# AFGHANISTAN

QUARTERLY REPORT TO PARLIAMENT FOR THE PERIOD OF JULY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2009



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QUARTERLY REPORT TO PARLIAMENT FOR THE PERIOD OF JULY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2009



Report to Parliament

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Cover photo: A man voting at a polling centre in Kandahar City Photos: Copyright CIDA, DFAIT, DND, Ottawa Police Service

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#### **Foreword**

In accordance with the March 2008 motion passed by the House of Commons, we are honoured to place before Parliament this sixth quarterly report on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. This report addresses events during the period July 1 to September 30, 2009.

Like many in Afghanistan and the international community, we had expected that the results of the August 20 presidential election would have been officially announced before the end of the September; indeed, we had expected to focus on the elections and their outcomes in our report. Unfortunately, allegations of fraud and electoral irregularities were raised, resulting in investigations by the Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission and the Independent Election Commission. The investigations led to a recount at certain polling stations. On October 20, the Independent Election Commission announced that President Karzai had received 49.67 percent of the vote, putting him below the 50 percent threshold required for a first round victory. A run-off election between the two leading candidates, Hamid Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was scheduled to take place on November 7. However, the run-off election was deemed unnecessary and cancelled on November 2, after Dr. Abdullah withdrew his candidature. Hamid Karzai was declared the winner.

Evidence of fraud notwithstanding, we must recognize the significance of these elections. These were the first Afghan-led elections in three decades and actual public debate took place between the leading presidential candidates. Millions of Afghans exercised their democratic right to vote, despite intimidation and violence from the insurgents. Allegations of fraud were reported and the bodies charged with investigating and resolving allegations performed their duties.

Canadian efforts contributed to building national institutions and democratic governance. The Electoral Complaints Commission was established and was able to carry out the very demanding task placed before it. Canadian-trained and -mentored units of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police provided security on polling day and, while there were numerous security incidents that day, there was no major disruption due to insurgent activity.

During the quarter, progress was made in many priority areas which guide Canadian efforts in Afghanistan. As detailed in this report, additional teachers were trained, police officers mentored, and land cleared of mines and released back to communities. We have exceeded several of our 2011 targets: microfinance loans were provided to more than 500 clients and the Afghan National Army is shouldering more than its expected share of the security burden.

This quarter, more children were vaccinated against polio than in previous quarters, and most importantly, the percentage of children deemed "inaccessible" due to security concerns decreased significantly. Yet with nine new cases during this quarter, bringing the national total to 22 for the year, it is widely acknowledged that the country cannot be polio-free by the end of the year, despite the best efforts of Afghan public health authorities and the international community. Nevertheless, Canada remains committed to the eradication of polio in Afghanistan and will continue to report toward that goal and support future vaccination campaigns.

Finally, we commend the hard work and resolve of the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, and all of our civilian staff, who continue to serve under extremely difficult conditions in Afghanistan. In particular, and on behalf of all Canadians, we honour the soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice, and their families.

Our next report will cover the period October 1 to December 31, 2009.

The Honourable Stockwell Day Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway

Stochall

The Honourable Peter MacKay Minister of National Defence and Minister for the Atlantic Gateway

The Honourable Beverley J. Oda Minister of International Cooperation The Honourable Lawrence Cannon Minister of Foreign Affairs

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The Honourable Peter Van Loan Minister of Public Safety

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### **Summary**

- Millions of Afghans turned out to vote in the country's first Afghan-led elections held in three decades, after a campaign in which presidential candidates directly debated the key issues.
- Afghan institutions administered and supervised the presidential and provincial council
  elections while Afghan soldiers and police assumed primary responsibility for ensuring
  security at polling stations on election day, August 20.
- Allegations of fraud in the balloting were identified promptly and addressed by two electoral bodies.
- The significant number of U.S. forces arriving in Kandahar province more than doubled the number of coalition forces available for security-related tasks, allowing the Canadian Forces to further focus on protecting the population.
- The quarter under review witnessed the heaviest loss of life for any three-month period since 2001 among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which had been greatly expanded. Eleven members of the Canadian Forces were killed. Afghan civilian casualties were high, with more than two thirds from insurgent violence.
- The security responsibility shouldered by the Afghan National Army (ANA) increased in Kandahar City and surrounding villages, the area of responsibility where the Canadian Forces are training and mentoring the ANA.
- Counterinsurgency tactics similar to those of the Canadian Forces were a key element for a new military approach in Afghanistan recommended by the ISAF Commander.
- Despite heightened insurgent violence, Canada achieved progress toward priority objectives, including reaching the 2011 target for the number of clients receiving microfinance loans.
- School rehabilitation, one of Canada's three signature development projects, saw the completion of seven more schools for a total of 12 to date, with a further 21 under construction.
- Several other education initiatives also moved ahead, including training of teachers and principals from community-based schools.
- Progress was reported in two other Canadian signature projects: more than 880,000 children across Afghanistan were vaccinated against polio in the quarter; and Canadian project engineers tackled technical aspects of manufacturing new gates for the irrigation canals associated with the Dahla Dam.

#### I. Introduction

Eight years since the allied ouster of the Taliban regime, the Afghanistan balance sheet presents both pluses and minuses. The latest coalition analysis acknowledges that the insurgents have seized the initiative, both in the armed conflict and by creating a crisis of confidence among the populace through the equally important "silent war" of fear, intimidation and persuasion. At the same time the widely acknowledged fraud in the landmark presidential election poses an equally serious crisis of credibility within Afghanistan and in nations whose soldiers are fighting and dying on Afghan soil.

Yet the Afghan people, while voicing frustration that their fledgling democratic institutions have not delivered more, nonetheless turned out in significant numbers to vote, despite being subject to violence and intimidation from the insurgents. Canada's engagement in Afghanistan is contributing directly to strengthening such institutions, to increasing the capacity of the Afghan government to extend basic services and to bolstering the ability of Afghan forces to provide security.

This report covers the period from July 1 to September 30, and pays particular attention to national institutions and democratic governance as core elements in Canada's mission in Afghanistan. This focus may seem self-evident since presidential and provincial council elections were held across the country on August 20, the first Afghan-led elections in three decades. Yet the polling day itself is only part of the story. Just as vital to democratic governance is the capacity for all the nitty-gritty of an election—publicizing how and where to vote, inclusive voter registration, an open nominating procedure, neutral and unbiased media, impartial adjudication of complaints, accessible voting centres and efficient supervision and administration of the actual voting. In Afghanistan all this and more had to be provided in areas racked by insurgent violence.

### **II. The Quarterly Context**

The quarter, which included most of the campaign period and election day itself, witnessed the heaviest loss of life among the greatly expanded coalition forces for any three-month period since 2001. Across the country, 223 allied soldiers were killed, of which 30 died in combat in Kandahar, including 11 members of the Canadian Forces. As well, August was the deadliest month so far this year for Afghan civilian casualties, with more than two thirds from insurgent violence. Losses remained heavy in the quarter for both the Afghan army and police, although figures were incomplete.

Two significant developments during the quarter intensified international attention on Afghanistan's progress toward stability. One was the presidential and provincial council elections—the spirited two-month campaign, lower-than-hoped-for voter turnout, allegations of fraud and a still uncertain outcome at the end of September. The second was the release of a detailed assessment by the senior commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, stating that the coalition effort was unlikely to succeed without a major shift in approach and mindset, accompanied by a substantial increase in coalition forces. This sombre military assessment

followed the arrival of an additional 20,500 U.S. soldiers and marines in the southern provinces. They were deployed as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the 42-nation coalition authorized by the United Nations Security Council and operating under the command of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Canadian Forces are part of ISAF.

Both the Afghan people and the international community had expected conclusive election results by mid-September and there was general disappointment at the lengthy delays. Yet the mere holding of an election is an immense challenge in a country experiencing armed conflict and lacking adequate infrastructure, robust institutions and



Canada's new Ambassador to Afghanistan, William Crosbie, visits a polling station in Kabul on August 20. Ambassador Crosbie took up his duties in August 2009, becoming Canada's fifth Ambassador to Afghanistan.

widespread literacy. Not only did the Afghans manage the nomination process largely in accordance with domestic electoral laws, but the number of candidates increased compared to the 2004 election. For the first time, presidential candidates engaged in political debates on the issues, making use of television and radio.

Through a program administered by the National Democratic Institute, Canada played an active role in supporting and enhancing the capacity of women to compete in the 2009 elections. Two female candidates contested the presidential race and 326 women contested seats in their respective provincial councils—a 14-percent increase over the numbers in 2005. Once election results are finalized, Canada will continue to support the successful female candidates to overcome the unique challenges they will face. The Afghan government and international community have already begun evaluating the electoral experience to improve planning for the parliamentary and district council elections scheduled for 2010.

In July and August the Taliban and other insurgents focused their intimidation efforts on discouraging participation in the elections. On August 20 there were nearly 450 security incidents, the highest number on a single day since 2001. Far fewer Afghans voted than in the 2004 elections and, while reliable figures remain elusive, most observers agreed that the turnout was notably lower in Kandahar. In opinion polling shortly after the election, Kandaharis gave poor security as the main reason for not voting. Nonetheless, the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, an umbrella group of Afghan non-governmental organizations, said the turnout demonstrated that Afghans have the "commitment and interest to progress toward an institutionalized democratic system."

The election was marred by what the UN Secretary-General acknowledged as serious electoral irregularities and fraud, which were still under investigation at the end of September. Perhaps understandably, opinion polling also found a continuing slide in the proportion of Kandaharis expressing a favourable opinion of their government, from roughly 80 percent a year ago to about 70 percent currently. The same poll reported favourable opinion of the Taliban at about 30 percent, representing a modest but steady upward trend during the past two years.

Also still unresolved at the end of the quarter was the future nature and magnitude of the counterinsurgency efforts. In an August 30 report, ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal recommended implementing a counterinsurgency strategy in which troops give top priority to protecting Afghans rather than seizing terrain or killing insurgents. Many of his suggestions parallel the approach already adopted by the Canadian Forces, as exemplified by Operation Kantolo [see text box on page 8]. General McChrystal, who also commands the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said this new approach should be supplemented by as many as 40,000 more coalition troops,



International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander, U.S. Army General McChrystal, talks to Kandahar Governor, Tooryalai Wesa, during a visit to Dand District, Afghanistan.

paralleled by an accelerated build-up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to reach strengths of 240,000 and 160,000 respectively. Importantly, General McChrystal's new counterinsurgency strategy took aim at improving the unity of effort among the coalition partners and between military and civilian organizations at all levels. At the end of September, General McChrystal's recommendations and the accompanying request for forces were still under consideration by NATO and the U.S. government.

A significant number of U.S. forces arrived in Kandahar province during this reporting quarter, vastly changing the environment in which many Canadians are working. Three extra infantry battalions were stationed in the province, more than doubling the number of coalition forces available for security-related tasks. In addition, a U.S. Military Police battalion arrived in Kandahar City to assist in mentoring ANP units in the region. This influx was accompanied by a concentration of Canadian Forces into a much smaller area of operations focused primarily on the major populated areas in and around Kandahar City. This vastly increased security presence, accompanied by a similar boost in American civilian efforts, will undoubtedly assist the Canadian-coordinated governance and development initiatives throughout Kandahar province and support moving Canadian priorities forward in the months to come.

## **III. Canadian Priorities: Reporting Progress**

Canada's military and civilian commitment in Afghanistan ranks as our country's most assertive expression of foreign policy since the Korean War in the 1950s. The numbers alone are significant—more than 2,800 military personnel, over 100 civilians and aid totalling \$1.3 billion since 2001—as is the overarching objective, to leave Afghanistan to Afghans as a country that is democratic, self-sufficient and stable.

An engagement on this scale warrants clarity about priorities and transparency about progress. In mid-2008, Canada announced six specific priorities: enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order; strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services; provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people; enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between



Following a civilian Transfer of Authority ceremony on September 23, newly appointed Representative of Canada in Kandahar, Ben Rowswell, stands with Canada's military commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance. Mr. Rowswell succeeds Ken Lewis.

Afghan and Pakistani authorities; help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance; and facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation. Since September 2008, an Appendix to the quarterly reports has spelled out detailed benchmarks for each priority and reported results in achieving them.

The priorities are shaped by two driving forces: the needs identified in Afghanistan's own development plans; and the fields in which Canada has demonstrated expertise. The resulting projects and programs are tailored to produce concrete results by 2011, when our military mission in Kandahar ends, and to speed Afghanistan's long-term development.

The priorities are mutually reinforcing. As Canadian support enhances the capacity of the ANSF to provide security in Kandahar, the expansion of safe locales improves prospects for exercising effective governance and delivering development. Such governance and development efforts are more likely to succeed where the bonds between Afghans and their government are being strengthened by the provision of basic services. Furthermore, meeting humanitarian needs not only responds to a moral imperative, but also—by helping the most vulnerable—joins the other priorities by addressing the needs of the population.

It is worth bearing in mind that progress in Afghanistan is an uphill struggle against the legacy of decades of violent conflict, civil war, poverty, corruption and abuse of power. As well, the resilient insurgency by the Taliban and others further frustrates development efforts.

## Priority 1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.

The ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The security required for good governance and sustained development demands that both be strengthened into effective forces. This task is being undertaken for the ANA in Kandahar primarily by the Canadian Forces, which are responsible for training and mentoring five of the six battalions (called kandaks) in the province and their Brigade Headquarters. Capacity building for the ANP in Kandahar is shared by Canadian civilian police and U.S. partners, supported by the Canadian Forces.



Canadian and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces work together on this mission. In the middle, the Squadron Sergeant-Major, Master Warrant Officer Richard Stacey, organizes the Squadron's road move, placing ANA vehicles in the convoy.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANA): By 2011, we expect that the ANA in Kandahar will demonstrate an

increased capacity to conduct operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts of Kandahar, with support from ISAF allies.

In Kandahar, Canadian Forces mentored the ANA, who assisted in providing security throughout the election period. Ensuring sufficient security at polling centres on the actual voting day was widely seen as a crucial test for the ANSF. Despite heightened insurgent activity in the lead up to, and conduct of, the elections, the security efforts led and executed by the ANA, combined with support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in security and transporting elections' material throughout the province, allowed polling centres to open and operate in all but two of the province's 17 districts. In Kandahar City and nearby villages the Afghan forces prevailed in every one of the more than 40 encounters with armed insurgents.



Afghan National Security Forces provided security at polling centres across Kandahar and throughout Afghanistan on the August 20 election day.

Continuing a trend that began last quarter, the ANA exceeded the 2011 targets by shouldering a greater responsibility for security in Kandahar City and its populated approaches, executing 80 percent of security operations on their own and leading more than 70 percent. Significant amounts of narcotics and explosives continue to be seized in operations now routinely planned and carried out by the ANA, ANP and other Afghan agencies with support from the Canadian Forces.

Canadian Objective for 2011 (ANP): By 2011, we expect that the ANP will demonstrate an increased capacity to promote law and order in key districts of Kandahar, supported by justice-sector and corrections capabilities.

To achieve transformation of the rule-of-law system in Kandahar, Canada is pursuing lasting improvements in three interlocking sectors—police, the justice system and corrections. Sustainable progress in all three faces significant obstacles. The ANP suffers from frequent incidents of corruption, extortion and drug abuse; as well, poor pay, substandard equipment and targeted violence from insurgents hamper recruitment and retention and sap morale. Advancing the professionalism of the ANP suffered a setback in the current quarter after the Kandahar City chief of police and other senior officers died in a firefight on June 30, 2009. Yet in the face of these challenges, the ANP performed well in providing security at polling centres and assisting the IEC in moving and securing elections' material.

Mentoring and training are central to Canada's efforts in promoting the rule of law. During the quarter, Canadian civilian and military police in Kandahar City provided basic training for 679 ANP officers in preparation for the election. The arrival of the U.S. 97th Military Police battalion has also increased the availability of mentors to support the ANP. In the corrections sector, training began for a new group of women officers who guard female inmates at Kandahar City's Sarpoza prison. As well, effectively tracking and managing criminal cases are essential to the smooth running of any justice system, which is why Canada provided training in computer use and case management for the ANP Prosecutor's Office.



A graduating Afghan National Police (ANP) officer receives his certificate from Canada's first police commander in Afghanistan, RCMP Assistant Commissioner Graham Muir. In the lead up to the election, Canada's civilian policing contingent taught a basic training course and mentored the ANP. Visit the AfCam Video Library at www.afghanistan.gc.ca to view a podcast on how Canada is mentoring the ANP.

Priority 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government.

Afghans desire dependable basic services such as education, health care, sanitation, roads, and water for homes and agriculture. Improving the delivery of these services is a litmus test for the Afghan government in earning greater public confidence. Canada's focus on reinforcing such institutional capacity directly improves lives and livelihoods in Kandahar.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that Kandahar's provincial administration and core ministries of the Afghan government will be better able to provide basic services to key districts of Kandahar province.

Progress continued in Canada's signature projects, two of which are under this priority—building, expanding or repairing 50 schools in key districts, and rehabilitating the province's largest irrigation system.

Construction was finished on seven new schools in Kandahar, for a total of a dozen completed since the project began in 2008, and work continued on 21 more. None of the Canadian-funded schools were among those that Afghan education authorities reported in mid-September were not holding classes because of physical damage, insurgent action or threats against students or staff. An example of such intimidation was the acid attack in November 2008 on a group of girls walking to school in Kandahar City. To counter such threats, Canada is now funding a year's rental of five school buses, providing safety for schoolgirls and female teachers to attend classes. Canada also supports more than 3,000 community-based schools across the country, reaching in excess of 80,000 students, predominately girls.

#### **Operation Plan Kantolo: Focusing on the Population**

Enduring stability in Afghanistan cannot be achieved through military efforts alone; development and diplomacy must go hand-in-hand, and Afghans and their government must be involved. Operation Plan Kantolo is the military operational plan based on counterinsurgency principles, which aims to bring lasting security to Kandahar City and key villages in the surrounding districts. It focuses on protecting the population and providing a secure space for governance and development to take root. Operation Kalay is the village-level application of Kantolo consisting of four key evolutions: Shape, Clear, Hold and Build.

**Shape:** Canadians work with Afghan village, district and provincial leadership to select potential villages where the clear-hold-build phases can occur.

**Clear:** The Canadian Forces along with Afghan security partners and U.S. forces work together to clear the area of insurgent fighters, establishing and maintaining local security, a necessary precondition for development programs and governance initiatives. Capacity building by Canadian civilian police helps to ensure that the ANP can play a vital role in protecting the population.

**Hold:** Once the village has been cleared, stabilization teams enter and address immediate needs, reinforce security and assess mid- to long-term needs such as water access and electricity. Concurrently, military and police mentors work with the ANSF to provide security. This combination of immediate aid, along with persistent security, builds trust and support from the local population and their leaders. Responsibility for development and governance slowly shifts to Afghan authorities under the continuing mentorship of Canadian civilian experts.

**Build:** With security in place and immediate needs being addressed, the Afghan government and development partners can provide basic social services, build schools and undertake agriculture projects. The population can see tangible results being provided by their government with the assistance of Canadian partners. As the

population feels more secure, they will return to work and school. As basic social services are provided, the population will feel more confident in the ability of their government to provide for them, and will be more supportive of government efforts to rid the country of insurgent elements. Ultimately, Afghanistan can be left to Afghans as a stable, more democratic and self-sufficient country.

**Operation Kalay I:** The village approach is still new and it is too early to assess its long-term effects, although initial results have been positive. The Canadian approach in the village of Deh-e-Bagh has attracted positive commentary from the international community, and has been described as the model for



A local Afghan repairs a building of the District Centre in Deh-e-Bagh, Kandahar province.

ISAF counterinsurgency operations. Security in and around the village has improved, allowing the UN to downgrade the security warning in the area. Several projects have provided employment for hundreds of Afghans to pave roads, repair mosques and dig new irrigation canals.

Other education initiatives also moved ahead: a new intake of trainees (mostly women) continued in a community-based adult literacy course already successfully delivered to more than 10,000 individuals; funds were made available to significantly upgrade a teacher training college with classrooms and a female dormitory, and to improve the water supply; and another 44 teachers were prepared to be "master" trainers (teacher-trainers), making a total of 144 so far in Kandahar. (By the end of the year, these master trainers should have helped upgrade about 300 teachers already in classrooms in the province.) As well, Canada is providing \$1.5 million over three years to strengthen anti-corruption measures at the Ministry of Education.

The three-year, \$50-million rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam with its canals and associated irrigation system is a second Canadian signature project and one of the highest development priorities of the Afghan government. Completion will mean reliable delivery of water to an area supporting four out of five Kandaharis, with the irrigation encouraging farmers to shift from opium poppies to legal high-value crops like pomegranates. In the quarter, Canadian project engineers tackled technical aspects of the project, and a manufacturer for the gates and weirs of the irrigation canals was identified.



Female students writing their exams at a teacher training college in Kandahar province. Through Canadian funding, upgrades to the teacher training college are underway, including improving classrooms, building a dormitory for female teachers and improving the water supply. Visit the AfCam Video Library at www.afghanistan.gc.ca to view a podcast on education in Afghanistan.

Finally, one 2011 target under this priority has already been exceeded. As of this quarter, more than 500 Afghans in key districts of Kandahar have received microfinance loans, which make available much-needed credit to people unable to obtain traditional financing.

None of the encouraging news above, however, can obscure the reality that insurgent activity in Kandahar continues to hamper the efforts of both the Afghan government and the international community in extending basic services. Some development partners can travel in parts of key districts only in armoured vehicles and under close military protection; in other areas even such constrained movement is impossible.

## Priority 3. Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.

In recent years Afghanistan has consistently ranked near the bottom of nations included in the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).<sup>1</sup> Not in dispute, however, is that at least one in four Afghans is unable to get enough food to live an active, healthy life, a consequence of decades of armed conflict, natural disasters and ineffectual governance. Diseases of poverty, such as tuberculosis, are widespread. For several million extremely



World Food Programme staff hand out food rations sponsored by the Government of Canada.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Released mere days after the end of the reporting quarter, the 2009 Human Development Index ranked Afghanistan 181st out of 182 countries covered.

vulnerable people, however, the daily struggle is even more exhausting since they must also cope with being torn from their homes.

Canadian Objective for 2011: Humanitarian assistance will continue to be accessible to Afghan refugees, and to returnees and internally displaced persons in Kandahar and nationwide.

In partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF implement the third of Canada's signature projects, the campaign to eradicate polio throughout Afghanistan, one of only four countries where the disease is still endemic. (Two others, India and Pakistan, are within the same region.) This quarter, more children were vaccinated than in previous quarters, and most importantly, the percentage of children deemed "inaccessible" due to security concerns decreased significantly. A vaccination campaign in July reached about 380,000 children aged



A child receives a polio vaccination.

five and under in Kandahar, and in September a broader campaign in high-risk districts of Kandahar and two neighbouring provinces reached 880,000 children. The percentage of children missed declined from 15 percent in May to under 5 percent in July.

Yet with nine new cases during this quarter bringing the national total to 22 for the year, it is widely acknowledged that the country cannot be polio-free by the end of the year. Canada remains committed to the eradication of polio in Afghanistan and we will continue to report progress toward that target.

The Canadian-supported removal of landmines and explosives in Kandahar moved ahead in July and August, making life safer for the residents of 11 villages by clearing land equal in area to more than 40 football fields. Nationally the number of casualties from such deadly remnants dropped this year to fewer than 50 a month, the lowest level in 10 years. Still the country-wide problem is extensive with estimates that at least 10,000 such hazards are scattered across more than 1,000 square kilometres.

Visit the AfCam Video Library at www.afghanistan.gc.ca to view a podcast on Afghanistan's landmines.

## Priority 4. Enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.

The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan provides a conduit for criminals and insurgents, while legitimate travel and trade are hindered by poor capacity at border crossing points. A better managed and more secure border holds out the prospect of increased economic opportunities for both countries along with a decline in unlawful activities. Better trained and better equipped border officials on both sides of the border are key elements.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that Afghan institutions, in cooperation with Pakistan, will exercise stronger capacity to manage the border and foster economic development in the border area.

The quarter saw modest progress toward achieving the Canadian objective for 2011. In Spin Boldak, work continued on getting the new Joint District Coordination Centre ready for preliminary operations by year's end. In July, two Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation workshops, established pursuant to the Canada-facilitated Dubai Process, were held. These joint working groups furthered commitments, agreed to by both countries in the Dubai Process Action Plan, on managing the cross-border movement of people and on counter-narcotics operations.



Afghans hard at work at the Joint District Coordination Centre in Spin Boldak.

Finally, the Canada Border Services Agency developed customs training modules, which will be included in the curriculum of the Afghan National Customs Academy, scheduled to open in early 2010. Consultations with international partners have resulted in the establishment of a new target under this priority: by 2011, we will have trained 150 to 200 Afghan Customs officials and three to four Afghan trainers, in collaboration with other international donors.

## Priority 5. Help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.

As noted in previous quarterly reports, democratic governance is an overarching priority for Afghanistan, meaning governance that is transparent, effective and accountable.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that national, provincial and local institutions, particularly in Kandahar province, will exhibit an increasing capacity for democratic governance in the deliberation and delivery of public programs and services, and in carrying out democratic elections.

Canada supports the electoral process in Afghanistan by providing Canadians with technical expertise, and financially with partners such as the UNDP, the Asia Foundation and the National Democratic Institute. The two-month election campaign for the presidential and provincial council elections, the actual voting on August 20 and subsequent events were important steps in building democratic institutions and ensuring future elections that are credible, inclusive and secure.

Statistics suggest the magnitude of the challenge: 41 candidates for president; 3,324 candidates for seats on 34 provincial councils; accreditation of more than 280,000 Afghan and international election observers; and an estimated 15 million registered voters. The two bodies chiefly responsible for handling these challenging electoral operations before and after August 20 are the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The IEC is an Afghan institution responsible for administering and supervising the election; the ECC adjudicates complaints and three of its five commissioners are appointed by the United Nations. In addition to pervasive security concerns, logistics challenges are formidable in Afghanistan, for

example requiring the setting up of separate male and female polling stations, and the use of mules and donkeys to bring ballots to and from some remote regions.

On September 16, the IEC announced preliminary and uncertified results of the presidential race, suggesting incumbent President Hamid Karzai had garnered a little more than 54 percent of the vote, with nearly 28 percent going to his main rival, former Afghan foreign minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Ten days later, the IEC announced preliminary results for the provincial councils in 30 of the 34 provinces.

There were major concerns about irregularities and fraud. On September 8, the ECC said it had "found clear and convincing evidence of fraud in a number of polling stations in each province investigated." That evidence was either more ballots cast than the 600 initially supplied to the polling station or a return for one candidate of 95 percent or higher. It ordered the IEC to carry out an audit. On September 21, the ECC and IEC reached agreement on the process of auditing a statistically representative sample of ballot boxes from more than 10 percent of polling stations. By the end of September, the actual auditing had not yet begun.

Away from the central government, much remains to be done in building institutional capacity. As part of that effort Canada helped set up a meeting among key stakeholders to discuss reconstruction, development and delivery of basic services in the southern part of Afghanistan, including Kandahar City. Through this meeting, stakeholders learned about new techniques to improve revenue collection and solid waste management from counterparts in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain, particularly at the district level. In a survey by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, out of 364 such district administrative centres in Afghanistan, 318 have no electricity supply. More than half the district governors have no office and four of five have no official vehicle.

#### Priority 6. Facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.

Sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan require not only a determined counterinsurgency campaign but also genuine political reconciliation. Led by Afghans and supported by the international community, a comprehensive reconciliation effort is essential to fostering a sense of national purpose among ethnic and tribal communities divided by decades of violence.

Canadian Objective for 2011: By 2011, we expect that national and provincial Afghan government initiatives will encourage political reconciliation, and receive timely support from Canada.

Canada supports important building blocks in an eventual Afghan-led reconciliation effort, including the Afghanistan Government Media and Information Centre in Kabul. The centre opened last summer to foster



School children's depictions of peace from Kandahar, Afghanistan.

communication between the central government and Afghans and has the potential to facilitate a national dialogue on reconciliation. During the quarter Canada agreed to provide \$1.6 million to

rebuild the meeting hall of the Kandahar Provincial Council, providing much-needed space for community gatherings.

As forecast, progress on reconciliation was minimal during this quarter because of the elections, although the two leading presidential candidates both identified reconciliation as desirable and necessary. The international community deliberately adopted a low profile on the subject to avoid pre-empting the evolution of an Afghan policy on reconciliation.

In the end, two essential steps toward reconciliation remain: the shaping of a national reconciliation strategy and the identification of a national agency to implement that strategy.



During her September visit to the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief, met with representatives from Afghan civil society.

Realistically these will only occur when Afghan leaders judge the time is ripe.

#### IV. Conclusion

Even more than usual, courage was the watchword in Afghanistan and Kandahar during the past three months. Millions of Afghans defied intimidation and violence to take part in the election campaign and to vote. The Afghan army and police stood up to the heaviest-ever day of violence to provide security at polling centres. The continued flow of U.S. forces into Afghanistan assisted all ISAF members, including the Canadian Forces, to demonstrate continued valour in counterinsurgency efforts such as Operation Plan Kantolo, designed to protect the Afghan population. And civilian development workers drew upon reserves of fortitude to carry out their vital role in danger zones.

This is a conflict of utmost complexity in a region of violent instability. We share this difficult mission with our close allies under UN authority and, most importantly, with the Afghan people. Although the endeavour remains risky and the outcome far from certain, Canada's mission in Afghanistan underscores the values that Canadians themselves hold dear. We are not only helping to build security, but we are also providing assistance to those in dire need and are working with Afghans to build the capacity to enable them to govern effectively.

## **Appendix**

#### Vision:

A more secure Kandahar that is better governed and can deliver basic services to its citizens, supported by a more capable national government that can better provide for its security, manage its borders and sustain stability and reconstruction gains over the longer term.

#### **Priorities:**

- Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces
- Basic Services
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Border Security and Dialogue
- Democratic Development and National Institutions
- Political Reconciliation

To support this vision and the priorities laid out in this report, the Government of Canada has identified a number of benchmarks and progress indicators that will help to:

- gauge levels of progress being achieved, or not, as the case may be;
- identify if and when adjustments to its approach are required, given the complex environment; and
- report results frankly to Canadians.

Benchmarking in Afghanistan is a difficult task with reporting dependent on gathering information while operating in a conflict zone.

- *Benchmarks* are reference points that help assess progress in specific priority areas. The benchmarks are in some cases quantitative, providing numerical targets, and in other cases qualitative, for instance gauging public perception or assessing the implementation of policies and programs.
- *Progress indicators* provide more specific information on how work is proceeding against those reference points. The challenge with progress indicators is in the ability to regularly report against them on a quarterly basis.
- Baselines refer to the current status of developments associated with the progress indicators, are a fixed point, and will not change over time.
- Targets are the level of progress that we hope to achieve by 2011. Some targets have already been met.

#### **Training and Mentoring Afghan National Security Forces**

**Context:** Benchmarks to measure Afghan National Army (ANA) progress are very precise and consistent with NATO's overall ANA training initiatives. To strengthen the policing, justice and corrections sectors, our benchmarks include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. A number of external factors will affect our ability to make progress in these areas. Insurgent violence deliberately targeting Afghan police has resulted in high rates of death, injury and desertion, which degrade police effectiveness and limit our ability to track trained police officers. Canada is one of many actors contributing to rule-of-law reform: Afghan ministries are leading this process and key international partners are playing critical roles.

Benchmark: Increase in the number of ANA kandaks (army battalions) in Kandahar capable of conducting near-autonomous security operations, and increase in the capability of their brigade headquarters.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### Baseline

One of the five ANA kandaks is fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To have four of the five ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The ANA brigade headquarters and one of the five kandaks are fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations. A newly formed sixth kandak has not yet been assessed.

Benchmark: Increase and/or maintain the effective strength (troops trained, ready and available for operations) of Kandahar-based ANA kandaks and their brigade headquarters.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The effective strength of the Kandahar-based ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters).

#### Baseline

One of the five ANA kandaks has an effective strength of 67% and the remainder currently have an effective strength of over 80%. The ANA brigade headquarters has an effective strength of 77% (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To sustain the level of effective strength of the Kandahar-based ANA kandaks (and their brigade headquarters) at 70% or higher.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

One of the six kandaks and the ANA brigade headquarters have an effective strength of 70%.

Benchmark: Progressive increase in the security burden shouldered by the ANA in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the Canadian Forces.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The percentage of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR that are executed by the ANA.

#### Baseline

45% of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR are executed by the ANA (April 2009).

#### 2011 Target

65% of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR are executed by the ANA.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

80% of total security operations were executed by the ANA.

The percentage of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR that are led by the ANA.

#### **Baseline**

45% of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR are led by the ANA (April 2009).

#### 2011 Target

65% of total security operations in the Canadian Forces AOR are led by the ANA.

#### **Quarterly Result**

72% of total security operations were led by the ANA.

Benchmark: To increase the number of key districts where the ANA are perceived by the majority of the population to be a professional and effective force that contributes to their well-being in key districts of Kandahar province.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of key districts where the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more.<sup>2</sup>

#### Baseline

In four of the six key districts the ANA has an approval rating of 85% or more (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

To maintain and/or increase the number of key districts where the ANA has an 85% approval rating.

#### **Quarterly Result**

In one of the six key districts the ANA had an approval rating of 85% or more.

Benchmark: Increase in the number of key districts of Kandahar province where there is a perceived improvement of security conditions.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of key districts where the majority of Kandaharis perceive security as improving.

#### Baseline

In zero of the six key districts, a majority of Kandaharis feel secure or perceive security as improving (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

The majority of Kandaharis in all six of the key districts feel secure or perceive security as improving.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

Although in none of the six key districts did a majority of Kandaharis perceive security as improving, in two districts, overall perceptions of security increased over the last quarter.

Benchmark: Increased Afghan National Police (ANP) capacity to provide effective police services in key districts of Kandahar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANP trained in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

25% of the ANP in key districts have completed Focused District Development (FDD) training (August 2008).<sup>3</sup>

#### 2011 Target

80% of key district ANP forces will have completed Focused District Development (FDD) training.

#### **Quarterly Result**

FDD training was completed by 679 ANP in the key districts this quarter, for a total of 2,030 officers. Due to current restructuring of the ANP, we cannot report on the percentage rate at this time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Approval rating for ANA is defined as being perceived as professional and capable force.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Focused District Development (FDD) is a six-phase police reform program that involves retraining, equipping and mentoring district police forces as consolidated units, over six to eight months (but generally lasts longer).

The number of ANP forces in key districts assessed at Capability Milestone 2: capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations. 4

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of ANP infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

0% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

80% of ANP forces in key districts are capable of planning, executing and sustaining near-autonomous operations.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Two of 17 police units, or 12%, are assessed at Capability Milestone 2.

#### **Baseline**

Five permanent substations have been constructed and equipped in key districts (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

15 new infrastructure projects, such as construction of substations or checkpoints, and 15 upgrades to existing ANP facilities are completed in key districts in Kandahar province.

All 15 new facilities built by Canada in Kandahar province are provided with basic equipment required to run a functioning police unit.

#### **Quarterly Result**

One infrastructure project and upgrades to three police facilities were completed this quarter, bringing the to-date totals to 13 infrastructure projects and six upgrades to existing ANP facilities.

#### Benchmark: Improved detention facilities in Kandahar that support the work of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Sarpoza prison and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detention centre in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

Immediate repairs were made in the wake of the attack on Sarpoza prison. Detailed needs assessments for ongoing infrastructure upgrades at both NDS and Sarpoza have been completed and project plans have been developed in consultation with the Afghan government (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

19 planned infrastructure projects, such as repairs to security infrastructure and refurbishment of prisoner quarters, are completed in Sarpoza prison in keeping with international standards and best practices.

12 planned equipment purchases, such as communications equipment, uniforms and office furnishing, are delivered to Sarpoza prison in keeping with international standards and best practices.

#### **Quarterly Result**

One infrastructure project to refurbish prisoner quarters and two equipment purchases to enhance perimeter security were completed, bringing the to-date totals to 12 infrastructure projects and nine equipment purchases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> FDD is assessed by Capability Milestones. Capability Milestone 2 is defined as "the police unit, staff function or installation can conduct basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks (appropriate to local circumstances) with occasional assistance from an international advisor or police mentor team.

The number of corrections officials trained and mentored in Kandahar.

#### **Baseline**

23 corrections officers (30%) and one senior manager (50%) have successfully completed initial corrections training; and two senior managers (100%) are participating in management training (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

100% of corrections officers and managers will have successfully completed their initial and advanced training programs.

#### **Quarterly Result**

58 corrections officers, or 67% of current staffing levels, commenced advanced-level training. Sustainment training for new recruits is also being delivered on an ongoing basis. The percentage of corrections officers trained will fluctuate between reporting periods as a result of ongoing changes in Afghan staffing levels.

Benchmark: Improved justice sector: a working court system in Kandahar City with competent judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and administrative personnel in place.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of training programs in place for justice officials Kandahar.

#### Baseline

There are no current training programs for justice officials in Kandahar (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Four training programs for justice officials in Kandahar are made available for those practising law and those involved in administering the legal system.

#### **Quarterly Result**

A three-month information technology training program for the ANP Prosecutor's Office was completed this quarter.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of justice sector infrastructure and equipment projects completed in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

Minimal judicial infrastructure exists. The Attorney General and Ministry of Justice building requires repair. In Kandahar City, there is one courthouse which is in disrepair and housing for judges and prosecutors is inadequate. In the other districts, there are only three courthouses, all of which require upgrading.

#### 2011 Target

Five justice facilities, including the ANP Prosecutor's Office, Attorney General's Office and High Court are built or rehabilitated to support the formal justice system in Kandahar City. Three justice facilities, including the Land Registry Office (Cadastre), ANP Prosecutor's Office and High Court are equipped to support the formal justice system in Kandahar City.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Three infrastructure projects in support of the justice institutions are ongoing. Two equipment deliveries, including security enhancements for the High Court and office supplies for the ANP Prosecutor's Office were completed.

Improved Ministry of Justice capacity to draft, revise, translate and promulgate laws passed by the Afghan government.

#### Baseline

Afghan Ministry of Justice's legislative drafting unit lacks the required capacity, processes and infrastructure to draft, revise, translate and promulgate legislation in an effective and timely manner (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

The Afghan Ministry of Justice's legislative drafting unit achieves improved capacity.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The Canadian-funded technical advisor to the legislative drafting unit at the Ministry of Justice developed and delivered training sessions on information technology.

#### **Basic Services**

**Context**: A number of benchmarks have been established under this priority, though some are less tangible than others as they are based on Afghan perception and will be measured against findings from public opinion research. It is important to note that polling in a complex environment like Kandahar is challenging and results may not always be reliable.

In the case of the Dahla Dam signature project, some key indicators have been established relating to the area of land irrigated and number of jobs created.

Benchmark: The Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system rehabilitated, generating jobs and fostering agriculture. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

#### **Progress Indicator**

Progress in the rehabilitation of the physical structures of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation components.

#### Baseline

Access road completed and bridge nearing completion (March 2009).

#### 2011 Target

Completion of all planned rehabilitation activities in accordance with the project plan.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The implementation phase has begun. The manufacturer to design gates and weirs for irrigation canals was identified; and project engineers conducted technical assessments.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Number of jobs created by the Dahla Dam project.

#### Baseline

Project plan is in development and will be finalized in the fall of 2008.

#### 2011 Target

10,000 seasonal jobs created by the project.

#### **Ouarterly Result**

157 jobs were created this quarter for a cumulative total of 355 jobs.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Number of hectares of land benefiting from improved irrigation and water management.

#### Baseline

20,000 hectares of land currently have access to irrigation (to varying degree and quality) via the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system

#### 2011 Target

30,000 hectares in total benefiting from improved irrigation and water management.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Progress against this indicator will not be realized or reported until the project advances to the irrigation phase.

#### Benchmark: A total of 50 schools built, expanded or repaired in Kandahar. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

Prog	ress	Indicat	or

Number of school projects (built, expanded or repaired) in key districts.

#### Baseline

19 school projects contracted and one school project completed (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

50 schools built, expanded or repaired.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Seven schools were completed this quarter for a total of 12; 21 schools are currently under construction.

#### Benchmark: Local and provincial institutions able to meet and implement the objectives of the National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Number of teachers trained in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

No teachers trained as yet through Canadian programming (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

3,000 trained teachers.

#### **Quarterly Result**

44 "master" teachers (i.e. teachertrainers) were trained this quarter for a total of 144.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Number of people receiving literacy training, vocational education and skills development.

#### **Baseline**

More than 5,000 individuals have received literacy training. Some 735 individuals have received vocational training (2007).

#### 2011 Target

20,000 additional individuals to receive literacy training. 1,070 additional individuals to receive vocational training.

#### **Quarterly Result**

13,500 individuals continued in various literacy training programs. Over 2,000 people have completed vocational training and skills development to date.

Benchmark: Provincial institutions and community groups able to identify and implement infrastructure projects.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Percentage of communities in key districts that have completed infrastructure projects undertaken by the locally elected bodies.

#### Baseline

60% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects (December 2007).

#### 2011 Target

75% of communities in key districts have completed infrastructure projects.

#### **Quarterly Result**

68% of communities in key districts have completed projects.

Benchmark: Kandaharis have confidence in the ability of the government in Kandahar to deliver basic services, particularly education and water, and joboriented economic growth.

<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	<b>Quarterly Result</b>
Percentage of Kandaharis who perceive an improvement in dependable delivery of services.	75% of Kandaharis polled indicate they are satisfied with efforts of provincial and local-level government to improve quality of life. 64% of Kandaharis polled are somewhat or very satisfied with provision of education. 39% of polled Kandaharis indicated they are satisfied with	To maintain and improve on perception of service delivery.	60% of Kandaharis polled are satisfied with the Afghan government's efforts to improve quality of life; 47% are satisfied with the provision of education and 40% are satisfied with employment in their communities.
	employment (February 2008).		

Benchmark: New economic opportunities created in key districts for Kandaharis.

<b>Progress Indicator</b> The number of business enterprises and cooperatives operating in key districts.	Baseline 206 agricultural cooperatives registered (April 2006) and 72 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating (July 2008).	2011 Target Steady expansion of the number of enterprises in key districts.	Quarterly Result Four new cooperatives were established in Dhari district.
<b>Progress Indicator</b> The number of microfinance and savings clients served.	Baseline 30 microfinance loans provided to clients in Kandahar (March 2008).	2011 Target Loans for 500 clients in Kandahar through the Microfinance Investment Support Facility.	Quarterly Result TARGET ACHIEVED: loans were provided to over 500 clients.

#### **Humanitarian Assistance**

**Context:** The first benchmark in this priority includes a series of quantitative and qualitative measures, as no single indicator is comprehensive enough to provide a complete picture. Considered together, they will help to provide an assessment of progress.

The challenges for this priority are not in the indicators themselves, but in the ability to report against them on a quarterly basis given that evaluations and assessments are undertaken across longer time frames. The evolving nature of security can challenge humanitarian access and limit the ability to report publicly on some efforts below the national level. It is also important to note that with some information, such as mine victims, officially reported numbers are only estimates given that many accidents go unreported.

#### Benchmark: Achievement of polio eradication in Afghanistan. \*Canadian Signature Project\*

Progress	Indicator
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The number of children receiving the polio vaccine during each of the multiple national campaigns conducted annually—multiple vaccinations are required to stop transmission of polio.

#### Baseline

In 2007, approximately 27.7 million vaccinations were administered to 7 million children during four national campaigns (2007).

#### 2011 Target

Eradication by vaccination by 2009.

#### **Quarterly Result**

380,000 children were vaccinated in the July national campaign in Kandahar and nearly 880,000 children were vaccinated in the September subnational campaign across 19 districts of the southern and western regions.

#### Progress Indicator

The number of polio cases reported.

#### Baseline

17 cases reported nationally (2007).

**2011 Target** Eradication by 2009.

**Quarterly Result** 

Nine new cases were identified this quarter, bringing the 2009 total to 22, including 14 in Kandahar.

Benchmark: Public institutions able to plan and coordinate emergency assistance and support to vulnerable populations in Kandahar.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Quantity of humanitarian food aid delivered in response to need.

#### Baseline

6.7 million Afghans (approximately 21%) supported with food aid, representing 214,000 metric tonnes of food against an identified need where 30% of the Afghan population were considered chronically food insecure (January-December 2007).

#### 2011 Target

Maintain and/or improve the number of Afghans receiving food assistance in proportion to need.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Canadian funding helped the World Food Programme provide over 50,000 tonnes of food to more than 3.9 million beneficiaries this quarter.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Progress Indicator**

The capacity of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Committee (ANDMC) and Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) to put in place effective disaster preparedness plans.

#### Baseline

The PDMC and United Nations in Kandahar developed a comprehensive contingency plan for a severe winter in 2007 and anticipated spring floods. Two training sessions were provided for the PDMC on disaster management.

#### 2011 Target

By 2011, PDMC will have developed comprehensive strategies and coordination mechanisms for responding to disasters.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Although Canada continued to identify opportunities to further build capacity to respond to disasters, no significant progress occurred during this quarter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Quarterly result to be confirmed once the World Food Programme submits its quarterly report.

Progress	Indicator

The access that vulnerable populations—women, children, disabled persons, returnees and internally displaced persons—have to essential quality health services.

#### **Baseline**

111 health care staff have received training (June 2008).

#### 2011 Target

500 health care workers trained.

#### **Quarterly Result**

An additional 87 health care workers were trained in Kandahar, for a cumulative total of 684. Additionally, the Maternal Waiting Home at Mirwais Hospital opened during this quarter.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The amount of land released and made available for communities as a result of survey and clearance of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) nationally and in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 180 square kilometres of land were released and made available nationally.

#### 2011 Target

A cumulative total of 500 square kilometres of land released and made available.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Over 0.25 square kilometres of land in Kandahar were released this quarter as a result of clearance and survey, bringing the cumulative total to 0.95 square kilometers in Kandahar. National results are released annually.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The number of people receiving mine awareness education in Kandahar.

#### Baseline

From March 2007 to March 2008, 33,500 individuals were provided with mine-awareness education.

#### 2011 Target

200,000 individuals provided with mine-awareness education.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Over 31,000 Kandaharis received mine-risk education training during the quarter, for a cumulative total of over 150,000 people.

#### **Border Security and Dialogue**

**Context:** Border security and dialogue are ultimately contingent on strong relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and on the resolution of some long-standing issues. Canada's benchmarks for this priority include qualitative and quantitative progress indicators to assess the effectiveness of Afghan and Pakistani border management efforts, including bilateral cooperation. As the border is long, its terrain difficult and its infrastructure underdeveloped, obtaining baseline information and establishing targets are challenging. Canada has already begun to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to identify infrastructure, training and other needs. This information will be essential to refining Canada's baselines and targets in the future.

#### Benchmark: Regular discussions on border issues.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Increased dialogue between Pakistani and Afghan officials through mechanisms including Canadian-sponsored workshops.

#### Baseline

Three Canadian-sponsored workshops have been held to date. Key mechanisms for discussions were suspended by Afghanistan in July 2008 (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Sustainable mechanisms for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues are in place and operating for senior officials.

#### **Quarterly Result**

In July, Pakistani and Afghan officials participated in two Joint Working Group meetings under the Dubai Process (counter-narcotics and managing the movement of people). Pakistani and Afghan officials are working on preparations for two subsequent Joint Working Group meetings (customs and law enforcement).

#### **Progress Indicator**

Increased cooperation at Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

#### Baseline

Regular Canadian-facilitated discussions at Kandahar-Baluchistan border are continuing.

#### 2011 Target

Mechanisms at border in place for regular and substantive discussions across a broad array of issues.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Canadian-facilitated discussions between Afghan and Pakistani military officials stationed at the Kandahar-Baluchistan border (Border Flag meeting) took place in September 2009.

#### Benchmark: Better managed border crossings on the Kandahar-Baluchistan border.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Training completed by border officials.

#### Baseline

No training provided to date (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

A tailored training curriculum for new recruits in international customs procedures and a senior management development program for Afghan Customs will be developed by September 2009.

NEW: 150-200 Afghan Customs officials and 3-4 Afghan Customs trainers trained by 2011.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The Canada Border Services Agency has developed its customs training modules for inclusion in the curriculum of the Afghan National Customs Academy in Kabul (expected to open in early 2010).

Key infrastructure projects completed, including procurement of equipment.

#### Baseline

Assessment of infrastructure needs not yet complete, some equipment purchases underway (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Construction completed of a Joint District Coordination Centre in Spin Boldak. Infrastructure and equipment improvements completed at Weish border crossing in Kandahar, based on the results of a feasibility study to be completed in March 2009.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Completion of the Joint District Coordination Centre in Spin Boldak is anticipated in November 2009. Plans are being formulated for preconstruction and resettlement for the Weish border facility construction project, on the land identified in the feasibility study. Equipment has been deployed in Pakistan to assist the government in securing the border.

#### **Democratic Development and National Institutions**

**Context:** Given the nature of the first benchmark, measures will include quantitative data such as internationally recognized Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments in addition to qualitative assessments of ministry-specific evaluation activities and public perception assessed through polling.

The Government of Afghanistan intends to hold two elections before 2011: a presidential election and provincial council elections in 2009, and the election of parliament and district councils in 2010.

Canada will actively contribute in this area but it is important to recall that Canada is one of many actors. The Afghan government is leading, with support from the international community.

Benchmark: Key Afghan government institutions able to plan, resource, manage and maintain the delivery of services including at the subnational level.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Provinces have established long-term provincial strategic plans that are aligned with Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) objectives.

#### Baseline

Zero provinces have completed a provincial strategic plan (PSP) (March 2009).

#### 2011 Target

All 34 provinces have completed a provincial strategic plan.

Kandahar will have demonstrated progress in implementing its strategic plan against identified timelines.

#### **Quarterly Result**

PSP development was initiated in four pilot provinces (Balkh, Takhar, Laghman and Bamyan).

Effective planning and budgeting mechanisms in place.

#### **Baseline**

The difference between planned and actual government spending is 9.7% (April 2008).

#### 2011 Target

The difference between planned and actual government spending should be less than or equal to 5%.

#### **Quarterly Result**

The specific data for measuring effective planning and budgeting is only available on an annual basis. However, a key input to the Afghan government's budgeting and planning process, namely revenue generation, has demonstrated progress.

#### **Progress Indicator**

Better government monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place to ensure transparency.

#### Baseline

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating): 3 (April 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Comprehensiveness of budget execution and financial reports, frequency and public access to them (PEFA rating): 3+.

#### **Quarterly Result**

PEFA results are produced only every two years.

#### Benchmark: Afghanistan's ability to manage upcoming elections.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The establishment of a national voter registry.

#### Baseline

Pilot voter registration process carried out in three selected provinces (April 2008).

#### 2011 Target

Update of registry completed in a four-phased approach, in advance of 2009 presidential elections:

- 14 provinces registered in phase I;
- 10 additional provinces registered in phase II;
- 6 additional provinces registered in phase III; and
- 4 additional provinces including Kandahar registered in phase IV.\*
- \* The target was updated as the Government of Afghanistan's plan for voter registration was finalized.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Following the completion of the four phases of the update as planned, limited registration continued into July.

D I I I I	D 11	2011 F	0 4 1 D 4
Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The number of registered voters	Approximately 12.6 million voters in	Two million new registrants added to	There are no significant changes to
nationally.	the existing registry (2005).	the current registry in advance of the	report for the quarter, as registration
		2009 presidential and provincial	closed in mid-July.
		council elections; 500,000 new	
		registrants added to the 2009 registry	
		in advance of the 2010 parliamentary	
		and district council elections.	
	I	I	I
<b>Progress Indicator</b>	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The percentage of voter turnout.	70% of registered voters participated	70% turnout for men; 40% turnout	As of September 30, uncertified data
	in the last presidential elections;	for women. These targets are	indicated voter turnout at less than
	51.5% of registered voters	consistent with figures currently	40% (for both males and females).
	participated in the last parliamentary	being used by the UNDP ELECT	
	and provincial council elections.	project.	
Progress Indicator	Baseline	2011 Target	Quarterly Result
The establishment of an independent	An independent electoral complaints	Establishment of an independent	The Electoral Complaints Commission
electoral complaints commission.	commission does not currently exist	electoral complaints commission.	(ECC) has established 23 provincial
crectoral complaints commission.	(August 2008).	crectorar complaints commission.	offices. As of September 20, the ECC
	(Tagast 2000).		had received 3051 complaints.
			Following the August 20 elections, the
			ECC, in the context of an investigation
			into electoral fraud, ordered the
			Independent Electoral Commission to
			conduct an audit and recount of ballot
			haves meeting already defined suitanis

boxes, meeting clearly defined criteria. The audit and investigation continue.

#### **Political Reconciliation**

**Context:** Ultimately, only the Afghan government has the authority to pursue political reconciliation; Canada and other international partners will play supporting roles. Progress indicators to measure this benchmark include the identification of Afghan institutions and officials responsible for moving reconciliation forward, as well as the establishment of a transparent and effective process for reconciling insurgents.

Afghanistan cannot secure peace or realize its governance and development objectives by military means alone. An Afghan-led, internationally supported reconciliation process can serve to foster sustainable peace.

#### Benchmark: The Government of Afghanistan increasingly able to promote reconciliation among Afghans.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The Afghan government identifies the institutions and officials responsible for promoting Afghan reconciliation and a national reconciliation process is established.

#### Baseline

A clear institutional focal point and process have yet to be identified (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

A lead authority is moving reconciliation process forward.

#### **Quarterly Result**

There are no further results this quarter. The time frame for a national reconciliation strategy will depend on the outcome of the Afghan election and the will of the Afghan people.

#### **Progress Indicator**

The Afghan government is better able to communicate with Afghans about reconciliation.

#### Baseline

The Government of Afghanistan's ability to share information about its programs, policies and objectives in a timely manner is limited (August 2008).

#### 2011 Target

The Government of Afghanistan is actively sharing information, at the national, provincial and district levels, regarding its programs, policies and objectives for reconciliation.

#### **Quarterly Result**

Canada is funding the reconstruction of the Kandahar Provincial Council meeting hall, which will create further capacity for community interaction.