



The Canadian Army Journal

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State Failure in Afghanistan and Security Challenges for Pakistan

Brigadier Raashid Wali Janjua

The "Operationalization" of Canadian Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century

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Note to File—Combat Service Support in the ANA

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THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL

CANADA'S PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL ON ARMY ISSUES

The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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EDITORIAL—STRATEGICALLY RELEVANT AND TACTICALLY DECISIVE

Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD, plsc

...A lesson to be learned from that campaign is this: If Canada is to go on furnishing troops as these were, and as undoubtedly she will, it is absolutely necessary that some provision should be made for maintaining each regiment at something like its numerical strength in the field. The wastage through wounds and sickness in a hard campaign is enormous, and if drafts of fresh men are not continuously received the regiment soon drops down to such small numbers that it becomes an inefficient unit in a brigade, and is thrown out to do line of communication duty or something of that kind. At the time Lord Roberts inspected the Royal Canadian Regiment at Kroonstadt on the 14th May, out of 1,140 who left Canada there were only present on parade 415. That shows you the wastage that takes place, and in future arrangements should be made to provide for this and keep our ranks comparatively full all the time.

...A more important lesson to be learned from this campaign, in fact the most important of all, to my mind, is this; The absolute necessity of every officer, N.C.O. and man, being trained before he takes the field, to be a thoroughly practical rifle-shot. I mean by practical, one who can judge distance, fire accurately and quickly at either stationary or moving objects, and who in the excitement of battle remains cool enough to make effective use of his rifle under all circumstances; in fact, who is so accustomed to its use that there is no chance of what is sometimes called "buck fever" getting hold of him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Buchan, Royal Canadian Regiment, 1902¹



Shortly after his return from active service in South Africa, LCol Buchan made these and many other relevant comments in an articulate and informed speech he delivered to a packed room at the Canadian Military Institute (CMI) in Toronto. The CMI (which would later earn the title of 'Royal' to become the RCMI) played a central role during the early days of the Canadian Army as a forum for the professional exchange of ideas and debate. It hosted experienced and knowledgeable speakers like Buchan, and ensured that these speeches and other lectures were published in its annual proceedings and distributed army wide. This served not only to capture the legacy of the Canadian Army for future generations, but also ensure that the voices and ideas of its soldiers were heard and considered by everyone.

Despite its delivery over a century ago, LCol Buchan's comments to the CMI in early 1902 remain remarkably salient for today's army. The first excerpt above is reflective of a leadership that understood the importance of creating and maintaining a strategically relevant force with expeditionary capabilities. Earlier in this same speech LCol Buchan made reference to the need for the army to 'expect the unexpected' and use the planning and preparation for the 1885 Northwest Canada campaign as a lesson that the South Africa-bound contingents had to learn from. The second excerpt is most certainly reflective of a leadership that understood the absolutely critical need to be tactically decisive. Far from the myth of bumbling officers and incompetent amateur soldiers, Buchan stressed in this speech that all his officers carried rifles and that if the subaltern couldn't learn to employ it decisively he would never make captain. In fact, all army officers had to earn a certificate at the School of Musketry in order to be considered for any promotion

past Lieutenant. Likewise, LCol Buchan made no bones about his Sergeants, and used the example of Sgt. Hart-McHarg, a crack shot, (later LCol Hart-McHarg, killed while leading his battalion at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915), as the type of junior leader he expected in his own regiment as well as throughout the army.

Contrary to popular myths, the army has never forgotten the need to create and maintain a strategically relevant and tactically decisive force. Today, the basic lessons put forth by soldiers such as LCol Buchan and others still ring true, and continue to inform army capability development from conceptual and doctrinal design right through to deployment in the field. More important, perhaps, it further proves that capability development was/is not driven solely by imitation or resuscitation, but also by unique adaptation and indigenous innovation.

This issue of the CAJ includes two important studies on strategic communications and information operations; a subject that continues to envelope all aspects of military operations. Followed by an analysis of future soldier requirements, this issue also examines the role of the army in the arctic from both historical and current perspectives, while asking at the same time what direction might we take in the future. As always, the journal wraps up with a healthy fare of notes, book reviews, and letters, so enjoy reading and let us know what you think.

Endnotes

1. This is the conclusion of a lecture delivered at the Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, on the 3rd of February 1902.



THE SACRIFICE MEDAL

NOTE: Following the reaction to the announcement of the creation of the Medal in some circles, the Minister of National Defence has asked the Chief of the Defence staff to conduct a review of the existing criteria and make recommendations to the appropriate government committee. The review is currently underway and the inaugural presentation of the Medal, and therefore general distribution, has been postponed until a final decision with regards to the criteria is made and announced. The Canadian Army Journal will post updates as they become available.



The Sacrifice Medal was created in the context of increased casualties in overseas operations to fulfill the desire of Canadians and the Government to provide formal recognition, through the award of an official medal emanating from the Crown, to those who are killed or wounded by hostile action. This honour replaces the Wound Stripe.

ELIGIBILITY & CRITERIA

The Medal may be awarded to members of the Canadian Forces, members of an allied force working as an integral part of the Canadian Forces such as exchange personnel, civilian employees of the Government of Canada or Canadian citizens under contract with the Government of Canada, on the condition that they were deployed as part of a military mission under the authority of the Canadian Forces, that have, on or after October 7, 2001, died or been wounded under honourable circumstances as a direct result of a hostile or perceived hostile action on the condition that the wounds that were sustained required treatment by a physician and the treatment has been documented.

Eligible cases include but are not limited to:

- death or wounds due to a terrorist attack, mine or bomb disposal duty, direct or indirect fire, rescue duty, collision of an aircraft, vehicle or vessel, on the condition that

the occurrence is directly related to a hostile action;

- death or wounds as a direct result of friendly fire aimed at a hostile force or what is or was thought to be a hostile force;
- wounds that require not less than seven days of treatment in hospital, or an equivalent course of treatment, and that were caused by:
 - exposure to the elements as a consequence of an aircraft, vehicle or vessel being destroyed or disabled by a hostile action;
 - harsh treatment or neglect while a captive of a hostile force; or
 - use of nuclear, biological or chemical agents by a hostile force.
- death caused by:
 - exposure to the elements as a consequence of an aircraft, vehicle or vessel being destroyed or disabled by a hostile action;
 - harsh treatment or neglect while a captive of a hostile force, or
 - use of nuclear, biological or chemical agents by a hostile force; or
- mental disorders that are, based on a review by a qualified mental health care practitioner, directly attributable to a hostile or perceived hostile action.

Ineligible cases include but are not limited to:

- death or wounds due to exposure to the elements other than listed above, or caused by acts of God;
- death or wounds caused by an accident arising from their employment in a theatre of operations but were not directly attributable to a hostile action;
- death or wounds caused by disease; or
- death or wounds that were self-inflicted or caused by the victim's negligence.

DESCRIPTION

The Sacrifice Medal will be a circular silver medal, bearing:

on the obverse a contemporary effigy of Her Majesty The Queen wearing a Canadian diadem composed of alternating maple leaves and snowflakes circumscribed with the inscriptions "ELIZABETH II DEI GRATIA REGINA" and "CANADA", separated by small maple leaves and on the reverse a representation of the statue named "Canada"—which forms part of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial—facing right, overlooking the horizon with the inscription "SACRIFICE" appearing in the lower right half of the Medal.

The effigy of Her Majesty represents not only The Queen as Canada's Head of State (highlighted by the word CANADA and the maple leaves) and Head of the armed forces but also as the FONS HONORIS (the Fount of All Honours). The Queen is the only person who can create an official honour in Canada and all Canadian Honours are bestowed in Her name. The tradition generally followed since the mid-19th century has been to depict who the medal is from on the obverse, what the medal is for on the reverse and who the medal is for on the edge. The Statue "Canada", designed by architect Walter Seymour Allward as part of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial, symbolizes Canada, the mother of a nation grieving for her fallen. This saddened figure personifies the sorrow for the lives lost and broken by conflict and makes a connection with Vimy, acclaimed by many as the birthplace of the nation and one of the most important military engagements in Canadian history. She faces a large field representing the loneliness and isolation of mourning but also the future. The statue depicts the figure of a woman, hooded and cloaked, head heavy, with her eyes cast down and her chin resting on her hand. She holds some laurel branches in her right hand, symbol of peace, honour and sacrifice.



Obverse-Avers



Reverse-Revers

The medal is fitted with a straight suspension bar ornamented with the Royal Crown.

The ribbon is a watered ribbon, 32 mm wide, with a black central stripe (10 mm), flanked by red edges (11 mm each) centered on which are 1 mm white stripes. Black represents the mourning of the dead and the shock of the wounds, the red represent the blood that has been spilled and the white, the hope for a better future. Red and white are also the official colours of Canada as decreed by King George V in 1921.

The bar has a raised edge and bears a central maple leaf overall.

BAR(S)

A bar is awarded for further occasions which would have warranted award of the Medal.

WEARING

The Sacrifice Medal shall be worn in the sequence prescribed in the Canadian Orders, Decorations and Medals Directive, and in the following manner:

- On the left breast, suspended from the ribbon described above, between the Royal Victorian Medal and the Gulf and Kuwait Medal.

- One bar is worn centred on the ribbon; if multiple bars have been awarded, they shall be evenly spaced on the ribbon.
- Where the undress ribbon is worn, a silver maple leaf shall be worn centred on the ribbon of the Medal to indicate the award of a Bar, a gold maple leaf shall be worn to indicate the award of a second Bar, a red maple leaf shall be worn to indicate the award of a third Bar and a combination of these devices may be worn to indicate the award of more than three bars (e.g. a red maple leaf and a gold maple leaf representing 5 bars, etc).

POSTNOMINALS

The use of a post-nominal is not authorized for this medal.

HISTORICAL NOTES

Captain Carl Gauthier of the Directorate of Honours & Recognition and Cathy Bursey-Sabourin, Fraser Herald at the Canadian Heraldic Authority at the Chancellery of Honours, Rideau Hall, collaborated to create the design.

The Medal is made of Sterling Silver and lacquered to prevent tarnishing. It is manufactured by the Royal Canadian Mint.

The Medal is engraved on the edge with the service number, abbreviated substantive rank, initials and surname of military recipients and the forenames and name of civilian recipients.

The inaugural presentation ceremony will be held by the Governor General at Rideau Hall at a later date on which occasion Her Excellency will present the Medal to approximately 50 representative recipients. General distribution will follow with priority given to posthumous awards. There were an estimated 360 potential recipients at the time of the announcement of the creation of the medal.

Questions from the media and the public regarding the creation of this honour should be addressed to the Honours Information Officer at Rideau Hall.



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STATE FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN AND SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN

**Brigadier Raashid Wali Janjua, afwc, psc, ptsc
Pakistan Army**


The US policymakers regard failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan to be festering incubators of terrorism.

James A. Piazza

The above quotation sums up the Afghan situation most succinctly.

The failed state, being the harbinger of instability to neighbouring states, acts as a predator that is prone to both import as well as export of instability.

Such states suffer from coercive as well as administrative incapacity and do not measure up to Max Weber's definition of a modern nation state; i.e. "a state that can monopolize violence".¹ It has been empirically proved that states experiencing high degree of state failure are more prone to transnational terrorist attacks.² Afghanistan is an unfortunate victim that has been administered a generous dose of nostrums when it required panaceas. It earned the sobriquet of a "state sponsored by the terrorists"³ because of its internal politico-economic weaknesses. It has historically acted as a see-through black hole where the xenophobic atavism of its denizens competed with a semi-republican socio-political ethos of a tribal society. Notwithstanding scores of sociological studies (some of those predictive in nature), the absence of reliable, census-based data makes it very difficult to predict any fundamental change in the centuries old Afghan socio-political landscape.



Combat Camera IS2009-0042

A country famished of resources and enervated by nearly three decades of continual turmoil represents the quintessential failed state with large swathes of territory controlled by warlords and non state actors. The present Afghan government cannot extend its writ

beyond Kabul and is dependent upon International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces for the defence of Kabul as well. In the absence of a de facto central state control, the de jure jurisdiction becomes meaningless. In order to understand the nature and magnitude of security challenges to Pakistan due to Afghan state failure with a view to recommend viable countermeasures, it is apposite to postulate a thesis.

State failure in Afghanistan, characterized by weak governance, rampant corruption, lawlessness, ineffective counter insurgency effort, uncontrolled organized crime/drug trafficking, and failure to deliver basic services, presents a clear and present danger to Pakistan's security and stability. Pakistan's geographically contiguous provinces with Afghanistan, like the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, are beset with serious security challenges like insurgency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)/Swat, socioeconomic instability, drug proliferation, influx of refugees, and a most virulent strain of religiously inspired terrorism. Pakistan can counter these challenges through an astute combination of politico-economic and military strategy, supported by a national political consensus in sync with international counter terrorism/insurgency efforts.

The identification and analysis of the reasons for state failure in Afghanistan are deemed essential to understand the extent of state failure and its fallout on Pakistan. Areas that need to be focused are the reasons of weak governance, effete counter insurgency response, corruption in state institutions (police, judiciary and civil services), uncontrolled organized crime/drug trafficking, and ineffective reconstruction/development efforts. The impact on Pakistan and her consequent response needs to be highlighted by focusing on the political, social, economic, and military dimensions of the security challenges with a view to offer sustainable and comprehensive solutions. Before undertaking an analysis of the factors contributing towards state failure and their impact upon security situation in Pakistan, a historical tour d' horizon of the Afghan situation is deemed pertinent.

May God save you from the claws of Tiger, the venom of Cobra and the vengeance of Afghan.

(An ancient Pushto prayer)

Background: Pre 9/11 Phase

Afghanistan has been the abode of some of the most truculent and iconoclastic tribes of the world for several centuries. It remained a part of the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent and was controlled for some time by Sikh rulers of Punjab. After the defeat of the Sikhs and annexation of Punjab by the British colonial power, Afghanistan was thrice invaded by the British. The first military campaign by the British to subjugate Afghanistan ended in a humiliating defeat for the British with only a lone survivor, a medical officer, out of the complete British contingent of 4500, to tell the tale after first Anglo- Afghan War in 1842.⁴ In order to protect their British-Indian empire from the depredations of Afghans and the expansionist ambitions of Czarist Russia, the British forced the Afghan Government, after the Second Anglo- Afghan War (1878-80), to sign the Treaty of Gandamak, and got the border delimited between Afghanistan and British India.⁵ The border was delimited under Mortimer Durand in 1893 and was consequently called the "Durand Line".

The area on the British-Indian side between the Indus River and the Durand Line was named North West Frontier Province (NWFP) by British Viceroy Lord Curzon in 1901. The area in the North West, starting from Chitral in the north to Dera Ismael Khan in south, was converted into a tribal area approximately the size of Belgium.⁶ The British accorded a special status to the area since they never expected to extract revenue from there and instead wanted it as a buffer zone or protective shield to preserve their imperial possessions. They instituted a draconian law i.e., "Frontier Crimes Regulation" (FCR), to control the refractory tribes. The legal status of the area was kept unchanged even after Pakistan's independence from British colonial rule. Law and order was enforced by a lightly armed militia called "Frontier Constabulary" supported by police in settled districts. The Army was kept in the selected cantonments as a force of last resort.

Constitutionally, the federally administered tribal area (FATA) of Pakistan enjoys semi-autonomous status and is directly administered by the President of Pakistan through the Governor of NWFP, who represents the Federal Government. FATA has traditionally been ruled by bureaucratic fiat and a restrictive FCR which is a kind of anachronism in this age of democracy.⁷ The area is inhabited by 61 fiercely independent and iconoclastic tribes who are deeply conservative and xenophobic in outlook. It constitutes one of the most inhospitable terrains in the world, where monitoring of cross-border movement is extremely difficult. Since British times certain "Easement Rights" have been given to the tribesmen on both sides of the border as a compensation for the arbitrary division of tribal lands and concomitant social dislocation. These rights are still in place and are availed by the people of FATA and Afghanistan for cross-border movement. Notwithstanding the actual purpose, the miscreants on both sides of the border exploit them for their own sinister ends.



Combat Camera IS2009-0045

Despite being a "terra incognita" compared to the rest of the country, the area actually behaved like a "terra firma" in the absence of a major destabilizing catalyst, where tribes lived a semi primordial life according to their tribal code and traditions. The "entente cordiale" between a stoic people leading a frugal life under a colonial style bureaucracy continued without a glitch until 1979 when these areas began to be used as a staging post for anti-Soviet resistance by the Pakistan Government with active support of the USA and other countries like Saudi Arabia. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored Jihad (Holy Struggle) attracted a polyglot group of religiously indoctrinated zealots from the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. Osama bin Ladin was one such Jihadi who participated in the guerrilla struggle as a CIA protégé. A string of religious seminaries opened up, financed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and USA, and charged with the mission to provide religious indoctrination to potential Jihadis. This set the process of a rise of religious leaders as the local power brokers supplanting the traditional tribal leadership structures like the age old Malik system.⁸

The Soviet occupation and influx of refugees from Afghanistan brought about a complete transformation in the region. The use of religious ideology as a leaven to bind the fractious tribes in a common band against communism brought these simple-minded feral warriors in close touch with an atavistic and puritanical creed of religious militancy with transnational appeal.⁹ A network of religious seminaries was created that would act as nurseries for subsequent Taliban. The six long years of Afghan Jihad militarized the area with a surfeit of weapons, making the job of law enforcement agencies extremely difficult.

The erstwhile “Mujahideen” or the “Holy Fighters”, who were once exalted as the “moral equivalent of founding fathers of America”, were jettisoned precipitately by their American mentors soon after the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. The sudden abandonment of Afghanistan by the USA resulted in a political vacuum that was exploited by Afghan warlords. When their infighting and depredations became intolerable, a group of teachers and students from religious seminaries arose from Kandahar and swept Afghanistan like a tornado. They were known as Taliban or “the seekers of knowledge.” They established initial order, but were led into a trap by foreign militants with cash to bankroll an insolvent state, and an ideology to inspire a universal concept of transnational jihad.

Post 9/11 Phase

The events of 9/11 and the Taliban Government's refusal to hand over Osama bin Ladin to the USA proved its undoing. The Northern Alliance (NA) a group of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara warlords were bonded together by the CIA to invade Kabul. According to ex-Director of the CIA George Tenet, “the NA had been nurtured for years by Pakistan's mortal enemies the Indians and the Russians”.¹⁰ The US covert teams comprising 90 CIA paramilitary officers, along with a small number of Special Forces' personnel, combined with Afghan militias to defeat the Taliban in less than two and a half months¹¹. They achieved this feat with overwhelming precision aerial bombardment directed by ground based covert operations teams. The crucial role played by Pakistan as a US ally on the war on terrorism brought it in direct confrontation with Al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban, who fomented an insidious insurgency in Afghanistan in collusion with their sympathizers in Pakistan's FATA region and some settled districts of North West Province.



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Pakistan's FATA region had already become a seedbed of radicalism, a veritable tinderbox vulnerable to a matchstick. This had happened slowly over two decades. One of the chief reasons for this environment was the non-reintegration of the ex-Mujahideen fighters who had remained true to their old vocation by offering services for jihad in Indian-held Kashmir. The security compulsions of Pakistan led to a tolerance of militancy as an expedient response to her security dilemma. The emergence of the Taliban as a political entity in Afghanistan invested these radicalized elements with visions of “Pan Islamicism” with religion as a supra-national entity sanctioning linkages with Taliban polity.

The Afghan Taliban and other resistance groups managed to recover from their initial collapse to organize an armed resistance against the US-installed Afghan Government in Kabul. The resistance acted as a role model for Pakistan-based radicalized foreign militants and their Pakistani sympathizers, who viewed Pakistan's support to coalition forces as an egregious sin. The Pakistan Army's efforts to quell the insurgency led to a further exacerbation of tensions that resulted in spread of insurgency to areas like Dir, Bajour, and Swat in addition to North and South Waziristan. The rise in Taliban insurgency was facilitated by the US decision to change the "schwerpunkt" of war on terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq. The state failure in Afghanistan resulted in enhanced cross border movement of militants, criminals, drug traffickers, and arms smugglers that further destabilized Pakistan's FATA as well as some settled districts of NWFP.

State Failure in Afghanistan—Causes and Indicators

In order to develop a clear understanding of the impact of Afghan state failure on Pakistan, it is necessary to understand the factors that contributed towards failure of the state in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's roller coaster political transition, from a stable constitutional monarchy under King Zahir Shah to an unstable democracy followed by a Soviet backed quasi communist regime, had rendered the state extremely fragile and vulnerable. The anarchy of the post-Soviet withdrawal and the repressive Taliban rule had left the country bereft of institutions and centralized authority that an ineffective Afghan government, headed by President Karzai, has not been able to resuscitate. The tragedy of the present state of Afghanistan is that all initiatives to develop institutions and infrastructure like the "London Compact"¹² and "Interim Development Strategy" foundered on the rocks of the poor security situation. All aspects of stability envisioned in the "London Compact," i.e. security, governance, reconstruction, and narcotics control, have remained far short of the desired targets.

The Afghanistan war was primarily conceived as a counter-terrorism operation without any nation-building and reconstruction strategy.¹³ The US eagerness to open a second front against terrorism in Iraq relegated Afghanistan to a lower-priority undertaking. Resource diversion towards the Iraq war badly hit US counter terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, as personnel from the CIA, Delta Force, Navy Seals and Special Forces elements in 2002-3 were diverted to Iraq¹⁴. The remnants of the Taliban staged a comeback in 2002 in the southern as well as eastern provinces due to weak writ of government and lawlessness spawned by government sponsored warlords. The factors that led to Taliban resurgence include insufficient troops deployed in insurgency-prone regions, and restrictive rules of engagement by NATO/ISAF. The Taliban resistance that began in 2002 metamorphosed into an insurgency in 2006¹⁵. According to Seth G Jones, "the number of suicide attacks went up from 27 to 139, remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1677 and armed attacks tripled from 1558 to 4542."¹⁶ Before dilating on the manifestation and causes of state failure, it is apposite to cite a few failings of US/NATO/ISAF counter-insurgency efforts. According to a perceptive analyst of the Afghan situation, despite the role of foreign sponsors the insurgency would not have become anything more than an annoyance had it not been able to exploit the intrinsic weakness of the Afghan state.¹⁷ The ideologically motivated Taliban filled in the vacuum along with tribes and local warlords in the absence of a strong state.¹⁸ A perceptive analyst of the Afghan insurgency has rightly concluded that it was Afghan government's inability to provide essential services that marginalized the population and created a window of opportunity for insurgents.¹⁹

According to Venda Felbab, "the post conflict Afghanistan had the lowest ratio of international peacekeeping troops to population as compared to other post conflict regions despite several heavily armed warlords."²⁰ The NATO led International Security Force (ISAF) comprises 53,000 soldiers. The countries contributing to the thirty-nine member coalition, besides the US and with the exception of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, operate under extremely restrictive rules of engagement or caveats that hamstringing their efficacy to counter the insurgency. Some of the caveats are as ludicrous as an inability to move after sunset and fighting in snow.²¹

The insufficiency of troops was brought to the fore by United States President George Bush during a NATO conference at Bucharest where he sought commitments for more troops by NATO members.²² The number of ISAF troops in Afghanistan was one third the number employed in Iraq “despite Afghanistan being twice the size of Iraq”.²³ The paucity of troops, vis à vis growing insurgency was encapsulated epigrammatically by a British commander who likened the situation to “Mowing the lawn that grows right back after a short interval”.²⁴ According to General James L. Jones “the coalition forces also suffered from overlapping of mandate and lack of unity of command.” He also “regarded 71 listed caveats as the operational cancer of NATO”.²⁵

The state failure of Afghanistan is borne out by the independent assessments of several think tanks. The Brookings institution ranks Afghanistan as the second weakest state amongst a total of 141.²⁶ The report analyzes the political, security and social indicators to establish the weakness quotient of states. The political indicators assess government’s accountability to the citizen, the rule of law, a corruption index and ability of bureaucracy to function independently. The security indicators focus on human rights abuses, physical security of citizens, and effects of violent conflict on population. The social indicators measure the state of basic human needs of citizen (i.e. nutrition), health, education, and access to clean water/sanitation.²⁷ According to the “Failed States Index” of the US Fund for Peace, Afghanistan figures seventh on the list of 60 weakest states of the world.²⁸

Dr Robert I. Rotberg, Director of the Belfer Center’s “Program on Interstate Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution” at Harvard University, concludes that state weakness is principally a consequence of ‘enduring conflict and human insecurity’.²⁹ Afghanistan has also been regarded as the most insecure state of the world, besides being the second-weakest state in the world.³⁰ Despite spending \$1.63 billion (US) on thirty-seven projects by the World Bank since 2002, “13% of Afghans have access to safe drinking water, 12% to adequate sanitation and 6% to electricity. 70% of the population is food insecure and only 40% of schools have buildings.”³¹

The weak governance of Afghanistan fuelled the insurgency and was a consequence of the wrong approach by the US government regarding nation-building and political stability of Afghanistan. President George Bush displayed a disdain for nation building by asserting that “US troops ought to be employed for fighting and winning wars.”³² According to George Friedman the Americans did not pay adequate attention to the vital task of government formation and rebuilding of Afghanistan right from the start of planning phase. “They neither had the resources nor the will to accomplish these tasks.”³³ Renowned Afghan analyst Ahmed Rashid states that, “it was unstated US strategy to leave Karzai ineffectual in the capital protected by foreign forces while relying on warlords to keep American influence in the countryside. It was a minimalist military intelligence driven strategy that ignored nation building and creation of state institutions.”³⁴

Currently, there are two insurgencies, the first led by Afghan Taliban in Kandahar and the second in eastern provinces led by a loose confederation of groups like Al Qaeda, Hizb-e- Islami, Gulbadin Hikmatyar and some Pakistan based non-state actors like Jaish-e- Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayabba and Tehrik-e- Nifaz-e- Shariat-e- Muhammadi. According to a report to US Congress in 2008, “the strength of the Taliban-led insurgency in Kandahar lies in its ability to regenerate combat power by leveraging tribal networks exploiting lack of governance and Afghan people’s inherent resistance to change.”³⁵ According to the same report, the principal vulnerability of both the insurgencies lies in their restrictive imposition of a medieval brand of religious code and failure to provide a modern sustainable mode of governance. Interestingly, the perceived vulnerability of the enemy has turned into US/ NATO’s own susceptibility due to the inability of the Afghan government to perform the basic functions of a state. The vacuum is being adroitly exploited by the Taliban through asymmetric warfare. An increased number of IED attacks (i.e. 2615 in 2007) is a clear example of the above.³⁶ These attacks have seriously curtailed the liberty of action of combat as well as the nation building echelons of the coalition.

Due to a failure of the bureaucracy, police, Afghan National Army and judiciary, the Afghan population, especially the rural segment, has become increasingly alienated and vulnerable to the propaganda of the Taliban. This has resulted in a public disenchantment with the government. A deeply conservative population that is left to fend for itself in a welter of lawlessness and human deprivation is fair game for the religious militants' propaganda apparatus. The failure of NATO/ISAF troops to operate without heavy reliance on airpower is leading towards a spiral of revulsion among the civil population due to their heavy casualties.³⁷ A total number of 3400 civilians died between October 2001 and March 2002 due to aerial attacks of US and NATO forces.³⁸ The 577 civilian deaths in Afghanistan due to US/NATO and Afghan air and ground actions in 2008 alone speak volumes about the civilian travails.³⁹

Most of the bureaucracy and government appointees in the provinces comprise either the local strongmen or their relatives. Of the first group of thirty-two provincial governors appointed in 2002, at least twenty were militia commanders and warlords.⁴⁰ In the presence of such elements it is easy to imagine the prevalence of corruption and misappropriation of development funds. There is a pervasive lawlessness with most of the highways connecting urban and rural centers under the control of militants who have made kidnapping for ransom a major source of their revenue.⁴¹ Up till September 2008, some "30 humanitarian aid workers had been killed and 90 abducted".⁴² Under these conditions, it is not difficult to imagine why development work has been virtually halted in rural areas.



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The Afghan police is poorly trained, unmotivated, and steeped in corruption. Out of 433 Afghanistan National Police units, "zero are fully capable, 3% are capable with coalition support, 4% are only partially capable and 77% are not capable at all."⁴³ The Afghan Defence Minister had recommended an increase of the police force from the current strength of 55,000 to 150,000.⁴⁴ Afghan police ratio (i.e. 180/100,000) is lowest in the region which needs to be raised to 250/100,000.⁴⁵ The quality of the manpower recruited for the police duties leaves much to be desired. Human Rights Watch, a US based watchdog group, issued a statement in May 2008 asking "President Hamid Karzai to stop appointing former human rights abusers as law enforcement officers".⁴⁶ The Afghan Border Police (ABP) is also poorly equipped and short of manpower. Resultantly the drug runners, arms smugglers, and criminals operate with total freedom.⁴⁷

The poor state of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is evidenced by a report in "The Herald." According to one article, "less than half of ANA's British and US trained soldiers

have chosen to re enlist after three years in uniform.”⁴⁸ The efficacy of an army that can hardly operate without its embedded trainers can be gauged by the fact that so far only one combat battalion (kandaq) can operate independently.⁴⁹ The ANA's helplessness in combating militants is evidenced by a recent Taliban attack in which they claim to have killed 30 members of the ANA travelling on Kandahar Helmand highway.⁵⁰ Though the Afghan Ministry of Defence desired a 200,000 strong ANA,⁵¹ it was very difficult under current conditions to even raise it to a level of 70,000 as planned by the coalition and the Afghan government.



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The condition of the Afghan judiciary also presents a sorry spectacle. Most of the judges are appointed due to political linkages and only 20% are qualified for the job⁵². Judges are tainted with corruption and incompetence. The appointments of judges are usually made upon political considerations and the recommendations of the warlords. According to a World Bank report, Afghanistan is in the bottom 1% of the world as far as the rule of law is concerned.⁵³ The emasculated judiciary poses no challenge to the depredations of criminals who spawn a culture of violence in cahoots with militants. As a result the people, especially in rural areas, have no option but to turn to informal justice mechanisms.⁵⁴

Since the fall of Taliban the incidence of kidnapping for ransom, drug abuse, violent crime and smuggling has increased manifold.⁵⁵ US had allied itself with warlords like Rashid Dostum, Ismael Khan, Hazrat Ali, Muhammad Fahim and Gul Agha Shirazi. These are men with known violent past and were used as a countervailing force against Taliban.⁵⁶ Despite such expedient alliances, the Taliban have been sedulously extending their influence over most of Afghanistan. A prime reason for such a rise in influence is the establishment of strongholds with public support in Afghanistan's rural areas.⁵⁷ The above data gives lie to the fact that the Afghan insurgency's focus lies inside the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Without understanding the underlying reasons for the motivation of the insurgents, the US and the coalition's focus appears to have turned towards a military, technological solution, the indubitable nemesis of a sound counter insurgency strategy. The insurgents' motivation springs from core religious beliefs that the terrorists have tapped into with great skill in the absence of a government that could provide security, political stability and socio-economic development. The failure to employ an efficacious nation-building approach feeds into a public disenchantment that wooed people towards the insurgents.⁵⁸ The opportunity to win

the peace after winning the war was lost, due to an inadequate attention to nation-building and reconstruction strategy; the veritable “deus ex machina” in every counter-insurgency effort.⁵⁹

The insurgency inside Afghanistan gets sustenance through its financial resources. In addition to external funding, the bulk of finances by insurgents are being generated through drug money. It is an interesting fact that under the repressive Taliban regime the poppy production had slumped to 185 tons in 2001 which climbed up to 8200 tons in 2007.⁶⁰ Afghanistan supplies world's 93% of the heroin and the Taliban garner revenue by taxing poppy farmers and smuggling heroin. There are around 920,000 users of illicit drugs in Afghanistan representing 8% of the adult population. President Karzai's inability to control his brother's drug dealings is an incentive for criminal mafia. His government's seriousness in combating corruption is evidenced by the appointment of Mr Izzatullah Wasifi as head of country's anti corruption administration, a person who was convicted for selling heroin.⁶¹

Now, as the country is awash in drug money and illegal arms, NATO/ISAF has failed to develop an ideological counter-point to the Taliban. In 2007, a total of 137 suicide attacks led to 1730 casualties compared to 141 attacks and 1100 casualties in 2006.⁶² There have been 1445 civilian casualties till mid September 2008, a 40% increase over the same period in 2007.⁶³ International troops were held responsible for 577 deaths, 395 of those caused by air strikes.⁶⁴ With insurgents in full control of Southern and Eastern provinces, President Hamid Karzai's influence hardly extends beyond Kabul, a fact corroborated by NATO's refusal to hand over defence of Kabul to him.⁶⁵

Hobbled by his puppet status and frustrated due to an abject state failure, President Karzai and former Northern Alliance members are refusing to bring Afghan opposition on board and persist with their metronomic accusations about Pakistan's inability to stop cross-border movement of Taliban members.⁶⁶ The scenario is fraught with serious security repercussions both for Afghanistan and Pakistan if the “March of Folly” continues. After gaining an insight into causes and manifestations of Afghan state failure, it is deemed pertinent to have a peep into its impact on Pakistan.

Security Challenges for Pakistan

The security environment in FATA was vitiated due to Pakistan's support to coalition operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan's support for the US-led war on terrorism infuriated the religious militants and Taliban sympathizers who started networking in an anti-coalition resistance using Pakistan's territory as a base. The armed militants outmatched the tribal chiefs who could not stand up to them due to a religiously charged atmosphere. The militants in FATA have killed approximately 120 tribal chiefs on charges of being Pakistani and American sympathizers.⁶⁷ The reasons for the present state of extremism, terrorism and violent insurgency include the failure to reintegrate the ex Mujahideen after the ouster of Soviets, failure to improve the socio economic conditions, loose writ of government and an anachronistic political exclusion of the people.

The slow but sure groundswell of sympathy for the Taliban resulted in coalescing around forty disparate militant commanders into a loosely organized resistance organization called “Tehrik-e-Taliban”.⁶⁸ The influence of the Afghan insurgency on Pakistani Taliban can be understood through the history of ideological affinity between the two. Around 60,000 Pakistani Taliban from religious seminaries called “Madressahs” had fought alongside Afghan Taliban in the 1990s during the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ In 2007, a Taliban spring offensive in Afghanistan increased violence in Waziristan as well as the capital city of Islamabad, where red mosque clerics openly challenged the government writ.⁷⁰ By the end of winter of 2007, the level of violence in Afghanistan's eastern provinces was down by 40% because the Taliban were concentrating all their efforts on destabilizing Pakistan.⁷¹

The Pakistan Army has deployed 112,000 troops in FATA and has conducted over 100 operations so far, losing over 1200 lives.⁷² The state of casualties and apprehensions

is given at Annex B. The insurgency earlier confined to FATA has also spread to Swat in the NWFP where approximately three divisions of Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps are battling the insurgents. There are reports of a regular influx of foreign militants from Central Asia especially from Tajikistan and Kunar/Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan. According to some reports around 3000 Afghan Taliban are hiding in Orakzai agency, the presence of which has resulted in the local tribe Alizai's declaration of war against them.⁷³

The uncontrolled Afghan insurgency has led to a continual rise in the acts of terrorism and violence in Pakistan. The acts of terrorism in Pakistan by Al Qaeda/Taliban militants have so far consumed 11,129 innocent lives.⁷⁴ In the first nine months of 2008, there have been 683 bomb blasts resulting in 4141 casualties. The state of casualties has been on continual rise, with "189, 863, 648, 1471, 3599 and 4141 (to date) casualties in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008".⁷⁵ The insurgency in Pakistan's tribal areas gets sustenance from a ready supply of drug money, arms, and manpower from Afghanistan. The bandwagon effect of the insurgency in FATA has started encouraging recourse to violence by ethno-cultural particularists in Balochistan. The insurgency is also a role model for radicalized religious and sectarian elements. The Red Mosque episode in Islamabad, where religious zealots openly challenged government's writ, is a case in point.⁷⁶

The polarization of society is being imperceptibly brought about due to a wave of sympathy for militants generated through regular civilian casualties from collusion air strikes. The antipathy for US actions and suspicion about her motives is running deep and pervasive in Pakistani society due to past US actions, such as leaving Afghanistan in the lurch after Soviet withdrawal, the inability to help resolve the Kashmir dispute, cutting off arms supplies to Pakistan during 1965 Indo-Pak war, and her growing strategic relationship with India. The US has also been accused of supporting terrorist organizations like Jandullah using Pakistani territory as a base.⁷⁷ A vast majority of Pakistanis also view America as a country driven by imperial ambitions and a global anti-Muslim Jewish agenda. The dominant view in the Pakistan's government and armed forces circles about the US promotion of Indian ambitions in Afghanistan, as driven by a Jewish agenda of denuclearization of the only Muslim nuclear power, is also not helping the matters.⁷⁸ Though a return to representative rule in Pakistan has resulted in political stability, the situation is still fraught with risks due to expedient partisan politics by opposition parties.⁷⁹ The right wing-dominated national print and electronic media is also chary and suspicious of US motives in the war on terrorism.

Due to polarization in society on the issue of war on terrorism, the armed forces and the government run the risk of losing public support. There is divisiveness and confusion in the Pakistani population regarding the US war on terrorism, due to which, until recent past, it was in a state of veritable denial about the gravity of the threat. A large majority under the influence of pervasive anti-Americanism believes that the Taliban's acts of terrorism are not inspired by political ambitions of ideologically driven obscurantists, but a natural response to US occupation of Afghanistan. This thinking, in large measure, has been responsible for a lack of public support in the past for the war on terrorism, resulting in a tardy and ambivalent government response to an existential threat to national security.⁸⁰ The badly needed national consensus is regrettably being continually eroded, due to civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Pakistan's FATA region.

Though the rise of religious militancy has disrupted the traditional social structure in FATA, the majority of people do not consider religious parties as the solution to their problems. 86% of the FATA residents believe that blowing up music shops and the girls' schools is not fair.⁸¹ In the general mayhem around FATA is this silent majority, wallowing in poverty and deprivation that needs to be rescued from the clutches of militancy. Pakistan has to contend with a hostile Afghan government, primarily due to elements of ex-Northern Alliance out to seek personal vendettas. India, unfortunately, instead of acting as a stabilizing factor has also started fishing in troubled waters. The opening of six consulates along Pak-Afghan border is being construed as an attempt to create a two-front threat situation for Pakistan. The role of Iran has also come in for a lot of criticism in the context of support to ethnic separatists in Balochistan.⁸² Iran views Pak-US cooperation with trepidation, a reason that has kept it estranged from Pakistan.

Pakistan is facing an energy crisis that is getting worse, due to growing consumer demand. The economic meltdown that is being prognosticated by the economic Cassandras is going to be a consequence of rising energy costs and concomitant shortage, if it ever comes about. The most economical gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan, which was being actively considered as a project in 2001, has been in limbo due to security situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan can act as the veritable geographical pivot of Eurasia in South Asia, linking it with West Asia.⁸³ It cannot actualize its above potential due to instability in Afghanistan. An example is the Gwadar port that was expected to serve as a strategic outlet for Central Asian energy exports and trade but has remained under developed due to intractable Afghan conflict.

The economic effects of drug proliferation in Afghanistan and the country's two million refugees also weigh heavily in these straitened economic circumstances. The number of drug addicts is increasing 7% annually, leading to a rise in crime. Thirty-six percent of total drug supply passes through Pakistan, a fact that portends an insidious symbiosis between crime syndicates and drug smugglers.⁸⁴ The drug money has financed criminals and smugglers besides acting as a lifeline for ethnic and sectarian particularists.⁸⁵ And the impact of this activity near Pakistan's border has aggravated Pakistan's problems, a fact evidenced by the UNODC's report regarding cultivation of 70% of Afghanistan's opium in five Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.⁸⁶



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Pakistan is still saddled with two million Afghan refugees who are reluctant to move back to Afghanistan due to the worsening security situation there. After 2001, there was another movement of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan that further complicated the repatriation of refugees. The costs of maintaining the refugees include environmental degradation, depletion of renewable energy resources, and a rise in crime.⁸⁷ In addition to the Afghan refugees, the government has been burdened with the cost of maintaining 19,000 internally displaced people from FATA.⁸⁸

The organized crime and lawlessness in Afghanistan have encouraged similar activities in adjoining Pakistani territories in FATA and Swat. Criminal activities like kidnapping for ransom are also on the rise. The criminal activities of tribal strongmen like Mangal Bagh and Haji Namdar in Khyber Agency of FATA bore a very strong resemblance to warlords of Afghanistan and had to be checked by a military operation by Frontier Corps.⁸⁹

Encouraged by the vigilante actions of Afghan warlords, the local clerics like Mufti Munir Shakir (Lashkar-e Islam) and Pir Saif-ur-Rehman (Ansar-ul-Islam) began a turf war near Peshawar, the provincial capital of NWFP, which had to be dealt through force by Pakistani law enforcement agencies. In Swat which was known as a tourist paradise until the recent past, Maulvi Fazal-ullah carved out a fiefdom terrorizing local population and kidnapping foreigners. The modus operandi, motivation and stratagems of such criminal activities were copied chapter and verse from the Afghan criminal gangs.⁹⁰ The unchecked crime in Afghanistan needs to be controlled by Afghan government and NATO/ISAF/US forces before it is metastasized into a social cancer in both countries.

The economic cost to Pakistan due to the backlash of terrorism is considerable. This is a consequence of strong support to international coalition in countering terrorism in Afghanistan by the Pakistani government and the armed forces. The Marriot Hotel bombing in Islamabad is a clear example of terrorists' attempts at weakening the anti-terrorism resolve of the nation. After the Marriot Hotel bombing by the terrorists in Islamabad on 20 September 2008, the volume of trading in shares plummeted to an all time low of 2.67 million on 26 September from 4.309 million on 19 September 2008. The low investor confidence and stagnant foreign investment bodes ill for an economy struggling to find its feet.⁹¹ The losses to business, tourism, and industrial activity in NWFP are staggering. The foreign exchange earnings due to tourism went down in the first six months of 2008 by 8%.⁹² Organized criminal activities like kidnapping for ransom are also on the rise. The frequent kidnapping of Chinese engineers have led to halt in several development and mining projects.

Pakistan's Response

In order to counter the above security challenges arising out of the Afghan situation, an efficacious political response at the national and international level is de rigueur. Tardiness and ambivalence due to lack of national consensus in combating terrorism and insurgency should now be a relic of the past in the presence of a genuinely representative government with a liberal outlook. At the international level, the resolution of all outstanding issues with India, especially the Kashmir conflict, needs to be pursued vigorously and sincerely. An entente cordiale between the two nuclear-armed countries is the surest sign of peace and stability, in the absence of which the region shall remain hostage to an arms race, nuclear proliferation and adversarial politics. The success of peace efforts is contingent upon the maturity of the political leadership of both countries and the sincere interest of the international community.

Pakistan needs to adopt a sustainable liberal and pluralistic polity based upon the strength of institutions and a true democratic culture. The grandiose strategic notions, like strategic depth, need to be shelved in favour of a cooperative engagement with all neighbouring countries including India. The reorientation of national security and foreign policy should be accompanied by a commitment to renounce proxy warfare through militant outfits.⁹³ There is an urgent need to forge a consensus against religious extremism and ethno-sectarian particularism by taking all political parties on board. The politicians should be charged with the responsibility of galvanizing their constituents against forces of extremism feeding into terrorism.⁹⁴ A liberal and pluralistic polity aimed at strengthening the federation through a correct balance between the powers of provinces and centre should be sedulously cultivated. The institution building and distributive justice should be the credo of national polity that should help present a united front against internal and external threats. The political consensus should get translated into a clear policy direction to evolve a comprehensive national anti terrorism strategy.

The geopolitical dividend Pakistan enjoyed due to its geostrategic location has been compromised because of Al Queda's control of Pakistani Taliban.⁹⁵ Along with military response, political integration of the region has become a compulsion for Pakistan. The anachronistic status of FATA needs to be abolished and the region merged with NWFP

through extension of political parties and judicial acts to all tribal areas. The political integration shall finish the enclaves of lawlessness where all criminals seek refuge claiming immunity from the law of the land. It is time these enclaves of instability were wooed away from a primitive medievalism masquerading as a time honoured highland warrior code.

On the social plane, the soft power of the state needs to be marshalled in support of the war on terrorism. The media, with pro militant sympathies, needs to be firmly weaned away from an irrational advocacy of extremism through a combination of persuasion and reprisals. In addition, the most powerful motivational tool in society (i.e., the moderate religious scholars) should be co-opted in the struggle against extremism. The state should sponsor such scholars and help in dissemination of their moderate views to counter the pernicious influence of hate material of extremists. The orchestration of US soft power, in line with its declared policy of reaching out to the voice of reason the world over, should be ensured to win over moderate religious scholars in the ranks of Taliban.⁹⁶ The fountainhead of Muslim radicalism in South Asia (i.e. Deoband seminary's recent edict against terrorism) should be propagated as a paradigm shift in Muslim concept of jihad.⁹⁷ The religious seminaries that indoctrinate an individual into extremism need to be monitored and reformed. Pakistan can attain all the above objectives despite the pervasive instability, provided the government displays a consistent resolve for their achievement.



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In order to isolate the incorrigible militants, a general amnesty should be offered to the more amenable segment and negotiations held to conclude sustainable peace agreements. Care should be taken that the agreements are conducted on government terms and are enforceable. The fate of previous peace talks with the militants' (i.e. Ladha in 2004, Sarorogha in 2005, North Waziristan in 2006 and Swat in 2008) should be kept in perspective.⁹⁸ A strategy to marginalize the most violent factions of the militants needs to be assiduously followed. A similar strategy should be replicated in Afghanistan by US/ISAF in order to "dry the swamp that breeds militancy".⁹⁹ Unenforceable and expedient deals that achieve nothing except temporary reprieve for the militants should be eschewed as a matter of policy.

The military action against insurgents in FATA and Swat needs to be undertaken with full vigour by the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps in order to sanitize the areas of their presence. The local tribes like Salarzai in Bajaur and Alizai in Orakzai that have evinced a desire to fight the insurgents should be coopted in a proper plan with the regular forces.¹⁰⁰ The military operations should be carried out in synchronization with US intelligence and coalition forces. Aerial attacks and predator strikes should only be executed on the request of Pakistan Army in order to avoid accidental friendly fire and the civilian casualties. The Pakistan Army needs to enhance its force quantum to make a quick impact in insurgent controlled areas. Operations would be time consuming and slow but need to be followed with determination. In addition to conventional attacks and raids, the insurgents' leadership should be targeted, backed up by effective intelligence inputs, through Special Operation Forces.



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An indirect approach strategy needs to be adopted wherein the sources of logistics and finances are choked through combined US- Pakistan covert operations. This, however, is a difficult undertaking given the state of drug trafficking, lawlessness, and insurgency in Afghanistan. It however, should be noted that through use of the military instrument, the insurgency can be managed but not entirely eradicated. The political instrument that is vital to complement the gains of the military instrument, however, is hamstrung due to destabilizing political vacuum and weak governance in Afghanistan.

Since the Afghan insurgency and state failure directly impact upon insurgency in FATA, it is necessary for US/NATO to increase the quantum of combat and nation building resources. According to Carl Robichaud, "the per capita expenditure on stability in Afghanistan, i.e.. \$57, was the lowest compared to other such operations like \$679 for Bosnia, \$526 for Kosovo and \$233 for East Timor."¹⁰¹ The insurgency on the east of Pak-Afghan border cannot be stamped out if it remains uncontrolled on the western side. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to share the responsibility to control cross border movement by deploying optimum necessary troops to survey the border. The disparity in deployed resources (i.e. over 1000 Pakistan posts vis a vis 100 Afghan posts) needs to be addressed.¹⁰²

The socio-economic development of FATA should be undertaken as per the needs and aspirations of the people of FATA. An overriding craving for education in the region needs

to be assuaged.¹⁰³ The provincial government of NWFP should expedite the initiation and implementation of all development plans, e.g. a \$2 billion Sustainable Development Fund for FATA that could not be earlier implemented. The funding from the Islamic states in the Gulf and their participation in the development works should be explored, and these might sit well with the religious sensibilities of the deeply conservative population of FATA.¹⁰⁴

The challenge of drug trafficking through Pakistan can be countered through greater funding for counter-narcotics efforts and the strengthening of border control/surveillance. The anti-drug measures have to be synchronized with international drug control efforts. Stricter checks at ports, airports, and border check-posts should be ensured by employing modern equipment. Pakistan needs international help to build the capacity of its law enforcement and drug control organization to block the drug flow chain emanating from Afghanistan. A hundred percent success in this endeavour is, however, a questionable proposition without dealing effectively with the drug proliferation in Afghanistan.

The economic cost of the Afghan situation, FATA insurgency, and sporadic acts of terrorism to Pakistan, can be minimized through a determined pursuance of an anti terrorism strategy backed by a national consensus. Investor confidence can be restored by special protection arrangements for business and financial centers. The losses to tourism, business, and industry in NWFP are a direct consequence of insurgency and terrorism. The speed of revival of business and industrial activity shall be directly proportional to the efficacy of the counter insurgency efforts. Novel incentives like Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) in FATA, with tax concessions, can only be brought to fruition in a secure environment. Without munificent and sustained economic support by international community, however, no meaningful development in FATA can take place.

There is a requirement of improving the coordination between US/NATO/ISAF, the Afghan government, and Pakistan in several aspects like border control, counter narcotics, intelligence sharing, and conduct of counter-insurgency operations. For optimizing the counter insurgency response, the capacity-building of Pakistan's army and paramilitary forces should be accorded top priority.

Pakistan, as well as coalition members, should fully understand that without winning the hearts and minds of the population, the support base of Afghan's insurgency will never be reduced. Holsti's idea, that the population can only be won over by a genuinely representative government, enjoying vertical as well as horizontal legitimacy, holds good for government in Kabul.¹⁰⁵ Eradication of corruption, good governance, and delivery of basic services to population are the prerequisites to win the public support. Crime and drugs, the two chief financiers of insurgents, need to be tackled with missionary zeal through combined efforts of Afghan Army/Police and US/NATO forces.

Since the insurgencies on both sides of the Pak/Afghan border are interlinked, the responses should be interlinked. It was Afghanistan where the insurgency first started before destabilizing Pakistan's tribal areas, and it is there that it was supposed to end first. Similarly all the partners in war on terrorism should understand that a simultaneous engagement of corrigible militants amongst the Taliban ranks should be carried out in Afghanistan as well as FATA. The political engagement of Taliban should preferably be carried out in Afghanistan. Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations Special Representative for Afghanistan, acknowledged his inability to win over the Taliban in 2002 and 2003 as his biggest mistake.¹⁰⁶ The Afghan officials who criticized the Pakistan Government for peace deals with tribal militants were quite supportive of a similar deal in Helmand's Musa Qila between Taliban and NATO forces.¹⁰⁷ Following a three-tiered broad strategy to deal with security challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan is recommended:

Tier 1—Political engagement with corrigible militants

Tier 2—Counter insurgency operations against incorrigible militants

Tier 3—Comprehensive nation building and reconstruction

Some writers have argued that the antidote to the current insurgency and instability is the revival of centuries old tribal social and power structures.¹⁰⁸ While denigrating the deification of tribal iconoclasm by Western scholars as “Victorian Pulp Fiction”, these writers cannot help falling in the same pitfall of projecting a fossilized culture as a panacea for all ills. All stake holders in the Afghan game must understand that the wounded tribal structure, medieval in practice and precept, had become effete even prior to rise of Islamic radicalism. That the Islamic radicalism has supplanted that structure is testament to the bankruptcy of intellectual vision of those social engineers who misdirected the social capital of a population, struggling to find a new meaning to its existence, towards religious obscurantism.



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Pakistan's security milieu has been intertwined with the Afghan situation since 1979. Twice the country has rendered itself a close ally of the US in wars of national survival in Afghanistan. The first was against the Soviet Union and its puppet regime in Kabul in the eighties, and the second against Taliban/Al Qaeda in 2001. In both wars Pakistan not only was the closest ally but the worst sufferer as well. War against the Soviet Union left Afghanistan with a legacy of religious militancy, narco-trafficking, and arms influx, all adding to a combustible mix in the ungoverned tribal areas of its North West Frontier Province. The war against the Taliban in 2001 left it in an even more difficult situation with poorly governed and insurgency hit Afghanistan fuelling lawlessness, insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan. Countries like India, Iran and Russia have joined in an attempt to maximize their interests at the cost of stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The above is hardly a just recompense for the efforts of a US ally whose cooperation was cited as one of the three reasons for US success against the terrorist threat.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

An attempt has been made in this paper to identify the nature and extent of state failure in Afghanistan and its adverse fallout on Pakistan's security. The collapse of state institutions, weak governance, rampant corruption, lawlessness, and under resourced counter-insurgency efforts have emerged as the main reasons, leading towards an estrangement of local population and strengthening of insurgents. The failure of international community to win

the hearts and minds of population in South and East has given an edge to the insurgents who are capitalizing on an ever spiralling wave of public anger for the losses suffered due to coalition's air and artillery attacks. The Afghan Army and Police have also failed to develop into a potent force capable of dealing with insurgents and criminals.

The unholy nexus between insurgents and criminals has led to a spurt in the drug trade, gun running, and kidnappings for ransom due. And this has provided the insurgency steady ground. The lack of operational synergy between ISAF/NATO, and the US, as well as the self imposed limitations by most NATO members, has given operational space to the insurgents which they are exploiting quite skilfully. The impact of Afghan state failure on Pakistan is evident in the shape of a full blown insurgency in FATA and Swat, besides a pervasive incidence of terrorism and suicide bombings. The consequent deterioration in the security environment has resulted in business losses and crippling losses to economy. The rise in crime, drug trafficking, and kidnappings have created a climate of insecurity to the detriment of business/industrial activity. Besides this problem, there is the adverse impact on the energy situation of Pakistan due to the virtual impossibility of energy flow from Central Asia and Iran due to security situation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's ability to deal with these challenges depends upon adoption of a holistic approach with a long term vision, fully leveraging the strengths of a nascent democracy, national political consensus, and astute diplomacy. A combination of bold political reforms, economic incentives, social initiatives and determined law enforcement measures in FATA/NWFP is required to counter the present challenges. The political and military instruments are required to work in close harmony in order to eradicate the insurgency. The help of international community, including NGOs with neutral credentials, is also de rigueur for socio economic uplift and development of insurgency prone areas.

Coordination with US and NATO is vital in coping with the security challenges in the spheres of intelligence sharing, counter insurgency, joint covert operations, border control, and anti drug operations. US/NATO also needs to avoid indiscriminate aerial attacks and overcome a reluctance to employ ground troops for fear of casualties. Better coordination between Pakistan and US intelligence operatives can and should minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties, the most potent source of public antipathy towards the US war on terrorism.

The future of FATA and Afghanistan lies in genuine representative rule, untrammelled by the totalitarianism of tribalism. Genuine democracy, good governance, rule of law and massive investment in infrastructure and human development, highlighted earlier in this paper, are the obligations that Pakistan, the United States and the international community owe to FATA and Afghanistan. The crisis of FATA is an opportunity which, if "not seized at the flood, shall condemn both countries' voyage to a trough of instability with concomitant adverse security implications for entire South Asia. It is up to the international community to take the current when it serves or lose its venture."¹¹⁰

About the Author

Brigadier Raashid Wali Janjua is currently a student in the National Security Program at Canadian Forces College Toronto. He joined Pakistan Military Academy in 1978, and was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers in 1982. He underwent basic infantry and combat engineering courses from the School of Infantry & Tactics Quetta and Military College of Engineering (MCE) Risalpur. He distinguished himself by securing first position in Junior Officers' Leadership Course at School of Infantry & Tactics Quetta in 1983. He joined Officers' Engineering Degree Course at MCE Risalpur in 1983 and graduated with Bachelor in Science Civil Engineering Degree in 1987. He served as a company grade officer in an engineer battalion where he was exposed to field command environment in an infantry division as well as the elite Frontier Works Organization. He was later posted as GSO 3 Operations & Intelligence in an independent infantry brigade group. During this tenure he participated in the largest army level field exercise meant to validate a new defensive offensive operational concept that brought about a

paradigm shift in the army's strategic orientation. He served as an instructor in the elite Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul for two years, after which he was selected for the Command and Staff College Quetta from where he graduated in 1993 with distinction. He was subsequently posted as a Brigade Major (Chief of Staff) in an infantry brigade of a Strike Corps. After two years as Brigade Major he was posted as Deputy Assistant Military Secretary at General Headquarters (Military Secretary's Branch) where he was responsible for the policy formation about the career planning of the officers. Upon promotion as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1998, he was upgraded as Assistant Military Secretary on the same assignment. The officer was given the command of his parent battalion in a deployed formation in Northern Areas in 2000. During this command tenure the officer was exposed to the operational dynamics of the combat in the wake of the Kargil Conflict. Under his watch, his battalion completed some extremely challenging projects under most hazardous weather and terrain conditions. He was awarded "Chief of the Army Staff's Commendation Certificate", for displaying outstanding leadership qualities and enhancing the overall operational efficiency of a deployed infantry formation. He was posted to the prestigious Command and Staff College Quetta in 2001, where he performed the duties of a Directing Staff (DS). During this tenure in addition to routine instructional responsibilities of a DS he also performed the duties as editor of "The Citadel", the prestigious professional magazine of the college. In 2003 he was appointed the "Director of the Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Affairs" of the College. He was selected for the armed forces war course (afwc) at National Defence University Islamabad in 2004 from where he graduated in 2005. He was promoted as a Brigadier in one step during the course and was retained as the member of the faculty of research in NDU. He was posted to a deployed infantry brigade in Kashmir on his first command assignment in October 2005. During an eventful command tenure on Line of Control, he encountered the devastating earthquake that accounted for over 80,000 lives. During this period he worked closely with the NATO rescue/relief contingent and several other international organizations besides coordinating activities of various government agencies operating in the area. After completion of his command tenure in 2007, the officer was appointed as Commander Corps Engineers (CCE) of the largest Corps of the Army, a position that he held for over a year before being posted as Director Planning Cell in the Chief of Army Staff's Secretariat. After completing this assignment he was selected for the National Security Programme at Canadian Forces College Toronto in August 2008 where he is presently employed. Brigadier Janjua holds masters degrees in war and defence studies from the Command and Staff College Quetta, and Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad respectively. In addition, he holds masters in arts degree in international relations from Balochistan University.

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THE "OPERATIONALIZATION" OF CANADIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Lemay

Rebuilding our capabilities and standing up for our sovereignty have sent a clear message to the world: Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage... focus and action, rather than rhetoric and posturing, are restoring our influence in global affairs.¹

**Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean,
Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada**

With these words, Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, confirmed what many analysts, many Canadians and most politicians had already acknowledged: "in the eyes of the world, Canada is back."² In his Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, the Prime Minister went further by calling Canadians to action. According to him, it is by "effective action beyond [its] borders, in concert with [its allies],... [action that] reflects our conviction that Canadian foreign policy must promote our values and defend our interests."³

Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, Canada, like its allies, is having difficulty adjusting its security policy to the ideological and asymmetric threat and the new world military scene. In this environment where the enemy is able to mobilize the info sphere with ever more skill, a number of studies show that democracies are vulnerable and must rapidly harmonize, coordinate and synchronize their diplomatic, military and humanitarian efforts if they wish to promote their political and strategic objectives internationally and attempt to exert what little influence they can through diplomatic prevention and conflict resolution.

The experience thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown the limits of purely military operations. Clearly, the traditional application of foreign and defence policies does not cover the entire spectrum of non-kinetic activities. Another approach, that of public diplomacy, could be a possible preventive option, a third approach to counter-insurgency and the war on terrorism. In a theatre of operations such as Afghanistan, that "draws a large amount of media coverage and is highly volatile,"⁴ [translation] synchronization of the Canadian government-wide strategy abroad is a daunting challenge faced with a public opinion whose patience is waning.

The aim of this paper will be to present an overview of the evolution of public diplomacy through the government-wide mission in Afghanistan and to analyze its impact on the information function and Defence public affairs (PA).

In the first part of this paper, we will explore the growing importance of public diplomacy over the last 20 years. In the second part, we will present the elements that, today, make it difficult to influence international and national public opinion through information.

The Importance of Public Diplomacy

Not so long ago, traditional diplomacy was solely the prerogative of professional diplomats. Acting as intermediaries between countries, they managed the application of

foreign policies in order to influence the opinions of foreign governments and the populations of other nations on behalf of their government.⁵ Today, this classic approach of diplomatic communiqués is outdated because of geopolitical, economic, technological and social fragmentation and the promotion of national interests. It is no longer sufficient for diplomats to simply urge governments and international organizations to act;⁶ public diplomacy requires targeting a larger audience and being more specific in selecting programs.⁷



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More specifically, the revolution in areas such as information, the proliferation of international media, the advent of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the interference of extremist groups make the concept of public diplomacy more than just an affair of the State.⁸ Today, diplomacy must combine traditional and modern ways of thinking.⁹ Where the State once made its own decisions, it must now pay special attention to the individual attitudes, judgments and convictions of the majority of individuals or groups with national and/or international sway.¹⁰



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Evan Potter sees this public enthusiasm as a result of the increasing globalization of conflicts and the explosion of communication infrastructures and technologies.¹¹ Members of the general public are now personally addressed in their own homes by international, multi-language information sources and can respond directly on the Internet and blogs to make their opinions known, correct false reports and add to the information being communicated. Everyone can now freely question politicians and decision-makers through an infinite number of discussion forums.

Public diplomacy as a means of prevention

The term “public diplomacy” is defined by Edward Djerejian, President of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World as the promotion of national interests through information, commitment and influence of populations around the world.¹² Others, such as Professor Jarol Manheim and diplomat Christopher Ross, see public diplomacy as a means of facilitating the achievement of foreign policy goals and describe it respectively as “the management of perceptions” and the art of seeking the support of “carefully targeted sectors of foreign publics.”¹³

In its broadest sense, public diplomacy can be compared with a discreet and non-violent promotional tool for achieving national objectives. This third approach, suggested by Pierre Pahlavi and Stéphane Roussel,¹⁴ has short-term aims (media activities) and long-term aims (cultural programs),¹⁵ and targets foreign (external) audiences, leaving PA the job of informing the national (internal) audience.¹⁶ The State finds in it a means of projecting a positive image and a clear message that favours dialogue, understanding and trust. It is also a channelling system for sharing ideas and information, an open and decentralized system,

and a system that uses means such as the whole of government programs specialized in education, culture, audiovisual media and mass communications.

By developing a government-wide strategic approach, Canada has identified its specific goals (Ends) and the instruments (Means) required to achieve them. Public diplomacy has become an important instrument among a variety of persuasive, cooperative and coercive means at strategists' disposal. When Prime Minister Harper addressed Canadians and foreign ambassadors on the subject of the role that Canada and the CF should play in global security, he was not only speaking of changes in Canadian foreign policy, but also identifying a public diplomacy objective and a reference point for political strategists.¹⁷

The new security paradigm

It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.

Osama bin Laden (2002)

For many years, strategic thought put State security first. The fall of the Berlin Wall, civil wars and non-traditional threats to global security¹⁸ have drastically changed ideas and, as previously mentioned, have triggered a diplomatic change of course that has put human safety and security before the security of States.¹⁹

The language of *realpolitik*, according to Wolfgang Koerner and Joseph Nye,²⁰ is forcing us to open our eyes to the world and learn from past experience. They propose a more balanced, human, "soft power" approach that takes individuals and their insecurity into consideration. Today, there is greater emphasis on more general and subtler concepts when discussing issues of "human security, capacity building, the sanctity of the individual, multi-lateralism, and the need to hold the authority of states themselves accountable."²¹ And it is precisely because it directly affects the individual that the concept of public diplomacy has become a useful political tool, a third avenue for preventing and resolving armed conflicts.

Far removed from the concept of traditional peacekeeping missions, the conflicts of tomorrow will probably be even more complex and violent and will likely resemble what British General Sir Rupert Smith called "war amongst the people."²² And it is difficult for the nations and armies of today to adjust their military policies, strategies, doctrines, and structures when confronted with the belligerents' non-conventional, asymmetric approach.

According to Djerejian, the reason for this is quite simple. Developed countries no longer have the monopoly on technology and information tools. Their enemies, who have fewer resources and who are realistic, have become experts in using non-military means such as influence, propaganda and disinformation.²³

In "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," Colonel Hammess defines the situation democracies will have to face in the future quite well: "Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations."²⁴

Actually, what Thomas Hammess writes quite accurately describes the conditions in which troops are currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military objective is no longer annihilation of the enemy, but rather a battle of charm in which the local population is at the strategic centre of gravity. It is a battle where efforts are very difficult to measure in the short run; a battle where the lines between war and politics, soldiers and civilians, peace and conflict are blurred. Today, access to telecommunication technology (cellular telephony) and information technology (digital cameras, video editing facilities, Internet, blogs, YouTube) gives enemy factions unprecedented command and control and intelligence capabilities, a recruitment and education tool, and a means by which to engage in a war of information and disinformation targeting the political, social and economic weaknesses of democracies. They have learned to bypass military forces instead of attacking them directly, which means that the military command cannot win the battle alone.

The importance of public diplomacy is becoming increasingly evident. It offers a new way and provides an approach adapted to the new security paradigm. The balance between the Army, the State and the People, according to Smith, has finally been upset. The mission of military troops has become "to win the hearts and minds [of the people]...rather than the destruction of an opponent's forces."²⁵ Public diplomacy cannot do it alone; it needs the support of a global information campaign aiming for cooperation and the promotion of a common message. This is what we will discuss in the next part.

Communicating With The Public

...the printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.

T. J. Lawrence

Following the recommendation of a group of independent experts on the future role of Canada in Afghanistan,²⁶ the Canadian government has gone ahead with a few initiatives. A parliamentary committee on Afghanistan was stood up under Minister Emerson. This committee was tasked with issuing clear directives concerning the government-wide approach, establishing the objectives and a compressed agenda for the next three years (till 2011), redefining the objectives and influencing the implementation plan and strategy. In addition, David Mulroney was appointed Deputy Minister of the Afghanistan Task Force, and he will be responsible for ensuring coordination and cohesion among the 3D components.²⁷ The government's decision to appoint Elissa Goldberg Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) in order to manage diplomatic-humanitarian activities, thus expanding the diplomatic footprint on the ground, signals a change in the management of IOs with the local population and Canadian and international media.



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The first challenge of the government-wide approach, according to a number of authors, is identifying the resources within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the leadership required to channel all 3D initiatives into a common effort of cooperation and collaboration involving all available interagencies and NGOs. The second issue is then to find a common ground concerning the prioritization of resources and efforts so that all may commit with one accord to supporting the campaign plan of the Commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A).

According to the Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), LGen Gauthier, the CF supports the plan 100% and discussions between

planners in the military and those in the various civilian departments (engaged in a concerted public diplomacy effort in Afghanistan) are making good progress.²⁸ The reconstruction of nation-States and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, which were diametrically opposed not so long ago, have in recent years become two sides of the same coin. The civilian and military lines of operation, which were parallel and entirely separate, are now converging quite rapidly and have become interdependent. Under the strategic leadership of Canadian government-wide public diplomacy, security, governance and development now share the same goals and establish the first measures of success to achieve the desired effect.

But, as Stephen Wallace (of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) pointed out, it is difficult to establish a common doctrine or *modus operandi* for the planning and conduct of 3D operations, hence the difficulty of maintaining the same viewpoint in analyzing problems and seeking solutions. Moreover, this reality increases the difficulty of developing team spirit and unity of effort and of quickly reaching a common vision and strategy among the various departments.²⁹

Foreign Affairs and CIDA, who were used to dealing with complex situations independently, now find themselves directly engaged in the operational bubble. They are forging ahead not only as departments establishing policies, but also as force generators deploying diplomatic and humanitarian teams in order to operate simultaneously in the same area of operations and in cooperation with Canadian troops.

Kandahar and strategic and operational communication

Since the summer of 2005, when the Canadian provincial reconstruction team (PRT) began operating in the Kandahar area, the media and the Canadian public have quickly taken an interest in the change of mandate that occurred when Canadian troops under Brigadier-General Fraser took over command of the region from the Americans and engaged in Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

From their arrival in Kandahar, deployed Canadian troops and civil servants had to take the thrusts of American and NATO public diplomacy into account. This diplomacy was supported by a strategic communications campaign led by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on behalf of NATO, Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan (CFC-A), to maintain the support of the Afghan and international population and help rebuild the country and establish a new democracy. One of the major difficulties was the synchronization and convergence of politico-military operations, PA activities, Intelligence Operations (IOs), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and effects-based operations (EBOs), including theatre-wide interagency effects (TIE), within a common communications strategy.³⁰

For the CEFCOM team of public affairs officers (PAOs) and the PAOs deployed in Afghanistan in charge of managing almost all the media communications of JTF-A and the PRT, the arrival of the RoCK makes their relations with integrated media more difficult. As many Canadians have noted, reports in 2008 still show little interest in civil-military development activities in the Kandahar area. Despite the PAOs' efforts, reporters' interest in humanitarian activities still seems low.

Since this is the first time that the 3D approach is actually physically engaged in a single area of operation, not only on the ground, but also in terms of interagency and inter-departmental operational planning, it is a duty of the PAOs and the communication officers to clearly understand the new organizational interdependence and the importance of developing and nourishing a relationship of trust. On the ground military activities in support of public diplomacy will be managed by the PRT. Because of the mission's importance and following the recommendations of the Manley Report, the number one priority of the Canadian communications strategy should be to inform the public through open and transparent media coverage. Direct, concrete efforts should be undertaken with the civilian population while increasing the proactive coverage of humanitarian actions on the ground. Lastly, IOs and PA are expected to be called into question by 3D and government communications representa-

tives. As the functional authority of the Department of National Defence (DND), the group led by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) (ADM(PA)) must provide a new integrated strategic direction in order to strengthen relations between military and civilian stakeholders in Canada and in Afghanistan. This strategy should give rise to new tools for planning, coordinating, synchronizing and conducting strategic communication while “operationalizing” the techniques, tactics and procedures related to media operations on missions. Some people believe there is a need to redistribute PA elements and swell the ranks of military PAOs with civilian communication officers. The option of simply having a spokesperson should also be considered. This approach will require close cooperation between the spokespersons for humanitarian and military activities and a good understanding of public diplomacy and of how military activities can support the common effort.



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PAOs need to adjust to the PRT in order to face the new issues that are raised by the information effort that the Canadian representative, Ms Goldberg, has generated. Contrary to current practice, there is a need to assign a PAO more experienced in the political-strategic environment and better able to support the objectives of the Afghanistan Task Force. The fact of the matter is that not all military PAOs have the required training and experience, and commanders would greatly benefit from having more civilian communication officers in this conflict area.

Winning the Battle of Ideas

Because the battles in counterinsurgency are small-scale and often clandestine... it becomes a matter of perceptions and victory is awarded to those who weave the most compelling narrative. Truly, the world of post-modern, 21st-century conflict, civilian and military public affairs officers must become war fighters by another name.

Robert Kaplan

In his article “Mind Manoeuvres,” Frank Hoffman, a former Marine officer and a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, describes the predominance of perceptions and the psychological dimension in irregular warfare.³¹ In his opinion, commanders today must deploy just as many non-kinetic tools, which he calls “munitions of the mind,” as conventional munitions. Commanders must have access to mass media outlets or whatever medium the local populace normally uses to obtain information, such as

civilian radio stations, local television stations, newspapers, the Internet or simple DVD/CD production capabilities. Hoffman believes that the key to success is communicating quickly with as many people as possible and having a consistent and culturally adapted message. In addition, he states that “conceptual distinctions between bureaucracies and existing occupational fields like public affairs and psychological operations need to be rethought.”

Rethinking the Operationalization of Public Affairs

Are we truly ready for an “agile, smart, networked threat—global insurgency—that uses religion to motivate violent extremism?” is the question that Potter and Copeland debated in 2008 in a co-signed (not yet published) article entitled “Public Diplomacy and Counterinsurgency in the Globalization Age: Two Sides of the Same COIN?”³²

Potter and Copeland present two notions that are closely tied to this paper. The first is the rigidity of organizational tools, policy instruments and military doctrines, and the second is the lack of experience and training among diplomats and military members. In their opinion, a much more flexible solution would lie with the emerging convergence and interface between public diplomacy and COIN operations. Shared themes, reinforcing brain power over firepower, and winning hearts and minds instead of taking control of territory should be at the forefront of this new partnership.


But Pahlavi and Roussel advise caution in this regard. Despite the integration efforts of the government-wide strategy, “maintaining a distinction between the roles of diplomacy, defence and development is crucial³³ [translation]. Within the PRT, relations between civil-military (CIMIC) personnel and humanitarian workers have always been strained. Humanitarian workers fear that the presence of military personnel and their involvement in humanitarian projects will affect their security, neutrality and impartiality—and this is not a new problem. It is easy to separate the activities in some cases, but there will always be a grey area in other cases. The same is true for PAOs and civilian communication officers. There is not just one message; there is a multitude of messages and an equally large number of actors to convey them.

The modern media environment, including “new media” such as the Internet, blogs and YouTube, has changed drastically. Everyone now has the ability to access a wider variety of information sources, thus it could be said that no government or international organization with the ability to reach a large audience can imagine that it is alone in managing or even influencing public opinion. Also, unlike terrorist groups that use 24/7 television coverage (Al Jazeera) or alternative media (the Internet) to disseminate their images and messages quickly, the Commander of JTF-A and the PAOs do not have the means to quickly counteract the surge of images and reports, thereby leaving the door open to propaganda and disinformation.

In Canada, unlike the approach used during the Kosovo bombings (daily briefing from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS)), the technical information sessions that have been offered every month since September 2008 do not seem to be popular among journalists in Ottawa. In a future paper, it would be interesting to analyze whether the quantity of information that comes from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and 3D partners is sufficient to satisfy the needs of the media, and if not, whether this deficiency has pushed journalists to bypass the PAOs and turn to civilian analysts or former CF members instead.

Certainly, CF Public Affairs cannot continue with its existing concept of operations. In order to remain relevant to the CF, commanders and the public, CEFCON and ADM(PA) PAOs must quickly rethink the method of operationalizing the PA function. As the concept in Kandahar is based on a series of analyses that were carried out in partnership with the Army PA Directorate in 2005 and adjusted in 2006, it is important to act quickly in order to keep up with the transformation and the arrival of the RoCK in Kandahar.

One of the stumbling blocks is the issue of command and control in relation to the various Canadian government departments. For JTF-A PAOs, formal and informal ties with



Canada are clear and go through CEFCOM. But what channels do military PAOs working with the PRT go through? The first impact to consider is the ability to select, train (basic courses and upgrade courses such as IO and CIMIC), equip and deploy the proper PA capability order to obtain the desired effect on the ground. The number of PAOs deployed at all times in Afghanistan is 6% of the total number of PAOs in the branch. The duration of the deployments varies between six and twelve months, depending on the position. Strength, resistance, the ability to react quickly, flexibility, innovation and adaptability are six key factors that must be considered in the development of the new PA strategy and applied directly to the training of future PAOs.

In light of the new reality of the contemporary operational environment, it is clear the traditional military response does not go far enough. Military commanders should ask themselves the following questions: "Who should be involved in coordination on the ground, and most importantly, who should support whom?" There is no doubt that public diplomacy and the government-wide approach have and will continue to have a major effect on the management of CF PA activities in Canada and on operations. More importantly, the ability to meet the strategic objectives of public diplomacy will be directly tied to the ability to inform commanders and to manage public messages in the local, national and international spheres.

Unlike Jomini's and Clausewitz's linear approach, the government-wide approach recommends a more holistic way of thinking that leads military personnel to consider different actors. For deployed PAOs and the CEFCOM HQ team, planning beyond the simple application of CF instructions and the simple theory of communication is crucial. They must understand both the political-strategic end state and the military objective to accomplish. They must strive to improve relations with civilian personnel from other government agencies and NGOs and to develop an excellent information exchange network. Within the contingent, PAOs must fully participate in supervising IOs while continuing to act as advisors to the commander.

The New War of Information

In terms of the mission, the communicator's challenge is to ensure that vertical and horizontal messages are unified at all levels because information has now become a "weapon." "Information is now an equalizer enabling the weak to challenge the strong."³⁴ In the asymmetric war, Al Qaeda and the Taliban have demonstrated a keen ability to target the public opinion of Western countries through disinformation and the discrediting of our governments while attacking the legitimacy of the mission and the determination of the population. For military analysts who think in a traditional linear fashion, information can be perceived as the centre of gravity of the operational strategic infosphere.

But "information does not create its own consequences"³⁵ [translation]. According to Jean-Claude Guillebaud, information is in some ways removed from its original purpose, which should be to inform citizens and help them make informed choices. Similarly, Potter holds that information moves along a continuum that includes monologues (the one-way communication of news releases, public speeches or official websites), dialogues (two-way communication between PRT members and the local population) and cooperation (the communicator develops a relationship with his/her audience). And one does not prevent the other.³⁶

For her part, Merrill Brown speaks of a dramatic revolution.³⁷ "The message [is] coming in loud and clear from bloggers and their readers"—there is a new form of citizen journalism and a new form of participation that targets 18- to 34-year-olds, 39% of whom use the Internet as their primary source of information and feel that the traditional news environment does not serve them adequately.³⁸ They want information on demand and choice in terms of sources. If the industry is not open to new approaches, it is in trouble. And although it may be a bit early to assess the impact of this revolution on PA, on political discourse and on journalism itself, we must recognize that a new way of delivering news is here to stay and that professional communicators may be unable to reach the emerging audience if they do not drastically adjust their delivery.

Lastly, we must realize that the wind of change is blowing in regards to public information—the public is becoming increasingly choosy about sources of information. Studies have shown that people are drawn to a specific source of information if it reinforces their system of values and beliefs. The development of military public diplomacy and PA activities and the growing movement towards public diplomacy of the Department of Foreign Affairs in conflict areas are now at the centre of an interesting public and academic debate.



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Conclusion

According to the International Policy Statement (2005), Canada must develop a new foreign policy and a new diplomacy. This diplomacy has increasingly become a public diplomacy that strives to reach people through new methods. Canada's credibility and influence abroad depend not only on the actions of the government, but also on Canadians themselves who interact, cultivate relations, and engage in ongoing dialogue with the goal of defending our values and interests and of helping increase our influence abroad.

As Sir Rupert pointed out, the environment of defence, security and humanitarian missions has changed, and public diplomacy has become an element of information for both domestic and international audiences. With the expansion and sometimes the intrusion of global media, what government representatives or military members do or say in foreign countries quickly becomes fodder for local public and political discussion. As the war of information is being played out today on the international scene, Canada must acquire the means to realize its foreign policy ambitions. The government-wide approach and the rapid development of new information technology compel us to take a new look at the way that the CF and its government partners operate. Canada must institutionalize its planning and its development of plans for future campaigns and design a communication strategy that supports government-wide intentions. As the Prime Minister said, we have to get past the rhetoric and take real action abroad with our allies that reflect the determination of Canada and our foreign policy to defend Canadian values and interests.

Lastly, this paper has shown the reasons why public diplomacy is an important area of university research and the transformation that is occurring in the world of public information. The unification of the government-wide effort in Kandahar and the synchronization and

harmonization of military and humanitarian activities demonstrate that there is new impetus in the three areas—security, governance and development—which are no longer parallel and linear, but are convergent and interdependent and work towards a common established narrative. The coherence of the message (physical as well as verbal), the image, the values and the information conveyed by public diplomacy is essential and will serve as a test of credibility for the 3D team. With violence that is no longer limited to traditional combatants and diplomacy that is no longer just the concern of the traditional diplomat, the question is no longer whether or not Canada must act, but rather “where, when and how” we must act.

About the Author...

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RETHINKING MILITARY LEADERSHIP FROM A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Eric Ouellet, PhD

Shamir and Ben-Ari¹ have presented some fundamental issues about the new challenges for military leadership in this Journal. Among them, that military leadership is now facing an increasingly complex world where previously taken-for-granted ideas about war and peace, technology, multinational coalitions, etc., do not hold anymore. They rightfully concluded that a “fresh” perspective to military leadership is needed. As a step towards developing such a new approach, this article proposes a renewed sociological look at military leadership.

It is generally agreed that many doctrines and procedures developed during the Cold War, devised to deal with a very specific set of circumstances, are now out of date. The Warsaw Pact strategic plans were well-known: the tasks to accomplish were construed as military in a strict sense; military objectives were deemed to be clear-cut; etc. Similarly, military leadership was oftentimes construed simply as part of classical, high-intensity, and symmetrical combats. It was seen as dealing with the “real stuff” because it was dealing with “real war-fighting.” Other dimensions of military leadership related to contexts such as garrison life, low-intensity conflicts, or technologically-driven units were too often deemed as unimportant. For these reasons, many facets of military leadership, both conceptually and as a practice, were not challenged. The end of the Cold War, the so-called post-modern social and political transformations in the Western world, as well as the re-emergence of low-intensity conflicts, have put a lot of our previous perspectives on military affairs into question.

The present challenges to military leadership also offer an opportunity to rethink how military leadership is conceptualized. Not only new realities affect how military leadership can be put into action, but it also forces us to have another look at our assumptions. The most fundamental assumption about military leadership is certainly its actual meaning and definition. As described below, previous approaches do not pay much attention to what *is* leadership, and are much more interested to find new practical ways of using leadership in the context of fairly well-defined bureaucratic structures. Hence, if one wants to give a “fresh” look at military leadership, it is imperative to provide an understanding of what *is* leadership, instead of trying to define what it *may do* in each specific context. This question of what *is* leadership is not a new one,² but it has received very few answers so far. To answer this question, it appears fundamental, as a first analytical step, to temporarily put in bracket prescriptive approaches, both utilitarian and moralistic ones, in order to provide a conceptual foundation. The purpose, however, is not to dismiss prescription, but to inform leadership of a more effective or successful practice.

The goal of this article is rather to propose an in-depth sociological look at leadership so that prescriptions for leadership can be based upon more solid ground. In other words, critically reviewing the prescriptive assumptions about leadership is not antithetical to better-informed prescription. To this end, this article presents a review of the key schools of thought on leadership, most having been built upon a psychological framework, to illustrate that key assumptions need to be revisited. This paper also presents the few areas of research on military leadership done from a sociological perspective to show that much work needs to be done, and that sociology has not yet provided an appropriate level of contribution to the study of military leadership. Then, this article proposes a sociologically-based model to analyze military leadership that aims both at providing a sound foundation and to show that sociology can be of great help in understanding military leadership. The model is based

upon two key concepts: the first involves defining leadership as relationships of meaning, and the second is a revisited concept of symbolic order to provide an operational tool for future empirical studies. Finally, a short discussion on the potential methodological and practical implications of this model is presented.



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Leadership and Psychology

After decades of clinical and organizational research on leadership, the only consensus is that there is no consensus on the meaning of leadership. One can quote James Macgregor Burns stating that “leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.”³ Such a statement about leadership is far from being unique. For instance, one can read that “more than 3000 leadership studies (House & Baetz, 1979; Stogdill, 1974), from the Iowa studies of the 1930s (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), to the sophisticated models of recent years (Fiedler, 1967; Vroom & Yetton, 1973), suggest the phenomenon is as theoretically elusive as it is empirically obvious.”⁴ Or again, “decades of academic analysis have given us more than 350 definitions of leadership. Literally thousands of empirical investigations of leaders have been conducted in the last seventy-five years alone, but no clear and unequivocal understanding exists as to what distinguishes leaders from non-leaders.”⁵ Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that most researchers on leadership do offer an operational definition of leadership, and this definition is much more unanimous than the one about what *is* leadership. This definition can be summed up as the effective capacity to influence others to act in ways they would not have accepted otherwise.

The systematic study of leadership is about one hundred years old and was very much influenced by the discipline of psychology.⁶ This is not surprising as leadership is commonly seen as individual performance (both theatrically and as a matter of accomplishing a task), and involves individual emotions. Such an individualist assumption can be found in the first set of systematic studies on leadership. In the early 20th century, leadership was mostly interpreted as an inherent individual quality,⁷ and the corpus supporting this interpretation is usually referred to as the *trait theory*. The work of theorists such as Ordway Tead⁸ is typical of this school of thought. The trait theory attempts to identify which personality traits are the most common among people recognized as effective leaders. This theoretical approach has since been seriously challenged.⁹ The multitude of personality traits that

are found among effective leaders brought many to reconsider the value of the trait theory. However, it is important to note that many practitioners of leadership, particularly in military organizations, still believe that true leaders are born, not made, hence leadership would be matter of inborn traits.

The second major school of thought in leadership research is based upon what is often called the *situationist* theory. This approach was developed mostly by psychologists with a strong empirical bent. Stogdill,¹⁰ through his famous research at Ohio State University, was one of the most prominent researchers of this school of thought. Under this approach, researchers attempted to compare the type of task to be performed with the leader's interpersonal style. They were trying to find what type of style is the most appropriate in a given situation. It acknowledges that certain social situations would be more conducive to certain personal styles. However, this approach remains, for many, unsatisfying. Subsequent psychological studies have shown that multiple personal styles could be equally effective in the same set of circumstances.¹¹



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Other critics of the situationist theory have pointed out that a key problem is how performance and effectiveness are defined. A prescriptive and essentially subjective understanding of what constitutes success is built into the situationist approach. Fred E. Fiedler,¹² a social psychologist, is the key advocate in developing the idea that leadership is more than group performance and style, or personality traits. His approach breaks away from searching for personality traits and leadership styles, and acknowledges that leaders can be trained and are not just born with leadership. It is rather the ability to adapt to various social contexts, and how such social contexts define successes, that are determinant. This school of thought is usually labelled as the *contingency theory*, because leadership and success are contingent upon social contexts and the leaders' ability to adapt. Although the contingency theory provides interesting tools to train leaders, as well as additional reasons to construe leadership as a social object, it cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. As Fiedler has stated more recently, "[I]f we learned anything from the past, it is that leadership processes are highly complex. Most serious researchers in the area agree that leadership is an interaction between the leader and the leadership situation, but this principle has still to be translated into practice."¹³ One of the often-cited problems

with the contingency theory is that it is based heavily upon a psychometric scale system. This system seeks to identify an individual's orientation towards either a task-oriented or relationship-oriented personality.¹⁴ Yet, this type of system is by definition unable to seize the full range of social constructs found in organizational settings. In other words, to be task or relationship-oriented becomes only meaningful within the limited parameters of modern bureaucracies. Unsurprisingly, this system does not work well outside stable bureaucratic conditions, and hence remains limited to a fairly narrow band of the leadership spectrum.

A growing critique about all of the previous approaches emphasizes that there is a general tendency to ignore important qualitative dimensions of leadership, such as persuasion, commitment, and establishing a vision and a sense of purpose for the subordinates. This has led to the emergence of the concept of *transformational* leadership. This critique comes from researchers such as Bernard Bass¹⁵ who emphasize the importance of communications between leaders and followers. Transformational leadership is based upon the idea that leaders by their actions and communications can share a vision and a perspective that will be accepted and uplifting for the followers, and that the followers would develop intrinsic motivation to surpass themselves to make the organization succeed. It is James MacGregor Burns,¹⁶ a political scientist who provides the conceptual base for this new approach for leadership research. Subsequently, many organizational psychologists and communications specialists proposed a more formal approach where they conceived "true" and ethical leadership as a capacity to morally empower followers to surpass themselves. As Burns stated, "I define leadership as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and motivations—the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations—of both leaders and followers."¹⁷ Within the context of transformational school, leadership traits and styles are construed as only means among many others to perform effectively as a leader. According to this school of thought, the foundation of leadership resides in accessing the values and aspirations of the followers. Thus, traits and styles alone are not necessarily leading the followers to surpass themselves in the long run, and thus should not be considered as being core elements of leadership.

One of the key problems with these approaches to leadership is that they tend to be built upon uncritical and utilitarian assumptions. The immediate needs of modern organizations are taken as a starting point, which effectively prevents one from seizing the fundamental nature of what *is* leadership. Whether one is apparently looking for successful leadership traits, styles or conducive contexts, leadership as a social object is embedded within prescriptions for success, which is fundamentally a relative notion. Even the moral prescriptions found in transformational school are fundamentally utilitarian. Burns states clearly that:

[...] transforming leadership ultimately becomes *moral* in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both. [...] thus they [the leaders] serve as an *independent force in changing the makeup of the followers' motive base through gratifying their motives*.¹⁸

Yet, Burns also makes a very strong statement about leadership when he puts that "the fundamental process is a more elusive one; in large part, *to make conscious what lies unconscious among followers*."¹⁹ Although Burns is very much aware that a leader can egoistically induce followers to believe that their "true" needs are not what they should be, subsequent modeling of transformational leadership has a tendency to dictate what are the "true" needs based upon corporate imperatives. The door was therefore wide-open to return to a fundamentally uncritical prescriptive approach. This type of process, while emphasizing the unconscious, also gave much material for those interested in psychological analysis to expand their leadership models.

This emphasis on individual unconscious processes is also the source of many ontological problems about determining what leadership *is*. As Parker and Shotter describe it:



No matter how benevolent one as a psychologist may be towards those one studies, no matter how concerned with 'their' liberation, with 'their' betterment, with preventing 'their' victimisation, etc., the fact is that 'their' lives are made sense of in terms which do not in fact make sense to 'them'. They only make sense, as Smith (1988) points out, within the 'ruling apparatuses' of the State, e.g. within schools, universities, polytechnics, the law and the police, health care, social welfare policy, etc.²⁰

In the final analysis, a prescription for morality in leadership (i.e., a leader engages followers based upon their genuine needs) is very much prone to an institutional prescription

where the followers' needs have to merge with the organizational bottom line. Irrespective of any critique against capitalist forms of organization, there are no transcendental reasons to believe that such a merger ought to be, and the existing knowledge of organizational life clearly indicates that a merger is not the norm.

What it means to be a leader (or a follower) in Western civilization, a given society, nation, institution, or organization is too often ignored. Unsurprisingly, specific capitalistic, bureaucratic, institutional, or organizational assumptions are taken for granted without attempting to see, in the first place, if they have any meaning for both the leaders and the followers. Being "effective," "successful" or "moral" is fundamentally embedded within social and political constructs. Those constructs can take a multitude of forms and shapes, and tend to be "immune" from bureaucratic decrees. All the schools of thought described above implicitly or explicitly hold that leadership can be measured only through "successful" organizational outcomes, or the recognition of "effective" leadership. With the exception of the contingency theory, there is little attempt to seriously analyze the actual meaning of "successful organizational outcomes" and "effective leadership" as foundational elements of their analysis. Because of those assumptions, it is not surprising that there is no consensus on what leadership *is*, while there is an implicit consensus on what leadership *should do*.

Military Leadership and Sociology

Many contributions to the conceptual understanding of military leadership go beyond the "Follow Me" approach and do brush upon its social aspects, but very few offer a substantial sociological perspective on the subject. And some published works are not devoid of annoying contradictions. A case in point is Buck & Korb.²¹ Although the editors acknowledge in their introduction that the most rigorous study of leadership has come from the social sciences, in terms of theory and empirical studies of leadership situation, and that the study of leadership is a study of human behaviour in a group setting, most of the readings are focusing solely on leadership as a person-based phenomenon (as opposed to a social role or social position-based situation) and as leader behaviour (as opposed to leader-follower interactions), and on leadership ethics and prescriptive solutions to military command.

Amongst the few studies and analyses where sociological models are used, one can note the works of Stone,²² Segal,²³ and Castonguay.²⁴ Stone's study of the effects of army life on individuals in a U.S. combat fighter squadron proposes a social system theoretical framework, where leadership is theorized as one system within the total social system of the squadron. The adjustment of the individuals to the squadron resulted in social system interactions in which not only leadership, but also status, cliques, participation and values played an important part. Each of these elements is theorized as interrelated sub-systems. However, the social system perspective presented therein is very similar to the trait approach to leadership. The leader's traits are held up as valuable attributes of personality, and are also a core component of the value system that maintains the unit's cohesion.

Another interesting study is the one done by Segal. The key argument is that as one progresses through the leadership hierarchy both the nature of the task to be performed and one's subordinates change, making past behaviour and individual traits poor predictors of future success. Hence, for Segal, leadership is not defined in terms of individual personality traits or formal organizational roles. It is understood rather as mutual respect, expertise relevant to the task at hand, recognition of that expertise, group goal, and a shared willingness to guide and be guided toward the fulfillment of that goal. Unfortunately, Segal does not capitalize on this to provide a comprehensive model for military leadership.

Castonguay creatively uses cultural analysis to study the differences in leadership between French-speaking and English-speaking units in the Canadian Forces. Part of his analysis is based upon the works of French-Canadian sociologists Guy Rocher²⁵ and Fernand Dumont²⁶ who have studied the interactions between language and culture in the Canadian context. Curiously, the concept of leadership in Castonguay's work is then



defined as a function of several variables: traits of the leader, leadership style, and situation, each being respectively associated with the trait approach, the behaviour-based approach, and the situational or contingent theory approach.

This being said, most authors²⁷ dealing with military leadership in the last two decades tend to adhere to the transformational school in which a charismatic and inspiring leader, usually of high rank, is critical for the success of a mission. This adherence of so many contributors to the transformational view of leadership is not surprising. Implicitly or explicitly, most are using a systems theory approach that focuses on total performance. Within this framework, the leader is seen as one element of an interrelated system of organizational goals. In this context, setting a vision, empowerment, and putting in place conditions to uplift morale become the leader's effect on the system. They do not look at the leader solely as an individual, and they also take into account the context of ongoing organizational dynamics requiring ongoing adaptation due to internal and external pressures. Yet, as

with most prescriptively oriented models emphasizing performance, the content of such dynamics remains taken for granted, and implicitly requires fairly stable bureaucratic and institutional parameters to provide an appropriate analysis.

Sociological Foundations For Studying Leadership

Relationships of Meaning

The study of leadership from the sociologically inclined literature is sparse but not fundamentally new.²⁸ One can think of the framing approach by Fairhurst and Sarr,²⁹ the symbolic leadership approach of Bolman and Deal,³⁰ the institutional analysis of leadership,³¹ or Burns³² insistence on seeing leadership as a relationship engaging followers' values. In this sense, the idea that leadership and the symbolic realm are profoundly related is well established. What is missing, particularly in the case of military leadership, is a conceptual foundation that not only covers leadership in the context of bureaucratic organizations, but also in contexts where life and death are at stake. The proposed definition of leadership, below, is therefore construed as an attempt to make more explicit underlying assumptions found in previous sociological works, rather than proposing a revolutionary perspective.

A key and unavoidable assumption is that leadership is fundamentally a social activity, as it involves interactions within a group. And if it is a form of social relationships, then it is also socially constructed like other social objects. In light of a sociological perspective, the usual implicit definition of leadership as influence to induce behaviour is transformed into engaging the prevalent meaning construct of a group. What is particular about leadership, however, is that it is usually observable only when there is a voluntary initiative taken by a social actor to impact other actors. Such an initiative has for its purpose to modify the actual social construction in which the social relationships are embedded. In other words, leadership implies an attempt (not necessarily with success) to set a group's internally accepted meaning of structure on one or more issues to induce behaviour from it. Whether it is the political leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. attempting to make African-American equality a valid and important issue in the eyes of an entire nation, or the leadership of a squad leader to overcome a situation that appears desperate, leadership is directly related to how perceptions and meaning are framed within a human collective.³³ For this reason, leadership can be fundamentally defined as *being a relationship of meaning*; and thus what leadership *does*, is to direct in a particular way such relationships of meaning.

The concept of relationships of meaning has been originally developed in linguistics to articulate the description of certain forms of syntax, where the meaning conveyed is important to understand sentence structure. This concept has been extended to intertextual analyses to describe how separate texts, or portions thereof, interact. In a similar manner, the growing field of knowledge management is using this concept to build searchable databases. Lastly, anthropology has also used this concept from a linguistic point of view to understand local culture and how certain cultural elements interact symbolically with each other.³⁴ In the present article, however, the concept of relationships of meaning is construed as a general set of symbolic relationships that are both dynamically and profoundly interrelated. In this sense, the concept of relationships of meaning is used here to describe globally, rather than through dyadic descriptions, ongoing informal relations within a group leading to the establishment of a worldview among the members, although partial in topics and limited in scope. In line with the Weberian interpretative tradition, meaning here is understood as a symbolic framework that allows group cohesion (and group conflicts), which indeed involves emotional affects and determines within a group what is acceptable or unacceptable, meaningful or purposeless, esthetical or ugly, etc.

The strength of this definition is that it removes the necessity of "successful" outcomes by emphasizing the engagement into a set of relationships of meaning. In avoiding using a prescriptive definition as a starting point, it is possible to preserve the integrity of the object under study. As a first application of this new approach to leadership, one can now



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construe leadership from a “maintenance” perspective in the sense that preventing relationships of meaning to evolve is also a form of leadership. Leadership does occur even if it is not directly observable. The implication for military organizations is that this definition broadens leadership beyond the heroic type. The otherwise mundane, routine and “not apparent” leadership that prevents demoralization, and ultimately mutiny (i.e., preventing other meanings from becoming the prevalent meanings of the group), can be construed in a quite different light.

However, it is important to recall that if leadership is getting engaged into relationships of meaning, whether in modifying or maintaining them, leadership remains very much dependent upon what such a social construct has to offer. Too often, the idea that the world is made of social constructs is wrongly associated with the idea that everything is relative and that social constructs are there to be modified at will. Social constructs are not plastic or easy to change. Although leadership is a

social construct, it remains embedded in a real symbolic universe. In this sense, one can understand this practical warning about leadership, that:

Whether delivered with many words or a few carefully chosen symbols, such messages [leadership vision] are not necessarily accepted just because they are understood. Another big challenge in leadership efforts is credibility—getting people to believe the message. Many things contribute to credibility: the track record of the person delivering the message, the content of the message itself, the communicator’s reputation for integrity and trustworthiness, and the consistency between words and deeds.³⁵

This difficulty of changing a given setting through leadership is certainly obvious from an empirical perspective, yet it needs to be better described from a conceptual one. To this end, what needs to be modified has been termed the localized symbolic order.

Localized Symbolic Order

At this point, an accessory concept to better understand leadership as relationships of meaning needs to be introduced. It is assumed here that what allows (military) leadership in the first place to exist is the prevalent symbolic order. The concept of symbolic order is certainly not a new one either in sociology, anthropology, and psychology. It has been debated and discussed by many, and it is not my intent to revisit the intellectual history of this concept. Such a task would require an entire research project. My purpose is rather to explore new fields of application for the concept of symbolic order.

There are two major approaches that stand out with respect to the study of symbolic order. The first one, deeply influenced by psychology and later by linguistics, is based upon the idea that there is a field of symbols that articulates our thought, self-concept, and behaviour. One of the main representatives of this approach in North America is George H. Mead.³⁶ Comparable research has been put forward in Europe, although starting from an entirely different intellectual tradition. One of its most prominent intellectuals is Jacques Lacan. Through the understanding of language and childhood development, these researchers attempted to explain the interactions between the symbolic order and

the socialization process. Lacan's analyses,³⁷ particularly, have been used by feminist researchers to explain how girls accept and become part of the patriarchal symbolic order. Some other scholars, Foucault³⁸ among them, extended this analysis to the symbolic control of the body. Whatever the merits and flaws of these theories, they do share an explanatory structure that places a central emphasis on the interactions between the individual and a society's cultural cohesiveness, in a way quite similar to Durkheim's³⁹ understanding of the religious form of social interactions. For the purpose of this paper, this type of symbolic order will be called the "grand" symbolic order, as it encompasses entire societies and cultures.



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The second approach, which can arguably be labelled as anthropological, is based upon the idea that social organizations and institutions are both an outcome and a creative source of the symbolic order. One of the best-known representatives of this approach is Marcel Mauss.⁴⁰ Through his study of the institution of gift exchange, he found that there is also an exchange that goes beyond the actual exchange of material gifts to create alliances with others. The individuals are sharing a part of themselves, not on an individual basis but rather as an integral element of their membership to a collective entity. Furthermore, gifts are exchanged as a way to share its non-material and symbolic properties. The obligation of giving, receiving, and reciprocating illustrates the existence of a complex symbolic web embracing the entire community. Mauss, ultimately, believed that the pre-capitalistic societies had institutions that represented a symbolic order that was not necessarily oppressive. Mauss' approach has been fruitful in the field of anthropology, and has been expanded by other anthropologists and sociologists. Among others, Mary Douglas⁴¹ considers that the symbolic order does not pre-exist in such a way that institutions are simply a reflection of it. She maintains that the institutions and associated behaviours create and reproduce the symbolic order. In this case, one can note that the focus in this instance has been the relationship between specific social institutions and the symbolic order. For the purpose of this paper, this type of symbolic order will be called the "institutional" symbolic order, as it is meaningful only to given institutions.

This illustrates that between these two approaches to symbolic order—grand and institutional—there is a missing element: the symbolic order of groups or networks acquiring a distinct identity through informal interactions. These informal identities can reflect formal organizational units like an infantry squad, but they also cover large ones, such as a crowd listening to a political activist who for the time they are assembled to share the rage, joy, fever or the nationalistic fantasy communicated by the orator. This symbolic

order is situated partially outside the institution as it covers large or small groups that either transcend the institution or are a specific subset of it, yet is to a greater or lesser extent part of the institutional symbolic order. Similarly, the localized symbolic order is more than a mere aggregation of individual consciousness reflecting the grand symbolic order, as the individual participants to the localized symbolic order remain shaped by the content of the grand symbolic order.

The meanings found in the group or network is therefore dependent upon the localized symbolic order. Hence, such meaning becomes part of the “truth”; *their* truth; what makes sense locally for them. If one participant engages the localized relationship of meaning, then there is observable leadership in action. Such a leader can draw upon the elements from all three symbolic orders to engage the group to see a situation differently and thus act differently. In other words, the cohesion of the primary group can then be explained as a relationship of meaning where the consensus is strong, even if most of it tends to reside in implicit assumptions and non-verbal language. This also explains why people who know each other do better as they create a new localized sense of collective self, and why newcomers tend to have a hard time integrating within a closely-knit group. The symbolic order that is shared is therefore localized in terms of its participants and its time span. However, it cannot remain static while under constant risk of being altered as a result of the various pressures from the environment that challenges its established meanings and membership variations over time.

With respect to military leadership, one of the single most powerful pressures against any symbolic order is the acid test of conflicts and adversity. And this explains why leadership is so important for military organizations. As Burns explains:

Leadership as conceptualized here is grounded in the seedbed of conflict. Conflict is intrinsically compelling: it galvanizes, prods, and motivates people. Every person, group, and society has latent tension and hostility, forming a variety of psychological and political patterns across social situations. [...] They [the leaders] discern signs of dissatisfaction, deprivation, and strain; they take initiative in making connections with their followers; they plumb the character and intensity of their potential for mobilization; they articulate grievances and wants; and they act for followers in their dealings with other clusters of followers.⁴²

Not only the meaning found in a localized symbolic order can be challenged or reinforced by others' views and actions, but the actual adversity stemming from life itself challenges or reinforces a localized symbolic order (e.g., sleep and food deprivation, bad weather, psychological wounds). Also, the localized symbolic order can be in competition, so to speak, with the grand or institutional ones.

One can take the following set of examples from the battle for Okinawa in 1945, and provide a renewed explanation as to how conflicts and symbolic orders profoundly intersect in military leadership:

On the troop decks most of the conversation was about the deadly habu, a long, thick, dark snake whose bite was supposed to have no known remedy. [...] and the habu soon passed into the immortal GI-Marines menagerie of the goony-birds of Midway, the upside-down pissing-possum of Guadalcanal, Australia's lunatic-lunged kookaburra, the “beavers” of the North African beaches, the New Zealand kiwi, and the indecent snow-snake of Iceland. The men speculated so much about the habu that they almost forgot the Japanese, although officers frequently “held school” on the weather decks to stress the dangers of their objective.⁴³

Any experienced leader knows that such silly talks are quite useful in managing fear and apprehension, and that in the context of an imminent seaborne invasion one should let it be. Yet, not any silly talk could do the trick, only the meaningful ones within the localized symbolic order, i.e., meaningful for those G.I.s.⁴⁴ This example also illustrates that the institutional symbolic order (i.e., within the context of accomplishing the mission) is oftentimes at odds with the localized one; hence, “holding school” was a way to prevent the localized symbolic order from drifting too far from the institutional one. Such tension can be exemplified by another anecdote, where “‘From Okinawa,’ one lieutenant told his



platoon, 'we can bomb the Japs anywhere—China, Japan, Formosa...' 'Yeah,' a sergeant mumbled, 'and vice versa'".⁴⁵ The strategic value of Okinawa was obviously not meaningful to all. Hence, one can consider that what happened during the Vietnam War could be explained in part by the fact that the gap between the localized and the institutional symbolic orders was extreme, and that the grand symbolic order being also in transformation during the late 1960s and early 1970s did not offer much more ground for commonality either.

Another form of conflict related to the localized symbolic order is the issue of membership. A localized order can be shaped in part by "resisting" or "embracing" outsiders. For instance, a key difficulty at the tactical level is that officers are not fully members of the troops' informal groups, and hence their access to localized symbolic orders tends to be mediated. Yet, "successful" tactical leaders are those who both engage the localized symbolic order and make it intersect with the institutional one, while maintaining a "distinct" group affiliation, such as this other example from Okinawa:

First Lieutenant Willard Mitchell, a powerfully built southerner who had played both football and basketball for Mississippi State. Idolized by his men and called "Captain Hoss," he was also beloved for his unashamed battle cry: "Watch out! Here comes 'the Hoss'—and God is on his side!" Mitchell returned their affection by calling them his "Lardassess," a fondly derisive and droll nickname that they loved.⁴⁶

This example recalls that it is not uncommon for soldiers to define themselves as underdogs (hence a meaning that is part of their localized symbolic order) because in the end they are the toughest who can endure the most; therefore, they have more chances, they hope, to come back home alive. The formal leader in this example was able to use existing meanings found within the group without being a full member of the group, but engaged himself into a unique and institutionally effective relationship of meaning with the troops.

Discussion

This sociological approach to military leadership also has the capacity to offer some elements of meta-analysis, and explain why certain aspects of leadership were emphasized across time. The structuralism of power and meaning relationships in the grand symbolic order of the *Ancien Régime* can be used to explain how military leadership was class-based, and hence, was only questioned when an out-of-class leader emerged. With the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie started to become the dominant class and thus the grand symbolic order was transformed; it allowed Napoleon's armies to recruit senior military leaders outside the aristocracy and yet still be respected by the troops as legitimate senior leaders. In societies that are strongly class-based, it makes sense to look at leadership from a trait perspective as meanings and social constructs tend to be much more rigidly codified. It is therefore not surprising that the study of leadership started from this perspective.

A similar process started before the Second World War where a greater democratization, accompanied with increased complexity of Western institutions, affected the grand symbolic order. Again, renewed discussions on leadership ensued, but this time giving birth to theories trying to harness leadership as a complex phenomenon within the relatively well-defined structures of modern bureaucratic organizations. The emergence of the situationist and contingency schools in the post-war years, as well as the expansion of management studies interested in leadership, is therefore not surprising.

In the present days, profound demographic changes towards greater ethnic diversity in the Western world and the acceleration of women's participation within the public sphere are modifying the grand symbolic order. What was taken for granted for so long is no more, and who can be a leader, and what meaning needs to be conveyed have changed. Hence, it is no surprise that the meaning of leadership, in general, is now questioned. Furthermore, the

institutional symbolic order of many Western armed forces was modified by the end of the Cold War. Peace dividends are being cashed through reduced military budgets concurrently to the emergence of complex military operations other than war (MOOTW). What was taken for granted by the military institution has been seriously shaken too. The combination of simultaneous changes at both the grand and institutional symbolic orders has had a direct impact on the many localized symbolic orders found within military organizations. As so many element of the symbolic universe are in transformation, leadership as a relationship of meaning becomes a difficult task, as there are fewer common points of references available. It is therefore not surprising that approaches to the study of leadership, such as those espoused by the transformational and symbolic leadership schools, have emerged in view of a clear crisis of meaning.

The proposed sociological approach to military leadership can at least provide a systematic explanation as to why military leadership is now being questioned. But it is not proposing changes in research methodologies, but rather changes for research questions. Thus, even in this period of major social change (grand symbolic order), there will be personality traits that will be more in tune with change in general, and leadership styles that could give a greater access to amending a localized symbolic order. Hence, certain wisdom and tools found in the trait and situationist theories remain relevant. Similarly, the tools to detect flexible personalities developed by the contingency school remain useful to find people who could be more in tune with their symbolic environment (localized and institutional symbolic orders). And yet, the tools to understand transformational leadership and to change the meaning at the political level (grand symbolic order), organizational level (institutional symbolic order), or in small groups (localized symbolic order) remain relevant. What this sociological model offers, however, is a theoretical framework that can identify what to look for since it defines what leadership *is*, instead of starting with what leadership *does* or *should* do.

It is not to say that sociology does not offer tools and methodologies of its own. One theoretical approach that can provide interesting tools to study leadership is symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism provides methodological tools to understand the possible interrelationships between localized symbolic orders and the grand, and with the institutional one. For instance, the interactionist's theatrical description provides an invaluable tool to understand how the institutional symbolic order is lived. This also helps to understand that a localized symbolic order cannot be completely insulated from the institutional form of symbolic order. Yet, the very idea that any theatre has a backstage, or that organizational life occurs also behind close doors, provides a powerful theoretical justification for maintaining that a localized symbolic order can coexist with an institutional one.

One may also consider that Garfinkel's ethno-methodological researches⁴⁷ help to provide the appropriate understanding of a localized symbolic order. His studies of language probe the complex assumptions and pre-utterance knowledge necessary to make sense of an exchange between two well-acquainted persons. This has been sometimes labelled "shared understanding." Similarly, the breaching experiments can be construed as illustrating both the existence of a grand or institutional symbolic order and the possibility of amending it on a local scale.

Conclusion

This paper started with a critique of the psychological approach to leadership in general, emphasizing the lack of understanding of what *is* leadership as a key issue. The intent was not to discredit important psychological studies or their methodologies, but rather to show how much sociology has to offer because it goes beyond one-on-one relationships or small group interactions. In a sense, research on leadership and military leadership in

particular, is ripe for a paradigmatic change, and it is only in pointing out problems rather than celebrating “successes” that such a change could occur. This paper, hopefully, is instrumental in supporting this change.

As pointed out above, the intellectual traditions behind the concept of relationships of meaning and localized symbolic order are not new. What this model attempts is to provide is a “fresh” look at what leadership *is* by reorganizing the existing conceptual tools and knowledge of leadership into a comprehensive approach. This model certainly remains heuristic at this stage, and is not designed to provide immediate practical solutions to the present day challenges to military leadership. However, it can allow researchers to ask different empirical questions because it takes a step back, and hence could provide new empirical answers, and ultimately propose different practical solutions.

Given the limited scope of this article, however, many important issues about military leadership could not be addressed. Among them are the role of strategic military leaders in shaping the institutional symbolic order and how it can distill into the localized one. Similarly, the role of strategic military leaders in integrating changes coming from the grand symbolic order into the institutional and localized ones remains to be explored. The impact of the bottom-up dynamics when an institutional leader is transformed in the process of gaining access to the localized symbolic order has not been treated either. Lastly, the full extent of how much formal relationship of powers provided by the institution (ranks, authority, etc.) do overlap with access to a symbolic order would deserve a significant amount of attention.

At the conceptual level, therefore, sociology can readily contribute to the understanding of what leadership is. Group members share certain perceptions, values, and understanding of the world. It is, sociologically speaking, what is transforming them into a group, and thus ceasing to be a simple aggregate of individuals; or conversely, it is what causes a group to dissolve into an individualistic mode and lead, for instance, to desertion and mutiny. In other words, looking at leadership from a sociological perspective allows the analyst to stop taking for granted the stable variables that were so necessary to previous approaches to the study of leadership. Social background, bureaucratic structures, cultural and geographic environment, and the nature of war itself are anything but stable. If these elements are construed as part of shaping a symbolic order, then it becomes easy to understand that this is the very fabric that military leaders can use to produce leadership effects.

About The Author...

Dr. Eric Ouellet joined the academic staff of the Canadian Forces College in January 2002. He did an undergraduate and master's degree in Political Science at Université Laval in Quebec City, and a Ph.D. in Sociology at York University in Toronto. In January 2005, Dr. Ouellet was appointed Director of Academics, responsible for the tasking of all academics at the College. Following two years at Defence Research and Development Canada's (DRDC) Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Dr. Ouellet returned to the College in August 2008.

Dr. Ouellet's current research covers historical case studies on counterinsurgency and military institutional adaptation, the institutional challenges of meta-organizational collaboration in the context of domestic national crisis, and on the integration of psycho-social models and methods into NATO's effect-based approach to operations.

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THE MULTIFUNCTIONAL MATERIALS NEEDS OF THE FUTURE DISMOUNTED SOLDIER

Royale S. Underhill, PhD

The Canadian soldier system vision is looking to three time frames: today, tomorrow and the future. The current efforts by the CF include the "Clothe the Soldier Plus" (CTS+), which involves incremental improvements to today's equipment (e.g., night vision goggles, non-lethal systems, etc.).

The dismounted soldier is now being considered as a system of systems where the new systems are designed to enhance the capability of the soldier. Some of these systems include the head-borne system, the battle management system, the ballistic protection system, the power system and the weapon system. This non-traditional view of the soldier is a direct result of Canada's Army of Tomorrow (AoT) and Adaptively Dispersed Operations (ADO) concepts.¹ Looking towards tomorrow and beyond, the future soldier will be required to carry more, utilize more technology and withstand more extreme environments.² Advances in materials and technologies will be required to alleviate the increased weight and related fatigue arising from these new demands.² *Multifunctional* materials may fulfill these needs. "Multifunctionality" is a cross-cutting idea that encompasses many classes of materials as well as their applications. Some of the applications of interest for the dismounted soldier include materials that are lightweight and enhance the stealth, ballistic protection, biological/chemical (BC) resistance, communications/energy storage properties, durability and comfort of soldiers' equipment and uniforms. The payoffs to developing these technologies include significant reductions in fatigue, casualties and detection, and improved individual environmental protection.

The focus on the soldier is not unique to the Canadian Forces (CF). The US has invested in the soldier as illustrated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN). Its mandate is to research advanced nanotechnologies to dramatically improve the survivability of the soldier of the future.³ The ultimate goal for ISN is to create a 21st century battle-suit combining high-tech capabilities with both light weight and comfort.³ The US Army Natick Soldier Center is also working on nanomaterials for protective materials, smart textiles and improved food packaging.⁴ Other countries have programs to address the requirements of their own future soldiers. In the UK, the program is "Future Infantry Soldier Technology" (FIST), the Italian army has "Soldato Futuro," the German army has "IdZ" and the French army has "FÉLIN." The Netherlands have identified the wireless soldier in a smart uniform as the central element in the future combat system.⁵

The Integrated Soldier Systems Project (ISSP) will build upon CTS+ to significantly enhance individual and group lethality, mobility and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence); providing the framework to move the soldier of today towards the Army of Tomorrow.^{6,7} The goal of ISSP is to provide soldiers with an integrated system of electronic devices, weapons accessories, operational clothing and individual equipment to allow them to operate in an evolving battle space.^{6,7} The ISSP along with other CF initiatives will feed into Soldier System 2020, a vision of how the soldier will respond to the future battle space. As part of the Soldier System 2020 concept, a roadmap has been developed to encompass a wide range of research areas that may lead to enabling technologies. In the continuous process of trying to anticipate future needs and develop the capabilities to address them,⁸ the CF army doctrine personnel have started the process of developing a vision for 2040.

Canada's ISSP has identified the need to explore novel technologies¹ for the soldier. Towards this end, Canada is involved in international collaborations to investigate appropriate technologies. These include the NATO research program on "Smart Textiles for the NATO Warfighter"⁹ and a trilateral agreement with the Netherlands and Sweden on a "unigarment" for the future soldier. The ultimate goal is for the unigarment to utilize nanotechnology and multifunctional materials to integrate lightweight armour, thermal management, BC protection and power/electronics into a single system worn by the soldier. This article will review some potential functional requirements of the future soldier, and present examples of multifunctional materials that may address these needs.

Functions of Interest

The functions of interest include equipment/uniform weight, soldier fatigue, thermal management both for thermal stress (arising from wearing/carrying kit), heat/cold stress (environmental), BC contamination detection/protection and ballistic protection (both improved core protection with reduced thermal stress and weight, and improved extremity protection). Current BC protection is heavy and its lack of breathability contributes to soldier fatigue. Improved ballistic protection is needed for increasingly dangerous environments, but current products cause thermal stress and reduced mobility. To achieve these functions with minimal impact to the soldier, new materials or combinations of materials designed for multifunctionality are needed.

There is a dichotomy in the needs of the dismounted soldier. On one side there are the increasing requirements for improved protection and individual communications, etc. that tend towards increasing the weight a soldier must carry. On the other side, the ability of the soldier to perform a mission is improved if the weight he has to carry is reduced. With the future soldier having to carry more equipment, a reduction in the weight of individual components or overall systems is necessary. Reduction in weight of equipment and uniform contributes to the endurance of the soldier by reducing fatigue/exhaustion.¹⁰ In the effort to reduce weight, lightweight materials must provide equivalent or improved functionality compared to the materials they are designed to replace.¹¹ In the US, the ISN has set as an ultimate goal, the reduction of the weight of a soldier's equipment/uniform from 45 kg to 7 kg (via an intermediate weight of 18 kg).¹² A reduction in weight can be achieved in one of two ways: utilising inherently lighter materials, or combining functionalities such that one item can do the job of two or more.

Weight Reduction

The Canadian infantry manual (volume 3) specifies that a soldier can carry 35% of his or her own body weight and still maintain a high percentage of agility, stamina and mobility.¹³ When the load exceeds 45% of body weight, functional ability drops rapidly. For an average soldier (i.e. 80 kg) these limits correspond to 28 kg and 36 kg respectively. The British Army's APRE (Army Personnel Research Establishment) has conducted trials that concluded that the economical load for a fit soldier is approximately 30% of his or her body weight and that the maximum marching load is approximately 45%.^{14,15} These correspond to 21 kg and 32 kg respectively. The US Army field manual on procedures for foot marches specifies that the fighting load should not exceed 48 lbs (22 kg) and the approach marching load should be less than 72 lbs (33 kg), based on an individual's ability.¹⁶ A comparison of the weights carried by the Canadian, UK and US infantry is given in Table 1. These are idealized numbers: in reality, the weights being carried can often exceed what is listed.

A study of how weight affects performance has been carried out. A recent Defence Research and Development Canada study determined there is a 25% reduction in a soldier's performance due to weight and heat retention while wearing a fragmentation vest without ballistic plates.¹⁷ With these results in mind, reducing the weight of any or all of the equipment carried is an important goal. Table 2 shows that the largest contributor to weight is a soldier's weapon and ammunition, followed by the fragmentation vest and ballistic plates and then the food and shelter. Areas that may benefit from weight reduction include new lightweight materials for pack frames (both small pack and rucksack), lightweight shell and



Courtesy of Author

insulating materials for clothing, sleeping bags, bivy etc. and lightweight packaging and casing materials for rations and ammunition.

Thermal Management for Comfort and Signature

Temperature regulation is required for comfort as well as reducing infrared (IR) signatures. Thermal management covers both insulation in cold conditions and cooling in hot conditions. Both conditions are of concern as the CF can be called upon to deploy in environments that range from arctic to desert conditions.

Traditionally, trapped air has been used as the primary source of passive insulation in clothing. Well known examples include down feathers and Thinsulate™. Insulation also works by reflecting back the body's radiant heat. The degree of insulation is determined by the material, the average distances between the insulation fibres, the fibre size and the thickness of the insulation layer. Finer fibres can be packed more densely, and in turn, can trap more air, thus improving the insulation.

Adaptive insulation is an active material that can expand/contract depending on the heat load. The goal is to create a network of fibres that are self-regulating and can transition between low-loft, low-insulation and a high-loft, high-insulation. The benefit to such a system would be a reduction in weight through the elimination of bulky layered clothing; meeting the ISSP's goal of thermal and

Image of the Canadian concept of the future soldier.

environmental protection with minimum bulk and weight.

At the other extreme, excess heat is also an issue. In hot climates the need for cooling can be a pressing requirement (e.g., Afghanistan has a countrywide extreme summer high temperature of 48°C¹⁸). Heat stress is a serious concern because it can affect the health and safety of the individual as well as operational performance.⁴ When the ambient temperature is above human body temperature (37°C), heat is transferred to the person. This heat added to the metabolic heat generated by the body itself results in the human body heating up. The fundamental issue for military personnel and emergency responders is the inability to reject heat (either metabolic or environmental) due to the insulating nature of the materials in their uniforms and/or personal protective clothing. As a result, core body temperature rises.

Passive or active cooling technologies can be considered to alleviate this problem. Passive technologies promote removal of perspiration from the skin. Such technologies include sweat-wicking textiles and other technologies that facilitate evaporation. Active cooling technologies include microclimate cooling (MCC). Microclimate cooling technologies remove excess body heat and reduce body core temperature by conduction and sometimes convection. The Natick Soldier Center reports that the use of MCC technologies "significantly increases a user's mission duration, improves mental acuity, reduces dehydration and enhances thermal comfort."⁴ Microclimate cooling technologies work by altering the microclimate immediately surrounding the individual. Cooled air, liquid, ice or wax is circulated around a series of tubes incorporated into a cooling vest. Applying these systems to the dismounted soldier is challenging due to their weight and power


requirements. Currently available personal cooling systems for the dismounted soldier operate on one of two principles:

- circulating air between the armour and the soldier's skin (convective cooling) or;
- body heat transfer (conductive cooling).

Both systems have draw backs. Circulating air requires fans, which need power, while heat transfer or phase change materials tend to lose their efficacy with time and require "recharging."¹⁹ Cooling can also be achieved by applying thermal regulation elements into the body armour itself. Johns Hopkins University has filed a patent that describes the use of high thermal-conductivity channels embedded into body armour to conductively remove heat from the body.

Biological and Chemical Protection

With growing concerns over the possibility of terrorist attacks using biological and chemical (BC) threats, protection is of increasing importance. Chemical threats refer to nerve and blister agents, while biological threats include bacteria (e.g. Anthrax), rickettsia (e.g. Typhus), toxins (e.g. Botulinum Toxin) and viruses. The drawbacks to traditional personal protective clothing (PPC) are its bulk, weight and lack of breathability (i.e., contributes to heat stress). There are two parallel and complimentary research streams in this area; sensors and protective clothing. Both are a necessity. Sensors are important for early detection of contaminants, while light, comfortable and protective wear is essential for survival.



Courtesy of Author

Molecular depiction of the three types of carbon nanotube. a) boat configuration, b) chair configuration, c) zig-zag configuration.

There are many companies and research groups investigating sensors for BC agents. The important aspect from a soldier's point of view is to make these sensors compact, lightweight and inexpensive. In this way every soldier could carry them, either in the form of a wrist watch-type device or integrated into the fabric of the uniform.

The purpose of PPC is to shield individuals from BC hazards. Personal protective clothing to combat BC threats consists of a gas mask at the bare minimum, but includes a chemical suit, boots, mask and gloves when full protection is needed. Unfortunately, no single combination of PPC is capable of protecting against all hazards. A number of factors must be considered when designing BC protection. These include: thermal comfort, catalytic breakdown of contaminant and self-sensing/signalling. PPC can be classified by design and performance. There are three classes relevant to BC protection. In order

of increasing contribution to heat stress they are: gas-tight, liquid-splash-protective and permeable-protective.²⁰ Gas-tight encapsulating suits provide a vapour-protective barrier. Liquid-splash-protective suits are not gas-tight, but are impermeable to liquid chemicals. Permeable-protective suits allow most molecules to permeate the surface, but chemically react with, or physically remove certain toxic materials before they can reach the skin.

Technologies for PPC include: permeable material treatments, permeable sorptive materials, engineered permeable materials and impermeable materials. Traditional textiles are permeable and do not offer protective properties against BC threats. Treatments and finishes can be used to enhance their protective capabilities. These treatments can impart high surface tension properties, and the ability to wick moisture. Permeable absorptive materials provide protection by trapping vapour-phase contaminants as they pass through the fabric. The two main materials for these technologies are active carbon and zeolites. The active carbon is selective for hydrocarbons, whereas zeolites can be tailored to absorb a range of contaminants.

Permeable materials can also be engineered to restrict the penetration of certain molecules while allowing others such as moisture or water vapour through. These materials are of particular importance because they allow for evaporative cooling and contribute to personal comfort. Engineered membranes include semi-permeable membranes, carbon-loaded semi-permeable membranes, nanofibre membranes and reactive material technologies.

Saratoga®, manufactured by Blücher is an example of an active-carbon-loaded filter fabric used in permeable-protective suits and is marketed by Tex-Shield Inc. as the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit (JSLIST) for the US Armed Forces.²¹ The corporate literature claims a minimum of 24 h reliable protection against neat and thickened chemical warfare agents, even after 45 days of wear and tear (including laundering) on the fabric.²¹ The manufacturer also claims high air-permeability, leading to a reduced heat stress and sweat accumulation.²¹ Impermeable materials prevent transmission of aerosols, liquids or vapours through their membranes. This includes the moisture produced by the user as well as exterior contaminants and can lead to increased heat stress for the wearer.

Fragmentation and Small Arms Ballistic Protection

Explosions from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are designed to maximize injury to exposed as well as protected human targets. Medical facilities are seeing more devastating extremity injuries than ever before, and the wounded arrive with severe damage to bones, blood vessels and nerves. Although fragmentation vests (a.k.a. frag vests) protect the upper torso and reduce the number of fatal chest injuries, the number of arm and leg injuries is on the rise. American sources show injuries affecting the arms account for approximately 25%, while legs make up approximately 30% of all injuries.²² The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in numbers of limb amputations more than double those in previous conflicts.²² This indicates that there is a need for new lightweight and flexible materials for both core and limb protection. Protection against projectiles is of ongoing importance because it is directly related to survivability.

Body armour is generally made from multiple layers of materials. When a projectile strikes the armour, it is caught in a mat of very strong fibres. The fibres absorb and disperse the impact energy. Each successive layer of material in the armour absorbs additional energy until the projectile is stopped. Frag vests with ballistic (armour) plates are the primary source of protection against shrapnel and small arms projectiles. Armour should defeat multiple hits of high level threats while maintaining the lowest possible weight, and provide the wearer with unrestricted movement. Historically, "combat assault" type frag vests were composed of soft fabric made of glass fibres. Modern vests are more advanced and are produced from synthetic fibres such as Kevlar® or Twaron®. These materials form the basic frag vest, which also allows ballistic plates to be added to pockets within. The ballistic plates can be steel, ceramic or high performance polyethylene (i.e., Spectra® or Dyneema®).²³ General frag vests provide front, back and side protection, but with increased

threats new vests include neck, shoulder and groin protection.²³ The drawback to these new vests is the increase in weight and bulk that adversely affects a soldier's performance.

Advanced armour materials must enhance protection and increase survivability. A number of factors must be considered when engineering armour. These include penetration resistance, weight, bulk, deflection, multi-hit capability, flexibility, comfort and field durability.¹¹ There are a number of synthetic fibres suitable for use in armour applications. Kevlar® is a para-aramid (i.e., polyaromatic amide) material from DuPont™ with high strength, low weight, high chemical resistance, high cut resistance and flame resistance. Spectra® by Honeywell is an ultra high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE). Honeywell claims that Spectra® is the highest strength-to-weight fibre in the world.²³ GoldFlex® is also manufactured by Honeywell using para-aramid fibres, in a process similar to Spectra®. Twaron® is another form of para-aramid manufactured by Twaron Products. It differs from other polyamides because it uses microfilaments that are finer and lighter than conventional fibres. Microfilament technology allows energy to be dispersed more quickly, while enhancing comfort and flexibility. Dyneema® (UHMWPE) has a high strength-to-weight ratio, can float on water and has high energy absorbing characteristics. Toyobo manufactures a polyphenylenebenzobisoxazole (PBO) fibre marketed as Zylon®. PBO has good thermal properties and almost twice the tensile strength of conventional para-aramid fibres. Toyobo claims Zylon will make excellent protective garments because its heat-and-mechanical-resistant properties will yield light, flexible fabrics with increased mobility and comfort.

The new materials discussed have decreased the bulk and weight of body armour from traditional materials. Newer materials, yet to be developed, in conjunction with further advances in vest design and engineering will continue to improve comfort and performance for the future soldier. To be considered an improvement, new lightweight materials must provide equivalent functionality while having a 30% weight reduction over conventional rigid armour. Armour can be improved by incorporating other essential functionalities. For instance, the ISN is investigating Kevlar® vests that incorporate a layer to protect against biological agents.

Extremity armour is not a new concept. Gauntlets for the arms and greaves for the lower legs date back thousands of years. The key is to protect vulnerable areas with a minimal increase in weight and without adversely affecting the ability to perform tasks. The US has developed a product called QuadGard®. The QuadGard® design uses Dyneema® and has been transitioned to use. In the future, the ideal materials used for extremity protection will be as flexible as ordinary textiles and only stiffen to supply fragmentation/small ballistic protection when needed. DuPont™ has proposed fabrics that change properties on demand by using plastic fibres with parallel hollow channels that can be filled with a material whose properties can be altered (e.g., *ferrofluids*).²⁴ An extension of this reasoning could yield a makeshift splint, that with the "flick of a switch" could cause the fabric around an injured part to become stiff and supportive.^{3,10}

Power/Data/Conductive Applications

The dismounted soldier of the future will be carrying increasing amounts of high-tech equipment. With more technology, comes the need for energy to power it. Increased energy demand translates to more weight unless overall power requirements are reduced or improved storage materials are implemented. Along with need for new power systems and storage, novel ways to transfer data are needed. Examples of applications include antennas that are integrated and/or embedded within clothing or other pieces of equipment, flexible displays, equipment that is powered either through wired or wireless systems, novel interconnects for equipment and power harvesting and energy storage for technology life extension. In some cases, integrating these applications into intelligent textiles may be desirable.²⁵

Information technology (IT) is playing an increasingly important role in the battlefield. Future soldiers will have an array of wearable IT to assist in their tasks. A head-up display (HUD) is a transparent display that supplies data without obscuring the user's view. The goal of an HUD is to increase situational awareness and operational effectiveness. Head-up displays have been used in fighter planes to centralize critical flight data within the pilot's field of vision, but they also have applications for the dismounted soldier. When supplied to the soldier via a visor or glasses, the technology is referred to as "head-mount" display (HMD). Head-mount display design is inherently a multidisciplinary endeavour encompassing engineering, materials and human factors. An HMD needs to be flicker-free for near-eye applications (i.e., less than a millisecond refresh rate), provide high-resolution information, have low power consumption and operate across a wide temperature range. Ideally, the HMD would be viewable under varying light conditions (e.g., daytime, dusk/dawn, night time, indoor and outdoor).

Night-vision technologies use image intensifiers to amplify the available light to achieve better vision. The most common methods for intensifying an image use low-light imaging, thermal imaging or near-infrared (IR) illumination.²⁶ Low-light imaging focuses the available photons onto a photocathode. The photocathode amplifies the image by generating more electrons than the incoming photons. The electrons hit a phosphor screen, providing the enhanced image. Typically a green phosphor is used because the human eye can differentiate more shades of green than any other colour.²⁶ Thermal imaging does not require any ambient light at all. All objects emit IR energy as a function of their temperature; the hotter an object, the more IR radiation it emits. Thermal imagers collect the IR radiation and use it to create an image. Because thermal imagers are based on IR radiation, they are able to penetrate smoke, fog and haze. Near-IR illumination combines a detector that will detect both low-light images and near-IR, with a near-IR illuminator. Near IR illuminators (e.g., 730 nm, 830 nm and 920 nm) provide supplemental IR illumination. The added illumination eliminates the variability of available ambient light, eliminating shadows and enhancing image contrast. It allows the observer to illuminate specific areas of interest. The supplemental near-IR lighting improves the quality of the image. The only drawback is that the device emits an IR signal which can be detected by others with the appropriate equipment.

In 1997, the CADPAT (Canadian Disruptive Pattern) was adopted by the CF to replace the traditional camouflage pattern. The CADPAT is a computer-designed pixelated pattern, which not only protects against visible detection, but is designed for near-IR protection as well, thus hiding a soldier from image intensification devices (i.e., night-vision technologies). Since implementation of the CADPAT design, armies in other nations have also started using a digitized disruptive pattern. The disruptive pattern can reduce detection by up to 40% when within 200 m of the subject. The requirements for improved camouflage include development of a pattern that is more universally applicable and that can transition between different environments, thus, eliminating the need for separate woodland, arid and arctic uniforms. Also, at distances greater than 200 m, the disruptive pattern begins to lose its effectiveness. A pattern that improves camouflage at greater distances may be of interest. Such a pattern might incorporate mathematical expressions such as fractals.

Technologies of Interest

The previous paragraphs outlined the developments and requirements for reduced weight, thermal management, BC protection, ballistic protection, power systems, and improved situational awareness. These requirements can be achieved through new materials, combinations of materials and careful design to impart multifunctionality. As soldiers are equipped with new technologies that enhance their capabilities and safety, it is essential that the weight of the equipment they are required to carry not be increased. In

addition, it is essential that enhanced environmental, ballistic and BC protection not increase thermal stresses or limits on mobility to the point where the soldier becomes ineffective in the field. The application of new materials, multifunctional materials and technologies have the potential to address these requirements. Some promising research areas are discussed below.

Nanomaterials

A nanometre (nm) is one-billionth of a metre; a human hair is approximately 80,000 nanometres thick. Another way to think about “nano-scale” is that one nanometre is to a metre what a pea would be to the distance between New York and Miami. A new class of materials, “nanomaterials,” have at least one dimension that is on the nanometre scale. Nanomaterials take advantage of the fact that when a material is of a size comparable to only a few atoms (i.e., 1-100 nm), size effects result that lead to unique properties.




Illustration of a membrane with nanopores; selective to allow water vapour through while restricting larger molecules such as chemical warfare agents.

Carbon nanotube (CNT) chemistry is a rapidly growing field. Carbon nanotubes can be thought of as sheets of carbon rolled into tubes. They are very strong, thermally conductive, either electrically conducting or semiconducting, and behave as field emitters. Some possible applications include: ultra-strong lightweight fabrics, field-emission based flat-panel displays, hydrogen storage devices, novel semiconductors, chemical/biological sensors, and electromechanical sensors.²⁷ When added to a polymer matrix to make a composite material, CNTs impart a mechanical reinforcement at low loading levels, thus reducing the overall weight of the composite required for a particular application.

Carbon fibre composites have been used for two decades to make strong, light materials. Specific examples of carbon fibre composite applications include automotive applications and sporting goods. The weakest part of a carbon fibre composite is the resin between the fibres. Technologies that use a combination of conventional carbon fibre composites with CNT additions are now being investigated. Because the CNTs are orders of magnitude smaller than the carbon reinforcing fibres, they improve the properties of the resin by improving strength and toughness. This technology is already being used commercially by Easton to make lighter, stronger composite baseball bats. The Easton CNT composite has also been used to make racing bikes that weigh less than a pound (0.456 kg) and are strong enough to withstand the rigors of the Tour de France. This technology has a lot of potential for many areas where lightweight, strong materials are needed (e.g., backpack frames, tent frames, etc.). Carbon nanotubes also have excellent energy absorption capacities. As such, they have potential applications in antiballistic materials. In a proof of concept demonstration Mylvaganam and Zhang have shown through modeling that nanotubes with large radii withstand higher velocity impacts. The ballistic resistance is greatest when the CNTs are tethered at both ends and the impact is in the middle of the CNT.²⁸ Okoli from Florida State University has developed a composite manufacturing process to create lightweight body armour (for legs, arms and head) that utilizes carbon nanotubes.²⁹

The term “nanofibre” refers to any fibre that has a diameter between 1-100 nm. Spider silk, collagen and cotton are examples of naturally occurring (protein) nanofibres. Polymer nanofibres are produced through “electrospinning” a polymer feedstock.³⁰ Because polymer nanofibre composites may be used to dissipate energy, they have applications in soft armour technologies. Soft armour is desirable to protect the extremities because it does not restrict movement. Teijin produces a woven textile with a large number of densely packed, very fine-denier Twaron® fibres—referred to as “microyarns”—that offer an improved protection level compared to thicker, coarser textiles made of the same composite materials.³¹ The microyarns are woven to minimize the crossover of warp and fill. Teijin then uses laminated fabric technology (LFT) to sandwich the woven textile between thin thermoplastic films, yielding the lightweight armour end product.³¹ Liu et al. have shown that when electrospun polycarbonate nanofibres are added to polycarbonate/poly(methyl methacrylate) matrices they improve the ballistic impact resistance of the composite while maintaining the material’s transparency.³² These materials show promise for eye protection and other transparent armour technologies.^{33,34}

Electrospun polyurethane nanofibres have been proposed for breathable, water-proof textiles.³⁵ These may have applications for sweat-wicking applications. Lee and Obendorf have shown that electrospun polypropylene webs provide excellent barrier performance against a high surface tension challenge liquid (specifically pesticides).³⁶ The goal of their research was to examine novel materials for protective clothing for agricultural workers, although the work could be extended to first responders and military personnel requiring BC protection. They identified a need for textiles that had both high protection and increased comfort in hot environments. Comfort was assessed by examining air permeability and water permeability (i.e., increased permeability meant increased comfort). Shreuder-Gibson et al. from the US Army Natick Soldier Center have been investigating electrospun polymers for protection against BC threats in aerosol form.^{36,37} Due to their high surface area, nanofibres could possibly be used for decontamination via adsorption and/or catalytic breakdown of toxins³⁶.

The thermal insulating efficiency of fibre-based insulation increases as the diameter of the fibre decreases.³⁸ This suggests that nonwoven textiles made from nanofibres should exhibit good insulating properties. The thermal properties of nanofibres and their potential for protection against cold environments are relatively unknown, but it has been postulated that they offer potential as insulating materials due to low mass, high strength and high surface/volume ratio.³⁸ The resulting decrease in weight and bulk over current thermal protective clothing could result in an increased mobility for the soldier.³⁸ Unfortunately,

Table 1: Summary of recommended weights carried by Canadian, American and British Infantry.

	Fighting Order	Battle Order	Marching Order
CAN	10-15 kg	15-20 kg	30-35 kg
UK	21 kg	24 kg	32 kg
US	22 kg	n/a	33 kg

Table 2: Examples of equipment carried by Canadian Infantry and their weights.

Item	Approx. Weight
weapon (excl. ammo)	4.7-7.6 kg
ammo	5-6.2 kg
helmet	1.6 kg
night vision goggles	0.5 kg
fragmentation vest	2.8 kg
ballistic plates (2) – for frag. vest	2.6 kg ea.
NBCD mask & case	2.3 kg
tactical vest (alone)	1.1 kg
camel back (3 L)	3.3 kg
small pack (alone)	1.5 kg
rations (24 h)	2.1 kg
rain gear	1 kg
rucksack (alone)	3 kg
rations (48 h)	4.2 kg
sleeping bag, bivy <i>etc.</i>	4.5 kg
ground sheet	1.4 kg
clothing	1.5 kg
combat jacket	1.3 kg
NBC suit, boots & gloves	4 kg

Table 3: Comparison of the strengths of various armour materials.

Tradename	Material	Yield Strength (GPa)	Density (g/cm ³)	strength/weight ratio
-	low carbon steel	0.5	7.8	0.1
-	high strength steel	0.7	7.8	0.1
Spectra®	UHMWPE	3.0	0.97	3.0
Dyneema®	UHMWPE	2.4	0.97	2.5
Kevlar®	para-aramid	3.0	1.4	2.1
Twaron®	para-aramid	3.6	1.4	2.5
Zylon®	PBO	5.8	1.6	3.7

Gibson's preliminary work in this area suggests that nanofibres are not useful for high-loft thermal insulation and that below 1 micron diameter and at low fibre volume fractions, they are not thermally efficient.³⁸ However, nanofibres may be incorporated into hybrid

batting) where a proportion of the fibres are larger to provide durability and compression recovery³⁸.

Smart Materials

Conventional textiles serve two purposes:

- to function as a protective layer for the skin and
- to perform technical functions.³⁹

When a textile performs additional functions, it is known as a smart textile. Desirable textile properties for military use include durability, "laundryability," flexibility and non-toxicity, with additional functionalities including light weight (low mass), improved camouflage, and BC protection. When considering the addition of new functionalities, the textile should retain the usual tactile, flexible and comfort properties of the cloth. As well, new textiles should not exceed the current bulk or increase the heat stress on a soldier. The ultimate goal for smart textiles is to be able to mimic skin, which can sense pressure and temperature, and reacts to these stimuli. Skin can change colour, is permeable, can shed and regenerate itself.

Smart textiles can be either passive, meaning they only sense the environmental conditions, or active, meaning they can both sense the environment and respond to it (e.g., thermoregulating garments that maintain the wearer's body temperature). Smart textiles could be used to augment the sensory system of the skin by sensing external stimuli such as proximity, touch, pressure, temperature and chemical/biological substances. Antibacterial properties can be added by incorporating nano-sized silver, titanium dioxide and zinc oxides.

Smart textiles will play a major role in future camouflage technologies. Metallic pigments are used for near-IR camouflage; a new generation of fibres using nanofibres of nickel, copper or silver may lead to fibres that could change colour.²⁵ Adaptive (or switchable) camouflage in the visible region may be possible with thermochromic inks or electroluminescent materials.²⁵

The comfort aspect of clothing is very important. A new technology that could be used to address comfort and possibly BC protection is "changeable pores." It may be possible to change the size of the pores in a polymer film using micro-polymer actuators. By changing pore size, the permeability is changed³⁹. Smaller pores have better BC protection and reduce the breathability of the membrane, making it more effective at insulating. DRDC Valcartier has developed a knitted shape-memory polymer textile for infrared camouflage of structures.⁴⁰ Other adaptive thermal insulations include VARILoft⁴¹ and "aerogel" insulators such as Nanogel®.⁴² VARILoft is also based on thermally responsive shape-memory polymer fibres. A thermally induced strain is created within the fibre as the temperature changes. Through engineering the fibre mats, the strain allows the resulting textile to transition from a flat, two-dimensional configuration to a larger volume three-dimensional structure. The result is a self-regulating batting that transitions from low-loft, low-R to high-loft, high-R insulation. Nanogel® is Cabot Aerogel's tradename for the aerogel it markets as "the world's lightest and best insulating solid material."⁴² Nanogel® is a silica-based aerogel lattice of 5% glass strands and 95% air which allows for high insulating properties while still transmitting light.

Smart materials are materials that can sense and react to environmental conditions or stimuli (e.g., mechanical, thermal, chemical, electrical or magnetic). Their functionality responds when required or dictated by the environment. Types of smart materials include: piezoelectric materials, shape-memory materials (e.g., alloys or polymers), pH-sensitive polymers, chromic materials (e.g., halochromic, electrochromic, thermochromic, or photochromic), and viscosity sensitive materials (e.g., magneto-rheostatic or electro-rheostatic).

Nanoscale manipulation results in new functionalities for intelligent textiles, including self-cleaning, sensing, actuating and communicating capabilities. Additionally, advances in processing techniques will result in improved yarns, films and textiles. A multi-component extruder can produce novel fibre structures, for instance, combining a sheath material over a core material to produce a unique core-shell fibre. The resulting fibre may combine properties of different polymers and additives including resistance to microbes, improved ability to retard fire, thermal protection, and electrical conductivity. This may be the engineering answer to achieving some multi-functionality that cannot be accomplished through chemical formulation.

Super-rheological Fluids

Also known as shear-thickening fluids (STF), the viscosity of super-rheological fluids change as a function of shear rate or applied stress. Typically, a carrier fluid is loaded to a high volume fraction (50-60%) with sub-micron sized oxide particles. These particles have been referred to as “nanobinders.” The particles are stabilized against flocculation by either surface charge or surface treatments. Joint research between the US Army Research Laboratories and the University of Delaware has developed a method to apply STFs to fabrics.^{43,44} Fabrics with STF show potential in the production of extremity armour. Materials with STF have demonstrated reduction in “back face deformation,” suggesting an ability to reduce the blunt trauma effect resulting of high energy ballistic impacts.

Conclusions

The predictions made during the Cold War that future warfare would be fought more by machine than man have proven to be wrong. Recent conflicts have shown the continuing importance of the dismounted soldier. As conflicts change and more importance is placed on the asymmetric threat, technology must be leveraged to gain full strategic and tactical advantage in Adaptive Dispersed Operations.

The systems soldiers use must enhance their capabilities to provide improved situational awareness, comfort (heat and weight reduction), and protection (ballistic, BC, camouflage). However, as new systems are added, the weight that soldiers must carry is increasing. This puts increased strain on soldiers, limiting mobility and effectiveness. New materials and engineering of materials offer an approach to enhancing the capabilities of these systems without increasing weight. Along with weight, added equipment may increase power requirements. New technologies to meet changing energy demands are needed.

To take full advantage of new and improved technologies, an understanding of the materials used to make them is required. A fundamental understanding of multifunctional materials is essential before they can be implemented effectively for defence applications. With understanding, these materials can be evaluated and transitioned into new products.

Developments in the areas of nanomaterials, smart materials, super-rheological fluids and numerous other technologies not discussed here show great promise for use in multifunctional materials. Applications of these materials and technologies should lead to soldier systems incorporating some or all of: reduced weight, increased comfort, reduced signature, improved chemical and biological protection, improved ballistic protection and improved situational awareness.

About the Author...

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INNOVATIONS IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: A NEW APPROACH

Andrew Brian S. Sullivan

Despite the numerous and devastating attacks claimed by Islamist terrorists, individual acts of terrorism are still not the greatest threat posed by these extremists. Rather, it is the ideology, which is their strategic centre of gravity and which allows them to continually recruit, finance and expand, that poses the greatest obstacle to successfully countering this threat. Failing to effectively and proactively counter the spread of the ideology that facilitates the expansion of religious-based terrorism gives the extremist elements of these groups the initiative to develop however and wherever they please. That initiative then reduces one's own options to those of a reactive nature only.

This is not to argue that all current counter-terrorism options have failed, rather that the list of options available remains incomplete to effectively deter and contain organizations such as Al Qaeda and similar affiliated groups. Militarily, Canada and her allies in Afghanistan can succeed in any battle with the Taliban. Socially and economically, significant steps have been taken towards addressing the 'root causes' of terrorism both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. However, it seems little is being done to directly confront the spread of the extremist ideology that lays the groundwork for new terrorist organizations to form in theatres of operations where such groups have not previously existed.

Fortunately, with the release of the Reports of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication in 2004 and 2008,¹ the U.S. Departments of State and Defense began to re-imagine information operations as a means to influence how civilians in Middle Eastern conflict zones perceive the West. This represents a concerted effort towards curbing the spread of this extremist ideology. While much credit must be given to the authors of these Strategic Communication reports for recognizing the central role of ideological competition in the War on Terror, there remains some room for improving their findings. Disappointingly, the focus of the reports is solely on the role of broadcasting and the internet in expanding U.S. influence around the world, without also elaborating on a low-technology option. This singular approach is likely to blunt the potential positive outcomes of any Strategic Communication initiative.

The Limitations of Broadcasting

While the Reports of the DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication correctly note that U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) operations reach more than 155 million people each week, they neglect to mention specifics. For example, Radios Sawa and Farda² broadcast to 15 million listeners, but these listeners reportedly only tune in for the music portion of the programming.³ Consequently, these stations continue to "have little influence on either governments or the 'Arab Street'."⁴ This lack of impact is largely because

Muslims generally and Islamists specifically do not lack for reliable information; much less do they... prefer Western sources of information to their own. To the contrary, many indicators suggest Muslims favour tuning in or reading reports prepared by their co-religionists, trusting these more than what comes from non-Muslims.⁵

Furthermore, there are a wide range of reports prepared by the Muslim community. U.S. broadcasting efforts must compete with *As Sahab*, the Al Qaeda media wing, Hezbollah's newspaper *Al-Ahed* ("The Pledge"), radio station *Al-Nour* ("The Light"), TV station *Al-Manar* ("The Beacon"), and approximately "200 other stations [that] beam Arabic-language programming to satellite dishes reaching even the poorest neighborhoods in the Middle East and North Africa."⁶

In addition to an abundance of satellite television and radio options, targeted audiences with internet access are free to choose from a variety of new media forms.⁷ Internet blogs, videos, and websites have added to the spectrum of, and complicated control over, available sources for information. As the 2008 DSB report notes, "People are free to choose content that closely matches their own interests and biases."⁸ This level of information saturation means that "attention, not information, becomes a scarce resource."⁹ As a result, the U.S. is now faced with the dilemma of continuing current broadcasting efforts in the Middle East, which have proven largely unsuccessful, or identifying a new niche to exploit.



Combat Camera AR2005-A01-373

A significant non-technological niche, currently unexploited by Western forces, is the human community. Specifically, person-to-person communication stands as one of the most fundamental and universally trusted realms of information in contemporary societies. This article will illustrate a framework for how introduced ideas might be effectively employed in a counter-ideological strategy to confront Islamist ideology within the communities from which terrorist organizations recruit. This strategy will be presented not as a competing counter-terror option to replace those that are currently in use, but as an additional tool designed to confront the spread of the ideology that facilitates and motivates individuals to carry out terrorist acts. The framework will outline three elements, including the method by which ideas transmit through a population, a mechanism by which ideas may be inserted into a given community, and a suitable idea as the means to obliquely confront Islamist extremist ideology. The purpose of this approach is to 'inoculate' a target audience against an extremist doctrine by inserting an acceptable idea whose presence limits or prohibits subsequent acquiescence to Islamic ideology. While not a 'hearts and minds' strategy, this framework provides the first stratagem of its kind to engage in the counter-ideological conflict that is the 'War of Ideas'.

Weaponizing Ideas: A New Niche?

Memetics, the study of memes, is concerned with how ideas can spread through a population to create a "social contagion epidemic,"¹⁰ much like a virus transmits between bodies. It is also concerned with how established concepts presently accepted within a community are occasionally replaced by subsequent ideas. The application of memetics to counterterrorism is concerned with creating an artificial, directed social epidemic to counter or replace the extremist ideology within a given community or group. An epidemic of this

type would be designed to elicit specific behavioural or attitudinal responses from the target audience. Memes are spread by word of mouth interactions, thereby negating reliance on modern communication technology such as the internet, radio, and television. Memes have been used to explain a variety of social learning phenomena, and as a whole, include attitudes, behaviours and beliefs, such as religious convictions.¹¹ Religious ideology is itself an example of this third type of meme.

Functionally, successful memes progress through four stages of replication. First, memes are assimilated and internalized by the new host. In the second stage the internalized meme is embedded in the host's memory where it is retained for future expression. The longer it is retained, and the greater accuracy with which it is retained, the better its ability to be spread. Third, the meme is made apparent to other potential hosts through its expression. The expression will generally take the form of linguistic or behavioural articulation, but is by no means limited to these possibilities. Fourth, when the expressed meme is passed to a receptive host it is then transmitted again, thus completing the cycle from expression to assimilation.¹²

Mememes are self-replicating and omnipresent in all cultures, existing in the subconscious background, or 'socio-structural white noise', that is the basis of every society. They act as a subconscious influence on a person's decision-making process by establishing the subliminal parameters within which conscious decisions are made. As such, they remain present within each member of a population, guiding their choices and actions. Due to the ubiquitous nature of mememes, as well as general reliance on oral transmission of information in the cultures where the West is currently facing the threat of Islamic-driven terrorism or insurgency, the ability to insert a specific message into the social network of a given group would be a non-technological-dependent means of spreading anti-jihadist messages. Relying on personal communication, such as gossip and rumors, instead of technology or literacy-dependent options, will insure deeper social penetration with less traceability. Through the manipulation of mememes, the West may directly influence the interpretation of perceptions in the War of Ideas.¹³ In this context, the objective will be to insert parasitic mememes into the natural flow of ideas within a specific community to create directed attitudes and behaviours that contradict or deflect the messages sent by Islamist extremists.

Tipping Points: Creating Social Epidemics

It is not enough to simply introduce an idea and hope that it alters a population's perception. Certain factors must be reached to produce the necessary 'tipping point' where a new social epidemic is created.

Social epidemics are idea-based social movements that spread through a population by exponential, rather than geometric, growth. While not every individual will be 'infected' by the idea contained within the movement, exponential growth means that virtually no one is left unexposed. The key to the shift between an idea that exists within a population and a full-blown epidemic is the tipping point, the moment at which a noticeable change occurs within the behaviour or perspective of a population. These points can best be thought of as a snow fall. The degree difference between having snow and not having snow may be only a few degrees, but the functional difference is green grass versus white snow.¹⁴ In a social epidemic, the difference in behaviour associated with the spread of the idea may be unobservable until the tipping point is reached. At this point, the change in behaviour becomes evident. This unquantifiable characteristic of tipping points has led to many failures in attempts to force, direct, and measure social epidemics. These three elements—that ideas spread through a population exponentially, that little causes can have significant effects, and that "change happens not gradually but at one dramatic moment"—are the identifying characteristics of social epidemics.¹⁵

To counter an ideology that is spreading through a population like a contagion, a means of 'inoculating' the 'uninfected' population must be found. The key to a successful memetic counter-ideological strategy will depend on its depth of penetration in that population. To

maximize the depth of penetration of the counter-ideology, the insertion will have to come from several different directions simultaneously, mimicking a network or swarm attack. It will have to expand from both the centre to the edges and the edges to the centre. Memes provide the best heuristic model because they are "self-replicating concepts that move through time and space without support from the source."¹⁶ Additionally, they are communicated along pre-existing social networks, meaning that they directly access an established, multi-directional communication net, enabling memetic messages to be sent in several directions simultaneously.



Combat Camera AR2006-A026-0056a

Insertion: CAPs as the Mechanism

If word of mouth is to be the method of initiating a social contagion epidemic, then the issue of establishing credibility with the target audience is crucial. One proven method of building exceptionally strong psychological bonds of trust is through the sharing of intense personal experiences. In a combat setting, these types of experiences can best be forged through the deployment of military forces already in theatre in a Combined Action Platoon (CAP) operation, similar to that employed by the U.S. Marines in the early part of the Vietnam War.¹⁷

Historically, CAPs were an innovative approach to troop deployment designed to overcome the growing problem of an increasing manpower shortage coupled with an expanding tactical area of operations.¹⁸ To solve this problem, the USMC conceived of combining "a squad of marines with local Popular Forces (PFs) and assigning them a village to protect [which] proved to be a force multiplier."¹⁹ This almost accidental "bottom-up strategy"²⁰ saw squads of "little more than a dozen Marines in villages, to support, train, and fight with existing Vietnamese units defending their own homes."²¹ Both the long-term and proximate nature of the Marine deployment to the people they fought with presented an inadvertent, but mutually beneficial, opportunity to engage in the War of Ideas that lay at the heart of the insurgency in the Vietnam War.²²

CAP deployment provided multifaceted opportunities for the Marines. These opportunities included destroying the networks of social and physical infrastructure that supported the insurgency; maintaining consistent, local, and direct security and law

enforcement in the village; protecting friendly infrastructure, thus allowing NGOs to safely operate in civic action programs; and organizing successful intelligence nets by accessing pre-existing social networks.²³ In combination, this effort effectively provided better service and protection to the population than was offered by the insurgents.²⁴ Each of these factors assisted in developing a high level of trust between the Marines and their hosts.

Furthermore, by posting the same Marines in one location for an extended period, the villagers came to know that “the Marines were committed to them, and trust developed from the personal contact of living, fighting, and dying together.”²⁵ As Marcus Corbin notes, “Living near the people in the villages engendered the trust of the locals. That trust yielded the most important ingredient of fighting a guerilla war—intelligence.”²⁶ The ensuing psychological bonds and mutual trust manifested itself in the form of shared intelligence. It is not difficult to imagine how sharing information leads to the mutual sharing and reinforcement of ideas, perceptions and attitudes. This real world model illustrates the practicality of deploying a CAP-style program in the current War of Ideas.

Auspiciously, there are grounds for assuming that a CAP deployment would be well-accepted in Afghanistan, and potentially by other populations under threat from Islamic extremism. According to the 2008 DSB report, a 2005 survey of 2,089 Afghans found that “81 percent held a negative view of Al-Qaeda’s [sic] influence in the world,” “88 percent held a negative view of the Taliban,” and “90 percent held an unfavourable (75% very unfavourable) view of Osama bin Laden.” Additionally, the same survey found an “83 percent favourable (39% very favourable) rating” of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.²⁷ In spite of these attitudes (or perhaps because of), these people remain under threat from Islamists, such as the Taliban. A CAP deployment by Western forces could provide the basis for securing threatened populations, while simultaneously establishing the trust relationships that are needed to permit new ideas and perspectives to be shared across cultures.

The model provided by the CAP deployment stands as an example of how human relations, regardless of cultural idiosyncrasies, can be used to promote specific psychological bonds that may influence cultural perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. Although CAPs were initially created to provide physical security, their presence allowed a unique opportunity to engage in the War of Ideas. While the ideas in Vietnam were socio-economic rather than religious in nature, the CAP framework is applicable to the Long War against Islamist extremists.

The Necessity of Oblique Memetic Attacks

Where new memes compete successfully, they will replace a target’s previously held beliefs or ideas, yielding new paradigms. Where they fail to compete, they are simply not re-transmitted and the tipping point is never reached. This is why newly inserted memes have the best chance of survival if they are inserted in such a manner that they do not compete directly with pre-existing memes. This oblique attack prevents the new meme from being rejected before it has a chance to influence the host’s perspectives and be passed on. An oblique memetic attack achieves its success by attaching itself to another similar meme already held by the host that is also more powerful than the meme it is attacking. For example, in a memeplex²⁸ as complex as religious beliefs, there are a core set of memes that are fundamental to the entire paradigm.²⁹ Each of these is supported by co-memes that reinforce the core and other co-memes. A new idea that attacks the core meme directly will be automatically rejected by the various co-memes that are designed, or have evolved, to protect the core meme. This is a direct attack and it will fail. However, a new idea that attaches itself to a core meme, and reinforces it while simultaneously attacking and replacing the pre-existing co-memes with its own co-memes, will create a strong sense of cognitive dissonance within the host’s mind.³⁰ If the new meme successfully reinforces the existing core meme while redefining the previous co-memes, a new paradigm will take root in the mind of the host.

A significant obstacle to introducing new ideas lies in finding a concept which the host is able and willing to internalize. Regardless of the level of trust established between two parties, new ideas that directly contradict a host's previously held beliefs will be quickly rejected. As such, a subtle, indirect, or piecemeal introduction of new ideas, that also support aspects of the host's pre-existing perspectives, will be far more effective than wholesale direct attacks on one's beliefs. For example, proposing the dominion of a secular society over religiosity to a devout Muslim will likely enjoy a spectacular rate of failure. Instead, any message to be introduced must be carefully crafted to support the core beliefs of the target audience while simultaneously undercutting, in this case, the Islamic extremist ideology that has attached itself to the host's religious and cultural worldview.

Current extremists have connected much of their ideology to the Muslim faithful by employing their status as religious scholars, calling on Muslims to reject all non-Islamic ideology.³¹ Their fundamentalist authority is perceived as an extension of the Koran, which is considered the literal word of God. This ideological centre of gravity begs the question: could the Koran and other fundamentalist structures be used to drive the target audience to question the extremist interpretation of Islam, and by extension, the authority of its promulgators?

Specifically, the history of Islamic scholarship has been marked by changes in its interpretation by religious scholars. The current extremist reconfiguration of the Muslim faith has required a nearly wholesale rejection of the Islam of the past. As Daniel Pipes notes:

In rejecting a whole millennium, the fundamentalists throw out a great deal of their own legacy, from the great corpus of Qur'anic scholarship to the finely worked interpretations of [Islamic] law.³²

The past century of ever growing extremist analysis has meant that "many fundamentalists are ignorant of their own history and traditions."³³ However, those traditions have not been lost by the wider Muslim community, and may be used to reintroduce concepts from the past that would challenge the extremist perspective.



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Derk Kinnane has identified three core concepts central to re-shaping the War of Ideas to weaken extremist ideology, as follows: properly defining, or re-defining, *jihad* and its role in holy war; Sharia law as derived from the Koran, the Prophet, and established custom; and *ijtihad*, an Islamic concept that means thinking afresh about Islamic doctrine.³⁴ The purpose of *ijtihad* is to introduce critical thinking about the state of Islam within Muslim communities. By dismissing the previous 1200

years of Islamic scholarship, extremists protect themselves by also rejecting this core cultural tenet of Islam. While Kinnane's first two concepts can be extensions of the third, it is the memetic promotion of the concept of *ijtihad* that will be the key to obliquely attacking the Islamists and blocking the spread of their ideology.

Ijtihad Explained

Ijtihad is a complex concept steeped in Islamic law. Islamic law (Shari'a) is derived from the Koran, the book of God's laws as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century, and the Sunna, which are the legal traditions established by the Prophet

in light of God's laws. However, the Koran itself is more a book of customs or guidance than codified law. It contains three different types of instruction: articles of faith, articles relating to ethics, and regulations for society and the state. Yet no more than ten percent of the Koran can be considered to constitute actual legal prescriptions. Rather than a book of actual laws, the Koran and Sunna function, relative to Shari'a law, in the same way as a constitution functions relative to a nation's laws. The Koran and Sunna make clear "the essential origin of legislation and prescription of law," rather than dictating the actual practice of those laws.³⁵ These specifics are left to Islamic jurists to deduce. The mechanism for deducing these legal particulars is the function of *ijtihad*.³⁶

The process of *ijtihad* has been defined as being:

practiced by a jurisprudent to discover secondary divine legislation (laws) regarding the organizing of human life and its diverse relations or endeavouring to discover and deduce the Islamic laws and regulations from their sources.³⁷

In essence, *ijtihad* is the effort to derive societal laws from the Koran and Sunna that are acceptable to God.³⁸ Due to the ever-changing needs of society, *ijtihad* is also responsible for interpreting and changing these laws as the context of the Muslim community evolves over time.³⁹ As new contexts emerge, these laws must then be re-thought.⁴⁰

While it may be assumed that the degree to which Islamic law is debated would be minimal, this assumption does not hold. Radwan Masmoudi, president of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy, acknowledges that although the Koran is universally seen as the literal word of God,⁴¹ "there has been and continues to be substantial disagreement about the meanings of certain verses and their application to different situations."⁴² Indeed, for the first eight to nine centuries after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632, *ijtihad* was "developed by Muslim scholars in order to understand and apply the message of the Koran to varying societal needs and conditions."⁴³ It was held that "without the process of *ijtihad*, many human activities are difficult to develop in the sphere of an Islamic life."⁴⁴

Interestingly, extremists such as those found in contemporary movements argue that *ijtihad* has not been practiced since the late ninth century.⁴⁵ The basis for this argument is that certain classical jurists of that period argued that all laws that could be derived from the Koran and Sunna had been written in their perfect form and no further interpretation was required. This argument has been called the "closing of the gate of *Ijtihad*."⁴⁶ In the absence of *ijtihad*, these jurists instituted the practice of *taqlid*. *Taqlid* is the imitation of established traditions without relation to context. The belief that all Islamic laws exist in perfection, and that no further interpretations are necessary is prevalent today, as "most countries in the Muslim world prefer to practice *taqlid* using *Ijtihad* only when the practice of *taqlid* cannot bring about the desired reforms."⁴⁷ While not commonly accepted as fact by conservative Islamic governments, as well as those infected with Islamist ideology, there is ample evidence that *ijtihad* had been practiced before, during, and long after the supposed "closing of the gate" and has not been entirely replaced with *taqlid* either in theory or in practice.⁴⁸

Historical Evidence for Ijtihad

History abounds with examples of *ijtihad* in practice from the time of the Prophet to the present day. For example, fifteen years after the death of Mohammed, the second Caliph, Omar ibn-al-Khattab (reigned 634-644), today considered as one of the "Four Righteously Guided Caliphs," stopped cutting off the hands of thieves who were stealing out of the necessity of hunger. Despite directly contradicting the Koran, which prescribes this exact punishment, the change was deemed just and the Caliph held that justice was "supreme."⁴⁹ Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib, who was the fourth of the "Four Righteously Guided Caliphs," argued that as men and women speak for the Koran, interpretation of its dictates "is an essential part of applying [Koranic] injunctions to the lives of Muslims."⁵⁰ It is also said that Imam Muhamma Ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (767-820), a founding leader of the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence, once gave a certain legal opinion in Baghdad. After moving to Cairo the next year, he gave a very different opinion to the same issue. When questioned over his

inconsistency, he replied "That was in Baghdad and this is in Cairo. That was last year and this is now."⁵¹

These classic jurists, among others, recognized the need for legal change as a social context evolves. As Wael Hallaq argues, the practice of *ijtihad* continued unbroken during the formative first five hundred years after the death of the Prophet. This is due to the persistent "differences among jurists, encouraged by ambiguities in legal terminology" which made any consensus on the end of *ijtihad* "impossible to reach."⁵²

There appears to be little emphasis on legal reflection between the 13th and 18th centuries. This is probably due to the retreat of Islam from Europe and the colonization of Muslim countries by Europeans in the latter half of this period. However, Muslim revivalists of the 18th and 19th centuries renewed the practice of *ijtihad*.⁵³ By the late 19th century, the role of *ijtihad* had expanded, and was seen less as a "legal tool and more the key to an Islamic *weltanschauung* based on rational thought."⁵⁴ The movement to restore the practice gained such strength that in 1898, Mohammed Abduh, considered the founder of Islamic Modernism, advocated the:

fresh interpretation of the principles found in the divine revelation as the basis of legal reforms. Abduh also argued that *ijtihad* was not only the right of modern day jurists but the only way by which Islam could adapt itself to the needs of today's society.⁵⁵

Ijtihad continued to play a role in legal reforms across the Middle East and North Africa during the 20th century.⁵⁶ Most notably, in 1960 Pakistani High Court judge Mohammed Shafi stated that "Reading and understanding the [Koran] implies the interpretation of it which must be in the light of the existing circumstances and the changing needs of the world."⁵⁷ As late as the year 2000, the council of Muslim *ulamas* (religious scholars) in Europe and the United States "decreed that it was permissible for Muslims residing in the West to buy houses with mortgages and to pay interest on these loans." Despite the fact that this ruling directly contravenes the Koranic prohibitions on charging or paying interest, it was justified on the grounds that Muslims in the West had particular financial and social needs that had to be met in this context.⁵⁸ The overwhelming evidence that *ijtihad* has been practiced almost continuously since the death of the Prophet, and the lack of consensus that it had been completely replaced by *taqlid*, is strong evidence that this cultural norm still exists in the Muslim world today.

Re-establishing Ijtihad

Even in those areas where *ijtihad* has been more or less replaced by *taqlid*, it may still be possible to reawaken the people to its practice. As *taqlid* is the direct imitation of classical practices, such as those found in the Koran, a Koranic basis for *ijtihad* needs to be found to be imitated through *taqlid*. Fortunately, Koran 21:78-79 illustrates that *ijtihad* not only has a basis in the Koran itself, but the verses cite its usage "by the prophets themselves."⁵⁹ Additionally, Koran 2:149, which speaks to the common practice of facing Mecca when praying, cites God as having said "Wherever you are, face the sacred mosque [in Mecca], and wherever you are, turn your face towards it." In this passage "God Himself indirectly encourages us to exercise our faculty of reasoning... to derive a logical conclusion on certain matters." This divine requirement elevates the practice of *ijtihad* to "the most important source of Islamic law next to the [Koran] and the Sunna."⁶⁰



Koran Cover

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Furthermore, the practice of *ijtihad* is sanctified within the Sunna as well, where it is directly prescribed by the Prophet. This tradition states that during Mohammed's lifetime he appointed Mu'adh Ibn Jabal as a judge in Yemen. According to the Sunna, the night before the judge departed for his new post,

The Prophet asked him: "According to what shall thou judge"? He replied: "According to the Book of God." "And if thou findest naught therein?" "According to the Sunna of the Prophet of God." "And if thou findest naught therein?" *Then I will exert myself to form my*

own judgment. And thereupon the Prophet said: "Praise to God who has guided the messenger of his Prophet to that which pleases his Prophet."⁶¹

This is direct recognition and approval of the practice of *ijtihad* in situations not specifically covered by the Koran or Sunna. Consequently, whether from the Koran, the Sunna, or *ijtihad*, legal theory is sanctioned by God as it is revealed in divine sources.

In Islam, as it is man's duty to worship God, it becomes incumbent on mankind to produce qualified jurists who will interpret the law as a means of worshipping God through this creation. According to Wael Hallaq this obligation is such that "Until *Ijtihad* is performed by at least one *mujtahid*,⁶² the Muslim community remains under the spell of this unfulfilled duty."⁶³ Moreover, laws that are uncovered by *mujtahids* "are only estimated" and not considered final, not even those laws that were "perfectly" formulated around the ninth century. Therefore it is required that existing laws be scrutinized. This scrutiny should be "pure and free from any fanaticism or internal or external factors such as political and sectarian tendencies."⁶⁴ Thus, "it is the duty of a rightly guided *mujtahid*... [to] cancel in all periods any of these sources which contradict the [Koran] and the Sunna or hold no water before a scientific justification."⁶⁵

That the practice of *ijtihad* is sanctioned by the Sunna and the Koran, prescribed by the Prophet, and required by God should be evidence enough to convince any Muslim of the duty of this practice. It remains incompatible to have a religion based on the Koran and Sunna without the mechanism of *ijtihad* to interpret which derived laws are acceptable to God in a given context. It is the religiously-immutable quality of *ijtihad* that makes it the strongest candidate upon which to base a counter-Islamist meme.

Similar Programs at Work

Although the insertion of an oblique, religiously-derived, memetic attack by Western military forces may appear radical, it should be noted that similar efforts have already been employed in other contexts. Rejecting a reliance on the internet and other forms of broadcasting to spread anti-extremist messages, Major General Douglas M. Stone, USMC, recent commander of U.S. detention facilities in Iraq, "introduced 'religious enlightenment' and other education programs" for his detainees.⁶⁶ The courses offered were taught by moderate Muslim clerics who teach based on a moderate doctrine. According to Stone, "Such schooling 'tears apart' the arguments of al-Qaeda."⁶⁷ These efforts are "part of waging a war in what he called 'the battlefield of the mind'."⁶⁸ Although it is not clear whether Stone directly intended to employ concepts from the field of memetics to counter the willingness of an audience to accept an extremist paradigm, it is clear that his efforts to insert an alternative ideology has enjoyed some significant success.⁶⁹

Stone's program has a latent function as well. By offering an alternative ideology, the detainees self-divide into those who accept the new perspective and those who flatly reject it. In Stone's words, this process "helps U.S. forces pinpoint the hard-core extremists."⁷⁰ Programs similar to Stone's model are also being employed in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and elsewhere.⁷¹ These initiatives have been successful in large part because they are able to bypass the competitive nature of the broadcasting market, and tap directly into the individual minds of their audience, thereby precluding the 'information saturation' obstacle inherent in the DSB's current recommendations.

Yet a significant problem remains if Stone's approach is to be used to counter terrorism more broadly. Specifically, his program is designed for prisoners. It is focused on those individuals who have already committed, or attempted to commit, a terrorist act. Stone's initiative fails to reach outside of the confines of his prison, ahead of the decision by a given individual to undertake a terrorist operation.

What is needed is a means to overcome this limitation and spread a similar counter-ideology outside of the prison camp and into the community as a whole. By introducing an effective alternative to Islamist ideology, those individuals who are not already committed



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to the Islamist course could be 'inoculated' against the extremist message. Conversely, the hard-core Islamists who reject any alternative view could be readily identified by their opposition to the new paradigm. Those individuals could then be identified as the most likely to commit a terrorist act before an attack is launched. Building on Stone's innovative circumvention to the limitations of mass media broadcasts, memetics can be used to generate an effective response to Islamist ideology in real world communities. A memetic attack, designed from the positive experiences of the CAP operations from the Vietnam era, would be an ideal means of countering modern extremist Islam.

Conclusion

Due to the nature and goals of Islamic-based terrorism, chiefly its need to replace its dead recruits and its desire to expand across the Southern Eurasian continent, it relies heavily on the spread of its ideology. Since ideas cannot be destroyed with munitions, a new means of attacking this threat must be found. Yet there is an inherent flaw in the expectation that broadcasting measures will have the desired propaganda effect of countering either the negative perceptions of the United States or the extremist ideology. The passive nature of a broadcasting strategy requires an active element within the community to encourage people to tune in. This is especially true in markets with fierce media competition, such as those in the Middle East. Fortunately, there are two possible means of overcoming this difficulty.

The first is to concentrate on the broadcaster. That is, increase the number of stations carrying your message, increase advertising for the stations, and increase the number of incentives used to draw in listeners. In short, these are all standard promotional strategies used in modern Western media. Certainly, this would require a huge influx of money and other resources to have even the potential to succeed. Additionally, a successful station must still establish and maintain its credibility among the population.⁷² This task may prove insurmountable in areas where American credibility is at its lowest, and therefore where such messages are needed most.

The second option is to identify, target, and dominate a niche that has not already been exploited. Regardless of whether or not an individual tunes in to a radio program,

virtually everyone in a given community is tuned into a social network. By 'broadcasting' a message along existing Muslim familial and social network lines the West may be able to 'inoculate' a given population against the spread of extremist ideology. The key to successfully immunizing that population depends on the depth and breadth of penetration of a given counter-meme. By basing the counter-ideology on a central component of the Islamic faith such as *ijtihad*, which is ordained by the Koran and the Sunna, the meme will not be a foreign construct; as its tenets will be more or less pre-internalized by the Muslim faithful. Thus, the inserted meme's main function will be to draw this concept to the surface of the target's thinking. The pre-positioned nature of this concept will ease the insertion and saturation of that meme. Furthermore, its penetration will be maximized by having the insertion come from several different directions simultaneously, mimicking a network or swarm attack. This networked attack will expand from both the centre to the edges, and the edges to the centre, and may best be deployed via a CAP-style military operation.

The dissemination of information from the West may begin and continue with radio broadcasts, and spread through newspapers, television, the internet, and cell phones, but it must always be recognized that we should:

not overlook the fact that throughout history informal methods of communication such as the gossip of the taverns, streets and marketplaces have been the standard local media for transmitting information, and these informal channels coexist with all the latest multimedia technology in contemporary societies.⁷³

A memetic attack on an extremist ideology through community-insertion techniques, combined with increased efforts in broadcast media, could result in a combined high-tech/no-tech 'pincer' attack, leaving the Islamists no other avenue to spread their message. No longer able to expand, current Islamists could be identified and detained before more attacks take place. Fortunately, the message that the West should promote already exists within the population. If it did not, many more Muslims would likely be extremists. Currently, Islamists are trying to tip the balance on moderate viewpoints in their favour. The West's counterstrategy must be to tip it back.

About the author ...

Andrew Sullivan completed his second undergraduate degree, in military history, in 2005, focusing on low-intensity conflicts during the Cold War. Recently he graduated from the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, where his research focused on developing innovative strategies in contemporary counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations. He has applied to pursue his PhD in the psychology of terrorism at the Department of War Studies, Royal Military College of Canada, in September 2009.

Endnotes

1. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004), and *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008). Hereafter cited as *Report 2004* and *Report 2008*.
2. Radio *Farda* (Radio Tomorrow) and Radio *Sawa* (Radio Together) are two BBG radio stations broadcasting into the Middle East. Other BBG operations include the radio, television, and internet of Voice of America (VOA); Al Hurra, an Arabic-language television news source; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL); Radio Free Asia; and Radio and TV Marti. Together the BBG absorbs approximately \$1.2 billion of the State Department's annual budget, an amount equivalent to one-quarter-of-one-percent of the annual budget for the Department of Defense. See *Report 2008*, 67-68, and *Report 2004*, 28.
3. Derk Kinnane, "Winning Over the Muslim Mind," in "Outmaneuvering Terror," *National Interest*, (Spring, 2004), 94.

4. Ibid.

5. Daniel Pipes, "Winning the Propaganda War [Versus Radical Islam]," *New York Sun*, (December 27, 2005): 1.

6. Craig Whitlock, "U.S. Network Falters in Mideast Mission," *The Washington Post*, (June 23, 2008): A01.

7. Interestingly, the authors of the report admit that although internet use is expanding in the Middle East, its current penetration "is estimated at only 10 percent" of the total population. See *Report 2008*, 44. The number of Internet hosts per 1,000 people is lower in the region than in any other area of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. According to Robert Stevens, "UN Report on Middle East Catalogues Widening Inequality," (September, 12, 2002), although 5 percent of the world's population live in the Middle East, the region accounts for just 0.5 percent of Internet users. This situation makes devoting significant resources to internet-based Strategic Communication the least penetrative method to actually influencing peoples' attitudes. Furthermore, this says nothing of the illiteracy rates in the region and how that will affect the targeted audiences' ability to receive messages sent over the internet, even as internet usage expands. According to the United Nations, the "overall adult literacy rate in the region is 62 percent compared to a global average of 79 percent".

8. *Report 2008*, 25 and 40.

9. *Report 2004*, 20.

10. Paul Marsden, "Memetics and Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin?", *Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission*, (12:2, 1998): 8.

11. In memetics, religions are considered "memeplexes". They are a complex mass of core memes, which are those ideas central to the belief system, and co-memes, which are those beliefs that support, and are supported by, the core memes.

12. Ben McConnell, and Jackie Huba, "Book Excerpt: Giving Up Control and Other Scary Lessons", *Brandweek*, (47:44, December 4, 2006): 21.

13. Social scientific research has largely confirmed that affects, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour can indeed spread through populations as if they were somehow infectious. Simple exposure sometimes appears to be a sufficient condition for social transmission to occur. See Marsden, 2.

14. Gladwell, Tipping, 13.

15. Ibid., 9.

16. Betsy D. Gelb, "Creating 'Memes' While Creating Advertising", *Journal of Advertising Research*, (37:6, November–December 1997): 57.

17. In "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition," Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl argue that the only way to disconnect the enemy from civilians is through persistent presence, i.e. "living among the population in small groups, staying in villages overnight for months at a time", as the only way to protect the population. This deployment strategy is exactly that employed by CAPs in Vietnam. See Nathaniel A. Fick and John A. Nagl, "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition", Foreign Policy, (January/February, 2009), and at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&print=1.

18. Of course, the same problem remains a significant obstacle in the Long War today, particularly in Afghanistan where recommended troop levels are between one half and one third of the necessary levels. See Fick and Nagl, Paradox 2-3 and 3-2.

19. Major Brooks R. Brewington, "Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement", USMC Command and Staff College (Quantico Va., 1996): 1.

20. Brewington, 15.

21. Marcus Corbin, "Revive Combined Action Platoons for Iraq", Centre for Defense Information (CDI): Straus Military Reform Project, (October 13, 2004): 1.

22. As both wars relied on ideas to spread their respective insurgencies and to gain the necessary strength to achieve their ultimate objectives, the critical similarity lays in how these ideas are spread, and how they might be opposed most effectively. While it is certain that the content of the ideas were distinctly different in Vietnam as in the Long War, the processes by which they were spread were sufficiently similar that any mechanism that successfully countered this process in Vietnam could be adapted for application in the Long War.

23. Brewington, 15. Italics added.

24. Ibid., 4.

25. Corbin, 2.

26. Ibid.

27. *Report 2008*, 36.

28. A memeplex is a group of mutually reinforcing ideas/memes. The most salient example of a memeplex is religion, where several (hundred or thousand) individual ideas interconnect for mutual reinforcement. The core ideas that are fundamental to the memeplex are known as core memes, while the lesser supporting ideas are co-memes. For example, a core meme in Christianity is that there is a kind and loving God who watches over each believer. A co-meme in this paradigm is that going to church on Sundays is an acceptable means of worship. The co-meme is not necessarily a

requirement in all forms of Christian worship, but without the presence of the core meme the impetus for the co-meme is lost.

29. A memplex is a collection of mutually self-reinforcing memes made up of a single, or single group, of core memes, supported by numerous co-memes all centered around promoting an action or collection of actions. Memplexes are extremely difficult to attack or dislodge, but they can be altered.

30. Cognitive dissonance is a psychological condition that occurs when two or more competing cognitions are held simultaneously by the same person. The resulting tension yields changes in behaviour. This concept will be discussed in detail below.

31. As evidenced by Osama bin Laden issuing fatwas in the late 1990s.

32. Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam", *First Things*, (December 1995), at www.danielpipes.org/article/273, 4.

33. *Ibid.*, 3.

34. Kinnane, 98.

35. For example, the Koran makes the duty of paying charity to support the poor an explicit obligation, but does not clarify the amounts nor on what grounds it should be paid. Unknown, *Ijtihad*, 2. See also Hasbullah Abdul Rahman, "The Origin and Development of *Ijtihad* to Solve Modern Complex Legal Problems", *The Islamic Quarterly*, (43:2, 1999): 77.

36. Rahman, 77.

37. *Ijtihad*, 1.

38. Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of *Ijtihad* Closed?", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (16:1, March, 1984): 33.

39. David Smock, "*Ijtihad*: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the Twenty-First Century", *United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 125*, (August 2004): 2. One main reason that laws derived from an infallible source may be subject to reinterpretation and change is that different perceptions of grammar, meaning, or initial interpretation of the Koran and Sunna may lead to differences in understanding and formulating laws.

40. *Ijtihad*, 5.

41. Despite the critical nature of *ijtihad* in understanding how mankind should behave in the eyes of God, *ijtihad* must never be applied to debate the existence of God, the validity of Mohammed as the Prophet of God, or the authenticity of the Koran. These are accepted as facts that are not open to interpretation. See Rahman, 75.

42. Smock, 2.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ijtihad*, 1.

45. Hallaq, 7-8.

46. See *Ibid.* for more detail.

47. Rachel Anne Codd, "A Critical Analysis of the Role of *Ijtihad* in Legal Reforms in the Muslim World", *Arab Law Quarterly*, (14:2, 1999): 124.

48. Even amongst those who argue that the gate to *ijtihad* was closed, there is little agreement on the timing of the closure. Following the death of the Prophet, several different schools of Islamic jurisprudence came into being, each with their own analysis of what constituted a perfect interpretation of the law, although the common view is that, if the gate was closed, it occurred at the end of the ninth century. However, others place its occurrence anywhere between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. This variance depends on the school of thought in question. See Hallaq, 3-4.

49. Smock, 2. See also Codd, 114.

50. Codd, 114.

51. Smock, 2.

52. Hallaq, 33.

53. Syed Farid Alatas, "Contemporary Muslim Revival: The Case of 'Protestant Islam'", *The Muslim World*, (97:3, July, 2007): 513.

54. Muneer Fareed, "Against *Ijtihad*", *The Muslim World*, (91, Fall, 2001): 357.

55. Codd, 121-122.

56. For example in Egypt in 1946, Syria in 1953, Tunisia in 1957 and Morocco in 1958. For details on each of these cases and others, see Codd, 122-126.

57. See *Begum v. Din, High Court Decision*, in *Pakistan Legal Decisions*, (Lahore: 1960, vol. XII, 1153), as cited in Codd, 112.

58. Smock, 2.

59. See Hamid Algar, "Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for *Ijtihād*?", *Journal of Qur'anic Studies*, (4:2, 2002): 1-22, in Colin Turner, ed., *The Koran: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies: Vol. II: Themes and Doctrines*, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004): 376-379, for a thorough consideration of four different accounts of the use of *ijtihad* by Sulaymān against the decisions of his father Dā'ūd.

60. Rahman, 74.

61. See Muslim, *Sahih Muslim*, (English Trans.), (3:976, 930), as cited in Rahman, 74.

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62. A mujtahid is a jurist capable of practicing *ijtihad*. See Smock, 4.
63. Hallaq, 5. See also *Ijtihad*, 3.
64. *Ijtihad*, 8.
65. Here the use of the term "scientific" refers to an emotionally and politically objective approach, free from internal or external political considerations, or personal desires. See also *Ijtihad*, 3.
66. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees: Moderate Muslims Enlisted to Steer Adults and Children Away From Insurgency," *The Washington Post*, (September 19, 2007): A01. see also Walter Pincus, Transcript of "Bloggers' Roundtable With Gen. Douglas M. Stone," interview with Major General Douglas M. Stone, USMC, *The Washington Post*, Federal News Service, September 18, 2007. Accessed 30 April 2008.
67. Pincus, "Reshape," 1.
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71. Nancy Durham, "Can Therapy 'Cure' Terrorism? Saudi Arabia Uses Creative Approach to Reform Junior Jihadis", *CBC News*, January 14, 2008, 1.
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THE USMC'S COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS: A COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUCCESS IN VIETNAM AND WHY IT FAILED TO DERAIL US MILITARY STRATEGY



Fraser Fowler

The literature on the Vietnam War, particularly as it pertains to the United States (US), is voluminous to say the least. This article therefore proceeds in the humble understanding that while it is unlikely to “go where no man has gone before,” there remains the hope that in choosing to highlight one of the success stories from the conflict, instead of the more popular pastime of spotlighting failures, some paths that have traditionally remained less traveled might be explored in greater depth.

Most analyses of US involvement in the Vietnam War are unanimous in their conclusion that the US was defeated and that this defeat was due in large part to the military strategy and overall approach that the American civilian and military leadership took in Vietnam. The US military, led in Vietnam by General William C. Westmoreland from 1965-1968, viewed the situation in Vietnam largely through the lens of the Second World War and the Korean War. Armed with these experiences, they not surprisingly pursued a conventional, big-unit strategy of attrition. This required enormous quantities of manpower and material, employed a mammoth amount of firepower, and resulted in significant casualties on both sides.¹



General William C. Westmoreland

Courtesy of Author

It is easy to be critical, particularly in the glare of historical hindsight. This criticism is made easier still, and amplified, when the effort is associated with a failure, especially one that destroyed so many lives and resources for what eventually came to be seen as an ill-defined purpose. Thus, rather than centre this article on a US failure in Vietnam this paper will analyze instead the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Combined Action Platoon (CAP) Program. This is one of the few examples of US efforts to defeat the North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, more commonly referred to as the Viet Cong (VC), that actually bore some fruit.

While there has been wide acknowledgement of “the other war” in Vietnam, that which was fought primarily at the village and hamlet level², attention has tended to rest on the efforts made from 1967 onward at “pacifying” the South Vietnam countryside under General Westmoreland's Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Less known and

discussed, however, is the CAP Program, established prior to this in August 1965. Despite drawbacks, the CAP Program showed great potential, and of the various pacification efforts in Vietnam, it has been widely considered as the concept that held the greatest promise as a strategic alternative.³ Despite its potential, however, the CAP Program failed to gain prominence and critical mass in South Vietnam.

The thrust of this article will be twofold. First, it will offer an analysis of the USMC's CAP Program: how it came into being, why it was the Marines who instituted it and not the Army, the specific successes and failures of the program itself, and, ultimately, why it failed to get much past the experimental stage.

Second, analysis of the CAP Program will be used to highlight two elements of American strategic thinking, and the challenges and problems the country encountered in pursuing this strategy. The first element, the tactical acumen and strength of CAP, serves to highlight the overarching flaws of the conventional approach that defined US military strategy in Vietnam. The second element, by examining the Program's demobilization and the fact that, despite positive results, it remained a relatively small-scale initiative, provides some insight into the nature and challenges faced in the American military regarding organizational adaptability and institutional learning. Understanding how CAP was formed, evolved, expanded and eventually disbanded reveals a great deal about the doctrinal rigidity under which the US Army operates.

Military Assistance

British historian Charles Callwell noted in 1906 that small wars are defined not by their size but, rather, by their characteristics⁴; this is certainly true for the conflict in Vietnam. By 1968, US forces in Vietnam numbered 536,000, Allied forces (Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines) numbered 66,000, and the South Vietnamese Army and its militias totalled approximately 670,000.⁵ These numbers certainly imply that the war was executed in a conventional manner by firepower-based big unit armies. The fact that large-scale battles were the exception rather than the rule, however, and that the real struggle took place at the village level amongst the people, indicates that the war was in reality a "small war."

The war in Vietnam was not a conventional war. It took place at the village level, along the densely populated coastal plains where 90% of the population in South Vietnam lived on approximately 15% of the land area. While there seemed to be a "collective cognitive dissonance on the part of the US Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting in it,"⁶ the same accusation cannot be levelled at the Marines.

The USMC has a strong tradition in fighting guerillas and in conducting what would today be termed as "unconventional" operations. Since their formation in 1775, the Marines have stressed the qualities of adaptability, initiative and improvisation. They recognize that total readiness is more of an objective than a reality, and that the war one prepares for is rarely the war one gets.⁷

In addition to the philosophical underpinnings of the Marine propensity for, and skill at, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, events in the interwar years also played a key role in the establishment of the CAP Program in Vietnam. Specifically, American interventions in Haiti (1915-1934), Santo Domingo (1916-1922) and Nicaragua (1925-1933) all involved Marines integrating into indigenous forces to combat an insurgency.⁸ In this sense, the CAP Program instituted in Vietnam represented the fourth time Marines had joined with local forces in combined action to battle an insurgency. A strong case could also be made for the inclusion of the Philippine War, where the Marines fought at the local level with indigenous tribes to great effect. Thus this would make the CAP Program the fifth example of combined action.

The Marines distilled their experiences and observations from these interventions into the *Small Wars Manual*, published in 1940. The *Manual* has since become a bible of sorts, not only for the Marines but for other branches of the service. It was re-published

in 1990, with dated references (regarding, for example, the care of mules) being removed. The *Small Wars Manual* remains highly applicable to current operating environments and is perhaps the strongest single piece of evidence that the Marines, more than any other branch in the US military, truly understand the nature of counterinsurgency warfare. Two passages, among many others, highlight this understanding well:

The application of purely military measures may not... by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political or social.⁹

In small wars... the goal is to obtain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life.... (Above all, in) small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.¹⁰



Courtesy of Author

Lieutenant General Victor Krulak

Contrary to the muscle-bound, raw force image of the Marines, the *Manual* highlights the non-military elements present in any conflict, the use of minimal force, respect for local cultures and, above all, a respect for the security, welfare and dignity of the indigenous populations whom the Marines are often charged to protect.

In addition to philosophy, and hard-earned and well-documented experience, USMC leadership also provided the foundation upon which CAP was formed. Two individuals in particular were central to the establishment of the CAP Program: Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPac), 1964-1968, and Major General Lewis Walt, Commander, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), June 1965-1967, which throughout this period was deployed in the northernmost corps area, I Corps.

General Krulak went to Vietnam eight times between 1962-1964 as the Special Assistant for COIN Operations, part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While there, General Krulak met several times with Sir Robert Thompson, a key architect of the British success against guerillas in Malaya and a person whom Krulak evidently respected. Krulak studied the complex situation in Vietnam and admits that while the necessity of locating and destroying the VC was relatively easy to understand, the necessity and manner in which one could win the loyalty of the people was less clear.¹¹ Thompson had established a set of COIN principles based on his Malayan experiences and, drawing on these, he advised Krulak that "the people's trust is primary. It will come hard because they are fearful and suspicious. Protection is the most important thing you can bring them."¹² Once security was established, Thompson also stressed health, education, land, prosperity and privacy. General Krulak took this advice to heart and called for the main military activities to be shifted from the jungle to the coastal plains.¹³ He became convinced that the most important contribution the Marines could make in South Vietnam was to deny the VC their most important resource—the people. Krulak also took his cue from North Vietnamese leader General Vo Nguyen Giap, who noted that "Without the people, we have no information. They hide us, protect us, feed us and tend our wounded."¹⁴

General Lewis Walt was of the same mind as Krulak and Thompson; all three of them recognized the village/hamlet as the centre of gravity in Vietnam. This was fortunate given that General Walt, as commander of III MAF, was ultimately the person in charge of implementing Krulak's ideas and defending Marine Corps initiatives in their tactical area of operation (TAOR). What began then was a heated debate between the USMC and General Westmoreland and senior Army leaders over military strategy in Vietnam. This debate lasted from March 1965 when the US first formally committed troops to the conflict in Vietnam up until General Westmoreland was replaced by General Creighton Abrams in June 1968.

General Krulak in particular argued for a “spreading inkblot” or “oil spot” strategy, also known as the “clear and hold” strategy, which involved securing one village after another. Krulak’s strategy was based on two factors:

- a lack of confidence in the “search and destroy” approach that was championed by Westmoreland; and
- lessons drawn from previous small wars in which the Marines were involved.¹⁵

General Krulak was a studious man and fond of research. As the war progressed, he cited studies that indicated that contact rates for search and destroy missions were less than 2%. It was clear to him that the VC was easily evading US forces and that they had the initiative. Validating Krulak’s claims to some extent was a 1966 study of 50 operations. The study indicated that of the operations successfully making contact, the VC initiated contact 85% of the time and achieved “tactical surprise” 80% of the time. In only 5% of operations did American commanders feel that they had “reasonably accurate knowledge of enemy positions and strength.”¹⁶

In essence, the Marines were comfortable with counterinsurgency because of their long history of small wars and policing actions.¹⁷ They have long-recognized that “small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority and under indeterminate order lacking specific instruction”¹⁸, and that in such an environment, the social, economic and political aspects of a conflict are often equally or more important than military actions, especially when conducting operations amongst the general population. Contrary to their hard-nosed image, an overarching USMC principle is to achieve results with minimal use of force and loss of life. In other words, do not fight small wars using big war methods.¹⁹ Given this historical and philosophical foundation, articulated in the timeless *Small Wars Manual*, it is hardly surprising that soon after landing in Vietnam the Marines were itching to get into the villages and commence aggressive patrolling, contrary to the wishes of General Westmoreland.

Although thousands of American military advisors had been in Vietnam for years (12,000 in 1963; 23,000 in 1964²⁰), the official start of the American ground war in Vietnam began 8 March 1965 when 3,500 Marines landed just north of Danang, the second largest city in South Vietnam, in order to secure the Phu Bai US airbase. The Marine commanders quickly realized that the geographical scope of the mission—to secure the ten square miles around the air base—vastly exceeded the resources of their single battalion—the 3rd battalion, 4th Marines. As a solution to this problem, Captain John J. Mullen, the battalion’s adjutant and civil affairs officer, suggested combining squads of 12 Marines, usually accompanied by one Navy corpsman (or medic), with the indigenous Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) platoons that consisted of approximately 35 men.²¹ Captain Mullen’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Taylor, agreed to the plan. Taylor then gained the support of General Nguyen Van Chuan, Commanding General of the 1st ARVN (Army of the Republic of South Vietnam) Division, and the Combined Action Platoons were born. The Phu Bai TAOR in which the airbase was situated had six PF platoons residing within it. In August 1965, the first four CAPs of Joint Action Company (later changed to Combined Action Company) began operations, organized and trained by First Lieutenant Ek.²²

Combined Action

The concept of combining Marines with indigenous forces, as has been noted above, was not new, having been employed in various guises by the USMC during the inter-war years in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua, and during the Philippine War 1899-1902. Thus, to attribute the establishment of the CAP Program to one single individual would be somewhat erroneous and misleading. The Program was not the result of in-depth strategic analysis or the product of a detailed study but rather an expedient, designed in response to a difficult mission with limited resources.²³ It was a product of the Marine mindset and approach to warfare.

Almost immediately, First Lieutenant Ek's four CAPs put the VC base in the Phu Bai area at risk. While the results among the general population were more difficult to discern at this early stage, "the Vietcong had to shoot their way into the hamlets, and this was not to their liking."²⁴ In taking the time to begin to understand the nature and routines of the South Vietnamese villager, Ek and his Marines found that the villagers responded well to a personal approach, whereas they tended to avoid and have disdain for large, impersonal propaganda drives. The longer the Marines kept the VC out of the hamlets, the more cooperative and pleasant the villagers became. General Krulak and General Walt recognized the potential of CAP immediately and, capitalizing on its initial success in Phu Bai, gave "combined action" official sanction.

The response from the Army and Joint General Staff in Saigon was telling: "If you want to play around with such foolishness you'll have to eat the personnel spaces out of your hide."²⁵ Throughout the life of the CAP Program, Westmoreland and MACV did not make any additional Marines available for the Program. Despite this, however, the Program was able to expand until early 1970 because most Marine commanders were willing to give up some of their men, depleting their own units, in support of the CAP Program. At its peak in 1969, no more than 2,220 Marines (and some Navy corpsmen) were part of the Program, spread out amongst a maximum of 114 villages. This represented only 2.8% of the 79,000 Marines in Vietnam.²⁶ While the overall numbers remained small, the effect, as will be demonstrated, was vastly out of proportion to the support the CAP Program received.

One of the characteristics of CAP that made it so unique was that the Marines serving in them were almost all volunteers, and there were a number of prerequisites that had to be met before they would be considered for the Program. The Marines running the Program took recruitment seriously. In order to be able to join a CAP, a Marine had to have served in Vietnam for two to four months, with at least six months left on his tour. The Marine could not have any disciplinary infractions, required a recommendation from his battalion commander, and could not demonstrate any signs of xenophobia.²⁷

Perhaps naturally, the theory was not quite as robust as the reality. Not all Marine battalion commanders viewed the Program positively and for some the CAPs were seen as a "depository for their misfits", and one result of the rapid expansion of the Program during 1966 and 1967 was that a "volunteer" came to mean that "if a man does not object, he is a volunteer for it."²⁸ There was the reality too that commanders were being asked to give up their best men and many of them were reluctant to do so. This being said, overall, the Program attracted higher than average quality Marines who displayed a relatively advanced degree of cultural sensitivity.

In addition to rigorous recruitment standards, another factor that contributed to the effectiveness of the Program was that a Marine CAP went to a village only at the request of the village or district chief, and only if the PF platoon lived in the village.²⁹ "This marriage of Americans to the indigenous village militia force illustrated a true centre of gravity for combined action."³⁰ Furthermore, once invited, the Marines did not just move straight into the given hamlet. Instead, they integrated gradually into the life of the hamlet or village. They began simply by observing the local routines in order to accustom themselves to the culture and habits of the villagers. There was limited daytime patrolling and security checks to begin with, which gradually increased to full night-time patrols and ambushes on a daily basis.³¹ Thus, in taking the time and care necessary to ensure the CAPs were well-manned with high quality personnel and by ensuring that the CAPs only went where they were invited and, once in location, integrated in the life of a village gradually and with respect, the CAP Program laid the groundwork for its future success.

For purposes of clarification, it is perhaps worthwhile to note at this stage that the CAP Program should not be confused with the "strategic hamlet program" of 1962. Established under South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem, the Strategic Hamlets involved creating a

fortified hamlet in a known VC-dominated area. South Vietnamese were moved from their own villages and relocated into these new hamlets. This was done irrespective of their desires to remain in their own villages, and they were required to stay in these hamlets except for organized and protected trips to and from the fields in which they worked. The program, perhaps not surprisingly, was widely viewed as a failure.³²

The objectives of the CAP Program were adapted from the existing missions of the PF platoons themselves. There were six key objectives:

- destroy VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility;
- protect public security and help maintain law and order;
- protect friendly infrastructure;
- protect bases and communication axes within the villages and hamlets;
- organize people's intelligence nets; and
- participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.³³

It is no coincidence that these objectives both mirrored and aimed to counter Ho Chi Minh's Six Forbiddances and Six Permissibles. Ho Chi Minh took much of his inspiration from Mao Tse Tung's rise to power via the Chinese peasant. Using China as an example, Ho Chi Minh, with the help of General Vo Nguyen Giap, developed a strategy (the Forbiddances and Permissibles) for the "liberation" of Vietnam. The PF/CAP's objectives aimed to loosen and eventually destroy the grip that the VC had established on South Vietnamese villages by first protecting the people and then improving their standard of living through a variety of civic action programs.³⁴

The US and its Allies were up against a formidable enemy in the North Vietnam and the VC. They were a battle hardened and successful insurgent body fighting on its own soil that was armed with the confidence gained from having defeated the global powers of Japan and France. At peak strength, France had over 300,000 men in Vietnam and their defeat was a noteworthy accomplishment.³⁵ Political organization was the key to North Vietnam's success, not just military strength. A central element of the VC movement was "its ability to organize a vast political machine within the history and culture of Vietnam."³⁶ In effect, the VC represented a government within a government in South Vietnamese society. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, the North Vietnamese Army and the VC were well-coordinated, and the focus and clarity of purpose that characterized North Vietnam's efforts to take over the South stood in sharp contrast to the American approach to the war and to President Diem's rule in South Vietnam.

Making up approximately 75% of any given CAP, the Popular Forces (PF) platoons in South Vietnam were a key component of the CAP Program. The challenges surrounding equipping, training and arming these platoons were significant and represent a major accomplishment of the Program. PF platoons were the lowest group on the totem pole in the South Vietnamese forces. They were poorly equipped, trained and led, and received half the pay of South Vietnamese Army personnel. Furthermore, a 1965 study by the South Vietnamese Army indicated that PF platoons suffered from a 25% desertion rate, four times that of the ARVN. The study also revealed a high weapons lost rate and a high number of "misbehavior incidents."³⁷ They were literally afraid of the dark, refusing to go out when they suspected VC were in the area, and tended to man the same positions every night, making it easy for VC to avoid them. Not surprisingly, they did not inspire much confidence in the villagers they were supposed to protect. General Krulak, inspecting a PF platoon in 1962 with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, described a group of "grave-faced little men.... No two in the same uniform, armed with an assortment of battered rifles, carbines and shotguns, they were monumentally unimpressive to look at."³⁸

The PF platoons were recruited from and served in their own hamlets. Herein lay their strength as far as the Marines were concerned. They knew the local area intimately, which

meant they could provide good intelligence, and they were protecting their own family, friends and land, which provided a high level of motivation.

The ultimate goal of the CAP Program was to create a level of security, and then bring the PF platoons up to a standard of training and effectiveness where they could assume responsibility for their own security. The Program was ideally supposed to work itself out of a job and move from village to village, leaving secure, prosperous and healthy populations in its wake.

In order to achieve this, the operations and activities of the CAP centred around co-habitation with PF platoons in their hamlets and villages, training PF platoons, aggressive patrolling, setting up ambushes, and undertaking various civic-oriented projects. The Marines trained the PF platoons in tactics and weaponry, and instilled a sense of discipline into their daily routine. The Marines had the power of the radio which could call in air support and additional resources from whatever regular units were operating in the vicinity. This comforted the PF platoons and gave them confidence. In return, from the PF platoons the Marines received language training, knowledge of local customs, and invaluable intelligence regarding the VC.³⁹

The CAPs also made frequent visits and monitored families whose members were known to be working with the VC. This reduced the recruitment of villagers by the VC because the individuals in question now realized they would have to live a life on the run, unable to return comfortably or safely to their families.⁴⁰

The strengths and successes of the CAP Program could be seen at both the village/hamlet level as well as farther up the strategic ladder. Additionally, the Program also had a generally positive effect on the morale of the Marines who served in CAPs. At the hamlet level, three aspects of the CAP worked in its favour. First, the small number of Marines involved (a squad of twelve) did not disrupt life in the hamlet or give the villagers the feeling that they were being "occupied." Second, the Marines possessed sufficient firepower, with the ability to call in a great deal more if necessary, to reassure the villagers of their relative security. Finally, the young age of the Marines and their relatively junior ranks were very similar to those of the PF platoons and this made establishing positive relationships between the two military groups that much easier.⁴¹

One of the most direct benefits of this relationship with the villagers was an increase in the volume and quality of intelligence provided by the villagers to the Marines. This increased the security and likelihood of survival of both groups. This is highlighted by the fact that, while mine and booby traps accounted for 30% of US casualties in the Vietnam War, the casualties to CAP Marines from these devices were reportedly too insignificant to record.⁴² The population of South Vietnam was accustomed to occupation and the accompanying deprivation that was caused by invading forces, whether Chinese, Japanese, French or VC. Once they realized that the Marines were committed to staying and were not intent on simply using them for their food, shelter and recruitment drives, they saw the benefit in keeping them alive in order to ensure their security and well-being. Closer relationships between the Marines and the villagers also resulted in less collateral damage. Fewer lives were lost due to stray artillery rounds and air strikes, and property and infrastructure was not damaged to the same extent as in areas where the CAPs did not operate. Although they could call in strikes at almost any time, the CAP Marines found they were much more reluctant to do so for fear of hurting someone they had come to know personally.⁴³

Another indication of the CAP Program's success at the village level was in the area of village security, governance and administration. A survey in 1967 showed that in hamlets where CAPs were located 80% of the village chiefs remained in their own home overnight instead of spending the night in the more secure compounds of the district chiefs, where they were less likely to be kidnapped or assassinated by the VC. Furthermore, 93% of these hamlets had functioning hamlet councils. In contrast, in those hamlets where CAPs

were not located, less than 20% of the hamlet chiefs remained in their own homes overnight and only 29% of these hamlets had functioning councils.⁴⁴

Once a modicum of security was established, the CAP could devote more time and effort to improving the infrastructure and general health of the village. The CAPs built bridges, churches, temples, roads, dispensaries, schools, marketplaces and classrooms, and through bringing their engineering and material assets to bear, the Marines could offer much more in terms of infrastructure development than the VC.⁴⁵

Another successful program that contributed directly to the health and well-being of the South Vietnamese population was the Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP). CAP Marines were universal in their praise of Navy corpsmen, and the MEDCAP revolved around use of these navy corpsmen for the treatment of non-life-threatening medical problems. While not a practice common in the US, in South Vietnam the Marines realized that often cleaning and covering a wound using some disinfectant a simple band-aid would save lives. Cuts or scrapes that would be considered very minor by Americans had potentially life-threatening implications for the Vietnamese, many of whom worked in rice paddies all day, up to their knees in water that had been fertilized with human excrement. The CAP Program claimed to have conducted over 1.9 million MEDCAPs over the course of its existence.⁴⁶ It was a service that was evidently in high demand and much appreciated, especially given that in 1967 there were only 750 doctors in Vietnam, half of whom were assigned to the Army. There were 1,200 Vietnamese doctors in Paris alone at this time and another 800-1000 others working internationally.⁴⁷ The need for even the most basic levels of medical care was great amongst the population.

The CAP Program sought to protect the lifeblood of the villagers as well—their rice. Under an operation called Golden Fleece, beginning with the autumn rice crop in 1965, the CAPs in the Danang and Chu Lai areas utilized intelligence provided by local inhabitants to launch attacks against VC units that were preparing to commence rice collection operations. The VC required about 1.5 pounds of rice per day per person and, lacking land of their own, prepared attacks during harvest season in order to secure adequate supplies of rice. The CAPs also protected the villagers as they harvested the rice and escorted the crop back to storage sheds. In the first season of Golden Fleece, approximately 870,000 pounds of rice was secured for the villagers, much of which might have been seized by the VC.⁴⁸

Success at the village level also resonated at the strategic level. Colonel William Corson, a former CAP commander, highlighted three areas where CAPs had a strategic impact: recruitment denial, subsistence denial, and combat casualties.⁴⁹ Although only representing 1.5% of the Marines in Vietnam, CAP units accounted for 7.6% of the enemy killed.⁵⁰ Also, from 1966-1968, the ratio of enemy losses to friendly losses for CAPs in the I Corps area was 7.2:1. This compared to a ratio of 7.6:1 for large units (800 or more men) in the same area. This indicates that the CAPs killed almost as many North Vietnamese Army and VC combatants as the much larger units but at less cost and with greater efficiency.⁵¹ Aggressive patrolling by CAPs and accurate intelligence resulted in a large number of engagements with the VC. Furthermore, constant patrolling in small units kept the true strength of the CAP unknown to the VC and gave the impression of strength beyond their actual numbers. Reports obtained from captured and dead VC indicated that they believed the numbers of Marines in the area were much higher than they actually were.⁵²

The increasing number of attacks being made by the VC on CAP defensive positions within the hamlets was evidence of a certain strain and perhaps frustration. This was not the preferred method of operation for the VC and the fact that they were attacking these positions is a fairly strong indication that they needed access to the hamlets for supplies and manpower. A key success factor for the CAP Program was the fact that the CAPs had well-defended positions established in the villages and refused to engage the VC unless it was on their terms. VC attacks on these positions resulted in heavy VC casualties as well as collateral damage to the village or hamlet itself. This further reinforced CAP control of the village. Amazingly, and as a testament to their combat power and fighting prowess, only one CAP was overrun during the entire six years of their existence.⁵³

In addition to operations such as Golden Fleece, the CAPs regularly monitored markets.

This had the immediate effect of allowing the markets to function, which in turn allowed the villagers to sell and trade their crops on the open market, an activity often not possible in areas where there were heavy concentrations of VC. It also allowed the CAPs to observe rice purchases. South Vietnamese government law limited purchases of rice to no more than five pounds per person per day. Those buying more than this amount were often VC buying for their companions, and thus they were easily spotted by the CAPs.⁵⁴

There is some strong evidence that the CAP Program had positive effects at both the village/hamlet (tactical) level as well as in the larger strategic plane. More difficult to measure, but central to the success of the Program, was the sense of purpose and motivation that CAP Marines seemed to possess in larger quantities than their brothers in other Marine units and throughout the rest of the US forces serving on the ground in Vietnam. One of the strongest indications of the success of the CAP Program is that 68% of CAP Marines signed up to extend their 13 month tour by a further six months instead of returning home to the US; this compares to 15% from all other forces serving in Vietnam.⁵⁵ This statistic is even more impressive when one considers that one out of every eight Marines in the CAP Program was killed, 80% were wounded once and 25% were wounded twice. This is indicative of a high level of morale, a strong sense of purpose, confidence in the CAP Program, and a sense of responsibility for the people with whom they were living and protecting, regardless of the heightened danger that the assignment brought with it.⁵⁶ Captain Moore, who did two tours in Vietnam, summed it up: "After 23 years in the Marine Corps, CAP was the most satisfying thing I'd ever done."⁵⁷

It would be inaccurate to suggest that the CAP Program was without its challenges and weaknesses. The main challenges that hampered the CAP Program were differences in culture, supply and personnel shortages, lack of an overarching strategy to guide the Program, and the relationship between the Army (MACV) and the USMC. Of these, the later two were the most serious and hampered the success of the Program to the greatest degree.

The key challenge between the two cultures was language. Quite simply, the Marines lacked all but the most basic training in Vietnamese and this lack of language skills would hinder the program throughout its existence.⁵⁸ At the end of the day, however, the success or failure of a CAP was not dependent on language. Certainly while patrolling and conducting ambushes, there was no need for verbal communication. There were other cultural "divides" that caused confusion and consternation. One was the apparent "right" the villagers felt they had to steal from the Marines who were materially so much better off than them. The Marines for their part often preferred hot, home cooked meals over C-rations and would often invite themselves into the homes of the villagers. The Vietnamese males were also inclined to show affection for each other and were very physical, which made many Marines uncomfortable. Again, while these were often irritants and on occasion led to low-level violence, they did not hinder the overall effectiveness of the Program to any great degree.⁵⁹

On a more practical level, when a CAP was assigned to a village, operational ties were almost severed with the battalion. A great deal of trust and confidence was placed in the hands of young squad leaders and being "forced to fill the shoes of a career officer and seasoned diplomat simultaneously"⁶⁰ sometimes led to violations in conduct, in one case a murder, but these were generally isolated incidents.

More serious was the lack of supplies and personnel, a symptom of the geographical and to some degree philosophical separation between the CAPs and their battalion headquarters. These problems were also the result of priority being given to large unit actions. The Marines were often left to scrounge for material to construct defensive fortifications and had to use their ingenuity (e.g. fake requisition orders) to procure M-14 carbines for their PF colleagues. The situation was similar where personnel were concerned. The CAP Program not only competed with the other units for Marines but it competed for the best ones available. This drew the ire of some non-CAP commanders who saw CAP as a liability that took away their best men and risked more when they provided reaction forces to aid the CAPs.⁶¹

The two biggest brakes on the CAP Program, however, were the lack of an overall strategy for the Program and the continual jousting with Westmoreland and MACV. Despite strong champions for the program, particularly General Krulak and General Walt, the creation of the CAPs themselves was the responsibility of battalion commanders in consultation with village chiefs. This led to ad hoc implementation and resulted in many of the CAPs being isolated. Isolation, in turn, meant lack of support and greater difficulty achieving security. There was no "intermeshed defensive net" or a "saturation deployment scheme", and this is clearly reflected in the fact that of the 114 CAPs eventually deployed, only two of them achieved a level of security in their first placement that was sufficient to allow the CAP to move into a new village.⁶² This cuts to the heart of the issue of the sustainability of the CAP Program and whether or not it was truly following an "inkblot" strategy with any success.

Finally, perhaps the biggest roadblock that prevented the CAP Program from reaching its full potential was General Westmoreland and the prevailing attitudes at MACV. As mentioned above, the CAP Marines comprised less than 3% of the total Marine force in South Vietnam. The top USMC leadership believed they had the correct response to the challenges they faced in defeating the VC and the NVA, yet Westmoreland held on to the cherished concept of "search and destroy" and insisted that the vast majority of Marine forces in South Vietnam pursue this strategy along the DMZ.⁶³ Inter-service rivalries were also at play but Westmoreland, conscious of the politics involved, preferred an indirect approach to get his way over direct confrontation with the USMC. He admitted later that "rather than start a controversy, I chose to issue orders for specific projects that as time passed would gradually get the Marines out of their beachheads."⁶⁴

On 17 May 1970, the last Combined Action Group of three CAPs was deactivated. The CAP Program had started in August 1965 with four CAPs. By the end of 1966, there were 58 CAPs, in 1967—79 CAPs, in 1968—102 CAPs, and in 1969—114 CAPs. The turning point in the fortunes of the CAP Program proved to be 1968. The Tet Offensive in January, the election of President Nixon, growing concern over the number of US casualties back in the United States, and the policy of "Vietnamization" all combined to ensure the scaling down and eventual demise of the Program. The decision to switch from "compound" CAPs to "mobile" CAPs was an effort to reduce the high casualty rates being suffered in the CAPs. While this increased the survivability of its members, mobility meant that the CAPs no longer lived with the people and thus lost some of the intimacy and trust that had previously allowed them to pursue not just effective military patrolling but also civic-oriented projects.⁶⁵

Of key importance was the shift in attitude on the part of the electorate back in the US and with the new President. Patience for the war had run out and the process of "Vietnamization" (handing over control of South Vietnam back to the Vietnamese people) had begun. In line with this, the CAPs were scaled back, demobilized and eventually disbanded.

Did the CAP Program ever have a chance of going to scale and making a potentially history-altering change to the outcome of the conflict in Vietnam? Without delving into an exercise in counter-factual history, the answer seems to be "very unlikely." At a fundamental level, Westmoreland and his commanders at MACV seemed "unable or unwilling to accept the conclusion implicit in the success of the CAPs, which was that their vast resources, equipment and technology were essentially irrelevant to the kind of war they faced."⁶⁶ On the USMC side, throughout the life of the CAP Program, from March 1965 to May 1970, the USMC command was serving two masters in a way. The likes of General Krulak and Walt believed very strongly that the proper way to fight the war was at the village level, protecting the populace from the threat of the VC, and in the process separating the VC fish from the water in which they so freely swam. They were true soldiers, however, and at the end of the day, they followed the orders from Westmoreland who commanded the overall American military effort in Vietnam.

A number of the successful aspects of the CAP Program serve to highlight the deficiencies in American strategic thinking as it pertained to the Vietnam War. These successes are in

the area of targeting, combat effectiveness and efficiency, intelligence gathering, and the morale and motivation of those Marines who served in the CAP Program.

The CAP Program under the USMC represents a rare example of a long-term commitment on the part of the US military to fight at the village or hamlet level. CAPs represent one of the few instances in Vietnam where American military personnel associated intimately with Vietnamese for long periods of time in a Vietnamese setting. In other words, they correctly identified and accurately targeted the centre of gravity of North Vietnam; the villagers in the South. The side who won control of this element of society would win the war, and this is exactly what transpired. The USMC was able to accurately target its efforts to achieve maximum effect because its underpinnings as an organization stress adaptability, initiative and innovation. They do not try to predict the future but rather learn from the past to the extent possible and move forward confidently, comfortable in the understanding that the next conflict in which they are involved is unlikely to be the one they trained for, but something to be expected and dealt with when the time comes.

In contrast, the US Army arrived in Vietnam with a firepower-based army that was generally inappropriate to the demands of COIN warfare.⁶⁷ During negotiations in Hanoi in April, 1975, Colonel H.G. Summers Jr., Chief of the Negotiations Division for the American delegation, commented to Colonel Tu, Chief of the North Vietnamese delegation, that "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." To this, Colonel Tu replied "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."⁶⁸

This exchange is indicative of much that defined US military strategy and mindsets during the Vietnam War and was central to its defeat. The US approached the war in Vietnam as a big-unit affair, counting on overwhelming firepower and technologically superior equipment and weapons to carry the day and propel them to victory. Under the leadership of General William C. Westmoreland, a veteran and product of the Second World War and Korea, MACV believed that its conventional forces would easily handle "a bunch of rag-tag Asian guerillas."⁶⁹ The US Army treated doctrine as a template and attempted to apply it unquestioningly. The result is that one ends up "trying to fit the circumstances to the doctrine rather than the other way around."⁷⁰

Conclusion

As has been discussed, the CAPs generally punched well above their weight in terms of combat casualties caused. A combined action platoon consisted of 50 men at the maximum, only twelve of whom were US Marines. They patrolled aggressively, engaged the enemy frequently and, as a result, suffered higher than average casualties. They accepted this as a necessary price to pay in order to protect the local inhabitants and effect change at the village level. Success was measured in booby traps defused, bridges built, MEDCAPS conducted, weapons confiscated and collateral damage avoided. In contrast, MACV focused on large-scale "search and destroy" missions using massive sweeps through the jungles. This approach actually prevented security in the countryside by generating displaced persons. These people fled to areas controlled by the South Vietnamese Army but they brought with them only "poverty, dislocation and instability."⁷¹ Body counts and confirmed enemy kills is how a quantitative military success would be measured and reached. Unfortunately, as Max Boot notes, "The Vietcong refused to play the Wehrmacht to Westmoreland's Patton."⁷² In fact, the NVA and VC welcomed the "search and destroy" approach and deliberately concentrated in remote areas in order to draw US forces away from the populous coastal areas, not unlike an animal trying to lure a predator away from their own nest. The goal was to encourage the Americans to engage in inconclusive battles that would gradually reduce their willingness to fight. The North Vietnamese leaders accurately read this situation.⁷³

The CAP Program's success in intelligence gathering highlights the transitory nature of the vast majority of the Army's experience in Vietnam. The key to gaining accurate

intelligence is patience and perseverance. By living in the villages, CAPs demonstrated to the people that they were there for the long haul and were not just passing through. This built trust and familiarity, which in turn produced valuable and accurate intelligence on VC activities and plans. That CAP deaths due to booby traps and mines were too insignificant to record is but one indicator of the intelligence gathering success of the program.

Again, in contrast, the “search and destroy” tactics used were fleeting in nature. Once finished, the troops went back to their well-protected base camps to prepare for the next large sweep. Time was a precious commodity not to be wasted where the US public was concerned as well. The thin, time-bound patience of the electorate does not permit the investment in time that most successful counterinsurgency efforts require.⁷⁴ Nixon wisely noted that “when a president sends American troops to war, a hidden timer starts.”⁷⁵ This was certainly true for the American efforts in Vietnam.

Finally, the generally high morale and motivation of many CAP Marines stands in stark contrast to the much lower morale in the rest of the US forces in Vietnam. CAP Marines felt a sense of purpose and responsibility associated with what they were trying to achieve. This sense of purpose for many in non-CAP units quickly dissipated upon their arrival in Vietnam. It is this sense of purpose and commitment that encourages learning. If an experience is distasteful and one does not believe in what one is trying to accomplish, it is an aspect of human nature to try to forget that experience or at least to re-visit it as infrequently as possible. Thus, the mantra that quickly followed America’s exit from Vietnam of “no more Vietnams,” a mantra that is still part of the lexicon for today’s foreign policy makers, is indicative of a lack of learning on the part of the US Army and its civilian leaders. Again, in the words of Max Boot, “Their hard-won experience, their painfully accumulated battle lore, was tossed away as casually as a spent bullet casing” in Vietnam.⁷⁶

Despite the shock of defeat, and the vehemence with which so many in the American leadership have vowed “no more Vietnams”, the US will nonetheless quickly have to realize that their predominance in conventional warfighting methods and their unparalleled firepower means that no enemy of theirs will willingly choose to fight the US on its terms. This means unconventional, asymmetric, guerrilla style tactics which the US absolutely has to accept and adapt to in order to survive.

The Combined Action Platoon Program in Vietnam represents a strong case study in military flexibility, adaptability and learning. It was certainly not the answer to all the challenges that the Vietnam War presented to American leaders and their militaries, but it was one of the more successful efforts at targeting and starting to defeat the insurgency in South Vietnam. By way of a study in contrasts, by shining the spotlight on one of the few successes of the war, one can perhaps gain a greater understanding of what did not work as well.

About the Author ...

Over the last ten years, Fraser Fowler has worked for the Canadian federal government in the fields of trade promotion, investment review, international development and national security. Entering through a management development stream, he has worked in both policy and programming capacities for a number of departments that include Canadian Heritage, Industry Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Privy Council Office. Fraser holds a BA in Political Science from UBC and a MBA from McGill University. He is currently pursuing a MA in War Studies at Royal Military College, where he is focussing on the history of guerrilla warfare and how it has informed and shaped current counterinsurgency doctrine and operations. Prior to joining the federal government, Fraser worked in the pulp and paper and telecommunications industries in Vancouver, B.C.

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THE CANADIAN RANGERS 1947-1952: CANADA'S ARCTIC DEFENDERS?

Chris Manoukian

The defence of the Canadian Arctic in the immediate post-Second World War period proved to be a difficult task for the Army. As the Cold War between the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist nations of North America and Western Europe grew tense, both the American and Canadian governments looked with concern to the vast and undefended Arctic territory. Lying directly between the two competing superpowers, this area was a potential future battlefield. In order to provide some military capability and defence in the North, the Canadian Rangers, an irregular reserve militia, were created in 1947. However, the Rangers only provided the illusion of defence during the period of 1947-1952. They received no formal military training and insignificant equipment, yet were expected to be a functional and effective organization. This very loosely organized group of men were to watch over Canada's vast Northern and coastal areas, aid in search and rescue, and defend against enemy raiders or saboteurs.¹

The entire Ranger system suffered from many "teething pains" in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the potential threat to the North was highest. The most important problems stemmed from one very serious flaw in the Ranger concept: the idea that the government could get something for nearly nothing. Until the Korean War in 1950, Canadian defence policy was determined by the budget allotted to the Department of National Defence.² The Army, Navy and Air Force all wanted as much funding as possible, which stretched the budget very thinly. For the Army, cheap solutions to large problems allowed each dollar to go further. The Rangers provided a cheap solution, but as with everything in life, you get what you pay for. By removing nearly everything necessary for the Rangers to be an effective force, the Army could afford to have widespread representation in Canada's North. However, this economy led to problems of organization, communication, equipment, training and recruitment.

This article will examine the first five years of the Rangers, from 1947 until 1952. The rationale for this limitation is that after 1952 advances in nuclear weaponry and long-range delivery systems created the possibility of total nuclear destruction. From the perspective of ground forces, this possibility decreased the strategic importance of Canada's Arctic significantly. Further research into the Rangers during the early Cold War would require consideration of many international as well as domestic political issues outside the scope of this article. Topics such as Aborigines in the military and Canadian Arctic sovereignty have been covered by other works. P. Whitney Lackenbauer's two books *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives* and *Aboriginal Peoples and Military Participation: Canadian and International Perspectives* are both excellent resources on the former.³ Shelagh D. Grant also provides a thorough examination of the political aspect of the latter in *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950*.⁴

Defining what constitutes *the Arctic* of Canada is difficult. Some definitions include anything north of Churchill, Manitoba as part of the Canadian Arctic.⁵ This is an acceptable compromise between geography and demographics, but is not quite complete from a military point of view. The Rangers were intended to fill in areas that did not have sufficient population to support Army Reserve units. The low population density of Canada meant that almost any area north of the 50th Parallel could not support a Reserve unit, aside from some portions of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.⁶ The result was a void, running through the north of the large provinces and most of the Northwest Territories, in which there was no military presence. Some of these areas may not be considered *the Arctic*, but they certainly were in the North and thus fell under the purview of the Rangers.

The Beginning: Pacific Coast Militia Rangers

The concept of a northern irregular force grew out of the successful wartime Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR). Concerns over the possibility of Japanese raids or invasion had been widespread in British Columbia in early 1942. Many men unfit for military service because of age, occupation or physique, had wanted to do their part for the defence of their homes.⁷ The idea behind the PCMR was that it would attract outdoorsmen who knew how to shoot and track and who also had intimate knowledge of the local landscape. Should the Japanese invade, the members of the PCMR would conduct a guerrilla war against the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. H. Taylor, the staff officer in charge of the PCMR, likened the organization to the Soviet defence in depth, where citizens took up arms and acted as partisans behind enemy lines. The PCMR were to fight on even if the Army retreated.⁸ The idea gained traction in the military and the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers came into being on 3 March 1942.⁹



Combat Camera 1996.005.069

Arm band worn by No. 29 Coy, PCMR, Fraser Valley Rangers

The PCMR recruited ten thousand individuals in only four months.¹⁰ These volunteers were not paid for their service, and as a result, the PCMR cost very little to operate. A miniscule budget of \$120 000 was used to cover training, operational and administrative costs.¹¹ This was just a drop in the wartime budgetary bucket. Officers could resign at any time and other ranks could obtain a discharge after thirty days' notice.¹² Ranger companies were formed based on location. Men organized into companies not only by where they lived but also by where they worked. Frequently, the employees of a cannery, iron foundry or other place of employment formed a Ranger company together.¹³

The question of how to arm the new members of the militia soon arose. Ross rifles left over from the First World War had been sent to Britain for home defence. The Canadian Army still carried the same No. 1 Lee Enfields that had replaced the Ross in 1916. Whatever rifles were left in stocks had likely been earmarked for the new members of the Army proper, not a militia unit made up of trappers, farmers and old men. The Rangers were eventually armed with American First World War M-17 Enfields in .30-06 calibre, various .30-30 carbines and one hundred Sten guns with a thousand rounds each of ammunition.¹⁴ Issuing several different calibres of firearms created problems with the supply of ammunition. This was corrected with the Canadian Rangers, all of whom were, and still are, issued No 4 Lee Enfield rifles with 200 rounds of ammunition per year.

Fortunately, the PCMR was never tested in combat. It is possible that if the Japanese had invaded British Columbia, the PCMR would have offered some resistance for a time. The real effect that the PCMR had was on morale. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the loss of Hong Kong and the rapid successes of the seemingly unstoppable Japanese military made Canadians living on the Pacific coast very nervous.¹⁵ The US Navy, which for all practical purposes protected Canada's West Coast, had been dealt a huge blow in December 1941. With Canada's long and barely defended coastline, it is easy to understand the impetus behind the creation of a militia unit for home defence. The Japanese invasion and occupation of the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu in June of 1942 certainly did little to ease fears of attack. That, however, was the high water mark of Japanese expansion.

In 1945, the Japanese started launching incendiary balloons into the jet stream, allowing them to float over the ocean to North America in an attempt to set forest fires. The PCMR helped locate and track the balloons on several occasions and also collected pieces of the devices for analysis.¹⁶ This was their last service. The Army disbanded the PCMR on 15 October 1945, exactly two months after the surrender of Japan.¹⁷

Towards Northern Security

Shortly after the dissolution of the PCMR, the Cold War started to ramp up. On 20 February 1946, the Soviet Union admitted to spying on Canada. Three weeks after that, Churchill made his famous "iron curtain" speech. By the summer of 1946, military commanders had begun to consider the creation of a militia unit similar to the PCMR. This new Ranger organization "would be confined to the sparsely populated areas of Canada along the coasts and along the fringe of the northern limits of population. Personnel belonging to this organization would be trained to act as guides and scouts, to increase their knowledge of the surrounding country and to act as guerrillas if required."¹⁸ This new force would operate from coast to coast to coast, instead of only along the Pacific as the PCMR did. The Canadian Rangers seemed to be an acceptable solution to the rather tricky problem of securing the Arctic against the developing threat of the Soviet Union.

American pressures on Canada to protect the North likely prodded the government towards action. The Americans did have a policy of intervening militarily in Canada if they "had good reason to believe that invasion or occupation of the Canadian Arctic by a foreign nation were [sic] imminent... with or without Dominion consent."¹⁹ The best way to protect Canada against her protectors was to provide some level of security in the North, a role the Rangers helped to fill, if only in appearance.

Northern sovereignty was of concern to the post-war Canadian government. During the Second World War, American military personnel had operated on Canadian soil for a variety of projects. After the war, several air bases still remained in American hands. Some of these underwent renovation and expansion in 1948, and there were plans for further construction in the works.²⁰ Continued construction in the North of air strips and radar stations created more potential targets needing protection from possible Soviet attack. Instead of allocating scarce Canadian Army resources to guard Arctic outposts or allowing more Americans to operate on Canadian soil, a different solution was needed. The Rangers helped to alleviate some of the pressure on the Army to defend the North simply by having bodies in uniform. However, the Rangers were ill-suited for the task of Northern defence because of their irregular nature and fixed locations.

The necessity of a military presence in the Arctic is questionable. The idea of a full-scale invasion of North America by the Soviet Union via Canada's north in 1947 was highly unlikely, if not impossible, due to technological constraints and the huge distances involved. This did not stop many officers in both the Canadian and American militaries from fearing such an possibility.²¹ As the Canadian Army conducted more operations in the North, the realities of Arctic movement and warfare became clear. Movement was difficult, and much time was spent by each individual simply trying to survive. Exercise LEMMING in 1945 demonstrated the importance of solid supply lines when operating in the North,²² something that would be difficult for a large Soviet force thousands of miles from base to maintain. It was thought that instead of a large invasion force, the most likely scenario would revolve around Soviet airborne forces capturing airbases in the North, such as those in Whitehorse, Churchill and Goose Bay. These airfields could then be used as refuelling sites for bombers on their way to major cities in Canada and the US. In such an event, the Rangers were expected to put their local defence plans into action and, after 1949, wait for the Mobile Striking Force (MSF).

The MSF consisted of three battalions of paratroopers, supposedly capable of being inserted into the North to combat an enemy raid or invasion.²³ Sub-units of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) started training for the new MSF role in early 1948.²⁴ Notwithstanding, the Rangers were to be the first line of defence against any Soviet

action, should it occur. The documents do not show if the delaying action the Rangers were expected to fight would have been only in the form of guerrilla tactics, or if it was to have included some form of static defence.

Canada's vast Arctic territory is even larger than that of Central Europe, if one includes the many islands of the Arctic Archipelago.²⁵ The shortest route from North America to the Soviet Union is over Canada's Arctic. However, the North is not just a vast, frozen wasteland. Forests exist in the sub-Arctic, and summer temperatures can be quite agreeable.²⁶ The problem of defence was not just the vast size of the Arctic, but the small size of the Canadian population and tiny numbers in the military. Many larger cities had reserve units, but cities in the North were few and very far between. The Army had suffered severe cutbacks in manpower because of rapid demobilization after the Second World War and the desire of Canadians to get on with their lives. The Active Force strength in mid-July 1947 was just under 14 000 with a Reserve of only 33 704.²⁷ Sending the few regular Army soldiers available to sit in the Arctic and watch for Russians would have been both terrible for morale and very expensive. Until the formation of the Rangers, little thought had been given towards enlisting the help of Canada's most northern peoples, generally First Nations and Inuit, into defence planning. In comparison, the Russian Arctic had a far greater population density, and the Soviets had spent decades integrating their Northern people into the country and thus their defensive network.²⁸ To the Canadian Army, Canada's northernmost people offered a cheap, if ineffective, solution to surveying and defending vast swaths of land.

Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and other top Army officers discussed at some length the form that the new Canadian Rangers should take. The PCMR served as the template upon which the new militia organization would be formed. In light of the military's budget, which had dropped significantly once the war ended, the Rangers looked like an excellent bargain. Questionnaires went out to each of the Army's geographical Commands asking for opinions on the proposed Ranger organization. Canada was divided into five territorial Commands, each with a General Officer Commanding (GOC) his designated area. Western Command covered British Columbia and Alberta; Prairie Command controlled Saskatchewan and Manitoba; Central Command and Quebec Command covered Ontario and Quebec, respectively; Eastern Command was responsible for the Maritimes.

The views expressed in the surveys by each Command displayed an uneven interest in the Ranger idea. Western Command essentially wanted to recreate the popular PCMR, whereas Eastern Command was not overly enthusiastic about the whole idea. Western Command wanted to train the Rangers "in rescue work, preparing a basic plan for the protection of vulnerable points, arranging a system of communication between pre-arranged points and participating in Active and/or Reserve Force exercises." By comparison, Eastern Command was not sure if they could come up with a training plan that would sustain local interest in the Rangers. The three remaining Commands, Quebec, Prairie and Central, advocated only the most minimal training in map reading and possibly the occasional exercise. When asked how the Rangers should be reimbursed, all but Eastern Command felt that they should be unpaid except for out-of-pocket expenses. Western Command stated that "the PCMR took pride in the fact that they were an unpaid body," and they wanted to continue this tradition. The only reason Eastern Command suggested the Rangers be paid was to keep people interested in participating.

This difference of opinion from coast to coast is understandable. Western Command had had a good experience during the war with the PCMR. Eastern Command apparently had enough trouble organizing Reserve units, and did not want another militia organization to add to its burden.²⁹ Once most of the details had been agreed upon, the Governor General ordered the Canadian Rangers into being on 15 April 1947.³⁰ The General Staff released Policy Statement No. 26 on 12 August 1947, outlining how the Rangers would be organized and operate. In wartime, the Rangers would have several duties to carry out under this policy. They were to guide troops within their area and watch Canada's coasts, if applicable. They were to give assistance to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the

"discovery, reporting and apprehension of enemy agents or saboteurs"³¹ and the reporting of suspicious activity. Rangers were also to assist in search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. These duties are straightforward and within the power of most citizens, but the Rangers also had orders to defend their territory.

The Canadian Rangers

The policy stated that in time of war the Rangers were to conduct "immediate local defence against sabotage, against small enemy detachments or saboteurs, and to assist and augment civilian protective arrangements against saboteurs..."³² In peacetime, the Rangers were to carry out similar duties and prepare for the defence of their locations. This seems reasonable enough, but as the Cold War intensified, more and more was expected of the Rangers in this capacity, even though they were not given the tools and training for the job.

Before the Canadian Rangers could accept any of their duties, the formations had to be organized and the men recruited. Even though international tensions were high and getting higher, volunteers did not flock to the Rangers as they had to the PCMR. The Rangers had an authorized strength of five thousand all-ranks from coast to coast, but reaching anywhere near that target proved to be difficult. Most of the people living in the Northern areas of concern were First Nations, Inuit or Métis, groups which had not traditionally had an interest in joining the Canadian military. Only 2.5 percent of the Aboriginal population had served in the military during the Second World War.³³ Enlisting their support for a military formation, particularly when many were considered to be second class citizens or worse, would not be easy. Racism, uniforms and lack of pay all had some impact on the slow start. Huge problems with communications made organizing the men who had been recruited difficult at best. The Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) stepped in with some solutions to these problems, lending the support of its vast northern networks and experience to the Army.



Cap Badge of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers

Combat Camera 2006.096.002

The first two phases of the birth of the Rangers entailed the selection and approval of company and platoon locations.³⁴ Several factors came into play in this selection process, including the strategic significance, supporting population, accessibility and the proximity to Reserve Force units. In northern areas, units were to be located at points that "would provide some measure of protection to localities where, in the majority of cases, it would not be desirable or economical to station operational troops in the event of an emergency."³⁵ Likewise, those along key areas of the coast were to conduct an observational role over Canadian waters. The Ranger units slated for the interior were tasked with protecting lines of communications and strategically important locations.³⁶ The Rangers looked to recruit men who would not generally be involved with the Army due to age, physical condition, occupation or personal preference. The Army did not want the Ranger units to take men into their ranks who could otherwise become Reserve or Active Force members.

Once the locations had been decided, the third phase of organization required commanders at the company, platoon and section levels. There seem to be no records explaining the officer selection process until the entrance of the HBC into the equation, which will be discussed later. Each section was to be commanded by a Ranger Sergeant, each platoon by a Ranger Lieutenant and each company by a Ranger Captain. None of these ranks held any power outside of the Ranger organization. Administrative duties above the company level were to be the responsibility of a staff officer in each of the respective Commands. Finally, the fourth phase stipulated the recruitment of Rangers up to the authorized strength for each Command.³⁷ In order to set up Ranger units in remote areas, senior officers visited each of the proposed locations to gauge interest and start the

organization process. Due to the lack of roads, Quebec Command enlisted the use of a Royal Canadian Air Force amphibious plane to fly to twelve proposed locations over three weeks for the purpose of Ranger recruiting.³⁸



Combat Camera 1996.005.206

Three Rangers heading out on patrol wearing the typical uniform of the PCMR

By December 1948, only forty-four officers and fifty-seven other ranks were part of the Rangers.³⁹ Aside from these figures, no statistics regarding the actual strength of the Rangers during the time period examined seem to exist. The annual reports issued by the Department of National Defence skilfully avoided disclosing how many Canadians were members of the Rangers. One report states that “Since its formation in 1947... the Canadian Rangers have undergone a gradual expansion. This process has, of necessity, been slow, owing to the large area covered by the organization and the nature of existing communications.”⁴⁰ Other reports simply state how many new Ranger companies or platoons had been authorized, not whether they had any actual members.

Part of the reason for the slow recruiting was that the early Cold War did not have the same sense of danger and urgency that drove so many men into the ranks of the PCMR.⁴¹ Even though relations between the West and the USSR were getting worse, there was still no imminent, credible threat to Canada’s territory. In 1947, the Soviets tested the Tu-4 bomber, a copy of the American B-29 with sufficient range to make a one-way flight to major North American cities.⁴² However, the Tu-4 did not enter into service until 1949, the same year the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. Until delivery systems and bombs increased in number and capability, it was thought that the main showdown would likely be in Europe and not over North America.

Most of the men targeted for recruitment into the Canadian Rangers were Aboriginals. Racist views towards First Nations had an impact on the Ranger organization. Views differed amongst commanders, ranging from condescension to those who felt that they were nearly useless. Major General F. F. Worthington, Honorary Colonel of the Rangers and GOC of Western Command, wrote that “they are not easy people⁴³ to handle at any time and unless you know the type very well, they are not apt to be very responsive.”

Worthington suggested writing a letter "containing the usual platitudes but with the object of gaining" the confidence of the new company commanders.⁴⁴ Major General Christopher Vokes, commander of Central Command, felt that white men would be the only people to make good Rangers. When replying to the CGS regarding the creation of a Ranger unit along the Cochrane-Mooseonee railway line, he replied:

The population is for the most part Cree Indian, some with Scotch names and blue eyes who exist by trapping and guiding for goose and duck hunters in the autumn. They are most indolent and unreliable and born lazy. Hunger is the only motivating force, plus the propagation of their race, at which they are very adept... I doubt the value of these Indians in a para military organization... You could never train them for anything except to fit into an early warning system or observer corps.⁴⁵

While, historically, aboriginal participation in the military was low, those from this area had an impressive record during both world wars, a fact Vokes seemed to overlook.⁴⁶ This attitude certainly did nothing to aid the recruiting process. Vokes preferred to choose locations where the local white population was sufficient to fill the ranks of the platoons.⁴⁷

Practical problems also hampered recruiting. Under the framework laid out by the General Staff, the Rangers received no pay but got an armband and a rifle similar to the PCMR. Reimbursement for out of pocket expenses was slow to materialize and hampered the efforts of local commanders trying to recruit members.⁴⁸ Patriotism alone was expected to fill ranks of a volunteer militia unit in sparsely populated areas during times of peace, and so the Army offered the barest of incentives.⁴⁹ The issued Lee Enfield, although an old design, was perfect for hard use in all sorts of weather. No one objected to the rifle and ammunition allotment, but some generals felt that the arm band was useless and insufficient. The PCMR had at least received helmets. During wartime an armband had been acceptable because of the need to conserve, but in peacetime it spoke only to budgetary constraints. Suggestions came in for uniforms of a practical nature for the territory the Rangers would operate in: green flannel shirts, parkas, winter cap and "a well designed, fairly large sized badge of good quality heavy white metal or silver to be worn on the outer garment as an indication of authority and duty."⁵⁰ However, this was not to be and in the fall of 1948 the cheap red armbands were issued.⁵¹ Thus, the unpaid militia was to defend the vast Arctic against a potential enemy with literally nothing more than a rifle and an armband.

Evolution and Integration

Communications problems plagued the Rangers during its first five years of existence. The problems of communicating and recruiting people in the north stemmed from both practical and technical problems. The long distances between the various Command headquarters and the proposed Ranger locations presented one hurdle to be overcome. Intertwined with this problem was the nature of the people with whom the Army tried to communicate. Trappers and hunters did not spend much time in cities, towns or other hubs of communication. The HBC stepped in to make this communication process more effective through the use of their trading posts and employees.

The HBC had only found out about the creation of the new militia unit when Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, the former Army historian, visited with his old school friend and HBC Governor, Sir Patrick Ashley Cooper in mid 1947. Considering their northern expertise, "Cooper was somewhat surprised and possibly mildly disappointed that he had not yet been approached by the CGS for assistance to or cooperation with the Canadian Army in the North."⁵² Dr. Omond Solandt, chairman of the Defence Research Board, also had a chat with Cooper, the latter reiterating his interest in assisting the Canadian Rangers.⁵³ Realizing the benefit of using the northern network, knowledge and relationships that the HBC had already set up, Foulkes decided to take full advantage of Cooper's help.⁵⁴ The Rangers did not have any issued means of communication, and so relied on the police, weather stations and HBC posts to keep in touch with their Commands.⁵⁵ Still, even when these stations were available, communications were poor. Many trading posts could not communicate directly with each other and relied on a series of relays.⁵⁶ This was still preferable to the

other available communication options: in the winter, dog sleds were the only means of travel and communication between trading posts and in the summer, rivers and some trails were available. In some areas, mail deliveries were made only once a year to trading posts. Quebec Command wanted to issue wireless sets to the various Ranger headquarters, but there were insufficient numbers to do so.⁵⁷ While use of the HBC communications networks was a vast improvement over dog sled communications, it was nowhere near the required level of efficiency. The lack of reliable and suitable infrastructure in the areas where Ranger companies were organized resulted in slow and ineffective communications.⁵⁸

On 13 December 1948 Prairie Command issued a report suggesting how to integrate the new militia organization into the Army. Many of the abovementioned benefits played prominently. The HBC's 215 trading posts across Canada's north acted as "the hubs of a wheel from which trappers and guides work out into the surrounding areas, like spokes. These men know every inch of the ground in their area, are expert riflemen and travel over the area frequently."⁵⁹ The report suggested closely integrating HBC employees with the Rangers, to the point of making senior managers Majors or Lieutenant-Colonels and trading post managers Captains and Lieutenants. The logic behind this was that because the HBC kept a close eye on its employees, they were expected to be trustworthy.

Piggybacking the Rangers onto the existing HBC network and hierarchy made sense from an economy of effort point of view. A hierarchy as well as supply lines were already established. This would save the government money; and therefore, make an already incredibly inexpensive organization even cheaper. Of course, such a close partnership could have political consequences, as "the plan as a whole has the appearance of setting up a private Hudson's Bay Company 'Army' which might possibly be used at some time as political capital for the purpose of embarrassing the Government."⁶⁰ After some consideration, Foulkes allowed the integration to go ahead with some small changes. The Army was to retain "complete control over Ranger appointments. In other words the holding of a certain position in the Hudson's Bay Company cannot be regarded as the sole prerequisite for a particular appointment."⁶¹

The Canadian Rangers were not to receive any kind of formal military training.⁶² No drilling, marching or small unit tactics were to be taught. The members, due to their occupation, were expected to already be expert marksmen. The individual Commands decided what, if any, training was necessary depending on the terrain and climate of the area under Ranger observation. In 1948, for example, the training focused on intelligence and communications.⁶³ Considering the problems of communications listed above and the lack of any radios on which to train, Ranger training was essentially whittled down to little more than map reading. The issued ammunition was supposed to be used for target practice, but because many Rangers were professional hunters and trappers, it was mostly used for hunting.⁶⁴ For the observation and search and rescue duties, the Rangers needed little by way of training, except perhaps in first aid. However, the Army seemed to feel that the qualities innate in Northern woodsmen would allow them to carry out their defensive mandate without instruction. This attitude changed in a few years as the Cold War progressed.

By November 1952, the Korean War was almost two and a half years old, and the Army started examining the possibility of expanding the role of the Canadian Rangers.⁶⁵ During the intervening five years between the creation of the Rangers and the detonation of the first hydrogen bomb by the United States, the potential Soviet threat to North America had increased. The successful Russian nuclear test in 1949 led to an expanded nuclear program, as well as the development of delivery systems. Long range bombers capable of delivering nuclear payloads across the Arctic Circle were being developed by both the Americans and the Russians. The Tu-4 was quickly becoming obsolescent as both the Tu-95 Bear and Tu-16 Badger conducted their maiden flights in 1952. Once the Bear, with its extremely long range, went into service, the Soviets no longer needed to capture airbases in the Canadian North to launch nuclear attacks. Around the same time as the Badger's first flight, the American B-52 took to the skies. It would be several years before any of these bombers became operational, so although the threat to Canada's North remained, it became increasingly unlikely.

An undated report on defence of the Canadian Northwest suggested the creation of specialized guerrilla units to be used in conjunction with the MSF. The report suggested that the enemy would invade Alaska and advance southwards along the Alaskan Highway. The time required for the MSF to respond to an enemy lodgement in the North was expected to be two days. This was fast but not fast enough. By the time the MSF responded, the Soviets might have accomplished their task and extricated themselves, the report argued. What exactly the Soviets would accomplish by marching down the Alaskan Highway—outside of a full-scale invasion—was not described. However, the report suggested that the long lines of communications stretched along a single highway would be perfect for guerrillas to hit, thus slowing the advance and allowing the MSF and later the American military to respond.⁶⁶



Combat Camera 1996.005.205

Members of 29 Coy, PCMR

Guerrillas must operate with a high level of endurance and the ability to live off the land, and the report indicated that professional trappers were the most adept and best suited to this. The proposed guerrilla company would be members of the Active Force: in a way, a professionalized version of the Rangers. The Rangers are described in the report as “potentially effective but... widely dispersed and their efforts uncoordinated.”⁶⁷ The author hinted at changing the role of some of the Rangers to fit into the guerrilla framework espoused in the report, by stating that:

The majority are ex-service personnel and work in and around the various settlements. The minority actually live in the bush. It is understood that the role assigned to them is, in general, of a static and defensive nature. It is considered that those more accustomed to making their living away from civilization would be misemployed in such a role. *Their temperament and chosen way of life would fit them much better in a more mobile and offensive role.* [author's italics]⁶⁸

A permanent guerrilla company would not likely find sufficient trappers and woodsmen to fill its ranks. To work in the proposed organization, members would have to formally join the Active Force and go through all the requisite training. Part of the reason the Rangers were formed and organized the way they were was to make service more appealing to those who did not want to do regular military training. Changing this would go against the “citizen soldier” idea behind the Rangers.⁶⁹ The Rangers remained as they were, and the formation of an effective guerrilla force was not realized.



Right: Lt. Col. A.L. Coote (CO of Lower Fraser Valley Area) and left: Lt. C. Casey Wells (Adj. of 29 Coy, PCMR)

The General Staff Officer (Operations and Plans) for Western Command made a similar appeal for forces located around strategic points that could react faster than the MSF.⁷⁰ He was "convinced that the local male inhabitants of northern installations if armed and trained for a specific defence role, could put up a good show; could delay the enemy in the accomplishment of their mission and could harass the enemy until the MSF could be launched."⁷¹ Whether the "specific defence role" would rely on guerrilla tactics or static defences was not discussed. Some of the strategic defence points for which the Rangers would be responsible were Whitehorse, Fort Nelson, Norman Wells and Fort Radium. Maj.-Gen. Vokes agreed with this proposal. He also understood that the Rangers symbolised the Army's intention to protect those in the northernmost fringes of Canadian population:

There is a requirement for some type of local defence force which would be effective in a limited manner against any real or supposed threat to communities in our sparsely settled coastal and northern regions. It is agreed that there may not be a real threat against many of these communities. However, the views of the local inhabitants do not necessarily coincide with this fact. Experience during the war 39-45 has shown that the demand for some form of local defence can well be so great as to cause the maldeployment of considerable numbers of regular troops.⁷²

Vokes understood not only the military but the political importance of the Rangers in northern communities. In times of uncertainty, war overseas and the potential of nuclear war, Canadians wanted to feel that they were protected. The Rangers helped fill this need, even if it was illusory.

Western Command continued the push for more training of Rangers and set up a short guide on how they were to operate when behind enemy lines. For example, the Rangers were to "always be psychologically maddening to the enemy and able to fight another day."⁷³ A list of training films indicated the type of combat for which Western Command hoped to prepare the Rangers. Films on close-quarter fighting, booby traps, six films on explosives and demolitions, and Donald Duck as "The Vanishing Private" were marked off along with many other titles on low level tactics and basic military training.⁷⁴ The records do not show if this broader defensive mandate was ever adopted. Nevertheless, the desire to increase the training of the Rangers demonstrates that at the time they were unprepared to carry out basic defensive measures.

In a hypothetical situation where the Soviets did launch an attack on Northern Canada, there would be many practical problems that the Rangers would face. The Red Army would not send second or third rate troops into any action in North America. Even if the nuclear capabilities of both sides were ignored, the outcome would likely not be positive for the Rangers. The organization was well suited to the tasks of observation, search and rescue and guiding military personnel on Arctic exercises, but not for defence against any serious threat. A handful of Rangers with rifles would not be able to hold up an attacking force of superior quality and weaponry for long. Harassment by a few Rangers might make an enemy pause, but it was unlikely that the Rangers could have held them up for the two days necessary to launch the MSF. They were not even issued hand grenades, machine guns or mortars, weapons necessary for creating a good defensive position. It could also be expected that any attacking Soviets would run into only a handful of Rangers because the small force was spread over such an incredibly large area. The PCMR had up to fourteen thousand members to observe only the Pacific coastline, and yet the Rangers had just a small fraction of this to watch over nearly the entirety of Canada's coast. This hypothetical situation assumes, of course, that the Rangers would have been able to respond. The problems of communications laid out earlier, along with the nature of the occupations of many Rangers meant that it would take some time in order for word to get out to the individuals. Once the Rangers met, they would have to observe and identify the enemy, and then put their defensive plan into action. The odds of this process working quickly and efficiently were not good.



Combat Camera 1996.005.202

PCMR members providing support to civilians workers in the Chilliwack, B.C. area.

Conclusion

The creation of the Canadian Rangers in 1947 was the result of a cash-strapped Army trying to provide some token of defence in the vast Canadian North. The Soviet threat was possible but improbable, particularly as time went on and nuclear weapons systems progressed in both range and yield. However, American pressure and the concerns of Canadians pushed the Army to do something. The tasks of search and rescue and guides for Army operations fell easily within the abilities of the Ranger organization. Where defence was concerned, the lack of funding, weaponry, communications, organization and training meant that against an actual threat, the Rangers would likely have fared poorly. The citizen soldiers, armed with rifles and responding to the call to defend their country, were expected to handle more than they were capable of in defence of Canada's North.

Endnotes

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7. Kerry Ragnar Steeves, "The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1942-1945" (Master of Arts, University of British Columbia, 1990), 15.
8. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 322.009 (D24), Lt-Col Taylor to Col Duguid, 4 April 1945.
9. DHH, 112.1 (D35) "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers—Organization."
10. Steeves, 23.
11. LAC, RG-24, vol. 2440, file C-604-18, "Historical Background of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and the Canadian Rangers," 3 July 1947.
12. DHH, 112.1 (D35) G. C. 320 "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers—Organization."
13. Steeves, 24.
14. DHH, 112.1 (D35) "Provision of weapons for Pacific Coast Militia Rangers" 1 June 1942. The military had also considered using rifles confiscated from enemy aliens, or asking the owners of some seventy-five thousand .30 calibre rifles across the country to lend or sell them to the Department of National Defence.
15. Steeves, 14.
16. John Moses, Donald Graves and Warren Sinclair, A Sketch Account of Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Military, (Department of National Defence, 2004) 77. Available: http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/downloads/Official_Histories/sketch_e.pdf
17. LAC, RG-24, vol. 2440, file C-604-18, "Historical Background of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and the Canadian Rangers," 3 July 1947. In recognition of their service, former Rangers could buy the rifle that they had carried from the Department of National Defence for five dollars. Of the 6224 .30-30 carbines and 3265 M17's issued to the PCMR, 3585 were sold to former Rangers complete with sling, pull through and oil bottle. DHH, 322.009 (D24) Lt-Col Taylor to Company Commanders, PCMR, 6 December 1945. LAC, RG-24, vol. 2440, file C-604-18, "Historical Background of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and the Canadian Rangers," 3 July 1947.
18. Ibid., Lt-Gen. Foulkes to GOC's, All Commands, 17 June 1946.
19. Quoted in Grant, 159.
20. Ibid., 215.
21. Kenneth Charles Eyre, "Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North" (PhD Thesis, University of London, 1981), 165-166.
22. DHH, 746.083 "Cold Weather Trials & Exercises Ex. 'Lemming'—CAORG [Canadian Army Operational Research Group] Rept. No 25," 25 May 1945.
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30. Ibid., "Appendix A -Order-" 15 April 1947.
31. LAC, RG-24, vol. 2440, file C-604-18, General Staff Policy Statement No. 26, 12 August 1947.
32. Ibid.
33. Moses, 67.
34. LAC, RG-24, vol. 2440, file C-604-18, General Staff Policy Statement No. 26, 12 August 1947.

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35. Ibid., Director of Military Operations and Planning (DMO&P) to CGS, 15 September 1947.
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 37. Ibid., General Staff Policy Statement No. 26, 12 August 1947
 38. LAC, RG-24, vol 2441, file C-604-18, "Organization of Canadian Rangers Quebec Command" 15 July 1948.
 39. Ibid., Adjutant-General branch Army HQ to Maj.-Gen. Penhale, 3 December 1948.
 40. *Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1950* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1951) 46.
 41. Steeves, 32.
 42. Randall Forsberg, ed., *World Weapon Database: Volume II Soviet Military Aircraft* (Brookline, Mass: Institution for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1986), 82-86.
 43. Worthington never wrote the word Indian or Native specifically, but from the tone and other language used it is likely that "these people" referred to are indeed Aboriginals. It is entirely possible that this meaning has been misconstrued, and that he was simply referencing northern people in general, including whites. If that is the case, then the feeling that Canadians in the North are somehow different from other Canadians certainly would not have helped recruiting either.
 44. LAC, RG-24, vol 2441, file C-604-18, Maj.-Gen. F. F. Worthington to Lt.-Gen. Foulkes, 29 November 1948.
 45. Ibid., Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes to Lt.-Gen. C. Foulkes, 9 December 1948.
 46. Lackenbauer, "Canada's Northern Defenders," 177.
 47. LAC, RG-24, vol 2441, file C-604-18, Maj.-Gen. C. Vokes to Lt.-Gen. C. Foulkes, 9 December 1948.
 48. Ibid., General of Western Command to Lt.-Gen. Foulkes, 30 December 1948.
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 50. LAC, RG-24, vol 2441, file C-604-18, General of Western Command to Lt.-Gen.. Foulkes, 30 December 1948.
 51. Ibid., telegram General Staff to Army Winnipeg, 14 September 1948.
 52. Ibid., Maj.-Gen. N. E. Rodger to Maj.-Gen. C. C. Mann, VCGS, 22 October 1947.
 53. Ibid., Dr. Omond Solandt to Lt.-Gen. Foulkes, 23 October 1947.
 54. Ibid., Lt.-Gen. Foulkes to Brig. R. O. G. Morton, 30 December 1947.
 55. Ibid., DMO&P to DSigs, 1 November 1948.
 56. Ibid., Maj.-Gen. R. O. G. Morton to DMO&P, 7 December 1948.
 57. Ibid., Brigadier BGS (Plans) to CGS, 7 February 1949.
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 59. Ibid., "Appreciation—Organization Canadian Rangers," 13 December 1948.
 60. Ibid., Brigadier, BGS (Plans) to CGS, 7 February 1949.
 61. Ibid., Lt.-Gen. Foulkes to GOC Prairie Command, 14 April 1949.
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 65. DHH, 327.009 (D207), Brig. T.G. Gibson, Acting Vice CGS to GOC Western Command, 7 November 1952.
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 69. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Rangers: A 'Postmodern' Militia that Works," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 4 (2005-2006), 52.
 70. Ibid., Maj. W. W. Coward to Colonel General Staff, 20 October 1952.
 71. Ibid.
 72. Ibid., Maj.-Gen. Vokes to Army Headquarters, 7 November 1952.
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THE FIRST "CHIEF OF LAND STAFF"— LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR EDWARD SELBY SMYTH, KCMG

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD

Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Selby Smyth, KCMG, was a British officer who served first as Adjutant-General and then later General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia from 1874 to 1880. Despite his British heritage, he is recognized as the first post-Confederation commander of the Canadian Army.

Born in Belfast, Ireland, on 31 March 1819, Selby Smyth was educated at Chiswick, Middlesex, and Putney College, Surrey. He entered the British Army on 26 January 1841, and was appointed an ensign by purchase with the 2nd Queen's Royal Regiment. Serving with his regiment in India, he was the Brigade Major to the Forces in the Southern Concan and Sawant Warree country during the Campaign of 1844 and 1845, where he saw considerable action with his unit. Again by purchase, he became a Captain on 4 August 1848, and was appointed Adjutant of the battalion and Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Sir Guy Campbell.

Smyth accompanied his regiment to South Africa on the outbreak of the Kaffir War in 1850. He served with distinction during the campaign and was mentioned in General Orders for his conduct in command of a column in action at Fish River Bush. Smyth also commanded one of the detached columns at the battle of Berea, where again he displayed exceptional command and earned himself a brevet majority. Following the war, Smyth served first as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Cape of Good Hope, from May 1853 to March 1855, and then as Deputy Quartermaster-General at the Cape until June 1861.

In 1860 he was detached from his regiment and appointed Inspector-General of Militia in Ireland, a post he held for six years. In 1867, while the flying columns he had organized against the Fenian political movement were at work, he was selected to act as Adjutant-General of the Army in Ireland, and was simultaneously made a Special Magistrate for the County and City of Dublin, to use troops independently in case of rebellion. In March 1868 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and in 1870 was made General Officer in Command of the Forces in Mauritius, in the southern Indian Ocean. While there, he acted twice as Governor during 1870 and 1871.

In the years immediately following Confederation, Canada's defence remained a shared responsibility between British regular forces and Canadian militia. As such, overall command of land forces rested with a senior British officer, usually appointed by England and with Ottawa's consensus. At first, however, it was difficult to secure a suitable officer, and many shorter temporary appointments were made while the situation persisted. In November 1873, the newly elected Canadian government again pressed the Governor-General for the appointment of a British general officer to command the militia in Canada. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker Powell had been the Acting Adjutant General since August, but he was a Canadian militia officer and therefore technically disqualified from being considered for the appointment at the time.

Much debate went back and forth between London and Ottawa over possible choices for the command. Yet, once the terms of the appointment were finally agreed to through the Colonial Office and the War Office, a decision was quickly made. On 1 October 1874,



Lieutenant-General Edward Selby Smyth, seated, left

Edward Selby Smyth was appointed by the Duke of Cambridge, commander-in-chief of the British Army, to the command of the Militia of Canada. It was a position he held for six years, making him not only the first but also one of the longest serving commanders of the post-Confederation Canadian Army.

Smyth arrived in Canada and immediately set to work. The Canadian militia he was assuming command of in 1874 was already an experienced and rapidly evolving force. Large portions of the army had been engaged in active border security since the mid-1860s, had repulsed two serious raids into Canada by the Irish Republican Army in 1866 and 1870, and had undertaken a long-range expeditionary campaign to the Red River also in 1870. In addition to these engagements, the army remained a *de facto* police force, along with the newly created North West Mounted Police (NWMP), and was routinely engaged with aiding the civil power to keep the peace across the nascent dominion. Finally, the Government of



No. 220 — MAJOR GENERAL E. SELBY SMYTH
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY TOPLEV.

Major-General Edward Selby Smyth

Canada had already taken its first steps towards establishing its own permanent force; Canadian regular army artillery batteries were formed in 1871, and discussions were already underway on the proposed creation of a military college at Kingston.

In 1875, Selby Smyth began an 18,000 kilometre tour across the country to British Columbia to inspect the NWMP, as well as several militia units stationed across the Northwest Territory. It was a long, arduous journey across largely undeveloped country, but Smyth revelled in his duties and the adventure of it. At the same time, he appreciated the growing security concerns along the Red River and Saskatchewan River districts, and needed to see the situation for himself.

Smyth also understood well the military's part in creating stability and security at home until a domestic police force could evolve to assume these roles entirely. In July 1878, he received the thanks of the Governor-General for the discretion displayed in holding the City of Montreal in military occupation upon the anticipation of riots, which it was believed were forestalled by the presence and conduct of his troops. Smyth was later promoted as a reward for meritorious and distinguished services, with a handsome stipend complementing his already considerable private assets. Soldiering in Canada proved both lucrative and professionally rewarding.

Overall, Selby Smyth was well-received by the Canadian Government and the Militia, noticed by example when he was made President of the Dominion of Canada Artillery Association. Upon completion of his tenure at GOC in Canada in 1877, Queen Victoria made him a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George (KCMG).

After leaving Canada, Selby Smyth returned to England where he later became the 'Colonel' of the 72nd Regiment of Foot in 1881. The following year he was promoted to Major General, and he went on to serve as Colonel of the Antrim Artillery in 1891. He became Colonel of The Queen's Regiment on 29 August 1893, and died peacefully in England on 22 September 1896.

Further Reading

To learn more about the Canadian Army's first commander, the following sources may be consulted through further reading:

Order in Council—Appointing Major-General Edward Selby Smyth to Command the Canadian Militia, 1875. LAC RG 6-A-1, vol. 21, file no. 604.

Orders in Council—Appointments of Major-General Edward S. Smyth, Major-General Rich, G.A. Luard and Colonel Fred D. Middleton as generals commanding the Militia of Canada. LAC RG 6-A-1, vol. 96, file no. 666.

Report to Privy Council, 10th September 1874, appointing Major General Selby Smyth to the command of the Militia. LAC RG 9-II-A-1, vol. 66, file no. 413.

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NOTE TO FILE—COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE ANA: 1ST BRIGADE, 205 CORPS TAKES ANOTHER GIANT STEP

Major David Yurczyszyn and members of TF 3-08 Kandak 5 OMLT

Soldiers must have water, food, ammunition, spare parts and fuel if they are to achieve their mission, so an army with inadequate combat service support (CSS) is an army in deep trouble.

After some two and a half years of capacity-building with Canadian mentorship, the 1st Brigade of the Afghan National Army's 205 Corps (known familiarly as 1-205) has its headquarters and its infantry kandaks up to or approaching full operational capability. The next step is delivering supplies and services to troops in the field.

All through 2008, soldiers of the Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) mentored Kandak 5—a battalion-sized ANA unit stationed at Camp Hero, near Kandahar Airfield—to provide 1-205 with CSS. Until recently, however, Kandak 5 did not seem ready to deploy outside the wire on one of the basic support tasks in this theatre: supplying a forward operating base (FOB).

Kandak 5's Commanding Officer and Operations Officer used the month of December 2008 to plan the delivery of logistic support as far forward in the battlespace as required. The kandak's leadership and soldiers then put together a forward support group—a composite company-sized element—and deployed it in support of *Operation ATAL 47*, conducted by 1-205 in the Zharey District of Kandahar Province. This was the first time 1-205 planned and executed such a sustainment concept in support of a mission.

The Planning Phase

Planning is the first step of any successful mission, the phase where every bit of information is analyzed and every possible scenario is covered. Over three days in December 2008, Kandak 5 Operations Officer, Major Talib, and his planning staff—with a little mentorship from the OMLT—developed two courses of action. They presented both to their Commanding Officer and the Brigade Commander, using sand models to demonstrate the options they had developed.

The winning plan proposed a forward support group (FSG), led by Major Talib and the kandak's Regimental Sergeant Major, to go to the FOB with a "reach-back capability"—a team assigned to return to Camp Hero for emergency resupply requirements. The highly motivated soldiers of Kandak 5 knew they would be delivering a level of CSS their brigade had yet to see. If successful, this mission would be the model for all future 1-205 sustainment and logistics operations.

Moving Out

The trip to the FOB was done in convoys, with elements of Kandak 5 leading the way. Both convoys arrived without incident, with all equipment and stores intact. Upon arrival, the soldiers of the FSG set themselves up in a way that made the most efficient use of the ground and the area defences allotted to them. Major Talib gathered his troops and briefed them on their camp and security routine, and then reported to the Brigade Tactical Operations Centre. With the camp set-up and settling into its routine, Major Talib could get a good picture of his assets and the mission tasks that might fall out of the orders he received from the Brigade. He set the FSG's battle rhythm and established a command post from which all communications traffic and orders would flow.

The call back to his Commanding Officer was a proud moment for Major Talib, who reported that Kandak 5 was ready to begin its mission, but required more firewood and spare parts to complete the tasks already pouring in. This problem was thoroughly war-gamed during the planning process, so the kandak commander (working with the Senior OMLT

Mentor) was ready to get his maintenance and warehouse officers—also working with a mentor—started on gathering equipment and stores. In hours, an emergency resupply convoy was heading down the road to the forward element, where the shipment would be promptly relayed to the FSG. The efficiency of this procedure confirmed to all leaders that Kandak 5 had a rock-solid plan that covered all eventualities.

The Execution Phase

Kandak 5's subunits were deployed to demonstrate the resources and capabilities a brigade CSS unit has to offer when deployed as a major player in the battlespace.



Combat Camera PIC10200c

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) had two taskings critical to the sustainment of 1–205 Brigade, and consequently, to mission success. First was security: HHC would provide camp security for all vehicles and equipment in the Kandak 5 compound, and force protection for elements of the FSG required to deploy into the battlespace to recover vehicles and casualties. HHC was also responsible for stocking and distributing the brigade's maintenance load of ammunition, rations, fuel and firewood. HHC's officers and non-commissioned members would settle for nothing less than strict security and proper supply discipline for goods destined for kandaks at the front.

The Maintenance Company area was large enough for a primary workshop and an equipment collection point (ECP) for vehicles recovered from operations. Technicians from Maintenance Company used a contact truck to visit forward positions to repair and service vehicles and equipment.

The Medical Officer and his team quickly established a medical centre to support the entire mission, a Unit Aid Station for Kandak 5 soldiers, and a casualty collection point (CCP) for all kandaks involved in the operation. Forward-deployed kandaks would move their casualties to the CCP, where Kandak 5's medical team would perform triage and send them on to the most appropriate medical facility.

To make all this happen, the soldiers of Transport Company became key players as they were tasked to haul the brigade maintenance load of food, stores, wood, ammunition, fuel and other necessities to the FOB and other destinations in the mission area. As soon as the stores were delivered, Transport Company was tasked to return to Camp Hero for truckloads of clothing, food, and winter relief supplies for distribution in the final stages of the operation to the people of Senjaray. The delivery of humanitarian assistance by the soldiers of Kandak 5 was paramount to the success of the mission. It was also yet another complex task the whole brigade could see Kandak 5 execute flawlessly.

Throughout *Operation ATAL 47*, information flowed back and forth between Brigade Headquarters and the front line. Kandak 5's Communications Company monitored all Brigade transmissions, operated the Brigade Command Post equipment and radios around the clock, and provided the Brigade Commander with a signaller. With all these brigade-level tasks, Communications Company also played a large role within Kandak 5, as Major Talib was running a Command Post of his own to monitor and control support provided by the FSG.

Major Talib, Kandak 5's Operations Officer, mounted the vehicles for one of the most important tasks of *Op ATAL 47*: counting and loading the humanitarian aid supplies for the town of Senjaray, and deploying to deliver them. The distribution of food, blankets, clothing and other household items to the local people was conducted as a sign of good faith, and to boost confidence in the ANA and the Government of Afghanistan. Major Talib identified the area where the distribution would be done, and briefed the Brigade Commander. After discussion, the chain of command gave Major Talib the green light to set the plan in motion.

The plan called for Afghan national security forces—army and police—to patrol with the Canadian battle group and OMLT from Task Force Kandahar and prepare a safe, secure site in Senjaray for the distribution of relief stores to the villagers. This task was completed in excellent form, creating stories and memories that will live for years.

Final Thoughts

The people of Afghanistan are best served by their own security forces. With support from the Government of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police continue to expand their capabilities to meet the security needs of the citizens of Afghanistan. *Operation ATAL 47* was a giant step in the right direction.

With the deployment of a Forward Support Group in a brigade-level operation, Kandak 5 broke new ground for the Afghan National Army, which continues to develop its professional skills. Kandak 5's mission on *Operation ATAL 47* pushed 1–205's combat service support capabilities to the next level, while the soldiers of Kandak 5 proved themselves a major asset to 205 Corps, on the leading edge of sustainment and logistics in the ANA.


As the capabilities of Afghanistan's national security forces continue to evolve, so does the Afghans' ability to take care of their own security and determine their own destiny as a nation.

— BOOK REVIEWS —

STEEL AND BLOOD: SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMOR AND THE WAR FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

HA MAI VIET, former Colonel, ARVN. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 459 pages, \$40.00 USD, ISBN: 978-1591149194

Dr J.R. McKay



Ha Mai Viet's *Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia* is an ambitious work. The author tried to produce both a history of the armoured branch of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam¹ (ARVN) and a history of the armoured branch's unit's roles on the ARVN's battles with the Vietnamese Communist forces. While South Vietnam, and by default the ARVN, and its armoured branch lasted for only twenty years, this was a nation and an army that fought against its enemies for most of that time.²

Steel and Blood is effectively two smaller books in one. The first part is a "Combat History" of the armoured branch's participation in battles as well as a narrative of the war from an ARVN perspective. The second part of the book, "Military History," is a summary of the organizational history of the South Vietnamese Armor Corps, a compendium of information on that branch and a comparison of its equipment with that of its North Vietnamese counterpart.

The combat history describes a series of battles from 1963 to 1975, based upon ARVN's battles with the Communists. It starts with an orientation on the role of the armoured branch's units in a series of battles, but slowly transforms into a general narrative on the progress of the war. Colonel Viet tried to tell the tale of what happened, balancing between what he stated that he sought to do and providing the proverbial "bigger picture." While this might frustrate some readers, some observations merit mention.

First, one should keep in mind that he has provided a glimpse into a perspective that is often overlooked. The common narrative with regard to the ARVN has been that it was overly oriented on the byzantine politics of Saigon and insufficiently focused on waging counter-insurgency operations until 1968, when the Tet Offensive led to the development of a more combat-oriented ethos. Colonel Viet's book points out that a number of ARVN units often fought harder than was realized at the time or since despite the political proclivities of some of the ARVN's general officers.³

Second, the author left one with the distinct impression that ARVN units tended to view their advisors less as sources of advice than sources of firepower. One gets the sense that during the earlier years, in some cases, ARVN officers may have resented advice from the technically sound yet less experienced advisors. The perception of advisors as sources of firepower appears to have become more acute after the 1972 Easter Offensive. The Nixon Administration's policy of "Vietnamization" meant the phased withdrawal of American combat forces and increasingly shifting the burden of combat onto the ARVN. The Nixon Administration could not reverse this trend for domestic political reasons and sought to make greater use of air power as a result. This is a potential lesson for those destined for

advisory duties; those being advised may be more interested in one's capacity to influence the battle than one's advice on how to do same.

Third, the book leaves one with the distinct impression that as the Communists made the transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, the importance of ARVN's armoured branch increased. The early battles described organizations analogous to reconnaissance squadrons conducting economy of force operations against the Viet Cong; the later battles described ARVN tanks duelling with the North Vietnamese counterparts. Indeed, the Communist fielding of T-54 equipped units prompted the ARVN's fielding of a number of M-48 "Patton" equipped units to cope with the threat. This also supports a broader point about the nature of insurgencies. The endgame of any insurgency is to set the conditions for assuring victory once conventional warfare begins. Colonel Viet's accounts of battle start with clashes with the Viet Cong guerrillas in the mid 1960s and ends with tank battles between the North Vietnamese Army and the ARVN.

This section of the book, unfortunately, was at times difficult to follow. The author sought to describe both operational and tactical actions without maps, but made references to a series of place names. While there was an appendix providing general maps of South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail, the inclusion of a series of smaller maps that showed the location and how the battles occurred would have helped clarify the "combat history." Throughout this section, one was tempted to read the "military history" to get a sense of the evolution of the armoured branch's organizations before linking it to their combat performance.

The military history was a collection of related topics designed to inform the reader about the war, the armoured branch's evolution and its equipment. Again, the ARVN perspective was enlightening and it allows one to see the conflict through Vietnamese, albeit Southern, eyes, as opposed to the American or French perspectives. The organizational history began with the Vietnamese National Army of 1950, which was the army raised by the French within Vietnam during the war with the Viet Minh. The ARVN's armoured branch's roots lay in the creation of a series of reconnaissance platoons in 1950, which coalesced into companies⁴ in 1951, battalions by 1953 and regiments by 1954. After the Vietnamese National Army became the ARVN in 1955, these reconnaissance regiments became armoured cavalry regiments, four armoured regiments, a school and an amphibious group. In this period, they were equipped with Second World War era equipment cast off by the French that had been donated by the United States. During the 1960s, the older equipment was replaced by M113 armoured personnel carriers and M-41 "Bulldog" tanks.⁵

The book describes the 1960s as a developmental period where the armoured branch began to specialize more. Armoured cavalry companies were the most common unit, but the branch also began to field reconnaissance and tank companies as well. Indeed, the book left one with the impression that the ARVN armoured branch fought most frequently as companies within larger entities. Indeed, the ambitious combination of the "combat history" and the "military history" was most useful in illuminating such matters. Colonel Viet followed this discussion of the evolution of the branch's units with a compendium of facts. This had the effect of breaking a logical sequence of information in order to provide a series of interesting yet esoteric facts. He identified every commander of an ARVN armoured unit from the troop to the brigade level, the surgeons, and provided an account of their reunion at Fort Knox in 2000. Unfortunately, the multiple sources of information made this section, and indeed the book, seem less of a general history than a sourcebook or compendium of facts about the ARVN armoured branch.

Ha Mai Viet was a South Vietnamese Armor corps officer who served for 21 years, retiring as a Colonel. During that time, he had served in a number of different positions

within armoured units, but his two most noteworthy positions were as an Assistant Division Commander and as the chief of the Quang Tri province.⁶ This meant he had fought the Communists for at least twelve years before leaving his country in its final days. His patriotism and pride in his military have been reflected in his writing. In addition, he wrote some of the accounts of specific battles from a personal perspective. Readers should take these points in mind before passing judgement on the book's value.

Readers may be wondering what value a book about a nation that vanished a quarter century ago may have today. What can the ARVN's experience tell us today? Is it relevant for the Canadian Forces in the early 21st century? The short answer to such questions is yes; however, this depends upon one's perspective and interests. Those interested in comparing the evolution of different armoured branches may also wish to read those parts of the book. One should note that the ARVN's approach to combat development was based upon trial and error in battle; they did not have the luxury of time to consider their organizations in great detail. Furthermore, reading the ARVN perspective may give pause for thought for those destined for advisory duties about what those being advised may be thinking.


Endnotes

1. The RVN is better known as South Vietnam.
2. Many readers will no doubt be aware of the American participation in the war, spanning from 1964 to 1973 and the end of the war between North and South Vietnam (1973-1975), however, many may not be aware that South Vietnam had to contend with several armed groups in its infancy in 1955 and coup attempts from within the ARVN. The Communist insurgency began in South Vietnam in 1957 and North Vietnam began to provide support to that insurgency in 1959. A year later, the North Vietnamese sought to see all armed resistance groups in South Vietnam coalesce into the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF). Readers may recognize the other, slightly inaccurate, name for the NLF—the Viet Cong. The ARVN began fighting
3. There are two examples of this phenomenon. The author defends the actions and decisions of ARVN tactical commanders at the Battle of Ap Bac (January 1963) and the President's direction that contributed to the disaster in Operation LAM SON 719 (January 1971). For details, see: Ha Mai Viet, former Colonel, ARVN, *Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armour and the War for Southeast Asia*, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008), 16-17 and 84. For examples of the criticism levelled on those two incidents, see: Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, U.S. Army, Retired, *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975*, (Novato: Presidio, 1988), 573-604, and Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, (New York: Random House, 1988), 203-265.
4. Readers should be aware that due to the influence of the U.S. Army, the ARVN armoured branch used the term "Troop" to describe subunit-sized organizations and the term "Squadron" for unit-sized organizations. This review uses the generic Canadian Army terminology of "company" and "battalion."
5. The M-41 "Bulldog" came into American service during the Korean War and entered ARVN service in 1964. It weighed 24 tons, its main armament was 76 mm, it had 12 to 38 mm of armour, and it could reach speeds of 72 km/h.
6. This province was in Military Region 1 / I Corps Tactical Zone, just south of the Demilitarized Zone. He left South Vietnam in 1975, during the final days of that country.

VIENNA 1683: CHRISTIAN EUROPE REPELS THE OTTOMANS

MILLER, Simon, illustrated by Peter Dennis. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, Campaign #191, 2008, paperback, 96 pages, \$22.95, ISBN-13: 978-1846032318

Richard Palimaka



The 1683 Siege of Vienna by an Ottoman army of 200,000 lasted from July to September of that year, until it was broken at the Battle of Kahlenburg by the Imperial relief force led by Jan III Sobieski of Poland. The siege represented the high-water mark of Ottoman expansion into Europe, and set in motion events which would eventually see the dismemberment of the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the rise of Russia and Prussia. Within a century, the traditional balance of power in Eastern and Central Europe would be completely altered. The continuing struggle between Islam and Christian Europe saw Ottoman holdings in Europe shrink over the next 200 years to encompass only the Balkans. Ottoman rule in the region influenced the thinking and attitudes of political elites, the Orthodox Church and social and intellectual development, ensuring that the “border of the shrinking enclave of what came to be called “Turkey in Europe” formed one of Europe's most deep-seated cultural fault lines.”¹ The Siege was an important turning point in a struggle which has lasted two millennia and still reverberates today.

This is the 191st title in the very successful Osprey Campaign series and *Vienna 1683* follows the proven and familiar format. Seven full-colour maps and a two-page 3D “birds-eye view” of the Battle of Kahlenburg support the text at appropriate locations. Dozens of contemporary maps and panoramic views are presented along with very colourful illustrations of critical points in the campaign and climactic battles. Some of the period battle maps are not reproduced large enough, making it difficult to distinguish geographic features from troop placements and movement. These are fascinating documents which deserved to be better emphasized.

In the opening chapters, the author quickly launches into this complex story to set the stage for the Ottoman decision to advance on Austria and its capital, Vienna. A brief outline of the major encounters from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the beginning of the 17th Century illustrate the intense conflict between Christian Europe and Islam as the Ottomans spread their influence through the Balkans and around the Mediterranean. This is followed by an account of the decline in the quality of Ottoman leadership through out the 17th Century as a series of inept Sultans were succeeded by children or were deposed by the Janissaries. As the author states, it is fortunate for Europe that Ottoman leadership was in a weakened state during the period of the Thirty Years War and was unable to exploit the situation. Imperial Austria, involved on two fronts, was preoccupied with the rise of French power and influence on its Western borders, and had difficulty dealing with the Ottoman threat. The prelude to the battle includes a rather thin order of battle, but has useful biographies of the main political and military leaders. An examination of the opposing forces is of necessity brief, but touches on the major characteristics and aspects of the Imperial, Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman armies.

The bulk of the book deals with Ottoman strategic decisions made on their advance toward Vienna, and the military, political and financial difficulties encountered by Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor, to organize a coalition to respond to the invasion. The harrowing experience of the Viennese defenders during the siege and Ottoman siege tactics are well described. The author is able to recreate some of the drama of the climactic Battle of Kahlenburg which saw the charge of the magnificent Polish Winged Hussars into the heart of the Ottoman camp.

Not so well handled is the aftermath of the battle, as only the period immediately following the lifting of the siege and the subsequent retreat are covered. The significance of the campaign and battle should have been placed in historical context, with at least as much effort as was dedicated to the prelude to the battle.

The final chapter is a description of the battlefield as it is today. The book is rounded out by a fascinating bibliography which includes some contemporary works. This volume is recommended as an introduction to the Siege of Vienna, and will add to the curiously short list of titles in English dealing with this event.


Endnote

1. Davies, Norman, *Europe: A History* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) 646
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ONE SOLDIER'S WAR

BABCHENKO, Arkady, translated from the Russian by Nick Allen. New York: Grove Press, 2007, hardcover, 396 pages, \$27.50 ISBN-10: 0-802118607

2Lt Mischa E. Kaplan



The ongoing conflict in Chechnya occupies a certain historical void in military studies. The Russian invasion of Chechnya, in 1994 and again in 1999, entered the former superpower into its first major conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian Army had not fought a war of this magnitude since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And yet, strangely, this conflict has received little attention amongst Western audiences. Although there has been some important work done on the political aspects of the Russian military, little has been written on the social aspects of this organization.¹ The fact that the Chechen conflict has been so catastrophic, in terms of human rights abuses and casualty figures, makes further inquiry into this field imperative. Chechnya, a region still in the grip of conflict, remains a dangerously misunderstood and under-examined battleground.

Thus it should be with a certain excitement that readers approach the English-language translation of Arkady Babchenko's harrowing account of his experiences in the Russo-Chechen wars. Babchenko—who was conscripted into the Russian Army in 1994 and volunteered for active service again in 1999—has given us an account of war that might as well have been plucked right out of the trenches of the Eastern Front during the Great War; the fact that the author is writing about a supposedly 'modern' military in the 1990s makes the story that much more terrifying. Readers hoping to gain a greater understanding of the political nature of the Chechen conflict will find little of interest in this book. Babchenko provides neither a coherent and structured narrative, nor a broad outline of the political actions which brought the Russians into Chechnya. The book's real focus is on the mundane and tragic everyday existence of a conscript soldier in a confusing and morally-nebulous terrain. Through a series of journal-like entries, Babchenko recounts his experiences with garrison life, in the Battle of Grozny, and in countless skirmishes and firefights with Chechen rebels. Although these journal entries were clearly written after Babchenko's demobilization, there is an immediateness to his writing that makes the reader feel a part of this cold and terrible world. Babchenko's literary style is frank and candid, apparently holding back none of the horrors which he routinely faced. From the daily violence that defines life in the ranks of the Russian Army to the grisly deaths of comrades

on the battlefield, Babchenko paints an eerie picture of a world devoid of compassion, in which all life has ceased to have clear meaning. Babchenko's world is one in which the callous and apathetic nature of war takes full shape.

While the Chechen rebel looms large and mysterious in Babchenko's narrative, the real enemy in the story is Russian military culture itself. Among the more disturbing aspects of this culture is the practice of *dedovshchina*, the 'bullying' of new recruits by more experienced soldiers. For readers who are familiar with bullying in the Soviet military, Babchenko's stories will provide few surprises. New recruits are routinely and brutally beaten by virtually everyone they come into contact with. From basic training to his first few months as part of a regiment, Babchenko is subjected on a daily basis to malicious and virtually unchecked violence. Even more disturbing is the transcendence of this violence through the ranks. The author notes, somewhat facetiously, that the only reason he was never beaten by a general was simply because he never came into contact with one. Violence is omnipresent. Amongst junior ranks, a group composed primarily of young conscripts, morale is low and violence and desperation all-encompassing. Desertion is a regular occurrence. The officer corps is equally uninspiring, an incompetent and brutal group which at times appears to place the loss of Russian life as their primary mission objective. These are officers from a bygone era, who still routinely beat those under their command, who without hesitation send troops into situations in which they would never venture themselves, and who place the importance of alcohol far above the safety or well-being of their soldiers. If Babchenko were to hold a mirror up to the Czarist army of 1914, the image would perhaps be little changed. The only real difference in Babchenko's book is that the soldiers are slightly better equipped (but only slightly).

It is difficult to summarize first-hand accounts of war. Personal narratives of conflict and violence are deeply personal and often moving stories of men and women who have been thrust into situations which are often too difficult for the human mind to truly comprehend. Conflict and violence are difficult and complex issues to grapple with, and thus writing about their experiences often becomes a sort of psychological unburdening for veterans of war. *One Soldier's War* is unique in that it does not seem to accomplish this. The book offers little personal insight into the nature of war, perhaps letting its detached narrative speak for itself. There is nothing about *One Soldier's War* that readers will find encouraging or uplifting. Babchenko's world is one in which fear, hatred, and desperation are regular facts of life. As mentioned above, readers hoping to gain an introduction to the Chechen conflict will find little of interest in this book. The real strength of *One Soldier's War* is its insight into Russian military culture, and its unflinching look into the social character and organizational culture of Russia's post-Soviet land forces. Babchenko's book provides a vivid and startling first-hand account of life in the Russian Army, an organization which appears to share much in common with its Soviet and Imperial predecessors. Because so little seems to change in the Russian military, it is safe to assume that the army which recently invaded the Republic of Georgia most likely looks very similar to the army described in this book. *One Soldier's War* provides English-speaking readers with a greater understanding of Russian military culture and the social character of the Russian military; that the book is also able to give readers a small window into the brutal and anachronistic nature of a formidable and supposedly 'modern' military power is testament to Babchenko's important literary accomplishment.


Endnote

1. For a recent exploration of the relationship between the Russian political system and the Russian military, see Zoltan Barany, *Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military* (Princeton, 2007). For an excellent broad overview of the Russo-Chechen conflict, see John Russell, *Chechnya—Russia's War on Terror* (Routledge, 2007).

COUNTERDECEPTION PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

BENNETT, Michael and Edward Waltz. Boston: Artech House, Inc., 2007, hardcover 335 pages, \$150.00, ISBN-13: 978-1580539357

Ms. Nancy Teeple, M.A., M.L.I.S.



The evolving nature of deception methods employed by adversaries requires greater sophistication in detection and prevention by intelligence agencies. Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz address the gaps in deception detection and denial in their textbook study on counterdeception methodology. Notably, this is a study in deception as much as counterdeception. The text outlines the principles and applications of deception, prior to embarking on the principles of counterdeception. The authors' aim is to apply this knowledge to make counterdeception an integral part of the tools, methods, and architecture of intelligence. In the forward of this text, James Bruce of RAND Corporation warns us that deception can make intelligence worse than useless. The authors indicate that their goal is to clarify the principles behind deception, and provide the tools to prevent or alleviate the damage of deception.

The authors demonstrate significant intelligence expertise. Michael Bennett (B.S.E.E. Purdue University, M.B.A. University of Connecticut) has an extensive background in government and private sector technologies of intelligence collection and analysis, and has worked in counterdeception since 2000. Edward Waltz (B.S.E.E. Case Institute of Technology, M.S. University of Michigan) leads the Intelligence Innovation Division of BAE Systems Advanced Information Technologies, providing intelligence analysis and information operations research for the U.S. intelligence community and the DoD. He is a specialist in signal processing, data fusion, and intelligence analysis capabilities.

In many ways, this text is a study in human psychology within the context of the knowledge management discipline of information science. The first chapter introduces the expanding and changing role of deception in the global security environment in the areas of information superiority, strategic information operations, global proliferation, asymmetry and individual power. An understanding of deception demonstrates the need for counterdeception as a necessary activity in the intelligence process to penetrate an adversary's methods of concealment and deceit. Notably, chapter one concludes with a useful annotated bibliography of principle texts on the study of deception. The second chapter outlines the principles of deception, reviews the history of deception analysis, conceptual models and theories of deception. This section reviews theories and principles proposed by various military strategists, such as Barton Whaley, Michael Handel, and R.V. Jones. The authors outline the fundamental principles of deception, namely truth, denial, deceit, and misdirection, attempting to provide a basic framework for understanding the mechanics of deception, developing approaches for detecting and countering deception, and providing for a corresponding set of counterdeception principles. Chapter three presents the cognitive vulnerabilities that are exploited by deception by way of biases and manipulation of human perceptions and beliefs. The cognitive aspects of human perception, judgment and reasoning are explored to provide a foundation from which to develop a set of counterdeception principles. The fourth chapter reviews the technical and non-technical methods of deception, evaluating such applications as technical and strategic sensors, signal and information systems (i.e. EW, SIGINT), human deception channels (PSYOPs, HUMINT), and establishing a coordinating stratagem of these methods to address the multiple

channels and methods which the deceiver might employ. Chapter five begins addressing counterdeception directly, defining the concept as an intelligence function primarily aimed at detecting, characterizing, and penetrating foreign deception operations (one might expand this concept to include "hostile" rather than "foreign" deception operations). Chapter six integrates the counterdeception principles and concepts of chapter five into non-technical methods for establishing deception-resistant operatives and organizations, so as to transform the vulnerable mind and organization into the prepared mind and organization. Chapter seven evaluates the practical technical methods implementing the fundamental analytical processes of counterdeception, namely detection and discovery. The eighth chapter outlines the organizational, systems, and technical architectures of counterdeception, describing the methods and technologies of counterdeception as a specialized process devoted to probe and penetrate deception and concealment activities. The final chapter concludes with an assessment of the future of deception and counterdeception in the global security environment, in light of potential vulnerabilities and strengths of populations and organizations, and the future role of scientific research in counterdeception.


The content demonstrates extensive research in a well-written format, in spite of poor editing. One of the major strengths of this text is the use of diagrams, models, flow charts and tables to clarify complicated concepts. Deception and counterdeception principles and applications are also illustrated in case studies and other examples from various global conflicts, a great deal of which focus on Second World War deceptions, but also extend to the Cold War and later conflicts in the Middle East, including lessons learned from the U.S. experience in the fight against WMD proliferation. All information sources, ideas and quotes are well-documented in detailed endnotes. Throughout the text, the authors credit forerunners in the field of deception and counterdeception, such as Barton Whaley, Michael Handel, and Richards Heuer, among others. The content includes theories and quotations by historical figures, such as Sun Tzu, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Basil Liddell Hart.

The authors explicitly target the new generation of intelligence officers, and analysts in particular, of civilian and military intelligence organizations. Although aimed at the U.S. intelligence community, this book should be required reading for any nation's intelligence operatives, analysts, and policymakers.

ORDINARY HEROES: EASTERN ONTARIO'S 21ST BATTALION C.E.F. IN THE GREAT WAR

NICHOL, Stephen J. Privately Published, 2008, hardcover, 350 pages, \$50.00, ISBN: 978-0978415303

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD



During the First World War the Canadian Army raised 260 infantry battalions for overseas service. Of these, 46 infantry battalions (plus four mounted rifle battalions) served with the Canadian Corps on the western front, and by the end of the war each of these "fighting" units had carved out a tremendous legacy for themselves. Sadly, only some had their stories told following the Great War, as the official history project failed and units were left much to their own devices to preserve their legacies. Though many units did manage to write and publish histories in the decades following the war, many others still did not, and to this day, these forgotten battalions wait silently for someone to fill the void.

Stephen J. Nichol's *Ordinary Heroes: Eastern Ontario's 21st Battalion C.E.F. in the Great War* represents a vital step towards filling the gap in Canadian Great War

battalion histories. The author's interest in the subject began with his own service in the battalion's perpetuating unit, the Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (PWOR), and over the years that followed he collected a wealth of information concerning the battalion from a wide variety of sources. Though the book is crafted in the narrative chronological format typical of this genre, Nichol's vast knowledge of this subject has enabled him to adapt his work to much wider audience, providing a level of readability and detail to satisfy both general audiences as well as the more focused researcher. At approximately 350 pages, the book contains everything one could desire to know about this infantry battalion, from its mobilization through to all its battles, to the details of all the officers and the men who served in its ranks.


Though a self-admitted "amateur" historian, Nichol has risen to the occasion and produced a first rate examination of an infantry battalion at war. His attention to historical detail is evident throughout the text; Nichol has made extensive use of both primary and secondary sources, has properly identified and included details of the many German units the battalion faced in battle, and has included the most complete honour and nominal rolls of the battalion published to date. Most important, his inclusion of many personal accounts from the battalion newsletter, *21st Battalion Communiqué*, serves to bond the entire story together, as well as put a very human face on the terrible business of warfare.

Being a self-published work the book is understandably less polished than professionally produced volumes, consequently, there are some aspects of this history the reader will miss. Maps of the many places mentioned in the book are too few and far between, and those offered are simply reprints of older (and sometimes inaccurate) official maps. As well, the book has no index, making it extremely difficult to track down the names of individuals described throughout the text or appendices. Still, these oversights do not detract from what is otherwise a very readable and well-researched effort.

These days, battalion histories may seem passé to some. Yet, just as with politics, all history is local and these narratives capture the core of the social fabric that bound the Canadian Army together during the First World War. Stephen Nichol is to be commended for lifting the history of a fighting battalion out of the shadows, and for continuing the tradition of battalion histories nine decades after it began.

FIFTEEN DAYS: STORIES OF BRAVERY, FRIENDSHIP, LIFE AND DEATH FROM INSIDE THE NEW CANADIAN ARMY

BLATCHFORD, Christie. Scarborough: Doubleday Canada, October 2007, hardcover, 400 pages, \$34.95, ISBN-13: 978-0385664660



Christopher Ankersen

If we are wise, we are told, we should not judge a book by its cover. In this case, we would be very foolish not to. Blatchford's *Fifteen Days* delivers exactly as advertised: it is chock full of stories of bravery, friendship, life and death. Covering two deployments of Task Force Orion, based on First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Second Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, to Afghanistan in 2006, *Fifteen Days* chronicles first-hand and vicarious accounts of short, often intense, encounters. The book has a singular subject: the Canadian soldier, and yet it covers that singularity in all its facets: from comedy—including fart jokes—to tragedy—including the grief of friends and survivors—to something in between—including drunken funerals in Newfoundland. What's more, it delivers these stories very well.

Indeed, that being said, it is perhaps more interesting to discuss what *Fifteen Days* is not. It is not Military History, it is anti-History. Absent is discussion of occupation, objectives, or operations. For those in search of context, look elsewhere. This book is, as advertised, a look at the events and results of fifteen days, not with omniscience or chronology, but with curiosity, admiration, and compassion. In doing so, Blatchford may be forgiven some mistakes (she describes Special Forces operatives as experts in counter-intelligence) and a few phrases that are jarring and out of place (she describes 1 PPCLI as a killing machine).

The book's effect is quite unsettling. Blatchford offers us a glimpse at true characters, (mostly) men and (some) women with simple perspectives, a love of life, and a deeper love of their friends. *Fifteen Days* provides a personal introduction to the contemporary Canadian Army, a subject largely unknown within Canada, made not by an expert, but a fan. Stripped of any pretence of detached objectivity, we enter a world where the observer's abiding love of her subject produces a closeness, an intimacy, that is truly disarming. "I can hardly bear to write about them sometimes, I find them so beautiful," Blatchford admits. The reader who finishes this book a-lachrymously is a hard case indeed.

At the same time, though, the reader, though moved, will have almost no idea of what these soldiers are doing in Afghanistan. They are laughing, crying, smoking, and dying floating free against a dusty, foreign, frighteningly violent backdrop. Setbacks—outright catastrophes—outnumber successes by a wide-margin. There is no reason here, only acting; no becoming here, only being.

In this sense, *Fifteen Days* is a postmodern tale *par excellence*. The deaths of soldiers—and there are many—cannot be called sacrifice because we are not sure what they might be sacrificed for. There are no villains (except mild ones, perhaps, in the higher-ups who issue silly orders or refuse to permit Remembrance Day reunions) because it is not clear where right and wrong are drawn. Afghanistan as a *mission* does not exist. We are not asked to believe any justification—not *burka*, not school, not well, not Karzai—that might explain why the clay grew tall.

Fifteen Days, with its focus on death and the lives that surround it, is an extended eulogy, a tribute to Canadians that most Canadians never know. It contains elements of a classic funeral oration: talk of soldiers' deeds and a mention of those, like parents, who are left to grieve. But here Blatchford plays foil to Pericles; her oration pays homage not to Athens, but to its soldiers. Where he speaks of principles and institutions at home, she conveys the lives of people who fight and die far away. Unlike Abraham Lincoln, who at Gettysburg entreats those who come after the fallen to ensure their deaths were not in vain, Blatchford asks nothing of us. Hers is not a lament. Unlike Rick Hillier, in his tribute to Sgt Short and Cpl Beerenfenger, Blatchford draws no lines between subject and object. Hers is not a lecture.


Blatchford's book is an introduction, an introduction to people remarkable in their ordinary aspect. An introduction to the recognized, like Major Bill Fletcher, recipient of the Star of Military Valour for his leadership under fire. An introduction to the agonized, like Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope, who bears the weight of a dozen souls lost. An introduction to the idealized, like Captain Nichola Goddard, the haunting voice on a radio, a woman and a pioneer. An introduction to Everyman, soldiers and Canadians all, some dead, like and Regimental Sergeant Major Robert Girouard, Sergeant Vaughn Ingram, and Private Andrew "Boomer" Eykenboom. And some yet living, like Lieutenant Trevor Greene and Sergeant Willy MacDonald, and Corporal Keith Mooney. Its pages brim with their dusty smiles, their candid admissions, their fears, their blood.

In our current age where war touches the lucky majority of us lightly, our vestigial vow—Lest we Forget—is cheapened without this book. Because to remember, we must first know. With *Fifteen Days*, Christie Blatchford helps us to gain a small measure of that requisite knowledge.

THE FIGHTING CANADIANS: OUR REGIMENTAL HISTORY FROM NEW FRANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

BERCUSON, David J. Toronto: Harper Collins, 2008, hardcover, 386 pages, \$34.95, ISBN-13: 978-0002007344

Lieutenant-Colonel Tod Strickland, PPCLI



Few elements within the Canadian military experience are as likely to raise the passions of soldiers, or academics, as much as the deceptively simple question as to the continued relevance of the regimental system in the 21st Century. Proponents and detractors abound, with arguments as diverse as their creator's backgrounds and experience.¹ Recently, noted historian and scholar David Bercuson entered this arena, with the publication of his latest work *The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan*. Bercuson is no stranger to the Canadian Army, or indeed to this subject matter; his previous books on World War Two, the Korean Conflict, the Patricias, and the experiences of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, form a foundation of credibility that few other scholars can match concerning the Canadian Army.

His stated intent is "to portray regimental cohesion under the very trying circumstances of war in order to demonstrate why Canada's soldiers still place so much value on the regimental tradition." In this, he succeeds. The book is a series of comprehensive illustrations of unit-level combat from across the breadth of Canadian military history. The chapters he devotes to the British and French experiences prior to the Twentieth Century alone commend this book to the reader. They are territory that is often forgotten by contemporary soldiers, and they clearly show the roots of the regimental system within Canada. Relying on secondary sources, which he clearly details for those who wish to gain further insight into a particular event or battle, this is well-written popular history which takes the myriad events of our Army's history and makes them accessible to a wide audience.

However, by Bercuson's own admission it is a work that is light on the theory of what makes our own particular version of the regimental system work. Readers who want to understand precisely what the regimental system is, why it is accorded such importance, or even how it functions in anything other than combat may be disappointed. To be fair, this was never part of the author's intent, although critical readers will find that he raises many unanswered questions.

Neither the American army nor their Marine Corps use the regimental system, yet they are arguably among the most combat-effective forces on the planet. If they do not need a system based on regiments, why do we? Similarly, although we preach the regimental system to all and sundry, we seem to take a perverse pleasure in bastardising it as it suits us. One only need examine the current practice of mixing sub-units from different regiments on operations, or incorporating members of numerous different regiments as individual augmentees, to see that the Canadian Army is hardly loyal to the system which it claims has historically given it a success-enabling degree of strength and cohesion. Separately, there is the fact that for the vast majority of time regiments are not actually in combat, and yet it is in these periods that the regiments work to build the cohesion that will see them through the trials of warfare. These periods are not covered at all. Readers interested in seeing how the Canadian Airborne Regiment carried out its last military duties, or understanding

the effects of the rebadging of the Black Watch and the Queen's Own Rifles (respectively to the Royal Canadian Regiment and the PPCLI) will have to look elsewhere.

That being the case, however, this book does offer some valuable perspectives which many other omnibuses of battlefield experiences tend to overlook (arguably because the book benefits from being the work of one author with a common theme throughout). First, it ably shows that rather than comprising one regimental system, there are at least three different systems at work within the Canadian Army. Each corps (artillery, engineers, armoured and infantry) has a slightly different take on the system and its application. Though the book has a definite infantry focus, Bercuson does discuss this issue with at least two of the vignettes focussing on armoured actions.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, *The Fighting Canadians* demonstrates that Canada's application of the regimental system has been extremely flexible and completely dynamic. Regiments may have traditions, but any reader will quickly see that our use of the system has varied so much over time that to call it a tradition is to border on misuse of the term. As Bercuson shows, we have re-rolled regiments, amalgamated them, re-named them and completely disposed of them as the need arose; whether for political expediency or military efficacy, our use of the regimental system has been anything but consistent. Whether this is a perversion of the intent of the regimental system, or an aspect of its inherent flexibility, may be the single biggest question demanding an answer.

The only real negative critique that can be made regarding this work is that the author's intent may have been too limiting. A book detailing both the theory and the application of the regimental system within Canada would be incredibly valuable as our army experiments with the "optimized battle group," and forces the system to evolve yet again. However, such a book would likely be very complex and would probably have far less broad appeal than that which Bercuson has produced.

Any member of a regiment named in the book will likely be quite interested in Bercuson's accounts of the actions of his or her unit. They will also benefit from seeing that their regiment's experience in combat is but one thread in the tapestry of our military history. It is too easy to fall into the trap of believing that it is only the history of one's particular regiment which matters. This book showcases the actions of a broad swath of Canadian regiments and should help widen perspectives in this regard.

Those that would argue either for or against the continuance of the system should also find this book to be valuable. Although it may be more evidence than argument, it provides a firm grounding in many of the actions where Canadian men and women fought and died. Whether you subscribe to the idea of regiments as an entity, or feel that they are an outdated system that no longer has a place in the contemporary environment, *The Fighting Canadians* clearly shows the path we have taken to get where we are.


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1. See for example, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Banks, "A Comment on 'The New Regimental System,'" *Canadian Army Journal*, Volume 7.1 (Spring 2004), 86-90.

THE COLDEST WINTER

HALBERSTAM David. New York: Hyperion: 2007, hardcover, 712 pages, \$42.00, ISBN: 978-1401300524

2Lt Thomas Fitzgerald, M.A., LL.B., 2IRRC



Pulitzer Prize winning author and journalist, David Halberstam's last work, *The Coldest Winter*, completed five days before his death, is his epic study of that little and often disregarded war, the Korean War. Called a "police action" or a "conflict" involving Chinese "volunteers", the story of the Korean War has many lessons for today's commander and politician alike.

Halberstam's book uncovers no new details nor offers no new interpretation of the war. The story is well known. On June 25, 1950, after being goaded by Mao Zedong and with the connivance of Joseph Stalin, Kim Il-sung launched his well trained, well equipped, veteran divisions against poorly trained, poorly equipped "occupation" American and South Korean regiments. Disaster quickly followed. Seoul fell and the (now) United Nations forces were penned into the "Pusan Perimeter". Facing complete annihilation, it was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's amphibious landing at Inchon behind enemy North Korean's lines which

led to the rout of the enemy back across the 38th parallel. It was after Inchon that the seeds for future disaster were sewn.

Contrary to all military principles of war, MacArthur divided his command as an early and lethal winter set in. Sending the 8th Army along the western side of the country under the dubious command of his favourite subordinate, LGen Edward Almond, and the Marines of X Corps led by MGen Oliver Smith along the eastern coast, the United Nation chased the defeated enemy into the northern regions of the peninsula. Ignoring credible intelligence of Chinese intentions—"it's not to their advantage to come in, so they won't come in"—and against the instructions of his superiors, MacArthur closed to the Yalu River and the inevitable occurred. Three hundred thousand battle-hardened Chinese veterans, following a series of spoiling, attacks, launched, arguably, the biggest ambush in U.S. military history. The 8th Army was pushed back behind the 38th and was saved only by an ingenious counter attack planned by LGen Matthew Ridgway now commander of the 8th Army. The Marines, in a fighting withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir ("Retreat, hell. We're just attacking in a different direction"), were evacuated by sea.

Villains abound in this recounting: the sycophants who surrounded MacArthur and went so far as to fashion intelligence and facts to support their commander's view of the world rather than reality; the politicians and media magnates of the "China First" lobby whose unwavering support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist cause made a rational policy towards Communist China and the Korean conflict impossible; American field commanders who, in the initial stages of the war, recklessly led their troops into battle, contrary to all military logic and common sense and, finally, the Commander-in-Chief, President Harry Truman, who chose to relieve MacArthur only when military necessity outweighed domestic political consequences. The focus of the author's disdain is, however, reserved for MacArthur, whose arrogant incaution leading to military reverses has already been mentioned, but whose failings go further; his refusal to be directed by his civilian superiors; his inability to share the hardships of his soldiers, never spending a single "night in the field in Korea" as noted by the author; his unwillingness to countenance opinions contrary to his own, are all on display in this narrative.

While *The Coldest Winter* provides vivid portraits of the titans of the era—Kim Il-sung, Stalin, Eisenhower, Ridgway and Truman—Halberstam's focus is on the ordinary GI or

the junior officer who fought these brutal and bloody battles usually against overwhelming numbers, in appalling conditions and in difficult terrain, often following the serious strategic or tactical miscalculation of their superiors. Provocative and penetrating descriptions of men knowingly going to their deaths while either attempting to break out of the Chinese encirclement or holding the line so their comrades could are most compelling. It is the courage and the heroics of the ordinary soldier and marine which is the heart of this story. The comments of Gen Ridgway in this regard bear repeating. "All lives on a battlefield are equal and a dead rifleman is as great a loss in the eyes of God as a dead General. The dignity which attaches to the individual is the basis of Western civilization, and that fact should be remembered by every Commander."

In an earlier book, *The Best and the Brightest*,¹ Halberstam chronicles the missteps by the American military which led to the American involvement in Vietnam. How domestic politics became part of national security calculations; how military/political discussions were based on flawed, incomplete and unreliable intelligence. While *The Coldest Winter* precedes *The Best and the Brightest* chronologically, the books are identical in theme.

In his conclusion, Halberstam points to the present situation in Iraq as proof of the old adage, "Those who do not learn by history, are destined to relive it." The Korean War was a war fought in a distant land against an unknown and shadowy enemy where goals were undefined and "which most Americans, save the men who fought there and their immediate families, preferred to know as little as possible". Has anything changed?


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1. New York: Random House Publishing (1997)

EMPTY CASING

DOUCETTE, Fred. Douglas & McIntyre Ltd. Vancouver, BC, 2008, hardcover, 228 pages, \$34.95, ISBN-10: 1553652916

Jérôme Levesque, DRDC CORA



In *Empty Casing*, Fred Doucette writes about the time he spent in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) in 1995–1996. He recounts what his daily life was like in Sarajevo and discusses the exceptional challenges that come with being a neutral observer, exposed to the horrors of an ethnic conflict but bound by a strict mandate of non-intervention. As he relates these experiences, Doucette also describes his difficult battle with post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS).

Doucette steers clear of the strategic and political aspects of the Serbo-Bosnian conflict and instead focuses mainly on his personal experience as a front-line witness of a daily battle for survival in Sarajevo, Gorazde and other towns in southern Bosnia. Perhaps even more striking than his descriptions of eluding sniper and artillery fire are his accounts of the extreme violence, contempt and hate that were part of everyday Balkan life in the '90s. In reference to what the author feels is the media's voyeuristic attraction to

war, Doucette collected some of his most shocking (read: sensational, appalling) anecdotes, placing these prominently in the chapters and subtitling them "War Porn." The attention to detail with which Doucette describes the events he witnessed, however horrendous, helps the reader to better understand the psychological trauma that such experiences can inflict on soldiers.

In addition to acting as a UNMO, Fred Doucette also had the opportunity to stay with a Sarajevan family for the greater part of his first year in Bosnia. UN observers are required to find their own accommodations in their area of operation, and the friendship that Doucette developed with his hosts and their neighbours is a major focus of the book. Doucette provides a first-hand glimpse of the Sarajevan mindset during the siege, and describes the brutal reality that Sarajevans were forced to contend with every day. Through reading about this friendship, the reader is able to better grasp the identification mechanisms that come into play and the feelings of guilt that can slowly grow when a soldier feels powerless to affect the fate of a people he is there solely to observe.

One fascinating aspect of the book is Doucette's description of the cycle of respite, guilt and extreme stress that was triggered by periods of leave, despite the fact that such vacations were meant to raise his morale. When he returned home from his first year in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 (he went back in 1999), the daily feelings of guilt that plagued Doucette gradually gave way to blind, unpredictable rages, leaving him vulnerable to painful flashbacks. It was during this period, which is covered in the second part of the book, that he began a several-year struggle with post-traumatic stress syndrome.


Some might deem the style in which *Empty Casing* is written to be deliberately provocative. Doucette's no-nonsense attitude leaves little room for political correctness when he writes, "[Some Serbian soldiers] were just f'ing [sic] animalistic cowards," or, "It is in Ottawa, at National Defence Headquarters, where the legal idiots who write our rules of engagement park their asses." Some people will no doubt recognize a soldier's frankness. The book project arose out of the journal that Doucette began keeping upon his return from Bosnia in an attempt to exorcise the demons that had been haunting him since 1995. One could argue that the profanity that peppers the story actually lends it a necessary degree of anger—anger that beleaguered the author for years after his return from Operation Palladium.

Regardless of what one might think of the style in which *Empty Casing* is written, Fred Doucette definitely has a rare ability to keep the reader riveted to the story. It goes without saying that this book also serves as a precious reminder of the fact that the spectre of ethnic violence in Europe did not disappear with the Second World War.

SOLDIERS MADE ME LOOK GOOD: A LIFE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR

MACKENZIE MGen (Ret) Lewis. Douglas & McIntyre Ltd. 2008, hardcover, 294 pages, \$32.95, ISBN: 978-1553653509

2Lt Thomas Fitzgerald, M.A., LL.B., 2IRRC



It was said that Napoleon, when asked to promote an officer, would respond, "Yes, yes, he can win battles, but is he lucky?" Luck appears to have been General Mackenzie's constant companion in this sequel to *Peacekeepers*. Whether it was a strong supportive family, athletic abilities, innate leadership skills or just being at the right place at the right time, Lewis Mackenzie has had his share of providence. *Soldiers Made Me Look Good* is both a rollicking good story, profound and poignant at times and, at other times, a strong indictment of modern military "management". The author traces his career as a young officer cadet at Camp Borden (as a recent graduate of CAP in CTC Gagetown. I was especially interested in these chapters realizing now, how much the army had changed in its teaching methods), through his various postings and deployments as an infantry officer and ultimately his tenure as Commander, Land Forces Central Area. In each of his

vignettes, General Mackenzie pays tribute to the ordinary soldier (the book is dedicated to "the Canadian soldier of today") and the important relationship which must exist between any officer and the NCM's of the unit she/he commands for each to achieve their objectives. In this regard, the chapter "Mutiny at Battle River" should be required reading for all junior commanders.

Soldiers Made Me Look Good is actually three books. Having chronicled his military life in the first part of his autobiography, General Mackenzie records events in his life since leaving the military in the middle third of his book. Whether as a federal candidate, hostage negotiator, public affairs commentator or author, he has not strayed from the public spotlight. What *Soldiers* does is add the author's perspective to events perhaps known only superficially by the public. This is the great value of the book. It recounts dispassionately and objectively, criticizing when necessary the actions of those involved (including his own), in this "story behind the story". Given the number and variety of the author's experiences, it is not surprising that at times this portion of the narrative comes across somewhat disjointed and hurried in its telling. The author has had such an interesting life, it might have been preferable to go into more detail regarding these events by providing an overall context for them. At the risk of expanding the book (which is not a bad thing given the subject), more detail would assist the reader in understanding the background and significance of the events recounted.

In two separate chapters, General Mackenzie strays from his autobiographical theme to respond constructively and effectively to criticism levelled at him by Carol Off in her book, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle* and to articulate his professional disagreement with Lieutenant General (retired and now Senator) Roméo Dallaire's assignment of military priorities—mission, men, self—rather than, according to the author, "in rare circumstances", men, mission, self. This command dilemma, as the author candidly admits, will never be resolved, but the value of the argument is in the discussion it engenders. As General Mackenzie and history point out, orders which are given from afar or which have no connection to the reality faced by the local comments may, in certain circumstances be more dangerous to the mission and to the soldiers involved in their observance, than in their disobedience. The trick is knowing, if that is possible, when those rare circumstances arise and conveying to commanders, the mind set, aptitude and support to disobey when they do.


The last third of this book looks at the war in Afghanistan and the author's concept of the future of the Canadian Forces. In both areas, General Mackenzie offers insightful and persuasive arguments for a rapid-response, expeditionary military force rather than one dependant on the largesse of others. I found this portion of *Soldiers* to be the most interesting given the current debate on the subject.

Recent years have seen a virtual explosion of books about the Canadian military written either from a current or historical perspective. What has been lacking is a good, well-written modern autobiography. No more.

SHOESTRING SOLDIERS: THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION AT WAR

IAROCCHI, Andrew. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008, hardcover, 362 pages, \$31.50, ISBN: 978-0802098221

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD



Scholarship devoted to Canadian participation in the First World War continues to expand thanks to the arrival of a new generation of academics devoted to widening the study of this conflict. In the last two years alone a number of books examining various aspects of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) have appeared, including several studies of army formations and units that fought on the western front.

In *Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division at War*, historian Andrew Iarocci draws on the tremendous wealth of primary sources available to historians of the Canadian Corps, as well as many more recent publications, to produce a very astute and detailed operational analysis of the first several battles fought by Canadians in the Great War. Divided into ten chapters as well as a number of appendices, the main thesis of the book takes issue with the popular myth that the 1st Canadian Division was largely an amateur formation that only survived its first year of

combat due to luck and raw courage instead of skill. Iarocci adopts a revisionist approach to these earlier official interpretations of the 1st Canadian Division, and openly challenges earlier official histories produced by Duguid in 1938, and Nicholson in 1964.

Iarocci does a good job of dispelling many of the traditional perceptions that have characterized the initial combat effectiveness of the Canadian Corps for far too long. He often points to the fact that it was not a lack pre-war professionalism and pre-deployment training that led to difficulties on the battlefield, but rather the constant lack of material resources, especially artillery support and small arms ammunition. In his analysis of the Second Battle of Ypres, Iarocci details several occasions where Canadian artillery runs short, or where units get captured only after losing all of their machine guns or running out of ammunition. From his examination of the divisional ammunition columns, Iarocci is able to demonstrate convincingly that the 1st Canadian Division performed as well as could be expected given their material restrictions.


With its focus on delivering up to date narratives of the Second Battle of Ypres, Festubert, Givenchy, as well as the less well-known Trench battles along the Ploegsteert-Messines front occurring later that year, the book gives less attention to other issues. Iarocci only briefly addresses the subject of gas warfare in his book, probably because the topic has already received considerable attention by other authors. Where he does seem to struggle is the issue of command and control. In an effort to always portray the division in a positive light, Iarocci is at times too sympathetic towards his subjects. Still, this empathy does not detract from the overall value of the analysis, and readers looking for a different assessment of key figures are recommended to read Kenneth Radley's history of the 1st Canadian Division, *We Lead, Others Follow*.

Perhaps the most refreshing aspect of the book, and also perhaps its greatest strength, is Iarocci's acknowledgement of and attention spent on the German formations facing the 1st Canadian Division. Too many Canadian First World War studies ignore the adversary, usually because their authors take myopic approaches to the study of the Canadian Corps. Iarocci has successfully included the impact of both sides in his analysis, and he is to be commended for it. *Shoestring Soldiers* is a very well researched history, a great companion to Radley's study of the 1st Division, and a must read for scholars studying this period.

CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR SO FAR

PIGOTT, Peter. Dundurn Press, Toronto, Ontario, 2007, hardcover, 240 pages, \$35.00, ISBN: 978-1550026740

Andrew Burtch



When aviation author and retired diplomat Peter Pigott set out to write this work in late 2006, Canadians were in the midst of a national debate over the role of their armed forces in an intensifying counter-insurgency war in southern Afghanistan. Most Canadians, who had not paid attention to the development of the Afghanistan mission during its first four years, were bewildered to discover that their soldiers were suddenly fighting Taliban militants in some of the Canadian Army's most pitched ground battles since the Korean War. Pigott's "unabashedly ambitious" goal for this book was to provide for his fellow Canadians a primer on the history of the conflict in Afghanistan and Canada's role in the military, diplomatic, and development aspects of the mission.

The first part of Pigott's work provides a condensed overview of Afghanistan's recent past, from the Soviet invasion to the intervention of multinational coalition following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. He has done a good job of synthesizing findings from popular works then available about Afghanistan and the Taliban

into an accessible account which explains the international impact of the Afghanistan conflict. However, the author has peppered this historical summary with romantic and overly simplistic portrayals of Afghan culture as depicted by Rudyard Kipling, Eric Newby, and, more troubling, popular novelists like Ken Follett. As a result, his history reads as part *realpolitik* and part romantic travel memoir.

Unfortunately, his historical section is the best part of *Canada in Afghanistan*. In reading his subsequent chapters, the book's most serious problems emerge. While the author expresses the general desire to explain the Afghanistan mission, there is no central argument. As a result no internal logic articulates the book's organization, structure, or content. The author flits between diplomacy, development, and defence issues. For instance, in six pages in his second chapter, the author mentions the death of Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry, Canadian soldiers arriving in Kandahar, the first prime ministerial visit to Kandahar, and the May 2006 parliamentary extension of the mission to 2009, among other topics. Also mentioned in these pages, for some reason, is the first despatch of Canadians to the South African War over a century ago, with little effort by the author to explain its connection to the nature in which Canadians are deployed today.

Equally troubling, Pigott relies overly on eye-witness and newspaper stories for his content but does not provide an objective analysis. His chapters are filled with seemingly unconnected compilations of lengthy eye-witness accounts. The most glaring example of this is an unusually long 22-page transcript from a member of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT) Civil-Military Cooperation Detachment. An informed reader could discern from this account that the death of Glyn Berry effectively paralyzed the delivery of aid from the Canadian International Development Agency and that the PRT was, at points, forced to reinforce the Canadian battle group operating in Zhari-Panjwai. Outside these 22 pages, Pigott does not comment on or even mention these developments, nor does he evaluate what this operational pause meant for the mission. Throughout the book, Pigott shares enough information about facets of Canada's role in the mission to whet the reader's appetite, but provides little analysis to explain what it all meant in 2007.

In his introduction, Pigott mentioned the risk of embarrassment or rebuttal that faces the authors of contemporary history, but much of his work replicates or synthesizes what

was already on public record in 2006. The author's own voice, experiences and opinions are missing from this text, and would have been valuable additions. The "Final Word" offered in his conclusion is not even his own. Pigott instead refers readers to the recommendations from the International Crisis Group's November 2006 report.


This work is not unworthy of examination, either by historians or the general audience for which it was intended. The personal accounts from Canadian soldiers provide interesting perspective on diverse issues such as the state of Canada's equipment, and the tempo of daily operations in Kandahar Airfield's (KAF) Hospital. Pigott obtained these accounts by interviewing Canadians working inside the wire at the PRT and KAF during his visit to Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. Pigott also exploited the public record to the utmost in assembling this book; if his bibliography were complete, it would be useful as a listing of many of the contemporary articles, government reports and news releases available to the public.

That said, this book was already dated by the time it hit the shelves in early 2007, and it has since been replaced by better works written by Canadian historians and journalists. These works have been better able to satisfy the goals Pigott set forth, interpreting the military, diplomatic and human aspects of the Afghanistan mission in greater detail and depth to a Canadian public still anxious for information about the conflict.

BRAVE BATTALION: THE REMARKABLE SAGA OF THE 16TH BATTALION (CANADIAN SCOTTISH) IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

ZUEHLKE Mark. Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2008, hardcover, 289 pages, \$36.95, ISBN: 978-0470154168

2Lt Thomas Fitzgerald, M.A., LL.B., 2IRRC



There exists in Canada a rich tradition of writing regimental histories. Commencing after the Boer War and continuing during the inter bellum years through to the 1970's, many veterans sought to write about the experiences of the unit in which they served so that their sacrifice and the sacrifices of their comrades would never be forgotten. Regrettably, the number of regimental histories being published is steadily declining.¹ This is one reason why Mark Zuehlke's *Brave Battalion* is a welcome addition to the genre. Another is that it is simply a well written, well researched history. Building on his reputation as Canada's most popular military historian, Zuehlke moves away from his previous histories of armies, corps, divisions and brigades² to an examination of what arguably is the heart and soul of the Canadian army—the Regiment.

With Great Britain's declaration of war on August 4, 1914, Canada found itself at war. With a small permanent force, the Canadian military contribution would initially be made by more than two hundred militia units. Drawn from across the land, these diverse units were summoned by the "erratic and eccentric" Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, to travel to Valcartier for their training. Four of these militia units—the 72nd Scottish Highlanders of Canada from Vancouver, the 50th Gordon Highlanders of Canada from Victoria, Winnipeg's 79th Cameron Highlanders of Canada and the 91st Canadian Highlanders from Hamilton—were eventually amalgamated into the 16th Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Canadian Division.

Brave Battalion recounts the history of the 16th Battalion from its birth on the Plains of Valcartier to its emergence, at the end of the war, as one of Canada's premier infantry units

with twenty-one battle honours to its credit. Fighting in battles now well known to most Canadians—Ypres, St. Julien, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Hill 70 and Passchendaele—the author constructs in vivid detail the horror and uncertainty of trench warfare.

If the reader is looking for an examination of grand strategy either allied or Canadian in the Great War, they will have to look elsewhere³. This history is the (at times) intimate story of individuals or small groups of soldiers and their leaders. In his usual style, reminiscent of that other great historian, Pierre Berton, Zuehlke creates memorable scenes and characters, which seem to literally leap off the pages. Pte (Piper) J. Richardson, recipient of the Victoria Cross (posthumously) who emboldened his company in its attack on the Regina Trench on Thiépval Ridge by marching back and forth in front of the enemy wire while a storm of fire engulfed him and his comrades, or Pte William Milne, another Victoria Cross recipient who crawled under fire through the mud to single-handedly destroy a gun emplacement which was holding up the battalion's assault on Vimy Ridge. The immediacy of death tugging, as it were, at the sleeve of every soldier, is evident in every page.

Because the author concentrates on the exploits of the battalion, he avoids the pitfalls of many authors who want, many years later, to second-guess the decisions of divisional, corps or army commanders on matters of strategy and tactics. Anglo-Canadian military relationships, usually difficult during the war, are not emphasized except when necessary to put an event into context. Finally, the greater political issues of the day, conscription to name one example, are (mercifully) omitted so as to not detract from the narrative.

This history could also double as a practical guide for the successful commander. It powerfully demonstrates the benefits of reconnaissance, the absolute necessity of a commander being seen by his subordinates and sharing their hardships; and the premium placed on clear communications and expectations between the elements of a combined arms attack, in this case, infantry and artillery, to achieve the objective. During the breaking of the Drocourt-Quéant Line on September 2, 1918, the commanding officer of the 16th, Cyrus Peck, (later awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions that day) led his battalion into battle, directing a troop of tanks during the battle and finally engaging and overcoming an enemy outpost himself. It cannot be gainsaid that respect is not given, it must be earned and the commanders of the 16th, the Leckie brothers—Robert and Jack, Peck, Scroggie and Urquhart earned that respect many times over for their unstinting devotion to duty and to their men.

There are a number of Canadian battalions whose stories remain untold even after so many years. This is an unfortunate situation, for it is at the battalion level that the traditions of the Canadian Army are to be found and preserved. Zuehlke has done a masterful job in *Brave Battalion*. Perhaps others will follow.


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GUNBIRD DRIVER: A MARINE HUEY PILOT'S WAR IN VIETNAM

BALLENTINE, David A. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, hardcover, 229 pages, \$33.98, ISBN: 978-1591140191

Dr J.R. McKay



David Ballentine's *Gunbird Driver: A Marine Huey Pilot's War in Vietnam* is a set of the author's memoirs from his tour as a Marine Corps lieutenant flying a UH-1E Huey in 1966-1967. What was immediately striking about the book was that the tasks assigned to him as a co-pilot and aircraft commander are strikingly similar to the contemporary tasks of tactical aviation despite the passage of 40 years. The Marine Corps doctrine governing the employment of tactical aviation differed little from contemporary Canadian doctrine on how tactical aviation can be employed. What differed was the nature of the airframe.

The book starts with a discussion of the UH-1E Huey and its specific characteristics. It was similar to the U.S. Army's UH-1B, but had additional specifications associated with being fit for sea duty and some limitations when compared with the Army. Early on, one gets a strong taste of the Marine Corps' sense that it is a 'poor cousin' to the U.S. Army with observations such as: "I flew a B model once at Hue with an Army lieutenant. I couldn't tell the difference

in how it flew, though I was envious of the copilot's ability to swivel the side-mount M-60s from his seat. Ours were fixed straight ahead; we had to be pointed at the target."¹ While he may have felt, as many in the Marine Corps have, that he belonged to the poorer and smaller of the two American armed services that engaged in land warfare, most Canadian readers would feel all the poorer if they read Ballentine's description of how many weapons his Huey carried. He stated that there were two M60 machine guns on each side as well as one for the Crew Chief and one for the door gunner for a total of six M60s. This was not all as there were 2.75" rockets mounted on both sides as well. It is no small wonder that this was nicknamed a 'Gunbird'.² While this was a significant amount of firepower, it left one wondering about how the volume and weight of ammunition affected the speed and range of the helicopter.

Ballentine belonged to VMO-6, stationed at Ky Ha near Chu Lai in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). I CTZ was the area of operations primarily manned by the USMC in the northernmost section of South Vietnam. The acronym 'VMO' means Marine Observation Squadron. These squadrons were formed in the Korean War for the purposes of airborne forward air control (ABFAC) and airborne observation posts (Air OP) for the control of close air support, artillery and naval gunfire, but in the Vietnam War, they were primarily used for escorting transport helicopters as well as a series of other tasks. The latter included medevac, insertion and extraction of small units, reconnaissance, command and liaison, ABFAC / Air OP and resupply.³ In short, they appeared to use the aircraft as much as possible for as many missions as possible within the airframe's limitations.

The book is divided into five different sections based on the author's time in country and level of experience. The first section discussed his arrival and time spent largely as a co-pilot for more senior pilots. The second section discussed his deployment aboard the USS Princeton and shipboard operations. This was the most fascinating part of the book as he described the special instructions associated with flying from a naval vessel with great detail in a very clear manner. Of note was his account of a command & liaison task where he almost ran out of fuel; this was instructive from both a leadership and technical perspective. The third section discussed his experiences in the middle of the tour; this was a pastiche of squadron life in camp and his most memorable missions. The next section was an account

of escorting a deployment of a Special Forces team into the A Shau Valley in the face of a significant enemy presence. The conclusion was a summary of his departure from Vietnam and a snapshot of his life since the tour, where he left the Marine Corps to pursue a career in academia, but returned to military service after earning his doctorate in European History as the career prospects were poor at the time.

Readers, however, must take into account that Ballentine is merely trying to tell his story, that of a junior officer pilot, as he saw events at the time. This is not an academic work as the tone and language of the writing is very colloquial, thus capturing Ballentine's zeitgeist as a young lieutenant over 40 years ago. This, however, is somewhat hindered by the author's parenthetical comments about reminiscences; some of which come across as atonement for the behaviour of a young officer from the benefit of hindsight and the wisdom of greater experience. The writing style appears to have been a deliberate choice on the part of the author. By virtue of his experience (having retired as a Colonel) and his education, he is a far more capable writer. At present, he is a faculty member at Johnson City Community College, Overland Park, KS (Suburb of Kansas City) where he teaches introductory courses on Western civilization. He can be forgiven for the writing style as it suited the purpose of the book—to tell the story as it was experienced by the author.

This book would be of greatest interest to the Tactical Aviation community for obvious reasons. Yet it may be of interest to those that would want to see a glimpse of one helicopter pilot's perceptions of a series of different situations associated with different types of tasks—that is where this book has the greatest value.


Endnotes

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2. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.
3. Ibid., p. xxiii. Section 1, Chapter 2, B-GA-440-000 / AF-000, *Tactical Helicopter Operations*, (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998) states that tactical helicopters carry out the following mission types: Reconnaissance & Surveillance, Direction and Control of Fire, Provision of Fire Support, Combat Airlift / Tactical Transport, Logistical Transport and Communications Support.

BAGHDAD AT SUNRISE, A BRIGADE COMMANDERS WAR IN IRAQ

MANSOOR, Peter. Yale University Press, 2008, hardcover, 416 pages, \$36.50, ISBN: 978-0300140699

Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hunt, CD



General Petraeus, the commander for the surge into Iraq and also the prime mover behind the American Army COIN publication, said of this book, "A must-read for soldiers, scholars, and policy makers alike." I thought it was a good read. It was interesting and contained many useful lessons and bits of information about the U.S. Army, counter-insurgency, and the situation in Iraq. It's not a must-read for everyone, but should be read by commanders and staff officers preparing to conduct counter-insurgency operations at the battle group and higher headquarters.

Colonel Mansoor is both a soldier and a scholar, a graduate of West Point and now a Professor, currently in the General Raymond Mason chair of military history, at Ohio State University. He served as the executive officer to General Petraeus in Multinational Force-Iraq, 2007-2008; as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Group that proposed the surge strategy in Iraq, 2007; as

the founding director of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, 2006; and as Commander of the First Brigade Combat Team, First Armored Division, in Baghdad, 2003-2004. He thus has a wealth of knowledge, both on Iraq and counter-insurgency and used this book to bring out many of the lessons he felt important.

He wrote the book using his diary and much of the information is what you'd expect to find in a diary, lots of detail, lots of names and his personal observations. Unfortunately, there's a little too much superfluous detail, which detracts from the overall value of the book by making it a longer read than necessary, I didn't need to know every time he smoked a Cuban cigar. Colonel Mansoor describes his tour of duty, as the brigade commander of the "Ready First Brigade Combat Team" in Baghdad, Iraq. His tour started at a relatively slow pace with the insurrection just beginning to take hold. His emphasis was on creating the democratic institutions necessary to move the various communities in Baghdad forward. They started the tour with a briefing from the British Army's Operational Training and Advisory Group, all with experience in Northern Ireland, which helped the brigade combat team set the intellectual stage for conducting counter-insurgency operations. They were tutored on how to break down the counter-insurgency tasks into two components—framework operations and surge operations. Framework operations are those activities a force has little choice but to execute, such as guarding pieces and critical sites patrolling and quick reaction forces for emergencies. Search operations are activities that enable a force to seize the initiative—cordon and search, checkpoints and ambushes, as well as humanitarian and civic action projects. This instruction became the conceptual underpinning for Colonel Mansoor's operations over the next year.¹ He applied the theory and learned his lessons by trial and error. His observations are good learning points for commanders operating in any counter-insurgency environment.

The first lesson he felt it necessary to pass on was a comment on interpreters. Local interpreters were an issue throughout the tour because of their various backgrounds, loyalties and language capability. It was hard to ensure precise translations. His recommendation is that in building an army for the 21st century a high priority must be assigned to improving language capabilities and noted that in the contemporary operating environment such language skills are as much a part of the soldier's equipment as the rifle and helmet.²

The second lesson, which he described as one of the most difficult issues in a counter-insurgency, is determining whom to trust. He met people every day on the street in council meetings and at the gates to his base. They offered lots of information and sorting truth from fiction and determining the motivation of the informant was extremely difficult. "I often joke that in Baghdad, we finally discovered something that travels faster than the speed of light—rumors, dubbed RUMINT [rumor intelligence] by our intelligence officers. Your context might have been in the plants, although proving so was difficult at best. Finally, a small percentage of Iraqis came forward with genuine useful information. Sifting the wheat from the chaff was graduate-level work."

A third lesson was about boots on the ground. As Colonel Mansoor learned, despite being an armoured brigade commander, much of this activity centered on the use of light and mechanized infantry. He believed that he was observing the passing of an era in military history, "precision weaponry had made massed armored operations increasingly problematic, and therefore it was unlikely the decisive phase of operation Iraqi Freedom was not the drive to Baghdad. But the struggle for stability is now occurring. We would win or lose the war on the Arab street—not with high-tech web weaponry, but with boots on the ground."

As his brigade was in the final stages of departing Baghdad and returning to Germany, an uprising was launched by the radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr's Mohammed's army as they tried to wrest control of Karbala from the government. The low-level insurgency went to high-intensity combat very quickly with Colonel Mansoor's tanks and APCs conducting combat in the streets of Baghdad and Karbala. Colonel Mansoor found himself having to make difficult decisions about how much force he could use. The insurgents were using religious shrines as their bases, destruction of these shrines would be counterproductive,

but using less force than available to him also endangered his soldiers. As he said, “it was the tough kind of trade-off one often faced in counterinsurgency operations—safety of the troops versus excessive collateral damage that could jeopardize the support of the population”.³

The book concludes with some reflections about the changing face of war and recommendations for improving the U.S. Army’s ability to fight them. There are several good ideas here and you can see how they have been built into to new counter-insurgency publication. I thought the most relevant and telling comment was, “While retaining the capability to conduct major combat operations, the Army must change its culture to embrace missions other than conventional land force combat. The current personnel system, its emphasis on rewarding technical and tactical competence at the expense of intellectual understanding and the broader, deeper grasp of the world in which we live, must adapt to promote those leaders with the skill sets and education needed for the wars we will fight in the years ahead. Effective leaders will be those who can think creatively, lead change, and understand information warfare and asymmetric battlefield—those who are flexible and adaptive.”

Endnotes

1. Pge 35
2. Pge 44 and
3. Pge320



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THE STAND-UP TABLE

Commentary, Opinion And Rebuttal

PLACE AND BETWEEN: A FUNDAMENTAL LOOK AT SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTS

Vincent J. Curtis writes...

I read the article by Major Devon Matsalla ("Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace," *The Canadian Army Journal*, Vol 11.2) with great interest because of two words in the title: concept and non-linear. The word "concept" caught my attention because it promised an attention to fundamentals; and the word "non-linear" because it is one of those buzzwords that have crept into the popular lexicon.

I believe that for the sake of clarity and accuracy, military theorists should refrain from using the expression "non-linear battlespace." In the first place, since the word "battlespace" refers to a three dimensional thing, the adjective proper to it is "rectilinear," not "linear" since linear refers to the quality of a line, a one dimensional thing. And since every battlespace is three dimensional these days, all battlespaces qualify as non-linear because all of them are volumes, not lines. What is probably meant by the term non-linear is "discontinuous" or "piece-wise continuous," to borrow other expressions from mathematics.

It is clear from reading Major Matsalla's piece that what he is speaking of is not a battlespace at all, which is where combat operations take place; but of a theatre, which is where military operations of all kinds take place, including sustainment. Hence, neither buzzword, non-linear nor battlespace is upon analysis applicable; and this is generally the problem when employing popular buzzwords in army doctrine.

The thrust of Major Matsalla's piece is to describe how a sustainment doctrine that was developed for a theatre with a particular geometric picture in mind is applied to a theatre that has a geometric picture different in kind from that from which the doctrine was developed. This is why the word "concept" is so important, because when one is working with concepts one should ground them in fundamentals. Clearly, theatre geometry cannot be a fundamental of sustainment doctrine, because it was necessary to adapt the concepts of the original doctrine to a new geometry. Linear and non-linear should, consequently, have no place in a sustainment doctrine that is grounded in fundamentals. Instead, the fundamentals ought to be applicable unchanged to the particular theatre, and the doctrine ought to be merely elaborated to suit the peculiarities, to the accidental and temporary properties, of a particular theatre in which sustainment operations are to take place.

Permit me to offer two fundamental concepts upon which a hierarchy of sustainment doctrine can be developed. The concepts are: Place and Between. Under the category of Place, we can be put the theatre itself, the port of disembarkation, bases, support areas, delivery points, commodity points, strong points, camps, etc. In these Places, support services are performed as per normal doctrine. The communications zone and combat zone of current doctrine do not qualify as Places for they are zones, not places; and they are the product of a particular kind of theatre: one characterized by a front. Since we aim at a doctrine based upon fundamentals, concepts that are derived from accidental properties cannot be incorporated into it, except as common accidents.

Thus, the operational picture of the logistician is of a theatre with Places in it. Since the purpose of logistics is to move supplies from one Place to another, the fundamental problem of logistics can be posed as: to move a freight of a certain quality in a certain quantity from one place to another in a certain period of time.¹ Since the Places are not in physical contact with each other (i.e. they are not "contiguous"), the freight has to be moved through the Between. Some of the problems of the movement of freight in a theatre are closely associated with the Between. Pertinent qualities of the Between include the quality

of the road, the weather conditions, and the tactical situation. It is the tactical situation of the Between that differentiates standard sustainment doctrine, that is, doctrine developed with a front in mind, with the methods that Major Metsalla elaborated upon in his article.

Since logistics presently uses the terms “Administrative” and “Tactical” as contraries that span the genus of threat level, these can be applied to describe the level of protection required to move convoys through the Between. From this it follows that for a given size of convoy, the greater the need for protection the lower the carrying capacity of the convoy, for the more vehicles are required for protection the fewer are available for carrying freight. In addition, the time required to mount a tactical movement is greater than an administrative movement because more coordination and preparation is required for a tactical move than an administrative move.

Applying these fundamentals to the Afghan theatre brings out the adaptations that Major Matsalla reports in his article. A high threat level throughout the theatre obliges second and third level sustainment groups to congregate within a few tactically protected Places in order to economize the combat power needed to protect them. The tactical situation, then, requires the putting of the Places of second and third line groups in physical contact with the Places of forward second and first line groups. And since the Places are in physical contact, there is no Between. In the war in Europe, which was characterized by a front, the tactical situation away from the front was of low threat, and convoys and Places did not require much protection. Hence, it was possible to separate the theatre into a communications zone and a combat zone based upon the geometry of the theatre created by the front, and to create sustainment organizations named after that particular geometry: first, second, third, and fourth line. This suggests that organizations founded upon a particular geometry of a theatre may have to be reorganized if that particular geometry does not obtain, and that reorganization is what Major Matsella described in his article: he expressed the new organization in terms of the old, as a mathematician would describe a new vector space using the basis vectors of the old vector space.

Major Matsella concludes: “the current Canadian sustainment doctrine, while entirely relevant for the linear battlefield, is based upon a number of premises that are no longer applicable in a non-linear contiguous battlespace such as Afghanistan.” Neglecting the terminology, I agree with this statement and offer here a set of fundamental concepts upon which a hierarchy of sustainment doctrine can be developed which is independent of theatre geometry, or at least upon which theatre geometry is a particular variable. In addition, there is a formulation of the fundamental problem of logistics.

In establishing new doctrine may I further suggest that the writers refrain from buzzwords and metaphors since these kinds of terms are never true, and one can never be sure what the terms mean. But if one sticks with fundamentals, such as Place, Between, Time, Quality, Quantity, movement, and so on, the fundamental doctrine will apply with particular adaptations tailored to the particular situation. That which is fundamental and primary can be applied to any particular, but that which is particular can only be applied to other particulars that are like it. The discerning eye will perceive this approach as an application of the KISS² principle.

Endnotes

1. Place, Time, Quality and Quantity are fundamental categories.
2. Keep it simple stupid.