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EDITORIAL—THE COGNITIVE CHALLENGE OF WARFARE

Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, plsc

I have borrowed the title of this editorial from Peter Paret's recently published book, *The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806*. In reading this latest work from one of the pre-eminent scholars of strategy and the life and influences of Clausewitz, I was reminded of how timeless the problems faced by soldiers truly are. The challenges associated with responding successfully to the enemy's innovation in war are certainly shaped by the period in which one lives, but the problems themselves remain very much the same from one era to the next.

It is important to appreciate that the purpose of such study is not necessarily to prove anything; the study of military history does not necessarily solve problems. Rather, military history is revealing and often identifies the questions that need to be asked today through the study of real historical problems and challenges; and by accurately examining past military experiences in some detail, the relationship between cause and effect today is further revealed to us.

Many of the articles that have come across my desk over the last five years have followed this model. They were high-quality examinations of topics of great interest and each article was in its own way a response to the cognitive challenge of warfare. It gives me continued comfort knowing that all ranks of our Army remain dedicated to openly and honestly debating subjects of importance to our land force development, and it is a reflection of an institution that continues to embrace the critical examination of itself. It is through this constant process that the Army will continue to evolve positively in the years to come.

As we head into the thirteenth volume of the new Canadian Army Journal, time has come for us as well to critically examine our work and consider change. We have had tremendous success in building the format of the journal over the last five years, taking it from an unwieldy black and white-only chunky publication to a full-colour fit in your pocket bilingual journal. We added a formal peer review process and adapted the latest Canadian copyright protection. We even took the Canadian Army Journal on-line. Still, there is much more work to be done, and many more things we want to accomplish. Beginning with Volume 13, you will yet again be treated to new ideas as the journal evolves yet again.

This issue of the CAJ is packed with articles, notes to file, items of interest and book reviews. I encourage you to read it, consider it, debate its contents and let us know what you think. As always, it is the Army's journal—your journal—so enjoy!

On The Editor's Desk...

It's been a few issues since I added this at the end of my editorials and I apologize. As mentioned above, I recently read Peter Paret's, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806. Currently, I'm reading two books. First on the pile is Patrick Hennessey's The Junior Officer's Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars. A pithy memoir of the modern day British Army officer, many of his experiences will be strangely familiar. The second book I'm reading is Shuja Nawaz's Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. This is arguably the most complete overview of Pakistan's land forces I have seen and is a must read, even at 600+ pages. I will have reviews into our book review section in the upcoming issues so watch for my assessments, or better yet, check them out for yourselves and let us know what you thought of them.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The Decorations for Bravery were created in 1972. The Cross of Valour (C.V.) recognizes acts of the most conspicuous courage in circumstances of extreme peril; the Star of Courage (S.C.) recognizes acts of conspicuous courage in circumstances of great peril; and the Medal of Bravery (M.B.) recognizes acts of bravery in hazardous circumstances.

Star of Courage

Sergeant David John Cooper, S.C., C.D., Winnipeg, Manitoba
Sergeant Dwayne B. Guay, S.C., C.D., Comox, British Columbia
Star of Courage

On February 16, 2007, Sergeant David Cooper and Sergeant Dwayne Guay, then master corporal, parachuted in extreme weather conditions to rescue a man who was stranded on an ice floe in the Arctic Ocean in the Northwest Territories. After a difficult landing due to the strong winds, the two search and rescue technicians made their way to the victim, provided first aid, and set up shelter until help arrived, some 11 hours later.

Petty Officer 2nd Class James Anthony Leith, S.C., M.S.M., C.D., Shearwater, Nova Scotia
Star of Courage

On September 28, 2006, Petty Officer 2nd Class James Leith risked his life to prevent the loss of civilian and military lives by dismantling an improvised explosive device (IED) on a road in the Pashmul area of Afghanistan. After his vehicle had been struck, Petty Officer 2nd Class Leith discovered an unstable IED. As his equipment had been destroyed in the original blast, he dismantled the IED using only his bayonet. His courageous actions enabled the reopening of a vital route for coalition forces.

Medal of Bravery

Sergeant Roger Chadwick Lane, M.B., Gagetown, New Brunswick
Medal of Bravery

On September 23, 2007, Sergeant Roger Lane, then master corporal, apprehended two men who had robbed a grocery store, in Edmonton, Alberta. Sergeant Lane was entering the store when he noticed a man wearing a disguise running towards him and realized that a robbery had just taken place. He caught the suspect, wrestled him to the ground, removed the gun from the suspect's waistband and threw it out of reach. While other shoppers assisted in restraining the robber, Sergeant Lane grabbed a second suspect who was running away. As the man struggled to free himself, he sprayed tear gas in Sergeant Lane's face. Although temporarily blinded, Sergeant Lane managed to subdue him and held onto him until the police arrived minutes later.

Lieutenant Denis Beaulieu, M.B., Bushell Park, Saskatchewan
Medal of Bravery

On May 12, 2007, Lieutenant Denis Beaulieu, then 2nd lieutenant, rescued a man from a possible drowning, in Cold Lake, Alberta. The victim had gone fishing when his boat suddenly broke apart, sending him into the freezing waters some 300 metres from shore. Alerted to the victim's predicament, Lieutenant Beaulieu ran into the lake and swam out to the victim. Reaching the panic-stricken victim's side, Lieutenant Beaulieu grabbed him by his life jacket and encouraged him to swim towards the shore. Suffering from hypothermia, it took them nearly 35 minutes to make it to safety, where others assisted them out of the water.

Master-Corporal Jonas Denechezhe, M.B., Lac Brochet, Manitoba
Alphonse St. Pierre, M.B., Lac Brochet, Manitoba
Clifford Tssessaze, M.B., Lac Brochet, Manitoba
Medal of Bravery

On October 13, 2006, Master-Corporal Jonas Denechezhe, Alphonse St. Pierre and Clifford Tssessaze rescued a mother and her two sons from a burning house, in Lac Brochet, Manitoba. Unable to enter the house, they broke a window to allow some of the dense smoke to escape. Using a front-end loader, they broke through a corner of the house to gain entry. The men located the mother and her two boys and brought them to safety. Sadly, one of the children died from his injuries.

Master Corporal Frédéric Heppell, M.B., Québec, Québec
Medal of Bravery

On November 17, 2007, Master Corporal Frédéric Heppell, then corporal, rescued two colleagues from a burning military vehicle, during a night deployment, in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device, sustaining massive damage to its frame. In spite of the exploding munitions and raging fire, Master Corporal Heppell forced open the latch to his cabin, ran to help three men who were trapped in the back of the vehicle, but found them lying lifeless under pieces of twisted metal. He then located two wounded soldiers who had been ejected on impact and pulled them to a safer location just moments before the tank exploded completely.

Meritorious Service Decoration (Military Division)

On behalf of Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, Mr. Marc Lortie, Ambassador of Canada to France, presented a Meritorious Service Medal (Military Division) to a French citizen whose specific achievements have brought honour to Canada. Colonel Jean-Pierre Duran, of the French Army, received his decoration on Monday, July 6, 2009, during a ceremony at the Ambassador's official residence in Paris.

Colonel Jean-Pierre Duran, M.S.M. (French Army) Bry-sur-Marne, France
Meritorious Service Medal (Military Division)

Colonel Duran, then lieutenant-colonel, demonstrated exceptional dedication and professionalism as assistant defence attaché at the Embassy of France, in Ottawa, from 2004 to 2008. His organization of a vast array of commemorative activities for Canadian veterans and military personnel has undeniably reinforced the bonds of friendship between Canada and France.

Mention in Dispatches

Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, announced today the names of four individuals mentioned in dispatches for specific achievements that have brought honour to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.

The Mention in Dispatches is a national honour created to recognize members of the Canadian Forces on active service and other individuals working with or in conjunction with the Canadian Forces for valiant conduct, devotion to duty or other distinguished service. Recipients are entitled to wear a bronze oak leaf on the appropriate campaign or service medal ribbon.

Master Corporal Jason James Boyes (Deceased)	**Shilo, Manitoba**
Corporal Nathan Hornburg (Posthumous)	**Calgary and Nanton, Alberta**
Master Corporal Denis P. Leduc	**Edmonton, Alberta**
Master Corporal Stephen Hector McPhail, CD	**Petawawa, Ontario and Fredericton, New Brunswick**

Meritorious Service Medal (US)

Lieutenant-Colonel David Quinn, CD Montréal, Québec
Meritorious Service Medal (US)

The Meritorious service medal (US) is awarded to Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. Quinn for outstanding meritorious service while serving as a major, staff exchange officer, G-4 Plans, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Major Quinn's personal courage, dedication, and commitment to mission accomplishment greatly contributed to the success of operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Major Quinn's conspicuous performance of duty represents exemplary achievement in the finest traditions of the Canadian Army.

Governor General to recognize Canadians with the Sacrifice Medal

Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, announced today that Canadians who either died or were wounded while serving with the Canadian Forces, will be honoured with the Sacrifice Medal.

> *The selflessness demonstrated by the members of the Canadian Forces and the civilians working alongside them must be honoured," said the Governor General. "They are ready to put their health and their very lives on the line in the hopes that democracy, security and peace will prevail in places where these ideals have ceased to exist. For this, we must recognize their courage and their sacrifices.*

The inaugural presentation of the Sacrifice Medal will be held at Rideau Hall during Remembrance Week, in November. Details of the ceremony and names of the recipients will be announced prior to the event.

For more information on the revised criteria for the Sacrifice Medal, please refer to the Department of National Defence news release at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3173

ARMY UPDATE—THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING FRAMEWORK

Major R.S. Lott

The Article "*Crucible of Success: Cultural Intelligence and the Modern Battlespace"* was an interesting and thought provoking article that convincingly and correctly argued the importance of cultural awareness (CA) in today's contemporary operating environment. Written in 2007, it accurately reflected the state of affairs of our CA Training prior to September 2007. Unfortunately, since it was not published until 2009, it serves as an inaccurate picture of today's CA Training regime for a majority of our combat troops deploying to Afghanistan.

In January 2008, the Army instituted the Afghanistan CA Training Framework to address feedback received from veterans of Task Force Afghanistan prior to August 2007 which expressed a general dissatisfaction with the lack of quality, relevancy and standardization of legacy CA Training. At that time Force generators were mandated to conduct this training but were left to their own means to design and deliver the training. Language training, now encompassed within CA Training, was usually delivered en-masse well in advance of deployment and was also deemed ineffective.

The Training Framework that is in place is the result of the collaborative efforts of the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and followed an extensive Training Needs Analysis (TNA) conducted by the Directorate of Army Training (DAT) in late 2007. Its aim is to provide our members with the cultural knowledge and skills necessary for them to operate effectively and to contribute to mission success. The Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) works closely with DFAIT and the Terrorism Research Center (TRC), (the CA service providers) towards continual improvement of this comprehensive training program.

The current Canadian Army's CA Training program is designed for three distinct, **Primary Training Audiences (PTA)**. For each PTA, there are three levels of CA Training to be achieved; these are:

- Level 1—Awareness;
- Level 2—Understanding; and
- Level 3—Application and Leverage.

Both PTAs are required to complete all three applicable levels of CA Training prior to deployment. All training is conducted in Canada with the exception of US based Mirror Image Training provided by TRC.

PTA 1—The Troops (from Private to Platoon Commander, this PTA includes Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements).

The three levels of CA for PTA 1 are:

- Level 1—Attend a two-day presentation by DFAIT based upon the "Afghanistan Cultural Resource" (ACR) program. This program covers the same content in the self-study tool for PTAs 2 and 3. However, PTA 1 receives this training as a group presentation (with a maximum of 200 people per group). This presentation also includes the involvement of two subject matter experts (SMEs) throughout the training.

- Level 2—a five-day program entitled, "Afghanistan Deployment Training" designed to provide military units an understanding of the customs, culture, tribes, warlords and

mindset of the enemy in Afghanistan. This program is delivered by TRC SMEs.

- Level 3—mentoring of platoon/troop members by CF veterans of the Afghan mission. Training is delivered by the BG typically during collective training.

PTA 2—Strategic/Operational/Tactical Commanders, Planners and Selected Enablers (including Unit COs, sub-unit OCs, and their respective 2ICs; select BG HQ Staff such as IO, PSYOP, CIMIC, HUMINT, Counter-Intelligence, Tactical Questioners and Intelligence personnel; and select personnel directly engaged in Diplomacy, Development and Defence (3D) operations at the tactical level [such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT)].

The three levels of CA Training for PTA 2 are:

- Level 1—an on-line self-study program using the ACR found on PSTC's website. The ACR program was developed for the CF by DFAIT.

- Level 2—a four-day program entitled, "Intercultural Effectiveness and Pre-Deployment Training DND—Afghanistan" which includes knowledge development of Afghan culture as well as enhanced learning related to cultural influences which impact on the planning process. This program is delivered by DFAIT.

- Level 3—in addition to being mentored by someone who has done the same job in theatre, all commanders will attend a three-day program entitled, "Executive Briefing on Afghanistan for Commanders". Enablers will attend a five-day program entitled, "Afghanistan Deployment Training for Enablers", which is designed for specialty military positions (Counter-Intelligence, HUMINT, Intelligence Analysts, CIMIC) who need a more detailed understanding of the strategic and tactical environment, motivations of the enemy, exploitation of the enemy's weaknesses, cell dynamics, intelligence operations, internal security, logistics, recruitment and training. Both training packages are delivered by the TRC.

PTA 3—Strategic and Operational Commanders, Planners and Selected Enablers (including Strategic Advisory Teams, JTF-A HQ personnel, and all personnel directly engaged in 3D at the strategic or operational levels. "Selected Enablers" include Psychological Operations, CIMIC, Counter Intelligence (CI), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Intelligence personnel at the strategic and operational level.

The three levels of CA training for PTA 3 are:

- Level 1—the on-line ACR self-study program as detailed in PTA 2, Level 1.

- Level 2—a four-day program entitled, "Intercultural Effectiveness and Pre-Deployment Training DND—Afghanistan" which includes knowledge development of Afghan culture as well as enhanced learning related to cultural influences which impact on the planning process. Training is delivered by DFAIT.

- Level 3—in addition to being mentored by someone who has done the same job in theatre, all commanders will attend a three-day program entitled, "Executive Briefing on Afghanistan for Commanders". This program is delivered by the TRC.

The current CA training program is focused solely on Afghanistan; however, future training packages are being developed for mission areas such as Sudan and Haiti and will be posted on the PSTC website when available. In addition, the overarching competencies and skills gained in intercultural effectiveness training will apply to any future mission.

Additional information is available on the PSTC's website, located on the DWAN at http://lfdts.kingston.mil.ca/pstc-cfsp/and on the Internet at http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/main.asp. All those involved in the delivery of Afghan pre-deployment training are strongly encouraged to visit this website to ensure their people receive the right CA training. Questions may be directed to MWO R. Kluke at 613-541-5010 extension 3195.

UNIT COHESION

Lieutenant-Colonel K.J. Hamilton

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of their mutual will, attack resolutely.

Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq[1]

Introduction

The importance of cohesion to military science has been the topic of much discussion over the centuries, as researchers have pursued techniques that would guarantee its successful establishment within military forces. Cohesion is a desirable characteristic much sought after by all groups, be it professional sports teams, engineering design groups, work-places, or more importantly for this paper, within a military construct, but few successfully capture it. In the past, military forces have often hunted for cohesion as a solution, recognizing it as some indefinable force, which, if gained and maximized, could change the tide of battle in their favour.

Today, cohesion is still seen as a critical characteristic of military forces, with more emphasis being placed on its value. Achieving and maintaining cohesion affords the unit the opportunity for higher morale, increased effectiveness and hopefully greater retention. Its absence brings quick disintegration to the fighting force, low morale, and little desire to stay the course, a course fraught with high operational tempo and increasingly long periods of time separated from family and friends on dangerous missions abroad. Unfortunately, "…international and domestic realities have resulted in a paradox of declining military resources and increasing military missions."[2] Canada, like many nations, is being called upon to participate in many non-traditional operations that pose new challenges.[3] Be it Haiti, Afghanistan or Sudan, these operations are calling more often upon our soldiers to work in a number of diverse locations under stressful and unfamiliar conditions, while simultaneously having to deal with government-dictated force structures for each mission. These force structures may be unsuitable for the tasks assigned.[4] This operationally-focused environment is the Canadian Forces (CF) of the future. With greater emphasis being placed on failed and failing states by many western governments, the CF, as one tool in the Canadian Government's box of diplomacy options, will see ever increasing, high-risk operational deployments as Canada attempts to become a larger player on the international stage.

The Canadian Land Force, also known as the Canadian Army, has and will continue to play a major role in projecting foreign policy while promoting Canadian values in failed and failing-state regions of the world.[5] The impact of high operational tempo of these recurring deployments are not yet fully understood, but one can postulate that morale, motivation and retention are impacted upon in some way. There are concerns that the situation may in fact be made worse by the introduction of Land Force Managed Readiness Plan (MR). For operations, MR will utilize deployable task-tailored plug-and-play units from across the CF, pulled together as a custom-fit solution instead of the one-size-fits-all model of the past. Although an efficient and flexible model, the long-term impacts of its use are yet to be quantified. MR currently draws subunits from across the country already belonging to larger formations and has the reach to task individual soldiers. The task force gathers at a predetermined location where it will train together before it is declared operationally ready for deployment. The cohesion challenges facing this new task force are undefined. In addition, the cohesion of the remaining subunits, from where many of these augmentation forces have been drawn, requires further study.

Cohesion data is collected regularly in the CF by utilizing the CF Human Dimensions of Operations (HDO) survey used for deployed operations, and the Unit Morale Profile (UMP), which is administered in a garrison or static environment.[6] Both seek to determine correlating variables which could be manipulated to influence cohesion as a strategy to mitigate stress and disenchantment while increasing the dedication and hopefully retention of CF members in this new unpredictable security era.

Combat Camera

Cohesion, although measurable through survey and analysis, is still a very difficult characteristic to quantify. Two fighting forces, equal in personnel and combat power, can be significantly differentiated by the factor of cohesion. Thus, all fighting forces work diligently to achieve and maintain it. Using a conceptual model of cohesion, it will be shown that the variables of leadership, trust, shared experience/time, and realistic training all strongly influence cohesion in units and must be thoroughly addressed within the new MR construct if it is to be successful. These variables require increased attention within the Land Force as it moves with great haste into the un-chartered waters of MR. If the soldier is stressed, unmotivated, disillusioned and loses his dedication to serve, leading to his release from the Army, a lack of cohesion is the nexus of this problem. If MR is to succeed, it must do so with the dedication and professionalism of the individual soldier.

This essay will provide a literature review of cohesion research, identifying key influencing variables which are presented in a conceptual model of cohesion. It will suggest how the input variables can be manipulated, leading to the final desired end state of increased motivation, efficiency, dedication and retention. It will offer identified variables that can be shaped and managed to positively affect cohesion in today's MR environment, leading to the identification of those variables which require greater emphasis within the CF as a whole.

Defining Cohesion

"As early as 400 BC, Xenophon had discovered that … not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them."[7] Performance in battle is essential to winning decisively. When

the soldier is exhausted from physical combat, chilled by the environment and mentally shattered from the sights and sounds of the operation, commanders rely on cohesion to hold the unit together. Literature regularly mixes and interchanges the definitions of morale and cohesion, thus it is important to define cohesion's meaning. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines cohesion as, "the act or state of sticking together closely."[8] "A cohesive group is one that will work together as a team. They have confidence in the ability of their fellow combatants, they have a strong sense of identity and social support; that is, other members of the group are interested in their well-being."[9] US Army Chief of Staff Edward Myer defined cohesion as, "the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress."[10]

To aid in the further understanding of cohesion, it is important to provide additional clarification and refinement of the two distinct types of cohesion: task and social cohesion. Task cohesion is more closely related to what the CF identifies as professional cohesion, "…a group of people voluntarily performing a service to society and unified by a common body of expertise and code of conduct."[11] Literature identifies that both types have a role to play, but, more recently, task cohesion has been cited to correlate more positively with morale and performance. There is also the possibility of having too much of social and not enough task cohesion.[12]

> *Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal.*[13]

> *Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group displays high social cohesion to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another.*[14]

That is not to say that social cohesion should be discounted completely, as there are many examples in history were social cohesion was seen as the deciding factor in victory. More recently, social cohesion is used to explain the overwhelming success of military actions. The great American combat historian S.L.A Marshall states, "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going … is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade."[15] He later concludes his thoughts by summarizing, "…friendship, loyalty to responsibility and the knowledge that he is a repository of the faith and confidence of others,"[16] is the reason young men fight together. More recently, it has been stated that "cohesion, or the emotional bonds between soldiers, appeared to be the primary factor in combat motivation."[17] There are many more examples of the same theme, "I do it for my buddies," or "I can't let my buddies down," which seem to support social cohesion as a correlated construct to group morale, motivation and performance. Unfortunately, there are discrepancies in the methodology in some of the findings and others are not supported by cited work.[18] However, it is difficult to argue with the scenes broadcast over the airwaves of the deaths of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan on OPERATION ARCHER. The statements from their loved ones was that the soldiers, even knowing the dangers of the mission which lay ahead of them, could not stand idle back in Canada while their friends and comrades departed for the war-torn country. These comments, although not scientifically supportive, intuitively suggest that social cohesion does, on some level, positively effect morale and leads to higher motivation, performance, dedication and effectiveness.

With all of these definitions, it has been noted that there are many instances where the meanings are misused or misunderstood. Many researchers group survey results together, or refer to cohesion as a single entity, which indeed it is not. Thus the concept of cohesion is an abstract one, which is thought to be well understood by the laymen, but is actually quite complex to grasp in reality.[19] "No definition of cohesiveness has become a generally accepted standard, and no uniformity has characterized the measurement or the operationalization of the construct."[20] Cohesion, however, is believed to be so important to group performance, motivation and effectiveness that the preceding challenges should not stop researchers from pursuing answers.

Most military officers are familiar with the military theorists such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini, and few would question the validity of cohesion and its impact on tactics, organizational design of forces, and synchronization of effects. This interest has not been degraded over the years; in fact, military interest in cohesion has been steadily growing. It has been suggested that the increasing lethality on the battlefield, disproportionate force strength and capabilities of potential adversaries, lessons learned from the Vietnam War, and military organizational design brought about by the new security environment consisting of non-linear asymmetric threats, have made cohesion a force multiplier to be sought after and exploited.[21] If this is assumed to be true, it is critical that organizational design of MR forces be constructed in such a way as to increase cohesion or, at the very least, set the conditions to improve it. This challenge can be accomplished by focusing efforts directly on variables that influence cohesion, by manipulating the inputs into these variables to leverage the cohesion that currently exists, or by commencing activities to build it before the MR task force deploys on operations.

Model Of Cohesion

This paper hypothesizes that leadership, trust, meaningful employment, shared experiences/time and realistic training all strongly influence cohesion. The conceptual model shown in Figure 1 depicts this relationship and how these variables directly influence morale and further impact upon motivation, performance, effectiveness, dedication and retention. "Unit cohesion should thus be seen as a contributor to morale, albeit a very important one, rather than a synonym or a related but independent concept."[22]



Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Variables Affecting Cohesion

Leadership

The military has always been focused on developing leaders who are required at all levels of the institution. "Military analysts have identified the quality of leadership as a key factor in determining whether units are cohesive."[23] Leaders who can display high levels of motivation and set the standard for others to emulate become a model of inspiration for others to follow.[24] This is crucial as the MR task force begins to take shape. From the moment the command and control nucleus of the high readiness task force receives its order to mobilize, the leadership needs to demonstrate its determination because ". . . leaders appear to have substantial influence on cohesion among their subordinates."[25] From their physical fitness level to dress and deportment, the leadership is looked to for guidance and motivation. If this is lacking at the leadership level, it will not flourish at the troop level. "By carrying out your duty and striving for excellence, a positive statement is made to the soldiers under you."[26] The abilities of the leadership will also be closely monitored by subordinates. Can they articulate mission statements and orders? Are they competent with their personal weapons? Leaders at all levels must regularly demonstrate their skills for subordinates to witness because, before operations begin, the soldier must know, beyond

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the shadow of a doubt, that their leader is competent and that those competencies will lead the unit to success in battle. "If they [soldiers] doubt his [the leader's] knowledge they will hesitate to commit their lives to his judgment—they will not act as a cohesive unit."[27] As the deployment date for the unit approaches and the tempo of preparations intensifies, stress within the unit will build. This is viewed as a normal emotional outcome of pre-deployment operations, which must be managed. "A leader's professional competency is the primary leadership factor that soldiers say decreases their stress."[28] Therefore, MR unit leaders must work hard to demonstrate their competency quickly as they will be dealing with many new personalities unfamiliar with them, arriving from formations outside the geographical area.

Once subordinates are comfortable with the competency of the leadership, they will seek assurances that their welfare and the welfare of their families will be addressed. "When leaders take adequate care of their soldiers, then their soldiers will more diligently carry out their duties, typically without the need for much supervision."[29] A leader who routinely demonstrates care, compassion and competency sets the conditions to influence cohesion in a positive way.[30] Thus, the importance of MR units in establishing rear-party social support networks, and hosting briefings for families during pre-deployment preparations are invaluable. Having unit leadership explain the mission objectives and answer questions during regular informal gatherings with families before deployment is invaluable to provide clarifications to those unanswered questions families will have. It is essential that MR leadership appoints a competent and effective rear party, lead by individuals who exude confidence and have the interpersonal skills to interact with worried and nervous families. "Soldiers' perceptions of leaders as caring and competent can influence the development of cohesion."[31] After the MR unit deploys for operations, regular social activities for the families, internet sites and local newsletters will go a long way in demonstrating to subordinates that the leadership cares. There exists strong positive correlation between the knowledge that a soldier's loved ones are being taking care of and unit cohesion.[32]

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Once deployed, soldiers will work long hours, encountering many stressful and unfamiliar situations. In today's security environment, one of high risk and high tempo operations, the chances of developing stress injuries have increased. "In a unit under stress, the strength

of unit cohesion and leadership may tip the delicate balance from a prevalence of combat stress reaction to valour."[33] Unit leadership must establish the environment cohesion needs to foster. "The cohesion and leadership in the unit are related to the soldier's perceived chances of survival."[34] Every soldier wants to survive, and every leader wants to bring their soldiers home. Developing cohesion early in the MR unit through solid, well documented leadership practices, and nurturing its growth, will only enhance the likelihood of success.

Trust

If trust is nurtured, soldiers will feel secure about depending on others for their survival, even under intense stress. If that trust is broken or misused, soldier will feel powerless and unable to cope with the anger that will develop.[35] Trust needs to be earned and once earned, kept. Communicating truthfully with subordinates is essential. Leadership will be looked to for answers and must be seen as the portal from where information comes, good or bad. Leadership must never lie to their soldiers or give conflicting answers, because their trust will be lost forever. Establishing trust must begin immediately when the MR unit forms. The leadership needs to create an environment that opens communication channels and fosters dialogue. Soldiers are inquisitive and will seek answers to the unfamiliar. This needs to be recognized up front and planned for. "Communication and trust between the provider and the recipient are crucial, because informing soldiers during combat of the real state of affairs will help lessen the fear caused by the unknown."[36] Trust needs to be earned, and is gained through displaying a balanced level of care and compassion for soldiers and being seen as an accurate source of timely information. Only through regular face-to-face contact with subordinates will trust in the leader's capabilities be forged.[37] This can be reinforced by conducting informal exchanges with the soldiers, either while walking through their work lines, exchanging dialogue along the way or by conducting junior leaders' hours at the lower end of the leadership hierarchy.

Combat Camera

This reasoning is not only true for communications, but applicable to every facet of the leader-follower relationship, as well as between soldiers themselves. "If the soldier trusts his comrades, he will probably perceive more safety in continuing to fight alongside them, than in rearward flight away from them and the enemy which they face."[38] Limited but intense combat engagements are becoming more prevalent, as the implementation

of Canada's new foreign policy agenda is exercised. The MR units will find themselves employed in dangerous and remote areas, where each person will be counting on the other for support. "In combat, the social support network is often crucial in importance. Expressed in a high level of unit cohesion and in the trust in effective leadership, it instigates a sense of optimism and hope for survival."[39] Soldiers are very conscious of the fact that their survival is dependent on others in the group. If this awareness is ever in doubt, cohesion will suffer significantly.[40] If engagements with enemy combatants occur, soldiers need to clearly understand their rules of engagement and be able to apply them accurately, with the certainty that they will be supported by the chain of command. "Therefore, trust in one's commander and comrades remains the most important factor for security."[41]

Developing this level of trust between soldiers has the potential to be a significant stumbling block for MR and requires greater attention. Although our military ethos will provide soldiers with the foundations of commonality, it may not achieve the desired level of trust required under stressful operational conditions. Ways of achieving high levels of trust will need to be studied more closely.

Shared Experiences/Time

It has always been postulated that spending time together was the universal key which would open all the barriers and permit unit cohesion to thrive. Time was consistently mentioned by those opposed to MR as one of the reasons it would fail. Units that spent long periods of time together would be cohesive units; therefore MR units, knowing that they would only be together for the duration of the operation, would never achieve the level of cohesiveness required for high-tempo, demanding operations. There is a documented level of merit to this concern. "Spending time together thus appears as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for unit cohesion to develop."[42] The quality of the time being shared and what is accomplished within that time become important factors here, much like in any relationship.

In order to foster cohesion and give it an opportunity to flourish, soldiers need time to share experiences, interact and get to know one another.[43] There are multiple ways to achieve this goal, from unit sporting events to social activities. "In the absence of shared experiences that can occur when individuals of a group spend time together, unit identity and cohesion have no opportunity to develop."[44] Understanding the pre-deployment period is a very busy time, this may be hard to achieve, but MR unit leadership needs to ensure ample time is given to the unit to gel, per se, to feel each other out, exchange ideas and have some fun. Tackling small tasks and accomplishing them successfully is also important. "There is considerable evidence that successful performance experiences promote cohesion,"[45] so making more out of the time spent together is essential. Cohesion enhancing experiences must "derive some feeling of success or accomplishment and the more interdependence among the members is necessary for success, the greater the payoff in cohesion."[46] Time spent together undergoing common experiences are pillars on which cohesion is built.[47]

Although an unlikely enough occurrence for MR units in any case, they certainly cannot afford wasted time or just sitting around. Boredom saps the life out of cohesion and there must be a never-ending struggle to ensure boredom is not permitted to take hold. "Boredom is an increasingly important negative correlate of cohesion."[48] Missions that last for years, tasking soldiers to return often to conduct the same mission year after year, do not lend themselves to foster cohesion. It has been shown that while cohesion generally increases over the deployment, it will drop off quickly over time if the members find their efforts unchallenging and unrewarding.[49] If the MR unit leadership senses boredom setting in, various types of specific technical professional development (PD) training are recommended.[50] A maintainer should delve into new maintenance procedures and issues, medical personnel into medical journals and forums, and so on. Making soldiers do seemingly meaningless or general PD will not work.

"Shared experiences while in the military thus become the glue which holds the work group together."[51] Soldiers must bear witness for themselves that their fellow soldiers have the capability and resolve under stressful conditions to react, and only then will shared

experiences build cohesion.[52] "This confidence, that in times of difficulty one has someone who is willing and able to help, is at the heart of unity cohesion."[53]

Realistic Training

Soldiers frequently complain about the mundane and repetitive training schedule in units. It is often felt that the soldier's skill or technical trade is understood, that proficiency had been attained long ago; and thus more training is just a waste of time. Although this point of view is presented often, the requirements to train on lessons learned from past operations and adapt old tactics, techniques and procedures to the new era of the non-linear, asymmetric battle space must be accomplished. This is the reality confronting high readiness (HR) units struggling to achieve cohesion, and it is only compounded with the introduction of new soldiers into a new unit, deploying to a new mission area where the possibility of encountering a multitude of new threats is very real. All is not lost, however, and building cohesion is very achievable. Leaders must never allow training to become irrelevant or unchallenging, "Because it is in training that unit cohesion is built before combat troops go on any military operation."[54]

Combat Camera

HR unit training must be built around realistic scenarios, or scenarios that they are likely to encounter on operations. "Training them to become seasoned soldiers who could survive on a battlefield, because they are technically, physically and mentally proficient,"[55] is the true objective. Cohesion will build as soldiers watch each other become more competent and skilled, accomplishing tasks which they will be asked to perform under significantly more pressure and stress. HR units cannot wait idly for orders to deploy on operations; they must train aggressively and with vigour, in preparation for their impending departure.[56] "Rigour and frequent training fosters unit cohesion, which is so crucial to combat effectiveness that Martin van Creveld[57] includes it in his definition of an army's fighting power."[58] The level of training required to build cohesion is achievable, within the HR unit construct, with careful planning and the requisite resource allocation. Although certainly more difficult with new mission deployments, current mission rotations must take advantage of lessons identified and more vigorously employ as mentors, experienced soldiers from the mission area in order to achieve this goal.

"Historically, armies that entered a conflict with good equipment and unprepared units either lost the conflict to better-trained armies or suffered ghastly losses until their training, paid in blood, caught up to the enemy's."[59] The early twentieth century German Army recognized the significance of training, spending an inordinate amount of effort honing the skills of its soldiers and officers alike into unyielding cohesive units.[60] There is the potential for HR units to fall into this trap, especially if training is viewed as an afterthought or taken too lightly. Through realistic training, soldiers will learn from one another, build bonds, suffer collectively and triumph as one. They will proudly work in concert to accomplish the mission, drawing on the credible training of the past for inspiration and guidance. Knowing that collectively they were successful during training will instil confidence in one another when faced with threatening challenges. When soldiers know that other soldiers care and are interested in their well-being, group cohesion is reinforced and will prosper.[61]

Conclusion

Cohesion is a characteristic that will enhance group effectiveness and is essential for combat forces to attain before being committed into harm's way. This paper has suggested that there are variables that directly influence cohesion and which can be manipulated to enhance cohesion in units. "It is essential to strengthen unit cohesion because, during combat, isolation and loneliness assault the cohesive power of a unit."[62] With the introduction of MR, the Canadian Army is experiencing the challenges in building and fostering cohesion within the HR unit. Significant attention has been focused on the Canadian Army's plan of bringing together small groups of soldiers from across the country to form one cohesive task-tailored force for operations. Although the task is a difficult one, it is one that is achievable.

As was presented in the conceptual model of cohesion, and validated through relevant literature, by concentrating more effort on the variables of leadership, trust, shared experiences/time and realistic training, it is suggested that cohesion can take hold and become well established. "These findings suggest that it is the combined effects of being already familiar with one another and then experiencing as a group a stressful task or exercise that together seem to have more impact on cohesion than either factor alone."[63]

"Confidence in the ability and willingness of peers and leaders to protect one in combat and a feeling of obligation to do the same for them are at the heart of unit cohesion."[64] Before soldiers depart on operations, it is critical that cohesion has an opportunity to foster well in advance.[65] An enemy aware of his adversary's centre of gravity will attempt at all costs to dislocate him from it. Leaders must diligently guard against this, as with the demise of unit cohesion, motivation, effectiveness and performance will fail.[66]

Researching this paper has drawn the same conclusions as others, that there is a "strong relationship between cohesion, soldiers' level of morale, and combat efficiency."[67] What is well understood, at least conceptually, is that cohesion plays a major role in group dynamics and is critical in organizations to shape unit morale and set the conditions for improvements in performance, motivation, effectiveness and retention. "This is an especially important issue for the military because modern operations rely more heavily on rapidly organized task forces tailored for particular missions than did those in the past."[68] Clearly this is the Canadian MR construct, which is now fully operational. The struggle continues to clearly identify the effects of cohesion and what variables can be influenced to make cohesion stronger. "Few studies have empirically addressed this issue."[69] There is a need for future research to clearly identify, quantify and articulate each variable directly impacting upon cohesion so they can be more carefully managed to ensure MR units depart for operational theatres as cohesive as possible.

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CAREER SATISFACTION OF ARMY LIEUTENANT-COLONELS

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In the early 2000s, the Chief of Land Staff commissioned a number of studies to examine aspects of the Canadian Army's culture. One of these studies, a wide-ranging survey of Army members from the rank of private to colonel, conducted in 2004, revealed that lieutenant-colonels were less satisfied with certain aspects of their careers than those surveyed from the other ranks.[1] While these results were dramatic, their validity was doubtful given the relatively small number of lieutenant-colonels who had completed the survey. This prompted a follow-on study in 2006, with a larger sample of Army lieutenant-colonels, to examine career satisfiers and dissatisfiers in greater detail.[2] This article summarizes the results of these two studies.

The 2004 Army Culture and Climate Survey

For this study, researchers travelled to the garrisons of Canadian Army units and administered The Army Culture and Climate Survey, a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, to 2,472 Army members from private to colonel. Of the respondents, 81% were Regular Force, 21% were Francophone, 83% were male, 46% were combat arms and 14% were officers. Less than 1% of the sample (or 15 respondents were lieutenant-colonels. Included in this survey were items that assessed career intentions (i.e., "Do you intend to stay in the Army or leave the Army?"), job satisfaction, commitment to the Canadian Forces (CF), confidence in the organization and perceptions of leadership. The results of the 2004 study were published in an internal report, and the major findings of this research were presented in the public domain the following year in a report written by Colonel Capstick and colleagues.[3]

When the data from The Army Culture and Climate Survey were compared across ranks, a number of career-related concerns emerged within the lieutenant-colonel rank.[4] In particular, there were four areas where the attitudes of lieutenant-colonels were less favourable than those of survey respondents from the other ranks.

First, lieutenant-colonels reported more difficulty in completing their daily assignments. In addition to their normal duties, they also reported the added burden of having to work on "unnecessary things." The report by Capstick and colleagues suggested that these two concerns might be an indication that lieutenant-colonels were experiencing a lack of control in the workplace that reflected more dissatisfaction with the *scope* (kind) of work they did than the *volume* (amount) of work they did.[5]

Second, lieutenant-colonels reported experiencing less transformational leadership from their superiors than would be expected. This finding was somewhat surprising as transformational leadership is advocated in CF leadership doctrine.[6] Transformational leadership is a style of leadership that inspires followers by providing a vision and developing an organizational culture that stimulates high performance; transformational leaders transmit a sense of mission, stimulate learning experiences, inspire new and creative ways of thinking in followers and develop followers by mentoring and coaching them.[7] Transformational leadership is best viewed in contrast to transactional leadership, which works on an exchange principle, in which leaders exchange rewards for good work, loyalty and commitment.[8] Research has demonstrated that transformational leaders tend to enjoy more successful outcomes from subordinates—including higher levels of job satisfaction, work

performance and group cohesion—than transactional leaders.[9] The fact that lieutenant-colonels surveyed for this study did not appear to be experiencing much transformational leadership suggests that they may have felt that they had not been given a compelling vision, were not being intellectually stimulated by their leaders, were not being developed for future challenges or any combination of these.

Third, lieutenant-colonels reported feeling less free to question their superiors' decisions and were less inclined to approve of others questioning superiors than would be expected of leaders at this rank. This finding is related to the issue of transformational leadership. Transformational leaders should inspire their followers to challenge the status quo and should facilitate dialogue between leaders and followers, but these outcomes did not appear to be happening at the lieutenant-colonel rank. Transactional leaders prefer hierarchical relationships between superiors and subordinates.[10] Unfortunately, this type of relationship likely would inhibit someone's perceptions of their ability to question a decision made by a senior officer.

Fourth, lieutenant-colonels were also less favourable in their views on second language requirements than survey respondents from the other ranks. Lieutenant-colonels felt that bilingualism carries too much weight in career progression. Capstick et al. suggested that these negative attitudes may be attributed to regulations precluding promotion for lieutenant-colonels who do not meet second language requirements.[11] All officers at the rank of colonel (or naval equivalent rank) must be bilingual with a CBC level of proficiency on the Public Service Second Language Evaluation (SLE) test.[12] It is unlikely that these bilingualism requirements will be reduced. A 2006 audit of language use at Canada's National Defence Headquarters by the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages recommended that this policy be strengthened and that only officers who meet or exceed the CBC bilingual proficiency be promoted.[13]

The results from the lieutenant-colonels in the 2004 study were concerning but, at the same time, difficult to interpret. The results were potentially concerning in that they might reflect a genuine discontent among Army lieutenant-colonels. Furthermore, if such discontent were present, it could impact on both the Army as an organization and the individual soldiers and junior officers who serve under lieutenant-colonels. Lieutenant-colonels represent the future senior management of the organization. Therefore, losing experienced officers of this rank would have a detrimental impact on the Army's intellectual capital and future management capability. Lieutenant-colonel is the rank held by most commanding officers in the Army, so officers at this rank have considerable influence on all Army ranks from private to major. Having discontented lieutenant-colonels in the Army could therefore have a potentially damaging effect on the morale and performance of more junior members.

The results from this study were also ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Because the sample was so small, consisting of only 15 lieutenant-colonels, it is not certain whether the results represented the feelings of all lieutenant-colonels in the Army or reflected unique attitudes held only by those who had completed the survey. The survey had been administered at all Army garrisons to "samples of convenience"; that is, individual Army members who were available and willing to complete the questionnaire when research staff arrived to administer it. It is possible that most lieutenant-colonels were too busy to complete the survey or were away on temporary duty. Perhaps most lieutenant-colonels were generally satisfied with Army life or saw no utility in completing yet another survey. Thus, it seemed possible that the 15 lieutenant-colonel respondents constituted a disaffected and unrepresentative sample of Army lieutenant-colonels, but one could not be certain on this point.

As a result of the 2004 Army Culture and Climate Survey, the report written by Colonel Capstick and colleagues recommended that the Army leadership make a special effort to engage with lieutenant-colonels in order to improve their level of career satisfaction and inclinations to remain in the Army.[14] They suggested a number of initiatives such as Chief of Land Staff town halls with lieutenant-colonels, having a larger number of commanding officers attend annual strategic planning sessions and holding annual meetings with key lieutenant-colonel staff officers. It is not known to what extent any of these initiatives have been undertaken.

The 2006 Lieutenant-Colonel Study

Given the potentially serious implications of the results of the 2004 study, a subsequent study—aimed solely at Army lieutenant-colonels—was undertaken. This study employed a wider array of data-gathering measures, as the 2004 results were based on questionnaire responses only, and researchers sought responses from a wider sample of lieutenant-colonels. In all, 49 lieutenant-colonels participated in the 2006 study.[15]

In September 2005, all 209 Canadian-based Land Force lieutenant-colonels in the four combat arms occupations (armour, infantry, artillery, combat engineer) and the logistics occupation were sent an initial contact letter in their first official language outlining the goals of the study and requesting their participation. These occupations form the nucleus of Army culture at the lieutenant-colonel rank level and thus were viewed as the most appropriate sample for studying lieutenant-colonel satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the Army. From the initial contact, 30 lieutenant-colonels participated in the focus group phase of the study. An additional 19, who were unavailable for the focus groups, participated by email—a total of 49 respondents. Most of the participants were male (97%), spoke English as their first language (83%), were in their 40s (97%) and were married (94%). All of the participants (100%) had children. The sample was comprised of lieutenant-colonels in all command phases of their rank; 65% either had commanded or were currently commanding, while the remainder were either waiting to command or were in positions that would not lead to a command.

The first phase of the research was a series of focus groups conducted in Gagetown, Valcartier, Montreal, Kingston, Petawawa, Edmonton, and at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Six focus groups were conducted in English, two in French and one in both languages. The focus group discussions sought the lieutenant-colonels' impressions in four general areas:

- aspects of their job they found satisfying;
- aspects of their job they found dissatisfying;
- the degree to which they understood the Army vision and its implementation; and
- aspects that could be changed to make their careers more satisfying.

Those who did not participate in the focus groups sent their responses to the researchers by email.

The study participants also completed three questionnaires in their first official language. The first was a demographic questionnaire seeking personal information such as age, occupation and experience, i.e. whether they had ever commanded at the lieutenant-colonel rank, were currently commanding or were post-command. The second was the Job Satisfaction Survey, a 36-item questionnaire designed to measure nine dimensions of job satisfaction:

- satisfaction with pay;
- promotion opportunities;
- immediate supervisor;
- fringe benefits (both monetary and non-monetary);
- contingent rewards (appreciation, recognition and rewards for work well done);
- operating policies and procedures;

- coworkers; and
- the nature of the work and communication within the organization.[16]

The third questionnaire was the Work Engagement Scale, a measure of psychological engagement with one's work.[17]

Survey Results: Job Satisfaction and Work Engagement

The results obtained from the lieutenant-colonels on the Job Satisfaction Survey were compared to normative results obtained from 28,876 (mostly American) public service workers in the medical, mental health, police and military occupations. The findings are illustrated in Table 1 and show that the lieutenant-colonels had higher satisfaction scores than the normative group on three dimensions: satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with coworkers and satisfaction with communication within the organization. The lieutenant-colonels were less satisfied than the normative group with respect to satisfaction with operating policies and procedures. Questions that assessed this dimension were:

> *Many of our rules and procedures make doing a good job difficult, My efforts to do a good job are seldom blocked by red tape (this item is reverse scored), I have too much to do at work and I have too much paperwork.*

Dimension	Average	Normative Average
Satisfaction with Pay	16.2	12.1*
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunities	13.2	12.0
Satisfaction with Immediate Supervisor	18.8	18.7
Satisfaction with Monetary and Non-Monetary Fringe Benefits	15.5	14.3
Satisfaction with Contingent Rewards (Appreciation,Recognition, Rewards for Good Work)	14.4	13.7
Satisfaction with Operating Policies and Procedures	9.9	13.6*
Satisfaction with Coworkers	19.1	17.9*
Satisfaction with Nature of the Work	19.3	18.9
Satisfaction with Communication within the Organization	16.2	14.1*
Overall Job Satisfaction Scale Score	145.5	135.8

Note: Scores in the average column are the average scores of the 49 lieutenant-colonels who completed the JSS. Scores in the normative average column are the average scores of 28,876 (mostly American) public service workers who have completed the JSS. The possible range of subscale scores is 4-24, and the possible range for overall scale scores is 36-216. * Means are significantly different, p < .05

Average Scores of the Research Sample on Dimensions of the Job Satisfaction Survey Compared with Normative Scores

Responses to the Work Engagement Scale indicated that the lieutenant-colonels were highly engaged in their work. Their scores on this scale were higher than those reported in a study of US military personnel, in which 93% of the respondents were enlisted personnel.[18] One would expect lieutenant-colonels to be more engaged than enlisted personnel, but it should be noted that people who are highly engaged and feel that they do not have the tools to do the job are at greater risk for adverse psychological problems and burnout.[19]

Qualitative Results: Satisfying Aspects of Work

Three areas of work satisfaction emerged from the focus groups and email responses. Results from the focus groups and emails did not seem to differ and are, therefore, presented together. Participants expressed satisfaction with the opportunity their rank permitted them to:

- command;
- influence the CF and Army; and
- work with soldiers in a mentoring and developing capacity.

By far, the satisfier that was mentioned the most frequently involved the challenge, opportunity and privilege to command. Some participants described the opportunity to command as the achievement of a long sought career goal, as the pinnacle of their career. In the words of one individual, "As a currently serving commanding officer, this is what I spent my whole career being trained to do and wanting to do..." Another commanding officer stated, "My position allows me to use the experience I have gained over the years." Related to the challenge of command are the responsibility, authority and autonomy to make decisions and changes, as described this way by one of the research participants:

> *I enjoy the scope of freedom to make critical decisions and the empowerment that comes with this freedom.*

Another source of satisfaction that was mentioned frequently involved the opportunity to shape and influence the CF and/or the Army:

> *What I find satisfying … [is] the ability to influence things. You can influence things and bring about positive change, that's the big difference. This sentiment included the chance to observe the influence of one's command on soldiers and their families—to make a difference and have an impact—as well as the opportunity to influence senior officers and even to shape CF and Army policy.*

One of the most frequently mentioned satisfiers was the potential to have an impact on soldiers' lives:

> *For me, I know that I help soldiers every single day. And the work that goes on in my section gets them boots and socks and weapons and stuff like that, and we're busy but we're happy busy.*

Participants also expressed satisfaction with the opportunity that their rank and position gives them to work with soldiers and more junior officers in a mentoring or teaching role:

> *I'd have to say it's being able to continue to work with soldiers … and have an opportunity to shape those soldiers and play a part in the bigger spectrum of the CF.*

Another stated:

> *I find it satisfying that I have a significant input to my subordinates' career path and can act as mentor to provide advice to my subordinates.*

Qualitative Results: Dissatisfying Aspects of Work

Most of the discussion on dissatisfying aspects of lieutenant-colonel employment revolved around promotion issues as well as the leadership that they received from their senior officers or upper management. The promotion dissatisfiers included second language requirements, academic requirements, command requirements, access to fast-track positions (described as "A-jobs"), demands on the family, the lack of deployment opportunities (for some) and the Army's high level of operational tempo.

As was the case with the 2004 Army Culture and Climate Survey results, bilingualism was a source of dissatisfaction with participants in the 2006 study. Many of the lieutenant-

colonels expressed an understanding of the importance of bilingualism, offering points like:

> *Canada is a bilingual country … Leaders should be able to speak to soldiers in their first official language … One should want to learn a second language for its own sake.*

On the other hand, many were frustrated by the lack of opportunities and time available for language training, and some questioned whether learning the second language should overshadow one's ability to lead. Some questioned the validity of the testing process:

> *Testing mechanisms do not take into account the military language and lexicon.*

It was pointed out that Anglophone lieutenant-colonels who want to learn French would have difficulty getting posted to environments that will help them develop and maintain their second language abilities:

> *The number of times I tried to get to Quebec and [they] said, 'you can't go there, you're an Anglo,' you know. It was never said on paper, but …*

Many thought it is easier for a Francophone to learn English because there are many more advantageous posting opportunities for them and more opportunities to use the new language. Francophone participants agreed that it is harder for Anglophones to become bilingual, but they still felt that bilingualism is important:

> *I can understand their [Anglophones'] point of view, but I have to be bilingual, so why wouldn't they have to be?*

Another source of frustration was the academic requirements for promotion. Some participants felt that the academic requirements were little more than a tick-in-the-box mechanism, possessing little, if any, relevance to their jobs.

Access to educational opportunities was another source of discontent:

> *Who gets full-time study and who doesn't?*

Some expressed frustration that those on the fast track for promotion are rewarded with academic training opportunities, while others are not. Instead of being used as developmental programs available to all who qualify, academic opportunities were viewed as rewards for only a select few; this was perceived as an inequitable practise. Access to command was another dissatisfier. Most lieutenant-colonels in the combat arms occupations desire command and view the opportunity to command as what they have trained for throughout their careers. Unfortunately, there are few command opportunities in the combat arms and how these positions are assigned can be a source of frustration. The perception that some commands are more prestigious and more likely to lead to better postings than others is also a source of frustration:

> *Career progression is still tied…to a few limited positions of command. If you're not in it, you're out.*

Participants told the researchers that the path to positions of command, whether at the lieutenant-colonel rank or higher, was through a limited number of highly valued positions called A-jobs. They described A-jobs as demanding:

> *This type of position involves a minimum of 10 to 12 working hours per day. A-jobs could be staff or command positions, although the command positions are more valued.*

A-jobs appear to be required for promotion, but they are scarce and require a large commitment from those who are chosen for one:

> *If there are any [prospects for future promotion], then I know in my mind I have to go to an A-job, and I have to work my guts out for the possibility of another one. That's frustrating.*

Pressure on the family was another issue. Many felt that the requirements for promotion—the long hours at work—can be very stressful and demand many sacrifices

from the family. "…Your family just goes in a closet for a couple of years and you deal with it. They pick up the scraps whenever you have time to do stuff. …[But] it's costly at the end." Some participants seemed resigned to the demands of seeking advancement, while recognizing the family costs:

> *The rewards I get at the professional level and all the positive aspects that came out of this lifestyle do not compensate for the problems my children now have to face, my spouse's frustration and the sacrifices we made overall.*

Others reported that they have stopped seeking promotion, such as the participant who stated:

> *I don't ask for jobs that won't allow me to take care of my child. I take jobs that will allow me to do both. … [They] are definitely not jobs that will lead me to higher levels.*

A few participants expressed dissatisfaction that they had not had opportunities to deploy, but most participants who talked about operational tempo expressed discontent with the high level of tempo and with its negative effects, and of postings in general, on their family lives:

> *I have seen horrendous numbers of folks needing to talk about domestic disputes, the suicide ideations, it just goes on and on.*

One participant summed it up like this:

> *The organization tells us [to] take care of [our] family. But in reality, the system does not allow much room to do so.*

Participants were also asked to comment on the leadership that they received from their senior officers or upper management. The responses included concerns about professional autonomy, the leadership style of senior management, the ability to question policy, Army transformation, the lack of resources and post-command employment.

Autonomy was a problem raised by many. Although many participants reported that they worked long hours (e.g., 10–12 hours per day), and often worked during evenings and on weekends, many of the frustrations they expressed had more to do with facing too many demands in too little time, and with having to spend too much time on low-priority issues, than the sheer volume of work. In short, many participants felt that they lacked control over their work (e.g., projects could be pulled at any time) and associated this with the risk-averse culture of the Army/CF:

> *The problem is … with the scope of change, the scope of the number of operations we're stuck into, everything is priority one …*

Several participants perceived a culture of micromanagement in the Army and the CF and, along with this, a perceived lack of power or agency:

> *Am I feeling pretty micro-managed? Oh, yeah … everything from personnel policies, to operational decisions, to my own calendar.*

Another stated:

> *They tell us that we are going to be empowered, but we are not.*

One of the findings from the 2004 Army Culture and Climate Survey was that lieutenant-colonels perceived more transactional than transformational leadership from their seniors. As we noted earlier, transformational leaders inspire followers by providing a vision and developing an organizational culture that stimulates high performance; they motivate, stimulate and develop their followers. They also encourage followers to challenge the status quo and to question authority. Transactional leaders, on the other hand, operate on a quid pro quo relationship with subordinates, offering rewards in return for loyalty and hard work.

Participants in the 2006 study reported a wide variety of leadership styles among senior officers, with both transformational and transactional leadership in evidence, but most

lieutenant-colonels in the 2006 study reported experiencing more transactional leadership than transformational leadership. One participant stated, "I can see elements of transformational leadership right at the top, but there is a preponderance of transactional leadership." Another participant felt that, "Transactional leadership is the default of an organization like the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. There are many generals out there [who] are transformational leaders. But it isn't institutionalized, and it takes only one transactional leader to screw the whole thing up." Another stated about leadership, "But quite often it's transformational first, and then quickly changes to transactional if they don't get that immediate buy-in." One participant felt that the culture of the Army does not encourage transformational leadership:

> *Our system has always rewarded transactional leaders and continues to do so. If we don't put real effort into changing the system, nothing will change.*

Because it arose as an issue in the 2004 Army Culture and Climate Survey, participants were asked whether or not they felt free to question the decisions of superiors. Although several participants reported feeling free to question superiors without reservation and a few reported feeling absolutely unable to do so, most participants gave a mixed response, or qualified their response in some way. Several participants felt that any questioning of superiors had to be done tactfully, as illustrated with this quote:

> *Yes, I feel free to question superiors, if I believe there is an issue. But questioning must always be done with the right tone and I prefer to use the term 'discussion' as, at the end of the day, orders are orders and the mission is paramount.*

Some participants only felt comfortable questioning superiors if they were not also concerned about promotion:

> *Yes, I do [feel free to question my superiors' decisions]. I try to do it in a smart way … I feel I can ask him anything I want. If I was still trying to make it to the next level, I would probably do what I used to do, which is to shut up and do as I am told.*

One participant perhaps summed it best when he said that some superiors are open to questioning whereas others are not:

> *So maybe it's a matter of personality in the current environment, but even in my last job I felt limited. It's like you're challenging their authority.*

Some participants expressed frustration with various organizational structures, systems and processes, or felt that there was too much organizational change, or that it was happening too quickly. It should be noted that during this period, both the Army and the CF were going through a massive program of "transformation," aimed at changing organizational structures, procedures and doctrine to enable Canada's military to better meet the demands of modern security threats.[20] Some participants felt that they understood the vision associated with Army/CF transformation, but were uncertain as to how Army transformation fit with CF transformation. Others expressed concern about implementing transformation as with this quote:

> *We are in that very chaotic phase as an institution, and I'm talking about the CF as a whole, not just the Army, and I'm trying to figure out how we're going to transform, without derailing our effectiveness. And it's not easy.*

Some felt that the vision lacks depth or substance, or that it will not stand the test of time, or that it represents nothing new:

> *I thought I [understood the vision] at one time and it was being well articulated, so I thought. But then I hung around a bit longer and had an opportunity to watch, and you start to realize that some of that vision is really only one PowerPoint slide deep, and there's no real depth or substance to it.*

Another said:

We've been in a state of flux and change ever since where there's been a new vision. … The goal posts keep moving every 2 years. … There's been a new Army way ahead, a new Army vision every time the Army commander changes." Several participants felt that while the vision may be sound in principle, it fails to consider the lack of resources that are needed for its implementation: "I understand the vision, but … a lot of us feel constrained by the number of people that are available to help make it come true.

Lack of resources, including people, was another major dissatisfier. Related to this was the impact that the current rate of operational tempo was having on organizational resources:

…We've got multiple organizations vying for the same asset, and that's usually our soldiers.

Along this vein another stated:

Well, the big stress on it is resource shortfalls. … We've shaved the ice cube right down so there [are]… no reserves, no redundancy. So when you have a shock to the system like having to deploy a large number of troops overseas, it leaves huge holes all over the place.

This is an important issue because, as we noted earlier, individuals who are highly engaged in their work, but who lack the resources to do that work, are at greater risk for emotional and psychological burnout.

Some of the participants currently serving as commanding officers expressed concerns about post-command employment, about the possibility that their next appointments, which would most likely be staff positions, would offer less challenge, status or power, than their present command positions. One said:

Post-command … certainly causes me some concern … that the position won't be as rewarding.

Another stated:

The scariest question you could probably ask any of us is, well, what are you going to do next?

How to Raise Levels of Satisfaction

When asked what the CF or the Army could do to improve their overall job satisfaction, participants recommended that senior leaders:

- provide units with the resources—particularly the people—needed to do the tasks they are being asked to perform;
- improve the career management and promotion systems, particularly with respect to bilingualism and academic requirements, to make these systems more transparent and fair;
- reduce bureaucracy by devolving some responsibilities and empowering commanding officers;
- modify the culture to reduce the current tendency of risk aversion;
- improve lines of communication between lieutenant-colonels and senior officers; and
- improve quality of life.

Conclusion

Although the results of the 2004 and 2006 studies appear complex and somewhat contradictory, there is also a thread of consistency. The 2004 results showed that a small group of 15 lieutenant-colonels had expressed elevated levels of dissatisfaction with their employment. The 2006 results confirmed that the dissatisfaction expressed by the small 2004 sample was not an anomaly. Moreover, the focus group discussions and email submissions from the 2006 participants yielded a list of career dissatisfiers that included policies and practices related to opportunities for promotion and command as well as issues relating to work (workload demands, lack of autonomy and resource shortfalls), leadership, operational tempo and family pressures.

On the other hand, results from the Job Satisfaction Survey showed that the lieutenant-colonels of the 2006 survey were more satisfied with most aspects of their career than a large group of American public service employees who had completed the same questionnaire. In fact, the lieutenant-colonels sampled in this study are highly engaged in their work and experience a number of key job satisfiers, including the opportunity to command, the ability to influence the CF/Army and the opportunity to develop soldiers. This finding is perhaps not surprising, as reaching the rank of lieutenant-colonel is a significant achievement for an Army officer. It is particularly satisfying for those who are fortunate enough to become commanding officers, but there is also a certain degree of prestige and fulfillment for those lieutenant-colonels who do not become commanding officers. Either way, most lieutenant-colonels appear to be satisfied with their success.

It is not uncommon for people to hold contradictory views on particular aspects of their lives. While the lieutenant-colonels reported satisfaction with many dimensions of the Job Satisfaction Survey, one exception (as shown in Table 1) was operating policies and procedures, where the lieutenant-colonels were less satisfied than others who had completed the survey. This result is consistent, however, with the focus group and email findings, as many of the dissatisfiers emerging from participants were aspects related to operating policies and procedures. One would expect dissatisfaction with policies and procedures to have a strong impact on the career satisfaction of lieutenant-colonels, because they are the commanding officers and staff officers who are charged with getting the work of the Army done. They are men and women of action from whom much is expected, so any organizational obstacles to their effective functioning would understandably elicit a strong sentiment from them.

In summary, the findings from this study indicate that Army lieutenant-colonels are highly engaged in their work and that they experience a number of key job satisfiers, including the opportunity to command, the ability to influence the CF/Army and the opportunity to develop soldiers. However, the study also revealed a number of job dissatisfiers among Army lieutenant-colonels, including those related to promotion criteria and opportunities, leadership and other organizational issues as well as concerns about post-command employment, workload, operational tempo and quality of life. The information obtained from this study may be used to inform the future development of personnel plans, programs and policies that could improve the psychological well being, operational readiness and retention of Army lieutenant-colonels. Moreover, the recommendations that emerged from this study may provide a voice for a group of officers who, in some respects, feel that they have lost theirs.

About the Authors...

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THE KANDAHAR LIGHT LOGISTICS PLATOON

Major C.R. Jansen

Kandahar Province, in Afghanistan, is as diverse as it is beautiful. Its complex terrain ranges from rough mountains to lush vegetation to harsh desert. During my 10 month tour as the G4 for Task Force Kandahar I was amazed daily, not only by how the local population have adapted to this diverse terrain, but how it continued to challenge our ability to operate and support mechanized forces. Afghanistan is truly the ultimate test of our skills and abilities to adapt and overcome the unknown. Tasked with the responsibility for the conduct of logistics in the Province of Kandahar I was each day presented with unique situations requiring unique solutions. The creation of the Kandahar Light Logistics Platoon was undoubtedly the most creative and controversial solution throughout our tour. It certainly generated the most snickers.

Author's Collection

Farmlands of Panjiway District

Panjiway Overview

The Panjiway District of Kandahar Province with a population of 82,800 is the second largest district in the province. It is considered the birthplace of the Taliban and as such has the highest concentration of insurgents. In 2001, Operation Medusa changed the control of this district from the Taliban to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The flavour of combat also shifted from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.

Panjiway is almost entirely a farming community providing the province's principal supply of tobacco and grapes. As wood is in extremely limited supply, the farmers constructed an intricate network of mud walls to grow their crops. From the sky it looks like a maze stretching throughout the district. From a soldier's perspective the district is a continuous obstacle that hampers all forms of ground movement. From the insurgent's perspective it is the perfect terrain within which to operate. Farmers' grape huts that could

be used as command and control (C2) centres, mud walls providing defensive barriers, and unlimited places to cache weapons and improvised explosive device (IED) components. The rows of trees that outline the farming zones provide the insurgents with cover from aerial surveillance. This allows small insurgent patrols to move with a degree of freedom between the various compounds.

Author's Collection

Grape hut blown by TFK Engineers

From ground level the mud walls present a unique challenge to navigate around. Each wall is approximately 4–5 feet in height with a base 3–4 feet and about 1 ½ to 2 feet of clearance providing just enough room for the farmer to use a wheel barrow to gather his crops. For both the insurgents and our forces these compounds served as immediate kill zones for which ever force was positioned first. The mud grape huts (see photo) provide height for either an observation post or a sniper position. The insurgents would use these as positions to fire their AK-47s or rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) at ISAF and ANA patrols. They would use them as logistic nodes holding large caches of munitions and home-made explosives (see photo) or at times Command and Control centres. While use of artillery high explosive or GBU-12s (500lb bomb) from coalition aircraft will cause significant damage, it is usually not until the engineers do their magic (see photo) can we truly remove one of these structures. It's truly amazing what the application of a little C4 can do when in the right hands.

Author's Collection

Mud walls and grape huts used by the farmers

The Sun—A New Threat

The summer of 2008 broke the temperature record in Kandahar Province with temperatures exceeding 50°C and added a new level of complexity to our operations. Operation RAWA TANDER (Rolling Thunder) was focused on clearing a number of key compounds of interest (COIs) heavily used by insurgents. These compounds served as C2,

logistic nodes and weapons caches for the insurgents. They had launched numerous assaults on ANSF and ISAF patrols as well as operations to intimidate village elders from these locations. Many of the IED attacks on our framework patrols and convoy operations were initiated from here. After shaping the area we were prepared to finally clear it. Given the importance of these compounds it was anticipated our forces would meet heavy resistance. The insurgents had used the farmland features to create defensive lines with fall-back positions, IEDs and weapons pre-positioned should uninvited guests arrive. Stealth would be the key in this operation. Our forces would need to establish their attack positions without tripping the insurgent early warning systems. The complexity of the farmland meant a mounted assault wouldn't be possible and due to the thickness of the mud walls used by the farmers, nothing short of a full-up armoured breach through the fields would due but this would clearly tip our hand. The 2 PPCLI Battle Group (BG) partnered with Afghan National Army (ANA) conducted the operation dismounted to maintain the element of surprise. Moving during the night, they were able to establish their positions with the intent to clear three main objectives: Westman, Parkdale and Richmond. Although most of the insurgents were rudely awakened from their sleep, ISAF forces came under heavy contact as they cleared through the first objective. Both artillery and air power were used to take out the grape hut firing positions used by the insurgents. While part way through the second objective, the extreme high temperatures combined with the exertion of combat had started to take its toll and the troops faced severe dehydration. With soldiers at the brink of collapse, and some already suffering from heat exhaustion, the BG was forced to break contact and return to the forward operating bases (FOBs). Although the operation significantly disrupted insurgent operations with a sizable weapons and IED cache destroyed, and large numbers of insurgents killed or captured, not all of the objectives were achieved.

Author's Collection

Home-made explosive cache



Author's Collection

Op RAWA TANDER

A combination of extreme heat (50–55+°C), the weight of body armour, tactical gear, and weapons (85–100 lbs) with the shear exertion of engaging insurgents in this complex terrain created a situation where our soldiers were dehydrating at a phenomenal rate. They

simply could not carry enough water to sustain them and we were unable to deliver fresh water to their location. Normally one would arrange either ground or air replenishment, but I quickly learned that nothing in Afghanistan is normal. Insurgent use of heavy machine guns ruled out the use of both aviation and air resupply, something about pilots having issues with bullet holes. We noted that Containerized Delivery System (CDS) drops in that area provided more supplies to the locals than our troops. While good for the locals it certainly had the negative effect on our troops. During previous operations, we used Leopard tanks (fitted with dozer blades) and Badgers (armoured engineering vehicles) to breach the mud walls so that replenishment could occur by ground, but this is where politics outweighs operations. With each wall we breached, the damaged grape vines would take 5–6 years to repair, meaning 5–6 years of reduced income to an already impoverished farming community. While CIMIC typically reimbursed farmers for damage following an operation, the funds were never sufficient. This resulted in a series of complaints from President Karzai to Commander ISAF and ultimately to Commander of Regional Command South and Commander Task Force Kandahar. While winning the combat operation, we were losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the local farmers. I've often wondered what operational restraints the insurgents followed. Brigadier General Denis Thompson, Commander of Task Force Kandahar challenged me to develop a different solution to this problem, which proved to be a unique and formidable task. I was surprised to discover that getting people to support the solution we developed was a bigger challenge than solving the problem.

Author's Collection

Breeching the mud walls

What Was Old is New Again

Modern 21st century solutions didn't seem to work, as I quickly discovered through my many NATO contacts and a detailed review of our capabilities. We decided to take a lesson from the locals and considered a time honoured solution—pack animals. The US Army's publication, "Special Forces Use of Pack Animals", FM 3-05.213 (FM 31-27) states:

One of the principal advantages of using animals in the era of modern combat is that mounted elements can move large quantities of material in areas not suitable for conventional transport. A pack animal detachment during movement, regardless of its combat mission once it reaches its destination, is a logistic transportation element. This fact alone severely limits the detachment's tactical capabilities. Even though the detachment may be considered a highly mobile unit, the presence of pack animals precludes the capability of maneuver. The mission of the detachment while moving is the safeguarding and delivery of the cargo to its destination, not to stand and fight. This point is not to say that all is lost tactically while moving; it just means that compensation has to be made for the lack of maneuver and concentrated fires.

Both the US Army and the Royal Logistics Corps had collected considerable research on the process of selecting a suitable pack animal for the specific type of operation you are supporting, the climate and terrain your operations will be conducted in. The US Army publication FM 3-05.213 further indicated that:

Mobility and effectiveness of the pack animal detachment depend largely on the selection and training of the pack animals. The pack animal, regardless of its color, breed, or size, should have a friendly disposition, a gentle nature, and no fear of man. It should be willing to travel under a load and be sure-footed. Large, draft-type horses usually are not agile and do not make good pack animals. The ideal pack animal should be 56 to 64 inches (14 to 16 hands) tall. (Since one hand equals about 10 centimeters [cm], the metric equivalent is 140 cm to 160 cm.) It must be tough, compact, sturdy, and well-formed.

With these criteria we examined the employment of horses, ponies, mules, donkeys, elephants, camels, lamas, and dogs. Each type had been successfully employed in support of military operations in different parts of the world. Elephants would be difficult to maintain in Afghanistan and their size would certainly remove any element of stealth. Camels, although employed throughout Afghanistan were bound to desert conditions. Like elephants, their height created problems and their soft hooves would quickly be damaged on the rough aggregate throughout most of Afghanistan. Mind you, the thought of running a camel train while disguised as Lawrence of Arabia was interesting. Lamas and dogs would simply not carry enough to make employment worthwhile and would have difficulty with the climate. Besides, their cuteness factor would just totally destroy any seriousness. Horses, although used in the past by the Mujahedeen, take considerable maintenance and will easily bolt when spooked. Mules, while able to carry heavy loads would be difficult to maintain in the climate of Afghanistan and, like horses, when spooked they tend to bolt. Surprisingly the donkey is the only pack animal that when spooked will only bolt for a few hundred meters then stop. Overall the donkey was considered the pack animal of choice for the Afghanistan theatre of operations. Both American and British Forces already employed donkeys in support of special operations, giving us a wealth of background knowledge from which to base our plan. What impressed me the most about donkeys was that:

- They could carry between 35–50% of their own body weight;
- They were accustomed to the weather conditions of Afghanistan;
- They only required to be fed and watered at the beginning and end of the day, hence you didn't have to carry supplies for the animals if conducting day patrols;
- When loaded the donkey focused on the work at hand and made little to no noise;
- In a fire fight situation, the donkey can be trained to lie down. Given the height of the mud walls and their low profile their odds of survival were very high; and
- If spooked, a donkey would bolt as all animals do, but stop after running 200–300 meters. This gives you the opportunity to reclaim the load.

While the donkey certainly was the best selection, we also noted that you had to be very careful in selecting your donkeys. You cannot mix males and females, unless you are planning lots of smoke breaks, as their minds are definitely not on carrying the load. Donkeys can be vicious; they will bite and kick if not handled properly. It is important to ensure the donkeys selected were not abused or mistreated.

Metrics

- On average each soldier carries a 4 L Camelback, and a 2 L Canteen. This equals 6 L weighing 13.2 Lbs (based on 2.2lb/L).
- A case of water consists of twelve 0.5L plastic bottles for a total of 6 L. This weighs 13.2 lbs.
- A healthy donkey weighs between 352–450 lbs. The books say max weight that can be carried is 35% (123–158 lbs), or 9–12 cases of water / donkey. Actual donkey handlers stated max weight can be up to 50% (176–225 lbs), or 13–17 cases of water / donkey.
- For a company of 120 Soldiers requiring a resupply of 6 L (1 case).

	352 lb donkey	450 lb donkey
At 35%	Need 13 donkeys	Need 10 donkeys
At 50%	Need 9 donkeys	Need 7 donkeys

Feeding

- 1 kg of donkey cubes in the morning, 1 kg of cubes in the evening when working.
- 5 kg of roughage per day (fed at any point in the day).
- During the summer 20L of water in the morning, 20L in the evening.
- Donkeys only have to carry own food if conducting a multi-day patrol and food/ water cannot be pre-positioned. Otherwise no requirement to carry food or water for the donkeys.

Employment



Pack animal packet formations

Reviewing both the *US Army Special Forces Use of Pack Animals publication* (FM 31-27) and the *Royal Logistic Corps Training Transport and Movements using Animal Transport publication* (70441a) provided most of the key details we required on how to best configure and employ a pack animal packet. The key would be having at least 3 good string pullers trained to manage a string of three donkeys each and a section for Force Protection (FP). Any larger and it would be difficult to manage, especially when crossing obstacles such as rivers. Load & Lift planning confirmed we only needed a packet of 7–9 animals to support the needs of a company depending on what was being carried. Conceptually this would operate the same as a combat logistics patrol, except it would be dismounted. The pack animals take the place of the prime movers and the force protection team take the place of the gun trucks. Although this is dismounted, the operation is conceptually the same. For our purposes we named this a "Light Logistics Patrol" (LLP); mind you, the

expression "*Jack Ass Patrol*" did come up on more than one occasion. Working with LCol Drew, DCO OMLT ROTO 5, we agreed that this would be a perfect task for the ANA. Most Afghans have grown up around donkeys and instinctively knew how to handle them. We also were aware that the ANA were having difficulty in adapting to modern warfare. Through mentorship the ANA developed very competent Infantry Kandaks but were struggling with the concept of CSS. We felt this program, if adopted, would help them revitalize their CSS ability, by providing them something useful they were already familiar with. With a pack animal capability that could be of benefit to both ANA and ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan, we would be giving the ANA CSS something that they could easily convert into a success story and build upon. It was also pointed out that should this not work, it could address the ANA feeding issue.



Light Logistic Project Phases

We developed a three-phased approach to establishing this capability. Phase 1 would be the proof of concept. We felt that if the Commander of 205 Corps would buy into the concept we would start with a small section to train as the string pullers combined with BG personnel as force protection. The handlers would be contracted local nationals (LNs) initially, and then later in Phase 2 this would become a pure ANA task. Phase 2 would also include training ANA logistic personnel to plan and execute the LLP in support of either an ISAF or ANA operation. In phase 3, this would transition to a platoon from their combat service support (CSS) Kandak. In this phase funding for the program would also shift from ISAF funding to Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) funding. CSTC-A is the organization in Kabul that provides funding and mentorship for the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD). At this stage the Light Logistics Platoon would be a pure ANA capability that through the MoD could be sustained indefinitely. It could easily grow into a company structure and be employed throughout Afghanistan.

LCol Drew along with Col Sutherland, the Corps Mentor, briefed my package to the 205 Corps Commander who liked the concept and felt it could become a full ANA capability if the proof of concept was successful. We had also determined that key to success would be getting the BG seats on the US Army Special Forces Use of Pack Animals course. This course is conducted in California on a routine basis. It was determined that 4–5 soldiers properly trained on the employment of pack animals in combat operations, they could conduct train-the-trainer programs with the ANA in Afghanistan. This would allow them to fully take over the concept without requiring ISAF oversight. The goal was to develop an ANA capability that could support both ISAF and ANSF operations throughout Afghanistan. Without this critical enabler of having troops initially trained through the US program, achieving this goal would be

difficult at best. During this period we conducted a number of press releases and CNN interviews which started a flurry of donkey traffic in my in-box including a lawsuit from "Donkeys are People Too" out of Florida who felt the Army shouldn't put animals in harm's way. I countered by pointing out we were planning an excellent benefits package for the donkeys. I was surprised at how many companies contacted me with offers to provide donkeys to support our troops.

With the structure laid out, we focused on the concept of employment, using the same strategies that were used to support mechanized forces during the Cold War era. This we felt was the simplest strategy to implement in a dismounted format. Under the old concept, the soldiers engaged in combat were called an "F" or Fighting Echelon. Each soldier would carry one day of rations. They were resupplied by an Administration Echelon broken into two components. The "A1" echelon would transit from the safety of a harbour to a pre-designated location. Here they would conduct a hasty delivery point (DP) with the soldiers of the F Echelon delivering rations, fuel, and ammo. The second half of the A Echelon called the "A2" would transit between the harbour and the commodity point or DP operated by the main supporting unit, typically a service battalion. They would carry an additional two days of supplies. This process ensured that the soldiers had a continuous supply of rations, fuel or ammo and that the system moved as the battle moved. Based on this strategy we developed a concept using donkeys to basically do the same task as the A1 elements. A Zulu harbour representing the A2 Echelon would be established within 20 Km (this is the max range of the donkeys when fully loaded and would provide sufficient standoff) of the planned operation (the location of the F Echelon). The harbour is selected, cleared and secured with the FP platoon. This FP platoon serves two purposes: first, it provides the security of the harbour location; but, additionally, it detaches an FP section to protect the Light Logistics Platoon as it conducts the A1 resupply. The advantage of this strategy is that should the Light Logistics Platoon be required to conduct a number of sustainment or light logistic patrols, the FP section task could be rotated with the remaining sections of the platoon. This would ensure fresh troops during each LLP.



LLP Employment Concept

Using the harbour as an impromptu A2 Echelon DP, supplies are delivered either by road or by slung by aviation. The ground delivery supplies could be transported either by the Battle Group Echelon using the Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle System (AHSVS) transport vehicles assigned to the Echelon, or if required by a dedicated combat logistics

patrol from KAF. The ANA CSS Kandak also could deliver supplies to this location using their International Transport Trucks. The donkeys are delivered to the harbour via a specialized transport vehicle. Once in the harbour they are loaded and marshalled into packet configuration and teamed with a section from the FP platoon. The LLP would deploy up to 20 kms to resupply the Fighting Echelon at a designated location. They would return to the harbour to rest up, take water, or load up for another deliver if required. Depending on the operation being supported, this could be a single one patrol operation or a series of patrols. Should the soldiers engaged in the operation not return to base, but rather remain overnight in a cleared compound, a patrol could be initiated that transports additional rations and ammunition to the compound before returning to camp. In situations such as this, the harbour would be relocated to support the operation and to ensure security of the harbour.

With the last of the critical details worked out and presented to BGen Thompson in a decision brief, we were given the authority and funding to initiate the proof of concept.

The Real Challenge—Standing Up the Light Logistics Platoon

Author's Collection

Pack animal humour or new close combat vehicle?

The summer had passed and rotations changed all of the key players and key supporters. Comd 205 Corps was promoted and moved to Kabul, 3 RCR relieved 2 PPCLI and neither the new BG nor the OMLT believed the idea had merit which simply generated more snickers during the weekly "DonkRep" briefs on the project. For an army based on mechanized solutions, implementing a pack animal based idea goes completely against the grain. This hesitation to support the idea also made it easier for some of the headquarters staff not initially sold on the idea to let things slip to the right. There is an age-old theory—if you don't like something, push it to the right for the next ROTO to deal with. It also meant I bore the brunt of a lot of pack animal humour aka "Jackassing around" (see photo) as most felt this was simply too funny a task to complete.

My first road bump was the new OMLT. The CO OMLT ROTO 6, LCol Shipley, felt that this was an inappropriate task for the CSS Kandak. He was focused on developing transport platoons and not pack animal platoons. At the time most CSS in the ANA were misemployed, the CSS Kandak was conducting vital point infantry tasks in Kandahar City instead of conducting sustainment of ANA operations. CO OMLT felt our concept would detract from the CSS Kandak. Following lengthy negotiations, he agreed to support the idea with the new Commander 205 Corps as long as the four ANA "String Pullers" we needed for the proof of concept could come from any of the Kandaks.

My second road bump was CEFCOM. Although we had briefed CEFCOM J4 staff early in the process and highlighted the importance of getting seats for the BG on the US Pack Animal course before they deployed, CEFCOM also thought the idea was too humorous to support. Once they advised us that we needed a fully staffed CONOP before they would support the concept, we started working closely with our G5, Major Frazer Auld, to staff a formal CONCOP for OP KHARBA (donkey owner). This laid out all of the responsibilities and tasks for each of the prominent players in Task Force Kandahar. Unfortunately, by the time this was completed, CEFCOM missed getting 3 RCR the seats on the US Pack Animal Course before they deployed. This was extremely unfortunate as we had identified this training as critical to the success of the proof of concept. With the hopes that it might still shake out, we pushed ahead.

My third road bump was getting a base of operations. It took considerable time for the BG, which were the principal land owners in Zhari/Panjiway and the Task Force Engineers to agree on a location suitable for our needs. We finally agreed on a base of operations, Patrol Base Sperwan Ghar in Southern Panjiway. This location provided defendable ground and was relatively central to our scope of operations. The patrol base, manned by the BG, was on the southern portion of the Ghar (mountain) with a guard tower on the peak. The ground on the north face was abandoned, but would suit our requirements. The Task Force Engineers hired a contractor to clear the ground of mines and unexploded ordnance, and then erected a chain link fence around the site. This took a considerable period of time to complete. The villagers of Sperwan were quite fascinated with what we were planning in this location and had expressed interest in our concept. Each day the local children would gather to watch the construction, taking great interest in the idea of donkeys coming to their area. The villagers felt they could create a series of cottage industries based on donkey by-products: hair, manure, etc. Local children could be paid to exercise the donkeys in the secured training ground. The villagers were disgruntled; they had hoped that once ISAF established the Patrol Base, some of the new wealth coming into Afghanistan would ultimately help them. This had not happened and they were now looking for any opportunities that could help their village. They had long awaited the construction of a school for their children, I had asked on their behalf to see if a school was planned. Apparently, because the insurgents roamed freely through the village at night, the Government project responsible for school construction felt it was unsafe to build the planned school and kept the project on hold. It was frustrating—ISAF had a patrol base right by the village, yet it was still seen as too dangerous for a development project. I had hoped that if we could get our Light Logistics Platoon up and we could establish a relationship with the villagers and this would change the Government's view on constructing the school. While this was seen as a win-win situation to help secure a solid relationship with the local farmers, we were unable to secure the support needed to conduct a Shore with the village elder before our ROTO ended. It was hoped that the follow-on ROTO would ultimately establish this relationship. Our Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) representative was able to identify the owner of the property, and arrangements for acquisition were completed through the Afghanistan government.

Author's Collection

Patrol Base Sperwan Ghar

Author's Collection

The Light Logistics Platoon stable and shed

My fourth road bump happened while I was on my second HLTA. Major Auld, our G5, was reviewing the notes on the project and conducting more research. He was alarmed at the fact that his research showed the donkeys carrying less of a load than anticipated and that they required regular feeding throughout the day. He was concerned that the donkeys would have to transport feed and water for themselves at the same time they were supporting our troops. This would mean they would need far more donkeys than planned to make this effective. The Task Force Kandahar Deputy Commander, Colonel Cade, reviewed the information and sided with Major Auld. This placed a temporary halt on the project until I returned from my leave. At the time the Task Force Engineers were still clearing the ground, this meant they stopped the clearing and we were losing valuable time. A second decision brief to BGen Thompson was conducted where all of the facts and the timeline were presented. The arguments as to why the concept should be halted were presented. I then provided a set of counter-arguments supported by my research and discussions with local handlers. The Commander finally decided to support the plan I presented; he made the point that although there were uncertainties as to the degree of success we could achieve, no one had yet offered a different solution that could work. We had to find a way to keep soldiers alive under these circumstances while not losing the hearts and minds of the locals in the process. Radical and as humorous as it may seem, the Light Logistics Platoon was the only concept that meets this requirement.

With the support of the Commander, and a sense of renewed support from the staff, we pushed forward. Unfortunately, we had lost a lot of time. I had less than three months left in my tour and we needed to accelerate aspects of the project if we were going to see something in place before we returned to Canada. The Task Force Engineers had resumed clearing the site and we needed to have a single organization that could pick up the remaining pieces. My G4 Ops, Captain Terry Byrd and I had worked closely throughout our tour with a number of contractors like Compass Security. Compass provided the security force for Supreme Services who were responsible for fuel delivery throughout Afghanistan as the principle ISAF contractor. They indicated that they knew a trusted team that could meet our needs, and were willing to not only vouch for but officially represent the team. At the same time we sourced a number of other contractors, but determined that only one could provide the full package we needed to meet our deadline. After confirming with the Comptroller that this complied with the guidelines for sole-sourcing we arranged a sole-source contract with the trusted civilian agency represented by Compass Security. This contract provided a workforce to build the facilities on the site which included renovating two abandoned buildings, one to be the stable and the other as the storage for feed and husbandry equipment. They also constructed additional fencing to separate the compound into a living/feeding area and an exercise area.

Author's Collection

Ex-Gurkas for local security

Once the fencing was completed the contracted team went into high gear, starting with renovating the buildings and spreading aggregate to level the site. 22 ex-Ghurkhas were brought on as a security force to protect the site as work commenced. Arrangements were made with the BG to allow the contractor housing at Patrol Base Sperwan Ghar. This ensured we had personnel on the ground to work continuously. The carpenters built the stables and continued improvements on the facilities. A well for fresh water was drilled on the site. The contract included provision of the food, tools, harnesses, and anything else needed to take care of a team of donkeys. 15 medically-certified donkeys were purchased and delivered to the site. Under the provisions of the contract each animal would receive annual inspections by a licensed Afghan veterinarian. A 72-hour replacement program for any injured/sick donkeys was negotiated to ensure we had a steady state of 10 donkeys at any point in time. It was assumed that animals would be injured from insurgent activity and we needed to ensure we had a plan to maintain

the capability. The company had to be careful where the donkeys were purchased, many of the local markets sold donkeys but we later learned that they were managed closely by the insurgents. Apparently the donkeys were pre-programmed by the insurgents to deliver contraband across the mountains into Pakistan, and then return at a later date with weapons, cash, etc. The donkeys we purchased were shipped in from outside Afghanistan. I was having nightmares at the time: imagine the IO picture of an ISAF donkey seen to be delivering supplies to the insurgents, we needed to ensure our donkeys had not be previously employed by the Taliban. Granted the ASIC was jumping at the opportunity to question each to ensure their loyalty.

To transport the donkeys to the harbour location, the company provided a vehicle customized to transport the donkeys. They provided three local handlers to take care of the donkeys including daily grooming, feeding, exercising, etc. They also provided a trainer to help educate BG personnel on how to properly load and control the animals, and an interpreter/project manager to ensure the project continued under the agreed to guidelines of the contract.

Although time was extremely tight, we were able to open the facility affectionately called the "*SPERWAN GHAR MEWS*" (taken from old English) as the home of the Kandahar Light Logistics Platoon, two weeks prior to our departure from theatre. This earned me the nickname, "Assmaster of Afghanistan" as quoted by BGen Thompson while presenting me with the official patch. Unfortunately CNN got a hold of that line and I have yet to live it down. The Commander was impressed at how much we were able to accomplish in such a short time. I think the expression stubborn as an ass came up a few times. I responded, "Sir, you made a request, my staff and I simply kicked ass and got it done."

We had completed the first phase of the concept plan, but the second phase is up to ROTO 7. While we had created an echelon support concept, they will have to train both BG and Afghan National Army soldiers on the use of pack animals in support of combat operations, and conduct a series of LLP to practice the echelon support drills. Although we put all the conditions for success in place, key enablers were missed, which will hamper this second phase. The BG needed personnel trained on the US Pack Animal Course to ensure they had personnel properly trained on the employment of pack animals in support of combat operations, at time of writing this had not occurred. We had briefed the follow-on ROTO on the details of the contract, but as usual with relief in place (RIPs), this was rushed and it was learned later that issues arose, which impacted the success of the second phase. These issues were all resolvable quickly with the clauses we built into the contract; however, they were, unfortunately, not addressed. If the second phase is conducted to its full potential, then we will have an effective means of resupplying soldiers operating in complex terrain while continuing to win the hearts and minds of the local farmers. It also has the potential to provide the ANSF with a new capability that could be employed to support both ISAF and ANSF operations across all of Afghanistan. As with many new concepts, it is easier to drop an idea than it is to give it a proper due. New concepts, new ideas are driven by personalities. If individuals are not committed to the success of an idea, it will not happen. This is the unfortunate reality of a staff officer and why we try to never get wedded to our plans.

Canada last used pack animals during operations in Sicily in the Second World War, and it is interesting that these lessons of old found new meaning and value in the 21st Century. Whether or not the project continues beyond our ROTO, we left with the satisfaction that as staff we succeeded in taking a commander's vision, controversial or not, definitely very humorous, and developed it into a reality against all odds. As a staff officer, sometimes that's the best we can hope for.

Author's Collection

The Sperwan Ghar Mews sign

Arte et Marte

Author's Collection

The first of our 15 donkeys

About the Author...

Major Charles R. Jansen is a reserve EME officer who has served over 31 years with reserve and regular force units, projects and headquarters. He recently served as the G4 for Task Force Kandahar Headquarters, JTFA Roto 5/6 where he was awarded the Comd CEFCOM Commendation for his unique solutions to the logistical problems encountered by both ROTO 5 and ROTO 6 Task Forces. Major Jansen currently serves as a staff officer with Land Forces Central Area Headquarters in Toronto, Ontario.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTRUSIONS INTO THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

Nancy Teeple

The possibility of an oil spill or a terrorist or a drug smuggler exploiting our back door is no longer theoretical. It is a real threat. Canada needs to be prepared.

Retired Colonel Pierre Leblanc[1]

Source: unknown

Norwegian Wild Vikings sail Berserk II through the Northwest Passage

Recently, Canadian national interest in Arctic security has re-emerged amidst the converging factors of changing geopolitical conditions and an unpredictable future. International competition for access to increasingly scarce resources has begun to manifest in the Arctic. Canadian Arctic security[2] expert Rob Huebert states that "climate change, rising resource prices, international politics and the development of new technologies are making it easier and more attractive to exploit the Arctic."[3] According to the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, climate change is causing the Arctic to warm up,[4] creating a progressive decrease in sea ice in the late summer. These conditions are opening the North to increasing international activity by actors attracted to the prospect of economic gain. As a result, Canada's capacity to ensure its national sovereignty and security in the North is becoming increasingly strained. Competition for resources, alternative shipping routes and migration increase the potential for conflict in the North. Unresolved boundary disputes between Canada and its circumpolar neighbours[5] are complicated by the growing international character of the Arctic and this may have demographic consequences for the northern population.

This environment creates ample conditions for exploitation by illicit and potentially hostile entities seeing the advantage in the vast and virtually undefended Arctic. Without a proper monitoring and enforcement infrastructure, the North could become a region for migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and second-order pollution.[6] In addition,

unregulated private enterprise could become a reality in the resource-rich region in light of Canada's status as the world's third largest producer of high quality diamonds[7] and its oil and gas potential, not to mention the market for Arctic cruise tourism and commercial shipping. Increasing international traffic in Arctic waters creates the potential for maritime accidents, accidental (or deliberate?) pollution of the marine environment and the unintentional introduction of foreign species into the delicate Northern ecosystem. Secondary security challenges, such as cultural clashes or conflicts over access to resources (i.e. drilling rights) might also emerge from an increasing international presence, compounded by potential disputes over territory and resources in the North. Such conditions may give rise to an unregulated foreign presence in the Arctic that would pose a significant security threat to Canada and its circumpolar neighbours.

This discussion surveys documented intrusions[8] into the Canadian Arctic,[9] demonstrating that the North remains vulnerable to infiltration by foreign entities. Many intrusions have involved illegal and potentially dangerous activities relating to international terrorism, trans-national criminal activity, challenges to Canadian sovereignty and foreign military operations.[10] This list comprises a catalogue of intrusions that have occurred from the Second World War until very recently. Some of the details are scant due to the limited availability and authority of sources on certain incidents of intrusion.[11] It is important to note that these details have been gathered from open source materials. The objective in producing this catalogue of significant foreign intrusions into Canada's Arctic is to highlight the reality of the threat that Canada faces in order to encourage the adaptation of national security and defence policies and the development of capabilities to meet the challenges of an otherwise remote and isolated Arctic. Following the discussion of intrusions is a brief analysis identifying issues for consideration regarding the improvement of Arctic security and defence.

Catalogue of Intrusions

The strategic potential of the Arctic has been recognized since the Second World War when, in 1942, after launching a diversionary attack on the Aleutian Islands just south of the Alaskan Coast, the Japanese occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska.[12] The May 1943 American effort to repel this foreign occupation resulted in significant Canadian, U.S. and Japanese casualties, but was followed by the retreat of the Japanese submarine fleet from Kiska.[13] The U.S. response, with its high number of casualties, demonstrates the strategic significance of the Arctic region as an access route to the North American continent and highlights the requirement to protect it. On October 23 1943, the German Navy and Ministry of Transport's Office of Meteorology established a WFL-26 weather station on the northern coast of Labrador via a U-537 submarine.[14] Similarly, Canada had also established an air base at Goose Bay in 1941 although Labrador did not officially become part of Canada until Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949.[15] The German weather station remained undetected until the late 1970s,[16] dramatically underscoring the history of neglect in respect of the strategic potential of the High North. The region's environmental fragility was also revealed in a failed Soviet attempt to launch a COSMOS 954 satellite into a stable orbit. On January 24, 1978, this nuclear powered surveillance satellite crashed into the Great Slave Lake region of the Northwest Territories as well as into northern Alberta and Saskatchewan, requiring significant effort on the part of the Canadian government to clean up the nuclear contamination.[17] Accidental nuclear contamination from foreign objects remains a threat to the Arctic region.

During the Cold War the Arctic was one of the main theatres of operations because the polar route posed a direct avenue of "attack against North American cities by Soviet bombers and nuclear missile forces."[18] As late as the 1980s, Soviet long-range bombers were observed near Alaska conducting exercises close to U.S. airspace.[19] The end of the Cold War, however, did not signal the end of the Arctic's value as a point of infiltration into North America, and Canada in particular.

1969/70: The Manhattan Event[20]

In 1969, after an announcement of the discovery of oil in 1968 in the Alaskan North Slope region, the U.S. sent its oil tanker *SS Manhattan* to sail through the Northwest Passage on behalf of the Atlantic Richfield Company The purpose of the voyage was to determine the feasibility of transporting oil from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to the American Eastern Seaboard.[21] Although accompanied by two U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers throughout the voyage, the *Manhattan* became stuck in the ice a number of times, requiring assistance from the Canadian icebreaker CCGS *John A. MacDonald*, which accompanied the tanker through the Passage.[22]

A great deal of controversy surrounds the *Manhattan* voyage because of its perceived violation of Canadian Arctic sovereignty.[23] The issue in question is whether Canada had granted permission to the U.S. to allow the vessel to enter the NWP. Canada did not officially claim sovereignty over the NWP until 1973, when the government asserted sovereignty as part of Canada's historic internal waters. However, the government did not enact any legislation or treaty to formalize this statement[24] and the other Arctic nations maintain to this date that the Passage constitutes an international strait. Interestingly, Canada and the U.S. strongly disagree on the internal/international status of the NWP, despite their bilateral Arctic security initiatives.

Sources indicate that in the months leading up to the *Manhattan* voyage, the U.S. Coast Guard and oil company executives had consulted Canadian officials and requested the assistance of a Canadian icebreaker throughout the voyage.[25] According to Navy Captain Thomas C. Pullen,[26] not only had Canada agreed with and supported the voyage, but in return for its participation, had negotiated an agreement with the Americans to share data on ice conditions and ship performance. In addition, Pullen affirmed that Roger Steward, master of the *Manhattan*, had followed protocol and flown the Canadian flag, making efforts not to offend Canadians.[27] The Trudeau government welcomed the *Manhattan* voyage and Canada's participation in the exercise, and expressed its position that there was no sovereignty challenge to Canadian territory.[28] Media reports at the time of the sailing misrepresented American intentions when the U.S. refused to officially request Canadian permission to enter the Passage. Media criticism effectively swayed political opinion towards accusing the Americans for violating Canadian sovereignty. In reality, a request for permission would have been interpreted as the U.S. recognition that the Passage represents Canadian internal waters.[29] In addition, other reports confirm Canadian participation in the voyage of the *SS Manhattan*. Although the U.S. had not officially request permission to enter the NWP, Canada officially granted permission anyway.

To be clear, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention states that foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage within a nation's territorial waters,[30] provided that the ship does not engage in prohibited activities.[31] The *Manhattan* voyage did not demonstrate any violation of Canadian security as it transited the Passage with Canada's full cooperation. The critical Canadian response to the voyage, although rooted in the sovereignty issue, concerned the potential for pollution of Arctic waters. When the *Manhattan* was damaged in the ice, there was fear that there could have been an oil spill, although ultimately no leakage occurred. However, the concern over setting a precedent for increased uncontrolled foreign shipping in the region considers the possibility of a vessel being damaged while transporting significant amounts of oil[32] or other pollutants that could drastically affect the delicate ecosystem of the High North. But since the *Manhattan* voyage occurred in cooperation with Canada, whose ship was there to assist the American tanker with navigational difficulties through the ice, there was little real concern for uncontrolled shipping, accidental or deliberate pollution—an extension of the sovereignty issue. In the spring of 1970 the U.S. announced another *Manhattan* voyage through the Passage,[33] accompanied by the Canadian icebreaker *Louis St. Laurent*.[34]

Interestingly, although the *Manhattan* voyage caused a considerable amount of media sensation, the previous submarine voyage of the USS *Seadragon* in August 1960 through

the Passage received little attention or criticism in the media. The reason for this might be that Commodore O.C.S. Robertson,[35] former commander of the HMCS Labrador, served as the ice pilot for the *Seadragon*'s voyage. In a mission to traverse the Parry Channel to collect oceanic and hydrographic data, the *Seadragon* transited the Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound and McClure Strait, prior to sailing to the North Pole from the Beaufort Sea. This submarine was the first submerged vessel to surface at the North Pole.[36] Both voyages of the *Seadragon* and *Manhattan* though the NWP occurred under similar circumstances in terms of cooperation and assistance between Canada and the U.S. including the participation of Canadian officers. Yet, it was only the *Manhattan* voyages that were politically sensitive, drawing public criticism. The reason for this controversy is speculative; however, it might be related to the perceived non-recognition of Canadian claims to the NWP, rather than the presence of vessels belonging to our allies to the south.

There is a long history of Canada-U.S. cooperation on Arctic expeditions. Great Britain transferred Arctic sovereignty to Canada in 1880.[37] During the period prior to and during the Second World War, Canadian Arctic sovereignty was virtually a non-issue. The World War II period saw cooperative efforts between Canada and the U.S. in continental defence, involving Arctic projects such as the Northwest Staging Route,[38] Crimson Route[39] and Alaskan-Canadian (ALCAN) Highway[40] (projects financed by the U.S.). These were mainly land-based defence projects, in which collaboration between the two nations continued into the post-war period when defence projects shifted to the maritime arena, specifically with the 1946 Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) negotiations (established in 1947) and the consideration of a northern role for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), which focussed its attention on the Pacific and Atlantic regions. Due to Canada's lack of resources to resupply the JAWS or provide ice-breaking capability or manpower to operate in the High Arctic, operations in the North fell to the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with participation by Canadian observers.[41] Canadian leadership, in contrast to military interest in bilateral defence initiatives, became concerned that it could not unilaterally operate in the North. In June 1948, a report on Arctic sovereignty was requested following the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. However, the report failed to address the issues of territorial sea, status of Arctic waters and the application of the sector principle to the waters in question. The status of Arctic waters became a concern in the late 1950s and 60s when the U.S. Navy began transiting the waters of the NWP with nuclear submarines, including beneath the sea ice.[42] However, sources suggest that these voyages were not related to the 1961 Brock Report, which was a naval policy initiative under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Brock indicating that the RCN intended to reassert Canadian Arctic sovereignty, on a "research and operational evaluation" basis.[43] Its recommendations included a three-ocean Navy and submarine patrols.[44] Although these recommendations sowed the seeds of national sovereignty over Arctic waters, they had a greater security objective in the notion of a visible northern military presence and an interest in anti-submarine warfare. Indeed, the security focus of projects in the later 1950s, such as the construction of the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line (1954),[45] the 1958 establishment of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense)[46] in addition to discussions on creating an underwater acoustic surveillance system and a high frequency direction finding network,[47] occurred in partnership with the U.S.

The distinction between sovereignty over land versus sovereignty over water complicated the NWP sovereignty debate that reared its head with the Canadian media response to the 1969 *Manhattan* voyage. With respect to the accusation of intrusion into Canadian sovereign territory, the issue of the Americans not requesting permission from Canada to enter what Canada considers internal waters, could set a precedent for other nations interested in exploring Arctic territory, pressing the issue of innocent passage within Canada's territorial waters in terms of the potential of intruding on Canadian sovereignty. Indeed, a 1970 document from the U.S. State Department states the U.S. position that: "We cannot accept the assertion of a Canadian claim that the Arctic waters are internal waters of Canada … Such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for the United States naval activities worldwide."[48] If indeed, the Passage is regarded as high seas, it would be easier for foreign entities to enter Canadian Arctic territory and adjacent national waters with the potential to cause environmental damage or pose a national security threat.

1984: Denmark Raises its National Flag on Hans Island

Source: Fox News (Mar. 26, 2007)

Danish sailors raise national flag on Hans Island in 2002

The ongoing dispute between Canada and Denmark concerns the ownership of Hans Island—a small 1.3 km² unpopulated island just south of the 81st parallel in the Kennedy Channel between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. The island has been a sovereignty concern for Canada since 1973, when Canada and Denmark drew borders in the Nares Strait between Canada and Greenland,[49] but delayed decisions regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island.[50] On numerous occasions since July 28 1984, the Danes have raised their national flag on Hans Island with assistance from the Danish Royal Navy. The last incident, which occurred on March 30 2004, prompted Canada to respond with Exercise *Frozen Beaver*, which involved two visits by Canadian Forces (CF) helicopters to the island to raise the Canadian flag. In participation with the Canadian Rangers,[51] the Canadian flag, a plaque and an Inukshuk replaced the Danish flag. Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham accompanied the CF on the second visit as part of a tour of Canadian northern installations.[52] The Danish government responded by protesting to the Canadian ambassador in Copenhagen, while the Danish Ambassador to Canada, Poul E.D. Kristensen, published a letter in the *Ottawa Citizen*,[53] asserting Denmark's sovereignty over Hans Island and threatening to send HDMS *Tulugaq* to the island. These actions set off a series of negotiations within the United Nations General Assembly in New York to attempt to resolve the sovereignty question. Although agreeable in terms of bilateral initiatives, no resolution was reached regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island.[54]

The planting of a country's national flag on disputed territory is provocative and is often perceived as a direct sovereignty challenge. A similar incident occurred when Russia planted its national flag on the seabed at the North Pole (see below). Although it takes more than mere flag-planting to challenge Canada's territorial integrity, the act itself provoked a response by the offended nation.

The Hans Island dispute indicates the economic potential on and around the island, for which the final decision regarding sovereignty might impact the status of Canada's other disputed regions in the North. Currently, the diplomatic status quo, reflected in Canada's and Denmark's agreement to disagree on the issue and consent to informing one another of each nations' activities on the island, is favourable to both parties. However, if the sovereignty issue is resolved in favour of Denmark, a precedent would be set for the disputed region of the Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada, and possibly for the status of the NWP, if Canada is perceived as unable to reinforce its claims.[55] Canada's questionable ability to control its northern territories might motivate other nations to challenge Canada's sovereignty and security capabilities in the Arctic. Northern defence specialist Kyle Christensen asserts that the best possible outcome to the Hans Island dispute is maintenance of the status quo, while proceeding with a string of diplomatic negotiations where both nations can claim success without challenging one another's claim.[56] Other Arctic security experts view the issue as irrelevant. For instance, Michael Byers considers the Hans Island dispute as a venue for politicians to "thump their chests" about sovereignty for elections purposes, distracting Canadians from important Arctic issues.[57] The larger picture concerns Canada's ability to assert itself when its sovereignty is challenged. The planting of the Canadian flag by the CF demonstrates a willingness to assert national sovereignty, but the question remains whether Canada is capable of enforcing that assertion.

The Hans Island question extends to other sovereignty issues in the region with respect to the potential for foreign intrusions and the requirement for a security presence. For instance, Inuit hunters from Greenland (under Danish jurisdiction) have been known

to travel to Ellesmere Island to hunt polar bears. Canadian Forces personnel participating in the March 2007 Operation NUNALIVUT reported that in the previous year's exercise, they discovered snowmobile tracks from the East, indicating intrusions by Inuit from Greenland. The goals of Operation NUNALIVUT were to establish a military presence, provide a sovereignty patrol and evaluate terrain and infrastructure capable to facilitate Search and Rescue in the event of a crash or forced landing in the High Arctic. The military presence was useful in detecting foreign activity in Canadian sovereign territory—activity that might otherwise be undetected unless a Ranger patrol happened to be in that location at the opportune moment. With regard to Greenlandic Inuit intrusions into Canadian sovereign territory, the issue also concerns claims by these Inuit that parts of Ellesmere Island constitute part of their traditional hunting territory.[58] Such claims serve to reinforce Denmark's claim to Hans Island; but, the intrusions threaten Canadian national wildlife, in particular the polar bear population and the ecosystem as a whole.

Source: National Post (Aug. 2, 2007)

Canadian Forces Northern Area troops raise the Canadian flag on Hans Island in July 2005

August 1985: The Polar Sea Event

In 1985, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Sea* sailed through the NWP to Greenland from the West Coast in order to resupply the American airbase at Thule. Initially, the *Polar Sea* was slated to travel from Seattle to the Panama Canal to the Atlantic to Thule; however, time constraints required a shorter voyage. The alternative required sailing through the Northwest Passage. The U.S. Coast Guard reviewed its plans with the State Department and Canadian Coast Guard, affirming that the voyage posed no sovereignty challenge. Canadians were invited to participate in the operation,[59] and two captains from the Canadian Coast Guard represented these "invited observers."[60] The Canadian Coast Guard vessel *John A. MacDonald* escorted the *Polar Sea* at the beginning of the voyage.[61]

Canada granted official permission to the Americans to sail the NWP, although no such request was made for the same reason that the U.S. did not request permission for the *Manhattan* voyage.[62] As previously discussed, such request would otherwise be interpreted as the U.S. recognizing the NWP as Canadian internal waters and negating the American position that an international strait runs through the Passage. This arrangement was acceptable until public criticism, comprised of media, academics, aboriginal representatives and special interest groups expressed anti-American sentiment and projected the notion that the U.S. intended to challenge Canadian sovereignty by deliberately not asking permission to enter the NWP. On August 7 a group named the Council of Canadians flew a plane over the *Polar Sea* and dropped two containers—one containing a Canadian flag—the other containing a message that the *Polar Sea* voyage insulted Canadians and threatened its sovereignty.[63]

Canadian leadership responded to popular demand that the U.S. be required to seek permission prior to entering Canadian internal Arctic waters; the U.S. promptly refused. Canada granted permission anyway to make a point.[64] In 1988, Canada and the U.S. reached an agreement on Arctic cooperation, in which the U.S. agreed that it would consult with the Government of Canada prior to sailing its icebreakers through the NWP. Significantly, this agreement does not alter either nation's legal or political position regarding the status of Arctic waters.[65]

Canada's ability (or inability) to reinforce its sovereignty claims in either region might affect the resolution of other competing territorial claims. With regards to the *Polar Sea* voyage, the perception that Canada is weak would be reinforced if Canada did not speak out against the perceived intrusion or violation of territorial sovereignty. However, seeing beyond the disputed status of the NWP, Canada and the U.S. saw the greater advantage in

cooperation in the *Manhattan* and *Polar Sea* voyages. The notion of intrusion and Canada's response therefore highlight Canada's preoccupation with the sovereignty issue, while relegating security to a secondary consideration. Canada has the option to continue to rail against the unyielding U.S. position or put its efforts towards reinforcement of maritime security in the passage.[66] Indeed, whereas the U.S. notified Canada about its intention to traverse the passage, other foreign entities might not be so accommodating, especially if their motives are suspect. At the moment, Arctic Canada Traffic System (NORDREG) is a voluntary reporting system that tracks all marine traffic North of latitude 60º, Ungava Bay and southern Hudson Bay. In 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced plans to amend NORDREG from "encouraged" reporting to a mandatory reporting system for all incoming traffic.[67] However, the challenge with making NORDREG mandatory is that it requires international recognition of the NWP as internal Canadian waters, a requirement that is not likely to be accepted by nations with shipping interests in the Arctic.[68] A bilateral security apparatus would suit the interests of both Canada and the U.S. without requiring an immediate resolution of the status of the NWP. Such an apparatus would address concerns of the unauthorized entry of foreign entities into North America via waters considered to constitute an international strait. Indeed, although a foreign vessel or aircraft might be observed through NORAD or other Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, there remains the requirement for a timely response capability to ensure that the foreign entity does not constitute a security threat to Canada or the U.S. In other words, if reinforcing sovereignty is the primary concern, it would be best supported by a capable security and defence force.

1993: Al Qaeda Flight through Iqaluit

In 1993, an aircraft allegedly purchased by Al-Qaeda operatives made a stop-over in Iqaluit on its way to the Middle East. It is understood that the stop-over was intended as a rest-stop to fuel the aircraft, although official sources have not confirmed these details. According to Colonel (Ret.) Pierre Leblanc, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) likely kept track of the flight having monitored the transaction of funds used to purchase the aircraft. According to media sources, this intrusion was only revealed after 9/11.[69] Little else is known about this occurrence as intelligence services continue to protect the security of information in certain investigations.

Al Qaeda has been in existence since August 11 1988 when it was formed by the senior leaders of the Al Jihad movement.[70] The organization's first terrorist attack occurred on December 22, 1992, when bombs were detonated at two hotels in Aden, Yemen. Al Qaeda's objective was to obstruct the U.S. military's participation in international famine relief efforts in Somalia.[71] The date of this violent attack predates the 1993 flight through Iqaluit indicating that the organization would likely have been "on the radar" as a global security threat.

Since NORAD creates a fence around Canada and U.S. air space, it would have observed the aircraft entering North American airspace. It has been suggested by Colonel Leblanc that the aircraft was permitted to continue on to the Middle East under observation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CSIS as part of a larger strategic intelligence initiative, possibly to determine the destination of the flight and to whom within Al Qaeda the crew was linked. However, this assessment is speculative since official sources cannot reveal the details concerning this intrusion.

Source: undetermined

Russian jet freighter IL-76

Fall 1998: Russian IL-76 Lands in Churchill [72]

In November 1998, a Russian Ilyushin-76 flew over the North Pole to Churchill, Manitoba.[73] The landing of this large cargo plane was an unusual occurrence at the Churchill airport, as reported by airport duty personnel present when it landed. The

pilot switched off his landing lights as soon as he touched down on the tarmac despite unfavourable weather conditions and poor visibility. This suspicious behaviour suggests a possible criminal purpose. Sources do not report the precise duration of Russians' stay in Churchill, but they do say that the crew did not stay long. Following the arrival of a Bell 206 helicopter at Churchill, the Russian crew drove back to the airport, loaded the helicopter onto the plane and took off. Airport personnel affirm that no one was there at the tarmac to inspect documents or question the crew—a role for the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).[74] However, the media reports that Canadian intelligence officials were monitoring the aircraft from its landing in Churchill to the point when it landed in a region of Russia known for organized crime. Colonel Leblanc suggested that if the nature of the flight was related to organized criminal activity the intelligence officials monitoring the craft would likely have been the RCMP, CSIS and Transport Canada, who allowed the flight to proceed to its destination. Some sources question whether intelligence officials let the Russians fly in and out of Churchill for intelligence purposes or because they lacked the power to intervene.[75] Others suggest that CF-18s could have been deployed from Cold Lake to the Forward Operating Location at Rankin Inlet, or that NORAD could have intervened, but chose not to for a greater strategic purpose.[76] The consensus is that intelligence officials allowed the flight to continue in order to monitor the activities of its crew. Although suspected, a connection between the flight and organized crime has not been confirmed.

The use of Canada's northern regions in organized criminal activity is a genuine concern. The Russian mafia is already involved in the Asian black market, including the illicit diamond trade.[77] Their interest might extend to Canada's diamond mines, which represent the third largest diamond industry in the world. The irregularity surrounding the Russian flight into Churchill begs the question of who provided the helicopter for pickup and for what purpose. According to a 2007 RCMP report there are numerous examples of organized crime syndicates using Canadian airports,[78] and a 2004 CSIS report states that:

> *Organized crime exploits any potential conduit to move illicit commodities from source or transit countries to their illegal consumer markets in Canada, in particular marine ports, airports and land border areas … illicit commodities are either concealed within the large volume of legitimate commercial and traveler movement entering through designated customs entry points or smuggled surreptitiously through the vast stretches of less controlled border areas … organized crime will exploit the less-monitored areas between the designated customs ports of entry.*[79]

Indeed, if Canada's Class 1 airports[80] are being exploited by illicit elements, the seaport of Churchill and its airport are all the more vulnerable to infiltration, as are less controlled ports in the far North. Colonel Leblanc was quoted in the *Nunatsiaq News*: "It's only a matter of time before organized crime starts to use the Arctic as a back-door into Canada." He warned that criminals would be attracted by the sudden emergence of new levels of wealth introduced by the northern diamond mines.[81]

1999: Chinese Research Ship[82]

In 1999 the Chinese icebreaker and research ship *M/V Xue Long* ("Snow Dragon")[83] arrived at Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories. The vessel is reported to have sailed undetected into Canadian waters, although once discovered, the Canadian Ice Service[84] assisted the ship's voyage using Radarsat[85] to navigate through the thick ice north of the Alaskan coast. The unannounced arrival at Tuktoyaktuk was apparently the result of mis-communication between agencies in Canada, as sources report that the Canadian embassy in Beijing had been notified by the crew of their intentions to sail into Canadian waters.[86] Assuming that the ship intended to sail north, away from Canadian waters, the Canadian Ice Service did not communicate the seemingly unannounced presence of the Chinese ship to Canadian authorities—i.e., the CCRA, CIC and Transport Canada.[87] In addition, Beijing would have informed Foreign Affairs, whose role would have been to inform the RCMP and relevant agencies that the Chinese had requested permission to sail into Canadian waters.[88] The ship's crew alleged that they were meeting a tour guide who was a Chinese national who had claimed refugee status in Canada in 1993.[89] The guide informed Canadian authorities that he was conducting a tour for the Chinese government.[90]

Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence indicate that the voyage was relatively innocent because the Chinese gave Canada notification. The information was mishandled in Canada due to a breakdown of communication between agencies that could have had disastrous consequences in more threatening circumstances. One critic stated that "we had no independent capability" in terms of having a presence, surveillance and immediate law and order enforcement capability.[91] If the voyage had more serious implications, such as smuggling migrants from China, transporting illegal armaments or if the crew was infected with a disease like SARS, Canada might not be capable of a proportionate response.[92] Remarks at the Senate Standing Committee concluded that:

> *…we are totally unprepared, we actually have the capability from a combination of air and space assets that we have the necessary RCMP, customs, health officials waiting at Tuk to do the necessary clearance … It gets down to the ability to actually have those assets so we have a proper intelligence picture of what is going on, so we can then respond to whatever level.*[93]

The refugee status of the Chinese national who was meeting the crew in Tuktoyaktuk arouses suspicion. It seems unusual that a Chinese refugee would be meeting with a research vessel representing the nation from which he claimed refuge. This circumstance might have alerted Canadian intelligence officials in conjunction with the fact that China is on the Canadian intelligence radar for economic espionage activities in Canada.[94] In addition, China has a rising interest in the economic potential of the Arctic, namely alternative shipping routes to the Suez and Panama Canals, as well as the oil and gas potential in light of its rising energy needs.[95] With regard to criminal intent, the *Xue Long* crew was reported to have been armed with machine guns.[96] Former commander of Joint Task Force North (JTFN), Colonel (Ret'd) Pierre Leblanc stressed that when the RCMP boarded the ship at Tuktoyaktuk, the cargo contained an "excessive" amount of weapons and ammunition, begging the question of arms smuggling. The RCMP also found one passport too many. These discoveries highlight a potential security threat posed by the Chinese voyage, regardless of the well-intentioned notification from Beijing.

September 1999: A Foreign Submarine in Cumberland Sound[97]

Canadian scientists observed a foreign submarine in Cumberland Sound,[98] an inlet located on the East Coast of Baffin Island in early September 1999.[99] Colonel (Ret'd) Pierre Leblanc noted that the presence of this submarine coincided with a visit by French President Chirac to Canada. This submarine may have belonged to France, but there is no indication in open sources whether the captain of the submarine or any nation associated with the vessel, requested Canadian permission to enter Canadian waters.

Unconfirmed sources report that unusual activity combined with the presence of unidentified objects have been observed in Arctic waters for some time. Indeed, reports indicate that foreign submarines have been sighted traversing Canadian Arctic waters unannounced for the past decade.[100] These observations, if valid, demonstrate foreign activity in Canadian Arctic waters for reasons undetermined. Furthermore, the presence of undetected foreign vessels poses a significant security threat to Canada because their activities (and intentions) are shrouded in secrecy. An incursion discussed below profiles an explosion in the East of the NWP that occurred under mysterious circumstances. Examples such as these suggest that other intrusions could occur without the knowledge of Canadian authorities, a fact which is alarming. The potential for other intrusions highlights the probability of increasing numbers of undetected foreign operations in the North, which at the very least constitutes a breach of national sovereignty. At the other end of the spectrum, such incursions pose a potential security threat to northern Canadians, the Arctic environment and the larger strategic interests of Canada and the U.S.

September 2006: Deported Romanian Sneaks Back into Canada through Grise Fiord

Another potential threat to security and national sovereignty is the infiltration of illegal immigrants into Canada through the Arctic. In early September 2006, Romanian national Florin Fodor, who had previously been removed from Canada on a series of criminal charges

in 2000,[101] re-entered the country via a 6-metre motorboat travelling from Greenland to Grise Fiord,[102] Nunavut (south of Ellesmere Island).[103] Fodor was apprehended by RCMP Cpl Tim Waters upon his arrival and pleaded guilty to immigration charges for entering Canada without permission from CIC. The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) reported that Fodor was also charged with failing to report to officials upon his arrival at the Canadian port.[104] Fodor was charged with two counts of violating the Canadian Immigration Act and sentenced to seven and a half months in jail, after which he was to be deported.[105]

Although he was apprehended by the appropriate authorities, reports indicate that Fodor was met at Grise Fiord by curious Inuit prior to encountering the RCMP. Northern Inuit populations might seem open and curious, but they provide a useful intelligence source to Canadian authorities in the event that an individual attempts to enter Canada illegally. In this instance, the system of observing and reporting worked in conjunction with local law enforcement. However, if Fodor had somehow evaded detection by the locals and the RCMP, he might have succeeded in his plans to infiltrate Canada and escape undetected to Toronto.[106] One might also question whether Fodor's presence was even detected before reaching Grise Fiord, suggesting a maritime awareness gap in sensing small vessels. Finally, Fodor's prior deportation from Canada on grounds of criminal convictions illustrates the severity of the threat in which foreign entities with criminal ties might attempt infiltration into Canada through gaps in Arctic security.

November 2006: Turkish Sailors Jump Ship in Churchill

Very little has been reported about an occurrence in which two Turkish sailors jumped ship in Churchill in order to avoid apprehension by Canadian authorities. Upon landing, they purchased train tickets to Winnipeg, but were apprehended by a rail ticket clerk, after which they tried to claim refugee status.[107] Sources do not specify what measures were taken following the apprehension of these individuals.

This example highlights the potential for alert civilians to thwart unauthorized entry, as in the previous case of the Romanian illegal alien, who just happened to be discovered by the RCMP in Grise Fiord. In this case, the rail ticket clerk was alerted to the unusual presence of Turkish sailors in Churchill. Had the clerk been less alert, one might consider how far the sailors could have infiltrated Canada.

Source: abc.net

Immersion of MIR-2 Russian Mini-Sub

August 2007: Russia Plants National Flag at the North Pole

Canada responded to a potential sovereignty challenge when Russia sent a submarine to plant its national flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007. Russian political personality and polar explorer, Minister of Parliament, Artur Chilingarov, and MP Vladimir Gruzdev led the mission to launch two Mir submarines to plant a titanium capsule with a Russian flag on the ocean floor 4200 m below the pole.[108]

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay,[109] dismissed the act as a publicity stunt and asserted that the North is Canadian property:

> *This isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory' … There is no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic ... we're not at all concerned about this mission—basically it's just a show by Russia … The question of sovereignty of the Arctic is not a question. It's clear. It's our country. It's our property. It's our water ... The Arctic is Canadian.*[110]

Source: Telegraph.UK (Aug. 1, 2007)

Mini Russian submarine on ocean floor at North Pole

This statement might be misunderstood as suggesting that the North Pole is Canadian, which it is not, but it does highlight the degree to which sovereignty politics affects Canadian sensitivities.

The status of the North Pole is complicated by politics and the uncertain geomorphology of the continental shelf beneath the sea at the North Pole. In light of its oil and gas potential, Russia claims that this underwater continental ridge, known as the Lomonosov Ridge, is a geographical extension of Asia's continental shelf. If this is indeed proven to be the case, then it could strengthen Russia's claim to the North Pole.[111]

Russia's Arctic interests are becoming increasingly clear. On January 7 2007, a Russian envoy led by former KGB (now FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, arrived via an Mi-8 helicopter to raise a flag at the South Pole. This act was dismissed as a stunt; however, sources report that Patrushev traveled to the North Pole in 2004 with a similar agenda.[112] These exploits have been criticized as part of Russia's attempt, known as the Russian Resurgence, to re-establish its Soviet-era influence globally.[113] Former Russian President and KGB operative Vladimir Putin announced Russia's interest in securing its strategic, economic, scientific and defence interests in the Arctic. Russia's act of planting a flag at the North Pole is just one of many ways in which the former Soviet state is attempting to demonstrate assertiveness towards its international competition.[114] Although not regarded as a credible threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, this act shows that Russia is serious about its northern strategic interests. It should be kept in mind that the Kremlin has not been tolerant of opposition in the past. For example, in November 2006, former FSB[115] officer, Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned by radioactive material, coincidentally following his public criticism of Russian political leadership and misdeeds of the FSB.[116] The nation of Georgia was invaded in late summer 2008 in response to its attempt to secede from Russia. In January 2009, Russia was revealed to be probing Canadian northern airspace (see Russian Bomber below). These aggressive actions suggest that Russia is not likely to back down from a challenge to the disputed northern territory estimated to yield significant quantities of oil and gas.[117] Indeed, Russia recently unveiled its national strategy for Arctic development up to 2020.[118]

August 2007: Wild Vikings Land in Nunavut

Five Norwegian sailors who called themselves the "Wild Vikings" attempted to sail through the NWP in August 2007. Led by Jarle Andhoy, this group intended to make a documentary of the voyage of their boat, the Berserk II, through the Passage to Nunavut

in the spirit of the historical 1903 expedition of Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen. This group was notorious for dressing up as Vikings, chasing polar bears, cozying up to walruses and drinking vodka with Russians, as documented in their previous voyages to northern Russia and Antarctica.[119] On August 24 2007, the Vikings were arrested in a western hamlet in Nunavut by the RCMP after failing to report their presence to Canadian immigration officials in Gjoa Haven, Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. It was revealed that Andhoy had misled the RCMP in Nunavut by hiding a member of his crew, Frederick Juell, who had been deported previously when the Vikings travelled to Halifax. Juell faced possible criminal charges for re-entering Canada illegally.[120]

The activities of this group may not have had sinister undertones, however, sources indicate that these Norwegians attempted to sail Canadian waters with two people undercover.[121] Regardless of intentions, this voyage constitutes illegal activity. The intrusion highlights the potential for criminal elements to enter Canada through its porous northern border, as observed in previous examples of intrusions at Tuktoyaktuk, Grise Fiord and Churchill.

August 2008: Foreign Submarine Sighted Following an Explosion at the Entrance of the Northwest Passage

Ten days following a mysterious explosion near the eastern entrance of the NWP, a foreign submarine was sighted only 10 to 15 kilometres from the location of the explosion.[122] The explosion occurred early on July 31, 2008 and was reported by Inuit hunters at Borden Peninsula, northeast Baffin Island to a northern Canadian Ranger, who investigated the occurrence. The hunters' report indicated that they heard a loud explosion, observed black smoke and several dead whales on shore. Joint Task Force North determined that there were no known vessels operating in the region and could not determine what might have caused the explosion. A long-range Aurora aircraft was dispatched to conduct reconnaissance over the site. Parks Canada reported to the site to assist in investigating the explosion.[123]

On August 9, 2008, a foreign submarine was sighted at the northern end of Baffin Island by the Inuit hunters who reported it to Canadian Rangers responsible for monitoring the Arctic for foreign intrusions. The CF has chosen not to comment on the details of the submarine sighting or the explosion, probably in the interest of preserving operational security. Whether the explosion was linked to the submarine has yet to be determined.[124]

This incident highlights Canada's inability to detect or stop underwater incursions. As previously stated, undetected intrusions or incursions constitute significant threats to Canadian security, specifically when security officials are not made aware ahead of time of the intentions of foreign entities operating in Canadian northern territory. Foreign submarines could be embarking on data gathering or espionage activities, military exercises, probing or testing Canada's detection and response capabilities. Unless the vessel is detected and the crew questioned, its purpose for traversing Canadian northern waters is speculative.

Inuit hunter communities are often the first to provide intelligence concerning unusual activity in the North. If the explosion had not occurred, it is possible that the submarine would have evaded detection. It might be extrapolated from this instance that other submarines successfully traverse Canadian Arctic waters without being detected if they do not affect the sea life or have any accidents that would result in destruction or noise on the surface of the sea.

February 16 2009: Russian Bear Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace

Reports from mid-February 2009 indicate that a Russian Tupolev Tu-95 aircraft approached (but did not enter) Canadian airspace three days prior to President Barack Obama's visit to Ottawa. Later reports confirm that there had not been one, but two aircraft that attempted to probe Canadian Arctic airspace. NORAD detected the Russian Bear long-range bomber heading toward Canada.[125] Sources indicate that this was not the first instance of such activity and Canadian officials report that this incident represents the twentieth incursion in the past two years.[126] Chief of Defence Staff General Walt Natynczyk

states that Russian incursions started about one and half to two years ago, "when we had not seen anything for decades," although the General did not report on the frequency of such flights or specific locations of occurrence.[127]

A spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the flight was part of "regular military training and air patrol plans in the northern latitudes … All the international flight regulations were strictly respected … Therefore, the very possibility of a violation of Canadian airspace is out of [the] question. The adjacent countries were informed of that flight in good time." Another spokesman from the Russian Embassy in Washington downplayed the incursion: "It was a routine flight over international airspace." However, Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay suggested that there was a "strong coincidence" that the flight occurred around the same time that Canadian security and defence assets were concentrated in Ottawa for President Obama's visit, and noted that the Russian Bear was met with … "CF-18 fighter planes and world-class pilots that know their business … [The pilots] sent a strong signal they should back off and stay out of our airspace." Prime Minister Stephen Harper noted that Russian incursions into Canadian airspace are a "real concern" and stated:

> *I have expressed at various times the deep concern our government has with increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace[128] … We will defend our airspace; we also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations to defend our continental airspace and we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada's Arctic.*

Source: Airforcetechnology.com

Tupolev-95 Russian Strategic Bear Bomber escorted by F-15C Eagle

The nature of these flights recalls Cold War incursions of Russian aircraft into North American airspace that ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. The resumption of such flights in recent years demonstrates elements of a Russian resurgence.[129] Indeed, Russia has openly expressed its national interest in claiming Arctic oil and resources.[130] NORAD spokesman Michael Kucharek noted the possibility that the Russian bomber was engaging in a military exercise:

> *These types of exercises occur and have occurred over the past few years in quite a few different times and places.[131]*

The intent of these flights is suspicious. Vladimir Drik, the aide to the Russian Chief of Staff confirmed to *Novosti* news that indeed the flight occurred on February 18, and that "the

Tupolev-160 fulfilled all its air patrol tasks … It was a planned flight." However, Canadian officials indicate that the crafts intercepted were a different model—the Tu-95.[132]

One might suspect that, in probing Canadian airspace, Russia is testing NORAD's ability to detect foreign aircraft in North American airspace and capabilities to respond. As noted, following Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Canada has been watchful of Russian Arctic activities. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has gone so far as to suggest that Russia has reverted to a "Soviet-era mentality,"[133] an opinion that could be supported by General Natynczyk's statement that until two years ago, Canada had not seen any activity from Russia for decades. Russia's re-activation of a former Soviet military station at Nagurskoye, where soldiers, scientists, meteorologists and FSB personnel are stationed, and which even had a personal visit by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov,[134] indicates a resurgence of Russian power in the North that might become increasingly aggressive in light of the strategic potential of the Arctic region. Notably, in late March 2009, Russia released a document on its Security Council website, titled "The basis of the national policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region until 2020 and beyond prospects."[135] This document indicates Russia's intent to increase its assets in the Arctic to support its political, economic and security interests in the region. A statement from the Russian National Security Council announced plans to establish FSB control of the Arctic and create a highly qualified special Arctic military force known as the Arctic Group of Forces created under the auspices of the Russian Federal Security Service.[136] Canada and its Arctic neighbours might now be on alert for aggressive Russian activities in the High North.

Source: unknown

L.A. class submarine USS Annapolis on surface of Arctic Ocean in March 2009

Summary of Intrusions[137]

INTRUSION/FOREIGN PRESENCE	Date
German weather station in Labrador	1943
USS Seadragon Submarine transit through NWP	1960
Manhattan Event	1969
Soviet nuclear satellite crashes into NWT / Alberta / Saskatchewan	1978

Denmark staking claim to Hans Island	1984-present[138]
Polar Sea Event	1985
Al Qaeda Flight through Iqaluit	1993
Russian Ilyushin-76 lands in Churchill	1998
Chinese Ship *Xue Long* lands at Tuktoyaktuk	1999
Foreign submarine at Cumberland Sound	1999
Romanian infiltrator lands at Grise Fiord	2006
Turkish infiltrators at Churchill	2006
Russia plants flag at North Pole	2007
Wild Vikings land at Nunavut	2007
Foreign submarine in NWP	2008
Russian bombers probe Canadian airspace	2009[139]

The following table categorizes the types of threats posed by each intrusion and includes those beyond Canadian territory to illustrate potential threats due to proximity, such as the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians. In some cases an intrusion can constitute a range of threats and suspected motivations, whether national, or criminal, terrorist or individual. Secondary environmental effects are no less serious as these affect public health and safety. All of these intrusions constitute some degree of sovereignty challenge, whether intended or not, as a result of entering Canadian Arctic territory without consent.

		Nature(s) of Threat			
Intrusion Perpetrator(s)	**Total Intrusions[140]**	**Military**	**Security**	**Economic[141]**	**Environmental**
National	11	7		1	5
Criminal/ Terrorist	2		2		
Individual(s)	3		3		
	16				

The motivations for intrusions constitute mostly a national character with a significant military interest. Notably, the environmental risk comes in a close second to the military threat, indicating that unregulated foreign activity in the North carries significant hazards beyond the realm of traditional threats. Individual intrusions pose a security threat when such activity runs contrary to Canadian national laws and regulations, as in the case of the Wild Vikings transporting an individual associated with global criminal activity or in the case of the Romanian who violated Canadian immigration laws.

Considerations

So far, there has not yet been a major national security emergency in the Canadian Arctic, but the potential remains, especially if Canada fails to build the capabilities necessary to respond to foreign intrusion or other emergency situations that could manifest in the North such as a Search and Rescue (SAR) incident,[142] or continued domestic attacks against oil and gas pipelines.[143] Analysis of the intrusions represented in this survey highlight a number of issues for consideration with respect to northern security and Canadian sovereignty:

- **There exists a valid security and sovereignty threat**. The events presented herein comprise known foreign intrusions. It is assumed that there are many others that have either been missed or that have not been reported in open sources. Foreign entities will likely continue attempts at unlawful entry into Canadian Arctic territory to infiltrate Canada (or transit through) from the North. Such threats originate from a variety of sources, such as organized criminal elements, terrorist entities, former

superpowers looking to reassert their strategic interests in the Arctic, other nations of questionable integrity conducting a range of covert activity beneath the sea ice, such as stealth submarine voyages.

- **The Arctic is vulnerable to infiltration**. Gaps in surveillance remain in spite of existing Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The intrusions presented herein demonstrate that Canada still lacks both effective situational awareness to know what is entering its northernmost territories and the ability to share that information across relevant agencies (not to mention timely response capabilities). The detection of foreign submarine activity is a concern, as Canada lacks an undersea surveillance system. The examples discussed demonstrate that any submarine detection is often the result of Inuit reports seeing or hearing something unusual, like an explosion or observing adverse affects on the environment, such as pollution or harm to local wildlife. Illegal fishing is also a significant concern because it could result in a loss of Canadian profit and resource depletion, not to mention adverse affects on the marine ecosystem. Indeed, foreign vessels operating in northern waters pose some degree of environmental threat in terms of the potential for pollution, particularly from vessels transporting oil. The *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24 1989[144] attests to significant risk of pollution occurring from unregulated shipping in Canadian Arctic waters.

- **Northern populations provide a valuable ISR resource**. The Rangers constitute an effective human surveillance (eyes and ears) apparatus to report unusual occurrences to JTFN. However, at times when these assets are not present at the moment of an intrusion, Inuit hunters or other northern residents might be in the vicinity to observe and report, as was the case of the explosion in August 2008. Northern communities have a clear interest in northern security since harmful foreign activities in their territory have the potential to affect their health, safety and lifestyle. In addition, the Inuit often provide a sovereignty presence in areas where Ranger patrols are less frequent and there are no RCMP detachments.

- **Existing arrangements have been successful in some cases**. In the two examples of the deported Romanian and the Wild Vikings intrusions, the combination of Inuit reporting and RCMP enforcement have successfully prevented unlawful entry into Canadian territory. Indeed, the presence of Inuit populations, Rangers, RCMP and CF (on exercise) acts to discourage unregulated or illegal foreign activity.

- **The harsh environment of the High Arctic provides a security advantage**. Extreme Arctic weather conditions serve to deter intruders. For instance, recent CF exercises[145] have revealed operational difficulties in the Arctic environment, such as complications due to dense fog, failing communications and equipment malfunction.[146] Although these conditions might inhibit response efforts to a northern emergency, it could be assumed that these shortcomings would similarly complicate attempts by unwelcome intruders. Complications on Canada's end can also be offset by Inuit Ranger capabilities of overcoming the challenges of Arctic conditions by using simpler, more traditional methods of operating and communicating in the Arctic.[147]

- **Bilateral initiatives have worked**. Canada's cooperation with the U.S. served to provide a security presence in the North to deter Soviet activities during the Cold War. Later attempts by Canada to assert sovereignty at the expense of collaborative security efforts with the U.S. undermine its Arctic security interests. Unilateral assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic would otherwise be extremely (perhaps, prohibitively) expensive because of the security infrastructure required to reinforce sovereignty claims.

- **Security enforcement is complicated by disputed territorial zones**. The challenges associated with the threat of foreign activities in Canada's Arctic are

complicated by disputes over the status of Arctic waters, such as the Northwest Passage and the unconfirmed geomorphology of the continental shelf extension of the Lomonosov Ridge. The complication extends to the sovereignty issue in terms of where Canada has an interest in establishing a national security presence. As noted, a bilateral security arrangement between Canada and the U.S. might serve to alleviate concerns of foreign activities in the North, facilitated by relaxing the sovereignty issue.

Conclusion

The intrusions discussed in this paper demonstrate that Canada's North remains a region of uncertainty with regard to international interest in Arctic opportunities and obvious vulnerability to foreign exploitation. The implications for Canada concern the continuation of intrusions, by which other nations might attempt to test Canada's ability to respond. Such consideration requires a critical assessment of Canada's capabilities in conjunction with an evaluation of the method and magnitude of response. Although the final section highlights a number of shortcomings in security and situational awareness in the Arctic, it also provides an analysis of resources that work. The latter might see further consideration by Canadian leadership and security and defence advisors in the development of Arctic capabilities to meet the challenges which Canada will inevitably face in the near-to-distant future. Huebert, among other Arctic security experts,[148] has noted that Canada is already on the course of rebuilding its Arctic capabilities.[149] Increasing academic publications and media reporting on Arctic security encourages Canadian leadership to remain committed to these initiatives.

History demonstrates that, however proactive they may seem at time of announcement, government proposals to improve Canadian Arctic capabilities have seen little action in reality, as observed in the abandonment of the 1965 initiative to acquire some U.S. *Skipjack*-class submarines,[150] the 1990 cancellation of the 1985 proposal to construct a Polar 8 class icebreaker[151] and the 1987 intention to build 12 nuclear submarines that was abandoned at the end of the Cold War.[152] If this trend continues, Canada and the greater North American continent remain vulnerable to increasing numbers of foreign intrusions through an unsecure Arctic.

About the Author...

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Endnotes

1. Former Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (now Joint Task Force North, JTFN). The quote appeared in Ed Struzik, "Who will Guard Our Gaping Back Door," Edmonton Journal (Nov. 18, 2007): http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/features/thebigthaw/story.html?id=df997504-b305-46f9-bd83-a2b11bc6a591. A briefer version of Struzik's article appears in the November 18, 2007 edition of the *Toronto Star* "Who's guarding our back door?" http://www.thestar.com/Arctic%20In%20Peril/article/277429.
2. National security as it pertains to the prevention of threats to Canadian public safety and security in (and from) the Arctic—this domain requires individual attention as defence analysts have described the North as a region vulnerable to external activity and/or internal human or environmental threats, pollution, threats to economic security, etc.
3. Ed Struzik (2007).
4. *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*. Cambridge University Press (2005).
5. Such as the international status of the Northwest Passage, disagreements on the Canada-U.S. boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and the continental shelf extension of Lomonosov Ridge
6. Natalie Mychajlyszyn, *The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence*, International Affairs—Trade and Finance Division (Oct. 24, 2008), [PRB 08-13E]: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0813-e.htm#theapex.

7. “Canada’s Diamond Rush,” CBC News (Sept 20, 2007): http://www.cbc.ca/news/backgound/diamonds/. Canada: A Diamond Producing Nation, NRC Canada (Dec 19, 2008): http://www.cbc.ca/news/backgound/diamonds/.
8. An *intrusion* is understood to be “the act of wrongfully entering upon the property of another,” which fits as a definition for the wrongful or unlawful entry of foreign entities into Canadian Arctic territory. *Infiltration* generally has the same meaning with a more subversive purpose. An *incursion* on the other hand describes a hostile entrance or invasion of territory.
9. Known intrusions are those that have been reported in open academic and media sources. This article acknowledges that there may have been numerous unreported intrusions as well as undetected and therefore unknown presence of foreign entities at various times within Canada’s Arctic.
10. Such as the recent Russian Bear flights near Canadian airspace and the announcement of a new Russian Special Arctic Military Force (see below)
11. Not to be confused with an *incident*, which according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary suggests an event causing trouble, or rather signifies an action that results in significant consequences, often with diplomatic implications—see the *Merriam-Webster’s* Dictionary.
12. LCol Paul Dittman. “In Defence of Defence: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 11.3 (Spring 2009), 9.
13. “US Army, Alaska (USARAK),” GlobalSecurity.org (Dec. 27, 2005): http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarak.htm.
14. W.A.B. Douglas, “Beachhead Labrador,” *Quarterly Journal of Military History* 8.2 (1996): 35-37.
15. Goose Air Base, Labrador, GlobalSecurity.Org (April 26, 2005): http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/goose.htm.
16. Douglas (1996).
17. Health Canada, Emergencies and Disasters, “The COSMOS 954 Accident,” (June 24, 2008): http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ed-ud/fedplan/cosmos_954-eng.php.
18. Huebert, Rob. “The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Canadian Arctic Security.” Chapter 1 in *Defence Requirements for Canada’s Arctic*. Edited by Brian MacDonald. CDAI Vimy Paper, 2007. pp 10. http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Vimy_Papers/Defence%20Requirements%20for%20Canada’s%20Arctic%20online%20ve.pdf.
19. The most commonly observed aircraft conducting these exercises was the Tupolev-142 (the Bear-H bomber), capable of carrying AS-15 air launch cruise missiles. Another craft observed is the Tu-95 (Bear-G), capable of carrying several AS-4 nuclear missiles—Douglas L. Clarke, “Increase in Soviet Training Flights Near Alaska,” RAD Background Report 118 (June 28, 1988): http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/143-4-200.shtml.
20. Although many sources describe the *Manhattan* voyage as an *incident,* this discussion views its categorization as an event, or noteworthy happening, since an incident rather suggests an act with significant diplomatic implications, which we would argue is not the case in the *Manhattan* voyages.
21. Under the auspices of Humble Oil & Refining Co.®—“The Manhattan’s Epic Voyage,” Time (Sept. 26, 1969): http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844952-1,00.html. Currie (2007), p. 6. Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison, & Greg Poelzer, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North*, Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers (2008), pp. 94-95. Christopher Kirkley, “The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiatives: Canada’s Response to an American Challenge,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 13 (Spring 1996): 41-42.
22. Indeed, the Time account notes that while traveling through the Barrow Strait, a Soviet submarine was detected by radar operators on board the *Manhattan* – *Time*, “Epic Voyage,” (1969).
23. Sovereignty: The right in international law to exercise State functions over a given territory to the exclusion of any other State—*Island of Palmas Arbitration* (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839—cited in Duncan E.J. Currie, “Sovereignty and Conflict in the Arctic Due to Climate Change: Climate Change and the Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean,” *Globelaw* (Aug. 5, 2007): 3: http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/arctic%20claims%20and%20climate%20change.pdf.
24. Canada claimed the Northwest Passage and all waters within the Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters in 1973 and again in 1975, although there was no official treaty or legislation to legitimize this claim. Therefore, the U.S. continues to deny this claim. In 1986, the formalization of Canadian sovereignty was initiated in the implementation of straight baselines—Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, “Still Unresolved After Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946-1998,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 29.3 (Fall 1999).
25. Coates, et al (2008), p. 95.
26. Captain Pullen participated in the *Manhattan* voyage as a representative of the Canadian Government, providing a link between the tanker and the Department of Transport’s, and served as an ice advisor—Ibid.
27. T.C. Pullen, “What Price Canadian Sovereignty?” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 113 (Sept. 1987): 70.
28. Christopher Kirkey, “The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiatives: Canada’s Response to an American Challenge,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 13 (Spring 1997): 42.

29. Coates, et al (2008), 96.
30. 12 nautical miles from the coast.
31. See articles 52 and 53 of Part IV: Archipelagic States of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm. However, according to article 52.2, "The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security."
32. Charron (2006). The resulting legislation, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) enabled Canada to exercise jurisdiction over shipping to protect Arctic waters—therefore, the issue of innocent passage under section 52.1, was superseded by provision 52.2 (see footnote 28).
33. *Time*, "Epic Voyage," (1969).
34. D. Bradford, "Sea Ice Pressures Observed on the Second 'Manhattan' Voyage," *Arctic 25.1* (Mar. 1972): 35.
35. Commodore Owen Struan Robertson had commanded Arctic patrol vessel, the HMCS Labrador on polar operations in the 1950s.
36. Elliot-Meisel (1999), footnote 27—Nathaniel French Caldwell, *Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security*, Praeger New York (1990), p. 44, 45. "China is Top Espionage Risk to Canada: CSIS," CTV News (June 27, 2007): http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070627/arctic_submarine_070627/20070627?hub=Canada: "In 1960, USS Seadragon conducted the first submerged transit of the Northwest Passage with a Canadian officer on board." Department of the Navy (U.S.), "Seadragon," Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships—Naval Historical Center (undated): http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/s8/seadragon-ii.htm. Awards to the Royal Canadian Navy, "ROBERTSON, Owen Connor Struan ("Robbie"), Commander, RD": http://www.rcnvr.com/R%20-%20RCN%20-%20WW2.php.
37. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
38. A series of airstrips and radio stations established during WWII.
39. In 1941, a series of airfields and weather stations were established in the North in a cooperative arrangement between Canada and the U.S. Iqaluit served as one of the airbases along this route.
40. Otherwise known as the Alaska-Canadian Highway—a supply route constructed in 1942, linking the U.S. to Alaska through a highway running through B.C. and Yukon.
41. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
42. Ibid. Nathaniel F. Caldwell (Lt. Cmdr. USN), Arctic Leverage, New York: Praeger (1990): 44-45.
43. Elliot-Meisel (1999). Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea," in W.A.B. Douglas, *RCN in Transition*, University of Washington Press (1988), p. 221.
44. Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Bland, "Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987," Canadian Defence Quarterly (April 1989), 30-31.
45. Distant Early Warning system, later upgraded with the North Warning System (NWS) in 1985. This system constitutes a series of radar sites across Arctic North America providing surveillance of airspace in polar territories.
46. The North American Aerospace Defence Command renewed its maritime warning system in May 2006, expanded its monitoring capabilities from space and air defence to maritime defence—About NORAD: http://www.norad.mil/about/index.html.
47. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
48. U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations 1969-1976," *Documents on Global Issues*, 1969-1972, Vol. E-1.
49. Guy Killaby (Lt.Comm.), "'Great Game in a Cold Climate': Canada's Arctic Sovereignty in Question," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 31. The 1973 agreement between Denmark and Canada involved the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the Canadian Eastern Arctic islands and Greenland—U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Limits of the Seas No. 72*, *Continental Shelf Boundary: Canada-Greenland, Issued by the Geographer* (Aug. 4, 1976).
50. Jackie Wallace, "Canadian Wins Right to Prospect Hans Island," *Nunatsiaq News* (Aug 26, 2006): http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/60825/news/nunavut/60825_02.html.
51. For a detailed discussion on the role of the Canadian Rangers, see works by P. Whitney Lackenbauer: "Teaching Canada's Indigenous Sovereignty Soldiers & Vice Versa: 'Lessons Learned' from Ranger Instructors," *Canadian Army Journal* 10.2 (Summer 2007): http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_2/CAJ_vol10.2_09_e.pdf ; "The Canadian Rangers: A Postmodern Militia that Works," *Canadian Military Journal* 6.4 (Winter 2005-2006): http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo6/no4/doc/north-nord-03-eng.pdf ; "Canada's Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005," in Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives (Eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Craig Mantle). Kingston: CDA Press (2007). pp 171-208; "Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers: Canada's 'Eyes and Ears' in Northern and Isolated Communities," in *Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture*, Vol. 2

(Ed. David Newhouse). University of Toronto Press (2008).
52. Killaby (2006), 31-32.
53. *Ottawa Citizen*, letter to the editor (July 25, 2005).
54. "Canada-Denmark Joint Statement on Hans Island," Polar Politics: Arctic Sovereignty and International Relations (Sept 19, 2005): http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/canadadenmark-joint-statement-on-hans-island.html.
55. Christensen, *Realpolik Extraordinare*, p. 2.
56. Ibid.
57. Wallace (2006).
58. "Canadian Forces Head out on High Arctic Patrol," CTV News (March 25, 2007). Bob Weber, "Patrol Visits Former RCMP Arctic Detachment to Deter Polar Bear Poachers," Arctic Musings (April 3, 2007): http://dl1.yukoncollege.yk.ca/agraham/stories/storyReader$3991?print-friendly=true.
59. Coates, et al (2008), p. 113.
60. Jessie C. Carman, "Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic Seas," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, Edited by Sam T. Tangredi, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (2002), Footnote 50. However, Lackenbauer, et al, (2008), indicate that three Canadian observers were on board.
61. Coates, et al (2008), p. 114.
62. Indeed, one CF source reports that leaflets were dropped by the Air Force onto the deck of the ship informing the crew that they were passing through Canadian waters and that Canada was officially granting them permission to traverse the passage.
63. Coates, et al (2008), p. 115.
64. Ibid.
65. Matthew Carneghan & Allison Goody, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty*, Government of Canada Parliamentary and Research Service, Prepared by the Political Social Affairs Division (Jan 16, 2006), Library of Parliament—PRB 05-61E: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.pdf, p. 5.
66. The U.S. interest in strengthening continental security following the events of 9/11 are not likely to alter this position, as indicated by the recent reiteration by former U.S. President George W. Bush that the Northwest Passage constitutes an international strait. Although such possibility was alluded to in Carneghan (2006), p. 5., Andrea Charron, "The Northwest Passage," *International Journal* 60.3 (Summer 2005): p. 847, suggests that an agreement in which the U.S. agrees that Canada would control the passage would provide "a way of security the North American perimeter."
67. "Extending the Jurisdiction of Canadian Environment and Shipping Laws in the Arctic," *Backgrounder*—Office of the Prime Minister (Aug 27, 2008): http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2246. "Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans Report on the Canadian Coast Guard, Icebreakers, and Canadian Sovereignty," *Canadian American Strategic Review* (June/Aug 2008): http://www.casr.ca/doc-dfo-senate-arctic-1.htm.
68. The greater ramifications of mandatory reporting with respect to foreign interests in the Northwest Passage would have to be examined in greater detail in a separate discussion.
69. Jane George, "Arctic Borders need Tighter Control, Former Commander says," Nunatsiaq News (Feb. 1, 2002): http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/nunavut020201/news/nunavut/20201_4.html
70. Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism," *The New Yorker* (June 2, 2008): http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all.
71. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Alfred A, Knopf (2006), p. 174.
72. Naval Operations in an Iceless Arctic—Symposium Notes (April 17-18, 2001): http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/Arcticscenario.pdf.
73. The most complete report on this incident is a publication by journalist Ed Struzik in the *Edmonton Journal*.
74. In December 2003, these roles were superceded by the Canada Border Services Agency.
75. Struzik (2007).
76. According to Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.'d) Rory Kilburn of RGK Consulting (March 2009). LCol Kilburn had served as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (precursor to JTFN) from 1999-2002. His credentials demonstrate significant expertise in Arctic security, as he oversaw planners for exercises Narwhal and Nanook, closely worked with Ranger patrols in the High Arctic, and worked with other government departments on northern scenarios. In addition, LCol Kilburn was the CFNA representative for the submarine sighting in Cumberland Sound (1999), CF representative for the North during and after 9/11, participated in ASIWG conferences, and coordinated with law enforcement agencies operation in Yukon (1999) and the North (2000).
77. Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Far East—Russian or Eastern?" IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Spring 1998), pp 65-66. "Russia in the Kimberley Process: The Leader's Responsibility," Civil

Research Council, Moscow (March 2005), see pp 8-12—"The Internal Russian Market of Diamonds: Chances of Criminal Attacks."
78. *Project Spawn: A Strategic Assessment of Criminal Activity and Organized Crime Infiltrating at Canada's Class 1 Airports*, RCMP Criminal Intelligence (2007): http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ci-rc/spawn-eng.pdf.
79. Highlights of the 2004 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada, Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (2004): http://www.csgv.ca/counselor/assets/OrganizedCrimeHighlightsCISCReport.pdf.
80. i.e. Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal (Trudeau) and Halifax.
81. George, Nunatsiaq News (Feb. 2002).
82. Naval Operations in an Iceless Arctic (2001).
83. *This Vitus Bering* Class icebreaker built in Ukraine in March 1993. Equipped with an advanced self-contained navigation system and weather observation apparatus, this A-2 class icebreaker has the capacity of breaking ice up to 1.2 m, including 0.2 m of snow—Polar Research Institute of China, M/V Xue Long (2006): http://www.pric.gov.cn/enindex.asp?sortid=18.
84. The Canadian Ice Service is a subset of Environment Canada. The Ice Service provides information on ice conditions and iceberg occurrences within the coastal regions of the Western and Eastern Arctic, Hudson Bay, East Coast, and the Great Lakes—Environment Canada, Canadian Ice Service: http://ice-glaces.ec.gc.ca/App/WsvPageDsp.cfm?ID=1&Lang=eng&Clear=true.
85. Remote sensing satellites; see Canada Centre for Remote Sensing, "Radarsat," Natural Resources Canada (Jan. 17, 2008): http://www.ccrs.nrcan.gc.ca/radar/spaceborne/radarsat1/index_e.php.
86. Parliament of Canada, "Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans," Issue 5—Evidence, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament, Chaired by Senator Bill Rompkey, Ottawa, ON (March 13, 2008): http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fish-e/05ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=7.
87. By 2003, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) was established as part of the clearance process to land on Canadian soil. CBSA took over the customs role of the CCRA and the intelligence and enforcement role of the CIC.
88. Struzik (2007).
89. Ibid.
90. According to Colonel (Ret.'d) Pierre Leblanc (March 2009), former Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (now known as Joint Task Force North) where he was responsible for coordinating military activities in Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut. During his command up North, Col Leblanc established the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group (ASIWG—now ASWG) in 1999 providing a forum within the Canadian security/defence community—Canadian Forces, the RCMP, Coast Guard, Revenue Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade—to discuss and evaluate Canadian Arctic security interests.
91. Rob Huebert on the requirement for the capability of knowing and then responding to activities occurring in the far North—Parliament of Canada, "Canada's National Security Policy," Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 17 – Evidence, 1st Session, 88th Parliament, Chaired by Senator Colin Kenny, Calgary, AB (March 8, 2005): http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/17eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76.
92. Unconfirmed sources report that in late 1997, two groups of Chinese illegals were apprehended in Iqualuit en route from Kangerlussuaq Greenland. These illegals held fake Japanese passports when they arrived on First Air airlines with one-way tickets bound for Montreal. Sources suggest that as many as 100 or more Chinese might have been smuggled into Canada through Iqaluit until the first group had been caught on November 8, 1997. Both groups comprising 16 people applied for refugee status upon apprehension and none of them had visas—Jason Van Rassel, "Iqaluit May be Gateway for Refugees," Nunatsiaq News (Jan. 12, 1998): http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/back-issues/week/60112.html#1.
93. Parliament of Canada, "Canada's National Security Policy," (2005).
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Claims New Report," (April 15, 2009): http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/04/15/02-88/.
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138. Negotiations (and debates) between Canada and Denmark are still under way regarding the status of Hans Island.
139. The most recent incursion of Russian bombers near Canadian airspace occurred in February 2009.
140. The USS *Seadragon* voyage is not included in this table, as the voyage itself never constituted a breach of sovereignty.
141. In the case of the *Manhattan* event, the motivation was commercial/economic, however, the motivation defaults to national in the sense that the vessel was accompanied by the U.S. Coast Guard. Whether this event constitutes an economic threat is debatable, as the ship was travelling toward a U.S. destination.
142. Notably, LCol Kilburn states that the ability of Canada to exercise its SAR responsibilities in the North in the event of an airliner crash is woefully inadequate, comprising in a huge hole in Canada’s capabilities in the North.
143. In regards to the six *EnCana Corporation* pipeline bombings in 2008-09 by an alleged local activist(s) near Dawson Creek, B.C., just north of the 55th parallel—see CBC News, “RCMP Urge

Patience in B.C. Pipeline Bomb Probe," (July 5, 2009): Royal Canadian Mounted Police, links relating to Dawson Creek pipeline blasts (Oct 2008-June 2009): http://bc.rcmp.ca/ViewPage.action?categoryId=525&categoryKey=major_investigations&siteNodeId=62&categoryName=Dawson%20Creek%20Pipeline%20Explosion&languageId=1; http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/07/05/bc-dawson-creek-sixth-pipeline-bombing.html; Schneider, Katie, "Pipeline Bomber a Serious Threat," Sun Media (July 6, 2009): http://www.edmontonsun.com/news/alberta/2009/07/06/10034856-sun.html.

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146. Struzik (2007).

147. For instance, the HF radio works well in the summer, although not so well in the winter when it would be difficult for intruders to operate in the High Arctic—Rory Kilburn (2009).

148. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Franklyn Griffiths, Andrea Charron, and Michael Byers.

149. Huebert, "Rise and Fall," (2007).

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SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE: CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC FLUENCY IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Captain L. Bond

"Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells."
Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, 1947

Since 2004, numerous articles have been written in American military journals about the need for cultural awareness and strategic communications. This movement was precipitated by initial reports of American servicemen's general ignorance of the human and cultural dimensions in Iraq during the initial phases of the stability operations following Operation Iraqi Freedom. In October 2004, Major General Robert H. Scales Jr. wrote what is now a much quoted article in the U.S. Naval Institute journal Proceedings called, "Culture-Centric Warfare," in which he called for a shift in operations and training towards greater cultural awareness as an essential component of counter-insurgency operations (COIN). This was followed by the meteoric rise to public prominence of Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus and his redirection of COIN in Iraq, which led to a dramatic decrease in insurgent violence. The subsequent public release of the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (CFM), which contains numerous sections advising thorough cultural awareness of one's area of operations (AO), drew even more attention to the issue of cultural awareness in COIN.

As a result, the American government and military have been quick to implement these ideas and have established human terrain teams (HTT), which are largely composed of academics and cultural anthropologists who are imbedded at the brigade level and often accompany troops on operations, and who provide cultural advice to unit commanders when required. Some academics and field commanders have lauded this program as an innovative step forward in military openness and flexibility, while others are concerned that by "farming out" cultural familiarity the U.S. military will lose an essential function in its COIN capabilities. There has also been substantial resistance within the professional anthropologist community who seek to dissociate itself from military operations.

The need for familiarity with local language and culture as well as the employment of anthropologists in battle groups is due to the social complexity of the COIN operating environment.[1] In COIN there is an enhanced need to interact with the local population since AOs are typically static. The soldiers on the ground often interact with the local population on a daily basis as they conduct patrols in the villages and countryside, demonstrating a security presence and the rule of law. As such, they are both ambassadors and front line gatherers of intelligence on the nature and characteristics of the population. Insurgents also have regular interaction with the population and are typically dependent upon them for support. Thus, it has often been observed that the local population is the main effort for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. In turn, cultural and linguistic awareness are fundamental for developing the trust of the local population. However, the focus should not be limited to teaching the soldiers how to avoid making cultural blunders that may offend local customs; rather, cultural appreciation demonstrates a genuine engagement with the population. It demonstrates respect, and it honours the people it purports to be sacrificing for.

In this article, I will argue that cultural learning, including language proficiency, is paramount to developing the cooperation, trust and respect between the host nation and the coalition partners that is necessary for successful COIN operations. I will also outline some of the main components of the U.S. shift towards greater cultural fluency and then

apply the principles to Canadian Forces (CF) operations, suggesting that the CF should consider adopting a more ambitious program of cultural and language learning consistent with the initiatives undertaken by the U.S.

Securing The Support And Respect Of The Local Population Through Language And Culture

In a conventional war one of the key ongoing objectives is the obtaining and retaining of ground. Opposing armies vie with one another to obtain more of their opponent's territorial possessions with the intent of controlling their key terrain and vital points, which usually entails capturing the heartland or capitol of the opposing force. In counter-insurgency the territory has already been obtained and military forces often operate in the same AO for several months at a time. They often patrol the same geographical area on a daily basis and occupy the same observation posts or check points for weeks on end. This means that the COIN operatives inevitably interact with the general public of the nation in which the operations take place, and so do the insurgent factions.

Thus, it has become generally accepted that in COIN it is imperative to gain the support of the local population as they become the centre of gravity for both sides of the conflict. In his study of what he deems the classic texts of counter-insurgency, Dr. Kenneth Payne points out that:

> *Declaring that the population is central to victory is a staple of counterinsurgency studies, almost invariably featured in the first few pages of the classic texts … Robert Taber, for example, writes that the population is the key to the entire struggle … While for Roger Trinquier, "the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population.*[2]

This fundamental principle of COIN was reaffirmed in the contemporary context by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl as he applied the principles of David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* to his command of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry in Baghdad.[3] Commenting on his experience, he bluntly repeats the maxim that "securing the population and gaining their trust was critical" during operations in Iraq.

Imbedded in the requirement to gain the support and trust of the local population is the need for government stability and legitimacy. In a conventional confrontation the overall objective is to force the formal capitulation of a belligerent government through the sound defeat of its military. The opposing countries act as a unified whole, so the defeat of the military usually entails the complete surrender of the country. However, in a counter-insurgency campaign the host nation usually contains splinter groups that vie for power in one form or another. The main problem is not a belligerent government but a government that does not have the control or cooperation of significant segments of the population. Insurgents build their cause and gain their support out of popular discontent. Thus, the goal in most counter-insurgency operations is to garner public support for the official sovereign while undermining the support for the insurgent groups. Support is won or lost through the population.

The means of achieving this goal must in some way produce the support of the population. Amongst most populations, and especially in conflict-ridden countries, the average person desires a few basic things: security, employment, education, health, a functional economy, adequate food and water supply, a functioning justice system, basic amenities, and cultural integrity. The government should provide most of these basic functions for the population, but in many war-torn and underdeveloped countries the government is unable to provide these basic functions. The CF doctrinal document on COIN—*Counter-insurgency Operations*—clearly states that winning the support of the local population and buttressing the influence of the local government is imperative. The document states:

> *Many insurgencies will develop in failed or failing states where governments have failed to address or satisfy the basic needs of their populace. These needs will differ depending upon the region and culture involved, but in general will include the basic essentials of a stable life, responsible government, religious freedom and economic viability.*[4]

The insurgent groups seek to manipulate this lack in order to stir discontent against the government while simultaneously garnering more support for their cause, which ultimately rests in a promise to provide that which the government cannot provide. The main function of the military then is to help the government provide these basic services so that the population will not have to look to alternative groups to provide their basic needs.

Of these basic functions, those that are associated with cultural integrity often occupy a greater sense of importance. The CFM defines culture as a "web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society."[5] In many cases culture forms the basis of beliefs, including what it means to be human, the relationship between man and a higher power, and forms the basic tenets of participation in a community, which is often essential to individual and collective survival. Despite the fact that in many countries the bulk of the population lacks many of the basic material needs, most insurgent conflicts are waged for reasons that tie into cultural, spiritual, psychological or social needs, which can be categorized as non-material since they reside within the collective consciousness of the communities and cannot be donated from an outside group the same way as material needs can.

Amongst many peoples, respect and honour are important aspects of their culture and traditions. Respect and trust may not be granted easily or quickly despite a UN resolution to provide assistance to the country and its inhabitants. In many cases it will take time and a clear demonstration that the occupying military is genuinely concerned with the welfare of the people of the area. In reference to COIN operations in Iraq, Dr. Sheila Jager says:

> *To be successful, you must understand the Iraqi perspective. Building trust, showing respect, cultivating relationships, building a team, and maintaining patience are all central features of the human terrain system which emphasize the power of people—friendship, trust, understanding—the most decisive factor in winning the war in Iraq.*[6]

Since COIN is more about winning the population than it is about destroying belligerents, gaining the respect and trust is paramount. Language is one of the most important aspects of respect. A person's mother tongue is often central to his or her identity. It is generally through the mother tongue that one learns one's family customs, culture and religion. People often identify with their language as the primary means to differentiate their kin from a foreigner, insider from outsider. Learning the language of the people in one's AO demonstrates a willingness to engage the local inhabitants on their level, through their means. "Historians emphasize that if the counterinsurgent force does not have an intimate knowledge of the language, culture, and history of the host population, there is little hope of winning its political allegiance."[7] Attempts to learn the language and customs of the region demonstrates commitment and a reaching out, a desire to empathize and find common cause. In COIN operations it is important break down the barriers between the locals and the foreign military. Language and cultural sympathy is one of the most effective and productive ways of doing this.

Insurgents often have an advantage in this respect despite all of the atrocities that they commit against the population since they are generally kindred. They share the same language, culture and customs. In many instances they are fighting to preserve the language, customs and culture of a people. The CFM states that "In most COIN operations in which U.S. forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population's interests."[8] Canadian COIN doctrine is equally insistent on the need for cultural awareness and claims: "it is just as important to understand the particular situation and culture in which an insurgency occurs. Without comprehension of the causes and characteristics unique to each insurgency, there will be little hope of successfully countering it."[9] For example, although many Afghans do not support the Taliban, most see them as the primary alternative to the Western backed central government in Kabul. Kabul is seen as the link to the West with its affluence, modernity and international cooperation. However, the Taliban are seen as the preservers of Pashtun culture, language and religion and the defenders of the local way of life against foreign intervention and domination.

On account of the particular nuances of Pashtun tribal culture the Taliban have a natural advantage that they exploit in their own information operations (IO).

Cultural and Linguistic Training Developments in the U.S.

The main impetus for the renewed emphasis on cultural awareness has been born out of the frustrating experiences of commanders and soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most influential proponent of the new movement within the U.S. military has been Lieutenant General David Petraeus. In his article, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," Petraeus discusses fourteen key observations for soldiering in Iraq. Number nine is "cultural awareness is a force multiplier." He states:

> *Working in another culture is enormously difficult if one doesn't understand the ethnic groups, tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings—and their respective viewpoints; the relationships among the various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course, local and national leaders. Understanding of such cultural aspects is essential if one is to help the people build stable political, social, and economic institutions. …It is also clear that people, in general, are more likely to cooperate if those who have power over them respect the culture that gives them a sense of identity and self-worth.*[10]

Thus, it is not simply a matter of avoiding taboos, cultural understanding is essential in order to read the human terrain—how both the population and the insurgents think, act and operate. It is as important as any other aspect of intelligence. General Scales was one of the first to notice the problem, and he articulated it in his article "Culture-Centric Warfare."[11] He believes that the U.S. military lost the initiative gained in the early stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM due to cultural ignorance. He states that "during the early months of occupation, cultural isolation in Iraq created a tragic barrier separating Iraqis of goodwill from the inherent goodness of U.S. soldiers."[12] Dr. Jager concurs, claiming that the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq were operating in a "cultural and historical vacuum" because they did not understand the complex cultural dynamics of the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish tensions that have driven Iraqi politics and society from the colonial era through to the fall of the Saddam regime.[13] Department of Defense (DoD) anthropologist Montgomery McFate adds that this "cultural isolation" was not a singular phenomenon, rather she claims that the U.S. government has not generally understood the nature of their adversaries very well and have repeatedly underestimated them. "Our ethnocentrism, biased assumptions, and mirror-imaging have had negative outcomes during the North Vietnamese offensives of 1968 and 1975, the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989), India's nuclear tests (1998), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), and the Shi'ite transformation of Iran (1979)."[14] Operationally, the American cultural disconnect was made apparent to McFate when a marine told her that "We were focused on broadcast media and metrics. But this had no impact because Iraqis spread information through rumor. We should have been visiting their coffee shops."[15]

In response to this problem, McFate and others have been arguing that the U.S. military needs to look to history for positive precedents of successful integration between cultural specialists and military operations. She points out that a historical precedent exists of successful interaction between anthropology and the military as seen in the First and Second World Wars and other post war counter-insurgency campaigns. She maintains that the military and the anthropology community need to draw upon this tradition and work together for success in Iraq and other small war scenarios. Another proponent of the integration of anthropology into military training and planning is retired French Army Colonel Henri Boré, who argues that the French Army learned the importance of cultural fluency on account of its 200 year tradition of counter-insurgency warfare in which there was good cooperation between the military and academic communities. He claims that "deployed French Army units learn about a foreign country's culture by studying its customs, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions. This anthropology angle became part of the military learning process."[16] During the colonial era (1862 to 1962) there was substantial cooperation between ethno-anthropologists and military commanders and they readily learned from one another.[17] Knowledge of the local population's culture, traditions, customs,

and languages was the key to the success or failure of small-unit leaders.[18] For the French, understanding local customs, traditions and modes of thinking had three key advantages: first, by understanding how the enemy thought, they would be more effective in predicting how they would act; second, it made it easier to connect with the local population in order to build their trust; and third, it provided excellent human intelligence (HUMINT).[19] However, Colonel Boré does not think there are any quick fixes to the problems of cultural ignorance as he explains that developing cultural awareness is a long-term process, one that has evolved for over a hundred years in the French Army.[20]

Photo: Elisabeth Ericson

Montgomery McFate

The British military also has extensive experience as a colonial power, operating largely amongst people of different cultures, languages and religions during its imperial reign. During the height of British colonialism, anthropology was an essential tool for understanding the languages and cultures of the various people the British expansionists interacted with.[21] This involved both the employment of anthropologists and the anthropological training of British soldiers. General Scales points out that:

> *The British Army "seconded" bright officers to various corners of the world to immerse them in the cultures of the Empire and to become intimate with potentates from Egypt to Malaya. Names such as China Gordon and T.E. Lawrence testify to the wisdom of such a custom.*[22]

During the First and Second World Wars the British military employed anthropologists in a number of roles and many became extremely successful spies.[23] Thus, the British military has an institutional culture that makes it more accepting of the need to employ anthropologists and incorporate cultural training and emersion into its doctrinal repertoire. As such, General Scales concludes that "Great Britain's relative success in Basra owes in no small measure to the self-assurance and comfort with foreign culture derived from centuries of practicing the art of soldier diplomacy and liaison."[24]

Such positive examples of culturally attuned soldiers are not absent from the recent history of the U.S. military as it been a standing practice within the Special Forces community to regularly include cultural and language education into its overall training requirements.[25] In his study of the development of the U.S. Special Forces, Tom Clancy with General (retired) Carl Stiner outlined some of the unique training Special Forces personnel undertook during 1960s:

> *Every soldier was provided with a working knowledge of the principle language in his group's area of focus … Later, language proficiency was increased enormously, and Special Forces soldiers were expected to devote as long as six months to a year, full-time to attaining fluency in their language … Similarly, each soldier was provided with cultural training, as appropriate, so that when he went into a country, he know how to behave in ways that would win friends and not alienate the people he was there to help, and thus harm the mission.*[26]

The arguments of McFate, Petraeus and Scales, as well as the experience of commanders and soldiers in the field have resulted in a transformation in thinking about counter-insurgency operations and the need for cultural and linguistic familiarity. The U.S. government and military have responded to the need for better cultural awareness and language training and have established numerous educational programs. Dr. Jager claims that the post-Rumsfeld Pentagon has emphasized cultural knowledge as a major part of its counter-insurgency strategy.[27] One of the leading DoD documents that outlined this shift

in thinking was the *Quadrennial Defence Review Report (2006)*. Amongst its numerous recommendations on linguistic skills and cultural competence, it states:

> *The Department must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision—from the strategic to the tactical. The Department must foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War.*[28]

At the national level it was recognized that there was a need to develop language initiatives amongst primary and secondary students. In January 2006, President George W. Bush announced the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI). The program was a result of a stark realization that there was a desperate lack of training in Arabic language and culture in American universities.[29] It was also a result of this transformation in thinking that identified a link between language proficiency and national security.[30] The Department of Education reports that the program focuses on the Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian languages and the Indic, Persian, and Turkic language families.[31] "This initiative represents recognition that foreign language skills are essential for engaging foreign governments and peoples, especially in critical world regions, and for promoting understanding, conveying respect for other cultures, and encouraging reform."[32] Engaging students in the early years of their education allows them the time required to become proficient in a foreign language, but more importantly it helps students develop a deeper appreciation of the differences between cultures as language is an important aspect of cultural nuances. Focusing on the youth also ensures that the U.S. will have sufficient depth of cultural and linguistic proficiency for the future by building a lasting capacity.

Within the military there are numerous language and cultural training initiatives, and it has begun "incorporating cultural awareness into almost all levels of training, from a general concept approach in accession training, to more specific and even formal pre-deployment training for troops."[33] In the United States Air Force (USAF), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the Air University to incorporate language training into its Air Command and Staff College and Air War College curriculum for the 2007 academic year.[34] The Marine Corps has opened the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL).[35] "According to Gen. Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the initial focus will be on the Arab culture, Arab language and on Islam. The eventual goal is for every Marine to have a language specialty and a regional area of expertise."[36] At the strategic level, the DoD recently begun to include lessons on National Cultures in the standard *Strategic Thinking* course and a new series of *Regional Studies* courses.[37]

Part of the shift has involved building upon pre-existing programs and positions such as the Foreign Area Officers (FAO). With regard to the FAO, the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006)* recommended:

> *Current and emerging challenges highlight the increasing importance of Foreign Area Officers, who provide Combatant Commanders with political military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness. The Military Departments will increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers seconded to foreign military services, in part by expanding their Foreign Area Officer programs … Foreign Area Officers will also be aligned with lower echelons of command to apply their knowledge at the tactical level.*[38]

According to the U.S. Army, "Foreign Area Officers serve where expert Army officers are needed to match their professional military skills and knowledge with their regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military relationships."[39] The United States Marine Corps (USMC) outlines a similar role and responsibility for the FAO who "uses the language and knowledge of military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world to perform duties as directed."[40] In order to achieve their missions abroad, the FAO undergoes an extensive training regime that includes language training, post-graduate work in an area of specialty, and an in-country immersion program.[41] Major Ben Connable is an FAO who served as the program lead for the Marine Corps Cultural Intelligence Program from 2006-2007, and based

upon his experience in Iraq he is convinced that "a properly trained, manned, and supported team consisting of a FAO, a CA [Civil Affairs] unit and a PSYOP [psychological operation] unit should be able to provide the kind of cultural expertise that staffs found lacking in 2003 and 2004."[42] During his tour, he found that the FAO program was successful, but claims there were not enough of them on the ground to adequately advise the commanders.[43]

Nevertheless, the DoD is concerned that it may not be able to develop all of its cultural expertise organically, so it has also begun to augment numerous levels of command with professionally trained cultural experts in line with recommendations from military anthropologists such as Dr. McFate. At the tactical level this has led to the establishment of human terrain teams (HTT). The Pentagon's HTT program involves assigning anthropologists and other social scientists to combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan.[44] The Army has devoted substantial resources to this project and it appears to be effective thus far. Citing a case involving a civilian anthropologist referred to only as Tracy, David Rhode of the *New York Times* reports, "Tracy's team's ability to understand subtle points of tribal relations—in one case spotting a land dispute that allowed the Taliban to bully parts of a major tribe—has won the praise of officers who say they are seeing concrete results."[45]

Courtesy of author

Members of the Human Terrain Team, 4th BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, talk with Sheikh Amer al-Mamouri, a Sons of Iraq leader in the northern Babil Province Sept 4

However, despite early signs of success, the HTT program has been the target of criticism both from within the military and from the academic community. Anthropologists have been especially vocal in their protest. The American Anthropological Association (AAA) has formally discouraged its members from taking part in HTT programs, claiming that it violates the AAA's code of ethics and that a military partnership would place anthropologists and their persons of study in harms way.[46] As a result, at least one thousand anthropologists have signed a pledge in which they swore they would reject Pentagon funding for counter-insurgency work in the Middle East.[47] Professor of Anthropology Hugh Gusterson suggests the reason for this is that "anthropology is, by many measures, the academy's most left-leaning discipline, and many people become anthropologists out of a visceral sympathy for the kinds of people who all too often show up as war's collateral damage."[48] McFate agrees, claiming that since Vietnam anthropologists have distanced themselves from government, and especially the military, due to post-modern and post-colonial tendencies.[49]

However, the scepticism goes both ways since the U.S. military is also leery of the field of anthropology, which is generally not respected in military universities and security think tanks.[50] An avid opponent of the HTT programs, Major Connable argues that the new trend involving the hiring of academics to develop HTT programs is misguided and ignores the fact that the military has done a reasonably good job at adjusting to the cultural component of their AO.[51] He claims that the military has been typically faced with a gap in cultural understanding at the beginning of operations, yet it has nevertheless adapted quickly.[52] He observed soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan engaging in more productive cultural bridge-building activities without HTT support. "Without input from the human terrain system (HTS)[53] reach back cells, FAOs, CA officers, and PSYOP officers have been actively engaging with local leadership and proposing culturally savvy solutions since the onset of the war."[54] He believes that the military should be developing its own long-term and institutionally sustainable systems so that it will be able to build upon lessons learned instead of entering new theatres of operations in a state of cultural ignorance and only seeking greater awareness after the fact. By relying upon outside experts the military would lose the organizational depth that has helped it succeed in other areas. As such, "the fundamental

flaws in the HTS concept put the system at cross-purposes with the services' short-term goals and future needs."[55] Ultimately, he is concerned that "deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era."[56]

Cultural Awareness and the Levels of Military Activities

In her study of cultural awareness in counter-insurgency, Dr. Jager identifies different levels of cultural understanding and indicates that different levels require different approaches.[57] The following section outlines the variations between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of cultural awareness and linguistic proficiency. The HTT and FAO programs, as well as the battlefield integration of cultural awareness suggested by Major Connable, are primarily tactical approaches. "Cultural knowledge as applied to the level of operations and tactics is concerned with the practical application of this knowledge on the battlefield."[58] At the tactical level there should be at least one person per combat team that is familiar with the cultural and linguistic climate. This person's role is twofold: first, he collects information and intelligence by carefully observing the cultural cues in the AO. As a cultural specialist, he should be able to detect the nuances in the cultural landscape and then report on the meaning of variations. His second role is as the spokesperson for the COIN force, both directly through his ability to communicate the message in the language of the people, but also in the goodwill demonstrated by his familiarity with the local language and customs.

Of course, no amount of linguistic training will replace the need for imbedded interpreters. Since they possess a level of cultural and linguistic fluency that cannot be taught, interpreters from the host nation are necessary in often providing a vital link between the COIN forces and the local inhabitants. In its Appendix C, the CFM outlines the use of linguistic support and advises on the employment of interpreters. "Though Soldiers and Marines should gain as much cultural information as possible before deploying, their interpreters can be valuable resources for filling gaps."[59] The CFM also points out that a degree of cultural familiarity is required in order to develop the requisite rapport with the interpreters and to employ them effectively.

Better developed strategic and operational level awareness is also needed, often referred to as a part of strategic communication. Dr. Jager argues that "there has been a great deal of concern with the application of cultural knowledge on the battlefield and far less interest in how this knowledge might be applied to formulating an overarching strategic framework on counterinsurgency."[60] Having anthropologists on staff would be more useful at this level. Soldiers can be taught what kind of cultural learning they need to have for the battlefield, but the DoD requires trained academics for the abstract cultural insights. The strategic level of communications involves the government and is concerned with selling the message to the people back home and in the AO. Cultural and language learning at this level involves understanding what does and does not work within a particular cultural framework and then learning an effective means of communicating it to the population, which inevitably involves speaking the language of the people. Richard Halloran defines strategic communications as:

> *... a way of persuading other people to accept one's ideas, policies, or courses of action … It means persuading neutrals to come over to your side or at least stay neutral. In the best of all worlds, it means persuading adversaries that you have the power and the will to prevail over them.*[61]

In order to do this, knowing the audience and its language is essential. For messages to be effective they require a detailed knowledge of nuance which is often lost in the translation process. An understanding of nuance requires individuals who are fluent in the cultures and languages of both the host nation and the expeditionary forces. Dr. Kenneth Payne points out that "understanding the audience requires research. The goal, in the end, is to segment the audience and deliver a tailored message to each segment, since a relevant

message is more likely to be persuasive."[62] It is at this level of communication warfare that the DoD has perhaps had greater difficulty and less strategic success. When asked what was puzzling about America's struggles with Osama bin Laden, Singaporean diplomat and scholar, Kishore Mahbubani, aptly replied: "How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world's greatest communication society?"[63] Of course the answer is quite simple: bin Laden has been effective because he knows how to speak the language of Islam to its adherents. Graduating only six Arabic specialists a year, America has not been able to speak to Islam.[64]

At the operational level, there are some areas of military operations that will require in-depth knowledge of the cultural terrain and others that will not. Areas like intelligence, plans, PSYOPS, and IO all need to be highly familiar with the cultural context of operations. For success in PSYOPS one must know how the population thinks and what influences it in order to have a positive effect. There is no point in developing an elaborate television campaign for a population that does not have electricity. In many areas the primary means of passing information is still word of mouth, so the message will have to be in the vernacular. The CFM emphasizes the importance of cultural understanding for intelligence. It states:

> *Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the [host nation] government. Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decision-making processes of individuals and groups.*[65]

The CFM also covers the various aspects of culture and society pertinent to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as the human dimension is recognized as being as important as the terrain or the enemy's order of battle.[66]

Recommendations for a Canadian Approach

Since 1948, the CF has been involved in over seventy-five UN and NATO missions throughout the world.[67] During these missions Canadians were regularly called upon to interact with the local populations and work in conjunction with people from a wide variety of cultures with a number of different languages. As such, the CF is rarely employed in situations where it is required to engage an enemy in armed conflict. When it does, it is usually in the context of COIN and PSO, which require the same manner of support from the local population as outlined above. In many instances, a major COIN or PSO will comprise a quarter to a half of a soldier's career. For example, the conflict in Cyprus, OPERATION SNOWGOOSE (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]), occupied the CF for over 30 years (1974–present) and was the only major operational tour for many Canadian soldiers during the late 1970s and throughout most of the 1980s. Missions to the former Yugoslavia occupied the CF for at least 15 years and better cultural, linguistic and historical awareness would have been invaluable in preparing for and operating in these missions. The CF has been involved in operations of various degrees of intensity and commitment in Haiti for a number of years. While the language gap is not as prohibitive since French is the official language of the country, cultural variations are an important factor. The CF, in conjunction with the UN, has also been involved in numerous operations in Africa. Missions to the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia would have benefited from a better understanding of the cultural factors and the nature of tribal alliances. Thus, even though the specifics for each conflict vary, the general patterns of African culture, conflict, post-colonial history, and tribal alliances pertain to nearly every player in the region. So, while each mission might have only lasted for a relatively short duration, the CF has had numerous missions in this war-ravaged region and can anticipate more in the near future. The same applies to the Middle East, whose countries share amongst themselves many of the same aspects of culture, language, history and religion. Thus, considering the one constant in CF operations over the last six decades is a need for mastery of the human terrain of the AO, one would think that cultural and linguistic training would be the cornerstone of CF operational and readiness training, and form the basis of its military attitude towards foreign regions. However, this is not the case. The CF provides minimal cultural and linguistic training to deployed troops and has not incorporated in-depth cultural awareness into the fundamental training agenda.[68] In addition, the CF Foreign

Language Training Centre does not currently operate regular theatre-specific language and cultural training programs.[69] Thus, the deploying soldier is left to his or her own devices in the attainment of a historical, cultural or linguistic familiarity with the AO.

Source: LFWA-JTFW

January 17, 2007—A Canadian CIMIC Officer speaks with elders at the Sperwan School in Panjwaii District during his first tour in Afghanistan with Task Force 3-06. He served 9 months as a CIMIC Operator during that tour, and is returning to the same position for another 9 months in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the CF should consider taking some important steps to improve its cultural and linguistic proficiency relative to the initiatives already becoming common within the U.S. military. These steps would be in concert with CF COIN doctrine, which places a high importance on cultural training and proficiency for deployed personnel.[70] The initiatives offered below comprise two main elements. First, the CF should establish a program to develop highly trained cultural and linguistic specialists similar to the American FAO and offer this program to intelligent and motivated non-commissioned members (NCMs) and junior officers. The program would develop general area specialists for contingency purposes, as well as establish a concentration on cultural and linguistic training for current or pending operations. The training could develop the candidates with no background; however, an emphasis would be placed upon recruiting personnel who already have mixed cultural experience and/or heritage. The second part of the initiative would involve a more comprehensive training of deploying non-specialists and the expansion of existing educational programs such as the Officer Professional Military Education (OPME).

One of the main objections to this approach is that it is simply impractical. Language training is difficult and often has little transferability. In order to properly train a soldier in a language it would take nearly one year in language school at near full-time hours. This would be a year that they would not be employed at a battalion and a year without much practice in basic soldier skills. It is also considered spurious because of the changing nature of the battlespace. Years spent teaching a soldier Pashtun, for example, would be wasted if he were deployed to Haiti. There is also the problem of regional dialects and scant transferable skills. The language taught in the classroom may be hardly discernable from

that spoken by the local population due to use of idioms and local dialects. The less literate and the more isolated a community is the more likely their language will have numerous differences from that of their neighbours.

Although these concerns may be valid in the short term, they do not properly pertain to the nature and duration of the typical pattern of Canadian expeditionary operations as outlined above. COIN and PSO are lengthy operations, so when the Canadian government is prepared to send troops on these types of missions, the CF should begin theatre-specific cultural and language training. By developing area specialists, the CF could be prepared for contingency operations in times of crisis. Moreover, these area cultural and language specialists could be trained to cover the spectrum of most likely operating locations. Specialists could learn Spanish with a concentration in South American culture and customs; or Arabic with a specialization in Middle Eastern and Muslim Customs; or French and English speakers could develop skill with regional dialects in African and Asian cultures, etc. Once specialists develop an area of cultural and linguistic proficiency they could be trained in mission-specific cultural circumstances in a relatively short period of time, recognizing that most sub-cultures have been heavily influenced by overarching dominant cultures.

In order to avoid classroom obsolescence, cultural and linguistic specialists could be sent on exchange programs similar to those offered by many university level international development or cultural anthropology programs. After a couple of months of basic cultural and linguistic training in the classroom, a candidate could be embedded in a cultural context where he would be expected to interact with the local population on a fulltime basis for several months. These soldiers could be attached to a willing non-governmental organization (NGO), enabling them to understand the inter-agency cooperation component of the COIN and PSO environment. It could also help in the establishment of ties between the military and other organizations that regularly work in war zones. General Scales proposed a similar approach saying, "A means for creating more global scouts might be a sponsorship program by the services that requires and provides funds for officers and non-commissioned officers to spend long periods in foreign countries."[71] Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen of the Australian Army is a good example of the by-product of this approach, and is the kind of leader that is able to combine in-depth cultural awareness with COIN savvy. As a young Captain he spent considerable time living in the villages of West Java as a part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language.[72] He is the by-product of a military that supports cultural training as a key component in effective COIN. Now he works with the U.S. military and is one of the Pentagon's key specialists in the cultural side of COIN.

These specialists, even if their specialty is focused on one area of the world, would be better suited to learn other cultures more quickly because of their prior training and experience. They would be selected based upon their aptitude for language learning and general good conduct; have to be highly motivated individuals who could operate independently and within a team; and be someone who could both retain basic soldier skills while training in specialist skills. Operationally, they would have to be committed individuals who were willing to deploy at a much higher rate than regular line units. In many respects they would have to possess a number of the same traits as Special Forces personnel.

The envisioned program would have many similarities to the U.S. FAO program as outlined above. The program would require:

- selection;
- a basic course to introduce the candidates to the theory and requirements of a cultural-language expert;
- culture and language training from six months to one year; and
- cultural emersion for another six months.

Individuals who have lived in more than one culture for extended periods of time would be able to forgo the third and fourth phases and be employed directly in the trade after completing the basic orientation. Considering the ethnic diversity of the Canadian population, it should not be difficult to find individuals with cultural fluency in every potential AO. There could be incentives for cultural experts such as signing bonuses and specialist pay that would encourage recruitment from ethnic minorities and improve subsequent retention.

For the non-specialist, a second far less intensive program could be introduced. As a part of the new culture centric approach, General Scales recommends that "every young soldier should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make every soldier a linguist but to make every soldier a diplomat with enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the street."[73] As units move through their readiness cycles they could start introducing more language and cultural components to their work-up training. This would not involve prolonged and detailed language instruction, but the soldiers would be expected to operate at a basic level of linguistic and cultural proficiency. As such, while a soldier would still be dependent upon interpreters, he would be able to follow certain aspects of a conversation between two native speakers. More importantly, a linguistically trained soldier would demonstrate to the local population a willingness to engage them at their own level and in their own tongue.

Source: ctv.ca. Wed. Jan. 3 2007

Canadian Radio Station to Hit Afghan Airwaves.

Another component of cultural training would be the inclusion of cultural and historical training in pre-existing programs. The CF already offers the advanced OPME program for officers.[74] It is currently a six-course program designed to augment an officer's professional education. Additional courses, such as a history program in key CF operations—Afghanistan, Haiti and the Former Yugoslavia—would be a practical addition to the curriculum. When soldiers are in the early stages of a deployment cycle they would be encouraged to take such a course through distance learning. Courses such as these would be instrumental in helping soldiers, especially team leaders, to develop an appreciation of the context of a conflict. Additional courses in Afghan Tribal culture and Islam could also be offered. There are numerous advantages to adding these courses to pre-existing educational programs since infrastructure and resources are already in place, and they would only

require additional course development at the learning centres. I am extremely confident that courses in Afghan culture and history would be particularly popular and provide forums for active discussion and debate. Programs such as this are instrumental in developing the CF as a learning institution.

An innovative example of the use of Canadian cultural and language-based expertise within the CF already exists: RANA-FM Radio. Rana Radio is an information and media operations initiative that utilizes Canadian citizens with a background in the culture and language of Afghanistan to communicate on the air with the people of Kandahar. Canadian Pashtuns with no previous broadcasting experience are recruited to work at the station and speak on air.[75] While providing a valuable service they are able to communicate a pro-government message to the population, and at the same time gather information and opinions from the population about the coalition presence. With a minimal operating cost, the radio station is able to reach upwards of 360,000 people.[76] Station manager David Bailey believes Rana Radio is an important part of the overall effort since "winning the information war is crucial where the Taliban is calling all the shots."[77]

Conclusion

The Canadian Forces has stepped into a cycle of regular expeditionary force deployments since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With ongoing humanitarian crises and genocidal conflicts throughout the world, it is likely that this current pace of operations will continue into the foreseeable future. In order to maintain this tempo, the CF will have to learn to fight smarter, not harder. To do this, soldiers are going to need to become better educated, better trained and capable of performing an increasing scope of tasks in a variety of theatres. Improving linguistic and cultural fluency is an important part of becoming a smarter and more efficient military. There is no doubt that improved cultural and linguistic fluency can pay huge dividends when operating in regions that are notoriously xenophobic. The CF should consider adopting some of the initiatives that have recently been incorporated in the U.S. military such as the FAO and the HTT programs. It should also to continue to encourage uniquely Canadian programs such as RANA-FM Radio as a means of winning the information domain, which is quickly becoming the battlefield of the 21st century.

About the Author...

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Endnotes

1. Although the arguments put forth refer specifically to COIN, the same elements apply equally to peace support operations (PSO) or any variation of UN intervention missions.
2. Kenneth Payne, "Waging Communication War," *Parameters* (Summer 2008): 39; *referencing* Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Paladin, 1970), 12; and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 9.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, U.S. Army, "Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People are the Key," *Military Review* (March-April 2009): 73; *referencing* David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory*

and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
4. Canadian Forces Publication, B-GL-323-004/FP-003, *Counter-insurgency Operations* (National Defence: Ottawa, December 2008):1-12, http://lfdts.army.mil.ca.
5. U.S. Department of the Army, *The US Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 89.
6. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, "On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge," *Strategic Studies Institute* (November 2007):11, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.
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8. CFM, 40.
9. *Counter-insurgency Operations*, 2-2.
10. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* (January-February 2006): 8.
11. McFate claims that the July 2004 General Scales article in the Naval War College's Proceedings magazine was one of the first of its kind with regard to cultural awareness. Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship," *Military Review*, (March-April, 2005): 24.
12. Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), "Culture-Centric Warfare," *The Naval Institute: Proceedings* (October 2004), http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1004_Culture-P1,00.html.
13. Jager, "On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge," 1.
14. Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 38: 42.
15. George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the 'War on Terror'?," *The New Yorker* (December 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/061218fa_fact2.
16. Colonel (retired) Henri Boré, French Army, "Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Military," *Military Review* (March-April 2009): 65.
17. Boré, "Complex Operations in Africa," 66.
18. Ibid., 67.
19. Ibid., 68.
20. Ibid., 71.
21. McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency," 28.
22. Scales, "Culture-Centric Warfare."
23. McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency," 29.
24. Scales, "Culture-Centric Warfare."
25. Major Adriane B. Craig, USAF, "Cultural Communication: Challenges to Strategic Communication," graduate paper, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, (Maxwell Air Force Base: May 2006).
26. Tom Clancy with General (retired) Carl Stiner and Tony Koltz, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (New York: Putnam's Sons, 2002), 134.
27. Jager, "On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge," 3.
28. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 6, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf
29. For example, American universities graduated a total of six Arabic majors in 2002. Croke, "Rethinking the War on Terrorism," 6.
30. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, Enhancing Foreign Language Proficiency in the United States: Preliminary Results of the National Security Language Initiative, (Washington, DC: 2008), http://www.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/competitiveness/nsli/nsli-preliminary-results.pdf.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Craig, "Cultural Communication."
34. Ibid., referencing Gen Michael T. Mosely, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (address, Air Force Association Symposium, Orlando, Fla., February 2, 2006), http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.

asp?id=216.
35. Ibid., referencing Geoff Fein, “Marine Corps Expanding Role for GWOT,” Defense Daily International (August 5, 2005): 2.
36. Ibid.
37. Jager, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge,” 6.
38. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006).
39. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet, P600–3–48, “Foreign Area Officer,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 1987): 1.
40. Marine Corps Order P1200.7V, pt. I.
41. U.S Army Pamphlet, “Foreign Area Officer,” 5. The FAO training program is as follows:
(1) FAO Entry Course: a short introductory course, taught at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, that introduces the newly designated Foreign Area Officer to the basic FAO missions and skills.
(2) Entry-level Language Training: Basic foreign language training is taught at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California for most languages. The courses vary in length from six to twelve months, depending on the difficulty of the language studied.
(3) Graduate Education: Officers will normally earn a master’s degree in an area studies curriculum at a proponent approved graduate institution. Some officers will enter the FAO program with a graduate degree in a closely related discipline and will have met the graduate-level objective.
(4) In-Country Studies: In-country studies designed to immerse the Foreign Area Officer in a foreign cultural and linguistic environment; provide advanced language studies; and develop a sense of region and country through a program of travel, research, and study. In most cases, the Foreign Area Officer attends a foreign military or civilian course of instruction. The duration of in-country studies varies from twelve to eighteen months. In other cases the officer will serve as an exchange officer in a foreign military unit.
42. Major Ben Connable, USMC, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Cultural Military Competence,” Military Review (March-April 2009): 61.
43. Ibid., 60.
44. David Rohde, “Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones,” New York Times, October 5, 2007, Asia Pacific section, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html.
45. Ibid. Rohde discusses a couple of further instances in which the program has been effective:
(1) “In one of the first districts the team entered, Tracy identified an unusually high concentration of widows in one village ... Their lack of income created financial pressure on their sons to provide for their families, she determined, a burden that could drive the young men to join well-paid insurgents. Citing Tracy’s advice, American officers developed a job training program for the widows.”
(2) “In another district, the anthropologist interpreted the beheading of a local tribal elder as more than a random act of intimidation: the Taliban’s goal, she said, was to divide and weaken the Zadran, one of south-eastern Afghanistan’s most powerful tribes. If Afghan and American officials could unite the Zadran, she said, the tribe could block the Taliban from operating in the area.”
46. American Anthropological Association Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System Project, October 31, 2007, http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/Human-Terrain-System-Statement.cfm.
47. Hugh Gusterson, “When Professors Go to War,” Foreign Policy (July 2008).
48. Gusterson, “When Professors Go to War.”
49. McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency,” 27.
50. Ibid., 26.
51. Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket,” 57.
52. Ibid.
53. Human terrain system is synonymous with human terrain team.
54. Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket,” 62.
55. Ibid., 59.
56. Ibid., 58.
57. Jager, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge,” 3-4.
58. Ibid., 9.
59. CFM, 341.
60. Jager, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge,” 4.

61. Richard Halloran, “Strategic Communication,” Parameters (Autumn 2007): 6.
62. Kenneth Payne, “Waging Communication War,” Parameters (Summer 2008): 41.
63. Interview by Kishore Mahbubani, “China, U.S., Europe — Whose Century?” The Globalist (March 2005), http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4406.
64. See note 28.
65. CFM, 80.
66. CFM, 83-113.
67. For a complete list and explanation of CF missions see the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command website, Past Operations, http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/pastops-eng.asp.
68. Emily Spencer and Tony Balasevicius, “Crucible of Success: Cultural Intelligence and the Modern Battlespace,” Canadian Military Journal 9.3, (2009):44.
69. Canadian Forces Foreign Language Training Centre website: http://www.cfls-elfc.forces.gc.ca/pro-ser/fl-le-eng.asp.
70. Counter-insurgency Operations, Chapter 6, Section 12, “Cultural Awareness.”
71. Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare.”
72. Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on Terror’?”
73. Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare.”
74. Officer Professional Military Education website: http://www.opme.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp.
75. CTV News, “Canadian radio station to hit Afghan airwaves,” Associated Press, January 3, 2007, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070103/afghan_radio_070103?s_name=&no_ads=.
76. Kristina Davis, “RANA-FM hits the airwaves in Kandahar,” The Maple Leaf, January 31, 2007, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=3387.
77. Ibid.

DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD PART I: ULTRA AND OPERATION TOTALIZE NORMANDY, AUGUST 8, 1944

David R. O'Keefe

In intelligence, as with history, it is unusual when a single piece of information surfaces that reveals the complete story. Rather, it is the collection of small, seemingly insignificant scraps of information that provide, when placed in the appropriate context, the proper framework for analysis. The challenge for the intelligence professional and decision maker is to place this information within the correct context (a challenge of particular import when that context is incomplete, corrupt or evolutionary in nature as was the case during the planning for one of the largest operations in Canadian Army history—Operation Totalize on August 8, 1944).

Increasingly, Totalize has surpassed the raid at Dieppe as the premier Canadian operation studied at staff schools internationally. By no means a disaster, the operation designed by 2nd Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, and planned under the auspices of General H. D. G. Crerar's First Canadian Army, is viewed as a much-hyped "white elephant" for failing to capture the long sought after town of Falaise and to live up to its billing as the "Amiens" of 1944. Plagued by over-planning, over-indulgence of firepower and excessive caution on Simonds' part, critics view Totalize at best as a "limited success" that played a leading role in the eventual "incomplete victory" in the Falaise gap.[1] The key to failure they point out is Simonds' rigid adherence to his two-phased plan that called for a seven-hour "pause" between phases. This pause, Simonds reasoned, was necessary as intelligence led him to believe that his forces would meet two SS panzer divisions in prepared positions around the town of Bretteville-sur-Laize in Phase II; something he maintained would require a second heavy bombing strike to deal with in an effort to break through the Normandy "hinge" and reach Falaise. As critics charge, a pause of that length in mobile operations is simply an "eternity," something that ironically stripped the Canadian attack of crucial momentum and afforded their German counterparts with a crucial window of opportunity to block the way to Falaise and wrestle Totalize to the ground.[2] To compound matters, some Flying Fortresses in the second strike hit elements of the Phase II assault divisions, causing delay and disruption while the remainder unloaded on a relatively empty Bretteville line. Unknown to Simonds, both SS panzer divisions used Bretteville as a temporary waypoint during regrouping for the counterattack at Mortain. By the time the bombs fell around 1400 hrs on 8 August, the 1st SS Panzer Division was 70 kilometres away fighting the Americans, while the 12th SS was entangled with the British west of the Orne River. Fuelling the controversy further were post-battle comments by Major-General George Kitching (4th Canadian Armoured Division) who claimed that both he and his 1st Polish Armoured division counterpart Major-General Stanislaw Maczek expressed concern about the negative effect the pause would have on the natural rhythm and momentum of battle.[3] To their dismay, and for reasons not understood at the time, Simonds would not comply and cancel the second bombing strike. Likewise, to the men in the lead elements of Phase II who stood to in their tanks and armoured vehicles for seven hours chomping at the bit, the decision seemed incongruous; with Phase I a success, their dander up and the road to Falaise wide open, why wait?[4] Further enflaming the issue, 12th SS Commander Kurt Meyer compared Simonds' decision to a "feeding pause" during a cavalry charge. To Meyer, Simonds missed a glorious opportunity as the road to Falaise lay wide open for twelve crucial hours from midnight on 7 August until noon the following day. Only "60 men and 3 Tiger tanks" allegedly stood in the way of the Canadian juggernaut and ultimate victory at Falaise.[5] As a result, critics conjecture that if Simonds had not been misled by his intelligence, he would have obtained the situational awareness needed well in advance to fundamentally alter the course of Totalize and boldly plunge his forces down the road to Falaise sealing off the German Army to the west before the nascent battle of the Falaise pocket turned into the battle of the Falaise Gap.

Building the Context

With the failure of Operation Spring on July 25–26, 1944, Simonds' 2nd Canadian Corps settled into two weeks of regrouping while attention focused on the advance of the Americans towards Avranches and the British Army towards Vire in Operation Bluecoat. In order to support these operations, Montgomery ordered First Canadian Army to put in a series of holding attacks along Verrières Ridge while Simonds prepared for a renewed assault down the Falaise road no later than 8 August. With the fluid situation on the American and British fronts and the potential of a German collapse in the air, the "whip was out," and Montgomery demanded intense offensive initiative. To impress this point, he relieved Major-General Erskine of the famed Desert Rats as an example to other commanders in Normandy. According to Montgomery, Erskine "would not fight his division nor take risks" and with "great vistas opening up ahead" the commander of 21st Army Group wanted generals "who will put their heads down and go like hell."[6]

Three days earlier, Simonds met with his divisional and brigade commanders to assess past, present and future operations.[7] The intent was to rally sagging spirits in the wake of the costly and controversial Operation Spring and inculcate both veteran and green divisions alike with the desired "killer instinct" needed for the next crack at Falaise. As such, an aggressiveness and urgency unseen in the previous weeks coloured the meeting, and Simonds reiterated that when the next attempt came, "no division will stop until every reserve had been employed—there will be no holding back."[8] It was clear that time had come to throw caution to the wind, and Simonds demanded they not "stop because the forward battalions are stopped, nor … stop until every reserve has been employed and used up."[9]Rationalizing his position, the Corps Commander explained that if the war was to be won in the near future, it could only be done by a "knock-out blow" and the present situation must be "exploited to the fullest extent … [and] … battle-tired troops must be pushed to the bitter end if need be."[10]

The next day Simonds presented his outline plan for Totalize to Crerar who seized upon its "historic" potential promising that, "we shall make the 8th of August 1944 an even blacker day for the German Armies than … twenty six years ago."[11] Unlike Operation Spring, the objective of Totalize was straightforward—break through and capture the commanding ground around Falaise.[12] Although the objective was indeed straightforward, the method for carrying it out was not. Based on the latest intelligence from a combination of Ultra and other sources, both First Canadian Army and Simonds knew that the German position south of Caen relied on two defensive lines: one atop Verrières Ridge and the other which was embryonic in nature and was around Bretteville-sur-Laize, four kilometres to the south. In these positions, one regiment from each the 1st and 9th SS supported by tanks and self-propelled guns held the forward line along Verrières while the remaining infantry regiments fortified the second defensive line around Bretteville. These reserve regiments, along with the "bloodstained remnants" of the 12th SS Panzer Division, would form the nucleus of the second defensive line. Simonds planned for two "break-in" operations in succession to pave the way for the eventual "breakout" and capture of Falaise.[13] To effectively "break-into" both lines, Simonds requested support from the heavy bombers of Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command and the United States 8th Air Force to augment the tactical air power supplied by the AEAF.

To overcome the first defensive line on Verrières, Simonds elected to attack under the cover of darkness with two divisions supported by a combination of artillery and RAF heavy bombers dropping a mixture of high explosive and fragmentation ordnance. The intent was to pulverize the German positions and breach the line in order to set up another "break-in" assault on the Bretteville line in Phase II. Fearing that his Phase II assault divisions would face diminishing artillery support as they reached Bretteville, Simonds ordered a second bombing to begin 14 hours after the Phase I H-Hour to obviate a lengthy pause to reposition artillery and maintain a "high tempo."[14] Ideally, aerial bombs would replace artillery shells to bridge the gap and avoid the loss of speed and momentum, while at the same time provide flank protection and a rolling barrage for armour as they hit the Bretteville line.[15]

However, no sooner had the ink dried on the first draft; developments on the Canadian front transformed the planning of Totalize.

The first week of August was a desperate time for the Nazi War effort as Germany faced resistance on the Eastern Front and the consequences of the attempt on Hitler's life. In an effort to dramatically alter the fortunes of war and offset anxiety caused by the American breakout at St. Lo, the Nazi leader chose to embark on a desperate military gamble in Normandy. Instead of withdrawing in an orderly fashion in front of the surging American armies, Hitler chose instead to roll the iron dice and launch a counterattack with the exhausted panzer divisions that remained in Normandy. Commencing on the night of 2–3 August, elements of four panzer divisions plus infantry and mixed battle groups began to move westward to their assembly area near Domefront at the western edge of the Normandy salient. Their task, in the Hitler-inspired Operation Lüttich, was to sever American forces in Brittany from their lines of communication by capturing the coastal town of Avranches.

Starting 2 August, the day after Simonds delivered his outline plan to Crerar, a series of Ultra signals from Hut 3 at Bletchley Park made it clear that the holding role assigned to First Canadian Army was not working. During a 48-hour period, no less than three panzer divisions—the 9th SS, 10th SS and 21st Panzer—moved west to counter the Allied threats near Caumont and the Domefront. Unaware that a major counterattack was brewing, the First Canadian Army believed that, despite the moves, the German High Command would continue to hold the Caen hinge firm, stop the British at Vire in order to withdraw imperilled units and employ air power in lieu of ground forces against the American forces pouring through at Avranches.[16] A feisty Montgomery concluded that the "bolts to the hinge" had loosened to the point where "the enemy front … could be made to disintegrate completely" and instructed "once a gap appears in the enemy front we must press into it, and through it, and beyond it, into the enemy rear areas."[17] With these events, and Montgomery's signal, the planning for Totalize was invigorated—particularly when he advanced the operation 24 hours and ordered the attack to be launched "as early as possible" but "no later than the 8th … preferably by the 7th."[18]

By 5 August, however, the swift-changing intelligence picture on the Canadian front created a mixture of confusion and optimism at Crerar's headquarters. The urgent news from Ultra, signalled at top priority, revealed the pullout of the 1st SS from the Verrières line. Immediately, Crerar ordered Simonds' divisions to "stick their necks out" to corroborate and cover the reports and any subsequent action based upon them.[19] The probe revealed a softening of the German front but not a complete withdrawal; the results did not convince First Canadian Army that the "thinning" of the line south of Caen signalled a major shift in German strategy.[20] Rather, it appeared that nothing more than the normal redistribution of reserves, or perhaps the abandonment of the Verrières line in favour of the more promising position at Bretteville, was occurring. As Crerar told subordinates that morning: "One thing is certain … he will not unduly weaken the vital northern hinge … so long as he intends to fight it out in Normandy."[21] Within this paradigm, nobody associated with the planning of Totalize fathomed a scenario where the German High Command would intentionally and unnecessarily risk "the hinge" in an unsound operation of war. Simonds agreed wholeheartedly with this assessment, particularly when Ultra revealed that 12th and 1st SS had moved towards Bretteville and had been replaced by the 89th and 272nd infantry divisions.[22] Within this context, it seemed to Simonds and Crerar that the second bombing was now more crucial for success than originally expected.

The main concept behind Totalize was the defeat of the German counterattack that typically followed any Allied push. With Ultra as reinforcement, Simonds seized upon the assessment and augmented the ground portion of Totalize based on the "probable thickening of SS troops" in the Bretteville line.[23] Expecting the battle of the hinge and perhaps Normandy to be decided here, he pressed for bolder action. In the revised plan, Simonds sought to "shoot the works" and ordered the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions to move in tandem through the Bretteville line to Falaise using the second bombing to "maintain the momentum."[24] Optimistically, Simonds thought that at least one division would get through

and informed First Canadian Army that if "conditions proved favourable" they could expect exploitation to Falaise on D plus 1 rather than D plus 2.[25] For the air component of Totalize, Simonds planned first and foremost to isolate the axis of advance from counterattack with a mixture of high explosive and fragmentation bombs and, only, secondly to hit the Bretteville line.[26] The overriding factor driving the second bombing was not the need to breach the Bretteville line per se, but to destroy the armour reserve and defeat the threat of counterattack posed by 1st and 12th SS. So key was this requirement that Simonds advised Bomber Command and the AEAF that, "No change would be required" due to the reshuffling but that "in the event of conflicting requirements, priority for air support should go to Phase II."[27]

As darkness fell on 6 August, the mounting evidence from Ultra clearly indicated the German drive at Mortain was much larger in scale and scope than previously contemplated.[28] The first of a series of signals intercepted late on the 6th reported the subordination of four panzer divisions (116th, 2nd Panzer, 1st SS and 2nd SS Panzer) to the 47th Panzer Korps with orders to attack westward.[29] After midnight, another intercept revealed that 7th Army would attack from the Mortain area westward with five panzer divisions and that the Luftwaffe was being called upon to provide support for a drive categorized as "decisive for clearing up situation in Brittany."[30] Minutes later a third intercept pointed to Avranches as the focus of 47th Panzer Korps' effort with the ultimate objective to "cut off Allies, who have broken through to the south, from supply base and to effect junction with the coast."[31]

The three messages set off alarm bells in Hut 3 at Bletchley Park, and the military and air advisors drew particular attention to the coming storm in a special comment signalled to commanders instructing them to weigh the importance of all three intercepts in concert. The ominous meaning was not lost on most Allied commands in Normandy. After initial scepticism, Patton ordered Lieutenant-General Walton Walker's US XX Corps to turn east to meet the threat, while commanders of the IX and XIX Tactical Air Forces immediately redirected fighter coverage to intercept Luftwaffe air support and interdict the panzers with fighter-bombers at first light on 7 August.[32] General Omar Bradley at 12th Army Group was astonished, calling the German move the "greatest tactical blunder I've ever heard of … probably won't happen again in a thousand years."[33] Originally, Montgomery and Dempsey viewed the regrouping as the usual "fire brigade" tactics designed to straighten the crumbling German line; but as the Ultra picture crystallized, it became clear that "the decisive phase in the Battle of Normandy" had been reached.[34]

In striking contrast to their British and American brethren, who now accepted the desperate nature of the gamble, First Canadian Army remained firm in their assumption that Von Kluge would not weaken the Caen hinge. Seemingly, even the Delphic character of Ultra could not quell the magnetic spectre of a panzer counterattack in the Bretteville area despite a dawning awareness of the German move at Mortain.[35] Apparently disconnected from the unfolding reality, Col Peter Wright's intelligence section at First Canadian Army omitted the 1st SS from the list of divisions taking part in the counterstroke. Instead, the intelligence section situated its armour in the Bretteville area and its infantry between Conde-sur-Noireaux and Vire—30 kilometres closer to the proposed Canadian axis of advance than its actual location outside Mortain.[36]

Despite evidence from both Ultra and other traditional intelligence sources, Wright—operating in the seemingly obdurate atmosphere at First Canadian Army—refused to believe that the entire division had left the Bretteville area.[37] At 0100 hrs on 8 August, less than two hours into Phase I, Wright still did not accept the full nature of the events unfolding along the front but did acknowledge to a certain degree that the immediate intentions of the panzer divisions lay elsewhere. Admitting that the nucleus of the 1st SS was "out of the way" and the 12th SS was the only panzer division left in the area, he reasoned that some elements of 1st SS stayed behind "to give strength and encouragement to the members of 89th Division." Likewise, he cautioned that the 12th SS may turn "on its heel away from the Orne" and join the 1st SS to form a counterattack reserve—something that he cautioned was likely already "in train" by the time his summary reached its readers.

Undoubtedly with knowledge of the Phase II bombing gearing up at air bases in England, Wright remained optimistic noting: "a design more agreeable to the breaking of the hinge is hard to imagine."[38] Unknown to Wright, the situation was more agreeable that originally thought. At this time, all elements of the 1st SS were in battle against the Americans in the Mortain area while the heavily under strength 12th SS, now broken up into three battle groups, was fighting the British at Vire and Grimbosq with its only remaining element on the Canadian front positions some distance to the southwest of Bretteville.[39] Despite evidence that the road to Falaise was indeed "wide open" for a period of 24 hours prior to the second bombing, neither First Canadian Army nor, consequently, Guy Simonds would shake loose from the preconceived notion that their professional opposite number would not attempt an unsound operation of war. In reality however, the subordination of military convention to political necessity was indeed unfolding; at 0645 hrs on 8 August—a full seven hours before the second bombing and the time his lead units reported the road open—Simonds continued to warn Crerar to expect counterattacks in the next 2–3 hours.[40]

The first bombing at 2330 hrs on 7 August alerted the Germans, and Kurt Meyer in particular, that the expected push south of Caen was underway. Disengaging from battle with the British at Grimbosq nearly 12 kilometres away, elements of the 12th SS raced towards Bretteville. Instead of facing Allied armour, anti-tank guns and aircraft as they tried to force a crossing over the Laize River to reach the Falaise road, they arrived unscathed and unopposed in the area north of Bretteville. As a result, Meyer's troops escaped destruction when the second bombing began at 1226 hrs. Canadian and Polish troops, however, suffered an unfortunate case of "friendly fire."[41] Without the chance to maintain or regain momentum, and as a result of the bombing going for naught, lead elements of Phase II of Totalize hit Meyer's battle groups in tactically enticing terrain that acted as a force multiplier. From these positions the 12th SS inflicted heavy losses and delay, and Totalize essentially ground to a halt. Although Simonds' corps captured Verrières Ridge and drove nine miles into enemy territory, they did not gain a clean break through and fell seven miles short of their ultimate objective of Falaise. To paraphrase Chester Wilmot, the hinge was indeed creaking, but…another major wrench would be needed to break the hinge away.[42]

In the wake of Operation Totalize, Crerar, Simonds, and the staff at First Canadian Army accentuated the positives by focussing on the capture of Verrières ridge and the area to the south. In sharp contrast, critics within Allied High command expressed frustration at the sluggish performance of the Canadians and the failure to capture Falaise on the 8th or 9th—a failure they reasoned allowed thousands to escape the resulting "Gap" over the next ten days.[43] As such, the failure of Totalize proved to be the proverbial scarlet letter for the Canadian Army forever branded a "flawed instrument" by not only Montgomery, but a generation of historians as well.[44] When the debate went public, Simonds and Crerar pointed to the lacklustre performance and inexperience of subordinates in an attempt to distance themselves and deflect criticism of their generalship.[45] Reinforced by the cloak of secrecy surrounding Ultra, the lone indication of failure to appreciate the situation accurately came in Wright's carefully crafted *mea culpa* in the introduction to his top secret post-war report on the use of intelligence by First Canadian Army:

> *It seems to me that the job of intelligence was first to report the evidence of what the enemy was doing and only secondly to appreciate what he should be doing ... it is wrong to place the stress on the appreciation of what it would be best for the enemy to do. That has its place but our first job is to state the evidence we have of what the enemy is in fact doing.*[46]

At first glance, the *prime facie* evidence supports the contention that Wright, Crerar and Simonds failed to correctly appreciate the situation; instead opting to "situate the appreciation" in their preconceived notion of what constitutes a sound operation of war.[47] This, however, is only a partial and premature explanation because full access to the complete corpus of Ultra material needed to assess this decision was not possible as the material remained classified for decades. Part II of this article will further explore the context of how Canadian decisions were made and what happened as a result now that a much broader range of primary sources, including Ultra, is available to us.

About the Author...

Professor David O'Keefe is a military historian, teacher, documentary filmmaker and former officer with the Black Watch (RHR) of Canada. After studying at McGill, Concordia, University of Ottawa and Cambridge, David taught history at various locations over the last 15 years including the University of Ottawa, John Abbott College as well as the Lester B. Pearson and English Montreal School Boards. From 1995–2000, David worked for the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence as their signals intelligence specialist where he contributed to the two-volume official history of the Royal Canadian Navy during the Second World War. Since 2003, David holds the position of Regimental Historian with the Black Watch where he has authored numerous articles on military and intelligence history and is currently working on the history of the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch during the Second World War. In addition to his work for National Defence, David has worked as a historian, creator, host, writer, assistant director and producer on close to a dozen military history television documentaries including *Black Watch: Massacre at Verrières Ridge, Murder in Normandy: The Trial of Kurt Meyer* and the Gemini nominated *From a Place Called War.* Presently, he is in development on two documentary series that showcase his path-breaking research into intelligence and decision making during the Second World War.

Endnotes

1. C. P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume III: The Victory Campaign The Operations in North-West Europe 1944–1945 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), p. 276. In response to the campaign along the Falaise road, the venerable Canadian military historian C. P. Stacey wrote: "It is not difficult to put one's finger upon occasions in the Normandy campaign when Canadian formations failed to make the most of their opportunities. In particular, the capture of Falaise was long delayed, and it was necessary to mount not one but two set-piece operations for the purpose at a time when an early closing of the Falaise Gap would have inflicted most grievous harm upon the enemy and might even, conceivably, have enabled us to end the war some months sooner than was actually the case. A German force that was smaller than our own, taking advantage of strong ground and prepared positions, was able to slow our advance to the point where considerable German forces made their escape. That this was also due in part to errors of judgment south of the Gap should not blind us to our shortcomings."
2. Brian A. Reid, No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2005), p. 5.
3. George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching (St Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 1993), p.193.
4. LAC RG 24 Vol. 14,046, War Diary, 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade, "OP Totalize: An account of Ops by 2nd Cdn Army Bde in France 5–8 Aug 44," Pg. 7. As dawn broke on the morning of the 8th the Sherbrooke Fusiliers reported to 2nd Cdn Armoured Brigade that the road to Falaise seemed wide open and asked for permission to push on to Falaise. This was denied as the Brigadier was under the impression that the lead elements of the 4th Canadian Armoured division were just minutes away from launching Phase II of Totalize. In the vanguard for that attack was the lead squadron of the Canadian Grenadier Guards (22nd CAR) under the command of Major Ned Amy. Years later Amy reported that an "interminable delay" was imposed on his squadron and he was told that they were to sit on the start-line until Rocquancourt was declared "clear." As a result, "we sat in our vehicles at a high degree of readiness for 3 or 4 hours waiting for this clearance….There may be other very valid reasons for this delay, however, at the time, the delay appeared unnecessary to us because we really skirted Rocquancourt rather than pass through it. Had we moved earlier, Kurt Meyer would have had less time to recover and reorganize his forces, and the situation close to our start-line may have been very different." LAC MG 30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers, Vol 2 Letter from E. A. C. "Ned" Amy to Reginald Roy February 10, 1981.
5. DHH Extracts from the Chaplain's Report of Interview with Kurt Meyer. 3 September 1950. Although Meyer's recollections may have been overstated, his estimation was not far off the mark. According to the research conducted for his dissertation concerning the I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy, Robert J. Sauer concluded that the German defenders had 10 Tiger tanks, 24 assault guns, 70 light and 30 heavy field howitzers while the Korps "reserve" consisted of 6 75mm anti-tank guns and 40 tanks of the 12 SS Panzer Division (under Meyer's command) fighting the British west of the Orne River. Robert J. Sauer, "Germany's I SS Panzer Corps: Defensive Armoured Operations in France, June–September 1944" (dissertation, Boston College, 1992), p. 332–3. Sauer's work does not take into account the 85th Infantry Division that was en route to Normandy with lead elements in the Trun area but yet to be seconded to I SS Panzer Corps. This move was not detected by Ultra or any other intelligence source. Although this would have surprised the Canadians, the

static second-line infantry division was hardly a match for the weight of two armoured divisions. For Totalize, Simonds had at his disposal three infantry and two armoured divisions plus two armoured brigades—a total force that included over 800 tanks and 60,000 troops backed up by nearly 700 guns and the might of the Allied tactical air forces. Roman Johan Jarymowycz, "The Quest for Operational Manoeuvre in the Normandy Campaign: Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout" (PhD dissertation, McGill University, 1997), p. 213.
6. Nigel Hamilton, Monty Master of the Battlefield (place: publisher, date), p.773.
7. Resume of remarks by Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds, CBE, DSO, GOC 2 Cdn Corps at O Group Conference held at 2nd Cdn Corps Conference room, the Château, Cairon, on July 30, 1944 at 1000 hrs—reported by Major A. T. Sesia. LAC RG 24 Vol.17,506.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Remarks to senior officers, Cdn Army Operation Totalize by COC-inC First Canadian Army August 5, 1100 hrs, 1944 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649.
12. Appreciation of Operation Totalize August 1, 1944 (delivered verbally to Crerar the day before) LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649.
13. Ibid.; LAC MG 30 E157 Crerar Papers Vol 5. First Canadian Army Lectures: The campaign in Normandy up to the "breakout" Battle South of Caen 7/8Aug 1944. Prepared by Brig C. C. Mann and Lt.Col P. E. R. Wright.
14. PRO AIR 25/704 First Canadian Army Operation Totalize Request for Air Support August 4–5 1944. The purpose of the air support in each phase on this date were: Phase I: Destruction of main enemy defensive localities and tanks harbours flanks of the attack during the break-in phase. Phase II: Destruction of main centers of resistance in the enemy's defensive system on the flanks of the attack. It was broken down into three sub phases: A) Destruction on main centers of resistance in the enemy's defensive system on the flanks of the attack in this phase. [Bretteville, Gouvix to St.Sylvain. Probable HQ for western part of defensive line, tanks concentrations and roads to and from the Forest De Cinglais, road blocks, few MG positions, Two coy reinforced area in village, ringed with AT and Arty, MG and inf., reinforced inf. coy area continuing the second line of defences west to the wooded area, Arty 11 tanks and SP, MG positions]; B) Progressive neutralization of enemy weapons on the frontage of attack, thereby providing a moving curtain of air bombardment behind which the armour can be launched for a break through in this phase. [Running progressively from Cintheaux—just south of Hautmesnil. It is a stretch of open country consisting of the second line of defences garrisoned by a battalion]; and C) Neutralization of enemy guns in his main gun areas at the time that the break through is gaining momentum [Urville SW to woods, Bretteville-le Rabet SW to St. Hilaire, Estree la Campagne SW to south edge of wood. Three areas which constitute a defensive area under development but with few signs of active occupation in force as yet, Little Arty but some bays suitable for tanks, SP or Arty, beginning of prepared infantry defences and probable Rocket sites].
15. Appreciation of Operation Totalize August 1, 1944 (delivered verbally to Crerar the day before) LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649.
16. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,645 First Cdn Army Intsum no 35 for 3 Aug. PRO DEFE 3 XL 4509, XL 4512, XL4521, XL4547, XL4545, XL4598.
17. Omar N. Bradley and Clair Blair, A General's Life (location: Simon and Shuster, 1983), p. 293; Russell Wiegley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (place: publisher, date), p.192; and LAC MG30 E157 Vol. 2 CP Montgomery's Directive M516 August 4, 2100 hrs.
18. LAC MG30 E157 Vol. 2 CP Montgomery's Directive M516 August 4, 2100 hrs.
19. Remarks to senior officers, Cdn Army Operation Totalize by COC-in-C First Canadian Army August 5 PRO DEFE 3 XL4684, XL4685; LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649; DHH Diary of Brig. N. E. H. Rodger 1100 hrs 1944 Although the Canadian Army's Special Wireless intelligence sections attached to First Can Army and 2nd Cdn Corps located elements of 21, 9th and 10th SS Panzer moving west, they could not provide anything on the 1SS Panzer division. Without any other information to corroborate the Ultra decrypts, Crerar's Chief of Staff, Churchill Mann, phoned Brigadier Elliot Rodger (Simonds Chief of Staff) and ordered both Canadian infantry divisions to "stick their necks out" and find out what was going on in May-sur-Orne, and Tilly. Later that night, Crerar sent a top secret message to both his corps commanders (Simonds and Crocker) indicating his desire to cover the Ultra findings. "In the circumstances known to you it is quite essential not only to maintain constant and close touch with enemy on your front but to hustle and bustle him increasingly. POW captured by troops under your command can now be of exceptional and general value and definite steps should be taken to secure samples at very short intervals. Intelligence and information of own troops require to be passed with utmost speed." LAC MG 30 E157 Vol 2 Crerar Papers August Top Secret message from Crerar to Crocker and Simonds 5 August 1944 2130 hrs.
20. Diary of Brig. N. E. H. Rodger (DHH).
21. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649 remarks to senior officers, Cdn Army Operation Totalize by GOC-in-C

First Cdn Army 051100 August 1944. This preconceived notion was a constant throughout Allied high command in Normandy. According to Omar Bradley, “A key assumption in the overlord plan was that after we had achieved overwhelming strength in Normandy the German Armies facing us would make a gradual withdrawal to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier….These were the prescribed textbook solutions to the German military battle in Normandy. But the Germans were not following the textbook… Hitler had made the decision to fight the showdown battle for Germany not at the Seine, as we had anticipated, but in Normandy.” Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 289.
22. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649 remarks to senior officers, Cdn Army Operation Totalize by GOC-in-C First Cdn Army 051100 August 1944.
23. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649 Operation Totalize Amendment August 6 1000 hrs; LAC MG 30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers, Vol 2 Interview with Captain Marshal Stearns. (ADC to Lt. Gen G. G. Simonds) July 14, 1982, p. 3.
24. Memo of telephone conversation between C of S First Canadian Army, Speaking from HQ Bomber Command and Commander First Canadian Army, Commencing at 1213 hours 6 August 1944; August 6 1000 hrs RG 24 Vol. 10,649 Operation Totalize amendment 6 Aug; LAC MG 30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers, Vol. 2 Interview with Captain Marshal Stearns. (ADC to Lt. Gen G. G. Simonds) July 14, 1982, p. 3.
25. August 6 1000 hrs RG 24 Vol. 10,649 Operation Totalize amendment 6 Aug: The first piece of information reported that the 272 Division side-stepped south-westward to take over the area previously held by 12 SS division, and that the latter “stepped back to the area of Valmeray.” The second reported that 89 Infantry division relived 1SS division on the sector between the left flank of the 272 Infantry Divisions and the Laize, and 1SS stepped back to the Bretteville sur-Laize–St. Sylvain position.” When cross referenced with the intelligence logs from First Canadian Army and 2nd Canadian Corp, there is no reference at all to the information presented. This, however, is not surprising as Ultra was not recorded in the logs and was to be BBRed (Burned Before Reading). On August 5 XL4873 reported at 1630 hrs that beginning that night 1SS Panzer “would be relieved stage by stage by 89 inf. div. and would assemble in area north of Falaise” and that its Battle HQ was moving that night to Ussy (U0842). As for the 272nd division, XL4833 revealed that the I SS Panzer Korps was reporting that the Boundary between 272 and 89 division was the southwest edge Maltot–the edge of Bully along river Laize–to U453–west edge St. Germain U0647–Eastern edge Ussy U0842. This was confirmed a little later by XL4864 that revealed that by the afternoon of August 5th the division’s front line was in a “new sector from U144647 to 138637 in line bending slightly frontward to 123621, west-southwest to 096611.
26. Jody Perrun, “Missed Opportunities: First Canadian Army and the Air Plan for Operation Totalize. 7–10 August 1944” (MA thesis, Carleton University, 1999).
27. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649 Record of telephone conversation, Col GS and Brig Richardson BGS Plans 21 Army Group on behalf of Brig Mann C of Staff First Cdn Army, from Main HQ to HQ AEAF August 5 2237 hrs; Memo of telephone conversation between C of S First Canadian Army, Speaking from HQ Bomber Command and Commander First Canadian Army, Commencing at 1213 hours 6 August 1944. PRO DEFE 3 XL4870.
28. Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty’s War Years 1942–1944 (place: McGraw Hill, 1983), 863 Pgs. From page 775 “In this new directive (M517) Monty was still unsure whether Von Kluge was perhaps pulling back to “some new defense line; but there is no evidence to show exactly what that main line is;” he certainly did not expect Von Kluge to stick to put his main Panzer strength into the Allied noose. If the Canadians were successful in reaching Falaise, then all Von Kluge’s forces west of Falaise were in danger of being cut off; if Von Kluge withdrew eastwards in front of the Canadians, then Patton could cut them off by moving behind: “if he (the enemy) hold strongly in the north as he may well do, that is the chance for our right flanks to swing round and thus cut off his escape. But whatever the enemy may want to do will make no difference to us” Monty declared in his new directive. “We will proceed relentlessly, and rapidly with our own plans for his destruction… That night however, the shift of Von Kluge to a “new defensive line” was revealed to be a shift to an offensive line — a secret counterattack by four Panzer divisions ordered by Hitler to take place on 7 August, with object of splitting the Allied army groups at Avranches. Although Ultra intelligence did not reveal the German Panzer attack in advance, the rapid decryption of ancillary orders for air support and the like enabled both Monty and Bradley to assess the scale of the offensive almost immediately. Thus when Monty reported by signal to Brooke on the evening of 7 August, shortly before the Canadian attack towards Falaise began, he was delighted by the way things were going[.]”
29. August 6 1948 hrs XL4997 ZZZZZ SH TG BV ON CR YK ZE EF ST DL Subordinated at 1300 hrs Aug 6 to 47 Panzer Korps (direction of attack west) from right to left: 116 panzer div. (strong indications) 2 Panzer division, 1SS Panzer division, and 2 SS Panzer division. 30. August 7 0011 hrs XL5027 ZZZZZ SH TG BV ON YK ZE EF ST DL AD According Fair indications) JdKorps II at 1700 hrs Aug 6, 7th Army to attack from 1830hrs Aug 6 with strong forces of 5 panzer divisions from area Sourdeval _ Mortain towards the west. First objective of attack road Brecy - Montgny, JDKorps II to support attack with all forces except JII. NOTE: Couple this with XL5029 of 0135 hrs August 7 sent to the same addresses as above. Details of JdKorps

operations for the day and confirmation of attack on the Avranches - Mortain area. Also: instruction for liaison with Panzer divisions to give current information on important centers of resistance and report air situation. Greater operational readiness to be aimed at as "success of attack decisive for clearing up situation in Brittany."
31. August 7 0429 hrs XL5053 ZZZ SH TG BV ON YK ZE EF ST DL (APGP/AHW/JEM) Incomplete information afternoon of Aug 6 from (fair indications) 47 Panzer Korps. Mention made of Avranches. Objective is to cut off Allies, who have broken through to (strong indications South), from supply base and to effect junction with coast. COMMENT Refer to XL4997 and 5027.
32. Bradford J. Scwedo, "XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton's Force Enhancers in the Campaign in France 1944" (Cadre Paper No 10, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, Air University, 2001), p. 49.
33. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life.
34. LAC RG 24 Second Army Instum No 64 Aug 7th 1944.
35. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10,649 August 7 1320 hrs Appreciation of Enemy Reaction to Totalize. At first glance this certainly seems unusual for an Army intelligence staff to provide an intelligence briefing to a Corps Commander without the aid—or knowledge—of his own intelligence staff. In reality, Simonds was in the Ultra picture but his intelligence staff was not and the timely information which was coming to light was only coming via the Ultra route which had to be very carefully guarded. Therefore, Simonds was more reliant on First Canadian Army's Intelligence than he was on his own skilled and adept but Ultra-less Corps staff.
36. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,645 First Cdn Army Intsum No. 39 Even reports of the capture of prisoners from 1st SS who admitted they had just arrived from the Caen sector were treated with scepticism although Wright later admitted that "never was an identification more welcome."
37. Ibid.
38. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,645 First Canadian Army Intelligence Summary No. 39 August 7th 1944.
39. Hubert Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzerdivision Hitler Jugend (Winnipeg, Fedorowitz Publication, 1994), p. 170–1.
40. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,624 Operations Log First Canadian Army, Sheet 6 Serial 35 Comd 2 Corps tele 080645 "Ops seem to be progressing satisfactorily but of course we must expect the usual counter attack during the next two or three hrs."
41. Perrun, "Missed Opportunities."
42. Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: W. M. Collins and Sons, 1952), p. 459.
43. LAC MG 30 E157 Crerar Papers Vol 24 Lecture to the Canadian Staff Course, Royal Military College, Kingston, 25 July 1946 by C. C. Mann.
44. Alistair Horne and David Montgomery, Monty: The Lonely Leader 1944–1945 (London: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 246.
45. DHH Comments on the official history letter from General H. D. G. Crerar to Col C. P. Stacey December 3rd 1958: "The only open stretch I can think if, at the moment, suitable for rapid movement in strength and for the general employment of armoured forces was the plateau country between Caen and Falaise — and that situation units and formations did not properly exploit chiefly through lack of adequate battle experience." Earlier he told Stacey that "In my opinion, the 'bog down' of the Second Canadian Corps attack on the 8th of August was mainly due to the 'dog-fight' in which the First Polish Armored Division became involved with a German force holding Quesnay wood and practically on that Division's start line. When dark came the Poles, after bitter fighting all afternoon, had advanced not more than a few hundred yards... On the other hand, the Fourth Canadian Armoured Division made a fairly deep penetration, though on a narrow front, to the west of the Caen-Falaise Road. If the Poles had only proceeded to smoke screen and contain the Germans in Quesnay wood (the latter were strong in 88 guns), then by-pass this obstacle to their advance, with the bulk of the Division, and push down to the east of the Caen-Falaise road, the result, I believe, would have been much different. By such widening of the front, and increasing of the depth of the advance of Simonds two Armoured Divisions that afternoon I think that the thrust might well have been tactically decisive, so far as the intended capture of Falaise was concerned." DHH Comments on the Official History, Letter from General H. D. G. Crerar to Col C. P. Stacey January 10th 1958.
46. LAC RG 24 Vol. 12,342 First Can Army Final Intelligence Report: Introduction 1945.
47. USAMHI Richard Collins Papers. Interview with Major-General Richard Collins by Lt Col. Donald Bowman, 1976.

THE QUEEN'S MEDAL FOR CHAMPION SHOT

Sergeant K. Grant

It has been said that to be truly expert at something requires the devotion of at least ten years of your life to its pursuit; be it a musical instrument, a sport or a particular skill. The same can be said of marksmanship, for to become a truly fine marksman takes years of practice and there is no higher prize or recognition of attaining expert status in this field than the winning of the Queen's Medal for Champion Shot.

Uniquely, it is the only medal in the long list of Canadian honours and awards that is won; all other honours are either awarded or earned. Open to all members of the Canadian Forces and RCMP, the Queen's Medal does not distinguish gender, as in the case of Pte Shannon Wills who in 1988 became the fist (and to date the only) female to win the medal, or age, as in the case of WO Ron Surette who at 55 became the oldest CF member to win.

The pursuit of the Queen's Medal is, however, a curious mix of operational requirement and sport. As a soldier one is expected to be able to effectively engage the enemy with one's personal weapon. As sport, it is as much a solo pursuit as a team event and while individual competitors may accept guidance along the way, the quest for the Queen's Medal is a road most often travelled alone as they seek self improvement and mastery of a skill.

History

The Queen's Medal has a long and illustrious history throughout the Commonwealth. First instituted by Queen Victoria on 30 April 1869 and to be awarded to the best shot from the British Army and Navy, it was initially envisioned as a bronze medal, although they were never issued in bronze due to problems in the manufacturing process. A run of sixteen was eventually produced and issued in silver; however, when the last medal was handed out in 1883 the award lapsed.

In 1923, some forty years after its last issue, the medal was re-introduced by King George V and the name was changed to the King's Medal. According to the orders of the day, countries eligible to compete for the award were the United Kingdom (the military forces stationed in England) together with the military forces of India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (including Rhodesia). The orders further stipulated that the medal was to be competed for "at the Annual Central Meeting … under Battle Firing Conditions," a tradition that continues today.

The first half of the twentieth century saw an increased popularity of and participation in marksmanship competitions throughout the Commonwealth. The list of countries entitled to award the Queen's medals grew annually to a peak of twelve; however, by the end of the 1970s, countries such as Rhodesia, Ceylon, Pakistan and India among others had dropped by the way side and had stopped issuing the medal.

In some cases the emphasis was shifted away from the British medal toward a more home-grown version of the same. In 1988, for instance, Australia stopped issuing the Queen's medal and replaced it with the three annual Champion Shot Medals to be issued one each for the Navy, Army and Air Force.

Today, only four countries award a total of eight medals annually. These are the British Royal Navy and Royal Marines combined, the British Army and Air Force, the Jamaican Defence Forces, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and New Zealand Army, the Canadian Reserve and RCMP combined and the Canadian Regular Force.

Within Canada, since its first issue in 1923, the awarding of the Queen's Medal has been inextricably linked to the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association—the DCRA. Some have questioned the reasoning for having a civilian organization issue a medal to the military, but a quick look at the history makes it clear why this tradition continues.

In 1868 the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association was founded as a response to the potential threat to Canada from outside forces, chief among which was the United States. The matter was compounded by the imminent departure of the British Garrisons (which eventually took place in 1871) and repeated raids like those mounted by the Fenians in 1866.

In practice, the immediate threat to national security was met with the rapid formation of numerous rifle clubs across the nation, an action that was supported by the newly formed federal government. Indeed, the government of the day felt that since the rifle was the primary weapon of the infantry, and given that any Canadian response to invasion would be met with militiamen, an organization with the mandate to "promote and encourage the training of marksmanship throughout Canada" should be supported.

As a result the DCRA would bring together under one umbrella organization thirty-three independent rifle associations from a number of the provinces. In fact, such was deemed the importance of shooting that the DCRA was later incorporated by an act of parliament in 1890 and later reinforced by the Militia Act of 1904. The Militia Act stipulated that in return for the government's support (in the form of free ammunition and access to military ranges) the DCRA had a legal obligation to the defence of Canada and those members of rifle clubs supported by the government were required to serve in the Militia in the case of emergency.

Every organization needs a home, and the national range designated for the DCRA in the 1860s was the Rideau Range, located behind the current home of the Russian Embassy in Ottawa (the range still exists but has been turned into a park that runs beside Range Road).

For several years this range flourished and it was not uncommon to see several hundred shooters out on a typical weekend. However, due to encroaching housing in the Sandy Hill area, the range was moved to Rockcliffe near the site of the RCMP's "N" Division and current home of the Musical Ride. From 1897 to 1920, the ranges at Rockcliffe flourished, seeing the construction of administration buildings and a 1000-yard range, and annual competitions with competitors from Australia, Britain, the US and all across Canada.

Post-First World War encroachment again became an issue and in 1920, in conjunction with the Minister of Militia, the DCRA helped select the current site of the Connaught Ranges for development. Since the DCRA was required to give up its buildings at Rockcliffe, the Association was granted use of the Connaught Range in perpetuity. In 1921 Connaught Ranges opened in time for the DCRA to hold its Annual Prize Meeting, and in 1923 awarded the first King's Medal for Champion Shot. With the exception of the period 1939 to 1946, the Annual Prize Meeting has been held every year at Connaught.

In 1957 the fledgling NATO organization collectively agreed to adopt the FNC1 as its primary infantry rifle. The Canadian Army made the shift from the .303 Lee Enfield, but since this new weapon was not available to the general public, and given the high number of military and ex-military members within the DCRA, the DCRA and the military arranged for its members to borrow these firearms to compete in the annual Service Rifle matches. The .303 continued on as the firearm most commonly utilized for target rifle competitions.

Throughout this period of change, the annual matches continued to be conducted by DCRA and its staff members. In 1968 the military introduced the Military Service Rifle Competition (what is now CFSAC). Initially this competition was also run by the DCRA but in the mid 1970s the military decided to take over the conduct of the competition. This arrangement lasted for about four years when DND approached the DCRA to again take responsibility for the conduct of the Service Rifle matches.

The DCRA did so and both matches were run concurrently up until the late 1980s when the Army staff again took control of the running of the Service Rifle competition. For many years the Canadian Forces Small Arms Competition (CFSAC) and the DCRA National Service Arms Competition (NSAC) were conducted conjointly. Up until 2002 in fact, either one or the other of the organizations was responsible for the conduct of the matches.

In 2003, due to its commitments in Afghanistan, the Regular Army did not participate in the annual matches. This marked only the third time the CF has stopped the matches for operational commitments (1941–1946, 1976, and 2002–2006).

In 2007 CFSAC started up again with a revised relationship with the DCRA. Now, the running of the CFSAC matches was open to other civilian organizations to bid on. The DCRA continues to hold its annual National Service Conditions Competition, just not in conjunction with CFSAC.

Awarding the Medal

This is where things get a bit confusing. From 1923 to 1952 Canada was granted permission to issue one medal for the Service Rifle Individual Championship during the DCRA Annual Prize Meeting. Under the heading of the Dominion of Canada, it was awarded to the best shot from the Militia, RCMP or Permanent Force.

The period following the Korean War, however, saw much change within the Canadian military. The Militia was being heavily reorganized, much effort was being expended toward the newly formed NATO organization, and the military's roles and responsibilities were being redefined. On the shooting front, the period 1953 to 1963 saw the Queen's Medal only awarded to the winner of the newly formed Canadian Army (Regular) or members of the RCMP. It appears that the militia were not eligible for the Queen's Medal and thus no medal was issued to a militia competitor according to the records of the day. In 1963 the medal was issued again to Militia as well as the Regular Force, and in 1964 the categories were reshuffled again when the RCMP was shifted from the Regular Army category to the Reserve category where they now continue to compete.

Also during the period 1954 to 1967, a second medal was granted for award to the Best Rifle Shot in the Royal Canadian Air Force during the DCRA Annual Matches. The RCAF medal was "to be competed for under small arms championship conditions during the Annual Prize Meeting of the DCRA and awarded to the winner of a competition conducted at that meeting under conditions prescribed by the Chief of the Air Staff." Consequently from 1953 to 1967, the members of Royal Canadian Air Force (Regular), The Royal Canadian Air Force (Auxiliary) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (Primary Reserves) competed annually for the Air Force Queen's Medal.

It is interesting to note that the records for the period 1963 to 1967 indicate that not two, but *three* medals were issued for top shot; one for the Regular army, one for the Reserves, and one for the Air Force, even though only two were officially sanctioned.

With integration in 1968 all branches of the military were brought together under one umbrella and a new competition was instituted called the Canadian Army (Regular) Rifle Competition (which has since morphed into what is now called the Canadian Forces Small Arms Concentration—CFSAC). This was a competition directed at the Canadian Regular Force and, to acknowledge the top shot, the Air Force Queen's Medal was discontinued and re-directed to the Regular Forces and renamed the Queen's Medal for Champion Shot (Regular).

The redirection of the Air Force Queen's medal to the Regular Force and the award of Reserve Queen's medal by the DCRA were confirmed in 1968 by Her Majesty the Queen.

Since the Reserve Queen's Medal has always been the responsibility of the DCRA to issue, it has continued to issue it at the Annual Prize Meeting to the top Reserve shooter even when the CF did not hold its annual competitions (2003–2006). It is this medal that traces its lineage back to the original King's medal of 1923.

The Medal

It is to be noted that up to this point the King's and, with the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, the Queen's Medal had been created under the British Honours System. In June 1968 after the unification of the Canadian forces, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II gave her approval for the granting in Canada of the British Queen's Medal for Champion Shot. However, in 1991 the Privy Council for Canada advised that there should be a Canadian version of the medal. On Aug 28 1991, her Majesty approved the creation of the Queen's Medal for Champion Shot in Canada and this is the version of the medal that is currently issued to both the Regular and Reserve winner.

The medal itself consists of a circular medal of silver on the obverse of which appears the crowned effigy of Her Majesty circumscribed with the legend ELIZABETH II DEI GRATIA REGINA and incorporating the word CANADA at the bottom and on the reverse of which appears the figure of Fame rising from her throne, a horn in her left hand, facing left and crowning with a laurel wreath in her right hand a warrior facing right; the warrior is standing on his right foot with his left foot raised and resting on the dais, supporting on his left knee a target having three arrows in the centre and holding in his right hand a bow and quiver full of arrows.

Author's Collection

The ribbon from which the medal is suspended, is dark crimson in colour, bordered on each side with a black stripe with a white stripe centered on each black stripe.

The winner wears the Queen's Medal for the complete period of his or her service. In each case in which the medal is issued a clasp denoting the year of award. An individual clasp only will be issued for a second or further award to the same individual.

Despite the high honour of joining a list of winners only slightly longer than that of Canadian Victoria Cross winners, there are no post nominals associated with the medal (though individuals have been known to sneak the letters QM after their name).

Photo: Base Photo CFB Kingston

Today the quest for the Queen's Medal continues to remain open to all members of the Canadian Forces, be they Army, Navy, Air Force, Ranger, regular or reserve. Indeed 2009 saw, for the first time in Canadian history, a Navy shooter, PO1 Martin Cashin, win the regular force Queen's medal.

It is interesting to note, however, that since its return in 2007, CFSAC has witnessed a change in the levels of cooperation amongst competitors. Once jealously guarded resources are now being freely shared between teams. At this year's event it was not uncommon to see as many as five competing teams on the same range training side by side. Ammunition was shared freely between teams so that training could continue and equipment was loaned by one team to the next to allow shooters to compete. There was even a "gentleman's agreement" between the regular force team captains to limit the size of the Letson Team entries to six (down from the specified 12-man entry) so that all could compete on an equal footing. The overwhelming sense was that the days of isolated teams competing for the prizes that so clearly defined previous competitions has passed to be replaced instead by a sense that "we are all in this together." Infused with this new sense of cooperation, competitors freely passed information and experiences between each other fully aware that at the end of the day it would be the man (or woman) with the best score who would win.

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NOTE TO FILE—THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION ON TROOP READINESS: CAUSES, PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND POLICY

Major J. Lewis, M.Eng., PhD

Concern about the environment is a reality in today's world and the military is no exception. However, even within the Army it is not often appreciated that these issues can have a very real and direct impact on troop readiness. Typically, troop readiness is viewed as a function of time and money. Given more of both, the quality of troop training should increase; however, a third factor is just as critical and is frequently overlooked—having access to high quality training areas. Without access to diverse training ranges, time and money can only do so much in preparing troops for deployment. Today, access is not a function of proximity—battle groups from across Canada travel to Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Wainwright for pre-deployment exercises while British troops travel across the Atlantic to train at CFB Suffield. Rather, access is largely defined by regulatory or legislative limitations imposed either internally within the Canadian Forces or externally by such governmental agencies as Environment Canada or the provincial environmental ministries. Those limitations, when they occur, are usually caused by environmental degradation, encroachment or conflicts with local communities. Frequently, these issues are intertwined. This research note will make the argument that from both a practical and a legislative standpoint, the state of the environment in our training areas will play an increasingly important role in how well we are able to prepare our soldiers for operational tasks. Furthermore, it will be argued that both public perception and hard science determine the political fallout from military environmental contamination. Therefore, scientifically valid remediation efforts and vigorous public relations both play a role in determining the impact of an environmental issue on Army readiness.

The perception of environmental risk has changed dramatically over the past decade. The population has become sensitized to these issues due to massive media exposure and they are more conversant with the potential impacts associated with those risks. Consequently, governments at all levels are responding to their constituents' concerns. Today, the presence of contamination on military-controlled Crown land may trigger the intervention of federal authorities, a situation unheard of prior to the 1980s. The trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination of the groundwater in the municipality of Shannon outside ASU Valcartier is a good example of this. Trichloroethylene had been used as a degreasing agent by the military and by military contractors from the 1950s to the 1980's on areas near the base that had been used for ammunition research and manufacturing[1]. The news of the groundwater contamination came to the attention of the citizens of the neighbouring municipality of Shannon in 2000, when privately owned water well outside the base was found to be contaminated[2]. This issue has generated considerable acrimony between the residents of Shannon and the officials at CFB Valcartier and has attracted national media attention. It is also currently the subject of a class action lawsuit seeking several hundred million dollars in damages.

Aside from the elementary observation that it is in everyone's best interest to avoid such contamination and confrontation in the first place. The other lesson which should be drawn from the TCE situation in Shannon is that the military chain of command needs to immediately and transparently address the concerns of municipal, provincial and federal authorities. The chain of command—and not just the base Environmental Officer—must understand the importance of immediately diverting resources to begin a scientifically valid clean-up, and it must effectively communicate this effort to the affected population. Public inquiries concerning environmental issues must be dealt with quickly and transparently. The Army in particular appears to be hearing this message. As the primary landowner in the Canadian Forces, this is perhaps to be expected. Tellingly, the Canadian Army homepage is the only one of the three branches to include a link which deals with environmental issues, including a strongly worded message concerning the environment from Lieutenant General Leslie.

So, situations like the TCE issue in Valcartier directly impact troop readiness by diverting significant resources in the form of time, personnel and money. Environmental remediation (and litigation) is extremely costly and preventing the environmental damage in the first place is desirable, although it may require an initial outlay of funds. A more subtle potential impact on troop readiness, but one which is even more alarming is the danger that the public will begin to form the opinion that DND is not taking care of its land holdings, regardless of what the scientific reality is. This could conceivably create a situation where a legislative body is forced by public pressure to limit the Army's training on Crown land.

Consider a case that occurred south of the border. In the United States, a full Congressional hearing was convened in April 2003 to examine "The impact of environmental laws upon military training procedures and upon the nation's defense security."[3] One of the primary situations of interest for this hearing was the case of the Massachusetts military reserve (MMR), where groundwater contaminated by military activities lead to the closure of the training area by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In October 1997, the EPA had issued a precedent-setting Administrative Order for Response Action in which the National Guard respondents were ordered to suspend virtually all military activities involving munitions.[4]

The MMR is a 21,000-acre installation located on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. There are 440 military bases in the continental United States,[5] not including hundreds of National Guard training areas. A moratorium on training at a single National Guard base in the U.S. will not have a strategic impact on troop readiness. In contrast, there are currently only 23 Canadian Forces bases, of which only 10 belong to the Army. We have relatively few training areas available to us outside our military bases. A moratorium on training for environmental reasons at any one of our bases would have an immediate and widespread impact on troop readiness. Such a moratorium may appear to be an absurd proposition today, but what will happen in 10 years time? In 1998, a hundred million-dollar lawsuit over some solvent in the groundwater outside CFB Valcartier would have also sounded absurd.

The fact is the military is held to the same federal environmental laws and regulations as any other organization operating in Canada. For example, it must abide by the *Fisheries Act*, the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,* and the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act* amongst others. The Auditor General of Canada Sheila Fraser has in the past called the military's track record on environmental issues "spotty",[6] and while DND disputes this characterization, when it comes to public opinion, perception is reality. If our environmental stewardship continues to be viewed by the public as "spotty" (again, regardless of the reality) we will probably eventually face a situation not unlike that of the Massachusetts military reserve.

It is important to understand that the risks caused by military environmental contamination are perceived very differently by the public than they are by legislative bodies (Ministries of the Environment) or by DND. In many cases, even the perceived threat of contamination is enough to cause public concern which may have a political and legislative backlash. Research has shown that rational measures of risk assessment produced by organizations often do not adequately reflect the concerns of the public.[7] The public takes into consideration a complex array of qualitative and quantitative factors in defining and evaluating risks. Several examples which are pertinent to the way the public perceives environmental contamination caused by military activities are:

- dread—people are more concerned about certain dreaded risks that evoke a response of fear or anxiety (e.g. exposure to potential carcinogens originating on military bases) than to risks that are not especially dreaded (e.g. household accidents);

- media attention—people are more concerned about risks that receive much media attention (e.g. TCE in Valcartier) than about risks that receive little media attention (e.g. on-the-job accidents);

- familiarity—people are more concerned about risks that are unfamiliar (e.g. getting poisoned by military chemicals) than about risks that are familiar (e.g. household accidents);

- impact on children—People are more concerned about activities that are perceived as putting children at risk (e.g. contaminated drinking water) than about activities which are not (e.g. adult smoking); and

- voluntariness of exposure—People are more concerned about risks that they perceive to be involuntary (unknowingly drinking contaminated drinking water) than about risks which the perceive to be voluntary (e.g. smoking, mountain climbing).[ibid]

The subconscious analysis performed by the public often has no basis in scientifically supportable risk. However, public perception drives political decisions, and thus the conclusions that are drawn by the public concerning risk will have an impact on policy. Preventing negative publicity and a potential public backlash requires not just prompt and proactive action to remediate any contamination for which the military is responsible, but requires a highly visible demonstration to the affected population that everything possible is being done to correct the problem. It is, in other words, a matter of public relations, transparency and public education. A public backlash is what led to the effective closure of MMR.

While there is clearly a legislative obligation to practice environmental stewardship, it is also simply in the best interest of the Army to protect its land in a sustainable manner. The long term effect of possibly losing access is one concern, but in the shorter term, it is a matter of ensuring our troops can train effectively in realistic terrain. The effect of environmental degradation in the short term comes down to the concept of "Train as you fight, and fight as you train". The value of training decreases when the training areas do not resemble real terrain. Locating vehicle hides becomes difficult as trees disappear. Practicing basic infantry skills such as ambushes and patrols becomes a challenge as vegetation cover retreats. Distressed soil loses its bearing capacity and vehicles bog down more frequently. Engineers find fewer and fewer areas that are appropriate for cratering, abatis and bridging. All of these impacts are examples of the kind of effects environmental degradation can have on training. Quite simply, areas that have been environmentally destroyed do not support effective, quality training.

Being proactive today to prevent future environmental problems is a simple way to drastically reduce remediation costs down the road, while at the same time building public trust in our ability to sustainably manage our training lands. Personnel at DGE and DLE are working diligently to solve the environmental legacy issues which we as an organization have inherited from over 100 years of military activity. These two directorates are brokering very positive environmental initiatives such as the National Wildlife Area at CFB Suffield which is being managed in partnership with Environment Canada. Much excellent work is being done, but environmental issues can appear quickly and unexpectedly. If resources and support are not made available to those who are solving both the physical environmental problem and the associated public relations, it is conceivable that at some point these issues will begin to have an impact on troop readiness.

Endnotes

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Painting—Welcome Party
Edward Fenwick Zuber
CWM 19890328-004
Beaverbrook Collection of War Art
© Canadian War Museum

Artist Edward F. (Ted) Zuber was born in 1932 in Montreal and first studied art at the École des Beaux-Arts de Montréal. He later attended Queens University (fine arts) and apprenticed to the religious painter Matthew Martirano.

At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Ted enlisted and became a parachutist with the 1st Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment. With the Battalion's mission to Korea in 1952, he first saw action on hill 187 as "I" (Intelligence) Rep to D coy. The unit's next front line position, hill 355 or "Little Gibraltar" required an additional rifle company, and Zuber was transferred to "E" Coy as a Bren Gunner. The winter saw him back with HQ Company, this time as a sniper up on the "Hook" position. It was here that he suffered a grenade wound, after which he was evacuated to the Norwegian M.A.S.H. and the 25th Canadian Field Hospital.

This image, entitled *Welcome Party*, and shows the lay of the land as seen from the Canadian trenches (the Hook). The promontory above the head of the middle soldier in the painting was called Warsaw, with the low ground to the left referred to as Ronson. The ground to the right of Warsaw held the Chinese trenches only 200 to 300 yards away. The painting depicts two replacement soldiers approaching their new platoon sergeant who is standing outside a bunker awaiting their arrival. To their left and frozen in the barbed wire, are two dead Chinese soldiers (one lying on top of the other) with empty eye sockets. As the artist points out, "the Chinese had left these two dead fellows in our wire, birds had eaten their eyes out and we joked about how they psyched out the replacements;" thus the painting's name.

Throughout his experience on the Korean Front, Zuber carried a sketch book to record the action around him. He produced many drawings and maintained a detailed "Sketch diary." These pictorial records of Canada's Korean involvement are particularly valuable historically, because there was no official war artist assigned to Canada's Korean experience. Thirteen paintings from Zuber's "Korean War Memoirs," are now in the collections of the Canadian War Museum.

When the Gulf War—Operation FRICTION—began, Ted was selected by the Canadian Armed Forces Civilian Artists Program (CAFCAP) as Canada's Official War Artist. From 21 January to 3 March 1991, he lived in Qatar capturing the images and experiences of Canadian service men and women.

For reproductions of Canadian War Museum images, or for more information, contact Image Reproduction Services, 1 Vimy Place, Ottawa, K1A 0M8; Fax 1-819-776-8623; email Imageservices@warmuseum.ca.

Additional military prints are available directly from the artist directly at: Zuber Fine Art, PO Box 99 Seeley's Bay, ON, K0H 2N8; (613-387-3618), or through his website at www.zuberfineart.com.

— BOOK REVIEWS —

AT THE SHARP END: CANADIANS FIGHTING THE GREAT WAR 1914-1916, VOL. 1
COOK, Tim. Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007, hardcover, 599 pages, $40.00,
ISBN 978-0670067343

SHOCK TROOPS: CANADIANS FIGHTING THE GREAT WAR 1917-1918, VOL. 2
COOK, Tim. Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008, hardcover, 727 pages, $40.00,
ISBN 978-0670067350

Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, plsc





The renewed interest by both scholars and the public in Canada's military role in the First World War has led to the recent publication of several important books on the subject, not the least of which is Tim Cook's award winning two volume historical survey, *At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914–1916,* and *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917–1918.* At just over 1310 pages combined, these tomes present one of the most vigilant efforts in recent memory to tell the tale of the half million Canadian men and women who served in the epic 'war to end all wars'.

As the curator of the Great War collection at the Canadian War Museum, Cook is well situated to undertake a study such as this. The first volume, covering the first two years of the war, is divided into no less than 40 separate chapters of approximately 10–15 pages each. Though seemingly daunting at first, these breaks allow the reader to consume the war in small episodes without having assumed a massive amount of knowledge on the subject beforehand. The simple plain language and very readable style of the volume speaks well to the general reader and specialist alike, and Cook has done a commendable job and bringing the history of the Canadian Corps to a much broader audience. Volume two, *Shock Troops*, delivers a similar menu, though its slightly greater length allows Cook to delve into the grittier descriptions of the war that are, if nothing else, both appreciative and telling of the horrors experienced by Canadian soldiers in battle on the western front.

The smaller chapters also allow the author to delve into a wide range of subjects, offering the reader a detailed mosaic of the experiences of Canada's First World War citizen-soldiers. Exploring well beyond simply the strategy and the tactics of trenches, Cook discusses a variety of subjects from discipline to lice; from food and drink to faith and religion. The strength of this approach is obvious. Instead of a dry narrative, Cook's characters very much come to life on the pages, turning long forgotten heroes and everyday men and women into people we can almost reach out and speak to again. It is a powerful approach and, as many readers and reviews have already suggested, it is admiringly effective.

These volumes do not tell the whole tale of Canadians fighting in the Great War, however, and for those looking to learn more about Canadian sailors and airmen during this conflict, one will need to look elsewhere. Yet given the scope of the project the author rightly provides a caveat at the beginning of the work to explain his focus; the two volumes are decidedly infantry-centric, and given the composition of the four-division strong Canadian Corps this is understandable. Unfortunately, the maps in the book are also lacking.

Canadian military histories seem incapable of providing decent maps for readers, and publishers always seem to feel the need to dumb them down as much as possible. Finally, the books are not without their factual errors, and at times throughout the writing, the enemy of the Canadian Corps, the Imperial German Army, is given only fleeting description or appreciation. This is especially noticeable to more advanced students of the subject, and at times leaves one with the feeling that only half the story was told.

Nevertheless, Cook has undertaken a massive effort of which he can be proud. Canadians have not enjoyed a comprehensive survey of their part in the First World War for several decades, making these two volumes a welcome and necessary addition to any library in the country. They are highly recommended to the specialist and general reader alike.

THE WAR WITHIN: A SECRET WHITE HOUSE HISTORY, 2006–2008

WOODWARD, Bob. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008, 487 pages, $37.00,
ISBN-13: 978-1-4165-5897-2

Second Lieutenant T. Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B.



In the last of his quartet of books chronicling the American invasion of Afghanistan and of Iraq,[1] noted author and reporter, Bob Woodward examines the White House's decision to send 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines—the so-called "surge"—to deal with the domestic situation in Iraq which, by the summer of 2006, was spiralling out of control. Initially, the military response to the situation was to "draw down" or reduce the number of troops in Iraq and, in a move reminiscent of "Vietnamization," to turn the conflict over to the Iraqi national army. The *War Within* details the discussion, debates and outright battles that occupied senior members of the Bush Administration and senior military leaders while this new policy was developed and implemented.

There are some startling revelations in the book, others are well known by now.[2] Foremost, the surge was not conceived by military leaders at the Pentagon or by the United States (US) commander in the field, General George Casey. Public announcements aside, the Administration knew that the war was slipping away from them. Incidents of violence were on the increase; the Iraqi government under Nuri al-Maliki was losing credibility and legitimacy; and the promised domestic economic and social revitalization was stagnating. A new strategy was needed.

Credit for the surge strategy resides with Stephen J. Hadley, National Security Advisor. (However, former Virginia Senator Charles Robb first used the phrase during his time with the Iraqi Study Group.) The troops were deployed to Iraq with the mission of bolstering basic domestic security in the hope that by so doing political reconciliation among the country's warring factions would result.

The surge occurred in the spring of 2007 under the command of General David H. Petraeus (Casey having been promoted to Army Chief of Staff), and incidents of violence diminished significantly over the next year and a half. As Woodward notes, however, the decrease in violence is not solely attributable to the increase of American troops. The "Anbar Awakening" (in which the tribal sheiks in that Sunni dominated province turned on Al Qaeda and aligned themselves with the US and the central government) occurred at approximately the same time as the surge. Additionally, Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his followers in his Madhi Army to end their attacks on American troops. However one characterizes the level of domestic violence, attributing its change of intensity solely to the surge is, Woodward states, too simplistic and more nuanced than originally thought.

In another revelation, Woodward writes of a new super secret program (by inference a combination of technological and operational techniques) "that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in extremist groups such as al Qaeda." Finally, Woodward

briefly shares with his readers that the US had been electronically spying on Prime Minister Maliki; the details of this covert operation are, however, maddeningly scarce.

The War Within is the result of interviews with several of the principal parties involved (including President Bush), unheard of access to several "secret" internal memoranda and documents as well as conversations with a number of anonymous sources. Unlike the three preceding volumes (where Woodward simply set out the narrative with little objective analysis), this final volume offers an examination and judgment of many of the parties. President Bush does not come off as well as he did in Woodward's previous histories: "For years, time and again, President Bush has displayed impatience, bravado and unsettling personal certainty about his decisions. The result has often been impulsiveness and carelessness and perhaps, most troubling, a delayed reaction to realities and advice that run counter to his gut." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is "uncertain" about the intersection between state and defence and never confronts Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld about the military's unreasonably optimistic military reports for fear of clashing with both the Secretary and the President's optimism about the war. The Secretary of Defense is described in unflattering terms; he comes off somewhat as a bully who was entrenched in his view that the war was being waged successfully and was scornful of those who thought otherwise. Even Stephen Hadley (who replaced Rice as National Security Advisor and was instrumental in the secret 2006 review leading to the surge strategy) often allowed his devotion to the President to get in the way of what should have been an objective analysis of Iraq. Of all the individuals on display in *The War Within*, none is more interesting or important to the story than General (retired) Jack Keane, former Army Vice Chief. Keane offered (often) unsolicited advice to Hadley, used "back door" channels with the President and the Secretary of Defense to convince them of the necessity for the surge and was, ultimately, responsible for the selection of General David Petraeus as its commander. All of which was done outside the military chain of command.

The War Within is a classic study of the process by which military decisions are reached in modern times. It tackles the thorny issue of political leadership in time of war and will remain the authority on both subjects if present "insider accounts" are any example.

Endnotes

1. Bush at War, Simon & Schuster (2002), Plan of Attack, Simon & Schuster (2005), State of Denial, Simon & Schuster (2006).
2. See, for example, George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (location: HarperCollins, 2007), and Scott McCellan, What Happened (location: Perseus, Book Group 2008).

THE WILL TO WIN: THE LIFE OF GENERAL JAMES VAN FLEET

BRAIM, Paul F. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001, paperback, 419 pages, $59.95, ISBN: 978-1591140498

Lieutenant-Colonel P. J. Williams



For many historians, the Korean War (1950–53) is known as the "Forgotten War." The battles and leaders associated with this conflict are known to relatively few as compared with the two World Wars of the 20th century. One of these leaders was General James Van Fleet, who came to lead the US 8th Army in Korea in the command shuffle following General MacArthur's dismissal. This is the first full biographical treatment of General Van Fleet; his own attempts at writing his own memoirs met with little success. The author, the late Paul Braim, served as a company commander in Korea under Van Fleet and later as Professor Emeritus at Embry Riddle University in the United States. In preparing this study, Braim relied not only on secondary sources but a wealth of primary material from both the General's family

and also United States (US) Army records. Sadly, Van Fleet's own personnel records have been lost.

General James Van Fleet grew up in very humble circumstances in rural Florida and only embarked upon a military career after his father had secured a place for him at the United States Military Academy, West Point. A member of the Class of 1915 (known in West Point lore as "The Class the Stars Fell On"), he was in very good company; among his classmates were Generals Eisenhower and Bradley. Van Fleet had a slow academic start. However by the time he graduated, he had found that military life suited him, as did his second love, football; a passion he was to pursue while later serving as an ROTC instructor at the University of Florida. His early career involved service on the Texas/Mexico border as well as operational duty in France during World War I (from which he emerged as a decorated infantry lieutenant colonel).

The theme of "will to win" permeates the book, and it was in the interwar years, while serving in various command and training posts and also while coaching football teams, that he solidified his views on the absolute necessity for thorough and effective training and possessing the "will to win." In Van Fleet's view, the combat value of a unit is determined in great measure by the soldierly qualities of its leaders and members as well as their will to fight. His views on team building were founded on the following principles:

- First, find aggressive individuals who do not shy away from physical challenges.
- Then, train these individuals to mold them into a team so that the needs of the group come before those of the individual.

In the interwar years promotion was slow, and when Van Fleet went to war for the second time, he was a full Colonel and leading the 8th Infantry Regiment in the first assault wave on D-Day. Here Van Fleet came into his own, and his career went from strength to strength. Within four months he rose in rank from colonel to major general and eventually attained the rank of corps command under General Patton. On more than one occasion, he was sent in to replace faltering commanders and to restore morale and the will to win. On each of these occasions he was successful.

Post-World War II his country would call on him again, this time to build up capacity within the Greek Army because, as the cold war began in earnest, Greece was at risk of falling to Communist domination. Though this assignment was somewhat unorthodox, he took to it in typical Van Fleet fashion, and over a period of four years, he was able to turn the tide against the Communists and to build up the Greek Army to the point where it was capable of conducting operations on its own. A large part of the book is devoted to Van Fleet's Greek service, and I found the parallels with our own Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity building efforts quite striking. The same issues we face today (in terms of training indigenous forces within a whole of government context and the accompanying frictions that can exist) were very much present in the Greece of the 1940s.

His next major assignment was to Korea as 8th Army Commander, where he would earn his 4th star. Similar to the problems he faced in Greece, he saw the building up of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army as the key to an eventual solution to the conflicts and so devoted considerable time to the priority. Arriving in country at a time when Allied moral was low, he once again was able to instill fighting spirit in his troops. Though they did not "win," his actions were key in enabling a resurgence of allied offensive spirit which placed them in a better position at the time of the 1950 armistice. He retired shortly after the war but was recalled to active duty by President Kennedy to conduct an assessment of US military assistance efforts in the Far East, a mandate which was later extended to economic issues. His final report, characterized somewhat by Van Fleet's blunt style, was to a large degree ignored. However, his insistence on creating joint geographically-based combatant commands presaged the current US Department of Defense organization that was put in place decades later.

General Van Fleet passed away in 1992 at the ripe old age of 100. President Truman called him America's "greatest combat General," while wartime US Army Chief of Staff the

formidable George C. Marshall (whom even President Roosevelt never had the courage to call "George") described him as, "probably the most aggressive and hard driving Corps commander we produced during World War II." His legacy lives on today in statues—in both Greece and Korea—and at his beloved University of Florida where "The Will to Win" room is named in his honour.

Such a study of a relatively unknown general from a so-called "forgotten war" is long overdue and begs the question of how many similar stories of Canadian military leaders from past eras are awaiting to be told. This book is highly recommended, particularly for those about to assume command and for those destined to serve in senior posts involved in indigenous force capacity building.

TURNING BACK THE FENIANS: NEW BRUNSWICK'S LAST COLONIAL CAMPAIGN

DALLISON, Robert L. Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2006, Paperback with maps, illustrations and index, 132 pages, $16.95, ISBN: 0-86492-461-5

Major J.R. Grodzinski, CD, MA



The Fenian Raids of the late 1860s contributed to the growing movement that sought to change the political structure of the colonies within British North America that ultimately led to Confederation; it also had important repercussions for the various militias, particularly that of the Province of Canada. The poor performance of the Canadian militia in 1866 brought sweeping reforms to a force that was found to be deficient in leadership as well as individual and unit training and organization at the unit level, while lacking the services vital to maintaining the force in the field.[1] In many ways, this situation shares similarity that of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, when the end of the cold war terminated the traditional post-Second World War North Atlantic Treaty Organization role of the Canadian Forces and forced it to search for a new one within a new international environment. The changing threat and a rising operational tempo revealed that many existing practices were deficient and sweeping changes were made to its own leadership as well as training, doctrine and procedures.

It is often forgotten that at the beginning of 1868 the "Canadian" militia ("army" was not an official term until 1940) was limited to the Province of Canada (made up of Ontario and Quebec). Later that year it absorbed the militias of the Maritime colonies into its structure. Before then, the militias of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were provincially controlled organizations that were occasionally better managed than their Canadian counterparts. Thus, when a group of disgruntled Irish-Americans sought to capture territory in British North America and use it to trade for Irish independence, British regulars who were supported by the militia of several colonies, including that of "Canada" opposed them. Fenian operations were not limited to the Niagara Peninsula; raids also occurred in New Brunswick and Manitoba. *Turning Back the Fenians* examines this brand of "terrorism" in colonial New Brunswick.

This book is the eighth in a series of military history titles published under the auspices of the New Brunswick Military Heritage Project, initiated by the University of New Brunswick in 2000 to promote greater awareness of the province's rich military history. The Project's main product has been a superb book series, generally well researched and written on a variety of topics. Other volumes have examined the fortifications of Saint John, the 1755 siege of Fort Beauséjour, the American War of Independence as it relates to New Brunswick, the Grand Communication Route from Saint John to Quebec, edited wartime diaries and a study of provincial war brides.

Turning Back the Fenians was written by Robert Dallison, a retired infantry officer with a lifelong interest in history and heritage. He also wrote a previous volume in this series titled *Hope Restored: The American Revolution and the Founding of New Brunswick* (2003).

The New Brunswick Militia was first organized in 1787; after the potential threat of war during the Trent Affair of 1861, a commission was established to review its state, which resulted in the innovative *Militia Act of 1862*. This divided the force into three groups, each with differing levels of readiness and training. The most important element was the Class A component, or "active militia," that, along with similar initiatives in other provinces, laid the foundation of our modern militia.[2] The Class A component consisted of a fixed force of cavalry, artillery, engineer and infantry units that were provided with uniforms, equipment and regular annual training, while the Class B and C groups received little or no training; the membership had differing personal situations, such as age, marital status and so on. It was this revitalized force, along with British regulars and the Royal Navy, which would meet the Fenians along the New Brunswick frontier with Maine.

The Fenian Brotherhood had some 10,000 members in America, many with recent experience from the American Civil War. By the mid-1860s, they had prepared for several attacks into British North America; fortunately these preparations did not go unnoticed and authorities on both sides of the border were cognizant of their plans and commenced their own preparations. In New Brunswick, both Lieutenant Governor Gordon and British military authorities received regular intelligence reports on Fenian activities. Gordon understood the potential threat, but refused to call out the militia, fearing the cost and disruption to the economy would create more trouble than the disgruntled Irishmen; instead he formed volunteer (i.e., unpaid) units to guard vital points. Dallison nicely presents the difficulties of home defence. He emphasizes the genuine public fear of the time (as up to 14,000 men were called out, including the Royal Navy patrolling in the Bay of Fundy) when an anticipated attack by the Fenians on St Patrick's Day 1866 failed to materialize. This was the power of the Empire coming to bear.

Dallison also notes further disagreement within the British camp. Lieutenant Governor Gordon and the commander of the forces of lower provinces, Major General Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, based in Halifax, differed on strategy: should they defend the entire frontier with Maine or concentrate military resources in a central location and then strike back? This classic political-military conundrum, where a sound military option conflicts with public morale and issues of territorial integrity is nothing new to military history. Doyle lost the argument and the frontier was defended.

In April 1866, the Fenians finally moved. Having concentrated in Maine along the border with New Brunswick, the first Fenians moved across the St Croix River on April 13, landing near St Stephen. Elsewhere, the Fenians seized a schooner in a hope to seize Campobello Island. Not only was the local militia called out to defend the island, but also American land and naval forces had been concentrated to contain the situation as a demonstration of American neutrality and to avoid a war between Great Britain and the United States. A five-vessel American naval squadron also helped end the threat to Campobello Island. Meanwhile, British land and naval forces were being shifted to New Brunswick; this was a combined Imperial, New Brunswick militia and American response that quickly ended the Fenian threat. By June 1866, the last of the New Brunswick volunteers returned home and the crisis was largely over.

While the raids did not amount to much, the performance of the New Brunswick militia demonstrated the prescience of the recent reforms, particularly the concept of the active militia. The successful outcome also enhanced public support for defence and increased interest in militia service. The most important legacy was political, for the Fenian Crisis gave new life to the concept of British North American union or Confederation. Local politicians who were at first apprehensive to this idea, grew to support it. Furthermore, the British government saw Confederation as necessary to the defence and well being of the North American colonies; as Dallison concludes, "Canada is the real legacy of the Fenian Crisis of 1866."[3]

Turning Back the Fenians continues the excellent quality of the New Brunswick Military Heritage Series. The author has taken events that are covered in one or two sentences in other books and provided a valuable insight into militia reform, home defence as well as questions of wider regional defence and diplomatic relations within the context of overall Imperial strategy and the changing political structure of British North America. This volume includes several excellent maps, prepared by Mike Bechthold, including one very useful map showing the deployment of New Brunswick and British forces during the spring of 1866. Another map showing Fenian plans and movements might have been helpful. There are also many excellent photos depicting militia units, British and American warships as well as various Britons, Canadians and Americans that played a role in the crisis. The book concludes with two useful annexes: one explaining terminology and the second a list of key personalities in 1866.

This is an excellent addition to the literature of the Fenian Raids and an excellent examination of the link between political and defence issues and how these questions affected the early development and evolution of British North America into the Dominion of Canada.

Endnotes

1. Bush at War, Simon & Schuster (2002), Plan of Attack, Simon & Schuster (2005), State of Denial, Simon & Schuster (2006).
2. See, for example, George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (location: HarperCollins, 2007), and Scott McCellan, What Happened (location: Perseus, Book Group 2008).
3. Robert L. Dallison, Turning Back the Fenians:New Brunswick's Last Colonial Campaign (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2006), p. 110.

THE GAMBLE: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ, 2006-2008

RICKS, Thomas E., New York: Penguin Books, 2009, hardcover, 394 pages, $31.00, ISBN: 978-1-59420-197-4

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Strickland



All wars are political, but few have been as politically charged in contemporary history as the Iraq War. A fixture of the nightly news, editorial columns, the Internet and blogs, we have become inundated with experts each professing to possess understanding and analysis, yet concurrently there is little comprehension regarding the "hows" and the "whys." We see the results of singular IEDs and strikes by heavy weapons, but do not gather insight into either the thought processes or rationale behind American actions in the theatre.

To be sure, there is an ever-burgeoning body of work on the war and its immediate effects. Journalists, soldiers, historians and self-designated experts are all contributing works. The majority of these seem to be focused at the tactical level, documenting individual battles or adding to the growing mountain of military biography that seems to naturally follow any conflict. Markedly little of the literary efforts to this point have placed their efforts on more than this; specifically, very little has been written on either the strategic or operational processes which shape how decisions are made or outline the effects that they are meant to achieve. It is this gap that Thomas Ricks has chosen to address with *The Gamble.*

Ricks is no stranger to the Iraq War and American involvement in the region. A Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who formerly worked for both the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post*, he is incredibly familiar with the American military and its leadership.

The legwork he conducted in preparation for his book on the initial American invasion (*Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* published by Penguin 2006) has given him a detailed and nuanced understanding of both the Iraqi theatre and the Washington Beltway. Because of this familiarity with the context, and a significant body of work on the American military in general, he enjoys a level of almost unprecedented access to the decision makers and power brokers; this access has enabled an exceptional book.

One of the main attractants is the character sketch that Ricks provides of the American military commander in Iraq—General David Petraeus. Acknowledging the American penchant for lionizing their military commanders, it is doubtful that anyone since Colin Powell or Norman Schwarzkopf has caught the imagination of the public like David Petraeus. Intellectually gifted with a PhD from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, he is also an accomplished soldier and officer, who has commanded at every level from platoon to combatant command. Thomas Ricks gives us an insight to the man and his character that no one-page biography could ever hope to equal. Readers get to see the General as he goes about his daily business, both in the period before he is named to command, and as he shapes the strategic environment. What is particularly refreshing is that the hero-worship is minimized and instead we are left to form our own opinions as Ricks paints the portrait of an ambitious, intelligent and articulate leader who is as at home in the corridors of power as he is on the streets of Baghdad.

In a similar vein, Ricks gives us one of the few comprehensive treatments of how operations have been shaped, planned and conducted at the strategic level for the Iraq War. The strategic level is generally an undiscovered realm in the Canadian experience; it would not be an indefensible argument to state that we have never been a strategic player on the world stage (can a country that does not act unilaterally ever really develop a strategic mindset?). The Gamble affords us an opportunity to see how strategic goals and intent are developed in national level political, military and diplomatic leaders. Starting with President Bush and ending with newly-elected President Obama, we watch as the war changes shape and character, evolving as the Americans gain experience and knowledge at a punishing cost. Similarly, we get to see General Petraeus at work, as he first builds his team and then marshalls support with congress for his concepts, ultimately ending in the oft-mentioned "surge." This is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that although the war was taking place in Iraq, the strategic "battlespace" was actually in Washington.

An exceptionally strong book, it possesses one obvious weakness, which is the ironic product of the asset which has given it its biggest strength—the proximity that the author has to both the subject matter and the principal personalities. Simply put, it has to be asked whether this book is truly an unbiased account of the war and the events which shaped it. Arguably, no book is ever truly without bias or a prism through which it presents the events, but Ricks has now, in his own way, become part of the establishment. His two books on the Iraq War, and his other works on the US military, give him a familiarity that may well have influenced how events are portrayed. Additionally, he is not a historian searching through the archives and conducting interviews long after the events have occurred and then treating them to a rigorous analysis. Instead, his is an immediate account, written very close to the events themselves and without some of the benefits that time and space allow. Ultimately, it is up to the readers themselves to decide which side of the double-edged sword is doing the cutting and whether or not the proximity enjoyed by the author is a blessing or a curse.

Well-written, with a strong narrative and a topic that most military professionals will find engaging, this is a book that is well worth reading. Indeed, if time and opportunity allow, read *Fiasco* first to get a more complete picture of the war and the situation that ultimately gave rise to the surge. The potential audience for Ricks' latest work is quite broad: political and bureaucratic leaders, military history buffs and anyone who is about to participate in the Joint Command and Staff Program would all find this book worthwhile. Similarly, anyone who is engaged in either planning or executing counter-insurgency operations or campaigns would be highly recommended to give this a read—if only to garner a more complete understanding of the very real political dynamics which affect how these types of campaigns are shaped.

THIEVES OF BAGHDAD

BOGDANOS, Colonel Matthew with William Patrick. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005, 320 pages, ISBN: 1582346453

Nancy Teeple



An important part of any counter-insurgency effort is for an occupying force to win the hearts and minds of the local population. This concept is not lost on Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, United States Marine Corps, who brought together the disciplines of warfighting, law enforcement and archaeology in a campaign to restore the looted treasures of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad (April 2003). This campaign demonstrates an important human dimension of counterinsurgency, namely, the preservation of a country's cultural heritage and national identity.

With a multidisciplinary background, Colonel Bogdanos brings a range of expertise to this project; he is a Marine Corps Reserve officer and a Manhattan assistant district attorney (homicide). He also possesses two master's degrees: one in Classics (Columbia University) and the other Strategic Studies (United States Army War College). Colonel Bogdanos wrote *Thieves of Baghdad* with the assistance of author William Patrick (*Blood Winter* [Viking, 1990] and *Spirals* [Houghton, 1983]).

The book describes his personal experience in the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York City. He was subsequently recalled to active duty in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda and the following campaigns in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Desert Scorpion. In this account, he describes the advantages of diversity within Central Command—namely the roles of the Marines, Navy, Army and Air Force—which comprised an effective, comprehensive force against the asymmetric challenges in Afghanistan. He details his own roles as a Marine "door kicker" (i.e., mobile strike force) and advisor (i.e., training and equipping foreign soldiers as force multipliers) in previous campaigns in South Korea, Lithuania, Guyana, Kosovo, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This experience is reflected in an understandably opinionated account of his challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has "been there and done it" and therefore has the expertise to comment on the shortcomings of United States' (US) policy driving the defence and security establishment, such as interagency incompatibility and bureaucratic barriers, opinions which received consideration during the 9/11 Commission.

Serving as the deputy director of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) in Baghdad, Colonel Bogdanos oversaw the counterterrorism investigative team, which combined, among other agencies, military (mostly Special Forces and Marines), Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement as well as Treasury. During his tour in Iraq, Colonel Bogdanos was alerted to the looting of antiquities from the Iraq National Museum. Although he met some resistance up the chain of command, the Colonel took on investigating the thefts of artefacts as part of the JIACG mission in Baghdad; a mission he noted might later be criticized as "a harebrained stunt that was going to end my career." Yet, in taking this risk the Colonel gained worldwide support for this initiative through public relations, outreach programs and international media coverage; he ultimately earned considerable recognition, including the National Humanities Medal in 2005 from former US President George W. Bush.

The account demonstrates how Colonel Bogdanos engaged the museum staff and the larger population of Baghdad in the mission of tracking down the stolen antiquities. The antiquities included treasures from the Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian and Assyrian civilizations, all of which once existed in the land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (c. 5400–530 B.C.). These artefacts comprised some of the world's most famous collection

of cylinder seals, cuneiform inscriptions on clay tablets, gold jewellery (which demonstrates sophisticated decorative technology), clay figurines, vases with ritual iconography and bronze statues. These pieces are all studied in many introductory archaeology university classes. For those unfamiliar with these materials, Colonel Bogdanos provides an explanation of the uses and function which these items held in antiquity.

Colonel Bogdanos applied crime scene investigation processes to tracking down and recovering missing artefacts and comments on the unique experience of conducting a criminal investigation within a combat zone using an interagency counterterrorism team. Indeed, the analogy is not lost on the author that a crime scene analysis follows similar principles to that of archaeological excavation methods (i.e., disturbing the evidence to study the evidence). However, unlike studying ancient civilizations, in this investigation the Colonel's team was able to question witnesses, follow leads and interrogate suspects.

Notably, intelligence revealed that black market antiquities trafficking paralleled illicit weapons smuggling as well as the drug trade and demonstrated links to terrorist financing. Sadly, those involved in antiquities smuggling not only included the thieves themselves and traffickers, but also art collectors, art dealers and even members of the archaeology community of questionable integrity. The investigation revealed that not only was the museum looted and its artefacts sold on the black market, but archaeological sites and undiscovered tells (i.e., mound sites) had also been looted, thus permanently obscuring evidence of the past.

The suspected involvement of museum staff contributed to the murkiness of the investigation, which was further complicated by the fact that the Baghdad Museum had been under control of the Ba'ath Party. Since Iraqi citizens from all levels of society were involved in the looting, Colonel Bogdanos cleverly established an amnesty program as a part of the recovery operation. This was a community outreach program that invited Iraqis to return the artefacts to the museum, with no questions asked; therefore, maintaining the principle objective of returning the property of the Iraqi people. In this way, the Colonel cultivated contacts and informants, which led to the recovery of high priority items, such as the Sacred Vase of Warka (c. 3200 B.C.), which represents the world's oldest stone vessel carved in relief.

The text provides maps of Afghanistan, Iraq and the district of interest in Baghdad, including diagrams of the museum's interior and exterior that display troop positions, sniper locations, caches of rocket-propelled grenades and tank positions. Colour plates included photos of the museum and rooms destroyed by looters, the artefacts (missing and recovered) and the teams with whom he collaborated on the recovery project.

The discussion is enriched with citations from antiquity to the present, such as quotations from Sun Tzu, Homer and Herodotus to Voltaire, Hemingway and Churchill, among many others. The Colonel's detailed account and analysis, augmented with such impressive scholarship, demonstrates that Bogdanos represents a true soldier-scholar.

Written from a first-person perspective, *Thieves of Bagdad* is an excellent read. I recommend this book to archaeologists, military personnel, intelligence officers and, even, law enforcement officers with an interest in the investigative and analytical processes, which in this case related to global weapons proliferation and its most unlikely connections with the illicit antiquities trade.

WHAT THE THUNDER SAID: REFLECTIONS OF A CANADIAN OFFICER IN KANDAHAR

CONRAD, Lieutenant-Colonel John. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009, softcover, 296 pages, $29.95, ISBN: 978-1554884087

Captain T.E.K. Fitzgerald



The lot of the logistics officer is an underappreciated one. Witness a comment attributed to Alexander the Great, "My logisticians are a humourless lot … they know if my campaign fails, they are the ones I will slay." The importance of logistics cannot, however, be gainsaid: "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."[1] It is for this reason, if no other, that LCol John Conrad's *What the Thunder Said* adds a welcomed dimension to the war in Afghanistan. As commander of the National Support Element (NSE), it fell to his soldiers to run the gauntlet of improvised explosive devices and ambushes to deliver the "beans, blankets and bullets" during Task Force Orion in the summer of 2006.

The three hundred members of the NSE were formed from 1 Service Battalion with extra personnel attached from 1 General Support Battalion and the Administration Company of 1PPCLI, and therein lay the seeds, according to LCol Conrad, of near disaster. After years of institutional neglect and prejudice as well as shifts in logistical doctrine, the "loggies" had become a forgotten branch of the Canadian Forces. Not surprisingly, the emphasis was on the combat arms element of TF Orion rather than on the men and women supporting it. As LCol Conrad convincingly argues, an army without support is just so many people standing around hungry, weaponless, naked and on foot. The second challenge confronting the NSE was the dramatic change in the agreed concept of operations worked out between LCol Conrad and LCol Ian Hope, the battle group commander. Initially, it was intended that one light armoured vehicle (LAV) company would be refitted at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) while the other two LAV companies conducted operations. Without notice however, the operation was revised so that the LAV companies would not be at KAF. Instead, they would be deployed to a group of forward operating bases (Martello, Spin Boldak and Patrol Base Wilson) and would require constant resupply and refitting. To achieve this, the NSE used convoys in a manner described by the author as "powerfully reminiscent of the Battle of the Atlantic." The convoys were protected by latter day-destroyers and corvettes: LAVs, Bisons and Coyotes. This is the real story of *What the Thunder Said*: the men and women who, daily, put their lives at risk to ensure that the "sharp end" remained supported. As the author writes, with no small measure of pride: "We are Canadian soldiers first, and if you get between us and the Canadian troops we are supporting, who need this *matérial* to survive, we will kill you."

There is no doubt that LCol Conrad has an in depth knowledge of his subject on historical, theoretical and practical levels; the last flowing from prior logistical experience in Cambodia and Bosnia coupled with more than twenty five years of experience. His knowledge is evident when he recounts the history of the Logistics Branch in the Canadian military from its inception as the Royal Canadian Service Corps (before that Canadian logistics was an adjunct of British Royal Army Ordnance resulting in Canadian soldiers in WWI and WWII being relegated to the "hind teat") to its evolution as close support service battalions (CSSB) and its garrison cousin, the general support battalion (GSB). It is clear that LCol Conrad is frustrated with this development which he ascribes, in varying degrees, to institutional neglect, to federal budgetary constraint, to the low regard of logistics held by the combat arms senior leadership and, quite candidly, to the leadership of the logistics Corps itself. He believes the Corps' leadership is either uninterested or unable to fight for their Corps and to provide it and the soldiers who work for it a clear vision and direction for the future. As LCol Conrad starkly notes, there are no LCol Hennesseys or LGen Walshs driving the Corps with a clear eye to its development.[2]

What The Thunder Said is briskly written. At times, it suffers somewhat from thematic disjointedness. The narrative does not move in a straight forward chronological order. It switches back and forth, making it difficult for the reader to follow the diverse story lines. The author has much to say, but, at times, individual paragraphs are crowded with apparently dissimilar themes. In one paragraph, for example, the author writes of a familiar brand of coffee, the scene found on a Libyan postage stamp and TF Orion's concept of operations—all very interesting and necessary but a little disconcerting to the reader. A future book will surely tighten up this stylistic meandering.

That said, *What The Thunder Said* is a very readable book. It touches on the hard realities of operational life but is suffused with poignant, sometimes humorous, vignettes. A number of individuals loom very large in the life of the NSE: RSM. Paddy Earles who is described as embodying "everything that is best in small-town Canada"; the irrepressible MCpl Whelan who, when faced with a possible night time ambush, reaches for his C7A2 rifle and nonchalantly walks to his post laconically uttering wise cracks; and MCpl Shawn Crowder whose constant witty repartees with his commanding officer demonstrate that, even in the face of danger and death, humour is a soldier's constant companion.

The author, himself, is very much a part of this story and comes into no small bit of self criticism. In August 2006, as a result of an unprecedented consumption of small arms ammunition, and notwithstanding almost scientific calculation of such usage, the Task Force was faced with a potential critical shortage—a nightmare for any professional logistician. In a very truthful retelling of the event, LCol Conrad writes how he had to appear before BGen David Fraser with "his hat on" to explain how the shortages would be rectified. There exists a simple grace in the author's writing of this incident—acknowledging the situation, not blaming anyone and moving forward to remedy it. Much can be learned from this single incident.

It is not surprising that the Canadian public is focused on the valour of the combat arms element of our Task Forces. To use that hackneyed expression, combat arms is "sexy." But bravery is where you find it. When faced with the uncertainty of death and destruction that is war, men such as WO Paul MacKinnon, Sgt Pat Jones and SM Miles embody the spirit of our fighting men and women and rise to the occasion. The death of any soldier under one's command is an unforgotten, unforgiving event. The sudden violent death of Cpl Raymond Arndt from a suicide bomber (VBSIED) while on convoy is vividly but respectfully described in a manner, which, to this reader, will not soon be forgotten.

What The Thunder Said is a very personal memoir that, perhaps, has been written for its cathartic effect. Interposed between the narrative of operations as well as the bravery and professionalism of subordinates are very personal diary entries, conversations and letters from family, heart felt expressions of love of country and family as well as the camaraderie that binds all soldiers in combat. Logistics and support may not be the first thing people think of when they consider the Canadian military. This book should cause them to reconsider.

Endnotes

1. Quote attributed to General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant United States Marine Corps
2. LCol Patrick Hennessey has assumed near mythical status in the history and culture of the Logistics Branch. He died during the defence of Hong Kong on December 20, 1941. LCol Hennessey grasped the necessity of mobilizing logistical units to the same level of mobility as the units they supported. Likewise, LGen Geoffrey Welsh (1909-1999), CBE, DSO CD was the Chief Engineer for 2 Cdn Corps during WWII and, in 1961, was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

CHURCHILL AND THE JEWS

GILBERT, Martin. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007, cloth with illustrations and index, 384 pages, $39.99, ISBN: 0771033265

Major J.R. Grodzinski, CD, MA



No author is best suited to write a book on this topic than Sir Martin Gilbert. A prolific author with 81 books to his name (and with at least five new titles in preparation), he is best known as Winston Churchill's official biographer and author of several important works and atlases on the two World Wars, the Holocaust and Middle East history. Between 1968 and 1988, Gilbert read some 15 tons of documentation while researching his eight-volume biography of Churchill; he also interviewed many of Churchill's contemporaries and, thus, has more than detailed knowledge of the subject than any other living person. One of his recent works, under review here, considers Churchill's relations with Jews and his support of Zionism.

Throughout his life, Churchill was an emotional and political supporter of Jews and the Zionist movement. The reason for this support, Gilbert argues, was Churchill's belief that the Jewish people formed the foundation stone of Western moral teaching and advanced certain ideas the Greeks and Romans could not. He once told an audience in Jerusalem that the creation of a Jewish homeland would be a blessing to the world. He also believed they would provide a meaningful challenge to Communism, and Churchill encouraged Jewish leaders to stay clear of Bolshevism. From the moment he entered Parliament in 1901, Churchill fought against prejudicial laws or legislation, while developing a network of prominent Jewish Britons as political allies. He welcomed the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which called for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish homeland, and on becoming foreign secretary in 1921, he gained responsibility for Mandate Palestine.

Thereafter followed heady times, combating second thoughts on the Balfour Declaration, immigration restrictions and persecution occupied much of Churchill's time, both in and out of office; for he never wavered in his support. As persecution of the Jews grew in Europe, Churchill believed their only relief was through migration to Palestine. Complications arose as some Zionists believed the British government was hostile to them. Some of this animosity dissipated when Churchill became prime minister in 1940, although that did not stop the assassination of one of Churchill's closest friends by a Zionist faction that also planned to kill the prime minister himself. During the war, Churchill argued vehemently against pre-war British policies, such as the Macdonald White Paper, that repudiated the Balfour Declaration. In 1948, Churchill was strongly committed to the new state of Israel and during his second premiership Churchill even suggested that Israel join the Commonwealth. This type of support was exceptional rather than the norm for a politician of that period, and Gilbert makes this point well.

Gilbert takes on Churchill's critics, some of whom argue that he was too much in the pocket of wealthy and powerful Jews and that his support had less of an ideological basis. While Gilbert convincingly discredits these claims, he shies away from addressing criticism that Churchill—and other wartime leaders such as Roosevelt—did not ardently attempt to avert the Holocaust; although to be fair, what could he do, other than help bring the end of Nazi Germany? Bombing Auschwitz may not have changed anything. Gilbert is very charitable towards Churchill, perhaps too much as Churchill rarely let his support of Zionist interests interfere with interests of Britain. Gilbert's critics accuse him of ignoring several contradictory actions by Churchill and of engaging in hagiography.

The text includes lengthy quotes from Churchill's writings and speeches, and these are often far too long. One of the jobs of the historian is to synthesize and present the general form and ideas of any discourse; detail is important, but the historian should master that and not burden the reader with too much of it. While Gilbert may have believed this level of

primary detail was important, it clouds the overall discussion. For someone who has read almost every document about Churchill and written so much about him, a more concise and original work was expected.

This topic has been of interest to other scholars and has been explored by Michael Makovsky in *Churchill's Promised Land: Zionism and Statecraft* (Yale University Press, 2008). Michael Cohen was, however, far more critical of Churchill's wartime policies in his 2003 *Churchill and the Jews, 1900–1948* (Frank Cass). Given the collections of documents and speeches that are now available, perhaps a tight vignette, offering the insights Gilbert is capable of, would have been better. In any event, while this is an interesting and at times colourful book, those by Michael Makovsky and Michael Cohen are better.

THE CANADIAN ARMY READING LIST: A PROFESSIONAL GUIDE FOR CANADA'S SOLDIERS

GODEFROY, Andrew. Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, July 2009, softcover, 139 pages, free of charge, ISBN: 978-0-662-06911-9,
NDID B-GL-007-001/ASF-001

Sergeant K. Grant



Today's soldiers face challenges their forefathers never dreamed of. Gone, for instance, are the days when the enemy was easy to identify. In his place has emerged an enemy that knowingly hides amidst the local population and watches for the opportune moment to spring his trap. Gone, too, are the days of fighting on the lush green fields of Western Europe; instead, today's soldiers find themselves fighting in unimaginable heat, on barren planes or over rocky terrain. To an extent, there is no way to prepare the soldier to fight in these conditions other than to immerse them into it and to hope for the best. Through the military makes an effort to prepare the soldier through professional development, the depth and breadth of cultural and historical awareness required by the soldier can at times seem overwhelming. To attempt to gain the required knowledge while on deployment seems folly as there is little, if any, free time, and the learning curve is so steep it appears to be a wall.

Away from the field, however, there is no better way to develop the knowledge and confidence required of the soldier's calling than by reading. Without a systemic course of study to guide continuing education, it falls to the individual to invest some of their personal time to seek out and read as much information as possible.

Recognizing the need for guidance, in 2001 the Canadian Army produced its first *Canadian Army Reading List* (CARL) to aid soldiers in their quests for knowledge. Since its original publication, however, much has transpired and much has been written. For the serious solider, the timely arrival of this latest version of the CARL will provide an instructive guide for exploring a given topic area. Organized by subject area, each entry provides author, title, bibliographic data and a brief annotation concerning the content of the book. The CARL provides an important starting point on any given subject.

It is to be noted that the CARL is by no means exhaustive and should not be considered the limit of what soldiers should read. Instead, it is designed to provide a starting point to enhance professional knowledge of those subjects that affect and influence soldiers' lives and thinking. Recognizing that soldiers' interests are many and varied, the purpose of the guide is to encourage and assist soldiers in continuing their professional education, and as such is an important desk reference.

The *Canadian Army Reading List: A Professional Guide for Canada's Soldiers* has been initially distributed along with the *Canadian Army Journal Vol 12.1*. It is available at http://www.armyforces.gc.ca/DLCD-DCSFT/specialPubs_e.asp and can be obtained free of charge from the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs in Kingston or through the *Canadian Army Journal*.

FIELD MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON: A POLITICAL SOLDIER

JEFFEREY, Keith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, hardcover, 325 pages, $108.00, ISBN 978-0199239672

Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, plsc



Notorious for arguably being the only British field marshal to die in action, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson was assassinated in front of his own house by two members of the Irish Republican Army in 1922. It was a tragic end for one of Britain's most central and controversial figures during the First World War, and his murder sparked generations of biographies that attempted to explain how Wilson's often misunderstood public life ultimately led his execution.

In this latest examination of the man, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier*, historian Keith Jeffery has shed a modern sensibility on the life of Britain's venerable Great War soldier. Born in 1864 in the midlands of Ireland, Henry Wilson came from an uncharacteristically modest background for a Victorian era officer, unlike many of his upper class peers who were also destined for higher command. Still, Wilson's athletic form and jovial demeanour often disarmed friends and adversaries alike, and he was able to successfully navigate his way through the late Victorian and early Edwardian society towards a higher station.

After regimental duties and operational service in Burma, Wilson served on the staff during the South African War. He later commanded the Staff College, and would find himself suitably placed at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 to be vaulted into even higher levels of command. During the Great War, Wilson made his reputation first as the main liaison officer to the French Army, and then afterwards commanded a Corps. Though not overly experienced in field command, nor very successful as a Corps Commander, he carried enough weight amongst the royalty and chose the right friends in government to ultimately secure the post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Despite Wilson's apparent focus solely on the politics of the army, he was also very committed to the serious study of strategy and tactics. In the years prior to the Great War, he routinely ventured across and studied the major European battlefields of both the Napoleonic Wars as well as the Franco-Prussian War. The study of these latter battlefields proved especially helpful in 1914, though unfortunately his peers and superiors did not always appreciate Wilson's intimate knowledge of the tactical geography along the western front. From Wilson's point of view, they seemed less interested in the war they were fighting than the war they wanted to fight. The results of such attitudes were often costly and deadly.

Keith Jeffery captures the complexity of Wilson's private and professional life brilliantly in this new study that earned him the Templar Medal from the Society for Army Historical Research. Much aided by the voluminous and detailed diaries Wilson left behind as well as time itself, Jeffery was able to provide a more modern and balanced assessment of Wilson than his previous biographers. The result is a well researched and written book well suited to students of leadership and command in the First World War.

VIETNAM: EXPLAINING AMERICA'S LOST WAR

HESS, Gary R. Malden MA: Blackwell, 2009, hardcover, 218 pages, $101.99,
ISBN 978-1405125284

Neil Chuka



Certain subjects are almost guaranteed to spark contentious debate amongst historians; the Vietnam War is one such subject. The debate over the war began at the start of US' involvement in Southeast Asia and continues today, and includes both macro-level questions (was the war central to US interests?) and micro-level questions (was the Phoenix program a success?). The debate has spawned an enormous body of literature which can be difficult to penetrate, particularly by those not familiar with the key questions and arguments surrounding the conflict.

As the various 40th anniversary milestones of the conflict approach and pass, historian Gary Hess has done a great service by authoring an historiography that does much to sort through the major schools of thought, questions, arguments and literature in an effort to provide clarity to the long debate. The literature on the war is roughly split into two schools: 'orthodox' and 'revisionist'. Normally, when discussing US military history, what is called the revisionist school reflects a train of scholarship which questions involvement in a war while the orthodox school is supportive of government involvement in a conflict. With the literature on the Vietnam War however, the trains of thought are reversed, with the orthodox school arguing that the war was a mistaken, unwinnable, unnecessary commitment, prosecuted with faulty military strategy and tactics. The revisionist school defends the war, arguing that it was a noble, necessary cause, and that failure occurred because the military was undermined both by government restrictions and a liberal, left-wing media. As Hess points out, much of the revisionist school consists of former government officials and retired military personnel who served in Vietnam and that there are many 'if-onlys' and 'what-ifs' used to bolster its arguments.

Hess has organized the book in a sensible fashion, arraying the chapters along a rough chronological approach tied to major debate subjects. He opens the volume with an overview of the schools of thought, and proceeds through the subjects of whether Vietnam was a necessary war, the role of John F. Kennedy, debates on military strategy and tactics, the role of the media, the effects of the 1968 Tet offensive and the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy that brought about an end to the US presence. Throughout, Hess engages the major pieces of literature on a given subject, the questions posed and the answers posited by the two schools. He also provides his assessment of the validity of the arguments of the schools of thought on a given point. Hess' conclusions though, which provides his assessments of which school has the strongest argument on a given point, are of little utility. The evidence produced in the volume is not sufficient to support the claims unless one is prepared to accept Hess' word based on his scholarly reputation. However, Hess' conclusions form a relatively small portion of the volume, the value of which is little undermined by those few words. A further criticism is that the presentation of the bibliography and references employed in the book are disjointed. Not all the references from the chapters are listed in the bibliography and not all the material in the bibliography is employed in the chapters. So while it may be "redundant" as Hess states, to list all the references used in the chapters in the bibliography, it would enhance the utility of the volume by simplifying matters for the reader. As it stands, the reader must scan both the chapter endnotes and the bibliography when searching for a particular source.

Overall, this is a very useful book. The layout and concise prose make this an easy text to read and likely would be well placed in undergraduate and graduate course reading lists. The price for the hardback version is a little tough to accept but a soft cover edition has been published at a much cheaper price more acceptable to most readers.

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: MILITARY CULTURE AND IRREGULAR WAR,

CASSIDY, R.M. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008, paperback, 224 pages, $23.95 USD, ISBN 978-0804759663

Captain D.A. Doran, MA, P.Eng, B.Eng



Colonel Robert Cassidy, PhD, is an active service officer in the U.S. Military and author of the subject book: *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror—Military Culture and Irregular War.* In this work, Colonel Cassidy argues that the current *War on Terror* is in fact more accurately likened to a *global insurgency* that is being perpetrated by "networks and groupings of transnational insurgents and terrorists" that are "complex, adaptive, asymmetric, innovative, dispersed, networked, resilient and capable of regeneration."[1] Further to his thesis, the author offers various insights on the arguably obsolete doctrinal paradigm of symmetric conflict. Cassidy uses historical examples in addition to current conflicts to illustrate the continual reticence of Western militaries to embrace doctrinal developments and innovations in the field of counterinsurgency operations (COIN). He asserts that until only recently Western armies focussed their operational thinking on more conventional force-on-force concepts instead of COIN.

While Colonel Cassidy's work succeeds in providing examples germane to the flaws within the current military mindset, (i.e., viewing COIN operations as an ephemeral anomaly as opposed to the norm) there remains a critical lack of context with respect to the operations he cites as historical support for the alternative approaches he suggests would lead to greater success. His central omission in this regard relates to how and *if* the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) were applied in achieving said success; it is this writer's assertion that they were not. The remainder will examine two specific examples cited by Cassidy and critique their *actual* relevance when framed within the LOAC.

Perhaps the most exceptional example of Cassidy's misrepresentation of success in COIN operations would be in his recounting of the putting down of the Mau-Mau Uprising by the British army in Kenya between 1952 and 1960. The author attributes British success in the campaign to soldiers operating "for long periods in the forest, using unconventional techniques against an unconventional enemy"[2] which "defeated the indigenous movement."[3] What Colonel Cassidy fails to note is that notwithstanding the LOAC in place at the time, the British operated unconstrained by these moral boundaries to achieve success. The atrocities committed to achieve this COIN victory are viscerally detailed in *"Imperial reckoning"—The untold story of Britain's gulag in Kenya*, written by Pulitzer Prize-wining author Professor Caroline Elkins. Elkins' work serves as a sobering counter-point to Cassidy's claims, tempering his ardent assertion of 'success' in the campaign. She notes that "hundreds of thousands of men and women…were detained in the camps and villages," subjected to "torture, hard labour, sexual abuse, malnutrition, and starvation"[4] at the hands of the Empire. These incidents, whether planned or not, were realities of this COIN campaign, which may potentially have contributed to its success in much the same way British concentration camps did during the Boer Wars in South Africa—breaking the insurgents' will to fight.

A second example cited by Colonel Cassidy serves as one of the centrepieces of COIN success in his book: the Malayan Uprising between 1948 and 1960. The author suggests that Britain was able to prosecute this war in a manner that "helped bring about favourable political outcomes" through the "stealth and cunning"[5] of the military. Cassidy goes on to describe the conflict as the "archetypal" COIN campaign achieved through "military measures, emergency regulations, and winning hearts and minds."[6] The military measures that Cassidy fails to expand upon in his work include the massacre at Batang Kali in December of 1948. During this event, also known as Britain's My Lai, English soldiers

sacked a village, rounding up and killing dozens of villagers whose genitals were then smashed, bodies mutilated and heads hacked off.[7] While Batang Kali remains the most noteworthy violation of the LOAC during the conflict, it was only an extreme permutation of countless other abuses that occurred during the 12-year campaign. So brutal were acts perpetrated during this conflict that the British government privately noted, "There is no doubt that under international law a similar case in wartime would be a war crime."[8] In addition to being a clear admission of culpability, this statement harkens to the still-salient attitude vis-à-vis COIN operations, where LOAC violations are tolerated under various tenuous pretences. Current campaigns have precipitated untold violations of human right through institutions such as Guantanamo Bay where ex-combatants are held without the rights or privileges afforded to them in accordance with the LOAC. While Colonel Cassidy may interpret the Malaya campaign as a success, in light of what has previously been noted it would hardly seem a success worth repeating.

Colonel Cassidy and Dr. Elkins exemplify stove-piped approaches to literature addressing conflict in the world. Cassidy sees things (as can be expected) from a purely military point of view, interpreting success in an almost Machiavellian manner of ends justifying means. This approach is countered by Elkins, who frames her arguments through an apologist interpretation of the 'white man's burden.' These views present starkly different interpretations of the same events, with each selectively omitting details that would otherwise tend to interfere with the readability of their respective works. That said, taken together, each author's writing tempers the other's in a manner that provides a complete picture of COIN operations. However, when taken separately, the two authors risk presenting overly skewed interpretations of world events that fail to address all the complementary factors required to create a truly balanced reading. These limitations make Cassidy's work an overall inadequate text to use in a manner that could potentially influence military thought and policy within the context of the Canadian Forces. Taking Cassidy's work at face value and on its own risks presenting a rose-coloured view of COIN operations within the modern context, which is not sufficient if Western military leaders are taught to operate by the rules they wrote themselves. While ignoring the LOAC does remove a degree of difficulty in establishing success in COIN, it is a factor tantamount to the credibility of a campaign and key in defining a core set of values that honour human life and aim to continually strive to uphold its dignity.

Endnotes

1. Cassidy, R.M. (2008), p. 4.
2. Ibid, p. 83
3. Ibid, p. 91
4. Elkins, C. (2005), p. 355
5. Cassidy, R.M. (2008), p. 89.
6. Ibid, p. 90.
7. Elkins, C. The New Republic (2005), p.16.
8. Ibid, p. 16.

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ELKINS, C. (2005). Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya. New York: Henry Holt and Co.

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THE ECHO OF BATTLE: THE ARMY'S WAY OF WAR

LINN, Brian McAllister. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, hardcover, 312 pages, $27.95 USD, ISBN 978-0674026513

Neil Chuka



Western militaries prefer to portray themselves as learning organizations that are adaptive and prepared to meet future threats and adversaries. The US Army exemplifies this tendency, with arguably the largest, best equipped and funded training, education, doctrine and concept development system of any military in the world. This system is supported by a large number of professional publications that allow serving and retired personnel and civilians to profess thoughts on contemporary military issues. By these means, the US Army attempts to not only fight today's wars effectively, but also prepare for future conflict by trying to discern the nature, ways, means and likely opponents of conflicts to come. This is no simple task. Debates over the role of the soldier, leadership and technology have always coloured and influenced debates over how the US armed forces should be employed.

Brian McAllister Linn, Professor of Military History at Texas A & M, President of the Society for Military History and author of several books dealing with various aspects of early US military policy and activity in the Pacific attempts to reshape the debate over what historians call the 'US way of war' in his most recent book. He does so by focusing not on the relatively brief periods of warfare across the US Army's history, but on the intellectual debates that have taken place between the periods of conflict. As Linn points out, "a military institution's concept of war is a composite of its interpretation of the past, its perception of present threats, and its prediction of future hostilities." Linn's argument is that peacetime professional debates on these subjects by members of the US Army have had greater influence on the institution's conception of war than its wartime experiences.

Using large amounts of archival material, including lesson plans, course syllabi, student essays and other material from the US Army's professional education system, and supported by the judicious use of secondary source material, Linn argues that three major schools of thought can be identified as the core of US Army intellectual thinking on warfare since the period of the War of 1812 (roughly the beginning of a professionalized US military). The first school Linn calls the "Guardians." The Guardians see war as "both an art and science," Linn writes, "subject to laws and principles which, if applied, provided the means to anticipate or even predict the consequences of specific actions or policies." The second school, the "Heroes," "emphasized the human element, and defined warfare by personal intangibles such as military genius, experience, courage, morale and discipline." This school of thought, Linn asserts, has been very adaptable and innovative, possessing the intellectual means to "transition from one form of war to another." The Heroes reject the notion that war is a science, seeing it as an art that cannot be explained by scientific formula. The last school Linn calls the "Managers." This group see war as a logical result of political and economic competition and argue that the nation must prepare for massive wars against international state rivals. Linn holds George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower as characteristic of this school. Because of the focus of this last group, Linn notes that they have historically been indifferent to the types of small, limited conflicts that characterize much of US military history.

This is an interesting book. Linn applies his basic framework to a chronological map that takes the reader from the post-War of 1812 period through to the "Global War on Terror." Throughout, he notes the impact of small and large conflicts on peacetime debates while clearly illustrating the interwoven strands of the intellectual schools through to the present day. While Linn could be accused of trying to tackle too large a subject and timeframe in

too few pages, his use of primary source material helps deflect this criticism. Linn's book can also be criticised as reductionist in that it attempts to distil the thoughts of a very large group of subjects into a limited number of schools. While Linn cannot completely dodge this criticism, he is careful to note the interaction and occasional agreement and cooperation between the schools of thought. This shows that he has allowed, at least to a limited degree, for the fact that the schools of thought are not hard and fast.

The work is easy to read and comprehend, offering much for those wanting a better understanding of the US Army's intellectual foundations and history. The book also offers some interesting food for thought for those involved in the Canadian professional military education, doctrine and concept development systems, as similar schools of thought are apparent in the historical and contemporary CF. Linn's framework, while not perfect, can help one understand some of the historical biases that have influenced the US government and armed forces' past decisions. Given the close relationship between the CF and US armed forces, this work will most definitely assist in understanding the decisions of our closest military ally.

BOUND FOR AFRICA: COLD WAR FIGHT ALONG THE ZAMBEZI

HUBBARD, Douglass H. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008, hardcover, 301 pages, $34.95, ISBN 978-1591143949

Sacha Burrows, MA



The Cold War is fertile ground for military historians and political scientists alike. US and Soviet efforts to establish spheres of influence had a major impact on international state politics. The rivalry of the two superpowers and their allies also played a large part in shaping the roles and policies of international institutions like the United Nations. The Cold War transformed the global stage; however, it is also important that intrastate changes are not forgotten. Well-researched country profiles and social histories are vital to understanding the domestic and regional instability that many countries faced under superpower pressure. Douglass H. Hubbard Jr. is able to illuminate internal change in Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe—through his autobiography *Bound for Africa: Cold War Fight Along the Zambezi*. This book provides a first-hand account of an African proxy war, alluding to the intricacies of Cold War rivalries and detailing counter-insurgency tactics used within that country.

Bound for Africa explores Hubbard's life during the Rhodesian Front War from 1972 to 1979. The author, a veteran of the Vietnam War, pursued a career with the British South African Police (BSAP) in Rhodesia. The BSAP was established as the local police force under British colonial rule in Rhodesia, but also acted as a paramilitary organization throughout Hubbard's employment. The influence of strict British military standards on the BSAP is meticulously recorded in Hubbard's account of his training. Later, describing his time as an instructor for the BSAP Support Unit, he provides details regarding weaponry and counter-insurgency tactics. These are the highlight of the work. Hubbard enables readers to understand Rhodesian police efforts to juggle local law enforcement with paramilitary, counter-insurgency, and security initiatives. This is a unique perspective of a society in flux under Cold War pressures. Most published histories of the Rhodesian conflict focus on the violent civil war that plagued the nation. Hubbard deviates from this by using his experiences to explore how the impending revolutionary chaos affected the lives and institutions that he was directly involved in. While this is a unique angle with which to explore Rhodesia in the 1970's, the book suffers from a lack of balance.

Although there is a brief overview of the Rhodesian conflict in John P. Cann's introduction, Hubbard's writing does not specifically explain the threats the country was facing. Different aspects of the revolution are referenced seemingly at random. For example, Hubbard briefly mentions international sanctions being enforced on Rhodesia approximately half way through the book, but does not expand this to illustrate the importance or the overall effects of the sanctions on the nation. In fact, he mentions that sanctions could actually be seen as a "catalyst for local industry."[1] This is a unique and interesting point of view, but Hubbard does not provide sufficient insight into the negative effects sanctions had on the nation, or adequate commentary regarding why they were imposed. Hubbard leaves the reader with little understanding of how seriously international sanctions restricted the nation's economy and war effort. Further, although Hubbard discusses counter-insurgency training at length, there are only snippets of information regarding the insurgents themselves. His readers will know of the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) which was backed by China and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) supported by the Soviet Union; however, he provides scant detail concerning just how powerful or large these elements were at the time. The motives of the rebel groups may also be confusing to those with limited knowledge of the conflict. Racial politics were a main motivation for insurgents to oust the existing predominantly white government, but Hubbard describes racial differences as creating no hostility in the environment which he was living.[2] A more detailed account of the rebel cause and their aims would have addressed this. These issues reflect the limitations of an autobiographical format to capture a satisfying picture of what was one of Colonial Africa's most complicated civil wars. Readers with little knowledge of the Rhodesian Front War might consider first reading more traditional accounts of the insurgency in order to fully appreciate Hubbard's work. Ronald Reid Daly and Peter Stiff's *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War* or Barbara Cole's *The Elite: the Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service* are two texts that would paint an appropriate backdrop for Hubbard's account. With a more well-rounded understanding of the conflict, Hubbard's readers would be able to detect arguments discreetly woven into the text. They could appreciate the subtle comparisons Hubbard makes between Rhodesia and Vietnam. Also, they could more clearly understand the disappointment he expresses regarding the dedication of major international powers to their smaller allies during the Cold War era.

Ultimately, *Bound for Africa* is a book with many layers. On the surface it is a detailed, first hand account of counterinsurgency efforts in Rhodesia during the Cold War. Underneath lies an interesting narrative regarding the influences of major international powers and their ability to intensify civil unrest in foreign nations to suit their own opposing agendas. Although written for an audience more familiar with the history of Rhodesia, Hubbard's work is an innovative addition to the history of Cold War insurgencies.

Endnotes

1. Douglass H. Hubbard Jr. Bound for Africa: Cold War Fight Along the Zambezi, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 125, 180.
2. Ibid, 130.

HORSE SOLDIERS: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF A BAND OF U.S. SOLDIERS WHO RODE TO VICTORY IN AFGHANISTAN

STANTON, Doug. New York: Scribner, 2009, hardcover, 416 pages, $36.00,
ISBN 978-1416580515

Nancy Teeple



Drawing upon interviews with U.S. special forces, U.S. civilians, Afghan soldiers and Afghan civilians Doug Stanton recreates the events of U.S. first responders in Afghanistan following 9/11, specifically the battle of Mazar-i-Sharif. This account demonstrates how U.S. special forces and CIA paramilitary personnel entered Afghanistan under dangerous conditions in order to provide advice and assistance to the three Afghan Generals leading the Northern Alliance: Abdul Rashid Dostum of the Uzbeks, Atta Mohammed Noor of the Tajiks, and Naji Mohammed Mohaqeq of the Hazara.

The account begins with an event in the future perfect tense describing the surrender of six hundred Taliban to the Northern Alliance and the subsequent prisoner uprising at the Qali-i-Janghi Fortress at Mazar-i-Sharif on November 24-25, 2001. This introduction is followed by a return to the event that spurred the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, namely the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and how the actors introduced in the book perceived the events of the day. The subsequent insertion of US SF and CIA paramilitary elements into Afghanistan is described in a series of challenges—both serious and humorous—experienced by these operators as they attempted to adopt local customs and collaborate with indigenous resistance forces comprising the Northern Alliance. First among these challenges was learning to fight on horseback, a feat for most of the U.S. advisors in Afghanistan.

Other challenges involved getting the various tribes of the resistance to cooperate with one another, while also encouraging collaboration with friendly Pashtun elements against the Taliban—this was a difficult prospect, as the Hazara, who had been persecuted by the Taliban (a predominantly Pashtun organization) attacked other Pashtuns in revenge. Cultural, tribal and religious issues also complicated interactions between forces, including navigating around the “mafia-like nature” of Afghan warlords who were involved in both legitimate and criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking and poppy production. However, U.S. SF and CIA adapted by adopting the local customs: they grew their beards, spoke the local dialect (Dari), and adhered to regional customs, which earned the respect of the Afghan Generals—warlords who taught them the tactics of warfare in the unique terrain of the country. On horseback, U.S. and Afghan forces used cavalry and light infantry against Taliban tanks, mortars, artillery, personnel carriers, machine guns and sniper fire. Identifying targets and calling in air strikes were the key to success by making the Taliban believe that U.S. forces could hit any target they wanted. The most important message that U.S. advisors took to the Northern Alliance was the notion that this was their war and “we are here to help you fight it,” indicating that the victory was to be seen as Afghan, not American. The final chapters return to the insurrection at the Qali-i-Janghi Fortress at Mazar where sources allege that U.S. forces came within minutes of losing the war in Afghanistan, before winning victory with the Northern Alliance.

The text provides maps of Afghanistan with the location of Mazar-i-Sharif, a detailed diagram of the Qali-i-Janghi Fortress, as well as a number of black-and-white photographs of U.S. SF, CIA and their Afghan counterparts. Doug Stanton is an author and journalist who demonstrates an informed background with an extensive bibliography comprised of texts ranging from studies on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, studies and perspectives on the CIA and special operations forces, and a history of conflict and insurgency in Afghanistan

since the Russian occupation in the 1980s. Other sources include government documents and news media.

The book's weakness also serves as one of its strengths: the writing style used to recount the U.S. presence in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. The account is portrayed from the third person perspective of U.S. special forces and CIA personnel, their families, leaders of the Afghan Northern Alliance resistance and even some Taliban and Al Qaeda members—notable among these was that of John Walker Lindh (the 'American' Taliban). This perspective provided an entertaining piece which humanized the actors involved in the conflict, and included references and quotes from military theorists such as Sun Tzu to illustrate the nature of deception in war.

This book is an informative and entertaining account for military historians, strategic specialists, intelligence officers and even laypeople, as it provides a useful cultural education on tribal Afghanistan—the context in which the insurgency continues today.

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