s University, 1964) B.A.(Hons.) (Queen’s University, 1962)


The Honourable Jake Epp has been Chairman of Ontario Power Generation Inc. since 2004 and served as the interim Chairman from December 2003 to April 2004.


Mr. Epp was the Senior Vice President, TransCanada PipeLines and President of TransCanada International (1993–December 31, 2000).

Mr. Epp also serves as Chairman, Health Partners International Canada, 2002–present.

Mr. Epp graduated from the University of Manitoba with a B.A. in 1961 and a B.Ed. in 1965. He was appointed to the Privy Council of Canada in June 1979 and received an LL.D. (Honourary) from Western University in 1988. In July 2006 he was certified by the Institute of Corporate Directors.

The Honourable Paul Tellier, P.C., C.C., Q.C.

Paul M. Tellier was President and Chief Executive Officer and Director of Bombardier Inc. in 2003 and 2004. Prior to this, Mr. Tellier was President and Chief Executive Officer and a Director of the Canadian National Railway Company (CN), a position he held for 10 years.
From August 1985 until he took up his post at CN in 1992, Mr. Tellier was Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet of the Government of Canada, the top public servant in the country. Mr. Tellier has received many awards including Canada’s Outstanding CEO of the Year 1998, and Canada’s Most Respected CEO, KPMG/Ipsos-Reid Survey, 2003.

Mr. Tellier has served in many positions in the public sector, including as Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in 1979 and as Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources in 1982.

He is a graduate of the universities of Ottawa and Oxford, England, and was admitted to the Québec Bar in 1963.

Mr. Tellier is a director of several corporations including Alcan, Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), Bell Canada and Telesat Canada, GM Canada and McCain Foods Ltd. He is Chairman of Global Container Terminals Inc. (GCT). He is also Strategic Advisor to Société Générale, a global bank headquartered in France.

In 1995, he co-chaired Centraide Campaign of Greater Montreal. Mr. Tellier was appointed Companion of the Order of Canada in 1993. He joined the McGill Desautels Faculty of Management Advisory Board in September 2006.

**Pamela Wallin, O.C., S.O.M.**

Pamela Wallin, O.C., S.O.M., is the Senior Advisor on Canada-US relations to the President of the Americas Society and the Council of the Americas in New York.

In Canada, she serves on several corporate boards, including CTVglobemedia, Canada’s premier multimedia company with ownership in CTV and The Globe and Mail; Gluskin Sheff & Associates, an investment and wealth management firm; Oilsands Quest, an energy development company; and Jade Tower, an independent antenna site and tower company.

She is the Chancellor of the University of Guelph. Pamela is a member of a special Advisory Board for BMO Harris Bank, a co-Chair of the National Strategy Council for the Mazankowski Alberta Heart Institute and a Board member of the Ontario Institute for Cancer Research.

Pamela was recently named an Officer of the Order of Canada.
Appendix 2: Consultations

Government of Afghanistan, Members of Parliament, and Provincial Officials

* Ryda Azimi, Senator, Mishrano Jirga (Upper House of the National Assembly), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Colonel Abdul Bashir, Commander, 1st Brigade, 205 Corps, Afghan National Army

* Sayed Hamed Gailani, First Deputy Speaker of the Mishrano Jirga (Upper House of the National Assembly), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Assadullah Khalid, Governor of Kandahar Province

* Tonita Murray, Senior Police and Gender Advisor, Ministry of Interior, Government of Afghanistan

* Atta Mohammed Noor, Governor of Balkh Province

* Jolanie Popal, Director General, Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Mohammad Younus Qanooni, Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of Parliament), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, National Security Advisor, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Amrullah Saleh, Director General, National Directorate of Security, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Omar Samad, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Canada

* Brigadier-General Agha Saqib, Chief of Police, Kandahar Province

* Sabrina Saqib, Member of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of the National Assembly), Kabul

* Habiba Sarabi, Governor of Bamiyan Province

* Lieutenant-Colonel Shirh Shah, Commanding Officer, 1st Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205 Corps, Afghan National Army

* Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations, New York

* Noorulhaq Uloomi, Member of Parliament, Kandahar Province

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1 List of people with whom the Members of the Independent Panel met with directly. The * refers to meetings that took place in Afghanistan.
* General Abdurahim Wardak, Minister of Defence, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Qazi Mohamod Yaqoob, Provincial Judge, Kandahar Province

* Mr. Khaliq Yar, Chief Prosecutor, Balkh Province

* Mohammed Ihsan Zia, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

**Afghan Civil Society**

* Sayeed Ahmad, Community Development Council Representative, Bamiyan Province

* Malem Akbar, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Dr. Muhammed Ali, Bamiyan Hospital

* Haji Atiq, Kandahar Provincial Council

* Farhad Azimi, Balkh Provincial Council

* Said Fayezada, Regional Manager, Chamber of Commerce, Balkh Province

Ashraf Ghani, Chancellor, Kabul University

* Abdulleh Ghul (micro-credit beneficiary), Bamiyan Province

* Nafisa Ghiasi, Principal, Girls Secondary School, Balkh Province

Aziz Hakimi, Executive Director, The Killid Group

* Ahmad Wali Karzai, Chair, Kandahar Provincial Council

* Qayyum Karzai, Member of the Wolesi Jirga, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Haji Ali Ahmad Khan, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Semira Manaseki, Midwifery Program Administrator, Bamiyan Hospital

* Ms. Nastura, Community Development Council Representative, Bamiyan Province

* Sayed Mobin, Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Balkh Province

* Professor Nurallah Mohsini, Chair, Afghanistan Institute of Democracy

* Abdullah Muhsene, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Dr. Ghulam Mohammad Nadir, Chief Surgeon, Bamiyan Hospital

* Haji Nazar, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Qadir Norzai, Kandahar Provincial Council

* Haji Mahmod Ogha, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Said Zahir Ogha, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province
* Haji Pacha, Member of the Amn (peace) Jirga
* Engineer Salam, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

Dr. Sima Samar, Chairperson, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

* Sayed Rahim Sattar, Vice-Chairman, Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau

* Khan Shirin, Community Development Council Representative, Bamiyan Province

* Tabardin, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Karim Talib, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Ahmad Shah Tarakai, Kandahar Provincial Council

* Dr. Harish Vashisthat, Instructor, Public Service School, Bamiyan Province

* Ali Yawar, Tribal Elder, Kandahar Province

* Zalma Younisi, Tribal Elder, Balkh Province

* Fatima Hassan Zada (micro-credit beneficiary), Bamiyan Province

Hameed Zarabi, Editor, Ashian Magazine

* The Elders of the Zharey District Shura, Kandahar Province

* Graduates and Trainees of the Midwifery Program, Bamiyan Hospital

**Foreign Government Officials**

Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York

Karel de Beer, Ambassador, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Canada

Ulrich Brandenburg, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO

The Right Honourable Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

The Right Honourable The Lord Mark Malloch Brown, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, US Department of State

Eliot Cohen, Counsellor, US Department of State

Richard Duqué, Permanent Representative of the Republic of France to NATO

Vice-Admiral A. K. Dymock, UK Military Representative, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the NATO

Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defence (Policy), US Department of Defence
Stewart Eldon, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to NATO

Dan Fata, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (European and NATO Policy), US Department of Defence

* Colonel Brendon Fraher (New Zealand), PRT Contingent Commander, Bamiyan Provincial Reconstruction Team, Bamiyan Province

Henrietta Fore, Under Secretary of State and Administrator, US Agency for International Development

* Ettore Francesco, Ambassador of Italy to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Gregory Gottlieb, Deputy Assistant Administrator (Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance), US Agency for International Development

Stephen Hadley, National Security Advisor (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), US National Security Council

Per Poulsen-Hansen, Permanent Representative of Denmark to NATO

Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, US Office of Director of National Intelligence

Zalmay Mamoozy Khalizad, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations in New York

* Regis Koetschet, Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan


Lieutenant-General Douglas Lute, Deputy National Security Adviser (for Iraq and Afghanistan), US National Security Council

Victoria Nuland, Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO

* Lieutenant-Colonel Per Olsson, Chief of Staff, Swedish Provincial Reconstruction Team, Balkh Province

* Andrew Patrick, Chargé, Embassy of the United Kingdom to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Alan Pino, US National Intelligence Officer (Near East), US Office of the Director of National Security

Brigadier-General Mark Ramsay, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Europe, NATO, Russia and Africa), Joint Staff, US Department of Defence

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, United States Department of State

Mark Robertson, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, US Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Herman Schaper, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to NATO

Appendix 2: Consultations
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

Gerhard Schlaudraff, Counsellor, Division Police Reform Afghanistan, German Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany

Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York

Tom Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State (Western Hemisphere), US Department of State

Igor Shcherbak, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York

James Shinn, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asia, US Department of Defence

Mitch Shivers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Central Asia, US Department of Defence

* Yvonne Stassen, Chargé, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Mark Strmecki, Political Counsellor, United States Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Vice-Admiral W. D. Sullivan, US Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

* Commander Juha Vauhkonen, Deputy Commander, Swedish Provincial Reconstruction Team, Balkh Province

Mark Ward, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and Near East, US Agency for International Development

* Brigadier General Dieter Warnecke, German Commander, Regional Command North, Balkh Province

Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the European Union to Afghanistan

* William Wood, Ambassador of the United States to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

General John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee

Ambassador Daan W. Everts, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan

BGen James Ferron, J2 (Chief of Intelligence), ISAF HQ

Lieutenant-General P. J. M. Godderij, Director, International Military Staff

Martin Howard, Assistant Secretary General for NATO Operations

* Major General Jacko Page, Commander, Regional Command South, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan

Lieutenant-General David Richards, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), NATO


* Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

**Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)**

* Major-General Robert W. Cone, Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

* Colonel Peter W. Foreman, Deputy Commanding General, Police Development, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

* Brigadier-General Jay H. Lindell, Commander, Afghan National Army Air Corps Development, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

* Brigadier-General Dennis C. Tabbenor, Deputy Commanding General – Afghan Army Development, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

* Brigadier-General Andrew Twomey, Deputy Commanding General – Programs, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

**United Nations**

Salman Ahmed, Executive Assistant to the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping (currently visiting research scholar, Princeton)

* Chris Alexander, Deputy Special Representative (Political) of the Secretary General, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

* Bo Asplund, Deputy Special Representative (Development) of the Secretary General, UN Mission in Afghanistan

* Elizabeth Bayer, Deputy Country Director, Afghanistan, UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Andrew Cox, Chief of Office, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, former Senior Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General

Erica Feller, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Jean-Marie Guéheno, Under Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations

Sir John Holmes, Under Secretary-General and UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator

* Abdul Latif, Political Affairs Assistant, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (Balkh Province)
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

* Salvatore Lombardo, Afghanistan Country Representative, UN High Commissioner for Refugees

* Catherine Mbengue, Afghanistan Country Representative, UN Children’s Fund

Janan Mosazai, Former Political Affairs Advisor, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

* Anita Nirody, Country Director, Afghanistan, UN Development Programme

Hafiz Pasha, Assistant Secretary-General for Asia, UN Development Program

* David Wilson, Director, Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, UN Development Program

Robert Blackburn, Senior Vice President, SNC Lavalin International

Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, former chief of mission in Afghanistan for Elections Canada (and former Canadian MP and cabinet Minister)

Sarah Chayes, Author, Journalist, and Founder of the Arghand Cooperative

Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Paul Fishstein, Director, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Louise Fréchette, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, University of Waterloo

Jack Granatstein, Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus of History, York University

Fen Hampson, Director, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

Peter Harder, Senior Advisor, Fraser Milner Casgrain (former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2007)

Bob Hathaway, Director of the Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Lee Hamilton, President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Paul Heinbecker, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, University of Waterloo

Domain and Subject Matter Experts

Sally Armstrong, C.M., Author and human rights advocate

Amir Attaran, Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in Law, Population Health and Global Development Policy, University of Ottawa

Frederick D. Barton, Co-Director - Post-conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. David Bercuson, Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

Appendix 2: Consultations
Seth Jones, Counter-Terrorism Expert, RAND Corporation

Arthur Kent, Journalist

Eugene Lang, Author, Public Policy Writer and Consultant (former chief of staff to two Canadian Ministers of National Defense 2002-2006)

David Mansfield, Independent Consultant and Counter-Narcotics Expert

* Joanna Nathan, Senior Analyst on Afghanistan, International Crisis Group


Keith Newman, Vice President, Environics Research Group Ltd.

Ambassador Manfred von Nostiz (Ret’d), Former Canadian Diplomat

Roland Paris, University Research Chair in International Security and Governance, University of Ottawa

Ahmed Rashid, Author and Journalist

Robin Raphel, Senior Vice President, National Defence University

Bruce Reidel, Brookings Institute

Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, Assistant Professor of Conflict Studies, St. Paul University (and Afghan Women’s Advocacy Commission of Canada)

Dr. Janice Stein, Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto

J. Alexander Thier, Senior Rule of Law Advisor, United States Institute of Peace

Non-Governmental Organizations

Almas Bawar Zakhilwal, Country Director (Ottawa Office), Senlis Council

Aziz Amiri, Canada-Afghanistan Business Council

Robina Bangash, Aga Khan Foundation

Gerry Barr, President and CEO, Canadian Council for International Cooperation

Steve Cornish, Policy and Advocacy Advisor, CARE Canada

* Anja de Beer, Director, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

Isabelle Daoust, Senior Advisor, International Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross

* Ed Epp, Vice-President for Resource Development, Mennonite Economic Development Associates
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire (Ret’d), Conference of Defence Associations

Nigel Fisher, President and CEO, UNICEF Canada

Scott Gilmour, Executive Director, Peace Dividend Trust

Ghulan Abass Gupta, Aga Khan Foundation

Sanjeev Gupta, Regional Manager, Aga Khan Foundation

Fazel Rabi Haqbeen, Senior Program Officer, The Asia Foundation

Pawasha Hassan, Country Director, Rights and Democracy

Hilary Homes, Campaigner on International Justice, Security and Human Rights, Amnesty International Canada

Oren Ipp, Head of Programs, National Democratic Institute, Afghanistan

* Lex Kassenberg, Country Director, CARE Afghanistan

His Highness The Aga Khan IV

Paul King, Chief of Party, Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project

Pierre Krahenbuhl, Director of Operations, International Committee for the Red Cross

Paul Larose Edwards, Executive Director, CANADEM

Sonia Lebesgue, Program Officer, Development and Peace

Stefan Lehmeier, Coordinator, Peace Operations Working Group, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee

Geoff Loane, North American Representative, International Committee of the Red Cross

David Lord, Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee

Norine Macdonald, President and Founder, Senlis Council

General Paul Manson (Ret’d), President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Shuvaloy Majumbar, Afghanistan Resident Country Director, International Republican Institute

Peggy Mason, Chair of the Executive Committee, Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee

* Aly Mawji, Resident Representative, Aga Khan Development Network

Kevin McCort, Interim Chief Executive Officer, CARE Canada

Michael Messenger, Vice-President Public Affairs, World Vision Canada

Joseph Patak, Adam Smith Council
Colonel Alain-Michel Pellerin (Ret’d), Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations

* Shirine Pont, Afghanistan Country Director, Peace Dividend Trust

Tamin Sediqui, President, Afghan-Canada Council

John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares

* Catherine Sobrevega, Country Manager, Mennonite Economic Development Associates

* Rory Stewart, CEO - Turquoise Mountain Foundation, and Author

Ms. Jamie Terzi, Assistant Country Director, CARE Afghanistan

Joanne Trotter, Aga Khan Foundation

Carrie Vandewint, Policy Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs, World Vision Canada

* George Varughese, Afghanistan Country Representative, The Asia Foundation

**Government of Canada Officials**

The Honourable Maxime Bernier, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sheila Bird, Director General, Afghanistan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Margaret Bloodworth, National Security Advisor, Privy Council Office

Ian Brodie, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Stephen Harper

Kerry Buck, Director General, Afghanistan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Susan Cartwright, Foreign and Defense Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office

* Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Chamberlain, Commanding Officer, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar

* Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Davis, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan, Kandahar Province

* John Davison, Political Director, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar Province

Vice-Admiral Davidson, Canadian Military Representative, Canadian Permanent Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

* Major Steve Desjardins, Commanding Officer, All Source Intelligence Centre, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan, Kandahar Province

Leonard J. Edwards, Deputy Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

* Linda Garwood-Filbert, Correctional Services Canada, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar Province

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Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

* Karen Foss, Deputy Political Director, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar Province

Robert Fonberg, Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence

Robert Greenhill, President, Canadian International Development Agency

* Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Girard, Deputy Commander, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (Kandahar Province)

Major-General Tim Grant, Deputy Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command

General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff

* Glen Hodgins, Counsellor (Political), Canadian Embassy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Ron Hoffmann, Deputy Head of Mission, Canadian Embassy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Ed Jager, Political Advisor to Brigadier-General

Guy Laroche (Kandahar Province), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Jim Judd, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

* Colonel Christian Juneau, Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan, (Kandahar Province)

* Colonel Serge Labbé, Commander, Strategic Advisory Team (Kabul, Afghanistan)

* Arif Lalani, Canadian Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Major Louis Lapointe, Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (Kandahar Province)

* Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, Commander, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (Kandahar Province)

Kevin Lynch, Clerk of the Privy Council

The Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay, Minister of National Defence and Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency

John McNee, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York

* Colonel Mike McLean, Defense Attaché, Canadian Embassy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Robert McRae, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

* Major Richard Moffet, Battle Group, Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (Kandahar Province)

* Dave Muirhead, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Kandahar Province
The Honourable Beverley J. Oda,
Minister of International Cooperation

* George Saibel, Minister
  (Development), Canadian Embassy,
  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

* Ron Schatz, Head of Aid, Provincial
  Reconstruction Team, Kandahar
  Province

Stephen Wallace, Vice-President,
Afghanistan Task Force, Canadian
International Development Agency

* Major Michel Zybal, Commanding
  Officer, Military Police, Joint Task
  Force - Afghanistan, Kandahar
  Province
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

Appendix 3: Overview of Public Submissions Process

In addition to its meetings with a wide range of stakeholders and experts in Canada and abroad, the Panel wanted to ensure that the public would have an opportunity to input into their analysis. The public was therefore invited to submit briefs for the Panel’s consideration between 1st November and 3rd December 2007. The Panel received 219 submissions from individuals and organizations. All of these submissions have been archived on the Panel’s website.

The submissions reflected the divergent perspectives that exist with respect to Canada’s current mission in Afghanistan. A majority of the briefs indicated that Canada needed to change the current orientation of its efforts, proposing strategies to improve Canada’s effectiveness, whether through an augmentation of investments in development and humanitarian aid, greater diplomatic focus, or some kind of scaling down of Canada’s military presence. Only some 30% of the submissions directly addressed one or more of the options included within the panel’s terms of reference. Those that did either advocated for Option 1 (continue training the Afghan Police/Military and pursue a phased withdrawal of Canadian troops starting in February 2009) or Option 4 (withdraw Canadian troops completely after February 2009 except for a small contingent to protect aid workers/diplomats).

The Panel sincerely appreciates the time taken by individuals and organizations who shared their views on Canada’s current and future engagement in Afghanistan.

Submissions from Individuals:

Acker, Alison
Allard, Greg
Allen, Linda L.
Anderson, Dorothy
Arhire, Manuela
Armstrong-Whitworth, Peter
Arnet, Dorothy
Assaf, Dany
Badeau, Normand
Baines, Robert
Bates, Ronald W.
Bavelas, J.
Beattie, Liane
Beaubien, Paul J.S.
Beaudet, Normand
Bélanger, Monique

Bell, John
Bell, Margaret
Bell, Sidney
Berard, Jacques
Berry, Alastair James
Bilodeau, Marguerite
Bishop, Ann
Blais, Jean Jacques, Hon.
Borgerson, Larry
Borremans, Guy
Bouchard, Agnes
Boutin, Magella
Bowler, Gerry
Brett, Jane
Campbell, Donald
Cantin, Fernande
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan

Submissions from Individuals (cont.)
Capstick, Col. (Ret.) Mike
Carten, John Frederick
Cecil, Andrew
Chan, Colin
Chartier, Benoit
Chavarie, Brandon
Chawla, Attar S.
Ciotti, Damien
Clayton, Jeff; Hislop, David; Hruskoci, Joanna; & Knight, Paul
Couture, Ann
Crawford, Brett
Daigle, Denis
Daniel, Edwin E.
Davison, Brian
de Puyjalon, Guy
De Valencia, Nicolas
Deen, Zobair David
Demers, Jacques
Deschamps, Jean
Deslauriers, Nicole
Désorcy, Jean
Dion, Eric
Dobson, Hugh
Dratler, Nathan
Dresser, Robert
Drouin, Yvon & Doyon, Jocelyn
Duhaime, Marc
Dupuis, Jacques
Elliott, James
Erickson, Ken
Fagan, John
Farago, Frank
Farkas, Desiree & Edward
Fortin, Line
Fortin, Louis
Foster, John
Franchomme, Joseph
Fraser, Alan & Roberta
Fresnais, Gilles
Gagné, Roger
Gardiner, Graeme
Gardiner, J. Graeme
Gargoura, Armand
Gilbert, Noëmie
Goldstein, Rosa
Govindraj, Suman & Vrishank, Master
Goyette, Pierre
Greene, Carol
Guindon, Johnne
Gurr, G.
Hanlon, Peter
Hannesson, Chris
Hansen, Paul
Harrer, Anthony
Hartnagel, Timothy & Patricia
Hegyi, Sandy
Hemming, Timothy
Hennessey, Peter
Henri du Vair, Pierre
Heynen, Jan
Hill, Derek
Hoeppner, David
Irving, Bill
Janzen, Gerhard & Mary
Jeté, Marco
Johnson, John M.
Johnston, Wade
Kamal, Sarah
Keeping, Janet
Kendirgi, Max
Kennedy, Michael
Kenney, Tim
Kerr, Donald J.
Keuk, Boun Pong
Kienholtz, Phillip
Kilgour, David, Hon.
King, Donald
Kippen, Grant
Knott, Freda
Knox, Allynne
Labrie, Daniel
Lacombe, Denis
Submissions from Individuals (cont.)
Lafontaine, Jacques
Langlois, Yves
Lavigne, Claude
Lavoie, Marlene
Lee, Rex
LeHay, David
Lemieux, Sylvie
Lightwater, Judy
Lyons, Phil
MacLeod, Paul G.
Mader, Les
Mansour, Danny
Maranda, Michel
Marshall, Beatrice
Martens, E.
Martin, Paul B.
May, Miriam
McDonald, Patrick
McGill, Hunter
McMurdo, Jeff
Meister, Don
Melliar, Gordon
Mendes, Errol P.
Miles, Robert
Mills, Alex
Mills, Donald
Morency, Benoit
Mugasera, Léon
Murray, Pat
Napier, Edward J.
Nicholls, Gordon
Ostofi, Gary
Ouelette, Louise
Pache, Marc
Paris, Bruno
Parkes, Anna
Perroni, Vic A.
Petrolekas, George
Poelman, Hughes
Poisson, Gilles
Porter, Christopher
Radford, Robert
Reddick, Helen M.
Rowswell, John
Roy, Guy
Ruel, Marc
Selzler, Guy
Seymour, Tim
Shore, Jennifer
Simard
Simard, Jean-Phillippe
Slater, Catherine & Gott, Jean
Slavin, Ruth
Smith, Karen
Sotas, Wilma
Spotton, William
St-Amant, Martin
Stevenson, Allan
Taylor, Edward
Tippel, Henry
Trembley, V.
Turgeon, Serge
V, Steve
Vukovic, John
Weera, Seddiq
White, Jeff
Wilson, Robert R.
Wilson, Sharon
Yeatman, Tim

Submissions from Organizations and Groups:
Afghanistan Canada Research Group
Afghanistan Reference Group
Afghanistan Working Group of the Centre for Peace Studies, McMaster University
Air Force Association of Canada
Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee
Canadian Coalition to End Global Poverty
Submissions from Organizations and Groups (cont.)

Canadian Federation of University Women
Canadian Friends Service Committee
Canadian Red Cross
Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
CARE Canada
Center for Ethics
Christian Reformed Churches in Canada
Conference of Defence Associations
Global Compliance Research Project
Green Party of Canada
Group of citizens from Merritt, B.C.
Joint Submission by Civilian Peace Service, Subsahara Centre, Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution, & Canadian Institute for Applied Negotiation
Les Artistes pour la Paix
Liberal Party of Canada
Newfoundland & Labrador Human Rights Association
Ontario Voice of Women for Peace
Oxfam Canada & Oxfam Québec
Petition signed by concerned citizens of Guelph, Ontario
Physicians for Global Survivors
Political Science 102 Class, University Canada West
Senlis Council
Society to Promote Departments of Peace, Hamilton Chapter
Society to Promote Departments of Peace, Victoria Chapter
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
The Canadian Islamic Congress
The Group of 78
The Ruxted Group
Victoria Women in Black
World Federalist Movement
Appendix 4: Relevant United Nations and NATO Documents

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

The situation in Afghanistan has long been a preoccupation of the member states of the United Nations and its operational agencies. Over the last 30 years efforts to promote peace and security, including through the imposition of sanctions, and to provide humanitarian relief and development aid, have been advanced through successive UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions and special mandates.

Following the 11 September attacks on the United States by the Afghan-based Al Qaida group, the UN Security Council issued a series of resolutions that helped pave the way for the international community to provide military, humanitarian, reconstruction and development support to the newly emerging Afghan transitional administration and the subsequent Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. This includes the authorization in December 2001 (S/RES/1386) of the establishment of an international security force, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This force was sanctioned to take all necessary measures to assist the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The Council subsequently authorized the renewal and expansion of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) mandate from Kabul across the country beginning in 2003 (S/RES/1510). The Security Council continues to view the situation in Afghanistan as a threat to international peace and security.

The Security Council was responsible for authorizing the creation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2002 (S/RES/1401) and outlining its mandated activities. The Council has renewed UNAMA’s work on an annual basis, which currently consists of six main elements: political and strategic advice for the peace process; providing good offices, assisting the Afghan government with the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; promoting human rights; providing technical assistance; and continuing to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with Afghan authorities.

1 See www.un.org/docs/sc
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

On September 12, 2001 NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 is the principle of collective self-defence, and provides that an attack against one or more of the Alliance partners in Europe or North America should be considered an attack against them all. Article 5 authorizes each NATO partner to take any action it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, in support of the ally attacked in the exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defence2. Article 5 goes on to state that any actions pursued should be reported to the UN Security Council, and that alliance actions should end when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. This was the first time Article 5 had ever been invoked by NATO.

In August 2003, NATO assumed strategic command and coordination of the UN Security Council mandated International Security Assistance Force. In October the North Atlantic Council agreed to a longer-term strategy for NATO in its ISAF role in Afghanistan. That strategy3 noted that NATO’s main political objective was to work in cooperation with the UN and European Union to support the Afghan Transition Authority to meet its responsibility to provide security and order.

NATO outlined nine key components critical to achieve its desired end state for Afghanistan4, including the election of a representative government to succeed the transitional authority; satisfactory progress towards the building of an operationally effective and multi-ethnic Afghan National Army that can provide security for the Afghan population, UN agencies and NGOs; satisfactory progress towards strengthening the central government and internal security related institutions such as the police and judiciary; removal or modification of the behaviour of warlords; satisfactory evolution of Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbouring countries, and progress towards the resolution of the terrorist threat from the Taliban, al-Qa’ida and other “extremist groups”. Progress in meeting these objectives was intended to be reviewed on an annual basis.

In December 2005, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed a revised Operations Plan to guide ISAF efforts. The Plan outlines the key tasks and challenges ISAF faces as it expanded its operations to the south and east of the country. A key supporting document to this revised Operations Plan is the Combined and Joint Statement of Requirements (C-JSOR) which articulates the nature and size of forces required for the expanded mission. ISAF nations are expected to then offer forces to fill gaps in the manning of the C-JSOR. However, significant shortfalls remain, particularly in southern Afghanistan.

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2 Right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the United Nations Charter (Article 51).
3 See S/RES/970 – See appendix for NATO Plan
4 A self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghanistan, able to exercise its authority throughout the country and without the need for ISAF to help provide security
Appendix 5: Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks and Timelines

On 31 January 2006, representatives from 51 countries and 10 organizations1 helped launch the Afghanistan Compact in London, at a meeting co-chaired by the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan. The Compact sets out a series of critical goals and timelines for Afghanistan in the areas of security, governance and human rights, and social and economic development for the 2006-2011 period. For instance:

- **Security**: The Compact reiterates the Bonn goal of expanding the Afghan National Army towards 70,000 by 2010 (may increase upwards to 80,000 subject to formal approval in 2008), and proposes the Afghan National and Border Police achieve a combined force of up to 62,000 by 2010 (subsequently amended upwards to 82,000);

- **Governance**: Appointments to all civil service positions, at all levels of government should be based on merit, with vetting procedures and performance-based reviews by the end of 2010;

- **Human rights**: By 2010 the Government’s capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations is meant to be strengthened, and Government security and law enforcement agencies are meant to adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property;

- **Economic development**: Electricity should reach at least 65% of households and 90% of non-residential establishments in major urban centres by 2010, and at least 25% of households in rural areas.

- **Social development**: By 2010 net enrolment in primary school for girls and boys should be at least 60% and 75% respectively, the number of female teachers should increase by 50%, and the basic Package of Health Services should be extended to cover at least 90% of the population.

The Compact represents a commitment by the international community to support Afghanistan as it makes its transition towards stability and sustainable development. The Compact is intended to be underpinned by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

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1 See the Afghanistan Compact document, Annex IV for a full listing of participating countries, participating organizations, and observers.
Appendix 6: Chronology

July 1973  
King Zahir Shah overthrown; Republic of Afghanistan declared, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan named as its first President

June 1975  
Jamiat Islami party launch insurgency in a failed attempt to overthrow the Daoud government

27 April 1978  
Daoud's government overthrown in a coup by the Afghan Army; Declaration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under President Nur Muhammad Taraki

25 December 1979  
Soviet Union invades Afghanistan

15 May 1987  
Soviet troops begin withdrawal; last troops leave on 15 February 1989

March 1989  
Civil war commences; conflict intensifies in 1992

1994  
Taliban grow in strength and takes control of much of southern and western Afghanistan

27 September 1996  
Kabul falls to the Taliban

1997-2000  
Fighting continues between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance; however, by 1998 the Taliban control 90% of Afghan territory

July 1997  
Lahkdar Brahimi serves as UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Afghanistan until 1999

15 October 1999  
UN Security Council imposes financial sanctions intended to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden (resolution 1267)

19 December 2000  
UN Security Council imposes further sanctions on Afghanistan related to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban (resolution 1333)

9 March 2001  
Destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban

9 September 2001  
Ahmad Shah Masoud, mujahideen rebel leader, is assassinated by the Taliban/Al Qaeda
11 September 2001  Terrorist attacks strike at New York City, Washington, DC and Pennsylvania, USA, organised by Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan

12 September 2001  NATO invokes Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which states that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all members of the Alliance

12 September 2001  UN Security Council reiterates the right of individual or collective self-defence consistent with the UN Charter, and calls on all States to cooperate to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the September 11 attacks, stressing that those harbouring them will be held accountable (resolution 1368)

20 September 2001  The US demands that the Afghan government turn over all resident Al Qaeda members and close all terrorist training camps

21 September 2001  The Afghan government refuses the US ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden

3 October 2001  UN Secretary General appoints a Special Representative (SRSG) for Afghanistan, initially Amb. Lakdar Brahimi of Algeria

7 October 2001  US and British forces, working under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), begin air strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan

8 October 2001  Canadian Operation Apollo, under aegis of the US-led OEF, sees deployment of Canadian warships and aircraft to the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea

9 November 2001  Northern Alliance seizes Mazar-e-Sharif; march on Kabul and other cities

13 November 2001  Northern Alliance enters Kabul and the Taliban government falls

14 November 2001  UN Security Council condemns the Taliban, supports international efforts to root out terrorism, and expresses strong support for efforts to establish a new and transitional Afghan administration (resolution 1378)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 December 2001</td>
<td>Bonn Agreement establishes interim Afghan government and sets out benchmarks to guide post-conflict democratic transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December 2001</td>
<td>International forces take control of Kandahar Province following Taliban surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December 2001</td>
<td>UN Security Council authorizes the creation of an International Security Force - ISAF (resolution 1386); subsequently re-authorized every 6 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 December 2001</td>
<td>Hamid Karzai sworn in as head of 30-member governing committee of Afghan Interim Authority (AIA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January 2002</td>
<td>Canada re-establishes diplomatic relations with Afghanistan; Hon. John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister, visits Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 January 2002</td>
<td>Tokyo donors' conference results in commitments of USD $4.5b towards reconstruction; Canada pledges $100m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February-August 2002</td>
<td>850 Canadian troops deploy to Kandahar under OEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>Canadian Forces serve in Kabul region (Operation Athena).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 2003</td>
<td>Canada (CIDA) pledges $250m to Afghan reconstruction and development over 2003 and 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 2003</td>
<td>NATO, at the request of Canada and others, expands its role in ISAF to include the provision of a &quot;composite&quot; HQ, new rotational commanders selected by SACEUR, and strategic coordination through SHAPE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 August 2003 NATO assumes responsibility for command and coordination of ISAF

September 2003 Canadian Embassy re-opens in Kabul

13 October 2003 UN Security Council authorises the expansion of ISAF’s operations to include operations anywhere in Afghanistan and extends its mandate to December 2004 (resolution 1510)

4 January 2004 Loya Jirga adopts new constitution for Afghanistan

9 February 2004 Canada (Lt. Gen. Rick Hillier) assumes overall command of ISAF forces for 6 month period

1 April 2004 Berlin donors' conference results in commitments of USD $8.2b towards reconstruction; Canada pledges $250m over the years 2005 to 2009

7 September 2004 NATO increases military commitments from 6,500 to 10,000 troops

17 September 2004 UN Security Council extends the ISAF mandate to October 2005 (resolution 1563); subsequently re-authorized every year up to present

7 October 2004 Presidential elections; Hamid Karzai wins with 55% of the vote and is sworn in as President of Afghanistan on 7 December 2004

10 February 2005 NATO expands ISAF to the west of Afghanistan

16 August 2005 Canada assumes command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar City

August 2005 Canadian Forces begin process of re-deployment from Kabul to Kandahar

18 September 2005 Parliamentary and Provincial elections held across Afghanistan

September 2005 Canadian Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) deployed to advise Government of Afghanistan ministries (Operation Argus)

19 December 2005 Afghan National Assembly convened for the first time in 30 years
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 February 2006</td>
<td>London International donors meeting pledges of $10.5b in new aid to 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>Canadian Forces in Kandahar Province begin operations under <em>Operation Archer</em> (OEF) assuming NATO lead for security, development and governance in the province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 2006</td>
<td>Canadian Parliament approves a two year extension of Canada's deployment of diplomatic, development, civilian police and military personnel in Afghanistan and enables funding and equipment to cover the extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 2006</td>
<td>Canada pledges $310m in additional aid and development in Afghanistan over the years 2007 to 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2006</td>
<td>ISAF expands its area of operations to six additional provinces in the south of Afghanistan, taking over command from OEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July - onward 2006</td>
<td>NATO troops take over leadership of military operations in the south of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-20 September 2006</td>
<td>Canada leads ISAF <em>Operation Medusa</em>; attacking Taliban strongholds in Panjwayi and Zharey districts of Kandahar Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 October 2006</td>
<td>NATO assumes responsibility for security across Afghanistan, by taking over command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led OEF Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February 2007</td>
<td>Canada pledges an additional $200m to Afghanistan's reconstruction and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 2007</td>
<td>The Prime Minister announces that the Government will seek &quot;some degree of consensus among Canadians&quot; on Canada's future role in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October 2007</td>
<td>The Prime Minister announces creation of Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7: Military Terminology

Within the Canadian Forces, the key Army elements include the *infantry* which travel in Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) and generally fight dismounted from their vehicles (although the LAV is armed with a light cannon and a machine gun); the *armour* which employ Leopard tanks and Coyote reconnaissance units; the *artillery* which provide long-range fire from their 155mm howitzers as well as specialized target surveillance elements; and the *combat engineers* which provide for the mobility (e.g. breaching obstacles) and protection (e.g. defusing IEDs) of other forces. For historical reasons, the Army uses different terms to denote their sub-units. In essence, the terms *troop* and *platoon* are equivalent and identify the smallest organizations led by a junior officer (normally a lieutenant). The terms *company*, *squadron* and *battery* identify larger units comprising several troops/platoons and are commanded by majors. Finally, *battalions* and *regiments* are equivalent units possessing a number of companies/squadrons/batteries and are commanded by lieutenant-colonels.

Although organized as separate units, these forces are routinely task-organized into groups of two or more as required for each distinct mission or task. These groupings are called *combat teams* at the company level and *battle groups* at the battalion level.

In simple terms, an infantry *section* comprises 10 soldiers and one LAV; an infantry *platoon* consists of three sections and a headquarters with a strength of approximately 36 personnel and four LAVs; and an infantry *company* has three platoons and a headquarters totalling approximately 130 personnel and fifteen LAVs. An infantry *battalion* has three infantry companies, a headquarters and addition combat support and logistics elements with a combined strength of approximately 850 personnel.

In Afghanistan, the Canadian *battle group* currently includes two infantry companies, a reconnaissance squadron (equivalent to a company), a tank squadron, an artillery battery (also equivalent to a company), a combat engineer squadron plus additional headquarters and support elements. The Canadian *battle group* includes approximately 1200 personnel. In addition, another infantry company has been assigned to the PRT to provide for its protection.

The Afghan National Army has stationed the 1st Brigade, 205 (Hero) Corps in Kandahar Province. This Brigade, totalling approximately 2900 soldiers, is structured with a headquarters, three infantry *kandaks* (battalions), a combat support kandak (engineers, reconnaissance and artillery elements) and a logistic kandak.
Appendix 8: Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leads in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Nation</th>
<th>PRT Province</th>
<th>PRT City</th>
<th>Regional Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>Kandahar City</td>
<td>RC (South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>Pol-e-Khomri</td>
<td>RC (North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>RC (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>Chaghcharan</td>
<td>RC (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>RC (South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>Meymana</td>
<td>RC (North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>Qala-e-Naw</td>
<td>RC (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>Mazar-e-Sharif</td>
<td>RC (North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>Lashkar Gah</td>
<td>RC (South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>Pol-e-Alam</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2)</td>
<td>Badakshan</td>
<td>Feyzabad</td>
<td>RC (North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Konduz</td>
<td>Konduz</td>
<td>RC (North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (12)</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>RC (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>Qalat</td>
<td>RC (South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khowst</td>
<td>Khowst</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>Gardez</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Sharana</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nangahar</td>
<td>Jalaabad</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>Mihtarlam</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>Bagram</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>Asadabad</td>
<td>RC (East)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There are 26 PRTs throughout Afghanistan with in excess of 200 civilians deployed collectively alongside military personnel. The number of civilian personnel deployed to each specific PRT varies dramatically.
Appendix 9: Estimated International Military Deployments and Fatalities in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF TROOPS DEPLOYED</th>
<th>FATALITIES (2001 – JAN. 2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other troop contributing nations (29)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>54,800</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties as of January 15, 2008
Appendix 10: Comparative Polls of Afghan Views

Between 2004 and 2007, a series of polls by entities such as the Asia Foundation, Charney Research (commissioned by BBC World Service and ABC News) and Environics (commissioned by the CBC, The Globe and Mail, La Presse, and the University of Toronto) were undertaken to assess Afghan views on the overall direction of the country, the presence of foreign forces and the insurgency, and reconstruction and development circumstances. These organizations have all used similar methodologies and the same polling organization in Afghanistan facilitated data collection (each of these has been facilitated by the Afghan Centre for Social and Opinion Research based in Kabul), but employed different questionnaires. Efforts were made to poll all regions, to gain a representational ethnic sample, and ensure input from men and women.

Public opinion polling is still a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan, and given the context faces logistical, cultural or political limitations. However, pollsters have increasingly achieved greater reach and sophistication in their methodology.

**OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY**

**FIGURE 6: VIEWS ON OVERALL DIRECTION**

On the whole, Afghans are positive about the direction of their country and support the presence of foreign forces on their territory, although that confidence appears to have diminished over the course of the past three years. The 2007 BBC/ABC commissioned poll suggests that 54% of Afghans believe their country is headed in the right direction, compared with a high of 77% in October 2005.

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The Environics poll conducted in September 2007 indicates that 28% of Afghans believe the country is moving in the wrong direction (compared with a low of 6% in October 2005\(^2\)). Reactions in the north, east and centre of the country tend to be more optimistic than those in the south-centre and west\(^3\). Importantly, those people who have a “mixed” opinion has grown – from 8% in 2004 to 15-17% in 2007. This figure bears watching, as it suggests a growing number of Afghans are uncertain about the future.

Afghans who think the country is heading in the right direction believe this is because of improved security and peace, reconstruction efforts, better access by women and girls to work and education, and progress on disarmament, freedom and democracy. Those who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction tend to cite a resurgence of the Taliban and a lack of security as their main preoccupation followed by unemployment and limited progress on reconstruction, and government corruption.

**Presence of Foreign Countries**

The Environics poll suggested that a majority of Afghans view the presence of international military forces in Afghanistan as a good thing for the country (61% nationally and 60% in Kandahar province), compared with those who perceive it as a bad thing (16% nationally, 23% in Kandahar Province), although 22% view it as neither good nor bad (15% in Kandahar Province). Polls do suggest that concerns with foreign forces increase when discussing issues such as civilian casualties, an issue that has emerged in particular over the last year. In terms of how long foreign forces should remain, according to the December 2007 ABC/BBC poll, some 45% of Afghans believe NATO forces should leave in the next two years, while 43% believe they should remain until security is restored (the mood of Afghans may be shifting in this respect; according to the ABC/BBC polls, in 2005 65% of Afghans felt US military forces should only leave after security was restored, compared to 45% in 2007).

**Reconstruction**

In terms of reconstruction and development aid, according to the December 2007 ABC/BBC poll, Afghans believe that reconstruction efforts implemented in their respective areas since 2002 have been largely effective (63% indicating very effective and somewhat effective). Among those Afghans who know that Canada is contributing to reconstruction efforts, Canada is listed among the four countries that stand out as doing a good job according to the September 2007 Environics poll (ahead of the UK but behind the USA, Germany and India).

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\(^3\) Presentation by Environics to the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. See also Asia Foundation polling.
VIEWS ON THE TALIBAN

Across the various polls conducted in the last four years, views on the Taliban have remained uniformly negative. In the autumn of 2003, some 75% of Afghans viewed the Taliban unfavourably (62% very unfavourably), 89% felt that way in October 2005 (75% very unfavourably), and 73% in September 2007 (53% very negative)\(^4\). At the same time however, when asked whether President Karzai should enter into negotiations with the Taliban and allow them to participate in the political process, some 60% of Afghans currently believe a negotiated settlement should be pursued\(^5\).


\(^5\) ABC/BBC December 2007 Poll, Page 11. The Environics poll suggested that 74% of Afghans would either strongly support or somewhat support negotiations between the Karzai government and the Taliban (36% and 38% respectively).
Appendix 11: Independent Panel Secretariat and External Advisors

SECRETARIAT TO THE INDEPENDENT PANEL

The panel was supported in its work by a Secretariat made up of officials seconded from the Government of Canada with expertise on Afghanistan and stabilization and reconstruction issues. The Secretariat was responsible for providing strategic advice and analysis in support of panel deliberations, identifying and organizing meetings with key Canadian and international experts, coordinating the travel of panel members, establishing the website, and managing the on-line submissions process. David Mulroney was Secretary to the panel, working with Executive Director Elissa Golberg, Special Advisors Colonel Michael Cessford, Samuel Millar and Cory Anderson, Chief of Operations Sanjeev Chowdhury, and Administrator Elizabeth Thébaud. Kaitlyn Pritchard provided important research support for the Secretariat. Financial administration and technological support were overseen by Gord Bergeron and Patty Goodfellow respectively of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

EXTERNAL ADVISORS TO THE PANEL

Dr. Fen Hampson and the faculty (Dane Rowlands, Michael Hart, Valerie Percival, Jeremy Littlewood, Jean Daudelin) and students (Zachary Archambault, Andrew Brunatti Jenny Butterfield, Maria Derks Shawn Friele, Roy Fuller, Anthony Ippolito, Joshua Kilberg, Simon Langois-Bertrand, Neil Lenksink Darryl Whitehead) of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs provided critical support to the Panel, assisting with the analysis of public submissions (outlined in Annex 3), and by identifying key themes and issues for the Panel to consider. Mr. John Hay provided essential assistance to the Panel in the drafting of its report. The Panel received communications advice from John Burke and Alvin Cader of Burke and Cader Media Strategies Inc. and St. Joseph Communications provided the design and final editing of the report. The Panel’s website was created by the Creatrix Design Group. Finally, there were many people who provided thoughtful input and advice to the panel through face-to-face meetings and email exchanges that are too numerous to list individually.

The Panel appreciates the dedication, energy and support it received from all of these people.