



REPORT

on the

HALIFAX DISORDERS

May 7th-8th, 1945

by

Hon. Mr. Justice R. L. Kellock

Royal Commissioner

Pursuant to Order in Council P.C. 3422½
of May 10, 1945

OTTAWA
EDMOND CLOUTIER
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1945

P.C. 3422½

CERTIFIED to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 10th May, 1945.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 10th May, 1945, from the Acting Prime Minister, stating that he has been advised by the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that on the 7th and 8th of May, 1945, during a celebration of the declaration of victory over Germany serious disorders occurred in the City of Halifax and the vicinity thereof, resulting in extensive damage and very considerable looting;

That it has been alleged that members of the Armed Forces of Canada were in part responsible for the disorders; and

That it is deemed expedient in the public interest that a full, thorough and searching inquiry be made into the disorders aforesaid.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Acting Prime Minister, advise that, pursuant to the powers conferred by the Inquiries Act, being Chapter 99 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, the Honourable Roy L. Kellock, a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, be appointed a Commissioner under the said Act to inquire into the said disorders and matters connected therewith, and to report his findings to the Governor General in Council.

The Committee further advise that authority be given to the Commissioner to engage counsel as well as a clerk and a reporter to aid and assist him; all expenses of the inquiry to be paid out of the War Appropriation.

A. D. P. HEENEY,
Clerk of the Privy Council.
OTTAWA, Ontario,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGES
I. INTRODUCTORY.....	5
II. NATURE OF PLANS FOR V-E DAY AND WHAT WAS IN CONTEMPLATION.....	6
General.....	6
Army.....	8
Air Force.....	9
Navy.....	11
III. NAVAL DISCIPLINE IN HALIFAX.....	23
IV. POLICE FORCES AND PLAN FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT.....	24
V. MUNICIPAL PROGRAM.....	28
VI. EVENTS OF MAY 7 AND EARLY MORNING OF MAY 8.....	29
VII. EVENTS OF AFTERNOON OF MAY 8.....	36
(a) Halifax.....	36
(b) Dartmouth.....	54
VIII. THEATRES.....	56
IX. RESTAURANTS.....	57
X. OTHER SUGGESTED CAUSES FOR RIOTS.....	59
XI. MERCHANT SAILORS.....	60
XII. MATERIAL LOSS AND DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL CEARGED WITH OFFENCES.....	61
XIII. CONCLUSIONS. 5, 22, 27, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 48, 50, 52, 57, 59, 60	

I. INTRODUCTORY

OTTAWA, ONTARIO,
July 28th, 1945.

To His Excellency

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Having been appointed by Commission dated the 10th day of May, 1945, to conduct an inquiry into certain disorders occurring on the 7th and 8th days of May, 1945, in the City of Halifax, in the Province of Nova Scotia, and the vicinity thereof, resulting in extensive damage and very considerable looting, I conducted the said inquiry at the City of Halifax on the 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th days of May and on the 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 18th days of June, 1945. In addition to Counsel for the Commission, I had the assistance of Counsel for the Department of National Defence, the City of Halifax, the Town of Dartmouth and Counsel for a number of merchants who had suffered loss as a result of the disorders. The sittings of the Commission were duly advertised and all persons in a position to testify or to give information were invited to do so.

Before dealing with the disorders themselves, it is important to consider the period prior to May 7th and what was in the minds of the civilians and officers in the armed forces who were charged with the responsibility of planning for V-E Day, as to the kind of situation which might reasonably develop in the Halifax area on such a day, and the program which would be necessary to have ready to put into operation.

What was in contemplation is to be found in written documents. These documents disclose that, having regard to the large numbers of service people in the area, it was quite evident that, unless adequate control were maintained of their personnel by the respective armed services throughout the period of celebration, disorder and consequent damage would be the result. It was seen that any plan to be at all adequate for the period of celebration must be based upon two fundamental considerations:—

(1) The object to be attained must be the keeping of the service personnel off the streets, where, if left to wander aimlessly in any considerable numbers, trouble would be the logical result. Programs for the day, therefore, would have to be designed to occupy the minds and the time of the service personnel and be sufficiently attractive to make their establishments more desirable than the streets.

(2) At the same time and, notwithstanding the care taken with respect to (1) above, there would have to be available sufficient force to take care of any trouble which might develop.

The disorders which actually occurred on May 7 and 8 owe their origin, in my opinion, to failure on the part of the Naval Command in Halifax to plan for their personnel in accordance with (1). Once started, the development and continuance of the disorders were due to the failure of the Naval Command to put down the initial disorders on each of the two days, May 7 and 8. Subsequently the insufficiency of the police forces, service and civilian, employed, as well as their faulty direction on both days, and the passive conduct of the Naval Command in allowing naval personnel to continue unchecked on the afternoon of May 8 without taking any steps to deal with the situation until a very late hour, when the disorders had begun to play themselves out, explain the length of time during which the disorders continued.

II. NATURE OF PLANS FOR V-E DAY AND WHAT WAS IN CONTEMPLATION

The formulation of plans for V-E Day was begun in September, 1944. A meeting was called by the Mayor of Halifax on the 19th of September, attended by civilians and representatives of the armed forces, and a discussion took place "as to what protection the armed services could give against damage", and it was agreed that the heads of the service police would discuss that matter with the Halifax Chief of Police.

Later meetings of a similar character were held, and also meetings of the police heads. In this way the heads of the services were kept informed of the plans of the City.

On November 20 a meeting of the "Sub-Committee, Administrative", of the Joint Services Committee, Atlantic Coast (which Joint Committee was composed of the Commanding Officers of the three armed services) was held, at which a report of an earlier meeting was given where, among other things, the holding of a parade on V-E Day had been discussed. The minutes read in part:—

"The representatives of the armed services left the civic authorities at this meeting with the impression that the projected parade would be purely a civic affair, with the Armed Services co-operating in controlling troops and policing main points of the city for the purpose of maintaining order amongst service personnel. Special precautions would be taken to prevent any attempt being made by service personnel to break into liquor vendors."

The Administrative Sub-Committee at this meeting recommended certain alternative proposals to the main Joint Committee concerning the form of celebration and control as follows:—

- "(a) A reading of a Proclamation by unit officers to all members of the armed services at a unit Thanksgiving Parade, the Proclamation to be worded in such a manner as to discourage boisterous celebrations; the remainder of the day to be spent in regular service routine; or
- (b) That following the reading of the Proclamation a joint Thanksgiving service be held and 'where possible a compulsory parade for all service personnel should be held in conjunction with a civic parade, in order that full control of the activities of service personnel throughout the day should be possible'."

(The underscoring is mine.)

At a meeting held on the 5th of April, attended by the Chief of Police of Halifax and the heads of the police of the services and others, for the purpose of making final decisions with regard to policing plans, the meeting was advised that the local liquor stores in Halifax would close, and the Chairman of the Liquor Commission suggested that it might be possible to have the police of the various services look after the buildings of the Liquor Commission. It was pointed out at that meeting, however, this could not be arranged.

Following this meeting, the Chief Commissioner of the Liquor Commission wrote to the three commanding officers of the services in Halifax as to the decision of the Liquor Commission to have its liquor stores close and suggested that the canteens of the services might follow suit. In his reply of the 6th of April, Admiral Murray, the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, the Senior Officer in Halifax, advised the Commissioner he had discussed the matter with the heads of the other two services and that it was their view it would be better that the service canteens should remain open to the extent of

the limited supplies that would be available to them on that day. Admiral Murray's letter contains the following:—

"In our opinion, the closing of the Liquor Stores and retention of the Services' Canteens under proper control, will go a long way towards keeping crowds of Service personnel off the streets where they might do harm to private and public property. Steps will be taken within our Canteens to limit the consumption of each person to such an extent that a larger number will be reasonably satisfied. This, combined with an organization to set up sing songs and entertainments within the Service-Establishments, should go a long way to relieve the impact of large numbers of joyful Service personnel upon the City."

The matter was again discussed by the Administrative Sub-Committee on the 16th of April, and it was decided that:—

"The Service bars should remain open as this would encourage personnel to remain in camp and less likely to congregate in unruly gangs downtown and could, therefore, be the means of extended control."

In communicating to his commanding officers the decision as to the closing of the liquor stores in Halifax and the keeping open of the navy canteens, Admiral Murray, under date of the 11th of April, said:—

"(3). It is considered that this action should facilitate the control of Naval personnel during V-Day in that they will be attracted to their own barracks and canteens rather than to aimless wandering about the town."

After referring to the importance of arranging for the rationing and widest possible distribution of the beer available in canteens, his memorandum proceeded:—

"Consideration should also be given to the possibility of arranging for music and singsongs in the canteens, continuing with other forms of entertainment within Naval establishments. By measures such as these, the celebration of V-Day will become a ship or establishment celebration, and the impact of a large number of Naval ratings upon the civil community will be greatly lessened."

The officers of the Naval Police throughout Canada, that is, the Shore Patrol Officers, met in Ottawa on the 19th and 20th of March. This meeting was attended by Lieutenant-Commander Wood, the Shore Patrol Officer in the Halifax area. The minutes of this meeting read in part as follows:—

"V-Day Celebrations, Possible Disorders.

It was generally anticipated by the meeting that V-Day celebrations are apt to be of a boisterous nature and that insofar as possible, civil and Service authorities should make preparations against breakage of windows, overturning of vehicles and the customary forms of property damage occasioned by mass-celebration.

Insofar as naval patrols are concerned, it was felt that they should not patrol the streets during this period, but be held in reserve to answer calls of an emergency nature and then travel in strong units to the point of disturbance."

On the 16th of April an association of certain Halifax citizens living in the north end of the City (where there are large naval establishments), calling itself the "Halifax North Civic Improvement Association", met and passed a resolution which was forwarded to the Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the Armed Services. This resolution, after pointing out that, in the opinion of the

Association, V-E Day was not far distant and that there would undoubtedly be great rejoicing and jubilation in Halifax, proceeded as follows:—

“AND WHEREAS, some of the people who will then be in this City are likely to celebrate said day in a riotous and rowdy manner and to molest peaceful citizens and damage and destroy their property.

AND WHEREAS breaches of the peace and damage and destruction of property are most likely to occur in restaurants, tea rooms and theatres and other public places.

AND WHEREAS it is imperative that all necessary steps be taken by the responsible authorities to preserve order and to protect the persons and property of the citizens of Halifax on that day and in particular that adequate police protection be provided for that purpose on said day.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that we, the members of the HALIFAX NORTH CIVIC IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, in meeting assembled earnestly urge the responsible authorities to take the necessary steps to ensure that order is preserved and that the persons and property of the citizens of Halifax are protected on V-Day and in particular to see that adequate police protection is provided for that purpose on that day and that special precautions are taken to prevent breaches of the peace, damage and destruction of property in restaurants, tea rooms, theatres and other places and that plans be now made by said authorities to provide said protection.”

This resolution came to the attention of Admiral Murray, who, in his evidence, said that it contained nothing which he did not at that time already have in mind.

ARMY

The personnel of the army in Halifax and vicinity on the 8th of May, 1945, was as follows:—

(1) Within the City:—		
In barracks	3,253	
In billets	1,236	
Total		4,489
CWAC in barracks		840
Total		5,329
(2) Outside the City		2,990
Total		8,319

The commanding officers of the various military units in the Halifax area met on April 13. In communicating their proceedings to the D.O.C. Military District No. 6, they stated that it was decided that messes and canteens should be open on “V” Day at the discretion of the Commanding Officers. The communication proceeds:—

“It was felt that every effort should be made to provide interests and entertainment within Unit lines and that, other than the normal number of personnel on leave and pass, men should be kept at their general duties, particularly members in Operational Units. It was felt that representation should be made to the Nova Scotia Liquor Commission for an increased quota of beer to be available for such occasion as an inducement to keep personnel off the streets.”

Brigadier White, D.O.C. Military District No. 6, said that the above minute reflected the policy which was adopted, with the object, as stated, of keeping the personnel off the streets. At three different conferences in April of the

Senior Staff Officers and representatives of all military units in the area, the steps which should be taken to make the men feel that they would enjoy themselves more in their own barracks than anywhere else were considered. Attention was directed to programs for each unit which would produce that result. The fact, as will appear, that comparatively few army personnel were involved in the disorders indicates that this planning and its execution were effectively done.

Brigadier White also explained that he did not have all of the above 8,319 personnel to plan for. Of the 1,236 on subsistence in Halifax, about 600 were married men, having their wives and homes in the city. Some were Permanent Force, who lived in married quarters belonging to the Government. He had no feeling that any of these, even if at home on the day, would be likely to cause any trouble. Outside the city the bulk of the men were at the forts, on the radar, searchlights and other equipment, and these men were not allowed to leave their posts. Some of the camps also were from twelve to fourteen miles away and he did not think men from them would likely be in the city in any event. He also explained that the men in barracks are not allowed to remain out at night. To do so a soldier must obtain an all night pass. The normal hours at which a soldier must be back at his quarters vary from 10.15 to 11.45, depending on the unit to which he belongs. The practice in the navy is quite different. All navy personnel not on duty, whether living in barracks or in billets in the city, are free from 5 p.m. to 7 a.m. the next day. This rule does not apply to men under 20 in barracks. They are required to be in their barracks by 10 p.m. Men of this age group who are on ships, however, are not required to be in at this hour.

At 2.45 p.m. on May 7, Brigadier White issued a communication to all his Commanding Officers, stating that the remainder of the day and all day May 8 would be a holiday. The memorandum went on:—

- (2) All normal duty must be carried out and security maintained.
- (3) Adequate staffs (Sunday pattern) will be maintained.
- (4) Essential services will be maintained.
- (5) Equipment and property shall be safeguarded.
- (6) Those employed these two days will be granted leave later on."

The programs which had been planned for V-E Day were such that they could be employed on the issue of this order on May 7 as well as on the following day, and that course was followed.

AIR FORCE

In a communication of the 3rd of April, 1945, from Air Vice-Marshal Morfee, Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern-Air-Command at Halifax, to all units of his command, it was directed that, upon receipt of news of the declaration of V-E Day, each commanding officer should hold a parade at which the declaration should be read to the assembled station. It was pointed out in the communication that it would be well to organize services of thanksgiving and to impress on the troops "the importance of their behaviour during any celebration and that war service gratuities can be lost where personnel are discharged for service misconduct". Also:—

"3. It is further suggested that C.O's should endeavour to plan and institute some form of entertainment to follow such a service so that the troops can be actively and pleasantly engaged on the station, rather than dissipating therefrom to local towns."

On the 10th of April, 1945, a communication was forwarded from Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa, to Air Vice-Marshal Morfee and other commanding officers of the Air Force throughout the country, two paragraphs of which read as follows:—

"(1) (h) That instructions be issued to every Department which has buildings or other public properties in its care, to communicate with its officers and agents, directing that suitable precautions be taken against damage in any celebration.

(2) Insofar as the various Commands are concerned, it is requested that arrangements be made for:—

(c) Adequate precautions at all units to ensure the protection of public property, and the preclusion of incidents which may bring disrepute to personnel of the service and the R.C.A.F. in general."

This was supplemented on the 10th of April by a further message, paragraph (3) of which reads:—

"Adequate control over celebrations must be exercised to ensure that the prestige of the R.C.A.F. is maintained."

The number of personnel who were not required for duty on May 7 and 8 was 1,189 in Halifax and 2,118 in the Dartmouth area. Of these, in the Halifax area, some 460 were quartered in barracks, of whom approximately 300 were women. No evidence was given with respect to the program planned for these women, nor for approximately 700 other free personnel who were billeted in Halifax.

In the barracks at No. (1) Release Centre, however, there were 200 men, of whom 162 were free on May 7 and 8. The evidence established that the men were assembled, the program which had been planned was outlined to them and they were cautioned with respect to behaviour. They were then entertained at their barracks and were not given leave, except for the purpose of escorting guests to a dance which took place in the evening of May 7 and which was attended, according to the Officer Commanding, by a large number of W.R.C.N.S. and ratings who had been invited. On May 8 the personnel of these barracks, while given a holiday, remained in their quarters. This was explained as due to the late hour at which the dance of the preceding evening had concluded. At 5.00 p.m. when word was received of rioting in the downtown area, they were confined to barracks and senior officers were detailed to the downtown area to order all air force personnel to return to their stations. At 8.00 p.m. it was found that about 72 per cent of the total personnel were present. A further 16 per cent had sleeping-out passes and a further 10 per cent were on furlough.

In the Dartmouth area, of the 2,118 entitled to leave, approximately 1,643 belonged to the R.C.A.F. Station which is some distance outside the town. Owing to the manner in which the news was broadcast in the morning of May 7, the great majority of the personnel left their posts without permission. According to the Officer Commanding, this was soon corrected and the situation in hand. The airmen's canteen for the sale of beer and non-alcoholic beverages was open from 12.00 noon to 2.00 p.m. and from 5.00 p.m. to 1.00 a.m., and dances were organized in the officers' and sergeants' messes and in the airmen's recreation hall, to which all personnel were permitted to bring civilians, and hostesses were on hand from different organizations in Halifax and Dartmouth. The R.C.A.F. also arranged for transportation to and from the station. The program in force at this station on May 8 was not otherwise described in evidence. Neither in Halifax or Dartmouth, however, were Air Force personnel a serious factor in the disturbances. A few, but only a few, according to the evidence, were involved.

NAVY

Turning to the navy. On the 22nd of February, the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, Rear Admiral Murray, sent a memorandum to the naval officers under his command in charge of various points outside Halifax, as well as to the commanding officers of the various port and shore establishments and ships at Halifax. This memorandum reads:—

"Armistice Celebrations"

"Consideration is to be given to the problem of maintaining adequate control within your Command during the celebrations to be expected upon the close of hostilities in Europe.

2. Unless suitable arrangements are made on the basis of local conditions, casualties and property damage may well result.

3. Certain of the more obvious points which should be considered are:—

- (a) A careful check to ensure that all ready-use lockers, magazines, etc., are locked.
- (b) Withdrawal of ammunition from Quartermasters and Sentries.
- (c) Additional care with fuel compartments.
- (d) Proper gangways and scrambling nets supporting them to shore.
- (e) Removal of pistols and primers from depth charges, and careful stowage.
- (f) Stowage of all pyrotechnics under lock and key.
- (g) Exceptional care to guard against fire as a result of bonfires, rockets, etc.

4. Celebrations should be encouraged along pre-arranged lines.

5. Duty watches may become non-existent unless comprised of reliable ratings.

6. Divisional Officers will be able to help the ratings protect themselves from the consequences of malicious damage to H.M. Property by a straightforward talk with their Divisions.

7. A report is to be made giving details of proposed action."

I think it well to make partial reference to some of the replies received from some of the commanding officers outside the Halifax area before dealing with those from the officers commanding in Halifax. Their plans for V-E Day reflect what was being provided against and furnish a useful comparison with the plans proposed by the officers within the Halifax area.

On the 12th of March the Naval Officer in Charge at Shelburne, where the naval personnel amounted to 2,190, submitted his proposed procedure to Admiral Murray. His memorandum reads in part as follows:—

- "2. (f) The Wet Canteens will be closed until such time as the celebration fever has quietened.
- (g) Divisional Officers will speak to all ratings in their Divisions on their behaviour and deportment when Armistice Day arrives, stressing the point that malicious damage of Government or civilian property, wild and unruly behaviour, drunkenness and the creating of disturbances will not be tolerated, at the same time pointing out that every indulgence possible will be given for the natural celebration of the occasion."
- (h) On Armistice Day, Lower Deck will be cleared and the Ship's Company spoken to by the Commanding Officer.

3. It is proposed that a route march with the band will then be organized.

4. A celebration dance will take place in the Drill Hall, with invitations to civilian guests, and as many picture shows as possible will be shown in the Coliseum.

5. The Special Services Officer has been instructed to organize additional entertainment to *occupy the time and minds of personnel.*"

(The underscoring is again mine.) The obvious comment on No. 3 is that it would tend to use up considerably the energy of the men. No's. 4 and 5 would take care of the remainder of the free time.

On the 17th of March the Naval Officer in charge at Saint John, where the naval personnel amounted to 480, submitted his plans in a general memorandum, together with schedules showing *in detail* instructions to be issued to the floating and shore establishments under his command. Paragraph (3) reads:—

"The Naval and Army Padres have consulted together and prepared a Thanksgiving Service, which will be printed and distributed to all Service Personnel and Civilians taking part. It is felt that such a Service will help to subdue over-enthusiastic celebrations similar to those experienced on Armistice Day, 1918."

In the schedule headed "Organization for Armistice Celebration", paragraph (5) reads in part:—

"It is inevitable that the rejoicing and the release from the tension of the last five and a half years of war will occasion celebrations of various kinds and while a certain relaxation of routines will be permissible, control of personnel is to be maintained *at all times.*"

(The underscoring is again mine.)

In the schedule headed "General Routine for Armistice Celebration, paragraph (7) reads:—

"Steps are to be taken to prevent damage to Naval, private property or stores. Additional watchmen are to be posted as necessary. Ratings should be warned in advance that any damage to His Majesty's property will be dealt with severely."

The memorandum also contains the following:—

"*Controlled and supervised* celebrations are to be encouraged but care is to be taken to keep celebrations in hand. The *first consideration* is the safety of the ratings and the prevention of damage to property."

On the 20th of March, 1945, the Commanding Officer at St. Hyacinthe, where the naval personnel amounted to 2,110, reported to Admiral Murray. In the course of his memorandum he pointed out that, as a great many men had their families in St. Hyacinthe, the number in the downtown area would be approximately 500 to 600, which "could be absorbed by this town, more especially as they will have their families with them".

On the 25th of March, the Naval Officer in Charge, Digby Area, where the naval personnel amounted to some 6,000, made his report, in which he pointed out that, since the receipt of the Admiral's memorandum of the 22nd of February, he had communicated with his Heads of Departments and Commanding Officers and that "reports have been received from the addressees which show that the suggestions have been seriously considered, and that all precautions will be taken to avoid damage to Naval Property, and to curb the exuberance of the men, so that injury and trouble may be avoided". The memorandum contains the following:—

"(2) Within H.M.C.S. *Cornwallis*, upon receipt of official advice of the cessation of hostilities, it is planned to clear lower decks immediately and

hold a short service of thanksgiving prayers. The ratings will then be told what celebrations have been planned, and will be warned that there will be no let-up in the administration of Naval discipline.

(3) Taking into consideration both the hour of the announcement and the state of the weather, it is then proposed to announce a Make and Mend, and to have Special Services" (that is the officer in charge of recreation) "provide sufficient entertainment to absorb the ratings' energies, and to keep their celebrations within reasonable bounds. It is felt that a Band Concert, free motion pictures in the theatre and Service huts, and a gala celebration dance in the Drill Shed would keep the ratings together in groups, and make for easier management. With the facilities available within *Cornwallis*, it is considered that celebrations can be carried on in an orderly fashion."

In a second memorandum to Admiral Murray of the 27th of March, the Digby Officer reported in part as follows:—

"(4) *General.*

(1) Immediately upon receipt of advice that hostilities have ceased, ratings are to be warned against getting into trouble, and reminded of the penalties for improper behaviour. They are to be specifically warned that there will be no change or let-up in the administering of Naval discipline, and that discipline is not relaxed with hostilities.

(2) The burden of responsibility for encouraging ratings to conduct themselves in a suitable manner is to be placed upon the shoulders of Divisional Officers who are to make judicious use of their influence to prevent trouble."

On the 13th of April the Naval Officer in charge at Gaspe, where the naval personnel amounted to 600, submitted to Admiral Murray the procedure to be followed by Officers in his Command. Paragraphs 5 (b) and (c) read in part as follows:—

"(5) (b) While it is not intended to limit the celebration of victory, wanton damage to H.M.C. property or possible loss of life must be prevented. Ships' companies are to be warned that they are still members of the Service and any breach of discipline may result in dishonourable discharge and subsequent forfeiture of rehabilitation grants, gratuities, etc.

(c) Arrangements will be made for parties within the establishment and ships' companies should be encouraged to attend there rather than proceeding ashore."

Coming to the Halifax area, including Dartmouth, it will be relevant first to describe the ships and establishments there located, together with the number of naval personnel. While Admiral Murray was Commander of a large area including Halifax, the various commanding officers in Halifax stood separately in relation to him, as did the commanding officers in Digby, Sydney, etc., and reported to him in respect of V-E Day as did those officers. In other words, Admiral Murray was the local commander in Halifax, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the larger area.

The total naval personnel in the Halifax area on the 7th and 8th of May, 1945, amounted to 18,223, made up of officers, including Wren Officers, 1,490, Wrens, 1,250, ratings 15,483, a total of 18,223.

The subordinate commands in the Halifax area were as follows:—

- (1) H.M.C.S. *Stadacona*, a shore establishment, consisting of three training schools.
- (2) H.M.C.S. *Scotian*, consisting of the naval dockyard, in which, in addition to ratings, a considerable number of civilians were employed.
- (3) H.M.C.S. *Kings*. This is an Officers Training Establishment at Kings College, Dalhousie University.
- (4) H.M.C.S. *Peregrine*. This is a manning pool.
- (5) *Captain "D"*. Within this command are included all war vessels based in Halifax.
- (6) *Commander of the Port*, consisting of harbour ships and shore staff.
- (7) *Commander of Motor Boats*.

H.M.C.S. *Stadacona*.

On the 8th of March, 1945, Captain Balfour, Commanding Officer at *Stadacona*, replied to Admiral Murray's memorandum of the 22nd of February as follows:—

"Armistice Celebration"

"It is submitted, with reference to C.N.A. 70-1-1 of 22nd February, 1945, that the main problem to be expected in this Establishment will be the protection of property and stores.

2. In this connection it is not anticipated that the average rating will be of much assistance in maintaining order.

3. In the happy event of an Armistice, the following procedure has been decided upon:—

1. Sunday Routine—Open Gangway.
2. All instructors in schools required for duty in their various schools.
3. A detail of selected reliable Chiefs and Petty Officers to stand by other important buildings.
4. Secure all ammunition, demolition charges, rifles, pistols, etc., in the D.E.M.S. Magazine under sentry.
5. Utilize shore patrol class under training as sentries and patrols. Little faith could be placed in the presently constituted main guard.
6. Pay special attention to Wardroom liquor stocks.
7. Normal canteen hours. These cannot be extended due to the quota of beer which would be on hand.
8. Immediate organization of a dance for the evening in the Recreation Building.

4. The whole object and purpose of the above is intended to control rather than restrict. Also, to keep an eye open for wilful damage and fire. It is felt that if damage can be kept to a minimum, natural discipline should reassert itself within twenty-four hours."

It will be observed that what was proposed for V-E Day was a holiday from 10.30 a.m. This is the meaning of paragraph 3 (1) "Sunday Routine—Open Gangway". It will also be observed that there is nothing in the memorandum provided for the ratings entitled to the "Open Gangway", with the exception of the dance in the evening and normal canteen hours.

On the 26th of April, Captain Balfour issued a memorandum to his officers, which reads as follows:—

“ARMISTICE DAY CELEBRATIONS”

“Present indications are that V-Day may be expected at any time within the near future. Therefore all Heads of Departments are to take immediate steps to organize their Departments in anticipation.

2. Officers and ratings will naturally wish to celebrate and it is desired that they should do so. However, while it is not wished that ratings should be restrained, nevertheless, there must be definite control to prevent damage to buildings and fixtures, while the celebrations go on.

3. Therefore, the following organization will go into force on V-Day. This may seem to be overly cautious but it will be far easier to slack off than tighten up when it is seen what the general reaction is.

- (a) All block Petty Officers will be required on board to stand by their blocks to see that the blocks are not damaged.
- (b) The entire regulation staff to be on board to be available to take any action required.
- (c) The Shore Patrol class in training at the time to be available in “J” Block to stand by to take over if the Main Guard should prove unreliable and also to send out wandering patrols throughout barracks to assist ratings who are drunk, to prevent the molesting of female personnel and to prevent fighting.
- (d) The Torpedo School and Mechanical Training Establishment to retain a number of senior Chiefs and Petty Officers to stand by in the respective schools to guard valuable instructional equipment. Other Department Heads to review their own needs and take steps to safeguard their Departments. In connection with this, cash should be kept as low as possible in all Pay Divisions.
- (e) Wardroom Bars should be open normal hours. Instructions will be issued as to the amount of liquor to be put on.
- (f) The Wet Canteen should be open as for Sunday routine and an attempt should be made to ration the beer in such a way that it goes to the greatest number and not too much to any one man. In the Wet Canteen sing-songs should be encouraged.
- (g) The orchestra of the Band will proceed to the Recreation Building and will play there for all those who wish to dance. The Band will be required for celebrations throughout the city.
- (h) All ammunition will be locked up and no sentries are to be armed except with empty revolvers which they could use as clubs if attacked.
- (i) The usual gate regulations for this day will be relaxed to permit Naval Personnel to proceed in or out of barracks at will, but civilians should be kept out of the barracks area as much as possible, with the exception of the Recreation Centre.
- (j) No bonfires will be permitted on Naval property and are to be put out by the Duty Watch or Patrols detailed for that purpose.

4. All Officers should be warned that they may be required on board for duty, although it is not anticipated that such a drastic step should be necessary. However, Officers are expected to be an example to the ratings and any Officer, who by his conduct on this day merits it, will be severely dealt with.”

It will be observed that, with the exception of sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) of paragraph (3), nothing is planned to occupy the time of the ratings. (g) is presumably limited to the evening dance referred to in the previous memorandum of the 8th of March. "Sunday Routine" for the Wet Canteen, referred to in (f), means that the wet canteen should be open from 12.00 noon to 1.30 p.m. and from 6.00 p.m. to 9.00 p.m. However, Captain Balfour said he was aware that there was insufficient beer to enable the canteen to open at 6.00 p.m. and, in fact, the stock of beer was exhausted at or before 1.30 p.m. Nothing was done in the matter of sing-songs. Captain Balfour said he had "very little faith" in the sing-songs in his canteen, as it was not limited to *Stadacona* men but was open to men of *Scotian* and ships in port. Furthermore, there was no piano, no song sheets, and no song leader.

On the 7th of May Captain Balfour issued the following program for the 8th of May, but he did not send it to Admiral Murray, or the Chief of Staff. It reads:—

"9.00 a.m.—Clear Lower Decks in the North Drill Shed for a short address by the Commanding Officer and a short religious service.

All Block Officers are to see that all blocks are cleared and marched to the North Drill Shed.

On Completion:

Sunday Routine—Open Gangway.

12.00 noon—Wet Canteen opens.

10.00 a.m., 2.00 p.m., 6.00 p.m., 8.30 p.m.—

A FREE movie will be shown in the Torpedo School Auditorium for all Navy Personnel—"This Man's Navy", Wallace Beery, James Gleason.

8.00 p.m.—Dance in the P. & R. T. Gymnasium for all Naval Personnel and guests.

N.B.—The Duty Watch on V-E Day will be granted leave from 9.00 a.m. Wednesday to 9.00 a.m. Thursday.

All Naval Personnel are informed that while it is very much desired that everyone have a good time, anyone causing wilful damage to either civilian or Naval property will be severely dealt with."

In evidence Captain Balfour explained that the program specified for the morning would be over by 10.00 and leave was given at 10.30 a.m. The moving pictures were to be shown four times, at 10.00 a.m. and at 2.00 p.m., 6.00 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. He estimated that each showing would take some one and one-half to two hours. The seating capacity in the auditorium was approximately 600. The cafeteria was open from 11.00 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. The dance was scheduled for 8.00 p.m. It will again be seen that, so far as occupying the time of the ratings and inducing them to remain within the confines of *Stadacona*, this program was quite inadequate.

Admiral Murray in evidence referred to the fact that there were playing fields and a recreation building at *Stadacona*. The playing field, however, was not in condition for use, and, while the recreation building was open, the recreation officer made no special plans for the men, either within or without the recreation building. The equipment was there if they desired to use it.

The personnel on the books of *Stadacona* on the 7th of May were 6,142 of whom 1,178 were in billets in the City, the remainder being in barracks. 3,583 out of the 6,142 were free to leave the establishment at 5.15 p.m. on May 7th and 3,038 actually left the premises. On the 8th of May the number shown on the books was 6,180, of whom 1,178 were in billets in the City. 3,262 were given leave as from 10.30 a.m. and 2,745 actually left the premises.

H.M.C.S. *Peregrine*.

On the 26th of March Captain Freyer, the Commanding Officer, reported his plans to Admiral Murray as follows:—

"Armistice Celebrations"

"Submitted:

With reference to your letter CNA 70-1-1, of the 22nd February, 1945, the following action will be taken in this establishment, if and when Armistice is announced:

1. Lower Deck will be cleared.
 - (a) Situation pertaining to local conditions will be explained.
 - (b) Behaviour will be stressed.
 - (c) If conditions allow, make and mend will be declared.
2. Firearms and ammunition to be withdrawn.
3. No bonfires to be allowed in the establishment.
4. Wet canteen.

Normal wet canteen hours will be observed."

This memorandum makes no provision for entertainment of ratings.

On the 7th of May, Captain Freyer issued his program for May 8th as follows:—

"Ships Routine for V-E Day, Tuesday, May 8th, 1945.

- 0615 (6.15 a.m.) — Call the hands.
- 0700 (7.00 a.m.) — Hands to breakfast.
- 0800 (8.00 a.m.) — Duty watch to muster (Mondays)
to clean blocks, etc.
- 0845 (8.45 a.m.) — Hands to clean in rig of Day No. 2.
- 0915 (9.15 a.m.) — Clear lower deck, duty cooks stand fast.
- 0930 (9.30 a.m.) — Church service in drill hall.
- 1030 (10.30 a.m.) — Open Gangway.
- 1300 (1.00 p.m.) — Movies.
- 1500 (3.00 p.m.) — Movies.
- 1700 (5.00 p.m.) — Movies.
- 1900 (7.00 p.m.) — Movies.
- 1930 (7.30 p.m.) — Open Gangway closed.
- 2100 (9.00 p.m.) — Dance in Drill Hall.

Wet canteen tap hours C.P.O. and P.O.

1300 (1.00 p.m.)

to

1430 (2.30 p.m.)

1800 (6.00 p.m.)

to

2130 (9.30 p.m.)

Men's

1230 (12.30 p.m.)

to

1400 (2.00 p.m.)

1830 (6.30 p.m.)

to

1930 (7.30 p.m.)

Building hours for wet
one half hour after closing
of taps."

This was not seen by Admiral Murray. It will again be seen that a holiday was declared as from 10.30 a.m. when "Open Gangway" was to be in force. The program of movies and a dance in the evening was similar to that at *Stadacona*. The capacity of the moving picture hall is approximately 1,100 and each performance lasted about one and one-half hours. The wet canteen for Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers was to be open from 1.00 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. and from 6.00 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. The wet canteen for the ratings was to be open from 12.30 p.m. to 2.00 p.m. and from 6.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. The only difference in the programs of *Peregrine* and *Stadacona* is that in the case of the former the theatre had a larger capacity and the pictures were shown more often. Captain Freyer stated that "it was sincerely our intention that we should do everything we possibly could to keep the men inside H.M.C.S. *Peregrine* on V-E Day". The sports ground at *Peregrine* was not available and the Director of Physical and Recreational Training made no special arrangements for sports on V-E Day. Captain Freyer said there was a recreational hall at *Peregrine*, but "we didn't pay any attention to that end of it". I think Captain Freyer made a frank answer, meaning that something more than the usual gymnasium and kindred forms of activity was necessary to attract the men on such a day as Armistice Day.

On the 7th of May there were 2,650 naval personnel on the books of *Peregrine*, of whom 2,575 were free at 5.00 p.m. on the 7th of May, 775 of whom actually left the premises. On May 8th there were 3,190 shown on the *Peregrine's* books, of whom 2,575 were given a holiday and 1,500 actually left the premises. *Peregrine* has accommodation for all of its personnel in barracks.

H.M.C.S. *Scotian*.

On the 8th of March, Captain Robertson, Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. *Scotian*, reported to Admiral Murray. It will be sufficient to summarize this memorandum.

It was proposed to assemble all available ratings actually employed in or about the Dockyard as soon as possible after the receipt of official word of the armistice and to have them addressed by the Commodore, followed by a short religious service. This same procedure was to be followed for the civilian dockyard personnel. Thereupon all personnel not required for essential services would be free to proceed out of the dockyard. The memorandum prescribed certain precautionary measures to be taken for the protection of property within the dockyard. Paragraph (5) reads:—

"The Commodore, when addressing Naval and civilian personnel, will stress the necessity of ratings protecting themselves from the consequences of malicious damage."

Captain Robertson explained that, with the exception of 862 maintained in barracks, all the personnel of H.M.C.S. *Scotian* were quartered in the city. He said that there were no recreation facilities for the personnel of his command within H.M.C.S. *Scotian* except a drill hall, and that they would have to be looked after, if at all, in *Stadacona*, or elsewhere. A "show" had been scheduled in the drill hall for May 8, presumably for the evening, but was cancelled.

On the 7th of May, 3,501 naval personnel, as distinct from civilians, were shown on the books of H.M.C.S. *Scotian* in Halifax, of whom 2,780 were free at 5 p.m. on May 7, all of whom left the premises. On May 8 there were 3,415 shown on the books of *Scotian* in Halifax, of whom 2,792 were free from 11 a.m. on May 8, all of whom left the premises. There were other personnel on the books of *Scotian*, but not in Halifax.

Commander Motor Boats

On the 17th of March the Commanding Officer of these small ships reported his plans for armistice celebrations to Admiral Murray. Again I do not consider it necessary to set this document out in full. The document contains the instructions to the commanding officers of the ships concerned. They were directed that the celebration was not to commence before receipt of official information and that, if time permitted, the general commanding officer would summon the commanding officers of the respective ships to a meeting where they would receive information and instructions. Certain initial precautions were to be taken for the protection of property and the securing of ammunition, etc. Paragraphs (6), (7) and (11) read:—

"(6) Commanding Officers are to muster the ship's company and announce the event, giving as much information as possible. At this time a straightforward talk is recommended, pointing out that while they are in no way desirous of curtailing the celebration of such a victory, they want to protect the men themselves from the consequences of malicious damage to H. M. property. The ship's company are still members of the armed forces and as such are subject to punishment and dishonourable discharge, which would mean forfeiting all war bonuses and rehabilitation grants.

A talk of this nature will be the soundest nature of preventing casualties and damage.

(7) Celebrations should be encouraged along prearranged lines if possible, thus supplying leadership unconsciously.

Commanding Officers are not authorized to order "Splice the Main Brace" (vide K.R. and A.I. 1825, para. 11). Should authority be received to do so, proper control is to be maintained. (This refers to the issue of rum.)

Forces may be required to take part in civil functions or to control the general public, therefore, leave should not be granted without approval.

(11) As the ratings can only be expected to act in keeping with the example set by their officers, it is up to every officer to see to it that his behaviour is exemplary."

On the 7th of May the personnel of these ships were 300, of whom 217 were free as from 4.30 p.m. on May 7, all of whom left their ships. The strength was the same on the 8th of May and the same number went ashore at 11 a.m.

Captain "D"

On the 8th of March, Captain "D", the commander of all war vessels based on Halifax, reported to Admiral Murray, forwarding a memorandum which he in turn had prepared for his subordinate officers. Paragraphs (1) and (2) read as follows:—

"(1) Consideration should now be given to the problem of maintaining adequate control in and security of your ship during the celebrations to be expected on the close of hostilities in Europe.

(2) Unless some forethought is given to the matter, it may be that casualties and property damage will result, especially if the termination of hostilities should occur when your ship is in harbour. Therefore, while celebrations to a degree should be encouraged, it is essential that they proceed along pre-arranged lines."

Paragraph (3) sets out certain steps of a precautionary nature required for the protection of property and the securing of ammunition, etc. Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) are as follows:—

"(4) Unless duty watches are composed of reliable ratings, they may well become non-existent. Commanding officers should therefore quietly and personally prepare a list of their most trustworthy officers and ratings to take over key duties in an emergency. The existence of such a list should not be promulgated until the occasion arises.

(5) In the event of a sudden cessation of hostilities, ships' companies should be addressed by the Commanding Officer. He should make it clear, in a straightforward manner, that while enthusiastic celebration of the event is understandable and will be encouraged, care must be taken by ratings to protect themselves against the consequences of malicious damage and accidents resulting from over-exuberance. The officers and ratings previously selected in accordance with paragraph (4) should then be assembled and suitably allocated to the Duty Watch. It is emphasized that the primary consideration in the selection of such ratings is reliability and good judgment, not necessarily technical qualification.

(6) This memorandum should not at this time form the subject of discussion with ship's officers other than the Executive Officer. Divisional Officers may, however, be instructed that discreet and carefully worded advice to the ratings, under them, may have a desirable effect in curbing a tendency to unrestrained celebration in the event of the contingency referred to.

(7) This memorandum should not be taken as an indication that the end of the war is imminent. It is intended rather to ensure that Commanding Officers prepare themselves for a situation which will no doubt confront them suddenly at some future date.

(8) It is not desired that this memorandum be answered in writing. Commanding Officers should, however, inform me personally that they have given the matter their consideration, and taken the necessary preliminary steps as outlined herein."

On the 7th of May the number of naval personnel under Captain "D" were 4,346, of whom 3,455 were free to go ashore. 1,740 actually went ashore. On the 8th of May the strength was 4,524, of whom 3,503 were free to go ashore and 1,692 actually did so.

COMMANDER OF THE PORT

On the 18th of March the Commander of the Port reported to Admiral Murray. In paragraph (3) he states:—

"(3) Due to the wide dispersal of shore personnel under my administration it is not considered that organized celebrations can be arranged except possibly at the two Outer Defence Stations."

The memorandum of this officer to his subordinates reads in part as follows:—

"(1) You are fully to consider the problem of maintaining adequate control in your department during the celebrations to be expected upon the close of hostilities in Europe. Unless suitable arrangements are made, casualties and property damage may result.

(2) Upon hearing that organized resistance in Europe is about to come to an end all Officers, Chief and Petty Officers in your Department are to be called together to have the situation explained to them, and warned to help ratings protect themselves against the consequences of malicious damage to property. They should then prepare to take the following precautions immediately the armistice is confirmed:—

(a) All ammunition is to be withdrawn from sentries and patrolmen and placed under lock and key. A check is also to be made that all other ammunition and pyrotechnics are safely locked away.

- (b) An officer (or the senior rating, where no officer is borne) is personally to check all fire-fighting equipment.
- (c) Liquid fuel stores are to be kept under constant supervision.
- (d) Care is to be taken that the duty watch comprises as large a percentage as possible of reliable ratings.
- (e) All ratings before proceeding ashore to be warned as to the consequences of malicious damage to property."

The number of naval personnel under the command of this officer on the 7th of May were 790, of whom 538 were free as of 4.00 p.m. 419 took advantage of this leave. On the 8th of May, the strength was 790, of whom 566 were given a holiday as from 10.30 a.m. 462 took advantage of this.

On the 2nd of April, Admiral Murray, having received the replies up to that date to his memorandum of the 22nd of February, issued a memorandum to the officers under his command, in paragraph (3) of which he approved of the arrangements proposed by his officers as set out in the memoranda to which I have referred above. Admiral Murray's memorandum reads as follows:—

"The object on this occasion is to ensure, as far as possible, that officers and ratings, who by their efforts in the past five years have made an outstanding contribution to the successful termination of hostilities with Germany, may give vent to their feelings with freedom and with credit to the uniform they wear and, at the same time, that both private and government property come to no harm.

2. That this is fully appreciated is apparent from the replies which have now been received from all authorities to whom my C.N.A. 70-1-1 of 22nd February, 1945, was addressed, but uniformity appears desirable on the following points:—

- (1) Co-operation with civil authorities in any thanksgiving services, particularly out of doors.
- (2) Bars in officers' messes and wet canteens to be open during normal hours.
- (3) The necessity for the greatest tact and forbearance on the part of officers and men of the Shore Patrol.
- (4) No bonfires within the precincts of any Naval establishment. Service fireworks or rockets not to be used.
- (5) "Splice the Main Brace" can only be authorized by signal from N.S.H.Q. and then can only be carried out in H.M.C. Ships.
- (6) As many Naval cars and trucks as possible should be garaged for the day.

3. Apart from these points, the arrangements proposed by Administrative Authorities to meet local conditions *are approved*.

4. As regards sea going ships, a victorious armistice is a very great event in the commission of each individual ship and, although there will no doubt be evening entertainments in base establishments open to officers and men of ships in harbour, I suggest that Commanding Officers should consider the possibility of marking the day by some entertainment, such as a ship's sing-song on board, that will be a ship and not only an individual personal celebration."

The last communication of Admiral Murray is a signal, issued to his subordinate officers, at 3.15 p.m. on May 7, as follows:—

"In wishing the personnel of this command a most joyful celebration of V Day, I must draw attention to the fact that there are probably a number of submarines manned by fanatical Nazis still at sea and that all responsibility for the safety of lives and property at sea remains upon our shoulders until all have been accounted for.

2. Operations must continue as usual, but particular trials, tests, practices and exercises, which can be cancelled without interfering with operations may be dispensed with for this day's celebrations.

3. I count on the common sense of all naval personnel and on their consideration for the feelings of those whose relatives will not return from this conflict to ensure that the celebration will be joyful without being destructive or distasteful.

4. This is to be read to all ships' companies before liberty men proceed on shore."

In the result, in the Halifax area on May 7, 9,069 naval personnel actually left their ships and establishments out of 13,306 who were free as from 5 p.m. that day. As already mentioned, under the practice which prevailed in the Halifax area at all times, these personnel were free until 7 a.m. the following morning. On May 8, 9,508 persons actually left their ships and establishments of a total of 13,093 who were free to do so. Of those who went ashore on May 7, 6,593 were from *Stadacona*, *Peregrine* and *Scotian*, while on May 8 these three establishments contributed 7,037 of the 9,508 who went on leave.

It is not surprising that these large numbers of naval personnel went into the city. There was no adequate program to hold them away in the case of *Stadacona*, *Peregrine* and *Scotian*. *Scotian*, as all concerned knew, had no facilities itself for entertainment, except the drill hall already mentioned.

For some considerable time prior to May, 1945, from 9,000 to 11,000 ratings and from 900 to 1,200 Wrens took advantage of their leaves on Saturdays and pay days and went "on shore". I assume little, if any, effort was put forth to keep the ratings in their quarters on such days. This, however, was not to be the case on V-E Day, but the acknowledged object of the plans for that day was to keep the ratings off the streets. I see no escape from the conclusion that, notwithstanding that the danger of allowing large numbers of ratings to wander about the streets of Halifax on V-E Day was clearly expressed in the documents circulating before that day, as heretofore set out, the responsible officers of the Navy in Halifax area allowed that very situation to eventuate. No one, in my opinion, who as much as glanced at the programs of *Stadacona* and *Peregrine* for May 8 could fail to realize their complete inadequacy. Had the Navy, like the Army, held one or more conferences of officers in Halifax to discuss these programs, I do not think they could have failed to realize how insufficient they actually were. There was no program at all, of course, in the main establishments for May 7 from 5 p.m. on. As to May 7, Admiral Murray deposed:—

"Q. Was there any plan for the evening of May 7 from 5 o'clock on for the entertainment, if you like, for keeping these people who were entitled to leave in their establishments or on their ships?—A. That plan was left in the hands of the individual commanding officers. No particular plan by me.

Q. Did you yourself know of any plan or plans for that evening?—A. Not conscious of it. But it was the general custom and I was quite satisfied that everything would be done.

Q. There was no general custom about V-E Day?—A. For any occasion. V-E Day had been discussed from the point of view of keeping the men amused and I felt certain that arrangements had been made."

III. NAVAL DISCIPLINE IN HALIFAX

Owing to the large and rapid expansion of the Navy from a 1939 peacetime personnel of approximately 1,400 to some 96,000 in 1945, technical training had of necessity to be given priority over shore discipline. Admiral Murray states that it was not until January of 1944 that he was able to emphasize the latter. The evidence establishes that vandalism, including the breaking of plate glass windows and the tearing down of awnings and street signs, mostly by intoxicated Naval ratings on paydays, was a usual and expected occurrence. This situation, however, substantially improved by August of 1944. Complaints as to the behaviour of Naval ratings in Halifax were the subject of newspaper comment in May of 1944, and at that time a Halifax citizen, after complaining to local naval officers, but not to Admiral Murray, wrote to the Chief of Naval Staff at Ottawa with respect to conditions. This citizen, Mr. Rankin, deposed that his complaints to the local officers on the staff of Admiral Murray had been fruitless. He, therefore, took the matter up with Ottawa. In the result, a Naval officer was sent to Halifax and Mr. Rankin stated, as did also the Chief of Police, that by August, 1944, the situation had greatly improved. Among the remedial measures taken was the institution of patrols by jeep, which contained not only Naval personnel but police personnel of the other services. In the opinion of Admiral Murray it had not been necessary to send anyone from Ottawa as the conditions complained of did not exist. The letters of the Chief of the Naval Staff at Ottawa, however, would not seem to reflect the same view.

Some police officers gave evidence that vandalism still continued on paydays, mostly by intoxicated naval personnel, while others had little complaint after the institution of the jeeps. However, Captain Miles, the Chief of Staff under Admiral Murray, stated that about January or February of 1945 the shore patrol officer had reported to Admiral Murray that he thought there had been a large increase in the number of offences on the part of naval personnel. Lieutenant-Commander Wood, the officer in charge of the shore patrol, also stated that, while drunkenness was an offence, intoxicated naval personnel were not interfered with by the shore patrol so long as the individual or individuals concerned did not become a nuisance. He said that he looked for a degree of intoxication on V-E Day, but, under his instructions, intoxication was not to be an offence on that day.

IV. POLICE FORCES AND PLAN FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT

In addition to the civil police of the City of Halifax and to the detachment of R.C.M.P. there stationed, each of the three services had its own police, the Naval Shore Patrol, the Army Provost Corps, and the Security Police of the Air Force. On May 7 and 8, the effective Naval Shore Patrol available for use in the streets of Halifax was approximately 156, not counting 5 who were on office duty exclusively. Eliminating those required to drive trucks the effective force was 133. In Dartmouth on these days the figure was 13. The Provost Corps had 169 men in Halifax and the Air Force Police 74. The R.C.M.P. had 43 men in Halifax. Of the city police, 86 men were available for police work throughout the city. When one considers that there were some 18,000 ratings (or 17,000 when the Wrens are deducted), 156 shore patrol compares unfavourably with 169 provost for 4,489 soldiers and 74 air force police for 1,189 airmen in Halifax.

Arising out of discussions among the heads of all these police services, it was arranged that on V-E Day each of the three armed services would send a liaison man to the city police headquarters where the police work for the day would be co-ordinated under the City Chief of Police. It was understood that each of the service police forces would be primarily responsible for its own particular personnel and that the city police would look after civilians. This was to be the primary responsibility, but beyond that all police would assist each other. The R.C.M.P. undertook to place such of their men as should be available on that day at the disposal of the Chief of Police to be employed as he might from time to time direct. The Liquor Commission was to station a watchman in each of its stores who would give warning of any attack. At the meeting of April 5, the Chief of Police says he was assured by the service police heads that on V-E Day the service personnel were going to be entertained at their quarters. He says he "felt quite sure" from the attitude of the heads of the police personnel that they felt that their men would be "quite happy in their respective headquarters." He also said:—

"... I was given the understanding that there would not be a large number of naval personnel, or military, on the street that day.

Q. That is because entertainment would be provided by the services in their respective places?—A. That is correct, sir."

There is here to be mentioned a rather strange document, Exhibit 72, drafted by Lieutenant-Commander Wood and approved by Admiral Murray. It is dated March 31, 1945, and came into existence by way of instruction for the Naval Shore Patrol to govern the discharge of their duty on V-E Day. While the document speaks of "proposed instructions", it is in fact the final document. Paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) read as follows:—

"(2) The main object of the patrol on this day will be to try and control naval personnel rather than restrict them. A certain amount of damage is bound to occur, and unless the patrols can persuade the offenders to desist, there is little further action to be taken. No person is to be apprehended by the patrol unless absolutely necessary, and it cannot be stressed too strongly that the success of the patrol on V-Day will rely solely on tact.

(3) Patrols will assist in traffic jams, attempting to break up fights, and protecting city property as far as possible. Should the patrol see

damage being done by naval personnel, they will attempt to stop it. However, if they are unsuccessful, no further action is to be taken. Apprehending a rating on this day may be the cause of a serious riot.

(4) When necessary, drunks are to be taken to their ships for their own safety. However, no charge will be laid, and any naval personnel who are in the vicinity when the drunk is removed should be informed of this fact, if asked, to prevent interference. If he is with "pals", who say they will take care of him, *do not argue*, let them do it."

This document is a departure from the instructions under which the Shore Patrol had been working, as set forth in the "Guide and Instructions to Naval Shore Patrol", dated the 8th of December, 1944. The first three paragraphs of the "General Instructions" of this guide may be usefully compared with those parts of Exhibit 72 above quoted:—

"Patrols are to pay strict attention to the conduct of naval personnel ashore, and will check ratings for improper dress, that is, caps on the backs, of their heads, coats unbuttoned, general appearance, hands in pockets, etc.

It is the duty of the patrols to see that liberty-men are a credit to the service and their uniforms. When requesting a rating to square off his cap or button his coat, he is to be spoken to in a civil manner and if the rating in question does not do as he is asked he is to be brought to the patrol station.

When approaching a man for any reason, care is to be taken in handling the man. If he is violent, it may be necessary to put handcuffs on him, but under no circumstances is the patrol to use any undue force. Patrols usually consist of three or four men and they can readily overpower any person without inflicting bodily harm. It is laid down that as much force as is necessary may be used in apprehending a man and the officer on duty will investigate all cases when patrols have had to use force. If it is proven that the patrols were brutal in their methods, they will be severely punished."

It was suggested in argument that as 300 copies of Exhibit 72 were made and something less than two hundred were required for the Shore Patrol members themselves, the document had not been kept secret and its contents had become generally known. While Lieutenant-Commander Wood distributed copies at the meeting attended by the various police heads and others on April 5 and left them there, I would be unable to say that the contents of the document became generally known in advance of V-E Day. However, I would think that it would not be long, after the policy laid down in the document began to be practised, before the sailors would realize that they had very little to fear from the Shore Patrol. It is, of course, one thing for a policeman to exercise discretion where a carnival spirit is abroad and being exercised harmlessly. It is another thing, however, for the policeman to abdicate his functions in the presence of destructive lawlessness. No comparable instructions were issued to the police of the other two armed services and no witness of any experience had any knowledge of a similar policy having been adopted by any other police force at any time. The instructions to the Air Force Police may be usefully compared with Exhibit 72:—

"V Day Instructions—Service Police Detachments

1. The following instructions outlining the duties of Service Police on V Day are forwarded for your guidance and adherence when the day of victory arrives:—

- (a) All Service Police at your detachment will report to the Detachment Headquarters for instructions on V Day and remain on duty or immediate call.
- (b) Your detachment will maintain close liaison with the civil authorities, Army Provost and Navy Shore Patrol where applicable.
- (c) Service Police are not to become involved in civil disturbances or demonstrations unless it affects Air Force property or involves R.C.A.F. personnel. If such instances do occur, endeavour to segregate all R.C.A.F. personnel from such gatherings in a diplomatic way and in such a manner to prevent its recurrence.
- (d) It is important that the behaviour and deportment of R.C.A.F. personnel be maintained above reproach and those requiring correction are to be warned that disciplinary action will be taken against offenders, which may adversely affect their gratuities.
- (e) Firmness and *tact with discretion* are to be used at all times, bearing in mind that it is not desired to curb good clean revelry, but to prevent any large scale "brawls" from developing which might cause adverse comments to arise against this branch of the service."

Lieutenant-Commander Wood said he had had no experience which enabled him to anticipate what might happen on such a day as Armistice Day. As a matter of fact, while he had been in the R.C.M.P. before going to the navy, his duties did not bring him any experience in handling crowds or maintaining discipline. It would have been wise procedure on his part, as well as on the part of Admiral Murray, had Exhibit 72 been submitted to persons of experience in such matters before being put into practice. The R.C.M.P., for instance, had a branch in Halifax. It is true that copies of the document were on the table at the meeting of April 5 when Inspector Storey and the Chief of Police, as well as the other service police heads, were present. The document was never drawn specifically to the attention of anyone of them and apparently received no consideration. Wing Commander McCallum said he "hardly knew what was in it". Inspector Storey looked at the document, but he was not asked to comment.

If little imagination was to be employed in the preparation of a program which would entertain the men in their ships and establishments and keep them off the streets, then all the more was it essential that the naval police should be in sufficient numbers and prepared to act energetically to put down promptly at its very outset whatever trouble should develop. In my opinion, 156 Shore Patrol were quite insufficient numerically to deal with 9,500 ratings. Hampered by such instructions as are contained in Exhibit 72, they would be almost useless.

The city did not have a police force sufficient to deal with such a crowd of naval personnel. That force was, if anything, already overtaxed. Thousands of people, apart from service personnel, had crowded, during the war, into a city with a pre-war population of some 70,000 people. In February, 1944, a survey of the Halifax Police Department had been made by a member of the Montreal police. At that time the population had increased to 106,000. According to this report, there was one policeman for every 1,086 people, while the peacetime ratio had been 1 to 714. The report recommended an increase in the force to 140 officers and men. In May, 1945, the actual strength was 94.

The evidence does not establish what view the city council took of this report. On the evidence it stands as the opinion of the officer who made it, and it is not possible on the evidence to say whether the conclusions of the report are sound or not. For present purposes, I do not consider it necessary to decide. It is, however, the only evidence as to the adequacy of the city police force and it indicates at the least that the municipal police were fully occupied with the population, apart from service personnel in barracks, ships and camps about its borders. Accordingly there was no basis for any delegation on the part of any of the three services of its responsibility for the good conduct of its own personnel.

V. MUNICIPAL PROGRAM

The program prepared by the City of Halifax for the citizens was the subject of a proclamation by the Mayor, and is as follows:—

CITY OF HALIFAX

PROCLAMATION

All citizens are invited to attend Thanksgiving Services, Demonstrations and Celebrations to be held on

V-E DAY

- 9.00 a.m. Bands will march from nine points on the outskirts of the City to the Garrison Grounds where the civil ceremonies will be opened by His Worship the Mayor.
- 11.00 a.m. Service of Praise and Thanksgiving to Almighty God in the various churches of the city.
- 2.30 p.m. Thanksgiving Services led by the Navy, the Army and the Air Force on the Garrison Grounds.

During the later afternoon and early evening provision is being made for all to join in community signing, demonstrations and celebrations on the Garrison Grounds—and street dancing on South Park Street (Sackville Street to Spring Garden Road) and South Street (Hollis to Barrington St.).

- 9.00 p.m. Illuminated display on the harbour and fireworks. Citizens should gather on the eastern slope of the Citadel Hill. Tune in on the local radio stations for further details, particularly on V-E Day.

On V-E Day citizens are urged to observe the following requests:—

Participate in the church services of Thanksgiving in their respective churches and the various celebrations on the Garrison Grounds during the daytime and on the eastern slope of Citadel Hill during the evening.

Refrain from driving vehicles into the down-town area and do not create pedestrian congestion in the district.

Remove all non-essential vehicles from the street.

REMEMBER VICTORY IN EUROPE IS NOT FINAL VICTORY.

ALLAN M. BUTLER,
Mayor.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

I have reproduced this in full as I desire to refer to it later on.

VI. EVENTS OF MAY 7 AND EARLY MORNING OF MAY 8

The district, within which the major portion of the disturbances in Halifax took place, is in the downtown part of the City, running from Bishop Street on the south to Buckingham Street on the north, and from the Harbour on the east to Barrington Street on the west, although there were disturbances outside that area on Gottingen Street, and elsewhere. In addition, the Agricola Street Liquor Store and Oland's Brewery were both attacked and they lie far beyond the downtown area.

In the downtown district mentioned, the main streets running north and south, proceeding from east to west, are Water Street, Hollis Street, Granville Street and Barrington Street. The east and west streets in the same area, commencing at the south, are Bishop Street, Salter Street, Sackville Street, Front Street, Blower Street, Duke Street and Buckingham Street.

At approximately 10.30 a.m. on May 7 the whistles in Halifax began to blow and shortly thereafter news of the surrender was broadcast by radio. People began to leave their places of employment and flow into the streets, and the day became a holiday so far as the civilian population were concerned.

At approximately 11.00 a.m. the policing plan went into effect and the liaison police officers of the three armed services arrived at the City Hall. At the same time two out of the three platoons of the Halifax city police came on duty, representing a total of approximately 40 men. The remaining platoon came on duty at 4.00 p.m.

The Citizens' Committee met at various times throughout the day and, under its direction, the plan designed for V-E Day was accelerated. Public address systems were set up to furnish dance music for street dancing and to make announcements, and these were in operation by 3.30 p.m.

It was not until approximately 5.30 p.m. that news was received of the official declaration of May 8 as V-E day. When this was received sound trucks were employed by the Committee to make this announcement public in the streets and to notify the people of the program for the following day.

The Committee decided also to have the fireworks in the harbour that evening and this was done between the hours of 9.00 and 10.30, while community singing on Citadel Hill was carried out during the same time, and these events were enjoyed by from 12,000 to 15,000 people.

The Wet Canteen at *Stadacona* closed at 9.00 p.m. About that time Lieutenant Commander Wood, who was then in his office at the *Stadacona* barracks in the north end of the city on Barrington St., roughly three-quarters of a mile from Buckingham St., observed a street car on Barrington St. outside *Stadacona* surrounded by a large number of naval ratings. He took thirty Shore Patrolmen he had with him there and proceeded to the spot, but before he arrived the street car moved off. He found a great deal of glass on the street and it was quite evident that the ratings, whom Lieutenant Commander Wood judged to number about one hundred, had smashed the windows in the street car. According to Lieutenant Commander Wood, "there was no way to tell who had done the damage and the crowd were quite cheerful, there was nothing nasty about them, and we got them to move off out of that vicinity". He also said:—

"Q. Do I gather that the crowd of navy personnel dispersed on your arrival?—A. Maybe a matter of ten minutes.

Q. You said you got them to move off?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you persuade them to?—A. Yes."

This is the initial instance of the application of the policy laid down in Exhibit 72. In my opinion, the course followed by Lieutenant Commander Wood was unfortunate. I do not agree that what Lieutenant Commander Wood did was the "only thing" he could have done. I think that the whole group might well have been returned to their barracks at once, at the least. Instead of that, they were allowed to believe that that kind of conduct would not be discouraged and were left free for further events of the same kind. It was not long before further events of the same kind were being enacted further south in the main business section of Barrington St. These events, which coincided with the expiration of sufficient time to enable this group to reach the downtown area, rapidly assumed more serious proportions.

About half an hour later, Lieutenant Commander Wood received a call from his liaison officer, Warrant Officer Barbour, at the City Hall, advising him that a large crowd were gathering on Barrington St. in the vicinity of the City Hall and were tearing down the flags which had been placed on the electric light poles to decorate the street. It had previously been reported to the Chief of Police that sailors were occupying Barrington St. to its full width and tearing down the flags. He had sent out his own police and some shore patrol but it was found that there were too many people engaged, both sailors and civilians, to handle and the men he had sent out could do nothing. No arrests were attempted. Lieutenant Commander Wood, on proceeding to the City Hall in response to the information received from Warrant Officer Barbour, said that on his arrival at the police station he saw a number of large Victory Loan flags being taken down by naval ratings and by civilians, that he discussed the matter with the Chief of Police and that, while the latter told him he was concerned about the flags being torn down, he felt it was impossible to stop it, and that no further action was being taken by him.

Lieutenant Commander Wood remained only a few minutes at the City Hall and then drove southerly down Barrington St. where he found the same practice going on all the way down the street.

In the neighbourhood of 10.00 p.m. naval ratings had begun to interfere with the operation of street cars on Barrington St., in the southerly part of the main business section, by pulling the trolleys off the wires. City Police and shore patrol were despatched and, ultimately, all the street cars, with some damage to glass windows, got off Barrington St., with the exception of one, which was attacked by ratings in force. One soldier also was observed taking part. All the windows in the street car and the seats were smashed, and the ratings then endeavoured to upset it. Finding this too much for them, they set fire to it. On the report of this reaching police headquarters, a number of city police and shore patrol were despatched to the scene, as well as a city police patrol waggon. It was by this time about 11.30 p.m. On the arrival of this vehicle, the ratings overturned it and set it on fire. The fire reels were sent for, but, when the firemen connected their hose with a hydrant and turned on the water, it was disconnected by naval personnel. It was again connected, whereupon naval men took the axes off the fire reels and cut the hose to pieces. The hose itself was also again disconnected from the hydrant and the water shut off. The Deputy Fire Chief in charge asked that he be allowed to put the fire out but he was refused and threats were made that if he did not take the hose away, the equipment would be upset. As the equipment was very expensive, he decided that discretion was the course to follow and the fire reels went away. The ratings later righted the patrol waggon and pushed it down one of the streets leading to the harbour where it ultimately finished up on one of the docks, completely wrecked.

A city police constable, who had been on duty on Barrington St. throughout the evening and who had assisted in getting the street cars away, said that the interference with the cars was by navy men and that a mixed crowd of service people and civilians were spectators. He observed that until about 9.30 the

crowd was in good humour, but after that time it was riotous. He said several street cars had their windows smashed by sailors using their fists on them while passengers were still on board. These riotous proceedings on Barrington St. went on until shortly before midnight. The police were dispersed in a number of places and such as were on Barrington St. were helpless in the face of the crowd.

News of these events was communicated by Warrant Officer Barbour to Lieutenant Commander Wood who had, in the meantime, returned to his office at *Stadacona*. Wood returned to the City Hall, where Barbour strongly advised him not to attempt to drive further as the crowd was very large and they might get into trouble with their car. Barbour reported to Wood that he had sent two trucks with thirty shore patrolmen to the scene and that these trucks had been attacked and an attempt had been made to set one of them on fire by throwing burning paper or rags on the canvas top. Wood and a subordinate, Lieutenant MacKenzie, proceeded to the scene and found a crowd which he estimated at from three to four thousand completely blocking Barrington St. Wood saw fifteen of his patrolmen and six city police there, but they were quite helpless. The situation was completely out of hand. He observed naval ratings inside the car and others outside trying to turn it over. He says that there were about 150 ratings occupied in and about the street car. A city police sergeant estimated that there was a crowd of 500 immediately around the street car, the majority being ratings, with some civilians and some air force and soldiers.

Wood says he had hardly been at that point for five minutes when word reached him that the Sackville St. Liquor Store had been broken into. This store is at the south-west corner of Sackville and Granville Streets, one block east of Barrington St. The attack on this store was made by a different group from that engaged on Barrington St., as the latter were still occupied there when word came to Wood and he left for the scene of this latest disturbance.

While these events were taking place the Chief of Police spoke to Warrant Officer Barbour and asked for more shore patrol. Barbour's reply was that he would do his best, but that the odds were against him and that the shore patrol could do nothing as they had only their bare hands.

The Chief of Police then endeavoured to get Admiral Murray on the telephone. Owing to some mistake in telephone numbers on his part, or on the part of his Secretary, he did not reach Admiral Murray, but spoke to the Officer of the Watch at the Naval Dockyard and told him of what was taking place. According to the Chief, he asked that officer to reach someone in authority to send help as naval personnel were committing considerable damage and he was short of men and the shore patrol had reported that they were powerless. The officer answered "Very well, he would see what he could do", but nothing was heard from this call. The Officer of the Watch to whom he spoke was Lieutenant Tunney, who was not at Naval Headquarters at all. This officer said that the Chief of Police told him that there were about 50 naval ratings breaking into or trying to break into one of the liquor stores. He thinks it was the Sackville St. Store and that Conrad asked him if he could do anything about it. He said to Chief Conrad that he would see what he could do. What he did, in fact, was to telephone the shore patrol office at *Stadacona*, where he gave the message to whoever was on duty and was advised that they had already heard about it and that everything would be taken care of. Admiral Murray says that he was at his home all evening but no one reported to him that night what was going on.

SACKVILLE ST. LIQUOR STORE

About 11.35 p.m. the watchman in these premises observed three individuals, whom he took to be merchant navy men, approaching the premises, and one of them was seen to thrust a flag pole through one of the windows. When they saw the watchman, however, they fled. He immediately telephoned police headquarters for assistance and shortly after some six city police arrived and were admitted.

At about 11.45 p.m. a number of naval ratings and one soldier approached the store. They were in turn followed by a larger crowd of sailors and civilians which soon filled the street in front of the store. Missiles were thrown and the plate glass windows were smashed. At this point, one of the city police inspectors went out and stood in front of the store. The soldier, already mentioned, told him that they did not wish to injure the police but that they had been denied liquor to celebrate V-Day and they intended to get it. The inspector said the liquor was not his to give. With that the soldier shouted "Come on boys" and he and the naval ratings, followed by a mixed crowd, stormed into the premises, some 25 or 30 gaining entrance. Looting immediately began as many of these broke through the police. One of the inspectors meantime had telephoned for more help and a sergeant and 15 shore patrol were sent. Wood and McKenzie joined these.

They proceeded to the store and found, according to Wood, a crowd of about 300 persons, composed of equal numbers of sailors and civilians. These were all active and he observed ratings and civilians coming out of the store carrying cases and bottles. Wood's party pushed their way along until they formed a cordon in front of the store. He himself entered the store and found the city police inside had by that time cleared out the raiders. Wood then left his patrolmen there with the city police and went to the City Hall. 30 R.C.M.P. constables arrived shortly and 5 remained till 5.00 a.m. There was no more trouble at this store for the remainder of the night.

HOLLIS STREET RETAIL AND MAIL ORDER STORES

About midnight the watchman at the retail liquor store heard a crowd coming down Sackville St. on to Hollis St. He immediately telephoned police headquarters and was told that the police would be sent as soon as possible. For some reason the city police did not call upon the army provost corps whose men were on call at the time.

In the meantime this crowd, composed of ratings, civilians and merchant seamen, had gathered at the store and a naval rating with a short piece of flag pole smashed one of the windows. Other windows were broken with similar weapons and naval ratings entered the store, followed by civilians and merchant seamen. Looting of the contents of the store commenced at once. The watchman estimates that the mob was composed of about 500 persons.

Major Crowell had observed this crowd approaching the liquor store on Hollis Street; the head of the crowd was largely naval personnel. He heard the glass breaking in the store and saw the first man, a sailor, entering. He immediately telephoned the City Hall, asking for from 30 to 50 shore patrol, stating that if they were sent immediately he felt that they could nip the trouble in the bud. He was advised that the shore patrol were on duty on Barrington St., but that they would endeavour to have other shore patrol sent. In the meantime the crowd were looting the liquor store, but the crowd did not increase and were moving away with their loot. He estimates the crowd at from 150 to 200, including the onlookers who were at the other side of the street. He says that the crowds were still around the street car on Barrington St. and the Sackville St. Liquor Store at the time this third crowd was attacking the Hollis St. Liquor Store. As late as 12.30 a.m. the street car was burning on Barrington St. and the crowd was still around it. In time, some city police arrived and were able to clear the store.

About 12.30, R.C.M.P. Constable Duncan and Staff Sergeant Beale arrived at the store and found it clear, but there was a large crowd outside the store which Duncan estimated at 400 or 500 people, mostly navy and civilians, with a very small percentage of army. This crowd was about to break into the store again and shortly after they came in and the looting re-commenced. The situation was beyond the control of the police. Duncan remained for about an hour, during which the looting continued.

In the meantime the mail order store on Hollis St. alongside the retail store, was attacked and entered. Hollis St. was by this time seething with a crowd estimated, by a reliable observer, to number about two thousand, eighty-five per cent of which being made up of equal numbers of ratings and civilians, fifteen per cent soldiers and a sprinkling of airmen. They were vaulting in and out of the stores with much shouting, and going along the street carrying boxes and bottles and drinking. Two trucks of about 10 shore patrol each were seen by a citizen to arrive after the second attack, and about sixty-five army provost. On the arrival of the provost it was not long before the crowd was dispersed. The provost set up a guard at the corner of Salter St. and Hollis St. and prevented the crowd again coming up Hollis St.

The 20 shore patrol and 6 city police had been sent to Hollis St. by Wood, who, at this time, was at the Buckingham St. Store where he had received word by radio of the attack on the Hollis St. Stores. Shortly after they were sent, Wood himself and McKenzie went to Hollis St. At this time the crowd had been removed. There were a few people about and it was evident to Wood that a considerable amount of liquor had been taken. He found cartons strewed over the street, as well as broken boxes and cases.

BUCKINGHAM ST. LIQUOR STORE

A few minutes after midnight Redmond, the watchman at the Buckingham St. Store, observed a crowd gathering in the neighbourhood and he immediately telephoned police headquarters. He was told they could do nothing at that time. A short time later the situation appeared more serious and he again telephoned police headquarters and was again told that all available men were down at the other stores. On both these occasions army provost men were on call but were not called upon by the city police until the store had been broken into. About 12.30 the glass in the store began to break and the crowd entered. In the lead were navy men and the majority of the crowd was composed of navy men but there were also some civilians. Looting immediately commenced and proceeded for about ten minutes. Lieutenant Commander Wood learned of this attack at the City Hall and proceeded to Buckingham St. with 20 shore patrol. About 8 or 9 city police arrived about the same time and an officer and 30 provost. Wood found a scene of great confusion, with people jumping in and out of the windows and carrying out cases under their arms. The police were able to stop the looting and clear the store. After the store was cleared a large truck containing about 30 shore patrol arrived. At 2.15 Assistant Commissioner Eames of the R.C.M.P. found the store strongly held by army provost.

AGRICOLA ST. LIQUOR STORE

When the Buckingham St. Store was cleared, Wood heard someone in the crowd remark that the Agricola St. Store would be next. He left 15 of his shore patrolmen at Buckingham St. and proceeded to the Agricola St. Store with the other 35. He found everything quiet at the Agricola St. Store and posted his entire force there. At 12.10 a.m., on request of a city detective, Col. Clarke sent one officer and ten provost to this store. A few minutes later another thirty men were sent. Shortly after Wood arrived 12 city police and 12 more shore patrol arrived. While here word came to Wood of what had happened at Hollis St. He took 20 shore patrolmen and 6 city police and proceeded there, leaving the remainder of the force at the Agricola St. Store. Thereafter, any shore patrol who were not employed guarding the liquor stores were used to round up naval personnel on the streets and return them to barracks.

SUMMARY OF NIGHT OF MAY 7TH-8TH

The result of the night was that approximately fifty per cent of the liquor stocks of the two stores on Hollis St. were looted, and a small quantity from the Sackville St. and Buckingham St. Stores, three per cent and one per cent respectively of these latter stocks. In the case of the Hollis retail store, this meant over 1,000 cases of beer and 100 cases of wine, as well as over 500 cases of spirits. In the case of the Hollis mail order store, the amounts taken, in round numbers, were 280 cases of beer, 175 cases of wine, and 300 cases of spirits. The totals from these two stores were therefore:—

<i>Beer</i>	<i>Wine</i>	<i>Spirits</i>
1280 cases	275 cases	800 cases

The cases of beer contained either 12 quarts or 12 pints, but in the case of the wine and spirits the cases contained either 12 quarts or 24 pints. The quantity of wine and spirits taken, therefore, from these two stores amounted to 12,900 quarts.

In addition to the liquor taken, the damage to the street cars, and the destruction of one street car, the police patrol car and the fire hose, a number of plate glass windows in approximately ten business premises were smashed. In two cases, which were under observation at the time the glass was broken, ratings were responsible. The evidence does not establish by whom the damage was committed in the other cases.

The disturbances of the night were initiated in each instance by navy personnel, with the possible exception of the attack on the Sackville St. Store. Even in this instance, however, ratings formed the spearhead of the attacking force. Civilians did not take any part in the attacks on the street cars or the fire hose. Civilians did follow the sailors into the liquor stores once entry had been made, and they shared evenly in the spoils, as did a very few soldiers and airmen. But, in my opinion, had it not been for the presence on the streets of large numbers of naval ratings, these lawless events would not have occurred. I think there is no need to look any deeper for the cause of these occurrences than the fact that navy personnel were permitted to be at large on the streets of Halifax with nothing to do at a time when the restraints of years of war had been suddenly lifted and the spirit of celebration was in the air. This was the very condition which was expressly stated, when the plans for V-E Day were being discussed, should not be permitted to arise. The shore patrol abandoned the field to the sailors who attacked the street car outside *Stadacona*. The police down in the city found the initial situation, which confronted them on the pulling down of the flags, too much for them. This activity, although not serious in itself, was symptomatic and was evidently so regarded by the Chief of Police. Anyone who has had any experience with crowds would realize that if not checked in milder forms of hysteria, more serious outbreaks are the natural sequence. The helplessness of the police downtown to control that situation was publicly demonstrated. From the attack on the street car and the pulling down of the flags to the burning of the street car and the police patrol waggon, it was only a step to the attacks on the liquor stores. I think it a not too unreasonable inference that the ratings who attacked the first street car outside *Stadacona* had come, or some of them had come, out of the *Stadacona* wet canteen on Barrington St., alongside of which the street car line lay. Lieutenant Commander Wood was of that opinion. That very situation was duplicated the following day. What they had in the canteen would not tend to diminish the excitement of the occasion and may well have proved the basis for a desire for further supplies later in the evening, a desire which could only be satisfied by forcible taking from the liquor stores.

It was unfortunate also, in my opinion, that the ratings were not only left to fend for themselves from 5.00 p.m. without any plan whatever to keep them suitably entertained and controlled, but that, with the exception of men under

twenty, they were free to wander the streets till 7.00 a.m. on May 8th. However valid such a rule may have been for ordinary nights, I think it contributed directly to the events of the night. The ratings had the whole night before them in which to carry on what they had begun.

In my opinion, therefore, the disturbances of May 7th and the early hours of May 8th were due to:—

(1) Failure on the part of the naval command to plan, in accordance with the requirements laid down by Admiral Murray himself, for the entertainment of the ratings in their own establishments for the purpose of keeping them off the streets. The fact that May 7th was an unofficial holiday, in my opinion, does not affect the matter. Admiral Murray knew in the morning that it was being accepted as a holiday in fact by the citizens of Halifax and that Armistice Day conditions existed in the streets from about 10.30 a.m.

(2) The mistaken policy of Exhibit 72 followed by Lieutenant Commander Wood when he failed to order into their barracks the ratings who made the first attack on the street car outside *Stadacona*.

(3) Failure of Lieutenant Commander Wood to report the situation on Barrington St., before the attacks on the liquor stores began, to his superiors so that effective action might be taken by the navy itself to clear the streets of its rioting personnel. There were 9,500 naval personnel in ships and establishments who did not go ashore that night, from which it would seem that a sufficiently strong force ought to have been assembled to halt the rioters. The situation was not reported until after the troubles were over for the night. The riotous condition on Barrington St. was apparently allowed to die out of itself.

(4) Failure to employ *all* the available police forces in strength. Such forces as were employed appear to have been used in scattered parties and the Air Force police were never called on at any time, although a liaison officer of that service was at all times at the City Hall. When not called on by the City police, however, the Air Force police were sent out on patrol by their own officers. The attacks on the liquor stores came so close together that police headquarters were thrown into confusion. When calls for help were sent in from the Hollis St. retail store and the Buckingham store, the answer given was that there was no one to send, although Air Force police and Army provost men were available and one platoon of city police of about 21 men, who were due for duty at 11.40 p.m., were not called before that time. Whether the full use of all police could have controlled the situation on Barrington St. at its height is problematical. All one can say is that the police forces could have been better directed and might well have been more effective, particularly at the liquor stores. The system of receiving calls and despatching aid was poor and did not tend to an effective or intelligent use of the forces available.

VII. EVENTS OF AFTERNOON OF MAY 8

(a) HALIFAX

At the conclusion of the night's events, Lieutenant Commander Wood sought Commander Johnson, the Executive Officer of *Stadacona*. There was disagreement at the Inquiry among the officers called as to whether Wood was attached to *Stadacona* and should have reported to the Officer Commanding there, or was on the Admiral's Staff and should have reported to him or his Chief of Staff, Captain Miles. Wood's understanding was that he had a dual position and that with respect to Halifax matters he was under the Officer in Command of *Stadacona*, Captain Balfour, but with respect to matters outside Halifax, but within the jurisdiction of Admiral Murray, he was on the staff of the latter. In any event, Wood did not report to Admiral Murray or Captain Miles, but to *Stadacona*. He roused Johnson from his bed about 2.00 a.m. and reported the night's doings to him and told him that the Chief of Police strongly recommended that the wet canteens be closed the following day. Wood says that he, Wood, was concerned about the quantity of liquor which had been put in circulation during the night and he believed that a number of ratings had liquor either on their persons or hidden. In some way Johnson got the impression that the Police Chief was going to take the matter up directly with Admiral Murray, although Wood says he did not tell Johnson this. Johnson did nothing until he met his Captain, Captain Balfour, at the religious service between 9.00 and 9.30 and, after telling him of what he had learned from Wood, he told him that the Chief of Police was calling Admiral Murray himself. The Police Chief did not speak to Admiral Murray and had not intended to do so.

In his turn Balfour spoke to Captain Miles sometime after 10.00 a.m., having tried unsuccessfully to reach Admiral Murray at his office. It occurred to Captain Balfour that, if the matter were sufficiently serious, in the opinion of the Chief of Police, to call for the closing of the wet canteens, it might well call for the cancellation of leaves for the day as well. When Captain Balfour spoke to Captain Miles, the way the matter was put, according to Captain Miles, was that the Chief of Police had asked that the canteens be closed and leaves stopped. This idea, however, that leaves should or might be stopped, appears to have originated with Captain Balfour, as Police Chief Conrod does not remember making that request. Captain Miles passed on to Admiral Murray both matters, that is, as to the closing of the wet canteens and the stopping of leaves, but Admiral Murray decided against both. A consideration which operated in his mind as to the closing of the canteens was that in *Stadacona* the supply for the day was 1,500 bottles of beer, which he regarded as small in proportion to the number of ratings to be served, and that the situation at *Peregrine* was not very different.

Admiral Murray had himself read in the morning paper an account of the events of the preceding night and a few minutes after 10.00 a.m. he called Captain Miles for a report. Captain Miles was to report to the Admiral after the latter returned from the church service which was being held at 11.00 a.m. It was at 11.50 a.m. when Captain Miles reached Admiral Murray. In the meantime, of course, the 10.30 a.m. leaves had again become operative. However, when Admiral Murray did get Captain Miles' report he took no action. His point of view is perhaps best disclosed by his evidence:—

"Q. You having read that in the paper in the morning, you say the matter of cancelling leaves didn't present itself to you on account of what you read in the paper?—A. No, the citizens of the navy had been invited

into the town by the Mayor's Proclamation, the same as other people, and our bands were playing them in." (This refers to Exhibit 34 on page 28 of this report. Admiral Murray seems here to be taking the view that the ratings on leave should go into the city.)

Admiral Murray continued:—

"Q. Yes, but you had had these thoughts of what might happen, and you had read what had happened, and you would go on the assumption that the bulk of these fellows were going on leave again that morning, and I would just like you to tell me why that matter would not occur to you. You say Lieutenant Commander Wood would not have authority to cancel leaves, that it would be a matter for you or Miles. That is something that would come to my mind; why would you not put a damper on these fellows and keep them in barracks?—A. My answer is no, it didn't occur to me to stop leaves."

"Q. Why?—A. Because the men were entitled to V-E Day celebration, and it would not be the same people who were proceeding ashore on Tuesday as had been there on Monday night."

"Q. If Lieutenant Commander Wood had reported to you the situation on the morning of May 8, as he should have, would that have affected your judgment on that point?—A. No."

"Q. You would still have let them go?—A. Yes."

"Q. I gather you said it would not necessarily be the same men on shore on Monday as on Tuesday?—A. That is correct."

"Q. Why not?—A. Because they would be on duty the following day."

"Q. All of them?—A. A large proportion."

"Q. Looking at that Exhibit 77, there were thirteen thousand odd who were in a position to go ashore on Monday and 9,069 went ashore. And on Tuesday 9,508 went ashore?—A. That is correct."

"Q. You cannot be at all certain that a good many of those on shore Monday were not there on Tuesday?—A. Of that number on shore you take the number that were billeted in the town and go on shore anyway. They are the ones who would be the same people again." (This figure for *Stadacona* and *Scotian* alone was 3,100). "The remainder would be the number who were not required for duty on Tuesday and who had been on duty on Monday."

"Q. Have you any actual data with the information of those that were ashore from establishments on Monday and were not ashore on Tuesday?—A. No, I am speaking in general terms. But in the main the people on shore Tuesday would not be the same as were on shore on Monday."

"Q. But you would not be certain that those who participated in the troubles Monday night would not be on shore Tuesday?—A. Not the particular individuals."

"Q. And the ring-leaders or actual participants on Monday night, most of them or all of them might be on shore on Tuesday?—A. That is possible, yes."

When it is considered that 3,100 of the personnel on leave on Monday who lived in billets in the city were also on leave on Tuesday, and that 4,300 entitled to go on shore on Monday did not go and formed part of those liable to be called on for the duty watch of some 5,600 on May 8, it will be seen that Admiral Murray could have had very little assurance that the participants in the disturbances of the previous night would not be well represented among those entitled to go ashore on May 8. Even though he could have been certain that none of the participants of the previous night would be on leave the next day, he could have no assurance, but would have every reason for apprehension,

that a repetition on May 8 of the conditions of May 7 (i.e., large numbers of ratings wandering about the streets of the city on the official holiday, with the police situation remaining the same) might bring about a repetition of the same sort of disorder. There was the added circumstance on May 8 that these ratings had before them the example of the preceding night, and there was the additional fact that there was on May 8 the distinct possibility that a large quantity of the liquor stolen the night before would be available in unauthorized hands and be put in circulation as part of the day's celebration.

At 11 a.m., at the suggestion of the Chief Liquor Commissioner, the Chief of Police convened a meeting of the heads of the service police and a representative of the R.C.M.P., for the purpose of discussing protection of the liquor stores. It seems to have been the opinion of all who attended that meeting, with one exception, that no recurrence of the trouble need be looked for before the evening at the earliest, and it was accordingly decided to post nineteen policemen, service and civilian, at each liquor store at 8 p.m. One, McIntyre, who was Superintendent of one of the warehouses of the Liquor Commission, says that, as a result of a warning given to him by one of the city policemen on the street that morning, he told the meeting that sailors on the streets had been heard to say something to the effect that they had got the liquor stores the night before and that they would get the warehouse that day. McIntyre was undoubtedly present in the room where the meeting was held, but in a minor capacity. The only one of those attending who had any recollection of any statement by him was the Chief of Police, who said that McIntyre said he had heard "they might go down to the storeroom". The policeman, who was McIntyre's source of information, in his evidence said that what he had heard on the street was a reference to the liquor stores having been broken into the night before and people saying "Look out that they are not broken into to-day". He was unable to say that he heard any sailor say this.

I think Mr. McIntyre no doubt did repeat that morning the effect of what the constable told him, but I think in his evidence he put the matter a little more definitely than he had actually done on the morning of May 8. He was not one of the conferees. He had gone to the headquarters of the Liquor Commission where the meeting was taking place in order to report what he had heard to Mr. Mahon, the Chief Commissioner. The meeting was not in a private room, but in an open office where there were other employees of the Liquor Commission carrying on their ordinary work. I think it is quite probable that the conversation between McIntyre and Mahon was not heard by anyone else. It did not impress itself on Mr. Mahon as he did not remember it. McIntyre himself, however, took heed and went to his own warehouse in the afternoon and was there when it was attacked.

While it was the view of those who took part in that meeting that they should not look for a recurrence before the evening, if then, there is this to be said for those who attended, that they had no knowledge that there were going to be large crowds of naval personnel loose on the streets during the day. Police Chief Conrod, on the contrary, said that he had been given to understand by the naval representative at the meeting of April 5, that on V-E Day there would not be large numbers of naval personnel on the streets. He also said that on the morning of May 8 he raised the question with Lieutenant Commander Wood and was assured that there would not be a repetition that day of the numbers of ratings who had been on the streets the previous evening. Mr. Conrod was at times so vague and his memory so unsatisfactory at times that I am not satisfied that he is correct in his recollection of this Tuesday morning conversation, but I think he is correct as to the understanding he received on April 5. Major Crowell had the same understanding and referred to minutes of a meeting held September 19, 1944, at which the naval representative, Captain Armstrong,

stated that "although such news might be the reason for some celebration, nevertheless it did not mean the end of the war, and until Japan was out of the picture there would probably be no V-Day celebration for the services". Major Crowell also said that in conversations with Admiral Murray on various occasions, the latter gave no figures "but reminded us that the navy had many duties to perform, V-Day or no V-Day, and that the navy intended to march their service personnel to a brief drumhead service and then march them back to duty".

The heads of the army and air force police might well have had the same view, as they knew that their own particular services had plans designed to occupy the time of their personnel at their own quarters. Apart from this state of mind, however, if those present at that meeting contemplated that there would be large numbers of naval personnel free on the streets of Halifax all afternoon, the view that the afternoon would be free from trouble, in my opinion, would have been pure optimism.

Although Major Crowell did not anticipate any recurrence, he went to consult the Chief of Police at the conclusion of the service at the Garrison Grounds at 10.40 a.m. to find out what additional arrangements had been made to deal with naval personnel in case they should congregate in any one spot and in case the events of the preceding night should recur. He was told that the Chief of Police was attending a meeting of the heads of the services police and he left word for the Chief to get in touch with him when he was free.

A few minutes after 1.00 p.m. of May 8 the operator of a street car proceeding south on Barrington St. observed, as he approached the gate leading to the street from the *Stadacona* canteen, a large number of naval ratings blocking the street in front of him. At that time they were throwing stones at the canteen itself. As the street car drew near, members of the shore patrol endeavoured to clear a passage, but they were pushed aside by the ratings, who, with considerable noise and shouting, took control of the car and smashed the windows and the seats, in fact, as the operator expressed it, "everything that was smashable on it". They tore one of the trolley poles completely off the car and it lay in the street. There are two trolley poles on these street cars, either of which is sufficient to operate it. The operator was ordered off and the passengers hastened to get off. As many ratings as could, crowded into it and drove the car down Barrington St. as far as Duke St., where, observing other shore patrol in the vicinity of the City Hall, they reversed the car to Bell's Lane, two blocks north of Duke St., where the car was abandoned.

Power, the car operator, said that, in his estimation, there were 2,000 ratings in the crowd which first stopped his car, and that ratings were streaming out of the canteen and the barracks. Wood, in his report of the matter, said that there were several hundred in the crowd around the car. Power says that the ratings acted as though they had been drinking. Lieutenant Commander Wood, who observed what happened from his office in *Stadacona*, telephoned the news to Captain Balfour and went out on the street. He observed a shore patrol waggon come away from the crowd of ratings, and when it reached him the men reported that they had been beaten off with sticks, stones and bottles. Wood says the ratings who had not got into the street car moved off downtown. He stated that the pattern of events was identical with that of 9.30 p.m. of the evening before, except that the mood of the ratings was not the same as that of those on the previous day. He was afraid of what might happen. He admitted in evidence that the time had arrived for the use of a strong striking force to curb these ratings, but he had not changed the instructions to his shore patrolmen from that laid down in Exhibit 72.

When he returned to his office, he received a call from Warrant Officer Barbour, his Officer in charge at the City Hall, that sixty shore patrol had been sent to the corner of Gerrish and Barrington Streets (about midway between *Stadacona* and the City Hall) to try to stop a large crowd of ratings there who

were heading south. Wood says he sent the truck, with the shore patrolmen who had been beaten off outside the canteen, back to Barbour, and he hoped that the combined force would be able to deal with the ratings. This could not have been a very strong hope, considering the comparative numbers of the shore patrol sent to deal with them (approximately 90) and the several hundred sailors stimulated in some degree by what they had had in the wet canteen and perhaps disappointed at the amount of beer which had been supplied them there. In the canteen itself, before the street car was attacked, there had taken place what a cook on duty described as "a pretty good row" when 200 beer bottles were smashed. Thirty-nine small panes of window glass were broken, but some of these were broken Monday night. Wood says that, as far as he knows, the men returning to barracks on Monday night were not searched and he had reason to believe that a considerable quantity of hard liquor was drunk with the beer in the wet canteen on the Tuesday.

Although Wood did not know it, this mob was on its way to Keith's Brewery, situated at the southerly end of the business district. While the fracas was going on outside the wet canteen, a sailor, passing through the north gate of the naval dockyard, said to R.C.M.P. Constable Pitts on duty there, that naval ratings had wrecked the canteen and smashed up a street car and were on their way to Oland's Brewery. There are two breweries in Halifax, Keith's and Oland's; Keith's being in the south and Oland's in the northern part of the City, but a Colonel Oland appears to be the principal shareholder and manager of both. Both are referred to in Halifax as "Oland's", and it was the Keith brewery which the sailors intended to attack, as later developed.

Constable Pitts' informant told him there were several hundred ratings involved. He immediately telephoned the word to his superior, Corporal McLean, and the message in due course reached the City Hall. This message, which mentioned Oland's, was telephoned to the City Police at 1.20 p.m., according to the R.C.M.P. record.

Captain Balfour took no action as the result of the report made to him by Lieutenant Commander Wood about 1.15 p.m. He does not appear to have had the same fear as Wood had. Until late in the afternoon no action of any kind was taken by any naval authority to control rioting sailors, who soon passed beyond all bounds, with the exception of such efforts as could be made by the shore patrol, who were hopelessly outnumbered and hampered by their instructions.

When the forces despatched by Barbour and Wood reached Gerrish and Barrington Streets, they were again beaten off by the mob of sailors who proceeded on downtown. The windows in the grocery store at the south-west corner of Gerrish and Barrington were smashed by the mob. From this store, cigarettes, apples and vegetables were taken, the latter being thrown about from hand to hand. This was the first instance of looting that afternoon. A witness who observed all this said he would not describe the crowd as intoxicated but that there was "quite a bit of excitement among them". The mob at this point, according to this witness, was made up entirely of navy men, but a few civilians were beginning to collect in the rear and to follow along. This witness, who lives next door to the grocery store above mentioned, had been inside his house, but, on hearing the sound of breaking glass, he came out. He said that from North St., which is just south of *Stadacona* to Gray St., a block south of where he lived, there were sixty or seventy houses on Barrington St. where the windows were broken. This is the route down which the ratings had come. The mob passed his house before 1.30 p.m. The course of the mob was traced by various witnesses all the way down Barrington and Granville Streets to Salter St., where they turned east to Keith's Brewery which they attacked. Behind them they left broken plate glass windows on both sides of the street and in some instances goods were taken from the stores and thrown about. Few windows escaped unbroken.

There were four R.C.M.P. Constables on guard at the Sackville St. Liquor Store. In the neighbourhood of 1.30 p.m. crowds of naval personnel were observed by these constables gathering on Sackville St. in front of the store. As described by one of the constables, ratings continued to join this crowd for the next hour and then civilians began to gather. About 4.30 an attack was made on the rear door with a plank used as a ram. About 5.00 p.m. the store was reinforced by additional city police and about twelve naval shore patrol and the attack was not renewed on this store.

In the meantime, about 1.30 p.m., Police Chief Conrod, who was home at lunch, received word that sailors were swarming about police headquarters and it looked as though they would attack it. Conrod immediately called Mayor Butler to get in touch with Admiral Murray for more help. The Police Chief himself proceeded to his office where he found the police bringing in sailors and civilians who were carrying loot. Shortly after he arrived, reports came in of the attack on Keith's Brewery and on one of the Hollis St. Liquor Stores, as well as of plate glass being broken in business houses.

After the Chief of Police spoke to the Mayor, the latter called Major Crowell and asked him to arrange a meeting of the heads of the services. Major Crowell had been on the point of calling the Mayor, having learned the result of the meeting of police heads held that morning and being dissatisfied with the security arrangements there made. Mayor Butler then tried to reach Admiral Murray. He was unsuccessful immediately, but reached him about 1.45 p.m. and told him what the Chief of Police had told him of rioting and disorder on Barrington St. and at the City Hall and that naval ratings were involved. In his evidence as to this conversation, Mayor Butler said:—

"I informed him to the effect that the situation, based on the information I had received from the Chief of Police, was very serious, and that the disorders ought to be nipped in the bud, and I asked him to do something. He then asked me what I would suggest and I stressed the point that naval personnel were involved heavily, and that while I thought I ought not to be suggesting or directing him, I thought his presence on the scene would have a profound effect on the rioters, particularly the naval ratings."

According to Mayor Butler, Admiral Murray said that he didn't think he could do that. At this point in the conversation, Warrant Officer Barbour arrived at the Mayor's house and reported that

"they had the police hemmed in at the City Hall, there was disorder and rioting on Barrington St., naval ratings were leading it and responsible for it, there appeared to be nothing he could do."

Mayor Butler excused himself from Admiral Murray while he heard Barbour. He then returned to the telephone and repeated to the Admiral what he had been told. The Admiral expressed a desire to speak to Barbour, who repeated to him what he had told the Mayor. According to the Mayor, Barbour several times said into the telephone "No, sir, it is the navy".

Admiral Murray says that he spoke to the Mayor about 1.55 p.m. He says he knew of the street car being taken and that Barbour told him the situation was more than the shore patrol could control with their existing force and he, Admiral Murray, told Barbour he "would get him every assistance I could as quickly as possible". The Admiral said that he then rang Captain Balfour and told him to place sixty-seven men, who were then in a class training to be shore patrol, at the disposal of Lieutenant Commander Wood. Captain Balfour was also to remain at *Stadacona*, to keep all his men there and organize them in parties of six or eight, with Petty Officers in charge, and hold them available. No other witness could speak of such parties and I am inclined

to the view that Admiral Murray is confused in his recollection at this point and has in mind a much later time. Captain Balfour told Admiral Murray that 400 navy men had just left the barracks for the service being held by the armed services at the Garrison Grounds at 2.30 p.m. and that these might be used to advantage.

Captain Balfour, in his evidence as to the above conversation with Admiral Murray, said:—

“The Admiral did not give me any particular story at all. He gave me instructions to provide sixty-seven, or he didn’t specify the number, he said the shore patrol classes under training; and that was sufficient indication to me that there was trouble or he would not require them.

Q. And he didn’t tell you to close the gangway?—A. No, sir.”

Captain Balfour also deposed:—

“Q. Could you, of your own initiative, stop leave on V-E Day?—
A. I did stop leave on V-E Day.

Q. When?—A. 1400 hours (2.00 p.m.).

Q. That was when you were told to do so by the Admiral?—A. I was not told to by anyone.”

Admiral Murray then received a number of calls from merchants downtown with complaints that sailors were breaking windows. He was also called by Major Crowell and it was arranged that the meeting of the heads of the services with the Mayor would be held at the Garrison Grounds before the service. The Admiral then left for that meeting, and the service itself, with his Chief of Staff, Captain Miles.

At approximately 2.25 p.m. the Mayor, Admiral Murray, Brigadier White and Air Vice-Marshal Morfee met on the platform at the Garrison Grounds. Brigadier White informed the Admiral that he had sent seventy-five provost, who had been stationed at the grounds, downtown. The Mayor explained the existing situation to the Admiral and that he wanted assistance, and Admiral Murray told the Mayor about his 67 trainees and that he proposed to march the members of the armed services then on the Garrison Grounds, with the exception of the women and the veterans, through the City after the service, with the band playing, “in the hopes that it would cause a diversion and stop any window breaking and damage that was going on at the time, and give people an opportunity to come back to their senses”. The three officers decided that the service should proceed and that it was wise that it should in view of the presence of many thousands of people there. The service proceeded, but the Mayor returned to police headquarters.

KEITH’S BREWERY

In the meantime the attack on Keith’s Brewery was proceeding. The day watchman observed people gathered outside the south gate on Water St. He could only observe their feet below the gate. In a few minutes the gate was broken down and sailors poured in, and he took refuge in flight. The sailors began at once to carry out cartons of beer. The entry through this gate was evidently distinct from another entry through the south gate at the corner of Salter and Water Streets. A group of naval shore patrol, led by Lieutenant McKenzie, had tried to lead the crowd of ratings west on Salter St. away from the brewery, but only a few ratings followed him. The larger number proceeded directly to the brewery and the shore patrol, seeing they were unsuccessful, proceeded to the brewery also. The patrolmen took up position on the south loading platform, but did not or were not able to cover it completely, as the sailors gained entry through a door opening on to this platform and began to carry out cartons of beer. Two witnesses who observed what took place said in evidence that several of the shore patrol themselves on this platform were

passing out cartons of beer to people who were standing adjacent to the platform. The crowd was now a mixture of sailors and civilians.

The next development was that an attack was made upon the north loading platform. Some ratings, and two or three soldiers and civilians, used a plank as a battering ram upon the door leading into the brewery from the platform. At this time some city police and 107 provost arrived. The city police blew their whistles and the crowd commenced to run out of the brewery premises. Some of the crowd in their anxiety to get away climbed a stone wall some four or five feet high, surmounted by a picket fence with barbed wire on top.

After the grounds were cleared, the provost pulled up one of their trucks across the gate at Salter and Water Streets. A large crowd began to gather, estimated by Colonel Clarke, the head of the Army Provost Corps, at approximately 4,000. He said it was a mixed crowd consisting of "a large number of civilians, a large number of navy, and some soldiers and some air force". After Colonel Clarke left the scene, sailors began to infiltrate past the truck at the gate until about 25 were inside. They then charged the door on the north loading platform which they smashed. The crowd pushed over the truck at the gate, flooded into the grounds, and the looting of the brewery began again and continued unrestricted. The police were overpowered. Beer was carried out in cartons and drinking began immediately, in the grounds and in the streets. Cartons were strewn about and bottles smashed indiscriminately. Something in excess of 33,500 quarts of beer were taken.

HOLLIS ST. RETAIL AND MAIL ORDER STORES

At approximately 2.30 p.m. the panel in the door of the retail store on Hollis St. was forced in. R.C.M.P. Corporal Hall who was on duty there, with another R.C.M.P. Constable and a Liquor Commission Guard, observed two or three navy men looking in. He ordered them away and they left. Naval shore patrol were sent for and shortly after 12 to 15 arrived and were stationed in front of the store. By 3.00 p.m. a large crowd had gathered, however, filling the street, with civilians and sailors about equally divided. The hoardings over the broken windows were pulled down and ratings immediately entered. A mixed crowd followed. The place was completely looted of its remaining stocks and the raid ended only with the exhaustion of the stocks. The police left when the rioters began throwing bottles about the store. Hollis St. had a continuous stream of people carrying beer and spirits, drinking, smashing bottles on adjoining buildings and littering the street with cartons, cases and glass.

The story of what took place at the retail store was repeated almost concurrently at the mail order store beside it. The attack was made immediately after the attack on the retail store and its development followed the same lines as the raid on the retail store. At the time it was attacked the mail order store had but three policemen in it, of whom two were R.C.M.P. constables. Both Hollis Stores were cleared of their stocks by 4.00 p.m.

While the raids on Keith's brewery and the two liquor stores on Hollis St. were still proceeding, the service at the Garrison Grounds came to an end about 3.00 p.m. Word of what was taking place at the brewery was brought by Colonel Oland, Colonel Clarke and Wing Commander McCallum to the heads of the services where they were holding a conference with the Mayor and Major Crowell. Colonel Oland told Brigadier White that the crowd at the brewery might number 3,000 and that the service personnel involved were "very definitely mostly naval". Mayor Butler stressed to the Admiral the seriousness of the situation and stated that unless he acted the former would "exercise all powers vested in me to appeal to the military authorities for help by invoking martial law, if that was in my power, or reading the Riot Act, which certainly was in my power".

The only result of this conference was that the service personnel which had paraded to the service were paraded down through the town. As a measure for dealing with the riots it was quite ineffective. In giving his order to the Officer in Charge, Admiral Murray outlined the route and gave instructions that the parade was to halt at the corner of Duke and Brunswick Streets, where they were to be turned over to Lieutenant Commander Wood, of the Shore Patrol, and to be used on the streets by him. There was considerable confusion in connection with the giving and receiving of this order. In the result, the naval part of the parade, instead of halting at the rendezvous, proceeded to *Stadacona* barracks. The officer commanding the parade was under the impression he was to contact Wood at the City Hall. He failed to locate him and remained at police headquarters awaiting a call from Wood which never came. The naval section of the parade, which left the Garrison Grounds 375 strong, arrived at *Stadacona* with 115 missing. Some deliberately deserted and some, apparently, were cut off by the crowd. The officer of the naval part of the parade gave the following evidence:—

“The crowd was coming right in on the parade at that time and there were a number of them drinking, and probably the ratings who were in the parade were in rather a mood—after all it was a Victory Parade, Sir, and I can quite see if they saw anybody in the crowd right in beside them, the temptation might be to fall out.

Q. That is your judgment as to what happened?—A. Not in all instances.

Q. What do you think the other instances would be?—A. I have heard since that some of the men were cut off by people walking through the parade, and others were pulled out.”

Two of the ratings who were in the parade in the last section were called as witnesses and said that they were cut off by the crowd. They watched proceedings for a while and then returned to their barracks or ship. No inquiry was made on the men's return to determine why any of the 115 were absent from the parade on its arrival at the barracks, nor were any of them asked for an explanation.

At the subsequent meeting held at 4.30 p.m., shortly to be referred to, Admiral Murray reported that these men “had gone over to the enemy”. Captain Balfour said that because of the circumstances as reported to him, of the crowd pressing in on the parade, he took no action and asked for no explanation of the five men belonging to *Stadacona* who were missing. That the treatment of this incident was undoubtedly lenient is not the point. In my opinion, the incident and the treatment of it prompt a question as to the state of discipline as it then existed in Halifax. Captain J. C. Hibbard, who became Captain “D” on May 4th, 1945, and who before that was commander of the *Skeena* and later of the *Iroquois*, did not hear of the incident until four days later. He immediately sent a signal to all the ships under his command ordering a full investigation. He deposed:—

“In my opinion this was a most serious offence and disciplinary action is being taken.”

This is more in accord with the concern with which one would consider such an occurrence would be regarded in a disciplined body of men. There would no doubt be judgment and discretion applied in considering all the circumstances, but one would think that no inquiry at all would not tend to improve the state of discipline.

On the arrival of the 230 men at the barracks, it was decided that it would be unwise to send them back uptown as they were tired. Admiral Murray

gave orders that they were to be given a hot meal and held there. He had in the meantime returned to his house at *Stadacona*.

Meantime the riots were proceeding downtown. Small parties of sailors in two's and three's roamed the business district, breaking shop windows and vitrolite shop fronts with their feet or boards, or metal stands taken from stores, sometimes entering and helping themselves to the contents, sometimes passing on. When the glass was broken, civilians were not slow to enter and loot. The preponderance of the evidence is that the breaking was done by naval personnel and the looting by them and by civilians, with more civilians taking part in the looting than ratings. There were only two cases deposed to in evidence where the initial breaking and entering was done alone by civilians. This procedure went on throughout the afternoon. There was intoxication everywhere in the downtown area. The police appear to have been scattered and ineffective. 75 members of the shore patrol were engaged in protecting Oland's Brewery (not Keith's) on Agricola St. Another 25 were at Keith's, with an additional 30 of the trainees. As to the others, Lieutenant Commander Wood said:—

"There were too few of them, no doubt about it.

Q. They were all scattered here and there?—A. Yes, they were all scattered.

Q. Never used in one body in one place?—A. No."

The bulk of the police forces under the direction of the Chief of Police appear to have been mostly concentrated at the liquor stores and breweries and there were too few remaining to be effective on the downtown streets. The events of the afternoon were apparently happening so quickly and so often that police headquarters was bewildered. As on the preceding night, the City Police Chief apparently forgot all about the liaison officer of the Air Force at the City Hall and the Security Police of the Air Force was never asked for by him. Of the three platoons of the City Police force itself, only two platoons of 40 men were used that afternoon on the downtown streets. The other platoon was on duty morning and afternoon at the Garrison Grounds and was allowed to go off duty at 4.00 p.m. The Air Force police were used, however, under the direction of their own officers. At Keith's Brewery they were instructed to remove their identifying insignia, as their commander had some apprehension that with the temper of the mob they might be attacked. They were used to order their own personnel back to barracks.

HEAD OFFICE LIQUOR COMMISSION

Sometime in the vicinity of 4.30 p.m., the Comptroller of the Head Office of the Liquor Commission observed a rating and a civilian approaching the rear door of the premises at the corner of Buckingham and Water Streets. Shortly after he heard the sound of hammering. On telephoning police headquarters, he was told that they would gladly help but they had no one to send. At it was obvious to the Comptroller that entry to the building would be gained, he locked the door into the bottling department and retired with the staff to the street in front. The Comptroller, Mr. Vyse, then went to the City Hall, where he found but one city policeman and one naval officer to whom he spoke, pointing out to the latter that there was rum, 40 overproof, in his building and that it would be very dangerous if it were reached. The officer said he "would see what he could do". Vyse said he saw quite a few naval shore patrol at the city hall going to and fro and all appearing to be busy. Another witness, who was on the street, saw the rear door of the Commission Office attacked by a party of twenty-six ratings, four civilians and an army Captain who had the red patch of the first division on his shoulder. The Captain was in

the rear while the sailors attacked the door. This witness did not see the door broken in but left the scene before that was accomplished. Vyse returned to his own building and observed that there were civilians and naval men in the building. He saw two civilians carry out two kegs of rum and put them into cars. Shortly after this four city policemen arrived and chased out the intruders. The evidence does not establish what people were found in the building by the police, except one intoxicated rating who was found two hours later. Two ratings' caps were also found.

By 4.00 o'clock the downtown streets presented a spectacle of broken plate glass, beer and spirit bottles, cartons and cases. People, civilians and service, mostly navy, were passing along, drinking, carrying liquor and loot. Cornwallis Park, Grafton Park, and part of Citadel Hill were occupied by drinking parties. These included women as well as men. Shortly after 2.00 o'clock a naval Petty Officer was observed kicking in the window of an office directly west of the Sackville Liquor Store. One witness observed several Air Force men breaking windows on Granville St. and passing along Hollis St. with loot. Navy men were seen to smash all the windows on the Prince St. side of the T. Eaton Co. Ltd. A naval Petty Officer broke the lower windows of the Eastern Trust Co. These were covered by gratings, but he used a 2" x 4" between the bars. Ratings were observed to break the windows of Mitchell's barber shop in Prince St. and the Needlework Store on Prince between Barrington and Granville. At various times throughout the afternoon various missiles were thrown through the windows of Henry Birks and Sons on Barrington St. by passers-by. The boarding did not go all the way up and the windows were broken above the boarding. About 6.00 p.m. naval ratings pulled the boarding off one of the windows. A naval rating was observed pulling off the bars across the door and the store was entered and looted by ratings and civilians. Show cases and shelves were smashed and a great deal of wanton destruction done.

Between 5.15 and 5.45 p.m. naval ratings and two civilians entered the Eaton store, the door being battered down by 8 or 9 ratings. Three glass showcases containing jewellery were kicked in and loot, consisting of rings, inexpensive watches and costume jewellery, was taken. The store staff were able to eject these people without help. Police assistance had been asked for but none was available.

By this time all army provost were being used, with the exception of one officer and 14 men employed at company headquarters. The provost had received a great many direct calls that afternoon from merchants in the city.

OLAND'S BREWERY, AGRICOLA ST.

Sometime after four o'clock, a small gate was broken in and one rating entered. He was arrested. A large crowd of at least one thousand was outside and an attempt was made to climb over the wall. This was prevented by the shore patrol inside. About 6.30 p.m. another 75 shore patrol arrived to reinforce those there. The crowd remained outside until about 7.15 p.m., when it finally broke up.

BUCKINGHAM ST. STORE

This store was guarded by four R.C.M.P. constables. No other police of any kind arrived throughout the afternoon. From 3.00 p.m. on different crowds gathered outside the store. One of the constables succeeded by persuasion in keeping them from attempting an entry until shortly after 5.00 o'clock. The boardings over the broken windows were pulled off and three naval ratings entered, followed by a mixed crowd estimated by one of the constables to be sixty per cent ratings and the remainder civilians and soldiers, with soldiers in the minority. The crowd, which the constable estimated at about five hundred, completely looted the store. In the opinion of the constable, the majority were sober but some were intoxicated.

AGRICOLA ST. LIQUOR STORE

About 5.15 p.m. the back door of the store was broken in by three ratings. At this time the store was held by two R.C.M.P. inside and fifteen shore patrol and ten army provost outside. These ratings were driven off. In a few minutes the door was broken down again (it had been replaced) by naval ratings and about twenty or twenty-five entered the store and did some looting before they were ejected. The police did not try to effect any arrests as there was a large crowd outside and it was considered that the thing to do was to get the ratings out and keep them out. As soon as the store was cleared, however, the front of the store was broken in. The boardings over the plate glass windows were torn off and the crowd surged through, and in about three-quarters of an hour completely looted the store. The constable who gave evidence said that naval ratings led the entry through one window and a civilian the entry through the other, and that the crowd which looted the store was made up of ratings and civilians in equal proportions, with a few soldiers. He said the majority appeared to have been drinking. The combined police force was powerless in the face of the crowd.

COLD STORAGE WAREHOUSE

The Liquor Commission kept a stock of liquor in this warehouse, which lies in the terminal district in the southerly end of the City. McIntyre, the Superintendent, having heard or understood that it might be attacked, went down to the warehouse about 3.45 p.m. and found the two watchmen there. About 4.15 persons outside began pounding on the doors and McIntyre telephoned the Mounted Police. In a few minutes a large door was broken down and from 40 to 50 naval men, with one civilian and one soldier, entered and began looting the liquor. There was no beer in these premises. These men were all to some degree under the influence of liquor. McIntyre suggested to them they should not try to take more than two to three bottles apiece. They accepted this suggestion and filed out with their loot before the police arrived. McIntyre had first tried to get in touch with the city police, but says he could not get an answer. After the raiders had left, some ten mounted police arrived.

After the meeting at M.D. 6, Colonel Clarke sent an officer, 20 provost and 180 soldiers to the warehouse about 6.00 p.m.

4.30 MEETING

After returning to his residence from the Garrison Grounds, Admiral Murray remained there until he received a request, at the instance of the Mayor, to attend a meeting at 4.30 p.m. at Brigadier White's office of the Chief of Police, the Mayor and the heads of the services. Prior to this meeting, Brigadier White, who had no army personnel suitable for use nearer than Debert, had already given orders for a battalion to be made ready at Debert in case martial law should be declared. The meeting assembled and during its deliberations reports continued to come in of several of the larger stores being broken into, as well as the Northern Electric Building and the attacks on the Buckingham and Agricola Liquor Stores. Admiral Murray, as the senior officer present, presided. I include some excerpts from his evidence:—

"I opened the meeting by telling those present that the meeting had been requested by the Mayor, that I understood from him that the situation by which our service police were at his disposal had broken down, and I asked him to inform the meeting of the situation at that time.

Q. Which he did?—A. Which he did.

Q. And I gather the situation as he reported it was still very serious?

—A. Yes.

Q. Then the Mayor, having made that report, what next took place at the meeting?—A. The Mayor didn't produce any plan except to suggest that all service personnel should be recalled to barracks."

.....
 "Q. What else happened?—A. The suggestion came forward from the Mayor that the service personnel should be recalled, and I told him that I didn't wish to have the service personnel recalled by themselves if the civilians were going to be allowed to remain and continue. That of the large numbers of service personnel ashore that afternoon, a very small number were involved in this particular incident, and that many others, who had their homes and wives and families in Halifax, were enjoying their V-E Day without any trouble, and I didn't wish to interfere with their enjoyment for the sake of these few that were in the city, and also that I didn't consider that it was practicable to separate the service personnel from the civilian in the situation as described to me by the Mayor and his Aldermen."

Just where Admiral Murray received his information that "a very small number" of naval ratings were involved in the disturbances, I do not know, nor do I know how he could have received that impression. So far as is shown by the evidence, the only naval officers who were actually in touch with the position of affairs on the streets were the two officers of the Shore Patrol, Lieutenant Commander Wood and Lieutenant McKenzie, and neither had made any such report to the Admiral. While Lieutenant Commander Wood said in evidence that only about 200 ratings were involved, this officer, shortly after the occurrence in question, made a report in writing for presentation to a naval court of inquiry at a time when his memory would be fresher than when he gave evidence before me. I quote from this document, which is Exhibit 120:—

"At 1345 (1.45 p.m. of May 8th) a call was received from the police station requesting assistance to break up a *large crowd* of naval ratings at the corner of Gerrish and Barrington Streets. Two trucks with approximately thirty men in each were despatched, and on arrival found *five or six hundred* naval ratings tearing a street car to pieces."

Lieutenant Commander Wood had himself observed this crowd a short time earlier and this report of his accords no doubt with what he saw as to the size of this crowd of ratings as it left the barracks. In any event, it accords with the evidence before me and I do not accept his evidence as to the smaller number.

The Provost Marshals of the Army and Air Force, Colonel Clarke and Wing Commander McCallum, were both at Keith's Brewery shortly after the first attack on that place was over. Both these officers estimated the mob there was at least 4,000 persons. Colonel Clarke, who was constantly in touch with his army provost corps throughout May 7 and 8, deposed:—

"Q. Did you ever get the impression from any source, from observation, or from any report that came to you, that there were only 200 naval ratings causing trouble that day?—A. No, my Lord.

Q. I take it you didn't hear that until this was all over?—A. The first intimation I had of the 200 was at the evidence here, my Lord."

Colonel Oland had reported the crowd at the brewery to number 3,000, with the service men involved mostly naval.

Notwithstanding the evidence presented at the Inquiry, all of which was heard by Admiral Murray, the latter clung to the position that not more than 200 ratings were involved in the rioting on May 8. He said in evidence:—

"Q. And you believed, and I take it still believe, there were only 200 ratings involved in all the rioting in the City of Halifax from 2.00 o'clock or 1.30 o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th until the curfew was imposed?—

A. Evidence given here shows that there were a larger number.

Q. That is not the question?—A. That is what I still believe."

On May 9 Admiral Murray issued a signal to the men of his command, which began as follows:—

"A handfull of undisciplined men in naval uniform (I shan't do them the honour of calling them naval ratings) probably not more than 200 in number"

Captain Miles, the Naval Chief of Staff, did not share that view. While the 4.30 meeting was proceeding, Captain Miles was applied to by Commander Mitchell for 100 men with helmets and axe-handles, with whom Commander Mitchell proposed to deal with the crowd looting the Hollis St. Liquor Stores. Captain Miles refused to supply the men because the matter of dealing with the rioters was then under consideration at the meeting and he thought that "100 men such as Mitchell asked for could not cure the situation by any means". He had gained his appreciation of the then existing situation from a conversation with Brigadier White. Captain Miles further deposed:—

"Q. And when you had your conversation with Brigadier White and formed your appreciation, did you think that there were only 200 sailors that were ringleaders or involved?—A. No, I had no knowledge of that then.

Q. You didn't think it was that small?—A. Oh, no, a large crowd.

Q. And a good many sailors involved?—A. Oh, yes, I would think so."

Admiral Murray showed a similar unwillingness to accept facts in connection with the events of the preceding night, as well as in connection with the complaints as to the conduct of ratings on Halifax streets in June, 1944. As to the events of the night of May 7-8, he said in evidence:—

"Q. Now, Admiral Murray, having regard to what you have heard as to what actually took place shortly before midnight and after midnight of May 7, should the matter not have been brought to your attention by someone?—A. I think it might have been brought to my attention by the civic authorities. My shore patrol were at their disposal.

Q. Should it not have been brought to your attention by anyone under your command?—A. I still don't believe that naval participation on Monday night was such as to make it a naval affair.

Q. Notwithstanding the evidence you have heard here?—A. Notwithstanding the evidence I have heard here."

.....

"Q. Did it occur to you to send for Lieutenant Commander Wood and obtain a direct report from him yourself?—A. No, I knew he was busy in consultation with the civil authorities.

Q. Did it occur to you to ask him to report to you as soon as that conference was over?—A. No, I was also busy about many things that day.

Q. Did you send for Lieutenant McKenzie, so that you could get a direct report from him?—A. No, I was satisfied with the report that Captain Miles had got.

Q. In what way?—A. That the naval shore patrol had covered itself with glory and I was quite proud of the part they had taken the night before.

Q. What do you mean?—A. They defended three of the liquor stores. I was told they had been called away from the street car performance to the Sackville Liquor Store where they had managed to get the people out with very little looting. And on returning they had been sent to the Buckingham St. Store where they kept the people out altogether, if I remember rightly. They had from there been sent on a false scent to the Agricola St. Store, and after a short time the information came that the Hollis St. Store had been broken into and they proceeded to that store and got the situation under control."

As to the conduct of the navy on the streets of Halifax in June, 1944, that matter has already been referred to. Admiral Murray's view was that there was no ground for complaint and no need for any officer to have been sent to Halifax from Ottawa in connection with the matter.

The importance of this attitude of mind on the part of Admiral Murray in failing or refusing to accept the actual facts of the situation, as it existed on Tuesday afternoon, is that he was less able effectively to deal with it, and this explains to some extent at least why no action was taken by him during the whole afternoon, beyond sending the 67 trainees to be used with the shore patrol. It was not until the conclusion of the meeting, which commenced at 4.30 p.m., that he took any other action.

As to Admiral Murray's view that it was not "practicable to separate the service personnel from the civilians in the situation as described to me by the Mayor and his Aldermen", one would think that if there were not more than 200 ratings involved that should not have been difficult with the forces at his disposal, apart altogether from the naval shore patrol. In my opinion, Admiral Murray ought, at the first sign of trouble at 1.30 p.m., to have recalled his men to barracks and, if he had to proceed to the Garrison Service (he was in charge of it), he ought to have left his Chief of Staff to see that it was done. Instead he took Captain Miles with him. His reluctance to go himself all the afternoon, or to despatch any of his officers, to recall the men is explained in his evidence. Admiral Murray said:—

"The Mayor had suggested a personal appearance by me and I said that would be dangerous to Naval discipline under the conditions then described by him.

Q. Why?—A. To have a senior officer appear amongst a drunken and rowdy mob.

Q. Of civilians? Or service men?—A. Both.

Q. You don't suggest that any of the drunken civilians or rowdy civilians would have offered violence to you personally, do you?—A. I have no reason to consider myself immune, if I interfered with what they were doing.

Q. But you would interfere not with what the civilian population were doing but your own men?—A. In other words, you consider that the civilian should have been allowed to go on doing his rioting and only the service man taken home?

Q. What I consider is not the slightest difference. I am asking you what your views were?—A. My views were that it was not the proper thing for me to make a public appearance under the conditions as described to me.

Q. Because, I suggest, you might suffer indignity or injury at the hands of your own personnel?—A. No.

Q. And I suggest that if there was a reason that that was the reason?—A. No.

Q. Well, what was the reason?—A. That I might suffer indignity, and indignity to me would be the end of Naval discipline for 24 hours to come, at the hands of a mob; an excited and, as described to me a drunken and excited mob.

Q. Did it ever occur to you to go down and try and see what effect your presence would have?—A. I had many other responsibilities that day besides the responsibility to the city of Halifax, and I could not give up my responsibility for the Battle of the Atlantic at that time.

Q. But you did, didn't you? You were in conference with a slight break, from 2 o'clock till 6. You did give up your time?—A. My time, but I did not place my authority in jeopardy.

Q. You weren't fighting the Battle of the Atlantic from before 2 o'clock until after 6 o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th? You were not fighting the Battle of the Atlantic in any way, shape or form?—A. You misunderstand my reply. My reply was that by going out there and suffering indignity it would have been the finish of discipline not only in the city of Halifax but throughout the whole command, and I did not feel I was entitled to take that chance at that time. I felt I was only entitled to take that chance when I knew the soldiers were coming along behind me, and then only because I wanted to have the matter cleared up before dark.

Q. Well, when you came to that conclusion you must have had in your mind that there was a most serious situation existing in Halifax?—A. I had.

Q. How long were you of that opinion?—A. I was of that opinion since 2 o'clock. I had given my reserves to the city.

Q. All right. Since 2 o'clock.—A. . . .

Q. So that you were satisfied that there was a very serious situation existing in Halifax?—A. Yes.

Q. And the only reason, or the reason that you took no effective steps to deal with it was that you thought that if you went down yourself into the city you would be subjected to indignity that would wreck the whole discipline of the Canadian Navy? I still would like to pursue this. In what manner was the whole discipline of the Canadian Navy to be wrecked by an indignity to you from some drunken civilian?—A. I have not said the discipline of the whole Canadian Navy, but the whole of my command.

Q. Well, the discipline of the whole of your command from some drunken civilian offering you some indignity?—A. That was not what I said either.

Q. Well, can you answer the question now? What did you say?—A. If I had made a personal appearance in the streets at that time in a matter which was still out of my hands—which was not in my hands, and I had suffered indignity, my car had been pushed over, all the Canadian Navy under my command who were still fighting Germans would have been left without a leader. I would have been the commander who was unable to control his troops, and I would have put myself in the position of bringing that about through having arguments and altercations with drunken and excited men, which is the first principle of all matters of dealing with personnel and not to be attempted."

* * *

"Q. Well, did you not have under your command some senior officer to whom you could have delegated the task?—A. The same would have applied, to a lesser degree, to them.

Q. Well, would it apply all down the line to a junior sub-lieutenant?—A. It applies all the way down the line to any officer. He should not enter into altercations with drunken or excited men."

As to Admiral Murray's reference to "a matter which was still out of my hands", he, from time to time in his evidence, took the position that, as the shore patrol were working in liaison with the other police forces under the direction of the Chief of Police of the City of Halifax, he had no responsibility for what was going on until, as he described it, the "civil government had broken down," by which expression he appears to have meant when the combined police forces were unable to handle the rioters. This had been the condition for some considerable time before 4.30 p.m. Admiral Murray knew, of course, that he had been appealed to by the Mayor before 2.00 p.m. and he also knew from Barbour that the ratings were then out of control. In my opinion, the position thus taken by Admiral Murray is untenable. He continued to have responsibility for navy personnel on the streets of Halifax and he did not shed that responsibility by permitting the naval police to work in conjunction with the other police forces. Whether subject to that arrangement or not, they had found themselves faced with a situation which they could not deal with. That situation, which arose before 2.00 p.m., called for prompt and effective measures. In my opinion, the responsibility for the employment of such measures with respect to rioting sailors rested with the Naval Command. As already mentioned, the basic understanding with respect to policing for V-E Day was that each service would primarily be responsible for its own personnel.

Shortly after the first attack on Keith's Brewery was over, both the army and the air force had a senior officer on hand investigating, Colonel Clarke and Wing Commander McCallum, the Assistant Provost Marshal. The A.P.M. had at that time ordered all airmen, whom he saw in the crowd, to leave the area at once and to instruct all other airmen they might see to do likewise. He had also put his service police on that work. At the conclusion of the service at the Garrison Grounds at 3.00 p.m., the A.P.M. was ordered by Air Vice-Marshal Morfee to clear the streets of air force personnel. At the 4.30 meeting the A.P.M. reported to Air Vice-Marshal Morfee that this was being successfully done. From 4.00 p.m. many senior air force officers, including Group Captains, were patrolling the various streets on Air Vice-Marshal Morfee's orders to pick up any remaining airmen. At 3.00 p.m. the A.P.M. had telephoned all Halifax and Dartmouth air force units requesting that all personnel be confined to barracks. It was not until 7.00 p.m., according to Captains Balfour and Freyer, that officers from *Stadacona* and *Peregrine* were despatched to get naval personnel off the streets.

To return to the meeting which had commenced at 4.30 p.m., consideration was given to invoking martial law. The possible serious consequences of such a step deterred all present from making that decision. The commanding officer of the R.C.M.P. in Halifax was sent for and expressed the opinion that only force could control the situation. It was calculated that, apart from resort to martial law, the only force available was the combined police forces in the city, estimated at 415 men. Nothing came of this. Admiral Murray's view is thus described by him:—

"Q. I think I interrupted you when you went to tell about the suggestion of Commissioner Eames?—A. I understood from what he had told us, that the situation could only be controlled by force, and he suggested a composite force of Navy, Army and Air Force, under a competent officer to go out with clubs and clean up the streets. Naturally that was illegal . . .

Q. In what sense?—A. The Services, unless called upon by Civic power in the ordinary course of law, has no authority over the civilians. I considered the matter very closely and I didn't wish to do it, but I did set the matter in motion in case I wanted to bring it into action later on.

Q. In what way?—A. That I wanted a particular Officer, Captain Robertson, to be ready to go out in charge of such a force.

Q. I think his name was suggested by Commissioner Eames?—A. Yes, and by Major Crowell. I didn't wish to send Captain Robertson out there because I was still hoping we could find a suitable police officer who had

authority to take charge of our men, and if they were acting in accordance with that and under the control of the police and had the assistance of the police, it would be legal for them to arrest civilians.

Q. A suitable officer of what service?—A. I asked everyone present if we could not find a Police Officer to take charge of this party.

Q. A Civilian Police Officer?—A. Yes, or a Mountie.

Q. And the suggestion was Captain Robertson?—A. Yes. That was quite illegal, but I was willing to consider illegal matters at that time. I was loathe to send Captain Robertson because he was in command of the Dockyard and was responsible for guarding considerably more valuable equipment and something much more important in the continuation of the war against Japan than existed in the whole of the shops at Halifax.

Q. And you hesitated to expose him to that risk?—A. Yes, him personally, because he had not been trained in police work, but he has been awarded the George Medal for work along similar lines. I have a very high respect for Captain Robertson.

Q. I imagine Commissioner Eames had a very high respect for him too?—A. Yes, everyone in Halifax has. He was also busily employed in very important work at that time.

Q. The tendency about him was altered?—A. Yes, when I found that the 260 men that I had given orders to send out with the Shore Patrol, I phoned the Barracks and found they had left, and as far as the Navy was concerned, I had no force to contribute to that combined composite force. They were already in operation under the Shore Patrol."

When these 260 (230) men actually went out it was then 6.00 o'clock or later. Nothing, therefore, came of Commissioner Eames' suggestion.

While the navy had many thousands of trained men in Halifax not on leave, Admiral Murray said he thought to use them might result in bloodshed. However, some eventually were used when the riots were on the wane, as will appear.

The decisions actually reached at the meeting were:—

(1) That V-E Day should be declared at an end as from 6.00 p.m. This decision was made and broadcast at 5.35 p.m.

(2) It was also decided to declare a curfew as from 8.00 p.m. This decision was made about 6.00 p.m. Some delay was experienced in getting the sound truck ready, but ultimately about 6.45 p.m. the Admiral and the Mayor went through the streets in the sound truck and made both proclamations public. By the time these decisions were taken, the riots had begun to abate to some degree, although at 6.45 p.m. a serious fire broke out in a drug store at the corner of Sackville and Hollis Streets and another serious fire broke out at 7.50 p.m. in a store at the corner of Sackville and Barrington Streets. Both fires would appear to have followed upon the looting of these premises.

At 5.45 p.m. Admiral Murray also instructed Captain Balfour to have the 230 men who had returned to *Stadacona* from the parade to go out with about 100 shore patrol to the south end of the city in parties of 10 men and endeavour to sweep naval personnel back to their barracks. The policy of Exhibit 72 was now abandoned and 150 of the men, on Wood's instructions, were equipped with axe handles, after he found that some of the shore patrolmen had armed themselves with sticks. Nine trucks were also sent out to follow the sound truck. According to Lieutenant Commander Wood, "this procedure had excellent results and naval ratings were brought to H.M.C.S. *Stadacona* North Drill Hall in waggon loads". He said there were a great many drunks at that time "and we were just throwing the bodies in" the trucks.

The use of the sound truck had a very marked effect and by 9.00 p.m. rioting had ceased. The troops arrived from Debert about 10.00 p.m., but

there was then no need to use them, except to parade them through the City. They were fully trained troops, including some paratroops, and their presence in the City became well known.

Until an early hour on Wednesday morning naval ratings continued to return to their quarters, many of them carrying liquor and loot of various kinds and many in various stages of intoxication. Considerable of the loot was thrown away before the men arrived at their quarters and was discovered the next day along the railway embankment near the dockyard, hanging on the fence around *Peregrine* and in its coal bins, as well as in the men's actual quarters. At 6.15 p.m. all leave for the navy was stopped and this order continued in force until May 11 at 5.00 p.m.

(b) DARTMOUTH

The service establishments on the Dartmouth side consisted of the Army A-23 Training Centre at Eastern Passage, about six miles from the town, an R.C.A.F. Station, about midway between the town and Eastern Passage, and various piers where ships are berthed.

An arrangement, similar to that in the case of Halifax, was discussed for Dartmouth, whereby the civilian police and the police of the service would operate from the police office of the town on V-E Day. This, however, did not materialize. The total number of civil police in Dartmouth was ten, including the Chief of Police. The strength of the shore patrol in Dartmouth was normally twelve, but it was planned to have six additional men from Halifax on hand on V-E Day. As it turned out, no additional men from Halifax could be spared on May 8th until the situation in Halifax permitted their despatch that night. The Air Force planned to have security police available, but not necessarily on patrol in Dartmouth. The Chief of Police was advised that arrangements were to be made by the Air Force "to try and keep the personnel on their stations with entertainment at that time".

The civil police and the Air Force police normally operated from town police headquarters, while the army provost and the shore patrol were stationed in separate buildings short distances away.

The Dartmouth civil police were instructed to report for duty as soon as news was received of V-E Day. There was no trouble of any kind in Dartmouth throughout the day or night of May 7th. The Police Chief stated that there was "quite a crowd" on the streets and that there were more service personnel than usual that evening.

About 2.00 p.m. on May 8th, word reached the Chief of Police that trouble had broken out in Halifax. He immediately made arrangements to tie up the ferry service between the two places should that later prove necessary. The ferry is the normal means of communication, as the distance by road is approximately twenty-five miles.

About 4.00 p.m. the Chief was returning to his office, after having made the above arrangement, and, as he passed the ferry terminus, he noticed that there were coming off the ferry quite a number of civilians and service personnel considerably under the influence of liquor.

About 5.30 p.m. a crowd of naval ratings began to gather in front of the liquor store at the foot of Church St. This is the only liquor store in Dartmouth. The manager of the store, who was alone at the time, telephoned the town police and the two city policemen who were there on duty at that time were sent and all town police were called for duty. The Chief also notified the R.C.M.P., the shore patrol and the army provost. Before any of the police arrived at the liquor store, it was attacked by the crowd, and the manager observed that the attack was led by eight sailors and two airmen who used a battering ram. The lower part of the door was pushed in, but, before entry was gained, the two civil police, six or eight shore patrol, and the same number of army provost arrived and were able to stay the attack temporarily. The

"crowd" at that time was estimated by the manager at about thirty-five, mostly naval ratings. In a very few minutes the attack was renewed and one door was pulled off its hinges by sailors. By this time a large crowd had gathered. One observer said it was composed of 30 per cent to 40 per cent navy, 10 per cent army and air force, and the rest civilians. Rocks, sticks and bottles were thrown in the door and the crowd entered on the heels of the service men and looting of the liquor stocks began. This went on for about an hour, notwithstanding the presence of six army provost, five municipal police and eight or ten shore patrol. The store was emptied of 438 cases of beer, 141 cases of wine and 818 cases of spirits (12 quart bottles to the case in each). A very small quantity was ultimately recovered.

While the raid on the liquor store was in progress, the Chief of Police endeavoured to get Lieutenant Commander Wood, or a commissioned officer of the shore patrol, and later Admiral Murray, on the telephone, but was unsuccessful. He then telephoned the Attorney General, who referred him to Brigadier White. The latter said that assistance could be procured from Colonel Meighen, the Officer Commanding A-23 Training Centre. Colonel Meighen, on being applied to, agreed to sent soldiers. It was then in the neighbourhood of 6.00 o'clock. A wholesale grocery store near the liquor store had also been broken into at that time.

The next development was the breaking of windows in business premises on Commercial Street, which runs along the waterfront and which, with Portland Street, which runs at right angles to the first named street, are the two business streets of the town, Portland Street being the principal business street.

It was then decided to stop the ferry service and this was done shortly before 7.00 p.m.

By 7.00 p.m. windows commenced to be broken on Portland St. A dense crowd formed within the two blocks between Commercial St. and King St. Ratings made up most of the people on the sidewalks next to the stores, while civilians occupied the roadway. Sailors were seen breaking windows and were followed into the stores by civilians. These proceedings went on from shortly after 7.00 p.m. until in the neighbourhood of 10.30 p.m. What police forces were available were powerless to prevent the window breaking and, in most cases, the looting which followed. The police forces then on hand consisted of ten Dartmouth constables, three R.C.M.P. and nine army provost.

The attacks on the stores on Portland St. came very close together. A 5c and 10c store was entered and, when the police arrived, they found eight or ten sailors and two civilians inside. These they ejected and the place was boarded up. While this was being done, a dress store was attacked and its contents completely cleaned out. A small department store lost a considerable amount of goods and other stores lost varying amounts, and there was some destruction of shop fixtures. Fifty-six glass windows in all in the store district were broken, out of a total of thirty-two stores damaged or entered. These constituted the majority of the stores in the area. In all of these cases where the breaking was observed by witnesses who gave evidence, the offenders were naval ratings. In one case one airman and two sailors made the break-in. Ultimately a detachment of approximately 125 men arrived from A-23 and about the same time about 50 Air Force men arrived from the airport. These, together with the ten town constables, seven or eight shore patrol and three R.C.M.P., were used as one body, and with two parties of sailors from ships in the harbour totalling sixty men, and the additional shore patrol when they arrived, began a sweep of the streets and by 10.30 p.m. succeeded in dispersing the crowds. The example of Halifax was followed, a curfew and declaration of the ending of V-E Day being broadcast about 9.00 p.m. Ferry service was resumed shortly after midnight.

VIII. THEATRES

Early in April at a meeting attended by Mayor Lloyd, Major Crowell, representatives of the armed services and two theatre managers, the Mayor asked that the theatres "should remain open on V-E Day in the hope that by so doing several thousand people would be kept off the streets". He said, however, that no special police were available to post inside the theatres. No assurance was given that the theatres would remain open, and one of the theatre representatives, who says he told those present that he felt they did not quite realize what the end of the war would mean in the way of celebration, made up his mind that the theatres operated by his company would not be open on that day. All the theatre owners were ultimately of the same opinion and an advertisement was placed in the press, which appeared about a week before May 8th, advising the public that the theatres would close on V-E Day "to permit the employees to join in the celebration of victory". There are nine theatres in Halifax with a capacity of approximately 7,500, and two in Dartmouth with a capacity of approximately 1,400. These last named theatres made the same decision and all theatres in Halifax and Dartmouth remained closed on May 7th and also May 8th.

IX. RESTAURANTS

Early in April, 1945, at a meeting attended by representatives of the restaurateurs, the Chief of Police and Major Crowell, the restaurateurs were urged to remain open on V-E Day. On April 12th the Secretary of the Restaurant Association wrote to the Chief of Police stating that the restaurants would co-operate "to the fullest extent to keep restaurants open that day if at all possible, closing at 8.00 p.m. In view of past experiences, they feel further that help must come from the authorities to keep order. It is requested that three men be posted in each restaurant for the service of \$5.00 which will be paid or donated in some way. The number of restaurants involved will be eighteen. We would appreciate an early reply to enable us to take this up at our next meeting, at which time the list of restaurants will be mailed to you".

On April 28th the Police Chief replied, merely stating that "everything possible will be done by the combined police forces of the services and of the city to render whatever help might be required".

As might be expected, no list of restaurants which would be open was sent to the Chief of Police and the restaurants largely followed the example of the theatres. Out of 55 eating places in Halifax, 16 were open all day on May 7th until various times in the evening, except one which closed at 5.00 p.m.; 27 closed by 2.00 p.m.; the remainder closed between 3.00 and 4.00 p.m. On May 8th 46 were closed all day. Of the remainder, some were open all day. The others closed at various hours from 11.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. The reasons for closing vary all the way from "waitresses walked out", "staff would not come to work", to "windows smashed and store damaged".

In Dartmouth, out of 16 eating places, 8 remained open all day on May 7th, while the others closed at various hours from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. On May 8th, 14 remained closed all day, one closed at 1.00 p.m. because of "sailors and civilians drinking". The other closed at noon because "everyone else closed for holiday".

In Halifax, the evidence shows that 15 hostels were open, while in Dartmouth there was one hostel open. The hostels in Halifax served 7,897 full course meals and 3,991 snacks on May 8th. These figures may be compared with 6,342 meals and 4,090 snacks on Sunday, April 15th, and 4,961 meals and 3,292 snacks on Wednesday, May 2nd.

When asked if he had any suggestion as to why the ratings had rioted as they did, Admiral Murray said that the ratings who came back to their establishments at noon on May 8th for dinner "may have felt resentment in the fact that they had to walk back on a hot day to get a meal in the barracks instead of being able to get it downtown". He said his suggestion was "pure supposition". No inquiry had been made by any naval officer to ascertain what decision the restaurants had ultimately arrived at. It was assumed, from the report of the meeting with the restaurateurs already referred to, that the restaurants would be open. May 8th had been proclaimed a public holiday and May 7th had been treated by most people as a holiday, and it was not unreasonable to expect that the employees of restaurants might wish to have the holiday also.

In my opinion, there is no reasonable basis, on the evidence, for the view that the sailors quartered at *Stadacona* had any resentment over the restaurants being closed, or carried such resentment the length of smashing up blocks of business premises after they themselves had been well fed. It will be remembered that the trouble on May 8th started outside the canteen at *Stadacona* at 1.30 p.m., after the noon day meal.

Admiral Murray's suggestion breaks down also when applied to the occurrences of May 7th. There was no hot walk back from the city that day, even if it could have been proved that the *Stadacona* sailors who started the trouble on May 8th had been downtown that morning at all. However, this was not proved. The cause of the troubles of May 7th and 8th were, in my opinion, the same, namely, lack of planning to occupy the minds and the time of the ratings and keep them from wandering in large parties about the streets.

X. OTHER SUGGESTED CAUSES FOR RIOTS

During the course of the Inquiry, Counsel endeavoured to ascertain from various witnesses whether there was discontent with Halifax conditions, on the part of service personnel, sufficient to establish that the damage done on May 7th was premeditated and in the nature of a *quid pro quo*. A few witnesses did depose to having heard complaints by service personnel, and one or two witnesses deposed to having heard remarks from naval ratings and civilians to the effect that Halifax would have a rough time on V-E Day. There was nothing in what was said at the time which caused those witnesses to report what they had heard, or treat the remarks as anything more than discontent of the particular individuals caused by some unspecified experience. On the other hand, the Intelligence Officers of the R.C.M.P. in Halifax knew nothing of any spirit of discontent on the part of service personnel. None of the naval officers who gave evidence had any knowledge of such a condition. Colonel Clarke, the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal of the Military District, said that, if there had been any rumours of discontent among army personnel, he would have known of it, and he had no such knowledge.

Admiral Murray did say that there was not sufficient accommodation in barracks for naval personnel and for that reason there had to be billets found in the city by the men who could not be put into barracks. (1,178 in the case of *Stadacona*; 400 in the case of *Peregrine*, and about 2,700 in the case of *Scotian*.) He thought there was no dissatisfaction to the extent of the unrest at this condition and that any dissatisfaction was not because of the way the men themselves had to live, but because of conditions under which their wives and families were forced to live. Admiral Murray also said that sufficient provision had not been made for playing fields for the ratings, but he did not think that these matters had any connection with the occurrences of May 7th and 8th. Evidence was tendered as to what had been done in Halifax in the way of entertainment, recreation and welfare of service personnel stationed in the City, mainly by voluntary work, which reached very large proportions. As no satisfactory evidence of the existence of any state of discontent or resentment on the part of service personnel toward the citizens of Halifax had been given, I did not consider it necessary to hear the proffered evidence. It would merely go one step further in establishing lack of basis for discontent. I have no doubt that individuals have had trying experiences in crowded Halifax as other people have experienced discomfort during the war in other crowded centres of population. If there were in fact any underlying discontent or feeling of resentment on the part of service personnel in Halifax on May 7th or 8th, the evidence failed to establish it, or that it had anything to do with the outbreaks.

XI. MERCHANT SAILORS

On May 7th 734 merchant navy men from ships in harbour were ashore in Halifax and on May 8th the figure was 793. A number of places of entertainment for merchant seamen are operated in Halifax by the Navy League. The Merchant Seamen's Club on Hollis St. will accommodate 350 at night and three meals a day are served; beer is served in the wet canteen. On May 7th and 8th the manager estimated the attendance at the Club on these days at between 400 and 500. In addition to this Club, there was in operation a club for Merchant Navy Officers, a club for naval officers and a recreation centre. No trouble was experienced by the League itself with these men on either of the two days.

The Assistant Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. said that, while his intelligence officers had no knowledge of any discontent on the part of naval ratings, they had some reports of discontent by merchant sailors of foreign extraction. This was not enlarged upon in evidence and I am unable to find that it bears any relation to the disorders under investigation. A few merchant sailors were observed in the crowds entering and looting the liquor places and two were seen on the night of May 7th-8th attempting to set fire to premises on Sackville St. by throwing lighted rags through the broken glass of the door. The witness who testified as to this said the fire was extinguished by an army officer and soldier who drove these men away. These men were then seen to run into Granville St. and set fire to other premises there, which was put out by people in the vicinity.

Apart from these incidents, merchant seamen were not involved in the disturbances.

XII. MATERIAL LOSS AND DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL CHARGED WITH OFFENCES

As a result of the two days' disorders, 3,987 cases of beer, 1,225 cases of wine, 2 cases of alcohol and 55,392 quarts of spirits were looted from the establishments of the Liquor Commission in Halifax, and 30,516 quarts of beer from Keith's Brewery, of which 1,140 quarts of spirits, 10 cases of wine and 81 cases of beer were subsequently recovered by the Commission. None was recovered by the Brewery.

In Dartmouth 5,256 quarts of beer, 1,692 quarts of wine and 9,816 quarts of liquor were looted from the Commission, of which 550 bottles were recovered.

I have already indicated the area and nature of the damage to business premises in a general way. I did not understand that I was to investigate the damage in detail. The smashing of glass windows and wanton damage to furniture and fixtures was not limited to premises of merchants. Financial houses and offices on Hollis St. in Halifax were also the object of attacks. In that City 564 firms suffered damage. 2,624 pieces of plate and other glass in these premises were broken and 207 of these firms suffered from looting in some degree. The particulars are set forth in Exhibit 52.

According to the evidence of Wing Commander McCallum, Assistant Provost Marshal for the Eastern Air Command, the number of airmen against whom charges were brought arising out of the disorders was 19 in Halifax and Dartmouth. Of the army, 41 soldiers were charged with various offences from being found in possession of loot to drunkenness and being absent without leave. In three cases the charges were dismissed, four were remanded for further evidence which later it was found could not be adduced. According to Exhibit 51, there were 34 naval ratings arrested on various charges, apart from drunkenness, and 117 civilians. In addition, 152 persons were arrested on May 8th and 9th on charges of drunkenness. The evidence does not establish particulars of the personnel so arrested. In addition, the navy had used its nine trucks on May 8th to pick up intoxicated sailors. Apparently the policy laid in Ex. 72 that no charge was to be laid for drunkenness on V-E Day was not departed from by the navy until the Admiral's signal of May 9th which provided that thereafter drunkenness was to constitute an aggravated offence.

I do not think that there is anything which I can usefully add. My conclusions are all set forth above and I have indicated in the "Table of Contents" where they are to be found.

Respectfully submitted,

R. L. KELLOCK.

July 28th, 1945.