
## AFGHANISTAN

DECEMBER 2008





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Report to Parliament

#### **Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication**

Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, December 2008

Quarterly.

Text in English and French on inverted pages.

Title on added t.p.: L'engagement du Canada en Afghanistan, décembre 2008

Available also on the Internet.

ISSN 1918-2732

Afghan War, 2001- — Participation, Canadian.
 Canada — Foreign relations — Afghanistan.
 Canada — Armed Forces — Afghanistan.
 Canada — Military policy.
 Canada. Privy Council Office.
 Title. L'engagement du Canada en Afghanistan, décembre 2008

DS371.412.S47 958.104'7 C2008-980202-0E

Cover photo: Dahla Dam, Arghandab district, Kandahar province Photos: © CIDA, DND

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#### **Foreword**

In accordance with the motion passed by the House of Commons on March 13, 2008, we are honoured to place before Parliament this quarterly report on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan.

One year ago, the Honourable John Manley and the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan recommended measures to bring greater effectiveness to our engagement in Afghanistan, and to communicate the results to Parliament and Canadians. On the Panel's advice, the Prime Minister established the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan; Parliament created a committee on our Afghan engagement; a task force was created within the Privy Council Office dedicated to this mission; and we have more closely coordinated diplomatic, development and security operations. In quarterly reports, we are recording in detail the progress of the mission.

This report addresses the quarter ending December 31, 2008. Since that quarter, significant progress has been achieved in advancing Canada's priorities. The Canadian International Development Agency announced that two Canadian companies, SNC-Lavalin and Hydrosult, will manage the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and irrigation system in Kandahar, a Canadian signature project. As well, during a visit to Afghanistan in January 2009, the Honourable Beverley Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, announced an additional contribution of \$14 million in humanitarian assistance.

January saw the inauguration of Barack Obama as President of the United States, the largest of our coalition partners in Afghanistan. Members of the Obama administration have declared their intention to refocus U.S. resources on the threat posed by the insurgency in Afghanistan, and on revitalizing Afghanistan's economic development. The deployment of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan can greatly improve prospects for security in Afghanistan and the region, and we look forward to cooperating with the new administration.

Insurgent violence in Afghanistan, and specifically in Kandahar where we have concentrated much of Canada's engagement, intensified during this past quarter. The cost, in Canadian lives lost, has been painful. With all Canadians, we salute every member of the Canadian Forces who has fought in Afghanistan. And we grieve with every family in mourning.

Our next report will cover the quarter that ends March 31, 2009.



The Honourable Stockwell Day Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway

Surenes Con

The Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay Minister of National Defence and Minister for the Atlantic Gateway

The Honourable Beverley J. Oda Minister of International Cooperation

The Honourable Lawrence Cannon Minister of Foreign Affairs

Burney Common

The Honourable Peter Van Loan Minister of Public Safety



Canadian civilian officials meeting with Afghan leaders at a shura (community meeting) in Kandahar province.



UNICEF/WHO health worker delivering vaccinations to Kandahar children during a regular polio vaccination campaign. Eradicating polio is one of Canada's three signature projects.



Local workers ready to distribute 300 metric tonnes of wheat seed and fertilizer donated by Canada to 5,000 Kandahar farmers.



Canadian Forces soldiers patrol within Zhari district, west of Kandahar City, in a joint Afghan National Army and Coalition security operation to remove Taliban forces from the area.

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#### **Summary**

- Security conditions in Afghanistan remained especially dangerous and by some measures deteriorated during the quarter.
- The humanitarian situation worsened in Afghanistan, and the international community assisted Afghan communities (particularly in the northern provinces) to prepare for severe winter conditions and food shortages.
- Important progress was nonetheless achieved in priority areas of Canada's engagement.
- With Canadian support, capabilities of Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar province improved. The Afghan National Army Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar reached "capability milestone 1"—meaning it was fully capable of near-autonomous operations with some help from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). There was more public reporting of insurgent improvised explosive devices to authorities, suggesting a heightened readiness among Kandaharis to act in defence of their own security.
- Major repairs were made to Kandahar City's Sarpoza prison—site of an insurgent attack last June. The prison is now assessed more secure than before the attack. Almost all Sarpoza prison staff have completed the first phase of basic training.
- Rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and irrigation system—a Canadian signature project—continued with preparatory construction. Two Canadian firms, SNC-Lavalin and Hydrosult, were selected to manage the three-year rehabilitation project.
- In school rehabilitation—another signature project—one school was completed during the quarter, bringing the total to three. Another 22 were under construction. Canada aims to help build, expand or repair 50 schools in key districts by 2011.
- Canada continued to support Afghanistan's national polio vaccination program, a third Canadian signature project. About 7.1 million children were vaccinated during this quarter, though the total number of cases still increased.
- Canadian Forces officers facilitated Afghan-Pakistani dialogue on border security, arranging a "border flag" meeting with Afghan, Pakistani and ISAF officers.
- Canadians helped Afghans prepare for 2009 presidential and provincial council elections.
- Canada's Embassy in Kabul encouraged Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.
- Provisions of the March 13, 2008, House of Commons motion on Canada's Afghan
  engagement are being met on schedule: a U.S. Army battalion has deployed to Kandahar; the
  Canadian Forces have acquired and deployed helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
  Kandahar; and our allies have been informed that Canada's military presence in Kandahar
  will end in 2011.

#### 1. Introduction

Building Afghanistan's capacity to provide basic services to its citizens—this ranks among the most urgent priorities of Canada's Afghan engagement. And progress has been achieved, even amid the violence and disorder of war. In this quarter, with Canada's help, another school opened in Kandahar. New businesses started, creating new jobs. Work on the Dahla Dam and irrigation project gathered speed. Construction of a major new obstetrical unit in Kandahar City was completed. Thousands of Kandahar farmers received wheat seeds and fertilizer, improving rural livelihoods and food security in the province. These and other Canadian-supported endeavours are strengthening the abilities of Afghan institutions to deliver core services to the public—and promoting a stronger Afghan confidence in their own elected government.

Canadians are advancing this and other priorities despite the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan. Violence, particularly in Kandahar and other southern provinces, persisted at increased levels during the quarter. Throughout Afghanistan, civilian and military casualties reached numbers higher than in any previous autumn quarter since the removal of the Taliban regime in 2001.

The deterioration of security conditions through 2008, and the geographic spread and intensification of the insurgency, underlined the pressing importance of another Canadian priority: enabling the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order. Supported by Canadian training and mentoring, ANSF units demonstrated an increased ability to lead and conduct operations independently.

At the same time, the Canadian Forces themselves continued combat against the insurgency—almost always partnered with ANSF soldiers or police. As ANSF and Canadian troops expanded counter-insurgency efforts in Kandahar, they exerted more pressure on insurgent networks, disrupted cells responsible for building and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and thwarted numerous insurgent attacks. Military and civilian casualties reflected this higher tempo of operations as well as attacks by insurgents. For members of the Canadian Forces, the deaths of nine soldiers (after three months without fatalities) made December the deadliest month of 2008.

On March 13, 2008, the House of Commons passed a motion calling for an extension of the Canadian military presence in Kandahar to July 2011. The House attached three critical conditions to this extension: the securing of an additional battle group (about 1,000 soldiers) from a partner country to deploy in Kandahar by February 2009; the acquisition of medium-lift helicopters and high-performance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by February 2009; and notification to allies in NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) that Canada will end its military presence in Kandahar as of July 2011, and complete the departure of Canadian Forces troops by December 2011.

These conditions are being met on schedule. A U.S. Army battalion has deployed to Kandahar; these additional 1,000 troops doubled the total of coalition combat forces in the province. More U.S. reinforcements are expected in Afghanistan in 2009. The Canadian Forces have acquired

and deployed the prescribed helicopters and UAVs to Kandahar. And NATO allies have been notified that Canada will end its military presence in 2011.

As well, Canada continues to increase investments in the improvement of governance and the acceleration of development in Afghanistan. More development specialists, diplomats, police and other civilians were posted to Kandahar and Kabul in the quarter. Our efforts are being coordinated in a coherent set of priorities, described in the following pages. Progress is being tracked and reported to Parliament and Canadians against an array of explicit benchmarks—all presented in these quarterly reports.

Progress will not come quickly. Afghanistan is a poor country at war against a determined and resourceful insurgency. Its full transition to a more secure and stable society will take decades. Nor can Canada control most of the forces at work in Afghanistan. Afghans themselves are caught up in a complicated interaction of tribal, ideological, economic and regional conflicts, and Canada is one of many countries trying to contribute to improvements in Afghanistan's security, governance and development. Nevertheless, we can achieve the best effects possible—and help improve the future for Afghans—with a disciplined and accountable implementation of Canada's own engagement.

This quarterly report addresses Canada's engagement from October 1 to December 31, 2008. The next report will cover the quarter ending March 31, 2009.

#### II. The Context

In Afghanistan generally, and in Kandahar specifically, security conditions remained especially dangerous and by some measures deteriorated during the quarter. Insurgency activity continued in and around Kabul. Criminal and factional violence compounded the insecurity generated by the insurgency in the capital and surrounding areas. In Kandahar province, where many of Canada's security, governance and development programs are focused, the overall severity and frequency of security incidents remained high, partly as a result of ANSF and Canadian operations against former insurgent strongholds. Kandahar experienced unprecedented numbers of insurgent attacks by IEDs; and the numbers of IED "finds" also rose, in part reflecting public willingness to report IEDs, along with greater ANSF and coalition capacity to find IEDs before they detonate. Public reporting of IEDs suggested a heightened readiness among Kandaharis to act in defence of their own security. Even so, nine Canadian soldiers were killed (all in December), and more wounded, in IED explosions during the quarter. In all, 32 Canadian soldiers were killed in the counter-insurgency in 2008. Across Afghanistan, more civilians and soldiers—Afghan and international—were killed in 2008 than in any earlier year of the war.

During the quarter, the Afghan National Army in Kandahar began to lead combat operations and suffered high casualty rates, mostly in IED attacks that increased both in frequency and complexity. Attacks against governing institutions continued, with IED strikes against the Kandahar Provincial Council and an assembly of district elders. Assassinations of prominent pro-government Kandaharis, and other acts of intimidation, also grew more numerous. The November acid attack on more than a dozen schoolgirls and teachers shook Kandahar City and caused an outcry throughout Afghanistan. It was a particularly shocking demonstration of the

insurgency and its consequences. (Remarkably, almost all the wounded girls have since returned to school.)

Public opinion is never easy to gauge in Kandahar, not least because many Kandaharis express reluctance to speak unfavourably of their government to a pollster. But high and rising levels of insurgent violence seemed to be undermining citizens' confidence in their safety and their future. In recent polling, more Kandaharis have said their security is getting worse, and the number who believe security is improving fell markedly—from more than 50 percent to less than 30 percent—in the span of a year.

The deployment of a U.S. battalion has strengthened counter-insurgency forces in the province, where Canada has about 2,800 troops in training and combat roles. The Canadian Forces' presence has also been strengthened, with the deployment of an Air Wing in Kandahar consisting of Chinook and Griffon helicopters, Heron and Sperwer UAVs, and the Theatre Support Element flying Hercules transport aircraft. The six Chinooks and eight Griffons, although they were not yet operational during the quarter, will provide Canadian personnel with safer transport than road convoys allow. The UAVs enhance intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities.

Canada participates in the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a coalition of 41 countries operating under NATO command and with the authority of the United Nations Security Council. The Canadian combat mission is to end in 2011.

### **III. Canadian Priorities: Reporting Progress**

In mid-2008 Canada established and announced the six priorities that define our engagement in Afghanistan. These priorities are to: enable the ANSF in Kandahar to sustain a safer environment and promote law and order; strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver basic services; provide humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable people; enhance border security with facilitation of Afghan-Pakistani dialogue; help advance Afghanistan's democratic governance; and facilitate Afghan-led political reconciliation. These priorities reflect Canada's particular areas of competence to contribute to a better life for Afghans. And they respond to the needs identified by Afghanistan's own development strategy, as part of a coordinated international program of aid to Afghanistan's security, governance and development.

Action on Canada's priorities is being designed and executed to achieve concrete progress by 2011, when our military mission in Kandahar ends. For greater effect, we continue to concentrate military and civilian efforts in Kandahar while maintaining an influential diplomatic and development presence in Kabul, so that security, governance and development programs reinforce each other.

We have also embedded benchmarks in our programming, enabling Parliament and Canadians to measure the progress of Canada's engagement in each of the six priorities. The benchmarks, and the results for this quarter, are presented in the Appendix of this report.

## Priority 1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) together constitute the ANSF. Strengthening both into lasting, effective forces is essential to create the security required for improved governance and development. Building the ANSF across Afghanistan is a shared mission for ISAF and the separate, U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. In Kandahar, the Canadian Forces carry primary responsibility for training and mentoring the ANA, and they support capacity building in the ANP by Canadian civilians and U.S. partners.

Equally urgent is the establishment of a strong civilian justice system able to implement and protect the rule of law. To this end, Canadian police, corrections and governance specialists are pursuing a number of initiatives to build capacity in the ANP, prisons and the court system in Kandahar.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANA): By 2011, we expect that the ANA in Kandahar will demonstrate an increased capacity to conduct operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts of Kandahar, with support from ISAF allies.

Benchmarks for this objective (as set out in the Appendix) serve to measure the capabilities of ANA units, the degree to which ANA battalions lead security operations in key districts, and public perceptions of the ANA in those districts.

Canadian soldiers continued training and mentoring five ANA battalions (known in Afghanistan as kandaks) and their Brigade Headquarters. In this quarter, the Brigade Headquarters achieved "capability milestone 1" (CM1), meaning it is fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations with some ISAF support. This was a significant accomplishment—the first time the ANA in Kandahar has been judged able to organize brigade-level activities independently. An ANA infantry battalion returned from leave and quickly showed in combat that it had kept its CM1 rating. Four other battalions were progressing at lower CM levels. One of the 2011 targets is to have four of the five battalions and their headquarters at CM1.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANP): By 2011, we expect that the ANP will demonstrate an increased capacity to promote law and order in key districts of Kandahar, supported by justice-sector and corrections capabilities.

Insurgent violence and intimidation—specifically aimed at ANP members, and correctional and justice-sector officials—continued to impede progress toward this objective. The ANP in 2008 suffered its highest casualty rates since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and its morale suffers from poor pay, insufficient support from the Afghan government in fuel, weaponry and ammunition, and other deficiencies. Recruitment and retention of staff have been inadequate. Illiteracy and corruption persist. In this quarter, some trained police were redeployed between districts and replaced with untrained ANP members. The effect was to halve (from two to one)

the number of ANP units in key districts capable of planning and conducting basic law and order operations with occasional help from mentors.

Nonetheless, work progressed through the quarter. Eleven additional Canadian police officers were deployed to Kandahar, bringing the total in Afghanistan to 29. As part of the U.S.-led Focused District Development initiative, Canadians helped train and mentor some 59 police officers in key districts during the quarter. The total trained in 2008 rose to 914. In support of policing and corrections, Canada continues to finance new police sub-stations, checkpoints, training facilities, basic equipment and salaries. Complementing these activities, Canada continued efforts with Afghan authorities and international partners to strengthen policing capacity at the national level.

At Kandahar City's Sarpoza prison—site of an insurgent attack and large-scale prisoner escape in June—Canadian trainers and mentors worked to reinforce security and improve living and working conditions for staff and prisoners during the quarter. Almost all Sarpoza corrections staff have completed the first phase of basic training, and managers have completed executive leadership courses. Considerable progress was made repairing and improving infrastructure, and the prison now is assessed as more secure than before the June attack. Improvements continue, with the aim of bringing the prison, and its treatment of prisoners, to internationally accepted standards.

### Priority 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government.

Encouraging and deepening public confidence in Afghan government institutions will be an essential part of countering Afghanistan's insurgency. The Afghan government can only secure that confidence if it improves its delivery of basic public services, including health care, education, roads, and water for households and irrigation. These obligations describe the dual imperative in this Canadian priority: to meet urgent human needs and to build Afghanistan's capacity for effective, responsible government.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that Kandahar's provincial administration and core ministries of the Afghan government will be better able to provide basic services to key districts of Kandahar province.

Two Canadian signature projects address this objective directly. The first is the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system. Important progress was made during the quarter. Construction of a new access road and bridge, strong enough to bear the weight of heavy dambuilding equipment, proceeded toward completion in early 2009. And CIDA—the Canadian International Development Agency—chose two Canadian firms, SNC-Lavalin and Hydrosult, to manage the \$50 million rehabilitation project over the next three years.

#### Signature Project: Dahla Dam and Irrigation System

(as seen on front cover)

Originally built in the 1950s through a U.S.-Afghanistan partnership, the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system store and distribute water to an area supporting 80 percent of Kandahar's population. But decades of war and disrepair have left the dam and canals operating far below potential, and scarce water is wasted. Rehabilitating the dam and irrigation system can dramatically increase the reliability of water supply to Kandahar farmers, and generate thousands of seasonal jobs. Canada will invest up to \$50 million over three years to make urgent repairs to the dam, fix gates controlling water flows from the Arghandab River, restore canals, and support establishment of a water management agency. The project also includes training for farmers in water management and crop production. The results: more sustainable and efficient distribution of water, improved farm production, employment growth and higher incomes.

A second signature project commits Canada to build, expand or repair 50 schools in key Kandahar districts. In this quarter one school was completed, bringing the total completed under the project to three. Another 22 were under construction. As well, we aim to have helped train 3,000 teachers by 2011. Teacher training continued in this quarter in a program funded by the United States, and the first phase of in-service training for working teachers has been concluded (most Kandahar schoolteachers have no post-secondary education). This is a necessary precursor to work that Canada will do in teacher training. Vocational and literacy courses for adults continued successfully during the quarter, with some 10,949 adults, including 8,984 women, preparing to complete a 10-month literacy course in January 2009.

For Kandaharis, most of whom are illiterate, learning to read yields simple but immediate and powerful rewards. "I can now read signs along the road in the city," said one woman, a widow with five children. For the first time, she and other participants can read children's names on documents, identify a bus route or qualify for a job.

Canada is working to help strengthen the reach of the Afghan government in a variety of national programs. But notable progress was also recorded in smaller-scale improvements to basic services important to Kandahar families. Through support to the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development and other partners, Canada assisted the start-up of a number of new businesses—including a bakery and a bazaar—that have now created jobs and generated revenue for local entrepreneurs. Canada helped set up a new service in Kandahar that enables local firms to bid on procurement contracts with international agencies and local government operating in the province—another job- and income-generating innovation. And Canada helped 26 Kandahari women secure start-up training and supplies to launch their own poultry businesses.

As another personal example, one businessman counted himself a successful beneficiary of two Canadian-supported loans for new machinery in his Kandahar City bedding factory. The loans—worth \$4,600 and \$9,200—"...enabled me to purchase more resources needed for the factory in order to operate my business with confidence," he said. His firm employs about 10 men in the factory and 70 women working from home. The loans were made possible by the Kabul-based

Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, which has received \$6.5 million from Canada in 2008-09 for its work across Afghanistan.

Still another project, widely popular among Kandaharis, involved a \$1.2 million Canadian contribution through public institutions to distribute 300 tonnes of wheat seeds and fertilizer to more than 5,000 Kandahar farmers. The seeds can produce more accessible and affordable food supplies for the province. For farmers, they will provide an alternative to growing poppy crops for the opium trade.

West of Kandahar City, in Zhari district, Canadian aid has helped link eight small villages with new roads while fostering new capacity for local development. The roads have noticeably improved life for villagers. Said one: "Before the construction of the road, we used to carry patients on our backs to health clinics." Besides more accessible health care, the project created jobs and served to build capacity in Zhari's Community Development Council, which was responsible for administering the road work.

These and all other development activities in Kandahar have confronted the impediments that war imposes on life and travel in the city and the countryside. Movement of Canadian development workers and non-governmental partners in some parts of key districts is nearly impossible. In other areas it requires travel in armoured vehicles under constant and close protection.

### Priority 3. Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.

Canada's humanitarian aid to Afghanistan answers the most desperate needs of Afghans and gives expression to our own enduring values. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries, and its people have suffered decades of war, bad government and natural disasters. Helping the most vulnerable among them remains a compelling duty.

Canadian Objective for 2011: Humanitarian assistance will continue to be accessible to Afghan refugees, and to returnees and internally displaced persons in Kandahar and nationwide.

Humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan are poor and deteriorating. Violent conflict, high food prices, drought and the resurgent incidence of polio have aggravated the plight of the vulnerable and created new needs. Warfare in some areas of Afghanistan has prevented or slowed the delivery of humanitarian aid.

In fact, humanitarian-aid workers are often victims of insurgent and organized criminal violence. In November, a mine-clearing team was abducted in Kandahar and one of its members was killed. Mine-education activities in two key Kandahar districts were suspended because of insecurity. In recent months, polio vaccinators have been kidnapped and vaccines stolen. A UN food convoy was attacked in Pakistan on its way to Afghanistan; 600 tonnes of food were lost.

Priority activities supported by Canada were nonetheless productive. Efforts toward the eradication of polio—a Canadian signature project—resumed during the quarter with vaccination

campaigns in October and November. The World Health Organization and UNICEF, with help from Canada and others, continued to work with the military to institute "days of tranquility" when vaccinators can reach children in communities throughout Afghanistan. The Canadian target is to achieve polio eradication by vaccination across Afghanistan by the end of 2009. To this end, Canada supported the vaccination of 7.1 million children in this quarter. However, the number of reported polio cases in Afghanistan actually increased in 2008 to 31 cases from 17 the year before. Of these 31 cases, 27 were in the southern region that includes Kandahar. Canada has also allocated polio-eradication funding to neighbouring Pakistan, where polio case numbers increased dramatically in 2008.

Mine clearing and mine education are another Canadian focus, benchmarked with progress indicators. In this quarter, mine-risk education teams reached more than 13,000 people. Progress on mine clearance is reported annually; since 2006, 346 square kilometres have been released to communities across Afghanistan. Our 2011 target is to have 500 square kilometres released and made available to communities. Mine-risk education continued in Kandahar, and with Canadian funding the UN is expected to start community-based de-mining operations in the province in 2009; the object is to increase Afghans' own participation in mine clearance and education. Nationally, the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan is taking steps to assume more Afghan responsibility for mine action, and it carried out clearance work around Kandahar City.

Women and girls comprise the largest category of vulnerable people in Afghanistan, facing barriers to education, health care and other necessary services. In Kandahar City, Canadian-funded construction of an obstetrical unit at Mirwais Hospital was completed in the quarter. The first facility of its kind in all of Afghanistan, this project is part of an Afghan government initiative to increase the numbers of women giving birth with the aid of trained birth attendants. This facility is expected to receive 1,000 patients every year. Canada is also supporting renovation of the hospital's female surgical wing and operating theatre.

The UN World Food Programme, with support from Canada and other countries, continued delivery of food supplies to Kandahar, with a focus especially on vulnerable populations of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. These food distributions have helped households cope with high food prices and the continuing drought afflicting Afghanistan.

Internally displaced Afghans, and returning refugees from Iran and Pakistan, remain acutely vulnerable and their numbers have grown. Through 2008 more than 377,600 Afghans were deported from Iran, and more than 278,000 returned voluntarily from neighbouring countries. By December there were more than 230,000 internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, most of them living in southern Afghanistan. In November, the convening of a major conference in Kabul—with Iran and Pakistan represented—indicated some progress toward a better coordinated regional approach to refugee issues.

### Priority 4. Enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.

Afghan security and development depend on improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan—especially with respect to the security and economic development of their shared

border region. Suppressing the flow of insurgents, weapons and narcotics between the two countries is necessary for countering the insurgency. Managing orderly and legal migration and trade, and fostering border-area economic growth, are critical to advancing security, governance and development in Kandahar.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that Afghan institutions, in cooperation with Pakistan, will exercise stronger capacity to manage the border and foster economic development in the border area.

Encouraging cross-border cooperation and implementing border-area development projects are obviously difficult. The border itself passes through rough and remote territory, travel in the area is dangerous and requires military protection, and the relationship between governments in Kabul and Islamabad has been troubled for many years. Tense relations between Pakistan and India, unsettled by the Mumbai terrorist attack and its aftermath, complicate Afghan-Pakistani cooperation.

Still, some signs of limited progress were evident during the quarter. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga process resumed with positive meetings in October; Canada has supported the process with aid to the Afghan Peace Jirga Secretariat. In Kandahar, Canadian Forces officers organized a "border flag" meeting of ISAF, Afghan and Pakistani officers to discuss border security matters, the first such meeting in eight months. Progress was also reported from the trilateral summit hosted by the President of Turkey in December, attended by the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan. All three presidents expressed support for cooperation in security, counter-terrorism action and development.

Canada made strides toward providing training and infrastructure at Afghanistan's border-crossing points, with preliminary training and needs assessments in the Spin Boldak area. Better border facilities there could increase Afghan capacity to collect badly needed customs revenues and manage movements of people and goods.

## Priority 5. Help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.

Democratic governance is a priority shared by Canada and partner contributors in Afghanistan, and by Afghanistan's elected government and parliament. This means governance that is transparent, effective and accountable. And it means conducting elections that are seen by Afghans as legitimate.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that national, provincial and local institutions, particularly in Kandahar province, will exhibit an increasing capacity for democratic governance in the deliberation and delivery of public programs and services, and in carrying out democratic elections.

Afghans are to hold presidential and provincial council elections in 2009, followed by parliamentary and district council elections in 2010. These are only the second set of elections in Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban regime from power in 2001, and together they will

mark a crucial milestone in the country's democratic history. Canadians are working to support the conduct of these elections.

During the quarter, voter registration was carried out with considerable success in northern, eastern and central regions of Afghanistan. Preparations were meanwhile underway for voter registration to start in the south, including Kandahar, in January 2009. Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) is leading the process, and international assistance is coordinated through the UN Development Programme. Canada is one of five donor countries on the steering committee overseeing this international support.

In Kandahar, Canadian civilians and military personnel have aided voter registration and other election preparations, including public education about the elections. Among other activities, Canadians have mentored ANSF units in planning and conducting security operations to protect voter safety and to police polling stations. In Kabul and Kandahar, Canadian diplomats have maintained regular conversations with the Government of Afghanistan, the IEC, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and senior tribal and provincial officials—including the governor and police chief of Kandahar—to work for the successful completion of the elections.

Risks and uncertainties remained, and expectations during the quarter were tempered by two facts. First, violent insecurity prevailed in much of the south, Kandahar included, and threatened to depress voter registration and election-day turnout. Second, there was no consensus by year-end among Afghan political leaders (and no decision by the IEC) on the date to be fixed for the presidential election. There were advocates for spring, summer and fall balloting, with opinions dividing partly on different readings of the Afghan Constitution. These constitutional arguments also reflected underlying rivalries common in democratic politics.

In other realms of governance, Canada was contributing to Afghan institution building. To cite one example, the Canadian Governance Support Office in Kabul became operational, placing Canadian civilian experts in key Afghan ministries to advise Afghan counterparts on policy making and implementation. By the end of the quarter, Canadians were serving with the IEC and in ministries including Agriculture, Education, and Energy and Water, and Canadians had been recruited to serve in the Ministry of the Interior and the Office of the Chief Economic Advisor to the President. In Kandahar, Canada has helped finance staffing for the provincial governor's office to strengthen local delivery of national programs.

#### Priority 6. Facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.

Achieving a stable peace in Afghanistan will demand a difficult political reconciliation among Afghans. It cannot be accomplished by military force alone. The processes of reconciliation must be led by Afghans, but they can be supported internationally.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that national and provincial Afghan government initiatives will encourage political reconciliation, and receive timely support from Canada.

A developing dialogue between Afghan authorities and coalition partners, including Canada, has helped create a common understanding of the right conditions for reconciling and reintegrating former insurgents into Afghan society. Simultaneously, several meetings during the quarter—the summit in Turkey, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga in Islamabad, and widely reported Saudi-sponsored contacts between unofficial Afghan government representatives and insurgent intermediaries—helped frame possible Afghan reconciliation in a broader regional context.

Canada has urged Afghan authorities to appoint a lead agency responsible for reconciliation at the national level, and to establish a national reconciliation process. A framework for local-level initiatives has emerged, coordinated by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance. There is not yet a fully developed national reconciliation strategy.

All that being said, no prospects for early and meaningful reconciliation were apparent during the quarter. Deteriorating security left little reason to expect insurgents to renounce warfare in significant numbers, and the government seemed unlikely to pursue vigorous negotiations before reducing the violence and reclaiming some position of strength. Nor could it be predicted how reconciliation might be affected by the 2009 presidential election.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Despite the grim and worsening realities of the war in Afghanistan, Canadians have been able to contribute to a better future for Afghans. Our engagement in particular is helping Afghans to begin providing more of the basic services that citizens of any country have a right to expect—schools for children, accessible health care, drinking water and reliable food supplies. We are helping to increase the capacity of the ANSF to maintain security. And we are helping Afghans create the institutions they need to achieve social stability, and to establish the rule of law that democracy requires.

This is a long, hard undertaking, with no easy or certain outcomes. It is one that we have shared with Afghans and with close friends and allies under UN authority, all with a common purpose—to protect international peace from the dangers that form in the violence of failed states. This has been a purpose that corresponds to Canadian values, and to Canada's security.

#### **Appendix**

#### Vision:

A more secure Kandahar that is better governed and can deliver basic services to its citizens, supported by a more capable national government that can better provide for its security, manage its borders and sustain stability and reconstruction gains over the longer term.

#### **Priorities:**

- Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces
- Basic Services
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Border Security and Dialogue
- Democratic Development and National Institutions
- Political Reconciliation

To support this vision and the priorities laid out in this report, the Government of Canada has identified a number of benchmarks and progress indicators that will help to:

- gauge levels of progress being achieved, or not, as the case may be;
- identify if and when adjustments to its approach are required, given the complex environment; and
- report results frankly to Canadians.

Benchmarking in Afghanistan is a difficult task with reporting dependent on gathering information while operating in a conflict zone.

- *Benchmarks* are reference points that help assess progress in specific priority areas. The benchmarks are in some cases quantitative, providing numerical targets, and in other cases qualitative, for instance gauging public perception or assessing the implementation of policies and programs.
- *Progress indicators* provide more specific information on how work is proceeding against those reference points. The challenge with progress indicators is in the ability to regularly report against them on a quarterly basis.
- Baselines refer to the current status of developments associated with the progress indicators, are a fixed point, and will not change over time.
- *Targets* are the level of progress that we hope to achieve by 2011.

#### **Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces**

Context: Benchmarks to measure Afghan National Army (ANA) progress are very precise and consistent with NATO's overall ANA training initiatives. To strengthen the policing, justice and corrections sectors, our benchmarks include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. A number of external factors will affect our ability to make progress in these areas. Insurgent violence deliberately targeting Afghan police has resulted in high rates of death, injury and desertion, which degrade police effectiveness and limit our ability to track trained police officers. Canada is one of many actors contributing to rule-of-law reform: Afghan ministries are leading this process and key international partners are playing critical roles.

#### **Benchmarks**

Benchmark: Increase in the number of ANA kandaks (army battalions) in Kandahar capable of conducting near-autonomous security operations, and increase in the capability of their brigade headquarters.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### Baseline

One of the five ANA kandaks is fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To have four of the five ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The ANA brigade headquarters and one of the five kandaks are fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

Benchmark: Increase and/or maintain the effective strength (troops trained, ready and available for operations) of Kandahar-based ANA kandaks and their brigade headquarters.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The effective strength of the Kandahar-based ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters).

#### Baseline

One of the five ANA kandaks has an effective strength of 67% and the remainder currently have an effective strength of over 80%. The ANA brigade headquarters has an effective strength of 77% (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To sustain the level of effective strength of the Kandahar-based ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) at 70% or higher.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Two of the five kandaks (and the brigade headquarters) have an effective strength of over 70%. The remaining three kandaks are between 65% and 70% effective strength.

Benchmark: ANA responsible for security in more of the six key districts of Kandahar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

A progressive increase in the number of key districts in which the ANA is responsible for security, with fewer supporting ISAF troops.

#### Baseline

The ANA is responsible for security in one of the six key districts (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To have the ANA responsible for security in three of the six key districts.

#### **Quarterly Result**

There are no key districts for which the ANA is responsible for security. Benchmark: To increase the number of key districts where the ANA are perceived by the majority of the population to be a professional and effective force that contributes to their well-being in key districts of Kandahar province.

<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	<b>Quarterly Result</b>
The number of key districts where the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more.	In four of the six key districts the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more (June 2008).	To maintain and/or increase the number of key districts where the ANA has an 85% approval rating.	No poll was completed between the period of the last report and this quarterly report.  Updated information will be collected during polling planned for
		I	next quarter.

Benchmark: Increase in the number of key districts of Kandahar province where there is a perceived improvement in security conditions.

Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	<b>Quarterly Result</b>
The number of key districts where the	In zero of the six key districts, a	The majority of Kandaharis in all six	No poll was completed between the
majority of Kandaharis perceive security as improving.	majority of Kandaharis perceiving an improvement in security (June 2008).	of the key districts perceive security as improving.	period of the last report and this quarterly report.
			Updated information will be
			collected during polling planned for next quarter.

Benchmark: Increased Afghan National Police (ANP) capacity to provide effective police services in key districts of Kandahar.

<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	<b>Quarterly Result</b>
The number of ANP trained in	25% of the ANP in key districts have	80% of key district ANP forces will	FDD training was completed by 59
Kandahar.	completed Focused District	have completed Focused District	ANP in the key districts this quarter,
	Development (FDD) training	Development (FDD) training.	bringing the total to approximately
	(August 2008). <sup>1</sup>		914 in the districts of Zhari,
			Panjwayi and Kandahar City. This is
			approximately 61% of all ANP for
			the key districts. The percentage of
			ANP trained will fluctuate between
			reporting periods as a result of
			ongoing changes in Afghan staffing
			levels and high desertion and
			casualty rates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Focused District Development (FDD) is a six-phase police reform program that involves retraining, equipping and mentoring district police forces as consolidated units, over six to eight months (but generally lasts longer).

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANP forces in key districts capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### **Baseline**

0% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

80% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The number of police units assessed as capable of conducting basic law and order operations (which equates to sustaining near-autonomous operations) has declined from two to one this quarter. This represents a total of 6% of the existing 17 police units in key districts (results based on November 2008 reporting).

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANP infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

Five permanent substations have been constructed and equipped in key districts (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

15 new infrastructure projects, such as construction of substations or checkpoints, and 15 upgrades to existing ANP facilities are completed in key districts in Kandahar province. All 15 new facilities built by Canada in Kandahar province are provided with basic equipment required to run a functioning police unit.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

Seven new infrastructure projects are ongoing. Upgrades to one police substation were completed this quarter.

Benchmark: Improved detention facilities in Kandahar that support the work of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Sarpoza prison and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detention centre in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

Immediate repairs were made in the wake of the attack on Sarpoza prison. Detailed needs assessments for ongoing infrastructure upgrades at both NDS and Sarpoza have been completed and project plans have been developed in consultation with the Afghan government (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

19 planned infrastructure projects, such as repairs to security infrastructure and refurbishment of prisoner quarters, are completed in Sarpoza prison in keeping with international standards and best practices.

12 planned equipment purchases, such as communications equipment, uniforms and office furnishing, are delivered to Sarpoza prison in keeping with international standards and best practices.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Three infrastructure projects, including perimeter security reinforcement and the main gate, were completed in Sarpoza prison this quarter, bringing the total number of infrastructure projects completed to eight.

Two equipment purchases, including

Two equipment purchases, including winter uniforms and office supplies, were delivered to Sarpoza prison this quarter, for a total of six equipment purchases completed.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of corrections officials trained and mentored in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

23 corrections officers (30%) and one senior manager (50%) have successfully completed initial corrections training; and two senior managers (100%) are participating in management training (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

100% of corrections officers and managers will have successfully completed their initial and advanced training programs.

#### **Quarterly Result**

52 corrections officers completed initial corrections officer training this quarter for a total of 86 corrections officers trained (100% based on current staffing levels). 18 officers commenced advanced level training this quarter (20% based on current staffing levels). Two senior managers have completed an Executive Training Program. The percentage of corrections officers trained will fluctuate between reporting periods as a result of ongoing changes in Afghan staffing levels.

Benchmark: Improved justice sector: a working court system in Kandahar City with competent judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and administrative personnel in place.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of training programs in place for justice officials Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

There are no current training programs for justice officials in Kandahar (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Four training programs for justice officials in Kandahar are made available for those practising law and those involved in administering the legal system.

#### **Quarterly Result**

A 21-day workshop on criminal law and procedure commenced this quarter.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of justice sector infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

Minimal judicial infrastructure exists. The Attorney General and Ministry of Justice building requires repair. In Kandahar City, there is one courthouse which is in disrepair and housing for judges and prosecutors is inadequate. In the other districts, there are only three courthouses, all of which require upgrading.

#### 2011 Target

Five justice facilities, including the ANP Prosecutor's Office, Attorney General's Office and High Court are built or rehabilitated to support the formal justice system in Kandahar City.

Three justice facilities, including the Land Registry Office (Cadastre), ANP Prosecutor's Office and High Court are equipped to support the formal justice system in Kandahar City.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Four infrastructure projects including security upgrades for the High Court and structural integrity work on the Attorney General's Office are in the development phase.

Three projects to provide equipment for the Land Registry Office (Cadastre), ANP Prosecutor's Office and High Court are in the development phase.

Progress Indicator
Improved Ministry of Justice capacity
to draft, revise, translate and
promulgate laws passed by the
Afghan government.

Baseline
Afghan Ministry of Justice's
legislative drafting unit lacks the
required capacity, processes and
infrastructure to draft, revise, translate
and promulgate legislation in an
effective and timely manner
(August 2008).

2011 Target
The Afghan Ministry of Justice's
legislative drafting unit achieves
improved capacity.

Quarterly Result
Staffing completed and technical
advisor to commence placement next
quarter.

#### **Basic Services**

**Context**: A number of benchmarks have been established under this priority, though some are less tangible than others as they are based on Afghan perception and will be measured against findings from public opinion research. It is important to note that polling in a complex environment like Kandahar is challenging and results may not always be reliable.

In the case of the Dahla Dam signature project, some key indicators have been established relating to the area of land irrigated and number of jobs created. Other indicators of progress will continue to be refined as the project moves into the planning and implementation stages.

Benchmark: The Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system rehabilitated, generating jobs and fostering agriculture. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

Progress Indicator Number of jobs created by the Dahla Dam project.	Baseline Project plan is in development and will be finalized in the fall of 2008.	2011 Target 10,000 seasonal jobs created by the project. Other targets will be established for the fourth quarterly report.	Quarterly Result In this quarter, 142 jobs were created in constructing preliminary infrastructure; a road was completed and bridge construction is underway for a total of 172 jobs.
Progress Indicator Number of hectares of land benefiting from improved irrigation and water management.	Baseline Project plan is in development and will be finalized in the fall of 2008.	2011 Target A target will be developed for the fourth quarterly report.	Quarterly Result  Progress against this indicator will not be realized or reported until the project advances to the irrigation phase.

#### Benchmark: A total of 50 schools built, expanded or repaired in Kandahar. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

#### **Progress Indicator** Baseline 2011 Target **Quarterly Result** Number of school projects (built, 19 school projects contracted and one 50 schools built, expanded or In this quarter, one school was expanded or repaired) in key districts. school project completed (June 2008). repaired. completed in the key districts of Kandahar, bringing the total rehabilitated to three. Construction began on an additional eight schools in the key districts with a total of 22 currently under construction.

#### Benchmark: Local and provincial institutions able to meet and implement the objectives of the National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan.

<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	<b>Quarterly Result</b>
Number of teachers trained in Kandahar.	No teachers trained as yet through Canadian programming (June 2008).	3,000 trained teachers.	Preliminary in-service training for approximately 2,300 working teachers is being funded by USAID. This is leading to comprehensive teacher training programs led by Canada in 2009.
Progress Indicator Number of people receiving literacy training, vocational education and skills development.	Baseline More than 5,000 individuals have received literacy training. Some 735 individuals have received vocational training (2007).	2011 Target 20,000 additional individuals to receive literacy training 1,070 additional individuals to receive vocational training.	Quarterly Result Literacy training for 10,949 adults (8,984 women) is ongoing and will be completed in January 2009. Vocational training targeting 470 adults is ongoing and will be completed in the next quarter.

#### В

			completed in the next quarter.
Benchmark: Provincial institutions a	and community groups able to identify o	and implement infrastructure projects.	
Progress Indicator Percentage of communities in key districts that have completed infrastructure projects undertaken by the locally elected bodies.	Baseline 60% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects (December 2007).	2011 Target 75% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects.	Quarterly Result 64% of identified communities in key districts now have completed projects. Over the last quarter, 95 additional infrastructure projects including irrigation canals, energy
			and protection walls were completed.

Benchmark: Kandaharis have confidence in the ability of the government in Kandahar to deliver basic services, particularly education and water, and joboriented economic growth.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Percentage of Kandaharis who perceive an improvement in dependable delivery of services.

#### Baseline

75% of Kandaharis polled indicate they are satisfied with efforts of provincial and local-level government to improve quality of life. 64% of Kandaharis polled are somewhat or very satisfied with provision of education. 39% of polled Kandaharis indicated they are satisfied with employment (February 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To maintain and improve on perception of service delivery.

#### **Quarterly Result**

No poll was completed between the period of the last report and this quarterly report.
Updated information will be collected during polling planned for next quarter.

Benchmark: New economic opportunities created in key districts for Kandaharis.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of business enterprises and cooperatives established in key districts.

#### Baseline

206 agricultural cooperatives registered (April 2006) and 72 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating (July 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Steady expansion of the number of enterprises in key districts.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

New data shows that there are approximately 1,000 SMEs in Kandahar City alone. In this quarter, Canada supported new enterprises including a poultry business, a bakery and a bazaar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of microfinance and savings clients served.

#### **Baseline**

30 microfinance loans provided to clients in Kandahar (March 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Loans for 500 clients in Kandahar through the Microfinance Investment Support Facility.

#### **Quarterly Result**

In this quarter, 126 clients in Kandahar received loans. In addition to microfinance, Canada also contributed to the creation of a new investment and finance cooperative in Kandahar, which provided two loans to enterprises (total value US\$295,000).

#### **Humanitarian Assistance**

**Context:** The first benchmark in this priority includes a series of quantitative and qualitative measures, as no single indicator is comprehensive enough to provide a complete picture. Considered together, they will help to provide an assessment of progress.

The challenges for this priority are not in the indicators themselves, but in the ability to report against them on a quarterly basis given that evaluations and assessments are undertaken across longer timeframes. The evolving nature of security can challenge humanitarian access and limit the ability to report publicly on some efforts below the national level. It is also important to note that with some information, such as mine victims, officially reported numbers are only estimates given that many accidents go unreported.

#### Benchmark: Achievement of polio eradication in Afghanistan. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

<b>3 1</b>	70	•	
Progress Indicator The number of immunizations delivered and children receiving the polio vaccine during each of the multiple national campaigns conducted annually—multiple vaccinations are required to stop transmission of polio.	Baseline In 2007, approximately 27.7 million vaccinations were administered to 7 million children during four national campaigns (2007).	2011 Target Eradication by vaccination by 2009.	Quarterly Result Nationally, 7.1 million children received vaccinations during the quarter. In each of the three campaigns in Kandahar, an average of 370,000 children were vaccinated; however, an average of 4,700 children were missed during each campaign as a result of problems with security and access.
<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The number of polio cases reported.	17 cases reported nationally (2007).	Eradication by 2009.	There were 31 cases of polio reported as of December 2008 with 27 cases in southern Afghanistan. This represents an increase over the last quarter. The north and northwest of Afghanistan have been declared polio free by the World Health Organization.

Benchmark: Public institutions able to plan and coordinate emergency assistance and support to vulnerable populations in Kandahar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The capacity of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and Kandahar Provincial Disaster Management Authority (KPDMA) to put in place effective disaster preparedness plans.

#### Baseline

KPDMA and United Nations in Kandahar developed a comprehensive contingency plan for a severe winter in 2007 and anticipated spring floods. Two training sessions were provided for the KPDMA on disaster management.

#### 2011 Target

By 2011, KPDMA will have developed comprehensive strategies and coordination mechanisms for responding to disasters.

#### **Quarterly Result**

A humanitarian response plan was put in place by KPDMA and the UN, and non-food and food assistance prepositioned, with lead Canadian support, in preparation for severe winter and flood risks in Kandahar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The access that vulnerable populations— women, children, disabled persons, returnees and internally displaced persons — have to essential quality health services.

#### Baseline

111 healthcare staff have received training (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Increase in the number of health workers available for Kandahar.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The regional hospital expanded obstetric and gynaecological services, and construction was completed on a new maternal waiting home, which will provide pre- and post-natal care.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The amount of land released and made available for communities as a result of survey and clearance of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) nationally and in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 180 square kilometres of land were released and made available nationally.

#### 2011 Target

A cumulative total of 500 square kilometres of land released and made available.

#### **Quarterly Result**

By November, 346 square kilometres had been cleared and released since January 2006.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of people receiving mine awareness education in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 33,500 individuals were provided with mine- awareness education.

#### 2011 Target

200,000 individuals provided with mine- awareness education.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Nine mine-risk education teams reached over 13,000 individuals. Training of trainers also took place for 76 teachers.

#### **Border Security and Dialogue**

Context: Border security and dialogue are ultimately contingent on strong relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and on the resolution of some long-standing issues. Canada's benchmarks for this priority include qualitative and quantitative progress indicators to assess the effectiveness of Afghan and Pakistani border management efforts, including bilateral cooperation. As the border is long, its terrain difficult and its infrastructure underdeveloped, obtaining baseline information and establishing targets are challenging. Canada has already begun to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to identify infrastructure, training and other needs. This information will be essential to refining our baselines and targets in future.

#### Benchmark: Regular discussions on border issues.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Increased dialogue between Pakistani and Afghan officials through mechanisms including Canadian-sponsored workshops.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Increased cooperation at Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

#### Baseline

Three Canadian-sponsored workshops have been held to date. Key mechanisms for discussions were suspended by Afghanistan in July 2008 (August 2008).

#### Baseline

Regular Canadian-facilitated discussions at Kandahar-Baluchistan border are continuing.

#### 2011 Target

Sustainable mechanisms for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues are in place and operating for senior officials.

#### 2011 Target

Mechanisms at border in place for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues.

#### **Quarterly Result**

An Afghan-Pakistani Peace Jirga meeting was held in October. The meeting was coordinated by the Afghan Peace Jirga Secretariat, which is funded in part by Canada.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Canadian-facilitated discussions between Afghan and Pakistani military officials stationed at the Kandahar-Baluchistan border (border flag meeting) took place in November.

#### Benchmark: Better managed border crossings on the Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Training completed by border officials.

#### **Baseline**

No training provided to date (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

A tailored training curriculum for new recruits in international customs procedures and a senior management development program for Afghan Customs will be developed by September 2009.

A target for the number of officials to be trained will be set in September 2009, in consultation with international partners and Afghan Customs.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) conducted a Canada-U.S. reconnaissance mission to Spin Boldak, in preparation for RCMP/CBSA Training Needs Assessment to take place in January 2009.

Progress Indicator
Key infrastructure projects complet
including procurement of equipmen

#### Baseline Assessment of infrastructure needs not yet complete, some equipment purchases underway (August 2008).

## 2011 Target Construction completed of a Joint District Coordination Centre in Spin Boldak. Infrastructure and equipment

## Infrastructure and equipment improvements completed at Weish border crossing in Kandahar, based on the results of a feasibility study to be completed in March 2009.

#### **Quarterly Result**

CBSA and DFAIT conducted a Canada-U.S. reconnaissance mission to Spin Boldak to advance the identification of infrastructure needs and challenges. A feasibility study for construction of a new border crossing facility in Kandahar (Weish) began in December and will be completed in March 2009.

#### **Democratic Development and National Institutions**

**Context:** Given the nature of the first benchmark, measures will include quantitative data such as internationally recognized Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments in addition to qualitative assessments of ministry-specific evaluation activities and public perception assessed through polling.

The Government of Afghanistan intends to hold two elections before 2011: a presidential election and provincial council elections in 2009, and the election of parliament and district councils in 2010.

Canada will actively contribute in this area but it is important to recall that Canada is one of many actors. The Afghan government is leading, with support from the international community.

Benchmark: Key ministries in Afghanistan able to plan, resource, manage and maintain the delivery of services including at the sub-national level.

Progress Indicator
Effective planning and budgeting
mechanisms in place.

Dascille				
The difference between planned and				
actual government spending is 9.7%				
(April 2008).				

Racalina

## 2011 Target The difference between planned and actual government spending should be less than or equal to 5%.

## Quarterly Result End of fiscal year reporting will take place annually. Some improvements were noted over this quarter, such as in the tracking of donor assistance through national budgets.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Better government monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place to ensure transparency.

#### **Baseline**

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating): 3 (April 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating): 3+.

#### **Quarterly Result**

PEFA results are produced every two years; however, data on specific indicators is available more frequently. For example, key elements of the budget monitoring and reporting process were strengthened, including improved mid-year budget review processes and regular analysis and reporting on budget expenditures.

Benchmark: Afghanistan's ability to manage upcoming elections.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The establishment of a national voter registry.

#### Baseline

Pilot voter registration process carried out in three selected provinces (April 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Update of registry completed in a four-phased approach, in advance of 2009 presidential elections:

- 14 provinces registered in phase I;
- 10 additional provinces registered in phase II;
- 6 additional provinces registered in phase III; and
- 4 additional provinces including Kandahar registered in phase IV.\*
- \* The target has been updated as the Government of Afghanistan's plan for voter registration was finalized.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The update of the voter registry proceeded as planned in the last quarter: phase I (October-November) and phase II (November-December) were completed, and in phase III six provinces were partially registered and will be completed in the next quarter.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of registered voters nationally.

#### Baseline

Approximately 12.6 million voters in the existing registry (2005).

#### 2011 Target

Two million new registrants added to the current registry in advance of the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections; 500,000 new registrants added to the 2009 registry in advance of the 2010 parliamentary and district council elections.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Interim reporting indicates that over 3.2 million eligible voters had been registered under phases I-III (October-December), approximately 40% of whom were women. Some registrations may overlap with the current registry.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The percentage of voter turnout.

#### **Baseline**

70% of registered voters participated in the last presidential elections; 51.5% of registered voters participated in the last parliamentary and provincial council elections.

#### 2011 Target

70% turnout for men; 40% turnout for women
These targets are consistent with figures currently being used by the United Nations Development
Programme ELECT project.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Results will be reported following the elections.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The establishment of an independent electoral complaints commission.

#### Baseline

An independent electoral complaints commission does not currently exist (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Establishment of an independent electoral complaints commission.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is being established through the UNDP ELECT program, supported in part by Canada.

#### **Political Reconciliation**

**Context:** Ultimately, only the Afghan government has the authority to pursue political reconciliation; Canada and other international partners will play supporting roles. Progress indicators to measure this benchmark include the identification of Afghan institutions and officials responsible for moving reconciliation forward, as well as the establishment of a transparent and effective process for reconciling insurgents.

Afghanistan cannot secure peace or realize its governance and development objectives by military means alone. An Afghan-led, internationally supported reconciliation process can serve to foster sustainable peace.

#### Benchmark: The Government of Afghanistan increasingly able to promote reconciliation among Afghans.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The Afghan government identifies the institutions and officials responsible for promoting Afghan reconciliation and a national reconciliation process is established.

#### Baseline

A clear institutional focal point and process have yet to be identified (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

A lead authority is moving reconciliation process forward.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Canada provides support to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), which is mandated to provide strategic direction on subnational governance. The IDLG is also emerging as a focus for reconciliation across Afghanistan but a national reconciliation strategy has not yet been fully developed.

Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The Afghan government is better able to communicate with Afghans about reconciliation.	The Government of Afghanistan's ability to share information about its programs, policies and objectives in a timely manner is limited (August 2008).	The Government of Afghanistan is actively sharing information, at the national, provincial and district levels, regarding its programs, policies and objectives for reconciliation.	Canada supported the creation of the Afghanistan Government Media and Information Centre, which is now operational. It also provides training, and is hosting a number of communications working groups, which bring together officers from
			Afghan government ministries and the international community to share best practices, with a view to better communicating with Afghans.  In Kandahar, Canada has provided technical assistance and financial

support to Afghan authorities to assist them to communicate more effectively

with the local population.