



Interdepartmental Evaluation Canadian Landmine Fund Phase II Executive Report

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The CLF Executive report outlines the main conclusions and findings of the evaluation. The full technical report, which includes three volumes (Vol 1 Technical Report, Vol 2 Country Case Studies and Vol 3 Other Background Research) is available from CIDA upon request.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAMEO	Canadian Association for Mine and Explosive Ordnance Security
CCMAT	Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDA MAU	Canadian International Development Agency – Mine Action Unit
CLF	Canadian Landmine Fund
CPAR	Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFAIT ILX	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Mine Action Section
DND	Department of National Defence
ESC	Evaluation Steering Committee
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMSMA	International Management System for Mine Action
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan
RBAF	Risk-based Audit Framework
RBM	Results-based Management
RMAF	Results-based Management Accountability Framework

1) Introduction

1. The first phase of the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) emerged in 1997 as a mechanism to help implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMs) and on Their Destruction, known as the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), or the Ottawa Convention. The Ottawa Convention entered into force in 1999, with 122 original signatories, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time announced Canada's substantial financial commitment to back up its political commitment to achieve the Treaty. In 1997, the CLF's purpose was to finance the implementation of the Treaty that had emerged from the Ottawa Process. This process remarkably brought about, in a relatively short time, a consensus among nations to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

2. Following an evaluation of the first phase, a second phase of the Canadian Landmine Fund was approved for 2003-2008. Canada's goals for CLF II were two-fold:

- In the short term, Canada sought to continue its leadership in helping to secure the Convention's long-term success. This involved promoting the Convention's universalization, effective implementation, and sustainability.
- Over the long term, Canada sought to maintain its leadership by gradually integrating all aspects of mine action into the normal operations of participating government departments. Canada also aimed to promote similar integration of mine action within multilateral organizations. These organizations include the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions (IFIs), international and Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.

The ultimate long-term objective was to reduce the humanitarian and development impact of landmines on vulnerable populations in mine-affected developing countries.

Table 1 Reviews the dates and amounts of the Canadian Landmine Fund – Phases I and II.¹

Table 1. Two Successive Phases of the Canadian Landmine Fund

Phase	Dates	Allocation
CLF I	1997–2002	\$100 million
CLF II	2003–2008	\$72 million

¹ All dollar amounts in this report are expressed in Canadian dollars, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

3. In compliance with Treasury Board requirements for a summative evaluation of CFL-II, this executive report presents the main findings and conclusions of a three-volume evaluation report of CLF-II. PLAN:NET Ltd., a Calgary-based consulting firm, was awarded the contract to conduct this summative evaluation and carried out the work in cooperation with Jim Freedman Consulting and Writing Inc. The evaluation was conducted over an 18-month period, starting in mid-November 2007. An Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC), made up of representatives from CIDA, DFAIT, and DND, oversaw and guided the evaluation. Based on various criteria, the ESC selected six countries for field visits: Cambodia, Colombia, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen/Jordan.

1.1) Objectives – CLF – Phase II Evaluation

4. The evaluation aimed to assess the results achieved in implementing the Canadian Landmine Fund – Phase II, the respective contributions of the three departments involved in the delivery of these results (outputs and outcomes), and the lessons learned by the three departments. The scope of the evaluation further includes an assessment of the degree of action on the recommendations of the formative evaluation of CLF I. More specifically, the evaluation aimed to determine the following. Did the results help to achieve the goals of the CLF, the Ottawa Convention and the mine action units of the three implementing departments? Whether the relationship between project costs and results has been reasonable? Has performance been satisfactory (relevance of results, sustainability, accountability, appropriateness of design and resource allocation)? Have activities been informed and timely? The evaluation was also expected to provide lessons and recommendations to guide Canadian mine action and other interdepartmental initiatives in the future.

1.2) Follow-up – CLF – Phase I Evaluation Recommendations

5. A joint evaluation of the Canadian Landmine Fund – Phase I, led by DFAIT², took place in 2001–2002. There were no visits to projects or mine-affected countries during that evaluation. The program had been in operation for only three years, a short time to assess the results of such a complex initiative. The Phase I evaluation concluded that the CLF maintained and reinforced Canada's leadership position on the landmine issue. The CLF lent Canada credibility, visibility, and influence in the international community. The CLF gave Canada leverage to motivate other countries to support mine action activities. Based on an analysis of the achievement of results, the evaluation recommended extending the Fund. It was determined that early termination would have prompted multilateral and bilateral donors to reduce their financial commitments and

² Evaluation of the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF), May 2002

participation in mine action activities. This would have eased the pressure on those states that had not yet ratified the Convention.

6. The Phase I evaluation also made several observations. It observed that the pace of clearance was slow, requiring more money, more technical innovation, or both, and that a more creative approach was needed to universalize the treaty more successfully to attract reluctant states. The evaluation was concerned that the dependency of NGOs on regular CLF funding meant that advocacy would stop as soon as funds ceased. The evaluation questioned whether mine awareness programs had the effect on casualties which were typically claimed for them, and noted that victim assistance faced the nearly impossible task of reforming bankrupt health systems.

7. The evaluation urged a systematic effort to strengthen the effectiveness of program governance, if for no other reason than to ensure greater knowledge of the program among stakeholders and administrators. There was a need for monitoring and better coordination, for a performance measurement strategy and a reporting strategy. In other words, there was a need for more coherent and informed authority to direct the program.

8. The evaluation offered nine recommendations. A management response and action plan was attached to the evaluation. Six recommendations were accepted and actions were committed. Two recommendations (on victim assistance and mine awareness) were partly accepted (since both DFAIT and CIDA raised difficulties to achieve them), but both departments proposed action to pursue with the international community. One recommendation was not accepted, since CCMAT believed, contrary to what was stated in the evaluation report, that all of its projects were linked to the needs of field practitioners and that they should continue funding long-term research initiatives. CCMAT proposed an action plan to continue to fund short, medium and long-term research initiatives. Based on what the evaluation team has seen from Phase II implementation, its assessment indicated that four recommendations have been implemented, four have been partially implemented and one is still not implemented. Annex 1 summarizes the CLF 1 evaluation recommendations, the response and proposed actions, as well as the assessment of status made by the evaluation team of CLF II.

2) Overview – CLF – Phase II

2.1) Structure and Roles

9. The Canadian Landmine Fund – Phase II has five components:

- **Treaty Ratification and Universalization** aims to promote the universalization, ratification, effective implementation, and sustainability of the Convention (and the universalization of the norm it contains), to mobilize political will, to promote

non-lethal alternatives to landmines. Universalization essentially aims to use diplomatic channels and a variety of incentives to persuade non-signatories to become States Parties.

- **Advocacy: Research, Policy Development, Partnership, and Outreach** aim to continue to support Canadian mine action policy leadership by ensuring that Canadian officials have access to the best available mine action information, to support policy development and mine action programming, and to articulate policy leadership by various means. This component aims to support the civil society-based regime that monitors global progress in implementing the Ottawa Convention. This component also aims to build the capacities of landmine campaign coalition organizations to play an active and sustainable role in working to universalize and support effective implementation of the Convention.
- **Promoting National and International Mine Action Technologies** aims to help States Parties to implement the Ottawa Convention. It also aims to encourage non-member states to join the Convention. It does this by providing Canadian or other appropriate technologies, mainly in humanitarian demining and victim assistance.
- **Humanitarian Mine Action, Including Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance** aims to build the capacity of mine-affected countries to plan and implement humanitarian demining programs, to provide a full range of services to landmine survivors (including physical rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration), to build awareness of landmine risks and to promote risk reduction behaviour.
- **Supporting the Research and Development of Mine Action Technologies Through the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT)** aims to provide technical support and assistance to the demining community. It does so by the following means. It develops credible and respected testing and evaluation standards, testing equipment and methods of evaluating mine action equipment. It provides facilities and technical assistance for the trial of appropriate technologies. It conducts testing and evaluation. Finally, it provides technical advice and assistance to equipment donors, academia, other government departments and mine action agencies in matters such as procurement, test methods and procedures, and equipment requirements and design.

In practice, these five components involve the following three sets of activities, each associated with one of three departments:

- Universalizing and promoting adherence to the Treaty in various ways, ranging from support for civil-society advocacy of the Treaty, to incentives for potential signatories. DFAIT ILX has had lead responsibility.

- Clearing landmines, warning people of dangers through mine risk education and helping victims in mine-affected countries. The CIDA Mine Action Unit (MAU) has had lead responsibility.
- Investigate technologies for humanitarian de-mining, neutralizing and detecting landmines. The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) have had lead responsibility.

2.2) Funding

10. Table 2 gives the amounts allocated by Canada for mine action activities from 2003 to 2008.

Table 2. Budgets by Participating Departments (\$ million)

Department	CLF I	CLF II	Total
CIDA – Mine Action Unit	50	34	84
DFAIT – ILX	33	28	61
DND – CCMAT	17	10	27
Total CLF I	100		
Total CLF II		72	
Grand Total			172

11. CLF I's \$100 million budget was allocated among three departments. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) received \$50 million. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) received \$33 million. The Department of National Defence (DND) received \$17 million. CLF II committed \$72 million overall, \$34 million for CIDA, \$28 million for DFAIT, and \$10 million for DND. In CLF II, the allocation to CIDA decreased from 50 percent to 47 percent of the total. The allocation to DFAIT increased from 33 percent to 39 percent of the total. The allocation to DND dropped from 17.5 percent to 14 percent.

12. Canada has always contributed a large proportion of global funding. Global funding for mine action rose during CLF II, as the USA, Japan, Norway, and the European Community significantly increased their funding. Funding from the Canadian Landmine Fund decreased, but new sources of funding, such as the Global Peace and Security Fund, came on stream in 2006-2007. Meanwhile, CIDA's bilateral desks allocated funds to mine action from regular programming budgets. As a result, Canada's overall proportion of global funding remained largely the same. During the CLF II period, Canada ranked among the top five global donors (except for 2005, when it ranked 7th).

13. Table 3 gives the total number of Canada's project disbursements for all mine action activities from 2003 to 2008. As recommended by the Government of Canada, mine action has been integrated into regular programming. Thus, CLF II resources have not

been the only source of Canadian mine action funding during the past five years. Other sources include CIDA's bilateral desks, Partnership Branch, International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA), and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) in DFAIT. The additional sources are included here, and their impacts are assessed as part of this evaluation, partly because they cannot be distinguished from CLF II funding, partly because they must be considered to understand Canada's overall role in mine action. It should be noted that these figures refer only to program costs, not overhead or delivery costs. The original \$34 million allocation to CIDA included \$3 million overhead costs, or eight percent, while the original \$28 million allocation to DFAIT included \$9 million, or 32 percent, in recognition of the different nature of DFAIT's work.

Table 3. CLF II and Non-CLF II1 Expenditures on Mine Action 2003–2008

CIDA

Source	Amount (\$ Million) ²	Percent of Total Funding	No. of Project Disbursements ³	Percent of No. of Projects
CLF	30.12	18%	129	31%
Non-CLF1	95.7	57%	54	13%
Subtotal	125.8		183	

DFAIT

Source	Amount (\$ Million) ²	Percent of Total Funding	No. of Project Disbursements ³	Percent of No. of Projects
CLF	18.342	11%	196	48%
GPSF	13.76	8%	24	6%
Subtotal	32.1		224	

DND

Source	Amount (\$ Million) ²	Percent of Total Funding	No. of Project Disbursements ³	Percent of No. of Projects
CLF	9.22	6%	11	2%
Subtotal	9.2		11	
TOTAL CIDA +DFAIT +DND	167.1	100%	414	100%

Source: DFAIT ILX, CIDA MAU and DND (CCMAT) financial/disbursement records

- ¹ Non-CLF includes spending by CIDA's bilateral desks, Partnership Branch, International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF).
- ²Variances from allocations are partially explained in RMAF: DFAIT (\$19.08 G&C, \$8.92 O&M), CIDA (\$31 G&C, \$3 O&M)
- ³See paragraph 17 for an explanation of project disbursements.

14. CLF II was originally divided into five components, described in paragraph 9. This has been an unusual arrangement. Among these categories, "humanitarian mine action" curiously lumps together three components (mine clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance) that are almost always separate in mine action practice. These are best

seen as three separate activities, requiring different expertise and management. Moreover, there is virtually no distinction between promotion of technologies (#3) and development of mine action technologies under CCMAT (#5). Thus, for the purposes of this investigation, the evaluation team has revised CLF II's original five official components, adapting them to a more feasible and practical set of six categories. These categories are:

1. Treaty Ratification and Universalization;
2. Advocacy (Research, Policy Development, Partnership and Outreach);
3. Humanitarian Mine Action (Clearance)
4. Stockpile Destruction;
5. Humanitarian Mine Action (Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance);
6. Promoting National and International Mine Action Technologies.

15. These categories were adopted for the evaluation, and the columns in Tables 4 and 5 largely reflect this. However, each department kept financial data records differently. The data thus are reflected under slightly different headings in Tables 4 and 5. For example, Universalization and Advocacy have been combined. Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance have been divided into two columns. The first category includes all advocacy activities, efforts to recruit new signatories, and support for research and NGOs working abroad on advocacy issues. This is a broad category, but finer distinctions cannot be made, because of the way that DFAIT ILX has maintained expenditures.³ The second category, clearance and survey, includes all planning, surveying, priority setting, and clearance. The third category, Stockpile Destruction, is considered separately because of DFAIT ILX's significant commitment to help countries to destroy their existing landmines. The fourth and fifth categories are key elements of humanitarian mine action (Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance). The sixth gives special attention to DND and CCMAT efforts to test equipment and to investigate new mine action technologies.

16. Expenditure amounts and numbers of project disbursements (see next paragraph for a description of project disbursements) are examined for each component, in Tables 4 and 5 below and throughout the report. A brief word is necessary about the quality of data available to the evaluation team. The three participating departments kept CLF II expenditures separately in different formats that are difficult to reconcile. At the same time, DFAIT ILX kept a record of expenditures and projects for CLF II as a whole.⁴ Since this was the only comprehensive set of expenditure and project data, the evaluation had to rely on this record for most analyses. However, the record has certain limitations. For

³ For example, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between advocacy and universalization.

⁴ When DFAIT ILX assumed the role of "lead policy unit for CLF", responsible for overseeing and having the "lead role for Canadian landmine initiatives," DFAIT ILX had to maintain the official CLF II record. (*Results-based Management Accountability Framework*, p. 6).

example, the record does not align expenditures with their respective purposes. Thus, the evaluation team could not distinguish expenditures on universalization or advocacy from stockpile destruction. Also advocacy is an all-inclusive category that combines a number of different initiatives, including research, outreach, universalization and institution building. The evaluation team sought to clarify what project belonged to what category, to produce the breakdowns in Tables 4 and 5.

17. Moreover, DFAIT ILX records list each disbursement separately, as if each was a separate project, though it may have been only one of many disbursements associated with a multi-year project. This made it difficult to count the total projects developed and funded by DFAIT ILX, DND CCMAT, CIDA MAU or bilateral desks. After much consideration, the evaluation team decided to count disbursements instead of projects, recognizing that disbursements may exceed actual projects, especially when multi-year projects are involved.⁵ The number of project disbursements is nevertheless useful as an indicator of the administrative load and commitment to different components.

18. A few salient points are to be drawn from Tables 4 and 5, which provide 2003–2008 mine action expenditures, from both CLF II and non-CLF II sources.

- Clearance and surveys account for a large portion of the contributions, that is, 59 percent (\$98.4 million / \$167.1 million);
- Both CIDA and DFAIT contributed clearance funding. CIDA contributed more, \$80.5 million (\$15.3 million + \$65.2 million = \$80.5 million), compared to DFAIT's \$17.9 million (\$5.2 million + \$12.7 million = \$17.9 million). However, DFAIT implemented a significant number of projects, as evidenced by the number of project disbursements (54 for DFAIT and 82 for CIDA);
- Advocacy has played a significant role in the CLF II program. In this table, advocacy includes research, outreach, universalization, and institution building. These contributions represent 20 percent of all expenditures during this period (\$33.1 million / \$167.1 million = 20 percent) and 38 percent of total project disbursements;
- CLF II funds have successfully generated extra resources from non-CLF budget resources, as indicated in Table 4. CLF II funds total \$ 57.64 million.⁶ Non-CLF resources generated for mine action during this period total \$109.5 million (\$95.7 million + \$13.76 million = \$109.5 million).

⁵ The number of CIDA MAU project disbursements for CLF II projects is 129, but the actual number of projects is only 59.

⁶ Sum of totals in rows 1, 4 and 7, Table 4

Table 4. Amounts of CLF II and Non-CLF II1 Expenditures on Mine Action, 2003–2008, Broken Down by Expenditure Category (C\$ million)

	1. Advocacy, Universal- ization et al ²	2. Clearance and Survey	3. Stockpile Destruction	4. Mine Risk Education	5. Victim Assistance	6. Technology and Testing	7. Total
1 CIDA CLF	4.6	15.3	0	5.3	4.9	0	30.1
2 CIDA Non-CLF	18.73	65.2	4.0	3.0	4.8	0	95.7
3 Subtotals	23.3	80.5	4.0	8.3	9.7	0	125.8
4 DFAIT CLF	9.84	5.2	2.44	0.4	.5	0	18.34
5 DFAIT Non-CLF – GPSF	0	12.7	.06	1.0	0	0	13.76
6 Subtotals	9.8	17.9	2.5	1.4	.5	0	32.1
7 DND	0	0	0	0	0	9.2	9.2
Totals	33.1	98.4	6.5	9.7	10.2	9.2	167.1

Source: DFAIT ILX, CIDA MAU, and DND (CCMAT) financial records

- ¹ Non-CLF includes bilateral desks, Partnership Branch, and International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for CIDA, and Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) expenditures for DFAIT.
- ² Includes advocacy, research, outreach and institution building
- ³ CIDA did not have the responsibility or authority to support advocacy/universalization. This amount is for support for institutions which deliver humanitarian demining results (clearance, MRE, VA), and support the mine clearance organization, MACCA.
- ⁴ Advocacy and Universalization were regarded as distinct objectives, but DFAIT ILX financial records make no distinction between them.

Table 5. Number of Project Disbursements¹ for CLF II and Non-CLF II² Mine Action Projects 2003–2008 Broken Down by Expenditure Category

	1. Advocacy Outreach and Universalization	2. Clearance and Survey	3. Stockpile Destruction	4. Mine Risk Education	5. Victim Assistance	6. Technology and Testing	7. Total
1 CIDA CLF	26	43	0	28	32	0	129
2 CIDA Non-CLF	8	39	1	2	4	0	54
3 Subtotals	34	82	1	30	36	0	183
4 DFAIT CLF	123	38	19	10	6	0	196
5 DFAIT – GPSF	0	16	1	7	0	0	24
6 Subtotal	123	54	20	17	6	0	220
7 DND	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
Total	157	136	21	47	42	11	414

Source: DFAIT ILX, CIDA MAU and DND (CCMAT) financial records

- ¹See paragraph 17 for an explanation of project disbursements.
- ² Non-CLF includes bilateral desks, Partnership Branch, and International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for CIDA, and Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) expenditures for DFAIT.

19. No single body or authority assumed responsibility for keeping a reliable central depository of information on projects and expenditures for CLF II as a whole. CIDA MAU, DFAIT ILX, and DND all kept their own reliable accounts of expenditures. DFAIT ILX compiled a composite of all expenditures drawing on these different sources. But each department's accounting records were not commensurate, and there was no requirement to make them so. The composite picture thus makes it difficult to compare expenditures by category or by year. Partners are not always clear. The evaluation team had to cross-check, surmise, and guesstimate to produce these and many tables throughout the text.

3) Evaluation Approach and Methodology

20. The evaluation methodology was designed to consider the fundamental characteristics of CLF II expenditures. Many partners shared in managing CLF II. There were activities in over 60 countries. There was a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, NGOs, and international organizations.

21. Given the scope of the program, the number of countries covered and the number of projects, it was impossible to account for all activities, policies and locations. Table 6 gives the total number of CLF II recipient countries by region. Table 7 gives the number

of CLF II projects by sources of funding. In other words, did the funds come from CLF II, or Non-CLF, including CIDA's bilateral desks, Partnership Branch, International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) in DFAIT? Considering all mine action projects, there were 414 project disbursements, with a value of nearly \$167.1 million. If one were to count CLF II projects only, there were 336 project disbursements, with a total value of \$57.64 million.

Table 6. Number of Countries Receiving Canadian Contributions 2003–2008

	Asia	Americas	Europe	Africa	Middle-East	Total
No. of Countries	13	7	16	19	8	63
Percent of Total	21	11	25	30	13	100%

Source: DFAIT and CIDA financial records

Table 7. Number of Project Disbursements and Amount Disbursed on Mine Action 2003–2008

NUMBER OF PROJECT DISBURSEMENTS

	CLF II (CIDA, DFAIT, and DND)	CIDA Non-CLF II (Bilateral, Partnership, or IHA)	DFAIT Non-CLF II(GPSF)	Total
Number of projects disbursements	336	54	24	414
% of total number	81%	13%	6%	100%

AMOUNTS DISBURSED (in \$ million)

	CLF II (CIDA, DFAIT, and DND)	CIDA Non-CLF II (Bilateral, Partnership, or IHA)	DFAIT Non-CLF II(GPSF)	Total
Amount disbursed (in \$ million)	57.6	95.7	13.7	167.1
% of total disbursed	34.5%	57.3%	8.2%	100%

Source: DFAIT and CIDA financial records

22. In light of the foregoing, a case study approach was adopted for this evaluation. The evaluation steering committee originally selected six countries to be the subject of case studies, including Cambodia, Colombia, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. When Yemen was not deemed stable enough for a field visit, Jordan was chosen as a replacement. Table 8 shows the number of projects and amount disbursed for the six countries selected.

Table 8. Countries Selected for Case Studies: Numbers of Project Disbursements and Amounts Disbursed, 2003–2008

Number of Project Disbursements

	CIDA and DFAIT CLF II	CIDA Non-CLF II (Bilateral, Partnership, or IHA)	DFAIT Non-CLF II (GPSF)	Total
Cambodia	20	11	0	31
Colombia	8	0	4	12
Jordan	9	0	0	9
Mozambique	5	2	0	7
Sudan	7	8	4	19
Uganda	11	0	4	15
TOTAL	60	21	12	93

Amount Disbursed (in \$ millions)

	CLF II	CIDA Non-CLF II (Bilateral, Partnership, or IHA)	DFAIT Non-CLF II (GPSF)	Total
Cambodia	2.4	9.5	0	11.9
Colombia	2.8	0	1.0	3.8
Jordan	.8	1.3	0	2.1
Mozambique	1.2	3.3	0	4.5
Sudan	4.3	19.9	2.0	26.2
Uganda	2.0	0	.7	2.7
TOTAL	13.5	34	3.7	51.2

Source: DFAIT and CIDA financial records

23. For the most part, the case study countries have large integrated programs. They are places where Canada has played a prominent role. They are at different stages of conflict or post-conflict and are representative of different regions of the world. The number of project disbursements in these six countries alone represents 22 percent (93 / 414) of the total number of projects for the five-year period. The amount spent on these countries totals nearly 31 percent (51.2 / 167.1) of all CLF II and non-CLF II expenditures. Brief synopses of these case studies can be found in Annex III at the end of this document.

24. Two evaluation team members each conducted three field studies. To provide uniformity, the case studies were structured identically, using a common evaluation grid, interview protocols and analytical approaches.

3.1) Data Collection Methods

In addition to Canadian mine action contributions in these field-visit countries, the evaluation team relied on a number of other data sources and information gathering techniques, briefly described below.

25. Literature and file review: There is a large body of literature on landmines. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) maintains a library of mine action program evaluations, and many items are available on line. Academic institutions produce articles, monographs and books. These institutions include James Madison University in the United States, Cranfield University in the United Kingdom, and quasi-academic institutions such as the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Two volumes, produced in Canada, have dealt with the background and evolution of the Ottawa Convention itself.⁷ All of these sources provide data repositories. However, the most useful source of data, and the one that takes all others into account, is the Landmine Monitor, published annually since 1998. The Canadian Landmine Fund has supported the production of the Landmine Monitor, described in later sections of this report.

In addition to the above, the evaluation team consulted a number of project files in CIDA, DFAIT, and DND. The objective was to review a selection of files that would provide information on universalization, advocacy in Canada and abroad, stockpile destruction and training, and humanitarian mine action projects (clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance) in all key target countries.

26. Site Observation's and Interviews. Both open-ended and structured interviews were conducted at different locations. As much as possible, interviewees in Canadian departments were met twice, once at the start of the research to provide information, and once at the end to provide clarification. Interviews were held with all key stakeholders, including military personnel and civilian officials in Canadian departments, Canadian and international civil society, recipient NGOs from other countries, all relevant UN multilateral agencies and key personnel in each of the field visit countries.

27. Surveys. Canadian NGOs belonging to the mine action network, created and maintained by the Canadian NGO, Mines Action Canada, were surveyed to determine the outcome of Mines Action Canada's efforts to promote mine action programming among its member organizations.

28. Numerical Data. The evaluation relied on three sources of numerical data:

⁷ Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, *To Walk Without Fear, The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998; and Jody Williams, Stephen D.

- Financial and other project-related records, maintained by the three implementing Canadian departments, were used to establish an overview of the Canadian Landmine Fund program, and its expenditures, themes, and sources of funding. Each of the three participating departments maintained its own separate record of expenditures, based on its own accounting protocols. This made it difficult to render a composite account of overall CLF II expenditures. The numerical data derived from CIDA and DFAIT financial records must thus be considered approximations;
- Global data is maintained on line and published annually by the Landmine Monitor. While it is unreliable in some instances, the Landmine Monitor is an invaluable source of information and insight on numerical trends in mine action. Its reports also provide insight into universalization of the Treaty, funding by donor countries, and adherence to the Convention by mine-affected states;
- Some numerical data is available only in mine-affected countries, where mine action centres and civil-society organizations compile mine action information. If it functions effectively in these countries, the International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) provides useful country-specific information on critical issues. These issues include landmine casualties, their causes and consequences, survey results and pace of removal where clearance occurs. The International Management System for Mine Action is a system devised by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to compile, record and analyze information specific to mine action programming.

3.2 Limitations

29. Nearly all mine-affected areas are in countries where governments function poorly. It is difficult to collect and verify information on standard indicators officially sponsored by government departments, such as income, health, and education. However, the problem is even more severe for indicators, such as the presence of landmines, which are typically not conceived as a government responsibility. Governments (such as Uganda and Mozambique) may be supportive of the Mine Ban Treaty's ideals, but even with the best of intentions, they are more focused on other priorities. Understandably, these priorities may not include maintaining information on key mine action variables.

30. Landmine casualty data are rarely kept separate from data on other trauma cases. Information about the number of incidents must thus be inferred from accident records at clinics and emergency centres. Sometimes casualties are gleaned from newspaper accounts, health centres, and intelligence departments. Information on victims may be found at rural and urban health centres. Mine risk education information is occasionally kept by education departments but more commonly by multilateral organizations. Mine action centres may maintain an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). According to the Landmine Monitor (2008), however, 92 percent of these centres are deemed to have incomplete records. This is only one of a number of factors

that accounts for inadequate data.⁸ The diversity and unreliability of sources make it a challenge to compile essential information. Inexperienced researchers often compile data, making the challenge even greater.

31. This evaluation had to use information cautiously and only when sources could be relied upon. This included information from the Landmine Monitor. The evaluation team had to find innovative sources of information to show linkages between expenditures and outcomes, which in some cases involve conjecture. Here, as elsewhere, the reliability of information imposes constraints on the overall assessment of mine action.

32. Even when information can be trusted, there remains the limitation of attributing outcomes to CLF II, a specifically Canadian source of funds, separately from other donor funds. This is the case in countries such as Sudan, where Canadian funding supports the United Nations Mine Action Office in Khartoum and Juba, along with a large number of donors. It is impossible to isolate the specific consequences of Canada's involvement. The same is true of Jordan, Cambodia, Colombia, and other countries. The dilemma is magnified where Canada channels funds through multilateral agencies, or Canadian funding is merged with other sources at CIDA and at the country level.

33. It must also be noted that, while this evaluation was expected to focus on CLF II expenditures, funds from non-CLF sources (bilateral and GPSF) were nearly twice the amounts from CLF II sources. In some cases, it is difficult to distinguish between CLF II-funded projects and projects funded by a related source. It is practically impossible to separate CLF II funds from non-CLF II funds in the field, and to attribute results exclusively to one or the other, in these six country case studies.

3.3) Evaluation Criteria

34. An ESC-approved evaluation grid includes a group of 37 key questions, which guided this evaluation from the beginning. These questions cover eight basic evaluation criteria outlined in the terms of reference:

- Relevance – Did the program and projects meet the overall aims of the departments involved and the needs of the recipients?
- Results achievement – Has the program realized its operational and activity targets, along with other anticipated and unanticipated results?
- Cost effectiveness – Were the activities and inputs used to achieve objectives the most cost-efficient, compared to alternatives?
- Sustainability– Can program outcomes be expected to endure beyond the funding period?

⁸ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2007, p. 42

- Partnership – Are responsibility and accountability shared among stakeholders and partners?
- Appropriateness of design – Did program administration and overall management suit program needs?
- Appropriateness of resource utilization – Was administration sensitive to using time and money in the most efficient manner?
- Informed and timely action – Did the program react sensibly to risks and changes in the course of implementation?

35. One of the evaluation's core functions was to assess CLF II in terms of its principal components – universalization, advocacy, clearance, stockpile destruction, mine risk education/victim assistance and testing/technology – with reference to the above eight evaluation criteria.

36. In the interest of brevity and to present the relevant information most efficiently, the eight criteria are presented in three groups.

- Achievement of results: This group combines results and sustainability;
- Relevance: This group combines appropriateness of design and partnership;
- Cost-effectiveness: This group combines appropriateness of resource utilization and informed and timely action.

37. This section briefly summarizes each project component's activities and assesses CLF II's performance on these three evaluation criteria. Every effort has been made to draw on the Results-based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF) in discussing performance on the evaluation criteria. The RMAF has suggested specific questions when assessing CLF II against these criteria. These questions are used here explicitly and implicitly. On the matter of relevance, for example, the RMAF suggests asking whether CLF II supports sustainable development in mine-affected countries, or whether CLF II is designed to addresses all of Canada's obligations.

4) Evaluation Findings

This section summarizes the key evaluation findings in the six categories of mine action discussed in paragraph 14. Management findings have been added at the end of this section.

4.1) Treaty Ratification and Universalization

38. One of the Mine Ban Treaty's key objectives was to bring as many States Parties on board as possible. This objective appeared in the Treaty's preamble which, if not legally binding, gave it unusual prominence,⁹ to wit:

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora...

39. As the Treaty evolved, the importance attached to this point gave it the same legal backing as other, more directly humanitarian objectives, such as stockpile destruction or victim assistance. The Nairobi Action Plan further reinforced the view that adding to the number of States Parties was essential to the cause. The Nairobi Action Plan assembled the positions and agreements adopted by the assembly of signatories to the Ottawa Convention, five years after the Convention entered into force. With its partners, the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Treaty's Implementation Support Unit, Canada embraced this exercise in statecraft as fervently as the Treaty's disarmament objectives. DFAIT ILX was committed to universalizing the Treaty and to the idea that more signatories and better clearance strategies would reduce the number of victims.

40. Allocations to support universalization are reported to have declined as a proportion of total CLF expenditures. However, Canada continues to maintain a significant level of funding to bring more signatories on board. It is hard to determine the total cost of these efforts. Canada offers a variety of inducements which contribute to universalization, but it is difficult to compile an accurate amount, since some of these inducements appear under stockpile destruction, mine risk education, and perhaps other categories. The evaluation team identified 20 countries, which Canada made deliberate efforts to recruit. Five of these countries agreed to become States Parties. It is conservatively guesstimated that direct recruitment costs total \$4.2 million (funding from CLF II and other sources).

Achievement of Results

41. Universalization efforts neatly divide into two phases, an earlier phase (2003–2005) and a subsequent phase (2006–2008). During the earlier phase, the success of CLF I continued into CLF II. Efforts by the Landmines Ambassador and his staff, and the wide

⁹ Shannon Smith, "Surround the Cities with the Villages: Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty" in Jody Williams, Stephen Goose, and Mary Wareham, eds., *Banning Landmines, Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy and Human Security*, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2008, p. 70.

range of advocacy efforts, succeeded in bringing more States Parties on board. In 2003, there were 141 States Parties. Two years later, by 2005, the number had increased to 148.

42. However, during the subsequent three-year phase of CLF II (2006–2008), the number dwindled, with no signatories in 2008, as indicated in Table 9. The decline in numbers is at least partially due to the fact that holdout countries, which have not yet signed, are among the countries least likely to do so. This decline in new signatories calls into question the resources committed to this activity.

Table 9. Year by Year Accessions to the Mine Ban Convention 2004-2008

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Number	3	4	4	4	0
States Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estonia • Ethiopia • New Guinea 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bhutan • Latvia • Ukraine • Vanuatu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brunei • Cook Islands • Haiti • Montenegro 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesia • Iraq • Kuwait • Palau 	

Source: <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/background-status-of-the-convention>; and <http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members>

43. As returns diminish, DFAIT would benefit from a yardstick to ascertain the point at which universalization costs cease to justify the benefits. This would help to ensure that funds spent to universalize the Treaty are commensurate with an accurate assessment of potential benefits. Savings from reducing expenditures to universalizing the Treaty might be redirected to humanitarian efforts.

44. Sustainability here refers to whether the recruitment of new signatories considers the likelihood that new States Parties will be full participant members of the Convention and will do what is necessary to adhere to its articles. DFAIT has been diligent in attempting to ensure increasing membership and the ability of new members to meet their obligations.

Relevance

45. Universalization is not one of the Mine Ban Treaty's express objectives, but it has been one of Canada's premier objectives. Leading the campaign to secure new Mine Ban Treaty signatories has been one of the ways that Canada has demonstrated its leadership in global mine action. Initially, and for most of Phase I of the Canadian Landmine Fund, DFAIT/ILX succeeded in building consensus among nations opposed to anti-personnel landmines. Each year, respectable numbers of new signatories were added to the roll of States Parties. For a number of years, notably during Phase I of the Canadian Landmine Fund, the number of signatories to the Treaty increased year by year.

46. The design of this component, and its inclusion as part of CLF II, stemmed from the Government of Canada's desire to assume a prominent and leading role in promoting the Ottawa Convention. DFAIT ILX also embraced the notion of citizen diplomacy, that is, the recognition that NGO partnerships are critical to success in securing new members and implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. DFAIT ILX ensured that NGOs played a major role in advocacy, serving as watchdogs and supporting the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. However, as noted in the preceding section, as the number of new signatories diminished, questions have emerged about the appropriateness, and thus relevance, of placing continued emphasis on treaty ratification and universalization.

Cost-effectiveness

47. Funds spent on universalization ought to be commensurate with a realistic assessment of what potential benefits are likely to accrue, especially as prospective signatories in the foreseeable future become small in number and may be of only modest importance to furthering the mine ban cause. It is difficult to specify precisely the total amount expended for universalization year after year since universalization expenditures are not always identified separately in DFAIT's accounting. Allocations in support of universalization are reported to have decreased as a proportion of total expenditures. However, the evaluators consider that universalization has received a significant amount of CLF II resources in relation to the probable benefits it is likely to offer.

48. In the evaluator's opinion, it would have been more appropriate if DFAIT ILX had adjusted its expenditure to reflect the fact that new signatories could feasibly be recruited. A timely decision would have redirected funds to other components where the likelihood of real impact was patently greater.

4.2) Advocacy: Research, Policy Development, Partnership and Outreach

49. Much has been made of the role of activist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in creating the Ottawa Convention. Some even claim that, in this case, NGO activism ushered in a new approach to statecraft, known as citizen diplomacy. NGO participation solidified in 1992, with six NGOs forming the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). In five years, the ICBL brought the landmines issue onto the world stage. Some say that the conventional wisdom about arms control negotiations was turned on its head. Not surprisingly, there have been vaunted claims for this new phenomenon that emerged from the Ottawa Process:

The mine ban movement demonstrated that it is possible for nongovernmental organizations to put an issue – even one with international security implications – on the

international agenda, provoke urgent actions by governments and others and serve as the driving force behind change.¹⁰

50. The Ottawa Convention acknowledged civil society's unique role in making the landmines issue a global concern. Appropriately, the Canadian Landmine Fund did the same in allotting funds to civil society in Canada and abroad to take part in implementing the Convention. The Canadian Landmine Fund implicitly accepted the idea that there was a new way of doing business in the international arena, where civil society would play a key role in promoting the Treaty's objectives. The Fund assumed that NGOs were privileged executors of complex political processes. These processes included mobilizing public opinion in Canada and abroad, managing the Treaty's implementation, monitoring its success and carrying out mine action programs around the world.

51. Civil-society groups have participated in implementing the Treaty in three ways: 1) generating public support for continued mine action in Canada, 2) serving as Treaty watchdogs, and 3) executing mine action projects in host countries.

Achievement of Results

52. It has been difficult to measure the impact of projects to support advocacy by civil society organizations. The evaluation team is not aware of any independent assessments of specifically Canadian contributions to civil society for advocacy purposes. The evaluation team has drawn on files and personal observation to assess the contribution of specific non-government organizations (GICHD, ICBL and ICRC) to universalization. The evaluation team has also reviewed the performance of five NGOs, such as CAMEO (Canadian Association for Mine and Explosive Ordnance Security) and CPAR (Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief) in executing a range of projects.

53. Efforts to raise public awareness, and to serve the Convention's implementation, have been successful in some regards and less so in others. Supporting NGOs as watchdogs in implementing the Treaty (DFAIT ILX) has been a considerable success. Supporting NGOs in delivering projects overseas (CIDA MAU) has been successful in some projects and less in others. Finally, there have been modest results in helping NGOs to raise public awareness in Canada and abroad (DFAIT ILX) maintaining an effective level of advocacy in Canada.

54. Civil-society groups excelled as watchdogs. CLF II funding (administered by DFAIT ILX) largely made this possible. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

¹⁰ Jody Williams and Stephen D. Goose, "Citizen Diplomacy and the Ottawa Process: A Lasting Model," in Jody Williams, Stephen Goose and Mary Wareham, eds., *Banning Landmines, Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy and Human Security*, Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008, p. 182

and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) served as critical observers and watchdogs for adherence to the Treaty. ICBL stands out for its yearly publication of the Landmine Monitor and for its network of affiliated organizations in 70 countries. These organizations assume various roles in supporting the mine action campaign at the national level. Mines Action Canada (MAC) is a Canadian NGO, but it too has had an active and commendable role as a watchdog. Its director was, and remains, an active and valued member of the ICBL board.

55. Regarding sustainability, if CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX had intended to ensure that their NGO partners would eventually be self-sufficient, performance on sustainability would not have been satisfactory. However, this was not the intention, and CLF II should not be held to this standard. In some cases, funding was provided to civil-society groups that were clearly not likely to sustain themselves.

Relevance

56. NGO activism brought attention to the landmines issue and convinced Canadian policy makers to take a stand. Citizen diplomacy (direct involvement of civil-society groups) became, not just a strategy, but a policy imperative. DFAIT ILX and CIDA MAU both incorporated a strong emphasis on civil society. In doing so, they responded insightfully to a very relevant feature of their commitment to the landmines issue: to involve global civil society in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.

57. CLF II demonstrates its commitment to partnerships by deliberately seeking to draw explicitly on the human resources and programming capacities of Canadian NGOs in implementing significant elements of the CLF II program. Deliberately incorporating civil-society groups as an integral part of the CLF II design very appropriately responded to the role these groups had played, and were expected to play, in focusing attention on the landmines problem.

Cost-effectiveness

58. CIDA MAU funded NGOs to deliver victim assistance and mine risk education projects in mine-affected countries. DFAIT ILX funded NGOs to engage governments and the public in support of Treaty membership and implementation. In both cases, cost-effectiveness meets a reasonably high standard. Relying on NGOs turned out to be a cost-effective approach to accomplishing these complex tasks.

59. NGOs assumed critical roles in implementation. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) maintained a network of NGOs and produced the Landmine Monitor which recorded and disseminated data on mine action. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Landmine Survivors Network undertook key responsibilities assisting landmine victims. The Canadian Landmine Foundation or the Canadian Association for Mine and Explosive Ordnance Security (CAMEO), a Canadian

NGO, undertook landmine clearance training in Southern Sudan. Both CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX supported these key roles that NGOs assumed in advocacy and implementation.

60. By design or by default, one Canadian NGO, Mine Action Canada (MAC), assumed responsibility for maintaining a high level of Canadian public awareness. The job was to get the message to Canadians and to encourage a gamut of other NGOs to do the same. Mines Action Canada carried out a number of programs to raise landmines awareness among Canadians. Mines Action Canada is the hub for communications through the mine action network. However, this does not seem to have made its network of members more active in mine action.

4.3) Humanitarian Mine Action: Clearance

61. Locating and destroying the remnants of war is the Mine Ban Treaty's pre-eminent concern and the main concern of the Canadian Landmine Fund. More funds have been spent, and more projects developed to locate and destroy landmines, than for any other activity. Locating and destroying landmines is the focus of the Treaty's most cited tenet, Article 5, which obliges each signatory to rid its country of landmines ten years from the date of signing. Progress toward meeting this deadline is a measure of the intention of States Parties to meet their obligations. Indirectly, it is also a measure of international donor support, including Canada's efforts to implement the Ottawa Convention.

62. In 2008, the ten-year deadline applied to 19 states, whose time it was to announce their compliance or, if necessary, to seek an extension. Fourteen states had prepared a request for extension. Four others had not. Only one seemed ready to meet the deadline. In 2009, four States Parties seemed ready to meet the deadline, still only a small fraction of the expected 19 states. It was clear that many States Parties had not made their best efforts to meet their commitments. In a number of States Parties, mine removal programs were plagued with inefficiencies. In most cases, programs lacked the necessary government support.

63. In the past five years, more than half of all Canadian mine action funding has been allocated to clearing unexploded ordnance. Some advances have been made. Roads cleared in the Sudan are now open for trade. Fields cleared in Cambodia are available for farmers to cultivate. Limited clearance of villages and fields in Uganda has given some displaced persons the confidence to return to their homesteads. Given the size of the task, however, as one commentator noted, this is like "bailing the ocean with a bucket".

Achievement of Results

64. Progress in clearance is typically given in square meters or kilometres cleared per year, or the number of anti-personnel mines removed from the ground. The Landmine

Monitor reports that it 'believes' 140 square kilometres were cleared in mined areas and that 217,000 anti-personnel mines were removed and destroyed around the world. These numbers give no indication about the pace or progress of clearance since the area cleared is not given as a percentage of total affected area, because total area affected is rarely known with any accuracy.

65. Linking specific clearance figures to Canadian funding is even more challenging since Canadian funding is almost always pooled with other donors' contributions. Even if Canadian funding were known in proportion to the total in a mine-affected country over a specific period, it would still be difficult to link Canadian contributions to a specific level of effort or proportion of the results.

66. There are few measurable indicators of clearance efforts and hence few causal inferences to be made between clearance efforts and their consequences." The evaluation thus relied instead on qualitative reports from landmine clearance companies, planners, consultants and local officials. All expressed concern that the pace of clearance rarely met expectations and overall was very modest.

67. The fact that the pace of clearance has fallen short of expectations may not have arisen so much from difficulties with particular projects but from the overall challenge of demining. It is uncertain that States Parties will meet the commitments they make when signing the Mine Ban Treaty. In most places and circumstances, clearance is limited by (1) expense, (2) logistical difficulties (in the Sudan, clearance is possible only during the dry season), (3) political sensitivity, (4) donor reluctance to support a potentially risk-prone endeavour which, in many cases, is diminishing in priority, and (5) insufficient information to help clearance operators work efficiently.

68. Landmine removal has occasionally been conceived and justified for CLF II funding as an end in itself, needing no other justification, except that it meets the obligation of Mine Ban Treaty signatories to clear all landmines in ten years. This oversimplifies the problem. There are many other factors to consider before embarking on a clearance program. It would have been helpful and more pragmatic to recognize that full clearance may not be possible in many cases, although the Treaty demands it. It may be preferable to clear only the most essential areas (key transportation arteries, clinics, schools, homesteads and critical farm land) and to leave less essential areas (non-essential arteries, non-critical farm land, remote pastureland and mountainous areas) for later.

69. Local institutions should have the capacity and resources to carry out clearance programs. Failing this, they should at least have the capacity to manage and set clearance priorities. This capacity exists in only a very few countries. Cambodia may be one. Others may include Lebanon, Jordan and Afghanistan. Funding and ensuring adequate capacity building is a vital element of a sustainable program. Another is ensuring that landmine clearance is integrated with development programs. CLF II

departments have acknowledged the importance of capacity building and a development focus. CIDA especially has espoused this, even if CIDA's terms and conditions for programming through the Mine Action Unit of the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate excludes direct funding to local government bodies, such as mine action centres.

Relevance

70. Mine clearance is the Mine Ban Treaty's core objective. CLF II's sizeable commitment to clearance attests to the relevance of its program to the Mine Ban Convention's objectives, to the principles of donor states and to international organizations. Some countries, such as Cambodia, have designed innovative clearance programs and have furthered the principles espoused by the Mine Ban Treaty and the international community. In a few instances, program design has been appropriate to both national and international policy imperatives. However, this is not the case everywhere. Even if many mine-affected states accept these principles, they may not share Canada's commitment to the urgency of mine clearance, since they have other, more pressing national priorities.

71. Despite their importance, moreover, national governments and national mine action centres have benefited only to a limited extent, directly or indirectly, from CLF II assistance. Yet national governments are probably the most important partners if one wishes to have a long-term impact. The evaluation team was informed that CIDA's Mine Action Unit was unable to support local government bodies, since its terms and conditions exclude direct funding to local public institutions. Canada's key partners in clearance activities have thus been international NGOs and international agencies, through which most funding has been channelled.

Cost-effectiveness

72. DFAIT ILX holds the view that any contribution to clearance goes some way to helping countries to meet their Treaty obligation to clear all landmines in ten years. Others, including CIDA MAU, recognize that simply meeting Treaty obligations (by undertaking any type of clearance program) renders a limited view of meeting the Treaty's Article 5 objective of clearance as quickly and as humanely as possible. This evaluation echoes CIDA MAU's view that, if clearance is undertaken mainly to meet the terms of the Treaty, this may not be the most cost-effective approach.

73. Where programs neglect to link clearance with development priorities, and low priority is given to capacity building of national and local governments, clearance programs are less effective, and funding them is commensurately less appropriate. A suitable design must achieve the right balance between clearing transportation arteries and clearing productive fields, and between training community members to demine on their own and leaving the job to professionals.

4.4) Stockpile Destruction

74. When signing the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties agree to destroy their stockpiles of landmines within four years (Article 4). This can be difficult to accomplish for financial and occasionally logistical reasons. Article 6 obliges the more affluent States Parties (signatories to the Convention) to assist others in destroying their stockpiles. When affluent States Parties do this, they accomplish two purposes: (1) they rid a country of its inventory of anti-personnel landmines, and (2) they motivate non-signatory countries to sign the Treaty by helping them meet one of their first obligations. DFAIT ILX has done both. It has assisted in stockpile destruction and used this as an incentive for hesitant countries to become signatories. In total, Canada has provided funds and technical assistance for 23 States Parties and one non-State Party to destroy stockpiles since 1997, that is, over Phases I and II of the Canadian Landmine Fund.¹¹ Between 2003 and 2008, during Phase II of the Canadian Landmine Fund, Canada provided funds and technical assistance to 12 States Parties to destroy their stockpiles in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America.

Achievement of Results

75. Over five years, 21 stockpile destruction projects were executed in 12 countries.¹² In most cases, DFAIT ILX arranged to make funds and expertise available to destroy stockpiles. This is a commendable level of effort. This has also allowed a small number¹³ of these 12 countries to become signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty by helping them to meet the conditions of Article 4. Reports indicate that Canada has provided high-quality expertise.

76. Canadian experts have worked closely with military personnel in partner countries, suggesting the kind of transfer of expertise that sustainability requires. Overall, since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, 80 States Parties have destroyed their stockpiles, 60 never had any and another 5 have not reported fully but probably do not have any. This amounts to 145 States Parties out of 155 members that have completed the destruction of their stockpiles leaving only ten States Parties that have not yet done so. With Canada's support, the Mine Ban Treaty has succeeded in dramatically reducing the stockpiles of landmines kept by its members. A total of 14 million remain to be

¹¹ DFAIT, *Meeting the Goals: Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund 2004-2007*, 2007, p. 14. The list includes Albania, Argentina, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Honduras, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen.)

¹² Rep. of Congo, Mauritania, Uganda, Sudan, Guinea Bissau, Chile, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan, Ukraine.

¹³ A DFAIT ILX officer writes that Serbia, Montenegro and Belarus joined following an understanding that assistance would be forthcoming to meet Article 4. These countries were beneficiaries of Canadian advocacy assistance.

destroyed, a small proportion (21 percent) of the original 66 million landmines which States Parties kept before signing the treaty.

77. These numbers must be put in context. Most of the world's landmines are kept by countries that are not States Parties, (such as China, 110 million; USA, 10 million; Russia, 25 million). The world's remaining number of landmines thus remains sizeable. However, there is evidence that the Mine Ban Treaty has influenced even those who are not members (such as South Korea) to reduce their stockpile. When all countries are taken into account, over the life of the movement to ban landmines, the number of countries possessing them has dropped from an estimated 130 to 46 (see Table 10). The number of landmines stockpiled has been reduced from an estimated 260 million to 175 million. Again, DFAIT ILX has played a significant role in this reduction.

Table 10. Overall Reduction in Number of Countries with Stockpiles and in Number of Landmines

Indicator	1990	2003	2007
Number of States with stocks of mines	130	78	46
Estimated number of mines	260,000,000	215,000,000	175,000,000

Sources: ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2007 p. 15, DFAIT, Meeting the Goals: Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund 2004-2007

Relevance

78. Stockpile destruction is formally advocated in the Treaty, accepted by signatories, and basic to the Government of Canada's landmine policy. In each of the 12 partner countries where Canada has provided assistance, landmine stockpile destruction has been seen to help meet important national commitments. Destruction activities seem to have been designed to follow the policy commitments that Canada and its partners share, as well as the technical protocol required to conduct these operations appropriately.

Cost-effectiveness

79. The evaluation team does not have any standard for what stockpile destruction should reasonably cost. Inspection indicates that the cost of each project ranges from \$14,000 to \$4 million, depending on the services provided and the size of the program. In most cases, expenditures seem to be justified, based on the amount destroyed and the training provided. Information in the files is not complete enough to determine whether resources have been used appropriately, whether funds have been used as intended, or whether more efficient alternative approaches were considered.

4.5) Humanitarian Mine Action: Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance

80. The Mine Ban Convention contains no separate section and sets no targets for Mine Risk Education (MRE) or Victim Assistance (VA). This distinguishes MRE and VA from mine clearance. Article 5 of the Convention requires mine-affected countries to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under their jurisdiction in ten years. Article 4 requires the destruction of all stockpiles in four years. The Treaty assigns no obligations to States Parties regarding mine awareness or caring for victims. Instead, in Article 6.3, the Treaty puts the onus, not on mine-affected states but on States Parties “in a position to do so”, to provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation and social and economic integration of mine victims and for mine awareness. “In a position to do so” is the operative phrase. Meeting this provision, unlike other provisions, is left to the discretion of benevolent countries that might be willing to assist mine-affected countries. Mine risk education and victim assistance share a subsidiary status.

81. The Canadian Landmine Fund does not treat MRE and VA as discrete pillars, though they have conventionally been counted as separate features of mine action. The Canadian Landmine Fund associates them with mine clearance under the heading of ‘humanitarian mine action’, in the shadow of mine clearance, which has received considerable attention. These two “sub-pillars” receive comparatively less attention than mine clearance.

82. There may be a practical reason. Mine clearance needs special institutions built largely from the ground up, to do its specialized work. Multilateral and bilateral donors do not hesitate to put them in place. Mine risk education and victim assistance are different. Everywhere, they have existing institutional homes that should, in principle, bear responsibility for delivering the services they entail. Mine awareness falls neatly under departments of education, and victim assistance under departments of health, where there are services to be delivered as part of curriculum designs or, in the case of victim assistance, as part of emergency and rehabilitative care. They are specialized services, add-ons to the already onerous burden of government ministries with limited budgets and substantial obligations. It is impractical to expect ministries of health or education to deliver such specialized services or care when more basic services are not provided.

83. Benevolent States Parties may wish to provide mine risk education or medical and rehabilitative assistance to victims. When they do, however, they face a dilemma. They can provide them through NGOs or UN agencies, or through existing departments of education or health. In the latter case, donors may lose control of their program, as it is swallowed by inefficient bureaucracies with perhaps the best of intentions and the worst of facilities to provide mine awareness or specialized health services. In the former and more common scenario, sustainability may be in jeopardy. Programs serve a limited population. They often have a short-term effect and little lasting impact. In most

instances, DFAIT ILX has chosen the former.¹⁴ It has typically avoided national departments of education and health. Instead, it has relied on local or Canadian NGOs, or on United Nations agencies.

Achievement of Results

84. Canada has supported mine risk education in 15 countries, from CLF II, Non-CLF II, bilateral or GPSF resources. Casualties from landmine accidents decreased in seven of these countries, as indicated in Table 11. This is a commendable record, since six experienced conflict in the two years concerned. The presence of open conflict seems to make a difference. Casualties decrease in almost all states where conflict has been modest, where mine risk education programs function free of the factor of hostilities and where there is not a large return of displaced persons.

Table 11. Changes in Casualties in Countries Receiving Canadian Mine Risk Education Funding

Country	Canadian contribution (\$)	Casualties in 2004	Casualties in 2006	% change
1. Nepal	60,000	1,445	169	-88%
2. Vietnam	500,000	238	96	-60%
3. Cambodia	390,866	898	450	-50%
4. Uganda	2,188,532	50	31	-40%
5. Angola	750,000	191	134	-30%
6. Bosnia Herzegovina	120,000	43	35	-18%
7. Afghanistan	161,115	878	796	-9%
8. DR Congo	194,304	50	53	+6%
9. Sri Lanka	85,421	56	64	+14%
10. Colombia	837,417	882	1167	+32%
11. Sudan	5,842,935	101	140	+38%
12. Mauritania	340,000	5	7	+40%
13. Chad	571,508	32	139	+334%
14. Algeria	120,000	7	58	+650%
15. Lebanon	209,340	14	207	+1378%

Source: CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX financial records and the Landmine Monitor reports for 2005 and 2007

85. It is more difficult to assess adequate progress in assuming national responsibility for landmine survivors. The evaluation draws on the Treaty's Implementation Support Unit program to track efforts in countries where progress is most needed to serve victims

¹⁴ It is important to reiterate that the terms and conditions of CIDA's mandate exclude direct funding to public bodies in host countries, such as mine action centres.

better. Of the 2415 countries where progress is said to be “most needed”, Canada has funded only 8. Canada does not seem to have chosen countries for assistance where the need has been verified as the greatest. Of the 14 that Canada has chosen for assistance, 8 of which were tracked by the ICBL, the Landmine Monitor and the ICBL have acknowledged adequate progress in only four, as indicated in Table 12. Six of these 14 countries were not among those recognized as being in the greatest need. Funds for victim assistance were provided to these countries with other criteria in mind.

Table 12. Progress in Treatment of Landmine Survivors among Beneficiaries of Canadian Assistance 2004-2007

Country	Canadian contribution to victim assistance (\$)	Progress
1. Cambodia	611,804	Adequate progress
2. Senegal	759,829	Adequate progress
3. Sudan	2,000,000	Adequate progress
4. Uganda	346,804	Adequate progress
5. Colombia	464,445	Inadequate progress
6. Burundi	150,000	Inadequate progress
7. Guinea-Bissau	255,000	Inadequate progress
8. Bosnia Herzegovina	100,000	Inadequate progress
9. Guatemala	245,000	Not among original V24*
10. Zambia	194,000	Not among original V24*
11. India	41,935	Not among original V24*
12. Laos	587,287	Not among original V24*
13. Palestine	32,580	Not among original V24*
14. Jordan	155,000	Not among original V24*

Source: ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2007, p. 45

86. Thoughtful and innovative programming has taken place in a number of countries. A mine risk education program in Cambodia successfully targeted scrap metal dealers, who dig up landmines to sell as recycled material. A mine risk education program in the Sudan developed a national curriculum, disseminated to all Sudanese primary schools, with the collaboration of the national Ministry of Education. Victim assistance in Colombia has developed an easy-to-use demonstration of the legal rights of victims to give survivors better access to treatment and rehabilitation services.

87. Regarding sustainability, however, as indicated earlier CIDA MAU has contracted with international NGOs or UN agencies to carry out the work. The advantage is that

¹⁵ These 24 are: Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Angola, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Serbia, Thailand, Yemen.

* V24 refers to those 24 States Parties that have reported that they have significant numbers of landmine survivors.

Canada does not lose control of projects. The downside is that projects are likely to serve a small portion of the population, and to have a short-term effect. The sustainable impact is also likely to be modest. “Despite this, observation of these projects indicates that many have been well-managed and nevertheless made an effort to work with national institutions to carry out work on a long-term basis.”

Relevance

88. The Mine Ban Treaty assigns no obligations to States Parties regarding mine awareness or caring for victims. Mine risk education does not have the same priority as other components. Canada has given mine risk education a priority that commendably exceeds the importance which national governments, other donors, or even the Convention itself attach to it.

89. In the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, Canada has supported partnerships linking UN agencies with mine action centres, UN agencies with local NGOs, Canadian NGOs with local NGOs, and local NGOs with local communities. These partnerships have typically been positive and enduring. In some cases, these linkages have gone beyond landmine awareness and resulted in a variety of collaborations. Where CLF II departments have contracted directly with NGOs, projects are well designed, generally on a modest scale and flexible enough to adapt as circumstances change. When UN agencies are contracted and in turn work with government departments, the contribution to capacity building cannot always be guaranteed because of the inherent risks associated with working with public institutions in these countries.

- For example, when funds were provided in Uganda through UNDP for mine clearance, the performance of Uganda’s Mine Action Centre under the Prime Minister’s Office was disappointing. When funds were provided through the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Sudan, very little progress was made in improving the capacity of either the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in the North or the Southern Sudan Demining Centre (SSDC) in the South, even though funding through UNICEF to the Minister of Education did have decent results. When funds were provided in Colombia through UNICEF and others for supporting the Presidential Program for Integrated Action against Mines (PAICMA) UNICEF found it difficult to work with PAICMA and made the decision to work instead through local NGOs. In none of the above cases has funding through multilateral agencies contributed significantly to capacity building of local government institutions.

Cost-effectiveness

90. Since we do not have data on total contributions by all donors to mine awareness in the countries reviewed, it is difficult to make a direct causal connection between the funds Canada has disbursed and the extent of casualty reduction. Some countries, with modest Canadian contributions, have significant reductions. Some, with large Canadian

contributions, have elevated casualty rates. To ensure the best return for funds spent (in terms of reduced casualties), it is essential to have a better understanding of relevant factors in reducing casualties, as well as a complete picture of the total funding allocated for these activities.

91. As indicated earlier, Canada has provided victim assistance support to a total of 14 countries. Of these, only 8 were among the 24 identified as most in need. It is important to add that this list of 24 countries was released in December 2004 at the Nairobi Review Conference when most of Canada's decisions on funding for victim assistance had already been made. As such, Canada may not have used its resources to assist principally those countries that have been flagged as most urgently requiring attention.

92. The use of resources by Canadian and national NGOs is transparent and appears to be appropriate in most cases. In contrast, the reporting of some UN agencies does not have the same level of detail. Instead of observing how the behaviour of communities has changed, measurable outcomes for UN agency programming may be limited to how many people have been contacted. Circumstances have changed in only a few instances, making projects less relevant and requiring informed intervention. This has happened to some extent in Uganda, where there was a change in mine risk education programs for displaced persons living in camps, as people moved back to their villages when the conflict ended. In general, however, changed circumstances have led to a change of project strategies.

4.6) Promoting National and International Mine Action Technologies

93. Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT), in the Department of National Defence, has carried out unique and specialized work. The evaluation has determined that CCMAT completed a significant amount of important research and development work in its mainly three years of full operation and one year of wind-down.

The table 13 outlines the numbers of projects and activities, by outcome, which CCMAT completed over its 3+ years of full participation in CLF II. A grand total of 84 activities are registered.

Table 13 Numbers of CCMAT Projects by Outcome and Activity Categories 2003-2006

Activity Sets	Outcome 1 AP Mine Detection	Outcome 2 Deminer Protection	Outcome 3 Mines Neutral- ization	Outcome 4 Enabling Technologies	Outcome 5 Victim Assistance	
Technical Support (Test and Evaluate)	7	7	18	0	0	32
Fielding and Promotion of Technologies	5	1	7	0	0	13

Activity Sets	Outcome 1 AP Mine Detection	Outcome 2 Deminer Protection	Outcome 3 Mines Neutral- ization	Outcome 4 Enabling Technologies	Outcome 5 Victim Assistance	
Research and Development	8	3	3	4	1	19
SUB-TOTAL R&D	20	11	28	4	1	64

Activity Sets	Outcome 1 AP Mine Detection	Outcome 2 Deminer Protection	Outcome 3 Mines Neutral- ization	Outcome 4 Enabling Technologies	Outcome 5 Victim Assistance	
OTHER ACTIVITIES						
International Coop. and Outreach						12
Donations						6
National Outreach						2
SUB-TOTAL OTHER						20
TOTAL	20	11	28	4	1	84

Achievement of Results

94. CCMAT identified landmine clearance equipment in relatively common use and tested and evaluated this equipment, with emphasis on applicability to humanitarian uses. These tests were done partly at the facilities of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technology (CCMAT), partly at the facilities of other organizations and partly in mine-affected countries. Some commonly used equipment was rejected outright. Some was judged more effective than others. In some cases, calibration was proposed for equipment to ensure optimal use in particular physical and environmental circumstances. In other cases, recommendations were made to improve equipment.

95. Information from interviews suggests that there is general frustration within the mine action community that the Mine Ban Treaty's technology objectives have not been met as they should have. CCMAT shares this frustration and is aware of this general perception. Where mine action technology is concerned, progress has generally been viewed as too slow and too costly. Bringing into general use new and innovative equipment that is fast, safe and cheap enough to win general acceptance and widespread use in the demining community has been elusive.¹⁶

96. Expert research is deemed to have been done. However, results are not commercially viable. This raises questions about the sustainability of outcomes. For

¹⁶ Refer to Annex II – DND Program Management Comment for paragraph 95

outcomes to be sustainable, there must be assurance that they would be widely used in the foreseeable future. There is little evidence of this.¹⁷

Relevance

97. As agreed with the Department of National Defence, activities have been undertaken within the framework of CLF II. CCMAT has made progress toward most outcomes defined within the Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF). Under the categories of detection, neutralization, protection, and enabling technologies, CCMAT has contributed to systematic progress in these agreed areas of humanitarian mine action. This is partially because the original design was appropriate. The CLF II design gave considerable emphasis to Canada's development of more efficient mine action technologies. The testing and technology component fulfilled this mandate. It is also observed, however, that little effort was made to promote the kind of technology that non-technical people in the community could easily use. More could have been done to devise technology appropriate to the social and financial constraints of mine action.

98. CCMAT has collaborated extensively with other research and implementing institutions. CCMAT has shown leadership in many areas of R&D. It has been a willing collaborator in others. It has made its human resources, laboratories and facilities widely available for testing and evaluation of innovations. It has recorded and made the results of its work widely available. It has supported publishing the findings of others.

Cost-effectiveness

99. Progress in mine action technology is widely regarded as too slow and too costly. Mine action technology development has not succeeded in generalizing the use of new and innovative equipment that is fast, safe, and cheap enough to win general acceptance. This general concern is relevant to a consideration of CCMAT's performance within CLF II. CCMAT might have done better to focus alternatively on developing technology that would have been less costly, more easily manufactured, and more commercially viable. This concern must be put in context by noting that CCMAT had only a limited period of time – just over three years - to meet these and other responsibilities.¹⁸

100. The meeting of States Parties in Nairobi, marking the fifth anniversary of the Convention's entry into force, provided an occasion for CCMAT to make its research more "development-oriented" in response to Articles 25 and 26 of the Nairobi Action Plan. The evaluation observed that some work did subsequently focus on lower-cost village-friendly technologies. Perhaps post-Nairobi, CCMAT did reduce the proportion of its work on higher versus lower technologies. Overall, however, research remained

¹⁷ Refer to Annex II – DND Program Management Comment for paragraph 96

¹⁸ Refer to Annex II – DND Program Management Comment for paragraph 99

informed primarily by technical issues, and not by socio-economic determinants of what equipment and approaches were suitable, affordable, usable and accessible to a broad range of mine-affected villagers.¹⁹

4.7) Management

101. Fund administration is not itself a formal component of CLF II. However, fund management has affected overall performance and is thus discussed here. Fund management has involved three distinct government agencies working collaboratively. The Treaty, which CLF II supports, is an integrated and focused agreement. However, its components are diverse and demand a range of skills and experience, which have had to be drawn from separate government agencies. The Government chose three agencies (DFAIT, DND and CIDA) to implement the Fund. These agencies were well suited to the CLF's challenges. However, they are distinct corporate entities within government. They are distinct in their mandates and thus their policy. They are distinct in their data collection, record keeping, and performance reporting frameworks. They are distinct in their corporate cultures and management systems. They are distinct in the pool of human resources and technical skills necessary to fulfill their respective roles in government. It has historically proven a challenge to integrate the work of these diverse entities in what is variously known as a "whole-of-government", "across-government" or "horizontal management" approach. The CLF is said to be one of the better such entities,²⁰ but faced its own set of challenges.

Achievement of Results

102. The organization structure and management systems used to deliver CLF II were carried over from CLF I. As such, they provided continuity between Phases I and II. They also rapidly and efficiently mobilized Phase II. The structure gave the three participating departments considerable scope to implement their respective mandates and program components on their own. A workable organization framework was established during CLF II, generally supported by congenial relations among the three implementing departments.

103. Overall planning, reporting, monitoring, and other accountability (RBM) instruments of the Fund were not established in a comprehensive, integrated and consistent manner, as originally intended. No directorate was recognized as being responsible for planning, chronicling, monitoring, and evaluating the program as a whole. This could have provided benefits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

¹⁹ Refer to Annex II – DND Program Management Comment for paragraph 100

²⁰ This understanding represents the reflections of key informants and interviewees. Since the evaluators did not study other multi-agency programming, they are not able to corroborate these views.

Relevance

104. The original intention was for oversight bodies to manage collaboration among the three partnering departments and to provide guidance for the CLF as a whole. These were not mobilized or put in place as planned. Key interviewees reported that this structure and its roles were deemed “impractical”. The terms of reference for these bodies were modified in the belief that the program did not warrant ‘hands on’ management and oversight at that level. The evaluators acknowledge this. The evaluation team also observes that the “intent” in proposing these oversight bodies — to build a formal leadership and collaborative mechanism among the implementing departments — could have been structured and implemented more effectively. An administrative body, similar to either of those described in the original project design, would have provided an independent leadership role, assuming it had sufficient authority to provide credible policy guidance for all three departments.

Operational Effectiveness

105. Complementing the RMAF by developing a five-year strategic plan, and/or preparing a more detailed management plan, could have strengthened collaboration and overcome the “impracticalities” of the organization structure’s collaborative mechanisms. The five-year strategic plan could have been updated in a Fund-wide annual planning exercise, as is often the case in strategic planning processes. Annual reporting might have been implemented, as originally intended, to show progress against the strategic and annual plans. A more coherent management system, encompassing all participating departments, would have made it possible to track overall outputs and outcomes more efficiently, and inevitably to impose a more consistent rationale on expenditures. The absence of records, which render credible account of CLF II activities, is itself a strong argument for more integrated management in cross-government programs such as CLF II.

106. Regardless of whether Fund-wide planning was carried out, if each participating department had prepared consistent annual plans and reporting instruments, this could similarly have helped to build internal communication and coherence among the three departments. This would also have afforded much-improved tracking and analysis of CLF II implementation, with more efficient use of resources. Some of the operational allocations provided to DFAIT ILX might have been used to sustain some of these coordination/planning functions.

5) Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

5.1) Conclusions

107. The Canadian Landmine Fund II contributed to the global implementation of a distinguished international convention, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. The Ottawa Convention, or Mine Ban Treaty as it is also commonly known, has been a diplomatic success, garnering one of the largest numbers of signatories in the history of disarmament conventions and generating considerable resources to help mine-affected countries clear mines, to educate their citizens, and to assist those injured. Canada's Landmine Fund II must be deemed a largely a successful initiative, by its association with the Mine Ban Treaty and by its performance.

108. The Canadian Landmine Fund II has significantly helped to increase the number of Treaty signatories. It has helped States Parties to meet some of their Treaty obligations. It has helped to reduce the global number of casualties. It has helped to destroy a large number of anti-personnel landmines stockpiled by governments. It has provided resources for removing landmines from roads, villages and productive land. It has helped to inform a number of individuals unaware of the landmine danger. It has continued to draw upon the considerable commitment of civil society organizations and drawn on many NGOs as implementers, campaigners and watchdogs. In many areas of the mine ban campaign, the Canadian Landmine Fund II has helped Canada maintain a high profile. It has done so by being ready to contribute public monies and services. Finally, the Fund has been an instructive experiment in the whole-of-government approach to an international problem involving a number of departments, in this case, DFAIT, CIDA and DND.

109. This evaluation chronicles these accomplishments. At the same time it has noted four issues where the Canadian Landmine Fund II's successes need to be qualified.

110. Administration and planning for the Fund's whole-of-government program involved coordination among three departments: DFAIT, CIDA and DND. This important task was originally assigned to a hierarchy of bodies, a Management Board (Ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Defense), a Secretariat (Deputy Ministers Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Defense) and an Inter-departmental Committee. Early on during Phase I, it was decided these coordinating bodies need not meet regularly and the Fund could be administered by allowing the different departments to manage their own allocations with DFAIT serving as point of contact, policy lead and coordinator. Members of these different departments felt this managed administration worked satisfactorily. The evaluators observed that a more centralized authority to

coordinate planning, keep records, and lend a greater measure of collaboration throughout the program would more effectively have promoted the Fund's core values, increased synergy among the departments and further increased overall effectiveness.

111. One of the core values, not always made explicit but clearly integral to Canada's landmine philosophy, was to ensure that the CLF II not only save lives but promote overall development and well-being in mine-affected countries. This was outside of the direct mandate of DFAIT and DND CCMAT. CIDA promoted the idea and put it into practice. The absence of a coordinated approach meant this universally accepted and essential value of a viable mine action strategy did not have the prominence it perhaps should have in the overall administration of the Fund.

112. An equally essential value of mine action programs is to ensure sustainability by building capacity among host country national institutions expected to deal with the landmine problem. This critical issue has been given some attention, but less than might be expected.

113. On the contrary, a great deal of effort has been given to universalizing the convention. The evaluators applaud DFAIT's efforts in this regard and acknowledge some successes. At the same time, they wonder whether the proper balance was struck between diplomatic efforts to conscript new signatories and meeting the diverse needs of mine-affected countries.

114. As the Canadian Landmine Fund II winds down, it is unclear whether Canada's leadership in the mine action community will continue to be as positive as its past, which has been a distinguished one, largely due to the considerable resources and the diverse programs administered through the Canadian Landmine Fund II and the three departments involved.

5.2) Lessons Learned

115. **Management of Whole-of-Government Programs.** Combining and tapping the efforts of three government ministries or departments requires something more than willingness to consult. It requires real authority to lead and govern the program, to keep accurate records, to monitor performance, to give enlightened direction and to ensure the most efficient use of resources by the combination of projects and other contributions. Participants in the Canadian Landmine Fund II were not disappointed in the administration that emerged to manage the program. However, the evaluation team feels that a more integrated program with a "central authority" (not necessarily ministers or deputy ministers) could have added considerably to program's coherence, efficiency and capacity.

116. From the start, the absence of a single oversight body limited coordination of the Fund's participating ministries/departments. Each ministry/department was accountable

for implementing CLF II's varied components. The Fund thus lacked a formal mechanism to coordinate inputs or to reflect systematically and analytically on performance. **The lesson learned is the following.**

- **When Canada accepts to implement such a singular and high profile international convention as the Mine Ban Treaty, an implementation mechanism with a more integrated unitary authority and interdepartmental mandate may be essential to improve coordination, focus efforts and make implementation of cross-departmental or whole of government programming more effective.**

117. **Building Institutions.** There is a tendency to regard mine action as essentially an emergency, humanitarian response. This is sensible under some circumstances, when main transportation arteries need to be cleared, or internally displaced persons (IDPs) are rapidly returning to homesteads they left during a conflict. However, treating mine action as an emergency humanitarian program sacrifices sustainability for immediate relief. It also sacrifices long-term solutions for limited short-term intervention. Mine action programs have a greater chance of success over the long term, when training is provided to local or national bodies, than when foreign companies remove mines. Donors have frequently been reminded of this in the past ten years. Canada has been among those that have spoken out on the matter. The landmines threat will not be solved in five or ten years. The most feasible approach to dispel the threat is for mine-affected countries themselves to become self-sufficient in mine action. The CLF II departments promoted institution building in principle, and lobbied to lend it greater attention, but rarely funded it directly themselves. The terms and conditions under which CIDA's Mine Action Unit operated prevented CLF II from doing so and CIDA's bilateral programs would be limited by their programming if landmine was not identified as a priority. Other departments chose to do so only in rare instances.

118. Canada faced considerable difficulties in practically supporting institution building. Its departments did not have the staff with the time to design and manage institution building programs and instead channelled funds for this purpose through multilateral donor agencies to increase the level of support while lightening the management and administrative burden. There was a tendency to favour partners with proven capacity and management systems as well as projects where the administration was straightforward. The result was that in spite of Canada's considerable diplomatic support for building mine action capacity in affected countries its field-level support was modest. Institution building may involve some risk but it is an inescapable element in mine action programming.

The lesson learned is the following.

- **If the landmine threat is to be significantly reduced, this takes time and competent national mine action bodies capable of assuming responsibility. It**

is essential to train mine action centre personnel, as well as health and education personnel. To transfer responsibility from international to national management of mine action, transition plans would need to be an essential part of all mine action programs.

119. **Clearance for Results.** Experience with the Canadian Landmine Fund has shown how difficult it is for States Parties to meet the Mine Ban Treaty deadline of removing all known anti-personnel mines within ten years of signing. Other donors have expressed similar concerns and sought solutions. A European Commission assessment has urged greater scrutiny of projects. It has recommended the following: Do not consider areas that Landmine Impact Surveys identify as low priorities; Employ new technologies where possible; Give more consideration to engaging the service of commercial operators.

120. A Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) assessment has recommended the following: Pay greater attention to communities; Emphasize the transfer of knowledge to local operators; Limit the influence of Foreign Affairs in mine action decisions to minimize political considerations in mine action programming; and support national mine action centres as coordinating bodies.

121. This report echoes many of these observations and recommendations. **The lesson learned is the following.**

- **Clearance has taken considerable time and money with less than anticipated results. In hindsight, the goals appear to have been overly ambitious. Failure to reach these goals within the established time frames may have damaged the Mine Ban Treaty's reputation. For mine action to yield lasting benefits, it must be technically competent and socially appropriate. It must proceed with the full collaboration of national and local institutions. Clearance is an important step toward helping countries to meet their obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty. At the same time, however, donors must be mindful of clearance's broader goals.**

122. **Harnessing Mine Action for Economic and Social Development.** In the medium and long term, mine action aims to save lives. However, it also aims to remove obstacles to economic growth and poverty reduction. This poses some unique challenges to donor agencies and host country institutions. Mine action is a risk-prone endeavour by its very nature. It involves the very real hazardous activity of removing unexploded ordnance.

123. There are no orthodox, hard-and-fast approaches for doing this. Mine action must take advantage of novel, sometimes unconventional²¹ means of detecting and neutralizing landmines. Affordable technologies must be found to meet the needs of the full range of objectives: securing infrastructure (such as schools, transportation arteries and market areas), clearing roads, and clearing farm or grazing land and villages. Gearing landmine programs to promote development does not come naturally. **The lesson learned is the following.**

- **Development programmers need to be more comfortable with working in risk-prone areas and working with organizations that handle and remove explosives. Mine action organizations must become more comfortable with the timelines and planning culture of development organizations. Donor agencies must make a concerted effort to identify how mine action serves development most effectively and how development programs can serve mine action. They must then commit funds and, with conscientious follow-up, ensure this occurs.**

5.3) Recommendations

124. The following main recommendations are offered for consideration by the respective departments:

Recommendation 1.

- Progress has been made but there is still much to do. CIDA and DFAIT should consider whether they want to maintain institutional support for involvement in the Campaign to Ban Landmines.
- **Implementing Authorities:**
 1. Canadian International Development Agency
 2. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Recommendation 2.

- At this stage in Canada's Mine Ban Treaty implementation, DFAIT ILX should ensure that funds spent on universalization are commensurate with a realistic assessment of likely potential benefits, since prospective signatories in the foreseeable future are relatively small and of little strategic importance.
- **Implementing Authority:** Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

²¹ This may include postponing clearance and, instead, fencing off unsafe areas to avoid accidents. It may alternatively include training villagers to accept the risk of demining on their own, with rudimentary training and tools.

Recommendation 3

- If funding is maintained for NGOs serving as mine action watchdogs and as executors of projects overseas, it is recommended that DFAIT ILX reconsider the means and extent of support to mobilize public opinion in favour of mine action, and the roles and responsibilities of Canadian NGOs in carrying this out.
- **Implementing Authority:** Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Recommendation 4.

- Canadian supporters of mine action should make a more determined effort to view mine action support from a development perspective. They must ensure that mine action is part of a development program, not as an exception but as a matter of course. Mine action technology approaches need to be more fully integrated with community needs and capacities, and with development programming in general, as local ownership and appropriate technology are essential for sustainability.
- **Implementing Authorities:**
 1. Canadian International Development Agency
 2. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Recommendation 5

- Victim assistance programs need to exercise greater care in selecting recipient countries. This will ensure that assistance goes to those most in need, and provide some guarantee that health ministries are willing to contribute, collaborate and integrate mine-victim assistance into their disability programming.
- **Implementing Authorities:**
 1. Canadian International Development Agency
 2. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Recommendation 6.

- Canada should continue its stockpile reduction program, building on its successes in the past five years. Some states will not collaborate, but others will, and they need help to destroy their existing stockpiles.
- **Implementing Authority:** Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Annex I: CLF I Evaluation Recommendations and Assessment Status of CLF II

Recommendation	Response and proposed actions	Assessment Status of CLF II
<p>1. Funding horizon</p> <p>It is recommended that Canada continue to fund MBT related landmine programming well beyond 31 March 2003. At a minimum there is a need to fund Canada's continuing administrative obligation as a State Party. Although it is anticipated that capacities within mine-affected countries will continue to increase and the need for donor assistance should decline, estimates of the length of time other States Parties will be required to provide continued assistance ranges from five to fifteen years beyond March 2003.</p>	<p>Response: Indeed, it is important to renew the funding allocated to mine action for at least another five years, as the CLF timetable differs from the one established by the Mine Ban Treaty.</p> <p>Action Plan: A memorandum submitted to the Minister's Office was approved on May 5. The purpose of the memorandum is to renew the CLF and it includes, among other considerations, a process for the integration of mine action into the departments' regular activities. This memorandum should be implemented in April 2004.</p>	<p>Implemented with a reduction in funds</p> <p>Funding continued for five years under CLF II. The dedicated fund terminated in 2008. Funding via other sources is expected to continue beyond this second five-year period.</p>
<p>2. CLF resourcing</p> <p>It is recommended that future decisions related to Canada's post-2003 approach should take into account the current leadership position of Canada within the international landmine community, and the fact that such leadership carries with it some level of political and moral obligation and responsibility to assist with any leadership transition.</p>	<p>Response: ILX fully supports this recommendation. Any decision related to Canada's post-2003 mine action approach affects Canada's credibility in this field.</p> <p>Action Plan: As previously stated, a memorandum submitted to the Minister's Office should make it possible to renew the Canadian Landmine Fund for a period of five years. Canada will thus be able to continue exercising leadership in this field.</p>	<p>Implemented</p> <p>Canada continued to play leadership roles in meetings of States Parties and in standing committees and contact groups.</p>

Recommendation	Response and proposed actions	Assessment Status of CLF II
<p>3. Universalization efforts</p> <p>It is recommended that the CLF's strategy to universalize the MBT continue to be refined and re-adjusted given that many of the remaining holdout countries (e.g. Russia, US, China and India) are doing so on account of military or security concerns. Canada and other donor countries must re-examine the extent to which programs such as the CLF can impact or influence the recalcitrant countries on this issue.</p>	<p>Response: ILX has already enlisted the help of Retired General Maurice Baril, who is in a position to enter into sustained dialogue with the military authorities of non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty. At each meeting with one of these countries, the subject of alternatives to mines is addressed. General Baril possesses the necessary credibility and expertise for exchanges to take place.</p> <p>Action Plan: Continue to call upon the services of General Baril so that dialogue will progress concerning possible alternatives to mines.</p>	<p>Partially implemented</p> <p>DFAIT ILX holds that increasing the number of treaty signatories is of paramount importance in Canada's mine action policy, in spite of indications of diminishing benefits. It is not clear how the approach has been 'refined' in order to more constructively dialogue with the 'recalcitrant' countries nor is it clear how the recruitment of General Baril has contributed in this regard.</p>
<p>4. Victim assistance</p> <p>It is recommended that the CLF examine the practical and ethical implications of integrating victim assistance activities into national systems of support to the disabled and general health services interventions in mine-affected countries.</p>	<p>Response: This issue was the subject of a number of debates and Canada played an important role in the discussions. ILX and CIDA agree that general health services as well as support to the disabled should include mine victim assistance. However, this is difficult to achieve, considering that the Canadian Landmine Fund does not have the resources to set up complete health care systems. Although the CLF provides aid, on a priority basis, for mine victim assistance programs, it does not discriminate where people are in need. In CLF-funded programs, ILX and CIDA ensure that mine victims' needs are well understood and that they receive the necessary attention from the national</p>	<p>Partially implemented</p> <p>Both CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX continued their policy of funding NGOs to provide assistance to victims. Little consideration was given to integrating assistance to landmine victims into national health programs for resource constraints. It must be said, however, that both</p>

Recommendation	Response and proposed actions	Assessment Status of CLF II
	<p>health system.</p> <p>Action Plan: As stated above, work must be done to integrate mine action into the departments' regular activities. Thus, the possibility of integrating mine victim assistance into any health assistance program and/or system of support for the disabled could be examined.</p>	<p>CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX both looked for workable alternatives to incorporating victim assistance into national health programs during CLF II.</p>
<p>5. Mine awareness</p> <p>It is recommended that the CLF re-examine the causal link between its mine awareness interventions and the reduction of risk behaviour in mine-affected countries.</p>	<p>Response: Presently, the international community is discussing this issue and Canada is actively participating in these discussions. Although it is clear that mine awareness is essential for populations at risk (for example, displaced populations that return to their home areas), the link between mine awareness and the reduction of risk behaviour is not as clear.</p> <p>Action Plan: Continue to discuss this subject at meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration and continue discussions with UNICEF (United Nations agency responsible for mine awareness).</p>	<p>Implemented</p> <p>The funding by DFAIT ILX and CIDA MAU of a number of mine awareness projects (approximately 25 for CIDA and 6 for DFAIT ILX) has certainly lead to a greater understanding of the issue and, in Colombia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Uganda and elsewhere, has led to a refinement of approaches to mine awareness.</p>
<p>6. Capacity building</p> <p>It is recommended that the CLF develop and implement a strategy that will take into account the potential of NGOs for self-sufficiency so that a more or less permanent state of financial</p>	<p>Response: ILX agrees that NGOs must develop their potential for self-sufficiency and that this must be done gradually, in accordance with a predetermined plan.</p> <p>Action Plan: Establish an action plan in collaboration with CLF-funded NGOs so that they can gradually become self-</p>	<p>Not implemented</p> <p>The recommendation was not well-informed. CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX never expected recipient Canadian</p>

Recommendation	Response and proposed actions	Assessment Status of CLF II
dependency is avoided...according to an agreed-upon timetable.	sufficient.	NGOs to become self-sufficient in mine action.
<p>7. Development of mine-related technologies</p> <p>It is recommended that the research and development activities of CCMAT that are funded by the CLF be restricted to short and medium term initiatives that are very clearly linked to identified and immediate needs of field practitioners. To avoid duplication of effort, CCMAT activities should continue to be co-ordinated and integrated with the research and development activities of other donor countries.</p>	<p>Response: The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) believes, contrary to what was stated in the evaluation report, that all projects are linked to the needs of field practitioners. To ensure that CCMAT's work effectively meets these needs, NGOs sit on the executive committee. In addition, through the Demining Information Technology Forum, it is possible for CCMAT to learn the needs of field practitioners. Finally, CCMAT uses the proposals of the Cambodian Mine Action Center describing needs associated with detection and protection. In addition, CCMAT does not believe that the CLF should only fund short and medium term research initiatives. Long-term research initiatives would not represent a greater risk than other initiatives. Notable success has been achieved by CCMAT as a result of this kind of research.</p> <p>Action Plan: Continue to fund short, medium- and long-term research by cost-sharing with other international partners, in order to reduce risk and increase the chances of success.</p>	<p>Partially implemented</p> <p>CCMAT has made an effort, during CLF II, to incorporate the needs of communities and other on-the-ground stakeholders in their research. CCMAT personnel conducted trials in mine-affected countries and sought to become familiar with the conditions of personnel in the field. Both the CLF I Evaluation and this evaluation have noted, however, that CCMAT could have done more to interact with affected communities and with those carrying out demining in mine affected areas.</p>
<p>8. Industry Canada</p> <p>It is recommended that the role of marketing and commercialization and by extension the role of Industry Canada within CCMAT and or the CLF be re-examined to determine the most appropriate role, if any.</p>	<p>Response: The role of Technology Partnership Canada (TPC) in the CLF is to assist with the commercialisation of demining technologies and equipment. However, according to a recent IC and DFAIT study, marketing opportunities seem very limited. This study paints an untraditional portrait of the market for humanitarian demining equipment and technology. This is mainly because the</p>	<p>Implemented</p> <p>A re-examination was done, and it was decided that Industry Canada's role should be discontinued.</p>

Recommendation	Response and proposed actions	Assessment Status of CLF II
	<p>purchase of equipment or technology is closely related to the funds allocated by donor countries. The fact that the market is not a "normal" commercial market significantly limits the role that IC, and TPC in particular, can play in the area of demining.</p> <p>Action Plan: That IC participates in the CLF in an advisory capacity, without being a full partner.</p>	
<p>9. Performance measurement</p> <p>It is recommended that the CLF immediately develop and implement a CLF-wide Results Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) addressing four issues in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance, roles and responsibilities and joint monitoring and coordination • Expected results for the CLF and its components • Performance measurement strategy • - Performance reporting strategy 	<p>Response: ILX has already taken the necessary measures to develop and implement an evaluation system. The Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) will in fact make it possible to establish a performance measurement strategy, as well as a systematic reporting system.</p> <p>Action Plan: Continue the work already begun so that the Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) become operational.</p>	<p>Partially implemented</p> <p>A Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) was drafted but not fully utilized.</p>

Annex II: Management Responses

1) CIDA's Final Management Response:

Background:

The Canadian Landmine Fund II (2003-2008) was an extension of a first phase that was in place between 1997 and 2002. In 1997, its purpose was to finance the implementation of the Treaty that had emerged out of the Ottawa Process, which brought about a consensus among nations to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Phase One of the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) received a positive evaluation in 2002 and a second phase was recommended. At the inception of Phase Two the purpose of the CLF remained largely unchanged.

Phase One committed \$100 million parcelled among three departments with the Department of National Defence (DND) receiving \$17 million, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) receiving \$50 million and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) receiving \$33 million. Phase Two committed \$72 million, \$28 million for DFAIT, \$34 million for CIDA and \$10 million for DND.

This summative evaluation of the Canadian Landmine Fund Phase II (2003-2008) gives a generally positive assessment of the contribution made by Canadian funding in support of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention). CIDA feels that the evaluation accurately and fairly represents CIDA's implementation of the mandate under the Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework of the Canadian Landmine Fund developed in 2003.

The evaluation is an extensive report, documenting the successes and trials of the Canadian Landmine Fund. The Executive Report provides an overview of the comprehensive evaluation of a complex multi-departmental initiative which, apart from a few challenges, worked remarkably well, according to the evaluators.

The Executive Report summarizes the findings for all three departments charged with the implementation of the Canadian Landmine Fund, CIDA, DFAIT and DND, under three groups of criteria: achievement of results (which combines results and sustainability), relevance (which combines appropriateness of design and partnership) and cost effectiveness (which combines appropriateness of resource utilization and informed and timely action).

The findings of the evaluation are reported under the major components of mine action programs: universalization, advocacy, mine clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance, stockpile destruction and mine action technology. Of the six recommendations proposed, three touch directly on CIDA's programming: namely Recommendation 1,

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which urges continued institutional support for mine action programming; Recommendation 4, which addresses the issue of mainstreaming mine action into development programming, and, Recommendation 5, regarding issues of victim assistance. Management agrees with the three recommendations and will encourage the most effective means to include them into ongoing Agency programming. For instance, on the issue of continued institutional support for mine action programming, CIDA has maintained a mine action focal point within the Agency to support its efforts to mainstream mine action into its development work, to work with the interdepartmental community on disarmament issues more generally, and to represent CIDA in international mine action fora. On the specific recommendation regarding mainstreaming (Recommendation 4), CIDA has, inter alia, mainstreamed mine action into countries where landmines have a strong impact on development and chairs an international 'contact' group which promotes the linking of mine action issues with development programming and has successfully promoted mine action within the OECD DAC. And finally, on Recommendation 5, which recommends exercising greater care in selecting recipient countries in order to ensure that assistance goes to those most in need, Management agrees that in future programming relating to victim assistance, CIDA will take this recommendation into consideration.

Responses to the recommendations made by the evaluators follow:

Recommendations	Commitments and Action	Responsibility Centre	Planned Completion Date	Progress
1. Progress has been made but there is still much to do. CIDA and DFAIT should consider whether they want to maintain institutional support for involvement in the Campaign to Ban Landmines.	Management agrees. CIDA has maintained a mine action focal point within the Agency to support its efforts to mainstream mine action into its development programming, to work with the interdepartmental community on disarmament issues generally, and more specifically, on the Campaign to Ban Landmines, and to represent CIDA at international mine action forums	CIDA DFAIT	on-going	
2. At this stage in Canada's Mine Ban Treaty implementation, DFAIT ILX should ensure that funds spent on universalization are commensurate with a realistic assessment of likely potential benefits, since prospective signatories in the foreseeable future are relatively small and of little strategic importance.	N/A	DFAIT		
3. If funding is maintained for NGOs serving as mine action watchdogs and as executors of projects overseas, it is recommended that DFAIT ILX reconsider the means and extent of support to mobilize public opinion in favour of mine action, and the roles and responsibilities of Canadian NGOs in carrying this out.	N/A	DFAIT		
4. Canadian supporters of mine action should make a more determined effort to view mine action support	Management agrees that to be fully successful, mine action needs to be	CIDA	on-going	

Recommendations	Commitments and Action	Responsibility Centre	Planned Completion Date	Progress
from a development perspective. They must ensure that mine action is part of a development program, not as an exception but as a matter of course. Mine action technology approaches need to be more fully integrated with community needs and capacities, and with development programming in general, as local ownership and appropriate technology are essential for sustainability.	<p>integrated into development programming. CIDA has mainstreamed mine action in countries where landmines have a strong impact on development.</p> <p>Internationally, CIDA chairs a 'contact group' which promotes the importance of linking mine action issues with development programming and has successfully promoted mine action within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.</p>	DFAIT		
5. Victim assistance programs need to exercise greater care in selecting recipient countries. This will ensure that assistance goes to those most in need, and provide some guarantee that health ministries are willing to contribute, collaborate and integrate mine-victim assistance into their disability programming.	Management agrees. In future programming that relates to victim assistance, CIDA will take this recommendation into consideration.	<p>CIDA</p> <p>DFAIT</p>	on-going	
6 Canada should continue its stockpile reduction program, building on its successes in the past five years. Some states will not collaborate, but others will, and they need help to destroy their existing stockpiles.	N/A	DFAIT		

2) DND's Draft Program Management Comments:

DND is generally in agreement with the findings of the evaluation team in the drafting of the Executive Report. Notwithstanding, there are four paragraphs in the document where the perceptions and views expressed therein diverge sufficiently from those of the program managers that comment is warranted.

95. Information from interviews suggests that there is general frustration within the mine action community that the Mine Ban Treaty's technology objectives have not been met as they should have. CCMAT shares this frustration and is aware of this general perception. Where mine action technology is concerned, progress has generally been viewed as too slow and too costly. Bringing into general use new and innovative equipment that is fast, safe and cheap enough to win general acceptance and widespread use in the demining community has been elusive.

DND Program Management Comment on paragraph 95

- CCMAT does not agree with "the general perception" that technology objectives have not been met to the extent that they should have. As a key and active participant in this complex and dangerous business, CCMAT would like to have seen more done, but also believes that its contribution was significant and important progress has been made.
- CCMAT disagrees with being judged on whether it succeeded or not in areas that were not included its mandate. Nonetheless, technology is in widespread use in humanitarian de-mining.

96. Expert research is deemed to have been done. However, results are not commercially viable. This raises questions about the sustainability of outcomes. For outcomes to be sustainable, there must be assurance that they would be widely used in the foreseeable future. There is little evidence of this.

DND Program Management Comment on paragraph 96

- CCMAT disagrees with what is being said here as it has the potential to mislead the reader. In fact the results were commercially viable and led to design changes which were incorporated into improved versions of various pieces of equipment currently being sold and used in de-mining in the field

99. Progress in mine action technology is widely regarded as too slow and too costly. Mine action technology development has not succeeded in generalizing the use of new and innovative equipment that is fast, safe, and cheap enough to win general acceptance. This general concern is relevant to a consideration of CCMAT's performance within CLF II. CCMAT might have done better to focus alternatively on

developing technology that would have been less costly, more easily manufactured, and more commercially viable. This concern must be put in context by noting that CCMAT had only a limited period of time – just over three years - to meet these and other responsibilities.

DND Program Management Comment on paragraph 99

- Please see management comment for para 95.
- While CCMAT's mandate did not include the development of new, more cost effective technologies per se, improvements were made to existing technologies (metal detectors/mechanical equipments) which did improve demining cost effectiveness.

100. The meeting of States Parties in Nairobi, marking the fifth anniversary of the Convention's entry into force, provided an occasion for CCMAT to make its research more "development-oriented" in response to Articles 25 and 26 of the Nairobi Action Plan. The evaluation observed that some work did subsequently focus on lower-cost village-friendly technologies. Perhaps post-Nairobi, CCMAT did reduce the proportion of its work on higher versus lower technologies. Overall, however, research remained informed primarily by technical issues, and not by socio-economic determinants of what equipment and approaches were suitable, affordable, usable and accessible to a broad range of mine-affected villagers.

DND Program Management Comment on paragraph 100

- CCMAT agrees that it stayed focussed on technical issues in compliance with Articles 25 and 26 of the Nairobi Action Plan - "Strengthen efforts to enable mine-affected States Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information..." "Share information on – and further develop and advance – mine clearance techniques, technologies and procedures..."

Annex III: Field Study Briefs Country Case Studies

Six one-page summaries of the country case studies are presented here. They are intended to give an abbreviated view of Canadian mine action in each of these countries, to show the very different contexts, programs and impacts. Each one-page brief begins with a one-paragraph description of Canada's intervention, followed by a synopsis of Canada's financial contribution, and a paragraph or two on the results and lessons learned.

Field Study 1: Cambodia

Description

Canada has been a major supporter of three noteworthy mine action achievements in Cambodia. The first achievement is the creation of provincial priority setting bodies, Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) that function as part of local government and establish provincial-level mine action priorities. Canada and Australia have co-funded these efforts to decentralize mine action decisions. The second achievement is Canada's on going support for a UNDP managed trust fund, now known as the Clearing for Results Trust Fund, which pools donor funds in support of local, development-oriented priority setting by the Government of Cambodia. The larger donors in Cambodia have been slow to recognize the importance of this pool of funds, which directly and indirectly supports the decisions of the provincial Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs). However, the initial Canadian and Australian commitment of funding has grown by attracting increased interest from larger mine action donors. The third achievement is the Agricultural Development in Mine Affected Areas of Cambodia (ADMAC) project, one of the very few explicit instances of integrating mine action into a development initiative. This initiative combines local mine action planning with agricultural extension services to small-holder farmers on recently-cleared land.

Financial Contribution

Canada's contribution has totalled \$11.9 million. A total of \$2.4 million has come from CLF II funds, contributed by CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX. The remaining, \$9.5 million, has come from non-CLF II funds contributed by CIDA's bilateral desk. The largest proportion of the total, 92 percent has supported clearance or planning for clearance activities. Six percent has supported a modest victim assistance program. The balance of two percent has supported mine risk education and advocacy.

Results and Lessons Learned

The distinctive focus on setting priorities for clearance has been a factor in Canada's success in Cambodia. Capacity has been built, institutions are in place and there is considerable promise of sustainability for most of the Canada's activities, notably those that have built capacity for setting priorities and making mine action decisions at the provincial and local levels. Casualties in Cambodia also declined during the CLF II program, from 772 per year in 2003 to 352 in 2007.

With collaboration and support from CIDA's Mine Action Unit, CIDA's Cambodia Country Program has taken the deliberate initiative to mainstream mine action into development initiatives over the past five years. One of the achievements of CIDA's Cambodia Country Program has been to source post-CLF II funding within Cambodia Country Program budgets, particularly as regards the Clearing for Results Trust Fund and the ADMAC project. The demonstrable outcomes bear witness to the effectiveness of Canada's approach in Cambodia. If there were a flagship country for the CLF II, Cambodia would be the one.

Field Study 2: Colombia

Description

Slightly less than half of mine action funding in Colombia has been used to finance an initial effort at mine clearance, helping the Organization of American States (OAS) demining unit to train two demining platoons, staffed by Colombian Armed Forces personnel. These demining units have restricted themselves to clearing mines laid by the Colombian Armed Forces as protection around their own military bases. Discussions are underway to bring in civilian demining organizations to carry out demining. Another substantial portion of total funding (30 percent) has supported mine risk education in five of Colombia's 32 departments, through a UNICEF mine risk education program.

Financial Contributions

Canada's contribution has totalled \$3.8 million. A total of \$2.4 million has come from CLF II funds, contributed by CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX. The other \$1.4 million has come from non-CLF II funds contributed by CIDA's bilateral desk, the Inter-American Hemisphere Fund, and the Global Peace and Security Fund. The bulk of the total (52 percent) has supported clearance activities. CIDA's Mine Action Unit and DFAIT program these funds. Thirty percent has gone toward mine risk education. Another 8 percent has supported victim assistance activities. The remaining 10 percent has supported stockpile destruction, surveys and advocacy.

Results and Lessons Learned

One of CLF II's principal mandates has been to integrate mine action with development. CIDA's Colombia bilateral desk argues that this has been done. Where it is not done, attempts are being made to move programming gradually in this direction. At present, clearance programs around military bases do not aim to promote socio-economic development in nearby communities. Some argue that it is uniquely difficult to clear landmines in ways that directly benefit and involve communities, because landmines used as weapons of war and in remote areas. In any event, the operations have had little or no humanitarian impact.

There are positive outcomes in other areas of intervention. Mine risk education funding through UNICEF has successfully been used to strengthen key mine-action civil-society organizations, notably Corporación Paz y Democracia and the Colombian Campaign against Mines. Funds have also strengthened victim assistance organizations, such as the Centre for Integrated Rehabilitation in Colombia (CIREC) and Handicap International. The program's coverage is not enough to have a great impact on the number of mine accidents. However, there are clearly other benefits. The program has strengthened some capable mine-action civil-society organizations and led the way toward decentralization, encouraging departmental and municipal governments to take more responsibility for mine action. The Handicap International program has developed information for dissemination to victims, to make them aware of their legal rights in the health system. If victims are able to understand their rights, landmine survivors will have better access to recuperative and rehabilitative services.

Field Study 3: Jordan

Description

Mine action in Jordan has been driven by Jordan's commitment to fulfil its Article 5 obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, and by donor support for this commitment. Helping Jordan to meet this Treaty obligation has been Canada's main rationale for CLF II financial support. Canada's program does not directly fund Government's National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR). However, it does fund the work of this committee through the UNDP, working in partnership with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). This funding expressly supported Government's policy on mine clearance and thus its demining institutions.

Financial Contribution

International support for mine action in Jordan began in 1996 with support from the United States. Canada was the second donor in 1998. Canada's contribution has totalled \$2.5 million. A total of \$0.8 million has come from CLF II funds, with contributions from DFAIT ILX and CIDA MAU. The other \$1.7 million has come from

non-CLF II funds contributed by CIDA's bilateral desk. Of this \$2.5 million, 62 percent supported clearance and survey efforts, 28 percent financed victim assistance programs and the remaining 10 percent supported advocacy by local organizations.

Results and Lessons Learned

Jordan's National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation is responsible for implementing the national mine action plan, including coordination of resource mobilization strategies. The Committee has made impressive gains in the past three years to release land by clearance, assisted by technical surveys and ongoing reassessment of the scope of the contamination problem. Jordan will not meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations by 2009, a disappointment to donors. However, with continued support from donors (including Canada) and the ongoing commitment of the Government of Jordan, it may be able to meet its Article 5 obligation by 2012.

The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation has emerged as a stronger body. In 2004, His Majesty King Abdullah II appointed His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad as Chairman of the NCDR. A director was appointed for the NCDR and, under the Prince's guidance, the NCDR was able to garner much greater international support for mine action in Jordan. The NCDR Board of Directors has also played a strategic role in governance of the organization. Board members include representatives from the Royal Engineering Corps (REC), the Royal Medical Services (RMS), the media, and the private business, legal and academic sectors, as well as a landmine survivor.

In 2007, the NCDR organized the 8th Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention on behalf of the Government of Jordan. Canada was the largest international donor supporting the Meeting. HRH Prince Mired Raad assumed presidency of the States Parties until the next meeting. In compliance with the Convention, Jordan also passed a mine ban law in 2008.

Field Study 4: Mozambique

Description

In the past five years, Canada has made a small-scale contribution to removing the last vestiges of Mozambique's landmine contamination. Minor landmine contamination remains in Mozambique, an estimated 10 km². This restricted area is responsible for very few casualties, less than .001 of the population (47 persons in 2008). The Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey was completed during CLF I. CIDA then invested in organizing a multi-level capacity building project to ensure that survey data was properly analyzed and used. This \$7.5 million project began during CLF I and carried over into CLF II. Experts were seconded to the information technology section of Mozambique's mine action centre. Equipment and training were supplied to the national mapping centre. A previous evaluation of this multi-phased set of activities was not

positive. CIDA did not follow up with any further capacity building projects. CIDA reverted to providing direct support for clearance operations, without training or institution building.

Financial Contribution

Canada's contributions totalled \$4.5 million. A total of \$1.2 million has come from CLF II funds, with contributions from CIDA MAU. The other \$3.3 million has come from non-CLF II funds contributed by CIDA's bilateral desk. All of these funds have been used for clearance.

Results and Lessons Learned

Canada has made an effort to use mine action support in Mozambique for capacity building in government departments. In particular, CIDA provided training to the mine action centre. In so doing, CIDA follows the lead of other donors that have emphasized capacity building in Mozambique by coordinating development assistance, largely via the Government of Mozambique. Over half of all development assistance is provided in the form of budget support. One of the outcomes of Canada's involvement in mine action in Mozambique has been to help build the capacity of government authorities to make key decisions.

The question now is whether to continue with mine action in a country where the vestiges of contamination have small-scale consequences. The argument from the Government of Mozambique, which CIDA implicitly supports, is that it now takes only a small-scale effort to make Mozambique compliant with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. This would make Mozambique one of the few global mine action successes. The question is whether seeking compliance is rationale enough to continue support for Mozambique where the problem remains on a small scale.

Field Study 5: Sudan

Description

The United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO), a large international body based in Khartoum, mainly implements the mine action program in the Sudan with commitments to, and funding from, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to perform specific services. The northern government's National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in Khartoum is effectively dwarfed by UNMAO and operates in its shadow. The southern government's mine action body, South Sudan Demining Corps (SSDC), likewise operates in the shadow of donors.

Canada has strongly supported the UN presence. There are two reasons why Canada has played a key role in the Sudan program. One is a sense of urgency and a belief that helping to neutralize landmines will likewise help to neutralize the conflict. The other is

an erroneous assumption that the Sudan is highly contaminated with unexploded devices. Until recently, the severity of the problem in the Sudan has been overestimated. Considerable attention has been focused on checking and clearing infrastructure, such as roads, while communities received comparatively less attention.

Financial Contribution

Canada's contribution totalled \$26.2 million, an average of about \$5 million per year. Of this amount, \$4.3 million has come from CLF II funds contributed by CIDA MAU and DFAIT ILX. The other \$21.9 million has come from non-CLF II sources, including CIDA's bilateral desk and the Global Peace and Security Fund, disbursed by DFAIT ILX. Of this amount, 48 per cent has been used for clearance, 28 percent has been used for mine risk education and 11 percent has supported victim assistance programs. The remaining 13 percent has supported institution building and stockpile destruction.

Results and Lessons learned

Over 22,000 miles of road were assessed and 3 million square metres of roadways were cleared, allowing access for food aid, making travel safer for returning internally displaced persons and opening previously moribund towns for trade and increased economic activity. Despite this, casualties in the Sudan have increased over the past five years, partly due to the return of displaced persons, partly due to how accidents are reported. Some community clearance has taken place in critical areas. Over two million refugees and internally displaced persons have resettled, if not on original homesteads, at least in nearby towns.

After nearly three years, there is relatively little assurance that, once the United Nations presence diminishes in the next two years, those who must continue the effort will do so. Building national institutional competence and ownership has been an afterthought.

However, we should note that CIDA's recent Bilateral Program programming has been made in favour of Linking Mine Action to Development (LMAD). Sudan's Bilateral Program recently approved the implementation of a \$5 million mine action and development program that includes local capacity building of mine action organizations (OSIL) and as activities focused on developing mine-affected communities. Moreover, recent Sudan Program analysis and discussion has focussed on pulling away from traditional mine action work (through attrition) in favour of future activities more in line with LMAD. Thought has also been given to possibly viewing MA as a crosscutting theme to be considered part of the analysis of all mainstream community development efforts. These thoughts and the new project fall outside and beyond the evaluation's period of review. Nevertheless, we should give some credit to CIDA's learning from past mine action efforts, thus leading to more progressive programming in the future.

Field Study 6: Uganda

Description

The Canadian Landmine Fund II in Uganda has supported the emergency response programs of three NGOs operating in Northern Uganda, supporting victim assistance and mine risk education for most of the people quarantined in camps.

Canada's three NGO implementing partners — Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR), World Vision and Associazione Volontari per il Servizio (AVSI) — have provided extensive assistance to landmine survivors in the form of small business loans, counselling, and micro-credit. In one case, Canada supported a local orthotics laboratory, which makes artificial limbs. This is the extent of institution building. Government ministries have sometimes been supportive, sometimes not. The Government of Uganda has generally done little to support these efforts. Wisely, Canada has not provided much direct support for Uganda's government institutions. This is particularly true of the Government's Uganda Mine Action Steering Committee and its implementing body, the Uganda Mine Action Centre (UMAC); 95 percent of its support comes from the UNDP. A small portion of UNDP support for UMAC is a Canadian contribution from the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). The Uganda Mine Action Centre contracts out demining to teams of Ugandan army deminers. By any standard, however, this centre is far from being committed to clearing the landmines in the northern districts. The Uganda Mine Action Centre lacks competent personnel, and interviewees do not consider it a reliable institution.

Financial Contribution

Canada's contribution has totalled \$2.7 million. A total of \$2 million has come from CLF II funds, with contributions from CIDA MAU. The other \$.7 million has come from non-CLF II funds, contributed by DFAIT ILX from the Global Peace and Security Fund. Eight percent of CLF II spending on Uganda has supported clearance, 12 percent has supported mine risk education and 80 percent has contributed to victim assistance.

Results and Lessons Learned

Accident treatment and prevention programs have been effective. Casualty figures have dropped by 43 percent, from 53 casualties in 2003 to 23 in 2007. The treatment of victims improved during these programs. The extent of antisocial activities, which made the camps unhealthy places, marginally improved. NGOs set an example by urging families and neighbours to integrate victims into their social milieu.

Canada-funded NGO programs have focused on humanitarian relief. It might have been difficult to pursue a more development-oriented strategy while the Lord's Resistance Army maintained a presence, but this changed three years ago. This would have been

a good time to shift the program's focus from protecting families in camps to helping families to re-establish their nearby homesteads, by combining mine awareness and protection with facilities to restart their farm livelihoods. The concern here is that Canada-funded NGOs have not shifted their attention from emergency or humanitarian activities to what could have been development-focused activities.