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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to a frosty 53rd edition *Canadian Military Journal* as we enter our 14th year of publication. We have put together a rather eclectic issue this time out, so hopefully, there will be at least something contained between these covers to pique the interest of each and every one of you.

Since these words are being penned during our annual period of national remembrance, I would like to draw our reader’s attention to this issue’s cover image. It is entitled, *The First of the Ten Thousand*, by British Columbia artist John Rutherford. It was commissioned by the Canadian Bomber Command Museum in Nanton, Alberta, and it graces our cover, courtesy of both the artist and the museum.

On 4 September 1939, one day after Britain’s declaration of war on Germany, Sergeant Pilot Albert Stanley Prince, born in Montreal but a Canadian expatriate and member of the Royal Air Force since 1935, was piloting one of 15 Bristol *Blenheim* bombers tasked to bomb German warships moored in the North Sea port of Wilhelmshaven. These warships turned out to be the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* and the cruiser *Emden*. Bombing individually at masthead height, while the initial attacks caught the defenders by surprise, Sergeant Prince, by virtue of his assigned position in the attack formation, was one of the latter pilots to attack the *Admiral Scheer*:

There was no element of surprise when Sergeant Prince arrived over the target. The German flak was heavy and well directed. Three of the four bombers that attacked were shot down during their low level bombing runs. A German witness reported the fate of a fourth: “The crew of one *Blenheim* attacked at such a low level that the blast of their own bomb on the warship destroyed the RAF aircraft.” Apparently the delay fuse malfunctioned…The aircraft flown by Sergeant Prince was one of the three that appear to have been shot down by flak. In an interview with a German journalist, Sergeant G.F. Booth, the observer [navigator], whose position was in the nose of the *Blenheim* was asked. “…if he noticed how the aircraft was shot down.” He answered, “…we hit something…I was looking forward. I just saw the water and heard the crash.” It appears the aircraft went down quickly, but Sergeant Prince must have had some control as the bomber was ditched in the harbour. All three crew members were successful in getting out of the aircraft and were picked up by a pilot boat. But Sergeant Prince had been mortally injured during the landing and died later in hospital.¹

Thus, to Albert Stanley Prince fell the dubious distinction of becoming the first Canadian Second World War casualty from any of the fighting services, a full five days before Canada’s formal declaration of war. He also became the first of over 10,000 Canadian Bomber Command aircrew who would perish during that conflict out of the approximately 40,000 Canadian airmen who served in that command, a mortality rate of over 25 percent. Lest we forget…

Once again, there is no dedicated ‘Valour’ column in this issue, since there were no announcements of military valour awards or formal presentations of them during the reporting period. However, here at the CMJ, we remain committed to acknowledging the combat valour of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen and airwomen, and we shall continue to do so if ever and when ever such announcements are made public.

‘Leading the charge’ this time out, defence scientist Dr. James Moore examines the host of non-conventional actors that are found in today’s battlespace. In his own words, “There are any number of irregular adversaries that populate the complex battlespace in which members of the Canadian Armed Forces may find themselves operating in future campaigns.” Moore believes that, given this ‘grab bag’ of applicable labels pertaining to these adversaries, be they warlords, narco-traffickers, insurgents or terrorists, what is needed is “…a shared, comprehensive term that facilitates the generation and communication of knowledge related to the intentions, capabilities, and behaviours of the host of actual or potential irregular adversaries likely to be encountered in post-Afghanistan operations.” He then goes on to propose such a candidate, the Armed Non-state Actor, or ANSA.

Moving right along, the historical advisor to the Canadian Army for the war in Afghanistan, Dr. Sean Maloney asks the rhetorical question, “Was it worth it?” with respect to Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan war. After presenting a lot of compelling points and analysis, he believes it was, and that with the help of Canada, much has been done to help the Afghans succeed. However, according to Maloney, “What the Afghans choose to do (and they are more than capable of making such decisions) with all this is another matter. Whether they have the capacity as a society to continue along this trajectory or relapse is in their hands, not ours.”

Maloney is followed by François Gaudreault’s assessment of the security threat as it exists at the national border between Canada and the United States. Gaudreault, a serving naval officer who is currently the Intelligence Collection Manager for the Canadian Joint Operations Command, concludes that while great strides have been made in the improvement of border security in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, what is fundamentally needed is a much better appreciation of just what actually constitutes the threat, and what constitutes an acceptable level of risk.

Then, in an article that bridges current political science and economic issues with lessons from the past, Major Garrett Lawless and Professor A.G. Dizboni take a closer look at President Dwight David Eisenhower’s farewell address to the American people on the eve of his retirement in 1961. In it, Eisenhower called for many things in balance, but most of all, for “…an alert and knowledgeable citizenry.” In the authors’ words, “Indeed, the fruitfulness of this address for today’s audience lies in the high task of developing our own understanding of what divergent truths led to this call for balance in the first place, so that we may be alert to just how tenuous our knowledge of these great subjects are today…” Finally, our major articles section closes again upon an historical note, this time with an analysis from Lieutenant (N) Jean-François LeBeau as to why amphibious warfare was used so extensively during
the War of 1812. Lebeau maintains that this was rationalized by geographical constraints, for psychological effects, for gaining the initiative and avoiding disastrous courses of action, and for increased operational mobility and flexibility.

We have two very different opinion pieces this time out. In the first, Commander Jacques Olivier examines the teachings of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz, and asks if there has truly been “… a fundamental change in the nature of the operational art of war” as it has been conducted over the last two millennia. He is followed by Professor Pascale Marcotte from the University of Moncton, who makes a compelling argument for the establishment of a Canadian remembrance trail through the various towns and villages in France and Belgium liberated by Canadian soldiers during the First World War.

We then offer Martin Shadwick’s perpetually thought-provoking opinions with respect to defence procurement in Canada, this time homing in on the specific acquisition needs and the issues and problems associated with them for each of the three fighting services. Finally, close with a clutch of individual book reviews for your recommended winter reading.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

ADDENDUM TO EDITOR’S CORNER

Tribute to Wartime Bomber Command

Bomber Command played an essential part as a guarantor of Allied victory during the Second World War. It provided an offensive tool that took the fight to the enemy when none other was available, and it gave the citizens of the Allied nations hope and pride while it did so. It provided Britain and the Dominions, through its very prosecution, a political dimension through which it could influence the conduct of the war. It demanded a significant diversion of German resources away from the Eastern Front, thereby aiding the USSR in its part of the combined struggle. It struck substantial, unrelenting blows against enemy morale. It threw Germany’s broader war strategy into disarray, forcing it to adopt a reactive, rather than proactive stance through industrial decentralization, which placed unsupportable burdens on a transportation system already stretched to the limit. This massive, diversified and sophisticated system was, in turn, the recipient of many crippling blows. The bombing campaign also generated a loss of German air superiority and meted out significant damage to the Reich’s industrial base, and it eventually starved the nation of petroleum products. It effectively stymied economic mobilization and technological development in many areas, and it goaded the Nazis into costly and ineffective retaliation campaigns. While a great human price was paid for these accomplishments, the gains realized were formidable.

A memorial commemorating the tragic loss of 55,573 Bomber Command airmen from Commonwealth and Allied nations during the Second World War was dedicated in Green Park, London, on 28 June 2012. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II unveiled a bronze statue, depicting seven Bomber Command aircrew that stands at the centre of the memorial. Its roof is constructed from aluminum drawn from a Canadian Handley Page Halifax III bomber from 426 Squadron that was shot down over Belgium on 12 May 1944, killing all eight crew members. These airmen were but a fraction of the 10,659 Canadian airmen now known to have perished while serving with wartime Bomber Command. The memorial also commemorates the people of all nations who lost their lives in the bombing campaigns of 1939-1945.

A spectacularly lifelike structure depicting a weary seven-man bomber crew, back on terra firma after a combat sortie, but anxiously scanning the skies for their returning comrades.
Dear CMJ,

Canadian Forces 2014 withdraw from Afghanistan. ...It’s up to ‘The Bieber’ now.

by Lieutenant (N) David Lewis

Canada and the coalition forces are scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. One of the most verbalized concerns of Afghans is the uncertainty of the aftermath of this withdrawal. There are many who fear a repeat of the era which followed the Soviet departure in 1989. The disengagement of the USSR and the abandonment by the West created a power vacuum which was eventually filled by radical elements.

Much has changed since the last Russian soldier walked back across the Friendship Bridge into Uzbekistan. In 1989, they left behind an isolated and parochial Afghanistan which had changed little over millennia. It was a land where information was dispersed almost exclusively through tribal leaders. Throughout its history, Afghanistan has remained a warlord dictated information vacuum.

The world today is much smaller than it was even two decades ago. International boundaries, cultural differences, and social barriers are all blurred by the onslaught of easily accessible new media. Afghanistan is no longer immune. In the past 10 years, the dramatic advance of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social media platforms have affected the country to Gutenberg proportions.

The Taliban forbade the use of the Internet. They deemed it a Western propaganda tool that broadcasted obscene, immoral, and anti-Islam material. Afghans only began to have internet access after the Karzai administration took office in 2002. Since then, there has been a phenomenal growth in wireless companies, internet providers, radio stations, and television channels. The telecom sector leads economic reconstruction, with four mobile service providers covering 75 percent of the country with over 2400 towers. As of 2012, about 85 percent of the country’s population has access to communication services. There are over eighteen million mobile phone users with 4G service, launched in 2013.

Afghans are also using Twitter and Facebook to bring about social change. In 2012, there were over a half-million Facebook accounts registered within Afghanistan. The majority of Afghans online are between 18 and 35 years old. This is a prime demographic for change within their country.

As the last rotation (Roto) of Op Attention recently left for Afghanistan, I look back over the last 10 years and my own experience in-country. The Canadian Armed Forces have stood strong and paid an enormous price for helping to defeat the Taliban, and by assisting in ‘rebuilding’ a country that was never ‘built’ in the first place. We have done a lot of things right in Afghanistan.

I think history might show that our greatest accomplishment, with the best residuals, was that for the first time in the country’s history, we created a climate which allowed for other voices. These other voices influenced, awoke, inspired, and challenged the Afghan people. They moved out of isolation into inclusion.

Some will see this as simplistic. There are, no doubt, a vast number of other factors which will affect a post-2014 Afghanistan. We must, however, recognize that the country today is a vastly different country than at any other point in its isolated history. Walls that defended against external forces have crumbled as a result of an internal tide. Afghan eyes are wide open, and they want more.

Radical Islam will be defeated by the rise of the Muslim middle class. As Afghans go online, on Ebay, on Amazon, on Autotrader, as they visit over 3800 online television stations and explore the world, they will refuse to be led back into the vacuum. Tribal leaders and Taliban will always have a voice, but they will be reduced to one voice amongst thousands.

A million Afghan girls wanting to listen to ‘The Bieber’ on their I-phones might do more to ensure long-lasting change than all the coalition forces combined. Whatever 2014 brings, it cannot be 1989.

– David Lewis

Lieutenant (N) David Lewis was Deputy Director of Social Media for NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, stationed at Camp Eggers, Kabul, in 2011.
WHAT IS AN ANSA?

James W. Moore

Introduction

Insurgents. Terrorists. Warlords. Narco-traffickers. There are any number of irregular adversaries that populate the complex battlespace in which members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) may find themselves operating in future campaigns. And as our prefatory list suggests, there are a plethora of terms that are used to describe these non-conventional actors. Yet, paradoxically, this embarrassment of terminological riches may actually hinder rather than help our understanding of the operating environment of the future. Rather than a ‘grab bag’ of labels from which to pick and choose, what we need is a shared, comprehensive term that facilitates the generation and communication of knowledge related to the intentions, capabilities, and behaviours of the host of actual or potential irregular adversaries likely to be encountered in post-Afghanistan operations. In this article, we propose one such candidate: the Armed Non-state Actor, or ANSA.

We begin with a discussion of the shortcomings of the terms, such as those mentioned above, commonly used to describe these non-conventional actors. These terms tend to be emotive and evaluative, and often obscure as much as they illuminate. Moreover, they do not easily lend themselves to distinguishing groups that are hybrids of multiple types and are constantly changing over time. Hence, the need for a comprehensive, neutral term of description. In the section that follows, we propose an alternative expression - the Armed Non-state Actor - and, in the absence of an authoritative definition, derive a working definition for the term:

– An autonomously operating planned group that has the capacity to use violence to achieve political ends.

We then contrast it with a competing phrase often encountered in the defence and security literature: the Violent Non-state Actor (VNSA), noting that ANSA is effectively a sub-category of VNSA. Finally, we conclude with some broader reflections on the need for - and the usefulness of - clear, shared terminology in advancing our understanding of these social actors.

Shortcomings in Common Terms

Why do we need to assign pride of place to an expression like ANSA? We already have a number of labels that
are routinely attached to irregular civilian or paramilitary individuals and groups confronted in the battlespace. And, unlike ANSA (see the next section), many of these terms have precise military-purpose definitions. Turning to the CAF’s central lexicographic repository, the Defence Terminology Bank (DTB), we find one commonly used term – ‘insurgent’ – defined as “an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.” (This is a slightly reworked version of the DTB’s definition of insurgency, as the Bank does not include a definition for insurgent per se.) This distinguishes – at least in lexical terms – ‘insurgent’ from ‘terrorist,’ that is, “a supporter of a dissident faction who resorts to violence in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends.”

Why transition from these more common labels to what some might argue is a more awkward and cumbersome expression like ANSA? In the first instance, these everyday labels carry with them far too much emotive baggage. Terms like ‘freedom fighter,’ for example, can inspire positive emotions of trust and admiration, while terms like ‘terrorist’ can stir negative emotions of fear and anger. Rather than these emotionally packed labels, what we need is a neutral term that identifies a slice of the actors in the social conflict space, but does not subconsciously incline us either for or against those actors through the terminology we use. By employing an impartial term like ANSA, we can hopefully avoid the biases inherent in these other, more loaded terms.

Closely related to this, these common labels are evaluative rather than analytical in that they express some degree of approval, or, more often than not, disapproval of the group to which they are applied. They are used as weapons of political warfare that reflect more on the actors that employ them than on the groups they purport to describe. Not surprisingly, these politically charged terms may change as circumstances change. For example, in the early years of the US occupation of Iraq, the US military loosely grouped together all Sunni-sectarian factions - including secular/ideological, tribal, and religious/Islamist groups - under the rubric of “insurgents,” “Anti-Iraq Forces” (AIF), or, in then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s graphic description, “dead-enders.” However, US terminology for these ANSAs changed dramatically when many of them turned against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2005/2006 and began fighting alongside US forces. Rather than insurgents, these former anti-coalition fighters were linguistically transformed into the “Sons of Iraq.” To avoid the vagaries of such political language, we should avoid as much as possible the use of subjectively evaluative terms like insurgent and terrorist in favour of a more objectively analytical expression like ANSA.

Not only pregnant with prejudice, common labels such as these do not fully capture the complex nature of these groups of interest. Most, if not all, irregular adversaries represent hybrids of the amorphous, ill-defined types to which these labels refer. For example, a group may launch military strikes against state security forces at the same time as carrying out terrorist attacks against civilian targets, while relying upon the profits from parallel criminal activities (i.e., kidnapping, drug trafficking, armed robbery, and so on) to finance its campaign of violence. The Afghan Taliban is a case in point. The majority of its military operations are conventional attacks (i.e., small arms fire, RPG attacks, and so on) directed against the Afghan security forces and international military forces. The group also deliberately targets civilians,
in particular, those seen as supporting or collaborating with the Kabul regime and its coalition allies. In 2011, for example, IEDs, suicide bombings, and targeted killings took the lives of 2332 civilians, 77 percent of all civilian conflict-related deaths in that year.7 To fund its campaign, the Taliban increasingly draws on earnings from criminal activities. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that 70 percent of the Taliban’s operational funding comes from the opium trade (i.e., taxing poppy farmers and guarding drug smugglers’ shipments).8 The money - estimated at US$500 million in 2007 alone9 - is pulling the group ever deeper into the drug trade. Former head of the counternarcotics task force at the American embassy in Kabul Doug Wankal described this process as the “FARCification of the Taliban,”10 in reference to the Colombian ANSA that over the years succumbed to the lure of profit in the cocaine trade. How should a group like the Taliban be classified? Is it an insurgent organization, a terrorist group, or a criminal gang? Or is it all three?

Moreover, these groups are dynamic social entities whose nature may change over the course of a conflict. A group may begin as an insurgent organization motivated to redress the perceived socio-economic and/or political grievance(s) of its parent group. However, as the conflict drags on, the initial motivation of grievance may fade as illicit economic opportunities for enrichment present themselves and greed becomes the dominant motivation for carrying on the fight. The group thus may metamorphose into a criminal organization, increasingly engaging in activities such as smuggling, extortion, blackmail, kidnapping, drug trafficking, illegal resource exploitation, and so on, while abandoning its original political raison d’être.

Illustrative of this dynamic is the apparent transformation of the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army - JAM), the Shiite militia of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Originally a nationalist militia that emerged in June 2003 in sometimes violent opposition to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, it came to be seen among many Iraqi Shiites as their sole defender during the months of intense sectarian violence that followed the bombing of the Al ‘Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. However, as the threat from Sunni insurgents ebbed and the sectarian conflict subsided, the militia lapsed into criminality. Young militia members - lacking direction and control from senior commanders swept up in American counter-insurgency dragnets - turned to dealing in protection, stolen cars, and property confiscated from dead or displaced Shiites as well as from Sunnis. Increasingly, many Shiites turned against them, criticizing the militia as “a band of street thugs without ideology.”11

JAM subsequently tried to move away from violence and criminality and to re-invent itself as a nonviolent social and cultural movement. In the summer of 2008, scant months after suffering a severe military setback in fighting in Basra and other areas of the south against Iraqi government and US forces, al Sadr ordered the militia’s rank and file to lay down their weapons and join a new religious and cultural wing of the movement called the Momahidoun (“those who pave the way”). According to Sadrist leaders at the time, this organization planned to offer welfare services, literacy programs, and courses in general Islamic teaching and ethics - open to all Iraqis regardless of sect or political affiliation - to counter the “culture of killing” that they said al Qaeda had brought to Iraq.12 The point to note here in this brief recounting of JAM’s apparent transformation is that these actors are not static social entities to which one may affix timeless labels such as insurgent, guerilla, or terrorist. Indeed, they may not even remain armed non-state actors, depending upon how they adapt to changes in the social environment in which they operate and of which they are a product.

**An Alternative: The Armed Non-state Actor (ANSA)**

For these reasons, the terms we commonly use to identify non-conventional actors in the battlespace are not particularly...
helpful in advancing our understanding of these players. Consequently, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive, analytically neutral alternative: the Armed Non-state Actor. But what exactly is an ANSA? When faced with questions of definition in lingua militare, recourse in the first instance should be made to the Defence Terminology Bank (DTB), the primary authoritative reference source of approved terminology in DND/CAF. A search of this repository, however, does not turn up a precise definition of the phrase. The DTB does define the more general term ‘non-state actor’ as “a person or organization not associated with an officially recognized government.” Armed groups (i.e., rebel opposition forces, militias, warlords, insurgents, and private military firms) are identified as one of nine types that make up the broader class of non-state actor, but this sub-category is not characterized further.

If we accept ANSA as a candidate for our alternative descriptor, how should we define it? In one respect, this is a unit of analysis question. When we speak of ANSAs, to whom or what are we referring: individuals or groups? Somewhat confusingly, ANSA has been used in the defence and security literature to refer to both individuals and groups. Thus, it is incumbent upon us to specify the unit of analysis, whether individual or group, to which we are referring when using the term. Bearing this in mind, the following section describes the derivation of a working definition for ANSA at the group level.

Our quest for a working definition starts from the premise that an ANSA is an agent, that is, a social actor with the capacity for purposeful or willed action. An agent may be either an individual or a group, but, as mentioned above, the definition of ANSA will apply to groups only, while individuals will be referred to as members of ANSAs. A ‘group’ is defined in general as “… a number of individuals, defined by formal or informal criteria of membership, who share a feeling of unity or are bound together in relatively stable patterns of interaction.” This shared “feeling of unity” or fraternity among members is a key feature of an ANSA. To adopt the term of political scientist Benedict Anderson in his seminal 1983 study on nationalism, an ANSA is an “imagined community” in the sense that “in the minds of each [member] lives the image of their communion.” Although there is a “deep horizontal comradeship” among its members, an ANSA is rarely a monolithic or monocultural entity. Individuals, cliques, and factions may hold different interests, values, and beliefs that can come into conflict, and, if too divergent, they can paralyze group action and ultimately threaten group order and cohesion.

Groups may be characterized as planned or emergent. A planned group is one deliberately formed by its members or an external authority. This includes traditional vertically-structured organizations in which the hierarchical relationships among the constituent elements are formally or institutionally ordered, as well as horizontal networks in which autonomous cells loosely synchronize their actions with other cells on a more or less ad hoc basis. An emergent group, on the other hand, is a collection of individuals who come together spontaneously to act without prior arrangement. In this respect, an ANSA is regarded as a planned as opposed to an emergent group. A rioting crowd is not an ANSA, although members of an ANSA may participate in, or, indeed, actively encourage the emergence of such a violent gathering.

“Somewhat surprisingly, ANSA has been used in the defence and security literature to refer to both individuals and groups.”
Groups may be further distinguished as either state or non-state actors. In sociologist Max Weber’s (1919/1946) classic formulation, the feature that sets the state apart among the panoply of human communities is that it “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force [original emphasis] within a given territory.” From time to time, the state may delegate the right to use force to other institutions or individuals, but it remains “the sole source” of this “right.” Consistent with this conceptualization, ‘state actor’ refers to the group or groups that control the amalgam of power institutions - whether configured in a modern bureaucratic, feudal, tribal, or other structure - that people generally associate with the governance architecture within a particular territorial entity. A ‘non-state actor,’ conversely, is simply a group that does not direct or control those institutions (regardless of whether or not they do, in fact, want to control them).

Moving on to armed non-state actors specifically, many working definitions have been advanced for the term, a selection of which follows:

“Groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control.”

“Armed groups that operate beyond state control.”

“Any armed actor with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives.”

“Any identifiable group that uses armed methods, and is not within the formal structure of a recognized state.”

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“Any armed actor with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives.”

“Any identifiable group that uses armed methods, and is not within the formal structure of a recognized state.”

Note that these definitions, drawn largely from the humanitarian and human rights community, are policy prescriptive rather than scientific definitions. They define the actors with whom, it is argued, humanitarian organizations must engage on a practical level in order to achieve specific policy goals, such as negotiated access in war zones to permit the supply of humanitarian aid.

The similarities in the above definitions are immediately apparent. More generally, definitions of ANSAs emphasize four characteristics:

A basic command structure.

An ANSA has a basic organizational coherence, with command structures ranging from loose decentralized structures (i.e., networks) to more rigid and centralized hierarchies. The key consideration here is the degree of control the command structure provides the leadership over the group, that is, whether it is sufficient to allow ANSA leaders to exercise a minimum level of restraint over the conduct of its fighters.
However, al Qaeda’s (The Base - AQ) move from “corporate terrorism” to “terror franchises,” or the apparent shift of the global jihadist movement more broadly to what sociologist Marc Sagemann (2008) describes as “leaderless jihad,” calls into question whether this remains a necessary characteristic.

The use of violence for political ends.

An ANSA uses violence as a means - although not necessarily the exclusive or primary means - to contest political power with governments, foreign powers, and/or other non-state actors. The practical political agendas of ANSAs are as varied as the groups themselves. They may seek to protect or advance the interests of their clan, tribe, ethnic, or religious community within a national or transnational framework. They may seek to overthrow a government or occupation authority, or, more fundamentally, to foment revolutionary change of the national or international political system. They may seek to conquer and control a national territory, or to detach a component region there from. They may seek to preserve a status quo or return to a status quo ante that privileges their political, social, and/or economic position or that of the group they claim to represent. Regardless of the specific end state, it is the capacity - that is, the capability and intention - to use violence to achieve political ends that is the main quality distinguishing an ANSA from other violent and non-violent groups.

Determining a group’s capacity for political violence may not be as straightforward as it seems. Consider, for example, the radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation - HT). HT is an international Islamic movement founded in 1953 by a Palestinian Islamic scholar and shariah appeal court judge Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. The group shares the same political goal as many violent jihadist groups: the reunification of the ummah in a single, authentic Muslim state - the Caliphate. With an international network extending through more than 40 countries, a membership conservatively estimated at over one million, and a cellular underground structure reminiscent of that of the Russian Bolsheviks, the group is thought to have the capability for violence. But does it likewise have the intent?

HT publicly rejects violence, and does not itself engage in terrorist attacks. However, Nixon Center Director for International Security and Energy Programs Zeyno Baran (2004), among others, sees its “rhetoric of democracy and…message of non-violence” as superficial. She claims that the group has never condemned the violence of other jihadist groups, nor has it denounced terrorist attacks. On this point, at least, Baran is wrong. HT condemned Armed Islamic Group (GIA) atrocities during the Algerian civil war (1992-2002), the 9/11 attacks, and the 7/7 attacks in Britain, (though Baran cannot be faulted for not referring to the UK attacks since they came after the publication of her monograph). Be that as it may, she continues:
In many ways, HT is part of an elegant division of labor. The group itself is active in the ideological preparation of the Muslims, while other organizations handle the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Despite its objections to this description, HT today serves as a de facto conveyor belt for terrorists.31

The UK government, for its part, does not share this simplistic ‘conveyor belt’ view of HT. A “Restricted” document leaked to the The Sunday Telegraph in 2010 entitled “Government strategy towards extremism,” says:

It is sometimes argued that violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way of a passing commitment to non-violent Islamist extremism, for example of a kind associated with al-Muhajiroun or Hizb ut Tahrir...We do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalisation in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalisation, to violence … This thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.34

Political scientist Emmanuel Karagiannis and social psychologist Clark McCauley (2006) have provided a more sophisticated analysis of HT’s approach to political violence. They argue that “[t]he content of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, which is based upon a selective interpretation of Islamic theology and history, serves as a barrier to the adoption of violence as a method for the establishment of an Islamic state.”35 HT’s strategy, which has remained essentially unchanged for over fifty years, consists of a three-stage action program emulating the progress of the Prophet Mohammed’s mission: (a) recruitment of the vanguard, (b) Islamization of society, and (c) establishment of the state and the spread of Islam through jihad.36 HT sees itself as being in the second stage of the process, involving the peaceful overthrow of existing Muslim regimes. The group’s task is to persuade society and, especially, the security forces to embrace Islam, the latter because they are the ones who will execute the peaceful coups d’état that will depose the current regimes.37 The war that HT fights in the second stage is for the hearts and minds of Muslims; it is not one fought on the battlefield. This is not to say that HT rejects violence per se. In the third stage of the action plan, jihad is the method by which the reunified Muslim state spreads Islam throughout the world. However, only the Caliph can declare jihad; HT - or any other non-state group, in its view - cannot take it upon itself to make such a declaration. (Resistance to foreign occupation, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the absence of Caliphal sanction, however, is permitted.) In this sense, HT’s conception of political violence is similar to the state-centric view of the West: violence sanctioned by the (Islamic) state is legitimate, while that engaged in without the authority of the state is terrorism (again, except in the face of foreign invasion of Muslim lands).38

Karagiannis and McCauley (2006) speculate, however, that, under certain circumstances, HT and its followers might resort to violence. For example, the group could decide to deviate from the Prophet Mohammed’s three-stage model. Alternatively, it could claim that matters had already moved to the third stage of jihad, for example, if a genuine Muslim leader should seize power in some state and credibly declare the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Repressive state action against the group, in particular the suppression or elimination of its leadership, could cause the movement to fracture, with break-away factions subsequently engaging in violence. Or, the group could align itself with the military in some country in a violent grab for power.39

So, the question remains: Is Hizb-ut-Tahrir an ANSA? Should the group fall under our analytical microscope? Given the ambiguities in the group’s ideology and strategy with respect to the use of violence, culminating in the fact that we cannot with confidence rule out the group’s resort to such methods under certain circumstances, the case can be made that HT should be considered an ANSA for analytical purposes.

Note the qualification “for analytical purposes.” The term ANSA is not a policy prescriptive designation. Simply because a group is identified as an ANSA does not necessarily imply that governments should take some form of suppressive counter-action against them. Those are decisions that must be based on a different kind of assessment, specifically, on an intelligence-based threat assessment. Here, we are only interested in advancing our understanding of the motivations and intentions of a select population of non-state actors. The term ANSA is used to identify that particular population of interest from a basic research rather than an operational law enforcement or national security standpoint.

Autonomy from state control.

A n ANSA not only exists outside the formal state institutional structure, but retains the capacity for independent decision. In other words, it is an autonomous entity, not merely an appendage of a state or its security forces; it operates beyond the responsible control of governments.40 While it may actively support and collaborate with a regime - and receive the regime’s support in return - this cooperation stems from a perceived coincidence of ANSA and state interests rather than as a response to superior orders.

The relationship between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army, known as FARC - EP or FARC) and the Venezuelan regime of deceased President Hugo Chavez well illustrates this point. In May 2011, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a 240 page dossier analyzing email communications and strategic documents found in eight computer data storage devices belonging to Luis Edgar Devía Silva (aka Raúl Reyes), one of seven members of FARC’s leadership council (formally, the Secretariat) and the head of its International Committee (COMINTER).41 Reyes was killed and the electronic archive retrieved in a March 2008 Colombian military raid on a FARC camp across the border in Ecuador. The archive sheds light on the pragmatically cooperative but often stormy relationship between FARC and the Venezuelan government. President Chavez saw the Colombian ANSA as a strategic ally in defending his Bolivarian Revolution against US aggression, as well as a partner in creating a revolutionary bloc throughout the region. Accordingly, he allowed it to maintain support zones in the border regions with Colombia, and promised financial and other material support (although he

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The FARC presence in Venezuela, 1999-2010.

Presence. The ANSA’s presence may be intermittent and its domination does not necessarily require a permanent, visible presence. This domination does not necessarily require a permanent, visible presence. The ANSA’s presence may be intermittent and its control exercised through “hidden” agents embedded in the population.43

These four defining characteristics are admittedly restrictive. They limit ANSAs to a subset of non-state actors that employ violence in social conflict settings. Those excluded include criminal groups, state-controlled paramilitaries, and private security companies (PSCs)/private military companies (PMCs), among others. Nevertheless, these characteristics provide us with the basic elements needed to frame a working definition of ANSA:

An autonomously operating planned group that has the capacity to use violence to achieve political ends.

Note the territoriality requirement - that is, the extent to which an ANSA’s aspirations and/or activities are tied to a particular territory - is ignored so as to encompass de-territorialized or transnational actors within the scope of the definition. Note also the added characteristic of ‘planned group,’ discussed above, to differentiate ANSAs from spontaneous collections of individuals who come together in, say, street demonstrations or riots.

International relations theorist Ulrich Schneckener (2009) adopts a similar definition to that presented here.44 Significantly, though, he does not limit ANSAs to the pursuit of political ends, thereby including criminals, marauders and mercenaries, and PSCs/PMCs within his universe of ANSAs. We do not consider these to be ANSAs, but include them within the broader category of Violent Non-state Actors (VNSAs).45 International relations specialist Kledja Mulaj (2009) defines VNSAs as “...non-state armed groups that resort to organized violence as a tool to achieve their goals.”46 These two terms, ANSA and VNSA, though similar, are not quite the same. Like Schneckener (2009), Mulaj does not qualify “goals” in her definition. Consequently, the term VNSA can apply to a wide variety of violent or potentially violent actors, such as criminal groups, militias, warlords, and others who pursue a wide range of goals beyond the strictly political. Indeed, it is precisely the nature of these goals that distinguishes ANSAs from VNSAs. A VNSA may pursue any ends - criminal, mercenary, political, millenarian, and so on - whereas an ANSA is specifically limited to the pursuit, in the main, of political goals. Hence, ANSAs logically constitute a sub-category of VNSAs. That is, an ANSA is necessarily a VNSA, but a VNSA is not necessarily

Some degree of territorial control.

An ANSA effectively controls a territory (not necessarily precisely delimited) and its resident population. This domination does not necessarily require a permanent, visible presence. The ANSA’s presence may be intermittent and its...
an ANSA. It all comes down to the ends that the non-state actor in question is pursuing through the use or threatened use of violence.

Are ANSAs the only violent or potentially violent groups in the battlespace? Certainly not. Are they even the most important VNSAs in the operating environment? Not necessarily. Consider, for example, the current deadly situation in Mexico. In the southern state of Chiapas, the revolutionary leftist ANSA Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation - EZLN) launched an armed uprising against the Mexican government in 1994. Is this uprising the fountainhead of the widespread violence that has plagued Mexico for the past several years? The answer is no. Since its brief and abortive insurrection in the mid-1990s, the EZLN has focused its efforts primarily on non-violent means to draw national and international attention to its political demands. Rather, the responsibility for the deaths of some 47,515 people in Mexico over the last five years can be laid squarely on the doorstep of drug cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas, rather than the EZLN.

ANSAs are certainly a part of the complex equation in the battlespace, but, as the Mexican experience demonstrates, there are other violent groups who also populate that space. These other VNSAs do not fall into our working definition of ANSA, however, since they do not meet the basic requirements of autonomous decision and the use of violence for political ends. Though more inclusive than insurgent or terrorist, ANSA is not an umbrella term that encompasses each and every violent or potentially violent actor in a conflict space.

There is another reason why we prefer ANSA as the identifier of choice for these actors. Though, as Mulaj’s (2009) definition makes clear, violence is a tool - and not necessarily the tool or the only tool - to which VSNAs resort, for those not schooled in the subtleties of the terminology (in particular, individuals at the policymaking level), “violent” non-state actor might give the mistaken impression that these groups are committed exclusively and single-mindedly to violence. This clouds the fact that not all ANSAs are hopelessly irreconcilable and can never under any circumstances change their goals or strategies, most especially, their resort to collective political violence. Hence, our preference for the term ‘armed’ NSA. Rather than an invariant strategy or an inherent trait, it suggests a potential or capacity for violence which these groups may tap into in any given set of circumstances.

Conclusion

The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms.

–Socrates

The arguments presented in the preceding pages are relatively straightforward. The terms we commonly use to identify irregular adversaries in the contemporary operating environment do not pass muster. They are emotionally charged, politically inflammatory, and analytically challenged. In their stead, we
offer up an alternative label - the Armed Non-state Actor - a comprehensive, analytically and emotionally neutral term of description, and set out a working definition of this technical expression. Assuming these arguments have been persuasive, the question still remains: what does this matter? Is the foregoing an interesting but essentially irrelevant semantic exercise? To answer this, we must place this in the broader context of knowledge development and communication within the defence and security community.

Shared, standardized terminology is necessary for defence science and technology (S&T) knowledge generation and development. The contemporary operating environment is overwhelmingly complex, too immense for any one individual to intuitively grasp fully or holistically. That is simply beyond the cognitive capacities of human beings. Consequently, we rely on knowledge development through the analytical method: break down the whole into its constituent elements to facilitate ‘drilling deep’ into these smaller parts, then reassembling the parts to better understand the emergent whole. The specification and definition of standard terms - like ANSA - is the essential first step in this knowledge development process. It allows us to clearly identify the entities of interest in the social conflict space so that we may efficiently and effectively focus our (limited) intellectual resources on this selected population. It allows us to bound the problem space, to reduce the complexity of the whole to manageable proportions, and in so doing to support and sustain the process of defence S&T knowledge building.

Shared, standardized terminology is also essential for clarity in communication. DND’s statement of Defence Terminology policy is unequivocal on this point:

Standardized, consistent and readily available terminology is required to create and maintain a common vocabulary to enable clear communication and understanding, and to enhance interoperability of people and information systems within DND/CAF, with our principle [sic] allies, other government departments and agencies, the defence industry and interest groups. 49

Mutually understood, precisely defined defence and security terminology allows us to talk to each other without returning to first principles in every conversation. Standard terms - like ANSA - embody a wealth of implicit information. Each time we want to speak about this class of non-conventional actor, we simply use the shorthand term ANSA, on the assumption that our interlocutors share with us the same baseline knowledge of the term. In other words, we don’t have to repeat the points discussed at length in this article each and every time we refer to an ANSA. The use of shared, standardly-defined terms greatly enhances the efficiency and comprehensibility of knowledge communication and transmission.

To sum up, this exercise in terminological elaboration is more than a mug’s game. From the standpoint of defence S&T knowledge development and communication, this is the first critical step along the path to advancing our understanding of an increasingly important class of irregular adversary in the future battlespace.
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Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, Quarterly data report Q1 2012, Kabul, Afghanistan: ANSO, 2012, p. 6. Improvised explosive device (IED) and indirect fire attacks rank second and third, respectively, in the Taliban’s tactical portfolio.


Ibid., p. 13.


For the distinction between unit and level of analysis, see A. Yurdusev, “‘Level of analysis’ and ‘unit of analysis’: A case for distinction,” in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1993, pp. 77-88.

J. Scott and G. Marshall (eds.), A dictionary of sociology (3rd Edition) (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 257. The term group also refers to aggregates or categories of individuals (i.e., social classes, demographic groups, etc.) who may not share a feeling of unity or engage in regular social interaction. Alternative definitions in the social science literature highlight different features of these social connections, emphasizing, among others, the communicative, structural, psychological, and/or identity aspects of the group. For a selection of definitions, see D. Forsyth, Group dynamics (4th Edition) (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), p. 4. Table 1–1.


Ibid., p. 7.

Forsyth, Group dynamics, p. 6.

Ibid. Advances in social media greatly facilitate the degree of coordination that can underlie seemingly “spontaneous” gatherings such as the pro-democracy demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring. As one Egyptian activist remarked, “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world” – quoted in P. Howard, “The Arab Spring’s cascading effects,” in Miller-McCune, 23 February 2011.


Ibid.


Shiite demonstrators protest against actions of coalition troops in Iraq, 12 August 2004.


31. Ibid., p. 11.

32. For reference to the IIT leaflets containing these condemnations, see “Banning non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), is the real threat to the British way of life” [Online petition], in Petition Online, at http://www.petitiononline.com/HTban/petition.html, accessed 28 May 2012. Please note that reference in this article to the information contained in the petition does not in any way imply approval of or support for the petition itself.

33. Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir..., p. 11.


36. Ibid., p. 318.

37. Ibid., p. 326.

38. Ibid., p. 328.


40. For more on the concept of responsible control, see James Moore, “Beyond the pale? The international legal basis of the Bush Doctrine” [Unpublished Masters thesis] (Toronto, ON: York University, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2006).


42. D. Farah, “What the FARC papers show us about Latin American terrorism,” NEFA Foundation, 1 April 2008, pp. 8, 16.

43. Glaser, Negotiated access..., p. 20.

44. U. Schneckener, Spoilers or governance actors? Engaging armed non-state groups in areas of limited statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper No. 21 (Berlin: DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, October 2009), pp. 8-9.

45. For a comprehensive survey of the social science literature relating to VNSAs, see L. Fenstermacher, L. Kuzmar, T. Rieger and A. Speckhard (eds.), Protecting the Homeland from international and domestic terrorism threats: Current multi-disciplinary perspectives on root causes, the role of ideology, and programs for counter-radicalization and disengagement (Arlington, VA: Office of Secretary of Defense, Director, Defense Research & Engineering, 2010).


48. For an update on the bloody turf war in northeast ern Mexico between the two cartels and their respective allies, see “Mexico security memo: Zetas-Sinaloa conflict,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 16 May 2012.


Pakistani Taliban fighters sit with their weapons on the back of a truck in Buner, northwest of Islamabad, 24 April 2009.
Tired Canadian soldiers take a smoke break, 3 July 2007.

“WAS IT WORTH IT?” CANADIAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Sean Maloney

Introduction

In 2012, I was asked by the University of Manitoba to give a conference presentation on Canadian operations in Afghanistan, with an eye on the larger issues of Canadian and Western intervention during the past twenty years. I crafted a presentation based upon my preliminary work dealing with the history of the Canadian Army in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011, the project with which I am currently engaged for the Canadian Army. However, it was clear during and after my presentation that what I put together was too detailed, and it assumed too much knowledge on behalf of a diverse group. There was not enough time to establish common ground between me and the audience. Furthermore, in informal conversations, and when socializing in various venues leading up to and after my talk, it was evident that many people I spoke with were overly focused upon a specific political-media complex meme to the exclusion of any new information or insight I could provide, given the level of access I have had to the war in Afghanistan, both in terms of documentation, and from the personal experience of ten operational deployments extending from 2003 to 2011.

Needless to say, I was surprised that a media meme1 could be so overwhelming in such a grouping of academics and practitioners. I have been brought up in an academic tradition where ideas were debated and the search for different angles, new information, and fresh perspectives were the epitome of the profession. This was usually a contentious but professional process. Somehow, the amalgam of these things produced for us either confirmation of our prejudices or some kind of new synthesis that served as a launch-pad for another round of discussion. I did not see that in the Afghanistan case. I saw firmly-held views on Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan that were dismissive of the facts, as they were, presented by a person charged with understanding our involvement in that demographically damaged, nearly post-Apocalyptic country. These were opinions shaped by existing academic models of how Canada behaves or has behaved or should behave on the international stage, as well as by media information. None of those models, however, adequately explains, or explains in only an extremely superficial way, why Canada was in Afghanistan and

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The Meme

The meme “Was it worth it?” emerged in July 2011 as Canada ended operations in southern Afghanistan. The concept of questioning the value of Canada’s operations in Afghanistan was itself not new: critics of the mission, especially those in the National Democratic Party (NDP) and those sensitized to casualties, asked similar questions in fall 2006 and again in the spring of 2007. The difference in 2011 was that Operation Athena was completed and so it was a natural breakpoint to look back and see where Canada stood after so many years. There was no detailed commentary on these matters by the Harper government nor was there any from the unelected bureaucracy. The “Was it worth it?” meme was, essentially, a creation of the media and their fellow travelers, the pollsters.

Then the meme went dormant, only to re-emerge in media coverage leading up to Remembrance Day in November 2011. As this was the first Remembrance Day since the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, almost all Canadian media elements deemed it useful to re-ask the question. After going dormant yet again, Paul Koring of the Globe and Mail reactivated it in a 6 February 2012 article highlighting the views of former ambassador Chris Alexander, former Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) commander Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, detainee critic Amir Attaran; ex-Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) head of aid Nipa Bannerjee; anti-war activist Raymond Legault; and retired Colonel Pat Stogran, commander of the Operation Apollo contingent in 2002.

The media outlets, all of them, used the same question again and again: “Was it worth it?” None of them provided any further explanation as to what they meant by ‘worth.’ All these media outlets implied, without stating so up front, that what they meant by ‘worth’ was the numbers of Canadian dead. Some brought up an estimated monetary cost of Canadian involvement, but it is evident that they really wanted to use the deceased as a measurement of effectiveness.

The National Post followed with a story on 8 August 2011, as did lesser known publications like the Socialist Worker. In approximately a four-week time frame, the bulk of Canadian media outlets were asking the same question, posed the same way, but only some were answering it, and then, self-referentially.

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Throughout the conflict, Canadian media continuously focused upon ramp ceremonies and Canadian deaths and woundings to the near-exclusion of any other Afghanistan topic. The coverage of Canadian deaths had a direct effect on the Opposition leader and his demands for Canadian withdrawal in 2006, and again in 2007. Mr. Layton expressly referred to Canadian casualties as a prime motivator for his opposition to continued combat operations. It is not surprising that the media, and critics of Canadian involvement, wish to use their measurement of effectiveness when analyzing ‘worth.’

This meme, then, is thus defined:

- Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan resulted in dead Canadians and the expenditure of lots of taxpayer money.
- There hasn’t been any real progress made.
- Canada withdrew in 2011.
- It wasn’t worth it.

Again, this meme is implied in the sample of media outlets: CBC, The Sun, The National Post, The Globe and Mail, and overtly stated in The Socialist Worker.

This is our common starting point. There is some debate on the matter (for example, Rosie Dimanno in The Toronto Star, and the minority opinions in the Koring piece,) but, for the most part, the meme was deployed far and wide through Canadian media outlets from July 2011 to February 2012. And, for the most part, it tended to dominate the belief systems of a wide variety of people I encountered at the conference, whether they were for or against Canadian involvement.

Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE)

The MOE for the war in Afghanistan bedeviled almost every Joint Task Force Afghanistan headquarters I visited in Afghanistan from 2006 onward, especially when we entered the war’s provincial-and district-level counterinsurgency phase in 2007. A combination of Ottawa bureaucrats and media connected the idea of ‘effectiveness’ to the concept of ‘progress.’ If we were ‘progressing,’ we were ‘effective.’ It was a question of what was selected for examination: development and reconstruction was one area, detainees was another. Now I will not get into the deep details of Western 19th Century historical proclivity towards ‘progress,’ although it definitely played a role, right up there with the scientific method and provability. The concept that the insurgency was worsening because there was not enough ‘development’ held sway with some commentators, but few could actually connect data to those pronouncements.

I would equally argue that North American sports-based cultures have deep-seated need for scoring as a mean of determining who is ‘winning’ and who is ‘losing.’ Many, rightly so, shudder at the use of body-counts as a progress measure in the American phase of the Vietnam War. Yet, that is what the meme uses as its MOE— in this case, a one-sided Canadian body count. Not a Canadian body count versus an enemy body count. Just Canadian bodies...
The assumption that Canada could somehow fight a bloodless war boggles the rational mind. Given how horrified some Canadians were over the relatively small number of Canadian dead, it is likely that some might have even started to feel pity for the enemy, in that the ratio of Canadian deaths to insurgent deaths may be between 1:20 to 1:50, or even higher.

The meme does not like to use the number of schools built and manned as a measurement of effectiveness, but those against the Canadian project in Afghanistan love to use the amount of poppy grown and turned into opium. However, they only like it if the argument uses United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) figures out of context to ensure that they grow exponentially every year. On a yearly basis, newspapers and other media outlets unthinkingly used virtually the same headlines on this topic.

The lack of ‘progress,’ however, becomes the major sticking point for close observers of the conflict. They never define progress, but again imply that it involves reducing the levels of corruption and the levels of violence. The argument, then, is that if drug production, corruption, and violence trends are all up, progress is not being made. Underpinning this argument is that reductions in all of these areas are necessary to reduce ‘violence,’ and this will somehow lead to reconstruction and then to an end to the conflict. “Progress,” it appears, cannot exist outside these categories. Nor, apparently, can incremental progress in any area. It had to be gross progress, right now. It also had to be gross progress made understandable to the common Canadian, or it did not count.

The connection between timeliness and progress is strong. It has to be done now or it is not progressing enough. Or, we have a short attention span: If it is not accomplished between now and when that attention shifts, than there is no progress. There is no room for error is this perfect, critical world, no room for wrenches thrown into the works, and inefficiency generated within what is supposed to be a ‘perfect machine-perfect’ it must be because we are spending so much money on it. Perfect, critical, consumerist… It is not really surprising that critics of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan want simplistic metrics that reinforce their existing views.

The one measurement of effectiveness we have on hand and in the public domain was the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS, dating from 2005-2006, laid out critical objectives with a timeline. A partnership between Afghans and Canadians, it was based upon hard-learned lessons in Bosnia. I have yet to see a Canadian media product that explains the ANDS and its importance to Canadians. To that end, I ‘locked horns’ with a journalist in Kandahar in 2007, and again in 2008. I challenged him when he claimed there was no strategy and no objectives, and pointed him towards the ANDS website. Did an explanatory article result? No. It was easier to count Canadian dead as if it was some
grim hockey score, rather than to explain that the fact there was now a strategic plan in a near-post-Apocalyptic environment, and that this was in itself an achievement and it ‘could-and-would-and-did’ lead to better things. But strategic planning is boring. And people who use the media want to be entertained. Death and violence and excitement entertains. Creating a strategy that will give the Afghans governance structures so that the global community will be more inclined to provide monies in order for reconstruction to take place is not particularly entertaining, nor is it exciting. We are presented with a challenge: how do we move beyond the morbid death complex that our media, with societal complicity, has created, and find a means of explaining what we have accomplished in Afghanistan that is understandable to the common Canadian?

Academic Approaches

I would have thought that the academic community might have stepped up and tried to meet this challenge, particularly during this conflict. On the whole it did not. The “Was it worth it?” question quickly morphed into the “Should we have gone in the first place?” debate, a related entity to the media-generated meme. From the academics canvassed by myself during this conference, I found generally that the Canadian Afghanistan project was projected through existing biases and approaches, and it was not seen as a unique series of events deserving of detailed and specialized analysis. I identified three broad ‘stove pipes.’

First, there is the ‘Stay at Home’ or ‘Isolationist’ viewpoint. This approach applies a simplistic cost-benefit analysis using Canadian bodies and Canadian dollars, compared to the state of Afghanistan today as portrayed by the media and by various reports from ‘think-tanks’ and international organizations. The situation is bad in Afghanistan, we have spent enough, we should leave, or, we should not have deployed there in the first place. This view tends to emanate from Quebec, and it is an echo of voices raised in opposition to the First and Second World Wars.

The obvious flaws in this argument relate to its simplicity. The argument does not take into account the progressive deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, which only became broadly apparent around 2005-2006. It avoids any analysis of Canadian interests or values and the role they play in decision making. It ignores the role that credibility plays in international affairs. In essence, it is an adolescent approach to international relations.

Second, there is the ‘UN Supremacy’ viewpoint. Within this construct, the United States is ‘evil’ and must not be permitted to act unilaterally in order to prevent it behaving illegally in the context of the International Criminal Court. Canada must distance herself from the United States to avoid being infected by this ‘evil.’ Therefore, Canada should only have engaged in Afghanistan under the rubric of the United Nations and UN-controlled organizations.

Third, there is the ‘Canada-US Relations’ viewpoint with multiple variants in play. Academia in Canada created an industry out of analyzing Canadian-American relations dating back to the 1950s, but most particularly in the 1960s and 1970s as petite nationalism fostered by the Trudeau regime sought to identify and inflate as many differences as possible between Canada and the United States. In many cases, it is easier to assess ‘Canada in Afghanistan’ as an extension of ‘Canada and the United States’ than it is to peer deeply at the plethora of bureaucratic and emotional motives that may have played a role in Canadian decision-making vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

There are three variants of the ‘Canada-US relations’ approach. First, there is the trade variant. The vast bulk of Canadian trade is with the United States, so it behooves Canada to operate alongside the United States as part of a North American bloc. Second, there is a variant that suggests that Canada is being coerced, either subtly or not, into siding with the United States in order to bolster coalition credibility. Third, we can identify a ‘solidarity’ variant, a ‘brothers in arms/we’re all in this together’ feeling.
Finally, there is the ‘Hillier’s War’ theory, whereby former Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier pushed the government to increased depths in Afghanistan for dubious reasons associated with American solidarity and/or to get the Canadian Forces into a fight, any fight, while Foreign Affairs tried valiantly to hold him back.

In none of my conversations did the words “al Qaeda” come up unless I initiated a discussion of 9/11 and the long history of al Qaeda’s war against its ‘near enemy’ and ‘far enemy’ dating back to the early-1990s. The enemy was always labeled by most conversants as “The Taliban” and no connection was made between the two, or any other organizations. Certainly, no connection was made between the 9/11 attacks and the presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There was also little-or-no discussion of Pakistan’s role in events.

None of the conversants mentioned the defence of or projection of Canadian values, or the fact that al Qaeda and Taliban values were in direct opposition to Canadian values. The idea that the enemy represented something other than a local terrorist threat to reconstruction did not register at all with some conversants. Indeed, it was only when prompted with this line of reasoning did one academic dismiss the whole involvement in Afghanistan because, to this individual, the Taliban and al Qaeda did not constitute an “existential threat” to Canada.

Nobody referred, in any way, to any possible humanitarian imperative or the fact that Afghanistan was the poorest country on earth and the most damaged in terms of demographics and infrastructure. Nor did the idea that Canada was helping Afghans and Afghanistan bear mentioning at all.

The Complex Reality

The idea that Canada made choices to get deeply involved with Afghanistan over a ten-year period, and the idea that those decisions were, perhaps, based upon Canadian interests and values, has not been explored by either the media or academia to a wide extent. Generally speaking, the idea that Canada acts independently is lauded when it runs counter to American decision-making. The idea that Canada independently chooses to side with and to operate alongside the United States is usually written off under some kind of coercive rubric. Perhaps we should entertain this idea: that Canada made choices, in the case of Afghanistan, several choices at different times, to remain engaged, and that those choices were made because of the increasingly shaky nature of the international project to assist Afghanistan. That also pre-supposes that our participation in that international project somehow reflected our values system as well.

We should also entertain the possibility that there was an underlying concept of national and international credibility that crept into the progressive nature of our involvement in Afghanistan. We committed to something. That ‘something’ was important to us for a variety of reasons, and we repeatedly re-committed to preserve Canadian credibility within the international system as well as maintaining the credibility of the Afghanistan project. I would suggest that the argument that Canada did all of this solely to develop or cultivate credibility with the United States is a far too narrow view.

As far as I can determine, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan passed through several phases.

1. Operation Apollo, 2001-2002: the deployment of a battle group to southern Afghanistan as part of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom.
2. Operation Athena, 2003-2005: Canada led the way in ‘NATO-izing’ the international project in Afghanistan in the Kabul area and in converting a European-led ISAF mission to a NATO-led one.
3. Operation Argus, 2005-2008: Canada mentored Afghanistan in the creation of a national development strategy and in Kabul-based governance structures. This was a bilateral arrangement between Afghanistan and Canada.
4. Operation Archer, 2005: Canada accepted responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, and worked to identify the major issues afflicting the province. Initially, this operated under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom, and transitioned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2006.

5. Combined Task Force (CTF) Aegis, and Task Force (TF) Orion, 2006: Op Archer was augmented with combat forces as the situation deteriorated in Kandahar Province, until Stage III expansion was completed in the summer of 2006, and the mission became ‘NATO-ized.’

6. Operation Athena, 2006-2011: This counterinsurgency mission continued as Canada mounted a disruption campaign under the auspices of ISAF to stave off insurgent interference with reconstruction and capacity building. After a three-year disruption operation, Canadian forces were progressively relieved in place by American forces in 2010-11.


If we are to measure the effectiveness of the missions, we need to understand what objectives were set for them. Only then can we ask, were they realistic objectives, given the circumstances, resources, and what we knew at the time? This is very different from ‘counting coffins’ coming off aircraft at CFB Trenton, or waving the annual UNODC narcotics report around like a bloody shirt. Or complaining about ‘corruption...’

The main Canadian objectives can be boiled down into two things, First, the removal of the Taliban ‘shield’ that was protecting the al Qaeda ‘parasite’ that fed off the Taliban. Once the Taliban government and its forces were removed, then headway could be made at attacking al Qaeda globally. Second, al Qaeda developed its parasitical relationship with the Taliban because of the disruptive civil war conditions prevalent in Afghanistan after the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1993. The second Canadian objective was to ensure that al Qaeda and other global terrorist groups were unable to use Afghan territory for their operations, and reconstruction was the means to do this. Fundamentally, these Canadian objectives remained in play the entire time Canadian forces were on the ground in Afghanistan.

These objectives were established after examining the direction that the American Operation Enduring Freedom was heading in November 2001. The strategic target of the whole exercise was the al Qaeda organization. Nobody knew what al Qaeda was capable of next. There were over 30 al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan: training, communications, and research. The only way to understand what al Qaeda was up to was to go in, seize these facilities and key personnel, and exploit them to build the larger global picture of their activities. Canada provided forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere as part of this larger effort.
In essence, Operation Enduring Freedom pulled away the Taliban shield, and put al Qaeda to flight from Afghanistan. Their facilities were exploited to great effect by coalition forces. Multiple ‘9/11-like’ attacks that were in the planning stages were ‘cut off at the knees,’ as were plans to acquire bio-chemical and nuclear weapons or material. Indeed, no al Qaeda attack of the same magnitude has taken place since the 9/11 attacks of 2001, though there were several in the advanced planning stages. That alone should be considered a major success, yet it was all subsumed by the hullabaloo over the American mounting the Iraq conflict. Indeed, the reduced level of credibility that al Qaeda has today and its inability to effectively subvert the ‘Arab Spring’ thus far should be directly attributable to the Operation Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan, coupled with the destruction of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Canada played a role in the Afghanistan portion of that coalition effort. Al Qaeda’s objectives, as stated by Osama bin Laden, have still not been met over ten years after 9/11, and nearly twenty years after al Qaeda initiated operations.  

During the early phases of the anti-al Qaeda effort, it was increasingly evident to Canadian planners and representatives in Tampa, Florida, (where US Central Command is located), as well as their counterparts from other Commonwealth countries, that American plans did not really address what happened after the exploitation effort took place. In a general sense, the American political leadership worked with other international partners to establish the Bonn Process, which was supposed to play a major role in reconstruction. Operation Enduring Freedom shifted focus elsewhere in 2002-2003: Specifically, Iraq and the Horn of Africa.

There were many complicated reasons for Canada to re-commit to Afghanistan, this time under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force. For our purposes here, however, the ISAF mission had stalled out by 2003, and nobody wanted to take on a leadership role with it. The interim Afghanistan government was beset with innumerable problems: it had no credibility with those who possessed the heavy weapons and the factional armies, and it had no legitimacy with the population. There was no bureaucracy to absorb the international donors’ monies needed for reconstruction. In effect, the possibility of a return to the conditions of 1993-1994 was very real in 2003. And, as we will recall, the creation of the Taliban movement in 1996 was a direct result of those conditions in the first place.

In a campaign formulated by then-Major-General Andrew Leslie and his staff, the NATO-led but Canadian-dominated ISAF achieved several objectives. First, the heavy weapons controlled by the various factions in Kabul were cantoned. Second, a coup attempt against the interim government was thwarted. Third, intelligence cued special operations neatered the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) terrorist group as it sought to undermine Kabul. Fourth, the Afghan National Army received more and more Canadian and American trainers and mentors, so that it could compete with the armed factions.

These steps created a positive psychological environment so that the Constitutional Loyal Jirga and the 2004 elections could move forward. Only then, with a legitimate, internationally-recognized government, could monies be made available for reconstruction. That effort, however, was threatened by two things.

First, there was a failure in the strategic plan. Canada stepped in, as requested by the Afghan government, and worked together with the Afghans to formulate a strategic plan for the country. The Canadian Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan (SAT-A) was a key player in this effort. The Afghan National Development Strategy was the product, and it was accepted in the London conference in 2006 along with the Afghanistan Compact. SAT-A also worked to help build a national civil service and to improve government capacity. Essentially, the ANDS helped link the security and development...
processes, and recognized the key components of development that reached down to the community level.

By 2005-2006, great strides had been taken by Canada, working alongside its coalition allies, to prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into a 1993-1994 state. There was now a government; there was a plan; there were reconstruction monies; and threats to the government and the plan were reduced as much as feasible, particularly in Kabul. This was amazing progress in three years, given the fact that Afghanistan was essentially a post-Apocalyptic environment. The next challenge was extending the government’s presence and authority outside of Kabul. And this is where the Afghanistan project encountered serious difficulties…

Three problems emerged. First, few countries wanted to join and lead the reconstruction effort in the provinces, and Afghanistan lacked this capacity at this time to do it herself. Second, there was unrest in a key southern province, Kandahar. Some believed the unrest was related to disproportionate development efforts that favoured northern Afghanistan at the expense of the south. The unrest itself deterred effective international efforts in a variety of ways. Third, it looked like the Taliban was resurgent in the south after resting and regrouping in Pakistan with new international backers.

It was crucial to the larger international project that the problems in Kandahar be defined and addressed. Again, Canada chose to commit to this course of action with Operation Archer. First, a Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team deployed, followed by a brigade headquarters and a battle group. Once on the ground, however, the security situation deteriorated, and a resurgent Taliban, propped up by al Qaeda’s global support network, expanded the insurgency in the province. The Taliban’s objectives included isolating and then taking over Kandahar City by coup de main and/or by foco (focalism, or revolution by way of guerrilla warfare ~ Ed.). From 2006 to 2009, Canada disrupted their designs. The Taliban never isolated unrest was related to disproportionate development efforts that favoured northern Afghanistan at the expense of the south. The unrest itself deterred effective international efforts in a variety of ways.

“In essence, Operation Enduring Freedom pulled away the Taliban shield, and put al Qaeda to flight from Afghanistan.”
the city, regional trade continued unmitigated, and the insurgents were unable to seize control of the city.

It is during these three years that Canada immersed herself in interagency counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts in the districts around Kandahar City. Numerous problems were encountered during this period. None of those problems, however, stopped Canada from disrupting the insurgents’ plans and forcing the insurgency to continuously alter its methods.

Note also that during this period, the Canadian project had a fluctuating end-date. This was, to an extent, a product of minority government politics. It is easy to look back and apply some definition to the whole period but at the time, Canadian planners had to plan for a less than two-year window, which, in turn, meant there was substantial discontinuity to the effort.

Canada also sought reinforcement during this time, but was unable to gain any from its NATO allies. At the same time, American policy was in a state of tremendous flux. There were problems in Iraq, and there were national elections in the United States. Reinforcement of the Afghanistan project in Kandahar was not guaranteed, but Canadian efforts tipped the balance, and by 2009 and into 2010, the Americans massively reinforced in Kandahar province. Canada played some role in pressing the American administration to make up its mind on a future course of action in Afghanistan at this time.

All the while, al Qaeda was under pressure elsewhere, mostly in Pakistan, and unable to mount extensive or damaging international operations, as they had pre-9/11. The organization was unable to re-establish its infrastructure in Afghanistan and was under continual attack by armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms operating from Afghanistan. In other words, Canadian strategic objectives circa late-2001 were still being achieved by 2010. Al Qaeda remained disrupted. The Taliban and other insurgent groups, however, continued to challenge the Afghanistan project in myriad ways.

These and other challenges only have slowed down the reconstruction effort and have not stopped it in its tracks. There is an Afghan governance system in place. Is it perfect and incorruptible? No. There are Afghan military forces and police that report to the national government. Are they somewhat corrupt and inefficient by Western standards? Yes. Are they an improvement over armed bands with fealty to a local power broker? This is debatable in some areas. There were no such forces ten years ago.

The technical capacity of Afghans has significantly improved, particularly in terms of construction. The geometric proliferation of construction companies with contracts from the Afghan government, international agencies, and so forth, should be noted. Is all this construction capacity and activity above board? No. The idea of contracting anything, let alone an Afghan construction company with a range of heavy equipment, was unheard of in 2001. The continual proliferation of consumer goods, particularly electronic goods, at the district level is a strong indicator of an increasingly functional economy. Somebody is procuring and selling these goods, and somebody buys them. That money comes from somewhere.

However, those critical of the Afghanistan project seldom look at this micro level, and instead focus upon the lack of progress in the poppy economy, corruption, and gender quality. The increasing level of violence is taken as a given that things are not working. I have yet to see a breakdown of that violence. How much of it is insurgent violence and how much of it is commercial violence? Is any of it attributable to Pashtunwali or other tribal dispute-resolution mechanisms? How much of it relates to tribal rivalry? At what point does this all intersect? There are high levels of violence and corruption in other countries (like Colombia and Mexico), but
there is still steady economic and social progress overall. Indeed, for point of comparison, the kill-rate for Mexican civilians in the city of Cuidad de Juarez, at 2000 per year, compares to the kill rate of Afghans civilians in the entire country (9759 dead from 2006 to 2011).\textsuperscript{13}

All this is to say that it has only been ten years since the removal of the Taliban and the prevention of another civil war. Afghanistan suffered over 20 years of war and had 1.5 to 2 million people killed in the 1980s alone.\textsuperscript{14} The fact that the Afghanistan project has progressed this far in this short a period of time is remarkable when the lens is adjusted away from the immediate problems and challenges, and some perspective is restored.

Keep in mind also that the Afghanistan project has been under continual attack by outside forces that do not want to see it succeed. I specifically refer to Pakistan, but also to those who provide weapons to insurgents. In my travels, I have encountered factory-fresh Chinese 82mm recoilless rifles and their ammunition, Iranian RPGs and explosively-formed penetrators, Iranian factory-made, mass-produced IED detonation components, and Pakistani copies of plastic Italian anti-tank mines. There is far too much criticism directed at the international effort, and not nearly enough directed against those who have set out to thwart it. This tends to be a particularly Canadian problem in that anti-American elements in our culture easily lock on to and disproportionately criticize American activities, and do not provide fair coverage of the nefarious behaviour of others. There have been no Canadian news stories, let alone academic analysis, excoriating Iran, China, or Pakistan for facilitating the flow of weapons to the insurgents in Afghanistan.

Let us never forget from where and why the Taliban movement emerged. Despite the media’s repeated assertions that Kandahar is the ‘spiritual home of the Taliban,’” the movement initially acted as a militia on behalf of economic interests in Quetta who wanted Highway 4 from Quetta to Kandahar free from interference, so their trade could flow to the ‘Stans.’ Later on, the Taliban received a variety of support when elements inside the Pakistani security system realized that if Pashtuns energies were focused elsewhere, they would not pursue ‘Pashtunistan’ at the expense of Pakistan. Still others accepted the idea that an independent Afghanistan might ally itself with India, with dire strategic consequences for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{15} If the motivation behind support for the Taliban and other anti-Afghan groups is the neutering of Afghanistan, we might even make the case that Pakistan is engaging in colonialism, and that Canadian efforts to protect the Afghan people from this external threat are laudable, morally acceptable, and thus far successful.

Pitched higher, the variant of Islam that historically dominates southern Afghanistan is Sunni Sufism. Islamic fundamentalists, be they Shi’a or Sunni Wahhabists, find inclusive sufist mysticism to be heretical. Indeed, the Deobandists in Pakistan, who are closely aligned with Saudi Sunni Wahhabists and the Taliban, are violently opposed to Sufism. Shi’a Iran aligned itself with Hazara groups and supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban… but did not arm Sunni Sufist groups. Given these facts, we could also make the case that Canada has protected a moderate Islamic minority from ethnic cleansing, or more appropriately, genocide in its proper definition: the destruction of a culture.\textsuperscript{16} Although the Canadian government’s ability to comprehend such matters was limited at the time, the unintended results remain the same. We have done what we can to protect the Afghan people in southern Afghanistan, regardless of what frame we want to put on it.
Dispensing with “Was it Worth It?”

I would suggest that the crippling and discrediting of the al Qaeda movement was worth the effort alone. This terrorist corporation had momentum and increasing credibility in the Muslim world prior to and well after 9-11. Success breeds success. The momentum was checked by the intervention in Afghanistan, which allowed us to examine the movement’s interior and put it to flight. The continual pressure on al Qaeda’s remnants in Pakistan via Afghanistan, coupled to the Afghanistan intervention and the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, has not allowed it to gain purchase in the ‘Arab Spring’ environment (yet), and, in the eyes of the West, the elimination of Osama bin Laden established a book-end to the 9/11 attacks. Although we can quibble over the actual dimensions of the impact of the bin Laden ‘hit,’ al Qaeda no longer terrorizes the West’s psychology in the ways it did in 2001 and 2002. If the elimination of Osama bin Laden in 2011 played a role in this reduction, and that assault was launched from Afghanistan, we must consider the possibility that there is some measureable success to intervening in Afghanistan. Clearly other means employed by the Clinton administration in the form of cruise missile volleys were ineffective, diplomatic and other attempts to separate bin Laden from the Taliban were fruitless. The only way to attack al Qaeda was to go after their facilities and leadership in Afghanistan.

And, if we apply the axiom “you broke it, you buy it,” it was morally incumbent upon the international community to assist the Afghans in regaining their balance in the post-Taliban world. The same critics who have vocalized about the inefficient efforts to stabilize Afghanistan would have likely been equally critical had there been no reconstruction effort at all, and Afghanistan lapsed back into a repeat of the events of 1993-1994. Canada chose to be part of that effort in 2003, and played a lead role in stabilizing Kabul and backstopping the Afghan Transitional Administration. Those efforts had measureable, positive effects. In Kandahar, Canada embarked upon a stabilization and reconstruction operation, but found herself under attack by an increasingly sophisticated insurgency. The inability of the insurgency to attain its primary objective in southern Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009 because of the presence of Canadians and their disruptive activity is a measureable success. Yes, progress in terms of reconstruction was not what it could or perhaps should have been. Yes, gender equality is not in general practice. Yes, schools remain unmanned. But the alternative was far worse. Collapse of the coalition effort in Kandahar would have doomed the international effort in Afghanistan half a decade ago. Instead, the Afghanistan project struggles along, five steps forward, three back.

In a recent conversation I had with a retired general, we discussed obliquely the “Was it worth it?” meme. One means by which he attempted to answer the question was to search for enduring effects of Canadian involvement, particularly in reconstruction. That was his measurement of effectiveness. Is it too soon to tell if we have enduring effects? Yes and no. A paved highway has a significant effect on the movement of goods: that can be measured. Ideas also follow roads into rural areas that were previously cut off from mainstream society. Measuring the impact of this will take years, perhaps decades. We may not have been able to force the Pashtuns to alter course on gender equality issues in accordance with Canadian values. But how do we know that somewhere a young Afghan girl who had positive exposure to female Canadian soldiers may decide to break out of the societal system—or even challenge it? We just don’t know yet.
All of this to say that Canada, through her contributions to the international Afghanistan project, has done what can be done to set the Afghans up for success. What the Afghans choose to do (and they are more than capable of making such decisions) with all this is another matter. Whether they have the capacity as a society to continue along this trajectory or relapse is in their hands, not ours. The enduring legacy of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan should consist of an amalgam of these aspects. This is not the Second World War with VE Day-like parades. The enduring legacy of Canada’s involvement in that war, it could be argued before 1990, was not only the destruction of Nazi totalitarianism, but also a bombed-out divided Germany and a world on the brink of nuclear holocaust over access to Berlin. After 1990, things looked a bit different. The enduring legacy now is a pacifist, unified Germany with immense economic growth and the highest standard of living in the world. We cannot predict with certainty what Afghanistan will look like 20 and 40 years downstream. To answer the question “Was it worth it?” is, in some ways, necessarily tentative, premature, and politically motivated.

Afghan children surround Corporal Marie-Anne Hardy as she takes a break during an early morning operation to conduct cordoned searches of fields and compounds, 4 June 2011.

NOTES

1. A meme is an idea, behaviour, or style that spreads from person to person within a culture — Editor.
2. CBC Cross Country Check Up, 10 July 2011, “Canada’s Combat Role in Afghanistan Ends… Was it Worth It?”
3. Thane Burnett, “War Wounds: Polls Suggest we don’t feel Afghanistan Mission was Worth It.” in The Ottawa Sun, 4 August 2011.
8. Koring, “Was it Worth It?”
12. Based upon the author’s observations in Panjwayi and Zharey districts over a five-year period.
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 (9/11) in the United States deeply shocked the nation and its allies. This event completely changed the world dynamic and deeply modified politics in North America. The US government, which had been taken by surprise, has taken major steps to ensure the safety of its population since then.

The new political imperative that resulted in the United States could be best summarized as “national security first.” Massive investments, deep institutional restructuring, and considerable policy changes have characterized this new quest for what could be called ‘perfect security.’ What were previously viewed as multilateral partnerships, based upon negotiation and mutual benefits, are now what Frank P. Harvey, a professor at Dalhousie University, categorizes as unilateral decisions, based upon “Homeland Security” imperatives.¹

Probably the best example is the border between Canada and the United States, which has been, for decades, referred to as the “longest undefended border” in the world. It is now in a process that, according to Deborah Waller Meyers of the Migration Policy Institute, should be seen as a “militarization.”² The first goal of this new border policy is to keep threats, mainly terrorism, outside, and to prevent them from entering the country.

Canada has also followed the path of adapting its border policy for security and counter-terrorism, as a responsible neighbor, major trading partner, and as a close ally.³ But in the eyes of many in the United States, and even in Canada, Ottawa is not doing enough to fight terrorism. Some observers still see Canada as too weak on terrorism and guilty of not taking the threat seriously enough.⁴

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Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 (9/11) in the United States deeply shocked the nation and its allies. This event completely changed the world dynamic and deeply modified politics in North America. The US government, which had been taken by surprise, has taken major steps to ensure the safety of its population since then.
Canada is the foremost trading partner of the United States, with a 8895 kilometre-long common border and 133 ports of entry, where over 200 million people cross every year and $1.4 billion worth in trade is conducted every day. Due to that huge flow of goods and people, and the impossibility of positively controlling the entire border, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers the Canada-US frontier a weak link in US national security. More security efforts are expected from Canada by Washington to match the already-implemented US security and anti-terrorism measures.

At this time, the dilemma for Ottawa is the following: continue to expand the security and anti-terrorism budget and efforts, even if it is unpopular with Canadian citizens, and regardless if it goes against the national agenda; or spend less on security but be prepared to see economic exchanges with the US decline. Since the key to this dilemma is based upon the perceived terrorist threat level in Canada, the main question should be: does the known terrorism threat at the border between Canada and the United States justify more security investments from both governments?

The missing element in both Canadian and American policies with respect to security is an end-state. At what point will the security at the border be sufficient, and at what point will the costs surpass the benefits? The hypothesis behind this article is that important improvements have been made in securing the border since 9/11, and that any new investments should be allocated, based upon a well-planned decision process that will take into account the myriad factors involved, not just the political imperative of ‘doing something.’

To that end, the purpose of this article is to determine if the improvements in security at the border since 9/11 are sufficient to meet the ‘reasonable level of security’ expected by Canada’s citizens, as well as how to plan new investments and commitments. Its scope will be limited to the terrorism threat, and not the other threats, which consist primarily of criminal activities. In the context of this article, the expression ‘reasonable level of security’ refers to the tools and measures necessary to prevent or to intercept terrorism before it reaches the United States, while simultaneously maintaining an open border, which permits trade and travel between the two nations.

Discussion

In past studies, several authors have provided information with respect to the status of the border before 9/11, and they provide a good benchmark for viewing the changes that have been effected since 2001. Jason Ackleson of New Mexico State University, in his paper, From Thin to Thick, refers to the US-Canada border before 9/11 as “…at best, a thin, relatively weak legal boundary.” All the focus at the time was based upon economy and trade between the two countries. He presents a list of economic agreements, all intended to “…facilitate trade, coordinate policy and efficiently manage the border.” Those agreements permitted a major increase in exchanges, as reported
by retired US Colonel C.P. Stacey in his article, *Undeﬁned no More*. The trade statistics rose to 80 percent of Canadian exports going to the US, and $250 billion worth of imports generated each year. The number of people crossing the border also grew to over 200 million a year, with the Windsor-Detroit border crossing having the highest transit volume in the world.4

With respect to the security aspect, an accurate summary of the border status pre-9/11 has been provided by Brigit Matthiesen, Senior Advisor to the US Government and her panellists from the Safe and Secure Canada–United States Border Conference, held in 2009.5 At that time, Canadian border agents were not armed, and they were often stationed alone at any given border post. There was also very minimal communication between the Canadian and US border agencies, and there was very little intelligence sharing between border agencies, but also with other Canadian law enforcement organizations.

Some observers espouse an insufﬁcient commitment to security on the part of Canada. York University professor Daniel Drache, in *Borders Matter: Homeland Security & the Search for North America*, presents the attitude of the Canadian government as still treating border politics as an economic issue.6 CP Stacey also cites a 2004 DHS report that refers to the Canadian border as being, “…too porous and poses a threat to US security.”7

On the policy side, some consider the Canadian attitude as being too liberal. Paul Rosenzweig, ex-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs for the DHS, wrote an article entitled, *Why the US doesn’t Trust Canada.*8 In this article, he denounces several Canadian policies as being too liberal with respect to the terrorist threat. He gives as an example the Canadian asylum policies, which, he believes, permits visa-free travel to the citizens of too many countries. Kent Roach of the University of Toronto also presents major differences between Canadian and American anti-terrorism policies. According to Roach, “[The] Canadian Counter-Terrorism Act is more respectful of human rights, its deﬁnition of human rights, preventive arrests, investigative hearings and secrecy provisions are more restrained than those of some other democracies.”9

Other papers touch upon the lack of security through public opinion. Deborah Waller Meyers, in her paper, *Does ‘Smarter’ Lead to Safer?,* discusses the perception in the United States that: “Canadian think security and border issues are only a US problem and that Canadians are not taking seriously enough the security issues.”10 Frank P. Harvey also cites a 2005 Ipsos-Reid poll that professed that around half the American and Canadian population believes that Canada is not doing enough to secure its border.11

On the other hand, some authors consider the Canadian contribution to security and counter-terrorism as being sufﬁcient. Ackleson cites the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) that have been created to patrol the border. The IBETs provide an “…integrated intelligence and tactical approach that combine law enforcement and counter-terrorism.”12 Those teams have greatly improved cooperation and efﬁciency at the border, particularly between the ports of entry. Deborah Waller Meyers also cites the NEXUS and US VISIT systems as being a successful way to combine security and ease of travel.13

John A. Winterdyk of Mount Royal University, and Kelly W. Sundberg, President and CEO of the International Institute of Criminal Justice Research, present most of what has been done by both countries to secure the border, and to ﬁght terrorism. Their assessment is that all the investments and policy changes have not created the promised secure environment, have caused multiple human right violations, and have struck serious blows to North American politics and democracy. For them, “Canada and the US have both taken dramatic steps to secure their borders from possible outside threats. What will be the long term cost?”14 Warren Coons, director of the IBETs in Canada, conﬁrms that “…national Security is the number one priority of all law enforcement agencies in both countries.”15 But for him, even with national security as the priority, the main threat at the border is criminality. Harvey also comments upon the Canadian national security policy. The government’s priority is closely aligned with that of the Americans: countering international terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD).16 Harvey regards those priorities as nonsense, since most Canadians do not believe them to be the most important security threats to Canada.

Another concept that surfaces in most of the research is the idea that perfect security is impossible. No matter how much money is invested in security, there will always remain a risk of failure. As Meyers states: “…there is no single realistic action that can be taken at borders that can prevent, with 100 percent certainty, another terrorist incident.”17 Harvey postulates that the US government will only be satisﬁed with perfect security, which is impossible to obtain. For that reason, he believes that spending will continue to increase, even if the goal will never be reached. He pushes the
idea even further, concluding that with all the resources invested in security since 9/11, if another attack was to happen, which is inevitable in his eyes, the public would automatically accuse the authorities of not doing enough, and this creates the need to spend even more. In essence, this would create a spiral wherein colossal amounts of money would be spent, again, for minimal gains. For Harvey, in this game, the terrorists have the upper hand, since small actions would have enormous consequences.22

Winterdyk and Sundberg also bring another interesting concept, stating that the border policy, the massive security spending, and the constant repetition to the public that there is an important terrorist threat at the border, might, through the concept of “moral panic,” create a real and superior threat.23 This concept was introduced by British criminologist Jock Young, and it refers to the sociological reaction to intense media coverage of a public issue. Even if the issue does not really exist, over time, people will start to emulate what they see or hear, and eventually, it will create an issue that was not there in the first place.24

Finally, one of the critical aspects of the problem seems to be missing from most of the research examined, namely, is there a terrorist threat within Canada? A few authors refer to it, implying that there is little proof that there are terrorists in Canada. Rosenzweig implies that since Canada has very liberal immigration and visa policies, it would be much easier for members of terrorist groups to enter and live in Canada.25 However, he does not provide evidence to confirm this claim. The most publicized case is when known-terrorist Ahmed Ressam tried to enter the US with a car packed with explosive material in 1999.26 It is, in fact, the only publicly-known case of a terrorist trying to cross the border from Canada into the United States.

The clearest reference to a terrorism threat was found in a book entitled *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around the World*, written by Stuart Bell, a Toronto journalist who specializes in terrorism and security issues.27 In his book, Bell refers to Canada as a breeding ground for terrorism. He believes that many of the most dangerous terrorist organizations have members in Canada, and that most of the deadliest attacks committed during the 20th Century had ties to Canada.

The literature with respect to border policies and security is abundant, and it also covers a wide spectrum of opinions and concepts. There is no consensus on the subject, and no clear trend that could show if public spending is sufficient, or even if the terrorist threat is real. This is likely due to the great difficulty associated with clearly defining what is ‘enough’ security. There is only minimal mention of the critical issue, at the policy level, of not providing an ‘end state,’ or an optimal security level where all the goals would be met. This is critical, because without such direction, spending will continue to spiral upwards, in order to try to fill the bottomless pit of the ‘perfect security’ fantasy.

What has changed since 9/11?

Many new laws and policies were put in place following the 9/11 attacks, most of which can be qualified as ‘unilateralism’ on behalf of the United States. Many of them had a direct impact upon the Canada-US border. The first and most important was, in 2001, the creation of the DHS, an organisation that brought together all the agencies charged with US security, “domestically, continentally and globally.”28 Its objective remains the protection of the United States, and it has the authority to take any measures necessary to ensure that protection. DHS is a massive organisation with over 216,000 employees and a growing budget, which blossomed from $20 billion in 2001, to $57 billion today.29 The DHS has basically nullified most of the previous border accords and put in place new rules, which both Canada and Mexico are obliged to follow. Those rules were put in place with no consultation with either Canada or Mexico. This unilateralism generated a deep economical impact, since the entire import-export industry of all three nations had to adapt to new costs and regulations. With the creation of the DHS, the number of agents at the border with Canada tripled. With this increase in personnel, the number of inspections also greatly increased, with expanded technological monitoring and new grounds for exclusion of entry into the US.30 As part of the new rules pertaining to border operations, visitors from more than 50 countries now require visas to enter the US,31 and Canadians, as of 2009, require a passport to cross the border. The passport policy has been pushed even further, whereby Canadians born outside Canada also require a visa to enter the US.32 In a 2002 case, Syria-born Canadian citizen Maher Arar was arrested while
travelling in the US. Arar was then deported to Syria, without notification being given to the Canadian authorities.33

New regulations also affect the commercial transports crossing the border. Since North American transportation system is integrated, “Canada and Mexico were informed that the entire continental transportation system had been re-regulated.” 34 All transportation companies have had to adapt to new rigorous security standards, including pre-clearances and pre-inspections by American personnel, new charges, and new delays at the border. The truck drivers themselves must also be cleared before they are permitted entry.

The security measures now in place at the border constitute a layered approach, whereby intelligence sharing between Canada and the US permits interception of a threat before it reaches the border. In several cases, DHS has also deployed custom and security personnel away from the border in order to intercept illegal immigration attempts. Road blocks, searches, and interrogations are conducted, even as far-ranging as 100 miles south of the border. As reported by US journalist Colin Woodard, in the State of New York, in some regions without access to the border, the number of customs and immigration agents has been increased, often resulting in a very aggressive presence near universities where foreign students are being actively monitored.35

Canada has followed the wave of security reforms since 9/11. Some bilateral accords have been signed, principal among them the Smart Border Accord of 2001, but most of the measures constituted ‘mirror imaging’ of the US measures. Bills C-11 (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act), and C-36 (the Anti-terrorism Act), closely resemble the American Patriot Act and the National Security Act in their intent, even if their application is more limited in Canada.36 In 2003, Canada created the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), which is the Canadian organizational parallel to the DHS. The Canadian rationale for placing multiple agencies under one umbrella was to “…create important synergies between national security and emergency management, corrections and crime prevention, justice information networks and law enforcement agencies,” 37 improving efficiency, data and intelligence sharing, and facilitating cooperation with the DHS.

Canada had also previously invested additional resources in the Joint Canada-United States Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs), created in 1996. These teams permit the monitoring of the large and problematic regions of the border that lie between the official ports of entry by law enforcement specialists from both nations. Canada also joined the US Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. Based upon the success of this organization, Canada agreed to review its immigration and visa policies, and also increased the number of its immigration officers deployed overseas.38

Other Canadian security and anti-terrorism initiatives have included the Anti-Terrorism Plan, which provided an extra C$5 billion to “…increase staffing of RCMP, Customs and Immigration, improve screening of immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors, enhance infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness, address border-security and increase the use of detention.”39 Canada also created the Border Infrastructure Fund, providing C$ 600 million to improve the physical security of the border posts. The border posts are also manned by extra personnel, and they are now armed.40

Success and Failures

Following more than a decade of investments and new regulations at the border, both successes and failures have transpired. On the American side, there is now a layered verification approach, allowing inspections and verification distant from the border, usually before shipments leave the country. This approach greatly improves the security of the frontier, since it tends to avoid last minute surprises and it helps the different agencies involved to maximize the use of intelligence.41 On both sides, intelligence is now better utilized...
through information sharing between the two nations and the different agencies involved in border security. This has been facilitated by the creation of those centralized organizations, the DHS and CBSA, resulting in less duplication of personnel and responsibilities, and an (intended) standardization of the databases being utilized. These initiatives help in the interception of threats before they get to the border, a capability which was nearly impossible in the past.42

Several initiatives have been put in place to minimize the effect of the extra security measures on the economy. Programs such as the Canadian NEXUS and the US-VisIt are now in place, permitting travelers that cross the border frequently to get a pre-clearance card and save time when crossing.43 Similar programs have been introduced by the US for the commercial ground shipping, under aegis of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). This program permits shipping companies to be certified by US custom agents, thus avoiding further border inspections and delays.44 It provides more stability for import/export between Canada and the US, since most supply chains are based upon ‘just in time’ delivery of goods, which make additional delays at the border very costly.45

The IBETs also constitute a significant improvement to securing the border, especially at those most vulnerable spots between the border posts. These units permit cooperation between the many national agencies on ‘both sides of the fence.’ Intelligence sharing through the IBETs now results in the interception of thousands of people that would have been able to cross undetected in the past. According to Warren Coons, Canadian Director of IBETs, the teams have been successful in thwarting several terrorist attacks while they were still in the planning process.46

Unfortunately, a number of initiatives have also been qualified failures. On the US side, DHS has been accused many times of wasting funds, lacking effectiveness, and even, of corruption. In 2008, American radio media reported that the organization faces low morale, misses deadlines, and has questionable successes.47 Earlier, a 2005 DHS report stipu-
lated that millions were misspent by the organisation, and that 146 personnel had been arrested for accepting bribes. One of the most questionable programs initiated by DHS was the SBINet ‘virtual fence’ program. Developed by Boeing, the program was eventually cancelled after generating a $400 million cost overrun.

On the Canadian side, CBSA has also experienced its failures. In 2007, 1200 students were hired under a summer employment initiative to work at different border crossings. However, these temporary workers critically lacked the experience and the maturity required for the job. Many incidents occurred, caused by irresponsible or inappropriate actions by these young employees. CBSA regular employees also lost some credibility when in 2007, the media reported that one-fifth of the border agents failed their firing tests. Maclean’s magazine has also accused CBSA of using most of its resources to maximize the revenue generated by the border, and less upon actual security. To cite a specific occurrence from 2007, the US Accountability Office conducted a security check, wherein two of their agents crossed the border with “a bag that looked like radioactive material,” without it being detected by Canadian border agents.

There have also been two major failures with respect to intelligence sharing between CBSA and DHS. The first is the actual incompatibility of the different databases that are being used by the agencies, which makes the sharing of information very difficult and inefficient. The second problem is the apparent conflict between intelligence sharing and privacy protection. The DHS require personal information on Canadian citizens for security and screening purposes, but there are no agreements as to what will be done with this information once it is in American hands. Fundamentally, there is no clear understanding on what information can be shared, and what should be protected under privacy laws.

Finally, the 2004 Canadian Auditor General’s report criticized the Canadian government for the way it handled its security spending immediately after 9/11. The report found no evidence that any threat assessment had been produced after 9/11, and that the policies and investments generated in its wake were not based upon known requirements, but rather, upon a perceived urgency to ‘do something.’ The report also noted that money and efforts were often poorly focussed, resulting in little progress with respect to security.

What is known about a terrorist threat in Canada?

Reference is often made to terrorist activities in Canada, but overall, supporting evidence is difficult to find. Even if some describe the situation as extreme, most experts consider the threats to be questionable. A few concrete examples, such as the case of Ahmed Ressam, do not constitute a compelling trend, considering that more than 200 million people cross the border every year. DHS reported that between 2004 and 2007, it intercepted 1160 foreigners with prior criminal convictions, or who “…pose a security threat” to the US. What has not been qualified is the number of suspected terrorists considered within those 1160 persons. Without it, it is impossible to judge success in securing the border. “Security threat” is a very generic term which does not necessarily relate to terrorism.

Authorities assure us that they are able to stop terrorists before they act, but very little is reported to the public, so it is even harder to assess such success. The US Custom Agency reports that on an average day, they seize over 7000 pounds of drugs. Further, every day, 800 persons are denied entry into the US, but the reasons for denial are not made available to the public. Those are successes, mostly against criminal activities, but the number of interceptions and denied entries are also due to the new rules with respect to visas and passports, which have expanded the reasons to deny entry. Thus, these statistics, taken by themselves, cannot be seen as good indicators of a terrorism threat.

A legitimate concern for a potential threat is the border itself. Its varied geography makes it very complex to monitor, and even with the IBETs, there are still major portions of the border that are vulnerable to illegal activities. What makes the problem even worse is the infrastructure in place at the ports of entries, which is “significantly outdated.” There is reasonable concern from the authorities on both sides of the border with respect to being able to ensure an entirely secure frontier. But it is also accepted as a reality of life that completely securing the longest undefended border in the world is simply not practicable.

Conclusion

By researching through official documents and academic literature, it is possible to better understand security issues as they relate to the border. There has been important progress in term of securing travel and economic activities. It is now more layered, better staffed, and more coordinated. And intelligence sharing is better than ever. Unfortunately, there are still some gaps. Massive organisations such as DHS and CBSA will always be plagued with bureaucratic problems, and human factors will always enter into the equation. The length of the border is also a major issue, but this has always been the case, and it is well recognized that a complete surveillance of the border is effectively impossible.

The most difficult aspect to assess is the success of the funds allocated to the overall security of the border. Billions of dollars have been invested from both governments to improve security, which was clearly deficient before the 9/11 attacks. Unfortunately, with a terrorism threat which was so difficult to assess at the time, it was difficult to determine what security measures were required to ‘fix’ the assumed weaknesses at the border. For the same
reason, it is still extremely difficult to assess what future measures are required, and what funds are reasonably necessary to meet an optimal level of security.

As expressed by Deborah Waller Meyers, “We must acknowledge the possibility of future attacks and take every reasonable action to prevent them as well as respond to them. But we must remain a society open to visitor and trade and true to our democratic heritage.” Considering the level of cross border traffic, a security failure of some measure is impossible to avoid indefinitely. It is unfeasible to attain a perfect security system which would prevent all terrorist attacks. With those facts in mind, extra care should be taken with respect to the implementation of future security measures, but spending at the border cannot constitute a bottomless pit generated by a pervasive need just to ‘do something.’ If too much is needlessly invested, a future attack, even a small one, will significantly erode public confidence, and pressure will trump even more security investments to bring back the lost trust.

Certainly, the terrorist threat must continue to be addressed vigorously and innovatively, not necessarily just by more security measures, but also by a better understanding of the actual threats and by objective and accurate reporting to our respective citizens. If the media and the authorities continue to propagate the idea that Canada is a fertile ground for terrorism, and that terrorists can walk freely and unchallenged on Canadian soil, it might well encourage actual terrorists to do so, thus creating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’

Finally, there are several examples that can offer pointers with respect to ways in which to counter terrorism. Most of the recent attacks that struck the Western world, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Moscow in 2011, were all committed by terrorists born in the country of occurrence. Even if better border security had been in place, it probably would not have affected the outcome. Another good example is the situation in Israel. No matter how much security is added, including a physical wall between Israel and the Palestinians, the attacks continue. Even worse, the constant state of security in Israel is believed to be part of the reason why the attacks continue.

Unfortunately, this article cannot offer a satisfactory answer to the question: does the known terrorism threat at the border between Canada and the United States justify more security investments from both governments? Investments and improvements have indeed been made, and the border is much more secure than it was before the 9/11 attacks, but our respective economies have since suffered. Without a better understanding of the threat itself, and a clear understanding of what the ‘reasonable level of security’ should be, unfettered increases in spending would neither be rational nor constructive. Unless both governments can agree upon what would constitute an acceptable level of risk, security investments will never stop increasing, since absolute security is an impossible ideal.
NOTES

6. Ibid., p.337.
7. Ibid., p.338.
11. Stacey, p. 27.
12. Rosenzweig, pp. 33-35.
14. Meyers, p. 27.
17. Meyers.
21. Meyers, p. 27.
25. Rosenzweig, pp. 33-35.
30. Meyers.
31. Drache.
32. Ackleson, pp. 336-351.
33. Drache.
34. Ibid., p. 9.
36. Drache.
38. Meyers.
39. Ibid., p.11.
41. Meyers.
42. Matthiesen, pp. 91-125.
43. Ackleson, pp. 336-351.
45. Meyers.
46. Matthiesen, pp. 91-125.
47. Winterdyk and Sundberg, pp. 1-18.
49. Ackleson, pp. 336-351.
52. Ackleson, p. 341.
54. Matthiesen, pp. 91-125.
56. Matthiesen, pp. 91-125.
57. Meyers.
58. Matthiesen, p. 119.
59. Meyers, p. 29.
60. Harvey, pp. 265-294.
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE NATION, 17 JANUARY 1961 ~ AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING TRUTH CLAIMS AND ITS RELEVANCE TODAY

Garrett Lawless and A.G. Dizboni

Introduction

Eisenhower’s farewell address is a polarizing work that finds promoters and detractors throughout the political spectrum. Although its contents cover much more than the one topic for which the speech is most famous, most analyses of this speech focus primarily upon the public-private defence relationship he dubbed the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). Eisenhower’s own handling of this subject within the address is superficial, and on the surface, his warning also appears contradictory to many of the defense-related decisions that he made throughout his two terms as president. So it is, then, that over the last half-century, both “doves and hawks” alike have been able to call upon the ghost of Eisenhower to support their opposing defense theses. That the speech is really a protracted call for balance is too often missed or ignored; and when it is discussed, this balance call is frequently only examined as a footnote to the greater MIC debate. This is disappointing. Within the address, what Eisenhower calls for in the specific is a continued balance of cooperation and partisanship within Congress, a renewed balance in national programs (to include the MIC as one among many), and a better balance between the wants of today and the needs of tomorrow. However, what Eisenhower calls for in the general is an alert and knowledgeable citizenry that will be capable of affecting this balance; and this, above all else, is the aspect of the speech most worthy of analysis. Indeed, the fruitfulness of this address for today’s audience lies in the high task of developing our own understanding of what

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divergent truths led to this call for balance in the first place, so that we may be alert to just how tenuous our knowledge of these great subjects are today, and then perhaps, move us a little bit closer to becoming the ideal citizen Eisenhower envisioned.

Discussion

As a preliminary exercise, it is worth exploring how something like truth can be divergent in the first place. Is not truth by definition singular? Indeed, this is the key that unlocks the rest. What is truth? If asked, most citizens would probably be hard pressed to give anything more than circular definitions of the word; and as we will see, it is this lack of understanding about truth in general that is the high obstacle for meaningful debate. For starters, many of us only understand the concept of truth scientifically. Undoubtedly, science is a powerful tool that has yielded many great results, and the emotional impact of witnessing significant scientific advances has, within the western cultural psyche, led many people to believe that objective truth is not only possible, but common. The problem with this is that such a belief can quickly stalemate public policy debates, because each side will feel that they are categorically right in their assertions, and so close their mind to the opposite view. This will occur honestly enough, because each side of the debate will have genuinely come to believe in certain truths that support their own position and other truths that defeat the opposite view. In this way, if one believes that there can only be one truth, then neither side of the debate will be capable of being sufficiently open towards the other to possibly accept it; and therefore, strong emotional and polarizing divides will be born, meaningful debate will die, and in the void, only empty rhetoric will remain.

The deeper understanding of truth is that it is simply any proposition that can be honestly held, consistently within the totality of those other beliefs experienced by an individual. In this manner, truth really is existential, and so, by approaching the opponents and proponents of Eisenhower’s balance calls existentially, we can better position ourselves to understand, discuss, and assess the relative merits of all sides. Thankfully, doing this is easier than it at first appears. Without delving (for the moment) into a nuanced philosophical discussion about something called a hermeneutic horizon, all which really matters is that one open one’s mind a little bit and recognize that no side of any argument speaks without a very real conviction that their position is true. Within this framework, let us now turn our attention to the issues of Congressional cooperation, the balance of national programs, and the balancing of the wants of today with the needs of tomorrow. By examining the divergent truth-claims surrounding these issues within the context of Eisenhower’s farewell address, the overriding importance and difficulty of generating an alert and knowledgeable citizenry should be made clear.

That Eisenhower opens his address by thanking Congress for their propensity towards cooperation over partisanship is enough to ignite strong feelings of nostalgia even in those not old enough to recall such heady times of efficient governance. Is it true that this government cooperated? By all accounts it is. The record of agreement between the President and Congress during Eisenhower’s tenure is remarkable, but what was so special about this particular moment in history that this level of cooperation does not seem
to appear at most other points in history? Within the broader context of this nascent nuclear age in America, there are perhaps two important markers that can be distilled out as making this period unique: fear and economics.

Today, it is common to recall the Eisenhower presidential era as one of high ideals, nice cars, happy music, and a prosperous outlook on life. Similarly, today, many defense planners openly pine for the ‘good old days’ of the Cold War, wherein the enemy was clear, and strategies were simple. It is interesting how quickly we forget that despite these niceties, the 1950s were also a period of tremendous fear of a man-made nuclear apocalypse. On one side, the US actively promoted a particularly positive view of itself, and on the other side of the iron curtain, the Soviet Union was demonized for its political philosophies and practices. This dichotomy was so extreme, and the fear that it produced was so intense that prominent US citizens would be publicly tried if even rumoured to hold any socialist philosophies. Eisenhower himself proclaimed that “he would rather be atomized than communized.” He had even developed a robust if not suicidal strategy for how to actually fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, which included how to train the citizenry through public reaction campaigns intended to regiment their response to a nuclear attack. This would (hopefully) ensure that no one would get ‘too hysterical’ after the predicted 25-30 American cities got ‘shellacked,’ thus giving the nation its best hope to rebuild itself from the ashes of a nuclear attack.

Is it any wonder that, within this context, the president enjoyed overwhelming cooperation from Congress? In a similar way, the 9-11 attacks on the US also removed many of the usual obstacles that normally impede presidential authority. In the wake of that nightmare, Congress overwhelmingly supported President Bush, and the Democratic opposition gave him a nearly free hand to act.

The difference between these two periods and most others is that intense fear has a way of raising common ground among otherwise divergent ideas, and thankfully, for the present moment, no such fear exists. Issues of health care, deficit spending, and the tone of US foreign policy are all important matters, but none of them alone or in concert represent any kind of clear and present danger around which the US population will rally. Instead, the population feels largely secure, and therefore, they remain content to pursue divergent agendas, based upon their own personal truth-claims. Specifically, there is less Congressional cooperation today because there is no emotionally intense focus upon any particular thing, which can then draw our personal notions of truth towards some common understanding.

The issue of economics is a bit more complicated. Despite great pretense to the contrary, economics is not a science in the strict sense of the word. Where the physical sciences postulate hypotheses and then rigorously test their validity within emotionally detached, controlled, and repeatable experiments, economics attempts to describe a system that is not controllable, and is subject to many emotional variables. In this way, economics tends to propose models that can accurately describe past events, but which often fail miserably in predicting the future. This in itself is fine, but where things tend to go awry is that this field of study also likes to wrap itself in the nomenclature of calculus. This then gives economics the appearance of mathematics, and this can lead to great and undeserved faith in its often contradictory and polarizing conclusions.

Specific to the era of Eisenhower, the ‘economic theory du jour’ that went a long way towards fostering accidental Congressional cooperation was Keynesian economics.

If feeling particularly poetic, one could describe the essential history of Western economics by saying that Adam Smith slayed
Hobbes’ Leviathan with an invisible hand and set the stage for capitalism. For those unfamiliar, Thomas Hobbes had suggested that humans needed to be ruled by an all-powerful monarch (the Leviathan), who would protect them from the wild and anarchic world around them. Adam Smith then argued that despite this anarchy, humans acting in support of their own self-interest would be guided by an ‘invisible hand’ that would then demand that they cooperate and help each other, and this cooperation is what will ultimately bring about the most prosperity for any individual. The problem with this invisible hand is that while it seems to work wonderfully in the long term, in the short game, there are sometimes hiccups that can cause devastation to free markets. This is ultimately what caused the stock market crash of 1929. In response, John Maynard Keynes proposed the adoption of a sort of ‘mini-Leviathan’ in the form of government controls to help buffer these periods, and in the Eisenhower era, this approach seemed to be working quite well. 

Ironically, bureaucratically self-serving exaggerations of Keynesian theory made the Republicans and Democrats of this era odd bedfellows. Rather than promoting the application of simple governmental controls on the economy, many on the left took the idea much further, and instead, used it to promote bigger government in general. Included within this structure was the idea of a larger defence industry that would be subsidized and influenced by the federal government. In this way, Congressional cooperation of this era was to a certain degree accidental. Eisenhower was not a Keynesian, and he loathed the idea of big government, but the Democrats knew that he also had a weak spot for defence. Thus, when Congress would push for ever more spending on defence programs that were supplying great revenue and jobs within their constituencies, it was only because the President was so concerned with national security that Congress normally got what it requested (and/or demanded). Taken from the point of view of truth, Congressional cooperation within this period is unique in history because of the effect that tremendous security fears had in generating a common ground upon which fierce opponents could agree. For this reason, even though both left and right each ascribed to different economic philosophies with respect to government spending, it just so happened that on the issue of defence spending, both sides of the debate desired the same action.

Naturally, the expedient unity on defence programs unraveled in the greater context of national programs, and this is what caused Eisenhower to fear that national programs in general were becoming unbalanced. However, contrary to what some would believe, it is incorrect to presume that Eisenhower would have wished to achieve a better balance in this area by increasing funding to other programs. Within the text of his farewell address, it is easy to find traces of the President’s strong preference for private entrepreneurial pursuits, such as when he juxtaposes the image of a heroic solitary inventor tinkering in his garage with bleak task forces of government-sponsored scientists working to fulfill some uninspired external mandate. Certainly, given Eisenhower’s fundamental hatred of communism, it is easy to imagine how uneasy such public-private relationships must have made him. Eisenhower did not want the government involved with the economy, but within Congress, there was great hope that the government would play an aggressive role in fostering full employment for the population through greater opportunities within government sponsored programs. Thus, with the only programs of this nature that Eisenhower would support being those of defence-based industry, it is easy to see how this one national program grew aggressively, while virtually all the others languished.
With Respect to the Past

The situation is no different today, and Eisenhower’s call for balance in national programs has not been heeded. This year, the US government spent more money on defence than on any other program, and by some calculations, has spent more money on defence than all other government programs combined. However, this imbalance is easily misunderstood, and therefore, it can be used to support a broad variety of contradictory arguments, some of which were made by Eisenhower himself. During one speech, Eisenhower claimed, “… [that] every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft. The cost of one modern, heavy bomber is this: a modern, brick school in more than 30 cities.” The problem is that such statements oversimplify the nature of government spending, which, in the end, needs to be viewed as an investment. Beyond the simple purchase of security, investing in defence industries also creates jobs and cash flows within the economy, and these, in turn, stoke the nation’s industrial engine in an immediate way that investing in educational infrastructure does not.

St. Basil’s cathedral in Red Square at night.

This is not to say that investing in education is without merit. Clearly, it is, but public debate is degraded when arguments are made for their rhetorical impact, rather than their true merit. It also presumes that if the US government were to scale back defence spending, it would instead reroute this funding to other national programs, and this is a false notion. In the final analysis, the US is a nation that embraces a free capitalist economy. The imbalance of national programs towards defence exists primarily because the fear and patriotism that this area generates within the public imagination provides a space for agreement among US politicians, and ultimately, it is this unique agreement that lubricates spending. However, because government spending in general goes against an almost primordial US resistance towards big government and bureaucratic influence in the first place, it is unlikely that any other national program will ever receive strong support, regardless of the greater or lesser support that may be given to defence in the future.

Eisenhower feared that this spending imbalance was robbing prosperity from future generations, which is an interesting fear, considering that he also felt that it was a very real possibility that there might not be any discernible future. Thankfully, in this regard, Eisenhower appears to have been mistaken. Not only has the world survived, but whatever ‘highs and lows’ the US economy has experienced over the last half-century, the level of prosperity enjoyed by US citizens today is far greater than what was enjoyed in his era. That said, this record of success does nothing to remove the same spending fears from entering the public debates of today, nor should it do so. No responsible society worthy of the label can conduct its affairs without an eye to the future, and this brings us to the general call of Eisenhower’s address: the need for an alert and knowledgeable citizenry. As long as meaningful political agreement can only be generated through intense fear, the future of Congressional cooperation will remain bleak. Also, as Eisenhower knew, the quality of public debate in general, which must be the arena where future national directions are charted, depends entirely upon society’s engagement, interest, and understanding of the articles debated. But, how realistic is this ambition for the ideal citizen? Can there be a common ground able to support Congressional productivity that is not rooted in fear? And how realistic is this notion of the ideal citizen? If there is to be an alternative, what is it? This brings us back to the question of truth.

The ‘hawks and doves’ who misrepresent Eisenhower on the issue of the MIC probably also fail to grasp the complexity of his position, and therefore, they should at least be considered honest in their truth claims. This in itself is not problematic. In fact, what is supposed to happen in such circumstances is that each side would bring their honest positions to the other, and in so considering the other’s positions fully and with an open mind, each would then come away with a fuller and deeper understanding of, for instance, Eisenhower’s apprehension about the MIC; that it developed incidentally within his competing national security fears and pre-Keynesian ideals. But this is not what normally happens. Instead, public policy debate too often becomes debased to a cacophony of empty rhetoric that everyone derides, yet concurrently embraces. This situation can become utterly confusing, and within contemporary political literature, no one seems able to discern a practical remedy for it. Unfortunately, this does not provide optimism for the development of an alert and knowledgeable citizenry.

It is claimed that no one can discern a practical remedy for this problem within contemporary political literature, but there is another field of study that does offer some hope because it deeply contemplates precisely this sort of issue. The field is called herme-neutics, and while it unfortunately remains little studied outside of philosophy, due to its esoteric language and methodologies, it does hold some promise for generating something close to Eisenhower’s ideal citizen. Within this philosophy is the notion of a hermeneutic horizon. This kind of horizon can be pictured as the mental field...
The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), best known for his concept of philosophical hermeneutics.

of view that one has when one looks out into the world around themselves. Specifically, it is the referential totality by which one is able to understand the world that they find themselves within. This is a difficult concept, so some further explanation may be warranted. Consider the fact that you cannot understand anything solely in terms of itself. Instead, you can only understand any object or idea in terms of its relation to some other object or idea. Take a moment to consider this. Now, if one can only understand something in terms of its relation to other things or ideas, it stands to reason that one is then only capable of understandings that are possible within the referential framework that that person has accumulated and internalized by virtue of their experiences in life. It is this that defines and limits the referential considerations of which one is capable, and the sum total of these referentials forms one’s personal hermeneutic horizon. Ultimately, it is this horizon that dictates what thoughts, ideas, and understandings are possible for any individual.

The mistake that people tend to make is that they presume that because an idea does not make sense within their personal hermeneutic horizon, that this idea then does not make sense in the universal. This can have very polarizing effects, because people will then come to believe that others, who hold ideas that do not fit within this horizon, simply hold nonsensical ideas. Clearly, this is not productive. Coupling this with the incredible pace of modern life, and the fact that somehow we now tend to believe that it is the responsibility of every citizen in a democracy to have opinions about everything, and one may begin to understand the source of the bombastic and empty rhetoric that both guides and limits the polarizing public policy debates of today. This need not be so. While it is unreasonable, counter-productive even, to expect citizens to become alert and knowledgeable on the incredibly broad and complicated discussions which take place within the public sphere, it should not be too much to ask that they understand how it is that they understand at all. The openness to opposing ideas, and the humility in one’s own thoughts that would result from this knowledge, is surely worth more than any specific understanding of a particular public policy.

Conclusion

Eisenhower’s farewell address will continue to resonate with those who look to understand the psyche of a nation grappling to cope concurrently with a surging economy and a near-infinite security threat. Controversial as the speech may at times appear, the ideas expressed therein are consistent within the broad context of the man and his era. Concerns with respect to national programs, public-private partnerships, and economic philosophies are interesting and worthy of real consideration, but it is the call for an alert and knowledgeable citizenry that demands the most consideration. From the wrong perspective, this appears to be an impossible wish. Even those who exist professionally within the public sphere can only hope to have deep understanding of certain specific subsets of the greater whole. But this is the wrong perspective. Instead of hoping for the impossible, what should be sought instead is a more common understanding of how it is that we understand anything at all. Armed with this, public debate should become more meaningful, nuanced, humble, and productive.

NOTES

10. Speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 16 April 1953.
11. Ira Chernus, “The Real Eisenhower.”
LESSONS FROM THE PAST

The Battle of Lake Erie, by Peter Rindlisbacher.

BREAKING THE STALEMATE: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE DURING THE WAR OF 1812

Jean-François Lebeau

Introduction

The War of 1812 is remembered for both its pitched land battles (i.e., Queenston Heights and New Orleans) and its famous sea battles between the Royal Navy (RN) and the United States Navy (USN). Yet, these famous engagements are only a small fraction of all the battles fought during the war. It has been suggested that the War of 1812 more closely resembled the First World War than its contemporary, the Napoleonic Wars. The hardships of the Upper Canadian wilderness and the American Northwest demonstrated that winter and disease were as much the enemy as the opposing military. The war continued for two-and-a-half years until the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 ended hostilities. Although this war has been exhaustively studied, one aspect that remains relatively unknown is the extensive use of amphibious warfare. In fact, many of the important battles were amphibious operations, including York, Chesapeake Bay, and New Orleans. Furthermore, both sides conducted many amphibious raids throughout the war.

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Why was amphibious warfare used so extensively? Why would the operational commanders decide to conduct amphibious operations when they had easy access by land to the enemy’s territory? To answer these questions, these operations must be put into context. This article will demonstrate that amphibious operations were a solution: (a) to overcome the natural obstacles of the wilderness, (b) to break the stalemate on land, (c) to provide commanders operational mobility and flexibility, and (d) to attempt to generate a psychological advantage. For the purpose of this article, discussion and analysis will be limited to the Atlantic and Great Lakes Basin theatres of operations.

The Atlantic Theatre of Operations

The British clearly dominated in the Atlantic theatre with the use of amphibious operations. They made full use of the extensive experience in expeditionary warfare they had gained during the Napoleonic Wars, as well as their advantageous positioning around the United States. As the world’s foremost naval power, Britain was capable of coercing an enemy economically, psychologically, and militarily. The nation’s main focus in 1812 was the European war against Napoleon, and she was not initially willing or prepared to go on the offensive in North America. Consequently, the British resorted to a defensive strategy until additional troops and resources were made available after Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. Prior to 1814, British strategy aimed to cripple the American economy via a guerre de course, to restrict the USN to its home waters, and to defend British North America from American invasions.

The Atlantic theatre of operations stretched from Newfoundland down the Eastern seaboard and into the Gulf of Mexico. This theatre was vital to the British because it was their only means of supplying their colonies and implementing their strategy against the Americans. Halifax and Bermuda were the two main stations for the RN in the Atlantic, and these could be supplemented with forces from the Leeward Islands and Jamaica stations in the Caribbean. These stations were strategically positioned to allow the British to maintain a presence in the Western Atlantic Ocean, escort or intercept convoys, enforce a blockade on American ports, defend the sea lines of communication to Québec City, and potentially act as springboards for an assault upon the United States.

The American military strategy had been largely ‘land-centric’ since the days of Thomas Jefferson, and the USN had only been created at the turn of the 19th Century, following the ‘quasi-war’ with France, and Mediterranean operations conducted during the Barbary Wars. When war was declared in 1812, the USN was ill-prepared for large-scale naval operations. Its few remaining ships were old – albeit large – frigates, and they were widely dispersed along the Atlantic coast, while the major cities were defended by a series of fortified positions.

A major concern for the United States at the outset of the War of 1812 was the lack of professional military personnel. There were few ‘regulars’ available for coastal defence, and most of these men were scattered across the country. President James Madison’s strategy revolved around the enclave of Upper and Lower Canada, which required the bulk of the US Army’s regulars, and relied upon militia forces for coastal defence. The American naval strategy was to create havoc by breaking the RN blockade, and to raid British commerce on the high seas. Matching the British in numbers was not feasible, especially after the defeat of Napoleon. Privateering was a solution to ensure that American trade to Europe continued. By the summer of 1814, despite the success of privateers, the American economy was in shambles.

British Operations – Summer of 1814

Despite some early victories by the USN, the RN gained control of the Atlantic Ocean in 1813 and implemented a campaign of amphibious raids led by Rear-Admiral George Cockburn. Its purpose was to harass the American population, perhaps create some dissidence, gather resources for the RN, and finally, to divert the American governments’ attention away from the Great Lakes Basin. This campaign forced the United States to maintain its coastal defences. In early 1814, Vice-Admiral Alexander Cochrane established an amphibious force at Bermuda using Royal Marines and regulars that had been redeployed from the Caribbean. From there, amphibious raids or assaults could be launched anywhere along the Eastern seaboard and into the Gulf of Mexico. Halifax was also an important location, with enough troops and resources stationed there to pose a threat to New England. However, it was not until the summer of 1814 that the British began to use larger amphibious raids to accomplish specific objectives.

Several amphibious operations took place in the summer of 1814. General Sir John Sherbrooke, then Lieutenant-Governor of
Nova Scotia, was ordered to capture the state of Maine in order to secure an overland route to Québec City. He planned to conduct a series of amphibious raids aimed at testing American defences and securing strategic positions along the coast. In June 1814, the British commenced their operation with the capture of Thomaston and St. George on the Penobscot River in Maine, followed by a raid on Eastport in July. This secured their position and allowed them to carry on with the main assault on Castine in September. Castine was not only a base for privateers, but it also provided access inland due to its position on the Penobscot River, which was vital to controlling Maine. A British strike force landed at Castine in early September and made its way up river to Bangor. The resulting victory created a year-round overland route to Lower Canada, and ensured a continuous flow of British supplies and troops to continue the war.

In addition, the main offensive had been launched two weeks prior in the Chesapeake Bay area. The bay provided access to two of the most important centres in the United States: Washington and Baltimore. The former was the seat of government, while the latter was the most important privateer port in the country. The British were already familiar with the area because Rear-Admiral Cockburn had been raiding coastal towns for over a year, and the RN had successfully blockaded USN forces in the bay. In August 1814, a strike force under the joint command of Cockburn and Major-General Robert Ross departed Bermuda with orders to conduct a large-scale amphibious raid on the American capital. The British force landed at Benedict on the Patuxent River on 19 August 1814, and marched north towards the American capital. In the meantime, Cockburn’s naval force conducted flanking operations up the Patuxent and Potomac Rivers. After routing the American forces at Bladensburg, the British captured Washington on the 24th of August. They continued with a joint assault on Baltimore in September, where they were eventually repulsed on the 14th of September. The intent of this campaign was to demonstrate their ability to strike deep inside American territory and close to the centre of power. There was no intent to occupy the region, but rather, to cause destruction and incite fear within the population. After Baltimore, the British force re-embarked and returned to its bases in Halifax and Bermuda for the final planning stages with respect to the upcoming invasion of New Orleans.

The Battle of New Orleans

The city of New Orleans lies at the mouth of the Mississippi River and it was (and remains) a major American shipping port. The city controlled access to the river, and by extension,
to the Midwest as far north as Ohio. Therefore, it represented a very attractive military and economic target for the British. The preparations for the New Orleans invasion started in the summer of 1814 after the Chesapeake Bay operations. The British were hopeful they could take advantage of the strife between the American and the Creek natives, and have the latter assist them with the invasion. With the war in Europe over, England was able to allocate more troops for this operation. The proposed strength initially varied widely, but by mid-December 1814, there were up to 10,000 British troops in the Mississippi River delta. However, its terrain was treacherously lined with bayous and flood plains, making it disadvantageous for the invaders. Furthermore, the river’s strong current made navigation up river difficult for sailing ships, and impossible for major warships. Consequently, the British decided to conduct an amphibious landing and trek overland to New Orleans. They found the enemy in entrenched positions without any artillery or naval support. After a series of attacks, the British forces were defeated by Major-General Andrew Jackson on 8 January 1815 after which they retreated and departed for other operations along the gulf coast.

The Battle of New Orleans demonstrated that amphibious operations have to be well planned and executed. The British did not fully take into consideration the challenges of the geography, did not make use of all the intelligence available about the enemy, and they underestimated American leadership and morale.

The Great Lakes Theatre of Operations

The situation was different in the Great Lakes Basin. Unlike in the Atlantic Ocean, amphibious warfare was not so one-sided, and both sides attempted to gain the initiative on land and for control of the lakes. The American strategy was to invade Upper Canada and fight eastward towards the fortress of Québec City in order to force the British out. Therefore, most of their land operations took place in the Great Lakes Basin, most particularly, in the area spanning from Detroit to Kingston.

When war was declared in June 1812, the Americans were confident they were going to ‘blitz’ through Upper Canada and make their way to Québec City by the end of the year. They planned to continue on to Halifax the following summer, and ultimately force the British out of North America. In reality the British, assisted by the Canadian militia and their native allies, proved to be strong opponents, despite their smaller numbers. The 1812 campaign was disastrous for the Americans, and they suffered humiliating defeats at Detroit and in the Niagara peninsula. The land battles resulted in stalemates and no appreciable gains were made by either side.

One of the obstacles faced in that remote area was the lack of infrastructure and resources available away from major centres. The road networks were primitive, and there were no canals connecting Lakes Erie and Ontario to other waterways. This made it difficult to build, maintain, and supply military forces. Following the failure of its land forces in 1812, the United States decided to invest in its naval forces to counter the British advantage on the lakes. The British had access to the St. Lawrence River, and by extension, the Atlantic Ocean, as well as resources from Europe. This was an advantage, because resources were scarce in Canada. But it was also a disadvantage, because the British were also at risk of being cut off from this lifeline if the Americans gained control of the river.

Initially, the Provincial Marine, and later, the RN, permitted the British to control the Great Lakes, and allowed them to intervene relatively quickly anywhere on the lakes. The Americans realized that their strategy would only be successful if they could control the lakes. They built a new naval base at Presqu’Île on Lake Erie, and invested in the existing one located at Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario. Those bases were defended and given the infrastructures necessary to construct warships. The USN was at a serious disadvantage in terms of the number of ships they possessed, but they had easier access to greater resources than had the British. It remained easier to build and arm American warships because of the relative proximity of industrial centres, such as Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and New York City. The Americans embarked upon a shipbuilding program aimed to match the British fleet in size on the lakes, and to contest the latter’s superiority. Furthermore, the pool of men available for service was greater in the United States than it was in Upper Canada. Consequently, the naval bases at Presqu’Île and Sackets Harbor became embarkation points for US amphibious forces, and they were located within a short distance of any possible target in Upper Canada.
American and British Operations – Summer of 1813

The Americans resorted to amphibious warfare as early as 1813 with an amphibious assault on York, the capital of Upper Canada. This was part of their strategy to cut the British troops off in the Niagara region, subsequently allowing them to attack the main base at Kingston and to secure Upper Canada. The amphibious strike force sailed from Sackets Harbor in mid-April and was escorted by USN schooners, due to the looming British fleet. However, the final destination was not made apparent, causing the British to wonder where the attack would take place. Based upon the American strategy, a number of locations, such as Kingston, York, and Burlington Heights were considered possible objectives. York was chosen by the Americans because of its importance and strategic location, and General Henry Dearborn and Commodore Isaac Chauncey decided to attack on 27 April 1813. The landing force met some resistance but was able to capture York and rout the few British regulars and militiamen with support from the schooners. The Americans torched the legislative buildings, and later withdrew to prepare for follow-on operations.

The Americans continued with a successful amphibious assault upon Fort George in May. In response, British Commodore James Yeo launched a raid against Sackets Harbor in an attempt to force Chauncey to break off his support in the Niagara region. The British landing force captured the base and set it ablaze but the ships covering the raid were unable to get close enough to provide gunfire support. Tactically, the raid failed to destroy the infrastructure and the shipyard, but operationally, it forced Chauncey to break off the assault and return to base. Following two major defeats on land, and without naval support, the Americans were unable to consolidate their position on the Niagara peninsula, and were forced to retreat to their positions on the Niagara River. However, they did gain control of Lake Erie in September 1813 with a victory at the Battle of Put-in-Bay, which allowed them to pursue and defeat the British forces on the Thames River later that autumn.

The Great Lakes theatre of operations remained stagnant until the end of the war, despite some offensive operations by both sides. Amphibious warfare was not utilized to the same extent as it had been in early-1813. Several small-scale amphibious raids were conducted, but without significant results. By 1814, the British were re-deploying some of their forces from Europe and were preparing to go on the offensive on all fronts.

The Rationale for Amphibious Warfare

Commanders in the War of 1812 were influenced to resort to various types of amphibious operations as a result of several factors: (a) the geographical constraints, (b) the inconclusiveness of land battles, (c) the increased operational mobility and flexibility given by amphibious capabilities, and (d) the resulting psychological effects upon the enemy.

Geographical Constraints

The vast, scarcely populated and under-developed area over which the War of 1812 was fought represented a tremendous obstacle to all commanders. Many locales in Michigan and Upper
Canada were considered the frontier, and often, were only accessible by water. The movement of troops and supplies was severely impeded by under-developed roads. The operations in the swamps of the Maumee River region and the bayous of New Orleans demonstrated the difficulties of operating in such areas but more importantly the impossibility of rapidly moving troops. These difficulties were made even more significant in the northern states, due to the harsh climate of the North American winter. The British also faced difficult weather conditions in the Chesapeake Bay area during the summer of 1814, despite its relatively more southerly latitude. Furthermore, ice-covered lakes in the Great Lakes Basin forced the ships back to harbour and ‘hand-cuffed’ armies for several months. That said, in fact, few military operations were undertaken during the winter months.17

However, the many large bodies of water and rivers in North America allowed commanders to use amphibious warfare to counter this disadvantage. Ships could transport all the personnel and equipment in a short time without having to stop for meals or rest and were not encumbered by the lack of proper roads. Therefore, it was sensible for both sides to develop the ability to conduct various types of amphibious operations. Remoteness became less of an issue with the creation of naval fleets on Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie, as well as the ability to operate on Lake Huron.

Another geographical factor that encouraged the use of amphibious warfare was the proximity of most major centres to a body of water. Halifax, Bermuda, Boston, New York City, New Orleans, York and Detroit are all obvious examples. But so are Washington and Baltimore, which were accessible from the Chesapeake Bay, and, as the British demonstrated, well within marching distance of an amphibious landing area. By utilizing amphibious forces, commanders could often overcome some of these constraints.

**Increased Operational Mobility and Flexibility**

Operational mobility and flexibility is the ability of a commander to move his forces as necessary, and to choose between two or more different courses of actions in order to complete his mission and meet a superior’s intent. Amphibious forces gave operational commanders mobility and flexibility because they could embark their entire landing force, move it as required within a given theatre of operations, and adapt to changing situations.

During the summer of 1814, British Admiral Alexander Cochrane and his superiors in London were considering several targets in the United States. They knew that it was unlikely that General George Prevost, then-Governor General of Canada, would venture very far into New England, given his previous policies.18 Furthermore, any campaigns fought on the Canadian border had proven to be unsuccessful to that point in time. However, an amphibious force based upon Royal Marine and regular British Army troops would allow them to strike the Americans and open a second front.19 Admiral Cochrane had operational mobility because he controlled the Western Atlantic Ocean all the way south to the Gulf of Mexico and deep into American waters. In return, this mobility also gave him operational flexibility and the ability to choose the location and timing of any assault. The British decided to strike in Maine and the Chesapeake Bay area, and then to withdraw in order to re-deploy their forces for the main invasion of New Orleans. Land-based armies would have been unable to accomplish this because they would have been reliant upon a steady stream of supplies from the fleet, in addition to being subjected to the inherent dangers of occupying enemy territory and the well-known difficulties associated with transportation by land.

The Americans learned from the defeats of 1812. They knew that they had to sever the British links between Lower Canada, Kingston, and the Niagara peninsula in order to be successful. They needed mobility and flexibility, and the amphibious force at Sackets Harbor provided this to the American commanders. They had the mobility to attack York which served as a node between Kingston and Niagara. It also meant the army could be moved anywhere on Lake Ontario in a short period of time in order to support an ongoing operation, to commence a new operation, or to protect their own positions. The operations at York and Fort George were good examples of this, and demonstrated that the Americans were actively attempting to find solutions to the stalemate that had developed on land.
Initiative and Disadvantageous Courses of Action

By the beginning of 1813, the Americans knew that the invasion of Upper Canada would not be as easy as they had initially envisaged. The previous year’s campaign had been unsuccessful and few gains had been made by either side. Consequently, the Americans needed to be bold and creative in order to regain the initiative. By attacking York in April 1813, the Americans surprised the British and forced them to leave their position and to re-group elsewhere. It temporarily severed the lines of communications between Kingston and the Niagara peninsula. This distraction gave the American commanders enough time to prepare the invasion of May 1813. Once again, Commodore Chauncey’s fleet was used to transport and land a force at Fort George and provide gunfire support. It gave the Americans the initiative, and it allowed them to push the British away from their fortified positions along the Niagara River. The Americans maintained it until later in the summer when they were defeated at the battles of Beaver Dam and Stoney Creek.

The situation was considerably different in the Atlantic. The British had adopted a defensive strategy in 1812 because they were involved in high tempo operations in Europe and could not afford to simultaneously fight two major wars on two different continents. However, it was still possible to affect the American economy and indirectly to influence the conduct of the war. Therefore, the British instigated an aggressive amphibious raiding policy as early as 1813. Regions such as the Chesapeake Bay, New England or the Carolina coast were targeted because of their proximity to major centres, their pro-war sentiments, and their support to privateers. The greatest British achievement was that this policy forced the American government into following a disadvantageous course of action. It became necessary to maintain coastal defences from Maine to Georgia, tying up resources that could otherwise have been used in Upper Canada.

The British increased the combat tempo in 1814 because the war in Europe was over and resources had been made available for other operations. Amphibious forces were again used because the British could strike at many locations simultaneously and divert the American government’s attention from the Niagara Peninsula and Lower Canada. The intensity and scale of the amphibious operations were also increased, and they represented a significant threat to the Eastern seaboard and the security of the American capital. These amphibious operations prepared the British for the invasion of New Orleans in late-1814. The latter was a bold enterprise aimed at creating a third front on the American western flank, and to gain the initiative in all of North America.

Psychological effects

The last positive factor for amphibious warfare use – psychological warfare - is a derivative of the second and third factors. The British were very good at psychological warfare, and they used it to their advantage. The American population was afraid of a British amphibious assault on their towns with the concomitant destruction, looting, and/or other reprehensible actions perpetrated by the attackers. Rear-Admiral Cockburn’s successful amphibious raiding policy resulted in near paranoia within the American population. Raids were also conducted from Halifax against the entire New England coast. The British were hoping to instill a climate of fear in the coastal population that would eventually force the American government to negotiate for the cessation of hostilities.
The results of this policy were mixed. In some cases, it did fuel a chronic fear, but also a hatred of the British, and it reinforced the patriotism and determination of the American people. The extent to which it contributed to the peace negotiations at Ghent is beyond the scope of this short article.

Conclusion

The amphibious operations conducted during the War of 1812 were, in part, the results of inconclusive land campaigns. They proved to be a successful solution to the impasse on land. They gave operational commanders the mobility and flexibility to strike wherever and whenever they wanted or needed to do so, and could force the enemy into following a different course of action. Commanders such as Rear-Admiral Cockburn and Commodore Chauncey used amphibious warfare successfully to gain the initiative in a theatre of operations, and to prepare the way for land forces. They correctly grasped that “the seat of purpose is on the land,” and they used amphibious warfare to achieve that purpose.

The War of 1812’s amphibious operations constitute good case studies for the modern officer, demonstrating how naval operations can influence the conduct of operations on land. They also demonstrate that success may not always be measured by the physical defeat of the enemy’s forces. Finally, amphibious operations have been and continue to be an important aspect of naval warfare. The War of 1812 provides many important lessons that are worth examining in further detail.

NOTES

3. Ibid., p. 83.
4. Ibid., p. 34.
7. Daughan, p. 41.
8. Ibid., p. 232.
10. Ibid., p. 320.
16. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
18. Lambert, p. 381.
Introduction

Many authors have professed to understand war and society throughout the ages, with the most celebrated pieces of literature including the crafty Il Principe of Italian political philosopher Niccolo di Machiavelli written in 1513 but published post mortem in 1532; and, of course, the Napoleonic wars grand theories of Prussian-German General Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz in his proverbial Vom Kriege, also published post mortem in 1831. Both these scholars of war and others have bearing on the central military treatise of this short article, the timeless The Art of War of Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, written in the Fifth Century BC.

As contemporary military doctrine has now evolved through the transformational theories of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) since the 1970s, and flirted with a plethora of epistemological system-of-systems concepts, one must enquire if there has truly been a fundamental change in the nature of the operational art of war over the last two millennia? This brief examination contends not, and will attempt to demonstrate that the principles of war remain robustly anchored in only a few tenets allegedly first recorded by Sun Tzu: to win without fighting; and if fighting one must, avoid strength and attack weaknesses; everything else is subordinate and a means to effectively achieve these canons. To do so, it will be shown that war, the use of violence to impose one’s will, remains a means to achieve political objectives, which necessitates an holistic offensive approach and the selection of the most effective modes of warfare if it is to be victoriously terminated at the lowest possible cost and in the shortest possible time.

This article will first examine the holistic perspective of Sun Tzu compared to other authors, and selected ‘system-of-systems’ theories of RAM. Next, Sun Tzu’s centres of gravity will be elicited, followed by the reasoning behind the proportionality of
strength and the types of warfare to use, given the will to fight and the resources available. A common thread throughout the article is the use of intelligence, which yields the ability for deception, and, in turn, surprise.

Holistic Offensive Approach

Clausewitz’ voluminous Vom Kriege highlighted that the shortest way to achieve political objectives is by the destruction of the enemy forces’ centre of gravity in a major decisive battle. Machiavelli’s Il Principe, on the other hand, focused upon domestic and foreign policies, and described how best to acquire, govern, and preserve a state by any means necessary through virtue, power politics, fortune and abilities, and ruthlessness and cruelty. Whereas Clausewitz and Machiavelli tackled very specific aspects of a grand puzzle, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War instead provided a holistic approach to waging war, which not only included the surgical use of force as a last resort, but also a variety of non-military methods, such as diplomatic, political, economic, psychological, and moral means to win without fighting.

Modern reincarnations of Sun Tzu’s holistic offensive strategy abound in the realm of the Revolution in Military Affairs. The RMA is defined as:

Any major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.\(^2\)

Let us consider, for instance, the use of ‘system-of-systems’ approaches, such Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO) which were exploited for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods during the 1991 Gulf War. Arguing against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, American planners and commanders seemingly adopted instead Sun Tzu’s tenet that: “…generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.” United States Air Force (USAF) Lieutenant Colonel (now retired Lieutenant General) Dave Deptula used RDO and EBO as key doctrinal concepts to achieve strategic effects.\(^4\) Notwithstanding the advancement in technologies and methods of application; the nature, the philosophy and the ‘systems’ remain essentially the same as those espoused by Sun Tzu 2400 years ago.

Although categorically rejected by the United States Joint Forces Command in 2008,\(^3\) it is germane to explain that the EBO’s system-of-systems analysis (SoSA) was divided into six major systems: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information. Each of these systems was comprised of nodes and links, nodes: the tangible elements such as persons, places, or physical things within a system; and links, the physical, functional, or behavioural relationships between nodes of any systems. The most vulnerable nodes and associated links are targeted for diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) actions to influence or change the system behaviour and resource capabilities, and thereby to reduce the enemy’s will to fight.\(^6\)

The idea is that activities on one system may have collateral first, second, third, or multiple order effects on other systems, thus potentially collapsing or paralysing the whole system-of-systems without actually engaging in a military conflict. After all, the premise of Sun Tzu’s holistic approach was ultimately to achieve the state’s political goals without fighting and with minimal destruction. “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

This ancient version of the ‘Whole-of-Government’ approach has been emulated in many shapes and forms in recent decades. Coincidentally, former Prime Minister Paul Martin’s 2005 International Policy Statement\(^8\) advocated that the best way for Canada to make a difference in conflict situations was to adopt a “3D” (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) framework.\(^9\)

Centres of Gravity

Sun Tzu’s holistic offensive strategy was predicated upon his priorities in terms of centre of gravity.\(^10\) In order of relative merit, the priority was to first attack the enemy’s plans and strategies at their inception, “…this means winning by intelligence.” Second was to disrupt and dissolve alliances about to be consummated, “…this means winning by intimidation.” Third, if non-violent methods failed, the strategy was to attack the enemy’s army, “…this means winning by fighting.” Lastly, when there was absolutely no other alternative, it was to attack the cities: “…this is the lowest form of attack.”

Resorting to the use of force did not, however, preclude the continued and concurrent use of non-violent methods, such as peaceful diplomacy and economic sanctions. Sun Tzu reiterated that
“...those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.” To be successful, this offensive strategy ought to be planned and executed with extensive use of intelligence, deception, surprise, speed, and the swift use of direct and indirect manoeuvres at all levels, from political to tactical.

An interesting re-creation borrowing from Sun Tzu’s centres of gravity priorities is that of retired USAF Colonel John A. Warden’s theory of strategic attack, based upon five levels of system attributes, namely, leadership; organic/systems essentials; infrastructure; population; and fielded military forces. One will note that leadership, organic/systems essentials, and infrastructure are explicitly covered by Sun Tzu in his first chapter on Estimates, wherein he speaks of moral influence, command, and doctrine. Great importance is indeed placed upon appraising these fundamental factors, as those who master them win, while those who do not are defeated.

By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders [leadership], so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril... By command [leadership] I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness... By doctrine I mean organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers [chain of command], and the provision of principal items used by the army [logistics, i.e. organic essentials and infrastructure].

Both Sun Tzu and Warden’s theories are compared in Figure 2, along with the contrasting centres of gravity of Clausewitz. Figure 2 reveals discrepancies, but more importantly similarities, in that, contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy’s army and cities is not a primary strategic goal. Instead, the focus is to force capitulation by applying pressure on DIME. Of note, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz saw the need to sever the enemy’s alliances to isolate and weaken his position.

**Figure 2 – Centres of Gravity**

It might be construed that Sun Tzu’s centres of gravity and their priorities remain the most relevant nowadays. One only has to examine the United Nations’ (UN) charter, which advocates the peaceful resolution of conflict by diplomatic solutions first, economic sanctions next, and the use of force as a last resort while protecting the population and providing humanitarian aid.

**Proportionality of Strength**

When non-violent methods failed and the situation escalated to the use of military forces, Sun Tzu established proportionality of strength rules which still today profoundly resonate in the art of operational warfare. The only caveat is that “strength” should mean resources, such as human capital (troops), as well as logistical resources, such as technology, energy, material, finance, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, Sun Tzu argued metaphorically that when one’s strength is ten times that of the enemy, one should attack him by surrounding him; assuming the generals are equal in intelligence and bravery, and the soldiers equal in competence and cohesion. When one’s strength is five times that of the enemy, one should pursue a direct assault with one-third of his forces; probe for weaknesses, and strike by surprise with the remaining two-thirds. When two-to-one, one should use part of his forces for a direct assault to a critical point the enemy is surely to defend; while attacking by surprise somewhere else, confusing the enemy, and forcing him to divide his forces.

Sun Tzu refers here to the pivotal use of the *cheng* and *ch'i*. On this point, he states: “Generally, in battle, use the normal [*cheng*] force to engage; use the extraordinary [*ch'i*] to win.” Of note, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz saw the need to sever the enemy’s alliances to isolate and weaken his position.

Wholeheartedly embracing these principles during the Second World War, the German tacticians fashioned the blitzkrieg to defeat opponents using the *nebenpunkt* (supporting point – *cheng*) and *schwerpunkt* (focus point - *ch'i*) manoeuvre warfare. The blitzkrieg philosophy used intelligence, speed, and agility to generate ambiguity, realize deception, exploit weaknesses, and focus violence effectively.

A more recent example is Operation Desert Storm in 1991, whereby the Coalition forces dominated the air, but the ground forces were more evenly matched. By controlling intelligence, General H. Norman Schwartzkopf threatened an amphibious assault in the east (*cheng*), but executed an armoured attack on the Iraqi army in the west (*ch'i*), thus winning a decisive victory with minimal casualties. The essence of Schwartzkopf’s deception was to appear at places to which the enemy must hasten; but to move swiftly where he did not expect. The strategies and successes of such commanders as Alexander, Hannibal, Belisarius,
As water has no constant form, there are in war no constant circumstances, and is definable only with reference to its opposite. But Sun Tzu had already deciphered what many are still attempting to comprehend today. What is irregular warfare, and when to use it? Some may argue that guerrilla warfare can be simply the application of Sun Tzu’s tactical guidance when disadvantaged by the proportionality of strength and resources.

Types of Warfare

In light of Sun Tzu’s priorities in centres of gravity (Figure 2) and his use of resources, given a proportionality of strength, it should now be realised that Sun Tzu had already captured the essence of irregular warfare, and even perhaps the use of terrorist action which Sun Tzu only suggested as a dishonourable last resort.

Insurgency, and, by extension, guerrilla activities, can be defined as “...a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.” In turn, terrorism can be defined as “...politically motivated violence against non-combatants with the intention to coerce through fear.” It might be that guerrilla warfare is simply the application of Sun Tzu’s tactical guidance when disadvantaged by the proportionality of strength and resources.

Even in the defensive mode, one is not actually passive, but always probing for intelligence, again, for the purpose of avoiding strength and attack weaknesses. Moreover, it is a mistake to attempt to discern too much between regular and irregular warfare, as most successful campaigns will use methods ranging within the regular-irregular spectrum. Sun Tzu said: “In battle, there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all.”

Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between these types of warfare with a few examples. It should be noted that this graph is temporal in that a given conflict will likely shift over time as will is affected and resources are expended or acquired. Note also that the conflict will often be seen from the view of one belligerent over others, likely, the one history deems to be victorious.

In opposing ends of the spectrum in Figure 3 (and 2) are the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. The Cold War was won by the United States over the Soviet Union by applying pressure upon the military aspect of DIME with the proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, while exhausting the economic element with such technological competitions as the Space Race at a time when the nation was already suffering economic stagnation. The fear of escalating to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) precluded any direct conventional or indirect irregular conflicts. This situation constituted winning without fighting. As for the 9/11 terrorist attack, disproportionally disadvantaged with the DIME elements, al-Qaeda used the enemy’s resources as a weapon and attacked the only targets they could kinetically: the cities, the infrastructures, and the population. Although perhaps morally reprehensible from a Western viewpoint, 9/11 was a meticulously well executed military plan with only 19 al-Qaeda casualties inflicting first order infrastructure destruction and mass casualties; and second and third order economic perturbation and apprehension to the heart of a hegemony. This approach consisted of avoiding strength and attacking weaknesses.
Controversial as it may be, the U.S. killing of Osama bin Laden, the founder and head of the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda, in Pakistan on 02 May 2011, by Navy SEALs of the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Development Group in a Central Intelligence Agency co-led operation is undoubtedly a superb execution of the operational art of war, wherein political will and resources were effectively exploited to fragment the enemy’s leadership.

Conclusion

The principles of war remain robustly anchored in the tenets espoused by Sun Tzu’ The Art of War treatise written 2400 years ago. Specifically, to win without fighting; and if fighting one must, avoid strength and attack weaknesses; everything else is subordinate and a means to effectively achieve these canons. War necessitates a holistic offensive approach if it is to be victoriously terminated at the lowest possible cost, and in the shortest possible time. Moreover, the selection of the most effective modes of warfare must take into account the proportionality of strength, the will to fight, and the resources available. A common thread is that the use of intelligence, deception, and surprise is instrumental.

Despite the blank pages of harmony in the human existence since the Stone Age, it is true that “…our collective memory is [too often] measured in terms of crisis and calamities, harrowing injustices, and terrifying episodes of brutality inflicted on each other.”20 It follows then, as Sun Tzu declared, that “…war is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival and ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”21 If human nature is indeed materialist to the core, self-serving, utilitarian, and pleasure seeking,22 then war theories will continue to be studied for many generations.

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NOTES

11. Ibid., p. 228.
17. McNeilly, pp. 228-229.
18. Ibid., p. 239.
19. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 244.
24. Cleary, p. 76.
26. Ibid.
28. “Now an army may be just likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.” See McNeilly, p. 248.
29. “For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interactions as endless as that of interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?” See Ibid., p. 240.
31. McNeilly, p. 213.
32. Rifkin, p.42.
The centennial of the First World War is fast approaching. It will be a very important anniversary for Canada and the rest of the world, given that more than 10 million people, including 60,000 Canadian service members, died as a result of that war. Some parts of Europe were particularly hard hit: several countries were occupied or ravaged, in whole or in part, by years of fighting. More than 600,000 Canadians served in Europe during the First World War; that represents almost one-sixth of the approximately four million men in the Canadian population at the time. Those men fought in France and Belgium, but they also shared the lives of the people of those countries for four years. It was the first time in history that so many Canadians had stayed that long in a foreign country.1

The centennial of the First World War will be marked by high-profile commemorative ceremonies in the parts of Europe where the war had devastating effects. Canadian soldiers fought mostly in three regions: near the Belgian town of Ypres, and in Picardy and Nord–Pas-de-Calais in France.2 They took part in the Battle of Ypres—the second battle of that name—in 1915, the Battle of the Bois du Sanctuaire (Sanctuary Wood) in 1916, and the Battle of Paschendaele in 1917. Canadians and Newfoundlanders also fought in Belgium in 1918, at Mons and Courtrai respectively. However, they spent most of their time in France: at the Somme in 1916 and 1918 (Amiens), and especially in Nord–Pas-de-Calais, where so many Canadians and Newfoundlanders fell on the Artois and Cambrai battlefields. From Festubert in 1915 to Valenciennes in late-1918, the maple leaf and caribou symbols were seen at Vimy, Lens, Arras, Monchy-le-Preux, the crossing of the Canal du Nord, Cambrai, Douai, and Denain, and in many other towns and villages in the region. Much of Nord–Pas-de-Calais was liberated by the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days in late 1918.

In addition to their combat activities, the Canadians lived in those regions for several years, side-by-side with the local people, sharing their suffering and their hope. When they were not on the front lines, the soldiers lodged in towns and villages, and the headquarters and support units were set up there. The hospitals and the logistics and supply services maintained daily contact with the Belgians and the French. For four years, the Canadians forged deep and lasting bonds with the local citizens. When the Canadian Corps left France to press on into Belgium at the end of the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918, war correspondent John Frederick Bligh Livesay wrote, “Behind is France and a people Canadian soldiers have learned in these four years to love and revere.”3 There is no doubt that the Canadians had more frequent and constant contact with the French than with the Belgians, particularly in Nord–Pas-de-Calais.

A CANADIAN REMEMBRANCE TRAIL FOR THE CENTENNIAL OF THE GREAT WAR?

Pascale Marcotte
Even when they were fighting in the Ypres area, the Canadians often had their rear lines set up in the nearby French Department of Nord. That was where they quartered, trained, and had numerous interactions with the local people.

The Canadians spent several years in Belgium and France, mostly in Nord–Pas-de-Calais. They stayed in towns such as Armentières and Arras, and contributed substantially to the liberation of Lens, Cambrai, Douai, Denain, and Valenciennes. In each of those places, the Canadians made a deep and lasting impression upon the local people, and they themselves came home with memories that would never fade. For example, J.F.B. Livesay had this to say about Denain, a town of some 20,000 inhabitants in the western suburbs of Valenciennes: “No jewel shines so bright, so constant and with such a hidden fire as this of the kind folk of Denain. They struck no medals, they named no public squares in our honor, but they gave us their whole heart (sic), and with it their uttermost possession—Denain, grimy little town of shining and cherished memory.” But in Canada today, who remembers Denain? And who remembers the villages of Villers-au-Bois and Gouy-Servins, where the Canadians spent long weeks resting or training, the caves of Arras, or the farms of Cambrésis, where the soldiers were billeted? Who still speaks of the forests in Normandy, Nord, Jura and Landes, where some 12,000 members of the Canadian Forestry Corps were running dozens of logging operations and sawmills at the war’s end? A few French people still remember, but Canadians in general were too quick to forget the bonds formed, in the suffering of war and the joy of liberation, with the people of France and Belgium.

The upcoming commemorative ceremonies should be an occasion for renewing those ties. The impact of the First World War was much more than military operations in Belgium and in northern France. The war affected all aspects of life, and its mark on the landscape is still visible. Unfortunately, today it is very difficult to find any trace of the Canadians’ presence. There is an imposing monument at Vimy that is well known and attracts thousands of visitors. But outside the park at Vimy, the trail goes cold. There are thousands of graves in the Commonwealth cemeteries and discreet memorials erected near Courcelette, the Bois de Bourlon, and Dury. The Newfoundland caribou can also be seen at Beaumont-Hamel, Gueudecourt, Monchy-le-Preux, and Masnières. However, there is no trace of the presence of the Canadian Corps headquarters at Rebreuve-Ranchicourt (1917), nor those of the Canadian Forestry Corps in Jura and Landes. There is no museum where French or Canadian tourists could learn about what the Canadians experienced in Europe from 1914 to 1918.

Other countries have been more proactive in making their presence felt. For example, Australia—which is no bigger than Canada, is considerably farther away, and does not have Canada’s traditional ties to France—is moving forward with planning ceremonies to commemorate the First World War. There is already a Franco-Australian museum in Villers-Bretonneux, where the Battle of Amiens began on 8 August 1918. Two other Franco-Australian museums were recently opened in Feuchy, and in Bullecourt, near Arras, two locations where Canadians also fought in 1918. By choosing to
operate those museums jointly with France, Australia is ensuring better coordination for managing and promoting them. The partnership is also a public declaration of friendship that can only inspire sympathy on the part of the French people.

Australia has also decided to invest €7.5 million (approximately C$10 million) to construct an Australian remembrance trail. A remembrance trail is an interpretive experience, and tourism in northern France and the Ypres area is heavily based upon remembrance of the First World War. The vast majority of people who visit those places are attracted first and foremost by the reminders of the war that dot the countryside: cemeteries, monuments, museums, parts of battlefields. The French Minister of Defence has already created its remembrance trails throughout the country; the Nord–Pas-de-Calais region has also done so for the First World War. Soon, it will be Australia’s turn to inaugurate its own. Could not Canada, so many of whose soldiers fought so hard to liberate those regions, do the same?

As things stand, it is too often impossible for a French person or a Canadian passing through to know that they are near a site where Canadian troops saw action during the Great War. There are many places—restaurants, hotels, urban squares, churches, farmhouses—where Canadians stayed and carried out missions that had great significance for the local people. Canadians who visit the region would be happy to know that they are standing on the very ground where other Canadians served and fought to liberate the country a century ago. The French and the Belgians would also be happy and proud to be able to acknowledge the routes taken by their liberators. The local authorities would probably be quick to install plaques or other markers themselves, if they were shown the places we as Canadians would like to see recognized. Canadian historians could work with the French and Belgian authorities and with regional organizations to identify those places, and thus begin the process of creating a Canadian remembrance trail in France and Belgium. The centennial of the First World War should be an opportunity to remember not only the sacrifice made by thousands of Canadian soldiers, but also the close and deep bonds formed during those four years between Canada and the regions of Europe that want to keep those memories alive. Vimy is a remarkable monument, perhaps the most beautiful one commemorating the First World War, but Canada’s contribution from 1914 to 1918 encompassed much more than just one battle. Let us make the most of the upcoming occasion to remind everyone of that reality.

I would like to express my appreciation for the exceptional contribution made by Jean Martin, historian at the Department of National Defence Directorate of History and Heritage, for historical information, and for the fruitful discussions that led to the writing of this article. Thank you. I also thank the granddaughter of Joseph Armand Stanislas Paillé of the Royal 22e Régiment, who fought at Vimy in April 1917.

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1. Only in the United Kingdom, during the Second World War, did a comparable number of Canadians stay for such a long period.

2. The Picardy region included the Department of Somme, where the Canadians and Newfoundlanders fought between 1916 and 1918. The Nord–Pas-de-Calais region was made up of two French departments, the Department of Nord and the Department of Pas-de-Calais.


It is a depressing but reasonable assumption that the myriad controversies associated with defence procurement in relatively-recent years (i.e., EH101, Cyclone and F-35, AOPS [Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship] and the Victoria-class submarine, and the CCV [Close Combat Vehicle] and assorted truck programs) have convinced an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical, public that it is virtually impossible to bring major—and many not so major—defence procurement projects in on time, on budget, and on specification. Concurrent and often messy, but clearly necessary debates over the perceived usefulness and cost-effectiveness of proposed (or aborted) acquisitions, competitive tendering versus sole-sourcing, the appropriate level of Canadian industrial benefits, and the place of defence procurement in a broader Canadian industrial strategy, the politicization of defence procurement, the utility and veracity of life-cycle costing that extends out multiple decades, and how best to reform what is clearly a dysfunctional defence procurement system must further stoke public unease. The only real certainty in this unsettling environment is that the analysis of defence procurement should continue to provide continuity of employment for the Office of the Auditor General, the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, and assorted ‘think tanks,’ journalists, and pundits.

This is not to suggest that fireworks over defence procurement are something new to the Canadian political and military experience. Indeed, controversies and scandals over defence procurement are as old as the country itself. Nor is it to deny that one can find procurement success stories mixed in with the flotsam and jetsam of failed or blighted procurements. The Diefenbaker government’s handling of the Arrow cancellation was breathtakingly clumsy, but the same government did make the eminently sensible and cost-effective decisions to acquire the Hercules and the Sea King. The Trudeau government parked brand new CF-5s, flirted with the diminutive Scorpion direct-fire support vehicle, and encountered some decidedly awkward moments during the Long-Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) program, but did better with the Canadian Patrol Frigate, and, in particular, the CF-18 Hornet. Success stories during the Mulroney era arguably included the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle and ADATS, but it miscalculated on SSNs, and was ultimately forced, on financial grounds, to scupper almost all the procurement initiatives outlined in its barely one-year-old white paper. The financially strapped government of Jean Chretien
controversially (and expensively) ‘axed’ the EH101 helicopter inherited from the Tories, but its performance on the procurement four-pack outlined in its 1994 white paper (ultimately the LAV III light armoured vehicle, the Cormorant search and rescue helicopter, the Victoria-class submarine and a new replacement for the Sea King) ranged from very good, to poor, to thoroughly embarrassing in the case of the Sea King replacement. The latter was, in essence, passed to the Martin government, but the resulting Cyclone has itself come down with a nasty, perhaps even fatal, case of the maritime helicopter blues (a global malady not confined to helicopters selected by Canada). The Harper government had successes with the C-17A, the C-130J and the Leopard 2, but has fared less well on other projects (i.e., AOPS, JSS, CCV and FWSAR [Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue]). Some of the latter, in fairness, were projects inherited in imperfect form from previous Liberal governments.

Nor is this to suggest that Canada has some form of perverse monopoly on ill-conceived, over-budget, much-delayed, unduly politicized, or poorly managed defence procurement programs. We may have a special gift for turning defence procurement gaffes—or perceived defence procurement gaffes—into some form of spectator sport, but even the most cursory survey reveals that we have lots of international company when it comes to less-than-stellar defence procurement choices. Any nation state that has purchased so much as an automatic rifle has procurement horror stories. For every successful defence procurement program, there are any number of F-111Bs, Sergeant Yorks, or airborne early warning Nimrods.

It is to suggest, however, that if Canadians have fundamentally lost faith in the defence procurement process—and, more broadly, in the equipment choices being made for Canada’s armed forces—then the timing could not be much worse, given the need for the phased recapitalization of virtually the entire Royal Canadian Air Force, very significant components of the Royal Canadian Air Force, and substantial elements of the Canadian Army. The challenges to the survival of a multi-purpose, combat-capable, tri-service defence establishment multiply when one takes note of the lack of a broad national consensus over future Canadian defence priorities. What, indeed, are Canada’s armed forces to do at a time when traditional pillars—such as our links to NATO and the United Nations—have been significantly eroded, or, in the case of such long-standing quasi-military and non-military roles as fisheries surveillance and search and rescue, been lost to privatization or semi-privatization? Will an economy that may or may not be inherently strong be able to underwrite the cost of a multi-purpose, combat-capable, tri-service defence establishment, or will we inevitably be confronted with some exceptionally painful military and defence policy trade-offs? The ‘New Zealandization’ of national defence, or some Canadian variation of New Zealandization, is not necessarily off the table. Loss of faith in a dysfunctional defence procurement system, heightened levels of sticker shock, uncertainty or a lack of consensus on broader national defence priorities, and reduced fiscal resources in a weakened economy, each spell trouble for the defence of Canada. Combined, in a perfect storm-style package, they constitute an even more serious challenge.

In the meantime, there has at least been some meaningful progress on a number of procurement fronts. In June 2013, Ottawa announced the selection of a Canadianized variant of ThyssenKrupp Marine System’s Berlin-class support ship to replace the aging Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ships Protecteur and Preserver. In the Joint Support Ship (JSS) competition, the well-proved and comparatively low-risk Berlin-class—Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, commissioned, in 2001 and 2002 respectively, and the substantially newer Bonn, commissioned in 2013—prevailed over a new design from BMT Fleet Technology. The Bonn incorporates lessons learned from a decade of experience with its sister ships, including a different power plant, and it forms the basis for the Canadian variant. Published design drawings of the Canadian variant show a variety of alterations, including fore and aft Phalanx close-in weapon systems, but intriguingly, do not show one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Berlin-class: a second heavy crane and removable, multi-purpose (i.e., hospital) modules immediately forward of the bridge. Their omission presumably reflects the lack of a stated Canadian requirement (and/or funding), but it would seem inordinately prudent to install, or, at the very least, make ‘fitted-for-but-not-with’ provision for the utilities (i.e., HVAC, plumbing, and electrical) necessary to support removable medical or other (i.e., joint communications) modules. This clearly would not make them genuine Joint Support Ships—that designation remains a misnomer—but it would give them a stronger claim to AOR+, as opposed to straight AOR status. There has, it must be noted, been some criticism that the Berlin-class ships, by comparison with the Protecteur-class, offer only two RAS (replenishment at sea) masts, reduced helicopter capacity (two rather than three medium helicopters), and less fuel for replenishment. Ottawa’s official response to the latter is that the amount of offload able fuel is “similar,” since the Protecteur-class cannot “discharge its full payload without creating stability challenges.”

The belated decision to move forward with the two Berlin-class vessels is welcome (a third such vessel is theoretically possible, but at this point unlikely), but two points should be stressed. First, the passage of time between the first glimmers of the ALSC and JSS programs in the early-1990s, and the delivery of the second Canadian ship from Vancouver Shipyards means that we will have taken almost 30 years to replace two AORs with two AORs. The
mind boggles at the amount of wasted time, energy, and money. Second, by acquiring what are still essentially AORs, and failing to supplement them with a vessel or vessels better-suited to sea-lift and multiple forms of credible support to joint forces ashore, Canada will continue to be markedly and dangerously out of step with long-established trends in foreign navies.

Contract definition on the proposed fleet of Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) is moving forward, albeit accompanied by increasing media and other attention to what are characterized as unduly high costs for comparatively modest vessels. This observer has long been wary of the complex tradeoffs inherent in a hybrid design, such as the AOPS, but has remained cautiously supportive on the grounds that a two-ocean navy is frankly ludicrous in a three-ocean country. Each capability ‘walkback’ in the AOPS design, whether for financial or other reasons, has eroded that support. One is hard-pressed to disagree with Ken Hansen’s recent lament over the progressive loss of volumetric space and fuel capacity in the AOPS. Writing in Vol 9, No 1 (2013) of the Canadian Naval Review, Hansen acknowledges, “…it is understandable that naval force planners would seek to maximize the number of [Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships] derived from the fixed funding envelope by reducing capabilities in the design. Numbers provide the most flexibility for scheduling operations and reduce the risk of not having an asset available when unexpected tasks arise. However, the austerity and severity of the northern maritime environment places a premium on size, capacity and self-contained support capabilities unlike anything the navy has experienced since [HMCS Labrador] left the fleet [in 1957]. It is evident that the lessons of that era have not been translated and internalized into doctrine by the current generation of naval leaders.” In his candid and thoughtful analysis, Hansen concludes, “…that the navy views its role in the Arctic as a sideshow that threatens to drain away resources from traditional capabilities.”

One is sorely tempted to suggest starting afresh on AOPS, perhaps by separating the Arctic and offshore requirements into two classes, but this would unleash any number of political, industrial, operational, and financial ramifications. Prioritizing quality over quantity by capping AOPS procurement at four hulls would address some issues but generate others, particularly on the offshore requirement. A naval abandonment of the Arctic would please some, both inside and outside of the Royal Canadian Navy, but would be painfully shortsighted, would not automatically free up funding for other naval priorities, and clearly would not endear the RCN to the Harper government. There are, perhaps, only two certainties: First, that the current AOPS approach is flawed in various respects, and second, that there is no quick and pain free fix to those flaws.

The air force side of the procurement ledger has been relatively quiescent of late, in part, perhaps, because of a certain amount of media battle fatigue on the F-35 file—just keeping up-to-date on global F-35 developments is now a full-time occupation—but primarily because the Harper government’s decision to examine additional fighter replacement options has, at least temporarily, blunted criticism of the F-35. Ever increasing controversy over the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) has also diverted media and other attention from fighter procurement. The original issues that surrounded the proposed acquisition of the F-35—the need or perceived lack of need for such an aircraft, its unit cost, and its life-cycle cost (inevitably a weighty consideration in stealthy designs)—have most assuredly not gone away, however. There is no question that the CF-18 must, in due course, be replaced, but it is difficult to shake the conviction that the Americans would have done themselves, and their allies, a substantial operational and financial favour if they had not attempted to develop disparate USAF, USN and USMC variants from one common platform. At the very least, the specialized needs of the USMC should have been addressed by a different aircraft. Canada and other nations are now confronted with an awkward choice between the fifth-generation F-35—an aircraft with pricing issues and a single engine, but very intriguing ISR and other capabilities—and less stealthy and less ‘future-proof,’ but still very potent generation 4.5 candidates, such as advanced versions of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. This observer suspects that the F-35 will ultimately prevail in Canada, but at a reduced fleet size that could render it something of a pyrrhic victory for its proponents.

On other fronts, CH-147F Chinooks continue to flow into 450 Squadron, thereby restoring a capability that should not have been lost in the first place, while multiple reports suggest that additional Aurora, perhaps four, will be upgraded and life-extended. This most welcome development would extend the service life of the maritime patrol/ISR fleet, and thereby remove the need for an early decision on a replacement (or replacements, since UAVs will no doubt factor in to some degree). Many will see the P-8 Poseidon as the obvious choice, but one suspects that an Aurora replacement competition could well resemble the LRPA contest of the 1970s, when there were questions about how much (if any) ASW capability to include and pressures to pursue made-in-Canada
options. Cue Bombardier’s Q- and C-Series. Urgently required is visible and quantifiable progress on the FWSAR successor to the Buffalo and Hercules—primarily to restore some measure of credibility to Canada’s SAR system, but also to help restore a modicum of credibility to defence procurement in Canada. To a far greater degree, the restoring of a modicum of credibility also demands prompt and definitive action on the Cyclone maritime helicopter. If the Cyclone’s issues can be satisfactorily rectified in an acceptable time frame, fine, but if a third Sea King replacement program is required, credibility with respect to procurement strategy will be seriously undermined.

Canadian Army procurement tends to generate far less attention than RCAF and RCN programs, partly because of the generally lower cost of army materiel, partly because army materiel is seen to lack the inherent cachet of aircraft and ships, partly because some army equipment is, by definition, multi-purpose that it is required regardless of whether one seeks a combat-capable army or a constabulary/peacekeeping army (trucks, for example), and partly because the army has been able to quietly and competently manage such projects as the M777 howitzer (procurement of which straddled the Martin and Harper eras). The conclusion of Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan also reduced media attention in this area. This is not to suggest, however, a shortage of contentious, tortured, and much-delayed army procurement programs. The repeated delays in acquiring standard military pattern logistics trucks, an important element of the Harper government’s mobility package of 2006, beggars belief.

Delays and other controversies also have dogged the more recent Close Combat Vehicle. Publicly unveiled in 2009, the CCV program seeks to provide Canada’s land forces with “a medium-weight armoured vehicle that is both highly protected and tactically mobile. The CCV will bridge the gap between the current light (5-25 tonnes) and heavy armoured (45 tonnes +) vehicle fleets, therefore providing the Canadian Army with an operational capability that can operate in intimate support of the Main Battle Tank or independently within a high-intensity environment.” In a September 2013 report for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute, authors Michael Byers and Stephen Webb urged that the CCV be cancelled because it “…is based on outdated Cold War tank doctrine,” and “…would duplicate a capability Canada already possess as a result of the recent LAV III upgrades.” The savings, approximately $2 billion, would be used to mitigate the effects of budget cuts on training. Although the rationales for cancellation are not necessarily identical—some of the technical and tactical conclusions of the report could certainly be challenged—cancellation of the CCV has also been recommended by some retired officers, and, reportedly, by the army itself. The Harper government may well resist such advice on the grounds, as journalist David Pugliese has observed, that cancellation “…would give it yet another military procurement black-eye.” Perhaps, but the savings from cancellation—or from deferral of the CCV—could arguably be put to better use.

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Engineers of Victory – The problem solvers who turned the tide in the Second World War
by Paul Kennedy
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Reviewed by Mark Tunnicliffe

The Second World War was a massive enterprise from any perspective: geography, combatants, casualties, scope, and resources. Any historian attempting to examine it faces a daunting task, and most have taken one of two approaches: a ‘top down’ view taken from the grand strategic, broad narrative or economic perspective; or a ‘bottom up’ view, as reflected in the experience of a particular individual or unit, a key campaign or battle, or the influence of a selected technology. Yale professor of history Paul Kennedy, author of the acclaimed Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, has taken a third approach – he begins at the middle. In Engineers of Victory, Kennedy asks how allied institutions comprised of individuals, organizations, doctrine, and technology were combined to produce successful responses to counter the Axis successes of the early years of the war. His ‘engineer’ context uses a broad definition framed as “…a person who carries through an enterprise through skilful or artful contrivance,” rather than the narrower technological and academic definition usually associated with the term. Appropriately illustrated with maps (to underline concepts) and plates (depicting individuals and technologies), Kennedy refines this definition in the context of the war to the integration of concepts, ideas, people, and technology in order to solve fundamental military problems.

Consistent with this approach, Kennedy confines his study to the middle years of the war, using a case study methodology to examine five key problems confronting the Allies at that time – winning the U-boat war in the Atlantic, winning command of the air over Europe, stopping the Blitzkrieg, conducting amphibious operations, and executing long-range operations in the Pacific – all posed as engineering ‘how to’ challenges. Kennedy’s work analyzes the turnaround decisions and processes that integrated a few motivated people and teams, a fundamental concept or doctrine, and a key technology or technologies that made the decisions work. In other words, this is an intriguing ‘systems level’ approach to fundamental problem solving with respect to one of the 20th Century’s greatest challenges: winning the Second World War. As Kennedy points out in his introduction, the relative weight of resources available to the Allies indicated that they should emerge as victors, but their identification of key problems and an engineered solution to them probably produced victory earlier and at less cost than might otherwise have been the case.

Kennedy relies upon secondary sources, including official histories, case history reviews, campaign histories, personal accounts, and technology studies. He also dips into Internet sources (particularly Wikipedia) and technology-centric publications, such as the platform pamphlets from Osprey Press. For this, his eclectic selection of sources, he makes no apology, as it permits him the span of depth in discussion that ranges from the particular (and personal), to the campaign level that frames his thesis.

The approach taken for each of these case studies is to examine earlier examples of a similar campaign to highlight where it succeeded or failed in order to introduce the particular Second World War problem. Some of these brief counter examples are drawn from early periods in history (Roman era Mediterranean anti-piracy operations as a preface to Atlantic convoys, for example), but more detailed examples are taken from engagements fought earlier in the war. Thus, the failed German attempt to gain command of the air in the Battle of Britain serves as a foil to the Allied air campaign three years later, and, naturally, Dieppe serves as a useful example of how not to prepare for an amphibious landing on an opposed shore.

At times, Kennedy appears to segue from his own question. In discussing the issue of “How to stop a Blitzkrieg” for example, he appears to answer the problem in the first few pages (i.e., you need sufficient geographic and strategic depth). His further analysis of the land campaign is then devoted to answering a different issue: “How to recover the geography lost to Blitzkrieg.” Further, his occasional mishandling of details can be frustrating at times. His identification of the Junkers Ju-52 (a transport aircraft) and Messerschmitt Bf 110 as medium bombers playing key roles in the Battle of Britain, for example, leaves the reader puzzled as to the depth of his research. That misidentification of the Bf-110 is particularly unfortunate, as it represents a missed opportunity to highlight the implications of the successful development of the P-51 Mustang as a long range escort fighter for the prosecution of the air war over Germany. While there were fighter-bomber variants of the Bf-110, that aircraft was originally developed as a long-range fighter, and, as such, when it was used over England as a bomber escort, it proved a failure due to the limitations of its design in the context of aerial combat in that theatre. A comparison of the two aircraft development projects could then have further underlined his theme of successfully matching people, concepts, and technology as key to tipping the balance in war.

Kennedy’s style is readable, and indeed flexible, varying as it does from the analytical, through the informal, to sometimes almost maudlin (when he describes the final days of some of the key players). This variation in style is probably an appropriate accompaniment to the variation in the scope of the issues the
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By Emile Simpson
Oxford University Press, 2012
256 pages, C$34.15 (HC)
ISBN 10: 0199327882

Reviewed by Michael Goodspeed

During the last 20 years, we have been presented with a smorgasbord of new theories about war and its recent evolution. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, numerous popular descriptors of modern war have been coined. These terms illustrate a broad range of conceptual thinking on the subject: Asymmetric Warfare, Net Centric Warfare, Cyber War, Iwar, the Three Block War, the Revolution in Military Affairs, the COIN Revolution, the Long War, the Greater War against Terror, and Fourth Generation War. All these labels in their turn have had a degree of validity and have served as important pieces in viewing the larger puzzle. One of the most perceptive and searching examinations of modern war in this tradition is found in a recent book entitled: War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics. This is an important examination with respect to, not just how armies, but how liberal societies think about the changing nature of modern war.

War from the Ground Up was authored by Emile Simpson, a recently-retired captain in the Royal Gurkha Rifles. Prior to writing this book, Simpson had three company level tours in Afghanistan, followed by a year-long defence fellowship at Oxford. This insightful book is an offshoot of those deployments and his academic sabbatical.

Although War from the Ground Up makes frequent references to the author’s personal experiences, it is not a memoir. Simpson writes about much broader issues. He intermeshes his own counter-insurgency experience with an oblique analysis of the “Clauswitzian paradigm,” and finds Clausewitz to be inadequate in explaining and describing war as it has recently evolved.

Much like the work of some of his predecessors writing about the theory of warfare, such as Thomas Hammes and Rupert Smith, Simpson believes that the nature of war has changed, and that the models based upon more conventional inter-state wars no longer suffice. Where Simpson departs from other contemporary theoretical predecessors is that, among other things, he argues that the West requires a greater understanding and expertise in the use of “strategic narratives,” a phrase he uses to describe messaging designed to address the conflict’s “strategic audiences.” He views a war’s strategic audiences as being all those critical groups within the war zone, as well as all other factions affected by the war. In developing these two lines of thinking, he assesses the “kaleidoscopic” nature of counter-insurgency and the diverse groups or audiences that are affected by modern insurgency. In this respect, Simpson views modern war, not in the polarized Clausewitzian dimension, but rather, he likens it to a political arena, one which is substantially more complex, multi-faceted, and dynamic than the relatively straightforward two-way struggle between opposing sides in inter-state conflict. And, just as in a political contest, Simpson believes that the winner in modern insurgencies will never satisfy all factions or audiences, and therefore, victory can never be absolute.

Simpson spends much of the book examining these twin themes of “narratives” and “audiences” through various lenses: globalization, strategy and the liberal state, ethical dimensions of modern war, and levels of strategy, as well as from several other perspectives. In doing this, his book is less a prescription of how to fight wars, and is more an abstract examination on differentiating the means and effects of modern war. In making his case, he draws in some measure upon his own experience and understanding of Afghanistan, as well other campaigns. Most notably, he also cites Borneo and Dhofar, but makes passing reference to a number of other campaigns as well.

One of the salient points Simpson makes is that modern liberal states have frequently failed to understand the nature of war, and, in doing so, they have conflated war and international political action. War, in his view, has morphed from being Clausewitz’s policy by other means, to international politics by other means. The heart of this argument is best encapsulated in his own words:

And is that not enough to ask of any book – to make the reader think?

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The Phantom Army of Alamein
by Rick Stroud
275 pages, $30.00

Reviewed by Debbie Miller

If some one were to ask you your opinion with respect to Operation Bertram, would you even know what operation they were talking about? I doubt that anyone but a diehard historian or a lover of the art of camouflage would know.

This book is a well written and annotated work dealing with the ‘marriage’ of two very unlikely themes – the artistry of the theatre, overlaid on the background of war, in particular, the North African Campaign of the Second World War, and the events leading up to the Second Battle of El Alamein.

The year was 1940, and Major Geoffrey Barkas had cobbled together a group of theatre designers, film makers, sculptors, model-makers, artists, and set painters who were to become the nucleus of the newly formed Camouflage Unit. The Phantom Army of Alamein tells, for the first time, the full story of how some of Britain’s most creative men put down their brushes, pencils, and cameras to join the rest of the world in the fight against the Nazis, and how they played a vital role in the winning of the war. The mandate of this unit was to support the British 8th Army by using a combination of concealment and embellishment, created with whatever came to hand, in an area and time when resources were very scarce. For example, early in the unit’s infancy, during the siege of Tobruk, they made a vital desalination plant appear to have been destroyed by German bombers. This was the beginning...
of the utilization of their storytelling skills to intricately weave webs of intrigue and deception; to make things appear that were not really there, and to make things disappear, all in an attempt to deceive the enemy and to give the Allies some advantages. Imagine having a film set the size of the Western Desert, flat and almost featureless, ‘bookended’ by the Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depression, upon which to create your illusions. The unit’s primary 1942 project became a crucial battlefield weapon for General Bernard Montgomery, when he ordered them to come up with a scheme to cloak and conceal all the preparations underway for the Second Battle of Alamein.

Operation Bertram at El Alamein was the largest visual deception campaign. It was a monumental misdirection in history, and it is the core of this tale. So, what did these soldier-artist-modellers-camouflagers actually do? How did they ‘hoodwink’ the German Desert Fox, aka Erwin Rommel? The answers constitute the best moments in the book. In general, I believe it would be fair to say that they used two approaches in their work. First, they made key weaponry disappear—not by vanishing, but by disguising it as something else, as a less threatening, innocuous entity. Tanks were made to look like trucks. Field artillery was concealed in other phony forms. And food, fuel, and other supplies were covered up and stacked to look like harmless transport vehicles. Second, at other times, for other purposes, they did exactly the opposite. Making clever use of the simplest materials, they constructed trompe l’oeil dummies (tanks, artillery, support vehicles) to create an illusory build-up, to ‘reveal’ things that were never there — optical illusions. As a result, they made the enemy think that Allied forces were being amassed at times and places that differed critically from the real situation. The Second Battle of El Alamein, in which these methods were employed, was the war’s first substantial land victory for the Allies. In part, Rommel had been hoodwinked by an army made of nothing but string, straw, and bits of wood.

The epic nature of the deception tactics utilized in Operation Bertram, and its role in the Battle of El Alamein, is beautifully told by Rick Stroud. The British, some like to tell you, are not inventive and ‘don’t do stuff.’ This beautifully told story outstrips the standard of many Second World War books I have perused recently, and it constitutes the right blend of unusual subject and solid research, mixed with plain good old fashioned intelligent writing. Stroud describes the colour and the chaos of war in the desert as our heroes wander in and out of the war zone in a succession of battered vehicles. They build amazing things out bits of junk, just like in an episode of MacGyver — these guys were geniuses. Their spirit of improvisation and artistry was immense, and the stakes were enormously high. Having to do all this while battle raged and armies swung to and fro across the desert must have constituted a nightmare.

Exulting in El Alamein, the first great British victory of the Second World War won without the assistance of American forces, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons on 11 November 1942: “By a marvellous system of camouflage, complete tactical surprise was achieved in the desert.”

As I read and reread this book it led me back to an oft-quoted Sun Tzu mantra. The great military philosopher, when referring to wartime deception, advised: “When able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.” I do not know of a better way to describe what these Allied tricksters did than the words embodied in this centuries old quote, as valid in Sun Tzu’s time as it was during the Second World War, and as it is today in the 21st Century…

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This is a remarkable book. It is the final installment of William Manchester’s amazing three-volume biography of Sir Winston Churchill. Manchester completed his research and began writing in 1988, and in the next 10 years, he completed approximately 100 pages. In declining health, he passed the torch to award winning journalist Paul Reid to complete the volume in 2003. William Manchester died the following year. Nonetheless, Paul Reid ably finished the task to the same high standard as Manchester’s previous volumes.

Although a biography, it expertly captures the essence of the time period, namely, the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. In many ways, it is a window into the strategic
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decision-making of Britain and the Allied cause. The book helps frame decisions, events, and personalities. It never fails to seize the reader’s immediate interest.

The book starts with a personal profile of Churchill, which is very detailed and provides an unblemished portrayal of the man. Through personal anecdotes, relationships, and the observations of others, a very accurate picture is developed, which sets the context for the remainder of the book. The author’s ability to capture Churchill’s personality in such a complete and personal manner is brilliant, and it helps the reader contextualize all else that follows.

The work then follows Churchill from his ascendency to the ‘prime ministership,’ to his seemingly-personal crusade against Hitler, to his twilight years in the post-war era. The writing is crisp and fast flowing throughout. The outstanding use of language and narrative style makes this chronological biography read like a story that is so engaging that it is hard to put down. Following the progress of the war, starting with the invasion of Western Europe, and through the perspective of Churchill as British War Lord, is simply remarkable. The insights with respect to the Fall of France, the Blitz, obtaining American support, the troubles with coalition partners, determining strategy, balancing political and military imperatives, to name just a few, generates a greater understanding of the conflict, its participants, and the decisions made. Moreover, the use of personal and official correspondence, letters, and diaries, as well as interviews with those close to Churchill, are all woven together expertly with the end effect that the reader feels they are sharing Churchill’s personal confidence.

Not surprisingly, the book focuses primarily upon the Second World War. In fact, 930 pages of the approximate 1,053 pages of narrative are devoted to the conflict. The remaining pages deal with the onset of the Cold War and Churchill’s twilight years. This is in no way a criticism as the insights into the policy /strategic level of war are simply invaluable.

The book also contains eight excellent detailed maps and 32 pages of black-and-white photos that capture key actors, some key events, but, most importantly, Churchill’s personality. Additionally, the volume contains extensive notes, and a very detailed and accurate index. In the end, this book should be read by all historians, military officers, and anyone with an interest in the Second World War, military history, or strategic-level military civilian relations and decision making.

Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD, retired from the CAF Regular Force in 2013. He is now the Director of the CANSOFCOM Professional Development Centre. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada and Norwich University.

Iron Man: Rudolf Berthold: Germany’s Indomitable Fighter Ace of World War I
by Peter Kilduff
London: Grub Street, 2012
192 pages, US$26.47

Reviewed by David L. Bashow

Grit and valour on the military battlefield is a theme that transcends national boundaries and time. Rudolph Berthold, a forester’s son, was the 6th highest scoring German First World War flying ace with 44 accredited victories in aerial combat.

American author Peter Kilduff has been researching military aviation history for more than 50 years. Dedicated to ferreting out the facts and in avid denial of suppositions, he edited and wrote for the U.S.-based Cross and Cockade Journal for 18 years. He became a founding member of the League of World War I Aviation Historians in 1986, and was the first managing editor of its highly internationally respected quarterly journal, Over the Front. He is currently this periodical’s book review editor, as well as an issue editor. A prolific writer, he is the author of 15 books dealing with aviation history, with a concentration upon the Imperial German Air Service, and he has received numerous awards for his outstanding research. Peter is also a recipient of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. His credentials and his credibility are therefore immaculate. In terms of academic rigour, this book, with its extensive endnotes, providing as they do not only source credits but extensive additional details, will satisfy even the most critical scrutiny.

Back to Rudolph Berthold… Born in 1891, he commenced his military career as a foot soldier with the 3rd Brandenberg Infantry regiment in 1910, and then learned to fly at his own expense in 1913, officially qualifying as a pilot that same year. When war broke out in August 1914, Berthold transferred to the German Air Service and began flying reconnaissance missions, initially as an observer, then later as a pilot. Quickly developing a reputation as a brave, resourceful, and extremely persevering warrior, he was a very early recipient of the Iron Cross in both its 2nd and 1st Classes. By September 1915, he had befriended Hans-Joachim Buddecke, a charter member of the first wave of German fighter pilot aces, which also included Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke. When Buddecke was transferred to the Turkish front shortly thereafter,
Berthold fell heir to a Fokker Eindecker (monoplane) fighter aircraft, and by late-April 1916, he had already achieved five aerial victories and had been seriously wounded in combat for the first of several times. In fact, demonstrating his signature virtually-unlimited repository of inner strength and willpower, he would ultimately survive being wounded, shot down, and crashing six times, the most debilitating of which was a gunshot wound that shattered his upper right arm in a dogfight that occurred on 10 October 1917. This took place on the same day he became just the 10th of an eventual 81 aviation recipients of the Order Pour le Mérite (the fabled ‘Blue Max’), Imperial Germany’s highest decoration for combat valour, and the German equivalent of the Victoria Cross. By this time, he had amassed 28 confirmed aerial victories. Incapable of admitting defeat, he continued to fly operationally, even when he had to be carried to and from his aircraft. He also rejected any surgical help, even refusing to have the offending bullet removed from his upper arm, believing as he did that having surgery would make it impossible for him to continue flying. In continuous pain from his untreated wounds, he persevered relentlessly, setting a shining example of fortitude for his contemporaries and for the men under his command.

Throughout the summer of 1918, while continuing to fly operationally, and while continuing to amass aerial victories, Berthold became increasingly reliant upon morphine for pain relief. However, such was the depth of his determination and willpower that he taught himself to write with his left hand in compensation for his shortcomings. However, on 10 August 1918, while flying his last wartime sortie, he downed two Royal Air Force DH-4 bombers (his 43rd and 44th victories), but collided with the last of them and subsequently crashed into a house. Due to new injuries, he was then hospitalized until the end of the war.

Ever the patriot, post-war, Berthold also became an ardent nationalist. As such, he joined the anti-communist Freikorps, founding the 1200-man strong Fränkische Bauern-Detachment Eiserne Schar Berthold sub-unit in April 1919. At the helm of this formation, he participated in several demonstrations and fought against opposing communist factions, until he was shot to death on 15 March 1920 in Harburg, Germany, during a riot between German nationalist and communist factions. The sobriquet Iron Man in reference to Rudolph Berthold is a highly appropriate branding for this remarkable warrior, and one of his young wartime apostles capsulized his personality as follows: “An iron man ~ with an absolutely unbendable iron will.”

In sum, Peter Kilduff has done a masterful job of capturing the exploits of Iron Man Rudolf Berthold, the man and his legacy. Highly recommended reading.

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) David L. Bashow, OMM, CD, a former fighter pilot, is currently an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, and the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Military Journal.
Captain Patrick Pollen, a pilot with 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron Bagotville, performs aerobatics as a member of the CF-18 Demonstration Team during the 2013 Comox Air Show, 17 August 2013.

Master Corporal Stephane Fortin, medical technician for the 2nd Canadian Field Ambulance, Petawawa, and member of the Canadian Armed Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team, examines the tonsils of a local child during Operation Renaissance, in Sara, Philippines, 21 November 2013.