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
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Canada's Professional Journal On Army Issues

The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official publication of the Canadian Army. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Canadian Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Canadian Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with the Canadian Army, defence, and security affairs.

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CCA FOREWARD



Lieutenant-General Marquis Hainse Commander Canadian Army CMM, MSC, CD

I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide some thoughts to the readers of this edition of the Canadian Army Journal. Since assuming command just a few short months ago, I continue to be impressed with the professionalism, commitment and quality of our team, and I would like to take this opportunity to provide some insight into where I see the Army going in the next three to five years.

As we are quickly approaching the end of our training and assistance mission in Afghanistan, we must continue to strive for excellence as a combat-effective and agile force that delivers focused and integrated land effects across the spectrum of joint operations. Clear direction and guidance from the Chief of the Defence Staff has empowered us to develop a new Army Operating Framework that will allow us to maintain our collective focus while achieving those goals. Furthermore, defining, planning for, and achieving a balanced force within our current fiscal climate is proving to be a challenge as we all must prioritize our tasks and make tough, principle-based decisions. I am confident that our battle-hardened and mentally agile team will quickly come to terms with the necessity of these difficult decisions as we maintain focus on the Army's objectives to deliver a strong, multipurpose and combat-effective force; develop a proud and relevant force ready to conduct adaptive dispersed operations; and protect a ready and deployable force across the spectrum of conflict. "Strong, proud, and ready" is the new motto of the Canadian Army, and I encourage all members to use it in communicating both internally and externally.

The adoption of a new 36-month Managed Readiness Plan has allowed us to reset our Force Posture and Readiness within the new fiscal environment, demonstrating that efficiencies can be found while remaining combat effective. The end result will see our forces, in the spring of 2014, fully prepared to respond to the Canada First Defence Strategy. As we continue to prepare the force, we must also modernize our capabilities and apply comprehensive thought processes to our equipment modernization as well as to the development and investment of our key joint enablers. Through this determined yet flexible modernization, we will ensure that success is achieved as we head towards Waypoint 2016 on the road to Army 2021. Our ultimate goal is to ensure that the Army is able to undertake adaptive dispersed operations across the full spectrum of conflict in a joint, interagency, multinational, and public environment.

One of the ways in which we seek to prepare our force for the future is through a variety of training and professional military education (PME) opportunities. The Canadian Army Journal offers an exceptional mix of timely and relevant articles that generate interest and often spur debate across all ranks. As we position the Army to align with future demands both at home and abroad, it is essential that we continue to learn from past experience, institutionalize best practices, and anticipate what the future may present. In so doing, this issue of the Journal continues our examination of the future of light forces; offers new insight on the command, control and execution of comprehensive approach missions; weighs the balance of options in recent force development; and explains the methods and tools we are employing to prepare the army for the future. I encourage you to not only read and reflect upon the material but, more importantly, to challenge the authors and to use this publication as a starting point for professional discussion and healthy debate. I would like to take a moment to personally thank all who have contributed to making the Canadian Army Journal an exceptional and thought-provoking read.

Strong. Proud. Ready.

Lieutenant-General Marquis Hainse, CMM, MSC, CD

Commander Canadian Army

GUEST EDITORIAL - IN PACE PARATUS



Brigadier-General Christopher Thurrott, OMM, MSM, CD Chief of Staff, Army Strategy

When not at war, professional armies must continue to think about and debate the nature and characteristics of conflicts—specifically, what they might be like, where they might take place, and with whom, how and, if possible, why they might occur. Armies smart enough to think ahead will endeavour to anticipate the nature of the next conflict through the investigation of new ideas and concepts, the examination and assessment of emerging trends, the creation of new doctrines, and the development of robust physical, intellectual, and social capital within their ranks.

The important role of the *Canadian Army Journal* in the ongoing intellectual development of the Canadian Army cannot be understated. Serving as the Army's primary, official forum for reasoned discussion and debate about the Army's future, it helps to foster innovative thinking and facilitates continuous adaptation to change.

Since its inception in 1947, the *Canadian Army Journal* has acted as a centrepiece for debating ideas that drive the Army's ongoing development and evolution. Over the past 65 years, the *Journal* has evolved, amalgamated, dissolved, and then reappeared along with changing Army needs, allowing broad contributions from all ranks and backgrounds. The number and quality of the contributions that have been made—largely voluntarily—over the past few years has been commendable given the many other priorities and pressures we have faced.

Yet, the Army still has much ground to cover in arriving at a shared understanding of that ongoing evolution, and there remain many key capability and force development questions that merit greater investigation from us all. This year, we are endeavouring to return the *Journal* to a more regular, periodical schedule of production, and our readers will also note more directed articles designed to initiate debate and provide knowledge on these many important subjects. It is anticipated that, by opening new lines of discussion on land force development and capability requirements for the Army of Tomorrow and the Future Army, we will encourage greater participation from across the Army to increase the direct contribution to the discussion.

With an unpredictable future security environment ahead of us, the Army must be prepared to face a broader range of roles, missions, and tasks in the coming decade as it completes its transformation towards adaptive dispersed operations. The discussion of how we may be able to best achieve our goals must begin now. The *Canadian Army Journal* is your journal to express your informed ideas and opinions on the Army's way forward. I challenge everyone in the Army to get involved in its evolution and engage the editor-in-chief.

IN PEACE PREPARED



Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp Editor-in-Chief

Writing on the development of international law in the late nineteenth century, jurist Sir Henry Maine noted that "war appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention." Reflecting on that statement, Michael Howard concluded in his own 2001 prize-winning essay on the subject that there was little evidence to suggest that Sir Henry had gotten it wrong. War, Howard reminds us, is a terrible yet universal norm in recorded human history, and nations that do not seek to prepare themselves for possible future conflict will pay an even greater price when that day inevitably arrives.

As we move into the final stages of our role on the ground in Afghanistan, we are reminded that, for the army, every post-conflict period is also in fact a pre-conflict period. With that in mind, the army must now focus greater attention on preparing itself for its future roles and missions both at home and abroad. It must also be prepared to do so within the context of the political and economic environments in which we all live. There may be some tough decisions ahead as the army aligns itself with Force 2016 in order to set the conditions for transformation circa 2021, but as history has repeatedly shown, the ebb and flow that accompanies this evolution is in fact a very natural cycle in Canadian Army affairs.

The Canadian Army Journal offers every member of the army an opportunity to take a direct part in shaping how we arrive at the army of tomorrow. In this issue, for example, Peter Gizewski of the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (CALWC) explains in detail how the army engages in future security environment study and analysis and some of the methods it employs. Those frameworks allow for broad and sophisticated horizon-scanning for emerging trends in the future operating environment, alerting the army to areas of interest and further investigation. That core activity typically generates many debates on what, where, how and why certain elements and technologies will impact the army and what those impacts mean in terms of future army concepts and designs. It is a fundamental part of the ongoing process of capability development.

Other articles in this issue reflect the sort of wider debate we want to see from the army going forward. Colonel Greg Smith and

Chief Warrant Officer Ambrose Penton's article on task force leadership lessons is an excellent primer for what they hope will be "one step forward in openly, dispassionately and perhaps academically talking about something that is at the core of what we do in the CAF." Major Eric Landry's article on the Leopard 2 seeks to encourage similar debate on the future of armour. Major Jean Vachon offers us a different view of the future of light forces, continuing the discussion on the subject from the previous issue. Again, here is a subject that merits much further debate. Lastly, we've included a historical case study analysis of the comprehensive approach to operations, as well as other interesting notes to file on recent developments in the soldier systems project, the results of Operation KEEPSAKE and recent announcements of army honours and awards.

I will close by simply emphasizing once more the message of the Commander of the Canadian Army and the Chief of Staff Army Strategy. Shaping the future army is the responsibility and opportunity of all ranks, therefore I encourage you to get involved through this journal at every opportunity. Please enjoy this latest issue. I look forward to hearing from you.

Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp Editor-in-Chief

On 22 March 2013 His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presented a number of Meritorious Service Decorations (Military Division) to members of Canadian and allied forces. The staff of the *Canadian Army Journal* congratulates all of the recipients of these awards, and wishes to highlight their achievements through publication of the following citations:

MERITORIOUS SERVICE CROSS (MILITARY DIVISION)

Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Marshall Southern, MSC, MSM, CD Ottawa, Ontario

As Canadian defence attaché at the Canadian Embassy in Libya during 2011, Lieutenant-Colonel Southern played a pivotal role in the successful and safe evacuation of Canadian citizens from that country. In difficult and dangerous situations, he showed an innate cultural awareness and intrinsic leadership ability. Lieutenant-Colonel Southern also provided vital support to the Ambassador in the re-establishment of the embassy, while taking on the responsibility of chargé d'affaires—an opportunity rarely accorded to a defence attaché.

Major Daniel Auger, MSM, CD Verdun, Quebec

As commander of operations and chief of staff of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Afghanistan, from April to October 2009, Major Auger distinguished himself through his leadership and professionalism. Faced with an increased number of units under Canadian mentorship, he ensured that the teams were properly equipped to meet the challenges of their mission and command expectations. Major Auger's coordination and tactical acumen greatly improved the operational efficiency of the Afghan units.

Sergeant Joseph Claude Patrick Auger, MSM, CD Montréal, Quebec

On December 18, 2010, during a reconnaissance operation to secure a road building project in Afghanistan, Sergeant Auger's platoon came upon a group of buildings that had been heavily booby trapped with explosive devices. Following explosions that seriously injured several of his soldiers, Sergeant Auger took charge of the situation calmly and in an exemplary manner. He regained control of his soldiers and ensured the rapid evacuation of the wounded personnel. Sergeant Auger's expertise and actions minimized the disastrous consequences of a chaotic and very dangerous situation.

Chief Warrant Officer Gérald Blais, MSM, CD Montréal, Quebec

From May to July 2011, Chief Warrant Officer Blais distinguished himself as Joint Task Force Afghanistan regimental sergeant-major when appointed to this position with little notice. In theatre since August 2010, as regimental sergeant-major of Headquarters and Signals Squadron, he demonstrated loyalty and flexibility, which eased his acceptance by troops and ensured full continuity of Task Force command. Chief Warrant Officer Blais' personal and professional attributes contributed greatly to the success of the Canadian Forces' counter-insurgency operations.

Major Pascal Blanchette, MSM, CD

Chatham, Ontario

As officer commanding Engineer Support Squadron in Afghanistan from November 2010 to July 2011, Major Blanchette ensured the provision of first-rate engineering support to Task Force Kandahar. Operating during a period of unprecedented expansion and transition, he contributed to the construction of over 30 tactical infrastructure installations, including Route Hyena, a critical road in the Horn of Panjwayi. Major Blanchette's acute resource management and outstanding performance contributed directly to operational success and ensured an efficient handover to our allies.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kirk Douglas Bland, MSM, CD

Halifax, Nova Scotia

Lieutenant-Colonel Bland was deployed to Naples, Italy, from April to June 2011, as part of Canada's contribution to the NATO mission to protect the people of Libya. His leadership and unwavering dedication enabled the establishment of the Canadian National Intelligence Centre and its ongoing success. He forged a highly effective team of civilian and military experts that rapidly and consistently provided meaningful, accurate and actionable intelligence to the Commander. Lieutenant-Colonel Bland's efforts contributed directly to operational success, and brought great credit to Canada.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sébastien Bouchard, MSM, CD Québec, Quebec

As commanding officer of the National Support Element of Joint Task Force Afghanistan from November 2010 to July 2011, Lieutenant-Colonel Bouchard distinguished himself by his leadership and dedication. Through his continued efforts, both at the forefront and behind the scenes, and through his determination, he shrewdly led his team, identified and implemented solutions, and provided ongoing support to the Canadian Forces. Lieutenant-Colonel Bouchard's performance in a dynamic theatre of operations was key to the Element's operational success.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Douglas Claggett, MSM, CD Calgary, Alberta

As chief of staff of Joint Task Force Afghanistan from September 2010 to 2011, Lieutenant-Colonel Claggett was instrumental to the capability of the Task Force Headquarters. Supporting operations in Afghanistan's demanding counter-insurgency environment, he fully understood and implemented the commander's intent while ensuring synchronization with our allies. Lieutenant-Colonel Claggett's skills as a leader, planner and diplomat were critical to the operational success of the mission.

Chief Warrant Officer Daniel Alexander Debrie, MSM, CD

Missanabie, Ontario

As operations chief warrant officer of the Engineer Support Squadron from November 2010 to August 2011, Chief Warrant Officer Debrie facilitated the expansion of coalition forces in the Horn of Panjwayi. Responsible for designing and constructing new tactical infrastructure, he optimized the use of scarce resources and ensured the framework would be sustainable in austere locations. Chief Warrant Officer Debrie's leadership, expert knowledge and determination enhanced the sustainment and protection of Canadian, American and Afghan forces.

Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Andreas Frank, MSM, CD

Chilliwack, British Columbia

As deputy commanding officer of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team from April to November 2010, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank was critical to the growth of Afghan National Security Forces. He established important contacts and brought together many diverse organizations during planning sessions. His leadership and diplomacy shaped the development plan for all of Kandahar Province and the Canadian area of operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank's efforts strengthened the capabilities of the Afghan forces.

Major Guy Charles Ingram, MSM, CD

New Lowell, Ontario

Major Ingram demonstrated foresight, dedication and leadership with the 3 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group. He successfully expanded Ranger operational capabilities beyond their traditional surveillance and sovereignty roles, thereby enabling the Canadian Forces to provide a more immediate and effective response in Northern Ontario. As commanding officer since 2007, he has played a key role in the development, introduction and expansion of the Junior Canadian Ranger Program. Major Ingram's vision and innovation greatly enhanced the quality and reach of this program to thousands of Aboriginal youth.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Misener, MSM, CD Iroquois Falls, Ontario

As commanding officer of the Task Force Kandahar Engineer Regiment, and as task force chief engineer from August 2010 to July 2011, Lieutenant-Colonel Misener was critical to the optimal employment of engineers. His acute understanding of Kandahar's complex counter-insurgency environment allowed him to lead from the front, providing exceptional guidance to his widely dispersed sub-units and ensuring the allocation of assets was in line with command intent. Thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel Misener's remarkable performance, Canadian and coalition forces received exceptional and unwavering engineer support during operations.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Paganini, MSM (United States Army) Old Bridge, New Jersey, United States of America

Lieutenant-Colonel Paganini, of the United States Army, performed exceptionally well as commanding officer of the 1-71 Cavalry Squadron, in Afghanistan from April 2010 to March 2011. Under his front line leadership, the squadron earned a reputation for its effectiveness and professionalism, and established itself as a critical component of Task Force Kandahar. Lieutenant-Colonel Paganini's tactical acumen and drive to succeed set an example for soldiers of all nations and were critical to the Canadian Forces' operational success in Afghanistan.

Colonel Michael Matthew Lawrence Rafter, MSM, CD Ottawa, Ontario

From September to November 2011, Colonel Rafter displayed leadership while deployed to Italy as part of Canada's contribution to the NATO-led mission to protect the people of Libya. As chief of staff and subsequently commander of Task Force Libeccio, he arrived at a challenging time for the mission and was essential in rectifying long-standing issues and maintaining the uninterrupted conduct of flying operations. Colonel Rafter's leadership, professionalism and diplomacy were critical to operational success, and brought great credit to Canada.

Major Harjit Sajjan, MSM, CD

Vancouver, British Columbia

Major Sajjan deployed to Afghanistan as a special advisor from February to November 2009, and from November 2010 to March 2011. His approach, based on his knowledge of local culture and tribal dynamics, helped senior management to engage with influential Afghan tribal leaders, and led to the identification of insurgent command and control connection points. Taking every opportunity to deploy forward to refine his leads, Major Sajjan provided critical situational awareness and reduced the Taliban's influence in Kandahar province through his sound analysis.

Colonel James Baxter Simms, OMM, MSM, CD

Kingston, Ontario

As chief of staff within Regional Command (South) Headquarters from September 2008 to June 2009, Colonel Simms performed remarkably well in leading planning efforts for a massive expansion of coalition and Afghan soldiers in southern Afghanistan. He revamped command and control processes to effectively manage an additional 24 000 troops while simultaneously overseeing the planning and synchronization of ongoing combat operations. Colonel Simms' visionary leadership was critical to effectively integrating the troop surge, and contributed directly to improved security in the region.

Colonel Steven Joseph Russell Whelan, MSM, CD Ottawa, Ontario

From July 2010 to September 2011, Colonel Whelan served as commander of Task Force Jerusalem, in support of Palestinian security reform. He set conditions for major changes within the Palestinian Security Forces' institutional and operational components, and forged a superb military–civilian team that built needed infrastructure and provided advanced training. Colonel Whelan's performance facilitated the ongoing professionalization of Palestinian Security Forces, highlighting Canada's role as an important contributor to the Middle East peace process.



FUTURING AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT:

Research Strategy and Method for Army 2040

Mr. Peter Gizewski, Mr. Regan Reshke and Mr. Bruce Chapman¹

Uncertainty is a predominant characteristic of the future security environment. As such, accurate prediction of what it will yield is impossible. Yet defence establishments must continue to strive to understand and define how their national security policies will meet the challenges arising within such a context. Indeed, state militaries routinely engage in forward planning for a variety of reasons, ranging from defence procurement to recruitment and retention of personnel and to assessment of emerging forms of warfare.

Preparation for future uncertainty is a daunting task. Indeed, while a vast amount of information exists which can offer guidance for understanding the scope and magnitude of change, making sense of that information and its military application is difficult.

Employment of futures methodology nevertheless offers a means for ensuring more systematic and rigorous future military planning. Indeed, the purpose of futures methodology is to systematically explore, create and test both possible and desirable futures to improve decisions. It includes analysis of key dimensions of the international environment, how conditions may change as a result of major trends and drivers at work in the international system, and the implications of such changes for implementation of policies and actions. While not a science, futuring methods can be used to provide a framework to better understand the present and expand mental horizons.

In fact, futuring and foresight methods lie at the heart of the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre's (CALWC's) Army 2040 project—an investigation of the security environment and its implications for Canada's Army in the years ahead.² The discussion below elaborates on the research strategy informing the Army 2040 effort. Following a brief description of the capability development process which the Army employs to prepare for the future, there is a discussion that briefly outlines the area of futuring or foresight and the development of the overarching framework used in the investigation. This article then details the steps involved in developing a series of alternative futures upon which more refined investigation of capabilities proceeds. An illustration of one such framework (e.g., energy and environ-mental sustainability)—along with a discussion of steps required to conduct systematic exploration and testing of each "alternative future" which that framework yields—concludes the paper.

ARMY 2040 AND THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

In dealing with the future, the Army utilizes a capabilities-based development process. For Army purposes, being "capable" is achieved through fulfillment of specific human, scientific, doctrinal, infrastructural, environmental, material and institutional conditions essential for successful service (i.e., the ability to achieve an effect). A three-step process is used in developing capabilities:

- Conceive—concepts are developed and translated into capability requirements;
- Design—selected capability requirements are translated into validated designs for future use;
- Build—validated designs for force capabilities are refined and realized for use in the field.

The objective of the process is to meet defence requirements, allowing the Army to remain relevant and effective in the current and future operating environments. While each step in the process is considered a distinct activity, considerable overlap occurs as a capability is first conceived, then designed and finally built over a number of years.

The capability development process is also aligned with three separate time horizons:

- The Army of Today, which encompasses a 0-5 year outlook and is roughly correlated with the Build stage of the process;
- The Army of Tomorrow, which encompasses a 5–15 year outlook and is roughly correlated with the Design stage of the process; and
- The Future Army, which entails a 15–30 year outlook and is roughly associated with the Conceive stage of the process.

While each horizon has its own set of challenges and outcomes, it is the Future Army outlook, 15–30 years into the future, which perhaps requires the greatest degree of abstract thinking. Indeed, the individuals working in this realm engage in what is commonly referred to as foresight.³ This group, known as the Concepts Team, examines the future security environment and identifies areas requiring more focused research for the identification of the capabilities required to operate in the future. In turn, the team proposes alternative concepts and technologies to achieve desired capabilities. The team consists of a scientific advisor, a strategic analyst, a historian, operations researchers, and operational function⁴ experts (command, sense, act, shield and sustain).

The group's duties include identifying and developing requisite expertise on key dimensions of the international security environment, as well as participating in all team brainstorming sessions dealing with the substantive issues of the project. Core team members were also charged with writing a number of short analytical papers identifying the key trends and drivers likely to be at play within the context of those dimensions examined, their potential impacts on security and the possible shocks that could alter the impacts identified.

Finally, a number of functional area specialists, i.e., subject-matter experts (SMEs), were called upon to participate in the team's work as needed to supplement its expertise and investigation of subject areas of particular interest. Such SMEs included a specialist in international law, energy issues, demographics, operational research and military personnel.

FUTURING AND FORESIGHT METHODS

The basic approach employed in conducting the project falls into the category of futuring and foresight. Futuring⁵ and foresight⁶ are growing international disciplines designed to "...critically examine the difficulties associated with making decisions with long term future consequences in conditions of uncertainty and to provide methods through which these difficulties can be minimised." As such, they represent a much-needed response to a profoundly human and natural tendency towards looking forward and preparing for what may come. Indeed, as Denis Loveridge notes:

Visions of the future exist because they are inevitable. ...(W)ithout them the polity can neither develop nor policy be created. Yet vision without discipline is to daydream. Foresight is an essential precursor to creating vision and is essential to prevent daydreaming. In that way foresight enables policy to be shaped.⁸

While a number of useful methods exist in this growing field, project personnel chose to employ the "environmental scanning" and "futures wheel" approaches, along with historical analysis (i.e., a focus on "hindsight") and "red teaming" to better understand the possible outcomes for the Army in the 2040 time frame.9

ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING

Environmental scanning is a process involving the acquisition and use of information about events, trends

and relationships that may have a strategic bearing on how an organization does business. The knowledge and insights gained from scanning serve to assist in more effectively planning the organization's future course. The process typically focuses on a large number of areas—in effect covering every major sector of the environment that can assist management in planning for an organization's future. It also involves the use of four basic techniques: undirected viewing, conditioned viewing, and informal and formal search of both primary and/or secondary sources of information. All four techniques are essential to the method's effective use. Indeed, as one observer explains:

Undirected viewing helps the organization to scan broadly and develop peripheral vision so that it can see and think outside the box. Conditioned viewing tracks trends and gives the organization early warning about emerging issues. Informal search draws a profile of an issue or development, allowing the organization to identify its main features and assess its potential impact. [And] formal search gathers all relevant information about an issue to enable intelligent decision making.¹⁰

FUTURES WHEEL

The futures wheel is one of the most common methods employed by futurists. It is a simple way of organizing thoughts and exploring the future. It can be compared to what is more commonly referred to as structured brainstorming and is aligned closely with mind mapping, a similar futures methodology. It is a simple graphic organizer that allows for a representation of complex interrelationships between trends and can be described as follows:

The futures wheel is a simple futures research method designed to systematically capture qualitative expert knowledge. The futures wheel allows researchers to identify and present secondary and tertiary consequences of trends and events.¹¹

While the futures wheel method is easily grasped by participants, an undisciplined approach can result in what is referred to as "intellectual spaghetti," i.e., the generation of a myriad of interactions that become so complex that they tend to complicate and confuse the implications of the trends examined. This method is limited to the knowledge of the participants. Although information overload can occur, confining analysis to the primary, secondary and tertiary rings allows for the visualization of a vast amount of qualitative information that has both depth and contextual richness.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (HINDSIGHT)

While the past is often said to be prologue, it is also not destiny. Indeed, historians themselves acknowledge as much in noting the necessity of devoting some attention to long-term planning visions in order to avoid falling victim to what might be termed the "profound forces of history."




Figure 1: Futures Wheel

That said, hindsight¹³ and learning from the past are essential components of the process of foresight, as

past experience often serves to filter and condition the impact of evolving trends and drivers on states, societies, and the organizations and individuals that make them up. To this end, the Army 2040 team also employs historical analysis of trends, drivers and their potential impacts to help ensure that observations and conclusions advanced were adequately informed by an appreciation of past history and context.

Such analysis in fact represented a crucial input throughout the entire process of the project. Yet given the chief focus of the 2040 effort—the implications of trends and drivers in the future security environment for future Army capabilities—particular emphasis was placed on the historical analysis of the Canadian military experience in general and that of the Army more specifically.

RED TEAMING

Finally, and throughout the effort, a process of "red teaming" was instituted as a means of providing an additional check on the team's output. ¹⁴ This involved selecting one core team member to carefully monitor and participate in group discussions with the aim of questioning the team's fundamental assumptions, the lines of reasoning employed in advancing arguments and conclusions concerning the material under examination, and raising alternative possibilities which may have been underplayed or completely overlooked during the course of group discussion.

APPLICATION: ESTABLISHING KEY FOCUS AREAS, DRIVERS AND ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

A 10-step process was used in the development and testing of alternative futures and their implications for the Future Army.

The steps are as follows:

STEP 1: IDENTIFYING KEY ASPECTS OF SELECTED FOCUS AREAS THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING

Use of the environmental scanning method led to the identification of seven focus areas as key for the Army in the 2040 time frame. All were then researched and studied in depth by team members to gain a full appreciation of potentially important changes—drivers, trends and "weak signals." The method allowed for an analysis of what is constant, what changes and what constantly changes, in the areas under scrutiny. It also helped provide a number of general, wide-ranging hints as to the direction that the future may take.




Figure 2: Alternative Futures Method

Seven focus areas were selected and researched: science and technology, social, political, economic, legal, physical environment and security.

Science and Technology. Developments in science and technology will influence the other focus
areas in many positive and negative ways. Key trend areas of technological development included

exponential technology growth and convergence; broadening cognitive and brain science; focus on green and clean technology; emergence of "small-tech" (e.g., micro- and nanotechnologies), biotechnology and genetics/genomics expansion and expertise; increasing robotics automation and artificial intelligence; and pervasive networks and networking.

- Social. Social characteristics of importance in assessing the nature and dimensions of future threats and challenges typically include population growth, location, age, ethnicity, general health (i.e., mortality and fertility rates), literacy, socio-economic status and/or religion. Additional indicators include individual views regarding key issues of importance in life (survival vs. self awareness/actualization) as well as attitudes and orientations toward the outside world (insular vs. cosmopolitan, religious vs. secular). Of particular interest in the social realm is the human dimension, which focuses on human capital within the organization.
- *Political*. Trends in the area of politics are numerous and can be tracked on a number of indices. Key indicators of importance include the overall configuration of power, or the basic structure of the international system; the processes which characterize its ongoing development and character; the nature, diversity, stability and legitimacy of the political units or organizations that make it up; and the basic issues which generate political action and competition.
- *Economics*. Today, and perhaps more so in the future, the first step in understanding national economies is to understand global economic issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by globalization and the divergence between the relative prosperity of the Northern hemisphere (developed states) and the widespread poverty and squalor characterizing its Southern counterpart (developing states). While prospects for global markets, partnerships and alliances contribute to international cooperation and peace through increased mutual dependence in the North, poverty and subjugation of human rights in the South create conditions for increased global insecurity.
- *International Law*. In discussing law into the future, the legal profession, domestic law, international law, supranational law¹⁶ and cyber law are of particular interest. Key to emergent legal issues are the enforcement mechanisms used to garner compliance. While this issue is well established and articulated within domestic law, mechanisms in international law, supranational law and cyber law are substantially weaker. While progress is being made in each of these areas, mechanisms to garner compliance are anticipated to evolve at a slower rate.
- **Physical Environment.** For more than a decade there has been debate about the role that physical geography plays in the broad context of international security. Some have argued that the resources present in our natural environment (and the manner in which they are utilized) can have a contributing impact on the development of collective violence. The impacts of physical geography are assessed by examining global resource scarcities, climate trends and the subsequent implications for regions such as the Canadian Arctic.
- Security. Industrial war—masses of people and machines in a trial of national or alliance strength—is no longer truly practised. The peace-crisis-war-resolution cycle has been replaced by continuous confrontation punctuated by outbreaks of conflict. Approaches to these situations range from amelioration within the environment, through deterrence and coercion, to destruction of opponents. Rather than achieving strategic political aims through crushing the capability of a state to resist the imposition of an outside political will, now the often unstated goal of intervention on the international stage is to create conditions in which containment or management of the situation is enhanced.

Investigation of changes in the human dimension likely to take place in the future environment, as well as of future potential shocks and uncertainties which could significantly alter outcomes in each area, ¹⁷ were also undertaken by team members to further enhance their understanding of the various forces and causal

mechanisms that could arise as the future unfolds. As such, the basic identification and extrapolation of drivers, trends and weak signals¹⁸ provided by environmental scanning was supplemented to ensure a more comprehensive appreciation of future possibilities and potential occurrences.

STEP 2: IDENTIFYING KEY DRIVERS USING THE FUTURES WHEEL

The higher-order impacts of the numerous trends were then identified though a process of structured brainstorming using the futures wheel method and a knowledge mapping tool known as PersonalBrain (see Appendix). The process led to the subjective identification of 12 key drivers of change deemed significant for the Army in the 2040 time frame:

- 1. Impact of age & demographics on military composition;
- 2. Energy security;
- 3. Exponential technology growth;
- 4. Human/social response to technology;
- 5. Expansion of operating environments;
- 6. Global environmental change;
- Globalization:
- 8. Conflicting/shifting identities;
- 9. Shifting power balance;
- 10. Resource security;
- 11. Distribution of wealth; and
- 12. Weapons proliferation.

STEP 3: DETERMINING UNCERTAINTIES AND THEIR POLARITIES FOR KEY CHANGE DRIVERS

Critical uncertainties are the "big questions" that are most critical to the focal issue at hand. In the case of the Army 2040, that focal question was as follows: how should the Army evolve in order to remain a key instrument of national power in 2040?

A solid analytical framework ultimately rests on the identification of two critical uncertainties affecting the Army and is relevant to the focal issue. The polarities or endpoints of the drivers of change were first established to further define and understand each driver. This resulted in the following polarities for each:

- 1. Impact of age & demographics on military composition—population decline and aging societies vs. population growth and younger societies;
- 2. Energy security—surplus of energy vs. energy deficiency;
- Exponential technology growth—set the pace by actively engaging in technological development
 and innovation vs. fall behind by rejecting or at best passively accepting new developments
 and innovations;

- 4. Human/social response to technology—reject technology vs. embrace technology;
- 5. Expansion of operating environments—defensive strategies vs. offensive strategies (i.e., monitoring new operating environments vs. actively exploiting new operating environments);
- 6. Global environmental change—crisis reaction vs. proactive action;
- 7. Globalization—acceleration vs. deceleration;
- 8. Conflicting/shifting identities—global community vs. fragmentation;
- 9. Shifting power balance—cooperative / less friction vs. competitive / more friction;
- 10. Resource security—sustainable supply of resources vs. unsustainable supply of resources;
- 11. Distribution of wealth—uneven vs. even; and
- 12. Weapons proliferation—disarmament vs. acceleration of weapon spread.

STEP 4: RANKING UNCERTAINTIES

Upon establishing the polarities for each change driver, the team then followed a process whereby each driver was subjectively assessed to establish its level of "uncertainty" and its "impact" in the future on a low, medium and high scale, thereby indicating a ranking of the change drivers. Uncertainty refers to a subjective assessment of the degree to which the key change drivers and their related trends are known or well understood. Thus lower uncertainty suggests a higher degree of confidence that an extrapolation of the trends will closely resemble actual future events. Impact refers to a subjective assessment of the degree to which the key change drivers will influence future events. This subjective assessment allowed the team to collectively understand the position of each change driver with respect to each other on an impact and uncertainty graph. The focus of the analysis thus rests with those change drivers that are both high on impact and uncertainty; in our case, energy security (2) vs. global environmental change (6) (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Impact-Uncertainty Classification

STEP 5: DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE FUTURE FRAMEWORKS

An alternative future is a logical, coherent, detailed and internally consistent description of a plausible future operating environment. Alternative futures provide a means to hedge against uncertainty and perhaps to envision a range of possible future requirements. The term "alternative future" is often used interchangeably with "alternative worlds," "future worlds" and "future scenarios." For the purposes of the Army 2040 project, alternative futures describe in objective terms what a future might look like. A scenario, the next step in the process, in effect tells a story incorporating the components of the alternative futures. The probability of each alternative future emerging is not assessed; rather, we consciously argue that each future meets a "not implausible" standard.¹⁹

Developing alternative futures is an important activity for an organization in an increasingly complex world. They represent a long-range planning tool designed to highlight changes in the operating environment that could influence and indeed shape the trajectory of Army capabilities in future decades. While it is anticipated that several aspects of the alternative futures may be wrong, their development can assist in guiding long-range Army planning. In essence, the process provides a hedging strategy against uncertainty.

Having established the axes of the framework to be developed, based on the two critical uncertainties determined by the team as having a high ranking in impact and uncertainty, the team then commenced brainstorming the four potential futures: the good, the bad, and two mixed quadrants, i.e., not so good/bad (see Figure 4).

Not so good/bad Environment & Climate Bad Not so good/bad Not so good/bad Unsustainable – Demand Supply Exceeds

ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SPACE (Energy & Environment)

Figure 4: Alternative Future Space

STEP 6: WRITING ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

The "good" quadrant (i.e., characterized by a proactive approach to the environment and a sustainable energy supply) might feature more environmentally responsible multinational corporations and a Canada that is a world leader in developing alternative energy sources. The "bad" quadrant (i.e., featuring a reactive approach to the environment and unsustainable energy supplies) might be marked by increased global competition for scarce energy resources and a greater need to protect Canada's Arctic region. The other two quadrants would represent a mix of those two extremes. Further, in each of the four alternative futures, consideration is given to those change drivers that are considered to be of high impact but of low to medium uncertainty, as represented in Figure 3 by key driver items 5, 1, 9, 3, 7 and 10. It is important here to consider these items

within the context of the established alternative future space, since each item will be influenced in subtly different ways by the unique context of each quadrant. As such, each quadrant becomes internally consistent with the overall framework. This allows for more robust futures and assists in the process of crafting scenarios—the next step in the process.²⁰

An initial set of four alternative futures based on the research team's identification of two global factors judged as ranking especially high in terms of impact and uncertainty (energy sustainability and global environmental change), was then elaborated,²¹ with each given a name reflective of the key message (or theme) characterizing it (see Figure 5).

Sustainable – Supply Exceeds Demand Materialism gone mad Environment & Climate Global quagmire Global quagmire Recyclable society Unsustainable – Demand Supply Exceeds

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES (Energy & Environment)

Figure 5: Alternative Futures

This initial set of alternative futures consists of the following:

- The High-Octane "Green" World A future in which global energy supply exceeds demand (i.e., is sustainable) and in which the world is taking a proactive approach to the environment.
- 2. **The Global Quagmire** A future in which energy supply is increasingly scarce (i.e., is not sustainable) and the world is taking a reactive approach to the environment.
- 3. **Materialism Gone Mad** A future in which energy supply exceeds demand (i.e., is sustainable) but in which the world continues to take a reactive stance on the environment.
- 4. **Recyclable Society** A future in which energy is scarce (i.e., demand exceeds supply) but one in which global actors are taking proactive approaches to the environment.²²

STEPS 7/8: SEMINAR WARGAME: TESTING AND ASSESSMENT

Determining the specific implications that each of the four futures hold for the Canadian Forces in general and the Army in particular represents the next logical step in the research agenda. Once again, such an exercise involves deductions based on the trends and drivers identified and the directional values accorded them in each quadrant.²³

The testing and assessment of each of the alternative futures is undertaken in a seminar wargame format over four one-week periods. All seminar wargames are conducted in a similar manner to allow for the results to be compared and analyzed.²⁴ Each exercise consists of a combination of presentations, discussions and ranking of results derived from participant assessment based on the future under examination. Seminar participation is by invitation and includes personnel from the capability development organizations of the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, Joint agencies and from select allied organizations, as well as defence scientists and select academics.

In examining each alternative future, seminar participants are provided with background information on the particular future under examination and asked to describe and prioritize 1) the potential defence and security implications that the future under examination produces, as well as 2) the characteristics and 3) capabilities that the Army would require to maintain its relevance within the future examined. ²⁵ Following examination and assessment of each future, results are recorded and eventually compared to identify Army 2040 core capabilities that are common across all four futures, those capabilities that may not be common but are nonetheless crucial in a particular future and any signposts that may indicate the direction in which the world is progressing.

STEP 9: COMMUNICATE

Results from the testing and assessment exercises conducted for each alternative future, along with the findings derived from a comparative assessment of all four, are then widely communicated to educate and inform the CF and other public and private agencies. They also provide a key foundation for further exploration, discussion and improvement of the alternative futures process and its outcomes.

STEP 10: RENEW

The alternative futures process is not a static undertaking. Indeed, research and monitoring activities must continue throughout. And at a predetermined time in the future, the process recommences. The first step in a new cycle entails a critical review of previous futures work in order to gauge its accuracy and relevance. Completion of the full life cycle of the process thus allows the Army to keep pace with the ever-changing global environment.

CONCLUSION

Uncertainty is a predominant characteristic of the 21st century global security environment. As such, the future security environment defies accurate prediction. Yet defence establishments around the world must continue to strive to understand and define how their national security policies fit within this paradigm. Arguably, the increasing pace of change and resultant complexity of the world offers little prospect for complete understanding. As such, organizations must learn to operate within uncertainty. The Army is not excluded from this reality.

In coping with uncertainty, futuring and foresight are gaining international recognition as disciplines which assist in understanding our increasingly complex world. Perhaps the greatest benefit is to be found not in the results of this new discipline but rather in the process itself. As Jerome Glenn notes:

The value of futures research is less in forecasting accuracy, than in its usefulness in planning and opening minds to consider new possibilities and changing the policy agenda. Its purpose is not to know the future but to help us make better decisions today via its methods which force us to anticipate opportunities and threats and consider how to address them. And strategically it is better to anticipate, rather than just respond to change.²⁶

Reactive military planning can result in high costs of blood and/or treasure. Adoption of a futuring research agenda and use of futuring methods offers a more proactive approach, allowing state militaries to anticipate and possibly highlight certain areas that require policy decisions today—both in defence and national

security—in order to meet future expectations. The Army 2040 project and the methods detailed above aim to provide just such an approach. The result offers a means to better ensure that even if accurate prediction eludes us, our forces will still be structured and equipped to quickly and effectively adapt to the challenges that do arise. In short, while futuring *cannot* remove the fact that we will often be surprised by the future, it will hopefully provide greater insurance against the danger that we are taken by surprise as it unfolds.

ENDNOTES

- An earlier version of this article was published by Defence Research and Development Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (DRDC CORA). See LCol Michael Rostek, Peter Gizewski and Regan Reshke, Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century, DRDC CORA TM 2010-264, December 2010. This article further elaborates the research strategy and method discussed in the earlier work.
- The focus of this paper is on the process employed by the Army Concepts Team for investigating the security environment and its implications for the future Army. The process outlined templates the "conceive pillar" of the Land Capability Development Continuum and is not necessarily product focused. The team is in essence a think tank, which utilizes foresight methodology.
- 3. To study the future is to study potential change—not simply fads, but what is likely to make a systemic or fundamental difference over the next 10 to 25 years or more. Studying the future involves not simply economic projections or sociological analysis or technological forecasting, but a multidisciplinary examination of change in all major areas of life to find the interacting dynamics that are creating the next age.
- 4. All Army activities can be grouped under one of five operational functions: Command integrates all the operational functions into a single comprehensive strategic-, operational- or tactical-level concept; Sense provides the commander with knowledge; Act integrates manoeuvre, firepower and offensive information operations to achieve the desired effects; Shield provides for the protection of a force's survivability and freedom of action; Sustain integrates strategic, operational and tactical levels of support to generate and maintain force capability.
- 5. World Futures Society publication on Futuring by Edward Cornish provides a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
- 6. Some prefer the term "futures research" and by that mean the use of methods to systematically identify the consequences of policy options and alternative futures with policy implications for decision makers. Others prefer the term "future studies" and by that mean any exploration of what might happen and what we might want to become. Still others, ostensibly in Europe and Francophone Africa, prefer "prospective studies" and by that mean the study of the future to develop a strategic attitude of the mind with a long-range view of creating a desirable future.
- 7. Philosophy, Aims and Objectives of the MA Foresight and Futures Studies, Leeds Metropolitan University (10 May 1999).
- 8. Denis Loveridge, Foresight: The Art and Science of Anticipating the Future (New York: Routledge; 2009), pp. 13-4.
- 9. The methods detailed below were particularly well suited to Army 2040 given the parameters of the project and the available material and human resources. All are characterized by an ease of use ideal for a team consisting of a small group of analysts with varying backgrounds, skill sets and time constraints. Indeed, their "user-friendliness" expedited the team's capacity to focus quickly on the analytical phase of the inquiry. Their technical requirements (e.g., computer support, software) were minimal, thus ensuring that they were highly cost-effective. And most important, all methods were particularly well suited to the nature of the analysis undertaken, i.e., the identification and investigation of long-term trends and drivers (an exercise which often involved qualitative data), and the exploration of the causal interactions that could occur between them (a task requiring visualization of complex interactions between variables). In fact, the activities undertaken in employing these methods encompass a number of functions often identified by practitioners in the field as methods unto themselves (i.e., scanning, trend analysis, trend monitoring and brainstorming). Beyond this, and as is described later in this paper, the project employs two additional methods, scenarios and gaming, in subsequent and concluding stages. As such, the project can be classified as drawing on a range of methods associated with the futuring discipline.
- 10. Chun Wei Choo, "The Art of Scanning the Environment," *Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 14.
- 11. Indeed, it is well acknowledged in futures research that "[n]o single method should be trusted; hence, cross referencing methods improves foresight." Further details can be found at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/thr/journal/v8/n1/full/thr20082a.html.
- Talbot Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft, "Conclusion: Seven Lessons About the Fog of Peace," in Talbot C. Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft, The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (United Kingdom: Routledge; 2006), p. 252.
- Hindsight is an awareness of forces that originate in the past, carry through to the present and continue to persist (albeit often in modified form) in the future. On this point, see Leon S. Fuerth, "Foresight and Anticipatory Governance," Foresight, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2009), p. 18.
- 14. For a discussion of red teaming in a military context, see Susan Craig, "Reflections from a Red Team Leader," *Military Review* (March–April 2007), pp. 57–60.

- See, for instance, Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1997) and Ronald Inglehart and Chris Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005).
- Supranational law is a form of international law, based on the limitation of the rights of sovereign nations with respect to one another.
- 17. Essays highlighting the key drivers, trends, shocks and uncertainties within each of these categories can be found in *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, Claxton Paper, No. 14, Defence Management Studies Program (Kingston: Centre for Policy Studies, Queens University; 2001). Analysis of the trends within each of these broad areas, using the futures wheel method, was then used to elicit the complex interconnections between them.
- 18. A driver is a factor that directly influences or causes change; a trend is a discernable pattern of change; and a weak signal is an early warning indicator of change, which typically becomes stronger by combining with other signals.
- It should be noted here that this is the same assessment used by John Gordon IV and Brian Nichiporuk. See, John Gordon IV
 and Brian Nichiporuk, "Alternative Futures and Their Implications for Army Modernization," (RAND: Santa Monica, 2003),
 p. vii.
- 20. The team's determination of key drivers in no way prevents additional examination of the other change drivers identified either in terms of how they could shape future worlds or in terms of their implications for Canada's Army. Indeed, such work is encouraged.
- 21. Consideration is also given to those change drivers considered of high impact but of low to medium uncertainty (i.e., the expansion of operating environments, the impact of age and demographics, shifting power balances, exponential technology growth and globalization See Figure 3). The intent is to ensure the development of more robust alternative futures and thus a solid base for the eventual process of crafting scenarios.
- 22. Alternative futures will be published in full along with a comparative analysis of results derived from the examination of each following completion of the Army 2040 Seminar Wargame series. For a preliminary version of all four futures, see LCol Michael Rostek, Peter Gizewski, and Regan Reshke, Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century, DRDC CORA TM 2010-264, December 2010.
- 23. The testing and assessment phase of the exercise employed by the 2040 team involves the examination of each alternative future and the implications which each held for future Army capabilities and characteristics. It should be noted, however, that the development of specific scenarios based on each future and exploration of the implications of these for capability development offers a second, additional option for the conduct of testing and assessment. Such an exercise would presumably yield conclusions at a somewhat greater level of specificity and fidelity than is the case from general assessment based solely on the alternative future itself. Yet it also demands greater investment in terms of time and resources. Given such factors, along with the limited size of the Army 2040 core team, it was determined that the initial exercise would remain confined to use of the more general option. That said, this by no means should exclude consideration and use of a scenario option in future iterations of the exercise.
- For a detailed discussion of the method utilized in an initial test run, see Bruce Chapman, Army 2040 First Look Materialism Gone MAD: Methodology and Results of the First of Four Seminar Wargames, DRDC CORA LR 2013 0-27, 19 March 2013, 19. pp.
- 25. Questions developed for use in the initial seminar wargame series are as follows:
 - 1) Given the world described, what defence and security implications are likely to affect Army 2040, and what missions and tasks are required for Army 2040?
 - 2) Given the defence and security implications of the world described, what characteristics are required of Army 2040?" and 3) Given the defence and security implications of the world described, what capabilities are required of Army 2040?
- 26. Jerome C. Glenn, Chapter 1: Introduction to The Futures Research Methods Series, AC/UNU Millennium Project Futures Research Methodology V2.0: 4.





THE CHALLENGES AND LESSONS OF LEADERSHIP IN A DEPLOYED ADVISORY TASK FORCE

Colonel Greg R. Smith and Chief Warrant Officer Ambrose Penton

I have not been formally taught anything about leadership since I completed the Basic Officer Training Course in Chilliwack, BC, in July 1989. Since that time I've seen numerous real-life, practical examples of leadership, both good and bad. I would like to think that I have rejected all the examples I considered poor, deciding I would never subject my subordinates to similar acts, decisions or techniques. Similarly, I have more frequently been inspired by my leaders', peers' and even subordinates' leadership examples and stored their good ideas in my leadership rucksack—so to speak—hoping, should I ever be honoured with further command, to equally inspire, lead and teach my subordinates.

I am writing this article with my Fire Team Partner, CWO Ambrose Penton, following approximately a year together leading Op ATTENTION Rotation One through Force Generation, to Afghanistan as the National Headquarters for a combat advisory Task Force (TF), and back. Perhaps some of you will grunt that these ideas are common sense and every leader with some experience in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should recognize and practise these techniques. For my Fire Team Partner and I, our year together training and deployed with the TF was a time of learning and development. We worked together to record these ideas in the hopes that others may read, learn, discuss, disagree and debate leadership in the CAF. It has been said in the past that leadership is a personal thing; perhaps that is why there has been a seeming dearth of formal, experience-based leadership discussion and debate in the CAF and the Canadian Army. If that is the case, let's get personal.

BACKGROUND

The Canadian Contingent Training Mission – Afghanistan (CCTM-A) Rotation One began Force Generation at CFB Gagetown on 7 November 2011. Training took place over approximately two months from November 2011 to early February 2012 and focused on Force Protection (rifle/pistol individual skills, convoy/Armoured Suburban Utility Vehicle drills and physical fitness) and Advisory Skills (learning Dari, urban Afghan culture and Security Forces Capacity Building). Further, based on the highly organizationally dynamic nature of the mission, the chain of command encouraged a culture of flexibility within the TF. As the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were continually learning and maturing, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and CCTM-A and their advisors had to be equally agile and therefore prepared to change employment, should they work themselves out of a job or indeed redeploy early if they were no longer required.

Finally, to build the cohesive teams across the geographically dispersed mission, the various Mission Elements were built and trained together during their two months in CFB Gagetown and thereby helped form the key small teams that would be necessary during a combat advisory mission. The 900-odd Army soldiers, Navy personnel and airmen/airwomen came together as a TF that was destined to be Canada's strategic commitment to NTM-A and began deploying in mid-February 2012.

Upon arrival in Afghanistan, CCTM-A personnel were assigned to numerous NATO camps across Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif (MeS) and the northeast city of Herat. Rather than remaining as a cohesive national team, the soldiers, sailors and airmen/airwomen of the TF began working in pre-existing NATO camps such as the Consolidated Fielding Centre in the Pol-e-Charkhi region of East Kabul, NTM-A Headquarters at Camp EGGERS in downtown Kabul, the Darulaman Literacy Centre in southeast Kabul near the well-known Camp JULIEN and the Regional Military Training Centre – North at Camp MIKE SPANN, near MeS, Balkh Province.¹ Indeed, the transfer of Canadian advisors from Camp STONE in Herat to the CFC in Kabul within a month of arriving quickly reinforced CCTM-A's need for organizational flexibility. With many of the personnel who had trained together in New Brunswick turned over to their Force Employment units, the Force Generating command team adopted the moniker Headquarters CCTM-A and formed the Canadian national headquarters based out of the National Command and Support Element (NCSE) at Camp PHOENIX in east Kabul.

The Commander of CCTM-A, a Major-General, was further double-hatted as the NTM-A Deputy Commander and Deputy Commanding General – Operations. He was therefore very preoccupied with running NTM-A for the American Lieutenant-General Commander and building the ANSF.² This left little time for Canadian issues allowing the Deputy Commander and TF Sergeant-Major housed within the NCSE to command CCTM-A on a day-to-day basis.³

Obviously confronting a very different command challenge from the CAF's experiences conducting counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar from 2006 to 2011, the Colonel / Senior Chief Warrant Officer command team had the privilege of exercising national command over CCTM-A Rotation One for eight months, and what follows is a list of lessons that the team learned. Its tenure proved to be a rather dynamic one due to the rapid withdrawal of the US troop "surge" and the resultant drawdown of American forces from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); this action further brought about the secondary effect of a Canadian reinforcement to fill some of the Americans' roles within NTM-A. However, rather than focusing on a chronological list of events based on the rotation's Campaign Plan, this paper will examine and discuss the lessons of command of a deployed advisory TF that the Deputy Commander and TF Sergeant-Major discovered and learned through experience. Although each had previous command and deployment experience, neither had had the privilege of training, deploying, nationally commanding and redeploying a force of that size, organizational dynamism and complexity.

LESSONS UP AND OUT

The "lens of deployment" and "building the narrative"

It goes without saying that the view of the strategic headquarters in Ottawa is different from that of the deployed theatre headquarters. This is not to suggest either view is wrong; the perspective on events, policies and conditions is simply different while nearly 10 000 kilometres apart. Indeed, having had the privilege of serving at both the tactical and institutional levels, I can tell you that it is neither helpful nor accurate to regard either headquarters as ignorant of the tactical or strategic truth or as unsupportive of the other. Rather, thanks to our military's extensive experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan, I would portray our institutional leadership in particular as highly tactically experienced, deeply sympathetic to deployed forces and strategically wise. Therefore the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and the various Force Generating headquarters were fully supportive and enabling; however, they understood issues from their strategic and institutional perspective, just as those deployed frame activities from a more theatre-biased, tactical viewpoint.

Understanding that the institutional and tactical headquarters view incidents, requests and challenges from very different lenses is a powerful enabler for both commanders and head quarter staffs. I therefore found it extremely useful to speak to my Force Generation and Force Employment commands and particularly my peers who were senior staff officers with a view to establishing some lens ground rules. First, I emphasized through my words and actions that I was not crazy and further suggested I was not about to lose my senses just because I was shortly to deploy. Second, I supportively agreed with my august colleagues that they equally were rational and that I did not expect them to lose their wits while I was gone. With this sage and respectful agreement, we conceded that on occasion during the deployment we'd both either see or hear something that made no sense from our perspective or lens. We concluded by agreeing that when in doubt, upon receiving information that made no sense from our respective lens, we'd default to trust and pick up the phone so we could understand each other's perspective.

The next step after establishing that we were sane, reasonable and intelligent people was to confirm the storyline of the rotation's deployment. I found this central narrative critical as an agreed-upon foundation between the Force Employing headquarters and the deployed TF. In this manner, my higher headquarters, both staff and boss, understood the central theme of my campaign plan: what I expected to occur, my main effort and the likely nature of future requests.

With such a great distance between headquarters and with the different lenses, it was extremely important to establish and maintain this narrative. Indeed, once deployed I spent considerable time emphasizing

the TF's storyline in weekly communications with commanders and staff, during visits from Canada and while dialoguing with my own commander to synchronize our national discussions. While spending considerable time and energy maintaining the narrative with Ottawa, I also had to understand that your higher headquarters was reciprocally responsible for maintaining your Common Operating Picture on the strategic conditions.⁴

I regularly repeated the following very simple analogy to the staff of CCTM-A Headquarters to display the importance of staying on message with your Force Employment headquarters in Ottawa. A narrative is a story that starts before deploying; you tell your higher headquarters that "once upon a time there were two dogs and a cat..." Throughout the deployment it is essential to maintain the story of those dogs and the cat—indeed, it is the central theme of the deployment that everyone will understand. Weekly VTCs must always include a quick check-up to communicate and confirm, "the cat and dogs are doing just fine!"

Events or situations will occur that may jeopardize the commander's central narrative. These occasions reflect a change to your expected campaign plan and will require deliberate commander-to-commander communication to perhaps seek guidance or, more likely, to ensure common Situational Awareness with your higher headquarters. Within our narrative such an unexpected change to our central deployed narrative goes something like this: "Hey boss, remember the two dogs and the cat?" "Why of course, how are they these days?" "Oh boss, they're doing great but I'm afraid it looks like a chicken is coming into the story..." Now if you and the staffs understand the lens and the overarching narrative, you can survive a chicken here and there. But if too many chickens show up, you're calling into question your original campaign plan and logic and credibility as a commander. Equally, frequent changes to the original narrative will make the higher headquarters suspect that perhaps you're prone to jumping to conclusions and perhaps are panicked easily. No one wants to hear their boss grumble at the other end of a secure VTC, "This guy sees chickens in his sleep!" However, with a well-established lens, the credibility you have built up and a strong original narrative, the relationship between a deployed commander and those enabling him back in Canada can handle a few chickens.

PREPARING THE NEXT ROTATION STARTS BEFORE YOU LEAVE

A rotation does not start with the signing of the Transfer of Authority certificate. Rather, you should be preparing your successor well before they arrive. This means they may well get to live the highs and lows of your deployment as they continually track your activities, tweak their own Force Generation plan and use you to scan the operational horizon for what they're likely to face. Indeed, to paraphrase Otto von Bismarck, "Your successor should be learning from your mistakes." With today's technology of emails, secure VTCs, SharePoint and, not to be forgotten, the telephone, there is no reason other than time that you and your successor cannot be in constant contact sharing best practices, expected changes, and deployed and domestic ground truths, as well as perhaps commiserating.

This worked very well during Op ATTENTION. The Deputy Commander of Rotation Zero was very collaborative, providing information and updates to the designated Rotation One Deputy Commander. Indeed, their first talk occurred prior to Rotation Zero's deployment. Similarly, the Deputy Commander dialogue between Rotations One and Two started very early. Rotation One made a very deliberate effort to maintain the Situational Awareness of our Rotation Two brothers and sisters. They were never forgotten on important document and email distribution lists, a seat was given up for the Rotation One operational recce for the Rotation Two Deputy Commander, SharePoint sites were open to them earlier than they were likely ready, and considerable work was put into enabling them with the required American Information Systems log-ins and the necessary ISAF Identification Cards.

This degree of cooperation and collaboration is considerable work. Enabling your succeeding rotation is a mindset and attitude that is command-driven. Deployments are very busy, and you must convey to your subordinate commanders, key staff and entire TF that setting the conditions for your successor's success is something you feel is important. It was my frequently expressed opinion that Rotation Two should start standing on our shoulders, not falling into a hole we dug for them. A handover can be very awkward when

your replacement realizes how much work you've left for them. Don't be jealous of the success of their TF versus your own: your replacements are building on your success, and they should do better than you, making the mission and the CAF the big winners.

IN ALL THIS FORCE EMPLOYMENT, DON'T FORGET THE REPERCUSSIONS ON FORCE GENERATION

Large deployments such as Op ATTENTION are a major muscle movement for the CAF and financially costly for the Canadian people. We soldiers, sailors, airmen/airwomen and SOF troopers are ambassadors for Canada to the nation in which we deploy and to our coalition partners, and these days we are idolized by Canadians themselves. One school of thought is therefore that we should train, deploy and maintain in theatre only the most competent, confident, fit and capable personnel possible. We are on operations, and the consequences of failure are too great to risk Canada's and our own personal reputation. We should therefore deploy only the very best and remove them from the TF the moment we sense weakness or detect dubious performance.

Equally in this Force Employment–centric mindset, we must realize that operational tours are stressful times for our subordinates. Whether our personnel are actually engaging in combat; experiencing exceptional professional challenges; overcoming a physical climate, geography and culture unlike anything they've seen before; or, most likely, trying to manage stresses from home, we place them in very difficult conditions and circumstances and then ask them to perform nonetheless. Under such circumstances people will fail professionally or in their conduct, or simply not demonstrate the brilliant competence of which "right-lined" PERs are made.

As a command team, we found it necessary to balance these two divergent themes and to manage attitudes within the TF. Although commanders need to expect the very best from their troops and be constantly sensitive to the indications and impacts of poor performance, we must equally expect, understand and mitigate suboptimal performance under demanding and stressful conditions. Indeed, it was our viewpoint that even the best among us will make mistakes, and operations are a tremendous opportunity for officers



and NCOs alike to overcome challenges, be mentored and improve. Rather than toss people out of theatre at the first sign of weakness or problems, we believed that unless maintaining an individual and tolerating their shortcomings genuinely placed the TF and the mission at risk or there were bona fide failures to live up to CAF values, mentoring is part of what we expect from ourselves and our subordinate commanders. A deployed operation is an opportune time for subordinates to learn under concentrated, careful and supportive leadership. However, if the continued presence of certain personnel is a danger or their conduct or professionalism has been unacceptable, take care of the discipline and the paperwork, then send those people home.





MCpl Joe Wilson, a member of the Roto 3 Quick Reaction Force, assists a member of the Armée de terre from France, as they take aim with the C9 machine gun during a coalition training session at KMTC on August 3, 2013.

BUILD THE RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR ALLIES

As previously discussed, before deploying you need to put considerable time and effort into your national relationship with your higher Force Employment headquarters. Once deployed, both national and international relationships become important as you proactively meet and get to know your international partners. Indeed, I found it critical as a national headquarters to establish sound relationships with other nations' command elements to achieve Canadian strategic and tactical objectives. Strategically, Canada had been involved in Afghanistan since late 2001, including the "heavy lifting" in Kandahar from 2006 to 2011, concluding in our very visible turning-over of infrastructure, remediation of various locations, depositing of equipment in sea containers and withdrawal in late 2011. To maintain Canada's national prestige, credibility and the CAF's "stock," it was important to regularly link up with other national headquarters and, through day-to-day interaction and messaging of current CCTM-A activities, illustrate and remind them that Canada was still strategically engaged in Afghanistan.

Tactically, regular interaction with other national contingent headquarters was critical to prevent misunderstanding, identify mutual opportunities and perhaps commiserate far from home. Of course formal meetings are one possible method of conducting coordination with peer headquarters; however, I drew inspiration from a book I had recently read to get business done much more informally. National headquarters are invariably busy, but everyone has to eat and relax from time to time; therefore, social interaction was an ideal hook to attract both peer and higher national headquarters. Thus a barbecue, a near-beer on the deck, a meal at the eating mess or dining facility, or a quick coffee are ideal occasions to talk national business. Equally, moments of great national pride such as a medals ceremony, Canada Day or a Canadian VVIP visit are great opportunities to invite your Allies to share in the experience and maintain contact with their Canadian friends. Indeed, with the considerable martial experience particularly of our American, British, United Kingdom and Australian peers, social interaction is an important time to discuss national lessons and perhaps even learn something.

Of course knowing your national contingent commander peers is critical should something occur between the personnel of your two nations. We had a very good relationship with TF HYDRA and subsequent TF CENTURION, the rotating US manoeuvre enhancement brigade for Kabul. Equally, the French



Cpl Julien Courcy, a member of the mentoring team at Camp BLACKHORSE, performs a demonstration for Afghan soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan on March 26, 2013 during Operation ATTENTION. In the background, SSG Sracko Hrzenjak of Croatia.

TF EPIDOTE and CCTM-A had a solid relationship throughout our eight-month tour together. These established lines of communication and multinational relationships were very important when an incident occurred on one of the Kabul camps that involved several different nations' troops. Resolving the problem quickly in collaboration with our Allies was only possible because we knew and trusted each other. The first time you meet your national peers should not be the day there's a big problem. Making an effort to establish and maintain cooperation and perhaps friendship with our Allies is well worth it.

INTERNAL - DOWN AND IN

Leadership is like maintaining a marriage: you need to work on it all the time, not just on special occasions

Although your relationship with your higher headquarters and peer national contingents is very important, you won't be employed long if you can't provide leadership to your deployed TF. If you're fortunate, as we were, you get to build the team during training and work with the same command teams and subordinates on deployment. In this manner you get to establish credibility down-and-in through leading by example physically, linguistically and in training. Equally, both your immediate subordinates and all the TF members get to see you frequently, come to expect your presence and interaction, and hopefully get to know you as a command team. I found, to a certain extent, "the medium is the message": by getting out there, solving problems reactively and proactively, and looking after soldier welfare, soldiers understand you're there for them.

In this way leadership was a constant relationship, not something constrained to the occasional disciplinary problem or important national event. Like a marriage, being out there every day, communicating and spending time with those you got to know during Force Generation, established and maintained that critical sense of trust. Subordinate command teams knew we were going to be around regularly and noted Canadian national problems. They and their subordinates knew we would record and attempt to resolve their problems. In this way, deployed national leadership was a constant relationship there to resolve problems; perhaps inspire, possibly tone down good ideas; but above all, to see, be seen and add value to the great work being done by Canadians via NATO in Afghanistan.

THE "SMELL" OF LEADERSHIP

Despite having commanded at the unit level previously, we quickly learned from these regular visits that you could smell the leadership environment. Call it the intangible sense of morale, the trust of leadership or *esprit de corps*—if you entered a camp and interacted with its inhabitants, you quickly sensed the environment. This subtle smell of leadership could be detected almost immediately upon doffing your protective gear and talking to the leadership and troops. Whether it hung over the camp like a depressive inky, morale-sucking cloud or brilliantly reflected off everyone and everything like a shining light of inspiration, you could quickly sense whether good or poor leadership was being practised.

Usually during these camp visits I would trundle off for an office call with the local commander while the Sergeant-Major would meet up with the local Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) and talk "NCO stuff." Via the officer talk I would exchange tactical for national situational awareness, confirm the camp command team understood current national direction, and get a better view of what national enablement the local commander needed. Meanwhile, the TF Sergeant-Major and the local RSM were talking about the business of soldier welfare issues, personnel problems or general camp NATO mission challenges. With the formal part of the visit complete, we could hopefully share a meal with the camp leadership and include a small group of their Canadian troops. It was a rare day when a soldier would exclaim how good or bad things were going in the camp; however, the overall morale was something that couldn't be hidden and quickly became a point of discussion between the TF Deputy Commander and Sergeant-Major at the visit's conclusion.

These regular visits taught me something about the type of leader I am and how my command team partner could balance my shortcomings. I am, by nature, a fairly optimistic person; reflecting this I tend to get very sunny perspectives from subordinates. Perhaps there is a tendency in all of us to give our bosses our "A-Game"—visiting commanders are overtly told the good stuff so that more contentious issues aren't allowed to cloud overall visits. This is an interesting judgement on human nature, but it doesn't help the travelling command team if the commander only gets to hear and see one side of the story. This taught me a stern lesson on building the relationships and the networks that will give you a broader and more balanced account of command challenges, hopefully before deploying. Fortunately, one such collection platform is your fire team partner, who is likely getting other perspectives from his NCO network. Hopefully, you have also built that same relationship with your immediate subordinates such as the TF Padre and other advisors so they can give you a more balanced assessment of what is going right and wrong. However you build your leadership collection network, it is important to understand you may not get a fulsome, balanced perspective on what is going well and poorly in the TF without it.8

I would add a final point on the obligation to regularly visit national subordinate camps and the benefits of doing so. Beyond providing leadership and confirming intent and welfare, such visits can provide valuable perspective to distant camps and personnel. Anyone who has been far from home either on a military deployment or for another reason can relate how, after an extended period, memories of home and the training and lessons of Force Generation can become distant. As the months march past from the date of deployment, the "muscle memory" of initial Force Generation fades unless we conduct regular continuation training. Similarly, mentally and morally, the greater context of Canada, the CAF and the TF slowly becomes overwhelmed by the daily grind of work, life and routine within our small camp or group of soldiers. For our trade craft, without continuation or refresher training, we begin taking shortcuts on important skills and we lose the instinct that allows us to respond intuitively during crises. Equally after months of deployment, we have a tendency to lose perspective on what is critically important: family, ethics and conduct as the immediate environment of our small groups overshadow this morally essential foundation. We found regular visits to remote locations, particularly those with junior leadership, helped protect or re-establish the greater perspective on Canada's mission in Afghanistan and the broader life outside of the camp and small social groups. Indeed, minor infractions of conduct, performance lapses and lagging morale are all indicators of this loss of context, the atrophy of the local leadership environment and the need for TF leadership to re-establish perspective.

LEADING LEADERS

The Force Generation for Op ATTENTION was somewhat unique in that it was very much focused on individual rather than collective skills. This type of training is rather challenging for leaders, and officers in particular, as they are herded along in collective groups to conduct basic skills training and testing. This is alienating for senior NCOs and officers, whose regular day-to-day function is leading soldiers, not acting like one. This challenge continues for many of them on deployment as they continue to advise or perform individually and not formally practise their leadership other than during the occasional convoy or foot movement "outside the wire."



Major Brent Whelan, Operations and Plans advisor, Captain Brian Nadon Curriculum advisor and Major Martin Anderson, Part Two Course advisor, observe a Afghan National Army (ANA) student at the Junior Officer Command and Staff College (JOCSC) briefs (right to left) Course Commander Colonel Amin and Operations and Plans Officer Colonel Ramatshah during an exercise in preparation for Exercise Panjshir Lion in a command post setting, at the ANA Command and Staff College in Kabul, Afghanistan.

We can all recognize that we don't stop being leaders simply because of the job we're doing. Indeed, good leaders will quietly lead from behind, which is a particularly important attribute for advisors in Afghanistan attempting to bring their principals the last steps to independence. Nevertheless, junior leaders under such conditions need to be reminded that they're leaders and that they need to be examples for the junior members of the TF or of their camps. Even if they don't feel as though they're leaders based on their lack of formal subordinates, there are informal subordinates everywhere watching their performance, conduct and indeed motivation throughout the tour.

Headquarters staff is another important group that requires a similar but differently toned form of leadership. Headquarters are of course replete with duty officers, the J-staff, officer advisors and chiefs of staff. Although some have formal leadership roles, the majority are informal leaders who conduct coordination, execute planning and pass on Situational Awareness tactically, nationally and laterally. We found it important to challenge these young leaders to think wider (which of our peer national headquarters needs to know?), think deeper (who does this affect tactically, and does our higher national headquarters need to be told?) and think long-term (what are the enduring effects of what we're doing to subsequent rotations in Afghanistan?). To address this challenge of perspective I attempted to regularly drag senior and junior members of the staff

out of the headquarters to see who they're supporting. It is much harder to idly drag your feet on a request from one of your supported camps when you've recently visited and seen their challenges first-hand.9

All the demands that you make of your staff to think wider, deeper and long-term means they're not always going to get it right. However, if you've created a learning environment where soldiers and leaders alike are prepared to try and potentially fail, then staff is going to learn from their mistakes and improve. Naturally, you'll need to have contingencies so that errors are picked up before there are serious repercussions. However, operational tours are such a concentrated period of overcoming challenges and learning opportunities that it would be unfortunate if staff, likely the leaders of the future, was not given a chance to try, learn from their mistakes and excel.



Indeed, in this sense I would echo many great commanders and teachers of leadership in stating "never waste a crisis." You want your leaders to learn, and operational tours are a great opportunity to do so. I know the TF Sergeant-Major, and I tried to pass on our knowledge and hard-won experience on a few occasions. Although they can sometimes represent great tragedy, crises are the ultimate visual aid to sear a critical lesson in the memory of everyone involved. Such emergencies are a time to react quickly, collectively acknowledge loss, and learn from and never repeat a mistake—don't neglect this last step and lose a valuable lesson that could be with you and your soldiers for the rest of your lives.

LEADERSHIP IN TIMES OF TROUBLE

History, and military history in particular, is replete with commanders providing excellent leadership in times of ample resources, well-trained and motivated troops, and an enemy back on its heels. Some, however, would say the truly great leaders are commanders who overcome great odds, crushing blows to morale and a shortage of everything except the enemy. Similarly, deployments are not all Canada Days and HLTA flights—into each operational tour a little rain will fall.

One such challenge is the ethical one. As mentioned above, isolated camps will lose perspective on conduct and ethics as the deployment proceeds. Indeed, ethics and morality has been a subject of some importance with our numerous challenging deployments fighting an implacable enemy in Kandahar Province over many years. On Operation ATTENTION Rotation One we were fortunate in having the time to shape our

ethics training during Force Generation. Each camp had a qualified Unit Ethics Coordinator, and ethics was part of both the pre-deployment training and in-theatre continuation training. Despite this, ethical lapses will occur, usually out of the sight of key leadership. During ethics training I always challenged leaders and soldiers alike with these words: "ultimately who are you loyal to?" In the struggle to know "what right looks like," I asked soldiers if ultimately they were loyal to their buddy, platoon, camp, Rotation One, the CAF or Canada. For when things go wrong—and they will—and a soldier or leader is trying to decide whether they should do something about it, what will be the view and damage outside of your immediate group, Coalition Camp, operational tour, the military as a whole and indeed the country when the failing is laid bare in the public eye?

There will be a tendency by soldiers and leaders to take no action when something goes wrong. Indeed, nothing is easier than doing nothing. Facing the problem head-on takes moral and physical courage and risks the enmity of fellow soldiers and perhaps immediate leadership who don't want to expose problems in their command. However, problems left unaired will linger; they will putrefy the moral and leadership environment of a small group and increasingly affect an entire camp and potentially TE.¹¹ A rotting moral foundation risks the long-term morale of any group and indeed the mental health of its members. Military operations demand sacrifice, loss and potentially the taking of life. Such actions can place great strain on any moral foundation—one that is weakened by the hidden rot of an unexposed failure of leadership and ethics risks collective collapse with corresponding damage to the entire group.

Once such a failing occurs—when leaders or soldiers make a mistake, whether ethical or otherwise—they are likely under enormous mental pressure. Despite the best efforts at discretion, camps and TFs are very small places, and these individuals quickly become the focus of leadership, military police and peer scrutiny. As much as we have fantastic and experienced military police, National Investigation Service and NCOs, disciplinary investigations take time. Meanwhile, the accused soldier attempt to carry on doing their job or perhaps even more challenging, are removed from their employment during the investigation. These soldiers, and perhaps their families, are under enormous stress as they await the conclusion of the investigation and potentially repatriation, a summary discipline trial or perhaps ultimately a court martial.

Although leadership must be very careful to neither attempt nor even simply be perceived as in any way influencing or prejudicing the very important investigative process, leaders must understand the pressure on their subordinates. Indeed, when our soldiers are accused of wrongdoing, that is the time for more leadership, not less. Although soldiers may be ostracized from their friends, peer group and perhaps even families, they must not lose the critical link to their chain of command. It is through this critical leadership bond that they receive advice, a listening ear and often access to padres and medical support. Balancing non-interference with an investigation and supporting your subordinates in a time of need is challenging for senior leadership—don't assume the more immediate, junior leadership that interacts daily with these troubled soldiers understands this balancing act.¹²

These personnel problems that occur during operational tours typically take place during predictable stages of a deployment. The midway point and just prior to the conclusion of a tour are typical times for a spike in problems. In my analogy, a tour is like holding your breath. Some soldiers are only able to hold it for half the tour until, having desperately fought not to breathe, explosively exhale as they simply couldn't maintain not having problems for that long. Equally, other soldiers do well for most of their time deployed when suddenly they or their family are no longer able to manage the pressure; there is a domestic crisis and a desperate plea to go home to resolve deep personal problems.

Having experienced this phenomenon on a previous deployment, the TF Sergeant-Major and I went proactive on personnel problems two months prior to the end of our eight months in Afghanistan. Initially, we spoke to the Canadian seniors in each of the NATO camps and scheduled a Canadian talk for their Canadian groups. In these sessions the TF Sergeant-Major and I were able to pass on our pride in their excellent performance to date and remind them that we were very close to the conclusion of the tour. We correctly told each soldier, sailor and airman/airwoman that they were critical in their advisory or support role and in their ability to hand over their job to their Rotation Two comrade, and that their job was not

complete until they had passed through Third Location Decompression. We were immensely proud of all the members of Rotation One and their families, as not one soldier was repatriated early for personal problems from that point in the deployment.

A final note on the challenges of leadership over a joint advisory TF: we were fortunate to Force Generate and deploy a group that included Army soldiers, Air Force personnel, Navy sailors, Special Forces Operators, Medical personnel, Signalers, Close Protection Operators and Military Police. I name each of those groups specifically because they each have their own specific subculture. As they were all deploying into an operational land environment, the colour of their uniforms largely changed to Arid Tan but their cultures, their mental framework and what they thought was important and unimportant remained unchanged.¹³

This was an interesting challenge for a couple of Infantry guys who have only had the privilege of commanding non-Infantry types from time to time. I personally found it an educational and eye-opening experience to lead non-Army people through Army Individual Battle Task Standards. Based on some much-appreciated advice during one of our pre-deployment reconnaissances into Afghanistan, I had the Senior Navy, Air Force and Medical Officer and their Senior NCO attend Orders Groups and further expected frequent, direct feedback to the TF Sergeant-Major and me on training challenges for their subordinates. This proved very useful to ensure that these smaller environmental contingents had a say in training and could identify whether Army-centric training was making assumptions about Navy, Medical and Air Force skill bases that weren't true. I believe this Force Generation was mutually educational for both the TF command team and our non-Army brothers and sisters as we came to understand how the other framed issues and problems.

As we deployed together, this previously established relationship was very valuable. The type of challenges experienced by the hard-working Canadian Air Force or Medical contingents in various NATO camps were quite different from those experienced by the Army-heavy camps encountered. We were fortunate to have solid officer and senior NCO command teams of these different groups that provided brilliant leadership to their teams and humoured us Army guys. ¹⁴ I learned much from our interaction and recognize that leadership has many forms.

CONCLUSION

Operation ATTENTION Rotation One and its Force Generation was an excellent opportunity to practise leadership of a national contingent. As the TF command team, internally we treated the camps scattered throughout Kabul and MeS as a Canadian formation and were fortunate to work with diverse Army, Navy, Air Force and SOF personnel. Externally, we were able to build upon the lessons learned in previous deployments to establish and maintain relationships with both foreign contingents and back to our higher national headquarters, which survived and flourished despite crises.

Our aim in writing this article was to express ideas and lessons learned on leadership while deployed. Perhaps most won't find these ideas terribly controversial; however, our hope is to be the catalyst for further discussion on leadership. Command is an act upon which so much of our military success is built, and it is unfortunate that there has not been greater discussion. After our years of operations in Afghanistan including multiple combat tours, formal, codified debate on leadership has largely not occurred. I hope this article can be one step forward in openly, dispassionately and perhaps academically talking about something that is at the core of what we do in the CAF.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS...

Colonel Greg Smith has commanded an Infantry platoon in Croatia, a parachute company, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment and a Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan, and he was the Deputy Commander of CCTM-A Rotation One. He is a graduate of CMR St-Jean and holds a master's in war studies and defence studies. Having acted as the Army G3 upon his return, he is now attending the National Security Program 6 at CFC Toronto.

CWO Ambrose Penton has 27 years in the CAF serving the majority of his time in Infantry battalions. He has commanded a Reconnaissance Detachment, an Infantry Section and a Reconnaissance Section in Croatia, and been an Infantry Platoon Second-in-Command (2IC), a Recce Pl 2IC, an Infantry Company Sergeant-Major, RSM Ceremonial Guard, RSM 2 RCR and TF Sergeant-Major for CCTM-A Roto One. He is currently the 2 CMBG Sergeant-Major.

ENDNOTES

- Camp MIKE SPANN in the town of Dedai, west of MeS, was named after CIA operative Steve Michael Spann, who was killed during a prisoner uprising at the Afghan fort and main headquarters of the warlord Dostum named Qala-i-Jangi (Warrior's House) in November 2001.
- NTM-A's mission statement was as follows: "NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international
 organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations, supports the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
 in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable,
 Afghan-led security." From Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force NTM-A, http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinatecommands/nato-training-mission-afghanistan/index.php, 23 Jun 13.
- 3. The NCSE could have been assigned more of a national coordination function rather than one of national command. Via a lower-ranking officer and non-commissioned officer, daily national issues would have simply been pushed back to CEFCOM (now CJOC) for adjudication. This was not the strategic decision on the Canadian national command construct for Op ATTENTION; therefore, command and supervision was assigned to a Colonel Deputy Commander and a Senior Chief Warrant Officer. The friction between national (CCTM-A) and NATO (NTM-A) direction will be discussed later in this article.
- 4. During Op ATTENTION Roto One, one such institutional narrative was the transformation of CEFCOM into CJOC and the helpful message that there might be staff frictions, as the overall size of the headquarters decreased by 25 per cent. More substantial strategic messages were such national points of interest as the increased Department of National Defence budgetary restrictions or, more disappointingly for us in Afghanistan, the continued and almost complete lack of Canadian national media interest in Afghanistan, CCTM-A or the ANSF's progress towards independence and self-sufficiency.
- 5. This is of course a rather simplistic representation of the challenges the Mission Transition Task Force (MTTF) brilliantly overcame in closing-down operations based out of Kandahar Airfield (KAF), packaging a large amount of equipment to return to Canada while concurrently enabling the stand-up of Op ATTENTION Roto 0 based largely in Kabul.
- 6. Gotlieb, A. The Washington Diaries 1981-1989. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006).
- 7. Indeed, if our boss doesn't get to see the best we can do or our "A-Game," who does?
- 8. I've always been told to "be yourself" as a commander. In this respect if you are being yourself, you likely have holes in your leadership game—hopefully your leadership strengths have enabled you to build a team that covers for those shortfalls.
- 9. Having been a staff officer at unit, formation and Army Headquarters on many occasions, I can attest that demands or requests from higher, laterally or below are normally followed by a deep sigh of "what now" from the overworked and under-appreciated staff officer. New requests or good ideas are simply more work for the staff team, particularly if it is a good but novel idea that needs continual pushing as it gains approval at higher levels of command. Regular visits to subordinate formations or units, particularly while accompanying a commander, gives staff perspective outside of the headquarters and allows them to crawl inside the head of their boss. Beware the intermediate boss who blocks such staff visits as "battlefield tourism."
- 10. As a student of military history, Field Marshal Slim is frequently held up as an example of a commander who turned around a desperate military situation for the Allies in Southeast Asia and thus was a truly great leader.
- 11. To illustrate this, I make a simple analogy between a hidden, un-discussed leadership or moral failure and a sandwich thrown in a lunch room and ignored for weeks. In time the food will fester, stinking up the whole room. Only investigation, exposure, a proper clean-up of the rotten situation and time will allow the leadership environment to begin to heal.
- 12. The best advice I ever received on the proper mindset to maintain with a soldier in trouble was to treat them like a bad child: "you did a bad thing, but we still love you."
- 13. During a pre-deployment reconnaissance we went to the Air Force camp for a briefing. In an inside-the-wire, informal, outdoor setting I was surprised to see the senior officers present speaking to us with rifles at the high ready position while the airmen and airwomen were walking around casually with only their mandatory pistol on their hips. I came to understand that on the flight lines these pilots were the "gun fighters" whereas those at lower ranks were "ground crew." The translation of this concept into a Land environment was culturally different and almost a reversal of roles for how the Army conducts Key Leaders Engagement security. Nevertheless, there was very solid leadership here and the camp was functioning very well.
- 14. In some cases, non-Army tactical groups were completely unfamiliar with the role and function of the officer/senior NCO command team and had to be mentored. Hopefully, they learned something from this Army approach.



SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW, AND SOMETHING BORROWED:

The marriage of convenience between Canada and its tanks

Major Eric Landry, MSM, CD

An army without tanks is as dumb as dirt.1

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, while combat was escalating in Afghanistan and discussions were in progress regarding the state-of-the-art protective equipment our troops needed, the Canadian Forces (CF) announced that they would be purchasing about 100 Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs) and that those tanks would be deployed to Afghanistan to support our members who were fighting the insurgency. After some quick studies, Canada reached an agreement with the Netherlands to buy 100 used Leopard 2A4 tanks. The purchase of the Dutch tanks was a change of course for the Canadian Army, particularly for the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Rick Hillier, who just a few years earlier had described the Leopard tanks as "a millstone around the neck." This major about-face concerning the future of the tanks was all the more surprising coming from an armoured corps officer whose career had started in tanks.

How was such a decision made? What are the factors that contributed to this 180-degree turn? At the time, the decision was seen as irrational by many CF officers. Using Richard Scott's framework of institutional analysis, which will be explained below, we will show in this essay that Canada's decision to purchase Leopard 2 tanks was consistent with the CF's institutional strengths.

Richard Scott developed a model of institutional analysis that is useful when assessing the decisions made in an institution like the CF. This approach has been put to the test many times to explain decisions that appear irrational. The model is based on three different but interrelated pillars: the regulative pillar, the normative pillar and the cultural-cognitive pillar. The regulative pillar relates to the laws and regulations in effect in an institution. Generally speaking, institutions constrain and regularize behaviour.³ The normative pillar further encompasses the organization's standards and values. Emphasis here is placed on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life.⁴ The last pillar, cultural-cognitive, is based on the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made.⁵ The affective dimension of this pillar is expressed in feelings ranging from certitude and confidence to confusion and disorientation.⁶

The three pillars have gained legitimacy over time. Whereas the legitimacy of the regulative pillar involves adherence to rules from a transactional and extrinsic point of view only (receiving rewards or avoiding punishments), the legitimacy of the normative pillar is more intrinsic, but retains a certain external component, because conformity is related to socially accepted standards. The legitimacy of the cultural-cognitive pillar is deeply anchored in the individual, as it is based on preconceived, taken-for-granted understandings. A joint analysis of the three pillars reveals a number of similarities and differences. There is therefore a correlation between the rationality of the decisions made within the institution and the alignment of the three pillars. Decisions made in organizations when the pillars are not well aligned are less likely to be rational.

In this article, we will use Scott's three pillars to examine the different elements at play in the decision to buy Leopard 2 tanks. We will then analyze two major factors that span those pillars: the protection of Canadian soldiers and the deployment of Canadian Leopard 2A4M tanks.

THE REGULATIVE PILLAR

This first pillar deals with the laws and rules that were followed or contravened in the tank procurement process. The government in power has great influence on defence policy. Despite all of the rules in place to

ensure the objectivity of the materiel procurement process, the opinion of MPs can change according to the mood of the constituents they represent.

As I noted earlier, Canada's policy for national defence tends to be whatever the prime minister of the day says it is. There is no real benchmark or statute that propels politicians in any particular direction, nor have they been wed to "commitments" as military officers might define them.

Officers may very well continue to develop plans without taking the realities of national life into account, while being aware that those plans will not be used in times of crisis. ¹⁰ That is a valid approach, but it inevitably gives rise to frustration and friction between the Department of National Defence (DND) and the other departments. The other possible route is to attempt to integrate political factors, as they are perceived, into military decisions, but in that case, there is a risk of being accused of serving partisan political interests to the detriment of military imperatives. ¹¹ In reality, the solution lies somewhere in the middle.

Sharing full veto powers with DND pushed Industry Canada and Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) to take part in defining the needs and modifications to be made in order to meet operational needs. That inevitably leads to delays and, in some cases, cost increases. ¹² The numerous constraints imposed by the Treasury Board (TB) on the tank replacement project made it practically impossible to carry out. ¹³ Government officials refused to acknowledge the level of violence of the Afghan conflict and the need to act quickly. ¹⁴ Dan Ross, who was Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) at the time, explained how government officials were attempting to reinforce the regulative pillar by clinging to the established rules, even though the chaotic situation required a departure from those rules and an urgent response for the sake of effectiveness.

A few years later, when the decision to extend the combat mission past 2009 was made, the urgency of the situation allowed the project manager to enter into a non-competitive contract with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) for the conversion of 20 of the Leopard 2A4s purchased from the Netherlands in order to meet Canadian operational standards. This agreement was beneficial for KMW, which saw it as a unique opportunity to test the new version in the harsh combat conditions of Afghanistan. The company therefore agreed to postpone all of its other contracts in order to complete Canada's and to deliver the tanks between late 2010 and spring 2011. 16

When the Harper government decided to end the combat mission as of summer 2011, the need was once again evaluated. Despite the vehicles' premature wear and tear, the Commander Canadian Army and the Expeditionary Force Commander both questioned the decision to replace the tanks in Afghanistan, as the mission was coming to an end. ¹⁷ However, a promise had been made that the new Canadian tanks would be deployed. Breaking that promise had serious consequences. Therefore, a compromise was reached: a summary analysis showed that sending five Leopard 2A4M tanks ¹⁸ would enable Canada to make good on its promise while not replacing the entire tank fleet in theatre a few months before the end of combat operations. ¹⁹

The fact that this project was carried out in a rather unorthodox manner and that the TB had approved it nonetheless gave rise to doubts concerning adherence to the rules and the rationality of the decision. That prompted the Auditor General of Canada to conduct an investigation, at the end of which she declared the following: "The contracting processes we examined complied with government policies." From the perspective of the regulative pillar, the decision to purchase tanks was made within the law, as explained below:

The purchase of military equipment must be carried out in compliance with all laws, regulations, and Treasury Board policies that apply to government purchases. Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) maintains what is known as the Supply Manual, which describes and guides such activities. It contains relevant laws and regulations, as well as government and department policies.²¹

Even though not all of the urgent needs were met, the Treasury Board Secretariat acknowledged that a considerable effort had been made to see this project through for the benefit of our troops.

It should be noted that while there had been slippages in the project, senior officials recognized from the outset that the schedule was ambitious and acknowledged that an extraordinary amount of work had been accomplished in a short period of time by all involved.²²

When that report was made public, DND responded positively to the observations by accepting the lessons learned as an effective tool to improve the military materiel procurement process to meet urgent operational needs.²³ Although it expressed willingness to follow the recommendations, DND declared that the urgent procurement of military vehicles had been agreat success.

The vehicles were delivered in a timely manner, giving deployed troops the added protection they need to safely do their jobs. These vehicles have saved Canadian lives, and continue to do so in Afghanistan.²⁴

To reiterate, this purchase was justified by pointing to the need to protect the troops, as Canadians are receptive to that argument. The argument was therefore political rather than administrative.

For anyone examining the government's official reaction to the Auditor General's observations, it is clear that no sense of fear or guilt was projected. DND sent the message that, even though the situation had forced it to skirt a few rules, the process had been conducted legally for the greater good of our soldiers on deployment. Certain documents had not been filled out, but the compliance organization, the TB, had approved the project anyway. The tanks were purchased in accordance with the law. The fact that departing from certain internal rules did not have any significant consequence certainly attests to their level of importance.

Sending new Leopard 2A4M tanks to Afghanistan just a few months before the end of the mission is a matter that is highly relevant to the regulative pillar. As DND had sidestepped established rules in order to meet an unforeseen need, it had to honour the commitments it had made in order to justify departing from those rules and avoid the consequences. The CF purchased 100 Dutch tanks, but only five of them were deployed to Afghanistan, as the tank replacement project managers had to



December 2010, Zangabad, Panjwayi District. Operating a Leopard 2A6M tank equipped with mine rollers, Sgt Steve Poulin (call sign T32B) prepares to lead the C Squadron combat team into the Talibanoccupied zone. Photo: Major Richard Graton



March 2011, Kheybari Ghar, Panjwayi District. Showof-force firing exercise prior to an operation conducted by the C Squadron combat team. In the foreground, the MG3 machine gun mounted on the Leopard 2A6M tanks. In the background, the Leopard 2A4M [CAN] tank fires with its 120-mm L44 cannon. Photo: Warrant Officer Stéphane Larouche



June 2011, Mushan, Panjwayi District. The T39 crew poses in front of the first Leopard 2A4M [CAN] tank to arrive in Afghanistan. From left to right: Maj Eric Landry, Cpl Pier-Olivier Gasse-Leblanc, Cpl Patrick Déselliers, Sgt Charles Côté. Photo: Master Warrant Officer Alain Champagne



constantly adapt to the government's wishes. As is appropriate, political decisions dictated military decisions. All of those decisions were made in keeping with CF culture, which will be the topic of the next section.

THE CULTURAL-COGNITIVE PILLAR

Analyzing the cultural-cognitive pillar is useful here, as it will highlight the military culture, technical standards and social realities in which the decisions were made. In many well-established institutions, routine decisions and standard practices are turned on their heads when the situation changes quickly. In its defence strategy, the government acknowledges that the global geopolitical situation has changed greatly.

Today we live in an uncertain world, and the security challenges facing Canada are real. Globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the safety and interests of Canadians at home.²⁵

The public understands that the CF is one of the diplomacy tools that the government can use. However, people have difficulty accepting that Canadian soldiers are being killed abroad if Canadians at home do not feel directly threatened. With the public becoming increasingly sensitive to losses, protection could represent one of the most important operational needs with regard to combat vehicles of the future. Procuring safe military vehicles that increase the life expectancy of soldiers on the battlefield is cognitively perceived as being completely justified. It would therefore be inconceivable for Canada to poorly equip its troops.

The end of the Cold War, the shifting of conflicts to urban environments and the cost of the vehicles prompted numerous countries to reduce their fleet of MBTs. However, Martin Shadwick explains that capability and expertise must not be lost, as the number of MBTs could increase again.



Although main battle tank inventories have plummeted in most allied countries (thereby explaining why late-generation MBTs are on offer at fire-sale prices), there remains a marked reluctance to completely eliminate the main battle tank. Even the smaller allied countries seek to retain a critical mass (e.g., one regiment) of MBTs, and genuine combined arms expertise.²⁷

Numerous experts therefore believed that MBTs were out of date and that procuring them closed the door to purchasing other defence materiel better adapted to the realities of modern conflicts. ²⁸ The perceived usefulness of MBTs has waxed and waned over the years. At some points, the tank occupied an important, indeed dominant, place in Anglo-American military thought and, at other points, it had more detractors than it may have deserved. ²⁹ The Afghanistan mission showed that most of the hypotheses that were formulated at the beginning of the last decade did not turn out to be correct.

Operation MEDUSA³⁰ is often recognized as one of the catalysts of the deployment of our tanks in Afghanistan. That was the opinion expressed by Colonel Omer Lavoie when he described his battle group's (BG's) participation in that operation in the *Armour Bulletin*.

1 RCR BG [Royal Canadian Regiment] was assigned to defeat a concentrated, prepared enemy defensive network within the districts of PANJWAI and ZAHRE. It is from this operation that the clear requirement for heavy armour in Afghanistan was born.³¹

Instead of being a counter-insurgency, the operation was quite conventional in nature. The identified deficiencies clearly showed the requirement for a platform combining firepower, mobility and protection.

The deployment of armour to Afghanistan has also reinforced with the local populace the resolve of Canada and NATO to bring stability to the region, and it has sent to the Taliban a clear message that we have the tools and determination to pursue them at a time and place of our choosing.³²

This perception was not shared by everyone, as Michael Wallace notes. From a general perspective, it did not seem very wise to put 28-year-old tanks into a combat zone filled with effective anti-tank weapons, to fight against combatants with three decades of experience attacking and destroying far superior armoured vehicles.³³

The tanks borrowed from Germany helped Canadians fulfill their mission in Afghanistan; the tanks purchased later were to be used to augment Army capabilities for the next 20 years. However, it is possible that there was some deliberate confusion of those two contracts. Protecting troops is more closely tied to Canadian values than is augmenting land force capabilities to defend Canada, as the DND/CF website shows:

Afghanistan and other recent conflicts have demonstrated the importance of a main battle tank and its heavily protected direct fire capability. The Canadian Forces' tanks in Afghanistan have deterred insurgent attacks and have allowed Canada's soldiers to safely access insurgent positions over terrain impassable for wheeled vehicles. They have provided our troops with direct-fire capability to destroy obstacles protecting and hiding insurgent fighters. Tanks save lives by providing soldiers with a high level of protection.³⁴

Therefore, it is evident that recent deployments of tanks, in Afghanistan or elsewhere, have set a new standard with regard to their use in an unconventional environment. The intensity of recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reaffirmed the tank's validity as a highly protected, powerful and effective operational asset that, in some high-threat scenarios, cannot be equalled by wheeled light armoured vehicles. By adhering to that standard, Canada showed its willingness to take its place among the forces that can have a real impact abroad. The fact that Canada developed its own version of the Leopard 2 tank helps reinforce that idea, as Lieutenant-Colonel Perry Wells, director of the tank replacement project, explains:


We've taken all of the lessons that we have learned in Afghanistan [and that] some of our allies have also learned . . . employing tanks. A lot of research and development has gone into the building of modern, add-on armour systems here in Germany. We've taken all that knowledge and combined it into one tank—our tank, right here—the Leopard 2 A4M [CAN]. 36

CF culture is made up of subcultures that are linked to the elements and the trades. That culture is different from civilian culture, hence the importance of finding the balance between what is good for the troops and what is good for the public. The technical standards have been studied, but the standards associated with individual values—those that convey an emotional aspect—also have an influence on decision making. These normative rules, which introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life, will be the topic of the next section.

THE NORMATIVE PILLAR

The institution's standards and values facilitated the integration of the Leopard 2 tank, and emotional and identity aspects influenced the operators' reactions. Some officers reveal an irrational attachment to the tank, as this quote from Colonel Hunter illustrates:





The values shared by the members of the Canadian armoured corps have a normative character that influences the behaviour of officers in the organization when they make decisions and recommendations. However, with regard to the work performed by the Leopard 2 tanks once they were deployed to Afghanistan, less subjectivity is conveyed, as indicated by the following on the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command website:



Central Asia and the Middle East has shown western militaries that tanks provide protection that cannot be matched by more lightly armoured wheeled vehicles.³⁸

Therefore, the deployment of tanks is seen here as fully meeting the existing standard during the operation and appears fully aligned with the values of Canadians in general, who want their troops to be well protected.

The creation of a Canadian version of the Leopard 2 tank certainly met with much enthusiasm among the senior leaders in the armoured corps. The lessons learned in Afghanistan influenced the technical standard specifications associated with this new version of the tank, such as installing better armour for the turret, retaining a shorter-barrelled gun and adding a plate under the hull to protect the tank from IEDs.³⁹ The highly positive reaction and glowing praise regarding the tank demonstrate the normative character of the values associated with armoured corps members. When Canada received its new tank in Germany, Major-General Bowes⁴⁰ revealed this emotional aspect:

The complexity of the contemporary operational environment has done nothing to dimish [sic] the importance of armour supporting the combined arms team. Canadians are proud to serve our nation and support our allies abroad with the best main battle tank [, the] Leopard [,] for today's complex operational environment.

Numerous people questioned the decision to replace five Leopard 2A6M tanks with five new Leopard 2A4M [CAN] tanks in Afghanistan. What surprised them, to some extent, was the fact that this replacement was occurring so close to the end of the combat mission. According to the *Canadian American Strategic Review*, there were two good reasons for that decision: those new tanks brought the number of Leopard 2 tanks in Afghanistan back up to 20, and DND had the opportunity to give its new version of the tank a genuine "baptism of fire" under operational conditions.⁴²

After the deployment of the Leopard 2 tanks, Colonel Hunter aptly summarized the reaction to their purchase:

A short two and a half years ago, [...] the tank as part of the Canadian Army's order-of-battle and a component of the combat arms team was dead. Then a remarkable thing happened. Canadian soldiers, mostly infantry, in Afghanistan realized they needed the direct fire support that only tanks could provide. The truth was admitted: Canada still needed tanks—and the Armoured Corps met the call.⁴³

Like the reactions that followed the announcement of the deployment of tanks to Afghanistan, the comments made by the armoured corps leaders were highly emotional and sentimental. This normative aspect is plain to see in an article by Warrant Officer Delaney:

[*Translation*] This tank is so impressive that we talk about it non-stop, so much so that our spouses in Canada have started calling it "the mistress of steel."⁴⁴

The normative pillar most definitely reveals relevant information concerning the rationality of the decision to acquire Leopard 2 tanks. The considerable influence that the mission in Afghanistan had on the application of established standards is certainly the most important factor. In order to directly appeal to Canadian values, the protection of soldiers was cited as the main reason for purchasing tanks. Like the troop members and officers who had used the tank during operations, the armoured corps leaders clearly showed an emotional attachment to the machine. According to them, the MBT is an integral part of any self-respecting army, and the acquisition was part of the normal order of things. Members of the armoured corps identify with the Leopard 2 tank and felt a strong duty to support the decision to purchase it. They would have undoubtedly had serious regrets if they had had to pass up this unique opportunity to rebuild the armoured corps thanks to the Leopard 2.

ANALYSIS

There is a clear correlation between the losses sustained by Canada in Afghanistan and the public support for the mission. As most Canadian citizens do not feel that they are in danger, they have a hard time accepting the deaths of soldiers who are tasked with protecting them in a place as far away as Afghanistan. Protecting the troops is therefore a theme that cuts across the three pillars of analysis to a remarkable extent.

In the regulative pillar, the political vision was clear: the objective of purchasing the tanks was to protect our deployed troops. That idea was reiterated by the Auditor General, who said that she understood the urgency to acquire the tanks because lives were at stake. Finally, when DND faced criticism from the Auditor General regarding adherence to the procurement process, it justified its actions by saying that lives had been saved. From a cognitive perspective, the general perception is that the tank causes a great deal of collateral damage in a counter-insurgency or an urban setting. However, that perception is corrected by operators like Colonel Lavoie, who declare that the presence of tanks reduces contact with the enemy and therefore engagements that are likely to cause collateral damage. The normative aspect is even more evident when the reactions of the armoured corps leaders are analyzed. Protection is an essential element of tank crew members' core values. Be it in a combined arms context or from a deterrence perspective in a counter-insurgency environment, tanks are called upon to protect those around them.

The decision to send only five Canadian Leopard 2A4M tanks raised a number of concerns. In fact, an analysis using the three pillars reveals significant inconsistencies. From a regulative perspective, the only apparent reason for the deployment of the five Leopard 2A4M tanks was the desire to avoid the consequences of breaking the promise made by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM[Mat]). From a normative perspective, there were strong emotional reactions, and numerous senior leaders in the armoured corps expressed genuine enthusiasm at the idea of deploying this Canadian version of the Leopard 2. Deploying a new vehicle in a theatre of operations is fully consistent with the correct way to proceed. It was therefore important to take this brief, unique opportunity, and it seems clear that the armoured corps officers would have had regrets if they had had to miss out on it.

Conversely, the cognitive reflex of commanders, who used the force and who saw that considerable funds would be spent to achieve a minimal effect, clearly shows that this decision was not based on standard practice. It would have been much easier to keep the fleet as it was and to finish the mission with the tanks that were already in Afghanistan. Even if there is a technical standard stipulating that it is preferable to put the tank to the ultimate test of combat, history has shown that the Leopard 2 tank had failed to meet that standard until 2007 and was still perceived as being one of the best MBTs in the world. An analysis of the three pillars therefore reveals that, in this case, the regulative took precedence over the cognitive. There is no doubt that the aim of deploying these new Canadian tanks was to justify their purchase to numerous organizations and to maintain DND's credibility. Deploying such a small number of tanks so close to the date of the troops' withdrawal was probably irrational, but that does not mean that it was a bad decision. Although the word "irrational" has a negative connotation, irrational decisions are sometimes fully justified because they are in line with the CF's institutional strengths.

CONCLUSION

The mission in Afghanistan drastically changed the way in which the CF purchases materiel. The tank procurement process had to be shortened because of the urgency to act. Despite attempts by government officials to enforce the established process and the numerous constraints imposed by the TB, the Leopard 2 tank was acquired in the blink of an eye. The tanks were purchased in a lawful manner, and the omission of certain steps was justified by the lack of time. Thanks to the deployment of those tanks, Canada was able to save lives and prove its willingness to play a key role in the conflict. Protecting the troops therefore carried more weight in the decision than the procurement rules. Protection also won out over the cognitive reflex that tanks should not be part of the solution in counter-insurgency warfare.

The decision to deploy only five Canadian Leopard 2A4 tanks near the end of the mission was primarily based on the ADM(Mat)'s promise. In this case, despite the cognitive criticisms of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and the Army, it was the fear of consequences from a regulative point of view that carried more weight. Faced with not meeting the delivery deadlines, the ADM had to find a compromise that was acceptable to all parties.

Various factors indicate that the decision to purchase Leopard 2 tanks was made in keeping with the institutional logic of the CF. The fact that the project leaders were not found guilty of breaking certain rules in the procurement process and that they received the "blessing" of the Auditor General confirms its legitimacy from a regulative point of view. From a cognitive perspective, the return to normal and conformity with the other NATO nations lead to the conclusion that this decision was desirable for the CF. Lastly, the numerous reactions to the tank revival and the fact that the armoured corps responded to the call point to a strong normative and identity component. Scott's institutional analysis has enabled us to show that the pillars were well aligned in the decision to acquire the tanks. In the current climate of budget cuts and expenditure restraint, optimizing the procurement process is certainly a timely subject. The success of the tank procurement project provides striking evidence that improvements are possible. It would therefore be beneficial for DND to learn lessons from this project in order to revamp its method of acquiring defence materiel.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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THE FUTURE OF LIGHT FORCES

Major Jean Vachon, CD

The fox knows many tricks; the hedgehog one good one. [Translation]

— Spartan proverb.

As the saying goes, the fox knows many tricks and the hedgehog knows one good one. The same can be said of the Canadian infantry today. As we learned in the Balkans in the 1990s amidst a civil war, or recently in Afghanistan surrounded by the treacherous acts of insurgency warfare, our infantry must demonstrate imagination and intelligence in order to deal with various situations in which tanks and cannons cannot have an impact on certain centres of gravity, such as winning the hearts and minds of the people.

For Canadian troops, the combat mission in Afghanistan ended in 2011. We acquired considerable experience at all levels, including combat operations and reconstitution and reconstruction operations. We showed the rest of the world the value of our work. Nevertheless, that was just one specific theatre; there is no need to rewrite every single combat doctrine manual. Army doctrine has stood the test of time and enables us to handle the full spectrum of operations. In addition, the lessons learned are applied at the various levels: we make good use of them or we improve our procedures. However, there is a downside: we seem to have little interest in developing and building on the hard-won experience in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that we gained in recent years or in maximizing our ability to operate and perform in complex terrain, especially on operations involving light forces.

This article reflects on the way light infantry units are operating in the face of the realities of today and tomorrow. It is by no means a scientific article nor does it present recommendations based on in-depth study. That said, we should be asking ourselves some questions about the way we do things and what kind of fighting force we would like to be over the coming decade. We must also ask ourselves what can be done at the Army level to ensure that the lessons learned in Afghanistan are not forgotten. To answer that question, we can show that the CF has acquired significant COIN expertise in Afghanistan and, emulating the U.S. Army Special Forces (the Green Berets) at an earlier period, we can draw on our Afghan experience and maximize our current capabilities in the light infantry battalions, that is, be able to generate force multipliers while doing more with less.

Like the post-Cold War era, the post-Afghanistan era is characterized by a search for "identity" in the CF and, as this article shows, particularly in the infantry. The central point is therefore the way in which our troops may act and have acted in a counter-insurgency environment. I have co-written an article with Major Charles Bolduc on the experience acquired by A Company (A Coy) in the 2 R22eR Battle Group (BG) in 2009 ("Making Strides at the Heart of the Insurgency," Canadian Army Journal, Summer 2010). In that article, we discussed how A Coy developed the concept of platoon houses, a method that enabled us to operate in COIN mode while living among the Afghan people and to stabilize an area of operation in and around the villages of Belanday and Nakhonay, as part of what the Americans call village stability operations. The method was adopted during subsequent rotations. Those efforts yielded tangible success but, unfortunately, it seems that the lessons learned will be relegated to the background. The CF put so much energy into understanding COIN that, in the post-Afghanistan era, some believe that it is time to focus on the doctrine and procedures that were set aside in Afghanistan; we must concentrate on conventional operations and prepare to confront a peer enemy. Any soldier with a bit of experience can agree with that. However, it is unfortunate, even detrimental, not to capitalize on the successes of Afghanistan. Currently, the CF has a critical element—time—that is extremely rare in periods of crisis. We have time to clearly identify our capabilities in order to maximize their use. As we are not in any particular theatre for the moment, we have an opportunity to guide the light units, provide the necessary support and train the soldiers to truly become experts in operations performed in an austere environment.

To draw a historical comparison, after World War II, a handful of men such as Aaron Banks and Bill Yarborough wanted to put their experience in the OSS and the Jedburghs to use. During those operations,

small groups of specially trained men were sent on missions far behind enemy lines to form and train resistance groups. Those organizations were the ancestors of the CIA and the U.S. Army Special Forces, also known as the Green Berets. However, Banks and Yarborough's idea of forming units specialized in unconventional operations went against the "Big Army" principle, where conformity and mass strength were the keys to success. Without going into detail, it is important to mention that they encountered many roadblocks courtesy of the chain of command, which did not really like non-standard troops being called "special." During that era, forces that were unconventional, whether because of their uniform (wearing a green beret) or the way in which they conducted operations, were perceived by the Pentagon as an area where career progression was slow or nonexistent. These small teams of guerrilla warfare specialists, whose members had to be experts in raids, possess knowledge of a foreign country, culture and language, and be able to conduct psychological operations, were seen as antithetical to the large-scale operations of the time, which mainly involved mass use of mechanized or airborne units. Banks and Yarborough were convinced that it was important to make use of the Jedburghs' successes and that even in a large-scale conflict, there would always be a centre of gravity where tanks and cannons could have no significant impact; more subtle measures were required to influence the population: the "winning of hearts and minds." It was not until after President Kennedy approved the project that any significant progress was made in that regard. The rest is history, and the Green Berets are known far and wide. The U.S. Army maximized their capabilities and resources despite some initial reluctance.

Canadian infantry soldiers proved many times in Afghanistan that they could operate across the full spectrum of operations, including attacking insurgents, securing a village, supervising school construction, and simply creating ties with the Afghan people. In 2009, small teams of 2 R22eR troops literally lived among the Afghans. It was necessary to lower our guard and take calculated risks with our own safety in order to increase the positive impact on them. It was not uncommon to see small groups patrolling the villages day and night. The soldiers had to be accessible to the villagers, knowing full well that there was a risk of ambush or attack. The objective was not to hunt down the insurgents, but to target the influential people who could enable us to attain the desired mission effects.² This practice was an incredible force multiplier; the perception that the CF should create a secure environment morphed into the impression that the local residents were ensuring the safety of the troops. The symbiosis was complete. The designated platoon house had only the minimum equipment and infrastructure required to create a safe environment for the troops. Canadian soldiers also acquired considerable experience while training Afghan military personnel and police officers in OMLTs and P-OMLTs, and while participating in stabilization and reconstruction operations with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) units, and so on. These conventional Canadian troops were able to accomplish the same things the Green Berets did with their Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs). An article by Major Jim Gant from the U.S. Army Special Forces entitled "One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan" 3 discusses parallel activities carried out during approximately the same period.

In the post-Afghanistan climate, do we really want to turn the page on our accomplishments and successes? Why not capitalize on that experience and integrate it into our new reality geared towards conventional operations? History shows that conflicts will always contain a component where force concentration alone will not be enough to attain the desired effect. A good option would be to redefine the role of light infantry battalions. The Afghan experience taught us that, to a large extent, operations in complex terrain require troops specialized in dismounted operations.

Light infantry members can operate from various platforms, be they vehicles, boats or aircraft, and even participate in parachute operations. In the doctrinal concept, light infantry is the perfect element to create bridgeheads and act as the transition element for the rest of the forces, which are conventional, mechanized and more robust, but which require more coordination and planning for deployment mobility. If they received extensive training on living in difficult and austere conditions, light infantry soldiers could act independently for a period of time and, if necessary, live among the local people in the theatre of operations. In the past, we had support weapons companies; if we tailored that concept to modern realities, the support company could include specialized bridgehead capabilities for influence activities. With troops who are better trained in psychological operations and CIMIC, it would be possible to prepare for the transition with



Troops protecting and living at Alpha 10 also depicting the local life at this post showing how the locals are living.

the main combat groups. The ties established with the local people and the key individuals (political or religious leaders, depending on the situation) would facilitate the stabilization and reconstruction phases. Such a light infantry battalion would enable the commander to have, as part of his or her own capabilities, a sub-unit specialized in "special operations": reconnaissance, direct actions, psychological operations, CIMIC, and guerrilla/counter-guerrilla warfare—in short, all COIN-related operations. With those new light infantry battalions, we would be able to conduct more conventional operations but also COIN operations or, conversely, act as guerrilla warfare specialists. The key to success is troops who are trained, self-reliant and resilient, and who have the right attitude about adapting to the environment, the population and the culture of the theatre of operations. As mentioned previously, A Coy of 2 R22eR BG was very successful in 2009 when performing COIN operations in Afghanistan. However, in hindsight, I sincerely believe that with troops trained for those types of operations and with the right mindset, we could have attained the same objective with less personnel and fewer resources. It is important to mention that despite willingness to adapt to COIN operations, pre-deployment training at that time was geared towards combat operations. Many soldiers were taken aback to learn that they would be literally living among the Afghan people.

The light infantry battalion provides the possibility of maximizing training for infantry soldiers who must be able to work in difficult terrain. To conduct the operations described in this document, it takes soldiers who have mastered basic fieldcraft:

- **reconnaissance patrols:** Conducted by small detachments of competent, self-reliant and reliable soldiers who collect information, usually deep in hostile territory. No matter what the operation is, gathering information in order to develop contingency plans will always be necessary;
- long-range patrols: Light troops working in an austere environment must be able to travel long
 distances on foot and master the basics of stealth movements in complex terrain. The Afghanistan
 campaign showed that it is difficult to be effective while travelling in difficult terrain, in extreme
 temperatures and with a large load of equipment;



Lieutenant Jean-Francois Horth meets with a local village elder during an early morning operation in Panjwai District to clear several small villages and compounds.

- **cordon and search operations in urban areas:** Recent deployments have shown that part of the operations always take place in an urban setting, be it a small village or a big city;
- insertion methods: The troops must be able to use the various available insertion methods—airborne, airmobile or amphibious methods, or motor vehicles—to achieve the objectives. It is important to note that in a similar context to the activities described in this document, it is necessary to be qualified in parachuting operations, particularly freefall parachuting (HALO and HAHO). Reconnaissance elements and COIN operators should be able to insert themselves as inconspicuously as possible while minimizing the risk of injury. These types of troops should not conduct parachuting with static lines;
- survival techniques: The soldiers must be able to live off the land or among the local people in
 the area of operations. The platoon house concept in Afghanistan demonstrated that logistics
 are complicated. On some occasions, the troops obtained food from the local people. For light
 troops, it is essential to be able to live "in the field" when required, so as not to be reliant on the
 conventional logistics system;
- base camp and routine activities: Regardless of whether the base in question is a conventional patrol base or a forward operating base, the light troops must be able to set up a base camp and perform routine activities indefinitely while awaiting the arrival of more robust forces.

In addition, it is recommended that the light troops be fully qualified in dismounted operations up to the company level: conduct ambushes, be knowledgeable in handling explosives and using evasion techniques, and have some basic skills in handling foreign weapons.

Beyond tactical knowledge, it is also necessary to have very good knowledge and skills in diplomacy. To act independently for a period of time, the troops must be able to represent the operational and strategic visions of high command. They must have the compassion of a social worker and know the ins and outs of election campaigns. They must be ambassadors as well as soldiers. It is therefore necessary that the soldiers have knowledge of foreign cultures, language abilities (especially the elements of the "new" support weapon company), and financial skills in order to manage budgets and take care of contracting (required during first contact with the local people in the theatre of operations to transition between stability operations and reconstruction if necessary). In Canada, we have a unique opportunity to familiarize ourselves with "foreign"



Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander Canadian Army along with members of his close protection unit and members from Oscar Company, The Royal Canadian Regiment, take part in a foot patrol and talk with village residents and elders in the Panjwai district on October 18th, 2010.

cultures through our Aboriginal communities in the North, whose customs are different from those of mainstream Western culture. I have worked in recruiting and taken diversity training, where I learned that there are a multitude of differences between the way of life in Canadian cities and villages and that of certain Aboriginal peoples; some of their tribal traditions are similar to the traditions of other cultures elsewhere in the world. With that type of preparation, the unit would truly be able to perform effectively across the full spectrum of operations.

I hope that this short article will foster discussion in the Army, and especially in the infantry, so that we can take full advantage of the hard-won knowledge and experience we have acquired over the past decade. We have the opportunity to maximize the operational capabilities of our light infantry soldiers. With agile, flexible and culturally aware light troops, each brigade could have its own rapid deployment force thanks to the light infantry units. Those units would be integrated into the brigades' operational organization charts and would provide commanders with greater flexibility. The troops could also, as required, support the special operations troops for certain operations. In order to deal with tomorrow's challenges and be ready to fight a peer enemy, our soldiers must be proficient in traditional fieldcraft, but we must not disregard our Afghan experience. Rather, we must make use of the COIN experience we gained and maximize what we



learned, as the CF is now a key player in such operations. Building on the training of these specialized troops would be to our advantage. Conventional warfare always has an unconventional component, so we should make the most of our full range of experience.

Within the infantry community, numerous senior officers and non-commissioned officers seem to believe that it would be beneficial to restructure the light infantry units and exploit this quick reaction force. Therefore, the question seems to be this: why has there not been any development since the formation of those units which, when it comes down to it, are just battalions with less equipment?

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Jean Vachon enrolled as a non-commissioned member in the Royal 22e Régiment in 1989. He served in its three battalions, including on the base in Lahr, Germany, from 1990 to 1993 and as part of the parachute company from 2000 to 2001. He also worked in recruiting from 2006 to 2008 in Moncton, New Brunswick. He was accepted to the University Training Plan Non-Commissioned Members (UTPNCM) in 2001 and completed a bachelor's degree in history at Université Laval. His operational missions include the Gulf War in 1991, the former Yugoslavia in 1992 (including the opening of the Sarajevo airport) and 1995, and Afghanistan, where he served as the second-in-command of a battle group infantry company during Roto 7. He is currently the commander of the Citadel garrison (2 R22eR) in Quebec City.



ENDNOTES

- For a good, easy-to-read historical account of the U.S. Special Forces, see Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces by
 Tom Clancy with Gen Carl Steiner (Ret.) and Tony Koltz, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2002, 548 pages. Although Tom Clancy
 was primarily known as a novelist, some of his books, like this one, detail the history of military troops and organizations in the
 United States.
- 2. As David Kilcullen states in his article "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," "The counterinsurgent's task may no longer be to defeat the insurgent, but rather to impose order (to the degree possible) on an unstable and chaotic environment."
- The article is available on Steven Pressfield's website at http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf.
- 4. According to "Reflection on Light Infantryman Essential Capability to Develop Skills, Willpower and Teamwork" from the Canadian Infantry Association, "Light Infantry units differ from other units in that they are habitually employed in close, restrictive terrain. The close-in fight on urban terrain is perfectly suited to Light Infantry units. Their tactics are a combination of multiple, small-unit operations that capitalise on surprise and attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Foul weather and night operations are the forte of light infantrymen. They strike at key elements of the enemy to disorganise and piecemeal him, and then finish him off."
- 5. In Afghanistan, shuras were held regularly. At the platoon house level, these meetings were organized by non-commissioned members (MCpls, Sgts) or junior officers. These meetings had a direct impact on operations, especially in terms of intelligence gathering and cooperation between the local people and the troops on the ground.



HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACHES:

The 1882 British Occupation of Egypt

Dr. Claire Cookson-Hills

The concept of integrating military and civilian dimensions in future army operations has a long provenance. For example, Howard Coombs, in his recent appreciation of Canadian whole-of-government operations in Kandahar between 2006 and 2011, articulated how the Canadian model of comprehensive "capacity building" in Afghanistan evolved from an earlier model known as 3-D (Diplomacy, Defence and Development) into what is now widely recognized as a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach.¹ This approach is characterized by a broad perspective on the development of security and governance that goes beyond military deployments and particularly emphasizes development projects and civil reconstruction.² The whole-of-government approach has evolved over time as challenges on the ground revealed the need for changes in policy.

Although whole-of-government whole-of-government is an evolving concept, historical case studies can be useful in distinguishing helpful methods from potentially problematic policies. Historical case studies also contextualize and situate contemporary whole-of-government approaches within the evolution of army innovation and problem solving. A look back to the 19th century, for example, yields several case studies from which useful insights may be gleaned. This article will focus on one such example, specifically the extensive and complex British intervention in and occupation of Egypt beginning in 1882.

In that year, a military rebellion destabilized Egypt—which at the time was an autonomous Ottoman colony—and brought an Egyptian colonel named Ahmed Urabi to power. Urabi deposed the European-friendly hereditary ruler, reneged on Egypt's international debt and attempted to nationalize the recently constructed Suez Canal. The colonel's actions, coupled with anti-European demonstrations in Alexandria, were a significant threat to British interests and provoked intervention. The British military operations in response to this challenge to imperial security, however, amounted to a short colonial war. In response to the anti-European riots, the British ordered a naval bombardment of Alexandria between 11 and 13 July 1882. Then, an advance force landed to try to prevent looting, quickly followed by a large British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that used Alexandria as base of operations. Although the British general, Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, attacked from Alexandria, that effort was stymied, and successful military operations occurred first along the Suez Canal and then down a transportation canal towards Cairo. What followed was an extended period of reconstruction and rebuilding, during which the British implemented forerunners to whole-of-government approaches in order to stabilize Egypt financially, politically and environmentally.



Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley.



Alexandria Bombardment aftermath.

EGYPT AS A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT CASE STUDY

Egypt between 1882 and 1914 (when the country became a formal protectorate of the British Empire) represents one of the most multifaceted approaches to state rebuilding on record. The immediate response to the 1882 conflict, therefore, is a good place to begin the assessment. The British government coordinated its response through the Foreign Office (not, significantly, through the Colonial Office, the India Office, or the War Office, the three government ministries most closely associated with colonial rule) and through the

highest-ranking British official on the ground in Egypt, the consul-general. Until 1883 the post was held by Edward Malet, then Sir Evelyn Baring was appointed. The three-division BEF suppressed the popular violence and ended the military's rebellion. The Egyptian army fought determinedly, however, and caught part of the BEF past its supply and communication lines at Kassassin as the troops advanced down the transportation canal; late British reinforcements repulsed the attack. After the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September 1882, the new regime all but collapsed. Working with local civil officials, the British Army integrated British officers into a new, loyal Egyptian army, and the Foreign Office appointed a series of civil and military advisors to guide public policy. The Foreign Office forged a series of formal diplomatic connections with the other European powers who, along with Britain, jointly controlled Egypt's public debt, and it had established an agency (the Caisse de la Dette Publique, commonly referred to simply as the Caisse) to manage Egypt's finances.3 The Caisse had control over Egypt's budget, and diplomatic relations with its governing European members were crucial. A relative of the deposed hereditary ruler was installed at the head of a British-run Egyptian government in order to



Sir Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, in 1895.

grant political and popular credibility. Joint Anglo-Egyptian garrisons were set up at strategic points around the country, most notably in Cairo, in Alexandria, on the Suez Canal and along the Nile River in the southern Egyptian provinces, thereby integrating Egyptian security priorities with those of Britain. The government also began heavy investment in development programs to rehabilitate Egypt's irrigation and transportation networks, as the country's spiralling national debt was another security concern. Because Egypt is a desert country with a thin zone of settlement along the Nile River, the modernization of irrigation programs was deemed to be of the highest importance in supporting Egyptian reconstruction and self-sufficiency programs so that the British forces could withdraw in the shortest practicable time.

However, the British government continued to push back its timetable for withdrawal. Between 1882 and 1914, the government expressed a commitment to ending the occupation 66 times, but in 1914, with the outbreak of war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the British government declared Egypt a protectorate and began a process of formal imperial integration. The reluctance to withdraw from the Egyptian project is one of the major differences between contemporary and historical case studies of WOG approaches. As Dr. Douglas Bland has argued, contemporary whole-of-government is meant as a way for "legitimate government (aided or directed by the UN) [to] develop in turn a more peaceful, liberal-democratic, consensual and self-sustaining national, regional, or international order. Self-government and liberal democracy were not British priorities in Egypt; instead, the imperial state concentrated on the establishment of a colonial relationship with Egypt that extracted natural resources and wealth from the "veiled protectorate" while securing British overseas interests through the Suez Canal.

But although the ends differed, the "tactics" of national stabilization and development bear similarities worth reflecting upon. In what follows, the actions of the British state and its agents in Egypt will be discussed through the lens of a whole-of-government approach, although the reader should remember that the intentions of the British Empire were very different from those of the international coalitions of the 21st century.

RE-MAKING EGYPT

Great Britain's attempt to transform the volatile, bankrupt Egyptian state into a stable, friendly and profitable entity progressed along several lines that are of interest in relation to the whole-of-government approach. They were (1) the integration of British (and other international) civil and military personnel at different levels of Egyptian government; (2) a unified vision of policy coherence and longevity with continued oversight from London; (3) development of irrigation technologies; and (4) internal and external Egyptian security. Between 1882 and 1914, despite ongoing unrest in the Sudan, the Anglo-Egyptian government kept Egypt free from all serious internal violence, although popular nationalism slowly became more vocal and widespread among Egyptian urban elites during that period. The Egyptian government also began to pay down its national debt, which was reduced from a ruinous ten times its GDP in 1882 to a much-improved five times its GDP in 1914.

Reconstruction efforts began immediately after the decisive victory by the BEF at Tel-el-Kebir in the Nile Delta in September of 1882. To re-establish continuity of governance, the British retained many of the top-ranking Egyptian politicians and bureaucrats in their positions and focused on court-martialling Urabi, who was banished to Ceylon. Simultaneously, the Foreign Office appointed a new consul-general, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer). Cromer, in fact, had held the position of Egyptian Consul-General between 1878 and 1879, and his reappointment was an attempt to install experienced and credible officials with existing ties to previous Egyptian administrations. Cromer appointed a series of British advisers to the different Egyptian ministries. In almost all of these ministries the advisors wielded the real power, and their "advice" quickly became policy without ever formally supplanting the existing governance structures, although many of the more corrupt Egyptian officials were quietly removed from power.8

The advisors were appointed by and promoted from within British personnel in the Egyptian government, and therefore the British consulgeneral had control over personnel policies. Lord Cromer chose almost exclusively middle-and upper-class, public-school-educated, experienced British and Anglo-Indian men to take up the advisory positions. Those bureaucrats came from both civilian and military backgrounds, and their appointments



Map of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

were made on the basis of personal expertise. The Egyptian army was thoroughly Anglicized through re-staffing with British officers who now commanded Egyptian other ranks; those British officers operated under the direction of the civilian consul-general rather than answering to the Egyptian military hierarchy. The Ministries of Finance and the Interior were similarly dominated by civilians imported from other colonial administrations. And, borrowing from a long tradition in British India of public works engineers, the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works was advised—and effectively run—by British military engineers.



Plaque in the Cloisters of Westminster Abbey, London, UK, to commemorate the work of the British in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from 1898–1955.

Anglo-Egyptian policymaking was centred upon the office of the consul-general, which had originally been just one of many European consular-diplomatic positions, but which after the 1882 occupation became the office of the *de facto* ruler of Egypt and the policy gateway back to the Foreign Office in London. For the first 24 years of the occupation, the Egyptian government was steered by a single individual, Lord Cromer, who brought a continuity of governance to the reconstruction of Egypt. Cromer's priority was the imposition of liberal financial management on Egypt, and he conflated the country's financial collapse with a broader Egyptian moral collapse. ¹¹ Cromer's government pursued remarkably stable policy objectives throughout his long tenure. His government paid "attention to the laws of sound finance, and in particular to the importance of low taxation, efficient fiscal administration, careful expenditure on remunerative public works, the minimum of interference in the internal and external traffic of goods." ¹² Based on the nineteenth-century liberal assumption that social, political and moral stability would follow from "sound" financial management, the advisors pursued fundamentally financial objectives. And because Egypt's goals were financial, the Egyptian government was able to express—and both Britain and Egypt were able to evaluate—the successes and failures of contemporary whole-of-government-analogous initiatives along quantifiable financial lines.

Cromer's financial management included the construction of "remunerative" public works. The Anglo-Egyptian administration built roads and railways across Egypt, erected telegraph lines, constructed and repaired government buildings, and of course rebuilt the transportation canals damaged during the 1882 battles for control of Egypt. But by far the most important public works projects were irrigation-based. Egypt's economy was steered towards producing the long-staple cotton that was badly needed in British textile mills, making the expensive public works politically and economically attractive to both states. One of the most Anglicized Egyptian departments, the Irrigation Department (a sub-ministry of Public Works), was stacked with officials brought over on contract from British India. The most senior of these officials were military engineers (officers from the Corps of Royal Engineers) specializing in irrigation engineering, and in the first decade of occupation they concentrated development efforts on the repair and rehabilitation of existing structures. In 1885, the engineers started repairing the Nile Barrage, a type of dam that had been partially constructed in the 1860s only to be abandoned as defective. Between 1885 and 1897, not only was the Nile Barrage successfully repaired and augmented, but so too were the irrigation canals that

brought extra water to the cotton fields of the Nile Delta. In 1898, encouraged by the success of the barrage and confident of long-term stability in Egypt with the expedition to Sudan and the drawing-down of the Mahdist War, the Anglo-Egyptian government began construction on an ambitious new irrigation project: the original Aswan Dam (1898–1902). This project was the first permanent dam in the valley of the Nile and expanded irrigation agriculture south of the Nile Delta. Taken together, the irrigation projects significantly increased government and business revenue, gave thousands of jobs to Egyptian labourers and highlighted the scientific prowess of British and Anglo-Indian engineers.

The Anglo-Egyptian army in particular was both an instrument for construction and a tool of coercion. The Corps of Royal Engineers built canals and government buildings in the Egyptian delta and along the Nile River and fulfilled notable peacetime and civil functions. However, as Andy Tamas has argued about post–Second World War whole-of-government operations, "in addition to the predominantly benevolent and altruistic intent there is a directive, value-laden and control-oriented dimension to the efforts of the military." These elements were clearly visible in the Egyptian occupation. In 1906, in the aftermath of a village riot in which a British officer was accidentally killed, the local courts set up courts-martial for the "insurrection" and sentenced villagers to imprisonment, public flogging and death. Several hundred Egyptians were on hand to witness the floggings and executions, and the sentences were carried out under guard by British regulars of the army of occupation; their military presence served as both deterrent and reminder. ¹⁴

As a fighting force, the Anglo-Egyptian army went into the field in 1885 and again in 1898, both times against Sudanese forces. In 1885, under the leadership of the Islamic mystic Muhammad Ahmed (known as the Mahdi), the Sudan declared independence. A British force sent to rescue the British governor, Charles "Chinese" Gordon, arrived days too late, and the Anglo-Egyptian government accepted the loss for a time. In 1898 a joint British and Egyptian army invaded the Sudan again in an expedition that climaxed at the famous Battle of Omdurman, wherein there were 450 Anglo-Egyptian casualties but over 28,000 casualties were inflicted on the Sudanese force. Borrowing from the structures in place in Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary force was led by British officers but was mostly Egyptian NCOs and other ranks. In both of these conflicts, the security threats were located on Egypt's borders but the operations reinforced the power and structure of the Anglo-Egyptian army.

In an effort to re-make Egypt into a stable and friendly government and protect British investments and the Suez Canal, the British occupation proceeded along some of the lines of contemporary whole-of-government operations: governance, development and security. Critically, these lines were interconnected on a number of levels: bureaucrats worked closely with military personnel at all levels of government to implement both security policy and development projects. The British occupation of Egypt highlighted British expertise at successfully governing its most idiosyncratic colonial situations.

LESSONS LEARNED

Politics of the occupation aside, many of the judgments and insights that might be drawn from the British occupation of Egypt for future whole-of-government approaches to fragile and failing states have already been espoused as policy in contemporary comprehensive operations. According to some knowledgeable commentators, however, those lessons have not always been successfully implemented in recent operations. ¹⁶ The following offers a short summary of some of the lessons that can be gleaned from the British occupation of Egypt, as an example of how the policies of the British government of the day were translated into effective action.

• The importance of development projects. The repair of the Nile Barrage and the Aswan Dam demonstrate how technological projects can create wealth. The Anglo-Egyptian government recognized the importance of irrigated agriculture to the economy, and specifically of long-staple cotton as an export commodity. They therefore poured money, time, expertise and materials into building a profitable irrigation system by first repairing the extant technologies and then extending the entire system southwards into Middle Egypt. The successor to this irrigation system is still in place today.

- Flexibility of the military. The British military was a flexible organization with a global reach that would be the envy of many countries today, and its colonial experiences were integral to Anglo-Egyptian governance. The army's institutional culture had adapted during long stretches of time overseas to many different duties, and its top field commanders were expected to govern. Between 1911 and 1914, Lord Herbert Horatio Kitchener was the Egyptian Consul-General. Although Kitchener was not representative of the British army or even its officer corps, his competency as consul-general demonstrates the impressive variety of talents that the British Army attracted. In British Egypt the military participated in development projects, rebuilt the Egyptian army, took up administrative capacities and assumed key security positions. With a range of specialists, a military culture of governance and veteran administrative personnel, the British Army successfully institutionalized long-term colonial governance.
- A unified vision in Egypt allowed the Anglo-Egyptian government to gain and maintain
 credibility and stability. The presence of Cromer and other long-service bureaucrats enshrined
 institutional memory. Cromer also imposed an overriding policy objective on the administration
 and ensured that this objective was achieved. The reduction of Egypt's outrageous debt was
 pursued through public works programs, free trade with the British Empire and strict internal and
 external security policies. Long-term policy coherence was achieved through this consistent vision.
- Choosing the correct organ of governance for the individual mission. In 1882, the British government could have transferred Egyptian Consular Affairs to the Colonial Office, the War Office, or even the India Office. Instead, Whitehall chose to allow the Foreign Office to govern Egypt as the Foreign Office's only colony. The Foreign Office was the right department for the task of governing Egypt because of the complicated international nature of Egyptian politics. Since other European countries not only held a large part of Egypt's foreign debt but also controlled Egyptian finances through the Caisse de la Dette Publique, the Anglo-Egyptian and British governments needed to be able to deal directly with the European Consuls-General and their governments. In a potentially hostile international climate, the Foreign Office was the British department best prepared for the task of governing the Ottoman colony.
- The importance of an exit strategy. The questionable moral dimensions of the British occupation aside, the Anglo-Egyptian regime remained remarkably stable and faced no serious internal resistance or instability between the fall of Urabi in 1882 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. It was only after Egypt was made a protectorate, with the intention that it would be permanently integrated into the empire, that serious nationalist and anti-British resistance began; it happened with alarming rapidity and culminated in a serious anti-British rebellion in 1919.

CONCLUSION

This brief case study has presented one historical precedent for future comprehensive-approach operations and has also demonstrated one of the ways in which academic historians and military practitioners can successfully engage one another to solve problems. In Egypt, the integration of bureaucratic and military operations meant a cohesive British strategy for subduing and occupying the state. Both the cohesion of vision and the integration of personnel are historically grounded and cannot be disassociated from the strategies or the intentions of colonial governance. Although Britain's intentions behind its occupation of Egypt differed from contemporary interventions in the developing world, the procedures employed demonstrate a historical continuity of concepts of effective whole-of-government-type operations between the late 19th and early 21st centuries. I believe that other colonial and whole-of-government operations case studies will also produce lessons that are relevant to the ongoing development of approaches to whole-of-government operations and other related concepts.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Dr. Claire Cookson-Hills is a British imperial and military historian working at Queen's University, Kingston. Her doctoral dissertation, "Engineering the Nile: Irrigation and the British Empire in Egypt, 1882–1914," was completed at Queen's in 2013; it studied the relationship between British military engineers, the irrigation projects they created and the occupation of Egypt. Dr. Cookson-Hills also studies environmental history and the history of science. A passionate teacher, she has taught military and global history at Queen's University.

ENDNOTES

- Howard G. Coombs, Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations Kandahar September 2010–July 2011 (CDA Institute Report, 2012), 3.
- 2. Ibid., 11–12.
- 3. The Caisse was first introduced in 1875 in the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian bankruptcy, and it was warmly supported by the European member nations who held Egypt's debt. France and Britain established dual control over Egypt in 1878, but during the Alexandria riots in 1882 France refused to act. Britain therefore took military action to quell the riots and oust Urabi alone. However, after Britain did not immediately relinquish Egypt to Anglo-French control, the French government felt that it had been subverted and in the years following attempted to use the Caisse to enact its own vision of Egypt.
- Robert L. Tignor argues convincingly that the Sudanese rebellion in 1884–1885 pushed back the British time to withdrawal significantly. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 61–62.
- 5. Niall Ferguson, The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998), 839.
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- 12. Ibid., 113.
- 13. Andy Tamas, Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan (Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 30.
- 14. Kimberly Luke, "Order or Justice: The Denshawai Incident and British Imperialism." History Compass 5, 2 (2007): 279.
- 15. The force that was put together in 1885 to rescue Gordon included a Canadian contingent of coureurs des bois and a British expeditionary force. This participation in the 1885 rescue operations marked one of the first, but certainly not the last, inclusion of Canadians in an international coalition in which they provided specific expertise—in this case, their riparian navigational and portaging skills. For the classic account of the Canadian contribution, see Roy MacLaren, Canadians on the Nile, 1882–1898: Being the Adventures of the Voyageurs on the Khartoum Relief Expedition and Other Exploits (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978). A more recent contribution to this historiography is Carl Benn's monograph Mohawks on the Nile: Natives Among the Canadian Voyageurs in Egypt, 1884–1885 (Toronto: Natural Heritage Books, 2009).
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OPERATION KEEPSAKE COMMEMORATING AFGHANISTAN

Warrant Officer Ed Storey, CD

The deaths of 158 Canadian Forces members, one diplomat, a reporter and a defence contractor, as well as the unreported injuries of several hundred soldiers, have become the benchmark against which many will measure Canada's involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

Canadians have always been proud of and interested in their military and military history, although, like an old friend or an established marriage, the relationship had for many years been taken for granted. The portrayal of our military as a benign force of peacekeepers who patrolled a green line or monitored ceasefire arrangements made it easy to forget that our troops had fought hard against determined enemies and gained the respect of our Allies during both world wars as well as the war in Korea. Even during the 1990s when overseas military commitments had Canadians serving in such diverse regions as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, their hard work was quickly overshadowed by the deplorable actions of a few individuals.

It was the NATO-led war in Afghanistan that awakened Canada's appreciation of its military. The reporting of combat action, IED explosions, reconstruction projects and, sadly, combat deaths, had begun to reignite Canadians' interest in their military, and they quickly learned that Canada possessed a modern, professional and highly trained military force that could conduct military operations in the harsh arena of Afghanistan.

In turn, this awakening brought forth public support for the Canadian military to a level that had not been seen since the Second World War. Not everyone may have supported the mission, but they certainly supported the men and women who had been assigned to serve overseas. Their tokens of support ranged from the traditional letters and cards to school children's cut-out artwork, handmade quilts, sports memorabilia, and even signed flags and banners.

During both world wars and the Korean War, and well into the late 1960s, Canadian military casualties were buried near where they fell, which meant that most of the graves were overseas. From the 1970s to the 1990s, military casualties were sent home, usually with little public knowledge or fanfare, only to be mentioned in passing on 11 November. That changed with Afghanistan. Increased awareness of domestic police and fire-service loss made the public more attuned to the price paid by those who put their lives on the line protecting our communities. That in turn spilled over into the military when, in April 2002, fallen Canadians started returning home from Afghanistan. Sights of not only government and military dignitaries, but also the grieving families, meeting the planes on the tarmac prompted an emotional response from the Canadian public, who could now empathize with the families of the fallen.





The move from Kabul to Kandahar and the increased combat tempo resulted in more casualties. With the newly erected Canadian memorial to the fallen in Kandahar being used as a backdrop for the televised casualty reports, and with images of Canadian military personnel visiting the memorial to pay their respects and leave personal mementos to their comrades, the way in which the military and the nation would commemorate its casualties from this theatre of operations was changing.

The change began when the Canadian military started to send families of the fallen to Afghanistan in order to experience some of the conditions in which their loved ones served and, perhaps more importantly, to help them to achieve "closure" with their loss. Those family members were regularly photographed and televised visiting the Kandahar memorial. Again, it was those images of mothers and fathers weeping at the memorial that helped a Canadian public sitting safely at home watching the nightly news form an emotional attachment with the military and their families.

Even the military was not immune to public displays of grief over the loss of friends and comrades. The military has long been considered a stoic institution of men who never let their emotions show, and images of soldiers openly weeping at repatriation ramp ceremonies revealed to the public that these men and women of the Canadian Forces were more than just soldiers—they were everyday Canadians.

Just as in past conflicts, Canadian soldiers wanted to build their own monuments to commemorate the lives being sacrificed in Afghanistan. Some of those memorials are known to the public and others are not. Few received any media attention. All were in far-off corners of southern Afghanistan and, like similar Canadian markers in places such as Cyprus and Bosnia, they will not all come home and will not be seen by the public. For the most part the only record of them will be long-forgotten photographs in a scrapbook or on a hard drive, or the memories of those who served. The challenge was, how do we share these mementos and memorials with Canadians in order to preserve these unique memories of Afghanistan?

Operation KEEPSAKE was founded at Canadian Expeditionary Command Headquarters (CEFCOM) in late 2009 by WO Ed Storey,



CEFCOM War Diarist; Irene Lythall, CEFCOM Visits and Protocol Officer; and Ann McMahon, CEFCOM Directives for International Operations (CDIOs) editor; in order to preserve some of the commemorative material from Afghanistan. Lieutenant-General Lessard, Commander CEFCOM, fully supported the Op KEEPSAKE proposal to repatriate as many mementos as possible from the Southwest Asia theatre, and the plan expanded in November 2010 to overseeing the dismantling and return of memorials when the Canadian staging base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Camp Mirage, was closed.

The Camp Mirage mementos were easy to collect as for the most part they were items of little intrinsic value and were not accounted for. Having a person dedicated to collecting that material eased the burden on camp personnel, who would have been given the arduous task of either collecting and packing the items or having them disposed of. Gathering all of the mementos, which ranged from camp signage to unit plaques and photographs to banners, flags, and artwork with sports and entertainment memorabilia, and having it shipped back to Canada, potentially allowed for the material to be better assessed and catalogued once on Canadian soil.

Perhaps the best-known memento was the "sign post" with its unique collection of handmade signs which pointed to various locations in Canada. The post could not be saved, but all of the signage was carefully packaged and returned to Canada.

The Camp Mirage memorial proved more challenging than the mementos. National Defence policy on the repatriation of memorials was rooted in regulations written after the First World War. In a nutshell, memorials were to be left in situ and, if they were to be returned, the cost would be borne by the unit that constructed the memorial. Clearly those regulations were outdated by 2010 and, in the case of the Camp Mirage memorial and eventually the one in Kandahar, these memorials were the work of successive battle group rotations and commemorated theatre losses, not just selected unit or regimental casualties.

Each of these Southwest Asia theatre memorials evoked an intense emotional response in both serving military personnel, as they represented friends and colleagues, and the families of the fallen, many of whom had actually visited the two memorials in person. Leaving them behind was not an option, and the Camp Mirage memorial was carefully dismantled and packaged by WO Storey for shipment back to Canada.

The Camp Mirage memorial was relatively small, occupying a site not much bigger than your average Canadian living room. It consisted of a central four-sided flat-topped pyramid-like cairn and two side "wings." Each was about a metre tall, and all were constructed of polished black granite attached to a centre core of cast concrete. Facing the memorial, the left-hand wing contained a bronze casting of the bas-relief *Fallen*, created by Canadian artist Silvia Pecota, as its central motif, and on each of the elements were placed



cast bronze plaques, one for each fatality. Each plaque contained a unit insignia as well as name, rank, initials, unit and date of death. In Camp Mirage, the cairn was placed outdoors on a concrete platform surrounded by a perimeter of grass and stone tiles, built into the base of the memorial. On the top of the pyramid was recessed lighting, which gave the site a dramatic look at night.

With the Canadian mission in Kandahar set to end in July 2011, an Op KEEPSAKE team from CEFCOM HQ consisting of Capt Melissa Manley, WO Ed Storey and Irene Lythall was sent into theatre in April in order to collect mementos and assess some of the memorials in that region for potential repatriation.

Again, as was done at Camp Mirage, every memento that could be collected was sent home. At the end of five weeks, this collection process netted enough material to fill a sea container. Establishing a rapport with the memento donors is essential and helps in locating other pieces for recovery. Besides the usual photographs, plaques, banners, camp signage and flags were such diverse items as a large fiberglass hockey mask, several Silvia Pecota framed prints, a hand-built motorcycle, the hockey scoreboard from the ball hockey rink and a custom-made barbecue. Every piece had a story to tell, and each was catalogued and securely packed for the trip home.

The Kandahar memorial was the largest item to be assessed and had grown as casualty numbers increased and Canada's military commitment got larger. What had started out as a central rock memorial brought down from Kabul with another Silvia Pecota bas-relief bronze casting in front was enlarged by being flanked with two walls of polished white marble, which held the polished etched black marble plaques listing each Canadian fatality. Over several years it was continuously upgraded with several walls, columns and extended wings designed to resemble an open-air vault. The fallen were commemorated on black marble plaques with

an etched photograph of each person as well as a unit badge and all of the details pertaining to the member and the date of death. The early plaques contained multiple names, but that soon changed to one name per plaque. The plaques were attached to the memorial wall by a wooden frame. By 2010 the memorial had been enlarged so that it could hold the plaques of the American soldiers killed while under command of Task Force Kandahar. This memorial also had built-in lighting which created a dramatic evening effect. At 17 metres long and 5 metres wide, this memorial would prove to be a challenge to dismantle and return to Canada.

Many people made a point of leaving personal mementos on the Kandahar memorial. These diverse items included poppies, letters, photographs, insignia and stuffed toys. All were deeply emotional. Over the years, all of those items had been meticulously saved and catalogued in boxes held by the camp sergeant-major.



The two boxes were handed over to the Op KEEPSAKE team in April 2011 for safekeeping, and all additional material was collected later in the year when the memorial was dismantled. This collection of material is unique to the war in Afghanistan, and a proper scholarly and informed decision should be made on how this material is preserved and displayed.

Predating the Kandahar memorial is a stone inuksuk that had been erected by Canadians early in the Afghan campaign. The memorial inuksuk is now located inside the perimeter of the Kandahar Airfield's boardwalk area, which is the social hub of the base. The inuksuk was constructed out of eight rock slabs gathered from the area around the airport and a nearby village. The inuksuk itself is oriented so that it "points" in the direction of Edmonton, the home station of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI). The platform surrounding the inuksuk bears plaques on all four sides dedicated to the memory of Canadian, American and other coalition soldiers killed in the fighting in Afghanistan.

The memorial inuksuk was built by members of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group, specifically members of "A" Company, 3 PPCLI, the battalion's pioneer platoon, and military engineers in response to the four Canadian fatalities at Tarnak Farm on 17 April 2002. The inuksuk and the surrounding memorial construction were dedicated on 16 July 2002, in the waning days of the initial Canadian presence at the Kandahar military base. Due to its international appeal and continued usage for memorial services, it was not repatriated when Canada departed the base.

Also found on the Kandahar base were two totem poles. Both were carved of Afghan pine from Herat, Afghanistan, which is near the country's western border with Iran, by a combat engineer, MWO Gary Crosby. One was situated beside the Kandahar memorial and the other, a fully painted version, was mounted in front of

"Canada House," the social centre for the Canadians on base. Uniquely Canadian and very distinctive, the three-metre-high totem in front of Canada House was recovered for repatriation in May 2011, and the other one was recovered in November.

Memorials could be found in many of the smaller forward operating bases manned by Canadians in Panjwai province, with perhaps the most well documented being that at Ma'sum Ghar. Located on a hillside and overlooking the camp was a large 17-metre-long Canada flag mural made of small red and white coloured stones. Positioned along the bottom of the flag were the 59 handmade markers to the fallen containing 63 names. These unique large painted stones lined the bottom of the flag, each one symbolizing the loss of one or more Canadians in combat. Many were faded and weathered while others were still sadly crisp and clean, reflecting their newness. Scattered among some of the markers were small personal mementos and plastic poppies. Situated at the bottom left-hand corner of the flag was a large wooden cross.

Unfortunately none of these markers could be repatriated to Canada. As they were made from local stones and as some were so badly weathered that they could not be read or moved, all that could be done was photograph them for preservation. In accordance with the wishes of the military members of the Task Force and with the support of the Commander CEFCOM, on 24 August 2012, a ceremony was conducted by the Task Force Kandahar military chaplain, Major Grahame Thompson, in which each marker stone was solemnly laid in a "common grave" at the base of the cross and in effect returned to the soil of Afghanistan, symbolizing the soil on which the Canadians fought and some had given their lives. Ma'sum Ghar was transferred over to US control, and the Americans have pledged to look after and maintain the site in the absence of the Canadians

Pre-fabricated concrete blast walls can be found everywhere in NATO Afghanistan bases; they come in three sizes and are known as Jersey or Texas barriers. These barriers provide a natural "canvas" for memorial artwork.

Located just outside of the Canadian "transient barracks" in Kandahar were a couple of barriers on which some of the family members who had visited the base had recorded their sentiments. Written in felt tip marker on the bare concrete and exposed to the elements, these musings reveal the intense emotions experienced by those who were fortunate enough to visit the base.

Small memorials on concrete barriers could be found on some of the bases. The soldier-inspired artwork on those memorials usually consisted of a list of the names of the fallen from the base. Occasionally the artwork would be more ornate with figures and background scenes. Unfortunately due to their size, weight and location, the recovery and shipment of any of those memorials was not an option, and all were left in theatre.

There were also smaller memorials painted on the sides of walls or engraved into floors. Again due to their location within buildings, these unique soldier-inspired memorials could not be returned to Canada and were left in situ.

Over 10 years of military action in Afghanistan has renewed Canadians' interest in their military; it has also brought home the human cost of this combat mission. Commemoration now involves more than just graves in far-off lands; with Canada's fallen having all returned home, there is a strong sentimental and emotional attachment to the memorials that were in theatre. The major memorials and many hundreds of mementos have been repatriated, and now the torch has been passed to us to ensure that those items are suitably displayed so that the legacy of Afghanistan will not be forgotten.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Warrant Officer Ed Storey has served for 34 years in the Canadian Armed Forces. Trained as a cartographer and a terrain analyst in the Canadian Military Engineers, he served in the former Yugoslavia, Central America, and Central Africa. While working at CEFCOM HQ as the war diarist, WO Storey deployed four times to Afghanistan to collect historical material over a period of three months. In 2010 he was also part of the Camp Mirage close-out team. For his work in Southwest Asia, WO Storey was presented with the Commander CEFCOM Commendation. His final posting was to the CJOC before retiring from military service in July 2013.



SOLDIER EQUIPMENT UPDATE - SEPTEMBER 2013


From the Directorate of Land Requirements




LAND OPERATIONS BOOT

The venerable MK III and general purpose boot (GPB) will soon be replaced by the new land operations boot (LOB), an element of the Clothe the Soldier project. Three different boots are currently undergoing evaluation as part of a competitive bidding process. The three different boots, pictured here as Boot A, Boot B and Boot C, will undergo user evaluation trials by soldiers at CFB Edmonton, CFB Petawawa and CFB Valcartier. The LOB is designed to be worn in temperate climates and introduces a number of product improvements, such as reduced weight, increased breathability and improved shock absorption. It is fully expected that at least one of the contending boots will meet soldiers' expectations. However, in the event that two of the contending boots receive exceptional performance evaluations, the opportunity exists for two different boots to be contracted for delivery. That would give soldiers a choice of which boot to be issued depending on their










SMALL ARMS MODERNIZATION

Phase 1 of the Small Arms Modernization project will include an upgrade of the C6 general purpose machine gun (GPMG) to the C6A1. Specific improvements are expected to include the reintroduction of the original gas regulator as well as the introduction of a new forward accessory rail, a new enhanced feed tray with rail and a new synthetic butt. Going back to the original gas regulator will allow the gunner to change gas settings without disassembly of the barrel group, and the forward accessory rail will enable the mounting of aiming devices and other accessories. The enhanced feed tray will enable the mounting of different sights, and the synthetic butt will be lighter and more durable.





ARMS AND THE MAN:

Military History Essays in Honour of Dennis Showalter

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

NEIBERG, Michael S., History of Warfare Series, Vol. 68. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers, 2011. Hardcover, 275 pages, \$146, ISSN 1385-7827

Reviewed by Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp


American historian Dennis Showalter remains a pioneer in the field of military history and a mentor to an entire generation of both American and international military scholars. It is little surprise, then, to see a collection of essays in his honour crafted by some of the highest quality, cutting-edge scholars in the field today.

Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honour of Dennis Showalter is the 68th volume in Brill's History of Warfare Series and is a fitting tribute to both Professor Showalter as well as the foundations upon which this particular series of studies has flourished.

Denis Showalter has taught history at Colorado College since 1969, where he specializes in Germany and its conflicts. He has been a distinguished visiting professor at both the United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy. More recently, he served as President of the American Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001, and today he continues to be an active participant in that forum. His several seminal works on the wars of Frederick the Great and the German wars of unification have received considerable praise, including a 1992 Paul M. Birdsall Prize from the American Historical Association for his book, *Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 1914.* Showalter's many publications appeared regularly in the reading lists of my own graduate studies courses in military history, thus I was both pleased and interested to see this tribute to his long and influential career.

Essay collections such as this, also commonly known as a *Festschrift*, can often contain a great diversity of topics depending on whom the celebrated individual came into contact with during his or her career. Showalter's own influence certainly reached far and wide, and that is reflected in the impressive list of contributors in this volume. Edited by Michael S. Neiberg, noted historian of the Great War, other authors included in the volume are William Astore, Mary Kathryn Barbier, Jeremy Black, Richard DiNardo, Robert Doughty, Eugenia Kiesling, Robert McJimsey, Kelly DeVries, Holger Herwig, and Robert Citino. Their essays are observant, insightful, thought-provoking, and reflective and cover topics ranging from Medieval military professionalism (DeVries) to the Battle of Kharkov and the limits of command (Citino) to America's infatuation with blitzkrieg, warfighters, and militarism (Astore). Any one of the entries in this collection would in fact make for an excellent starting point for further discussion and debate amongst army officers and other ranks, and this reviewer was certainly impressed with the attention paid to the subjects presented here.

As with all of Brill's publications, this book is beautifully bound in hardcover and would make a welcome addition to any institutional library or personal bookshelf. Although not inexpensive, Brill's publications are well worth the investment and this book is highly recommended to anyone either familiar with Showalter's career and publications or with an interest in the broader study of military history and historiography.



THE SECOND WORLD WAR

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BEEVOR, Antony, London: Little Brown & Company, 2012, hardcover, 863 pages. \$39.00, ISBN 978-0-316-02374-01

Reviewed by Major Thomas K. Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B

One might well wonder whether there is anything new to say about the Second World War that would necessitate writing a weighty tome on the subject. Granted, it was arguably the greatest conflict in history, with approximately 70 million casualties. However, a number of superb one-volume histories already exist. What could British author and former British Army officer Antony Beevor find so revolutionary or so novel as to inspire him to rework well-tilled ground?

Most historians view the war as an aggregation of separate, distinct, unrelated events, but Beevor concentrates on the interconnectedness of war. He argues that General Zhukov's defeat of the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol in August 1939 was a major factor in Japan's decision to commence offensive operations in the Dutch East Indies rather than against Moscow in Manchuria. That decision allowed Stalin to concentrate on his western front with Germany rather than dividing his forces. Beevor asserts, further, that the questionable strategic bombing campaign conducted by the Allies forced the German military to move fighter squadrons from operational zones to defend Germany, thereby enabling the Allies to gain tactical air superiority. Beevor cites the British bombing of industrial plants, particularly in Essen in the spring of 1942, as the reason for the delay in the production of Panther and Tiger tanks, which in turn led Hitler to postpone Operation ZITADELLE, the Kursk salient offensive, much to the eventual benefit of the salient's Soviet defenders. Herman Goering's decision to keep his best combat aircrews flying an endless round of operational sorties rather than rotating them through assignments as combat instructors left the *Luftwaffe* a spent force without even the rudiments of operational sustainability by the time of the Normandy invasion. It is this interplay between events—great, not so great and minor—that sets *The Second World War* apart from similar histories.

So what is new?

- Operation MONASTERY, Beevor writes, was Stalin's plan to deliberately leak the plans for
 Operation MARS in November 1942 to German military intelligence so that German eyes were
 focused elsewhere when Operation URANUS, the plan to destroy the German Sixth Army at
 Stalingrad, commenced.
- Cannibalism was an official policy of the Japanese Imperial Army to feed its troops in its occupied territories: Allied prisoners of war and local people were kept alive to be butchered for their flesh. Out of sensitivity for the relatives of those individuals who died in the camps, Japanese commanders were never prosecuted at the Tokyo War Crimes tribunal.
- Contrary to the picture painted in most histories, the Chinese Nationalist Army under Chiang Kai-Shek was not as corrupt and incompetent as traditionally thought. Under extremely extenuating circumstances, the Chinese Nationalists acquitted themselves reasonably well.



British and American intelligence officers were aware of the plan to assassinate Admiral François Darlan
in Algiers in December 1942 following the TORCH landings but did nothing to prevent it or
advise their superiors beforehand, even though General Eisenhower remarked in a private
moment that "a little assassin" would have benefited the Allies.

The Second World War demonstrates that although the war ended in September 1945, recent archival releases have provided material about it that will be examined for years to come.

The challenge confronting anyone attempting to write seriously about World War II is to do justice to the immensity of the war without losing sight of its singular impact. War is a tragedy on both a large and a small scale. Beevor is masterful in his reconstruction of well-known battles but weaves in hundreds of instances of personal suffering to depict war's vast human tapestry. He examines the global aspect of the war, focusing primarily on the Soviets and the Germans when discussing events in Europe. Some critics will take issue with the short shrift given to, or the complete silence about, certain important events such as D-Day, Midway and the Manhattan Project. Canadian readers will notice the absence of any substantial mention of Canada's efforts in the war, save for a brief discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic and Dieppe. In the panorama of war, some detail is necessarily lost. This is war writ large.


Relying on letters and diaries, Beevor explores the impact on individuals through a series of stunning vignettes and anecdotes. Frozen German soldiers under a light crust of snow are described by a young Soviet interpreter as being under a "glass sarcophagus." The Wannsee Conference participants, mostly lawyers, doctors and other university-educated professionals, meet to discuss the Final Solution with all the formality of a corporate board meeting, drinking brandy and smoking cigars afterwards. There is the story of Dr. Ara Jerezian, a member of the fascist Arrow Cross movement who saved hundreds of Hungarian Jews from certain death,



and that of a Soviet infanteer who recounted in a letter to his mother that, after a battle on the approaches to Berlin, he could not sit down and prepare dinner without sitting on a German corpse. Another story, that of a Korean, Yang Kyoungjong, who was conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army, captured by the Soviets in Manchuria and impressed into the Red Army, captured by the Germans in the Ukraine and forced to serve in the *Wehrmacht* until he was captured by the Americans on Utah Beach and sent to Britain as a PW, demonstrates the theme of Beevor's work: the global reach of war and its human impact.

Beevor is unsparing in his praise and criticism of military and political leaders: Roosevelt is described as "vain, cold and calculating" and Mountbatten as a "vertiginously over-promoted destroyer Captain." General Mark Clark is "slightly deranged." French General Gamelin is "stupid," and General McArthur is an "egomaniac with his own inflated legend." Brigadier Orde Wingate of Chindits fame is a "manic depressive" and Marshal Zhukov is "callous" with the lives of his soldiers. Beevor is sharply critical of Britain's "favourite general," Montgomery, describing him as "over cautious and "lacking in initiative and boldness," while Rommel is characterized as "overrated." The only major wartime figure whose reputation emerges largely intact is Eisenhower, whom Beevor lauds as a superior coalition leader though "politically naïve." Beevor, with his soldier's clarity, writes that while generals and politicians reap the rewards of a battle won, it is soldiers and civilians who must live (or die) with the consequences of their leaders' lapses in judgment.

In this work, Beevor lives up to his reputation as a first-class historian and story teller. *The Second World War* will please general readers of military history and subject experts. At more than 800 pages, Beevor's account is both gruelling and gripping. It shows, once and for all, that the telling of war is too important to be limited to the campaigns and battles of generals. The dispossessed, the massacred, the abused and the victimized also have stories to tell.



CHINA AND INDIA:

Great Power Rivals

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

MALIK, Mohan. Boulder, Colorado: FirstForumPress / Lynne Rienner, 2011, hardcover, 467 pages, \$79.95, ISBN: 978-1-935049-41-8


Reviewed by Major (ret'd) Roy Thomas, MSC, CD, MA (RMC)

The Prime Minister made his first state visit to India at the same time that his government was preparing to approve the purchase of a major Alberta oil sands player by a Chinese state-owned corporation. The book *China and India: Great Power Rivals* by Professor Mohan Malik, a scholar at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, provides detailed con-

text for those two 2012 events and concludes with five possible 2040 outcomes of the rivalry.

Professor Malik notes that "Asia has never known both China and India growing strong simultaneously in such close proximity with disputed frontiers and overlapping spheres of influence." The rivalry is not between "traditional" nation-states but between "civilizations." For example, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, written more than 2,000 years ago, is still on Army officer reading lists. Indian works of similar vintage on governance, compiled in the *Arthashastra*, also remain valid.

The present "combination of geopolitical competition and selective partnership on transnational issues of mutual interest" is seen as the most likely outcome of the rivalry in 2040. A Sino-Indian Cold War is not just a 2040 potential outcome but a possibility in our immediate future. Both China and India are now nuclear powers with long-range delivery systems, and our international system does not want to see 2040 become the year of a Sino-Indian War or mark complete Indian capitulation to Chinese dominance, two other scenarios posited by Malik.



China India eastern border depicting the disputed areas in this sector including NEFA.

These five strategic futures are developed within a framework of three triangular relationships suggested by Professor Malik, the major one being between "US-India-China." Since, in the Chinese world view, "collective entities" are seen either as "subordinates" or as "enemies," any minor or even middle-sized power adjacent to the United States would be seen simply as an American "vassal." Indeed, in one of the book's two indexed references to Canada, the author alleges that China is trying to wean Canada, among other American allies, "away from Washington."




Army readers may feel that Canada can play only a minor role in the India–China flashpoints identified in chapters on Tibet, the 4,500 kilometres of undefined shared frontiers, the China–Pakistan–India Triangle and Burma. However, Canada did send military observers to the short-lived UN India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) after the 1965 Indo-Pak War as well as maintain a commitment for several decades to the still ongoing UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir.

Some readers might observe that Canada does have a diplomatic role to play in some of the many "multilateral maneuvers" being undertaken by both the Indian and Chinese civilizations, as described in the chapter dedicated to that aspect of the rivalry. For example, China now opposes, with its Security Council veto, any suggestion that a simple Security Council vote, such the one that gave Communist China its permanent seat, could be the process for giving rival India a "veto" seat. This particular India—China issue gives rise to the only other reference to Canada in the citations. Our diplomats might also be interested in the chapter on nuclear proliferation.



Our sale of petroleum resources, and indeed of some of the companies pumping out these energy supplies, when viewed alongside our limited naval presence in the Indian Ocean, will make the chapter titled "Energy Flows and Maritime Rivalries in the Indian Ocean" an absorbing read for Canadian naval officers. Lastly, every chapter has several pages of citations, and a 29-page bibliography offers the opportunity to pursue lines of thought generated by Professor Malik.



THE COUNTERINSURGENT'S CONSTITUTION:

Law in the Age of Small Wars

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION: SITARAMAN, GANESH, New York: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 328 pages, \$35.00, ISBN: 978-0-19-993031-9

Reviewed by Captain T.D. Wentzell, MA

To those who accept the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency, as adopted in both Canadian and American counterinsurgency doctrine, establishing the rule of law is a key component to achieving success. Although the premise is widely accepted, it has almost become a

tautology because of the lack of a theoretical foundation connecting rule of law, law of armed conflict and counterinsurgency.

Ganesh Sitaraman's *The Counterinsurgent's Constitution* is the first modern book-length treatment on the relationship between law and counterinsurgency strategy. The author, an assistant professor at Vanderbilt Law School and former research fellow at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, presents a cogent, well-researched and thought-provoking book that usefully bridges this gap. In a rapidly growing canon of "fad" counterinsurgency writings, it is one of the few that I expect will be of lasting interest and utility.


Sitaraman divides his book into three sections. The first, *Of Law and War*, addresses where counter-insurgency fits into the existing framework afforded by international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict. Of note are his discussions regarding the incongruity of existing laws that were designed for conventional warfare, such as the prohibition against non-lethal weapons, conceptions of prisoners of war, and the shortcomings of the law of occupation where nation building, not just short-term administration, is at least part of the counterinsurgency strategy. The second section, *From War to Peace*, focuses on the role of amnesties, trials and truth commissions as it relates to post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The third section, *The Reconstruction of Order*, addresses the establishment or re-establishment of the rule of law. Among other things, Sitaraman discusses the importance of constitutional design, the variety of duties that police can fulfill, and different approaches to incorporating traditional justice systems into the state courts in order to build legitimacy among the people.

Sitaraman's work accepts and even requires sacrifices to formalistic perceptions of the rule of law. He accepts the requirement for killing and capturing hard-line insurgents, the need to sacrifice accountability for reconciliation in the case of amnesties, and the incorporation of traditional justice systems at the expense of jurisprudential consistency. Sitaraman emphasizes the need for creativity, decentralization, regionally appropriate solutions, and acceptance of the reality that ideal outcomes may not be immediately achievable. However, making some sacrifices while progressively establishing the rule of law will contribute to the isolation and de-legitimization of irreconcilable elements of the population. The author's theoretical framework remains useful and applicable to the counterinsurgents themselves, and not just "ivory tower" theorists.

The Canadian reader may also have concerns that Sitaraman's book would be too entrenched in the American legal system to be useful. Fortunately, that is not the case. Although writing for an American audience, Sitaraman keeps to general principles and does not nest his arguments among statutes or systems specific to the United States. In fact, he makes no mention of the *Foreign Assistance Act* or the *Arms Export Control Act*—two of the principal American statutes implicated in counterinsurgency or foreign internal defence operations—and only briefly touches upon the *Foreign Claims Act* in the context of paying reparations to civilians. Most of Sitaraman's statute- or convention-specific discussions address sources of international law, such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions, to which Canada and the United States are equally bound.



The Counterinsurgent's Constitution is well written, coherent and immensely thought provoking; it left me with as many questions as answers. Sitaraman's book makes a valuable contribution to existing scholarship in counterinsurgency. I recommend it to anyone interested in counterinsurgency strategy, the law of armed conflict, or the role of law in nation building in general. It is hopefully only the first of many books on this interesting and relevant topic.



GIVE ME SHELTER:

The Failure of Canada's Cold War Civil Defence

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BURTCH, Andrew. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012, hardcover, 300 pages, \$85.00, ISBN 9780774822404

Reviewed by Major A.B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp

Sadly, the end of the Second World War did not usher in an era of sustained peace and security as many had promised or hoped for. Instead, Canadians were immediately faced with the advent of an even grimmer and potentially deadlier Cold War that, if it ever turned hot, could very likely have witnessed the end of civilization as everyone knew it.

In that anxious time between the nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which effectively ended the war in August 1945, and the culminating point of the American–Soviet political standoff over the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, Canada sought to solve the seemingly impossible problem of surviving a nuclear war through a comprehensive approach to the defence of its civilian population at home.





Andrew Burtch's groundbreaking study, *Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada's Cold War Civil Defence*, takes a hard look at the government's official civil defence program from its inception in 1948 until its demise circa 1968. In its formative years prior to 1954, government policy articulated a strategy of self-help in targeted Canadian cities, a plan loosely based upon previous experiences of how civilian populations had adapted to the various bombing campaigns against them during the Second World War. For a while, at least, it was believed that cities and their populations could absorb the blows of atomic bombs and survive. Therefore, the federal government sought to place the political and financial responsibility for civil defence on the shoulders of those target cities. Mayors and other officials resisted this attempt, of course, causing no end of friction between federal and municipal levels of government over who would pay for civil defence.



When the United States and the Soviet Union successfully detonated their first hydrogen bombs after 1952, the idea that cities could absorb the blows of bombing and survive quickly changed. Policies changed again and civil defence planning soon refocused on a new strategy of evacuation. It was assumed (or at least suggested) that citizens would have fair warning of an impending attack and therefore have time to leave their cities in an orderly fashion. Yet, as Burtch reveals in his examination of the evacuation policy, this plan often ignored the real physical and lasting effects of nuclear blasts, especially those generated by thermonuclear weapons. Safety distances were often too short, and once the effects of fallout and radiation were better known, it seemed as if nowhere would be safe in a post-apocalyptic world.

The final phase of civil defence explored by Burtch is the national survival phase, which lasted from roughly 1959 to 1962. During that era, the government undertook the construction of hardened underground national infrastructures across the country—including the well-known "Diefenbunker" near Carp, Ontario, which still survives today as a national Cold War museum—that, it was assumed, would provide the basis for the postwar survival and reconstruction of the country. This plan focused on continuity of government and encouraged every citizen to build their own fallout shelter in order to survive the most lethal period during and immediately following an attack. As with the strategies before it, the chances of success were slim.

Beyond the strategy and planning, *Give Me Shelter* offers the reader an excellent case study of Canadian civil–military relations and goes to great lengths to examine in detail how civil defence irrevocably reshaped parts of the military, and in particular the Canadian regular army and militia. Burtch's examination of military leadership roles in civil defence, as well as his chapter on the survival army from 1959 to 1962, will be of particular interest to army readers. Overall, Andrew Burtch has successfully tackled a complex subject that fundamentally affected national defence in Canada at the height of the Cold War. *Give Me Shelter* is a chilling but engaging read, and it is highly recommended for those with an interest in that period of history.



PANTHER:

Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
GREEN, Michael and Gladys. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012, hardcover, 288 pages, \$27.50, ISBN 978-1-84908-841-1

Reviewed by Captain Chris Buckham

In the opening years of the Second World War, Germany enjoyed a decided advantage in overall armour capability. In spite of some of the technical inferiority of German tanks versus their adversaries, superior training and tactics allowed the Germans to dominate the battlefields of Poland and France.

However, during the initial stages of its invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the German Army began to sense that its armour superiority was slipping away. By the autumn of 1941, the increased competency of the Soviet Army's employment of armour and the appearance of the Soviet T-34 main battle tank drew the Germans' attention to deficiencies in their fleet of tanks. The T-34, with its simple but effective 76-mm gun and well-sloped armour protection, was characterized at the time by one German Panzer General as "the finest tank in the world." As a temporary solution, the Germans up-gunned the Panzer IV medium tank with a long-barrel, high-velocity gun until a more permanent solution could be found. Meanwhile the armaments ministry set to work to design a new medium battle tank to restore combat dominance; that would lead to the production of the PanzerKampfwagen V—Panther medium battle tank.

Michael and Gladys Green's new book, Panther: Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance, sets out to tell the story of the development of the Panther and its variants. Overall, the book is a well-written and illustrated account of the Panther tank's evolution and development. After providing the background of the operational circumstances faced by the German Army that motivated the development of the Panther as well as an overview of the German design process, it explores the Panther using chapters based on the classic characteristics of armour fighting vehicles: firepower, protection and mobility. Each of those chapters is well researched and written such that, regardless of the reader's previous knowledge of armour vehicle design, each characteristic is fully explored and explained. Supported by pertinent quotations from official wartime






German and Allied documents on the Panther's performance during operations, as well as first-hand veteran accounts of engagements involving the Panther, the book provides an engaging story of technical adaptation in conflict.

Panther: Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance will appeal to a wide variety of readers. For the general reader of Second World War history, Panther provides a better understanding of the characteristics of armour and its tactical employment, particularly through the eyes of those who fought and fought against the Panther. For the more initiated, Panther is an outstanding case study in combat development. Michael and Gladys Green's inclusion of operational analysis reports and the demonstration of their impact on technical improvements to the Panther provide a superb example of combat adaptation. In addition, modellers and gamers will find the extensive and detailed photographs of the Panther and its variants that accompany the book a valuable reference.

Overall, Michael and Gladys Green's *Panther: Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance* is an engaging account of the development of one of the Second World War's premier armour fighting platforms and will be a welcome addition to any armour enthusiast's bookshelf





THE EYES OF THE DIVISION:

The Reconnaisance Battalion of The 17.SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Götz von Berlichingen"

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

GUNTHER, Helmut. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc, 2012, hardcover, 252 pages + 68 b/w and 11 maps, \$49, ISBN: 1-927332-00-97

Reviewed by Captain Chris Buckham

Helmut Gunther became an Untersturmfuhrer (Second Lieutenant) in the Recce Bn of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division in 1944 after recovering from wounds he sustained during operations on the Eastern Front. His book begins with his unit being stationed in Vire, France, on 6 June and the launch of the Normandy invasion.

The memoir traces the operations of the unit as it engages British and American forces across France to the region of Metz, where Gunther is wounded again and hospitalized until the end of the war. Then comes an account of the treatment that German POWs received from the victorious Allies as each side struggled to come to grips with the challenges of postwar Germany.

The narrative focuses exclusively on the tactical level: Gunther describes his and his comrades' experiences from the perspective of their small unit. He clearly shows the confusion of an army engaged in continuous defensive operations, and their frustrations and challenges are seen through a lens of cynical humour and resignation universal among all soldiers. One of the real strengths of this book is that the reader begins to appreciate the German soldier as a human being suffering the same fatigue, fear and uncertainties as soldiers anywhere. I was also struck by the men's resilience in adversity and their maintenance of professionalism even as the front collapsed.






Gunther relates a number of anecdotes throughout the book that provide insight into the morale, resilience and dedication of the German soldiers. For example, the stories about some of the "snatch and grab" missions, leaving a unit calling card on the doorway of US Regimental HQ during a deep recce operation and utilizing "unorthodox" means to acquire logistics support from the German system all add depth to the narrative. His comments and observations about the incarceration of the German soldiers following the cessation of hostilities are very enlightening and sometimes disturbing. Interestingly, the author's demobilization documents stated that he was precluded from any professional employment due to his being a member of a Waffen-SS unit. However, he notes that that was, in fact, never an issue when it came to post-war work.

Gunther is not a professional author, and his writing style is somewhat choppy. He has included personally produced local maps that assist the reader in tracking the unit's location. It is difficult to follow the narrative at times, as the stories are drawn from snippets of diaries and correspondence written throughout the war. Nevertheless, I enjoyed the book. It was refreshingly candid and free from heavy moralizing in favour of either side. It is a soldier's recollections of his experiences and those of his immediate peers and how they coped under conditions that would challenge the strongest of characters.

JJFPub has a tradition of high-quality books, and this one is no exception. Once again this publisher has produced an outstanding source for military historians seeking the "human" experience.



WARLORDS:

Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:


COOK, Tim. Toronto: Penguin, 2012, Hardcover, 472 pages, \$34.00, ISBN 978-0-670-06521-9

Reviewed by Major Thomas E.K. Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B

In his ground-breaking treatise on civil—military relations,¹ Stanley Huntington theorized that political leaders set national strategy for their countries and leave it up to the military leadership to decide how that strategy is to be achieved. Just as a patient does not decide how to perform an operation, or

a client how to argue a lawsuit, a political leader does not interfere in the sphere of military operations.

Too much interference or meddling in military matters is, Huntington argued, both unwelcome and, in some cases, dangerous. This "normal" theory of civil—military relations was refined in Eliot Cohen's *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Time of War.*² Cohen asserted that the great wartime leaders, the warlords, men like Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben Gourion, did not take this "hands-off" approach to leadership in wartime. They did not give the military professionals absolute discretion in deciding how to conduct operations. Instead, the great leaders immersed themselves in and became knowledgeable about military matters. They prodded and even second-guessed their military leadership on matters usually reserved for an autonomous military.³ In this context of civil—military relations, noted historian and museum curator Tim Cook's new book, *Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars*,⁴ is both a critically important and a timely contribution to the literature.



Sir Robert Borden, 8th Prime Minister of Canada, 1911

Warlords traces the wartime political leadership of Sir Robert Borden, a Conservative, in World War I and William Lyon Mackenzie King, a Liberal, in World War II. Both men lacked any significant military experience; indeed, Borden stated that he was "not a military man." Both men felt uncomfortable around military personnel, and the feeling was clearly reciprocated. Cook writes that while Borden visited Canadian wounded in hospital during his frequent trips to England, he could never empathize with them. On one of King's few visits to Canadian troops in England, they jeered him for keeping them waiting in the rain on parade. Both men declined to become significantly involved in the strategic direction of the war and, in

- Stanley P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
- 2. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Time of War (Toronto: The Free Press, 2002).
- In their book The Last Lion: Winston Churchill: Defender of the Realm, 1940–1955 (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2012), the authors, William Manchester and Paul Reid, chronicle the almost picayune military decisions Churchill reserved for himself during World War II.
- 4. Tim Cook, Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars (Toronto: Penguin, 2012).




Clockwise from top left: William Lyon Mackenzie King, Winston Churchill (UK), the Earl of Athlone, and Franklin D. Roosevelt (USA) on the terrace of the Citadel in Quebec City, during the Quebec Conference where the invasion strategy for Normandy was discussed.

particular, the deployment of Canadian troops. Cook writes of King that he "recoiled at even knowing what his army was doing let alone asking for influence over it." Borden, on one occasion, lambasted the Imperial War Cabinet after the folly of Passchendaele, but by then it was too little, too late. King only heard about the Canadian participation in D-Day when he was awakened and informed of it on 6 June 1944. Cook highlights the fact that the diaries of both men contain little comment about the horrors of war and the sacrifice of Canadian personnel. It is small wonder, as Cook argues, that notwithstanding the sacrifices of Canadian soldiers in both wars, Canada's international standing declined following the peace. While her soldiers, sailors and airmen were in the forefront of the war, their political leaders remained relatively unknown.

Borden's and King's contributions to the war effort may have been less on the battlefield and more on the home front, but those contributions revolutionized Canadian society. Borden created legislation, *The War Measures Act*, that allowed for censorship, internment of enemy aliens and the suspension of *habeas corpus*. His *Military Voters Act and Wartime Elections Act*, arguably pure partisan politics, respectively lowered the voting age to permit all soldiers to vote and permitted women with a link to a soldier overseas to vote federally. King's lasting contribution to the war and its aftermath may have been his support of closer military ties between Canada and the United States, exemplified in the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and his *Veterans' Charter*, a compendium of legislation and programs for returning veterans.

Borden and King will never be considered the peers of Cohen's quartet; thus Cook's title is a bit of a misnomer. Neither man could be considered a Lincoln or a Churchill. But then, maybe Cook is correct when he writes that both men were warlords "albeit in a Canadian way." Perhaps, in the traditional Huntington manner, they maintained the stability of the home front, giving the soldier the tools to complete the job and leaving the senior command the necessary strategic latitude to win the war.



CANADA AND CONFLICT

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

JAMES, Patrick. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012, softcover, 156 pages, \$16.95. ISBN: 9780195432206

Reviewed by Mr. Peter Gizewski

For many in North America, the world changed fundamentally in the wake of the terrorist bombings of 9/11. Gone was the sense of relative calm and invulnerability largely taken for granted in the decade following the Cold War's end. Not surprisingly, many longstanding and cherished ideas regarding national security and the requirements for effectively achieving it seemed in need of change. As such, 9/11 can be viewed as a transformational event, acting to

fundamentally alter notions of national security and its practice.

This is the central assertion animating *Canada and Conflict*, Patrick James's recently released survey of Canadian security policy post-9/11. For James, 9/11 and the events surrounding it worked to move Ottawa away from a predominantly liberal-internationalist security stance emphasizing soft power toward one far more firmly grounded in hard-nosed *realpolitik* and national interest. Once considered a "peacekeeping nation," Canada post-9/11 became far more willing and able to use force and engage in armed combat in pursuit of its goals.

The evidence marshalled in support of James's contentions is substantial. Canada's entry into and ever greater participation in the war in Afghanistan, its growing commitment to a range of border security and continental defence initiatives with the United States, and its steady upgrading of the military capability of the Canadian Forces are all highlighted to underline the shift. So too is Canada's increasingly assertive stance on Arctic sovereignty and security, as well as its active involvement with other NATO allies in the bombing and eventual overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The overall picture drawn is of a nation ever more wedded to the idea that challenges to security require not simply pious words but robust capabilities and the willingness to use them.

To be sure, James concedes that not every action taken post-9/11 marked a distinct departure from the past, particularly in terms of the goals sought. For instance, Canada's involvement in the Libyan mission can easily be seen as a reflection of longstanding support for the rule of law and humanitarian values, undertaken more in an effort to end the suppression of a subjugated people by a brutal dictator than from any concern about a direct threat to Canadian national interests. Similarly, it can be argued that Canadian operations in Afghanistan and greater defence integration with the United States both had liberal-internationalist as well as realist motives, among others. That said, the dominant shift in overall orientation has been toward realism in terms of both ends sought and means employed.

Nor, James notes, has the shift toward a more realist, hard-power stance simply amounted to Canada deferring to the preferences of its southern neighbour. True, a number of Canadian initiatives did generate approval from Washington (particularly regarding Canada's contributions in Afghanistan). Yet, in other areas, Canada's actions have been far less agreeable. That was illustrated not only by Ottawa's unwillingness to actively support the US invasion of Iraq by joining its "coalition of the willing," but also by its failure to

participate in Washington's plans for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Moreover, James notes that the shift in Canada's security orientation may even work to feed US-Canada tensions—a contention underlined by recent Canadian assertiveness on issues of Arctic sovereignty and security.

Reducing these and other sources of tension can prove difficult. Nevertheless, James suggests a number of areas in which improvements in Canadian decision making could be helpful. Most notable is the need to avoid falling prey to excessive anti-Americanism and moralizing—both longstanding Canadian traits which tend to tarnish Canada's international image and obstruct the creation of balanced policy. Canadian officials should also educate themselves more fully on the workings of the US government so as to better manage expectations and enhance their ability to influence Washington.

On the whole, however, James sees the post-9/11 shift in Canada's security orientation as positive. It has resulted not only in a more balanced approach to security generally, but also in a nation that is both more worldly and more engaged. In fact, he concludes that such an approach should serve Canada well in future.



Unfortunately, Canada's capacity to continue to practise the more realist, hard-power orientation developed is far from clear—particularly in light of recent fiscal and budgetary pressures on government departments. Already, signs indicate a marked decline in enthusiasm for a number of the programs boldly trumpeted in the Canadian government's *Canada First* defence strategy as well as a more cautious stance on the use of the military. Such a situation underscores the significance of economic factors in the development and practice of security policy. In fact, if one criticism is to be levelled at James's book, it lies in the relative lack of attention devoted to economics: not only in accounting for the capabilities available for addressing security issues, but also the role that economic realities may play in shaping *and* in justifying—the general character of the Canadian approach ultimately taken—both past and present.

At the end of the day, however, this volume is well worth the read. Clearly written, relatively jargon-free and effectively argued, it features a solid bibliography and a good index and is reasonably well organized. The author also offers some useful insights into Canadian security from the standpoint of international relations theory, examining the extent to which various theoretical constructs help explain the various actions taken and policies developed. As such, the text should serve as a good teaching tool for instructors and a useful primer for students interested in recent Canadian security policy.

