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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations in endnotes are translated from their original language, we will use the abbreviation ‘TOQ’ at the end of the note to indicate that readers can find the original citations in the other language version of the Journal.
EDITOR’S CORNER

W ell, it was not a particularly arduous winter here in southern Ontario, and spring is now in full burst mode in our little corner of the Great White North. With the promise of the season brings, we hope we have cobbled together a diverse and stimulating array of articles, opinion pieces, and reviews to pique the interest of our readers.

In our lead article, Major Rob Stokes, a former infantry officer and now a lawyer serving in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, introduces a few of the conceptual approaches to military personnel law and policy (MPLP), views MPLP’s core concepts through the filtering lens of approaches to military personnel law and policy (MPLP), and reviews to pique the interest of our readers. He is followed by Marco Wyss and Alex Wilner, two senior researchers for the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland, who present a compelling endorsement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II as a 5th Generation fighter acquisition for Canada. As an old fighter pilot, I must confess that I find the debate surrounding the planned acquisition of the jet profoundly interesting. Nonetheless, the ramifications of cost overruns, production delays, some relatively minor structural issues (not unusual in a new aircraft), and a recently-announced, unspecified impact upon American acquisition plans all suggest that the jury of public, and, to an extent, professional opinion is still out on this unquestionably fine aircraft. Time will tell …

Next, Andrew Morrison, an Army Reserve Intelligence Officer and an associate veterinarian, argues that, given the complexity and diversity of today’s operations, use of the modern military veterinarian, focusing upon helping to build sustainable agriculture to help stabilize societies in need, is a tool that should be employed by the Canadian Forces. In our historical section, Christian Breede, infantry officer and PhD candidate in War Studies, outlines “… the historical context (in relation to Clausewitzian theory) of the (American) decision to develop limited nuclear options [LNOs]” as a strategy to counter the extreme policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in U.S. nuclear war planning. He further offers that “… the search for those options was tainted by inter-service and inter-departmental rivalries, ultimately leading back to a de facto posture of massive nuclear exchange.”

Pierre Pahlavi and Karine Ali then provide an interesting and informative study of Portugal’s little-known involvement in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique during the period 1961-1974, “… as a unique perspective to examine the adaptation of a Western army to irregular warfare.” In doing so, they emphasize the cultural-cognitive (ideological/ideational), normative (doctrinal/strategic), and regulative (laws, rules) dimensions of Portugal’s counter-guerrilla efforts in the region “… [conducted] to prevent its three African colonies from becoming independent.”

Lots of opinion pieces in this issue, and I am very pleased that we are generating so much interest and comment. Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Rémi Landry, an associate professor at the University of Sherbrooke and a former infantry officer with the Royal 22nd Regiment (Vandoos), furthers the ongoing ethical debate with respect to the morality of battlefield mercy killings through presentation of a fresh perspective on the ethical importance of the act committed by Captain Robert Semrau in October 2008. Next, Michael Gibson, the Deputy Judge Advocate General Military Justice, launches a spirited defence of Canada’s military justice system, which he staunchly maintains is one of the best in the world. Then, renowned Canadian historian Desmond Morton takes a fresh look at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759, and argues that it was the Royal Navy and its timely appearance on the St. Lawrence River the following spring, and not British land forces, that altered the course of history at Québec and in British North America. He is followed by the Canadian Defence Academy’s Dr. Rick Monaghan, who argues that the CF’s current language education and training programs cannot support the demand for them, and that they are about to be underfunded. In brief, he maintains, “… unless there is commitment to continuing to modernize Second Official Language and Training (SOLET), the CF requirement for bilingual personnel cannot be met.” Finally, as the last of the opinion pieces, NATO analyst Paul Cooper opines that the establishment of a specialized NATO Governance Support Team (GST) would be a welcome and worthwhile asset in helping to turn around a failed or failing state, or in establishing a post-conflict state.

Our own Martin Shadwick takes a detailed look at the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), and maintains, among other things, that “… sealift, support to joint forces ashore, and related capabilities are relevant to a broad range of military, quasi-military, and non-military contingencies, both at home and abroad …”

Finally, we close the issue with a rather extensive and diversified sampling of book reviews for further consideration by our readers. Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
Canada’s three military valour decorations, namely, the Victoria Cross, the Star of Military Valour, and the Medal of Military Valour, were created by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, on 1 January 1993. All the decorations may be awarded posthumously.

The **Victoria Cross** is awarded for the most conspicuous bravery, a daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

The **Star of Military Valour** is awarded for distinguished or valiant service in the presence of the enemy.

The **Medal of Military Valour** is awarded for an act of valour or devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

Additionally, the **Mention in Dispatches** was created to recognize members of the Canadian Forces on active service and other individuals working with or in conjunction with the Canadian Forces for valiant conduct, devotion to duty, or other distinguished service. Recipients are entitled to wear a bronze oak leaf on the appropriate campaign or service medal ribbon. Like the military valour decorations, the Mention in Dispatches may be awarded posthumously.

On 13 December 2011, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presented three **Military Valour Decorations** and 42 **Meritorious Service Decorations** to members of Canadian and allied forces. The Governor General said, in part:

“Each of you has demonstrated your understanding of the Canadian military ethos, and your role in representing the values of Canada ... Showing extraordinary courage, resolve and ingenuity in difficult conditions, you exemplify the ideal of service to country.”

“... The decorations you are receiving today are a testament to your courage, your ability and your determination. Together, you embody our commitment to the rights and freedoms we cherish in a democratic society, and to the personal values of duty, honour, and service. On behalf of all Canadians, thank you.”

### MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS

**Medal of Military Valour**

- Private Tony Rodney Vance Harris, MMV – Penfield, NB
- Warrant Officer Michael William Jackson, MMV, CD – Abbotsford, BC
- Captain Michael A. MacKillop, MMV, CD – Calgary, AB

### CITATIONS

Private Tony Rodney Vance Harris, MMV
Penfield, New Brunswick
Medal of Military Valour

On November 23, 2009, Private Harris was at Forward Operating Base Wilson, in Afghanistan, when insurgents
unleashed a mortar attack. Without regard for his own safety, he ran to the scene of the impact and provided first aid to American soldiers. Noticing another soldier trapped inside a burning sea container, Private Harris went to his aid, single-handedly pulled him to safety and rendered life-saving first aid as rounds continued to fall. Private Harris’ courageous and decisive actions under fire that day saved several lives and brought great credit to Canada.

Master Corporal Paul Alexander Munroe, MMV, CD Stonewall and Swan River, Manitoba Medal of Military Valour

In the midst of a three-hour battle in Afghanistan on August 19, 2006, Warrant Officer Jackson and Master Corporal Munroe’s platoon was forced to conduct a withdrawal while under enemy fire. Fully exposed to the violence of the enemy, these soldiers risked their lives to coordinate the safe movement of personnel and damaged vehicles. Their heroic actions under constant fire enabled the platoon to regroup and continue the fight, while denying the enemy an opportunity to capture and make use of stricken Canadian equipment.

"Master Corporal Munroe received his insignia at an earlier ceremony."

Master Corporal Martin Amyot Montreal, Que.
Corporal Joshua Antonio Lautoka, Fiji
Captain Breen Carson Toronto, Ont.
Corporal Neil Dancer Halifax, N.S.
Corporal Andrew Paul Downer Richmond Hill, Ont.
Master Corporal Evan Duff North Bay, Ont.
Corporal Joseph Don Henry St. John, N.B.
Corporal Shaun Hofer Carberry, Man.
Major Robert Mathew Hume, CD Halifax, N.S.
Private Kirk Farrell Barrie, Ont.
Sergeant Patrick Michael Farrell, CD Conception Bay, N.L.

On December 14, 2011, Governor General Johnston announced the names of 23 individuals mentioned in dispatches for specific achievements that have brought honour to the Canadian Forces and to Canada. Mentions in Dispatches are a national honour created to recognize valiant conduct, devotion to duty or other distinguished service.

"Mentioned in Dispatches"

Captain Michael A. MacKillop, MMV, CD Calgary, Alberta Medal of Military Valour

As commander of a reconnaissance platoon from October 2009 to May 2010, Captain MacKillop disrupted insurgent activities in a volatile sector of Afghanistan through his courageous and relentless engagement of the enemy. Often facing fierce resistance and fire from multiple directions, he remained composed during intense battles, calmly providing direction and constantly looking to gain the advantage. Captain MacKillop’s exceptional leadership under fire and his ability to get the most from his soldiers were critical to consistently defeating insurgents in Afghanistan.
**VALOUR**

Sergeant Jedd Michael Lafleche
Master Corporal
Ian Matthews-Pestana
Sergeant
James Ray Brent Martin, CD
Master Corporal
Stuart Douglas Murray, CD
Sergeant
James Ray Brent Martin, CD
Master Corporal
Stuart Douglas Murray, CD
Sergeant
P. Michel Simoneau, CD
Master Corporal
Jayson Swift
Lieutenant Matthew Tompkins

*Military Valour Decorations*

**Medal of Military Valour**

Captain William Todd Fielding, MMV, CD
Niagara Falls, Ontario

On August 5, 2010, Captain Fielding’s Chinook helicopter was struck by enemy fire, in Panjwaii, Afghanistan, causing the fuel tank to explode and rendering the aircraft nearly inoperable. With the helicopter in flames and the cockpit rapidly filling with smoke, Captain Fielding made the time-critical decision to land in enemy territory rather than fly to a friendly landing zone. His outstanding courage and devotion to duty allowed him to execute an emergency landing and then lead the evacuation of the burning aircraft. His actions no doubt saved the lives of all crew and passengers that day.

Master Corporal Adam Holmes, MMV
Kapuskasing, Ontario

From July 30 to August 2, 2010, Master Corporal Holmes displayed tremendous courage and continuous composure while coordinating exceptional fire support during a four-day combat operation. Constantly under fire, he willingly and repeatedly exposed himself to attack while identifying enemy positions and directing fire upon them. In addition, he single-handedly turned back a group of insurgents who had come within 30 metres of a friendly position. Master Corporal Holmes’ valour and determination were critical to the success of the operation.

Master Corporal Gilles-Remi Mikkelson, MMV
Bella Coola, British Columbia

On November 1, 2009, a member of Master Corporal Mikkelson’s joint Canadian-Afghan foot patrol was severely wounded by an improvised explosive device. During the ensuing ambush, Master Corporal Mikkelson selflessly crossed through intense enemy fire to provide life-saving first aid to the critically wounded Afghan soldier. Despite the danger, his outstanding courage saved a comrade’s life and brought great credit to Canada and the Canadian Forces.

Private Philip Millar, MMV
Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia

On November 23, 2009, Private Millar demonstrated great heroism during an insurgent attack on Forward Operating Base Wilson, in Afghanistan. With mortar rounds falling around him, he unhesitatingly ran to the impact area to provide first aid to a seriously wounded American soldier. Despite the danger, he remained with the casualty, fully exposed to the attack.
Private Millar’s courageous actions under fire allowed for the best possible treatment to his comrade and brought great credit to the Canadian Forces.

Master Corporal Paul Douglas Mitchell, MMV
Weymouth, Nova Scotia
Medal of Military Valour

On June 5 and July 18, 2010, Master Corporal Mitchell’s front line devotion to duty and courageous actions under fire were instrumental in the defeat of two sustained insurgent attacks. While repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire and fearlessly maintaining his position, he inspired other soldiers and ultimately repelled the enemy attacks. Master Corporal Mitchell’s selfless actions and disregard for his own safety undoubtedly saved the lives of his fellow soldiers.

Private John Nelson, MMV
Wiseton, Saskatchewan
Medal of Military Valour


Upon hearing of a casualty, Private Nelson, under his own initiative, rushed headlong into the raging battle to reach his wounded comrade. Bullets rained around them as he administered first aid. While risking his own life, Private Nelson displayed courage, composure and selflessness as he rendered the necessary assistance to save the life of a fellow Canadian soldier.

Sergeant Graham Marc Verrier, MMV, CD
Winnipeg, Manitoba
Medal of Military Valour

On July 31, 2010, Sergeant Verrier’s patrol was caught in open terrain by an insurgent ambush, during an operation in Afghanistan. Despite being fully exposed to enemy fire, he immediately initiated a frontal assault on the enemy position. He also inspired his fellow soldiers to follow and relentlessly engaged the insurgents until they broke contact. Sergeant Verrier’s selfless, courageous and decisive actions under fire were critical to protecting the remainder of his platoon and defeating the enemy ambush.

Photo GG 2012-0011-001 by Sergeant Ronald Duchesne

Group shot of recipients at the 26 January 2012 presentation ceremony held at Rideau Hall.
Martin Shadwick, in his Commentary ‘Defence and the 2011 Election,’ published in the Autumn 2011 issue (Vol. 11, No. 4), describes the 2010 United Kingdom Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) as ‘capability slashing’ and ‘more a massacre than a review.’ This description has to be refuted.

Firstly, the Review was guided by the 2010 National Security Strategy (focused upon strategic risk management and effectively defining the Ends), alongside a Comprehensive Spending Review (focused upon rid-ding the country of debt and effectively setting out the Means) and the Review itself encapsulated a whole of Government approach to how (the Ways, in another word) the goals of the National Security Strategy are to be delivered in an affordable manner. There is logic underpinning the flow of Ends, Means, and Ways, and it is transparent.

Secondly, I know of only two capability ‘con-straints’ in the SDSR. One is the loss of Maritime Patrol Aircraft, against which the capability gap is closed to an extent by other means, but not fully, I grant. The other is the loss of Carrier Strike Aircraft, which is not to be a permanent loss, but a ‘holiday’ until the maritime variant of the Joint Strike Fighter is available (construction of the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, weighing in at over 65,000 tonnes each, is well underway in UK shipyards). Every other decision to date has centred upon capacity rather than capability. In some areas, notably cyber security, there will be an increase in both capacity and capability.

Thirdly, while over 9000 servicemen and women are deployed in a combat role in Afghanistan, and other global commitments are sustained, the United Kingdom has fired air-and submarine-launched cruise missiles, combat tested its unique Brimstone mode sensor missile, and introduced the launching of attack helicopters from a platform at sea, all against targets in Libya and to the desired effect, under Canadian leadership. None of these capabilities will be ‘mass-acred.’ What will be cut away, we hope, is anything that does not contribute to high quality, rigorously prioritised, balanced, efficient, well-supported, flexible and adaptable, expeditionary and connected military capability. Our fear is that allies will cut away readiness and reach to satisfy domestic politics, leaving their military force ‘hol-low.’

There is risk in what the SDSR sets out to do, and the greatest risk is the concurrency of reform activities. The change programs are ambitious and the deadlines are tight. The judgment on whether SDSR is a ‘mas-sacre’ or not must be held back until 2015, the year of the next Defence Review, when we will have a clearer view on how well we have managed the total change, nothing piecemeal here, recently embarked upon. It is worthy of note that the United Kingdom will still meet the NATO defence spending target at two percent of GDP, and throughout the next four years, with an expectation to continue beyond, it will have the fourth largest military budget in the world. Martin Shadwick’s judgement of the UK SDSR has been premature, in my view.

Yours Sincerely

Barry Le Grys MBE, MA, FInstRE
Brigadier
Defence Adviser
British High Commission
Ottawa
THE MANY PROBLEMS IN MILITARY PERSONNEL LAW & POLICY

by Rob Stokes

Introduction

Military personnel law and policy (MPLP) in the Canadian Forces (CF) has become a complex and often confusing topic. Superficially, there is a maze of innumerable and habitually inconsistent MPLP instruments: regulations, orders, instructions, manuals, etc. Yet there is even greater complexity and consequential confusion on its substantive level. It is time that this is confronted and discussed candidly.

This article advances toward three objectives. The first is to introduce a few of the different conceptual approaches to MPLP which often come into opposition with one another. Prominent in this introduction is the struggle between military instrumentalism and modern, liberal individualism. Differences between these approaches, and others, hinder MPLP coherence.

The second is to underline that MPLP’s core concepts—from enrolment through to release—are best viewed as a spectrum of closely related issues. On this spectrum, law is policy and policy is law. Because each different conceptual approach applies to most MPLP issues, it is a liability to view only a narrow band of the spectrum in isolation.

Third, this article makes a few observations on MPLP development. Substantive MPLP emerges from MPLP development. Any view of MPLP today would be incomplete without any exploration of some current realities in MPLP development. These observations are found under the heading “Development Hell.”

It is important to understand MPLP because all members have a personal stake in MPLP. Every member is enrolled in,
serves in, and is eventually released from the CF. Many members administer MPLP daily to other members. Misunderstanding and misapplying MPLP affects members’ morale, finances, and careers. Poor MPLP wastes increasingly scarce CF resources. MPLP’s strategic implications are serious.

Today, there is MPLP confusion and complexity. Unapologetically, this article adopts a generally theoretical tone because: a) MPLP’s larger landscape is too often obscured by the dense undergrowth of MPLP specifics and trivialities; and b) when tackling conceptual challenges, nothing is more practical than theory. From that vantage point, this article concludes with a few suggestions on how MPLP may be improved.

Enrolment

Enrolment is usually seen as a process: paperwork, interviews, medicals, and so on. These sub-processes compose a part of enrolment. However, substantive matters lurk behind them.

First, assuming the CF is neither a public employment nor welfare project, but is an instrument to defend Canada, then the quintessential question is whether the CF can use the applicant. Every enrolment form, question, and examination aims to identify useful applicants. Those who appear to be useless should never be enrolled; their inefficiency will divert CF resources away from its instrumental purpose.

This question engages economics. By example, the CF undoubtedly can teach your parents to be CF-18 pilots; but can the CF do so efficiently? In an age of finite resources, the premium matching of one set of resources (instructors, money, time, etc.) to another (untrained people) justifies rigour in selection. Normative aspects of efficiency are also engaged; for example, why would the CF enrol someone who will be disruptive?

Second, enrolment creates a legal condition—the liability to serve as a member until lawfully released. The modern, vexing concern is the nature of that condition.

Conventionally, military service constitutes a unilateral commitment, by the citizen to the Crown, in return for which the Crown assumes no obligations. In practical terms, a member can expect nothing from the Crown at any time, is obliged to serve the Crown at its whim, and can be released “at pleasure,” i.e. when the Crown wants. This concept’s origins are feudal, and its advantages strongly favour the Crown.

Recently, however, that view has been said to be out of touch with modern Canadian society. Public employment as feudal servitude is rejected. Public employment is to embrace a more contractual approach dictated, in whole or in part, by legislation. Furthermore, it is said that disputes over dismissal from public employment should, subject to legislation, be viewed through the lens of contract law. These recent developments seem amenable to modern CF life until the lens of contract is used elsewhere along the MPLP spectrum.

Contract clashes with unilateral commitment. Service without any expectation denies modern society’s expectation of benefit. If the two ideas could easily co-exist, then the precise point at which “at pleasure” ends and contract begins would be identifiable. But it is not. MPLP’s law might identify satisfactory answers but MPLP’s policy might not, and vice-versa. When law is policy and policy is law, such differences are problematic.

Attempting to reconcile such differences, there is normative talk of a Crown-member “social contract.” One code-phrase for this is that something is “the right thing to do.” The notion of a Crown-member social contract is revolutionary because it presupposes that: a) the Crown-member relationship is an ideological one; b) there is injustice within the relationship; and c) the extant relationship is somehow illegitimate. It furthermore ignores better alternatives, such as amending MPLP to reflect the “social contract” vision, or to stop talking about a “social contract” altogether.

Often obscured in the competition between these various approaches is their undisputed but crucial commonality: the subordinate servant must obey the superior master’s orders. That rule is the key to understanding the purpose of
terms of service (TOS) establish the length of the Crown-member relationship. Viewed through the lens of contract, TOS are easily understood: “The CF and I agree that I will serve for X period of time after which each of us can either freely walk away from the other or gladly renew our relationship.”

An immediate question is whether the agreement is symmetrically enforceable. The Crown has powerful enforcement tools: i.e., the offences of mutiny, desertion, insubordination, and disobedience of a lawful command. The CF member has only one tool: the right to release upon completion of TOS. Imbalances in negotiating power are common throughout society; therefore, whether TOS express “at pleasure” or contract is somewhat irrelevant. But irrelevance does not prevent resentment that there is an imbalance from which to begin.

TOS also have structure. Legislation permits the CF to use two types of TOS: fixed and indefinite. Fixed TOS create a legal right to release at a pre-determined point in time. Indefinite TOS lack this effect but are administratively more convenient. A current MPLP debate asks whether fixed TOS provide any administrative benefit, especially after de-linking TOS from pension entitlement.

One’s position in that debate usually follows one’s assessment of: a) CF benevolence, particularly the CF’s policy of allowing nearly every member to release on six months notice; and b) the importance of protecting individual legal rights. Yet, benevolence and rights should never be confused.

Perhaps because of a practical compromise in that argument and previous pension legislation, the CF has long used a hybrid TOS structure in the Regular Force. The first several TOS tend to be fixed; an indefinite one is offered after long service.

The length of the initial TOS (and periods of “obligatory service” after education) often expresses an economic principle: the CF wants a return on the CF’s investment. However, after the initial investment is recouped, the principle motivating the diversity of fixed TOS between various occupations is unclear. Occupation-specific TOS arguments are undermined by the CF’s benevolent, six month voluntary release policy. Moreover, although there is efficiency in offering a single, common, pan-CF TOS after every initial fixed TOS, MPLP does not offer it.

Indefinite TOS are different than fixed TOS. First, “indefinite” conveys temporal uncertainty, facilitating termination at any time, i.e. “at pleasure.” Nonetheless, a current MPLP phenomena equates indefinite TOS to service until retirement age. This turns indefinite TOS into very long fixed TOS. The phenomena are explicable only if one links individual dignity to job security; but employee job security is not typically an employer’s instrumentalist choice.

Second, there is MPLP controversy over when to offer a member indefinite TOS. Some suggest when the member has obviously chosen the CF as a career; but how is that assessed? Some contend when the member is proximate to the right to release by reason of an annuity; but what is the benefit of any TOS beyond that point? Some urge an early offer of indefinite TOS to entice a member to choose the CF as a career; but this puts the burden of a CF-slanted agreement, and the absence of a tangibly foreseeable right to release, upon the shoulders of a person with little or no CF experience.

Concerning Reservists, they can serve on fixed TOS, but invariably, are only offered indefinite TOS. This is an MPLP choice; perhaps TOS enforcement cannot be reasonably reconciled with fundamentally part-time service in a volunteer force. Alternatively, economics may have led the CF to forego the administrative costs of managing fixed TOS. This suggests some incoherence in the Total Force concept, which will be discussed later.

To these observations are added two others. First, MPLP perhaps teaches bad citizenship: the CF’s six months notice policy condones members’ broken promises. Short fixed TOS might address this problem, but many members may view them as failing to provide long-term employment security.

Second, MPLP ignores the option of members’ serving without any TOS after they complete their fixed TOS. Nothing requires the CF to release a member whose fixed TOS have expired and who has not claimed their release. In times of severe attrition, every extra day of service extracted from a member helps the CF. A strict instrumentalist MPLP approach would retain CF assets for as long as they are useful.
Components

At enrolment (becoming a member), the choice of component, and sub-component, determines when the member is available (at the Crown’s service) to be ordered to do any assigned job (to perform duty).

There may be three components: the Special Force, the Regular Force, and the Reserve Force. The last has four sub-components: the Primary Reserve, the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service (COATS), the Canadian Rangers, and the Supplementary Reserve. Each component and sub-component engenders a unique service obligation. Legislation establishes three types of service obligations:

• “Continuing full-time military service.” The Regular Force is on this type of service. Its members are always available for duty - even at 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning.

• “Other than continuing full-time military service when not on active service.” This is particular to the Reserves. The phrase “other than continuing” means that service in this component is fundamentally part-time in nature.

• “Active service.” It is suggested that this is best done by what it does. Active service engenders “continuing full-time military service.” It imposes additional legal restrictions and obligations upon the member that are, by legislation, deemed necessary for CF efficiency when it is in its operational mode.

These three distinct obligations reflect the CF’s original design. The Special Force was to be a full-time component used in wartime, as war was envisioned immediately after the Second World War. The Regular Force was to be a full-time component in peacetime, its members being the professional seed of the Special Force. The Reserve Force was for wartime mobilization. In peacetime, Reservists were only needed part of the time—for training and sundry domestic duties. These overarching concepts have spawned considerable controversy.

Total Force

The Total Force concept expresses a degree of integration between the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. The concept exists in tension with the CF’s original, post-Second World War legislative design whose premises were: a) members of the two components are different in commitment, character, background, and training; and b) any synthesis should occur in a common, third component—a wartime Special Force. From the 1950s onward, the constant, active service status of the Regular Force contributed to the marginalization, and, finally, the irrelevance of the Special Force. The original, legislative design was forgotten, and the Regular Force and Reserve Force were left to bicker over its remains.

There are several approaches to the controversy. The economic and sociological approaches are the most common. The former might argue for the allocation of resources on the basis of optimal benefit. The Crown’s finite resources should be given to something it can always use (a full-time member) instead of something it can only infrequently use (a part-time member). This approach also explains many differences in pay and benefits. A sociological approach might concentrate on group dynamics and class relations. Because the CF is composed of all its members, distinctions between sub-groups of members (components) should be reduced, if not eliminated. Pay and benefit equality arguments follow. With modification, both approaches are used by advocates on each side of the Total Force controversy.

There is another approach that is invariably overlooked. The controversy might be better informed by acknowledging the consequences of the Special Force’s absence. Can the CF presume that a government will never constitute the Special Force? No. Consequently, some consideration should be given to how the CF should organize itself to prepare for that event. Today’s Total Force ideal of two integrated components occurs within—and against—the legislative design for three distinct ones. The controversy should encompass that fact.

Component Transfers

Component (and sub-component) transfers are related to the Total Force controversy. Transfers change a member’s service availability. The member who was available full-time is now available only part-time, and vice versa.

The original legislative design strongly implies that full-time to part-time transfers should proceed as though they were releases. The reverse (part-time to full-time) is, however, dissimilar to enrolment. Therefore, the design hastens increases in service liabilities, and slows decreases in service liabilities. It is purposively biased in favour of preserving full-time service in either the Special or Regular Force.

The governing view in modern MPLP displaces that bias and favours a ‘faster-is-better’ approach that satisfies members who want a seamless career, gracefully transferring between components. Individualism dominates, but it is unclear why it should dominate. From an instrumentalist perspective, a speedy decrease in service liabilities can hurt the CF: member satisfaction does not assure CF operational effectiveness. Furthermore, the seamless career reduces administrative predictability and diminishes the meaning of service in both components. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence that a substantial number of members actually avail themselves of the seamless career.

Component transfer MPLP also exhibits schizophrenia. Consider Reserve Force to Regular Force transfers. MPLP law allows a transfer to take 30 seconds to complete. However, MPLP policy sees administrative hurdles: i.e., credentials are scrutinized, and the Reserve Force sergeant is reverted to Regular Force corporal.

Given the original design’s Special Force, and the ongoing imperative to anticipate emergencies, it can be provisionally accepted that a sergeant in one component should be able to do the comparable job in another component somewhat efficiently, or at least adequately. If the sergeant cannot, then the original design has tools, such as reversion and re-muster, to position the member correctly in the new component. Therefore, it is unclear why MPLP is fixated upon pre-transfer
administration; perhaps bureaucratic formalism defeats both instrumentalist and individualistic interests.

Membership, Service, and Duty

Earlier, this article associated “member” with legal status, “service” with availability, and “duty” with the obligation to perform assigned jobs. The legal position of the Regular Force is straightforward: every member is always available to do any assigned job. The member’s duty to do an assigned job, at any time, is correlative to the CF’s right to assign a job, at any time. The concepts operate together coherently.

Their operation in the Reserve Force is different. Active service aside, Reservists are liable to serve only in accordance with regulations; only then is the correlative in effect. Regulations parse different Reservists’ liabilities. At one extreme, members in the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train for a specific number of days, or be called out to do duty (not called out to train). At the other extreme, those in the Supplementary Reserve must serve only when placed on active service by reason of an emergency. Daily Reserve Force routine then produces conceptual challenges. Consider three cases:

First, absent a training order, how does the Reservist come to be on duty on a Tuesday night at the armoury? Typically, Reservists make themselves available for service by leaving home, going to their unit, and signing in. At that moment, it appears that the Reservist is on duty. Suppose, however, that the unit is not conducting any training, or does not want that particular member to train: is the member on duty or even on service? Can the member unilaterally put themselves on service or on duty, or is some agreement with the Crown required? If the latter, who makes that agreement on behalf of the Crown? These questions pit contractual consent against “at pleasure” commitment.

Second, what is a “Class ‘A’ Reservist”? This term is perplexing. MPLP law permits a Reservist to be on Class A Reserve Service one day, Class B the next day, and Class C the day after. Each type of Reserve Service expresses: 1) the duty performed; and 2) when it is performed. There are no Classes of Reservists. MPLP policy, however, welds the service type to specific establishment positions, and microscopically manages establishment movements. Consequently, the CF loses administrative dexterity. It is unclear why a technocratic choice is allowed to handcuff instrumentalist objectives.

Last, what is a “Class ‘B’ contract”? The ubiquitous belief in the mini-contract must be explained as a sub-set of either a larger Crown-member contract, or of the “at pleasure,” unilateral commitment. The inherent contradiction of mini-contracts in a larger “at pleasure” context fractures MPLP consistency. The contradiction diminishes only if the mini-contract either: a) exists within a larger contractual framework; or b) is not viewed as a contract at all. Yet, both alternatives disrupt the status quo belief.

Military Occupations

The essential questions are these: a) does a person enrol in the CF, or in a particular occupation in the CF; and b) in either case, what is the scope of the liability to perform any lawful, military duty?

The first question has always been difficult. Historically, regiments were very occupation-specific, and involuntary transfers between regiments were highly objectionable. The 1960s’ MPLP sketch recommended general service for nearly all officers (hence “general service officer”) and occupation-specific service for all other ranks (“trades”). Although this theoretically partially reduced the basis for objections, nearly all involuntary transfers, in practice, remained objectionable.

Objections today often pit managerial discretion against enrolment-inducing statements. For example, a member complains that a pre-enrolment promise to be trained in a particular occupation has been broken by a post-enrolment occupation transfer. On the one hand, the member made a life-altering choice in relying upon the recruiting centre’s representations with respect to the first occupation. On the other hand, the CF needs someone in the second occupation, and this particular member is available for service. These competing views illustrate the larger conceptual struggle: what is the nature of enrolment?

The scope of liability presents equal difficulty. When on service, members are liable to perform any lawful military duty. The legality of ordering a trained infantry corporal to attack an enemy position is clear. Much harder is ordering that same corporal to do the job of a pay clerk but without the necessary training. Mistakes and errors are foreseeable. Presumably, the CF—an instrumentalist body—wants to mitigate those risks. Therefore, a lawful order might also imply a reasonable order, given the member’s experience, skill, and training.
Assuming the same, is a member’s duty liability somehow wedded to their specific occupation? If ‘yes,’ then job security is engaged, and “at pleasure” service is somewhat diminished. If ‘no,’ then reasonableness should control, and the CF may be obliged to train members so that its orders to them may be objectively reasonable. Either way, MPLP struggles to explain how the member has made a unilateral commitment, in return for which the Crown assumes no obligations.

The key difficulty for MPLP is that the concept of authority is polarizing. An instrumentalist embraces it, but the individualist rejects it, or wishes to constrain it. One important question is whether a member has a right, an enforceable claim, to hold an authority that is theoretically to be granted solely at the CF’s discretion.

The subject of promotion is illustrative: does a member have a right to be promoted? MPLP permits approval of a promotion if there is a vacancy on the CF establishment, and a member who meets certain conditions and standards is recommended for promotion. Evaluation reports and merit boards are tools in the approval process. Together, they construct promotion as a privilege granted at the CF’s discretion. Consider, however, uncontrolled promotions from private to corporal, or from lieutenant to captain. There is also promotion upon enrollment (or after graduation from training) for doctors, lawyers, military police, and others. In such instances, active CF discretion is minimized to the point that the member believes in a claim-right against the CF to assist the member in obtaining the promotion. Perception matters: “I should have been promoted” is a common grievance.

If the concept of authority is the best lens, and if claim-right can impinge upon it, then the scope and legitimacy of the ‘master-servant relationship’ created at enrolment are jeopardized. A privilege-grant and a claim-right are irreconcilable. Whether the CF intended a member to have a particular authority becomes irrelevant when the member can claim that particular authority. This imperils the nature of service to the Crown.

Today’s MPLP de jure position is contested by MPLP’s de facto recognition of members’ authority interests. Service to the Crown is distorted: the binary, hierarchical construct mutates into some form of a participatory, social dynamic more typical of a union, a self-governed profession, or a guild. The classic mantra “To the Queen” confronts a contemporary Canadian question: “What about me?”

Release

“What about me?” is the individualist’s seminal question in release matters. Release may be viewed from at least three vantage points: a) service terminated “at pleasure;” b) the expulsion from a self-regulated profession; and c) the termination of a contractual relationship. MPLP today mixes these perspectives in surprising ways. In doing so, it blurs the CF’s character and impairs the CF’s ability to manage itself.

The self-regulated analogy sees members posted to positions where they are authorised to approve another member’s release; CF culture and norms are brought to the approval process and exert a degree of self-regulation. In contradiction, the CF’s design explicitly calls for an undemocratic CDS con-
trol and administration. That the Governor-in-Council appoints the CDS theoretically weakens the self-regulatory model because the Chief of the Defence Staff: a) is not necessarily the product of a widely-held CF culture; and b) is empowered to change that culture. There is embedded tension in this model.

The contractual model does not fit perfectly, either. It is true that the termination of private and CF employment can be reduced to a few comparable reasons: a) the person cannot do the job; b) the person does not want to do the job; c) the organization does not want the person to do the job; and d) the organization no longer has a job for the person to do.

Nonetheless, there are also differences. For instance, “specific performance”—forcing the person to work—distinguishes CF from civilian employment. A civilian employee has a (nearly) absolute right to walk off the job, but military legislation (i.e., the offence of desertion) prevents a member from doing the same. Contract also implies contractual rights: does a CF member have an enforceable right to CF employment? The standard answer is ‘no;’ all members supposedly serve “at pleasure,” and the Crown can unilaterally release its servants from service. Two phenomena, however, temper this answer: 1) the CF invariably releases members only on the basis of some fact, not some whim; and 2) the CF overly uses procedural fairness, a hallmark of job security. Both phenomena hint at a fettered managerial power.

Release MPLP today alternates in its use of these three different perspectives. For example, the enrolment offer of a good steady job with a prospect of a pension makes it difficult to deny the member’s taste of contract. But members who believe their release was unjustified grimly learn that they have no contractual remedy. There is an understandable degree of confusion.

Compounding it is the team social dynamic. Because of the adverse consequences of a loss of employment, some members who regulate the CF as a profession may hesitate before expelling another, unsuitable member. Release decision-makers are members as well. The presence of union-like thinking—and union solidarity—in CF membership should not be underestimated. Self-regulation allows conflict of interest, and struggles to serve the public interest and a member’s interest concurrently. The same is said of many other self-regulating professions.

Once upon a time, release MPLP asked blunt questions: a) what can the member do for the CF? and b) does the CF want the member? To use these questions in their most ruthless form for the sake of instrumentalist efficiency might require a significant societal change, perhaps one beyond the CF’s grasp. But MPLP has failed to identify any coherent alternative to them. If the CF is a seriously instrumentalist body, then it would rather seek fair—not necessarily procedurally fair—ways to keep asking the blunt questions.

Development Hell

Aggravating MPLP’s conceptual difficulties are several practical difficulties. These belong under the rubric “development hell,” a place where ideas are still-born, or bitterly attacked and procedurally suffocated. A few of MPLP’s practical difficulties are described below.

MPLP conception and expression require the expenditure of finite intellectual capital. That capital is also in demand elsewhere in the CF. An inability to expend that capital risks producing poorly conceived MPLP, epitomised by the uninspiring “… we must do something, this is something, let’s do this.” Such an abdication can result in a tendency to issue only minor MPLP clarifications and amendments. Consequently, individual strands of MPLP tend to feed off one another: MPLP X creates a perceived need for exception Y , whose unexpected consequences lead to nuance Z. The MPLP field becomes crowded and mangled. MPLP becomes a wilderness of single instances.

When a conceptual field is fallow, inadequate substitutes can move in. For instance, an existing, seemingly non-controversial order may be blandly converted into a new format and trumpeted as progress—but that is not new, innovative MPLP. Another example sees practice replacing concept: i.e., a clerical attitude saying that MPLP concept X cannot work, because MPLP practice Y is used today.

MPLP development also contends with the strong CF desire for consensus. ‘Push-down’ MPLP initiatives might quickly overcome the consensus-imperative if they lack specificity. ‘Push-up’ initiatives confront numerous obstacles, including the need for further horizontal consensus as the initiative progresses vertically. Compounding this is a recurring need to educate, because the MPLP developers’ reasoning and motivation become increasingly diluted, the more distant the staffing location of the initiative from those developers. Achieving and maintaining consensus is exhausting.
Once achieved, consensus remains fragile, horizontally and vertically, until MPLP publication. One dissenting voice in a consensus-driven environment can thwart months or years of studious work. Bargaining—especially across vertical hierarchies—also imperils consensus. Bargaining can even involve issues unrelated to the MPLP initiative. The epitome of this phenomenon in this author’s experience involves a pan-CF conduct policy being held hostage to a senior heckler’s demand for an extra clerk: no extra clerk, no policy endorsement.

There is a more insidious threat to MPLP development: CF members have ideological biases. Some members are, for example, instrumentalists and some espouse individualism. Every opportunity to participate in MPLP development is an opportunity to inject a particular ideological slant to an MPLP concept. These threats can spring from anywhere and anyone.

There are several filters to identify the type of ideologue with whom one is dealing. One is procedural fairness. If Canadian law requires that MPLP use procedural fairness when taking administrative action against a member, then both the instrumentalist and individualist will agree that it must be used. If, however, Canadian law does not require procedural fairness, then, generally, the instrumentalist will oppose using procedural fairness, and the individualist will advocate its use. Similarly, the normative member will urge “the right thing,” but the economist will advise adopting the most economically efficient (not necessarily the cheapest) option. The key point is that all members in MPLP positions use their ideologies to shape or attempt to shape policy; MPLP development is a political exercise.

In light of the aforementioned difficulties, it is not surprising to see fatigue and exhaustion in MPLP development. The expenditure of intellectual capital in an already busy day, clearing the MPLP wilderness here and there and everywhere, avoiding polarising controversy, overtly or subtly fighting for one’s ideology in any initiative, building and maintaining—or torpedoing—consensus, bargaining with other MPLP participants, and outwitting the hecklers: combined, these are daunting challenges for any member working in MPLP development. They are especially daunting for MPLP amateurs on a short posting. It is far easier to coast in passive tranquility to the end of one’s posting. Bland activity substitutes for actual accomplishment. Unfortunately, there is a risk this is becoming an acceptable MPLP norm.

These and other, similar features of “development hell” allow MPLP to slowly drift into a state of confusion and complexity. That state is not an enviable one.

What is to be done?

There are many things that can be done to reduce MPLP’s confusion and complexity. Four are believed to be decisive: 1) recognize the MPLP context; 2) build MPLP expertise; 3) measure MPLP development; and 4) impose upon all MPLP one single ideological bias.

The chain of command paradigm is not the dominant one in MPLP. Some chaotic mutation of a Westminster democracy prevails. In the CF there are: fractious political parties, wayward cabinet ministers, unruly backbenchers, special interest groups, devious lobbyists, loud picketers, militant unionists, supposedly non-partisan judges, unexpected court rulings, finicky constituents, and elections—i.e. postings—every few years. All influence MPLP development.

The analogy is apt, because many MPLP issues are socially normative. This distances MPLP from many operational matters (which are philosophically more comparable to scientific positivism and sovereign command theory). The analogy also demands realism in one’s expectations of senior CF leadership. To seek clear-cut direction from the senior MPLP chain of command is to reveal naivety. There is a partial, legitimate excuse for their silence or inaction: they cannot take an MPLP view from nowhere, even though that is sometimes exactly where they begin.

They could be better informed by experts. Across all government departments, sophisticated policy development is recognized as a professional skill. Generally, the CF lacks that skill-set for MPLP. Readily imaginable arguments in favour of using amateurs are, it is submitted, flimsy and unconvincing. The CF could benefit from permanent MPLP expertise, combining a mature appreciation of: 1) military administrative history; 2) public policy development as a skill and as an art; and 3) principles of administrative law. Located near the apex of the CF hierarchy, a small group of somewhat senior but
very ‘service-savvy’ MPLP professionals with a remit to
develop and write pan-CF MPLP of strategic importance but
tactical application—from enrolment to release—might reduce
MPLP confusion and complexity, and assist MPLP leaders in
expressing their vision.

Developing that expression cannot continue ad infinitum.
Activity is, in fact, a lousy substitute for actual accomplishment.
Yet, the development of many MPLP initiatives drones on endlessly. The CF should adopt a temporal benchmark for
every MPLP initiative. From the moment CF senior leadership
determines—with or without lower level prompting—that it
needs sound MPLP about subject X, the CF should be able to
produce it in a timely manner. Much of CF unification and
integration went from concept to reality in less than five years.
The United States of America’s participation in the Second
World War lasted less than four years. Given the immense
scale of those undertakings, it is suggested that one year is a
reasonable target for expert MPLP staff to produce sound
MPLP on even the most difficult of MPLP subjects.

But something more is probably needed.

The MPLP framework the CF uses
today was written in 1950. It evolved
in the mid-1960s. It has remained largely
unchanged since then. Few CF members
have any mature recollection of the 1950s
and 1960s. But the CF and its members
have changed. Conceptual tension is the
modern framework’s currency. Social
integration, the radiating effect of constitu-
tional values, egalitarianism, contract,
individualism, legal economics, instru-
mentalism, collectivism, the “social con-
tract,” public service equivalency, feudal-
ism (“at pleasure”), and other discernable
philosophies, notions, and trends com-
peting for prominence in MPLP today: all
brew together, but few blend well.

I suggest that there are two pri-
mary antagonists in today’s MPLP: a)
instrumentalism; and b) individual-
ism. (True, economics is an omni-
present variable but it perhaps only
informs choices made under the oth-
ers). Instrumentalism is the CF’s
imperative: everything is a tool to
defend Canada, and to fight and win
wars. Individualism is a societal fact:
the individual is of primary impor-
tance. This article speaks principally
to the conclusion that MPLP is now
constantly experiencing the struggle
between instrumentalism and indi-
vidualism. Neither is in apparent
control; neither ever surrenders. At
stake is the CF’s strategically vital
terrain of MPLP conception, devel-
opment, and implementation. The
prolongation of this contest is not in the CF’s best interest.

MPLP coherence demands monism and consistency.
Monism looks to one single principle, a master principle
informing everyone and everything. Consistency is the regular
application of the master principle in the expression of rules.
MPLP’s rules—law as policy and policy as law—are now
undergoing an unenviable dynamic: a fragmentation into a
chaotic collection of petty rules lacking a coherent whole.
This is unsustainable and increasingly unmanageable.
Complexity and confusion threaten.

What is to be done? The CF must from necessity choose
between two incompatible, conceptual alternatives: instru-
mentalism or individualism. One might temper the other—but
only one can dominate. A clear, decisive choice that
expresses and imposes the desired ideological bias across the
CF would go a long way toward resolving the many prob-
lems in modern MPLP.
Introduction

The international market for fighter jets is in for a period of tumultuous change. New aircraft that incorporate ‘fifth-generation’ technology will soon be entering the production phase, and are expected to enter military service in the coming decade. When they do, some producers of combat aircraft will find themselves overshadowed by rising challengers; others may cease to exist altogether. With little doubt, the fighter jet industry will become increasingly polarized. The Americans and the Russians will retain their preeminent positions but they will be joined by China. Europe, on the other hand, is likely ‘heading for the exit.’

Shifting technological demands and the future structure of the fighter jet industry will leave a mark on Canada’s air force. Global trends in the production of military hardware matter because where Ottawa buys its weapons can be just as important as what it buys. The arms trade is a political minefield. There are costs associated with procuring fighter jets that go well beyond the monetary value of each aircraft. The arms trade and the transfer of sophisticated military technology between states are as much driven by political demands as they are by strategic rationales. All things considered, and notwithstanding the ongoing debate over Canada’s planned purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, the simple truth is that Canada has very few palatable alternative options.

THE NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER CLUB: HOW SHIFTING MARKETS WILL SHAPE CANADA’S F-35 DEBATE

by Marco Wyss and Alex Wilner

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The JSF remains a contentious albeit promising program. The aircraft is being produced by a US-led consortium of eight (unequal) partners, of which Canada is a junior member. When it goes operational, the F-35 will be the most sophisticated multi-role fighter in the sky. While falling short of introducing a full-blown technological revolution, the F-35 and its emerging fifth-generation contemporaries represent the future. Already, Canada’s main allies have signaled their intent to fly F-35s. For Canada, doing the same guarantees interoperability. And given that uncertainty is the only certainty in international relations, ensuring Canadian pilots are flying the best machines into future combat will go a long way in making sure they can do their jobs safely and expeditiously. Naturally, the JSF has its faults. The program has suffered from a number of production and testing delays, and it appears to be exorbitantly expensive. But the bottom line remains: if Canadians are set on equipping their military with the most advanced arms available, political considerations and market demands all but guarantee that their only choice of aircraft is the F-35.

Our argument is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the traditional arguments offered by both proponents and opponents of the F-35. We turn next to a discussion of the evolving global fighter jet industry, illustrating how fifth-generation aircraft will transform the market. In the third section, we discuss the theory and policy of purchasing weapons. We then conclude by reflecting upon Canada’s procurement options in light of global market shifts and practical considerations.

The F-35: Today’s Debate

In July 2010, Canada signaled its intent to purchase 65 F-35 Lightning IIs. That decision led to a fierce national debate that eventually became a central theme of the federal election held in May 2011. The debate is marked by several competing claims.

In general, proponents of the F-35 rely upon four arguments. First, they suggest that Canada needs to replace its ageing CF-18 Hornets with a sophisticated fighter jet so as to protect its sovereignty and regional interests. The complexity of safeguarding Canadian sovereignty, adds Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Lloyd Campbell, a former Chief of the Air Staff of Canada’s air force, requires a manned aircraft rather than an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or a combat drone. Simply put, the F-35 will help ensure Canada can continue to defend its national interest while effectively partnering with the US in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Second, JSF supporters suggest that nobody can predict the nature, ferocity, or geographic location of future combat missions, so it would be prudent for Canada to prepare for any and all possible scenarios by equipping itself with the best hardware available. The 2011 Libyan air war is a case in point. Few envisioned that Canada would be called upon to support NATO in enforcing a UN-mandated mission in North Africa. That Canada sent seven CF-18 fighter jets (along with several reconnaissance aircraft and air-refueling tankers) to Libya, and dropped 330 laser-guided bombs on targets in the first three months of combat alone caught analysts by surprise. The Libyan conflict demonstrates once again that Canadian fighter pilots could be tasked at any moment with carrying out unpredicted, multilateral combat missions well outside Canada’s ‘traditional’ field of operations. The F-35 allows Canada to hedge against the ‘unknown unknowns’ of international affairs. Despite what the Israeli military historian and theorist Martin van Creveld describes as the “fall of air power,” and notwithstanding the role helicopters and drones have in counter-insurgency operations such as Afghanistan, manned fighter aircraft are not yet obsolete.

Third, proponents point to Canada’s history to illustrate that Ottawa rarely – if ever – operates in a theatre of war without its allies. If Canada wants to use air power to do anything other than defend its sovereignty in the coming decades, military interoperability with its allies will be of paramount importance. Whenever Canada has deployed its CF-18s internationally – the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the 1998/1999 Kosovo Air

“A general, proponents of the F-35 rely upon four arguments.”
Campbell, and the 2011 Libyan Air Campaign – it has done so as part of a coalition. The US, the UK, Australia, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Norway are all likely to be flying F-35s by 2020. The benefit of joining them is guaranteed interoperability. Canada can decide to fly different aircraft into combat, but there are risks in doing so when part of a coalition. In the early phases of the Libyan conflict, for instance, Sweden’s contribution to the mission – eight JAS Gripen fighter jets – was grounded at the Sigonella airbase in Sicily, because the base carried jet fuel incompatible with Swedish aircraft. “This really should have been investigated as soon as we arrived,” offered Lieutenant Colonel Mats Brindsjö, head of the Swedish Air Operation Center, “but we didn’t have time with all the other details.” Unfortunately for the Swedes, anticipating the finer details is a prerequisite of participating in a theatre of conflict. When Canada flies F-35s alongside its allies in a future combat environment, it will ensure its pilots have the right tools to work effectively and safely with others.

Finally, and most importantly, the F-35 is a fifth-generation fighter. As a class of fighters, these aircraft feature all-aspect stealth with internal weapons, extreme agility, full-sensor fusion, integrated avionics (the entire suite of electronic communications, navigation, display, and control instruments), and some or full supercruise (the ability to fly continuously at supersonic speed without use of afterburner). Although the F-35 is not designed to supercruise and operates in afterburner, the aircraft does integrate the other major fifth-generation properties, significantly reducing its vulnerability. Furthermore, the synthesis of data in the cockpit gives the pilot a better overview of the tactical situation in line with the doctrine of network-centric warfare. Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, the current Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force, argues that the F-35 is “... revolutionarily different in terms of capability.” It will have a qualitative edge over older, fourth-generation models like the CF-18, and upgraded models, like the F-18 Super Hornet. The only comparable operational fifth-generation aircraft is the F-22 Raptor, flown exclusively by the United States Air Force. But Washington is phasing out the Raptor’s production, having placed all its hopes on the F-35.

Opponents of the F-35 counter in a number of ways. First, they suggest that Canada was too hasty in siding with the JSF and propose that other aircraft should be considered. They also point to the conflict in North Africa for insight, illustrating that Canada’s CF-18s have done an exemplary job in Libya. Why buy the superbigly-expensive F-35 if cheaper, less sophisticated options – like the Super Hornet – would meet Canada’s needs? To F-35 critics, the Libyan air war highlights the continued utility of this generation of aircraft, so the best bet for Canada is to allow for a competitive tender that considers alternatives to the JSF. As India’s and Australia’s purchases of fourth-generation fighters have recently demonstrated, sophisticated aircraft can be purchased from a number of sources, and, as the US is now doing to its fleet of F-15s and F-16s, older aircraft can be upgraded to extend their service. Canada could, critics suggest, also purchase an alternative to the F-35. Yet this criticism neglects the fact that these countries are trying to fill medium-term gaps in national capability rather than replace fifth-generation options altogether. Australia has signalled that it will fly the F-35 and India has bought into Russia’s fifth-generation fighter project. Neither is replacing these future purchases with upgraded fourth-generation fighters. Instead, they are ensuring they have the short-term capability to properly defend their interests in the time it will take them to integrate newly-acquired fifth-generation fighters into their fleets.

Second, some critics suggest that the F-35 is not as effective a fighter jet as proponents make it out to be. Winslow Wheeler, the Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the US Center for Defense Information, takes issue with the “performance rhetoric” that accompanies the F-35, arguing that its stealth capabilities are overblown, the aircraft is “bulky,” and its engine less effective than presumed. Other critics suggest the aircraft will lack the capability to communicate in Canada’s Arctic until the proper software is made available in 2019. The F-35 also has ‘experienced some bumps’ during its testing phase. In March 2011, for instance, an F-35 Lightning II experienced dual-generator failure. All F-35s were grounded and testing put on hold until the problem was solved. Other critics claim that the F-35’s multi-role capability compromises on individual criteria better met by separate and different models of aircraft.

At the very least, critiques conclude, Canada should wait to confirm its F-35 purchase until all testing has been completed. Admittedly, the F-35 is still being tested, and there remain many unknowns with respect to its performance. But as tests proceed, they apparently reveal flight characteristics which are similar to and better than those of the F/A-18 Hornet. In addition, alongside stealth, the JSF’s “real strength,” explains Lloyd Campbell, “is its integrated defensive and offensive sensor systems that provide the aircraft with the ability to see, identify, and counter everything around it, day or night.” Arguably, it is highly likely that the F-35 will outclass previous generations of fighters.

Third, critics point to the JSF’s cost. Much of the debate in Canada and elsewhere has cen-
tered on the program’s rising price tags. Canada has committed $9 billion for the purchase of 65 aircraft, along with simulators, spare parts, and other hardware. Critics contend these figures are grossly inaccurate. Wheeler pegs the unit cost of each F-35 at $155 million, not the suggested $70 million that the Canadian Government cites. And Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), in March 2011, forecast the total ownership cost for 65 F-35s over a period of thirty years at nearly $30 billion. Others, however, such as David Perry, a doctoral candidate and a defence analyst with the CDA Institute, have illustrated the difficulty of accurately pinpointing the overall and unit costs of the JSF. Comparing figures attributed to Canada’s Department of National Defence, the PBO, and the US Government Accountability Office, Perry writes, “is misleading as doing so essentially compares apples and oranges.”

The F-35 is certainly expensive, but how expensive is unclear. Finally, in light of threats by US Senators John McCain and Carl Levin to oppose shifting defence budgets to cover the JSF’s cost overruns, there are fears that the US might scrap the F-35 altogether. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta ‘ rattled a similar sabre’ in November 2011 when he warned that drastic cuts to the defence budget would lead to the cancellation of the program. Notwithstanding fiscal constraints, these fears are unfounded. Despite gross cost overruns, the JSF program is considered essential to US national security. Washington has placed all its hopes for the future equipment of its armed forces on the F-35, which is the only manned fighter currently under development in the US. Dropping the program altogether would leave the US without a next generation fighter, and few means to credibly project air power in the coming decades. Likewise, the JSF was designed to replace a variety of aircraft types and will retain a quasi-monopoly on the Western fighter market as a result. That many air forces are contemplating replacing their rapidly ageing fourth-generation fighter fleets with next generation models like the F-35, should give the Americans a way to recoup some of the costs of the program. Besides the nine JSF partners, Singapore and Israel are planning their own purchases. And in coming years, the US may eventually widen the circle of potential F-35 customers. It seems prepared to offer the aircraft to Japan (Japan’s acceptance of the F-35 announced 19 December 2011-Ed.), and India, for instance, and there are indications that Washington may eventually – in the coming decades – extend a version of the jet to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

The F-35: Tomorrow’s Debate

Making an informed decision with respect to Canada’s next fighter jet requires going beyond the current debate and taking global factors into consideration. Of greatest concern are the shifting dynamics of the global market for combat aircraft. For the most part, Canada’s F-35 debate has yet to properly take these factors into consideration. If Canadians want to equip their air force with the best available tools, it makes sense to focus upon next generation technology. There is little point in looking backwards. The future rests with fifth-, not fourth- generation fighters. While critics are right to point to the F-35’s flaws and costs, neither criticism negates the fact that the future of the global fighter jet industry will eventually be centred around fifth generation technology. It is where that technology is based that will determine Canada’s purchasing options.

Fourth-Generation Fighter Market

Currently, the global market for combat jets is dominated by fourth-generation fighters and their upgraded cousins, known as 4+ and 4++ generation fighters. Fourth-generation aircraft integrate pulse-Doppler radar and look-down/shootdown missiles (which help localize and detect targets) and increased manoeuvrability. The upgraded 4+ and 4++ fighters include additional capabilities: high agility, sensor fusion, and reduced signatures; and an active phased-array radar (a system with an electronically guided beam), partial stealth capability,
and, to some extent, supercruise capability, respectively.\textsuperscript{24} In today’s conflict environment, these aircraft remain highly competitive. During the Libyan Air Campaign, for instance, the French \textit{Rafale}, the Swedish \textit{Gripen}, British-flown Eurofighter \textit{Typhoons}, and US F-16s have all performed well.

In terms of market distribution, only twelve countries build fighter aircraft. Although the industry is primarily privately owned, few military development programs can survive without the support of their respective governments. It is usual, then, to equate the production of a jet aircraft with a national program. Currently, China, France, India, Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the US develop and build fighter jets. Pakistan also has an indigenous program, the JF-17 \textit{Thunder}, but it is largely controlled by China, which co-developed the fighter.\textsuperscript{25} And a multinational European consortium, consisting of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, came together to produce the \textit{Typhoon}.

Of all producers, the market is dominated by the US and Russia. Their 4+ and 4++ generation aircraft – the various modernized versions of the US F-15 (like the F-15 Silent Eagle), F-16, and F/A-18 and the Russian Su-30MK, Su-35, MiG-29SMT, and MiG-35, respectively – are (and are expected to be) exported in fairly large quantities.\textsuperscript{26} Between 2005 and 2009, the US exported 331 new aircraft (and produced a similar amount for their own use) while Russia exported 215 fighters. These figures translate into a 34 and 22 percent share of the global market respectively. Exports by other countries, which primarily supply their own air forces, are comparatively small. In the case of China (41 exports) this is intentional. Beijing’s primary concern is to equip the People’s Liberation Army Air Force as quickly as possible, which is in line with its 2008 White Paper and its anti-access/area denial defensive strategy.\textsuperscript{27} But the three European producers, who are keen to recoup the costs of their programs with external sales, have so far failed to penetrate the market. In the past five years, Sweden sold 37 \textit{Gripen}s, the Eurofighter consortium exported only 24 aircraft, while France has yet to sell even one \textit{Rafale} abroad.\textsuperscript{28} To date, Paris has proven exceptionally incapable of securing an order for its fighter. For example, in November 2011, the UAE, despite an aggressive marketing campaign and personal involvement by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, handed France a “stinging rebuke” by sidelining the \textit{Rafale}.\textsuperscript{29} The affordable and simply designed Pakistani JF-17, on the other hand, might eventually prove a successful export, especially to developing countries.

The small group of producing countries solicits bids from and supplies a broad range of countries. Most of the combat aircraft exported since 2005 have gone to India, Israel, or the United Arab Emirates, whose purchases account for roughly one-third of global sales. While India and China are mainly supplied by Russia, other countries, such as Israel, the UAE, South Korea, and Singapore procure most of their combat aircraft from the United States. Sweden has sold smaller batches of \textit{Gripen}s to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Thailand. Germany and the UK have had some limited success selling the \textit{Eurofighter} to Austria and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{30} Australia is purchasing – as mentioned earlier – two dozen \textit{Super Hornets} from the US to bridge the gap until the delivery of its F-35s.\textsuperscript{31} Producing countries are also courting smaller buyers, like Switzerland, in order to secure orders.\textsuperscript{32} However, the most hotly contested procurement programs are those of the rising powers of India and Brazil. In April 2011, India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft program – a US$10 billion project to purchase roughly 125 fighters – finally whittled the international competition down to the \textit{Rafale} and \textit{Typhoon}, ‘dealing a blow’ to US producers.\textsuperscript{33} With respect to the Brazilian program, which is worth an estimated US$ 4 billion to US$ 7 billion, the \textit{Super Hornet}, \textit{Rafale}, and \textit{Gripen} are still in the running. The program is, however, suffering delays.\textsuperscript{34} More generally, in light of crumbling Western defence budgets, jet-makers are increasingly focusing upon the promising Asian market.\textsuperscript{35}

Clearly, the production and purchase of fighter jets is a vibrant and highly competitive affair. Indeed, combat aircraft dominate global arms transfers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), fighter jets and their related weapons and components account for 33 percent of the global “volume of transfers of major weapons” among and between states. Consider further that of the top 100 arms-producing companies in the world, the top three built combat jets, and the top ten either produced jets or components and weapons for jets.\textsuperscript{36}

\*Update – However, on 13 February 2012, the Indian Air Force announced its intention to purchase 126+ Dassault Rafales for fighter force modernization.
Fifth-Generation Leap

War and technology go hand-in-hand. As Martin van Creveld has noted, “... war [and the hardware to wage it] is completely permeated by technology and governed by it.” Yet, technology evolves, and, as a consequence, arms markets change. Canadians would be wise to avoid being unduly swayed by current market forces in contemplating their next fighter purchase. The dawning age of the fifth-generation fighter is going to produce global winners and losers.

Despite encountering recent technical problems, the US F-22 Raptor is currently the only fully developed and operational fifth generation aircraft. As noted, however, its production has been halted. The US is relying completely upon the JSF, which it will use to replace its existing fleet. Originally, the F-35 was to have been built in separate configurations for the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps respectively. However, due to technical problems, testing delays, and budgetary concerns, the development of the short take-off and vertical landing type was put on probation, and the plans for an alternative jet engine were discontinued.

Today, the Pentagon plans to buy roughly 2400 units over the next three decades, with another 600 aircraft slotted for export. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, however, and with the resulting austerity measures being enacted by a number of governments, F-35 purchases might be scaled down.

Nonetheless, the F-35 will be the first fifth-generation combat jet available for purchase, and it remains far ahead of its potential competitors in terms of testing. Despite minor setbacks, the F-35 flew over 750 times between the start of flight testing in 2006 and March 2011, and in October 2011, its short take-off and vertical landing capabilities were successfully demonstrated aboard the USS Wasp. And while the program’s cost overruns and production delays have been worrying and troublesome, the development program is moving ahead. In July 2011, for instance, an F-35 was delivered to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida where it will be used to train new pilots. It is the third production model supporting testing missions.

And according to the director of the JSF program, US Vice Admiral David Venlet, the F-35s “… are ahead of their goals for the [2011] test program” and have “actually gone beyond what they were considered to be behind in 2010.” If so, the F-35 testing phase may be back on track.
Other than the US, Russia has made the greatest progress in developing a next generation fighter. Even though the Russian aircraft industry is today a mere shadow of its former Soviet-era self, Moscow has made strides in recent years. It has undertaken enormous efforts to modernize its air force and is reorganizing the partially privatized aviation industry. Like the US, it began developing a fifth-generation aircraft in the 1990s. In early 2010, the prototype, designated the Sukhoi T-50 or PAK-FA, underwent test flights. At the August 2011 MAKS international air show in Zhukovsky, the jet made its first demonstration flight. Although it suffered engine problems at Zhukovsky, and has yet to undergo a number of important developmental hurdles before it can be properly compared to the F-35, the PAK-FA promises to be a highly competitive aircraft. Although its precise capabilities remain classified, it appears to have the attributes of a fifth-generation fighter. It has also gained international support; India has bought technology are not always approved. The situation is different in the case of Western states. Despite the Chinese arms embargo, the US and European countries continue to export dual-use technology to China. While on one hand it is profitable to do so, it is also possible that some of this equipment may have found its way into the J-20 program.

What is probable, however, is that the Chinese will have their own operational fifth generation aircraft within a decade. Since the 1990s, China has reformed and strengthened its armaments industry with the goal of building strong, reliable, and self-sufficiently equipped armed forces. The aviation industry and the air force in particular, received preferential treatment in this process. Although the Chinese have yet to draw level with the US and Russia, they will catch up. And although China has prioritized equipping its own air force, it is increasingly discovering export markets as a lucrative source of revenue. In the medium term, Chinese fighter jets will probably compete with 4+ generation types produced by Europe, Russia, and the US for orders from developing countries. Most recently, in May 2011, it was reported that China had given – rather than sold – 50 upgraded JF-17 aircraft to Pakistan. As China’s military needs are met, it may well seek other trading partners. In the longer term, the Chinese might supersede the Europeans in the global market, and their fifth-generation aircraft – which will likely be affordable – will be a significant competitor for the respective US and Russian models and 4++ generation types.

As for China, its aircraft industry has made an apparent quantum leap. Beijing has made huge investments in the state-controlled aviation industry in hopes of modernizing its air force. Until recently, China imported aircraft from Russia, or produced licensed or modified versions of Russian models. But in the meantime, China has also made its own indigenous advances. The Chengdu J-10 is Beijing’s first modern fighter jet. And in early 2011, China took the world by surprise by unveiling the prototype of its fifth-generation fighter, the J-20. While little is known about the aircraft, it appears to integrate Russian engines and technology. If so, it is possible that China’s recent advances were the result of purchasing, reverse-engineering, and then further developing Russian jet technology. However, since Russia already considers China to be a potential market competitor, export licenses for aviation technology are not always approved. The situation is different in the case of Western states. Despite the Chinese arms embargo, the US and European countries continue to export dual-use technology to China. While on one hand it is profitable to do so, it is also possible that some of this equipment may have found its way into the J-20 program.

That leaves Europe… In all likelihood, European producing states will continue to assert their market position for some time yet, bolstered by their 4+ generation aircraft. But that there is currently no European development program for a fifth-generation fighter suggests they may be facing eventual market extinction. It will be difficult for the Europeans to make up the development shortfall with regard to fifth-generation fighters, especially taking current fiscal concerns into consideration. Given the costs of leaping into the next generation of fighter technology, no individual European country – such as France or Sweden – is likely to remain in the game for very long. Averting a European decline will require the establishment of another multinational consortium – like the one behind the Eurofighter. But a consortium, which will ideally be joined by French and Swedish expertise, is unlikely to take root, given that several European states – including the UK, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway – have already partnered with the US on the F-35 project. None are likely to eagerly pitch in for another expensive – and risky – program. Only slightly more promising is Anglo-French cooperation. Both nations have significant armament capabilities, and have declared their willingness to engage in defence and armament cooperation. Joint development of an unmanned aerial vehicle is one small but concrete step in this direction. But against this overall background, it is unlikely that a fifth-generation combat aircraft will be developed in Europe.
The Politics of Procurement

Shifts in the global market for fighter jets will have political and policy ramifications. The purchase, sale, and trade of military equipment differ markedly from the trade of other goods. “Arms sales,” explains subject matter authority Andrew J. Pierre, “are foreign policy writ large.” According to Keith Krause, a Canadian political scientist and currently the Director of the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding at Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, with respect to the supply side, states participate in the production and transfer of arms for three principle reasons: for wealth, military victory, and power. In terms of wealth, the arms trade generates foreign exchange, reduces the costs of research, development, and procument through economies of scale and export sales, creates domestic employment opportunities, and can help sustain economic growth through military production. As for victory, weapons are produced to safeguard a domestic arms supply and are exported in exchange for rights over foreign military bases, to assist and defend friendly states, to substitute for “direct military involvement”, and/or to provide grounds for testing newly developed technology. In terms of power, states trade arms in order to have access to and influence over foreign leaders, to signify and solidify a commitment to defend another state, to influence regional balances of power, to establish a regional presence, and to gain access over scarce or strategic resources.

On the demand side, states are motivated to purchase and acquire foreign armaments for internal, regional, and systemic rationales. In the first instance, foreign weapons can help a regime defend itself against internal threats or help it drive domestic modernization programs. In terms of regional dynamics, weapon transfers can guarantee a state’s security, help it fight and win a war, and let it gain influence over neighbours. Systemically, acquiring weapons can allow a state to pursue “status, power, and prestige”. This schema is echoed by Barry Buzan, a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, and Dr. Eric Herring of the University of Bristol, who suggest that states effectively follow a combination of an “action-reaction model” – states strengthen their armaments because of the threats they perceive from other states – and a
“domestic structure model” – states are motivated to arm themselves because of internal forces.64

In either case, politics often informs both a producer’s motivation to transfer arms to another state and a recipient’s motivation to acquire arms from another state. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, when opposing Western and Eastern blocs duelled over global political support by using the arms trade as an instrument of foreign policy. The acquisition of arms from one of the two superpowers was widely acknowledged as evidence of a state’s allegiance. Clients became allies. But the politicking behind the Cold War’s arms trade was nothing new. “Arms transfers have been used at least since the Peloponnesian Wars,” writes Krause, “to achieve the political, military and economic goals of states and rulers.”65 The same principle exists today. What distinguishes the arms market from, say, the automobile market, is the pervasive influence of political considerations in driving policy, shaping decisions, and influencing state behaviour.66 This is especially evident when it comes to fighter jets. When one government decides to purchase sophisticated military hardware – like combat jets – produced by another state, it is not only thinking about improving the quality of its armed forces, but also about the political and strategic signals it is sending to other countries (and its own citizens) with its purchase.

The transformation of the market for combat aircraft will change the political and military balance of power. Future competition for orders between Beijing, Washington, and Moscow will be motivated by both economic and political considerations. Rather like the Cold War, ‘the name of the game’ will be to create mutual dependency between the leading players with those on the ‘buy’ side. By choosing their source of imports, buyer countries will reveal their geostrategic alignment. And given that there will be fewer suppliers in the market; these political and military dependencies will inevitably increase.

Conclusions

Where does that leave Canada? Ideally, it will buy its next fighter from an ally. This goes beyond ensuring continued military interoperability. At issue is that Ottawa must avoid sending an unintended political message with its purchase. Likewise, buying from a friendly state will pre-emptively ‘grease the wheels’ in the event spare parts are needed during a crisis or conflict. Getting caught in an international dispute in which Canada’s interests rest on one side of a political divide, while the pieces it needs for its aircraft are stranded on another, would be foolish. And it is also important that Canada signs off with a producer that will survive over the long haul, which will ease with maintenance and future developments.

Given that upgraded fourth-generation jets will eventually go obsolete, and that the emerging fifth-generation market will be dominated by the US, Russia, and China, Canada has but one choice: the F-35. Given its political and social history, its normative and ideological preferences, and its alliance partnerships, Canada is in no position to buy Russian or Chinese military hardware. The political and strategic ramifications of replacing an American-led initiative like the F-35 with a Russian or Chinese program would be monumental, if not catastrophic.

The JSF program has proven to be an exorbitantly expensive, imperfect, and risky endeavour. Canadians are right to debate the merit and cost of their participation. And yet, Canada has few viable alternatives. Arguments suggesting Canada can replace its ageing CF-18s with ‘soupied-up,’ fourth-generation versions, ignore the bigger picture: these aircraft, no matter the upgrades, will eventually go the way of third- and second-generation aircraft – that is, to the dump. Flying a modern air force will require investing in fifth-generation technology, and unless Canadians are prepared to sacrifice American, European, and Western political relations as well as general goodwill in order to fly Russian or Chinese jets into combat, the F-35 is the only remaining option. And, of course, Ottawa should not presuppose that Moscow and Beijing would be willing to sell Canadians their most sophisticated hardware.

NOTES


5. David McDonough, “Canada and the F-35 Procurement: An Assessment,” in Canadian International Council Commentary (29 October 2010); Philippe Lagasse and Justin Massie,
The Case for Reactivating the Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps (RCAVC)¹

by Andrew G. Morrison

Introduction

Up until the end of the First World War, horses and other animals were a common sight on the battlefield, either as chariots of war, or as the backbone of the supply train. By the late-19th and early 20th Centuries, national armed forces (including that of Canada) had added veterinary services to their order of battle in order to ensure these vital animals were protected from disease and treated for injury. But with the advent of mechanised warfare, the majority of service horses were retired - and in some cases (including Canada), the supporting veterinary corps were disbanded. However, as the decades passed, modern warfare changed yet again, with great armour battles based in Europe and Africa becoming far less a feature of combat. At present, 21st Century warfare places a much greater focus upon counter-insurgency campaigns in which the military is not fighting through the objective, but is living with it. The complexity of operations in which insurgents are engaged, not on battlefields, but within living, working societies, requires the development of new tools, as well as the return of some old tools. This article will argue that the use of the modern military veterinarian, whose efforts are focused upon building sustainable agriculture in order to stabilize societies through better public nutrition and increased opportunities for trade, is one such tool that should again be employed by the Canadian Forces.

Brief History of the Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps

Prior to 1910, veterinary support to the military forces in Canada was provided by a regimental system. Local veterinary practitioners would hold a commission in a mounted unit, and would leave practice for 10-15 days per year to train with and supervise the regiment’s horses. Only one or two regiments had permanent veterinary officers.²

In 1910, there began a gradual move to replace the Regimental Veterinary Service with the Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps, which included the Canadian Permanent Army Veterinary Corps (the regulars), and the Canadian Army Veterinary Corps (the reservists).³ By the start of the First

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World War, this reorganisation had not yet been completed, but sections from Winnipeg and Montréal were sufficiently developed to form the backbone of the Canadian expedititionary veterinary services, referred to as the Canadian Army Veterinary Corps – Canadian Expeditionary Force (CAVC-CEF). During the initial move to England in October 1914, the CAVC supervised the shipping of 7636 horses in 14 ships, with the SS Montezuma carrying the largest number, 973 animals. During the crossing, only 86 horses (less than one percent) were lost.\(^4\)

In time, two veterinary hospitals were set up in Europe: No. 1 Canadian Veterinary Hospital in Le Havre, France, and No. 2 Canadian Veterinary Hospital in Shornecliff, England. The latter eventually housed the Canadian Veterinary School and the Instructional School for Farriers. No. 1 Canadian Veterinary Hospital was one of eighteen Imperial Veterinary Hospitals established on the lines of communication, and it supported, not just Canadian equines, but all horses of the Imperial Army.\(^5\) At its peak, No. 1 Canadian Veterinary Hospital had stabling for 1364 horses, although at one point, the number of horses under care exceeded 2000.\(^6\)

In addition to the hospitals, veterinary support extended to the field forces, where 221 officers and sergeants cared for the 23,484 horses of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces, as well as other horses of the Imperial forces. Their role was not only to treat minor illnesses, but also to provide supervision and preventative measures to ensure the fitness of the fighting horses. More serious cases were transferred to the veterinary hospitals, and replacements were provided through the remount units. Mobile veterinary sections provided additional services and a link to the veterinary hospitals.\(^7\)

At this formative time in its history, the role of the veterinary service as a whole was to reduce animal wastage. During the entire war, the Canadian gross wastage rate (including animals evacuated to hospital, missing, and dead) was 26 percent, where the dead wastage (those who died, were killed, or destroyed) was 9.5 percent. During the war, the Canadian Corps returned 80 percent of injured horses back to the line, where they continued to move soldiers, ammunition, food, water, guns, and so on, into combat.\(^8\) In November 1919, the CPAVC received the Royal designation, in honour and recognition of its excellent performance during the war, a title that was later extended to the CAVC in 1936.\(^9\)

The interwar years brought about the mechanization of the Canadian Army, as well as reorganization and rationalization. The result was a smaller RCAVC, whose role was accordingly diminished like that of other units. However, the twilight years of the Corps were characterised by a leadership (including that of the RCAVC itself) which did not foresee a role for the veterinary corps beyond the welfare of the military horse. As a result, on 1 November 1940 the RCAVC was disbanded by a recommendation of the Treasury Board, which was approved by the then-Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone. The annual cost savings achieved was just $10,334.\(^10\) The demise of the Corps was lamented by contemporaries in editorials appearing in The Canadian Journal of Comparative Medicine and Veterinary Science;\(^11\) in one such editorial, the decision-makers were characterised as suffering from “muddle-headedness.”\(^12\)
The Modern Military Veterinarian

If military veterinarians are no longer looking after the health and welfare of the Regimental horse, then what is their role in modern warfare? The US Army Field Manual 4-02.18, Veterinary Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), specifies three broad functions for the military veterinarian:

1. food safety, food security, and quality assurance;
2. veterinary medical care; and
3. veterinary preventive medicine.\(^{13}\)

These three functions are also the core of civilian veterinary medicine. The first function, that of food safety, food security, and quality assurance, does not have much of a public profile, but, in fact, Canada’s food supply is secured and monitored in large part by veterinarians (meat inspectors being the best-known example). Anyone with pets would be familiar with the second function, that of veterinary medical care. The third function, veterinary preventative medicine, prevents disease in animal populations (i.e., via vaccination, proper nutrition, effective breeding, etc.), but is also an important part of the human medical system that identifies and helps prevent transmission of ‘zoonoses’ (diseases that pass from animals to humans).\(^{14}\)

All these veterinary functions also constitute a vital contribution to the “One Health” concept - an emerging field of study which connects veterinary, human and environmental health into a comprehensive, synergistic approach to planetary health. One Health promotes the tenet that the environmental, medical, and veterinary health disciplines must be linked in order to provide a solid foundation for progress.

It is “…a movement to forge co-equal, all-inclusive collaborations between physicians, veterinarians, and other scientific-health and environmentally-related disciplines,”\(^{15}\) and is supported by government agencies and professional associations worldwide.

The modern military veterinarian can employ the above three functions in support of three broad military roles:

1. support to conventionally-deployed forces;
2. support to civil authorities; and
3. support to operations other than war.

The first role, support to conventionally-deployed forces, can be executed by providing care to military working dogs and other military animals, support to the military medical system by providing veterinary medical intelligence on the ‘zoonoses’ of a particular area of operations, and advice and support to commanders on the safety of local food procurement. Training can be provided to soldiers with respect to safe practices around indigenous animals. This role is largely part of medical care and force protection.

The second role, support to civil authorities, directly reinforces provincial and federal veterinarians during an emergency. This can be done by operating in regions and conditions where civilian veterinarians cannot, as well as advising commanders during domestic operations that involve livestock (such as rafting of cattle in the New Brunswick floods of May 2008 by CF Engineers)\(^{16}\) [see Figure 2], and assisting authorities during the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom). Although animal care and welfare may seem unnecessary to military planners, it must be acknowledged that the evacuation of civilians from an area of operations is more easily accomplished if provisions have been made for the care and transport of their animals (whether pets or livestock). For instance, it has been informally estimated that as a result of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, up to 50 percent of the human fatalities could be attributed to people refusing to evacuate without their pets, or returning to the disaster zone in an attempt to rescue their pets.\(^{17}\) A Zogby International poll found that 61 percent of pet owners would refuse to evacuate their homes if they could not take their pets.\(^{18}\) Given that about 56 percent of households in Canada contain at least one cat or dog, that there are an estimated 8.5 million cats and 6 million dogs in Canadian households,\(^{19}\) and that many pets are considered part of the family (even to the point of being regarded as “furry kids”), the human emotions involved can be intense, and therefore should be a factor in planning for domestic operations.

The third role, support to operations other than war, is perhaps the most relevant for Canada, given that Canadian Forces are, and likely will continue to be,
deployed to disaster zones (such as Haiti) or to developing, “failed/failing states” (such as Afghanistan, Congo, and Sudan). Canadian Army Counter-Insurgency Operations recognizes that the military may be the only element of power capable of working in such environments. The root of much civil strife, though framed in ideological arguments, is generally linked to quality of life. Issues like lack of food, disease, and a poor economy are often the result of agricultural failure. By improving the state of livestock health through emergency, routine, and preventative medicine, and by improving livestock hygiene, the modern military veterinarian can assist in improving food production and in reducing animal and human disease, thereby establishing a base from which to improve the economy through increases in local market activity. When working with non-governmental organisations and government agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), separate areas of operations would usually be defined. CIDA would not normally contemplate directly-supported or joint projects with the military. Rather, the likely modus operandi would see the military on the ground first, providing veterinary services during the stabilization period. Later, CIDA could, through their programs, replace and expand upon the military veterinarians’ initial work. The military could provide reconnaissance data to CIDA and ensure a smooth handover.

All three of the above military roles can be supported by one or more types of military veterinary tasks, as outlined below.

The Role of Modern Military Veterinarians amongst Canada’s Allies and Other Armed Forces

Given that, historically, the military veterinarian was closely tied to the horse, and that in Canada, the move towards adopting the “Iron Horse” led, in part, to the disbandment of the RCAVC, it is not surprising that similar moves were afoot amongst Canada’s allies and other militaries during the mid-20th Century. Australia and New Zealand disbanded their veterinary corps in 1946 and 1947 respectively.

However, many other armed forces still have active veterinary services, both Regular and Reserve components. Currently, notable allied services include the United States Army Veterinary Corps, and the Royal Army Veterinary Corps (UK). The 55th International Military Veterinary Medical Symposium, held in 2009 in Marseilles, France, saw the participation of military veterinarians from Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Morocco, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Belgium, Norway, and Finland. The 19th annual Asia-Pacific Military Medical Conference held in 2009 in Seoul, South Korea, had a total of 36 military veterinarians participating from Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States. The United States, German, and British armies have had veterinary services in Afghanistan, where both the US and the UK have had members of their veterinary services killed in action. Both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO have used veterinary programmes in Afghanistan. Civilian veterinary programs have also started in some parts of Afghanistan. The Indian Army has had veterinary detachments in the Sudan where they worked with Canadian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Officers. Clearly, in all these cases, the modern military veterinarian has found varied and valuable work to undertake, as these armies do not rely upon the horse.

Military personnel and local farmers/veterinarians escort cattle across the flood-swollen St. John River, 2 May 2008.
How Could Canada Use the Military Veterinarian?  
**Development/Force Protection**

Perhaps the greatest value of military veterinarians is their second-order effect of force protection, derived from the first-order effect of development work. Very basic veterinary projects, such as parasite removal, vaccination, improved nutrition, and better breeding can significantly improve animal production among a given local populace. Increased productivity yields more food, better human health, more economic activity, and, ultimately, a greater number of local citizens who experience higher levels of happiness, satisfaction, and perhaps even gratitude. Insurgents are not likely to provide a veterinary service to the community. Therefore, in an insurgency, the military veterinarian provides an essential service that the locals are unlikely to jeopardize. This has the potential to lead to better intelligence, fewer Tier II fighters, and a more stable community that sees value in the military presence. The insurgency then appears unable to look after the needs of the locals, and it loses legitimacy. At a more advanced level, veterinary involvement in Agri-business Development Teams (ADTs) can assist in stabilizing and growing the agricultural economic base of society, aiding the supported community to increase its capacity to meet its most basic of psychological needs. Once the security situation has improved, in part due to veterinary activities, the greater civilian veterinary resources of governmental and non-governmental organisations can continue to build upon the foundations established by the military veterinarian.

As a partner in global animal health and security, the military veterinarian also has a role to play in keeping foreign disease out of Canada. Work done overseas in identifying foreign disease, and in the implementation of appropriate decontamination or quarantine procedures, can assist the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in preventing foreign disease outbreaks in Canada that would jeopardize the food upon which our health and economy depends.

Domestic Operations

The potential scope of Canadian military veterinarians in Domestic Operations is vast. The most likely scenario would involve aid to civil powers in response to a natural or man-made disaster. Every disaster will have an animal component, whether pets, livestock, or wildlife. The military veterinarian would be a valued resource in these operations, providing liaison with other government departments on animal issues, and providing service on the ground where civilian resources are unable to operate, or have been exhausted.

The Canadian Veterinary Medical Association has recently established the Canadian Veterinary Reserve (CVR) as a civilian tool for emergencies. Initially, the CVR was formed to give the Canadian Food Inspection Agency a surge capacity in the face of a foreign animal disease outbreak on Canadian soil. It has subsequently expanded to a point where it can provide individual and small veterinary team support, both domestically and abroad. Currently, this support is voluntary and it provides only the services of veterinarians, without any equipment. A military veterinary capability could support and even serve as the vanguard for the CVR, due to its faster deployability and to the greater acceptable risk assumed by military personnel. A military veterinary capability would also have its own equipment and could access greater resources through the military supply system. In the case of a Domestic Operation where the military is supporting an evacuation (i.e., floods), military veterinarians can be deployed into the evacuation area to care for and rescue pets and livestock prior to transfer to civilian authorities.

Many animal rescue organisations now provide mobile shelters to assist with disasters, but their access to the disaster area may be restricted for security and mobility reasons. Anecdotally, it has been suggested that there have been instances in which civilian organizations attempting to rescue animals have been mistaken for looters. The military veterinarian can serve as the bridge between these civilian organizations that provide the majority of care, and the secured area of operations. The animal rescue world is a highly complex environment incorporating legally mandated SPCAs and humane societies, charitable organisations, emergency measures organisations, well-meaning individuals, and so on; military officers unfamiliar with this world would find it difficult to integrate effectively with these groups. A military veterinarian would be expected to have some mastery of the complexities surrounding animal issues and the associated agencies, including government departments, official and unofficial non-governmental organisations, and well-meaning but sometimes misguided individuals. The military veterinarian could play a valuable role as a commander’s liaison with this dynamic and often emotional environment.
Arctic Sovereignty

Currently, very few veterinarians work in remote parts of Canada, especially the North. Army veterinarians could use these regions for training exercises, achieving realistic training by running triage facilities and quick impact projects (i.e. vaccine clinics) while providing service to currently under-serviced communities. Adding veterinarians to Arctic sovereignty missions would add extra legitimacy to Canada’s presence and additional services to its citizens in the North. A recent exercise, Operation Nunalivut 10, worked with the Danish forces’ SIRIUS Dog Sledge team. The team was there to conduct a familiarization patrol around CFS Alert. With a force of military veterinarians, the Canadian Forces might, in future, consider the use of service dog teams in the North, in conjunction with the snowmobiles and ATVs currently used by Rangers and other forces.

Research

Although this would admittedly be beyond the likely scope of the Canadian Forces, military veterinarians can serve as important partners in military research. Research into biological defence - a component of Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) - can be directly supported by military veterinarians, as many biological agents are of animal origin (i.e. anthrax). The US Navy Marine Mammal program not only trains marine mammals for service, but conducts important research with respect to their health, as well as methods of protecting them from the effects of military equipment.

Service Animals

Several federal government departments have active working dog programs, including the RCMP Police Dog Service and the Customs and Border Services Agency, whose dogs detect narcotics, firearms, currency, and agricultural products. The Canadian Forces also has working animals, including the Military Police Working Dog Trial. In both Bosnia and Afghanistan, pack mules and donkeys have been used by the CF where access by vehicles was difficult.

Goats have been used by CIMIC teams in Afghanistan as reparation for damage and injury caused by CF actions. The CF contracts civilian companies to provide explosive detection dogs in Afghanistan, which led to a Safety Digest notice after a soldier was bitten.

The Bottom Line

To deny the intensity of human emotion where animals are concerned, because the object of the emotion is an animal rather than another person, is both naïve and unrealistic. Not having a plan to cope with the animals located in an area of operations can make it more difficult than necessary to assist the local populace. There are also situations in which only military or specially-trained veterinarians could operate, such as security and CBRNE environments. Decontamination of animals is likely to be necessary when civilians are being decontaminated. Veterinary expertise could be useful for the biological portion of CBRNE, given that many of the agents involved are of animal origin.

In these operations, civilian veterinary involvement must, of necessity, be limited, especially in the initial phases of disaster operations, and over the longer term in areas with security problems. A military veterinarian can be part of reconnaissance teams and the Canadian Forces’ Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART), and can undertake regular rotations through theatres of operation.

Some military responsibilities in these areas would include gaining support of the local population for the mission, mitigating some of the root economic causes of the conflict, and enhancing domestic services, such as water and food supplies. The military veterinarian provides a bridge until the security situation permits civilian veterinarians to resume or establish their practice.

By working with the communities within an area of operations, providing basic training for local veterinarians and farmers, and facilitating the delivery of supplies such as vaccinations and de-worming products, the military veterinarian can start programs aimed at the well-being of agricultural livestock that will increase the productivity of local herds and flocks. The improvement in overall conditions of the people and through them, the society itself, can assist the military commander in shortening the period between the commencement of military operations and the handover of a secure area of operations to civilian authorities. Many of the projects spearheaded by military veterinarians can be relatively inexpensive and short-term, but can also provide lasting benefits, even after the operational forces depart. Handover to reputable NGOs or agencies, such as CIDA, would bolster long-term sustainability.
The Reactivation of the RCAVC: What Would It Look Like?

A reactivated Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps, structured within the Army Reserve, would not have to be a large or expensive program. It could be completely ‘scalable’ to available resources, giving flexibility to changing operational environments. The foundation of the Corps would be established veterinarians and registered veterinary technicians (RVTs) subsequently trained as Army Reserve soldiers. Recruiting would be restricted to those already qualified and licensed in a province of Canada. Both these professions have training, certification, and regulatory systems in place. The training bill would be limited to basic soldier skills and the professional ‘delta’ between the civilian and military veterinarian. This could be contracted to our allies’ existing programs, as well as domestic programs from other government departments (i.e., Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Department of Agriculture courses) and Emergency Measures Organisations. CFIA already runs a foreign disease course, and is involved with the CVR in developing the all-hazards training piloted in Ottawa in March 2010.

Establishing the RCAVC within the Army Reserve would be beneficial for many reasons. The veterinarians’ clinical and surgical skills could be maintained through private practice, eliminating the need for hospital infrastructure. Veterinarians and registered veterinary technicians would maintain their provincial licenses through mandated continuation training, reducing the training bill. In return, the military could provide compensation through pay and benefits, which would be cheaper than designing, building, and delivering the training itself. As noted earlier, several of Canada’s allies already possess strong veterinary corps. Their training programs, doctrine, and TTPs could be adapted to Canadian needs.

The number of veterinarians and RVTs needed would be a function of government and military policy. As this topic has not been the subject of discussion for some time, there is no formal policy to which reference can currently be made. For the sake of this discussion, the Army’s Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) could be used as the basis of the planning assumptions. For example, the MRP calls for up to two Army Task Forces to be deployed at any one time. The minimum veterinary capability would be a veterinary detachment: one veterinarian and two RVTs. Using a five-to-one ratio for force generation, one Task Force could be sustained with six veterinarians and twelve RVTs. Thus, with two Task Forces in the MRP, the RCAVC would need a minimum establishment of twelve veterinarians and twenty-four RVTs. This is a relatively modest structure compared to the current US Army Veterinary Corps of 2700 members.

“A reactivated Royal Canadian Army Veterinary Corps, structured within the Army Reserve, would not have to be a large or expensive program.”
Given that the Army is divided into four Land Force Areas, the 36 positions previously identified could be organized into four veterinary sections of three veterinarians and six RVTs each, one for each Land Force Area Headquarters. Support would come from within the LFA Headquarters. The sections could be organized under an Area Veterinary Officer, or as part of the Area Surgeon Branch. If the role is to be limited to humanitarian missions, the veterinary section could be housed in the Area G9 (Influence Activities) branch.

A small Corps Headquarters consisting of a Senior Veterinary Officer (Corps Commander), a Senior RVT (Corps Sergeant Major), an operations and training officer, and a clerk would complete the unit of 40 soldiers. The operations and training officer and the clerk should be full-time positions.

From this small unit, the Canadian Forces would gain the capability to better support the Government of Canada’s objectives across the country and around the world, through the advancement of animal health in some of the most needy and insecure areas of the globe, in addition to adding another level of protection around the soldier.

Alternatively, veterinary capability could be based within the Canadian Forces Health Service, but the structure should be similar, possibly organized around the JTF surgeons. Given that veterinarians are primarily deployed to land operations, all veterinarians and RVTs should wear the Army uniform, maintain Army standards, and be attached to Army formations.

Conclusion

The notion that the military veterinarian became obsolete with the service horse is erroneous. Militaries around the globe have retained their military veterinary units, which are currently providing valuable service. The Canadian Forces would benefit greatly from a renewed RCAVC, both at home and abroad, supporting combat, development, disaster, and other operations. With the Canadian Forces’ current and future operations to be focused upon failed and failing states - where the foundation of the economies of at least some of these is agriculture - not reinstating the RCAVC might be considered short-sighted. Every conflict involves people, and all civilizations rely upon animals for food, work, and companionship.

The Canadian Forces exists in an era where inter-state conflict is limited, but intra-state conflict is more common. The nature of these conflicts will often call for intervention lasting years or even generations. One cannot effectively repair a failing state without helping to provide the means for that state to feed itself and generate livelihoods for its people. That fact alone justifies the presence of the military veterinarian in modern conflict.

The RCAVC was forged during one of the most brutal wars in history, and acquitted itself admirably. It is time to reactivate the Corps, and provide the opportunity for it to serve once again.

NOTES

1. Many thanks to Dr. Gordon Dittberner, Prof. Tim Ogilvie, Dr Bill Brown, and all the others who reviewed the drafts of this paper. Also I am grateful to my wife, Dr Jennifer Morawiecki, for her editing.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Ibid., Chapters 5 & 6, passim.
6. Ibid., p. 34.
7. Ibid., p. 84.
8. Ibid., p. 80.
10. Ibid., p. 199.
17. Email from Dr Heather Case, American Veterinary Association, 4 May 2010.
21. Personal communication Jean McCardle, Canadian International Development Agency, Feb 2010
22. Ian M. Parsonson, Vets at War: A History of the Australian Army Veterinary Corps 1909-1946 (Canberra: Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2005), p. 163


20. Personal communication from Dr. Ben Weinberger, a veterinarian who volunteered in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, March 2010.


10. Modern media allows a look at these activities. The following links from YouTube demonstrate modern military veterinarians at work. (all accessed 17 October 2010).

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sN_NZIkg8uc
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvByV95dUAo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPwkgujJs_
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvByV95dUAo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo


2. Royal Army Veterinary Corp

1. Modern media allows a look at these activities. The following links from YouTube demonstrate modern military veterinarians at work. (all accessed 17 October 2010).

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvByV95dUAo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo

0. Modern media allows a look at these activities. (accessed 17 October 2010).

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
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• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hknYckzBpo
Claudewitz is often misunderstood. In the first chapter of the first book of his classic work *On War*, Clausewitz constructs an abstract notion of war – a war of extremes. He describes extremes of will and exertion, along with extremes of force, which, if in “…the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forces us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it,” leads to a concept of absolute war. For Clausewitz, however, the notion of absolute war was not applicable to reality, and the concept of absolute war was to remain a theory. When taken into the realm of reality, the laws of probability rule and replace the certainty that underpin absolute war. For Clausewitz, however, the notion of absolute war was not applicable to reality, and the concept of absolute war was to remain a theory. When taken into the realm of reality, the laws of probability rule and replace the certainty that underpin absolute war. With certainty removed, each of the three extremes needs to be modified, and principal among them, the reason for going to war. Clausewitz’s classic notion that the “…political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation…,” confirms the notion that absolute war is an abstraction, and that war, once applied, creates a connection between the people, the military, and the government.

With the advent of nuclear weapons and the gradual development of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as a policy for preventing nuclear war, many of the arguments laid out by Clausewitz were regarded as obsolete. Starting in the late-1960s, specifically after being briefed on the U.S. Nuclear War Plan, then-President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, sought to modify the extreme strategic options about which they just been informed. They sought to insert Clausewitz into U.S. nuclear war planning, and to prove that “War does not consist of a single short blow.” They sought what became known as limited nuclear options (LNOs). However, the search for those options was tainted by inter-service and inter-departmental rivalries, ultimately leading back to a *de facto* posture of a massive nuclear exchange.

This article will outline the historical context of the decision to develop limited nuclear options, and will then explain

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the impact that inter-departmental and inter-service rivalries exerted upon these options. Finally, it will demonstrate that limited nuclear options ultimately led back to the reality of a massive response imperative for the United States.

Context

The Single Integrated Operating Plan 4 (SIOP4), although more detailed and thorough than the SIOP originally conceived in 1962 under the Kennedy administration, remained a rather blunt tool with which to wage war. When briefed to Nixon and Kissinger in 1969, both reacted negatively to the gravity of the decision with which they would be faced, should a crisis erupt between the superpowers. As Nixon remarked, “No matter what [the Soviets] do, they lose their cities…what a decision to make.” Options were needed.

The SIOP, as briefed in 1969, contained three separate “functional tasks” that could then be either combined or used in isolation, as required. Each task was given a simple letter for identification. ALPHA targeted all the Soviet nuclear forces, while BRAVO targeted Soviet conventional forces. CHARLIE targeted urban and industrial sites. Employing ALPHA and BRAVO only – it was believed – should minimize collateral damage. CHARLIE was the task that targeted the cities. The tasks were further subdivided into pre-emptive and retaliatory packages. A pre-emptive Task ALPHA involved the launching of 1 750 warheads, while all three options initiated together would have entailed the release of over 3000 bombs and warheads. In the event of retaliation, Task BRAVO only called for 454 nuclear weapons. The fewest of all, 351 such weapons, were “slated for task CHARLIE.”

In all cases, targets were identified and assigned in both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Regardless of whether retaliatory or pre-emptive, the tasks called for many megatons of nuclear ordnance to be delivered to the Eurasian continent, to say nothing of the inevitable Sino-Soviet retaliation. The SIOP, although a plan, was one that could not be exercised without unimaginable global cost. Nixon recognized this, and following the brief, he directed Kissinger to come up with alternatives.

Considered a rite of passage for new presidents, “the briefing on the SIOP is the first time that sitting Presidents of the United States become fully aware of their responsibilities regarding use of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.” This briefing “…gives a terrible, practical reality…” and given the technological advances available by 1969, Nixon felt more options could be generated. By the late-1960s and early-1970s, the technology surrounding nuclear weapons had advanced to the degree that it had begun to influence nuclear policy in three ways. First, as warheads became smaller, more accurate, and more efficient, the idea that a nuclear weapon could be discretely targeted added credence to the idea of using them in a limited way to achieve certain policy goals. Related to this, the improvements in command and control now included nascent information technologies, best illustrated by the change in the acronym from C2 to C3I. These advances suggested to some strategic planners that limited exchanges could be controlled. Second, the introduction of improved conventional munitions (ICMs), as well as the concept of precision guided munitions (PGMs), began a move that some thought would raise the threshold upon which the decision to employ nuclear weapons would be made. It was felt that ICMs – to some extent – equalized the conventional forces with nuclear weapons. Finally, some expectations for options were inadvertently raised with the new ability to alter the effects of nuclear weapons. The much-debated neutron bomb was “…misleadingly characterized as a weapon that killed people and left property intact.” Rather, it was designed to enhance radiation (blast and other such effects remained) so as to penetrate armoured vehicles and to kill or disable the crews. Taken together, these technological advances – incorrectly perceived or otherwise – added weight to the desire and argument for options to use nuclear weapons in a manner other than simply a massive exchange with concomitant mutual annihilation.
Cleavages

Surprisingly, despite the dramatic reaction by both Nixon and Kissinger towards the SIOP, both revision and the production of options were slow in coming. Agency, departmental, and service cleavages provide a framework for understanding why it took almost ten years to develop some form of options that could be employed short of a ‘full-blown’ nuclear exchange.24 The eminent British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman identified agency cleavages at the beginning of his chapter on nuclear options in his The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. He argues that the concept of nuclear weapons parity “…was a concept which Congressman and diplomats could readily understand… It was not, however, a concept which naturally appealed to the community of professional strategists.”25

Politicians and strategists were concerned with fundamentally different ideas. Where the politicians seemed to seek some form of stability through numbers (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – SALT), the strategists were more inclined to examine capabilities, and they sought realistic ways to fight with nuclear weapons. Strategists saw little value in SALT. Rather, they sought to find ways to build credibility through the development and signaling of a real set of nuclear options that would avert an Armageddon.26 At the highest levels within the United States – between the elected officials and the intellectual elites interspersed on Interstate 495 in Washington – there was a divide with respect to the utility of limited nuclear options.

Departmental cleavages formed the second obstacle to Nixon and Kissinger’s initiation of limited nuclear options. As under previous administrations, civil-military relations were strained as the military saw the direction Nixon gave to Kissinger as “… another attempt by civilians to meddle in force planning.”27 As a result, Kissinger’s initial calls to develop nuclear options went unanswered. Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Wheeler, and the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, Kissinger’s repeated request to examine options were either ignored or answered with “… cryptic charts providing capsule summaries of “representative” military plans….,”28 which also ruled out sub-SIOP employment of weapons because such employment ran counter to doctrine – the very doctrine that Kissinger was trying to change. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs felt that nuclear options would actually undermine American credibility with respect to a willingness to employ nuclear weapons against a broad target set.29 In short, “… the high command had little interest in working with the White House in rethinking the war plan.”30 It was not until seven months later that the pressure applied by the White House to the Department of Defense started to bear fruit. In July 1969, “…faster procedures for selective options”31 were implemented, and the options that Kissinger sought finally began to emerge.32 Despite the JCS misgivings with respect to nuclear options, the air force had been working on just such a set of options with the Rand Corporation. One key player in the development of these options was James Schlesinger,33 and he would play a key role in a future administration.

The third and final cleavage, again consistent with the history of the development of nuclear policy, was between the air force and the navy. With the refinement of the submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM – a navy asset), the air force’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) were feared to be going the way of the strategic bomber – too vulnerable to continue to be relevant as a threat for deterrence. Columnist and author Fred Kaplan characterized the conflict between the navy and the air force as an intense rivalry, asserting that both services fought for control of U.S. nuclear policy. Although missing the point of the nuclear triad,34 Kaplan does make an interesting argument that this rivalry could also be seen as proliferating nuclear weapons broadly across the services. That such proliferation also makes strategic sense seems to have escaped (or was ignored by) Kaplan. 35 More pointedly, a report released in 1975 by a widely-quoted analyst at the Rand Corporation, Carl H. Builder, and others, but only recently declassified and released through George Washington University’s National Security Archive, began to formalize the case for the ICBM. The report argued that the ICBM’s superior accuracy and relative cost-effectiveness lent itself to a series of unique roles to include a reserve or an elite-strike capability.36 More provocatively, however, the report began to
argue in favour of first strike counterforce employment – something that ran completely counter to the underlying philosophy of U.S. nuclear policy of no first use.37 These three cleavages, between agencies, departments, and the services themselves, slowed the development of limited nuclear options as demanded by Nixon in 1969 upon first taking office. The cleavages however, like other rivalries in the past, centred upon the issue of nuclear policy, also served to add vigour to the debate, and they certainly had a net positive impact upon the final product. That product would finally see implementation under a new Secretary of Defense and former Rand strategist.

Commitment

R
ergarded as the first professional strategist to become the United States Secretary of Defense,38 James Schlesinger took office in 1973, replacing Elliot Richardson, who had been in office for less than a year. Kissinger now had an ally with respect to the reforms he sought. At this time, there was a “…unique opportunity…”39 that Schlesinger capitalized upon in order to put his theories into practice – namely, the theory that escalation in nuclear war could be controlled, and nuclear war could be essentially fought to a victory, avoiding “…widespread collateral damage.”40 He agreed that Clausewitz could be inserted into the concept of nuclear war. He also argued that, should the United States be forced to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, realistic options had to be presented to his Commander-in-Chief, the President.

…we want to have the planning flexibility to be able to respond selectively to the attack in such a way as to (1) limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation, and (2) hit meaningful targets with a sufficient accuracy-yield combination to destroy only the intended target and to avoid widespread collateral damage…reserving our “assured destruction” force and persuading, through intra-war deterrence, any potential foe not to attack cities.41

His policy developed further to include three key military objectives. First, nuclear weapons could be employed in aid of conventional forces. Second, nuclear weapons would be employed in a retaliatory counterforce role, and third, they would be used as a tool for escalation dominance. This dominance implied an ability to attain a level of military superiority to control further escalation.42 It was ‘a tall order.’

Four criticisms of Schlesinger’s new doctrine powerfully underscore its shortcomings. The first relates to the concept of controlling nuclear war. The distinguished New York Times foreign correspondent, Drew Middleton, reported that the notion of controlling nuclear war was impossible. Based upon an “…extensively documented study…”43 by the Australian professor of strategic and defence studies, Desmond Ball, he suggested “…[that] the superpowers, “rather than devoting further resources” to pursuing “the chimera” of controlled nuclear war, should devote more effort to other means of satisfying the objectives.”44 One needs to once again recall Clausewitz, who stated that war has a tendency to escalate.45 Although referring to his experience during the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz’s caution is equally applicable to nuclear war. A second criticism suggested that with options for limited use, the likelihood of such use now also increased. The critique – although originating from comments against the Defence Program Review Committee – still held true for Schlesinger’s new doctrine. Should a crisis erupt, limited nuclear options could make the weapons more desirable to use than conventional forces, and “…flexibility would increase the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.”46 The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons would be lowered with the introduction of options.

A third criticism relates to the idea of misinterpretation. National Security Archive analyst Dr. William Burr indicated that if the Soviets where to employ a doctrine of launching upon the detection of incoming nuclear missiles, they might interpret this signal as an attempted first strike, thereby causing them to retaliate massively to what was otherwise a limited American attack. It was never clear to the United States what the Soviet response would be to a limited strike.47 Finally, a fourth criticism was technical, and it was centered upon the issue of command and control. Bluntly, “…the U.S. ‘Command Centers do not possess the combination of survivability and capability which is required for the conduct of limited strategic nuclear war.”48 These four criticisms, combining technical concerns with strategic and policy concerns, illuminate some of the challenges of fighting a nuclear war consistent with a notion of war conceived of by Clausewitz.
Despite these criticisms, President Jimmy Carter, in 1980 and after an 18-month review that was initiated upon his entrance into office,46 signed Presidential Directive (PD) 59 that codified Schlesinger’s doctrine as policy.50 In essence, the directive allowed the United States the flexibility to respond in kind should the Soviets “...move up the escalation ladder...[and be able to]...respond effectively at each level.”51 More precisely, the directive targeted military and political targets, rather than the traditional urban and industrial targets normally associated with such weapons of mass destruction.52 The directive broke the strategic force into target sets of Regional Nuclear Options, Limited Nuclear Options, and Economic Recovery targets, and it also directed the maintenance of a strategic reserve.53 In keeping with the new political and military imperative, the targets now included “…second-echelon military and political leaders.”54 It did not target senior leadership, insuring that there was someone with whom to negotiate the escalation. Although it took seven years and two more secretaries of defense55 to revise, what President Carter signed in 1980 was consistent with the doctrine first refined by Schlesinger. The United States now possessed a policy with which to attempt a controlled nuclear war.

**Consequences**

Although the Secretary of Defense at the time (1977-1981), Harold Brown, is said to have doubted whether limited options would avoid escalation,56 some empirical work on the subject actually suggested that limited nuclear options could work. Using game theory techniques, Robert Powell concluded that “…states prefer to have relatively smaller, less-destructive limited options…”57 and that “…as the crisis continues, the states become less and less likely to escalate further.”58 But despite this somewhat overly rational vote of confidence from a game theorist, the question of how a nuclear strike – notwithstanding its degree – would be interpreted by the Soviet Union left too many questions. Specifically, if the Soviets employed a launch-under-attack policy – meaning that they would only retaliate upon confirmation of a nuclear detonation on their soil – even a single nuclear detonation could potentially trigger a massive retaliation.59 Just because one side adopts a certain policy does not automatically mean the other side will adopt it as well.

This ultimately led to a paradox in that through the search for limited nuclear options, a policy that would invite and even leave the United States vulnerable to a Soviet strike was created. In essence, by attempting to control escalation, even if the United States did not strike first – for example as a limited (albeit escalated) response to a limited attack – they could find themselves in a position to be the first to strike at cities. By doing so, the Soviet forces would be able to retaliate in kind and thereby destroying U.S. cities.60 This nuance was not lost on either side, and as such, the U.S. would be hesitant to strike at cities first, but the Soviets would also appreciate this constraint, and could actually find it empowering to strike the U.S. in a limited nuclear manner.61 Further complicating matters, should the Soviets strike only American ICBMs, the President would lose his only hard target – or ALPHA task-suited (in the language of the SIOP) - systems and be left only with systems suitable to striking cities. The Americans could be forced through circumstances, even without the justification of escalation, to be the first to strike at Soviet cities. In either case, it was a situation that did not offer any immediate solutions, and it was deemed unacceptable.62

According to Freedman, the solution turned out to be a return to “…the crude political science of early airpower theorists...who believed that strategic bombardment could detach the elite from the mass and thus cause swift social breakdown.”63 This came about through an assessment that, given the Soviet Union’s centralization of power, striking at elements of it would achieve early capitulation. This policy was articulated in PD 59,64 but it failed to indicate that much of this “Soviet political culture”65 would be most likely located in urban areas.

As this debate was unfolding, Carl Builder continued to release reports and articles advocating, not only a specialization in roles for the ICBM fleet, but also the development of a genuine (and declaratory) first-strike counter-force capability, insisting that is was not a destabilizing policy.66 His logic was
persuasive as he indicated that a second-strike counterforce capability (which the U.S. possessed at the time) was only appropriate if accompanied with a conventional force advantage (which the U.S. did not have at the time). He therefore argued that, in order for American nuclear policy to align with the conventional force realities, it had to adopt a credible first-strike counterforce posture. Whether Builder was writing this out of an honest belief in the value of counterforce postures, or out of a desire to maintain a credible role for ICBMs can be debated, but his assertions were nonetheless provocative. In many ways, the search for limited nuclear options also continued the advocacy of massive strikes.

Conclusion

Initiated by Nixon and Kissinger, refined by Schlesinger, and finally implemented by Carter and his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, nuclear war fighting has always been considered a difficult endeavour. Beset by rivalries and competing visions, the success of the development of nuclear options short of a massive exchange remains unclear. The efforts by the various administrations to insert Clausewitz into nuclear policy were successful in that options were created, but their efficacy remains clearly in doubt. Leaders and analysts alike during the Cold War found the concept of massive retaliation lacking, and, as such, eagerly sought an approach of flexible response, such as that offered by Schlesinger’s concept of limited nuclear options. American nuclear military strategist Bernard Brodie makes the interesting point that Clausewitz’s dictum of only fighting wars that have political goals is lost within concepts that seek to cause “… so much greater damage to its industrial plants than [does the US].” For Brodie, such thinking has caused war to lose its political relevance as it becomes simply about destruction on a cataclysmic scale. Limited nuclear options seemed to offer a way to keep the political goals alive in the contemplation of a nuclear exchange. However, in this writer’s opinion, any attempt to actually fight a nuclear war probably would have been more like ‘whistling past the graveyard’ – unnecessarily risky.

This article has outlined the historical context of the decision to examine limited nuclear options, as well as the inter-departmental and inter-service rivalries that affected this option’s development. With respect to its application to the realities of the Cold War and the human factor in general, Clausewitz appears to have fallen out of step yet again. However, if one more carefully interprets the Prussian’s classic relationship between politics and war, Clausewitz remains relevant. War, without political goals, is senseless – nuclear weapons simply made the divide between war and politics that much more narrow. In this writer’s opinion, this is as true today as it was during the Cold War.

NOTES

1. The conflicting points of view and interpretations of Clausewitz and On War range from issues of translation to analysis. For example, quality of translations vary drastically, from the thorough and objective (Peter Paret’s and Sir Michael Howard’s version), to the abridged and biased (Anatol Rapoport’s version). “Which Translation of Clausewitz’ On War Do You Have?” www.clausewitz.com, accessed 27 October 2010.


2. Clausewitz, p.78.


4. Ibid, p. 87.

5. Ibid, p. 89.

6. The concept of mutual assured destruction evolved over time after the Second World War. Beginning with a state of a nuclear weapons monopoly, the United States developed concepts such as massive retaliation and then later, flexible response.

Furthermore, the concept of deterrence was not without its detractors, initially within the military itself, and then later – with Regan – within the realm of politics. From a military perspective, deterrence was found objectionable as it was seen to cede the initiative to the enemy, a strategic posture that military officers found abhorrent. See Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy” in International Security, Vol. 2 (1978), p. 68, and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Also, see Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
8. Clausewitz, p. 79.
10. Ibid., p. 34.
11. Ibid., p. 42.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 45.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 36.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., pp. 360-361.
19. Where C2 stood for Command and Control, C3I now stands for Command, Control, Communications and Information. The current doctrine now uses C4I meaning Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information.
22. Ibid., p. 367.
23. Ibid.
27. Freedman, p. 359.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 59.
32. Ibid., p. 56.
33. Ibid.
34. The nuclear triad is in reference to multiple delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The triad includes bombers, submarines, and land-based launch sites. Freedman, p. 326.
37. Ibid.
38. Freedman, p. 360.
39. This opportunity refers to the confluence of the right technology (increasingly more sophisticated delivery systems) with the right people (key White House and Defense Department officials of like minds) in the right place (office) at the right time (together), which allowed for theory to be put into practice. Ibid., p. 361.
40. Ibid.
42. Freedman, p. 365.
44. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 66.
48. IDA analysts L. Wainstein et al. in Ibid, p. 61.
49. Mossberg.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ball and Toth, p. 68.
54. Mossberg.
55. Schlesinger was replaced as Secretary of Defense by Donald Rumsfeld, who then turned the post over to Harold Brown under the Carter Administration.
56. Mossberg.
58. Ibid.
59. Burr specifically quotes Wainstein et al. in suggesting that there existed a “…fundamental uncertainty concerning Soviet responses to limited nuclear strikes on the USSR.” Burr, p. 66
60. Freedman, p. 371.
61. Mossberg.
63. Ibid., p. 377.
64. Mossberg.
65. Freedman, p. 376.
67. Ibid., p. 18.

Die Tafelrunde by Josef Schneider.
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: PORTUGAL’S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, GUINEA BISSAU, AND MOZAMBIQUE (1961-1974)

by Pierre Pahlavi and Karine Ali

Introduction

The study of Portugal’s involvement in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique offers a unique perspective to examine the adaptation of a Western army to irregular warfare. First, it is a case still conspicuously ignored by academic experts in this domain, the bulk of their attention being devoted to the study of the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, or the Americans in Vietnam or Iraq. However, Portugal’s COIN operations in Africa offer an exceptional illustration of a successful adaptation of a Western army to irregular warfare. As this type of war requires, by definition, a degree of adjustment, success in defeating the adversary is largely dependent upon the friendly forces’ capability to adapt to a new context. Organizational adaptation, however, is not simply a matter of reorganizing structures, or modifying ‘command & control’ (C2) and doctrine. It also requires dealing with deep and oftentimes very subtle institutional forces that facilitate or prevent effective shifts from taking place.

By going beyond traditional explanations usually limited to logistical, doctrinal, and geopolitical factors, sociological institutional analysis presents notable advantages to study and to understand how some institutional forces that are, in general, neglected by scholars specializing in this field, can lead to unwanted adaptation, or can provide a solid basis in an irregular warfare context. Using sociologist Richard Scott’s model of institutional analysis as a framework, this article emphasizes three key dimensions of Portugal’s counter-guer-
Sociologists have studied changes within institutions since the 1980s through institutional analysis.

rilla warfare to prevent its three African colonies from becoming independent (1961-1974): the cultural-cognitive (or ideological /deontological pillar on which it rests), the normative (doctrinal and strategic basis of military action), and the regulative (laws, rules, institutions). The combined study of these factors will allow tackling the crucial question of legitimacy, the logic of stability, and the dynamic of change resulting from the interaction among the three pillars of institutions.

1. Theoretical framework

Émile Durkheim, the founder of modern sociology, emphasized that any institution can exist only if it serves a social function that can be legitimized. Hence, institutions will engage in substantial adaptation only if they have no other options available. One of the fruitful ways to look at institutional change is isomorphism. It has been noted that organizations in a similar field of activity tend to copy each other, in terms of formal structures, but also with respect to espoused values and shared worldviews. Indeed, expediency in the face of uncertainty (i.e., what appears to work for competitors) is often a key driver in effecting institutional change.

Sociologists have studied changes within institutions since the 1980s through institutional analysis. Yet, however powerful this approach may be, very few sociologists have applied it to the military institution. Therefore, it is not so well known how the military institution maintains its internal integrity when the challenges are coming from facing a new type of enemy that does not conform to the usual definition of the state-centric military warfare. Conventional military institutions tend to copy each other, but, as this case study illustrates, isomorphism can also occur when a conventional army faces an unconventional enemy. The outcome of such isomorphic dynamics, however, can seriously debase the core foundation of an institution’s capacity to maintain its social legitimacy.

Although there are several schools of thought with respect to sociological institutional analysis, one of the few authors who succeed in providing a comprehensive framework to study institutions is Richard Scott. Scott’s framework follows the main pillars of social order, but provides more details for one of them. The first pillar is defined as regulative, and it encompasses the notion of social predictability. It is made of both formal and informal rules, regulations, laws, and sanction systems. Scott divides the second pillar related to its cohesiveness into two pillars of institutional analysis, namely the normative and the cultural-cognitive. Social cohesion is possible if a number of implicit values and norms are shared about what is desirable and legitimate, and these shared notions form Scott’s second pillar. The third pillar, the cultural-cognitive, refers to shared preconceived notions, thought patterns, and worldviews that also contribute to maintaining social cohesiveness. These three pillars of institutional analysis provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the actions and decisions within an institution.

The key unit of analysis in institutional analysis remains key decisions taken by key actors, which lead to real actions or inaction. It requires a degree of qualitative interpretation that is similar to the one done in the well-established field of organizational analysis. The main variables that determine why these real actions or inaction take the turn they do are based upon the three pillars; they are interdependent variables. For instance, rules and regulations can limit what is thinkable (cultural-cognitive), while the rules themselves can also be seen as an expression of some underlying norms and values. To overcome these overlapping dynamics, institutional analy-
The first pillar of this institutional framework is composed of the cultural-cognitive/ideological elements, upon which rests the Portuguese counter-insurgency (COIN). Its components are fundamental because they provide the entire structure (normative and regulative dimensions), its coherence, as well as its legitimacy. The most important elements in this matter are territorial integrity and lusotropicalism.

Portugal’s presence in Africa dates back to the end of the 15th Century. Most of Portugal’s military, intellectual, and political elites, starting with former Prime Minister Antonio de Olivirra Salazar, perceived Portuguese presence overseas as vital for the nation. The colonies held an important economic promise4 and they were crucial to giving Portugal status as vital for the nation. The colonies held an important economic promise and they were crucial to giving Portugal status as vital for the nation.

Using as examples the Portuguese army’s counter-insurgency experience, the following sections will demonstrate how useful Scott’s framework is to study the influence of non-material factors with respect to the adaptation of a Western military institution in a non-conventional context.

To defend its position, Portugal developed rhetoric to present the country as an atypical colonial power; one of its significant components was the lusotropicalist ideology, introduced by Brazilian intellectual Gilberto Freyre. Portugal used this concept to underline the distinct nature of its relations with its African colonies. According to anthropologist and social activist Miguel Vale de Almeida, lusotropicalism was “… a special kind of inclination or capacity for miscegenation”12 possessed by the Portuguese, essential to “transform the representations and practices of the anachronistic Portuguese colonialism.”13 Portugal wanted to be perceived on the international scene as a multi-racial and multi-continental nation, having “… cordial relations with the non-European populations […] in the tropics.”14 In the midst of the creation of the UN and its Charter and anti-colonial conferences, lusotropicalism proved to be useful to defend Portuguese colonialism,15 with an emphasis on the “ideal of the harmonious blending of racial, religious, and cultural differences.”16

Lusotropicalism provided Salazar with both scientific validation and ideological justification for refusing to relinquish his country’s colonial empire.17 The vast majority of the Portuguese people were convinced that lusotropicalism represented their country’s practices, policies and goals overseas.18 This cultural cognitive pillar was strong enough to serve, not only as a basis for the political position, but also to impregnate the doctrinal adaptation to the African counter-insurgencies.
3. The normative pillar

The study shows that the Portuguese concept of irregular warfare also rests upon a strong normative basis. A doctrine designed for this COIN was used by the Portuguese army, serving as solid normative pillar. The Portuguese counter-insurgency rested upon specific elements creating an original ‘way of war.’ Its careful analysis, in light of the historical military results and political changes, may lead to some useful lessons about institutional drivers of change or stability, of success or failure, in COIN operations.

To develop adequate counterinsurgency tactics adapted to the African conflicts, both the political and the military elites contributed to the thinking with respect to the use of the asymmetrical weapon. The Portuguese used parts of French and British doctrines and lessons learned from counter-insurgencies in Algeria, Indochina, Kenya, and Malaya. They sent officers to the Centre d’Instruction de Pacification et Contre-Guerilla in Algeria in 1959, and came to the conclusion that their army had to “… make the most urgent preparations to fight an insurgency.” From the French concept of guerre révolutionnaire, they learnt the importance of making social advancement a centerpiece of their efforts. They also followed France’s example by dividing the counter-insurgency into psychological war and psychological action – the first to undermine the insurgent’s will to resist, and the second to “… strengthen both the morale and allegiance of the people and the fighting will of the soldiers.” From the British experience in Kenya and Malaya, they used these general principles: minimum use of force, coordination of intelligence, civil-military cooperation, and small-unit operations.

Considering the outcome of other equivalent counterinsurgency campaigns, but also the size of the territories, resources limitations, and the probability of a long term war, the goal was to maintain a low intensity conflict, low casualties, and low cost. Therefore, a specific doctrine was written by the Portuguese Army General Staff in 1960, entitled O Exército na Guerra Subversiva (The Army in Subversive War). This doctrine demonstrated the will to take into account the particularity of the conflicts in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, and provided a solid normative pillar to the counter-insurgencies.

Given the nature of the warfare, the Portuguese Armed Forces chose to reorganize into small units of light infantry. Inspired by the British, Portugal used “… small patrols of well-trained men who could penetrate rugged terrain to gather intelligence, kill guerrillas, disrupt food gathering […] and above all, make contact with the population.” Almost all Portuguese navy, air force, and army units – apart from cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries in some cases – were reorganized into infantry companies on a provisional basis. In accordance with the doctrine, the idea was “making them better able to keep up with the guerrillas on the ground” by giving up heavy weaponry to facilitate redeployment.

Another normative characteristic of the counter-insurgencies was the Africanization of the troops. This practice, in itself, was not an innovation. However, with the counter-insurgencies, political and military elites provided a new logic to local recruitment. First, because of the necessity to limit metropolitan casualties; second, because a multi-racial army countered the criticism of a ‘race war;’ third, because it allowed maintenance of “… a strong solidarity with the population;” fourth, because of the tactical advantages, such as the recruits’ knowledge of the local terrain, or the use of informers… Therefore, the miscegenation of units sets Portuguese armed forces apart from their French counterparts, and served as an important basis of their strategy. Portugal’s armed forces also trained para-militias, responsible for most of the defence of rural towns and fortified villages. In Mozambique, the use of tribal enmities when recruiting people from a certain ethnic group into defensive forces, gave the Portuguese a strategic advantage. Also, they developed an intelligence apparatus derived from the British system in Malaya: this political and military intelligence apparatus relied upon the use of agents and informers, air and ground reconnaissance patrols, and a system of intelligence coordination centres. Portugal also used “disgruntled nationalists to assassinate their one-time comrades.”

“The Portuguese used parts of French and British doctrines and lessons learned from counter-insurgencies in Algeria, Indochina, Kenya, and Malaya.”
Where the French failed to kill Ho Chi Minh in 1952, the Portuguese were able to eliminate many insurgents, including two prominent nationalists in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. To convince the local population to join or to cooperate, the use of propaganda proved to be crucial: “subversion [was] fought by means of wall papers, placards, pamphlets, etc.” The field and bush newspapers published by the army were of the foremost importance, destined to the soldiers, but also distributed among the population; they served purposes of information, propaganda, and counter-propaganda. Pamphlets also played an important role by requesting the local population to leave the bush and report to the armed forces, thus disrupting the support they provided to the liberation movements; one stated: “[that] straight thinking people live in the village.” Propaganda has always been part of any counter-insurgency campaign; what gives the Portuguese approach its specificity was the message promoting the multiracialism of Portugal’s colonial policy. This aspect is crucial as it clearly reflects lusotropicalism, which served as a major legitimizing pillar upon which rested the institutionalization of the counter-insurgencies.

To limit the military involvement and cost, various socio-political initiatives completed the military strategy. The tactical use of the populations was, in this matter, of foremost importance. First, Portugal favoured the settlement of Metropolitan Portuguese citizens in its African colonies to reaffirm the indivisibility of its territory. Portuguese settlements in Angola and Mozambique were also seen as necessary to “ensure resistance to any spread of the liberation movements;” Portugal thus encouraged workers and convinced ex-servicemen to settle in the colonies. In addition, Portuguese officials tried to favour the resettlement of the local population in villages they built, despite the existence of land laws stating that only vacant land could be given as land concessions. This policy was well-perceived by military, government groups, and civilian officials because it allowed them to control insurgent activities, detect guerrilla infiltrators, and better extend services, such as education, medical care, and sanitation. This resettlement into small guarded artificial villages proved to be a major aspect of the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaigns. In terms of psychological war, it allowed the Portuguese to satisfy military requisites of defence and population control, while freeing land for future European settlement. It also stimulated the economic and social development of the local population, which was crucial to winning hearts and minds. In Angola alone, more than one million people were resettled.

These resettlements regrouping the local population in gated villages were notably used to serve the socio-economic promotion mission of the counter-insurgencies. Indeed, psychological action in the form of socio-economic development programs was another important asymmetric strategy used by the Portuguese. Portuguese soldiers took part in psychological action missions, built hospitals and schools in the fortified villages and sometimes performed teaching duties. Portugal understood the importance of the support of the local population and thus wanted to address their grievances to counter the arguments put forward by the insurgents with respect to the iniquities of the society in the colonies. The military aspect of the war was considered to be a secondary issue. Portugal developed various types of socio-economic programs, but put a special emphasis upon their educational effort to provide an “… avenue of opportunity for the population rather than the frustration of a dead end.”

Finally, one other characteristic was the containment of warfare to the rural areas; the insurgents surrendered the cities but, apart from minor sabotage, did not cause much urban disruption.
4. The regulative pillar

From a regulative point of view, this study demonstrates that Portugal’s counter-insurgencies in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique rested upon a series of both formal and informal rules, as well as laws enacted to facilitate their conduct. Various measures were adopted by the Portuguese leadership to make the use of O Exército na Guerra Subversiva possible.

Portugal’s counter-insurgencies in Africa were undertaken in conformity with a body of acts and laws adopted by the métropole, ranging from a Constitutional Law, to laws specific to the overseas territories. The formulation and amendments of these laws after 1945 were mainly guided by the will to project the image of a united Portugal in accordance with the cultural cognitive understanding of the African colonies, therefore legitimizing a fight to keep them under Portuguese rule. The Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire was renamed the Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces in 1953 in an attempt to erase references to the notions of ‘colonies’ and ‘empire’ in Portuguese Law. However, the legislative changes that took place appear rhetorical, without a significant impact upon the local population, merely to project a positive image of the conditions of the locals abroad. Indeed, the status of the indigenous populations versus the Portuguese settlers was one of the great concerns expressed by international observers. In the 1960s, Portugal abolished its colonial forced labour laws as well as the special statute excluding the local population from citizenship. Since citizenship was granted to the population in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, the Electoral Law of 1968 also gave them the right to vote, as long as those doing so could read and write Portuguese. Land laws were also enacted; the control and the use of land proved to be a crucial aspect of Portugal’s counter-insurgencies with the resettlement policies. To protect the local population from wrongful appropriation of their properties, land laws officially stated: “[that] only vacant land [could] be given as land concessions;” some Portuguese settlers nonetheless took possession of land made vacant by the resettlement of the local population. Despite these unlawful appropriations, Portugal did not make these land laws more precise to avoid such practices, due to a significant European campaign for more land concessions. Other institutional changes highlight the Portuguese will to disguise the colonial nature of its Empire in response to the strong decolonization movement in the international community after 1945. Portugal’s Constitutional Law was revised in 1972. Even though the change was sometimes deemed “superficial,” it reaffirmed the equality of status between the colonies and Metropolitan Portugal. However, being recognized as autonomous regions did not come with the power to make decisions in matters related to diplomatic and consular relations, laws, nomination of the Governor, control of the financial administration, and so on. Therefore, it appears that the regulative pillar was more fragile than the first two pillars, more open to criticism and more susceptible to rapid changes.

However, from a purely military point of view, the regulative basis appears to be more solid. As was the case at the doctrinal level, Portugal made changes and adaptations to various military and defence organizations to prepare the armed forces to the conduct of the counter-insurgencies in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique. Until 1950, prior to its adhesion to NATO, Portugal had two different forces; the first was stationed in the métropole under the authority of the Ministry of War, while the Ministry of the Colonies was responsible for the second force, stationed in the ultramar. To coordinate the military efforts in the colonies, those forces were unified and put under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defence, thus relegating the Ministry of War (renamed Ministry of the Army) to the same standing as the Ministries of the Navy and the Air Force. Portugal, learning from the experiences of fellow NATO members, decided to merge the two forces to facilitate a more coherent and centralized approach to the African counter-insurgencies. 1950 was also a turning point in terms of management of military affairs. Before that year, this management was exclusively coordinated in the political sphere through the work of the ministries. However, starting in 1950, “[... joint operational activity of the armed forces was channeled through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the various Commanders-in-Chief.” By facilitating a better coordination between the political and the military leaderships, Portugal hoped to secure victory in the three counter-insurgencies. Maintaining a close relationship between those leaderships was notably necessary.
Moreover, lusotropicalism was also made part of the curriculum that the overseas territories were willingly a part of Portugal. Treatment of the local population, and it was used to reaffirm the legitimacy of its counter-insurgencies by putting great emphasis upon equality, allowing them to claim a distinct contrast with previous COIN operations, such as France’s guerre révolutionnaire in Algeria. The fact that Salazar’s regime held on to its colonies longer than most of the former colonial empires, and that, even after the coup, the idea of African independence was perceived as “treason,”68 tends to prove that the cultural-cognitive support for colonisation was strong.

From a normative point of view, various measures were taken to strengthen the new operational norms, including the implementation of new doctrine in the field of military planning and training. Thanks to the initiative of writing the doctrine O Exército na Guerra Subversiva, the Portuguese counter-insurgencies present a great originality: no soldier was sent to fight without a clear idea of what he was going to fight, how he was going to do it, and the result he was supposed to expect. Military training was redesigned to familiarize the personnel with both psychological war and psychological action initiatives to undertake in the African colonies. Since

5. Integrated analysis

To better understand to what extent the three pillars play a crucial role in the overall institutionalization of Portugal’s African counter-insurgencies and the role they may have played in the dismantling of the military operations, it is necessary to analyze their inter-relation and their relative importance with respect to the solidity of the entire construction.

The cultural-cognitive pillar appears solid. Indeed, facing an increasing international anti-colonization movement, Portugal tried to strengthen the acceptance of its empire and the legitimacy of its counter-insurgencies by putting great emphasis upon its singularity as an atypical colonial power. Therefore, its propagandistic effort was largely based upon the lusotropicalist ideology, according to which the Portuguese were better colonizers, due to an historical and cultural inclination towards adaptation and miscegenation.65 Lusotropicalism put a great emphasis upon mutual understanding and equal treatment of the local population, and it was used to reaffirm that the overseas territories were willingly a part of Portugal. Moreover, lusotropicalism was also made part of the curriculum of various administration schools. Notably, it was taught in the School of Colonial Administration, and in the social and political science institutes.66 Sustained by a large propagandistic campaign, lusotropicalism quickly became a consensual idea, allowed Portugal to showcase the country as an example living up to its reputation in terms of good practices in its colonies, and it served as a cultural-cognitive basis for the counter-insurgencies’ institutionalization. On the political side, lusotropicalism was used to improve Portugal’s image as a united country, composed of overseas provinces willingly a part of Portugal, and served as a basis for the legislative changes presenting Portugal as a multi-continental nation – differentiated from being a colonial power. Thanks to lusotropicalism, Salazar’s regime was able to reaffirm the legitimacy of his country’s presence in Africa, and it therefore faced little-to-no opposition when the time came to make fundamental institutional changes, such as the amendment of Portugal’s Constitutional Law just two years before the coup d’état. Information control and propaganda insured the delivery of the message in favour of Portugal’s colonial empire. Widely used to spread the lusotropicalist ideology, they created the conditions necessary for the acceptance of the institutional changes and adaptations made for the counter-insurgencies. The recuperation of lusotropicalism by Salazar’s regime allowed Portugal to justify the use of force to defend the country’s territorial unity. From a military point of view, it played an important part in various doctrinal decisions, for example by ‘opening the door’ for a greater integration of African personnel in the armed forces. In addition to resolving Portugal’s manpower problems and helping the Portuguese counter-insurgency units to achieve “notable levels of tactical success,”67 the use of local population troops also legitimized Portugal’s counter-insurgencies by depicting Portugal’s armed forces as allies fighting at the side of the local population. Moreover, this specific approach, based upon equality, allowed them to claim a distinct contrast with previous COIN operations, such as France’s guerre révolutionnaire in Algeria. The fact that Salazar’s regime held on to its colonies longer than most of the former colonial empires, and that, even after the coup, the idea of African independence was perceived as “treason,”68 tends to prove that the cultural-cognitive support for colonisation was strong.

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the ‘psychological weapon’ became very central, PSYOP doctrine and principles were taught to Portuguese soldiers before their deployment to the three theatres. "... to defend territorial borders, to ensure internal security, and to develop a program of psychosocial activity." While training their troops, the Portuguese made sure to address the following interrelated issues: making the troops capable of understanding subversion and insurgency, teaching the importance of the integration of both civil and military measures, developing leadership skills adapted to counterinsurgency warfare, and teaching tactics used in a counter-insurgency environment. A Centre for Special Operations Instruction was also created to provide training in acção psicológica (psychological action) – which later became APSIC or PSICO (psycho-social action). This large diffusion of the new doctrine helped to solidify the normative pillar by contributing to the easy acceptance of all its specific components.

**Conclusion**

Thanks to a large consensus among the political elites and the public with respect to the need to maintain dominion over the African colonies, the regulative pillar also seems strong enough to prevent any unwanted institutional change. With well-broadcasted and controlled rhetoric designed to idealize Portuguese nationalism, Salazar’s regime was able to rally Portugal’s population, as well as NATO allies, and it demonstrated the will to take the military leadership’s expertise into account in 1950 when it agreed to share the management of military affairs with the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Commanders-in-Chief. Various institutional changes resulted in a greater decision-making power to the military leadership, then made free, for instance, to design, teach, and implement elements of the singular Portuguese counter-insurgency doctrine.

Some may have argued that African loyalty was not gained, or that the intended counterinsurgency goals of strategic resettlements were not achieved because the insurgency spread. However, most analyses tend to acknowledge that the military strategy was successful. For almost fifteen years, despite the lack of human, material, and financial resources, the size of the territories to defend, significant international disapproval, the absence of an historical example of successful comparable counterinsurgencies... the Portuguese maintained a low-intensity conflict and a low level of metropolitan casualties at relatively low cost. It is commonly accepted that, in 1971, military victory was acquired in Angola, and that the Portuguese Army was able to contain the Mozambican insurgency, at least until 1970. There is no doubt that the robustness of the three aforementioned pillars played a crucial role in these achievements.

However, political obstacles were too high. From the beginning, the African insurgents had little hope for military victory, but they waged a “war of attrition to drive up Lisbon’s costs in blood and treasure,” to weaken Portugal’s will to fight. Indeed, after many years of sacrifices, even the Portuguese Army was realistic with respect to the military indefensibility of the area on the long term, and was conscious of the fact that “no amount of military verve could overcome the political problem of legitimacy in Africa.” Despite global acknowledgement of success in the implementation of the various institutional changes, and adaptations made to fight the counter-insurgencies, strong criticism from the international community proved to be the most important obstacle for Portugal.

Contrary to the Algerian case, the Portuguese Army decided to move forward and create the political solution that the civil government was refusing to provide in order to end the conflict. Members of the army usurped power in 1974, notably because of the ‘dead end’ their country was facing in the three counter-insurgency campaigns that kept “… pumping in men and money” without resulting in clear victory. Soon after the coup d’etat orchestrated by officers of the Armed Forces – 25 April 1974 – Portugal negotiated the decolonization of its African colonies. Guinea Bissau was granted independence in September 1974, Mozambique in July 1975, and, lastly, Angola in November 1975.

"Lusotropicalism put a great emphasis upon mutual understanding and equal treatment of the local population, and it was used to reaffirm that the overseas territories were willingly a part of Portugal."
The Portuguese counter-insurgencies, drawing lessons from past insurgencies, and based upon a doctrine of their own, accepted by the military and the population, were based upon really solid cultural, normative, and even regulative pillars. However, what this case study tends to prove is that, no matter how efficient the COIN strategy, or how strongly institutionalized it is, the main motor of change remains political. No military campaign can be won without concomitant political support.
Commentary on an article by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Peter Bradley, PhD, “Is Battlefield Mercy Killing Morally Justifiable?” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Winter 2010)¹

Introduction

The purpose of this opinion piece is to build upon an article about mercy killing on the battlefield, published in winter 2010 by an author who has been my friend for thirty years.

First of all, I want to emphasize that Professor Bradley’s arguments are clear and accurate. I see in them the mark of an accomplished researcher, who, over the years, has refined his thinking on military ethics - a subject that, in the Canadian context, is prominent in the day-to-day practice of the profession of arms.

I will introduce two new perspectives that I believe should have been included in a complete assessment of the ethical importance of the act committed by Captain Robert Semrau in October 2008. Firstly, it must be noted that Professor Bradley’s thinking is consistent with Canadian military ethical principles governing the decision-making process, as set out in official publications.² But it appears to me that an assumption has been made that those principles can be applied universally, regardless of the cultural environment and the operational context in which our troops are required to work. That might lead one to think that, whatever the situation, it is always possible to make a decision that conforms perfectly to the Canadian military’s Code of Conduct.³ Could it be that the situation facing Captain Semrau was a typical case of the harm dilemma,⁴ which recognizes that all possible solutions will cause harm or injury?
Secondly, Professor Bradley’s analysis deals only with the individual soldier’s accountability, and assumes that the military institution and Captain Semrau’s immediate superiors are above reproach, and are in no way responsible for his actions. Clearly, it was Captain Semrau who consciously and deliberately committed the act in question, but it is the military institution that selected him and supervised him throughout his preparation and his assignment in Afghanistan. Even if no error committed by Captain Semrau can be attributed to any shortcoming on the part of the chain of command, might its representatives have an ethical responsibility for the act committed, or are they blameless?

I will support Professor Bradley’s position by presenting the effects that an analysis of these perspectives might have upon his ethical assessment of the case in question. Bear in mind that herein, we are examining a hypothetical case whose resemblance to Captain Semrau’s will be limited to the circumstances and environment described by Professor Bradley, in addition to some known facts. I will end the analysis with a brief conclusion.

Are Canadian Ethics too Strict?

More than ever, we must integrate the operational context into the decision-making environment of military personnel in order to relativize their ethical conduct. Professor Bradley bases his analysis upon the Canadian context, which implies that the Canadian rules for ethical conduct are to be applied rigorously, no matter in what environment or structures Canadian Forces (CF) members are working. But what happens when a CF member must operate outside the Canadian context and adopt the customs and practices of a foreign culture in order to integrate into that culture to ensure the success of an operation, setting aside his or her own convictions? And what happens if those foreign mores and cultural practices are inconsistent with our own, and are incompatible with the CF Code of Conduct and Canadian ethical principles? What must the soldier do: disobey a legitimate order from a Canadian superior, which has been approved by the Canadian authorities, and refuse to serve in an arbitrary and possibly unethical context? Or must he or she adapt to that context, by recognizing the legality of the operation and acknowledging that certain unethical acts must be committed, against the soldier’s will, with the aim of contributing to putting an end to an injustice that is even greater than that resulting from the unethical conduct committed?

I believe it is clear that, in such circumstances, members of military forces regularly face dilemmas in which their actions could have positive or negative consequences, and that they must then rely upon the doctrine of double effect. That doctrine makes it possible to determine whether the decision made will result in as much good as it will harm, or in more good than harm, and therefore be ethically acceptable. Despite the rigour of this doctrine, we must recognize the difficulty of accurately assessing the true importance and consequences of the actions to be carried out. In addition, there is no guarantee that the moral assessment underlying the decision-making process will be the same for everyone. Considering the brief time available, the complexity of the decision-making process that must be undertaken, and the importance of the consequences of the action to be carried out under such circumstances, the soldier is subjected to such a high level of stress that only experience will enable him or her to manage a given situation well, and to react promptly. Unlike his or her superiors, the soldier has no direct support for making the decision, other than instinct and experience.

There are many historical and contemporary examples that illustrate my point: the Canadians who, during the Second World War, were parachuted in to join the French Resistance, and the human cost of the sabotage to which they contributed; and, more recently, snipers in Afghanistan who had to locate and deliberately eliminate human targets; the CF-18 pilots who bombed strategic targets in Libya without being absolutely certain that no civilian lives would be lost; and, lastly, combat operations carried out at various times in inhabited areas.
Let us briefly recap what we know about Captain Semrau’s situation. At the time, he was a junior officer carrying out the tasks involved in mentoring an Afghan unit. His primary responsibilities during Afghan combat missions were to accompany the Afghan troops and to advise them on the various protocols to be followed, to serve as a contact point with the local ISAF authorities, and, as the highest-ranking Canadian, to command the members of his mentoring team. The reprehensible act in question occurred several months after Captain Semrau’s arrival in theatre. 9 In accordance with the international conventions that apply to his case, the primary responsibility for administering first aid to and arranging medical evacuation for all injured persons falls to the Afghan commander, and, to a lesser degree, to all the combatants present, both Afghan and Canadian.

Given the passive, indifferent attitude of the Afghan troops, and even that of the Canadians toward the injured Taliban fighter, as described by the members of the mentoring team, one can assume that a similar situation might have occurred during previous operations, and that seriously injured Taliban members had been abandoned without receiving the care they needed. Such an act is against the law and completely contrary to Canadian rules of conduct. 10 I can only assume that, in keeping with those rules of conduct, such illegal actions were reported to the Afghan and the Canadian authorities, but that that type of behaviour did not disappear. That might explain why Captain Semrau, who had an exemplary service record,11 including a previous period of duty in Afghanistan with the British forces, decided to act as he did. Indeed, confronted with the harm dilemma, and in keeping with the doctrine of double effect, he may have chosen to put an end to the Taliban fighter’s suffering, thereby prioritizing a respect for human dignity. 12

I must re-emphasize that I did not follow Captain Semrau’s trial, and that the situation I am describing here is a hypothesis for the purposes of illustrating my argument. If we assume that Captain Semrau had only two options,13 namely, to abandon a Taliban fighter dying of wounds to the abdomen and legs inflicted by a 30-mm cannon shell,14 or to kill the man in order to end his suffering, the act of killing a wounded man appears in a different light - which does not, however, absolve the captain of individual responsibility. Personally, if I were in the same situation, I would consider it humane to end the wounded man’s life as quickly as possible, even if the act was extremely traumatic. Is it better to leave the wounded, dying man without administering any care to him, because the mission must continue, and to abandon him to his fate while hoping for a miracle? In that situation, which solution is more wrong: to do nothing, or to hasten the dying man’s death? Both are equally criminal, but one appears to be more humane. Indeed, under international conventions, we are obliged to assist an injured person, whatever that person’s affiliation. Therefore, to leave the scene without doing anything is to violate that imperative, and it would, I believe, constitute just as serious a wrong as taking the person’s life.

If we limit ourselves to the two above-mentioned options, we can say that Captain Semrau contributed directly to an execution, no matter which decision he made. That being said, deciding to do nothing is a choice for which he is responsible, as, to a lesser degree, are the other members of his team, while he alone is responsible for the act of ending the life of the injured man. And what about the responsibility of the Afghan officer, whose conduct was undoubtedly the primary cause of the illegal act?

An illustrative parallel to this situation can be found in the film Sophie’s Choice, in which the heroine, played by Meryl Streep, is forced to decide which of her two children will survive, and which will be sent to a death camp. Throughout the film, she reproaches herself for the choice she made, when, in reality, she was the victim in the situation - the guilty party was the Nazi officer who forced her to make an unethical choice. In addition, although I do not want to enter into a debate on assisted suicide, which is presently the subject of a commission of inquiry in Quebec,15 I must say that I also see points in common with the moral issues raised by the legalization or prohibition of assisted suicide for individuals with incurable, debilitating diseases.

This case also reminds me of some situations I witnessed in central Bosnia during the spring of 1993, when I was
detached to the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). We were asked to work on an investigation into the existence of a prostitution ring. The investigation revealed that Croatian women living in a Muslim-majority enclave that was under a food embargo imposed by the Croatian troops (some of whom were the husbands of these women), were forced to prostitute themselves for packs of cigarettes in order to buy food for their children. There was a shortage of cigarettes at the time, and a pack sold for almost 20 Deutsche Marks on the black market. The families of Bosnian refugees that had been displaced to central Bosnia refused those women access to the lineups when food was being distributed at the United Nations food banks, due to their Croatian origins. I also remember having discussions with personnel from foreign headquarters, who took it upon themselves to judge the morality of the Yugoslavian women, while on the other hand, I admired the courage and self-sacrifice they demonstrated in doing whatever was necessary to feed their children.

That particular case illustrates the international community’s inability, on occasion, to protect civilians in danger. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel could not come to their aid because it was not part of UNPROFOR’s mandate. I recall one situation that occurred during that same mission in April 1993. While I was travelling through a village in a Jeep with a group of unarmed observers, we noticed five people lying in the road. I ordered the driver to stop the vehicle. Just as I was investigating the situation, we were fired upon by a number of masked individuals, who were hiding behind buildings. I therefore had no choice but to leave the scene and abandon the people lying in the road to their fate. We were unarmed, and it was impossible for us to take them in our vehicle. A few hours after reporting the incident to the UNPROFOR authorities, I returned to the scene, but I never found the five people. I have often gone over that situation in my mind, wondering what could have been done to protect them. To this day, I still do not know whether my actions were ethical, or whether I violated our Code of Conduct.

In short, despite all the ethics training that military personnel receive, it appears clear that ethics have their limits in situations of armed conflict, when military members face predicaments in which they must choose the solution that seems to have the least serious consequences, according to their values. We must also admit that war, in all its complexity and ignobility, cannot always be conducted in accordance with professional ethical precepts, and that occasionally, a soldier must settle for choosing a lesser evil, acting upon instinct and adhering to his or her personal values. Of course, individual soldiers will always remain responsible for their own actions, even though the operational context and environment are imposed upon them, and are often unknown. That is what now leads me to examine the ethical responsibility of the chain of command from the perspective of institutional ethics.

**Institutional Ethics**

It is incumbent upon senior officers to anticipate the moral uncertainty that is inherent in asymmetrical warfare, and to instil in junior officers and young soldiers the basic moral principles which they can use to make informed moral choices in ambiguous situations. Although general rules, such as our Code of Conduct, are useful, they can never replace the countless value judgments that will be required, given the uncertain nature of operations.¹⁶

For the purposes of my argument, I will provisionally define ‘institutional ethics’ as the modelling and teaching of military ethics, which is also directly connected to the ethos¹⁷ of the Canadian military profession. Institutional ethics (IE) involves all the functions required for promoting and maintaining actualized ethics within the Canadian Forces. In addition, it is a product of the ethical conduct of the entire senior leadership of the CF, which comprises that of each individual senior leader. Each leader commits to personally setting an example of high moral standards, while respecting the integrity and dignity of each of his or her subordinates. However, hand-in-hand with this responsibility comes a certain discordance, in that the senior leaders are ultimately responsible for the CF’s performance, both on a day-to-day basis and when carrying out the numerous operations entrusted to them, and for applying the Code of Conduct in the profession of arms.¹⁸

IE is, therefore, the ethical accountability which the chain of command and the senior leaders who are part of it have toward their subordinates in the execution of their daily tasks. Consequently, the ethical behaviour of those authorities must
be reviewed when their subordinates conduct themselves in unacceptable and illegal ways that tarnish the image of the profession of arms. That ethical responsibility requires, among other things, that sufficient resources be devoted to preparing the troops properly before deployment, particularly for unusual tasks being performed in unconventional environments. Ethical duty - certain aspects of which, I acknowledge, overlap with the operational responsibilities of the chain of command - is not unlimited, but it must include ensuring adequate training and appropriate equipment for those tasks, as well as appropriate follow-up throughout the period when the tasks are actually being carried out. It is important to recognize that military personnel working in a unit where Canadian operating methods are completely unknown have very different needs than do personnel serving in a Canadian formation.

In addition, the individual ethics of those authorities should oblige them to assess themselves during unusual circumstances and incidents. And, depending upon the circumstances, their ethics should prompt them to acknowledge that certain ethical errors committed by subordinates are connected to institutional shortcomings, or to specific operational needs. Those authorities should then make a commitment to reconsider the level of accountability to which members who have committed wrongful acts should be held, and to correct the institutional shortcomings, when it is in their power to do so.

Let us remember that CF members are called upon to operate in wartime conditions, where managing chaos is a daily task they must perform while complying with international conventions and Canadian laws, which cannot predict the nature of all situations that will be encountered, or provide a suitable framework for determining what conduct is appropriate for achieving a given operation’s objectives. No doubt, an understanding of those facts influences international criminal courts, and the International Criminal Court itself, which usually attributes some degree of accountability (which varies depending upon the circumstances) to the highest-ranking officers when it is proven that war crimes were perpetrated by their subordinates. However, that is not the case in question here.

I realize that the concept of IE is absent from Department of National Defence (DND) publications, and that its relevance could be questioned. My objective is, above all, to send a message to senior leaders that the military institution has an ethical responsibility for the way it uses its human resources, especially when its members are called upon to work in unfamiliar environments. I also recognize that the concept must go hand-in-hand with transparent, loyal conduct by military leaders, who are legally subordinate to the political authorities. It is this last aspect of the senior leaders’ duty that I have a problem with, since it must be reconciled with respect for the dignity of all people. We must not forget that that particular principle is the first one listed in DND’s “Statement of Defence Ethics.”

How, then, do we reconcile this principle with the secret nature of some of the CF’s operational entities, and the institutional culture of the supremacy of the mission, which is impressed upon every CF member, commencing upon his or her first day in uniform? Add to that the complexity of contemporary military operations, the fact that such operations may be both joint and/or combined, and that the unconventional nature of the missions may involve the use of force. It seems obvious to me that these contradictory demands placed upon the chain of command may lead it to make decisions that have predictable consequences, both good and bad, and that expose the people executing the decisions to dilemmas, and the consequences of those dilemmas, as part of their day-to-day work. We need only think of the effects of post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) on many CF members who have served in recent combat operations to realize the significant impact of these operational environments.
tion in recent decades, major changes have been made to the quality of the services provided to CF members and their families in order to maintain that privileged connection. This special relationship also serves as a basis for the unshakeable trust in the chain of command that must be established and maintained to ensure unconditional loyalty, in particular, during combat operations, since it is well known that that relationship is closer within combat units. Clearly, any ethical shortcomings on the part of the higher authorities can have a serious impact upon that privileged relationship.

That being said, if one wishes to pass ethical judgment upon professional acts committed by members of the military, we cannot do so without considering what training IE provided, and what example it set for those troops, as well as the nature of the tasks assigned to those troops. The situation we are considering involves a subordinate officer serving as a mentor to a foreign force. The Afghan National Army (ANA) differs from the CF in its method of operation, as well as with respect to its languages and culture. At the time, its code of conduct no doubt reflected tribal and religious practices more than international conventions, at least, at the level at which Captain Semrau was operating.

We should therefore add to Professor Bradley’s ethical analysis an assessment of the preparation Captain Semrau underwent before his deployment. We must also ask whether the captain received proper supervision throughout his assignment in Afghanistan, and whether his superiors were informed of any ANA unethical practices. In addition, we need to know whether he had already reported such acts before the October incident, and, if so, how the chain of command reacted. Were Captain Semrau and the members of his team really properly prepared to work in that type of environment? When they took on the role of mentoring Afghan troops, did Canadian authorities realize the risks to which they would be exposing their military personnel from an ethical point of view? And what steps did they take to keep those risks to a minimum?

Obviously, the answers to those questions could change the way we view the events of 19 October 2008. If we were to discover inadequacies in the training and supervision provided to Captain Semrau, that could shed a different light upon his degree of responsibility and the ethical nature of his actions.

My 1993 stint in Bosnia with the European Community exposed me to situations in which I could count only on myself, in an unknown environment for which my military experience had not really prepared me. Nevertheless, I always felt that I was fully responsible for my actions. But even though the person who commits an action is always responsible for that action, the chain of command must accept part of that responsibility if it is proven to have failed, deliberately or not, to do its duty. Certainly, extreme situations sometimes require rapid responses, which, even if anticipated, might well create ethical dilemmas that our military personnel are not always equipped to face.

This shared responsibility is nothing new: it has always existed and it was institutionalized on the international scene during the Nuremberg trials, when Nazi leaders, including Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity because they incited their subordinates to commit atrocities. Depending upon the nature of those atrocities, I doubt that all the people who committed them with the approval of the Nazi regime were judged by the German courts as being equally guilty.

Consequently, it seems entirely appropriate, from the point of view of ethics, that we take another look at the accountability of higher authorities, especially in situations where the conduct of military personnel has led to legal and criminal prosecution. The ethical nature of a given mission to be carried out must be assessed, and it must be ensured that the military members involved receive the required training and supervision so that they can perform their duties ethically.
Conclusion

My objective has not been to absolve Captain Semrau, who will always be responsible for his actions, but rather to show that the ethical importance of his actions was not limited to the setting in which he committed them. Firstly, the nature and the complexity of modern warfare, subject to our society’s requirements in terms of respect for human life and human rights, will pose more and more harm dilemmas for the individuals fighting those wars. Even adherence to legal and legitimate interventions governed by international law will necessarily cause its share of harm and injury. Operations in unconventional environments will also occasion their share of inquiries into the legality of the intervention protocols, and on the corresponding actions. We need only think of the ongoing political saga concerning accusations of mistreatment of Afghan prisoners and violations of international conventions by the Canadian authorities from 2006 to 2008, with its continuing new developments, to realize the changes that have occurred in combat environments, and the ethical importance of those changes.

If the attitude that British Army Brigadier Shelford Bidwell espouses with respect to “... not wanting to hurt your enemy too much” is correct, then all the wars we fight in the future will have an ambiguity. We will have to abide by the laws of war that our society accepts, but we will want to – indeed, we will still have to - destroy the opposition’s capability to fight, and to impose our will upon them.27

This potential ambiguity calls for thoughtful reflection upon what I have termed institutional ethics. IE involves, on one hand, providing troops with adequate preparation and follow-up, and, on the other hand, recognizing the ethical responsibility of the CF’s senior leaders, and certainly the political leaders, who place the troops in situations in which their actions will have ethical importance and may cause harm. The authorities must therefore acknowledge the ethical risks to which they are exposing their subordinates, and assume their share of responsibility for the acts committed by those subordinates. By doing so, they will position themselves to maintain the privileged relationship they currently have with all their subordinates, and prevent that relationship from deteriorating.

Lastly, although I am not questioning the Canadian military’s hierarchy of ethical principles, I believe that deliberately placing military personnel in situations where they will have to commit actions that may cause harm shows a lack of respect for their dignity, even if it is being done in order to achieve a higher objective, such as safeguarding national interests.

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NOTES

1. I thank Marc Imbeault, PhD, associate professor at RMC Saint-Jean; Major (ret’d) Yves Simard, assistant professor at RMC Saint-Jean; Colonel (ret’d) Pierre Cadotte; and my wife, Danielle - all of whom have contributed to my thinking on this issue in recent months and/or read and commented upon the final manuscript.
3. Louis Pojman reminds us that, although moral principles have universal value and objectivity, moral rules are not absolute, and the majority of them can thus be cancelled out by others in certain situations. Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right & Wrong, 4th Edition, Wadsworth Canada, Thomson Learning, 2002, pp. 18–19.

Malham Wakin discusses this in terms of universal obligations, rather than absolute principles. He describes these obligations as being not absolute,
not always observable, and occasionally incompatible. However, they are not arbitrary, subjective, or subject to cultural relativity. They concern all human beings, but do not apply to all possible circumstances. “Our rule of action is that we are justified in violating our universal moral obligations only when they conflict with a higher obligation and we cannot fulfill both at once.” Malham M. Wakin, “The Ethics of Leadership,” in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, 2nd Edition, Malham M. Wakin (ed.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 195–196.

4. “[A] situation in which any possible solution will cause harm or injury to others. This type of dilemma is often described as a “lose-lose situation.”” Ethics in the Canadian Forces: Making Tough Choices (Instructor Manual), Canadian Defence Academy and Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006, p. 13.

5. Some of Canada’s allies have ethical codes similar to that of the Canadian Forces, but although respect for the dignity of all persons is present in their list of ethical principles, it does not appear to occupy first place, as it does in the CF. Lieutenant-Colonel Jeff Stouffer and Stefan Seiler, PhD, (eds.), Military Ethics: International Perspectives, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010).

6. “I need to meet rules, the mandate, the political commander of the Afghan troops who fought ‘I must meet rules, the mandate, the political

…

7. “A situation in which any possible solution will cause harm or injury to others. This type of dilemma is often described as a “lose-lose situation.”” Ethics in the Canadian Forces: Making Tough Choices (Instructor Manual), Canadian Defence Academy and Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006, p. 13.

8. Some of Canada’s allies have ethical codes similar to that of the Canadian Forces, but although respect for the dignity of all persons is present in their list of ethical principles, it does not appear to occupy first place, as it does in the CF. Lieutenant-Colonel Jeff Stouffer and Stefan Seiler, PhD, (eds.), Military Ethics: International Perspectives, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010).

9. “I need to meet rules, the mandate, the political

…

10. Providing care to an injured combatant is a cultivated reflex that becomes natural to our soldiers, and it is difficult to understand how experienced soldiers, such as Warrant Officer Longaphie, a member of the mentor training team, did not react by coming to the man’s aid, even if we assume that it was not the first time the team had found itself in a similar situation. Considering the pre-deployment training period and the selection process undergone by all members of the team, other possibilities, such as a flagrant lack of professionalism, sheer incompetence, or inadequate preparation for the mission were probably not contributing factors.


12. “You personally failed to abide by one of our most important principles: that of using force only in accordance with lawful orders. You might have been torn between your personal moral values and your duties as a Canadian soldier.”

13. The information we have indicates that it would have been possible to ask the British forces to perform a medical evacuation. However, doing so would have caused a delay and would no doubt have had consequences for the continuation of the operation.

14. “A U.S. Apache helicopter was called in and fired several bursts from its 30-mm automatic cannon. This gun can fire more than 600 rounds a minute. Some time later, fire was directed at the edge of a cornfield, Longaphie and Harasza came upon a badly wounded Taliban fighter surrounded by Afghan soldiers. The insurgent had been shot from a tree by the attack helicopter; he had life-threatening wounds to his abdomen and legs.” Andrew Duffy, “A tale of four soldiers: the day that led to Robert Semrau’s court martial,” Ottawa Citizen, 18 July 2010, http://assolutatranquillita.blogspot.com/2011/02/captain-robert-semrau-one-of-canadas.html. Accessed on 2 June 2011.


17. The Canadian Forces ethos is the centre of gravity of the military profession. It provides an ethical framework for professional handling of military operations while serving as the basis for the legitimacy, the effectiveness, and the honour of the Canadian Forces. We must also recognize that the military institution is represented and led by its chain of command, which is made up primarily of senior officers, and that the impetus for putting our concept of institutional ethics into practice comes almost exclusively from the leadership of those senior officers. In addition, ethics must be actualized within the context of military rules and Canadian laws.


19. The inquiry into the deployment of the Canadian Forces in Somalia and its consequences illustrates this very well.

20. “Because the military function is so directly related to our human values, those charged with the leadership of that function must be sensitive to those values and must exhibit some understanding of them.” Wakin, p. 196.


22. “The British Army officer Brigadier Shelford Bidwell suggests in his writing that ethics and professional requirements frequently clash. His remark that ‘…’ no general ever won a war whose conscience troubled him or who did not want to beat his enemy too much’ points to the fact that some senior ranks in the profession of arms could have a significant psychological problem in trying to perform the tasks that they are required to undertake.” Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London: Pimlico, 1976), p. 15, quoted in “Ethics and the Profession of Arms,” conference report, Aerospace Centre 2000 Air Power Conference, Air Power and Joint Forces, Commonwealth of Australia, 1995.

23. It was no doubt for those reasons that the Chief of the Land Staff published in (2009) Duty with Discernment: CLS Guidance on Ethics in Operations. This work deals with, among other things, the nature of asymmetrical warfare, and its combatants.


25. Since 2007, support provided to CF members and their families has been reviewed, in view of their new needs and the impact of recent operations. For example, see the news story at http://www. canada.com/news/Somnia/4308320/story.html and the Personnel and Family Support Services website at http://www.aspf.ca/en/index.asp. In addition, Veterans Affairs Canada has updated its services to take today’s realities into account, and it continues to improve the services it offers to veterans from the 1990s.


27. MacFarling.
lieutenant-General (ret’d) Richard Evraire has recently published a favourable book review of Military Justice in Action: Annotated National Defence Legislation by Justice Gilles Létourneau and Mr. Michel Drapeau. Although I would demur from his favourable review of the book, (in my view, it is of marginal utility as it consists largely of straightforward annotations to statutory and regulatory provisions that are readily available online, and it also contains a number of factual errors), for the present purpose, I would like to focus upon some comments made in the review echoing a number of the critiques advanced by Létourneau and Drapeau in the book and elsewhere. These advocate “… reducing to a minimum possible the disparities between military criminal law and civilian criminal law,” as well as lamenting the proclaimed lack of Canadian military legal doctrine. In advancing these views, both the authors and Lieutenant-General Evraire misapprehend the current state of affairs concerning the Canadian military justice system.

The reality is that Canada has one of the best military justice systems in the world. This was recognized by the former Chief Justice of Canada, the late Right Honourable Antonio Lamer, in his 2003 independent review of the provisions of the National Defence Act, wherein he stated: “Canada has developed a very sound and fair military justice framework in which Canadians can have trust and confidence.” As he noted, other states, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, have studied the Canadian military justice system and looked to it as an example to emulate in many respects in making improvements to their own systems.

Some of the recommendations of the Lamer Report have already achieved statutory implementation. Bill C-15 (the Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act), currently before Parliament, aims to complete the task of providing a legislative response to the recommendations made in the Lamer Report in order to ensure that the military justice
system continues to evolve to keep pace with changes in the law, and in societal expectations.

Létourneau and Drapeau criticize some differences between the military and civilian justice systems. These differences exist for a reason. The fundamental point that must be made is that differences do not mean that one system is inherently inferior to the other, nor constitutionally deficient. The real question is not whether there are differences, but rather whether the military justice system is compliant with constitutional requirements, and effective in fulfilling its purpose.

A separate military justice system exists because of the unique needs of the Canadian Forces to fulfill its mission of defending Canada. This was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in its seminal 1992 judgment in the case of R. v. Généreux:

The purpose of a separate system of military tribunals is to allow the Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain directly to the discipline, efficiency and morale of the military. The safety and well-being of Canadians depends considerably on the willingness and readiness of a force of men and women to defend against threats to the nation’s security. To maintain the Armed Forces in a state of readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and, frequently, punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct. As a result, the military has its own Code of Service Discipline to allow it to meet its particular disciplinary needs. There is thus a need for separate tribunals to enforce special disciplinary standards in the military.³

The paramount need to maintain discipline in a state’s armed forces has been recognized since ancient times. But in the popular imagination, this recognition is often accompanied by an unreflective prejudice that military justice systems give scant regard to fairness or justice in order to maintain discipline.⁴ This need not be so. The ends of discipline and justice are not mutually exclusive. The conclusion in the Powell Report of 1960 incorporates much wisdom in recognizing this:

Discipline - a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be performed – is not a characteristic of a civilian community. Development of this state of mind among soldiers is a command responsibility and a necessity. In the development of discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake to talk of balancing discipline and justice – the two are inseparable.⁵

Rather than becoming entrenched in rigid positions that reflect ideological predispositions about military justice, the question that should be posed is: what is it that Canada, as a state, needs its military justice system to do? And, once this is identified, what functional attributes does such a system need to possess in order to effectively accomplish these ends? Once this analysis is undertaken, one is then in a position to rationally determine what the ambit of the jurisdiction of the military justice system should be in terms of offences, persons, territory, and time, and what differences in procedure may be required.

The Canadian military justice system has two fundamental purposes: to promote the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces by contributing to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale; and, to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. It thus serves the ends of both discipline and justice.

These purposes are stated in the statutory articulation of purposes, principles, and objectives of sentencing in the military justice system contained in Bill C-15.⁶ This recognizes that it is most acutely in the process of sentencing on the basis of objective principles that one is obliged to directly face the question: what is it that one is actually trying to accomplish in trying someone in the military justice system? The synthesis
of the classic criminal law sentencing objectives of denunciation, specific and general deterrence, rehabilitation, and restitution, with those targeted at specifically military objectives, such as promoting a habit of obedience to lawful commands and orders, and the maintenance in a democratic state of public trust in the military as a disciplined armed force, illustrates that military law has a more positive purpose than the general criminal law in seeking to mould and modify behaviour to the specific requirements of military service.

Simply put, an effective military justice system, guided by the correct principles, is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the armed forces of a modern democratic state governed by the rule of law. It is also key to ensuring the compliance of states and their armed forces with the normative requirements of international human rights law, and of international humanitarian law.

In order to accomplish these fundamental purposes, service tribunals must possess certain functional attributes: the requisite jurisdiction to deal with matters pertaining to the maintenance of discipline and operational effectiveness; that those doing the judging must possess an understanding of the necessity for, role of and requirements of discipline; they must operate in a legally fair manner, and be perceived to be fair (the requirement that the military justice system be perceived to be fair arises both from the need to maintain societal support in a democratic society, and that the fact that, in all-volunteer armed forces, soldiers, sailors, and airmen and airwomen will not long abide a system that they feel to be fundamentally unfair and will vote with their feet); they must be compliant with constitutional and applicable international law; and they must be prompt, portable, and flexible. That is why the two types of service tribunals in the Canadian military justice system, courts martial and summary trials, are designed the way that they are.

The purpose of summary trials is to provide prompt but fair justice in respect of minor service offences, and to contribute to the maintenance of military efficiency and discipline, in Canada and abroad, in time of peace or during armed conflict. Summary trials are vitally important to the operational effectiveness of the CF. They are the workhorse of the military justice system, consistently trying around 96 percent of cases. They exemplify the attributes of promptness, portability, and flexibility mentioned above. And, it must be pointed out, that perhaps the two most eminent constitutional jurists of the Charter era in Canada, former Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justices Brian Dickson and Antonio Lamer, have both conducted independent reviews of the military justice system during the past 15 years, and both supported the importance and constitutionality of the summary trial system.

The portrayal of summary trials advanced by the authors in the book and elsewhere, and reflected in the review, is, at best, a very partial depiction of the full picture that must be taken into account in making a responsible and accurate assessment of the fairness and constitutionality of the summary trial system. It does not mention the crucial role played by the offering of elections to accused persons between summary trial and court martial, nor that no person may suffer a true penal consequence as punishment at a summary trial unless they have first been given that election. It also does not mention the long list of statutory and regulatory provisions that promote fairness at summary trials. Constraints of length do not permit a full examination of this issue in this article, but the best antidote for incomplete information is to examine all of the facts. Lieutenant-General Evraire in his review, as well as the Létourneau and Drapeau in the book itself, inaccurately assert that the Canadian Forces does not have much doctrine on military justice; in fact, there is ample. As an example in the context of summary trials, readers who wish to more fully inform themselves can look at the Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level Manual, available on the internet at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/Training-formation/MilJustice-JustMilv2.2-eng.pdf.

The authors observe that members of the Canadian Forces are not entitled to a trial by a jury of 12 persons. This is true. It is what s.11(f) of the Charter provides. However, to assert that a provision of the Charter is not consistent with Charter principles is not a viable argument. Rather, because of the unique needs of military discipline and efficiency, the findings at trials by General Courts Martial are determined by a panel of five military members. The differences between panel and jury trials have been judicially considered, and the courts have upheld the validity of court martial panels. Panel members are selected by a random methodology, and they swear an oath to carry out their duties according to law, without partiality, favour, or affection. Court martial panels are different than civilian juries to reflect military needs, but they are not unfair or unconstitutional.
VIEWS AND OPINIONS

The authors have also criticized the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians in the narrow circumstances Parliament has specified in the National Defence Act. This is a complex subject, but for an account of why many civilians would actually prefer to be tried by court martial in certain circumstances, and the arguments in favour of retaining such jurisdiction, see: Michael Gibson, “International Human Rights Law and the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility While Precluding Impunity,” (2008) 4 Journal of International Law and International Relations 1 at 22.

No justice system can remain static and expect to remain relevant to its users, and the military justice system is no exception. Legislative reform of the military justice system involves a process of continuous improvement over time, just as is the case with the civilian Criminal Code. Bill C-15 provides important updates, as well as a statutorily mandated regular independent review to help ensure that this is accomplished.

The Canadian military justice system is not perfect. No human justice system is. But it is a fair, effective, and essential element in promoting the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces, and ensuring justice for its members.

NOTES

1. In Bill C-60 (enacted as S.C. 2008, c.29) and Bill C-16 (enacted as S.C. 2011, c.22).
4. As reflected in the widely-cited and now tired maxim attributed to the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau that “…military justice is to justice what military music is to music.”
6. At Clause 62 of the Bill.
7. In Canada’s case, as predominantly reflected in the judicial guarantees in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
8. QR&O 108.02.
On 12 September 1759, a quarter-millennium ago, Major-General James Wolfe, a sickly, red-head, led his British army up a steep path to the Plains of Abraham and waited for the French defenders of Québec City to respond. They did so ‘in spades.’ Ignoring centuries of advice from ‘Monday-morning quarterbacks,’ not to mention almost half his available forces, the Marquis de Montcalm summoned his available troops — white-coated regulars from famous French regiments, and a more motley array of Canadian militia and aboriginal allies, and marched to meet the British at the Butte à Neveu, a rocky outcropping in front of Québec’s crumbling walls.

The two armies were roughly equal in number, but very different in training. An infantry colonel for most of his career, Wolfe had spent the summer training his soldiers to load their Brown Bess muskets as fast as they could, but to fire only at its ideal range, 25 yards. Meanwhile, Montcalm mixed his regulars with local militia but despaired of making real soldiers out of the scruffy and willful Canadiens. Never, throughout the entire summer, did militia and regulars train together. Faced with the British on that September morning, the militia wanted to do what modern soldiers would be told to do: throw oneself on the ground, crawl to a vantage point, and shoot to kill. Militia caused a scattering of British casualties, among them General Wolfe, hit in his hand and his belly, but not mortally hurt (at least, not yet…). Both lines of regulars, true to the tactic of the time, stood looking at each other. Again and again, at Carillon, Oswego, Fort William Henry, and only a month earlier, at Montmorency Falls, the French regulars had overwhelmed the British. Why wait?

Ignoring a depressed and pessimistic Montcalm, the regulars began crowding down the Butte, firing as they advanced, although rarely hitting enemy soldiers at such a range. The rocks, trees, and brooks of the Butte dissolved their ranks until the French had split into three armed crowds, two heading north and one south, ignoring Wolfe’s centre. The British stood firm and silent, watching the gap between the two armies narrow. At 25 meters, shouted orders cut the air. The redcoats raised their muskets to their shoulders. “Fire!!!” Smoke and a roar burst from the British ranks. Six-pounder cannon on each flank added to the carnage. Soldiers drew ramrods, removed remnants of burning powder, rammed down a fresh charge and a lead ball, and prepared a second volley. Shaken by the gaps left by the militia, and now by victims of the British volley, French soldiers wondered what would happen next. Only one answer was obvious: they would die. Some turned to escape their fate. Panic in war is always contagious.
Montcalm’s proud regulars dissolved. His side shattered by a British cannon ball, a fatally injured Montcalm was dragged into Québec through a jostling, panicked crowd of his soldiers. He would die before dawn.

His adversary was already dead from a third probably-Canadien bullet, at the moment of his astonishing victory. Four soldiers stood by their dying general, not the crowd carefully selected by the artist for Benjamin West’s famous painting. Meanwhile, drawing their claymores at Brigadier-General James Murray’s command, Fraser’s Highlanders raced to the Butte à Neveu to cut off the French Army’s retreat.

For 250 years, military historians have claimed that Canada’s fate was decided in about ten minutes. In his new history, Northern Armageddon, Peter MacLeod measured the battle at eight minutes. However, his book reveals a larger truth. Some people went on fighting. No one told the Canadiens or their aboriginal allies to run away. Because Canadien militia stopped Fraser’s Highlanders five separate times, the French regulars could stop, catch their breath, form up, and begin their doleful march to Montréal. A few days later, prodded by starvation and the grisly fate of rape and murder guaranteed for the defenders and civilians of any city taken by storm, Québec’s city governor, the Sieur de Ramezay, surrendered the city to Wolfe’s successor, Brigadier-General George Townshend.

The war not over… In the spring, Montcalm’s successor, the Chevalier de Lévis, brought the militia and the French regular battalions back to Québec. Because Québec was no more defensible in April than it had been in September, Brigadier-General James Murray, Wolfe’s successor, led British forces, decimated by a brutal winter, to meet them at Ste-Foye. Weakened by hunger, frost-bite, and disease during that cold and hungry winter, the British were no match for the French. Leaving behind a thousand dead and wounded, the British fled back through the gates to Québec. If a French fleet had come up the St-Lawrence, the Battle on the Plains of Abraham would hardly now be worth remembering. Québec would again have been French. Instead, on 9 May 1760, a British sentry spotted a distant sail. As both sides waited, the ship approached. It was H.M.S. Lowestoft, the frigate that had received Wolfe’s corpse on 13 September. A British fleet followed within hours. France had abandoned its valiant colonists to British mercy.

What choice did they have? When he prepared for the Seven Years War, the British Prime Minister had made a shrewd choice. Britain’s navy was one of the best in the world. Its army was not. Strategists tell us to reinforce strength and Prime Minister Pitt did so. In the summer of 1759, Pitt’s strategy paid off in two battles virtually unknown to Canadians. First, a British fleet destroyed France’s Mediterranean squadron by drawing it into the Atlantic and down the African coast.
to Lagos, where it was driven ashore and destroyed. In a more conventional battle, Admiral Edward Hawke intercepted the French Atlantic fleet at Quiberon Bay on the coast of Brittany. The result was a decisive British victory. If the French navy had arrived to confirm Lévis’ victory, it would have reversed history. It was no longer available. Two naval victories virtually unknown to Canadians transformed our history.

If this was not quite the story you learned in school or from the CBC, neither did Pauline Marois or Gilles Duceppe, who got any 2009 re-enactment of the battle cancelled to save Québeckers from humiliation. Why did no one tell them about their heroic ancestors? Thanks to Peter MacLeod, the Canadian War Museum historian who took his work seriously, all Canadians now have a more inclusive and more fascinating story of a crucial year in our history.

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Where are we?

Canadian Forces (CF) language programs are dysfunctional. In civilian post-secondary studies throughout Canada, on-line learning is routine, virtual classrooms are commonplace, computerized assessment is the norm, client-based and student-centred learning are enforced by provincial policy, and multiple paths to learning are simply advertised and encouraged. In colleges and universities, and even among private providers, research is actively supported and more effective learning methodologies and technical support for learning are actively pursued. In the CF, on the other hand, Second Official Language Education and Training (SOLET) still applies the ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of training. Courses are predominantly teacher-focused and based upon 30-year-old training curricula that are designed to resist change. On-line support for learning can be accessed by some, but the learning management system, Autonomous Language Learning in Interaction with Elements in Synergy (ALLIES) is a replication of the aged curriculum and designed to complement classroom teaching, rather than foster independent learning. There is next-to-no pedagogical direction for CF members who wish to grow a proficiency in their Second Official Language on their own. Virtual classrooms, which would allow students at similar levels to work together from several locales over several time zones, simply do not exist, so learners who have acquired proficiency levels at great cost to the CF slowly lose that proficiency awaiting selection for courses at their next level. Assessment of Second Official Language proficiency in the three skill sets of Reading, Writing, and Oral Proficiency (listening and speaking), though available online through the Public Service Psychology Centre, is still predominantly paper-based and highly susceptible to compromise. CF policy on the delivery of SOLET is as outdated as the curriculum itself, relying upon directives and instructions issued in the ‘mid-eighties,’ and made largely irrelevant by changing attitudes and expectations in current practice. Custom and policy restrict access to training severely: only CF delivered courses are supported, and these courses are based upon an outdated curriculum design. Selection for courses is limited, and with fiscal restraint, will become even more limited. Access to second language education and training outside the CF-delivered course is neither encouraged nor supported. Even if someone were to take courses to improve their language skills offered by a private provider, or a local community college or cégep, being re-tested before the five-year expiration of an official profile is a challenge.

In business and industry, professionals are expected to maintain currency in acquired skills on their own, or through regularly scheduled professional development activities. In the CF, members expect maintenance of their linguistic proficiency to be provided to them at their convenience, and at enormous cost – this expectation and support is mandated by outdated policy as well. In terms of policy, management, design, access, and assessment, there is little to recommend current SOLET to CF members except for two things: it is the ‘only game in town,’ and the teaching and assessment staff are dedicated and extremely knowledgeable professionals, getting positive results in spite of the outmoded training model they work within.
How did we get here?

Language Education and Training has evolved slowly in the CF. Language courses began to be provided in earnest after the Second World War. Air force courses in English were established to train technicians. The army followed suit, and collaboration became inevitable. The longer history of operational and occupational bilingualism had bubbled beneath the surface since long before Confederation and somehow seemed to resolve itself in Upper and Lower Canada – strategies and operations found expression tactically in both English and French, as well as in Scots and aboriginal languages, to effectively preserve us from incursions from the south. Officially, a directive from the head of Canadian forces in 1899 reminds anyone who has aspirations of advancement to learn French, lack of which is characterized as a defect. By the 1960s, lower-level courses (roughly equivalent to our current A-level courses) were provided at bases, and upper-level courses (roughly our B-levels) became centralized, delivered initially by teachers from the Public Service Commission, who, only much later, were integrated into the Department of National Defence (DND). Courses in French took root in the 1960s as well. Assessment was based upon an internationally recognized numeric standard for four skills: proficiency in listening, reading, writing, and speaking. That numeric standard, still used in the US and in NATO, was superseded in 1996 by the Public Service alpha-standard in three skills: reading, writing, and oral interaction. Since the 1970s, the greatest challenges for language education and training have been the selection of candidates, and in meeting legislated requirements. In spite of the Official Languages Act (OLA), meeting legislated requirements in the CF generally meant that French-speaking members were expected to learn English to advance in their careers. Selection was based upon several factors, the most dominant being the availability of personnel.

On a strategic level, attempting to efficiently resolve legislated requirements through selection of the right people at the right time at the appropriate proficiency has led to some interesting contortions and inefficiencies: byzantine occupational quotas were established for non-commissioned members (NCMs), for whom language was considered nothing more than a skill that can be trained; mandatory residential courses of up to 33 weeks for incoming officers (with downwardly mobile expectations of success, and no follow-up); ‘one-on-one’ learning and maintenance programs for general and flag officers at their convenience; and contracted Second Language Training (SLT) for members with no sanctioned requirement to learn a second language. Until 2001, there were two levels of training attainment, two profiles that were routinely assessed. Then, things changed. By 2005, it was clear that all members were expected (really) to use their second languages to lead, to manage, to communicate with the public, and to train. Senior officers were encouraged, and then ordered, to acquire and maintain a high level of second language proficiency, or to leave the armed forces. Over three decades, the training establishments had failed to evolve systematically to adapt to higher standards and more stringent demands upon students, and DND regularly received damning reviews from the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages and the Standing Committee on Official Languages for its inability and perceived reluctance to comply with the ‘law of the land.’

At an appearance before the Standing Committee on Official Languages in 2003, the Minister of National Defence (MND) committed to raising the standards of bilingualism in senior ranks. In immediate response, more advanced programs of study were designed and initiated, and a process to identify senior officers requiring SOLET was established. The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was designated the training authority for all language programs in the CF (Official Languages, Foreign Languages, and International Programs for foreign governments), and began working with Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) service providers to standardize procedures. In 2006, the Director of Official Languages instituted a strategic model to ensure that the CF complied with the legislated requirements for all national departments and agencies. The Official Languages Program Transformation Model: 2007-2012 recognized the uniqueness of bilingual requirements in the CF, in contrast to that requirement in other Government of Canada departments and agencies. The Transformation Model outlined a more realistic and accurate set of expectations within DND to ensure compliance with the Official Languages Act. As the expiring Transformation Model draws to an end, and as a new Transformation Model is being hammered out, it is quite evident that there is wider awareness in the CF of the value of bilingualism. The Transformation Model identified key areas where compliance to the OLA required change. Individuals providing leadership, services to the public and to members, and instruction were earmarked as priorities for SOLET. A Linguistic Audit of the Individual Training and Education System in the CF was conducted by the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages at the request of the CF in 2008-2009, and it recommended 20 changes be effected in the Individual Training and Education System to achieve compliance with the OLA. As one component of IT&E, SOLET is immediately affected by these recommendations. In 2011, Armed Forces Council endorsed a strategic plan for the modernization of the IT&E system. The IT&E Modernization Initiative identified gaps and inefficiencies in the broader IT&E system, most of which are easily recognizable in SOLET. Among these strategic gaps are the inadequate exploitation of modern learning methodologies and technologies; inadequate resources to support quality and quantity control; inefficient use of resources; inadequate performance measurement; incomplete evolution of the CF as a learning organization; lack of instructor and manager development; and a lack of synchronization within CF personnel generation.

Specific to SOLET as a line of operation within IT&E Modernization are the development of a CF OL specification; integration of SOL proficiency, and maintenance into individual members’ career-long learning plans; the tagging of OL requirements tied to rank, jobs, and positions; and the provision of expanded use of technology-based interactive methods to make available wider access to language learning, and an increased capacity to provide opportunities for learning.
Where to now?

At the beginning of this short article, the outdated policies relating to SOLET were mentioned. These policies are now under review. CF OL specifications, until now sporadic interpretations of the OLA and Treasury Board guidelines, will go a long way to synchronize understanding and efforts. The CF’s approach to education and training has undergone significant change in the past two decades, in keeping with the shift in emphasis from delivering training, to providing access to learning, from teacher-centric to student-centered learning opportunities that has characterized Canadian post-secondary education. The new policies will reflect this contemporary philosophy of education. In parallel with a shift to contemporary pedagogy is a shift in culture that will be difficult to manage: the social structures of a military community, with its emphasis upon command and control, are at variance with a client-based educational system. The process has begun through structural changes in IT&E and SOLET delivery and delivery policy. The transition will be bumpy, and judging from the timelines that SOLET has evolved through to date, slow to implement. SOLET touches so many aspects of IT&E and the Military Employment System that change has been necessarily slow – like transitioning from an oil-based to an electric-based transportation system.

From the point of view of a learner today, access to SOLET is a challenge. Selection for full-time courses rests in the hands of career managers, as it should be. Access to part-time courses, on base, is in the hands of the chain-of-command, as it should be. Access to self-directed on-line CF language courses is easy – one needs only to sign on, register, and then set aside time to explore the learning management system and begin learning the other language. French courses are delivered by ALLIES (the on-line version of the Canadian Forces French Curriculum), and supplemented at higher levels by a CF-licensed commercial package called Tell Me More, selected after a thorough study of several alternatives (including one package that is heavily advertised on television and in print media). Instruction on how to use the software to build linguistic competency is minimal. Courses in English and French are available through local educational institutions and private agencies – but are the financial responsibility of the learner. For those who have a base competence in their second language, courses of study in many areas (locales, as well as academic or professional subjects) are delivered in the second language, and they provide an immersive learning context; this is quite effective. There is no educational reimbursement for private or public language courses.

In a five-to-ten year period, on-line self-study courses should be available in both languages, with instruction on how best to use the on-line resources according to one’s learning style. Links to learning materials directly related to ones trade would be introduced as basic competence grows. For instance, a medical technician could be linked to on-line courses in that trade in the target language as the language course progresses. Virtual classrooms could connect learners in different areas into a homogenous class with a facilitator to direct collaborative learning. Communities of practice to maintain levels of proficiency could be commonplace through the use of social media supported through the CF Campus. For each recruit, career requirements for SOL, if applicable, will be identified and access to learning opportunities posted to one’s individual learning plan well in advance.

From the perspective of a teacher, current options are limited. Teachers are insulated from the educational system as a whole. Today, there is no opportunity to work for a period in assessment, or in curriculum development, or professional development of peers, or program management. In the future, opportunities for professional enhancement should open up for those who are interested in learning more about their profession and for contributing to its improvement. Options to facilitate virtual classrooms, provide individual tutoring at several levels, conduct focused research, or engage in face-to-face classroom teaching will increase one’s ability to grow profes-
sionally. There is no interaction among staff in training establishments, but in the future, joint professional development opportunities, mediated by technology, will open the doors to areas of collaboration that we see only dimly today.

Curriculum development is currently in the hands of two small teams isolated from teachers and assessors and program evaluators. IT&E Modernization, and therefore SOLET Modernization, sees development teams consisting of language education practitioners, program designers, knowledge management personnel, personnel managers, psychologists, and learning science experts collaborating with each other, and specialists from other areas (such as simulation designers) in curriculum and program design, development, implementation, validation, and maintenance. The expertise and experience of military language education and training establishments throughout NATO and among its partners, as well as current research and development in the knowledge sciences, already complement language curriculum development in the CF; collaboration will increase as funding for large-scale projects shrinks. An environment and social structures for collaboration already exist, but they are under-utilized.

Assessment of linguistic proficiency today is conducted at several levels. Certification of OL proficiency is conducted by means of the Public Service Commission Second Language Evaluation tests delivered in person, by telephone, on-line, or on paper at designated test administration sites. In time, all these can be delivered on-line. Current research in the USA has validated on-line listening and speaking proficiency tests. The SOLET assessment team in St-Jean develops and delivers assessment instruments for performance checks (summative) and enabling checks (formative) for both the Canadian and International language programs. They also develop diagnostic tests to assist in course placement and verification of profiles. As these instruments move to on-line delivery, more effort can be devoted to the development of computer adaptive tests and the refinement of other tests to produce more accurate results. And just as program development teams will have the ability to tap a wider range of expertise, so will assessment development teams. This ability to ‘tap’ extended expertise in testing and program development has been one of the strengths of SOLET; Canada’s long-term engagement with the Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC), the NATO advisory body on language issues, has facilitated assessment and development expertise for over 40 years, and has done much to establish Canada as a world leader in language education and training.

For managers, ready access to online tools for learners to manage their own learning within the requirements of the CF will eliminate many of the roadblocks to language learning and assessment. Providers of opportunities for learning will be able to rely upon a learning environment that supports corporate requirements and individual interests.

The opening paragraphs herein provided a rather bleak picture of SOLET. But access to on-line support for self-directed learning is improving quickly, access to testing is becoming easier through policy change, and the professionalism of teaching and testing staff continues to grow. These are good starting points. SOLET has evolved slowly from a training activity to a learning strategy in order to meet increasing demands on CF members, and on the employment, training, and education systems that support them. Responding to greater demand with fewer resources is urgent, and it has begun. But it will take time. In the meanwhile, short-term changes to policy, to management structures, and to program design and delivery are needed. The longer-term strategy and goals are clearly articulated for IT&E in general, and the SOLET programs need to engage fully in IT&E Modernization in order to better serve the CF, and to meet legislated as well as employment requirements.

The need for change is urgent. Legislative requirements will not go away, and neither will operational and occupational requirements for bilingual personnel -- people who can work in both languages. Our current language education and training systems cannot support growing demand, and we cannot expect current levels of funding to continue. In the context of an employment system that requires mobility and responsiveness, the option of contracting all SOLET services is unrealistic and ultimately unworkable. Put simply, unless there is commitment to continuing to modernize SOLET, the CF requirement for bilingual personnel cannot be met.

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THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: ESTABLISHING A NATO GOVERNANCE SUPPORT TEAM

by Paul Cooper

Introduction

NATO has recognized that, for the foreseeable future, most conflicts will be of a counter-insurgency nature involving failing or failed states. As a result, NATO has understood that a 3D approach (Defence, Diplomacy and Development), otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Approach,” involving the engagement of more than just military capabilities, is required to deal successfully with these failed/failing state conflicts. Specifically, it has recognised that the primary concern in turning around a failed/failing state, or in establishing a post-conflict state, is to take a comprehensive approach in dealing with three sectors; Security, Development, and Governance.

Based upon the experience of individual member nations and NATO itself in both the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts, a great amount of expertise has been developed with respect to Security Sector reform. Additionally, premised upon national contributions via individual national militaries in establishing “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” (PRTs) a degree of expertise has been developed by NATO and its member nations in the realm of Development. But whereas NATO has been fully engaged in two out of the three sectors, its engagement in the Governance sector has been lacking. The main reason is that Governance has traditionally rested within the realm of national ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or the Development Agencies of the NATO member countries, as well as with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

However, there are periods of time within the spectrum of conflict when, based upon threat level and/or lack of readiness, these traditional players cannot deploy to engage the Governance sector until much later.
opportunity has passed. This issue is particularly important, since one could argue that pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict in a counter-insurgency type of operation quickly become blended, with no clear-cut delineation between phases. More importantly, a level of threat will exist for extended periods of time such that civilian-based Governance assistance is not able to be deployed. Yet, effort in all three sectors is vital at all times. In this regard, this short article proposes a specific approach to the Governance Sector that NATO may wish to consider; namely, the establishment of a NATO Governance Support Team (GST).

Historical Perspective: The Canadian Strategic Advisory Team (SAT)

Beginning in August 2005, at the request of the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, the Canadian government dispatched a 20-man Strategic Advisory Team to work for the Presidential Office. This team, consisting of military officers from a mix of army, navy, and air force backgrounds, deployed with a broad mandate to assist the President in establishing a nascent government, as well as assistance in implementing government services to the nation. At the time, President Karzai was struggling to establish a working government, supported, for the most part, by first-time elected members of his national parliament, the majority of whom had minimal if any previous experience in government, or, for that matter, with any other form of executive management. Exacerbating his initiative further was his reliance upon a Soviet-trained civil service bureaucracy accustomed to being paid very little, and producing even less.

Deployment of the Canadian SAT produced immediate results with respect to helping the Afghan government get started. Over the next three years, Canada provided three rotations of military-generated SATs, gradually refining its mandate into one of capacity development at the executive level throughout numerous ministries and government agencies. Eventually, after three years, the SAT was transformed into a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) - contracted initiative. This initial Canadian effort placed a dedicated team right at the centre of the Afghan government, dealing exclusively with ‘Governance’ at a time when threat levels prevented any other viable civilian based effort from addressing the ‘Governance’ sector. It is from the experiences of the Canadian SAT that the following deductions and observations are drawn with a view to recommending the best way ahead in establishing and operating a NATO Governance Support Team.

Why a NATO GST?

The sooner an effort is made in turning around, or establishing, government services, the sooner a general populace will throw its support behind the government, and withdraw itself from any insurgency. Therefore, the sooner governance development assistance can be rendered, the better. As previously mentioned, there are periods within a conflict where a military-generated GST, exclusively focused upon the Governance sector, would be a great advantage as the only viable capability deployed in the absence of any other Governance development effort. In this case, a NATO-generated GST, by its very nature, would be able to deploy into a theatre during periods when a given threat level may be unacceptable to other non-military actors. Additionally, military personnel are accustomed to living in austere environments that a civilian team may find far too disconcerting to enable a concentrated level of sustained effort. Not only would a NATO GST be able to deploy, it should be able to remain in support for a considerable time, whatever the local conditions.

One of the great mistakes made in the Afghanistan operation was an initial influx of “Fly-by MBAs [Masters of Business Administration].” These highly paid ‘governance’ mercenaries, hired by various well-intentioned third parties, “… arrived on a Monday, observed for a Tuesday, wrote a report on a Wednesday, presented it Thursday, and departed on Friday.” They were neither willing nor able to stay in Kabul for any great period of time. By no means did they gain the trust of the members of the government or the few functioning civil servants. In fact, quite the opposite occurred. They were, for the most part, treated politely while in country, but, once gone, their advice was usually ignored. Conversely, a NATO-generated team able to remain in place despite risky austere conditions would engender respect and
trust, thus enabling it to assist in Governance development and a resulting restoration of governmental services.

One of the great traits of NATO military culture is its training/mentoring orientation. This embedded trait is ideal for the task at hand; to train and/or mentor mid-to-high level bureaucrats to become effective managers. Military officers are always training their subordinate officers, both formally and informally. Thus they tend to be well-suited for this type of work.

A new government, supported by an atrophied bureaucracy, and faced with attempting to establish government services in the midst of a conflict or post-conflict environment, can view its national situation as overwhelmingly complex. A military Governance Support Team, drawn from well-trained and experienced staff officers, can apply either their own national processes, or a NATO planning process, to help render a complex situation comprehensible. More importantly, it can assist the host government in developing national strategic and operational level plans, which would also assist in the provision of government services.

**NATO GST Operating Principles**

The following are some operating principles that should be used to generate forces, and then to conduct, a NATO GST mission.

**Create trust.** This type of effort, although potentially having strategic ramifications is, by- and-large, conducted on an ‘individual-to-individual’ basis, i.e., a GST member assisting a host government member. It can only be successful if the target training audience believes that the GST truly has the trainee’s national and personal interests at heart, and this belief can only be established through trust. It is imperative that each GST member works towards gaining this trust, and, once gained, retains it.

**Arrive culturally aware.** Gaining the trust required to establish a personal relationship with the target training audience can be greatly assisted by arriving in-theatre culturally aware of host nation social practices. As first impressions tend to last, GST members commencing work with an understanding of the cultural nuances of day-to-day living with respect to the target trainees will expedite the process of gaining trust.

**Facilitate intra-governmental networking.** It is natural for most institutional members to become ‘bogged down’ by the day-to-day aspects of their own specific ministry. A synergistic effect can be created by combining the efforts of various ministries to attain a more comprehensive approach.

**The host nation agenda is paramount.** The GST must be fully committed to the national government agenda, whatever it may be, other than, obviously, anything unethical or illegal. The team cannot be seen to be undermining or co-opting any governmental initiative. The GST must endeavour to assist the government in determining its priorities, offer constructive suggestions towards attainment of those priorities, and then actively support the attainment of those priorities.

**Leave no fingerprints.** The GST must be selfless and virtually invisible in its efforts, and, at all times, must not seek any specific recognition. It is extremely important that, while developing the Governance capability of a host nation, the GST does not undermine the individual or collective credibility of the host nation’s government. In other words, all credit for successful governance must be retained by the host nation.

**Become completely a part of the office.** Embedding in the working offices of the government is essential, and by embedding, it is not sufficient to just co-locate. To gain clear insight into the daily routine of a host ministerial office, one must be completely embedded therein, in daily work routine, in dress, and with respect to the social aspects of the work environment. With regard to security measures, the principle of ‘blending in’ trump overt kinetic operating methods. Of note, this approach may well demand an acceptance of a higher level of risk from operational/tactical level NATO commanders.
A NATO GST, comprised of team members from various ministries, would be able to take a more strategic view to discern the possibilities of a combined ministry effort. Once ascertained, the GST can suggest, at the highest level possible within respective ministries, that undertaking a combined ministerial approach would be beneficial.

**Do not do their work for them.** The GST will be viewed by some members of the host government as a means to lessen their work load, if not to avoid it completely. On the other hand, it will be tempting to members of the GST to implement a governmental program themselves, as opposed to coaching a host bureaucrat into becoming capable of doing so himself. That said, on occasion, the urgency of an issue will warrant direct action by a GST member. The trick is to know when to do so, and when not to do so. Retaining ‘credibility’ within the office should be the guiding principle when making a decision to become directly engaged.

**Feed Success.** In all likelihood, the GST will be faced with a mentorship task of extreme magnitude. In keeping with the ‘No fingerprints’ principle, the GST, by necessity, will be small in size, so as to blend in with the government staff, but not to overwhelm it, and therefore, it will only be able to field a limited number of officers. Given this limitation, the GST cannot afford to waste effort. Ministries will vary in their acceptance of a NATO GST initiative. Invariably, some host bureaucrats will neither be willing nor capable of accepting GST assistance, either due to a personal perception of the GST member(s) as a threat, or as a result of intellectual incompetence. In either case, if, after various efforts of negotiation between the GST commander and the host ministry management, a given situation is unresolved, remove and deploy those GST member(s) affected to another ministry, preferably one that is progressing favourably, due to GST support.

**Engage all levels of Governance.** To the extent possible, given the personnel manning of the GST, this effort should be applied, not only at the ministerial office level, but also at the sub-ministerial level (i.e. provincial as well as district and city level). By engaging all levels of governance within a given ministry/government service sector, the GST can ensure that the success it may effect at any given level of government is not rendered ineffective by a lower or higher level of administration’s lack of capacity.

**Stay awhile.** Host nation bureaucrats will be aware that you are a foreigner with good intentions, but that you invariably are returning to your home country. When faced with this premise, if the bureaucrat believes that you are only on the ground for a brief period of time, unwilling to invest long-term in their efforts, he/she will be somewhat unwilling to accept the support of the GST. Therefore, it is extremely important at the outset to express the intention to remain with the ministry for an extensive period of time, or until the ministry feels that GST support is no longer required.

**Invariably, some host bureaucrats will neither be willing nor capable of accepting GST assistance, either due to a personal perception of the GST member(s) as a threat, or as a result of intellectual incompetence.”**

**But do not overstay your welcome.** This principle is not contrary to the previous one. If the GST is successful in implementing a minimum level of competency within a ministry, it needs to remove itself. There will be hesitancy on the part of a minister and/or senior staff to let the GST go, as, in most cases, these ministries will always be faced with a minimum of executive resources, and will view the departure of the GST as a loss. However, below the ministerial level, the GST will be resented if it continues to provide unnecessary mentorship. Even more so, it will be especially resented if it is unwilling to undertake non-mentorship tasks, while adhering to the ‘Do not do their work for them’ principle. However, the GST must be particularly careful not to pull out of a ministry before an acceptable level of competency is attained, and, more importantly, before it is likely to be sustained without the GST present.

**GST Composition**

The initial deployment rotation of a GST should be made up of a balance of both generalist (i.e. combat arms planners) and specialist officers (i.e., engineering, legal, logistic). Regardless of the actual corps/branches/elements of origin, the members of the team should have acquired practical experience by virtue of employment with their respective DND staffs. This is not the same as having served on a military command staff. The experience of employment on a defence department staff, engaged in a civil service-based governance process, will be the basis to enable the GST member to mentor the development of the host nation civil servant. The mission of a GST is to create competent civil servants and effective government processes. It is not deployed to create military staffs and processes. Subsequent GST rotations may also look to the selective employment of reservist officers, who may have an expertise that could be applied to a specific host nation ministry.

**Friction Point**

There is one major friction point with respect to the establishment and implementation of a NATO GST. Traditionally, the area of Governance sector development is conducted via ministries of foreign affairs, development agencies, or NGOs, and it is understood and accepted that it is appropriate that these ministries/agencies should be considered the first priority for the execution of a Governance development mission. However, whereas they should be considered the first priority to deploy, when they cannot, it does not preclude the quick dispatch of a NATO GST. In establishing this capability, NATO must gain support at the highest levels of its member nations that a military-generated GST will be supported, and, at the earliest opportunity, replaced by a civilian-based equivalent capability, either under NATO command, or on a national bilateral basis.
Recommendations

At the earliest opportunity, NATO should establish on a standby deployable basis, a NATO Governance Support Team. This team, once established, should only be deployed when deemed that the Governance sector of a NATO Comprehensive Approach-based campaign is not being addressed by non-military actors. It should conduct its operation in accordance with the specified principles listed earlier, and hand over its operations to non-military agents as soon as practicable, with minimal disruption to the mentorship mission at hand. In establishing this capability, NATO should request that the Canadian Government, on a ‘Lead Nation’ basis, and premised upon its very successful Strategic Advisory Team experience, undertake the initial force generation task, with a view to handing the initiative over to the NATO Allied Transformation Command/Joint Warfare Centre.

Conclusion

It is clear that the future of warfare will invariably call upon a Comprehensive Approach at some point during the phases of a given counter-insurgency operation. NATO has, through its recent operational experience, accepted this fact. And while NATO has, to a great extent, engaged itself in executing a Comprehensive Approach to Security and Development sectors at the strategic and tactical levels, it has experienced limited engagement in the Governance sector, since the development of this sector has traditionally been conducted by non-military actors. Unfortunately, due to high threat levels, the traditional civilian-based engagement in developing the Governance sector has been lacking, especially at the commencement of a NATO counter-insurgency campaign. The establishment of a NATO Governance Support Team able to deploy on demand will close this void in a Comprehensive Approach until such time as a civilian-based effort can deploy.

Major Paul Cooper completed the NATO Defence College course in July 2011, having served as a member of the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) in Afghanistan from August 2007 to August 2008. He is currently an analyst at NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre Headquarters in Stavanger, Norway.
On 3 June 2010, the Harper government - taking note of the need to renew Canada’s naval and coast guard fleets, and of the need to avoid the traditional ‘boom and bust’ approach to ship procurement - announced its National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS). The strategy was billed as a “historic and important shift in shipbuilding procurement, moving from a project-to-project basis to a long-term strategic approach. This approach will generate enhanced regional and industrial benefits and [engage] Canada’s world-class industrial skill-base.” The three elements of the NSPS included: “two packages of work valued at $33 billion in total to build large vessels, one for combat ships and the other [for] non-combat ships; small vessel construction valued at $2 billion for shipyards that are not selected for the large vessels; and…ongoing refit and repair work valued at $500 million annually which will be open to all shipyards through normal procurement processes.” Also departures from past Canadian experience were the measures taken to isolate the selection process from “personal favouritism and political influence,” to secure transparency, and to promote engagement with both industry and “independent third-party experts.” As a result of “extensive consultations with the shipyards,” the “proponents themselves helped shape the selection process by identifying and establishing the weighting of the selection criteria.” The process ultimately resulted in five proposals from three bidders (two combat, three non-combat).

Less than a year-and-a-half later, itself a noteworthy achievement, the NSPS Secretariat announced that Irving Shipbuilding Inc. had been selected to build the $28 billion combat vessel work package (i.e., six-to-eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships [AOPS] and 15 Canadian Surface Combatants [CSC] for the navy), while Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. had been selected to build the $5 billion non-combat vessel work package (i.e., two-to-three Joint Support Ships [JSS] for the navy, and one polar icebreaker, one offshore oceanographic science vessel, and three offshore fisheries science vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard). Davie Canada Inc., in one corporate form or another the builder of a sig-
COMMENTARY

by Martin Shadwick

A significant percentage of Canada’s present and past naval and coast guard vessels, was unsuccessful in its bid for the non-combat work package, but will be eligible to compete for other elements of the NSPS.

Prime Minister Harper announced on 12 January 2012 that agreements in principle, designed to lead to the finalization of the strategic sourcing arrangements (i.e., the umbrella agreements) had been reached with Irving Shipbuilding and Vancouver Shipyards. The umbrella agreements will define the relationships between the Government of Canada and the selected shipbuilders, and will “set the parameters under which the government will negotiate fair and reasonable individual contracts” with the shipyards. Following the finalization of the umbrella agreements, “negotiations will begin for the first project in each work package” (i.e., the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships in the combat package, and the Canadian Coast Guard’s offshore science vessels in the non-combat package).

The Harper government’s handling of the massive shipbuilding program, for the most part, drew rave reviews from a broad spectrum of observers. For example, Jeffrey Simpson noted in the Globe and Mail of 26 October 2011 that the Harper government had broken with Canadian shipbuilding tradition -“50 per cent engineering, 50 percent politics” - in “exemplary fashion.” The government “remained true to its word. It made the overarching political decision to re-stock the navy and coast guard. It defined the ships it wanted, and the money it would pay. It asked a group of civil servants to assess the shipyards interested in bidding. It hired an international firm to cross-check their work. It published the results, and lived by them, whatever the political consequences.” The approach “produced a rational, fact-based decision, bullet-proofed the government from any charge of political interference, and gives Canada a chance to build a more streamlined and efficient industry.”

It is indeed difficult to challenge either the shipyard rankings determined by the NSPS Secretariat, or the government’s basic approach to the traditionally messy and politicized shipbuilding puzzle. Given the current state of the three bidders - it terms of corporate structure, financial stability, work force, physical plant, and countless other metrics - it is impossible to envisage any other result. The government’s approach to maritime procurement was sensible and pragmatic on multiple levels, and it could prove most useful in future procurements.

Not coincidentally, it also spared the Harper government a dangerous replay, on an even broader scale, of the infamous CF-18 maintenance contract that so damaged the Mulroney government in the 1980s. On a broader level, the government’s decision to initiate a holistic, long-term, and thoroughgoing maritime modernization program involving both the RCN and the Canadian Coast Guard may well, at long-last, break the wasteful and inefficient ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has long plagued the shipyards, their employees, and other relevant components of the Canadian defence industrial base, and condemned both the RCN and the Canadian Coast Guard to horrific cases of preordained block obsolescence.

That said, and not withstanding a most promising start, challenges and potential challenges abound. The rebuilding of the navy and the coast guard will require sustained and predictable funding over a protracted period of time - challenge enough in the current tough economic environment, but even less certain-looking out several decades and several governments. A changing geo-strategic environment will, over time, undoubtedly necessitate changes and alterations in the projected fleet mix and/or in the capabilities of specific ships, and the NSPS - and its stakeholders - must be sufficiently flexible to cope. In both the short and longer terms, government-industry consultation - so vital in the formative phases of the NSPS process - must continue at a meaningful and appropriate level. Indeed, all parties must be alert to the dangers of slipping back, incrementally or otherwise, into the old ways of maritime procurement in Canada.

Tough decisions loom. How many Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and Joint Support Ships will actually be built? What is the status of vessel types, both naval and coast guard, not currently identified as part of the NSPS? How much will Canadian industry be involved in the design of the currently projected
vessels (the CSC looms particularly large in this regard)? How much Canadian systems integration capability will be appropriate or necessary? Are adequate government and industry arrangements in place for workforce expansion and professional development? How does the NSPS dovetail with a broader Canadian defence industrial strategy? In the absence of the long-dead naval drawing office, can Ottawa adequately vet industry offerings? Initial priority at Vancouver Shipyards will go to the research ships, but how will Joint Support Ship and polar icebreaker construction be prioritized? NSPS announcements to date have generated very little public, media or political pushback, but is there a danger that future public support and understanding for maritime modernization will be taken for granted?

For the RCN, the first type out of the NSPS priority box - no doubt to the chagrin of some less-than-enthusiastic naval personnel - will be the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship. Although few tears were shed when the Conservatives jettisoned their original plan for a trio of “armed naval heavy icebreakers,” the AOPS has taken a verbal pounding from those who see it as a flawed hybrid with a compromise hull form that will be less than ideal for operations in the Arctic, the Atlantic, or the Pacific. Its endurance, speed, sensor suite, and armament have drawn particular criticism. At this point, however, the Conservatives have too much political capital tied up in their northern strategy (and NSPS?) to abandon the AOPS in favour of some other option, so the only realistic hope might be to address such issues as endurance on a priority basis, and to leave as much provision as possible for future additions (i.e., an enhanced sensor suite) via the ‘fitted for but not with’ approach. The AOPS is indeed a hybrid, invariably triggering compromises, but at least the RCN of the future will possess some northern capability.

The Joint Support Ship, meanwhile, now has a projected builder - Vancouver Shipyards - but not, at the time of writing, an agreed design. After the JSS was ‘de-scoped’ in 2008, becoming, in effect, an AOR+, Ottawa indicated a willingness to examine both new (i.e., in-house) and existing (i.e., foreign) designs. An October 2010 Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN) signalled Ottawa’s intention to award contracts to ThyssenKrupp and Navantia to determine if, and how, their existing Berlin- and Cantabria-Class vessels could be adapted to Canadian needs. This process has not gone well, and published reports suggest that Navantia, at least, has withdrawn. That would appear to leave only a Canadianized Berlin-Class, and an in-house design from BMT. The optional third ship remains decidedly problematic - Canadian options on military hardware always are - but there can be no doubt of the urgent need to replace the two existing AORs.

The decision to re-cast the JSS as a much more modest - but still far from inexpensive - “AOR+” would have been less noteworthy had Canada pursued some parallel option for sealift, in-theatre support to joint forces ashore, disaster relief, and related tasks (i.e., something along the lines of the notional “big honking ship” mooted by then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier). Speculation about such a ship quickly fuelled a cottage industry as pundits and bloggers eagerly championed both through-deck amphibious assault ships (i.e., the French Mistral-Class and Spain’s Juan Carlos I-Class) and more conventional LPD (Landing Platform Dock) amphibious ships (i.e., the USN’s San Antonio-Class, and the Dutch/Spanish Rotterdam-and Galicia-Classes), thereby reanimating a debate that had surfaced some years earlier with proposals, from various sources, for various mixes of through-deck assault ships and AORs, or AORs and more modest amphibious ships. Indeed, it is interesting to recall that the Conservative defence plank during the 2004 election cam-
The “big honking ship” did not surface in the naval shopping list provided by the Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008 - in fairness to the Conservatives, the three Joint Support Ships then envisaged offered more multi-role capability than the ‘de-scoped’ JSS/AOR+ of 2010 - or in the NSPS. Canada did take at least a quick look at the second-hand acquisition of the almost-new Royal Fleet Auxiliary Largs Bay - indeed, there were reports of interest in some very high Canadian military circles - but the vessel, made redundant by the British Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010, was sold to Australia for A$100 million in early-2011. One can, admittedly, argue that Canada does not require an amphibious capability, that administrative sealift requirements can be met by chartering civilian vessels (as in the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan), and that in an era of intense austerity, any quest for amphibious and support capability would divert scarce procurement and operating dollars from more important requirements (notably the JSS/AOR+ and the Canadian Surface Combatant), but is it prudent to eschew even a modest supplement to the JSS/AOR+? This is not to suggest a return to the early JSS configuration, or a Canadian copy of Australia’s ambitious blueprint (two Canberra-Class LHDs, variants of the Juan Carlos I-Class, are currently under construction), but it is to point out that sealift, support to joint forces ashore, and related (i.e., disaster relief) capabilities are relevant to a broad range of military, quasi-military, and non-military contingencies, both at home and abroad, that the post-Cold War and post-9/11 geo-strategic environment remains challenging and unpredictable, and that there has been a post-Cold War and post-9/11 trend, apparent in navies of all sizes, to acquire or bolster sealift and support capacity. We will undoubtedly come to regret the absence of a Largs Bay, or something at least partially comparable, in the years ahead.

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suspect that many historians will make their judgment on the book from the cover alone. As one can determine from Dr. Sean Maloney's remarks in his acknowledgement, he has a polarizing effect upon many. You either like his work, or you do not. Having said that, I believe his title is appropriate. Many historians would consider Sean's work roguish, if for no other reason than his approach. He has written a history of the early phase of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan, namely Spring/Summer 2006, from a very personal perspective. The book is, in essence, a literary reality show starring Sean Maloney. It is a snapshot of his personal time, travels, and experience in-theatre. His history of events, their genesis and execution, are all based upon his observations, investigative questioning, and assessments. He admits as much.

Puritans and traditionalists will undoubtedly cringe. There are virtually no endnotes or sources. The few that are provided reference only his own previous work. In the end, you are left with two simple choices - you either accept what he says and his assessment at face value, or you do not. Adding to the potential discomfort of some historians is the fact that the narrative text is gritty, very personal, and replete with expletives.

Having said all of that - I liked it. The account of CTF Aegis and TF Orion is fast-paced and detailed. Importantly, it provides insight into the decision making, complexities, and challenges with which leaders at the company to task force level had to wrestle. Where Christie Blanchford’s renowned work, Fifteen Days, tells the tale of the Spring/Summer battles through an intimate detailed account of events from the perspective of a number of soldiers who fought in those climatic engagements, Sean’s account helps explain how and why our soldiers engaged in those deadly combats.

The book is raw in its narrative delivery. However, it captures the complexity and terror of war and conflict better than sterile accounts based upon memorandums and reports, where the smells of cordite, fear, sweat, and death are not at all present. His reflection upon those who deal with the dead and wounded brings to the fore the true cost of conflict, and the price still being paid by survivors. In all, the book is very real, and he captures many of the underlying issues of the conflict well. He very ably provides a riveting account that describes the scope of the fighting in southern Afghanistan from an insider perspective close to decision making at various levels during the time period. Maloney also commendably explains the complexity and difficulty of balancing security and development, as well as the challenges of operating in an ambiguous, alien, and harsh environment while attempting to conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.

To support the text, the book also provides 15 black-and-white photos that capture key personalities, as well as some of the equipment used by Canadians, and the terrain with which they had to contend. More importantly, the volume contains seven detailed maps that allow the reader to understand and follow the operations and battles described. The book also includes three graphics that help explain COIN theory.

Undisputedly, Dr. Maloney is one of the most experienced and knowledgeable historians with regard to Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. He is the Canadian Army’s designated historian, and is currently writing the history of the Canadian Army in Afghanistan. He has spent many months in theatre with virtually all the Canadian battle groups that rotated through Kandahar. He is well-connected and knowledgeable on the subject, and, as such, he brings insight not available elsewhere. Maloney helps fill in gaps that are not readily available in archival files. Nonetheless, the most significant criticism I have with the book is that Sean makes no effort to provide substantiation of his conclusions or assessments. The complete lack of any sources or justification for conclusions leaves the reader, as noted earlier, in a tough bind. It almost comes across as an arrogant, ‘… take my assessment at face value or too bad for you, I don’t have to explain myself.’ In the end, it detracts from the work, as the reader is left wondering what really happened in a given circumstance on occasion. For instance, he refers on numerous occasions to the “assassination” of Canadian diplomat Glynn Berry. However, an exhaustive Board of Inquiry that investigated the incident, and all those involved for months, determined categorically that this was a case of ‘being in the wrong place at the wrong time.’ Sean’s choice of stressing the “assassination” conspiracy theory without providing any context or substantiation, or at least making known why this was done in light of official findings contrary to his viewpoint, is unfortunate.
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Overall, I found the book interesting and provocative. The writing is crisp and moves quickly. I strongly recommend the book to military historians, military practitioners, and the general public alike. In the end, it provides an excellent snapshot of COIN in the Afghan theatre of operation during Spring/Summer 2006.

**The Information Front: The Canadian Army and News Management during the Second World War**
*by Timothy Balzer*

**Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010.**
255 pages, $85 (HC), $32.95 (PB).
ISBN 9780774818995 (HC)
ISBN 9780774819008 (PB)

**Reviewed by J.L. Granatstein**

"War has always been news," writes Timothy Balzer in the first line of his book, and management and control of the war news has always been of prime importance to politicians and generals. Balzer’s book, *The Information Front: The Canadian Army and News Management during the Second World War,* is a well-researched and well-thought out study of how the Army’s public relations apparatus functioned during the greatest war in Canadian history.

The product of both a master’s and a doctoral theses, Balzer’s book details the development and operations of the Army PR apparatus, from nothing at the beginning of the war in 1939 to a large, smoothly-functioning organization by the time First Canadian Army was in the field in 1944-1945. There are some interesting characters on his pages, not least Colonel R.S. Malone, who eventually led the Army’s PR efforts, and whose 1946 book, *Missing from the Record,* omitted much and embellished the rest. What is most interesting in Balzer’s account, however, are his case studies of Dieppe, Sicily, and three Normandy incidents.

The Dieppe study, the only one to be examined here, is explosive. The raid on Dieppe was a disaster, a completely bungled operation that saw Canadian troops thrown away in wholesale. There were British commandos involved, as well as fifty American Rangers, but it was a Canadian operation, launched under the auspices of Combined Operations Headquarters, and led by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Mountbatten was about as well-connected as any serving officer could be, his royal relatives and political friends everywhere. He was also acutely aware of the value (to him) of good public relations, and his headquarters planned and plotted carefully before every operation, not least a big operation such as Dieppe.

Mountbatten’s aim was to ensure that Dieppe was seen as a success, whatever the operational outcome. Success would equal success, but so would failure; it was all a matter of presentation. While there was, in fact, a PR plan prepared for a failure, it was set aside and the plan for success was used instead. There were great and important lessons learned, the media was told, and important objectives were achieved. Yes, casualties were suffered, but the results more than justified them. And for years afterwards, Mountbatten repeated the same line, arguing that the lessons of Dieppe paved the way to the genuine success of D-Day. General Harry Crerar, who had pushed the Canadians into the Dieppe raid, argued the same, and countless historical accounts have repeated this dubious claim. The need to justify slaughter, the requirement that senior commanders be viewed as wise and deserving of their promotions and their glory, all combined to put lipstick on the pig of disaster.

Even from the Canadian Army’s PR point of view, Dieppe was spoiled by the great media coverage the tiny American contribution received. His eye on bigger prizes, Mountbatten understood that U.S. publicity was worth much more than Canadian, and there were more American PR staff attached to his headquarters for the Dieppe operation than Canadian. As it was, once the casualty lists became public—one newspaper was forced to publish the hugely long list over three days—the raid achieved its Canadian notoriety,
and Dieppe remains the most contentious Canadian operation of the war.

But happily for him, Mountbatten was spared blame, or, at least, spared enough that his career progression was not interrupted. To ensure that posterity treated him well, he pressed a compliant Winston Churchill to adjust drafts of his memoirs to ensure nothing too critical was said by the great war leader. A full account of this historical re-jigging can be found in David Reynolds’ wonderful book, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (2004), a volume that unfortunately did not make its way into Balzer’s bibliography. In truth, Canada ought not to have expected anything more than it received. In a Grand Alliance, the smaller powers were expected to know their place and keep (relatively) silent.

Balzer’s is a most interesting book, a fine academic study that deserves a wide readership. It is the 21st volume in the Canadian War Museum’s excellent series, *Studies in Canadian Military History*.

Jack Granatstein, OC, PhD, one of Canada’s most renowned historians, is the author of Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (2nd Edition, 2011).

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**Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921**

by James Wood


$90.00 (HC), $32.95 (PB)

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Reviewed by Matthew Trudgen

There have been a number of works that have addressed the development of the Canadian Militia and the Permanent Force in the period from Confederation to the First World War. However, these books have generally focused upon the Canadian professional officer corps, as well as the British officers sent to Canada to serve as commanders of the Canadian Militia. The result has been that many aspects of this experience, including Canadian ideas of what constituted a citizen soldier, have generally been neglected. This lack of scholarship fortunately has been addressed by James Wood in his new book *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921*. Wood, the author of *We Move Only Forward: Canada, the United States and the First Special Service Force, 1942-44*, examines Canadian popular conceptions of the citizen soldier to understand their role as “… an ideal and symbol by which Canadians ordered their understanding of armed conflict and their notions of a citizen duty to serve.” Wood focuses this study on the beliefs of Canadian militiamen and military enthusiasts in order to understand how they attempted to improve Canada’s defences as well as to create the “societal conditions in which a citizen army could flourish.”

Through an examination of publications, such as the Canadian Military Gazette, he concludes that these individuals had a “… surprising degree of sophistication that attended their thinking on the role and function of the citizen soldier.” For example, he argues that most militiamen of the period did not buy into the myth that Canadians were natural soldiers. They may have disagreed with the officers from the British Army and the Permanent Force on how much and what kind of training was required. Indeed, they generally disliked the emphasis that most British and Canadian professional soldiers placed on drill, but they did recognize that the Canadian citizen soldier needed to be prepared for battle. Ironically enough, the focus of these militiamen on practical training had to contend with the reality that, on parade, the militia was expected by most Canadians to be well drilled and to look like British regulars.

As part of this discussion, Wood examines the various debates throughout this period with respect to how to reform the militia. In particular, he focuses upon the influence of various factors such as the use of Switzerland as a model, and developments in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. He details the beliefs of Sir Frederick Borden, who was Laurier’s Minister of Militia, and Borden’s Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes. In addition, he connects the issue of military training with the social reform movement of the period and how programs such as cadet training in Canadian schools were justified by the need to improve the health and fitness of the nation’s youth.

He also describes the impact of various “war scares,” including the one in 1896 over the Venezuela-British Guiana border dispute. He added that, for most of this period, Canadian militiamen, despite the claims of some historians such as C.P. Stacey, were focused upon the defence of Canada from the United States. These individuals even used
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various historical examples ranging from the Ancient Greeks against the Persians, to the Boers against the British in order to bolster their case.

Wood concludes his work by arguing that the First World War changed this situation dramatically with the result that the untrained civilian volunteer replaced the militiaman as the archetype of the Canadian citizen soldier. He asserts that “… for better or for worse, it was his sacrifices that had won the war and, consequently, his example that became the model by which a citizen’s obligation to serve would be understood in the 1920s and 1930s.” It would be “… his example and sacrifices that became the standard by which Canadian citizen soldiers would again be judged in the Second World War.”

Militia Myths is a well-researched work that offers a convincing argument about Canadian ideas of the citizen soldier. One part I particularly enjoyed was his point that many people in Canada concluded that all what was needed throughout this period to defend the country were lots of good Canadian lads who were trained to shoot rifles. This example illustrates that flawed Canadian thinking with respect to defence issues is nothing new. The book does have some weaknesses, namely that Wood, at times, presents many facts and figures, as well as opinions of various personalities from this period, but does not subject these details to sufficient analysis. One example was that he notes that the rural press often opposed initiatives aimed at increasing Canadian defence preparedness, but does not provide reasons for this reality. Nonetheless, this is a very good study of the development of the Canadian citizen soldier between 1896 and 1921 that makes a significant contribution to the scholarly literature in the field of Canadian military history.


NOTES
2. James Wood teaches history of the University of Victoria. He is also the author of Army of the

Between Peace and War: British Defence and the Royal United Services Institute, 1831–2010
by Damian P. O’Connor
London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2011
333 pages, £19.50
ISBN: 0-85516-173-6
Reviewed by Gabriel Sauvé

After writing his thesis on imperial defence in the second half of the 19th Century, Damian O’Connor is now examining an institution that was highly influential in the debate on that issue. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), through its conferences and the prestigious RUSI Journal, provides an ideal forum for debates affecting all aspects of the military world. Access to the institute’s archives has enabled O’Connor to convincingly establish a link between RUSI’s history and intellectual output, and the overarching political and military history of the past two centuries. The author also shows the influence and relevance of the institute, from its founding to the present day. O’Connor has taken the story of RUSI’s institutional, financial, and realty-related ‘ups and downs,’ and painted a vivid and captivating picture of the organization’s existence over many years. The reader comes to see RUSI as an abiding and vital organization with an unwavering objective: to show that defence must be taken very seriously. In this account, O’Connor argues that complacency among politicians, idealist illusions, and paltry funding are the most powerful and enduring enemies to security in Great Britain.

RUSI was founded in 1831 by the victor of the Battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington, to help officers avoid idleness and to encourage them to take an interest in their profession. Those objectives were attained in part because the institute earned the reputation of being the only place where a young officer could question a superior. RUSI quickly became a point of contact for military personnel, scientists, and politicians. O’Connor notes that the ability to foster exchanges, while also giving direction to those exchanges, is precisely how the institute has always made its influence felt. RUSI members also discovered that public opinion can be used to influence decisions. In a rather original venture, staff members of the institute, in addition to expressing themselves publicly in the newspapers and in Parliament, more-or-less overtly backed the publication of fictional works. Those works, written by informed and credible authors, were intended to raise awareness among the public, politicians, and civil servants by exposing the real threats to the nation—threats for which the armed forces were not adequately funded, equipped, or prepared. The Battle of Dorking (1871) and Third World War: August 1985 (1978) are examples of this unusual literary genre.

For O’Connor, the fight for adequate funding for the armed forces is what best defines the institute’s mission over its 180 years of existence. The British/liberal tendency to want to enjoy the fruits of peace, coupled with a false sense of security tied to the insular nature of the country, are
what have regularly kept military budgets below minimum levels. O’Connor shows that RUSI, far from seeking ever-increasing sums of money, has consistently focused upon analyzing whether the means are sufficient for the ends. Consequently, the utter inadequacy of Great Britain’s military resources in relation to the political objectives set by its leaders, and the role that Britain has wished to play in the world, has been denounced by RUSI for the better part of the past two centuries. The institute has been as realistic as possible in its analysis of the use of the British armed forces, taking into account the decline of the British Empire and decolonization.

The institute, ever pragmatic in its military thinking, is also depicted by O’Connor as being unswayed by ideologies. Imperialism as the be-all and end-all, and the praetorianism of the 19th Century found no more apologists within the institute than did fascism, communism, or the idealism surrounding the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s; the organization’s sole objective has always been to ensure the defence of Great Britain and its democratic values. Despite the defensive stance, reflecting upon the use of weapons in a liberal regime, from the era of Open Diplomacy to the present, requires that we, with our fallible collective memories, be constantly reminded of the armed forces’ essential role as bastion of democracy. O’Connor makes good on that requirement by quoting—more than once—Colonel John Ward from 1921: “We shall never be such a society of Angels that we can do without the hangman and the prison... because there are always a certain number of lunatics who think they are sane.” This assertion was certainly not disproven by the Second World War, and is just as relevant as ever today. For RUSI, in contrast to the spirit of the times, the motto has been—and shall remain—*si vis pacem, para bellum*.

It is abundantly clear that this book, published by RUSI, was written by an ardent supporter of the institute. O’Connor’s admiration for those who have poured their energies into the institute, and his tendency to emphasize RUSI’s successes while citing external factors to explain away each of its shortcomings can sometimes be grating. For example, on the topic of the institute’s inability to develop a doctrine for mechanized warfare in the 1920s and 1930s, O’Connor places the blame upon the poor quality of the armoured vehicles available in England and the underfunding of research. That does not come anywhere near to explaining the lack of a doctrine that could very well have compensated in part for those deficiencies.

All-in-all, *Between Peace and War: British Defence and the Royal United Services Institute, 1831–2010* showcases the exceptional RUSI Journal, and is essential reading for any researcher who wishes to seriously study British or Western military thought of the past two centuries. More generally, O’Connor’s work demonstrates the importance of independent research on security issues, and it provides a better understanding of the influence of a ‘think tank’ of this scope.

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**A Matter of Honour: The Life, Campaigns and Generalship of Isaac Brock**
by Jonathan Riley.
336 + xiv pages. $27.95 (paper).

**The Astonishing General: The Life and Legacy of Sir Isaac Brock**
by Wesley B. Turner.
369 pages. $35.00 (cloth)

Reviewed by John R. Grodzinski

Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, who was killed early in the War of 1812, is regarded by Canadians as the “Saviour of Upper Canada.” Interest in the life of Brock is so powerful that two new biographies have been published this year. With the bicentennial of the War of 1812 now upon us, interest in this popular figure is bound to increase.

In 1812, Brock was head of the provincial government and commander in Upper Canada; he was a relatively inexperienced officer, who, during the previous decade, held various posts in the Canadas. While his military service was lengthy, his operational experience was not-Brock’s last action had occurred in 1799. Nonetheless, Brock is credited with saving Upper Canada in 1812. Indeed, the hagiography (an idealized biography) that is so evident in many works about Brock is both pervasive, and, in some ways, perverse. The cult associated with his legacy is so strong, that when I dared present a
different perspective in which Brock vacillated over some decisions, was credited with victories not his own, and that the Americans were incapable of conquering Canada in 1812, the Parks Canada employee I was speaking with at the Brock Memorial on Queenston Heights asked me to leave the grounds.

The publication of these biographies provides an opportunity to re-assess Brock’s leadership and his legacy. The authors of these works are no strangers to the War of 1812 or the Napoleonic War, and they present their subject differently. For Jonathan Riley, an accomplished soldier, leadership and command form the heart of his work, while academic historian Wesley Turner has written a biography that seeks to understand Brock and to explain why he remains such a popular figure. Complicating the task for both authors is Brock’s unique position as the sole British general to meet the figure. And, while, as one of the authors reveals, four other British generals fell in combat during 1812, they fell in Spain, a theatre where conditions were distinctly different from those in Canada.

Wesley Turner subscribes to the heroic view of Brock. Turner is a professional historian, and he conducted his studies at the University of Toronto and Duke University. Until his recent retirement, he spent 31 years teaching history in high schools and at Brock University. His previous writings on the War of 1812 include The War of 1812: The War That Both Sides Won (2000), and British Generals of the War of 1812 (1999 and 2011).

To Turner, Brock was the most unlikely of heroes; his high birth and unimpressive combat record in Upper Canada – amounting to two battles – does not have the makings of a glorious figure. It was following his death that Brock’s glorification came to life, and memories of his character and personal bravery transformed his setback at Queenston Heights into a victory, and transformed him into a Canadian hero. He suggests that Brock (aided by others) prevented the American conquest of Canada in 1812. Had Brock not taken Detroit, Brigadier-General William Hull would have marched into Upper Canada, outflanking Fort Mackinac in the north, and the Niagara Peninsula in the south. Another American army would have crossed the Niagara River and advanced towards Burlington Bay, leaving all of Upper Canada west of Kingston in American hands. How the Americans would have achieved this, especially since their logistical capability was almost non-existent, and their lack of command of the lakes is never considered. Hull was defeated by his lack of will, and he returned to the United States on his own. American forces collecting in the Niagara region and near the border of Lower Canada were in disarray. What Turner proposes was simply impossible.

In my view, a much better perspective on these events is provided by historian Jonathan Reilly. As War of 1812 historian Donald E. Graves, notes in his foreword, A Matter of Honour is “… a study of a good soldier by another good soldier.” Riley’s experience in the interplay between regular troops and indigenous tribal fighters, and his academic training, provides him with a unique perspective towards his topic. Lieutenant-General Jonathan Riley, CB, DSO, PhD, is currently the Master of the Armouries, responsible for the Royal Armouries collection of arms, armour, and artillery held in the Tower of London. During an impressive career in the British Army that spanned nearly 40 years, Riley held battalion and brigade commands in the Balkans, division-level command in Iraq, and, latterly, as Deputy Commander of NATO ISAF in Afghanistan. He also completed a doctorate in history, and has written 12 books on military subjects, including Napoleon and the World War, 1813 (1999 and 2007) and Napoleon as a General: Command from the Battlefield to Grand Strategy (2007).

In this, his latest book, Riley contends that Brock was guided by the moral compass of the era, and that honour, bravery, and loyalty, tinged by an impulsive nature, were his key character traits. These attributes are evident in the examination of Brock’s tenure as acting Commander-in-Chief of British North America between 1805 and 1807, and his later appointment as administrator and commander in Upper Canada. Here we see Brock dealing with, on one hand, “… the timeless struggle between the primacy of civil authority and the requirements of sound military preparations;” while on the other, achieving a “decisive effect” in establishing aboriginal engagement with Britain before hostilities commenced, and prior to his meeting with the influential war leader, Tecumseh.

Brock differed with his superior, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, the Commander-in-Chief of British North America, over pre-war plans for the defence of the Canadas. Prevost’s concept
relied upon an operational defensive with tactical offensives as necessary, and this was not to Brock’s liking. Brock, like many officers serving in near-isolation, may have felt local conditions were being misread, and he thus pursued matters on his own, including engaging in an alliance with the western natives, and advocating the expansion of Crown authority into American territory, which “… [committed] Britain to a strategy no one was calling for either in London or in North America.” As inept generalship and poor preparation on the part of the Americans allowed Brock to get away with this potentially-dangerous course of action, a factor that is often overlooked by historians, Riley wonders how Brock, if he had survived, would have fared against a revived American army and an expanding American navy in 1813 or 1814.

Turner provides no adequate answer for his question regarding Brock’s legacy: why has so much attention been given to a general officer who died in the early months of a conflict that lasted over three years? He refers to accounts by contemporaries of the irreparable loss to the British war effort following Brock’s death, newspaper articles that, in the post-war years, presented him as a hero, as well as the popular songs that praised Brock’s bravery. Little mention is made of the historiography of the War of 1812, and how, over the course of time, certain figures were written out of the history, while others were praised. The motives for erecting the first monument to Brock in 1827 are not explained, nor are the reasons for the construction of the second, larger monument. Many questions remained unanswered, while the military analysis is untenable.

*The Astonishing General* is a fair biography of Major-General Isaac Brock, yet it has many shortfalls, whereas there is little to quibble about in *A Matter of Honour*. Riley has presented a fresh examination of a compelling figure from the War of 1812. It is an even-handed biography that navigates clear of that mythology and hagiography that has so plagued the historiography of Sir Isaac Brock. By doing so, Riley offers a new perspective of Brock’s generalship during the War of 1812.

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**Kiss the kids for dad, don’t forget to write. The Wartime Letters of George Timmins, 1916-18**

*by Y.A. Bennett, (ed.)*

*Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009.*

224 pages,

$85.00, Hardcover

ISBN: 9780774816083

$32.95, Paperback

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**Reviewed by Craig Leslie Mantle**

Quite often, ‘edited’ collections of letters dating from the First World War simply reproduce the original documents as they were written. Offering little more than a few grammatical corrections, and perhaps a brief biographical sketch of the soldier-author, some ‘editors’ seem content to let the letters speak for themselves, and to allow readers to both form their own opinions concerning their content, and to draw their own conclusions regarding their importance as literary and historical artefacts. While such an approach has definite merit – making contemporary accounts accessible, regardless of the amount of editorial paraphernalia, is arguably what matters the most – reading collections of this sort can, at times, be a decidedly unfulfilling experience owing to the lack of contextual information and additional detail concerning various subjects upon which the author offers comment. *Kiss the kids for dad, don’t forget to write* is certainly not of this mould.

George Timmins, the soldier whose letters have been reproduced in this collection, originally enlisted in the 116th Battalion (from Uxbridge, Ontario) in March 1916 and was subsequently transferred by the following October to the 18th Battalion (from London, Ontario), where he served for the remainder of the war. Promoted to lance-corporal shortly after Vimy, he was also present at Passchendaele and was subsequently wounded at Amiens. Deeply personal and touching, Timmins’s letters reveal that he, like so many others, was fighting two separate wars: one to help realize victory on the Western Front, and the other to remain a relevant part of the family that he left behind in Canada. His correspondence with his wife, May, and on occasion, his eldest daughter, Winnifred Mary, or simply Winnie, reveal a man torn between the duties of a soldier and the responsibilities of a husband and father. The stress and anxiety occasioned by his dual commitments to both army and family become all the more evident as the months pass and his missives home increase in number.

Although written during the war, Timmins’s letters are more ‘social’ than ‘military’ in both character and orientation. Believing at times that he might bore and disinterest his wife with his recollections of purely military matters, he tended to comment on different domestic concerns, such as his daughter’s gradual movement into womanhood, the amount of work that his wife undertook and its implications for her health, the precarious family budget, and the pressing need for his children to perform more household chores. His correspondence is not by any means devoid of ‘things military’ – the military historian can still utilize this collection with profit – but the emphasis tends to fall slightly upon ‘things non-military.’ To be sure, he mentions the importance of mail and the influence of the all-seeing censor, his increasing war weariness, conscription, and his commitment to seeing the war through to its successful conclusion despite being critical of the army, its administration, and some of its lead-
ers. The stressing of domestic over military matters is by no means unique, however. Within the larger Canadian historiography of the First World War, other edited collections have a similar feel, such as that by John Macfie that reproduces the correspondence of three brothers, all of whom served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and attempted to manage their personal interests from afar and by proxy.1

George Timmins’s letters are important “... because they draw us into the everyday life and relationships, at home and abroad, of a married Canadian infantryman.” Being infused with pathos and the harsh pain of separation, his comments to his wife and children (and sometimes his gentle advice to both) also offer a window into the internal dynamics and coping mechanisms of a Canadian family disrupted by war. Not only were Timmins’s children forced to mature more quickly in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the home, but the responsibility for decision-making and the household itself, including finances, was shifted largely, if not entirely, to his wife. That his letters offer broad comment on the impact of the First World War on both Canadian and British society, especially individual families, also makes Kiss the kids for dad a useful resource for the study of the home front during the 1914-1918 period.

The editor, Yvonne Aleksandra Bennett, an associate professor at Ottawa’s Carleton University, whose earlier publications include work on British pacifist Vera Brittain,2 has produced an exceptionally insightful and comprehensive volume. George Timmins was a prolific writer, and it appears that only a portion of his wartime correspondence has survived. What remains, however, is by no means inconsiderable: some 67 letters, four of which were written to family members in the 1960s and 1970s, and four letter fragments, are presented in Bennett’s volume. The collection begins with an introductory essay that ably sets the stage for what follows: not only does it relate pertinent biographical information about the Timmins family, but it also demonstrates how George Timmins’s perception of the war, and what he thought pertinent to record, was influenced by the different communities of interest with which he was connected, namely his family, his home town (Oshawa, Ontario), the men in the trenches, and the civilians behind the lines.

Of perhaps greatest significance, Bennett has pursued nearly every ‘lead’ within each letter, offering additional information on other individuals and issues that Timmins saw fit to mention. The result of such investigations is a thorough section of notes that rivals the text of the letters in terms of actual length. Bennett has been careful to cite many of the major academic works within the field, as well as archival material taken from repositories in both Canada and the United Kingdom, all of which lends authority and credibility to her notes when considered together. A comprehensive bibliography, coupled with a complete index, make Kiss the kids for dad so much more than other examples of its genre. Substantial energy and effort were obviously expended in readying these letters for publication.

Without doubt, Kiss the kids for dad is a superbly-edited volume that offers insight into the multifarious challenges faced by a Canadian soldier at the front, and a Canadian family at home in Ontario. Being apart for more than two years, George Timmins’s frequent letters home reveal the difficulties of continuing a mature relationship from a distance. Husband and wife, father and child, each endeavoured to sustain the morale of the other. Mail received at the front clearly had an uplifting effect, perhaps to a greater extent than the daily and much-coveted tot of rum. As such, it is indeed unfortunate that the letters that Timmins received from family members have not survived, for only then would it have been possible to assess whether he was ultimately successful in his efforts to help them adapt to his (thankfully temporary) absence.

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NOTES

2. Bennett, Kiss the kids for dad, p. 2.