The Canadian
Army Journal
14.2 Summer 2012

ARTICLES

National Defence Défense nationale

Canada

The Canadian
Army Journal



PRODUCED FOR

Chief of the Army Staff Detachment Kingston (Directorate of Land Concepts and Design)
PO Box 17000 Stn Forces, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7K 7B4

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION

Canadian Army Publishing, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7K 7B4

WEBSITE

LFDTS Webmaster

COVER PHOTO CREDIT

Canadian Forces Combat Camera

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ISSN—1713-773X
NDID—R-GL-007-000-JD-004
Print—Bilingual Tumble

Printed in Canada

Source: Combat Camera

The Canadian Army Journal

Canada's Professional Journal On Army Issues

The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. *The Canadian Army Journal* is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

DISTRIBUTION AND SUBSCRIPTION

The Canadian Army Journal (ISSN 1713-773X) is distributed throughout the Army and to select National Defence Headquarters, Maritime Command, Air Command, and Directorate of Information Systems Operations addresses.

Copies are also provided to defence-related organizations, allied armies, and members of the public and academia. Inquiries regarding distribution, subscription, and change of address are to be made to thearmyjournal@forces.gc.ca. On the Internet, visit *The Canadian Army Journal* at www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/.

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THE ART OF WAR

BOOK REVIEWS

MISSION PRIMACY—NEGOTIABLE?

Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD
Guest Editor

Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD

I would like to thank Major Godefroy for the opportunity to be the guest editor for the next two issues. It is a pleasure to play a small role in the army's primary professional journal. I would like to comment on mission primacy, professionalism and the tension between the two in a low-intensity, limited-war environment like Afghanistan. To do so, I will use Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope's experience as a battle group commander in Kandahar in 2006 as a lens. In *Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan*, published in 2008, Lieutenant-Colonel Hope wrote, "Despite training and doctrine that stated otherwise, it became my practice in battle to stop tactical manoeuvring of sub-units in order to extract casualties," because ultimately, "the destruction of no number of Taliban was so important as the safe evacuation of one Canadian (or Afghan) soldier."

Colonel Hope's comments had immediate traction for me because I was, and am, working on a study of fighting power. I define/describe fighting power as "the synergy of moral factors within a military unit that creates moral force. Moral force allows a unit to withstand casualties and setbacks and successfully engage in extended combat. The generation of fighting power allows a unit to impose its will upon the opponent." Lieutenant-Colonel Hope's perspective reverberates even more since I read the recently released *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, which states that the army "must remain capable of rapidly transitioning to effectively conduct high-intensity combat operations." High-intensity combat operations mean more casualties than those sustained over the course of a decade in Afghanistan (138 killed in combat by IEDs and in ambushes/firefights and more than 1,500 wounded).

I sympathize with Lieutenant-Colonel Hope. Afghanistan was not Normandy, where the army suffered 18,444 casualties, including 5,021 killed, in 79 days of high-intensity combat against a peer opponent, and where Guy Simonds told his subordinates that the troops, no matter how tired, had to be pushed "to the bitter end if need be." There was no "bitter end" scenario in Afghanistan. It was a limited war, with limited goals and ultimately a limited effort on Canada's part. Certainly, Canadian soldiers on the ground doing the fighting and dying did not see their personal efforts as limited. Indeed, they gallantly shouldered the burden of unlimited liability in a limited war. Lieutenant-Colonel Hope's decision to weight his actions more toward force protection than toward mission primacy is not without precedence in the Canadian experience.

Should professional soldiers think in terms of "I fight where I am told, when I am told, against whom I am told, for as long as I am told" regardless of the context? Should they be immune to a risk-averse mentality? Had Lieutenant-Colonel Hope executed every mission aggressively, with the associated increase in casualties, would there not be questions about the cost, both from the public and perhaps from within the army itself? What was so important about some village thoroughly cleared by Canadian efforts only to be subsequently left to the enemy? Similar questions were asked about the 10-day battle for Hill 937 (Hamburger Hill) in May 1969. The US Army suffered 46 killed and 400 wounded in taking the hill, then promptly abandoned it to the enemy.

It is important to understand that Lieutenant-Colonel Hope was not avoiding hard fighting; indeed, he recognized that the idea of winning without hard fighting was "complete folly." Limiting Canadian casualties was an element of his approach to effects-based operations in a counter-insurgency environment. In Normandy the Army pursued battle to physically reduce the Germans, but Lieutenant-Colonel Hope argued elsewhere that in a counter-insurgency reducing the enemy physically is less important than reducing him psychologically. I am not entirely convinced of this, but it does logically explain why Lieutenant-Colonel Hope placed less weight on traditional mission primacy.

After reading *Dancing With the Dushman*, I firmly believe that Lieutenant-Colonel Hope's experience demonstrates the burden of command and that he successfully fused his responsibilities as a technician in the profession of arms with his duty to safeguard the lives of his soldiers to the best of his ability. Yet the consequences of reconfiguring the mission primacy/casualty care dynamic *may* have unintended consequences for the army's fighting power in the future. Indeed, a critical question is this: can the Army afford the luxury of announcing that mission primacy is in any way negotiable in low-intensity conflicts?

Lieutenant-Colonel Hope stated in 2005–2006 that the Canadian military had a "fragile nature regarding loss of life" because it had raised the profile of loss "to near cult-status." To be fair, he subsequently amended that view by 2007–2008, declaring himself to be "wonderfully surprised at how robust we actually were." I have heard different opinions on whether the Army could make the psychological transition to casualty rates associated with higher-intensity operations. The army's professional development would benefit greatly from further commentary on this subject by those of all ranks who have practised unlimited liability in low-intensity conflicts.

ON THE EDITOR'S BOOKSHELF...

I am currently reading William Johnston's reassessment of the army's effectiveness in Korea. *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea* has much to offer combat arms and logistics officers.

Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD
Guest Editor

STAR OF COURAGE

Corporal Winston William Matheson, S.C., C.D.
Enfield, Nova Scotia

On November 20, 2009, Corporal Winston Matheson rescued a wounded soldier from a burning bus, following a head-on collision in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. The driver of a bus carrying two passengers was unable to avoid an oncoming SUV that had drifted into his lane. On impact, Corporal Matheson was thrown forward and landed halfway through the front windshield. Despite his injuries, he made his way back inside the bus to search for the other passenger, while the bus driver escaped. Corporal Matheson grabbed the injured man and, with great difficulty, opened the emergency exit and pushed him outside. Corporal Matheson then fell unconscious but was pulled to safety before the bus became completely engulfed in flames.

MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS

Captain William Todd Fielding, M.M.V., C.D.
Niagara Falls, Ontario

On August 5, 2010, Captain Fielding's Chinook helicopter was struck by enemy fire, in Panjwaji, Afghanistan, causing the fuel tank to explode and rendering the aircraft nearly inoperable. With the helicopter in flames and the cockpit rapidly filling with smoke, Captain Fielding made the time-critical decision to land in enemy territory rather than fly to a friendly landing zone. His outstanding courage and devotion to duty allowed him to execute an emergency landing and then lead the evacuation of the burning aircraft. His actions no doubt saved the lives of all crew and passengers that day.

Master Corporal Adam Holmes, M.M.V.
Kapuskasing, Ontario

From July 30 to August 2, 2010, Master Corporal Holmes displayed tremendous courage and continuous composure while coordinating exceptional fire support during a four-day combat operation. Constantly under fire, he willingly and repeatedly exposed himself to attack while identifying enemy positions and directing fire upon them. In addition, he single-handedly turned back a group of insurgents who had come within 50 metres of a friendly position. Master Corporal Holmes' valour and determination were critical to the success of the operation.

Master Corporal Gilles-Remi Mikkelson, M.M.V.
Bella Coola, British Columbia

On November 1, 2009, a member of Master Corporal Mikkelson's joint Canadian-Afghan foot patrol was severely wounded by an improvised explosive device. During the ensuing ambush, Master Corporal Mikkelson selflessly crossed through intense enemy fire to provide life-saving first aid to the critically wounded Afghan soldier. Despite the danger, his outstanding courage saved a comrade's life and brought great credit to Canada and the Canadian Forces.

Private Philip Millar, M.M.V.
Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia

On November 23, 2009, Private Millar demonstrated great heroism during an insurgent attack on Forward Operating Base Wilson, in Afghanistan. With mortar bombs falling around him, he unhesitatingly ran to the impact area to provide first aid to a seriously wounded American soldier. Despite the danger, he remained with the casualty, fully exposed to the attack. Private Millar's courageous actions under fire allowed for the best possible treatment to his comrade and brought great credit to the Canadian Forces.

Master Corporal Paul Douglas Mitchell, M.M.V.
Weymouth, Nova Scotia

On June 5 and July 18, 2010, Master Corporal Mitchell's front line devotion to duty and courageous actions under fire were instrumental in the defeat of two sustained insurgent attacks. While repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire and fearlessly maintaining his position, he inspired other soldiers and ultimately repelled the enemy attacks. Master Corporal Mitchell's selfless actions and disregard for his own safety undoubtedly saved the lives of his fellow soldiers.

Private John Nelson, M.M.V.
Wiseton, Saskatchewan

On June 16, 2010, Private Nelson's foot patrol came under attack by insurgents on three sides, in Afghanistan. Upon hearing of a casualty, Private Nelson, under his own initiative, rushed headlong into the raging battle to reach his wounded comrade. Bullets rained around them as he administered first aid. While risking his own life, Private Nelson displayed courage, composure and selflessness as he rendered the necessary assistance to save the life of a fellow Canadian soldier.

Sergeant Graham Marc Verrier, M.M.V., C.D.
Winnipeg, Manitoba

On July 31, 2010, Sergeant Verrier's patrol was caught in open terrain by an insurgent ambush, during an operation in Afghanistan. Despite being fully exposed to enemy fire, he immediately initiated a frontal assault on the enemy position. He also inspired his fellow soldiers to follow and relentlessly engaged the insurgents until they broke contact. Sergeant Verrier's selfless, courageous and decisive actions under fire were critical to protecting the remainder of his platoon and defeating the enemy ambush.

MEDAL OF BRAVERY

Lieutenant (N) André D. Bard, M.B., C.D.
Esquimalt, British Columbia

Leading Seaman David J. S. Denman, M.B.
Shearwater, Nova Scotia

On September 23, 2009, while working as a dive team, Lieutenant André Bard and Leading Seaman David Denman risked their lives to search for possible live ammunition in a pond, in Stewiacke, Nova Scotia. An unknown number of grenades had been thrown into a large pond. One of the explosives had malfunctioned and was in an extremely dangerous state. Using a metal mine detector in the murky water, the dive team searched the bottom of the pond, where they found the unexploded grenade buried deep in the mud. The device was carried a safe distance away and detonated. Lieutenant Bard and Leading Seaman Denman continued their thorough search of the pond, finding and removing other weapon fragments.

Sergeant Kent James Gulliford, M.B., M.S.M., C.D.
Kamloops, British Columbia and Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador

On April 24, 2009, Sergeant Kent Gulliford rescued an injured backcountry skier who had fallen into a deep crevice on Mount Compton Glacier, northeast of Vancouver, British Columbia. Sergeant Gulliford was the search and rescue team leader aboard the Cormorant helicopter tasked to locate and rescue the victim. In complete darkness, the Cormorant was kept in a hover position over the steep face of the glacier, while two of the victim's companions were hoisted aboard. Sergeant Gulliford was then lowered into the 30-metre crevice where he located the injured victim. It was a complex operation for him to get them both hoisted up to the helicopter without further incident. Sadly, the victim did not survive.

Chad Khadr, M.B.
Gatineau, Quebec

Corporal Tamer Khadr, M.B.
Ottawa, Ontario

On March 14, 2010, Chad Khadr and his cousin, Corporal Tamer Khadr, rescued a man from a burning vehicle, on Highway 15, in southern Quebec. The car had skidded on the wet pavement, hit a pole and landed on the median, causing a fire to break out in the engine compartment. The passenger managed to get out and was led to safety by Corporal Khadr while Chad Khadr pried open the driver's side door. Corporal Khadr crawled into the smoke-filled vehicle through the passenger side and undid the driver's seat belt. The rescuers worked quickly to free the victim and carried him a safe distance away before flames fully engulfed the wreckage.

Leading Seaman Patrick S. Moulden, M.B., C.D.
Hamilton, Ontario and Victoria, British Columbia

On April 3, 2010, Leading Seaman Patrick Moulden risked his life to ensure the safe evacuation of a wounded soldier, in Afghanistan. Leading Seaman Moulden and his team responded to an emergency call after an improvised explosive device (IED) critically injured a soldier. When a second device was discovered, Leading Seaman Moulden proceeded to dismantle it by hand before the rest of the counter-IED team arrived. With limited safety equipment at his disposal, Leading Seaman Moulden exposed himself to great danger to ensure that the IED was dismantled in a timely fashion, in order to permit the safe landing of a helicopter sent to evacuate his wounded comrade.

Master Corporal Daniel Edward Gilles Rochette, M.B., C.D.
Sudbury and Napanee, Ontario

On June 17, 2009, Master Corporal Daniel Rochette saved a man from possible drowning in the Jacques-Cartier River, in Pont-Rouge, Quebec. Master Corporal Rochette was fishing with his family when a man, standing near them, fell into the water and was carried off by the river's powerful current. Acting quickly, Master Corporal Rochette jumped in after him, but the strong current made the situation very dangerous for both men. Master Corporal Rochette had to let go and return to the shore, from which he held out a log to the distressed man. After a few attempts, the victim managed to grab on and the rescuer pulled him to shore.

ISAF personnel and Afghan elders share a meal at Panjwai District Shura

Source: Combat Camera

A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF HUMAN TERRAIN MAPPING

Major Derek Spencer

During the Cold War, much effort was put into developing structures, doctrine, equipment and skills within the Canadian Forces to win a near-competitor force-on-force conflict. Since its end in the early 1990s, however, military operations have changed focus. While militaries were addressing the end of this environment with ideas like the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), operations began to focus on the challenges faced in the post-9/11 era during peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations (COIN). Success in these operations began to be marked by the demand for greater effort to understand the indigenous populations within the battlespace. This in turn has raised a call within NATO and Canada to take a comprehensive approach that includes civilian government agencies and non-governmental and international organizations integrally in planning processes and execution of operations.[1]

Following on logically from this, the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan point to the need to reform how the intelligence function supports operations. In simple terms, there are some proposals that recommend major changes in how military intelligence is structured and conducts analysis. A coherent voice on this issue is found in the paper *"Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan"* by MGen Michael Flynn, Capt Matt Pottinger and Paul Batchelor.[2] Although said paper focuses on identifying problems with the intelligence function in Afghanistan and proposes methods to correct it, some feel it applies to more general situations. It argues for changes in terms of where intelligence personnel work within the command and force structure and also what information they collect and process out to delivery.

When one matches up the comprehensive approach with a reformed structure and focus for military intelligence, the need for a focus on the "human terrain" emerges. As early as 2004, when then Chief of the Army Staff, General Rick Hillier, stated a requirement for the Canadian Army to be able to be successful in post-9/11 conflicts,[3] he was clear that understanding the "human terrain" was critical.[4] This term came from the U.S. Army lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan during those counter-insurgency operations.[5] As new concepts of employment are developed in the CF such as "adaptive dispersed operations" and "full-spectrum operations," much discussion continues on the need to understand the cultural and social characteristics of indigenous populations. It is obvious, however, that while the comprehensive approach and military intelligence may operate within a joint (JIMP) environment, people live and interact on the land. Whatever is meant by "human terrain" and the host of other terms surrounding it, this is an Army problem, and the Army must understand how to handle this requirement.

It is fine to talk of high concepts such as "navigating the cultural and human terrain," but for the Canadian Army, this must be practical. In the Cold War, battlefield assessment undertook classic terrain analysis (TERA) to understand the effects of the physical geography on friendly and enemy forces. Staff officers were then taught to understand these ground effects using the mnemonic FLOCARK, whereas today the analysis is called a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) and uses powerful software and high-resolution satellite imagery. Unfortunately, in the COIN environment, there is a need to understand the human terrain, and our Land Forces do not have a predictable and understandable body of techniques to generate "human terrain mapping." At this stage, even this concept is not very well developed doctrinally. A formal term used in the social sciences is "social geography," but this term was developed for more permissive and benign environments and therefore does not apply well to military planning in COIN operations in a realistic way. Within the intelligence community in the last few years, a newer term has gained prominence called "socio-cultural analysis," which is promising but not yet developed sufficiently to provide a trainable set of skills that can be used today to produce tactical decision aids. However, these concepts together can be combined with the practice of providing geospatial support to the conduct of COIN operations.

Captain Jeff Rioux, a Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Officer and Captain Adam Scher, United States Army, Commanding Officer of Dog Company speak with local Afghans during a patrol with Dog Company in the Talukan Bazaar

Soldiers from Oscar Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, talk to local villagers in the Panjwai District to explain why they are in their area

Counter-insurgency operations are not new, and neither are opinions on how to support their conduct. The Canadian Forces released its Counter-Insurgency Operations doctrine publication in December 2008 as its allies were also issuing updated doctrine on the topic.[6] What was missing from this doctrine and other supporting CF publications and manuals was any specific guidance on how geospatial support could be different in a COIN environment. So while technology has greatly improved with the pervasive use of GPS, the widespread distribution of Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and high-quality data and high-resolution satellite imagery using them, not all of the implications are fully understood to best support decision makers. The evolution of theoretical concepts to use these capabilities in modern full-spectrum operations is only just emerging.

It is axiomatic to state that to support decision makers, the environment must be understood. Within the modern battlespace, it is clear that the population is critical to success; one might even call it the "vital ground." The understanding of the population can be improved by analyzing it in reference to the terrain. Geospatial intelligence provides a means to organize that understanding into an objective and measurable framework, thus making the analysis more actionable and comparable to other intelligence and operational factors. Therefore, this paper will propose to better define the tradecraft by defining and identifying issues and concepts in the emerging field of human terrain mapping.

SOME GROUNDWORK

As a complex activity, counter-insurgency and the doctrinal concepts that surround it require definition. CF doctrine now has a clear definition of an insurgency. It states that an insurgency is part of a wider set of irregular activities and threats to a secure and stable environment. Irregular activity may be defined as "behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority."[7]

Conversely, doctrine defines counter-insurgency operations as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency."[8] An insurgency is a political problem; the military plays a largely supporting role to other agencies and government departments in countering an insurgency, thus the need for a comprehensive approach. As indicated in the definition, a wide range of agencies, elements of power and capabilities, in addition to the military, must come together in a unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency.[9] The conduct of these operations broadly occurs within four lines of operation. At the operational level of campaign planning, CF doctrine describes four thematic lines of operation: security, governance, development and political process. These differ from classic force-on-force confrontation, which focused only on security.[10]

It is often stated that the modern battlespace is complex and multi-dimensional. To be useful, however, a more expressive and objective framework is needed to define it. One model that is routinely used in NATO plans involves the broad factors of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII). It provides a framework for all military analysis of a battlespace to move beyond the classic analysis of enemy, weather and terrain to include factors that impact the population—the true vital ground in COIN and peacekeeping operations.[11]

As a Land Force plans and executes operations, it constantly requires a detailed understanding of the geography in which it operates. One enabler to that understanding comes from Geospatial Intelligence. This is defined as "the exploitation and analysis of geospatial information, including imagery, combined with intelligence data to describe, assess and visually depict geographically referenced activities and features on the Earth."[12]

AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENT ZONES (ADZ)

One concept in modern COIN thinking that achieved some success on operations involved the idea of Afghanistan Development Zones (ADZ). The ADZ concept is a modification of Sir Gerald Templer's Ink Spot theory used in the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). Templer proposed that villages as population centres be secured with military forces but not across a continuous front. The insurgency might be able to manoeuvre the countryside but, without access to the population, they would get no material support. These secured spots could then be expanded outwards to separate greater portions of the population from the insurgency. These spots would continue to grow and link up as the insurgency weakened. Eventually the whole nation would be under the control of the counter-insurgency forces.[13] The U.S. military modified this concept in Iraq in 2006–2007, renaming it the Urban Oil Spot method.[14]

The ADZ concept takes this Ink Spot theory forward with a switch in emphasis from security to development. This concept was an organizing concept in Regional Command South in Afghanistan in 2007 and was put into practice by the Canadian Task Force in Panjwai.[15] As a concept, it provides an operational means of focusing security, development and governance efforts in the counter-insurgency on a specific geographical space. As the rule of the legitimate government and security are established in this zone, further effort on all the lines of operation are directed into it to expand it.

While tidy conceptually, a warning flag emerges from this discussion of ADZ. It directs activities in a way consistent with the key factors of COIN but provides no methods with which to organize an understanding of the battlespace. One can get caught up in the ambiguity of the factors without having a means to organize them. It is proposed, therefore, that a mature form of human terrain analysis within a PMESII framework could be that method. The problem at present is that there is no body of tradecraft to produce human terrain mapping (HTM), nor is there detailed doctrine for this within the geospatial engineering or intelligence communities inside or outside of Canada.[16] As well, the data necessary to start an analysis is extremely difficult to collect and maintain in coverage and currency. Unfortunately, the real data collection of non-geographic factors such as "quality of life," "vulnerability" and "average wage" are difficult to collect in a COIN environment and may only be meaningful over areas larger than an ADZ. It may not be practical in many cases to establish the values of such key indicators across the necessarily "fuzzy" boundaries of an ADZ. Finally, the analysis process that uses that data is immature and lacking in scientific rigour. Adequate analysis of the success of an ADZ effort is clearly linked to the collection of adequate data in support of HTM. The good news is that even if ADZ as an operational method has these shortcomings, it is not a serious concern. Developing an effective HTM methodology from doctrine to delivered product would support any COIN campaign because it would value-add intelligence preparation of the operational environment in a way not presently done well.

Brigadier General Dean Milner, Task Force Kandahar Commander, greets the village elders at the beginning of the Shura

Source: Combat Camera

DETAILS CONCERNING A CONCEPT OF HUMAN TERRAIN MAPPING

To go forward, a functional definition of HTM is necessary to frame this discussion. This is a challenge because CF COIN doctrine completely ignores geospatial intelligence. Even imagery intelligence is given very light mention for the purpose of highlighting changes in technology, not differences in employment. Military planning in COIN operations seeks to determine a course of action that defeats the insurgency. Influence and military force are directed to achieve an effect that delivers a desired end state. Human terrain analysis must therefore assess how that force and influence will be modified by human behaviour.

As may have been apparent in the earlier discussion, "human terrain" is thrown around as a term but is hard to quantify. The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program (ABCA) attempted to clarify this in 2010. Its SENSE group developed a working definition of "human terrain" as

Members of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) mentoring Kandak 4 of the 1st Brigade of the 205th Corps of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) during a series of coordinated validation exercises

"the social, political, economic and infrastructural environment, belief systems and forms of interaction, of the people who can affect the environment in which soldiers operate." They further defined "human terrain mapping" (HTM) as "the process of rendering to a geographic map those comparatively static demographic features, social features or the location of physical items of symbolic and ideological importance of a culture."[17]

Using this HTM definition, a foundation is established. This basis highlights two concepts under analysis. Firstly, the subject of the analysis is human behaviour. This will fall into a number of categories of interest in subsequent decision making such as political, economic, military social, demographic and religious fitting within the PMESII framework. The second aspect is that this behaviour can be linked to geographic position. By accurately geographically positioning the behaviour, the advantage is that analysis can be done to determine how the terrain affects it. While the simple geographic position is of practical value, there is an interaction between the terrain and the behaviour that hopefully can be modelled to some extent conceptually and therefore understood sufficiently to draw future deductions against which to make decisions. The objective and measurable nature of this geographic position then means that actions can be taken that are immediately practical in military operations.

An immediate practical consequence of this definition is the observation that a large portion of collection assets used by the military for the purpose of supporting operations have limited use in understanding the population. In general, geospatial data is collected remotely to provide an understanding of large spaces of the earth's surface in a variety of themes. The main effort in these collections is to obtain larger areas and greater detail and resolution as technology improves and sensors become more available. The major assumption in this collection effort is that between visits of the sensor, the feature or attribute does not move or change appreciably. Production systems from sensor to analyst are designed to sample as often as the feature in question changes as well as gain a quality measurement of that factor. Therefore, between samples, the situation is constant enough to give a meaningful analysis. This works well for geographic features, civil infrastructure and even large enemy military formations. Unfortunately, this is substantially harder with many behaviours given human mobility, particularly in an active combat area. New methods of data collection are therefore demanded such as surveys, historical records, human intelligence reporting and academic research. The present systems, doctrine and understanding surrounding the use of modern surveillance platforms such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that presently provide reconnaissance information to support tactical decision making are also inadequate for this task. New processes and procedures in military decision making will have to be developed.

NEW KEY DATA SOURCES

In an attempt to technically define a foundation such that geospatial data can be collected and managed to support the understanding of the human terrain, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has developed a broad hierarchy as a framework to organize sources into categories:[18]

- **Level 0.** This is the foundation made of geophysical and natural features such as mountains, rivers and lakes.
- **Level 1.** These are the physical manifestations of culture such as roads, mosques, power lines and schools.
- **Level 2.** This is an attempt at "putting culture on a map" by creating database models that can be used to position human groups concerning religious, ethnic and tribal features.
- **Level 3.** Finally, the data framework would attempt to build an objective language and structure to position attitudes and behaviours of people. These intangibles would be used to get an indicator of that critically important concept "intent."

Therefore, while Levels 0 and 1 are conventional geographic features, Levels 2 and 3 go beyond classic geospatial data classes to include other data types. The semantic, ontological and database modelling of these levels will take years of effort from highly specialized experts. While that effort is going on in many forums in the U.S. and NATO, mostly at Level 2, it unfortunately does not aid current and near-future operations. It is like trying to build a national chain of gasoline stations while folks are waiting on the roadside to fill up their cars. It does not even really address where the gasoline is coming from. In practical terms, though, in the interim, it is proposed that to address a PMESII analysis, some specific data types be considered:

- **Population density and size**—Population is the key statistic to support all COIN operations. As the support of the civilian population is key to the success of COIN operations, population details are critical for all lines of operation. Census data is clearly the most important thing to obtain. However, census taking is a mature government activity requiring a very stable security environment, coordination of a large number of employees, professional control of data collection, sophisticated analysis and substantial funding. Therefore, in counter-insurgency operations, there is less-than-perfect knowledge of population numbers and distribution. This subsequently results in the need for more intuition and qualitative data to determine government service provision and administrative boundaries. This is not hopeless, though, as aid agencies and the U.N. make population estimates to better plan their operations. These estimates are publically disclosed and often geospatially referenced down to the district or even the community level.

- **Ethnic distribution, density and relation**s—The details of local population must lead to a detailed understanding of ethnicity. This understanding would lead to how ethnic groups within the area of operations interact. The intent is to achieve strong governance arrangements and effective civil–military cooperation. This is a substantial shift from past GIS work, which focused on small-scale cartographic products for atlases or posters. COIN support requires large-scale (high-resolution) collection and detailed analysis of very subtle tribal affiliations to produce meaningful decision support.

- **Agricultural practices**—This data is relatively easy to collect, given the abilities of remote sensing and the efforts of international organizations such as the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization to collect the classifications in detail. Land use and classification are well-understood processes in military and civilian GIS practice. What must be added to these technical collections is local knowledge from farmers and agricultural experts to validate and enrich the understanding of the pattern of life surrounding agriculture. The way that agriculture affects people and changes over time may also be GIS themes but are not often understood in a military context. Agriculture, of course, may enhance the less-than-perfect knowledge of population distributions as a key indicator of human behaviour in rural areas.

- **Religious aspects**—In many COIN ops, religious aspects can be of great concern to the civilian population. Understanding religious issues, intensity and practice also establishes better integration with the pattern of life. Additionally, places of worship are protected under the laws of war and so are collected from remotely sensed images as another building type. However, this is only the beginning of understanding, and one should not be deceived that knowing that a specific building is a place of worship develops any significant detail on religious beliefs, practice, patterns or affiliations. No one knows if interpolating mosque locations creates an accurate "religiosity" surface in the same way one could do with spot heights to make an elevation model. At best, this kind of mathematical modelling might create general guidelines for civilian affairs experts.

- **Economic activities (legal and illegal)**—The pattern of civilian life is heavily influenced by economic practices. Therefore, getting an understanding of legitimate economic practices is useful. Illegal economic practices are often used to fund the continued insurgency. Even representations of the patterns are atypical in GIS practice. Locations of factories and businesses only capture a small part of the issue. It might be possible to collect images of a market over a period of time and match it to on-site reporting to determine relative changes in economic activity. This, of course, is sensor and analyst intensive, requires months of patience and is primarily qualitative.

- **Community attitudes and atmospherics**—This data is collected from a variety of intelligence sources. As a result, there is an issue with the repeatability of sampling and the impossibility of covering a wide area of interest. Sampling and surveys are resource intensive and seriously influenced by security concerns. Some activities can be remotely sensed, such as garbage pickup and night time electricity consumption, which can be indicators of underlying attitudes but are again qualitative and therefore used with a wary eye.

- **Displaced person patterns (IDP/DPRE)**—As discussed earlier, indigenous people are critical to the success of the counter-insurgency operation. Battle activities in the COIN typically cause people to leave their homes, resulting in IDP camps, humanitarian issues and refugee movements across international boundaries. These impacts add additional complexity and risk to the successful conduct of the operation. As in other issues involving people in an insurgency, collecting the data is difficult—it is of limited accuracy and is only accurate for a very short amount of time.

Afghan children surround Corporal Marie-Anne Hardy as she takes a break during an early morning operation to conduct cordoned searches of fields and compounds

In summary, these data sources are non-traditional in military analysis and are mostly derived from sensors that are also not conventional, making them difficult to collect and only usable over very limited geographic areas. The risk here is that the traditional dependence of geospatial intelligence on remote sensors creates a greater demand for ever more technical solutions. The answers instead might in a particular case come from logical analysis of existing sources to create suitable but not perfect data. Other alternatives could be to find data not normally used in TERA such as cadastral data, HUMINT or media surveys. Development of HTM requires critical problem solving to answer operational questions, not just creating engineering workflows with better technology.

SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

Geospatial intelligence is only useful as an enabling function if it supports the conduct of military operations. Doctrinally, these operations can be organized into influence activities and physical effects. While physical effects (or fires) include lethal and non-lethal systems, they are deliberately used to create first-order effects upon the adversary. It is the influence activities that are gaining more emphasis under COIN. Therefore, in light of this distinction, it is possible to look at these activities to refine HTM collection and tradecraft.[19]

Manoeuvre Warfare. CF COIN doctrine repeatedly refers to the indigenous population as the key factor in the conflict. As a start, then, a simple characterization of where that population is physically located is a fundamental question, if only to best direct combat operations so as to minimize collateral damage. This was done to great effect by U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007.[20] Focus on these factors and the necessary collection effort gave meaningful answers. The focus should now be to take further steps to institutionalize these practices, broaden the clients that can be serviced by these methods and develop more advanced analytical techniques.

Information Operations (INFO OPS). Arguably the key influence activity in COIN, Info Ops consist of deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS), public affairs (PA) and civil–military cooperation (CIMIC). The goal is to increase support of the indigenous population for the legitimate government and COIN by promoting their objectives and delegitimizing the insurgency. While directed at the moral plane of warfare, their effects must occur in physical space. The key factors in their effective employment include detailed intelligence that fundamentally includes the analysis of human factors. The population occupies specific locations in physical space critically characterized by these factors, and they affect how that influence occurs. Therefore, effective Info Ops require detailed analytical products to achieve the necessary comprehensive targeting to best synchronize effects.

Brigadier-General Ahmed Habibi, Commander of the 1st Brigade of the 205th (Hero) Corps, the District Governor and Brigadier-General Dean Milner, Commander of Task Force Kandahar (TFK) meet with local Afghan elders in Nakhonay region, Afghanistan

Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Another important influence activity, CIMIC is a military function that supports the mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in the area of operations. COIN and peacekeeping operations are characterized by the presence of a large number of non-governmental and supranational agencies providing aid, reconstruction and development efforts, hence the demand for a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, since the legitimate government itself is operating within the battle space in an effort to establish its effectiveness in areas that require coordination with military operations, CIMIC is an important enabling function within the campaign plan. Therefore, the accurate geographical arrangement of all of these non-combat activities in a meaningful way can be useful to enhance CIMIC efforts. CIMIC can also provide expertise to develop new key sources as mentioned above.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). It is not an exaggeration to say that intelligence derived from direct questioning of people is of the greatest value in COIN. Of all the possible sources, the indigenous or host nation population is undoubtedly the best source of HUMINT if systematically analyzed. An interesting situation occurs in this regard, however. The organization of HUMINT analysis within a geospatial framework correlated with other geospatial data can result in executable all-source intelligence for operations and greater situational understanding. Conversely, HUMINT collection itself can be benefit from the analysis of human factors in a geospatial context. For example, HTM can provide a detailed understanding of the tribal, security and economic situation in a specific community under consideration. This linkage between HUMINT and HTM has potentially the greatest scope for mutual benefit. Unfortunately, such linkage is completely absent in CF doctrine and in present Geospatial Intelligence tradecraft and is yet another set of stovepipes needing collapse.

DEVELOPING HUMAN TERRAIN MAPPING—CIMIC PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) is a reasonably mature military analysis technique. It is a logical four-step process to organize and focus the discovery efforts involved in understanding an area of military operations. While led by the Intelligence Branch, other branches are involved as necessary to gain a better understanding of the terrain, population, urban environment, political situation, and so forth. As IPE is ultimately intended to determine enemy courses of action, it is driven by an understanding of doctrinal adversary templates.[21] As an alternative method, it is proposed that the CIMIC Preparation of the Environment (CPE) be established as a similar process that puts the CIMIC team in the lead with support from other staff branches for some of the atmospherics, permissiveness and security dimensions. While the titles will remain similar, the steps of CPE would essentially change in character from doctrinal IPE as follows to:

1. **Definition of the area of interest.** The character of determining the "areas" must now include more human dimensions such as political structures, tribal dynamics and economic relationships.

2. **Determine the battle space effects.** While IPE would focus on environmental impacts on allied and adversary operations, CPE expands the assessment. The impact on operations is affected by attitudes and atmospherics in addition to classic physical, environmental and terrain effects.

3. **Assessment of actors' capabilities.** The next step in IPE is an "assessment of adversary capabilities." However, the presence and operations of neutral forces have an effect on the operations of all sides of the COIN. That itself is a unique factor in this regard. It is not a conflict of two sides but a complex interplay of a spectrum of allied and adversary forces. The actors include the indigenous forces and factions, non-governmental organizations, criminal syndicates, neighbouring sovereign states and international organizations. The effects are equally complex and subtle. Obviously, the allegiance and intentions of these actors is not clear-cut. This step requires the active collection of a large amount of data on all of these actors outside of normal ISR collection methods.

4. **Determine actors' courses of actions (COA).** As there are more actors and their intentions span from opposition to support, determining their courses of action is more complicated than in IPE. With an adversary, one determines the most likely and most dangerous courses of action. This allows a friendly force to develop its courses of action that will defeat the enemy. Much of the conflict is then decided by application of force and command skill as an adoption of the COA. The conflict is determined by overwhelming the opponent. This is not the same situation with the actors' COAs in a COIN as cooperation; de-confliction and synchronization are the goals consistent with the comprehensive approach.

This approach was trialled in ISAF in 2007 using the Afghan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) as a data source with only limited success.[22] Collecting, managing and distributing the data of the ACSP was manpower intensive and focused on ISAF HQ's communication to the Government of Afghanistan. The use of the data at Regional Command South HQ to support CIMIC planning was successful but did not enjoy wide staff support due to the more urgent focus on combat operations.

SOME PROPOSED DECISION SUPPORT PRODUCTS

Human terrain seeks to associate human behaviours with geographic location and other relevant geospatial information to support decision making. Of particular interest in this context is decision making to support campaign planning in counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations. In total, these products serve to give a greater understanding of the pattern of life in areas of concern. The form or format of the product is not at issue here. What is of interest is what decisions need to be made. The types of outputs from this analytical process are as follows:

- **Permissiveness**—Assessments of how much support enemy and friendly forces have in a specific area with regard to the activities they wish to conduct are important to campaign planning. As these assessments rely on intangibles such as atmospherics, ethnicity, tribalism and religious affiliation, they are extremely difficult to conduct accurately.

- **Areas for development**—As one of the key lines of operation in COIN is reconstruction and development, locations for aid projects are critical to effectively support operations. This includes but goes beyond standard location-allocation placements or collateral damage assessments and again relies on synchronizing the effects of development with security and governance efforts among a variety of unlinked organizations.

- **Key leader engagement support**—Support of the local population is important to effective achievement of development and securing the legitimacy of the host government. Counter-insurgency forces rely on key leader engagement (KLE) to develop this local support. While permissiveness is one aspect of best pursuing KLE, other factors such as understanding tribal lay-down, economic situation and criminality would also have to be considered.

- **Support to disaster planning and relief**—By definition, a host government in a COIN has less than full governance capacity. Therefore, its ability to react to and mitigate the effects of a disaster is rarely sufficient. The result is that the assisting military forces must develop contingency plans for possible disasters to support the host government, and those plans rely on good geospatial intelligence enabled by HTM.

- **Counter-criminality planning**—Countries undergoing a COIN often do not have sufficient rule of law to resist the existence of widespread and organized criminality. This criminality, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, often exists to fund the requirements of the insurgency. Therefore, combatting this criminality is necessary to defeating the insurgency and supporting the legitimate government's stability. Geographic products can be critical to combatting this criminality directly or assisting the government to do so.

CONCLUSION

Human terrain is presented in the geospatial intelligence community as a new concept in support of modern military operations. The linkage with social geography may yield detailed developments in the future, especially as COIN operations evolve into more traditional and stable peacekeeping efforts. The real difference is that social geography is practised in modern peacetime states where data of all types is plentiful and the environment is permissive; these conditions do not apply in COIN operations or peacekeeping.

Instead, what is required is to take this early set of concepts observed during recent operations and undertake an end-to-end development of doctrine, operational user requirements, data collection and acquisition to produce the necessary training, equipment and tradecraft to develop human terrain mapping fully with operational experience and critical, focused problem solving. This, of course, requires time and conscious effort to further develop the theory and practice.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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A Combat Engineer soldier of 12 Field Squadron, 1 Combat Engineer Regiment poses behind a row of 155 mm artillery shells found during Op TIMIS PREEM

Source: Combat Camera

CULTURAL IRREGULAR WARFARE STRATEGIC:

Culture and Non-Kinetic Strategies Employed by Non-State Actors

Captain Juan C. Castillo, MSc

The implementation of unconventional warfare by non-state actors has become one of the leading international security concerns of the post-Cold War era, especially after the shocking attacks of 9/11.[1] While this is by no means a new phenomenon, the way these groups have proliferated and enhanced their capabilities in the Information Age has forced both analysts and policymakers to constantly rethink how to address these non-traditional threats.[2] Moreover, the consequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated that in the West there is a great demand for further understanding of both the aims that these groups pursue and the methods they employ to accomplish them. Nonetheless, when entering the realm of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and low-intensity conflicts, it becomes imperative to acknowledge the great diversity that exists underneath these headings. As noted by Ulrich Schnecker, a variety of groups that differ in motivation, behaviour, organization and membership form the general notion of VNSAs.[3] Certainly, within this great diversity there is a great deal of confusion, as some of these actors tend to be categorized by the strategic and tactical tools they employ, such as terrorism or guerrilla warfare.[4] Thus, when tagging an organization as being simply a terrorist or guerrilla group, there is a risk of neglecting salient features that define both the organizational behaviour and motivation of these groups. Eventually, it is necessary to understand the attributes and complexities that these actors possess in order to effectively find a way to counteract them.

Conversely, these violent groups do share two common qualities that are, as the name implies, their use of violence as the main vehicle to advance their interests and the fact that these actors have some sort of social organization. The first quality, which is the most significant one, places the non-state actors in a position of defiance vis-à-vis the state, as the latter's primordial role has always been the legitimate use of violence.[5] It has been estimated that more than 90% of the armed conflicts that have occurred in the post-Cold War era are of either an intra-state or transnational nature, which conspicuously reflects the role that these actors have in propagating international violence.[6] Also, the use of force creates a political effect in which powerful violent actors have been able to generate and run "para-states," where any sort of public order goes hand in hand with the distribution of force.[7]

Nevertheless, the resources that VNSAs enjoy are limited in comparison to the state, and therefore they are forced to adopt a posture where the toolbox of unconventional warfare becomes their core instrument for carrying out political change.[8] Even though there are instances in which, as a result of the hybridization of warfare, violent non-state actors have been able to minimize the capabilities gap (i.e., the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and the Mexican Cartels), these groups will ultimately rely on maximizing the advantages that exist within asymmetric warfare.[9] Subsequently, this strategic choice brings the local populace to the centre of the struggle between the state and the violent actors. *The US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* clearly states that any irregular warfare campaign being carried out by an armed group will rest its centre of gravity on the civilian population.[10] Certainly, the ability that the non-state actor has to infiltrate civil society within its area of operations becomes as significant as any military action. In fact, the actor's ability to effectively perform functions such as recruitment and the acquisition of logistical support and, most importantly, obtain some sort of legitimacy, will always depend on how effective it is at aligning the population with its own *raison d'être*.[11] Consequently, the civilian's normative perceptions become a contested space where the violent actor's narrative seeks to usurp the state's natural position of authority.

In this light, the purpose of this piece is to examine how different armed non-state actors employ non-kinetic doctrines and tactics in order to influence civilian populations within their areas of operations as they seek to erode the normative power of the state. To accomplish this, the paper will look at the VNSAs' choice of non-kinetic activities through the lenses of their strategic culture, as this paradigm helps to elucidate how these groups' organizational features and political perceptions influence their strategic choices.[12]

It is important to note that because they are part of the VNSAs' grand strategy, both kinetic and non-kinetic actions are interlinked, and how they complement each other should be considered. Accordingly, this piece will be divided into two comprehensive sections that will discuss the theoretical framework behind non-kinetic doctrines and how it applies to three different case studies.

The first part will focus primarily on developing a model based on existing hypotheses that aim to explain the nature of VNSAs and their non-kinetic interaction with civilian populations. However, it becomes extremely difficult to develop an overarching theorem because of the divergence that exists among the armed actors' interests, organization and methods. Instead, this chapter will look at how both internal features and external forces influence the actions that armed actors undertake as a means of infiltrating civilian communities. The second part will introduce a case study, which will look at the Taliban currently operating in Afghanistan and neighbouring states. This armed group has been labelled one of the most significant security challenges that the US and allied states must address in the coming decade.[13] Furthermore, Afghanistan has become the primary stage where past lessons of both unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) theory are being tested on a daily basis. Therefore, this section will see what types of non-kinetic actions the Taliban is engaged in, and how these are tailored to address its strategic needs.

THE INTRINSIC TRINITY: STRATEGIC CULTURE, THE CIVILIAN POPULACE AND NON-KINETIC ACTION

As it was mentioned throughout the introduction, the concept of VNSAs is a broad term incorporating different types of social organizations that utilize the tool of violence to advance their interests in one way or another. According to Phil Williams, the global presence of actors such as "tribal and ethnic armed groups, warlords, drug-trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents and transnational criminal organizations" have made the state-run monopoly of violence nothing more than a "convenient fiction" in the 21st century.[14] The sole existence of these actors sets them in a recalcitrant position in relation to the political, social and economic order desired by the state. Despite that, this situation does not define the type of interaction that the VNSA needs to have with the state. For instance, criminal gangs are interested in maintaining the *status quo* of state structures because these facilitate the accumulation of wealth through a parasitic relationship.[15] If anything, this type of actor normally seeks to stay "below the radar" due to the fact that, under normal circumstances, the state has the means to cease its existence through formal force mechanisms such as law-enforcement agencies.[16] Equally, other types of VNSAs may have pro-state political interests, and thus they may be supported by agencies or elements within the state structure.[17] Examples of these can be seen in the case of GAL in Spain during the 1980s or the Serb Volunteer Force (aka "Arkan's Tigers") in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.[18] Nevertheless, the scope of this piece is to focus on VNSAs that not only pose an ontological challenge to the state but also seek to usurp its power by advancing political outcomes through coercive means. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on the relationship between anti-state VNSAs, their *modus operandi* and the civilian population by using a theoretical framework.

The anti-state VNSA, unlike the criminal-parasitic or pro-government types, is able to organize, plan and execute physical attacks that have "strategic effects against the state."[19] Moreover, this armed non-state actor seeks to slowly acquire the state's characteristics, as it aspires to exercise power in a wide range of matters within a controlled geographical space.[20] In spite of this, the VNSA is faced with the complex tasks of undermining the state's security apparatus while pilfering its legitimacy. Normally speaking, the state has the upper hand in matters of coercive force as, in order to have institutions, it needs the force mechanisms to back them up. Similarly, legitimacy is something that the armed non-state actor lacks because of its inherent illegal character within the state's social framework.[21] Therefore, the VNSA requires a lifeline between itself and the population, as this is the core environmental element from where physical support and legitimacy may arise. In front of these quagmires the VNSA resorts to irregular warfare as a rational choice that tries to address the two predicaments (physical and political) placed by the state. According to US Air Force doctrine, irregular warfare (IW) is defined as

> *A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.*[22]

Corporal Montgomery of 12 Field Squadron, 1 Combat Engineer Regiment, signals to a fellow soldier while keeping an all-around defense position during Op TIMIS PREEM

For the VNSA, the struggle against the state bifurcates in two dimensions where the use of physical violence must be complemented with a political struggle for the populace in the area of operations. Indeed, the relationship between the non-state actor and civilian populations is complex and often defined through variables that are based on the needs and expectations of the VNSA.

VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

The main reason why the paradigm of strategic culture can be used as an effective device to understand the intentions that VNSAs have towards civilian populations is the fact that it helps to elucidate the actor's strategic preferences and choices. A study conducted by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)/Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) defines strategic culture as

> *Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and common narratives that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.*[23]

Traditionally, this notion has been assigned to the study of states' behaviour in the international system after J. Snyder introduced the term in the late 1970s.[24] However, due to the VNSAs' organizational characteristics, it becomes feasible to see what internal variables determine the behaviour that they exhibit towards environmental elements, specially the state and the civilian population. According to Colin Grey, strategic culture is "contingently prescriptive" as it becomes "a guide to strategic action" in the battlefield, which pervades both "the combatants and their military organization."[25] He also warns that an "adverse strategic necessity can subvert or utterly overthrow its influence," clearly alluding to the rationality of strategic actors that can react to changes in situational conditions.[26] Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that strategic culture remains pervasive, as it ought to translate into operational reality the interests and beliefs that the actors ultimately pursue.

When examining a VNSA, it is possible to see some determinant variables that compose the actor's strategic culture. James M. Smith argues that things such as political traditions, history/experience, beliefs/values, geospatial situation, classical texts/stories, economic resources and its security concept provide the inputs on which the actor starts building its cultural framework.[27] Subsequently, as these determinants shape the strategic culture within the VSNA's organization, they provide the basis through which the decision-making processes and information flows take place. Because of the varied nature of armed non-state actors, these determinant variables are going to be heterogeneous as well, therefore making each VNSA's strategic culture unique. Regardless, these determinants play the same role in each organization; as Smith points out, elements such as the relationship between the leadership and membership, the overall perspective that the group has on the situation at hand and finally the actions that the group executes go through a sequential dynamic process that is structured on the actor's strategic culture.[28]



Figure 1: Strategic Culture Dynamics

Likewise, the content of the narrative being used by a VNSA provides another significant dimension that transcends from the normative structure of its strategic culture into the actual operational activities in which the armed actor is engaged. According to Lawrence Freedman, narratives are "compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn."[29] Furthermore, he points out that narratives in themselves are "strategic" because they are "deliberately constructed" and reinforced with "current ideas that when not grounded on actual evidence seek to appeal to the human emotion."[30] In the end, narratives come across as dogmatic devices that seek to generate some sort of response from their

target audience, either within or outside the group. However, most importantly, the narrative allows any strategic actor to define its position in relation to others, and from there, define what type of action it must take towards them.[31] Both the narrative and the cultural determinants imbedded in the VNSA's strategic culture will shape the expectations that it has on the population. Consequently, it will also shape the actions that the armed actor will take in order to generate the desired effects on the populace. In some instances, the VNSA uses the narrative as an instrument that seeks to generate a reaction among civilians. Al Qaeda, for example, has launched propaganda campaigns that are tailored to sub-populations in the Muslim world that are under political stress.[32] Even though their major political goal is to have the entirety of Muslims behind their cause, the organization attempts to influence specific segments of the populace that they perceive as being more responsive because of their grievances.[33] Similarly, communist VNSAs may direct their narrative towards the grievances of the working and peasant classes in the local populations.[34]

Finally, when considering the role that strategic culture plays in the behaviour of a VNSA, it becomes equally significant to examine how the armed actor's leadership develops an intricate relationship with the latter. Traditionally, the leadership element within an armed group is seen as the provider of "strategic direction to break the ties between the population and the government" and to establish and maintain "the credibility for the movement."[35] Moreover, referring to Colin Gray's point, in face of "strategic adversity," this is the element within the VNSA that will dictate what kind of actions the group must take.[36] However, an armed non-state actor's long-established strategic culture might affect how the leadership makes choices and develops preferences. For instance, E. P. Hollander notes that leaderships reflect a "dialectical relationship between strategic culture and operational behaviour."[37] This means that the elites of the group undergo a socializing process in which the narrative that is being manipulated by them can constrain their behaviour in the future.[38] To some extent, there can be some level of stress between *ad hoc* leadership decisions and the strategic culture shared by the collectivity. Nevertheless, the leadership elements within a VNSA are "strategic users of culture" that have the power to steer the direction of the cultural discourses within the organization and thus set the general direction of the non-state actor.[39] Thus, the behaviour that the VNSA has towards the civilian population and the state will be shaped by both the culture that exists within its organization and the direction that this receives from the actor's leadership.

THE HUMAN BATTLESPACE: THE STRATEGIC CIVILIAN POPULACE

The local populations are indeed a significant factor in the conflict between the state and the VNSA, especially since the latter's success in achieving any political, economic or social change depends on their support. Therefore, it becomes imperative for the non-state actor to develop a doctrine through which it can generate the desired effects on the population and, in that way, satisfy its strategic needs. The US Air Force *Irregular Warfare* White Paper clearly explicates that the populace's support provides both sides with the necessary "moral or physical strength, freedom of action" and "the will to act."[40] Furthermore, the document asserts that the "support of the people determines which side prevails" in the VNSA's struggle against the state.[41] In fact, the only way through which the actor is able to survive as a belligerent entity is by being able to acquire and maintain access to demographic resources. Similarly, John Nagl notes that for VNSAs engaged in an asymmetrical conflict, the people can provide "multidirectional" strategic and tactical goods such as "logistical support; a recruiting base; intelligence; cover and concealment."[42] Some of the classical "unconventional warfare philosophers" have made the people (and their support) their central thesis on how to achieve victory.[43] For instance, Mao Tse-tung has described the civilian populace as the "true bastion of iron" and the "richest source of power to wage war" against the state.[44] Also, Ernesto "Che" Guevara noted that the VNSA engaged in guerrilla warfare must become one with the people in order to succeed and not become "exterminated like criminal gangs."[45]

The great reliance that the VNSA has on the populace has led some scholars, such as Martin Van Creveld, to believe that low-intensity conflicts (LICs) are "non-trinitarian" wars where the role of the "army" and the "people" become amalgamated.[46] However, VNSAs are separate political entities in their own right, which regardless of their motivation emerge when there is "feasibility for conflict" within the state structure.[47] A better way to describe the interaction between the VNSA and the population is as a pathogenic relationship where the armed actor seeks to infiltrate and influence the civilian communities within their area of operations.

For instance, David Kilcullen argues that, in cases such as al Qaeda's, it is possible to see how a VNSA seeks to "infect" areas where the state is weak in order to start a "contagious" operation that would allow it to penetrate similar areas and thus enable it to influence a significant segment of the population.[48] Moreover, as Kilcullen points out, areas that are governed by weak state institutions resemble sick organisms that can be taken over by an invasive bacterium; i.e., the VNSA.[49] Indeed, the armed non-state actors appear as viral entities that seek preservation and escalation by exploiting the human capital resources offered by civilian communities. Likewise, Troy Thomas and William Casebeer have used the *Applied Systems Theory* to better explain "the energy flows" that VNSAs undertake with environmental features, specially, the civilian populace.[50] According to this paradigm, an organization is composed of different sub-systems that interact with the environment depending on the organization's general needs. Thomas and Casebeer have pointed out that functions such as support, maintenance (internal entropy and culture), cognition (decision-making ability) and conversion (tactical actions) are carried out by sub-systems within the VNSA that are somewhat parallel to organs in a living organism.[51] Similar to a cardio-respiratory system, the support subsystem enables the whole VNSA macro-system to perform the other functions, as it is responsible for acquiring recruits, stakeholders and logistical assets that must come from the civilian population within the area of operations.[52] Once again, this reflects the general dependency that VNSAs have on the populace in order to subsist.

A MODEL OF NON-KINETIC ACTION

Given the high strategic value that the civilian population has in an asymmetrical conflict, it becomes imperative for the VNSA to obtain the outcomes it desires from it. The *US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual* notes that there are four methods through which armed actors seek to generate support: first, by using persuasion, then by employing coercion, then by encouraging overreaction, and then by using apolitical methods (economic incentives).[53] None of these methods are exclusive, as any of them can be used in combination according to the interests and strategic culture of the VNSA. Most significantly, these popular support methodologies come in a dichotomy of physical and non-kinetic actions, which again may fulfil a complementary role for each other. For example, ideological narratives and kinetic attacks taken against state security forces can persuade a target population, depending on the characteristics of the conflict environment.[54] However, the non-kinetic element is considered the most significant aspect of irregular warfare as, without the use of "physical momentum," it seeks to generate "effects" that will quickly translate into "support" from the civilian population.[55] In other words, this is the device that is used by the VNSA to struggle for the population's collective normative values and subsequently align/morph them towards the actor's strategic interests.

Hurley et al. argue that non-kinetic actions can take different forms, such as direct communication, indirect communication and what is defined as the "voice of actions," all of which vary according to the VNSA's doctrine and expectations of the population.[56] Direct communication refers to any sort of direct interaction that VNSA agents or combatants may have with the populace. For example, Mao's *Three Rules and Eight Remarks* ensured that the Chinese communist insurgents were well behaved towards civilians and thus emphasized that the "People's Army" was the "Army of the People."[57] Similarly, Mao employed ideological cadres that indoctrinated peasants in order to influence the population directly through non-kinetic means.[58] On the other hand, indirect communication refers to information or propaganda that the VNSA makes accessible for the target populations without needing to have a physical presence in order to deliver it (i.e., websites, print media or clandestine radio stations). The Iraqi Insurgency is a good example of a VNSA that has been able to successfully use the Internet both as a "virtual sanctuary" to broadcast jihadist propaganda and as a means of facilitating the conversion of possible insurgents and receiving economic support.[59] Finally, the "voice of actions" reflects physical activities that are not violent in nature but that instead come in the form of public goods such as infrastructure or healthcare—goods that are likely to generate pro-VNSA effects within the populace.[60] For instance, Hezbollah and Hamas have been successful in gathering local civilian support by providing public goods that local governments in the host nation have failed or been unable to deliver.[61] In the long run, the combination of any of these tactical tiers helps to conceptualize salient features of the non-kinetic doctrine that is being followed by a VNSA.



Figure 2: Thomas and Casebeer's VNSA System

Even so, it is important to remember the role that strategic culture plays in shaping the VNSA's choices and preferences, which eventually materialize into (on the ground) operational activities. Furthermore, the actor's culture defines its position towards the population and simultaneously provides guidance on how to interact with it. Specially, since the cultural determinants such as narratives, myths and ideologies within the armed actor provide a "theory" on how to achieve "victory," they will ascertain how to influence the populace and thus develop a doctrine of non-kinetic action towards it.[62] The VNSA's leadership elements may provide further determinants that will keep moulding an established non-kinetic doctrine. Also, the civilian populace that inhabits the armed actor's area of operations has heterogeneous characteristics, as it may be divided along tribal, socio-economic, religious or ethnic lines, which can influence how the VNSA behaves towards segments of the population.[63] Certainly, as a rational actor, the VNSA is more likely to seek sub-groups in the general population that are prone to be influenced by its non-kinetic strategy. Ultimately, the beliefs and expectations that the armed actor has on the population will shape the cognitive process that translates this normative framework into operational actions. The dialectical relationship between the VNSA's normative framework and its leadership will determine what non-kinetic strategy will effectively influence the population while simultaneously adhering to the actor's political and cultural dogma. In addition, the desired effects from the non-kinetic doctrine must be complimentary to the actor's use of violence and overall strategic objectives.

THE TALIBAN AS A COTEMPORARY CASE STUDY

The Taliban is a VNSA that has experienced an evolutionary process, which has transformed a radical fringe organization into one of the most infamous insurgencies in today's international security environment. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the victorious *mujahedeens* never became a cohesive movement but instead were deeply divided along tribal, ethnic and political lines. Subsequently, the lack of consensus among the different resistance groups made the newly established provisional government virtually non-existent, leaving a power-vacuum, which the *mujahedeen* leaders competed for.[64] Indeed, these same warlords violently fought each other in order to maintain control of areas that in their point of view have traditionally belonged to their respective tribe or ethnic group.[65] In addition, the most powerful ones sought to control Kabul and the provisional government as a way to showcase their power.[66] Thus, the Afghani political landscape came to resemble more a medieval feudal society than a modern Westphalian state.[67] During this period, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the Afghan–Pakistan region by building *madrassas*, which sought to spread the conservative Wahhabi version of Islam among the local tribal communities.[68] The residential free education offered by these religious schools became extremely popular among Afghan refugees living in the Pakistani borderlands who had fled their homelands during the Soviet invasion and the ongoing civil war.[69] From there, the Taliban (literally meaning the "students") emerged as a radical Islamist movement that combined Wahhabi radicalism with traditional South Asian Deobandi beliefs.[70] Between 1994 and 1996, under the auspices of the Pakistani ISID (Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate), which had grown weary of the situation in Afghanistan, the Taliban militants took over their home country at a speed that surprised many observers.[71] Initially this VNSA, under the command of Mullah Mohammed Omar, gained considerable popular support for ending the violence and corruption generated by the warlords.[72] However, this widespread optimism soon turned into fear because of the Taliban's austere interpretation and draconian enforcement of Islamic law.[73]

By 1998, the Taliban was able to control 80% of the country, creating a *de facto* state that was only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Only a small portion of the country was left under the control of the Northern Alliance, which was a fragile coalition of non-Pashtun warlords (mainly Hazaras, Tajiks and Turkmens). Nevertheless, the political status of the Taliban would change once again in 2001 when the US-led coalition launched Op ENDURING FREEDOM and Op as a response to al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks.[74] Only 102 days after the New York terrorist attacks, the Taliban regime was brought to its knees by American and allied forces.[75] From 2002 until the present day, the Taliban has resurfaced as an insurgency fighting against both the NATO forces deployed all across Afghanistan and the newly established Government of Afghanistan (GOA), which this VNSA deems to be illegitimate.[76] Indeed, for the Taliban, it became a matter of regrouping and reorganizing itself in order to launch a gradually intensifying irregular warfare campaign against the new Afghan political order.[77] David Kilcullen argues that, in its present form, the Taliban is an "insurgent coalition" that is composed of a "fragmented series of tactical alliances of convenience."[78] Currently, the major factions within the "greater Taliban" are the Taliban Quetta *shura* (council), which is mainly the leadership of the 1990s Taliban regime led by Mullah Omar, Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (aka the Pakistani Taliban), and smaller movements such as *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* (LeT), *Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin* (HiG), *Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM), plus surviving elements of al Qaeda.[79] Hence, this chapter will examine how the current Taliban organization has developed an overarching strategic culture that has helped shape its current non-kinetic strategy.

CULTURAL DETERMINANTS AS COHESION IN A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM

The fact that the Taliban is shaped as an insurgent federacy may give the impression that the organization of this VNSA is somewhat chaotic and without effective central command structures. However, according to Antonio Giustozzi, between 2002 and 2006, the Quetta *shura* was successful in co-opting and re-absorbing the lesser insurgent groups into the greater Taliban structure and thus in exercising a high degree of control over them.[80] The only exception has been HiG, which, since 2004, has violently clashed with the Taliban and as of 2010 has been willing to enter in peace negotiations with Kabul.[81] Even so, the Taliban and its subsidiaries remain as the major VNSA organization operating throughout Afghanistan. Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood argue that the Taliban is a "network of franchises" in which a "local Taliban" gains recognition from the organization's main hierarchy (Quetta *shura*) in return for its "support and cooperation."[82]

Consequently, the local-level franchise will support the Taliban grand strategy while retaining local freedom of action, and thus it allows it to exploit "tribal loyalties" or other socio-cultural structures within its area of operations.[83] For the central *shura* to maintain the general direction of the organization's grand strategy, it appoints six regional commanders whose responsibility is to ensure that the "local Talibans" are acting in accordance with the leadership's interests while allowing them to have a high degree of flexibility in the way that they are organized and in the tactics that they choose to employ.[84] As a matter of fact, these regional commanders are responsible for disseminating the central *shura*'s directives as *fatwas* (religious decrees), which the leaders of the local cells must follow in the context of their operational situation.[85]

Given the extensive geographical area that is covered by each regional command, it becomes imperative for the leadership component of the Taliban to employ cultural determinants (i.e., *fatwas)* as command and control devices necessary to steering the organization's general strategic direction. For instance, since the Taliban's shift from being a vertically integrated regime to a horizontally managed insurgency, Mullah M. Omar has ceased dictating direct operational orders and has instead focused on sending "messages of encouragement" to field commanders as strategic guidance.[86] Still, the leadership has also set up more rigorous control mechanisms such as the *Laheya*, which is a guidebook on conduct and discipline that Taliban insurgents are expected to follow.[87] To some extent, this rulebook bears some resemblance to Mao's *Three Rules and Eight Remarks*, as it seeks to generate popular support through positive interactions between the insurgents and the local populace. Among the *Laheya's* most salient points there are three prevalent themes, which are as follows: the importance given to the local commander and the chain of command; the prohibition of the harassment or ill treatment of civilians; and the use of local commanders, the Council of Ulema (clerics' council) or tribal elders to resolve issues between local cells and the civilian population.[88] Withal, according to Giustozzi, as far as the available information shows, the Taliban throughout Afghanistan seem to adhere to this rulebook, which reflects the functionality that exists in the command and control structure between the Quetta *shura* and the local Taliban cells.[89] Also, by using narratives and literature such as these, the central leadership of the Taliban is able to ensure that the local cells are part of the organization's main effort without compromising their decentralization. Both Kilcullen and Giustozzi note that the ability of local Talibans to operate without central support has become one of their strengths when fighting both NATO and GOA forces, as any COIN operation must take into consideration the difference that exist in the *modus operandi* of each cell.[90]

By the same token, Afsar et al. assert that the Taliban's grand strategy is divided into four sequential stages. First, the Taliban seeks to mobilize the religious public in Afghanistan and neighbouring states; afterwards, it will rally the Pashtun tribes through ideological means against the Kabul government; thirdly, it will secure legitimacy for the movement while people loose confidence in the government; and, finally, it will re-establish an Islamic emirate that will be composed of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan.[91] In principle, this strategic scheme follows a classical irregular warfare framework through which victory can only be achieved through gradual popular support. Moreover, Seth G. Jones argues that the general strategy being adopted by the Taliban allows each local cell to develop its own logistics and support networks, which are tailored to the local population's characteristics.[92] To some extent, this notion exports Thomas and Casebeer's VNSA-system model from the overall actor (Taliban) to the franchises (individual cells), making each of the latter responsible for developing its own sub-systems. Clearly, this approach has helped the Taliban to regain strength in an extremely heterogeneous battle space. By way of illustration, some observers initially suggested that the Taliban has traditionally favoured the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, whose home region is Kandahar province. The tribe is also the group to which Mullah M. Omar belongs.[93] Even some members from the US and NATO forces have gone as far as tagging the Taliban as a "Ghilzai Insurgency."[94] Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Giustozzi, the Taliban "did not want to present themselves as aligned with a particular tribe or community," as they yearn to expand and operate throughout the whole of Afghanistan.[95] Indeed, the majority of the Quetta *shura* is currently composed of members of non-Ghilzai tribes (mainly Durrani and Karlanri), showing that the Taliban's decentralized organization is inclusive through ideology rather than being exclusive through ethnicity.[96] Simultaneously, the Taliban franchises have successfully gathered support from communities that belong to other ethnic groups, such as the pro-Taliban cells composed mainly of Hazaras and Tajiks in the northern part of the country.[97] Clearly this elucidates the fact that, by using a decentralized system, the Taliban is able to use local commanders that are native to their area of operations, and that it can therefore exploit existing cultural dynamics regardless of the region's human geography.

Canadian soldiers from Charles Company, 1st Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment, conduct operations in the Panjwai District west of Kandahar City after an unconfirmed number of suspected Taliban insurgents were spotted in the immediate area possibly trying to set up an ambush

Source: Combat Camera

NON-KINETIC DOCTRINE: MULLAHS AND THE SHADOW EMIRATE

As a result of the Taliban's decentralized system, the notion of having a non-kinetic doctrine overlaid on the way local Taliban commanders put into operational action the guidance that is provided by the main *shura*. The central leadership of the organization expects each cell to act in accordance with the disposition of the population, and thus the latter must try to either persuade or coerce it. While the individual tactics that the cell commanders employ must be tailored to the target population, the Taliban overall seems to use similar direct and indirect non-kinetic actions throughout the regions of Afghanistan where it operates. For instance, David Kilcullen notes that the Taliban has launched a propaganda campaign throughout southern Afghanistan that focuses on five simple slogans: "Our party, the Taliban"; "Our people and nation, the Pashtun"; "Our economy, the poppy"; "Our constitution, the sharia"; and "Our form of government, the emirate."[98] In principle, the purpose of these "rallying calls" has been to create a unified front among social groups that would politically compete against each other (i.e., tribal elders vs. Islamists vs. poppy growers).[99] Certainly, this approach also permits local cell commanders to focus on non-kinetic tactics that target the interests of major regional stakeholders, such as poppy growers in southern Helmand, Islamists in Kandahar or tribal patriarchs in Zabul. Moreover, this broad yet efficient approach has facilitated the establishment of support networks by the Taliban, as noted by a report from the Afghan National Directorate for Security, which states that

[The Taliban's use of] recruitment techniques in the ongoing stage is becoming sophisticated. They approach tribes, sub-tribes and communities in the villages. They want them to sever their relationship with the government and also preach to the population to support the jihad against the Americans and the government, which they consider the infidel.[100]

Nonetheless, at the tactical-cell level, it is possible to see how local Taliban commanders can employ a variety of tactics that shift from district to district. Hence, the Taliban's non-kinetic doctrine can be placed in a dichotomy of indirect and direct tactics, which, according to Tim Foxley, seem to come from different command sources, once again elucidating the decentralized structure of the Taliban.

In reality, the Taliban has a very wide-ranging psychological operations (PSYOPS) arsenal that can target specific audiences in a variety of operational environments in Afghanistan. In the case of indirect non-kinetic action, the Taliban has learnt that the use of technology in the form of multimedia goods can "serve its cause," as it did for the insurgency in Iraq.[101] For example, the Taliban has distributed thousands of DVDs and VCDs in Kabul, Kandahar and some of the other major cities containing footage of "successful" Taliban operations, speeches by mullahs regarding the "inherent" conflict between Islam and the West, and other recordings showing jihadists from all over the Muslim world.[102] It is known that sympathizers of the Quetta *shura* make most of these, as they are able to disseminate propaganda in areas that are controlled by the government or NATO, such as in major urban centres. The Taliban also seeks to reach protected populations by establishing clandestine radio stations (i.e., the *Voice of Sharia*) and websites (i.e., www.alemarah.org), which can reach audiences all over the region.[103] Furthermore, the Taliban has also become quite skilled at using official media outlets, such as regional and international news agencies, to promote itself in order to gain new recruits or gather popular support.[104] According to Jason Motlagh, the Taliban currently has the upper hand with respect to influencing the population, as the GOA has been quite slow in developing a propaganda strategy that could counteract the multimedia approach being used by the insurgents.[105] However, as Foxley argues, the strength of the Taliban's non-kinetic doctrine really lies in its direct-action tactics, as most Afghans do not own TVs, radios or PCs through which they can access the multimedia propaganda circulated by the insurgency.[106]

When examining the direct non-kinetic activities being employed by local Taliban cell commanders, it becomes obvious that using both persuasive and coercive methodologies is dependent on the cultural context of both the cell and the referent civilian populace. For example, Kilcullen notes how the elders of the Mahsud tribe on the Afghan–Pakistan border encourage some of their youth to fight and support the Taliban as a result of tribal loyalties that may exist between them and Taliban commanders.[107] Also, the commanders may use economic means to encourage local civilians to join their lines or support them, especially since the latter may not have any political preferences towards the Taliban. Instead, these individuals work as "part-time" insurgents that get remunerated by the Taliban based on the specific "combat jobs" they perform, or, as Kilcullen points out, some of them temporarily join the Taliban, becoming "accidental guerrillas" as a result of the lack of opportunities that exist in their communities.[108] Also, the insurgents have the ability to present themselves as an instrument to exercise *badal* (revenge in the Pashtun honour code) to civilians who have lost members of their family or property due to NATO's collateral damage or "hard knock operations."[109] Comparably, there are cases where the local commander's intent is to win the population's "hearts and minds," which he does by informing them about a future ambush or attack against NATO or GOA forces in order to avoid collateral damage and demonstrate good will to the local inhabitants.[110] Yet, for the Taliban, favourable socio-cultural conditions are not always prevalent in many of the districts through which it operates, therefore compelling local commanders to use coercive means with the population.

One of the most prevalent types of coercive non-kinetic actions currently employed by the Taliban is the posting of *shabnamah* (night letters) in local communities, which has been described as an efficient method of "population control."[111] Historically, these letters have been literary instruments used by Afghan "religious figures, jihadists and rebels to encourage people" to oppose "state authority and regulations"; the letters were quite prevalent during the wars against the Afghan monarchy and the Soviet invasion.[112] Today, the Taliban is using them as a method of popular "instruction and intimidation" through which it exposes civilians to the organization's narrative while simultaneously dictating the behaviour that the insurgency is expecting of them (mainly, to not cooperate with NATO or GOA forces).[113] People who fail to follow those instructions are deemed to be "collaborationists"[114] and run the risk of suffering public beatings or being assassinated. Pro-Taliban mullahs are also frequently used as an additional cultural weapon, as they are quite influential in Afghan society. In the past, mullahs would be hired by *maliks* (tribe leaders) as spiritual guides to serve the community; however, after the introduction of Salafist *madrassas*, the mullahs have transformed into local leadership figures who compete politically against their former patrons.[115] More importantly, because most of the leading *shuras* are composed of mullahs, the Taliban has used them to set up support networks, given that a great majority of clerics in rural areas have links with the insurgency.[116] Therefore, local pro-Taliban mullahs are able to apply pressure on the population by preaching against backing the "corrupt government in Kabul" or doing anything that would be detrimental to the Taliban's main effort.[117]

Ultimately, the biggest success with respect to the Taliban's non-kinetic strategy has been its ability to install shadow government institutions in 18 districts where the presence of NATO troops or the GOA is weak.[118] Mainly, these come in the form of sharia courts in which local commanders perform judge/conflict-resolution duties for local communities.[119] The main threat that is posed by these "shadow courts" is that the civilian populace starts seeing the Taliban as a moral and legal authority that is superior to the GOA and even traditional tribal structures. In some instances, the Taliban has sought to provide medical and education services (after destroying government-funded clinics and schools); however, because of their clandestine nature, it becomes difficult to distribute these public goods without government or foreign forces disruption.[120] Conclusively, the decentralized approach to non-kinetic action has allowed the Taliban to influence a great portion of Afghanistan's heterogeneous population. However, the strategic strength that is provided by this organizational structure may also become its prime weakness. The contradictions generated by different local Taliban commanders may hinder any decisive action that can be taken against the GOA or NATO. Furthermore, current COIN operations in Afghanistan can exploit the existing incoherence that may exist among Taliban cells within a regional command as a way to weaken their influence on local populations.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the precedence that the human battle space has in irregular conflict environments makes it imperative for VNSAs to develop non-kinetic strategies that seek to sway civilian populations in their favour. However, the methodology on how to accomplish this is mainly dictated by the strategic culture that the armed actors possess, which ultimately works as an operational guide. Certainly, internal cultural devices such as organizational history, ideology, narratives and beliefs provide the VNSA with a theory on how to achieve victory against the state or other hostile VNSAs. Also, this same strategic culture defines how the VNSAs see themselves in relation to the relevant civilian populations and the expectations they have from them. Therefore, the development and implementation of non-kinetic strategies is a process strictly derived from the approach through which an armed non-state actor seeks to achieve victory as it becomes necessary to provide its campaign of physical violence with some sort of political, social, or economic meaning that makes it acceptable for the civilian masses. Fundamentally, both physical violence and non-kinetic action are complimentary and dependent on each other in irregular warfare.

As it was discussed throughout this piece, the shape of these strategies is as diverse as the groups that utilize them because of the heterogeneous nature of the human societies that are being targeted. Even so, through the case studies examined in this paper, it is possible to point out two common themes in the way VNSAs engage civilian populations. Those common themes are the dichotomies of persuasion vs. coercion and direct vs. indirect action. For an armed non-state actor that seeks to displace the state from its area of operations, the use of both persuasive and coercive tactics facilitates the erosion of government presence in target civilian communities. By persuading, the VNSA is able to obtain popular support, while by coercing, the population starts loosing faith in the public authorities and thus looks at the armed actor as the main agent of social order. In the case of the Taliban's decentralized system, local commanders seek to either persuade or coerce the populations at the district level, depending on their posture towards the insurgency, the GOA or NATO-ISAF forces.

Finally, it is worth mentioning how the VNSAs are able to use these non-kinetic strategies to exploit points of social tension that are being experienced by the target populations. Grievances such as lack of economic opportunities, political oppression or even the state's inability to provide public goods create a niche for the VNSAs' non-kinetic strategies, as these can be moulded as a response to these issues. Similarly, the VNSA may choose to employ cultural devices such as mythology, religion or local beliefs as access points to the population, which again can be used to gather support and acceptance from the target audience. For COIN practitioners, this reflects the necessity to develop strategies that are able to deny any type of political, economic or cultural exploitation that can be used by VNSAs in their favour. Furthermore, this denial must be accompanied by flexibility, as any COIN practitioner must be ready to not only accurately detect possible features that may be exploited by non-state actors but also be capable of using a wide range of military, political and civilian tools that can efficiently create a barrier between the VNSA and the civilian population.

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Major Bob Ritchie of the OMLT (Operational Liaison and Mentoring Team) speaks with a soldier of the Afghan National Army during an operation in the Panjwai District of Afghanistan

Source: Combat Camera

JUST FOLLOWING ORDERS IS NOT SUFFICIENT:
How to Make Ethical Decisions

Mr. J. Peter Bradley, PhD

I was speaking with a senior army officer recently about ethics training for soldiers. When I suggested that soldiers should receive training on how to make ethical decisions, he said this was not necessary; "all soldiers have to do is follow orders." I was surprised by this stance, but then wondered if other military personnel might hold similar views. This prompted me to examine my own beliefs on the subject and write this article on why junior military personnel should be taught how to make ethical decisions.

When individuals take a position on a particular issue, it is not uncommon for them to overlook opposing points of view. With this in mind, I began my analysis by considering potential objections to teaching soldiers about ethical decision making, and I came up with four. First, soldiers do not need to know about ethical decision making because that is not part of their job. Second, Canadian soldiers are ethical and do not need further development in this area. Third, ethics cannot be taught. Fourth, orders and regulations provide all the guidance that soldiers need to perform their duties. In the following paragraphs, I refute each of these arguments and show why military personnel should receive instruction on how to make ethical decisions. Finally, I conclude with an outline for a short course on military ethics.

PART ONE: WHY TEACH SOLDIERS ABOUT ETHICAL DECISION MAKING?

Is ethical decision making part of the soldier's role?
One objection to teaching soldiers how to make ethical decisions might be that they do not need to have this skill because ethical decision making is not the job of soldiers. Proponents of this position might say that soldiers are men and women of action, while ethical analysis is for individuals more interested in talk than action. This view, to the extent it exists, fails to take into account how frequently ethical problems can surface in military life and the dire consequences that follow when soldiers make unethical choices. This position also ignores the fact that military professionals, regardless of how junior in rank, must be capable of making ethical decisions.[1] I will expand on each of these points.

First, there are many dilemmas in military life that require individuals to make ethical decisions. I should pause here briefly to explain what I mean by the term "ethical decision." I use the term in two ways. First, an ethical decision is one in which the choices presented to the decision maker have ethical implications. If the choices open to the decision maker have the potential to harm or benefit people (stakeholders), then the decision has ethical implications. Clearly, most of the decisions that military personnel make in operations have the potential to harm or benefit someone (e.g., subordinates, peers, non-combatants, enemy) and are therefore decisions with ethical implications, which I label in this essay, ethical decisions. Second, an ethical decision can be distinguished from an unethical decision by examining relevant outcomes, motives and obligations. If the decision maker chooses an option that: (a) leads to moral outcomes, (b) satisfies the moral and professional obligations owed stakeholders and (c) follows from moral motives rather than self-interest or other non-moral influences, then he or she has made an ethical decision.

Second, mishandling decisions with ethical implications and making unethical choices can be harmful at many levels. As pointed out in the Chief of the Land Staff's policy on army ethics, unethical actions on the part of soldiers can erode public support for military operations,[2] a strategic blow to the military force of any democratic nation. At the tactical level, unethical behaviour can hurt both the stakeholders impacted by the decision and the decision maker himself. The violence inherent in military operations ensures that unethical choices by soldiers can cause harm to those nearby. Consequences for the decision maker can include disciplinary action if the unethical actions are also illegal actions. The decision maker can also experience moral trauma. In his work with Vietnam veterans, American psychiatrist Jonathan Shay observed that many of his patients suffered from post-traumatic stress because of moral injury.[3] Recently, Brett Litz

and his colleagues fine-tuned the concept of moral injury, defining it as "perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations."[4] Because each of the actions included in Litz's definition (perpetrating, etc.) involves decisions that can lead to serious mental health outcomes such as post-traumatic stress, depression and other afflictions, it seems appropriate for the military to protect its personnel with high-quality training in ethical decision making.

Third, ethical decision making is an important part of professional life. Being a member of a profession carries an expectation that the individual will act in accordance with ethical values and professional codes. But values and professional principles come into conflict on occasion, and simply following rules or orders will not always lead to proper professional behaviour. Professional people need to be able to make professional decisions, and training is required to provide them with the skills they need to make such decisions. That is why training in ethical decision making is included in the professional development of doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers and members of other professions. The Canadian military purports to be a profession, and the Canadian Forces (CF) manual, *Duty with Honour*,[5] declares that everyone in the CF, regardless of rank, is a member of the Canadian military profession; consequently, the CF should be teaching its members, even junior members, how to make ethical (professional) decisions.

To sum up, ethical decision making is an important part of the soldier's role. Ethical decisions are integral to military operations. The consequences of getting such decisions wrong can have far-reaching effects, and the military's professional status requires that all its members, from the highest to the lowest ranks, know how to make ethical choices.



Why the emphasis on ethics training? Aren't Canadian soldiers ethical?
A second possible objection to teaching soldiers how to make ethical decisions is that it is unnecessary because they are, for the most part, ethical people. Because Canadian soldiers have not committed unprofessional acts like some soldiers in other militaries, proponents of this view might say that Canadian soldiers do not need ethics training. There are several problems with this position.

First, Canadian soldiers have engaged in unethical behaviour in the past. The most significant examples are the professional failures of army personnel in Somalia and Bakovici in the 1990s. During the deployment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to Somalia in 1993, soldiers committed a number of unethical, and illegal, acts.[6] Several Somali men were killed by Canadian soldiers under questionable circumstances during this tour, but the event that is remembered most is the torture and beating to death of a local teenager who had been caught stealing camp equipment.[7] Around the same time that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was experiencing ethical failures in Somalia, the 12e Regiment blindé du Canada was having its own problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the former Yugoslavia. At the heart of this episode was a group of about 40 Canadian soldiers who had been tasked with protecting the staff and patients at a mental hospital in Bakovici. Distressing reports emerged in the spring of 1994 alleging that some of these soldiers had been involved in drinking parties, sexual activity with nurses and interpreters, rough treatment of patients, and black-market activity.[8] Investigations into the Somalia and Bakovici incidents showed that Canadian soldiers had indeed made poor moral choices. In addition, these moral failures resulted in embarrassment for the Canadian Forces, grief for the victims and career repercussions for the perpetrators.

Third, not all unethical acts are large-scale, public events that bring unwanted attention and humiliation to the military and the nation. In fact, most unethical acts are smaller, common occurrences that go unnoticed except by those directly involved. Actions such as roughing up detainees, selecting a favoured soldier for promotion over a more worthy individual or falsifying reports may seem relatively small on the grand

scale of unethical behaviour, but they are unethical acts nonetheless and often go unreported. Incidents of such minor magnitude occur more regularly than we might think and erode professional ethos. So how is a junior soldier implicated in such episodes supposed to act? Without any training in ethical decision making, individuals are left to figure out what is right on their own.



Although there have not been any large-scale, public displays of unethical behaviour from Canadian soldiers in recent years, there have been lapses in our not-too-distant past, and we can be certain that minor transgressions are occurring now. There is a tendency to downplay smaller transgressions, but even minor breaches of ethical behaviour can have a detrimental effect on the professional development of junior personnel and therefore must be eliminated to the greatest possible extent. Teaching soldiers about ethics and ethical decision making can help in this area.

Can ethics be taught?

A third objection to teaching soldiers how to make ethical decisions might be the commonly heard assertion that ethics cannot be taught. This position is often based on two assumptions: (a) by the time most people reach early adulthood, their "ethical character is firmly set"[9] and (b) there is no evidence that ethics education or training actually enhances ethical functioning.

While it is true that much of our personal development occurs in the early years, we do not stop evolving when we reach adulthood. In fact, people are still growing in late adolescence—about the age that many recruits join the military. Consider, for example, how the attitudes of most military personnel change in the early years of their career on issues related to physical fitness, patriotism and teamwork. In many cases, these values are developed and shaped by military experience.

As for the argument that ethics training does not influence ethical behaviour, we first need to understand that ethical behaviour is much more complex than most people realize. In fact, there are four components of ethical behaviour—perception, judgment, motivation and action—each of which is itself a form of behaviour.[10] For example, perceiving the ethical implications of a situation is a critical moral behaviour, even though it is a cognitive response that may not be observable to others. Similarly, moral judgment is a cognitive behaviour that draws on the intellectual abilities of individuals to weigh all the issues when solving ethical problems. Moral motivation refers to the willingness of an individual to act on the basis of ethical ideals rather than self-interest. Ethical action is where all the dimensions come together: the individual takes action after coming to an understanding of the ethics of the situation (perception), made an ethical choice (judgment) and decided to pursue the ethical option (motivation).

When we view ethical behaviour as a complex array of actions and abilities, we observe that education and training enhances some aspects of ethical behaviour, but perhaps not others. Research has shown that moral perception (also called sensitivity) and judgment can be improved through education and training—we can teach people to be more aware of the ethical implications of daily life and to improve their moral decision-making ability.[11] While there is no research evidence showing that education directly affects ethical action itself, there are studies showing that increasing one's moral judgment with education or training can lead to ethical actions, thus indicating a link between education and action via judgment.[12] It should be pointed out that research on the relations between ethics education and ethical action is still an emerging field, with no studies based on military samples yet, so there is still much to learn in this area. That said, findings to date indicate that important aspects of ethical functioning can be enhanced with education and training.

Overall, it appears that education and training does have a positive effect on the ethical development of individuals. In fact, virtually every Western military now devotes considerable resources to ethics education for officers (for more on this, see the volume of essays on military ethics education by Robinson, de Lee and Garrick).[13] While such education for officers is commendable, it should be extended to junior members of the military.

Don't orders and regulations provide all the guidance required?
A fourth objection to teaching soldiers how to make ethical decisions might be that orders and regulations, by themselves, are thought to be sufficient for guiding the behaviour of military personnel. In the words of the colleague I mentioned in my introduction, "all soldiers have to do is follow orders." Often this is true, but not always. I can think of four instances in which orders may not be sufficient.

First, situations can change after orders have been issued, and military leaders may not be present to give soldiers direction when they need it. Army units are dispersed on the battlefield to a greater extent than in the past, so it is not uncommon for junior soldiers to work independently or in small groups. At times like these, individual soldiers may be required to make decisions that have serious consequences, perhaps even with life-and-death implications. Even though soldiers in such situations are usually operating under orders or statements of commander's intent, situations can change after orders have been issued, and unexpected opportunities to pursue other important goals can emerge. If the commander is not available to provide direction when these changes occur, the soldier on the ground must decide what to do. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the Canadian army subscribes to the mission command philosophy in which "subordinates are empowered to perform and respond to situations as their commander would have, had the commander been there in person."[14]

Colonel Hercule Gosselin, Commanding Officer of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) is given a tour of an Afghan National Police (ANP) Control Point (CP) in the Panjwai District by the ANP CP Commander



Second, even the most comprehensive orders, standard operating procedures and rules of engagement (ROE) cannot cover all the smaller decisions that must be made when obeying orders. Imagine, for example, all the little, and not so little, decisions a sergeant might have to make while obeying an order to establish mobile checkpoints in an urban combat zone. Where do I position the checkpoints? Which of my soldiers do I place at the first point of contact where people enter the checkpoint? What levels of military force will be used? Under what conditions? The list goes on. In fact, the decisions that must be made in such small-unit operations have serious ethical implications, as illustrated in an article by Thomas Smith on the difficulties American soldiers experienced in avoiding civilian casualties at hasty checkpoints in Iraq.[15] Smith noted that soldiers were applying their ROE in a way that emphasized force protection at the expense of non-combatant immunity. In response to comments about the shortcomings of ROE, a general, who was quoted in the same article, stated that ROE "were never intended to tell service members exactly what to do in a specific situation … instead, they serve as reminder of general principles of the law of armed conflict."[16] In other words, soldiers are expected to interpret ROE, and because such interpretations have life-and-death implications for civilians and soldiers, they are, by nature, ethical decisions, which require soldiers to have highly developed ethical decision-making abilities.

Third, even though military personnel are obliged to follow legal orders, individuals up and down the chain of command often exercise discretion when following orders. Subordinates can respond to orders in a variety of ways. They might follow orders to the fullest extent possible, follow orders half-heartedly or follow some orders while ignoring others. In the same vein, Canadian military historian Anthony Kellett has observed a certain flexibility with respect to following orders in combat, with soldiers occasionally expressing outward compliance to orders while not actually obeying them.[17] Such reactions to orders are quite complex, reflecting a chain of assessments and decisions in which individuals contemplate the orders they receive, consider the implications of the orders and then take one form of action or another. When viewed this way, we see that military personnel make decisions involving ethical implications all the time, even when obeying orders.

Fourth, superiors can issue illegal or immoral orders that subordinates should not obey. This is rare, but crimes of obedience can occur when someone in "authority gives orders exceeding the bounds of morality or law,"[18] and soldiers then commit crimes by complying with the orders. It is important that soldiers know how to tell the difference between legal orders and illegal orders, but it is easy to confuse the two. Classes on how to evaluate ethical problems and make ethical decisions would help soldiers distinguish legal orders from illegal ones. Crimes of obedience, such as the atrocities at My Lai[19] and some of the transgressions at Abu Ghraib,[20] typically occur because junior personnel are not sure of the difference between legal and illegal orders. Such events can also follow from vague and ambiguous orders from leaders, which can then interact with the emotions of followers to create an environment in which soldiers commit harmful acts. For example, the torture and beating to death of Shidane Arone by Canadian soldiers in Somalia followed from a mix of influences: (a) vague authorization by officers to "abuse" Somali nationals caught infiltrating the camp and (b) the soldiers' anger over many things, including the large number of thieves slipping into camp each night.[21]

Orders and regulations alone are not sufficient for guiding military behaviour. Soldiers need to know how to make ethical decisions because there are so many decisions to be made, even when following orders. Furthermore, soldiers need to have decision-making skills for when leaders are not present or for the rare occasions when they receive illegal or morally ambiguous orders. In the absence of any formal training on how to make judgments about right and wrong, soldiers have to rely on their own personal decision-making abilities, which may not be sufficiently developed. Clearly, the military institution has a moral responsibility to teach its people how to make sound ethical decisions.

Sergeant Miranda Robertson questions local Afghans on the needs of their communities to help determine what projects should be undertaken by the Provincial Reconstruction Team

PART TWO: WHAT SHOULD BE TAUGHT IN ARMY ETHICS TRAINING?

Now that I have stressed the value of teaching soldiers about ethical decision making, allow me to suggest in this final part of the essay an outline for a short, introductory course on army ethics that could be offered in Canadian army units. The course comprises five modules, described below, that could be taught over a two-day training period or presented as individual sessions of about two or three periods each, by instructors from within a unit's chain of command.

The first module introduces soldiers to the ethical and legal influences that define what it means to be a professional soldier in the Canadian Army. This is an introduction to the ethical foundations of army ethos in which soldiers would learn what professional concepts such as ethics, morality, legality and ethos mean. They would also learn how Canadian values, international law (i.e., Geneva conventions, law of armed conflict) and military rules and regulations (i.e., Queen's Regulations and Orders, rules of engagement, Statement of Defence Ethics) come together to shape army ethos. This is an excellent occasion for a unit leader (e.g., company or platoon commander, sergeant-major) to explain to soldiers what it means to be a member of the regiment, battalion, unit, etc.

The second module would focus on influences that can cause soldiers to make unethical choices. Soldiers' decisions are determined by a combination of their own personal qualities (intelligence, motivation, etc.) and characteristics of the situation (leadership, peer support, threat level, etc.). Instruction in this module would highlight the personal characteristics that soldiers need to muster to make the correct choices, and point out those negative personal qualities (e.g., prejudicial attitudes, lack of self-confidence) that can contribute to unethical choices. An important part of this module would focus on the social influences in military units that can lead to unethical outcomes (e.g., negative peer influences, animosity towards out-groups) and decision-making errors that commonly occur in stressful situations.

The third module would expose soldiers to the types of ethical challenges they may face on operations. Of course, ethical challenges can vary from one kind of military operation to another, so this module would have to be updated regularly to ensure its relevance with current Army operations. Topics covered here would include issues such as how to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, how to apply proportional force (not so much as to incur non-combatant casualties, but enough to fulfill the mission), how to treat detainees and prisoners, and how to respond when witnessing unlawful behaviour or cultural customs that would be considered unethical in Canada. Torture should also be covered in this module to illustrate how uncontrolled emotion and poor leadership can lead good soldiers to engage in torture.

The fourth module would teach soldiers how to conduct an ethical analysis, that is, how to mentally work through an ethical problem to decide on a morally correct course of action. As mentioned in the first part of this essay, soldiers at all levels of the Canadian Army are considered to be military professionals, so they need to be able to make professional decisions when required. The teaching points of this module would be based on the four-stage decision-making model promoted by the Army Ethics Programme (perception, judgment, action, learning)[22] and the idea that ethical decision making is about taking the interests of others into account, not looking after oneself first.

The fifth module would focus on implementing ethical solutions. Many individuals are able to determine right from wrong but then fail to do the right thing for one reason or another—perhaps through fear of retribution from leaders, losing the support of their peers, or other risks. Consider the options open to a junior soldier in Adam Day's story of a vehicle patrol during Operation ATHENA in Afghanistan.[23] A section of Canadian soldiers had been tasked with reconnoitring a number of objectives, but they did not complete the mission as ordered. Instead, the team stopped about halfway through the patrol and napped until it was time to return to the base. Imagine the dilemma this presents to a junior member of the patrol. What action should the soldier take? If the soldier is able to delude himself into thinking the mission was stupid or too risky, he might be personally satisfied with the way the patrol was partially executed and not do anything. On the other hand, he would know that it was professionally wrong to complete only part of the mission. A simple ethical analysis could tell him that. But what should he do now, especially if no one else from the patrol team is taking action? The intent of this module would be to show soldiers how to deal with situations like these—to give them options when faced with difficult choices.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that ethical decision making is an important part of the Canadian military profession, and all military professionals need to know how to make professional choices. Like most Western military forces, the CF has programs in place to educate officers and senior non-commissioned members about ethics. Given that we are now in the age of the strategic corporal,[24] training in ethical decision making needs to be provided to junior soldiers as well.

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ENDNOTES

1. There is a considerable overlap between the terms "ethical" and "professional." In some cases the terms are virtually synonymous, because all professions have codes of ethics for guiding the behaviour of their members, and many of the difficult decisions that professionals face are ethical decisions.

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While at one of the forward operating bases, the Honourable Governor of Kandahar, Rahmatullah Raoufi greeted and discussed affairs with Brigadier General Denis Thompson, the Commander of Task Force Kandahar

Source: Combat Camera

The Royal Canadian Dragoons march on to Parliament Hill for the 125th anniversary parade of the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Royal Canadian Regiment

Source: Combat Camera

RICHARD TURNER'S SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Mr. William Stewart

"Never let it be said the Canadians had let their guns be taken."

—R.E.W. Turner, 7 November 1900

On a windy 21 February 1900, Lieutenant R.E.W. Turner, commanding No. 3 Troop "B" Squadron of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles, embarked on the SS *Milwaukee* for South Africa to fight for Queen, Empire, and country on a foreign shore. The South African War (1899–1902) "made" Turner as an officer, a leader, and a recognized war hero. It was also the critical step that brought Turner to command the 2nd Canadian Division and eventually all Canadian forces in England during the First World War.

A group of officers of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles, Lieutenant R.E.W. Turner is shown standing first from the right

In 1899, Turner was a respected field-grade cavalry officer from a wealthy and influential Canadian family. Photographs of the time reveal an unprepossessing war leader. They show a slim 26-year-old man of slightly above-average height at 5'9½" with a weak chin and owlish glasses who looks like a mild wholesale grocery clerk.[1] In that non-bellicose figure, however, there existed a magnetic, aggressive, and authoritative subaltern who, through personal example, repeatedly convinced men to follow him into the utmost peril. In 1901, Turner returned to an enthusiastic welcome in Quebec City as a Lieutenant-Colonel with two wounds, a Victoria Cross, a Distinguished Service Order, and a superb war record.

When it was time to appoint senior commanders of the first Canadian contingent in the fall of 1914, there were arguably other Permanent Force officers better qualified to command. However, Sam Hughes, then Minister of Militia and Defence, wanted officers from the militia in command, and there were few equal to Turner's record of active service, seniority, and recognized courage.

Lieutenant General R.E.W. Turner, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,

This article examines Turner's transformation from the son of a wholesale grocery owner to a widely acknowledged Canadian war hero as a result of his service in the Boer War.[2] Specifically, it argues that his participation in the war was critical for his later military career in three respects. First, it developed his reputation, visibility, and legitimacy to differentiate him from other Militia officers of the same age and class. Second, it moulded his character as a leader, especially in the eyes of his peers as well as the public. Third, it also boosted his own confidence through successful military service; the accolades of his men, his peers, and his superiors; and the award of prestigious decorations.

WAR BACKGROUND

The South African War was the result of British imperial policy and commercial interests aligning at the end of the 1800s to annex the two Boer republics through peaceful means or, if necessary, through war and conquest. The Boers were determined to maintain their independence, even when faced with the prospect of war against the mighty British Empire. The Boers resolved to strike first and issued an ultimatum to the British on 9 October 1899, which, not surprisingly, the British rejected. Suddenly, the British Empire was at war. As part of a grander scheme to involve the Dominions in this Imperial web of military engagement, the British Government requested small contingents organized as companies from all the Dominions, including Canada. Initially, however, these formations were more of a symbol than they were a significant accretion of fighting strength to the rising British war effort.[3]

In Canada, the Laurier government was under intense pressure from countervailing forces to provide a contingent or to stay out of the war. In the end, Laurier, backed into a corner, had to offer a 1,000-man (i.e. battalion-sized) contingent that would be paid for by the British. This contingent became the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, an infantry unit that would later win fame for Canada at the Battle of Paardeberg. The surprising aspect of this offer of troops was that it was Canada's British-born Governor General who demanded that the battalion fight as a standalone unit, unlike the Australians and New Zealanders, whose initial contingents served only as companies within British units.[4]

RAISING THE SECOND CONTINGENT

Laurier's Cabinet met on 1 November 1899 and agreed that it was politically expedient to offer a second contingent. Initially, the British authorities politely declined the offer but promised to reconsider if circumstances changed. The humiliating defeats of the "Black Week" of 10–15 December 1899 changed the circumstances, and Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, cabled Canada on 16 December accepting the second contingent. He requested that it consist of trained mounted troops. In response, Canada offered a regiment of mounted rifles formed into two battalions, along with three batteries of field artillery.[5] Within a month of the offer's acceptance, the units were assembled, equipped, and awaiting transport to South Africa. This was a credible performance, considering the state of the Canadian Militia; in the words of James Woods, the "Canadian Militia was not an army, but an aggregation of amateur military units scattered widely across the Dominion."[6]

Each battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles (CMR) consisted of two squadrons of four troops, each of 40 men commanded by a lieutenant.[7] On 28 December, Turner was selected to command the 3rd troop, from Quebec City, of "B" Squadron 1st CMR.[8] Turner was a major in the Queen's Own Canadian Hussars and, like many other officers, he reverted to a lower rank to participate in the campaign. He was eager to go and was worried that he would have to remain behind when he was not selected for the first contingent.[9]

The squadron commander was Major Victor Williams, a 33-year-old Permanent Force officer and a member of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Ironically, thanks to Sam Hughes' dislike of the Permanent Force,

Turner leapt over Williams in rank in the First World War.[10] Turner found Williams excitable in battle and preferred the "A" Squadron commander Major William Forester.[11]

Each man was mounted on a Canadian horse, although the rigours of the trip to South Africa combined with harsh conditions on the *veldt* (prairies) quickly killed most horses. The campaign was hard on the horses, as only 18 of the original 375 Canadian horses survived the *veldt*.[12] By July, Turner recorded that he was on his ninth horse. The long hours in the saddle and the less robust Argentinian ponies meant a high loss rate for horses. Large horses were reserved for the Cavalry, so it was difficult to get suitable mounts. Each man was equipped with a Lee Enfield rifle, a sword bayonet, a cloth bandolier holding 100 rounds, and a Colt revolver. Initially, they wore Canadian clothing, but once in the field, the men received British clothing. Later in the campaign after hard wear, their clothing was more of a collection of patches and whatever they could steal.[13] The one piece of distinctive Canadian gear retained was their Stetson hats, which gave them a unique look.[14]

Edward Morrison, the officer commanding one of the Canadian Field Artillery sections, described the unit much later in the campaign:

> *You would not wonder at the good opinion entertained of Canadian troops out here if you saw the splendid work of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. On parade they look like a regiment of cowboys, with their shaggy little ponies, prairie hats and rough-and-ready uniform—for their original kit is worn out and they wear any sort of clothes they can pick up.*[15]

Commanding the 1st Battalion CMR was Lieutenant-Colonel François Lessard, the commander of the Permanent Force cavalry unit, the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD). Lessard was a rarity in the pre-war Permanent Force: he was a senior French-Canadian officer in a heavily English-oriented service.[16] Thanks to his Permanent Force background and strong innate abilities, Lessard knew both how to work the system and how to prepare and lead his men into battle.[17] Carman Miller characterizes him as "superb, courageous, decisive, cool and insistent."[18] However, the British authorities did not view Lessard as positively and thought he lacked confidence.[19]

The core of the 1st Battalion CMR was a Permanent Force cadre from the RCD amounting to a quarter of its strength, and they gave the battalion a strong foundation to build an effective mounted infantry unit. Lessard was able to convince the authorities to change the unit's name to the RCD in August, and that is the name used to describe the unit in the remainder of the article. Turner was not enamoured with the name change, recording in his diary on 5 September that he thought the change absurd and had told Lessard so.[20]

A horse destined to serve in the war, being off-loaded in Port Elizabeth

Before leaving for the war, in what the newspapers chronicled as one of the most romantic moments of the departure of the second contingent, Turner married his fiancée Harriet Augusta Godday on 8 January 1900. She was vacationing in England with her parents when Turner cabled her that they could marry if she could return before the unit departed in a week. She was clearly resourceful and decisive, and within two hours of getting the cable, she was packed and on her way to catch the next steamer to North America. She arrived the day before the wedding. They were married in the Quebec City Anglican Cathedral in appropriate pomp and circumstance, with a 30-man honour guard from the Canadian Mounted Rifles and a large crowd in attendance. Turner and his new bride had a one-day honeymoon in Montreal highlighted in Turner's diary by buying kit for his departure.[21]

Shortly thereafter, the unit departed to Halifax with Turner and his new wife after a torch-lit honour guard at the train station. Turner wrote "Happy Man" in his diary.[22] The troop arrived in Halifax on 12 January expecting to ship out shortly to South Africa, but the Canadian authorities had condemned the transport they were supposed to take. As a result, the unit spent six weeks in Halifax, which was probably not a hardship for the newly married couple. The delay also enabled Major Williams to train his raw troops in horsemanship, drill, and military deportment.

COMBATANTS

The RCD's foes were the Boers, a militia force who were excellent shots, superb horsemen, and resourceful. They would choose when to fight and when to retreat, so it was difficult for the ponderous British columns to engage them. The Boers did not have the training or the will to fight it out with the British and could not endure the heavy losses that the British routinely suffered. If the battle went against them, they would run pell-mell back to their horses and disappear into the *veldt*. They fought for their homeland, their farms, their families, and their way of life, and so were formidable opponents. While there were many complaints about the Boers using explosive bullets and not respecting the sanctity of the white flag, they generally treated prisoners with respect. In the case of the Canadians, they went above and beyond their responsibilities in their treatment of prisoners, often releasing them shortly after capture.[23]

The RCD were Mounted Infantry who fought in a single line, unlike the British, who fought in a double rank because of what Lessard perceived to be "better training."[24] The RCD trained and were equipped to fight both mounted and dismounted but always as infantry. The glorious cascade of horses, lances, and swords in a cavalry charge was not for them, as that usually resulted in empty saddles, dead horses, and little damage to the enemy. Theirs was the far more demanding drudgery of 20 hours in the saddle on searing hot days and freezing cold nights, constant vigilance, thorough care of their horses, poor rations, and deprivation of creature comforts, all interspersed with the fear and intensity of battle with an often unseen foe. They were usually the first to fight and the last off the battlefield. The mounted infantry had to be consummate horseman, physically tough and masters of field craft, and possess endurance and stamina. Successful leaders had to have quick intelligence, *coup d'oeil*, decisiveness, and the ability to motivate exhausted, thirsty, and scared men.

DEPARTURE

The RCD finally departed Halifax on the newly converted SS *Milwaukee* on 21 February with their men and horses, just as they learned about the RCR victory at the Battle of Paardeberg.[25] The long voyage gave the RCD another opportunity to gel as a unit. The men arrived healthy and acclimatized, but it was far harder on the horses—some were lost during the voyage and the remainder were debilitated by the lack of exercise and the difficult conditions.

The RCD arrived in Cape Town on 21 March and then spent a week at a windy, sand-encrusted location misnamed Green Point to allow the horses to recover. Originally, the British authorities had planned to give the raw Canadian troopers a month of training, but Lessard was able to convince them that the additional training done in Canada was sufficient. As a result, the unit marched to Stellenbosch on 5 April to collect remounts to replace the horses lost during the journey to South Africa.

Once in Stellenbosch, "B" Squadron advanced on 8 April towards Bloemfontein, the capital of the Boer Orange Free State and the main base of Field Marshal Lord Roberts, as its horses were in better shape than those of "A" Squadron and the need for Mounted Infantry was immediate. Roberts was the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa and had captured the city in earlier operations. The Squadron and Turner's first duty was to escort a column of infantry and mules to Bloemfontein. Turner writes that he was detached with two troops to deliver 100 mules and, during a storm at night, the mules stampeded into another column of mules escorted by a British unit. After considerable confusion, Turner reorganized the column and marched on, reinforced by mules from the British column.[26]

At Bloemfontein, the Squadron was attached to Colonel Edwin Alderson's 1st Mounted Infantry Corps, a brigade-strength unit. Alderson, because of his successful experience in commanding Canadians here, including the RCD, would later be appointed as the first commander of the 1st Canadian Division in 1914. Alderson had a negative view of Turner's ability during the Great War. However, as Turner was three levels removed from Alderson in South Africa, it is unlikely that Alderson would have had much opportunity to judge his capabilities in this campaign.[27]

Alderson's command was dispatched on 22 April as part of a larger operation to capture one of the most effective of the Boer leaders Christiaan de Wet's commando operating in the southeast corner of the Orange Free State. De Wet evaded the clumsy British columns, but in the process, "B" Squadron had their first action, and the result demonstrated they had much to learn. After withdrawing from an initial encounter, Williams drew up his squadron in close order within the range of Boer guns. The Boers did not take long to start shelling this ideal target. A British officer charged over to Williams to urge him to get his men into extended order—that mistake was not made again. Fortunately, there were no casualties. Turner's assessment of the unit's performance was, "we were too green to be of much use—but did not run away."[28]

The column returned to Bloemfontein, and "B" Squadron finally reunited with the remainder of the RCD. They then prepared to take part in the capture of Pretoria—the capital of the Transvaal Republic, the Northern Boer republic. Roberts' scheme was to advance along the rail line to Pretoria and use his cavalry and mounted infantry to outflank the Boer defensive positions. The advance would be spasmodic, as Roberts had to wait for his supplies to catch up and replenish his forces. The superior mobility of the Boers frustrated the outflanking manoeuvres, however. As a result, the campaign to Pretoria would be a series of sweeps that succeeded in levering the Boers out of their river or *kopje* (hill) line but would not trap them.[29]

FIRST HONOURS: CROSSING THE VET RIVER

The Boers fell back across the Vet River and prepared to defend the line. The Vet was a substantial military obstacle. It was 40 yards wide, deep with steep brush-filled banks and only a few fords. On the morning of 6 May, Major-General Sir John French, the commander of the cavalry, decided to try to force the river at multiple locations with "B" Squadron of the RCD in the lead. As per standard procedure, "B" Squadron approached to within 500 metres of the river and pushed out about a dozen dismounted scouts, led by Lieutenant Turner, to develop the Boer position. The Boers responded by opening fire on the scouts, and the scouts promptly scuttled back. Over the next few hours, the Boers were able to keep the RCD pinned down under the hot late autumn sun and the biting of red ants.[30]

It was at this point that Turner and Lieutenant Harold Borden, the son of the Minister of Militia and Defence Frederick Borden, worked their way to the edge of the river down a dry ravine that was screened from the view of the Boers. Turner, showing considerable initiative, was determined to cross the river and called for volunteers to follow him. Reportedly, everyone there volunteered. This part of the river was steep, deep, and swift in current, so the Boers did not station troops to cover it. Turner and six volunteers then crossed the river, holding their rifles over their heads as the water rose to their chins. Turner later lamented that the water had soaked his haversack and ruined his wife's letters. Borden and another volunteer crossed separately. Turner's group, joined by Borden, then advanced about 200 metres and encountered a force of Boers in a farm. After a short firefight across a field, Turner and his group withdrew back across the river in the face of superior numbers.[31]

Their probing attack, however, disrupted and distracted the Boers' defensive arrangements so that Lessard could lead the remaining RCD across a ford in strength and outflank the Boers' river position. Private Rae of Montreal was quoted in a newspaper article as saying "the men are a unit in ascribing the credit to their dashing young officer," referring to Turner.[32] For his initiative and gallantry, Turner was awarded the D.S.O., which, given that he was a subaltern at the time, indicates that his actions were highly regarded. Typically, the authorities awarded the D.S.O. to officers in command above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or to more junior officers for actions just short of the Victoria Cross.[33]

The next day, Turner was back on piquet duty. He proudly wrote his wife that he had been under fire five times and was "Feeling fit and burnt brown."[34] The next days would be physically demanding, with long hours in the saddle in the heat of the day and nights so cold that water in buckets froze. On 11 May, Turner reported being in the saddle for 20 and a half hours. By 12 May, the RCD had reached Kroonstad and had yet to suffer any casualties due to clever use of cover and their new-found commitment to the benefits of open order.[35] The RCD would rest at Kroonstad for a week while supplies for the expedition were brought up, and horses and men recovered from the ordeal of campaigning.

Disrupting the rest, Intelligence reported that an important Boer commander was staying at Bothaville, 70 kilometres to the northwest. Alderson took a flying column of six troops, two from the RCD led by Turner, to capture this commander. Leaving at 5 p.m. on 16 May, the column marched through the night and most of the next day to surprise and seize 34 important prisoners. It was a hard, exhausting ride with men falling off their horses while asleep, but they accomplished their mission.[36] In recognition of his performance at the Vet and the expedition to Bothaville, Turner was promoted over two other more senior officers to be an acting Captain in "A" Squadron. Already, Turner was being recognized as an effective leader.

On 19 May, the advance on Pretoria resumed. There was fighting almost every day, but fortunately for the RCD, there were no casualties other than the inevitable loss of horses. Nevertheless, there were dangerous encounters, such as during the advance to the next line of defences when Turner ran into a Boer ambush that sprung prematurely. He escaped by wheeling and riding through the smoke of a *veldt* fire that was "almost unbearable."[37] Survival in the advance guard required quick thinking and decisiveness, characteristics Turner had in abundance.

The advance proceeded until reaching the last Boer defence line before Johannesburg. As part of the battle to breach this line, the RCD and the CMR had to traverse a river and then charge across a plain exposed to heavy Boer fire to seize *kopjes* on the flank. The two units endured heavy enemy fire, holding the *kopjes* until French ordered them back. The Canadians then had to ride back across the fire-swept plain. Riding in extended order and leaning over their horses to shield themselves as much as possible, the two units raced through the open killing zone with surprisingly few casualties—a handful of wounded men and dead horses. The vaunted Boer marksmanship did not seem to be evident on that occasion or in most RCD and CMR engagements. Over the course of the campaign, the RCD suffered only 15 casualties to enemy fire and, given that they participated in 29 engagements, it was a minimal loss, if the Boer rifle fire was as accurate as claimed.[38]

The battle demonstrated how far the Canadians had progressed, as they were able to operate under sustained enemy musketry, capture their objective, and then withdraw under heavy fire without sustaining serious losses or becoming disrupted.[39] Turner wrote with justification, "I was proud of the men that day."[40]

French was able to turn the Boers right and force them to abandon Johannesburg. The British captured the city on 31 May and Pretoria on 5 June. With the capture of the Pretoria, Turner, like most observers, believed, "Boers on the run—the war cannot last long now." Under normal circumstances, the loss of the richest city and the fall of the capital in the face of overwhelming numbers would make this prediction true, but not with the Boers.[41] The nature of the campaign changed as the Boers dispersed into the hinterland to fight a guerrilla war. They would quickly gather to strike the unguarded train or unwary column rather than directly confront the overwhelming British force.

After the capture of the capital, the unit garrisoned Derdepoort to the northeast of Pretoria to defend one of the gaps in the ridges that surrounded Pretoria to the north. The unit spent over a month in place, bleeding men to rear-area employment, disease, and boredom, until it consisted of little more than a squadron in strength. The lack of remounts also crippled the unit, as the campaign to Pretoria had inflicted a terrible cost on its horses. Because of the horse shortage, the Canadians became known as consummate horse thieves. At one point, the prickly former Canadian GOC General Hutton had his horse stolen, and "was he ever mad."[42] Boer forces hung around the edges of the British position in Pretoria, looking for an opportunity to strike

the long, tenuous supply line. On 4 July, in response to Boer moves, the Dragoons marched to Rietfontein to the west of their former position. Starting on 8 July, Turner acted as "B" Squadron commander for a week while Williams was away, again indicating the confidence the authorities had in him. During this period, there was an engagement in support of a battery of Royal Horse Artillery where seven men were wounded. The first man hit was Lieutenant Young, who Turner jocularly wrote suffered "a scalp wound—the shortest officer in the regiment."[43]

On 15 July, the Dragoons, after moving to Rietvlei to the southeast of Pretoria, encountered a strong Boer attack on the outpost line. Turner, by now a combat veteran, impassively described supporting the piquet line under pressure from the Boers and allowing the attackers to approach within 60 metres before falling back. It was during this engagement when the Dragoons provided support to a hard-pressed British unit that Lieutenants Burch and the Minister's son Borden were killed. These deaths elicited telegrams from all the senior officers in the British command. Both were popular and effective officers.[44]

With the Boer threat dispersed and supplies available, Roberts could now finish the last stage of his campaign by marching on Middleburg, Belfast, and further East to close off the last link to the outside world through Portuguese East Africa. The RCD and the CMR were part of this advance and would see hard fighting over the next month. Lessard injured his thigh in a horse fall on 28 July, so Williams moved up to command the RCD, and Turner became acting Squadron commander again until Lessard returned at the end of August.[45]

By now, the Canadians had developed into an under-strength but effective mounted infantry force. In a battle near Rietvlei, Turner reported that a British General had said that the "Canadians have shown the regulars how to fight." Turner had a realistic appreciation of the need for training and preparation and was not a proponent of the inherent superiority of straight-shooting, hard-riding but untrained militia over regulars. He realized from the start that the Canadians had much to learn. As he wrote, "It has taken time to learn and teach—but we certainly have an efficient fighting unit."[46]

As an indication of the worth of the Canadian mounted infantry, the British authorities offered all RCD officers, including Turner, commissions in the British Regular Army. Turner clearly wrestled with this opportunity. He liked the active aspects of military life—he had already been in 17 engagements by his count—but he found camp life dull and the meagre pay of a subaltern an issue. In the end, he decided to stick with his family's business. Turner, later in September, received another indication of his worth when he was appointed an intelligence officer.[47]

After reaching Middleburg to the east of Pretoria on 27 July, the RCD and the CMR did outpost duty to protect the fragile line of communications along the railway. This involved more long, tedious hours on hot days and frigid nights on the high *veldt*. This area of South Africa was much higher than even Calgary at about 2,400 metres. The lack of remounts strongly suggested to Turner that the regiment would soon be returning to Canada. The newlywed officer was clearly pining for home. However, fierce fighting, recovery from serious wounds, and another five months were in store for Turner before his return to Canada.[48]

On 13 August, Major Forester, the commander of "A" Squadron, was invalided with rheumatism, which was a common complaint in the unit brought on by the long exposure to harsh conditions. It took a strong physique to survive the long hours of pounding in the saddle, and only a handful of men made it to the end of the campaign with the unit.

By the end of August, the RCD garrisoned Belfast, which was roughly halfway between Pretoria and the Portuguese border. The RCD's role was to patrol a 32-km zone around Belfast to keep the Boers off the line of communications. To the north was a 500-man commando and, to the south, the Carolina Commando of about 1,000 men commanded by General J.C. Fourie. These two commandos could initiate actions, while the lack of men and an unaggressive commanding officer at Belfast hamstrung the RCD's ability to take the battle to the enemy. Turner characterized the commanding officer at Belfast, a Lieutenant-Colonel from the Berkshire Regiment, as an "awful old woman."[49]

As a result, there was an ongoing series of encounters initiated by the Boers, resulting in further casualties to men and horses. Boer attacks on trains would require a patrol to burn some unfortunate's farm and send the family to a camp at Middleburg as an object lesson. Turner did not enjoy this duty. "Have sent a lot of Boers and their families to Middleburg," Turner wrote, "You cannot help but feel sorry for them leaving their house, belongings and farms." In another case, Turner led a sweep to burn farms in retaliation for a train attack and described it as "unpleasant work."[50]

There were constant engagements and in one case, in October, Turner demonstrated his leadership skills and sang-froid. While returning from a farm-burning expedition, the Boers lured two of Turner's men into an ambush. Both men were badly wounded, with one being shot off his horse and captured and the other escaping by riding hard through a fusillade of bullets. Warned of the ambush, Turner expertly extracted his force out of the Boers' trap. As one of his troopers put it, "Lt. Turner certainly showed good judgment in extricating us from a very nasty operation."[51]

The Boers, in their characteristic excellent treatment of the captured, dropped off the wounded man, Private Carter, at the outskirts of Belfast later that day, as they had no resources to take care of a wounded prisoner. Turner dispassionately wrote that he cut a bullet out of Carter's chest with a pocketknife. Surprisingly, given the state of medical care and the rough surgery, Carter survived.[52]

ULTIMATE HONOUR: VICTORIA CROSS AT LELIEFONTEIN

To suppress the increasingly belligerent and troublesome Boer commandos, the British High Command sent a more aggressive commander, Major-General Horace Smith-Dorrien, and reinforcements to Belfast. With these additional forces, Smith-Dorrien was to take the battle to the Boers. His first attempt was an abortive two-column operation to drive south and deal with the Carolina Commando.[53] The two columns had to trundle through horrendous rain, mud, and sleet that crippled the men and horses. Morrison, the Canadian commanding a section of "D" Battery Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), reported that the horses were shivering so hard from the cold and wet that they could barely stand.[54] Smith-Dorrien realized his force was in no condition to fight and ordered it back to Belfast. This expedition was so grueling that Turner did not write until two days later, describing it as the worst 24 hours he had experienced in South Africa.[55]

After allowing the men and horses to recover and the ground to dry, Smith-Dorrien resolved to attempt another push south. This time it would be a single "flying" column to avoid the coordination challenges of the first attack and make better use of the limited mounted forces.[56] The column consisted of the RCD, the CMR, four companies each from the Shropshire Light Infantry and the Suffolk Regiment, a squadron of the 5th Lancers supported by two guns of "D" Battery RCA, a section of pom-poms and two five-inch guns of 84th Field Battery for a total of approximately 1,200 men. A 10-km-long transport train encumbered the column and, according to Morrison, was all out of proportion to the size of the force. This painfully slow and unwieldy collection of animals and wagons greatly limited the mobility of the column and restricted Smith-Dorrien's options if he had to retreat. Smith-Dorrien's force would have to face a Boer force that, while outnumbered overall, had a significant mobility advantage in that all of their men were mounted, while Smith-Dorrien's force had at best 200 to 250 mounted men.[57]

The terrain that the column had to traverse was a series of ridges separated by valleys three to five kilometres wide, ultimately leading to the Komati River, which the column would have to cross before reaching Carolina. These ridges made it possible for the outnumbered Boer outpost line to delay the advance without having to commit to a stand-up fight. It was spring in South Africa, so most of the Boer fighters were at their farms planting their crops, and it would take time to gather their forces.

With reveille at 1 a.m. and departure at 3:30 a.m. on 6 November, the inaptly named flying column lumbered south again towards Vanwyksvlei. During the day, the column pushed steadily south against the Boers' outpost line until they reached the last ridge line running from Witkloof to Leliefontein overlooking the

Source: Public Archives-3640361

Komati River where the Boers intended to make a more concerted effort to stop or at least slow down the advance. An initial infantry attack failed, but with artillery and machine-gun fire suppressing the Boers, the RCD outflanked the Boer position and drove them off the ridge.[58]

During the night, the Ermelo Commando and a smaller third force reinforced the Carolina Commando. The Boers expected a further advance in the morning and decided not to wait passively, but to pre-empt the British in the morning. The intent was to strike in the centre to fix the British position with the Carolina Commando and then outflank the ridge line on the left with the Ermelo Commando, while the third force distracted the other British flank. It was a bold move but was feasible because of the Boers' mobility advantage.[59]

Smith-Dorrien determined that he did not have the necessary force ratio for success and decided to withdraw to Belfast.[60] The only option then was to get that 10-km-long transport column safely back to Belfast in the face of a far more mobile Boer force. It would require skilled rear-guard work to prevent the Boers from overwhelming a section of the rear guard and getting in among the animals, guns, and wagons.

A withdrawal in the face of a more mobile opponent is a one of the greatest challenges facing a rear guard. It requires careful management and skilled direction to ensure that no part of the rear guard is overwhelmed. The speed at which the oxen could ponderously haul their heavy loads over the next ridge line conditioned the retreat. The rear guard, consisting of the RCD supported by infantry and Morrison's two guns of "D" Battery RCA, would hold in position until the transport column finished crossing the next ridgeline.[61] Then began the most dangerous part of the task: the guns would withdraw up the ridge to the infantry supports in a leapfrog fashion, with one gun always in position to fire, and the troopers would drop back, keeping the pursuers at bay. This challenging choreography would then repeat for the next ridge. The rear guard commander had to ensure that his force did not get so closely engaged that it could not retreat, but it had to slow the enemy down sufficiently to allow the baggage train to escape.[62]

Lessard had approximately 90 men available in six troops, and he divided the force into three groups spaced over an arc of 2,250 metres with Sergeant Edward Holland's Colt Machine Gun and Morrison's guns in the centre, ready to reinforce any hard-pressed section. Turner was responsible for the centre.[63] Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, with his CMR reinforced by the 5th Lancers, was on flank-guard duty. Their role was to protect the flank as the column retreated.

The battle commenced at 7 a.m., when Smith-Dorrien started the transport column on its way back north to Belfast. The move surprised the Boers, and it took them an hour to realize what was happening. However, it did not fundamentally change their plans; the only difference was that instead of a desperate pre-emptive strike, it was now a pursuit operation.

At 8 a.m., the Boers moved out and immediately realized that a key position that overlooked the route of the transport column on the left flank of the British line was unprotected. Always quick to spot a tactical advantage, the Boers raced to take the *kopje*. Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, recognizing the key terrain, raced with his CMR for the *kopje* as well. The Canadians were faster, beating the Boers to the top and easily repelling the resulting Boer attack.[64]



Campaign Map

Initially, the Dragoons in the rear guard were successful in holding off the Boers for several hours. It took some time for the Ermelo Commando to get into action, so most of the pressure was on Lessard's left flank. Evans had to move off his *kopje* position to continue to act as a flank guard to the column as it withdrew. This then allowed the Boers to concentrate on Cockburn's command, which was protecting the left wing of the rear guard. Lessard, recognizing the pressure, ordered Morrison to send his No. 5 gun to support Cockburn.

Morrison and his gun galloped slightly up hill, unlimbered, and started to shell the encroaching Boers. The rapid gallop across the battlefield further tired the already fatigued animals. Morrison was contently shelling the Boers and had forced them to dismount when Lessard rode up in a panic, shouting, "For God's sake, Morrison, Save your guns!" Boers were curling around Cockburn's line and threatening to capture the gun. Immediately realizing the seriousness of the situation, Morrison limbered the gun and raced away, while Cockburn's command courageously stood their ground, knowing they would be overwhelmed. Cockburn, who would win a VC for this action, and his men delayed the Boers long enough for Morrison to escape. All of Cockburn's command were captured or killed.[65]

By about 10 a.m., after three hours of fighting and a withdrawal of three miles, the rear guard was in trouble. Their left was wiped out while their right was under intense pressure, and the centre denuded of troops to support the wings. The horses pulling the two guns were faltering and had dropped from a gallop to a trot to a slow walk. It was at this stage that the Boers realized they had the glittering prospect of capturing "D" Battery's two 12-pdr guns. Beyond the obvious propaganda and morale benefits of seizing the two guns, they had already captured ample ammunition for those pieces, so they could significantly supplement their force's firepower. Seizing the opportunity, the Boers launched a cavalry charge, something they did not typically do.[66]

Morrison kept firing to keep the Boers at bay as he retreated with both guns, but he realized he was not going to get across the ridge before the Boers reached him. He appealed to the British infantry supports for help, but the commander, probably deciding it was a lost cause, turned and retreated across the ridge line. As a last desperate ploy, Morrison sent his last galloper to find Lessard and plead for reinforcements. The rider instead encountered Turner, who took immediate and decisive action that made his career and saved the guns. Turner had "picked up" a wound in his left shoulder and used this as an example to rally about 12 men. He shouted, "Never let it be said the Canadians had let their guns be taken." He positioned the dismounted men in a declivity. The Boers, about 100 to 200 strong, charging and firing like a "wild west show," with General Fourier and second-in-command Commandant Prinsloo in front, rapidly closed in on the guns. Sergeant Holland was effectively supporting the guns, but when the Boers closed in to within 200 metres, he valiantly picked up the blisteringly hot Colt gun off its carriage, carried it to the limber and escaped, the second action that day for which a Canadian Victoria Cross would be awarded.[67]

With the last obstacle out of the way, the Boers charged on, not registering that they were entering an ambush. When they reached the kill zone, Turner ordered his men to fire. Almost immediately, Fourier was shot off his horse and died, and Prinsloo was killed a few moments later. The momentum of the charge took the Boers through the Canadian position, where they killed one man and wounded two others. However, the loss of their two leaders disrupted the Boers' cohesion and gave enough of a respite for Morrison's guns to escape.[68] The surviving Canadians were able to scramble away. Today, one of the 12-pdr guns is prominently displayed in the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa.

Roughly 30 minutes after Turner was first wounded, he was hit seriously again by a bullet in the neck that just missed his spine and carotid artery. His horse sustained two wounds as well. Morrison claimed that Turner only left the field for the ambulance after Lessard ordered a Sergeant to take him away. As Turner was being evacuated, Smith-Dorrien rode up to ask about the situation and to congratulate Turner on the performance of the Dragoons.[69]

Turner's action was enough to win the third Victoria Cross for the day. Ironically, at the beginning of the advance south, Turner had remarked that he hoped the men would not take undue chances, as he wanted to lead them in a promised march through London.[70] During the Boer War, the British High Command was sensitive to the loss of guns, and 20 percent of the VCs won during the war were awarded for saving guns.[71] Turner demonstrated courage, skill in setting up the ambush, and steadiness under fire and pain. That Turner was able to rally men in such a dire situation is also indicative of his leadership and the esteem with which he was regarded. This action was not decisive in any sense other than to Turner's career and would go largely unnoticed today were it not for the fact that it led to the most VCs being won by a single Canadian unit in a day.[72]

Turner was evacuated and began a long recuperation period that was extended when the wound became infected. While in hospital, Smith-Dorrien visited him to congratulate him again on his valiant performance. Later, Smith-Dorrien sent Turner a copy of the dispatch he wrote on the engagement, which Turner thought was "most handsome of him." The dispatch concluded with Smith-Dorrien's opinion of the RCD: "he would choose no other mounted troops in the World before them if he had his choice."[73]

Turner wrote Hattie on 15 November to assure her that his wounds were not serious, and, demonstrating he was on the mend, he mentioned that two of his nurses were quite pretty. Two weeks later, he wrote that he would return via England and that he had heard he was recommended for the VC. He did not expect to get it, but being considered for it was still an honour. A parade of the great and mighty visited him while he recovered, including the formidable Kitchener, the new Commander-in-Chief of South Africa, who complimented him on his plucky fight.[74]

Turner contracted a fever that set him back. It was not until February that he could wrangle transportation to England. Understanding how to deal with army red tape, he had taken the sensible precaution of obtaining a note from Kitchener "to expedite the departure of this officer when medically fit." When a medical officer presented an obstacle to his departure for England, Turner deployed the letter and the situation changed instantly: "The red tape medico got very busy."[75] Turner sailed to England, where he met Hattie.

Turner returned to Canada late in the evening of 11 May 1901 to a rapturous welcome by hundreds of citizens. Turner and Hattie then attended an outdoor civic reception with thousands, despite the late hour. Turner received his VC from the visiting Duke of Cornwall and later King George V on 17 September 1901 in front of 5,000 troops and thousands of spectators. As further recognition of his accomplishments, he commanded the right wing of Canada's contingent at the coronation of Edward the VII. On the voyage back to Canada, all the NCOs and men of the cavalry signed a certificate expressing "our gratitude for the hearty interest you have taken in our welfare under your command."[76]

Two issues—promotions and replacements—arose during the campaign that would bedevil Canadian involvement again during the First World War and vex Turner in his role as commander of the Canadian forces in England. Lessard complained that he could not promote deserving officers and other ranks, because the British regarded this as a Canadian prerogative and Lessard could not communicate with Canada. As a result, Turner, despite acting at times as a Squadron commander, was still a Lieutenant at the end of the campaign. As for replacements or the lack thereof, by October, the RCD was operating at less than squadron strength primarily due to illness and men being employed elsewhere. As of 16 October, only seven percent of the losses were combat casualties: dead, wounded or missing. The problem was the unit received no replacements, so this increased the load on those remaining, and this would have been a serious issue if the unit had been required to stay longer.[77] When Canada went to war, this would again be a predicament that had to be solved if the Canadian forces were to retain their edge.[78]

Turner was a courageous officer who was undoubtedly an inspirational leader. He demonstrated good judgment, sang-froid, and a cool eye in the stress of battle. His men, his peers, and his superiors, as demonstrated by his increasing responsibilities during the campaign, respected him. He was physically tough and indefatigable to survive without any illness through to the final stages of the campaign.[79] Despite the physical demands and pressures of battle, he maintained a positive outlook. His letters to his wife are relatively honest about the horrors and strains, but his attitude is positive—he penned only a handful of negative comments about other officers whereas he made multiple positive references to his men, other officers, and other units. His letters also reveal a reflective officer who was much more than just a dashing subaltern.[80] However, despite all of his excellent service, it is necessary to point out that he was acting as a junior officer with far fewer responsibilities than he would shoulder in the First World War, where he successively commanded the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Canadian Division, and, from December 1916 onwards, the Canadian forces in England.

In a theme that repeated throughout his military career, Turner would connect in a positive way with his men and be remembered with genuine affection long after. An example is a letter from an old comrade,

Boer War Victory Parade, Barrington Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia

Albert Hilder, who, 46 years later, wrote Turner recounting a RCD reunion. The men in the 2nd Troop expressed "their best wishes for your continued good health from men who respect you and know you as a man, and a gentleman and a brave officer."[81]

The other key factor arising from Turner's participation in the Boer War was a strong appreciation for the capabilities of the Canadian soldier once properly trained. Turner's experiences showed what Canadians could accomplish and undoubtedly contributed to his strong support for Canadian control over all aspects of the war effort in the First World War. His diary entries indicate justified pride in his men and unit as they became more proficient.

ENDNOTES

1. Turner worked at his family's wholesale grocery firm.
2. The South African War (1899–1902) is also commonly referred to in history as the Boer War, or more specifically as the Second Anglo-Boer War.
3. B. A. Reid, *Our Little Army in the Field: The Canadians in South Africa, 1899–1902*, 1. ed ed. (St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Publishing, 1996), 9–12.
4. Later Australian and New Zealand contingents were sent and served as battalions. C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies,* 2 vols. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), 71; Christopher Pugsley, *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War* (Auckland: Reed, 2004), 41, 46.
5. Hugh John Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900" (Masters, University of Ottawa, 1983), 13; Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, vol. no. 28 (Montreal: Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 154.
6. James A. Wood, "The Sense of Duty: Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896–1917" (PhD, Wilfred Laurier University, 2007), 40.
7. Canada, *Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian Contingents During the War in South Africa*, 1899–1900, (Ottawa 1901), 70.

8. Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps Commander in the First World War, was ill in late 1899 and early 1900 and did not join. It is unclear why he did not join a later contingent. Hugh MacIntyre Urquhart, *Arthur Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian* (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons (Canada), 1950), 15.

9. "Diary Entry, 1 November 1899," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC. Note this is not an actual diary but a collection of excerpts of letters written by Turner to his wife. It is similar to his diary from the First World War. When compared to extant letters, the diary entries are accurate but incomplete, as not everything in the letter is included in the "diary" entry.

10. In the First World War, Williams did not reach the front until 1916 where he commanded the 8th Brigade before being captured at the Battle of Mount Sorrel in June 1916.

11. "Diary Entry, 29 May 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

12. "Lessard's Report, 2 January 1901," RG 9 II A3 v32 T10404, LAC.

13. The Australians and New Zealanders recognized the Canadians as superior looters. Pugsley, *The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War: 47*.

14. "Diary Entry, 18 July 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC.; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 158. The RCD were ordered to hand in their revolvers shortly after arriving in South Africa. The CMR kept theirs and believed them useful when having to investigate farm houses.

15. E.W.B . Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa* (Hamilton, Ontario: Spectator Print. Co., 1901), 216.

16. For more information on Lessard, see John Macfarlane, "The Right Stuff: Evaluating the Performance of Lieutenant-Colonel F.-L. Lessard in South Africa and His Failure to Receive a Senior Command Position in the CEF in 1914," *Canadian Military History* 8, no. 3 (1999).

17. In 1916, Lessard was an Inspector General and toured the Canadian lines in France and camps in England. As part of the tour, Lessard visited the Second Division and Turner's ADC Montague reported Lessard lectured Turner as if he were still the junior subaltern in the Boer War. Turner did not take umbrage and accepted it with good grace. "F.F. Montague Comments," 19710147-015/DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.14, Turner Fonds; CWM.

18. Carman Miller, *Canada's Little War* (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 2003), 2003.

19. Brereton Greenhous, *Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883–1983* (Belleville, Ont.: Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983), 175.

20. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 13; "Diary Entry, 5 September 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

21. "Wedding Article, 8 January 1900," 19710147-005/DOCS MANU 58E 5 2.1, *Turner Fonds*; CWM; "Diary Entry, 29 December 1899," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

22. "Diary Entry, January 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

23. Reid, *Our Little Army in the Field: The Canadians in South Africa, 1899–1902*: 9–14.

24. *Ibid.*, 35; "Lessard's Report, 2 January 1901."

25. Turner's brother Albert, serving in the RCR, was wounded in this battle. "Diary Entry, 22 February 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

26. "1st CMR Regimental Diary Extracts," RG 9 II A3 v32 T10404, LAC; *"Comrades All,"* MG 30 E339 v1, *Hilder Fonds*; LAC, 16; "Diary Entry, 28 March 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

27. The command structure was Alderson, Lessard, Williams and then Turner as a Troop Lieutenant. Turner does not comment about Alderson in his diary.

28. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 85–87; "Diary Entry, 30 April 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; *"Comrades All,"* 20; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 223.

29. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 97.

30. Greenhous, *Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883–1983*: 97.

31. Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 229; "Diary Entry, 7 May 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC. The description of the engagement and the number of participants varies across the different accounts. I have relied on Turner's Diary for the number of men who accompanied him.

32. "Newspaper Article of DSO Action," 19710147-005/DOCS MANU 58E 5 2.1, *Turner Fonds*; CWM.

33. "The Distinguished Service Order (DSO) was instituted on 6 September 1886 by Queen Victoria to reward "individual instances of meritorious and distinguished in a war." In principle, the Order was for officers ranked Major—or its equivalent or higher—but the honour also could be conferred on junior officers in very special cases." "Orders and Decorations—Distinguished Service Order (DSO)," http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/cmdp/mainmenu/group01/dso; Changboo Kang, "The British Infantry Officer on the Western Front in the First World War: With Special Reference to the Royal Warwickshire Regiment" (PhD, University of Birmingham, 2007), 367.

34. "Diary Entry, 7 May 1900."

35. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 103.

36. "Diary Entry, 16 May 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 10; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 234.

37. "Diary Entry, 16 May 1900."

38. "Diary Entry, 29 May 1900"; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 236–37; Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 118.

39. Greenhous, *Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883–1983*: 101.

40. "Diary Entry, 29 May 1900."

41. "Diary Entry, 30 May 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

42. *Ibid.*

43. "Diary Entry, 8 July 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds; LAC; "Comrades All,"* 43.

44. "Diary Entry, 16 July 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 247.

45. "1st CMR Regimental Diary Extracts."

46. "Diary Entry, 20 July 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

47. "Diary Entry, 9 August 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; "Diary Entry, 27 September 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; "Turner War Record," G.A.Q. 4-40, RG 24 v1815, LAC.

48. "1st CMR Regimental Diary Extracts"; "Diary Entry, 7 August 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

49. "Diary Entry, 25 October 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 256.

50. For more on farm burning, see Chris Madsen, "Canadian Troops and Farm Burning in the South African War," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 2 (2005); "Diary Entry, 21 August and 7 October 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

51. *"Comrades All,"* 56; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 257.

52. "Diary Entry, 7 October 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 257.

53. Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, *Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service* (London: J. Murray, 1925), 252.

54. Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa:* 251; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 263.

55. "Diary Entry, 4 November 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 180–181; Smith-Dorrien, *Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service*: 253.

56. B. A. Reid, ""For God's Sake ... Save Your Guns!" Action at Leliefontein, 7 November 1900," in *Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758–1945*, ed. Donald E. Graves (Toronto: R. Brass Studio, 2000), 217.

57. The RCD had approximately 90 to 95 men; the CMR about the same with the remainder provided by the 5th Lancers. A cavalry squadron would consist of 50 men at this point in the war and hence the total strength.

58. Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa:* 259; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 267.

59. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 181.

60. Smith-Dorrien, *Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service*: 257.

61. The Canadian Mounted Infantry was better suited to rear-guard actions because the 5th Lancers were equipped with swords, lances and carbines that were outranged by the Boer Mausers. *Ibid.*, 254.

62. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 186; Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 270.

63. The descriptions of how Lessard deployed his troops vary from three units of two troops each to two groups of three troops each. It makes more tactical sense having three detachments of 30 men spread over the ground rather than two groups, so I have opted to follow Albert Hilder's description. It is possible that the deployment started out as three groups, but through movement of reserves ended up as two groups of three troops as per Morrison's description.

64. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 188.

65. *Ibid.*, 195; Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa*: 267.

66. Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902*, no. 28: 273.

67. "D Battery, Rcfa Report, 9 March 1901," 19870027-001 58C 2.14, *Turner Fonds*; CWM; Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa*: 269; "Diary Entry, 7 November 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC; *"Comrades All,"* 64; Reid, *Our Little Army in the Field: The Canadians in South Africa, 1899–1902*: 134; "Saving the Guns in South Africa," http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2004/05/saving-the-guns-in-south-africa/.

68. Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 195.

69. "Diary Entry, 22 and 28 November 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

70. *"Comrades All,"* 60. In the end, the RCD did not get their march through London as promised.

71. Sixteen out of 78 VCs were awarded for saving guns. Reid, ""For God's Sake ... Save Your Guns!" Action at Leliefontein, 7 November 1900," 234.

72. *Ibid.*, 192.

73. "Diary Entry, 15 November 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

74. "Diary Entry, 15 and 28 November; 13 December 1900," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

75. "Diary Entry, 6 February 1901," MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, *Turner Fonds*; LAC.

76. "Newspaper Drawing of Turner Receiving VC," 19710147-005/DOCS MANU 58E 5 2.1, *Turner Fonds*; CWM; "Gratitude for Interest in Welfare for 1902 Coronation," 19710147-012/DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.12, *Turner Fonds*; CWM.

77. The RCD was reduced to 3 Officers and 83 Other Ranks out of a total of 21 Officers and 381 Other Ranks. Canada, *Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian Contingents During the War in South Africa, 1899–1900.*

78. "1st CMR Regimental Diary Extracts"; "Lessard's Report, 2 January 1901."

79. Turner fought in 27 out of the 29 engagements of the RCD, and almost all of the 2,700 kilometres the regiment marched. Canada, *Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian Contingents During the War in South Africa, 1899–1900*: 99.

80. Thomas P. Leppard, "The Dashing Subaltern – Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect," *Canadian Military History* 6, no. 2 (1997).

81. "Hilder to Turner, 14 October 1946," 19730069-001/DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.11, *Turner Fonds*; CWM. Hilder reported that of the original 40 men in the troop, two died from enteric fever, five were wounded, five taken prisoner, and 14 were sick in the hospital.

The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Royal Canadian Regiment march on parade. The parade was held on Parliament Hill to commemorate the 125th Anniversary of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) and the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), both of which were established on 21 December 1883

Members of "C" Squadron, 2R22eR BG, consisting of troops from the Lord Strathcona Horse (LdSH (RC)), are conducting sighting adjustment process

Source: Combat Camera



An unidentified infantryman of the Régiment de la Chaudière preparing to disembark from HMCS PRINCE DAVID off the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June 1944

Source: Public Archives-3202207

REASSESSMENT OF A CRISIS:
Canadian Infantry Reinforcements during the Second World War

Mrs. Caroline D'Amours

During the North-West Europe campaign, the fighting effectiveness of the Canadian Army was severely tested. The infantry, the main arm of the service in the conflict, accounted for 70 percent of all casualties combined, though it made up less than 15 percent of the total Canadian force in Normandy.[1] These brutal conditions affected the reinforcement organization, which struggled to provide a constant number of trained infantrymen for combat. The Canadian units at the front were therefore continually undermanned, and the issue of training infantry reinforcements at the front became a key factor in the fighting effectiveness of these units. However, it is generally thought that Canadian infantry reinforcements during the Second World War were ineffective in combat due to their inadequate training.

With such a high casualty rate in infantry units, the experience level of the reinforcement soldier was the rule, not the exception. So, how was the Canadian Army able to advance against such a formidable enemy if its reinforcements were poorly trained? Using the example of reinforcements for the Régiment de la Chaudière during the North-West Europe campaign, it is possible to disprove certain claims concerning the training of infantry reinforcements. The experience of this regiment, which fought from D-Day to V-E Day as part of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (CID), and its French-speaking character explain the choice, since the dire shortage of infantry reinforcements facing French-language units might lead one to believe that the readiness of the individuals joining these units was less than that of their English-speaking counterparts. Taking the example of a French-Canadian battalion, it can be seen that even in the worst of situations, the new arrivals do not seem to have suffered any deficiencies with respect to training.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The shortage of Canadian infantry reinforcements is directly tied to the conscription issue. The Canadian Army was exclusively made up of volunteers during the Second World War until the beginning of 1945, with the arrival of conscripts. A significant portion of Canadians, including farmers on the Prairies, members of ethnic minorities in Western Canada and Francophones in Quebec, were against conscription for overseas service. Having lived through the social instabilities of the First World War convinced the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King not use this strategy to sustain military efforts. However, the fall of France in the spring of 1940 was the first time the spectre of an attack on home soil was raised, and on June 21, 1940, the federal government adopted the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA), authorizing conscription for home defence.[2]

In April 1942, following a plebiscite on conscription, Bill 80 amended the NRMA and released the government from its promise not to legislate overseas service. Some changes were subsequently made to include the Western hemisphere in the definition of home defence. Prime Minister King committed to using this prerogative to send soldiers overseas only if absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, preparations for the invasion of Normandy in the spring of 1944 brought the issue of the shortage of reinforcements to the forefront. Well before D-Day, Canadian military authorities realized that there was a large gap opening between the number of infantrymen required to maintain combat unit strength and the number of reinforcements destined for the units. In fact, as of March, the potential shortfall of infantrymen was brought up by leaders in the Canadian Army and even by Field Marshall BL Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief of the 21st Army Group. Indeed, the forecasted wastage rate over 3 months for an infantry unit during periods of intense activity was 48 percent, rather than the 76 percent actually sustained by these units during fighting in North-West Europe in 1944.[3] Unfortunately, the wastage rate had been officially set for the Canadian Army based on the calculations of the British Army during the North Africa campaign in the summer of 1942. In that region, mechanized operations and firepower were the key elements on the battlefield. This was not the case in North-West Europe or Italy, where the infantry did most of the fighting. Consequently, the infantry reinforcement pool was not large enough to meet the needs of the units at the front,

while the pools for other corps were too large, creating a major surplus at reinforcement organization depots.[4] Sadly, this issue was downplayed by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, then Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London. Nonetheless, at the end of March 1944, CMHQ ordered the remustering of 2,000 artillery, engineer and armoured corps general duty personnel (which did not include specialists or qualified soldiers) to the infantry.[5]

At the same time, Canadian military authorities at National Defence Headquarters adopted a policy favouring dispatching already formed and trained units of conscripted soldiers overseas. Thus the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB) was mobilized for active service in 1944, a few weeks after returning from Kiska. The promise of sending units overseas as active force contingents that would be kept intact (provided they were up to strength) was meant to encourage men from the four infantry battalions in the brigade to volunteer. In this manner, they could serve as immediate reinforcements for the reserves of infantrymen stationed in the United Kingdom. However, after a month, only 769 infantrymen had agreed to sign up for general service. To help ensure the success of this effort, it was decided that appeals would be made to other units under the NRMA to fill out the ranks.[6] In the end, the Winnipeg Grenadiers, Rocky Mountain Rangers, Canadian Fusiliers and Régiment de Hull arrived in England on June 2, 1944, with over 2,000 men. The Régiment de Montmagny was also sent based on the same provision after having absorbed volunteers from the Régiment de Joliette to reach the 500-man minimum needed to sail.[7]

With respect to the French-Canadian infantry battalions, the situation was even worse than for English-speaking Canadian units. On April 13, 1944, there were only 348 French-speaking other ranks available, against requirements of 1,563 in French-Canadian infantry units.[8] On May 21, to increase the strength of these battalions and particularly the Régiment de la Chaudière (which took part in the Normandy landing), General Crerar ordered the transfer of French-speaking infantrymen then serving with English-speaking units of 2 CID and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division (CAD). Concerns over the shortage of French-speaking infantrymen were not resolved by this measure. Counting personnel transferred during this period (mainly from the artillery) and arrivals from Canada, the three French-Canadian battalions of the 21st Army Group could draw on 1,221 infantry reinforcements, or enough to cover 60-day wastage at intense rates (estimated at 1,126 men) for the two French-speaking battalions of 2 CID and the Régiment de la Chaudière.[9] This measure would apply for the rest of the summer of 1944. Even though these reinforcements enabled immediate needs to be met, there was no reserve in the United Kingdom for the Royal 22e Régiment, which was fighting in Italy at the time. The fact that there were fewer losses than estimated for the Régiment de la Chaudière during fighting in June 1944 and the delay of 2 CID's arrival due to the slow progress of operations meant that the situation was not as serious as anticipated.

The problem resurfaced at the beginning of August, when the Canadian Army's significant losses in Normandy revealed the poor organization of reinforcements for all infantry units. Fighting in North-West Europe was longer and more intense than expected for the infantry battalions. The Canadian battalions fought almost constantly between the landing on June 6, 1944, and October of that same year. As a result, on August 29, 1944, shortly after the closing of the Falaise Gap, 3 CID alone had a deficiency of over 800 infantrymen.[10] The reinforcements issue remained a major concern for the rest of the fall of 1944, for both military leaders and Canadian politicians. The crisis was aggravated by the insufficient number of voluntary enlistments for general service, a problem that had persisted since 1943. Thus, at the very moment when the requirement for trained reinforcements became most pressing due to significant losses sustained in North-West Europe, the number of available men had dropped dramatically. Losses from fighting for the Gothic Line and the capture of Coriano Ridge, the Rimini Line and San Fortunato Ridge in Italy in August and September only made the situation worse. 1 CID recorded 2,511 casualties, including 626 men killed in action between August 25 and September 22.[11] To reduce the deficiencies created by these battles, military authorities decided to transfer reinforcements intended for other units to infantry units in addition to using infantry tradesmen and specialists, whose numbers would easily satisfy immediate requirements.[12]

On July 25, 1944, Lieutenant-General Stuart ordered more remustering of reinforcements from other corps to the infantry for the theatres of operations. Following this order, a detailed training program was developed for recently remustered troops. Thus, between August 12 and September 1, 4,088 men

were transferred, most from armoured, artillery and engineer corps.[13] Remustering efforts continued until January 1945, but in smaller numbers. In all, 12,142 other ranks were transferred to the infantry between April 1944 and January 1945 in North-West Europe. Further, in July 1944, the 1st Canadian Corps, fighting in Italy, acted similarly in creating 12 CIB for 5 CAD. In so doing, it removed the Westminster Regiment from the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade, transferring soldiers to the infantry from 1 CID's reconnaissance regiment, the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, as well as from the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. This restructuring was necessary given the inherent difficulties of fighting in the olive groves and mountains of the Italian peninsula.[14] As for the French-Canadian battalions fighting in North-West Europe, the situation remained problematic until October 1944. Lieutenant-General GG Simonds, the Acting Commander of the Canadian Army at the time, considered dispatching entire companies of English-speaking reinforcements to augment the strength of French-speaking units. It was an idea that received the approval of General Crerar. Subsequent political events regarding conscription partially solved the problems of the French-Canadian infantry units.[15]

ISSUE OF THE QUALITY AND TRAINING OF REINFORCEMENTS

On September 18, 1944, the publication of Major Conn Smythe's comments brought the military crisis into the public domain. He accused King of sending infantry reinforcements overseas who were too young, green and poorly trained. He claimed that many had never thrown a grenade or fired the Bren gun or PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank). He went on to say that large numbers of casualties resulted from the greenness of reinforcements, both to the rookies and to the experienced soldiers who had to look after them.[16] This view of the reinforcement situation in North-West Europe was largely shared throughout the ranks of the army overseas. In October, Major AG Stevenson prepared a condition assessment of the state of infantryman training in four companies of the Black Watch Regiment in which he deplored the ignorance of the reinforcements sent to his unit with respect to tactics and weapons handling. He stated, among other things, that 14 out of 379 soldiers had not received any infantry training upon their arrival at the Regiment and 29 of them had received less than one month of such training.[17] After adding to those figures the number of soldiers who had only received one month of training, he reported that close to 45 percent of the men had received one month or less of infantry training before joining the unit. Stevenson concluded, "It is unnecessary to point out to you, sir, that the previous training of a man listed as for instance, "one month," on paper, probably represents considerably less time actual training."[18]

This view seems to have proliferated throughout Canadian military historiography. Indeed, the preparation and performance of reinforcements are only ever mentioned unfavourably. CP Stacey piques curiosity by stating that "the training of reinforcements provided by [... the] emergency programme left a great deal to be desired."[19] A number of historians agree and point out that there were not enough reinforcements and that those who finally arrived were, for the most part, poorly trained. They deplore, among other things, the fact that most reinforcements came from other corps than the infantry and received minimal training for their new trade. These reinforcements were therefore less effective on the battlefield than soldiers who had been originally trained for this type of combat.[20]

The most scathing criticism regarding the quality of reinforcements sent to the front in North-West Europe is levelled by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker in their book *Tug of War*, first published in 1984. Like Smythe, the Whitakers criticize the reinforcements for their inability to handle weapons used by infantry regiments, the danger to which they exposed their experienced peers, their lack of discipline and their tendency to be taken out of action quickly. In their opinion, the shortage of infantry soldiers led CMHQ to hasten the dispatch of reinforcements, thereby cutting short their training.[21] However, in 2006, Terry Copp, commenting on Major Stevenson's report, gave the issue a little more nuance. He said that Stevenson "might equally have concluded that 89 percent had one month or more of recent training and that many of them had served with the battalion through August and September."[22] This coincides with the findings of Allister Hain, who analyzed the records of the members of the Calgary Highlanders killed between 1939 and 1945 and briefly touched on the subject of the training of reinforcements. Based on his data, he concluded that reinforcements received adequate training if one considers its duration and the reinforcements' originating units. He points out in particular that reinforcements survived longer than soldiers in regular units.[23]

In short, the generally accepted opinion, both among veterans and in Canadian military historiography, is that infantry reinforcements brought in during the campaign in North-West Europe were taken out of action more quickly than experienced troops and had incomplete training. According to this school of thought, the situation was the result of reinforcements for the most part being remustered from other corps than the infantry. Both infantrymen and remustered soldiers were sent into battle too quickly after enlisting, which affected their trade knowledge. They did not have a sufficient mastery of weapons handling or basic infantry tactics, nor the physical skills needed for their new employment on the European front. Are all these charges warranted? In his work, Stacey says, "It is a notorious fact of army life that no commanding officer ever admits that the reinforcements his unit receives have been properly trained."[24]

What is the basis of these opinions shared by soldiers and historians? There seem to be two main reasons that explain the proliferation of this view. First, as Robert Engen states, regardless of the level of training received by the reinforcements, one cannot expect a soldier who has never seen real battle to cope as well as experienced men when he joins a unit. No doubt, most infantry commanders do not believe the new arrivals are as effective as existing members of the regiment. Engen also points out that despite myriad remarks on

Sergeant Joseph Aspirot of the Régiment de la Chaudière backs up Lance-Corporal Fernand Hervie, who has thrown a hand-grenade into a building during a training exercise, Shoreham-by-Sea, England, 27 January 1943

the fighting qualities of reinforcements, in the questionnaires examined, negative comments are the minority and most respondents had no criticisms regarding the training or skills of new members. As he proposes, concerns regarding the lack of relevant training of some reinforcements were probably legitimate; however, this situation was the exception, not the rule. The quality of reinforcements normally seems to have been adequate when compared with soldiers already on the front line. Well trained or not, infantry reinforcements require time, learning and experience to become effective and fit into a fighting unit. Even if a soldier is well trained, he cannot have been taught to work within a particular unit.[25]

This view coincides with the "absorption of reinforcements" policy of Lieutenant-General Simonds. In his letter of October 28, 1944, sent to all commanders in the field, Simonds recalled the importance of properly integrating reinforcements. He said:

> *the position of a new reinforcement joining a unit is quite different from that of a soldier who has served with a unit for a considerable time and goes into battle beside officers and NCOs who have trained him and with men whom he knows. The reinforcement (unless he is a recovered casualty returned to his own unit) comes as a stranger. Regardless of how thorough his preliminary training may be, in the stress of his first battle, he may react in a way contrary to his training unless steps have been taken to win his confidence. [...] He may do things in the stress of the moment which afterwards he may realize were contrary to what he had been taught.*

Simonds went on to encourage regimental officers to take steps to ensure new arrivals were properly absorbed. For this purpose, he proposed a minimum of two to five days spent at the unit's LOB (Left Out of Battle) "school" to allow officers to get to know them better and assess their weapons handling ability and give them the opportunity to receive training on the latest tactics. All of this was to allow them to adjust to their new surroundings before going into battle. However, Simonds recognized that periods of intense activity were not always conducive for setting up these schools; the shortage of reinforcements as well as constant fighting gave regimental commanders few opportunities.[26]

The idea that a reinforcement soldier could not be as useful as a battle-trained soldier made its way into official history. However, this view does not take into account the fact that experience is the key element of fighting effectiveness. Stacey says that military training can do just so much with respect to preparing *all* soldiers. He admits that Canadians, having less battle experience than the Germans in the North-West Europe campaign, would have been much more effective if they had not been "fighting their first battle and learning as they fought."[27]

A second explanation for these opinions may be found in the debate surrounding conscription. As indicated by Copp in his book *Cinderella Army*, the issue of reinforcements cannot be divided from the politics regarding conscription for service overseas.[28] Thanks to the plebiscite in 1942 and postal censorship for military personnel, it is known that, in general, Canadian forces were pro-conscription and the shortage of infantry reinforcements only served to harden this stance. Thus, knowing that considerable numbers of NRMA soldiers were in Canada and could be quickly dispatched overseas may have unconsciously coloured the views of soldiers and their commanders.[29] Why accept volunteers having only received one year of training or coming from a non-infantry corps when thousands of properly trained men were waiting in Canada? By criticizing the quality of the training of reinforcements, a common complaint at the time, one could hasten the application of the NRMA. In the end, it was precisely complaints of this nature that brought the conscription crisis to the fore again in the fall of 1944; the result was over 13,000 conscripts being sent overseas.[30]

This way of looking at the conscription issue seems to have "tainted" the works of historians, which explains the fact that their viewpoint coincides with the soldiers'. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the opinions expressed were primarily based on the testimonies of soldiers at the time, and Hain's study (the only one to look at the issue directly), does not confirm these beliefs.

THE REINFORCEMENT SITUATION IN THE RÉGIMENT DE LA CHAUDIÈRE

A better understanding of this situation can be gleaned through the Régiment de la Chaudière personnel records.[31] The Regiment was one of four French-Canadian battalions mobilized in Quebec from the very beginning of the war. After being reassigned to 3 CID, the Régiment de la Chaudière along with two English-speaking regiments, the Queen's Own Rifles and the North Shore (New Brunswick), formed the 8th Infantry Brigade. Arriving in England in July 1941, they boarded ships on June 1, 1944, in Southampton for what would be the largest military operation in history. The "Chauds," as they were widely known, fought in the battles of Normandy and the Scheldt, and then pushed towards the Netherlands where they fought in the Battle of the Rhineland. They were in Germany come V-E Day.

According to the strength report of May 26, 1944, the battalion went into action at Bernières-sur-Mer already short 18 other ranks, as only 794 members boarded the ship.[32] The shortage of French-Canadian infantrymen would have consequences right from D-Day. Naturally, the situation only got worse; the battalion lost 100 men in all in the single day of June 6.[33] The subsequent fighting was just as intense. On June 16, the Regiment's numbers had decreased to 651 other ranks. Figure 1 shows that the Canadian reinforcement organization was moderately able to offset the losses from the capture of Caen in July. Recruiting efforts by members of the Régiment de Hull and Régiment de Montmagny allowed for the arrival of reinforcements, but for the Régiment de la Chaudière, the effects of the deficiency would be felt throughout the battles in Normandy.

The Scheldt campaign also claimed a large number of victims and put pressure on the reinforcement organization. Unfortunately, with the especially high losses in late October during Operation SWITCHBACK to clear the Breskens Pocket, the defects in the reinforcement organization were brought to light. For the Régiment de la Chaudière, the influx of reinforcements did not bring the ranks up to full strength for the heaviest fighting, since, as shown in Figure 1, deficiencies were so high at the end of October. The Regiment was down 171 other ranks on October 28 and 93 on November 4; this situation would continue to be an issue until the end of January.[34] A lack of reinforcements likely explains the fact that the proportion of incoming reinforcements did not exceed 16 percent during the Scheldt campaign. Afterwards, the lull in fighting before the Rhineland campaign limited the shortages of infantrymen.

Still, the Rhineland campaign claimed its share of victims during February and March of 1945. Luckily, the losses were much fewer for the French-Canadian unit, and the arrival of conscripts likely allowed for troop strength to be kept at an acceptable level. The data in Figure 1 confirms the pitiful state of troop strength during much of the fighting on the continent. In the face of this particularly worrying situation for the Régiment de la Chaudière, the quality of training for reinforcements might have been neglected to correct the shortfall that prevailed throughout the fighting in North-West Europe. On top of that, only around a hundred other ranks took part in the entire campaign from D-Day to V-E Day. The Régiment de la Chaudière alone received 1,163 reinforcements between June 8, 1944, and the end of the war in Europe. The Regiment's fighting effectiveness was therefore directly related to the quality of its reinforcements, since they constituted 60 percent of its numbers.[35] Thus, other ranks training was a determining factor for combat performance. Even though historians are generally strongly critical of the quality of the reinforcements' training, their assertions have not yet been proven to be based on solid evidence.

To address this issue, personnel records of soldiers who died in service during the Second World War—the only such records currently available to researchers[36]—can be used, though men killed in action do not represent a conventional sample. Certainly, training played a major role, since a poorly trained soldier has little chance of surviving on the battlefield. But, death on the field of battle is also random. It is the result of circumstance: being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Indeed, losses during the North-West Europe Campaign "were usually the result of indirect fire, especially mortar and artillery."[37] In all, 1,957 other ranks served in the Régiment de la Chaudière between 1944 and 1945. The personnel records of the 224 soldiers killed in action that make up the sample for the Regiment therefore represent 11 percent of those who served in the battalion during the 11 months of the European campaign and constitute a statistically valid sample.[38] It is therefore possible to extrapolate from the data for this group of Regiment members to make generalizations about the men who served in the unit's rifle companies. If the group



Figure 1: Progression of other ranks casualties and deficiencies for the Régiment de la Chaudière. *Sources: WFR, WD, Régiment de la Chaudière, June 1944–May 1945, (LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol 15180-15181) and Progressive casualty statistics ledgers 1939-1946, RG 24, C-3, Vol 22900*

of soldiers killed in action is random, then any factor characteristic of between one quarter and three quarters of the sample would be characteristic of the entire battalion 19 times out of 20 with a margin of error of 6.5 percent.[39] Out of the 224 records of soldiers who were killed in action, 138 belong to reinforcements[40] who joined the Regiment in that capacity after June 6.

Let us examine some data on the enlistment of these other ranks who arrived as reinforcements for the Régiment de la Chaudière. Figure 2 provides the enlistment years of the soldiers who joined the Regiment after June 6, 1944. We can see that 23.2 percent of the members enlisted in 1939, 1940 and 1941. The rather small proportion can no doubt be explained by the particular nature of this group of infantry reinforcements. It is normal that there would be fewer soldiers in the first three years, when most enlistees were probably incorporated into permanent units stationed in England. It is also evident that three out of four soldiers swelled the ranks of Canada's Active Army between 1942 and 1944.[41] For 1942, one could surmise that the numbers are due to the United States entering the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This attack might have convinced a lot of French-Canadians that this conflict was not just Britain's imperialist war, a sentiment held by a large number of people up to that point. Plus, the threat hanging over Canada might have sounded the alarm for some conscripts and encouraged them to volunteer for overseas service. Finally, the plebiscite in 1942 might have led some Canadians to enlist before they were called up so they could choose their unit, as explored further on in this paper.[42]

YEAR	VOLUNTEERS[43]	NRMA VOLUNTEERS[44]	CONSCRIPTS	TOTAL
1939	4 (100 %)	0	0	4 (2.8 %)
1940	15 (100 %)	0	0	15 (10.8 %)
1941	7 (53.8 %)	6 (46.2 %)	0	13 (9.4 %)
1942	17 (85 %)	3 (15 %)	0	20 (14.5 %)
1943	23 (82.1 %)	5 (17.9 %)	0	28 (20.3 %)
1944	6 (10.5 %)	43 (75.4 %)	8 (14 %)	57 (41.3 %)
1945	0	1 (100 %)	0	1 (0.7 %)
Total	**73 (52.9 %)**	**58 (42 %)**	**8 (5.8 %)**	**138**

Figure 2: Number of reinforcements by year of enlistment in the active force and method of recruitment.
Source: Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24)

For 1944, a massive absorption of reinforcements into the active force occurred: 41.3 percent of our sample members entered general service in this one year alone. Certainly, the intense recruitment campaign that was launched in March targeting the reserves played a major role, as 2,000 soldiers transferred to the active force. More than three out of four of our soldiers came from NRMA units. Additionally, out of the 57 soldiers who enrolled in the Active Army in 1944, the data gathered indicates that 64.9 percent who volunteered came from either the Régiment de Hull or the Régiment de Montmagny. Up to that point, these two operational units were comprised of conscripts for home defence. Thus, the Canadian military authorities' offer to deploy Canadian infantry units overseas intact considerably increased the number of infantrymen available as reinforcements, which was good news for the French-Canadian unit.

To this number should be added the soldiers conscripted and deployed overseas after Mackenzie King's decision to use them. In the case we are examining, they numbered eight. This indicates that, despite the political crisis caused by conscription, the military contribution of conscripts to the Régiment de la Chaudière was minimal. This data demonstrates the profound importance of volunteers in the Canadian war effort.

It is also interesting to note that more than one out of every two soldiers volunteered from civilian life. Of course, this category includes significant numbers of men who volunteered after receiving their call-up papers. Copp makes note of this in his article:

> *The category "volunteered from civilian life" almost certainly understates the impact that the National Resources Mobilization Act had on the behaviour of young men after 1941. The choice facing them during the war was not simply to remain a civilian or volunteer for the services. The probability of being conscripted under the NRMA for service in Canada must have been a significant factor in the decision of those who volunteered from 1942 to 1945.*[45]

All of the conscripts in our study came from the infantry: six of them arrived in February 1945 and the other two in March. From all this data, the conclusion can be made that the majority of infantry reinforcements who arrived after June 6, 1944, served a relatively long time. Only 8.2 percent of men arriving at the battalion in 1944 did not come from the training organization developed for NRMA soldiers. Their length of service from the date they signed their attestation papers must therefore in theory have been long enough for them to have learned the basic skills of an infantryman.

Further, a number of veterans and Canadian military historians have commented on the overabundance of soldiers from other army corps besides the infantry who were used to supplement infantry reserves.

It is therefore interesting to look at the proportion of soldiers arriving from different arms to see if these comments were justified. Figure 3 shows that three out of four other ranks who arrived after June 8, 1944, received infantry training, which leads one to believe that they had at least a basic knowledge of their new role. Among other-than-infantry training units, artillery accounts for the highest number at 16. However, it is surprising to see that, even during the worst of the infantry unit reinforcement crisis (between August and November 1944), close to 75 percent of reinforcements came from the infantry. Thus, despite a significant shortage, the fact remains that the majority of reinforcements received training that was directly related to their experience at the front. The proportion of soldiers from other units was 25 percent, as will be examined later in this paper.

Other than the corps of origin, Figure 3 illustrates that close to 75 percent of soldiers who were killed in action or died from their injuries arrived at the front between June and September 1944. In addition, over 80 percent of soldiers arriving from other corps also arrived at that time. This is surely not surprising, given the particularly high casualty rate for this period and the reinforcement crisis that hit the French-Canadian battalions starting in August 1944 and which lasted until November (in the case of the Régiment de la Chaudière). This data confirms the scale of fighting in Normandy, during which 56 percent of the reinforcements arrived.

In summary, these few statistics show that despite the infantry reinforcement shortage, the majority of reinforcements had training related to their role on the European front. Criticism about the surplus of men from other non-infantry corps is not supported by the facts presented here. This data further supports the information collected by Copp and Hain, who indicate that infantrymen made up the majority of their samples.[47]

DATE/CORPS	RCIC	RCA	RCE	RCOC	OTHER[46]	TOTAL
June	22 (78.6 %)	2 (7.1 %)	1 (3.6 %)	2 (7.1 %)	1 (3.6 %)	28 (20.3 %)
July	38 (77.6 %)	6 (12.2 %)	1 (2 %)	3 (6.1 %)	1 (2 %)	49 (35.5 %)
August	5 (83.3 %)	0	0	0	1 (16.7 %)	6 (4.3 %)
September	12 (63.2 %)	4 (21.1 %)	3 (15.8 %)	0	0	19 (13.8 %)
October	4 (100 %)	0	0	0	0	4 (2.9 %)
November	1 (100 %)	0	0	0	0	1 (0.7 %)
December	2 (100 %)	0	0	0	0	2 (1.4 %)
January	3 (42.9 %)	2 (28.6 %)	0	0	2 (28.6 %)	7 (5.1 %)
February	4 (100 %)	0	0	0	0	4 (2.9 %)
March	8 (61.5 %)	1 (7.7 %)	2 (15.4 %)	0	2 (15.4 %)	13 (9.4 %)
April	3 (60 %)	1 (20 %)	1 (20 %)	0	0	5 (3.6 %)
May	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	**102 (73.9 %)**	**16 (11.6 %)**	**8 (5.8 %)**	**5 (3.6 %)**	**7 (5.1 %)**	**138**
TOTAL DURING THE CRISIS	**18 (72 %)**	**4 (16 %)**	**3 (12 %)**	**0**	**1 (4 %)**	**25**

Figure 3: Number of reinforcements by corps of origin and date of arrival. *Source: Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24)*

LENGTH OF TRAINING

The repeated requests for well trained infantry reinforcements made numerous commentators believe that the instruction provided to these men did not give them the skills needed for their trade because of the limited time spent in the Canadian training organization. One might think that the severity of the infantry reinforcement shortage would cause the same thing. It would have been easy for senior officers in the Canadian Army to reduce the training time of infantrymen to speed up the arrival of reinforcements at the front. In August 1944, the question of accepting a lower standard of training was addressed by First Canadian Army Headquarters. General Crerar, Commander of the First Canadian Army, approved his Headquarters' recommendation not to lower training standards for infantry reinforcements. CMHQ concurred on the condition that infantrymen "found to be sufficiently advanced to complete refresher training more quickly would be dispatched to meet outstanding demands for reinforcements" by units at the front.[48] However, none of the information sources gathered for this paper mention the criteria used by authorities to determine which soldiers could complete refresher training more quickly. Thus, for both infantrymen in Canada and remustered soldiers, it was standard throughout the entire war to provide refresher training on the latest weapons and techniques used by units at the front despite a persistent shortage of infantrymen.[49]

It is also important to review the type of training received by soldiers in the Régiment de la Chaudière during the Second World War. Figure 4 illustrates the typical journey of the infantry soldiers, volunteers and NRMA volunteers, in our sample. Basic training took place at the Basic Training Centres in Quebec, New Brunswick and Ontario over a period of 8 weeks. At the centres, the men received physical fitness training to strengthen their bodies, weaponry training to become familiar with the tools of war and specialized training (first aid and other) to learn the basic skills they would invariably need on the battlefield. Apart from gymnastics, the troops also used the parade grounds to practise an activity universally known as drill: attention, at ease, marching in ranks and rifle handling.[50] Among the members in our sample, one soldier out of three attended one of the following four Basic Training Centres: Sorel, Montmagny, Rimouski or Fredericton.[51]

The first phase was followed by advanced training, where soldiers received familiarization training in sub-units (sections, platoons and companies) at different infantry training centres. During this second phase, which lasted two months, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) learned how to organize the men and lead them into combat. The men learned to fight in sections of around 10 men, in platoons made up of three sections and in companies made up of three infantry platoons. In theory, they were taught minor tactics including the key "fire and movement" principle.[52] There was less time spent on drill during this phase. The soldiers' days were filled with shooting rifles, learning to live outdoors (putting up a tent, cooking, digging latrines), digging trenches with shovel and pickaxe, and, above all, marching increasing distances to build up endurance. Some NCOs and a few men were designated for specialized courses: map reading, combat gas specialization, handling the section's Bren gun and other weapons, and driving and mechanical maintenance. In the case of the Régiment de la Chaudière, more than one man out of three was trained at the Infantry Training Centres at Valcartier or Farnham[53] where advanced individual training was given.

Finally, soldiers learned group tactics at the higher levels, the battalion and brigade. Levels above the brigade are less relevant for infantrymen. In Canada, there was no training above the brigade level during the war. Even though division and corps manoeuvres challenged the endurance of the men, they were mostly run to test manoeuvre and administration capabilities of officers of all ranks and roles. This final phase took place in England[54] for Canadian formations except the 4th Armoured Division, which did not undergo it at all.[55]

According to Major-General Burns, the minimum time for preparing an infantryman for combat with a unit on the front was 33 weeks, or 231 days. To this was added four weeks of refresher training in the United Kingdom to familiarize infantrymen with new weapons and techniques, for a total of 259 days.[56] For the soldiers landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944, the average time between their enlistment and their arrival at the front was 1,071 days. For the volunteer infantrymen sent as reinforcements, the average time was 856 days. It was much less for NRMA volunteers sent as reinforcements, who spent only an average of 569 days in the Canadian Army before being sent to the front. However, the time difference is not really that great, for a comparison must be made with the volunteer infantrymen who signed up in 1943 and 1944, since



Figure 4: Typical journey of a volunteer or NRMA volunteer reinforcement. *Source: Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24)*

they were the ones who could be urgently sent to the front. The average time for soldiers who enlisted in 1943 was 325 days between the signing of their papers and their arrival at the Régiment de la Chaudière. For those who enlisted in 1944, the time decreased to 279 days before they reached the French-Canadian unit.[57]

Thus, contrary to the commonly held belief, it does not necessarily appear that the Canadian Army sent reinforcements to the front without taking the time to train them first. Was refresher training cut back? If one relies on Burns' information—that after their arrival in the United Kingdom, the men spent four weeks more receiving refresher training and an additional two for administrative processing—the volunteers' stay in the United Kingdom was usually 42 days. However, CMHQ did issue the directive in August 1944 that refresher training could be completed more quickly. It appears, in general, that military leaders did not skimp on training, since voluntary infantrymen received on average 421.2 days of training in the United Kingdom. The men who enlisted in 1943 remained an average of 82.6 days in the training organization before being sent to the front.[58]

In the case of NRMA volunteers, they spent an average of 229.7 days between enlisting in the active force and arriving at the front. For those enlisting for overseas service in 1943 and 1944, the length of time spent in the Active Army before arriving at the front was 117 days. On the other hand, after being forced into the Active Army, conscripts spent 110 days in the organization before arriving in Europe. According to Burns, the minimum time required for a conscript who decided to enlist in the Active Army before arriving at the front was 84 days: the two weeks' passage, the refresher training and administrative processing. All NRMA volunteers spent 84 days or more before arriving at the front save two who reached the continent in 82 days. Every conscript had at least 84 days before joining the Régiment de la Chaudière. Therefore, the evidence seems to prove that the army did not send its men directly to the front, decreasing their preparedness, since, pursuant to Crerar's orders, training time had generally not been shortened.[59] The data in this paragraph does not take into account the time spent in NRMA units, so in fact the men were much longer in training.

Next let us look at the case of soldiers remustered from other corps. Military authorities agreed that four to six weeks of training would make these soldiers ready for battle at the front.[60] If the two weeks of administrative processing is added, the men would spend between 42 and 56 days before arriving at their combat unit. According to the data from our sample, the soldiers spent an average of 111.3 days before joining the Régiment de la Chaudière. Looking only at the men who took part in the remustering programs in the months of April and August 1944, we note that they spent an average of 67 days in the infantry before joining the French-Canadian unit. Using the same calculations as Major AG Stevenson did in his October 1944 report, one arrives at the conclusion that nearly 19.4 percent of remustered soldiers had less than one month of infantry training. Extrapolating this calculation for the entire reinforcement contingent, this group of soldiers represents only 5.1 percent of the total. What is more, 80.6 percent of remustered soldiers received more than one month of training. Once again, the Canadian organization showed signs of flexibility: one of the soldiers spent 240 days in training before joining his new battalion, while another spent only 4 before arriving at the Régiment de la Chaudière. However, the latter had already taken advanced infantry training when he first joined the Canadian Army.[61]

In short, the length of training offered to different infantrymen was not necessarily related to the crisis confronting the Canadian military administration. For three out of four reinforcements, the time spent in infantry training gives the impression that they were as well trained as their permanent-unit counterparts. They were far from being just men in uniforms. The time allotted for training remustered soldiers also seems propitious. It cannot be said that these men were sent to units at the front with no infantry training. Nevertheless, as Copp and McAndrew assert, length of training is not necessarily a good indication of its quality. According to them, "There was only a tenuous connection between time in service and the quality of training [...]."[62]

Other factors, such as the quality of the commanding officers who were in charge of training but did not all know how to train their soldiers, may have lessened the effectiveness of the training. When the British General Bernard L Montgomery inspected the Canadian units and their commanders in the spring of 1942, he found that approximately one quarter of the battalion commanders were entirely unfit to train their men or lead them into battle.[63] Likewise, the difficulties inherent in expanding an army—shortages of equipment, weapons and training areas or planning problems—all affect the value of the training given to the men.[64] Further, days spent "training" are not all dedicated to such activities in reality. For example, a soldier spends a lot of time shuttling between the different centres or units to which he belongs. Therefore, the assessment must look farther than time spent to really evaluate the quality of training given to the men of the Régiment de la Chaudière.

Let us now consider the four-week refresher training given to remustered soldiers. The syllabus, dated August 9, was divided into 216 periods (45 minutes each), including 8 on handling the Bren gun, 4 on grenades and 2 on the PIAT.[65] A further 32 periods were spent at the firing range so soldiers would learn to handle all the weapons used at the front. Thus, from the very first week, and for three weeks thereafter, new infantrymen used the Bren gun and the PIAT. In the second week, grenade throwing was added to firing range exercises. If the training plan was properly followed, no reinforcements should have been remustered without receiving training on handling these various weapons. Additionally, 16 periods were dedicated to section tactics and 16 more to field craft. Finally, 20 periods were spent on marching drills, 20 on physical fitness training and 12 on sports. In short, both weapons handling and basic combat tactics were part of the training. Plus, given the number of periods allotted to physical fitness, it seems that military authorities fully understood the importance of the physical skills required of the remustered soldiers in their new employment on the European front lines.

With respect to the training of soldiers coming directly from the infantry, the Canadian training centres' standard syllabus details their progress from enlistment up to their transfer to reinforcement units and posting across the Atlantic.[66] Lasting a total of 22 weeks, the syllabus was divided into 900 periods. Training on the machine gun took up 41 periods, including 30 in the first 8 weeks (basic training). Grenade training accounted for 15 periods, including 8 during basic training. Finally, PIAT training occurred over a total of 8 periods in the 9th and 10th weeks during advanced training. The refresher syllabus for reinforcements

once they arrived on British soil shows the provisions made by Canadian military authorities to facilitate the transition to the front.[67] Training was divided into two main parts: a two-week session to refresh the soldiers' memories and another one-week section on group tactics. Out of the 177 training periods, 6 were allocated to the machine gun, 2 to the PIAT and 4 to grenades. The third week focused mainly on section tactics (10 periods) and range practice (19 periods). Ultimately, the facts here do not seem to corroborate the idea that infantry reinforcements were not trained in handling the weapons required for the performance of their duties. However, the question remains whether the training they received was sufficient for them to do their duty on the battlefields of North-West Europe, a key to their survival at the front.

COMBAT EXPERIENCE

This section will examine the time spent at the front by the men of the Régiment de la Chaudière. Even though in battle death can often be quite random, a poorly prepared soldier will suffer the consequences of his inadequate training. As Major-General Christopher Vokes said, "Trained men [...] have a 75 percent chance of survival. Untrained men had none."[68] In other words, we should expect men who have not received training to be hit more easily than battle-tested soldiers and therefore remain with the battalion for a shorter time. Much has been said about reinforcements' difficult transition to the battlefield, including the Whitakers' comments about their short stay at the front. In Tremblay's opinion, experience at the front is important for survival. Some of his sources said that reinforcements:

> *could not tell what weapons the enemy was using to fire on them, which is useful for protection purposes or to prepare an attack. With the "booms," the new arrival only hears a noise, while a veteran knows what danger he is facing and instinctively finds adequate protection. In fact, instinct is just one factor, since you need to know what danger you're facing to be able to protect yourself from it. The recruit's chances of survival are therefore less than a veteran's.*[69]

However, if this is true for reinforcements, it is also true for battalion soldiers arriving at the front for the first time. The study data shows that the experience factor is essential for everyone: regular soldiers and reinforcements alike. Could regular members of the battalion (and historians by extension) have been wrong in criticizing the quality of the training of new arrivals? In their work *Battle Exhaustion* Copp and McAndrew unconsciously support this argument in stressing the importance of battle experience to complete the training of every soldier in a unit.[70] It is also important to note that even though well over 75 percent of casualties sustained by the Régiment de la Chaudière were reinforcements (which is normal given the higher proportion of reinforcements in the Regiment), they spent more time at the front than the "permanent" soldiers. In fact, the average time spent serving at the front in the Regiment was 68.9 days for reinforcement soldiers, compared with 56 days for soldiers who had been on the front from June 6. Of course, the intensity of fighting in June had a major influence on these figures.

CORPS (NUMBER)	TIME (DAYS)
RCIC (102)	68.7
RCA (16)	79.31
RCAC (2)	121
RCE (8)	68
RCOC (5)	65.6
RCAMC (2)	104
RCASC (1)	51
CFC (2)	22
Average for non-CIC	**69.4**
Overall average	**68.9**

Figure 5: Average time served by reinforcements at the front based on corps of origin. *Source: Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24)*

Of the reinforcements from the other arms, only those from the artillery corps (in their greater numbers) seem to have had higher survival rates. For the most part, they arrived in the same period as the reinforcements from the infantry corps.

This fact is interesting for another reason. If one considers the intensity of battles fought by the new arrivals, there is reason to believe that the quality of training received by these soldiers was equivalent to that received by their predecessors. German soldiers put up a fierce resistance to the Canadians during the last days of the battle of Normandy and throughout the operations in the Scheldt, and the toll on the men was no less than that paid by the soldiers who landed on the beaches of Normandy. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that there is no noticeable difference between reinforcements from the infantry and reinforcements from other corps if analyzed together as a group. However, it should be remembered that most of the infantry reinforcements arrived between June and October 1944, the months with the highest casualty rates for the Regiment and 3 CID. This information suggests that the refresher training given to soldiers from non-infantry corps was effective.

Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the battalion operated under-strength until November 1944. Consequently, Regiment members' duties for this period were more complex and left them at higher risk of being hit. However, the many reinforcement soldiers who arrived between June and October 1944 were in the same situation: they too were fighting in an undermanned unit and thus easier targets for the Germans.

Given the collected data, there is reason to doubt the repeated criticism of the quality of reinforcements sent to the front and the idea that all reinforcements were quick to be killed in action. The reinforcements sent to the front in North-West Europe from June 6, 1994, up to the end of the war were a large group with entirely unique experience. However, veterans and military historians have frequently complained about the insufficient numbers of reinforcements sent to infantry battalions throughout the North-West Europe campaign. The data collected for this study confirms those complaints. The reinforcement organization was unable to provide the necessary manpower for a long campaign, despite the years that had gone by since the start of the conflict. Nevertheless, contrary to the wide-held belief among historians that the majority of reinforcements received incomplete training, this reassessment shows that, in large part, the training was of sufficient length. Moreover, it shows that the belief that reinforcements arriving at the front came from the artillery, armoured or engineer corps is unfounded based on the data at our disposal. There were large numbers of infantrymen reaching the Régiment de la Chaudière, which, as a French-language unit, faced shortages of reinforcements that were all the more glaring. The experience of these men on arrival at the front seems to have been quite similar to that of the "regular" soldiers. The information gathered in the course of this assessment points to the conclusion that survival for these soldiers was not merely based on chance; the study revealed that they received training of sufficient length and their combat survival rates were similar to those of other soldiers.

With respect to the remustered soldiers, one could ask if an average of 67 days of advanced infantry training was sufficient to be effective in the field. We must keep in mind that length of training is not necessarily the best indicator of the quality of training and therefore look at the kind of training received by these men. For this study, only weapons handling training could be assessed, and incompletely at that. Other factors like battle discipline and endurance for long marches could not be assessed and require further research.

Nevertheless, writings from the period include a number of comments that leave us wondering about the quality of training that conscripts received upon their arrival in the United Kingdom. Byers wrote that Brigadier WHS Macklin, Deputy Chief of Staff at CMHQ in London at the time, wrote in one of his reports in December 1944 that "the Army could at least be sure that most of the NRMA men would be relatively well-trained." According to Macklin, a number of men would probably be above the standard of some of the men who had been remustered in September and October. Moreover, based on a brief survey conducted in March 1945, the unit commanders from the three Canadian divisions in Europe shared Brigadier Macklin's view of the quality of the conscripts. In their opinion, the conscripts were equal to the volunteers in a number of categories, including "their general attitudes, their standard of training, their fighting ability and their morale."[71]

These positive comments about conscripts were taken up by official historian CP Stacey. In his opinion, the conscripts performed brilliantly at the front in North-West Europe. He shares the positive comments written in the Algonquin Regiment war diary in April 1945: "*Reinforcements*. Coming as required.

Only about 25% have had previous battle experience, but all appeared well trained and they stood up well under a tough initiation." Similarly, he mentions the following comment from the Loyal Edmonton Regiment's war diary of April 30: "during the month our Battalion has taken on strength eight officers and 167 other ranks; among the latter are approximately 40 NRMA personnel. [...] in the few small actions they have engaged in so far they have generally shown up as well as all new reinforcements do...."[72] It may be that conscription for overseas service, so eagerly awaited by the soldiers, finally brought satisfaction. The criticism is therefore no longer appropriate. The absence of serious complaints from the front regarding the training of reinforcements, noted by Stacey, also supports this position. In the end, these considerations demonstrate the need for further research on these issues.

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ENDNOTES

1. Terry Copp, *Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944–1945*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, p 5.
2. JL Granatstein and JM Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada*, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1985, p 143–151.
3. CP Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966, p 284.
4. Donald T Byers, *Mobilizing Canada: The National Resources Mobilization Act, the Department of National Defence, and Compulsory Military Service in Canada*, Doctoral dissertation. McGill University, 2000, p 357.
5. ELM Burns, *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945*, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1956, p 96; Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Tug of War: The Allied Victory that Opened Antwerp*, Toronto: Stoddart, 2000 [1984], p 214–216.
6. W Boss, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ), Report No 122, *Situation of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, Spring 1944*, August 29, 1944, Appendix C, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Department of National Defence (DND). The report is available in English online on the DHH Internet site at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/index-eng.asp.
7. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1970, p 429-430; Boss, *Situation of the Canadian Military Forces,* Appendix C.
8. J MacKay Hitsman, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ), Report No 63, *Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army During the Second World War*, August 17, 1953, DHH, DND, p 196.
9. Hitsman, *Manpower*, p 197–198.
10. Copp, *Cinderella Army*, Appendix A, p 297.
11. GW Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume II, The Canadians in Italy, 1943–1945,* Ottawa: Queen's Printer, *Histoire officielle de la participation de l'Armée canadienne à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Volume II, Les Canadiens en Italie, 1943–1945*, 1966, p 562.
12. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign,* p 630–632.
13. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments,* p 433–438; Copp, *Cinderella Army*, Appendix A.
14. Douglas E Delaney, *The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005, p 164.
15. Hitsman, *Manpower*, p 199–201.
16. "Reinforcements Poorly Trained Major Connie Smythe Charges," *The Montreal Gazette*, September 19, 1944, p 1.
17. War Diary (WD), Black Watch (RHR) of Canada, Regimental Museum and Archives, series BW003 (War Diaries), file 1RHC, October 1944, Appendix 4.
18. WD, Black Watch, October 1944, Appendix 4.
19. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, p 632.

20. Copp and Bill McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, 249 pages; Yves Tremblay, *Volontaires : des Québécois en guerre, 1939–1945*, Montreal: Athéna, 2006, 141 pages; Robert C Engen, *Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, p 126–133.

21. D and S Whitaker, *Tug of War*, Chapter 10 (mainly).

22. Copp, *Cinderella Army*, p 178.

23. Allister Hain, *Calgary Highlanders: A Profile Based on Personnel Records,* Master's thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1990, p 15–32.

24. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government,* p 440.

25. Engen, *Canadians Under Fire*, p 132. The author would also like to thank Douglas E Delaney for raising the last point of this argument, ie the difficulties for soldiers not trained with a particular group.

26. *Debates*, House of Commons, November 23, 1944, p. 6532–6533. Hitsman mentions the letter read to the House of Commons by General McNaughton in his report on manpower problems. Hitsman, *Manpower*, p 170. Or see "Visit by SD & T to NW European Theatre" (LAC, RG 24, Vol 9880, file 2/TL REP 12/1).

27. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume I: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955, p 252–253.

28. Copp, *Cinderella Army*, p 178.

29. The author draws inspiration from Byers' idea that awareness of the existence of NRMA men in Canada influenced the actions of both army commanders and their political opponents on the issue of conscription. Byers, *Mobilizing Canada*, p 372.

30. Hain, *Calgary Highlanders*, p 19.

31. The LAC only authorizes the consultation of the personnel records of soldiers who died in the Second World War. They are therefore the only such records currently available to researchers. Researchers may also access the records of people who have been dead for over 25 years. However, proof of death is required, which may be time-consuming given the number of records for consultation.

32. Reinforcements to Field, 2nd and 3rd Divs—Stats Showing No of Rfts to Inf Fd Units of 6 Jun 44/4 Oct 44, LAC, RG 24 [DND], C-3, Vol 10517.

33. See Appendix B in Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, p 650. According to Stacey, 1 soldier died of his injuries, 36 were injured and 41 were taken prisoner.

34. WFR, WD, Régiment de la Chaudière, June 1944–May 1945, (LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol 15180-15181).

35. Jacques Castonguay, *Le Régiment de la Chaudière, 1869–2004*, Lévis: Le Régiment de la Chaudière, 2005, see Appendix H, p 647–690 and p 369. Note that the study does not include the Regiment's officers.

36. The author would like to thank Terry Copp and Yves Tremblay for their help with the methodology used here as well as their support while the research was being conducted.

37. Terry Copp and Christine Hamelin, "Le Régiment de Maisonneuve: A Profile Based on Personnel Records," *Canadian Military History*, Vol 8, No 4 (Autumn 1999), p 17.

38. In total, 227 NCOs and other ranks from the Régiment de la Chaudière died in Europe. However, three records were excluded from our sample, as two soldiers died from accidental causes after the end of hostilities and one other was killed in combat but with another regiment than the Chaudière (an error in the record). To ensure accuracy of the study, they were removed from this sample.

39. Suppose someone is very interested in the proportion of men in the Régiment de la Chaudière who were born in Quebec, but outside the Montreal metropolitan area. Nobody has this information for the entire regiment, but it is known that out of 224 men who died, 142 or 65.7% were born in Quebec. The issue is knowing if the sample is representative of the real proportion of soldiers in the regiment born in Quebec, excluding Montreal. If one accepts that being born in a specific place neither increases or decreases the risks of being killed, one can reasonably conclude that the sample (224 for all of the Chaudière regiment) is unusual (which happens approximately 1 time out of 20) or that the actual proportion of soldiers born in Quebec is between 59.2% and 72.2%. The margin of 6.5% comes from dividing 0.975 by the square root of 224, the number of members in the sample.

40. According to the *Dictionary of Military Terms*, to reinforce a troop means to "send additional personnel and equipment [,] to give assistance or replace casualties." Thus, for the purposes of this study, a reinforcement is any other rank who arrived at the Regiment on the front after June 6, 1944, and who therefore did not participate in the landing on D-Day, even though this may cause confusion. Accordingly, any soldier who was with the Regiment from the beginning of the war, but who was taken off strength before Operation NEPTUNE, is considered a reinforcement. Similarly, any soldier who arrived only a few days before the start of the offensive and landed on the beaches of Normandy on June 6 is not considered a reinforcement for the purposes of this study. Richard Bowyer, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, London: Bloomsbury, 2004, p 202.

41. Granatstein and Hitsman, *Broken Promises*, p 204–207; Boss, *Situation*, p 8–10.

42. The author would like to thank Yves Tremblay for this comment.

43. This category is comprised of volunteers from civilian life; that is men who had not belonged to any military unit before joining the active force.

44. To simplify categorization, the expression NRMA volunteers will be used to distinguish these men from volunteers from civilian life.

45. Copp and Hamelin, "Le Régiment de Maisonneuve," p 22–23.

46. Includes members from the following corps: RCAC, RCAMC, RCASC and CFC.

47. Copp, "Le Régiment de Maisonneuve," p 23; Hain, *Calgary Highlanders*, p 22.

48. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 438.

49. In his study on manpower problems, Burns notes the following regarding training given in Canada: "Theoretically, the essentials could be covered in that period, and doubtless anyone of average intelligence who was keen to serve and to learn could have mastered the rudiments of any private soldier's job within the time laid down, provided he had moderately good instructors, and provided there was the equipment, training grounds, ranges and so forth needed for giving effective instruction. Unfortunately these conditions were seldom all found in combination. […] The result was that training in Canada was seldom completed in the scheduled four months or so, and even then, the majority of reinforcements arriving in the United Kingdom were not trained to a state which the field units considered to be satisfactory. It came to be accepted that a minimum of four to six weeks' refresher training would be required by all reinforcements during their stay in England." Burns, *Manpower*, p 77–78.

50. Yves Tremblay, *Instruire une armée : les officiers canadiens et la guerre moderne, 1919–1944*, Montreal: Athéna, 2007, p 99; Timothy Harrison Place, *Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944*, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p 16.

51. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

52. Timothy Harrison Place, "Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War," War in History, Vol 7, No 4 (November 2000), p 444.

53. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

54. This point is inspired by David J Bercuson, Battalions of Heroes: The Calgary Highlanders in World War II, Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994, p 18–19 and Tremblay, Instruire, p 102–103.

55. Angelo N. Caravaggio, *Commanding the Green Centre Line in Normandy: A Case Study of Division Command in the Second World War*, Doctoral dissertation, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2009, p 99.

56. "[...] the minimum time from enlistment of the reinforcement to his reaching the field unit would be two weeks at the depot, seventeen weeks in training centres in Canada, two weeks' passage to the United Kingdom, two weeks for the required administrative processing before going to the front," Burns, *Manpower*, p 80-81. A total of thirty-three weeks. If four weeks' refresher training is added, that makes a total of 37 weeks.

57. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

58. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

59. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

60. *Memorandum: Manpower and Training Policy, Remustering to CIC*, September 15, 1944, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol 9900, p 1.

61. Régiment de la Chaudière, military records from sample (LAC, RG 24).

62. Copp and McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, p 102, footnote.

63. John A English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command*, New York: Praeger, 1991, p 130.

64. Chapter 4 in Caravaggio's thesis, even though it concerns an armoured division, is very informative about the problems that Canadian Army units and formations may have encountered on British soil. Caravaggio, *Commanding*, p 87–100. The author would like to thank Douglas Delaney who informed her about this thesis.

65. For the remustered soldiers' training syllabus, see *Training Reinforcements in UK Generally 1942/09–1944/11* from CMHQ in London (LAC, RG 24, Vol 9900, file 2/REINF/1/3).

66. Canadian Army, *Canadian Infantry Training Centre Standard Syllabus*, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944, p 12–13.

67. For the refresher training syllabus, see *Training Reinforcements in UK Generally 1944/11–1945/03* from CMHQ in London (LAC, RG 24, Vol 9901, file 2/REINF/1/6).

68. D and S Whitaker, *Tug of War*, p 229.

69. Tremblay, *Volontaires*, p 49. *(Unofficial translation)*.

70. Copp and McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, p 63.

71. Byers, *Mobilizing Canada*, p 408–409.

72. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, p 633.

The staff courses evolved in 1946 into the Canadian Staff College at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario, which then became known as the Canadian Army Staff College, a name it held from 1947 to 1968

Source: Department of National Defence

THE "GOD OF WAR" AND THE "QUEEN OF THE BATTLEFIELD":
Studying the Soviet Army Threat at the Canadian Army Staff College, 1946–1956

Dr. Alex Herd

The year 2011 marked the 65th anniversary of the formal establishment of a Canadian Army staff college in Kingston, Ontario. At staff college, officers develop the capabilities required at field and static headquarters, at brigade level and above, for the planning and preparation of operations, logistical support, administration, and other duties that enable an army formation to fight. During the Second World War, the Canadian Army, having recently undergone a period of rapid growth, urgently needed more and better-educated staff officers to handle larger ground forces and new technical developments; for the first time, the army's own wartime staff courses were called upon to meet that need. The staff courses evolved in 1946 into the Canadian Staff College, which then became known as the Canadian Army Staff College (CASC), a name it held from 1947 to 1968.[1] The post-war staff college therefore grew out of wartime contingencies and the army's need to handle the increasingly complex technological demands of modern warfare. As the world during the early Cold War period (1946–1956) divided along opposing ideological lines, CASC student officers' professional military education increasingly focused on the army's next potential battlefield enemy, the Soviet Red Army. Whether it was encountered in northern Canada or northern Germany, staff officer candidates in Kingston were prepared to meet the Soviet military threat; most importantly, they were readied to do so within the context of an emerging Canada–U.S. defence relationship.

In the late 1940s, North American officials were concerned with Soviet airborne troops capturing parts of northern Canada in advance of a major Soviet military thrust south against the continental U.S. By the early 1950s, that fear was exacerbated by the continued presence of a large Soviet Army force stationed in Europe. Canadian Army leaders thought hard about fighting future wars against the Soviets, in particular alongside their American counterparts. The studies on the Soviet Army at the CASC placed this thinking squarely under the spotlight. If the Canadian Army fought its Soviet counterpart during the early Cold War period, its defence of northern Canada against Soviet raids and other small incursions would involve coordination with American military units. Other Canadian Army units, as part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, were prepared for coalition warfare against the Soviets in defence of Western Europe. Evidence indicates that CASC education regarding the Soviet Army primarily focused on the Soviet divisions' fighting power, in order for Canadian Army staff officers, in a potential future conflict, to exploit their weaknesses and achieve battlefield success under conditions largely determined by American defence priorities.

Not that American military policy turned back the Canadian Army's longstanding British traditions, from which arose the CASC's establishment, organization, and course curricula. Before the Second World War, a few Canadian Permanent Force officers had been annually admitted into the British Army staff colleges at Camberley, England, and Quetta, India, to qualify for senior staff and field command appointments in Canada's army.[2] Wartime constraints on Anglo-Canadian personnel and material resources obligated the Canadian Army to run its own staff courses, which were first held in England and then at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston.[3] Those wartime staff courses, which lasted between four and six months, copied the syllabi at the British Army staff colleges. The early Cold War courses, which were first held at RMC and then at Fort Frontenac, were extended to a year in length and also adopted the British staff course curricula.

As in the British Army staff college system, the core of the Canadian Staff College's instructional cadre was the Directing Staff (DS) of senior officers, which ran courses and evaluated students' work. Annually, the CASC's total instructional staff was between 12 and 17 officers during the first five years of the early Cold War and increased to between 22 and 28 over the next five years. Most of the instructors were Canadian Army officers, but there was at least one Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) officer and two to four British and American officers per year.[4] The student body was composed of captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels seeking qualification as staff officers. The early Cold War CASC student body, initially composed of around

50 officers annually, was predominately made up of members of the Canadian Army, Air Force, and Navy, with a smaller number of British and U.S. Army officers. As the Cold War progressed and new western alliances developed, the student body increased to over 90 members annually and was greatly diversified. In the 1950s, Indian, South African, French, Turkish, Norwegian, Belgian, Italian, Australian, and Pakistani officers studied at the CASC.[5]

Students were divided into syndicates—small groups of ten officers each—for the purposes of analyzing and resolving various contemporary military problems. The course syllabus had both theoretical and applied segments, with individual and syndicate studies and group conduct of various command exercises, which usually involved tabletop maps and telephones and were based on realistic battle situations.[6] The staff course curriculum included a wide breadth of subjects that, divided into series (which spread a subject's coursework over a few weeks to a few months), ranged from administration, to amphibious operations, to current affairs, to the logistics of infantry and armoured divisions in combat. From the time the first Cold War course was held in 1946–1947, the curriculum also annually included a series on U.S. military strategy and armed forces organization; beginning in 1950, the course included a similar series on the Soviet Union's armed forces. In that manner, Canada's contemporary strategic and defence problems drove the focus of staff officer study.

One of the immediate post-Second World War issues was American defence priorities that involved Canada. In June 1946, joint Canadian–American political–military discussions over the establishment of an effective air defence system in northern Canada led one newspaper, the *Financial Post*, to call Canada "another Belgium." Early that year, the newly-created Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) of Canadian and American military planners had produced an appreciation of a potential enemy attack on North America around the year 1950. No longer shielded by its geographic position, the continent would be subject to short-range missiles, aircraft, and rockets launched from both submarines and Arctic bases "seized for the purpose." Additionally, enemy long-range bomber aircraft would deliver atomic weapons against targets in North American government, industrial, and population centres, flying over the polar cap and northeast Canada—the shortest route between the Eurasian landmass and the Western Hemisphere. The MCC's recommendations for an extensive defence network included air bases "as far to the north of potential targets as feasible," along with fighter-interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft emplacements.[7] The urgency with which American officials pressed those requirements was met with caution by both Canadian government officials and senior military officers. For example, despite the apparent consensus within the MCC, the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Robert Leckie, opposed the U.S. service chiefs' view that a future attack on North America would primarily aim to destroy the continent's war potential. Rather, Leckie believed that such an assault would serve as a diversion from enemy operations elsewhere and therefore did not warrant an extensive northern defence scheme and its intrusion on Canadian territory, use of Canadian resources, and significant financial implications. Leckie preferred more moderate defence proposals.[8]

Not surprisingly, when the Canadian press caught wind of the matter, it thus interpreted the Americans as forcing an "Atomic Age Maginot Line" on Canada.[9] The concepts of "another Belgium" and another Maginot Line referred to recent history: in 1940, the Germans had invaded France through Belgium, bypassing the Maginot Line system of fortifications along the Franco–German border, rendering moot its defensive purpose. Similarly, the newspaper reports in 1946 expressed both Canadians' concerns with the American strategic preoccupation with their north and the mutual Canadian–American fear that the Soviets would first attempt an invasion of the U.S. over that same ground; by implication, the Soviets would also bypass defensive bases along the northern frontier.

The main concerns of North American defence planners were the interrelated threats of Soviet bombers and airborne forces. The officials knew that the Soviets needed forward air bases to enable two-way bombing missions against the continental U.S.[10] The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, Greenland, and Newfoundland were all potential spots for the establishment of such bases. The Soviets would achieve lodgements in these areas through airborne operations. In the post-war period, North American defence planners believed that the Soviets had between eight and ten airborne divisions and approximately 5,000 transport-type aircraft to deliver airborne units, with the ability to send roughly 6,000 troops in this manner against Alaska or northwest Canada by 1950.[11] The MCC's appreciation, incorporated into the June 1946 Canada–U.S.



Canadian Army Staff College at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario in the early 1950's



Captain Jimmy Stafford, GSO 3, assisted by Sgt A.J. Coull and Cpl R.A. Parker lays out one of the training models in Normandy Hall, Kingston, Ontario during a staff college exercise in the 1950's

Basic Security Plan (BSP) that updated the joint defence requirements for post-war North America, thus recommended the creation of garrison and mobile forces "to guard against lodgments in the north."[12] Under the BSP, to meet that requirement the Canadians had to provide an airborne or air-transportable brigade group (with supporting airlift). For the post-war Canadian Army, this was an attainable objective, as at its core were three infantry regiments of one battalion each. As a result, plans were outlined for such a formation, prepared to conduct "lodgement reduction" operations in the north[13] through the appropriate airborne, air-transportability, and winter training of the army's three infantry battalions.

Despite the Canadian government's public commitment in 1946 to meet the BSP obligation,[14] the brigade group did not formally come into being for two more years, when it was designated the Mobile Striking Force (MSF) and one infantry battalion at a time began conversion into an airborne/air-transportable unit. Planners at Army Headquarters (AHQ) anticipated that all three battalions would be airborne/air-transportable by spring 1951, well beyond the BSP's timeline for this dual capability.[15] Part of the problem was that a general shortage of instructors, aircraft, and equipment slowed training. The MSF concept was also undermined by a poor army-air force showing during Exercise EAGLE in 1949.[16] To rectify the situation, the Canadian Army's Chief of the General Staff, General Charles Foulkes, appointed Brigadier George Kitching as Commander Designate of the MSF, assigned the MSF commander's position special priority and promised to provide all the resources the brigadier required for airborne operations and Arctic defence. Under Kitching's watch, the MSF proved it was capable of operating effectively as an airborne/air-transportable force in the northern parts of North America. In early 1950, MSF and American units successfully completed Exercise SWEETBRIAR in the harsh climates of the Yukon and Alaska.[17]

Meanwhile, and until the Soviets developed a significant long-range bomber capability,[18] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planners recognized the MSF's importance to continental defence and incorporated this formation into plans designed to protect the United States' war-making capacity, either against Soviet agents' sabotage and subversion or against Soviet airborne attacks short of intercontinental strikes. For example, in spring 1948, the JCS Plan HALFMOON envisioned, on the outbreak of war, a joint Canada–U.S. effort to secure the Western Hemisphere's military resources with a Canadian infantry brigade group as part of the defence of northeastern Canada.[19] Moreover, in November 1949, one of the JCS sub-committees, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, produced Plan OFFTACKLE, in which "an air mobile Canadian regiment" was allotted to the "Western Hemisphere reserve."[20]

In 1950–1951, the MSF's roles in continental defence increased, despite the Canadian Army's creation of two additional infantry brigade groups for United Nations service in Korea and NATO service in West Germany and the resultant strains on army personnel resources. In the context of international tensions heightened by the Chinese intervention in Korea in late 1950, the MSF was prepared for rapid deployment in defence of two important uranium mines in the Northwest Territories (that, by 1953, were providing over 50% of the uranium required for U.S. production of nuclear weapons), the Alaska Highway system, and the U.S. Strategic Air Command's bases in Canada, such as that at Goose Bay, Labrador—a vital military link between North America and Europe and a key component of continental defence. The implications of an enemy occupation of these sites for NATO's nuclear deterrent and supply system were clear.[21] By the mid-1950s, the MSF was an important part of the broader U.S.-led North American defence system against Soviet lodgements, by which the enemy would attempt to disrupt "North America's ability to defend Western Europe and carry the war to the Soviet Union proper."[22]

At the CASC, Canadian Army staff officer candidates were prepared for employment with the MSF, which remained important to the Canadian Armed Forces' efforts to develop airborne, air-transportable, and arctic/sub-arctic operational capabilities. The MSF was directly tied to the joint Canada–U.S. military and scientific work on arctic, sub-arctic, and winter weather operations conducted at the Joint Services Experimental Testing Station (JSES) established at Fort Churchill, Manitoba, in 1946.[23] Whereas Fort Churchill was primarily used for vehicle, weapons, and equipment tests and the acclimatization of ground troops to extreme cold weather conditions, the command and control of these soldiers and their equipment remained relevant to staff officer education in Kingston during the period from

1946 to 1956. Beginning with the first Cold War CASC course, staff officer candidates learned about "Winter Warfare," "Arctic Warfare," or "Northern Operations"—some years as part of a broader series on "Tactics" or "Operations War" and other years as an independent series within the curriculum. The purpose of these studies was to analyze "the employment of ground and air forces in the non-settled areas of the Northern Hemisphere, in particular of Northern Canada" and at times included both an in-house preparatory phase at Fort Frontenac and a tour of the Canadian Army's northern training facilities.[24]

The "Northwest Tour" or "Northern Tour" included stops in Whitehorse, Yukon, and at Fort Churchill. At the latter location, student officers were exposed to the research data collected on, for example, arctic clothing, medical problems, mobility and transport, and the employment of air forces.[25] Naturally, student officers learned more about the effect of winter conditions on operations in northern Canada through exercises. For example, in 1950, Exercise ICEWORM, a six-hour indoor tactical exercise, dealt with the training and employment of "a small force in the FORT CHURCHILL area under conditions existing in Jan[uary]"; students prepared the exercise's first two requirements in Kingston and then were issued and given the opportunity to discuss the third and final requirement, on the employment of ground and airborne units against an enemy invasion of northern Canada, at Fort Churchill.[26]

The MSF had a role in this exercise's scenario, as it was to be deployed in defence of vital points in the far north, northwest, and northeast of Canada after "relations between the Atlantic Pact Nations and the PHILISTINES became increasingly strained."[27] ICEWORM was one example of the connections between Canadian Army staff officer education and Fort Churchill. In the early 1950s, some Canadian Army officers had the opportunity to participate in MSF operational exercises out of Fort Churchill, including the POLE STAR series of exercises over the winter of 1951–1952. In each phase of this winter manoeuvre, a reinforced MSF infantry company group was tasked with the capture or destruction of an enemy lodgement.[28] As the Canadian Army had plans to use Fort Churchill as an advanced base for MSF operations in a war,[29] it is not surprising that, from 1951 to 1955, 11 MSF exercises were undertaken, some with American participation.[30]

The critical concept is that student officers in Kingston learned about the MSF's important role in the defence of Canada, a role that made the formation interoperable with American ground forces tasked with continental defence. They also learned that the MSF's operations were largely influenced by the capabilities of its constituent troops, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment in extreme cold weather and over snowy ground—capabilities determined by Canadian and American personnel at Fort Churchill. The latter point cannot be understated. The JSES was a direct outgrowth of late Second World War sub-arctic and arctic exercises that demonstrated the limitations of both Canadian and U.S. army troops and equipment operating in northern climates.[31] At the JSES, Canadian and American service personnel and civilian scientists worked alongside each other, sharing information and ideas. The MSF was also involved in this process; the exercises out of Fort Churchill allowed MSF members to exchange ideas, doctrine, and equipment with American personnel.[32] If Canadian CASC graduates were tasked to the MSF or to any other northern post, they were well prepared to work within the established framework of joint Canada–U.S. defence of the Arctic against Soviet Army attack.

Although the Soviet threat to northern Canada was legitimate, a Canadian Army–Soviet Army clash during the 1950s was most likely to come in Europe. In late 1951, the first NATO-tasked Canadian Army formation, the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (27 CIBG), arrived in northern West Germany to serve with the British Army of the Rhine. In Germany, the Canadians spent the majority of their time under the higher NATO Headquarters Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). On schedule, 27 CIBG rotated home in late 1953; every two years a new brigade group rotated into the line while the previous formation returned to Canada. 27 CIBG was replaced by 1 CIBG, which was then followed by 2 CIBG in late 1955.[33] Those formations faced formidable Soviet conventional ground forces stationed in Eastern Europe—forces maintained since the Second World War to counterbalance U.S. strategic nuclear power through the threat of a rapid takeover of Western Europe.

Source: Department of National Defence



Source: Department of National Defence

Above: Exercise participants log the last mile on the trail to Fort Churchill during training exercises in the late 1950's

Left: A fighting patrol from the 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, coming under fire, burrows into the deep snow to engage the "enemy" during a winter training exercise

Soviet military policy was largely focused on the training and equipping of these conventional forces.[34] By the time 27 CIBG arrived in the European theatre, the Soviets had programs underway to modernize and improve the military forces arrayed against NATO. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), consisting of 22 of the 30 Soviet Army divisions deployed in Eastern Europe, was among the first Soviet forces to be re-equipped and receive training, a process accelerated by the onset of the Korean War and U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to organize an integrated NATO force on the continent. The GSFG's combat elements were significantly improved. Its six field armies increased their battlefield mobility and firepower through the motorization of their transport and the strengthening of their armoured units (through the integration of new tanks), while the GSFG's supporting tactical air army incorporated "early-generation" MiG jet fighters into its units.[35]

The GSFG, as the immediate threat to NATO forces in Germany, would clash with Canadian Army units if war broke out.[36] By the mid-1950s, the GSFG's constituent formations were arranged in two operational echelons of three armies each. The first echelon, composed of a mix of tank, mechanized, and rifle divisions, was tasked with pinning down and creating gaps in NATO forces' defensive lines. The second echelon of tank and mechanized divisions was designed as a mobile force to exploit the success of the first echelon.

The GSFG's large support organization included two artillery corps, two independent tank divisions, and approximately 2,000 close support aircraft. Additionally, the Soviets had numerous East German and Polish divisions in the region at their disposal. All GSFG units were equipped and manned at near-wartime levels.[37]

In the event of a war, those East Bloc forces would most likely strike first at NORTHAG. The terrain defended by the Canadian brigade groups was generally flat and open and therefore favoured Soviet motorized and mechanized operations. The other option, the land defended by NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG) to the south of NORTHAG, was "less inviting." In a plausible wartime scenario, Soviet forces would concentrate their initial effort against NATO forces in northern Germany and then, with the collapse of the NORTHAG front, they would push quickly west through the Netherlands to seize NATO reinforcement ports, move south into Germany's Ruhr industrial region and northwest France, and attempt to cut off the CENTAG forces in southern Germany.[38]

To counter a Soviet conventional invasion of NATO territory, in the early 1950s JCS plans conceptualized allied forces holding a line against Soviet ground forces in Western Europe.[39] Within a year of their organization's establishment, NATO leaders adopted a planning concept in which a strong defence along Germany's Rhine River represented the best means to stop a Soviet advance.[40] Although the Canadian Army brigade groups were trained in all forms of land warfare,[41] defensive operations remained at the core of their war preparations. The concept of operations for 1 CIBG, serving as part of British Army I Corps in NORTHAG from late 1953 to late 1955, was indicative of the Canadian brigade groups' expected role against enemy attack in Germany. 1 CIBG was primarily prepared "to fight a covering force battle forward of the Rhine and then effect a withdrawal to the river's west bank," where NATO forces would delay the Soviets long enough to move mobilized formations into battle.[42]

These mobilized formations included, of course, Canadian Army infantry and armoured divisions. In the mid-1950s, short-term mobilization plans had one division available for European service within 30 days after hostilities began and a second division available sometime beyond the first 30 days of war.[43] In that respect, the 1 and 2 CIBGs were important to British Army I Corps' operations in NORTHAG, as they enabled their parent organization, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (activated in 1954 as part of the regular army's expansion at that time), to deploy more rapidly to the German front than mobilized British divisions; in effect, for the British, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division represented the only reinforcements available within 90 days of the hostilities commencing.[44]

The early Cold War CASC curriculum likewise prepared student officers for staff appointments with army formations in Europe. Throughout the CASC Soviet Armed Forces series (which began in 1950), student officers critically analyzed how Canadian infantry and armoured divisions would fare against their Soviet equivalents on the battlefield. The primary purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces series was to teach students Soviet Army organization, equipment, and tactics, "particularly from divisional level down." Moreover, as the CASC Directing Staff noted,

> *It should also be appreciated that simply knowing these things is not enough. The Soviet Army must be compared with our own so that its relative strengths and weaknesses clearly emerge. The Soviet Army's reactions will not be the same as our own. It is for this reason that the personal characteristics, background and training of the Soviet soldier and officer should be familiar to each officer.*[45]

Additionally, staff officer candidates were encouraged to keep the Soviet Army in mind throughout their time as students, as they were informed that the "study of Soviet Army methods is not a subject for consideration at the start of the Course [*sic*] and then for pigeon-holing. It should be given frequent thought throughout the course."[46] Likewise, officers were to "pursue these studies actively after they [left] the course, making use of all available official information and knowledge gained from authentic non military sources."[47]

The series was annually organized around the same topics. Student officers first studied the general organization of the Soviet High Command and the three armed services and the degree of political control over and within them; then they studied the Soviet field army, field divisions, weapons and equipment, tactics, and logistics.[48] Beginning in 1951, précis were supplemented annually by a lecture on "The Soviet Soldier as an Individual" and a panel discussion on Soviet Army organization, tactics, and weapons. Representatives of AHQ's Directorate of Military Intelligence handled these lectures and discussions[49] (for numerous instructional purposes, this directorate provided the CASC Commandant and his staff with intelligence and other information on the Soviet Army). In 1952, a lecture entitled "An Analysis of Soviet Military Tactics and Strategy 1943–1945"[50] was added and remained an annual feature to "acquaint the students with high level Soviet planning and the execution of large scale attack operations."[51] Another consistent part of the curriculum was a list of recommended background reading on Soviet armed forces, Russia/the Soviet Union (politics, economics, people, and security), communism, and Joseph Stalin.[52] One other notable reading, appended to the end of the 1950 curriculum, was a copy of an article by Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, in which he argued against the common post-Second World War western view that denigrated the Soviets' combat qualities by discussing their wartime performance on the Eastern Front and the Soviet technical developments that had been made in all three armed services since 1945 (see below).[53]

The most important studies were those focused on the Soviet field divisions, as each year these formations' capabilities formed the core of the series' syndicate discussions. During those studies, student officers learned that the Soviets deemed artillery to be of great importance to both defensive and offensive operations[54]; that, as a result of both artillery's important roles and the wartime experiences of the Soviets, the Soviet Army was the only modern army to have grouped artillery into divisions;[55] and that the Soviets' "artillery-mindedness"[56] was exemplified in Stalin's alleged statement that "Infantry is the Queen of the Battlefield but Artillery is the GOD OF WAR."[57] Students focused their efforts on the analysis of Soviet Army rifle, mechanized, and tank divisions, the equivalents of Canadian Army infantry and armoured divisions.

Each year student officers were asked to compare Soviet mechanized and tank divisions with the Canadian armoured division and highlight the most important differences. This was a logical comparison, as the Soviet divisions contained tank and other armoured units found in the Canadian formation. However, the functions of the Soviet mechanized division were closer to those of the Canadian armoured division; that is, both were similarly balanced in tanks and infantry to allow for employment as independent fighting forces. Meanwhile, the Soviet tank division was more suited for "shock" action, "to punch a penetration in the breakout battle" exploited by rifle and mechanized formations.[58] The syndicate discussion on this subject involved a comparative table of the main differences in composition and armament of the three divisions.[59] Whereas, overall, the Canadian armoured division had more tanks, its tank units were composed of either medium or light tanks, while both Soviet divisions had the numbers of medium and heavy tanks to make up for this supposed disadvantage. The Soviet formations were also better designed for mobile operations, with the advantage in motorized rifle battalions, the employment of a significant number of motorcycles, and fewer overall personnel.[60]

Invariably, the composition and overall strength of some armoured sub-units changed from year to year; however, on paper the DS believed that the Soviet divisions held the advantage in battle, and that opinion did not significantly change by 1956. Whereas in 1950 the Canadian armoured division could "see off" either of its Soviet counterparts,[61] from 1951 onwards, it was "doubtful if, on paper, a canadian [*sic*] armoured division could see off either the Soviet tank or mechanized division."[62] The Canadians' main problem was dealing with the JS-3 heavy tank, found in both Soviet formations, which Canadian tank and anti-tank guns were incapable of knocking out with a frontal shot at ranges of 1,000 yards or more.[63] Conversely, when compared with its Soviet equivalent, the T-34, the Canadian Centurion medium tank was "the better equipment" in terms of gun armament, sighting equipment, armour, speed, manoeuvrability, and reliability.[64] Moreover, as the below quotation from the Directing Staff's notes outlines, the Canadian armoured division possessed the following advantages:

a. Numerical superiority in armour over both divisions.

b. Ability to fire more accurately on the move.

c. Artillery is better coordinated and is more mobile, more accurate and [has] slightly better range over the Soviet numerical[ly] superior mortars and rockets.

d. Greater technical efficiency and better technical equipment, (e.g. RCE equipment, dozers, armoured recovery vehicles.).

e. Greater flexibility through better wireless communications, system of grouping.

f. Organically, the Canadian armoured division is much stronger administratively, i.e. it has approximately 200 more task vehicles than the Soviet tank or mechanized division, thus making the supply of ammunition and petrol easier[.] However, the Soviet division has approximately 4,000 fewer people to feed and caters for fewer frills and amenities.[65]

Advantage (a) above did not last through the mid-1950s. By 1955 the DS had recognized that the overall combined number of tanks, self-propelled guns, and other assault guns clearly gave the Soviets the advantage in armoured strength.[66]

Annual comparisons of the Soviet rifle division with the Canadian infantry division followed a similar pattern. In conducting such comparisons, student officers considered which division, in their opinion, was more powerful. According to the DS, this advantage depended on the armoured and anti-tank elements within the respective divisions in a given year. In 1950, the "respective fighting power" of Soviet rifle and Canadian infantry divisions was "about even."[67] In 1951 the balance was tipped in favour of the Soviets because of the presence of 52 T-34/85 medium tanks in the rifle division.[68] In 1952, however, the Canadian infantry division had the "decided advantage" because of the introduction of two anti-tank elements: 48 "medium gun tanks" (added to the division's anti-tank regiment) and 3.5-inch rocket launchers (added to its infantry battalions).[69] In 1955, things came full circle, as both divisions' fighting power was again deemed "fairly even."[70]

For Canadian student officers, these comparisons provided an idea of how, in the event of wartime mobilization, their infantry and armoured formations could potentially fare against Soviet Army ground forces in Europe. CASC students were also asked to think beyond units' numerical strengths and armaments' battlefield capabilities and consider the Soviet Army's broader military weaknesses and how to exploit them. An important objective of the Soviet Armed Forces series was to get students "to air their views generally on what they [had] read, and to make them think critically, and to realize that weaknesses [did] exist, despite all the [Soviet] propaganda!" Three specific Soviet Army military weaknesses were identified in the areas of mental abilities, methods, and materials. First, most Soviet Army officers, including generals, lacked sufficient military and non-military education, and Canadian Army instructors believed that this shortcoming could undermine the strategic direction of Soviet Army campaigns, especially if senior officers did not grasp the campaigns' broader picture. Within the Soviet Army there was also a lack of trust in subordinates, and that tended to kill initiative and "reduce flexibility."[71]

Secondly, in all phases of war, the Soviet Army generally adhered to rigid plans. To counter this tendency, the DS suggested to CASC students a few methods by which to successfully deceive and surprise Soviet forces, whether the latter conducted defensive or offensive operations. A key point was to avoid a static battle in which the Soviets committed their massive numbers of troops and vehicles. In that respect, the DS recommended using a screening force to impress on the enemy that the Canadian position was further forward than in reality; then, through a last-minute withdrawal of that screen, the Soviets would hit "thin air" and lose their impetus.[72] Another weakness related to Soviet Army methods was the Soviets' "use of masses," which could be stopped by "a really well controlled 'mass' of high explosives" and/or the emplacement of a series of physical obstacles, such as mine belts.[73]

Thirdly, the Soviet Army suffered from material deficiencies, including a lack of "soft transport," which increased both the time needed for the dumping of troops and battle equipment and the Soviets' dependence on railways for similar supplies. For the Soviets, this shortcoming implied that they would have less ammunition available per weapon under mobile warfare conditions than in static warfare. The CASC DS therefore suggested that a "hasty" rather than a deliberate attack against Soviet ground forces, coupled with air strikes on Soviet-used railways, would "pay a large dividend." Additionally, the Soviet Army lacked significant numbers of technicians and technical equipment. While the lack of technicians was related to the aforementioned educational deficiency, the lack of technical equipment was exhibited in the poor stocks of various items, such as bridging and harbour equipment. Consequently, Soviet forces relied extensively on local resources, a dependency inhibited by the destruction of both local timber resources and railway systems.[74]

Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. Rutherford, the DS officer who put together the Soviet Army curriculum in 1950, made some general observations on the early Cold War Soviet Army that placed its specific problems in a broader context. In terms of the Soviet Army's internal cohesion, Rutherford wrote:

> *There must be great difficulties in welding together a fighting force composed of many different races drawn from say Eastern Poland to Vladivostock [sic]. Clearly the quality of the soldier will vary enormously from the 'window dressers' in Berlin and Vienna to the Asiatic hordes' [sic] in some of the Siberian divisions. It is going to be difficult to inculcate the Russian nationalist spirit into the latter. The only thing that can hold the latter together is down-right fear. Such troops, when their leaders become casualties, are unlikely to behave comparably with Canadian soldiers in similar circumstances.*[75]

LCol Rutherford also believed that if the Soviet Army's command and control disintegrated, then it would experience a "violent" collapse. Moreover (and most likely because of the "tight political control" over both the Soviet people and their armed forces), political discontent was probably rife throughout both the Soviet Union and within its army. The DS officer aptly noted that "[t]he relations of the millions undergoing forced labour must alone be a great potential menace." Finally, Rutherford stated that, "Although, as a semi-civilized people, the Russians may have a morale similar to the Japanese, there is evidence that, in 1941 and [19]42, when encircled they were prepared to surrender."[76] These comments illustrated early Cold War western views of the Soviets that were likely pervasive among Canadian officers and influenced their approach to their major enemy.

These western views of Soviet and Russian military, political, social, and cultural characteristics largely derived from those of the German generals who fought on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. Immediately after the war, Liddell Hart interviewed many of these officers,[77] but it does not appear that he intended to broadly promote negative stereotypes of the Soviets. In his article "The Red War Machine" that was included in the 1950 CASC curriculum on the Soviet Army, Liddell Hart sought to correct the historical record, make a case that the Soviet armed forces in the Second World War were more sophisticated than contemporary western officials believed, and demonstrate that in 1950 the USSR's military was continuing to improve its technical proficiency, equipment, and tactics. Ironically, it appears that Rutherford ignored Liddell Hart's analysis.

As the British scholar stated, "A prevalent opinion in both British and American military quarters is that the quality of Russia's forces is very low, technically and tactically, compared with their quantity" and that western governments were "inclined to accept that opinion." That view had been evident in the early stages of the Second World War, when both British and American military officials expected the Germans to promptly defeat the Soviet Union. Although that scenario almost materialized in 1941, over the next few years the Soviets recovered to ultimately defeat the Nazi foe. Liddell Hart argued that the Anglo–American view in this case "demonstrated the tendency of the military to jump to assumptions and the need for a more scientific exploration of the facts."[78] That the same western bias persisted in the early Cold War period was

largely the result of the impressions western soldiers gained through contact with Soviet troops at the end of the war. Soviet soldiers were characterized as disorderly, untidy, stupid, and primitive, an image reinforced by crude equipment and an odd assortment of transport—i.e., engine-powered tanks and trucks supplemented by horse-drawn carts.[79]

That the Red Army appeared as "an ill-equipped rabble" did not account for the Soviets' overall battlefield performance against the Germans, especially in 1944–1945, when they turned the tide in the Great Patriotic War without the benefit of superiority in firepower and airpower, as the Allies had over the Germans in the West. To explain the Soviets' wartime success and, by implication, pinpoint contemporary trends within the Soviet armed forces, Liddell Hart turned to the experience of the aforementioned German generals. In Liddell Hart's view, these generals' "evidence" provided "a fairly clear and complete picture of the equipment and tactics, the character and quality of Russia's forces."[80]

Although Liddell Hart considered all branches of the Soviet armed forces, he focused most of his attention on the Red Army, tracing the quality of its weapons and equipment from the beginning of the war to its end, contending that Soviet material improvement over this period "may be a fair indication of likely improvement since the war."[81] Specifically, in late 1941, new Soviet tank models appeared on the battlefield—too late to stop the disasters associated with the Nazis' invasion of the USSR that summer—and subsequently contributed to both Soviet victories and later, better models. The T-34 medium tank, for example, was faster than any German tank at the time. During the battle of Stalingrad (1942–1943)—as the German generals "ruefully admitted" after the war—the T-34 outclassed the German Panzer III and IV tanks. Moreover, in 1943 the T-34 could still outrun the Germans' new, powerful Tiger tank in the open Russian countryside. The Soviet KVI heavy tank, meanwhile, led to the development of the JS tank, which was first deployed in early 1944 and still considered to be "the most powerful tank in the world" by the end of the war.[82]

Liddell Hart emphasized this "tank race" because it illustrated the Red Army's ability to keep ahead of other armies in technical developments and served as a warning because it showed "how the Russians concentrated on the development of the weapon that mattered the most while also turning out well designed and reliable weapons of other kinds"; consequently, in the post-war period, it was "wise to reckon that the Russians [were] at least keeping their former rate of progress in design."[83] The inclusion of this article in the CASC curriculum was therefore significant, as it countered widespread western stereotypes of Soviet technical and tactical capabilities. Moreover, Liddell Hart's "tank race" example highlighted Soviet tanks that remained part of early Cold War Soviet armoured formations' orders of battle and whose capabilities, as shown, were studied by Canadian Army staff officer candidates as part of their preparations for future war with Soviet ground forces. Liddell Hart's article was likely intended to make student officers think about their own views of the Soviets and teach them to never underestimate the enemy.

One final note relates to the impact that the formation of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in 1954 had on the CASC curriculum. Throughout the early Cold War, army planning (and, by extension, staff officer education) remained focused on the employment of divisions in the next war, despite the Canadian Army being formed of a single brigade group until shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. The activation of the 1st Infantry Division helped CASC officials' ability to develop the appropriate outlook among future staff officers. As stated, there were four reasons behind the division's peacetime establishment: firstly, to meet Canada's NATO commitment of fielding a division ready for battle "in a short time if required"; secondly, to "provide the structure within which formation commanders and staffs could be trained to exercise and fight formations"; thirdly, to experiment with new techniques of handling formations under nuclear warfare conditions; and finally, to have available a formation headquarters for studies, exercises, and demonstrations for the Canadian Army as a whole. Rockingham observed that, until the division was activated, the training of commanders and staff in the techniques of operating a division headquarters was available only through skeleton or other CASC exercises, which were limited by the fact that no real troops were affected when orders were given.

1st Infantry Division commander Major-General John Rockingham promptly initiated divisional exercises over the course of 1954–1955, including during the division's first concentration at the new training area at Gagetown, New Brunswick. This training included Exercise RISING STAR, which marked the first time the division manoeuvred as a complete formation with all three brigades

Beginning in 1954, Canadian Army commanders and staff officers in training could use 1st Infantry Division exercises to evaluate subordinates' actual reactions to higher formation orders.[84] Rockingham promptly initiated divisional exercises over the course of 1954–1955, including during the division's first concentration at the new training area at Gagetown, New Brunswick. This training included Exercise RISING STAR, which marked the first time the division manoeuvred as a complete formation with all three brigades. Umpires and "Control" for the exercises were provided by CASC DS and students.[85] Therefore, the 1st Infantry Division's exercises supplemented those at the CASC and backed up the Canadian Army's mobilization plans for war against Soviet ground forces in Europe with more tangible elements.

From the beginning of the Cold War in 1946, Canadian Army staff officer education was shaped by Canada's contemporary security threats and defence problems. In the Cold War's first years, U.S.-directed continental defence priorities led to the establishment of the Mobile Striking Force and joint Canada–U.S. manoeuvres in northern climates, where Soviet incursions were expected. The Kingston staff course curriculum reflected those developments, with studies on fighting in winter weather and exercises (both theoretical and real) that involved the MSF and American counterparts. By 1950, the commitment of the NATO Integrated Force to counterbalance the continued presence of large Soviet forces on the European continent necessitated a correlated emphasis in Canadian Army staff officer education. In the Soviet Armed Forces series,

CASC student officers largely focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Army's constituent combat divisions. The series' focus was the means by which Canadian officers were readied to fight the Soviet enemy as part of a western alliance largely directed by U.S. military strategic objectives. In the cold climates and rugged terrain of northern Canada, Canadian Army units would battle the enemy in coordination with similarly-trained American ground units. In Europe, under war conditions, Canadian Army ground formations in West Germany would be placed at the disposal of SACEUR as part of the western alliance underpinned by U.S. military might. This aspect of the Canadian Army's preparation to fight the Soviets is best understood as an extension of early Cold War American plans for western defence against Soviet attack.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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ENDNOTES

1. In 1968 the institution became known as the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College and then later, the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College. As of August 2011, the school is designated the Canadian Army Command and Staff College.

2. An Ex-Cadet, "The Staff College, Quetta," *Royal Military College of Canada Review and Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate* XXIX, No. 52 (1948): 25; Howard G. Coombs, "In Search of Minerva's Owl: Canada's Army and Staff Education (1946–1995)" (PhD diss., Queen's University, 2010), 66, 68; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 1, *From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 88; and John A. Macdonald, *In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899 to 1945* (Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1994), 79.

3. Lt.-Col. R.T. Bennett, "The Canadian Staff College," *Royal Military College of Canada Review and Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate* XXVIII, No. 51 (1947): 49; Coombs, "In Search of Minerva's Owl," 77, 81–83; Dominick Graham, *The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 55–57; J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 153–154; Macdonald, *In Search of Veritable*, 101–107; and C.P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*, vol. 1, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 140, 237.

4. "CASC/CLFCSC Instructors 1946–1973," in Coombs, "In Search of Minerva's Owl," 141, table 6–1.

5. On the expansion of the student body and DS, see George Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching* (Langley, BC: Battleline Books, 1986), 285–288. On the diversity of the student body, for examples see "The Students As Seen by One Another," *Annual Review—Canadian Army Staff College* 1, No. 1 (1952): 19–35; and "Class of '55," *Snowy Owl* 1, No. 4 (1955): 69–84.

6. 6 A variety of exercises formed a traditional part of the Anglo-Canadian staff course system. For CASC officials, these exercises had proven their worth during the Second World War. See Douglas E. Delaney, *The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 35–36.

7. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 3, *Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 337.

8. *Ibid.*, 341.

9. The 29 June 1946 edition of the *Financial Post* included a series of headings related to this matter: "Canada 'Another Belgium' in US Air Bases Proposal"; "Hear Washington Insists Dominion's Northern Frontier be Fortified"; and "'Atomic Age Maginot Line' is Feared." See Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 347–348; and Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 24.

10. For example, an early Soviet long-range bomber, the Tu-4 (based on the U.S. B-29) could only hit Alaska on round-trip missions from the USSR. Sean M. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence 1948–1955," *Canadian Military History* 2, No. 2 (1993): 76.

11. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 77.

12. Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 338.

13. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 82.

14. The government informed Parliament in 1946 that airborne training for the post-war Active Force Brigade Group was forthcoming. See Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience 1942–1995* (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 73.

15. Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 77–78.

16. In the exercise plan, the airborne company of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was to seize a Soviet-captured airfield at Fort St. John and the Peace River Bridge in northern British Columbia by parachute assault, with the rest of the battalion landed by aircraft for follow-on operations. However, among other problems, the lead aircraft missed the drop zone during the parachute assault. The exercise showed that neither the army nor the RCAF were ready to effectively deal with enemy incursions in the north, and newspaper reporters present during the exercise duly explained this situation to the Canadian public. *Ibid.*, 81.

17. In SWEETBRIAR, Canadian and American ground and air forces destroyed an enemy advance down the Alaska Highway towards Whitehorse and recaptured an airfield at Northway, Alaska. Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 82. For Kitching's perspective on his time as MSF commander, see Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields*, 277–281.

18. As Maloney notes, the decline of the MSF's importance to continental defence after 1955 was largely the result of the Soviets' development of long-range jet bombers in the mid-1950s which could be aerial refuelled and therefore did not need forward bases for such a purpose. At the same time, these aircrafts' ability to deliver nuclear bombs posed a greater threat to North American military bases than an airborne troop assault. Continental defence planners thus shifted their focus away from land-based continental defence to continental air defence and the coordination of these efforts in the creation of the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 86.

19. Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945–1950*, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, vol. 845 (New York: Garland, 1988), 91.

20. *Ibid.*, 114.

21. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 84.

22. *Ibid.*, 77.

23. See Andrew Iarocci, "Opening the North: Technology and Training at the Fort Churchill Joint Services Experimental Testing Station, 1946–64," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, No. 4 (2008): 74–95.

24. "Canadian Army Staff College Operations War Northern Operations Students Guide to Series," October 1950, Canadian Army Staff College (CASC) 1950 Course, Volume 9 Operations War, Folio 47, Box 16, 80/71 Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) Papers, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Department of National Defence, Ottawa (DND), 1.

25. For example, see *Ibid.*, 2–3.

26. "Serial 1 Canadian Army Staff College Operations War Northern Operations 7 Exercise ICEWORM Exercise Instructions," October 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 9, Folio 47, Box 16, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1.

27. "Serial 2 Canadian Army Staff College Operations War Northern Operations 7 Exercise ICEWORM Opening Narrative," October 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 9, Folio 47, Box 16, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND. The "Philistines" were one of the theoretical paper-based enemies, reflecting real potential enemy army forces' orders of battle, employed in staff exercises at the CASC.

28. Iarocci, "Opening the North," 88.

29. *Ibid.*, 90.

30. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 86.

31. For examples, see Exercises ESKIMO (January–February 1945) and MUSKOX (February–May 1946). ESKIMO, primarily a Canadian Army–RCAF exercise, also involved American and British participants and served to measure the impact of sub-arctic winter conditions on the mobility and fighting efficiency of a combined arms striking force of approximately 2,000 personnel. MUSKOX also involved air-ground cooperation, plus the study of mobility and logistics over snow. This exercise included the extended movement of personnel between Churchill and Edmonton, Alberta, and demonstrated that it was possible to airborne re-supply ground troops by parachutes, gliders, and transport aircraft. Iarocci, "Opening the North," 75–76.

32. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force," 86.

33. The rotation of entire brigades lasted until 1958, when the rotation pattern switched to units. Major Andrew B. Godefroy, "A Part of our Heritage—Operation PANDA and the Canadian Army in Cold War Europe," *Canadian Army Journal* 8, No. 4 (2005): 4.

34. Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945–1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 33–34.

35. *Ibid.*, 38–40. Quote is from page 40. Scholars demonstrate that, even with post-war demobilization, by the 1950s there were considerable Soviet ground forces in Europe. Within two years, the Soviet Army had reduced its 1945 strength from between 500 and 550 divisions to between 175 and 180. See David M. Glantz, *The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union*: *A History* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), 175; and Malcolm Mackintosh, *Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1967), 271. The spearhead of 30 divisions in Eastern Europe was backed by around twice as many divisions in the western USSR. Mackintosh states that there was between 60 and 80 such divisions, while Wolfe states that there was an estimated 50 to 60 divisions in Soviet western military districts. Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, 271–272; and Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945–1970*, 39.

36. For more on the Soviet ground forces that faced 27 CIBG in the period 1951–1953, see Sean M. Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951–1993* (Toronto and New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1997), 34; and "The Threat to NORTHAG, 1951–53," in *ibid.*, 35, figure 1–3.

37. Maloney, *War Without Battles*, 79. See also "The Threat to NORTHAG, 1953–63," in *ibid.*, 80, figure 2–2.

38. Maloney, *War Without Battles*, 81. For a visual representation of the German territory under the respective jurisdictions of NORTHAG and CENTAG, see "Northern Army Group Corps Dispositions 1953–57," in *ibid.*, 82, figure 2–3.

39. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945–1950*, 153.

40. The 1950 concept MC 14 was titled "Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning." Maloney, *War Without Battles*, 36.

41. From the beginning, 27 CIBG was prepared for "the usual wide variety of offensive and defensive options," with its training program "structured to achieve proficiency in all types of operations," including advance to contact, deliberate attack, deliberate defence, withdrawal, and defence of a bridgehead. Maloney, *War Without Battles*, 39.

42. Maloney, *War Without Battles*, 83.

43. *Ibid.*, 74.

44. *Ibid.*, 83.

45. "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series," March 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5 Intelligence US Armed Forces Soviet Armed Forces Future Warfare, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 2.

46. "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Army Series," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5 Chem. Warfare Intelligence US Armed Forces Soviet Army, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND.

47. "Canadian Army Staff College Students' guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series," March 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 2.

48. For example, see *ibid.*, 1–2. The précis on logistics was introduced in 1953. SC 3201-81/1-19 "Canadian Army Staff College Brief—Soviet Armed Forces," September 1952, CASC 1953 Course, Volume 1 Series Briefs 1953 Outline Block Syllabus 1953 Provisional Time-table Weekly Time-table Order of Battle and Address Group, Net Identification Sign and Call Sign List RCAF Order of Battle Staff Data Philistine Armed Forces, Folio 70, Box 26, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND.

49. For example, see "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series,"March 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 2. In 1955 and 1956, the lecture was entitled "'The Soviet Soldier" and "Characteristics of the Soviet soldier [*sic*]," respectively. "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series," February 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6 Staff Duties Soviet Armed Forces, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1; and "Appendix "A" [?] to SC 3310-81/1-1 (DS) to SC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) to SC 3201-81/1-28 (DS) dated 19 Sep 55 [Canadian Army Staff College] Series Block Syllabus," September 1955, CASC 1956 Course, Volume 1 Series Briefs Provisional Time Tables Weekly Time Tables Order of Battle and Address Group List Student Handbook Armoured, Folio 100, Box 40, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 2.

50. "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series," March 1952, CASC 1952 Course, Volume 6 Intelligence United States Armed Forces Soviet Aamed [*sic*] Forces Future Warfare, Folio 64, Box 23, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1.

51. "Canadian Army Staff College [Soviet Armed Forces] Series Block Syllabus," September 1952, CASC 1953 Course, Volume 1, Folio 70, Box 26, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 3. In 1955 and 1956, this lecture was entitled "An Analysis of Soviet Military Tactics and Strategy." "Canadian Army Staff College Students' Guide to Soviet Armed Forces Series," February 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1; and "Appendix "A" [?] to SC 3310-81/1-1 (DS) to SC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) to SC 3201-81/1-28 (DS) dated 19 Sep 55 [Canadian Army Staff College] Series Block Syllabus," September 1955, CASC 1956 Course, Volume 1, Folio 100, Box 40, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 2.

52. To compare how this list expanded over the course of this series, see "Appendix A to Soviet Army 6 Recommended Reading List," n.d., CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND and "Appx "A" to Students' Guide to USSR Series Russia, the Soviet Army and Communism A Selection of the Books in the Fort Frontenac Library," February 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1–2.

53. Capt B.H. Liddell Hart, "The Red War Machine," n.d., CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1–6.

54. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 3 Soviet Field Divisions," March 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 13.

55. "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 6–7.

56. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 3 Soviet Field Divisions," March 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 13.

57. "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 7.

58. *Ibid.*, 4.

59. In 1950, this table compared the Soviet tank and mechanized divisions with a "British Armoured Division." "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 6–7. From 1951 onwards, the Canadian armoured division was compared with its Soviet equivalents. For example, see "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4–5.

60. For example, see the table in "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

61. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 7.

62. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 5.

63. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 7; "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 5; "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 8 Questionnaire—USSR DS Notes," March 1952, CASC 1952 Course, Volume 6, Folio 64, Box 23, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 5; and "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

64. "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 COURSE, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

65. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 5.

66. "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

67. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 8.

68. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 6–7.

69. "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 8 Questionnaire—USSR DS Notes," March 1952, CASC 1952 Course, Volume 6, Folio 64, Box 23, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 6–7. Quotation is from page 7.

70. "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4. The DS also observed that, regardless of its constituent anti-tank elements, the Canadian infantry division had consistent advantages over its Soviet counterpart. One of them, the Canadian division's ability to maintain "a greater period of continued operation," was offset by the Soviet Union's ability to "produce so many divisions that long periods of sustained action are not such a prime requisite for its division." Other Canadian advantages included more flexible artillery coordination, better signals communication, and better engineer support. See "Canadian Army Staff College USSR 6 Questionnaire—Soviet Army Organization DS Notes," April 1951, CASC 1951 Course, Volume 5, Folio 53, Box 19, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 7; and "Canadian Army Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Questionnaire—USSR 3 DS Notes," March 1955, CASC 1955 Course, Volume 6, Folio 95, Box 38, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

71. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 9.

72. The Germans had successfully employed this method along the Eastern Front with "fewer casualties." *Ibid.*

73. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 10.

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.,* Roger Reese points out that Slav–non-Slav relations within the Soviet Army became problematic as soon as non-Russian minorities began to form a significant part of the Soviet armed forces around 1939. As Russians found themselves increasingly outnumbered, the challenges of language barriers and racism within the Soviet armed forces were exacerbated. Consequently, the environment of the post-war Soviet Army was frequently characterized by minorities' resentment towards Slavs who treated non-Slavs as inferiors. In most cases, Russians (who consistently composed the bulk of the Soviet officer corps) assumed that the Soviet Army was a Russian army and took for granted that minorities should learn the Russian language, and they believed that their failure to do so indicated either defiance or ignorance. Roger R. Reese, *The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917–1991* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 151–152.

76. "Canadian Army Staff College Soviet Army 5 Syndicate Discussion DS Notes," January 1950, CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 11.

77. In particular, see B.H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1948) and the updated version, B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill: Germany's Generals, their rise and fall, with their own account of military events 1939–1945*, rev. and enlarged ed. (London: Cassell, 1951).

78. Capt B.H. Liddell Hart, "The Red War Machine," n.d., CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 1.

79. *Ibid.*, 2.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*, 2–4. Quotations are from page 4.

83. Capt B.H. Liddell Hart, "The Red War Machine," n.d., CASC 1950 Course, Volume 5, Folio 43, Box 15, 80/71 CLFCSC Papers, DHH, DND, 4.

84. Major General J.M. Rockingham, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, "First Canadian Infantry Division," *Snowy Owl* 1, No. 4 (1955): 35.

85. *Ibid.*, 39–40. Quotation is from page 40.

Canadian Forces Master Corporal Louis-Fillipe Groulx searches a local Afghan man during an early morning operation to conduct cordoned searches of fields and compounds

Source: Combat Camera

THE FUNCTIONS OF INSURGENT VIOLENCE:
A Systems Perspective[1]

Mr. James W. Moore, LL.M., PhD

The Canadian Forces Land Force doctrinal publication *Counter-Insurgency Operations* defines *insurgency* as "[a] competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change."[2] This is the standard lens through which insurgent violence is viewed in Western militaries: violence is one of—if not *the*—principal means by which an *armed non-state actor* (ANSA) seeks to appropriate political power from the established (and, it is assumed, legitimate) authorities in the context of an insurgency. US counter-insurgency doctrine, enshrined in the 2006 joint Army and Marine field manual *Counterinsurgency*, echoes this perspective: "In all cases, insurgents aim to force political change: any military action is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end."[3]

In this view, the insurgency equation is simple and straightforward: violence is the means to power. But is that all there is to insurgent violence? Can we refine our understanding of the function of insurgent violence in societies experiencing violent intergroup conflict? This article will present an alternative but complementary perspective on the functions of insurgent violence or collective political violence (CPV) more broadly, situating it in the context of political science theorist David Easton's political systems model. We will argue here that CPV serves two critical systemic functions: as a *feedback mechanism and as a self-adjustment mechanism* of the political system.

COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE—A WORKING DEFINITION

But first, let us derive a working definition for collective political violence.[4] We begin with the concept of violence. *Violence* is the direct or indirect use of force so as to inflict physical or psychological injury to persons or material damage to property. *Collective action* refers to "any action that aims to improve the status, power, or influence of an entire group, rather than that of one or a few individuals."[5] *Collective political violence*, therefore, can be defined as violent collective action that aims to achieve a group's desired political ends (broadly inclusive of macro-economic and social goals) within the structure of a society's socio-political system. The latter—the socio-political system—is understood here in the classic Eastonian sense, as a set of social interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.[6] The distribution of values refers to the allotment of the material, ideational and symbolic assets of a society to its members, for example, the redistribution of economic resources to individuals and groups through the welfare state, the assignment to citizens of civil rights and liberties, and so forth.

The essence of CPV, then, is the use of violent means by a group to secure a share in or to appropriate for itself the power and authority to define the values of a society and dictate the distribution of these resources across other individuals and groups within that society; this distinguishes CPV from, say, criminally or pathologically motivated violence employed for non-political group or individual ends. Such violent appropriative behaviour inevitably leads to conflict with other groups in society. In such intergroup conflict, elements of both social identity[7] and group-based self-interest[8] are in play as two or more self-perceived and/or ascribed groups compete for this allocative power and authority.[9]

EASTON'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS MODEL

To set the general context for the examination of CPV, let us consider the phenomenon in terms of David Easton's model of the political system.[10] In his seminal works on politics, Easton distinguishes a system on the basis of what it does or the primary function it performs, hence his definition of the political system as "a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society."[11]

Easton's systems model proceeds from the assumption that sociopolitical conflict is unavoidable, that individuals and/or groups within a society will inevitably find themselves at odds over the distribution of scarce values, whether "spiritual or material."[12] When they cannot settle these disputes privately, they seek the authoritative allocation of these material, ideational and symbolic values through the political system.

As is characteristic of any system, the political system will readjust itself when subject to stress so as to return to its original path toward some specific goal or end state. In other words, the political system is a "self-regulating, self-directing set of behaviors."[13] But what is this end state towards which the system strives or, more precisely, operates as if it were striving? The goal of the political system is to persist. Easton defines *persistence* as "the perpetuation of any means through which values may be authoritatively allocated."[14] The necessary condition for persistence is the acceptance of the system's allocations as binding by most of the people most of the time.[15] (Easton does not concern himself with the reasons why society at large might accept these choices as binding. In that sense, his model lacks a critical element—a theory of political legitimacy.[16]) Consequently, the political system must have self-regulating mechanisms, or "homeostatic devices,"[17] to maintain support within its critical limits so that the system can continue to perform its identifying function, that is, the allocation of values in a manner generally accepted as authoritative. This may be specific support, that is, a quid pro quo in which support is given to the authorities in return for specific desired outputs. This, however, is insufficient for system persistence or survival. According to Easton, there must also be a reservoir of diffuse support or general backing given "the whole way of ordering political relationships,"[18] which I would term *system legitimacy*. This is nevertheless related to system output in that failure to provide desired outputs diminishes diffuse support over time. Conversely, consistently providing desired outputs should ideally foster the growth of such support.[19]

The "first, easiest, and most direct"[20] means to boost this support, according to Easton, is to increase the outputs of the system, that is, to augment the production and distribution of the material, ideational and symbolic resources demanded by society. (In a counter-insurgency context, these outputs would be security, governance and development, which are sorely lacking in Afghanistan at present.) Alternatively, certain other variables might have to be displaced from their original positions in order to maintain the level of support above its crucial threshold. Extrapolating from this, it may be necessary, as an example, to change the system's rulers or rules, that is, to replace the value allocators and/or reform the procedures by which they determine allocations. This could be done through democratic institutions and mechanisms such as elections, plebiscites, referenda, and so forth, or through more violent means such as *coups d'état* or revolution, that is, violent political behaviours (this will be elaborated upon below).

Under ideal conditions, the self-adjusting mechanism of Easton's model works in a manner comparable to the invisible hand in Adam Smith's model of the economic system.[21] The demand makers and the support givers—that is, the people—seek to maximize values by demanding outputs from the authorities or the producers of outputs. They will extend their support to the authorities to the extent that the latter can satisfy their demands. In other words, their support is contingent upon the authorities' performance in the provision of desired outputs, for example, security, law and order, good governance, economic development, essential services, and so forth, which I would call *performance legitimacy*. The authorities' ability to perform, in turn, depends upon their competence to achieve set goals and the availability of resources to do so. If they are incompetent or corrupt and/or lack the resources to increase outputs in response to demand, the support givers will withdraw their support from those authorities, that is, the authorities will lose legitimacy in the eyes of the affected segments of the population.

Support can also be lost in another way. Since the values being distributed are scarce, increasing the satisfaction of some individuals or groups takes away from the satisfaction of others. In other words, the allocation of values is a zero-sum game—one person's or group's gain is another's loss (hence the basis for intergroup conflict). In these circumstances, the support of the have-nots, not surprisingly, weakens. In response, the authorities, who are support maximizers, modify the distribution of outputs among these diverse and competing constituencies so as to restore their fading support among the discontented elements of society.

It is this interplay of the maximizing behaviour of the people and the authorities that ensures that, in principle, support does not fall below the critical threshold. As Sorzano argues, this mechanism operates as an automatic and self-correcting invisible hand that maintains the level of support needed for the system to perform its identifying function without conscious and deliberate effort to this end on the part of the system's actors.[22] This does not preclude deliberate action, however. As Easton notes, individuals can deliberately and rationally create regulative devices, that is, set up institutional structures and mechanisms, that will help keep the homeostatic variables—in this instance, the level of support—within their respective critical ranges.[23]

A Leopard 2A6M Main Battle Tank from the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) and part of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, provides over-watch during operations in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

A central condition for the operation of the system's self-regulating process is the transmission of information or *feedback* from the people to the authorities.[24] Such feedback is essential if the authorities are to gauge the level of support within the system and the impact of their outputs upon it, and to correct their behaviour accordingly. According to Sorzano, one may infer from Easton's writings that he believes that, in modern mass societies, a democratic institutional framework—"a pluralistic and structurally differentiated set of political institutions"[25] and the democratic norms that underpin those institutions—is most conducive to the feedback process. Such a framework provides multiple channels of communication between the people and the authorities. As well, the authorities are more likely to be responsive to the information coming up from the people, in part due to the existence of institutional mechanisms for implementing sanctions against nonresponsive authorities, such as voting them out of office. This is one of the defining characteristics of democratic systems.[26]

A CRITIQUE OF EASTON'S MODEL

Easton's systems model offers some interesting insights into the functioning of the political system, at least at an abstract level. However, some of the assumptions underlying this model are open to debate. Take, for instance, the assumption of scarcity, the notion that the values available to achieve goals within the framework of the political system are scarce relative to demand, a condition that inevitably leads to conflict, which necessitates mechanisms for authoritatively deciding among competing claims on those values. Are all the system's values truly scarce? Consider, for example, power, "the chief resource of the political system."[27] In one sense, power is indeed a scarce commodity in that there are physical limits

to its material elements, for example, natural resources, military capability, economic capacity, population base, and so forth. However, power is not simply the aggregate of a society's material resources (that is, its hard power), but "the capacity of an agent to control the behavior of another person or group"; in other words, it is "a 'relational' matter between or among persons and groups."[28] It is as much a function of nonmaterial factors—which international relations theorist Joseph Nye, Jr. describes as the primary currencies of soft power such as values, culture, policies and institutions[29]—as it is of material resources. Is it meaningful to think of scarcity in relation to these intangible factors?

Or let us consider another example. Can we speak of a fixed stock of freedom in a society? Does the freedom allocated to one group necessarily come at the expense of another, that is, is the allocation of freedom a zero-sum game? For example, did the extension of civil rights to the African-American community in the US in the 1960s diminish the civil rights of the white American population? As sociologist Robin Williams, Jr. observes:

> *Some values, such as those of religious devotion, group pride [or group identity more broadly], community recreation, are inherently nondistributive; they are participated in rather than divided up. One person's enjoyment does not diminish another's participation in the same value complex—indeed, the value may require that others share it.*[30]

More generally, not all value allocation problems are zero-sum, and individuals or groups often may advance their own particular interests through cooperation with others. In game theory, this point is demonstrated, for example, in the class of coordination games, where both players can realize mutual gains but only if they choose mutually consistent strategies.[31]

For the sake of argument, let us accept that the salient values up for distribution are indeed scarce and that, if the demands of one group for these values are satisfied, the demands of some other group are not. According to the model, support for the regime or the system itself among the disadvantaged group should weaken. This, however, may not be the case.



Troops, acting as insurgents, prepare to attack a multi-vehicle convoy during Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE

Source: Combat Camera

Master Corporal Brent Nolasco and Sapper Kevin Brown from the 2nd Canadian Engineer Regiment, finish laying out detonation cord attached to C4 explosives that will set off explosive ordinance

First, the disadvantaged group may not consider the unequal distribution of values to be unjust; they may feel, for whatever reason—perhaps weak or uncertain collective self-esteem—that they are not entitled to or deserving of the privileges accorded to the advantaged group. Even if they are unhappy with the system's allocation of outputs, they may not be motivated to change it. They may simply resign themselves to their group or fraternal relative deprivation.[32] As Joanne Martin notes, "inequalities may cause feelings of injustice, but these feelings may have little effect on behavior, causing a behavioral, if not emotional, tolerance of injustice."[33] Easton himself recognizes this possibility. He observes that peasant societies display "a kind of political impermeability, a long-suffering patience on the part of the general membership that leads to the acceptance of one's fate and either a complete absence of any thought of politicizing one's wants or an unquestioned stifling of any urge to do so."[34] In European feudal society, Christianity played a critical role in this process, convincing the peasantry to accept their lot in this life in anticipation of a better life to come in the hereafter.

And, if motivated to act, withdrawal of support from the system is only one possible response. Indeed, Wright et al. set out five categories of individual and collective action that may be taken in response to intergroup inequalities on the part of members of disadvantaged groups:

> *(a) apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position, (b) attempts at individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the system, (c) individual action outside the norms of the system, (d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed norms of the existing system, and (e) instigation of collective action outside the norms of the system.*[35]

Easton's model touches on only three of these responses: inaction or acceptance [option (a)], or withdrawal of support for the authorities, either within or outside the confines of the rules of the system [option (d) or (e), respectively]. He does not refer to the possibility of individual normative or non-normative responsive behaviour [option (b) or (c)].

This relates to another weakness in Easton's model: the assumption that the authorities will readjust the allocation of values so as to ameliorate the dissatisfaction of disadvantaged groups in society and thereby to maximize their—that is, the authorities'—popular support. If, as discussed above, a disadvantaged group acquiesces to the unequal distribution of outputs and, though they are not actively lending their support to the authorities, neither are they withdrawing their tacit support, then the authorities may see no need to actively court the disadvantaged group's favour. In other words, even if the authorities are assumed to be support maximizers, they need only concern themselves with maintaining the backing of the participant actors, those activists concerned with "both the input and output aspects of the political system."[36] They do not need to keep all groups within society happy in order to maximize their support, only those—whether a tribal, clan, sectarian, religious, class or ideological community—whose continued backing is essential to the regime's survival in power.

CONCLUSION: INSURGENT VIOLENCE IN EASTON'S MODEL

How, then, does the phenomenon of insurgent violence, or collective political violence more generally, factor into the Eastonian model? Two possible functions suggest themselves. First, CPV may be part of the system's *information feedback process*. Especially in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes where the lines of communication between the people and authorities are extremely limited and tightly controlled, such as Qaddafi's Libya, CPV may be the only means by which a group or groups can signal to the authorities their discontent with the prevailing allocation of values.

Does the incidence of CPV, then, indicate that the allocative function of the political system has totally broken down; to use an economic analogy, is it evidence of market failure? Not necessarily. It may be an indication that the system is readjusting itself to restore the critical threshold of popular acceptance of its policy outputs. In other words, CPV may serve as a *self-adjustment mechanism* of the system, its second possible function. The use of violence (within limits) allows the system to restore the critical level of popular acceptance of its authoritative allocations, whether by redistributing a particular value within the framework of the existing system through political reform, replacing the current allocators within that system by way of a *coup d'État*, or reordering the basic rules and norms by which the allocators determine and implement distributive choices by revolution. In other words, these violent behaviours may indicate not that the system has completely broken down—though, if the violence escalates from the instrumental to the nihilistic, this may well be the case, as in failed states like Somalia—but that it is, in fact, alive, if not particularly well, at that point in time.

While CPV can certainly serve these two critical systemic functions, that does not mean that it *should*, or that it is necessarily the preferred system adjustment mechanism. Violent change, for good or bad, inevitably comes at tremendous cost. As the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development states:

> *Armed violence destroys lives and livelihoods, breeds insecurity, fear and terror, and has a profoundly negative impact on human development. Whether in situations of conflict or crime, it imposes enormous costs on states, communities and individuals.*
>
> *Armed violence closes schools, empties markets, burdens health services, destroys families, weakens the rule of law, and prevents humanitarian assistance from reaching people in need. Armed violence kills—directly and indirectly—hundreds of thousands of people each year and injures countless more, often with lifelong consequences. It threatens permanently the respect of human rights.*[37]

There is, however, an alternative action strategy: *political defiance*, also referred to as nonviolent resistance or nonviolent struggle. Gene Sharp, the American philosopher of nonviolent action, defines this as:

> *nonviolent struggle (protest, noncooperation, and intervention) applied defiantly and actively for political purposes…The term is used principally to describe [nonviolent] action by populations to regain from dictatorships control over governmental institutions by relentlessly attacking their sources of power and deliberately using strategic planning and operations to do so.*[38]

Political defiance has a long and surprisingly impressive record, from the 1905 Russian Revolution to the 1986 people-power movement in the Philippines.[39] More recently, it was the modus operandi in the colour revolutions witnessed in the early 2000s: Serbia's Bulldozer Revolution (2000), Georgia's Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004), Lebanon's Cedar Revolution (2005) and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution (2005). These methods, and Sharp's writings,[40] also inspired the youth uprisings in Tunisia (Sidi Bouzid Revolt) and Egypt (25 January Revolution) in early 2011 that swept aside the aging autocrats who had stifled change in those societies for so many years.[41] Though it cannot be denied that CPV is a force for systemic change, these exemplars demonstrate that there are other nonviolent—and morally preferable—mechanisms for systemic feedback and self-adjustment.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

James W. Moore is a Defence Scientist in the Socio-Cognitive Systems Section at DRDC Toronto. He previously spent 20 years as a Strategic Analyst responsible for research and reporting on the Middle East with the Directorate of Strategic Analysis/DRDC CORA in Ottawa. He earned his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1991 and an LL.M. in public international law from Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, in 2006. His current research projects include developing a conceptual framework for understanding the motivations, intentions and behaviour of armed non-state actors (ANSAs), as well as an extensive semantic.

ENDNOTES

1. The Socio-Cognitive Systems Section at DRDC Toronto has undertaken a Technology Investment Fund (TIF) Project entitled "A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics." TIF Projects are forward-looking, high-risk—but potentially high-payoff—research endeavours conducted under the auspices of DRDC. The aim of this multi-year Project is to advance our understanding of:

   - The **strategic roles** of ANSAs in the context of violent intergroup conflict; and
   - The **operational dynamics**—that is, the group structures, functions and processes—of ANSAs, in both their internal and external aspects, that facilitate the performance of these roles.

   Broadly speaking, we seek to shed some light on what ANSAs do and why they do it, situating their motivations, intent and behaviours in the wider context of chronic intergroup conflict.

   This article is one of several reports produced in Phase 1 Conceptual Development of the Project research program. An earlier version has been distributed as an internal DRDC document: Technical Memorandum (TM) 2011-019 "A Note on Collective Political Violence in Easton's Political Systems Model" (February 2011).

2. Directorate of Army Doctrine, Department of National Defence, Canada, *Counter-insurgency Operations*, (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2008), p. 1–2.

3. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), p. 1–5.

4. For a survey of theories of CPV, see E. Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts*, (New York: Routledge, 2004).

5. M. Van Zomeren and A. Iyer, "Introduction to the Social and Psychological Dynamics of Collective Action," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 65, (2009): p. 646.

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7. From Social Identity Theory; see H. Tajfel and J. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in W. Austin and S. Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, (Monterey: Brooks-Cole, 1979).

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11. Easton 1965a, p. 57.

12. Easton 1953, p. 137.

13. Easton 1965a, p. 128.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

16. Strong, pp. 273–274.

17. Easton 1965a, p. 95.

18. Easton 1965b, p. 409.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

20. *Ibid.*
21. Sorzano, p. 100.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Easton 1965b, p. 116.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
25. Sorzano, p. 104.
26. *Ibid.*
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30. R. Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, 1st ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 137.
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THE NILE EXPEDITION FOR THE RELIEF OF GENERAL GORDON—THE CANADIAN VOYAGEURS' FIRST TOUCH OF THE NILE

FROM A SKETCH BY OUR SPECIAL ARTIST MR. F VILLIERS

"The Canadian voyageurs passed Wady Halfa on Sunday, October 20th, and about five miles from that place the steamer, which was towing the whalers in which they had arrived, left them to their own resources, and the Canadians had their first touch of the Nile. For a moment utter confusion seemed to prevail as with shouts the men seized their oars, and prepared to row out of the 'fours' formation in which they had been tugged up the river. The mass of boats gradually opened out and spread over the surface of the waters, and presently, a light breeze springing up, the lug sails were hoisted, and the little fleet sailed gaily up to their camping ground at the foot of the first series of rapids."—*From the description of Our Special Artist.*

The Nile Expedition for the Relief of General Gordon—The Canadian Voyageurs' First Touch of the Nile
Fredrick Villiers—CWM 19700227-001, Beaverbrook Collection of War Art Canadian War Museum

CANADIAN VOYAGERS IN THE SUDAN 1884–1885

Sergeant K. Grant, CD

In the winter of 1884 Canada participated in her first overseas expeditionary mission when she sent nearly 400 boatmen to the Sudan in support of the relief of the British General "China" Gordon. At the time, the Sudan was being administered by the Egyptian government, but a Muslim self-proclaimed "Mahdi" named Mohammed Ali had begun a revolt and his influence was growing rapidly. An attempt by the Egyptian Army to suppress the revolt ended in failure and resulted in the Mahdi overrunning large areas of the Sudan. In London, the British government was reluctant to become involved in the problems of the Sudan, and decided instead to evacuate its troops, as well as British nationals living there.

General Charles "China" Gordon, who had previously held the position of Governor General in Sudan, was dispatched to the area with orders to supervise the evacuation. General Gordon tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Mahdi to allow safe passage of evacuees, and he quickly found himself fighting a defensive battle. He began by fortifying the city's defences and prepared to defend Khartoum with 7,000 Egyptian and loyal Sudanese troops. Even with the forces of the Mahdi closing in on Khartoum, Gordon led several successful attacks against the Mahdi's forces, keeping the city open long enough to evacuate approximately 2,000 women, children and sick before the city was besieged in March 1884.

For 320 days, the siege wore on. Rations ran low and people began to starve. Gordon pleaded with London to send reinforcements, but Prime Minister Gladstone refused, seeing Gordon's defence of the city as a contravention of his orders. Finally, after much pressure from the newspapers, the public, and even Queen Victoria, a relief mission was organized in July.

Under the command of Lieutenant-General Garnet Wolseley, a veteran soldier who had served in Canada, it was decided that the fastest way to get to Khartoum would be to travel up the Nile River.



General Charles "China" Gordon (1833–1885)

Lieutenant-General Garnet Wolseley (1833–1913)

Based on his experience with Canadian Voyagers during the Red River Rebellion, Wolseley asked the Governor General of Canada if it would be possible to raise a contingent for the expedition. In only 24 days, 386 volunteers were recruited from Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba. They were men ranging in age from 18 to 64 of French, English, Indian and Métis backgrounds, including a small number of Canadian military officers to command and administer the expedition. All signed on for a six-month engagement, the expected duration of the expedition.

Sailing on the *S.S. Ocean King* under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fredric C. Denison, who had been Wolseley's aide-de-camp during the Red River Rebellion, the Canadians arrived in Egypt on 7 October 1884 and were immediately dispatched upstream. At Aswan, the Canadians saw their boats for the first time: 800 converted Royal Navy whalers 30 feet long, 8 feet wide and weighing 1,073 pounds. Each was big enough to carry one voyager, twelve soldiers, their ammunition and their provisions for 100 days. The boats were fitted with a rudder, two masts rigged with small sails, and oars, and each carried six 15-foot pushing poles and two boathooks. If a boat had to be portaged around a cataract, it required 30 soldiers to carry it. For the next 31 days, the voyageurs worked to bring 600 of the boats and nearly 6,000 troops 860 miles upstream. Realizing that time was running out for General Gordon, at Korti Wolseley split his force into two columns. He sent 2,400 men by camel on a 280-km shortcut across the desert to avoid the Great Bend of the Nile in an effort to reach the city sooner. The remaining 3,000 soldiers continued up the river. But at Korti the Canadians were nearing the end of their contract. Despite generous inducements, which in some cases included doubling their pay, only Denison and 85 others decided to continue on. The remainder elected to return to Canada in time for the logging season.

Two days from Khartoum, Wolseley's relief column received word that the Mehdi had stormed the city on 26 January, slaughtering General Gordon, all of his troops, and nearly 4,000 civilians. Despite the best efforts of the Canadian boatmen, the mission was considered a failure. Prime Minister Gladstone was severely criticized for his delays in organizing a relief, and he was blamed for the death of Gordon.

Nonetheless, the work of the Canadians was lauded and all members of the expedition were awarded a British medal for their services, with 44 being awarded the Kirbekan clasp for their participation in that battle. General Wolseley personally thanked the contingent, and though 16 Canadians died on the expedition, it was widely held that "without them, the ascent of the river, if not impossible, would have been far slower and attended with far greater loss of life."

This painting, "*The Nile Expedition for the Relief of General Gordon—The Canadian Voyagers' First Touch of the Nile*," was painted by Fredrick Villiers and depicts the beginning of their journey at Aswan. For reproductions of Canadian War Museum images, or for more information, contact Image Reproduction Services, 1 Vimy Place, Ottawa, K1A 0M8; Fax 1 819 776 8623; e-mail Imageservices@warmuseum.ca.



"The Nile Expedition: Arrival of the First Division of the Camel Corps at Wadi Halfa." This easy way of travelling was only possible until the cataracts were reached

Whalers being hauled through the Second Cataract by an elaborate system of ropes



WESTMORELAND:
The General Who Lost Vietnam

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
SORLEY, Lewis. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011, hardcover, $30.00 USD, 395 pages, ISBN 978-0-547-51826-8

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B

The spectre of the Vietnam War simply will not disappear. The war provides a standard by which counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are measured. It is used to characterize foreign-policy initiatives found objectionable by individuals or groups. Vietnam is often considered the nadir of the American military and many of its senior leaders. There seems to be an unrequited desire to blame the military for the "quagmire" that was Vietnam. It was the military that "lost" Afghanistan. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Lewis Sorley's new book, *Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam*, continues this dubious tradition but raises it to a new level. The military did not lose Vietnam—one man did. One man lost the war, and his name was General William Childs Westmoreland. It was Westmoreland, a man described as possessing doubtful intellectual and strategic-thinking prowess, who failed to appreciate or chose to ignore the fact that the Viet Minh and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) could not be defeated by a strategy of conventional main forces manoeuvring for a decisive victory.

Sorley comes to his subject with a wealth of knowledge and experience. He is a prize-winning author of a number of books about the war in Vietnam and related military topics,[1] a Vietnam veteran himself, and a professor of military history. Analysts of the Vietnam War are divided as to the proper characterization of the war. One school of thought sees the war as a textbook insurgency that needed appropriate counter-insurgency techniques to defeat it.[2] The other opines that the Viet Minh guerrillas merely provided a sideshow, a distraction from the real centre of gravity, Hanoi.[3] It was North Vietnam that mustered the bulk of the main forces, that acquired supplies from its allies and that sent those supplies south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other supply routes. Sorley is clearly in the former camp and has mustered a formidable array of evidence that Westmoreland was irretrievably in the latter.

Eagle Scout at 15, First Captain at West Point (Class of 1936), battalion commander at 28, full Colonel at 30, youngest Major General at 42, Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the 101 Airborne Division and Superintendent of West Point, Westmoreland or "Westy" checked all the right boxes before President Lyndon Johnson sent him to Vietnam as Deputy, MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), which he assumed command of six months later. It was a command, a war and a people that Westmoreland knew little about and, according to Sorley, he was disinclined to learn more.

If *Westmoreland* suffers from any stylistic defect, it is the author's desire to string together endless criticisms about Westmoreland from his peers, colleagues and subordinates, and call it narrative. To be sure, this biography is a textbook on how not to fight an insurgency: ignore the host nation and leave its military

untrained and underequipped (the M-16 issue); establish metrics of success that are either irrelevant or inaccurate (the body count and crossover point fiascos); conduct large unit "search and destroy" operations at the expense of more local "security" or pacification operations (the "Americanization" of the war); and denigrate and relegate the host military to a secondary role. These errors in military judgment were compounded by Westmoreland's appetite for self-promotion, his inclination to be disingenuous and to encourage such behaviour in his subordinates, his transformation from a professional non-partisan military leader into a "pitchman" for the Johnson administration, and his perception that the press was "the enemy."

Tet proved to be the undoing of Westmoreland and his "light at the end of the tunnel" perspective. He was relieved and promoted to Army Chief of Staff where his tenure was described by a senior American general as "unhappy." He retired, ran unsuccessfully for governor in his home state of South Carolina, wrote his memoirs, and unsuccessfully sued CBS for libel for accusing him and others of falsifying North Vietnam's Order of Battle immediately prior to *Tet*. He died on 18 July 2005.

Sorley paints an unflattering portrait of Westmoreland as a man of hubris fighting the wrong war against the wrong enemy. The author, at times, strays from objectivity into pettiness. *Westmoreland* attempts to demonstrate that Vietnam was a winnable war. It is debatable, however, as his title suggests, that one man lost the war. Victory has many fathers while defeat is an orphan.

ENDNOTES

1. *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Time*, New York: Schuster & Schuster (1992); *Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press (1999); *Honor Bright: History and Origins of the West Point Honor System*, Columbus: McGraw Hill (2008).
2. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, (1986); Bing West, *The Village*, New York: Pocket Book (2002).
3. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, New York: Presidio Press (1982).

A Marine from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, moves an alleged National Liberation Front activist to the rear during a search and clear operation held by the battalion 15 miles (24 km) west of Da Nang Air Base



TRIUMPH AT KAPYONG:
Canada's Pivotal Battle in Korea

BIBLIOGRAPICAL INFORMATION:
BJARNASON, Dan. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011, softcover, 195 pages, $22.99, ISBN: 978-1554888726

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B

Kapyong, a forgotten battle in a "forgotten" war, where seven hundred dirty, scruffy, cold, highly trained amateurs stood their ground and beat back repeated human wave attacks. Kapyong, where 2 PPCLI slammed the door shut on a Chinese breakthrough and thereby saved Seoul from capture. Kapyong, where the heroic defenders of a small but vital hill earned the Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation for their bravery but, to the dishonor of the government of the day, were not permitted to wear the coveted blue ribbon for five years afterwards. All this and more are recounted in noted Canadian journalist and amateur historian Dan Bjarnason's fast paced and superbly written book, *Triumph at Kapyong: Canada's Pivotal Battle in Korea*. Based on primary and secondary sources and on the interviews of a dwindling number of survivors, Bjarnason has penned a well deserved tribute to these all but forgotten men.

The background to the battle is well known. Canada, as part of its United Nations commitment to stem the North Korean invasion of South Korea on July 25, 1950, initially contributed three infantry battalions, 2 PPCLI, 2 RCR and 2 R22eR.[1] By the time these battalions had been recruited, organized and trained, events in Korea had changed dramatically. The American forces initially crowded into the Pusan Perimeter broke out and raced northwards, linking up with American and Korean forces driving east and south following the spectacular amphibious landing at Inchon. The linkup between the two forces and the expulsion of the North Koreans from the south changed Canadian plans. Rather than sending all three battalions, it was decided to send only 2 PPCLI, commanded by WWII veteran, LCol Jim Stone, as it was the most advanced in its training. The government thought that the Patricias would see little action given the turn of events. The Patricias were destined to be an occupation force. This all changed when, on October 25, 1950, communist China entered the war and quickly reversed the gains of the United Nations' forces.

In April 1951, the Chinese commenced their spring offensive, attacking all along the line. One of their main thrusts was toward the Kapyong valley, a natural and direct route to Seoul. Sitting in reserve, the Canadians were ordered forward to defend Hill 677 and stanch the enemy offensive. They dug in on April 23 and waited. They did not have to wait long. To their front, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) 6th Division was routed. To their left, the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment was decimated almost to a man along the banks of the Imjin River. The 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), supported by a company of the US 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion, held high ground five kilometers across the Kapyong Valley to the east but, after battling wave after wave of Chinese infantry for sixteen hours and running low on ammunition, both units withdrew on April 24. The waiting was over. The stage was set for 2 PPCLI and the Battle of Kapyong.[2]

Bjarnason's book is a superb account of the battle. Written in a "you-are-there" style, the author recounts hour by hour, in meticulous fashion, the ebb and flow of the battle. Bjarnason writes with a great measure of affection and respect for his subjects. Rather than leaving the story to its dry narrative, the author introduces the reader to many of the battles heroes: Pte Wayne Mills, a DSM who, wounded twice, used his Bren gun to great effect, retaking a trench and repulsing an enemy attack; Hub Gray commanding the mortar platoon who steadfastly kept the "back door" closed against repeated Chinese attacks; "Smiley" Douglas, who lost an arm but won the Military Medal for selflessly risking himself to save the men of his section who had wandered into a minefield; Lt Mike Levy of D Coy, who called down artillery fire on his position when the outcome of the battle was very much in doubt; and finally, their commander Jim Stone who, in a passage almost from a movie script, said, "Let the bastards come! Nobody leaves."

Military history is replete with incidents where small groups of desperate men fought against overwhelming odds and either prevailed or died––the Spartans at Thermopylae, the French Foreign Legion at Cameron, the Old Guard at Waterloo, the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers at Etreux, the Texans at the Alamo, the 1/7 in the Ia Drang Valley and the list goes on. It is amazing, as Bjarnason laments, that Kapyong has not taken its place in this pantheon. It may be our national desire to forget a war that was never really popular and never really resolved anything. It may be that the ten fatalities suffered in the battle made the battle a minor affair. It may be that recent events have overshadowed the battle. It may be that the survivors, volunteers all, left the army after the war and took up their civilian lives and minimized their efforts. (As one veteran observed, "It was just a hill after all. Just like a thousand hills over there"). This is regrettable. Kapyong deserves a greater place in the collective psyche of Canada. That short, sharp battle on that cold, lonely shale hill disposes once and for all the myth that Canadians are not, by nature, a warrior society. Bjarnason's book, *Triumph at Kapyong*, should be read by anyone who thinks otherwise.

ENDNOTES

1. The Canadian Army Special Force (CASF) consisted of approximately 5,000 volunteers. Recruited and trained as part of the regular Army, the special force called for a new battalion to be added to each of the three Regular Force infantry regiments. The special force would train only for Korea, thereby leaving the regular army intact. In addition to 2 PPCLI, 2 RCR and 2 R22eR, the CASF (or 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB), as it later came to be called), elements of the Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery were attached. Commanded by BGen John "Rocky" Rockingham, one of Canada's finest "lead from the front" tacticians from WWII, 25 CIB quickly shed the "soldiers of fortune" label unfortunately attached to it by then CDS Gen Charles Foulkes.
2. The battle takes its name from a nearby village and the Kapyong River.



DEMOLISHING THE MYTH:
The Tank Battle of Prokhovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operation Narrative

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
ZAMULIN, Valeriy. Solihull, UK: Helion and Company Ltd., 2011, hardcover, 630 pages, $71.75, ISBN: 978-1-906033-89-7

Reviewed by Major C. Buckham

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, many documents and unit records of Soviet operations during the Second World War became available to scholars both within Russia and in the West. Valeriy Zamulin has taken advantage of this opportunity to produce an outstanding operational history of the Battle of Prokhorovka. Fought on the Southern Front of the Kursk conflict between 2 and 17 July 1943, the battle represented the zenith of German offensive capability on the Eastern Front.

Zamulin's book is written from the perspective of the Soviets. He has taken advantage of numerous first-hand accounts from sources ranging in level from junior soldiers to front commanders, which give context and depth to the narrative. While the scope of his study is relatively narrow, the breadth of his operational narrative provides a clear sense of the challenges faced by the Russian commanders controlling the fluid, fast-moving conflict.

Zamulin's approach to the Russian Command's performance during the battle is balanced and objective. His use of daily logs, orders, situational reports and first-hand recollections highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of Russian command and control. Specifically, he repeatedly points out the tendency of the Russians to be extremely stratified in their decision making. Interestingly, the pressure on senior commanders to perform effectively was compounded by the implied (and real) threat of the consequences should they fail.

One of the real strengths of this book is the author's ability to expose the reader to both the interdependent role of the various arms and the individual challenges that each arm faced and the successes each achieved. The Battle of Prokhorovka revealed the Russian military leadership's growing confidence in its abilities and equipment. Many errors were committed, and Zamulin discusses them within the larger narrative of the battle. He highlights weaknesses in senior leaders' ability and experience levels in terms of coordinating effective counterattacks using combined-arms assaults. Nevertheless, it is evident from the overall performance of the Russian command and soldiers that morale and competency had improved dramatically.

What I particularly enjoyed about Zamulin's book is the way that he presents his evaluation of the battle. Thus, although he sets his third-person narrative at the operational level, he seamlessly transitions as required to the tactical and the first person, providing the reader with a much greater appreciation of what was going on in the minds of the individual commanders and soldiers. Additionally, while this book is primarily a narrative about the Russian experience, the author does make a concerted effort to include the German perspective, which adds further context and flavour. Zamulin has obviously researched the units involved in great depth. Included within the narratives are breakdowns of unit strengths by vehicle type and personnel, unit replacement rates and overall loss rates for both the German and the Russian sides.

Zamulin concludes his narrative by addressing the commonly held beliefs of historians surrounding the Battle of Prokhorovka. Additionally, he summarizes very succinctly the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian commanders from the perspectives of experience, doctrine and quality of equipment.

Rounding off the book is a comprehensive list of all of the units from both sides that were involved in the battle. Zamulin also provides an in-depth bibliography of his primary and secondary sources. One small observation: the fact that all the maps are gathered into one section of the book does not in any way detract from the narrative, but it does make tracking the battle harder for the casual reader.

Demolishing the Myth is an outstanding historical analysis of a "battle within a battle." For the military historian, Valeriy Zamulin's book is a work of profound depth and scope. It contains something for any branch of the combat arms professions and for operators in a joint environment. The cost was horrific, but the Russians learned many lessons from their experiences during the Battle of Prokhorovka and quickly applied them.

The eastern front at the time of Operation CITADEL. Orange areas show the destruction of an earlier Soviet breakthrough that ended with the Kharkov offensive operation. Green areas show German advances on Kursk



HITLER

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
KERSHAW, Ian. New York: Allen Lane, 2008, hardcover, one volume abridgment with new preface, 1030 pages, $26. ISBN 978-1846140693

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, plsc

The troubled and conflicted history that resulted in Adolf Hitler's rise to total power in Germany, followed by his pursuit of total war, continues to both fascinate and appal us. The subject of dozens, if not perhaps hundreds, of biographies that have been written in the years following the end of the Second World War, none may still compare to Ian Kershaw's *magnum opus* study of this villain. Originally published as two separate volumes totalling some 1,400 pages entitled *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris* (1998) and *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis* (2000), this latest abridged version in a single volume is accompanied by a new preface and some further insights in a (slightly) smaller package.

In this landmark study, Ian Kershaw has expertly organized his subject by seeking to answer two rather simple questions. First, how did Hitler rise to power? How did a bizarre misfit from Austria, an "unsophisticated autodidact lacking all experience of government," rise to overcome the Nazi roughnecks, the existing government and the social classes that were accustomed to ruling? Second, asks Kershaw, once Hitler had power, how did he exercise it with a ruthlessness that exploited every weakness in his opponents?

The answer, as Kershaw rightly points out, cannot only be found in the extraordinary personality of the man who drove Germany into oblivion over a period of 12 destructive years. Instead, the answers are often within an examination of his relationships with others, both successful and failed. The result for Kershaw's readers is a book that is not just a seminal examination of Adolf Hitler, but also of the leading figures in Germany and Europe during the first half of 20th century.

Biographical examinations of this scale are admittedly not for the casual reader. The journey that Kershaw takes the reader on requires discipline and commitment; for the story is often complex, even though the author does an outstanding job of presenting his case in a clear and very readable manner. Still, the effort invested in this lengthy tome is more than rewarded. Kershaw reveals a man that was everything and nothing like one might have expected him to be. Hitler's rise to power ultimately depended upon his friends and connections. Despite his own talents he made many mistakes along the way, several of which nearly ended his career early. In his youth, Hitler was aloof and often lazy. During the First World War he was anything but courageous and in the inter-war years he lived for a long time in shameless poverty in a group hostel. His talent for agitation in local cafés is what brought him to the attention of others, and it took others to assist his ascendance through the more refined ranks of political power. Once he was in charge, he bribed the military elites with rearmament and catered to their desires for glory. In return, the military ensured his place. In war, Hitler cared very little for the suffering of his people. After the fall of Stalingrad, he couldn't even be bothered to assuage a grieving population with a simple radio address.

Adolf Hitler reading in an aircraft

Adolf Hitler surrounded by children. Baldur von Schirach is at right behind Hitler

At times, it seemed that Hitler was more interested in his daily after-supper movie options than he was in the worsening situation on the Eastern Front. At other times, he seemed completely absent from the total war that he had instigated.

For novice and veteran students of the Second World War alike, Kershaw's biography of Hitler offers a degree of judgment and insight that makes this book a must read. Given its aim, scope and depth of research—barring some great new discovery, this book will remain the seminal work on Hitler for decades to come. It is highly recommended.



CANADIANS UNDER FIRE:

Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

ENGEN, Robert. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, hardcover 240 pages. $34.95, ISBN 978-0773536265

Reviewed by Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD

After the Second World War, American Brigadier-General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall attempted to quantify the human dimension of combat. Apparently, he used after-combat interview techniques, developed in Makin and Kwajalein Atoll, with approximately 400 rifle companies in the Pacific and European theatres. In *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, Marshall developed a "ratio of fire" and concluded that "on an average not more than 15 percent of the men had actually fired at the enemy positions or personnel with rifles, carbines, grenades, bazookas, BARs, or machine guns during the course of an entire engagement. The best showing that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made at least some use of his firepower."

Robert Engen, in his 2009 study, *Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War*, offers a powerful counterpoint to the Marshall thesis. Engen is not the first to do so; over the years several scholars have challenged Marshall's research methodology and personal integrity. However, Engen's contribution is unique: finally, a sophisticated analysis of Canadian infantry in the Second World War. It is long overdue. *Canadians Under Fire* is based on battle-experience questionnaires completed by 161 Canadian infantry officers who served in Italy and Northwestern Europe. The questionnaires were filled out days or weeks after events. Engen carefully explains the questionnaire theory and design. His thesis is that the data derived from the questionnaires do not support Marshall's contention regarding ratio of fire. That conclusion fits nicely with the evidence that Canadian artillery was ineffective in destroying dug-in enemy infantry and that Canadian armour was ineffective in closely supporting infantry onto objectives. Had Canadian infantry behaved according to Marshall's ratio of fire, it is difficult to imagine how they would ever have closed with and destroyed the enemy.

Still, Marshall's ratio-of-fire thesis developed immediate traction, partly because it made sense intuitively—the continuum-of-fighting-power model suggests that active followers, leaders and heroes make up a minority of combatants—and partly because so many combat-experienced officers accepted it for various reasons. Colonel Edwin B. Crabill, commander of the 329th Combat Team, 83rd Infantry Division, asserted that in combat the rifleman "almost never sees *anything* to shoot at." Major Charles E. Hiatt, a company commander in the 84th Infantry Division in World War II, noted in 1951 that "We just assume that every man will fire his weapon at the enemy when he has an enemy to fire at," but "as any soldier with combat experience knows, that notion is far from the truth."

In 1951, Major W.E. Garber of the Royal Canadian Regiment declared that, since there was little difference between Canadian and American infantry, "it is probable that there is a comparable reluctance to engage the enemy [in the Canadian army]." Also in 1951, Captain W.R. Chamberlain of the Royal Canadian Dragoons stated that Marshall's ratio-of-fire figures applied "equally as well to the Canadian Army" because Chamberlain had "seen this happen only too often, and has received confirmation of this practice from practically all infantry officers whom he has queried." That statement and Engen's thesis appear diametrically opposed. However, the two views may be correct in different situations. The reader would be wise to pay close attention to Engen's treatment of differing Canadian tactics in different environments.

Engen's conclusions reflect contemporary Canadian experience in Afghanistan. Every Canadian Afghanistan combat veteran this reviewer has cornered and asked to comment on Marshall's thesis has rejected it entirely. Indeed, there seems to be too much fire, not too little. The high rate of fire in Afghanistan is, I think, the result of two imperatives: one tactical and one psychological. In their training, Canadian infantry are taught that winning the firefight requires large amounts of small-arms ammunition. Psychologically, firing a large number of rounds apparently makes soldiers feel safer, but that assumption needs to be examined in much greater detail by Operational Research. If Marshall was indeed wrong, we will also need to rethink Dave Grossman's argument that the act of killing was, and remains, an insurmountable obstacle for many soldiers. *Canadians Under Fire* is an important contribution, not only to analysis of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, but also to current discussions of combat effectiveness. All professional soldiers should read it.

Personnel of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, firing a Vickers machine gun during an attack near Carpiquet, France



THE DIARY OF AN ARTILLERY OFFICER:

The 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery on the Western Front

BIBLOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
BICK, Major Arthur Hardie. DSO, edited by Peter Hardie Bick. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011, softcover, 222 pages, $28.99, ISBN 978-1459700406

Reviewed by Colonel Peter J. Williams, CD

I first took note of this little gem in an advertisement in a magazine lying around our lines in the HQ. On a subsequent trip to Chapters, I was able to get the last one in stock. First World War diaries have always held a particular fascination for me, and as this is the diary of a gunner, somewhat rarer than that of a front-line infantryman, it was an account I had just had to read.

Major Arthur Hardie Bick served as the Brigade Major (BM, or G3 in modern parlance) of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery from December 1917 to February 1919, when he and his troops deployed back to Canada from a post-war stint of garrisoning Germany. Arthur's son Peter eventually edited his father's journals, enabling the modern reader to get a sense of life on the Western Front, albeit from the perspective of a staff officer, in the final year of the Great War.

Arthur was already a veteran when he was posted as BM, having previously served as Battery Commander (BC) of the 15th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, and having fought in several battles, including Passchendaele. As BM, apart from being the principal—indeed, almost the only—staff officer assigned to the Commander Divisional Artillery (CDA), he was also responsible for writing the daily war diaries of the Divisional Artillery, and it is those entries that form the basis of the book, Arthur's own words being supplemented by those of Peter, who helps put the various entries into a wider context.

Many of the entries are rather brief and almost invariably begin with a description of the weather (November 11 was blessed with "fine weather," according to Arthur), followed by a description of the key events of the day. While the brevity of some entries can at times be rather off-putting, in some ways I could empathize with him, as at the end of a long day on operations, even on the staff, one was fairly exhausted and the thought of composing a few words was often a great challenge. In preparation for an attack the following day, Arthur notes that barrage maps promised by Corps HQ for 1600 hrs did not arrive until 1830 hrs, and then only a poorly detailed overlay was received. Arthur then notes that this resulted in "very hasty work by 1st CDA office staff and even with quick work, ordered and barrage charts are not issued until 2330." Considering that Arthur's staff could probably be numbered on the fingers of one hand, likely lacked sophisticated copying devices and had to dispatch products to brigades by hand, one gets a sense that getting the necessary staff work done must have been a Herculean effort. The Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and Belgian Croix de Guerre he eventually received were clearly well deserved.

As one reads the entries, the sheer scale of the 1st Canadian Division's efforts is quite staggering. Prior to major offensives, additional ammunition was dumped at gun positions. For the entry of 4 April 1918, for instance, Arthur records that "Gun dumps increased to 600 x 18 pounder per gun and 400 x 4.5 per howitzer." Much of this transport was done by horse, and the state of those animals was always a major concern. As late as 24 October 1918, Arthur noted that a new batch of remounts were "a poor lot."

This was remedied a short time later through the discovery of good foraging and grazing areas in the vicinity, which reminds us that the Great War horse was in many ways the modern equivalent of the modern-day logistic vehicle. The horse also had the added benefit that in emergencies it could be considered an option for the provision of rations: an entry of Arthur's from December 1918 (yes, after the Armistice!) noted that due to logistical challenges, "No march is possible for this brigade tomorrow unless horses are to be sacrificed." Thankfully, rations caught up the next day, and this option never had to be exercised.

For me, Arthur's accounts also serve to confirm many of the popular myths concerning the higher direction of the war: the generals he dealt with visited their units rather frequently, and the war in its latter stages was a highly mobile one, particularly its last three months, known as "The Hundred Days." Arthur's accounts of the post-war period in garrisoning Germany are no less interesting, and we learn of the Khaki University established in order to prepare soldiers for their eventual return to civilian life.

The book is lavishly illustrated with photos, mostly from the Royal Canadian Artillery Museum in Shilo, I was pleased to note, and the maps enable the general reader to follow the course of the events described.

Certainly this is a wartime memoir with a difference. While there are quite a few accounts of front-line soldiers, and Arthur had done his time as a BC, accounts of those involved in the higher tactical direction of Canada's war are not as numerous, and so we are grateful to Peter Hardie Bick for bringing his father's diaries to a modern audience. Highly recommended.



THE END:
The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
KERSHAW, Ian. Toronto: Penguin, 2011, hardcover, 564 pages, $45.00, ISBN 978-1594203145

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LLB

By September 1944, the western Allies had broken out of their Normandy beachhead and were surging towards the Reich. In the east, Army Group Centre had been decimated with more than half a million casualties during Operation BAGRATION and the Red Army was consolidating its position for its initial push into German territory. From the air, Germany was being bombed night and day by the American, Canadian and Royal Air Forces. By any definition, Germany had lost the war. Yet, for another ten months, the German state maintained a semblance of order, civil servants went to work, civilian courts processed cases, mail was distributed and newspapers circulated, war production was maintained and even increased and the *Wehrmacht* offered stiff resistance everywhere, even mounting a winter offensive (the Ardennes Offensive) that almost succeeded in splitting the western armies. Why did the Germans fight so hard and for so long after the war was obviously lost?

In this meticulously researched and superbly written work, British historian and noted expert on the Nazi period[1] Sir Ian Kershaw answers this question, a question that was as important then as it is now: What causes a country and its leadership to fight when any rational, responsible government would have sued for peace? Why choose destruction over surrender, defiance over negotiation? Using a vast array of primary and secondary sources, including: soldiers' letters; intercepted conversations of German POWs; internal reports; memoirs of high-ranking German leaders and intelligence gathered by the Nazis on their own people, Kershaw debunks the myth that the Allies' insistence on "unconditional surrender,"—coupled with strategic mistakes committed by their armies, completely explains the stiffening resistance of the German Army, state and society and their commitment to a fight to the end. Instead, he argues, it was the charismatic nature of the Nazi regime (as distinguished from the waning charismatic nature of its leader) which

Soldier of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division looking at a portrait of Adolf Hitler hung on a wall by using a knife

motivated this irrational defiance. What Kershaw calls "the structure of rule and underlying mentalities behind them" were fundamental to understanding why ordinary Germans were prepared to fight on to the undeniable bitter end; why they were prepared to continue their genocidal policies against the Jews and foreign workers—thereby diverting valuable war materiel; why they were prepared to kill each other through increasingly more repressive practices; and why a highly trained, professional military leadership continued to obey absolutely irrational orders emanating from the *Führerbunker*. Even compared to other totalitarian regimes, Hitler was personalized in the extreme. He was, at once, the supreme military leader, the head of the Nazi Party and the head of the German government. By the fall of 1944, there was no one person or unified group who could challenge his writ. The government was fragmented and eroded. In brief, there was no surrender because the *Führer* would not contemplate surrender.

Adolf Hitler standing in an automobile during the Nazi Party Congress of 1935

The End balances a chronological and thematic approach to the period from the failed July 1944 Bomb Plot to the surrender of Germany in May 1945. Kershaw develops a number of sub-themes which support his final argument. He reasons: lingering public support for Hitler; the omnipresent terror apparatus; the dominating quadrumvirate of Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann and Speer; the increasing power of the Nazi Party in the personages of the 45 *Gauleiter* (district leaders); the public and military backlash following the failed Stauffenberg plot—which resulted in a new "stab in the back" mentality; the fear of Russian occupation; the inability of some to consider a future without Hitler; the continued readiness of high-ranking German officials and military leaders to continue doing their duty (*Führerprinzip*); a sense of fatalism brought on by a general war-weariness; and the traditional German deference to authority, all contributed to the inevitable endgame.

The End can only be described as magisterial, a masterpiece of storytelling and analysis. More than any preceding work, it presents a more nuanced consideration of this period of history. In the opinion of this reviewer, no one has authored a better description of the human dimensions accompanying the collapse of Nazi Germany. Kershaw's conclusions are equally applicable to present-day authoritarian regimes which fail to face the inevitable. That makes *The End* mandatory reading for those who set foreign and military policy in this country. As recent events have demonstrated, many autocratic leaders will not go quietly into that good night.

ENDNOTES

1. *Hitler: 1889–1936 Hubris*, London: W.W. Norton & Company (1999); *Hitler: 1936–1945 Nemesis*, London: W.W. Norton & Company (2001), *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis and the Road to War*, London: Penguin Press (2004), *Luck of the Devil: The Story of Operation Valkyrie,* London: Penguin Press (2009).



THE TRIPLE AGENT:
The al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
WARRICK, Joby. Toronto: Doubleday, 2011, hardcover, 272 pages, $31.00, ISBN 978-0-385-53418-5

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LLB

On December 30, 2009, at Forward Operating Base Chapman, an isolated, cold and windswept CIA camp in Khost Province near the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, a group of senior CIA and other intelligence operators and their accompanying security guards waited with great anticipation for the arrival of Humam Khalil al-Balawi, a Jordanian pediatrician and reformed jihadi cyber warrior who had infiltrated the senior ranks of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The purpose of the meeting was to debrief Balawi and learn the location of several high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The meeting did not go off as planned. Balawi detonated a specially designed suicide vest, killing himself, four CIA officers, three of their bodyguards, an Afghan employee of the CIA and a senior Jordanian intelligence officer. Balawi's "martyrdom operation" was, in fact, a deceptive al-Qaeda counter-intelligence operation.

This is the background to Pulitzer Prize-winning national security journalist Joby Warrick's *The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA*. In a deliberate, non-accusatory fashion, relying on interviews with the principal parties involved and the families of the survivors, Warrick writes a disturbing narrative of the events leading up to that tragic day and how, in hindsight, it could have been avoided. *Triple Agent*, at times, reads like an Ian Fleming or a Jack Higgins spy thriller, yet the author infuses these riveting passages with intimate and poignant portraits of the dead provided by their colleagues, friends and families.

The path that took Balawi from the quiet streets and refugee camps of Amman to Khost was simple enough. Caught in 2008 by members of the Jordanian General Intelligence Division (GID), the feared *Mukhabarat*, for posting violent and vitriolic jihadi videos online in praise of al-Qaeda under the nom de plume Abu Dujana al-Khorisani, Balawi quickly renounces violence after three days of "humiliation" in Jordanian custody. He agrees to be "flipped" by the CIA and the GID. Perhaps blinded by their desire and in their haste to locate the senior leadership of al-Qaeda, American and Jordanian intelligence did not fully appreciate or look into the background of their new double agent. In a world where patience, deliberation, discretion and attention to detail are watchwords, Balawi's handlers quickly decided to send him to the largely lawless northwest area of Pakistan, a staging area for Taliban and al-Qaeda operations.

Once in Pakistan, Balawi used his medical knowledge to gain access to the senior leadership of the Pakistan Taliban, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP). Within months, he had sent the GID (and, through the GID, the CIA) tantalizing emails and a remarkable video file that suggested he had become the personal physician to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the purported second-in-command of al-Qaeda and the operational mastermind of 9/11. Understandably, a decision was reached in Washington to pull Balawi in so that he could be debriefed. Unknown to his case officers, however, Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders had turned GID's and CIA's "golden source" into a triple agent in a classic "dangle operation" against them.

There are a number of sub-themes that weave their way through this masterfully written narrative: the close cooperation between American and Jordanian intelligence; the primacy of the CIA in the fight against transnational terrorism; the unprecedented use of unmanned aerial vehicles ("drones") as the weapon of choice in this fight; the silent, deadly world of U.S. counterterrorism; and the adaptability of al-Qaeda and its allies. As Warrick argues, this type of operation is both singularly important and equally alarming, as it demonstrated the ability of several discrete insurgent groups to coalesce to formulate and execute a reasonably sophisticated plan that fooled what is arguably the most sophisticated intelligence agency in the world.

Triple Agent should serve as a case study of the tensions that exist in the tradecraft of counterterrorism. The competing interests; the need to act swiftly on intelligence that grows stale minute by minute and second by second, thereby permitting the subject to escape or go to ground; and the need to perform time-consuming due diligence on intelligence acquired, regardless of its source or its importance; are on full display here. The failure to rigorously scrutinize both the information and the informant and the tragic results wrought by not doing so is the powerful message left with this reader.

Elements of "C" Squadron Combat Team, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) maintain observation on an Afghan village



THE TASTE OF WAR:
World War Two and the Battle for Food

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
COLLINGHAM, Lizzie. London, Penguin Books, 2011, hardcover, 634 pages, $50.00, ISBN: 978-0713999648

Reviewed by Captain Michael Peterson, PhD

The fact that deaths (at least 20 million) from starvation, malnutrition, and related diseases exceeded deaths (19.5 million) from military action during World War Two may surprise readers of this interesting and unusual book. Lizzie Collingham, a British social historian, offers a comprehensive picture of the grievous human cost of World War Two. She explores the role of food in the ideology that led the world to war, in the social context of total war, and in the military context of feeding vast militaries. Collingham connects this piece of human history with contemporary security issues by noting the parallels between food availability and demands then and now.

In the 1930s, the totalitarian governments of Germany and Japan, with their ideologies of racial superiority and entitlement, were unwilling to rely on trade with Britain and the US to feed their people. This book effectively argues that the German and Japanese desire to secure their food supplies was a major cause of World War Two.

German and Japanese planners looked to Eastern Europe and Manchuria, respectively, to develop breadbaskets for their empires. The populations of these regions would be systematically displaced and starved, thus creating living room for the conquerors. Collingham calls this policy of deliberate extermination by starvation the "exporting of hunger"—the wholesale plundering of the food supplies of others so that the homelands would not go hungry. As the war continued, the Nazis accelerated their concentration and destruction of Jews in order to meet their self-imposed quotas of eliminating "useless mouths." Policies of genocide and food security thus went hand in hand.

Poster: Hunger, America Fights Starvation in Belgium

Collingham's accounts of how governments struggled to feed their peoples and militaries will fascinate students of logistics and social science. Total war placed enormous stresses on food production. To compensate, governments adopted rationing based on their values. For the US, the mobilization of its vast food resources inspired a new middle class ideal of prosperity. In Britain, egalitarian standards of rationing exposed pre-war class-related nutritional deficits and led to social reforms. In the dictatorships, rations were allocated based on one's value to the war effort. Soviet workers and soldiers functioned on the brink of malnutrition through the worst years of the war.

Starved prisoners, nearly dead from hunger, pose in a concentration camp in Ebensee, Austria. The camp was reputedly used for "scientific" experiments. It was liberated by the 80th Division

In Germany, the ruthless plundering of other countries' labour and food reserves (as Canadian troops discovered upon liberating a starving Holland) meant that most Germans did not face starvation until the final collapse. Japan, its maritime shipping totally destroyed, fared the worst. By 1943, the Japanese government was reduced to exhorting its people to eat "decisive battle food," which included insects, rice straw, and seaweed.

Holland: A policeman keeps an eye on the breadline. A person's weekly ration was the equivalent of 400 grams, a chunk of bread during the "Hunger Winter"

Adequately feeding militaries of millions posed huge challenges. Advances in nutritional science, reforms to army food services, and superior resources meant that Allied troops generally ate better than their foes. German armies were expected to augment their rations with food confiscated locally, to the detriment of occupied populations. Their Russian opponents were generally hungrier and became expert foragers, keeping scurvy at bay by eating nettles and boiling pine needles. The worst off were the Japanese, who were eventually reduced to eating dried grasses, palm starch, and, ultimately, each other. American troops became the wonder of the world for their seemingly unlimited rations, and so, as Collingham notes, "plentiful American food became a symbol of the United States' economic prosperity."

For decades after 1945, ruined societies struggled with hunger while the victors, particularly Americans, dedicated themselves to increased consumption. Other countries followed the American example as they recovered, and so consumerism, obesity, and "diseases of affluence" are legacies of the war. Advances in nutritional science, food preservation, and storage technologies are more positive results of the war. As global population and food demands continue to climb, as climates change, and as agriculture reaches yield limits, Collingham predicts that governments (and, by association, militaries) will once again need to manage the world's food supplies and relearn the lessons of World War Two.



CONQUERED INTO LIBERTY:
Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
COHEN, Eliot A. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, hardcover, 405 pages, $34.99, ISBN: 978-0743249904

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LLB

"[T]his book [deals] with America's most durable, and in many ways, most effective and important enemy of all; Canada." With that provocative statement; academic, author and national security advisor Eliot Cohen introduces the history of the "Great Warpath," that strategically important tract of land lying between New York City and Quebec City, which for over two centuries was the battleground for the French, the British, the Americans and their respective Aboriginal allies. The prize at stake was control of North America. The title of this history comes from a subversive pamphlet smuggled into Quebec by American revolutionary sympathizers and addressed to the Quebec *habitants*. It was intended to persuade them to throw off their yoke of British religious and political oppression and welcome the invading Americans as liberators. It is interesting, as Cohen notes, how many of the descendants of those American leaders believe in the same paradoxical notion today.

Professor Cohen argues that the American "way of war" had its genesis in the hundreds of battles, skirmishes and raids carried out by the Dutch, French, Aboriginals, British, Canadians and Americans in a series of struggles with ever-changing allies and enemies. The American notion that victory is achieved only by the complete destruction and the utter dismantling of the enemy state, not by the extermination of its people, is traced to the successive invasions of Canada. Similarly, the siege, surrender and subsequent "massacre" of the denizens of Fort William Henry by the French and their Abenaki and Iroquois allies in August 1757 demonstrated to the American command that victory trumped honour. As Cohen astutely writes, "American military culture thus became a self-contradictory hybrid of form, restraint, and etiquette, on the one hand, improvisation, raw energy and unwillingness to accept limits on the other."

The two centuries of war in which the Great Warpath was used as an avenue of invasion and defence also saw the genesis of a number of modern-day strategic and operational concepts in American military doctrine. Those concepts included: the deployment of Special Forces; the emphasis on training rather than on drilling; the encouragement of the thinking soldier—one guided, not dictated to, by doctrine; the fundamentals of raising, training and supplying an expeditionary force; the utility of psychological subversion over military force; the necessity of civil rather than military government during occupation; the necessity of passports for transnational travel; "cross-border operations" into a neutral country to secure the arrest and removal of anti-American elements; reliance on "citizen soldiers" commanded by professionals, and "anticipatory self-defence" as an international law concept. All of them trace their roots from the battles of the French and Indian War to the Fenian Raids. Cohen also argues that there are lessons to be learned today from the French and British "advisors" to the Aboriginal tribes: empathy has great strategic value and "good enough" is often the hallmark of success.

Conquered Into Liberty is not a "top-down" history focusing on generals and statesmen. Nor does it look from the "bottom up" at individual farmers, soldiers and families. Instead, it tells its story from the point of view of neither the famous nor the unknown, but from the perspective of those mid-level leaders and managers whose duty it was to get the job done. The author writes of little-known Canadians: Pierre Rigaud de Vaudreuil—Governor General of New France, a native-born Canadian who knew that the French could not defeat the British in a head-to-head battle but could, with a combination of raids

Engraving of a map drawn by a British officer after the Battle of Hubbardton

and preemptive strikes on British bases, stalemate the enemy until more favourable results occurred elsewhere; the "shrewd and generous" Sir Guy Carleton—Canada's governor, who devised the plan to split the American colonies in two by driving down the Lake Champlain corridor; and La Corne St Luc—"the old wolf," a Canadian partisan who led daring and bloodthirsty raids into British territory. Cohen's narrative also tells of battles and of places that have receded into the mists of time, long forgotten until now: Fort Ticonderoga (Fort Carillon), the Battle of Valcour Island, Hubbardton, Crown Point and the Battle on Snowshoes.

This is a story worth telling, and Cohen tells it very well. It is a story of heroism and cowardice, competence and ineptitude, death in the snows of Quebec and on the waters of Lake Champlain—a story worth reading. At the end, the reader can still hear the rattle of musketry and the roar of the cannon shot, the shouts of command, the flap of canvas and the creaking of oars, the dip of the paddle and even—with some effort, the near-silent padding of moccasin-shod feet.



THE POLITICS OF COMMAND:
Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and The Canadian Army, 1939–1943

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
RICKARD, John Nelson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, hardcover, 366 pages, $46.95, ISBN 978-1442640023

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, plsc

After considerable neglect for many years, Canadian military biography is enjoying a revival amongst scholars and military practitioners, the result of which has been the recent publication of several new books on key figures in Canadian Army history. John Rickard, a Canadian armoured officer and historian, has added his own scholarship to the growing list with a new detailed study of Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the brilliant but troubled Commander of First Canadian Army during the dark early days of the Second World War.

A distinguished artillery officer and veteran of the Great War who later rose to become Chief of the General Staff (1929–1935), McNaughton was also a renowned scientist and founder of Canada's National Research Council. At the outbreak of the Second World War, McNaughton was back in army service as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) British VII Corps, which was redesignated the Canadian Corps in December 1940. At the end of 1941, after continued growth and reinforcement, the Canadian Corps evolved to become First Canadian Army. McNaughton commanded this larger formation until December 1943. By then, his abrasive nationalism to keep the First Canadian Army intact had earned him too many adversaries both in England and at home. As well, intrigue over his supposedly clumsy performance in a critical army training manoeuvre in March 1943—Exercise SPARTAN—led to accusations of command incompetence. General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, did not like McNaughton and wanted him replaced, as did several Canadian politicians. Deemed too old and unfit to command, McNaughton was finally forced to resign and was replaced by General Harry Crerar.

Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton

Though McNaughton has not been the subject of a full-length study since historian John Swettenham's three-volume examination in 1969, in the subsequent decades, several military historians have certainly solidified traditional views of his character and reputation. Often described as "crusty" and uncompromising, McNaughton's apparently lacklustre performance during Exercise SPARTAN is often cited as the main reason for his demise. That is where Rickard intervenes and offers a different view. Taking advantage of the considerable new evidence that has become available over the last 40 years, Rickard argues that historians have accepted the status quo explanations of McNaughton's performance too quickly, without full consideration of the facts in the archival record. He reveals, for example, how General Sir Bernard Paget, the principal referee in Exercise SPARTAN, thought very highly of McNaughton's performance, feeling it was at times both bold and imaginative. He also proves that it was often others in the British government and chain of command,

First Canadian Army Troops at Valcartier Camp, returning from drill



Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton in the First Canadian Army Mobile Library

not McNaughton, who were obstructing Canadian efforts to send forces into the Mediterranean theatre of war. In essence, Rickard argues very effectively throughout this new study that none of our accepted wisdom on McNaughton is quite what it seems, and his analysis is both revealing and critically important to our understanding of Canadian high command in wartime. Rickard successfully shows that both the man himself and his record of employment deserved another look, and that is what he delivers in this new and incredibly well-researched and well-written biography of A.G.L. McNaughton, GOC First Canadian Army.



SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

ROSTEK, Michael, and GIZEWSKI, Peter Editors, Kingston, McGill—Queen's University Press, 2012, Softcover, 277 pages, $39.95, ISBN: 978-1-55339-351-1

Reviewed by Sergeant K. Grant, CD

At a peacekeeping conference held in the fall of 2004 in Ottawa, shortly after Major-General Leslie returned from Afghanistan as ISAF Commander, he made the statement that trying to control the 1,400 NGOs operating in the Kabul area "was like herding cats." In reply, a panel member and director of CARE Canada said that "to herd cats, all you need is the right cat food." In a couple of sentences, these two men summed up the nature of the antagonistic relationship between the government, the military, and the NGO community.

That said, this book, *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, is an important line in the sand for the crisis response community. I say "important" because, when it comes to working together, history has shown that all parties approach the subject with trepidation and with a great deal of naïveté about their counterparts. So it is with this book. *Security Operations in the 21st Century* is a collection of essays from various government and non-government organizations dealing with crisis response. If you have any experience at all with overseas operations, you will find this an illuminating read. Broken into five parts, the book covers a range of topics, from what constitutes the basic definition of the comprehensive approach, to how best to make the military/government/NGO relationship work on domestic and international operations.

On the surface, what this book does is juxtapose how the players would approach each of the topics. On the one hand, having key players write about their perspective is a good thing—it clears the air by breaking down myths and illuminating shortcomings. But, on the other hand, if we take a moment to look more closely, the reader will recognize that the real focus of this book is not so much each organization's approach as it is their culture. Indeed, as the reader moves through the book, it becomes increasingly clear that the crux of the conflict between organizations lies in how to operate in the grey area between war and a safe and secure operating environment. In a country such as Afghanistan, where the omnipresent threat of violence creates this overlap, the issue of control becomes overwhelming. How much security is enough? When is an area truly safe? Given that none of the organizations wants to subjugate itself to any other, conflict between all of them becomes the norm.

That is not to say that cooperation does not exist. Indeed, on either end of the spectrum, it is fair to say that in times of war "most NGOs recognize that the military has a distinct role to play in conflict scenarios, and agree that they should take the lead in these situations. As well, most NGOs have little difficulty working side by side with the military in a natural disaster zone." Nonetheless, when a conflict zone is transitioning into a stable, functioning society, the altruistic culture of some NGOs tends to foster an "us vs. them" ("them" being the military) approach and a dogged belief that they are somehow separate and not associated in any way with military operations. This I see as tribalism, since experience clearly shows that the concept

of neutrality exists only in the minds of the NGOs and not in the minds of the people they purport to serve. And yet, whether anyone likes it or not, as long as the GoC continues to employ its resources to solve problems on both the domestic and international front, a comprehensive approach will be required. Key to its development, however, will be the understanding that "engagements are never *only* a military problem, though the military may be a key enabler." The issue then becomes one of institutional maturity.

Institutional maturity requires strong leadership and a genuine desire to cooperate to achieve the goal. While this book offers a first step in that direction, it also highlights a unique characteristic of the Western approach to international operations, namely, our ingrained, doggedly individualistic need to launch ourselves on a crusade to "do good," without first finding out what is needed or wanted or what anyone else is doing—an approach often referred to as "stove-piping." That, in turn, raises the question of expectations and again highlights the difference in approaches. The military's approach to success tends to be centred on short-term goals, i.e., secure the airfield, deliver water, re-establish the power grid, and so on. NGOs tend to take the longer view: build the school, *and* deliver the supplies, *and* supply the teachers, and… and…and. The military views a situation as a problem to be solved, while NGOs see it as one to be addressed.

Established in 1996, ASCHIANA is one of Canada Fund partner NGOs which works in the field of street children's development issues in Afghanistan. The children consist of boys and girls who are undertaking formal school education in accordance with the curriculum of the Ministry of Education

The Canadian military also differs from NGOs in that, when it is not *on* operations, it is training and developing policies, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and doctrine *for* operations. That is not to say, however, that it is inflexible. Indeed, since the early 2000s, the military and government agencies have both made a concerted effort to relearn the lessons of the past and develop procedures that actually work in complex operating environments. JIMP and the comprehensive approach are examples of policies designed to foster cooperation between all players. Publications such as *Toward Land Operations 2021, Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow,* and *Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Land Forces* illustrate the military's recognition of the need to work with other players in the field and develop policies and doctrine in support thereof. Yet while doctrine and policies are nice, the drawback is that they tend to result in a checklist approach to problem solving.

What is certain is that the modern operational space is populated by an enormous number of actors, each with its own agenda, mandate and goals. I would suggest that, to effectively respond to an international crisis, it would behove the players to develop a unified approach that leverages their abilities to the maximum. To do that, however, requires getting everyone to come to the table and agree upon areas of responsibility *before* they deploy. This book makes it painfully clear that what is required for the comprehensive approach to work is some kind of neutral, third-party agency—one set up specifically to respond to natural disasters and conflict and that could coordinate the efforts of anyone and everyone interested in making a contribution. The agency would put Canada's best foot forward and, hopefully, reduce the congestion created by everyone running to the rescue. The unified-approach concept could be expanded upon in the future, with exercises and training sessions all designed to reduce response times and increase efficiency.

But we are not there yet. Just getting everyone to talk to each other is proving to be a difficult task. Despite boisterous claims of wanting to "do good" for the disadvantaged, nobody seems too enthusiastic about pooling their resources. The reason for this is simple: until all parties are prepared to park their egos at the door and work toward a universal goal, the biggest elephant in the room will be fear—fear of losing control of their resources and personnel or, worst of all, of being absorbed by another organization and thereby becoming redundant.

The solution to this situation will be for people to gather together, clearly state their positions, argue and disagree. Only by declaring their view—which is, in part, what this book does—will the players begin to understand and trust how the other parties operate. If in the end some organizations merge, then that can only be seen as a good thing, since it signifies a move toward greater cooperation and a truly unified, comprehensive approach to a disaster.

Egos will always be a problem; whether they are reflected in the mindset of overzealous commanders or the tribal views of NGO organizations, 'twas ever, and will ever, be thus. Yet one cannot help but be disappointed when institutions continue focusing effort on protecting their turf with political manoeuvring rather than working with others to craft a genuinely effective response to a crisis. Continuing this divisive approach to international aid will do nothing to make things better and, in the end, will only hurt those we are trying to help.

In writing reviews, I am loath, without just cause, to make the blanket statement that any book is a "must read." I will confess that, in places, this book angered me enough to put it down for the sheer naïveté of some of the positions espoused. There were also parts that felt like death by PowerPoint for the blandness and the formulaic, government nature of the writing. Even so, one cannot help but see hope in the words and essays contained in *Security Operations in the 21st Century*. They are an important first step to understanding and developing a comprehensive approach, and I feel strongly that, if you are a player in the international crisis response game, this book is, indeed, a must read.



Sergeant David Layden, an Electrical Distribution Tech from 1 Engineering Support Unit, Moncton, New Brunswick, holds a wooden beam while a local worker hammers in the nails to build the floor of a shelter being made for an orphanage in Fondwa, Haiti

Source: Combat Camera

ALSO RECEIVED BY THE *CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL*

OUT OF NOWHERE: A HISTORY OF THE MILITARY SNIPER, FROM THE SHARPSHOOTER TO AFGHANISTAN

PEGLER, Martin. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Soft Cover, 303 pages, $16.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-645-5

The sniper is probably the most feared specialist warrior and the most efficient killer on the battlefield. Endlessly patient and highly skilled, once he has you in his crosshairs your chances of survival are slim. This revised edition of the acclaimed Out of Nowhere provides a comprehensive history of the sniper, giving insights into all aspects of his life. His training, tactics and equipment, and the psychology of sniping are examined in the context of the major wars of modern times—including: the American Civil War, both world wars, the Vietnam War and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. First hand accounts from veteran snipers demonstrate their skill and extraordinary courage, and show why they are still such a vital part of any war.

WAKE ISLAND 1941: A BATTLE TO MAKE THE GODS WEEP

MORAN, Jim. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Soft Cover, 96 pages, $14.99
ISBN: 978-1-84908-603-5

On the same day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they also launched air attacks on Wake Island, an important American naval base still under construction in the Pacific. Three days later, a Japanese invasion force was bloodily repulsed by the scratch force of Marines, sailors, and even construction-worker volunteers who defended it. Despite American efforts to relieve the island, the Japanese launched a much greater invasion attempt a few weeks later and, despite gallant resistance, the American commander was compelled to surrender the island. This book tells the complete story of the 16-day siege of Wake Island and of the vicious fighting that took place in one of the legendary "last stands" made by the US military. Number 144 in Osprey's Campaign series.

ADVANCE AND DESTROY: PATTON AS COMMANDER IN THE BULGE

RICKARD, John Nelson. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011, Hardcover, 490 pages, $34.95
ISBN: 978-0-8131-3455-0

In Advance and Destroy, John Nelson Rickard, a captain in the Canadian Forces, examines Patton's operational performance during the Ardennes campaign. The Ardennes was different from any other campaign Patton had experienced, and he had to fight hard and manoeuvre extensively to gain positions of advantage over an opponent desperately trying to seize the initiative. By studying Patton's command and operational techniques in the battle, Rickard comes to a new understanding of the leader, debunking myths and providing new insights into his renowned military skill and legendary personality.

STEEL CAVALRY: THE 8TH (NEW BRUNSWICK) HUSSARS AND THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

WINDSOR, Lee. Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2011, Softcover, 200 pages, $18.95
ISBN: 978-086-492657-9

Modern duels between rival tanks have long fascinated historians. The 8th Princess Louise's (New Brunswick) Hussars was one of the most battle-proven armoured regiments of the Second World War. Founded in 1848 as a volunteer cavalry regiment, the Hussars traded their beloved horses for cars on the eve of war. When war broke out, they mobilized as a motorcycle regiment before finally converting to tanks in 1941. The story of the Hussars' Italian campaign begins in late 1943 with their arrival in Naples and their first action near Ortona. This volume tells the story of their participation in the great drive beyond Monte Cassino to Rome and in the fierce and bloody battles at the Gothic Line and Coriano Ridge, which cemented their reputation in Canada's military history.

THE SAS IN WORLD WAR II: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

MORTIMER, Gavin. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Hardcover, 256 pages, $25.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-646-2

In his new book, WWII historian and regular Guardian contributor Gavin Mortimer examines the pivotal events of one of the most famous military units of all time. Starting with the unit's formation in July 1941, Mortimer recreates the heady days when a young Scots' Guard officer called David Stirling persuaded MEHQ to give its backing to a small band of 60 men christened "L Detachment." From there, drawing on over 100 hours of interviews with veterans, he describes the early raids in the desert against Axis airfields that inflicted a deadly cost on the enemy.

DESERT RAT 1940–43: BRITISH AND COMMONWEALTH TROOPS IN NORTH AFRICA

MOREMAN, Tim. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Softcover, 64 pages, $19.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-501-4

Made up of units from all over the British Empire, perhaps no other British force of World War II is better known than the "Desert Rats," a term eventually used for all men of the Western Desert Force and Eighth Army. As the only British forces actively fighting Italy and Germany on land, and enduring harsh living conditions and intense combat, these men soon forged a strong sense of identity and a common purpose. Using evocative photographs and newly commissioned artwork, this book examines what it was like to live and fight on one of the most inhospitable battlefields on Earth.

ITALIAN ARMY ELITE UNITS AND SPECIAL FORCES 1940–43

CROCIANI, P., and BATTISTELLI, P.P. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Softcover, 64 pages, $19.95
ISBN: 978-1-84908-595-3

Whether created in advance for a planned purpose or forged on the battlefields of North Africa and the Eastern Front, the Italian Army's elite and special forces units distinguished themselves despite their generally inadequate weapons and equipment and the unfavourable odds they faced. This book describes formations and units that earned the respect of their allied opponents—the Ariete Armoured Division, the Trieste Motorized Division, the Folgore Paratroop Division and the Guastatori Assault Engineers—together with lesser-known special units such as the X Arditi Regiment, Monte Cervino Ski Battalion, Blackshirts Sea-landing Group and Frecce Rosse foreign volunteer battalions. It is illustrated throughout with rare wartime photos and detailed colour plates of uniforms, insignia and equipment.

THE ROAD TO VICTORY: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO OKINAWA

O'NEILL, Professor, Robert. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2011, Softcover, 272 pages, $33.00
ISBN: 978-1-84908-716-2

On December 7, 1941, as the Japanese dived out of the clouds above Pearl Harbor, America's future was fundamentally altered. Ever since the first world conflict, the United States had resisted the temptation to be drawn into wars outside of its borders. But with this one surprise attack, America was thrown into the fray of the Second World War. This new history by military specialists, Osprey Publishing, reveals each of the battles America would fight against Imperial Japan, from the naval clashes at Midway and Coral Sea to the desperate, bloody fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Each chapter reveals the horrors of battle and the grim determination to wrest victory from certain defeat.

LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE: THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL STUDIES AND REPORTS ON NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY—2000 TO 2006

No 15, The Claxton Papers, Kingston, School of Policy Studies, Queens University, Hardcover, 128 pages
ISBN: 978-1-55339-314-6

This research project looks inside the Department of National Defence (DND) during the time period from 2000 to 2006 to assess how public service officials and military officers "processed" and otherwise reacted to studies and reports the DND received from non-governmental research institutes, academic researchers and committees of Parliament concerning Canada's national defence, government defence policies and the outcomes of those policies. From that research, we draw conclusions not only about the degree of influence such documents have had on national defence policies and administrative practices, but also how researchers and Parliament might better present their work to enhance its influence on the public policy process.



BUSH WARFARE

In the Victorian Era, many young talented Canadians graduating from the Royal Military college of Canada went on to serve in the British Army. William Charles Gifford Heneker, from Sherbrooke, Quebec, was one of them. Between 1896 and 1906 Heneker served in more than a dozen African campaigns ranging from peacetime military engagements to major combat operations. As a tactical commander, Henniker demonstrated considerable talent and skill, and in 1907, he preserved his strategic and tactical ideas on fighting small wars and counterinsurgency (Bush Wars) in this book for future commanders to consider.

LAND OPERATIONS 2021

As the 21st Century unfolds, Canada's Armed Forces must be ready to operate in within an international security arena marked by uncertainty, volatility and risk in order to meet national security needs and expectations. This book outlines an employment concept that is ambitious and forward thinking, but at the same time well grounded in the lessons that we have captured from today's operations. In essence, it is a conceptual guide, from which force generation must evolve, acknowledging where we are, what we have achieved, and what we must do to ensure continued success in the future.



THE CANADIAN ARMY READING LIST

In September 2001, the Canadian Army produced its first *Canadian Army Reading List*. In the time since its publication many new books and articles of interest to the Canadian Army have appeared, prompting the need to revisit the list, and review and expand it. This new and revised *Canadian Army Reading List* retains most of the original publication, while adding a considerable amount of new material for soldiers to consider. The aim of the *Canadian Army Reading List* is to provide an instructive guide to soldiers to explore suitable literature on a wide range of subjects.

WHAT RIGHT LOOKS LIKE

CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF—ARMY ETHICS PROGRAMME

Though we are challenged by the enhanced ambiguity of an increasingly dangerous and complex operating environment, we assert our ***"Ethical Certainty"*** *through our uncompromising adherence to the Army Values: Integrity, Courage, Loyalty, and Duty. This process of positioning the Canadian soldier for operational success ensures that we, as ethical warriors, will do our* ***Duty with Discernment*** *and respect the dignity of all persons.*

Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin,
CMM, MSC, CD,
Chief of the Army Staff/Army Commander

Chief Warrant Officer Giovanni Moretti,
MMM, MSC, CD,
Army Sergeant-Major

DIOGENES · DIOGÈNE
ARMY ETHICS PROGRAMME
"Know What Right Looks Like"
PROGRAMME D'ÉTHIQUE DE L'ARMÉE DE TERRE
« Savoir ce qui est bien »