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- Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word. E-mail address: cmj.rmc@forces.gc.ca.
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- Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text as long as they are written out in full the first time they are used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
- All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one short paragraph maximum) biographical sketch of the author which includes current appointment, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address. Appropriate excerpts for publication will be chosen by the Editor.

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Manuscripts normally (unless commissioned) will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, who will make recommendations to the Editor as to suitability for publication. Manuscripts will be judged on the quality and originality of the argument or discussion, the relevance and timeliness of the topic, and on quality of the writing style. Unless otherwise agreed upon, the Canadian Military Journal insists upon right of first publication of any given submission. The Editors reserve the right to edit manuscripts for style, grammar and length, but will not make editorial changes which affect the integrity of the argument or discussion without reference to the author. Manuscripts that are not accepted for publication will be returned to the author, if desired. No copy of unpublished manuscripts will be retained by Canadian Military Journal, the Editorial Board or the Department of National Defence.
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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Summer 2013 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. After a long, tempestuous winter and a spring that we easterners thought would never arrive, the flowers are now in blossom and barbecue season is in full swing. However, so much for global warming, at least, in this part of the world...

There is no dedicated ‘Valour’ column this time out, since there were no traditionally formatted announcements of military valour awards or formal presentations of them during the reporting period. However, readers should be aware of the following official honours announcement, CANFORGEN 052/13, issued on 26 March 2013, which reads in part as follows: “On behalf of the Queen, His Excellency the Governor General has approved national honours for [three] deserving individuals.” Two members from CANSOFCOM [Canadian Special Operations Forces Command] were awarded a Star of Military Valour, and one member from CANSOFCOM was awarded a Medal of Military Valour, all for outstanding actions in Afghanistan. “For security and operational reasons, the names and citations of the recipients are not released.” We are very proud of you.

Again, quite an eclectic issue this time. We lead with three articles dealing in one form or another with Canadian operations in Afghanistan. Major Bob Martyn, an infantry officer and an academic, (as are all our contributors in this section), tackles the difficult questions associated with lessons learned through the Afghanistan experience, and what direction the Canadian Armed Forces, particularly the Canadian Army, should take in terms of force optimization for future operations. Next, Colonel Howard Coombs looks at the Afghanistan experience from a Whole of Government (WoG) perspective. He argues that although frictions did exist between military and non-military actors, by the end of the Canadian combat mission in July 2011, those issues had been largely resolved. The inter-governmental alliance had matured, “…and greatly enabled the effects necessitated by military activities by connecting them to the longer-term sustainable outcomes desired by developmental and political advisors and agencies to enable the host nation – Afghanistan.” Then, in a rather unusual change of pace, our own Colonel Bernd Horn relates a Canadian combat experience from 2011, in which Canadian Special Operations Forces, working in lockstep with the Afghan Provincial Response Company - Kandahar, delivered a decisive combat defeat to insurgents operating in the Kandahar region. This engagement generated significant praise from the American General David Petraeus, the ISAF commander at the time.

Moving right along, British Army Captain Ryan Kristiansen takes a light-hearted hypothetical look at how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) might rule in an ongoing friendly sovereignty disagreement between otherwise-good friends Canada and Denmark over a virtually insignificant and miniscule island located in the far north. Hans Island might truly be ‘The Mouse That Roared’ in the context of trivial land claims...

Kristiansen is followed by Canadian Armed Forces Padre Claude Pigeon, who discusses spirituality as a factor contributing to mental resilience in Canadian Armed Forces members, and he situates this examination within the confines of the 2012 pilgrimage to Lourdes, France. Pigeon maintains that pilgrimages offer “… an opportunity for a religious and spiritual journey, outside of a magisterium authority. The novelty of this contribution is the reflection based on a first-hand experience of active duty military personnel who have, in unique ways, confronted and continue to confront, existential questions arising from terror, violence, armed conflicts and war.”

Then, Maxime Rondeau and Lisa Tanguay, teachers in the Professional Development of Non-Commissioned Members Division at the Canadian Forces Recruit and Leadership School ask what education is both required and viable for Non-Commissioned Members. Finally, our major articles section closes on an historical note, namely, the Dominion of Canada’s Whole of Government approach to the Red River Rebellion of October 1869. Major David Grebstad, an artillery officer, maintains that, over the ensuing eleven months, “…the young Dominion Government under John A. Macdonald employed a comprehensive Whole of Government approach to successfully achieve its political goal (the acquisition of what is now Western Canada).”

We have two very different opinion pieces to pique the interest of our readers in this issue. First, retired CAF Colonel Richard St. John expresses exception to Professor Michael Byers’ (Vol. 13, No. 1) statement that “…since 2006, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has successfully prevented a return to all-out hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.” An Intelligence Branch officer and former defence attaché to Israel, St. John believes that, “Mutual deterrence – great fear – is what has kept another war from breaking out, not UNIFIL’s presence or activities.” Next, and as part of the Canadian Military Journal’s mandate to provide a voice to gifted young service members with interesting ideas, Lieutenant Nicholas Kaempffer, also an artillery officer, herein attempts “…to highlight how the technological innovation Google Earth is revolutionizing public access to geographic information … once under the sole purview of the state,” and that this “…has generated unintended insurgent utilization by virtue of the transition from state to public ownership of public data.”

We then offer Martin Shadwick’s thought-provoking opinion piece as to why the Royal Canadian Air Force should seriously consider augmenting its strategic airlift fleet with the expedient acquisition of a fifth C-17A Globemaster III (CC-177) strategic transport aircraft. Then, we close with a brace of book review essays on very different subjects, and a number of individual book reviews for your summer reading consideration.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
I read with interest the article titled “The Use of Web Conferencing in Joint and Command Staff Programme Distance Learning [JCSP DL]” (Vol. 12, No. 4), which argues that using a new “web conferencing tool” will enable synchronous learning activities (all participants are on line at the same time) that “… will undoubtedly result in a better learning experience for students” in “distance learning courses of JCSP.” I write to offer my views, based upon my experience as a member of the team that designed and managed, between 2003 and 2009, the precursors of and the first version of distance learning JCSP. I would like to address two questions: 1) the decision to use asynchronous group learning techniques (participants are on line at different times) instead of synchronous learning activities for distance learning JCSP, and 2) the assertion in the article that face-to-face seminar learning is a pedagogical “best practice” that is more effective than other types of group learning.

When we were designing the distance learning JCSP, two of our basic assumptions were that: 1) individual learning activities could be accomplished at any location convenient to the learner and did not have to be in a residential setting, and 2) group learning activities could be synchronous or asynchronous, but needed to be carefully designed to achieve maximum effectiveness. We adopted the synchronous face-to-face seminar methodology for the two residential portions of the course, where all students met for the first two days of the course “...to foster feelings of community and of belonging,” and for the final two weeks, to conduct small group discussions, case studies, and seminars related to academic activities completed during the year, as well as operational planning process exercises. The residential activities related to team building and academic activities completed during the year were discontinued about four years ago. The residential portion of the course is now only run during the final two weeks of the course, which is largely focussed upon the operational planning process. When designing JCSP DL, we considered using a synchronous seminar method for the distance portions of the course using available technology, namely, videoconferencing. Even though it was not as advanced as today’s technology, it would have allowed for a ‘face-to-face’ seminar experience. The decision to use asynchronous group learning methodology was based, not upon a lack of technological capability, but upon the fact that a synchronous activity was not possible. With learners located literally around the world, and with some deployed and having limited internet connectivity, it was not possible to schedule or to guarantee connectivity for synchronous activities. Therefore, asynchronous activities were used.

We were not concerned about the effectiveness of asynchronous activities because a review of the literature at the time confirmed that they could be every bit as effective as synchronous activities. In addition, we accepted that traditional face-to-face learning is not necessarily a ‘best practice,’ because, as the article indicates, a “truly effective...distance education setting” can be created by following basic principles of student learning. A recent Queen’s University draft report “Virtualization and Online Learning,” which was based upon a comprehensive review of the literature (available at http://www.queensu.ca/sapt-f/?page_id=864) reaffirmed these principles. It also noted that many innovative ways of active learning designed to facilitate different styles of learning can constitute more effective alternatives.

These findings in the literature were confirmed by the experiences of our design team, composed of senior officers and academics who had taught at CFC and at universities for many years. Their experiences reflected the fact that, while the face-to-face seminar experience at CFC can be a very effective learning experience, this is not always the case, especially if the experience is not designed well, or if subject matter experts are not part of the seminar discussion. The less successful seminar activities have been described as “pooled ignorance” where students operated “on ‘gut feeling’ and past experience,” rather than engaging with new ideas and applying critical thinking skills.

In my view, all higher education learning activities, including JCSP DL, should be carefully designed to achieve learning outcomes, not just to replicate processes found in residential settings. The design must also take into account the varied needs of the learners. While new technology may enable traditional forms of teaching, like the lecture and the face-to-face seminar, these activities are increasingly being supplanted by more effective learning methodologies in both residential and distance settings. Technology may be a useful adjunct to achieving learning outcomes, but it should not be the main justification for change.

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AfgHANiSTAN

The peace we think we have is only an interregnum before another cycle of conflict.

Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, 2000

Introduction

Respected American journalist and foreign correspondent Robert Kaplan’s quote is poignantly foreshadowing, being published when the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were winding down from the most onerous of the Balkan operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, yet before being thrust into Afghanistan. As Western nations look beyond our current combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, questions arise regarding the reconstitution of our military forces. This is not a particularly new practice; peacetime armies have traditionally faced budget cuts and down-sizing, societies have ‘demilitarized’ as its citizens clamoured for some elusive ‘peace dividend,’ and military leaders and strategic thinkers have pondered the lessons from that conflict in order to forecast the way ahead. It is not difficult to see this being played out in Canada, where media stories relating to the military are increasingly scarce, save those attacking the government on aircraft and ship acquisitions, or some perceived Veterans Affairs scandal. So, where should the Canadian Armed Forces be going? Many of our parameters will be dictated by economics and government policy, but there remain several choices to be made, and this article will ultimately suggest a route in which we are not overly constrained by our Afghanistan experiences.

In several American military journals and websites, there are ongoing discussions on whether a force optimized for counter-insurgency (COIN), or one based upon traditional conventional war fighting skills, is the correct way ahead. Given the significant number of current CAF veterans whose operational perspective is coloured by Afghanistan service, this debate resonates north of the border as well. The deliberation’s touchstone is Boston University Professor of International Relations Andrew J. Bacevich’s article, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” in which he spells out the views of the two camps he labels ‘crusaders’ and ‘conservatives.’ In broad terms, the crusader view is that, rather than any specific military threats, political instability abroad poses the greatest dangers. As such, social engineering in the form of establishing Western-style democracies is key to mollifying unruly
foreign populations. Conversely, while the conservatives accept that these ungoverned spaces are problematic, retooling the military as a constabulary force would merely bog America down in generations of unwinnable wars, to the detriment of preparing to face continued conventional threats, such as those coming potentially from North Korea, Iraq, or China.

I acknowledge that this article will focus almost exclusively on the land elements of this argument. This is due naturally to the Army being the service predominantly concerned with the ongoing COIN versus conventional warfighting debates, while the Air Force is fighting its F-35 battles, and the Navy, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy -- both arguably optimized for conventional conflicts. In addition to these services’ in-house procurement stories, their combat operations in Libya under Op Mobile further demonstrates their maintaining a conventional war-fighting focus. So with this as prelude, I will commence with a look at our Afghanistan experience. It isn’t pretty.

**Afghanistan**

Afghanistan’s history is one of almost constant conflict. As many of us know, Afghans are a hard, proud people. For centuries, their land held geostrategic importance, sitting astride strategically significant trade and migration routes between Persia, China, and India. Today, it straddles territory between Iran and Pakistan, as well as a potentially profitable oil pipeline from the Caspian region to the Arabian Sea. The Afghans have proved problematic for many generations of powerful empires, spanning Alexander the Great around 300 BC, the British during several Anglo-Afghan Wars between 1839 and 1919, and the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989.

This most recent iteration of fighting in Afghanistan commenced in October 2001 with Operation *Enduring Freedom*. The mission was initially successful in removing the Taliban from Kabul and most major towns, although much of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership escaped to Pakistan – a recurring theme. Nonetheless, many observers dismissed the significant role of the Afghani Northern Alliance in the campaign, pointing to the application of predominantly Special Operations Forces and aerial-delivered precision munitions as having “… changed the character of war.”

While Iraq and Afghanistan did witness a novel, massive influx of special operators locating high-value targets and ‘Scud Hunting,’ this was not the war-winning revolution their supporters proclaimed.

Citing the absence of a UN mandate to intervene in Iraq, and perhaps believing US’ intelligence regarding the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program to be somewhat circumstantial, the Chrétien government chose to focus upon Afghanistan. From an original plan of providing security in and around Kabul, the operation has consistently expanded throughout the country and the region under the auspices of either the American-led Operation *Enduring Freedom*, or the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Canada went into Afghanistan with conventional forces in 2002 under the auspices of the United Nations-sanctioned Bonn Agreement, in order to provide security for the re-establishment of an Afghan government. In the intervening years, the CAF shifted its focus from the environs of Kabul down south to the scene of the war’s heaviest fighting in Kandahar province.

During that process, in the words of Parliament’s Standing Committee on National Defence, “Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) is the most combat capable, best trained, best equipped and best led formation of its size and kind that Canada has ever fielded. It has been strategically relevant, operationally effective and tactically decisive.” Have no doubt, on the surface, there is little to quibble about; Canadian troops have proven up to whatever tasks have been demanded of them, fighting with honour and distinction.

Canada’s commitment has spanned the provision of Infantry Battle Groups, ably supported by other combat arms, logistics, and intelligence service support and medical enablers, as well as brigade-level command teams. The Air Force has consistently provided...
fixed-wing strategic and tactical airlift, and Maritime long-range patrol aircraft (LRPAs), subsequently adding rotary-wing lift and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), while the Navy element was committed to the fight primarily by patrolling in the Persian Gulf. For the majority of the Navy and a significant portion of the Air Force, Afghanistan was largely ‘business as usual.’

The Army’s habitual war-fighting roles were augmented by tasks such as the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A), and the running of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). SAT-A consisted of predominantly military officers providing political advice on topics such as education, or justice, or women’s rights. Concurrently, the KPRT would focus upon facilitating the rebuilding of local infrastructure to serve Afghan citizens. These are both important components of addressing such political instability, but are they military roles? Canada has a lengthy track record of promoting and advising foreign democracies, predominantly through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), as well as the recently-abolished International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD).  

As the war rolled on, Canada consistently ‘upped the ante’ in troops and equipment, even pushing through a non-forecast procurement of Leopard 2 tanks to add to the fray in 2006. We steadfastly acknowledged that we wanted to put an Afghan face on operations, emphasizing training, rebuilding, and democracy, but both the Afghan tribesmen and the Taliban had other ideas. For example, a village elder noted that providing arms so that they can provide for their own security was nothing new: “We tried that program during the Russian occupation…and when we armed people they went and joined the insurgency.”

Canada was able to do as well as it did because our troops are competently trained in the intricacies of conventional war-fighting, having been exposed to all-arms battle during large exercises in Canada, the United States, and Germany. The theoretical and higher-level skill sets were provided to our leadership at the Canadian Forces College, or during exchanges with our Allies’ war colleges, all of which emphasize, “train for the known; educate for the unknown.” These fundamental skills were reinforced by recent deployments by many of our troops to the Balkans – Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo – where the lessons were brought home in very stark terms. In all, Canada fielded an effective fighting team. The issue, however, is with the previously-quoted Commons’ Committee’s second sentence, referring to having been “strategically relevant, operationally effective and tactically decisive.” Part of the problem facing the alliance through most of the war was forging ahead despite an inchoate strategy.
Incoherent Strategy

In 2001-2002, fresh on the heels of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was easy to articulate simplistic policy goals. Yet, it soon became apparent that Western political leadership, particularly that of Bush and Blair, “... did not understand the nature of war and therefore did not appreciate the reciprocal, interactive, and often unpredictable relationship between war and policy.”

Canada’s official development policies routinely face similar non-governmental organization (NGO) and bureaucratic criticism. While these people applaud human rights and democracy, resistance is due to “... the ongoing negative association of democracy promotion with US-style interventionism.” In other words, tendency of DFAIT and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to provide little of substantive value appears due to simplistic anti-Americanism -- the fist-shaking values trumped by first-year university students cueing up to be uniformly ‘rebellious.’ A difficulty in turning to DFAIT is one of credibility, relying on 26-year old PhDs with no life experience, let alone knowledge of foreign deployments. To be fair, this generalization was not applicable to all DFAIT personnel who deployed. The late Glyn Berry, for example, was one of several highly regarded political people who contributed to the mission. The frustration at the lack of solid, attainable political objectives, however, only added to this frustration with Lester Pearson’s heirs. This is not remotely a Canadian-only problem. It was precisely this lack of strategic guidance that subsequently contributed to the removal of US General Stanley McChrystal as ISAF commander, following the reporting of his disparaging remarks regarding senior US political representatives, right up to the President, in Rolling Stone magazine.

While McChrystal and his men are in indisputable command of all military aspects of the war, there is no equivalent position on the diplomatic or political side. Instead, an assortment of administration players competes over the Afghan portfolio... This diplomatic incoherence has effectively... hampered efforts to build a stable and credible government in Afghanistan.

Militarily, several governments scrambled to write doctrine for this “new” form of warfare – Canada’s B-GL-323-004-FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations; The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual; the British Joint Doc Pub 3-40 Security and Stabilization. All generally contain chapters on governance, social, and cultural analysis, and the building of schools and wells. As noted by Oxford University’s Hew Strachan, these are “... not so much doctrine as aspiration, an effort to co-opt other government departments, outside the Ministry of Defence, as well as the host nation, in the implementation of operational goals.”

One of the major problems with writing these doctrinal manuals, and this is the crux of the matter, is that they routinely cited irrelevant conflicts, most notably, the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria. While there were certainly some ‘nuggets to be mined,’ these campaigns were nested within conflicts whose overarching conditions are no longer extant. Neither in Afghanistan, nor in any future conflict featuring Western intervention, are we likely to see the CAF fighting on behalf of an imperial power in a decolonizing war against insurgents seeking independence. Several other conflicts cited by the authors of the time were ideology-based, within the context of the Cold War’s bi-polar international system -- again, a condition no longer in existence.

The lack of a coherent doctrine was more than made up for with a stream of catch-phrases and snippets of policy, such as counterinsurgency (COIN) expert John Nagl’s “organizational learning” or Galula’s “targeting discontent.” It got so out of control that at one regional headquarters, a flippant staff officer would distribute cards containing various trendy phrases and popular buzzwords. When these were briefed or appeared on PowerPoint, the words would be checked off. The ‘game was up’ when one enthusiastic officer murmured “bingo” too loudly...

...closely studying our enemy, I saw an insurgency that was operating in a way that we could only dream of. I was almost envious of their singularity of purpose and ability to thrive in places we could not... There is likely not a single Taliban who does not... closely studying our enemy, I saw an insurgency...
upon the metrics of schools built, or health care and education. The absence of a peaceful, stable society shows the dubious utility of such metrics.

Afghanistan’s Future

We focused so much effort upon Karzai, falsely assuming that the Kabul government held sway over the villages, which made much of our efforts irrelevant. The President’s recent media declarations about the Americans’ duplicitous negotiations with the Taliban are nothing short of bizarre, as he is trying to clutch power and leverage as much continued Western support as possible. This will only become more pronounced as we move nearer to the coincidentally timed Afghanistan national elections in April 2014 and the final drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force.

The situation will inevitably worsen because, despite the pleas of Karzai or any successor, Afghanistan simply does not have the economic wherewithal to offset the drop in Western aid and military spending. We built an Afghan army with 13,000 vehicles, which require drivers, mechanics, parts, and fuel. Added to this, we provided in excess of 31,000 computers to a functionally illiterate army, providing basic computer training to only 2000 operators. While this gap between requirement and capability has largely been filled by contractors; while this has proven financially beneficial to several nations’ recently-retired military personnel, it is not even remotely sustainable by any follow-on Afghan government.

Unlike Iraq, where most despised the coalition occupation from the outset, a significant number of Afghans accepted the coalition presence, despite it being exceedingly difficult to convince a native population to side with foreigners against its own culture. However, a series of incidents, such as Koran-burning, reports of US soldiers desecrating Taliban corpses, numerous incidents of civilian collateral damage, and, quite significantly, US Staff Sergeant Bales’ accused murder of 16 Afghan civilians was the final straw in eliminating the population’s trust. In effect, we were ignoring David Galula’s “First Law” of COIN: “The support of the population is as important for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”

The withdrawal of coalition troops currently shapes the entire political/military thinking in Afghanistan; no one is seriously negotiating, and everyone is trying to maximize their end-state position. To have even a remote chance of adding value, the training mission in Afghanistan should continue for at least five more years with ongoing security cooperation beyond that, but that likelihood becomes more doubtful weekly. US anti-Taliban strikes have increased rapidly, up to 110 attacks a day in June 2012 -- the most since the war began. Conversely, the competence and reliability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are unravelling. As they increasingly take the lead on operations, and their casualty rate climbs proportionally, their morale declines. This has been adding to their already significantly high number of desertions, such that “… normally high attrition rates have swelled to epidemic, levels that greatly exceed the rate at which new recruits are being added.” Regrettably, the troops that remain are occasionally viewed with suspicion, given recent claims that 20 percent of US casualties are attributable to ANSF “treachery.”

We are leaving Afghanistan much as we found it -- one of the most impoverished, corrupt, drug-riddled, and violent nations on earth. Afghanistan remains a pariah narco-state that produces the lions’ share of the world’s opium; in 2011 for example, production increased by 61 percent -- in excess of 6400 tons. The $1.4 billion that this trafficking brought in provides support to the Taliban and warlords that the government simply cannot match for its security forces. Karzai rejected poppy eradication, citing environmental concerns. In a corruption survey, only Somalia and North Korea rated lower, with Afghanistan having received only eight points of a possible 1000 available, according to Transparency International. Fully 23 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP was paid in bribes. A Russian drug task force raid this year netted almost 21 tons of heroin and morphine within an Afghanistan border province. This was the equivalent of a year’s worth of hard narcotics, found in only one raid, suggesting that the situation is worsening. In a society of such stark poverty and corruption, our nation-building efforts have done little more than create a culture of entitlement and dependency. It’s hard to build a functioning economy upon that.
So, what is the way ahead for Afghanistan? Quite simply, as long as the Taliban have a sanctuary in Pakistan, or anywhere, we cannot win and they know it, whether we acknowledge that or not. There appears to be no endgame strategy, beyond “not losing too quickly.” We will tell ourselves that we gave them the tools to succeed with our training and mentorship programs, but the war is stalemated, and everyone is looking out only for their own best interests.

In effect, for Canada and the Western alliance, we lost. It is not pleasant to hear, in the face of the sacrifices of our troops, families, or the ultimate effect upon the Afghans we befriended, but there really is no other way to read this. Yes, the military has several Lessons’ Learned repositories, so we could do better the next time. One lesson clearly not learned, however, is how little we remember history, particularly regarding this type of war. In 1969, commenting upon General Westmoreland’s Vietnam strategy, Henry Kissinger wrote:

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, fighting in their own country, needed merely to keep in being forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States tired of the war. We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war; the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win.33

The reality of the situation, as described by RAND analyst Celeste Ward, is, “... what we need, for strategic purposes, is to create the perception that we didn’t get run off.”34 This discussion will now turn to the way ahead, by suggesting some military necessities in the face of global trends, which will be followed by specifically Canadian perspectives and the offering of some personal recommendations for consideration.

Global Trends and Military Force Projection

Utility of Force 101: Militaries and war have been with us throughout time -- Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, et al have provided the introductions. The mere title of this journal suggests that little should need to be said on the general topic. Unfortunately there has been a recent spate of books, such as General Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force, which have proclaimed, “War no longer exists...war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs; such war no longer exists.”35 That such battles are scarce, I grant. Looking at the previous half-century of conflict in South Asia, Central America, the Balkans, and Africa, I can understand how one may be tempted to pen such a eulogy. I suspect, however, that it may be over-simplified, if not outright premature. The last ‘real war;’ a la Studs Terkel’s The Good War, was not a Marquis of Queensbury event, played out distinct from non-combatants, during daylight hours with suitable pauses for refreshment...as citizens of Dresden, London, or Hiroshima may attest. Granted, some attributes, such as fighting “so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim,” may have changed emphasis, but conserving your troops to fight another day is hardly a ground-breaking premise, either.36 One can only assume that should we be involved in a conflict whose stakes were significantly higher, General Smith would be obligated to write a revised edition, particularly with an eye to the nasty world outside our gates.

Future prognostication is often a dubious task -- a fact as obvious to stock market investors as it is to Intelligence professionals.

Future prognostication is often a dubious task -- a fact as obvious to stock market investors as it is to Intelligence professionals. And yet, some trends stand out, which highlight the way ahead with some degree of certainty that will inform the type of military Canada requires. For example, population growth, coupled with the potential shortages of food, water, and energy, indicate a likely growth in failed states and instability. Before striking main battle tanks and fighter aircraft from the order of battle however, one should also consider that by 2030, no country is likely to be a stand-alone hegemonic power.37 Having neither a stable balance of power nor a ‘global policeman’ is likely going to usher in an increasingly violent era.

One of the most obvious contemporary threats is terrorism, particularly against an urban, ‘high-tech’ society. While this is predominantly a law enforcement and judicial matter, responding to a major terrorist attack is one of the six core CAF missions.38 Because this is of justifiable interest to
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), particularly Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) and the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU), rather than being a generic CAF issue, this article will delve no further into terrorism.

It goes without saying that the world contains hostile nations with significant conventional military forces. Iran, for example, which is increasingly autocratic and bellicose, maintains the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, which it is expanding in numbers and sophistication. North Korea’s large conventional military force is well postured to conduct limited attacks with little-or-no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship or the artillery bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern Limit Line. They have subsequently made WMD advances with a successful satellite launch and a third nuclear test. China has become increasingly uncompromising in its regional maritime territorial disputes. Their comprehensive military modernization favours nuclear deterrent and strategic strike capabilities and strengthening its growing power projection capacity. As shown in the above snapshot of weapons’ holdings, there are significant conventional military forces out there, some of whom are actively anti-Western, while others have dubious records of stability.

As the Americans documented in their most-recent Quadrennial Defence Review, there are some difficult trends in the evolution of force planning. For Canada as well, we must balance current operational readiness with the development of future capabilities. We cannot simply ‘down tools’ and tell the government, “we will just take a break here.” Secondly, despite the growth in Intelligence, history continually sees us in unexpected locations. In 2001, we showed as little regard for Afghanistan as we had for the Balkans in 1991. Finally, and tied-in with this second trend, the melding of threat capabilities makes a neat categorization of threats as conventional or irregular nearly impossible. A future conflict could very well see a combination of unconventional warfare in the form of terrorism and cyber-attacks, coupled with conventional weaponry, such as stand-off weaponry and air defences emphasizing anti-access.

To see a more precise model of such a conflict, one would be hard-pressed to find a more cogent example than the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Hezbollah routinely utilized the urban terrain and proximity to innocent civilians to facilitate their ambushes of Israeli forces, and then to melt back into hiding amongst the non-combatants. The tactics of choice were decentralized sniping and machinegun fire into convoys that had been stopped by IEDs. More conventionally, the Israelis faced attacks by indirect rocket fire, as well as significant threats from modern anti-tank guided missiles, such as the Russian AT-13 and AT-14; “… it is estimated that ATGMs accounted for 40 percent of the IDF’s fatalities.” Hezbollah even used Iranian Mirsad-1 and Ababil-3 armed UAVs, which feature GPS navigation out to a range of 450 kilometres while carrying a 50 kilogram explosive payload. As noted, such a conflict would prove difficult for force planners to project within a Canadian fiscal and geopolitical context.

Figure 1: Current conventional weapons.
So What Future Faces a Canadian Military?

While certainly not much of a revelation, the Canadian military is facing tough political and economic times. In Canada, support for non-peacekeeping expeditionary campaigns has never been particularly strong, notwithstanding the “support the troops” bumper stickers. The Western alliance has gone through two wars that were of dubious popularity while they were occurring, and have provided no discernable gain to Canada’s national interest or security.

Militaries remain in existence to enforce government policies, both domestically and abroad. As articulated in CAF doctrine, without question, the Government will continue to use the military as a key foreign policy tool. It is within this structure that the Army derives its mission, which is to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives. These objectives span the range of protecting vital national interests, contributing to international peace and security, and promoting national unity, democracy, the rule of law and individual rights and freedoms. They also include promoting peace, order, and good government, as well as the pursuit of economic well-being. Canada’s Army further states: “…the army alone possesses the capability to seize and hold ground, dominate terrain, and physically protect land-based resources and people. As such, it is a strategic and decisive element of national power.”

If one considers the broader foreign policy picture, DFAIT identifies three objectives: “…the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global framework; and, the projection of Canadian values and culture.” Yet even within the context of these generic policies, there is little additional impetus to maintain a standing force to address Afghanistan-style conflicts as long as they remain peripheral interests.

Politicians, whether ruling or in opposition, will increasingly use these recent wars as ammunition to score media points. As strategic analyst Robert Kaplan notes in commenting upon the US defeat in Iraq, the war was “…actually a failure less because no weapons [of mass destruction; the Bush administration’s public reason for invading Iraq] were found than because of the financial cost, the lives lost, and the military quagmire that ensued, and that worked to strengthen Iranian power in the region for nearly a decade.” This ties in with what US Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis writes in a scathing Armed Forces Journal article, “Truth, lies, and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down.” He offers: “What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by US military leaders about conditions on the ground… Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.”

Such statements will be repeated by hostile journalists, with the prime effect of having politicians think less hospitably about their armed forces. To ameliorate this now, and to avoid similar situations in the future, the realities of warfare cannot be ‘sugar coated.’ “When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be.”

Adding to this is a recent trend in scandal-exposing books along the lines of Rob Semrau’s The Taliban Don’t Wave, or Frank Ledwidge’s Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such works tend to be simplistically written and a treasure trove of quotes readily removed from suitable context. Such potential negative media coverage, when coupled with global economic contraction, argues against a government, with an eye towards voter popularity polls, being overly willing to commit to such an operation so far down the scale of national interest to non-strategic, ‘discretionary’ wars.

Despite this gloomy political scenario, the CAF will still be required. Put very simply, the CAF is the force of last resort when Canadian interests are to be defended using force. Formulated this way, the commitment of combat-capable forces is a matter of choice, influenced significantly by whether these interests are categorized as matters of survival, vital, major, or peripheral: survival is self-explanatory; vital issues could result in serious harm to the state; major issues may adversely affect a state’s political, economic, and ideological well-being with corrective action usually occurring through diplomatic negotiations; peripheral issues affect private citizens or companies operating abroad, without adversely affecting our well-being.

There are some decision-makers and media opinion-shapers who are predisposed to wring their hands and proclaim that we are obligated to care about such regimes, or call for “something must be done” with each tear-filled child that appears on the international news. Even Lester Pearson, however, understood our limits and chose to frame Canada’s involvement in Korea as “selective collective security -- with Canada deciding where and when and if we do anything under the [UN] charter.” With the ongoing global financial crises, our ‘disposable income’ for foreign deployments will require ever more discerning choices to be made. Our decision makers must be able to identify which conflicts are strategically disruptive to specific states, regions, or transit routes.

Canada must retain flexibility in determining our foreign commitments. In addition to the severity of the interests being threatened, the only other major determinant to action is our alliance commitments. While this includes NATO, our geography and culture predisposes us such that “Canada’s foreign policy behaviour will be largely directed at the United States.”

Carrying our share of such a security burden is in our best interests, and it cannot be met with a constabulary-style force.

Despite the uncertainties of the future, for the CAF, the responsibilities are quite clear. The Canadian government has stated in concise, unambiguous language:

In such a complex and unpredictable security environment, Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the core capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address both conventional and asymmetric threats...Indeed, Canadians expect and deserve no less than a highly capable military that can keep them safe and secure while effectively supporting foreign policy and national security objectives.
By mandating a “fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military,” the government effectively moves us away from a COIN-centric military to one capable of addressing Canadian vital interests. COIN, as a subset of stability operations, is closer to war fighting than it is to peacekeeping, but “closer to” clearly indicates that it is not the military’s primary function. To paraphrase former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Dr. Janine Davidson, “… because you have a doctrine for COIN doesn’t mean that you have a policy of invading countries in order to conduct COIN.”

Ottawa’s ongoing force planning and resource allocation discussions are informed by DND/CAF Corporate Risk Profile documents. In the current DND report, the first risk listed is “Canadian Forces Reconstitution,” noting that the CAF, “… after several years of high tempo operations centred on Afghanistan, will continue to balance the readiness levels necessary to maintain its leadership role and responsiveness.” This suggests that the current situation, with our close ties to Afghanistan-style counter-insurgency, is a risk requiring rebalancing.

The aphorism ‘train for the known; educate for the unknown’ suggests that we have developed the skills to address any tactical problems we are likely to face, since basic war fighting training, if embraced, covers off the most dangerous potential threats. Tied in with this is an emphatic warning tied to an after-action analysis of the US in Iraq, which stated, “Lesson: The greater the geopolitical risk one takes, the more expert must be the execution of the enterprise!” While our military leadership is competent at our requisite skills, the government dilutes this expertise at its peril. There is worrisome evidence from recent training exercises that just such skill fade is already occurring, from some logistics functions being degraded, due to habitual reliance on in-theatre contractors, to soldiers believing that walking down main roads without a requirement for camouflage or tactical movement is ‘the norm,’ since that is what they know from their war.

There are increasing pressures for specialization within the military to focus upon these ‘small wars,’ and improve upon our skill-sets within non-traditional missions, such as post-conflict stability, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction tasks. Every indication of the way ahead, whether looking at potential threats, or the Canadian economy, denies the luxury of building single-mission forces. To cite the Potomac Institute’s Frank Hoffman, “… we do not have the luxury of building separate agencies for each block of a Three Block War world.” The simple reality is that a conventional combat-capable military can do smaller conflicts, but a COIN-focused military is not capable of doing conventional war fighting.

I do not argue that the future battle space will have no need of nuanced, multilateral responses. I would, however, suggest that it is ‘penny-wise and pound foolish’ to build a constabulary military simply because it is less expensive to rehearse sitting around drinking tea with village elders than it is to maintain competence in combined arms’ attacks. The CAF’s ultimate, no-fail response is combat forces on the ground. So far throughout human history, and despite competing claims of weapons’ manufacturers, war has always devolved into basic killing, with the inevitable requirement that “only infantry can hold ground.”
Conclusion

Western nations are looking towards their militaries within the context of two concurrent factors, the winding down from combat operations in the Persian Gulf region and south-west Asia, and a global economic downturn. Military forces are an easy target for those clamouring for a post-hostilities ‘peace dividend.’ As noted, this is not a particularly new practice; one does not need to dust off the history books to look at 1919 or 1946, as many of us lived through the post-Cold War’s “decade of darkness” equipment draw-downs and training curtailments.

As these accounting-driven shadows descend on us once again, our military leaders and strategic thinkers ponder the lessons from our conflicts. Many of the markers along the way are dictated by economics and government policy, but there remain several choices to be made. A critical juncture early in the planning discussions has been labelled by our American counterparts, the ‘crusaders’ and the ‘conservatives.’ Have no doubt that these terms are simplistic merely to facilitate discussion; there are significant nuances to both.

The ‘crusaders’ -- supporters of emphasizing a military geared for stability operations and countering insurgencies -- have been bolstered by the enthusiastic wave of research conducted in the 21st Century’s first decade. Non-military people often ‘weighed in’ on the debates in support of these strategies; after all “building schools and wells” is cheerier than “close with and destroy the enemy.” For those who accepted that the military had a role, it was often over-simplified to “providing security,” so that the NGOs and civil servants could work undisturbed. There was little understanding that providing security in the face of an adaptive, dedicated enemy was ‘easier said than done.’ In both Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN efforts were considered successful, not when regions were peaceful and democracy and human rights flourished, but merely in “the prevention of more bad headlines.”

The ‘conservatives’ tend to see COIN and similar operations as a necessary but distinctly subordinate subset to conventional war fighting skills. Afghanistan, for all its costs in blood and treasure, provided an excellent proving-ground to confirm many of these skills and to determine equipment strengths and weaknesses. There is growing concern, however, that, because this has been a defining moment for so many of our soldiers, there is a growing disinterest in maintaining the skills that would be necessary against a ‘near-peer’ adversary providing a survival- or vital-threat to our national interests.

Arguably, such a ‘high-tech’ conventional threat is not as statistically likely as turmoil in ungoverned spaces, failing states, or regional dictators threatening neighbouring states. Nevertheless, the results of failing to adequately prepare our military, through proper training and equipment, to succeed in such a conflict are much more horrific. Retooling the military as a constabulary force, particularly because of short-term economic exigency, would leave the Canadian government with much fewer foreign policy options in future conflicts, even those short of conventional war. Indeed, such a program would likely see Canadian soldiers bogged down in further unwinnable wars, to the detriment of responding effectively to continued conventional threats.

NOTES

7. A 3PPCLI Battle Group deployed to the Kandahar area in 2002 as part of a US Army Task Force under ISAF. Most of the Army commitments have been under ISAF, initially near Kabul, and subsequently, in Kandahar. At the time of the troop draw-downs, Canadian Special Operations Forces remained linked with the OEF mandate.
9. This listing is not remotely all-inclusive; it is intended merely to highlight the wide spectrum of military support throughout the operation.
10. Gerald Schmitz, “Understanding the Curious...
Case of Canada’s Ambiguous Approach to International Democracy Assistance.” Paper provided to Queen’s University Centre for International and Defence Policy, 25 February 2013. Author’s copy.

16. The quote comes from a relatively senior Canadian Army officer who requested non-attribution.


18. Ibid.


20. Author’s experience. It wasn’t me. Although I had heard “targeting disconnection” attributed to David Galula several times. I am quite familiar with his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, and am unable to find a specific reference.


22. Dr. Howard G. Coombs. “Canadian Whole of Government Operations: Kandahar – 09/2010 – 07/2011,” CIDA Institute Report, December 2012, pp. 4-5. Rather than merely not stepping up to the table, the previously-cited Parliamentary Report states: “If the 3D strategy is to be effective, all these Ds must be able to apply their individual expertise in a complementary and aggressive way to address the mission at hand. It seems though, that CIDA may have been a drag on diplomacy and defence in late 2006.” See Canada, House of Commons, Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, p. 56.


27. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, NY: Praeger, 1984, p.74. While we emphasized cultural familiarity as part of the ‘hearts and minds’ dogma, how many Canadian troops learned Pashtun or Dari? After all, we are a country with a very poor track record in this field.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. See also Transparency International Corruption Index, at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results., accessed 28 February 2013. Even the Afghan Assistant Minister of Defence for Personnel and Education, Lieutenant-General Baaz Mohammad, notes that the leadership is driving the troops away, with AWOLs being “…the result of commanders’ misbehaviour with individual soldiers…[it makes] no sense to buy military equipment, tanks, airplanes. If we do not have the properly trained and assigned people to maintain the equipment, we will lose the war.” From a report of Afghan Assistant Minister of Defence for Personnel and Education’s speech at the Afghan Air Force Conference Centre, Kabul, 5 February 2013. Author’s copy, with thanks to Dr Howard Coombs “Aerogram.”


35. Ibid., p. 17.


44. US National Intelligence Council, in Global Trends 2030, pp. 70-72.


47. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1995), p. i. Fortunately, Canada in the World, in typical bureaucratic fashion, avoids hard questions like the definition of national interests.


50. Ibid.


54. Canada, Canada First Defence Strategy, (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 2008), p. 7. At the time of this writing, the Government had indicated a revised document was in the works.


57. Kaplan, “Rethinking the Iraq War.”


59. I hesitate to use the term ‘no-fail’ since it crops up regularly on Power Points, discussing everything from foreign interventions to the testing of Individual Battle Task Standards.

60. Kaplan, “Counterinsurgency Forever?”
Field Commanders have demonstrated a real need for access to development programs that they control and deploy in rolling out COIN [counterinsurgency] and stability operations. This provides the certainty of resource access, and allows for continuity within the surgical, strategic deployment, and effects building that true COIN requires. With the stability of districts achieved, the solidification of these gains is realized through the insertion of economic improvement. The eventual handover of development responsibilities to the civilian agencies known for their development work in the Third World can then occur.

~ Keith Pratt, United States Agency for International Development, Dand District.

Pratt’s comment alludes to the ongoing friction that exists between the imperatives of following up military success in counterinsurgency operations through stabilization activities, and the need for sustainable reconstruction and development articulated by non-military partnered agencies and/or governmental departments. It also describes the need for military commanders to be able to create reconstruction and development projects, sometimes called 'quick impact projects,' and access long-term and self-sustaining capacity building programs orchestrated by other agencies. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and their field partners have, most recently, been dealing with these dilemmas in the fragile security environment of southern Afghanistan. Although frictions still existed between military and non-military actors, by the end of the Canadian combat mission in July 2011, there had been success resolving these issues. The Canadian inter-governmental alliance had maturated and greatly enabled the effects necessitated by military activities by connecting them to the longer-term sustainable outcomes desired by developmental and political advisors and agencies to enable the host nation – Afghanistan.

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The background to Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was succinctly described by international security pundits, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, in their 2007 work, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, as Canadian commitment to a brief combat mission in 2002, was followed by participation in a 2003-2004 stabilization intervention. This initial intervention was, in turn, trailed by provincial reconstruction, and then gradually, in 2006, to a deadly low-intensity conflict which would eventually cost Canada 162 lives. In 2011 Canada’s role transitioned from fighting in southern Afghanistan, primarily Kandahar, to providing advice and assistance within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission – Afghan (NTM-A) with the preponderance of the nation’s forces located centrally in the region of Kabul.

Canada’s Afghanistan mission also provided the initial trial of the amalgamation of defence, diplomacy and development – 3D approach - that had been created as the expression of Canadian foreign policy in conflicted regions around 2003. This concept evolved into the ideas represented by the more all-inclusive expression ‘Whole of Government’ (WoG), and, in essence, remained primarily concerned with integrating all instruments of policy, regardless of department or agency, in order to produce a desired effect linked to national strategy. The growth of the integrated approach to this conflict can be demonstrated by examining the work done in 2010-2011 by the Whole of Government team during Canada’s last year in Kandahar.

Canada’s inter-governmental efforts in Afghanistan developed from nascent beginnings. The foundation of the campaign can be said to have been laid in January 2004 when then-Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Canadian commander of the International Security Assistance Forces (Rotation V) (ISAF V), was presented with a number of dilemmas expressed by President Hamid Karzi, who, at that time, was the leader of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). Most important of these was the lack of unified action by the myriad governments and organizations that had resulted in less effective development and caused a weakening of potential effects. Also, as a result of the lack of a shared approach, ISAF V could not move beyond lower order, or tactical military activities in order to achieve higher-level and enduring strategic objectives. Hillier understood that without a coherent strategic concept in which all involved parties, military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, donor institutions, the international community, and, most importantly, the ATA and Afghan people could partake, no operational level campaign could be created. Also, he believed that “…rebuilding failed states or failing states was not a security, governance or economic problem; it was all three…” Accordingly, he used his ISAF staff, and later, two Canadian officers, tasked from Canada, to assist the ATA in articulating a strategic concept. This model was eventually released in the form of an idea paper entitled “Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” While primarily developmental in nature, it also specified ideas that would later be used to assist with governance and security. These core ideas later emerged within the Afghanistan National Developmental Strategy (ANDS), which continues to be an overarching Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) policy document governing multiple activity streams by all those contributing to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

This initial effort later resulted in Karzai requesting similar support from Hillier after he became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The result was a small group of advisors that worked with the Afghan government in a similar fashion to the 2004 efforts. Regrettably, this ‘Strategic Advisory Team -
Over the course of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, there were two relatively divisive Parliamentary votes - May 2006 and March 2008 - concerning the extension of the mission and its essential character. There was also considerable attention paid to the convening of an independent panel to make recommendations on the future course of the mission in 2007 - the Manley Report - and a highly politicized public discourse over the Government’s detainee transfer policy, which began in 2007 and continued throughout Canada’s involvement. A positive effect of this very public political debate was recognition of the breadth and complexity of the Afghan challenge, which contributed to a substantial evolution in both the strategic Whole of Government coordination framework in Ottawa and the corresponding mission structure and civilian resourcing in Afghanistan. Hillier notes in his memoir, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War, that the outcome of this period was a defence policy statement that provided the over-arching strategy for the use of Canada’s military. The Canada First Defence Strategy mandated the CF:

…to be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team will constitute a key element of a whole of government approach to meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.

As a result of all of this, after early 2008, Canadian efforts in Afghanistan were overseen by a Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan, supported by the Afghanistan Task Force in the Privy Council Office and an ad hoc committee of Deputy Ministers who met on a weekly basis. The deployed Canadian civilian and police contingents grew from a handful in 2006 to more than 100 in 2009, with a relatively robust civilian leadership cadre at the embassy in Kabul, at Kandahar Airfield under the leadership of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), and a senior civilian director of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). In 2010, the latter two positions were amalgamated, and the RoCK became the Director KPRT.

Following the Manley Report and the Parliamentary vote of March 2008, the Canadian Government unveiled a detailed set of policy objectives for the mission, and soon thereafter, developed a framework of benchmarks to measure and report on the progress achieved on each of its six key policy priorities. These were:

In Kandahar

1. Maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police, and supporting complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections.

2. Provide jobs, education, and essential services, such as water.

3. Provide humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees.

4. Enhance the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In Afghanistan (nationally)

5. Build Afghan institutions that are central to our Kandahar priorities, and support democratic processes, such as elections.

6. Contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.

It is noteworthy that just one of these priorities involved security, and its focus was entirely upon building the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to sustain a more secure environment, and to promote law and order. Also, with significant increases of American military personnel in the region after 2009, the CAF, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Afghans were able to focus
their efforts and resources to support security operations in an increasingly smaller area in southern Afghanistan – from 2010 to 2011 the districts of Panjwai’i, Dand, and, initially, Daman, within the province of Kandahar. Concomitantly, DFAIT and CIDA remained engaged across the province.

Furthermore, with the purpose of facilitating Canadian efforts towards development and governance in Afghanistan through security assistance, the Manley Report recommended prolongation of the Canadian military commitment beyond 2009. Parliamentary approval was given to extending CF involvement until 2011. Consequently, the Canadian military strategy until 2011 included training the ANSF, providing security for reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar, continuation of Canada’s responsibility for the KPRT, and preparing for changeover of the current security mission in southern Afghanistan to American or other allies in 2011. It was a comprehensive focus that involved all departments of government.

The Whole of Government mandate was incredibly important in the context of the counterinsurgency Canadians fought in southern Afghanistan. It provided impetus for the primary Canadian agencies, the Department of National Defence, DFAIT, CIDA, as well as others, to work together in a holistic fashion in order to create desired outcomes. This requirement was aptly captured by American defence advisor and public policy expert, Sarah Sewall in 2006 – as the nature of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were made apparent to their Western participants:

COIN is a particularly dynamic, decentralized, and three dimensional form of warfare because the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation are more interdependent that in typical conventional operations and because the end state cannot be achieved strictly by military means [Emphasis added by author].

Canadian counterinsurgency practice in 2010 – 2011 reflected these precepts. TFK conducted operations that were aimed at defeating the insurgent and the insurgency. The activities required to deal with both were not synonymous, and they required a Whole of Government effort. It was clearly understood that any military victory achieved against the insurgent needed to be quickly followed with permanent ANSF presence – both military and police – in addition to functioning governance, as well as reconstruction and development efforts linked to both provincial and national economies. The TFK approach to counterinsurgency was more than the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach first articulated in American doctrine in 2006. It had been refined by successive rotations to a nuanced DEFINE-SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION. It was necessary to (1) define the problem, (2) shape the environment, (3) clear or separate the destructive influences from the population, (4) hold through the establishment of security, (5) build capacity using governance, reconstruction, and development, (6) enable the local population, and (7) facilitate transition of control to host nation authorities. Due to the significant non-military component to activities across this spectrum, which increased as one moved towards TRANSITION, an integrated, Whole of Government team, with a common understanding of the issues and shared operating concepts to address them, was necessary to succeed.
TFK captured this approach in its mission statement:

In partnership with Afghan National Security Forces, Coalition Forces and Whole of Government Partners, Task Force KANDAHAR will conduct comprehensive Counter-Insurgency operations in order to DEFEAT Insurgent influence and improve Afghan society across Governance, Development and Security lines of operation in PANJWAI’I, DAND and DAMAN.18

Soon after its arrival in Afghanistan, official responsibility for Daman was taken away from Task Force Kandahar. Consequently, the primary districts that were the responsibility of Task Force Kandahar were Panjwai’i and Dand districts. Panjwai’i had a population of approximately 80,000 people. Its district leader,19 Haji Fazluddin Agha, had been a front commander in the fight against the Soviet Army during 1979-1989 – a member of the mujahedeen.20 Of importance to note was that Panjwai’i was the birthplace of the Taliban, which exerted a particularly strong influence upon the western portion of the district.21

Dand district had a population of about 450,000 people. Its district leader was Haji Amadullah Nazek, a member of the new wave of Afghan leadership born at the end of the Soviet era. He was a Kandahari who developed into adulthood during the turbulence of the 1990s. Dand was the southern gateway to Kandahar City, considered the ‘key to the south,’ and, as such, it was a strategic staging point for Taliban.22

There were challenges. This Whole of Government approach, involving defence, diplomacy, and development, required an increased level of interoperability between agencies that often lacked a common coordinating infrastructure. The Manley Report altered that situation. The result was seen in attempts to build shared consensus for the establishment and coordination of decentralized Whole of Government operations from the then-newly implemented national Afghanistan Task Force and Government of Canada departments, through the interagency team at the Embassy in Kabul, to the efforts of the RoCK and the Commander TFK, along with efforts of the men and women of the KPRT and TFK. But even then, this evolution was not without problems, and despite the best will and intentions, Canadian Whole of Government operations, while moving ahead at the strategic and operational levels of war, occasionally faltered at the tactical level.

The areas that were problematic revolved around the non-military effects needed early in the counterinsurgency spectrum. TFK identified as part of its operational vision, a number of ‘tipping points’23 that were components in its Whole of Government approach:

**Security**

- Adequate numbers of capable Afghan police addressing village requirements and protecting, not preying upon, the people
- ANSF-led combined and single service operations
- Integrated ANSF command and control responsive to the District Leader and maliks, or leaders

**Governance**

- Responsible and responsive district leader and staff
- Representative and functioning district and village shuras, or consultative bodies, and provincial processes
- Line ministry representatives from primary line ministries working at the district centre, and reactive to village requirements

**Development**

- Functioning District Development Committees, and village development representation leading to all development coordinated through the District Leader to meet priorities set by the district in conjunction with villages
described the British Army experience from 1945 to 1970: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, in which he during counterinsurgency, were accurately captured by British regulation and its implications in the civil-military relationship. This situation could falter was the assignment of non-military tasks done as part of the planning process. The point at which the synchronization of Whole of Government effects would be appear to be. A common vision was first established by the Commander TFK and the RoCK, and then communicated to respective staffs. Cross staff liaison happened regularly through the DFAIT and CIDA advisors at TFK, as well as TFK Liaison Officer with the KPRT. In support of operations, the synchronization of Whole of Government effects would be done as part of the planning process. The point at which the process could falter was the assignment of non-military tasks to organizations that were capable of operating in the violent environment of combat.

Due to the uncertain security environment in the early stages of the counterinsurgency fight, field partners, such as DFAIT and CIDA, were challenged to work alongside the CAF. Also, they were not mandated to provide the immediate effects necessary to reinforce the success of military activities. This situation and its implications in the civil-military relationship during counterinsurgency, were accurately captured by British Brigadier Frank Kitson in Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, in which he described the British Army experience from 1945 to 1970:

...although an army officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civil authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons. At every level the civil authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of the operational plan, although once it has been decided to use a particular measure they will know how to put it into effect. 24

Consequently, TFK made use of its embedded advisors, political and developmental, as well as input from the RoCK and the organizations that comprised the KPRT in order to realize the Whole of Government construct. 25

This process was much more straightforward than it might appear to be. A common vision was first established by the Commander TFK and the RoCK, and then communicated to respective staffs. Cross staff liaison happened regularly through the DFAIT and CIDA advisors at TFK, as well as TFK Liaison Officer with the KPRT. In support of operations, the synchronization of Whole of Government effects would be done as part of the planning process. The point at which the process could falter was the assignment of non-military tasks to organizations that were capable of operating in the violent environment of combat.

This gap was closed by the CAF, under the rubric of Influence Activities, (IA), where information operations, psychological operations, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams contributed to connecting the immediate effects needed by security operations within governance and development with the longer-terms programs, processes, and policies established with the assistance of agencies, such as DFAIT and CIDA. In other words, the non-sustainable effects of the type attained by military quick action projects were connected to the longer-term sustainable activities required by sub-national and national processes through the work of IA. These small teams were attached to field forces, and they worked hand-in-hand with district stabilization teams (DSTs), combined military civilian teams, which were located at district centres. All were connected to both TFK and the KPRT. Also, through the synchronization matrices created for operations, the input of the development and political advisors, KPRT and RoCK, could all be taken into account.

Of the two main focus areas, governance was reinforced through direct support to structures that would assist district public administration and management, from the infrastructure required to effectively govern, to assisting with building human capacity for governance within the district. Assistance was provided to create the conditions that representative village shuras would provide spokespersons to the district shura. In turn, the district shura was assisted with connecting to the province. Throughout all of this the information domain was shaped in a fashion to support these Afghan structures using capabilities available to information and psychological operations teams.

Simultaneously, reconstruction and development were not neglected. Of great value was the Commander’s Contingency Fund (CCF), which bankrolled a host of quick impact projects. The CCF was similar to the American Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP). It permitted the Commander TFK to access and deliver reconstruction and development project funds in order to bridge the gap between existing projects funded by other donors and planned inter-agency program funding. Examples of CCF projects prior to 2010 included Afghan National Police infrastructure and equipment, Kandahar University Campus improvements, and the equipping of the Kandahar Fire Department. Linked to this was the Cash for Work program – comparable to the United States concept of “Money as a Weapon System.” This permitted the employment of fighting age men and youths to work on local projects during the times of year that insurgent violence was highest, normally at the end of the agricultural season of plantings and harvests. By employing fighting age males (FAMs), TFK reduced the numbers available to insurgent commanders through employment. Nevertheless, it was always understood that these activities must lead to sustainable governance and development. They needed to link closely into DFAIT and CIDA efforts and expertise.

As a result, there was progress in both Dand and Panjwai’i, the latter of which was the most challenged district. In Dand, a critical mass of the tashkil, the organization or structure, was assembled, and it represented a positive example for Kandahar governance. Led by an effective district leader, the staff members were increasingly able to plan and execute with minimal support from the international community. In terms of staffing, the Justice sector was a key gap. In other areas, education and other services were strong and vibrant. At the same time in Panjwai’i, the district tashkil slowly trickled in and melded as a team. With Karzai’s appointment of Agha as leader in 2010, the district was revitalized. While work remained to be done to cement the gains made on the security front, Panjwai’i was moving in a positive direction. One can see from a snapshot of the progress from looking at the changes in the two districts over the course of a single year:

A Tale of Two Districts

**PANJWAI’I**

Governance (Tashkil filled/unfilled)
- September 2010 - 2/37
- July 2011 - 11/40

Schools
- September: Open - 1; Closed - 31
- July: Open - 10; Closed - 27

Clinics
- September: Open - 1; Closed - 4
- July: Open - 2; Closed – 3

**DAND**

Governance (Tashkil filled/unfilled)
- September 2010 - 12/28
- July 2011 - 22/40

Schools
- September: Open - 15; Closed - 16
- July: Open - 31; Closed - 0

Clinics
- September: Open – Unknown; Closed - Unknown
- July: Open - 5; Closed – 0

On top of this, Canada supported the stabilization of Panjwai’i and Dand districts by ensuring that freedom of movement was maintained *in* and *around* these districts through constant road improvements. This route construction enabled the movement of ANSF and NATO forces to conduct security activities and support governance and development initiatives – ultimately this assisted in reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and the rejuvenation of the local communities through access to health care, education, and markets for their goods. All-in-all, over 103 kilometres of roads were constructed or improved, 40 kilometres of which were paved, and four bridges were constructed. This was done through a combination of local contracting with CCF funding and with the resources of the TFK Engineer Regiment, which completed over 150 reconstruction/construction projects. Although relatively small, 261 military and civilian personnel (seven Defence Construction Canada and 74 Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP)), the Engineer Regiment influenced almost all aspects of the TFK effort. In addition to the work they completed and supervised, they also ensured the prioritization and synchronization of engineer, stability, and reconstruction efforts.

In similar fashion, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams arranged for 521 projects directly supporting and
involving Afghans in key villages, and helped create 10,000 man-days of employment. These included:

- Canals and drainage projects - 29 canals, 56 kilometres
- Schools (in partnership with CIMIC) - 28 schools
- Mosques (in partnership with CIMIC) - 42 mosques
- Police Infrastructure -18 sites
- Governance Infrastructure - seven sites
- Health Clinic - one clinic

CIMIC teams also facilitated smaller projects that assisted with the necessities of everyday life, from humanitarian assistance, to supporting Afghan initiatives of all types. This resulted in positive effects beyond what anyone could have imagined and throughout the process was connected to programs and policies facilitated by DFAIT and CIDA on behalf of GIRoA.30

If anything, the CAF experience in its last year of combat operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the imperatives of the paradoxical trinity of Whole of Government operations: (1) Security without Governance is meaningless, (2) Governance without Development is unsustainable, and (3) Development without Security is unsupportable. The CAF has learned and relearned a great deal through its activities in Afghanistan. The implementation of a comprehensive Canadian intergovernmental approach in addressing the complex dilemmas of the contemporary environment was the result of the efforts of those who served in Kandahar from 2006 onwards. This work and sacrifice underpinned any progress experienced in 2010-2011. Canadian field partners have included DFAIT and CIDA, as well as other governmental organizations, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Corrections Services Canada (CSC).31

Additionally, if there is one other lesson that must be reinforced, it is the need for the creation and maintenance of organizational and individual relationships, and the construction of communal vision between myriad groups and individuals. Not only will this facilitate the Whole of Government construct, but it acknowledges the distributed and unstructured nature of 21st Century operations. Effective command in the contemporary environment is not possible using traditional hierarchical measures of command and control. It requires structures that are inclusive, establishing and maintaining common trust and shared intent. This permits them to be self-synchronizing and adaptable, exercising unity of effort to accomplish a mission. These organizations are military and non-military, consisting of a mixture of information and social networks that self-synchronize as a result of shared vision. In the same fashion, as was the case with the bundle of twigs in Aesop’s Fable, the whole is stronger than its individual parts. This can certainly be demonstrated through the experiences of the Canadians in Kandahar during 2010-2011.32

As a final point, the Whole of Government team in Afghanistan learned vital lessons with respect to counterinsurgency and inter-departmental interface, but underpinning...
everything was the need to integrate all military and non-military efforts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, both horizontally and vertically. Arising from that, in order to ensure that the quick impact projects and capacity building conducted as part of military operations are integrated into long-term and sustainable activities, it is necessary to provide military commanders with the means – resources and people – to enable that relationship. The role of Influence Activities, engineers, and other key enablers in this effort cannot be underestimated. I believe practitioners and theorists like Pratt, Sewall, and Kitson are correct in that military officers must be prepared and enabled to orchestrate all types of non-military activities. These efforts, aimed at reconstruction, development, and governance, are necessary to achieve success in the low intensity conflicts that we have been fighting over the past decade, and will continue to fight into the foreseeable future.

NOTES

1. Some of the ideas and materials in this chapter are a synthesis of the research contained in previous works: Dr. Howard G. Coombs and Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel Gauthier, “Campaigning in Afghanistan: A Uniquely Canadian Approach...” in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., No Easy Task (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011); Dr. Howard G. Coombs, “Canadian Whole of Government Operations Kandahar – September 2010 to July 2011,” Vimy Paper (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, December 2012); and, Dr. Howard G. Coombs, “APLN.06.03.06 Introduction to the Comprehensive Approach to Operations in a Joint, Inter-Agency, Multinational and Public Environment,” Presentation to the Army Operations Course, Canadian Army Command and Staff College, Kingston, ON (31 October 2011); Also, I am indebted to the comments and correspondence of Keith Pratt, United States Agency for International Development, who supported the efforts of Task Force Kandahar in the district of Dand, Kandahar province, Afghanistan during 2010-2011. Any errors or omissions in the final writing should be attributed to my understanding of the information and research that was accessed or provided by Keith and others.


3. Counterinsurgency, or COIN, is most commonly understood as organized military action taken to combat an insurgency. Australian researcher Dr. David Kilcullen has suggested: “It focuses on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by – or interaction with – the insurgent, competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level.” David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. xvi.

4. The title Canadian Forces has recently been amended to Canadian Armed Forces.


7. Hillier was later promoted to general and appointed Chief of Defence Staff from February 2005 to July 2008.


11. See Canada, “Haji Fazliddin Agha was killed along with members of his family and retiree by a suicide bomber. For discussion of Panjwai’s and the Taliban movement, see Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

12. Details of Panjwai’s and Dand included in Coombs, “APLN.06.03.03 Introduction to the Comprehensive Approach to Operations...”, Slide 28.


18. In cited Coombs, “APLN.06.03.03 Introduction to the Comprehensive Approach to Operations...”, Slide 29.

19. The terms ‘district leader’ and ‘district governor’ have been used interchangeably. For the purposes of this article ‘district leader’ is utilized.

The hot Afghan sun poured into the forward operating base (FOB) on the edge of Kandahar City with a relentless tenacity. Even shade provided but a temporary respite. However, for the Canadian Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed in FOB Graceland, the heat, much like the complex, ambiguous, and ever-changing environment in which they worked, was taken in stride. Then, single shots cracked in the distance, piercing the relative midday tranquility of the FOB. Starting like a faltering engine, the shots started in spurts and soon increased in frequency until there was a consistent rhythm to them. At one point, tracer arced over the FOB, prompting some to believe it may have been their camp that was under attack.

The commander of Operation (OP) Legion, Roto 1-11, Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 58 and his Ground Force Commander (GFC), Captain David, quickly moved to the tactical operations centre (TOC) to discern what was transpiring in the city. Shots fired within the environs of the sprawling urban mass was not unusual, particularly as a result of the insurgency, but clearly, something significant was occurring. The volume and pattern of the exchange of fire, punctuated by sporadic explosions, clearly indicated trouble. Moreover, the widespread and persisting nature of the violence seemed to indicate it was not localized to one specific area.

CHAOS IN KANDAHAR: THE BATTLE FOR BUILDING 4

by Bernd Horn

The commander of Operation (OP) Legion, Roto 1-11, Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 58 and his Ground Force Commander (GFC), Captain David, quickly moved to the tactical operations centre (TOC) to discern what was transpiring in the city. Shots fired within the environs of the sprawling urban mass was not unusual, particularly as a result of the insurgency, but clearly, something significant was occurring. The volume and pattern of the exchange of fire, punctuated by sporadic explosions, clearly indicated trouble. Moreover, the widespread and persisting nature of the violence seemed to indicate it was not localized to one specific area.
As the CANSOF officers and their staff were busy contacting higher headquarters and other sources to determine what exactly was occurring, a runner from the Afghan Provincial Response Company - Kandahar (PRC-K) arrived with a message from his commander. The PRC-K, which was co-located with the CANSOF forces at FOB Graceland, had been called out by their Afghan National Police (ANP) chain-of-command. In fact, they were told to get the PRC-K downtown to the Governor’s Palace as quickly as possible. The Canadians were now intimately drawn into the drama unraveling in Kandahar City on 7 May 2011. With no information, and with indications that an attack was occurring close to their FOB, and with the knowledge that the current fighting season had already proven to be one of the most violent of the insurgency, SOTF-58 was rapidly being pulled into the chaos and crisis that had already gripped the city.

The ‘hook’ dragging SOTF-58 into the fray was the PRC-K. It was an Afghan National Special Police unit consisting of approximately 135 personnel, organized in three special response teams (SRT). And it was SOTF-58’s Green Team2 that was responsible for both training and mentoring their Afghan partners. As a result, when the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) or ANP chain-of-command called for the PRC-K, they expected all available troops to respond. Moreover, there was an implicit understanding that the PRC-K, and its mentors, were to deploy immediately, much akin to a quick reaction unit.

Since the PRC-K was co-located in a tented camp in FOB Graceland, the activation of the PRC-K was fairly simple. Normally, the Provincial Chief of Police (PSCP) and / or the Kandahar Chief of Security (KCoS) would task the PRC-K. The ANP liaison officer at FOB Graceland would receive the call by cell phone, and this would trigger OP Response, the mutually agreed upon contingency plan to activate the PRC-K and mentors for an operation. On notification, the Green Team would prepare both the PRC-K and themselves to deploy, while SOTF-58 headquarters would immediately coordinate battlefield deconfliction with the battle space owners (BSO) and notify its chain-of-command headquarters (Joint Task Force - Afghanistan (JTF-A)) and Regional Command (South) [RC(S)] that OP Response was being executed.

For the Afghans, the PRC-K was an integral part of the Kandahar City security plan. As the SOTF-58 Commander explained, “They were the best of the Afghan units.”

And so, despite the complete absence of information with respect to the events that had seized the city, SOTF-58 prepared to deploy the PRC-K. The SOTF commander acknowledged, “We knew we had to go out. We followed as close as possible.” What made the situation worse was the fact that strategic analysts noted that the violence in Afghanistan in 2010 had reached its worst levels since 2001. With the end of the poppy season, the 2011 fighting season continued the trend.3 On 2-3 April, the Taliban joined protests over the burning of a Quran by Pastor Terry Jones in Florida and attacked the governor’s compound. The protests left nine dead and more than 90 injured.4 Less than a week later, on 7 April, the Taliban attacked a police training centre, leaving six dead. On 15 April, they infiltrated ANP headquarters and killed the chief of police, and nine days later, on 24 April, the Taliban tunneled 500 militants out of Sarpoza prison. Significantly, the last two operations were accomplished with support from the inside.5

In the end, Kandahar City had begun to spiral into chaos, presenting even greater risk to Coalition forces. Increasing attacks and social unrest within the city made normal operations exponentially more difficult. Exacerbating the already difficult and complex urban operations was the fact that it was becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate friend from foe. Between Taliban fighters dressed in government uniforms, sympathizers and active ‘agents’ ready to turn on their former colleagues and allies, the battlespace was as difficult as it gets.

Then, at approximately 1230 hours on 7 May 2011, Taliban insurgents conducted a massive coordinated attack in the city. They hit multiple objectives, including the Governor’s Palace, the old ANA Corps headquarters and a police sub-station (close to FOB Graceland), as well as three other police sub-stations, ANP headquarters, the mayor’s office, and two high schools. Taliban forces also attempted to block major roads leading into the city.

The Taliban offensive was clearly a major operation. Insurgent commanders declared that their objective was nothing short of “taking control of the city.”6 The attack, by approximately 60-100 insurgents and up to 20 suicide bombers, was part of the Taliban spring offensive codenamed Operation Badar.
The attack on Kandahar City and its estimated one million inhabitants was a deliberate strategy to turn the insurgency in the Kandahar region more into an urban focus, as the American surge in the rural outlying regions had pushed the Taliban out of their strongholds in the surrounding districts. Having learned from years of fighting, the Taliban realized that if they attacked multiple targets, they would overwhelm the security forces. The Taliban commander explained, “…if we attack one place all the security people will come and surround us; this way they can’t stop us.”

This devious strategy held some truth. The battle opened with an explosion outside the provincial governor’s compound, followed by gunfire from the upper levels of a multi-story commercial shopping centre. Interior ministry spokesman Zemari Bashary stated eight suicide bombers had blown themselves up during the simultaneous attacks on the governor’s compound, an office of Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, and police outposts.

And so, at 1330 hours, 7 May 2011, the Afghan authorities activated OP Response. With one insurgent attack a mere 400 metres from FOB Graceland itself, the commander of SOTF-58 had some major decisions to make. He recalls:

We heard shots. They sounded like they were coming right into camp. It was evident things were going on in the city. We were trying to figure out what was going on. So was the battlespace owner. In the northern part of [FOB] Graceland we could see out where the canal and school were situated. Insurgents were holed up there. With the multiple attacks in the city I ratcheted up the camp to full stand-to as we tried to figure out what was going on. It was very chaotic. We figured the PRC-K would be called out so we increased our notice-to-move (NTM). No-one knew what was going on. Between the BSO and us, no-one knew. Shortly thereafter the PRC-K was called out to defend the Governor’s palace.

With that decision, David and his Green Team focused upon assisting the PRC-K to ‘get out the door’. However, they also began to prepare to deploy, knowing the inevitable call would be made. The PRC-K members were eager as they drew their weapons, ammunition, and marshalled their vehicles. Once assembled, all of them, with the exception of one section kept back in reserve, quickly raced off toward the sound of gunfire only a short distance away.

The PRC-K arrived shortly thereafter at the Governor’s Palace, and the senior ANP commander on the ground quickly put them to use. Initially, they were deployed as part of the cor- don around the Palace compound. However, insurgents had seized the two-storey ‘Blue Building’ north of the Palace grounds, and they were firing at the Governor’s residence and surrounding buildings with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The PCoP and KCos quickly employed the PRC-K in the attack, and a prolonged firefight and assault ensued.

Meanwhile, CANSOF personnel at FOB Graceland were on a 100 percent alert. Fortuitously, some information began to dribble in from JTF-A headquarters as the situation began to crystallize. By now, the Taliban objectives had been identified and mostly isolated. One of the major targets was a large three-storey commercial shopping complex (designated as Building 4) south of the Governor’s Palace. Insurgents had barricaded themselves inside it, and were pouring fire into the Governor’s compound and adjacent buildings. Even before the PRC-K had completed their assault on the Blue Building to the north, the Afghan MoI demanded they attack the new objective.

To that end, at 1700 hours, the BSO, an American battle group under Combined Task Force (CTF) Raider, codenamed Phoenix 6, requested that SOTF-58’s Green Team and their mentor PRC-K, begin planning for a deliberate assault on the shopping mall complex that contained in excess of 100 different rooms. Knowing that the complexity of the task was beyond the PRC-K, Captain David and his men left FOB Graceland to link-up with the PRC-K commander and the BSO to begin conducting planning for a deliberate assault on the new objective.

As they neared the rendezvous point (RV), David tried to establish communications with Phoenix 6, but was unable to do so. Then, suddenly, as they rounded the corner to their designated geographic location for the RV, they were met by a scene of devastation. In the midst of all the destruction, an American mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, which had just hit an improvised explosive device (IED), was limping backwards. “That whole area was obliterated,” described Sergeant Clifford, “… you could tell a lot of bombs had gone off. The entire area was a complete mess.” Sergeant Caleb recalled, “… the Governor’s Palace was shot to bits.” Warned that there were additional IEDs planted in the road ahead, the Green Team convoy backed up and established an alternate vehicle drop off point (VDO).

Captain David and his team arrived at the RV point at approximately 1800 hours. By this time, the PRC-K had just secured the Blue Building. Although tired, the PRC-K soon appeared at the RV, prepared to take on their second assault of the day.

The objective had been cordoned off by the American battle group, which provided force protection by keeping any new insurgents approaching from different areas and attacking the assembled PRC-K and mentors. However, the Americans were clearly played-out. They had been stretched thin throughout the city with multiple incidents that had occurred throughout the day. Moreover, the threat of suicide bombers and IEDs remained extremely high. Everyone was on edge.

Phoenix 6 now provided guides to take the PRC-K and their mentors through the palace grounds to allow them to reach the objective building from a less exposed approach. Exiting the Governor’s residence, they were able to move to a
At this juncture, the Americans and Afghan ANSF had only an educated guess as to where they might be located at this point in time. Up until this point, they had no idea how many insurgents occupied the building, nor where they might be located. The insurgents had been last seen in the building ten minutes earlier. However, a plan for a follow-on operation existed, so David commenced the clearance operation at 1830 hours.

The assault group were now ready to begin their search, commencing in the basement, since it was the safest point to start. The ground force commander (GFC) reasoned that the building was so large, and his force so small, that he had to keep the plan simple. Moreover, he was concerned about separation, and the risk of ‘blue-on-blue’ (friendly forces engaging each other) engagements. At every control point, (i.e., at each floor, at one of the three stairwells), the mentors were to leave a PRC-K member. David also tried to leave one of his CSOR personnel at strategic points so that they could control a number of PRC-K members, who, as a general rule, tended to be easily distracted and to leave their posts, if not carefully supervised.

With night rapidly descending, the assault detachments rushed across the open ground and raced to the entry point. As they moved into the open, they observed a number of civilians on a balcony. The Afghan civilians were ordered to come down and taken into custody. Sergeant Sebastian, who was on his fourth combat tour in Afghanistan, remembered: “It surprised us. We weren’t expecting to see that many ‘friendlies’ still there.” This now raised the potential level of complexity. Were there additional non-combatant civilians still in the building?

With this concern in their minds, Sergeant Clifford and his team secured the entry point and the north staircase. He quickly realized that the south-end stairs also allowed access to the basement, so he was forced to “… lock them down as well eating up the limited valuable manpower before the clearance actually began.” Sergeant Sebastian and his assault detachment then proceeded to clear the basement. The shopping complex was the nightmare the CANSOF operators dreaded it would become. There were gaps in the floor that allowed one to see into the basement, or, conversely, to see up. The PRC-K and mentors began the clearance of the basement. It was huge, with many locked doors, and it required considerable time and effort. As the mission was to find the insurgents, the search was not overly detailed. Doors locked from the outside were left for a later follow-on search. Nonetheless, it was far from simple. The large, dark, garbage-strewn basement was also cluttered with a large number of big bags of powder and various boxes.

With the basement cleared, Sergeant Clifford now ‘leapfrogged’ his assault detachment through that of Sergeant Sebastian, and cleared the first floor. Once again, there was no contact with the enemy. Sergeant Sebastian’s detachment now moved to the second floor. They quickly found an individual, and took him under control. During the remainder of the sweep, they found an additional four people, one of them wounded. As there was no way at this point to determine their status (i.e. combatant or non-combatant) they too were taken into custody and temporarily ‘controlled’ by the PRC-K.

Low concrete wall that stood between the palace grounds and the target building. David used this as his assembly area. From here, he conducted a leader’s reconnaissance to confirm the point of entry. Meanwhile, his snipers and joint tactical air controller (JTAC) moved into an adjacent building to the west of the objective, where the Americans and the ANP had already established a vantage point. The snipers quickly established themselves and began to observe the objective for movement.

The task before the Green Team and their assigned PRC-K was daunting. The building was massive in sheer scale. Adding to this was its complexity. It was a kaleidoscope of shops and bazaars, one more overflowing with goods and wares than the other. Rugs, tapestry, burlap bags full of goods of every description littered the shops, hallways, and entrances. Anyone and anything could be hidden from view. It was nothing short of a death trap.

Anyone and anything could be hidden from view. It was nothing short of a death trap. The challenge and risk did not escape the CANSOF personnel. “I was immediately struck by the size of the building,” conceded Captain David. Sergeant Justin assessed immediately: “We don’t have enough guys.” Sergeant Caleb gasped, “…it was huge - a CQB [close quarter battle] nightmare.” The SOTF 58 commander exclaimed, “…the building was one large danger area. There were no hard walls within the building. Someone could fire from one floor to the next.”

Despite the scale and scope of the objective, which could easily suck in a number of highly trained conventional infantry companies, David had only 25 SOTF-58 personnel, as well as approximately 55 members of the PRC-K to conduct his assault. That said, with a plan in place, David commenced the clearance operation at 1830 hours.

The US cordon force indicated that enemy forces had been last seen in the building ten minutes earlier. However, they had no idea how many insurgents occupied the building, or where they might be located at this point in time. Up until this juncture, the Americans and Afghan ANSF had only exchanged fire with the building occupants. No-one had dared to enter the gigantic complex.

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However, the guard detail, as well as the requirement to post sentries on all the stairwells, ate into the number of troops Clifford had available for clearance operations. As a result, Sebastian’s assault detachment pushed through and carried on to clear the third and final floor.

By the time the assault force reached the third floor, the mission seemed to be anti-climatic. Complacency began to set in with the PRC-K. It became increasingly difficult for the mentors to focus their Afghan partners. The final level appeared to be just more of the same. Similar to the other floors, this one contained a bank of shops, one running into the next, along the exterior wall. Some doors were locked; others were not. In the centre was a large atrium, which appeared simply as another solid block of shops. Cut through each level were empty columns that ran from open skylights in the roof to the first floor. Connecting everything was a corridor or walkway that ran like a race track around the entire floor connecting the staircases and inner atrium to the bank of shops on the exterior wall.

As Sergeant Malcolm ran up the staircase to join his detachment commander on the third floor, he immerged on the landing just in time to meet some of the PRC-K personnel who had just begun sweeping the upper floor. Then, without warning, shots that sounded like miniature explosions in the confined space, rang out. Immediately, the mentors and some of the PRC-K members returned fire turning the narrow walkway into a virtual shooting gallery. Shots thudded into beams and supports and splintered the thin walls. One Afghan was shot in the hand through his pistol grip, a finger dangling, held only by tissue.

Sebastian now pulled everyone back so that they could assess the situation. It appeared that at least one or more insurgents were barricaded in a series of shops at the corner of the atrium. With night setting in, it was difficult to see the exact location of the shooters, or, in fact, the layout of the actual block of shops. What did appear evident was that they had selected their barricaded position very carefully. The storefront in which they were holed up was encased in a series of iron bars with glass, which not only made it difficult to approach without actually being seen, but also nearly impossible to determine where the door was actually located. Moreover, the metal grill exterior made it difficult to enter, since this would require an explosive breach or a power saw. But, most importantly, the shooters had a dominating position of fire. From their den, they could sweep the walkway with a deadly fire that would make approaching from any direction a virtual death-wish.

Sebastian posted security on the barricaded shooters and ensured that the wounded PRC-K member was moved to the casualty collection point (CCP) at the entrance of the building. After discussing the situation with the GFC, he then attempted to manoeuvre around the third floor from the opposite direction in an attempt to better define and engage the threat. Meanwhile, the snipers were prepared to fire into the shooter’s den if they detected movement.

Sebastian now looked for an alternate approach. As they skirted some shops, they came across a number of wounded fighting age males in adjacent shops, and they were evacuated to the CCP. Having verified the ground, Sebastian’s group was now in a position to attempt a second assault. This time, he decided to try an approach from the opposite direction. He told his interpreter to stay close behind him so that he could pass instruction to his PRC-K assault force. A major concern was the fact that the PRC-K preferred not to use night vision goggles (NVGs), had no lasers, and relied upon flashlights. Not surprisingly, as the assault force stepped off, the crunching glass and bobbing flashlights warned off the insurgents, who reacted violently and unleashed a torrent of fire.
Sergeant Sebastian went to turn back, and then fell over the interpreter, who was literally directly behind him. Sebastian fell to the ground. As he crawled back to cover, the concrete wall directly above him was ‘brewed-up’ by machine gun fire spraying him with shards of metal and concrete. Some bullets actually passed through his uniform. The close combat quarters and heavy enemy fire now caused the Afghan PRC-K members to scatter in panic.

It was evident to Sebastian that the barricaded position was well-chosen. It commanded a dominating position of observation and fire that swept with all approaches with deadly fire. Moreover, it funnelled anyone attempting to assault the position into a deadly killing zone.

The second attempt had failed. Captain David revealed the complexity of the situation with which he had to deal. “It was not just the enemy.” He described what happened as follows:

“We had to spend time confirming where the Afghan PRC-K members were. Some went to the stairway and others to the entry point. We had to send guys looking for them to confirm whether there were any wounded or missing. We also had to get flashlights for them since they didn’t like using their night vision goggles (NVGs). As a result, we lost a lot of time.”

In the end, Sergeant Sebastian managed to reassemble a force and imbue them with a will to fight. He then led yet a third attempt against the insurgents. The detachment commander now planned to hug the wall of stores and attempt a stealthy approach to the target area. Sebastian fired two 40 mm rounds from a stand-alone M203 into the insurgent’s position. He then led his assault team forward. Once again, as they crunched through the glass and debris, and the moment the PRC-K troops turned on their flashlights, the insurgents opened up a deluge of fire. The Afghans panicked and immediately scattered. Problematically, as they ran, they also continued to fire, unfortunately, not aimed shots. Very quickly, the CSOR mentors found themselves caught in a vicious cross-fire.

During this latest attempt, one Afghan soldier was wounded in the eye by shrapnel, and he was evacuated to the CCP. After discussing the next approach with the GFC, they decided upon an ‘old-school’ assault using covering fire as they moved down along the frontage of the shops.

As they were discussing the next assault, Sergeant Andy, positioned in the VDO, informed the GFC that they ‘had eyes on,’ and could use the .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG) to pound the shooter’s den. The air quickly vibrated with the staccato of the “boom, boom, boom” as the HMG pounded the insurgent lair. The tracer rounds, however, ignited a fire in an adjacent shop that quickly grew in intensity and created a ‘witch’s brew’ of black, toxic smoke.

David ordered the VDO to cease fire, and then, in coordination with his snipers in the adjacent building, he laid down covering fire for the fourth assault as Sebastian and his team began to move down the atrium clearing shops on the way to their target. With thick black smoke billowing along the ceiling like angry clouds rolling in, warning of an impending storm, the assault group inched forward lobbing grenades into each room as they slowly moved down towards the objective. Repeatedly, Sebastian was forced to step into the open to lead and mentor his Afghan charges, as well as his own men. Although this meant exposing himself to the deadly enemy fire, he felt compelled to take the risk to spur the PRC-K members into action.

His continued bravery impressed Captain David. “Sergeant Sebastian never hesitated to lead the assault against insurgents and exposed himself to intense close range fire each time,” lauded the GFC: “He showed incredible skill in his ability to motivate his wavering Afghan force for each assault.”

Progress was slow, but the assault force made headway. Sebastian detonated two distraction devices (DD) to signal the firebases to stop their covering fire. As they prepared to close with the objective, one of Sebastian’s biggest concerns was that the gunmen were rigged with explosives and would blow themselves up once the assault force was close. Despite his trepidation, he pushed forward. However, as they neared the den, one of the Afghan police members continued on past the safe area and into the actual target frontage. Then, the insurgents came to life once again and showered the hallway with lead, hitting the unfortunate PRC-K member in the throat.

It was 2305 hours, and the building clearance had, to this point, taken four-and-one-half hours. The majority of the PRC-K members now attempted to break contact on their own. However, Corporal Zachary, who was positioned at the back of the assault group, held them in place. Meanwhile, Sebastian and an Afghan crawled out to rescue their wounded colleague. They crawled as far as possible under a stream of gunfire. Stretching out their hands, they were able to lock onto the wounded policeman and drag him back to cover.

Sebastian realized the wound was bad. Corporal Zachary, the detachment’s tactical care provider, who himself to this point had constantly put himself in danger to mentor, encourage and lead PRC-K personnel, now quickly came to the aid of the seriously wounded policeman. He ignored the hail of gunfire perforating the walls all around him and provided immediate medical care, which saved the life of his Afghan colleague. He then assisted in the evacuation of the wounded individual to the CCP.

Captain David revealed: “Other PRC-K were visibly shaken by the wound.” The process had been draining. Sergeant Caleb explained: “We tried to ensure they did their drills but it was a nightmarish situation.”

Sergeant Clifford noted that the environment was extremely chaotic. “We were constantly trying to figure out where our people were,” he explained, “... because we were concerned someone could be hurt, lying unknown somewhere.” Almost blind to the myriad dangers in the smoldering death trap, the CSOR mentors focused on the mission and their Afghan charges.
Undeterred by fatigue, or the extended close combat and with the fire in the adjacent room raging out of control, the heat searing anything and anyone in the area, Sebastian now led a fifth attack. This time he placed himself and two mentors at the very front of the assault. Using a firebase for covering fire, and hugging the wall of shops, they once again moved forward. Once they reached the target area, Sergeant Clifford lobbed a grenade, and Corporal Zachary tossed in a DD. As the PRC-K detachment approached, however, incredulously, the insurgents sprang to life again and opened fire. Chaos now ensued. The PRC-K police broke, all the while spraying fire in an undisciplined manner as they withdrew to safety, jeopardizing the lives of the mentors, who were once again caught in the middle of hail of a fire.

Sebastian conceded: “I really thought we would make entry this time, but when I looked around it was only Canadians up there.” He did conclude, however, that it was impossible to make entry from the front, due to the metal bars and the fact that in order to stack by the door meant exposing the detachment a mere metre or two from the shooters. To this point, it had been a consistently increasing mix of fatigue and stress with a constant rotation of assault, regrouping, new plan, and back into the fray. Command Chief Warrant Officer John Graham commented: “The substantial enemy lanes of fire turned the normal high risk of the assault into just plain dangerous; it wasn’t even calculated risk anymore.”

With the latest attempt, fatigued by the extended period of combat, including their previous action at the Governor’s palace, and now distracted as they were by the casualties they had taken, the PRC-K became increasingly unreliable and difficult to mobilize. “The mentors were no longer coordinating and coaching the Afghans – they were leading them and in some cases dragging them forward.” After the last effort, Sergeant Sebastian commented, “… it was impossible to get any PRC to assist.”

With the fire raging out of control and the PRC-K played out, Captain David now called a pause in the action and gathered his detachment commanders to discuss alternate solutions. He was “… shocked at how much ammunition we put into the room and they were still firing back.” They would later discover that the insurgents had planned and staged the attack carefully, prepositioning weapons, explosives, and equipment. In addition, they had created ‘mouse holes’ between some of the walls, which allowed them to retreat deeper into the atrium behind protective barriers, and to only come out once the assault force came close to their barred stronghold. In any case, the GFC kept the insurgents under observation and pulled back to reconsider options.

The SOTF 58 commander sent forward an ammunition resupply and reinforcements in the form of the SOTF Black Team. The team leader was Lieutenant (N) James. They arrived at approximately midnight. After a briefing, James, David, and their detachment commanders conducted another leader’s reconnaissance to reassess the situation. Then suddenly, at 0055 hours, the darkness transformed to day as a huge orange fireball erupted, followed almost immediately by a huge reverberating boom as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), assessed as being on a timer, detonated inside of the cordon almost directly beneath the position being used by the snipers in the adjacent building.

The enormous explosion rocked the building and knocked down a large number of individuals. The SOTF commander observed: “The Taliban picked the site carefully. It showed the amount of preparation. They had pre-positioned vehicle IEDs where they expected [the] first responders to be.”
With the stubborn defence ongoing, RC(S) headquarters had authorized AH-64 attack helicopter gun runs on the target. However, David had resisted, for fear of excessive collateral damage. But, the idea of overwhelming precision firepower to hit the insurgent stronghold had taken root with the Canadians. At 0207 hours, with the fire dying down, David now took another approach. Using an external fire-base, he coordinated a volley fire of 66mm M72 rocket launchers in a precision strike against the barricade. An M48 grenade launcher was used to punch a hole in the wall that provided a direct line of fire into the insurgent barricade. It also permitted the more effective use of 7.62mm and .50 calibre fire. The tactic was used to great effect, and it hit the enemy den. However, it also ignited yet another fire. Thick black toxic smoke soon billowed from the doomed shopping mall as building materials and plastics melted in the intense heat. Stockpiled insurgent ammunition stocks began to ‘cook off,’ and visibility within the building became extremely limited.

Between 0215-0230 hours, the snipers believed that they saw movement inside the barricaded stronghold, and they unleashed a second volley into the insurgent position. By 0300 hours, the fire was still burning. The danger and stress to this point had been unending for the GFC, who had now been ‘under the gun’ for over eight hours. One report noted: “Captain David was instrumental in providing calm and professional leadership to motivate both his own personnel and the PRC-K in attempting to clear the barricaded shooters.”

Moreover, David himself was immersed in the close fight. Repeatedly, he exposed himself to enemy fire to provide covering fire to manoeuvring forces, and to provide target indication in the confined cordite-filled hallway using white light. Sergeant Caleb noted: “As I was preparing 40mm grenade rounds, he provided me with the white light needed to place the munitions into the correct room, thereby seriously divulging his position to the insurgents.”

The current respite, albeit brief, was welcomed. By 0343 hours, the fire was almost out, and David, guided by advice from the SOTF-58 commander, decided to reassess the situation. Extreme fatigue within the small team now started to show itself. Members of the PRC-K had been fighting since early afternoon in oppressive heat. The mentors had also been on stand-by since early afternoon and had not eaten since that time, as they had been caught up in deploying the PRC-K and then preparing themselves. Moreover, they had been immersed in extremely stressful circumstances, leading and supervising members of their partner force, who increasingly began to pull out of the fight, thereby placing, not only the burden of leadership and command on the mentors, but also the actual fighting. Added to this, the extreme heat, exacerbated by raging fires, darkness, an enveloping smoke, and tenacious insurgents all fuelled an extremely dangerous situation. Not surprisingly, Captain David now decided to contain the situation and to allow for some rest and regrouping.

As light began to sneak across the Afghan horizon, the Ground Force Commander was ready to renew the operation. At 0515 hours, David issued orders for the final clearance. Once again, the assault force began from the basement. Reinforced with the Black Team, which had not yet been engaged in direct clearance operations, David designated them to lead the PRC-K in the renewed assault. Once again, they commenced at the basement and quickly swept up through the first and second floors, to ensure the insurgents had not relocated during the night. Then, they emerged on the third floor and pushed through the labyrinth of destroyed
shops. This time, there was no resistance. In the enemy position, they found the badly charred remains of two dead insurgents, along with several weapons, ammunition, and IED components. The objective was secured at 0612 hours.

Captain David then conducted a physical battle space hand-over (BSH) with Phoenix 6, at which time, all fighting age males that had been detained were handed-over from the PRC-K to the BSO. Final resolution was thus achieved at 0747 hours, 8 May 2011.

On completion of the BSH, the ground force redeployed to FOB Graceland, arriving without incident at 1000 hours. In the end, the results were two enemy killed in action; one enemy wounded, six fighting age males detained and passed to the BSO, as well as four PRC wounded. In closing, Captain David acknowledged, “It boggles the mind how difficult it can be to deal with a few bad guys.”

Emerging from the chaos and crisis, however, were the great efforts of the PRC-K and SOTF-58. General David Petraeus, the ISAF commander at the time, noted on 10 May 2011: “It is too bad they [Afghans] don’t have the equivalent of the Presidential Unit Citation for Afghan Police units because that PRC down there [Kandahar] probably deserves it.” The PRC-K was later awarded a National Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Medal of Recognition. Nor did the CANSOF contribution go unnoticed. This action garnered a series of honours and awards, including two Stars of Military Valour, a Medal of Military Valour, a Mention in Dispatches, and two Chief of the Defence Staff commendations.

NOTES

1. First names only will be used throughout the monograph to protect the names of SOF personnel still serving.
2. "Green Team" refers to the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) element within the SOTF. They were specifically tasked with training and mentoring assigned Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) organizations.
4. Pastor Terry Jones held a mock trial at his Dove World Outreach Center on 2 April 2011 in Gainesville, Florida. He originally intended to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11 in response to plans to develop an Islamic center near the site of the September 2011 terrorist attack. The act sparked days of deadly protest worldwide.
5. Trofimov.
7. Ibid.
8. At the end of the mission, Sergeant Sebastien noticed a number of bullet holes in his uniform. In addition, he then also realized he had taken some small shrapnel fragments in the leg.
9. COMISAF Morning Stand-Up, 10 May 2011.
Background

Hans Island (Danish, Hans Ø) is a small, uninhabited island of approximately 1.3 square kilometres. It is located in the middle of the Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait, between Greenland and Ellesmere Island.

For many years, the ownership of Hans Island was not actively contested. However, Canada and Denmark each had the understanding that it was their possession. Its remote position did not attract much attention in Ottawa or Copenhagen. Since the early-1970s, following Canada’s and Denmark’s determination of the geographic coordinates of Hans Island, the question of which nation the island belongs to has remained unanswered. While the 1973 maritime boundary commission between Canada and Denmark was able to delimitate the continental shelf between Greenland and the Canadian arctic islands, it left 875 metres of the boundary, with Hans Island lying in the middle, undefined, and the question of sovereignty unanswered.

A Canadian petroleum company (Dome Petroleum) began exploring the area in the early-1980s, and it is the area’s economic potential, in the form of hydrocarbon deposits, shipping, and fishing that seems to have perpetuated this friendly disagreement between two otherwise very close allies.

While Inuit have lived in the areas now known as Ellesmere Island and Greenland since 900 AD, any claim that the Inuit may have had of sovereignty over Hans Island was lost during the colonization process. British and Danish law view that any sovereignty the natives held over the island was bequeathed to the respective monarch, either by the act of colonization or through the treaty process.

By September 1522, the southern route around South America had been discovered, due to Magellan’s circumnavigation, and the isthmus of Central America had already been identified by Vasco Balboa in 1513. Therefore, the search now began for a northern route around America. While the Portuguese and the Spanish focused their efforts on finding a Northwest Passage by scouring the North Pacific, the English, led by Martin Frobisher’s expedition of 1576, and subsequently followed by John Davis, explored the waterways north of Labrador and west of Greenland.
The Viking Eric the Red sailed to Greenland in 986 AD and founded a colony. This colony lasted several hundred years, but appears to have been abandoned by 1360.\(^5\) Danish kings sent several expeditions to search for the lost Norse settlements in the 16th Century - but modern Danish colonization is generally considered to have begun in Greenland in 1721, when a mission and trading station were established in Godthåb by Hans Egede. Following this, a military governor was appointed for a short time until administration of the territory was given to companies in exchange for monopolies on trade in Greenland.\(^6\) Apart from changes to the degree of autonomy granted to Greenlanders in the 20th Century, Denmark has retained complete sovereignty over Greenland. Due to the explorations of the American Robert Peary in the late 19th Century, the United States of America did lay claim to areas of Northern Greenland, though these claims were relinquished when Denmark ceded the Danish Virgin Islands to the United States.\(^7\) Norway, which became an independent nation in 1905 following centuries of first Danish, and then Swedish rule, claimed that north-eastern Greenland was terra nullis, and that in light of centuries of Norwegian commercial trade with this area, the sovereignty over this portion of Greenland ought to belong to Norway. This view was not upheld by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933.\(^8\) Since this time, the sovereignty over Greenland proper has not been questioned.

Hans Island itself is named after a Greenlander, Hans Hendrik, who worked as a hunter and assistant on several expeditions along the northwest coast of Greenland in the 1800s. It remains unclear exactly how early it was named after Hans Hendrik, but the first map that shows the island’s position and name is from the American Charles Francis Hall’s North Polar Expedition of 1871-1873 aboard the USS Polaris.\(^9\)

The first Danish maps of northern Greenland to include Hans Island were produced following the 2nd Thule Expedition of 1916-1918 and the Bicentenary Jubilee Expedition of 1920-1923. These were printed in Meddelelser om Grønland.\(^10\)

The maps are significant, because they are the first printed by either Canada or Denmark, the previous maps having come either from earlier American or British expeditions to the area. Hans Island is clearly shown as belonging geologically to the Silurian formations found in Washington Land on Greenland, and distinct from the Inuitian orogeny formations on Ellesmere Island.
Across the Nares Channel from Greenland, Ellesmere Island was first sighted by William Baffin, an Englishman, while on an expedition with the Muscovy Company of London in 1616.11 More serious explorations of the area did not occur until the mid-19th Century, again by Englishmen. The British Arctic Expedition of 1875-1876, led by Sir George Strong Nares, was sent by the British Admiralty to attempt to reach the North Pole via Smith Sound. On this expedition, Nares became the first explorer to take his ships all the way north through the channel between Greenland and Ellesmere Island (now named Nares Strait in his honour) to the Lincoln Sea.12 The British claims to the area rest on these explorations, as well as the earlier attempt to find the Northwest Passage by Martin Frobisher and the lands granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company. In July 1880, Queen Victoria approved an Order-in-Council stating: “All British Territories and Possessions in North America, not already included within the Dominion of Canada, and all Islands adjacent to any of such Territories or Possessions, shall (with the exception of the Colony of Newfoundland and its dependencies) become and be annexed to and form part of the said Dominion of Canada.”13 This order in council, along with the previous British expeditions and the continued occupation of the area since, is the basis for Canada’s claim of sovereignty over Hans Island today.

Interestingly, Hans Island is not shown on the Canadian national map sheet at all.14 The area where Hans Island is situated is covered by the legend of Canadian Geological Survey map 1359A.

Canada and Denmark entered into an agreement to begin negotiating the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Greenland and Baffin and Ellesmere Islands in 1973, and the treaty came into force in 1974.15 As noted by A. Rubin, when the parties were negotiating the shelf boundary they ran into the problem of Hans Island straddling the boundary, based on baselines and equidistance.16 They were unable to solve the problem, and thus, for the area around Hans Island they created two series of points, A and B between which the Points 122 and 123 were left unconnected. Hans Island sits between these two points.

Both Canada and Denmark agreed in the 1973 treaty to refrain from issuing licences for the exploitation of minerals, but that did not prevent Dome Petroleum from carrying out research on the island in 1981 and 1983. The Danish government responded to this research visit by carrying out a series of expeditions and flag planting ceremonies on the island in 1984, with further visits in 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2003.

The Nootka Crisis

While the eastern and southern boundaries of Canada had been essentially fixed by the late 18th Century, the Pacific coast of North America remained terra nullis. In 1790, Britain and Spain nearly went to war over a territorial dispute at Nootka Sound, in modern day British Columbia. Due to its protected natural harbour, Nootka Sound had become, not only a refuge for European fisherman and whalers plying the north-western Pacific, but also a centre of trade between Europeans and the native tribes. Word had been received during a 1788 Spanish expedition to Russian Alaska that the Russians intended to occupy Nootka Sound. In an effort to pre-empt the Russians, in 1789, the Spanish sent an occupation party north to reconnoitre the Sound and give the impression of an occupying force to any foreign ships that would arrive.17

The Spanish entered the Sound on 12 May 1789, under Esteban Jose Martinez. The Ifigenia Nubiana, owned by Englishman John Meares - but flying a Portuguese flag and consisting of English officers and crew - was already at anchor there.

On the 8th of June, the North West America, another ship owned by John Meares, arrived and was seized by Martinez. On the 15th of June, the Princess Royal, under Thomas Hudson arrived and was also seized. During this time, Hudson wit-
nessed the Spanish conduct a ceremony designed to take possession of the Sound in the name of the Spanish king.

John Meares returned to England in the spring of 1790, and informed the government of the seizures. Angered by the incident, Prime Minister William Pitt threatened to go to war with Spain. The Royal Navy made preparations, while at the same time, feelers were sent out to gauge the response of England’s allies. The Dutch and the Germans agreed to assist England. Due to the French Revolution, France, a Spanish ally, was unable to come to her aid, nor were Austria or Russia. Spain quickly realized the precariousness of her situation, so both parties agreed to meet to settle the issue.

The main argument put forward by the British during the negotiations with the Spanish was the lack of a permanent settlement on the Northwest coast. This, in British eyes, was viewed as an incomplete occupation of the area, and insufficient to justify claiming sovereignty over it. The Spanish claims of possession were based upon the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1493, and upon a doctrine which claimed sovereignty was gained by discovery and formal acts of taking possession. Historian John Norris claims that this was not a new policy formulated by the British, as claims of occupation in conjunction with sovereignty had been put forward on these grounds before, but the beginning of an era of consistently applying the concept that sovereignty equates to the occupation or use of a territory.

### The Island of Palmas Case

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was preceded by another judicial body, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which was formed following the First Hague Conference of 1899. This court is the world’s oldest institution for the settling of international disputes. One of the most important cases resolved by the PCA that relates to island territorial disputes was the Island of Palmas Case between the United States of America and The Netherlands.

Palmas is a small island located 48 miles southeast of Mindanao, having a population of about 750 at the time of the case. Further southeast are the Meangis Islands in Indonesia, which at the time was known as The Netherlands East Indies. The US based its ownership of the island as the successor to the Spanish, which had ceded the Philippines to the US in the Treaty of Paris of 1898. Palmas is within the boundaries of Article III of the treaty that outlined the territories that were ceded to the United States. In 1906, the commander of the Philippine Department of Moro visited Palmas Island during an inspection of the areas under his command. Upon his arrival, he discovered that a Dutch flag was flying above the island.

Both nations questioned the title that the other claimed to the island, and thus, both the USA and The Netherlands agreed to submit to binding arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The US argued that Spain had obtained an original title by discovery, and furthermore, that formerly title based on discovery was of ‘unquestioned validity.’ While this view was accepted by The Netherlands, their Counsel went on to state that no principles of international law can be considered to have existed in the distant past. Furthermore, he also stressed that title to a territory cannot be seen as occurring at one discrete moment in time, and that changing concepts of law had to be taken into consideration.

The Americans also suggested that although there was little evidence of actual Spanish exercise of sovereignty over the Palmas Island, it was proper to take into account the geographical nature of the island – namely, that it was part of the Philippine archipelago. Spain’s title over the archipelago was clear, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that Spain’s occupation and control of Mindanao and other islands included Palmas. To support this claim, the Americans made reference to the North American and Australian continents – where well into the 19th Century there were few European settlers in vast areas of the territory. This paucity of occupation did not mean, however, that the territories that were unoccupied were open to settlement by other nations. Additionally, as it was admitted that
they could not show Spanish occupation and control over every inch of the Philippines archipelago it was unnecessary to demonstrate occupation and control over Palmas itself.

The Dutch claim was also based on original discovery. However, the Dutch went further by arguing for possession under prescriptive title. The prescriptive title argument rested on the premise that by occupying Palmas openly and notoriously and having effective jurisdiction on the island over such a long time, the Dutch had gained title to the island, even if it had been originally discovered by the Spaniards and claimed by the Spanish.27

In his conclusions, the arbitrator first stated that the Treaty of Paris, while it included the Island within its limits of cession, did not vest upon the United States any rights not already vested in Spain. He then turned to evidence of whether Spain had any sovereignty over the islands prior to the Treaty of Paris.28 By way of reviewing the evidence submitted by both parties, the arbitrator reached the conclusion that The Netherlands’ claim to the island should be upheld. There were questions concerning whether or not Spain’s rights to the island had been extinguished by the Treaty of Utrecht or the Treaty of Münster, but in the end, it was the long, continual exercise of sovereignty by The Netherlands that had never previously been challenged by Spain or a third party that weighed most heavily in The Netherlands’ favour.29

**Application to Hans Island**

What would be the likely outcome of an ICJ ruling if Canada and Denmark were to turn to the ICJ to determine which nation has sovereignty over Hans Island? A treaty can be seen as a form of contract law, and is thus a useful and well understood principle for the court to base its decision upon. In the case at hand, no extant or historic treaty between Canada or Denmark exists which details the boundary, save for the 1973 Delimitation Treaty, which explicitly leaves the boundary between Points 122 and 123, which lie on either side of Hans Island, undecided as a result of Canada and Denmark’s inability to agree upon to which nation the island belonged. As such, it cannot be argued that the island was given to one party or another, and is of no use to the ICJ in determining ownership of the island. The 1880 Order-in-Council, which transferred the Arctic territories from British control to the Dominion of Canada, did not delimitate the boundary of the territories to be transferred, and therefore, does not explicitly include Hans Island in the transfer. Similarly, neither the United States’ claim over northern Greenland following Robert Peary’s explorations, nor the Danish Virgin Islands Treaty of 1916, included a reference to the island or the geographical extent of the claim that was being ceded. Had any of these treaties or the Order-in-Council mentioned the island, it would add significant weight to that party’s argument of ownership.

Geography is an argument that many can understand, especially where the proposed natural feature is a river boundary or valley that forms a natural boundary between nations. The island lies in the middle of the Kennedy Channel, and straddles the delimited continental shelf boundary. It does not appear obviously to belong to Canada or Denmark. However, geological studies conducted by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland do suggest that the island is geologically more in common with Washington Land in Greenland than with Ellesmere Island. This argument would appear to support the Danish case.

Additionally, the principles of effective control and history apply aptly in the case of both Canada’s and Denmark’s claim for Hans Island. In all likelihood, this would be an argument put forward primarily on the basis of effective control - due to Denmark’s mapping, geological research, and military visits - and a secondary argument of historical claim to the island. The Danish historical claim is as strong as Canada’s, and thus would be used to boost the primary argument of effective control.

As there has never been a history of settlement on the island, effective control would be demonstrated by other acts which would validate each nation’s sovereignty over Hans Island. Canada would certainly base its claim on the voyages of the English explorers, and Queen Victoria’s Order-in-Council of 1880. Countering this claim, Denmark would put forward the initial discovery of Greenland by the Vikings, which was followed up in the 1720s by a permanent colonization and dominion over Greenland. Like the Island of Palmas case, original discovery is backed by the argument that it is not necessary to occupy every part of a territory to demonstrate that you continue to claim the territory, and the Danish administration in this region of the world was in place much earlier than that of the British.
Had Canada claimed Hans Island earlier in the 20th Century, she could have made an effective counter-argument that, similar to the Nootka Crisis, discovery does not equate to sovereignty over territory in the absence of effective control over the said territory. However, as illustrated previously in this article, the Danish published a geological map showing Hans Island as geologically connected to the Danish mainland as early as 1922. Though this action may seem somewhat insignificant, as international law specialists Georg Schwarzenberger argues in Title to Territory, in the case of an uninhabited island an initial display of sovereignty may suffice to maintain that title unless subsequent evidence of an intent to abandon the jurisdiction is forthcoming.

Furthermore, the planting of a Danish flag on the island, reminiscent of Martinez at Nootka Sound, was a clear declaration of Danish sovereignty over the island. Canada subsequently followed suit with its own flag planting ceremony, but in a case of this type, it would have to be argued that the Danish claim has been the most persistent and is backed by the actions of a state which considers itself to have not only sovereignty over a territory, but can additionally point clearly to first discovery (the Vikings) and a subsequent re-establishment of control over the territory in the 18th Century.

Canada’s explicit claim on Hans Island came quite late in the 20th Century, long after the Danes had already mapped the island and shown it to be an integral part of the territory of Greenland. As Peter Dawes notes in his paper, the fact that current Canadian Geological Survey mapping for the area continues to omit the island certainly does not bolster the nation’s claim over Hans Island.

In the case of territories where the ownership is in dispute, the systematic mapping, and the geological exploration and classification of territories must be seen as a declaration of interest and a general exercise of sovereignty. The visiting of territory by military vessels, the ultimate demonstration of a sovereign power, can only be viewed as effective control by the ICJ. The fact that Canada has attempted to demonstrate its sovereignty over Hans Island by mounting military expeditions there of its own, although demonstrating a genuine interest in the island, came after the Danish military had already visited the island and they have been mounted less frequently and with considerably more difficulty than the Danes have managed to accomplish. Canada has committed to building new ships capable of extended deployments to the region, but the Danes already have the capability to do so, and they carry out extended naval deployments in the region, have regular aerial surveillance in place, and have a standing military patrol in Greenland, Slædepatruljen Sirius. President of the International Court of Justice Basdevant’s observations from the Miquiers and Ecrehos case favour Denmark, as the Danish exercise effective military control in the vicinity of Hans Island, not the Canadians.

Queen Victoria.

The crew of the Danish warship Vedderen perform a flag-raising ceremony on the uninhabited Hans Island, 13 August 2002.
As Schwarzenberger notes in *Title to Territory*, a gradual consolidation process takes place before territorial title becomes secure. In the beginning, every title is relative, and it is through a series of events or actions that title becomes secure. In the case of Hans Island, both Canada and Denmark have carried out activities and made claims that, viewed independently, would be good grounds to securing title, but when viewed together, the collective actions of one can be said to have built a more secure foundation, and in this case the ICJ would almost certainly rule that Denmark has and continues to exercise the most sovereign-like authority over the island. It would thus be compelled to award sovereignty of Hans Island to the Danish.

In accordance with Article 4 of the 1973 Delimitation Agreement, the baselines would be adjusted to incorporate Hans Island. The effect of this would be to shift the international boundary to the north, increasing the size of Danish territorial waters. The result would be similar to the effect that Franklin Ø (to the west of Hans Island) has on the baseline.

Conclusions

While historically, sovereignty was based upon first discovery and religious edicts, such as the Treaty of Tordesillas, the development of international law over time has demonstrated that first discovery alone will not be granted much weight by the ICJ when deciding cases where other factors are present, as exemplified by the Island of Palmas case.

The Nootka Crisis is important, as it can be seen as a starting point for when the principle of effective control became established. Indeed, from this point forwards, elaborate ceremonies of possession would need to be buttressed with occupation or administrative control. 35

As the map of the world was being filled in with the respective colours of the European empires, it became necessary to delimit the territories such that administrative boundaries would become clear, and effective administration could take place. These treaties have proved useful in territorial disputes, not only because they can be referenced when trying to verify boundaries and ownership over territory, but also because they give an indication of the intent of the parties to the treaty, similar to a contract in civil law. 36 As evidenced in the *Islands of Palmas* case, the foundation of the United States’ claim on the island was based upon the Treaty of Paris, which ceded the Philippines to the US, and from there, the Spanish claim of original discovery. Had the island not been included within the bounds of the territory to be ceded to the US, it is unlikely that the question of ownership would have ever arisen. In the case at hand, the treaty that can be referenced with regards to Hans Island, the US treaty with Denmark which ceded the Danish Virgin Islands to the US in 1916 made no reference to which areas of Greenland the US was relinquishing its claim. 37 This is especially unfortunate in light of the fact that Hans Island was discovered during an American expedition, as it remains unclear if the Americans ever included Hans Island as part of their claim on northern Greenland. Had it done so, Denmark would be in a much stronger position to back its claim. Likewise, Canada would have benefited had the 1880 Order-in-Council been drafted in a manner which would have delimited the boundaries.

As with the *Island of Palmas* case, both Canada and Denmark have sent military expeditions to Hans Island as part of their attempt at securing their respective claims. 38 Stevenson argues that these visits are inadequate and should be rejected by the ICJ in an eventual decision, as they would set a precedent that whichever nation can make the most frequent visits to the uninhabited regions of the world would be able to claim sovereignty over those territories, and could constitute the starting point for a ‘land rush.”

This view does not reflect the realities of the case at hand, nor of the situation in which the world finds itself at the dawn...
of the 21st Century. The world has long since been carved up by competing nations, and there are currently no other conceivable disputes over land territories in the high north. Hans Island is a classic sovereignty dispute that has been replayed numerous times around the world. It is an obscure island, the sovereignty of which is assumed by two parties who only realize they are in conflict when they agree to work together to delimit the international border between the countries.

It can be said that in the case of Canada, it is fortunate that this is the only territorial dispute that she is facing in the north with respect to a land feature. Canada’s systematic failure to maintain a constant presence in her Arctic territories does not assist her claims of sovereignty in this dispute, but it serves to strengthen Denmark’s claim.

The Arctic is an inhospitable place, and it would be unreasonable to suggest that a lack of settlements or commercial activity would constitute an abandonment of a territorial claim. Government funded activities, either in the form of scientific research, or military activities are naturally a sound basis upon which effective control can be based.

Stevenson suggests that an equitable solution should be the basis for an ICJ decision on the sovereignty of Hans Island. While this sounds like a tidy solution to the question of sovereignty, it seems to ignore the history of sovereignty disputes, and the practical issue of management. History has scarce examples of island territories being voluntarily shared, with the most familiar examples of divided islands - Hispaniola, Cyprus, Borneo, Ireland - being the result of armed conflict.

While the possibility exists for Canada and Denmark to agree to an equitable decision by the ICJ, it would seem unnecessary for them to do so when it would be relatively straightforward to draft a treaty that would divide the island by connecting Points 122 and 123 of the 1973 Canada and Denmark Delimitation Treaty. If both parties submitted the case to the ICJ, it would be in order to secure a decision that would award the island in its entirety to one party or another. Thus, through examining the historical antecedents and ICJ jurisprudence in this article, the evidence suggests that Hans Island would be awarded to Denmark by the ICJ.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
24. Max Huber, The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), 1928.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
31. Dawes & Tukiainen, pp. 77-80.
32. M. Bernert, Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2010).
35. Mills.
40. Summer.
Introduction

With the recent deployments of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) into war zones, many military members have increased their interest in their personal spiritual journey as a means to cope with different personal issues and struggles. The personal search for meaning, defined in its broadest sense as spirituality, is a necessary experience in a society where the development of individual liberty is preferred instead of just receiving a common vision of the world. Some human sciences specialists advocate that spirituality is a factor that highly contributes to resilience. In the CAF context, military chaplains are responsible for providing spiritual training programs and opportunities. For example, in May 2012, a delegation of 65 Canadians (soldiers and dependants) joined the 12,000 military members from 34 countries who attended the 54th International Military Pilgrimage to Lourdes (France). In this article, the author, who was present with the Canadian delegation, reflects upon the meaning of this unique worldwide event, from the context of the Canadian military culture which relates to a wider phenomenon in the Western world. The selected approach is action-research and narrative objectification. The subject is in accordance with the increasing interest being generated for pilgrimages because they offer an opportunity for a religious and spiritual journey, outside of a magisterium authority, that is, the official teaching of a bishop or pope. The novelty of this contribution is the reflection based on a first-hand experience of active duty military personnel who have, in unique ways, confronted and continue to confront, existential questions arising from terror, violence, armed conflicts and war.

With the extension of recent military deployments in combat zones, a number of CF members have undertaken a personal spiritual journey. One of the motivating factors behind this spiritual soul searching is the need to manage various personal and ethical challenges, including physical or psychological injuries, loss, grief, and trauma; the need to manage violent situations in an ethical, upright manner; and family problems, such as separation. Spirituality as a process relates to the personal quest for meaning, which can be all the more necessary in a society where personal freedom takes precedence over a shared world view. Is not spirituality, as defined in that way, a factor that significantly contributes to resilience? The notion of ‘resilience’ is borrowed from the world of physics, and relates to the ability of a metal to absorb energy from a shock, or to sustain pressure without being permanently distorted. In the field of human sciences, the term refers to a process that is more complicated than mere mechan-
SpiriTUAliTy AND THE MiliTAry

... remain himself when there is a blow from the environment and to carry on his human development despite his misfortunes."

The discourse and practice of healing and health exists in most religious groups in relation to the meaning given to life’s difficulties. Pilgrimages have a special role in human and spiritual experience, and as such, bring total solace during the spiritual journey. Military activity, which by its very nature is at times marked by dramatic intensity, provides more opportunities for people to face borderline situations in which life—either the individual’s or somebody else’s—is threatened, and all of a sudden, questions about the meaning of existence need to be answered: Why are we alive? Why does violence exist? Why is there injustice, or suffering? Why do we die? Seeing soldiers who are very effective on the ground leads one to wonder whether they might be the same people who treat questions of meaning with the same healthy attitude that they have towards physical and mental well-being.

The military pilgrimage and socio-religious inquiry

In the CAF, chaplains are tasked with offering soldiers spiritual training programs and other types of spiritual guidance. Canadian chaplains have therefore been working together since 1958 in organizing the International Military Pilgrimage (IMP) to Lourdes, France, under the responsibility of the Diocese of the French Armed Forces. In May 2012, a delegation of 65 Canadians (soldiers and members of their families) joined the 12,000 soldiers from 34 countries who were participating in the 54th International Military Pilgrimage. And what, one might ask, was the significance of the event, both in terms of Canadian military culture and the socio-religious context of the Western world? This double-barrelled question underpins the narrative objectification that follows, which resulted from a process related to the action-research approach. The narrative and the reflection, both exploratory, are based on the experience of the author and of active service personnel, who must deal with questions concerning the meaning of life in a very singular way. The point of view is that of a military chaplain.

The IMP experience is part of a phenomenon observed in the Western world that is neither exclusive nor univocal: the abandonment of traditional places of worship, often in favour of a spiritual experience that takes the form of a personal quest for life’s meaning and a search for values. The pilgrimage is an experience that is all at once human, spiritual, and religious, and that is linked to certain elements of military culture. How should one interpret the still very marked interest that exists in an international-scale event that is religious and spiritual and that brings together pilgrims from various Christian faiths and religious backgrounds, as well as men and women who have no particular religious affiliation and who are pursuing their spiritual quest on their own? And from that question, two more arise: Would the pilgrimage experience in a military context offer a meaningful place to express the individual spiritual quest? And, would it also be a fruitful place of accompaniment for CAF chaplains who are called upon to suggest that CAF members and their families participate in such experiences on a voluntary basis?

Regarding those questions, the anthropologist Victor Turner has highlighted a number of commonalities of the pilgrimage experience across various traditions, both religious and societal. He shows that all types of pilgrimages mark, in one way or another, a gap with respect
to the spatial, social, and psychological status quo. Pilgrimages radically expand the bounds of the social and individual universe, opening up new possibilities for meaning and the future. Pilgrimages also involve passing into a marginal or liminal space. He also refers to a set of social relationships within which a form of theophany (a visible manifestation of God or a god to man – Ed.) is produced that results in a deeper sense of community. Following that experience, pilgrims are generally compelled to rejoin society, but as changed, renewed people. They can thus take a new place and play a new role. These elements or factors open up new pathways to explore when considering the human and spiritual approach of the pilgrims against the backdrop of military life or a military career.

Pilgrimages in the Western world: revival and comparative scope

At the heart of the modern Western world, while a number of traditional places of worship have been abandoned, pilgrimage sites remain surprisingly vital. The figure of the pilgrim even seems to be the new archetype of the spiritual being vis-à-vis the religious being. For example, over 200,000 pilgrims followed the Camino de Santiago in 2011, whereas in 1993, only 70,000 people walked at least 100 kilometres of the medieval pilgrimage route. Most religious traditions are tied to specific sacred sites and to specific types of pilgrimage, even though the meaning of the pilgrimages, their duration and their degrees of intensity vary to a great extent. For example, Hajj in Mecca and Umrah in Medina are among the five pillars of Islam, not to mention the other types of pilgrimages that involve, for example, visiting deeply sacred sites and the tombs of Muslim saints. In Judaism, pilgrimages are also encouraged, the most well-known of which is likely the pilgrimage to the Western Wall of the temple in Jerusalem. In the Eastern traditions, Hinduism has Chardham Yatra, the pilgrimage to the source of the Ganges and its tributaries. The Buddhist religion also has pilgrimages, notably to the four holy places connected to the life of Gautama Buddha. And let us not forget the sublime images of Lhasa, where pilgrims converge, shaking prayer wheels and wooden prayer beads. At the end of their journey, the pilgrims follow the Barkhor, which circles around Jokhang, the most sacred temple in Tibetan Buddhism.

People of all backgrounds, who have nothing bringing them together in their natural environment, gather in these sacred meeting places to share a single reality. In the sea of pilgrims, neophytes can be found alongside initiates in the quest for greater spiritual maturity. Agnostics can also be found seeking answers. There are also believers who hope to heal physically or mentally, or who want their whole being to be purified or renewed. That said, all appear to recognize the value of having a personal experience that takes some of its strength and depth from a tradition that is passed on and received, often outside the traditional institutional frameworks. Many pilgrims wish to remain outside of magisterium authorities that, by their very nature, are tempted to establish the rules and boundaries of the experience, and to direct it or even restore it. It is perhaps as a place of freedom that the pilgrimage most interests contemporary men and women seeking meaning with which to imbue their lives and the world. In the pilgrim experience, the ‘totally other’ can arise unexpectedly. The pilgrim experience does not merely involve a discourse or a dogma that one accepts; it also involves a personal journey that can be experienced just as well in silent companionship on the road of the Camino de Santiago as it can in the ceaseless wave of invocations repeated during the descent into the Ganges, or in the constant murmur that can be heard at the Western Wall (also called the Wailing Wall) in Jerusalem.

The reason for the staying power of pilgrimages in contemporary culture, and even their revival, is perhaps not to be found first, or exclusively, in the concerted efforts made by the disciples of various religions, but is rather based in the reality and aspirations of modern-day men and women. In Western Christianity (although not exclusively), amidst the increasing desanctification of religious institutions, the reign of technology and electronics, and the instantaneous mobilization of people on Facebook or Twitter, our contemporaries seem to be searching for the stable, fixed roots of a sacred land. In a world that is constantly changing, the quest for personal meaning in one’s life, in connection with a coherent system of values, and the feeling of being rooted in a tradition, help people anchor themselves and catch their breath. That anthropologically-based need to be in touch with a sacred space, a Mother Earth, is manifested in people’s attraction to a specific holy place, and their thirst for an absolute that does not always have a name. This quest resurfaces in an impromptu manner in
Questions about existence are just as powerful and urgent for people today as they have been in the past. The answers that satisfy and mobilize us are generally those that arise out of a personal process. Pilgrims of today seem to be heading off in search of what the world has been unable to offer them, and they hope to find it. 

Would pilgrimages contribute to democratizing spirituality because everyone has free access to them, regardless of background, and because each participant is called upon to make his or her own pilgrimage an out-of-the-ordinary experience? The crowd that enters sacred places is a motley crew: seekers of the absolute and tourists, deeply devout types and individuals motivated by curiosity, old people, young people, people who are sick, athletes, families and individuals, people who are at peace, and people who are in crisis. The composition of the crowd of pilgrims erases the established social divisions, and fashions a different way of relating. The unifying experience of the pilgrimage on the personal and collective level places human beings before an ‘otherness’ that all at once fascinates and attracts them, and makes them doubt. The new social structure that is created, in just one moment, is that of a fairer, friendlier world, and the group of pilgrims offers a glimpse of that world. The peaceful, harmonious mix of people from all social classes, ethnicities, and races who gather around the same place of pilgrimage, on unifying, holy land, makes it possible to begin realizing that ideal, multicultural, and multilingual model of humanity that we dream of. What strengthens the group is not faith or belief, but the quest for meaning, openness to an experience that goes beyond what is known and the pre-established order, the shared process of going into oneself, and openness to others and the unexpected. Respect for the unique, valid experience, for what is different, in the face of an absolute that none of us can possess or fully exhaust becomes a meeting point, a place of renewal and a way of reviving day-to-day life such that it can no longer be viewed in the same way. From there emerges new significance that we can lend the world, starting with our own.

The affinity of practices from military culture and pilgrimage culture

To a certain extent, Canadian military traditions already offer privileged places of personal and collective experience similar to the ones that make up all pilgrimages: military parades organized to celebrate the achievements of the past and reflecting the values of Canadian society; and commemorative gatherings and ceremonies held at the same sites as events that have marked our history and shaped our collective memory, such as Vimy Ridge and Beaumont-Hamel, and the beaches where the Normandy landings occurred. A few recent examples of events that led to similar experiences might be the ceremonies commemorating the 90th anniversary of the storming of Vimy Ridge in 2007, the celebrations for the 65th anniversary of the Normandy landings in 2009, and the commemoration of the War of 1812. There have also been international gatherings, such as the Nijmegen marches in the Netherlands, and tattoos bringing together military bands from around the world. In the same manner as international sports competitions, these are opportunities for Canadian Armed Forces members to develop strong relationships with their peers, and to cultivate closer ties with friendly nations while showcasing their expertise. Closer to home, the rare but no less important ceremonies for dedicating or depositing the colours (flags) in a secure location or sanctuary bring together former and current soldiers from the same unit, thus contributing to reinforcing the social bonds that unite them.

Therefore, the entire military culture is steeped in a world of meaning where each individual is asked to find his or her uniqueness within a community. Badges, mottos, pennants and flags all reflect common values. They also turn up in military models. Thus exposed and acknowledged, they can serve as a unifying element between past, present and future for each of the members who take part. The personal decision to embrace a common heritage and the pride, loyalty and esprit de corps that follows is similar to the personal endeavours of pilgrims who go off to find themselves and are thrown into the depths of a truth that can only surpass them and grant them access to an absolute and universal reality—a reality that will lead them to well-being and even a surplus of being.
Canada’s participation in the 54th International Military Pilgrimage to Lourdes: openness and inclusion

The IMP to Lourdes is under the responsibility of the Diocese of the French Armed Forces and is supported by the French government. It is part of a tradition that is at once anthropological, spiritual, and military. From 12 -14 May 2012, I had the chance to accompany a delegation of ten CAF members from various units from the national capital region during the pilgrimage. The members of our group had a broad range of personal motivations for being there. Although some of the participants were part of a particular religious tradition, neither belonging to a group or institution, nor the habits linked to religious practice or a specific set of personal beliefs, were criteria for taking part. The only conditions for participating were as follows: within the context of an international gathering, pursue a personal quest for meaning and be open to developing a sense of spirituality, the expression of which should be part of a religious reality that is influenced by a strong military culture. Within the very specific context of the IMP, my role as military chaplain was to accompany and support a group of men and women from different religious traditions and different personal backgrounds. They shared the same desire, namely, to deepen their values and beliefs by having a real encounter with themselves and others.

The unifying pretext of their individual approach was provided by an international gathering of over 12,000 participants from 34 countries, who came in the same universal spirit of military brotherhood, having undertaken a spiritual quest related to a particular path. The intent of the author is not to ignore or diminish the scope or religious significance of the event. The pilgrims therefore had a variety of personal motivations: the desire to take a step back from day-to-day life, the need to take a break after fighting cancer, the wish for personal renewal after numerous deployments or the loss of a loved one, the desire to take stock of situations in their personal and professional lives, the urge to experience healthy camaraderie outside of everyday life, the search for real human contact beyond social networking on the Internet, the desire to go over their personal and professional history with the aim of breathing new life into an already busy military career, and so on. None of the soldiers’ personal motivations was foreign to the human and spiritual experience of the pilgrim. Military culture is no stranger to religious signs, symbols and rituals: think of parades in uniform, colour parties, large gatherings such as opening and welcome ceremonies for national emblems, ceremonies held at the local cenotaph, the presence of military musicians during movements, and the performance of rituals. The soldiers’ ordinary environment enables them to easily access a symbolic plane. The transition to such a plane was also realized during the various activities offered during the pilgrimage: walks in the mountains, quiet time, exchanges with other pilgrims who had come from other places and had different cultural backgrounds, the writing of a personal journal, and interactions with other members of the group. At the heart of this concentrated range of activities, both personal and collective, answers to questions concerning the meaning of life can emerge in a way that is unique and specific to each pilgrim—that was my predominant finding. Places and modes of personal experience are endless, just as the possibilities of meaning are far from unequivocal. It is also difficult to evaluate the impact alone that a gathering of thousands of young people can have in a place that is designated as sacred land conducive to spiritual soul searching. Have we forgotten that the religious space, when it helps everyone live in a way that is open-minded and respectful of other people’s experiences, remains a valid and privileged place for the encounter of the self, the ‘other,’ and an absolute?

In summary: resilience, soldiers’ personal growth and the role of the chaplain

Existential coherence, which involves the development of a personal life plan (i.e., meaning given to life, which helps to overcome the difficulties that arise) generally ranks among the major factors that contribute to promoting military resilience and improving mental health, along with the search for
values and coherent beliefs about the life plan.\textsuperscript{13} The recent implementation of the \textit{Road to Mental Readiness} program reminds us, in its own way, that values and beliefs are essential to soldiers’ operational readiness; the Canadian Armed Forces recognize the importance of that.\textsuperscript{14} With respect to human resilience, Boris Cyrulnik\textsuperscript{15} notes that after major collective tragedies (massacres, wars, genocides), the basic elements of personal and social reconstruction, more easily observed in children, are a sense of meaning and affection that is perceived and felt. In addition, with regard to ethics, in the context of prevailing political liberalism\textsuperscript{16} where any shared vision of meaning is excluded in favour of individual freedom, the quest for meaning no longer seems to be merely an option: rather, it is an imperative. Values and beliefs help individuals materialize the sense of meaning given to their lives and find their place within their social group.

In the context of the Canadian military, it is notably up to the chaplains, as specialists in matters related to life’s meaning, to find and offer concrete, credible places that can aid people in finding that personal significance, as well as to help their values and beliefs take root. The International Military Pilgrimage to Lourdes is a concrete place to express the quest for meaning in an anthropological context that is broad, ecumenical, and inter-religious, and that seems to align with the needs of men and women of today. Adherence to structures or dogma is neither a starting point nor a prerequisite for the experience to be beneficial on a human and spiritual level. In addition, the presence of many elements of military culture, such as parades, marches to the sound of military music, gatherings, ceremonies on parade grounds, commemorations, \textit{esprit de corps}, and the celebration of shared values using different symbols, are aspects that favour the recognition of the pilgrimage as a place that is accessible, and even familiar, to the soldiers who participate therein. This proximity by affinity may facilitate a personal approach, while encouraging the search for significant elements that can help the pilgrims establish a direction, or find meaning in their lives.

Most of us military chaplains have participated in marches, as well as in long convoys in combat zones alongside soldiers. These are ideal places for building trust and credibility, and, oftentimes, for offering spiritual guidance at the heart of military life. My participation in the 54th International Military Pilgrimage has convinced me that this type of experience can, under certain conditions, be conducive to the personal and professional development of Canadian Armed Forces members (and their families) who are interested in such an approach. Moreover, the experience at Lourdes, and the fragmentary narrative outlined in the preceding lines also raise questions and set conditions concerning the role of resilience and the socio-spiritual credibility of current religious groups with regard to contemporary aspirations—complex issues that I am not yet sure how to answer, save for here in this article, in the words summarizing the reinterpretation of the experience. It is on the grounds of personal experience and the individual quest for meaning, undertaken in response to questions concerning existence that the link between military culture and pilgrim culture was made for the purposes of this article. The pilgrimage created a credible space in which soldiers felt welcome and encouraged to find their own way, while maintaining a link with a group of people seeking meaning. Here we have one of the conditions for making credible and effective, and even revitalizing, the discourse and practice of healing and health that exists in most religious groups, in relation to the challenge of overcoming life’s difficulties. One conviction remains, however, at the end of this narrative: pilgrimages are relevant to the very core of the expertise and role entrusted to military chaplains, who are mandated religious leaders within the Canadian Armed Forces. The different religious and spiritual traditions that are relevant to Canadian military chaplains are still full of possibilities that we are far from exhausting.
1. A reworked version of this text was submitted—in order to give a specialized Francophone audience access to it—in the magazine Incursions, No. 7, Paris, 2nd quarter, 2012.

2. Boris Cyrulnik, Ces enfants qui tiennent le coup, Marseille, Revigny-sur-Ornain, Hommes et Perspectives, Collection, 2000, p. 9. As part of her work surrounding the implementation of a military resilience training program in preparation for the deployment of Canadian troops to Afghanistan, psychologist Christiane Routhier suggests the following operational definition: [trans.] “Military resilience corresponds to the process whereby a soldier remains functional despite stress and potential traumas, by cultivating the psychological distancing necessary to situate these intermittent events in his individual life history; place their effects in context and access the general resistance resources against the effects of stress in order to cope with them; and continue on his path toward attainment of his personal life goals.”

3. The first IMP was held 13–16 June 1958. That year, Catholics from around the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Notre-Dame apparitions in the small town of Lourdes, in France. A number of foreign pilgrims arranged to go to the grotto in Lourdes and participate in the jubilee events at the sanctuaries. Taking advantage of the international excitement, Monsignor Badre, who at the time was the director of the French Army’s Catholic chaplany, also invited the chaplains from the foreign delegations within NATO to Lourdes. They had already participated in the national pilgrimages that had been organized since 1944 by Father Besombes, a priest from Marseille, and a military chaplain. Monsignor Badre also suggested to Monsignor Werthman, the then-curate for the German army, to join the gathering. Thus, with great significance, the Bundeswehr—the army of the Federal Republic of Germany that was created in 1955—came to participate in the first IMP. That gathering for the [trans.] “reconciliation of peoples of the world” (speech by Marshal Juin at the military camp) preceded the major meeting on September 14 and 15, 1958, between General de Gaulle and the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, which politically sealed the reconciliation between the two countries. The IMP’s origins are therefore rooted in the massive presence of soldiers who were still in Europe in the years following the war and in the reconciliation process that was underway between France, Germany and all the Allied countries. As a result, the gathering of those armies in one place to pray for peace—armies that, just a few years earlier, had fought against or alongside one another—was highly symbolic. To obtain a more detailed historical account, go to http://fcgmm.com/index.php/presentation-du-pelerinage-militaire-international.html , accessed 30 July 2012. The main source is René Dupuy’s Le Pèlerinage militaire international à Lourdes, IMP Historical Commission, France, n/a, accessed 30 July 2012.


7. See Reginald Bibby, Beyond the Gods & Back: Religion’s Demise and Rise and Why It Matters, (Toronto: Project Canada Books, 2011). The author, who has been a sociologist and observer of religious fact in Canada since 1975, emphasizes the enduring nature of religion in Canada rather than its disappearance. He presents the idea of a restructuring and polarization of religious fact, maintained on the side of the religious groups by the arrival of new Canadians, among other things. The researcher also notes that there is still a great deal of interest in spirituality when it is not perceived in institutional terms, i.e., belonging to a group or regularly participating in religious services.

8. In most of these places, commemorative monuments are built to remind people of the sacrifice made by soldiers who died in combat. A directory of Canadian commemorative monuments built around the world can be found at http://senterans.gc.ca/fr/memoriaux Accessed 30 July 2012.

9. The war fought between the United States and Great Britain between 1812 and 1815. British North America, particularly Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec), was the main objective of the American military operations. The Government of Canada’s Website on the topic can be found at www.1812.gc.ca . Accessed 23 August 2012.

10. Canada has been participating in this event since 1975. Lastly, see the work of Michel Stavrou and Sister Jean-Marie-Valmigère, Le pèlerinage comme démarche écclesiale, (Paris, Thélès, 2004).

11. In accordance with an old military tradition, Beechwood, the National Cemetery of Canada, also houses recently dedicated colours. They are hung in the Hall of Colours on each side of a magnificent commemorative stained glass piece, “Hope in a Broken World,” donated by the Canadian Military Chaplains’ Association. The Hall of Colours has already received the Queen’s Colour of the Maritime Command (Navy), and the colours of several of Canada’s most famous regiments, including the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Royal 22e Régiment. The colours of the Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent Regiment, of the Primary Reserve, were the last colours to be laid up in the hall, in May 2012. Following tradition, they will remain honourably suspended and untouched, until with the passing of time, they completely disintegrate.

12. The proposed program included participating in the international Military Pilgrimage to Lourdes and a professional development activity at the Canadian National Vimy Memorial. Most of the Canadian participants who took part in the IMP funded their own trip.


14. Road to Mental Readiness is the new national training program of the Canadian Armed Forces; it is aimed at training troops before, during and after deployments to operational zones, particularly combat zones. Module 5 of the pre-deployment training program is wholly devoted to the importance of personal values and beliefs. Readers who are interested in this topic can go to www.borces.gc.ca/r2mr-rvpm , Accessed 30 July 2012.


16. John Locke (1632–1704) is generally considered to be the father of political liberalism. His two treaties on civil government (published in 1690) develop the basic ideas behind liberalism. They include the statement that humans possess inalienable rights (liberty, property, security), that governing bodies have limited powers, and that the delegation of authority is based on a temporary social contract that can be changed. For a broader presentation of political liberalism, see James F. Childress and John Macquarie (eds), “Liberalism,” in the Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1967, 1986 [revised edition].)”
Introduction

Non-commissioned members (NCMs) of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as explained in the first edition of the doctrine manual Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (hereinafter referred to as Duty with Honour), are an integral part of the Canadian profession of arms. The publication of Duty with Honour was part of an institutional process that has been well documented, particularly in this journal. The catalyst of the process was the Somalia Affair, but the end of the Cold War and Canadians’ changing expectations of their armed forces were also significant factors. To respond to those challenges, numerous studies were conducted in the 1990s, which concluded that a reform of military ethos and leadership in the CAF was essential. An in-depth review of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System (CFPDS) was identified as a tool that could facilitate that reform. That said, the reflection associated with the review of the CFPDS has largely focused upon the needs of the officer corps.

As teachers at the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Division (NCMPDD) at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS), we feel that the institutional reflection on NCM professional development (NCM PD) is incomplete, and that is at the root of the substandard implementation of its strategic vision, as evidenced by the ambiguity surrounding the aim of NCM PD and the difficulties related to the operationalization of the educational dimension of NCM PD. We feel that the implementation of this vision would benefit greatly from better coordinated action on the part of the stakeholders and parties involved. Consequently, in this article, we propose a vision of the NCMPDD as a forum—both physical and intellectual—for the achievement of unifying projects, which would be beneficial to NCM PD stakeholders and the CAF organization as a whole, especially in a context of increasingly scarce resources.

The first section of this article is a brief overview of the concept of professional development (PD) in the CAF and what it means for NCM PD. The second section examines the causes of the incomplete reflection upon NCM PD. The third section focuses upon the observable consequences of the incomplete reflection and the possible solutions. The last part of this article discusses the unique contribution that the NCMPDD—which was known until very recently as the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre (NCMPDC) and was part of the Canadian Forces College—can make to the community of stakeholders and parties interested in NCM PD in the implementation of these solutions.

Maxime Rondeau, MSc. (political science), and Lisa Tanguay, MA (history), have taught at the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Division (formerly the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre) of the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School since 2005. They have each worked on developing training plans for the Centre’s programs and have participated in numerous working groups on the professional development of non-commissioned members.
Professional development and the role of the NCMPDD

The CAF’s effectiveness relies largely upon the quality of its training and education system. As such, most CAF members, from the time of their enrolment, take part in an ongoing PD process. The Canadian Armed Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES) defines this as a “comprehensive, integrated and sequential development process that constitutes a continuous learning environment” and consists of the pillars of training, education, self-development and work experience. Therefore, the aim of PD is to prepare CAF members for the escalating requirements of their careers and ensure adherence to the performance criteria set out in the military employment structure.

In accordance with the leadership development framework (LDF), the NCMPDD curriculum participates in the development of the five meta-competencies related to the profession of arms and required by the context in which it is exercised: expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology. The NCMPDD programs thereby ensure that most of the strategic objectives (SOs) that constitute the vision of the NCM corps in 2020 are attained, particularly SO 2, a professional NCM corps; SO 3, a knowledgeable NCM corps; and SO 4, outstanding leaders.

Although the NCMPDD curriculum is not necessarily all that different from NCM PD offered in past decades, the specificity of its curriculum—and even that of NCM PD as a whole—can be seen in the wider range of topics covered and the significant revamp of its philosophy, and even its aim. An indicator of that revamp, in our opinion, is the growing emphasis upon education, acquisition of theoretical knowledge, and development of critical thinking skills, as opposed to instruction, training, and acquisition of specific technical skills. That statement is not meant to support the notion that instructional and training activities are less important in NCM PD. Rather, there is reason to believe that the environment in which the CAF operates requires a modification of the NCM PD vision. It is no coincidence that that modification has occurred at the same time as the integration of the NCM corps into the Canadian profession of arms.

In accordance with that integration, the NCM corps is required to possess abstract theoretical knowledge and to master complex skills. As the historian Allan English explains, Duty with Honour states that the fundamental differences between the NCM corps and the officer corps stem from their traditional responsibilities and expertise. For example, the officer corps has the authority to command and to decide when force will be used, whereas the NCM corps generally executes specific technical tasks that arise out of the decisions made by the officers. However, because of the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity of the security environment in which the CAF operates, there is increasing overlap in the levels of conflict, and a growing number of responsibilities are being delegated to the junior levels. Consequently, NCMs are now engaged at the operational and strategic levels, and the distinction in terms of responsibilities and professional expertise has morphed into the requirement, for all members of the profession of arms, to demonstrate the critical thinking skills, creativity, and discernment necessary in the security environment of the 21st Century. Important from an institutional perspective, the integration of the NCM corps into the profession of arms involves numerous cultural changes, which are still in the process of occurring, and have contributed to the incomplete reflection upon NCM PD.
Origins of the incomplete reflection

In this section, we will examine three elements that we believe constitute the incomplete reflection on NCM PD: the incomplete research on NCM PD, the conceptual problems inherent to the documents that are supposed to guide the development of NCM PD, and, lastly, the ambiguity as to the aim of NCM PD itself. The analysis of those three elements will be used to fuel the discussion in the upcoming sections on the problems with implementing the NCM PD strategic vision and the possible solutions we would like to share with the community of stakeholders and parties interested in NCM PD.

In order for any strategic vision to be implemented, a series of obstacles, organizational and otherwise, must be overcome. Therefore, the information (i.e., all the qualitative and quantitative data) that is used to develop that vision, and the procedure for implementing it, are of utmost importance. However, we feel that the information pertaining to NCM PD is incomplete. The paltry amount of research devoted to NCMs— which is not just a CAF issue—has had consequences on the CAF and NCM PD. Too often, institutional and academic research on the NCM corps is conducted as part of a larger reflection on the education and professionalization of the officer corps. As a case in point, NCM Corps 2020 is considered a “companion document” to Officership 2020, and the specific objectives described in Officership 2020 are incorporated into NCM Corps 2020. Although there may be logic behind that approach, the outcome is that the intrinsic value of NCM PD and its associated educational needs are rarely a subject of analysis as such. While there has been rather detailed and in-depth institutional reflection on officer education, fewer resources have been allocated to reflecting on the education of NCMs. Consequently, the objectives of NCM PD, particularly with regard to professional expertise, are not often enough based upon empirical research, as English recommends.

In addition, this lack of information has led to a major issue at the operational level as to the organization of NCM PD.

Based upon developments over the last decade, the CFPDS has been reorganized according to the responsibilities of the two corps, but there is still ambiguity as to the level of expertise required by each of the corps. For example, the expertise required of NCMs with regard to the general system of war and conflict is not clearly determined in Duty with Honour. Although the various levels of expertise required are set out in the Non-Commissioned Members General Specifications (NCMGS), the lack of clarity of some of the described tasks,
and the interpretative nature of the LDF, do not provide clear strategic guidance as to the level of professional expertise required by the NCM corps. Although the conceptualization of the LDF was integrated into the CAF institutional leadership doctrine, and has been included in the NCMGS and the qualification standard (QS) for Developmental Periods 1 to 5, its ‘operationalization’ has yet to be developed. As we will see in the next section, that has direct consequences with respect to NCM PD. It should be noted that the LDF for officer professional development (OPD) is also incomplete. However, it could be argued that given the culture and structure of OPD, its educational dimension is less problematic than that of NCM PD. At a minimum, it would appear that the implementation of the OPD strategic vision can better adapt to the LDF in its current state. Indeed, that highlights the last element of the incomplete reflection on NCM PD: its aim.

NCM PD currently seems to be pursuing two objectives that are very different, though not necessarily incompatible. On the one hand, as evidenced by the requirements set out in NCM 2020, there is a desire to equip the NCM corps with specific tools, such as stronger ethos, critical thinking skills, communication skills, cultural intelligence, and so on. The logic behind that desire is solid, because it satisfies both the societal imperative and the functional imperative. On the other hand, there is a desire to provide PD opportunities to senior NCMs who are destined to be part of a command team. The underlying logic also stands to reason, as those NCMs must be able to communicate with the officers on the command team, master the professional jargon, and demonstrate specific skills enabling them to make effective recommendations. Nevertheless, those two objectives, although compatible, contribute to the ambiguity that characterizes NCM PD. In fact, the final result of an NCM’s progression through the NCM PD developmental periods (from basic qualification to the senior appointment program) has still not been clarified. Is the goal for the CPO1s/CWOs who will complete the senior appointment program to obtain a diploma? Would the proposed Professional Military Education Program for NCMs (NCM PMEP), similar to that of the second OPD developmental period (although that component is in a state of flux) but spread out over the five NCM PD developmental periods, support the succession planning process, and thereby help identify future members of the command teams? As long as those types of questions remain unanswered, it will be difficult to optimize implementation of the NCM PD strategic vision, because that could lead to already scarce resources being used unwisely, or for incompatible purposes. The next section addresses the practical consequences of the incomplete reflection on NCM PD.

Consequences of the incomplete reflection

As teachers at the NCMPDD, we have observed strategic and operational consequences as a result of the incomplete reflection on NCM PD. At the strategic level, the recent publication of various guidance documents has undermined the optimization of NCM PD because of a lack of clear governance. At the operational level, the revision cycle of the documents that guide the development of NCM PD is impeding its implementation, particularly with regard to developing and updating the NCMPDD curriculum.
Strategic consequences

The modernization of CFITES opened the door to the NCM PD update and the formulation of new strategic guidance. Some of that guidance applies to the entire NCM corps, while other parts seem to apply to senior NCMs who are destined to participate in the succession planning process. Among the documents that are for all NCMs, the distribution of the NCM PD Modernization Plan, and the publication entitled Maintaining the Track: Benchmarking NCM Corps 2020 Progress (hereinafter referred to as Maintaining the Track) shed light upon the importance of assessing the attainment of the strategic objectives put forth in NCM 2020. On one hand, according to the NCM PD Modernization Plan, the NCM 2020 objectives have not yet been completely achieved, and the result is a growing gap between NCM PD and the need to develop the judgment and critical thinking skills required of NCMs in the contemporary operating environment.31 Similarly, the plan concludes that that NCM PD does not provide enough educational opportunities that foster the development of judgment and critical thinking skills.32 On the other hand, the authors of Maintaining the Track feel that progress has been made towards achieving the vision set out in NCM 2020, although much remains to be done, particularly to determine and describe NCMs’ educational requirements.33 We are sceptical of the claim that the gap is widening between NCM PD and the development of NCMs’ critical thinking skills; we have witnessed the gradual alignment of the programs given by the NCMPDD on the strategic objectives set out in NCM 2020. That said, we do acknowledge that some ambiguity remains as to the educational requirements for the NCM corps.

The conclusions drawn from those two documents are interesting, but they provide little information on the concrete accomplishment of the NCM 2020 strategic objectives. Despite its relevance, the study conducted by the Maintaining the Track team is qualitative and indicates the participants’ opinions but cannot be generalized to the NCM corps as a whole. The authors do not deny that; they acknowledge that even though the start-up phase indicated in the NCM 2020 detailed implementation plan ended in 2008, no formal assessment has been conducted thus far to determine the extent of the progress made to date.34

Despite the absence of a formal and quantitative assessment, new strategic guidance, more specific to NCMs who are destined to participate in the succession planning process, has been added to that of the NCM 2020 vision. Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model (hereinafter referred to as The Strategic Employment Model) proposes to introduce a “Progressive Model for CPO1/CWO professional development from a graduated, flexible, and comprehensive perspective.”35

The document entitled Competencies Expected of Senior Appointments – The Strategic Chief36 (hereinafter referred to as The Strategic Chief) suggests a list of attributes which are required for the roles and responsibilities of CPO1s/CWOs who have obtained a senior appointment. Those publications provide valuable strategic guidance, but do not specify its integration into the current NCM PD scheme or the impact upon the achievement of the NCM 2020 vision.37 Moreover, the organizations responsible for PD delivery are given significant leeway:

As a recognized profession, the CAF has the ability to develop its own professional curriculum, standards and certification. Centres of excellence such as CMP, DLI, NCMPDC and CFC must develop specific education to better train NCMs to think critically and gain a more broad-based understanding of the strategic environment. These must not simply be modifications to Officer Curriculum, but rather focused, exclusive and tailored towards NCMs, while supportive of the Progressive Model.38

Moreover, the NCM PD Modernization Plan gave rise to the development of an NCM PMEP, still in the draft phase and inspired by the officer professional military education system. The NCM PMEP is partially aligned with the content of the NCMPDD programs and could influence NCM PD as a whole. However, in its current state, we do not know whether it is intended for the NCM corps as a whole, or just the senior NCMs selected to be members of a command team. In addition, one of the only manifestations of the NCM PMEP consists of the integration of some of its elements into the NCMGS. Therefore, it appears that the aim of the NCM PMEP has yet to be determined, in spite of the difficulties in finding common ground between the parties involved.

In sum, the CFITES modernization and the NCM PD update preceded the publication of strategic guidance docu-
ments without establishing a clear system of governance in order to determine the priority of strategic guidance. Moreover, all those directives influence the mandate and the activities of the NCMPDD without necessarily taking its operational realities into account.

**Operational consequences**

The development of the NCMPDD’s curriculum is part of the cycle of revision of a series of documents from the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA): the NCMGS, the QS, and training plans (TPs). However, the frequent and substantial revision of those documents do not seem to fit into a holistic and systematic scheme that takes the operational realities of the NCM PD delivery organizations and other interested parties into account. Also, the absence of a holistic system of development and the tempo at which those documents are revised undermine the delivery of NCM PD. Until very recently, the NCMPDD was responsible for the TPs, and therefore, in charge of carrying out the changes made in the NCMGS and the QS. The Division is supposed to take back that responsibility once the transition to CFLRS has been finalized. Notwithstanding questions of reorganization, the tempo of revision of the above-mentioned documents is difficult to maintain with the current resources. The NCMPDD has managed to qualify the required number of candidates in a year without making the changes imposed by the cycle of revision and development of the NCMGS, the QS, and the TPs. In addition, since the 2011 revision cycle, the documents that guide the development of NCM PD have been submitted to the interpretation of the LDF before it has even been ‘operationalized’ by CDA. Consequently, a multitude of questions regarding the practical application of the LDF in the development of curriculum have remained unanswered, thereby contributing to undermining NCM PD delivery. We believe that the curriculum revision and development cycles, like the development of strategic guidance, would benefit from greater coordination between the NCM PD stakeholders if they were anchored in the operational realities of the PD delivery organizations.

When considered individually, these strategic and operational issues do not threaten the quality of NCM PD in the short term. In this sense, the NCMPDD is fulfilling its mandate, as it is able to provide high-quality PD, based upon the NCM 2020 vision. However, at the strategic level, the absence of coordination among the various strategic guidance, along with the organizational problems regarding curriculum development, is preventing the optimization of that vision. A coordinated effort between the NCM PD stakeholders, and the centralization of the reflection on NCM PD and its delivery, could be contemplated as solutions. Cooperation among NCM PD stakeholders would facilitate the achievement of the new guidance set out in documents such as *The Strategic Chief*, and *The Strategic Employment Model*. The next section broaches the role that the NCMPDD could play in fully achieving the NCM 2020 vision.

**An NCM PD centre of excellence**

An opinion expressed by one of the respondents of the *Maintaining the Track* study was that the NCMPDD “is not equivalent in terms of status and credibility to the other CF colleges or US Army academies for NCOs.” Admittedly, a rallying point must be established to ensure the development of NCM PD’s strategic vision and governance. We believe that the NCMPDD can serve to centralize institutional reflection on NCM PD. Its contribution could be made at various levels. In addition to being a PD delivery organization, it can participate in developing the NCM PD strategic vision and produce empirical research on NCMs, thereby offering solutions to overcome the different operational and strategic problems.

**Solutions to operational problems**

First, we believe that the expertise acquired thus far by the NCMPDD can help NCM PD stakeholders solve operational problems. The NCMPDD’s expertise is wide-ranging. As the main NCM PD delivery vehicle, the Division and its diverse personnel (mentors, NCMs, civilian personnel) possess in-depth knowledge of the professional and operational realities of NCMs that is indispensable to the implementation of any NCM PD program. The Division also boasts expertise with respect to distance and in-class PD: various in-class and online teaching methods have been developed and improved since 2003. The NCMPDD personnel have been trained to provide high-quality instruction, and the lessons learned since 2003 are an important component of the Division’s corporate memory. The Division could thereby participate in systematizing a development process according to the experience acquired during the various phases of development and revision conducted thus far.
It would be beneficial for the institution to further build upon that expertise and allow greater flexibility to PD delivery establishments like the NCMPDD. The NCMGS are currently made up of a set of tasks identified under headings such as leadership. The level of precision of those tasks is such that it goes against the philosophy set out in the NCMGS standard, which aims to grant flexibility to the subject-matter experts working in PD organizations. Rather than formulating tasks using action verbs and specific conceptual notions (for example, “sustain the whole of government approach”), it would be indicated to give more latitude to PD delivery establishments, so that they could choose, on the one hand, the right learning taxonomy (the science of classification – Ed.), and, on the other hand, the appropriate concepts in accordance with the overarching topics selected by the establishment. That approach would ensure coherence in the taxonomic progression throughout the developmental periods and a continuous update of the concepts taught. In our opinion, it would be beneficial to give greater flexibility with regard to the guidance given in the documents that guide the development of NCM PD, while devoting more effort to the organization of the strategic vision concerning, for example, the aim of PD and the precedence of the strategic guidance. Moreover, the Division’s operational expertise could be extended at the strategic level.

**Solutions to strategic problems**

The NCMPDD leadership and teaching personnel have been delivering NCM PD since 2003, and they pore over NCM PD strategic guidance documents on a daily basis. We believe that the Division would be well placed to participate in the development of strategic guidance if it acquired, in addition to its operational expertise, institutional (i.e., academic) expertise on the NCM corps as a whole. That expertise could be acquired by developing research programs with the aim of collecting empirical data on the NCM corps and, more specifically, on senior NCMs.

Given the pool of candidates that it qualifies every year, and the diversity of its personnel, the NCMPDD would be the perfect choice to become a centre of research devoted to NCMs as a professional corps. Because of the number of candidates it qualifies annually, the Division could poll NCMs as a professional corps and conduct empirical research on each rank in order to better define the responsibilities and educational needs of every PD phase. Collecting empirical data would give rise to better familiarity in the CAF with the specific needs of the institution and its main NCM education organizations. Different platforms could be used to poll NCMs on a large scale during the distance learning phase of the programs, and the discussions of the study groups conducted during the in-house phase could serve to analyze more specific problems. That would help identify the educational requirements of the NCM corps and prevent a duplication of the officer education system. The NCMPDD could thereby participate in developing an education system just for NCMs that is based upon empirical data. Naturally, this institutional research would be conducted while taking into account the crucial link between the NCM corps and the officer corps, and the need to harmonize their respective PD systems to some extent. The NCMPDD’s previous affiliation with the Canadian Forces College is bound to facilitate the link between the NCM PD and OPD curriculums.

However, acquiring that expertise depends upon the interaction of NCMs with their instructors and teachers. Therefore, the quality of the relationship—*virtual* for the distance portion, and *face-to-face* for the in-class portion—is of utmost importance in an environment where collecting empirical data is an objective. We therefore believe that the establishment of a genuine centre of excellence goes hand-in-hand with the maintenance of courses offered in class and the interaction of candidates with qualified teachers and subject-matter experts. On that topic, for example, we feel that the abolition of the in-house course for CPO2s/MWOs should be reconsidered.

**Centre of excellence, NCM school**

Lastly, the NCMPDD’s credibility is also suffering from the absence of a clear identity and a sense of belonging. Since its creation in 2003, the NCMPDD has operated as part of a number of different organizations such as the Canadian Forces Learning and Development Centre, the Canadian Forces College, and, more recently, CFLRS. Without commenting on the NCMPDD’s affiliation with any one of those organizations, it is clear that such a frequent change of administration is symptomatic of a lack of identity that has likely resulted in the reflection on the education of NCMs being incomplete.

In conclusion, the NCMPDD’s identity could be strengthened if its mandate were expanded to include ensuring the centralization and governance of institutional reflection on NCM PD. If the Division participated in the development of
concepts, strategic guidance, and research with respect to NCM PD, the NCMPDD would be in a position to become a genuine centre of excellence, and, in the long term, a leadership school able to acquire institutional expertise on NCMs as a professional corps.

Awareness of the roles and responsibilities of NCMs, and recognition of their integration in the profession of arms would be enhanced. Considered as the guardians of the NCM corps and co-managers of the profession of arms, CPO1s/ CWOs could, through the NCMPDD, provide governance of a NCM PD system “with strong, centralized and coherent direction in accordance with strategic guidance from the Armed Forces Council.”

We believe that by investing the necessary resources to centralize institutional reflection and empirical research in the NCMPDD, it would be possible to optimize the achievement of the NCM 2020 vision, while offering concrete solutions to problems that are currently undermining the effectiveness of the NCM PD system. Centralizing institutional reflection and research in the NCMPDD would facilitate the sharing of information and the acquisition of institutional expertise on the NCM corps, while strengthening, in practice, the learning organization concept and the governance of NCM PD.

NOTES

1. The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mélanie Paquette to the reflection that is at the root of this article, and to thank her for her comments on the current version. We would also like to thank Jean-François Marcoux and André Séguin for their comments.


4.“These stakeholders include certain work cells of the Canadian Defence Academy, the Canadian Forces College, the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, the Chief Force Development, and so on.


7. As discussed previously in this article, the societal imperative refers to the legitimacy of the CAF and the compatibility between the values of the institution with those of the parent society. Canadian society. The functional imperative refers to the organization’s ability to effectively conduct its missions. In both cases, NCM PD can be seen as a way to satisfy both imperatives.


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13. In order to avoid a debate over nomenclature and for the purposes of this article, we consider individuals in the rank of PO1/WO to CPO1/CWO as being senior NCMs. See DAO 5031-8 and the most recent NCMS for the distribution in the Developmental Periods.

14. The Canadian Forces Professional Development System, Department, pp. 15–16 and 20–21.


16. For example, in the mid-1980s, the senior NCO course also covered topics such as communication, management, and military leadership.

17. Duty with Honour, p. 11.


20. Ibid., pp. 15. 21. Ibid., pp. 18–19.

22. For example, see Yves Tremblay et al., L’éducation et les militaires canadiens, (Montréal, Éditions Athéna, 2004).


24. A good example is the “Debrief the Leaders” project. Initially, the project was supposed to have an “officer” component and an “NMC” component. Only the “officer” component was published.


26. Duty with Honour, p. 16.

27. Ibid., p. 17.

28. To understand the genesis of the concept of meta-competencies in the CAF, see Robert W. Walker, The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006). The concept has been repeated in a number of official publications, including Leading the Institution.

29. As discussed previously in this article, the societal imperative refers to the legitimacy of the CAF and the compatibility between the values of the institution with those of the parent society. Canadian society. The functional imperative refers to the organization’s ability to effectively conduct its missions. In both cases, NCM PD can be seen as a way to satisfy both imperatives.


31. Alternatively, there is the concept of “interdisciplinary overview,” which can be considered a form of the “interdisciplinary” overview. This concept can be found in the work of Guiseppe Caforio, “Trends and Evolution in the Military Profession,” Guiseppe Caforio (Ed.), (New York, Routledge, 2007), pp. 217–237.

32. Ibid., p. B-3.


34. (Translation) “Although the 2008 deadline for the execution of the five-year ‘start-up’ included in the NCM Corps 2020 detailed implementation plan has passed, no assessment has been conducted to determine the specific progress made,” Maintaining the Track, p. 9.


36. CPO1 Cléroux (CF CWO), Competencies Expected of Senior Appointments – The Strategic Chief, February 2012.

37. Beyond Transformation acknowledges that it is necessary to review the General Specifications (GS).

38. Beyond Transformation, p. 34. Please read “NCMPDD” in place of “NCMPDC.”


Sir,

The National Committee of the Red River Metis orders Mr. William McDougall not to enter the North-West Territory without the special authorization of this Committee.

By order of the President, John Bruce
Louis Riel, Secretary
Dated at St. Norbert, Red River, this 21st Day of October, 1869.¹

Introduction

With the presentation of this note to the Honourable William McDougall, Lieutenant-Governor designate of the Territory of Rupert’s Land, the acquisition of what is now Western Canada by the young Dominion came to an abrupt halt. In the preceding years the embryonic nation had decided upon a national policy of acquiring the vast tracts of land occupied by the Hudson’s Bay Company, and had secured an agreement with the Company and the Imperial Government in London to do so. Upon his arrival in the Red River Settlement, Canada’s plans were stymied by a small group of Métis intent upon self-governance and protecting their culture, their traditions, and their way of life. The intent of this article is to demonstrate how, over the eleven months that followed, the young Dominion Government under John A. Macdonald employed a comprehensive Whole of Government approach to successfully achieve its political goal.

Background

The events that led to this juncture are too broad to fully investigate here. Nonetheless, to fully understand the issue this article intends to address, it is important to conduct

Major David W. Grebstad, an artillery officer, holds a BA in History from the University of Manitoba, a MA in History from the University of New Brunswick, is a graduate of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College, and is presently attending the CAF Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) in Toronto.
a brief summary of the events that led to McDougall’s rebuff at Pembina.1*

Since 2 May 1670, the vast terrain known as Rupert’s Land had been administered by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had been granted a royal charter and trading monopoly within the territory by King Charles II. The Red River Settlement, situated in Rupert’s Land at the confluence of the Assiniboine and Red Rivers, was a conglomeration of Métis buffalo hunters, French Canadian fur traders, Scottish colonists, American traders, First Nations people, and Canadian expansionists. Its hub and capital was the Hudson’s Bay Company trading post at Fort Garry where sat the representation of civil authority, the Council of Assiniboia.

By the mid-19th Century, a change of world view within Canada and the United Kingdom contributed to the slow decline of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s fortunes in Western Canada. The taste for imperial expansion in Britain had waned; the concept of a commercial monopoly governing a territory became anathema to the British Empire. The ‘laissez-aller’ economic zeitgeist of the UK; and interest in Canada for westward expansion increased.

These conditions, coupled with the fear of American annexation, combined to push the Dominion of Canada and the Hudson’s Bay Company to reach an agreement in April 1869 for the transferral of Rupert’s Land to the Dominion, with the Honourable William MacDougall being nominated as its first lieutenant-governor.

Negotiations between the Imperial Government, the Dominion Government, and the Company had been ongoing for some time, as early as 1865. They were pre-empted by the work surrounding Confederation, but were never wholly abandoned. Negotiations involved a continuous ‘to-and-fro’ among the three principals, but never included consultation with the people who actually lived in the territory. As a result, when rumours of the negotiations were circulated in the Red River Settlement, the local inhabitants became understandably concerned. This disquiet was exacerbated by the arrival of Dominion surveyors in October 1869, who had begun staking out lots with a disregard for established farms and land titles. A group of Métis confronted the surveyors and ‘sent them packing.’ Shortly thereafter, on 19 October, the Comité National des Métis was formed, and on 3 November, its members seized control of Fort Garry and deposed the Council of Assiniboia. It was this committee that forbade McDougall entrance to the territory, and which would evolve into the Provisional Government in February 1870.2**

Between 19 October 1869 and 24 June 1870, this body formed the de facto government of the Red River Settlement. It was established primarily to protect the rights of the land holders in the settlement while also providing some degree of law and order among the competing and volatile interests in the territory.

“Negotiations between the Imperial Government, the Dominion Government, and the Company had been ongoing for some time, as early as 1865.”

1* For a more in-depth review of the whole story, the author strongly recommends George F.C. Stanley’s Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River and The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions. Additionally, Captain George L. Huyshe’s The Red River Expedition is an excellent first-hand account of the Wolseley Expedition by an officer of the 60th Regiment who participated in it.

2** For clarity, the term Provisional Government will be used throughout this article. It should be understood to represent both the Provisional Government and the Legislative Assembly of Assiniboia.
the settlement. The population was divided into a variety of camps, with a pro-Canadian faction openly fomenting violence to ensure the establishment of Canadian authority in Rupert’s Land. The conflict between this element and the Provisional Government eventually subsided, but not before an attempted rebellion, the mass arrest of pro-Canadian revolutionaries, and the execution of Orangeman and Ontarian Thomas Scott, a singular act that would change the nature of the conflict. This violence aside, the relations between Canada, the Company and the Provisional Government were generally good, and they involved a great amount of diplomacy. In the end, the Bill of Rights that was drawn up by the Riel government and presented to the Dominion Government was accepted, and it formed the basis of the Manitoba Act of 12 May 1870, which brought the Province of Manitoba into Confederation. Upon its ratification on 24 June 1870 by the Provisional Government, the insurgents essentially became the legitimate government representing the authority of the Crown in Manitoba.

Manitoba Manifest Destiny, eh? Canada’s Strategic Goal in the Ecosystem of Conflict

Before one can analyse how the Macdonald government utilised a Whole of Government approach to achieving its strategic goal, one must understand the nature of that strategic goal. The specific end state that the young Dominion was pursuing was the annexation of Rupert’s Land into the Dominion. While up until the mid-19th Century, pre-Confederation Canadians expressed little interest in the west, after Confederation the fertile lands west of Lake Superior started to look appealing. George F.G. Stanley observed: “Canadian people began to regard the vast unpeopled territories to the west as the natural outlet for their surplus population and as the necessary complement for the full development of their commerce and nationality.” Unfortunately, Canadian eyes were not the only ones looking west. Manifest Destiny had gripped the American consciousness. Stanley wrote: “...the purchase of Alaska from the Russians by the United States [in 1867] was a sharp reminder of the covetous interest Americans had always displayed in the northern regions of the continent.” The fear of American annexation was reinforced when the US offered to purchase Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company for ten million dollars in 1866. American interest in Western Canada prompted Macdonald to rise in the House of Commons and state: It is imperative to find a broad country from the expansion of our adventurous youth, who are not satisfied to look here and there for an isolated tract fit for settlement. It has consequently always been a
political cry in Western Canada that this country must be obtained; no sentimental cry either, but one eminently practical – a cry expressive of both principle and interest. If this country is to remain British, it is only by being included in the British North America scheme.  

Thus, for want of an outlet for commerce and a growing population, and in response to the threat of American expansion into Western Canada did the young Dominion adopt its own, uniquely Canadian version of Manifest Destiny and enter into the ecosystem of conflict that was centered upon Fort Garry and the Red River Settlement.

Theorist David Killcullen writes that the ecosystem of conflict is one in which multiple, independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage, collaborate or compete in pursuit of their interests. At the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, the interests of American annexationists, Canadian expansionists, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the people of the Red River Settlement collided. In pursuit of their interests, the Government of Canada used a 3D approach to secure its national goal.

Old Macdonald had 3Ds

The Whole of Government approach used by Macdonald’s government is often overshadowed by the predominance of the Wolseley Expedition. This is understandable, since the military expedition was by far the most manifest of the government’s attempts to bring the recalcitrant colony to heel. Also, the lengthy, torturous route and sheer force of will required to complete the expedition ensured that the Wolseley Expedition would attain a certain legendary status that all but eclipsed other tools of the Macdonald government. To be sure, the Wolseley Expedition was a valuable, perhaps the most valuable, weapon in the Whole of Government arsenal, but the “defence” part of the formula, to use the modern day term, was not the sole tool employed by the Macdonald government.

Diplomacy

While Canada did not acquire de jure control over all of its diplomatic efforts until the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, it nonetheless conducted diplomatic
efforts in pursuit of its national interests, albeit within the limitations inherent in being a colonial dominion. As there were many actors involved, Canada’s diplomatic actions covered a wide spectrum.

When it was determined that a military force would need to be deployed to the Red River, the Macdonald government fully understood that any such military force would have to be a joint Anglo-Canadian adventure. Having no permanent military of its own, and only a Militia to call upon, Canada lacked the military muscle to unilaterally launch such an audacious expedition. An additional motivating factor was fear of American expansionism, and it was believed that only the inclusion of British regulars would deter American action. As a result, Ottawa entered into a series of negotiations with London to secure British participation in the expedition.

However, the British were not particularly interested. The expense of maintaining a global colonial garrison, and the waning interest in empire, spurred Britain to begin withdrawing her troops back home. That said, after much correspondence between the Dominion and Imperial Governments, Canada was able to secure British participation in the expedition. However, they were on a very short leash. The Commander-in-Chief Canada, Lieutenant-General the Honourable James Lindsay, made clear to the Canadian Government that all British forces, including those participating in the Red River expedition, would leave Canada for Britain by the winter of 1870. Further, the Governor-General informed Macdonald that it was not the wish of the Imperial Government that British forces were to be used to compel the Red River settlers to unite with Canada, and that other means should also be employed. Despite these constraints, the Dominion Government was able to diplomatically ensure British participation, which added veracity to the expedition.

Diplomacy was also employed to secure a peaceful settlement with the Red River settlers. From the outset, Macdonald was not adverse to negotiations with Louis Riel. In late-December, he dispatched a delegation to Fort Garry in an attempt to peaceably resolve the situation. Macdonald sent federal representatives in the personages of Grand-Vicar Jean-Baptiste Thibault, Colonel Charles-René-Léonidas d’Irumberry de Salaberry (son of Charles de Salaberry, hero of the Battle of Châteauguay in 1813), and Donald A. Smith (a senior officer of the Hudson’s Bay Company) to explain the Canadian position. In addition, he managed to secure the assistance of Bishop Alexandre Tache of St. Boniface, who was in Rome for an Ecumenical Conference, in the hope that his close association with the Red River population might lead to a peaceful solution. The federal delegation arrived, and during 19-20 January 1870, Donald Smith gave two speeches in which he “… communicated his understanding of Canada’s intention with respect to the settlement and to settlers and their existing privileges and rights.” The speeches were well-received, and they contributed to continued peaceful negotiations. It should be noted, however, that Macdonald was a deft and opportunistic politician, and Smith had been despatched to Red River with secret orders to foment a counter-revolution amongst those agreeable to the Canadian position. In fact, he found no such appetite among the populace, save for a small number of pro-Canada extremists, so instead, he pursued the goal of his ‘cover story.’

The government in Red River dispatched delegates to Ottawa as well. On 22 March, the Reverend J.J. Ritchot, John Black, and American saloon owner Alfred H. Scott departed Fort Garry for Ottawa with the Bill of Rights drafted by the Provisional Government for presentation to the Dominion Government. It is important to note that this delegation departed after the execution of Thomas Scott, when martial fervour was at a fever pitch in Ontario. As a result, upon their arrival in Ontario, the delegation was arrested for complicity in the murder of Thomas Scott. The federal government wisely intervened to secure their release, after which the Dominion Government and the Red River delegates entered into discussions with respect to the future of the Red River Settlement. All this indicates that the Macdonald government was clearly willing to use the diplomatic tool to achieve their national goal, engaging both the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government in a manner to best pursue their own interests. In particular, it should be noted that the negotiations that were entered into by the delegates of the Provisional Government and the Government of Canada eventually produced the Manitoba Act that created the Province of Manitoba, and, legally speaking, achieved the political goal of bringing Rupert’s Land into Confederation.
The actual development of Manitoba was slow to occur. The technology of the era, coupled with the isolation of the province, meant that infrastructure development would take years, if not decades to attain. That notwithstanding, the first step in ensuring a prosperous province was the establishment of a safe and secure environment. When Archibald assumed his post as the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba on 2 September, “… rather than pursue former members of the Provisional Government with warrants and threats, [he] devoted much of his time and most of his efforts to organizing the civil administration.”\(^{18}\) The first order of business was to establish some form of law and order. Manitoba’s first year was one of high tension, as former enemies continued to live side-by-side. In order to address this situation, Archibald first attempted to recruit a police force from the local population. Unfortunately, very few volunteers came forward, so, as a result, the offer was extended to members of the Ontario and Quebec Rifles – the two Militia battalions that had participated in the Wolseley Expedition and remained behind when the British regulars departed – who provided the nucleus for the first Manitoba Constabulary.\(^{19}\) This was followed closely by the construction of the province’s first jail.\(^{20}\)

Further development of the province continued with the release of Militia soldiers, a large number of whom were given grants of land in the province. Others took up employment on the Dawson Road – a federal initiative to build a road from the grants of land in the province. A JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public) capable force is defined as follows:

…”a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations) which inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place. To be ‘JIMP-capable’ entails the adoption of an approach to operations, both domestic and international, that allows such players to effectively interact. Most importantly, it involves a belief in the requirement to adopt a comprehensive approach to problem solving that involves the holistic consideration and, ideally the coordination of all relevant players.\(^{21}\)"

The key component, therefore, is not necessarily the structure of the force itself, but its ability to comprehensively interact with all necessary elements. A critical part of the Canadian strategy was the assembly of a JIMP-capable force personified by the Wolseley Expedition.

### Joint

The ‘joint’ element of the concept is defined as “…involving other national military elements and support organizations.”\(^{22}\) The force dispatched to the Red River was not particularly joint in the way the term is understood today. As the area of operations concerned is found in the centre of the continent, there was not much requirement for naval support, once the inland route was chosen over the option to sail to York Factory and approach from the north. However, during its transit of the Great Lakes from Collingwood to Port Arthur (modern-day Thunder Bay) at least one Canadian gunboat was known to be patrolling Lake Huron to defend against Fenian attacks on the expedition.\(^{23}\) Additionally, while not strictly naval elements (the Royal Canadian Navy would not come into being until 1910) the steamships chartered for the transit of the Great Lakes were certainly a maritime component of the force.

### Interagency

The ‘interagency’ element is defined as “… involving other government departments and agencies, both domestic and foreign (these will include, host nation government departments including security forces; government departments and agencies from support nations; and international government bodies, such as UN agencies).”\(^{24}\) The Wolseley Expedition truly reflected the Whole of Government philosophy of the Macdonald government, in particular, concerning the cooperation demonstrated between different agencies of the federal government. The logistical and administrative arrangements were the responsibility of the Control Department, who were tasked with “looking after the foodstuffs, forage, fuel, stores, etc.”

### A JIMP-Capable Force

While the term JIMP is a recent creation, the concept of JIMP has existed for some time. The Wolseley Expedition embodied the concept of JIMP in spirit, even if it was not specifically labelled as such. Regardless, the concept of what JIMP is provides an excellent tool for analyzing the cohesive and coherent force assembled by the Macdonald government. A JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public) capable force is defined as follows:

…”a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations) which inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place. To be ‘JIMP-capable’ entails the adoption of an approach to operations, both domestic and international, that allows such players to effectively interact. Most importantly, it involves a belief in the requirement to adopt a comprehensive approach to problem solving that involves the holistic consideration and, ideally the coordination of all relevant players.\(^{21}\)"

The key component, therefore, is not necessarily the structure of the force itself, but its ability to comprehensively interact with all necessary elements. A critical part of the Canadian strategy was the assembly of a JIMP-capable force personified by the Wolseley Expedition.
hospital supplies, postal, pay” and other necessities. In addition, Mr. S.J. Dawson of Canadian Public Works was employed to improve the road from Port Arthur, as well as the purchase of the wagons to traverse the road, the hiring of the teamsters, road workmen, and voyageurs, and the chartering of the steamships that would transport the expedition from Collingwood to Fort William.

Multinational

The ‘multinational’ element is defined as “… involving one or more allies or international coalition partners.” As mentioned previously, the Macdonald government felt that British involvement was critical to ensuring that the political message delivered by the expedition had some substance. From a practical standpoint, the time it would take to assemble and train a force of volunteers, and the concern with respect to the effectiveness of a wholly Militia force if hostilities erupted, meant that a regular army component was necessary. Canada did not establish its own permanent force until October 1871, so the only recourse for the Macdonald government was to ensure British military participation. However, since the intent of the expedition was to secure Rupert’s Land for Canada, there had to be some Canadian participation. In the end, the Wolseley Expedition consisted of one battalion of British regulars (the 60th Regiment – a British unit stationed in Canada) and two battalions of volunteers from Canadian Militia units who formed the 1st Ontario Rifles and 1st Quebec Rifles. Additionally, this force was augmented with a detachment of Royal Artillery, a detachment of Royal Engineers, and a detachment of the Army Hospital Corps and Army Service Corps. The latter two elements fell under command of Assistant Controller Irvine of the Control Department.

Public

The ‘public’ element is defined as “… involving a variety of elements including: domestic and international publics, host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations, public volunteer organizations, international organizations and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms recruited to support the government.” Wolseley engaged the public early in his approach to Red River. Upon his arrival at Port Arthur, he dispatched a letter to the people of the Red River Settlement which was duly published in the local newspapers, including Riel’s New Nation. Riel helped set the type himself! Wolseley’s proclamation is an excellent example of early Public Affairs work to shape the opinion of the target population to facilitate a military force achieving its mission. As such, excerpts of it are worthy of inclusion here:

The Red River (Wolseley) Expedition at Kakabeka Falls, 1870.

Our mission is one of peace and the sole object of the expedition is to secure Her Majesty’s sovereign authority - Courts of Law such as are common to every portion of Her Majesty’s Empire will be duly established and Justice will be impartially administered to all races and to all classes. The Loyal Indians or Half Breeds being as dear to our Queen as any other of her Loyal Subjects.

The force I have the honour of commanding will enter your Province representing no party either in Religion or Politics, and will offer equal protection to the lives and property of all races and of all creeds.

The strictest order and discipline will be maintained and private property will be carefully respected. All supplies furnished to the troops will be duly paid for - should any one consider himself injured by any individual attached to the force his grievances shall be promptly enquired into.

All loyal people are earnestly invited to aid me in carrying out the above mentioned subjects.

Additionally, the Macdonald government was astute enough to understand that one of the best ways to ensure a peaceful transition to Confederation in Manitoba was to leave local administration in place as long as possible, and to gradually transition to federal authority. Macdonald was wary of allowing the military commander to assume the duties of a civilian authority over the province of Manitoba. When the delegation representing the Provisional Government left Ottawa with the Manitoba Act, they enquired as to whom should administer the Province until the arrival of the new lieutenant-governor. George Etienne-Cartier, Macdonald’s ‘right-hand man’ and a member of the federal delegation...
responded, “... let Mr. Riel continue to maintain order and govern the country as he has done up to the present moment.” Riel did, in fact, remain in authority after the Provisional Government ratified the Manitoba Act on 24 June. Unfortunately, upon the arrival of the Wolseley Expedition in Fort Garry on 24 August, Riel and many of his lieutenants fled. The federal government prevaricated on the subject of a promised amnesty to the members of the Provisional Government, and there was a legitimate concern that with the arrival of the military force, pro-Canada extremists who had been incarcerated under Riel, would seek retribution. The departure of Riel, and the collapse of the Provisional Government, coupled with the delayed arrival of the lieutenant-governor, resulted in a lack of civil authority in the province. Wolseley approached the Hudson’s Bay Company to fill the authority-void, as it represented the last legitimate civil authority in Red River prior to Riel’s Provisional Government. Thus, “… the Hudson’s Bay Company, although for only a brief period between 24 August and 2 September, became the de facto, if not the de jure civil authority in the new province.”

The Wolseley Expedition was a force ahead of its time. It was a JIMP-capable expeditionary force that was able to employ a comprehensive approach that welded together interacting elements to achieve the Dominion’s strategic goal. However, it was more than just a formed body of troops. The Wolseley Expedition was a well organized political tool that represented one of Canada’s first uses of military forces utilized for broad political purposes.

**Rowboat Diplomacy**

In his 1981 work, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979*, strategic theorist James Cable defined gunboat diplomacy as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nations within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.” While at first blush this term may not seem appropriate for consideration here, if Cable’s definition is looked at from a broader perspective, and not limited to naval elements, one can see that any military force can achieve the effects he ascribes to gun boat diplomacy. In particular, Cable argues that naval forces can embody several different types of force: a definitive force – that force that is used to remove the cause of a dispute; a purposeful force – that force that is used to change the policies of the target government; and an expressive force – that force that is employed as outlets for emotion. The Wolseley Expedition, in one way or another, embodied each of these types of forces.

**A Definitive Force**

The existence of the Provisional Government was the dispute that faced the Canadian Government. The Macdonald government had entered into good faith negotiations with the Hudson’s Bay Company and secured the purchase of Rupert’s Land in what it saw as a perfectly legal and legitimate transaction. The ethical dilemma of non-consultation with the local inhabitants did not seem to factor into the negotiations whatsoever. Thus, when the Métis band stopped the recognized representative of the federal government from assuming his (perceived) rightful duties as governor, a political dispute arose. The Dominion Government used a number of its strategic tools to resolve the issue, which came to a peaceful conclusion with the ratification of the Manitoba Act by Riel’s Provisional Government. The peaceful end to the dispute was not always a foregone conclusion, however. There remained the threat of...
that an agreement would not be reached with Riel’s Provisional Government, and the territory would have to be annexed by force, although this was by no means the preferred solution.37 Certainly, in the minds of the members of the expedition, their role was to ‘conquer’ the territory. Despite the peaceful overtures expressed by Wolseley in his proclamation mentioned previously, upon arrival at Fort Garry on 24 August, he formed up the 60th Regiment in order of battle and marched on the fort, prepared for a fight. Upon their arrival, they found the fort empty, guns unmanned and flags struck from the poles.38 Such a martial manner is odd, considering that two months earlier, to the day, the Provisional Government had ratified the Manitoba Act and essentially joined Confederation. Perhaps one can attribute this to the poor state of communications extant at the time that prevented Colonel Wolseley from learning that the Provisional Government was, by order of the federal government, the legitimate representation of the Crown in Manitoba. Had Wolseley not appeared to be so bent on a fight, perhaps Riel and his lieutenants would not have fled, and the province would not have been thrown into a temporary state of anarchy, due to the lack of civil authority that followed. Regardless, had negotiations not been as productive as they were, the military expedition was prepared (some might argue too prepared) to remove the cause of the dispute with force.

A Purposeful Force

As mentioned previously, the ecosystem of conflict is a mass of interlinked actors pursuing their own interests either through competition or collaboration. The Wolseley Expedition was dispatched in order to pre-empt the Manifest Destiny policy of the United States. As noted previously, American interest in annexing the Canadian West was on the rise, fuelled by the concept of Manifest Destiny, and by the lure of fertile arable land for settlement.39 The establishment of Canadian authority in the province, coupled with the two battalions of Canadian volunteers that occupied the territory, sent a clear message to Washington that Manitoba was Canadian territory.

An Expressive Force

Perhaps the greatest role that the expedition played was that of an expressive force. As demonstrated previously, the Macdonald government, and the Imperial government in London, preferred a peaceful settlement of the dispute that was amenable to both Ottawa and the Red River Settlement. The expedition was considered early, but its role was primarily one of a purposeful force to pre-empt American interest in the west, rather than a definitive force to remove Riel and his supporters by force. The situation changed drastically, however, upon the execution of Thomas Scott by the Provisional Government. Until that point, the Dominion government was still weighing the benefits of dispatching a force. However, “… the issue of sending a police force, or a military expedition to Red River was settled, not by Macdonald… but by an outburst of political indignation in Ontario when news broke of the execution of the Ontario surveyor and Orangeman, Thomas Scott.”40 The bloodlust was palpable in the editorials of the expansionist-minded newspapers, and an invigorated Canada First movement that became the primary political instrument for expansionists in Ontario.41 Neither Macdonald, nor any politician, could afford to ignore the political momentum that had arisen surrounding the execution of Thomas Scott. Riel’s firing squad had settled the debate concerning the dispatch of the Wolseley Expedition. Macdonald knew that whether or not the force would ever bring Riel and his supporters to battle, the force would have to be sent in order to sate the appetite for revenge that permeated Ontario. This is instructive, since it indicates that not only are the actors in the ecosystem of conflict external to one another, each also contains internal actors for whom there must be an accounting. While geographically, an ecosystem of conflict may be limited to a theatre or area of operations, politically it is spatially boundless.

Conclusion

This article is not an endorsement of the actions of either the Macdonald government, nor of the Provisional Government under Louis Riel. In both camps there is sufficient unethical behaviour to warrant a certain degree of condemnation. Regardless of the morality of the ‘ends,’ the
"means" employed by the young Dominion constituted a Whole of Government approach.

The Whole of Government approach used by the Macdonald government achieved its political goal by pursuing its strategic end state along a number of lines of operation. Diplomatically, it ensured British participation in the military force to lend veracity to its operations, and engaged the Provisional Government in diplomatic exchanges and negotiations which eventually produced a mutually-amenable political settlement to the dispute. The federal government set the conditions for a peaceful and prosperous Province of Manitoba by developing the civil administration and setting the conditions for law and order to facilitate economic prosperity. The Dominion cobbled together a robust military force that included all the elements of military power available to the government, as well as other federal departments, and local (Red River) public and government agencies. This provided a military component that was poised to remove the obstacle to the political goal by force if necessary, deterred American incursions into the Canadian West, and sated the public desire for action in retribution for the execution of Thomas Scott.

NOTES

4. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 47.
8. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 73.
9. Ibid, p. 76.
10. Ibid, p. 81.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, p. 76.
13. Ibid, p. 60.
17. Ibid, p. 65.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Gizewski and Rostek, p. 56.
26. Gizewski and Rostek, p. 56.
27. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 88.
28. Campbell.
29. Gizewski and Rostek, p. 57.
30. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 258.
32. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 178.
34. George Etienne-Cartier quoted in Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 184.
35. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 185.
37. Stanley, Toil and Trouble, p. 76.
40. Ibid, p. 77.
41. Ibid, p. 79.
I have just read the article After Afghanistan: Canada’s Return to UN Peacekeeping by Professor Michael Byers in Vol. 13, No. 1 of the Canadian Military Journal. I will not take issue with the central argument of his article, other than to say that Canada should not undertake any military mission that is not in Canada’s national interests, however defined, and should only do so when there is a reasonable chance that the mission will be successful.

I will take issue with one statement: “Since 2006 [i.e. since the summer war between Israeli and Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia terrorist group], UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] has successfully prevented a return to all-out hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.” This assertion, unadorned by any supporting argument or evidence, cannot stand unchallenged. The statement is, in my opinion, dead wrong.

I was the Canadian Defence Attaché to Israel from 2004-2008, and so was intimately involved in Canada’s effort to evacuate Canadians from Lebanon during the 2006 war, by being the interface between the Government of Canada and the Israel Defence Forces. [This is not in error - it is Israel, not Israeli, Defence Forces] And I was the front-line war analyst and reporter for the Government, since I was the Canadian who attended all the IDF briefings given to defence attachés about the war’s progress. Since my departure from Israel, I have very closely monitored events in the region, not least the cold peace that exists between Israel and Hezbollah.
To raise the first and most obvious objection to the author’s statement, if UNIFIL has prevented another Israel-Hezbollah war, why did UNIFIL not prevent the 2006 war? While UNIFIL was ‘beefed-up’ after the war, what is so fundamentally different about it now that it has succeeded where the smaller UNIFIL signally failed, if failure it was? The author does not tell us.

Whatever UNIFIL’s contribution to the peace since 2006, it is far, far less than that of fear; both Israel and Hezbollah are deterring each other from going to war again.

Israel fears Hezbollah. Israel is deterred by Hezbollah because it knows that another war will see a far greater number of rockets and missiles being fired at Israel than in 2006, of which many will inevitably get through. In 2006, Hezbollah rockets killed numerous Israelis and did considerable damage to northern Israel; one-third of Israelis living within range of Hezbollah rockets evacuated to the south.

Hezbollah now boasts a rocket and missile inventory that, according to Israeli Defence Minister Barak, stands at 75,000, or some five times more than Hezbollah had in 2006. Even with a high success rate from the Iron Dome and Patriot interceptors, Israel’s anti-rocket and anti-missile defences will simply be swamped. Israeli casualties will be higher, perhaps much higher than in 2006, and the damage done will also be greater.

Moreover, Hezbollah may also have some Scud guided missiles, courtesy of Syria, with which it can strike anywhere in Israel. The Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona is an obvious target, although Patriots may prevent any successful attack on it. Hezbollah has recently boasted that it has the capability to hit any target in Israel; unlike in 2006, when no Hezbollah missiles hit Tel Aviv, it is certain that Hezbollah could do so today. [On the first night of the 2006 war, the Israeli Air Force destroyed all of the several dozen long-range Hezbollah missiles, the only ones Hezbollah had that were capable of reaching Tel Aviv. It is not known whether Israel will be able to pull off a similar and equally remarkable intelligence coup in any new war.]

Israel is thus very afraid of what Hezbollah will be able to do in another war, and so does not want to start one, save in the case of a pre-emptive strike, either because they fear Hezbollah is about to attack, or possibly in the case of having

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A Lebanese Hezbollah guerrilla observes a fire rising from a burning object in a Beirut suburb, 17 July 2006.
intelligence that Hezbollah is starting to get chemical weapons from Syria. The Israeli fear factor will go even higher if Hezbollah gets chemical weapons. In fact, I believe both Hezbollah and Syria are very worried that the Israelis could be prompted to strike should Hezbollah get them, which is why I believe that this has not occurred, at least not at the time of this writing. That Israel is prepared to act was demonstrated on 30 January of this year, when it attacked a convoy headed to Lebanon from Syria reportedly transporting advanced surface-to-air missiles destined for Hezbollah.

Israel is thus deterred by Hezbollah, and UNIFIL has nothing whatsoever to do with this. UNIFIL has signally failed to halt Hezbollah re-armament since 2006. UNIFIL cannot do anything about the smuggling north of the Litani River, since it is not deployed there. But UNIFIL also will not enter towns and villages south of the Litani without an escort of Lebanese troops, which effectively means the Lebanese Army has a veto on any UNIFIL attempt to deal with Hezbollah weaponry being brought into the area.

Because the Lebanese Government (that part that is not Hezbollah) and many Lebanese people are so afraid of Hezbollah, the Government does not want UNIFIL to have unfettered access to towns and villages to get at Hezbollah weapons. Hezbollah has switched its deployment strategy since 2006; prior to the war, Hezbollah rocket sites were largely based in rural areas. They are now largely in urban areas, in part to ensure more Lebanese civilian casualties, more schools and mosques being destroyed, and so on, in another war, thus aiding Hezbollah’s propaganda efforts. There have been almost no seizures of Hezbollah weaponry since 2006 by UNIFIL.

In fact, I believe not only is Hezbollah deterring Israel, I think it is deterring UNIFIL as well, since no troop-contributing nation in UNIFIL is really prepared to go to war with Hezbollah to try to disarm it. Indeed, it did not take long for the UN to make clear its unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah or to prevent weapons being smuggled to it. On 27 August 2006, the UN Secretary-General said that UNIFIL would not intercept arms shipments from Syria, unless requested to do so by Lebanon. Few if any such requests have been made.

And Hezbollah? Hezbollah fears Israel greatly. Hezbollah is deterred from war by Israel, because it is very afraid of what Israel will do in the next war. Israeli officials and politicians have made it very clear publicly that Israel will conduct a very different kind of war the next time. In 2006, the Israel Defence Forces obeyed an Israeli Cabinet directive that Lebanese infrastructure was not to be harmed (something not widely known or appreciated), except for that infrastructure which could aid Hezbollah directly in its military efforts. So, for example, Beirut’s airport was hit to prevent Iran or Syria from using it to re-arm Hezbollah during the war.

In the next war, the Israelis will knock out all important Lebanese infrastructure sites, probably within a couple of days into the war. IDF reservists will be mobilized, in the tens of thousands, and three-or-four IDF mechanized divisions will roll north into Lebanon. We can expect IDF forces to operate from the start in Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley stronghold. With the lights literally turned out all over Lebanon, Israel will proceed to grind Hezbollah to military dust; Israel will be deaf to the inevitable international pleas to cease fire.

All of this can be expected, because no Israeli politician of any stripe would want a repeat of the indifferent results of Israel’s military operation of 2006. No Israeli politician could survive if the result is anything less than the military defeat of Hezbollah. Incidentally, though it is commonly believed otherwise, the IDF in fact scored some impressive military successes during the war, such as destroying all of Hezbollah’s long-range missiles on the first night of the war, as noted above. Still, the overall result of Israel’s military effort in 2006 has been accurately described as failure, but not defeat.

Nasrallah knows what Israel is going to do if there is another war. He also knows that the Lebanese people will punish Hezbollah very badly if its military adventurism leads to another war. Indeed, Nasrallah said famously after 2006 that if he had known what the Israeli reaction was going to be,
Hezbollah would never have carried out the kidnap operation that sparked the war.

All this explains why Hezbollah, though re-arming ‘to the teeth’ and hence deterring Israel, has not fired one shot at Israel since 2006. Not a single one. They may have been behind a couple of terrorist attacks elsewhere, but for the Israelis - at least if there are not too many casualties in such attacks - that is within the current ‘rules of the game’, just as Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah operatives like Mugniyeh are part of the game, rules which do not include going to war for acts carried out outside Lebanon and Israel, with the possible exception of deniable assassinations by Israel in Lebanon. The only thing that Hezbollah has done is carry out its relatively-recent unarmed drone stunt. Even doing that was probably with no little trepidation on Hezbollah’s part. They did not claim the drone ‘victory’ until a week later, although they were quick to admit that they expected Israel to shoot it down, which is what happened.

The Hezbollah propagandists then ‘went way overboard’ about the drone stunt. They actually posted a photo of a UAV with a Hezbollah logo cropped into it - except that it was clearly a US UAV, because you could clearly see the US emblem still in the photo on the aircraft. The IDF’s reaction to the drone, aside from shooting it down? Israeli fighters flew over Beirut the next day, breaking the sound barrier and creating sonic booms. However, the Israelis did not pull any triggers, because Israel is still deterred by Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, after a short post-war pause, Israel resumed reconnaissance flights over Lebanon to keep track of Hezbollah military moves and sites. Hezbollah has not fired one shot at them. Not one. UNIFIL’s contribution? Counting the number of flights and lodging protests.

Hezbollah is thoroughly deterred by Israel, because Hezbollah knows the next war is going to turn out very badly for Hezbollah and all of Lebanon. Not because UNIFIL is in the way; to Hezbollah and Israel, UNIFIL will be at most a minor annoyance.

For these reasons, I simply cannot accept Professor Byers’s statement. It ignores utterly the powerful and dominant fear factor, the factor which since 2006 has been the reason why Israel and Hezbollah have not gone to war.

In the next war, in light of the death of four UN military observers in 2006, UNIFIL will, I believe, pull its troops out of the more exposed posts into as few sites as possible. Indeed, troop-contributing nations may choose to pull their troops out of Lebanon altogether, if they think they can do so without being caught in the crossfire. They will thus not even be able to record most of the events taking place.

So UNIFIL’s ‘track record’ since 2006 has not been a good one. Mutual deterrence - great fear - has kept another war from breaking out, not UNIFIL’s presence or activities. UNIFIL has not stopped Hezbollah from re-arming. UNIFIL cannot stop IDF over flights of Lebanon. And UNIFIL will not even be able, in my opinion, to play the role of recording current history during the next war, if there is one.

Colonel (ret’d) R. Geoffrey St. John, MSM, CD, formerly an Intelligence Branch officer, was the Canadian Defence Attaché to Israel from 2004 to 2008, and Chief of the Middle East / North Africa Section at Chief of Defence Intelligence, National Defence Headquarters from 2010 to 2011.
My interest in Google Earth was first piqued after a friend of mine, Corporal Johann Reimer, had returned from a nine month tour at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, in 2006. As the initial medic on the scene of a mass-casualty incident, he helped apply life-saving first aid to soldiers wounded by a rocket attack against one of the base’s many mess halls. As all soldiers do, Johann found humour in the story of a wounded but happy comrade, saved by the ice cream he had bent to retrieve, which left his posterior to absorb several pieces of shrapnel otherwise aimed at his chest. The architect of the rocket strike, later killed by an American gunship, was begrudgingly admired for his skill in accurately targeting specific facilities on the base. Months later, I noticed several news outlets on the internet referring to
In the Interest of Empire

Maps and the military have a long and interwoven history, as conquest and empire have relied upon cartography for navigation, commerce, strategy, and tactics. The first ‘Empire Maps’ were produced by the Spanish and Portuguese in the 16th Century, and were known as the Padre Real, and the Padron Real. These maps were highly coveted and jealously guarded by Boards of Trade, as cartographer and author David Turnbull noted: “Portugal and Spain were the first nations to attempt to construct spaces within which to regulate all geographical knowledge.”

Akin to quelling a prison riot before it started, these states were attempting to ‘lock down’ cartographic knowledge, through proactive, not reactive action, leaving rival nations unaware and unable to compete for territory in the ‘New World.’

By establishing trade boards that allowed for the maintenance of trade monopolies, the Spanish and the Portuguese were able to safeguard the physical security of their colonies, upon which hinged the economic security of the state. Thus, maps became highly coveted and jealously guarded by the state as they became both the ‘blueprints’ of colonialism, and instruments of warfare. However, the Portuguese and Spanish could not maintain their stranglehold on maps of the ‘New World’ forever, and, plagued by technical problems, the Padre Real and the Padron Real fell into disuse and obscurity.

Despite the inherent technical and financial difficulties of charting empire, the allure of cartographic knowledge meant that great efforts were made, specifically by the French via the Cassinis, to map the territory of the state.

Thus, it is clear that since the advent of ‘empire mapping,’ the state has had a vested interest in limiting access to cartographic information in order to control knowledge vital for economic benefit and security. Chris Perkins, and Martin Dodge, in their excellent essay entitled Satellite Imagery and the Spectacle of Secret Places, (rightfully, I maintain) contextualize Europe’s history of state involvement in cartography, stating:

Large-scale national topographic surveys commissioned throughout Europe from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and extended to European colonies were established primarily to help military forces to maintain state control over territory. State mapping agencies almost all trace their origins to military needs and the cartographic specifications underlying most contemporary national ‘framework’ geospatial data-sets are derived from the needs of war fighting.

The power of the map became of utmost importance, not only to the state that endeavoured to chart its empire, but to rival nations, who had a great amount to gain by acquiring the cartographic knowledge of their opponents. In this manner, wars for information started in earnest.

Knowledge as Power

From both a strategic and economic perspective, it is vital for states to map, not only their internal boundaries, but those of their neighbours. In an ever globalizing world, the scale of ‘neighbour’ has increased to encompass the planet, meaning that nations invest enormous efforts of capital and manpower to map the ‘other.’ Today’s surveillance technology is a far cry from Lord Baden-Powell’s mapping of enemy positions by hand – indeed, it is a world of satellites, spy planes, and clandestine operations. The Cold War and cartography were very much correlated in the rise of modern geographic survey technology, as states spared little expense to map enemy positions, routes, infrastructure, and activities. While this technology and cartographic knowledge was initially hidden from the public, brought out only occasionally for the needs of national security, the civilian world gained slowly gained access to cartographic knowledge once only held within the

insurgent use of Google Earth to plot rocket firing solutions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I couldn’t help but think back to the tale of the life-saving ice cream. This short article will address the ever-unfolding and still-unfinished story of insurgent utilization of Google Earth, set within the history of cartography and empire, and the decentralization of geographic knowledge in the 21st Century. The first two chapters, In the Interest of Empire, and Knowledge as Power, will situate the reader within the history of mapping, security, and the state. From Enter Google Earth onwards to the final conclusion, a discussion on insurgent use of Google Earth, a powerful, satellite-based, global cartographic application, including case studies, will be undertaken. The intent here is to highlight how the technical innovation Google Earth is revolutionizing public access to geographic information, now that cartography is becoming a decentralized endeavour.

This unprecedented access to specialized satellite material, once under the sole purview of the state security and cartographic information, now that cartography is becoming a cartographic innovation undertaken. The intent here is to highlight how the technical innovation Google Earth is revolutionizing public access to geographic information, now that cartography is becoming a decentralized endeavour. This unprecedented access to specialized satellite material, once under the sole purview of the state, has generated unintended insurgent utilization by virtue of the transition from state to public ownership of geographic data. To properly contextualize this evolution, the initial link between the state security and cartographic knowledge must be discussed.

Peter Birch, Google Earth Product Manager, presents the future of Google 3D Maps at the company’s offices in San Francisco, 6 June 2012.
views and opinions

purview of the state. As the commercial demand grew, the public began to utilize military cartographic technology for civil activities. The Global Positioning System, widely known by its acronym GPS, was initially developed by the government of the United States to fixate military movements on battlefield maps, and it is now available globally to the public. It is still owned by the US government, and it is considered a national resource, with every aspect of the service controlled by the state. In the event of a conflict, or situation where it deems necessary, the US government is able to either reduce the accuracy of, or completely block out civilian GPS receivers. This fact, in itself, has led to many nations and organizations, including China, Russia, and the European Union, to develop native systems to provide GPS capability. Moreover, it demonstrates the continued need for the state to strictly control access to and use of cartographic resources. This brings about the interesting question of what governments are to do when they can no longer control the creation and distribution of cartographic knowledge, specifically when said knowledge contains information vital to military interests.

*Enter Google Earth*

Developed privately by Keyhole Inc., and purchased by Google in 2004, *Google Earth* is a virtual globe, map, and geographical program available for free, on the internet. Simply put, *Google Earth* gives users access to the world at their fingertips, and by utilizing satellite photos at an average resolution of 15m per pixel, almost any part of the planet can be ‘zoomed in’ upon, providing information on buildings, roads, topography, and so on. When combined with another Google product, known as ‘Google Street View,’ users are able to view a digital image of the street correlated to the location they are viewing on Google Earth. Thus, *Google Earth* provides citizens free imagery and cartographic knowledge which was once under the sole purview of the state. Roger Stahl, in his essay, *Becoming Bombs: 3D Animated Satellite Imagery and the Weaponization of the Civic Eye*, discusses the impact and power of *Google Earth*:

> Since its public unveiling in 2005, *Google Earth* has been unable to shed its martial aura. Because the view from the sky has so long been a lever of military power, the new “regimes of visibility” precipitated by *Google Earth* have become sites of contest both in terms of domestic national security and international geopolitics. To many in the West, its unveiling recalled Cold War rumours of spy satellites that could read a license plate from space and a hundred Hollywood scenes of five-star generals doing so from high-tech dungeons deep in the earth. As the fabled technology settled into everyday civilian life, it seemed to recruit a nation of desktop generals who scanned the contours of the globe with bomb sight eyes. Throngs of amateur *Google Earth* “spies” began the task of seeking out and testing the technology against the planet’s secret spaces, pooling their findings in online communities. Perhaps the most famous of these “finds” was an enormous Chinese military training area, a mock-up of a section of the Chinese-Indian mountain border, discovered by a Californian living in Germany. The intrigue of this discovery propelled the story around the world with the momentum of the newest espionage blockbuster.

With the introduction of *Google Earth*, the general public is gaining access to cartographic knowledge once highly restricted and controlled, often with controversial results. The conflict between public the private rights, and state security in the age of *Google Earth* will be in focus for the remainder of this short article.

*Information Wars*

When the state was the traditional bastion for cartographic knowledge, access to information could be highly regulated and controlled. In the case of war and conflict, the axiom of “what you don’t know, can’t hurt you” could not be further from the truth. Warfare has always been, and will continue to be driven by information, meaning, what you don’t know can kill you. Thus, the state took issues of surveillance and imagery seriously, both to safeguard secrets, and to preserve strategy. *Google Earth*, in essence, provides the general public the power of the ever-seeing satellite eye, removing state supremacy in the realm of geographically situated knowledge. The corporate interests of *Google* are directly challenging state secrets, and suddenly, governments are no longer ‘in the driver’s seat.’ Journalist Roger Stahl reported the laconic view of Lieutenant General Leonid Sazhin, an analyst for the Russian Federal Security Service, who claimed: “Terrorists don’t need to reconnoitre the target. Now an American company is working for them.” The institutionalized state control of geographic knowledge is under threat, as Harley states: “[O]fficial
Google Earth and the ‘War on Terror’

In Western society, a key indicator that individuals/governments/corporations take reservation with an issue is demonstrated in their willingness to take legal action against a perceived slight or injustice. Take the seemingly-unprecedented example of British troops stationed in Basra, Iraq, where members of the Royal Green Jackets, an infantry unit, have threatened to sue Google if soldiers were wounded by an attack facilitated by Google Earth Images. In an article describing a historical ‘first,’ journalist Elinor Mills detailed how British soldiers had reacted to the knowledge that “… documents seized in raids on insurgents’ homes were printouts from photos taken from Google Earth that show the location of buildings, tents, latrines and lightly armoured vehicles.” When confronted with evidence that insurgents had pinpointed the precise latitude and longitude of soldiers’ quarters, a British intelligence officer surmised the situation by stating: “This is evidence, as far as we are concerned, for planning terrorist attacks...We believe they use Google Earth to identify the most vulnerable areas, such as tents.” Reports of similar incidents have occurred throughout Iraq, and the discovery of instructional videos located online briefing insurgents on how to use Google Earth to attack Coalition forces has made such news mainstream. Google Earth is becoming more than just an interesting application – it is becoming a weapon. Weapons do not have to consist of rifles, helicopter gunships, or grenades, as Captain (ret’d) Nathan Fick recalled in his memoirs One Bullet Away: “In the Marines, anything can be a weapon; it’s a whole new way of thinking. My plastic MRE (Meal, Ready-to-Eat) spoon was a weapon if I used it as an insulator on a radio antenna so that I could talk to jets and call in air strikes.” Concerns of the nefarious capabilities unintentionally laden within Google Earth have prompted controversy regarding the safety of soldiers deployed overseas during the ‘War on Terror,’ as well as within domestic security circles. China, Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain, Sudan, Jordan, Sweden, and the United States have all undertaken efforts to block or ban Google Earth from photographing certain facilities, including the White House, and Google Street View has been banned from photographing military bases in the United

Take 3rd World Ideology, Add 2nd World Weaponry, Plus 1st World Technology, Equals...

Within the tragic tale of the long-established Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that Israel has held the dominating position of military supremacy via technology and surveillance for several decades. This balance of power is slowly starting to shift, and one element in this ever-changing equation is the introduction and utilization of Google Earth by Palestinian militants to more accurately strike Israel with rockets. Striking distant targets with indirect fire (munitions fired beyond line-of-sight) is extremely difficult, as numerous variables are required to predict the necessary point of aim. Imagery from Google Earth allows the collection of distance, altitude, and target identification, allowing militants the ability to both fixate (figure out where they are) and orient (what way they need to point) rocket positions, to strike Israeli positions using firing tables. In layman’s terms, Google Earth allows Palestinian militant groups, such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, to more accurately strike specific locations within Israel, by giving them a better picture of real-world intelligence on the ground. This cartographic knowledge was once almost exclusively held by the Israelis, and Google Earth is, in essence, ‘levelling the playing field’ between the two combatants. Khaled Jaabari, a commander for the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, stated: “We [al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade] obtain the details from Google Earth and check them against our maps of the city centre and sensitive areas.” Thus, Google Earth is narrowing the technical divide between two historically mismatched opponents. Ten years ago, militants such as Khaled Jaabari simply could not match the surveillance and cartographic capabilities of the Israelis, who spent millions, if not billions of dollars to maintain such superiority. Now, groups like the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade are receiving high quality geographic information, for free. While this cost is easy for them to bear, it is certainly the opposite for the Israelis, and efforts have been undertaken to have imagery purposely censored or lowered in resolution to make targeting more difficult. Following the next case study of Google Earth and the ‘War on Terror,’ further discussion will deal with state responses and security issues regarding Google Earth.

map-making agencies, usually under the cloak of ‘national security,’ have been traditionally reticent about publishing details about what rules govern the information they exclude especially where this involves military installations or other politically sensitive sites. Google Earth has upset government hegemony over satellite imagery, and significant concern has been raised internationally over state secrets and security infrastructure shown within the plain sight of the public eye. Furthermore, Google Earth is being used by individuals and organizations in active, not passive methods, to challenge long-established state domination over space and military intelligence. The first case study that will be examined with be the use of Google Earth by Palestinian militants to strike targets within Israel.
Views and Opinions

States, as well as around sensitive facilities in Great Britain. While the efforts of many states in limiting the impact of sensitive cartographic knowledge to outsiders, access to Google Earth is widely available internationally, and on several occasions, Google has accidently revealed areas blurred out at the request of governments. While Chris Perkins and Martin Dodge assert that “...the most effective mapping...has been, and often still is, the exclusive preserve of the military,” they miss the point that insurgents do not need extraordinary complex or detailed maps to strike targets. Simply put, Google Earth provides, for free, a static, ‘bird’s-eye view’ of the battlefields of the 21st Century, a capability unavailable to all but a select group of states ten years ago. Google Earth can be, and has been used, to assist in successful insurgent operations that would have been unimaginable without the cartographic power of the state. This decentralization of knowledge is unprecedented, and this trend will likely increase, not decrease over time. Prior to concluding, this article will look at the response of Google Earth to claims that it threatens national security.

Responses from Google Earth

Google Earth has been both praised and pilloried for its responses to requests based upon national security concerns. While Google Earth director John Hanke has pointed out that terrorists have, and will continue to attack targets with or without Google Earth, on several occasions, Google has acquiesced to demands to reduce resolution on locations deemed sensitive, including complexes in India, Great Britain, and the United States. Furthermore, as Google Earth is based out of the United States, they are prohibited in exporting Google Earth to Iran, due to U.S. regulations. Despite the downscaling of resolutions in some sensitive areas, what is clear is that Google Earth is here to stay, and that it will be continued to be used for both peaceful and nefarious applications.

Implications and Conclusions

Google Earth represents more than a dual use (civilian/military) technology – it marks the movement of cartographic information, once jealously guarded and vetted by the state, into the public domain under private control. Maps possess enormous power, and the aforementioned transition is not without growing pains, as seen in case studies of Israel, and the ‘War on Terror.’ While the unintended capabilities of Google Earth represent a threat to the control of cartographic knowledge by the state, there is hope that the decentralization of geographic information will result in a more harmonious world. While this short article was intended to inform the reader about a developing cartographic story, the conclusion has not yet been written, as Google Earth remains in its infancy. Ultimately, like most things in this world, Google Earth will become what we, as humanity, make of it.

Lieutenant Nicholas Kaempffer, an artillery officer, has a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree in Geography from Queen’s University. He is a Troop Commander at the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School (RCAS).

NOTES

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid, p. 16.
6. Lord Baden-Powell, founder of the Boy Scouts, was an English officer during the 19th-20th Centuries, famous for his intelligence work, whereby he would disguise himself as a butterfly collector and sketch sensitive enemy military installations, hiding the outlines within the wings of his drawings.
7. A case in point was President Kennedy’s publication of Russian nuclear missile installations in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Surveillance photos from American U2 spy planes was used to garner both political support at home, and within the United Nations for a blockade of Cuba – a prime example of military cartography at work.
9. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
24. Ferro.
26. Ferro.
HOW MUCH STRATEGIC AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH?

by Martin Shadwick

In a fiscal environment so tight that the expansion of the RCAF’s Twin Otter fleet from four to five aircraft would be problematic, the quest in some quarters for a fifth C-17A Globemaster III (CC-177)—a decidedly more expensive proposition than the humble Twin Otter—will strike some observers as a quixotic ‘non-starter.’ If one considers the ramifications for strategic airlift of ending Canada’s major combat role in Afghanistan (a role that figured prominently in the raison d’être of the current C-17A fleet), the looming termination of Canada’s training role in Afghanistan, and the decidedly modest number of Canadian military personnel presently deployed on United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations and then adds the reservations of those who favour other procurement priorities, who harbour doubts about the C-17A’s ability to operate from short runways and austere airfields, or who are wary of the political optics of media imagery showing C-17As disgorging armoured limousines and SUVs during prime ministerial visits, then the case for a fifth C-17A may well sink below the ‘non-starter’ level. That said, it would be both imprudent and short-sighted to reject out of hand the augmentation of the existing C-17A fleet. The current fleet has performed yeoman service across a broad spectrum of non-military, quasi-military, and military roles, both at home and abroad, since the first aircraft was delivered to CFB Trenton in 2007, but fleets as tiny as four aircraft can pose a complex array of service-ability, availability, and cost-effectiveness issues. Canada may well find, upon closer inspection, that the experience of other C-17A operators, who initially acquired four aircraft, but then incrementally expanded their fleets—to eight in the case of the Royal Air Force and six in the case of the Royal Australian Air Force—would be worth emulating.

Having fumbled the acquisition of an earlier strategic airlifter—the Lockheed C-141A Starlifter—in the late-1960s, and then witnessed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for Canadian-owned (as distinct from pooled) strategic airlifters during the Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin eras, it is something of a miracle that Canada even acquired the C-17A. Liberal defence minister John McCallum, for example, informed the 2003 annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations that “… the Canadian Forces will not be unilaterally purchasing large transport planes.” In November 2002 and April 2003, testifying before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), McCallum took note of the substantial financial cost of strategic airlifters such as the C-17A, expressed concern over the perceived paucity of gainful employment for such aircraft in normal day-to-day (i.e., non-surge) operations, and observed that only two NATO members, the United States and the United Kingdom, possessed their own strategic airlifters. While acknowledging that strategic airlift was “a high prior-
ity,” McCallum argued that some form of pooling arrangement with NATO allies constituted the way forward. The lack of enthusiasm for a Canadian C-17A fleet was not confined to the political level. Rick Hillier, both before, and—at least initially—after his appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff, staunchly opposed acquisition of the C-17A, while championing the recapitalization of Canada’s tactical airlift (i.e., C-130 Hercules) capability.

It took the arrival of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, and, in particular, the pivotal efforts of his first minister of national defence, Gordon O’Connor, to secure C-17As for the Canadian Armed Forces. The new government argued that “today’s changing and uncertain global environment demands Canada’s military have its own reliable and independent access to strategic airlift to move heavy equipment quickly, over long distances and deliver it to where it is needed in Canada, in support of humanitarian relief, or to a theatre of operations.” Ottawa’s decision to acquire only four aircraft—internal air force studies had indicated a requirement for five or, preferably, six aircraft—was a reflection of hard-fought trade-offs, and, as such, something of a disappointment, but the core decision to eschew pooling in favour of a Canadian C-17A fleet was both prudent and pragmatic, given the inherent flexibility of strategic airlifters, the vagaries and risks of total dependence upon pooling, chartering or borrowing, and the unpredictable and unforgiving post-Cold War and post-9/11 strategic environment. It should, of course, be noted that acquisition of four C-17As did not totally eliminate the need to charter foreign airlift resources.

The decision to procure the C-17A, announced in June 2006 as part of a larger $17.1 billion mobility and logistical package that included three multi-role Joint Support Ships, a “... minimum” of sixteen medium-to-heavy-lift transport helicopters (i.e., a variant of the Boeing CH-47F Chinook), 17 tactical transport aircraft (ultimately the Lockheed C-130J Hercules), and 2300 medium logistics trucks, generated some criticism related to the modalities of the procurement process (i.e., the use of the Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN) mechanism, and the exclusion of the C-17A project, on ‘national security’ grounds, from the provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organization—Agreement on Government Procurement, and the Agreement on Internal Trade), but the C-17A purchase per se attracted virtually no political, public or media backlash. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, a fifth C-17A should have been pursued vigorously in 2006-2007 when the economy was comparatively healthy, when public support for defence modernization was comparatively robust, and the needs of the Afghan operation loomed large.

In a January 2013, position paper that “strongly” recommended the acquisition of “at least one” additional C-17A for the RCAF “as soon as possible”, the Air Force Association of Canada (AFAC) lauded both the C-17A’s “…ability to operate into and out of short runways and austere airfields” and its usefulness since entering service: “In just five years, the [C-17A] has enabled the Government of Canada to respond to a wide array of domestic and global humanitarian missions and expeditionary operations. Domestically, annual support to Op Nanook in the Arctic, and the re-supply of [Canadian Forces Station] Alert are prime examples of the aircraft’s capabilities. Internationally, the humanitarian relief mission to Haiti, the air bridge between Canada and Afghanistan, and the rapid transfer of support equipment to the Libyan campaign, clearly demonstrate the aircraft’s unique expeditionary capabilities. In fact, it was these attributes that enabled the Government to respond in Haiti and Libya within the first few hours of these crises...”

The position paper noted that some of the maintenance and support issues traditionally associated with small fleets had been mitigated by joining the C-17 “Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP), which allows certain support costs associated with the aircraft to be apportioned on a pro-rata basis across all users... A requisite of the GISP program, however, is that all aircraft in the global fleet must be maintained and upgraded to a common standard, requiring that they undergo a ‘heavy maintenance’ program approximately once every five years. This process takes about five months to complete, and, given the heavy utilization of Canada’s [C-17A] fleet over the past five years, all four of our aircraft will have to go through the program during the next two years. What this means in practical terms is that the [ambitious] tasking rate the RCAF has maintained in the past will not be attainable over the next two years—and this same situation will present itself every four-to-five years thereafter. In other words, Canada will face periods where the availability of strategic air mobility will be severely curtailed, and the CAF’s ability to respond to a crisis potentially jeopardized.” The paper acknowledged that the ‘operational pause’ “…the Canadian Forces are now experiencing may partially offset the near-term pressure on the [C-17A] fleet,” but cautioned that “…no one can predict when or where the next humanitarian disaster or global crisis will occur.”

A Canadian CC-177 completes a heavy equipment drop as part of the Joint Operational Access Exercise 13 (JOAX 13) held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 22 February 2013.
COMMENTARY

The AFAC paper posited that an additional C-17A would allow Ottawa to “avoid or reduce appreciably the requirement to use contracted offshore airlift resources to support CF operations, resulting in significant annual savings which could be used to offset acquisition costs associated with an extra aircraft,” adding that “…the need for contracted airlift may be especially acute should unforecasted demands occur during … heavy maintenance” periods. Moreover, an additional C-17A “… would increase the number of aircraft available for tasking by about 25 [percent] and also allow the RCAF to spread utilization over a larger fleet. This would provide the Government with an enhanced ability to respond to domestic and international crises, support its evolving strategy for exercising sovereignty over the lands and waters in Canada’s vast northern areas and reduce the costs associated with contracted airlift.”

Decidedly less than enthralled with the AFAC’s case for a fifth C-17A was Stephen Priestley of the online Canadian American Strategic Review (CASR). “The Air Force Association of Canada,” he writes, “now advocates us buying another C-17. The main reason stated is that the first go-around contract leaves us an aircraft short when the mandatory maintenance bell dings (well, we don’t want to void that add-on warranty, do we?). Nor do we want to be caught short on the [C-17’s] capabilities—which AFAC starts by praising but that former C-17 Project Management Office staffers now say never existed.” One aim “… of DND’s Airlift Capability Project (Strategic) was to garner a rough-field capability not available with leased airlifters while, at the same time, giving complete control over these new assets. Well, it seems that the C-17 Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program ensures that our control is limited.”

“Before we’re on the hook” for another C-17A, argues Priestley, “would the Airpower Advocacy Committee [of the AFAC] care to [tote] up how many billions we’ve spent so far” for the in-service support maintenance contract, dedicated C-17A ground support equipment, new hangars, and upgrades to runways, taxiways and parking pans?” “To be fair,” writes Priestley, “the Air Force Association of Canada openly acknowledges that Boeing is one of its sponsors… Nor is there any hint that the Airpower Advisory Committee writers unfairly favour one of its sponsors. No, it is more that AFAC has never met an expensive Air Force procurement project that it didn’t like.”

Arguably shrill, and not altogether representative of the CASR’s more customary blend of bluntness and constructive criticism, the CASR rebuttal can, in turn, be challenged on a number of points. C-17A infrastructure costs, notably at CFB Trenton, have most assuredly been substantial, but could one not argue that sunk costs actually bolster the case for a fifth C-17A? The CASR raises an interesting point when it characterizes the C-17 Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program as sovereignty-eroding but was there a credible and cost-effective alternative? The CASR’s reservations about the rough-field capability of the C-17A will undoubtedly raise hackles, but, in fairness, the issue is not new. As the British aviation journal AIR International recently observed, “a debate has raged for years in the [United States Air Force] C-17 community about when, whether, how much and exactly how the C-17 should operate from unpaved runways.” The CASR’s contention that the rough-field capability of the C-17A was oversold in the Canadian context deserves wider analysis, but there can be no denying that the C-17As bring new and impressive capabilities in this area. Other points of disagreement between the AFAC and CASR can, one trusts, be resolved without recourse to ‘blue berets.’

Can a credible case be made for the judicious expansion of Canada’s C-17A fleet? Those responding in the affirmative would stress that strategic airlift is, by definition, a highly flexible enabler and force multiplier, one that generates additional options for Ottawa decision-makers, and one that is relevant to all branches of the Canadian Armed Forces, to the full spectrum of non-military, quasi-military, and military roles, and to domestic, regional, and overseas operations. More to the point, an additional C-17A would: (a) materially boost Canada’s strategic airlift capability and significantly enhance availability and lines of tasking; (b) provide valuable capacity when a C-17A is absent for heavy maintenance; (c) avoid or diminish appreciably the need to charter commercial aircraft or rely on the strategic airlift resources of allies; (d) maximize the return on investment already made in the existing C-17A fleet and infrastructure; (e) extend the service life of the C-17A fleet; and (f) provide an additional hedge against unforeseen contingencies.

Those less enamored of follow-on C-17A procurement may well, in fact, acknowledge the multifaceted versatility of strategic airlift, but post that the cost of additional procurement (and any necessary additional military personnel) is
simply too high, given exceedingly tough economic times and a host of competing military priorities. In an echo of John McCallum’s comments of a decade ago, there are also lingering doubts in some quarters about the day-to-day need for more than four strategic airlifters. The Canadian strategic airlift fleet may not be perfectly sized, but it is “right-sized,” and, supported by chartered or borrowed foreign aircraft, a new fleet of C-130Js, and, in due course, a new fleet of Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) aircraft with secondary or tertiary airlift capabilities, should suffice.

Official comment on the prospects for an additional C-17A has been limited. When queried on this issue by Canadian Defence Review, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Tom Lawson, observed that “… the Department briefly considered exploring options to purchase a fifth [C-17A]. As the option was explored further, it was determined that it was currently not affordable and has been put on indefinite hold.” Lawson’s comments were diplomatic and carefully nuanced, but, with C-17A production finally nearing its end—and no credible prospect of significant, or even modest, new orders from the United States—the question of a fifth new-build Canadian C-17A will soon become academic. If Canada desires that fifth aircraft, if it wishes to possess an additional measure of strategic airlift insurance—and prudence suggests that it should—it must move expeditiously.

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here is a growing list of recent books on war and the human propensity for violence – whether things are getting better or worse, and what we, as a global society, need to do about it. It is an important topic. After all, given some of the potential scenarios for disaster, we need to find some way to navigate the relationship between sustainability, ethics, and war if more than a handful of humans, living somewhere in caves, are to greet the 22nd Century.

How we live together, under what conditions, and how we resolve the conflicts made inevitable by differences of wealth, opportunity, and geography are crucial elements of a sustainable future. Add to these the unknown factors associated with climate change, and whether we, as the human race, are destined for war or peace ceases to be a question that should only be debated by academics.

Once the debate moves out of the halls of academe into the streets, however, it may tend to take on a different character, aimed at exhortation and persuasion and bound by fewer limits on creative and imaginative expression. Thus, however valid some parts of their arguments might be, I am reluctantly unconvinced by the efforts of John Horgan, Joshua S. Goldstein, and Steven Pinker to persuade a popular audience that things are starting to ‘come up roses.’

John Horgan’s short book, The End of War, is a conversational, thoughtful reflection on his efforts to engage audiences over the past couple of decades in a discussion of the inherent violence of humans and the resulting prospects for world peace. Horgan begins by saying that his long-standing personal faith that there will be an end to war is now based upon empirical evidence: “If you find this book totally persuasive, I’d be thrilled. But my more realistic goal is to start a conversation about why we fight and how we can stop” (p. 26). A science writer by inclination and profession and the author of the hugely popular book, The End of Science (1996), Horgan understands the nature of evidence and its role in proving conclusions. Instead of ‘number-crunching’ his own surveys, however, he engages in an essentially qualitative analysis of anthropological, sociological, and historical ‘data’ amassed by others to discount the ideas that violence (and therefore war) is innate at personal or social levels.

If, as Horgan says, neither violence nor wars are necessary responses to certain situations, if they are choices, we can (for the right reasons) make other choices. Thus, Horgan’s book aims at making an ethical statement – we are choosing to be violent, we are choosing to start wars, and therefore, the crucial element that needs to be addressed is an ethical one.

According to Horgan, we need to make better, smarter, and less destructive choices – and other parts of his book demonstrate that individuals and cultures in other times and places have done just that. Challenging the pessimists, he says: “If we all want peace – and every sane person does – surely we’re smart enough to achieve it. Or rather, choose it. When we start believing that we can end war, we are already well on our way.” (p. 26)

For his part, Joshua S. Goldstein is already convinced things are getting better all the time – we just need to do more of the same things that have already been working well. In Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, the international affairs scholar concludes: “Today, bit by bit, we are dragging our muddy, banged-up world out of the ditch of war. We have avoided nuclear wars, left behind world war, nearly extinguished interstate war, and reduced civil wars to fewer countries with fewer casualties. We are almost there” (p. 328).

Goldstein argues that the numbers of those killed in war has declined dramatically, and there is no indication such a decline is slowing or stopping. His numbers are interesting, but not meaningful. Cursory assessment of ‘successes’ like intervention in Sierra Leone does not provide enough analytical depth to make it an example of how to intervene in other similar situations. Nor does he relate this apparent decline of war-related casualties in any significant way to the changing shape and nature of 21st Century conflict, and therefore, how such ‘official’ numbers might be interpreted.

He argues that something must have changed in our global society to account for the change in statistics, but without some clear causal relationships, his book reads like one very long post hoc fallacy. Official casualties have dropped, so therefore, it must be because of something we have done differently over the past fifty years or so.

Goldstein, if pushed, would likely agree that his narrative with respect to the success of recent efforts to reduce war is really a plea to do what his last chapter urges, to invest more in the prevention of conflict and the operations of the United Nations. Whether we can draw the kinds of comparisons Goldstein attempts between money spent on UN operations and results realized or not, there is the qualitative reality that less war would seem to benefit us all. But the question remains as to whether we can make a choice toward a more peaceful future, as Horgan argues, or whether, because of human nature, violence and war are inevitable.

In The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, Harvard psychology professor Steven Pinker takes the same idea, and looks to human nature for the answers left...
uncertain on the pages of history. Pinker’s thesis, that somehow over time, we have become less violent and therefore less disposed toward war or other forms of socially constructed violence, is relayed in some 800 pages of facts, figures, and interpretations from across a wide range of sources: “For all the tribulations in our lives, for all the troubles that remain in the world, the decline of violence is an accomplishment we can savor, and an impetus to cherish the forces of civilization and enlightenment that made it possible” (p. 696).

The “we” tends to be imperial. While examples range from the Yanomamo to the !Kung, the focal point is Western, European, and tracks little further back in time than the medieval period. Given the sweep of the book, it might seem unfair to chastise Pinker for ‘cherry-picking’ his evidence, but given the literally global and universal nature of his conclusions with respect to the human condition, I believe such criticism is merited.

While our civilization has a propensity for certain types of technological development in comparison to others, this technological difference should have no effect on “the better angels of our nature.” The types of social organization and social behaviours made possible by contemporary technological developments have certainly affected how we live together, but whether this has through some neuroplasticity affected how we think, and therefore changed some inherited tendencies toward violence is an entirely different issue.

Certainly, other civilizations seem to have matured, and have, over time, developed forms of social management that relied less upon violence. Perhaps if we had better historical access to the operations of such civilizations, there might be some merit to a comparative discussion of why this happens.

But we do not, and as an historian and as someone deeply distrustful of sociobiological explanations, I would argue Pinker’s book fails to do more than advance an amusing idea. I am not convinced that there are any “better angels” today than there were a hundred or a thousand years ago. If we seem to be more in the midst of peace than our ancestors, it is in part because we have found ways of disguising the violence we inflict in other, less overtly physical ways – and subletly is not one of the “better angels” Pinker identifies.

Pinker’s perspective is more linked to victor than victim, protagonist rather than bystander, and loses much of its persuasive force as a result. He ‘plays fast and loose’ with wildly varying types of historical evidence, in form as well as in verifiability, and sidesteps the fact that European civilization was remarkably crude, brutal, and unsophisticated in comparison with civilizations elsewhere in the world, right up until the Renaissance period. That Europeans eventually relearned how to eat with a fork is not evidence of any deep neurobiological insight or some special social development related to technology.

Yet, while I could ‘nitpick’ with Pinker throughout the length of his book, the fundamental problem with his thesis is one that Horgan, for a briefer book on a similar theme, manages to avoid. I do not think we have developed any inherently more decent society as a result of socializing our violent urges or developing some different brain chemistry. We are still, to use Raymond Fosdick’s expression from his 1928 book by the same name, “… the old savage in the new civilization.”

Fosdick’s point was that moral development has not kept pace with technological development. Moral development, however, will not be the result of some neurochemical change. Instead, it is the product of the choices we make, as individuals and as a society. Horgan argues that we can be influenced by a culture that socializes or enculturates certain types of behavior or attitudes, which, in turn, may disappear from the horizon of our decision-making and therefore seem innate, but these are, in fact, the product of choices, not biology. If we want different results, we need to make different choices. This is the result of making the ethical moment pre- eminent over any other moment whenever possible, including whatever passes for our “nature,” better or otherwise.

I would be happy to think I live in a less violent society than my ancestors…but if I track back over the last hundred years, excluding the major conflicts over which they had no control, I do not think I am particularly safer where I live than they would have been in their local community. Of course, if history becomes the record of major declared conflicts, given that we live in what Pinker calls “the Long Peace,” I am safer than they were….at least, until the next war breaks out. It is a retrospective analysis similar to what lies behind the safety board at an industrial plant, listing the number of ‘safe days’ there have been for workers. The moment an accident occurs, the board gets reset to zero and we obviously cannot predict when that might happen.

A hundred years ago in 1913, by all accounts, people felt the last century was off to a good start in comparison to what had gone before it.

From the perspective of its victims, moreover, it is hard to feel good about the condition of global society in the midst of this Long Peace. The body count in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to spiral into the millions; Iraq and Afghanistan; Libya and Syria; Mali and the Central African Republic – these and many other countries, continue to experience the low-level conflict that does not add up to a headline in Pinker’s analysis, but which is just as real and violent as any European war to those who are its victims.

Add to these deaths by violence, fueled by a global arms industry, the structural death toll caused by famine, disease, lack of clean water, political or economic embargoes against health care and medical supplies, among other factors, and quite rapidly, the picture of our “better natures” becomes just as tinged with the blood of innocents today as has always been the case.

To add an ironic dimension to the situation Pinker conveniently ignores, if we also included the numbers of internally
displaced persons and refugees (who in times past would have rapidly become casualties of war), one might argue the only “better angels” holding back the consequences of our otherwise violent behavior in this Long Peace are UN peacekeepers and the staff of the UNHCR and various international aid agencies.

As for “the better angels” themselves, moreover, there is nothing interesting about Pinker’s analysis. The better angels Pinker depicts – empathy, self-control, moral sense and reason (p. 668) – have always been there, just as the darker ones have always been there. It becomes a matter of which ones we choose to follow, to which of the angels on our shoulder we choose to listen – and thus, we are back in the realm of ethics.

If we consider the moral strictures of all major religious and philosophical traditions, the choices associated with these “better angels” are neither new nor recent, nor are they dependent upon some neurobiological progress helpfully located in 21st Century Western culture. Humans have debated their ethical choices from the beginning of time; both individuals and societies have decided which direction to travel as a result of the choices they have made.

The only difference between our choices and the ones made by previous generations is the scale at which the consequences must be considered. We can literally and immediately affect large areas, even the earth itself, by individual decisions that otherwise, in the past, had at least seemed limited by local horizons.

I believe Horgan is correct to say that better choices would lead to less violence of all kinds, and ultimately, to more peace. The potential to make those kinds of choices – with large-scale effects – makes our “ethical moment” the most crucial in human history.

We need to cast the question of war or peace in an ethical context, not one in which we are excused by accidents of fate, birth, or neurobiology from responsibility for what we decide.

We make choices for reasons and our reasons reflect our values or what we believe is most important. We can therefore work back from our choices – our decisions -- to the reasons behind them, and thus, to the values, in their turn, that underpin our reasons.

The “ethical moment” is embedded in both our personal narrative and the narrative of the culture in which we live, narratives that are woven together out of our values and our reasons for making the choices that we do. Horgan, Goldstein, and Pinker explore those narratives, challenging us to reflect upon the roles we play and on what our choices say about what we believe to be the most important things in our lives and our world.

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Re-Examining the Bombers: A Book Review Essay
by Sean M. Maloney


These two books operate from different standpoints but are fundamentally about the same thing: Swift and Pyves are each on a quest, but their trails lead them to the same destination. They want to understand their grandfather’s experiences as aircrew serving with RAF Bomber Command during the Second World War. Swift’s relation disappeared in 1943, while Pyves’ became lost in haze of alcohol and post-traumatic stress disorder until his death in 1987.

The distinction between the British approach (Swift) and the Canadian approach (Pyves) is almost a distinction in national caricature on several levels. Bomber Country is the more philosophical and literary of the two works. Swift is a poet, at heart and by profession, and that is his vantage point.

Where is the war poetry of those engaged in the strategic bombing offensive? That leads him to track down and uncover the circumstances of John Eric Swift’s short life, and by doing so, answers the question, what happened to his grandfather? Richard Pyves, on the other hand, wants to understand what the war did to his grandfather, and why it was so. Night Madness is more technocratic in the detailed explanation of each reconstructed mission, but it is not exactly bereft of literary merit: the letters back and forth between his future grandmother and Ron Pyves are intertwined in the tactical and technical narrative. Swift is about situating his grandfathers’ experiences in the larger schema of the war, history, and British society. Pyves ultimately reaches conclusions examining the injustice of Canadian society in shunting veterans to the side out of embarrassment until they die.

The larger issue of the morality of, and the ex-post facto moral debate over, Second World War strategic bombing is not ignored, nor is it ‘treated with kid gloves’ by both of our authors. Swift grew up in a guilt-riven society, where Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris only gets his monument in 1992 and the Bomber Command Memorial is only constructed in 2012. Nobody visits the Pathfinder Force museum, and it is as much a tomb as the graveyard in which they find Richard Swift. Was his grandfather a war criminal? Pyves, on the other hand, has to confront the fact that Ron Pyves felt guilty about his role in...
the bombing of Dresden in 1945. Did his grandfather believe he was a war criminal? If so, why?

Both authors, incidentally, stumble over the role that the 1960s generation played and continues to play in aggravating their quests, as well as negatively impacting their respective relations. Ron Pyves has psychological issues brought on by incessant and negative media coverage of Vietnam in the 1960s which accelerates his condition. Daniel Swift is repeatedly confronted with a literature that presents insane moral equivalence arguments equating strategic bombing with the Holocaust. For Swift, there is a historical counter-literature in which he can take comfort, but for Ron Pyves, that historical analysis comes too late.

And in other cases, the desire within certain quarters of British and Canadian society to sweep away and ignore those who participated in such operations finds expression in both works. Canada’s Veterans Affairs of the 1970s and 1980s is populated with a generation of dismissive, uncaring bureaucrats that emerge from the 1960s Zeitgeist, and they are led by a Prime Minister who was openly derisive of Canada’s participation in the Second World War. Swift is confronted with deliberate literary amnesia by poets who did not serve, ignoring the poetry of those who did but did not make it home alive to publish. Or, in the case of squadron reunions, Swift relates a situation whereby those at the reunion were the ground crew. The aircrew members were all dead. One aircraftswomen, who married another bomb technician, tells him: “Most of us [women] steered clear of the aircrew because they backfired near me, I’d probably dive for the sidewalk or under a table. I suppose it takes time to get used to these things.” And this is 1941. He has four more years to go.

After reading both works, it is difficult not to conclude that post-war British and Canadian society and their governments have behaved abominably towards those who participated in Bomber Command operations during the 1940s. Yes, there is a right to dissent, to disagree, to argue, and debate issues of policy, strategy, and application. And we should. However, to deliberately employ a current, or even a 1960s moral framework to judge the decision-making and activities of the 1940s remains a disingenuous approach at best. Those decisions were undertaken at a particular time, under specific conditions. The negative effects of that 1960s social and societal framework contributed to and will continue in the future to place barriers in the way of veteran’s health and reintegration. It is not right that these men should have been moral pariahs and to be treated so by the societies whose elected officials asked them to undertake these physically, psychologically, and morally hazardous missions.

Night Madness has a different take on personal relationships. Ron’s future wife, Kay, maintains a voluminous correspondence, much of which is reproduced in the book. What the author does not quite comment upon is how divorced from the reality of Ron Pyves’ war the letters actually are. He juxtaposes these anodyne letters full of up-beat anachronistic language (‘swell,’ ‘gosh,’ ‘snaps’) with technical narrative: (‘Outbound: 356 miles. Inbound: 462 miles, total distance flown: 818 miles. 434 Squadron: WL-D (KB 830) Bomb load: 18 x 500 pounds.’) If Pyves’ intent is to jar the reader with this approach, he succeeds. (Incidentally, my relations who served in Bomber Command during this time generally did not correspond with their families back home because their wartime reality was incapable of depiction to those who were not experiencing it.) Ron Pyves attempts to do so in one letter: “If you were to light a firecracker, or if a car backfired near me, I’d probably dive for the sidewalk or under a table. I suppose it takes time to get used to these things.” And this is 1941. He has four more years to go.
and historical fact. It is easy to read and absorbing, and it captures the essence of Borden’s tortured political career up to the commencement of the First World War. Cook gives the operational context of the war swift coverage, focusing rather upon its impact at home, specifically, the social and financial implications. Borden’s second visit to Britain in 1915 is especially well covered, capturing his drive to gain more autonomy for Canada. What comes out of the first part of the book is the strain and fatigue of the nation’s political leaders as they struggled through the competing demands of fighting a global conflict, including nothing less than pressing trade and fiscal challenges, conscription, worries of insurrection, riots, the imposition of martial law, and the gaining for Canada of a place in the peace process and international landscape at the end of the war.

The book then moves on to William Lyon Mackenzie King in the same manner. The fast flowing text carries the reader through King’s family background and early formative years, particularly his beginning in Ottawa as Deputy Minister of the Department of Labour, and his start in politics after eight years as a public servant. King’s rise to the status of the nation’s warlord is arguably so Canadian. He spent the First World War working for the greatest of the American ‘robber baron’ families – the Rockefellers; suffered two electoral defeats; had psychiatric problems, and yet, he became a perfect candidate for the Liberal leadership convention in 1919 after Laurier’s death. After all, his electoral defeats and employment had spared him being tainted with any of the contentious issues surrounding conscription or liberal party infighting. As a result, he could not be tarred for any past sins of the party itself.

Cook does a wonderful job of describing King and his approach to becoming the champion of the right for Canada to act independently. He weaves in King’s spiritualism and private life, which, although enlightening, is also somewhat disturbing, considering his stature and role in the nation. The author’s description of the years leading up to the Second World War, and the international as well as internal tensions is also fast moving and very interesting as he summarizes complex events and issues with flare and clarity.

The author’s skill at providing a clear image of the characters, from King to his trusted ministers who ‘moved mountains’ to mobilize Canada for the war effort, is commendable. He succinctly captures King’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as his very astute political instincts. It is quite fascinating to see how an otherwise-uninspiring individual actually led a nation through the turbulent pre-war and war years. In fact, it is ironic that Canada’s ‘warlord’ had never served in the military, and was incredibly awkward and nervous in front of troops, unable to rouse them with patriotic fervor or speech. However, this does explain his lack of focus upon troops overseas and his primary focus on domestic issues, particularly finances and conscription. In the end, the author ably explains how this contradiction of a leader – a man who was not inspirational, had no charisma, a plodding personality and was easy to dismiss - held power for 22 years and had a seminal impact upon the nation.

Overall, the narrative is fast moving, clever, and highly engaging. Historical fact, scholarly insight, and devilish personal foibles of the main characters combine to make the read highly interesting and entertaining. The book is well researched, and it contains a wealth of endnotes that provide sources and additional information, as well as an extensive bibliography. The author is clearly knowledgeable about the subject, and he has utilized seminal sources, both secondary and primary. The book also contains an accurate and detailed index, a well as 30 black-and-white photographs and political cartoons of the time. These assist with providing some visual cues to the narrative.

In the end, this is an exceptionally well-written book, and it is highly recommended for anyone interested in Canadian history and/or leadership through periods of complexity and conflict.

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Transforming NATO:
New Allies, Mission, and Capabilities
by Ivan Dinev Ivanov
Toronto: Lexington Books, 2011
280 pages, $70.95
ISBN: 978-0739137147
Reviewed by Derek Spencer

A staff officer in the Canadian Forces at age 40 today would have been sitting in Grade 8 Social Studies in 1984. It would have been a minor current event in that class to discuss the fact that Spain had joined NATO two years earlier. The alliance that represented the institutionalization of the transatlantic coalition that won the Second World War had been relatively static for many years. If that officer joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1992, the Alliance had still really not changed much: it continued to provide a categorical commitment to the collective security of its members. Now, if one fast-forwarded to the present, that officer could be forgiven for thinking that the NATO that fought over Kosovo in 1999 and remains in Afghanistan today is really just an out-of-date relic of the Cold War. Canada as the junior member of NATO’s transatlantic wing, has not recently had European dramas in its face and many of its citizens have missed the
substantial changes in the Alliance Canada helped shape 63 years ago.

NATO is a living, dynamic thing, and so its progress and direction is very hard to track without active effort and study. However, the reality is that NATO has dramatically changed in character and complexity since 1999 as the global security environment, European political and economic integration, and transatlantic relations have evolved. With respect to that evolution, references and resources devoted to understanding those changes may be plentiful in number, but they have various shortcomings. One option for an inquiring mind is to slowly and selectively find and read leading articles in learned publications. Another option is simply to read Ivan Ivanov’s book, *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities*.

Ivanov manages to accomplish three valuable and specific tasks with his book. First, it is a very current and relevant work, having been published in August 2011. Therefore, he would appear to be the first to publish a work of this academic rigour that comments upon the 2010 Strategic Concept. Second, he has cobbled together 63 years of reference literature, with focus upon the last 20 years, to provide a single descriptive voice dealing with the nature of NATO. This is somewhat unique in a field where books are often collections of single issue papers. In my opinion, decent sources in this regard are the *Bison Papers* from the University of Manitoba, and *NATO in Search of a Vision*, edited by Gulnur Aybet. However, while these works provide expert analysis of a number of aspects and issues, and they are well edited, they each nonetheless provide a fractured voice on their respective themes. Not so with Ivanov. His voice and perspective always ring clear, from start to finish.

The greatest contribution Ivanov makes with this book is to provide a logical framework for understanding the modern NATO in the context of its new missions, allies, and capabilities. As he is the single unifying voice expressed herein, he can take the time to develop two linked concepts borrowed from Economics: ‘Club Goods’ and ‘Complementaries.’ Clearly, NATO fits well the description of a heterogeneous club, and therefore, much of its behaviour as an organization can be placed in context. His development of ‘club goods theory’ as a description of NATO may be somewhat generous, but it does nonetheless provide a view that the Alliance is a rational actor in an evolving global environment.

It is fascinating to view the rapid expansion of NATO from 16 nations to 28 nations through this lens. Previously, NATO had focused upon the Cold War and practical related issues, such as the number of Western combat-ready divisions available in Western Europe. Using Ivanov’s framework, the addition of small states, such as Estonia and Croatia, make more sense because they broadened the Alliance membership, brought new capabilities, and supported new missions.

With the theoretical framework firmly established, Ivanov rigorously reviews NATO’s alliance structure, its previous and current missions, and its present capabilities. This is not bedtime reading: it is a textbook where each page literally drips with facts and footnotes. The bibliography itemizes 20 pages of press releases, academic works, and policy documents. This is truly a ‘one-stop shop’ for acquiring an understanding of NATO in the modern era. It is slow to start, and an academic book, especially through the first two chapters covering Club Goods and Complementaries. Those without an Economics background may need to simply bypass those chapters to get on to the review of alliances, missions, and capabilities. However, the review of these latter elements is engaging and complete. Ivanov’s expertise and knowledge allow him to lay bare NATO’s complexity in a meaningful way.

It is recommended that those in the profession of arms should read this book. NATO is definitely not an optimal organization, and even an apologist like Ivanov makes this clear. Furthermore, NATO is ‘not going away,’ and Ivanov’s framework provides evidence supporting this premise. NATO outlived its first and largest enemy, just as it has outlived many of its critics. Perhaps Robert Kaplan said it best: “NATO is not perfect but there is nothing better to replace it.” The Government of Canada recently re-committed to the Alliance at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, and so the Canadian Armed Forces will remain as contributors to NATO. With that reality solidly reaffirmed, it is important to understand it and to use it to the benefit of our armed forces. Ivanov’s book is a good foundation for that understanding.

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The final portion of the book, “Triage,” deals with how US forces, the Department of State, and USAID tried to engage the Afghan government and key players in the southern provinces. These efforts were aimed at trying to bring political stability to this part of the country. Targeted counter-insurgency operations in Kandahar and Helmand brought some tangible results. However, a lack of fundamental understanding of basic Afghan needs, and the inability to move bureaucratic inertia to meet those needs led to a series of lost opportunities. For example, it was recommended by a number of USAID consultants that they help the Afghans grow cotton as a substitute for poppies. The Afghan government would subsidize the production of it and thus encourage it as a legitimate crop. However, the US Government was unwilling to grant exemptions to rules that prevent it from supporting countries where the production of cotton was subsidized by the government, and therefore, the project ‘went nowhere.’ Chandrasekaran’s interviews with State Department individuals that reside on the agricultural file in Afghanistan greatly enhance his argument. They highlight the State Department’s many missed opportunities for development in the area of Afghan agriculture.

In reading *Little America*, one gets the sense, unfortunately, that the United States has actually been its own worst enemy in Afghanistan, even after the surge. While the Obama administration did renew focus upon Afghanistan, its desire to begin pulling out by July 2011 did not really lend enough time for commanders to necessarily consolidate the surge’s gains. As well, the internal wrangling inside the US Government and military apparatus make it clear that the competing objectives inside both the military and civilian branches were not properly reconciled into a clear and cohesive direction.

While Chandrasekaran’s account relayed in the book make this point indirectly, I find that he does not often state what his own recommendations should be. The book’s value would have been enhanced if he had made more overt recommendations of his own, rather than having the reader try to infer them from the content of his book. That being said, he seems to highlight criticisms and quote the views of specific State Department and military personnel on a more regular basis, leading the reader to believe that their views are synonymous with his own.

This book is truly a fascinating account of both the history of America’s involvement in Afghanistan and its failures to complete its work there. This is despite an enormous, albeit hampered and often misdirected effort. It is a book that is certainly worth reading, and it would be of interest to any person wishing to gain insight into America’s war in Afghanistan, where it has come from, and where it may be going.

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