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Foreword

It is our honour to place before Parliament this quarterly report on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. As promised in the first of these reports, tabled in Parliament last June, this report sets out benchmarks by which Parliament and Canadians can measure the progress of Canada's Afghan mission between now and 2011.

Canada's engagement in Afghanistan represents the largest Canadian military undertaking abroad since the Korean War. Moreover, Afghanistan currently receives more Canadian development aid than any other country. As a result, Canada's relationship with Afghanistan constitutes an increasingly important element of Canadian diplomacy. Our commitment to Afghanistan, as affirmed by the House of Commons in its motion of March 13, 2008, is ambitious.

The costs of fulfilling this commitment are considerable. The Government therefore welcomes the October 9, 2008, report of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, "Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan," which explores difficult questions for examination by Parliament and Canadians. In particular, the report addresses the complex issues of how to calculate the present and projected costs of implementing our engagement in Afghanistan, and how these costs can best be presented to Parliament in a timely and transparent form. We look forward to a full and informed discussion of these critical matters.

The October 12, 2008, hostage-taking of CBC journalist Mellissa Fung in Kabul, and her eventual release to safety on November 9, 2008, with the full cooperation of Afghan authorities, served as a stark reminder of the dangers faced every day by Afghans and members of the international community alike in Afghanistan. But it also reminds us of the dedication of so many Canadians, like Ms. Fung, who work tirelessly in that very challenging environment.

This quarterly report covers the summer period, from the tabling of our last report on June 10, 2008, through to the end of September 30, 2008. Our next report will record conditions and mission progress during the fall quarter that ends on December 31, 2008.



The Honourable Stockwell Day Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway

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The Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay Minister of National Defence and Minister for the Atlantic Gateway

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The Honourable Lawrence Cannon Minister of Foreign Affairs

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I. Introduction

Summer has come to be known in Afghanistan as "the fighting season"—when insurgents mobilize for their most aggressive offensives. In Afghanistan generally, and in Kandahar specifically, this summer was especially violent. Numbers of insurgent incidents, and casualty rates among civilians and soldiers, reached levels higher than in any year since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. Security conditions in this quarter were worse than in the previous quarter, and worse than a year ago.

Despite these unprecedented levels of insurgent violence, Canada strengthened its engagement in Afghanistan during the quarter. Training and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces have advanced. Progress has been achieved in three Canadian signature projects—to rehabilitate the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system in Kandahar, to build or restore 50 schools in the province, and to continue polio vaccinations to protect some seven million children across the country. Canada and international partners have acted to support border-security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And we have invested more resources in the necessary long-term work of improving Afghanistan's own capacities for democratic governance and reconciliation.

All of these actions are directed to fulfilling our commitment to the six priorities that define Canada's mission in Afghanistan, priorities affirmed in the first quarterly report on the mission tabled in Parliament last June.

During this quarter we developed and published an extensive set of benchmarks, by which Canadians and Parliament can assess what progress is or is not being made in the mission between now and 2011. The benchmarks can also help us identify changing circumstances and adapt to new conditions as they arise.

While Canada remains an influential player and has a growing embassy in Kabul, we are now concentrating both our civilian and military contributions to Afghanistan in Kandahar. Our strategic objective is straightforward. It is to make measurable progress by 2011 toward building a safer and better governed Kandahar supported by a national government more able to advance Afghanistan's own security and development.

This is a dangerous and arduous undertaking. Afghanistan is at war against a fierce insurgency, and these last several months have been particularly difficult. But by understanding the Afghan conflict more clearly, and tracking Canada's successes and setbacks carefully, we can direct our efforts for the best effects possible in Afghanistan's violent context.

This quarterly report addresses the summer period extending from mid-June to the end of September. The next report will cover the fall quarter ending December 31.

II. The Context

Overall security in Afghanistan grew worse during the summer quarter.

The violence in Kandahar was punctuated in June by the insurgent attack on Sarpoza prison in the provincial capital, Kandahar City. Most of the prison population—including several hundred Taliban prisoners—escaped as a result. Immediately afterward, insurgents infiltrated into the district of Arghandab north of the city. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supported by Canadian and other soldiers and air crew of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), subdued those insurgents in Arghandab after several days of fighting. This Afghan-led operation served to demonstrate the Afghan National Army's improving capabilities.

The prison break, and the rising frequency of roadside bombings, suicide attacks and other violence, undermined Kandaharis' sense of security and confidence in their government. Although insurgents were vulnerable to ISAF and ANSF security operations, insurgents themselves were demonstrating improved tactical leadership and in some cases mounting larger and more complex attacks. In extensive parts of some Kandahar districts, insurgents had complete or nearly complete freedom of movement. For civilian development workers in those areas, freedom of movement remains limited.

Insurgent activities and attacks intensified in other regions of Afghanistan as well. Security in and around Kabul deteriorated during the quarter, and there have been numerous incidents along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. The worsening security conditions were attributable in some degree to better organization and communications displayed by Taliban and other insurgent groups operating from bases inside Pakistan.

Nevertheless, events in Afghanistan and abroad presented several positive opportunities for better security, governance and development. In Paris, ministers from Canada and 67 other countries assembled in June for the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan; many announced additional funding for Afghan development. (Canada had earlier announced an increase in our allocation to Afghan development and reconstruction from \$1.3 billion to \$1.9 billion over the years 2001 to 2011.) The Paris conference reinforced international support for the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the multinational collaboration contributing to Afghan development. Soon after, the G8 countries (again including Canada) reasserted support for Afghan-Pakistani cooperation in securing their common border, and committed aid to border-region development. This G8 action reflected one of Canada's own priorities for our Afghan mission.

In Kabul, the Government of Afghanistan took action against corruption. A new anti-corruption law was enacted, and an independent anti-corruption commission was established. Also in Kabul, the ANSF assumed authority for security in the capital, replacing ISAF in this role and marking a significant advance in Afghan capacity. And the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, announced a plan to increase the size of the Afghan National Army from about 65,000 to 122,000 soldiers over five years.

In Kandahar, the United States deployed 800 additional soldiers to the province, significantly reinforcing ISAF there. Sizable additional U.S. reinforcements, as signaled publicly by U.S. authorities, are expected to arrive in Afghanistan beginning in 2009.

And in Ottawa, the Government has announced that we are acquiring helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for deployment to Kandahar. The acquisition and deployment of medium-lift helicopters and UAVs will meet an important provision of the March 13, 2008, House of Commons motion, which set conditions for extending Canada's military mission in Afghanistan until 2011.

III. Canadian Priorities: Benchmarks for Progress

The Government this year has strengthened and concentrated the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan in three crucial ways. First, we are focused on achieving results by 2011, when Canada's military presence in Kandahar is to end. Second, we are focusing our civilian and military efforts in Kandahar, where Canadian soldiers, diplomats, development specialists, police, corrections officials and others can work jointly for greater effect. (The number of Canadian civilians posted in Kandahar rose by 20 in the quarter, to 51; another 23 were in Kabul.) And third, we have reshaped our engagement in a coherent set of six policy priorities—the mission framework described in our first quarterly report, and addressed in detail below.

To accomplish that concentration and achieve progress, we have introduced benchmarks by which Parliament and Canadians can judge whether, how and in which priorities our mission is succeeding. Many benchmarks are numerical—counting numbers of trained soldiers or teachers, for example. Others are more qualitative, conveying assessments of governmental abilities or political change.

All our benchmarks are consistent with those identified by Afghans themselves and embedded in the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. But they have been specifically devised to gauge progress in the six priorities of Canada's Afghan engagement. All are presented in an appendix in this report.

Three points bear repeating. The first is that Afghanistan has endured decades of poverty, misrule and warfare and ranks among the world's least developed countries; the present conflict there is immensely complicated, deeply rooted in Afghanistan's complex history, and exacerbated by the turmoil of the region. The second point is that Canada is one of many countries contributing to the improvement of Afghanistan's security, governance and development. It is obvious that we cannot control most events there. The third point is that, while our objectives in Afghanistan are realistic and achievable, Afghanistan will remain a developing country for many years—with all the challenges faced by developing countries. Notwithstanding all that, we can design and conduct our engagement to maximize the probability of making progress in each of our priorities.

Priority 1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.

Building the capacity of the ANSF is an urgent necessity in order to create the security in Afghanistan that good governance and development require. ISAF (under the command of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and a separate U.S.-led security transition program are helping Afghans build that capacity.

The ANSF consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). In Kandahar the Canadian Forces have primary responsibility for helping to build the capacity of the ANA, and provide support for capacity building in the ANP.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANA):

• By 2011, we expect that the ANA in Kandahar will demonstrate an increased capacity to conduct operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts of Kandahar, with support from ISAF allies.

Benchmarks for this objective are precise and consistent with ISAF training programs throughout Afghanistan.

One critical benchmark is the number of ANA battalions (called kandaks) capable of conducting near-autonomous security operations. Canadian soldiers are training and mentoring five ANA battalions and their brigade headquarters, and partnering with ANA units in security operations. The 2011 target is to have four of the five battalions and their headquarters fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations with some coalition support. Earlier in 2008, one battalion was assessed as fully capable—a notable first—and it has resumed operational status after a period of leave. (In the ANA system, battalions are categorized as operational, in training or on leave.)

Another ANA benchmark is the number of key districts where the ANA leads security operations. (Canada has identified six key districts in Kandahar for our civilian and military engagement.) Our 2011 target is to have the ANA responsible for security in three key districts. In June 2008, an ANA battalion held lead responsibility for security in one key district. Because the battalion went on leave during this quarter, the security lead in that district has reverted to the Canadian Forces until the ANA can reassume its leadership in the coming year.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANP):

 By 2011, we expect that the ANP will demonstrate an increased capacity to promote law and order in key districts of Kandahar, supported by justice-sector and corrections capabilities. ANP reform has persistently lagged behind ANA improvement. Illiteracy, corruption, drug abuse, absenteeism and inadequate training have long undercut the ANP's performance and reputation.

Police capacity building in Kandahar is organized in two principal international initiatives: the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led Focused District Development program. Canada contributes to both. During the past quarter Canada deployed seven more civilian police trainers to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 21 in Kabul and Kandahar. As well, the Canadian Forces had about 50 members training and mentoring the ANP in substations outside Kandahar City.

One of our progress indicators for ANP reform is the number of district ANP forces capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations. The 2011 target is to have 80 percent of ANP forces in key districts of Kandahar with that capability. In this quarter, two of 17 police units (12 percent) in six key districts were able to conduct near-autonomous operations with occasional assistance from police mentors.

The promotion of law and order demands a functioning court system with trained judges, competent prosecutors and defence lawyers, and a prison system where rights and the rule of law are respected. One of our benchmarks, in an array of improved justice- and correctional-sector capabilities, is the quality of detention facilities in Kandahar, including Sarpoza prison. The object is to improve inmate care and bring facilities closer to international standards. One 2011 target is to have all corrections officers and managers completing initial and advanced training programs. This quarter, 34 corrections officers (39 percent) had completed initial corrections training and two senior managers had taken part in management training.

The Sarpoza prison break was a setback to Kandahar's security and to Canadian capacity-building work. Sarpoza is a central facility for law and order in Kandahar, and its vulnerability highlighted the urgency of improving the prison itself and the performance of its staff and management. Supported by Canada, repairs and improvements to the prison have begun and training is accelerating.

Priority 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government.

Success against an insurgency requires a government to earn and hold the confidence of its citizens. Securing this confidence depends at least in part on a government's delivery of necessary services including education, water, sanitation, electricity and health care; and its performance in creating jobs through investments in irrigation, roads and other development infrastructure.

Canadian Objective for 2011:

 By 2011, we expect that Kandahar's provincial administration and core ministries of the Afghan government will be better able to provide basic services in key districts of Kandahar province.

We have launched two Canadian signature projects to help meet this objective. The first—and a major benchmark—is rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system, generating employment and promoting agriculture. One of our 2011 targets is to have created 10,000 seasonal jobs as a result of the project. This quarter, the Government opened the process of soliciting proposals from contractors; we expect to select a contractor in the next quarter. Some 30 jobs have already been created in road and bridge construction and security.

In a second signature project, Canada has embarked on the construction, expansion or repair of 50 schools across key districts of Kandahar. At the end of this quarter, two of those schools were completed and 14 are under construction. This signature project is also supported by teacher training. The 2011 target is to have trained 3,000 teachers in the province, and we have begun to identify candidates for this program.

Progress in these signature projects, as in all development efforts in Afghanistan, is inevitably constrained by prevailing security conditions. Implementation, service delivery and data collection in key districts are sometimes prevented by insurgent violence.

Priority 3. Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and it is beset by natural and conflict-caused disasters. This Canadian priority is directed to saving lives, alleviating suffering and building self-reliance among the most vulnerable of the Afghan people.

Canadian Objective for 2011:

• Humanitarian assistance will continue to be accessible to Afghan refugees, and to returnees and internally displaced persons in Kandahar and nationwide.

The most pressing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan now arise from food insecurity due to drought and high food prices, continuing internal displacement, child and maternal mortality rates that are among the worst in the world, and the many and chronic disadvantages afflicting Afghan women. Access to vulnerable people is often prevented by security conditions, and the Afghan government's capacity to respond to their needs is severely limited.

Canada will continue to provide financial support to experienced international partners, such as United Nations agencies that are active in Afghanistan and aiding vulnerable Afghans. In a Canadian signature project, we will increase our contributions to the

eradication of polio in Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan, which is one of only four countries where polio is still endemic. By late September this year 20 new cases had been reported, including eight in Kandahar. (Five cases were reported in the province in 2007.) Our benchmark for this signature project is the eradication of polio in Afghanistan. By 2009, we expect that Afghanistan will have met its goal to halt the transmission of the polio virus in Kandahar and all of Afghanistan. About seven million Afghan children were vaccinated nationally last year and in the first quarter of 2008. (Depending on several factors, including a child's age and health and the type of vaccine used, it can take one dose, or as many as 10 or more, for a child to be fully immunized.)

The polio campaign has been repeatedly subjected to insurgent attacks. In September, two Afghan doctors and a driver, working for the World Health Organization, were killed by a suicide bomber in the Spin Boldak area of Kandahar. The Taliban claimed responsibility.

Another benchmark will measure the capacity of public Afghan institutions—most of them new and untested—to plan and coordinate emergency assistance in Kandahar. Our 2009 targets for this benchmark are being developed with Afghan and international partners.

Still another indicator is the extent of land released and available to communities through surveying and clearing mines and other explosives, nationally and in Kandahar. Last year 180 square kilometres were released and made available in Afghanistan, and the number of mine victims declined 19 percent from the year before. Our 2011 target, based on the clearance target in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, is a cumulative total of 500 square kilometres released and available for use.

Priority 4. Enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.

Advancing the security and development of Kandahar will depend in large measure on improving security and development along the province's border with Pakistan. Ultimately, a more effective management of the border will not be possible without closer relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. To that end, Canada is undertaking several initiatives to facilitate those closer relations.

Canadian Objective for 2011:

• By 2011, we expect that Afghan institutions, in cooperation with Pakistan, will exercise stronger capacity to manage the border and foster economic development in the border area.

The troubled relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been fully evident in recent months. Flows of insurgents and munitions from Pakistan into Afghanistan continued. At the same time, scheduled meetings between officials of the two countries, intended to build confidence and cooperation, were suspended. Leaders of both

governments have since engaged bilaterally, and both governments have agreed to resume bilateral discussions and take part in Afghanistan-Pakistan-ISAF meetings. Even so, long-standing sources of those bilateral strains—disagreement over the Afghanistan-Pakistan boundary line, the presence of terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan, the continuing presence of some two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan—remain unresolved.

Nonetheless, some progress on this priority was achieved. G8 governments recommitted their support for development and security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and pledged to coordinate programs for border-region development. For our part, Canada has signed an agreement with the Afghan government to provide start-up funding for the Afghan Peace Jirga Secretariat, an organization that will, among other things, facilitate meetings of Afghan tribal leaders living along the border.

Canada is also facilitating a series of workshops bringing together senior border officials of both countries on issues of customs, migration, narcotics control and other mutual concerns. One early and practical result: harmonization of working hours at Afghan and Pakistani border posts. For the first time, border stations on both sides are open seven days a week, which allows easier border crossings for legal commerce, rising customs revenues for both governments, and a new opening for a stronger shared sense of confidence between the two countries.

Building that confidence is a necessary part of the complex process of promoting practical cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also true that the border is long, the terrain harsh and infrastructure scarce. So setting Canada's benchmarks in this priority is taking time. One benchmark, for instance, will target training of border officials and address the installation of new infrastructure. In the meantime, we are working with Afghans and Pakistanis to assess real needs and realistic opportunities for better border management.

Priority 5. Help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.

Governing authority in Afghanistan is constitutionally centralized, and public services are mostly provided by provincial branches of national ministries and agencies. But overall governing capacity is weak, and government institutions without well-defined responsibilities are vulnerable to political rivalries, inefficiencies and corruption. It is therefore a Canadian priority to help Afghans build their country's capacity for democratic governance—by contributing to effective and accountable public institutions and electoral processes that enable the delivery of public services and give Afghans more say in the decisions that affect their lives.

Canadian Objective for 2011:

• By 2011, we expect that national, provincial and local institutions, particularly in Kandahar province, will exhibit an increasing capacity for democratic governance in the

deliberation and delivery of public programs and services, and in carrying out democratic elections.

Democratic governance (a cornerstone principle of the Afghanistan Compact) means free and fair elections, a public sector that is open and accountable, and the honest, efficient and effective provision of public services. Achieving these elements of democratic governance is critical to improving the well-being of Afghans, and to sustaining security and development for the future.

Afghanistan's next presidential and provincial elections are to be held in 2009; parliamentary and district council elections are scheduled for 2010. The course of these elections will provide one telling measure of Afghanistan's democratic progress.

Canada is supporting the electoral process by helping to strengthen the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission and assisting all elements of the electoral process, from voter registration to the creation of a post-election complaints mechanism. We are also giving specific electoral support in Kandahar. Our benchmarks will help us monitor Afghan government abilities and performance in holding these elections. Example: the existing voter registry contains about 12.6 million names; our target is to have another two million voters added in time for the 2009 elections, and a further 500,000 for the 2010 elections.

We are also helping Afghans reinforce policy making, administration and service delivery in central-government ministries. In August we began the transition from the Canadian Forces-led Strategic Advisory Team to the Canadian Governance Support Office (CGSO) in Kabul. The CGSO is to advise key ministries; help build their capacity to plan, finance, manage and evaluate programs; and coordinate Canadian and Afghan development and governance activities. Importantly, the CGSO will enhance Afghan ministry abilities to support Canadian signature projects such as the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and irrigation system. When fully operational, the CGSO will represent one of the steps taken to strengthen the civilian component of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. The pace of bringing the CGSO to full strength will depend partly on security conditions in Kabul. By the end of September, the CGSO had deployed one advisor to the Ministry of Energy and Water and was preparing for seven more deployments in the coming months.

Priority 6. Facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.

The military counter-insurgency campaign conducted by Afghan forces and ISAF, no matter how successful, cannot by itself secure lasting peace or achieve Afghanistan's governance and development objectives. Any sustainable peace will require political reconciliation, an imperative all the more difficult in a society divided over many years by violent conflict. Reconciliation must be led by Afghans themselves. Canadians and international partners can help facilitate those efforts.

Canadian Objective for 2011:

• By 2011, we expect that national and provincial Afghan government initiatives will encourage political reconciliation, and receive timely support from Canada. Afghan authorities have attempted such efforts—not least with programs aimed at disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former insurgents. In the main, it must be said, these initiatives have not progressed far. Canada has taken measures to support Afghanled reconciliation when opportunities have emerged. We have also joined other governments in supporting the establishment of the Afghanistan Government Media Centre—a valuable improvement in the Afghan government's ability to communicate with its citizens. And we are planning to work with Afghans to map local power structures and conflicts in southern Afghanistan, including Kandahar. The aim here is to form a better picture of local divisions, and encourage peaceful dispute settlement among local power brokers and communities.

Our benchmark for this priority will be the Afghan government's capacity to promote reconciliation. One of the progress indicators will be the identification, by Afghan authorities, of the institutions and officials responsible for promoting this reconciliation. Our 2011 target is for responsibility to be clearly delineated, with a lead authority moving a reconciliation process forward. The Afghan cabinet recently identified the Independent Directorate for Local Governance as responsible for reconciliation efforts, but a process has not yet been developed.

IV. Conclusion

The Canadian commitment to Afghanistan is difficult, costly and dangerous. But our purpose is sound: to contribute, as best we can, to an Afghanistan that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure. With that objective, Canada's mission is focused for practical and realizable results by 2011.

Canada is not alone in this undertaking. We are an important contributor, with more than 50 other countries, to an international partnership supporting the rebuilding of Afghanistan under UN authority. With our partners, Canada is working to help advance the well-being of Afghans—and to develop a country that does not again harbour a terrorist menace to international peace and the security of Canadians.

Appendix

Vision:

A more secure Kandahar that is better governed and can deliver basic services to its citizens, supported by a more capable national government that can better provide for its security, manage its borders and sustain stability and reconstruction gains over the longer term.

Priorities:

- Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces
- Basic Services
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Border Security and Dialogue
- Democratic Development and National Institutions
- Political Reconciliation

To support this vision and the priorities laid out in this report, the Government of Canada has identified a number of benchmarks and progress indicators that will help to:

- gauge levels of progress being achieved, or not, as the case may be;
- identify if and when adjustments to its approach are required, given the complex environment; and
- report results frankly to Canadians.

Benchmarking in Afghanistan is a difficult task with reporting dependent on gathering information while operating in a conflict zone. Many of the benchmarks are clearly defined, but some are still being refined. Where programming is relatively new, for example, indicators are still being developed and baselines or targets have not yet been set. These will all be regularly reviewed and adapted.

- Benchmarks are reference points that help assess progress in specific priority areas. The benchmarks are in some cases quantitative, providing numerical targets, and in other cases qualitative, for instance gauging public perception or assessing the implementation of policies and programs.
- *Progress indicators* provide more specific information on how work is proceeding against those reference points. The challenge with progress indicators is in the ability to regularly report against them on a quarterly basis.
- Baselines refer to the current status of developments associated with the progress indicators, are a fixed point, and will not change over time.
- Targets are the level of progress that we hope to achieve by 2011.

Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces

Context: Benchmarks to measure Afghan National Army (ANA) progress are very precise and consistent with NATO's overall ANA training initiatives. To strengthen the policing, justice and corrections sectors, our benchmarks include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. A number of external factors will affect our ability to make progress in these areas. Insurgent violence deliberately targeting Afghan police has resulted in high rates of death, injury and desertion, which degrade police effectiveness and limit our ability to track trained police officers. Canada is one of many actors contributing to rule-of-law reform: Afghan ministries are leading this process and key international partners are playing critical roles.

Benchmarks

Benchmark: Increase in the number of ANA kandaks (army battalions) in Kandahar capable of conducting near-autonomous security operations, and increase in the capability of their brigade headquarters.

Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The number of ANA kandaks (and their	One of the five ANA kandaks is fully	To have four of the five ANA kandaks (and	Results for this indicator will be reported
brigade headquarters) capable of planning,	capable of planning, executing and	their brigade headquarters) fully capable	quarterly. One of the five ANA kandaks is
executing and sustaining near-autonomous	sustaining near-autonomous operations	of planning, executing and sustaining	fully capable of planning, executing and
operations.	(June 2008).*	near-autonomous operations.	sustaining near-autonomous operations.

^{*}It was previously reported in the baseline for this progress indicator that the brigade headquarters was fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations. This was not accurate and the baseline has been adjusted accordingly.

Benchmark: Increase and/or maintain the effective strength (troops trained, ready and available for operations) of Kandahar-based ANA kandaks and their brigade headquarters.

ANA kandaks and their brigade neadquarters.			
Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result

The effective strength of the Kandaharbased ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters). One of the five ANA kandaks has an effective strength of 67% and the remainder currently have an effective strength of over 80%. The ANA brigade headquarters has an effective strength of 77% (June 2008).

To sustain the level of effective strength of the Kandahar-based ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) at 70% or higher. Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. Five of the five Kandaks (and the brigade headquarters) have an effective strength of over 70%.

Benchmark: ANA responsible for security in more of the six key districts of Kandahar.

Progress Indicator

A progressive increase in the number of key districts in which the ANA is responsible for security, with fewer supporting ISAF troops.

Baseline

The ANA is responsible for security in one of the six key districts (June 2008).

2011 Target

To have the ANA responsible for security in three of the six key districts.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There are no key districts for which the ANA is responsible for security. In June, an ANA battalion held lead responsibility for security in one of the key districts. When the battalion rotated into a leave cycle, the security lead reverted back to the Canadian Forces. This battalion has since returned and resumed operations but the Canadian Forces maintain the lead for security.

Benchmark: To increase the number of key districts where ANA are perceived by the majority of the population to be a professional and effective force that contributes to their well being in key districts of Kandahar province.

Progress Indicator

The number of key districts where the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more.

Baseline

In four of the six key districts the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more (June 2008).

2011 Target

To maintain and/or increase the number of key districts where the ANA has an 85% approval rating.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. The ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more in four of the six key districts. Recent polling has shown that there has been no change from the baseline for this indicator.

Benchmark: Increase in the number of key districts of Kandahar province where there is a perceived improvement in security conditions.

Progress Indicator

The number of key districts where the majority of Kandaharis perceive security as improving.

Baseline

In zero of the six key districts, a majority of Kandaharis perceiving an improvement in security (June 2008).

2011 Target

The majority of Kandaharis in all six of the key districts perceive security as improving. *

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There are no key districts where a majority of Kandaharis perceive an improvement in security. Recent polling has shown that there has been no change from the baseline for this indicator.

^{*} The target for this progress indicator has been adjusted upwards from a target of three key districts where the majority of Kandaharis perceive an improvement in security to a target of all six key districts where the majority of Kandaharis perceive an improvement in security.

Benchmark: Increased Afghan National Police (ANP) capacity to provide effective police services in key districts of Kandahar.

Progress Indicator

The number of ANP trained in Kandahar.

Baseline

25% of the ANP in key districts have completed Focused District Development (FDD) training (August 2008).

2011 Target

80% of key district ANP forces will have completed Focused District Development (FDD) training.¹

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. FDD training was completed by 386 ANP in the key districts this quarter, bringing the total to approximately 855 in the districts of Zharei, Panjwayi and Kandahar City. This is approximately 57% of all ANP for the key districts. The percentage of ANP trained will fluctuate between reporting periods as a result of ongoing changes in Afghan staffing levels and high desertion and casualty rates.

Progress Indicator

The number of ANP forces in key districts capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

Baseline

0% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations (August 2008).

2011 Target

80% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There were two police units assessed as capable of conducting basic law and order operations (which equates to sustaining near-autonomous operations) with occasional assistance from police mentors. This represents a total of 12% of the existing 17 police units in key districts.

Progress Indicator

The number of ANP infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

Baseline

Five permanent substations have been constructed and equipped in key districts (August 2008).

2011 Target

A target for this indicator will be reported in the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There were no additional results to report this quarter.

Benchmark: Improved detention facilities in Kandahar that support the work of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Progress Indicator

The number of infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Sarpoza prison and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detention centre in Kandahar.

Baseline

Immediate repairs were made in the wake of the attack on Sarpoza prison. Detailed needs assessments for ongoing infrastructure upgrades at both NDS and Sarpoza have been completed and project plans have been developed in consultation with the Afghan government (August 2008).

2011 Target

A target for this indicator will be reported in the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. A number of security assessments were undertaken and measures implemented at Sarpoza prison and the National Directorate of Security this quarter (e.g., repairs to the prison's observation towers).

¹Focused District Development (FDD) is a six-phase police reform program that involves re-training, equipping and mentoring district police forces, as consolidated units, over six to eight months (but generally lasts longer).

Progress Indicator

The number of corrections officials trained and mentored in Kandahar.

Baseline

23 corrections officers (30%) and one senior manager (50%) have successfully completed initial corrections training; and two senior managers (100%) are participating in management training (August 2008).

2011 Target

100% of corrections officers and managers will have successfully completed their initial and advanced training programs.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. Eleven corrections officers completed initial corrections officer training this quarter for a total of 34 corrections officers (39% based on current staffing levels) trained in the key districts. Two senior managers completed 9 modules of training (out of 26 modules in total) as part of their management training. The percentage of corrections officers trained will fluctuate between reporting periods as a result of ongoing changes in Afghan staffing levels.

Benchmark: Improved justice sector: a working court system in Kandahar City with competent judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and administrative personnel in place.

Progress Indicator

The number of training programs in place for justice officials Kandahar.

Baseline

There are no current training programs for justice officials in Kandahar (August 2008).

2011 Target

Target to be developed in consultation with the Afghan government and UN partners, with a view to confirming the target for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

The frequency of reporting results will be in line with the target established. District officials from four of the key districts participated in pre-trial process seminars organized by the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team this quarter.

Progress Indicator

The number of justice sector infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

Baseline

Minimal judicial infrastructure exists. The Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice building requires repair. In Kandahar City, there is one courthouse which is in disrepair and housing for judges and prosecutors is inadequate. In the other districts, there are only three courthouses, all of which require upgrading.

2011 Target

Target to be developed in consultation with the Afghan government and UN partners, with a view to confirming the target for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

The frequency of reporting results will be in line with the target established. A Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team position was staffed this quarter to advance planning and implementation of justice-sector infrastructure and equipment projects.

Progress Indicator

Improved Ministry of Justice capacity to draft, revise, translate and promulgate laws passed by the Afghan government.

Baseline

Afghan Ministry of Justice's legislative drafting unit lacks the required capacity, processes and infrastructure to draft, revise, translate and promulgate legislation in an effective and timely manner (August 2008).

2011 Target

The Afghan Ministry of Justice's legislative drafting unit achieves improved capacity.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There were continued discussions between Canada's ambassador and the Afghanistan Ministry of Justice on plans to support the Ministry of Justice's legislative drafting unit.

Basic Services

Context: A number of benchmarks have been established under this priority, though some are less tangible than others as they are based on Afghan perception and will be measured against findings from public opinion research. It is important to note that polling in a complex environment like Kandahar is challenging and results may not always be reliable.

In the case of the Dahla Dam signature project, some key indicators have been established relating to the area of land irrigated and number of jobs created. Other indicators of progress will continue to be refined as the project moves into the planning and implementation stages.

Benchmark: The Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system rehabilitated, generating jobs and fostering agriculture. *Canadian Signature Project*

Progress Indicator Number of jobs created by the Dahla Dam project.	Baseline Project plan is in development and will be finalized in the fall of 2008.	2011 Target 10,000 seasonal jobs created by the project. Other targets will be established for the fourth quarterly report.	Quarterly Result Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. The project plan for the Dahla Dam is currently under development with evaluation of bidders underway and contractor selection to be finalized prior to the next quarterly report. Thirty jobs have already been created in areas such as road and bridge building and security to support the inception of the project.
Progress Indicator Number of hectares of land benefiting from improved irrigation and water management.	Baseline Project plan is in development and will be finalized in the fall of 2008.	2011 Target A target will be developed for the fourth quarterly report.	Quarterly Result Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly once reporting begins. Progress against this indicator will not be realized or reported until the project has been implemented and advanced to the irrigation phase.

Benchmark: A total of 50 schools built, expanded, or repaired in Kandahar. *Canadian Signature Project*

Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
Number of school projects (built, expanded	19 school projects contracted and one	50 schools built, expanded or repaired.	Results for this indicator will be reported
or repaired) in key districts.	school project completed (June 2008).		quarterly. Fourteen formal schools are
			now under construction. One school was
			completed during this quarter, bringing the
			total to two schools completed.

Benchmark: Local and provincial institutions able to meet and implement the objectives of the National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan.

Progress Indicator Number of teachers trained in Kandahar.	Baseline No teachers trained as yet through Canadian programming (June 2008).	2011 Target 3,000 trained teachers.	Quarterly Result Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. Canada continues to advance discussions with the Ministry of Education and the World Bank and will report on results in this area during the next quarter.
Progress Indicator Number of people receiving literacy training, vocational education and skills development.	Baseline More than 5,000 individuals have received literacy training. Some 735 individuals have received vocational training (2007).	2011 Target A target will be developed for the next quarterly report.	Quarterly Result Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. Close to 11,000 Afghans (including almost 9,000 females) in Kandahar continue to receive literacy training this quarter under a 10-month program through Canadian support to the World Food Program (WFP) (finishing in January 2009). Over 450 Afghans continue to receive vocational training this quarter through Canadian-funded support to the WFP over the period May 2008 to February 2009.

Benchmark: Provincial institutions and community groups able to identify and implement infrastructure projects.

Progress Indicator Percentage of communities in key districts that have completed infrastructure projects undertaken by the locally elected bodies.	Baseline 60% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects (December 2007).	2011 Target 75% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects.	Quarterly Result Results for this indicator will be reported annually. Through several programs supported by Canada, over 60 infrastructure projects were completed in key districts between June and September. These projects include community-level infrastructure projects such as rehabilitation of irrigation canals, reads wells subjects and restortion wells.
			such as rehabilitation of irrigation canals, roads, wells, culverts and protection wall construction.

Benchmark: Kandaharis have confidence in the ability of the government in Kandahar to deliver basic services, particularly education and water, and job-oriented economic growth.

Progress Indicator

Percentage of Kandaharis who perceive an improvement in dependable delivery of services.

Baseline

75% of Kandaharis polled indicate they are satisfied with efforts of provincial and local-level government to improve quality of life. 64% of Kandaharis polled are somewhat or very satisfied with provision of education. 39% of polled Kandaharis indicated they are satisfied with employment (February 2008).

2011 Target

To maintain and improve on perception of service delivery.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. 72% of Kandaharis polled in this quarter indicated they are satisfied with efforts of provincial and local-level government to improve quality of life. 63% of Kandaharis polled are satisfied with the provision of education. 34% of polled Kandaharis indicated they are satisfied with employment.

Benchmark: New economic opportunities created in key districts for Kandaharis.

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Progress	Indicator

The number of business enterprises and cooperatives established in key districts.

Baseline

206 agricultural cooperatives registered (April 2006) and 72 small and mediumsized enterprises operating (July 2008).

2011 Target

A target will be developed for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly following the establishment of a target in the next quarterly report. Information compiled during this quarter indicates that progress in key districts where security conditions are conducive to commerce is being advanced. Over 200 small businesses are operating in just one of the key districts in which Canada is strongly engaged.

Progress Indicator

The number of microfinance and savings clients served.

Baseline

30 microfinance loans provided to clients in Kandahar (March 2008).

2011 Target

A target will be developed for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly.

Security conditions and cultural factors have slowed progress in extending microfinance services throughout Kandahar. However, 76 microfinance clients are being served in Kandahar, which includes an additional 29 loans this quarter.

Canada is currently leading a study in Kandahar to identify alternative delivery models for expanding financial services to small and medium-sized enterprises. Opportunities identified and forward approaches will be highlighted in the next quarterly report.

Humanitarian Assistance

Context: The first benchmark in this priority includes a series of quantitative and qualitative measures, as no single indicator is comprehensive enough to provide a complete picture. Considered together, they will help to provide an assessment of progress.

The challenges for this priority are not in the indicators themselves, but in the ability to report against them on a quarterly basis given that evaluations and assessments are undertaken across longer timeframes. The evolving nature of security can challenge humanitarian access and limit the ability to report publicly on some efforts below the national level. It is also important to note that with some information such as mine victims, officially reported numbers are only estimates given that many accidents go unreported.

Benchmark: Achievement of polio eradication in Afghanistan. *Canadian Signature Project* **Progress Indicator Baseline** 2011 Target **Quarterly Result** The number of immunizations delivered Approximately 27.7 million vaccinations Eradication by vaccination by 2009. Results for this indicator will be reported and children receiving the polio vaccine were administered to 7 million children quarterly (Kandahar) and on an annual during each of the multiple national during 4 national campaigns in 2007 basis nationally. Seven million children were targeted for immunization during each of campaigns conducted annually—multiple (2007).vaccinations are required to stop three national campaigns so far in 2008; transmission of polio. national reporting to confirm those reached. however, is only received annually. In Kandahar, reports indicate that over 350,000 children received vaccinations in each of these national campaigns as well as during four subnational campaigns carried out this year. In this quarter, a national campaign was carried out in August and two subnational campaigns took place in June and September. **Progress Indicator Baseline** 2011 Target **Quarterly Result** The number of polio cases reported. Results for this indicator will be reported 17 cases reported nationally (2007). Eradication by 2009. quarterly. Twenty cases of polio, eight of which are in Kandahar, were reported as of September 25, 2008. This is an increase over last year, which saw 5 of the 17 national cases reported for the entire year, in Kandahar.

Benchmark: Public institutions able to plan and coordinate emergency assistance and support to vulnerable populations in Kandahar.

Progress Indicator

The capacity of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and Kandahar Provincial Disaster Management Authority (KPDMA) to put in place effective disaster preparedness plans.

Baseline

PDMA and United Nations in Kandahar developed a comprehensive contingency plan for a severe winter in 2007 and anticipated spring floods. Two training sessions were provided for the KPDMA on disaster management.

2011 Target

A target will be developed for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported annually. ANDMA and KPDMA, along with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and aid agencies, prepared a contingency plan during the quarter for a severe winter and anticipated floods for the southern region in 2008/2009. Approximately 3,800 families are targeted in Kandahar, along with 9,000 children under the age of five and 4,500 pregnant and lactating women.

Progress Indicator

The access that vulnerable populations—women, children, disabled persons, returnees and internally displaced persons—have to essential quality health services.

Baseline

A baseline will be established for the next quarterly report.

2011 Target

Increase in the number of health workers available for Kandahar.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported annually. Canada is working with partners such as UNICEF to increase access to quality health services through the training of health care staff and the establishment of a new obstetric facility. As of September 2008, 90% of the construction of the facility was completed.

Progress Indicator

The amount of land released and made available for communities as a result of survey and clearance of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) nationally and in Kandahar.

Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 180 square kilometres of land were released and made available nationally.

2011 Target

The target is a cumulative total of 500 square kilometres of land released and made available.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported annually. Although formal reporting of results regarding land released to communities through surveys and clearance of mines is undertaken on an annual basis, Canada, as a lead donor, is working with its key mine action partners to report more frequently on detailed results achieved. Canadian funding is contributing to the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan's current operations in 32 of the country's 34 provinces. Kandahar is the third most contaminated province in Afghanistan.

Progress Indicator

The number of people receiving mine awareness education in Kandahar.

Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 33,500 individuals were provided with mine awareness education.

2011 Target

200,000 individuals provided with mine awareness education.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported annually. Following the integration of mine awareness education into the school curriculum for grades 1 to 6 by March 2008, this subject has been incorporated into grades 7 to 12 text books during the past quarter. Radio broadcasts have also been prepared during this past quarter which is helping to broaden the scope of the communities receiving mine awareness education.

Border Security and Dialogue

Context: Border security and dialogue are ultimately contingent on strong relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and on the resolution of some longstanding issues. Canada's benchmarks for this priority include qualitative and quantitative progress indicators to assess the effectiveness of Afghan and Pakistani border management efforts, including bilateral cooperation. As the border is long, its terrain difficult and its infrastructure underdeveloped, obtaining baseline information and establishing targets are challenging. Canada has already begun to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to identify infrastructure, training and other needs. This information will be essential to refining our baselines and targets in future.

Benchmark: Regular discussions on border issues.

Progress Indicator

Increased dialogue between Pakistani and Afghan officials through mechanisms including Canadian-sponsored workshops.

Baseline

Three Canadian-sponsored workshops have been held to date. Key mechanisms for discussions were suspended by Afghanistan in July 2008 (August 2008).

2011 Target

Sustainable mechanisms for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues are in place and operating for senior officials.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There was an agreement this quarter between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resume bilateral discussions, including Afghanistan-Pakistan-ISAF Tripartite meetings. Dates are being explored for the next Canadian-sponsored workshop.

Progress Indicator

Increased cooperation at Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

Baseline

Regular Canadian-facilitated discussions at Kandahar-Baluchistan border are continuing.

2011 Target

Mechanisms at border in place for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. There was agreement this quarter to resume Canadian facilitated discussions on the Kandahar-Baluchistan border between Afghan and Pakistani military officials in November.

Benchmark: Better managed border crossings on the Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

Benommark. Better managed Border Grossings on the Nandaniar Bandomstan Border.			
Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
Training completed by border officials.	No training provided to date (August 2008).	A training target is being developed, together with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a view to confirming this target in the next quarterly report.	The frequency of reporting results will be in line with the target established. Canadian efforts this quarter were focused on assessing training needs and setting the groundwork for programming.
Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
Key infrastructure projects completed, including procurement of equipment.	Assessment of infrastructure needs not yet complete, some equipment purchases underway (August 2008).	An infrastructure target is being developed, together with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a view to confirming this target in the next quarterly report.	The frequency of reporting results will be in line with the target established. Canadian efforts this quarter were focused on assessing infrastructure needs and setting the groundwork for programming. A Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team position was staffed this quarter to advance border security programming.

Democratic Development and National Institutions

Context: Given the nature of the first benchmark, measures will include quantitative data such as internationally recognized Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)* assessments in addition to qualitative assessments of ministry-specific evaluation activities and public perception assessed through polling.

The Government of Afghanistan intends to hold two elections before 2011: a presidential election and provincial council elections in 2009, and the election of parliament and district councils in 2010.

Canada will actively contribute in this area but it is important to recall that Canada is one of many actors. The Afghan government is leading, with support from the international community.

Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
Effective planning and budgeting mechanisms in place.	The difference between planned and actual government spending is 9.7% (April 2008).	The difference between planned and actual government spending should be less than or equal to 5%.	Results for this indicator will be reported annually. Quarterly budget expenditures are on track to improve on the previous year's performance as indicated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) "Making Budgets Work" project's quarterly reports. Canada is working with the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and other experienced partners in Afghanistan through projects such as "Making Budgets Work" that are advancing progress in the area.

Progress Indicator Better government monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place to ensutransparency.	ıre
Benchmark: Afghanistan's a	b

Baseline

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating*): 3 (April 2008).

2011 Target

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating*): 3+.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported biannually. Although PEFA ratings are only formally assessed every two years, Canada is in discussions with the World Bank to advance annual assessments for Afghanistan. Progress in the areas assessed by the PEFA is being made through Canadian support to such programs as Making Budgets Work, the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program, and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which identify and fill the needs of the Afghan government for continued progress in achieving good governance.

Benchmark: Afghanistan's ability to manage upcoming elections.

Progress indicator
The establishment of a national voter
registry.

Baseline

Pilot voter registration process carried out in three selected provinces (April 2008).

2011 Target

Update of registry completed in a fourphased approach, in advance of 2009 presidential elections:

- 14 provinces registered by November 2008;
- nine additional provinces registered by December 2008:
- seven additional provinces, including Kandahar, registered by January 2009; and
- four additional provinces registered by February 2009.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. Canada's support to this process has so far been through the UNDP's Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT).

Progress Indicator

The number of registered voters nationally.

Baseline

Approximately 12.6 million voters in the existing registry (2005).

2011 Target

Two million new registrants added to the current registry in advance of the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. 500,000 new registrants added to the 2009 registry in advance of the 2010 parliamentary and district council elections.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly following the launch of a registration process. The Government of Afghanistan, with support from Canada, undertook planning and preparation to launch a voter registration process in October, including the launch of public outreach activities (in September), development of voter registration training materials and recruitment of staff.

Progress Indicator

The percentage of voter turnout.

Baseline

70% of registered voters participated in the last presidential elections. 51.5% of registered voters participated in the last parliamentary and provincial council elections.

2011 Target

Expectations will be established in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan for the next quarterly report.

Quarterly Result

To be reported as events occur in 2009 and 2010.

Expectations of voter turnout will be established by the Government of Afghanistan. Through programs such as the UNDP's "ELECT" and the Elections Basket Fund, Canada will support meeting this target. Reporting will occur following the elections.

Progress Indicator

The establishment of an independent electoral complaints commission.

Baseline

An independent electoral complaints commission does not currently exist (August 2008).

2011 Target

Establishment of an independent electoral complaints commission.

Quarterly Result

Results for this indicator will be reported quarterly. With the current priority focus on voter registration, work on the electoral complaints commission has moved into subsequent quarters.

Political Reconciliation

Context: Ultimately, only the Afghan government has the authority to pursue political reconciliation; Canada and other international partners will play supporting roles. Progress indicators to measure this benchmark include the identification of Afghan institutions and officials responsible for moving reconciliation forward, as well as the establishment of a transparent and effective process for reconciling insurgents.

Afghanistan cannot secure peace or realize its governance and development objectives by military means alone. An Afghan-led, internationally supported reconciliation process can serve to foster sustainable peace.

Benchmark: The Government of Afghanistan increasingly able to promote reconciliation among Afghans.

Progress Indicator

The Afghan government identifies the institutions and officials responsible for promoting Afghan reconciliation and a national reconciliation process is established.

Baseline

A clear institutional focal point and process have yet to be identified (August 2008).

2011 Target

A lead authority is moving reconciliation process forward.

Quarterly Result

Canada continues to advocate the creation of an Afghan-led national reconciliation process, and remains in close contact with the Government of Afghanistan on this. We continue to support nascent Afghan-led efforts to develop strategies for reconciliation, which we hope will lead to the identification of a focal point and the development of a national reconciliation strategy.

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The Afghan government is better able to communicate with Afghans about reconciliation.

Baseline

The Government of Afghanistan's ability to share information about its programs, policies and objectives in a timely manner is limited (August 2008).

2011 Target

The Government of Afghanistan is actively sharing information, at the national, provincial and district levels, regarding its programs, policies and objectives for reconciliation.

Quarterly Result

Canada is currently supporting efforts to increase the Government of Afghanistan's capacity to communicate with its own population. This includes providing financial support to the Afghanistan Government Media Centre.